

AN ANALYSIS ON THE
CONTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
IN TURKEY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
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May 2007

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The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

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in

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May 2007

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ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN TURKEY

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May 2007

This is an analysis on the contribution of civil society to democratic consolidation in Turkey. This thesis will try to understand this problematic by assessing the civil society's formal structure, legal framework, internal values and its impact during the consolidation process. The key aim here is to understand the civil society's role as a contributor to democratic consolidation by mapping the civil society and democratic consolidation relationship in Turkey. While doing so, this study will base itself on a combination of theories that link the civil society to democratic consolidation with an empirical tool for the assessment of this linkage.

Keywords: Civil society, democratic consolidation, Turkey.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE'DEKİ SİVİL TOPLUMUN DEMOKRATİK PEKİŞMEYE ETKİSİ ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME

Torus, Emre

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Mayıs 2007

Bu çalışma Türkiye'deki sivil toplumun demokratik pekişme ile olan ilişkisini incelemektedir. Çalışma, bahsedilen ilişkiyi Türkiye'deki demokratik pekişme süreci içerisinde sivil toplumun resmi yapısını, faaliyet gösterdiği yasal çerçevesini, içsel değerlerini ve etkisini inceleyerek açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çalışma ile hedeflenen, sivil toplumun ile demokratik pekişme arasındaki ilişkinin ortaya konması ve bu ilişkinin izlerinin Türkiye özelinde sürülmesidir. Çalışma, sivil toplum ve demokratik pekişme ilişkisini ele alan bir dizi teoriyi, yenilikçi bir ampirik uygulama ile birleştirerek adı geçen ilişkiyi incelemeye çalışmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Sivil toplum, demokratik pekişme, Türkiye.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This is an analysis on the contribution of civil society to democratic consolidation in Turkey. This thesis will try to understand this problematic by assessing the civil society's formal structure, legal framework, internal values and its impact during the consolidation process. The key aim here is to understand the civil society's role as a contributor to democratic consolidation by mapping the civil society and democratic consolidation relationship in Turkey. While doing so, this study will base itself on a combination of theories that link the civil society to democratic consolidation with an empirical tool for the assessment of this linkage.

As controversial areas, there are a number of different conceptual approaches to democratic consolidation, civil society and their relationship. As

the core concepts of this thesis, these concepts will be employed in a particular framework throughout the study. The following paragraphs will offer a brief explanation about this framework and the detailed theoretical discussion about these concepts will be provided in the following chapters.

For the purposes of this thesis, the term democratic consolidation shall be understood as “the process of attaining broad and deep legitimation about the democratic regime” (Diamond, 1999: 65). Three key areas appear as important for this definition. First democratic consolidation is a process. Second, within this process, the political actors of democratic regime (both at elite and mass levels) craft its characteristics. Third, it is expected that elites and masses should demonstrate a broad consent on the legitimacy of the constitutional system rather than promoting the authoritarian solutions (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 3-7; O'Donnell, 1992: 49; Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros, 1995: 8-10). As Diamond puts it (1999: 65) in total this process refers to a shift in political culture and this shift is dominated by a number of actors within the society.

Although both the elites and masses appear as the main actors of democratic consolidation process, a considerable amount of work on

democratic consolidation has a special focus on actions, setups and culture of political elites as the main directing agents of democratic consolidation. Established preference within this literature is to define democratic consolidation as an end product of a consensus among ruling elites on the rules of the democratic system (Burton, Gunther and Higley, 1992; O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986; Przeworski, 1992). Without any doubt, political elites can be counted among the key actors within the consolidation period. In most of the cases their impact goes well beyond the above mentioned consensus and elites act as the main agents of the democratic regime. They direct and decide on regime type (i.e. whether it is parliamentary or presidential), on concentration of power and on settings of institutions of accountability (i.e. constitutional court). Moreover, elites' legacy is influential on how party and interest group leaders exercise their power. These include their ability to bargain with each other, form coalitions, mobilize public support, and respond to public demands (Diamond, 1999: 219).

As the last sentence of previous paragraph suggests, although elites may be pre-eminent, they do not constitute the whole framework. The actors that take part during the process of democratic consolidation are not only the individuals either at elite or mass level. A number of institutions that aim to organize the collective action such as political parties, trade unions,

professional associations and alike are also quite influential in this process. These actors have their own action strategies and normative orientations. These orientations, characteristics, rhetoric and strategies can be counted among the important determinants in sketching democracy. Furthermore, democracy cannot be defined solely as a system where elites compete and acquire power through elections. Democratic regimes must be responsive and responsible to the interests of the public and to that end, democratic political systems should function in a setting of rule of law that protects the rights to speak, publish, organize, lobby and demonstrate for their citizens. The importance of mass public for democratic consolidation rests on this assumption: The mass public, through organizing itself, always has the chance to improve upon the democratic regimes by questioning and challenging the present undemocratic practices and values. Mass public, through their organizations, can play a part in democratic consolidation by contributing to the social and political programs by trying to bring to the public agenda the topics that are salient to them. Through vocalizing the problems and needs, civil society organizations can produce warnings for the elected officials and pinpoint the problems related to democratic shortages. On the occasions when the governing elites do not take action for solving problems related to the democratic deficits, civil society appears to be the only tool for identifying these problems. These organizations by intercommunicating through mass

medium or by directly drawing attention of the elected officials by utilizing different tools like campaigns may elevate and pinpoint the issues of democracy into the political agenda. On the areas like public administration reforms or human rights issues that elites seem reluctant to act upon, civil society may fill the gap and put up the issues in the public circles. All these examples refer to the fact that democracy as a political system necessitates a public that is organized for democracy, digest its values and norms and committed to its common “civic” ends (Diamond, 1999: 221). A possible way to construct this public is through civil society.

The Case

This study will try to locate the above-mentioned discussion in the Turkish context. By such an effort, I hope to underscore the following. The above mentioned elite-centred approach is also visible in the literature on Turkey. Throughout the literature on both civil society and democratic consolidation in Turkey, the significant reference has generally been made to the behaviour, organization and the culture of political and/or state elites (Heper, 1992; Heper and Keyman, 1998; Heper and Güney, 2000; Özbudun, 1996; Özbudun, 1997). It is persuasively argued that there is an “omnipotent state”, which shapes both society and political system within the Ottoman-

Turkish continuum. Undoubtedly, this type of strong and coercive state, supported by strong bureaucratic tradition, was permanently sceptical of civil society. Additionally the dominance of community over individual and uniformity over diversity, donates the state with a pre-approved responsibility of leading the ignorant masses located at the periphery (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 250). Hence, it would not be wrong to argue that the state in Ottoman-Turkish continuum tried to pressurize, oppress or curb the civil society and in most of the cases did not allow the formation of societal consensus that might emerge from bottom during the Ottoman-Turkish continuum. Accordingly, one does not anticipate much to find a civil society in Turkey that is contributive to democratic consolidation.

However, such explanations of civil society that profoundly rooted in history and culture, although comprehensive and highly illuminating, does not “necessarily do justice to the potential for change in the political system or indeed within society itself” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 250). In Turkey civil society movements have been growing since 1980s and especially during the 1990s in terms of qualitative and quantitative importance for making Turkish society more liberal and democratic than before (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003: 217-232). Especially during the 1990s civil society’s role as a contributor to democratic consolidation appeared in the agenda of among both decision

makers and academia with the special focus of European Union candidacy. It is correctly argued that civil society in Turkey, for the first time in Turkish politics started to articulate and represent the demands of various social segments and manage to transmit these demands to political actors and state elites relatively effectively and it is based on these arguments that civil society and civil society organizations have been given special importance as a necessary condition and an important factor for promoting democracy in Turkey (Heper and Keyman, 1998: 272).

It is expected that by carrying the analysis out of the common circles that focused on activities, institutionalisation and background of political and state elites, this study will try to contribute to the democratic consolidation studies in Turkey and provide a more comprehensive picture of the subject in question. In order to fulfil the above-mentioned task, first I will analyse the concept in question by:

1. Presenting the theories and conceptual perspectives related to the civil society and democratic consolidation;
2. Setting the functions of civil society that are salient in democratic consolidation based on the theoretical and conceptual perspectives discussed and,

3. Mapping out those functions in the Turkish context by the help of an empirical model.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES

Civil society and its linkage with democratic consolidation have come to occupy much attention over the last few years. This boosted interest is not limited to the academic circles. The importance of the concept is well known among the policymakers, practitioners and alike. Civil society is now seen as an important element of society next to economy, polity and family. Indeed, while it is regarded as a major component of what makes social life possible, civil society is also increasingly seen as 'problematic' and fast-changing, and in many ways as something that can no longer be taken for granted.

In the following paragraphs I will discuss the theoretical approaches to civil society and democratic consolidation. By this way I hope to clarify the pertinence of these terms in the literature. Then I will provide explanation about the employment of these concepts as basic notions of this thesis. While doing so, I will particularly indicate the characteristics of civil society that are salient in democratic consolidation in terms of scale and scope and its potential strengths and weaknesses.

2.1. Civil Society

As the struggles of nations over democracy have become intense during the last decades of our century, scholars and policy makers from both ends of the intelligentsia and political spectrum have converged to reawaken and reinvent the antique eighteenth-century notion of civil society. This resurgence of interest in civil society, changed the old attributions attached to the concept and relocated it to the status of being a key area for the possible democratisation of the world that we live in. With this updated function, the concept is now increasingly used to define the space of social activity and societal organizations that directly or indirectly support, promote or struggle for democracy, democratisation and democratic consolidation (Grugel, 2002: 93).

The meanings of civil society have varied enormously across time, place, theoretical perspective, and political persuasion. Different political ideologies identify civil society nearly with everything from multi-party systems and the rights of citizenship to individual voluntarism and the spirit of community (Seligman, 2001: 203). For example according to Shils (1991: 4) civil society refers to a part in the society which is beyond the boundaries of both family and state and has an existence on its own. Shils argue that civil society a) covers various autonomous organizations, b) connect itself to state with a legal framework and c) encapsulates the civil conducts within the particular society that it operates. All these three areas have ties to the democratic maturity. He argues that the absolute distinction between state and civil society is not acceptable since both state and civil society are subject to constitutions and laws that define their boundaries (Shils, 1991: 4-5). However, this relationship is not an easy one since it is mainly the state that has the power of enacting laws. Additionally civil society needs a state that voluntarily listens to the demands of civil society. Within such kind of a framework the characteristics of state civil society relationship, depends on the degree of “civility” among individuals (Shils, 1991: 16). For Shils, civility is “an attitude of attachment to the institutions that constitute civil society [and] concern for the good of society” (Shils, 1991: 11). By this definition Shils refers to an area of mutual responsibility among citizens where different parts of

society are treated as equals. Therefore civil society acts as an encourager of the attitude of civility that will eventually contribute to the democratic consolidation.

Michael Walzer's conception of civil society may also be utilized when the concept's relationship with democratic betterment is concerned. According to him, in modern democracies individual citizens do not have active but passive roles within the decision making processes (Walzer, 1992: 90). At this point civil society appears as an important area where citizens join the decision making processes through civil societal institutions such as unions, movements and interest groups etc. (Walzer, 1992: 99). This point is quite important since by this way citizens have the chance of channelling their ideas, opinions and demands to the state and eventually this framework creates chances for democratic maturity. However he introduces an interesting paradox by perceiving state as an "organization" among various organizations of civil society. Since it is the state that determines the legal boundaries of civil society, it occupies an area within the civil society. Hence we can talk about a bilateral relationship between state and civil society: "only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society and only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state" (Walzer, 1992: 104).

This latter point was further elaborated by White (1994: 379). He questioned the democratization potential of the civil society organizations and points out the possible depreciative effect of civil societal organizations on democratic development. According to White one should make distinctions between various types of civil society. He points out these types as a) “modern” interest groups and “traditional” groups based on kinship or ethnicity; b) informal social networks that are based on patrimonial or clientelistic relationships; c) illegal organizations such as Mafia and d) associations that try to change the existing political regime (White, 1994: 380). White argues that these organizations depending on the conjuncture may act against democratic maturity and be supportive of authoritarian regimes. So it is not possible to argue that a “strong” civil society is contributive to democratic development at all conditions. Also the idea that a “weak” civil society is not contributory to democratization is a vague idea (White, 1994: 380).

By this framework White tries to differentiate the “ideal type” and “actual reality” of civil society. According to him for instance in the genuine conditions the distinction between state and civil society is generally murky, they can shape each other both in democratic and non-democratic ways (White, 1994:

381). So the characteristics of democratic development are highly dependent on the interaction between state and civil society (White, 1994: 385). Additionally, the nature of democratic participation within civil societal organizations as well as their relationship among each other is also a determining factor for the consolidation of democracy (White, 1994: 389).

An alternative approach for understanding civil society was developed by Cohen and Arato (1994). They locate the civil society above the private sphere (that consist of families) and associational sphere (that consist of voluntary associations) and perceive “civil society as a sphere of social interaction between economy and state” (Cohen and Arato, 1994: ix). According to the writers civil society embodies the “structures of socialization, association and organized forms of communication of the life world to the extent that these are institutionalized (Cohen and Arato, 1994: x). This is a definition neither based on society nor state. They prefer to define civil society not as a unified but as a plural and differentiated social structure (Cohen and Arato, 1994: 697). They give special importance to the social movements as a crucial element of a modern civil society and a form of citizen participation. These movements will help to expand the area of rights and hence will contribute to further democratization (Cohen and Arato, 1994: 20).

Writers also think that the relationship between the political and civil societies is also exigent for the democratic maturity. Within the forms of representative democracies, political society not only conceives civil society but also it should be open to the guidance of civil society (Cohen and Arato, 1994: 413). Then again, like Walzer and Shils, Cohen and Arato thinks that the boundaries of civil society should be determined by the state and legal order. If state does not exceed the legal boundaries and intervene in the civil society, it is expected that the civil society would be more contributive to democratic development (Cohen and Arato, 1994: 19). Additionally writers think that the democracy may only be developed to its best at the level of civil society since the functioning of civil societal organizations display high degrees of egalitarian and participatory character when compared to the organizations located in political sphere like political parties (Cohen and Arato, 1994: 417).

Norton's ideas may be fruitful at this point for carrying out the discussion of civil society out of western circles. He defines civil society as "a melange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties and groups come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen" (Norton, 1995: 7). He agrees with Shils on the idea of "civility" as an important

ingredient of civil society. He extends the application of the concept of “civility within” the civil societal associations to “civility among” the associations (Norton, 1995: 12). Although he thinks that the level of civility is quite low or absent in the Middle Eastern context, since the art of association can be learned, there is a prospect of launching a form of civil society within this particular context (Norton, 1995: 12).

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s contribution to this discussion is particularly important because of their special reference to the civil society’s relationship to the democratic consolidation. They define civil society as the “arena of polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements and individuals attempt to articulate values to create associations and solidarities and to advance their interests” (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 17). For writers, the existence of civil society is a necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy. However the existence of civil society should be supported by the existence of autonomous political society, rule of law, state bureaucracy and institutionalized economic society (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 18).

Similar to Linz and Stepan, Larry Diamond focuses on the features of civil society that serve for the development and consolidation of democracy. He defines the civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self generating, largely self-supporting, relatively autonomous from state and bound by a legal order or set of shared values” (Diamond, 1999: 221). By this definition it is possible for citizens to come together under the umbrella of civil society for exchanging information, expressing interests and channel demands to the accountable state officials (Diamond, 1994: 5).

For Diamond civil society encapsulates diverse sets of organizations both formal and informal including economic (commercial associations and networks), cultural (religious, ethnic and communal organizations), informational and educational (organizations which try to produce and disseminate knowledge), interest based (groups like professional associations and trade unions), developmental (organizations which aim to improve the quality of life of the community), issue-oriented (movements for environmental protection, rights of women and alike) and lastly civic organizations (groups working in activities like election monitoring, voter education etc. in a non-partisan fashion) (Diamond, 1994: 6).

Diamond proposes a twelve item list for assessing the democratic functions of civil society: 1) checking, limiting and monitoring the power of the state, 2) supplementing the role of political parties in stimulating participation, 3) development of democratic attributes through education, 4) providing multiple channels for interest representation beyond political parties, 5) mitigating principal polarities of political conflict and hence surpass clientelism, 6) generating cross-cutting interests that will mitigate the political polarities, 7) recruiting and training new political leaders, 8) creating organizations with explicit democracy-building goals (e.g. election monitoring), 9) disseminating information and empowering citizens so they can defend their interests, spread of new information and ideas 10) providing basis for reform policies 11) conflict mediation and resolution and 12) enhancing “the accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, effectiveness, and hence legitimacy of the political system by fulfilling the above listed items” (Diamond, 1999: 239-250). According to Diamond “the more active pluralistic, resourceful, institutionalized and democratic is civil society, and the more effectively it balances the tensions in its relations with the state the more likely it is that democracy will emerge and endure” (Diamond, 1994: 11). The definition and democratization functions of civil society provided by Diamond will be utilized for the purposes of this thesis in a different manner which will be explained in the methodology chapter.

From the discussion above I will try to extract a working definition that will provide a base for methodological problems and empirical applications of this study. To that end, I presented the discussions about civil society with special reference to its democratization abilities. The conception of civil society as a guard against the powerful state (Keane, 1988: 39-44) and the view of civil society as the source of civic education (Boussard, 2003: 75) can be added as two last important points. These two approaches are important because both conceptualize civil society within the frameworks of pluralism and civic education, which foresees voluntary associations, as agents for serving democracy by assisting the development of democratic values like trust tolerance and compromise, which were further utilized in the democratic consolidation literature since 1990s.

Therefore, in compliance with above framework, I will use the term civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self generating, largely self-supporting, relatively autonomous from state and bound by a legal order or set of shared values.” (Diamond, 1999: 221) This is an operational definition of civil society for the purposes of this thesis. It does not attempt to define all aspects of civil society, nor does it necessarily fit different perspectives and approaches equally well. What the definition does, however, is to list elements and components that most attempts to define civil

society would identify as essential. Such kind of a theoretical approach gives the chance of analyzing the different constitutive blocks of the democratic progress in different locations and periods. Thus it constitutes a suitable base for the analysis of the constitutive block of civil society in the context of Turkey.

2.2. Democratic Consolidation

Analysis of democratic consolidation requires the discussion, a priori, of two significant and related concepts: democracy and transition to democracy. Democracy is a complex notion whose definition varies from minimalist, procedural criteria to normative criteria. Definitional variations of the notion of democracy correlate with the recent global emergence of democratization that produced many diverse forms of democracies. Since an amplified discussion on democracy and transition to democracy is out of the scope of this study, the following paragraphs will mainly touch upon the key components of these subjects and the main discussion will be related to the democratic consolidation.

As a “wave”, during the last two decades of 20th century, more than 60 countries shifted from authoritarian settings to democratic ones (Diamond,

1999). This shift produced an extensive amount of literature on the nature and characteristics of these new democracies. Basically, the focus of this literature is two folded: the analysis on transitions themselves and the analysis on the consolidation of these democracies (Mainwaring, 1992: 294). To start with, a widespread inclination in these discussions of transition is attaching some adjectives to democracy and categorizes the democratic practices accordingly. The result of worldwide democratic developments has been the adoption of what the political scientists David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997: 431) call "democracy with adjectives." Some of these qualified notions are: "hybrid regime" "semi-democracy," "virtual democracy" "electoral democracy" "illiberal democracy" "delegative democracy" "pseudo-democracy," "feckless democracy" "competitive authoritarianism," "facade democracy" "weak democracy" "formal democracy" and "partial democracy" (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 55-57).

All of these categorizations call for some basic terms like freedom, rule of law, elections and alike. These terms are among the basic requirements for a democratic system but they lack as being adequate sources for a research on democratic consolidation. The "wave" approach generally identifies democracy with the institutional setups with their decision-making procedures

and mainly the centre of attention is on the electoral processes, where citizens are democratic actors who can choose among different contestants. This Schumpeterian understanding of democracy (1943), foresees habitual elections as the single and sufficient tool of participation in a democratic system. A follower of the Schumpeterian definition, Huntington sees a political system as “democratic, to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers were selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes” and democracy is no guarantee against bad government policies, but the population can punish the government at the following election (1991: 16). Hence three aspects were identified as central components of democracy: competition, participation and political rights. Although these may be counted among the basic requirements for a democratic system, they are far from being adequate sources for a research on democratic consolidation. These theories adopt a quite simplistic understanding of democracy that equates it with the elections without giving importance on dimensions like civil liberties or nature of party systems and alike. As proposed by Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl (1994: 182) the dominant variable of elections may end with the fallacy of electoralism. Additionally, the world experienced the cases of representative democracies that have low levels of governmental accountability and poor public influence on decision making. Notwithstanding its ability to envision democratic

consolidation beyond national experiences, wave theory does not address the *processes* of democratic consolidation as a process and rather it employs generalisations with fewer criteria for democratic consolidation. (Korkut, 2003: 28).

In his discussion on transitions to democracy Juan Linz (1990: 25) refers to these difficulties by stating that there is no scholarly consensus on how to define consolidation. Conceptions on consolidation range from a minimalist one i.e. existence of fair and regular elections to the digestion of democratic values among the all levels of society. Andreas Schedler (1998: 91) argues that the addition of many qualifiers to the concept of democratic consolidation have altered the concept 'beyond recognition'. Despite this critical consolidation observation, Schedler suggests that although the concept of democratic consolidation appears as an 'omnibus concept, a garbage-can concept, a catch-all concept, lacking a core meaning' analysts do not face a dead-end road. He suggests that if the researcher can identify the meaning and the boundaries of his conception on democratic consolidation and put forward the empirical cases, then it is possible to have an analytical base. So the employment of the term rests on a particular analyst's empirical facts and analytical ends (Schedler 1998: 92).

Alternatively, democratic consolidation is understood as an end product of different historical practices that the democratic systems had experienced. Within this understanding, the central postulation is that democratisation will take place once the structural features, such as high per capita income, widespread literacy, and prevalent urban residence are well placed within the system (Grugel, 2002, 49). Lipset's (1981) work, which tried to establish relation between the democracies and a number of and Almond and Verba's (1989) study on the relationship between democracy and civic values, may be counted among the prominent examples of this approach. All these works and others presume that consolidation can only be reached under the circumstances of performing a number of preconditions, which are assumed to be related with democracy. This theory comes with the danger of overstressing the significance of structural features and hence leaves no room for evaluating interactions among actors of democratisation and the implications of these interactions on the process of consolidation.

Yet another explanation of democratization proposes the idea that the process is highly dependent on the policies of governing and opposing elites (Przeworski, 1992 and O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986). Within this process the interaction between diverse elite groups determines the kind of regime that ultimately emerges. Thus, various elite groups seem to be the

determinant actors on the regime change and establishment. Accordingly it is these elite groups that determine the nature of the regime change, neither the process itself nor the legacies. Democracy, thus, can be established autonomously from the structural context where at the same time the population is regarded only as an onlooker. This approach is criticized because of its strong emphasis on the actors (Pridham, 1995, 166).

One last approach to review is historical sociology, which methodologically favours 'legacies' as key variables. It is different than the modernization theories in the sense that it displays an interest in explaining outcomes with a state-centred view (Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985). Instead of excessively society-based accounts of political change, this theory concentrates on other forces in society. Accordingly state strength, for instance, may enable the state to overpower the pro-democratic forces in the rest of the society. Moreover, many structures and constellations persist, and are influential beyond their original or historical mandates. Hence, previous state structures and regime forms shape later political developments. However there is a danger of equating processes of democratic consolidation entirely through the influence of structures. After all, the process of democratic consolidation is more than a prolongation of the transition from authoritarian rule (Schmitter and Karl 1994, 175).

Questioning structural determinants of democracy, however, should not solely credit the work of individual agents in laying the framework for the process of democratic consolidation. Still, one must recognise the importance of various forms of interactions among the structures, elites and the ordinary citizens in all processes of democratic consolidation. Hence, a proper description of the groundwork for democratic consolidation must account for the complex interaction between agents and structures in confusing conditions (Schmitter and Karl 1994, 175).

A key question that this study seeks to address is: under what circumstances may democratic consolidation as a process can be developed? According to O'Donnell (1992: 45), consolidation calls for

'political institutions specific to democracy the emergence of regularized and predictable practices which are generally and habitually respected, which are embodied in public organizations capable of processing the demands of politically active sectors of society with little or no disruption or violence, and which are in line with rules of the competitive game which prohibits suppressing that competitiveness.'

Institutions are crucial in the consolidation process, for the path to democratic consolidation is "obstructed or destroyed by the effects of

institutional shallowness and decay". Political institutions are crucial for democratic consolidation because they promote "not only political trust and cooperation among political actors" but also "tolerance, civility and loyalty to the democratic system" (Diamond, 1992: 75).

Democratic institutions help to solve political conflict according to procedural norms that "eschew violence or other polarizing forms of behavior that could be a threat to the maintenance of civil order" (Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros, 1995: 9). Without autonomous functioning institutions, O'Donnell (1992: 22) contends, 'any degree of democratization achieved is precarious and explosive. Independent institutions help to promote horizontal accountability potentially because the latter requires state agencies that have the power, both de jure and de facto, to oversee and to impose criminal penalties on any illegal activities committed by other state agencies and their leaders. Without independent institutions, actions of elites are constrained only by the 'the hard facts of existing power relations' (O'Donnell, 1992: 60). In political a situation in which everyone is trying to get ahead politically and economically, without rules and regulations, the consequence is naked use of power.

With the absence of strong, autonomous institutions, newly emerged democracy is likely to be consumed by the existence of non-formalized but strongly operative practices such as clientelism, patrimonialism, and corruption. Patron-client and patrimonial linkages form networks through which the political elite dominate the society and weaken political opponents. These networks are used to ensure the accumulation and extension of power for different political factions. Thus, in order to increase their power base, political elites need to increase their patronage networks. The widespread existence of a well-functioning patronage system not only undercuts the function of political institutions but also hampers the reform of existing institutions and the establishment of new institutions.

When civil society's role on democratic consolidation one last approach seems worthwhile to analyze: the role of political elites. Elite behavior and interactions, collectively termed "elite political culture" play an indispensable role in the process of democratic consolidation. "Without question" Diamond writes, "elite political culture is crucial to democratic consolidation." Democracy would not function without elites' acceptance of the regularity and predictability of "the rules, and limit of constitutional system and legitimacy of opposing actors who similarly commit themselves..."(Diamond, 1999: 173). According to

Diamond the significance of elite political culture in the process of democratic consolidation is twofold. First, elites' political decisions are contingent on their beliefs. Second, as leaders of a polity the magnitude of their impact on political events is high (Diamond, 1999: 66).

Buton et. al. also emphasize the role of the elites, especially their consensus on the legitimacy of democratic institutions and rules, in the process of democratic consolidation. Although they acknowledge that structural, institutional and cultural factors are important, they hold the firm belief that "elite convergence" a process of interaction among elites, will eventually lead to "elite consensual unity, thereby laying the basis for consolidated democracy" (Burton, Gunther and Higley, 1992: xi)

Consolidation also requires that political elites display action that "respects each other's rights to compete peacefully for power, eschews violence, and obeys the laws, the constitution, and mutually accepted norms of political conduct" (Diamond, 1999: 68). Furthermore, elites should also be committed to the maintenance of a peaceful environment by avoiding "rhetoric that would incite their followers to violence, intolerance, or illegal methods. Political leaders do not attempt to use the military for political advantage" (Diamond, 1999: 69).

As long as the elites have consensus and agreement on the democratic rules and procedures, democratic norms and practices will become embedded first at the elite level and then radiate throughout the polity, establishing a firm foundation for democratic consolidation.

My basic thought is that democratic consolidation takes place as a result of complex interactions among and between different actors. Moreover the meaning attached to democratic consolidation varies according to contexts and goals. In line with that, the new modernization theories offer a developmental understanding of democratic consolidation as a system of power and politics that emerges in fragments or parts, by no fixed sequence or timetable (Diamond 1999, 16). The constitutive blocks of the democratic progress like, the appearance of new parties, the development of civil society, movement toward consensus about rules etc. establishes the foundations for further democratic maturity. Such kind of a theoretical approach gives the chance of analyzing the different constitutive blocks (i.e. civil society) of the democratic progress in different locations and periods.

Thenceforth, by and large, this essay will recognize the term democratic consolidation as a process with multiple dimensions. All democracies face the risk of electoralism and legitimacy problems and these problems may be eliminated by “maximizing the opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in which they live, and to participate in and influence debates about the key decisions that affect their society” (Korkut, 2003: 33). To that end, I think the cooperative achievement of individuals will be equally important as individual/elite contribution to the democratic consolidation. Hence joint and constructive involvement of citizens may be counted as one of the crucial element of the process of democratic consolidation and this involvement is only possible through civil society.

2.3. Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation Discussions in the Turkish Context

The following paragraphs will provide general/historical information about the formation and development of civil society in Ottoman-Turkish continuum. My priority here is to focus on the civil society-state relationship and trace the signs of the above discussion in the Turkish context. By this way I hope to assemble a system for understanding the civil society's linkage with democratic consolidation in Turkish setting.

The history of Western Europe on many instances refers to the salient struggle between state and the decentralised power nodes. The Ottoman-Turkish case however rests on a different base where the centre did not confront any significant negating powers. Besides the Ottoman-Turkish polity which was shaped by the exaggerated fear of anarchy and rebellion and did not leave enough room for the representation of social interests (Mardin, 1973: 173). Under such conditions state becomes the dominant side in its relationship with civil society and defines the nature of the relationship. As Heper (1991a, 13) mentions for the Turkish case the struggle between state and civil society was insignificant since the power was concentrated on the state.

In the Ottoman-Turkish continuum the establishment of new republic started an important era in with respect to state society relations. As an attempt to launch a modern society and state the new republic tried to reorganize the state society relations. Religion a) as being the sole area that was shared between society and the state and b) acting as the source of legitimacy for the state was replaced by secularism. This replacement altered the state society relations by introducing secular law instead of *sheria*. On the

whole, the project of new republic aimed a democratic western society. However, the new republic tried to effectuate this aim, mostly as an inherited practice from Ottoman Empire, by dividing the society into two big segments of elites and masses. As the emissaries of long-term interests of the state bureaucratic elites demanded the conformity of masses with their decisions to realize the above-mentioned aim. Eventually this paradoxical behaviour ended up creating a bureaucratic society rather than a civil society (Belge, 1986: 1920). On the conditions where states tried to “wrap the societies” within grand projects, it is too hard to find the accommodating conditions for the establishment of a vivid civil society. Because in order to attain the “grand aim” which was agreed on by bureaucratic elites, all parts of society should work hard in great concinnity, without vocalizing their differences. When civil society concerned, the outcome of such kind of a practice is the evanescing of societal forces that has the potential of instituting the civil society (Gevgilili, 1990: 118).

When the civil society concerned, the passage to the new republic from Ottoman setting generated two diametrical results. The first of them is the consolidation of state’s power over society. The modernization project of republic, which was enforced by bureaucratic elite, tried to manipulate the masses according to the necessities of the grand project of modernization.

Within this setting the people were not treated as citizens that constitutive elements of republic but as masses that needs guidance. Hence the power of state was not based on citizens, but on this grand project (Insel, 1996: 120). This situation limited the formation of civil society in a great deal. However, as a second result, we also espy the matutinal signs of civil society as well during this period. As Çaha (1997: 258) points out the formation new parties, associations, newspapers, publications and legal arrangements related to women, family and alike might be counted among positive developments related to civil society. When we contrast these two results we might say that the ascendancy of the former over latter shaped the future of civil society in the new Turkish republic. Although the grand project of modernization includes the formation of civil society, the bureaucratic elites as the executers of this project had chosen not to provide autonomy to civil society and accordingly the structures of civil society were partly installed among the Turkish setting (Belge, 1986: 1920).

The multi party period, which started after 1946, constitutes another turning point for the civil society in Turkey. By the help of spaces that opened up for alternative ideas, the forces of civil society became more visible within the society. However within this new architecture, still the “red-lines” of Turkish state were valid. Basically, the state drew out two fundamental principles for

the administration of Turkish society. The first one is secularism, which was inherited from the single party period and the second one is anti-communism. Any kind of formation within the civil society should take these limits into consideration.

The number of associations augmented considerably during the multi party period (Toksöz, 1983: 373). For example the legalization of unions under the Trade Union Law of 1947 paved the way for the slow but steady growth of a labor movement that evolved parallel to multiparty politics. With the help of the Law related to the Labour Unions in 1947 the number of such organizations reached to 394 in 1958 (Sakallıoğlu, 1987: 130). The principal goal of unions as defined in the 1947 law was to seek the betterment of members' social and economic status. Unions were denied the right to strike or to engage in political activity, either on their own or as vehicles of political parties. In spite of these limitations, labor unions gradually acquired political influence. The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu--Türk-İs) was founded in 1952 with government's instigation to serve as an independent umbrella group. Under the tutelage of Türk-İs, labor evolved into a well-organized interest group; the organization also functioned as an agency through which the government could restrain workers' wage demands.

The increase in quantity, however, did not reflect the quality of these organizations as democratic agents. Since some major labour unions were established by political parties of the period to backup their policies Sakallıoğlu (1987: 224) labels them as corporatist organizations that helped the control of state. This approach of state towards civil society organizations is also visible on state's policy on chambers and bars. Similar to unions, by organizing chambers and bars as semi-arms of state and providing limited pluralism, the state managed to set up a control mechanism over the economic activities. As such, state tried to mould the labour unions as agents, which will cooperate with the state for the long-term interests of the republic.

Another problem of newly formed associations as democratic agents was related to the legal arrangements of their existence. For example the Law on Associations did not provide enough space for associations to act as the nodes of opposition within society (Turgut, 1984: 270). Consequently, the organizations of civil society preferred to be close to the state rather than to the society. Even though this predilection helped these organizations to survive, they did not manage to articulate interests that differ from the interests of state.

As a result of the economic and political crises between 1954 and 1960, the army decided to intervene and seized the power. The bureaucratic elite thought that the system was functioning not in accordance with the “grand project” and decided to get back to power and reshape the political system. A new constitution was planned and introduced by the temporary military government. The 1961 constitution was carrying out some positive elements for the improvement of civil society. The autonomy granted for universities and media, the assurance of basic rights to organize, publicize and declare ideas, the social state principal were to name some.

The socio-economic relaxation and stability of society associated with the expanded areas of freedom contributed to the refreshment of civil society. For example, during 1960's, according to the findings of Özbudun (1975: 80) the number of associations was increased nearly 20 times when it is compared with the previous decade. The labor movement expanded in the liberalized political climate of the 1960s, especially after a union law enacted in 1963 legalized strikes, lockouts, and collective bargaining. However, unions were forbidden to give "material aid" to political parties. Political parties also

were barred from giving money to unions or forming separate labor organizations.

Turkish society went through a high level of politicization and polarization during 1960s and 1970s. Civil society organizations and especially unions were no exceptions. Workers' dissatisfaction with Türk-İs as the representative of their interests led to the founding in 1967 of the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Trade Unions of Turkey (Türkiye Devrimçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu--DISK). DISK leaders were expelled from Türk-İs after supporting a glass factory strike opposed by the Türk-İs bureaucracy. Both Türk-İs and the government tried to suppress DISK, whose independence was perceived as a threat. However, a spontaneous, two-day, pro-DISK demonstration by thousands of laborers in Istanbul--the first mass political action by Turkish workers--forced the government in June 1970 to back away from a bill to abolish DISK. For the next ten years, DISK remained an independent organization promoting the rights of workers and supporting their job actions, including one major general strike in 1977 that led to the temporary abolition of the military-run State Security Courts.

During 1960s the economic choice made in favour of import substitutive strategies generated some important affects on labour unions. Since labour

factor is understood as a factor of demand rather than cost under the import substitutive strategy, it helped to the potency of labour unions and forced the establishment of congruity among employer unions and labour unions (Keyder, 1993: 71). However, the negotiating power of unions diminished due to the severe discordances among and within the organizations. As a result of these disagreements many small, segmented and inoperative unions established that put a threat on the congruity above. Later the increased number of strikes and demonstrations were perceived as the “rehearsal of socialist revolution” by the Turkish armed forces and used as one of the “legitimation tools” for the 1971 memorandum.

The domination of state elites as sole commissionaires of the long terms of state resumed within these periods. These elites had the idea that the problems of Turkey may only be solved by an “order” which should be based on a bureaucratic system. The indispensable result of this perspective was the further centralization/bureaucratization of state. The harvest of this strategy on civil society was especially become visible on professional chambers and associations. During this period a number of laws passed in order to restrict the activities and organize chambers and associations with branches and sub branches throughout the country in order to ease the state control over these organizations (Tosun, 2001: 283).

As described above the execution of 1960 constitution opened up new horizons for civil society in Turkey. However these credits were reversed with the 1971 coup by the termination of white-collar worker unions and youth associations and limiting the activities of labour unions and chambers. The tendency of civil society organizations acting as semi bureaucratic arms of state became quite visible during this period. For example The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is) was one of the contributors to the groundwork of Law no 1317 that limits the activities of syndicates. With the Revolutionary Labour Unions Confederation (DISK), Turk-Is were among the eager applauders of the 1971 coup. In spite of their support, these organizations turned out to be the main sufferers of the coups (Isikli, 1990: 388).

The policies of post 1960 epoch produced a relatively liberal opening within the social and political spheres. However within the economic sphere the choice was made in accordance with a state centred development plans. Although these openings created opportunities for civil society, especially the state's dominant position within the economic sphere spilled over to the other spheres of society and hindered the development of democratic practices

among civil society (Tosun, 2001: 285). For example according to Sakallioğlu (1987: 246) organizations like Turk-Is, TOBB, (The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) and alike were openly utilized by DP government as control centres of societal order. After the 1971 memorandum, with a series of amendments on laws related to the autonomy of unions, media organizations universities and alike the increments of the previous decade were nearly forfeited. According to Ahmad (1995: 220) the 1973 constitution and sequential laws tried to extinguish all kinds of opposition, debilitate unions and universities.

This trend of military was also reiterated during the 1980 coup with further limitations on every aspect of civil and political life. According to Koker (1995: 71) the transition period after 1980 coup was labelled by three policies. a) the renunciation of the state centred economic policies and replacement of these policies by market oriented economic policies; b) the preparation of new constitution and laws and c) a new cultural policy that mitigates the principle of secularism.

By and large the new market oriented economic policies of post 1980 was enforced by the military. Since the new policies are on the whole worked

in favor of the bourgeoisie, this context machined collaboration between the military and the bourgeoisie. As Bulutay (1970: 91) writes this collaboration was first established during 1960s by appointment of military bureaucrats to the executive boards of important companies.

It is clear that the economic policies of post 1980 created employment, expanded foreign trade and investments and with the progression of private entrepreneurship the space of state within the economic sphere was reduced (Turan, 1998: 203). The reduced responsibility of state within economic sphere ended up with the discussions about state's space within the social space. Hence these economic policies provided an accommodating framework for an expansion of civil society (Turan, 1997: 21). Accordingly, during the 1980's the power of labour unions was waned, chambers and industrial organizations became more salient within the civil societal sphere.

The military elites of 1980 coup openly discriminated some of the civil society organizations against others. While the labor unions and associations with leftist tendencies (such as DISK, Peace Association and alike) were closed and punished severely, the others that presented close ties to state (such as TUSIAD, TOBB and others) managed to survive (Tosun, 2001: 302).

The military bureaucracy displayed its mistrust to civil societal organizations and as Özbudun (1995b: 29) writes they perceived these organizations as institutions that are under the influence of political parties with the obliquity to radicalism. Hence it would be plausible to argue that the Turkish state after the 1980 coup was restructured and this new structure would be in favor of state rather than the civil society.

Following the 1980 coup, the military regime banned independent union activity, suspended DISK, and arrested hundreds of its activists, including all its top officials. Meanwhile, the more complaisant Türk-İs, which had not been outlawed after the coup, worked with the military government and its successors to depoliticize workers. As the government-approved labor union confederation, Türk-İs benefited from new laws pertaining to unions. For example, the 1982 constitution permits unions but prohibits them from engaging in political activity, thus effectively denying them the right to petition political representatives. As in the days prior to 1967, unions must depend upon Türk-İs to mediate between them and the government. The original form of 1982 constitution restricted the establishment of new trade unions and places constraints on the right to strike by banning politically motivated strikes, general strikes, solidarity strikes, and any strike considered a threat to society or national well-being. Hence it is not surprising that the 1982 constitution was

designed as a tool for state to intervene to all possible areas of social and political life (Tanor, 1986: 154). As Soysal (1986: 190) points out 1982 constitution gives clear priority to state's interests over its citizens. Especially when the limitations on the freedom of press and freedom of association concerned state tried to protect itself against every possible power node.

The evolution of chambers and bars display similarities with unions. They were organized as semi-autonomous bodies under the 1961 constitution. 1982 constitution also made amendments related to these organizations and transmuted them into occupational organizations with responsibilities to state. The Turkish Trade Association (Türkiye Odalar Birliği--TOB) has represented the interests of merchants, industrialists, and commodity brokers since 1952. In the 1960s and 1970s, new associations representing the interests of private industry challenged TOB's position as the authoritative representative of business in Turkey. Subsequently the organization came to be identified primarily with small and medium-sized firms. The Union of Chambers of Industry was founded in 1967 as a coalition within TOB by industrialists seeking to reorganize the confederation. The Union of Chambers of Industry was unable to acquire independent status but achieved improved coordination of industrialists' demands. By setting up study groups, the union was able to

pool research on development projects. In addition, the union organized regional Chambers of Industry within TOB.

Business interests also were served by employers' associations that dealt primarily with labor-management relations and were united under the aegis of the Turkish Confederation of Employers' Unions (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu--TISK). This confederation was established in 1961, largely in response to the development of trade unions, and was considered the most militant of employers' associations. Although membership in TISK was open to employers in both the private and public sectors, it was primarily an organization of private-sector employers. When the military regime took power in 1980, labor union activities were suspended, but TISK was allowed to continue functioning. Employers supported the subsequent restrictive labor legislation, which appeared to be in accord with TISK proposals.

Another representative of business interests, the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İş Adamları Derneği--TÜSIAD), was founded by the leaders of some of Turkey's largest business and industrial enterprises soon after the March 1971 military coup. Its aim was

to improve the image of business and to stress its concern with social issues. At the same time, TÜSIAD favored granting greater control of investment capital to the large industrialists at the expense of the smaller merchant and banking interests usually supported by TOBB. TÜSIAD's leaders also were concerned with the widening economic inequalities between regions and social classes and opposed TISK's extreme antilabor policies.

The limitations of 1982 constitution on social and associational life was an end result of the phobia against individual freedoms that was amassed among military elites. Although amended 11 times up to 2006 the 1982 constitution with its provisions against associational life thwarted the formation of a vivid civil society in Turkey. We can trace the reflections of this on the political parties as well. Since the military elite perceived politics and political activity with the potential of being dangerous and aberrant, the laws and regulations for the political parties displayed a warped configuration. According to Parla (1996: 116) the laws and regulations foresaw political parties as organizations that refrain from political competition, display absolute harmony with the long-term interests of the state and withdraw from power where necessary. Within such kind of a contexture, the links between political parties and society were cut off and they turned out to be agents of state rather than being institutions that vocalize the demands coming from the society.

More interestingly, some of the organizations from the civil society sphere exposed parallel views with the military elite and supported the 1980 coup. For example Turk-Is championed the intervention and took part within the military government with 'honour' (Parlar, 1997: 128). When asked, Turk-Is remarked the supremacy of national unity over any kind of individual right that has the potential of disturbing the power of the executive (Gemalmaz, 1995: 60). Thus Turk-Is was displaying an ultimate example of pragmatism by taking part in a non-democratic government with the expectation of organizational survival.

With its comprehensive report about the new constitution TISK went one-step further than Turk-Is, and demanded new regulations that limit the press, proposed the establishment of new state security courts, prohibition of labour unions and strikes. According to Gemalmaz (1995: 65) 1982 constitution is actually the constitution of TISK.

The military elite chose to depoliticise the society and restructure the political system according to the above-mentioned principles. These principles rebounded by the governments of post 1980 and the political system

increasingly braced the executive, suppressed associational life and abated the civil society (Kalaycioglu, 1998: 120). However in despite of the unfavourable legal conditions, civil societal movements revived after the passage to multi party politics in 1983.

The Ottoman-Turkish state tradition has always been described by the existence of a strong central state a weak periphery (Mardin, 1969; Mardin 1973; Heper 1980a; Heper 1985). Starting from the early period the main tool for the Ottoman rulers to establish the order within the society was dependent on the “principle of justice”. Basically it was a circular system starting with the protection of citizens by the state; in return citizens produce wealth and pay taxes to the state; and in return state will be able to introduce more land to the system and in return citizens produce more wealth. This political and social structure of Ottoman society fathered not only the fabrication but also the segmentation of a number of groups/classes among society with clear-cut distinctions. The prominent one was the distinction between the ruler (*askeri*) and the ruled (*reaya*). The survival of the social system was highly dependent on the consent of this asymmetrical relationship between and among these groups.

According to Mardin (1973: 171), the relationship between the state and the society was formulated in a different way within the Ottoman Empire than its western counterparts. Basically, the ongoing struggles of state with different social groups located at periphery (feudal groups, industrial workers etc.) profiled the principles of the central state in western societies. However these institutions of west, including the aristocracy, clergy and alike, were absent in the Ottoman setting (Özbudun, 1995a: 220). In the dearth of these institutions, the relation between state and civil society was set out to be a hierarchical one, where the Ottoman state acted on top “as an umbrella state that covers all of the civil societies” (Inalcık, 1998: 79). Hence, we observe a fusion of civil society to the state in Ottoman Empire, which is a rather different path than the Western examples.

Heper (1985: 35) points out two important outcomes of this system. Firstly rather than fulfilling the actual societal demands, the Ottoman state gave priority to a number of vague and abstract interests. And secondly state officials focused on the survival state rather than a consensus among the societal groups. As a result, state was positioned over and beyond the society and also religion as a sacred institution that needed to be protected at any time for any cost (Mardin, 1990: 180).

The survival of such kind of a socio-political system was only possible with a strong patrimonial bureaucratic mechanism (Mardin, 1990: 179). The main task of the bureaucratic class was to keep societal groups as they are and where they are in order for the flawless functioning of the system. Hence alternative demands to power and/or any kind of limitation on the power of state were not welcomed by the centre. Eventually this framework had a negative effect on the formation of civil society in Ottoman-Turkish setting. The consent to the state, in return of protection, was institutionalised and vigorously internalised by society which had left no room for the establishment of alternative power centres. As Mardin puts it, "The Ottoman state has always tried to trace and control the societal movements and reshaped them according to the interests of the state" (Mardin, 1990: 179). Indisputably this system produced some results like the articulation of values of distrust to the state, the trepidation from the power of state, malfeasance of law and alike. According to (Heper, 1980b: 5) this horizon was inherited by the Turkish Republic in the forms of elitism, sanctity of state, use of physical power and prejudice to opposition and affected the formation of civil society.

As noted above, the Ottoman social and political system demanded an absolute and continuous conformity from its citizens. This demand, at the same time, necessitates a strong state that penetrates into every aspect of

social life by limiting the space for civil society. Hence throughout the Ottoman experience, state did not mature itself with the inputs provided by civil society. Quite the opposite, state limited the area of civil society for the sake of its survival. The Ottoman elites were quite careful about controlling any kind of power centre that was out of the described legitimate boundaries (Mardin, 1969: 259). As a result the institutions that have the potential of representing the civil society cooperate with the state rather than collecting and transferring the demands of their members to the state. This helped to the reproduction of the system without any serious grass root opposition.

This situation became problematic especially after the 17th. Century when the consent that was necessary among the social groups was started to be questioned. The internal functioning and institutions of Ottoman Empire was heavily dependent on the inclusion of new lands to the system. Once the expansion of the empire stopped the internal equilibrium of the empire was shaken. The all-encompassing power of state began to recede by the 19th century with the recognition of individual rights and freedoms, right to property and equality before law for the first time the preconditions of a civil society were established (Gevgilili, 1986: 35).

Still there was not enough room for the establishment of a vivid civil society. Deep rooted practice of political elitism of the Ottoman Empire highly affected the westernization policies of the Young Turks who were the main agents of reforms. Parallel to the old bureaucratic elite of Ottoman Empire, Young Turks also thought that the welfare of the society depends on the survival of the state. In accordance with this horizon, the bureaucratic elites believed that they can produce the necessary solutions for the endurance of the state. Hence during the westernization attempts, centre had a strong advantage against the unorganized and weak periphery. Consequently the reforms aimed the unity of state rather than establishing and expanding the basic rights of citizens. This situation was also inherited by the early Turkish republic. During the reforms of republic, the motor force behind reforms was not the civil society but it was the bureaucratic elite located at the centre. Hence the bureaucratic elite had the chance of acting separately from the periphery and engineered the reforms without the contribution of citizens.

So thereupon, the modernization attempts of the Turkish Republic has been carried out in the same character as it happened in the late Ottoman context, where the masses have been considered as inert addressees who could be molded in accordance with the principles of the state elite. As Heper (2000: 71) suggests, the Ottoman desire for a strong state that would regulate

the polity and society from above left a particular imprint on democracy in Turkey.

The decline of the Ottoman Empire from the nineteenth century onwards and its collapse in the following century deepened the Republican elite's perception of the need to empower the state in order to maintain territorial unity of the country (Gürbey, 2006: 8). Under such circumstances, the state elite located at the centre consolidated its power by prioritizing themselves as the agents of highest ethical values and consider themselves as the teachers of masses. With this horizon, as exemplified in the previous paragraphs, the state in the republican context sustained its unchallengeable, sacred position. The mindset of the state elites that focused on elevating the country to the level of contemporary civilization may be utilized as an important key for understanding the modernization project and the single-party period. As Aydın (2005: 26) puts it, in Turkey the state has located itself against society, and treated society as an "immature mass of people", and more importantly until the ideal society that they envisioned took place, did not hesitate to curtail the ordinary citizens "ways to participate in politics." Additionally as Heper (1985: 51) points out, Atatürk, believed that people had to be kept under the strict control of the enlightened elite: "the people should not have sovereignty until their collective conscience reached a certain level.

The national will, as shaped by the people, would emerge only to the extent that the people become civilized”.

Mostly the modernization project in Turkey was carried out in a top-down fashion. Accordingly state elites interpreted the democratic principles on their own, which fabricated effects on the formation of civil society in Turkey. As Heper (1991b: 49) puts it,

“The state elites took democracy not as the representation and *reconciliation* of the interests and opinions of different social groups but as finding the one best policy by the enlightened elite, that is, by the State elites themselves. Democracy was equated with educated debate among a few. For Atatürk, this state of affairs was going to be a transient phenomenon, for he believed in the potential of the people to develop and become more rational. Only then could civil societal elements have their weight in the polity; the dominant state could turn into a substantially neutral state... After Atatürk passed away, however, the state elites on the whole abandoned the belief in the potential of the people to develop and become more rational. Thus, they converted the Atatürkian approach to politics ... into an ideology. Not unexpectedly, secularism became the backbone of the official ideology in question.”

At this point crediting Sartori may be fruitful for a better evaluation of the circumstances. Sartori (1987) suggests two dimensions for explaining democracy: horizontal and vertical dimensions. The former refers to the liberal democratic aspects of democracy (like equality, contribution and alike) and the

latter represents the state aspect of democracy (basically the long term interests of state). For a strong liberal democracy there should be a reasonable balance between these two dimensions. This balance at the same time represents the stability between autonomy and control. From the discussion above, we observe a disproportion among these dimensions for the favour of vertical dimension when the Turkish context concerned.

The above anatomy accentuates the importance of historical processes in the building of a strong state against civil society. However with the help of historical developments that took place especially after the transition to multiparty politics in 1946, spaces for associational activity and pluralist politics expanded. According to Toprak (1996: 90-91) the thirty year period between 1950 and 1980 was characterized by the struggles to set the systems for party politics and democratic procedures, guarantee the civil rights and legitimize the civil associations. Following these decades especially during 1980s, the relatively free environment created by economic liberal policies, affected the state society relationship in Turkey. The policies of economic liberalism first reduced the role of state within the economic sphere and following that these effects were spilled over to the cultural and social spheres and hence helped to the reformation of civil society in Turkey.

This tendency continued during the 1990s and civil society movements expanded both in qualitative and quantitative terms. This inclination elevated the importance of civil society and underlined its importance for the democratic maturity of Turkish society (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003: 217-232). Both decision makers and academia created particular spaces in their agendas for discussing the civil society's role as a contributor to democratic consolidation. During 1980s and 1990s civil society organizations in Turkey initiated the verbalization and representation of the interests of various social segments and bequeathed these pursuits to the state elites relatively effectively. Accordingly, during this period, civil society and civil society organizations gained significance as necessary features for the promotion of democracy in Turkey (Heper and Keyman, 1998: 272).

In Turkey, discussions on civil society during 1990s revolved around notion's relationship with other concepts like citizenship, secularism, liberal economic policies, voluntarism, consensus vs. conflict, and ethnicity and democratic maturation. Authors like Keyman and İçduygu (1998), focused on the formulation of citizenship in the Turkish context and underlined its characteristics as a product of the Kemalist modernization project. According to Keyman and İçduygu, for example, the western modernization project transformed the "individual" to "citizen" by basing the project on the philosophy

of rights. During the republican reforms in Turkey on the other hand, state handled the responsibility of transformation of individual and instead of organizing the societal relations according to the philosophy of rights; rather it preferred to define the societal relations in an alternative way (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998: 172-174). Since the Kemalist reforms foresaw a) a societal model based on homogeneity and uniformity and b) a citizenship model based on duties rather than rights, the citizen as a subject of political inquiry evolved in a different way. Hence this approach highlights the defective character of citizenship in Turkey by referring to the concretion of the citizen with the state. Since democracy and democratic amelioration necessitates autonomous individuals organized under civil societal organizations, this situation affected the development of civil society in Turkey in a deprecating way.

Nevertheless authors like Nilüfer Göle portray a peremptory framework about consolidation of democracy in Turkey. Göle thinks that democracy has already been consolidated in Turkey since Turkish public has internalized democracy as a norm of political behaviour (Göle, 1997: 47). As a result of the liberal economic policies, with the contribution of private mass media issues like secularism, religious and ethnic identity and alike gained priorities within public debates (Göle, 1997: 47). According to Göle civil societal movements during 1990s may be understood under the categorizations of liberal, Muslim

and leftist movements. First, with the help of liberal market oriented economic policies, a space has been created which is relatively independent from the state which is suitable for the inauguration of civil society. Second as a result of cultural politics of post 1980s, Islamist movements found the opportunity to organize and vocalize common demands of their participants' against state policies. And third as the leftist category Göle underlies the issue oriented civil societal groups that represent different identities within the civil society (Göle, 1994: 222).

As Göle, Robbins also italicizes the development of civil society during 1980s and 1990s in Turkey. Robbins (1996: 74) explains this boost with giving reference to both internal and external factors. While author counts the globalization of market economy, media and communications among the external factors, he interlineates the restructuring of Turkish economy according to neo-liberal principles as an internal factor. These developments alleviated the established cultural and political identity and created additional space for the furtherance of civil society (Robbins, 1996: 74). Additionally the expanding appeals of different religious groups and ethnic differences found place both in political and public agenda. These developments sharpened the social and cultural divisions among the society and difference became more visible (Başkan, 1998: 235).

The post 1980 era anatomized in an alternative way by a number of scholars. For example Navaro-Yasin (1998: 59) argues that the above-described developments took place only at the discourse level. According to Navaro-Yasin, after 1980 coup there was a need for a “space” which should “demonstrate” independent features from the state and accordingly state “discovered” the idea of civil society (Navaro-Yasin, 1998: 60). By this way, state managed to produce and reproduce the official ideology outside of its own boundaries. Unquestionably, organizations that are concerned only with the fabrication of official ideology of state, might have limited chance for the development of democracy.

Sarıbay explains the expanded interest in civil society in Turkey with a rising demand for the establishment of western institutions for the sake of protection of the individual against state. Thus, civil society as one of these western institutions was perceived as a magic tool for democratization by every political formulation. Sarıbay argues that this situation resulted in a new political attitude in Turkey that may be called as “civil societism” since the notion was practised without giving priority to the social and/or political reality depicted by it (Sarıbay, 1998: 96). The lip service paid to the civil society was

not helpful at all for creating values like democracy, tolerance etc. under the dominance of Islamic social structures and/or dominant political ideologies (Sarıbay, 2001: 143).

Ersin Kalaycıoğlu elaborates another dimension of the subject in question and elaborates the “quality” of civil society organizations in Turkey. According to Kalaycıoğlu (1998: 121) since traditional orientations and unwritten practices became dominant during the post 1980 period, religious organizations like *tarikats* were accepted and diffused on a wider scale. Author labels this structure as “neopatrimonialism” which is a new form of patrimonialism, referring to a situation where strong primordial values triumphs over modern political structures with a strong state and weak civil society (Kalaycıoğlu, 1998: 122). Furthermore Kalaycıoğlu refers to the rate of memberships to associations in Turkey and states that the 10 percent rate in Turkey is well under the levels of developed countries (Kalaycıoğlu, 1998: 127). Author concludes his arguments by referring to the problems related to the existence of independent judiciary and neo-patrimonial political culture that hinders the development of strong civil society (Kalaycıoğlu, 1998: 133).

Jenny White's contribution to the discussions of civil society puts another dimension to the problematic. She argues that the current civil societal structures in Turkey bases themselves son mutual trust and interpersonal obligation rather than on individualistic contractual memberships (White, 1996: 143). Author refers to the difficulty of explaining non-western societies by the western terminology and tries to identify the similarities and differences of civil society in Turkey with its western counterparts (White, 2002: 261-272).

From the expostulations above one may conclude that the formation of civil society in the Turkish context initiated on incongruous grounds resulting from both political and social systems. Nonetheless, this situation started to evolve intermittently especially with the modernization movement that took place in the late Ottoman and early republican period. The augmentation related to civil society continued and accelerated especially during the last two decades and the role of civil society as a contributor to democratic maturity became macroscopic.

In this chapter I have tried to carry out a theoretical discussion related to civil society and democratic consolidation. The first and second sections of this chapter provided the conceptual and theoretical discussions of the terms civil society and democratic consolidation respectively with a reference to their

relationship. The third section tried to portray the historical background and current situation of civil society in Turkey. In the following part of the dissertation I will put forward a model for analysing the relationship between civil society and democratic consolidation and apply this model in the Turkish context. This model will be framed by both theoretical discussions and historical background presented in this chapter.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This chapter will put forward a model for the analysis of civil society and democratic consolidation relationship. To that end, first I will put forward the dimensions of civil society and democratic consolidation relationship and present a framework that will open up the possibility of an empirical analysis for the issue in question. Then I will provide information on the operationalization of my model including sampling and data analysis tools.

3.1. Dimensions of Democratic Consolidation and Civil Society Relationship

As mentioned in the previous chapter this thesis understands democratic consolidation as a process and recognizes civil society as one of the main crafters of this process. On the event that a democracy turns into a sole electoral regime, there will be problems of acquiring legitimacy at mass levels. Democracy should be understood as a tool for adjusting power relations in a way to maximise the chances of citizens to manipulate the environment in which they live, and to contribute in and influence debates about the vital decisions that shape their society. The contribution of citizens to the democratic system through representative organizations can contribute to the consolidation in the following ways: a) by pressuring the decisions of representatives b) by conveying the policies of governments to the public c) by acting as a counterpart to the government both as an information source and implementer. In the following part I will present the approach for evaluating the democratic consolidation functions of civil society that will be utilized within this study. It will be a different classification that recommends a simple model, providing bases for an empirical research.

This thesis will frame the relationship between democratic consolidation and civil society within four major dimensions: formational, legal, value-based, and impact-related (Anheier et. al., 2001). All of these four dimensions are divided into sub-dimensions that search for their relevance with democratic consolidation.

3.1.1 Formational Dimension

A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation is expected to have many strong, and varied civil society organizations that command various resources. The numbers of the civil society organizations may be an appropriate starting point for our purposes since it will reflect, in one way or another, the quality of the associational life. As the number of associations in civil society increases, it is more likely that these organizations will develop diverse purposes and agendas that will find reflections in the society. Moreover, the membership structure to these organizations may also reveal important facts. That is to say, on the conditions of lack of qualities of mutual trust, assurance and collaboration in a given society the greater the membership to civil society organizations are expected refer to the wider the range of social involvement and activities that will find organized base. Through membership to the civil society organizations citizens may develop their qualities of trust, confidence and cooperation. These democratic qualities

are expected to reappear and settle in the political culture of the society. Additionally multiple memberships to the civil society organizations may help citizens to understand and evaluate the cross-cutting patterns of interests.

The vertical depth of civil society organizations seems to be another important point. What is meant by vertical depth is the extent to which civil society organizations are able to establish local branches that quest for their organization's goal at the lower levels of public life. This situation not only contributes to the membership, but also active participation of these members. Such kind of a setup will bring the members in a face-to-face relationship that will contribute to the elaboration of their current issues.

3.1.2 Legal Dimension

Democratic consolidation through civil society necessitates a legal environment that enables citizen participation for the representation of their collective interests. There is often a need for clear and coherent regulations, which support civil society organizations and do not create obstacles to their freedom or unduly burden their operations. The laws must not only protect the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly of individuals, but also the exercise of these freedoms through the formation of legal entities

such as civil society organizations. Beyond guaranteeing the existence of civil society organizations, the laws ensure that they are governed with the principles of accountability and responsibility, and that they adhere to professional codes of conduct and self-regulation.

Autonomy of the civil society organizations appears as an important factor within this dimension. What is meant by autonomy is the absence of dominance of higher organizations, especially of the state. To the extent that the purpose of the civil society organizations are controlled and rerouted to according to the interests of a higher organization like state, it is expected that civil society's ability in crafting democracy will be undermined. To avoid the danger of too many regulations that make engagement in civic activity difficult and burdensome, civil society organizations must be encouraged to operate with self-regulation.

The political landscape that the civil society operates in is highly influential in its abilities of consolidation. A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation should have supportive legal, political and socio-cultural environments.

3.1.3 Value dimension

An important key for understanding our problematic is highly dependent upon an analysis on the production of democratic values within and among the civil society organizations. As a part of citizen activity, participation in civil societal organizations fortifies social bonds, flourishes sympathy to the others and raises consciousness about democratic system. The more often that actors have the opportunity to develop the organisational and political capacity to advance their goals, protect their interests, and preserve their values in the democratic institutional environment, the more secure their commitment will be to that environment (O'Donnell, 1992).

However, it would be naïve to presume that every civil societal organization has internal democratic structures, which open ways to democratic deliberation. Although, it is not easy to determine the internal democracy levels of civil society organizations still it is crucial to consider the degree of democracy within civil society organizations to evade tautological reasoning. To understand the issue in question, an elaboration on the institutional arrangements may be rewarding. Elected leadership based on free and uncorrupted elections, the rules that guarantee the freedom of expression within the organization and alike are crucial factors that an organization should have. However, one may still doubt about the internal

democracy level of a particular organization with above-mentioned characteristics since many organizations display these formal structures in a combination with authoritarian setting. Civil society organizations with strong central leadership cadres that are based patron-client tradition may be effective in fulfilling the short term aims like reaching governmental resources and alike but it may end up with the subjugation of the dissenting members' opinions. If the organizations' agenda is usually dominated by one person or a cadre, by and large there is no room left for the different ideas of the members. Eventually, a structure of such kind will not be contributive to the democratization processes. Furthermore, inter-organizational relations constitute another important dimension for the democracy building potential of civil society organizations.

Although some civil society organizations display domesticated democratic practices internally, they may not have same attitudes against other civil society organizations. Inevitably, if we expect any kind of democratic contribution from civil society, the goals and the methods of its organizations should not be totalizing or aiming to seize power over other organizations (Diamond, 1999: 228).

3.1.4. Impact Dimension

Civil society organizations can play a part in democratic consolidation by contributing to the social political and economic programs by trying to raise the topics that are salient to them. Through vocalizing the problems and needs, civil society organizations can produce warnings for the elected officials and pinpoint the problems related to democratic shortages. Hence, by sensing these democratic shortfalls and trying to stipulate changes, civil society can contribute to political institutionalization. As Boussard points out “civil society as an agenda setter can also have implications for the performance or efficiency of the democratic regime, which is central to a widespread legitimacy among the population” (Boussard, 2003: 103). Moreover, it would not be wrong to suggest that agenda setting is not only limited to matters related to the political sphere, but also touches upon the issues like projects for the general welfare of the citizens. On the occasions when the governing elites do not take action for solving problems related to the democratic deficits, civil society appears to be the only tool for identifying these problems. Civil society by intercommunicating through mass medium or by directly drawing attention of the elected officials by utilizing different tools like campaigns may elevate and pinpoint the issues of democracy into the political agenda. By this agenda setting function on the areas like public administration reforms or human rights issues that political parties and

politicians seem reluctant to act upon, civil society may fill the gap and put up the issues in the public circles.

The impact of civil society may be observed via its collaborative interchange with the governments and its policies. Civil society may involve in mutual assignments in which civil society organizations pool resources with governmental bodies, or some form of partnership. Hence as a counterpart, civil society can supply trust to political society by acting as a consultative body and by cooperating with state agencies for a competent policy performance. It is worth to mention that when the developmental work is concerned, civil society has a comparative advantage over state agencies. By being out of the scope of state bureaucracy, civil society organizations commonly, function in a more efficient and effective manner. Since they are often tightly connected individual's daily life, they are not only sensitive to emerging problems but also have the capability to indicate the concerns of individuals instantly which states at best can do indirectly (Warren, 2001: 78). Accordingly, by providing policy suggestions and cooperation to the state agencies for an efficient implementation, civil society and government cooperation could increase regime performance, which will eventually contribute to the bolstering of the regime legitimacy.

Another impact area of civil society is related to accountability. According to O'Donnell there are two forms of accountability: vertical and horizontal (1999, 38). Vertical accountability mainly refers to the relations between the government and citizens where the accountability is established through elections. When horizontal accountability is concerned Schmitter includes civil society as a main actor and defines it as:

“...the existence of permanently constituted, mutually recognised collective actors at multiple levels of aggregation within a polity that has equivalent capacities to monitor each other's behaviour and to react to each other's initiatives. These countervailing powers can be constituted of different mixes of public and private organisations. Their internal composition would be based on the participation of citizenship that is on the equality of rights and obligations of their respective members.” (1999, 61).

Hence, according to this definition, even under the conditions of vertical accountability, civil society acts as agent that monitors the state activities. Thus in normative terms, civil society is expected to contribute to the consolidation process.

Hypothesises, key questions and sub-dimensions related to the major dimensions are provided in Table 1.

TABLE 1 DIMENSIONS AND SUB-DIMENSIONS OF DC-CS-R AND

DC-CS-A

<u>FORMATIONAL DIMENSION</u> Hypothesis: A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation has many strong, and varied civil society organizations that command various resources. (Walzer, 1992; Cohen and Arato, 1994; Diamond, 1994) Key Question: How large is civil society organizations in terms of membership, institutions, and networks; what is the level of sector concentration and which resources do they command? Formational Sub-dimensions - F1 - Membership structure - F2 - Sector diversity - F3 - Citizen participation - F4 - Funding	<u>LEGAL DIMENSION</u> Hypothesis: A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation has supportive legal environment. (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Özbudun, 2003; Anheier, 2001) Key Question: What is the legal and political space within the larger regulatory environment in which civil society operates; and what laws and policies enable or inhibit its development? Legal Sub-dimensions - L1 - Operational Environment - L2 - Threats and Opportunities - L3 - Political Context - L4 - International Dimension
<u>VALUE DIMENSION</u> Hypothesis: A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation has values that support democracy and sustain liberal values. (White, 1994; Norton, 1995; Diamond, 1999) Key Question: Which values inspire the civil society; what sort of norms and practices does it represent and transmit; how inclusive and exclusive are they; and what is the level of tolerance to other civil society groups? Value-based Sub-dimensions - V1 - Establishing Democratic Values - V2 - Internal Democracy - V3 - Exclusiveness vs. Inclusiveness - V4 - Transparency	<u>IMPACT DIMENSION</u> Hypothesis: A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation works as a counterpart to the state by formulating policies for social, economic and political problems and monitor the implementations of these policies. (Cohen and Arato, 1994; Diamond, 1999; Boussard, 2003) Key Question: What is the contribution of civil society to specific social, economic and political problems? Impact related Sub-dimensions - I1 – Impingement - I2 – Responding Social Interests - I3 – Counterpart - I4 – Empowering Citizens

Throughout this study the classification of the civil societal organizations will be made on two basic headings: the “activity areas” and the “scope” of the organizations. Former is related to the interests of the organizations. Civil society covers a great number of organizations with different characters both formal and informal. Although there are different categorizations for civil societal organizations within the academic literature (Diamond, 1994: 6) I will utilize a tripartite categorization of a) interest based organizations b) cultural organizations and c) topic oriented organizations. Among the first group I will include the organizations that look for the betterment of common material or functional interest of their members like workers, employers, commercial associations and alike. The second group will cover the organizations that advocate the common cultural rights and/or values, religious faiths beliefs and symbols. Finally the third category will include the organizations that work for the improvement of quality of life of a peculiar group (women, consumers etc.) or community as a whole on special topics (environment, human rights, election monitoring etc.). The latter is related to the organizational scope of the associations. Basically organizations in Turkey organized at local and/or national level. This bipartite categorization seems appropriate for the Turkish context since more than 95 percent of civil societal organizations in Turkey mentioned within the will fits under this categorization (TTV, 2005: 643-678).

3.2. Operationalization and Sampling

3.2.1. Operationalization

The system I propose here is called as democratic consolidation- civil society rectangle and democratic consolidation- civil society area (DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A). DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A is a model that was inspired by The Civil Society Diamond that was developed by CIVICUS and Helmut Anheier (2001), which presents the overall findings of a “Civil Society Index” study in form of a diamond-shaped graph. However DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A, with its statistical accuracy, is a more advanced version of this tool with a different focus. It is a measurement system for presenting and analyzing the major contours of civil society in relation with democratic consolidation. The basic aim of the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A is to evaluate the democratic consolidation and civil society relationship in a systematic and visual way. In order to fulfil the above mentioned task the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A system is set to:

- Describe the state of civil society along a number of core characteristics and major dimensions
- Serve as an assessment and a visual tool

- To set a systematic analysis that is empirically grounded, conceptually-informed and relevant for policy purposes and
- Be useful for national, regional and local level applications as well as comparisons.

The DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A faces nonetheless several challenges. There are major conceptual and methodological issues involved in developing a measurement and assessment system applicable across countries that differ in terms of culture, economy and politics. Such issues include questions like: “what is meant by civil society, what characteristics are significant for measurement purposes, and how should relevant data be presented and analysed?” What is more, there are significant technical challenges in terms of data coverage and availability. Many of the data items needed for the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A are not readily available at the levels of quantity and quality needed. Yet while the task may face serious obstacles at first, there can also be little doubt that systematic information and reporting system on civil society is very much needed.

The DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A system rests on two basic assumptions. The first of them is that civil society is an evolving system, where separate dimensions can develop their own dynamics that frequently produce new outcomes. Second is that the concept of civil society is open to multi dimensional analysis that displays different orientations and variations over time. Accordingly, the outcome of a DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A analysis does not produce uni-dimensional explanations of civil society, like the ones based on only economic or legal aspects. Moreover it comes with a set of criteria that constitute a base for comparison among organizations, regions etc. Basically, the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A aim to establish basic qualities of easy usage and interpretation.

As explained this study will focus on this relationship in four different dimensions. These dimensions function in three different levels of units of analysis: a) Comprehensive level b) Intermediate level c) Micro Level. At the comprehensive level DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A may be applied to countries, societies or regions that may set opportunities for comparative studies. At the intermediate level, the unit of analysis is no longer civil society itself as it is in comprehensive level but a particular segment or sub-field of it like human rights or community development. Within this level DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A would deal with institutions, organisations and individuals of special relevance to the

field of democratic consolidation. Finally, at the micro-level the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A applies to one organisation or one specific setting primarily. Here, for example, we find the opportunity to focus on one civil society organization in any specific area like human rights and compare it other human rights organisations in the context of the larger civil society and the parameters of human rights policies in the area in which it operates.

The distinction between these units of analysis is important because each level necessitates different types of indicators. This study, because of its limitations, will operate in the micro and intermediate level. For all different DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A applications indicators should be in the same level of analysis. Table 2 represents the relationship between different levels and indicators.

TABLE 2 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS AND INDICATORS

Level: Comprehensive Indicators: Aggragete data Reference: Countries, regions etc.
Level: Intermediate Indicators: Organizational data Reference: Operation fields like human rights.
Level: Micro Indicators: Data based on single unit Reference: Individual case studies

In accordance with the framework described above, a number of sub-dimensions were set to portray the dimensions. To start with as the sub-dimensions for the formational dimension a) membership structure, b) sector diversity c) citizen participation and d) funding were selected. Secondly for the legal dimension a) operational environment, b) threats and opportunities, c) political context and d) international dimension were addressed as sub-dimensions. The value dimension were analysed with a) establishing democratic values, b) internal democracy, c) exclusiveness vs. inclusiveness and d) transparency sub-dimensions. Fourthly and finally for the impact dimension, the sub-dimensions of a) impingement b) responding social interests c) acting as counterpart and d) empowering citizens were arranged. All of these sub-dimensions were transferred in to indicators in the form of questions and located in the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A questionnaire.

DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A questionnaire consists of 49 questions. The respondents were expected to express degree of their agreement with the statement shown by the indicator by giving a score from 1 to 7, with the lowest being an expression that you do not agree at all with the statement. The intermediary scores between 1 and 7 will then represent alternative options

between these two polar positions. Questions 1 to 13 are related to formational dimension, where 14 to 29 were set to investigate the legal dimension. Similarly questions between 30 and 39 were arranged to examine the value dimension and questions between 40 and 49 examines the impact dimension. DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.

The scoring was calculated for DC-CS-R at the indicator level by adding the individual scores for each indicator and then dividing the sum by the number of respondents. Secondly adding up the individual indicator scores and dividing the sum by the number of indicators will calculate the sub-dimension score. Finally adding up the scores of the sub-dimensions and dividing by the number of sub-dimensions provided the dimension score.

The DC-CS-R merges these different measures under one diagram and presents it visually. DC-CS-R figures exemplify the relationship between civil society and democratic consolidation in terms of four dimensions. Alternative figures can be produced at different levels of analysis like the national, regional etc with different units of analysis under the condition that the adequate data is available.

One point to remember is that the DC-CS-R exercise does not provide statistical precision. the DC-CS-R is an exercise in perceptions, and this technique is able to present approximations of people's thinking and perceptions in a way that is helpful and also productive. However in order to determine an exact numerical values out of the data this study will employ one last calculation. The areas of rectangles that will be calculated by utilizing standard deviations of indicators, sub dimensions and dimensions that will offer concrete figures. This will be called democratic consolidation-civil society area (DC-CS-A). All of the assumptions and levels of analysis that are valid for DC-CS-R is also valid for DC-CS-A. For calculating the DC-CS-A score every indicator's score will be divided by the standard deviation value of the research database. Afterwards, these scores of indicators will be added up and divided by the number of indicators in a sub-dimension which will provide the sub dimension score for DC-CS-A. Similarly the sub-dimension scores of DC-CS-A will be added up and divided by the number of sub-dimensions for the dimension score of DC-CS-A. The area score will be calculated through the following method: scores of each level will be placed on the extensions of a plus chart as points. Then these points will be connected to each other to form a quadrangle. The area of this quadrangle will provide the DC-CS-A score. Trough this method this study will not offer only visual representations of the

values through DC-CS-R but also solid numerical values for further comparisons.

All of the civil society organizations that operate in Turkey were taken as the main population of this study. The preference of civil society organizations as respondents to the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A questionnaire depends on a number of reasons. Firstly the issue in question is a highly specialised one and only the citizens who have ties with civil society organizations may respond to the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A questionnaire in a comprehensive way. Secondly, the perceptions of civil society volunteers as the agents of policies created by these organizations will provide the accurate information about the democratization capabilities of those policies. Finally, other societal groups like bureaucrats, politicians etc. who might have interest in this research, have to be kept out of the population due to the time and funding limitations. Accordingly with the available resources to the researcher the civil society organizations constituted the most appropriate population for the field work of this study.

3.2.2. Sampling and Field Work

The Directory for Civil Society Organizations (Türk Tarih Vakfı, 2005; “directory” herein after) the civil society organizations in Turkey were grouped according to their a) organizational structures (foundations, associations etc.) and b) activity areas (topic oriented, interest representation etc.) c) geographical locations and d) scope of activities (national, local, regional etc.). This classification displayed similarity with the classification on civil society organizations that were set for this study. During the field work of this study I aimed to reach around 450-500 respondents. A sample of 553 was chosen according to the stratified random sampling method for the database. By utilizing this sampling method this study tried to reach all types of the civil societal groups that are active in society. Accordingly, the sample included different civil societal organizations that display different characteristics.

The field work of this study was carried basically on the Internet. The notice and questionnaires were sent to the respondents firstly via e-mail. The DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A questionnaire was also put on a web-page on the Internet. The non-responding civil society organizations in the sample were reached by alternative e-mails or telephone where necessary. Due to time

limitations of the study field work was planned to be conducted within 90 days. After 90 days, 213 responses were collected in the database. This refers to a response rate around 45 percent. Although a higher response rate was planned (around 60 percent) for this study, the response rate acquired is well above the unacceptable rate of 30 percent (Mangione, 1995).

Table 3 illustrates the frequencies and percentages of the activity area of the civil society organizations included in the database.

TABLE 3 ACTIVITY AREA OF ORGANIZATIONS

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
interest based	84	39.4	39.4	39.4
cultural	20	9.4	9.4	48.8
topic oriented	109	51.2	51.2	100.0
Total	213	100.0	100.0	

From these figures it is understood that the topic oriented organizations encircled nearly half of the database, with the 64 percent. Topic oriented organizations were followed by interest based organizations and cultural

organizations in size, with the percentages of 39.4 and 9.4 percents respectively. All of these figures display similarities as shares in the original directory. Hence it would not be wrong to conclude that when organizational activity areas concerned the sample displayed similar characteristics with the population.

As mentioned this study employed two different levels for the analysis of the scope of organizations: regional level and national level. Table 4 displays the scope of the organizations that are present in the database.

TABLE 4 SCOPE OF ACTIVITY OF ORGANIZATIONS

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
regional organizations	72	33.8	33.8	33.8
national organizations	141	66.2	66.2	100.0
Total	213	100.0	100.0	

As the numbers suggest the bulk of the database (66 percent) consists of organizations that operate on the national level. This share also seems appurtenant since the organizations that operate at the national level are

expected to, command various sources, involve in more activities and cover more citizens. With the share of 33 percent database also provided an important space for the regional level organizations. By this way this study expects to demonstrate similarities and differences related to our research question at the national and regional level if any. Similar to activity area of organizations, scope of the organizations in the sample displays collation with the original population.


Table 5 indicates the numbers related to the activity and scope of civil society organizations sampled in the database.

**TABLE 5 ACTIVITY AREA AND SCOPE OF ACTIVITY OF SAMPLE'S
CROSSTABULATION**


	regional organizations	national organizations	Total
interest based	37	47	84
cultural	9	11	20
topic oriented	26	83	109
Total	72	141	213

According to Table 3 with 83 organizations the biggest share in the database was taken by the organizations that are topic oriented and operate on national level. The least share nine organizations belong to cultural organizations that function on the local level. When the numbers and shares of other organizations in between concerned the sample seems to catch the diversity on both activity area and scope successfully. Eventually this distribution will help to conclude results in a more reliable way. Finally Figures 1 and 2 displays the percentages of organizations compared with each other on the grounds of activity area and scope in the forms of graphics

FIGURE 1 PERCENTAGES OF REGIONAL AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS



**FIGURE 2 PERCENTAGES OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH DIFFERENT
ACTIVITY AREAS**



CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

This chapter will present a) findings of the field study of this thesis and b) evaluate these findings within the theoretical and empirical framework described in previous paragraphs. Following paragraphs are designed to present the findings first at the comprehensive level (aggregate data for all organizations) and then at the intermediate level (data for different groups of organizations). By this way I will not only set an evaluation on general situation but also a generic base for the further analysis where necessary. During each of these evaluations I will regroup the findings of the field study according to the activity areas of civil society organizations and further breakdown the sub-dimensions among these groupings for a more comprehensive analysis. But

before going into these analyses, I will provide a key for the interpretation of the results generated by the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A tool. This key will be a guide for the interpretation of the numbers generated by the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A method that will open up the chance for comprehensible analysis of the data.

4.1. Key for the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A tool


As mentioned in the second chapter the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A tool will be employed as the main empirical tool for the examination of data collected. The DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A method consists of two different “plus shape” charts united in one single chart. In this combined chart the DC-CS-R chart rests on the left and DC-CS-A on the right.

DC-CS-R presents the indicator/sub-dimension/dimension scores produced by the database as a quadrangle. The more the quadrangle stretches to the outer boundaries, it represents a more contributive environment of civil society to democratic consolidation. This is due to the structure of the likert scale employed in the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A questionnaire: the score “7” was given for the cases of most contributive situations. Similarly, a quadrangle that produces a perfect rectangle at the

value of “4” on each extension of the plus the chart, represents a neutral position of civil society related to its abilities to the democratic consolidation.

The DC-CS-A tool also produces a quadrangle but different from the DC-CS-R, it comes with an area score. Similar to the DC-CS-R, bigger quadrangles that produce higher values, represent more contributive possibilities of civil society to democratic consolidation. According to the calculations the score of 954.845 represents the neutral value for the DC-CS-A. This value represents the neutral position of civil society related to democratic consolidation. That is to say the DC-CS-A values those are bigger than 954.845 labels the contributive abilities of civil society. The neutral figures of both DC-CS-R and DC-CS-A are presented in Figure 3.

FIGURE 3 NEUTRAL VALUES OF DC-CS-R AND DC-CS-A




In Figure 5, the DC-CS-R located on the left produces a perfect rectangle with values of “4” on each side of the chart that refers to the neutral position described above. The DC-CS-A on the right represents the neutral DC-CS-A value of 954.845 based on the calculation on DC-CS-R score.

4.2. Findings and discussions at the comprehensive level

This part of the chapter will evaluate the findings by presenting the general scores for dimensions and further breakdown of these scores according to activity areas of civil society organizations.

Figure 4 presents the results of the DC-CS-A/DC-CS-R tool at the comprehensive level.

**FIGURE 4 DC-CS-A/DC-CS-R TOOL RESULTS FOR
COMPREHENSIVE LEVEL**



4.2.1 Formational Dimension

Hypothesis: A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation has many strong, and varied civil society organizations that command various resources.

Key Question: How large is civil society organizations in terms of membership, institutions, and networks; what is the level of sector concentration and which resources do they command?

Formational Sub-dimensions

F1 - Membership structure

F2 - Sector diversity

F3 - Citizen participation

F4 - Funding

The analysis on the formational architecture of civil society organizations will open up chances for understanding the scope of social involvement and activities. It is expected that through membership to different civil society organizations, citizens will have the chances to develop their values of trust and confidence. Additionally it also expected that those values will spill-over to the political sphere as well. As much as the membership to civil society organizations expand and diversify, it would be more helpful for citizens to comprehend and appraise the diverging forms of interests.


The organizational configurations of organizations may also reveal some important facts about the formational dimension of civil society and democratic consolidation relationship. For example the ability of organizations to machinate local offices that aims to realize the organizations' aspirations at the different levels of public life would constitute a positive aspect of this

relationship. By this way, members not only will have the opportunity to set a face to face interaction with other members but also compare their demands both at local and national levels.

One good point to start for an investigation of contribution of civil society to the democratic consolidation may be an analysis on its formational features. As mentioned in the hypothesis a civil society that assists to democratic consolidation is presumed to have various powerful and diverse civil society organizations that command different resources.

In accordance with the above frame work, our model examines the formational dimension with four sub-dimensions of a) membership structure, b) sector diversity, c) participation and d) funding. As seen in figure 6 these sub-dimensions with the averages of 2.90 for membership structure, 3.21 for sector diversity, 2.64 for participation and 2.25 for funding produced a relatively small quadrangle for DC-CS-R, with lower values then neutral “4”. These findings are summarized in Figure 4.

**FIGURE 5 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR FORMATIONAL
DIMENSION/OVERALL**



Further examination on the indicators demonstrates that;

- a) more than 85 percent of the respondents think that the membership of citizens to civil society organizations is not adequate;
- b) 67 percent of the respondents think that civil society organizations in Turkey do not cover all sectors and groups effectively;

- c) Around 90 percent of the respondents think that citizens do not participate in civil societal activities and;
- d) More than 91 percent of the respondents think that civil society organizations face serious funding problems

When the low formational DC-CS-A score of 449.980 accompanied with above propositions it would not be wrong to argue that the formational dimension of civil society in Turkey seems to be weak and far from being contributive to the democratic consolidation.

At this point, some assignments related to the effects of culture and tradition on the formation of civil society may be helpful for explaining these low scores, especially the sub-dimensions of membership structure and participation. According to Saribay (1997) the presence of a political culture that favours the absolute power of a political institution (i.e. state) restrains the establishment of multiple social institutions with different focus points. The societies that compile and reproduce the docile behaviour patterns have tendencies to leave the resolutions of societal problems to that particular higher authority. Erkan (1995: 7-10) states that, a democratic society with a vibrant civil society should produce four basic cultural practices of social compromise, tolerance, political democracy and rationality which are missing

in the Turkish context. The evaluation of these values in the World Value Surveys ratifies the absence of above-mentioned values. According to these surveys (WVS: 1990; 1996 and 2001) more than 92 percent of respondents do not belong to any kind of voluntary organization or activity; 81 percent of the respondents think that people will take an advantage on each other if they find the opportunity; 60 percent of the respondents state that the democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling and over 40 percent of the respondents did not count the values of “tolerance” and “respect to others” as values that need to be thought to children. Even these basic figures suggest that the political culture of Turkish society is not adequate for the formation of a vibrant civil society.

Elsewhere, the position of Turkish state against civil society was counted as an important obstacle for the formation of a vivid civil society (Akşit et.al., 2003: 85-90). The administrators of a number of topic oriented civil society organizations affirm that Turkish state by a) both defining and solving every problem in society, b) using psychological tools for preventing people to have organizations, c) closing itself to the contributions coming from civil society and finally d) not providing financial opportunities to civil society organizations, create barriers for the formation of civil society.

The low scores related to funding and sector diversity sub-dimensions may also be explained with the help of above paragraphs. According to the 66 percent of respondents of DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A database, civil society organizations do not cover different groups of society like ethnic groups, women, workers etc. adequately. Additionally 67.1 of the respondents think that civil society organizations in Turkey are not organized effectively throughout the country. According to the research done by History Foundation of Turkey (TTV) the major source of income of civil society organizations are subscription fees (TTV: 2003). Since the membership rates are low, consequently the funding of these organizations are being far from adequate levels.

As the low scores of DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A and above analysis suggests the formational background of civil society organizations in Turkey is quite weak. It would not be wrong to argue that the formational structure of civil society in Turkey is rather determined by the existence of a strong state and a weak political culture that does not have enough accumulation of organizational ability (Akşit et.al., 2003: 306).

4.2.2 Legal Dimension

Hypothesis: A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation has supportive legal environment.

Key Question: What is the legal and political space within the larger regulatory environment in which civil society operates; and what laws and policies enable or inhibit its development?

Legal Sub-dimensions

L1 - Operational Environment

L2 - Threats and Opportunities

L3 - Political Context

L4 - International Dimension

A legal setting that accredits citizen participation for the realization of common interests is among one of the pre-conditions of a civil society that is expected to contribute to the democratic consolidation. The legal system should not only provide organized and reasoned codifications that comfort the


civil society organizations but also refrain from crafting mechanisms that curb their freedom or bar their operations. The laws that protect the freedoms of association, assembly of individuals and expression at the individual level, should also shield these rights at the organizational level. Beyond hedging the existence of civil society organizations, these laws should also certify that they are governed in accordance with accountability and responsibility.

The opportunities that are existent for the enhancement of self-governing capacity of civil society organizations seem to be a relevant sub-dimension of legal dimension. This capacity is highly related to the existence of other stronger power centres such as the state. To the point that the aim of civil societal organizations are guided by the interest of alternative power centres like state, it is not too hard to anticipate that the civil society's capability as a crafter of democracy will be damaged. The existence of innumerable rules and regulations will affect the magnitude of the civic activity and hinder the self regulation abilities of civil societal organizations.

In accordance with the above frame work this thesis analysed the legal dimension under four main headings, namely operational environment, opportunities, political environment and international dimension. As Figure 8

demonstrates the DC-CS-R scores are relatively higher than the formational level with values of 3.31 for operational environment, 3.69 for opportunities, 3.27 for political context and 3.36 for international dimension. Figure 5 displays these DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A Scores for Legal Dimension.

FIGURE 6 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR LEGAL DIMENSION/OVERALL



Furthermore, according to the indicators of legal dimension;

- a) More than 77 percent of the respondents think that, in practice, freedom of press is not established in Turkey;

- b) Around 60 percent of the respondents think that civil societal organizations cannot freely criticize governments;
- c) 72 percent of the respondents think that there are obstacles for the enjoyment of basic political rights in Turkey and
- d) Around 60 percent of the respondents think that the actions of international civil society organizations are hampered in Turkey.

The DC-CS-A score for legal dimension was produced as 712.320. Although this is a higher value than the formational dimension score, it still under the neutral level of 954.845. So we may conclude as similar to the formational dimension, in overall terms, legal dimension also falls short in creating a potential for the democratic consolidation functions of a civil society.

According to Özsunay (2000: 21) the legal framework for associational activity in Turkey displays a hybrid structure, trapped between authoritarian and democratic principles. Due to political and social fluctuations through the years the shape and content of this framework altered. Although the civil law no: 1926 foresaw a relatively democratic and liberal framework for associational activity, the law number 2512 issued in 1938, curbed the

previous law and altered the law according to a more authoritarian principles. After the end of world war two, in 1946 with the enactment of the law no: 4919, the legal framework for associational activity again rested on more liberal principles. This liberal framework reached to its peak with the additional support of 1961 constitution and the numbers of associations climbed from 205 to 41.000 (Özsunay, 2000: 22). However after the 1971 military intervention with the legislation provided by law no: 1630 in 1972, the framework mutated to the authoritarian setting once again. The law number 2908 which was passed after the 1980 coup lingers the provisions of the previous law and sustained the status quo related to the associational activity up to early 1990s. This law has been amended several times (1988, 1997, 2000, 2002 and 2003) and replaced by the law no: 5253 in 2004.

Up to late 1990s the legal framework for associational activity in Turkey displayed a number of other problems. To start with one may mention the technical issues related to this framework. The laws that govern the associational activity in Turkey rest both in the spheres of private and public laws. As a principle, issues related to the structure of organizations, decision on activities and alike are covered under the private law and the punishment codes for the activities of associations that agitate the public order are arranged under public law. In Turkey, the private law related to associational

activity is partly inserted under the provisions of Turkish civil law which creates uncertainty. Secondly, law foresees the existence of a) at least seven founders, b) five primary and five reserve members for executive committee and c) three primary and three reserve members for auditing committee for establishment of an association. Needless to say, these pleonastic reservations create extra obstacles in front of associational activity. Thirdly, the law lodges qualitative restrictions about the founders and members of associations. For example the associational activities of civil servants are extensively restricted as being members and/or founders. Fourthly, the law proposes a complex and difficult setup for the arrangement of international relations of associations. In most of the cases the international contacts of associations necessitates the approval of either Ministry of Internal Affairs and/or Ministry of External Affairs. Although the framework for associational activity tried to be altered a number of times, it won't be wrong to suggest that the legacy of barriers in front of the associational activity still loiters.

The DC-CS-R scores are located around the value of "3", which leaves limited room for being positive about the legal dimension. The highest DC-CS-A score belongs to topic oriented organizations with 740.055, still below the

neutral score of 954.845. For legal dimension –different than the formational dimension- groups of organizations produced very similar scores to each other. Accordingly, I have an inclination to say that the legal arrangements do not discriminate among civil society organizations and provide same opportunities and/or obstacles for all.

All of these items within the legal sphere create serious problems for the associational activity. These regulations may be assessed as practices that accord with the well-established suspicious reflex of Turkish state against associational activity. However this framework reproduces a system that hinders the possibilities of citizens to organize, with a high possibility to result in a passive and inactive civil society.

The low DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A scores and above discussion demonstrates the state's willingness to control and direct civil society. This desire of Turkish state becomes crystal clear primarily among legal codes and practices. Although some steps were taken during the last years to ease the legal boundaries of associational life, the existent rules and regulations are still seems to be the proofs of the above-mentioned inclination of state. Needless

to say, the legal conditions directly have effect on the other dimensions especially the formational dimension.

4.2.3 Value Dimension

Hypothesis: A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation has values that support democracy and sustain liberal values.

Key Question: Which values inspire the civil society; what sort of norms and practices does it represent and transmit; how inclusive and exclusive are they; and what is the level of tolerance to other civil society groups?

Value-based Sub-dimensions

V1 - Establishing Democratic Values

V2 - Internal Democracy

V3 - Exclusiveness vs. Inclusiveness

V4 - Transparency


The production of democratic merits within and among civil society organizations constitutes an important part in our analysis. The participation of individuals in civil societal organizations energizes social affinities, amplifies commiseration to the other citizens and raises awareness about the deficits of democratic system. On the condition that citizens have the chances to organize themselves and realize their goals, it is expected that they will be committed to the democratic environment that provides the base for these activities.

Unequivocally, the civil society organizations do not produce democratic values and structures at all times and conditions. It is decisive to judge the level of democracy within civil society organizations to avoid this tautological reasoning. For a democratic setting every civil societal organization should not only have elected leadership based on free and uncorrupted elections but also the rules those guarantee the freedom of expression within the organization. Even though the above-mentioned criterions are set these formal structures may still function in an authoritarian setting. On the condition that the agenda of organizations is dictated by one person or a group there is no space left for the altered ideas of the members and the system may produce the condition of

the subjugation of the dissenting members' opinions. Eventually, a structure of such kind will not be contributive to the democratization processes. Additionally even if the civil society organizations exhibit established democratic practices internally, they may not have same outlook against other civil society organizations. Inevitably, if one anticipates any kind of democratic input from civil society organizations, the ambitions and the means of these organizations should not be in a totalizing manner.

This thesis evaluated the value dimension under four sub-dimensions of a) building democratic values; b) internal democracy; c) exclusiveness and d) transparency. As figure 6 demonstrates the DC-CS-R scores of value dimension are closer to the neutral value of 4 which differentiates this dimension from others. The sub-dimensions of internal democracy, exclusiveness and transparency produced DC-CS-R values that are higher than or closer to neutral level, where only the democratic values dimension produced the value of 3.19.

**FIGURE 7 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR VALUE
DIMENSION/OVERALL**



The further analysis on indicators revealed the fact that

- a) Around 21 percent of the respondents think that civil society organizations work for the establishment of democratic values at the societal level;
- b) Around 80 percent of the respondents think that the internal functioning of civil society organizations are not democratic but at the same time 67 percent think that the executives of civil society organizations are elected through fair elections;

- c) More than 40 percent of the respondents think that civil society organizations do not involve in gender discrimination within their functioning; and
- d) Around 55 percent of the respondents think that the civil society organizations in Turkey have transparent and accountable organizational structures.

The value dimension produced the value of 896.350 for DC-CS-A tool. This is the highest score among other dimensions. Accordingly it should be noted that although the value dimension still stays below the desired levels of DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A scores it has the best position over the other dimensions.

Both Inglehart (1990: 37) and Fukuyama (1995: 10) considers the democratic values like trust and tolerance as crucial factors in prolonging cooperation and associability in a civic setting which in turn directly related to the establishment of a stable democracy. In a former research (Kalaycioğlu, 1995: 37) the levels of trust in Turkey was portrayed at low levels: around 90 percent of people living in Turkey think that the fellow human beings are not trustworthy. This throughput seems consistent with the findings of the study since the DC-CS-R score related to the establishment of democratic values

sub-dimension was calculated as 3.19. This value descends to even lower than “3” among cultural organizations. Another research that also focused on the values that are prominent among civil society organizations in Turkey revealed the fact that a) there is a tendency to ignore the “others” (other civil society organizations, other individuals that have different issues to rise etc.) and exclusively focus on their own issues b) high levels of “moralism” that produces the exclusion of different organizations of marginal groups and c) radicalization of their stances which leaves limited room for democratic values like trust and tolerance (Kadioğlu, 2005: 38-39).

The civil society in Turkey displays a high level of diverse and fragmented structure. According to Akşit et. al (2003: 313) this situation is a result of a number of factors including the strong state tradition, the gap between centre and periphery and socio-political conditions of last two decades. This fragmentation is also visible among the civil society organizations. Although civil society organizations cooperate with each other on specific occasions, these attempts are far from constituting a stable institutional structures. Especially underlining the political differences among the civil society organizations hinders the blossoming the democratic values of trust and alike.

The problems related to the internal democracy of these organizations also produced low scores in the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A analysis. The 86 percent of respondents thinks that the internal functioning of civil society organizations are undemocratic. The members contribute to the decision making processes occasionally and this responsibility are mostly taken by the administrative boards. The existing hierarchical structures bars the possibilities of democratic participation and the reluctance of members help to the upholding this structure (Akşit et. al., 2003: 313).

4.2.4. Impact Dimension

Hypothesis: A civil society that is contributive to democratic consolidation works as a counterpart to the state and contributes to the solving of social, economic and political problems.

Key Question: What is the contribution of civil society to specific social, economic and political problems?

Impact related Sub-dimensions

I1 – Impingement

I2 – Responding Social Interests

I3 – Counterpart

I4 – Empowering Citizens

Civil society organizations can take an active role during the democratic consolidation process by committing solutions to the social and political programs. They can awaken the public by pointing out the axial issues and by verbalizing the problematic areas and requirements. Civil society organizations can effectuate warnings for the elected officials and diagnose the problems related to democratic shortages. Hence, by locating these democratic paucities and trying to stipulate changes, civil society can play an important role during the process of political institutionalization. Furthermore, these actions of civil society are not only limited to issues that take part in the political sphere. By means of these actions, civil society forces also comment on the issues like projects for the general welfare of the citizens. Where the governing elites do not respond to the problems related to democratic deficits, sometimes civil society organizations come forth as the main apparatus for spotting these problems. Civil society by utilizing the mass medium or by noticing the elected officials through different strategies like campaigns an

alike can lift the issues related to democracy into the political agenda. Hence, civil society forces by this way have the opportunity to fill the gap between elected officials and society and put up the issues in the public circles that political parties and politicians seem reluctant to act upon.

The civil society forces have the ability to establish collaborative interchange with the political society that enhances its impact capability. For example, civil society may involve in mutual assignments in which organizations pool resources with governmental bodies, or some form of partnership. Hence acting as a counterpart, civil society can bring in confidence to political society not only by acting as a counseling body but also by cooperating with state agencies for a proficient policy performance. Additionally, acting out of the scope of state bureaucracy, civil society organizations habitually, operate in a more efficient and effective manner when compared to state. Therefore, by supplying policy proposals and assistance to the state activity, civil society and government collaboration could increase regime performance.

Civil society can also play a part in democratic development by providing education to the public and distribute information and facts about the


political system. As a result, the citizens who have limited knowledge about the democratic system can be informed and so that they can be aware of their rights and duties. For the same reason, citizens may bring together an understanding of trust in the democratic system with a permanent check on the performance of the ruling elite. In addition civil society as an educator can raise communal responsiveness, and thereby enhance the democratic proficiency among citizens. On the condition that the civil society organizations are democratically structured, democratic outlook and conduct can be built up by taking part within these organizations. Civil society may act as an important source of civic education for both the ruling elites and the public and open up the channels for dissemination of democratic values to the public. A significant number of civil society organizations in Turkey are involved in the project of educating the citizens concerning different aspects of the democratic system including the areas like women rights, consumer rights or directly the democratic rights and duties. Lately with the funds of European Union, these attempts are accelerated.

Civil society has the potential to contribute to democratic development by creating original political choices. Without doubt, civil society movements have the potential of transforming themselves into political parties that seek power within the political sphere and thus could enrich representation and

amplify pluralism in society. By this way, civil society may act not only as a source of new political alternatives, but also as a pool of new leadership. Civil society as a source of pluralism can contribute to democratic development by generating new political alternatives and by supplying different perceptions that can improve representation and encourage discussions.

This thesis analysed the impact dimension under the sub-dimensions of impingement, responding social interests, acting as counterpart and empowerment of citizens. As Figure 7 demonstrates the DC-CS-R scores are relatively higher than the formational and legal dimensions with the values of 2.35 for impingement, 3.66 for responding social interests, 3.85 for acting as a counterpart and 4.08 for empowering citizens.

**FIGURE 8 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR IMPACT
DIMENSION/OVERALL**



Furthermore, according to the indicators of impact dimension;

- a) 24 percent of the respondents think that civil society organizations are effective in monitoring and directing the policies of governments;
- b) Around 30 percent of respondents think that a considerable amount of citizens in Turkey have trust to the civil societal organizations;
- c) Around 30 percent of respondents think that civil societal organizations pressurize governments for solving the prioritized problems of society
- d) Nearly 50 percent of respondents think that civil society organizations are helpful for the generation of social capital.

The impact dimension produced the value of 714.870 for DC-CS-A tool. This is the second highest score after the value dimension however it is under the neutral level of 954.845. So it would not be wrong to conclude that although the impact dimension seems inadequate in creating a potential for the democratic consolidation in general terms it has a better comparative position over the legal and formational dimensions.

In overall relatively high DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A scores of impact dimension may be explained with a number of current developments.

Especially with the current European Union agenda, civil society organizations in Turkey are pressing more than ever and try to set the agendas in a wide range of policies, which will expectantly contribute to a possible membership of Turkey to the European Union (Türk, 2002). An enthusiastic process of policy adaptation and harmonization started within Turkey when it was declared that Turkey was accepted as an official candidate for the European Union after the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. Among many important areas of this harmonization process, the issue of civil society seemed to be a vitally important one to the European Union bodies. The importance of this topic has been reflected in the Accession Partnership Document issued in 2000, in which the European Union Commission identified its priorities, objectives and conditions for the full membership of Turkey. Accordingly, in 2001 Turkish government launched the National Programme which states the aim of full protection of individual rights and freedoms, the freedom of thought and expression, the freedom of association and peaceful assembly and the enlargement of the space of civil society in Turkey in order to elevate the structure and quality of Turkish democracy to the level of the European standards. More than one hundred civil society organizations with the motor power provided by Economic Development Foundation (IKV) established a campaign for agenda setting, which tried to both direct and monitor the governmental activity on harmonization issues. This well-organized movement

contributed to the political determination for a possible full membership to the European Union and accordingly, pushed the governments to pass the necessary laws (Birand, 2002).

Civil society organizations also monitor the reforms in the areas of judiciary and public administration. Without doubt, one of the vital elements of a democratic system is an autonomous judiciary with well-established organizational capabilities. The judiciary in Turkey has always been criticized by civil societal organizations, especially by the bars, basically because of its lack of independence from the executive. During 1990s, with the help of European Union membership agenda, civil society in Turkey started to demand reform for the judicial system. Civil society organizations raised the issue to the political agenda with special reference to the conflicting nature of the current judicial system with the European Union norms. Among other things, civil society demanded reforms including the reorganization of the dual structure of judiciary (civil and military) and check of military courts by the higher civilian courts where necessary. Civil society organizations also play an active role in the public administration reform discussions. A wide range of civil society organizations including municipalities, employee associations, trade unions and alike, commented on the new reform draft and accentuate their demands about the new law (Güngör, 2003). These demands were also put

forward by the civil society organizations during the meetings of Economic Social Council, which is an auxiliary institution advising to the government (Haskebabcı, 2003).

One last example worth to mention is related to the area of human rights. In the area of human rights, civil society organizations increasingly become visible with the help of high media attention and publicity. The examples of such efforts appear repetitively in media. Although, it is very dubious that they have the same influence power as the groups mentioned above, they still vocalize their demands through communicating channels like private publications, demonstrations and the Internet. Accordingly, they are fulfilling the function of setting priorities and drawing attention to issues that traditionally ignored by ruling elites. In the Turkish case, one may argue that the issues like human rights are only phonated by civil society organizations and hence they remain as the sole base for representation and articulation of the opinions and demands coming from society.

The disastrous earthquake happened in 1999 provides a suitable landscape for analyzing civil society's role as a government counterpart in Turkey. The quake hit the Marmara region of Turkey and more than 17,000

lives were lost. It also destroyed more than 100,000 houses and 16,000 businesses, caused serious damage to the infrastructure including telecommunication networks, highways, industrial settings and alike. Just after the disaster, perhaps even faster than the state officials, civil society organizations reached to the region assisting survivors. As of 3 October in the province of Adapazari alone, there were 55 different groups (including private-sector companies, NGOs both foreign and Turkish, foreign government aid providers and some run by the state agencies) that had set up tent cities (Jalali, 2002: 130). Some of the civil society organizations noticed the need for a better coordination and went one step further to form a group which consists of 40 organizations under the name of Civil Society Earthquake Coordination Committee to provide help in a more effective and efficient way. Under the coordination of this organization, civil societal groups managed to pool their resources jointly and provided services more effectively.

The efforts of Turkish Medical Association (TTB) and the Turkish Association of Architects and Civil Engineers (TMMOB) may constitute another example. They have noticed the incapability of governmental bodies in assisting activities and decided to form up another aid group. This aid group first, conducted a survey to assess the needs of victims with surgical precision and then each organization took responsibility for providing different services

(Dirican, 2003). While some of them were responsible of distributing goods to neighborhoods, others like TMMOB were responsible for assessing the destruction to infrastructure such as electricity and building damage (Jalali, 2002: 131). Universities did also involve in aiding activity with their technical knowledge in areas like the inspection and reconstruction of damaged buildings and infrastructure. The earthquake disaster revealed the fact that, civil society can act as a powerful force in Turkey that can even handle hazardous situations of such magnitude.

Although civil society organizations provide educational service in a number of different subjects, the area of human rights appears up to be the most popular one. Frequently civil society organizations stress the importance of human rights issues and the need for an increased awareness and knowledge in this area for ordinary citizens. An example campaign was launched in 2004 by the Association of Support for Contemporary Life (Cagdas Yasami Destekleme Dernegi, CYDD). Within this campaign, CYDD aims to provide basic knowledge on human rights and democracy to a population of 8000 citizens living in 6 different districts of Istanbul. They have reached 2000 citizens already, and provide essential information about citizen, patient, social and worker rights (Aktaş, 2005). A further example is the project carried by Kadikoy Municipality of Istanbul, under the name of Social Cooperation for

Democracy and Human Rights (Demokrasi ve İnsan Hakları İçin Toplumsal İşbirliği Projesi). This project is funded by both European Union and Kadikoy Municipality and started in 2003. The campaigners not only reached a considerable amount of citizens including unemployed and handicapped people but also representatives of civil society organizations who have branches in Kadikoy. The participants were educated by the experts in the areas of human and basic democratic rights (Yılmaz, 2005).

This information providing activity and training is not only limited to the ordinary citizens. Several organizations are engaged in the work of training and capacity building among civil servants. In the area of human rights, an interesting example is the effort of The Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed People (MAZLUM-DER). Beyond its other activities, this organization also offers human right courses to the religious leaders (*imam*) (Milliyet, 2004). MAZLUM-DER was actually the first organization to train the religious officials in the area of human rights. Its vision is not only to defend freedom expression for all kind of politic views and thoughts, but also to promote respect for human rights among the different societal groups as well. Another example is the campaign held by Turkish Democracy Association (Turk Demokrasi Vakfi, TDV), which aimed to provide

basic human rights education to headman of villages in central Anatolia where the course took place in three different cities and reached to 40 headmen.

Besides human rights issues, civil society organizations provide education and training in other areas like social and economic rights. Typically, these activities involve production of information material and courses or seminars and the bulk of these projects have a special focus on the vulnerable groups or groups in an exposed situation. Projects aiming at educating women and to elevate the women's position in the society may be counted among examples. In a recent example 59 different civil society organizations pooled their resources in order to provide basic training for elevating women's position in society. According to their data they have reached 4000 women and 63 percent of the women who took the course managed to eliminate violence against them completely and 22 percent reduced it in considerable amount. Additionally 30 percent of the attendants started to work to provide additional income to their household and 54 percent returned to school either to complete their education or to start a new one (Akçura, 2005).

As a conclusion two points seem to mention worthwhile. First of them is related with the visible popularity of the human rights issues among the civil

society organizations in Turkey. Regardless of their main focus of activities civil society organizations have a significant tendency to insert the human rights issues both into their agenda and activities. For example, a project carried by the Association for Homeless Children in Adana (Adana Sokak Çocukları Derneği), which has the aim of creating active work force out of young and homeless children, includes education in human rights as a part of this activity. The second one is related to the state civil society relations. The educational function of civil society refers to cooperation with state authorities. All of the examples provided above have a connection with a related state office either for informing purposes or as a cooperative body. Additionally Turkish state by itself also through utilizing its institutions aims to raise consciousness about human rights issues by providing education to its officers. For example The Provincial Human Rights Watch Boards, (Insan Haklari Il Izleme Kurullari) which set by the Ministry of Interior Affairs offered courses on democracy and human rights to not only the police and gendarmerie but also to a wide range of civil servants (Çolak, 2001).

Another issue is the political activities of civil societal organizations. Although by definition political parties are excluded from our definition of civil society, the significant increase in the number of parties in Turkey is worth to mention at that point. Between the years of 1983 and 1999 the number of

parties, which compete in national elections, rose from three to twenty. It is quite dubious that any of these small political parties will turn out to be strong political actors in the near future. Yet, it would not be wrong to suggest that even the mere existence of new parties may open the channels of pluralism in political society. One common argument about traditional political parties in Turkey is their disability of transmitting the demands coming from the society. The existence of small parties endows the voters with at least a feeling that they can prefer a party that stands for them. In the end, by presenting different political options to the voters, these parties could also amplify the legitimacy of the democratic system as a whole. With the presence of alternatives, a generous political debate could be stimulated among the public circles. Furthermore, these kinds of movements, on the condition that they have their origins rooted in civil society, may viaduct the divide among the conventional political parties and civil society.

Mainly the new political parties emerged during the 1990s was an end result of the enduring economic crises of the times. The traditional political parties under this heavy economic turbulence, did not function as think tanks for processing new political or economic ideas or policies. Such kind of an absence for political opposition has helped to the establishment of a number of civil societal organizations, which aimed to fulfill this gap. During 1990s the

political opposition produced by civil societal organizations like New Democracy Movement (YDH) or The Limpid Movement (ARI) became more and more visible among the popular circles. Even though they have not succeeded in ending the dominance of the traditional parties, they managed to find space in media, improve representation, contribute to an increased pluralism in society and helped a healthy debate with alternatives. Additionally, they were referred as model organizations for traditional political parties on a number of occasions. For example during 1999 leadership elections of Peoples Republican Party (CHP), a number of candidates referred to YDH as a successful model for CHP for the establishment of linkages with civil society (Zaman, 1999).

Civil society may act as a rich resource for the establishment of democratic leadership on the condition that leaders have backgrounds in democratic civil societal practices. The conventional political parties and their non-democratic organizational structures that are often coupled with the corrupted economic and political elite do not constitute a suitable base for the establishment of such democratic leadership. As a result of that, new generations are neither visible and nor effective in the political parties in the Turkish context. Moreover the transformation from civil society to the political society is quite rare. With the exception of YDH, which started as a think tank

and later transformed itself to a political party, it is quite unlikely to see the repositioning of civil societal organizations into political society. Recently, however, this tendency started to change with a number of individual transfers from civil society to political society. Actors who took important places in civil society organizations began to acquire positions in political sphere. For example, the ARI movement that is active over a decade, recently, managed sending its members to the political parties and parliament (Yılmaz, 2001). However the movement itself neither supports a political party nor transfers itself to the political sphere. Rather they prefer to support individual candidates who have belief in the rule of law, transparency and democratic values (Köprülü, 2002).

One another point worth to mention is, interestingly, this relocation occurs not only from civil society to political society but also from political society to civil society. The politicians, who are out of the political sphere for any reason, search to establish the ways of integration into civil society.

In Turkey civil society as a source of new political alternatives, did not produce a significant reassignment of leadership from civil society to the political community. However with the emergence of new parties, and although

they have not confronted the continual supremacy of the conventional parties, it is expected that they will contribute to the possible pluralism channels in Turkish society.

4.3 Findings and discussions at the intermediate level

The following paragraphs will analyse the findings for some of the civil society organizations at the intermediate level. As mentioned before this study grouped the organizations under the headings of a) interest based organizations b) topic oriented organizations and c) cultural organizations. The investigation at the intermediate level will reveal the similarities and differences among different types and portray the chances of democratic consolidation abilities of these different groups of civil society organizations.

4.3.1 Interest Based Organizations

As mentioned earlier, this study covers the organizations that look for the betterment of common material or functional interest of their members under the category of interest based organizations. Hence this category includes not only the workers and businessmen associations but also other commercial organizations and alike.

The DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A values for the economic interest based organizations are provided in figure 8.

FIGURE 9 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR INTEREST BASED ORGANIZATIONS




Figure 8 different than the previously displayed DC-CS-A charts, produced values below or around “4”. The highest value was produced by the value dimension with 4.09 and the lowest value belongs to the formational dimension with 2.95. For legal dimension and impact dimension DC-CS-A chart has the values of 3.56 and 3.71 respectively. The DC-CS-A score with the value of 715.860 stays under the neutral value of 954.845. The following

paragraphs will interpret the above mentioned values. While doing so I will refer to the historical background of these organizations and then, basically focus on voluntary interest based organizations and chambers.

Interest based organizations deserves special attention as examples of civil societal organizations in the Ottoman-Turkish continuum. The Ottoman guilds appear as the earliest example in this tradition. The guilds were occupational establishments that tried to serve the economic interests of small and middle-sized entrepreneurs. There is a disagreement about whether the Ottoman guilds acted as an extended arm of the state or manage to stay autonomous (Tosun, 2001: 210-214). However, it would not be wrong to argue that as institutions of society they were utilized and directed by the Ottoman state as agents for economic and social control (Baer, 1980: 98). As professional institutions involving in economic activity guilds did not have the freedom neither to compete among themselves nor to determine the commercial practices like prices, profit rates etc. Additionally the approval of state officials on the administrators of guilds was necessary. The polity of Ottoman State that tries to control and direct every civil societal establishment leaves no room for adversary style of politics. When there was a need for the recognition and organization of the entrepreneurial activity by the 1850s state continued the above-mentioned tradition and tried to ascertain a close

command on these activities. As a result the state tried to manipulate the economic development via its centralized administrative system. As Mahçupyan writes (1994: 56) “the state possessed the area of rights that should be opened up for citizens, as prerogatives for itself”. Hence, the state during its modernization perpetuated the old tradition of the domination of state over society.

After the elimination of guilds from the bureaucratic system, the interest based organizations emanated as mutated forms of guilds under the organizational structures as chambers. They were initiated by state and established by law with status of “public institution” and responsible of fulfilling the duties of state where necessary. They were setup to work with the State’s relevant offices to support trade and industry (Öncü, 1983: 1567-1570). Chambers had the monopoly on the occupational activity of all related professionals since membership to chambers were mandatory. This actual situation shaped the chambers as agents of state rather than the assignees of their members. This is due to the reason that this organizational structure was further utilized by young Turkish republic during the single party period. Although state’s supervision on chambers was loosened during the multi-party period due to the relatively liberal policies, governments reaction to these new situation was that of altering the formal control mechanisms with informal ones

(Heper, 1991a: 15). The era after 1950 up to late 1960s was labeled with governments arbitrary and discriminative approaches to the chambers (Bianchi, 1984: 115) where the chambers' opinions only valued when they are fully compatible with government's policies.

From the above discussion we may conclude that although the interest based organizations were introduced into the political system, it seems that the basic intention behind this introduction was not agglomerating the demands coming from society but to predominate them. According to Heper (1991a: 16-17) the voluntary interest based organizations followed the same route as chambers and did not produce ideas that challenge the status-quo.

Basically the issues related to democracy appeared in the agenda of interest based organizations in Turkey during 1990s especially with the efforts of voluntary economic interest based organizations. Especially by the mid 1990s, the referral to democracy and democratization became visible among the reports and periodicals of associations. The motive behind this interest in democracy was explained by referring to a need for an instrument for "generating greater legitimacy for these organizations and their activities through exercising their social responsibilities via the civil society" (Öniş and

Türem, 2001: 97). However their conception of democracy and degree of commitment to democracy display asymmetries. The Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) became quite visible with their research activities and reports related to democratization. With a divergent approach than TÜSİAD, the Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MÜSİAD), can be categorized as a second-ranking association in terms of raising democratic demands. The Union of Turkish Chambers and Stock Exchanges (TOBB) and Turkish Employers' Confederation (TİSK) seem to be less vocal forces than TÜSİAD or MÜSİAD in calling for a democratic opening (Öniş and Türem, 2001: 98).

Basically the rapid development of private entrepreneurship during 1950s and 1960s opened up the way to the establishment of business associations. The fast-growing holdings with multi functions of the time decided to unite under the umbrella of TÜSİAD. TÜSİAD different then other business associations like TOBB displayed a selective style for the membership to the institution with high entrance fees and referencing system. Due to those reasons TÜSİAD still rest on the firms with relatively high business capacity which are mainly located in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Additionally Vorhoff (2002: 317) states that the main success of these firms

was mainly a result of the economic policies of early republic. This essential connection of TÜSİAD with the state shaped its mission and administration. The mission statement of the organization refers to the principles of Atatürk and his perspective of the modern Turkey based on secularism. This basic principle eventually necessitates the respect to the democratic rights of individual on the grounds of entrepreneurship, belief and thought.

Besides its economic activities TÜSİAD also perceives itself as an institution which provides information and opens up the channels of debate on the important issues related to the current agenda of the country. Buğra explains this “self-awarded” responsibility with the inability of Turkish state on establishing strong relationship with the private entrepreneurship and society (Buğra, 1994: 132). TÜSİAD with such kind of an activity tries to alter its position from an “interest group” to a “pressure group” where former refers to a group which self-interestedly seeks only for profit and latter refers to a civil societal organization that works for the well-being of society. Accordingly it becomes “normal” to step up and pinpoint the socio-economic problems of the society. However, according to Vorhoff (2002: 321) this behavior also “covers the real motive of profit behind the general aim of strengthening of the society”.

TÜSİAD, in principle, has an internal democratic structure where its internal bodies of administration are elected by its members. Decisions are taken by the board of directors with the help of board of advisories. The commissions, where the basic policies and projects of organization are set, are open to all members (Gülfidan, 1993: 52-53).

It would not be wrong to argue that TÜSİAD starting from its early years of establishment aimed to limit its activities within the economic sphere and refrained from involving in politics. However, the organization displayed a noteworthy change of stance in the context of the 1990s. TÜSİAD circulated a series of reports that focused on the inherent dearth of the democratic system and to offer ways of mastering these insufficiencies and, consequently, extend the boundaries of democratic politics in Turkey. The essentia of these efforts reflects the TÜSİAD understands on democracy, which equates the term with good governance. The organization increasingly insisted on a neutral administration and the performance of laws for the establishment of a secure and foreseeable context. Security, predictability and responsibility constituted the basis for TUSİAD's demand for democratization, primarily as an instrument for better governance which, in turn, was identified as a precondition for

attaining and sustaining competitiveness in the global era (Öniş and Türem, 2001: 98).

In an alternative manner TÜSİAD also demanded democratic reforms in order to act parallel to the so called "global norms" of citizenship and human rights. TÜSİAD's publications in 1997, 1999 and more recent one that is published in 2006 touched upon the sensitive issues including the freedom of expression, the extension of the language and cultural rights of the Kurds and the necessity to establish the civilian control over the military and alike. Hence, these reports tackled directly and suggested deep-seated reforms in the two key areas constituting the most troublesome and problematic aspects of Turkish democracy, namely the issue of "minority rights" and the pervasive role of the military in Turkish politics (Öniş and Türem, 2001: 100).

Although with a different nature, focus and track "The Independent Association of Businessmen and Industrialists", MÜSİAD, which is a more recent organization that was founded in 1990, also expressed the importance of democratic opening. In contrast, to TÜSİAD's members, MÜSİAD members are small and medium sized firms, supported with a limited number of large scale firms. The organization's membership size reached to its peak with

around 3000 firms, displaying a parallelism with the rise of the Islamist Welfare Party in the mid-1990s (Öniş, 1997: 750-755). Like TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD has also issued a number of reports related to both economic and non-economic spheres including issues of democratization. Different than the TÜSİAD's studies which prioritize the above-mentioned issues, MÜSİAD's reports revolve around the critics of the secular character of the Turkish state and demand for an additional space of religious rights and freedoms whereas TÜSİAD has never challenged the Turkish version of the secular state. It would not be wrong to argue that, the organization mostly highlight the problems related to the religious freedoms and did not involve in discussions related to the individual rights and democratic freedoms. In comparison to TUSİAD, MÜSİAD tried to draw an extra attention on the issue of "social and ethical rights" within business-labor relations with the aim of a more fair distribution of public resources among large and small businessmen.

The most significant attempt of MÜSİAD related to democratization was crystallized in the organization's report called as the "Constitutional Reform and the Democratization of the State". Basically this report contains recommendations that would help to reorganize the state in a way that it would be more responsible to the society. With this report MÜSİAD altered and expended its limited vision about democratization raised issues like

accountable governance, parliamentary modification, and abolition of boundaries on the freedom of thought and alike. It would not be wrong to argue that MÜSİAD during the late 1990s team up with TÜSİAD on the idea of "optimal government" based on constitutional limits on the share of fiscal deficit as a proportion of GNP, with both visions clearly influenced by the language and the rhetoric of neo-liberalism and the New Right (Öniş and Türem, 2001: 102).

Surely TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD are not the only interest based organizations that put efforts in the directions of democratization. The Union of Turkish Chambers and Stock Exchanges (TOBB) surfaced as yet another organization during the 1990s that involved in democratization debates. Indeed TOBB pioneered the debate about democratization with their report entitled as "The Eastern Question" in 1995 preceding the other publications and reports by organizations mentioned above. The report touched upon the economic, political and social problems of eastern Anatolia and offered a series of solutions. After their first report, TOBB has published two further studies, related to the constitutional arrangements and law on political parties and elections. The former was criticizing the undemocratic character of the 1982 constitution and comprised some mild and circuitous proposals for

transformation in the areas of human rights, individual and civil freedoms are mentioned in the text. The latter spotlighted the unfair nature of the laws related to the party and election system and offered a series of modifications in order to widen the limits of political representation. According to Öniş and Türem (2001: 103) TOBB prioritize the issues related to laws and regulations because they consider “existing legal framework as one of the major obstacles in the way of achieving a Western style liberal democracy which is representative and stable at the same time”.

Although the above-mentioned organizations constitute more or less common grounds for pro-democratization efforts "The Turkish Employers' Confederation, TİSK, displays an alternative stance compared to others. The organization rather than taking part in democratization debates preserved its traditional attitude which prioritize the business-labor interactions and wage issues. Accordingly, TİSK preferred to interpret globalization in a functional way with special focus on issues like flexible specialization and the advantages of employing labor on a more flexible basis. The more hot topics related to the globalization-democratization nexus in the Turkish context have been pushed to the background on the TİSK's agenda.

Overall, above-mentioned interest based associations started to perceive democracy on the basis of values that it rest upon, and value the issues like human rights and citizenship during the 1990s. Although their efforts display irregularities they have produced genuine reports on issues relating to democratization, civil and human rights and constitutional reform. The highest score of 4.09 on DC-CS-R rectangle for interest based organizations related to the values dimension also certifies this tendency. However this tendency should transform itself into“regularity” with the aim of extending civil and human rights.

There is no doubt that interest based associations, notably TÜSİAD, took active position for pushing democratic reforms into Turkish politics and their worth should not be undervalued. However we have to still analyze the margins of these attempts in order to understand the issue in a comprehensive manner. In most of the cases these limits are dependent on the organizations’ relationship with state. Although the interest based business associations enjoyed a degree of independence from state during the post-1980 era, it would be disingenuous to conclude that the dependency of these organizations to the state has been disappeared. The interest based

organizations in Turkey maintain uneven admittance to state assets. One another conclusion about interest based associations in Turkey may be related to their heterogeneous character. This heterogeneity “among” the organizations also visible “within” the organizations. According to Öniş and Türem (2001:111) the internal divisions or conflicts also restrict the ability of key business associations like TÜSİAD or TOBB to play a more active role in this respect.

In most of the cases, the interest based organizations tend to perceive democracy as a tool to an end rather than as something which is essential and important in itself. This understanding on democracy became clearly visible especially issues related to globalization and European Union (EU). They tend to view the full membership to the EU as an objective with economical benefits. Democratization, on the other hand, is perceived as an intermediary step that needed to be fulfilled within the process by these organizations. So one can conclude that the contribution of such kind of interest based organizations to democratic consolidation is heavily dependent on the external factors like the membership to the EU. Hence one might conclude that if the “signals provided by the EU are weak in this direction as compared with the other candidate countries included in the enlargement process, the likelihood

of the business community pursuing the wider democratization agenda with any kind of vigor will be considerably reduced.” (Öniş and Türem, 2001: 110).

Interest based organizations seem to focus more heavily on the conducive benefits of democratic consolidation such as the betterment in the economical sphere. That is why mostly these organizations do not have any concern in setting coalitions with other segments of civil society to confront the state and promote its democratization agenda. Mostly the business associations in Turkey, have been quite reluctant to enter into such alliances and have been careful to maintain a distant, arm's length relationship both with other business associations as well as wider segments of the civil society. According to Öniş (2001, 111) this "weak horizontal integration" in Turkish civil society and ignorance of the different segments of civil society by business community creates a major weakness in terms of further expansion of democratic norms in Turkey. Moreover the semi official nature of the other organizations like TOBB limits the ability of these associations' abilities to introduce wider democratization agenda. Accordingly it would not be wrong to conclude that the business community in Turkey cannot act in a uniform manner to promote democratic development.

All of these comments and conclusions force us to inquire the nature of these efforts in the sense that whether they are efforts 'from below'. Such kind of an inquiry will reveal the limits of the contribution of interest based groups to the democratic consolidation. In a political setting where civil society is naturally fragile and fragmented, I have an inclination to argue that interest based organizations have limited contribution to democratic openings. That is to say they do not foresee and propose fundamental democratic transformations but instead they attach the demands of democratization to their primary interests.

Not surprisingly by the end of 1980s the concept of civil society also became popular among the occupational organizations in Turkey. Nearly all of the occupational organizations not only charged the term with an inherent positive substance but also compete for the sole representation of the civil society. Basically occupational organizations perceive civil society in two diverse approaches. According to Bora (2000: 303) the first occupational group which consists of entrepreneurship/capital based organizations perceives the civil society as a power node within the society and try to encapsulate and legitimize the use this source of power node under their authorities by referring representation abilities. On the other hand the second group which consists of expertise based organizations gives special

importance to the qualitative aspects of the term, like democratization, freedom and alike. When we analyse the inner-organization structure while we observe that the “figure of president” is quite strong among the first group the sense of togetherness is much more valued among the second group (Bora, 2000: 303).

The advanced technological methods employed among occupations, increased professionalization and the changed complex market relations during the last two decades affected the occupational organizations' fabric. For example the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) faced the decentralization demands of the local branches of architect and engineer chambers. According to Bora (2000: 304) while these local branches insist on a change about TMMOB which transforms the organization into a loose confederation, the central administration of TMMOB thinks that such kind of a transformation will affect the power of organization in a negative manner. Through debates, TMMOB, announced that the organization should not be perceived solely as a functional organization that provide services to its members. TMMOB argues that the organization is an area that carries certain values like democratization, freedom and alike. This approach is also visible in Turkish Doctors' Union (TTB). Instead of being a bureaucratic organization that is in service of state, on many instances and


local publications TTB declared that they have the aim of being the doctors' organization. This was an alternative stance to chamber tradition in Turkey where they act as regularity tools for governments. As Bianchi (1984) correctly puts the chambers with the above mentioned role aimed to control the members rather than representing them. Among the responsibilities of chambers we may also include issuing licenses to the exporters (Kalaycioğlu, 1991: 83), purchasing of government subsidized products and alike. All of these functions of chambers forced them to perform as state economic enterprises rather than focusing on interest articulation (Ergüder, 1991: 73). The central governments' tendency to regulate the private economic activity through these chambers may also be counted among the factors that bar these organizations ability as civil societal organizations. So in overall I have an inclination to say that these interest based organizations carry a historical luggage which is stuffed with practices of a form of state corporatism. This form of corporatism comparatively is less visible among the organizations like TÜSİAD and alike. In principle for a long time these organizations kept their distance from the governments (Esmer, 1991: 128). Although these groups have their relative autonomy against state they still had little impact on the political efficacy. These groups seemed to speak up for the public interest rather than their own members' interest and did not carry any economic activity that clashes with the objectives of governments (Esmer, 1991: 130)

It would not be wrong to argue that today in Turkey interest based civil society organizations display significant ties with the Turkish state. These ties become quite visible when state tries to manipulate the economic or social activities through these organizations. Accordingly the type of relationship between interest based civil society organizations and state may easily transform itself to a clientelist one. Although this clientelist type of relationship was quite dominant through the early years of republic it started to change especially by the 1990s. However this change happens in a quite slow and careful manner. Although the interest based organizations touched upon the issues related to democratization lately, they were watchful to display themselves within the status-quo, not as agents that want to change it. Alternatively they try to justify and melt their interest within the overall interests of Turkish society that were defined by the state. This kind of justification is highly related with the republican political culture which rejects the class differences among the Turkish society (Vorhoff, 2002: 351). Unless these organizations will follow alternative strategies which further relieve their ties with status-quo, it would not be easy for them actively contribute to the democratic consolidation process in Turkey.

4.3.2 Topic Oriented Organizations

As stated earlier this category includes the organizations that work for the improvement of quality of community as a whole on special topics (environment, human rights, election monitoring etc.). Accordingly under this heading I will be analysing the DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A scores produced by the topic oriented organizations at the intermediate level with a special focus on the human rights organizations in Turkey. The DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A scores of topic oriented organizations are provided in figure 9.

FIGURE 10 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR TOPIC ORIENTED ORGANIZATIONS



Like other topic oriented civil society organizations human rights organizations appeared as an important part of civil society in Turkey starting with the 1980s. Although there were attempts to raise the issues related to human rights in the public and political agenda in Turkey before 1980s, these efforts were not successful and often accused of being anti-state and communist (Plagemann, 2002, 362). However starting from 1980s the human rights issues became more familiar to the public with the efforts of a number of organizations. These initial attempts were spotlighting a limited number of issues and basically focused on the conditions of prisoners. This narrow focus, when combined with inadequate social support and organizational ability, limited the success of these organizations at the social level. Additionally the early attempts of these organizations carried a high level of ideological nature which contributed to the above mentioned failure. For example on a number of occasions TAYAD refused to cooperate with İHD because of ideological differences (Şeşen, 1996: 205).

Organizations like Human Rights Organization (İHD) and Association of Families of Prisoners and Detainees (TAYAD) while underlining the human right violations in prisons, not surprisingly gained the hostility of Turkish state. Both of the organizations faced a series of investigations and accusations which interrupted and barred their activities. However one important difference

between İHD and TAYAD is that, İHD successfully recognized the insufficiency of the social base of the organization and tried to enhance their social base in order to gain more legitimacy among the public. This strategy when combined with improved organizational skills provided a space to İHD against state. Moreover the “activist base” of İHD was also developing, as being the only legal leftist platform of late 1980s (Plagemann, 2002, 364). With these updated credentials, İHD enhanced its vision and started to vocalize other human rights issues like citizen rights, women rights and alike. With the relative political relaxation of early 1990s the groups which were originally organized under İHD started to leave the organization and locate themselves under other organizations such as bars, chambers and trade unions. At the same time, however, other alternative groups such as feminists, environmentalists and alike started to unionize under the organization. Accordingly by the early 1990s İHD totally alternated its original vision and started to deal with a diverse set of human rights issues.

The political climate of 1990s in Turkey was labeled by two salient topics: The Kurdish problem and the rising of political Islam. The disapproving position which were taken against Turkish state on these issues, created serious problems for human rights organizations in Turkey. Additionally, the position that was taken related to Kurdish problem which included serious

accusations to the state, especially damaged the legitimacy of these organizations among the public eye. One critical result of this situation was mislaying the popular support. These developments started a new discussion among human rights organizations in Turkey that focused on the need for an alternative strategy. This new strategy was anticipating an alternative approach to human rights issues that does not limit itself with concentrating on the policies of state. Rather it defined the human rights as the ethical standard of political and social life (Plagemann, 2002, 371). So by the mid 1990s the human rights movement in Turkey, once again, tried to establish a popular base by referring alternative human rights issues rather than concentrating on limited subjects.

By the mid 1990s other than the human rights organizations, the occupational associations also started to involve with human rights issues. Arising from the need to refer to legal expertise for setting the standards of human rights, the position of lawyers' associations and bars became vital. A number of organizations including the bars of İstanbul, İzmir and Diyarbakır and voluntary associations of lawyers like Contemporary Lawyers' Association and Conservative Lawyers' Association carried a number of campaigns related to the human rights violations (Berktaş, 1995: 36).

On most of the cases the subject matter of the human rights activities is the policies of states. Serious critics of human rights organizations may create both domestic and international problems for any state. Hence as a reflex states has always been suspicious about the activities of human rights organizations and Turkey is not an exception. Additionally in the Turkish context the human rights issues were commonly perceived within the framework of relations with Europe. This condition contributed to the understating the issue of human rights as artificial trouble. This perception fuelled the dose of suspicion among the eyes of state officials and human rights organizations were blamed not only for criticizing the state but also for being agents of international actors. Hence reforms that were pushed by international actors were always questioned and faced the problem of institutionalization.

It seems that, the state of Turkish democracy during the last two decades, in most of the cases, is stacked between opportunities and disappointments. On the one hand, this state is full of hope, fuelled by the democratic developments including the election of pro-Islamic governments, establishment of pro-Kurdish parties and alike. The issues that were hardly mentioned or tolerated after the 1980 coup -like the question of minorities,

criticisms on state-, became a part of the daily political agenda. By the end of 1990s judiciary in Turkey attached itself to this trend by becoming more sensitive to human rights issues. However on the other hand, during these Turkey remained a country in which human rights violations were common. Additionally the military's propensity to supervise the civilian rule, which was certified by three military coups, lingered on by, perhaps habitually, forcing the elected prime minister to resign. These developments were reported by the officers of the European Union in 1999, with special reference to the "serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of minorities". Since the duty of advancement towards democratization and the improvement of fundamental human rights, usually, were not carried by Turkish state, this need has been vocalized by a number of associations both within and outside Turkey. These efforts were materialized especially in the forms of documentations that mentioned the nature and extent of human rights violations around the country. Hence, even though the Turkish state acted reluctant to develop and implement human rights, still both in theory and application the issue of human rights made substantial inroad in Turkey. Internationally sanctioned codes of human rights have been adopted as a normative standard and a practical tool by a variety of groups that have together come to constitute part of a vocal civil society in Turkey (Watts, 2001: 12).

Although traditionally the discussion on the human right issues in Turkey refers to the state's actions, interestingly variety of civil societal organizations took the advantage of the "human rights discourse" and placed this discourse at the very center of their agenda. For example Islamist movement in Turkey through the civil societal organizations has "amalgamated its notion of rights to include liberal definitions of individual human rights along with more traditional Islamic conceptions of rights deriving from community membership" (White, 2001: 17-26). Moreover, organizations dealing with women's and children rights attached the issue of human rights to their discourses (Arat, 2001: 27-34; Libal 2001: 35-44). Additionally, Turkish state executed investigations to analyze human rights violations in Turkey which ended up reports that echoed within both national and international circles. Furthermore on numerous occasions the need for a new constitution and laws that extend the basis for human rights were mentioned by the state itself.

Since the Turkish state seems reluctant and/or inefficient to establish human rights norms within the country, this role was taken over by civil society organizations. However one critical question still remains: to what extend these organizations can be efficient enough to open up space for extending human rights in Turkey? One strategy is to cooperate with international human

rights organizations. In order to be more effective on governments, globally, civil society organizations that deal with human rights issues prefer to carry the disputes to the international arena. By multiplying “the channels of access to the international system” and making “international resources available to new actors” transnational networks have helped activists advocating various forms of human rights to obtain money, credibility, and political and economic leverage against the state (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 1-39). Turkish human rights organizations seemed to follow the same strategy. According to Cizre (2001: 63-67) Turkey’s two preeminent human rights organizations, the Human Rights Foundation and the Turkish Human Rights Association, are aligned with a variety of international agencies, and are funded almost entirely by outside sponsors. Elsewhere Arat (2001: 28-32) underscores the importance of Turkish women’s links to feminists abroad were for the promotion of women’s rights in Turkey; by giving the example of Turkish women’s centers, which in 1992 received a great deal of publicity and extensive legitimization from their prominent participation in an international petition campaign to secure the acknowledgment of women’s rights as human rights.

Such kind of efforts, underlie the importance of “international institutionalization” (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 6) -a term which describes to the

level that a country bounds itself with international or bi-lateral agreements- as a factor which influence the effectiveness of human rights-promoting civil society organizations in democratic settings. The international agreements can be utilized to force the states for taking more action. In the Turkish context this trend displayed itself as the ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights and the country's participation in the European Court of Human Rights, which rulings against Turkey by the Court have contributed directly to the implementation of new laws (Hicks, 2001: 85). Within the same framework, Arat (2001) and Libal (2001) correctly underlie the importance of Turkey's signing of the Convention on the Elimination of All Types of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1985 and United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1990 as important catalysts for the women's and children's rights' movement in Turkey. However one has to mention an important caveat here. Although it seems that at the global level transnational human rights networks contributed to the actions of human rights organizations, the Turkish context suggests a more complex scene which these networks at the same time hinder the work of domestic human rights activists. Both Cizre (2001: 55-77) and Bozarslan (2001: 45-54) argue that in Turkey, human rights organizations usually lacked the necessary domestic social and political backing, with consequent over-reliance on external organizations and these relationships have further distanced

them from the populace they most need to reach, encouraging particular standards of discourse and behavior that are unpopular in Turkey. Additionally the Turkish state demonstrated a dual approach to these organizations which complicated this picture even more. On the one hand the Turkish state has tendency of utilizing the human rights organizations as a show-case of formal democracy and on the other perceive them as trojan horses, disposing secret political agendas.


The problems that I have defined for interest based organizations are also valid for the topic oriented organizations. The low scores of DC-CS-R and DC-CS-A are highly related with the position of state against these organizations. These problems are symptoms of a historic relationship between state and society in which the rights of the state to protect itself and its own vision of the nation are privileged over the rights of the individual. It would not be wrong to suggest that until this relationship is renegotiated by integrating basic rights into all levels of life then these problems will probably linger on. The practices of human rights organizations that questioned the activities of Turkish state which are related to the ethnic, religious and cultural matters put serious pressure on these organizations. The huge number of lawsuits against these organizations confirms this pressure. Once again the

sacred position of Turkish state that does not admit any kind of criticism comes into sight and limits the possibilities of democratic openings.

4.3.3 Cultural Organizations

As mentioned before the organizations that advocate the common cultural rights and/or values, religious faiths beliefs and symbols are categorized under the heading of cultural civil societal organizations. The DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A scores of cultural organizations are provided in figure 10.

FIGURE 11 DC-CS-R/DC-CS-A SCORES FOR CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS



When compared to economic interest based organizations cultural organizations displayed poorer scores in DC-CS-R / DC-CS-A analysis. The formational, impact and value dimensions produced scores around “3” where value dimension is close to the neutral value of “4”. Similarly the DC-CS-A score generated for cultural organizations is 673.320 which is lower than the score of economic interest based groups.

Since Islamic religious communities have an influential role in Turkish social and political life, it would be fruitful to make an analysis on their potential related to the democratic consolidation in Turkey under this category. An investigation on the Fethullah Gülen Community, will be quite helpful for such kind of an effort since this community may be counted among the highly significant religious communities in Turkey. There has already been a discussion about this community’s contribution to democracy in Turkey (Kasaba, 1998; Aras and Çaha, 2000; Başkan: 2005) and by the empirical data I got from the database I will try to deepen this discussion.

According to Başkan (2005: 851) Gülen’s discourse is a double-faced one. While Gülen locates Islam as the highest principle for the regulation of social structure at the same time he highlights the components of civil societal

life such as tolerance and democracy. This double-faced approach produces vagueness and leaves limited room for making a consistent analysis about the community's understanding on civil society with reference to democratic consolidation. In order to make a reliable analysis we have to refer to the idea of "Nurculuk" which is the basic doctrine of Gülen's community. Historically Nurculuk displayed a closer position to the state and sanctified the order provided by it rather than prioritizing democratization (Başkan, 2005: 851). This positioning of Nurcu community "by the state" structurally affected the community's approach to civil society and civil societal values. As a result of this alliance Başkan (2005: 853) argues that the group ended up with "hesitation and anxieties, ambiguities, mixed feelings, and political polarization among societal actors, unless democratization of state/society relations is achieved on the basis of 'secular' organization of civil society and the democratic regulations of societal affairs by the Turkish state". However if we trace the development of community during the last three decades we witness an essential change where comparatively the possession of social capital of the community has been transformed from an uncivil form to a civil one. So our first question still keeps its validity: how can we assess community's approach to democratic values like tolerance, within the framework of democratic consolidation?

The community's reference to democracy and tolerance became quite visible during last two decades. Gülen values tolerance as a tool where we can utilize in the absence of societal consensus (Gülen, 1997: 19-20). When Gülen defines the components of tolerance he refers to the notions of respect, forgiveness, being just and kind. He connects the idea of tolerance with the ideas of collective consciousness where societies need to establish in order to have a civil life (Gülen, 1997: 19-22). Hence it would not be wrong to argue that Nurcu community favoured and encouraged the establishment of the value of tolerance among the society. Additionally on democracy, the community with the vocalization of Gülen, rejects the inaptness of the notion with Islam. He refers to the necessity of order in the Islamic thought and argues that democracy is helpful to establish this order with the consent of people (Can, 1996: 18). For Gülen freedom should not be unlimited since we are living in the forms of societies. These societies' ethical norms and values may be used as a guide for the boundaries for freedoms in order to refrain from anarchy (Turgut, 1996).

In related literature it has been argued that the formation of values like trust and tolerance is dependent on the formation of the horizontal networks of cooperation rather than the vertical ones (Putnam, 1993). It can be argued that Gülen's community as a cultural civil society organization, displays a vertical

structure of cooperation rather than horizontal one. The establishment of formal relations along a strong vertical hierarchy, gender discrimination, lack of criticism within the community may be counted as some examples for this proposition (Başkan, 2005: 857-858). Hence it would not be wrong to argue that the functioning of Gülen's community does not promise a suitable background for the establishment of values for the democratic consolidation. Nevertheless Gülen's community seems to occupy an important area in the civil society discussions in Turkey in relation to the democratic consolidation in Turkey.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The idea of civil society as an actor for democratic consolidation has attracted considerable interest in the past decade. Departing from this interest, this study sets out to analyze the civil society's contribution to democratic consolidation. More particularly, the research question guiding this study was: What is the condition of civil society as an agent for democratic consolidation in Turkey? In this concluding chapter, the empirical and theoretical arguments will be summarized and further discussed. The implications of the conceptual framework will be scrutinized, and the chapter raises a number of suggestions for future research.

A substantial amount of all countries that try to consolidate their democratic systems end up in a gray zone between democracy and authoritarianism (Schedler, 2002). The fact that many transitions result in hybrid democracies rather than full-fledged ones, illustrates that the process of democratization is much more complex than the transition theories have assumed (Carothers, 2002). On such conditions, the actors involved in democratic consolidation can make the difference between survival and breakdown of a democratic regime (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 14). Surely countries try to enhance the possibilities that will further consolidate their democracies. Clearly, there are certain conditions that restrict or enhance the options available to the actors engaged in democratic consolidation. Who, then, are the actors that could act as agents of democratic consolidation? This study has focused on one particular actor—civil society. Certainly civil society is made up of multitudinous, and sometimes conflicting, interests and obviously not every civil society organization has an interest in democratic consolidation. Yet, it would not be wrong to argue that at a certain level of abstraction we might refer to civil society as an agent for democratic consolidation. Other actors, e.g. politicians, elites and alike, can also contribute to democratic consolidation and consequently, this study does not provide a complete picture of the democratization process. It is rather an

attempt that describes the democratic consolidation process from a civil society perspective, and the study concludes that the contribution of civil society to the democratic consolidation in Turkey is limited, but not totally absent.

It would not be wrong to argue that the civil society in Turkey displayed signs of development since 1990s. The quantity and also the quality of civil society organizations have become different. During this study I have referred to the fact that in the Ottoman-Turkish continuum social, political and economic power has always been captured by the strong center which prevented the establishment of a vivid civil society. At the same time however there is still room for being optimistic. The associational life of the republic started with the multi party period and accelerated especially with the help of 1961 constitution and during 1970s many organizations especially the trade unions and chambers acted as important agents of political and social developments. Although these developments were interrupted by the 1980 coup, starting from early 1990s again the development of civil society in Turkey gained momentum. The publicly known civil societal organizations were established during and after the 1990s. It is possible to observe a certain amount of decrease in the centre's power, especially during the last two decades. The last two decades were marked by a number of practices that try

to produce alternative stances to strong state. It would be worthwhile to remember that all of the civil society organizations that were included to this study somehow are the products of this change. Paradoxically this tradition of strong state contributed to the establishment of these new organizations: Especially events of the 1999 earthquake and issues related to human rights fuelled the establishment of new organizations. Hence for a more comprehensive evaluation of civil society in Turkey as a contributor to democratic consolidation one should consider the complexity of social change and mobility among the Turkish society.

Undoubtedly civil society's democracy-building functions are complex and constitute a mix of supporting and countervailing power functions. These functions have been identified and analyzed under four dimensions under this study: formational, legal, value and impact. The investigation on the formational characteristics of civil society revealed the scope of social involvement and activities. A legal setting that accredits citizen participation for the realization of common interests is among one of the pre-conditions of a civil society that is expected to contribute to the democratic consolidation. The legal system should not only provide organized and reasoned codifications that comfort the civil society organizations but also refrain from crafting mechanisms that curb their freedom or bar their operations. The laws that

protect the freedoms of association, assembly of individuals and expression at the individual level, should also shield these rights at the organizational level.

The production of democratic merits within and among civil society organizations constitutes an important part in our analysis. The participation of individuals in civil societal organizations energizes social affinities, amplifies commiseration to the other citizens and raises awareness about the deficits of democratic system. On the condition that citizens have the chances to organize themselves and realize their goals, it is expected that they will be committed to the democratic environment that provides the base for these activities.

Unequivocally, the civil society organizations do not produce democratic values and structures at all times and conditions. It is decisive to judge the level of democracy within civil society organizations to avoid this tautological reasoning. For a democratic setting every civil societal organization should not only have elected leadership based on free and uncorrupted elections but also the rules those guarantee the freedom of expression within the organization. Even though the above-mentioned criteria are set these formal structures may still function in an authoritarian

setting. On the condition that the agenda of organizations is dictated by one person or a group there is no space left for the altered ideas of the members and the system may produce the condition of the subjugation of the dissenting members' opinions. Eventually, a structure of such kind will not be contributive to the democratization processes. Additionally even if the civil society organizations exhibit established democratic practices internally, they may not have same outlook against other civil society organizations. Inevitably, if one anticipates any kind of democratic input from civil society organizations, the ambitions and the means of these organizations should not be in a totalizing manner.

Civil society organizations can take an active role during the democratic consolidation process by committing solutions to the social and political programs. They can awaken the public by pointing out the axial issues and by verbalizing the problematic areas and requirements. Civil society organizations can effectuate warnings for the elected officials and diagnose the problems related to democratic shortages. Hence, by locating these democratic paucities and trying to stipulate changes, civil society can play an important role during the process of political institutionalization. Furthermore, these actions of civil society are not only limited to issues that take part in the political sphere. By means of these actions, civil society forces also comment

on the issues like projects for the general welfare of the citizens. Where the governing elites do not respond to the problems related to democratic deficits, sometimes civil society organizations come forth as the main apparatus for spotting these problems. Civil society by utilizing the mass medium or by noticing the elected officials through different strategies like campaigns and alike can lift the issues related to democracy into the political agenda. Hence, civil society forces by this way have the opportunity to fill the gap between elected officials and society and put up the issues in the public circles that political parties and politicians seem reluctant to act upon.

The civil society forces have the ability to establish collaborative interchange with the political society that enhances its impact capability. For example, civil society may involve in mutual assignments in which organizations pool resources with governmental bodies, or some form of partnership. Hence acting as a counterpart, civil society can bring in confidence to political society not only by acting as a counseling body but also by cooperating with state agencies for a proficient policy performance. Additionally, acting out of the scope of state bureaucracy, civil society organizations habitually, operate in a more efficient and effective manner when compared to state. Therefore, by supplying policy proposals and

assistance to the state activity, civil society and government collaboration could increase regime performance.

Civil Society in Turkey especially became visible and relatively effective by the early 1990s. A general look on the Turkish political history revealed the fact that democratic functioning was disrupted by military regimes; all which combined political and social reforms with had direct effects on civil society. However as a general evaluation I may conclude that although the ruling elite allowed some space for civil society, at the same time tried to control and manipulate the parts of civil society. Civil society does not stand out as any particularly visible democracy-promoting actor in the consolidation process. In most cases in the Turkish political history civil society did not emerge as an important factor that pressed for the consolidation of democracy. More specifically, this study has shown that it was the relative restraint of the political regimes, in combination with both inclusive and exclusive strategies and attempts to split civil society, which undermined civil society's countervailing power. Only during the times of relative political relaxation the tendency to unionize and hence the production of democratic demands becomes visible. When Turkey started to enjoy a more stable political context especially during late 1990s, new organizations emerged and civil society developed into an important countervailing power that criticized the

government on many areas including human rights abuses, the membership to European Union and alike. Under these circumstances the role of civil society has been changed and civil society started to transform itself into an important agenda setter, which has attracted attention to issues related to the democratic quality, such as human rights, the judicial system and the electoral process.

Civil society organizations possess important competence in several areas, something that became evident especially in the reconstruction work after the 1999 earthquake. To what extent civil society organizations have been interested in, and been allowed to perform, these consolidation functions is dependent on the broader political setting. The case of Turkey illustrates that when the political context has been unfavorable, civil society has been disappeared from the sight, and when it has been relatively more favorable, civil society started to produce democratic consolidation functions. However, the Turkish political context is a complicated one; through different strategies the Turkish state has tried to undermine the countervailing power of civil society in general.

The democracy-building functions that have been described as important in this study are of course dependent on the selection of organizations examined. Different kinds of organizations obviously have different interests and, consequently, engage in different kinds of activities. Thus, it is no surprise that the traditional civil society organizations are more likely to function as a counterpart of the government than new groups, which are more likely to act as agenda setters. However, one objective of this study has been to analyze different kinds of organizations. What can we learn from the case of Turkey and how can the knowledge acquired from this study be of any general use? The conclusions presented here are valid only for the case of Turkey, but let us turn to a more general discussion of the theoretical ideas that we have acquired from the case.

Implications for the study of civil society and democratic consolidation relationship researchers enthusiastically welcomed the resurrection of the concept of civil society in the 1980s. Civil society appeared as a catchword in democratization studies, and like many other catchwords it went from being welcomed with uncritical enthusiasm to being fiercely criticized. What is particularly interesting about the concept of civil society is that it has been subject to a wide range of interpretations in political theory and, consequently, has several different meanings. The future stability for a newly established

democracy was dependent on a vital civil society, it was often argued. However, the idea of civil society soon became subject to widespread criticism; it was argued that civil society meant all and nothing, that the concept had been stretched beyond recognition and that it provided only tautological reasoning. As this study shows, civil society can play a role in the process of democratic consolidation. However, we definitely need to refine our conceptual tools to be able to understand civil society's functions. During the consolidation period, civil society can contribute to democratic development by being a countervailing power and promulgating a democratic orientation of reforms. However, it is important to note that only as long as civil society organizations have a commitment to democracy will they advocate a democratic orientation of the reforms. Yet civil society may still act as a countervailing power, regardless of its internal democracy or whether the organizations are interested in democracy. Thus, if we want to understand how civil society can strengthen democracy by a process of learning by doing, it is crucial to consider the degree of democracy within civil society organizations if we want to avoid tautological reasoning. How this can be done remains a methodological challenge to democratization studies. One particularly challenging feature, as this empirical study illustrates, is that many organizations are formally democratic but, in practice, these formal structures co-exist with authoritarian traditions, e.g. clientelism. Just like in political

societies in many newly established democracies, there is a gap between formal democratic structures and informal practices. This problem clearly needs to be examined, and one challenge is to develop the appropriate methodological tools.

This study has also emphasized the importance of the political context. The democratic consolidation as a process is highly under the influence of the traditions, historical trajectories and cultural orientations. At the last instance both the existence of a democratic state and a democratic civil society is dependent on the existence of a democratic political culture. The existence of the values tolerance, cooperation and alike are inevitable factors for a democratic civil society. Civil society does not emerge from or exist in a vacuum, but is formed by the broader state-societal relations. The manipulation of civil society by state inevitably damages the democratic potential of civil society. In the ideal case civil society should be relieved from these manipulations in order to realize its democratic consolidation functions set in the study. Taking the political context into account is therefore necessary for our understanding of civil society's input to democratic consolidation. The character of the regime affects civil society and its role in this process. If a regime is relatively tolerant towards the popular sectors, and uses different strategies to control or to co-opt civil society organizations,

these civil society organizations may be less inclined to demand democratic reforms. Moreover, if the strategies to control civil society have included attempts to split civil society it will, in the same vein, be less prone to set their differences aside in order to act collectively for a transition to democracy. Consequently, these sectors became less radical, and less concerned with urging a change. Thus, there was no united front for a political change, and the consolidation was mainly guided by the elite. However, at some instances like issues related to human rights abuses civil society emerged as a fierce critic of the regime. However, it was not the old organizations that reacted against the deteriorating human rights situation but new ones that had developed as a response to the political situation. This raises two interesting questions; is the emergence of new civil society organizations a requisite for an altered relationship between the state and civil society? And, is the emergence of new organizations necessary to preserve civil society's countervailing power function? The strategies of the governing elite, particularly the strategies that a government might use to control or manipulate civil society, are equally as important in the consolidation period. Our case involves several examples of how the state has included civil society and thereby managed to undermine its potential democracy-strengthening function. Through subtle means, civil society is being manipulated, and this strategy has been used during both authoritarian and democratic periods in

order to avoid opposition. It seems, however, that democratic consolidation studies' understanding of civil society would be more complete if the relation to the society was given more attention.

This study based itself on some tentative theoretical ideas. A study like this inevitably stresses recent developments and events and, consequently, there is a risk that “events of the day” stand out as more important and having a more lasting effect than they turn out to have. Thus, a note of caution is needed; the theoretical propositions that this study has generated are only tentative ideas. To say it in a different way, this is only a photograph of the social reality. Needless to say, we need more than “photographs” of social phenomena for more detailed analysis. This framework may be supported by some extra research methods like in depth interviews and alike to present the problematic in a more comprehensive manner. However, the conceptual framework outlined in this study proved to be a satisfactory tool to analyze civil society's position during democratic consolidation process in Turkey. It illustrated certain processes, but it also generated new questions. The framework is particularly concerned with the difficulties that the civil society experiences. There are a considerable number of cases that the framework outlined here could apply to. In the midst of a global expansion of countries in transition, we need better understanding of the process of democratization,

particularly of democratic consolidation in societies and civil society's functions in this process. This study has generated some new ideas concerning civil society's democracy-building functions that might be worth exploring.

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APPENDIX A

DC-CS-A/DC-CS-R QUESTIONNAIRE

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle katılmıyorum						Kesinlikle katılıyorum

- 1- Türkiye'deki vatandaşların önemli bir bölümü herhangi bir sivil toplum kuruluşuna üyedir.
- 2- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum örgütlerinin önemli bir bölümü şemsiye kuruluşlar (platformlar, konfederasyonlar vb.) altında da örgütlenmiştir.
- 3- Türkiye'de sivil toplum örgütlerinin oluşması için yeterli alt yapı (insan gücü, vatandaş talebi, hukuki düzenlemeler vb.) bulunmaktadır.
- 4- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum örgütlerinin önemli bir kısmının yurt dışı bağlantısı bulunmaktadır.
- 5- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının önemli bir bölümü kuruluş amaçları farklı olsa da kendi arasında işbirliği yapmaktadır.
- 6- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının önemli bir bölümü insan kaynakları açısından herhangi bir sorun yaşamamaktadır.
- 7- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının önemli bir bölümü teknolojik ve altyapısal sorunlar yaşamamaktadır.
- 8- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum örgütleri toplumdaki tüm grupları (etnik gruplar, kadınlar, işçiler vb.) temsil etmektedir.
- 9- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum örgütlerinin önemli bir bölümü ülke çapında örgütlenmiştir.
- 10- Türkiye'deki vatandaşların önemli bir bölümü siyasi olmayan gönüllü hareketlere (gazetelere mektuplar yazmak, siyasi içerikli olmayan dilekçeler imzalamak vb.) katılmaktadır.

- 11- Türkiye'deki vatandaşların önemli bir bölümü gönüllü olarak sivil toplum çalışmalarına katılmaktadır.
- 12- Türkiye'deki vatandaşların önemli bir bölümü sivil toplum kuruluşlarına gönüllü olarak bağış yapmaktadır.
- 13- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının önemli bir bölümü finansal açıdan herhangi bir sorun yaşamamaktadır.
- 14- Türkiye'de sivil hak ve özgürlükler (ifade, örgütlenme özgürlüğü vb.) pratikte kolaylıkla uygulanabilmektedir.
- 15- Türkiye'de basın özgürlüğü pratikte geniş ölçüde uygulanmaktadır.
- 16- Türkiye'de sivil toplum örgütleri basit (uzun bürokratik işlemler gerektirmeyen), hızlı ve masrafsız bir şekilde kurulabilmektedir.
- 17- Türkiye'de sivil toplum kuruluşlarına vergi kolaylıkları sağlanmaktadır.
- 18- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları hükümetleri özgürce eleştirebilmektedir.
- 19- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları devletin etkisinden bağımsız olarak hareket etmektedirler.
- 20- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları hükümet müdahalelerine maruz kalmadan faaliyet göstermektedirler.
- 21- Türkiye'de devlet, sivil toplum kuruluşları ile iletişim halindedir.
- 22- Türkiye'de devlet, sivil toplum kuruluşları arasında ayrımcılık yapmamaktadır; hepsine eşit mesafede durmaktadır.
- 23- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum örgütlerinin önemli bir bölümü devletten herhangi bir yardım almamaktadır.
- 24- Türkiye'de vatandaşların temel siyasi hakları (siyasi süreçlere katılım, özgür ve adil seçimler sonucunda seçme ve seçilme hakkı, siyasi parti kurma vb.) önünde herhangi bir engel bulunmamaktadır.
- 25- Türkiye'de vatandaşların önemli bir bölümü kanunlara uygun davranmaktadır ve hukuk devletine saygılıdır.
- 26- Türkiye'de sivil hak ve özgürlükler (ifade, örgütlenme özgürlüğü vb.) kanunlar tarafından garanti altına alınmıştır.
- 27- Türkiye'de basın özgürlüğü kanunlarca garanti altına alınmıştır.
- 28- Türkiye'de uluslararası sivil toplum kuruluşlarının faaliyetleri engellenmemektedir.
- 29- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının uluslararası kuruluşlarla işbirliği yapması önünde herhangi bir engel bulunmamaktadır.
- 30- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları demokratik ilkelerin toplumsal seviyede yerleşmesi ve pekişmesi için çalışmalar yürütmektedir.
- 31- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları bir yöntem olarak şiddeti yoğun olarak kullanmaktadır.
- 32- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının iç işleyişleri demokratiktir.
- 33- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının yöneticileri şeffaf ve adil seçimler sonucunda göreve gelmektedir.

- 34- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları toplumsal seviyede farklı fikirlerin oluşması için uygun hoşgörü ortamını yaratmaktadır.
- 35- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarında kadın erkek eşitsizliği yaşanmamaktadır.
- 36- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları iktisadi yoksulluğun azaltılması için etkili çalışmalar yürütmektedir.
- 37- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları için yozlaşma (rüşvet, adam kayırma vb) önemli bir sorun alanı değildir.
- 38- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları şeffaf ve denetlenebilir finansal yapılara sahiptir.
- 39- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşlarının önemli bir bölümü hükümetlerin daha şeffaf ve denetlenebilir olması için çalışmalar yürütmektedir.
- 40- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları hükümetlerin bütçelerine ilişkin hukuki düzenlemelerinde etkilidirler.
- 41- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları hükümetlerin performanslarını gözlemleme ve hesap sorma konusunda etkilidirler.
- 42- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları toplumun öncelikli sorunlarına eğilmektedir.
- 43- Türkiye'deki vatandaşların önemli bir bölümü sivil toplum kuruluşlarına güvenmektedir.
- 44- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları toplumsal ihtiyaçların karşılanması için hükümete baskı uygulamaktadır.
- 45- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları toplumsal ihtiyaçların karşılanması için doğrudan kendileri çalışmaktadır.
- 46- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları vatandaşları eğitime ve bilgilendirme çalışmalarını etkili bir şekilde yürütmektedir.
- 47- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları vatandaşların örgütlenme, kaynakları harekete geçirme ve ortak çalışma yeteneklerini geliştirmektedir.
- 48- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları, toplumsal olarak dışlanmış kesimleri (sokak çocukları, eşcinseller vb.) topluma tekrar kazandırmak için etkili bir şekilde çalışmaktadır.
- 49- Türkiye'deki sivil toplum kuruluşları, üyelerinin sosyal birikimlerinin (hoşgörü, güven vb.) artmasına önemli katkılarda bulunmaktadır.

Lütfen kurumunuzun faaliyet alanını işaretleyiniz:

- 1- İktisadi (üretim veya ticarete yönelik birlikler veya ağlar)
- 2- Kültürel (ortak hakları, değerleri, inançları, inanışları ve sembolleri savunan dini, etnik, cemaat tipi örgütlenmeler)
- 3- Eğitim ve bilgilendirme hizmeti sağlayan (kamunun yararı için eğitim ve bilgilendirme faaliyetleri yürüten)

- 4- Çıkar grubu (İşçiler, emekliler, çalışanlar vb. den oluşan üyelerinin ortak çıkarlarını koruyan ve geliştirmeye çalışan örgütlenmeler)
- 5- Gelişimsel hizmet sağlayan (bireylerin kişisel kaynaklarını birleştirerek toplumun kurumlarını, altyapısını ve yaşam kalitesini yükseltmeye çalışan örgütlenmeler)
- 6- Konu odaklı (Çevre, kadın hakları, tüketiciyi koruma vb. konulara odaklı örgütlenmeler)
- 7- Yurttaşlık bilinci ile ilgili (siyasi tarafsızlık ilkesi içinde, politik sistemin geliştirilmesi için seçim gözlemciliği, seçmen eğitimi, yolsuzluk karşıtlığı gibi faaliyetlerde bulunan örgütlenmeler)

Lütfen Kurumunuzun etkinlik alanını seçiniz:

- 1- Yerel veya bölgesel
- 2- Ulusal kurum / Yerel veya bölgesel temsilcilik
- 3- Ulusal