

**DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION IN TURKISH PRISONS:
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MAMAK AND DIYARBAKIR PRISONS
BETWEEN 1980 AND 1985**

by

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STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

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ABSTRACT

Historically, one of the most significant eras in which incarceration was used as a tool to manage political opponents of the regime in Turkey was 1980s, specifically during and after the 1980 Military coup. Since the aim of these military prisons was to dissolve revolutionary organizations, Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons had significant parts in the determination of which political organization survived and continued as a political player, and which could not. This study investigates the contentious prison environments and reveals the different dynamics of collective action within the high-risk contexts of Diyarbakir and Mamak Prisons between 1980 and 1985. Dwelling in the opportunity – threat structure, development of interpersonal relations, shared identity, which were solidified during the course of prison life among the prisoners, and the risk-liability of the leaders appear as contingently interconnected themes in explaining the collective action in these two prisons. This thesis contributes to the discussions on different mobilization processes under high-risk contexts in undemocratic environments and addresses the understudied aspect of collective action in Turkish prisons.

Key words: high-risk collective action, leadership, identity, state repression, political prisoners, military coup, Diyarbakir Prison, Mamak Prison

ÖZET

1980 askeri darbesi ve 1980li yıllar, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihinde rejim muhalifi grupların hapsedilmeyle bastırılmaya çalışıldığı en önemli dönemlerden biri olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Darbe hapishanelerinin amacı dönemin devrimci örgütlerini dağıtmak olduğundan, bu askeri hapishaneler arasında Mamak ve Diyarbakır cezaevleri hangi örgütlerin darbe sonrasına siyasi birer aktör olarak devam edip hangilerinin edemediğine dair de rol oynamışlardır. Bu tez 1980 ve 1985 yılları arasında Mamak ve Diyarbakır askeri cezaevlerinin çatışmalı ve riskli ortamlarında siyasi mahpusların kolektif eylemlilikleri arkasındaki dinamikleri karşılaştırmaktadır. Siyasi fırsat ve tehditler yapısı içerisinde kolektif eylemliğin olabilirliğini, hapishanede geçen süre içinde gelişen mahpuslar arası ilişkiler, ortak kimlik ve liderlerin risk alabilirlikleriyle açıklamaktadır. Bu tez, riskli ve antidemokratik ortamlardaki farklı mobilizasyon süreçleri üzerine olan tartışmalara katkı sağlamakla beraber daha önce pek çalışılmamış olan Türkiye hapishanelerindeki kolektif mücadele deneyimlerine de ışık tutmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: yüksek riskli kolektif eylemlilik, liderlik, ortak kimlik, devlet baskısı, siyasi mahpuslar, askeri darbe, Diyarbakır Cezaevi, Mamak Cezaevi

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Introduction

Studying contentious prison environments and dynamics of collective action of prisoners in 1980s' Turkey is significant for several reasons. Primarily, there is a deficit of sociological research on Turkish prisons and their historical relationship with social movements. Subsequently, the written material on prisons, daily prison life, non-political prisoners or political prisoners' resistance is limited to the political organization's self-promotional heroic literature, the counter-propaganda of the state, or the memoirs of former political prisoners. Sociologists can help overcome these competing narratives and advance the understandings of how the use of incarceration as a tool of political repression impacts oppositional mobilization and vice versa. Here I present how the state tries to dissolve the revolutionary social movement organizations of 1970s and their networks by repression and disciplinary policies. Subsequently, I focus on Diyarbakir and Mamak prisons and the response of political prisoners to the oppressive measures.

This thesis contributes to collective action literature and addresses the discussions on different mobilization structures under high-risk contexts in undemocratic environments. Moreover, it reveals different dynamics of collective action in prisons by comparing how repression and resistance interacted in two different prisons. I aim to reveal how insurgents developed collective action under high-risk conditions. Within the opportunity-threat structure, there are four factors that play an explanatory role in the processes of engaging in collective action in these prisons. These are the different ways and levels of exercising state repression, development of a shared identity and interpersonal relations among prisoners, which were solidified during the course of prison life, and the perceptive leadership. I argue

that repression propels collective action if there is a risk-labile leadership and solidary face-to-face relations between the insurgents in undemocratic and high-risk conditions.

Different approaches to the relationship between state repression and dissidence do not agree on a single outcome. Contextualizing each case is important to find out different dynamics in that relationship. As a result of my research, I argue that the extreme repression in Diyarbakir Prison impeded the recruitment to collective action at first. The initial attempts of collective actions remained limited to the leaders. Concomitantly, as time went by indiscriminate extreme repression turned into an opportunity to form alternative solidary relationships, which were crucial in recruitment to high-risk collective action in prisons. Furthermore, the role of risk-labile leaders and their framing of the actions within the concept of honor facilitated the formation of collective action in Diyarbakir Prison. On the other hand, moderate-level, selective repression in Mamak Prison and cohabitation of left and right-wing political prisoners hindered the formation of alternative personal relationships other than the prior organizational ties. On top of these, the lack of risk-labile and people-oriented leadership barred the formation of collective action in Mamak. As a result, we witnessed fewer and less sustained instances of collective action in Mamak and greater and more sustained collective actions in Diyarbakir.

Historically, one of the most significant eras in which incarceration was used as a tool to manage political opponents of the regime in Turkey was 1980s, specifically during and after the 1980 Military coup. This study investigates the contentious prison environments and reveals the different dynamics of collective action within the high-risk contexts of Diyarbakir and Mamak Prisons between 1980 and 1985. The street protests and university occupations between 1974 and 1980 were among the largest

protests in the history of the Turkish republic. Coalition member of the era, CHP was depicting the situation as a “de facto civil war”(Boratav, 2006). Armed skirmishes between revolutionary and right wing insurgents and the police were commonplace. Assassinations by both right and left wing groups had mounted to over 5,000 by September 1980. Turkey's military leaders abolished the parliament after a coup and imposed martial law on the entire country (International, 1982). The military coup of 1980 in Turkey crushed the increasing protest cycles of the 1970s, seeking to deactivate the labor unions as well as the socialist revolutionary organizations.

The junta, composed of five generals, declared martial law in 67 provinces. Members of armed, unarmed, legal, and illegal right wing and left wing organizations were charged in military courts and held in military prisons. With the coup, all political and trade union activity was banned, political parties shut down and their leaders were arrested and major newspapers were closed. One of the most visible legal impacts of the coup was the decrease in the number of union member workers from five million in 1980 to one million in 1984 (Yılmaz, 2013).

Within the first six weeks after the coup, 11,500 people were arrested (Zurcher, 2004). This number rose to 30.000 by the end of 1980, and a year later 122.600 more were arrested. By September 1982, a total of 80,000 people were still imprisoned, 30.000 of who were awaiting trial (Zurcher, 2004). Almost one third of the prisoners were political prisoners and nearly all of them kept in military prisons. Between 1980 and 1986 a total of 650,000 people were arrested in Turkey. 230.000 of them were tried, and 7,000 were convicted and sentenced with capital punishment (Yılmaz, 2013). The fifty condemned prisoners who were ultimately executed included members of the parliament, political parties, and trade unions (Yılmaz, 2013). The findings of Amnesty International in Turkey confirmed reports that the use

of torture by police and military personnel was widespread and had increased during the 1980s. The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT) declared there were one million victims of torture in Turkey by the year 2008. Amnesty International repeatedly documented that, in practice, incommunicado detention was often longer than the legal duration and systematic torture was being practiced in military prisons (Amnesty International, 1985).

As can be gleaned from the numbers, the use of imprisonment and violence was intimately linked to an imperative for state control. The absolute authority of military officials in fact began a new era in prisons of Turkey. The military's disciplinary control aimed to turn prisoners and citizens into soldiers, and those who refused were violently punished. In this politically contentious environment, three prisons namely, Mamak prison (in Ankara), Metris prison (in Istanbul) and the Diyarbakır prison (in Diyarbakır, often called the *dungeon or #5*) turned into notorious places. Within the scope of this MA thesis I focus on Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons. Mamak Prison, in Ankara the capital city, was the place where Turkish revolutionary organizations were incarcerated and Diyarbakir Prison, in Diyarbakir, was the place where the Kurdish revolutionary organizations were kept.

However, the significance of Kurdish identity in this process did not develop in the prison, it stems from a historical ethnic discrimination.¹ Kurdish identity and language had been denied for 60 years in the Turkish Republic by the time the military coup happened in 1980. Educated Kurdish youth had started to get politically organized in the 1950s, and by the 1970s there was a plethora of Kurdish revolutionary organizations. Most of these groups chose political violence and guerilla fighting as a method to combat the Turkish state. Those insurgent Kurdish

¹ More detail about this conflict and its history is provided below.

students of 1970s found themselves in Diyarbakir Prison with the 1980 military coup. Therefore, another thing that makes Diyarbakir Prison case significant is its role in increasing mobilization to PKK guerilla camps in mid-1980s. (Zeydanlioglu, 2009)

Since the aim of these military prisons was to dissolve the revolutionary organizations, Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons have significant roles in determination of which political organizations survive and continue as political players and which would not survive. The commanders of martial law in each city determined the characteristics of the prisons. More than that, they appointed the chief commanders of the prisons, Raci Tetik² for Mamak Prison and Esat Oktay Yildiran³ for Diyarbakir Prison, giving them authority that they used to train the guards to conduct torture and misbehavior in the prisons. Yet this period also saw prisoners develop creative means of resisting statist authority. Main aim of this thesis is to explain different processes of resisting statist authority by forming collective action in two prisons, namely Mamak and Diyarbakir

In Chapter I, I visit theoretical discussions on incarceration, prison riots and collective action. In Chapter II, I document the brief history of Turkish prisons and Kurdish question. Further in Chapter III, I introduce the Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons in detail and in Chapter IV, I analyze my findings.

² He served in special armed units with the NATO forces in Korea War (1950) and Turkey's invasion of Cyprus (1974). He was publicly missing after the prison mission. The place he lives is still unknown.

³ He served in special armed units in Turkey's invasion of Cyprus too. They both confessed in interviews and dialogues with the prisoners that they practiced the torture methods in the prisons, which they learned and practiced in those previous overseas missions. Esat Oktay Yildiran was shot and killed by a PKK member in a public bus later in 1988.

Methodology

I conducted 28 semi-structured and open-ended in-depth interviews with former prisoners who were incarcerated in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons during 1980 - 1985. Their age ranged between 50 and 80 when I conducted the interviews. These interviews took place in February and March of 2014 in Istanbul, Ankara and Diyarbakir. Each interview lasted between 90 – 120 minutes.

My interviewees consisted of twelve former prisoners from Mamak prison and sixteen from Diyarbakir prison. Six out of twelve Mamak interviewees were Dev-Yol members. Remaining included two Acilci, one THKO-Devrim Yolu, one TIP, one Halkin Kurtulusu and one Dev-Savas members. Diyarbakir interviewees, on the other hand, belonged to the following organizations: four DDKD, three KUK, two PKK, two Rizgari, one Ala Rizgari, one THKO and one Ozgurluk Yolu member. Furthermore, my Diyarbakir prison interviewees included one non-affiliated prisoner and one smuggler. Vast majority of the Diyarbakir Prison were PKK members, despite this fact I could only reach two former PKK member inmates. This was because my limited time in Diyarbakir was shortly before the local election date and still-activist former inmates were very busy, most of them had become guerillas or returned to their villages and some did not agree to talk.

I use the testimonies of former political prisoners as my primary source. Primarily, reports and documentations on the era are very limited. Despite the potential problems that arise with interviews that rely on participants' recollections of more than 30 years ago, I value the experience of the prisoners as evidence and the importance of making them public to understand what happened under the military regime. As Sarlo claims with reference to Sontag, "understanding is more important

than remembering; but to understand first we have to remember”(Sarlo, 2012). Even though testimonies might be partial, recounting them in this thesis is a big part of the understanding process.

I employed a snowball sampling method to locate my interviewees. I used my contacts at HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi)⁴, CISST (Ceza Infaz Sisteminde Sivil Toplum Derneği)⁵, VAKAD (Van Kadın Derneği)⁶ and others to reach the initial contacts who directed me to more connections. The interviews took place at cafes, office spaces and houses of informants. I recorded all the interviews except for one that I could not because of a technical problem. All informants consented and allowed me to use their real names in the thesis, despite which I chose to use pseudonyms to prevent potential risks.

I have also located rare but informative autobiographies and memoirs written by former political prisoners. I coded the interviews and identified the themes and concepts that are central to my study. I analyzed all these accounts in the light of the theoretical framework that I drew from the literature on prisons, social movements and particularly collective action.

This research is important for its contribution to the understanding of how and why people mobilize under high-risk and pressure. It tries to enrich the limited historical and sociological literature on collective action in Turkish prisons. Additionally, it has the potential to contribute to our understanding of the impact of repression in social movements in undemocratic regimes.

⁴ People’s Democratic Party

⁵ CSMPO (Civil Society in the Penal System Organization)

⁶ Van Women’s Association

Limitations of the Research

I could only reach three female informants from Diyarbakir Prison and five from Mamak. The population of female political prisoners in Diyarbakir Prison was at most 75 in a total of 1000 - 2000 prisoners. In Mamak, on the other hand, the number of female political prisoners reached at most 200 in a total of 1000 to 2000 prisoners. Therefore, the experience of female prisoners and their different coping mechanisms with repression is missing from my analysis. Secondary sources on the experience of female political prisoners in Mamak provide some lead. However, for the Diyarbakir prison these sources are highly insufficient compared to Mamak. Due to time limitations and the scope of my research I could not reach more female interviewees. There is a need to conduct a separate research on women's collective action in both of Mamak and Diyarbakir.

I officially requested information from the Ministry of Justice on the number and gender of the inmates during 1980-1987, and asked permission to visit the prisons. Unfortunately, the Ministry briefly responded by stating that they do not hold such records. Thus, to draw a sizable picture I deduced the total number of prisoners from informants' guesses and official trial cases. Another limitation of this thesis is that, due to time limitations, I could not conduct a comprehensive review of newspapers and trial cases.

Reflections on the Field

My gender, age and own position have a doubtless effect on the results of my research. For instance, I could not contact any former guardians or right-wing political prisoners. I tried to contact a lawyer of a former right-wing prisoner, but they were not willing to meet me. Moreover, I was aware that the male political prisoners hesitated to share the sexual torture experiences and auto-censored those parts most of the time. In one of the interviews, the informant openly said that if I were a male researcher he would have told me more. He was about to recount an instance where soldiers were burning an old man's pubic hair and burned him up to his face. But his friend, who joined us for part of the conversation, persuaded him to tell the story while I was in the restroom. Then he said that they decided to tell me the story, because I was their daughter's age, so it would not be so *ayip* (inappropriate). I was in a disadvantaged position because of my gender with male informants but my age occasionally compensated for that. There were times that female prisoners also told me if I were a male researcher they would not tell me their "intimate" memories, though they made me turn the recorder off while recounting sexual harassment and torture experiences. Thus, I excluded those parts from my analysis.

In some of the interviews, both my gender and age became a barrier, but the fact that I was not a formal member of a political organization presented a neutral ground where they could share their experiences. For example, two of the male informants from Dev-Yol's central committee were not disposed to share their stories with me. They asked if I was a daughter of a member of their group or if I was a member of any other organizations. When I said "no", they were relieved because they said "others" try to discredit Dev-Yol with their work on Mamak.

They also emphasized on how young I was. And probably because I was a young female student, they did not take me seriously at first. They kept asking me

questions or quizzing me on the topic before the interviews. I had to meet them several times before conducting the actual interview. Because of their attitude I felt the need to change my casual outfit before the interviews. I started to wear a little make up and heeled boots rather than sneakers when I met them. This change in my outfit had the reverse effect in my Diyarbakir field study. They treated me extra kind and respectful assuming that I was some sort of a professor, even though I told them I was a graduate student. Overall, male informants from Diyarbakir were more willing to talk, and treated me more friendly than the male informants from Mamak. On the other hand, being a young woman had a positive effect on all female informants. I never felt the need to change my look before meeting them. They were all very welcoming and happy to talk to me.

Two of the interviewees wanted the recordings of my interviews, and I shared them with the informants.

CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Social movement theories, such as resource mobilization, rational-choice and political opportunity structure offer various approaches to explain collective action. They explore why and how people mold individual wills into collective performances and under what conditions these actions lead to a change in the existing situation. Particularly, various disciplines from criminology and political science to sociology have been studying collective action in prisons as a social phenomenon. This study aims to contribute to the literature on the collective action in general and in Turkish prisons specifically by comparing the Mamak and Diyarbakir prison cases between 1980 and 1985.

Unique forms of collective performances occur in prisons under limited conditions. To have a multifaceted analysis of this inquiry, I will utilize both structural and constructivist theories but mostly highlighting micro-level processes of mobilization. I will not delve into all the available literature on collective action in prisons. Instead, this section will give a general opinion on collective action literature and its entanglements with the prisons. My aim is to develop an analytical framework for the dynamics of collective action in Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons between 1980 and 1985.

Analysis of collective action finds place in social movement theories. These theories mainly evolved around rationalist, structural and cultural perspectives. Each viewpoint offers various approaches to explaining the formation, recruitment, and mobilization processes of collective action. Dynamics between macro-level structures and micro level-mobilization processes, mainly between the state repression and the constructed aspects of the social world such as emotions, culture, identity, face to face interactions, space and time have explanatory power for this thesis. I will attempt to

draw a framework for my specific cases in which I need to explain the variations in formation of collective action under different opportunity structures.

Theoretical Discussion and Literature on Prisons

Contrary to popular belief, the history of prisons and imprisonment in the modern sense does not go very far back into world history. Imprisonment as it is enforced today, which may occur prior to or preceding a sentence by a constituted court, became the dominant form of punishment only in the 18th century in Europe (Morris & Rotman, 1995). The concept of imprisonment was introduced as a humane alternative to physical punishment. As in Western Europe, in Turkey as well the transformation from traditional understanding of justice to rationalized penal codes began to emerge in the mid 19th century. “Modern” forms of imprisonment only trace back to the introduction of the Tanzimat (1839) edict in the late Ottoman Empire.

Some of the early scholars on prisons, such as Syke, Ignatieff, Melossi, Otto & Kirkheimer, Goffman, Foucault and Useem & Goldstone, investigated prisons as if they are prototypes of the society; and built their theories of the society at large on their observations of prisons. Unsurprisingly, early studies on imprisonment are based on white men’s experience. It is very hard to find research on issues of race or experience of females in prisons prior to 1980s. In these early studies, matters of identity, subjectivity and agency are implicit too. Yet in this work I conceive the issues of identity and agency in the prison as nodal points when explaining collective action in prisons. I will approach prisons as not places where only power ubiquitously enacts but as contested spaces where power and resistance are constantly in flux. To this end, I will mainly discuss Foucault, Goffman and Garland’s ideas of

imprisonment to constitute the medium through which I want to frame my argument about collective action in prisons.

Core Justifications for Imprisonment in Penology

“Many total institutions, seem to function merely as storage dumps for inmates, but they usually present themselves to the public as rational organizations designed consciously, as effective machines for producing a few avowed and officially approved ends (Goffman, 1961, p.74).

“...Juridical punishment is not the transparent and rather self-evident institution of crime control that is commonly taken to be...Punishment today is a deeply problematic and barely understood aspect of social life, the rationale for which is by no means clear (Garland, 1990, p.3)”.

Common historical justifications for the use of imprisonment by penologists are: incapacitation, deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation (treatment). Incapacitation was the most usual justification among different societies, as it effectively curbed the prisoner's ability to inflict criminal harm on those outside prison walls (Morris & Rotman, 1995, pp.4-11). Incapacitation was not a form of punishment in itself but a means to prevent the suspect from absconding before a decision could be made, or a sentence passed.

Morris and Rotman explain deterrence as a justification to imprisonment, by preventing people from acting against the law (1995). However, Garland shows that prisons are not so effective in deterring people from offences. In contrast, his research show that the possibility of an ex-prisoner to re-commit a crime is more than the

never experienced people (Garland, 1985). As another way of justifying prisons, the concept of retribution proposes to redress injustice. In a way, it was a moralist justification to “make even” the relationship between the offender and the offended. Finally, rehabilitation as a justification for imprisonment came into play through 17th century by the influence of ideas flourished during European enlightenment.

Rehabilitation (treatment) differs from deterrence in the way it aims to change and give a new form to the prisoners’ attitudes. Schedules based on hours devoted to education, praying and preaching, workshops and etc., were first implemented in North American and British prisons, reflecting real or imagined protestant ethics of hard work, prayer and the ethical purification of one’s self (Garland, 1985, pp. 27-53). Communal- based sentencing (ward system in Turkey, where 20 to 80 prisoners inhabited a single unit) went hand in hand with the rehabilitative form of punishment. The treatment approach superseded security, prevention and deterrence rhetoric of punishments in mid-20th century (Garland, 1985). However, starting with the late 1970s, risk-management and security approaches replaced the emphasis on treatment.

According to Garland prisons host a continuous relationship with culture and politics (1995). Since prisons are in constant flux with the cultural and political environment, in which they are embedded; the prisons of 1980 military coup era gained a new meaning and function too, both for the governors and the inmates. In addition to deterring political prisoners from further political action outside the prison, military coup era prisons became like an incubator where the governors tried to separate each political prisoner from their affiliated organization network and dissolve their organization structure by the use of ‘rehabilitation’, coercion and torture. Strict planning of the daily routines of physical and normative education sessions was imposed on inmates. Normative education sessions were composed of

memorizing the official chauvinistic history and military anthems whereas physical education was to practice exercising and marching in the military order. Yet the goal of ‘treatment’ was to create the ideal nationalist Turkish citizen, who would give up the revolutionary ideology they were imprisoned for, and adopt Ataturk’s ideas and the military’s edicts. Revolutionary ideas of socialism, communism and anarchism, as a term that was used to refer the former two, were seen as extensions of a mental disorder. Some psychiatrists of the era published how “pathological” is to be an anarchist and that is a form of “psychopathy”⁷. Thus, the ideologies that demand a revolutionary change in the social order were stigmatized as psychopaths, who needed to be treated into obedient citizens. In the 1980 coup d’état era, the military used the prisons to transform insurgents into docile citizens.

Approaches to Incarceration and Modern Society

As I previously indicated, early scholars on prisons consider these places as communities where they could base social theory on. Being one of the earliest scholars of prisons, Durkheim tried to explain development of societies over penal evolution. Rusche and Kirscheimer, on the other hand, argue that policies of crime institutions were determined according to the changes in mode of production in a society and for the benefit of the ruling class (1939). From a Marxist perspective, they explain the correlation between development of capitalism and quality of the inmate population in Britain in parallel to the rise of labor-based prisons. Another example to these theories is Sykes (1958) in his early study where he conceives prisons as an autonomous social system within a society. He relates prison authority to a totalitarian

⁷ See the news pieces: S. Recep Doksat, “Anarşistler”, *Milliyet*, July, 12th 1956
“Süt Dökmüş Kediye Döndüler”, *Hürriyet*, December, 24th 2000

regime and seeks for tactics how to preserve a peaceful order in the prison where he calls that as “society of captives”.

Ignatieff (1981) and Melossi (1981) also mapped the relationship between the changes in mode of production and forms of punishment that ruling classes employ over the society. Taking Rusche and Kirkheimer’s analysis a step further, Melossi discussed the value of the inmate labor for the economy (Sipahi, 2006)⁸. But, he problematized the control over the labor force via education and training sessions in prison more than just utilization of the cheap inmate labor. In fact, his focus on methods of controlling the labor force in the prison is the use of “disciplinary power”.

Discipline and Punish (1975) became one of the most praised and cited sources on imprisonment. Similar to the earlier scholars on prisons, Foucault correlates change in punitive mechanisms with the rise of modernity. Foucault explains the prison order by showing how a certain social group would use discipline and surveillance technologies to surpass another social group. Goffman, on the other hand, acknowledges the contentious relations in prisons and suggests that inmates create defensive adjustments to the mortifying aspects of spatial power (1961).

After reviewing the abovementioned theories in brief, I will mainly utilize Goffman and Foucault’s approaches to analyze collective action in Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons. Thus now I would like to discuss and compare their theories in detail and extend some of their concepts that I already mentioned above.

Disciplinary Power and Resistance in the Prison

Foucault introduces the concept of panopticon to understand the dynamics in one of the modern institutions where power takes an architectural form that is prisons. Panopticon is a metaphor for internalizing the observation of another to create self-

⁸ Unpublished MA Thesis

monitoring in the subjects. Bentham's ideal model of panopticon is never completely realized in architecture, where each prisoner is visible to the observer and cannot really know whether she is observed or not. What they assumed panopticon would achieve was the constant feeling of being observed controls her behaviors as if the inmate is always under the surveillance. However, surveillance as a disciplinary method is still being implemented in prisons via cameras in the form of a digital gaze. According to Foucault, prisoners cannot escape from the grid of discipline and the panoptic gaze (Foucault, Rainbow (eds.), 1984). He argues:

“Prison, as the ultimate panopticon, puts inmates in “so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible” (Foucault, Rainbow (eds.), 1984, p.19-20).

The cases I investigate provide evidence for how inmates find ways to escape that web of surveillance. These escape methods are also examples for what Goffman suggests as the “secondary adjustments”, an analytical concept for countering power in total institutions that I will discuss in detail later. For instance, unlike what Foucault says, female political prisoners in Mamak Prison between the years 1980 and 1984 show that prisoners could escape from the grid of discipline and panoptic gaze. One of the former prisoners stated that there were guards in shifting hours with the duty of just gazing at the ward from the window of the ward. Prisoners were using their bodies as curtains in front of each other when they needed to exchange an item or news to escape the gaze.

Furthermore, they said that there were blind areas of the ward, which Goffman calls as “free spaces” for example the cooking area where they could perform illicit acts such as rehearsing for a small play in the ward or waxing. In addition to being a counter example for the constant surveillance in the prison, these acts of female

political prisoners show us how inmates were in effort to preserve the control on the use of their bodies other than what disciplinary power imposes on them.

Productive Power and Resistance

Foucault (1975) depicts power also as productive, positive and educative rather than solely being repressive and as an entity that cannot easily be relegated. In his analysis, the subject might be active in the process of self-formation but acts according to the operation of particular disciplines, which forge a docile body that may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved (p.17). According to him, this is replicated in general society by what Foucault calls the microphysics of power, a process whereby we become our own regulators.

Foucault's theories differ from his contemporaries in 1960s-70s. He does not focus on power relations solely in political theory and even in state. In his understanding of power, sovereignty or law is secondary. Power is decentralized and everywhere; it is neither a structure nor an institution (Foucault, Rainbow (eds.), 1984). Prior to Foucault's genealogy of power and subject, discussions on domination had revolved around fixed and institutionalized forms of power. Discussions on resistance on the other hand, were about organized opposition to power. Although this binary is not abolished from the literature and Foucault does not conceptualize resistance in prisons, his novel approach to power as being also productive paves the way for further discussions on resistance. Furthermore, in his later works Foucault states his well-known dictum, "Where there is power, there is resistance," and leaves an open gate to discuss forms of resistance in prisons (Foucault, 1993, p.101). Since, it does not have to be collective or organized to count an action as resistance, I will consider creative actions of the inmates, such as communication methods, cooking,

singing or dancing as resistance too. These actions that can contribute to one's subjectivity in different way than the disciplinary power could also provide alternative accounts to overcome the abovementioned binary discussion between institutional power and organized resistance.

My cases as well as O'Hearn's research (2012) show that power alone does not shape the prison life, but the dynamic relationship between power and resistance does. Since according to Foucault, power is relational and it is ontologically in coexistence with resistance, a thorough examination of the web of relations in daily life of prisoners can help us understand that the disciplinary power is not a homogenous, top-down exercise, but it is a complex map of relations. In this context, rather than solely thinking resistance as an effect or result of the power, we should see that resistance also shapes power.

Furthermore, Goffman and Garland reinforce the importance of contextualization of power in prisons and help us overcome what is missing in Foucault's discussions of the capillary power in prisons. Garland argues that if Foucault had studied resistance in detail as he had studied power, he would have modified his narrative of the operation of power in prisons as less of an 'automatic' process and more of a matter of micro-political conflict in which the individual subject may draw upon alternative sources of power and subjectivity to resist that imposed by the institution (Garland, 1990, p.173). However, Garland does not discuss the resistance in prisons or contextualize it over a concrete case either. At this point, Goffman's ethnography at a mental institution and his theoretical explanations on the

dynamics of the relations at total institutions are more suitable to my analysis of the Mamak and Diyarbakir cases.

Diverging from Foucault's ubiquitous power based explanations, Smith and Goffman present Durkheim's early writings on deviance and punishment. Smith highlights that Foucault's analysis lacks meaning and interaction, and that punishment cannot be a mere rational response to disorder (2008). Smith, further claims that incarceration also constitutes emotional reactions (Smith, 2008). The cases that I scrutinize in this thesis also show the role of relations, emotions and interaction in coping with the prison life.

Similarly, drawing on Durkheim's insistence on emotional reactions in prison, Goffman investigates inmates' and wardens' worlds separately in "total institutions" with micro-relational lenses (1961). Goffman (1961) defines a total institution as "a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administrated round of life" (p.6) He acknowledges that total institutions would not be without resistance by stating:

"Where enthusiasm is expected, there will be apathy; where loyalty is expected there will be disaffection; where attendance, absenteeism; where robustness, some kind of illness; where deeds are to be done, varieties of inactivity. We find a multitude of homely little histories, each in its way a movement of liberty. Whenever worlds are laid on, underlives develop" (Goffman, 1961, p.305).

His analysis helps us see prison sites do not reflect the complex politics of state discipline in a form of mere "domination" and "resistance," nor do they always follow

patterns of the production of “docile” bodies in Foucauldian terms. Instead, they generate culturally complex and politically fraught environments with underlives.

Goffman acknowledges the “total institutions” as contested spaces and suggests that inmates create defensive adjustments to the mortifying aspects of spatial power (1961). His analysis of the interaction between inmates and staff and with the space unearths how prison order attacks the self and identity via humiliation, mortification and contamination and how self and identity adapt or find creative ways to resist inside.

Mortifying aspects of the power can either be losing one’s private possessions, personal appearance, individual space or as the most commonly seen forms of mortification in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons: “disruption of the usual relationship between the individual actor and his acts” (Goffman, 1961, p.35) Mostly this disruption takes the form of humiliation such as the forced act of deference to call the wardens as “commander”, obligation to humbly ask permission to scratch one’s self, to use the bathrooms or to ask for sanitary pads during female inmates’ periods. In addition to mortification, Goffman in his ethnography also mentions contamination in total institutions as a way to attack one’s self (1961). For instance, contamination includes unclean food, messy wards, floors, common areas and toilets. Diyarbakir case has extreme instances of physical contamination such as preclusion to clean one’s body with water or scarcity of drinking water. Another instance of contamination from Diyarbakir and Mamak prisons is the loss of sense of personal safety and physical integrity caused by arbitrary beatings and various forms of torture.

Both mortification and contamination have humiliating aspects, by creating the situation of loss of adulthood, self-determination and autonomy for the inmates. Goffman discovered that since the inmates cannot defend themselves by usual means

such as distancing their selves from the mortifying situation, they employ methods of resisting that incapacity (1961). He conceptualizes these methods in total institutions as “secondary adjustments” and “underlife” formed by those secondary adjustments. Goffman explains secondary adjustments as “practices that do not directly challenge staff but allow inmates to obtain forbidden satisfactions or to obtain permitted ones by forbidden means” (1961, p.54) Secondary adjustments provide the inmate a sense of having control over her environment. I will talk more on the examples of secondary adjustments in Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons such as communicating via tapping on radiator pipes or making a ropeway by undoing their socks and using that lift as a tool of transportation and exchanging of goods or news.

Resembling James Scott’s concept of “hidden transcripts”, inmates have “free spaces” they use in the backstage of the usual performance of staff-inmate relationships (Goffman, 1961,p.230.) They have their own ways of communication, currency, transportation of goods and stashes. Mamak and Diyarbakir cases too reveal occurrences of giving nicknames to threatening situations, items or spaces and making jokes about them. Especially, female inmates’ sustained resistant performance in Mamak prison shows how mocking with mortifying situations reduce the threat they feel.

Primary adjustments help preserve the structure of the institution whereas there are two types of secondary adjustments: disruptive and contained. Disruptive ones aim for a radical change in the structure and contained ones exist within the institutional structure without pushing for a radical change. For instance, hunger strikes can count as disruptive ones and learning how to speak without moving one’s lips can be counted as contained secondary adjustment.

Discussions on “Prison Riots”

Initial studies on inmate movements started during Second World War era with research on the war-prisoner camps in Korea, Vietnam, Nazi camps and Soviet labor camps (Pederson, 1978). Subsequently, most of the researchers focused on American prisons. As previously mentioned, the general tendency amongst scholars to develop a social theory for the wider society by studying prisons also reveals itself here. Useem and Goldstone (1999) conducted an intriguing study where they implemented Skocpol’s state-centric theory of revolutions to prison riots. They investigated whether state-centric theories of revolution would be supported by the dynamics of prison riots, which they also refer to as “micro-revolutions”.

Moreover, functionalist approaches were popular in two main veins: inmate-balance theory and rising expectations theory. Sykes arguing in favor of the inmate-balance theory suggested that riots were results of increasing coercion by the officials distorting normally functional social system that is initiated by inmates themselves. Basically, this approach suggests “authority cannot be taken away from inmates, however skilled the effort, because shared authority is an essential element of prison stability” (Useem and Reisig, 1999, p.755). Jacobs (1977) on the other hand, defends the “rising expectations” approach, claiming when a more tolerant prison order takes the place of a stricter one, inmates’ higher expectations will not be met and turn into a riot. In another study, Useem and Reisig suggested these two approaches are complementary to each other (1999). Furthermore, in their study which they discussed prison riots as micro-revolutions, Useem and Goldstone conclude that be it loose or tight, riots are more likely to take place during transition or reform of existing practices -from tight to loose or loose to tight- and “like all historical events—subject to the role of contingent events that can shape the outbreak, duration, and scope of the

event” (1999). While they put forward similarities between revolutions and prison riots such as elite dissension, administrative failures and popular grievances they buttress the importance of people’s perception of the central authorities acts as immoral, ineffective or unjust (Gurr and Goldstone 1991, p. 331). In another critical study, the same scholars discuss that although the social movements theorists reject the breakdown theory of collective action, they found evidence to support this theory in New Mexico Prison riot in 1980 (Useem, 1985).

The difference of my case is that former inmates I interviewed are previously organized political prisoners who were already in politically contentious relationship with the state. Intensifying state repression in the prison aimed to break their organization structures. Thus in these high-risk contexts, explaining inmate collective action solely by extreme deprivation, inmate-balance, rising expectations or breakdown theories is not feasible. Nevertheless, synthesizing all these different approaches to inmate collective action shed light to my analysis because distortion of the shared authority in the prison and extreme deprivation covaries as igniter factors for collective action in the cases I investigate too.

When approaching collectivity in total institutions, Goffman introduces another captivating concept to help explain the collective rejection of the absolute rule of prison authority in prison by “collective teasing”. The concept of collective teasing as a form of secondary adjustment is commonly seen in Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons as well. Goffman defines collective teasing as rejecting staff and he gives the examples of slogan shouting, booing, tray thumping, mass food rejection and minor sabotage (Goffman, 1961, p. 58). He also acknowledges that there would be inmates who would choose to be obedient but this obedience is not unavoidable. With the

beneficial insights of ethnographic research, he also unravels the effect of inmates' status, their connections outside and expected need from staff to keep their emotions under control. The effect of inmates' outside connections and hardships of the emotion-control by the staff was especially seen in Mamak prison. There are instances of special treatment to the inmates whom fathers or uncles are in military or high-ranked bureaucrats. I will also present and discuss the salience of good treatment by the staff who pitied the inmates in Mamak Prison.

At his point, I will get support from collective action theories in general, rather than those focused on prison riots. Here, Pederson's early comparative analysis is also very significant in pointing out the temporal relationship with the social movements outside and inmate movements in the prison (1978). Moreover, Goldstone also directs our attention to the pushing role of shared ideology and sense of injustice in formation of a group solidarity and collective identity in prison riots as well (1999).

Discussion on the Dynamics of Collective Action

I do not employ a single "grand theory" that I find as an all-encompassing frame for the cases I investigate. Instead I utilize crucial parts of several theories to form a framework within which I analyze the experiences of Turkish and Kurdish inmates. Rather than insisting merely on the centrality of human agency or the structural elements to explain the dynamics of collective action, I find that my method of analysis acknowledges the convoluted interactions of micro, meso and macro level factors together. To this end, I prefer to utilize a blend of theories as heuristic device rather than forcing my cases to fit in a single theoretical approach. To have a comprehensive understanding, first I will briefly demonstrate the existing collective action theories.

Behavioral Approach

Until late 1960s, a psychological causality dominated the discussions around collective action (e.g. Strikes, street protests, marches, vigils etc.). This perspective suggested that social movements are marginalized, unorganized, abrupt crowd reactions fed with grievances or deprivations. Commonly used term of “collective behavior” for explaining social movements, indicated something inferior than a conscious and purposive action. This paradigm has long been criticized for reducing collective action into a sporadic social breakdown or an irrational anomia and for marginalizing the participators.

Rational Choice and a Critical Look

Later on with Olson, by the late 1960s and 1970s, rational-choice theories paid more attention to the ways and motivations behind mobilization and rejected centrality of the behavioral theories. Rational-choice theories explain participation based on methodological individualism and usually utilize abstract, game-theoretical tools for analysis. They insist that rational individuals would not participate in collective action to gain public goods; unless the group consist of quite a small number of people or they are forced to join. Furthermore, Olson discussed the logic of collective action and suggested that collective action depends on selective incentives and perceiving the possible personal gain as the outcome (1965). Selective incentives can be positive or negative and if a social movement could offer positive incentives for the group, the problem of free riding could be overcome.

However, in every different historical context ideological differences and conflicting interests always interact such as organizational, class-based, gender-based distinctions together with differing previous life experiences of the protestors that might precede the value of personal material gains. Especially in high-risk collective actions positive

incentives are not solely individual but are collective gains (Loveman, 1998). Loveman criticizes the rational-choice theory for its inapplicability to the high-risk, life threatening, unpredictable contexts such as the object of this thesis: military prisons. With a reference to Geddes, she posits that rational-choice theory can work best where the “rules of game” are predictable (1998). She also reminds us the combination of material or non-material incentives can change over the course of a collective action. Therefore, it would be a limited understanding if one only focuses on the material incentives at the decision point of recruitment but not through the process. In such environments like Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons where the cost of an action can be death, torture or any kind of physical and psychological harm and the benefit is the “maintenance of honor”, the rational choice theory based on a material calculation will most likely predict inaction.

Considering political actors’ decisions of acting collectively in unpredictable environments, as being irrational would be overly simplifying them into an economic theory. Instead of conceptualizing them as having homogenous perceptions and motivations about certain situations, I consider the contingent operation of the mixed motivations, backgrounds, interactions and shared identities in addition to the material benefits as motivation behind the decisions of individuals. Discussions in the literature clearly conclude that collective settings operate differently from the economistic models used by Olson. Still, the self-interest assumption is a useful heuristic principle rather than an explanatory law when explaining collective action in prisons.

Resource Mobilization Approach

Resource mobilization theory objects behavioral theories on the grounds that they define mobilization processes and collective actions as irrational and unorganized mobs. McCarthy and Zald lead another discussion to prove that rational individuals can legitimately participate in normal and organized activities of social movements (1977). They suggest that grievances and shared ideologies, beliefs can always exist in a society. However, to mobilize people crucial elements are the availability of the material (money, services etc.) and non material (authority, faith etc.) resources, structural elements like political freedom, networks, state repression, means of communication, media & transportation institutions, legitimacy, and so on (1977).

Yet, resembling the rationalist approach, resource mobilization theories assume that individual or organizational interests are objectively defined and the success of a social movement is positively correlated with the availability and the richness of the resources mentioned above. This theory has been criticized for taking its evidence solely from the American social movements experiences, centralizing an entrepreneurial approach to social movements and insisting on the need for incentives and/or coercion to foster mobilization (Aslanidis, 2012). More specifically, conditioning the assurance of a strong organization and availability of resources for mobilization, which lacks highly in a military prison environment, I could not depend merely on this structural theory either. Yet, because of the flexibility of the term “resource” this theory is capable of creating a synergy with micro-level processes of mobilization; thus integrating emotions and identity to the collective action.

Political Opportunity Structure: Threats and Opportunities

Diverging their foci from both grievances and resources Tarrow, Tilly and Goldstone in *Dynamics of Contention* take a more structural and systematic approach than the antecedent scholars and pay attention to the political and institutional conjunctures in which the social movement operates (2004). The political process perspective and political opportunity structure neither conceive social movements as irrational spontaneous acts nor as merely rational calculations of resources. The novelty of contentious politics theory is to suggest mechanism-processes approach to fulfill the absence of a methodology in social movements literature. According to them, having access to resources or expecting material gains are not sufficient for emergence of a collective action. Instead, they claim definition of a political opportunity structure is necessary for understanding the challenges towards an established political order (Tilly & Tarrow & McAdam, 2004). This approach is helpful to better embed Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons in the broader political context. Moreover, in Tarrow and Tilly's formulation, political opportunity structure is "external" to potential collective actors, so even resource-poor, "weak or disorganized challengers" can benefit from the altering opportunities (2005). This is why in a resource-wise poor and repressive environments such as prisons; opportunity structure can be utilized to embed the collective action in the institutional structure of the prison.

Political opportunity structure refers to features of regimes and institutions that facilitate or inhibit a political actor's collective action and to changes in those features (Tilly & Tarrow, 2005). Goldstone and Tilly's formulation in the simplest version suggest a relationship in which as opportunity grows, action mounts and as opportunity shrinks action fades (Aminzade, 2001). Though, in their later studies

they expand the scope of the theory by acknowledging that repression can function either way to action or non-action (Aminzade, 2001).

This latter perception leads us to look at both changing threats and opportunities that occur in the political system. Goldstone and Tilly emphasize that threats and opportunities are two distinct concepts that can overlap or interact with each other (Maher, 2010). Moreover, Tarrow suggests that an opportunity is not exactly the opposite of a threat, but rather a beneficial change or shift in the political system and economic resources between the state and the challengers (1996). Furthermore, these authors define threat as the cost a social group will bare or the level that they expect to suffer from inaction. They break threat into two different categories: “harms that are currently experienced or anticipated (current threat), and costs of repression if protest is undertaken (repressive threat) (Tarrow, 1996, pp.22-41).”

However, explaining collective action in high-risk contexts is more complex than assuming that collective action would occur when current threats (the cost of inaction) are perceived as greater than repressive threats (the cost of action). In their views, protest usually leads to an increase in repression or concession, rather than less. To explain this, they suggest scrutinizing the interaction between opportunities and repressive threats, which gives rise to contention (Aminzade, 2001) . There might be a correlation between perceiving the opportunities, threats and emergence of a protest but Diyarbakir and Mamak cases show that there is no direct causal relationship.

Although Goldstone and Tilly encourage us to realize the interaction between opportunity and threats they still base their theories on the decision process to act that is a calculation based on the state’s or oppressor’s actions (repression or concession).

That is not to say that the concepts of opportunity and threat are not explanatory, but at the same time they are structurally limited, leading us to miss the rich micro level dynamics in the formation of collective action in prison. However, there are instances even though inmates acknowledge opportunities they cannot mobilize or sustain collective action. To form a collective action in high-risk contexts, merely acknowledging threats and opportunities is not enough to recruit insurgents. Without the existence of a variety of interpersonal ties, trust in the leaders' willpower in taking risks and channeling emotions like anger, dignity/honor and fear into collective identity, overt resistance acts in high-risk contexts would be very rare as James Scott also suggests (1990).

At this point we need to orient our attention to the micro-relational aspect of collective action. That is to say, we need to consider the micro level factors such as one's perception/framing of self, emotions and meso-level elements such as organizations and networks all together embedded in the opportunity-threat structure to see why collective action processes were different in Diyarbakir and Mamak Prisons.

Moving to Micro-Level Explanations: Cultural and Emotional Theory of Action

Abovementioned theories have overlooked the micro-level interactional dimensions for a long time and dominated the discussion on social movements. Until 1990s, when feminist and constructivist scholars started investigating social movements, cultural processes and micro-level interactions in social movements analysis, stayed limited with the rational choice theory as if the individuals were unsocial beings. Jasper criticizes this attitude by stating that even if individuals

always do what is best for them, we need to look into interpretive and emotional dynamics that shape their decisions (Jasper, 2010). Piven (1997), also points out that strategic choices of protestors are more important than the structures they face.

Emotions and Collective Action

In parallel with Einwohner's (2003) work on Warsaw ghetto uprising, this study also supports that collective action does not always need an opportunity and not every opportunity turns into action. With reference to Gould's emphasis on the motivating role of emotions, Tarrow also recognizes that emotions like grief, anger, and pride turn into resources in converting passivity into action (1993). Even though Goodwin's study shows that affective ties have the possibility to act as barrier in front of collective action, Jasper passionately introduces emotions into the field of social movement theories. He argues that people are much more than rational actors. In his words: "... in deciding whether and how to engage in contentious politics, people have to make sense of themselves and their worlds and the relationship between the two. They must evaluate their situations, consider their sometimes ambiguous and contradictory desires, confront their fears, assess their own values as well as those of mainstream...much more than rational calculation occurs as people engage in this kind of (sometimes conscious, sometimes less-than-fully conscious) interpretive work)"(Goodwin ,& Jasper, 2004).

Drawing upon my fieldwork too I also argue that feelings are not exclusive to the mobilization structures. We should consider how people feel about themselves, the political situation and the options as components of interpretation before and during action. If we turn to amalgamate emotions with political process theory as Jasper neatly does: "Opening political opportunity might generate emotions like hope and pride or might legitimize emotions like anger and indignation, which in turn

might inspire an emotionally resonant collective action frame or a reallocation of resources toward collective action. In his paradigm, attention to emotions might help us understand why and how opening political opportunities sometimes facilitate protests. (Goodwin, & Jasper, 2004) For example, moral shocks, unexpected and outrageous link emotions such as anger, indignation, self-respect and grief to confrontational action. According to Goodwin et al. (2007) different kinds of emotions are tied to different aspects of resistance. Affective emotions facilitate respect and trust, which enable effective leadership and solidarity and moods such as hope, optimism, or grim determination raise morale, which is necessary to “keep on keeping on”, which I will show is crucial in formation of a collective action in prisons.

Networks and Relations

Meanwhile, Tilly, McAdam and Tarrow also argue that collective action emerges from interrelations between different subjects and the intersections of their perceptions of reality (2004). Additionally, McAdam reminds that assuming individuals as isolated beings detached from their context when making cost-benefit analysis would be misleading. He buttresses the role of interpersonal relations and social networks (eg. friends, family, co-workers etc.) in the decision making process of individuals. Particularly, if we consider inmates' dependence on each other to survive in prison, it would be unrealistic to assume that each inmate would solely decide according to their individual utility. For example one's personal wrong doing in a ward ends in punishment for all and one's informal cooperation with the officers harms her comrades and makes her an untrusted person, which would lead to isolation.

McAdam, Paulsen, Welgrave and Diani's works provide multifaceted discussions on the individual level aspect of mobilization process. In their findings, the main discussion revolves around the role of social ties and individual networks in recruitment process of a social movement (1993). McAdam & Paulsen (1993) display the shortcomings of the literature on social ties and networks in a way that existing literature already underlines the facilitative role of social ties in recruitment. However, neither they elaborate on which dimension of the social ties are influential in recruiting nor how competing ties and multiple embedding effect individual decision. According to them one should pay attention to the dimensions of the social ties, namely their salience, and centrality or strength that matter in the micro-mobilization process (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993).

Furthermore, individuals are embedded in multiple ties and some of those ties can be constraining as well. McAdam's emphasis on history of activism before, namely biography also makes sense for the political prisoners. I have evidence to support that how previous experience of activism; biography and relations were crucial in formation of collective action in the prisons. Interpersonal ties and constraining aspects of them indicate that already knowing someone in a movement does not lead to higher recruitment rates to the movement. Dimensions of the ties, their salience, centrality etc. should also be considered.

However, Jasper finds this effort of including individual level factors into social movement studies still carry their structural bias because the concepts of networks and ties too assume an established structure of relations. Looking into interactions that pave the way for molding those ties would be more informative. He suggests that rather than going from macro to micro, going from interactions to relations and to ties and networks would provide us a richer and more comprehensive

understanding of the dynamics at individual level of collective action (Jasper, 1997). On a similar lane, Viterna (2013) unearths the recruitment strategies of FMLN and motivations behind individual decisions of women guerillas by introducing the centrality of identity. According to her, the salience of identity has appeared to have a major prominence in mobilization processes. Further discussion will be on showing how movements can create opportunities for recruitment and how threats in the political contexts have the potential of increasing or decreasing the number of latent participants via reshaping the meanings of identities and the memberships of networks.

Leadership and Identity

Especially in undemocratic and high-risk contexts, leaders could be really influential in enabling and collectivizing action. Particularly, my case showed that risk-liability of the leaders is an igniter factor for emergence of a collective action in prisons. Resembling Weber's distinction of bureaucratic and prophetic leaders, Aminzade also distinguishes leaders into task-oriented and people-oriented. According to him, task-oriented leadership functions in getting things done orderly in comparison to people-oriented leadership, which evokes emotions and "reshape followers' framing" of the situations to take action (2001). As the cases of Mamak and Diyarbakir also unravel, in repressive contexts it is not sufficient for leaders to just get things done, rather they should also take leading roles in such defensive actions. At this point, Gamson also stresses the importance of leadership abilities in conducting the process to aim and maintaining motivation (1991). I will utilize these distinct conceptualizations when I delve into the details of the recruitment processes in Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons. As O'Hearn also comments on, presumably, a leader's devotion of her interests and desires to the collective would encourage others

(2012).

Additionally, Clifford and Sharon hypothesize that besides a movement's political opportunity structure; the type of leader, the movement's ideology of martyrdom, the leader's embodiment of a shared group identity and the movement's preexisting unity matters (2007). Although they focus on the impact of assassination of a leader on the movement, their perceptions of external and internal factors that shape a movement emphasizes micro-level mobilization factors once again. I also think that many studies oversimplify the difference between leaders and followers, though there can be many informal leaders of a movement. The cases of Mamak and Diyarbakir showed me that regardless of the source of their reputation trust in their knowledge and risk-liability determines their weight in the mobilization process.

Literature on collective identity is wider than the literature on leadership. Polletta and Jasper define collective identity as "an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution." Prior bonds and organizational affiliations facilitate the formation of a shared identity among the people (2001, p. 285). Furthermore, A well-defined and shared understanding of "us" vs. "them" is an essential precondition of successful mobilization (Gamson, 1992). Thus, when a clearly identified enemy exercises coercion to humiliate and degrade, this situation would ignite a group's tactics to combat that humiliation and forge their shared identity against it. Here, Gould and Calhoun enlighten us about how individual and collective interests, identities, and solidarity are conceived, constructed, maintained, and reproduced in the process of struggle itself. Calhoun states, "Identity is, in many cases, forged in and out of struggle, including participation in social movements" (2009). Thus, the relationship

between collective identity and action is reciprocal and reproduces itself with the changing dynamics of the process.

Repression and Collective Action

State repression plays an important role in shaping the dynamics of collective action. There are a plethora of perceptions and disagreements among scholars regarding the impact of state coercion on dissidents' resistance. In most theoretical models, state repression and especially state-sponsored violence towards leaders is associated with movement decline (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2001; Tilly, 1978).

In contentious politics reasoning, repression reduces the political opportunities that facilitate movement development (McAdam, 1982). In their articulation, repression “makes organizing difficult and dangerous, as those who seek to activate indigenous organizations or form new ones become easy targets for sanctions” (1982). Repression can therefore cause ordinary movement participants to drop out, fearing the costs and risks involved (McAdam, 1988). It can also create a sense of hopelessness and resignation. Finally, repression may also destroy unity by creating informers, as activists suspect one another of being collaborators with the oppressor (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988). As my cases show, it can also turn into an opportunity for the action.

On the other hand, Lichbach and Loveman argue that repression facilitates collective action. Keeping all the different approaches in mind, the cases I investigate provided me evidence to support that even though repression might cause demobilization and depression or hopelessness among the inmates at a time through the process, it also opens space for alternative interactions, sharing and trust to

develop and if the leaders play perceptive role, followers could re-frame their situation and mobilize. That is to say, increasing threats for a movement has the potential to turn into an opportunity if the dynamics at micro-level interactions could be channeled into action.

Therefore, my cases support O'Hearn's analysis of Irish "blanketman protest" by the IRA members in late 1970s; in his words: "Mortification can clear the way for collectivism and solidarity" (2012). In addition to these, Kalyvas has more to argue on repression by distinguishing into selective and indiscriminate violence in irregular contentious environments. He mainly examines civil wars but I think his differentiation of the use of selective and indiscriminate violence is also explanatory for prisons. Kalyvas argues that indiscriminate violence occurs when precise information is scarce or selection criteria are rough when deciding whom to attack (2006). Although this was not the case in a prison environment where the authorities have full information about the prisoners, his third argument about the "use of indiscriminate violence to control a population, shape the behavior rather than simply to loot, displace, or eliminate" seems explanatory (Kalyvas, 2006). Obviously Turkish state conceived Kurdish liberation movement as a bigger threat than the Turkish socialist movement and chose indiscriminate violence against Kurdish political prisoners while imposing selective violence in Mamak prison to Turkish political prisoners.

This was also as an attempt of continuing assimilation policies as Zeydanlioglu also takes our attention (2009). Kalyvas conclude that indiscriminate violence seems to be counter-productive, "with the exception of situations where there is a high imbalance of power" (2009, pp.171). He contributes to our

understanding of collective action in high-risk contexts by arguing “When violence is indiscriminate, compliance is almost as unsafe as non-compliance, because the “innocent” can do little or nothing to escape punishment and the “guilty” are no more (and sometimes less) threatened ” (Kalyvas, 2009, pp.154) He further adds that selective violence is effective in enabling deterrence because “ the effectiveness of selective violence hinges less on pinpoint accuracy and more on a perception among the population that a process of selection is taking place” (pp.150). This distinction between indiscriminate and selective violence is important because we witness the different outcomes they lead to in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons.

CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Turkish Prisons and Political Prisoners in the Republican History (1920-1980):

Conditions of Prisons between 1920 and 1980:

To have a better understanding of the experience of political prisoners during early 1980s, we must relate the changes in the organization of prison system until 1980s. Here, I briefly review the changing management methods in the prisons, penal codes and daily prison order in the republican era. Financial incapacity, lack of modern prison buildings and escalating organized political opposition appear as main determinants of the state-hand intervention to transform these institutions.

The transformation from traditional understandings of justice to rationalized penal codes, the birth of “modern” forms of imprisonment, dates back to the introduction of Tanzimat Edict (1839)⁹ during the late Ottoman period. In addition to public executions, physical punishment, exile, penal servitudes (*prangabentlik*, *kalebentlik*, *kurek cezasi*) and imprisonment in castles, islands, dungeons or the houses of governors or imams¹⁰ were widely used under the rule of Ottoman Empire (Yildiz (2012)). In 1871 the first modern prison building was built with the precise aim of imprisonment in Sultanahmet,¹¹ Istanbul (Sen, 2007). The Republic of Turkey inherited the Ottoman prisons, when it came to power in 1923, along with the financial and governmental incapacity to manage them until late 20th century. Due to the financial deficiency, schools, hospitals, military wards, churches, caravansaries¹², and castles were utilized as places of incarceration by the early republic (Eren, 2014).

⁹ Starting in the late 18th century with modernization reforms in the military, the legal and tax system and the bureaucracy were already significantly reformed in Ottoman Empire. Later on, such “liberal” concepts as equality before law, Ottoman citizenship, property rights and security of life were introduced with the Tanzimat Edict (1839).⁹ Shortly after the declaration of the edict, reforms in crime control institutions such as courts, police service, gendarme and prison reforms were also initiated.

¹⁰ The title of the person who leads prayers in a mosque.

¹¹ The historical district of Istanbul where the first Ottoman palace stands.

¹² Historical inns with large courtyards

The first penal code of the Republic was introduced in 1926. It classified imprisonment into four broad categories of punishment: light imprisonment, exile, imprisonment, and heavy imprisonment. Light imprisonment was enforced on minor offences and confined the offender from two days up to two years. Exile forced the person to live in a town at least 60 kilometers away from the crime sight. However, it was not a form of confinement; the person could live with her family or work in that new town from six months to five years. Exile was listed as a legal form of punishment until 1965. Heavy imprisonment, on the other hand, was a sentence either for a life-term or twenty-four years or under harder conditions including solitary confinement (Eren, 2014). Differing from the penal codes of 19th century, the 1926 penal code made use of progressive sentencing. That is to say, depending on “good behavior” (determined by prison regulations) and work record of the prisoner, her punishment could be decreased. In one of the opening speeches of the Turkish Grand Nation Assembly in 1923, Mustafa Kemal¹³ talked about the situation of the prisons in his speech. He stated that the ministry of interior prepared a report on the need for restoring the existing prisons and accelerating the construction of new prisons suitable to the modern needs of the era and to educate the inmates.¹⁴ There were nearly 35,000 prisoners at the time this speech was given (Sen, 2007).

The new laws and Kemal’s speech make it apparent that the early republicans aimed to “rehabilitate” the inmates to make them beneficial individuals to the society in their terms. Different from deterrence, rehabilitation aims to change and give a new form to the prisoners’ attitudes. However, the young republic was not able to create

13 (1881–1938), Turkish general and statesman, President 1923–38; also called Kemal Pasha. He was elected the first President of the Turkish republic, taking the name of Atatürk (‘father of the Turks’) in 1934. He abolished the caliphate and introduced other policies designed to make Turkey a modern secular state.

¹⁴ TBMM’s 1st year 2nd legislation year opening speech: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tarihce/ata Turk_konusma/1d4yy.htm

the “modern” prison buildings and sufficient trained staff suitable for their aims of rehabilitation, which required vocational and physical training for inmates.

Progressive regulations were introduced in an attempt to leave the traditional loose ruling of prisons depending on the arbitrary decisions of the prison administrations. However, similar to the Ottoman prison reforms, the reports and narratives of the inmates indicate that these regulations were never completely implemented on the ground. The journalist Zekeriya Sertel depicts the Istanbul (Sultanahmet) prison in 1930s in these words:

There was a huge atelier in which prisoners worked...One day they took us to the ward of heavy imprisonment, a cellar from Byzantines. It was a deep dark place without windows and with a heavy smell of moisture and coal. About 500 inmates were living in that cellar with a slice of bread given by the prison for a day. They were smoking weed to accelerate their deaths, they seem to be lost their humanity and turned into animals, and they were the residuum of the society (Ozturk, 2004, p. 127).

It would not be wrong to assert that prisons were the least invested of all state institutions in the early republican era. As Sertel’s depiction also shows, the new penal code remained solely on paper. The state did not invest resources in or respond to the needs of the inmates in regard to health, hygiene, nutrition or the architectural style. Moreover, lack of security, violence among inmates, lack of hygiene, overcrowding and co-habitation of minors with adults were the worst aspects of the early republican prisons. Absence of separate prisons for women and children was also a major problem when managing the overcrowding and addressing the prisoners

with special needs. In parallel with Sertel's observation, judiciary inspectors stressed the problem of overpopulation in their report in 1932:

Most of the buildings are not suitable to be used for imprisonment. Prisons are overcrowded, for example there are 597 inmates in contrast with the capacity for 150 people in Kastamonu prison, 375 prisoners in contrast to capacity for 200 in Samsun and 900 prisoners in contrast to capacity for 500 people in Izmir prison. Absence of ventilation and heating systems, absence of separate buildings for women and children scarcity of water and food are urgent problems of the prisons and should be overcome immediately (Demirbas, 2008, pp. 144-145).

Although the government passed legislation in the 1930s to build new facilities in order to address the problem of overcrowding, it wasn't until the 1950s that new construction of prison buildings picked up speed. Between 1929 and 1950, 87 prisons were constructed; but when the one party rule of the Republican People's Party (CHP)¹⁵ ended in 1950 and the Democrat Party (DP)¹⁶ came into power, the number of prisons jumped to 149 only within three and a half years of the DP rule (Hur, 2009). This escalation in the number of prisons was also a harbinger of the new waves of trials. The DP expanded the scope of the penal law by expanding the duration of punishments and the definition of crimes. Furthermore, the DP increased the arrests of TKP (Communist Party of Turkey) members and followed a harsh opposition policy against CHP and the press. As a result, the prison population jumped from 32,250 in 1953 to 46,000 in 1955 (Ozturk, 2004, p. 92).

¹⁵ The secular modernist political party established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and ruled the republic for 30 years with one-party government.

¹⁶ The conservative and pro-Islam political party as the opponent of CHP.

The Short-Term Trial of Labor-Based Prisons: 1930 - 1950

As a reflection of the global economic crisis and the interwar period, the need for manual labor became urgent for the economy (Sipahi, 2006). In 1934 a new law enforced the construction of work-based prisons in Turkey (Ozturk, 2004). Therefore, by taking Germany and the Soviets as examples, policy makers introduced labor-based prisons to the Turkish penal system between 1930 and 1950. It was introduced as a quick-fix formula of the state-centered economy of 1930s, and it was used for a short period of time to compensate the lack of adequate labor force in agriculture, mining and road construction. The period of forced labor of prisoners ended in 1950 with the general amnesty of the government led by the Democrat Party (Sipahi, 2006). After 1950, prison policies remain unchanged until the next legal changes of 1965.

Political Prisoners of the Early Republican Prisons: 1920-1960

I briefly depicted the prison system of the early Republic, which—like the Ottoman system that preceded it—was characterized by insufficient physical capacity and the inability to meet the needs of the prisoners. Yet there was another challenge for the penal system, namely: the political opponents of the new regime.

With the declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923, and even before then, opponents of the new regime were being arrested. Until the 1960s, the majority of the political prisoners were members of the TKP, opponent journalists in Istanbul and opposition military officials, together with the former bureaucrats of the Empire (those former bureaucrats were mostly the members of Committee of Union and Progress) (Ozturk, 2004). The new republic was attacking a variety of opponents

including Islamists, Kurdish insurgents and members of TKP in its early years. Its main methods were arbitrary trials under state of emergency, incarcerations, and executions. Kurdish uprisings of the 1920s and 1930s were suppressed with arbitrary trials, executions, and massacres (Besikci, 2013).

“Political prisoner” as a legal term was not used at that time by the state authorities. In state discourse, these prisoners were generally referred to as communists or anarchists (TKP members and other socialists), “rebels” or “bandits” (Kurdish insurgents) or “reactionists” (Islamists) up until the 1970s. After the 1970s, the term “terrorist” was coined and used to refer to all political prisoners at an increasing rate.¹⁷ On the other hand, wardens, prison officials and other inmates used the term “politicals” (*siyasiler*) to refer to such prisoners within the prison environment.

Daily Lives of the Ordinary Prisoners and Political Prisoners in the Early Republican Prisons: 1920s-1950s

Until 1934, political prisoners were kept together with the ordinary prisoners (*adliler or adiler*). Only a few sources address the daily lives of prisoners or the interactions of ordinary and political prisoners before 1970s. Fortunately, the novels, poems and paintings of the former inmates provide much valuable information about the prisons of that era. Orhan Kemal’s *72nd Ward*, Kemal Tahir’s *Esir Sehrin Mahpusu*, Kerim Korcan’s *Tatar Ramazan*, Ibrahim Balaban’s paintings and Nazim Hikmet’s poems written in prisons are some of the sources that help one grasp prison life before the 1970s. These narratives show that ordinary prisoners were living in an

¹⁷ See <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/toplum/139818-hapishane-den-cezaevi-ne-turkiye-de-degis-en-mahpusluk> Analysis of the use of “terrorist” in Milliyet gazetesi between 1950-2004 shows the increase in the use of terrorist and decrease in the use of anarchist from 1950s to 2000s for the political prisoners.

order of *ağalık* (agha rule) and political prisoners had their *commune* systems (Ozturk, 2004). In a commune system money and food that visitors brought were shared equally among member inmates. In addition to this financial sharing, committees formed an ideological education program and every member of the commune contributed to the daily practices like preparation of food and cleaning the ward.

Kemal Tahir talks about his day in prison in one of his letters to Semiha Hanim in 1950:

We wake up at 7am have breakfast until 8am. After breakfast we pace back and forth in the yard, play some board games until lunchtime. We sleep until 3 pm or wait for the newspapers; in the evening we pace the halls again. At 7 pm we have dinner and at 8pm listen to radio (electricity in Nevsehir turns on by then). At night we write letters, read and listen to the news on the radio, sometimes it plays dance music. Then electricity goes off at 12pm, and we go to sleep (Tahir, 1992).

The narratives show that the political prisoners could plan their daily routines. Prison authorities, on the other hand, had no strict policy of programming the daily lives of the political prisoners until 1971 military coup. Moreover, *agha rule* of the ordinary prisoners depended on the hierarchy between the prisoners according to the type of crime, their wealth, and the length of their sentence. The wealthier and the longer sentenced had more power over others and received larger shares of the goods—including, for instance cigarettes, weed, food and security. Even the location of their beds was determined by a person's position in the hierarchy. Hierarchy degraded from corners and window fronts to the door front. At the bottom of that hierarchy were the *adem babalar* or *meydanci*. Adem Babas were the inmates without supporters inside

or relatives outside. They had no money or clothes (Eren, 2014). Aydemir mentions the narrative of Nazim Hikmet's lawyer about the ordinary prisoners:

There were two types: professionals and the amateurs. The professionals were less in number but they held the power. They had back-ups like a hit man and exploited the amateurs, organized gambling sessions and forced sexual intercourse with the youngsters (Ozturk, 2004, p. 210).

Necip Fazil Kısakurek also emphasizes, “everything is for sale in the prison, from a pencil or socks to a golden tooth or heroin. All these take place in the center of the yard, the competitors also attempt to kill each other on the same square” (Ozturk, 2004, p. 262). Narratives show that gambling, murder, laceration, rape, poverty and drug use, were widespread among ordinary prisoners. Some narratives mention that ordinary prisoners would attack the political prisoners, but most of the time they had a peaceful relationship.

In 1934, a new law stated, “Communists should be separated from ordinaries to impede the spread of their pernicious ideas”(Ozturk, 2004, p. 145). With this new law, wards were segregated in prisons to make this separation possible, and state discourse distinguished the position of political prisoners from the ordinary prisoners. By 1940, the total population of the country was 17,812,000, and the prison population was 21,237—less than 1% of the overall population (Ozturk, 2004, p. 263).

Increasing Numbers of Political Prisoners: 1960-1980

In previous sections, I stressed the physical insufficiencies, unattended needs of the prisoners and the self-programmed prison life both for the ordinary and political prisoners. After the abolishment of labor-based prisons, Turkish state remained oblivious to the state of prisons until it faced the increasing socialist revolutionary opposition in the 1960s and 70s.

According to Boratav, after 1950 more people became actively engaged in social and political life. With the transition to a multiparty system in 1950, the political parties had to consider the needs of the peasants, workers and tradesmen—at least during election times (Boratav, 1988). Thus, it is useful to touch upon the DP rule and the 1960 military coup before considering the polarization of the social and political realm between the 1960s and 1980s.

Throughout the 1950s, the DP employed a repressive policies against the CHP, the press, and the communist opposition, namely the TKP (Boratav, 1988). Furthermore, the DP government pursued liberal market economy reforms during the first half of the 1950s, which was also visible in the 1947 party program of the CHP. Liberalization of imports, relying on foreign capital investments and credits, characterized the DP efforts to transition into a liberal market economy model. However, these attempts failed due to rising inflation and severe devaluation of Turkish Lira in 1958. The pressure of the post-WWII years and the Korean War affected foreign markets and foreign trade negatively. Thus, it led to a high level of external debt (Boratav, 1988).

In this context, DP government strengthened the punitive hand of the state by expanding the scope of the penal law, constructing new prisons and pursuing arrests of communists and opponent journalists. On the 27th of May 1960, the military intervened in parliamentary rule and nearly 500 Democrat Party affiliated politicians

including the ministers, party members, prime minister, and the head of the state were arrested. Members of the DP were confined in the prisons, which they had helped construct. The major trial was held in Yassıada and lasted 204 days. In the end, fifteen executions took place—including the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes—forty-three lifelong sentences, and numerous other sentences were issued (Ozturk, 2004).

Law professors appointed by the military prepared the 1961 constitution in which certain social and political rights were given more liberty than before. For example, workers gained the right to collective bargaining and unionizing, and new institutions were formed to provide checks and balances. The new constitution partially protected citizens from the state. As Keyder (1989) also points out, the 1961 constitution opened space for new political actors and for the eventual politicization of society. However, despite the fact that most history books commemorate the 1961 constitution as the peak of Turkish democracy, it is important to remember that it was introduced by a military coup. It was not liberating for all segments of the society. For example, in 1959 fifty Kurdish students and politically active young men were arrested with the accusation of conducting Kurdish nationalist propaganda against the Turkish state.¹⁸ The president suggested they be executed, and framed their activism as a communist threat in order to receive financial aid from the United States ("STMA, Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mucadeleler Ansiklopedisi Cilt.7," 1988).¹⁹ They were, however, not executed but kept in solitary cells for about a year. One of the students died in custody because of poor health conditions. Meanwhile, the military coup happened and the National Unity Committee²⁰ arrested 485 Kurdish local and religious notables at a camp in Sivas in 1960. They chose fifty-five of the sheiks and

¹⁸ Known as the 49s case.

¹⁹ Framing all political oppositions under "communist threat" was a common strategy of the governments to ask financial and military aid from USA until 1990s.

²⁰ The National Unity Committee (in Turkish, Milli Birlik Komitesi) was a group of military officers, led by General Cemal Gürsel, that staged the military coup of 27 May 1960 and subsequently ruled Turkey through 20 November 1961.

aghas from the group and exiled them to different western cities of the country. Another implication of this coup was to turn Armenian and Kurdish names of the villages into Turkish and campaign for only speaking Turkish in public spaces.

Until the 1960s, the left was active in the political realm under the name of TKP. In 1961 the Workers Party of Turkey (TIP) was established, and it dominated the leftist opposition sphere throughout the 1960s. In the 1965 general elections the Justice Party, as a continuation of the former DP, came into power, and for the first time six different political parties found seats in the parliament including TIP, CHP, YTP (New Turkey Party), which was established as a right-wing party by the Kurdish elites and other right-wing politicians. The Nation Party (MP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) were also on the right wing. In 1966 the government released a general amnesty law, targeting the remaining DP members. A majority of the prisoners considered that law too narrow, and soon after prisoners started protesting this private amnesty law in Ankara, Istanbul, and Elazig prisons (Ozturk, 2004).

Towards the end of the 1960s, left-wing Turkish and Kurdish student organizations became visible in the street protests and university demonstrations. In the mid-1960s, both Turkish and Kurdish socialists came together under the leadership of the TIP, which unlike most of the socialist parties of the era, preferred an unarmed parliamentary route towards socialism and gained seats in the 1965 elections (Zurcher, 2004). Alongside the TIP, the Kurds also organized under TKDP (Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan), established in 1965, DDKO (Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearts), established in 1969, and the Democratic Party in Turkish Kurdistan (T-KDP), formed in 1970. TKDP was an illegal Kurdish nationalist party. T-KDP was also illegal and had a Marxist framing for the struggle but they were both

aiming for a free Kurdistan. DDKO on the other hand, resembled a Kurdish student organization holding cultural activities during its initial years (Turkmen, 2013). Unlike the Kurds who preferred to organize under TIP, TKDP and T-KDP were inspired by the Kurdish armed movement in Iraq and had close connections there. In this vibrant environment, towards the end of the 1960s, TIP started to lose its place as a unifying party of the left. Fractionalizations within the TIP became visible between the Turkish and Kurdish socialists and promoters of SD (Socialist Revolutionary Argument) and the MDD (National Democratic Argument). The supporters of the SD were claiming a parliamentary route to fulfill socialism; whereas, supporters of MDD had Turkish nationalistic constituents and suggested a military coup with the alliance of the army, intellectuals and bureaucrats before the proletariat dictatorship (Akyol, 2010).

Meanwhile, the same fractionalization was taking place among left-wing university student organizations. FKF (Federation of Thought Clubs), which later was turned into DEV-GENC (Revolutionary Youth) in 1969, was the leading student organization. Student protests targeted capitalist system and U.S.-imperialism together with the university students' issues such as illiberal school environment, high fees, and unequal treatment. The most popular of these armed organizations were the THKP-C (Turkey People's Liberation Party/Front), led by Mahir Cayan, TKP/ML (Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist), led by Ibrahim Kaypakkaya, and the THKO (Turkey People's Liberation Army), led by Deniz Gezmiş. These revolutionary student organizations were in touch with the Palestinian guerilla camps in Lebanon, and most of them visited the camps between 1968 and 1971. Concomitantly, right-wing para-military groups with an "anti-communist war" motto

were trained by the state in commando camps to fight against the flourishing armed revolutionary organizations.

Along with revolutionary student organizations and political parties, labor unions were also polarized. In 1967 DISK (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey) was established in opposition to the state-led Turk-Is (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions) (Ozturk, 2004). 1968 was the year when a number of left wing students were imprisoned for the first time. The years between 1968 and 1971 passed with increasing number of strikes in mines, factories and farms; numerous invasions of universities by the organized students; mass street protests; and violent attacks against U.S. and Israeli ambassadors or soldiers. The police and gendarme responded violently to all these actions. On March 12, 1971, the military intervened in parliamentary rule for the second time. This time their reason was to end “anarchy”²¹ and economic downfall.

The Prison System as an Institutional Weapon Against Revolutionary Social Movement Organizations

From the 1960s on, a majority of new prisons were built as closed prisons. They were built on a ward-based system until they were transformed into high-security rooms/cells based prisons of 2000s. Embedded in the new legislation code of the year 1965 was also an article about regulating the daily lives of prisoners. Article 122: “Wake up, cleaning, physical training, going to school or joining workshops, meals, free time and sleep hours schedules were determined according to internal regulations.” Point 123: “Inmates could not talk during working hours, meal times or at schools. Inmates could not talk after the sleeping hour (Menguc, 1968). The new

²¹ Anarchy here does not refer to anarchism, but rather to the actions of socialists with reference to disrupting existing “order”.

legislation paralleled that from the 1930s, which sought to treat (rehabilitate) inmates. However, in 1967, the abolishment of progressive sentencing, introduction of closed prisons as high security institutions, and the goal of programming the daily lives of the prisoners show that a new governmentality in prison management was developing. The architectural novelties, intense security precautions and strict inner regulations on daily lives of the prisoners were the manifestation of the shift to a strict regulatory form of disciplinary rule in prisons. Working regularly, being subjected to a time schedule, obeying the hierarchy of the prison authority and a moral life style were the expected outcomes of this disciplinary rule in prisons.

Additionally, until the covenant of 1967, political prisoners were not officially classified and separated from ordinary prisoners. In 1967, the new covenant categorized the prisoners into three groups: 1- First committers of crime, persistent violators, habitual or vocational criminals; 2- the criminals to be subjected to a special regime because of their mental, physical and age situations; 3-Political criminals (Menguc, 1968). The covenant enforced the isolation of the political prisoners from ordinary prisoners and defined the aim of such “treatments” as: “the use of precautions, technics [sic.] and rules to create the willingness to obey the laws and help the prisoners adapt to the outside life easily” (Menguc, 1968, pp. 379-423). It is possible to interpret these changes in prison management as the state’s response to escalating socialist opposition.

Throughout the 1970s, an increasing number of Turkish and Kurdish left-wing insurgents found themselves imprisoned as political prisoners. According to the data from General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses, Table 1 and Table 2 show the increasing number of prisoners in the 1970s and 80s.²² These tables show that

²² <http://www.cte.adalet.gov.tr/>

number of total prisoners in Turkey increased from 30 thousand in the mid-1970s to 79 thousand in 1981.

Table 1: 1970-79 Total number of convicted and detained prisoners.

YILLAR	HÜKÜMLÜ				TUTUKLU				GENEL TOPLAM
	ERKEK	KADIN	ÇOCUK	TOPLAM	ERKEK	KADIN	ÇOCUK	TOPLAM	
1970	*	*	*	30.119	*	*	*	26.392	56.511
1971	*	*	*	33.416	*	*	*	28.047	61.463
1972	*	*	*	36.140	*	*	*	28.749	64.889
1973	*	*	*	33.722	*	*	*	27.246	60.968
1974	*	*	*	5.442	*	*	*	19.418	24.860
1975	*	*	*	14.276	*	*	*	23.340	37.616
1976	*	*	*	19.881	*	*	*	24.450	44.331
1977	*	*	*	22.632	*	*	*	27.752	50.384
1978	*	*	*	25.212	*	*	*	29.430	54.642
1979	*	*	*	22.417	*	*	*	30.236	52.653

Source: <http://www.cte.adalet.gov.tr/> (yillar=years, hukumlu=convicted, tutuklu=arrested, genel toplam=total, erkek=male, kadın=female, çocuk=children)

Table 2: 1980-89 Total number of convicted and detained prisoners.

YILLAR	HÜKÜMLÜ				TUTUKLU				GENEL TOPLAM
	ERKEK	KADIN	ÇOCUK	TOPLAM	ERKEK	KADIN	ÇOCUK	TOPLAM	
1980	*	*	*	31.241	*	*	*	38.931	70.172
1981	*	*	*	42.446	*	*	*	37.340	79.786
1982	*	*	*	44.650	*	*	*	33.551	78.201
1983	*	*	*	45.144	*	*	*	31.114	76.258
1984	*	*	*	46.370	*	*	*	26.694	73.064
1985	*	*	*	45.388	*	*	*	25.842	71.230
1986	*	*	*	30.786	*	*	*	21.364	52.150
1987	*	*	*	31.315	*	*	*	19.484	50.799
1988	*	*	*	33.078	*	*	*	18.592	51.670
1989	*	*	*	29.407	*	*	*	17.697	47.104

Source: <http://www.cte.adalet.gov.tr/> (yillar=years, hukumlu=convicted, tutuklu=arrested, genel toplam=total, erkek=male, kadın=female, çocuk=children)

The 1970 coup effectively suppressed the rising left wing movements in Turkey only for a while. A significant number of young people subsequently died in custody and in skirmishes with the police and soldiers. Three of the student leaders

were executed, and many others were imprisoned and died in custody between 1971 and 1974. Kizildere Massacre (March 1972) and the three executions (May 1972) had the greatest effect on the revolutionary groups. Maltepe, Mamak, Sigmalcilar and Pasakapisi prisons confined most of the revolutionary insurgents until their release with the 1974 general amnesty law. The significant drop in the total prison population in 1974— from 60,000 in 1973 to 24, 000 —is because of the amnesty law.

Although their leaders had been killed by the state, with the 1974 amnesty law, remaining members were released and they re-formed the revolutionary organizations. Especially between 1974 and 1978, Turkish and Kurdish left wing organizations established strongholds in ghettos, factories, trade unions and universities. Fractionalizing between the Kurdish and Turkish revolutionary organizations continued and speeded up in the second half of the 1970s. Kurdish organizations that were founded in the post-1974 era considered Kurdistan as a separate country and a colony, which is divided between four nation-states of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey (Turkmen, 2013). Thus, they re-framed their struggle beyond a lack of democracy or a class struggle that could be overcome by collaborating with Turkish revolutionary organizations. Impressed by the Cuban Revolution, victories of North African and Asian colonial liberation wars, post-1974 amnesty organizations also came one step further and internalized armed struggle to break Turkish state's colonialism.

Here are some of the organizations established during the 1970s whose members were imprisoned into the 1980s. The main active Kurdish revolutionary organizations in the post-1970 era whose members were incarcerated in the 1980s were: DDKD-DDKAD (Revolutionary Democratic Women's Organization), Ozgurluk Yolu (Revolutionary Path), Rizgari, Kawa, PKK (Kurdistan Worker's

Party), KUK (Kurdistan National Liberators). The main active Turkish revolutionary organizations in the post-1974 era were: Kurtulus (Salvation), Devrimci Yol (Revolutionary Path), Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), Halkin Yolu (People's Path), Halkin Kurtulusu (People's Salvation), Acilciler and TIKKO (Turkey's Worker-Peasant Salvation Army).

The first elections after the 1971 coup were held in 1973 and resulted in a coalition government led by CHP and MSP (National Salvation Party). After the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, CHP abolished the coalition and asked for early elections. A new coalition government was established between AP, MSP and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), which is called as the "first nationalist front government." The next general elections was held in 1977 and resulted in the second nationalist front government. As the revolutionary movements popularized on the streets, the nationalist front governments' response became harsher. They secretly organized and agitated commando troops and right-wing student organizations against workers and students organized under socialist unions.

The era between 1974 and 1980 was the most vibrant, polarized, and contentious political environment experienced by both right-wing and left-wing communities. On the one hand, besides daily and armed skirmishes between right-wing and left-wing students and between left-wing students and police, May 1st (1977), Maras (1978) and Corum (1980) massacres ignited political contention between left-wing insurgents and the state. The number of mass street protests, strikes, factory and university invasions, bank robberies, and armed skirmishes between the organizations or police forces escalated. In 1978, a state of emergency was declared to combat increasing "anarchy" and "fraternal fighting." Eventually, in 1980 the military abolished the civil government and ruled the country for three years.

On the other hand, due to the disputes over methodology, ideology, and mobilization zones, armed skirmishes and enmities flourished among socialist revolutionary organizations too. Conflicts between the above-mentioned organizations will matter for our understanding of the dynamics among inmates in Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons between 1980 and 1985.

Prison Order between 1970-1980

The order in the prisons started to change with the 1971 coup. The above-mentioned prison legislation of 1965 and 1967 introduced a more regulatory rule in prisons. This was further emphasized by the military rule in 1970s. Following the 1970 military coup, political prisoners were considered as soldiers (Calislar, 2010). Secondly, just as if they were in a military ward, their hair had to be short as a soldier's, roll calls were made in the military order, prisoners had to stand still and wait for the guards, and they were expected to obey a military hierarchy in the prison. In addition to this militarized regime, political prisoners were forced to wear ties. Treatment in the prisons was becoming harsher when THKP-C leader Mahir Cayan and four of his friends fled from Istanbul Maltepe Prison within the first seven months of the coup. Colonel Nevzat Bolugiray was in charge of the prisons during the emergency state of 1978-1980 and the 1980 military coup in Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Hatay and Mersin. He presents the situation of the 1970s and early 80s prisons in the region:

As the number of arrests increased, especially after the Maras events, overcrowding was the major problem. Desperately we converted dining halls and the wards of the soldiers' into prisons. People were sleeping on top of each other under very poor health conditions. Security precautions,

on the other hand, were extremely insufficient in civilian prisons. People were everywhere, in the corridors, doorways, and toilets everywhere. The prisons had the ward system, wards of 80-100 people. If we had the room for a system of cells for 3-5 people, we would have obstructed the way of the ideological education sessions of political prisoner and their commune systems. Moreover, escapes were the biggest problem. For example, a right wing agitator fled and killed someone and returned back to the prison! The precautions were so weak that anyone could escape easily. The architecture of the prisons was far away from keeping the terror criminals safely (Bolugiray, 2001, pp. 69-73).

In addition to Bolugiray's observations, Calislar, a former inmate of Mamak Prison, depicts the 1970s prison environment in Ankara as a place where they could stay all day in the yard, move between the wards, and had access to books and cigarettes (2010, pp. 9-11). Despite the disciplinary rules and laws that were introduced, the use of time was still under the control of the prisoners in Ankara. Actually, the military coup in 1970 tried to introduce regulating the daily lives in the prisons, but only the 1980 military coup could realize it for a while. I will describe the era between 1980 and 1987 in detail in the next chapters.

1980 Coup d'état and Military Rule in Prisons

Junta justified the 1980 coup by stating that they had to intervene to restore the social and economic order (Birand, 1985). It was a common practice in other places of the world too in late 20th century that violence interferes when the capitalist order cannot function properly with the organized opposition in a democratic context

(Dilek, 2014). In parallel to the global economic recession and rise in oil prices post-1974, the Turkish economy was in depression with over four million dollars of foreign trade deficit in 1977 (Boratav, 2003). High inflation rates and repetitive devaluations were not satisfying the IMF's economic restoration policies for Turkey. Moreover, increasing strikes and empowering labor unions were seen as management problems for the employers. In addition to crushing organized labor, students and Kurdish insurgents, the 1980 military coup also functioned as a transitory means to introduce a neo-liberal economy model by collaborating with big capital owners of the era.

Since the military promised to pursue the economic “stabilization policies” of the 24th of January, local capitalists and global organizations such as the NATO, IMF and World Bank were in favor of the 1980 coup d'état (Mavioglu, 2006). Within these financially deficient conditions, the military built new prisons, increasing their capacity from 55,000 to 80,000. The construction of Metris and Diyarbakır prisons were accelerated to be ready for confining the insurgents during the 1980 military coup, however Metris opened later. Martial Law Command of Istanbul announced that the slowing down of work constituted a crime. Subsequently, after having adopted the most restrictive constitution of Turkey via referenda was on October 10 1982, most social and political rights were suspended. Seniority compensation rights of workers, membership to labor unions, and rights to collective bargaining and strike were limited (Birand, 1999).

Military order de jure endured until November 6, 1983 but de facto stayed in power towards the end of 1980s. Civil elections held on November 6, 1983, consisted of candidates approved by the military council, MGK (National Security Council). On July 1985, martial law ended in Ankara. Subsequently, martial law ended two years

later in Diyarbakir in July 1987. Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons were actively used to imprison political prisoners in this era, specifically between 1980 and 1985.

As novel practices of discipline in Turkish prisons, military prisons of 1980s operated to transform prisoners into soldiers. The disciplinary program imposed on these prisons was strict and violent in comparison to a previously loosely controlled prison system. Mehdi Zana in his memoirs from Diyarbakir #5 Prison writes: “According to the decision made by Military Court of Cassation in 1975, general and political prisoners could be treated as soldiers before the military courts. Prescription of Military Penal and Detention houses’ section for ‘rules for prisoners to obey’ declared: ‘soldier convicts should not forget that they are soldiers and civilians should not forget that they are soldiers before the military judiciary’” (Zana, 2004). Such episodic evidence reveals how procedures of punishment were evolving into a barrack-style mode of military discipline in prison. State authorities were carrying the rule of military barracks into wards by strict daily programs.

Torture and strict regulation of the daily schedules were dominant in prisons, especially in Diyarbakir, Mamak and Metris. Bilgin, in Ibikoglu’s thesis, tells us of how a routine day in prison would begin at 6 am, with prisoners responding to the warden’s calls with shouts of “I am here commander!” in each roll (Ibikoglu, 2012). Educational hours centered on Ataturkism and religion. Prisoners were forced to memorize the anthems and words of Ataturk. If they went against the rules, they were beaten or worse, faced violent forms of torture. Another prominent application of military rule in prisons was mandatory uniforms. Resistance against uniforms, torture, military discipline, and the top-down imposition of a homogenous subjectivity grew among political prisoners. Prisoners relied on the commune life and other forms of resistance to survive under the military regime. The communes in wards improved

both the psychological and physical health of the prisoners by fostering solidarity and flashed of organized movements against prison authority.

Chanting slogans, rejecting meals, refusing to stand up when a guardian came around, refusing to wear the uniform, and boycotting the canteen meals were some of the everyday forms of resistance contrived and put into practice by the detainees. Above all, however, the most effective and publicly prominent forms of protest were hunger strikes and acts self-immolation. Among Metris, Mamak and Diyarbakir prisons, special attention was given to Diyarbakir Prison. The most extreme cases of torture reported from here, where the Kurdish insurgents were kept. To have a more comprehensive understanding about the significance of the Kurdish identity in a Turkish military prison, we need to grasp the historicity of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Here is a brief description of the process.

Historical Background of the Kurdish Question in Turkey

Historically, the root of the Kurdish conflict can be traced to 19th century Ottoman Empire's modernization era. The Ottoman Empire took control of Kurdistan²³ in the 16th century (Besikci, 2013). Until the beginning of the 19th century, Kurdish tribes had local autonomous governments where they regulated their religion, local security, education, trade, judiciary courts and so on. The relation between the Empire and the Kurdish tribes depended on a military agreement in which Kurds provided warriors to the Empire during wartimes and protected the Empire's borders with Safavid (modern Iran) Empire (Bruinessen, 2000). Especially the Empire's efforts in centralization and tax reforms in the beginning of the 19th century ignited the conflict between autonomous Kurdish governments and the Sultan. The resistance of Kurdish tribes against state centralization and lose of their autonomy created the

²³ Geographically the area where the Kurdish speaking population had lived for centuries in southeastern region of modern Turkey, northern regions of modern Iraq and Syria and northwestern region of modern Iran.

perception of Kurds as obstacles in Turkish modernization (Yegen, 2007). Between 1803 and 1912, Kurdish tribes rioted twelve times and fought with Sultan's central armies. During this era of armed conflict in 19th century, Turkish nationalism was flourishing in the Balkans. Furthermore, the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) was the nodal point where Muslimhood marries Turkish nationalism, with the loss of vast territory and most of the non-Muslim population, the idea of homogenization of the population occurred (Yegen, 2007). The traumatizing consequences of the Balkan Wars with the loss of Balkan territories made Turkish modernists abandon Ottomanism²⁴ and conceive a nation-state without non-Muslims, as only way to escape from the past.

Moreover, the First World War and the Turkish Independence War followed the Balkan wars. As a result of all these wars, the Ottoman Empire was partitioned, invaded by the Allied forces, and the territory shrank to Anatolia. The modern Turkish Republic declared independence in 1923 on the territory of Anatolia and a small portion of Thracia. In the following years between 1920 and 1938, different Kurdish tribes rioted nineteen times (Bruinessen, 2000). After 1925, the future trajectory of Turkish nationalism added Turkification to the Muslimification of Anatolia. Of the two major non-Muslim peoples of Anatolia, a majority of the Armenians faced the pogroms and were killed, and a majority of the Greeks were exchanged with the Turks of Greece. Kurds on the other hand were considered as future Turks, since a majority of the Kurdish population was also Sunni-Muslims.²⁵ In a way, Turkishness was a status that Kurds could acquire if they assimilated into Turkishness (Yegen, 2007).

In other words, Turkish nationalism was open to Muslim peoples of the

²⁴ The idea of pulling different ethnic and religious groups together under the Ottoman citizenship.

²⁵ The Alewite and Yezidi population of Kurds were seen religiously heretical in the eyes of the Turkish authorities, they were also killed or deported.

Empire, which were seen as potentially assimilated Turks, but it was closed to the non-Muslim populations (Yegen, 2007). After 1925, the Turkish government denied the existence of Kurds as a separate ethnic group. Speaking Kurdish was banned, all information regarding Kurdistan erased from the history textbooks, the Kurdish and Armenian names of the villages, streets, and regions were turned into Turkish, among other efforts to obscure a separate Kurdish past. “Scientists” inspired by the Italian and German fascism in 1930s, were measuring skulls and trying to prove that Kurds were genetically inferior to Turks, that their language was a distorted version of Farsi, and that they were primitive mountain savages, uncivilized bandits who had to be educated and assimilated into Turkishness (Yegen, 2007). Kurds were thus allowed basic citizenship rights as long as they assimilated into Turkishness. Stemming from this historical ethnic discrimination, educated Kurdish youth had started to get politically organized in 1950s, and by the 1970s there were plethora of Kurdish revolutionary liberation organizations. Most of these groups chose political violence and guerilla fighting as a method to resist the Turkish state.

Yegen’s analysis shows the shift in Turkish nationalism’s perception of the Kurdish question accordingly, the first half of the 20th century saw a rivalry between backward tribal sheikhs, pre-moderns and a modern, prosper Turkish army and government. By the 1950s and 60s communist mobilization produced center-periphery tension from an economic perspective. In 1970s, Turkish nationalism approached Kurdish national liberation movement as a product of a global communist movement. This approached turned into a security and democratization problem by the 1980s and 1990s due to the changes in the global political realm (Yegen, 2007). Similarly, Gunes shows the transformation of Kurdish movement since 1960s from the bases of social inequality and lack of economic development to discourse of


colonization of Kurdistan by four nation-states and a need for socialist revolution in 1970s. Again the belief in the need for a socialist revolution left itself to armed struggle for national liberation during 80s and human rights discourse from late 90s onwards (2011). We can see how Turkish nationalism and Kurdish movement transformed through similar paths. Of course this similarity is not only based on their contingency and reciprocal relationship, but also the influence of international conditions such as the Gulf War, Cold War, the pressure of international press and the EU membership process, which contributed to a rise in human rights discourse. I will show how in the case of Diyarbakir prison the use of state repression and prisons to dissolve social movement organizations continued the Turkish state's assimilation policies towards the Kurds.

CHAPTER III: INSIDE THE MAMAK and DIYARBAKIR PRISONS

Mamak Military Prison: Setting

Mamak Military Prison was built in the Mamak district of the capital city, Ankara, at the outskirts, downhill of the Huseyingazi Mountain. It is located inside the 28th Division of the 4th Army Corps. It continues to be a military prison. Mamak was infamous amongst the Turkish revolutionaries because during the 1971 coup, student movement leaders Deniz Gemis, Huseyin Inan and Yusuf Aslan stayed there prior to being sentenced to death by the military junta of the 1971 coup. In 1970s the entire prison was composed of only one building to confine convicted soldiers, two big and two small wards, and two solitary confinement cells. Subsequently, one building became Block-B and new blocks were added (A, C and D blocks) before the 1980 military coup. In addition to the cells, the infamous Colonel of Mamak Prison, Raci Tetik, built special solitary confinement spaces, which he called *tabutluk* (coffins). Tabutluks were dark, vertical rectangular prisms of 1x1 square meters, where one could either sit or stand. The space was not enough to lie down or move around. Another architectural feature that is specific to Mamak was the *kafes* (cages). Cages were modeled after the lion cages, and were built to keep prisoners in for a few days before sending them to their wards.

Figure 1: Tabutluk (coffin)



Source: <http://www.mimarlarodasiankara.org/mamak/index.php-Did=7.htm>

After the 1974 general amnesty of political prisoners, left-wing political organizations dispersed into separate smaller organizations following different revolutionary leaders of 1960s and 70s. The Mamak military prison housed nearly 31,000 prisoners between 1980 and 1985. The yearly population increased to 3500 inmates, at times housing a maximum of 200 female inmates. Majority of the inmates were members and sympathizers of Dev-YoL, followers of the tradition of THKP-C and Mahir Cayan. Dev-Yol had the highest number of sympathizers and members within universities and working-class neighborhoods. Its protests attracted the largest crowd and organization structure extended into central Anatolia Mediterranean and the Black Sea region. Members of Halkin Kurtulusu (People's Salvation), who were the followers of the tradition of THKO and Deniz Gezmis, comprised the second largest population of inmates in the Mamak Prison. The remaining political prisoners

were scattered in smaller numbers, and they were members of TKP, Kurtulus, Halkin Yolu, Dev-Savas, Acilciler, TIKKO, Partizan, TIKB, Aydinlik, TKP/ML and Devrim Yolu. In addition to these left-wing political organizations, there were members of the right-wing political organizations as well. They were the sympathizers or members of MHP, MSP, Grey Wolves and Turkish Revenge Brigade. However, they were negligent in numbers in comparison to the political prisoners associated with left-wing organizations. An important element of Mamak constituted placing right wing and left-wing political prisoners in the same wards and cells under the policy of “*karistir baristir*” (mix and reconcile).

Common types of political actions of the above mentioned organizations were pirate demonstrations, meetings, organizing and informing the people living in poor neighborhoods and new students in universities, posting revolutionary banners and painting walls with slogans, bank robberies to fund their organizations, issuing periodicals, distributing fliers and holding informative political theory meetings in student houses or university halls. Armed skirmishes between the left and right wing political organizations as well as with the police were very common. A few of those organizations formed guerilla squads, but could not sustain or grow like the PKK did.


Entering Mamak Prison

Interrogation of the inmates took place at the police station, known as DAL (Deep Inspections Laboratory). Everyone was subjected to torture, electric shocks, Palestinian hangings and beating. Sexual harassment and rape at the police station were also common before being taken to Mamak. Mamak was infamous for the cages Colonel Raci Tetik constructed during his reign the prison. The cages were used to welcome the new comers with torture. Every prisoner was beaten in this cage and

kept for days before being assigned to the wards. Torture, in the form of regular beatings with a truncheon, excessive exercise in extreme temperatures and verbal humiliations, dominated the prison life. Although the level of violence never intensified as it did in Diyarbakir prison, it was a daily routine. Other repressive implications included banning family visiting hours, attorney visits, and free yard hours. Similarly, mandatory education and training sessions, as depicted in previous chapters, were introduced in Mamak prison too.

The two cages in A-Block yard were used to put inmates for days on end. Mehmet depicts the cage: *“When I saw the cages, I immediately remembered the books I read on Vietnamese resistance in Saygon prison. There were also cages, the only missing thing were two lions!”* Metin goes on: *“After staying seventy days at DAL and suffering from torture, we were dreaming of a comfy ward, but what we got was a cage! Literally a lion cage with fences in the middle of the prison yard! They kept us in the cage for three days constantly humiliating before scattering us to the wards.”* The cages in Mamak Prison are typical examples of mortification of self in Goffman’s description of total institutions. Since this kind of cages were made for keeping animals, soldiers were degrading inmates’ status by keeping them in the cages like animals, stripping them off from their belongings and privacy.

Figure 2: Kafes (cage)




Source: *Kaktusler Susuz da Yasar*

Daily Routine in Mamak Prison

By July 1980, prior to the coup, the infamous colonel of Mamak Prison was assigned. As nearly all interviewees stated, military rule in Mamak prison started on 28th of August 1980, about fifteen days before the actual declaration date of the coup. On 28th of August 1980, a preliminary decree on the military coup was posted to the Generals asking them to be ready for action at any moment. On the very same day, a special team of soldiers brutally attacked the prisoners in Mamak Prison. This was the first operation conducted in the prisons to mark the military coup. Kemal says: *“Special commandos from Bolu came for that operation. They didn’t stop beating us and shooting at the sky and our wards until the morning.”* All the male and female inmates were severely beaten and threatened between 28th of August 1980 and 11th of September 1980. During these thirteen days, one inmate died due to torture, many of them were injured and soldiers managed to impose the military order in the Mamak prison.

According to the new rules, inmates must salute the wardens as “commander”, and they should shout and give an oral report and headcount to the soldiers. When they did not shout enough they would be beaten up. Moreover, inmates had to wake up at 6am, shave, and start physical education every hour for 45 minutes followed by a 15 minute break and then start normative education, memorizing Ataturk’s life and edicts or *Nutuk* for 45 minutes (Yildiz, 2001). Education sessions consisted of forced reading sessions of a book on Ataturk, memorizing sixty military anthems, the Turkish national anthem and national oath, and praying before meal times. The daily schedule of prison life in Mamak was the same with Diyarbakir Prison. The only difference was that the military imposed the rules a week before the coup in Mamak and it lasted shorter. Calislar depicts the era of the 1980 coup as a “new system”, where we see the inmates lost their control over time. He states that before the coup ward doors were open all the time. Prisoners could freely visit other wards during 1970s, however conditions became stricter with the 1980 coup (2010). With this new system, spaces gained new meanings. Yards became spaces for military education and torture; wards became spaces where their interactions with others were watched and punished. Tabutluks were the ultimate space of incarceration. Nevertheless, inmates could create free spaces in the wards and utilize yard hours to communicate.

Figure 3: Physical education hour in Mamak Prison



Source: <http://www.mimarlarodasiankara.org/mamak/index.php-Did=7.htm>

Diyarbakir Prison: Setting

Diyarbakir Prison is located in the Baglar district of the city of Diyarbakir, one of the biggest hubs in southeast Turkey²⁶. Currently, it is not in use; instead, a new high-security prison was built. There is an ongoing discussion between former inmates, their relatives, human rights associations/activists, political parties, and the government to decide the future of the old building. Human rights activists demand that the prison building be turned into a museum of resistance and torture. The government on the other hand, wants to either demolish or turn it into a school or hotel.

In 1980s, the prison was not surrounded with an urban area like it is today; it is located on the west-end of the city. Architecturally, it was built as a “type-E” prison, which consists of five parallel blocks with shared yards, resembling the letter E. Including the administration building; it consisted of five blocks in total. Former

²⁶ Northern Kurdistan

inmates point out that at the time of their transfer to the prison, its construction was incomplete.

The structural maximum capacity of the prison was between 600 and 900. However, informants report overcrowding, more than a thousand inmates at times. Based on these accounts, more than 20,000 people stayed in Diyarbakir Prison between 1980 and 1985 (Bulut, 2003). The population of Diyarbakir prison was predominated by the PKK (Kurdistan Worker's Party) members. PKK had 591 defendants at the main trial. There were also members of the following Kurdish organizations: DDKD (Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association), Ozgurluk Yolu (Liberation Path), KUK (Kurdistan National Liberators), Rizgarî (Salvation), Ala Rizgarî (Flag of the Salvation) and Kawa. Additionally, there were also members of smaller Turkish revolutionary organizations: TKP, Dev-Yol, TIKKO.

Entering Diyarbakir Prison

Before entering the prison, each inmate was interrogated in the 7th Army Corps campus, which was named as "Kurdoglu" (equivalent of DAL in Ankara). One of the first measures after the 1980 coup d'état was to extend the maximum period of detention from 15 to 30, and then to 90 days. Not all of the inmates were held there for 90 days, but most of them were kept more than 30 days. Nearly all informants were taken there handcuffed and blindfolded. Without exception, they experienced severe beatings, electric shock, rape (exact number not known), threats that their children or spouses would be raped, Palestinian hanging, beating with baton, starvation and dehydration. Their nails were pulled off and cigarettes were put off on their backs and sexual organs.

Inmates were forced to admit to the crimes the prosecutors assigned to them and share information about their comrades. After the interrogation process, they are transferred to the Diyarbakir military prison. The beating and interrogation begin upon entering the prison as well. The first thing a female prisoner, Aliye, remembers about the prison is: *“Doors, I remember iron doors shutting and opening, the voice they made. I understood I was in a terrible place, though I was thinking I could relax after the interrogation, but no. The giant one of the guards asked me if wanted to stay in a room with a TV or bath. I was surprised. Then they took me to a cell full of sewage water rising up till my belly. They kept me there for one week, beating me in that pool of sewage everyday before sending me to the ward.”* The treatment inmates received entering the prison is significant in the way that it depicts how the insurgents were already subject to violence, exhausted and passivized prior to and during their acceptance to the prison. Thus, they entered prisons already aware of the risks responding to state repression. These accounts also represent how former-prisoners started telling their prison experience.

Daily Routine in Diyarbakir Prison

In Diyarbakir prison, between 1980 and 1984, fifty-two insurgents were killed, twelve were disabled due to severity of torture and 108 caught tuberculosis (Tekin, 2012, pp.40-54). Colonel Esat Oktay’s interval (1981-1983) in the Diyarbakir prison made the prison enlisted in the ten most notorious jails in the world.²⁷ Severe and systematic beating, being stripped naked, the obligation to salute Captain Esat Oktay Yıldiran’s dog, water and food deprivation, falaka (beating of the soles of feet), “Palestinian hangings” (hanging by the arms), excessive exercise in extreme

²⁷ <http://www.criminaljusticedegreehub.com/top-10-most-violent-prisons-in-the-world/>

temperatures, stretching, squeezing or crushing of limbs and genitalia, piling of naked prisoners on top of each other, asphyxia and mock execution, electric shocks (specifically electrodes attached to genitals), extraction of nails and healthy teeth, forcing prisoners to mix with prisoners with tuberculosis, sexual humiliation and assault, rectal examinations, forcing prisoners to beat/sexually humiliate/rape or urinate on each other, rape or threat of rape of prisoners, or relatives of prisoners in their presence by prison guards, violent forcing of truncheon rectally, forced feeding of rotten/contaminated food or faeces, baths in prison sewers (referred to as “the disco” by the guards) (Zeydanlioglu, 2009) were the most common methods of torture during Esat Oktay’s reign. In brief, systemic mortification of self (identity), sexual molestation and physical pain dominated the domain of prisoners’ lives.

Before the military coup, despite martial law was declared in 1978, restrictions on prisoners’ actions were very limited in Diyarbakir prison. Prisoners could bring resources such as books and paper into the prison. They were in charge of scheduling their own daily routines and could communicate easily with other wards. There were no education sessions or special extra-repressive rules either. However, a few months following the coup, repressive sanctions and violence escalated (Ayata, 2011a).

Fragmenting, planning and arbitrarily rescheduling of time in prison was one of the preliminary disciplinary tactics of the military to transform political prisoners into nonresistant and docile bodies. The junta introduced mandatory military educational hours and torture into the daily life of the prisoners, similar to the case in Mamak prison. One of the male informants, Sidar, recounts their typical day: *“They woke us up around 5-6 am. Without an exception everyday we had to shave, and share one little plastic cup of water with three to five other people. I remember they made us shave twice on the same day. We had to salute them as “commander” and*

stand in attention. After the shave, they made us pray and eat something. Then until 11-12pm we had to do military exercise in the yard, which included running and shouting military anthems. Same thing repeated until dinnertime. They would not let us sit freely even for five minutes. They would not give you free time to think. Around 9-10pm everyone had to sleep lying down in a stand still position. If one of us would talk to one another during these, they would severely beat us up.”

Accounts interviewees talk about, confirm Foucault to some degree, but further prove that being physically regulated does not necessarily mean that they are becoming docile. Sidar emphasizes: *“they ruled our bodies to some extent but not our souls. People lost their physical and psychological health but most of us believed that if we were subjected to that cruelty because of who we are, then let it be, we won’t give up who we are.”* Inmates did not only conceive these attacks against their bodies but also themselves, their identities. As social movement scholars suggest, the formation of a shared identity is a very important part of the formation of a collective action. Repression appears to be a very effective factor to enforce the process of clarifying the distance between “us” and “them”.

Figure 4: Normative education session in Diyarbakir Prison



Source: <http://en.habervesaire.com/haber/1604/>

CHAPTER IV: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS of COLLECTIVE ACTION in MAMAK and DIYARBAKIR PRISONS

Demographic Comparison of the Inmates in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons between 1980 and 1985


Since I do not have accurate demographic information about the entire prison population of Mamak and Diyarbakir between 1980 and 1985, I am presenting the information about my interviewees as a sample.

Table 1: Inmate Age Group

	Inmate Age Group				Sex	
Prison	15-20	20-25	25-30	>30	Male	Female
Diyarbakır	3	6	4	3	13	3
Mamak	5	5	1	1	7	5

Political movements in this period attracted a very young group of people, 67% of the inmates I interviewed were incarcerated between the ages 15 and 25 years old. Some of which were already involved in armed skirmishes and guerilla camps in Syria and Palestine prior to the 1980 coup.

Table 2: Education Level of the Inmates



This bar graph shows the education level of my informants when they were incarcerated. Even though the difference between Mamak and Diyarbakir is not extreme, this pattern coincides with the information I reviewed in the secondary sources. It suggests that Mamak Prison's population was more urban and better educated than the Diyarbakir Prison.

The differences and similarities reveal their impacts in multiple veins. First, in both prisons, political prisoners had the tendency of belittling the guards (the lowest ranking soldiers at the time). Aysen, a female prisoner, from Mamak recounts that: *"We were all very educated and not from some cheap universities like Sutcu Imam or so. There were Teaching Assistants and students from METU, AU and doctors too. Soldiers on the other hand were philistine, young boys coming from the villages of central Anatolia. Probably, they had not interacted with many women before; they harassed us, beat us, they didn't even know how to treat to us. The chief commander Raci Tetik once came to our ward and shouted: I hate you all, you are all so literate and cultured, despite all the bad treatment you see, you still can go-by and laugh!"*

Can, a male prisoner, from Diyarbakir Prison also shared that: *“They were specially picking the soldiers to torture us. Most of them were illiterate young boys from central Anatolia or Black Sea region. They were all right-wing folks or had some people from MHP in their family. These were the people who didn’t even know how to socialize or look after a sheep in their villages, but here at the prison they were empowered, they could torture and command us”*.

Second, this distinction reveals itself in the discourse of PKK leaders as they justified the positions they take either to onset an action or not. I will describe this more in detail when I compare the role of leadership in two prisons. I also included the number of inmates who went to boarding school because boarding schools appeared to have a prominent role in framing Kurdish students’ ethnic identity in a political context. I will divulge on this issue more when I compare the role of a collective identity in the mobilization process of a collective action.

Even though the difference between educational backgrounds of the soldiers and prisoners do not seem to affect collective action, this situation increased the prisoners’ feelings of degradation and helped their emotions to be channeled into a further possible reaction. In Goffman’s analysis one of the mortifying aspects of power is humiliation. This includes “disruption of the usual relationship between the individual actor and his acts”. (Goffman, 1961, p.35) Mostly this disruption takes the form of humiliation such as the forced act of deference to call the wardens “commander”, obligation to humbly ask permission to scratch one’s self or to use the toilet. Since, the political prisoners believe that normally their status is higher than uneducated soldiers, the disruption of that status order is also an attack on their self and adulthood, which further deteriorates their honor.

Chronology of Events in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons

In the Diyarbakir Prison, military rule imposed increasing restrictions and violence gradually after the coup, specifically during Mevlut Akkoyun's (internal security chief) rule. But the hardest and most violent conditions were experienced during Esat Oktay Yildiran's reign, which was between August 1981 and September 1983. In the Mamak prison military rule exercised nearly two weeks before the coup and intensified within a short time. With the coup, officials in both prisons isolated the leaders of political movements into solitary cell confinement. Some of these leaders had already been incarcerated before and were experienced in determining action plans and ideological education strategies in prisons. Since the leaders were isolated and none of the trials had started, communication among prisoners was the biggest obstacle keeping them away from mobilizing en masse. Leader cadres of Dev-Yol in Mamak, waited for their trials to start before they took action. Since Dev-Yol or PKK constituted the largest groups in the prisons, inmates from smaller organizations did not take action unless Dev-Yol joined in Mamak or PKK joined in Diyarbakir. In both of the prisons, the most effective form of collective action was hunger strikes.

The table in the below shows the number and durability of the declared hunger strikes in two prisons. There were fewer and less sustained hunger strikes in Mamak Prison when compared to more frequent and sustained attempts in Diyarbakir.

Table 3: Chronology of the Hunger Strikes

Prison	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Mamak		July 10 days			February 42 days
		December 10 days			
Diyarbakir		January 8 days		September 27 days	January 54 days
		April 43 days			

Partizan, Acilciler and Halkin Kurtulusu trials started before Dev-Yol's in Mamak. Additionally, some Acilci inmates were transferred to Mamak from the Metris prison, where they were already protesting. On July 7, 1981, members of Halkin Kurtulusu, Acilciler, Partizan raised the first call for collective action in Mamak, in the form of a hunger strike. According to Mehmet's account, more than 150 joined the hunger strike for ten days, but another smaller group started with fifty people, endured longer and ended with two people on the 32nd day.

Protestors were severely beaten everyday in the courtyard and kept at specially designed claustrophobic cells called as "tabutluks" (coffins). Since Dev-Yol, with 753 inmates in the prison, did not join in the first call of action, a big enough participation was not attained. The strike ended without any collective gain. In the following months, towards the end of 1981, on December 21st inmates collectively agreed to start a hunger strike again. This time Dev-Yol participated too. However, soldiers targeted especially the male prisoners on their first three days and made them quit on

the third day. Only female prisoners and leaders staying in solitary confinement endured this strike until the end for ten days.

Until the next collective attempt in February 1984, against mandatory uniforms, none of the groups tried to mobilize other inmates into a collective action in the Mamak Prison. Utilization of constant repressive measures in Mamak increased towards the end of 1983 again. The first head count of 1984 took very long with extra beatings. Military introduced mandatory uniforms in all prisons simultaneously. Male prisoners in Mamak resisted wearing them and beatings intensified. Officials were dressing them up by force and torture. Soon after they forced to dress, they would tear them off. As the protest persisted, the prison authorities decided to negotiate. They offered to accept prisoners' demands to end beatings, military education sessions and verbal humiliation if prisoners would accept to wear the mandatory uniforms. As a result, inmates agreed to wear the uniforms and the torture ended in Mamak.

However, the right-wing prisoners were not fond of this situation. They fabricated a motive and attacked left wing inmates at the ward. Soon after, the fight intensified and soldiers reintroduced the education sessions and beatings to quell the fight. In turn, left-wing inmates did not obey the rules and started a hunger strike. This was the biggest collective action achieved in Mamak Prison. Without any former planning, it expanded and endured for 42 days. This time, nearly the entire population contributed and the families put pressure on the military officials outside. One of the prominent members of Dev-Yol was from a well-known family with close ties to high-ranking army members. Oguzhan Muftuoglu says that member's father talked to a member of the junta, and he said if they would give up the hunger strike, Raci Tetik will go and conditions would improve. Upon hearing this, they agreed to quit the hunger strike. The hunger strike ended with prisoner's acceptance of wearing

uniforms in return for ending repressive measures. Exceptionally, female prisoners fostered their resistance by not referring to soldiers “commanders”, and not participating in education hours and so on.

Meanwhile in Diyarbakir Prison, shortly after the military repression started to increase towards 1981, leader cadre of PKK, staying in isolated cells from others, started a hunger strike for eight days as a warning on January 4th 1981. That very first hunger strike was to state that they are not going to obey the military rules and if the military rules continue they would start a bigger strike. Other inmates also supported them by chanting slogans and hitting keyholes, but this warning stayed limited with a very few contributors. Main reason behind low participation was because the trials had not started yet. Thus, communication among prisoners was very limited in Diyarbakir Prison as well.

A short time after Colonel Esat Oktay was instated duty around February 1981, imposition of the military rules accelerated and violent attacks against the inmates became widespread. In the following months of Colonel Esat’s rule, leader cadres of PKK held a second protest. On March 4, 1981 PKK leader cadres started a death fast with 14 others from the cells #35, this time against Esat Oktay’s brutal leadership and to stop violence in the prison. As a result of the attacks during the death fast, only 80 to 100 inmates left disobedient out of a total prison population of 1000-2000 at the time. Remaining resisters were refusing to read Turkish Oath and National Anthem, referring to the soldiers as “commander”. During the protest, one inmate died as a result of being force fed by the prison doctor.

When the hunger strike reached its 40th day; the PKK main trail (with 591 suspects) had already started on April 13th 1981. Trials were big opportunities for communicating with others and to voice their opinions in the official reports. Inmates

went to the courthouse pale and tired from the hunger strike and did not approve of their ids checks, as a way of protest against judge's demands. This first hunger strike, initially comprised of 25 participants, ended with an agreement with Colonel Esat. According to the negotiation, the Colonel accepted not to engage in torture, not to impede inmates' political defenses at the trials, allow family and lawyer visits conducted without beatings and restrictions on action and won't use the basic necessities such as water, food and excretion as means of repression (Welat, 2011). In response, inmates would stand at attention like soldiers when they would see the guards and they would go to visits and trials in a single file line. Soon after the negotiation Colonel did not respect the agreement and started practicing torture again and by May 24th 1981, the last remaining resistant leader cadre also accepted to obey the military rules and suffer that violence. Thus, between August 1980 and May 1981 the military maintained order in both Mamak and Diyarbakir by coercion.

In continuum with pacification of the inmates and escalating torture in Diyarbakir Prison on Newroz day²⁸, the 21st of March 1982 one of the members of the leader cadre of PKK, Mazlum Dogan, hung himself in his cell, leaving three matches on the ground. Drawing upon the symbols of the day and the matches, the PKK framed his suicide as flaunting resistance in the prison. Two months after this act, four PKK insurgents self-immolated by starting a fire with thinner, plastics and paint that were used to paint the walls and windows with Turkish flags (Yetkin, 2010). They left a letter stating that *"this is not a life to live"* and urged everyone to follow Mazlum Dogan, and resist against torture (Yetkin, 2010).

²⁸ The Kurdish New Years day, which tells the story of a young blacksmith Kawa's revenge on the cruel king and lighting the resistance fire on the mountains of Kurdistan.

These protestors were using their bodies as instruments of resistance and these kind of self-sacrificing actions created moral shocks as well as heroic stories for morale. Following these self-sacrificing actions, on 14th July of 1982 the leader cadre of PKK declared an unconditional death fast against the torture. It endured for 65 days and ended with the death of five insurgents from the leader cadre. At the end, soldiers and prisoners reached an agreement to end the torture, end the duty of Esat Oktay, improve the quality of food and cure the ill insurgents at the hospital. These amendments were valid only for the ward #35 where leader cadre's cells were (Ayata, 2011b). This was the first gain of the insurgents but it was only limited to the participants.

The biggest collective action of the Diyarbakir Prison with the most widespread contribution started on September 5th, 1983. It endured for 27 days and majority of the insurgents contributed (Zana, 2011). On the 27th day of the hunger strike, an agreement was reached. For the first time after three years, torture ended. They had access to pencils and paper, were able to talk in wards, corridors and at common spaces, and ordering books from outside were free. For the first time, insurgents had the confidence and morale of winning. The following three months, the insurgents were at ease. A group of insurgents was attacked by the soldiers during visiting hours in January 1984, greatly unsettled the group after relatively peaceful days. The new government imposed mandatory uniform on all insurgents in all prisons of Turkey by the end of 1983. Soon after the beginning of January 1984, a hunger strike started against the mandatory military uniform. Unlike the 1983 resistance, leader cadre did not organize this action; it started abruptly. This time, the morale, experience and the confidence gained by the September 1983 resistance enabled a vast participation.

Inmates agreed to wear the uniforms but conditions never became notorious as it was before September 1983, though repression continued towards the end of 1980s.

Up until now, despite the repression having been more severe in Diyarbakir Prison between 1980 and 1983 than in Mamak Prison, we see more frequent and sustained formation of collective action in Diyarbakir Prison and fewer and unsustainable instances of collective action in Mamak Prison. I argue that the lack of risk-averse leadership, enduring contested relationships between the different organizations and inability of reframing a shared identity in the prison impeded the formation of a large-scale and sustained collective action in Mamak.

In Diyarbakir Prison, during the escalation process of repression between 1980 and 1983, we witness frequent attempts of collective action, however, they remain limited to the leader cadres. More insurgents were recruited in 1983 and 1984. Inmates utilized the opportunities opened in 1983 such as shift to a civil government, Esat's transfer and the Suruc group's trial with one inmate from each ward. There was another factor coming from outside, the PKK launched its first armed attack against the Turkish army in August 1984, and it was celebrated in the prison as a source of morale. Diyarbakir Prison case also shows that it is more likely to see collective action during the escalation process of repression than during the era when its intensity became stable. Moreover, I argue that the main reasons why leaders could not recruit more insurgents to the early collective actions were 1-lack of means of communication, 2- intensity of repression, 3- conflicted relationships in between different organizations. As time went by, shared identity between insurgents maintained and the problem of organizational conflicts was overcome in Diyarbakir Prison but not in Mamak Prison.

Opportunity and Threat: Role of State Repression


One of the basic assumptions of opportunity-threat structure is that people can mobilize in response to changing political opportunities (Meyer, 2004). According to the political opportunity theorists, a large-scale mobilization is most of the time preceded by a transformation or power realignment in the political power structure. Activists perceive this transformation as a chance to shake the structure or make changes more likely. However, micro-level dynamics could also shape changing opportunity-threat structures. For instance, as a result of the negotiations after July 1982 hunger strike in Diyarbakir Prison, the chief of intense torture era, Colonel Esat Oktay was removed from duty towards the summer of 1983. Inmates' action paved the way for a change in the power alignment. In that transitional process of the new colonel, torture decreased initially, even though it escalated again later, the leader cadre of PKK who gained exemption from torture and military rules after the July resistance started planning a bigger collective action, which started on September 5th, 1983. Of course, for the September 1983 hunger strike, utilization of the political opportunities of the removal of Colonel Esat, Suruc group's trial with at least one inmate from each ward to communicate and moving to a civil government in November 1983 would not be possible if other micro-level dynamics such as development of alternative relations under repressive conditions and a perceptive leadership did not exist.

Lichbach (1987) and Loveman (1998) argue that repression facilitates collective action. Further, repression in opportunity-threat structure is one of the

factors that raise the costs of collective action. However, by comparing the mobilization processes in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons, I reach a conclusion of; at first the extreme repression in Diyarbakir Prison between 1980 and September 1983 impeded the recruitment to and expansion of the collective action and collective action remained limited with the leaders. Concomitantly, as time went by extreme repression turned into an opportunity to form alternative relationships, which were crucial to overcome the problem of organizational conflicts in recruitment to high-risk collective action in prisons. Interviewee Haldun explains how they perceived the intensity of the repression and how it acted as a barrier to collective action too: *“Everybody realized that we had to do something. But you got beaten, or even raped with truncheons even you talk to the person next to you. I wanted to die for hundreds of time but there is the possibility of not managing it. What if I cannot die? Then the torture would be worse than dying by myself. Your space and resources are very limited, if you survive from the suicide than it is worse than death. Sometimes death was something that we could not achieve, you want to die but you could not.”*

As the interviewee suggests, between 1981 and 1983 in the case of Diyarbakir prison, extreme repression creates the will to act against the repression but it also depresses the conditions to form a collective action. If we include that rumors of death and gossip create a climate of suspicion in the prisons as well, as the violence intensifies, it is less likely for the political prisoners to form a collective action. In contrast, in Mamak Prison, neither repression intensified as it did in Diyarbakir Prison nor did the attempts of resistance. I will explain this difference by variations in the meso and micro level variations in two prisons.

According to the type of change in opportunity-threat structure certain micro and meso-level dynamics might develop such as reframing the meaning of identity, emotions and developing interpersonal relations. My thesis shows that the main determinant of mobilization is formation of a shared identity, role of leaders in that process and forming new ties under the conditions of changing opportunity threat structure. Military chose different ways to increase repression in two prisons. In Mamak Prison, changing of the power structure started earlier and with immediate violent attacks in a short time; in Diyarbakir Prison it happened gradually between 1980 and 1983 but was sustained at a more violent and longer phase than in Mamak. In Mamak Prison, military rule started before the coup on August 28, 1980 with special commandos, shooting around the prisoners and severely beating them by causing death of one on the very first night that they imposed the military rule in the prison. Other than differing in its temporal process of imposition, military had different repressive policies in two prisons.



I showed some of the differences and similarities in the **Table1** above. First, the military allowed the communal lives based on organizations in Mamak prison but they ban the communal livings based on organizations in Diyarbakir Prison. Second, they mixed right-wing and left-wing political prisoners in wards and cells in Mamak, there were no right-wing prisoners in Diyarbakir. Third, violence was selective in Mamak and indiscriminatory in Diyarbakir. Fourth, repression towards ethnic identity and sexuality were severe in Diyarbakir, it did not exist in Mamak Prison. Fifth, torture was way more violent in Diyarbakir Prison but for the majority of the population it did not go beyond severe beating and falaka (beating the soles of the foot) in Mamak Prison. Though, the conditions of the leaders were similar, they were both isolated in the cells in both of the prisons. However, their positions were different. Leaders in Mamak did not take initiative roles as “early risers” but leaders in Diyarbakir did.

Selective vs. Indiscriminatory Violence

According to my interview data, in Diyarbakir Prison there were no criteria on whom to torture. For instance, there were Arab prisoners from Iraq Communist Party, elderly peasants or neighbors or relatives of insurgents without any relation to political organizations, smugglers, and even a German tour guide once in Diyarbakir Prison. Even those from Iraq Communist Party and the German tour guide were forced to practice military rules, torture and memorize Turkish Oath and the military anthems. Moreover, Diyarbakir Prison was also famous with the high number of

informers (snitches). However, being an informer and collaborating with the officials would not change their situations as well.

In Mamak Prison, cooperation paid off. For instance, Raci Terik separated the cooperative female prisoners to a ward where they were exempt of severe repression and had more resources in. Torture in Mamak prison was also selective. Besides the inmates in leader positions, they told me they were tortured in DAL not in Mamak. Selected leaders were subjected to torture other than beating and falaka in Mamak Prison. Female prisoners were also exempt of falaka most of the time, they were only beaten by batons on the hands, back or legs. Furthermore, soldiers consciously picked the important people and the leader cadres from Dev Yol and kept them in tabutluks. Leader cadres of other organizations were also kept in tabutluks but special attention was given to Dev-Yol leaders. Because it was such a vast mobilized organization outside, administration worked more on them. Waiting outside in the cold, beating with baton and messing wards were a common experience of them.

Kalyvas argues “When violence is indiscriminate, compliance is almost as unsafe as non-compliance, because the “innocent” can do little or nothing to escape punishment and the “guilty” are no more (and sometimes less) threatened.”(Kalyvas, 2006, p. 147) For instance, the four inmates who burned themselves in the middle of the ward in 1982 in Diyarbakir Prison were in the so called “confessors’ ward”. By the time they realized the intensity of violence did not change for them, they made the decision to take action. In Mamak Prison on the other hand, female prisoners say they were subjected less severe violence than the male prisoners and leaders were treated worse. For instance, Levon Ekmekciyan, an Armenian revolutionary was subjected to worse behavior and more humiliation before his execution than the Turkish revolutionaries. However, if inmates comply with the soldiers in the prison, they

experience less repression. Kalyvas further adds that selective violence is effective in enabling deterrence because “ the effectiveness of selective violence hinges less on pinpoint accuracy and more on a perception among the population that a process of selection is taking place.”(Kalyvas, 2006) Thus, I think the difference in imposing repression in two prisons also have role in the different formation process of collective action.


Table2 shows the difference in the intensity of repression in two prisons. Even though these numbers are incomplete because of the unreported events by the junta, it reveals information. First, I wanted to show how repression in Mamak increased faster before the coup and in the first weeks of the coup in 1980. In contrast, it gradually intensified in Diyarbakir Prison and stayed at an intensified phase. I think the number of deaths in the early stages of the coup in 1980 and the change in that number according to the years show both the difference in pace of repression’s imposition and its intensity. Secondly, as Tekin also tells in his book, purposely infecting prisoners with tuberculosis by contaminating their food is another example of how indiscriminate violence was imposed in Diyarbakir Prison (Tekin, 2012).

														Grand
DIYARBAKIR								MAMAK						Total
Cause of														
Death	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1986	N/A	TOTAL	1980	1982	1983	1985	TOTAL	
Death Fast			4		2			6						6
Death														
Sentenced									3	2	1		6	6
Suicide			5		3	1		9	1	1			2	11
Tortured to														
Death	1	7	13	4	4	3		32	2	1			2	35
Unreported														
cause of														
death		1	2	3			8	14			2	2	4	18
Sub-Total	1	8	24	7	9	4	8	61	6	4	3	2	14	75
Cause of														
Injury														
Tuberculosis							104	104						104
Injured /														
Crippled														
After														
Torture		2	5		4		1	12						12
Grand														
Total	1	10	29	7	13	4	113	177	6	4	3	2	14	192

It is disputable to quantify or measure repression but I made a comparison of prison conditions based on the interviews to have a base to discuss different outcomes influenced by different levels of repression. I determined repressive conditions introduced by the military order and counted their mentions in the interviews. Additionally, I think comparing the number of inmates who became disabled or died under torture and the number of inmates who were executed by the state are also indicators to grasp the difference in extent and intensity of the repression in these prisons.

Table 3 below shows the difference in the extent of the repression in two prisons. It was not only in the form of attacking their bodies but also using other daily or natural needs as means of repression such as food and water deprivation. Additionally, more existence of occasional good relations with soldiers in Mamak also show there was a difference in approaching two different inmate groups on the military's side. The greater existence of activities such as singing, dancing and theater also shows the difference in restriction of the action in two prisons. Though, I should note that instances of laughter, dance and theater appeared in the female prisoners' accounts more than in male prisoners' accounts.

Number of Conditions Reported in Diyarbakir and Mamak Prisons



How Did Micro- and Meso-Level Dynamics Vary Under Different Power Structures?

Organizational Networks and Interpersonal Relations in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prison

Another factor in front of a large-scale and sustained collective action besides the intensity of violence at that time was the organizational conflicts in both of the prisons. The cases I investigate provided me evidence to support that even though repression might cause demobilization and depression or hopelessness among the inmates at a time through the process, it also opens space for alternative interactions, sharing and trust to develop. If the leaders play a perceptive role in this process, followers could re-frame their situation and mobilize. That is to say, increasing threats for a movement has the potential to turn into an opportunity if the leaders could

channel the dynamics at micro-level interactions such as emotions and a shared collective identity into forces for recruitment.

Prior to September 1980, each political organization had its own ward and commune in which they controlled the space and the resources in it. For instance Ferhat from Mamak tells: *“Before the coup we could obtain anything in the prison, I even had my own gun. We could visit other wards and spend our time as we wished.”* Dursun from Diyarbakir prison tells: *“Martial law was in practice since 1978 but there was no military rules or restrictions until the morning of September 12th, 1980. We had our radio, books and other things, they started constraining after the coup.”* Another male inmate from Diyarbakir Prison said: *“Manners of the guard changed and he started not responding our demands. Then we heard on the radio that the military had intervened. We chanted slogans and sang anthems so the outside would hear us...we were hopeful that DISK would resist, Dev-Yol, Kurtulus, PKK, KUK those were the organizations with vast followers...but as time went by and the visitors told we understood that nobody was resisting outside.”* These accounts show contrary to the idealized panoptic prisons; disciplinary rule was not very strict and regulatory before the coup.

In contrast with the abovementioned accounts, post-1980 coup d'état, military rule in the prison did not let the political prisoners to continue their daily practices as they wished. For example, commune systems in the wards became forbidden and they dispersed the members of the same organization to different wards in Diyarbakir Prison. The plethora of organizations was in conflicts with each other. For example, PKK and KUK even got into armed skirmishes, over ideological conflicts and who gets to mobilize in Kurdish region prior to the military coup. These conflicts echoed

within the prison as well. Therefore, the mixing method of the military junta was successful at first to impede their formation of solidarity.

As the interviewee Can from Diyarbakir Prison, a former member of the KUK, stated: *“Normally KUK and PKK are enemies, sometimes in the prison we were helping each other. However, we did not join their calls of action in 1981. PKK members from the nearby ward informed us, via communicating through a water hose. They passed the message that if we individually want to join, tomorrow we could start with them. As a response, we said that we were members of a political organization and if they forsake our organization, we wouldn’t join them individually. They said that they considered KUK as an extension of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization, but they knew that there were good people among us.”*

A similar account from Mamak Prison: *“Halkin Kurtulus and TKP was not in dialogue at all. Dev-Yol was despised in the prison too, they rejected joining the first call of action.”* Left-wing revolutionary organizations of the 1970s in Turkey fragmented according to the different political traditions of Soviets, China, Cuba, and Albania. Most of the contentions between the organizations were coming out of the different sample country experiences they choose to follow. These accounts suggest that the weak and contested relations and poor communication impeded the willingness of other groups to join each other’s calls at first.

In addition to organizational conflicts in Mamak, left-wing insurgents were forced to live with right-wing political prisoners, who used to literally look for instances to kill each other outside. This difference increased the impossibility of formation of solidarity or an action plan in the wards or cells in Mamak Prison. Because, mixing them with right-wing prisoners meant a double-isolation, since right-wing prisoners were aligned with the soldiers. Especially the relations between

revolutionaries and fascists were to the extent that Kaya tells: *“If the food came while I was at the trial and the fascist cell mate took it in, I would not eat it. During Ramadan, they wanted to sleep at the lower deck because fasting made them dizzy. We did not allow that; we refused any kind of relation with them. Only the commune representatives of both sides would talk if there is a problem or write the canteen list together”*. Additionally, since the military allowed them to pursue their communal lives based on organizations, each political organization formed their own commune and only the commune spokesmen was in touch to transmit the ideas or requests of the sides for the left-wing organizations too.

Another puzzle is to make sense of these contested relations between organizations in the prison. McAdam’s study on Freedom Summer shows how interpersonal relationships and friendship networks matter in recruitment into action. He facilitates our understanding of how the abovementioned contested relations between organizations play role in forming collective action. He argues the types of social networks within which potential participants are embedded affect micro mobilization processes (1986). Furthermore, Loveman states that this is especially the case for recruitment to potentially risky forms of collective action (1998). Thus, I think between the years of 1980-1983 leaders’ onset of collective actions couldn’t be expanded to the followers because of the contested social networks and intensity of violence in Diyarbakir prison. The effect of contested relations, doubled in Mamak because of right-wing inmates. Additionally, lack of perceptive leadership and reframing a shared identity were other impediments to a collective action between 1980 and 1984 in Mamak Prison.

Although I stated the depressive impact of intense repression on collective action by barring the formation of interpersonal relations, repression can also become constructive in forming solidarity. For instance, to cope with this isolationist policy of forbidding the communal livings based on organizations, inmates formed secret groupings based on townsmanship, neighborhood and familial/traditional ties in Diyarbakir Prison and pursued communal livings with those smaller clicks. Coping with violence together, sharing torture, water and food in the scarcest conditions produced trust and solidary relations between the members of different contested groups. In a way, state repression as the biggest threat, turned into an opportunity for political prisoners to form new solidary relations.

Kleinmann further shows that violence has consequences such as suffering and means of coping, it destroys inmates' local worlds and perceived differences via turning everyone into victims, violence gives birth to a opportunity of coming together under shared claims (2000). Interviewee Can explains these alternative relations: *"After a while, enmities between different organizations in the prison became invisible. We saw that the only enemy that is trying to destroy us was the state. We could not have survived if we didn't help each other. Moreover, if one is from a different organization but at the same time he is from my village, kinship (asiret) or family and I don't help him, it would be indignifying for my family. If I confess that person's political acts outside or spy on him inside, their family would say the son of Haci Aziz is dishonorable. I could not do this to the reputation of my family."* Therefore, we should acknowledge that both the operation of power and resistance is a dynamic and variable process and this process does not have a fixed beginning or end like no socio-historical process does. It can be cyclical - the relations can reiterate themselves or it can be spiral - the reiteration could reach a progressive

point as did in the case of alternative commune formation. The communes in wards improved both the psychological and physical health of the prisoners by fostering solidarity and instances of organized movements against prison authority.

I already showed how more traditional ties depending on kinship or descending from the same village/town among inmates functioned to form solidarity under repression in Diyarbakir Prison. At this point, Gould presents that personal ties such as kinship or close friendship are particularly important for recruitment to high-risk activism (Gould, 1991). Leender's analysis on the role of tribal networks in mobilization of people in Syria also suggests that "these networks offered relatively autonomous sites for the sharing of grievances, the circulation and interpretation of information, and the framing of state repression, as well as solidarity, skills, and resources for mobilization under prohibitive conditions of massive repression." (Leenders, 2012) In a high-risk environment full of informers around the ward, formation of trustful and solidary ties were harder than usual. Thus, these alternative relations, other than organizational, developed under the repressive conditions contributed to the widespread mobilization process for the September 5, 1983 resistance in Diyarbakir Prison.

In Mamak Prison, on the other hand, conditions never deteriorated enough to break the partisan boundaries for a sustained large-scale collective action until 1984; when administration abruptly attacked them and everybody protested mandatory uniforms. That is not to say that prisoners were not sharing time together or help each other if needed. Especially, the allowance for organization-based communes and cohabiting right-wing prisoners supported the negative conditions for maintaining trust and solidarity and break the organizational boundaries, which are crucial for recruitment. In brief, the case of Diyarbakir prison shows that violence, to some

extent creates the bedrock to form an alternative space and collective action based on shared experience, emotions and coping strategies in the prison. These interpersonal relations, different from the organizational ties, contributed to the changing shared identity of the insurgents during the process and fostered willingness to join collective action too.

Role of Effective Leadership in High-Risk Collective Action

Leadership has an important role in motivating and recruiting followers to take action. Gamson says that it might be easier to persuade someone to sign a petition but to invite someone to high-risk actions such as hunger strike in a prison is not the same as the former (1991). I argue that the lack of perceptive leadership and enduring contested relationships between the different organizations impeded the formation of sustained and large-scale collective action. I discussed Aminzade's categorization of leader types before into "people-oriented" and "task-oriented". I also already presented that the majority's action makes sense in the prison; therefore followers were waiting for Dev-Yol in Mamak and the PKK in Diyarbakir to take action first. Between 1980 and 1983, PKK leaders declared a hunger strike three times and some of them self-immolated. Expectedly, gradual deviation from the old loose and less regulatory prison management model to a strict military discipline led to reactions among the inmates. Loveman states that "early risers" (in cases of severe repression) may mobilize in response to, not despite, severe repression; their actions may then create space for later waves of participants who may indeed be responding to relative improvements in the structure of opportunities"(1998). The overt protestors of 1980-1982 in Diyarbakir Prison and the ones who started the first hunger strike on July 1981, in Mamak Prison can also be considered as "early risers". However, the

difference is that early risers in Diyarbakir Prison pursued their leading position in the course of actions to recruit more people until the conditions they protested ended. Leader cadres in Mamak Prison on the other hand, did not re-frame the situation in the prison to start a mobilization; instead they waited for another threat to occur, which happened with imposition of mandatory uniforms in 1984.

Thus, I refer to them as people-oriented leaders who “reshape followers’ framing” of the situations to take action. Leaders of Dev-Yol might be counted as “task-oriented” since they only took a role in negotiating on conditions when ending a collective action and made political defense in the courts. Below is the comparison of the two different types of leadership in Mamak and Diyarbakir:

From Mamak, Celal says: *“Dev-Yol was not a hierarchical organization, we didn’t have a formal membership status. The leader cadres never conceived of themselves, as they were still leaders inside. If one inmate asked them what to do, how to respond, they would respond as: “we are at the same level with you guys, we all have the same one-vote right as you have so we cannot tell you what to do here. Under these dangerous conditions everyone is responsible of his own survival.”*

Furthermore, one of the leaders of Dev-Yol, Oguzhan Muftuoglu, says: *“We were devastated when 204 of the central members of Dev-Yol in managing positions were arrested and released information about the rest. We were really depressed. As leaders, we stepped back in the prison; I did not make an organizational-based defense in the trials as well. There was no organization left, I made my defense based on a movement.”* (Bostancioglu, 2011, pp. 252-254) Despite leaders’ rejection of the leadership in the prison, prison officials considered them as their addressee. For

example, to end the biggest hunger strike of Mamak in 1984, officials talked to Dev-Yol leaders, took them to each ward so that they would announce that the hunger strike had ended, inmates agreed wearing the uniforms but repression and violence in prison ended. This was also an example for a task-oriented leadership. Additionally, since vast numbers of followers of Dev-Yol were captured after dissolution in the central committee when 204 of them were caught, informants in the prison were another big problem facing mobilization. Kadir says: *“Dev-Yol leaders waited very long, until the trials had started, to take action. They were afraid of risking others’ lives as well as causing the informants to occur.”* Therefore, they eschewed creating conditions suitable for that, too.

In Diyarbakir Prison, on the other hand, informants’ accounts parallel Viterna’s analysis that “in high-risk contexts maintaining an identity or networks alone are unlikely to generate participation unless a specific recruitment attempt is made”(Viterna, 2013, p. 57). In parallel with Viterna, Interviewee Can states: *“Leaders should walk first. If they won’t no one will follow, people want to see leaders in the battle field, fighting for them.”* This account also coincides with O’Hearn’s findings that leadership has a critical role in organizing and framing a collective action (2013). Especially in Diyarbakir Prison when the leaders take risks on behalf of everyone, they foster morale, trust, respect and solidarity amongst the followers. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the difference in the ways of leadership in two prisons depended not only on their strategic choices. One of the PKK leaders when organizing a hunger strike says: *“ The majority of our followers were peasants or workers who did not get ideological education or read the revolutionary materials as we did. We know why we are here but they might not. We*

should not let them feel abandoned, they are here because of us so we should be the ones to take responsibility for their survivals and give them some morale.”(Sunar, 2015) Thus, different from Dev-Yol leaders, since PKK leaders were aware of the demographics of their followers, they were in favor of taking risks. Probably, Dev-Yol leaders were aware of their followers’ ideological consciousness and did not feel an extra need to pioneer for them, since most of them were urban university students. That is to say, their decisions were not only individual or ideological but also based on the context of their movements. I noted this point about the discourse of the leaders under the demographic comparison of the two prisons.

Collective Identity, Emotions and Honor in Re-framing Resistance

One of the main differences between Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons is the salience of Kurdish identity in the process of mobilization in Diyarbakir Prison. Nearly all of the prisoners’ mother tongue was Kurdish, and speaking Kurdish was banned in the prison. Insurgents had experienced verbal humiliation and additional torture because of speaking Kurdish among themselves and during family visits and also if also refusing to say that they are “Turks”. Colonel Esat Oktay once told the insurgents: *“Don’t call this place as a prison! This place is a school, where you will learn to be worthy of Turkish nation and Ataturk.”*(Welat, 2011) Therefore, Junta’s aim was not only to destroy the organizational networks of Kurdish revolutionary insurgents, but also to continue assimilating the Kurds (Zeydanlioglu, 2009).

Actually interviewees showed me how they bridge their initial consciousness of “Kurdishness”, which started to develop when they started school or before in the family, to their perception of shared identities in the prison. Izzettin tells his process

of secondary socialization as: *“Mardin city bazaar was dominated with Arabs when I was a child. They would call Kurds by an Arabic word meaning “donkey”; sometimes they would sell us stuff at double the price. In addition to the bazaar, I couldn’t communicate with the teachers at the school because I didn’t know Turkish when I started. Now they are still trying to make people memorize the Turkish Oath or anthem, as some of the peasants here don’t even know Turkish”* Extra humiliation due to their ethnic identity helped them see they have more commonalities than their revolutionary stances in the prison.

I also included a boarding school parameter to the demographic table where I show the education levels of the interviewees. Interviews from Diyarbakir prison showed me boarding schools, *yibo(s)* and teacher schools, especially the teacher schools in Kirsehir and Dersim, are focal spaces where Kurdish youth affiliates with a political organization. Boarding schools for Kurdish youth was a confrontational place where they stay with Turkish students and educated with the official state ideology. Ahmet summarizes his boarding school experience as: *“Between 1971 and 1972 300 Kurdish students went to Kirsehir Teacher School, the following year 150 more Kurdish kids came and we became 450 Kurdish students out of 1000 students in total. We realized how Kurdistan was in poverty and we were making comparisons with the Turkish kids and ourselves since teachers were referring to them as “our kids”. To compensate that uneven situation we pursued a strong campaign for the student representative elections though polarizations were mostly based on left-right rather than Kurd-Turk back then.”* Those schools were the places where they continued gaining an understanding of their ethnic identity as being the oppressed and despised in the country they live in.

According to Berger and Luckmann, secondary socialization is the internalization of institutional or institution-based 'sub-worlds' (1959). In Diyarbakir Prison, the soldiers' aim was to make them internalize that prison's institutional sub-world of a militarized Turkishness, where they were humiliated and tortured because of their ethnic identities and ideological stances. As a response to this forced socialization, inmates developed their own underworlds, in Goffman's terms where they could create their alternative communes.

Moreover, after the torture sessions Colonel Esat would ask them if they were "Turks" or not, and if they said "yes", he would send them to the wards, but if they said "no I am a Kurd", he would continue to torture them and kept in cells. Thus, practices like those continue shaping their perceptions of a shared identity throughout their socialization in the prison. At this point, Gamson (1992*b*) proposes that "a necessary precondition of successful mobilization is a well-defined and shared understanding of "us" and "them"—the solidary notion of who *we* are must be supplemented by clear agreement over who or what we are *against*. To the degree that an identifiable enemy exercises power by attempting to humiliate or degrade, this can heighten an insurgent group's collective identity, if that insurgent group develops tactics to neutralize or transcend humiliation." (p.12) I think this differentiation of "us" and "them" also blurs the lines between organizations. As these repressive and violent implications towards their bodies and identities continued, inmates started to perceive the military coup not only to combat with their revolutionary organizations but also to destroy their identities. Engin *illustrates this situation by stating: "The issue was not to pacify the inmates, it was to break Kurdish people's will. Both mortification and contamination have humiliating aspects, by creating the situation of loss of adulthood, self-determination and autonomy for the inmates. Goffman*

discovered that since the inmates cannot defend themselves by usual means such as distancing themselves from the mortifying situation, they employ methods of resisting that incapacity (1961). Similarly Nurettin says: *“Their aim was to destroy our identity and leave without a personality”* This salient aspect of clearing the boundaries between “us” and “them” over their own ideological distinctions in Diyarbakir Prison was one of missing things in Mamak Prison.

There was no repression targeting one’s ethnic identity or sexuality in Mamak Prison. Thus, inmates could not frame their insurgent identities into a collective identity. I argue that there are two reasons for that. First, inmates could form good relations with some of the soldiers via *hemsehrilik* and religious affiliation. Alevite soldiers were not treating them as cruel as others and from time to time they were helping the inmates. Second, historically Turkish left-wing organizations have some kind of faith in the military as a potential ally for the revolution²⁹. Third, there were some affectual platonic relationships on the side of the soldiers to the female prisoners. Here are some examples to the good relations with the soldiers: Kaya:

“One guardian was a sympathizer of the HK. They had a song about their comrade shot in Antep, for example that guardian asked me to sing that song. One day he came and asked me if I had killed the Muradiye Mayor, I said no, he thought I was lying but really Kawa was responsible of that action. That kid appeared to be from Muradiye, he thanked me for killing the mayor, even though I didn’t. They helped us a great deal then they were punished for that. We were so sorry for them to have been beaten because of carrying messages in between us. Then they said: “They beat us once, but you are beaten every day. Good boys they were.”

²⁹ MDD tradition.

Another inmate Kamer says: *“Those soldiers were also in their twenties. There were both fascist and leftist guardians. Alevites were pro-left wing prisoners most of the time. We could also form ties via hemsehrilik³⁰. There was one from my village who helped me a lot. He carried messages from my mom to me. Once he asked me what I missed the most, and I told him sunflower seed. He brought me a package but it blew while he was throwing it from the loophole. They tortured him a great deal, his military service ended because of me. Some of them fell in love with us too. Once one gave a lipstick to Figen (laughs)”*

Moreover, female prisoners during a beating session chanted *“Soldiers and people are brothers!”* and, as time went by, prison administration felt the need to hang a banner saying: *“Compassion for the convict is betraying the homeland”* (Yildiz, 2001, p. 165) These accounts show that the political prisoners in Mamak did not maintain clear boundaries between them and the soldiers to frame a shared collective identity for themselves to counter the soldiers as the prisoners in Diyarbakir did. In Diyarbakir Prison, prisoners could perceive them as being Kurds versus soldiers being the Turkish state, the colonizer enemy. The relationship between collective identity and action is reciprocal and reproduces itself with the changing dynamics of the process. (O’Hearn, 2013) However, in Mamak prison, that dialectic did not forge a shared identity, prisoners did not clearly distance themselves from the soldiers as them being “revolutionaries” and the soldiers being the fascist state, the enemy for example.

What is more important is how leaders framed collective identity during the mobilization process. In Diyarbakir prison, the leaders of PKK framed their resistance as a fight for honor. For example, on the morning of 5th of September 1983, during the roll call, slogans came from the ward # 27. For the first time since 1980, slogans were

³⁰ A type of positive

chanted in the prison (Tekin, 2012). A strong voice was shouting: “Comrades! Revolutionaries! Democrats! Patriots! This is the day of honor! This is the day of riot! Slogans from other wards followed this initiation “Human dignity will beat torture!” “Damn colonialism!” and even “Long live death!” was chanted as a slogan. In a way, death, resistance and honor were equated in the prison.

In Mamak Prison, leaders allowed everybody to be responsible for their own bodily survival. The concept of preserving one’s honor or equating it with resistance did not appear. Since the concept of honor appeared mostly when they were telling about sexual humiliation in Diyarbakir Prison, I checked for the same thing in Mamak. Kadri said: *“There wasn’t torture targeting sexuality in the prison. However at the interrogation in DAL, everything happened: rape, sitting on a bottle, rape with baton etc. In Mamak, it was to a lesser extent like bending, hitting in the ass, creeping, duck walk”*. This is valid for the male prisoners. Female prisoners had more to say on sexual attacks, which I will present in the following section.

As I said before the concept of honor appeared in the interviews mostly when they were telling me about the torture and humiliation against their sexualities. These are some examples that my informants gave when they were describing the incidents that they felt their honor was under attack. Tekin says: *“Colonel Esat once said that “you will be ashamed of yourselves when you are released from here, your women will not sleep with you again.” Sidar: “Once they wanted all of us to spit on a friend and then urinate on him. None of us did that, they beat the hell out of us, but we didn’t spit or urinate. Then they took that soldier away since he couldn’t make us spit or urinate on a friend. This was a very normal thing, but we felt extremely happy for not doing that. Especially between 1980 and 1984, they did everything to make us feel dishonored. They forced people to rape their fellows, checked our penis to see if we were*

circumcised, tied a rope to our penis and pulled like we were a line train and more that I cannot say.” For instance, all the informants have experienced sitting in a sewage pool by force. As Einwohner also argues that honor can be a motivational factor and facilitate collective action when combined with the opportunities (2003); resistance becomes a way to maintain honor, sometimes suicidal protest acts like the ones in 1982 and 1984 in Diyarbakir Prison are seen as self-preserving rather than self-sacrificing.

Female Political Prisoners

Exceptionally, female insurgents have found ways to construct a culture of resistance in Mamak prison. They never agreed to refer to the soldiers as “commander”, they refused to attend the mandatory education sessions, they cooperated with each other in the wards by preserving dialogue in between different political organizations’ communes and pursued all of the hunger strike calls despite the increasing state violence (except Dev-Yol members at the first call in July 1981). In addition, not extending their hand for truncheon, sharing knowledge and resources like clothes and food, and refusing to chant the Turkish oath when soldiers asked, all served as parts of their culture of resistance. These kind of collective decisions could not be observed in the male prisoners’ wards.

For example, even though female Dev-Yol inmates did not join the first hunger strike, they resisted by not allowing the soldiers take the female strikers to solitary confinement. Ninety-nine of them were tried specifically for resisting soldiers on that day and they did not give headcount after that incident, which is a very unusual and risky way of protest in a military prison. In the second hunger strike although the male prisoners gave up on the third day, female prisoners endured till the

end, tenth day. They revealed most of the accounts on free spaces, laughter and humor. For example, they had a beauty contest on “who has the best scars from the last beating” or they were making small sketches.

Senay says: *“There was passive resistance until the removal of colonel Raci Tetik and introduction of forced a prison uniform in 1984.”* What he means by passive resistance is parallel with Scott’s conceptualization of a hidden transcript: every subordinate group creates, a "hidden transcript" that represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant (1990). Nurgul explains: “We named the guards, we were mimicking them and laughing, we laughed a lot. As they hear us laugh they came in and beat more, there was nothing more than our laughter driving them crazy in the prison.” The concepts of hidden and public transcripts provide us tools to interpret the rumors, gossip, gestures and jokes of the powerless as anonymous and insinuating backstage vehicles as critique of the power. Therefore, the fact that prisoners in Mamak prison could not sustain collective action in prison does not mean that they were not resisting or they had no claims to make. However, the exceptional situation of the female prisoners is not detached from the rest. There were differences in the implication of repression to female and male prisoners. Female prisoners repeatedly stated that they were not subjected to severe beatings as male prisoners were. Additionally, since prisons are architecturally designed for males and women’s political imprisonment was seen as a very extra ordinary situation for the state, prison administration could not decide how to behave or situate women. First, they did not put females to Mamak. Instead, they brought women to a high school building called “2 yillik”. In that school building, there was no military rules, violent or repressive conditions, iron bars or doors. Furthermore, since it was designed as a school-building, prisoners’ interaction with outside was commonplace via windows.

Female prisoners formed bonds in that school building and when they were moved to Mamak prison they preserved their solidary bonds. In the first call of action female Dev-Yol members followed the males and did not join the hunger strike. However, in the second call, despite all the males' giving up on the third day, females continued until the end.

Contrary to Foucault's assumption of the total transformation of the bodies, hunger strike examples and the use of rectum or bushy hairs as smuggling spaces present how resistance also consists of remaking and reclaiming one's space and bodily hexis. Here, I argue that using one's body for collective purposes, such as smuggling cigarettes in one's hair bun or smuggling paper notes inside one's body shows us how resistance not only opposes the power but also creates its own space and control over one's body. Thus, female political prisoners in Mamak Prison, between the years of 1980 and 1984, show that prisoners could escape from the grid of discipline and panoptic gaze. One of the former prisoners stated that there were guards whose shifts involved staring at the ward from the window of the ward. Prisoners were using their bodies as curtains in front of each other when they needed to exchange an item or news to escape the gaze. Furthermore, they said that there were blind areas of the ward, for example the cooking area.

As an example of the creative aspect of the resistance, tens of female political prisoners rehearsed in the cooking area while some others were curtaining and guarding the door for them. In a month they were ready to perform a play on the Uruguay revolution. At first, the deduction of everyday forms of resistance sounds difficult to determine and analyze them, but a thick description of the everyday actions of the political prisoners, namely looking for the meaning and consciousness that they attach to their actions showed me how subjects could bend the limits of

disciplinary power with relational and productive resistance tactics in the contexts where they cannot break those limits of power. Their resistance was capable of reshaping power by bending, mocking or getting round the power relations. Thus, female prisoners' experience in Mamak shows once a shared identity and solidary ties formed even though the threat increases (when they were moved to Mamak from the school building) insurgents could preserve their culture of resistance.



Conclusion

Within the scope of this dissertation I examined the dynamics of collective action in Mamak and Diyarbakir Prisons between 1980 and 1985 through experiences of 28 former prisoners. Starting with the theoretical background chapter first I visited collective action theories in brief chronology such as collective behavior, rational choice, resource mobilization and political process approaches. I introduced a theoretical approach to have a better understanding of my cases by situating micro and meso- level dynamics, such as interpersonal relations, emotions, organizational networks, framing a shared collective identity and role of leadership, into opportunity-threat structure in the prisons.

I also visited prison riot theories in brief but neither rising expectations nor the inmate-balance theory were appropriate for my cases. Thus, after reviewing Goffman, Foucault and Garland, I approached prisons as places shaped by the interaction between repression and resistance instead of idealized panoptic spaces where power ubiquitously enacts. As in Goffman's study total institutions, where inmates create defensive adjustments against the mortifying power, my cases also show that repression as a threat can create bedrock for collectivizing those defensive adjustments.

Subsequently, in the historical background chapter I documented the transformation of governmentality in Turkish Prisons since 1920s. We witness how institutional changes happened in relation to societal changes. One of the biggest determinants of those societal changes was the upheaval in social movements. Moreover, I documented the historical relationship of the political opposition and incarceration stemming in Ottoman Empire. In continuum, I presented the both politically and economically contentious era of 1970s before the 1980 military

intervention. The era between 1974 and 1980 was very significant for the polarizing Kurdish and Turkish revolutionary organizations. State repression managed to suppress the armed Turkish revolutionary organizations together with many other Kurdish organizations and their networks with the coup. However, PKK chose guerilla warfare strategy after 1984 and continued its struggle for a liberated Kurdistan.

Since discussions on the impact of repression on collective action do not merge at one point we need to contextualize each case and look for the differences. For instance, to form a collective action in high-risk contexts, merely acknowledging threats and opportunities is not enough to recruit insurgents. Without the existence of solidary interpersonal ties, trust in the leaders' willpower in taking risks and channeling emotions like anger, dignity/honor and fear into collective identity, observing collective action would be very rare. These dynamics explain the scarcer and less sustainable collective action in Mamak and greater with more sustainable actions in Diyarbakir. Overall, I argued that repression drives collective action if there is a risk-labile leadership and solidary face-to-face relations between the insurgents in undemocratic and high-risk conditions.

Further, the differences in state's repression, its extent, intensity and temporality between the two prisons carried a significant importance in determining inmates' resistance. Thus, interaction between repression and resistance help us understand the prison order. When approaching to repression, I mainly utilized Kalyvas's conceptualizations of selective and indiscriminatory violence to explain the different outcomes of state repression in two prisons. I argued that, indiscriminatory violence became counter productive, since cooperation did not pay off in Diyarbakir Prison. Moreover, the intensity of the repression, paved the way for necessary micro

and meso- level dynamics to develop in Diyarbakir Prison such as alternative solidary relations other than organizational networks, trust and solidarity among the inmates. The extent of the repression, namely its denial of Kurdish identity and attacks towards inmate sexualities facilitated the sharing of a collective identity among the inmates. More importantly, risk-averse, people-oriented leadership in Diyarbakir Prison framed the situation into action for honor and pioneered for the rest. In parallel with O'Hearn's case of Irish political prisoners, the leaders' ability to taking risks behalf of the followers is also a motivating factor in recruitment.

In Mamak Prison on the other hand, I argued that the selective violence was effective in enabling deterrence because cooperation paid off. Moreover, moderate level of repression never attacked inmates' ethnic identities or sexualities as different from the Diyarbakir Prison. This difference is important for two reasons. First, those specific attacks against identity clarify the distinction of "us" vs. "them" and propel the concept of honor, which is absent in Mamak Prison. Second, the moderate level of repression enabled the conditions for preserving organizational boundaries in the prison thus, preventing alternative solidary ties to evolve and overcome the organizational conflicts. On top of these, I argued that leadership was task-oriented in Mamak prison and did not pioneer for the followers, which is very crucial in recruitment to high-risk collective action. Exceptionally, female political prisoners in Mamak created a culture of resistance in the wards. In further research the impacts of different understanding of repression according to gender identities, the relation between space and solidarity and role of humor and laughter should be investigated in detail to come up with a solid analysis on female prisoners' collective action experience.³¹

³¹ See Akbas, M. (2011). Mamak Kitabi. Ankara: Ayizi Kitap.for detail.

Subsequently, as Della Porta (1996, p. 66) attempts to typologies repression based on five dimensions: 'repressive' versus 'tolerant', based on 'the range of prohibited behavior'; 'selective' versus 'diffuse', assessed by the array of repressed groups; 'preventive' versus 'reactive', based on the timing of police repression; 'hard' versus 'soft', as judged by 'the degree of force involved'; and 'dirty' versus 'lawful', based on 'the degree to which respect for legal and democratic procedures is emphasized'. In comparison, state repression in the cases I choose was more tolerant, selective, soft and "lawful" in Mamak prison whereas it was more repressive, diffused, hard and dirty in Diyarbakir prison.

Drawing upon Viterna's micro-mobilization analysis, I conclude that the existence of opportunities and threats are not sufficient enough to form collective action in high-risk contexts. As Viterna states, movements take off when changing macro-level environment reshapes the meaning of identities people hold and the networks in which they are embedded. Thus, changes in the level of repression in these prisons pave the way for insurgents to reframe their identities, actions and networks. Within this fluctuating order I argue that extreme repression in Diyarbakir Prison impeded recruitment and expansion of collective action at first. Collective action remained limited within the leaders cadre during September 1980 – September 1983. Concomitantly, as time passed by, extreme repression turned into an opportunity to form alternative relationships and a shared identity among prisoners, which were crucial in recruitment of others to high-risk collective action. Moreover, the role of risk-labile leaders and how they framed their actions within the concept of honor facilitated the foundations of collective action in Diyarbakir Prison. As this process overlapped with the political opportunity in 1983, the shift into a civil

government, chief guardian changed and Suruc trial began, collective action further strengthened.

On the other hand, cohabitating with right-wing political prisoners and lower level of repression hindered the formation of solidary relationships other than the prior organizational ties and a shared identity to constitute bedrock for recruitment and to overcome the prior organizational conflicts. Additionally, the lack of leadership skills left the reframing the movement in the prison insufficient to sustain collective action in Mamak Prison. As a result of the contingent interaction of the abovementioned dynamics, we see a more frequent and sustained formation of collective action in Diyarbakir Prison and scarcer and unsustainable instances of collective action in Mamak Prison.

This thesis also opens questions for further research. Post-prison activism of the released inmates could be investigated to find out how state repression influence mobilization structures of the movement organizations. Another prison, such as Metris should be added to the comparison to be able to make more generalizations about the high-risk collective action in prisons. Even more, an international comparison would contribute more to the theory and the literature whether to see if the findings of this thesis are valid for other insurgents in similar conditions.

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