

**THE SECURITIZATION OF SYRIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS IN TURKEY'S
2018 GENERAL ELECTION: ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL DISCOURSES OF
JDP, RPP, NMP AND GP**

ADALET ŞAHİNER

JULY, 2021

THE SECURITIZATION OF SYRIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS IN TURKEY'S 2018
GENERAL ELECTION: ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL DISCOURSES OF JDP, RPP,
NMP AND GP

BY

ADALET ŞAHİNER

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY

JULY, 2021

PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date: 12.07.2021

Name/Surname: Adalet ŞAHİNER

ABSTRACT

Security has begun to be associated with more than one issue in the modern world. One of them is the issue of international migration, and consequently, there is an increasing understanding of migrating people within the scope of security. In this study, it is aimed to reveal how the refugees who migrated to Turkey due to the conflicts caused by the Arab Spring in Syria in 2011 were removed from the humanitarian focus and associated with the security of the country. For this purpose, the security-oriented statements made by the parties regarding the Syrian asylum seekers in the 2018 general election manifestos were evaluated using the discourse analysis method.

The statements of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP, JDP*), the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP, RPP*), the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP, NMP*) and the Good Party (*İYİ Parti, GP*) in the People's Alliance and the Nation Alliance that securitize the issue of Syrian asylum seekers have been evaluated within the framework of the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School. Before the 2018 general elections, the government party JDP allied with the NMP. The main opposition party, RPP, signed an alliance agreement with the GP. The main argument of the study is that when viewed from the ideological spectrum, it is seen that parties that are expected to make similar discourses on immigrants develop discourses according to their position in the ruling and opposition wing. Accordingly, it was concluded that the discourses of the opposition Nation Alliance on Syrian asylum seekers mostly reflected its attitude on government policy and made more negative discourses towards asylum seekers. However, it was concluded that the People's

Alliance, which is on the government side, made more moderate discourses about Syrian asylum seekers, contrary to their ideological spectrum.

Keywords: Syrian asylum seekers, Copenhagen School, securitization theory, securitization of migration, political parties, election manifestos




ÖZET

Güvenlik modern dünyada birden fazla konu ile ilişkilendirilmeye başlamıştır. Bunlardan birisi de uluslararası göç konusudur ve dolayısıyla göç eden insanları da güvenlik kapsamında değerlendiren anlayışlar artmaktadır. Bu çalışmada 2011 yılında Arap Baharının Suriye’de neden olduğu karışıklıklar sebebiyle Türkiye’ye göç eden sığınmacıların insani odaktan çıkarılıp ülke güvenliği nasıl ilişkilendirildiğini ortaya koymak amaçlanmıştır. Bu amaçla 2018 genel seçim beyannamelerinde partilerin Suriyeli sığınmacılarla ilgili yaptığı güvenlik-odaklı açıklamalar söylem analizi metodu ile değerlendirilmiştir.

Cumhur İttifakı ve Millet İttifakında yer alan Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) ve İyi Parti’nin Suriyeli sığınmacılar konusunu güvenlikleştiren söylemleri Kopenhag Okulunun güvenlikleştirme teorisi çerçevesinde değerlendirilmiştir. 2018 genel seçimleri öncesi hükümet partisi JDP, NMP ile ittifak yapmıştır. Ana muhalefet partisi RPP ise GP ile ittifak anlaşması imzalamıştır. Çalışmanın temel argümanı şudur ki ideolojik spektrumdan bakıldığında göçmenler konusunda benzer yönde söylemlerde bulunması beklenen partilerin iktidar ve muhalefet kanadında bulundukları konuma göre söylemler geliştirdiği görülmüştür. Buna göre, muhalefette bulunan Millet İttifakının Suriyeli sığınmacılar konusundaki söylemlerinin daha çok hükümet politikası üzerine tutumunu yansıttığı ve sığınmacılara karşı daha olumsuz söylemlerde bulunduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Ancak hükümet kanadında yer alan Cumhuriyet İttifakı Suriyeli sığınmacılar konusunda ideolojik spektrumlarının aksine daha ılımlı söylemlerde bulunduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Suriyeli sığınmacılar, Kopenhag Okulu, güvenlikleştirme teorisi, göçün güvenlikleştirilmesi, siyasi partiler, seçim beyannameleri





*I want to dedicate to my mother, Emine Şahiner, who gave me
unconditional and endless love.*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Selin T rkeř Kılıç, who guided me with her valuable knowledge, shared her experiences, and contributed to the completion of my thesis with her patience and guidance.

I would like to express my gratitude and respect to my very esteemed teacher Prof. Dr. Emin G rses, who provided invaluable comments and guidance on the content of my thesis and supported me academically and morally from the very beginning of my graduate life.

Besides, I would like to express my gratitude to my precious mother and father, who were my source of motivation in completing my studies with their prayers and support, to my precious sisters Neslihan řahiner Yıldırım and Seda Sarıboęa, who provided their moral and financial support throughout my education life, and to my brothers Yusuf, Mustafa and Vehbi řahiner for all their support.

I would also like to thank my friend Feray Varıř, who was with me at every moment while writing my master's thesis.

Last but not least, I would like to express my love and thanks to my future husband Yařar Doęan, with whom I shared my stressful and happy moments and motivated me throughout this process and his precious mother.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	i
ABSTRACT.....	ii
ÖZET.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
LIST OF TABLES.....	xii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xiii
ABBREVIATIONS.....	xiv
INTRODUCTION.....	1
0.1. Political Party Positions.....	7
0.2. Thesis Structure.....	10
CHAPTER I SECURITY AS AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	
CONCEPT: TRADITIONAL APPROACHES	13
1.1. Historical Development of the Concept of Security.....	14
1.2. Traditional Security Approaches.....	20
1.2.1. Idealism and Collective Security.....	28
1.2.2. Realism and Military Power	31
1.2.3. Neo-realism (Structural Realism) and Security	36
1.2.4. Liberalism and Institutionalization	40
CHAPTER II SECURITY AS AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	
CONCEPT: NON-TRADITIONAL APPROCHES AND THE COPENHAGEN	
SCHOOL	45

2.1. Feminism and Security	45
2.2. Post-structuralism and Security	48
2.3. Post-colonialism	49
2.4. The English School.....	50
2.5. Social Constructivism and Security.....	51
2.6. The Copenhagen School and the Securitization Theory	56
2.6.1. Securitization of Migration.....	61

CHAPTER III MIGRATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CONCEPT	63
3.1. History of Migration.....	63
3.2. Types of Migration by Borders	64
3.2.1. Domestic Migration	64
3.2.2. International Migration	65
3.3. Types of Migration by Purpose or Willingness.....	71
3.3.1. Voluntary Migration	71
3.3.2. Forced Migration	71
3.4. Types of Migration by Regularity or Irregularity.....	73
3.4.1. Regular Migration.....	73
3.4.2. Irregular Migration: Is Every Irregular Migrant Illegal?	73
3.5. Identification of Persons Involved in Migration Movements.....	74
3.5.1. Who is an Immigrant?	74
3.5.1.1. Irregular Migrant.....	76

3.5.2. Is a Refugee a Refugee Everywhere?	77
3.5.3. Asylum Seekers	79
CHAPTER IV TURKEY'S MIGRATION HISTORY	82
4.1. Turkey's Migration History.....	82
4.2. LFIP and the Principle of Non-Refoulement.....	88
4.3. The Reasons for Migration to Turkey	89
4.4. Migration Legislation of Turkey	90
CHAPTER V TURKEY'S EVOLVING MIGRATION POLICY IN THE FACE OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS	93
5.1. The Reasons that Dragged Syria to Civil War	93
5.2. First Forced Migrations from Syria.....	96
5.3. First Migrations to Turkey Stemming from the Syrian Crisis and Security Concerns.....	98
5.4. Turkey's Migration Policy after the Syrian Crisis	105
CHAPTER VI SECURITIZATION OF SYRIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS IN 2018 GENERAL ELECTION MANIFESTOS	111
6.1. Syrian Asylum Seekers in the 2018 General Election Manifestos.....	112
6.1.1. The JDP and its Discourse of 'Guest'	113
6.1.1.1. Description of People Emigrating from Syria.....	113
6.1.1.2. Are Syrian Asylum Seekers a Problem to Security?.....	116
6.1.1.3. Solution Suggestions: Where Exactly is it Safe to Establish a Safe Zone?.....	118

6.1.2. The RPP and its Discourse of ‘Syrian Asylum Seekers’	121
6.1.2.1. What is the Definition of Syrian Asylum Seekers?	121
6.1.2.2. What is the Problem about Syrian Asylum Seekers?.....	122
6.1.2.3. What is the Solution to Syrian Asylum Seekers Issue?	124
6.1.3. The NMP and its Discourse of ‘Syrian Asylum Seekers’	125
6.1.3.1. What is the Definition of Asylum Seekers and Problem about them?	125
6.1.3.2. What can be the Solution to the Issue of Asylum Seekers?.....	129
6.1.4. The GP and its Discourse of “Everyone is Happy in their Homeland”	130
6.1.4.1. What is the Definition of Syrian Asylum Seekers and Problem about them?	130
6.1.4.2. What is the Problem with Syrian Asylum Seekers and What could be the Best Solution?.....	131
6.2. Contribution to Literature	134
CONCLUSION	138
REFERENCES.....	145

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. 2011-2015 General Election Results.....	8
Table 2. 2018 General Election Results.....	8



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. International migrants, 1990-2013 (millions).....	68
Figure 2. Number of international migrants by SDG region of destination, 2010 and 2019.....	69
Figure 3. Syrians Under Temporary Protection by Year	87
Figure 4. Number of Irregular Migrants Apprehended in Turkey by Years.....	100



ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD	Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı <i>Directorate of Disaster and Emergency Management</i>
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management <i>Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü</i>
EU	European Union
GP	Good Party <i>İYİ Parti</i>
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JDP	Justice and Development Party <i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>
LFIP	Law on Foreigners and International Protection <i>Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu</i>
LON	League of Nations
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs <i>Dışişleri Bakanlığı</i>
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NMP	Nationalist Movement Party <i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i>
OAU	Organization of the Union of Africa
PDP	Peoples' Democratic Party <i>Halkların Demokratik Partisi</i>
RPP	Republican People's Party <i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i>

TPR	Temporary Protection Regulation <i>Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği</i>
UMCD	International Association for Refugee Rights <i>Uluslararası Mülteci Hakları Derneği</i>
UN	the United Nations
UNHCR	the United Nations High Committee for Refugees
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

This study is designed to investigate the security discourses of political parties in Turkey in the context of Syrian asylum seekers. For this purpose, these parties' manifestos for the 2018 general election are analyzed in-depth within the framework of securitization. Adopting the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory, the dissertation is built around the question of how the discourses on Syrian asylum seekers are constructed as election promises. As such, this analysis will reveal the instrumentalization of irregular immigration from Syria to Turkey in the Turkish political parties' election manifestos.

The research method preferred is discourse analysis of the 2018 election campaigns belonging to four major Turkish political parties. Furthermore, this analysis is shaped on the basis of the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School. Contrary to conventional security approaches, the Copenhagen School accepts the concept of security with a multi-dimensional framework including various types of security: economic, social, environmental, political and military security (Buzan, 1983, pp. 75-83). In this vein, the Copenhagen School of security studies adopts a more dynamic approach to security introducing the Securitization Theory. Accordingly, securitization is defined as a process that political actors in a given context selectively perceive non-security issues (such as migration) as security threats to achieve their political ends (Bilgin, 2010, p. 43). Followers of the Copenhagen School argue that securitization of an issue leads to a sense of urgency in society allowing leaders to take extraordinary policy measures that would otherwise be unacceptable (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde 1998, p. 24). In this regard, the theoretical framework set forth in this study helps explore how Syrian asylum seekers in Turkey changed from a non-security issue to a security issue in the official discourses of

major political parties. Within this scope, the thesis analyzes election manifestos of four major Turkish political parties: Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/AKP/JDP*) Republican People's Party, (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/CHP/RPP*), Nationalist Movement Party, (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi/MHP/NMP*) and Good Party (*İYİ Parti/GP*) in the 2018 elections. The scrutiny of these four parties – that compete and ally with each other – is to unveil how the issue of Syrian asylum seekers has become a political tool in their election campaigns.

The reason that the 2018 election manifestos are chosen for analysis is that these general elections were the first one where the issue of Syrian asylum seekers became a domestic political issue. In addition, this issue first created a concern for Turkish voters during the 2018 elections (Altındağ & Kaushal, 2021, p. 165). Although the mass movement from Syria to Turkey started in 2011, the numbers dramatically increased after 2014 (Erdoğan, 2018b, p.1) and reached 3,623,192 in 2018 (Erdoğan, 2020, p. 24). On the other hand, the 2015 general elections are not included in this analysis since they took place immediately after the mass migration from Syria. Furthermore, previous studies demonstrated that the anti-immigrant discourse had not yet started in Turkey in 2015 (Fisunoğlu & Sert, 2018, p. 11). In this regard, political parties' campaigns and manifestos during the 2018 general elections are expected to better reflect on the influx of Syrian asylum seekers. Indeed, the said political parties developed policy suggestions regarding asylum seekers to seek support from voters. Thus, this study takes political parties as securitizing actors due to their statements in the aforementioned election manifestos.

A securitizing actor can be defined as a person or a group that puts a subject in a security framework via their discourses (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998, p. 40). In other words, this actor can take extraordinary measures in the face of an issue only if

they have legitimacy. Thanks to their discourses, such actors can act with a peculiar solution mechanism other than regular political tools (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998, p. 24). In this context, political parties are legitimate actors speaking to voters in their election campaigns and promising better conditions for society. In doing so, they frame the problems of society from their perspective and strive to mobilize people to support their solutions. Therefore, the language they use in election campaigns is an important political tool for securitization.

The political discourses used in Turkey's 2018 general elections shed light on the securitization of the issue of Syrian asylum seekers. Turkey is taken as the case study, since it has been one of the major destinations for asylum seekers fleeing Syria. One of the reasons why Turkey has become the most important recipient country is its open-door policy for Syrian asylum seekers (Kirişçi, 2014, p. 14). In addition, Turkey offers relatively better opportunities to asylum seekers than other countries. It is known that Turkey grants citizenship to a certain number of Syrian refugees of Turkish origin (Gülyaşar, 2017, p. 686; Euronews, 2019). The third reason is that people who migrated from Syria deemed Turkey as a safe zone for the transition to Europe (Karasu, 2018, p. 68). By the end of 2017, Turkey has become the country receiving the highest number of asylum seekers/refugees with 3,400,000 people. Turkey was followed by Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and the North African Region, respectively (UMCD, *International Association for Refugee Rights*, 2021). In this context, Syrian asylum seekers have become a very serious domestic policy concern as well as an international issue for Turkey. In this study, it is examined how the admission of people from Syria to Turkey – after the civil war erupted in Syria in 2011 – affected Turkish politics through political parties and their discourses. Analyses include political parties' reflexes, their outstanding statements about Syrian

asylum seekers as well as their security policies pertaining to Syrian asylum seekers fleeing the country. These analyses are aimed at investigating whether the said political parties used statements that securitized Syrian asylum seekers in Turkey.

In literature, there are a great many studies focusing on Syrian asylum seekers as well as critical reviews of these studies within the framework of the Copenhagen School. As a matter of fact, specific articles explain the Copenhagen School and the securitization theory through a comprehensive and systematic review of critical studies in literature. Furthermore, a doctoral dissertation aiming to be the first study scrutinizing political and historical securitization is one of the pioneering studies in Turkish academic literature in understanding the Securitization Theory (Baysal & Lüleci, 2015; Miş, 2012). Analyzing international migration from the perspective of transformation into a security issue, Mandacı and Özerim's research, for instance, assesses the topic through radical parties (2013). Gülbak's master thesis examines the transformation in Turkey's Syria policy during the JDP period according to the securitization (2018) understanding. In the same vein, Devran and Özcan examine the discourses and policies of Turkish parties between 2011-2015 on immigrants from Syria in an attempt to determine the said parties' perspectives on this issue (2016). Demirtaş's article, *Refugees and Securitization*, analyzes how migration is securitized according to the Copenhagen School (2019). In addition, there is a considerable literature exploring the policies of the European Union (EU) regarding immigration and immigrants (Şemşit, 2010; Yılmaz-Elmas, 2016, Türkeş-Kılıç, 2018). Kapani's book exploring the functions of political parties is regarded as an influential source for this study in terms of understanding the effectiveness of parties in the securitization process (2007). Krotký's study analyzing how Czech political parties use securitization of immigration in their election manifestos is a critical source in

understanding how political parties securitize immigration as a strategic and discursive tool (2019).

Çiçek, Arslan and Baykal analyze political parties in Turkey with respect to their 2018 election manifestos (2018). On the other hand, this study differs from that of Arslan and Baykal in that it analyzes party discourses in the 2018 election manifestos according to the Securitization Theory. Unlike the article in question, this study focuses on the problems defined by political parties in their manifestos from the perspective of security rather than dwelling upon the social and economic dimensions of the given problems. In this context, Çoban evaluates how the JDP government securitized the migration problem as well as the institutions that emerged in this period (2019). However, this thesis predominantly seeks answers to the question how four major Turkish political parties changed their discourses regarding asylum seekers particularly after the massive migration of Syrians to Turkey in 2015 in line with the Securitization Theory. From this perspective, 2018 election manifestos of political parties can be evaluated according to their position towards the government. Indeed, various ideologies – including opposing views – of political parties have a critical role in shaping their political discourses. Thus, this study aims to contribute to literature with an analysis of political parties' promises for the future in their election manifestos, their problem definitions and proposed solutions with a particular focus on the fact that they have turned the issue of Syrian asylum seekers into a political tool. In this context, the study will manifest that Turkish political parties shape their discourses on Syrian asylum seekers according to their opposition to or alliance with the government rather than their ideology within the scope of Securitization Theory.

The discourse analysis of each political party's election manifesto is conducted by focusing on three main questions:

1- How does the party define people who fled to Turkey from Syria?

2- Are Syrians in Turkey associated with problems and if so, what kind?

3- What are the policies that the party proposes as a solution to the problems they put forward?

Answers to these questions will enable uncovering the variance in parties' positions and therefore, the subjectivity of the relationship between Syrian asylum seekers and the concept of security. Furthermore, this analysis will reveal how political parties use discourses on Syrian asylum seekers as a political tool to achieve their goal: To secure most of the votes from Turkish citizens. Hence, the approaches of major political parties towards the issue of Syrian asylum seekers will be assessed in relation to their position in the election (pro-government or pro-opposition).

The parties whose election manifestos are put under scrutiny are the JDP (Justice and Development Party), RPP (Republican People's Party), NMP (Nationalist Movement Party) and GP (Good Party) respectively according to the number of seats they won in the 2018 election). Despite being the fifth party in the parliament, the Peoples' Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi/HDP/PDP*) is excluded from the analysis since the party members abstained from benefitting from securitization discourses in their policies. The PDP advocated that the will of Kurds living in Syria should be recognized by Turkey, as well as advocating the same for Kurds living in Turkey. Thus, they called for the government to grant Syrian refugees asylum and improve their living conditions (Devran & Özcan, 2016, pp. 45,47). Evaluating the PDP in comparison to parliamentarians, it can be observed that PDP members made more neutral statements about Syrian refugees and argued that the focus must be on the humanitarian dimension of the Syrian crisis (Apaydın &

Müftüler-Bac, 2020, pp. 20-21). In this line, the PDP criticized the lack of status for Syrian refugees and expressed their dissatisfaction with defining Syrians as guests in the country (Çiçek, Arslan & Baykal, 2018, p. 152). For this reason, the PDP is not included among the political parties that used securitization policies regarding Syrian asylum seekers in Turkey as one of the focal points of this study.

0.1. Political Party Positions

Literature exploring the relationship between migration and political orientation suggests that political parties that qualify as right-wing parties in the political spectrum are mostly against immigrants. One reason for this is that they claim immigrants will financially burden the country's economy, increase the unemployment rate, abuse the economic opportunities of the country, and create instability since they have a different value system. Parties that call themselves left-wing, on the other hand, mostly make statements in favor of the country helping immigrants (Però, 2005, pp. 832-858).¹

Nevertheless, ongoing debates indicate that right- and left-wing parties use similar approaches in case of heavy immigration and see it as a security problem (Alonso & Fonseca, 2011, p. 865).² In an attempt to see whether this claim applies to political parties in Turkey, some of the discourses belonging to major political parties – that are in alliance with each other – will be analyzed in depth in the next chapters.

¹ For more information, see RYDGREN, J. (2005). Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family. **European Journal of Political Research**, 44(3), pp. 413–437.

² For the approaches of political parties that emphasize the egalitarian dimension, see. Carvalho, J. (2020). The positions that mainstream left-wing parties adopt regarding immigration, **Party Politics**, Vol.26-4, pp. 379-389.

Table 1.*2011-2015 General Election Results*

Name of the Party	Number of members winning the MP position (2011)	Number of members winning the MP position (June 7, 2015)	Number of members winning the MP position (November 1, 2015)
JDP	327	258	317
RPP	135	132	134
NMP	53	80	40
GP	-	-	-

Table 2.*2018 General Election Results*

Name of the Party	Number of members winning the MP position (2018)
JDP	295
RPP	146
NMP	49
GP	43
People's Alliance	344
Nation's Alliance	189

The two groups of political parties with the highest number of members in the Turkish Grand National Assembly are called the ruling party and the main opposition party (Official Gazette, 2017). Accordingly, the JDP is the ruling party and the RPP is

the main opposition party. As a result of the elections held in 2011, the JDP obtained the right of representation at the parliament with 327 deputies, the RPP with 135 and the NMP with 53 deputies. In the elections of June 7, 2015, 258 members from the JDP, 132 from the RPP and 80 members from the NMP were elected as members of parliament. Likewise, the JD, RPP and NMP managed to have 317, 134 and 40 deputies respectively after the general election held on November 1, 2015 (Supreme Election Board, *Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*, YSK, 2011; 2015a; 2015b). Established in 2017, the Good Party or the GP (Celep, 2018, p. 109) participated in the 2018 general elections after leaving the NMP. Following the general elections in 2018, the *People's Alliance* – consisting of the Justice and Development Party, a.k.a. the JDP, and the Nationalist Movement Party, a.k.a. the NMP – managed to have a total of 344 MPs. On the other hand, the *Nation's Alliance* – consisting of four major opposition parties (the Republican People's Party a.k.a the RPP, the GP, Saadet or Felicity Party a.k.a FP, and the Democratic Party, a.k.a DP) had a total of 189 MPs (YSK, 2018). The FP and DP from the Nation's Alliance are excluded from this analysis since their number of seats was below five. Although the PDP is the third largest party in the parliament in terms of the number of representatives, it is not taken into consideration in this study either, since the DPD did not make security-oriented statements about Syrian asylum seekers.

The JDP obtained the majority of the seats in the parliament by 2018, while it has also been the governing party since 2002. Syrian asylum seekers were first admitted to Turkey within the framework of the open-door policy in 2011 (Kaya, 2021, pp. 359, 360). Accordingly, the JDP's election manifesto was expected not to reflect a critical approach to Syrian asylum seekers. Rather, the governing party was

expected to persuade voters that Syrian asylum seekers did not constitute a threat to Turkish society.

For the 2018 general elections in Turkey, the NMP allied with the JDP due to the risk of votes falling under the threshold after the break of the GP from the NMP (NMP, 2018, p. 7). The JDP also had to ally with the NMP to secure a majority of the votes. In this regard, the NMP – that had a national conservative base – began to take on a more secular approach and a homogeneous infrastructure of central politics (Türkmenoğlu-Köse, 2017, p. 32). The GP, on the other hand, allied with the RPP with the declaration signed on May 5, 2018 to eliminate the risk of falling under the threshold in elections (Erdoğan, 2018b, p. 775; Aydoğan- Ünal, 2019, p. 326). The GP shared in its alliance statement that their main objective is to reflect voters' political preferences on election results and ensure justice in representation despite differing world views (Cumhuriyet, 2018). The NMP and the GP share the same background in terms of the nationalist spectrum (NMP, 2009, pp. 18-19; Good Party Programme, *İYİ Parti Programı*, p. 5). In general terms, though, the JDP and the RPP are expected to have a more determining effect in alliances, while the NMP and the GP are more likely to be in a supportive position for their alliance. Although both the NMP and the GP are right-wing parties, they might not have similar discourses regarding Syrian refugees in Turkey. On the other hand, the NMP is observed to share similar statements with the JDP due to their alliance and thus, the NMP is not expected to severely criticize government policies. In this regard, the GP's rhetoric seems to shape in accordance with their alliance with the opposition.

0.2. Thesis Structure

This thesis is organized as follows:

To build a theoretical and conceptual framework, this study first features a discussion of the concept of security in international relations in the context of its history. Thus, Chapter I and II elaborate on how traditional security theories deal with security to provide a better understanding of how security is conceptualized in international relations. Followed by this analysis, security conceptualizations under new theoretical approaches are explained in detail. In this regard, the study adopts an unconventional security approach and examines the phenomenon of migration within the framework of ‘new security’. After determining how security is conceptualized within the framework of these new security approaches, it was found useful to analyze the “Securitization Theory” purported by the Copenhagen School, since this theory forms the basis of this study in elaborating on the securitization of the migration issue.

In the aftermath of setting the theoretical framework, the study proceeds with an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of migration – a significant concept affecting international relations – according to its historical framework in Chapter III to understand the different categories of migration affecting the concepts analyzed in this study, first these various types of migration are explained in detail. Followed by clearly setting forth the types of migration, the concepts of immigrant, refugee and asylum seeker are explained according to their definitions in international legislation.


Chapter IV is allocated for an analysis of Turkey’s migration history. Indeed, Turkey has been a hot spot for both emigration and immigration. This analysis also includes the mass migrations it had received until the influx of Syrian asylum seekers started with an attempt to provide a general outlook pertaining to migration in Turkey. In this context, this chapter provides an account on how Turkey has transformed from a country that sent more emigrants in the past into one that has been receiving more immigrants. In this vein, the concept of non-refoulement is of great importance in

comprehending Turkey's migration history. As a matter of fact, this principle was adopted by the 1951 Geneva Convention and regulated in Turkey in 1994, while being expanded with the *Law on Foreigners and International Protection* (LFIP) in 2013. This chapter also features the migration legislation adopted in Turkey in the 2000s – when it became a target country for migration – with an attempt to provide an insight for comparison to the legislation changing after the arrival of Syrian asylum seekers (which is explained in the following chapter).

Chapter V focuses on the reasons paving the way for the emergence of the Syrian civil war, which resulted in forced mass migration of Syrian asylum seekers all over the world. In addition, it is explained when the first mass migration resulting from conflicts started to influx Turkey. In this context, it is further discussed how these massive and continuous migrations to Turkey have caused economic, military, social and political security concerns. This discussion includes the military effects of Syrian asylum seekers on Turkey's border security, economic effects on the country's budget and unemployment rates and their social effect (meaning how asylum seekers are perceived by locals in society). The last chapter of the study, on the other hand, concentrates on the political effects of Syrian asylum seekers on domestic politics featuring political parties' approaches to the subject. The last part of Chapter V analyzes the kind of changes made in the migration policy since Syrians first started to enter Turkey.

Chapter VI constitutes the analysis part of the study. Here, it is aimed to determine whether Syrian asylum seekers were subject to securitization in the 2018 general election manifestos of Turkish political parties. If so, the ways they were securitized are investigated in this part. Furthermore, this covers the analysis of solution proposals of political parties for Syrian asylum seekers subjected to

securitization. In this context, the statements of JDP and the NMP (People's Alliance) and RPP and GP (Nation's Alliance) in the 2018 general election manifestos are evaluated within the framework of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory. Finally, the locations where the JDP, RPP, NMP and GP placed Syrian refugees are explained according to their discourses in their election manifestos. Consequently, it is aimed to show how the issue of Syrian asylum seekers is used as a political tool in the form of an election promise. This will reveal how Turkish political parties define Syrian asylum seekers in their manifestos, how they perceive them as a problem as well as the policies they have developed as solution proposals.



CHAPTER I SECURITY AS AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CONCEPT: TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

Defining security is a very complex and controversial process since even citizens of the same state evaluate it differently, let alone those who share a similar view. Nevertheless, the simplest definition of security is to eliminate threats against values (Williams, 2013, p. 1). In order to explain how this thesis treats security, there is first a need for an extensive account on the conceptualization of security in international relations. Thus, the first two chapters introduce the variance in the theoretical approaches to international security.

Analyzing the security perspective of international relations approaches in the modern world, it is striking that there are two different basic views: the traditional security approach (dealing with security with a classical state focus) and the new security approaches focusing on state-centered and military security issues as well as contemporary security issues. This thesis adopts the non-traditional security approach and explores migration within the ‘new security’ framework. This chapter aims to build a basis for the discussion of new security approaches and for this purpose, it provides a thorough account of traditional approaches to security. The following chapter will move onto considering the non-traditional approaches.

1.1. Historical Development of the Concept of Security

Although the mankind has had to deal with the phenomenon of security since the beginning of human history, its roots can be traced back to the Hellenistic period. The concept in question is the equivalent of the expression “*ataraxia*”, meaning calmness and indifference at that time. This perception can also be found in the Pax Romana, the Roman Peace system, which was established in Ancient Rome to ensure general security and continued for about 200 years. The system generally refers to a

security order provided by the empire. The word “*securitas*”, which was used in the Roman period to refer to peace and removal of all kinds of anxiety, is the expression corresponding to the concept of security. In this line, the concept of security used today is derived from the word *securitas* (Arends, 2009, pp. 5-6).

Indeed, the concept of “*securitas*” has been used since the beginning of the first century A.D to mean being free from worries, or safety, security and freedom from dangers. The word “*securitas*” is the equivalent of the concept in question and it is derived from the words “*se*” meaning “without” and “*cura*” meaning “fear” in Latin. Outside this context, the word was also observed to be used in reference to negligence and disregard at that time with no objective basis (Haser, 2018, p. 9).

The concept of security began to be used in the sense of the modern times in the 17th century. In other words, it was started be divided into two as domestic and international security. The Osnabrück and Münster Agreements signed in 1648 after the 30 Years’ War marked the beginning of this distinction between domestic/internal and international security (Anghie, 2010, pp. 52-53). Moreover, nation-states started to emerge after these agreements and in monarchies, an individual’s transfer of their rights to a higher authority to protect themselves meant security and thus, it became a need. In this system, individual security was perceived to be equal to state security and this enabled the concept of security to be addressed at the national level. Thus, along with security, threats causing the need for protection began to be included in the management of the international system. In this way, the principle of ensuring the security of both states and individuals against external threats ensured considering both state and individual security within the scope of state’s sovereignty.

The collective security approach (Brauch, 2008, p. 3), first put forward by the League of Nations (LON) for the states seeking security after the First World War, gave rise to the hope that security could be achieved in the international arena (Baylis, 2008, p. 70). This led to the emergence of idealism seeking international peace by means of the League of Nations. At that time, idealism began to be widely accepted by societies, believing that it was in search of a solution the insecurity that emerged after World War I. Although the concept of security was mentioned after this period, security studies did not go beyond the military examination of security.

Following World War II, the United States of America (USA) led security studies that exclusively focused on the military aspect of security. Indeed, the scope of the discipline was in line with the heightened security considerations of the Cold War. The official inclusion of the concept of security in academic studies was due to the Ford Foundation's support to these studies in 1970 and the establishment of "*International Security*", a scientific journal featuring articles on security (Çetinkaya, 2012, p. 242). In this period, the concept of security was considered equal to national security since it was believed that the only element to protect for state continuity was the independent political authority (Ergüven, 2016, p. 779). Therefore, security studies were limited to military security.

Just before the Cold War Era, advocates of a human-centered approach demanded expanding the scope of the concept of security, which had thus far been handled with a classical state-oriented and military perspective (Çetinkaya, 2012, p. 244). With this demand, discussions started around the idea that the security of individuals, societies and global security should also be the subject of security. Combined with the changing circumstances, the idea that security studies must include individual, society and global security – in addition to state security as the

most important actor in the international field – became widespread. On the other hand, the Cold War that erupted after World War II had caused handling the issue of security in a narrow scope – limited to states only (Sheehan, 2005, p. 6).

Security studies before World War II were mostly tackling military and war strategies. In the aftermath of World War II, on the other hand, security became a field of study seeking ways to save the international system from negative consequences of wars by moving away from its definition in military terms. Such studies aimed to prevent wars and their deep damage on states in an attempt to bring a safer international environment. In this regard, it may well be argued that the discipline of international relations gained significant momentum after World War II. With the change in the content of the understanding of security, international relations have now become more security-oriented rather than war and defense-oriented (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 4).

In the period after World War II, the principle of *balance of power* became essential in ensuring security, and states eventually fulfilled this principle for deterrence. As a matter of fact, decision makers named the deterrence policy as a rational act for states (Oğuzlu, 2007, pp. 13-14). At the same time, the concept of security already had the potential for expansion, while the rising demands to change its definition by moving away from the military-political approach increased with the effect of the nuclear tension between the two superpowers in the years before the Cold War (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 2). Security necessitates the power of states to repel the attacks they have to deal with, or to deter a state to counter-attack. Otherwise, a state cannot be considered to be in a secure environment. As a matter of fact, if any state within the system takes actions to change the balance of the system at the expense of the security of another, other states will unite and act with the policy of

balancing the power of this state. The state, which is thought to disrupt the balance in the system, is expected to be informed about the burden it will have to face when the principle of balance of power is applied by other states. Thus, this state will be called to withdraw this attitude to disrupt the balance.

Buzan divided the concepts used to support security into three categories: The first group is complementary concepts including deterrence, strategy and limitation. The second group consists of parallel concepts such as sovereignty and power. The last group, on the other hand, features opposing concepts such as peace and risk, which are intended to be used instead of security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 14). Since the survival of state is essential, security is a phenomenon that should be built to ensure this continuity. National security studies are considered closer to security in the historical process. That is to say, national security was more concerned with military capability and strategies in the past to eliminate threats against state survival.

Barry Buzan analyzes security in a wider international framework focusing on the political, economic, environmental and military aspects of security (Baylis, 2008, p. 73). Accordingly, this traditional perspective prioritized the military aspect of security, regarded as “high politics” after World War II. Other issues out of the scope of security were regarded as “low politics”. In other words, contemporary problems such as human health, transboundary migration and international terrorism were attributed secondary importance and were deemed outside the scope of military security.

Regarding why there has not been a consensus on the definition of the concept of security, Buzan argues that it is a controversial and ambiguous concept “as in the cases of love, freedom and power” (Buzan, 1991, p. 7). Likewise, McSweeney claims

that security is a difficult process to define and a phenomenon that resists being defined, even though it is associated with universal words such as “peace, honor and justice” (McSweeney, 1999, p. 13). Although there is no clarity in the definition of the concept, there is a common view that security includes being away from threats and dangers.

In this context, it can be uttered that the traditional military-oriented security approach in security studies failed to give any clear answer to the inability of states to increase their security capacities in the face of the ever-increasing arms race. Indeed, this race created new problems such as financial burden to states. Therefore, there was a clear need to deepen the meaning of the concept of security or a change in the traditional military-oriented security approach. Consequently, new studies advocating the inclusion of other dimensions in state and international security emerged (by questioning the value of the former state-centric approach) despite the deeper emphasis on national security issues in the international relations system in the past (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 2).

Furthermore, the new understanding is different from that of the traditional military view of security in that it is shaped by claims that individuals and actors are exposed to not only military threats but also other types of threats. Thus, it is argued by many that such threats with different nature must be evaluated under the scope of security. Indeed, in the period after World War I, idealism (aiming to achieve world peace and collective security) failed and, contrary to what idealists claimed, this ideology could not prevent the outbreak of World War II. Thus, realism – which takes its roots from idealism and traditional security approach – served as the dominant thought of international security until the end of the 1970s. Another reason why idealism is discredited is the failure and dissolution of the League of Nations, which

was established within the framework of idealism. However, with the internationalization of identity complexity problems, increasing environmental problems, human rights violations and crimes that emerged in the international area before the 1980s, the realist security perspective was also ineffective in finding solutions to these new problems. Hence, debates started about its place in security perceptions (Baran & Macar, 2017, p. 252).

The traditional military-oriented approach accepts power capacity to be in parallel with security and concentrates on how to counter military threats from another actor with military measures. In this classical understanding, state and state security take precedence over every value. However, with the enrichment of the scope of the concept of security over time, a new understanding emerged that includes different elements under security as a criticism of this traditional approach. In the post-Cold War period, former and new security researchers covered this issue to a greater extent paving the way for the emergence of new security approaches. These include the Copenhagen School of Security Studies and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 13). This critical understanding defends that it is wrong to see power as the only source of building security. Rather, states face new dangers other than military threats and this should not be ignored. Since security does not mean the same for an individual and a nation, the conditions of being in a safe or unsafe state are different for each actor. This causes the expansion of the concept of military security into political, environmental, economic, social and human security (Hansen & Buzan, 2007, p. 2).

1.2. Traditional Security Approaches

In the field of international relations, the authors who led the first theoretical studies included Aristotle and Plato. Likewise, Thucydides' "History of the

Peloponnesian Wars” and Machiavelli’s “The Prince” are the first examples of studies in this field. The Westphalian system is considered the beginning of the nation state system. It also provided the basis for the traditional security understanding in international relations. The core of the Westphalian Peace System was shaped by the need to keep military power always ready and at the highest level to ensure the continuity of a state. In this context, a state was defined as an organization built on a territory with strictly delineated borders and endowed with immunity and territorial integrity. From this perspective, the scope of international relations studies remained mostly limited to diplomacy and international law studies until 1914 (Ari, 2011). From an academic point of view, international relations studies first emerged and turned into a discipline when a department was opened in Wales Aberystwyth University in 1919 (Baylis & Smith, 2005).

As part of international relations theories, idealism – a reflection of liberalism – comes to mind first. Idealism was shaped predominantly by the Anglo-Saxon thought of the time. Although idealism is accepted as the first theoretical approach specific to this field, it can be said that it is more of a grid of ideals rather than a theory, since idealists thought about the way international relations were structured rather than developing a solid theory. The traditional security approach maintains that the relationship between state and security is always direct. In that, states are always the most important actors and the core of the concept of security is military security. In this regard, advocates of the traditional school argue that security is related to competition and conflict between states. Every state tries to ensure its interests, protect its sovereignty, political authority and territorial integrity while also striving to keep their military power at the maximum level. These are regarded as the indispensable features of security according to the above-given understanding.

The reason why idealism started to be questioned about its effectiveness in ensuring world peace is that World War II broke out after World War I, although idealists ardently argued that a peaceful world was possible. In contrast to idealist claims, world states faced a war even more destructive than the preceding one, let alone establishing world peace. Furthermore, the League of Nations – which was established on the promise of playing a major role in building world peace as part of idealism – failed in its actions. This constituted another reason for this theory to lose its effectiveness. Indeed, idealism survived for only ten years as an influential thought system after World War I. followed by it, realism became the dominant theory.

In accordance with Thomas Hobbes' argument that man is the wolf of man, the greatest threat to a state in traditional security understanding comes from another state (Miller, 2001, p. 17). In general sense, states that desire to gain power and grab the interests of other states regardless of their own capacity are among the greatest threats in the international system. Furthermore, this includes states that can trigger nationalism in neighboring countries. Although the above-mentioned theories followed some common paths on the way to security, each theory defined security within the framework of its historical development, economic and political conditions (Arıboğan, 2007, p. 326). According to Dedeoğlu, the emergence of these approaches to security and their different views depend on the differences in the perception of threats against the security of a state as well as the different ways of ensuring state security (Dedeoğlu, 2008, p. 24). The traditional understanding of security suggests that states are more concerned with how much military power another state has compared to itself rather than how much power they own. In literature, this is explained with the understanding of zero-sum game and put forward by realists.

With the spread of the capitalist world system under the control of European states in the 14th century, some states began to be colonized, and this system caused irreversible heavy consequences combined with the industrial revolution in the 18th century. Western states had the advantage of this development and while there was an increase in welfare in the West, other states both suffered from colonization and became even poorer. These developments led to unbalanced distribution of resources and the emergence of central states in the north and peripheral states in the south. In this context, the aim of all states in the international system is to maximize their earnings and reduce those of others as much as possible, and each state wants to protect its own security. Due to the anarchic system that dominates the international area, there is a constant uncertainty about how states will act and there is no higher authority to control the movements of a state within the system. At the same time, a state cannot predict the real goals of another state and cannot be sure whether it will change its moves later. For this reason, states do not rely on other states. They determine their defense systems according to their own circumstances and national interest. That is why security is an indispensable element of international relations (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 83).

In the period before the World War II, the scope of security could not be taken out of military issues, although the content of the concept was partially expanded after this period. Thus, security was generally used in connection with national security and research subjects predominantly remained limited to military capacity. Considering states as the only and most valuable actors (to be subject to security efforts) and ignoring other security problems as relatively inferior issues laid the groundwork for the Cold War. In this regard, supporters of the traditional security understanding claimed that the most effective way to ensure security was to increase alliances as

much as possible. Furthermore, they believed that protecting the nation-state system was essential. The national military security policy of states was formed by efforts to increase the capacity to eliminate and deter threats against state survival and territorial integrity (Buzan, 1991, p. 70). As mentioned before, these threats and military security issues were considered high policy areas by states.

From another perspective, the Industrial Revolution demonstrated the importance of the need for energy and the concept of security issues shifted towards energy security. This unbalanced distribution of resources, population, urbanization and change in energy systems brought about socio-economic and environmental security problems on a global scale. Hegemonic states shaped their security strategies within the framework of their dominance over source control. At the end of the 19th century, when colonial activities came to an end, nation-states gradually began to gain their independence and these newly independent nation-states, unlike hegemonic central states, began to have a say in determining security strategies and consequently in resource control. Thus, nation-states became actors that could threaten security. This development caused security strategies to gain a regional dimension through changing the balances in resource control (Buzan, 2008, pp. 109-112).

The 20th century was marked as one of the most destructive periods in human history, accompanied by nuclear disasters and immense wars. As a matter of fact, this century passed not only with wars and conflicts, but also with intellectual and regional polarizations, global social and economic crises. Nonetheless, each great development and each war became a turning point in human history. As much as World War I and II, the most destructive wars in human history were caused by the desire of states to become the dominant power controlling natural resources. Moreover, wars had serious negative consequences for both winners and defeated states. Hence, both

winner and defeated states were observed to try to establish a new state and social order after the relevant war. They shaped their security strategies in this process. In this regard, states' changing policies and strategies to restore national order paved the way for adding a new dimension to the concept of security.

The United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, which were established respectively and under the influence of some countries, can be cited as proof of the importance of security in the field of international relations. At the end of this period, the balance of the world system changed from multi-polarity to bipolarity. The constantly changing balance between the USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) resulted in the escalation of tensions with the increase in the production of nuclear weapons. This also led to the emergence of constant conflicts and wars between the two superpowers struggling to control nuclear weapons and have regional power (Buzan, 2008, pp. 112-113). With theoretical and practical studies, the traditional state-centered and military-oriented realist theory that shaped the security perception of the 20th century started with Thucydides. Carr, Huntington et al. and other scholars further contributed to the development of the realist theory. This conflict-oriented approach that played a major role in describing this century as the age of crisis was insufficient in overcoming the crises that emerged in this period.

Looking from the perspective of international relations theories during the Cold War, realism can be observed to dominate many areas concerning states in the system. Despite the expectation of disarmament after World War II, there was an increase in arms race as well as improvement in weapons technology. This affected the realist policy's spread around the globe (Bakan & Şahin, 2018, p. 138). In general, it may well be said that the threats, risks and major depressions of this century shaped

the international system. Accordingly, the international system of the period can be explained by Thomas Hobbes' claim that man is a wolf of man considering the natural state. Furthermore, the way nation-states act as the main actors in the system can be explicated with Machiavelli's proposition that every way to reach one's goal is permissible (Sandıklı & Emeklier, 2012, p. 3). As threats spread beyond borders and a single state could not afford to eliminate these threats alone, security policies started to take shape within the framework of the collective security understanding. In this context, the concept of military security was evaluated within the scope of traditional security. The aim of military security was to protect national interests. Moreover, the solution of international problems and efforts to ensure global security depended on international cooperation and state interdependence (Bilgin, 2006, p. 15). On the other hand, the realist approach, which was the dominant idea of the Cold War period, left its place to the idea of neo-realism after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Baylis, 2008, p. 71). On the basis of neo-realism is the view that cooperation in the international system cannot be permanent.

The unbalanced distribution of strategic resources and ongoing wars caused the international problems to continue increasingly in the late 20th century. During this period, the scope of security was deepened by the increase of transboundary global problems such as international terrorism, economic problems and environmental disasters affecting all the humanity equally. Other examples of these problems are starvation, poverty, depletion of the ozone layer, smuggling, terrorist activities, transboundary migration and refugee problems. The emergence of terrorist attacks in September 2001 constituted a turning point with regard to security issues all over the world and led to the prominence of both methodological and theoretical approaches on how to resolve the rising insecurity. Afterwards, discussions started about the

scope of these approaches and the direction of security perceptions. The attack against the USA also changed the content of threat-security perceptions considerably. Therefore, smuggling, organized crime, religion, ethnic origin and terrorist activities started to be included in the studies as threats that should be evaluated within the scope of security (Gurcan, 2012, p. 73).

By the end of the Cold War, it was argued that this narrow traditional view did not reflect the main reasons for national and regional insecurity and that there were also unconventional threats requiring attention. These included environmental problems, international crime and terrorism, cross-border migration, growth of non-state actors and increasing global problems due to excess population growth. Indeed, these are called some of the new generation threats (Mallavarapu, 2008, pp. 10-11). Upon this development, scholars started to think about new approaches about what the content of security would be, since the realist political theory was unable to explain existing security issues in the post-Cold War period in international politics. Such threats have become international with the effect of globalization. They have constantly renewed and undergone changes during the course of history. This has ultimately led international relations theories to re-evaluate security in terms of developing a solution proposal to problems after thorough analysis. Within the framework of these changing conditions, various international relations theories have attributed different meanings to security and its content. In fact, all approaches producing theories on international security have been shaped according to the structural characteristics of their period. These characteristics include estimates based on social, political and economic developments, major actors in the international system, and interactions among actors. These components have constituted the connection between theory and practice.

1.2.1. Idealism and Collective Security

It is possible to trace the origins of idealism back in the enlightenment period. As a matter of fact, idealism emerged as a result of efforts to establish peace and build international security at the end of the 18th century. Hugo Grotius, Immanuel Kant, John Locke and John Stuart Mill had a great influence on shaping the idealist thought during this period. Particularly Immanuel Kant and John Locke shaped and helped the spread of the idealist trend. Moreover, idealism increased its influence in international relations particularly after World War I under the leadership of USA President Woodrow Wilson. Although idealism was discredited at the end of World II with fascist regimes gaining power, it became important again in the post-Cold War period. However, as a result of the attacks against the USA in 2001 and the international terrorist attacks that continued increasingly afterwards, idealism lost its influence almost completely and the world started to question the legitimacy of nation-states.

The word idealism was first used in 1923. Birkenhead was the first to include this concept in a paper he presented in his Rector's Speeches at Glasgow University. Birkenhead emphasized that the philosophical meaning of idealism differs from that of the one used in international relations. According to him, idealism means the desire to be more advanced than an individual or a community and to reach a higher position when viewed from a philosophical perspective, while in terms of international relations it means the desire to improve the relations between states according to ethics and values (Gözen, 2015, p. 70). In his work titled *Perpetual Peace*, Immanuel Kant suggested in 1795 that the first way to achieve international peace was through the consent of individuals in a state (Kant, 1960, pp. 122-123). In other words, citizens are expected to stay away from the idea of war and adopt an attitude in favor of peace, considering the negative consequences, costs and disasters of war in order to

achieve peace. In this context, Kant argued that states need to dissolve their permanent armies since a state's constant readiness for war and keeping its military power high would lead to fear and threat perception by other states (Kant, 1960, p. 110). In return, this would cause other states to constantly develop a counter-policy against the threat they perceived.

In reality, however, there is currently no group or individual identifying with the idealist approach. On the other hand, those who uphold the opposite view – realism – have critical point of view towards idealism. Edward Carr shared that idealism is an approach that includes certain ideas from the enlightenment philosophy, liberalism and Wilson's Idealism (Haser, 2018, p. 22). In other words, it can be said that the idea in question is derived from liberalism. According to those who support idealism, ensuring order in the international area depends on the understanding of peace based on rules. Thomas Paine, for instance, argued in his book *Rights of Man*, written in 1791, that only if a democratic revolution is accomplished, then humanity will be able to get out of its current problematic situation. Thus, he reflected his advocacy for democracy in this study.

In the 19th century, the world heavily felt the influence of idealism, though. Nevertheless, World War I led to massive transformations in many areas by the effect of winning and losing states. Indeed, opinions dominating the international system were also affected by these transformations. As a matter of fact, scholars studied idealism before World War I from a more moderate and optimistic perspective. More precisely, the most important goal in idealism was to achieve international peace. It was thought that this goal could only be achieved if repressive authoritarian governments were abolished and the principle of nation-state prevailed in international relations. However, the experience of a world war led to changes in the

idealist understanding regarding international security. Thus, idealist researchers began to base their studies more on a scientific approach. They put aside being optimistic about international security problems and tried to produce scientific solutions. From this point of view, it is possible to call idealism a war-peace theory in a sense, since it emerged in a period between World War I and II seeking a solution on how to heal the wounds resulting from the incredibly devastating disasters caused by war and how to achieve international peace. For this reason, it may well be stated that idealism is a theory emerging right after the birth of the international relations discipline (Gözen, 2015, pp. 68-69). Over time, idealism progressed with the establishment of international peace after the destruction caused by the world war. In fact, idealists concentrated on a world view based on world citizenship during World War I as a way of salvation. Envisaging world citizenship was especially supported by Kant's ideas (Kant, 1960, pp. 17-28). Idealists accepted the anarchic nature of the international system, yet they argued that this structure would not pose an obstacle to developing mechanisms to prevent wars and conflicts. Indeed, they ardently claimed that such mechanisms could be of use in building international cooperation. However, it might be understood that efforts to prevent wars and conflicts can yield successful results when there is a central authority in the system as well as international cooperation. In this way, an international security force would be able to achieve universal peace.

In this line, collective security forms the general perspective of idealists regarding security. The League of Nations contributed to the spread and expansion of the understanding of collective security. This organization introduced an order where if any member of the League of Nations bore an attack, all member states would respond to it, deeming the attack as made against all member states. Accordingly, the

understanding of collective security defined within the framework of idealism is an effort to establish international cooperation and alliance that is deemed necessary to protect the sovereignty of nations from aggressive foreign policies. However, idealists had to turn their point of view to international law and international organizations due to the heavy consequences of the war over time. Thus, idealism could only progress in theory after a while. Supporters of this ideology soon accepted that having an international security force was essential for maintaining security (Dedeoğlu, 2008, p. 53).

On the other hand, idealists assume that democracy and peace are two different phenomena, but developing in parallel to each other. This means that a democratic state will naturally achieve peace thanks to democracy's merits. Contrary to this idea, although the USA defined itself as a democratic state, it had continued its aggressive stance throughout the Cold War period. The USA did not participate in the formation of the League of Nations and followed an introverted policy. Consequently, the emergence of fascist regimes and the rise of fascist leaders including Hitler and Mussolini, and the Great Economic Depression of 1929 reduced confidence and belief in collective security and idealism (Bakan & Şahin, 2018, p. 139). After this process, idealism and collective security lost their value in the international area as a result of severe criticism.

1.2.2. Realism and Military Power

The dominance of realism in international relations increased after World War I, however it lost its effectiveness when idealism failed to prevent the outbreak of World War II. According to realism, individuals pursue their interests, and likewise, states aim to protect their interests and increase their opportunities by acting just like individuals. Furthermore, realists believe that in the international system dominated

by anarchy, all states act similarly. As stated before, the idealist view was shaped by inspiring from liberalism and idealists advocated for the need to heal the wounds of the destruction that emerged after World War I, restore order and eliminate security problems through peaceful methods. However, when idealist solution proposals failed and World War II outbroke, the world severely criticized idealism and these criticisms mainly came from advocates of the realist approach. The founder of the realist theory, Edward Hallet Carr give place particularly to these criticisms in his work *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939 An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. Afterwards, realism was accepted as one of the basic approaches to the discipline of international relations.

An analysis of the foundations of realism regarding international security demonstrates three indispensable elements: First is that states are the most important actors of the international system and individual security depends on state security. According to this state-oriented security understanding, the second important element is the existence of anarchy due to the lack of a supreme mechanism to control the movements of states in the international area. The last element is the phenomenon of power, coming into the forefront in connection with the state of anarchy. Here, the most effective method to eliminate conflicts and ensure security in the international system is to use force (Knutsen, 1992), and it is very important how much power states have.

Thucydides, Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes are considered the founding fathers of what is today referred to as classical realism. The fundamental value of classical realism is state and that states must protect their national interests under any circumstances. Besides, state leaders should behave to maintain state survival, its sovereignty and increase its power. In this regard, classical realists argue that

sovereign state is the core of world politics. Accordingly, other actors like international organizations and international institutions are not important in the international area. Classical realists refer to entities that have monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory as states. According to this theory, sovereignty is that states make and implement their own laws. From this aspect, it can be said that realism is a state-centric theory.

Hans Morgenthau, one of the most important defenders of realism, included realist dynamics in his work named “*Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*” (Morgenthau, 1948). Morgenthau emphasized that state is the main actor in international relations and argued that the system is anarchic due to the lack of a higher authority or mechanism in the international area. From then on, scholarly work on international relations began to include the concepts of national interests, international politics and power.

Realists state that cooperation is impossible in ensuring security in the international field. Rather, they assert that security can only be built by balancing forces. The reason why states have different powers – to be used in balancing the gains in the international area – is due to relative gains. In other words, the fact that a state’s earnings are higher than another will cause concern for that state, regardless of how much its power is. At the same time, international organizations will not contribute to cooperation as they represent the interests of states.

Realism is the earliest theory seeking a solution for ending wars. The solution realists found is the balance of power: If the survival of a state is threatened by a hegemonic state or coalition or stranger states, they should join forces, establish a formal alliance and seek to preserve their own independence. For instance, Western countries established NATO – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – in order to

protect the capitalist world from the USSR. In contrast, the USSR established the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, it can be said that the Cold War is the best example of the balance of power mechanism. Indeed, this is the reason why it was named after the Cold War. Two states did not engage with each other, there was no direct physical war. In the changing international environment after the Cold War, states were unsure about how to shape their new security perceptions and what the new threats were. While communism was previously perceived as a threat by Western states, especially with the attack against the USA on September 11, 2001, which was called a terrorist activity, especially the great powers determined their threat perceptions as religious terrorism. Subsequently, the Bush Doctrine was issued announcing that terrorist activities were effective in destruction and idealistic approaches started to be discussed again due to the ineffectiveness of idealist organizations such as the UN in resolving international conflicts.

Another assumption of classical realism is about domestic and international realms. In this context, the domestic realm features hierarchy and there is a certain order and security in a state. However, there is anarchy at the international level although anarchy does not mean chaos in the international realm. It means that there is no world-central government, in other words, this indicates the absence of a central overarching authority to ensure the rule of law. Therefore, the external sphere is full of insecurities, dangers and threats. Realists argue that all states aim to survive, maintain their existence and sovereignty. However, a state's sovereignty is not guaranteed under anarchy in the international area. At this point, realists suggest the self-help argument. Accordingly, states are responsible for the continuity of their countries and should never rely on anyone else to do so. Realists further advocate that politics is a zero-sum game. That is to say, more for one actor means less for another

and actors prefer competition rather than cooperation. In the international area, the lack of a mechanism to monitor the behaviors of states against each other or another actor causes states acting in accordance with their own legal rules in the domestic field to ensure their security with their own means (Sheean, 2005, p. 8).

From this perspective, realists associate negative behaviors of states with human nature and define human nature as non-altruistic. Hence, they expect actors to seek to satisfy their own interests and demands. This leads to a competitive relationship between actors and power becomes the central tool for states to survive in the system. Realists define power in terms of military capabilities, that is, the more military capability a state has, the stronger it is. At the same time, material power is the most important source of power for them. Given the competitive nature of this relationship, power is conceptualized as a relative concept. In other words, when a state calculates its power, it does not only consider its own capabilities, but also the power that other actors have.

In realism, the reason for the existence of a state is to protect its own citizens, yet it is argued that there is no such obligation for the international community (Steans, Pettiford & Diez, 2005, p. 51). This fact reveals the importance of power capacity. In addition, realism adopts a state-centered approach and power refers to military power. In this context, a state considers a threat it encounters as a security issue in case that threat includes the use of military force. On the other hand, if the threat can be resolved without the use of military force, then it is considered a political issue (Tanrisever, 2010, p. 110). Thus, while the economic, social and environmental problems encountered in the international area are evaluated as low politics, military issues are regarded as high politics. Furthermore, states tend to place such issues in a hierarchical order. On the other hand, issues that the international

community experiences (outside the boundaries of a state and thus not posing a threat to any state's security) are not seen as *security* issues. In this theory, the security of individuals is ignored. For instance, actors remain indifferent to migrants and refugee problems as they are national effects have negative consequences for only the people concerned (Steans, Pettiford & Diez, 2005, p. 68).

1.2.3. Neo-realism (Structural Realism) and Security

Although several neo-realists including Mearsheimer do not consider cooperation in international relations completely impossible, Mearsheimer argued that this cooperation will not be sufficient to ensure international security (Mearsheimer, 1995b, pp. 9, 12). From this perspective, he purported that states cooperate only for their specific interests and goals, and therefore, it remains limited. Thus, states are highly likely to deceive each other. Thus, the prevailing opinion is that states will generally form military alliances with each other, as the possibility of military alliances to provide security is considered higher than cooperation (Tertrais, 2004, pp. 135-136).

The reason why states cannot be in solidarity in the international area and act on their own resources is that the next step of the other party can never be predicted. Another obstacle to solidarity is that even if states acted within the scope of cooperation, they would be more concerned with how much they earn or the other party earned for themselves – relative gain – rather than focusing on the absolute gain for both as a result of this cooperation. Indeed, many neo-realists assume that these relative gains can be used as a threat to the opposite state (Ergüven, 2016, p. 792). In this vein, international organizations are seen as insufficient to contribute to security, since each state will be more concerned with relative gains and there will be no positive reflection of cooperation in the competitive environment. Thus, it is deemed

ensuring security will only be possible if states come together in a similar sense of gain.

According to Waltz, if states can ensure their survival in anarchy, then they can increase their other interests, profits and power (Waltz, 1979, p. 126). Waltz focused on the individual state and the international system in the construction of international security and argued that the international system formed based on the state of anarchy. This is unlike realism, since realists underline only state actions (for their interests) in explaining the international system. Deep diving into the neo-realist understanding, it can be observed that neo-realism is based on the assumption that the anarchic nature of the system leads each state to ensure its national security according to the principle of self-help. However, self-help might end up with a *security dilemma*. As a matter of fact, in Waltz purported in his study “*Theory of International Politics*” that security in the international system depends on the bipolar system since this would decrease the number of hegemonic states and deterrence would affect other states (Waltz, 1979).

In line with these presuppositions, neo-realists assume that states take actions based on their relative gains to increase their capacity. Furthermore, those who analyze the importance of states in the international system from the neo-realist window, argue that what is essential is the continuity of states. Hence, the steps that states take to provide this continuity render the international area a field of continuous competition. In fact, the international system dominated by anarchy necessitates continuous competition. While this situation increases the earnings and security of some states, it may cause some others to remain in an insecure environment, which would in turn negatively affect them. This is often cited by one well-known metaphor:

the zero-sum game meaning the gain of one state and the loss of another from the perspective of neo-realists.

As mentioned before, neo-realists argue that a state realizing its own security at the expense of the security of other states will cause a security dilemma in the international area. The reason for this is that increasing one state's capacity to the highest level possible will most likely cost the other state. In response, that state will take this situation as a threat. The security dilemma arising from the anarchic nature of the international system in such an environment means that states constantly approach each other with suspicion, characterize each other as a threat, and this ultimately leads to the rise of insecurity. In a system that allows each state to act in its own interests, states increase their military capacity as much as possible. However, this is an action that will ultimately eliminate the state of security for both states in question. An example for the security dilemma that makes states think they are in an environment of mutual distrust could be Turkey and Greece's perceptions of each other as a threat, although they did take place on different sides during the Cold War Era. Due to their perceptions, both states were pushed to reciprocally increase their arms.

Neo-realists utter that that if a state decided to increase its military power, another state will feel threatened and will start to question why that state is increasing its power. Ultimately, this state will feel obliged to increase its power by concluding that the other state is preparing an attack. Afterwards, the first state that has increased its power will also increase its power again, as it will feel threatened by the second state, and the second state will increase its power again in response. All in all, this will turn into a vicious cycle or in international relations term, a *security dilemma* (Snyder, 1984, p. 461).

Neo-realists give different answers to the question of how much power is enough for great powers. This question, in fact, has divided them into two groups: defensive and offensive realists. According to this division, Waltz advocates for defensive realism saying that an appropriate amount of power is enough since balancing will take place whenever a state becomes too much powerful. More concretely, other states will unite and destroy such a state like Nazi Germany. Therefore, balance of power is a method that regulates the international system for neo-realists. In other words, if the international system is secure, it means that states will also be safe, and order and stability can only be achieved through this balance (Waltz, 1979, p. 41). Unlike realism, neo-realism dwells upon the international system rather than nation-states in security studies. As for other differences when compared to classical realism, neo-realists – particularly Kenneth Waltz – attribute more importance to military security issues while also including international political economy in the security analysis. They suggest that economic security is a concept that has significant effect on today's world (Waltz, 1979, p. 110).

Defensive neo-realists also argue that every state should behave in a protective manner against the status quo in terms of ensuring security. On other hand, offensive neo-realists claim that states should have a revisionist character. Defensive realism is thus based on the idea that conquests can bring some benefits for great powers, yet they cause problems for both sides in the medium or long term, since states will suffer from the consequences of offensive realism. Hans Morgenthau formulated a realist understanding where states first try to gain power, and then they want to protect their power and finally reveal their power (Morgenthau, 2005, p. 52).

Offensive realism, usually associated with Mearsheimer, is based on the idea that states should maximize their power as much as possible; great powers should

gain more and more and try to be hegemons as this is the only way that guarantees survival. States do not always balance the hegemon per se, and this is not going to happen every time. Sometimes, small states follow the hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 2, 3). After World War II, the European states following the USA instead of balancing it can be given as an example in support of this argument.

1.2.4. Liberalism and Institutionalization

The roots of liberalism can be found in John Locke's studies, which later continued with thinkers such as David Hume, Adam Smith, Montesquieu and Immanuel Kant. The ideological structure of liberalism formed on the basis of the concepts of equality, freedom, property and rationality. The liberal perspective includes democracy, continuous improvement, and the perfection of human nature. Although power has an important place in international relations, liberals firmly believe that it is essential to establish cooperation since order can only be achieved in the international system through cooperation among states. Despite being an important actor in international relations, states are not perceived as the only important actors. Rather, individuals, multinational companies, non-governmental organizations and international organizations are now deemed important according to this comprehension. Considering liberalism as a theory under the discipline of international relations, it can be said that liberal efforts aimed to eliminate the insecure environment that emerged as a result of World War I and prevent such a war again.

Although the individual is the core of the liberal ideology, it is called a traditional theory since it deals with the concept of war within the framework of security. Liberal theorists criticize realists for seeing everyone as enemy. In other words, treating international politics as an unending struggle and seeing everyone as a

potential enemy ultimately becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, realism has become self-fulfilling. According to liberals, states can establish good relations with each other as world politics is not only about competition and conflict, but also has good aspects (Russett, 2013, p. 95). According to their main assumption, people are rational and want to maximize their freedom and prosperity. The other assumption is that progress is possible and people can change themselves in a positive manner through education and technology. Another assumption of liberalism is related to cooperation. Liberals argue that humans can cooperate and this will be beneficial for everyone. There is a harmony of interest in liberalism and humans can benefit from similar conditions. On the contrary, in realism there is always possible conflict when it comes to similar interests. Liberalism has linked the establishment of international law and norms to collective security. The reason for this is that they claim international law will abolish the state of anarchy and peace will be established only when institutionalization occurs. In this context, if individuals and states prefer to cooperate in the solution of problems and accept that they have common interests, they will further improve the democratization process and this will diminish the possibility of conflict in the international field. The reasoning behind this claim is that democratic states will not fight each other and this will consolidate security.

Another groundbreaking assumption by liberals is that economy is as important as military security issues (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 263). In this sense, trade is a regulator of international relations since it increases welfare for people and contributes to justice and peace. In this way, states become dependent on each other and the increase in the cost of war creates a deterrent factor. The effect of economy on restricting wars is to make free trade dominate the entire international system. Since states do not know each other, wars might break out between states. However, a free

trade area will make states communicate, build mutual understanding and this benefit all joining parties. Thus, it may well be said that free trade leads to peaceful relations among states from the liberal perspective. Following the end of the Cold War, the practice of balance of power evolved into a multipolar world. Concomitantly, the scope of the concepts of security and power expanded to include economic, social and technological dimensions. According to liberalism, ensuring security depends on dealing with economy, democratization and international terrorism (Çetinkaya, 2012, p. 254).

Liberals also assume that the world has changed at the end of World War II, but this change intensified after the Cold War (the 1990s). This change can be seen in the decline in the number of inter-state wars, rising economic interdependence with the Bretton Woods System and the increase in the number of intergovernmental institutions such as the UN, EU, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union. Namely, the number of international institutions increased and states became interested in membership to such institutions. Today, states or other international actors may in some cases engage in strategic interdependence to avoid future risks (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 8). Furthermore, the concept of democracy is important to liberals, and they argue that because realism ignores democracy, it cannot explain the aforementioned change. Liberals suggest that wars can be limited by the effect of first the theory of democratic peace and then economic relations and international institutions. In realism, balance of power prevents wars, but in liberalism, the solution of getting rid of all wars and achieving peace is through democratic states. Therefore, democracy will make sure that the world will be in peace. This is referred to as the democratic peace theory. According to this theory, democratic countries do not fight with another because of the norms of democracy,

the principle of peaceful conflict resolution through negotiation and compromise by peaceful manner. Liberals argue that the contribution of international institutions to curbing wars is to promote peace. International institutions are norm-breakers and they force states not to violate rules and regulations.

According to liberalism, there is always the possibility that thoughts can change, and therefore, this means there is always an opportunity to establish cooperation and agreement between states (Dunne, 2008, p. 163). Based on the idea that perceptions and thoughts can change, they argue that states can cooperate, especially against the zero-sum game model advocated by neo-realists, since it is not anarchy or evil intentions of states, but perceptions that determine the limits of states' movements in the international system. The *raison d'être* of states is to protect the innate rights such as property, life and freedom of people who are considered to be equal by birth. It is argued that states, just like people, have the right to increase their interests, to maintain their independence and existence. In this context, liberalism shows parallelism between humans and states. Contrary to realists who assert that human nature is evil, so states reflect the evil nature of people by being self-seeking, liberals promote that human nature is rational and states act in this direction. As it is mentioned before, the intellectual roots of liberalism are based on the idea of *Perpetual Peace* put forward by Immanuel Kant. On how to achieve perpetual peace, liberals propose the implementation of a democratic government ruled by a republican constitution. At the same time, they suggest that free trade to be facilitated by commercial exchange systems will bring more peace to the world. Since this system will provide economic independence in the international area, it will also contribute to the peaceful maintenance of inter-state relations such as the EU or France-Germany. According to Kant's theory, cosmopolitan law and international law should be

included in public law in addition to constitutional law. If these three come together, states will establish peaceful relations and this will result in the confederation of sovereign states.

The next chapter will elaborate on the new security approaches suggesting that there is a need to address contemporary security problems outside the state-centered view and military security problems according to the discipline of international relations. Unlike traditional theories, these new approaches reveal that new generation threats are added to the international area and it is not enough to provide military security alone. Therefore, there is a need to include issues other than military security to the scope of security. The next chapter will provide an explanation on -traditional security approaches to security within the framework of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory, which constitutes the theoretical framework of this thesis.

CHAPTER II SECURITY AS AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CONCEPT: NON-TRADITIONAL APPROCHES AND THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL

It is now argued by many that the concept of state security should include not only military issues but also environmental, social, economic and political problems emerging in the international area particularly with the effect of globalization after the 1990s. Indeed, these contemporary security threats put the whole world society at risk from the state to the individual level, and thus, human security issues must definitely be analyzed as part of security studies.

In this vein, new security approaches cover feminism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism, the English School and social constructivism. This chapter will elaborate on each and every of these theories with a deeper focus on the Copenhagen School – one of the new security approaches – as the core of this study.

2.1. Feminism and Security

Feminism entered the discipline of international relations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Feminists opposed the classical traditional security approaches arguing that state is the only and most important actor in the system. They suggest that the international system is anarchic and dangerous. The feminist approach is based on the idea that concepts such as rationality, autonomy, national interest and power are reflected by realists as the building blocks of state security. In fact, they assert that these concepts are used in a way that socially constructs masculinity as an ideal (Tickner, 2004, p. 44). Feminism criticizes that realism constitutes a male-dominated security structure. As a matter of fact, realists analyze the concepts such as war and conflict only by attributing them to men. Contrary to traditional theories, feminists argue that wars not only affect soldiers and states, but also civilians. Wars are an

important aspect of security; however, they are not the only aspect. Therefore, they propose the expansion of the definition of security. Wars lead to death of many people, poverty and insecurity. In this regard, feminists state that security is necessary not only for states, but also for individuals and communities. On top of that, they claim that the *raison d'être* of states is always to protect their citizens paying taxes and transferring their rights to the state. Nonetheless, states might sometimes become a danger to their citizens like Nazi Germany. Therefore, states are not sufficient to ensure security and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or individuals are also expected to protect people.

Feminists first ask the question where women are in the decision-making process and complain about the lack of women in world politics. Moreover, according to feminism, women are underrepresented in parliaments and politics. Tickner, for example, argues that actors whose security is threatened in international conflicts are portrayed only as men. Yet, it should not be overlooked that women are affected as much as men (Tickner, 1992). In addition, feminists argue that some circles want to legitimize all forms of violence by subjecting women to a male-dominated understanding, where men are privileged and have control at all spheres of life (Enloe, 1989). According to feminists, views that legitimize foreign policy through masculinity associate women with the private sphere only, while assuming men belonging to the public sphere. For this reason, it is seen as normal for women to work as babysitters at home and for men to work outside for a living. Feminists assert that this is a socially-constructed demerit (Harding, 1986, pp. 17-18).

From this perspective, feminists allege that International Relations (IR) must include analysis of the question, “*Security for who?*” in addition to analyzing the meaning of security. Thus, many feminist scholars ask this question in their research

and they also consider gender bias, domestic violence, poverty, wars and environmental degradation as threats to security. Another assumption of feminism is that IR theories are not interested in experiences of women and ignore the contribution of women, whereas they are only about men. For instance, realism focuses on great powers – all that remains do not matter. However, feminists say that even though women are not part of the power domain, they shape politics in different ways in various sectors. Therefore, women should have a say in the international field, too.

Secondly, feminism focuses on the notion of gender. In this line, they first differentiate the concepts of sex and gender. Gender is socially-constructed or a socially-learned behavior. It refers to society's expectations that distinguish masculinity from femininity. In this regard, thinkers such as Tickner and Sjoberg have taken up issues such as military prostitution, diplomatic households, and domestic service, which were ignored while analyzing international relations (Tickner & Sjoberg, 2013, p. 206). According to these authors, women can show traits attributed to men, and likewise, men can incorporate traits that appear to belong only to women in their characters.

The feminist approach defines security from the perspective of violence, arguing that security can be built by reducing all types of violence: structural, physical and ecological (Tickner, 1997, p. 624; Tickner & Sjoberg, 2013, p. 213). For example, the fact that women and children constituted 80% of the refugees in the United Nations' Human Development Reports during the boycotts applied to Iraq in 1993 shows whose security was mainly violated in this case. Thus, feminists argue that states must protect their physical and moral structures against the anarchic system to be able to ensure their security (Tickner & Sjoberg, 2013, p. 212).

2.2. Post-structuralism and Security

Pioneered by Richard Ashley, the post-structuralism approach emerged in the 1980s in an attempt to include actors marginalized and ignored by traditional theories in researches. Post-structuralism is an approach with different arguments contributing to the international relations discipline in two ways: Firstly, by introducing the concept of discourse and secondly the relationship between identity and foreign policy. In this vein, Derrida and Foucault led the emergence of debates over epistemological and ontological assumptions. In literature, post-structuralism is referred to as critical constructivism going further than structuralism. Post-structural theorists, who are also among post-modern thinkers, argue that thinkers are not neutral (including themselves), while examining world politics (Edkins, 2007, p. 88). J. Derrida is the leading name in understanding the effect of post-structuralism on international relations with his outstanding works including “*Speech and Phenomena* (1973)”, “*Writing and Difference* (1978)” and “*Of Grammatology* (1998)”.

Post-structuralists focus on the movements that prepare the ground for the emergence of entities and elements. In this context, they do not exclude states, but focus on how it is formed. Their argument is that there is no natural knowledge or truth. All truths and natural knowledge are socially-constructed and everything is a reflection of power. Post-structuralists do not understand the language in the same way as other people do, and they think that the words someone chooses affects that person’s policy. Thus, they assume that discourses define the limits of people’s social practices and all discourses are in a way related to power. Knowledge is also related to power since elites create dominant discourses in a society. As a solution proposition to this unneutral way of understanding, post-structuralists endeavor to de-neutralize the dominant discourses and make sure re-thinking of excluded alternative

words. They associate this with deconstruction and genealogy. In order to understand how dominant an idea is, just like looking at the genealogy, one should look into the past and try to determine what alternatives are silent and invisible next to that idea.

In this line, Derrida introduced the concept of deconstruction, which can be regarded as one of the cornerstones of post-structuralism. He argued that in order to speak of an entity, we must speak of its opposite, otherwise there cannot be a dichotomy (Edkins, 2007, p. 96; Culler, 1982). On the subject of deconstruction, he uttered that it is necessary to look at how dichotomies occur and how they work.

States use dichotomies to legitimize themselves while identities constructed in states are mostly exclusionary. According to this assumption, states are not structures that have existed from the very beginning of history, they reconstructed themselves each time. Societies are affected by what the media, ministers and elites say thanks to the power they hold. In addition to Derrida, Foucault became a source of inspiration for the post-structuralist perspective, as even other thinkers of many different views benefited from the concept of genealogy in their analyses.

2.3. Post-colonialism

Influential thinkers such as Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak shaped what is today known as post-colonial security approaches. In line with their studies, *post-* does not mean that a period is over and a new one has begun. The conceptualization of *post-* and post-colonialism is firstly used to explain how the West is symbolized, and secondly, it is actually used to explain the limitation of the West in its acts of colonization in the face of struggles for independence. The post-colonial security approach focuses more on the problems of power, identity, culture and modernity. Post-colonialists allege that there is still colonization due to the activities that render the West as superior and most modern.

The post-colonial security approach also focuses on how security studies in the world contribute to the insecurity of the other and inferior groups, which are called *Third World* in international politics. For this reason, they argue that not only the concept of state but also the concept of security should be revisited, since evaluating state as the sole actor of security reproduces colonial activities and causes insecurity for societies in international politics (Dikmen-Alsancak, 2019, p. 23).

In the same vein, post-colonialism analysts elaborate on power-knowledge and predominantly underscore the issue of post-colonial insecurity (Krishna, 1999). They claim that security discourses today function to legitimize violence in all its forms, as well as colonial violence. In his book, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Fanon, 1968), Frantz Fanon (one of the most influential authors on post-colonialism) and Jean Paul Sartre (known for his philosophy of existentialism) both mention the intellectual values of post-colonialism (Grovogui, 2013, p. 247).

2.4. The English School

The English School is a middle way between idealism and realism, sharing certain values with realism, idealism as well as liberalism. Thereby, the English School is also referred to as a pluralist notion for its multiple assumptions. The English School primarily focuses on how independent political authorities maintain order within the anarchic structure of the international system. They agree with realists in the context of power and balance of power, while they also have consensus with liberals in the context of international law, rules, norms and institutions. They further argue that non-material values are as important as material power when it comes to states in the system. As a matter of fact, they presume that there is a certain order in the international system, however this order is driven not only by the balance

of power and power but also by the acceptance of rules and international arrangements.

For states, institutions in world politics refer to long-term practices such as diplomacy, war and international law, which help ensuring the order of world politics. In parallel to this thought, what matters is not normative ideas, but ideas that practitioners believe in and try to implement. (Wightand & Porter, 1991). This approach found a great place in the discipline of IR when Dunne wrote his book, *Inventing International Society* (Dunne, 1998). For the English School, international system, international society and world society are three interrelated elements in world politics. The international system is majorly built upon power and power politics of states. On the other hand, there is also an international society in the system. In other words, people share some rules and norms, while states willingly accept these norms as well as institutions. For them, international society is a whole consisting of different states. Accordingly, the English School believes that not only states but also individuals are the main actors of the international system, bringing a new approach to politics among states. More details about the English School's opinions and the way it envisions the discipline of international relations can be found in Hedley Bull's *International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach* (Bull, 1966).

2.5. Social Constructivism and Security

As will be remembered, the new security approaches explained above are important in that they point out to the addition of new and contemporary threats to the definition of security in the context of international relations. The common ground of these new security approaches is that they question classical security paradigms (Sandıklı & Emeklier, 2011, p. 28). However, in order to explain whether the issue of

Syrian asylum seekers has been reconstructed by political parties in Turkey, there is first a need to understand social constructivism and the Copenhagen School's securitization theory.

After the Cold War period, Nicholas Onuf was the first scholar to use constructivism in the discipline of international relations. He investigated new security definitions outside of military security and tried to determine how to achieve change and development in international relations (Onuf, 1989, p. 102).

Constructivists, in this sense, claim that international relations and social life are built by individuals. Contrary to what realists claim, constructivists suggest that the determining factor for state behaviors in the international field is not their military capability, but their identity. In case of conflict or reconciliation, states decide on the basis of their identities. Moreover, states take into account the identity of the other relevant party when establishing trust relationships. To show with an example, the USA thinks that 500 nuclear weapons owned by Britain is less dangerous than 5 nuclear weapons owned by North Korea since it deems the former as a friend and the latter as a foe (Wendt, 1995, p. 73).

In the light of the above information, it can be said that the constructivist approach is based on three elements in terms of international relations analysis: First, there is a need to underline normative elements (Karacasulu, 2014, p. 116) and theory in addition to material elements to understand the interactions or conflicts between states. Secondly, identity explains the reason for the actions of states in the international system and determines the direction state perceptions towards each other. As a matter of fact, not all states are the same with each other. Finally, since international relations are a social structure, it is the subjects that act within the

system that create the system, while they are themselves are also affected by the system.

According to social constructivism, all national identities are socially-constructed. States sometimes have multiple identities like individuals, but constructivists underscore that identities and interests are not fixed. Identities define interests and interests define actions. For instance, after World War II, German identity shifted from militarism to pacifism. In other words, German decision-makers decided to create a different identity and they willingly constructed their identity in relation to pacifism. Norms, on the other hand, form a standard for actors' proper behaviors with their given identity and they come through routine practice. Norms have a role in the definition of power since power also means legitimacy. According to constructivism, a state's perception of another state as a threat does not depend on the material power it has, but on the differentiation of that state according to the identity perception it creates. The threat perception that states use while alienating each other is shaped by the trust relationships they build. As a matter of fact, some states have shaped their behaviors against Muslims as terrorists after the attacks of September 11 reveals the effect of identity on threat perceptions (Sandıklı & Emeklier, 2012, p. 41). The factor that determines state behaviors as compromising or confrontational is the identities they attribute to each other.

Social constructivism is not only concerned with constructivism but also other critical theories such as feminism. As it will be remembered, feminists claim that gender is socially-constructed. Thus, social constructivists say that structures such as the international system consist of both material and non-material (ideational) elements and they are not constituted by capitalism or military power. At this point, they argue that it is necessary to focus on the ideational aspect of structures. In this

sense, the (international) structure affects state behaviors. However, it is always thought about how the structure emerged in the first place. Social constructivists emphasize that structures would not exist without the practices of their actors. In other words, actors create structures by their practices but then they remain limited. Besides, the ideational structure can change, but it is not that easy since it is historically constructed. The structure also limits the agency after it is created. Furthermore, constructivists also reproduce the security dilemma model (one of the main arguments of neorealism) and claim that the security dilemma is a situation that arises not from the movements and practices of a great power, but from beliefs and practices (Wendt, 1995, p. 77). More precisely, they explicate that a security dilemma arises when a state thinks about the worst-case scenario in relation to other states' intentions, and manipulates threat perceptions accordingly. Indeed, every state determines its interests according to the principle of self-sufficiency within the framework of intersubjective understanding. Therefore, security dilemmas are socially-constructed, however, this does not mean they can be socially-changed as the social structure of knowledge, action and material resources is sometimes restrictive.

In addition, constructivists allege that the concept of culture, which determines the social and political structure of societies from the past to the future, is a very important factor that can result in solidarity or exclusion of societies. With a sense of belonging, the concept of culture can shape the security perceptions of states and societies by affecting the meaning attributed to security. For example, culture might well lead to the perception of irregular migrations or cultural diversity as a threat (Akpınar, 2013, pp. 471-472). The main component forming the concepts of culture and identity is the norm passed on to states by international organizations and non-governmental organizations (Ergüven, 2016, p. 804).

Constructivists assume that realism cannot explain the dynamics of human rights in world politics. In social sciences, they allege that almost every concept like sovereignty, human rights and refugees is socially-constructed. However, ideas of state leaders and public opinion change over time. For instance, Turkey and Greece were enemies in the past, yet they started to build a close relationship in the late 1990s thanks to cultural exchange. Now, although there are still certain problems between the two countries, Greece is not the archenemy of Turkey as their ideas have changed.

In this context, constructivists – as much as realists – acknowledge the existence of anarchy in the international system. Yet, they question what anarchy means in terms of how a state behaves the same as another. According to realists, every state is a potential enemy to each other, but for constructivists, it is necessary to understand how decision-makers think, behave and how they should act in order to see whether it is an enemy or not. Hence, the constructivist approach pictures that states facing any threat in the international area will eliminate the threat by acting on the collective security model. Plus, there is the notion of collective identity defined as states' perception of other states as a part of their own welfare. Thus, states will be able to eliminate threats since they have adopted international norms in a way that does not ignore their own interests (Ergüven, 2016, pp. 802-803).

Furthermore, constructivists utter that the anarchic nature of the international system stems from states' acceptance of this structure and acting accordingly. In other words, the thoughts and movements of states when it comes to the international system build the state of anarchy. Social constructivists also advocate that although mainstream theories like neo-realism and neo-liberalism recognize that the structure is anarchic and say that structure is the primary determinant state behaviors, they cannot explain how the Cold War came to an end without a physical war. Since they are

state-centric theories, they cannot explain new issues and dynamics, systematic transformations and the importance of NGOs and non-state actors. Constructivists claim that they can explain the end of the Cold War: They assume the war ended not because of international institutions and military balance, but because of ideas. Thus, for them, it is necessary to look at non-material factors to understand international relations.

2.6. The Copenhagen School and the Securitization Theory

Constructivism has added new insights to the classical understanding of security with the Copenhagen School. In this sense, constructivism is associated with the Copenhagen School on the subject of “perception”. As can be understood from previous analyses, constructivism deals with how people perceive security, and how they socially construct an idea. The situations that guide this perception are mostly subjective thoughts related to cultural background. Controlling these perceptions can be possible through looking at the facts with distance from the subject (McSweeney, 1996, p. 87). In this line, the Copenhagen School sheds light on the fact that when an identity is constructed and socially precipitated, it becomes a possible reference object for security (Buzan & Wæver, 1997, p. 243).

From a historical perspective, the Copenhagen School emerged in an environment where neo-realists failed to give adequate answers to the international problems and human security issues breaking out with the collapse of the Soviet Union, demolishing the Berlin Wall and the ethnic and cultural disintegration movements in the 1990s. Similarly, Buzan argued that the number of actors studied in international politics papers after the 1990s must be increased, marking a shift from the extensive focus on sovereign states. After this point, the dominant subject in the

working areas of the Copenhagen School became state security, as well as the dimension of social security.

The difference of the Copenhagen School from other security theories and approaches is that it has brought a different perspective to the analysis of European movement dynamics aimed at re-establishing order in the discipline of international relations after World War II. That is, the school asserted that problems other than urgent threats affecting the continuity of states should not be included within the scope of security and should be evaluated under de-securitization. The Copenhagen School scholars define de-securitization as the process where a topic that is previously considered a security issue ceases to be an issue that requires extraordinary measures. By de-securitizing, it is shown as a regular unimportant issue belonging to public space (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde 1998, p. 4), or in other words, this issue is no longer built as a security threat (Buzan, 2008, p. 108).

Stating that the security environment is predetermined, the Copenhagen School has contributed to the expansion of the concept of security by reflecting on the securitization and normalization concepts. Academics including Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde, and Ole Weaver are the representatives of the school. They predominantly argue that focusing only on the military aspect in international relations studies will render that analysis incomplete and thus, it is critical to cover political, social, environmental and economic security issues as well (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, 1998), while also noting that non-state actors should be included within the scope of security with its expanded definition (Buzan, 1983). Particularly for Buzan and Wæver, security studies should not consider the security of a whole, but rather, the international political sphere should be separated geographically since the risks and threat perceptions each region has to encounter are different from each other.

In his analyses, Buzan focuses on sub-state actors by prioritizing the security of sovereign states rather than individuals. He further draws attention to analytical units such as the international system, state and ethnic groups (Karacasulu, 2007, p. 97). In this vein, he proposes the idea that the political security of the third world countries – which were overshadowed by the two superpowers after the 1990s – could only be achieved with the end of the Cold War. From this perspective, Buzan explains military security as the relationship between the perceptions of states against each other with regard to their military defense and attack capacities (Buzan, 1991, p. 433). On the other hand, as the definition above indicates, the Copenhagen School attaches greater importance to social security. Defining the notion of social security, they suggest it includes the protection of identity and cultural values. This is in line with what they call as migration from the periphery to the center and their efforts to address identity conflicts (Sandıklı & Emeklier, 2012, p. 47). As a follow-up, Buzan argues that military, economic, social and environmental security are interdependent.

One of the most important concepts presented by the Copenhagen School to the international relations literature is the *securitization* concept. In order for a problem to be evaluated within the scope of security, a political actor should introduce that problem to the public as an existential threat with their discourse, and at the same time, the public should accept this problem as an existential threat through these discourses. Covering an issue in the public sphere and securing it with an existential threat is to bring it to the political sphere, and this constitutes the dimension of securitization that causes excessive politicization (Aktaş, 2011, p. 14). The concept of securitization was first used by Ole Wæver in 1995 and later turned into a theory. Ever since, it has been very effective in increasing the importance given to social security.

The securitization process involves four major components: *The speech act, a reference object, securitizing actors and the audience* (Balzacq, Leonard & Ruzicka, 2016, p. 495). This indicates that securitization is a *discursive and political process*. The *reference object* is the values that are claimed to be under threat such as the state, environment and national security. Securitizing actors often call on the public to defend such reference objects to ensure their continuity. Here, a *securitizing actor* is the subject claiming the presence of an existential threat. It is the actor who calls for taking measures to eliminate this threat via their discourses. In the securitization process, the party that needs to be convinced of the existence of such an existential threat and the need for extraordinary measures is the *audience* (Wæver, 2008, p. 152). The actors that apply securitization in the election manifestos analyzed in this thesis are political parties. The reference object here is national security. The audience that will be convinced of the securitization process is the public who will read the statements in the election manifestos. In light of this information, it will be observed that securitization is used to normalize and legitimize the exceptional and non-political measures to stand up to a normal issue that is reflected as a threat to the existence of the valuable subject in society. In other words, the process of taking urgent and extraordinary measures to eliminate the threats against the reference object, is referred to as securitization. The actor initiating the securitization process by trying to legitimizing the said measures to save the reference object is the securitizing actor. In addition, these actors sometimes include sub-reference objects in their discourses to express that they are also under threat next to the reference object (Mandacı & Özerim, 2013, p. 111). Here, in the securitization process, it is the public opinion that will be made to believe that the threat is real and the necessary measures are legitimate (Wæver, 2008, p. 152). In order to make the securitization process

meaningful, it is critical that the audience begins to perceive this process as a security threat, and therefore they must be convinced by the securitizing actor about the existence of that threat (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998, p. 25). The perception of insecurity in the audience group will cause the securitizing actor's discourses to affect those audiences more and more (Löwenthal & Guterman, 1949, p. 138).

Along with the emergence of security issues other than military threats such as immigration as well as many other contemporary security problems, the international community has started to see them as significant threats to the international system. As a matter of fact, the phenomenon of immigration was seen as an issue requiring only humanitarian intervention in the 1990s. However, officials started to often cite it alongside the concept of security in the political environment that shaped after the end of the Cold War. In this line, the Copenhagen School alleges that elites in a society fulfill the securitization process, and today mostly leaders, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups make use of securitization. For instance, the European Security Working Group was established in 1985 to tackle new security concerns for Europe except the military security issues. Thinkers from this Working Group have critically incorporated the securitization theory into security studies. Advocating the deepening of military security, the Copenhagen School, on the other hand, claims that naming every issue related to individuals as a threat (securitization), may bring risks and disrupt the democratic and political functioning of states (Hisarlıoğlu, 2019, p. 2). In this regard, the securitization theory is used to explain the process of legitimizing the handling of any problem as a security threat (Türkeş-Kılıç, 2018, p. 5).

In order to initiate the securitization process defined as discourse of practice, the language used should be in the hands of the political elite or influence groups. These people should emphasize the need for urgent action. As mentioned before,

securitization is a discursive and political process and it is based on an intersubjective interaction. Here, security is defined as the speech act. The best example for the speech act is that the 9/11 attack was securitized rather than considering and treating it as a crime. The decision-makers of the USA at that time claimed that they needed to carry out a military attack against Iraq and Al Qaeda in their consistent statements, which would render their actions legitimate within the scope of the securitization method. Indeed, then President George W. Bush made a speech focusing on the “evil” 2001 attacks, and this manifests that the threats were securitized through speech and act. This ultimately led to legitimizing many extraordinary measures under the Patriot Act (Hisarlioğlu, 2019, pp. 2-3). At this point, Buzan and Wæver claim that a normal political issue was turned into a military issue with the aforementioned legitimations, while the measures taken restricted some rights and freedoms. Buzan further suggests that an issue that was previously securitized and perceived as a threat must be removed from the scope of threat and de-securitized to avoid negative consequences as limitation of rights and freedoms in case it is not a threat anymore (Buzan, 2008, p. 108). The end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the USSR is an example of de-securitization of many issues that had previously been securitized.

2.6.1. Securitization of Migration

The phenomenon of migration came more into to light at the end of the 19th century. This brought along the distinction between a citizen and a foreign national, citizens having political rights in their sovereign lands. In this regard, migration became the subject of securitization departing from this distinction. The securitization of migration is formulated as follows: A large group of foreign nationals (X) will invade the settlements of locals (Y), thus diminishing the Y influence. The locals (Y) will not be able to remain the same as before, since the culture of X will shape society

and change the order. After this stage, the change in the composition of the population will cause Y to differentiate (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998, p. 121). Today, people who are subjects of international migration have been depicted as refugees and asylum seekers and immigrants. International irregular migration of Syrians started in 2011 with the outbreak of the civil war in the country by the effect of the Arab Spring. These migration movements are still continuing and creating threats such as xenophobia, racism, discrimination and border insecurity in target countries.

Securitization theory provides a tool to analyze this thesis. Securitization theory is not a static point of view and allows to look at security discursively. It shows that discourses are constructed and these discourses become a tool for what the securitizing actor wants to do. Securitization theory offers a humanitarian perspective and thus provides a more intersubjective view of both security and Syrian asylum seekers.

CHAPTER III MIGRATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CONCEPT

3.1. History of Migration

It is not possible to agree on a single and clear definition of the phenomenon of migration, which has been increasing since the beginning of history of humanity. As a matter of fact, the reasons, method and characteristics of migration as well as historical conditions constantly alter. This also changes the meaning of migration on a continuous basis. Therefore, it is difficult to make a specific and single definition of migration as it concerns research in multiple science branches. The concept of migration, as it is generally accepted in social sciences and international relations, is a global phenomenon that means temporary or permanent, regular or irregular, compulsory or voluntary movement or displacement of people from one place to another due to social, political, economic and/or cultural reasons (Tuncel & Ekici, 2019, p. 51). In another definition, migration is described as the process of geographical movement that changes the structure of society in political, social, cultural and economic terms (Özer, 2004, p. 11). Moreover, there is more than one categorization of migration by many thinkers or countries. For example, Petersen categorizes migration as primitive, free, controlled and forced migration. Fitcher, on the other hand, categorizes it in two groups as voluntary and forced migration (Kurt, 2006, p. 150).

Migration manifests itself practically in every field for every country and expands its sphere of influence in terms of both the sending and receiving country. Indeed, it is known that migration brings along many economic, political, social and other problems. Thus, in addition to a change in geographical location, the phenomenon of migration also changes the political, economic and social life in the

recipient country. It is thus considered a fundamental mechanism affecting social life. As indicated above, migration can be analyzed first in two categories as domestic and international migration. Further, migration can be understood in two groups as voluntary and compulsory according to the purpose of movement. Finally, migration can be divided into other two groups as regular and irregular depending on the way of realization. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines migration as the movement of persons away from their place of usual residence, either across an international border or within a state. On the other hand, the IOM distinguishes immigration by referring to it as the act of moving into a country as the point of arrival other than one's country of nationality or usual residence. The destination country effectively becomes migrants' new country of residence.

3.2. Types of Migration by Borders

3.2.1. Domestic Migration

As defined before in the study, migration can be thought in two categories as domestic and international or external migration. The former is referred to as displacement within the same country, while the latter is moving outside the country. In other words, domestic migration is movement from one region to another, from city to village, from village to city or from one city to another within one's country of residence without going to another country. Therefore, domestic migration does not cause any decrease or increase in the population of the country, however the population of the recipient region increases. Often, the reason for domestic migration is economic inequalities between cities or regions. As a matter of fact, industrially developed cities attract migrants from other cities within a given country.

3.2.2. International Migration

When it comes to migration, scholars of international relations often study international migration, or in other words, external migration. Relocation of people from one country to another with the intention of settlement is called international migration. According to IOM, international migration is the movement of persons away from their place of residence and across an international border to a country where they are not nationals. In literature, external migration and international migration are generally used interchangeably. In this study, the term international migration is preferred for use, since the phenomenon of migration is evaluated in terms of crossing borders to reach other countries.

International migration can take place with several reasons: Labor migration, brain drain and exchange migration. These can be voluntary or compulsory. In other words, while an individual or a community of individuals chooses to go to another country voluntarily in order to have better political, economic and social conditions from where they are located, they could also be forced by their state to move outside the country.

Globalization, economic interdependence, free movement of persons and advanced technology have resulted in people moving from one settlement to another sooner or later. In addition, these developments – particularly globalization and advanced technology – have led developed countries to seek raw materials in other countries and provide opportunities of international migration. In this line, international migration has given many people the opportunity to meet different cultures and co-exist despite adaptation issues, which bring along several economic, political, social or cultural problems.


Since the beginning of history of humanity, migration has always been visible

in the world. Migration might be the result of political issues, such as persecution, which would cause people to desire to escape from their place of residence. Or, it can result from welfare deprivation. Many people today try to move to a better place to find better economic and social opportunities. From this perspective, while migration is the “result” of economic and social transformations in a society, it is also the “cause” of dynamic transformations in the receiving country (İçduygu & Sirkeci, 1999, p. 250). Although the factors that cause migration differ from country to country, they have some common points. The first is the different level of welfare between underdeveloped and developed countries. Countries that lack sufficient young population increasingly need labor. Families desire to move together with others migrating workers for better employment opportunities. Also, people may want to leave their country due to the disorder their government causes in that country.

Looking at the history of migration, it can be said that the first international migrations began with slave trade. In the 17th and 18th centuries, European states traded African slaves to America and other European countries for colonialist purposes. From this point of view, such migrations with enslaving people are positioned under the category of forced migration. Another development that can be considered the beginning of international migration in history was the movement of extra labor to European countries or colonies to find new living spaces. This generally took place in the Netherlands, England, Portugal, France and Spain with the industrialization of Europe in the 1800s. Such migrations gradually continued until World War I. When trading of Africans as slaves to America and Europe ended, slavery still continued under the name contract labor. Although it is claimed that these workers made the contract of their own accord under a contract labor, 30 million Indians were taken forcibly from around the world to meet the need for labor force

until World War I.

By the 1960s, countries already had certain legal regulations effective on small-scale international migration movements, however, both the nature and purpose of migrations have changed since those years. In general, large-scale migrations were from underdeveloped countries to Western countries with political, economic and security concerns, and when these cross-border movements began to contradict the laws of the target country, problems caused by migration continued to increase. At the end of the Cold War, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Western Europe began to be the subject of extensive migration waves. Indeed, the development of advanced communication methods and transportation techniques by the 20th century facilitated migration to a greater extent. During the same period, conflicts in the Balkans increased the intensity of migration towards Europe. On the other hand, migration mobility decreased in the late 1990s due to the reducing number of conflicts (Dustman & Frattini, 2011, pp. 7-8).

Figure 1.*International migrants, 1990-2013 (millions)*


Note. Source: UN, Population Division, September 2013, p. 1, “International migrants, 1990-2013 (millions)”

https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/popfacts/PopFacts_2013-2_new.pdf

Around the world, the number of international immigrants from developed and developing countries was 154 million in 1990 and 175 million by 2000, and this figure reached 232 million in 2013. From 1990 to 2000, the flow of migrants increased by 1.2 million per year. This figure increased 2.3 million per year between 2000 and 2010. However, in the period from 2010 to 2013, international migration decreased to 1.6 million per year. It can be seen that in 13 years after the millennium era, there was an increase in international migration of about 55 million people.

Figure 2.

Number of international migrants by SDG region of destination, 2010 and 2019



Note: N. Africa and W. Asia = Northern Africa and Western Asia; Central and So. Asia = Central and Southern Asia; Eastern and SE Asia = Eastern and South-Eastern Asia; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean

Note. Source: UN, Population Facts, 2019, p. 1, “Number of international migrants by SDG region of destination, 2010 and 2019”

https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/populationfacts/docs/MigrationStock2019_PopFacts_2019-04.pdf

From 2010 to 2019, the number of international migrants increased by about 51 million and the number of migrants reached 272 million. Looking back at 2000, international migrants made up 2.8% of the world’s population, and by 2019 this rate increased to 3.5%. At the same time, it can be observed that about 12 out of every 100 people were international immigrants in the North, while 1 out of every 100 people was an international immigrant in the South. In 2019, just over half of all international immigrants lived in Europe and North America. In 2019, Europe hosted the largest number of international immigrants with 82.3 million, followed by North America with 58.6 million international immigrants, and North Africa and West Asia hosted 48.6 million international immigrants.

Some of the international organizations that functioned and still do to address migration issues include the League of Nations, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the International Refugee Agency, the United Nations High Committee for Refugees (UNHCR). Moreover, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Geneva Convention as referred to in the next sections) was also formed to address refugee issues. The Additional Protocol of 1967 on international migration also aimed to find a common solution approach towards migration crises. Nevertheless, as in other developments throughout history, states always put their national interests at the forefront at times of crisis, moving away from a solution-oriented approach when it comes to taking responsibility. Hence, it can be said that international organizations working to address migration problems via sharing the same language have failed to do so.

Migration, especially international migration, served as a political tool that greatly contributed to the acceleration of the transition to the nation-state system. This system's effectiveness increased with modernity. However, in addition to making this contribution spontaneously, political decision-makers structured this phenomenon and used it as a tool in administrative processes (İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014, p. 49). In addition, international migration has been observed to be used as a goal in an attempt to balance social and political transformation caused by migration.

The driving force of the phenomenon of migration, which has been going on since the early stages of history, can be found in voluntary as well as mandatory reasons. In addition to voluntary versus forced migration, and migration based on labor versus asylum, the phenomenon can also be divided into another group as legal and illegal depending on the method to reach the destination country. International migration reached the intercontinental dimension with the discovery of Americas.

And today, this phenomenon continues to remain at the intercontinental level. The most recent example of such large-scale migration is the one started with the civil war in Syria in March 2011 due to the influence of the Arab Spring.

3.3. Types of Migration by Purpose or Willingness

3.3.1. Voluntary Migration

Voluntary migration can take place based on the desire to achieve a better level of education, increase financial opportunities or settle in a place with higher economic welfare to leave a better future for the next generation. In this context, after World War II, European countries voluntarily accepted migrations from developed or less developing countries, especially Turkey and Greece, to obtain the labor force they needed. This was marked as a period of intense voluntary migration (Dönmez-Kara, 2015, p. 27). An example of the type of voluntary migration is the migrations of workers from Turkey to Europe in 1960.

3.3.2. Forced Migration

Forced migration often takes place due to the obligation to flee one's country to find a safer place due to threats such as violence, oppression, persecution and terrorism. In history, many individuals had to leave their homeland and emigrate to another country due to armed conflicts or wars. Besides, states used population exchange as a solution in the past to eliminate the mistrust between them and forced people to migrate as a solution mechanism. Although voluntary migration might lead to negative consequences such as being ruptured from family or failing to fulfill one's desire in the new country, forced migration can lead to much more serious problems that affect many segments of society. Forced migration to many parts of the world, especially to Turkey, in order to escape persecution in Syria with the civil war that began in 2011, has soon become a universal event affecting the security of countries

in many dimensions, especially economic.

Forced migrations may not always originate in war or turmoil. However, natural disasters such as drought or climate change (although caused by humans, climate change is a natural disaster developing out of the control of humans) also have a major impact on displacing people. Yet, since not every country is affected by natural disasters at the same rate, they will not be able to follow a common path. For this reason, each state shall determine a migration procedure in accordance with its national interests as well as its capacity to provide security, housing, education and basic needs of persons moving to the country. The relevant country must also undertake initiatives to ensure the newcomers' integration. On the other hand, migration in the globalized world seems to be a problem that not any country can solve alone. Thus, there is now a consensus that migration must be addressed within the framework of common ideas and responsibilities in the international dimension.

Gürel, on the other hand, examines the phenomenon of migration by dividing it into three: individual migrations, mass migrations and chain migrations (Gürel, 2001, p. 134). Accordingly, individual migration is a type of migration that individuals make as a result of their own decisions based on their knowledge and abilities. Mass migration is a type of migration that all segments of society perform collectively for economic or social reasons. Chain migration is a type of migration that varies depending on the age and gender of the subjects in question, but is influenced by the ideas and movements of a certain group in the place where they live. They tend to follow such groups in their migration patterns. In this context, the migration from Syria to Turkey can be called a forced, mass and chain international migration, and as with all types of migration, it has brought certain problems both for the sending and the receiving country.

As can be seen, elements such as a threat and security concerns are not included in the definition of migration. Yet, migration may not always bear the same consequences for the receiving country and the migrating population. Continuing for centuries, the phenomenon of migration has expanded to include different meanings over time, leading to deriving many new concepts in relation to migration.

3.4. Types of Migration by Regularity or Irregularity

3.4.1. Regular Migration

Regular migration is defined as people moving, travelling, transiting and entering a country by complying with laws and travel regulations by legally crossing international borders (IOM, 2013, pp. 26-99). Accordingly, a regular migrant does not lack any documents necessary or does not violate the law on the path of entry to another country.

3.4.2. Irregular Migration: Is Every Irregular Migrant Illegal?

Irregular migration includes the movements of transit, shuttle and asylum seeking. In fact, the economic, demographic and social characteristics of migrating individuals or communities can change very quickly in this type of migration. The reason why transit migration is called irregular migration is that these types of migrants pass through the borders of a country that is not the target country. In shuttle migration, migrants stay in the destination country for a certain period of time and return to their own country afterwards (Yılmaz, 2014, p. 1687). Since irregular migration usually takes place by illegal means, it is rather difficult to detect (Çetiner, 2018, p. 30). Nonetheless, the international community criticizes the use of the concept of illegal migration instead of irregular migration (Koser, 2005, p. 5). Migrants are increasingly forced into irregular migration, or forced to choose this path through human and migrant trafficking. Since the preferred route and vehicles are

dangerous when using illegal roads, thousands of people lose their lives or property on this journey. Furthermore, this is caused by the risks associated with transporting people in mass using cheap methods. As can be understood the main driver for irregular migration from underdeveloped or developing countries to developed countries is economic factors. It should also be noted that this type of migration is currently the most common type.

The first irregular migration movements to Turkey began in the 1970s when people from Poland traded suitcases to Istanbul, and the suitcase trade continued until the 1990s through the USSR, Eastern European countries, Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, Iraq and North African countries. In a while, these people started working in informal jobs and benefitting from irregular migration. In this vein, refugees and asylum seekers can be evaluated under irregular migration. People who are in asylum status until the refugee application is completed must leave the country within two weeks if their request is rejected. In the case of Turkey, the illegal migration process includes not only illegal means and undocumented entry to the country, but also people who still reside in Turkey even though they cannot obtain the refugee status.

The subject of this study is irregular migration movements from Syria to Turkey, however, the concept of immigration will first be explored for clarification purpose.

3.5. Identification of Persons Involved in Migration Movements

3.5.1. Who is an Immigrant?

It is rather difficult to come up with a clear definition of the concept of immigrant since there is no consensus on the international area. There is debate over whether the definition will change depending on whether this type of migration is

mandatory or not (Çetiner, 2018, p. 27). When defining the concept of immigrant, most countries have incorporated the UN definition in their legislation. In this line, the UN definition of immigrant is as follows: Immigration is the permanent or temporary relocation of people with the intention of settling. According to this definition, an immigrant is a person who has left the place where s/he has been a citizen for at least a year and started to live in another country. Yet, it is hard to fit this definition into every situation.

This complexity prevents identification and lies in the factors affecting the concept of immigration. At the same time, the inability to determine the people who entered the country with irregular migration and how long they stayed is another problem that causes this complexity. The IOM states that there is no general definition for immigrants but suggests that immigrants include people and their families who have moved to another region or country to improve their economic situation (IOM, 2013, p. 37).

In general, an immigrant is defined as a person who changes his place for certain reasons, but in Turkish law, immigration status contains a different meaning than the concept of international immigration. According to Turkish law, in order to be accepted as an immigrant, there must first be an intention to settle in Turkey, and in addition, it is necessary to be connected to Turkish culture and have Turkish ancestry.

The process of removing one's immigration status also varies from country to country, and therefore it is not clear when people cannot be called immigrants anymore is another problem. At the same time, since countries have different laws and procedures for immigration, this causes the immigration status to have different meanings in each country. Nevertheless, when immigrants return to their home

country they often have their immigration status in the destination country removed (Şemşit, 2010, p. 9).

3.5.1.1. Irregular Migrant

Asylum seekers and refugees seeking international protection are called irregular migrants when they enter another country by illegal, smuggled routes. At the same time, if the person whose application for asylum is finalized and rejected and still remains in the country, this person becomes an irregular migrant (Bloch & Chimienti, 2011, p. 1273). Other situations that make persons illegal immigrants include not leaving the country, even though their work and residence permits and visas have expired (Spencer & Triandafyllidou, 2020, pp. 2,3). The distinction between illegal and legal immigrants is used by some scholars in the form of irregular-regular immigrants (Paspalanova, 2008, p. 82). They argue that the roads they choose or are forced to choose for migration movement are illegal and thus, they should not be referred to as migrants in the legal context. Yet, some do not accept the word illegal as the situation is mostly related to guilt rather than legal crime (Valenti, 2009, p. 11). Hence, many scholars prefer to study migration in the context of regular and irregular rather than legal and illegal.

According to the IOM, an irregular immigrant is a person who moves or crosses an international border and is not authorized to stay in or enter the relevant state in accordance with its legislation and the international agreements it has signed (IOM, 2019, p. 133). In Turkish legislation, it is stated that the concept of irregular migrant has different meanings for the destination country, the source country and the transit country. In terms of the target country, irregular migrants are those who come to the country illegally (or legally but do not leave within the legal period). On the other hand, the necessary exit procedures are determinant in terms of irregular

migration from the perspective of the source country. As for the transit country, irregular migration refers to passing from the country using legal or illegal routes to reach the destination country (Directorate General of Migration Management, DGMM, 2021a).

As it will be remembered from previous analyses, international migration is a cross-border mobility expressed as the departure of persons from their country of origin or residence for the purpose of settling in another country, either temporarily or permanently (IOM, 2013, p. 87). International migration covers several types of migrants such as refugees, asylum seekers, migrants for family reunification and laborers' migration. On the other hand, each country has a different definition of these concepts according to their varying opportunities and procedures. Consequently, it can be observed that there is a legislative gap between the characteristics of migration depending on each country.

3.5.2. Is a Refugee a Refugee Everywhere?

The concept of refugee has international acceptance based on the 1951 Geneva Convention.

In this regard, the incidents before January 1, 1951 paved the way for the definition of refugee as follows: Refugees are people who are outside of their try of nationality or habitual residence and have well-founded fear of being persecuted due to their race, religion, nationality, membership to a particular social group or political opinion, and these people are unable or unwilling to benefit from their country's protection while they cannot return for the fear of persecution (UNHCR, 2011, p. 3).

The concept of refugee used in Turkish legislation was adopted in its current form in the 1951 Geneva Convention. Yet, it was placed in a geographical reservation. That is, when the phrase "events that occurred before 1951" was removed

from the 1951 Geneva Convention with the signing of the Additional Protocol of 1967, the geographical restriction requirement was left to the initiative of countries and the time restriction was removed (Tiritoğlu-Ersoy, 2019, p. 442).

Turkey accepted the Convention by the geographical reservation, since a refugee problem took place in Europe after World War II and Turkey was following anti-communist policies at that time. Currently, authorities responsible for migration regulations in Turkey do not remove the geographical reservation, as they believe Turkey will be negatively affected by migration waves since it is like a buffer zone between Europe and countries experiencing political complexities (Dönmez-Kara, 2015, p. 158). In fact, due to the complexity and diversity of these types of irregular migration to Turkey, there is a confusion about the concepts, and Turkey grants temporary asylum to people from outside Europe. As a matter of fact, Turkey has been a significant asylum country since the 1980s. It has become the country receiving the highest number of Syrian asylum seekers (after Lebanon and Jordan) in the Syrian migration caused by the riots that began in 2011 (Fargues, 2013, p. 248). Turkey currently uses the definition of refugee given in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), Article 61 under the section “Types of International Protection: Exclusion from International Protection”, adopted on April 4, 2013. In accordance with this law, a foreigner who is outside the country of which s/he is a citizen because s/he fears that s/he will be persecuted because of his/her race, religion, nature, membership to a certain social group or political thoughts due to the incidents occurring in European countries, and who cannot benefit from the protection of this country or does not want to take advantage of protection out of fear, or a stateless person who is outside his/her country of residence as a result of such incidents, cannot return there or does not want to return because of this fear, is granted refugee status

after status determination procedures (LFIP, 2013, p. 12037).

On the other hand, the term refugee has recently been defined in other ways too, with the effect of new factors added to the reasons for migration. For example, poor quality of life due to climate change and drought caused by global warming, the problems of thirst and hunger that African countries face, geographical deterioration caused by natural disasters and mass migrations due to material losses have led to a re-discussion of the concept of refugee. In this context, the Convention on Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of the Organization of the Union of Africa (OAU) and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration for refugees accept the UN definition of refugee as a standard.

However, the concept of refugee has started to be used to also cover people who feel threatened due to problems such as lacking a proper occupation, widespread violence, human rights violations, internal conflicts, external aggression and foreign domination in some countries. All those who are forced to flee their countries due to such threats (that damage public order) and leave their homelands to be able to continue their lives are now included within the scope of the term refugee in addition to threats to freedoms and security (OAU, 1969, p. 2; UNHCR, 1984, p. 2). From this point of view, a person with refugee status in one country may not be accepted as a refugee in another country with the same characteristics, since each country has a different perspective regarding the concept of refugee. This is why the concepts of asylum seeker and refugee are often confused.

3.5.3. Asylum Seekers

According to the UN definition, asylum seekers are people, who have applied for refugee status and the decision has not yet been finalized. In Turkey, people from Syria cannot have a clear status, though, since they do not come from Europe. In this

study, the concept of asylum seeker is used for Syrians only for the similar characteristics they contain with others in the world. However, there is still confusion about the term in Turkey as Turkey refers to Syrians with multiple terms: refugees, asylum seekers, guests, brothers, Syrians or Syrian migrants. There is no legislation that officially define the concept of asylum seeker distinguishing it from other terms.

In Turkey, the concept of asylum was first used in the “Regulation on the Procedures and Principles to be Applied to Individual Foreigners who have Asylum in Turkey or who have Requested a Residence Permit from Turkey to Asylum in Another Country, as well as Foreigners who have Come to our Borders for Asylum Purposes Collectively and Population Movements that may be”. In this law, the concept of refugee includes the geographical initiative mentioned in the 1967 Additional Protocol. Accordingly, the only difference that distinguishes an asylum seeker from a refugee is that it covers people who have migrated to Turkey from outside Europe (Balcı & Göcen, 2018, p. 5). The definition of asylum seeker features similar characteristics to the definition of refugees, yet does not include the phrase ‘*coming from Europe*’.

Turkey has adopted regulations such as the 1994 Asylum Regulations, 2003 Law on Work Permits for Foreigners, 2005 Turkish National Action Plan for Asylum and Migration and 2006 Housing Law. In this way, Turkey has demonstrated the steps it has taken to adapt to changing conditions regarding asylum seekers in addition to its efforts to reorganize its international migration policies. In this context, it has shaped its migration policies and new regulations in such a way to keep national interests while also abiding by the international agreements Turkey signed with regard to migration. An amendment was made to the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) in 2013, changing the concept of asylum seeker into *conditional*

refugee. With this amendment, there is now an addition to the relevant clause that a stateless person will be granted the conditional refugee status and such a person will be allowed to stay in Turkey until they are resettled in a third country (LFIP, 2013).

So far, the study concentrated on the history of migration and various types of migration. As for Syrians in Turkey, it can be argued that they do not fully represent the criteria of the refugee status due to Turkey's geographical reservation to the 1951 Geneva Convention. For this reason, when questioning whether securitization was applied to Syrians in Turkey, they will be evaluated under the concept of asylum seeker. The reason why this concept is preferred here is that it refers to people who have applied for refugee status, but have not yet obtained it, as in the case of Syrians. The next chapter, thus, will specifically dwell upon Turkey's migration history in an attempt to answer the question how it has turned from a sending country into a migrant receiving country. Additionally, this chapter will elaborate on the reasons for migration to Turkey, while also pointing out to its status as both a target and a transit country for migrants.

CHAPTER IV TURKEY'S MIGRATION HISTORY

4.1. Turkey's Migration History

Given the focus of this thesis on the migrants who fled to Turkey from Syria following the civil war, this chapter is allotted to an in-depth analysis of the migration history of Turkey specifically concentrating on those hosted by Turkey, rather than migrations from Turkey to other countries.

Turkey has been the target country of many migration movements for centuries due to its geopolitical and geostrategic position. It has also been used as a transit country by those who want to arrive in Europe since it is located on the transit route to Europe. For this reason, international migration has had heavy impact on Turkey, both as a target and transit country.

Labor migrants going to European countries, especially Germany, initiated the population migration outside the country for the first time in Turkey's history (İçduygu, 2004, p. 89). On the other hand, Turkey first assumed the identity of a country that receives migration by the 1980s. This was predominantly due to the increasing migration routes as well as opportunities that come along with globalization. As much as such positive developments, negative incidents such as political upheavals and economic problems in nearby regions also had their reflections on Turkey by means of attracting migrants. For example, Afghans and Iraqis often sought asylum in Turkey as a result of the political turmoil in those countries. Looking even further back, people fled the former Soviet lands after its collapse looking for job opportunities as they had been left unemployed with the prevailing ideological change.

In this context, it may well be uttered that Turkey hosted many migration waves from the Ottoman Empire until today, in addition to being a sending country

too. However, this took place in order: First, Turkey was a sending country and then it gradually became a country of arrival and transition. In this line, it would be meaningful to start the analysis of the migration history of Turkey with the Ottoman period. Ottoman migration policies started to shape by the effect of the intense migration movement to the empire as a result of the Crimean War between 1853 and 1856 (Bayraktar, 2007, p. 407). As such, the Ottoman Empire showed tolerance to every immigrant without discrimination of language, religion, or race (Kaya, 2014, p. 19). This, in turn, had a very important role in the increased migrations to the Empire.

In the 15th and 20th centuries, Turkey continued to receive migrants from other countries as a legacy of the Ottoman Empire. While immigrants consisted only of Turks and Muslims, people of different religions and races began to flock to Turkey after the 1980s (Dönmez-Kara, 2015, p. 137). Before the Crimean War, migrations to the Ottoman lands included the arrival of Jews from Spain in 1492, the refuge of King Charles of Sweden in the Ottoman Empire in 1709 with an army of two thousand people, and the arrival of the Hungarian Prince in the Ottoman Empire in 1849 with a group of three thousand people after being defeated in battle (DGMM, 2017, p. 23). Since understanding the migration policy of the Ottoman Empire will shed light on the reviews of Turkey's migration policy, it is necessary to understand the social, cultural and political origins of Ottoman migration history as well.

In fact, migrations to Turkey continued to a great extent when the Republic of Turkey was established after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Citizens of the newly-found Republic of Turkey were mostly immigrants and refugees (Canpolat & Ariner, 2012, p. 15). As can be recalled, irregular migrations to Turkey can be understood in different categories: Shuttle and illegal labor migration, asylum seeker and refugee migration and transit migration. Over the past half-century, refugees and asylum

seekers have made a large part of the irregular migration to Turkey, especially from Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria. It is known that 384 thousand immigrants came to Turkey as a result of the population exchange between Greece and Turkey from 1922 to 1938. Along with the population exchange agreements signed by the Republic of Turkey, the migration of Turks and Muslims to Turkey continued to increase. Particularly from Greece, the exchange agreements led to the arrival of many Turks in the country in 1923 and 1924. Between 1923 and 1927, approximately 1.7 million people migrated to Turkey from many other countries, mainly from the Balkans (Kirişçi, 2004, p. 2). Migration movements from Bulgaria in 1950 and 1951 and from Yugoslavia after 1954 are also evaluated in this context.

In the 1930s, about 120 thousand people migrated from Romania to Turkey. In the 1940s, many Jews fled to Turkey due to the persecution after World War II, while some moved to Palestine using Turkey as a transit country. Between 1923 and 1945, 800 thousand people came from the Balkans and 800 thousand people came from Germany between 1933 and 1945. During the same period, many Bulgarian and Italian Jews took refuge in Turkey due to the Nazi genocide. Indeed, during World War I, a large part of Turkey's population consisted of non-Muslim Christians and Jews (İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014, p. 54). With the proclamation of the Republic, however, the proportion of non-Muslims in the country's population started to decrease due to the effect of Turkization and Islamization moves as part of the nation-state building process during and after World War I (İçduygu & Sirkeci, 1999, p. 49). The Armenian deportation in 1915 and the population exchange between Turkey and Greece as a result of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 are among the first steps in this regard. Accordingly, 400 thousand Muslims living in Greece were sent to Turkey (Demirhan & Aslan, 2015, p. 37).

In the modern sense, domestic and international migrations in Turkey began after the 1950s. Yet, the migrations to Turkey in the 1970s differed in quality from the migrations in the history of the Republic. That is, Turkey accepted migrants more on the basis of ethnicity after the proclamation of the Republic, while in the last half century, this has changed and Turkey is accepting migrants with various ethnic backgrounds. Due to its geographical location, Turkey is a transit point between the Asian, European and African continents and is located on the transit route of sea routes. Hence, it has been an outstandingly attractive country for irregular migrants and asylum seekers who engage in migration movements due to the problems they experience in their homelands (İçduygu, 2014, p. 104).

As stated before, about 800 thousand Turks and Muslims came to Turkey from the Balkans (Kirişçi, 2000' s transfer İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014, pp. 54-56). From this date until the 1980s, migrants continued to influx Turkey due to conflicts and irregularities in some countries, and they chose Turkey mainly for its geographical location. As a result of the 1988 Aleppo Massacre, about 100 thousand Iraqi Peshmerga crossed Turkey's borders. During these periods, there were also a large number of migration movements to Turkey from African countries such as Sudan and Somalia (Dönmez-Kara, 2015, p. 142). Migrations from other countries included: 52 thousand people from Iraq in 1988; 345 thousand people from Bulgaria in 1989; 51 thousand people from Iraq in 1991 (after the first Gulf War) and 17,746 people from Kosovo (due to the internal conflict in 1999 (Çakı, 2018, pp. 30-31).

As can be understood from the context of conflicts, most of the migration movements to Turkey during these periods were in a mandatory and irregular manner, while asylum seeking, seeking refuge, illegal immigration and human trafficking cases continued non-stop. Thus, it is unlikely to consider these migrations under the

category of voluntary migration due to a very large influx of migrants to Turkey. In the early 2000s, migrations to Turkey continued with the same intensity until 2010. In fact, about 3 times more people arrived in Turkey in 2001. Thus, the number of immigrants from Turkish and other nationalities who came to the country reached 32 million. According to a UN report, Turkey has become the country receiving the highest number of asylum seekers/refugees by the end of 2017 with 3 million 400 thousand. Turkey was followed by Lebanon with 1 million people and Jordan with 660 thousand people, respectively. Most of the remaining Syrians migrated to Iraq and the North African Region (UMCD, 2021). Since 2011, many of the Syrians who came to Turkey have returned to their countries, but there is still an influx of migration to Turkey, and the majority is stated to come through irregular migration.

After the 1980s, on the other hand, Turkey began to receive regular student immigration, especially from Asia and Africa. Another type of regular migration that Turkey received at that time included retirees who wanted to come from Europe to Turkey as tourists. In consequence, it can be stated that Turkey has been actively accepting immigrants or foreign nationals (while the vast majority of immigrants are from the Middle East).


As the 21st century is marked by the increasing refugee flows around the world, the USA is also accepting a large number of refugees from Turkey and other countries. In addition, a high number of refugees are resettled in Canada, Australia, Norway, Finland and Sweden, respectively. Nevertheless, European countries' rate of accepting refugees has been declining and Europe is observed to steadily reject asylum applications (Canpolat & Ariner, 2012, p.16). Despite this attitude, Syrians – forced to leave their homeland due to the civil war starting in 2011 – found ways to internationally migrate to European countries – first in small groups then in larger

groups. This international migration, especially to Turkey – is still ongoing.

In this context, Turkey first defined asylum seekers from outside Europe as guests and then as people under temporary protection status in accordance with the LFIP (LFIP, 2013). Along with the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) published in the Official Gazette No. 29153 in 2014, Syrian asylum seekers arriving in Turkey have been granted temporary protection status. This status rules that asylum seekers cannot be subject to torture or inhumane treatment, guaranteeing that there cannot be pressure on these people with discrimination against language, religion or race. Those with this status have the right to benefit from educational and health care opportunities in Turkey using their temporary protection identity. At the same time, arrangements have been made for joint efforts with international organizations to provide people with temporary protection status with opportunities regarding placement in a third country (TPR, 2014).

Figure 3.

Syrians under Temporary Protection by Years



Note. Source: Directorate General of Migration Management, “Syrians Under Temporary Protection by Years” <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>

According to a report published by Hacettepe University Center for Migration

and Political Studies (HUGO) in 2014, 74% of Turkish citizens consider asylum seekers from Syria to be religious brothers or guests fleeing persecution (Erdoğan, 2014, p. 25). Syrian asylum seekers entering the country for the first time in 2011 reached 14,237 in 2012. As of May 12, 2021, the number is 3,671,277 (DGMM).

4.2. LFIP and the Principle of Non-Refoulement

In accordance with the principle of non-repatriation set out in Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention, persons who cannot be protected in their own country and seek international asylum and protection cannot be repatriated and returned, regardless of their religion, race or language (UN, art. 33). The repatriation of asylum seekers to a country where they are persecuted or oppressed is considered a human rights violation. In this regard, countries need to develop legislations on international migration to determine whether migrants coming to their lands illegally were actually persecuted in their homelands. In addition, entries and exits must be regularly monitored based on such a legislation (Jastram & Achiron, 2001, p. 19).

In Turkey's national legislation, the principle of non-refoulement is included in Articles 26 and 29 of the 1994 regulations. Accordingly, those who collectively seek asylum may be extradited or deported when the turmoil in their country ends or if they pose a threat to the national security and public order of the receiving country (Official Gazette, 1994, p. 7). Moreover, Article 3 of the Turkish law no. 6548 also includes other protection types for refugees, conditional refugees as well as those considered in the secondary protection status. Article 4 bans repatriation. In this regard, conditional refugee status is defined as the same as refugee status, but this time the persons in question are stateless persons from countries outside Europe, and they remain in this status (and are allowed to stay in Turkey) until they are resettled in a third country. Secondary protection status, on the other hand, is granted to stateless

persons other than refugees and conditional refugees. They must be facing a life-threatening danger if they are sent back to their country of origin or residence. The principle of non-refoulement has been further expanded within the scope of Article 4 of the LFIP (LFIP, 2013, p. 12020-1).

4.3. The Reasons for Migration to Turkey

Due to the fact that Turkey is a transit route connecting the European and Asian continents and it is geographically proximal to the Middle East, it is likely to be very seriously affected by domestic conflicts in the neighboring countries triggering migration (Güner, 2007, p. 83). At the same time, the rapidly increasing globalization after the Cold War and the beginning of Turkey's accession talks to the (EU) have greatly affected the course of international migrations to Turkey (İçduygu, Erder & Gençkaya, 2014, p. 14). Thus, it has recently turned very quickly from a sending to a receiving country in terms of migration. And it is often cited by scholars that Turkey was indeed only referred to as a country sending migrants to other countries around the globe, it has now become both a receiving and transit country, which has changed the social and economic dynamics of Turkish society (Ünal, 2014, p. 68).

As a matter of fact, it can well be argued that Turkey did not have sufficient regulations and was unprepared for the waves of migration in the face of rapidly growing influx of asylum seekers. Yet, Turkey has tried to do its best to eliminate the social, economic, cultural and political irregularities resulting from heavy immigration. To that end, Turkey undertook an initiative to fill in the gaps in Turkish legislations pertaining to migration issues. In addition to legal arrangements at home, Turkey also signed a number of international conventions.

The reasons for the increasing influx of migrants to Turkey in the last century can be understood in several articles:

- Turkey has a strategic position as a transit point to other European countries and has proximity to regions such as Asia and the Middle East,
- Turkey is preferred by tourists for opportunities and historical values,
- Regulations are made in Turkey to make sure political, economic, social and cultural development,
- EU membership negotiations started in October 2005 (Dönmez-Kara, 2015, pp. 147-148),
- The lack of sufficient legal regulations and the ability to identify and control immigrants lead to an increase in the number of illegal immigrants in Turkey.

4.4. Migration Legislation of Turkey

Prior to 2001, the Turkish Ministry of Interior Affairs (MIA) and the Police Department were managing institutional organization of immigration issues. After this year, development plans and reports issued within the framework of the EU membership process required Turkey to go to a more institutionalized structure on migration. Hence, the EU accession talks have been influential in driving Turkey to adopt legal regulations in the field of international migration. As a matter of fact, the “Turkish National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the Field of Asylum and Migration” in 2005 was one of the first steps towards establishing a civil migration organization. With the National Action Plan created in 2005, Turkey’s scattered regulations such as law annexes, circulars and regulations were tried to be gathered under a single roof (National Action Plan, 2005).

In Article 727 of Turkey's Ninth Development Plan covering the years between 2007 and 2013, it is stated that an Immigration and Asylum Organization will be established in order to effectively combat illegal immigration and asylum seeking movements. At the same time, it is stated that necessary legal and institutional arrangements will be made regarding the establishment of shelter centers at border zones (Ninth Development Plan, 2006, p. 98). In 2008, the Asylum and Migration Legislation Administrative Capacity Building and Implementation Bureau was established for the purpose of improving migration governance in Turkey. Within the framework of the efforts to collect the scattered legislation and bring them under a single roof, the LFIP No. 6548 was adopted in 2013. This law aims to eliminate the problems that may occur during the implementation phase of migration governance. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was initially responsible for international migration policies, the State Planning Organization and other ministries started to implement relevant policies in this field after these initiatives.

The Law No. 6548 regulated the establishment of the Directorate General of Migration Management, or shortly, the DGMM. Currently, the DGMM is the leading institution responsible for migration governance of Turkey, and it operates under the Ministry of Interior Affairs. The DGMM has branches in provinces and districts in Turkey in addition to cooperating with foreign organizations. Other institutional actors who play a role and support migration governance in Turkey include the Migration Policy Board (established in 2013 under the name Migration Board) (DGMM, 2019; DGMM, 2019b), the Directorate of Disaster and Emergency Management (AFAD) and the International Protection Assessment Commission in addition to many other non-governmental organizations (Arık, 2020, pp. 59-63).

As it can be remembered, the previous chapter elaborated on Turkey's

migration history and how it transformed from a sending country to a receiving country, in addition to dwelling upon the reasons for migration to Turkey. In connection with these analyses, this chapter will shed light on the factors causing the Syrian conflict, forcing Syrian asylum seekers to find a new *home* for themselves after the ramifications of the Arab Spring. In addition, particular attention will be paid to the legal situation of Syrian asylum seekers in Turkey, entering the country in 2011. Indeed, Syrian asylum seekers were granted a conditional refugee status since they could not obtain refugee status, yet they were allowed to stay in the country until they were resettled in a third country (LFIP, 2013, p. 12038). Turkey's post-2011 immigration legislation will also be a focal point of this chapter with an explanation of the impacts of Syrian asylum seekers on Turkish migration policies. More importantly, the laws and regulations enacted after the arrival of Syrian asylum seekers will be examined within the framework of the concept of security.

CHAPTER V TURKEY'S EVOLVING MIGRATION POLICY IN THE FACE OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS

5.1. The Reasons that Dragged Syria to Civil War

The conflicts in Syria erupted in 2011. However, it is essential to trace back the incidents that caused a crisis in earlier times. In other words, it would be insufficient to explain why the country has lost its citizens as migrants and asylum seekers to other countries by attributing the crisis only to a single armed conflict that took place in the year 2011. In an attempt to provide a thorough understanding, it is critical to have a historical analysis. In this connection, Syria declared its independence in 1946 and the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party seized power via a coup in 1963. When Hafez Assad, who became President in 1971, passed away in 2000, his son Bashar Hafez al-Assad took over the administration. Syria is still governed by the socialist, nationalist and authoritarian Ba'ath Party (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); Çetiner, 2018, p. 65). Until 2001, the agenda of the country was occupied by issues of democratization, freedom and human rights. In 2005, these issues were raised again ending up with signing the Damascus Declaration. Yet, the group of opponents to the government later disintegrated (MFA). Although Bashar Assad creates the perception that he takes a progressive approach in the global economy within the framework of a liberal understanding, he has not been very successful to do so. As a matter of fact, the country's security rules are almost the same as they were introduced in 1963. The Hama Uprising, which resulted in the death of 10,000 people in 1982, was one of the first incidents to instigate internal turmoil in the country. Later, the Druze protests took place in 2000 and the Kurdish uprising in 2004. The conflicts continued until 2011 (Düvell, 2017, p. 432).

In this line, Syria's internal turmoil arising from political and economic problems has led to more serious administrative irregularities and has increased the number of conflicts day by day. From a political perspective, the suppression of sectarian and ethnic groups in the administration and their inability to be represented in the political sphere have led to an increase in demands, fueling further conflicts. Although a very small part of the country is affiliated with the Nusayri sect, the members of the parties that govern the country belong to the Nusayri sect. This leads to hate speech against the government among the remaining Sunni Muslims, Druze and Christians. However, it can be seen that there are more than one group next to the Nusayris, who seem to be alone in the administration. Especially the cooperation with the rich Sunni traders of Damascus based on economic interests is one of the most important examples showing that minorities are also effective in the administration (Süer, 2012, p. 5).

The import substitution industrialization attitude adopted in order to sustain the economy, in fact, have had a significant negative impact on the country's economy. The political instability brought about by the economic collapse has led to the cease of foreign capital flow in the country. Practically, investors became unable to do business here and left the country. Banking and tourism activities have been disrupted and this has prevented progress in Syria's industrialization (Şen, 2013, p. 62). On top of that, the period between 2007-2012 marks the longest-term drought experienced in modern Syrian history. So much so that Dara, where the first opposition movements started, felt the impact of the drought most heavily for five years. Dara's livelihood is based on agricultural production and the drought hit this region to a great extent (Werrell, Femia & Sternberg, 2015, pp. 30-34). At the same time, economic deficiencies arose due to scarcity of resources in Syria mostly because

of the conflict with Israel. The government used the majority of resources for military power and defense purposes.

In addition to economic bottleneck, different income levels instigated inequalities among citizens. In this sense, the poor have become poorer and the rich have gotten richer (Dede, 2011, pp. 23-24). The administration tolerates a limited liberalization in the economic field and it has displayed an attitude against political liberalization (Süer, 2012, p. 7). The reason for this attitude is that the government aspires to increase its authority and attract foreign investment to the country.

Furthermore, Syrian elites owned unearned income and did not oppose the regulations brought by the regime. Nevertheless, the distribution of assets only among the elites caused severe complications and affected the whole country in the long-term (Şen, 2013, p. 61). Approximately 30% of the Syrian population remained below the poverty line (El Sarraj & Taşgın, 2015, p. 2) and the first emigration started in 2010 due to the drought and conflicts.

The anti-regime demonstrations started in 2010 when a young person burned himself in front of the governorship in Tunisia to protest, and spread to other Middle Eastern countries in a short time with the domino effect. It did not take long for the demonstrations to spread across Syria. In 2011, the fluctuation created by the Arab Spring was felt in Syria, and in March 2011, the incidents started to escalate. While the country was in such turmoil, the small protests that started in the South quickly spread throughout the country contributing to the spread of what is now called the Arab Spring. In response, the Assad regime tried to control the upheavals by displaying an oppressive but compromising attitude. This means that the Assad regime implemented a compromising policy by raising salaries of public servants, issuing regulations in line with the demands of the public, lowering oil prices and

taking liberalization steps in the Syrian economy. In addition, the governor of Deraa was dismissed, a general amnesty was declared, and it was announced that some detainees would be released (Anadolu Agency, 2012). However, these short-term arrangements did not satisfy the public and they continued to instigate uprisings (Tepeciklioğlu, 2015, p. 172).

However, the Assad regime soon began an oppressive policy against the demands of the opposition (Elhadj, 2011, p. 2). As a result of the interventions in the form of fiery attacks against the anti-regime demonstrations that started in Deraa, the anti-regime protests soon spread to major cities such as Damascus, Homs, Latakia, Aleppo and Hama (Çolak, 2017, p. 90; Koldaş & Köprülü, 2011, p. 34). The regime commenced fire on people by using law enforcement forces against the protests, tried to suppress people with detentions, arrests, armed and tank interventions and air strikes. On the other hand, people responded by taking up arms (Tyyskä, Blower, et al., 2017, pp. 4-5). In July 2011, it was announced that an opposition organization called the *Free Syrian Army* was established (El Sarraj & Taşgın, 2015, p. 5; Özdemir, 2017, p. 122). It was later made official by the UN that a civil war broke out in the country after the Assad forces took power with armed interventions (Vatandaş, 2016, p. 6). After this point, people started to believe that the only way for salvation was to overthrow the Assad regime, and this idea spread rapidly. The Assad regime described this situation as a crisis and did not acknowledge the public protests and demonstrations as a response to existing problems in Syria (Kilo, 2011).

5.2. First Forced Migrations from Syria

Due to civil war, the life of Syrian citizens was under threat and their living standards fell to very low levels. Therefore, they started to massively migrate to the border countries including Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Turkey and North Africa, as

well as to various European countries. As a result, these movements turned into irregular migration waves (Demirtaş, 2019, pp. 1-2). After the civil war broke out, the government of the country weakened, and new terrorist organizations emerged along with the opponents of the regime and started activities to fulfill their demands.

Thus, Syria has become a place where regime supporters, opponents of the regime, terrorist organizations disguised under a religious and ethnic appearance, and global and regional actors engage in activities to grab power (Çoştan & Yaylı, 2020, p. 2081). As of 2021, it can be said that Syria is divided into three regions: The first region (the vast majority with 64%) can be considered under de facto control of Russia and Iran and ruled by Assad's forces. The second region is under the control of the USA-backed PYD/YPG (23%). The last region is under the control of the opposition supported by Turkey (13%) (Abdulmeced, 2021).

The Assad regime also evaluated this crisis as a reflection of the disagreements and conflicts between the global and regional powers, trying to draw the regime's attempts to suppress the demonstrations on a legitimate plane (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2011, p. 1). At the same time, the USA, Russia, Iraq, Iran, China and Turkey, have been found in actual or political intervention against the Syrian government. This has further expanded the complexity of the crisis. As a matter of fact, the Arab Spring did not start only because of administrative issues that caused a confrontation between the public and the government. Rather, Western states were also involved in the conflicts since they had goals of obtaining the control of the vast majority of oil and natural gas resources in Syria to shift the balance of power in the region (Çoştan & Yaylı, 2020, p. 2085).

The fact that Turkey is sharing a border with Syria and applying an open-door policy has led to the highest number of migrants from Syria. Indeed, it is also the country accepting the highest number of asylum seekers in the first place (Uzman & Tösten, 2016, pp. 252-253). After the riots in the city of Dera, Turkey called for reform of the Damascus administration, but when Assad took an opposite position, Turkey began to take a stance against the regime (Çoştan & Yaylı, 2020, p. 2087; Kirişçi & Karaca, 2015, pp. 306-307).

The complex and controversial status of Syrian asylum seekers have put them into an environment of insecurity in every country they have gone. In other words, asylum seekers have to do risky jobs by earning a living illegally to survive, since their status and rights are not clear in the receiving country. Besides, problems with social cohesion, exclusion and deprivation of education are severe issues for both the receiving country and asylum seekers. Furthermore, asylum seekers are often associated with problems causing insecurity in the host society. These problems range from economic burden to social cohesion, from prostitution to human trafficking (Korkmaz, 2016, p. 108). This was likewise observed in Turkey. Since most of Syrians live in cities and villages other than refugee camps, they are seen as a problem with the same perceptions.

5.3. First Migrations to Turkey Stemming from the Syrian Crisis and Security Concerns

A recent study shows that the most important migrants to Turkey were northern Iraqi Kurds in 1988, Turks from Bulgaria in 1989, and Syrians beginning to come in 2011 and still continue to influx (Erdoğan & Kaya, 2015, pp. 298-299). The Syrian migration differs in nature from these migrations in 1988 and 1989 considering

the length of stay of Syrians coming with mass migration after the civil war broke in their homeland. This has since shaped Turkey's policies with a major impact.

The date of the first migration to Turkey due to the Syrian civil war was April 29, 2011, which was about 1 month after the beginning of the internal turmoil.

Different from most of European states, Turkey initially imposed an open-door policy on Syrian asylum seekers, referring to them as 'guests' in official discourses. Syrians first entered the Cilvegözü border gate of Hatay's Yayladağı district with a group of 252 people. The migration of so-called Syrian asylum seekers as guests continued to increase after this date (Erdoğan, 2014, p. 6), and these '*guests*' began to disperse to other regions and cities in Turkey. However, as the duration of the stay of asylum seekers increases, both the government and the public have been increasingly concerned that they will not return to their homeland.


In 2011, Turkey became the third country to receive the highest number of Syrian migrants after Lebanon and Jordan (Fargues, 2013, p. 248). Currently, about 65% of the total number of Syrians in the world (about 3 million 600 thousand) are located in Turkey. Lebanon follows Turkey as the second country that hosts the highest number of Syrian asylum seekers with about 865,500 people. After Lebanon, Jordan is ranked the third country hosting about 664,600 Syrian asylum seekers. In addition to these countries, Syrian asylum seekers are also heavily populated in Iraq, Egypt and North Africa, respectively (UNHCR, 2021). As can be seen, Turkey houses more than half of all Syrian asylum seekers in the world granting them international and temporary protection status.

As the severity of the civil war increased, the relevant authorities in the respective countries have a hard time in recording irregular migrants from Syria

despite meticulous inspections and researches. Thus, Turkey also has announced only an approximate rate of Syrian migrants in the country, although the number of most irregular migrants is determined.

Figure 4.

Number of Irregular Migrants Apprehended in Turkey by Years



Note. Source: Directorate General of Migration Management “Number of Irregular Migrants Apprehended by Years” <https://www.goc.gov.tr/duzensiz-goc-istatistikler>

11 months after the first entry of Syrians into Turkey in 2011, the Ministry of Internal Affairs enacted the “Directive on the Admission and Accommodation of Citizens of the Syrian Arab Republic Coming to Turkey for Mass Asylum and Stateless Persons Residing in the Syrian Arab Republic” on March 30, 2012 to manage the crisis more effectively within the legal and administrative framework (DGMM, 2021b). In this context, Turkey provided temporary protection to 256,971

Syrian foreigners in a total of 26 temporary housing centers in 10 cities after 2012 as part of its open-door policy. According to data by the DGMM reporting to the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs, the number of temporary housing centers decreased on September 16, 2020. Within this scope, it is stated that 59,877 Syrians are hosted under the temporary protection status in seven housing centers of five Turkish provinces. It can be said that Syrians have extended their stay in Turkey due to confusion and conflicts continuing in their country. Thus, they are supported by the Turkish government in taking shelter outside refugee camps to ensure social cohesion. As a matter of fact, the number of Syrians living outside camps is much greater than those who are hosted in refugee camps (DGMM, 2021c).

Circular No. 2015/8 published by the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) and Directive No. 9648 “Principles of Health Services to be Provided to those under Temporary Protection” issued by the Ministry of Health on November 4, 2015 are regulatory legislations for the effective and efficient execution of Health Services for Syrians. In this context, the Public Health Care Directorate is responsible for providing primary health care services to persons under temporary protection. In addition, other affiliated organizations, as well as voluntary health care organizations contribute to services provided to Syrians. All these services are given in accordance with the Health Service Procurement Protocol signed between AFAD and the Ministry of Health (Ministry of Health, 2015). Furthermore, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, the Red Crescent, the UNHCR and many national and international NGOs are involved in the control and implementation of migration policies for the Syrian refugee crisis.

On the other hand, in order for Syrians to benefit from services such as health, education and transportation in Turkey, they must first provide their biometric

records. This is a practice implemented for the purpose of ensuring public order and security (Demirkiran, 2019, p. 111). Additionally, Syrian asylum seekers in Turkey are subject to a security investigation to obtain temporary identity documents under temporary protection status. More precisely, biometric information and address information of persons requesting temporary protection in Turkey under the temporary protection status are registered in the address registration system. At the next stage, asylum seekers, who do not pose a threat to public order and security, are given temporary or indefinite identity cards. The DGMM issues temporary identities and governorates make the necessary arrangements. Syrians are not charged any fee for receiving these identities (TPR, 2014, pp. 6210-6211).

In this line, Turkey decided to monitor and audit Syrian asylum seekers who were not provided an identity card between 2011 to 2015. After 2015, the government officials started to give them temporary identity cards. This, indeed, shows that Syrian asylum seekers are considered an element of security. Furthermore, Turkey takes measures against certain epidemics, the number of which has increased after Syrians started to enter Turkey. Therefore, the Turkish government organized vaccination of those visiting Syria during holidays at the border point. This is an indication that the issue is treated as a security issue in terms of health care.

The circular No. 2014/21 of the Ministry of Education regulates the right of Syrian children to education in Turkish schools. This also includes information about temporary education centers in Turkey in addition to conditions for providing education. However, some temporary education centers were closed at the end of 2017 due to the difficulty of inspection and adaptation, since 80% of those schools had Syrian teachers and the language of instruction was Arabic, rendering the

adaptation impossible (Hürriyetcom.tr, 2017). This is another indication that Syrian asylum seekers are perceived as a security threat.

In this regard, Turkey felt the need to reshape its migration policy according to international protection laws due to the impact of the heavy influx of Syrians as well as the process of adapting to the EU. As a matter of fact, Turkey's role has become more important in the EU context after the Syrian civil war (Fargues, 2013, p. 259). As such, the EU calls on Turkey to adopt a law regarding migration and international protection issues in Chapter 24 of the negotiations with the EU titled "justice, freedom and security" (DGMM, 2017, p. 23). On top of that, Turkey also was willing to change its migration policy since Syrian asylum seekers – who were initially thought to come only for a temporary period of time – became permanent residents in Turkey. Another reason for a change in its migration policy is that Turkey was left alone by the international community since it intervened in the Syrian civil war. Other reasons include increased economic burdens and concerns about border security (Şahin-Mencütek & Gökalp-Aras, 2015, pp. 194-195).

Turkey is trying to regulate migration legislation by issuing laws, regulations, directives, communiques and circulars within the framework of the migration administration. Decisions by the Council of Ministers within this scope constitute the guiding light for the management of migration issues. Accordingly, Turkey adopted a law in 2013 for the first time for asylum seekers, who came from Syria as guests as part of its open-door policy in 2011, as their number continued to increase, rather than decrease. This law covers issues for both immigrants and the social status of asylum seekers in the country (LFIP, 2013). Turkey's embracing of Syrian asylum seekers without discriminating against religion, language or race and without setting any

quota is considered a very positive humanitarian move by the international community (Kirişçi, 2014, p. 41).

The LFIP No. 6458, published in the Official Gazette on April 11, 2013, is the first law adopted to fill the gap in the migration legislation emerging after Syrian asylum seekers came to Turkey. After that, in order to manage migration policies efficiently, national migration legislation was regulated within the framework of laws such as Passport Law No. 5682, Housing Law No. 5543, Work Permits for Foreigners Law No. 4817, Foreign Direct Investment Law No. 4875 and Turkish Citizenship Law No. 5901.

Article 91 of LFIP and TPR or Temporary Protection Regulation, published in the Official Gazette No. 29153 and enacted in 2014, has also introduced a number of provisions to eliminate the disorder caused by Syrian asylum seekers and clarify their uncertain status. However, there is also the provision that the president may decide to temporally or indefinitely limit or stop the temporary protection measures implemented in the event of any case that may threaten national security, public order, public security or public health (TPR, 2014, p. 6208). This is an indication that Syrian asylum seekers are evaluated within the scope of the Turkey's security policy. Also according to the TPR, the temporary protection status covers Syrian asylum seekers, who come to Turkey to find emergency aid and temporary asylum, and guarantees not to send them back and limits their stay in Turkey.

Another issue with Syrians is that since 2016, people with temporary protection status have been granted work permits in Turkey. However, Turkish society perceives this as a threat since there is the belief that Syrians cause unemployment as they provide cheap and unskilled labor and steal jobs from Turks.

HUGO, a research foundation, conducted a study to measure the perception of Turkish people towards Syrians and found that 56.1% of Turkish citizens think that Syrians have stolen their jobs, while 30.5% disagree with this argument (Erdoğan, 2014, p. 31).

Syrians whose stay in Turkey has been prolonged in parallel with the ongoing civil war in their country have had to work in a permanent or temporary job to provide themselves and their families with livelihood, as well as to continue the housing and nutrition services they receive. However, since it is not possible for them to have a profession in Turkey and they are generally not qualified personnel, Syrians are mostly employed in seasonal, short-term, temporary and low-paid jobs. From this perspective, it is also clear that Syrian asylum seekers are vulnerable to exploitation of their labor since they are forced to work under difficult conditions in some cases. Syrian asylum seekers are mostly employed in sectors that local people do not prefer to work in such as the construction, agriculture, shoemaking, textile sectors, household services, cleaning and babysitting (Esen & Duman, 2016, p. 194). Moreover, these jobs are usually performed off the record.

5.4. Turkey's Migration Policy after the Syrian Crisis

For Ankara, the most difficult aspect of the Arab Spring to manage was the Syrian crisis resulting from the internal turmoil of Syria, with which Turkey shares a border of 800 km (Djalili & Kellner, 2013, p. 108). In the early years of the civil war, Turkey believed that the regime would respond to the demands of people positively or that the regime would change as a result of these democratic demands. At the beginning of 2011, thus, Turkey started to apply an open door policy for asylum seekers coming from Syria within the framework of the *Ansar-Muhajir* (people from Medina who helped immigrated Muslims) understanding (Demirtaş, 2019, p. 5).

Believing that the war would soon end, Turkey named the guests that they thought would return to their countries as volunteer ambassadors for good diplomatic relations between Syria and Turkey in the future. Ahmet Davutoglu, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated in a television show in 2012 that they would continue to help people in Syria and declared that the end of the complexity in Syria was approaching, saying: *“It is now necessary to express this process in months or weeks, rather than in years”* (Cumhuriyet, 2012).

However, as mentioned earlier, the civil war in Syria has become such that more than half of the country’s citizens have been displaced. A large proportion of the displaced persons emigrated to Turkey. In the beginning, Turkey tried to manage this heavy migration process alone, however, the financial resources necessary to address the basic needs of asylum seekers started to diminish. Thus, Turkey asked assistance (both financial support and material support to ensure safety) from the international community in the placement of Syrian asylum seekers (Erdoğan & Kaya, 2015, pp. 298-299).

The open-door policy allowed Syrian asylum seekers to take shelter in Turkey as they fled the civil war that caused massacre of civilians. However, this policy also led some members of terrorist organizations to enter Turkey under the guise of asylum seekers. This situation was interpreted as that Turkey was vulnerable in terms of ensuring security (Tunca & Karadağ, 2018, p. 60). In fact, many in the Turkish society assume that irregular Syrian asylum seekers were the perpetrators or contributed to the bomb attacks, mortar attacks and suicide bomb attacks in the past. From 2011 (when first Syrians entered Turkey) to June 2014, the rate of breaching laws was thirty-three in ten thousand, and more than 61% of these crimes involved

document forgery. A severe risk in this regard would be a mass reaction movement by the public accompanied by provocative actions (Ağır & Sezik, 2015, pp. 116-117).

As can be understood from the above insights, Syrian asylum seekers are seen as a cause of insecurity where they arrive, while most people note that Syrians do not feel safe after their arrival due to this perception (Deniz, Ekinci & Hülür, 2016, p. 31). At the 4th Ordinary Provincial Congress of JDP in Kocaeli, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then-Prime Minister emphasized that Turkey would continue its journey with the JDP government embracing Syrians: “*We will not turn our backs on our Syrian brothers in the face of the Assad regime*”. As part of the open-door policy, Turkey primarily accepted over 40 thousand Syrian guests and would continue to help Syrians escaping the cruelty in their homeland (Haberler.com, 2012). From that time on, the government maintained the discourses of “*our Syrian brothers and Syrian guests*” to characterize asylum seekers from Syria. The number of Syrian asylum seekers, who were admitted to Turkey in good faith that they would return to their country afterwards, reached one and a half million in August 2014.

The terrorist organization DAESH (also known as ISIL/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) made its first terrorist attack in Turkey’s Nigde city on March 20, 2014. This and similar attacks pushed Turkey to shape its security policies to eliminate these terrorist activities resulting from the Syrian crisis. During this period, Syria received support from regional powers including Iran, Russia and China. This completely eliminated the chances for a UN-wide intervention. The Western-based terrorist organization emerging in Syria prevented global powers such as the EU and the USA from supporting the opposition group in the Syrian conflict.

Although it has been ten years since the first entry of Syrians (who were initially called guests) to Turkey, they have not yet returned to their homeland. This has triggered the continuation of the problems caused by migration and Turkey's open-door policy. Moreover, the existing problems have led to the perception of this issue in Turkey as a humanitarian and state-based security problem. Therefore, Turkey abandoned its approach (that the security issues in Syria were outside its borders) and started to follow a supervised open-door policy after 2015. In the period after 2011, the issue of Syrian asylum seekers was excluded from security based on the argument that Syrian asylum seekers had no negative impact on security. However, in the post-2015 period, there started to be more focus on security concerns caused by the migration of Syrians to Turkey. During this period, the Assad regime thoroughly increased its power and strengthened its legitimacy on the grounds that they were united against the terrorist organization ISIS in a very large coalition with Russia, the USA and Iran.

In 2015, a Russian plane crashed in the Yayladağı district of Hatay violating our airspace according to the rules of engagement. This led to a severe crisis between Turkey and Russia. Disputes continued for a while. Russia expressed its reaction by imposing a series of embargoes on Turkey. In fact, Russia's reaction was quite harsh as Russian officials said 'an attack on a Russian plane would be deemed as an attack against Russia'. This further strained the relations between Russia and Turkey, which had already been confronting due to the Syrian crisis (Kurban & Cabbarli, 2019, p. 112). After this point, Turkey stated that Turkey had a legitimate position in this case and this attitude of Russia was unacceptable. Turkey made it clear that they would take similar measures in response to its attitude towards Turkey (National Security Council, NSC, 2015).

On June 16, 2016, Prime Minister Binali Yildirim convened with provincial heads from the JDP in the iftar program. He said, “*we will strengthen a foreign policy understanding that increases friends and reduces enemies*” (Hürriyetcom.tr, 2016). He further underlined that their support for the Syrian opposition continued and that they would eliminate all enemy elements, since the ongoing civil war in Syria had been laying the groundwork for terrorist incidents in Turkey. In this regard, he further stated that allowing the PYD/YPG (the extension of the PKK terrorist organization in Syria) to open representative offices in Berlin and Paris was contrary to allied and friendly relations, requesting reconsideration of this decision (NSC, 2016). With a conflict-free zone intended to be created in Syria through operations, Turkey would contribute to the peace of the region. In this regard, the Euphrates Shield operation was successfully completed and more than 100 thousand Syrians returned safely to their homes.

By 2018, Turkey had been continuing to implement its migration policies with the fight against Syrian-based terrorist organizations in the region in an attempt to build a terror-free zone to ensure the safe return of Syrian citizens to their countries. For this purpose, Turkey cooperated with Russia and Iran in a number of ways, such as the tripartite summit in Idlib, the Geneva and Astana process, and the Sochi agreement.

3,576,370 thousand Syrian asylum seekers were registered to enter Turkey according to the information shared by the DGMM in 2019 (DGMM, 2019b). as can be remembered, decision-makers in Turkey had accepted all Syrians with an open-door policy in the early days of the crisis, however, they have switched to the rhetoric that ‘*Turkey is not the keeper of any country, it is not a warehouse of migrants*’, with increasing security concerns today (Demirtas, 2019, p. 5). At the NSC (National

Security Council) meetings in 2019, it was defended that the operations needed to continue as part of the efforts to create a safe zone. This was seen as the only way to make sure Syrians returned their home safely. Also, Turkey invited the international community for support in facilitating the return of Syrians to their countries without discrimination (NSC, 2019).

Today, news in Turkish media suggest that issues on Turkey's border security and border violations are accepted in the context of the threat-security relationship. At the same time, the difficulties and security risks asylum seekers face are widely covered by the press news in reference to human security (Memişoğlu & Başol, 2019, p. 197).

In connection with these analyses, the next chapter will elaborate on 2018 election manifestos with reference to security-oriented discourses regarding Syrian asylum seekers. Indeed, the People's Alliance and the Nation's Alliance made election alliances before the 2018 general elections. They covered the issue of Syrian asylum seekers in the manifestos. These discourses will be analyzed with the tools provided by the Securitization Theory. In this way, it is aimed to understand whether the issue of Syrian asylum seekers is securitized or not, and if it is, in what way it is done so. It will also be possible to show what determines the securitization practices of Turkish political parties.

CHAPTER VI SECURITIZATION OF SYRIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS IN 2018

GENERAL ELECTION MANIFESTOS

Evaluation of 2018 election manifestos and discourse analysis constitute the methodology of this chapter to better comprehend political party discourses based on security in the context of Syrian asylum seekers, marginalization and exclusion efforts. As mentioned previously, the theory of securitization developed by the Copenhagen School will be benefited in this part of the study to understand the repercussions of the discourse analysis. More specifically, this chapter will explain how the political expressions used in the 2018 election manifestos were actually used as a securitizing tool in an attempt to reveal the political concerns behind the party discourses that regarded Syrian asylum seekers as an external threat or a vital national security problem. In addition, the policies developed to solve this “asylum seekers problem” will be analyzed in-depth. In this context, it will also be determined how securitizing actors used these statements to take extraordinary measures regarding asylum seekers.

First, the analysis focuses on the statements in the 2018 election manifestos that define Syrian asylum seekers as a problem for the purpose of examining whether the People’s Alliance and Nation Alliance have referred to the Syrian asylum seekers as a threat. Making this determination is important in that the discourses of the parties as securitizing actors cause certain perceptions of security threats as securitization object shown for the public. Subsequently, election manifestos will reveal whether the issue of Syrian asylum seekers were used as a tool for the implementation of the relevant parties’ policies.

After the first group of Syrian asylum seekers entered Turkey in 2011, the Turkish government accepted these asylum seekers as guests (Oytun, 2014, p. 11)

based on an assumption that the Assad regime would be destroyed in a very short time and a new administration would be formed in accordance with the demands of Syrian people. As a matter of fact, Ahmet Davutoglu, the Foreign Minister at the time, stated in a news program that the Assad administration would not be permanent and the situation would be resolved within weeks (Cumhuriyet, 2012). As can be seen from this discourse of Davutoğlu, politicians made a call for hospitality starting in April 2011 assuming that the conflict in Syria would be resolved in a very short time.

However, the conflict exacerbated contrary to these predictions and when it became clear that the temporary guests were permanent, politicians started to reshape their discourses and policies. In this line, Turkey started to take some measures in order to determine the status of asylum seekers in the country and solve the problems arising from asylum seekers since it was now evident that they were about to become permanent residents. More precisely, the most important steps that Turkey took for Syrian asylum seekers included the temporary protection status and readmission agreements (Bayındır, Goularas & Sunata, 2015, p. 21). For instance, according to the agreement signed on December 16, 2013, Syrian asylum seekers who have reached Europe by transit from Turkey will be able to be sent back to Turkey. At the same time, the agreement also regulated the issue of the repatriation of refugees and asylum seekers, who come to Turkey through EU countries (MFA, 2013, p. 1; Official Journal of the European Union, 2014, pp. 5-6).

6.1. Syrian Asylum Seekers in the 2018 General Election Manifestos

The votes received in elections are very important in determining the parliamentary distribution. Moreover, electoral alliance is another crucial element in determining the number of seats in the parliament. Electoral alliances are mostly used to go beyond a certain threshold. In this regard, the first electoral alliance was legally

used in 2018 (Official Gazette, 2018). The JDP and NMP made common discourses on the Syrian asylum seekers issue after the coup attempt in 2016 and formed an alliance called the “*People’s Alliance*”. The RPP established the “Nation’s Alliance” with the GP, HP and DP on May 5 (Çolak, 2020, pp. 728-729).

6.1.1. The JDP and its Discourse of ‘Guest’

Founded in August 2001, the JDP came to power 16 months after it started its activities. On November 3, 2002, it managed to have 365 deputies with 34% of the votes (Ak Party Regulation, p. 7), introducing itself as a conservative democratic party. After the JDP came to power, it adopted the “zero problems policy with the neighbors” (Davutoğlu, 2013). Following the traditional threat-protection centered border understanding along with policies such as zero problems with neighbors and regional ownership, the government adopted a more flexible understanding of border management (Miş, 2012, pp. 232-236) and historical unity. However, the Syrian civil war required reshaping of this flexible border understanding. The JDP, which has been in power since 2002, has become the main policy-maker in Turkish politics during the Syrian civil war. In the 2018 general elections of Turkey, the People’s Alliance was established with the NMP (Çolak, 2020, pp. 728- 729). Being a one-party government without coalitions for a long time, the JDP made an alliance with the NMP due to its decline in vote rates. With this development, the NMP started to take on a more secular and homogeneous structure and to adopt central politics (Türkmenoğlu-Köse, 2017, p. 32). Since the JDP was in power, its party ideology determined the migration policies towards Syrian asylum seekers.

6.1.1.1. Description of People Emigrating from Syria

The JDP government, which has accepted Syrian asylum seekers as guests within the framework of its open-door policy since their first arrival in Turkey in

April 2011, has developed its discourse in this direction (Oytun, 2014, p. 11). As mentioned before, the government expected the crisis to be short-lasting and anticipated that the Assad regime would soon be destroyed. Thus, the government aimed to make a good impression on behalf of Turkey by sheltering the people fleeing from Syria, as they were expected to return to their country in a short time (Alagöz & Demirkıran, 2020, p. 217). This assumption is underlying the government's preference of the term 'guests' for the incoming Syrians at the time. However, as the Assad regime endured and the crisis prolonged, the guests seemed to be permanent. This has led to the rise of many concerns (Karasu, 2018, p. 57).

Syrians were first referred to as asylum seekers in the 2018 election manifestos in Turkey. The analysis of the JDP's 2018 election manifesto reveals that although the JDP government is aware of the size of Syrian asylum seekers, (JDP, 2018, p. 134), the government officials do not relate them with economic, social or military security issues. Indeed, Syrian asylum seekers arriving in Turkey were accepted without any discrimination such as religion, language, race or sect as a requirement of the open door-policy. The issue that should be mentioned here is that Syrian asylum seekers were not securitized by the JDP in the first place as they did not predict that this internal turmoil would continue for a long time. At the same time, the government uttered that Turkey was being the subject of an increasing influx of migrants and that the issue of migrants should be a humanitarian task for the whole world (JDP, 2018, p. 134). As the influx of asylum seekers increased, the *guest* discourse was replaced by terms containing new concerns.

Indeed, described as the largest migration wave seen in the world in recent history, our country has been subjected to a large influx of forced displaced migrants with the civil war in Syria. In this process, Turkey has shown its humanitarian reflex

by implementing an ‘open door’ policy and has been the country that accepts the highest number of asylum seekers in the world (JDP, 2018, p. 134).

It was declared that Turkey was the country that accepted the highest number of asylum seekers and that the government built temporary housing centers to meet the basic needs of asylum seekers. A reason for assistance to asylum seekers is that Turkey emphasized the shared Islamic history as per the Ansar-Muhajir understanding (Karasu, 2018, p. 57). As a matter of fact, there is reference to religious unity with Syrians in the past (Memişoğlu & Ilgıt, 2016). The concept of “*muhajir*” refers to people who escape oppression and persecution to find safety and freedom. This concept is associated with the religion of Islam (Devran & Özcan, 2016, p. 46).

In connection with this perceived proximity, 26 temporary housing centers – established in 2017 – accommodated more people than the total number of Syrian asylum seekers in other countries. Here, all their basic needs were met. On the other hand, Turkey complained that other countries had not fulfilled their duties towards asylum seekers. Since there was a geographical reservation set out in the 1951 Geneva Convention (Dost, 2014, p. 34), Turkey found a solution: To grant Syrians the temporary protection status (Dost, 2014, p. 63).

As mentioned above, Turkey built a total of 26 temporary housing centers in 10 provinces near the Syrian border since the first raids in 2011. 216 thousand Syrians were placed in these centers. (...) The total number of Syrian asylum seekers in temporary housing centers in Turkey is currently 277,710, while there are 230,315 Syrian asylum seekers in housing centers in other countries. Services are provided to 7% of the asylum seekers under temporary protection status in the temporary housings consisting of 9 tent cities and 11 container cities in 10 provinces (JDP, 2018, p. 134).

It can be said that Turkey does not grant refugee status to these Syrian asylum seekers from outside Europe since it does not want to fall under the specific responsibilities of giving the refugee status. In this way, it may well be argued that this issue has been securitized as Turkey chose to grant these asylum seekers temporary protection status.

6.1.1.2. Are Syrian Asylum Seekers a Problem to Security?

The JDP government stated that 3,6 million Syrian asylum seekers were under temporary protection in Turkey by the end of 2017. In addition, the government also shared that they took several steps to ensure that these asylum seekers go back to their country safely. Here, social security is shown as a sub-reference object under threat, while economic security is shown as a reference object in discourses. In other words, the issue of Syrian asylum seekers was first placed in the political sphere and then constructed in the security sphere (Mandacı & Özerim, 2013, p. 111).

During the ongoing Syrian war, Turkey has major steps to facilitate the safe return of a significant part of asylum seekers to Syria, while also fulfilling its humanitarian duty (JDP, 2018, p. 135).

In this context, Syrian asylum seekers are accommodated in protection housings by the virtue of scrupulousness. The only way for these asylum seekers to safely return to their countries is through the establishment of a safe zone in Syria, where the civil war still continues. Their return can only be guaranteed with the cooperation of Turkey and Syrian people. From this point of view, the desire to create a safe zone in Syria is also an indicator of accepting the fact that there is not a safe place there. That is why there is a need for a region unaffected by conflicts. This need can also be evaluated on the axis of security.

Therefore, Turkey now aims to legitimize its operations that have been launched to safely resettle asylum seekers. In this line, Turkey continues to fight against terrorist organizations in Syria in the eyes of the public and the international community.

It can be said that the Turkish government is carrying out activities in Syria to be able to send Syrian asylum seekers back to their countries due to the JDP's perception of a threat to Turkey's national security. As a matter of fact, it is stated by the officials that ensuring the safety of life of people in the region is a responsibility. In addition, it can be said that the JDP government aspires to close the security gaps caused by Syrian asylum seekers. Moreover, there is a general perception that Turkey's border security is under threat and there is a need for operations to ensure safety and send asylum seekers back to their country as soon as possible.

While the Arab Spring was not yet fully felt in the entire Middle East by 2011, Turkey claimed that it had made the largest rescue operation in history by securing the evacuation of Turkish citizens in Libya (Haberturk, 2011). Consequently, it is believed that Turkey exhibited an exemplary behavior to the world by using peaceful methods of settlement to eliminate confusion. Likewise, the JDP government claims that they will continue to provide assistance to Syrian asylum seekers in ensuring a safe environment particularly for children. Accordingly, war is not and cannot be a solution.

The Operation Euphrates Shield started in August 2016 and ended in March 2017. As a result of this operation, a bilateral safety zone was established in Cerablus

and Çobanbey (these areas were declared as non-conflict zones), and Syrian asylum seekers were resettled in these areas.

It is claimed by many that Syrian children learned wisdom and not war from Turkey thanks to these efforts. As underlined before, Turkey conducted the largest evacuation operation from Libya (JDP, 2018, p. 276).

After Cerablus and Çobanbey in the north of Syria were cleaned of terrorist elements by the Operation Euphrates Shield, many people from within Syria and Turkey migrated to the safe zone here and its population exceeded a million (JDP, 2018, p. 276).

In fact, the Operation Euphrates Shield was the first one that the Turkish government conducted in Syria. They underscored that this operation was to ensure the welfare of people in the region and safely send Syrian asylum seekers in Turkey back to their homes. From this perspective, the concept of security was not associated with asylum seekers at the first stage, and discourses were developed within the framework of a regional security understanding, underlined by the aim to ensure the security of Syria (JDP, 2015, p. 332). To that end, security strategies gained a regional dimension (Buzan, 2008, pp. 109-112). Later, the authorities tried some solutions to reduce the economic burden stemming from addressing the needs of asylum seekers.

6.1.1.3. Solution Suggestions: Where Exactly is it Safe to Establish a Safe Zone?

In order to achieve the status determination procedures for Syrians, the Turkish government has reshaped its policies, while taking administrative steps to bring about a quick solution.

In line with this purpose, there are more measures to assess asylum seekers' applications faster. In addition, the reliability of the data systems where asylum

seekers are registered is increased. The aim of this move was to prevent some misunderstandings and opposing ideas that might arise in the public opinion. Furthermore, decision-centers referred to as International Protection Bureaus were established to ensure the efficient use of opportunities. On top of that, these bureaus served with experts to check whether applicants met the necessary criteria for asylum. From another perspective, information of Syrian asylum seekers (who are registered to the system) is constantly updated, which is an indication that there is a desire to restructure the measures for asylum seekers in case of need.

Officials from the government also state that they will create a reliable data system in the field of migration. They will continue to update the data of more than 3,5 million Syrians under temporary protection. Also, they will finalize the applications of those seeking international protection in the country by careful examination in the aforementioned decision centers. Hence, the capacity of these centers have been gradually increasing in adapting to the changing circumstances (JDP, 2018, pp. 137-138).

In the same vein, the JDP government claims that Turkey has fulfilled its humanitarian duty as necessary, and invites the international community to cooperate on Syrian asylum seekers and provide financial support, since they pose economic burden for the country.

In fact, our country has not been able to see the expected support from developed countries and international institutions for refugees, while their economy should be responsible for the entire international community. ... Thus, it is often emphasized that the international community must do its part in sharing the burden and responsibility (JDP, 2018, p. 302).

From this perspective, the JDP government has made it explicit that its economic capacity would not suffice to meet the needs of all asylum seekers, whom it refers to as refugees. In the face of the burden they cause, the government stated that Turkey has fewer financial resources than developed countries or international institutions. This is another indication that they cover the issue of asylum seekers within the scope of security in terms of economic burden. From this point of view, it can be said that the requests for assistance are made both on behalf of Syrian asylum seekers and the welfare and security of the country. Reading the JDP's discourses in the context of the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School, it can be observed that the JDP offers the solution of creating a safe zone in Syria to address the needs of Syrian asylum seekers. In this sense, the state of asylum seekers is called a security problem that necessitates extraordinary measures (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde 1998, p. 4). It can also be said that JDP aims to send Syrian refugees back to their countries after their temporary protection status expires. In their study, Çiçek, Arslan and Baykal look at the discourses of the JDP in literature. However, since their study does not evaluate these discourses within the framework of securitization, it overlooks the conclusion that the temporary protection status given to Syrian refugees is a securitizing measure taken to avoid refugee responsibility. The aforementioned study argues, like this thesis, that the JDP accepted asylum seekers for its *Ansar-muhajir* understanding. The argument in this thesis is that the JDP does not securitize the issue of Syrian refugees to a great extent overlaps the main argument of the said study that the JDP does not have a very harsh discourse against refugees.

6.1.2. The RPP and its Discourse of ‘Syrian Asylum Seekers’

The RPP was established within the framework of the principles of republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism and revolutionism. Now, it is the main opposition party against the JDP government (RPP, 2018 Party Statute). The RPP established the “Nation’s Alliance” with the GP, HP and DP on May 5, 2018 (Çolak, 2020, pp. 728-729).

6.1.2.1. What is the Definition of Syrian Asylum Seekers?

The discourse used by the RPP in its 2018 election manifesto is mostly shaped by the claim that Syrian asylum seekers are burden on the Turkish economy, causing unemployment and making unfair gains. The JDP used the word asylum in a softer sense, while the same word was used in a harsher and critical language within the RPP.

Criticizing the government for accepting all Syrian asylum seekers with its open-door policy after the Syrian civil war, the RPP associates the reason why Turkey faced a very intense influx of Syrian asylum seekers with the government’s wrong attitude towards immigration. Thus, no matter the case where the word crisis is used in relation to asylum seekers, it always has a negative connotation associated with a number of problems for the opposition party of Turkey.

In this line, it is claimed that the so-called palace diplomacy, which approached the Arab Spring in an opportunistic and expansionist manner, caused Turkey to face a large immigration of Syrian asylum seekers due to the adventurous policies it followed. The Syrian asylum seeker crisis has become a serious problem not only because of the humanitarian tragedy, but also the economic costs it imposes on our country (RPP, 2018, p. 27).

Concomitantly, the RPP defines this situation as the “Syrian asylum seeker crisis” due to the consequences and magnitude of this migration movement of Syrians to Turkey. Based on this discourse, it can be said that the party sees Syrian asylum seekers as an issue that needs urgent action and believes that they pose a risk to the future of the country. The word crisis, indicating the existence of threat or danger, has been used as a tool that might pave the way for extraordinary measures (Baysal & Lüleci, 2015, p. 91). Thus, this issue has been securitized as a precautionary situation. At the same time, there is a discourse that the issue of asylum seekers will have devastating consequences for humanity. One of the most important discourses to consider here is the use of the phrase “Syrian asylum seeker crisis”. Where there is a crisis, there is danger too, so Syrian asylum seekers have been directly securitized while criticizing government policies. This discourse may well give the audience the perception that they are under threat. This is to realize securitization via the power to influence the societies’ view of immigrants (Holmes & Castaneda, 2016, p. 13).

6.1.2.2. What is the Problem about Syrian Asylum Seekers?

It can be seen in the RPP’s 2018 election manifesto that its policies regarding Syrian asylum seekers are based on returning people who migrated from Syria to Turkey and that’s why they call them “asylum seekers” (RPP, 2018, p. 27). The RPP’s intention to send Syrians back to their homeland can also be regarded as an indication that there is not a high level of acceptance and tolerance towards new asylum seekers.

Although there are advocates of the idea that the Syrian issue should be resolved by settling the conflicts in the region, Turkey’s operations and interventions in the region have been characterized as meddling in the internal affairs of Syria. The RPP intended to send Syrian asylum seekers to their country safely, however claimed

that these interventions would lead to more serious problems regarding the defense of the country due to interfering in Syria's internal affairs. Therefore, the RPP defends the idea of bringing a tangible solution to the issue of Syrian asylum seekers.

They claimed in the election manifesto that after a peaceful solution in Syria, they would ensure the safe return of those who wish among Syrians under temporary protection in our country without being victimized (RPP, 2018, p. 125).

Also, they stated in the manifesto the following: *"We will make sure that assistance to Syrians under temporary protection is transparent and controllable. We will supervise the assistance in accordance with the Turkish legal system and independent organizations. We will prevent Syrians, especially children, from working in unregistered and unacceptable conditions"* (RPP, 2018, p. 126).

"We will fight against the "informal employment of foreign and migrant workers for they are seen as cheap labor" (RPP, 2018, p. 171).

"In relations with Europe, we will end the use of Syrians who have emigrated to our country as leverage with an understanding that ignores human rights" (RPP, 2018, p. 121).

As can be understood from the above phrases, the RPP defended the rights of asylum seekers in the country arguing that they are earning unfairly, although they refer to the unemployment and economic burden caused by Syrian asylum seekers hosted in Turkey. In this regard, they claim that the resources that the government is using to meet the needs of Syrian asylum seekers are not made clear to the public, despite the promise of transparency in providing aid and assistance. Nevertheless, the government promised to ensure the security of the economy and that assistance to Syrian asylum seekers would be controllable. On the other hand, the RPP claims that

the assistance provided by the government is neither controllable nor traceable, thus, they consider the issue of asylum seekers as a legal and security issue.

6.1.2.3. What is the Solution to Syrian Asylum Seekers Issue?

The RPP is also approaching the crisis in terms of the victimization of Syrian asylum seekers and criticizing that Syrian asylum seekers, who cause unemployment, are used as cheap labor by taking advantage of their need for help. For this reason, the RPP's election manifesto also points out to the fact that Syrians are prevented from doing regular jobs by illegal means as they are considered cheap labor. Thus, they argue that there is a need for more care especially for Syrian asylum seeker children. There is also the argument that Syrian refugees are used in shaping the relations between the EU and Turkey. Indeed, the use of Syrian asylum seekers by the government to enter the EU in repatriation agreements has been criticized. It has been stated that Syrian asylum seekers are used as an object instead of forgetting that they are human, so to speak. In this case, the victims of the process are Syrian asylum seekers, since their human rights are violated. This has taken place by the securitization of Syrian asylum seekers.

According to the RPP, Syrian asylum seekers do not work under the same conditions as Turkish tradesmen and other employees after obtaining a work permit in Turkey, which is said to be a harm to Turkey's economy at every turn.

The manifesto says: *“We will prevent Syrians from competing unfairly by doing business exempt from taxes and legal obligations. We will ensure the unity of norms and standards in social security. We will eliminate the differences against the artisans”* (RPP, 2018, p. 195).

In this regard, the RPP officials aimed to convince the public by stating that the law gives Syrians privileges. In this regard, they claim that asylum seekers are not obliged to fulfill the obligations that Turkish citizens are incumbent: This causes injustice and victimization of tradesmen as they cannot exercise their rights due to unfair competition. In other words, they claim that Syrian asylum seekers are preventing shopkeepers from profiting. Arguing that inequality prevails in terms of social security, the RPP promised to provide welfare for the public. Thus, it can be said that they promised a legal order, where everyone living in the country would be equal before laws, and the reasons for distrust would be eliminated.

6.1.3. The NMP and its Discourse of ‘Syrian Asylum Seekers’

In 1969, the name of the Republican Villagers’ Nation Party was changed to the Nationalist Movement Party or NMP. As a result of the general election held in 1999, it became a partner in the coalition with the support of the conservative, nationalist and right-wing side and became the second party with the highest number of seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TÜİK, 2012, pp. 93-94). Devlet Bahçeli, who was elected as the chairman in 1997, is still the leader of the NMP today. In the 2018 general elections in Turkey, NMP (Çolak, 2020, pp. 728-729), which established the “People’s Alliance” with the JDP, received 11.10 % of the votes.

6.1.3.1. What is the Definition of Asylum Seekers and Problem about them?

The fact that the issue of Syria was addressed under the headings of *ensuring security* and *public order* in its election manifesto is an indication that the NMP is approaching the issue of asylum seekers as a situation that threatens Turkey’s security. The perception that the Syrian crisis is causing social complexity and insecurity due to unhealthy urbanization also prevails within the NMP.

Indeed, the party officials stated that “*regional risks and dangers arising from Syria have also taken on a chaotic and complex structure that is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid*” (NMP, 2018, p. 67).

By using words such as chaotic and complex when referring to the risks posed by Syrian asylum seekers, the NMP officials pointed out in their manifesto that the issue had become very severe and difficult to solve throughout the society. At the same time, while expressing that Turkey faced risks and dangers, they wanted to note that Turkey was facing intense negativity due to the crisis.

Furthermore, in its 2018 election manifesto, the NMP positioned asylum seekers as a threat to the security of the country. Nevertheless, they also addressed the security and social problems that these people encountered in Turkey. Therefore, the NMP argued that there was a need to implement policies to reduce their difficulties and quickly remedy the existing structure as it had been causing social destruction (NMP, 2018, p. 109).

Here, the use of the concept of destruction, which is related to the society and security of the country, is built on the perception that asylum seekers pose a threat to national security. Emphasizing that this constitutes a high risk of disrupting the social balance, the NMP tried to legitimize certain urgent measures. In line with the Copenhagen School’s assumptions, it can be observed that Syrian asylum seekers in Turkey were securitized by the NMP since they were referred to as a threat to the political authority and the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state. In fact, they were cited as an “existential threat” (Wæver, 2003, p. 12; Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998, p. 22).

In the same vein, the NMP associates asylum seekers with epidemics and socially disgraceful crimes in the country, describing them as groups that lead to severe problems in Turkey. The party noted that crimes and problems such as theft, mendicity, epidemics, prostitution, child marriage and labor abuse occurred after Syrian asylum seekers arrived in Turkey, although not seeing Syrians within the scope of security at the beginning. This discourse means that they claim Turkey did not have any security issues before the arrival of Syrian asylum seekers. They said that even if they were not involved in any crimes or caused a problem, Turkey had difficulty in overcoming the financial burden brought by asylum seekers. The NMP further noted that Turkey's budget was not sufficient to meet and coordinate the basic needs of these asylum seekers, whose numbers had been growing every day, and was unprepared for this unexpected situation.

“In addition to the high economic cost of having a significant number of asylum seekers in our country, Turkey also faces important social problems such as theft, robbery, rebellion, mendicity, the spread of epidemics, drug use, prostitution, child marriage and illegal labor” (NMP, 2018, p. 109).

In this regard, the NMP also stated that they were against all kinds of discrimination against women and that women and children should be protected against all kinds of violations of rights and abuse (NMP, 2008, pp. 37,123). Accordingly, they accepted the fact that the incidents mostly affected women and children as they were the most vulnerable group. In other words, the exclusion in society spread due to the fact that asylum seekers were associated with serious crimes especially against women and children. Moreover, as underlined before, there was the perception that Syrian asylum seekers had been stealing jobs of locals. Yet, these agitator discourses increased concerns in the public, while making it rather hard to

live in this country for Syrians who were away from their homeland (Löwenthal & Guterman, 1949, pp. 6-9). In order to earn a living for themselves and their families, they were sometimes forced to work in jobs that were not much preferred by Turkish citizens.

In this context, Syrian asylum seekers, especially women and children, are argued by the NMP to live in unhealthy conditions. Yet, there is also the other side of the coin: Turkish people have negative effects in their economic, social life as well as psychology (NMP, 2018, p. 109).

As can be understood, the NMP did not avoid pointing out to the fact that Syrian asylum seekers are vulnerable to victimization. Thus, they also stressed that there was a need to address this issue. Nevertheless, the NMP's discourse was built around the endeavor to convince Turkish people of the problems arising from hosting Syrian asylum seekers. The party stated that asylum seekers have a negative impact on Turkish citizens in terms of social and psychological well-being and economic welfare.

Overall, the NMP made statements that posed Syrian asylum seekers as a threat to society and tried to influence the audience (Löwenthal & Guterman, 1949, p. 138). They emphasized the threat to national security of the country by blaming Syrian asylum seekers for the crimes in society, which had been spreading unrest. They indicated that these crimes were not committed in Turkey before the arrival of Syrian asylum seekers to the country. They deemed decision-makers and their policies to be responsible for the crimes, reducing the reason of terrorism and other crimes to only one issue.

6.1.3.2. What can be the Solution to the Issue of Asylum Seekers?

Since the NMP approached the issue of asylum seekers within the framework of security and order in its election manifesto, it can be observed that the party sees this issue as a threat to Turkey's security. The perception that asylum seekers cause social complexity and insecurity due to unhealthy urbanization also prevails within the NMP. In this context, there is the securitization of asylum seekers since their unplanned urbanization is associated with disrupting the homogeneity of the people living in a given region of Turkey. As it was explained in the chapter elaborating on the securitization process of migration, the NMP made use of the argument that asylum seekers will affect the way of life in the home country, or even reshape society (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, 1998, p. 121).

Thus, the solutions that the NMP offered included the following: To resolve the issue of mass migration at its source, ensure that those admitted to our country reside in areas bordering their homeland, distribute asylum seekers abroad under registration and in designated places, ensure that they eat, drink, take shelter and dress in healthy conditions, and quickly return asylum seekers to their homeland when the conditions are mature (NMP, 2018, p. 123).

The party also indicated that they intend to stop asylum seekers from entering Turkey by reference to a policy to prevent immigration, although such a policy has never been implemented yet. Nonetheless, they presented the first solution step as finding alternatives that would ensure that asylum seekers would not come to Turkey. Second, they argued that asylum seekers who have already entered Turkey should be placed in areas close to the border rather than dispersing them in different Turkish regions and cities. The idea of this solution stems from the fact that asylum seekers – who are supposed to be sent back – would return easier if they did not disperse too

much. For asylum seekers who have entered Turkey and are scattered in various regions, the steps to follow are to register all asylum seekers as regularly as possible and to place them in previously designated places, not haphazardly. Following these steps, it is recommended to eliminate the possible risks that may cause insecurity and to ensure public safety. In their discourses regarding asylum seekers, the NMP officials underlined that the basic needs of Syrians – who have been forced to emigrate to Turkey – must be met as part of the awareness of humanitarian tasks. On the other hand, it can be understood from several statements that the ultimate goal is to send asylum seekers back home after the state of conflict ends.

6.1.4. The GP and its Discourse of “Everyone is Happy in their Homeland”

The GP was founded on October 25, 2017 and its principles are listed as hope, determination, justice, future, knowledge, wealth, courage and civilization (Good Party Program, İYİ Party Program, p. 3). The leader of the party is Meral Akşener, who left the NMP in 2016. The Party made a nation’s alliance agreement with the RPP in the 2018 general elections (Çolak, 2020, pp. 728-729). In order not to stay below the threshold in elections, the GP allied with the RPP via the declaration signed on May 5, 2018 (Aydoğan- Ünal, 2019, p. 326)

6.1.4.1. What is the Definition of Syrian Asylum Seekers and Problem about them?

The GP argues that the solution they offer for Syrian asylum seekers is their repatriation and that Turkey shall not be liable for the people forced to leave their homes as a result of the civil war in Syria. It has developed its policies on migrants based on the idea of not accepting new asylum applications.

6.1.4.2. What is the Problem with Syrian Asylum Seekers and What could be the Best Solution?

The GP states that the migration policy implemented by the JDP government caused Syrian asylum seekers to flock to Turkey and that they could not resolve the issue of Syrian asylum seekers. For this reason, the party officials promise to implement a new Syria policy, which is argued to be easier to implement and offer more efficient solution mechanisms than existing policies of the government. In this context, the GP argues that its policies are so reliable that they could resolve the issue of Syrian asylum seekers completely within a year. Accordingly, the GP says that Syrian asylum seekers, whom the government calls our guests, should be sent to their country next Ramadan, and then they could be guests only at iftar tables. The GP also utters that their relations will continue after Syrian asylum seekers return to their country. Thus, it has developed the content of its policies to resolve the issue by establishing good relations with Syria.

In the GP's statements, they uttered the following: *"We will implement a new Syria policy. We will ensure that our Syrian guests are returned to their country. We will be doing iftar together in Syria as guests of our Syrian brothers in 2019 Ramadan"* (GP, 2018, p. 48).

In addition, their manifesto for the election included the following promises: *"As part of international cooperation and joint struggle on the migration and refugee problem, we will ensure the formation of safe zones primarily in source countries, develop policies to prevent migration and the influx of refugees from these countries, and add third countries to readmission agreements to ensure that countries that cause or facilitate migration bear the cost"* (GP, 2018, p. 48).

In this regard, the party/ the securitizing actor can be observed to use security of the population in its discourse (based on the concepts of influx and struggle) as the reference object. They defined people migrating from Syria as refugees and pointed out to refugee problems in Turkey. In this line, the concept of culture shapes the meaning attributed to security, leading to the perception that irregular migrations are a threat, while cultural difference is also considered a threat (Akpınar, 2013, pp. 471-472). Thus, the GP does not consider the idea of a shared life with refugees possible. The presentation of migration and refugees as a threat by the GP means that the party approaches the issue from the perspective of security. Thus, invitation to the international community to take responsibility can be understood as an effort to reveal the seriousness of the issue.

Approaching the problem of asylum seekers as a problem causes negative connotations and means that the GP aspires to address it within the framework of security issues. In their statements, they underlined that they would take steps to identify problems in the country and prevent migration. At the same time, they promised before the said elections that the GP would contribute to the efforts of making the source country a safe place to avoid immigration before it even begins. In their manifesto, they claimed that their aim is to send asylum seekers from Turkey to their as well as third countries in accordance with a readmission agreement. Thereby, they underline that they would impose certain obligations on countries that cause migration or facilitate migration movements by developing a deterrence mechanism through these agreements. This goal again shows that there are more mechanisms to prevent immigration in the policies of the GP.

In this line, it can be understood that the party presented Syrians under temporary protection – who cannot be prevented from entering Turkey – as an issue

that must be taken under control. Therefore, the election promise was to overcome the issue of asylum seekers in an attempt to convince the public opinion that this was a problem for the country. In fact, when the GP announced its policy of repatriating Syrian asylum seekers, it can be said that its aim was more innocent to gain legitimacy with the argument that everyone feels best and happiest in their homeland.

They said, *“We will take control of Syrians under temporary protection in our country”* (GP, 2018, p. 49).

“Based on the assumption that “everyone is happy in their homeland”, we will cooperate with the Syrian state to return Syrians under temporary protection to their homeland” (GP, 2018, p. 49).

“We will prevent non-Turkish citizens from engaging in unregistered commercial activity” (GP, 2018, p. 49).

“We will give temporary residence, not citizenship, to the parents of children born in Turkey” (GP, 2018, p. 49).

It can be inferred from the above statements that they needed the support and assistance of the “Syrian State” when sending Syrian asylum seekers back to their countries. From this point of view, it can be understood from their reference to the Syrian state that the GP accepts the Assad regime as the representative of Syria. As the RPP argued, there is a general acceptance within the GP that asylum seekers cause unfair competition in Turkey and this poses a risk to the economy. In addition, the GP members are endeavoring to give confidence to those who think that asylum seekers cause unemployment with the promise that non-Turkish citizens working illegally will be prevented from doing so if they come to power. They also claimed that it is a threat to security since asylum seekers cannot be granted citizenship while being called non-

citizens of Turkey. In other words, the fact that asylum seekers have children within the territory of Turkey will not ensure obtaining Turkish citizenship, and their status will again be temporary protection status. This means that the GP regards the admission of asylum seekers to Turkish citizenship as a threat and therefore, tries to prevent it by using the securitization method.

6.2. Contribution to Literature

If the political parties that are analyzed in this study had discourses according to their ideologies, it would be expected that the JDP, NMP and GP would have harsh rhetoric against immigrants, while the RPP would be expected to deliver discourses that are shaped around the idea of accepting immigrants. However, the examination of the 2018 election manifestos show that each party made statements not according to its own ideology, but according to its alliance or opposition to the government. For this reason, it can be said that the securitization discourses of political parties were determined by their positions – pro or against the government – at the time of the elections. As a result of the analysis of the election manifestos in the last chapter, it can be understood that the People's Alliance subjected Syrian asylum seekers to less securitization, while the Nation's Alliance subjected them to more intense and harsh language.

In the light of the above explanations, it can be said that the JDP, which defines itself as a conservative democratic party (Doğanay, 2007, p. 66), can be positioned as a right-wing party. However, it is seen that they do not use the same arguments with the right-wing parties in Europe when it comes to immigrants. It follows a more positive attitude towards migrants (JDP, 2018, p. 134) and does not implement an exclusionary policy against migrants. The JDP only supports the return of asylum seekers after the administration in Syria changes.

On the other hand, the RPP defines itself as a social democratic left party (RPPb, p. 24). However, the RPP takes a more negative attitude towards immigrants, while it should have a helpful attitude according to their ideological spectrum. In this respect, although it is a leftist party, it makes statements advocating that immigrants lead to a great economic burden in Turkey and if necessary, the return of asylum seekers must be ensured after harmonizing conditions in Syria (RPP, 2018, p. 27).

Although the NMP is on the nationalist right wing, it has made certain securitization discourses on Syrian asylum seekers, yet it has made softer discourses than expected as a result of the People's Alliance it formed with the JDP. The GP has developed its policy of migrants on the idea of not accepting any new asylum applications. It is in favor of improving the conditions in Syria and sending Syrian asylum seekers back (GP, 2018, p. 48).

While the GP used the term Syrians in its election manifesto, the NMP did not use the term Syrian while talking about asylum seekers in its election manifesto. The reason for this can be explained as follows: Saying Syrian differentiates those people based on different nationalities. Since the MHP belongs to a nationalist base, it may be that they do not want to use a language that will externalize them and highlight their Syrian identity. When he defines them as asylum seekers, he uses a more accepting language. Thus, due to the alliance, it does not actually securitize them as much as a nationalist party would.

In their analysis of political parties' 2018 election manifestos based on their discourses, Çiçek, Arslan and Baykal pointed out to how the problem of Syrian asylum seekers is handled in the manifesto and its solutions rather than specifically focusing on security and securitization (2018). This article emphasizes that the JDP

did not develop strict policies on combating immigration. Moreover, it did not develop effective policies to safely return Syrian asylum seekers to their country. On the other hand, the article suggests that the RPP considers the issue of Syrian asylum seekers as an economic burden, while also attaching importance to the humanitarian tragedy. In this regard, these arguments are in parallel with this thesis. Emphasizing that the NMP considers the issue of Syrian asylum seekers as a security problem, Çiçek, Arslan and Baykal do not refer to the softening of the NMP's discourse – which is expected to increase – due to its alliance with the JDP. As for the GP, it is emphasized that the party advocating solving the refugee problem by making arrangements in Turkey's foreign policy and creating a safe zone in Syria to send them back. However, it is not explored how the GP treats this topic as a security issue. This thesis takes a step forward and analyzes its manifesto within the framework of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory. In this way, it clearly demonstrates how the relevant parties identified the issue of asylum seekers as a problem and offered their solution proposals in their election promises. Thus, this study is important in underlining the connection between securitization theories and the use of Syrian asylum seekers in political party discourses. It also sheds light on how these promises were legitimized by the method of securitization.

Çoban's research, on the other hand, used the Securitization Theory framework, yet focused on how Syrian asylum seekers were securitized only during the JDP period (2019). Here, there is only an evaluation of party leaders and institutions established during the JDP period. Nevertheless, Çoban's work contributes to literature by explaining how the immigration problem that emerged during the JDP government was securitized throughout Turkey on the basis of the regulations made after the arrival of Syrian asylum seekers, in addition to new laws

and institutions. However, Çoban's research does not address the specific approaches of political parties. In this respect, this thesis is important in terms of adding to literature how the parties allied with the JDP and the opposition parties securitized the problem of Syrian asylum seekers.



CONCLUSION

International migration can briefly be defined as the movement of people from their homeland to another country by crossing borders. When categorized according to its purpose, this migration movement is referred to as either voluntary or forced migration. Accordingly, the aim of voluntary migration is to move to another country for better living conditions, while the purpose of forced migration is often to flee the conflict in one's own countries. This also includes being forcibly displaced. In this context, international migration and internal displacement movements in Syria after the Arab Spring are evaluated under the category of forced migration. In addition, the purpose of migration determines how migrants are identified in their destination country. Although people forcefully migrating from Syria to Turkey are officially defined by the words refugee or asylum seeker, they are not fully compatible with the criteria of either of these statuses. Yet, this study has accepted the term "asylum seeker" since the status of Syrians in question is closer to the definition of asylum seeking. As a matter of fact, due to the geographical reservation Turkey made in the 1951 Geneva Convention, it is not possible to grant them refugee status (UNHCR, 2011). Turkey provided temporary protection status to Syrian asylum seekers with the TPR/Temporary Protection Regulation entering into force in 2014 (TPR, 2014).

Today, mass irregular migration stemming from the Syrian Crisis continues to spread all over the world. While it might have serious effects on the bordering countries in the region, this immigration movement has concerned mostly European countries and Turkey. In the first phase, Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs) mostly received acceptance from Syria's neighboring countries, Lebanon and Jordan. In the early stages of the migration movement that started in 2011, Turkey also accepted thousands of Syrian asylum seekers into the country following Lebanon and

Jordan (Fargues, 2013, p. 248). Before long, Turkey became the country that accepted the highest number of Syrian asylum seekers in the world (Uzman & Tösten, 2016, pp. 252-253). From this point of view, it is expected that the state that houses the highest number of asylum seekers should have the right to say more about this issue. Based on this idea, Turkish political parties shaped their discourses according to this heavy population of Syrian asylum seekers in the country.

In this line, Turkey had to issue a migration legislation quickly, since Syrian asylum seekers came suddenly and rapidly. The first step in this regard was to issue the LFIP/ Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP, 2013). Afterwards, a series of other laws and regulations were enacted to determine the status of Syrian asylum seekers who could not be granted the refugee status. Some laws are issued to determine their residence and working status, as well. At the same time, multiple institution were established to address the issue of migration and cooperate with many different organizations. In addition to policies to regulate the issue of Syrian asylum seekers in Turkey, authorities also carried out activities to send them back and resettle in Syria. These activities were carried out within the framework of a security-oriented approach, since Syrian asylum seekers were considered to stay in Turkey temporarily and they would pose a threat to the security of the country. Political parties particularly made use of this perception within the scope of their securitization efforts.

In this line, it can be observed that the concept of security has started to be uses a tool and a goal over time allowing the possibility of benefitting from extraordinary measures (Baysal & Lüleci, 2015, p. 91). As explained in the beginning of this study, there is a need for a reference object whose security is allegedly under threat, a threatening factor, a securitizing actor who will realize the securitization, discourses as a means of securitization and a public to be persuaded in order to complete all the

stages of securitization (Balzacq, Leonard & Ruzicka, 2016, p. 495). As the Syrian crisis has deepened rather than resolved, it is now understood that Syrian asylum seekers will not be temporary, but permanent, thus, parties have started to design their migration policies and discourses according to the permanent asylum seekers. The 2018 election statements of political parties in Turkey best reflect these policies and discourses. Indeed, parties made their statements in an emotional language to persuade the public. For instance, the word “guest” that the JDP often uses can be argued to be preferred to establish a humanitarian and cultural bond between Turkish citizens and people immigrating from Syria to Turkey. Another purpose of the use of the word guest is to explain that these people – who are not given the refugee status – can only benefit from the rights provided to guests. This indicates the intention to prevent asylum seekers from demanding more than the services or rights offered to guests.

When the discourses made by parties about Syrian asylum seekers are examined within the framework of the Copenhagen School, it can be seen that no political party chose these discourses by chance, and every word and discourse was constructed in a way that creates a certain perception (Mandacı & Özerim, 2013, p. 110). In other words, since an actor who makes securitization or de-securitization is aware that the public will be seriously affected by these discourses, they try to develop those discourses in a way that allows people to act in the same direction. If the discourses achieve their target, the people who need to be persuaded will develop a judgement as the same as the actor who is delivering the discourses. Yet, the public (the audience) may well reject these discourses, too (Aktaş, 2011, p. 16).

It can be understood, though, that election manifestos are one of the places where the public will best understand the views of the party that they support. The

same applies for understanding political party approaches to the issue of Syrian asylum seekers. As a matter of fact, it has been observed in this study that elections manifestos were used as a tool to ensure perception of a regular issue within the scope of security by means of discourses. This process often takes place as follows: An important actor of the securitization process, the public (the audience) will see such discourses frequently shown in election manifestos and this will increase security concerns. They will ultimately start to say that this issue is a threat. Thus, no matter how an issue is not related to security, the party that aims to securitize it will use the issue in its manifesto very often to make sure it is perceived as a security issue to achieve its party goals.

The focal point of this thesis, the JDP, RPP, NMP and GP made statements about Syrian asylum seekers in their 2018 general election manifestos, covering it in the widest way. Although each party has a certain ideological orientation, the election statements in this study are examined according to whether the related party is pro-government or in the opposition group, instead of their ideologies. As a matter of fact, discourses by political parties constitute critical domestic policies and particularly the opposition parties construct their discourses in a way that criticizes the government policy rather than reflecting their ideology. They make these criticisms by arguing that there is a significant threat element due to Syrian asylum seekers. They assert that there is a need to produce solutions to ensure security in the country. According to the Copenhagen School, if an issue is made a security issue, an extraordinary situation will be created to legitimize all possible activities and measures to eliminate this extraordinary situation (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998, pp. 24-26).

Based on the above assumption, it is clear that the JDP and the NMP will adopt a more neutral and pro-government stance regarding Syrian asylum seekers due

to the People's Alliance they established. The governing party, JDP, has been accepting Syrian asylum seekers since 2011 and more often underlining its discourse that they will take steps to send asylum seekers – who they call guests – back to their country after establishing a safe zone to cease their extended stay (JDP, 2018, p. 135). However, it can be said that the government party JDP made these statements mostly to support its activities at the border and in Syria. In this regard, the JDP's securitization covers the Syrian crisis itself rather than Syrian asylum seekers. The safe zone they intend to build in Syria is considered within the scope of securitization (JDP, 2018, p. 276). Assessing according to the assumptions of the Copenhagen School, the government endeavors to legitimize its steps to resettle Syrian asylum seekers back in Syria through creating a safe zone, indicating the legitimization stage of the securitization method (Türkeş-Kılıç, 2018, p. 10). Due to its ideological attitude, the NMP, on the other hand, is expected to strongly oppose the admission of Syrian asylum seekers to the country at an increasing rate. Although it has made pro-government statements due to its alliance with the JDP before the 2018 general elections, the party is observed to securitize the issue by the effect of increasing crimes and threat in society (NMP, 2018, p. 109). Yet, it can be argued that the NMP criticized the admission of an excessive number of asylum seekers with a relatively softer discourse. If it was a member to the opposition or did not share the same policy as the JDP, it would have assert more ardently that the issue of Syrian asylum seekers is a security issue. As a matter of fact, before 2018, the NMP stated that asylum seekers were a problem that incremented concern and worry in Turkey (Devran & Özcan, 2016, p. 47). Nevertheless, it was observed that the NMP softened its discourse over time by the effect of its alliance with the JDP.

While criticizing the government's hosting of Syrian asylum seekers in the country, the RPP takes the issue away from the human focus and regards it as a security threat. In this line, it can be said that it commodifies the issue, since it is possible to criticize the government by opposing the admission of asylum seekers to the country and advocating for sending them back. The RPP actually claims to be a social democratic party, however, the words it uses are different from what it claims: It has developed discourses that criticize the JDP in a purely positional way. In other words, their discourses in the election manifesto do not reflect the party's ideology but severely criminalize the issue of Syrian asylum seekers. Again according to the Copenhagen School, the claim of a threat to security legitimates all kinds of policies beyond political boundaries (Buzan, 1998, pp. 23-24). From this perspective, it can be stated that the RPP tries to legitimize the return policy it offers as a solution. On the other hand, the GP's aim is to fill the center-right of the political spectrum. Its discourse after the election alliance with the RPP is shaped on the basis of the idea that new Syrians should not be allowed to enter the country. In fact, the GP showed asylum seekers as the reason for the emergence of problems in society by harsh discourses. As a matter of fact, they see the reason for struggle in society is the influx of Syrian asylum seekers. In this way, the party tries to convince the public that it was not possible for Syrian asylum seekers and local people to live together.

In consequence, it can be deduced that the issue of Syrian asylum seekers has been securitized by all the four political parties subject to analysis in this study. The only point where the parties differ is the direction of their securitization, which this study sought an answer as well. On the ideological spectrum, the NMP and the GP are expected to be closer to each other, however, their discourses seem not to be similar since the NMP is in coalition with the government and the GP is on the opposition

side. Moreover, it is observed that the opposition parties use discourses that are against the government's policies on migration rather than basing their arguments on a certain ideology in their election manifestos. Thus, the parties that have been securitizing the issue of asylum seekers to a great extent and proposing extraordinary measures to eliminate this securitized problem are the opposition parties, the RPP and the GP.

In conclusion, this study aimed to serve as a source for future studies to understand how the political parties in Turkey generally treat Syrian asylum seekers. Furthermore, the kind of threats that Syrian asylum seekers are associated with were investigated in-depth. Indeed, this alteration in perception took place with the change of perception: from humanitarian to security-threat focus. This study did not focus on the discourses of political party leaders only, since this would not suffice to fully comprehend the policies of the government and the opposition. This could be the subject of a future study with a focus on the discourses of both parties' leaders via interviews. Yet, it should not be forgotten to determine whether the discourses reflecting the party's ideology match with those of the leaders. Since the issue of asylum seekers has been gaining importance every passing day and it is multidimensional issue, an alternative cross-country study would be useful as it would shed light on election statements in different countries and contribute to the literature of international migration and security.

REFERENCES

- Abdulmecid, M. (2021, January 9). *Suriye: 2020'de yaşananlar ve 2021'den beklentiler*. İRAM. https://iramcenter.org/suriye-2020de-yasananlar-ve-2021den-beklentiler/?send_cookie_permissions=OK
- Akpınar, B. G. (2013). Uluslararası İlişkilerde Kimlik Sorunsalı. In H. Çomak, C. Sancaktar. *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Teorik Tartışmalar* (pp. 455–482). İstanbul: Beta Yayınları
- Aktaş, A. (2011). Güvenikleştirme yaklaşımı ve Türkiye'nin ulusal güvenlik anlayışındaki dönüşüm. *Kırıkkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 1(2), 7–47.
- Alagöz, B., & Demirkıran, Y. (2020). Düzensiz göç, güvenlik ve politika: İran ve Türkiye örnekleri. *Ortadoğu Etütleri*, 12(1), 206–237.
- Alonso, S., & Fonseca, S. C. da. (2012). Immigration, left and right. *Party Politics*, 18(6), 865–884. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068810393265>
- Altındağ, O., & Kaushal, N. (2021). Do refugees impact voting behavior in the host country? Evidence from Syrian refugee inflows to Turkey. *Public Choice* 186, 149–178. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00768-3>
- Anadolu Agency (AA), Anadolu Ajansı, (2012, March 14). *Halk ayaklanması “bir” sloganla başladı*. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/halk-ayaklanmasi-bir-sloganla-basladi/377401#>
- Anghie, A. (2010). Basic principles of international law: A historical perspective. In B. Çalı, *International law for international relations* (pp. 46-70). New York: Oxford University Press.

Apaydın, S., & Müftüler-Bac, M. (2020). Turkish Perceptions of the EU Migration Deal Based on Turkish Parliamentary Debates. Working Paper, MAGYC project.

Arends, J. (2009). Homeros'dan Hobbes ve Ötesine: "Güvenlik" Kavramının Avrupa Geleneğindeki Boyutları. Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations, 6(22), 3–33

Arı, T. (2011). Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri: Çatışma, Hegemoya, İşbirliği, Bursa: MKM Yayınları.

Arıboğan, D. Ü. (2007). Uluslararası İlişkiler Düşüncesi: Tarihsel Gelişim. İstanbul: Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Arık, D. (2020). Türkiye'de Göç Yönetişimi ve Suriyeli Sığınmacıların Türkiye'ye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etkileri. Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 7(1), 58–74.

Aydoğan-Ünal, B. (2019). Türkiye'nin Yeni Sisteminde Seçim Öncesi İttifaklar. Gümüşhane Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Elektronik Dergisi, 10(2), 321–328.

Bakan, S., Şahin, S. (2018). Uluslararası Güvenlik Yaklaşımlarının Tarihsel Dönüşümü ve Yeni Tehditler. The Journal of International Lingual Social and Educational Sciences, 4(2), 135–152.

Balcı, M. ve C. E. Göcen, (2018). Legal and Political Situation of Syrian Immigrants in Turkey. Uluslararası Afro-Avrasya Araştırmaları Dergisi, 3(5), 1–21.

Baldwin, D. (1997). The Concept of Security. Review of International Studies, 23(1), 5–26.

- Balzacq, T., Leonard, S., & Ruzicka, J. (2016). 'Securitization' revisited: Theory and cases. *International Relations*, 30(4), 494–531.
- Baran, T., & Macar, E. (2017). Değişen Güvenlik Yaklaşımları Örneğinde Kopenhag Okulu'nun Toplumsal Güvenlik Yaklaşımı. *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 10(54), 251–259.
- Bayındır-Goularas, G., & Sunata, U. (2015). Türk Dış Politikasında Göç ve Mülteci Rejimi. *Moment Dergi*, 2(1), 12–40.
- Baylis, J. (2008). Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güvenlik Kavramı. *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations*, 5(18), 69–85.
- Baylis, J. & Smith, S. (2005). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Studies*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bayraktar, H. (2007). Kırım ve Kafkasya'dan Adana Vilayeti'ne Yapılan Göç ve İskânlar (1869-1907). *Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, (22), 405–434.
- Baysal, B., & Lülecî, Ç. (2015). Kopenhag Okulu ve güvenlikleştirme teorisi. *Güvenlik Stratejileri*, 11(22), 61–96.
- Bilgin, P. (2006). What future for Middle Eastern studies?, *Futures*, 38(5), 575–585.
- Bilgin, P. (2010). Güvenlik Çalışmalarında Yeni Açılımlar: Yeni Güvenlik Çalışmaları. *Stratejik Araştırmalar*, 8(14), 30–53.
- Bloch, A., & Chimienti, M. (2011). Irregular migration in a globalizing world. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34(8), 1271–1285.
- Booth, K. (2012). *Dünya Güvenliği Kuramı*. (Z. Arkan, Trans.) İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.

- Brauch, H. G. (2008). Güvenliğin Yeniden Kavramsallaştırılması: Barış, Güvenlik, Kalkınma ve Çevre Kavramsal Dörtlüsü. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, 5(18), 1–47.
- Bull, H. (1966). International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach. *World Politics*, 18(3), 361–377.
- Buzan, B. (1983). *People, States and Fear the National Security Problem in International Relations*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books LTD.
- Buzan, B. (1991). *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Buzan, B. (1991b) New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century, *International Affairs*, 67(3), 431–451.
- Buzan, B. (1998). Security, the State, the "New World Order," and Beyond. In R. D. Lipschutz, *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Buzan, B. (2008). Askeri Güvenliğin Değişen Gündemi. *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 5(18), 107–123.
- Buzan, B. & Wæver, O., & Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers
- Buzan, B., & Hansen, L. (2009). *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge University Press.
- Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (1997). Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies. *Review of International Studies*, 23(2), 241–250.

- Buzan, B. (2007). *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. ECPR Classics. (2nd). Colchester: ECPR Press,
- Canpolat, H. & Arıner, H. O. (2012). *Küresel Göç ve Avrupa Birliği ile Türkiye'nin Göç Politikalarının Gelişimi*, Ankara: ORSAM.
https://www.orsam.org.tr/d_hbanaliz/Analiz_123_tr.pdf
- Canyurt, D. (2015). Suriye Gelişmeleri Sonrası Suriyeli Mülteciler: Türkiye'de Riskler. *Akademik Bakış Dergisi Uluslararası Hakemli Sosyal Bilimler E-Dergisi*, (48), 127–146.
- Carvalho, J. (2020). The positions mainstream left parties adopt on immigration, *Party Politics*, 26(4), 379–389.
- Celep, Ö. (2018). How can Akşener's İyi Parti contribute to Turkey's Democracy?. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 16(4), 109–118.
- Culler, J. (1982). *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Cumhuriyet, (2012). Davutoğlu, Esad'a Ömür Biçti.
<https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/davutoglu-esada-omur-bicti-366362>
 Retrieved March 17, 2021.
- Cumhuriyet, (2018). “Millet İttifakı” Resmen Kuruldu: Protokolün Detayları Ortaya Çıktı. <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/millet-ittifaki-resmen-kuruldu-protokolun-detaylari-ortaya-cikti-969564> Retrieved May 18, 2021

- Çakı, A. (2018). *Geçmişten Bugüne Türkiye'nin Göç Politikası ve Suriyeli Göçmenler Bağlamında Göç Yönetişimi*. Master Thesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Karaman.
- Çetiner, Ö. (2018). *Göçün Güvenlikleştirilmesi: Suriye Krizi ve Avrupa Birliği*. Master Thesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Adana.
- Çetinkaya, Ş. (2012). Güvenlik Algılaması ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorilerinin Güvenliğe Bakış Açıları. 21. Yüzyılda Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, (2), 24–260.
- Çiçek, A., Arslan, E., & Baykal, Ö. N. (2018). 2018 Seçim Beyannamelerinde Suriyeli Göçmenler Sorununun Ele Alınışı ve Çözüm Önerileri. In H. Yaylı, Türkiye'de Toplum, Yerleşim ve Yönetim Tartışmaları. 12. Uluslararası Kamu Yönetimi Sempozyumu, Kırıkkale, Turkey, 146–156.
- Çoban, A. (2019). Güvenlikleştirme Yaklaşımı: Türkiye’de Suriyeli Göçmenler ve Göçün Güvenlikleştirilmesi. TUIC Akademi.
https://www.tuicakademi.org/guvenliklestirme-yaklasimi-turkiyede-suriyeli-gocmenler-ve-gocun-guvenliklestirilmesi/#_ftn1
- Çolak, Ç. (2020). Seçim İttifakı Sisteminin 2018 Milletvekili Genel Seçimine Etkileri. Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, 15(2), 719–742.
- Çolak, F. S., (2017). *Kopenhag Okulu Bağlamında Suriyelilerin Türkiye'ye Etkileri*. Master Thesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Bursa.
- Çoştan, U. & Yaylı, H. (2020). Suriyeli Mülteciler Özelinde Türkiye'nin Güvenlik Politikaları. *International Social Mentality and Researcher Thinkers Journal*, 6(37): 2081–2096.

- Davutoğlu, A. (2013). Zero Problems in a New Era. *Foreign Policy*,
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/21/zero-problems-in-a-new-era/>
- Dede, A. Y. (2011). The Arab Uprisings: Debating the “Turkish Model”, *Insight Turkey*, 13(2), 23–32.
- Dedeoğlu, B. (2008). *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Strateji*, İstanbul: YeniYüzyıl Yayınları
- Dedeoğlu, B. (2016). *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Strateji*, İstanbul: YeniYüzyıl Yayınları.
- Demirhan, Y., & Aslan, S. (2015). Türkiye’nin Sınır Ötesi Göç Politikaları ve Yönetimi. *Birey ve Toplum Dergisi*, 5(9).
- Demirkıran, Y. (2019). *İran ve Türkiye’de göç ve güvenlik politikalarının karşılaştırmalı analizi*. Master Thesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul.
- Demirtaş, B. (2019). Mülteciler ve Güvenlikleştirme. *Güvenlik Yazıları Serisi*, (8)
- Deniz, A. Ç., Ekinci, Y. & Hülür, B. (2016). Suriyeli Sığınmacıların Karşılaştığı Sosyal Dışlanma Mekanizmaları. *SBARD*, 14(27), 17–40.
- Devran, Y., & Özcan, Ö. (2016). Söylemlerin Dilinden Suriye Sorunu. *Marmara İletişim Dergisi*, (25), 35–52.
- DGMM, (2015). *Türkiye Düzensiz Göç Strateji Belgesi ve Ulusal Eylem Planı*. Ankara: GİGM Yayınları.
- DGMM, (2017). *Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, Türkiye Göç Raporu 2016*. Ankara: T.C İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları, (No: 40).

https://www.goc.gov.tr/kurumlar/goc.gov.tr/YillikGocRaporlari/2016_yiik_goc_raporu_haziran.pdf

DGMM, (2019). Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü 2018 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu.

<https://www.goc.gov.tr/kurumlar/goc.gov.tr/evraklar/Stratejik-Yonetim/Faaliyet-Raporlari/2018-Yili-Faaliyet-Raporu.pdf>

DGMM, (2019b), Geçici Koruma: Yıllara Göre Geçici Koruma Kapsamındaki

Suriyeliler. <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>

DGMM, (2021a). Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, Düzensiz Göç Hakkında.

Retrieved February 15, 2021 from <https://www.goc.gov.tr/duzensiz-goc-hakkinda>

DGMM, (2021b), Türkiye’de Geçici Koruma. <https://www.goc.gov.tr/turkiye-de-gecici-koruma>

<https://www.goc.gov.tr/turkiye-de-gecici-koruma>

DGMM, (2021c). Geçici Korumamız Altındaki Suriyeliler,

<https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-korumamiz-altindaki-suriyeliler> Retrieved March 12, 2021.

Dikmen-Alsancak, N. (2019). Üçüncü Dünya Güvenlik ve Postkolonyal Güvenlik

Yaklaşımları Arasındaki Farklılıklar: Devlet, Kültür ve Modernite.

Uluslararası İlişkiler, 16(63), 13–31.

Djalili, M. R., & Kellner, T. (2013). “Arap Baharı” Karşısında İran ve Türkiye:

Ortadoğu’da Yeni Bir Stratejik Rekabete Doğru Gidiş mi?. İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat.

Doğanay, Ü. (2007). AKP'nin demokrasi söylemi ve muhafazakarlık: muhafazakar demokrasi ve eleştirel bir bakış. *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 62(01), 65–88.

Doran, M. S. & Shaikh, S. (2011). Syria The Ghosts of Hama. In K. M. Pollack, et al. *The Arab Awakening America and the Transformation of the Middle East*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press.

Dost, S. (2014). Ulusal ve Uluslararası Mevzuat Çerçevesinde Ülkemizdeki Suriye’li Sığınmacıların Hukuki Durumu. *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, 4(1), 27–69

Dönmez-Kara, C. Ö. (2015). Göç Bağlamında Uluslararası İşbirliği ve Türkiye’nin Politikaları, Doctoral dissertation, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Çanakkale.

Duman Ç. (2020). Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kuramlar.

Duman, M. & Esen, A. (2016). Türkiye’de Geçici Koruma Altındaki Suriyeliler: Tespitler ve Öneriler. İstanbul: WALD Dünya Yerel Yönetim ve Demokrasi Akademisi Vakfı.

Dunne, T. (1998). *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School*, Houndmills: Macmillan.

Dunne, T. (2008). Liberalism. In J. Baylis, S. Smith, & P. Owens, *The Globalization of World politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Dustmann, C., & Frattini, T. (2011). Immigration: The European experience. *Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano Development Studies Working Paper*, (326).

- Düvell, F. (2017). 'Voice' or 'exit'? From the streets of Syria to the borders of the EU. *Geografie*, 122(4), 429–448.
- Edkins, J. (2007). Poststructuralism. In M. Griffiths, *International Relations Theory for the Twenty- First Century* (pp. 88- 97). New York: Routledge.
- Elhadj, E. (2011). Why Syria's regime is likely to survive. *MERIA Journal*, 15(1), 77–82.
- Elmas, M. S. (2013). *Modern Toplumun Güvenlik Çıkmazı: Tehdit, Risk ve Risk Toplumu Perspektifinden Güvenlik*, Ankara: USAK Yayınları.
- El Sarraj, A. & Taşgın, C. (2015). *Arap Baharı ve Suriye İç Çatışması*. İstanbul Fikir Enstitüsü Yayınları.
- Enloe, C. (1989). *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense Of International Politics*. Berkeley CA: University of California Press; London: Pandora Books.
- Erdem, E. (2016). İnsani Güvenlik Kavramı Bağlamında Çevre Güvenliği. *Gazi Akademik Bakış*, 10(19), 255–281
- Erdoğan, M. (2014), *Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler: Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum*. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Erdoğan, M. (2017). *Suriyeliler Barometresi*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Erdoğan, M. (2018). Syrians in Turkey: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey. *Anatoli*, (9), 13–30.

- Erdoğan, M. (2018b). Türkiye’deki Suriyeliler: Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Erdoğan, M. (2020). Suriyeliler Barometresi 2019 Suriyelilerle Uyum İçinde Yaşamın Çerçevesi. Ankara: Orion Kitabevi
- Erdoğan, M. & Kaya, A. (2015). Türkiye’nin Göç Tarihi: 14. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye’ye Göçler. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Ergüven, N. S. (2016). Uluslararası Hukuk Açısından Güvenlik Kavramının Teorik Temelleri. Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 65(3), 771–835.
- Euronews, (2019). Bakan Soylu: Çocuklar dâhil 92 bin Suriyeliye vatandaşlık verildi. <https://tr.euronews.com/2019/08/02/bakan-soylu-92-bin-suriyeliye-vatandaslik-verildi-suleyman-soylu> Retrieved April 13, 2021.
- Fanon, F. (1968). The wretched of the earth. New York: Grove Press,
- Fargues, P. (2013). EU Neighbourhood Migration Report 2013, Migration Policy Centre. Retrieved from Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository, <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/27394>
- Fisunoğlu, A., & Sert, Ş. D. (2018). Refugees and Elections: The Effects of Syrians on Voting Behavior in Turkey. International Migration.
- Gök, N. (2019). Suriye Krizi’nin Türkiye’ye Yansımaları (2011-2017). Üsküdar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, (8), 77–114.
- Good Party Programme, İYİ Parti Programı. <https://iyiparti.org.tr/storage/img/doc/iyi-parti-guncel-parti-program.pdf> Retrieved April 26, 2021.

Gökalp-Aras, N. E. ve Z. Şahin-Mencütek (2015). The International Migration and Foreign Policy Nexus: The Case of Syrian Refugees Crisis and Turkey. *Migration Letters*, 12 (3), 193-208.

Gözen, R. (2015). İdealizm, Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

GP, (2018). Milletimizle Sözleşme.

https://im.haberturk.com/images/others/2018/05/30/YParti_SeimBeyanname_si.pdf

Grovogui, S. N. (2013). Feminism. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki, & S. Smith, *International Relations Theories Discipline and Diversity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gurcan, M. (2012). Savaşın Evrimi ve Teorik Yaklaşımlar. In A. Sandıklı, *Teoriler Işığında Savaş, Barış ve Çatışma Çözümleri* (pp. 71–132). İstanbul: BİLGESAM Yayınları.

Gülbak, O. (2018). Understanding Turkey's Syria Policy During the Ak Party Era: From Desecuritization to Securitization. *Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü*, İstanbul

Gülyazar, M. (2017). Suriyeliler ve Vatandaşlık: Yerel Halk ve Suriyeli Sığınmacılar Çerçevesinde Bir Değerlendirme. *OPUS – Uluslararası Toplum Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 7(13), 678–705.

Güner, C. (2007). İltica Konusunda Türkiye'nin Yol Haritası: Ulusal Eylem Planı. *Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, 56(4), 81–109.

Gürel, S. (2001). Türkiye' de Göç ve Bütünleşme Sorunsalı In F. Gümüsoğlu, *21. Yüzyıl Karşısında Kent ve İnsan*. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık.

Haberler.com, (2012). AK Parti Kocaeli 4. Olağan İl Kongresi.

<https://www.haberler.com/ak-parti-kocaeli-4-olagan-il-kongresi-3784681->

[haberi/](#) Retrieved March 15, 2021

Habertürk, (2011). Türkiye Tarihinin En Büyük Kurtarma Operasyonu.

<https://www.haberturk.com/dunya/haber/604016-turkiye-tarihinin-en-buyuk->

[kurtarma-operasyonu](#) Retrieved March 31, 2021.

Hansen, L., & Buzan, B. (Eds.) (2007). International Security: Vol 3. Widening security. SAGE Publications. SAGE library of international relations

Harding, S. (1986). The Science Question in Feminism Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Haser, D. (2018). *Uluslararası ilişkilerde güvenlik kavramı: Soğuk savaş sonrası dönem güvenlik*. Master Thesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul

Hisarlıoğlu, F. (2019). Güvenlikleştirme, Güvenlik Yazıları Serisi, 24.

<https://trguvenlikportali.com/wp->

[content/uploads/2019/11/Guvenliklestirme_FulyaHisarlioglu_v.1.pdf](#)

Retrieved January 31, 2021.

Holmes, S., & Castaneda, H. (2016). Representing the “European refugee crisis” in Germany and beyond: Deservingness and difference, life and death.

American Ethnologist, 43(1), 12–24.

Hürriyetcom.tr, (2016). Başbakan Binali Yıldırım: Dostlarını Artıran Düşmanlarını Azaltan Bir Dış Politika Anlayışını Güçlendireceğiz.

<https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/basbakan-binali-yildirim-dostlarini->

[artiran-dusmanlarini-azaltan-bir-dis-politika-anlayisini-guclendirecegiz-40118547](#) Retrieved March 15, 2021.

Hürriyetcom.tr, (2017). Suriyeliler için Açılan Sivil Eğitim Merkezlerine Kapatma Kararı. <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/suriyeliler-icin-acilan-sivil-egitim-merkezleri-40409288> Retrieved March 18, 2021.

International Crisis Group (ICG), (2011). Uncharted Waters: Thinking Through Syria's Dynamics, Middle East Briefing N°31, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ece4b4d2.html>

International Organization for Migration (IOM), (2019). Glossary On Migration: International Migration Law N° 34, Geneva: International Organization for Migration. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf

IOM, (2013). Göç Terimleri Sözlüğü N°. 31. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml31_turkish_2ndedition.pdf

İçduygu, A. & Sirkeci, İ. (1999), Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye’inde Göç Hareketleri. In O. Baydar, 75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı.

İçduygu, A. (2004). Demographic Mobility and Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government Responses, Mediterranean Quarterly, 15(4), 88–99.

İçduygu, A. (2014). Global Turkey in Europe II: Energy, Migration, Civil Society and Citizenship Issues in Turkey-EU Relations (pp. 81–106, Rep.) (Aydın-Düzgıt S., Huber D., Müftüler-Baç M., Keyman E., Tasci J., & Tocci N., Eds.). Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Retrieved February 21, 2021.

İçduygu, A., Erder, S., & Gençkaya, Ö. F. (2014). *Türkiye'nin uluslararası göç politikaları, 1923-2023: Ulus devlet oluşumundan ulus ötesi dönüşümlere*. İstanbul: MireKoç.

Jastram, K., Achiron, M., United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, & Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). (2001). *Refugee Protection: A Guide to International Refugee Law*. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union.

JDP, (2015). 2015 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi.

<https://www.akparti.org.tr/media/318795/7-haziran-2015-edited.pdf>

JDP, (2018). Güçlü Meclis Güçlü Hükümet Güçlü Türkiye.

<https://www.akparti.org.tr/media/318779/24-haziran-2018-cumhurbaskanligi-secimleri-ve-genel-secimler-secim-beyannamesi-sayfalar.pdf>

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. *World Politics*, 30(2), 167–214.

Kant, I. (1960). *Ebedi Barış Üzerine Felsefi Deneme*. (Y. Abadan, & S. L. Meray, Trans.) Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları.

Kapani, M. (2007) *Politika Bilimine Giriş*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.

Karabulut, B. (2011). *Küreselleşme Sürecinde Güvenliği Yeniden Düşünmek*, Ankara: Barış Kitabevi.

Karacasulu, N. (2007). Avrupa Entegrasyon Kuramları ve Sosyal İnşacı Yaklaşım. *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, 3(9), 82–100.

- Karacasulu, N. (2014). Uluslararası İlişkilerde İnşaatçılık Yaklaşımları. In T. Arı, Postmodern Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri - 2: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Eleştirel Yaklaşımlar. (pp. 105–125). Bursa: Dora Yayıncılık.
- Karasu, M. A. (2018). Türkiye’deki Suriyeli Sığınmacıların Kentlerde Neden Oldukları Güvenlik Riskleri. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 36(2), 51–74.
- Kardaş, T. (2007). Güvenlik: Kimin Güvenliği ve Nasıl? In Z. Dağı, Uluslararası Politikayı Anlamak, Ulus Devlet'ten Küreselleşmeye (pp. 125–152). İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları.
- Kaya, A. (2014). Türkiye’de Göç ve Uyum Tartışmaları: Geçmişe Dönük Bir Bakış. In Mustafa Altunoğlu, et al. İdeal Kent Göç I (pp. 11–28). Kent Araştırmaları Dergisi, (4).
- Kaya, A. (2021). Europeanization and De-Europeanization of Turkish Asylum and Migration Policies. In Reiners, W., & Turhan, E. (eds) EU-Turkey Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70890-0_14
- Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2012). Power and Interdependence. Boston: Longman.
- Kilo, M. (2011). Syria ... the road to where?, Contemporary Arab Affairs, 4(4), 431–444.
- Kirişçi, K. (2014). Syrian Refugees and Turkey’s Challenges: Going Beyond Hospitality. Washington D.C.: Brookings), <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Syrian-Refugees-and-Turkeys-Challenges-May-14-2014.pdf>

- Kirişçi, K., & Karaca, S. (2015). Hoşgörü ve Çelişkiler: 1989, 1991 ve 2011’de Türkiye’ye Yönelen Kitleli Mülteci Akınları. In M. Erdoğan, A. Kaya, Türkiye’nin Göç Tarihi. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Knutsen, T, L, (1992). A History of International Relations Theory: An Introduction. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Koldaş, U. & Köprülü, N. (2011). Arap İntifadası mı?: Arap Dünyasındaki Toplumsal Hareketlerin İçsel, Bölgesel ve Uluslararası Dinamikleri, Akademik Orta Doğu, 6(1), 23–61.
- Korkmaz, A. (2016). Suriyeli Sığınmacılardan Kaynaklanan Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri. Akademik Hassasiyetler, 3(6), 83–116.
- Koser, K. (2005). Irregular migration, state security and human security. Geneva: GCIM.
- Krahmann E. (2005) From State to Non-State Actors: The Emergence of Security Governance. In: Krahmann E. (eds) New Threats and New Actors in International Security. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Krishna, S. (1999). Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka and the Question of the Nationhood, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Krotký, Jan. (2019). When Migration Unites Political Parties: The Securitisation of Migration in Czech Party Manifestos. Politologický časopis - Czech Journal of Political Science. (26),181–199.
- Kurban, V., & Cabbarlı, H. (2019). Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri ve Uçak Krizinin Rus-Türk Kamuoyundaki Yansısı. Ege Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi, 10(2), 105–118.

Kurt, H. (2006). Göç Eğilimleri ve Olası Etkileri. *Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi*, 4(1), 148–178.

Küçük, M. (2009). Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramında Konstrüktivist Dönüşü Anlamak. *Ege Akademik Bakış*, 9(2), 771–795

LFIP, (2013, April 11). Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, (No: 28615).

<https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/04/20130411-2.htm>

Linklater, A. (2005). The English School. In S. Burchill, A. Linklater, et al. *Theories of International Relations* London: Macmillan, 93–118.

Löwenthal, L., & Guterman, N. (1949). *Prophets of Deceit: A Study of Techniques of the American Agitator*. New York: Harper Brothers.

Mallavarapu, S. (2008). *International Relations Theory and Non-Traditional Approaches to Security*. New Delhi: WISCOMP.

Mandacı, N., & Özerim, G. (2013). Uluslararası Göçlerin Bir Güvenlik Konusuna Dönüşümü: Avrupa’da Radikal Sağ Partiler ve Göçün Güvenlikleştirilmesi, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 10(39), 105–130.

McSweeney, B. (1996). Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School, *Review of International Studies*, (22), 81–93.

Mcsweeney, B. (1999). *Security, Identity and Interest: A Sociology of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Mearsheimer, J. J. (1995). A Realist Reply. *International Security*, 20(1), 82–93.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (1995b). The False Promise of International Institutions, *International Security*, 19(3), 5–49.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The Trragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Memişoğlu, F. & Ç. Başol (2019). Turkish Media's Response to the 2015 'Refugee Crisis', *Alternatif Politika*, 11(1), 192–233.

Memişoğlu, F. & Ilgıt, A. (2016). Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Multifaceted Challenges, Diverse Players and Ambiguous Policies. *Mediterranean Politics*, 22(3), 1–22.

MFA, (2013). Türkiye-AB Vize Muafiyeti Süreci ve Geri Kabul Anlaşması Hakkında Temel Sorular ve Yanıtları.

https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/pub/vize_gka_kitap_15_12_2013.pdf

MFA, (2021). Suriye'nin Siyasi Görünümü. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/suriye-siyasi-gorunumu.tr.mfa> Retrieved March 4, 2021.

Miller, Benjamin. (2001). The Concept of Security: Should it be Redefined?. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 24(2), 13–42

Milliyet, (2018). 'Cumhur İttifakı' Protokolü'nün tam metni.

<https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/cumhur-ittifaki-protokolu-nun-tam-metni-2662293> Retrieved April 6, 2021.

Ministry of Health, (2015). Geçici Koruma Altına Alınanlara Verilecek Sağlık Hizmetlerine Dair Esaslar Hakkında Yönerge

<https://khgmstokyonetimdb.saglik.gov.tr/Eklenti/19213/0/gecici-koruma-altina-alinanlara-verilecek-saglik-hizmetlerine-dair-esaslar-hakkinda-yonerge-27032015pdf.pdf>

Miş, N. (2012). Güvenlikleştirme Teorisi ve Türkiye’de Güvenlikleştirme Siyaseti 1923-2003. Doctoral dissertation, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Sakarya.

Morgenthau, H. (1948). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: A. A. Knopf.

Morgenthau, H. (2005). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: McGraw Hill.

National Action Plan, (2005).

<https://www.goc.gov.tr/kurumlar/goc.gov.tr/yonetmelikler/Temel-Belgeler/Iltica-Ve-Goc-Ulusal-Eylem-Plani.pdf>

Ninth Development Plan, Dokuzuncu Kalkınma Planı 2007-2013, (2006, July 1).

Official Gazette, (No: 26215),

<https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/07/20060701M1-2.pdf>

NMP, (2009). Parti Programı "Geleceğe Doğru.

https://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/_mhp2007/kitaplar/mhp_parti_programi_2009_opt.pdf

NMP, (2018). Milli Diriliş Kutlu Yükseliş.

https://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/_mhp2007/kitaplar/24haziran2018_secim_beyannamesi_tam_web.pdf

NSC, (2015). 18 Aralık 2015 Tarihli Toplantı.

<https://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/18-aralik-2015-tarihli-toplanti>

NSC, (2016). 26 Mayıs 2016 Tarihli Toplantı.

<https://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/26-mayis-2016-tarihli-toplanti>

NSC, (2019). 26 Kasım 2019 Tarihli Toplantı.

<https://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/26-kasim-2019-tarihli-toplanti>

OAU, Organization of African Unity, (1969). Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. 6(10),

https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36400-treaty-0005_-

[_oau_convention_governing_the_specific_aspects_of_refugee_problems_in_africa_e.pdf](#) Retrieved February 14, 2021.

Official Gazette, (1994, November 30). (No:22127)

<https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/22127.pdf>

Official Gazette, (2017, February 11). (No: 29976).

<https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2017/02/20170211-1.htm>

Official Gazette, (2018, March 16). (No: 30362).

<https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/03/20180316-28.htm>

Official Journal of the European Union, (2014). AGREEMENT between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation. [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22014A0507\(01\)&from=EN](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22014A0507(01)&from=EN)

Oğuzlu, T, (2007). Dünya Düzenleri ve Güvenlik: Ulus-Devlet Güvenlik Anlayışı Açılıyor mu?" *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*, (6), 13–14.

Onuf, N. (1989). *Worlds of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. University of South Carolina Press, Columbia.

Oytun, O. (2014). Suriye'ye Komşu Ülkelerde Suriyeli Mültecilerin Durumu:

Bulgular, Sonuçlar ve Öneriler.

https://www.orsam.org.tr/d_hbanaliz/201452_189tur.pdf Ankara: ORSAM.

Ozan, E. (2017). Suriye İç Savaşı ve Türkiye'nin Değişen Güvenlik Gündemi.

ANKASAM.

Özdemir, E. (2017). Suriyeli Mülteciler Krizinin Türkiye'ye Etkileri. 1(3), 114–140.

Özer, İ. (2004). Kentleşme, Kentlileşme ve Kentsel Değişme. Bursa: Ekim Kitabevi.

Paspalanova, M. (2008). Undocumented vs. Illegal Migrant: Towards

Terminological Coherence. Migraciones Internacionales, 4(3), 79–90.

Però, D. (2005). Left-wing politics, civil society and immigration in Italy: The case

of Bologna, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(5), 832–858.

Roskin, M. G., Cord, R. L., Medeiros, J. A., & Jones, W. S. (2013). Siyaset Bilimi.

Ankara: Adres Yayınları.

RPP, (2018). Millet İçin Geliyoruz. <http://secim2018.chp.org.tr/files/CHP->

[SecimBildirgesi-2018-icerik.pdf](http://secim2018.chp.org.tr/files/CHP-SecimBildirgesi-2018-icerik.pdf)

RPPb, Çağdaş Türkiye İçin Değişim, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı.

<https://chp.azureedge.net/1d48b01630ef43d9b2edf45d55842cae.pdf>

Russett, B. (2013). Liberalism. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki, & S. Smith, International

Relations Theories Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

- Rydgren, J. (2005). Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44(3), 413–437.
- Sandıklı, A. & Emeklier, B. (2011). 21. Yüzyılda Yeni Güvenlik Anlayışları ve Yaklaşımları. In H. Çomak & C. Sancaktar, *Uluslararası Balkan Kongresi (International Balkan Congress) 21'inci Yüzyılda Uluslararası Örgütlerin Güvenlik Yaklaşımları ve Balkanlar'ın Güvenliği*. Kocaeli: Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Sandıklı, A. ve Emeklier, B. (2012). Güvenlik Yaklaşımlarında Değişim ve Dönüşüm. In A. Sandıklı *Teoriler Işığında Güvenlik, Savaş, Barış ve Çatışma Çözümleri* (pp. 3–70). İstanbul: BİLGESAM Yayınları.
- Sezik, M., & Ağır, O. (2016). Suriye'den Türkiye'ye yaşanan göç dalgasından kaynaklanan güvenlik sorunları. *Birey ve Toplum Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 5(1), 95–124.
- Sheehan, M. (2005). *International Security: An Analytical Survey*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Snyder, G. (1984). The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. *World Politics*, 36(4), 461–495.
- Spencer, S., & Triandafyllidou, A. (First Online: 21 May 2020). *Migrants with Irregular Status in Europe*. IMISCOE Research Series. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34324-8_4 Retrieved March 27, 2021.
- Steans, J., Pettiford, L., & Diez, T. (2005). *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*. Harlow: Pearson Education.

- Süer, B. (2012). Suriye’de Değişim Çabaları: Bir Bağlam ve Süreç Analizi. *Akademik Ortadoğu*, 6(2).
- Şemşit, S. (2010). Avrupa Birliği Göç Politikasının Güvenlikleştirilmesi ve Dışsallaştırılması: Türkiye'ye Yansımaları, Doctoral dissertation, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İzmir.
- Şen, Y. (2013). Suriye’de Arap Baharı. *Yasama Dergisi*. (23), 54–79.
- Tanrısever, O. F. (2010). Güvenlik. In A. Eralp, Devlet ve Ötesi, Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar (pp. 107–123). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Tekeli, İlhan (1975). Göç Teorileri Ve Politikaları Arasındaki İlişkiler. Odtü Mimarlık Fakültesi Dergisi, 1(1), http://jfa.arch.metu.edu.tr/archive/0258-5316/1975/cilt01/sayi_1/153-176.pdf Retrieved February 07, 2021.
- Tepeciklioğlu, A. O., ve Tepeciklioğlu, E. E. (2015). Teoriden Pratiğe: Suriye Krizi ve Uluslararası Toplum. *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 70(1), 163–193.
- Tertrais, B. (2004). The Changing Nature of Military Alliances, *The Washington Quarter*, 27(2), 135–150.
- Tickner, J. A. (1992). Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security. New York: Colombia University Press.
- Tickner, J. A. (1997). You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists. *International Studies Quarterly*, 41(4), 611–632.
- Tickner, J. A. (2004). Feminist Responses to International Security Studies. *Peace Review*, 16(1), 43–48.

- Tickner, J. A., & Sjoberg, L. (2013). Feminism. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki, & S. Smith, International Relations Theories Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tiritoğlu-Ersoy, H. H. (2019). Türkiye’de Mültecilerin Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Hakları. YBHD, (2019/2), 435–474.
- Toy, M. E. (2019). *Bir Siyasal İletişim Aracı Olarak Sosyal Medya: 31 Mart 2019 Yerel Seçimlerinde Cumhur İttifakı ve Millet İttifakı’nın Twitter Kullanımı*. Master Thesis, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, İstanbul.
- TPR, (2014, October 22). Official Gazette, (No: 29153).
<https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/10/20141022-15.htm>
- Tunca, H., & Karadağ, A. (2018). Suriye’den Türkiye’ye göç: Tehditler ve fırsatlar. *Kara Harp Okulu Bilim Dergisi*, 28(2), 47–68 .
- Tuncel, G., & Ekici, S. (2019). Göçün Siyasal Etkisi: Suriyeli Göçmenlerin Türkiye Siyasetine Etkisi. *Birey ve Toplum*, 9(18), 49–72.
- TÜİK, (2012). Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri 1923-2011. Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu Matbaası.
- Türkeş-Kılıç, S. (2018). Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası’nda Uluslararası Göçün Güvenlikleştirilmesi. *Mukaddime*, 9(3), Özel Sayı, Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası ve Göç Özel Sayısı, 1–20.
- Türkmenoğlu-Köse, D. (2017). Küreselleşme sürecinde Türkiye'deki sağ partiler: Ak Parti ve MHP. *Kırklareli Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 6(4), 25–37.

- Tyyskä, V.; Blower, J.; Deboer, S.; Kawai, S.; Walcott, A. (2017). The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Short Orientation, RCIS Working Paper No: 2017/2, Ryerson University, Toronto.
- Ullman, R. (1983). Redefining Security. *International Security*, 8(1), 129–153.
doi:10.2307/2538489
- UMCD, International Association for Refugee Rights, *Uluslararası Mülteci Hakları Derneği*, Hangi Ülkede Ne Kadar Mülteci Var? Retrieved February 23, 2021 from <https://umhd.org.tr//page/hangi-ulkede-ne-kadar-multeci-var-/341>
- UNHCR, (1984). *Cartagena declaration on refugees*. <https://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc19084/cartagena-declaration-refugees-adopted-colloquium-international-protection.html>
- UNHCR, (2011). The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol. Geneva: UNHCR.
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ec4a7f02.html>
- UNHCR, (2021). Total Persons of Concern by Country of Asylum.
<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria> Retrieved March 12, 2021.
- Uzman, N., & Tösten, R. (2016). Suriyeli Akademisyenlerin Bakış Açısından Türkiye Suriye İlişkileri ve Sığınmacıların Meselesi. *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmalar Dergisi*, (24), 251–272.
- Ünal, S. (2014). Türkiye’nin Beklenmedik Konukları: “Öteki” Bağlamında Yabancı Göçmen ve Mülteci Deneyimi. *Zeitschrift Für Die Welt der Türken Dergisi*, 6(3), 65–89.

- Valenti, S. (2009). Protecting the human rights of irregular migrants: the role of national human rights structures. Padova: University of Padua - Interdepartmental Centre on Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples.
- Vatandaş, S. (2016). Avrupa'ya Göçmen Akışı ve Türkiye'de Göç Politikaları. *İlke İlim Kültür Eğitim Derneği*, (3), 1–19.
- Wæver, O. (1995.) Securitization and Desecuritization, In R. D. Lipschutz, On Security, (pp. 46–86), New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wæver, O. (2003). Securitization: Taking Stock of a Research Programme in Security Studies. Unpublished manuscript.
- Wæver, O. (2008). Toplumsal Güvenliğin Değişen Gündemi. *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations*, 5(18), 151–178.
- Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
- Waltz, K. (1986) *Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power*, In R. Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Waltz, K. (2001). *Man, The State and War a Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing international politics. *International security*, 20(1), 71–81.
- Werrell, C., Femia, C., & Sternberg, T. (2015). Did We See it Coming? State Fragility, Climate Vulnerability and the Uprising in Syria and Egypt? *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 35(1), 29–46.

Whitlock, G. L. & Carter, D. J. & TV Open Learning. (1992). Images of Australia: An Introductory Reader in Australian Studies. St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press.

Wightand, G., & Porter, B. (1991). International theory: the three traditions: Martin Wight. London: Leicester University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Williams, P. (2013). Security studies: An introduction. London: Routledge.

Yılmaz, S. (2007). 21. Yüzyılda Güvenlik ve İstihbarat. İstanbul: Milenyum Yayınları.

Yılmaz, A. (2014). *Uluslararası Göç: Çeşitleri, Nedenleri ve Etkileri*. Journal of Turkish Studies.

Yılmaz-Elmas, F. (2016). Avrupa Birliği Göç-Dış Politika İlişkisinde Paradigma Değişimi. Doctoral dissertation, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara.

YSK, Supreme Election Board. (2011; 2015a; 2015b).

<https://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/2011MilletvekiliSecimi/turkiye/milletvekilisayisi.pdf>

<https://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/Milletvekili/1Kasim2015/KesinSecimSonuclari/96-E.pdf>

<https://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/Milletvekili/7Haziran2015/KesinSecimSonuclari/ResmiGazete/E.pdf>

<https://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/24Haziran2018/KesinSecimSonuclari/2018MV-96D.pdf>