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COALITION GOVERNMENTS IN TURKEY:
"OFFICE-SEEKING OR POLICY-PURSUING?"
A STRUCTURAL APPROACH

A THESIS PRESENTED BY TUNA BASKOY
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
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SEPTEMBER, 1996

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


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ABSTRACT

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A STRUCTURAL APPROACH

TUNA BAŞKÖY

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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This study examines Turkish coalition government experiences to find answer to the question of whether they were office-seeking coalitions or policy-oriented ones. Accordingly, the theoretical framework is proposed to investigate all aspects of the coalitions during the formation and maintenance stages. Situational, compatibility, and motivational variables are taken into account as the factors that influence the composition of the coalitions, their duration and success. Four European country experiences are elaborated briefly so as to show significance of the party system for coalition building and coalition success. After the application of these three variables to the Turkish coalition experiences distribution of seats among the coalition partners and common problems that they faced are also elucidated with reference to the composition of coalitions.

ÖZET

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Bu tez Türkiye'deki koalisyon hükümetlerinin devlet kaynaklarını kontrol etme yada politika üretmek amaçlı hükümet mi oldukları sorusuna cevap vermek için bütün koalisyon deneyimlerini kapsar. Buna paralel olarak teorik çerçeve koalisyon hükümetlerinin bütün yönlerini inceleme amacını gütmektedir. Durumsal, uygunluk, ve motivasyonel değişkenler koalisyonların içeriğini, sürekliliğini, ve başarısını etkileyen faktörler olarak düşünüldü. Parti sisteminin koalisyonların inşası ve başarısı üzerindeki etkilerini göstermek amacıyla dört Avrupa ülkesinin koalisyon deneyimleri özetlendi. Yukarıda belirtilen üç değişken Türkiye'ye uygulandıktan sonra bakanlıkların dağılımı ve koalisyon hükümetlerinin karşılaştığı ortak problemler koalisyonların içeriği referans alınarak incelendi.

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INTRODUCTION

In multiparty democracies political parties compete with each other to attract more constituencies on the basis of their 'proposed program of action explicitly intended to bring about a particular states of the world which can be thought of policies'.¹ The type of election system employed in every country affects the distribution of seats in proportion to votes each party received. There are two types of widely used election systems: simple majority and proportional representation system, and among these two, the proportional representation which includes the list system with d'Hondt calculation method is the most widely used one.²

A political party which won the absolute majority of the parliamentary seats obtains right to form government. If there is such a party either at least two or more parties come together and form a coalition government or some of them may give outside support to a minority government led by a political party or parties. The aim of this thesis is to analyze Turkish coalition government experiences in the light of coalition theories to find out whether Turkish coalition experiences fit into the office-seeking or policy-pursuing categories with possible reasons.

Coalition governments are seen as not beneficial because of the fact that political parties have no capability to fully implement their party programs in order to carry out their policy objectives individually. In this sense, Blondel and Muller-Rommel point out two dimensions of coalition governments as a positive and a negative one.³ On the one

¹A. Laver and W. B. Hunt, *Policy and Party Competitions* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 3.

²According to Lijphart, fourteen out of twenty-two democratic countries use the proportional representation method with the list system. A. Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press), pp. 150-168.

³J. Blondel and F. Muller-Rommel, eds., *Cabinets in Western Europe* (Houndmills: McMillan, 1988), pp. 9-12.

hand, each coalition partner may restraint the arbitrary use of political power by other coalition party(ies), on the other hand, the probability of conflict among coalition partners decrease the policy flexibility of the government, starting during the bargaining stage.

1. POLITICAL PARTIES IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES

Political parties are the only actors in parliamentary democracies that ensure continuation of the system as a whole. For this reason it is essential to elaborate the nature of a political party very briefly. Macridis defines a political party as

an association that activates and mobilizes the people, represents interests, provides for compromise among competing points of view, and becomes ground for political leadership.⁴

It is an essential instrument for gaining political power and governing the country. Political parties integrate various groups through participation, socialization, and mobilization processes. By doing this they also converge various demands and interests of different groups into policy and decisions. That process, in general, is called interest articulation and aggregation. In this way they steer the government machine to implement their particular articulated and aggregated policies which were demanded by their constituencies.

Political parties may be integrative or competitive in their approach to social matters.⁵ Integrative parties are seen especially in one or two party systems for each party claims to represent the interests of the whole nation. Contrary to this, a competitive party seeks the support of a particular section of the society and tries to get as much possible support as it can by developing the best policies to the demands and interests of

⁴R. C. Macridis, 'Introduction', in R. C. Macridis, eds., *Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas* (New York: Harper&Row, 1967), p.9.

⁵Ibid., p.23.

that specific group. Parallel to this idea Epstein uses the concept of 'programmatic party', he claims that minor parties are more programmatic than their larger counterparts.⁶ Social cleavages shape and reshape the party systems in time. These cleavages can be economic, regional, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and rural-urban one. In this understanding, it can be asserted that party systems are the result of existing cleavages in a particular country.⁷

Interests and demands of social groups may change in time. A party with such a constituency must adopt new policies and leave the old attachments. Nevertheless, parties have an image that stems from their past policies and actions. They have sometimes difficulties in dealing with such situations. Because, on the one hand, each party tries to assure its internal policy consistency, on the other hand, if it aims to gain the support of it has to answer the changing demands of its social base so as to win more votes. Macridis adds

thus parties are intermediate institutions- between the unity of government and diversity of the electorate, between the radical minorities of the electorate and the general assumptions, between the acquisition of power and the code of past policies, between the policies of the electorate has supported and the policies necessary for changed conditions.⁸

That kind of an understanding implies the existence of two-way traffic between the ruler and the ruled and that is the core idea of the parliamentary democracy if it is considered as a pyramid built from below and political parties are the only actors that

⁶L. D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies* (New Jersey: Transaction Inc., 1993, second edition), p.264.

⁷S. M. Lipset, 'Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups', in R. C. Macridis, eds., *Political Parties*, p.43. He also corroborates Duverger claim's of the inseparable relation between the electoral system and party system.

⁸Ibid., p.22.

bridge the gap between the citizens and the state. They turn the demands and interests of citizens into government policies.⁹

This is the ideal type of a political party in Weberian sense and its definition in Western European democracies. The situation is somewhat different in transitional and developing societies which recently adopted multiparty democratic system. Because of rapid social change and population increase, political parties are not able to fulfill new demands of various social groups in a competitive party system, having a short history. Since the middle classes, which constitute the largest section of the society in Western democracies, are absent in developing countries, political conflict concentrates at the extremes of the political Left-Right spectrum. Competition among political parties is seen as a 'zero-sum game' which means that the winning party both gains control of the system and seeks to transform it inalterably into its own image'.¹⁰ The party which controls the system uses the state resources to increase its strength among the masses and 'almost inevitable that the party will become above all a channel for patronage and purchase of political support'.¹¹ The reason for this is that political parties have no institutionalized structure. Party officials and parliamentary deputies work as if patrons. Their first aim is to concentrate on short-term benefits rather than long-run policy objectives that pave way to the emergence of political clientelism. It alludes a particular kind of relationship between the two actors that is based on direct exchange of goods.¹² By using scarce resources the patron develops unequal, one-sided relationship that implies inequality of the status and the client is subordinated to the patron's will. Otherwise there is no way to access the services provided by the patron.

⁹S. Neuman, 'Toward a Study of Political Parties', in A. J. Milnor, eds., *Comparative Political Parties* (New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Company, 1971). p. 29.

¹⁰M. Palmer, *Dilemmas of Political Development: An Introduction to the Policies of Developing Areas* (Illinois: E. E. Peacock Publishers, 1989), p.204.

¹¹P. Cammack, D. Pool and W. Tardoff, *Third World Politics: A Comparative Introduction* (London: McMillan, 1989), p. 113.

¹²J. Chub, *Patronage, Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), especially first part of the book.

In developing countries, it is very difficult for any political party to gain majority of parliamentary seats due to the frequent change in composition of constituencies of political parties which stems from heterogeneous and transitional structure of the society. Consequently coalition governments become inevitable. There must be compromise and reconciliation among the political parties as precondition for the formation and the survival of the cabinet coalitions. In the absence of these conditions under the firm and decisive leadership that is able to meet the severe problems the developing countries face, Palmer describes the situation as follows:

.....the longevity of coalition regimes tends to be perilously short, coalition governments often last less than a year, and alignments with the coalition shift even more frequently. Thus, hard but unpopular policies requiring more sacrifice for the sake of economic and political development initiated by one coalition are often softened or reversed by the next political parties.¹³

In the light of this succinct introduction as parallel to the aim of the thesis the first chapter covers the review of coalition theories and theoretical framework, the second chapter, the experiences of the four European countries. While the third chapter concentrates on Turkish coalition governments that subsume all experiences to substantiate whether they were office-seekers or policy-pursuers coalitions the conclusion evaluates the overall findings.

¹³M. Palmer, *Dilemmas of political Development*, p.208.

CHAPTER I

CABINET COALITIONS

Political parties are the sole actors that are competing with each other to acquire as many seats as possible so as to form the cabinet and hence to control instrumentalities of the government individually. Qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the party system become significant during the coalition formation stage. There are different classifications of party systems but as relevant to the topic of this thesis it is enough to mention here three names like Blondel, Sartori, and Laver and Schoffield. Blondel makes distinction, on one hand, between two party systems and two-and-a-half party systems, on the other hand, between the multiparty systems with a dominant party and without a dominant party. Sartori distinguishes four categories: two party systems; multiparty systems with moderate pluralism whose prominent traits are limited fragmentation and moderate centripetal competition; multiparty systems with polarized pluralism that are characterized by the existence of high number of parties with centrifugal tendencies due to the ideological polarization; and finally predominant party systems.¹

Laver and Schofield identify three types of party system with reference to the number of political parties, their size, and their relative position on the ideological

¹G. Sartori, 'European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism', in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), and P. Mair, 'Political Parties and the Stabilization of Party Systems', in P. Mair, eds., *West European Party Systems* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p17-19. Whereas Duverger makes distinction between two party systems and multiparty systems Almond, by emphasizing qualitative aspects the multiparty systems, draws a line between 'working' multiparty systems and 'non-working' or 'immobilist' multiparty systems. In addition to these Rokkan distinguishes between even multiparty systems with three or more parties having approximately equal size and a dominant party with three or more small parties and two big parties with one small party.

spectrum.² These are bipolar party systems; unipolar party systems; and multipolar party systems. According to them, the first one includes two big parties and a smaller party which holds the power, and depending on its decision government swings from one pole to another like the German and Austrian party systems. The second one comprises a large party and several smaller ones as seen in Luxembourg, Ireland, Iceland, Norway(1945-1971) and Sweden.³ But the third system consists of parties with different numbers and effective size. Coalition bargaining becomes complex and difficult. The Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Italy take place within the third category.⁴

1. 1. REVIEW OF COALITION THEORIES

It is possible to make distinction between two groups of scholars according to the criterion they put into the heart of their theories. Riker, Gamson, Leiserson and Axelrod can be put into the first category, De Swaan, Budge and Keman, Laver and Schofield into the second one. Whereas the former perceive the coalition parties' gains in terms of government portfolios as the only factor that determines a party's decision whether to include in a specific coalition or not, the latter sees party policy as the only motive during the coalition bargaining.

The idea that underlies the core of 'office-seeking' coalition theories is stemming from the game theory. The theory assumes the existence of a rational actor who 'is the one that acts so as to maximize his utility function'.⁵ Von Neumann and Morgenstern contributed to the theories of coalition by developing their game theory that necessitates the existence of at least two rational actors as described above, some conditions such as zero-sum gains, and easy access to the information about other actors. In other words,

²M. Laver and N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 114.

³Ibid., p. 114.

⁴Ibid., 116.

⁵A. De Swaan, *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations* (San Fransisco and Washington: Jossey-Bass Inc. , 1973), p.20.

since the aim of all participants is alike, every possible act and fixed gains must be known by all participants in a way that participants can develop strategies to maximize their gains and hence to reduce the cost.⁶ The theory is an n-person constant-sum games which means that rational actors do not want to share the fixed prizes with an unnecessary actor or actors after assuring that their coalition is winning. In other words, actors try to form winning coalitions which do not contain unnecessary members. This type of coalition is a 'minimal-winning' one because it does not contain such members, the subtraction of a single actor means that the coalition can no longer assure its winning status.

For further clarification of this theory of minimal-winning coalition Riker and Gamson inserted the 'size' principle into the theory and the former argued that

in n-person, zero-sum games, where side-payments are permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions occur.⁷

The size, here, ascribes the weight of the parties or their deputy number. Simply he argues that parties prefer to enter into a coalition with a party or parties that have necessary number of seats in order to win the confidence vote and no more. He also provides an explanation for the formation of surplus majority coalitions with the help of his concept, 'information effect'. He stated that depending on the number of parties

..the greater the degree of imperfection or incompleteness of information, the larger will be the coalitions that coalition makers seek to form and the more frequently will winning coalitions actually formed be greater than minimum size.⁸

⁶W. H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962, second edition), pp.14-15.

⁷Ibid., p. 32.

⁸W. H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, pp.88-89.

According to Gamson, parties share the coalition payoffs proportional to the resources, i.e., number of deputies they contributed to the coalition.⁹ However, in some situations number of the political parties with unequal weight may be higher which implies that coalitions to be formed have to include more actors. Leiserson provides an explanation for these situations by advancing his theory of 'bargaining proposition'. He claims that

winning coalitions with the fewest members form,....since negotiations and bargaining are easier to complete, and a coalition is easier to hold together, other things being equal, with fewer parties.¹⁰

There appears a problem about how parties choose their possible coalition partners if there are several parties with the equal weight. Leiserson gives an answer to this question by introducing the concept, 'ideology'. In such situations actors try to form coalitions with a party or parties, having the most similar ideologies.¹¹ For further specification Axelrod proposed a closely related theory that predicts 'minimal connected winning coalitions'. The term 'connected' is used for coalitions that consist of parties which are adjacent on the policy scale.¹² Coalitions that are made up of adjacent parties are called 'closed coalitions'. Again, here, size is the determining factor.

Up to now either the number of political parties or their size and sometimes both of them determine the composition of coalitions, however party ideology remained as an auxiliary variable. As an overall evaluation it can be claimed in the light of these theories that political parties form coalitions to procure payoffs rather than to achieve party policies. Such theories could not provide explanations for grand coalitions, or minority governments.

⁹A.De Swaan, *Coalition Theories*, p.63.

¹⁰M. Leiserson, 'Coalition Government in Japan', in S. Groennings, E. W. Kelley, and M. Leiserson, eds., *The Study of Coalition Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970), p.90.

¹¹M. Leiserson, 'Power and Ideology in Coalition Behavior: An Experimental Study', in S. Groennings et al., eds., *The Study of Coalition Behavior*, p.

¹²A. De Swaan, *Coalition Theories*, p.75.

In order to surmount this deficiency and to provide an explanation for the formation of grand coalitions or minority governments De Swaan advanced his 'policy distance' theory. He claims that

an actor strives to bring about and be included in a winning coalition with an expected policy that is as close as possible to his own most preferred policy.¹³

With this radical shift, quantitative restrictions disappeared provided that fifty plus one per cent of the parliamentary seats are secured by the partners. However, party policy became the determining factor for the composition of the cabinets. Its further implication is that political parties' perception of the government ministries also changed. They were started to be seen as means for implementation of party policies.

In real life settings the situation is somewhat different and more complex than those theories imply. For this reason it is essential to build a theoretical tool that enables one to understand all influencing factors during the formation as well as the maintenance stage. By doing this the factors that lead to the disintegration of coalitions can be discerned without missing any relevant aspect.

1. 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As the sole actors political parties can only bargain each other to set cabinet coalitions. Coalition government may be defined as a group of political parties that come together by pooling their resources to act common policy objectives stated in their coalition protocol through exercising control over the shared government apparatus of the state¹⁴ This definition implies the existence of two stages: coalition formation and its maintenance. Questions to be asked here may be: why a particular coalition is formed

¹³Ibid., p.98.

¹⁴E. C. Browne, *Coalition Theories: A Logical and Empirical Critique* (California: Sage Publications, 1973), p.14.

rather than other possible other alternatives? and which factors do influence coalition maintenance?.

It seems appropriate to define some frequently used concepts in coalition theories before elaborating the theoretical framework. These concepts are as follow: 'core', 'center party', 'pivotal party', and captive party'.

The notion 'core' refers to a position or a space that lies at the center of the policy space. a center party is a party that occupies the area or the center along the Left-Right continuum. It is more humanitarian in social and economic matters, more tolerant than the Left in matters of religion simultaneously, though it is less tolerant to co-operation with the socialist and communist parties.¹⁵ Its constituency is made up of petite bourgeoisie and small shopkeepers in addition to the industrial working classes and big industrialists.¹⁶ Factions with different policy orientation provide policy flexibility through alternation of control of a particular faction to the overall party machine for some time like Italian Christian Democratic Party(DC), or Belgian Christian-Social Party(CVP/PSC). The center party is 'ready to cooperate with all responsible forces and at times pleading for a 'broadly based government' or even a 'national coalition' '.¹⁷ According to De Swaan, the core policy position always exists and it is an area where the stable solution for coalition formation lies. As parallel to this idea Sartori suggests that 'a center opinion, or a center tendency always exists in politics; what may not exist a center party'.¹⁸ For stable coalitions the center party which occupies the core policy position is necessary.¹⁹ In the absence of this type of a party or parties, or if the core is empty, other

¹⁵D. Pickles, *Government and Policy of France* (London: Methuen, 1972, vol.1), p. 169

¹⁶W. Safran, *The French Polity* (New York: Longman, 1985, second edition).

¹⁷A. De Swaan, *Coalition Theories*, p. 109.

¹⁸G. Sartori, 'European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism', in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princetoxon University Press, 1966), p.156.

¹⁹Laver and Schofield claim that in multidimensional policy space, in contrast to unidimensional space, only the largest party may occupy the core policy position. Small parties have no such chance. M. Laver and N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government*, p.134.

parties with different policy objectives gain strategic importance and the process of coalition formation becomes complex and hence the formed coalition, as a result, may be fluctuating, unstable and short-lived due to the lack of stable membership. Budge and Keman briefly describe the repercussions of the absence of the center party at the governmental level as such that

government policy fluctuating with changes of coalition; acrimonious disputes within the coalition and a possibility of total immobility to agree on any stable policy. There is a further implication from the point of view of normative democratic theory that policy solutions will be arbitrary, products of chance conjunctions of circumstances, rather than cohering around an equilibrium point produced by the electoral and legislative success of the parties.²⁰

A 'pivotal party' is a party in a minimal winning coalition that ceases to be winning if that party withdraws from the coalition.²¹ In other words, it is a key party for the coalition. On the other hand, a 'captive party' is an extremist party that can be excluded from the government and hence has no capability to propose coalition options, rather it is heavily dependent on the decision of other parties. A captive party has desire to participate in the cabinet coalitions. The initiator party plays the card of inclusion of it against the pivotal party in order to reduce the latter's bargaining power. In addition to this, moderate parties may follow accommodative strategies to alleviate the negative public opinion by including it into the coalition. However the latter insists on minimal winning coalitions because they have no chance to play off one actor against another so as to turn power balances for its advantage within the coalition.²²

²⁰I. Budge and H. Keman, *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 22.

²¹W. H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, p. 125.

²²S. Groennings, 'Notes Toward Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance', in S. Groennings et al., eds, *The Study of Coalition Behavior*, p. 451.

Political parties may perceive office or policy in different manners. By using these two criteria Laver and Schofield distinguish four types of parties. Political parties may see office as an end in itself or as a means to achieve policy objectives. They may also develop policies as a means to gain office or for their own sake.²³

To answer the two questions that have been mentioned earlier-why the particular coalitions are formed rather than other possible alternatives? and how are coalitions maintained after the formation?, the coalition formation and maintenance stages should be treated separately for achieving a better understanding.

According to Groennings the time period in which coalition formation process is activated, causal relations between actors and the relative importance of the coalition to the actors determine the composition of coalitions.²⁴ Parallel to these three factors situational, compatibility and motivational variables influence each party's willingness to participate or not in a particular coalition.

1. 2. 1. SITUATIONAL VARIABLES

Situational variables include economic, political, and social characteristics of the time period in which a particular coalition is formed. Number of political parties, the location of political parties on the policy scale i.e., whether they are center, pivotal or captive parties, are also included within the situational variables. Keman and Budge propose three general assumptions that are related to the location of parties during the bargaining stage. These are:

1. When no party secures the parliamentary majority, parties that can win the confidence vote create a cabinet coalition so as to implement their most preferred policies;

²³M. Laver and N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government*, p. 38-39.

²⁴S. Groennings, 'Notes Toward Theories', p. 450.

2.a. In democratic systems, since the ultimate aim of political parties is to secure the democratic life they do not accept to enter into a coalition with anti-system parties;

2.b. If there is no anti-systemic threat, parties try to form a coalition by considering the line of socialist-bourgeois division;

2.c. If there is no such division each party follows its own interests;²⁵

Political parties usually have several factions. While they unite during the emergency situations like during the election and coalition bargaining times, and if there is an outside threat to the integrity of the party they try to control the party and if the party is a governing one they try to transform their policy preferences into government policies.

Situational variables also deal with cultural values and norms about the political issues that influence the degree of willingness of the parties to negotiate. Therefore public opinion as an external pressure over their decisions plays a significant role in Western democratic societies. Pragmatic party constituencies encourage the politics of compromise. But they may be suspicious of some coalition partners. Groennings argue that parties may represent positive and negative attitudes during the formation stage.²⁶ In contrast to the former that consist of behaviors like rationality, willingness to experiment, senses of thrust, tolerance, and pragmatism, the latter concentrate on senses of suspicion, parochialism, superiority, and self-righteousness, craving for contradiction, and an outlook that compromise is a sign of weakness. However, when the situation became enduring parties feel a great pressure to coalesce with the party or parties in contrast to the normal times.²⁷

²⁵I. Budge and H. Keman, *Parties and Democracy*, p. 34.

²⁶S. Groennings, 'Notes Toward Theories', p. 453.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 454.

1. 2. 2. COMPATIBILITY VARIABLES

These variables represent particular features of parties that support or discourage partnership among parties. The related proposition is that high degree of similarity among the compatibility variables of different parties increases chance of the creation of a coalition. Party ideology, or similar goals, their social bases, party structure, leadership, and prior party relations can be counted within this category.

Those actors with similar ideology or common policy goals are more likely to form a coalition if such things have priority for them. Another factor related to compatibility is the party structure because there is a positive relationship between the degree of centralization and party elites' decision to coalesce with other parties, especially with the unwanted one, and to continue the partnership if they are in the same coalition. The existence of factions means organized dissensus within the party and weak institutionalization makes the situation difficult for party elites' to decide whether or not to enter into a coalition with a particular party.

Leadership variable deals with the similarities between the party leaders, their response to the pressure coming from party supporters and their constituencies.²⁸

Prior party relations play decisive role over decisions of the actors during the coalition bargaining stage as such that traditional animosities and historical experiences reduce the chance of making a coalition. Prior coalition success or failure either increases or decreases the available number of parties and hence coalition options.²⁹

²⁸Ibid., 454.

²⁹Ibid., p. 455.

1. 2. 3 MOTIVATIONAL VARIABLES

Motivational variables deeply affect a party's decision to or not to enter into a coalition during the bargaining stage. All parties have constituencies and they promise their supporters to implement particular policies before elections. Voters measure their success by looking at the criterion like to what degree they fulfill their promises once they are in power. Voters decide whether to punish or reward in the subsequent elections by looking at their policy performance.

In general there are two motives that parties have to take into consideration: the desire to gain rewards and desire to assure a party's survival or avoidance of party identity loss. Rewards may be 'positions, policies, and depriving one's worst enemy of control'.³⁰ In addition to these, legitimacy for the extremist parties and public recognition for the smaller parties are very vital motivations. There is a positive relation between the immediate need to rewards and the party's desire to take part in a coalition. The anticipated positions of parties and number of political parties also influence a party's decision.

Parties having the same ideology or similar goals do not want to create a coalition among themselves, especially small parties escape from such a partnership because of fear of being swallowed up by the big partner. The reason for this unwillingness is that they are competitors for the same constituency. Small parties also avoid making coalitions with the big partner due to the fear of remaining under the shadow of the

³⁰Ibid., p. 456.

latter.³¹ They accept the participation only on the condition that they get as many government portfolios as they can get. If their position on the policy scale does not allow such a chance they want to set up a coalition that also includes small partners besides a big one in order to alleviate such a danger. Extremist parties prefer to create coalitions with the nearest party and with the minimal number of parties in which they have the greatest weight to control the policy direction of the coalition.³²

1. 3. DISTRIBUTION OF MINISTRIES

Coalition payoffs are important for both policy-pursuing and office-seeking coalition partners. Distribution has two dimensions: quantitative and qualitative. Gamson's theory of proportional distribution is true for only coalitions which include either parties with different sizes or parties with almost equal size in normal situations. But this balance seems to skew toward pivotal and small parties in unstable and competitive bargaining situations because the largest party or parties become dependent on the smaller ones.

Browne proposes two reasons why the small parties usually extract bonus or extra ministries from their big partner.³³ The first one is that they are pivotal parties in the sense that the fate of coalition depends on their decision which gives them psychological power. Secondly, larger parties prefer small ones as they give them a chance to control the government's policy direction without any restrictions. So the bigger party gives extra or bonus ministries to the smaller ones as long as the latter do not challenge its leadership position in the government and does not harm its control over the flow of government

³¹A. Panebianco, *Political parties: Power and Organization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

³²A. De Swaan, 'An Empirical Model of Coalition Formation in N-Person Game of Policy Distance Minimization', in S. Groennings et al., *The Study of Coalition Behavior*, p. 429.

³³E. C. Browne, *Coalition Theories: A Logical and Empirical Critique* (California: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 56.

policy.³⁴ When the number of small parties increases the party with the greater size has to distribute more portfolios which means the loss of its leadership position. Then it gives up such a claim and becomes more reluctant to give extra portfolios. The distribution, then, becomes proportional to the percentage of seats each party contributed to the coalition.³⁵

In terms of qualitative dimension generally the party with the greatest weight gets the premiership, internal and foreign affairs, finance, education, and finally defense.³⁶ Each coalition partner desires to control particular ministry or ministries so as to implement party policies.³⁷ Whereas Left-wing parties control spending or distributive ministries, like labor, health, social affairs, and construction, Liberal and Conservative parties have desire to get ministries related to economy such as finance, industry, and also internal affairs. The Ministry of Education is the most controversial one during the coalition bargaining because whether they are religious, liberal, or leftist parties they all want to control that ministry in order to teach and disseminate their particular party philosophies.

1. 4. COALITION MAINTENANCE AND TERMINATION

Coalition parties prepare a coalition protocol at the end of the bargaining in order to draw borders of their actions during their rule. They do avoid discussing issues that might cause coalition breakdown. At the initial stage, they also establish coordination mechanisms and several sub-committees below the cabinet level to regulate internal communication among the coalition partners.³⁸ The fate of the coalition depends, to some

³⁴Ibid., p. 58.

³⁵Ibid., P. 64..

³⁶M. Laver and N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government*, p. 169.

³⁷I. Budge and H. Keman, *Parties and Democracy*, p.53.

³⁸J. E. Schwarz, 'Maintaining Coalitions: An Analysis of the EEC with Supporting Evidence from the Austrian Coalitions and the CDU/CSU', in S. Groennings et al., eds., *The Study of Coalition Behavior*, p. 245.

extent, on the existence of the common decision-making mechanism because coalition parties are assumed to have reciprocal responsibilities, and also assumed to make decisions unanimously to reach policy goals stated in the coalition protocol.

They know that they cannot fulfill their individual policy promises due to the lack of parliamentary majority. They give up some part of individual party goals in order to reach an agreement. When the number of parties increases each partner has to make more concessions that may lead to the loss of party constituency. Another point that has influence over the coalition maintenance is that extremist or captive parties have to make either more policy concessions in comparison to those of their moderate partners or have to withdraw from the coalition.³⁹ The reason for this is that local party elites are 'inclined to be the most interested in the maintenance of purity of position for the sake of showing a distinct profile to the electorate and at least appreciative of logrolling concomitants'.⁴⁰ Local party governors have an immediate chance to observe reaction of their constituency to the actions of the party at the governmental level. There may be a gap between what they promised and what they are doing in the government. Nevertheless, party elites try to do the best for the country rather than immediate fulfilling of their constituencies' wishes. When the party has an institutionalized structure it is easy to keep the whole party organization as united.

Coalition partners follow some strategies toward each other during the bargaining as well as the maintenance period. These are bargaining, persuasion, and broker strategies.

Confrontation among partners does not generally emerge immediately after the formation. In the first stage they prepare legislation and implement common policies. It is something like a 'honeymoon period'. In the second stage there may appear some minor disputes among the partners; they overcome these disputes either through

³⁹M. Duverger, *Political Parties* (London: Methuen, 1964, third edition), P. 336.

⁴⁰S. Groennings, 'Notes Toward Theories', p.462.

persuasion or through broker role of the party leaders. In contrast to the first two stages in the third stage, especially when a general election is approaching major confrontations can be expected because parties try to fulfill their *raison d'être* policy goals to become a responsible party in the eyes of their constituency, they even break the coalition.⁴¹

Parties may continue the partnership if there are no better available coalition options. Withdrawal cost also affects a party's decision to remain or withdraw from the coalition. In order to avoid such a public punishment every party avoids from breaking the coalition if there is no 'outrageous injustice or failure to achieve any major goal'.⁴²

Governments are terminated in such occasions: when there is a formal resignation, when the party composition of the government changes, when the Prime Minister resigns or when there is a new general election.⁴³ The degree of compatibility and similarity of party goals determine the fate of the coalitions like internal policy disagreement and the fear of identity loss. Success also leads to termination of a coalition because, according to Budge and Keman,

when a party feels it can capitalize on its record so as to gain vote or limit losses, and when it has the premiership, with the ability to call an election at will, then it will do this the better to pursue long-term policy objectives by consolidating its policy position.⁴⁴

All these three variables indicate that multifarious factors influence the formation of a specific coalition. Before investigating Turkish coalition experiences it seems better to elaborate coalition experiences from Western European democracies.

⁴¹ibid., p.464.

⁴²Ibid., p.463.

⁴³I. Budge and H. Keman, *Parties and Democracy*, p. 166. Dodd does not use the Resignation of Prime Minister as a relevant criterion as a relevant criterion rather he uses a criterion of reallocation of government portfolios among the coalition partners. L. C. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), P. 213.

⁴⁴I. Budge and H. Keman, *Parties and Democracy*, p. 59.

CHAPTER II

EUROPEAN COALITION EXPERIENCES

This chapter concentrates on selected examples of European coalition governments. Laver and Schofield distinguish four types according to their perception of policy and office. They may see:

1. The office as an end in itself;
2. The office as a means to influence the government policies;
3. The policy as a means to control the office;
4. The policy as an end in itself.¹

In the light of this theoretical framework, Laver and Budge put the Irish and Italian political parties into the first category, the Norwegian, German, Lukembourgian, and Israelian parties into the second one, French parties during the Fourth Republican period into the third one, and finally the Swedish, Danish, Belgian, and again French parties during the 1946-58 period into the fourth category².

It seems appropriate to elaborate individual country experiences according to De Swaan's definition of a coalition government to make clear each party's perception of the coalition membership as appropriate to the thesis's subject matter. He argues that

coalitions emerge from the interaction among actors each of which strives to bring about and join a coalition that he expects to adopt a policy which is as close as possible to his own most preferred policy.³

As parallel to what this definition implies, it is necessary to follow a specific path which includes several criteria in examining the individual country experiences

¹ M. J. Laver, and N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The politics of Coalition in Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p 39.

² See M. J. Laver, and I. Budge, (1992), p.414.

³ A. De Swaan, *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments after 1918* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1973), p. 82.

after summarizing the general feature of coalition experience of each country, the author applies the following common criteria to each country to find out the differences among the political actors that are acting in different party systems and in social and economic conditions. These criteria are

- i. Number of parties within the existing party system;
- ii. Position of the parties within the particular party system (e.g. pivotal parties or captive parties);
- iii. Party strategies (including constraints, prior party relations, motivation e.g. desire to gain rewards, or self-preservation or to remain in opposition);
- iv. Party structure (e.g. unified or having fractions);
- v. Party ideology and party goals.

I chose one country from each category just mentioned above which are Italy, Norway, France, and Belgium.

2. 1. ITALY

The Italian case shows four significant tendencies in the post-war period, the last of which ended recently when the newly formed Social Democratic Party won the absolute majority of seats in the parliament after 48 years of coalition dominance in Italian politics.⁴ These tendencies are centrism (1948-1963), center-left coalitions (1963-1976), national solidarity one (1976-1979), and pentapartito coalitions (1979-1996).⁵ The first four coalitions that were brought about by De Gasperi comprised all parties in 1946 due to 'high valuation of national consensus at the time of foundation of the Republic'. After expelling the Communist Party(PC) from the government in 1947

⁴The Christian Democratic Party(DC) gained absolute majority at the end of the 1948 general elections.

⁵These distinctions were made by A. Mastropaolo, and M. Slater, 'Party Policy and Coalition Bargaining in Italy, 1948-1987: Is There Order Behind the Chaos?' in M. J. Laver, and I. Budge, eds. *Party Policy and Coalition Government* (London: St Martin's Press, 1992).

Table 2. 1. ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS 1946-1987

Prime Minister	Date in	Parties in Government
Parri	06. 1945	Action Party, DC, PCI, PLI, PSI, PDL
De Gasperi I	02. 1946	DC, PCI, PSI, Action Party, PDL, PLI.
De Gasperi II	07. 1946	DC, PCI, PSI, PLI, PRI
De Gasperi III	02. 1947	DC, PCI, PSI
De Gasperi IV	05. 1947	DC, PLI,
De Gasperi V	05. 1948	DC, PSDI, PLI, PRI
De Gasperi VI	01. 1950	DC, PSDI, PRI (abstention from PLI)
De Gasperi VII	07. 1951	DC, PRI(abstention from PSDI, PLI)
De Gasperi VIII	07. 1953	DC(external support from PRI)
Pella	08. 1953	DC(external support from PRI, PLI, and Mon)
Fanfani I	01. 1954	DC(government without vote of confidence)
Scelba	02. 1954	DC, PSDI, PLI(external support from PRI)
Segni I	07. 1955	DC, PSDI, PLI (external support of PRI)
Zoli	05. 1957	DC,(exter. support from Monarchists and MSI)
Fanfani II	02. 1959	DC, PSDI (external support from PRI)
Segni II	02. 1960	DC(external support from PLI, PMP,PNM,MSI)
Tambroni	03. 1960	DC(external support from MSI)
Fanfani III	07. 1960	DC(external support from PSDI, PRI)
Fanfani IV	02. 1962	DC, PSDI, PRI(external support from PSI)
Leone I	06. 1963	DC(abstention from PSI, PSDI, PRI)
Moro I	12. 1963	DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Moro II	07. 1964	DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI.
Moro III	02. 1966	DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Leone II	06. 1968	DC(abstention from PSU, PRI)
Rumor I	12. 1968	DC, PSU, PRI
Rumor II	08. 1969	DC(ex supp. from PSI, PSDI, absten. of PRI)
Rumor III	03. 1970	DC,PSI, PDSI, PRI,
Colombo	08. 1970	DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Andreotti I	02. 1972	DC(external support from PRI, PSDI, PLI)
Andreotti II	07. 1972	DC, PSDI, PLI(ext support from PRI)
Rumor IV	07. 1973	DC, PSI, PDSI, PRI
RumorV	03. 1973	DC, PSI, PDSI external support from PRI)
Moro IV	02. 1976	DC, PRI,(external support from PSI, PSDI)
Moro V	02.1976	DC(external support from PSDI)
Andreotti III	07. 1976	DC(abst. from PCI, PSI, PSDI, PLI, PRI)
Andreotti IV	03. 1978	DC(external support from PCI, PSI)
Andreotti V	03. 1979	DC, PSI ,PRI(gover. without vote of conf)
Cossiga I	08. 1979	DC, PSI, PRI(abstention from PSI, PRI)
Cossiga II	04. 1980	DC, PSI, PRI
Forlani I	10. 1980	DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI
Spadolini I	06. 1981	PRI, DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI
Spadolini II	08. 1982	PRI, DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI

Fanfani V	12. 1982	DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI(abstention from PRI)
Craxi I	08. 1983	PSI, DC, PSDI, PRI, PLI
Craxi II	08. 1986	PSI, DC, PSDI, PRI, PLI
Fanfani VI	04. 1987	DC(gov. without vote of confidence)
Goria I	07. 1987	DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI
De Mita	04.1988	DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI

Party names: DC: Christian Democratic Party; PCI: Italian Communist Party; PSI: Italian Socialist Party; PLI: Italian Liberal Party; PRI: Italian Republican Party; PDI: Italian Democratic Party (Monarchist); PSDI: Social Democratic Party; PSU: United Socialist Party(a fusion of PSI and PSDI); Source: J. Blondel, (1988).

with the support of the Catholic Church, the United States, and the Confindustria (Confederation of Industries), the Christian Democratic Party (DC) obtained an absolute majority of the seats. The significant actors were the DC as the dominant actor in all Italian coalitions after the war, the Liberal Party(PLP), the Social Democratic Party(PSDI) and the Republican Party(PRI).⁶ These small parties either took part directly in the post-war coalitions or they supported the DC minority coalitions with other small parties like the Italian Social Movement(MSI) and the national Monarchist Party(PNP).⁷

The right-wing faction within the DC was successful in preventing the acceptance of the PCI and the PSI as eligible coalition partners, but at the same time it resisted the demands of a group within the party for setting up a coalition with the Rightist parties until the attempt of the Tambroni government. It was supported by the MSI. That action resulted in massive popular hostility against his government in 1960. As a counterbalance to this faction, the Moro faction, a leftist faction within the DC, was trying to bring about its plan of opening to the Left by including the PSI and DC within the same cabinet. They finally achieved this aim in 1963. This newly formed government was the first majority government within the six years.

In the second period, governments were rather stable and they gave priority to reform many government institutions and to start a new wave of industrialization. But

⁶The PSDI split from the Italian Socialist Party in 1949.

⁷The Nationalist Social Movement was neo-fascist party that saw itself as a heir of the defunct Fascist Party.

these projects were hampered by the political opposition and the recession in the world economy in the mid-1960s. Both parties lost votes to the parties that stood on their left and right. During this period, although the PSI merged with the PSDI in 1966 to form the United Socialist Party(PSU) they again split in 1969 when they could not represent good performance in the 1968 general election due to the growing pressure of the PCI at the local as well as the national level. In the aftermath of 1968 events the Moro faction was replaced by a right-wing faction and the DC distanced itself from the Left by approaching the Rightist parties. This tendency reached its peak when the DC lost votes in the referendum on divorce and abortion.

Oil crisis and economic recession that resulted in social unrest and growing terrorism led the DC to seek new coalition partners which was essential for widening the social basis of the government. For this reason, hoping to take part in the subsequent coalitions finally, the PCI gave an external support to the DC minority governments in the third period. As the PCI obtained no concession from the DC and started losing its votes, it withdrew its support from the DC minority government after the assassination of Aldo Moro in 1979.

The new period is characterized as pentapartito coalitions with no common policy ground among the coalition partners. Mastropaolo and Slater describe this period as

no programmatic base existed for the collaboration of the five parties of this pentapartito coalition, payoffs were almost exclusively ministerial posts and political nominations to the sottogoverno.⁸

The DC was a government party without interruption because of its pivotal role in coalition bargaining until recently. The source of its role comes from both its electoral strength and position on the ideological spectrum which has always been in the

⁸M. J. Laver and I. Budge, eds., *Party Policy and Government Coalitions* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 315.

center. Small parties were captive parties because of the fact that they either had to take part in coalitions or to remain in the opposition. This fluctuated from time to time, depending on the dominance of a specific faction to the decision-making mechanism of the DC. They had no role that could affect the composition of the coalition. The existence of the small parties on the Left and on the Right gave the DC an opportunity to play off one against another. In other words, small parties created a space for the DC to act independently without any constraints during the bargaining which was the case especially after the exclusion of the PCI from the government in 1947 as the second largest party in the Italian party system. All these meant that the fate of all the remaining parties, including the PSI, was dependent on the DC's strategy which was in turn tied to dominance of the particular faction within the party according to changing social, political, and economic circumstances.

Except for the PCI, the DC and the PSI, as the influential actors in Italian politics, had several factions, each of which is called 'correnti' in Italian language. The DC, according to Laver and Schofield, 'is more a coalition of factions than a party.'⁹ Leader of the each faction chose its candidates which reinforced the continuation of the loose structure of the DC. It was not a unitary actor, rather a combination of various factions with different policy targets.

Likewise, the PSI, as the member of most of the coalitions since 1963, split in 1949 when Saragat socialists departed from the party to create the PSDI and recombined to form the United Socialist Party(PSU) in 1966. The fusion lasted only three years when the PSDI left the party after the failure in the 1968 elections. Though Craxi, the leader of the PSI in the 1980s, reduced the number of factions within the party, conflict at the personal level remained much the same, according to Jacobs.¹⁰ It

⁹M. J. Laver and N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.231.

¹⁰F. Jacobs, 'Italy', in F. Jacobs, eds. *European Political Parties: A Comprehensive Guide* (Essex: Longman, 1989).

can be argued that party factions were one of the significant variables in Italian politics of coalition. In order to draw attention to this variable, Laver and Schofield quoted the following paragraph:

All factions must be accommodated in the government. When a new governing coalition is formed, the twenty-six or more cabinet seats and the sixty or more sub-cabinet posts are distributed not only by party but by party factions.....Moreover, because factions extend their power out of the party and into the governing institutions, disagreements among them are carried into the government itself. As a result, governments have been completely paralyzed and on occasion half have fallen because of fictional disputes.¹¹

By taking the existence of competing factions into account, it is possible to summarize the DC's ideology and goals. The DC did not have a specific party ideology in the sense of the PCI or the MSI during its coalition partnership. Rather it functioned more as a power broker than pursuing particular party policies. It was a catch-all party with the Left and Right-wing factions. Dominance of the Right-wing or Left-wing faction to the party changed coalition partners. This meant that it had the capability to follow any economic policy. In terms of economic policies, it has always followed pragmatic policies because of its nature as a catch-all party in the absence of a particular party ideology that could steer its economic policies. According to Jacobs, whereas the party expanded role of the state and adopted expansionary economic policies during the domination of the Moro faction and its coalition with the Socialist parties in the 1960s it followed laissez-faire economic policies in the 1980s.

The existence of several factions meant that the party had to fulfill demands of the various groups simultaneously. It had also Social Christian, and trade union wings through which it provided state assistance and state investments in the Southern, poorer

¹¹M. Laver and N. Schofield, (1990), p.231.

part of the country. The party had to expand the state machinery to provide better living standards to those people in this part of the country which required the state intervention. During its coalition with the PSI they nationalized electricity, for example. Moreover, the party took decisions such as indexation of wages, strict rent controls.¹²

Though its name implies a religious party, it has been more like a non-confessional party with a Catholic faction. In the absence of a conservative party, having definite religious ideology on the right of the DC most of the Italian conservatives voted for the DC. Another indicator of the DC as the non-confessional party is that it formed coalitions with the lay parties in different times rather than selecting them according to the religious criterion. Factions, as representing different segments of society, created paradoxical situation for the party. On the one hand, the party could not behave as a unitary actor, on the other hand it has reached every part of society and maintained its permanent social support. Allum describes the DC as

the dominant bourgeois party, with political power as its chief aim. Power is required not to implement a specific policy but rather to prevent others from doing anything to which it, the Church and the great economic groups would be opposed.¹³

In short, the DC, as a pivotal party that was on the center of the political spectrum, maintained equilibrium until the recent elections by not leaving free space to any actor to spoil the balance. Rather, intra-party factional balances determined the party policy and hence its coalition partners.

¹²F. Jacobs, (1989), p.179.

¹³P. A. Allum, *Italy: Republic Without Government?* (New York, Norton, 1973), p.229.

2. 2. NORWAY

Before explaining the structure of coalition governments in Norway, it is useful to summarize the particular features of the Scandinavian party system that consists of countries like Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.

Predominant cleavage in three countries has been socio-economic one for years. The existence of three traditional parties - Liberal, Conservative and Social Democratic parties- as the effective ones depicts this reality. The addition of the Communist and Agrarian parties increased the number of parties from three to five in the 1920s. The situation remained the same until 1970s with the exception of appearance of the Christian People's Party as an advocator of religious and cultural values in Norway in 1933. The aftermath of the referendum on whether or not to enter into the European Economic Community in the 1970s caused an increase in the number of parties from six to eight in Norway, and from five to ten in Denmark.¹⁴ The political cleavage has had two axes in the Scandinavian party system: one has been the ideological cleavage e.g. Left-Right spectrum and the other has focused on rural-urban issues though it did not have much significance, in general. So there has been bifurcation of the political parties as the bourgeois or non-socialist (including Conservative, Liberal, and Agrarian parties) versus the socialist bloc that consisted of the Social Democratic or Labor Party, and the Communist or Radical Socialist parties. While the Social Democratic or Labor Party has dominated the Left of the ideological spectrum the bourgeois side of the spectrum has remained fragmented evenly to three or four parties that means bloc competition rather than competition among the individual parties. The predominance of the Social Democratic or Labor Parties after the Second World War led to cooperation among the bourgeois parties to provide an alternative government to the Socialist bloc

¹⁴Einborn and Logue, 1989. p.70

in the 1960s. Voters aligned and realigned themselves within each bloc rather than preferring to move from one bloc to another. It implied continuation of the sensitive balance between the two blocs. So parties have to carry out the policy promises which necessitates better a party organization and a strict party control over the constituency. Otherwise, they cannot behave as unitary actors. For this reason, the Scandinavian parties have highly developed party structures and hence sophisticated organizational structures with country-wide branches. For them, then, it is easy to form and maintain a coalition for a long time, in contrast to the Italian case. Its repercussion at the level of coalition bargaining is the formation of either Social Democratic or Labor government or the bourgeois coalition of three or more parties.

The reason why the author chose Norway is to show that minority governments are not the last solution to the government crisis. According to Strom, minority governments are a rational choice if political parties consider the long term policy targets and if opposition parties have an opportunity to affect government policies.¹⁵ Norway represents two significant tendencies in her experience of coalition governments in the post-war period. The first tendency is characterized by the Labor Party's majority governments in the 1945-1961 period. The Labor dominance to Norwegian politics was over at the end of the 1961 general elections due to the emergence of the Socialist Party on the left of it. The second period that was characterized as the alternation of the Labor minority governments and the bourgeois three or four-party majority coalitions started after this election and still continues today.¹⁶ Strom and Leipart identify three significant features of the Norwegian coalitions in terms of their composition after the 1961 general elections.¹⁷

¹⁵K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

¹⁶H. Rommetvedt, 'Norway: From Consensual Majority Parliamentarism to Dissensual Minority Parliamentarism' in E Damgaard, eds. *Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992).

¹⁷K. Strom and J. Leipart, 'Policy Pursuit and Coalition Avoidance', in M. J. Laver and I. Budge, *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*.

Table 2. 2. NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENTS: 1945-1990

Prime Minister	Date in	Party Composition
Gerhardsen I	1945	Grand Coalition
Gerhardsen II	1945-1951	Labor
Torp	1951-1955	Labor
Gergardsen III	1955-63	Labor
Lyng	1963	Conservatives, Christian People's Party, Liberals
Gerhardsen IV	1963-65	Labor
Borter	1965-71	Center Party, Cons. Party, Chris. People's Party, Liberals
Bratteli I	1971-72	Labor
Korvald	1972-73	Christian People's Party, Center Party, Liberals
Bratteli II	1973-76	Labor
Nordli	1976-81	Labor
Brundland I	1981	Labor
Willoch I	1981-83	Conservatives
Willoch II	1983-86	Conservatives, Christian People's Party, Center Party
Brundland II	1986-89	Labor
Syde	1989-90	Conservatives, Chris. People's Party, Center P.
Brundland III	1990-	Labor

Note: The party of the prime minister is listed first.

Source: E. Damgaard, eds. *Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992).

The first feature is that coalitions have been either Socialist or bourgeois because of the two-bloc characteristic of the Norwegian party system. The second feature is the decision of the Labor Party of entering any coalition with either the Left-wing or Right-wing parties. This meant that Labor governments have always been minority ones since 1961. The third characteristic is that bourgeois coalitions consisted of at least three non-socialist parties with the exception of the Willoch government in the 1981-83 period that expanded to comprise the Christian People's Party and the Center Party in 1983. These three features fit the general characteristics of the Scandinavian coalition experiences.

The shift from majority Labor governments either to the non-socialist majority coalitions or to the Labor Party minority governments was the result of the changes in the Norwegian party system in the 1960s and 1970s. Until the 1961 general election,

there were five parties which were the Labor Party(DNA), as the only representative of the Left on the ideological spectrum, the Conservative Party(H), the Liberal Party(V), the Christian People's Party(KRF) , and the agrarian Center Party(SP) which had been known as the Farmer's Party before 1959. The emergence of the Socialist People's Party in 1961 did not disturb the balance between the two blocs, though it ended the Labor's historical predominance in the Norwegian politics since 1945.¹⁸ Distribution of parliamentary seats among the two blocs was evenly balanced that non-bourgeois bloc had 76 seats in comparison to 74 seats of the bourgeois bloc in which the Conservative Party had the largest share with 29 seats after the 1961 general elections¹⁹.

This period of stability lasted until the referendum on whether or not to join the European Community in 1972. The referendum weakened the unitary status of the parties. Because the two-bloc politics, as the determining feature of the Scandinavian party system, provided inducement for the parties not to split. But the referendum divided the Liberal Party into two pieces as pro-EC and anti- EC parts. Whereas the Conservative Party and the Labor Party supported the entrance the Center Party and the far-left were against the entrance. New political groups emerged after this event that were the Socialist Electoral Alliance on the Left and the Ander's Lange Party on the Right.²⁰ Although these new developments caused volatility the traditional parties like the DNA, the Conservative Party remained as unitary actors.²¹ This specific organizational characteristic gave them an opportunity to follow particular strategies in time like the Labor's strategy of not entering into a coalition with any other party for decades.

There have been two leading parties in the Norwegian party system which have been the Labor Party and the Conservative Party. During the 1961-65 period the

¹⁸It renamed Socialist Left Party later.

¹⁹A. De Swaan, *Coalition Theories*, p.281.

²⁰This party was renamed as the Progres Party later.

²¹ M. J. Laver and N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government*, p.237.

Socialist People's Party was the small pivotal party because of the fact that the Labor Party minority government, that had been established with the outside support of the Socialist People's Party after the 1961 general elections, was brought down again by only one no confidence vote of the same party.²² Moreover, though the four-party bourgeois coalition government remained in power they never obtained vote of confidence until the 1965 general elections because of lack of the two votes of majority. The Progress Party played the same role in the aftermath of the 1985 elections. Because it became a key party in the evenly balanced Storting(Parliament) where the socialist bloc won 77 seats in 1985 and 80 in 1989 versus 78 and 62 seats of the bourgeois bloc in the same elections. The number of seats the Progress Party won was 2 in 1985 and 22 in 1989. With the outside support of the Progress Party the Labor minority government remained in power until 1989. The party would have supported the bourgeois coalition rather than the Labor minority government during the same period. But the Progress Party decided to give support to the three-party bourgeois coalition in the aftermath of the 1989 general elections. The coalition was broken down after a year when the dispute about Norwegian attitude to negotiations, which was held between the EC and the EFTA, emerged.²³

As mentioned above, two characteristics of Norwegian political parties - highly cohesive organizational unity and strict adherence to the party policy - distinguish them from other European political parties. It can be easily seen that these two features are interrelated if the extremely evenly balanced Parliament is taken into account. According to Strom and Leipart, since they have represented interests of different social groups like those of workers', farmers', and business groups', they have tried to obtain office for instrumental reasons. In other words, they have seen office as a

²²That party had just two seats in Parliament which is enough for the illustration of the evenly balance between two blocs.

²³For more information see H. Rommetvedt, 'Norway', in E. Damgaard, eds., *Parliamentary Change in Nordic Countries*

means to an end rather than as an end in itself. So they received ministries related to their party interests to fulfill what their social base demanded or what they promised to them before the elections. Economic issues have been the main areas of dispute among the parties, though there have been always minor social, and cultural cleavages existed like abortion problem at the beginning of 1980s. The competition among the political actors concentrated on how economic goods and pains would be distributed among various segments of society.²⁴ The dispute between the Labor Party and the Conservative Party, as the two largest parties within the system, focused on the subject matter of the state control of business. The DNA has followed social democratic strategy in its economic policies. The state involved in economic matters in order to lessen the growing pains of the crisis through producing counter-cyclical policies. It also changed its policies of direct state investment to eclectic state involvement and control of the key industries rather than the whole economy. However, it never gave up its goals of social equality and rewarded all supports through its redistributive policies in the 1945-65 period. As a ruling party, although it has had a strategy not to form a coalition with any party since 1930s it has always given chance to the oppositional parties to influence the party's decisions and policies.

As the largest non-socialist party, the Conservative Party has always claimed that market share of the private sector should be increased and there must be a balance between the public and the private sector. This meant that it also favored social market economy like the DNA in contrast to its European counterparts such as British Conservative Party. So the party is a moderate conservative, however the only difference between it and the DNA has been over means rather than the ends. Alteration of the power in 1965 and coming of the bourgeois parties did not create a rupture

²⁴See the related section in A. De Swaan, *Coalition Theories*.

between the non-socialist and socialist period.²⁵ Rather, the non-socialist coalition of the four center-right parties (Conservatives, Liberals, Christian People's and Center parties) was seen as a continuation of the Labor Party government due to the fact that they passed the pension reforms, which had been introduced by the Labor Party, along the similar lines what the DNA had proposed.

Strategically, the Conservative Party pursued policies in its relation to other parties that aimed at ending the DNA's predominance in the government in the 1950s and 1960s. That was necessary for the party's continuation. Otherwise, it would have not satisfied its adherents and attracted new electorates. As the largest party of the right, small parties were afraid of being swallowed up by the Conservatives. They, at the beginnings, hesitated to enter into a coalition with the largest party in order to preserve their party identities. The Conservative Party made some reasonable concessions to alleviate the fear of the small parties during the initial phase of cooperation in the 1960s which meant the implementation of the common policies rather than only that of the Conservative Party and an equal distribution of the government portfolios among the coalition partners.²⁶

In sum, it is possible to argue that the agreement over social market economy created consensus among all the Norwegian political parties in the absence of an acute ethnic, cultural, or religious cleavage. Arter states that

the exceptional four-party non-socialist coalition under Per Borten in 1965-1969 proceed differently. All network of deputy ministerial committees was developed, comprising the deputy (assistant) ministers from all the governing parties, and these constituted important forums of consensus building.²⁷

²⁵ M. Elder, A. H. Thomas, and D. Arter, *The Consensual Democracies?: The Government and Politics of the Scandinavian States* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) and F. Jacobs, "Norway"

²⁶ A. De Swaan, *Coalition Theories*.

²⁷ D. Arter, *The Nordic Parliaments: A Comparative Analysis* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984), p.114.

All these mean that policy-making in Norway has been based on consensus and cooperation at the level of inter-party elites.

2. 3 .FRANCE: THE FOURTH REPUBLICAN PERIOD

Unlike the prior two cases the party system was unstable in the French case during the 1945-1958 period. It is necessary to start with elucidating the party system before elaborating the coalition experiences. The French Assembly was dominated by the three groups in 1945 which were Communists(PCF), Socialists(SFIO), and Christian Democrats(MRP). The last one was the new-comer after the Radicals had lost power. The MRP had been the largest party during the Third Republican period²⁸. Three of them controlled three-quarters of the Assembly seats in 1945. The urgent social problem to be solved by the political parties was the preparation of a new constitution during the first years of the Fourth Republic. While the Communist Party favored a unicameral assembly in order to escape checks of the upper house. The SFIO and MRP were against the idea because of the fear of domination by the PCF over the whole Assembly, though they agreed with unicameralism in principle. As opposed to all, De Gaulle demanded the establishment of the presidential system with a strong head of the state and an executive power. The constitution that proposed the establishment of an assembly was rejected by the electorate in the referendum. At the end of the elections for the Constituent Assembly that was held in 1946, the MRP emerged as the largest party with 28 percent vote share²⁹.

²⁸J. F. McMillan, *Twentieth-Century France: Politics and Society 1898-1991* (London: Edward Arnold, 1992), p.154.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p.155.

Table 2. 3. FRENCH COALITION GOVERNMENTS: 1946-58

Prime Minister	Date in	Coalition Composition
De Gaulle	11. 1945	PCF, SFIO, MRP, RAD, UDSR, Cons
Gouin	01.1946	PCF, SFIO, MRP
Bidault	06. 1946	PCF, SFIO, MRP
Ramadier I	01. 1947	PCF, SFIO, MRP, RAD, UDSR, RI
Ramadier II	10. 1947	SFIO, MRP, RAD, UDSR, RI
Schuman	11. 1947	SFIO, MRP, RAD, UDSR, AR
Marie	07.1948	SFIO, MRP, RAD, UDSR, RI, PRL
Queuille I	09.1948	SFIO, MRP, RAD, UDSR, RI, PRL
Bidault II	10. 1949	SFIO, MRP, RAD, RI, PAYS
Pleven I	07. 1950	SFIO, MRP, RAD, RI, PRL
Quille II	03. 1951	SFIO, MRP, RAD, RI, PAYS
Pleven II	08. 1951	MRP,RAD, UDSR, IND, PAYS
Faure I	01. 1952	MRP, RAD, UDSR, IND, AP
Pinay	03. 1952	MRP, RAD, UDSR, IND, AP
Mayer I	01. 1953	MRP, RAD, UDSR, ARS, IND, PAYS
Laniel	06. 1953	MRP, RAD, UDSR, RPF, ARS, IND, PAYS
Mendes-France	06. 1954	RAD, UDSR, RS, ARS, RI, PAYS
Faure II	02. 1955	MRP, RAD, UDSR, RS, ARS, RI, IND, PAYS
Mollet	02. 1956	SFIO, RAD, RDA, RS
Bourges Mannoury	06. 1957	SFIO, RAD, RDA
Gaillard	11. 1957	SFIO, MRP, RAD, RDA, RS, IND

Party name: PCF: Communist Party, SFIO: Socialist Party, MRP: Christian Democratic party, RAD: Radical Party, UDSR: Union Democratique et Sovialiste de la Resistance, RPF(ARS): The Ressamblement du Peuple Francais(Gaullist), RGR: dissident Moderates (like Indep, and Paysans), UFF: Pujadist Party.

Source: A. De Swaan, 1973.

The Communist Party also slightly increased its percentage of votes. The SFIO, however, was the net loser in this election. Finally, the MRP and SFIO agreed on the creation of a second chamber and later the new constitution was accepted.

For the preparation of the new constitution grand coalitions were formed in the first years of the Fourth Republic which consisted of mainly the PCF, the SFIO, and the MRP as well as the Radicals and Conservatives. When the Cold-War appeared, the Communists were expelled from the government permanently in 1947. The following coalitions, in the absence of the PCF, followed the same pattern that included Socialists, Catholics, and Radicals. The significant feature of the coalitions in the 1946-51 period

was the inclusion of the unnecessary members. According to De Swaan, in this period, political parties tried to choose partners whose policy objectives showed similarities with their most preferred policies³⁰.

The general election, held in 1951 substantially changed balance of power among the parties in the Assembly. The Conservatives and Gaullist doubled their seats from 19 per cent 34 per cent; whereas the MRP lost almost half of the Assembly seats.³¹ The Gaullist RPF emerged as the largest party from the election and this situation lasted until the end of the Fourth Republic with minor changes.

Socialists did not participate in any coalition government from 1951 to 1956. The Gaullist RPF voted against all the governments until 1953 when de Gaulle withdrew himself from active political life. In the absence of three largest parties, all coalitions were minority in character until the support of the right-wing factions of the Gaullists(ARS) to the Pinay government in 1952. The RPF split into two parts each of which formed different parties. These were the URAS(later became RS) and ARS. There were two coalition alternatives at that time, the coalition of Communists, Social Democrats, and Catholics i.e., center-Left or the coalition of Catholics, Radicals, the RDA, Gaullists(RS), Independents, and Poujadists(UFF), i.e., center-right. Right-wing parties tried all available combinations including all the right-wing parties till the return of the SFIO in 1956.

As the Gaullist movement lost its effect Poujadists(UFF) emerged as anti-system party with 53 seats at the end of 1956 general elections, but they were prevented from entering the government. Throughout the period, France waged war against her colonies, especially in Indo-China and Algeria. After the loss of Indo-China war and the seizure of power by the extremists in Algeria, de Gaulle was perceived as the only man who was capable of producing the solution to the threat of civil war. He was voted into

³⁰ A. De Swaan, *Coalition Theories*, p.186.

³¹ M. J. Laver and I. Budge, *Party Policy*, p.391.

the power through which he obtained the right to prepare a new constitution. He suspended actions of political parties for some time. The most clear feature of the coalitions formed in the 1947-58 period was that the leading actors were the parties of the center and of the Right in coalition bargaining.

There were two largest anti-system parties that were the Gaullist RPF and the PCF, whereas the latter was in the position of permanent opposition, the former lost its status in 1953 completely but its role was later carried out by the newly formed Poujadist UFF until the end of the era. Two parties (the PCF and Poujadist UFF) were excluded from the government permanently. Rather than having a center party like the DC in the Italian case or the Social-Christian Party in the Belgian party system, the French party system had several center parties. Exclusion of the largest parties from the government paved way for the inclusion of all the smaller parties. Fragmentation prevented emergence a powerful center party that could play pivotal role during the coalition bargaining. There were several center parties such as the MRP, the Radical Party, the UDSR, the PRG, and Independents. Petry points out the existence of 'plural core'.³² According to him, parties that formed the plural core in all period were the UDSR, Radicals, the MRP, and Independents which took role in coalitions after 1951. Though the MRP emerged as the center party after the 1946 elections its center status was eroded by attacks of both Socialists and Radicals. Whereas the Radicals' main criticism was directed to the MRP's progressive character in social matters as an advocator of the state intervention and of the state help to those who need, Socialists and Communists criticized its clerical character. The 1951 election results proved this reality. Systemic parties started to follow strategy of the permanent exclusion of the PCF from the government in 1947 and as result of this policy the PCF could not become coalition member since then till the end of the relevant period. Likewise, the Poujadist

³²F. Petry, 'Coalition Bargaining in the French Fourth Republic 1946-58', in M. J. Laver and I. Budge, *Party Policy*, p.387.

UFF experienced such an event till the end of the period. However, the Gaullist party could not continue its opposition role.

According to Pickles, there were four political families that were the Right, the center-Right, the center-Left, and the Left.³³ Political actors were not unitary actors. On the one side, there were Communists, Socialists and Radical Leftists; more reactionary Rightist parties constituted the other side of the spectrum and all these meant the permanent erosion of the center on both fringes.

Both the MRP and the Socialist Radical Party, as center parties, were loosely organized. McMillan states that 'the MRP was essentially a party of leaders, without a natural a well-organized base. Overnight, it lost its credibility as the party of fidelity to de Gaulle'.³⁴ The Socialist Radical Party was never a socialist party because of its individualistic, economically conservative leanings in contrast to the other Left-wing parties. But it was a strong Republican and an anti-clerical party. As a party policy, it favored comprehensive state educational system. Due to the internal quarrels it split into several parties, though it had been one of the old and significant parties in the French political life until 1945. However, it took part in all coalition governments and ten out of twenty-one governments were headed by the Prime Ministers from the Radical Party which implied that it was still an influential party at the governmental level.³⁵ Again it was split into two parts in 1956.

The MRP was perceived as the party that could fulfill the place of the Radicals at the inception, because the PCF was ejected from the government and hence the SFIO lost its pivotal position in the party system. The MRP played the role of the center party until 1951. It was a center party since it was a supporter of the democratic Republican ideas and its main inspiration was coming from the Catholic principles though its

³³D. Pickles, *The Government and Politics of France: Institutions and Parties* (London: Methuen & Co., Vol. 1, 1972), p. 171.

³⁴J. F. McMillan, *Twentieth-Century France*, p. 157.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 196.

members were not exclusively Catholic. It was a party that was in favor of social reform, however it was against Marxist and collectivistic ideas. According to McMillan, 'it seemed for a time, likely to take the place of the Radicals as a party forming a hinge between the moderate Right and the anti-clerical Left'.³⁶ It was resembling a left-wing party because of its organizational form with its strong trade union links. The party failed in this role for it was a newly formed party with a weak social base. The emergence of the Gaullist party and the electoral recovery of the Radicals in 1951 elections weakened its pivotal position in the coming years of the Fourth Republic.³⁷ The party became more closer to the Right than the Left when it started to form coalitions with the Right-wing parties after the 1951 elections.

Blondel identifies two most prominent features of party system during the Fourth Republic which were the existence of ill disciplined parties and secondly proliferation of parties through party splits especially on the right of the spectrum.³⁸ Its repercussions at the social level were the perception of parties as catch-all parties and the competition among the several parties such as all clerical center and center-right parties as opposed the anti-clerical left-wing camp that was including Communists, Socialists, and Radicals, for the votes of the same social group as in the case of the Catholic School problem in 1947.³⁹

³⁶Ibid., p.207.

³⁷E. Cahm, *Politics and Society in Contemporary France (1789-1971): A Documentary History* (London: George G. Harrap&Co. Lim., 1972), p. 296-97.

³⁸J. Blondel, *The Government of France* (London: Methuen&Co., 1974), p.55.

³⁹J. Hayward, *The One and Indivisible French Republic* (New York: W.W. Norton&Company, 1973).

2. 4.BELGIUM

It is appropriate to analyze Belgian coalition experiences by looking at the changes in the party system. In general, the party system comprised three effective parties at the Parliamentary level until 1960s. These were the Christian-Social , the Liberal, and the Socialist Party. Possible coalition options were the Christian-Social and Socialist, the Christian-Social and Liberal, the Socialist and Liberal or tripartite grand coalition.⁴⁰ Social events have affected the coalition composition in addition to Cold-War that means the permanent exclusion of the Communist Party from the game. The royal question in the years from 1945 to 1950, and the school problem between the 1952-58 years were the most significant ones.⁴¹ The School Pact was concluded among three parties in 1958. The Socialists and Liberals formed two coalitions in 1945-47 and 1954-58 period. Before the Christian-Social Party gained the parliamentary majority in the 1950 general election, the Christian-Social Party governed the country with the Socialist Party from 1947 and onwards until the election.

The stable three-party system began to undergo significant changes from 1958 onwards that lasted until 1978 when the Socialist Party, as the last one, divided into two pieces. It is necessary to divide that period into two parts again in order to capture minor but influential factors that affected the party system. The Flanders' economy gained momentum after 1950s in contrast to the Walloon's which had been the dynamic one until these years. Language problem emerged beside the regional problem in the fifties and sixties. Moreover, the Liberal Party reoriented itself by repudiating its traditional anti-clerical character. Socio-economic issues, rather than religious ones, became important for the party. It also renamed itself as the Party of Liberty and Progress in

⁴⁰J. Fitzmaurice, *Politics in Belgium: Crisis and Compromise in a Plural Society* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1983), p. 186.

⁴¹J. Gerard- Libois and X.Mabille, 'Belgian Electoral Politics', in A. Lijphart, eds. *Conflict and Co-existence in Belgium: The dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society* (Berkeley: University of California, c.1981) pp.130-131.

Table 2. 4. BELGIAN GOVERNMENTS: 1945-85

Prime Minister	Date in	Party Composition
Spaak I	03. 1946	Socialist
Van Acker I	04. 1946	Socialist, Liberal, Communist
Van Acker II	08. 1945	Socialist, Liberal, Communist, UDB
Huysmans	08. 1946	Socialist, Liberal, Communist
Spaak II	03. 1947	Christian-Social, Socialist
Eyskens G I	07. 1949	Christian-Social, Liberal
Duvieusart	06. 1950	Christian-Social
Pholien	08. 1950	Christian-Social
Van Houtte	01. 1952	Christian-Social
Van Acker III	04. 1954	Socialist, Liberal
Eyskens G II	06. 1958	Christian-Social
Eyskens G III	11. 1958	Christian-Social, Liberal
Lefevre	04. 1961	Christian-Social, Socialist
Harmel	07. 1965	Christian-Social, Socialist
Vanden Boeynants II	03. 1966	Christian-Social, Liberal
Eyskens G IV	06. 1968	Christian-Social, Socialist
Leburton	01. 1973	Christian-Social, Socialist, Liberal
Tindemans I	04. 1974	Christian-Social, Liberal
Tindemans II	06. 1974	Christian-Social, Liberal, RW
Tindemans II	03. 1977	Christian-Social, Socialist
Tindemans IV	06. 1977	Christian-Social, Socailist, FDF, VU
Vanden Boeynants III	10. 1978	Christian-Social, Socialist, FDF, VU
Martens I	04. 1979	Christian-Social, Socialist, FDF
Martens II	01. 1980	Christian-Social, Socialist
Martens III	04. 1980	Christian-Social, Socialist, Liberal
Martens IV	10. 1980	Christian-Social, Socialist
Eyskens M	04. 1981	Christian-Social, Socialist
Martens V	12. 1981	Christian-Social, Liberal

Party names: Christian-Social : PSC/CVP; Socialist Party: PS(B)/(B)SF; Liberal: PVV/PLP; VU: Flemish Federals; FDF: Front Democratique des Francophones; RW: Rassemblement Wallon.

Source: J. Blondel and F. Muller-Rommel, *Cabinets in Western Europe* (London: McMillan, 1988).

1961. All these events-regionalism, linguistic disputes, and adoption of the new program by Liberals-meant change in the electoral behavior as well as the growth of regional and community parties like the Flemish(VU), the Walloon(RW), and the Brussels(FDF) Party. Their number of seats also increased during these years.⁴²

⁴²The VU's seats rose 5 in 1961 to 12 in 1968, the RW's to 2, and the FDF's to 3.

Coalitions included either Liberals or Socialists in this period due to the pivotal position of the Christian-Social Party. After 1968 traditional three-party system was broken down when the 'Louvain Affair' appeared.

French and Flemish languages have been spoken in Belgium for centuries. There have been small conflicts between Flemish speakers and French speakers. These small conflicts reached the climax point when the dispute over the location of the Louvian University came to surface in 1968. The crisis was about 'of choosing between an expansion of the French section of the Catholic University of Louvain (at that time a single institution in Flanders), or the transfer of the French section to a French-speaking area'.⁴³ This affair created tensions within the traditional parties which, in turn, split the Christian-Social Party into Flemish(CVP), and Francophone(PSC) parties in 1968. Likewise, Liberals were divided into the PVV and PLP in 1972, and finally schism within Socialists created two different parties of the SP and PS in 1978. After these events, the effective number of parties jumped from three in 1961 to nine in 1978.

Proliferation in the number of parties deeply affected the coalition formation as well as its maintenance. Moreover, the situation became more complex after the introduction of new institutional constraints. These social developments required constitutional amendments which necessitated two-thirds of parliamentary majorities. Two available coalition options emerged, either the grand coalition of three traditional parties or the coalition of two traditional families plus one or two community parties. In all, when the Constitution was amended newly introduced articles imposed new conditions on coalition composition. According to Fitzmaurice, three of them were crucial for the coalition formation. The first one stipulated that the cabinet includes 'an equal number of French speaking and Dutch speaking Ministers'.⁴⁴ The second article

⁴³J Gerard-Libios and X. Mabilie, 'Belgian Electoral Politics', in A. Lijphart eds, *Conflict and Co-existence in Belgium*, p.132.

⁴⁴J. Fitzmaurice, *Politics in Belgium*, p. 122.

promulgated the existence of three regions(Brussels, Wallonia, and Flanders) and two communities(Francophone and Flemish) . Finally, the third article stated that in order to pass legislation which is related to a particular community and region there must be

a majority vote within each linguistic group of both Houses, providing the majority of the members of each group are present and on condition that the total votes in favor in two linguistic group attain two-thirds of the votes cast.⁴⁵

Then, political leaders had to provide a coalition which includes two-thirds of Parliamentary deputies plus a single majority from the community(ies). So political parties had two options: either to form a grand coalition of three traditional families or to create a coalition that would include two traditional families and one or two community parties. The coalitions that were formed in 1971-1980 period fulfilled these conditions. For example, while the coalition formed in 1973 was a grand coalition embracing three traditional families those formed in 1977 and 1978 included Christian Social and Socialist families as well as the VU and the FDF. The new party system almost returned to the traditional three-party system at the beginning of 1980 because most of the coalitions that have been formed during this period consisted of two traditional parties. The Christian-Social parties have always been the dominant ones. So it can be concluded that the Belgian case has three significant features which are as follows.

- i. Coalition governments are the rule rather than the exception;
- ii. Except for two cases in 1974 and 1977-78 years, the minority coalition governments are rare in the coalition history of Belgium; and finally

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 122.

iii. The Christian-Social Party has been the permanent member of all coalitions since 1947 except for the coalition of Socialists and Liberals in 1954-58; that kind of option lost its feasibility as the school problem was solved in 1958.⁴⁶

The Christian-Social Party(CVP/PSC) has always been the pivotal party because of its center position on the ideological Left-Right spectrum and its electoral strength. After the school question was solved in 1958, the party gained opportunity to play off Liberals against Communists until the constitutional revision. After that time, according to Rudd and Fitzmaurice, factors have determined the party strategy that have been constitutional requirements and factions within the each party and in the family as well. After the split the CVP in the Flanders region and the PS in the Wallonia emerged as two unequally powerful parties.

As a pivotal party, that has had power to decide which party would take part in the coalition government, it is essential to look at the factors and the motivations that influenced decisions of the Christian-Social parties. In other words, intra-party relations must be analyzed in order to reach a better explanation.

As the largest party, the Christian-Social parties have represented interests of various groups. The CVP has been the largest party at the national level in contrast to its Francophone counterpart- the PSC. As Fitzmaurice pointed out, the three social groups- Catholic workers, small traders and businessmen, and farmers have had organizations within the party and they have provided continual support for the CVP. Factions, representing workers and businessmen have competed with each other as the representatives of conflicting interests within the party. The fate of the coalition partners were dependent on the dominance of the particular faction within the party as the case for the DC in Italy. Whereas the labor organization within the party has favored

⁴⁶C. Rud, 'Coalition Formation and Maintenance in Belgium: A Case Study of Elite Behavior and Changing Cleavage structure, 1965-1981', in G Priadham, eds. *Coalitional Behavior in Teory and Practice: An inductive Model for Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.120.

formation of a coalition with the former, businessmen and small traders have always wanted to see the Christian-Social and Liberal coalition. The PSC, as the junior party within the family, has been in favor of entering into coalition with the Liberals. These two dimensions made the job difficult for the CVP both at intra-party and inter-party level.

Likewise, Socialist parties have had the same problem. The PS and SP have had different trade union affiliations. Due to the prosperous economic climate in Flanders region, the Flemish trade unions have not been against entering into coalition with either Christian-Social Parties or Liberal parties. In contrast, the Walloon Socialist trade unions have rejected the option of forming coalitions with Liberal parties since 1970s as natural part of their policies like 'decentralization of economic powers and the implementation of the socialist economic policies in Wallonia'.⁴⁷ The CVP and the PS became pivotal parties in coalition bargaining. Developments within each regionally powerful party deeply affected their probable coalition partners. In this context, within-party developments of the CVP have been much more significant than those of the PS. Changes in power balances among the factions within the CVP was dependent on social and economic circumstances but still both parties have the fear of replacement by the relatively powerful regional parties. Whereas the former feels the danger of being outflanked by the VU, the latter by the RW.

As the constant partner of all government coalitions, the CVP has been a pragmatic, flexible, and moderate party. It has played the arbiter role in Belgian politics through pursuing a center-Right and center-Left path depending upon social and economic circumstances. According to Fitzmaurice, with the emergence of community issues, it has changed this role gradually and became a strong supporter of Flemish cultural identity. As the largest party in the country, its dominance in the state paved

⁴⁷J. Fitzmaurice, *Politics in Belgium*, p.134.

way to the development of patron-client relations between the party and the Flemish population.

To sum up, though there are linguistic disputes between political parties of the same family, they did not abandon their practice of acting together during coalition formation process and entering the same coalition government in the 1980s. Laver and Schofield summarizes the situation as 'links between language wings of the same family may loose in some cases, but they are not yet loose enough for one wing to go into office without the other'.⁴⁸ For this reason, Lijphart characterizes the Belgian case as the most clear example of consensual democracy in the world whose prominent characteristic is the sharing of the executive power among the parties of different communities rather than the majority party.⁴⁹

The existence of a center party makes easy the coalition formation because of its reconciliatory power as representative of interests of different segments of society. For such a party it is easier to make coalition with parties that are on both side of the spectrum. The French case clearly supports this idea. The absence of a permanent center party during the bargaining stage and in the coalition governments resulted in regime breakdown. However, in the Italian case, although party fragmentation and polarization were seen, the existence of the DC prevented such an event due to its pivotal role that comes from its center position in the party system. Whereas the existence of two blocs and the Labor dominance to the Socialist bloc and the Conservative Party as the powerful one in the Bourgeois bloc made the coalitions stable in Norway, the CVP/PSC's pivotal role as the center-party prevented the chaotic

⁴⁸M. Laver and N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government*, p. 221.

⁴⁹A. Lijphart, "Introduction: The Belgian Example of Cultural Coexistence in Comparative Perspective", in A. Lijphart, eds. *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, c.1981), p.4-5.

situation even after the fragmentation of the traditional parties in the 1970s. However, the same event ended the parliamentary democracy in France in 1958.



CHAPTER III

TURKISH COALITION GOVERNMENTS

3.1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH CABINET COALITIONS

This chapter covers all the coalition governments that have been formed since the general election, held in 1961 and tries to find out whether they were office-seekers or policy-oriented.¹ All possible factors, namely situational, compatibility, and motivational factors will be taken into account as stated in the theoretical section. Descriptive and explanatory research designs were employed so as to analyze their nature without missing any relevant factor. As a historical topic, documents of the past about the topic as the primary and secondary sources were used for data collection. While the first category includes parties' brochures before the elections, government programs, newspapers, and coalition protocols the second one consists of textbooks, handbooks, periodicals, and magazines. This study covers a comprehensive survey of newspapers, especially *Milliyet*, starting before the general election till to the disintegration. The survey also included the issues of *Hurriyet* and *Cumhuriyet* that were published in 1979, of *Turkish Daily News*, from January to August 1996, of those periodicals like *Briefing*

¹The study does not embrace the RPP and the JP minority coalitions created in 1964 and 1979 respectively due to the absence of another coalition partner or partners. Although the TPP-MP and the TPP-WP coalitions that were created after the general election, held on December 24, 1995 could not provide majority in the Assembly they will be investigated due to the existence of at least two political parties. Moreover, 'aboveparty' governments that took place between 1971-1973 after the semi-military intervention will not be scrutinized due to the absence of free bargaining situation.

that were published between 1991-1994 and of Middle East Monitor that were published in March, April, May, June, and July 1996.

Before elaborating the coalition theories it seems useful to give some descriptive information about them.

Table 3.1. Election Results(Votes and Seats)²
ELECTION RESULTS

<u>YEAR</u>	RPP	JP	RPNP	NTP	DemP	NSP	RRP	NAP	TPP	SDPP	MP	WP	DLP
15-Oct-61													
Votes(%)	36.7	34.8	14	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
N. of Seats	173	158	54	65	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14-Oct-73													
Votes(%)	33.3	29.8	-	-	11.9	11.8	5.3	3.4	-	-	-	-	-
N. of Seats	185	149	-	-	45	48	13	3	-	-	-	-	-
5-Jun-77													
Votes(%)	41.4	36.9	-	-	1.9	8.6	1.9	6.4	-	-	-	-	-
N. of Seats	213	189	-	-	1	24	3	16	-	-	-	-	-
20-Oct-91													
Votes(%)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27.2	20.75	24	16	10.8
N. of Seats	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	178	88	115	62	7
24-Dec-95													
Votes(%)	10.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19.2	-	19.7	21.4	14.6
N. of Seats	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	135	-	132	158	75

²The data of the pre-1980 elections were taken from E. Ozbudun, 'Election Results', in K-D. Grothusen, eds., *Turkey*, pp.739-743.

In addition to the this table the following one gives some descriptive information about the coalitions.

Table. 3. 2.³

TURKISH COALITION GOVERNMENTS(1961-1996)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Prime Minister</u>	<u>Coalition Parties</u>	<u>Date In</u>	<u>Date Out</u>	<u>Vote of Confidence</u>	
					<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
1961	Inonu	RPP-JP 173-158	Nov-61	May-62	269	4
1962	Inonu	RPP-NTP-RPNP-IND 171-62-33-13	Jun-62	Dec-63	259	134
1965	Urguplu	JP-NTP-RPNP-NP 172-22-19-13	Feb-65	Oct-65	231	200
1974	Ecevit	RPP-NSP 185-48	Jan-74	Sep-74	235	136
1975	Demirel	JP-NSP-RRP-NAP 150-49-9-3	Mar-75	Jun-77	222	218
1977	Demirel	JP-NSP-NAP 189-24-16	Jul-77	Dec-77	229	219
1978	Ecevit	RPP-RRP-DemP-IND 214-2-1-12	Jan-78	Oct-79	229	218
1991	Demirel	TPP-SDPP/RPP 178-88	Nov-91	May-93	280	168
1993	Ciller	TPP-SDPP/RPP 178-52	Jun-93	Sep-95	247	184
1995	Ciller	TPP-SDPP/RPP 182-65	Oct-95	Mar-96	243	172
1996	Yilmaz	MP-TPP 125-135	Mar-96	Jun-96	257	207
1996	Erbakan	WP-TPP 158-128	Jun-96	-	278	265

³The data were gathered from newspapers. *Coalition Protocol Between the True Path party and Social Democratic Populist Party* (Ankara: Basbakanlik Matbaasi, 1993).

The first coalition was formed between the RPP and the JP. In terms of number of political parties the coalition confirmed Morgenstern and Neumann's theory of minimal winning coalitions but as a surplus majority coalition it did not fit Riker's theory of a minimum-sized coalition because of its number of Parliamentary seats which were more than necessary. Except for the total seats, the RPP-JP coalition was verifying Leiserson's and Axelrod's propositions in the sense that the number of actors were minimal and adjacent on the one dimensional policy scale which meant that this coalition was a 'closed' one as no political party(ies) stood between them.⁴ However the RPP-JP coalition could not support De Swaan's theory of policy distance because they were holding different ideas on the proper role of the state in economy and government's attitude toward religion. In other words, as his theory implies there has been no smooth transition from Left to the Right in the Turkish case which stems from the absence of a center party.

The second coalition was among the RPP-NTP-RPNP-independents that was a surplus majority coalition when its weight is taken as a relevant criterion. This coalition did not fulfill propositions of coalition theories both in terms of political party's policy positions of parties

The last one consisted of the JP, the NTP, the RPNP, the NP.⁵ It was a minimum-sized coalition with regard to parliamentary seats. Although it was not a minimal-winning one Riker's theory predicted truly. It also a 'closed coalition' because all adjacent parties took place within it. It means that it was fitting De Swaan's policy distance theory.

⁴Sayari ordered parties on the one dimensional policy scale as follows: RPP-JP-NTP-RPNP. S. Sayari, *Parlementer Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hukümetleri* (Istanbul: Bogazici Universitesi Matbaasi, 1980), p.172.

⁵The Nation Party was an offshoot of the RPNP that was established by ex-Chair of the RPNP, Osman Bolukbasi with his friends in 1962. Result of confidence voting: 231 'yes' against 200 'no' votes. *Milliyet*, March 5, 1965.

Order of parties from Left to the Right was the RPP-JP-RRP-DemP-NSP-NAP that emerged after the 1973 general election.⁶ The first coalition consisted of the RPP and the NSP after four months of coalition bargaining. Morgenstern and Neumann's as well as Riker's theory of minimum-sized almost truly predicted this coalition. It also supported Leiserson's theory in terms of its weight but fails to fulfill the policy criterion. Both De Swaan's policy distance and Axelrod's 'closed' coalition theorems could not predict the coalition in terms of their policy positions.

The second coalition was the coalition of the JP-RRP-NSP-NAP, the so-called the First National Front Coalition.⁷ This coalition was a minority one. Since four parties' parties could not assure parliamentary majority independent deputies voted in favor of the government. De Swaan's theory predicts this minority coalition to some extent but the majority condition was not fulfilled.

The Second National Front coalition was formed by the three parties that were the JP, the NSP, and the NAP.⁸ Although there were parties among the coalition partners but ideologically there were no differences between them. So this coalition may be identified as a closed one. However, it partially verified De Swaan's theory of policy distance because the NSP was a pro-Islamic party in contrast to the secularist nature of the JP.

The second coalition embraced the RPP, the RRP, the DP, and finally the independents.⁹ This coalition, as Ahmad pointed out, a de facto coalition of the RPP and

⁶S. Sayari, *Parlementer Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hukumetleri*, p. 175.

⁷Before the confidence vote there were deputy transfers because of the fact that total seats of the four parties were not enough Parliamentary majority. The number of each party's seats were as follows: the JP(150), the NSP(48), the RRP(9), the NAP(3). Eight deputies left the DemP and became independent the number of independents rose to 14. The result of confidence vote was 222 'yes' against 218 'no' votes. Two deputies abstained from voting, while four deputies did not come to the voting three of whom were the DemP deputies. *Milliyet*, April 12, 1975.

⁸The coalition won the confidence vote with 229 'yes' votes against 219 'no' votes. *Milliyet*, August 2, 1975.

⁹The situation before the confidence was as follows in Parliament: the RPP(214), the DP(1), Independents who left the JP(14), the NSP(24), the NAP(16). *Milliyet*, December 21, 1977. The coalition cabinet won the confidence vote with 229 'yes' votes against 219. *Milliyet*, February 18, 1978.

JP. There was no ideological similarity between the coalition partners.¹⁰ It was a minimum-sized coalition but not a minimal-winning one. It did not proper to claims of the policy-based theories of De Swaan, Leiserson and Axelrod.

From Left to the Right the policy scale was the SDPP-DLP-TPP-MP-WP after the 1991 general election. The all three cabinet coalitions were formed by the TPP and the SDPP/RPP that were minimal winning and surplus majority coalitions. Since they did not share similar ideas about economic matters and since their understanding of secularism was different De Swaan's and Axelrod's assumptions did not have predictive power.

Two minority coalition governments were set up after the general election of 1995. Whereas the MP-TPP minority had outside support of the DLP the WP-TPP coalition was backed by the Grand Unity Party(GUP) which is a coalition of the Right-wing parties.¹¹ De Swaan's policy distance theory predicted the former as the coalition of parties, having similar policy goals. However the second one is coalition of parties that are holding opposite ideas about Turkish foreign policy, secularism, political problems.

¹⁰The RPP split from the SDPP in 1992 but two parties merged under the name the former in 1995. The WP made an alliance with the Reformist Democracy Party, and the National Work Party before the election to pass ten per cent national threshold.

¹¹The MP made an election alliance with the small Grand Unity Party that won seven seats on the ticket of the MP.

3. 2. SITUATIONAL VARIABLES

Economy was in bankruptcy in 1961 due to the deterioration of the terms of trade which was the result of export stagnation. The government either canceled or postponed most of the investments.¹² Private enterprises also stopped most of their activities because of economic insecurity, unpredictability, and the RPP's program of planned economy. In addition to these unfavorable conditions, the poor harvest in 1960 and also 1961 worsened the economic conditions in Turkey. Just after 1963 economy entered into a period of recovery when the private sector had secured ascendancy over that of the state. Moreover, agricultural production, especially cotton and tobacco, increased depending on good weather conditions.¹³

Economic stagnation resulted in four-million unemployed and a highly skewed income distribution in the sense that two per cent of population received thirty-eight per cent of national income which, in turn, meant social unrest and political instability.¹⁴ The reason for the May 27, 1960 military intervention was to restore order and democracy in Turkey. The National Unity Committee was dissolved after almost one and half year of rule when the first civilian government was set up. However its de facto rule continued because after the October general election in 1961 political party leaders, the service commanders, and the chief-of-the-general-staff Cevdet Sunay met on October 23, 1961 and signed the Cankaya Protocol. The protocol stipulated that the army would not intervene provided that

i) all parties support the candidacy of General Gursel during the presidential election;

¹²F. Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), p.268 and see for the economic policies in the 1950s R. Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.57

¹³Ibid., p.279.

¹⁴Milliyet, October 3, 1961.

ii) they would abstain from making a political issue out of amnesty and claim amnesty for those ex-Democrat Party members who were still in prison;

ii) they would not criticize or debate laws passed by the NUC since May 27; and finally

ii) Ismet Inonu, the Chairman of the RPP, would be the prime minister and would form the new government.¹⁵

Following the protocol, the military did not cease to supervise daily politics, rather its supervision continued in two ways:

a. The military officers, who had carried the coup, became life Senators in the newly established Senate except the 'Fourteens';

b. General Gursel was duly elected President.¹⁶ Moreover, there were two military coup attempts on February 22, 1962 and May 21-22, 1963.

The Justice Party's economic policies of expansionary growth resulted in the indirect military intervention on March 12, 1971 whose rule lasted two years. Since Turkey was a newly industrializing country at that time, her infant industry was dependent upon importation of foreign capital, intermediary goods, and also raw materials. The government had to import all these necessary items without exporting at the initial stage of industrialization. In order to meet all these expenditures the ruling party chose inflationary growth that led to an abrupt rise in inflation. This affected the segments of society with fixed income at the beginning of the 1970s. After two years of growth which was the result of increasing exports and the rise in the workers' remittances the economy became stagnated again because of the recession of the world economy after the OPEC doubled oil prices in 1973 and again in 1979. Rise in oil prices in the world markets meant increase in prices of capital, intermediary goods as well as

¹⁵O. F. Lologlu, *Ismet Inonu and the Political Modernization of Turkey, 1945-1965* (Michigan: Michigan University Microfilms Xerox Company, 1971), pp. 229-230 nad F. Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment*, p.171.

¹⁶J. M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Turkey* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), p.13.

those of raw materials. Moreover, Turkey needed more foreign currency to meet her oil expenditures. During these years coalition governments did not halt expansionary industrial growth. The stagnation in industry resulted in decrease of average GNP rate from seven percent to four per cent and rise in inflation from forty to sixty per cent in 1977.¹⁷ Its repercussions at the societal level were the deterioration of the civil service and decline of thrust to the democratic government due to the widespread pessimism among the people and the perennial accusations among the political elite.¹⁸ Ahmad also states that after the formation of the RPP-NSP coalition in 1974 political terrorism started again.¹⁹ These worsening economic and social conditions gave way to polarization both at the elite and societal level.

Export-oriented industrialization policies replaced the former import-substituting ones immediately after the military intervention on September 12, 1980. The first civilian Motherland Party government formed in December 1983 and the subsequent TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition government also followed the same expansionary economic policies as their predecessors did before the intervention. Although the growth rate was around seven per cent in 1983-1987 after that date it gradually decreased. These expansionary economic policies again resulted in economic crisis at the beginning of 1994, resulting in chronic inflation, unemployment, deterioration of social justice due to unequal distribution of the national income, decreasing productive capacity of the private sector, strikes of the workers in the public sector that led to the disintegration of the TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition in September, 1995. Effects of all these worsening economic conditions have been the erosion of the middle classes, social unrest, high electoral volatility, and finally fragile coalition governments. Erguder states that 'Turkish

¹⁷E. Ozbudun and A. Ulsan. 'Overview', in E. Ozbudun and A. Ulsan, eds., *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey* (New York and London: Meiner Publishers, Inc., 1980), p. 18.

¹⁸K. H. Karpat, Turkish Democracy at Impasse: Ideology, Party Politics, and the Third Military Intervention, *International Journal of Turkish Studies* (Vol.2, No. 1, Spring/Summer, 1981, pp.1-43), p.40.

¹⁹F, Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), p.169.

democracy has continued to frail and this constitutes one of the most important obstacles to further democratization in Turkey.²⁰

The party system displayed a 'bipolar-decentralized' character after the 1961 general election. Two decades of the monoparty rule ended when the Democrat Party was allowed to form and compete in the general election of 1946. It eventually came to power in the 1950 general election by obtaining 53.3 per cent of the total votes and 83.8 per cent of the Assembly seats, thanks to the simple majority election system.²¹ Its reign had lasted until the military coup that was carried out on May 27, 1960. In the meantime the DP consolidated its organizational structure in all around the country, even in the villages similar to the RPP. The discerning characteristics of the two big parties on the each side of the spectrum were their strongly institutionalized pyramid-type and country-wide organization with branches in subdistricts and villages(bucak and ocak organization). Their approach to politics were integrative, rather than class-based or sectarian. Party system was a two party system but the center or the core area was vacant in the 1950s. Sartori argues that party system of moderate pluralism is more likely if there is already 'structured and stabilized party system' which means

One in which at least one or two of the existing parties have acquired, at the moment in which proportional representation is introduced- a national platform, a unified symbol, and some stable organization also at the local level, so that they are perceived by the country at large as the natural foci and channels of the political system. Clearly the strong structuring of the early parties can in itself be a powerful restrainer or container of party proliferation.

Under these circumstances the internally created parties are likely to play a

²⁰U. Erguder, *The Turkish Party System and the Future of Turkish Democracy*, in E. Balim, et al, eds., *Turkey: Political, Social, and Economic Challenges in the 1990s* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), p.69 and A. Eralp, 'The Politics of Turkish Development', in A. Finkel and N. Sirman, eds., *The Turkish State and Turkish Society* (London: Routledge, 1990), P.242.

²¹E. Ozbudun, 'Political Parties and Elections', in K-D. Grothusen, eds. *Turkey: Handbook on South Eastern Europe* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 1985, Vol.IV), p.266.

major role in the mass party era (instead of being ousted by the external created parties) and the pattern is therefore likely to remain bipolar.²²

There were four parties around the center, three of which were against the government ownership of industries (the newly established JP and NTP, probable heirs to the defunct DP together with the RPNP). Their understanding of the government's attitude toward religion was similar but it was different from that of the RPP. These parties won 62.5 per cent of the total votes and 277 seats respectively. However, the RPP as the only statist party with its strict understanding of secularism obtained 173 parliamentary seats with 36.8 per cent of the total vote. The party system was 'bipolar-depolarized' there were four moderate parties with centripetal tendencies because this party system includes three or four parties.²³ The reason for the centripetal tendency was the vacancy of the core area in Turkish party system. In 'bipolar-decentralized' party systems all parties have chance to become a coalition partner; while some parties are alternating in the government others change their coalition partners. Available number of possible coalition government options are relatively higher but limited.²⁴ The newly established NTP was the pivotal party with its 65 seats in the Assembly in the sense that it was the key party in all coalition options except the RPP-JP coalition.

Sartori further argues that development of centrifugal tendencies are possible provided that a religious-confessional criterion is superimposed upon the Left-Right dichotomy. The degree of centrifugation depends on the power of the religious appeal.²⁵ At the beginning of the seventies, party system became fragmented starting in 1967 but not polarized until the creation of the pro-religious National Order Party(NOP) and its heir, the National Salvation Party(NSP) a year after its closure in 1972. After that time

²²G. Sartori, 'European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism' in Lapalombara and Weiner, p.170.

²³Ibid., p.165.

²⁴Ibid., p.138.

²⁵Ibid., p.170.

the party system started to represent tendencies of polarization. With the adoption of the RPP's 'left-of-center' policies in 1965 the already existing distinction between the two blocs became more obvious. Although there were basically no differences between the type of cleavages among political parties, namely the role of the state in the economy and the parties' attitudes towards religion before and after the shift political parties started to be ranged from the Left to the Right after the RPP's shift. In other words, the parties that were more tolerant towards the Islamic religion and that gave priority to private sector in the economy took place on the right of the political spectrum as opposed to the strict secularism and the statist economic policies of the leftist parties. The defection of the two liberal factions of the RPP in 1967 and 1972 and their merger as separate parties to form the Republican Reliance Party(RRP) in 1973 illustrates the homogenization of the camps.

As parallel to the prominent features of the party system in the 1970s which were fragmentation, the emergence of the pro-Islamic NSP, polarization, emptiness of the center again Sartori proposes another typology of the party system, 'polarized-multipolar', that can explain Turkish case especially in the second half of the 1970s. Its significant characteristics are

1. the lack of centrality indicated by the physical existence of a center and thereby the likely prevalence of centrifugal drives; 2. a high degree of ideological rigidity or in any case a non-pragmatic approach to politics; 3. marked cleavage at the elite level, which in turn deepens the fragmentation of basic consensus; 4. the absence of real alternative government; 5. the growth of irresponsible opposition and thereby the politics of outbidding, of unfair competition.²⁶

²⁶Ibid., p.159-160.

Although Right-wing parties won 61.4 per cent of the total votes and 258 seats they were divided among five parties due to party fragmentation.²⁷ It implies that in a polarized multipolar system every party has a great relevance for the formation of coalition governments as in the case of the National Action party with three seats. The pro-Islamic National Salvation party became the pivotal party or the unavoidable partner of all majority coalition options when the newly established Democratic Party (DemP) rejected to participate in any coalition either with the RPP or the JP after the 1973 general election. When the system was polarized the RPP became a captive party. The reason for this was that it could not propose any coalition alternative against the Rightist bloc.

The ultimate reason for the increasing importance of the small parties was the alternation of all coalition partners in the absence of an influential center party as the unchanging coalition partner. Put differently, center-Right and center-Left parties normally prefer to make a coalition with the center party as the approximate partner on the policy scale rather than the extremist ones. When the system was polarized the smaller parties became inevitable for all coalition options instead of the center party which has been always absent in Turkish politics.

Despite three years of military rule and the closing down of all parties bipolar structure of the Turkish party system reemerged after the 1983 general election. The distribution of votes skewed towards the Right again. In the absence of a significant religious party, the party system remained bipolar-decentralized until the 1991 general election. Though there was an increase in the number of parties in the Assembly after the 1991 general election the available number for coalition formation was very restricted which prevented the emergence of a pivotal party.

²⁷See E. Ozbudun, 'The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization, and Fragmentation', *Middle Eastern Studies* (Vol. 17, No. 2, 1981, pp.228-240) and I Turan, 'Stages of Political development in the Turkish Republic', in E. Ozbudun et al, eds., *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey* (Ankara: Sevinc Matbaasi, 1987),

Despite the emergence of two significant center-left and two center-right parties in the post-1980 Turkish party system the left-wing parties were able to secure 95 parliamentary seats with their 31.5 per cent of votes compared to right-wing parties with 67 per cent of votes and 355 Assembly seats respectively in the 1991 elections. In the 1995 general election the total vote percentage of the Left was around thirty percent in contrast to approximately seventy per cent of the total right vote.²⁸ The Party system can be named as 'bipolar-fractionalized' during the 1965-1973 and 1991 to present era.

Recent coalition bargaining supported the hypothesis, developed by Keman and Budge, who stated that systemic parties form coalition among themselves by disregarding the Left-Right distinction in order to secure the democratic system against the anti-systemic party or parties as the DLP and the MP did. The pro-Islamic Welfare party(WP), as the largest one in the aftermath of 1995 general election, did not play an influential role during the coalition bargaining process which was stemming from its captive party status meaning that all parties rejected coalition partnership with the WP. Another characteristic of the 'bipolar-fractionalized' party system is that keeping other factors under control, parties with centrist tendencies has capability and power to pacify anti-systemic parties during the coalition formation stage despite their fragmented nature.

Emergence of the Democrat Party as opposite party of the RPP in terms of economic and religious cleavages in Turkish society, a twenty-seven year rule of the RPP with strict secularist and strong statist economic policies created centrifugal tendency among the political elite when the multiparty politics was introduced. Majority election system and the victory of the DP in the three subsequent elections after 1950 because of the Islamic character of Turkish society resulted in emergence and consolidation of bipolar party system in Turkey. The RPP, as the only party of the 1923-1946 era consisted of an overwhelming statist faction together with a smaller group who were on

²⁸The calculation was made adding the votes of the parties that could not pass the ten per cent electoral threshold.

the side of private sector but they were also secular persons. This faction left the party after the RPP had moved to the left.²⁹ Except for two factions that moved to the Right due to their inclination to support the private enterprise, there was no inter-bloc party movement. After this process of internal party homogenization political parties have had certain tendencies within the same party philosophy. It means that there may be a liberal, a conservative or a nationalist group putting stress on private enterprise within the center-Right party, other Right-wing parties have the same economic views but their stress either big industrialists or the smaller ones and on religion differ.³⁰

Unlike the formation of the NTP that capitalized on the remnants of the defunct Freedom Party, during its establishment in February 1961, the JP's party elites were newcomers because the party elites of the ex-DP had been in prison. However, these two newly emerged parties found ready party organizations at the provincial and sub-provincial level stuffed by the followers of the DP. In contrast to the organization of the NTP that followed a mixed pattern of penetration because of its ready party elite and of diffusion through inheriting ex-DP's organizations at the local level, the JP's organization pattern was completely diffusive because of the fact that the defunct DP adherents saw the JP as the natural heir. Arsev similarly states that

when the time came to establish party organization at the country level, the job to be done was to change the name of the party and some party officials due to the ready organization of the Democrat Party.³¹

²⁹M. Y. Geyikdagi, *Political Parties in Turkey: The Role of Islam* (New York: Preager, 1984), p.125 and M. J. Landau, *Radical Politics*, p.17.

³⁰Though the Motherland Party tried to this but in the end or at the top elite level there was no such faction. Because center-right parties have always been controlled by the liberal and nationalist faction rather than either conservative or the social democratic faction, even they have had little influence on the party policies..

³¹A. Bektas, *Demokratiklesme Surecinde Liderler Oligarsisi, CHP ve AP (1961-1980)* (Istanbul: Baglam Yayıncılık, 1993), pp. 33-34.

Party factions play decisive role during the coalition formation as well as the maintenance stage. In order to reach a better understanding it is vital to identify the party factions. Dominant coalition of the JP's elite had no control over the 'zones of uncertainty' during the first years of its establishment, in Panebianco's term. In other words, they could not control who would be the deputy candidate before the election. The party was more like the federation of different factions in the Assembly with different aims. It consisted of three different groups in the Parliament,: conservatives and religious sympathizers who became deputies for the first time, some authoritarian liberal persons, emotionally attached to the DP, and finally the moderate, better educated ones, closer to the state administration. The first two groups made an alliance against the moderates on the basis of the common goal i.e., to obtain immediate pardon for ex-DP prisoners.³² They were either called 'extremists' or the 'nationalist-sacredists'(*miliyetci-mukaddesatci*).³³ The Competition between these two factions had continued until the December 1970 when the extremists left the party to establish the Democratic Party under the leadership of Ferruh Bozbeyli, even though the moderates became dominant after the Second General Congress of the JP in 1964 with the election of Suleyman Demirel, party Chairman.

Though Ekrem Alican and his close associates secured full control over the party executive, they could not succeed in obtaining the loyalty of the party's parliamentary group. Religious and ardent nationalist groups also left the JP either to create the religious NOP, later the NSP, or to take part in the pro-fascist National Action Party, led by Alpaslan Turkes. Likewise, the RPP also lost its last remnants of conservative faction in 1972. Towards the end of the decade three tendencies emerged within the RPP which were the group gathered around Ali Topuz, the General Center's group or the moderates

³²C. H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p.147.

³³M. Y. Geyikdagi, *Political Parties in Turkey*, p.102.

who were supporting the General Executive Board, and Deniz Baykal's group. While the first one was against the second, the third one opposed to the two by adopting the motto 'left opposition'.³⁴

The center-right parties-the TPP and the MP- have always had a secularist and a conservative faction, including nationalists and conservatives with their secondary role in the party administration. However, the liberals have been the ascendants and hence the ruling ones as their counterparts during the pre-1980 period.³⁵

Tursan draws attention to the existence of the three factions within the TPP which are the 'status quo' group, the 'conservative renovators', and the 'liberal renovators'.³⁶ The First faction led by Ismet Sezgin and Koksall Toptan left the TPP after the formation of the TPP-WP minority coalition together with their ten friends. The second faction under the leadership of Ayvaz Gokdemir and Baki Tug prevented further democratization program during the TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition by collaborating with other parties' conservatives in the Assembly. The third faction is headed by the party Chairwoman Tansu Ciller.

The MP's factions has been liberals led by the party leader, Mesut Yilmaz, and conservatives who had the least influence on the direction of party policies.

The SDPP was including the old RPP party elites and the new ones during its first establishment. After its merger with the Populist Party in 1985 this conflict became more apparent when Baykal's group, as a continuation of the pre 1980 era factional disputes, had tried to capture the party control until he left the party with his eighteen associates to revitalize the defunct RPP in 1992. Inonu did not give ministries to this old faction in the TPP-SDPP coalition government. Baykal's group became the dominant one shortly after the merger of the SDPP and RPP under the name of the latter in 1995. Another group

³⁴Milliyet, October 22, 1979.

³⁵H. Tursan, 'Pernicious Party factionalism as a Constraint of the Transitions to Democracy in Turkey, *Democratization*, (Vol.2, No.1, Spring 15, pp.169-184), p.175.

³⁶Ibid., p.179.

within the SDPP was A. G. Gurkan's one whose aim was more democratization during their coalition partnership with the TPP.³⁷

Turkish public opinion has always been on the side of consensus and compromise has generally no strong ideological commitments. Rather it has behaved in a pragmatic way in the sense that people and businessmen have called for the formation of the RPP-JP coalition during the 1960-1980 era and more recently before formation of the TPP-MP coalition if no single party enjoyed a parliamentary majority. Finally party followers and businessmen succeeded in realizing their historical aims when the TPP-MP short-lived minority coalition was formed because of the strong pressure over the parties. Even though it was a short-lived one this coalition demonstrated power of the centrist tendency of the Turkish public opinion. Survey results that have been carried out before the 1977 general election illustrated that seventy-five per cent of the respondents identified themselves with centrist, moderate ideological tendencies in the heydays of ideological polarization at the elite and mass level.³⁸ The results of the 1977 general election illustrated that a great amount of votes were won by the center-Right and center-Left parties in the absence of the center party rather than extreme parties.

However the situation was somewhat different at the party elite level especially in the evenly but precariously balanced parliaments of the 1970s. The past legacy of the political culture of the state precluded the development of the notion of the loyal opposition because of some characteristics like low tolerance and authoritarianism.³⁹ Karpat argues that some Turkish political leaders, including Inonu, perceived the RPP as the vanguard of Turkish modernization and educator of the people, the party elites

³⁷Ibid., p.181.

³⁸E. Kalaycioglu, 'Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey: Changes and Continuities in the 1990s', *Comparative political Studies*, (Vol.27, No. 3, October 1994, p.403-424), p.422.

³⁹E. Ozbudun, 'State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey', in L. Diamond, eds., *Political Culture in Developing Countries* p.252. and also his another article 'Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations' in L. Diamond, J. Linz, and S. M. Lipset, eds., *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy* (Boulder and Colorado: L. Rienner, 1990), p.201.

despised the opposition when they were in power or they identified those who were in power as usurpers when they were in opposition. The largest two parties have represented this political culture.⁴⁰ According to Heper,

their intolerance toward opposition, which leads to the persistent accusation that one's opponents have divisive motivations, would have hampered cooperation among the political parties.⁴¹



⁴⁰K. H. Karpat, 'Turkish Democracy at Impasse', p.32.

⁴¹M. Heper, 'Recent Instability In Turkish Politics: End of Monocentrist Policy', *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, (Vol.1, No.1, Winter 1979-1980, pp.102-112), p.109.

3. 3. COMPATIBILITY VARIABLES

This sub-section tackles with the question of to what degree coalition partners have shared the similar party ideology, or the similar policy goals. Variables such as compatibility of their social bases, and the effects of prior party relations on the composition of the coalitions will also be considered.

The first coalition was between the RPP and the JP, the heir of the ex-DP, after the general election of 1961 that was described by Dodd as 'shot-gun marriage'.⁴² Ideologically, the difference between two parties was coming from their attitude toward the role of the state in economy which means that whereas the former was giving priority to the state in economic matters the latter supported the private enterprise but the state would get involved in economic matters if the private enterprise could not manage. In other words, the state economic enterprises had to play a role of supporting and encouraging the private sector.⁴³ During the election campaigns the JP insisted on its ideas on the proper role of the state in economy. In opposition to this idea that assigns the state into the secondary role the RPP emphasized that the economic planning had to be realized through the newly established State Planning Organization(SPO). The reason for this was coming from its strong criticisms of the defunct DP's economic policies which had been characterized by lack of any economic planning.⁴⁴ For this reason the new Constitution of 1961also stipulated the establishment of the SPO. Shaw and Shaw describe it as 'progressively but basically a middle class liberal party, somewhat more socialistic than before but still moderate'.⁴⁵

⁴²C. H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey*, p.144.

⁴³Milliyet, September 13 and October 1, 1961.

⁴⁴O. F. Lologlu, *Ismet Inonu and Political Modernization of Turkey*, p.235 and .

⁴⁵S. J. Shaw, and E. K. Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of modern Turkey, 1808-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, vol. 2), p. 421.

Another source of difference was coming from their attitudes toward religion despite the fact that both parties were secular in their nature. In contrast to the strict secularism of the RPP, the JP represented a more tolerant attitude toward religion. But the former relaxed its statist and secularist policies before the election, consequently the party recognized the equal status of the private sector with that of the state and interpreted its statism as a social welfare state ⁴⁶ The party also welcomed foreign capital under equal conditions with domestic capital so as to secure the support of the business community.

Both parties promised a piece of land to the landless and land-short peasants, although the JP's promise was weak one, rather it preferred to increase agricultural productivity with modern farm techniques. The party declared to revise some segments of the prevalent taxation system related to land, property, and agricultural income taxes, and also to reduce the proportion of taxes on small trade. Furthermore, the party also promised to abolish compulsory sharing bonds and to eliminate wealth declarations.⁴⁷ The JP promised to decentralize the state administration and to increase the autonomy of the local administrations.

The only point on which both parties declared the same intentions was the recognition of the workers' right to strike and establishment of social welfare provisions that would embrace the whole population.⁴⁸

However, the NTP had different outlook from the JP as one of the partners in the second coalition government with the RPP, RPNP, and Independents. It was an adherent of the nineteenth century or laissez-faire liberalism. In an interview, Ekrem Alican, the Chairman of the NTP, stated that except in areas where the public interest was

⁴⁶F. Bahrapour, Turkey: *Political and Social Transformation* (New York: Theo, Gaus' Sons Inc., 1967). p.57.

⁴⁷K. H. Karpat, "Social Groups and Political System after 1960", in K. H. Karpat, eds., *Social Change and Politics in Turkey* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), p.253.

⁴⁸Even in the health sector the JP was recognizing the priority of the private enterprise, according to Dodd. C. H. Dodd, *Politics and Government*, p.141.

predominant, private enterprise should be the basis of the economic development, the state had to help the individual entrepreneurs by providing technical knowledge, personnel as well through its technology and capital especially in areas where the private enterprise was weak. There is conditionality here that the state had to withdraw from these areas as the private enterprise was flourishing.⁴⁹

Social justice might be provided through a just taxation system, according to him, but the taxation system should be inductive to the development of the private sector rather than curbing it. Due to its strong adherence to liberal ideas coalition bargaining with the RPP failed in the first round when there was disagreement over the proper role of the SPO. Although the JP accepted the equal status of the state sector with the private ones and planning role of the SPO, the NTP declared after the disintegration of the RPP-JP coalition that they were against the SPO's working manner that would discourage private enterprise.⁵⁰ The NTP successfully made its ideas accepted by its coalition partner-the RPP during the second round of the bargaining. According to the agreement Alican would be the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economic affairs, including the activities of the SPO. Due to its pivotal position, the RPP had to give more concessions as shown in the coalition protocol of June 24, 1962;

..... the state must encourage private enterprise, its investments, and to divert them towards the fields necessitated by rapid and balanced development. However, this encouragement must be through a financial and credit policy, and through the formation of a capital policy, and guidance and technical knowledge, and technical knowledge, and not through direct interference, which is compatible with the economic and political order with which we identify ourselves. The fundamental principle that must guide the work to

⁴⁹Milliyet, September 5, 1961.

⁵⁰Milliyet, June 9, 1962 *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri(1960-1978)* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1978, Cilt. 2), p.36.

be undertaken by the state, should be to make strategic investments, investments necessary for long-term development, and investments that private enterprise cannot undertake.⁵¹

Another coalition partner, the RPNP, had been representing the conservative and religious sector of the Turkish political spectrum until its charismatic leader, O. Bolukbasi, with his close associates left the party in 1962 to revitalize the ex-Nation Party(NP) of 1948.⁵² After their departure the RPNP became relatively a moderate party that had been formed by the dissidents of the DP.⁵³ The party remained alive together with the RPP during the military intervention in 1960.

According to Karpaz, the RPNP adopted principals of liberalism in both economic and political matters. The party program envisaged for the state a role of supervising the market rather than becoming an obstacle through interference.⁵⁴ The conditions the party declared before the coalition bargaining with the RPP justifies Karpaz's statements about the party program.⁵⁵ These were about the working principals of the SPO, land reform, and proper role of the state in economy. In relation to the first, the party officials claimed that the SPO had to get rid of theoretical works and had to focus on projects with practical value.

As a core idea of liberalism, the party recognized private property as sacred rights of individuals and proposed that land reform had to be dealt with in terms of management rather than distribution of the land. In other words, similar to the ideas of the JP and NTP RPNP was envisaging agricultural reform rather than land reform. The third conditionality was to end the state capitalism. Again it gave the state secondary role in economic realm, guiding private enterprise by providing capital and information.

⁵¹F. Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, pp. 273-274. and K. H. Karpaz, 'Domestic Politics', in K-D. Grothusen, eds., *Turkey*, p. 72

⁵²W. F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980), p.103..

⁵³K. H. Karpaz, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 433.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p.433.

⁵⁵Milliyet June 13, 1962 and September 15, 1961.

However, it was not against planning within the idea of national economy. It envisaged that the state should train religious men, though it accepted the separation of the religion from the state.

The third coalition government consisted of the newly formed NP in addition to the JP, the NTP, and RPNP. The NP was the most conservative party with its special emphasis on religion and morality.⁵⁶ Like RPNP it believed in the priority of the private sector over that of the state as well as flexible planning but strongly against unequal competition that would lead to the extinction of smaller ones as well as being against communism and fascism.

The first two coalitions were compulsory in the sense that they were dictated by the military.⁵⁷ One of the life senators had stated two days before the NTP's acceptance of the partnership of the RPP that 'we told President Gursel that nobody except Inonu should be premier, and it is impossible to think a cabinet without the RPP'.⁵⁸ In terms of party goals the third four-party coalition was a caretaker coalition before the 1965 general election.

The constituency of the RPP consisted of different segments of the society, mainly bureaucrats, some part of the intelligentsia and professional groups, some segments of the business community which were against inflationary economic policies of the DP, and local notables. In contrast the JP's constituency was embracing large segments of the business community, especially newly rising commercial groups and industrial middle classes, non-radical intellectuals, landowners and traditional rural elements in the relatively developed regions of the country. The NTP was also appealing the same constituency as the JP, but the party was powerful in the eastern provinces of

⁵⁶R. P. Nye, *The Military in Turkish Politics*, p. 273.

⁵⁷C. H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey*, p.273.

⁵⁸Milliyet, June 20, 1962. Another interesting was that the voting held by the general Administrative Board of the JP to decide whether to make coalition with RPP or not resulted in 90 'yes' votes against 89 'no' votes. Six out of ninety persons had planned to abstain from voting at the beginning. Milliyet, November 16, 1962.

Turkey because its strong party organization during the time of the Freedom Party in the second half of the 1950s.⁵⁹ The RPNP and its offshoot, the NP, appealed to the conservative votes, large amount of which was concentrated in Central Anatolian provinces like Konya, Ankara, Kutahya, Kirsehir, Afyon, Yozgat due to the charismatic leader, O. Bolukbası.

In relation to leadership and constituency factors, the constituencies of the JP and NTP felt hatred against the RPP and its veteran leader Inonu. Dodd draws attention to two factors that led to the such feelings: whereas the first one was originating from the bad reputation of the RPP and of its leader due to the strict secularization program, heavy-handed bureaucratic administration, and statist economic policies from which large segments of the population, especially the rural ones, newly rising merchants and industrial middle classes had been deeply affected during the monoparty period, the second factor was the result of identification of the RPP with the military intervention as a rescue operation to save the RPP from the repressive policies of the DP.⁶⁰

The JP leader, Ragip Gumuspala, who had been a general before he retired from the army in 1960, was rather a moderate person. Because of his personality and of the hostility of the JP's constituency against the RPP he was not successful in establishing control over the party's parliamentary group and its provincial organizations during as well as after the coalition. Osman Bolukbasi was opposed to both Gumuspala and Inonu. Ekrem Alican and Hasan Dincer were moderate leaders of the NTP and the RPNP.

Except for the RPP the two newly formed parties had no firmly established country-wide party organization before the 1961 general election. When they became coalition partners this created problems for the governing party elites in reconciling the demands of the parliamentary groups, the provincial party leaders and the party executives. The environmental complexity and hostility in terms of electoral volatility

⁵⁹K. H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics* p.433

⁶⁰C. H. Dodd, *Politics and Government*, p.135.

and army's hostile attitudes toward the newly established parties played significant role on the stability and effectiveness of the coalition during the 1961-1965 period.

The party system is generally identified with fragmentation and polarization in the 1970s, starting toward end of the sixties. In addition to the two parties, three new parties emerged which were the Democratic Party, splitting from the JP, the NOP, established by those who left the JP, and the RPNP. The third and last one was the Turkish Unity Party(TUP). Moreover, the RPNP was reorganized and renamed as the National Action Party in 1969. All of these newly emerged parties took place on the right side of the spectrum with the JP. Four cabinet coalitions and a JP minority coalition were created within a seven year period until the military intervention of 1980.

Turkish political parties had to adapt themselves to their changing environments. In other words they were compelled to revise their ideological stance on the policy scale. Because as Ozbudun stated with increasing industrialization and social mobilization they (center-periphery cleavages) tend to be replaced by functional cleavages'.⁶¹ It meant that parties had to aggregate changing interests without interrupting internal party balances. However, it was a very difficult job to reconcile the old elements with the new ones within the rigid hierarchical structure of the two old parties where there were vertical relations between the party elites. For this reason the change was a slow and painful process, resulting in departure of the old elements rather than in reconciliation between them.

The RPP adopted 'left-of-center' policies to cope with its environment efficiently and not to yield its constituency to the newly formed Turkish Labor Party. Karpat describes the RPP's new ideology as follows:

⁶¹E. Ozbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.55.

The new ideology rejected Marxism and Communism, as well as the old form of nationalism formulated by Ataturk, that had been basis of the party until the 1960s. Instead, it preached social justice, populism, and economic development based on massive state support, without rejecting private enterprise or individual ownership of property.⁶²

According to the new program of the party, the 'public sector' would be the vanguard especially in the establishment and development of large industrial enterprises and industry which was producing basic industrial goods.⁶³ The state would be empowered with opportunities and capabilities to realize planned and disciplined rapid industrialization, although the new program was giving priority to the national economy while not precluding international competition. On the contrary, the program stipulated that structuration of Turkish industry with its institutions, adjustment of it to the EEC standards and empowerment of its competitive power in the Common Market would be taken into account as solution to the economic problems of the country.⁶⁴ This implied that Turkey would not refrain from the Common Market she would also look for new markets in the Middle East.

The party declared its strong support to the small and medium-sized economic enterprises against the large industrial conglomerates in order to decrease regional inequality and population concentration in big cities.⁶⁵ The party brought some limitations over the foreign capital in terms of both quantity and sectors in which it would take place.

⁶²K. H. Karpas, 'Introduction to Political and Social Thought in Turkey, in K. H. Karpas, eds., *Political and Social Thought in Contemporary Middle East* (New York: Preager, 1982, second edition), p. 448-449.

⁶³*Ak Gnlere: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1973 Secim Bildirgesi* (Ankara: Ajans-Turk Matbaacilik Sanayi, 1973), p.87.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p.58.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p.82.

It declared that all rights related to working life would be restored and social welfare provisions would be established.⁶⁶ For the land-less and land-short peasants the party also promise land through the state's buying of the large lands for distribution.

It seems useful to elaborate the conditions in which the National Salvation Party and the Democratic Party were established.

The effects of newly changed cleavages were immediately felt in the state-business relations and hence within the political parties as agents of representing, aggregating, and realizing these interests at the governmental level. The effects of the functional cleavages were firstly seen within the body of the Union of Chambers that had three parts in the sixties and seventies. These were the Chambers of Industry, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Chambers of Commerce and commodity exchanges. Their countrywide numbers were respectively 8, 131, 50, and 52 in 1977.⁶⁷ The Chambers of Industry were located in provincial and district centers where large industrialists had no branches. These chambers were more like trade organizations. However, they had enough number of branches to dominate the general assembly of the union because of the weighted representation compared to the Chambers of Industry which were representing the industrialists' interests from metropolitan areas like Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara.

In order to prevent corruption and favoritism at the ministerial level, allocation of limited foreign currency was left to the Chambers of Industry when the government adopted rapid industrialization policies in the 1960s. Another function of the Chambers of Industry was the preparation and distribution of quotas for the restricted commodities in the import regime.⁶⁸ All these were implying that big industrialists had control over

⁶⁶Ibid., p.223.

⁶⁷A. Oncu, 'Chambers of Industry in Turkey: An Inquiry into State Business Relations as a Distributive Domain', in E. Ozbudun and A. Ulasan, eds., *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey* (New York and London: Holmes& Meier, 1980), p.458.

⁶⁸Ibid., p.469.

the allocation of resources in relation to the commercial sectors and small-and-medium-sized industrial enterprises, generally located especially in the Anatolian part of the country. Necmeddin Erbakan's attempt to become the president of the Chambers of the Union in 1969 and Demirel's manner of the recapturing of the Union from Erbakan as the Prime Minister in 1969, according to Barkey, irritated the business community and led to the crystallization of different interests within the JP. The JP's support to the big industrialists became obvious with this event. Its implication was that the JP could not succeed in aggregating various interests within its body.⁶⁹ Appearance of the NSP and DemP illustrated transformation of this cleavage conflict to the political arena.

According to Sencer, the National Order Party, that was the predecessor of the National Salvation Party, tried to reconcile morality and market economy.⁷⁰ The core of the party's economic policy is to 'develop, stimulate and guide the private enterprise within the framework of inducing rightful earnings and respecting the private ownership rights'.⁷¹ However the NSP was against the monopoly capital; it was putting emphasis, like its coalition partner-RPP on vertical and horizontal diffusion of the capital so as to assure equality between individuals and regions but like the other Right-wing parties it was also assigning the state into the secondary role in economy, limiting its role in areas where private enterprise had no enough power to establish and run economic and industrial establishments. The state should leave these areas to the private enterprise after establishing necessary enterprises and assuring their productivity.⁷²

According to Sarıbay, 'national view', the official ideology of the NSP that was adopted in the first General Congress of the party on January 21, 1973, had five targets.

⁶⁹H. J. Barkey, *The State and Industrialization Crisis in Turkey* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p.151.

⁷⁰M. Sencer, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partilerin Sosyal Temelleri* (Istanbul: Gecis Yayınları, 1971), p.369.

⁷¹A. Y. Sarıbay, *Türkiye'de Modernleşme, Din, ve Parti Politikası: Milli Selamet Partisi Örnek Olayı* (Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985), p.103 and N. Erbakan, *The Just Economic System* (Ankara: Bars Ltd. and Milsan Ltd, 1991) part related to the Essentials of the Just Economic System..

⁷²Ibid., p.103.

These were internal peace, state-society integration, the ideal of a big Turkey, moral development, and finally material development.⁷³

In terms of land reform, since the party accepted the principle of respecting the ownership rights, it was against land distribution. However, the party was envisaging the distribution of the state lands and large private lands that were not used through the consent of the owner. Unlike the RPP's program, agriculture had no priority in the whole development process. Rather than land reform, the NSP was insisting on educating the peasants and increasing the productivity of agricultural lands. This means that the Party was not against landlords.

What the NSP understood from the word 'secularism' was totally different from that of the RPP. While the former was perceiving it as religious freedom the latter was interpreting it as freedom for the leftist ideas.⁷⁴

In contrast to the ideas of the RPP, the NSP was also against Turkey's entry to the Common Market and all kinds of interests. All these depict that except similar targets of heavy industrialization and support to the small industrialists, they did not share more things. There were deep ideological differences between the coalition partners both in terms of economic as well as in social matters.

The second coalition was created by four parties that were the JP, the NSP, the NAP, and the RRP.

Ex-colonel Alparslan Turkes captured the control of the RPNP in 1965. Before renaming the party as the National Action party in 1969 he reorganized the party in terms of ideology by adopting 'nine lights' or principles, recruiting personnel, and re-organizing the party whose main feature was its strict hierarchic and militia-type structure. It became a pro-fascist party, emphasizing ardent nationalism and pan-Turkism with strong anti-communistic and leftist leanings. The 'nine lights/principles' consisted of

⁷³Ibid., p.111.

⁷⁴K. H. Karpat, 'Turkish Democracy at Impasse', p. 37.

1. Nationalism;
2. Idealism;
3. Morality that was understood as the protection of Turkish customs and beliefs;
4. "Social-mindedness, referring to the protection and encouragement of free enterprise, the provision of economic incentives to holders of small capital and state-wide organization of social welfare"⁷⁵;
5. Scientific mentality;
6. Liberalism, recognizing all rights and freedoms;
7. Care for peasant;
8. Populism; and finally
9. Industrialization.⁷⁶

The party envisaged a strong state as above and beyond the classes; the existence of classes was rejected. Rather the party's understanding of society was based on the existence of six social sectors in a hierarchic way due to the perception of society as an organic entity whose members have different talents. These sectors were workers, peasants, tradesmen and artisans, civil servants, employers and lastly liberal professionals.⁷⁷

The party also included religion in its official ideology in 1973 to draw more votes. The party was economically and politically against the Common Market for nationalistic reasons, but it was not against private enterprise. Instead, its program proposed a mixed economy where the private sector would have priority over that of the state.⁷⁸

⁷⁵J. M. Landau, *Jews, Arabs, Turks* (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1993), p.p270-271.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 272.

⁷⁷M. A. Agaogullari, 'The Ultranationalist Right' in I. C. Schnick and A. Tonak and , eds., *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.195.

⁷⁸Ibid., p.195.

Another partner of the First National Front Coalition was the Republican Reliance Party(RRP) that was created by the conservative faction of the RPP in 1967 after Bulent Ecevit had been elected the General-Secretary of the party and the RPP had moved to the left; later it merged with another party-the Republican Party which was also an offshoot of the RPP that emerged after the resignation of Inonu in 1972. The party could not have much incentives to offer to its voters, nor could it meet the attacks by stronger rival parties which created instability within the party. Finally it became almost extinct with three deputies in the aftermath of the 1977 election.

The party was a liberal party, having strong secularist tendencies. It was representing interests of the traditional and conservative elements like landlords and merchants.⁷⁹ The First and Second Nationalist Front Governments included all the ideological tones of the right that were adjacent on the policy scale between the 1975-1978 era.

The last coalition was formed after the Second Nationalist Front had fallen apart towards the end of 1977 by the RPP, the DemP, the RRP, and twelve Independent deputies, who had left the JP. The interesting thing was that these twelve deputies left the JP during the climax of the ideological polarization in the party system.

The DemP that had been formed by forty defectors from the JP in 1970 obtained forty-five seats in 1973 and only one seat in the 1973 and 1977 general elections respectively. The DemP's deputies had been representing the traditional wing of the JP. It did not take part in any coalition government until 1978 due to the deep ideological differences between the RPP and the ideological similarity with the JP. In the absence of any organizational incentive and the internal strife due to the environmental hostility resulting from the attacks of the JP, it could defend its unity against such hostility only until March 1975 from October 1973. As a newly formed party, it could not manage to

⁷⁹W. F. Weiker, *The Modernization of Turkey*, p.135.

pass 'survival threshold' like the RRP in the complex and hostile environment of the 1970s.⁸⁰ Similar to the RRP, the DemP which was on the side of the private sector and representing interests of the landlords, traders and merchants against the industrialists. Demirel's attempt to tax agricultural incomes to finance social welfare provisions and his manner of dealing with the Chambers of Union event in 1969 alienated this faction from the JP.⁸¹ Like other newly emerged small parties it was also against the monopoly capital.

The four newly emerged four parties-the DemP, the RRP, the NAP, and the NSP had almost the same constituency; however, the last one was strongly supported by the small Anatolian industrialists and artisans with traditional conservative elements in contrast to the first two ones whose constituency heavily consisted of landlords and merchants. As different from others, the NAP mainly represented the interests of the lower middle classes.

There was a historical rivalry between Ecevit and Demirel as well as between the latter and Erbakan. The NSP established its party organization in forty-two provinces and approximately in three hundred districts in 1973, these numbers had reached sixty-five and over four hundred, respectively by 1977.⁸² Likewise, the NAP had also completed party organization in important provinces in a very hierarchical manner not unlike that of the army by 1973; all power rested in the general Executive Board, but in practice in the hands of the party Chairman, Alparslan Turkes.⁸³ According to Landau, number of its branches had reached 567 out of 572 administrative units by 1980.⁸⁴

Other two personality parties, the DemP and the RRP, took the JP's and the RPP's local party organizations with them in traditional provinces when they left these parties.

⁸⁰The term "survival threshold" is used by A. Panebianco, *Political Parties*.

⁸¹M. Sencer, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partilerin Sosyal Temelleri* (Istanbul: May Yayınları, 1971), p.379.

⁸²A. Y. Sarıbay, *Türkiye'de Modernleşme, Din, ve Parti Politikası*, p.109.

⁸³M. A. Agaogullari, 'The Ultra-nationalist Right', p.194.

⁸⁴J. M. Landau, *Jews, Arabs, Turks*, p.267.

The two big parties lost their provincial party organizations as well as party cadres which meant a kind of covert de-institutionalization for these two big parties. In other words, all parties practiced change, they either renovated at their party organization like what the RPP did in urban areas or newly established ones like the NSP and the NAP built new party organizations. In order to distribute organizational incentives to the party administrators as well as party followers and hence to complete and consolidate their organization they immediately had to come to power. The precarious balance between the Right and the Left bloc further restricted the possible number of coalition alternatives. Large parties became heavily dependent on the smaller ones. The DemP could not manage to consolidate its party structure through sharing governmental power and it finally dissolved itself in 1978 after eight years of life.

For the elaboration the very nature of Turkish political parties it is useful to perceive them as organizations. Panebianco defines a political party as 'a structure in motion which evolves overtime, reacting to external changes and to the changing environments in which it functions'.⁸⁵ He argues that

a party's organizational characteristics depend more upon his history, i.e., on how organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor. The characteristic of a party's origin are in fact capable of exerting a weight on its organizational structure even decades later. Every organization bears the mark of its formation, of the crucial political administrative decisions made by its founders, the decisions which 'molded' the organization.⁸⁶

He points out three factors that determine a party's 'genetic model':

1. The pattern of a party's initial country-wide organization, i.e., through penetration or diffusion;

⁸⁵ A. Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.49.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.50.

2. The existence of the external supporter during its initial formation period; and
lastly

3. The presence of a charismatic leader at the inception.⁸⁷

Combination of these three factors causes strong party institutionalization. In addition to these, the degree of party competition and the nature of party-state-bureaucracy relations also affect the degree of institutionalization.⁸⁸ A party, which is initially formed in such a manner, has its administrative bureaucratic staff and party professionals with regular, 'centripetal' and 'vertical' internal elite recruitment tradition. If the party has a charismatic leader the cohesive governing elite's loyalty is to the leader rather than the party. Elite recruitment does not follow a regular pattern, rather division of labor and organizational incentive distribution are in the hands of the charismatic leader. There are no factions in both types of parties. The reason for this is the lack of free space where party elites move freely. But there may be tendencies whose relation with the dominant party elites or the charismatic leader shows a vertical character. To challenge the position of the charismatic leader means excommunication and the end of one's political career.⁸⁹ The parties organized through diffusion are more like a federation of factions with centrifugal elite recruitment pattern. Whereas the change in the strongly institutionalized parties and parties having charismatic leaders are painful and slow process, for the latter this change is a usual phenomenon.

Political parties function in an environment which may be complex, unstable, and hostile to their existence. Environmental complexity depends on socio-economic conditions, number of political parties and electoral volatility. There is a curvilinear relation between complexity, instability, and hostility. In changing social situations the internal cohesion of parties may weaken because several groups may propose different

⁸⁷Ibid., p.50.

⁸⁸Ibid., p.113-114.

⁸⁹Ibid., p.52.

alternatives to control the environment and/or decision-making process diffuse in order to deal with immediate problems.⁹⁰ In unstable environments party splits are the usual events. However, when unstable environment becomes hostile to threaten the existence of the party the degree of internal unity and party cohesion increases. There is a curvilinear relationship between these two variables, according to Panebianco. Attitudes of the state or those of the military in the Turkish case increases internal party cohesion.⁹¹ There is also positive relationship between the size of the party, degree of institutionalization and coping with the environmental complexity as the cases RRP and of DemP clearly illustrated in the Turkish context.⁹²

Two significant factors that have affected political parties and hence the party system during the multiparty era were rapid social change and military interventions. Whereas the former caused party splits the latter one created the problem of institutionalization for the political parties. Besides a⁹³ttitudes of the state led to the formation of strong DP's party organization in the fifties.

Turkish political parties have represented similar features in the sense that they have been, in Duverger's term, internally created parties, except for the Turkish Labor Party, they all have had charismatic leaders such as Adnan Menderes of the DP, Suleyman Demirel of the JP, Ismet Inonu of the RPP and handful cohesive governing elites with centralized decision-making structure, i.e., they have been similar to the cadre parties, representing oligarchic tendencies. For this reason they either could not easily change their policy direction. In terms of the degree of institutionalization two largest parties, the RPP and the DP together with its heir the JP represented strong party institutionalization until the 1980 military intervention.

⁹⁰Ibid., p.60.

⁹¹Ibid., p.206.

⁹²Strong institutionalization gives way to party splits after certain degree because of the policy inflexibility which originates from the centralized nature of the decision-making system within the party..

⁹³M. Heper, 'State, democracy, and Bureaucracy in Turkey,' in M. Heper, eds., *The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp.131 and 132.

In relation to internal organization of parties in the 1970s Sayari claims that intra-party democracy existed in the nominal sense in the 1970s In those years he argued that

incumbent party executives exercise a good deal of control over the general proceedings and the outcome of the elections for the top leadership positions since the provincial congresses, where the delegates to the General Congress are chosen, are usually under the control of a local faction which aligns itself with the dominant faction within the central party organization.⁹⁴

Dodd, related to another undemocratic aspect of the party organization, argues that delegates secretly vote for the election of the members of the Central Governing Body and the party leadership.⁹⁵ Implication of this structure is the existence of two types of party governing elites: those who were party careerists, starting from the lowest level, and deputies who had no influence over the party's decision-making mechanism as well as their future role in the party, especially if the party had a charismatic leader, as Panebianco argues. This mechanism may explain why the JP deputies left their parties in the heydays of polarization in the late seventies.

Prior party experiences influenced the parties' decision to accept the partnership of some parties. The NSP rejected the RPP's offer to form a coalition because of the coalition experience in 1974 as did the JP as the rival party of the RPP since 1963.

The two center-Right and center-Left blocs had been represented by the RPP and the JP fragmented with the military intervention in the 1980s. On each side of the blocs two similar parties emerged that were the Social Democratic Populist Party(SDPP), the Democratic Left Party(DLP), the Motherland Party(MP), and the True Path party(TPP). The first coalition was set up by the SDPP and the TPP after the 1991 general election.

⁹⁴S. Sayari, 'Aspects of Party Organization in Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, (Vol.30, No.2, Spring 1976, pp.187-199), p.190.

⁹⁵A. Ayata, 'Ideology, Social bases, and Organizational Structure of the Post-1980 Political Parties', in A. Eralp et al., eds., *The Political and Socio-economic Transformation of Turkey* (Westport: Preager, 1993), p.42 and C. H. Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy* (Huntington: The Eothen Press, 1990, 2nd ed.), p.117.

The SDPP perceived rapid industrialization as the only solution to the country's problems; however, it urged a more egalitarian taxation system and economic planning through which the state would assume a directing role in the economy. It defended the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs), but its program revealed that it did not look at privatization ideologically.⁹⁶ The SEEs should take a role,

1. In areas where high technology are employed;
2. To close the economic gap between the regions;
3. In areas where the SEEs are producing strategic goods and services for the public interest.⁹⁷

In relation to privatization Ismail Cem, one of the leading ideologues of the SDPP, argued that social democracy had no obsession with ownership rights. Depending on the conditionality of the public interest any enterprise could be bought and sold. Those SEEs that were in good conditions and those that had strategic significance for the public interest had to be autonomized in order to save them from the influence of politics and bureaucracy.

Cem claimed that despite its intermediate regulating role, the market could not play the role of the sole organizer in the long-run; this role had to be given to the common will of the people in the long-term. The state has to define macro-economic targets and to determine the direction of the economy. The state had to protect the public interests against the private ones; in doing so its intervention ought to be supportive and protective rather than restrictive.⁹⁸

Other targets of the party were the 'consolidation of democratic principles and the development of a social democratic culture'.⁹⁹ However their understanding of democracy was not based on 'sameness' of individuals but on the recognition of

⁹⁶ *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi programi: Yeni Hedefler, Yeni Türkiye* (No information).

⁹⁷ D. Baykal and I. Cem, *Yeni Sol* (Istanbul: Cem Yayinlari, 1992), p. 86.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.87.

⁹⁹ A. Ayata, 'Ideology, Social Bases, and Organizational Structure of post-1980 Political Parties', p.42.

differences within the limits of national integrity. According to Baykal, another leading member of the SDPP, the SDPP was against the 'standardization' and hence the 'homogenization' of the people.¹⁰⁰ Baykal further argued that 'our national integrity was the integrity of individuals, having different ethnic roots and religious beliefs'.¹⁰¹ National integrity could not be reduced to ethnic sameness, rather everybody ought to be able to seek, develop, represent and reveal his/her national identity within ethnic differentiation.¹⁰²

The TPP, on the other hand, was holding liberal and nationalistic ideas in relation to economic and national issues that were connected to its strong negative feelings against communism.¹⁰³ In other words, the party's philosophy was based on the concepts of social justice and political egalitarianism as it is the case in the liberal theory. According to Ayata, the TPP's understanding of social order was based on 'collective freedom' rather than 'individual freedom'. The former 'is collectively used and embedded in the traditions of the country as the nation of the people'.¹⁰⁴ The state was perceived as a liberal state and it was assigned into the referee role in economic life.¹⁰⁵ Despite such deep ideological differences between the two parties their coalition was the longest living one in Turkish multiparty history if we ignore its disintegration and revitalization in September just before the general election, held on December 24, 1995.

The TPP and the MP created a center-right minority coalition that was backed by the DLP of Bulent Ecevit.

The MP's ideology was the synthesis of the ideologies of the pre-1980 parties, that is a combination of tenets of market economy, social justice, nationalism and

¹⁰⁰D. Baykal and I. Cem, *Yeni Sol*, p.76.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p.76.

¹⁰²Ibid., p.76.

¹⁰³C. H. Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*, p. 117.

¹⁰⁴A. Ayata, 'Ideology, Social Bases, and Organizational Structure of Post-1980 Political Parties', p.41.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p.41.

conservatism, according to founder and former leader of the party, Turgut Ozal.¹⁰⁶ For him, social justice was the basis of internal peace that had to be country-wide.¹⁰⁷ Free market was the economic aspect of the MP' ideology because free competition is appropriate to human nature that leads to increase in production, and prevents unproductivity.¹⁰⁸ Their understanding of nationalism was the same with the Kemalist understanding. The party, according to Ozal, reconciled secularism and conservatism because their understanding of conservatism was based on respect for the traditions and mores of Turkish society rather than standpattism.¹⁰⁹

Ozbudun briefly describes both the attitudes of the party toward the state and its bureaucracy with reference to its economic policies as such that

...for the first time in Turkish politics, smaller government, less governmental involvement in the economy, the greater reliance on market forces, privatization of public economic enterprises, and an overall reduction of state activities became consciously articulated party goals.¹¹⁰

With regard to their ideologies, there were no differences between the two coalition partners in their approach to economic as well cultural matters; the only problem, however, was the competition for the same place and for the same constituency, in other words, their 'hunting ground' was the same and hence the question is a life and death matter, especially for the TPP.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶G. Ozbas, eds., *Kurulus ve Icratlarıyla Anavatan Partisi* (No information about the book) . The book is a compilation of speeches of Ozal who delivered in different places and times.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p.212.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p.212.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p.213.

¹¹⁰E. Ozbudun, *State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey*, in L. Diamond, eds., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 263.

¹¹¹The concept 'hunting ground' is used by Panebianco see for the TPP F. Acar, 'The True path Party 1983-1989', in M. Heper and J.M. Landau, eds., *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* (I. B. Tauris, 1990), p. 191.

The last and governing one is the coalition of the TPP and religious Welfare party minority coalition, backed by the ultra-nationalist pro-Islamic ultra-nationalist Grand Unity Party(GUP). Although both parties believe in the salience of the private enterprise in the economy the WP supplants the TPP's secularist world view with the Islamic one. The WP, the heir of the NSP, changed its protectionist economic policies of the pre-1980 era. According to Sen, it adopted market oriented economic ideas.¹¹²

The MP appeals to the newly rising export-oriented business groups, upwardly mobile newly migrated urban workers especially in the private sector. A carried out in December 1993 illustrated that the TPP's and the MP's constituencies were not different from each other. The only variation was that small peasants, merchants and artisans were more strongly represented(a sixteen per cent difference) in the TPP's constituency than that of the MP.¹¹³ Housewives constituted a significant proportion of their social base. The SDPP/RPP followers are white-collar workers, civil servants, employees and students. Blue collar workers, including factory workers employed in the private as well as public sector, service workers, sales persons, drivers and agricultural workers as well as merchants and artisans, are all attracted by the WP.¹¹⁴

In terms of party organization the WP has a mass party organization at the grass-roots level due to its organic organizational model. Domination of the same party elites for almost twenty-six years at the top level does not confirm the idea that it is a mass party. Rather the WP, like other parties, is closer to a cadre party because of this feature. For this reason almost all Turkish political parties are like what Panebianco calls 'electoral-professional' parties.¹¹⁵ He points out several features of such parties. Party professionals play the central role in these parties due to their special tasks; vertical ties

¹¹²S. Sen, *Refah Partisi'nin Teori ve Pratigi* (Istanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1995), p.9.

¹¹³ TUSES Veri Arastırma A.S., *Türkiye'de Siyasi partilerin seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Toplumsal Tabanı, 1993* (Ankara: Cem ofset Matbaacılık Saayii A.S., 1995), p. 44.

¹¹⁴Ibid., pp.42-47.

¹¹⁵A. Panebianco, *Party Organization*, p.264.

within the party are weak because of their appeal to "opinion electorate" in contrast to what mass parties do; personalized leaders and public representation play prominent role in terms of the image of the party; grants by interest groups and public funds are the main financial sources of such type of parties rather than income coming from party members; they put more emphasis on issues and party leadership; party careerists and interest groups' representatives occupy significant place within the party organization.¹¹⁶ Existing Turkish political parties represent most of these features in their party organization. For example the recently re-elected Chairwoman of the TPP did not permit the election of seventy-six deputies on the TPP tickets in the general election of December 1995 and her preference for the top level professionals and bureaucrats, the former leader of the MP's "princes", and the unchanging party leaders depict what Panebianco proposes.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p.264.

3. 4. MOTIVATIONAL VARIABLES

The environment was both complex, unstable and hence hostile in terms of both electoral volatility and in terms of the military's threat to the newly formed the JP and the NTP that were competing for the votes of the ex-DP in the first half of the sixties. Their attitudes toward economic and social matters were almost identical. Therefore as the smaller of the two, the formation of a coalition with the JP would have meant identity loss for the NTP. Another constraint was that all the ties between the JP and the RPNP were broken down due to the personal adversities between the two leaders-Ragip Gumuspala and Osman Bolukbasi. He was also denouncing the RPP and his leader's attitudes.¹¹⁷

The RPNP revealed its intention to participate in a national coalition as the last possible solution, but the JP was against the creation of a national coalition. Rather the party was preferring a coalition under its leadership which would include both the NTP and the RPNP. The NTP was in a difficult situation as a pivotal party in the sense that on the one hand, despite its good intention to create a coalition with the RPP it had fear of both domination of it as a big partner and of the reaction of its indecisive constituency that could be triggered by the powerful opposition party i.e., the JP. Bad reputation of the RPP among the masses negatively affected the NTP's final decision. On the other hand, coalition partnership with the JP would mean for it identity loss. Although the NTP was ready to enter into coalition with the RPP which would include the RPNP, this option was out of consideration because its leader, Bolukbasi, declared that the RPNP would not take part in any coalition.¹¹⁸ The RPP-JP coalition was the last option. Moderates and ex-DP members urged the JP to accept the partnership of the RPP because the party might gain legitimacy in the eyes of the army through this way it might alleviate the

¹¹⁷Milliyet, October 19, 1961.

¹¹⁸Milliyet, November 10, 1961.

military's pressure over the party, and also an amnesty might be secured for the ex-DP prisoners. According to Toker, the business class wanted to see the JP in power so as to restore their lost due to the economic crisis in the last years.¹¹⁹

The second coalition was created by the RPP, the NTP, the RPNP, and the independents. Considering the partnership of the NTP, it would make the coalition with the RPP because this time the RPNP was ready to enter into coalition after Osman Bolukbasi and his close associates had already left the party in 1962 to revitalize the former Nation Party of 1948. Although the JP elites declared that they wanted to form a coalition with the RPP the latter rejected this option due to the former coalition experience with it. After obtaining great policy concessions from the RPP because of its pivotal role the NTP consented to make a coalition with the RPP which was essential for the survival of both the regime and the smaller parties.¹²⁰

A right-wing caretaker coalition was set up in March 1965 that consisted of the JP, the NTP, the RPNP, and the NP in order to deprive the RPP from controlling the government before the general election of 1965 and to use the state resources before the election rather than implementing common policies.

No party obtained a parliamentary majority in the 1973 general election because of the distribution of the Assembly seats among seven parties, three of which won seventeen seats (the RRP 13, the NAP 3 and the Unity Party of Turkey 1).

The leader of the JP, Süleyman Demirel, declared that the JP would remain in opposition by rejecting the idea of a right-wing coalition that was proposed by the leader of the newly emerged Democratic party leader (DemP), Ferruh Bozbeyli.¹²¹ The latter argued that the RPP was on the left in contrast to their Rightist position. He further argued that he was trying to consolidate Rightist ideas in the country and wanted to see a

¹¹⁹M. Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları 1944-1973: İnönü'nün Son Başbakanlığı 1961-1965* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, second edition, 1994), p.22.

¹²⁰Milliyet, June 8, 1962

¹²¹Milliyet, October 19, 1973.

Rightist party in power rather than a leftist one.¹²² The DemP declared that it would do every sacrifice and effort to protect the rights of the people against the Left by taking the nation's tendencies into the consideration.¹²³ However the JP leader was planning to recover his losses by remaining in the opposition. In contrast to the attitudes of these two parties, the Islamic National Salvation Party(NSP) as a newly created one was open to all coalition options. After the rejection of coalition proposal of the RPP by the JP and the DemP, the NSP called a Rightist coalition once again. However their rejection reinforced the NSP's hand in coalition bargaining with the RPP. Some provincial leaders of the NSP stated that

then there will be no coalition without us, we have to obtain more concessions. For example we should receive more ministries and create equal rights in the works that would be done.¹²⁴

In all, two groups emerged within the NSP despite its powerful bargaining position that was coming from its pivotal status in the party system: those who favored a coalition with the RPP and those who were against it. Whereas the former was claiming that to participate in a coalition with the RPP was useful for the future of the NSP since the left press was on the side of the NSP in those days, if they would reject the offer the left press might disseminate negative ideas about the party that might lead to closure of the party the latter was arguing that if the NSP participates in the coalition the powerful opposition party, the JP, might follow a strong opposition strategy that might lead to the loss of the NSP's already fluent constituency in the end.¹²⁵ All these illustrate that even though the two parties had no similar party ideologies, the concern for gaining legitimacy and the aim of protecting its constituency played a greater role in the decision of the

¹²²Milliyet, October 18, 1973.

¹²³Milliyet, October 27, 1973.

¹²⁴Milliyet, November 5, 1973.

¹²⁵Milliyet, November 6, 1973.

party.¹²⁶ Another significant motivation was to use the state resources to distribute organizational incentives to party administrators as well as to followers. This was also true for the RPP because whereas the former was a newly established party the latter experienced covert de-institutionalization by losing its provincial organizations to the RRP and the shifting weight of its constituency from rural to urban areas where the party established new party organizations and the university students became the new party organizers in these areas. This is why two clauses that stipulated an immediate pardon for the prisoners and legitimatization of the ownership of squatter houses on state lands before end of 1973 without permission in the common government program of the RPP and NSP.¹²⁷ At the first round of meetings the NSP rejected the offer due to fear of losing the support of its conservative constituency and religious orders. After Demirel's failure to form a coalition when the DemP leader rejected to enter into a coalition with the JP under Demirel's leadership, the NSP accepted partnership of the RPP.¹²⁸

The rejection of Demirel's Premiership by the DemP was the apparent reason. The main reason was the fear of being swallowed up by the big brother, the JP. This became obvious after the dissolution of the RPP-NSP coalition partly due to the disputes between the partners but mainly to the RPP's desire to turn the Cyprus success into vote in an early general election. When the RPP rejected any idea of coalition with the NSP the DemP became the unavoidable or pivotal partner for all eligible coalition options, either a mixed coalition with the RPP or a rightist coalition. It always rejected a coalition with the JP for avoiding identity loss. The DemP did not form a long-term working coalition with the RPP due to both fear of strong opposition of the JP and ideological differences between it and the RPP. Furthermore it did not want to take the

¹²⁶T. Arkan, 'The National Salvation Party', in M. Heper and R. Tapper, eds., *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p.83.

¹²⁷F. Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, p.336.

¹²⁸According to Toprak, the NSP lost the support of the Nurcu Order after this coalition. See B. Toprak, "Religious Right", in A. Tonak and C. Schnick, eds., *Turkey in Transition*,

responsibility of carrying a leftist party to the power in an early election.¹²⁹ Although as a rightist party the DemP was shared the same ideas with the JP, the fear for losing its identity the situation became very critical for the DemP. Recognizing this reality Ferruh Bozbeyli, the leader of the party stressed that the DemP was under the covert pressure of both the RPP and the JP. Whereas the former was looking for a partner that was essential for an early election the latter's only target was to disintegrate the party.¹³⁰ Finally following the JP's declaration of its decision which was about a cooperation with the NSP, the RRP, the NAP to form the so-called the Nationalist Front Government against the Left. This event prepared the end of the DemP which entered into a process of disintegration with the departure of a group headed by Sadettin Bilgic, known as the leader of the extremist faction in the JP until 1970. The four-party Nationalist Front Government won the confidence vote with 222 'yes' vote against 218 'no' vote.¹³¹ These events supported the idea that the newly created DemP could not pass the survival threshold and finally disintegrated because of the environmental hostility. Although it had managed to resist the hostility up to the certain point with its increasing internal strength it dissolved almost two years later when it failed to pass such threshold. The party lost its ability to distribute incentives to its followers and members by rejecting all possible coalition options which quickly led to the disappearance of the weakly institutionalized party. Because it had no adequate resources to control its environment's complexity in the sense of both electoral volatility and high number of political parties. The disintegration of the DemP verifies Panebianco's hypothesis which claims the

¹²⁹The leader of the RPP declared that the party was open to all coalition options provided that there would be early election, *Milliyet*, September 20, 1974.

¹³⁰*Milliyet*, April 12, 1975.

¹³¹One day before the voting distribution of the seats in the Assembly was as follows: the JP(150), the NSP(48), the RRP(9), the NAP(3), Bilgic's group(8), the RPP(189), the DemP(31), the TUP(1) and Independents(2), *Milliyet*, April 12, 1975. While two deputies abstained from voting four deputies did not come to voting three of whom were the DemP members, *Milliyet*, April 13, 1975.

existence of the curvilinear relationship between environmental hostility and internal strength of political parties.

It was possible to identify manifest and latent goals of the members of the First and Second National Front Coalition Governments. The manifest goal for all partners was to prevent an early election and hence the RPP's control of the government alone after a possible early election rather than the implementation of common policies. Smaller parties found an opportunity to come to power which was essential for their survival, especially for the survival of the NAP and the NSP. The RRP had already failed to pass the survival threshold in 1969 and peculiarly in 1973. For this reason it had no such an assertion in subsequent elections and in coalition bargaining to maintain its identity. However the NAP and especially the NSP had to reconcile two significant targets: on the one hand they had to maintain their identity within the rightist coalition, on the other hand they had to control the state resources to consolidate their newly-created country-wide party organization by distributing incentives. Thanks to its pivotal role which was vital for the survival of the coalitions the NSP managed to reconcile these two aims by obtaining great concessions from the RPP and the JP. For the NAP, there was no such problem of identity loss as an ultra-nationalist party if one takes the common denominators of the National Front coalitions into account. These were nationalism and religion. The JP's latent motivation was to recapture the votes it had already lost to the DemP, and the NSP.¹³² The JP pursued a strategy of persistent attacks against the RPP to reach this target which was necessary for survival of the coalitions with no policy objective and the RPP responded to these attacks by adopting destructive attitudes toward the government as a prominent feature of what Sartori calls 'irresponsible opposition'. The reason for this was the absence of any coalition

¹³²S. Sayari and I. Sunar, 'Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects', in S. O'Donnell and P. C. Schmitter, eds, *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe* (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 180, 181, and 182

alternatives for the RPP in a polarized party system in the second half of the 1970s and disappearance of the line between the government and opposition. Polarization resulted in the revitalization of the same coalition among the same partners except the RRP after the early general election in 1977 that is known as the Second National Front Coalition after failure of Ecevit's abortive attempt to form a RPP minority government.

The Second National Front Coalition was replaced at the beginning of 1978 by the RPP-DemP-RRP and dissidents from the JP as result of the National Fronts' inability to solve the problems of the country such as street violence, unemployment, rising inflation as a manifest reason. But the latent factor for their departure was Demirel's reluctance to revise the cabinet.¹³³

Four parties emerged after the 1991 general election as possible coalition partners. Those were the True Path Party(TPP), the Motherland Party(MP), the Social Democratic Populist party(SDPP), and finally the Welfare Party(WP). However, the Welfare Party(WP), the Reformist Democracy Party(RDP), and Nationalist Work Party(NWP) made an election alliance which is known as the holly alliance to avoid the ten per cent national electoral threshold before the election. The MP declared its intention to remain in opposition in order to recover its losses as an ex-ruling party despite the calls from the business community for the TPP-MP coalition. Mesut Yilmaz, leader of the MP, declared that 'Nation gave us the duty of opposition. We will carry out our responsibility as the main opposition party.'¹³⁴ Liberal wing of the TPP rejected the coalition with the Islamic WP. The only solution was the TPP-SDPP coalition. Before the election Erdal Inonu made a statement that the SDPP was ready for every coalition options if the party could carry out what it promised to the electorate before the election.¹³⁵

¹³³Milliyet, December 26, 1977.

¹³⁴Milliyet, October 22, 1991.

¹³⁵Milliyet, September 5, 1991, The SDPP's promises were a new constitution, replacement of the President, a new election system, decentralization of the state administration, equal income distribution,

When the coalition broke down on September 20, 1995 the MP's condition for the creation of the MP-TPP coalition was an early election. However, Tansu Ciller, leader of the TPP, did not accept an early election proposal with her party's twin which had increased its popularity as the main opposition party due to the failure of the coalition to solve the country's urgent problems. This shows their intention that their first and foremost motivation focused around the gains and losses rather than common policy targets. After the failure of Ciller's attempt to form a minority government with the help of the minor parties, the only remaining option was the revitalization of the TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition. Deniz Baykal, the Chairman of the SDPP/RPP, had already declared that his party was ready to form a coalition with its former partner as long as the latter accepted his conditions which led to the coalition breakdown.¹³⁶ They revitalized the old one as a caretaker election one. Their aim was not to produce solution to the problems of the country but to remain in power during the election.

The early general election results that was held on December 24, 1995 necessitated the formation of a coalition. The novelty was the emergence of the WP as the first party with a two per cent margin. The two center-Right parties with equal strength reached an agreement on the creation of a center-Right minority government to which the center-Left DLP of Ecevit gave outside support after two months coalition bargains. The common denominator, for this time, was to prevent the Islamic, anti-secular WP coming to power rather than implementation of common policy targets.¹³⁷

reformation of the tax system, personnel reform, union right to public servants, reformation of the conscription system.

¹³⁶The conditions were the wage increase for the workers who were employed in the public sector, cancellation of the postponement of the strikes of public sector workers, solution of the problems between the partners about the decrees related to governors, the content of the Anti-terrorism law amendments of the some articles of the Constitution and promulgation of adjustment laws, future of the deputies of the dissolved People's Democracy Party, and RPP's claim of the resignation of Necdet menzîr who spoke against the RPP during the Funeral of a police as the Chief of the Istanbul Police. *Milliyet*, September 20, 1995.

¹³⁷E. Ozbudun, 'Turkey: How Far From Consolidation?', *Journal of Democracy* (Vol. 7, No. 3, July 1996, pp.123-138), p.123.

They demanded votes from the electorate to prevent the a possible WP government. In accordance with this strategy, both parties rejected coalition offers made by the WP. However Mesut Yilmaz met several times with the WP leader, Necmeddin Erbakan although he declared that they would not set up a coalition with the WP. The problem between the two center-right parties were not policy disagreement but it was locked on the question of who would be the Prime Minister as a manifest reason. Yilmaz followed power-broker strategy to reduce the TPP's bargaining power and also he might aimed at dividing the rival party. With regard to the second strategy Ciller argued that 'no one should base his plans on the DYP(TPP). Let him go and return the mandate or form a government. This is because the DYP will not be divided'.¹³⁸ Moreover, one of the influential deputy of the TPP, Necmeddin Cevheri stated that 'we will not let this party be divided. This responsibility belongs to all of us'.¹³⁹ Other deputies also made public statements that the most important duty for them was to preserve the integrity of the TPP against all attempts aiming at dividing it. Put differently, the situation illustrated that environmental complexity may turn into hostility if there is more than one party competing for the same position. The hostile environments increase the internal strength of the parties up to certain point. Since both the MP and the TPP had an equal degree of institutionalized structure which is necessary for the control the environment, the TPP maintained its integrity because of the hostility. They finally set up a minority coalition which lasted only three months.

With the disintegration of the minority coalition due to the corruption allegations about Ciller. The only alternative that could save her the Motions was Erbakan's WP. The TPP-WP coalition was not totally unexpected, because during the coalition bargaining immediately after the elections and before the formation of the TPP-MP minority government, Yalim Erez, as the right-hand of Ciller argued that

¹³⁸Turkish Daily News, february 16, 1996.

¹³⁹Ibid.

our aim is not being in opposition. We have come to power. And we want to form a coalition with the ANAP(MP). If it does not work out with ANAP, we will look for other government formulas. Whatever government formulas can possibly ensue from this overall picture, we will try each one.¹⁴⁰

He also declared that 'if it is right for ANAP to form coalition with the RP(WP), it would be equally right for the DYP to form a coalition with the RP'.¹⁴¹ This statement shows that they were fearing from their constituencies rather than aiming at preventing the WP from coming to power. There were two possible reasons for the TPP's insistence on remaining in power. One was related to Erbakan's declaration that he would start motions about Ciller(that would send her to the High Court and possibly end her political life) just after both the MP and TPP had revealed that they would not set up any coalition that would include the WP.¹⁴² For this reason the Coalition with the MP would save Ciller from such danger. The WP remained the last solution to save her after the disintegration of the TPP-MP minority government. The second reason was that in order to consolidate her power within the party. She had not permitted re-election of seventy-six former TPP deputies in the last election so as to consolidate her power within the party. Her party leadership could only be secured by distributing of incentives to new deputies.¹⁴³

As stated in the theoretical section, the WP, as an extremist party, always preferred to enter into coalition with the MP rather than the TPP immediately after the election as well as after the MP-TPP coalition fell apart. As a pragmatic party, the WP tried not to miss any opportunity which would open the way to the power in order to legitimize itself and to distribute incentives to the party followers which is the only way to consolidate its country-wide party organization.

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹Ibid.

¹⁴²Milliyet, January 1, 1996.

¹⁴³Turkish Daily News, January 18, 1996.

Coalition experiences in the post-1980 period depicted the significance of motivational factors on parties' decisions. Policy objectives were not taken into account seriously. At the theoretical level, coalition bargaining before the formation of the MP-TPP and the WP-TPP coalition created intra-elite and elite follower conflicts as in the case of the TPP. 'Conflict-inducement negotiations' of the MP could have led to the TPP's disintegration, but it did not divided because of environmental hostility. However, twelve TPP deputies left the party when it accepted coalition partnership with the WP. The Reason for this departure was centralization of internal decision-making and concentration of power rather diffusion of it and also absence of necessary mechanisms to deal with intra-party problems.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴M. Maor, 'Intra-Party Determinants of Coalition Bargaining', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, (Vol.7, No. 1, pp.65-91), p.66.

3. 5. DISTRIBUTION OF MINISTRIES

Distribution of ministries among the coalition partners has two dimensions. Coalition parents prefer to get many ministries. However, at the end of the bargaining they receive some of them. each party also value ministries differently. This subsection evaluates distribution of government portfolios quantitatively and qualitatively.

The table illustrates that all big coalition partners were the net losers except for the TPP as the bigger one compared to the MP. The minister/deputy ratios of the coalition parties, controlling almost equal number of deputies were relatively equal or it skewed toward to the smaller ones slightly. The respective ratios of the RPP and the JP were 6.36 and 6.96 in 1961. In other words, while the former could get 6.36 ministries for every hundred deputies the same number of deputies meant 6.96 ministries for the latter. These ratios were 11.80 and 13.64 for the TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition in 1991. Those numbers for the TPP-MP(13.33-12) and the WP-TPP(11.39-14.84) coalitions depicted Gamson's theory of equal distribution of number of seats between the partners, having almost equal weight in normal times.

The equality disappeared when the difference between the weights of the partners became larger. This observation was true for the RPP-NTP-RPNP-indep. coalition. The respective ratios were 7.02, 9.68, 12.12, and 7.69. Results for the RPP-NSP (9.73 to 14.58) and the TPP-SDPP/RPP coalitions(9.89 and 18.46) support the idea of skewnes toward the smaller ones in normal times. It can be argued that there was negative relationship between the number of the seats and the coalition gains. In other words, when the difference between the smaller and the larger one became greater the coalition gains of the smaller ones were increasing.

The numerical findings also supports the idea that bargaining power of the smaller partners increased either when the system became polarized or the Right-wing parties came together to form coalition. The ratio for each coalition partner during

Table 3.3. Minister/Deputy Ratio for all Coalition Partners

Party	N. of Ministers	N. of Deputies	Minister/Deputy Ratio
RPP	11	173	6.36
JP	11	158	6.96
RPP	12	171	7.02
NTP	6	62	9.68
RPNP	4	33	12.12
Ind.	1	13	7.69
JP	10	172	5.81
NTP	4	22	18.18
RPNP	4	19	21.05
NP	4	13	30.77
RPP	18	185	9.73
NSP	7	49	14.28
JP	16	150	10.67
NSP	8	49	16.33
RRP	4	9	44.44
NAP	2	3	66.67
JP	16	189	8.47
NSP	8	24	33.33
NAP	5	16	31.25
RPP	23	214	10.75
RRP	2	2	100
DemP	1	1	100
Ind.	9	12	75
TPP	21	178	11.8
SDPP/RPP	12	88	13.64
TPP	18	182	9.89
SDPP/RPP	12	65	18.46
TPP	18	135	13.33
MP	15	125	12

WP	18	158	11.39
TPP	19	128	14.84 ¹⁴⁵

the JP-NTP-RPNP-NP coalition was as follows: 5.81, 18.18, 21.05, and 30.77. They rose sharply to 66.67 in 1975 for the NAP and to 100 for the RRP and the DemP in 1978. It is possible to formulate the existence of a positive relationship between the bargaining power of the smaller parties and the polarization of the party system, especially in bipolar party systems. Because the smaller parties got a ministry for their every deputy from the RPP in 1978 compared to the concession of the JP to the NAP(66.67) in 1975. It meant that the former as the Left-wing party had to give more concessions to the Right-wing ones for the coalition building.

Since the JP leader, Suleyman Demirel was not deputy at that time the premiership was given to an independent deputy, Hayri Suat Urguplu, in 1965 and the coalition partners of the TPP-MP and the WP-TPP coalitions agreed on the rotational premiership. Except for these three cases leaders of the biggest parties always became head of the coalition governments.

Ministries such as the finance, education, interior, and external affairs have always been the most important ones for all parties with varying size. The largest coalition actors received the ministries such as finance , education and external affairs before 1980.

There were always disputes between the parties about who would control the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Interior. While the JP was able to get the Ministry of Interior in 1961 the NTP could not manage to prevent its control by the RPP in 1962. It was against the RPP's control, both parties reached an agreement and wrote

¹⁴⁵I used approximate deputy numbers for the calculation of the coalition gains for these coalitions that were formed in-between elections. Premierhip was not included during the calculations for the last two coalitions because of its rotational status.

down to the coalition protocol that the Interior minister would be appointed by the RPP after the coalition partners reached a consensus on the same person.¹⁴⁶

The Nation Party as the smallest partner of the coalition in 1965 received the same ministry because of its powerful bargaining position within the party system. Although the RPP declared before the coalition bargaining in 1974 that it did not give the political ministries the NSP got the Interior ministry as a concession at the end of the bargaining.¹⁴⁷ The NSP rejected a proposal suggested by the RPP deputy Deniz Baykal to accept any other ministry. The NSP deputy, Oguzhan Asilturk, argued that 'the government has three feet: its political foot is the Ministry of Interior, the social foot is the Ministry of Education and the economic foot is the Ministry of Finance. If we do not receive one of them we cannot set up a coalition partnership'.¹⁴⁸ It continued to control this ministry during the National Front coalitions, although the JP and the NAP did not want to give this ministry to the NSP at the beginning of the coalition bargaining before the Second National Front Coalition.¹⁴⁹

These patterns changed in the post-1980 period. While the TPP as the big partner got the Interior, Education, and Finance ministries the SDPP/RPP received the Ministry of External Affairs in 1991. The TPP leader, Demirel, did not give the Ministry of Education despite insistence of the latter on this ministry. Later on it gave up this claim but wanted to control one of the three ministries which were the Ministry of Interior, Agriculture, or Public Works and Housing. Finally it got the last one.¹⁵⁰

Due to the almost equal weight of the TPP and the MP they shared four ministries equally. As the former received ministries such as education and external affairs latter got the finance and interior ministries. However, the WP had to make more concessions

¹⁴⁶Milliyet, June 17, 1962 and June 22, 1962.

¹⁴⁷Milliyet, November 7, 1973.

¹⁴⁸Milliyet, January 15, 1974.

¹⁴⁹Milliyet, June 15 and 17, 1977

¹⁵⁰Milliyet, November 18, 1991.

to its coalition partner- TPP because of its captive status. Whereas the latter managed to control the Ministry of Education, External Affairs, and Interior so as to pacify the reactionaries within it the former got only the Finance Ministry.

Political parties tried to control particular ministries which were related to their specific party policies. The JP got the Ministry of Trade until 1977 when it became coalition partner. The JP and the TPP ,as continuation of the former, controlled the Ministry of Education except during the RPP-JP coalition. They also controlled the Ministry of Health except during the National Front coalitions. In Western European coalition experiences that ministry was controlled by the Left-wing parties. Ekrem Alican, the leader of the NTP, became the Deputy Prime Minister responsible from economic affairs so as to control the SPO. He did not accept the partnership until the RPP accepted such a condition.

The RPP and its heir, the SDPP/RPP received ministries such as the labor, public works, and foreign affairs whenever they took part in a coalition government. The NSP always controlled the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Industry. But the WP could not get the latter in 1996. Both the NSP and the WP always managed to receive the Ministry of Justice.

3. 6. COALITION MAINTENANCE AND TERMINATION

Turkish coalition governments have had no permanent standing committee to solve problems between the members except for the one during the RPP-NTP-RPNP-Ind coalition. Establishment of the standing coalition committee was demanded by the NTP to resolve conflicts among the partners. It consisted of chiefs of parties' parliamentary groups.¹⁵¹ However, the NTP leader Alican sent memorandum to Inonu directly rather than to the committee in order to talk about the solution of the problems that the coalition was facing.¹⁵² It illustrates the ineffectiveness of it. Later coalition partners decided to set up a standing commission that was led by ministers from coalition partners to increase its power.¹⁵³

There have been no standing coalition committee or commission, rather coalition partners have preferred to form ad hoc commissions, including ministries from each party. Prime Ministers occasionally participated and sometimes headed them. They also met other party leader or leaders to reach an agreement to find out solution to problems.¹⁵⁴

As pointed out at the beginning of this part due to the structural characteristics of Turkish party system coalition governments have been either rightist coalitions or mixed ones. It seems very useful to look at the sources of the problems that emerged between coalition partners at the ideological level.

¹⁵¹Milliyet, June 9, 1962.

¹⁵²Milliyet, December 25, 1962.

¹⁵³Milliyet, August 21, 1963

¹⁵⁴See how coalition partners solve the problems Milliyet, April 15, 1974, May 21, 1974, November 22, 1992, January 16, 1993, January 24, 1993, and April 14, 1995.

3. 6. 1. RIGHT-WING COALITIONS

Rightist coalitions embrace the four-party coalition in 1965, the First and Second National Front Coalitions between 1975-1977, the MP-TPP from March 12 to June 6, 1996 and the WP-TPP minority coalitions from July 8, 1996 now on. The common characteristic of all is that their aim was not the realization of common policy targets; the uniting factor was rather the prevention of the RPP until the 1980, of the Islamic WP from coming to power, and the last one's sole motivation was to save Tansu Ciller, leader of the TPP, from the motions submitted by the WP.

The first one was the caretaker rightist coalition for approximately nine months before the general election, held in October 1975. Each party aimed at using state resources before the elections that would provide them with power during the election campaign. The small partner Nation Party criticized Premier Urguplu's visit to Moscow and its two deputies did not sign the cultural agreement between Turkey and the USSR in order to draw public attention before the general election.¹⁵⁵ The coalition disintegrated with the election.

The second one was the National Front Coalitions that was set up to prevent an early general election and the possible rise of the RPP. The government rejected the bill related to the early election in the Assembly five days after its establishment.¹⁵⁶ Since there was no common policy agreement among the partners other than postponing the early election they immediately started to move independently to follow their individual party interests. As a part of its individual party policy Suleyman Demirel, Chairman of the JP, declared that the government reduced the price of the artificial fertilizers and especially more reduction on the prices of the fertilizer that is used in wheat cultivation between 43 and 154 *kurus* a kilo. He said that the government subsidized the farmers

¹⁵⁵C. H. Dodd, *Politics and Government*, p.157 and Milliyet, August 9, 1965.

¹⁵⁶Milliyet, April 18, 1975.

with around TL five billion.¹⁵⁷ While the prices were going up in the world markets as a result of rising oil prices the JP was aiming at recapturing its rural former constituency that had already been lost to the DemP and hence leading to the extinction of the RRP, the NSP and the DemP. Moreover the government also increased the quantity of economic support for cotton producers as well as some agricultural producers without reflecting these increases to the prices of the final produced goods.¹⁵⁸ Besides these the government promised to clean all the debts of the peasants.

The NSP used its pivotal role to force the JP and other coalition partners to realize its individual party policies. Some of the conditions that NSP extracted from the JP for the continuation of the coalition was a curriculum based on moral values in national education, the establishment of the State Industry and Investment Bank, relocation of general directories, new cadres for the Ministry of Industry, in return, the NSP did not obstruct the decisions of the cabinet.¹⁵⁹ The government could not promulgate the import regime on time because of the conflict between the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Industry, since the former was controlled by the JP and the latter by the NSP. As two rival parties the JP and NSP could not agree on the location of any public project in two years, according to Barkey.¹⁶⁰ Moreover the NSP did not sign the authorization about a ten per cent devaluation of TL in September 1977. It was made by the Central Bank without the approval of the cabinet.¹⁶¹ They did not have common decision-making mechanism nor was there correspondence among the partners, rather they behaved independently.¹⁶² Ahmad states that political parties were behaving as they

¹⁵⁷Milliyet, April, 20.

¹⁵⁸Milliyet, June 22, August 6 1975, and April 20, 1976.

¹⁵⁹Milliyet, November 7, 1975.

¹⁶⁰H. Barkey, *The State and Industrialization Crisis in Turkey* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 164.

¹⁶¹F. Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p.167 and F. Ahmad, 'The Military intervention and the Crisis in Turkey', in H. Ramazanoglu, eds., *Turkey in the World capitalist System* (Aldershot: Avebury. 1985).

¹⁶²M. Heper, recent Instability in Turkish Politics: End of a Monocentrist Policy?, *International Journal of Turkish studies* Vol.1, No.1, Winter 1979-1980, pp.102-113, pp.105-106.

were preparing for an election. They preferred short-term party goals such as creating job opportunities for party followers in the state bureaucracy. There were seventy thousand vacant civil servant positions in the bureaucracy. In addition to this, 224 thousand civil servants were recruited until the end of 1977.¹⁶³ The number of appointees within the first nine months of the National Front Coalitions were 1497, of whom 602 were upper-level bureaucrats. The number of recruitment was 1286 of whom 359 were upper-level during the RPP-NSP coalition.¹⁶⁴

The JP deputies were complaining about the cabinet. Despite Demirel's promise to revise the cabinet he did not fulfill his demand which created instability within the party.¹⁶⁵ Hilmi Isguzar, the JP deputy from Sinop, stated that the government was more like a federation rather than a coalition, each party was following its own interests.¹⁶⁶ Similar to this statement, according to Mustafa Kılıç, the JP deputy, the government was not a coalition, it was a government with three heads; every party was governing by itself within the coalition government. He points out two reasons for this event one of which was personal disputes and the other was the NSP's attitudes within the coalition.¹⁶⁷ All these illustrates the two faces of the problem: one was the NSP's attempt to preserve its identity vis-à-vis the JP and the second one was desire of all parties to allocate government resources to their followers. The NSP put more emphasis on industrialization policies because the other parties were also tolerant towards religion. In other words the religious theme lost its significance within the rightist coalition. In order to compensate this gap the NSP always created problems for the JP. The First National Front coalition ended with the early general election. The defections from the JP ended the second one towards the end of 1977.

¹⁶³Hurriyet, December 13, 1978.

¹⁶⁴Milliyet, January 1, 1976.

¹⁶⁵Milliyet, September 29, 1977.

¹⁶⁶Milliyet, October 27, 1977.

¹⁶⁷Milliyet, December 12, 1977

The MP-TPP coalition was a compulsory co-operation of the two center-Right parties, backed by a center-Left party to prevent the rule of the Islamists and the union of the center-right, as the leader of the TPP stated.¹⁶⁸ It was dependent on the decision of the center-Left DLP, especially on the privatization issue. The Coalition had already made a concession to the DLP by omitting a government target to privatize the country's social security institutions in the government program before the vote of confidence.¹⁶⁹

The first problem emerged between coalition partners on the issue of appointment of key state bureaucrats like to the Central Bank, the Treasury and the Privatization Administration Board. Although the leader of the TPP, Ciller, did not take a post in the government she had obstructed all the government decisions until her demands were met as the governors were appointed.¹⁷⁰

Meanwhile, the WP started motions to investigate alleged irregularities in the issue of contracts by the state-owned Turkish Electricity Distribution Company(TEDAS) and the privatization of the state shares in the Turkish Automotive Industry Co-operation(TOFAS). While the former was passed by 232 votes against 179 in the 550-seat assembly on April 24, 1996 the latter was by 376 votes to 141 to set up a parliamentary probe about her.¹⁷¹ The MP deputies also voted in favor which worsened the relations between the coalition partners.

The TPP's strategy was, then, to deadlock the government that would result in the resignation of Mesut Yılmaz. So they could put the blame on him and hence could become the party that was not breaking the coalition in the eyes of the public. It was the only way to escape the public punishment in the subsequent election.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁸TurkishDaily News, march 7, 1996.

¹⁶⁹Middle East Monitor, Vol.6, No.3, March 1996, p.15.

¹⁷⁰Turkish Daily News, April 12, 1996

¹⁷¹Turkish Daily News, April 25, and May 10, 1996.

¹⁷²Turkish Daily News, April 26, 1996.

Another problem with her was the claim that she had allegedly misspent the TL five hundreds billion from the Prime Ministry slush fund.¹⁷³ Although President Demirel advised her to inform the Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz she rejected the idea and declared that the TPP would withdraw from the government. When the Constitutional Court invalidated the confidence vote for the TPP-MP government the Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz handed his resignation to President Demirel on June 6, 1996. Two weeks before the resignation of the government the TPP's leader stated that

being a minority government it cannot carry out the functions of the state in this situation..... It is essential to form a majority government which can work and solve the country's problems. The DYP will give the necessary support to such a majority government.¹⁷⁴

Parallel to this statement the TPP did not hesitate to set up the TPP-WP minority coalition so as to save its leader from the motions rather than to produce solutions to country's urgent problems as claimed by its leader. Two problems emerged between the partners: one was each party's approach to the Kurdish issue another one was the Turkey's foreign policy directions.¹⁷⁵

Coalition governments could not work when all the Right-wing parties came together. Small partners became representatives of interests of small segments of the society and directly transmitted them to the parliament, especially in the seventies. They followed their specific party ideologies strictly. Ideological rigidity increased when the number of competing parties rose in the same period. However, all parties gave up their party ideologies during the coalition bargaining. Erhmann argues that

the gap between high sounding principles and the need for pragmatically based coalitions becomes painfully obvious. It makes ideologies appear as

¹⁷³Turkish Daily News May 18, 1996.

¹⁷⁴Turkish Daily News, June 6, 1996 and see also Middle East Monitor, Vol.6, No. 7, July 1996, p.15.

¹⁷⁵Turkish Daily News, August 7, and 8, 1996.

subterfuges and convinces the voters that electoral contests are manifestations of sheer irresponsibility.¹⁷⁶

Heads of the coalitions could not control the ministers. They tried to fulfill demands of the party rather than those of the governments.¹⁷⁷ They became independent units within the federation-like coalitions.

3. 6. 2 MIXED COALITIONS

Mixed coalitions consisted of the RPP-JP, the RPP-NTP-RPNP-Ind, the RPP-NSP, the RPP-DemP-RRP-Ind, and finally the TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition. It is possible to identify two kinds of problems that emerged between the coalition partners. The first problem that they faced was related to the economic matters but the second one was a bit more complex one and related to political as well as religious affairs. Parallel to the mixed cabinet coalitions, ad hoc Right-wing parliamentary coalitions have been the usual one during the deliberation of substantial matters in the Assembly.

The amnesty question determined the life of the first coalition with the economic ones. After the government had pardoned those who had attempted an abortive coup on February 21-22, 1962 the JP's internal power balances changed that resulted in the increase of the influence of the extremists within the party.¹⁷⁸ The RPP consented a partial amnesty for the Yassiada trials, while other parties were claiming the release of all prisoners.¹⁷⁹ Whereas the RPP proposed a partial amnesty that would include those up to six years of imprisonment before the October 29, the JP pressed for the inclusion of those up to ten years in the first stage and all the remaining ones in the next stage with a determined date. The difference between four years was the exclusion of twenty-six

¹⁷⁶H. W. Erhmann, *Politics in France* Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971, second edition), p.203

¹⁷⁷F. Petry, 'The Role of the Cabinet Ministers in the French Fourth PRepublic', in M. Laver and K. Shepsle, eds., *cabinet Minsters and Parliamentary Government* (Cambrige: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.132.4

¹⁷⁸Milliyet April 14, 1962.

¹⁷⁹Milliyet, May 2, 1962.

persons.¹⁸⁰ This illustrates that the JP moved according to the demands of its constituency.

When the RPP and the JP met on May 3, 1962 they discussed economic problems . The JP claimed the abolition of the declaration of the wealth and cancellation of the compulsory saving bonds. The reason for this was their promise to their electorate before the election. Another dispute between the parties originated from the working manner of the SPO.¹⁸¹

The bill aiming at starting a probe about ex-DP deputies-Samet Agaoglu, Sitki Yarcali, and Esat Budakoglu for misusing their post was rejected by the votes of the JP and NTP.¹⁸² The RPP became very angry about this cooperation. Finally İnönü resigned on May 30, 1962.

The second coalition witnessed the same problems. Economic problems were related to the working manner of the SPO. The leader of the NTP claimed that the SPO was an advisory board that could not determine the proportion of the taxes which was the job of the Finance Minister.¹⁸³ The NTP had the fear of being dominated by the RPP. Alican sent a memorandum to Inonu and proposed to act in cooperation.¹⁸⁴

There were two cases of covert coalition in the parliament among the parties on the right side of the bloc. While the NTP and RPNP deputies voted in favor of the JP's general amnesty proposal, they also voted against lifting the JP deputy Resat Ozarda's immunity.¹⁸⁵ This made clear that they naturally cooperated on issues that were substantially significant for them. Small partners withdrew from the coalition immediately after the local election held on November 17, 1963 to prevent further party losses.

¹⁸⁰Milliyet, May 14, may 21, and may 22, 1962.

¹⁸¹Milliyet, may 4, 1962.

¹⁸²Milliyet, April 26, 1962.

¹⁸³Milliyet, sepember 11, 1962.

¹⁸⁴Milliyet, January 14, 1963 and July, may14, 1963.

¹⁸⁵milliyet Februyay 22, and May 14, 1963.

The RPP-NSP coalition government experienced problems in ideological and also cultural areas. Twenty deputies of the of the NSP voted against granting amnesty to those who had violated the Articles 141 and 142 of the penal code even though the NSP promised to vote in favor during coalition bargaining that took even place in the coalition protocol. Before the voting, one of the NSP deputies argued that they could not forgive communists.¹⁸⁶ Like the NTP the NSP also tried to avoid the dominance of the RPP. The party chose small but controversial issues to draw public attention like the party issues related to public morality, pornographic publications and movie films. The RPP withdrew from the coalition immediately after the Cyprus victory to capitalize on its success in an earliest election which was necessary for coming to power alone.¹⁸⁷

The last coalition was between the RPP, the RRP, the DemP, and Independents from the JP before the military intervention. The independent ministers behaved as a Right-wing party within the coalition. The acceptance of the proposal given by the seventy-four RPP deputies which was mainly about the establishment of the engine industry by the state created a government crisis as the independent ministries strongly reacted against the decision.¹⁸⁸ The Industry Minister Orhan Alp, an independent deputy, declared that the RPP had to accept the powerful situation of the independents within the government. The independent deputies were not responsible for the RPP's program, they had to wait until obtaining parliamentary majority to implement their program.¹⁸⁹ He started to behave independently after this event and in one of his meetings with the industrialists he stated that 'you do not consider the SPO's plan seriously'.¹⁹⁰ The six

¹⁸⁶Milliyet, March 23, 1974

¹⁸⁷Milliyet, September 16, 1974.

¹⁸⁸Hurriyet, November 30, 1978.

¹⁸⁹Hurriyet, December 12, 1978.

¹⁹⁰Hurriyet, January 27, 1979.

independent deputies were also against the modification of Articles 141 and 142 of the penal code.¹⁹¹ This coalition terminated after the by elections towards end of 1979.

The last mixed coalition was between the TPP and the SDPP/RPP. They advocated before the election to change the constitution radically and to move President Turgut Ozal from the office. They declared a re-democratization program after the election with great enthusiasm.¹⁹² They pledged that civil servants would establish trade unions and the Higher Education Board would be abolished. However from its inception this time privatization and again critical political and social events for both sides affected the degree of the compatibility between the partners. The war on privatization and democratization between them lasted until the end of the coalition in the form of reciprocal bargaining. The TPP could not obtain any concession from its partner related to privatize the SEEs without giving some concession about democratization. It seems better to concentrate on the substantial topics, including the economic ones, about which the ruling TPP and the Right-wing opposition parties made co-operation.

The first one was that the TPP and MP back-benchers voted against the proposal that was given by the group deputy chiefs of the two coalition parties. It was about the appointment of the university rectors by President among the three candidates who are to be elected by the university staff. The Higher Educational Council would become ineffective with this proposal. After this event the TPP Chairman, Demirel, promised his coalition partner to correct this situation at the General Council but the same coalition led by TPP deputy Ayvaz Gokdemir rejected the same bill once again.¹⁹³

The SDPP was forced to make significant concessions in its proposal. It was about the changes in the Code of Criminal Procedure which would increase the rights of

¹⁹¹Cumhuriyet, April 15, 1979.

¹⁹²C. H. Dodd, 'Developments in Turkish Democracy', in V. Mastny and R. C. Nation, eds., *Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 135.

¹⁹³Milliyet July, 1992.

suspects in detention forced substantial concessions. The reason for this was the tacit alliance between President Ozal and hard-liners of the TPP.¹⁹⁴ The TPP and MP conservatives brought an issue which was about not to include crimes under the realm of jurisdiction of the State Security Courts(DGM) within the democratization package to the agenda in the Assembly, the arrangement was withdrawn back to the Justice Commission. The partners found a middle way which was about the redefinition of the crimes and in return the extension of the detention period, and the existence of a ready-waiting lawyer in terror crimes which was the TPP's proposal.¹⁹⁵ The MP, WP, and TPP back-benchers moved together to reject the SDPP bill under which May 1 would be made a public holiday despite some of the TPP deputies' supported to the bill.¹⁹⁶

Conservatives of all parties in the parliament, including those of the TPP, reached an agreement to act together to remove the clause about the pro-shariah activities from the newly prepared anti-terror legislation. It was prepared by the mixed group of the coalition partners.¹⁹⁷ The other problem with the anti-terror bill was that the exclusion of a clause concerning anti-secular activities in the committee. The SDPP wanted the clause back in by claiming that anti-secular or Islamic fundamentalism was detrimental like the Kurdish nationalism for the state. The debate over the bill was delayed.¹⁹⁸ The bill that would grant the civil servants union right was sent back to the Constitutional Commission as a result of the proposal given by the TPP and MP deputies.¹⁹⁹ Two parties made co-operation in the Assembly for the appointments to the vacant post of the Radio-TV Upper Commission, five deputies from the TPP and Four

¹⁹⁴Briefing, March 8, 1993, Issue 930, p.7.

¹⁹⁵Milliyet Novamner 16, 1992.

¹⁹⁶Milliyet, March 11, 1993, and Briefing, March 15, 1993, Issue 931, p. 7.

¹⁹⁷Briefing, Novamner 29, 1993, Issue 966, p. 4.

¹⁹⁸Briefing, December 1993, Issue 968, p.5

¹⁹⁹Milliyet, May 5, 1994.

from the MP were elected. The TPP had promised its partner to leave one post to it.²⁰⁰ The twin center-right parties also cooperated in the Planning and Budget Committee of the parliament to alter some points of the privatization bill.²⁰¹ Although the modifications were not very important they were related to the very basis of their party philosophy. All these support the idea that Right-wing parties move as long as there is very threat to their material as well as ideological existence. However the cooperation was a temporary one rather than a lasting one due to the similarities of their aim in the last instance. The other side of the coin is related to the dependence of the statist/leftist parties to the right-wing parties because they have been always controlled by more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats in both coalitions and constitutional amendments.²⁰²

The TPP/SDPP/RPP coalition fell apart on September 20, 1995 due to the disagreements over some points like wage increases for the public workers, delay of strikes, etc. Later on these two parties formed a caretaker coalition that lasted until the 1995 early general election.

The mixed coalition experiences support the two-bloc character of Turkish party system. Co-operation among the Right-wing parties at the parliamentary level rather than the governmental level was the result of weak party institutionalization on substantial issues which have been especially economic and religious one. The statist/Left-wing parties have still been preserving their strict secularist attitudes and statist economic policies. Because two topics -privatization and democratization were the main source of dispute between the TPP and the SDPP/RPP as representatives of each bloc during their coalition. Jacobs argues that

the general approach of Turkish political parties to the politics of democracy can be divided into three categories: short-run and

²⁰⁰Milliyet May 11, 1994.

²⁰¹Milliyet, October 24, 1994.

²⁰²K. Saybasili, *DYP-SHP Koalisyonunun Uc Yili* (Istanbul:Baglam Yayinlari, 1995).

pragmatic; middle-range and programmatic; and long-range and messianic. With rare exceptions, the first is the most prevalent in Turkish politics,....²⁰³



²⁰³J. M. Landau, 'Conclusion', in R. Tapper, eds., *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics, and Literature in a Secular State* (london: I. B. Tauris, 1991), p.207.

CONCLUSION

The thesis sought to an answer to the question of whether Turkish coalition governments were office-seeking or policy-pursuing ones. Political parties were taken as the only actors and their aim and duties were evaluated, their manner of working in Western European and in developing countries were compared in the introduction. Their behavior represented great differences in the two different contexts. Their manner of functioning is important for their policy aims. In other words, their policies are especially short-term rather than longer-term in developing countries. Its effect on coalition formation, maintenance, and success were also evaluated which carries significance for Turkey as a developing country.

In the first chapter the coalition theories were revived and a theoretical framework was built. The second chapter concentrated on the experiences of four European countries to show the influence of the number of parties, their relative position, individual party strategy, party structure and their ideology on the composition of the coalition and its duration in order to compare Turkish case and find out a proper place for Turkish coalition governments in terms of whether they were office-seekers or policy-pursuers. The third chapter tried to answer this question by considering all the factors that affected formation of the coalitions and their success in the light of the theoretical framework, developed in the first chapter.

It can be argued that coalition governments in Turkey were 'office-seeking' in general. Because most of the cabinet coalitions were either minimum-sized or minority coalitions. Minimum-weighted coalitions were the JP-NTP-RPNP-NP(226 seats) in 1965, the RPP-NSP(233 deputies) in 1974, the JP-NSP-NAP(229 seats) in 1977, the

RPP-RRP-DemP-independents(229) in 1978, the second TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition(230) in 1993. They either could just provided the parliamentary majority or their total number of seats was slightly over the required limit, the highest number was 233 among the five coalition experiences.

There are three cases of minority coalition governments which were the JP-NSP-RRP-NAP in 1975, the TPP-MP in 1996, and finally the WP-TPP coalition that was established in the same year. In other words, nine coalition governments were numerically weak ones in the parliament out of twelve. It meant that coalition governments could not initiate to change the constitution or to make substantial policy shifts. They were dependent on the parliament in all their moves because of their precarious majority. Although coalition partners knew that their coalition would be ineffective in the parliament over the most significant issues they formed coalition governments. Then, by looking at the numerical data about the coalitions it can be argued that four-thirds of the coalitions that were set up until now were office-seekers. Their first and foremost aim was to control the government rather than to produce solution the country's problems by establishing powerful government coalitions.

Four surplus majority coalitions were formed which were the RPP-JP(331 seats) in 1961, the RPP-NTP-RPNP-independents(266) in 1962, the TPP-SDPP/RPP(266) in 1991, and finally the TPP-SDPP/RPP(247) in 1995. The first two coalitions were the compulsory ones rather than the result of the natural process. Political parties like the JP, NTP, RPNP accepted the partnership of the RPP because of the military fear. But the JP rejected the idea of the national coalition even in such situation. Rather it preferred to set up a coalition with the NTP. However, in all European countries political parties formed grand coalitions, including all the parties after the Second World War. This has not been the case in Turkey yet. Their reluctant attitude resulted in the regime breakdown in 1980.

Their office-seeking character can also be verified qualitatively in addition to the quantitative verification. As indicated in the third chapter situational and motivational

factors affected their decision to participate or not the particular coalitions. The first two surplus majority coalitions were the last options and unnatural ones or they were 'shot-gun' coalitions. The aim of the JP was not policy but to gain legitimacy and to obtain a general pardon for the ex-DP members from the RPP. Besides the motivational factors, comparison of the compatibility variables related to the coalition parties supported the great differences between the coalition partners in terms of party ideology and goals which were revealed during the election campaigns, party structure, and their constituency.

The only target for the four-party coalition in 1965 was to be in power before the general election and to prevent the RPP's control the government. The coalition was a caretaker one rather than a policy producing one. It was an office-seeking one because the NTP had not accepted the JP's partnership after disintegration of the second coalition government in November 1963.

The coalitions like the RPP-NSP, the RPP-RRP-DemP-independents, the TPP-SDPP/RPP in 1995 the were the last remaining options. Their target was not carrying out common policy objectives. While the last one was a caretaker government the first two had no ideological similarities. The DemP did not accept to make coalition with the RPP in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 general election and even it rejected the idea of a creation of a caretaker election government with the RPP after the RPP-NSP coalition fell apart in September 1974. Although it had only one deputy in 1978 it participated the coalition. Likewise, though the RRP had left the RPP because of its leftist policies in 1967 it did not hesitate to take part within the same coalition with it in 1978. The same conditions were also true for twelve independent deputies as being members of the JP before establishment of the coalition. As secularist and religious parties the RPP and the NSP came together to create a coalition in 1974. The latter had heavily criticized the former for its leftist policies before the election.

For the parties that took place within the WP-TPP, the TPP-MP, and the so-called First and Second National Front coalitions the most preferred party policies had no significance. While the TPP and the MP agreed to create a coalition so as to prevent the pro-Islamic WP coming to power. However, the public statements made by the TPP deputies and its leader supported their office-seeking aims. Because they stated during the coalition bargaining with the MP that if they could not form coalition with the MP they would accept the WP's partnership. Similar to this case the National Front coalitions aimed at controlling the government instead of accepting the RPP's dominance to it. The first coalition was set up to save the TPP leader from the motions, started by the WP leader.

The only coalition government that was set up with great enthusiasm was the TPP-SDPP/RPP coalition in 1991. They came together to carry out their party programs which were revealed before the elections like democratization, solution of the problems such as terrorism and unemployment. Coalition partners had different ideas about economic as well as political issues. Privatization and democratization were the two permanent sources of dispute between the coalition partners. Despite the fact that this reality was known by the coalition partners before the coalition and also became obvious immediately after the formation of the coalition they continued the partnership for five years. They could not carry out any major policy objectives within these years. Then, it can be deduced that if their aim was not to realize common policy objectives the remaining answer was the control of the state resources.

The source of disputes among the parties during bargaining supports the office-seeking nature of Turkish coalitions. Disputes among the coalition partners originated from the distribution of ministries rather than from policy disagreements. Coalition partners always formed the 'roof' of the coalition before preparing the coalition protocol. The only policy dispute was between the RPP and the NTP over the control of the SPO and the role of the state in economy during the bargaining.

In general two motivations- party gains and maintenance of the party identity- determined the composition of the coalitions, their duration, and coalition success. The vital problem for the political parties in Turkey which led to the predominance of these two factors during coalition bargaining has been weak party institutionalization. A short history of multiparty politics in Turkey, military interventions and the closure of political parties by the army, and rapid social change prevented the consolidation of the country-wide party organizations, parties could not control their volatile constituencies. They had no regular party members to finance their expenditures like their Western European counterparts. Once they were in power they preferred short-term policy objectives to the long-term ones which were essential for the immediate control of the volatile constituency.

Small parties as the newly emerged ones always considered to protect their party identity vis-à-vis their bigger counterparts and also their twins. This was the case for the NTP, RPNP, NSP, NAP, RRP, DemP in the sixties and seventies. The smaller parties like the DLP and the GUP did not accept to take part in the coalitions that were established in the first half of 1996 to secure their identity by avoiding the possible strong criticisms of their twins such as the RPP and the NAP. Even the big ones such as the TPP could not continue its coalition partnership with the MP for the same reasons.

Party motivations concentrated on the positions and targets such as depriving one's worst enemy of control the government rather than on common party policies. For this reason they failed to succeed in finding solutions to economic as well as political problems Turkey has been facing.

Turkish party system is similar to the Norwegian one, both systems have had no center party like the DC in Italy and the CVP/PSC in Belgium. There was no permanent party in all coalitions. The significant difference between the Norwegian and Turkish cases was that whereas the former had institutionalized parties the Turkish ones could not consolidate their organization due to the military interventions. While the Right-wing

parties gave outside support to the Labor minority governments in Norway their Turkish counterparts formed the Nationalist Front coalitions to prevent the rise of the RPP. For this reason Turkish coalition experiences were similar to the French cases between 1945-1958 period. There were large number of small parties which became representatives of interests of small segments of the society. They transmitted them to the parliament especially in the second half of the seventies. They formulated and decided policy and acted as the principal agents in mobilizing for their proposals and actions. Policy differences between the ministries within the same government has always been the case in Turkey. Coalition members not only populate the state but also they penetrated society. They behaved independently in the coalition to consolidate their party organization. The reason for this kind of behavior might be the lack of clear-cut government opposition divide in the Turkish context as the four-party coalition in 1965, coalitions that were established in the second half of the seventies and the WP-TPP coalition supported this reality. Another reason may be weak institutionalization of political parties and an immediate need for control of patronage .

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