

**UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF SUPPORT FOR THE
EUROPEAN UNION AMONG TURKISH YOUTH: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPLICIT
ATTITUDES**

by
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ABSTRACT

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Keywords: Implicit association test (IAT), the EU-Turkey relationship, voting
behavior, social identity theory, system justification theory

Turkish public opinion on EU is a relatively under-studied area in political science literature. To understand the dynamics behind the attitudes towards the EU, this study applies to implicit association test (IAT) and explicit survey measures, and two social psychological theories of inter-group relations, namely social identity, and system justification theories. The recent literature has shown that implicit attitudes can contribute to our understanding of vote choice (see Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Raccuia 2016; Ryan 2017). Employing data from a sample of 247 participants from three universities and the youth branches of the four major Turkish political parties, the study compares the strengths of explicit and implicit attitudes on a hypothetical membership referendum to the EU. The findings suggest that the Turkish national identity occupies a pivotal place in shaping the perceptions and preferences of the Turkish youth toward the EU. In the logistic regression analysis, the explicit EU attitudes predict vote choices on the hypothetical referendum better than any other variable. Even though it shows significant correlations with self-report EU measures, the predictive value of the implicit EU attitudes on voting behavior is not as strong as hypothesized. Nonetheless, in the OLS regression analysis, implicit measures are statistically significant in explaining the legitimacy of the system boundaries between the EU and Turkey. These findings are discussed in relation to their importance in understanding the complex nature of Turkish public opinion on the issue of the EU-Turkey relations and other political preferences.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE GENÇLİĞİ ARASINDA AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NE OLAN DESTEĞİN DİNAMİKLERİNİ ANLAMAK: ÖRTÜK TUTUMLARIN ÖNEMİNE DAİR BİR İNCELEME

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Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Mert Moral

Anahtar Kelimeler: Örtük çağrışım testi (ÖÇT), Türkiye-AB ilişkileri, oy verme davranışı, sosyal kimlik teorisi, sistemi meşrulaştırma teorisi

Siyaset bilimi literatüründe, Türkiye kamuoyunun Avrupa Birliği'ne yönelik tutum araştırmalarının az sayıda olduğu ve sınırlı dinamikleri ele aldıkları görülmektedir. Bu çalışmada, AB'ye yönelik tutumlar sosyal kimlik ve sistemi meşrulaştırma kuramları çerçevesinde, örtük çağrışım testi (ÖÇT) ve anket ölçüm yöntemleri kullanılarak ele alınmaktadır. Önceki çalışmalar, örtük tutumların oy verme davranışını açıklamada faydalı olabildiğini göstermiştir (bkznz. Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Raccuia 2016; Ryan 2017). Bu çalışmada, üç farklı üniversitenin öğrencilerinden ve dört siyasi partinin gençlik kollarından oluşan 247 kişilik bir örneklem ile, açık ve örtük tutumların Türkiye'de AB'ye yönelik yapılabilecek (varsayımsal) bir üyelik referandumunu açıklamadaki rolleri karşılaştırılmaktadır. Ampirik analizler, Türkiye gençliğinin AB'ye yönelik tutum ve algılarında Türk milli kimliğinin merkezi bir rol oynadığını göstermektedir. Lojistik regresyon analizinde, AB'ye yönelik açık tutumlar, katılımcıların referandumdaki oy verme davranışını diğer değişkenlerden daha başarılı şekilde açıklayabilmektedir. Öte yandan, diğer açık tutum ölçekleriyle anlamlı korelasyonlar göstermesine rağmen, örtük tutumların oy verme davranışını varsayılan düzeyde açıklayamadığı ortaya konulmuştur. Diğer analizlerde, örtük ölçümlerin AB ve Türkiye arasındaki sistem sınırlarının meşruiyetine yönelik algıları anlamlı şekilde açıkladığı görülmektedir. Tüm bu kuramsal beklentiler ve ampirik bulgular, kamuoyunun süregelen Türkiye-AB ilişkilerine ve çeşitli siyasi tercihlerine yönelik karmaşık algılarını anlayabilmek adına sırasıyla tartışılmaktadır.

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To my family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP Justice and Development Party	9, 12
ANAP Motherland Party	9
AP Justice Party	8
BIAT Brief Implicit Association Test	viii, 33, 76
Brexit British Exit from the EU	11, 30
CASI Computer-assisted self-interviewing	42
CDU The Christian Democratic Union of Germany	11
CHP Republican People's Party	7, 10
DEHAP Democratic People's Party	10
DSP Democratic Left Party	9
DTP Democratic Society Party	10
EC The European Communities	7
EEC European Economic Community	7
EU The European Union	1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 24, 25, 26, 29, 34
HADEP People's Democracy Party	10
HDP Peoples' Democratic Party	10
IAT Implicit Association Test	2, 4, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 42
IRB Institutional Review Board	52
ISSP International Social Survey Programme	49
MHP Nationalist Movement Party	8, 9, 10

MSP National Salvation Party.....	8
RP Welfare Party	9
TESEV Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation	16



1. INTRODUCTION

Turkey's relationship with the EU has always been an interesting subject for political scientists. One of the salient features of the rich literature on the EU-Turkey's relations is its explicit focus on macro-level state relations and the cultural and/or sociological challenges that a future membership would bring. Though it would be harsh to criticize this set of studies for their macro-level approach, it is obvious that these challenges cannot be isolated from the micro-level dynamics of the societies involved. Several scholars have pointed out that the success of the EU project depends on the acceptance of the people of the countries involved in the Union who are both the target and the foundation of the whole process. This European project is unprecedented in terms of its ambitions and scale regarding the lives of large numbers of individuals. However, these features of this project can be seen as the soft spot of it: without the support of people, it is bound to dissolve in the long run. As known, public opinion is the basis of decision-making mechanisms in democratic countries. In every democracy, public opinion possesses the power of forcing any government to take or abolish some policy decisions. Therefore, it becomes essential for the EU and respective policymakers to be knowledgeable about the trends in public opinion in member and the candidate societies, a necessity that has been faced by the EU itself by realizing regular public opinion research such as Eurobarometer.

Although no one can deny that we have learned a lot from macro-level studies, it would also be difficult to ignore that such studies have not helped explain why the support to the EU project is so changeable and very sensitive to some social, political, and economic developments. There are some easily discernible patterns of stability in public opinion as well as the patterns of changes over the years. To understand the dynamics behind these complex patterns of public opinion, the levels of analysis should also include the individual as well as the macro factors. Therefore, we believe that any attempt at to understand the support to the EU has to utilize the psychological explanations regarding the attitudes.

Political psychology is one of the disciplines that have proposed such explanations of

attitude formation and attitude change. However, the conceptual and methodological problems prevented the disciplines from reaching a consensus on how to measure attitudes. The attitude-behavior relationship is at top of the list of the topics that have been debated by the scholars starting from the 60s. Over the years, it has been seen that some behaviors, irrespective of what they entail, are difficult to predict by using attitudes. For some scholars, one reason for this difficulty could be the people's unwillingness to report their real opinions through self-reports or simply giving distorted responses as they think doing so is socially desirable. These problems led political scientists to find ways of enhancing their ability to predict and capture accurate opinions by focusing on the measurement of implicit attitudes. Therefore, the doubt that the explicitly reported opinions and attitudes measured by conventional survey methods may not be the only way of exploring how people develop and change their attitudes has led some scholars to search for alternative techniques of attitude measurement. Consequently, the concept of implicit attitudes has started to attract attention in this area. As any advancement in the area of attitude measurement has been utilized by scholars of other social sciences, a similar interest has recently started to grow in political science as well.

The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is one of the most prominent instruments that have been developed in the current line of research of attitudes. Some scholars believe that the technique could be effective in capturing the latent factors behind the behavioral outcomes that may be related to attitudes. The IAT is expected to show the relative strength of an individual's association through response latency. This helps researchers to control the social desirability effect in biases that come with in-group favoritism. Because of the automated nature of the measure, individuals' cognitive control over the formation of the association is assumed as minimal. As Burdein, Lodge and Taber (Burdein, Lodge, and Taber 2006, 359) have put it, this "enables us to measure some of the automatic and effective responses and predispositions that influence thoughts and behaviors outside of conscious awareness." However, the importance of subconscious processing and its effectiveness in predicting people's political behavior has been incorporated into the empirical research to a minimal extent in the relevant literature. Although some studies are utilizing the implicit attitude measurement in predicting the political behaviors, the use of this new technique is still scarce in public opinion research on the EU. In the literature on EU-Turkey relations, no study employed such a technique yet. As empirical studies in Turkey focus mostly on the descriptive analyses of determinants of support or disapproval with the EU (see Kentmen 2008; Yılmaz 2002; Çarkoğlu 2014; Şenyuva 2014), any attempt at handling the issue concerning latent factors gains additional importance. Given the pivotal place of the identity issues in the context of the EU-

Turkey relationships, discovering the latent factors that shape the Turkish public opinion can be seen as a valuable attempt.

In this thesis, I draw upon the suggestions that implicit attitudes have the potential to be useful in the prediction of voting behavior (Galdi, Arcuri, and Gawronski 2008; Roccato and Zogmaister 2010). It is important to emphasize that these studies often point towards an effect on specific political issues rather than political elections (Raccuia 2016). The EU-Turkey relations present an ideal case by which we can hypothetically put the Turkish public in a situation to assess their opinions about the future of the relations in a potential referendum.

Often, people do not indicate nor reveal their true motives or intentions directly. When it comes to concepts related to political associations such as voting, they especially shy away from presenting their true attitudes (and behavior). This results in opinions reported as undecided or indifferent. Independent from their unwillingness to respond, these types of individuals represent an important part of the samples employed to examine political behavior. Gathering these types of information and most importantly investigating new ways to improve the accuracy of individuals' responses to questions of political nature has always been an essential part of political research. Recently, most of these efforts make use of the so-called implicit attitudes to gather more accurate responses and better predict political behavior. It is important to note that, implicit attitudes operate on an unconscious level. Studies show that even though people might be aware of their implicit attitudes (but not necessarily approve), they might not know how implicit attitudes influences their behavior. For this specific reason, individuals' political behavior may be influenced by their implicit attitudes on a particular topic or its related concepts (Gawronski, Hofmann, and Wilbur 2006).

The relevance of the implicit measures in political science research is explained in depth later in this thesis, however, the relevance of the measure when it comes to assessing EU attitudes explaining why we specifically employ implicit measures can be explained as follows: One of the reasons why especially implicit attitudes can help explain EU attitudes is the "top of the head" nature of the EU related topics for Turkish citizens. The EU is not a topic that constantly bothers or affects individuals' lives. Therefore, it is expected that EU attitudes are somewhat disconnected from rational opinion-forming processes. Secondly, issues such as the current state of bilateral relations of the EU countries with the Turkish government, xenophobia in the EU, and the populist rhetoric of the far-right European politicians might generate responsive reactions, fear, or animosity towards the EU. Thirdly, the in-group and out-group dynamics which might affect individuals' attitudes are proven

to be effectively measured by their implicit attitudes (Burdein, Lodge, and Taber 2006; Lodge and Taber 2005; Nosek et al. 2009; Wittenbrink, Gist, and Hilton 1997). In addition, given that public opinion is relatively positive even when the bilateral relations show a negative trend (European Commission 2009), social desirability could be a strong factor when individuals answer explicit questions on the EU. Implicit measures help avoid the problem of social desirability (Kim 2003; Steffens 2004). These aspects of the Turkish public opinion on the EU make us utilize implicit attitudes and use them together with the conventional measures to assess EU attitudes.

Even though the potential referendum question was also used to test through conventional methods in previous studies of public opinion in Turkey (see European Commission 2003; GMF 2014), no study has yet utilized implicit measures in examining the attitudes towards the EU-Turkey relations. To our knowledge, a similar shortage of research is also the case with the political voting behavior in Turkey. Given the observed efficiency of implicit attitudes as measured by the IAT in similar complex political voting situations in previous studies, we expected a similar outcome in predicting the vote choices of the Turkish youth in a potential referendum.

The main aim of this study is to examine the relative strength of explicit and implicit measures in the context of EU-Turkey relations, a topic in which there is no study conducted yet. By considering the well-known shortcomings of both measures, I try to present a combined model that could allow us to understand and explain more about the Turkish public opinion on the EU. Here, the IAT will be used to assess subconscious, implicit attitudes towards the EU, whereas the explicit attitudes, which are known as the strong predictors of voting behavior, and political identity will represent the conscious and rational side of the coin.

Another element of this study is the comparison of two rival social psychology theories on inter-group relations, namely the social identity, and system justification theory. These theories are selected for having a theoretical framework in which the different and contrasting determinants of the Turkish public opinion towards the issue of Turkey's membership to the EU are examined. Social identity theory helps us to understand the dynamics of inter-group relations from the "in-group favoritism" perspective, whereas system justification theory is helpful by presenting the idea of "out-group favoritism". These theories were used to generate certain hypotheses to be tested both by the conventional survey methods and the IAT technique.

This thesis starts with a section that includes a history of the EU-Turkey relationship. This historical account is presented by combining it with a chronology that depicts the trends in the Turkish public's support to Turkey's candidacy and

membership to the EU. In the next section, I introduce examples of the theoretical explanations in the literature on public opinion. A separate section was devoted to the afore-mentioned social psychological theories that have been proposed to explain the inter-group attitudes and behaviors. The basic differences between social identity and system justification theories are discussed with a special reference to the heterogeneity observed in the opinions of the Turkish public towards the EU. The next section provides details of the concept of implicit attitudes. Combined with the theoretical underpinnings of this concept, a detailed account of how implicit attitudes are measured is presented with a specific reference to the IAT technique. The last section before the method section explains the theoretical rationale behind the present study and the specific hypotheses that were derived from the social identity and system justification theory.



2. TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Turkish public opinion on the EU is very volatile and prone to periodical highs and lows. This makes it very active and influential over both sides. With the extensive media coverage of the EU in Turkey and the growing popularity of the accession negotiations after the 2000s, the Turkish public's knowledge of the EU is somewhat established. This chapter provides a piece of brief background information on Turkey and the EU's long-lasting relationship and the dynamics behind the public opinion and so-called "Euroscepticism".

Euroscepticism is mainly used in the literature to define negative EU attitudes. Within the member states or those that are on track to become one, Euroscepticism has become a concept that is closely related to the status of the Europeanization and relationship with the EU. The internal and external conditions and challenges are closely related to the degree of negativity and suspicion towards the EU (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002).

Euroscepticism is defined by Taggart as "the idea of a contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration" (Taggart 1998, 365). This definition mostly deals with the EU-level Euroscepticism. Today the EU's neighbors and future members demonstrate a distinct type of Euroscepticism. Even non-European candidate states' citizens develop suspicions towards the entire Europeanization process, the policies, institutions and repercussions. Europeanization, as a concept that is closely related to identity and multiculturalism, generates a kind of skepticism drawing a different picture than the one Taggart's depicts. In this regard, Turkey's candidacy is a helpful example to see how a non-EU member state that is however a part of the Europeanization process shows discontent with Europe.

Public opinion surveys focusing on the topic, show sharp changes in the public's perceptions of the EU over time. The Transatlantic Trends Survey's (2014) findings show that support for the membership¹ decreased from 73% to 38%, from 2004

¹"Generally speaking, is EU membership a good thing or a bad thing for Turkey?".

to 2010. The same survey also indicates that it, however, increased up to 53% in 2014. These data are important since they indicate that public opinion is prone to periodical fluctuations. It is crucial to understand that public opinion is not independent of the effects of exogenous events or influences. By looking at the major socio-political changes and important incidences in terms of the relationship between Turkey and the EU, it may be possible to understand the reasons for these shifts.

Turkey, known for its geostrategic location between Europe and Asia, emerging economy, and a large population consisting mostly of young people has been waiting for its European Union membership much longer than any country in contention for membership. Turkey's association with the European Union is directly related to integrating Turkey's various economic, political, and legal norms to the European Union's Copenhagen Criteria. Furthermore, the Turkish government and the European Union need to come to a compromise, meaning that Turkey needs to comprehend and accept the membership conditions for the European Union, while the European Union needs to acknowledge and accept that Turkey's various idiosyncrasies neither will pose a threat nor are unsuited to the European Union's socio-economic structure. In the future, when this equilibrium is reached, both Turkey and the European Union will be able to work through the tensions escalated throughout the accession negotiations process and concentrate on future potential partnerships.

Following the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, Turkey was quick to become associated with the organization in 1963. The framework of the association was legalized under what is called the "Ankara Agreement." One of the most important bases of the association with the EEC was the prospect of a "Customs Union", which would enable Turkey to export and import products with the EEC member states without any restrictions. As stated in the agreement, its main goal was to "achieve continuous improvement in living conditions in Turkey and the European Economic Community through accelerated economic progress and the harmonious expansion of trade and to reduce the disparity between the Turkish economy and . . . the Community" (EEC 1963). This step has been a turning point for Turkish foreign policy and Turkey's foreign relations with Europe.

In Turkey, the 1960s and 1970s shows severe ideological radicalization and political polarization. The academia and students were under the formidable influence of the radical left parties and movement. In the early 1970s, the influence of the radical left grew among industrial workers, continued to spread among the new migrants of big cities and also found a place within ethnic and religious minorities,

for instance, the Kurds and the Alewis. Influenced by the leftist and anti-imperialist ideas within the public, the CHP (Republican People's Party) adopted more of a radical leftist position in foreign policy issues which meant distancing Turkey from the United States and the EC (The European Communities). In October 1978, as the CHP government, Turkey suspended fulfilling its obligations towards EC. This one-sided suspension was carried out based on the fact that trade liberalization and low import tariffs were reducing the foreign currency revenues which were vital for Turkey's development efforts.

Going hand in hand with the leftist movement, in the 1960s and 1970s, the radical right also saw its rise. The radical right was represented in politics by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the National Salvation Party (MSP). The MHP represented Turkish ethnic-nationalism while the MSP represented Islamism. The radical left and the radical right were both against improving Turkey's ties with the EC. According to the MSP, the EC was a Christian Club that was supported both ideologically and financially by the Vatican. Thus, Turkey, a Muslim country, should have no place within a Christian project. MHP, on the other hand, took more of a mixed stance by taking the anti-imperialist discourse from the radical left and adopting the anti-Christian ideology from the Islamists. The MHP's stance was that joining the EC, Turkey would give Europe an excellent chance to interfere in Turkey's internal affairs, which would potentially lead to weakening the unity of the Turkish state, aggravate the demands of political minorities, and cause the over-westernized Turks to revolt against the government, thus hurting the nation state. The radical right parties never had large electoral supports but they were electorally salient enough to divide the votes of the major center-right party, the Justice Party (AP). This led the AP to form a coalition with two radical right parties to form a government. AP's radical right coalition partners in the late 1970s, which used to be the Nationalist Front members between 1975 and 1977, used their influence on the domestic and foreign policies, preventing all attempts of Turkey to become closer to the EC (Yilmaz 2011).

Eurosupportiveness saw its zenith in the 80s and early 2000s. This rise in support for the EC in 1980s was due to the relatively relaxed political environment in Turkey that arose with the end of the military regime. All movements, especially political, were heavily suppressed and the centrist parties supported reconciliation with Europe to strengthen and stabilize the fragile democracy in Turkey. This was the background in 1978 where the Turkish government applied for EC membership. Within the given timetable, Turkey was able to make its market economy comply with the European standards. The harmonization of the internal markets and integration to the Customs Union helped Turkey continue the integration process with the rest of

the EU *acquis*, namely, the political and legal reforms. As a consequence, in 1987, Turkey applied formally for EU membership. However, its formal candidate status was not recognized until the Helsinki Summit of 1999. After the announcement of the formal candidate status, the EU-Turkey relationship has picked up momentum. At that moment, the relationship was more complex and interdependent compared to the socio-political environment when the Ankara Treaty was signed.

The prospect of being a candidate was a pushing force for Turkey and created motivation to harmonize its remaining legislation and policies with the EU's '*acquis communautaire*'. The European Commission's Accession Partnership Document accelerated the harmonization process by setting a guideline for Turkey. This led to the adoption of a National Programme in 2001, solely focused on the integration to the EU. The coalition government ² of the time adopted a constitutional reform package that included the judicial cornerstones of the harmonization process. This package brought amendments to the Constitution of 1982. It included the abolition of the death penalty which is still a prominent and controversial topic in Turkish society. The reforms continued after the change of government in 2002. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) government did not hinder the process. Indeed, it accelerated the reforms. The introduction of six harmonization packages, including the new penal code, showed Turkey's ambition and effort for the membership.

As in the 1970s, the 1990s was a period of turmoil where political processes were affected by the polarization of ideologies, political radicalization, violence and military interference. This polarization in the 90s was caused by Islamism and secularism and Kurdish nationalism and Turkish nationalism. In the 90s the Euroscepticism of the radical right-wing parties became less severe while they were in power. From mid-1999 to late 2002, MHP had an important role within the ruling coalition. This coincided with the period when Turkey's candidacy for EU membership was recognized by the EU following this the coalition government promised to carry out reforms on minority rights, restricted rights on Turkish minority language education and broadcasting and abolished capital punishment. Likewise, the governing party between 1996 to mid-1997 RP (Welfare Party), did not apply its election promise which was to cease the customs union with the EU.

As a consequence, in 2004, the successful adoption of the EU *acquis* by Turkey prompted the EU for the activation of the full membership protocol, which led the European Council decision to open membership negotiations with Turkey. After that, at the Brussels Summit of 2004, the European Council concluded that Turkey

²57th Government of Turkey (1999-2002). The Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) were members of the coalition led by the DSP leader, Bülent Ecevit.

had complied sufficiently with the Copenhagen political criteria and that the accession process could officially begin on 3 October 2005 (Commission 2004, 3). At the Helsinki Summit, the Council declared that Turkey is now a candidate country that is destined to join the EU.

With Turkey's candidate status, Euroscepticism started to decline once again. AKP's positive agenda towards the EU and pro-EU politics seem as an essential determinant here. On the other hand, CHP as a Kemalist-secularist opposition party started to balance AKP's pro-EU policies with a Eurosceptic agenda. Public opinion polls showed that CHP voters reacted to this shift, as the EU support rates had gone down from 83% to 60%. CHP's rhetoric included claims that the AKP aimed to weaken the military which was then regarded as the guarantor of the secularist establishment (Yılmaz 2011). CHP resorted to a nationalist rhetoric on important domestic and international issues concerning Turkey such as the Cyprus issue. MHP voters, which have been habitually Eurosceptic, have never been in favor of the EU. The support of the MHP voters for the EU while the party was in power between May 2002 and December 2005, dropped from 54% to 47%, then in September 2007 to 44% . An exception is the Kurdish nationalists, Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP) – Party for a Democratic Society - which is the successor to the People's Democracy Party (HADEP) and Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), supporters who had unwavering support to the EU throughout this period. This different attitude of HDP supporters can be explained that ethnic minority parties are usually more supportive of the EU because they trust that their minority rights will be acknowledged through the EU.

In the Turkish National Assembly after the 2007 general elections consisting of four party groups, AKP and DTP were the only pro-EU parties whereas MHP remained consistently Euroskeptical and CHP had been crossing the lines between mild Eurosceptic to strong Eurosceptic discourses. However, all the turmoil within the parliament did not hinder the positive reform processes that started in 2002 and productive rhetoric from the negotiating politicians of both the Turkish and European fronts. This resulted in the highest support for the membership since the start of the formal accession process. EU was finally seen as a credible partner by the Turkish public that could commit and deliver its promises. Moreover, the tangible results of Turkey's progress lifted the levels of support to the membership –both domestically and internationally. The Eurobarometer study of 2004 measured the support as high as 71%. This was the highest ever support level measured in Turkey. It is safe to say that these figures now look distant considering the Turkey-EU relationship as of today.

Shortly after the Brussels Summit, the accession negotiations commenced in October 2005, albeit incrementally. Yet, it was made clear by the EU that the membership was not inevitable. The Commission report states that the process is “open-ended” and “cannot be guaranteed beforehand” (Commission 2006). These were reminders for Turkey that there was still a long road ahead.

In the following years, Turkey’s relationship with the European Union had seen strong support from the public and political spheres. The successful integration process and candidacy status intrigued Turkish citizens towards Europe with hopes of economic and political prosperity. However, over time, this hopeful picture changed to a disheartened one due to two fundamental reasons. Firstly, there was an expectation that the Customs Union would eventually evolve into a full membership, which did not. Secondly, the EU’s attitude has long fluctuated between the implication of that Turkey will not be accepted to the European Union and the indication that Turkey is too good of a country to be waiting this long (Erisen and Erisen 2014). That being said, these sentiments were not the only factors, as the prospect of candidacy was interrupted with several internal and external factors.

The external factors are closely related to the changing image of Turkey in the eyes of the influential member states. Certain member states such as France and Austria were vocal about their attitude towards a potential Turkish membership. They brought the possibility of national referenda, even if Turkey were to fulfill all the requirements. The remarks of then-French President Nicholas Sarkozy went far by stating that Turkey is not and would never be a European state, regardless of the status of the negotiation process. This would perhaps sum up the gravity of the remarks made by certain EU members (Müftüler-Baç 2017). Besides, Germany, one of the critical figures that push for the commencement of the negotiation process, had gone through an election and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) came to power. The new Chancellor Angela Merkel and her party drastically changed Germany’s approach towards the accession negotiations. The negative atmosphere and sudden lack of support from the influential members of the Union slowed down the accession negotiations and created disappointment within the Turkish society.

Regional and international scope conditions for both the EU and Turkey did not help the relations in the period after 2005. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 hit Europe’s relatively smaller countries harshly and the prospect of membership for Turkey was put even further away as Europe had to deal with internal problems. In both decision-making and public levels, it fostered a negative climate which prevents a dedicated focus on enlargement (Aydın-Düzgüt and Kaliber 2016). The fundamental problems within the EU have strengthened the opposition to enlargement. Today,

the European Union still faces internal problems. The looming shadow of the Brexit, trade-related problems with the US, the lack of unity toward the establishment of a unified European foreign policy and a stagnant market economy all contribute to the causes of hesitancy in accepting Turkey as a member state. Adding to those, it must be noted that there is a big transformation within Europe after the Euro Crisis and the increasing tensions with the rise of Russia and refugee crisis put the EU in a status where it needs to adhere to integration and preserve its borders rather than enlarge them. All these conditions directly or indirectly affected Turkey's prospect of membership. The discussion of absorbing Turkey in a potential membership has become more of a topic of political and economic discussions (Aydın-Düzgit 2012). This added to the downward spiral of the discussions on Turkey's cultural and societal differences which today waits to be reconciled by the European public.

From the internal side of things, after years of active reforms, AKP started to display indications of "reform fatigue". The party was not as enthusiastic and assertive as bringing new reforms and legislations. This was also connected to the unrequited nature of the relations. The conditionality of the relations was broken and the credibility of the EU was weakening. Albeit initially interested in the EU membership, AKP has always been skeptical about the process. The incumbent party, AKP were enthusiastic in Turkey's candidacy and working towards a full membership but in the last couple of years, this has not been the case. The reason why AKP was initially supportive of the candidacy may be explained as their reluctance to diverge from the existing foreign policy at the time of its coming to power. After 2011, the reforms had slowed, but the major breaking point was 2013 when a series "reversal of reforms" were put in force (Müftüler-Baç 2017)

The AKP government's stance toward the EU in its first electoral term was positive but practical. Turkey's candidacy to the EU was declared in 1999, and the accession negotiations were initiated in 2005; throughout this process, AKP kept a Kemalist façade on their foreign policy and displayed Europe as the safe haven of democracy with higher welfare standards, which was the natural direction for Turkey (Alpan 2016). It should be noted that improving relationship with the EU and the reforms enabled AKP to have the upper hand on many issues against the military and judiciary (Noutcheva and Aydın-Düzgit 2012).

Nevertheless, it is widely accepted among scholars that the 2007 election was the start of the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy of AKP (Bilgin and Bilgiç 2011). This policy depends on Turkey's Ottoman history and the Islamism to situate itself in the broader region as a regional power (Saraçoğlu and Özhan Demirkol 2015). While this policy change was at the domestic level, the EU-Turkey relations was also coming to

a halt, which was due to the slowing pace of the negotiations between Turkey and the EU, the Eurocrisis, Cyprus stalemate, increasing anti-Turkish attitude among the EU public, and worsening democratic practices in Turkey.

The current literature shows that the change in Turkey's foreign policy and the deterioration of the Turkey -EU relations changed in both the policy and identity of the government, as a result of which Turkish political elites had distanced themselves from Europe. The positive image of Europe changed to a negative image in the AKP discourse, where the EU was represented as the unwanted intruder in Turkish politics and a discriminatory entity which was historically and religiously different and is democratically, politically and morally inferior to Turkey (Aydın-Düzgit 2016).

This can be traced back to the 60s where Europe was presented as morally inferior to Turkey (Döşemeci 2013), as well as Europe's representation as the unwanted intruder goes hand in hand with the increase of the Sèvres syndrome in the 70s (Aydın-Düzgit 2018). Nonetheless, after 2007, the above-mentioned representations of Europe became the formal and officially pronounced views. Moreover, the novel representations, e.g., Turkey being better than Europe thanks to its Ottoman past, was also utilized by the AKP government and officials along with the frequent use of the well-known past narratives in framing the EU accession process and other matters.

One of the most important turning points in the EU-Turkey relationship came when it was least expected. Not long after the successful summit of March 2016 regarding the refugee issue and revitalization of the accession negotiations, Turkey experienced a failed coup attempt. Before the failed coup attempt, the Transatlantic Trends Survey data (2014) show that the pro-membership figures were increasing following a stagnant period after 2011. The support figures hit 53%, which marks the highest figure since 2006. The Eurobarometer data also show a similar picture. In the November 2013 study, the pro-EU attitudes increased from 20% to 43%, which is more than twice of an increase. Şenyuva's (2014) study shows that most of the pro-EU voters were center-left voters who were alarmed by the government's infringement of their rights and liberties. Those may see Europe as a potential source of protection from the government and the integration process as a hope to boost democracy.

Following the failed coup attempt, the Turkish government declared a state of emergency and the measures taken afterward were harshly criticized by senior EU officials (Müftüler-Baç 2017). The major political changes in Turkey also conveyed the message that reforms had halted. The relationship has deteriorated and Turkey's preparedness for the negotiations was pushed aside. This resulted in public opinion

surveys showing that the support for the membership fell to 28%. This is the lowest point in the history of the Turkey-EU relationship. This shows that the 15th July coup attempt was the breaking point after the long and mostly negative trend of the relationship. After a while, the support once again took a positive turn and started to increase. The Eurobarometer study conducted in 2017 (European Commission 2018) shows that the EU supporters reached 47%. It is a significant change following the increasing negativity in the relationship. Kadir Has University's (2017) study also confirms Eurobarometer's results with 48.4% public support for the membership. Even though it is intriguing how the support had built up so fast after a long period of negativity since 2001 we see that Turkish public opinion is very responsive to exogenous events affecting the Turkey-EU relationship.

The direction of the relationship and variety of challenges to it show that Turkey's path to membership is unique in every aspect. We can argue that both sides constantly fail in their pledges and are more occupied with domestic politics. This results in a trend in public opinion with lots of highs and lows. As mentioned above, public opinion is not immune to all such turbulence within and between parties, and the public reaction may follow a fluctuating pattern. Even though people's responses to these issues can be reduced to a simple state of support for membership or vice-versa, many factors influence these attitudes. The next chapter provides a summary of public opinion studies in Turkey and the theoretical explanations for attitudes towards the EU.

2.1 Understanding Public Opinion Research

2.1.1 Public Opinion Studies in Turkey about the EU

In recent years, studies focusing on Turkish citizens' attitudes and opinions towards the EU have been attracting a lot of interest. However, this area of study is still relatively under-developed when compared to other areas within the realm of European studies. There is low if any, interest within this field in quantitative measures and methods to understand the motives behind the Turkish people's attitudes towards

the EU. Thus, to understand the roots of these attitudes and the motives behind the integration, it is necessary to explore new dimensions that may contribute to the field. Previous studies that addressed certain issues and elements of the integration process and its ramifications, particularly focus on the in-group and out-group dynamics of the attitudinal displays on the EU integration process of Turkey are reviewed in this chapter.

Public opinion research and surveys on the Turkish public's opinion towards the EU membership are limited compared to those focusing on the EU member states. The absence of a periodically updated database that is comprehensive enough to address EU-related issues makes it hard for researchers to build on previous work and investigate different dimensions of Turkey's EU-integration process. However, some essential studies were conducted in Turkey. They vary regarding their contexts, how the data are used or collected, and how they explain different aspects of the public opinion.

Firstly, the European Union's public opinion database, the Eurobarometer, is a crucial source. This database is a periodically updated platform where the data from the citizens of European member states and candidate countries are collected and disseminated. The data address many issues regarding the integration process and specifically focuses on certain issue dimensions in each individual member or candidate state. Turkey's inclusion into this dataset dates back to 2001.

Muftuler-Bac and McLaren's (2003) study approaches public opinion from a different aspect. The sample of the study is composed of the Turkish Grand National Assembly members and the data were collected from the parliamentarians themselves. This methodology provides critical insight from those who directly influence the integration process. In this respect, this study emphasizes elite perceptions towards the EU-Turkey relationship and attempts to predict the future of the negotiations. The study points out the importance of some issues such as national sentiments within the parliament and representatives' prospects towards EU negotiations with a questionnaire that could help further research to build on.

Most of the earlier research was quantitative and presented that pragmatic expectations play a significant role in presenting the EU as positive among the Turkish public (Çarkoğlu and Çiğdem Kentmen 2011) while, it was discovered that the understanding of democracy in Turkey among the public played a minor role in shaping attitudes towards Europe (Kentmen 2012).

On the other hand, qualitative research was even less common, the only well-known study is by Yılmaz (2011). Yılmaz's research on Euroscepticism is based on the

data from 2003. He identified the main sources of Euroscepticism in the public of Turkey as concerns on national sovereignty, fear of losing moral values, perceptions of discrimination against by the EU, and the Sevres Syndrome.

The study by Carkoglu, Erguder, Kirisci, and Yilmaz (2002) can be considered among the pioneering public opinion studies regarding Turkey's EU membership and integration as well. It was followed by Carkoglu, Erguder, Kalaycioglu and Yilmaz's work in TESEV. The importance of these studies is that they were empirically informed, focusing on the determinants of Turkish public support towards the EU. These studies extensively focus on the effects of economic considerations, support for democracy and the effect of national identity among various other determinants.

2.2 Theoretical Explanations of Public Opinion Formation on the EU

The theoretical explanations on the EU and Turkey public opinion have mostly been on cognitive terms (Anderson and Reichert 1995; Gabel and Palmer 1995). The cognitive framework rests on that the nature of the relationship hinges on an expansion to reach potential economic benefits. This is plausible given that Turkey is a free-market economy with a young and dynamic workforce. Utility maximization is the main motive in these models. The rational choice model explanations use cognitive cost-benefit calculations while using the utility as the value (Erisen and Erisen 2013)

One of the other public opinion theories on EU integration is the cognitive mobilization theory. The theory can be traced back to the studies of Inglehart. Inglehart (1991) defined it as the effect of socioeconomic and educational mobilization on how an individual calculates costs and benefits of the integration process. The theory posits that higher education and socioeconomic level result in higher support for integration. This is coherent with the findings that show individual gains or losses from the integration is the source for the attitude towards the EU (Anderson and Reichert 1995). Gabel and Palmer (1995) also find similar results to the previously explained studies. In their study, citizens who have the perception that the EU will provide direct personal benefits are inclined to support the EU. This study finds empirical support for that there is a distinction between direct personal benefits and benefits for the whole nation. Potential benefits of the EU tend to affect indi-

vidual support if the benefit is personal, while the support decreases if the benefit is distributed within a group, in this context, the nation.

Arikan (2012) argues that group-centric arguments include perceived interests and threats to society which show themselves in the attitudes towards the EU. Arikan posits that the perceived material and political benefits boost public support for the EU. On the other hand, perceived material and cultural threats create a decline in this sentiment. Using the Eurobarometer survey data, the researcher tested this hypothesis and showed that these sentiments are “rather than being determined by rational calculations of costs and benefits to the self, attitudes towards the EU are mostly motivated by perceived group benefits and symbolic concerns” (Arikan 2012, 82).

The self-interest-based explanations of political attitude formation are also commonly used in academic literature. The self-interest simply posits that individuals make rational decisions when forming their political opinions. In other words, they calculate their cost and benefits in any given situation (Kinder 1998). This approach has been used by Turkish scholars to understand the Turkish public’s attitudes towards the EU. Arikan, using both Carkoglu’s and Eurobarometer’s dataset, showed that these utilitarian perspectives work well for both the European and Turkish publics. Further explaining this phenomenon, using Carkoglu’s (2002) survey data Arikan posits that “it could be that rather than their objective material position in the society, people’s belief that they will benefit from integration may be the decisive determinant of EU-related attitudes” (Arikan 2012, 83). These findings also suggest that rational choice-based explanations can provide us with significant power in explaining people’s evaluations of the integration process. It depends on the rationale that any type of gain, whether it is political, economic, and/or social is the source of attitudes. According to this study, many people see the EU as a “source of benefits” to their country and believe that the EU will grant favorable advantages to the country especially in the areas of democracy and human rights.

However, other studies show that cognitive evaluations are not the only driving force of citizens’ political opinions. Gabel and Whitten’s (1995) empirical research suggests that cognitive evaluations such as cost-benefit evaluations help explain the EU integration support, yet national identity bears significant explanatory power as well. This shows that non-cognitive processes such as nationalistic convictions may still balance or overcome cognitive evaluations. Therefore, I believe it is possible to argue that attitudes towards the EU and attitudes, in general, can be explained by measuring individuals’ irrational sentiments that do not rely on simple cost-benefit calculations. This promises to add more to the public opinion domain than the

measures only based on cognitive assumptions such as cost-benefit or interest-based calculations. Henri Tajfel (1982) shows that individual-level motives are repeatedly ignored when in-group motivations and pressures are in place. That is, the presence of group identity may overcome rational choice-based expectations.

McLaren (2006) rejects such rational choice explanations by positing that those have a problem of objectivity as they are limited by the knowledge of the individuals about the issue. Adding to that, McLaren states that national identity is a crucial component of individuals' attitudes towards the EU. McLaren emphasizes that strong threat perceptions regarding issues such as immigration and loss of sovereignty are also as significant as utility-based motivations when forming attitudes towards the EU (McLaren 2002). The idea of losing the nation-state related features such as border and migration controls to a supranational entity such as the EU is a concern for nationalistic groups. The strength of the in-group identity reflects the perception of the out-group. De Vreese and Boomgarden (2005) support McLaren's findings in their study where they show that immigration is the most significant factor affecting the attitudes towards the EU.

In general, group-centric theories build on that in-group favoritism is quite decisive in the formation of individuals' attitudes. Their common features involve specific assumptions about the group and individual behavior and attitudes. Jost and Banaji (1994) state that the theories that give the in-group motives a pivotal place tend to assume that there is solidarity, support, and justification of the group's and group members' interests against outgroup members.

Brewer and Roderick (1985) state that in-group similarities are preferred over dissimilar out-group attributes. This is line with the seminal work of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) on inter-group relations that posits prejudice is directed at the out-group or out-group members as a form of hostility. These two works share the in-group favoritism feature in their explanations of the attitudes towards the other. Bobo, Sidanius, and Pratto (1994) assert that inter-group relations in a society are inherently conflict-laden. Sidanius and Pratto (1993) also state that "prejudice, discrimination, and institutionalized oppression are inevitable outcomes of inter-group relations".(as cited in Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004, 882)

Brewer's (1979) studies add to the approaches mentioned above by many scholars. They state that inter-group behavior is ethnocentric and in-group favoritism is inevitable. Elites of dominant groups become hegemonic when it comes to imposing their will on the subordinate group (Fiske 1993). This is an interesting finding which shows us a similarity with the rationality-based approaches (which will be mentioned below) in a systematic way. Members of subordinated groups first seek

to escape from the implications of group membership by exercising their individual exit and mobility options (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Consequent literature further supports the claim stating that “[p]olitical ideology mirrors/group membership, individual and collective self-interest and/or social position.” (as cited in Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004, 882)

The theoretical insights examined in this section lead us to hypothesize about the in-group favoritism aspect of the Turkish public’s attitudes towards the EU. Europe and Turkey both have historically negative constituted images of each other. The conceptualization of the out-group and in-group are mostly as symbolizations of each other as the “Self” and “Other”.

This is in line with Muftuler-Bac’s (2000) suggestion that “...all that is non-European determines what Europe is, and in the case of a non-European identity, it is all that is European that sets its self-image. The concepts of Europeanness and non-Europeanness are thought to be mutually exclusive with the line of demarcation between “civilized” Europe and “barbaric” non-Europe.” (Müftüler-Bac 2000, 26). This similar kind of identity formation is expected to be evident among the Turkish public as well. Supporting Muftuler-Bac, McLaren also suggests that Turkey’s membership process creates a different type of effect on groups of citizens of the EU. The effect shows itself in the reactions which are related to the symbolic threat perceptions when the Turkish candidacy is brought up. However, other prospective candidates are treated based on utility-based calculations.

2.3 Conclusion

To understand the Turkish public’s attitudes towards the EU, without disregarding the effect of rationality-based explanations, I believe moving beyond them and focusing on in-group and out-group perceptions of Turkish people is very important. Because opinions are not only based on rationality in many occasions, we observe that groups may behave in ways that are hard to explain using a rational choice framework. As in the case of the EU-Turkey relationship, identity politics constitutes an indispensable part of these attitudes. In line with the group-centric approaches in previous literature, public opinion studies have mostly focused on group interests in the form of ethnic or social identity.

In these respects, this study acknowledges that rational and cognitive theories provide solid explanations for the nature of the relationship between the EU and Turkey. However, they are insufficient for accounting for all different aspects of public opinion formation. By introducing social psychological theories related to political processes, the picture will be clearer. To such end, social identity and system justification theories, and implicit attitudes will be explained in detail in the next section.



3. THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS

3.1 The Social Psychological Bases of the Relationship between the EU

and Turkey

It is clear from the previous review of political and sociological studies that the public opinion towards the Turkey-EU relations has exhibited a pattern that can be characterized by some periods of stability and change. Although the object of the attitudes, namely the Turkey-EU relation, stayed the same throughout the process of candidacy, there have been times in which people's perceptions towards the issue of candidacy have been quite positive or negative. Besides, the diversity in the Turkish public opinion regarding the candidacy issue is also evident. It would be plausible to assert that this dynamic and heterogeneous nature of the issue of attitudes toward the Turkey-EU relations cannot be fully examined only by using sociological or political analyses. Given the subjective nature of these attitudes, a psychological approach would help capture the individual-level factors operating behind the formation and maintenance of these attitudes.

A branch of psychology, namely social psychology, offers some theoretical perspectives that may be effective in explaining the above-mentioned pattern of stability and change in public opinion. A limited number of multi-level theoretical approaches (for example, social identity theory, social dominance theory, and system justification theory) from the intergroup relations area of social psychology have been widely used for studying the social problems that are originated from the tense relationships between societies or groups. These relatively new and promising approaches seem to be effective in handling the issues is necessary and much-needed depth in other areas of social sciences. As these new approaches have been developed as a reaction to the individualistic and reductionist explanations that dominated social

psychology for decades, they are welcomed by other social scientists as well, such as political psychologists (Huddy 2001).

However, these frameworks differ from each other in terms of their focuses and basic assumptions regarding the general nature of status hierarchies in societies. For example, social dominance and system justification theories have been designed to explain why the status hierarchies in societies tend to be stable, whereas social identity theory is more effective in explaining the change in the status quo of disadvantaged groups in the hierarchical structures. In the present study, two of these theoretical frameworks, namely, social identity theory and system justification theory, are utilized in understanding the dynamic nature of the Turkey-EU relations.

3.2 The Social Identity Theory

Social Identity Theory is a multi-level theory which helps to understand the relationships between group attitude and behavior from the perspective of social psychology. This theory is closely related to the group phenomenon and deals with similarity, stereotype, identification, in-group bias, group norms, group identity, discrimination and prejudice (Tajfel and Turner 2001, 33). Besides, this theory was the first attempt to overcome the difficulties that were originated from the reductionist and individualistic approach that dominated the area of social psychology until the '80s.

Before the 80s, Sherif tried to criticize this individualistic tradition with a theory, namely, the Realistic Group Conflict Theory that emphasized the interdependency between the group members and the group as a whole. In his three staged experiments, namely the Robbers Cave experiment, where the participants' group consisted of 11-12-year-old males in a summer camp. This experiment showed that being an unmixed group could affect entire in-group relations and that individual anger or ideological differences do not cause hostile attitudes towards an outgroup. Rather, what causes hostile attitudes are directly related to ingroup and outgroup relations. Furthermore, common objectives which need intergroup cooperation may help rectify these hostile relations between groups (Sherif 1966)

Social Identity Theory, inspired by Sherif's perspective, evaluates social identity and (parallel to identity) social behavior as a dimension that demonstrates continuity between its two extremes, which is different from previous theories assuming that

social behavior is solely as interpersonal. One point is true, through individual identity and interpersonal relations. However, the crucial point is social identity and intergroup relations (Tajfel and Turner 2001, 34).

3.2.1 Social Categorization

Social categorization is a cognitive process by which individuals divide social complexity into different compartments and, categories and sort them. However, this process should not be seen as an objective cognitive mechanism, as it is affected by the values, culture and social representations of social structure which an individual is a part of. Therefore, social categorization is not an objective process, On the contrary, it is a subjective organization that the individual conducts by taking himself as a reference point (Tajfel and Turner 2001, 41)

The categorization of the social structure of an individual alone does not help that individual to give meaning to his or her social environment but simultaneously, thanks to his or her group membership, helps understand her position in this structure and thus determine her social identity (Tajfel and Turner 2001, 40)

Due to their group memberships, individuals become more and more like their in-group prototypes and transforms “I (self) into we (collective self / social identity)” (Hogg and Williams 2000, 92). On the other hand, the in-group prototype that transforms individuals to us, contrary to the subjective prototype of the out-group, is perceived as more attractive by the in-group members (Hogg and Moreland 1993, 97).

According to the Social Identity Theory, in-group favoritism (i.e., when the in-group is preferred and favored against the outgroup) is due to individuals trying to affirm their own social identities in the categories they are a member of since social identity stems from the social category an individual belongs to. In other words, according to the Social Identity Theory, the main role of membership to a social category and the comparison process is to help a person acquire a positive social identity and thus a positive self-construct and self-respect (Brewer and Kramer 1985, 224). This is because individuals can only develop a positive social identity if their own group has a stronger and more prestigious image than the comparison groups (Tajfel and Turner 2001, 40). Moreover, this can only be obtained by the person who shows favoritism towards her own social category concerning the outgroup (Hogg

and Abrams 1988; Tajfel 1982)

Social Identity Theory suggests that to create a group identity and identify with a group, a mutually positive relationship among individuals of the group is not mandatory. The essential condition is having a positive attitude towards the perceived prototype of the group, of which the individual is a member of due to social categorization (Hogg and Moreland 1993, 95). This indicates that identification is defined, along with positive attitudes towards in-group, as the individual's feelings of belonging and commitment to his/her own group.

Individuals, to affirm their own self-construal, compare their own group to other groups and try to create a positive distinction from others. Similarly, acting according to the group norms, having positive feelings, respect and trust toward the in-group, finding oneself similar to the in-group members, defining oneself and the out-group through stereotypes and using ethnocentrism becomes possible when the commitment and belonging felt towards the in-group is prominent (Haslam, Reicher, and Reynolds 2012; Hogg and Moreland 1993)

Group identity plays an important role for people when creating a positive self-image. Positive social identity stems from the fact that an individual will favor its own group of which he/she is a member compared to the comparison group. However, when the group descends in social hierarchy its contribution to creating one's social identity also diminishes. Consequently, group members will either try either to enhance the positivity of their self-images or to preserve their existing positive images through various strategies (Hogg and Williams 2000, 87). Tajfel and Turner (2001) argue that social attitudes of individuals and groups are dependent on belief systems which may be seen as the reflection of the nature of inter-group relations existent in the status quo. These belief systems are formed according to how the social structure is perceived whether it is flexible, permeable, and/or legitimate.

3.2.2 Turkey-EU Relations from the Perspective of the Social Identity

Theory

Turkish public opinion is a group phenomenon. It can be investigated through the group identity and the formation of this identity. Symbolic matters and interests concerning a group, affect the identity formation process. This is what the social

identity theory seeks to answer (Tajfel 1982). Individuals represent a group identity that is, a matter of fact, a part of their identity, to construct a self-reflective image of themselves to the members of out-groups (Huddy 2001). As mentioned, social identity is a very important issue in the EU integration process and the identity-based politics have a substantive role in which the public directly is a part of. This comes from the understanding that the “national identity” is the primal reference point for the identity of the state (Taggart 1998). Following these remarks, it can be plausibly argued that groups with stronger nationalistic tendencies or ideologies reflect national identities which classify EU as an entity that erodes national interest and identity. This leads to the dismissal of any further integration by these parties and their constituent groups.

The Turkish political atmosphere also shows that there are a disparity and misalignment of interests within political parties towards the EU. This being part of identity politics in Turkey, Euroscepticism based on identity has been reflected vocally by far-right political parties such as the Turkish nationalists MHP (Nationalist Action Party) and the Islamist SP (Felicity Party). This is as expected and in line with many other prospect countries and member states. For the MHP, EU accession is a threat as its program possesses the bolstering of minority rights and the imposition of new rules over the Turkish state in certain areas which they believe that they will serve the hands of foreigners who are continuing to take the country under Western patronage and creation of a physically divided Turkey. Moreover, the Islamists’ view of the EU is rather shown more hostile with remarks such as the “Christian Club”, where there is no place for Muslims.

The historical background of the relations carries a strong role in such perceptions, depending on the collective memories on the long Christianity versus Islam dispute. This dispute, more or less, continues for both groups. Especially in Turkey, where the stagnation of the accession process is regarded as a humiliation against Christian Europeans and this disappointed feeling towards the EU fuels the traditionalist and ethnocentric ideas within Islamist and nationalist groups. Therefore, these groups propose different ways for political directions for the future of the integration process.

The examples could very well point to a direction where the effect of perceived threats from out-groups is the main influence behind the public opinion and attitudes. In my opinion, this is not separable from the realistic, game-theoretical models that were mentioned above where the material benefits were also the rationale behind the attitudes. Out-groups may pose a threat to the identity of the in-groups as well as the interests of other social groups that may share another identity which is based on material similarities. Another threat that is observed to

be substantive is cultural and symbolic threats. Social identity theory posits that the symbolic concerns of individuals may very well contribute to their threat perceptions. These threat perceptions could stem from identity-related issues to hold irrational value-based concerns over out-groups (Kinder and Sears 1981). McLaren (2002) finds that immigrants or diverse ethnic groups increase the threat perceptions and the existence of a threat from different ethnicities decreases support for further integration in specific issues in the EU member states. This is expected as the “Other” can possess a fear in the public that the status-quo will change and the economic and societal comfort of the individuals will be threatened (McLaren 2006). The important thing is that the symbolic threats lead to a dismissal of further integration within these countries. But the content of these threats is barely a danger neither to the integrity of the society, nor their economic well-being.

Then, it is safe to hypothesize that the EU, as it has been seen as a “Christian club” by the Turkish public and authorities, the importance of the perceived symbolic and material threats have a negative effect on people’s perception on the EU-Turkey relations and EU, in general. And the social identity theory would posit that symbolic effects would bear more effect on the issue as people may be more inclined to follow their own social group which they share the same identity.

As shown, current theoretical explanations and previous works, societal and individual-based components, along with the perceived material and political benefits are jointly important when one is explaining the positive EU attitudes. On the other hand, perceived threats and a strong sense of a social identity lead to a more negative perception of the EU, according to in-group favoritism based theories and expectations.

3.3 The System Justification Theory

System Justification theory was developed by Jost and Banaji (1994). Different from previous theories on intergroup relations focusing on ego-justification and group-justification System Justification Theory added motivation of an individual to defend the stability and continuity of the hierarchical structure within a society, even though it may not benefit the individual or the group. This is defined as system-justification motivation.

To fully grasp the system justification theory, ego-justification and group-justification motives should be reviewed. Ego-justification indicates that individuals develop stereotypes to protect and justify their own position and attitudes (Jost and Banaji 1994, 2). In other words, ego-justification is the motivation of the individual to achieve a positive self-perception (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004, 887). In the group-justification motive, stereotypes are created to ensure the continuity of the whole group's social status (Jost and Banaji 1994, 2). Thus, group-justification is the motivation of the individual to perceive the group he/she is a member of as positive and legitimate (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004, 887). Although both justification motivations are useful, they come short in explaining how individuals or individual's in-groups accept negative stereotyping towards themselves and how these stereotypes become widespread in society. To address these problems, Jost and Banaji proposed that, apart from ego and group justification, there should be another motivation. Hence, they focused on system justification as a motivation to address the permanence of the status quo (Jost and Banaji 1994, 2)

System justification is the motivation to support the status quo even though it may be disadvantageous for the individuals or groups within a society (Jost and Banaji 1994, 10). In other words, system justification is a psychological process by which the existing social, political, economic and gender-related conditions are accepted and justified as logical, good, fair, natural, desired and inevitable just because they exist (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004, 887). Founded upon this motivation, system justification theory indicates that stereotypes emerged, not for the benefit of the individual or group, but to explain the economic and social status, and the inequality between the distribution of power and resources (Jost and Banaji 1994, 3). Individuals, instead of questioning the legitimacy of their roles or statuses presented to them by the system, define themselves and others with traits (positive or negative) that are coherent with their social position. Therefore, the stereotypes that are created in this stage are used as a tool to justify the system (Jost and Banaji 1994, 11). For example, when stereotypes such as "untalented, dirty, unintelligent, unreliable" are assigned to people who work in a certain career field, these stereotypes are then used to legitimize unequal payment and their low rank within the status quo for workers in that career field (Jost and Banaji 1994, 12).

Stereotypes that were created with the motivation for system justification are not only for out-group members. These stereotypes also provide self-assessment and help them to understand and explain their own position and roles that the system has provided them. Therefore, lower-ranking group members tend to blame themselves, not the system and believe that they deserve their positions (Jost and

Banaji 1994, 13). Moreover, they justify their own inferiority more than in reality (Haines and Jost 2000, 231). This self-depleting belief further inhibits them from attempting to obtain a higher position. The powerful/advantageous groups are stereotyped in a way that their power and achievements are justified even by the powerless/disadvantageous groups, and the powerless/disadvantageous groups self-stereotype themselves in a way that indicates they deserve their position. This stereotyping justifies everyone's position within the status quo and leads to its permanence (Jost and Banaji 1994, 14).

Nevertheless, scholars accept that all stereotypes cannot be explained using the system justification approach. Hence, they propose ego and group justification approaches. Those two also point out that, many stereotypes serve to legitimize the status quo; without considering this motivation, the reasons for negative self-stereotyping towards oneself and in-group, and the permanence of the status quo cannot be properly understood (Jost and Banaji 1994, 16). Therefore, the system justification theory explains the relationship between an individual and the social system she belongs to by incorporating all three system justification approaches.

According to the System Justification Theory, it is possible that these three motivations can be in conflict and contradistinction to each other for individuals. Since ego and group justification approaches centralize the benefit of the individuals, these motivations pave the way for social change. Besides, the system justification approach, which comprises of the social and psychological needs to legitimize the status quo, is considered in the literature as somewhat stronger than the other two. It is the power of the system justification approach that ensures the permanence of the status quo. However, when no explanation justifies the system, ego and group justification may be considered superior and urge the disadvantaged group to create social change (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004, 887).

3.3.1 The EU-Turkey Relations from the Perspective of the System Justification Theory

As seen in the above explanations, System Justification Theory differs from social identity theory in its attempt to explain the perceptions towards the advantaged groups in a system of status hierarchies. For social identity theory, members of disadvantaged groups try to increase the value of their identities by using some identity management strategies that range from simple demands for changing or

modifying the comparison standards used in the society to some direct competition methods such as organizing under political parties or in resistance movements. In general, the dominant responses of members of disadvantaged groups can be seen in the context of in-group and out-group confrontation and driven by an in-group identification.

On the other hand, for system justification theory, it is the out-group favoritism that makes it possible for the system to be stable and resistant to change. From the perspective of System Justification Theory, the relationships between Turkey and the EU can be considered as a system of status hierarchies at which individuals (group members) develop attitudes based on their perceptions towards the legitimacy of it. As the main motivation for the individual is to perceive a system as just and legitimate, individuals may be expected to support the status differences between their groups and the superior group (or groups) by expressing positive attitudes toward the advantaged groups (i.e., out-group favoritism). However, due to some reasons (most of them are related to social desirability expectations), such attitudes are not easy to be expressed explicitly. Therefore, the most suitable way is to measure them by using implicit techniques such as implicit association tests.

3.4 Implicit Attitudes

3.4.1 The Implicit Association Test (IAT)

As mentioned above, the evaluation of the attitudes towards the EU is a subject of growing importance in political science. Assessment of the attitudes is mostly made using explicit measures such as survey studies and unstructured interviews (Boomgaarden et al. 2011). Yet, political research has grown into a field in which methods of various disciplines have started to be adopted. These disciplines are mainly the ones that intensively focus on the attitudinal and behavioral aspects of humans, such as social and cognitive psychology. This field of research has concluded that there is not only a controlled, “explicit” form of attitudes, but also an “implicit” one (Frieze, Hofmann, and Schmitt 2008) Understanding the importance of using

both types of methods gave birth to the Implicit Association Test (IAT). As IAT is a continuous measure (often within the range of -2 and 2), it allows us to measure both negative and positive associations. It disables any kind of initial adjustment in the attitude; thus, it helps to explain the sorts of situations people may experience where they may not have the time for lengthy and conscious access to their thoughts. Considering that political science is a field with an abundance of symbols, such symbols may trigger implicit, affective reactions (Lodge and Taber 2005).

Choma, Hafer (2009) and Roccato (2010) found that these attitudes help explain voting behavior. Likewise, the superiority of an additive model (consisting of explicit and implicit measures) to an explicit-only model in explaining voting behavior was found elsewhere (Roccato and Zogmaister 2010). These studies were then furthered by Galdi, Arcuri, Gawronski (Galdi, Arcuri, and Gawronski 2008), who point out the importance of implicit attitudes in understanding the voting calculi of, especially undecided voters.

After presenting the applicability and importance of the implicit measures for the field of political science, it is important to point out why EU attitudes are fit for the dual-process model. Firstly, EU related issues are not remarkably obvious or prominent for Turkish citizens. Most of the integration happens at an intergovernmental level rather than inter-group or individual. Secondly, the history of the relations and current state of affairs (e.g., Brexit, EU-Turkey relations, immigration, and cultural conflict) may breed the formation of implicit attitudes and non-cognitive reactions. Thirdly, the uncontrollable nature of the implicit attitude formation helps us assess and eliminate potential in-group or outgroup effects such as political alignment or partisanship (see Burdein, Lodge, and Taber 2006; Lodge and Taber 2005; Nosek et al. 2009; Wittenbrink, Gist, and Hilton 1997). This touches upon the distorted essence of the explicit attitudes as well. Perceived social desirability and any kind of behavioral bias constitute the biggest limitations of explicit answers to survey questions (Leary and Kowalski 1990; Paulhus 1984). It is important to note that individuals' attitudes towards an issue like the European integration process are closely linked to the political atmosphere in the country. Hence, such questions might not receive adequate and most honest replies. Implicit measure bypasses the issue of social desirability or in-group bias (Kim 2003)

IAT asks the participants to classify stimuli objects presented on a computer screen in a fast and continuous manner. These objects are often attribute (such as Good and Bad) and target concepts (such as Cat and Dog.). The concepts may be objectified by words or images. In an IAT test, they are carried out as a series of blocks. The respondent is presented one block at a time. Before each block, the respondent

is instructed by the program to categorize these concepts. The instructions differ in each block which depends on the foundation of the given block's measure. The respondent presses on the assigned keys with her both hands to categorize the stimuli objects that represent the concepts. Each block measures the associations between the attribute and target concepts. For example, a type of block may request the respondent to press a key with her left hand when she is presented with the concepts of "Good and Cat". On the other hand, "Bad" and "Dog" are assigned to the right hand. The blocks get reversed between blocks to measure the strength of the association between the Good and the Cat, and the Dog and the Bad.

Reaction speed is crucial in the classification of the concepts, but respondents are expected to make a few mistakes. Mistakes are shown on the computer monitor as a red "X" to enable the respondent to rapidly correct it and continue. The speed of the classification is crucially important. However, it does not bear any meaning on its own. As each block progresses, each attribute-target concept sequence is compared. IAT allows us to compare the average latency in each block. As a consequence, the attribute and target concepts that take longer to affiliate with one another give us the measure of the relative implicit association to the attribute concept (Hofmann et al. 2005, 1375). Given the theoretical expectation that, while the explicit evaluations can be decoded to their affective and cognitive elements, the implicit evaluations are more deeply related to the affective element of the attitudes (Smith and Nosek 2011, 300)

Any task is expected to get lengthier when rapid reactions are met with slower introspective reactions. Conscious and lengthy reactions are often observed when explicit attitudes are expressed. However, the same cannot be said about the implicit ones. Reprocessing and cognitive control are minimal throughout the IAT processes. When reprocessing lengthens, it opens the way for a potential cacophony of thoughts. Other problems such as social desirability bias may emerge as well. Thus, IAT appears as one of the, if not the, most straightforward measuring techniques for "affective orientation" Campbell and his colleagues (1960) discussed.

Another dimension of the IATs is the prediction of political behavior. Studies show that IATs perform notably stronger than the explicit-only models (Greenwald et al. 2009). The predictive power of the IATs is especially better than the explicit-only methods when the studies are conducted closer to the election date (Frieze, Bluemke, and Wänke 2007). Empirical evidence shows that implicit and explicit measures tap onto different dimensions in explaining political behavior (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Ryan 2017).

In this study, I build on previous literature and move beyond voting behavior, and

suggest that an additive model combining implicit and explicit measures may help explain political attitudes and (intended) behavior, particularly individual attitudes and behavior towards the European Union. Recent studies suggest that voting in referenda and public opinion formation are more complex than merely voting in an election (Galdi, Arcuri, and Gawronski 2008). As the recent referendum in the United Kingdom to exit the EU suggests, issue-related referendums demand more complex explanations. Since Turkey is a country where referenda are frequently used as a political tool, attitudes towards issues that are not directly related to political parties or candidates constitute an important topic to study.

In this section, I will outline the recent developments on the implicit attitudes concerning their use in political science and behavioral studies. IATs had not been seen as useful instruments for predicting behavior for a long time, especially in the circumstances involving conceiving and control. Thus, their predictive ability was underestimated (Perugini 2005). Nevertheless, this trend is now reversed thanks to the success of the additive methods that combine explicit and implicit measures. Combining these two sorts of models provided scholars with great explanatory power specifically with regards to individual behavior (Dovidio et al. 1997).

Even though the IAT was used in various behavioral studies before, its first use in political science was by Karpinski (2005). This study focused on the US presidential election in 2000 and showed that implicit attitudes were significant determinants of voting intention. However, the implicit model was not as significant as the explicit model when the two methods were compared. The validity of IATs was further tested in a larger representative study (Roccatò and Zogmaister 2010). The study was conducted before the 2006 Italian elections and showed that IAT contributed significantly and increased the predictive power of explicit measures. The study showed that there was a consistent relationship between IAT and voting behavior (Roccatò and Zogmaister 2010). With the addition of the implicit attitudes, the study improved our ability to explain (self-reported) voting behavior to a much higher extent than that for voting intention.

IAT's predictive validity found empirical support in another study as well. This study was conducted before the 2001 Italian General elections. The study suggested that IATs significantly predict the voting behavior of decided and undecided citizens Arcuri and colleagues (2008). In a similar study, Galdi and his/her colleagues (2008) utilized IAT to predict attitudes and opinions towards a local issue. Their study shows that for undecided citizens the measure significantly predicts future opinions. This was, however, not the case for explicit attitudes of the undecided. Strikingly, the opposite could be said about decided citizens where explicit attitudes

were significant determinants of their behavior, well above and beyond their implicit attitudes.

Interestingly, two other more recent studies show a different picture. Roccato and Zogmaister (2010) and Frieze and his colleagues' (2012) studies further support the importance of the so-called additive model and its higher explanatory power. However, both studies find that explicit attitudes were more significant predictors of the vote choices of both decided and undecided voters. These findings contradict Galdi's (2008) above-mentioned study. The authors argue that the reason is that both sorts of measures highly overlap and implicit measures increase the predictive power of the explicit measures only incrementally. However, all previous studies conclude that the additive, combined, models are quite useful and should be used when modeling voting behavior.

3.4.2 Brief Implicit Association Test (BIAT)

This study utilizes a brief version of the IAT measure. The Brief Implicit Association Test (BIAT) has a relatively shorter design than standard procedures (Sriram and Greenwald 2009). It requires less time to administer, however, the aims and measures of the test are the same. In the standard IAT, four focal categories are presented as single focal points in each of the seven blocks. However, in BIAT just two categories are focal and the respondent is presented with a combination of focal and non-focal concepts. All in all, BIAT stands as an efficient version of the IAT. It is also a quick and reliable measure as shown in several studies in previous literature (see D. Pavlovic and Žeželj 2013; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Sriram and Greenwald 2009)

To exemplify the administrative content in our study, when the respondent is presented with the "Turkey" block of the BIAT, he is instructed to press only one key (in our case P) on a laptop for Turkey related images and for "Positive" words such as "Joy, Love, Peace, Perfect," and the other key (in our case Q) for anything other than the specified concepts. This process differs with only focal points changing throughout the exercise. The difference from the standard IAT is the way that it is designed. In the BIAT design, the EU-related images and "Negative" words such as "Ugly, Disgrace, Terrible, and Horrible" are assigned to another key and the test would continue with both focal and non-focal concepts being altered in each round. The BIAT design also includes two training blocks to make the participant get fa-

miliar with the procedure. The other six blocks are used to calculate the implicit attitude scores. In BIAT and this study, the self and in-group related categories are always focal and the “other” categories are non-focal. The reason is that the self-association aspect of the measure is more reliable than trying to associate with the “Other” (Sriram and Greenwald 2009). Following previous literature employ BIAT tests, the “D-score” is utilized to interpret the results of the measure (Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji 2003). As mentioned above, the standardized score ranges from -2 to 2 and is calculated as follows:

$$D = \frac{Latency(EU) - Latency(TR)}{SD}$$

That is, the mean response latency scores of each block’s target categories are subtracted from the respondent score, then the difference is divided by the standard deviation (for a detailed explanation of the computation of the D-score, (see Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji 2003). Positive results indicate that the participant is faster in responding to the EU images and Positive words pairings than she is for Turkey images and Positive words pairings. As faster responses imply that the respondent has an automatic association with the given category, we can infer that a positive result in this measure shows an inclination, more positive affection, and automatic association for the EU. The reverse of the score would imply an automatic association with Turkey.

The blocks of four items are randomly ordered and they repeat two times over the process. The repetitions consist of “outgroup (EU)+positive” and “ingroup (Turkey)+positive” blocks. A group is paired with positive words, meanwhile the other is paired with negative ones. The figure in the Appendices shows a block example used in our study. It provides the mentioned categorization of groups and pairings. In this study, the target stimuli are the European Flag and “positive” word pairings. Respondents with positive EU attitudes are expected to respond faster and categorize the flag with positive attributes. For those with positive Turkey, attitudes are expected to show the opposite, a slower reaction.

3.4.3 Advantages of the Measure

IAT aims to assess the automatic association processes of individuals. Therefore, it is quite difficult to deceive the test with responses that do not reflect the participant’s

actual attitudes. More importantly, social desirability bias or identity-based strategies are hardly effective in test results (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998, 1465). In other words, even though respondents try to hide their true attitudes, IAT is quite successful in revealing their deeply-seated prejudices or stereotypes. This is one of the major advantages of IAT compared to the other tests used for such purposes that is based on respondents' self-declaration. The other main advantage of IAT is that it does not get affected by the other various factors in the procedure. Greenwald and his colleagues (1998) showed that IAT scores are not affected by the methodological changes such as the number of stimulants or the position of the chosen category (left or right). Another striking advantage shown by Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, and Banaji's (2000) studies is the familiarity with presented stimulants do not change the IAT score. Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji (2009) also found that the stimulants' content does not influence test results. Regardless of whether they employ a set of images or words, many independent studies show no significant impact. In light of all these findings, the use of IAT is seen as an effective way of assessing several types of individual attitudes. The test is widely used in various areas and there is a growing interest in additive methods combining implicit and explicit methods in political science (see Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Maier et al. 2015; Ryan 2017; Theodoridis 2017). However, related studies are very few in Turkish academic literature except for the field of psychology.

4. ARGUMENTS

The primary aim of this chapter is to highlight the main research questions and hypotheses empirically assessed in this thesis and to outline the research design. In the first half of this chapter, I present an overview of the study's main goals. First, I particularly focus on the question of whether implicit association affects attitudes towards the EU. Second, I try to explore if implicit attitudes are influential in the decision-making calculus of individuals when making their vote decisions. To test these and the other related hypotheses, I use survey methods to measure individuals' explicit attitudes and a computer-based test to explore their implicit attitudes to see whether implicit attitudes bear predictive validity as the dual-process theory suggests (Ksiazkiewicz and Hedrick 2013). Lastly, to find answers for the second set of research questions, I use two different explicit measures to assess the in-group and out-group favoritism within my sample and to empirically assess another set of hypotheses concerning the relationship between individuals' social identity and system justification tendencies and implicit associations. I am especially curious about whether there is a link between non-cognitive processes and political behavior as a function of such attitudes.

In the second subsection of this chapter, I primarily concentrate on my research design. As noted above, this study utilizes the Implicit Association Test (IAT) (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998) and conventional survey methods. Hence, this chapter includes details about how these measures correspond to theoretical arguments and hypotheses raised in this chapter.

4.1 Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses

Explicit and implicit attitudes are different in the ways that they are formed and affect political behavior. Explicit attitudes are known as controlled and cognitively-processed attitudes which are formed by long and repetitive thoughts, whereas implicit attitudes are instantaneous reactions that are often stimulated by symbolic objects that bear meaning to the individual (Strack and Deutsch 2004). However, previous research suggests that these two types of attitudes are not completely detached from each other. Rudman (2001) states that conscious, repetitive evaluations of any concept may ignite automated responses. This may diminish the validity of IAT and create distorted results. On the other hand, if the person is aware of her/his uncontrolled attitude towards an issue, s/he can mix her implicit and explicit attitudes (Maier et al. 2015). Hence, we could expect implicit and explicit attitudes to be correlated only to a moderate degree. Even though these concepts are measured by different methods and relate to contrasting mental processes, both aim to measure the same fundamental association.

New studies in the context of pro-EU or Euroskeptical attitudes, with the inclusion of implicit attitudes as a supplement or rival to the explicit attitudes, appear to be superior to the models that include only one of the measures. The reasons behind the inclusion of the implicit attitudes can be described in three ways in the Turkish context. Firstly, the EU is an institution that does not directly interact with the everyday lives of Turkish citizens. Therefore, Turkish citizens are expected to be reluctant or indifferent towards the subjects related to the EU. Individuals might thus be inclined to project their associations implicitly rather than explicitly. From an attitudinal perspective, this might result in resorting to the implicit associations to reflect their political opinions when asked. Secondly, as previously stated in the literature, nationalistic, territorial inclinations can shape citizens' attitudes towards a more socially desirable political behavior in line with their national identity (Anderson 2019). Implicit association measures are shown to be less prone to such social desirability effects than are the conventional survey methods (Olson and Fazio 2004). Thus, introducing both the implicit measure and the explicit survey items can help reduce this effect to a certain degree.

Even though the introduction of implicit measures into political science research is still recent, Iyengar and Westwood's (2015) study shows that making use of implicit attitudes in explaining political phenomena brings depth to public opinion research. In their study, the authors show that implicit political bias is much more prevalent

than the implicit racial bias. In this day and age, considering that political identities are rooted deeply in societies, implicit associations suggest the possibility of a noteworthy explanation. Pérez (2010) states in his study on attitudes towards immigrants that “implicit attitudes appear to be more group-specific in nature yet nonetheless influential in political decision-making” (Pérez 2010, 539). Other studies also show the influence of implicit attitudes on political behavior, yet it is important to note that the findings of the empirical studies regarding the power of such influence are mixed (see Chapter 4). That is, there is no consensus on which measure is better. Hence the following hypothesis derives from that both measures tap onto the same attitudes, however to differing extents. In general, it can be argued that these two kinds of attitude measures are expected to correlate with each other, but the magnitude of the relationship should not be very high, because a perfect correlation would mean that there is no difference between these two.

H1: The implicit and explicit pro-EU attitudes will show a positive, but moderate correlation.

4.1.1 Hypotheses Regarding the Social Identity Theory’s Propositions

In the previous chapters, it was pointed out that there are issues that are measured from a cognitive perspective such as rational-choice models may not work. As McLaren (2002) puts it, negative or positive attitudes towards the EU may stem from some suppressed emotions of fear of “the Other” and hostility towards an unknown culture rather than rational choice calculations of benefits of the EU. These all make sense if we see the EU as not only a regulatory regional organization but as a “policy-making organism” that enters the daily lives of citizens and impose certain values and identity. From this perspective, the EU may be perceived by many as a threat to their national identities. Therefore, my hypothesis builds on a line of reasoning put forward by Risse (2003) and Carey (2002). Since these studies employ data collected from European citizens, they measure an explicit European identity and hypothesize on a “European identity” while my focus is on the Turkish national identity. I will also examine the relationship between the identification with the Turkish national identity and implicit attitudes towards the EU. The hypotheses regarding national identity are as follows:

H2: As an individual's level of identification with the Turkish national identity increases, his/her scores of explicit attitudes towards the EU decrease.

H3: As the individual's level of identification with the Turkish national identity increases, his/her scores of implicit attitudes towards the EU decrease.

Moreover, the idea that the EU may be perceived by many as a threat to their national identities will be tested by using political party affiliations of Turkish youth, and their implicit and explicit attitudes towards the in-group (i.e., Turkish identity). In general, when compared with the relatively marginal parties (for example, HDP), the Turkish national identity occupies a pivotal position in some parties' political identities and agendas (for example, MHP, CHP, and AKP). Therefore, the EU should be seen as an identity-based threat by those who identify with relatively centrist parties. As it is closely related to the suppressed emotions of fear felt for the "Other", I hypothesize that the implicit in-group favoritism is correlated with the level of identification with the Turkish national identity, especially for the supporters of a political party.

H4: For the supporters of a political party, the level of identification with the Turkish national identity shows a positive and significant correlation with the implicit attitudes towards Turkey.

4.1.2 Hypotheses Regarding the System Justification Tendencies

I also argue that a group of individuals' attitudes towards the EU may change according to their perceptions regarding the status boundaries in the socio-political system of intergroup relations. The System Justification Theory posits that disadvantageous groups tend to legitimize the current systemic hierarchy by exhibiting out-group favoritism, mostly in an implicit form. Because individuals who have a high level of group identification, such as the national identity, tend to favor their in-groups, we can hypothesize that those with a higher level of belongingness to the Turkish national identity show more positive attitudes towards the EU, which is the

out-group in this sense.

Perceptions about inter-group relations not only differ between high and low-status groups but also within both groups. The stability, legitimacy, and permeability simply refer to the perceptions regarding the out-group and the status of inter-group relations. These are expected to depend on an individual's or a group's position within the society. For instance, permeable group boundaries would indicate that social mobility for a disadvantaged group is possible. Therefore, the status relations are permeable. Correspondingly, the stable and legitimate perceptions of the status relations would mean that collective action is unlikely for a lower status group. On the other hand, a higher status group's perception of stability and legitimacy would imply security. The ideological standpoints of the groups are also imperative to better understand such status structures. (Verkuyten and Reijerse 2008)

Therefore, I propose a set of hypotheses regarding the perceptions towards the legitimacy of the EU and permeability of the EU for the Turkish citizens in connection with the explicit and implicit attitudes:

H5: The level of identification with the national identity and system justification tendencies in the forms of perceptions towards the legitimacy and permeability of status and group boundaries between the EU and Turkey are negatively correlated.

H6: Explicit attitudes towards the EU and system justification tendencies in the forms of perceptions towards the legitimacy and permeability of status and group boundaries between the EU and Turkey are positively correlated.

H7: Implicit attitudes towards the EU and system justification tendencies in the forms of perceptions towards the legitimacy and permeability of status and group boundaries between the EU and Turkey are positively correlated.

One of the major goals of political science research is to discover the determinants of political behavior. As mentioned above, the implicit attitudes of individuals have been proposed as an alternative to the conventional methods in capturing the dynamics of political preferences and behavior. In this regard, it would also be important to examine the impact of implicit attitudes on voting behavior. Thus, I also test the relative strength of implicit and explicit attitudes in predicting the preferences of individuals in a hypothetical referendum on Turkey's EU membership.

My hypothesis regarding the relative power of explicit and implicit attitudes in predicting the votes in a potential EU membership referendum is as follows:

H8: Implicit attitudes towards the EU will have a stronger predictive power than the explicit attitudes in predicting EU-related voting behavior.



5. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

The data for this study were collected benefiting from a computer-assisted self-interviewing (CASI) method and a follow-up implicit attitude test (IAT). The field-work for this study was conducted in the spring of 2019 by the researcher and using his two personal computers. A convenience sample of 247 respondents was drawn taking into consideration the participants' ages and party affiliations. The parties were chosen according to the parliamentary representation of the parties of which they are members of youth organizations, and the universities were chosen to conduct comparable numbers of interviews from both private and public colleges. 88.26% of respondents in our sample are students, consisting of undergraduate and master's students, while the rest are recent university graduates. The participants filled an online questionnaire, which included several explicit EU attitudes, partisanship, and nationalism items. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to take the IAT first, then the online-questionnaire, whereas the other half took the online-questionnaire first. In total, 247 interviews were rated as of sufficient quality and used in the analyses.

The online survey asks individual participants to evaluate the policy positions of parties regarding the European Union. Since no single EU-attitude scale commonly employed in cross-national studies is used to measure individuals' attitudes toward the EU, I used the set of questions from the latest Eurobarometer dataset that was conducted in Turkey with Turkish citizens and was translated to Turkish (European Commission 2009). In the questionnaire, various questions focus on the different aspects of EU-Turkey relations and individual attitudes toward the EU. I included questions that can gauge political support for the EU, as well. These questions include the evaluation of the EU's policy positions on some of the controversial issues in Turkey, such as the death penalty and education in mother-tongue.

Given that the Eurobarometer questionnaire did not include any questions about a possible referendum on Turkey's EU membership, I took the referendum question from the Eurobarometer survey of (2003). The question's wording is as follows: "If there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of Turkey's membership of


the European Union, would you personally vote for or against it?” I believe it is a very convenient survey item to assess this study’s main hypothesis that “[i]mplicit attitudes towards the EU will have a stronger predictive power than the explicit attitudes towards the EU in EU-related voting behavior.”

Demographic questions, nationalist attitudes, and political preferences of the participants were the other items in the questionnaire. The questionnaire also included items aiming to measure respondents’ knowledge about the EU and EU-related policies that are adopted or to be adopted by Turkey. To such end, I made use of the The Comparative Study of Electoral System (CSES 2018) Module 4’s demography and party identification questions and International Social Survey Program’s (ISSP 2013) national identity questions. The questionnaires for both studies were available in Turkish.

5.1 Sample

As noted above, the sample includes university students and members of the youth branches of the four main legislative parties by employing a non-probability sampling technique –i.e., convenience and purposive sampling. Participants from universities were selected from the undergraduate and first-year graduate students of Sabanci University, Uludag University, and Canakkale 18 Mart University (N=159) who volunteered to take part in the study. These universities were chosen to ensure that the sample includes students of both private and public universities. Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the sample by universities and party youth members.

Figure 5.1 Political Party and University Sub-samples



Student samples do not always bear, or project partisan attitudes required for this study's goals, hence, the second half of the sample consists of the members of Turkish political parties' youth branches. The second half of the sample consisted of the members of four main political parties' youth branches (AKP, CHP, MHP, and HDP; N=128) who were contacted with the help of the chairs of these branches. The parties were chosen by taking account of legislative parties at the time of the institutional review board application for survey data collection. As the legal age limits for the youth-branch members of the parties range between 18 and 30, the same criterion was also used for selecting the university sample. Party youth wings were selected as the sample group because of their convenience and higher likelihood of projecting partisan attitudes.

The ages of the participants range from 18 to 30 with a mean of 22.8 and a standard deviation of 2.26. (For women, mean=22.6, SD=2.08; for men, mean=22.96, SD=2.4). Excluding the university sample, 31 of 128 participants were AKP members, 33 were CHP members, 32 were HDP members, and 32 were MHP members.

Note that, during the post-survey adjustment phase, a total of three participants who scored below the accuracy rate of .35 in the BIAT were dropped from the sample. The analyses were thus conducted using a sample consisting of a total of 247 people.

Table 5.1 Summary Statistics of Main Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
EU Referendum Vote Choice	0.685	0.465	0	1	213
Pro EU Attitudes	3.423	0.872	1.167	5	247
EU IAT Score	-0.265	0.547	-1.402	1.143	247
EU Policy Support	5.951	2.581	0	10	243
Stability	3.206	0.796	1.333	5	243
Legitimacy	3.06	1.071	1	5	246
Permeability	3.111	1.073	1	5	247
National Identity	2.986	1.009	1	5	247
Ideology	4.485	3.026	0	10	233

5.2 Data Collection Tools

The research was conducted using the personal computers of the researcher. Therefore, a Computer-Assisted Self-Interviewing (CASI) software, SurveyMonkey, was used as the intermediary to gather information from participants online and an additional program is used to measure implicit attitudes. The computer program is called “Inquisit”, which is specifically designed to measure implicit favoritism. In our study, it is designed to measure the favoritism between Turkey, and the European Union.

The questions and scales that were utilized during the research included demographic and party identification questions, national identity scale (ISSP 2013), Stability, Legitimacy and Permeability Scale (Mummendey et al. 1999, 267), and the set of questions drawn from the Eurobarometer surveys to measure various EU-related attitudes and preferences. The psychometric attributes of the scales in the questionnaire are explained in detail in the next subsections.

5.2.1 Computer Assisted Self-Interviewing (CASI)

Computer Assisted Self-Interviewing (CASI) questionnaires present survey items to individual participants on computer monitors or device screens. The participants use keyboards or touch-screens of their devices. CASI questionnaires are usually administered using specialized software or online intermediaries that are programmed

to present survey items and record the answers of individual respondents. CASI is widely used given the recent advancements in technological tools and devices. With CASI, recorded answers are easily translated into statistical formats and exported as numeric responses. The CASI tool used in this study is SurveyMonkey. This tool translates the data into a statistical format that is readable by software such as STATA, Excel, or SPSS. The use of SurveyMonkey requires a computer and the purchase of the software (Brown, Vanable, and Eriksen 2008).

There are many advantages of CASIs over traditional paper-and-pencil surveys or face-to-face interviews. In a survey such as ours that involves complex and intertwined responses, it is important to minimize the extra unnecessary information. Moreover, it is much faster and reliable if the respondent is not distracted by irrelevant questions. The computerized method makes it easier to branch questions, assign logic related answers, and reduce worry with consistency checks. It is also important to add that assessments made by CASI can increase the participant's conception that her answers and especially sensitive information remain confidential. This may enhance the perception that information remains confidential because the researcher does not guide the process and cannot easily view the respondent's answers.

5.2.2 Implicit Association Test (IAT)

The implicit association test (IAT) is designed by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998, 1464) to study the implicit attitudes of individuals. It is argued in related literature that these attitudes are unconsciously formed, yet can automatically affect individual behavior (Greenwald et al. 2009). In studies that utilize the IAT procedure, respondents are asked to categorize stimulants (images or words) into two target categories in the fastest time possible with the least errors. After the completion of a block, two items are paired with an attribute category and the respondent is asked to pair these items with previously assigned positive or negative attribute categories. This proceeds interchangeably throughout seven blocks of pairings. Finally, the latencies are calculated and the mean latency rates of the pairings of each attribute, and target item are subtracted to calculate the implicit association (Hofmann et al. 2005). The IAT's theoretical background, procedure, and advantages were explained in detail in Chapter 4.

The IAT test used in this study is a brief version. Given that the full version of

the IAT takes more than 15 minutes to conduct, the brief version (called BIAT) is found more convenient and appropriate for the task at hand. The brief version measures the exact, same association with fewer trials and is also a validated method. I measure implicit association toward the EU or Turkey by using the implicit partisan effect BIAT that Iyengar and Westwood (2015) initially created. I change the images and words used by the partisan BIAT with EU- and Turkey-related images, and positive and negative stimulus words in Turkish. To such end, I use the template of the partisan BIAT, because it also uses similar, contradictory concepts (Democrat vs. Republican) to measure association in the US. I chose the images of the EU and Turkey from the most popular, copyright-free images. “European Union” and “Turkey” were the keywords searched via Google Images, and four different images were chosen from among the most popular images on the first page of results. The words are the same as those used in Iyengar and Westwood’s research, which are also the standard ones also used by the Harvard Implicit Project (<https://implicit.harvard.edu>). However, after the feedback I received throughout the pilot phase of the study, I decided to change target categories’ names from “Good” and “Bad” to “Positive” and “Negative.” The instructions and commands are also translated to Turkish. The images, words, and instructions employed in this study are presented in Appendix A. The IAT was conducted using the “Inquisit 4 Lab” computer software. The program presents a “D-score” after each test. The scores are calculated according to the latency differences of the pairings made by each individual participant.

5.3 Questionnaire and Scales


5.3.1 EU-Attitude and Issue Specific Questions

To measure citizens’ explicit attitudes toward the EU, I respected the question wordings in the Eurobarometer survey, which asked respondents to report their perceptions and about their knowledge about the EU. Eurobarometer is considered the gold standard in EU public opinion research. I utilized the questions from the

latest available Eurobarometer questionnaire on Turkey, which is the 2009 Spring version (European Commission 2009).

To measure support for the EU, Eurobarometer includes a battery of questions. The question items in the questionnaire are often asked as a battery to assess what previous studies usually refers to as the “attitudes towards the EU”. Unlike the previous Eurobarometer surveys, the latest one does not ask the referendum question, which is used as a dependent variable in this study. The latest Eurobarometer, on the other hand, aims to measure individuals’ perceptions toward the EU in many different dimensions, whereas this study only focuses on the basic battery on pro-EU attitudes and certain issue-specific attitudes questions. Each EU attitude battery item is presented to the participant on a five (5) point Likert scale (1= “I totally disagree”; 5= “I totally agree”). The issue-related evaluation questions are on an (11) eleven-point scale (0=“Totally Disagree agree”; 10= “Totally Agree”). The questions are listed in the Appendix B.

Figure 5.2 Scree Plot of the Factor Solution of the EU Attitude Scale



Pro-EU attitude questions were first analyzed via factor analysis. The items were highly correlated and loaded onto a single factor with an Eigenvalue score of 3.31. Figure 5.2 shows the loading on the single factor. The Cronbach’s alpha (scale) reliability score is .82 for the Pro-EU attitude scale. For the questions on the EU knowledge, the items loaded on a single factor as well with an Eigenvalue score of


3.30 and scale reliability of .83.

5.3.2 ISSP National Identity Scale

The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is an annual survey program that conducts cross-national surveys on various topics. ISSP's (2013) "National Identity III" module is the latest national identity module of the program (that includes Turkey). The module includes a comprehensive battery of questions on relevant socio-political topics ranging from group-membership to political participation. Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu (Çarkoğlu 2014) present their findings from Turkey, which included Turkish translations of the commonly used questionnaire. The study provides us a series of items on nationalism, citizenship and national identity out of which I use the national identity-battery in this study.

The questions in the ISSP's National Identity module also included a set of questions on group-membership and perceptions on the different dimensions of Turkish identity. Since our main aim in asking these questions is to measure national identity as a form of social identity, survey items on other topics such as political efficacy, social trust, immigration, and many others were not taken into account. Once again, each item is presented to the respondents using a five (5) point Likert scale (1= "Disagree Strongly"; 5= "Agree Strongly").

Figure 5.3 Scree Plot of the Factor Solution of the National Identity Scale




The questions were later subjected to a principal component analysis as a six-item scale. As shown in the Figure 5.3, the questions loaded onto a single factor with an Eigenvalue score of 2.72 and with a Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient of .83.

5.3.3 Status Stability, Status Legitimacy, and Group Permeability Scale

In order to examine the perceptions of Turkish youth about the relationship between Turkey and the EU, Mummendey and her colleagues' (1999) "Status Stability, Legitimacy, and Permeability Scale" was used in this study. The scale measures individuals' perceptions towards the stability, legitimacy, and permeability of the status relationships of their own group with the help of a total of nine items (three items for each of stability, legitimacy, permeability). Each item is presented to the respondents on a five (5) point Likert scale (i.e., 1= "Totally Disagree" to 5= "Totally Agree"). I adjusted Verkuyten and Reijerse's (2008) Turkish translation of the Mummendey's scale, used in a study focusing on the stability, legitimacy, and permeability perceptions of the Turkish and Dutch people in the Netherlands. The principal components analysis on the nine items of the scale reveals a two-factored

structure with Eigenvalues higher than one. But as expected, three other questions load onto a third factor that has an Eigenvalue value of .96. It is important to note that, these three factors explain in turn 42%, 33%, and 23% of the total variance. In line with the scree plot below, we can thus conclude that our findings are in line with the theoretical expectations and findings in previous literature.

Figure 5.4 Scree Plot of the Factor Solution of the Stability, Legitimacy and Permeability Scales



These subscales' reliability analyses show that their Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients are in turn .54 for "Stability", .69 for "Legitimacy," and .77 for "Permeability." The reliability coefficients are lower than ideal, especially for the "Stability" subscale. The reason is possibly related to the low number of questions used to construct each scale (three for each). However, previous studies encountered similar values, which were then used to construct the examined subscales (Mummendey et al. 1999, 269). In this regard, rather than constructing a single scale I employ these subscales separately in the empirical analyses.

5.3.4 Control Variables

Several control variables are included in the analyses to capture individual-level, demographic determinants of voting behavior. I control for “Gender”, which is coded as a binary variable marking female respondents. The distribution of gender within the sample is close to ideal. From 247 participants, 131 (52.8%) are male and 116 (47.2%) are female.

One of our main control variables is political ideology. In order to measure it, we asked respondents to place themselves on an eleven-point scale ranging from “Left (0)” to “Right (10)”. The mean of our sample is 4.48 with a standard deviation of 3.02.

Education is another control variable. It is an ordinal variable, ranging from 1 (Illiterate/No formal education) to 9 (Doctorate complete). However, considering that most respondents are university students, I do not expect any significant association between education level and the variables of interest because of the lack of variation.

Income is also included among the control variables given that our sample includes both public and private university students, and youth branch members. The descriptive statistics show that there is sufficient variation in the sample. Moreover, previous research suggests that income is related to individuals’ attitudes towards the EU.

Participants’ religiosity levels were asked in the survey study as well. The wording of the question was as follows: “Regardless of how many times you attend to religious service, to what extent do you define yourself religious?” The question was asked on a 4-point scale ranging from (0) “Not at all religious”, (1) “Not very religious”, (2) “Somewhat religious” to (3) “Very religious”. The summary statistics of the control variables are in the Appendix C (Table C.2 and C.3).

5.4 Data Collection Process

Before the data collection process, the present study was reviewed by the Sabanci University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) and approved by the Ethics Committee on April 13, 2019. Following the official approval, the data collection process started in May 2019 and was finished in June 2019.

Participation was voluntary, and participants were not compensated in any form.

After informing each participant about the research ethics and procedure, and getting their consent, the researcher arranged interview dates for each participant. Participants were provided with a silent office environment to fill the questionnaire and take the BIAT test.

This procedure was, however, somewhat different for the youth branch members. Given that each member was close to a different local municipality branch, by getting the approval of party officials, the same environment was created in an appropriate office in party buildings. Before the data collection, each participant was provided with an “Information Approval Form” that includes information on the research’s topic and rights of the participants. After the participant read and approved the form by signing it, the procedure was initiated by the researcher. Each participant completed the questionnaires and tests individually and took approximately 20 minutes in total.

As mentioned above, the data collection tools were presented to the participants in random order to minimize and balance any effects that could arise from their ordering. This practice is important considering that the ordering could affect the nature of the automatic cognitive process measured by the IAT.¹ The instructions, executional steps of the BIAT, and questionnaire are provided in Appendices A and B.


5.5 Empirical Findings

First, I start by assessing the correlation between implicit and explicit measures. The correlation between the implicit and explicit score is moderate but statistically significant in the full sample (Pearson’s $r = .416$, $p < 0.001$; $N = 247$) and similar to previous studies. Table 5.2 shows the correlations in the effective sample, which is higher than those reported in Appendix C (Table C.1) ($r = .459$, $N = 202$ for the full sample; using pairwise deletion of cases with missing information).

Figure 5.5 shows the relationship between implicit and explicit EU attitudes in the full sample. The dashed line shows the lowess smoother. Markers are jittered to

¹We conducted a “One-Way ANOVA” analysis to find out if there were any effects that arose from the ordering. The significance level ($F = 1.25$, $p = .45$) is below 0.05. and, therefore, there is not a statistically significant difference in the ordering of the independent variable.

Figure 5.5 The Relationship between Explicit and Implicit Attitudes



show the distribution more clearly. As stated in the previous sections, weak explicit attitudes may correlate with strong implicit attitudes. Hence, a disassociation between implicit and explicit attitudes is not unexpected. However, the figure shows that there is not a substantial disassociation as expected. Still, we see observations where implicit attitudes are strong while explicit attitudes are weak. On the other hand, the markers colored according to reported partisan identification of respondents do not show any readily observable patterns.

Figure 5.6 The Bivariate Relationship between Implicit EU Attitudes and Vote Choice




Figure 5.6 shows the bivariate relationship between the implicit EU attitudes and the EU referendum vote choices. The table suggests a positive relationship between the variables. The positive implicit EU attitude scores mostly associate with the support for the EU membership, whereas the negative implicit EU attitude scores completely associate with the opposing vote choices. The degree of association suggests that the vote choice may be predicted from the IAT scores.

I then test the eighth hypothesis. To test which attitudinal measure has a stronger predictive power, I use a logistic regression where the dependent variable is “EU Referendum Vote Choice”. To reiterate, the survey item is as follows: “If there were to be a referendum today on the question of Turkey’s membership to the European Union, would you personally vote for or against it?”. The variable is binary and takes following values: “0= I would vote against it”, and “1= I would vote for it.”. In

Table 5.2 Correlations of the Main Independent Variables for the Effective Sample

Variables	Explicit EU Attitudes	Implicit EU Attitudes	EU Policy Support	Legitimacy	Permeability	National Identity	Political Ideology	Weak Partisan	Strong Partisan
Explicit EU Attitudes	1.000								
Implicit EU Score	0.459* [202]	1.000							
EU Policy Support	0.681* [202]	0.422* [202]	1.000						
Legitimacy	0.437* [202]	0.312* [202]	0.403* [202]	1.000					
Permeability	0.290* [202]	0.137 [202]	0.183* [202]	0.138 [202]	1.000				
National Identity	-0.633* [202]	-0.378* [202]	-0.618* [202]	-0.545* [202]	-0.134 [202]	1.000			
Political Ideology	-0.563* [202]	-0.363* [202]	-0.570* [202]	-0.474* [202]	-0.132 [202]	0.666* [202]	1.000		
Weak Partisan	-0.023 [202]	0.068 [202]	-0.014 [202]	-0.051 [202]	-0.102 [202]	0.045 [202]	-0.023 [202]	1.000	
Strong Partisan	-0.261* [202]	-0.082 [202]	-0.244* [202]	-0.182* [202]	-0.186* [202]	0.259* [202]	0.188* [202]	0.385* [202]	1.000

*p < 0.05 (Two-tailed) Note: Correlations are computed by pairwise deletion; numbers in brackets show the valid N's for each correlation.

order to assess each main independent variable's effect individually, I estimate three separate models on voting behavior in a hypothetical referendum. In the first model, I look to the bivariate relationship between the implicit attitudes and potential EU referendum vote. In the second model, I look to the effect of the explicit attitudes on the potential EU referendum vote. In the third model, I included both implicit and explicit measures to assess their relative predictive powers on the dependent variable. Lastly, the fourth model includes explicit and implicit measures along with the demographic control variables.

For the main analysis of this study, we continue with the second hypothesis. To explain the potential membership referendum for the EU, we analyze whether the implicit or explicit EU attitudes explain a higher percentage of the total variation in intended vote choice. Overall, respondents had slightly higher pro-EU attitudes than Euroskeptical attitudes ($M=3.4$, $SD=.87$). In general, respondents support EU-related policy changes in Turkish domestic policy as well ($M= 5.95$, $SD=2.58$). The mean value for the dependent variable of vote choice is .685 ($SD= .465$), meaning that Turkish youth would support the EU membership if a referendum takes place in the future (see Appendix C (Table C.2)) for detailed summary statistics). Even though this study does not have a representative sample, these results correlate with the recent major public opinion studies' findings (European Commission 2009; Kadir Has University 2017). Table 5.3 shows the logistic regression estimates on the voting behavior in a potential referendum.

The likelihood ratio test suggests that the first model, replacing the implicit with the explicit attitudes, provides a better fit to the data than does the second model. The third model is the combined model that includes both implicit and explicit measures as the independent variables. In Model 3, only the explicit attitudes are significant predictors of voting behavior. The combined model's fit does not show any significant increase compared to the first model. The addition of the control variables does not change the overall significance of explicit attitudes either. Implicit attitudes toward the EU remain insignificant. Control variables also do not enhance the fit of the model drastically (Log likelihood= -54.866787). Put differently, neither the implicit attitudes nor the control variables could not predict the vote choice of the Turkish youth. After controlling for implicit attitudes, the correctly classified cases ratio does not change (86.38%). These results suggest that implicit measures are redundant in this analysis when explicit measures are included.

Similar to previous studies, our additive model shows that the explicit measure has higher predictive power. While the implicit attitudes in the implicit-only model

Table 5.3 Logistic Regressions on Intended Vote Choice in a EU Membership Referendum

	Explicit Model	Implicit Model	Combined Model	Control Model
Explicit EU Attitudes	2.989*** (0.553)		2.968*** (0.566)	3.169*** (0.589)
Implicit EU Attitudes		0.599 (0.433)	0.402 (0.543)	0.108 (0.586)
EU Policy Support	0.200 (0.133)	0.501*** (0.105)	0.166 (0.137)	0.291* (0.165)
Political Ideology	0.0764 (0.134)	0.125 (0.111)	0.0987 (0.137)	0.112 (0.146)
AKP	1.503 (0.998)	-1.332* (0.752)	1.646 (1.008)	1.502 (1.049)
CHP	0.436 (0.768)	0.968 (0.647)	0.304 (0.786)	0.665 (0.820)
MHP	-0.147 (0.906)	-0.854 (0.771)	0.120 (0.959)	-0.257 (0.988)
HDP	0.124 (0.871)	-0.151 (0.758)	-0.206 (0.926)	-0.415 (0.923)
National Identity			-0.334 (0.343)	-0.543 (0.391)
Income				-0.152 (0.124)
Gender(Female)				-1.355* (0.660)
Age				-0.0363 (0.116)
Religiosity				0.267 (0.239)
Constant	-10.82*** (1.980)	-2.309** (0.994)	-9.467*** (2.321)	-7.711** (3.651)
<i>N</i>	202	202	202	202
Log likelihood	-58.574	-83.506	-57.867	-54.867
<i>AIC</i>	133.1	183.0	135.7	137.7
<i>BIC</i>	159.6	209.5	168.8	184.0

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

predicted voting behavior significantly on its own, in the combined model they do not affect the vote decision. Moreover, the inclusion of the variable increases the log-likelihood marginally.

To test the hypotheses related to the propositions of social identity theory, Turkish national identity's relationships with the explicit and implicit attitudes were examined from the correlation results in Table 5.2. As expected, the level of identification with the Turkish national identity exhibited significant negative correlations with the explicit ($r = -.633$, $p < 0.001$) and the implicit ($r = -.378$, $p < 0.001$) pro-EU attitudes. These findings provide tentative support for hypotheses 2 and 3 by showing

that, as the identification with the Turkish national identity increases, the support for the EU decreases. The findings point to that individuals with a higher level of identification with the Turkish national identity can be expected to be more inclined to have negative and Euroskeptic attitudes, whereas individuals with a lower level of identification tend to have more pro-EU attitudes.

Given that the measure of implicit attitudes has a scale ranging from -2 to +2, it is important to note that it simultaneously measures the attitudes towards Turkey as well. On the continuum, the pole of “-2” corresponds to a full association with Turkey, while the pole of “+2” corresponds to a full association with the EU. Since the measure produces estimates for both sides of the continuum, it is possible to evaluate the scores concerning the implicit attitudes towards Turkey as well. Therefore, it was hypothesized that mass political parties in Turkey are attached to certain dimensions of the Turkish national identity and followers of these parties may project positive implicit attitudes towards Turkey. Therefore, these implicit attitudes are expected to be strongly correlated with higher levels of identification with the Turkish national identity for political party supporters.

The correlation analysis show that, implicit attitudes has no significant correlation with the Turkish national identity for supporters of each political party within our sample. The reason may be the small sample sizes for each party. When the analysis is conducted on the partisan sample ($N=213$), we see a negative and significant overall correlation ($r=-.363$, $p<0.001$) (see Appendix C (Table C.8)). Furthermore, when the same correlation analysis is conducted for the individuals who responded only “Very close” to their closeness to a party on the questionnaire ($n=138$), the correlation between explicit EU attitudes and national identity shows the highest negative correlation. However, even for those strong partisans, explicit attitudes show a much higher negative correlation ($p=-.65$, $p<.001$) than the implicit measure ($p=-.39$, $p<.001$), whereas the negative correlation of pro-EU attitudes and national identity scores is significant for both measures.

Consequently, we fail to reject the null for our fourth hypothesis for all the political parties we examine. However, the partisan sample as a whole shows a strong correlation in regards to national identity and implicit attitudes. All in all, we can suggest that for individuals with high levels of partisanship, national identity and implicit attitudes are somewhat related.

The hypotheses regarding the relationships between the explicit and implicit attitudes towards the out-groups and the legitimacy of the inter-group status hierarchies were tested via correlation analyses. First of all, as a reminder, the results above show that (Table 5.2), as our first hypothesis suggests, explicit and implicit attitude

scores have a significant, but moderate positive relationship ($r=.459$, $p < .001$). This finding supports the conceptual distinction between explicit and implicit measures by showing that, even though these two methods measure the same attitude, they cannot be seen as merely the same measure. Therefore, there is some merit to use them simultaneously in search of the dynamics behind social behaviors, including the political ones.

Secondly, the explicit attitudes exhibit significant positive correlations with the perceptions towards the legitimacy of the status boundaries between the EU and Turkey ($r= .437$, $p<0.001$). That is, as participants perceive the status boundaries as legitimate, they tend to have positive explicit attitudes towards the EU. Similarly, as the participants see the status boundaries between the EU and Turkey as permeable, they tend to have positive explicit attitudes towards the EU ($r=.290$, $p<0.001$). These findings provide support for our sixth hypothesis. As for the implicit attitudes, the findings show that these attitudes are positively and significantly correlated with the legitimacy of status boundaries ($r=.312$, $p<0.001$). However, even though the correlation between the implicit attitudes and the permeability is positive, it does not reach statistical significance ($r= .137$). Therefore, hypothesis 7 is not supported.

In light of these findings, it can be concluded that the individuals who perceive the status quo as legitimate, tend to have more pro-EU attitudes, in both implicit and explicit forms. However, the perceptions towards the permeability of the status boundaries are only correlated significantly with the explicit EU attitudes. Adding to that, to find out which measure is a stronger predictor of the legitimacy and permeability of the status boundaries between the EU and Turkey, I apply an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. I examine strong-partisan, weak-partisan, and non-partisan groups to see if partisanship affects the understanding of the status relations between the EU and Turkey. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the OLS regression estimates.

Table 5.4 The Effects of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes on the Legitimacy of the Status Boundaries between the EU and Turkey

	Non-Partisans	Weak Partisans	Strong Partisans	Total
Explicit EU Attitudes	0.019 (0.321)	0.335 (0.196)	0.035 (0.114)	0.149 (0.090)
Implicit EU Attitudes	-0.090 (0.351)	0.172 (0.224)	0.289* (0.161)	0.232* (0.119)
National Identity	-0.066 (0.213)	-0.300* (0.162)	-0.537*** (0.101)	-0.426*** (0.076)
Income	0.055 (0.093)	0.022 (0.048)	0.023 (0.041)	0.030 (0.029)
Gender(Female)	-0.185 (0.319)	-0.551** (0.238)	0.035 (0.175)	-0.186 (0.123)
Religiosity	-0.117 (0.129)	-0.045 (0.088)	0.031 (0.066)	-0.013 (0.047)
Constant	2.869 (1.830)	2.977*** (1.110)	4.284*** (0.777)	3.641*** (0.579)
<i>N</i>	37	71	138	246
<i>R</i> ²	0.121	0.301	0.362	0.303

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The OLS estimates show that the effect of implicit attitudes on the legitimacy of the status boundaries between Turkey and the EU is conditional on the strength of individual respondents' partisan attitudes. Firstly, Table 5.4 shows that for non-partisans, none of the variables are significant predictors of legitimacy. For weak partisans, national identity and explicit EU attitudes explain legitimacy significantly, while other variables except for gender fail to do so. For strong partisans, national identity's effect is both statistically and substantively significant. Implicit attitudes are also statistically significant predictors for the dependent variable. Explicit attitudes remain insignificant for each of the three groups.

Table 5.5 shows the estimates on the perceptions towards the permeability of the status boundaries. The regression estimates suggest that only explicit EU attitudes predict permeability of the status boundaries between the EU and Turkey, for each level of partisanship. For non-partisans, none of the variables explain the permeability perceptions. Explicit attitudes are statistically and substantively significant for both strong and weak partisans.

The findings from the additional regression analyses reported in models entitled "total" in Table 5.4 that, in the full sample, participants' perceptions towards the legitimacy of the status boundaries between the EU and Turkey could also be predicted by their level of identification with the national identity and their implicit

Table 5.5 The Effects of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes on the Permeability of the Status Boundaries between the EU and Turkey

	Non-Partisans	Weak Partisans	Strong Partisans	Total
Explicit EU Attitudes	0.052 (0.387)	0.496** (0.227)	0.363*** (0.132)	0.395*** (0.104)
Implicit EU Attitudes	0.068 (0.417)	0.019 (0.259)	0.050 (0.185)	-0.011 (0.137)
National Identity	0.281 (0.263)	0.212 (0.188)	0.103 (0.116)	0.105 (0.088)
Income	0.076 (0.116)	0.005 (0.056)	-0.017 (0.047)	-0.001 (0.033)
Gender(Female)	0.298 (0.399)	-0.150 (0.276)	-0.198 (0.202)	-0.062 (0.141)
Religiosity	-0.168 (0.154)	0.026 (0.102)	-0.022 (0.076)	-0.022 (0.054)
Constant	1.697 (2.268)	0.858 (1.285)	1.762* (0.893)	1.531** (0.668)
<i>N</i>	38	71	138	247
<i>R</i> ²	0.068	0.095	0.081	0.077

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

attitudes. However, only the explicit attitudes were able to explain the variation in the permeability scores, as seen in Table 5.5, in the full sample.

With regard to the partisan attitudes of participants, we came across with a rather different and interesting pattern that neither the social identity nor the implicit and explicit attitudes were able to explain significant variation in the legitimacy and permeability scores of non-partisans, whereas the national identity and the implicit attitudes explain an important part of the variation in strong partisans' perceptions about the legitimacy of status boundaries. To reiterate, for the weak partisans, it was only the national identity that explained their legitimacy scores whereas their permeability scores were predicted only by their explicit pro-EU attitudes.

The findings for the strong partisans imply that perceptions towards the EU are shaped especially by their identifications with the national identity and subconscious attitudes towards the EU. We believe that these findings can be seen as additional evidence pointing to the importance of implicit attitudes in the issue of the EU-Turkey relationship.

6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The main aim of this study is to examine the extent to which their implicit and explicit attitudes towards the EU would influence the voting behavior of Turkish youth in a possible referendum for Turkey's membership to the EU. The impact of these different sorts of attitudes on vote choice was assessed based on a series of hypotheses derived from two rival social psychological theories, namely social identity, and system justification theories. Both theories aim to explain inter-group relations. As mentioned above, social identity theory focuses on the possibility of change in social hierarchies, whereas system justification theory aims to explain why such hierarchies tend to stay stable and legitimate. Using these rival explanations allow us to study the elusive dynamics of Turkish people's perceptions about the relationship between the EU and Turkey. As this relationship can be characterized by some periods of stability and sudden changes over the course of Turkey's candidacy, such theoretical frameworks are valuable in understanding the volatile nature of the public opinion on this matter.

First of all, it should be noted that even in this period of deteriorating relations, the support for the EU membership in this study's sample of Turkish youth is still high. Although the sample is not a representative one, it would not be completely wrong to evaluate this finding as a good sign for the future of the EU-Turkey relationship. However, the empirical analyses in our study point to that, even though the overall support is high, there is still considerable variance in Turkish youth's attitudes towards the EU. This necessitates a detailed analysis of their preferences in the long run. It is obvious that such an analysis should include political and social psychological variables measured simultaneously, preferably coupled with a strong theoretical framework.

The findings of the present study suggest that the Turkish national identity occupies a pivotal place in shaping the perceptions and preferences of Turkish youth towards the EU. As the level of the identification of the youth with the Turkish national identity increases, both the explicit and implicit pro-EU attitudes tend to decrease. Given the well-known prominence of the national identities as political

leverage in nearly all political systems of the world, this finding may not come as a surprise. It is possible to note that national identity helps an individual categorize himself/herself in the dichotomy of “us” and “other”, as long suggested by social identity theoreticians.

Broadly speaking, our findings point to that perceptions and attitudes of the Turkish youth towards the EU are largely formed based on national identity. Therefore, it would be plausible to expect that they would be quite sensitive to any change in the discourse on the EU in everyday politics. Any attempt by political elites that makes the distinction between the Turkish national identity and the EU more salient would strengthen the “us” and “them” dichotomy and, consequently, reduce the support to the EU. I believe such attempts that are encountered frequently in daily politics are one of the factors that keep the level of support low. Turkish youth for whom their national identity is more prevalent perceive the EU as the “other” or an out-group. This finding is in line with the popular expression that the EU is perceived by the Turkish public as a “Christian club.” However, the findings regarding the effect of implicit attitudes on pro-EU attitudes suggest that a highly valued national identity seems to be deeply rooted in the minds of individuals even at an unconscious level.

One way of overcoming potential problems associated with this finding can be suggested by using the social identity theory’s basic propositions. For the proponents of this theory, the cognitive process of social categorization creates prejudice and discrimination between groups, as it enhances the differences between the in- and out-groups. If members of rival groups could be able to categorize themselves under the same categories, their perceptions towards each other would be more positive. By differentiating between three levels of self-categorization (personal, group, and humanity), Turner 1999 suggested that categorizing the self and the other into the category of humanity would decrease the negative effects of divisive social categorization. Therefore, the content of political discourse is very decisive for individuals to develop positive perceptions and attitudes towards the “other”. To my knowledge, the present study is the first attempt to show that Turkish people’s perceptions towards the EU may have an automatic, unconscious form, as well as an explicit form frequently measured in survey research.

I was able to show that this was also the case with the followers of the political parties that are known for their use of the national identity as an anchor for shaping their political identities. The study’s sample included supporters of four legislative Turkish political parties –AKP, CHP, MHP, and HDP. Partisan identification with the AKP, CHP, and MHP are positively correlated with a positive national identity, whereas, as expected, we find a negative correlation for HDP support-

ers. As the Turkish national identity is not a defining feature in HDP's political identity, this finding may be evaluated as yet another supporting evidence for our argument. Another important finding was regarding the differences partisanship brings to attitudes. It is shown that strong partisans demonstrate more implicit and national-identity based decisions rather than conscious, rational ones. As implicit scores show the degree of association with the Turkish identity as well, based on these findings one can state that it is possible to expect that national identities will remain at the center of the stability of the possible schism between the publics of the EU and Turkey.

The most important finding of the present study is about the examination of the basic determinants of the vote choice of the Turkish youth in a possible referendum for Turkey's membership to the EU. The findings from the regression analysis of voting intentions of respondents show that implicit attitudes, only when entered alone in the equation, were able to predict significant variance in voting preferences. That is, as respondents with more positive implicit attitudes towards the EU tend to vote in favor of the membership. However, the effect of implicit attitudes disappear when explicit pro-EU attitudes were introduced to the regression model (with or without other control variables of gender, income, and religiosity), suggesting that explicit attitudes are much more powerful in predicting electoral behavior. Similar findings regarding the relatively stronger explanatory power of explicit attitudes than the implicit ones were also presented in other research (Maier et al. 2015; Raccuia 2016; Theodoridis 2017). Nonetheless, I believe the finding that implicit attitudes explain significant variance in the dependent variable alone is a promising finding for future research.

Both social identity and system justification theories assume that individuals try to understand the complexity of social systems by developing some general explanations regarding the nature of those systems. Perceptions about the status boundaries between advantaged and disadvantaged groups in terms of their legitimacy, stability, and permeability constitute the bases of the general beliefs about the social structure. The empirical findings regarding the relationship between perceptions towards the social system and the national identity suggest that, as Turkish youth have positive explicit pro-EU attitudes, they tend to perceive the status boundaries as legitimate and permeable. A somewhat similar pattern was observed concerning the effect of implicit attitudes at a subconscious level.

Our findings point out that the main phenomenon of interest in the system justification theory (i.e., implicit out-group favoritism) has strong relevance in explaining Turkish youth's perceptions towards the EU-Turkey relationship, together with that

of the social identity theory (i.e., identification with the in-group). In line with the propositions of the system justification theory, implicit pro-EU attitudes help explain perceptions of the legitimacy of the status boundaries between the EU and Turkey. This finding implies that if the respondent perceives the EU positively, it is quite likely that s/he would see the status inequalities as legitimate.

It is quite clear that such an evaluation of the inequalities run counter to the common-sense explanation of the issue, as it implies that one may think or behave against the interests of his/her in-group. The originality of the system justification theory's propositions comes into the picture here: as the system justification theoreticians Jost, Banaji Nosek (2004) put it, theories emphasizing the importance of in-group favoritism ("group justification theories", including social identity theory) fail to cover the importance of out-group favoritism that function as an individual-level factor in maintaining the inequalities in social systems. As individuals have a basic tendency to justify the illegitimate and unjust nature of status boundaries, they also tend to favor powerful and advantaged out-groups over their disadvantaged in-groups. In the context of the EU-Turkey relationship, this explanation seems relevant at least for some individuals: those who do not identify with their in-group (the Turkish national identity) tend to view the EU in a positive light by exhibiting implicit favoritism towards the out-group. The findings demonstrating that implicit pro-EU attitudes have a significant negative relationship with the level of identification with the national identity provide empirical support for this conclusion.

This study is a mere attempt to go beyond the limits of descriptive analyses of Turkish youth's attitudes towards the EU. Unlike most of the previous research, we focus on vote choices of Turkish youth by informing our expectations by prominent social-psychological theories. Another important contribution of this study to literature comes from its use of explicit and implicit measures simultaneously. Our findings suggest that there is merit in utilizing the two types of attitude measures in examining EU support. A rather indirect contribution to the relevant literature is the finding regarding the relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes: a moderate correlation between these two measures implies that these variables are associated with different aspects of the same attitude. However, the size of the correlation is not large enough to warrant that they are the same. The existence of a certain degree of disassociation between the two measures suggests that while one is inadequate, the other one can substitute it.

I believe the contributions of the findings and the methods of the present study are not limited to the literature on the Turkey-EU relationship. As recent research

in other countries has shown, exploring the subconscious determinants of political behavior may pave the way for a new and promising interdisciplinary approach for understanding the dynamics of political indifference and ambivalence. Together with social identities such as national or ethnic identities, the use of implicit attitudes may help scholars better understand the political preferences of the Turkish public that are resistant to change. Given the polarized nature of the Turkish public in both the social and political realms, it can be argued that such a research strategy promises new solutions for explaining attitudinal and behavioral preferences.

Turkish youth's attitudes do not drastically differ from the public's opinion. In this study's sample, we see individuals with high and low attachments to the national identity and group interests. Their polarizing views about the EU are not different from the polarized political atmosphere within Turkey. The complex and never-ending process with the EU does not help the domestic discussions on Europe and West, in general. The hostile representation of Europe by certain media channels in Turkey, declining enthusiasm from EU membership, and even hostility towards particular political groups in the last few years might be the reason why individuals turn to more sensitive explanations such as national identity and symbolic politics (Arikan 2012, 97)

This study shows that national identity is a reference point when people try to understand things they do not know or simply cannot comprehend. The symbolic politics feed national identities and determine how people evaluate the EU and to an extent "West". However, the overall support of the Turkish youth for the EU is still an important reason to keep the relations alive. Furthermore, the important role of symbolic concerns and group ideology can also act as a driver of more positive relations.

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APPENDIX A

BIAT Design and Instructions

I used the standard set of positive and negative stimuli for both the EU and Turkey BIAT as well as images that represent and may stimulate Turkey and the EU. Here I present the images and stimulus words together with their Turkish translations that I used in the study:

Positive affective stimuli: “Wonderful, Best, Superb, Excellent “,
Turkish: “Keyif, Sevgi, Huzur, Muhteşem”

Negative affective stimuli: “Terrible, Awful, Horrible, Worst”, Turk-
ish: “Berbat, Korkunç, Çirkin, Rezalet”

To instruct the participants about the testing process I slightly adjusted the instruction text used in the Partisan BIAT study by Iyengar and Westwood (2015) and adapted it the EU-Turkey context, later translated it into Turkish. Here I present the instructions that were given to the participants before the BIAT, together with their Turkish translations:


English:

“In this task, you will be instructed to press the ‘P’ key for ‘POSITIVE’ words and images from one specific group, either EU or TURKEY. The ‘Q’ key is used for ‘NEGATIVE’ words and images from the other group. Press the ‘P’ key for all items that belong to the categories at the top of the page. Press the ‘Q’ key for everything else. The first items will help you get used to the task format. Classify items as quickly as you can while making. Make as few mistakes as possible. Going too slow or making too many mistakes will result in an uninterpretable score. It is OK to make an occasional mistake. If you press an incorrect key you will see a red ‘X’. Rapidly correct the error by pressing the other key.”

Turkish:

“Bu görevde, ekrana olumlu (örn. keyif) veya olumsuz (örn. berbat) kelimelerin yanı sıra AB ya da Türkiye ile ilişkili resimler gelecektir. Sizden beklenen, ekranda beliren kelimeler ve resimler karşısında, sunulacak talimatlara uygun bir biçimde, “P”

Stimuli Images



ve “Q” tuşlarına basmanızdır. İlk birkaç deneme, uygulamaya alışmanızı sağlayacaktır. Mümkün olduğu kadar hızlı cevaplandırın ve hata yapmamaya çalışın. Testi çok yavaş cevaplamanız ya da çok fazla hata yapmanız sonuçların yorumlanamamasına neden olacaktır. Nadir yapılan hatalar önemli değildir. Eğer yanlış bir tuşa basarsanız kırmızı bir 'X' işareti ile karşılaşacaksınız. Hızlıca doğru tuşa basarak hatayı düzeltiniz.”

Scoring Procedure

The procedure produces a “D-score” that is used to interpret BIAT results. The score ranges from -2 to 2. The scores are the differences in the mean response times of the paired target categories divided by the pooled standard deviation over each block. Category A (EU) and Category B (Turkey) are alternately paired with positive and negative words. The participants pair Category A and B via the instructions given before each block. Full scoring steps are adapted from Iyengar and Westwood (Iyengar and Westwood 2015):

1. First two blocks are trial blocks and not scored.
2. Only the data from block 3 to 6 are used.
3. Trials with latencies higher than 10,000 ms are eliminated.
4. Subjects who scored 10% of trials with a latency less than 300 ms are eliminated.
5. Mean of accurate latency of each block is calculated.
6. Pooled standard deviation for all trial rounds are computed.
7. Differences between the appropriate scores are computed for each round.
8. Differences are divided by the standard deviation that is used in the step 6.
9. Do not use cases that showed higher error rate than 35%.

APPENDIX B

Questionnaire Items

EU Attitude Question Items

Avrupa Birliđi'ne g venirim.

Benim fikirlerim T rkiye'de dikkate alınmaktadır.

Genel olarak bakıldığında, T rkiye'nin Avrupa Birliđi'ne girmesi iyi bir  eydir.

Genel olarak bakıldığında, T rkiye'nin Avrupa Birliđi'ne girmesi  lkemiz a ısından fayda sađlar.

Genel olarak bakıldığında, Avrupa Birliđi'nin g z mdeki imajı olumludur.

T rkiye, AB yerine, Ortadođu'daki m ttefikleri ile daha yakın olmaya  ncelik vermelidir.

Avrupa Birliđi'nin geleceđi hakkında,  ok mu iyimlersiniz, olduk a mı iyimlersiniz, olduk a mı k t mlersiniz, yoksa  ok mu k t mlersiniz?

___  ok iyimser

___ Olduk a iyimser

___ Olduk a k t mser

___  ok k t mser

___ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum

___ Cevap yok

Peki, 2030'da Avrupa Birliđi'nde, insanlar etnik ve dini azınlıklara kar ı daha ho g r l  m  yoksa daha ho g r s z bir toplumda mı ya ayacak?

___ Daha ho g r l 

___ Daha ho g r s z

___ Hi bir  ey deđi meyecek, bug n n toplumuyla aynı olacak

___ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum

___ Cevap yok

Sizin g r   n ze g re, Avrupa Birliđi d nyada insan haklarını te vik etmek ve savunmak adına  ok fazla mı  alı ma yapıyor, yeteri kadar mı  alı ma yapıyor, yoksa yaptıkları yetersiz mi kalıyor?

- ___Çok fazla
- ___Yeteri kadar
- ___Yetersiz
- ___Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
- ___Cevap yok

Bugün yapılacak bir halk oylamasıda siz, Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği için mi, yoksa karşısında mı oy kullanırdınız?

- ___AB üyeliğini destekler yönde oy kullanırdım
- ___AB üyeliğine karşı yönde oy kullanırdım
- ___Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
- ___Cevap yok

EU Related Policy Support Rating Scale

Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olmak için her türlü fedakarlıkta bulunulmalıdır.

Avrupa Birliği'ne giden süreçte Alevilerin kimliklerini korumalarını kolaylaştıran düzenlemeler yapılmalıdır.

Avrupa Birliği'ne giden süreçte vatandaşların Türkçe dışındaki anadillerini öğrenebilmelerine imkan sağlayan yasaların çıkması iyi olmuştur.

Avrupa Birliği'ne giden süreçte Türkçe dışındaki ana dillerde radyo ve televizyon yayınları yapılmasına imkan sağlayan yasaların çıkması iyi olmuştur.

Avrupa Birliği'ne giden süreçte ordunun Türkiye siyasetindeki rolünü kısıtlayan yasaların çıkması iyi olmuştur.

Avrupa Birliği'ne giden süreçte idam yasasının her suç ve herkes için kaldırılması iyi olmuştur.

Stability, Legitimacy and Permeability Scale

Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişki önümüzdeki yıllarda aynı şekilde devam edecektir.

Avrupa, Türkiye'den daha iyi durumda olmayı hak ediyor.

Ne yaparsa yapsın, Türkiye'li biri asla bir Avrupa'lı olarak kabul göremez.

Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin şimdiki durumu sadece geçicidir.

Türkiye'nin (Avrupa'ya kıyasla) daha kötü durumda olması haksızlıktır.

Türkiyeli birinin Avrupalı olarak kabul görmesi hiç zor değildir.

Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği arasındaki ilişki kolay kolay değişmeyecektir.

Haklı olarak Avrupa, şu anda Türkiye'den daha iyi durumdadır.

Türk birinin Avrupalı olarak kabul görmesi neredeyse imkansızdır.

ISSP National Identity Scale

Türkiye hakkında öyle şeyler var ki benim bugün Türkiye'den utanmama sebep oluyor.

Eğer başka ülkelerin vatandaşları da, Türk'ler gibi olsaydı; dünya daha iyi bir yer olurdu.

Genel olarak, Türkiye çoğu dünya ülkesinden daha iyi bir ülkedir.

Ülkesi yanlış şeyler yapsa da, insan ülkesini desteklemeye devam etmelidir.

Ülkem uluslararası spor müsabakalarında başarılı olduğu zaman, Türk olmaktan gurur duyuyorum.

Genel olarak, Türkiye ile gurur duymak istediğimden daha az gurur duyuyorum.

Economy-related Items

Geçtiğimiz 1 (bir) yıl içinde iş başındaki hükümetin izlemiş olduğu politikalar sizce ailenizin ekonomik durumu üzerinde nasıl bir etki yaptı?

Peki, yine benzer bir cetvel üzerinde geçtiğimiz 1 (bir) yıl içinde iş başındaki hükümetin izlediği politikaların Türkiye ekonomisi üzerindeki etkilerini değerlendirirmisiniz?

Partisanship Battery

Kendinizi herhangi bir siyasi partiye yakın görüyor musunuz?? __Evet

__Hayır

__Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum

__Cevap yok

Kendinizi bir partiye diğerlerine göre daha yakın hisseder misiniz?

__Evet

__Hayır

__Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum

__Cevap yok

Kendinizi hangi partiye yakın hissediyorsunuz?

__Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP/Ak Parti – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)

__Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP - Pervin Buldan/Sezai Temelli)

- ☐ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP – Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu)
☐ Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP – Devlet Bahçeli)
☐ Saadet Partisi (SP – Temel Karamollaoğlu)
☐ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
☐ Cevap yok
☐ Diğer:.....

Kendinizi bu partiye çok mu yakın hissediyorsunuz, biraz mı yakın, ya da pek yakın değil mi? ☐ Çok yakın

- ☐ Biraz yakın
☐ Pek yakın değil
☐ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
☐ Cevap yok

Siyasette insanlar bazen sağ'dan ve sol'dan bahsederler. Size vereceğim 0'ın en solu, 10'un ise en sağ gösterdiği cetvelde Partisini nereye yerleştirirsiniz Aynı cetveli kullanarak partisini nereye koyardınız?

- ☐ “Sol-Sağ”ı hiç duymadı
☐ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum/Nereye yerleştireceğini bilemedim
☐ Cevap yok
☐ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
☐ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
☐ Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi
☐ Halkların Demokratik Partisi
☐ İyi Parti
☐ Saadet Partisi

Peki bu cetvelde kendinizi nereye koyardınız?

- ☐ “Sol-Sağ”ı hiç duymadı
☐ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
☐ Cevap yok

Peki, bu ifadelere siyasi partiler sizce ne derece katılıyorlardır? Lütfen her bir parti için aşağıdaki rakamlara göre ayrı ayrı cevap veriniz.

- ☐ Fikrim Yok/Bilmiyorum

__Cevap Yok

__Türkiye, AB'den bağımsız olarak, Kıbrıs konusunda kendi çıkarlarını korumalıdır.

__Türkiye dış politikasını Avrupa'ya yoğunlaştıracağına, farklı coğrafyalarda alternatif politikalara yönlendirmelidir.

__AB uyum yasaları çerçevesinde hazırlanmış toplumun milli ve manevi duygularına ters düşen yasalar yeniden düzenlenmelidir.

__Türkiye AB üyeliği için gerekli reformları hayata geçirmelidir.

Demographic Information Form

Cinsiyetiniz?

__Erkek

__Kadın

Doğum YILINIZI öğrenebilir miyim? [4 rakamlı olarak yazın (örn: 1975)]

__Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum

__Cevap yok

Sahip olduğunuz en yüksek eğitim seviyesinin ne olduğunu söyleyebilir misiniz?

__Okuryazar değil, hiçbir resmi eğitim almamış

__Okuryazar ancak diploması yok

__İlkokul mezunu (5 yıllık)

__Ortaokul mezunu/İlköğretim mezunu (8 yıllık ilköğretim ya da 5 yıl sonrası 3 yıllık ortaokul mezunu)

__Lise mezunu

__Lise'den mezun olup yükseköğretime devam etmiş ama bitirememiş.

__Üniversite mezunu

__Yüksek lisans (Master)

__Doktora

__Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum

__Cevap yok

Halen, kazanç karşılığı herhangi bir işte çalışıyor musunuz?

__Halen kazanç karşılığı bir işte tam zamanlı olarak çalışıyorum (haftada 32 ya da daha fazla saat) S38'e geçin

___ Halen kazanç karşılığı bir işte yarı zamanlı olarak çalışıyorum (haftada 15 ila 32 saat arası) S38'ye geçin

___ Halen para karşılığı bir işte haftada 15 saatten az çalışıyorum S38'e geçin

___ Aile üyelerine yardım ediyorum (Ücretsiz aile işçisi) S38'e geçin

___ Çalışmıyorum S37'ye geçin

Şimdi sayacaklarımdan hangisi size en uygun olanıdır?

___ İşsiz / İş arıyor, bulsa çalışmak istiyor S40'a geçin

___ Öğrenci S40'a geçin ___ Çırak, iş eğitimi alıyor S40'a geçin

___ Hasta, engelli, sakat S40'a geçin

___ Emekli S40'a geçin

___ Ev kadını S40'a geçin

___ Diğer S40'a geçin

___ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum

___ Cevap yok

Mesleğiniz nedir? Yani ana işinizin ismi nedir ya da ünvanınız nedir?

___ Yazınız:

___ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum

___ Cevap yok

Kendiniz için okuyacaklarımdan hangisi en uygun olanıdır?

___ Beyaz yakalı çalışan

___ İşçi

___ Çiftçi

___ Serbest meslek sahibi

___ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum

___ Cevap yok

Medeni halinizi öğrenebilir miyim?

___ Evli ya da evliymiş gibi biriyle birlikte yaşıyor

___ Dul

___ Boşanmış

___ Nişanlı

___ Ayrı (hukuken evli fakat eşinden ayrı yaşıyor)

- ☐ Bekar
- ☐ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
- ☐ Cevap yok

Siz bir dine bağılı mısınız?

- ☐ Hayır, hiçbir dine bağılı değilim S45'e geçin
- ☐ Evet, Müslüman'ım S42'ye geçin
- ☐ Evet, Hristiyan'ım S44'e geçin
- ☐ Evet, Musevi'yim S44'e geçin
- ☐ Diğer:.... S42'ye geçin
- ☐ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum S42'ye geçin
- ☐ Cevap yok S42'ye geçin

Sünni Müslüman mısınız?

- ☐ Evet Sünni Müslümanım
- ☐ Hayır Sünni Müslüman değilim S43'e geçin
- ☐ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum S43'e geçin
- ☐ Cevap yok S43'e geçin

Peki, Alevi misiniz?

- ☐ Evet Aleviyim
- ☐ Hayır Alevi değilim
- ☐ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
- ☐ Cevap yok

Ne sıklıkta ibadet ettiğinize bakmaksızın, kendinizi ne derece dindar biri olarak görürsünüz?

- ☐ Hiç dindar değilim
- ☐ Pek dindar değilim
- ☐ Biraz dindarım
- ☐ Çok dindarım
- ☐ Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
- ☐ Cevap yok

Şimdi size okuyacağım dillerden hangilerini konuşabiliyorsunuz?

- ☐ Evet, konuşabiliyorum

___Hayır, konuşamıyorum

Çocukluğunuzda anne veya babanızla, günlük görüşme ve konuşmalarınızda hangi dili veya dilleri konuşturdunuz?

___Türkçe

___Kürtçe

___Arapça

___Almanca

___İngilizce

___Diğer

Geçtiğimiz altı ayı dikkate alırsanız, bütün aile fertlerinin maaş, kira, emekli aylığı v.b. gelirlerini göz önünde bulundurarak ortalama toplam aylık hane halkı gelirinizin şu sayacağım gruplardan hangisine en yakın olduğunu söyler misiniz?

___150TL ve altı

___151-250

___251-350

___351-450

___451-550

___551-750

___751-1000

___1001-1500

___1501-2000

___2001-3000

___3001-5000

___5001-7000

___7001-9000

___9001-11000

___11001TL ve üstü

APPENDIX C

Figure C.1 Income




Figure C.2 Religiosity




Figure C.3 Potential Referendum Vote




Table C.1 Correlations of the Main Independent Variables

Variables	Explicit EU Attitudes	Implicit EU Attitudes	EU Policy Support	Legitimacy	Permeability	National Identity	Ideology Scores	Weak Partisan	Strong Partisan
Explicit EU Attitudes	1.000								
Implicit EU Attitudes	0.416* [247]	1.000							
EU Policy Support	0.657* [243]	0.379* [243]	1.000						
Legitimacy	0.419* [246]	0.315* [246]	0.416* [242]	1.000					
Permeability	0.264* [247]	0.103 [247]	0.125 [243]	0.092 [246]	1.000				
National Identity	-0.618* [247]	-0.327* [247]	-0.599* [243]	-0.507* [246]	-0.103 [247]	1.000			
Political Ideology	-0.537 [233]	-0.322 [233]	-0.580* [229]	-0.452 [233]	-0.117 [233]	0.668 [233]	1.000		
Weak Partisan	0.005 [240]	0.102 [240]	0.000 [237]	-0.029 [239]	-0.106 [240]	0.078 [240]	-0.011 229	1.000	
Strong Partisan	-0.224* [247]	-0.005 [247]	-0.216* [243]	-0.123 [246]	-0.174* [247]	0.262* [247]	0.212 [233]	0.414* [240]	1.000

*p < 0.05 (Two-tailed) Note: Correlations are computed by pairwise deletion; numbers in brackets show the valid Ns for each correlation.

Table C.2 Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
EU Referendum Vote Choice	0.685	0.465	0	1	213
Pro-EU Attitudes	3.423	0.872	1.167	5	247
EU IAT Score	-0.265	0.547	-1.402	1.143	247
EU Policy Support	5.951	2.581	0	10	243
Legitimacy	3.06	1.071	1	5	246
Permeability	3.111	1.073	1	5	247
National Identity	2.986	1.009	1	5	247
Ideology	4.485	3.026	0	10	233
AKP	0.146	0.354	0	1	247
CHP	0.332	0.472	0	1	247
MHP	0.146	0.354	0	1	247
HDP	0.198	0.4	0	1	247
Weak Partisan	0.887	0.317	0	1	240
Strong Partisan	0.559	0.498	0	1	247
Gender(Female)	0.47	0.5	0	1	247
Age	22.806	2.262	19	30	247
Income	11.777	2.098	1	15	247
Religiosity	2.267	1.029	1	4	247

Table C.3 Summary Statistics for the Effective Sample

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
EU Referendum Vote Choice	0.688	0.464	0	1	202
Explicit EU Attitudes	3.477	0.921	1.167	5	202
Implicit EU Attitudes	-0.224	0.561	-1.402	1.143	202
EU Knowledge	6.135	2.645	0	10	202
Legitimacy	3.127	1.118	1	5	202
Permeability	3.097	1.079	1	5	202
National Identity	2.957	1.042	1	5	202
Political Ideology	4.366	2.993	0	10	202
AKP	0.144	0.352	0	1	202
CHP	0.342	0.475	0	1	202
MHP	0.149	0.356	0	1	202
HDP	0.228	0.42	0	1	202
Weak Partisan	0.905	0.293	0	1	202
Strong Partisan	0.584	0.494	0	1	202
Gender(Female)	0.421	0.495	0	1	202
Age	22.985	2.297	19	30	202
Income	11.792	2.194	1	15	202
Religiosity	1.946	1.383	0	4	202

Table C.4 Summary Statistics for AKP supporters

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
EU Referendum Vote Choice	0.406	0.499	0	1	32
Pro EU Attitudes	2.493	0.804	1.167	5	36
EU Policy Support	4.648	2.039	0.333	10	36
IAT Score	-0.451	0.505	-1.349	0.893	36
Legitimacy	2.269	0.839	1	4.667	36
Permeability	2.87	1.107	1	5	36
National Identity	3.973	0.797	1.833	5	36
Political Ideology	8.029	1.944	5	10	33
Gender(Female)	0.472	0.506	0	1	36
Age	22.667	2.438	19	30	36
Income	10.833	2.613	1	15	36
Religiosity	3.083	1.079	0	4	36

Table C.5 Summary Statistics for CHP supporters

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
EU Referendum Vote Choice	0.847	0.362	0	1	72
Pro EU Attitudes	3.814	0.593	2.167	5	82
EU Policy Support	6.438	2.001	0	10	80
IAT Score	-0.188	0.558	-1.138	1.143	82
Legitimacy	3.335	1.029	1	5	82
Permeability	3.348	0.913	1	5	82
National Identity	2.666	0.737	1	4.5	82
Political Ideology	3.063	1.786	0	8	79
Gender(Female)	0.573	0.498	0	1	82
Age	23.341	2.3	19	27	82
Income	12.39	1.676	9	15	82
Religiosity	1.537	1.178	0	3	82

Table C.6 Summary Statistics for MHP Supporters

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
EU Referendum Vote Choice	0.3	0.466	0	1	30
Pro EU Attitudes	2.719	0.846	1.167	4.333	36
EU Policy Support	3.023	2.008	0	8.667	36
IAT Score	-0.608	0.466	-1.402	0.685	36
Legitimacy	2.454	1.161	1	5	36
Permeability	2.639	1.296	1	5	36
National Identity	3.949	0.711	1.5	5	36
Political Ideology	8.028	2.035	1	10	36
Gender(Female)	0.083	0.28	0	1	36
Age	21.778	2.231	19	27	36
Income	11.944	1.672	8	15	36
Religiosity	2.75	1.105	0	4	36

Table C.7 Summary Statistics for HDP Supporters

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
EU Referendum Vote Choice	0.851	0.36	0	1	47
Pro EU Attitudes	3.965	0.673	2.333	5	49
EU Policy Support	8.295	1.7	2.333	10	49
IAT Score	0.117	0.463	-0.738	1.118	49
Legitimacy	3.633	0.847	1.333	5	49
Permeability	3.095	1.097	1	4.667	49
National Identity	2.116	0.690	1	4	49
Political Ideology	1.688	1.339	0	5	48
Gender(Female)	0.49	0.505	0	1	49
Age	23.429	2.062	19	28	49
Income	11.327	2.593	1	15	49
Religiosity	1.429	1.414	0	4	49

Table C.8 Correlations of the Main Independent Variables for the Partisan Sample

Variables	Explicit EU Attitudes	Implicit EU Scores	EU Policy Support	Legitimacy	Permeability	National Identity	Political Ideology
Pro EU Attitudes	1.000						
IAT Score	0.431* [213]	1.000					
EU Knowledge	0.671* [211]	0.388* [211]	1.000				
Legitimacy	0.436* [213]	0.348* [213]	0.412* [211]	1.000			
Permeability	0.282* [213]	0.127 [213]	0.140* [211]	0.089 [213]	1.000		
National Identity	-0.633* [213]	-0.363* [213]	-0.618* [211]	-0.531* [213]	-0.108 [213]	1.000	
Political Ideology	-0.558* [206]	-0.358* [206]	-0.611* [204]	-0.463* [206]	-0.109 [206]	0.690* [206]	1.000

*p < 0.05 (Two-tailed) Note: Correlations are computed by pairwise deletion; numbers in brackets show the valid Ns for each correlation.