

BAŞKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN UNION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S DEGREE WITH THESIS

THE ROLE OF LOBBYING ACTIVITIES
DURING THE EU MEMBERSHIP PROCESS OF TURKEY

MASTER'S THESIS

BY

EDA ŞENEL

ANKARA – 2023

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BAŞKENT ÜNİVERSİTESİ
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ÖZET

Demokratik sistemlerde karar alma mekanizması açık bir süreçtir. Alınacak kararlar öncesinde ilgili tarafların konu ile ilgili düşüncelerini öğrenmek, görüşlerini almak ve uzlaşma yolu bulmak kamu otoritelerinin izlediği bir yoldur. Çıkacak kararlardan etkilenecek taraflar da kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda otoriteleri etkilemeye çalışırlar. Lobicilik olarak adlandırılan bu faaliyetler, çağdaş demokratik ülkelerde siyasi kültürün önemli bir parçası haline gelmiştir. Bu faaliyetler karar alma süreçlerinde siyasi mekanizmayı etkilemeyi amaçlarlar. Demokratik sistemlerdeki bu yapısal özellikler Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) yapısına da yansımıştır.

Türkiye (TR), AB'ne en uzun üyelik süreci olan ülkeler arasında eşsiz bir örnektir ve bu süreçte tanıtımı açısından lobiciliğin rolünün değerli bir yeri vardır. Lobicilik AB'de etik ve yasal bir çerçeveye oturtulmuştur, şeffaflık esastır. Türkiye'de ise lobicilik faaliyetleri resmi bir çerçeveye oturtulmamıştır, düzensiz yapılmaktadır ve gayri resmi bir alandır, etik bir çerçevesi çizilmemiştir. Etkileşimler sonucunda tarafların çıkarlarına göre sosyal olarak inşa ettiği bu karşılıklı ilişkide lobiciliğin rolünü incelemek AB'nin TR'ye yönelik bazı eleştirilerinin daha iyi anlaşılmasına ve TR'nin bu alandaki eksiklerinin görülmesine yardımcı olacaktır. Türkiye ile AB ilişkilerinin geldiği noktayı bütünüyle lobiciliğe bağlamak doğru olamaz, ancak uzun süredir devam eden bu inişli çıkışlı ilişkiye rağmen iki taraf da birbirinden vazgeçmemektedir ve lobiciliğin rolünün incelenmesi buna bir farklı bir boyut katacaktır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye, Lobicilik, İnşacılık, Karar Alma

ABSTRACT

Decision-making in democratic systems is an open process. It is a process in which before decisions are made, public authorities learn the opinions and views of relevant parties and find a way to compromise. The parties affected by the decisions will try to influence the authorities in line with their interests. These activities, called lobbying, have become an important part of the political culture in modern democratic countries. The aim is to influence the political mechanism in decision-making processes. These structural features in democratic systems are also reflected in the structure of the European Union (EU).

Turkey is a unique example for one of the longest membership processes a country has had to the EU and the role of lobbying is valuable in terms of introducing Turkey throughout this process. Lobbying is based on an ethical framework in the EU and transparency is essential. Contrary to this, in Turkey, lobbying activities have not been placed in an official framework nor a legal basis and it is an informal field. Examining the role of lobbying and how it is socially constructed in this relationship accordingly with interests and as a result of interactions, will help to better understand some of the EU's criticisms of Turkey and Turkey's deficiencies in this area. It would not be correct to attribute the current point of Turkey-EU relations entirely to lobbying, but despite this long-standing relationship with ups and downs, both sides do not give up on each other and examining the role of lobbying will bring a different perspective to their relations.

Keywords: European Union, Turkey, Lobbying, Constructivism, Decision-Making

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List of Abbreviations

BUSINESSEUROPE	Confederation of European Business
CEE	Central and Eastern European
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
CoE	Council of Europe
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DISK	Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
EUROCHAMBERS	Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IKV	Economic Development Foundation
MEP	Members of the European Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

SEA	Single European Act
TEPAV	The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
TEU	The Treaty on European Union
TFEU	The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TISK	Turkish Confederation of Employers Association
TOBB	The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
TR	Turkey
TÜSIAD	Turkish Industry & Business Association
UK	United Kingdom
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICE	Industrial and Employers' Confederation of Europe
US	United States
USA	United States of America
WWII	World War II

INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) – Turkey relations have been going on with ups and downs for many years, and even though they are affected by political developments, both sides have not given up on each other. Turkey is considered a unique case due to its longstanding membership process. There might be significant reasons to why these relations have been going on for so long and examining the role of lobbying could provide a different perspective regarding it.

Lobbying is a particular topic that has many aspects. It can be defined as any sort of initiative that is organized by individuals or groups, which aims to influence lawmakers. It is essential that people who are engaged in lobbying activities introduce themselves, create a public opinion and have it accepted.¹ There are various unique methods such as persuasion or introduction, which are used to pressure and impact the decision-making processes, especially the political decisions of a group or a country. In other words, lobbies are special pressure groups that target influencing the decision-making mechanisms, especially in the legislative field.² Today, the impact of lobbying is increasing in political processes.³ Interest and pressure groups are closely associated with the institutional structure of countries. In Turkey, the pressure groups usually consist of economic and religious groups, functioning effectively in almost every subject from politics to economy.⁴ But are these functioning pressure groups able to actually use the role of lobbying in order to successfully socially construct relations and impact the EU - Turkey process in a positive way?

¹ Meltem Sezgin. “Lobicilik Kavramı ve Yöntemleri”. *İstanbul Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Dergisi | Istanbul University Faculty of Communication Journal 2* (2012). Accessed October 23, 2022. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iuifd/issue/22877/244534> p. 2, 4, 5.

² Seyfettin Aslan. “Siyasal İktidarı Etkileme Yöntemlerinden Biri Olarak Lobicilik”. *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* (2015). Accessed October 23, 2022. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/dpusbe/issue/4765/65486> p. 1.

³ Cenay Babaoğlu. “Lobicilik ve Kamu Yönetiminde Katılım”. *Türk İdare Dergisi*, 483, s: 3-20 (2016). Accessed October 23, 2022. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321915509> p. 3.

⁴ Berkcan Tuner. Büşra Görgülü. “Baskı Grupları ve Lobicilik: ABD ve Türkiye Üzerine Bir İnceleme”. *Tuic Akademi Websitesi*. Accessed October 23, 2022. <https://www.tuicakademi.org/baski-gruplari-ve-lobicilik-abd-ve-turkiye-uzerine-bir-inceleme/>

Although lobbying through non-governmental organizations is effective, lobbying activities are also impacted by political environments. There are many factors that must be considered when examining this particular topic. Interest groups and lobbying are what depict the borders of representative democracy.⁵ Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that the establishment of a legal ground for these activities is essential to achieve a balanced and equal environment where actors are able to conduct their lobbying activities transparently. The EU has a well-established legal basis for lobbying and this allows the effective effort of successfully achieving the using role of lobbying. But Turkey doesn't have a systematic structure like the EU when it comes down to lobbying. In fact, there are no regulations nor enough transparency for lobbying, which results in Turkey's efforts to remain weak in the process of accession to the EU.

The EU's system involves a transparent environment where its citizens are not separate from the structure. Considering that with any choice comes a decision, the EU's decisions involve the target of building policies with a direction of what and how to approach as a Union.⁶ European citizens' involvement in this environmental context indicates that ideas and beliefs that are formed by actors in this ideational environment, reconstruct or reproduce this structure through their actions and behaviours.⁷ Therefore, the theory of social constructivism is clearly seen in the formation and structure of the EU. Hence, this is also one of the ideal explanations of social constructivism theory, which will be observed when studying the relation between the EU and Turkey.

The fact that social constructivism is related with how human agents are not independent from their social environment shows how it is also directly related with how lobbying actors work to construct an opinion, which aims to create an impact or difference especially in political grounds, with regards to their interests. The connection between social constructivism and the role of lobbying, therefore, is actually clearly seen in how the EU and Turkey relations are formed.

⁵ John C. Scott. *Lobbying and Society: A Political Sociology of Interest Groups*. (Polity, 2018). Accessed 13 January, 2022. <https://www.perlego.com/book/1536314/lobbying-and-society-pdf> p.14.

⁶ John Peterson. Elizabeth Bomberg. *Decision-Making in the European Union*. (London: Palgrave, European Union Series, 1999). Accessed January 16, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-27507-6> p. 4.

⁷ European Studies Hub. "Social Constructivism and the EU". <https://hum.port.ac.uk/europeanstudieshub/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Module-4-extract-9-Social-Constructivism-and-the-EU.pdf>

The negotiations between Turkey and the EU regarding its possible membership to the Union started as a positive development in the beginning considering it was an opportunity for modernization. Although today, it has come down to a standstill since the political relations between them has deteriorated. However, the relation between them does not end or break completely and both sides are still very much attached to each other. Lobbying and using it as a method of persuasion is essential in order to eliminate negative attitude and oppositions towards Turkey within the EU. Being able to successfully use the role of lobbying for this relation would help improve Turkey's image. The role of lobbying in connection with social constructivism theory will be used to observe this unique relation. Alongside this, examining how decision-making mechanisms work in both the EU and Turkey, will aim to provide a distinctive perspective in terms of understanding how the role of lobbying in relation to social constructivism works to impact Turkey-EU relations.

While conducting this study, it is important to note that the EU is a supranational entity in which its member states have transferred parts of their powers to reach a common ground, where they share agreed goals with the target of creating social, economic and political integration. But it must also be noted that the EU is unique in terms of how it has characteristics of both supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. The EU was able to achieve this common ground through its well-established institutional mechanisms, with a common parliament, council and commission that represents each member state, making it similar to the decision-making mechanisms and structure of a country. It is clear in the EU that in both polities' lobbyists take part in interacting with certain institutions that aim to impact policy processes.⁸ It has been observed that legislators can certainly be influenced by leadership figures and outside factors in its Parliament.⁹

⁸ Cornelia Woll. "Lobbying in the European Union: From *sui generis* to a Comparative Perspective" *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol: 13 (2006). Accessed October 24, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760600560623> p. 3.

⁹ Roger M. Scully. *Policy Influence and Participation in the European Parliament*. (Legislative Studies Quarterly 22, no. 2 (1997): 233–52.) Accessed October 24, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.2307/440384> p. 10.

Turkey, on the other hand, is a country and it has its own unique structure as well as mechanisms compared to that of a union model. It is also clearly observed that lobbying activities have been going on for a long time within Turkey, in fact, since the days of the Ottoman Empire. To briefly explain this fact, during the Ottoman Empire days there were very powerful pressure groups, most of which were usually religion related. These groups were powerful instruments during the constitutional monarchy days but this developed into a softer act after the reign days were over. What is meant by ‘softer’ is that the actions of pressure groups were not as harsh as they were during the Ottoman days and these developed into social basis, where they started to carry out their activities through various clubs and institutions. Furthermore, lobbying activities in Turkey lobbying acts were especially significant during hard times of wars and spreading revolutions across the country with the establishment of the Republic.¹⁰ But this specific study will focus on how Turkey uses the role of lobbying today, to establish steps towards its accession to the EU.

It must also be noted that today, lobbying has its rules and regulations that differ in parts of the world. So, both the EU and Turkey have different approaches when it comes to lobbying. In fact, the EU specifically has rules that have to be followed to make lobbying a legit act, but in Turkey there are no regulations related to lobbying, which makes it a spontaneous act. There are valuable efforts but the fact that there is no legal ground that allows an equal and transparent environment creates a weakness in terms of Turkey’s efforts in this area. Turkey’s accession to the EU is effected by social, cultural and religious factors, as well as geopolitical reasons and other rooted issues that will be mentioned and examined in this study.¹¹

The main question is, does lobbying play an active role in Turkey’s EU membership process? The main argument of this study is to reach the point that having an established legal basis and rules for lobbying creates an equal, balanced and transparent environment for actors to conduct these activities. Having regulations would allow for the effective effort to successfully achieve using the role of lobbying. In this case, Turkey and its efforts towards its accession process to the EU as well as EU criticisms towards Turkey will be examined since they all have many aspects. It is not possible to entirely downgrade Turkey’s inability to access

¹⁰ Ibid., Tüner, Görgülü. *Tuic Akademi Websitesi*. <https://www.tuicakademi.org/baski-gruplari-ve-lobicilik-abd-ve-turkiye-uzerine-bir-inceleme/>

¹¹ Elizabeth Shakman Hurd. *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations*. (Princeton University Press, 2008). Accessed January 16, 2022. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7s5nn> p.84-88.

the EU entirely to lobbying but looking into how the connection of social constructivism and lobbying is clearly apparent and significant in their unique relation will provide a different overall perspective to this issue.



CHAPTER ONE

Theoretical and Conceptual Background

1.1. Methods, Techniques and Types of Lobbying

There are many different ideal definitions of lobbying. Some say it is the intention to influence the political system, while others indicate that it is a process of attempting to impact the government. Some even describe lobbying as an influential weapon that is used to provide businesses competitive advantages in terms of their market success both domestic and overseas.¹²

All of these definitions lead up to a similar outcome. Therefore, lobbying can be described as the process of trying to persuade authorities, institutions or the government through various ideas and information.¹³ On the other hand, it can also be explained as types of different activities that are carried out to gain advantage over groups and people.¹⁴ Generally, the main target of lobbying is to impact the government.¹⁵ It can take place at local, national and state levels of the government, with registration or no registration.¹⁶ To further expand this, lobbying activities are usually conducted directly or indirectly by a variety of interest groups. Directly operating lobbyists tend to register to record and report all of their activities, while indirectly engaging lobbyists lay low and carry out their activities in a more private manner.¹⁷

¹² Frank J. Farnel. *Lobbying: Strategies and Techniques of Intervention*. (Les Editions d'Organisation, 1994). Accessed March 5, 2022. p. 13.

¹³ Lionel Zetter. *Lobbying: The Art of Political Persuasion*. (Harriman House Ltd, 2008). Accessed February 2, 2022. p. 3.

¹⁴ Ibid., Scott. *Lobbying and Society: A Political Sociology of Interest Groups*. p. 14.

¹⁵ Anthony J. Nownes. *Total Lobbying, What Lobbyists Want (and How They Try to Get It)*. (Cambridge University Press, 2006). Accessed March 5, 2022. p. 16.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 16-22.

So, rather than being described as a single activity, lobbying can be explained as a process because lobbyists carry out numerous activities over a certain duration of time.¹⁸ This will all be explained in more detail throughout the thesis. Overall, lobbying will be explored and explained in this thesis to show how its use impacts Turkey's accession to Europe.

To very shortly explain where lobbying comes from, the term itself actually dates back to the ancient Greek civilization. Ancient Greece can be described as the base of European progress. Lobbyists were a type of diplomatic citizen, whom would target influencing high level political issues.¹⁹ On the other hand, the modern history of lobbying was mainly formed throughout the construction of America and it was something that was integrated within the American identity.²⁰ The constitution of United States of America (USA) supports freedom of both the press and expression, which makes lobbying a rightful act for any individual or group as long as it is carried out peacefully. To go even further, Farnel actually claims that lobbying is what led to the establishment of the government of USA because it is entrenched on the foundation of representing interests both governmental and non-governmental, while also creating a balance between judicial, legislative and three executive powers, all widely impacting the legislation.

In the old days, lobbying would be performed through people and their deep roots of connections to decision-makers. These personal relations with contacts were not considered effective. In today's world, modern lobbying has formed into a much more impactful act where businesses are involved. This is because firms are able to interfere with the government through creating a pressure by using critical strategic tactics, depending on the situation. These strategic tactics may involve things such as persuading authorities through bribery, personal relations, financial pressure or help, and other related similar acts.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁹ Jovan Kurbalija. "Ancient Greek diplomacy: Politics, new tools and negotiation, 'Diplomacy and Technology: A historical journey'", *DiploFoundation* (2021), Accessed September 16, 2022.
<https://www.diplomacy.edu/histories/ancient-greek-diplomacy-politics-new-tools-and-negotiation/>

²⁰ Ibid., Farnel. *Lobbying: Strategies and Techniques of Intervention*. p. 17.

To go even further with this, the philosophy of lobbying itself consists of creating competitiveness among businesses because all sides aim to achieve the better from their perspectives, which also creates a harmony among the government and these businesses.²¹ It not only impacts state relations but also corporate affairs or in other words, the public opinion of companies.

On the other hand, because of its popularity in USA, lobbyism is actually something that is studied among universities there. It is mostly known and studied within the USA, but European countries have also recognized and blended this profession into their own areas. Terms such as ‘corporate affairs’, ‘public affairs’ and ‘governmental affairs’ have been introduced within Europe. To briefly explain; a) corporate affairs refers to public affairs and policies being integrated at the corporate level of businesses, b) public affairs refers to the establishment of policies among partners and the public, including the social and political development of these businesses programs and their communication with decision makers, c) governmental affairs on the other hand refers to government relations.²²

The corporate body itself is what is considered important here, especially in terms of corporate communication, which aims to establish a good image of the company and services that it provides, all in relation with the term ‘publicity’. This is because a company or an institution with a good image would be seen as trustworthy, which would bring significant impact on the public, especially if the company takes part in lobbying activities. All in all, lobbying has different approaches and aspects, which makes it become a strong tool in guiding decisions.

In order to further understand all of this within Europe, it is important to briefly examine the three main aspects that explain professional lobbying there. These are; a) the interdependence between social and economic issues, b) power of information and transparency, and finally, c) creation of a balance among stakeholders.

²¹ Ibid., p. 18, 19.

²² Ibid., p. 19, 20.

To start off with the first one, interdependence is what refers to how both social and economic issues are linked with one another, where there is a chain reaction between them. Hence, social and economic situations both impact each other; when one of them goes through challenges the other one also experiences them. On the other hand, transparency, information and knowledge are considered as strength alongside a good image. Both information and knowledge are connected to transparency, which is also linked to freedom of communication and expression. The democracy level of a country is actually linked and determined with the elements of both freedoms of expression and communication, especially in Europe and institutions that are located there.

Furthermore, creating a balance refers to balancing the different interests of businesses. Balancing interests means having a portion of each interest, which signifies the importance of how beneficial a lobbyist's knowledge of different areas would be. For example, knowing well of the economy, policies, laws or communication, would provide the lobbying side with advantage if they can properly balance, combine and make use of these areas.²³ In a way, it could actually be said that lobbying is an industry in which people and businesses operate towards a common goal that they follow, through trying to create an influence on the public.²⁴ This influence can be direct or indirect as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. To follow this up, techniques and methods of lobbying will be discussed.

On the other hand, several different techniques and methods are used to carry out the activities of lobbying. The types can be explained as; legislative, executive, judicial, grassroots/indirect, direct democracy, electoral and other. Legislative lobbying consists of participating and testifying in legislative hearings, meeting personally with legislators, doing them favours or providing them with gifts. Lobbyists meet these legislators in meeting rooms, their personal offices, government buildings or informal venues such as cafes or restaurants and they sometimes provide them with favours or gifts that are desired by the legislator. This can include giving them with free service offers such as driving them to work or other places, taking care of their child, providing them with catering, giving them tickets to events or providing them with discounts for certain activities.²⁵

²³ Ibid., p. 20.

²⁴ Ibid., Zetter. *Lobbying: The Art of Political Persuasion*. p. 26.

²⁵ Ibid., Nownes. *Total Lobbying, What Lobbyists Want (and How They Try to Get It)*. p. 17.

Executive lobbying consists of interacting with special agencies, having one on one meetings with chief executives or executive agency personnel's, serving on executive agency boards or committees and providing written comments on rules and regulations. Meeting with chief executives is not easy because they are usually very busy people, therefore this can also be carried out through having meetings with their aides.²⁶ The judicial branch includes the aim to influence judicial areas, engaging in litigation or submitting amicus curiae briefs.²⁷

Grassroots/indirect lobbying includes contacting through emails, social media or phone campaigns, face to face meetings within groups or with government officials, having a spokesperson for the media, joining protests or demonstrations and creating ads for the media. There are even annual lobbying days where group members come together to meet personally with government officials such as legislators. The ads that are created can involve religious or other interests and run on the internet, radio, newspapers as well as television.²⁸ Direct democracy involves creating campaigns for or against a referendum or an initiative and attempting to impact the ballot. The aim is to influence citizens' approval of initiatives or referendums and it involves directly approaching someone who is part of developing the legislation.²⁹

Electoral lobbying involves creating campaigns for or against candidates, supporting and endorsing candidates, election advocacy, making in-kind and monetary contributions to political parties and candidates, mobilising activists to support the candidate by working on their behalf and issuing voting guides. This includes running advertisements to support a certain party, insisting people to vote yes or no for a certain initiative.³⁰ Finally, other types of lobbying acts include joining coalitions with lobbyists or other organizations.³¹

²⁶ Ibid., p. 19.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 21.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 22.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 23.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 23.

³¹ Ibid., p. 18.

Lobbying Techniques

Legislative Area	➤ Testifying at legislative hearings ➤ Personal meetings with legislators ➤ Doing favours or providing gifts
Executive Area	➤ Interaction with special agencies ➤ One on one meetings with chief executives or agency personnel's ➤ Serving on executive agency boards or committees ➤ Written comments on rules and regulations
Judicial Area	➤ Engaging in litigation ➤ Submitting amicus curiae briefs
Grassroots/Indirect Lobbying	➤ Contacting via email ➤ Contacting via social media ➤ Contacting via phone campaigns ➤ Face-to-face meetings within groups ➤ Face-to-face meetings with government officials / decision makers ➤ Spokesperson for the media ➤ Joining protests or demonstrations ➤ Creating advertisements
Direct Democracy Area	➤ Campaigns for or against a referendum or an initiative ➤ Targetting to impact the ballot
Electoral Area	➤ Creating campaigns for or against candidates ➤ Supporting and endorsing candidates ➤ Election advocacy ➤ In-kind & monetary contributions to political parties and candidates ➤ Mobilising activists to support candidates on their behalf ➤ Issuing voting guides
Other Lobbying Acts	➤ Joining coalitions with lobbyists or organizations

Figure 1: Lobbying Techniques.³²

³² Figure from Nownes. *Total Lobbying, What Lobbyists Want (and How They Try to Get It)*. p. 18.

Originally, the term ‘lobbyist’ was used for people who mainly targeted legislators. Today, lobbyist is used for people who spend most of their time trying to make an impact on legislative decisions. But besides targeting government officials, lobbying actually also targets ordinary citizens. The reason why ordinary citizens are targeted is because they have the power to impact government officials’ decisions, which is the main goal that lobbyists want to achieve.³³ In order to achieve it, they have to influence the public. It can be emphasized here that communication is key when it comes to creating any sort of influence, especially in lobbying.

1.2. Lobbying as a Part of Public Communication

Communication is an important part of all of our daily lives. Lobbying means providing information and it was noted in this study that information means power. With that being said, in today’s globalized world, technology and public communication are leading areas in which people can basically get information anywhere, at any time, from many platforms such as the internet, television and radio, all accessible through computers, tablets or even mobile phones. The globalized world allows an ease in terms of access to information, also by bringing people closer to each other through the mentioned developed technologies, making the flow of information quicker. Mass media and its role have become increasingly dominant in our world, to the point where it is involved in every part of our daily lives. Its role in politics has especially expanded, where people have become an ‘active participant’ through shaping and impacting opinions over the media making the public opinion an important part of political processes.³⁴

Lobbying allows peoples' voices to be heard in the political field. To go even further, it can be said that lobbying is a function of communicating, which also resembles what public relations professionals do.³⁵ Lobbyists are always involved in some sort of a communication process that aims to influence the decisions of public authorities. It can also be said that people who conduct lobbying activities are information providers who serve the public as their ‘eyes and ears’. They advocate, represent, inform and educate on behalf of the public interest or in other words, their clients’ interest. A large network with various exchanges of information also

³³ Ibid., p. 25.

³⁴ Jay G. Blumler. Michael Gurevitch. *The Crisis of Public Communication*. (Routledge, 1995). Accessed March 7, 2022. p. 2-3.

³⁵ Kati Tusinski Berg. “Finding Connections between Lobbying, Public Relations and Advocacy”. *Public Relations Journal*. Vol.3. (2009). Accessed March 7, 2022. <https://prjournal.instituteforpr.org/wp-content/uploads/Finding-Connections.pdf> p. 1.

involves different tactics, methods and strategies used by lobbyists to make an impact on the political field. It can also be said that a lobbyist's strongest profession would be to be successful at persuading people into changing their ideas.³⁶

As Milbrath also states in his work, there is a "*well-known phenomenon where people viewing the same event may perceive it quite differently*". Lobbying itself is a process of communication, therefore the main target of the lobbyist would be to figure out and know how to best handle the communication methods to achieve getting through to government officials or decision makers.³⁷ Public relation campaigns are an important example of where lobbying is used through the indirect communication method.³⁸ Advocacy is another example where lobbying is used to advocate and publicly represent someone, an idea or an organization with the target of trying to persuade the public to make perspective of the interest favourable. In other words, advocacy is considered as the central function of both lobbying and public relations.³⁹

In today's world, communication is usually carried out through the media and it can be said that it is an essential healthy function of the public, as long as it is understandable, timely, clear and correct. The function of the mass media has served and serves through channels in which messages share different interests that usually include political, social or economic situations.⁴⁰ Therefore it can be stated that public communication is strongly connected to the mass media and its means. It is also deeply connected with lobbying because of its wide range use of communication combined with mass media, which targets influencing people and steering them into the direction of the interests' perspective. Public communication can also be held through ways such as lectures, gossiping, rumours, songs, movies, shows, theatre or other forms.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

³⁷ Lester W. Milbrath. "Lobbying as a Communication Process". *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 24, Oxford University Press. no. 1 (1960): 32–53. Accessed March 7, 2022. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2746664> p. 35.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 45.

³⁹ Ibid., Berg. "Finding Connections between Lobbying, Public Relations and Advocacy". p. 4.

⁴⁰ Thomas Remington. "The Mass Media and Public Communication in the USSR." *The Journal of Politics* 43, University of Chicago Press, no. 3 (1981): 803–17. Accessed April 4, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2130638> p. 804.

On the other hand, media plays an important role in directing public communication and there are different types of media users and consumers within the public. There are also different types of media users such as critical users, professional-functional users and the consumers. Consumers are ones who passively accept the messages that are presented through the media, without any judgement. They usually have low level of information and rely on information which they receive from their co-workers or friends. Critical consumers are people who don't rely on information from interpersonal relations, they rather have picky and judging sort of attitude towards what is reflected within the media due to their own background knowledge. The professional-functional people are ones who use the media as a tool for laying out information to guide and coordinate other people. These people have a wide range of network in terms of interpersonal contacts and are usually activists with a social role in different types of communities or groups. To further explain, media use is considered practical for the professional-functional people because they combine both research and network connections before absorbing any sort of information on the media.⁴¹

To this respect, it can be explained that lobbyists are professional-functional people who are able to use public communication in combination with the media in order to achieve their target of influencing people in the direction of a specific interest. As explained in the techniques of lobbying, a wide variety of different methods are used to convey a message or information and make people believe it. Having face-to-face meetings, joining protests or demonstrations as an activist with a social role, having wide range connections, a big network pool of people or knowing how to spread information through good use of communication, all signifies a combination between lobbying and public communication. Subsequently, according to social constructivism, communication and any form of interaction is essential in order to determine interests. Since lobbying consists of aiming to achieve these interests, it can be stated that it is very much connected to how communication constructs our interests and therefore brings the urge to act on them through various acts of lobbying.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 807, 808.

1.3. Decision-Making Mechanisms

When it comes to mechanisms, it is important to know what decision-making is and where it comes from. There are many different ideal definitions of decision-making. Some say it is determining alternatives, analysing and picking the best out of it, others say it is the decision between two or more alternatives⁴². Overall, decision-making can be described as the process of making a choice by being influenced through different types of experiences, situations, information and knowledge, all connected with each other. It is considered a complex process which the human being goes through due to the involvement of pressure that comes from aspects such as the situation, person's identity, background, expertise, judgement, experience and other related concepts.⁴³

To further expand this, it can be said that making a decision comes with having a target or following values that are of interest for the person or for a group of people; it involves in depth observation or perhaps comes from the experiences.⁴⁴ The process of decision-making can influence outcomes. This is especially seen in how governments decide on policies through various ways of responding to pressure in order to achieve democratic accountability. In today's world, for most countries, achieving democracy, being diplomatic and prosper has been a priority besides the new security concerns that have emerged.⁴⁵

After this brief definition of what decision-making is, it is important to point out that the study of international relations itself involves a major deal of decision-making, especially whilst examining the different choices of states through their policy makers and leaders. While studying international relations, it can clearly be observed that there are various patterns of conflict and unity that covers decision-making throughout history. In international relations, it can be mentioned that states or political leaders make their decisions depending on the

⁴² Mehmet Torunlar. "Yönetim Eyleminin Bir Parçası Olarak Karar Verme Süreçlerinde Belge/Bilgi Yönetiminin Önemi ve Katkıları". *Bilgi Yönetimi Dergisi* 1, no.1 (2018). Accessed August 19, 2022. p. 2.

⁴³ Mark Roycroft. Jason Roach. *Decision Making in Police Enquiries and Critical Incidents*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). Accessed August 20, 2022. p. 2.

⁴⁴ Herbert A. Simon. *Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science*. (American Economic Review 49, no.3, 1959). Accessed September 21, 2022. p. 273-22.

⁴⁵ Nicholas Bayne. Stephen Woolcock. *The New Economic Diplomacy, Decision-making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations*. (Routledge, 4th Edition, 2017). Accessed September 21, 2022. p. 47.

situational context or in other words, depending on circumstances.⁴⁶ This can be explained with how the world has evolved from unitary states to pluralist actors within the international field.

According to the realist view in international relations, states are considered as the key actor when it comes to diplomacy. But after the war era and developments within the world, it has been clearly observed that foreign policy decision-making has evolved into a pluralist form rather than only a state focused unitary form. In the post-war era, international organizations and bodies such as United Nations, European Economic Community were formed, with the aim of becoming functional agencies for states to act in the international arena. On the other hand, the importance of economic and social relations became a high priority for states especially after how the Cold War did not turn into a 'Hot War'.⁴⁷

At this point, it is of importance to mention 'agenda-setting' when it comes to decision-making. Realistically, the world consists of power politics and only big issues such as peace and war are taken into consideration rather than the details, therefore it is easier to see the big picture and act on it. What is meant by this is that in realism, the agenda within the international field sets itself. But like it was mentioned above, the world has evolved into a pluralist form where there are a lot more actors, who in fact set the agenda because they are able to bring any sort of issue at the top priority, promote it and make it seem as the main focus of the international agenda. Regimes can be constituted and this happens when there are rules, norms and various decision-making actions made through decision makers' intentions in an area of international relations.⁴⁸

It can be said that there are a variety of different types of decisions and their levels of analysis within foreign policy. To get into some of the types of decisions in foreign policy, the first type to with can be single decisions, also known as 'one shot', which are not very common in the international arena, because it doesn't involve a sequence of decisions since actors tend to make decisions through sequences of events or interaction with other actors. US decision to invade Iraq in 2003 could be given as an example for a one shot decision. Interactive decisions, also known as strategic, are decisions that are made by two sides, which impact one another

⁴⁶ Jonathan Renshon. Stanley A. Renshon. *The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making*. (Political Psychology 29, (no. 4, 2008): 509-536). Accessed September 20, 2022. p. 511-520.

⁴⁷ Chris Brown. Kirsten Ainsley. *Understanding International Relations*. (Palgrave Macmillan. 3rd ed., 2005). Accessed September 23, 2022. p. 34.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 36, 37.

and are impacted by others. The ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ example makes it easier to understand this; where two suspects who have been arrested are interrogated separately and they are offered to admit their crime in return of a good bargain deal or they can refuse the deal and stay loyal to the other suspect who is their partner.⁴⁹

Types of Decisions - One shot (single) decisions - Interactive decisions - Sequential decisions - Sequential-interactive decisions - Group decisions Levels of Analysis in Foreign Policy Decision Making - Individual - Group - Coalition Environmental Factors Affecting Foreign Policy Decisions - Time constraints - Information constraints - Ambiguity - Familiarity - Accountability - Risk - Stress - Dynamic vs. static setting - Interactive setting	Information Search Patterns - Holistic vs. unholistic - Order sensitive vs. order insensitive - Alternative based vs. dimension based - Maximising vs. satisficing - Compensatory vs. noncompensatory Noncompensatory Decision Rules - Conjunctive - Disjunctive - Elimination by aspect - Lexicographic
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Figure 2: Types of Decisions and Levels of Analysis in Foreign Policy Decision-Making⁵⁰

To move onto sequential decisions, these involve interrelated decisions in which the actor has to decide from multiple options that they have in mind. These involve planning and decision phases such as; do they want to attack, negotiate, withdraw or scare the actor, or when they want the operation to finalize. On the other hand, there are a sequence of interactive decisions, which involves the decision of at least two sides and them both responding to each other’s decision. This could be a strategic, interactive and sequential, something such as an arm race where a move from one side impacts the other ones and the impacted sides decide to respond back. Group decisions are considered complicated due to actors having different priorities,

⁴⁹ Alex Mintz. Karl DeRouen. “Types of Decisions and Levels of Analysis in Foreign Policy Decision Making”. *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making – Chapter 2, Cambridge University*, 15:37 (2010). Accessed September 23, 2022.

https://www.academia.edu/41178893/Types_of_Decisions_and_Levels_of_Analysis_in_Foreign_Policy_Decision_Making p. 15.

⁵⁰ Figure prepared by the writer of this thesis, inspired from Mintz & DeRouen’s article “Types of Decisions and Levels of Analysis in Foreign Policy Decision Making”.

goals or interests, making it hard to choose from options as a group. Therefore this usually requires negotiation between actors and has different dynamics compared to individual decision-making.⁵¹

Some other decisions that could be mentioned are the following; unilateral decisions, described same as the name, made and implemented only by one side; negotiated decisions, hence its name involves at least two sides or more having multilateral talks and negotiating; structured decisions, which are routine decisions that are definitive, certain, and repetitive; and semi-structured decisions, described as not properly planned and risky. Unstructured decisions on the other hand can be described as complex processes since there is no sort of goal, routine, repetitiveness or planning, which can lead to poor decision-making. According to Herbert Simon, the decision-making process consists of 4 stages; a) intelligence which is the stage of collecting information and identifying the issue, b) design stage where alternatives are listed and a criteria is created to choose from, c) choice stage where the criteria is used to decide from the alternatives, d) implementation stage where resources are allocated and decision is put into effect.⁵²

There are also levels of analysis in decision-making, in other words ‘the decision unit’ such as the individual level, group level, and the coalition. Depending on the level of the decision unit, this impacts foreign policy decision-making. Individual decision-making usually is related with being a leader who has enormous power in a country where they can make decisions by themselves. Institutions do not impact these leaders since they have enough power to decide by themselves for an entire country. Individuals are of more value especially when there are ongoing times of crisis in high-level diplomatic contexts. The group level on the other hand involves brainstorming, group polarization and other things that work around group dynamics, impacting foreign policies. This can include joint work and group decisions through debates that impact the decision process. Presidential cabinets and institutions usually use the group decision unit to set bureaucratic agendas. Moving on to the coalition decision-making unit, this is usually related with the size and number of parties, where the majority rules or there are certain allegiances to reach a coalition in order to achieve minimum-winning.⁵³

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 16, 17.

⁵² Ibid., Simon. “Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science”.

⁵³ Ibid., Mintz, DeRouen. “Types of Decisions and Levels of Analysis in Foreign Policy Decision Making”. p. 19, 20.

Following the other listed items on the figure; it can be explained that there are environmental factors such as time constraints, ambiguity, familiarity, accountability, risks, stress, information constraints, types of settings when it comes to deciding in foreign policies. It is also important to note that the search patterns for information impacts decisions too. These patterns may include order sensitive or insensitive, alternative or dimension based, compensatory or non-compensatory, holistic or unholistic and maximizing or satisficing approaches. And then there are non-compensatory decision rules that can impact the decisions, such as conjunctive, disjunctive, aspect elimination and lexicographic (selection of an alternative, which provides the perfect service for achieving the most valuable aspect).

All in all, in this thesis, what is aimed to understand from decision-making mechanisms is to observe and see how Turkey and Europe have different and similar ways of managing people and making decisions through their institutional mechanisms and perhaps other elements that may impact these choices.

1.4. Social Constructivism Theory

Theories can be explained as speculations that help us understand topics with a broader perspective. To be more precise, studies associated with issues and inquiry usually always involve a theory behind it. They not only explain issues in depth, but also guide the way towards a clear vision of possible complicated matters such as deciding on problems, arranging data or examining and defining the behaviors of actors through simplifying reality.⁵⁴

This study will use social constructivism theory to examine how lobbying impacts the public opinion of European people in terms of Turkey's long-standing membership process to the EU with the aim of understanding if it can play a role in changing negative thoughts about it to positive ones. Alongside this, the study will aim to present the relation of social constructivism regarding how institutions form the public opinion and impact authorities. In order to make more sense of this theory, it must be acknowledged where the roots of constructivism derive from and views of some of the theorists who developed social constructivism must be explained to see how their models differentiate or relate with each other.

⁵⁴ Raymond Aron, Daniel J. Mahoney, Brian C. Anderson. *Peace & War: A Theory of International Relations*. (Routledge, 2003). Accessed December 23, 2021. p. 29.

This way, a broad view regarding the integration of Europe, developments of lobbying and Turkey's place in this chamber will be better understood.

Before actually getting into the different models and views of social constructivism, it is also important that we describe the place of constructivism within international relations. The theory of international relations itself tends to be explained as a history that consists of consecutive debates; first one being between realists and idealists in the 1920s-30s, second one being between scientificists and historicists in the 1950s-60s, and the third one, considered as the infamous 'Third Debate' being between positivists and post-positivists in the 1980s. The fourth debate which emerged in the 1990s on the other hand, has been observed as the exchange between rationalists and constructivists, resembling actual conversations among different theoretical positions within the discipline, for the very first time. The international relations discipline has appeared to be an academic battlefield where paradigmatic competition was the main issue.⁵⁵

With this "traditional battlefield" behaviour, constructivism was able to break and make itself relevant in the world. The word 'constructivism' became a buzzword within European integration theorising and the discipline of international relations. In fact, it became so highly relevant that the notion of the "constructivist turn" started to get extensively accepted within the community. Constructivists were considered as "seizing the middle ground", aspiring to construct compromise. The constructivist move had an important contribution to "establishing the middle-ground" between mutually exclusive paradigmatic positions such as reflectivists and rationalists.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Antje Wiener. "Constructivist Approaches in International Relations Theory: Puzzles and Promises". *Webpapers on Constitutionalism & Governance beyond the State*, No: 5 (2006). Accessed January 10, 2023. p. 2.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.




Figure 3: Core Theoretical Positions.⁵⁷

As seen in the above figure, establishing the middle ground resulted in a base-line of a “binary” relationship between positivism and postmodernism. This also allowed a web of communications to emerge with a focus on middle-range theorising such as discussing ontologies like norms, identities, ideas or discursive practices. An area was created for “friendly” debates, which allowed the theory of international relations to move forward from the grid-lock of binary positioning. This move caused an awakening in terms of the popularity of constructivism, making it a strong movement within the discipline of international relations theory, alongside theories regarding the European integration.

During the process of the movement of theories related to European integration, empirical research produced comparative and detailed case studies such as the impact of norms like human rights, environmental standards, citizenship rights, and many more. The role of socialisation was specifically emphasized throughout this process, due to the change of strategic positions within global politics, in other words also mentioned as ‘games’ international actors play. The role of socialisation within international organizations, specific administrative cultures and other influence of different rationales on compliance with certain global principles, norms and procedures that are identified by international law became of high importance globally.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 3. (Figure by Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener, 1999: 532)

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 4.

In terms of its specific focus on previously disregarded aspects of international relations, constructivism occupies a central place especially for the important ideational factors and social nature of international affairs. It is also considered as one of the main approaches, which offer a comprehensive account of the formation and impact of identity in international relations alongside linkages to actions and interests. Constructivism is a way of studying social relations based on a social ontology that insists that human agents do not exist independently from the social environment they live in, and in fact collectively share systems of meaning in them. Hence, constructivism as an approach in the discipline of international relations, which embraces a social ontology while it also deals with larger social collectivities, mostly in the form of states. In fact, constructivists argue that as social beings, agents shape and are in return shaped by the social structures in which they are situated. Therefore, in this respect constructivism actually challenges the assumption that formation of interests, state identities and preferences are prior as well as exogenous to social interaction.⁵⁹

So, social constructivism is a line of theorems which dates back to the end of 1980s and during post-Cold War era when a new discussion was generated in international relations discipline. It is an idea based on the building of the social reality and it is not only an international policy theory, but it also aims at ensuring the comprehension of the world rather than explaining it. Other and formerly asserted theories of international relations such as neorealism mostly dwell on the materialistic and individualist approach about the states system. Such approaches have failed to generally explain the end of the Cold War and changes within the international system. Therefore, the approach of constructivism has revived during this term.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Zeynep Arkan. “‘Via Media’ vs. the Critical Path: Constructivism (s) and the Case of EU Identity”. *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* 3 (2014): 21-36. Accessed 10 January, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.167325> p. 23.

⁶⁰ Alexander Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics*. (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Accessed December 23, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612183> p. 4.

In the theory of social constructivism, an emphasis is made on the social aspect of international relations and a series of fundamental claims are presented as the feature of the theory. Social constructivism defends the opinion of how social reality is constructed. International politics is socially constructed by social relationships. Concepts of international relations such as anarchy, sovereignty, security, interests and cooperation have emerged during the social construction process. This theory alleges that the international relations and structure are shaped by conceptualised norms, rules, ideas, beliefs and values.⁶¹

Constructivism is mostly explained as an approach, but according to Friedrich Kratochwil, constructivism is neither a theory nor an approach to politics any more than empiricism is. Empiricism is related with us correctly perceiving things through our senses as human beings, and constructivism is considered as the things we perceive being a product of our own conceptualizations, making both of the cases a meta-theoretical issue. Both of them answer the question of ‘how do you know?’ more than other questions that regard the issue, institutions, variables and so on. Empiricist view will signify the operationalization and measurement of the theoretical terms so that what is done is justified. The constructivist view will point out social phenomenon such as an authority or money, which is not natural but utterly conventional. Therefore, both of them point towards a meta-theoretical answer rather than a theoretical one, although they both have implications regarding substantive theories and methods that are chosen.⁶²

Kratochwil also explains the constructivist perspective as an heir to many of the traditional epistemological debates. He mentions that in the last century, constructivism was deeply influenced by the modern systems theory and cybernetics, which ended up severing the link between predictability/uniqueness and determinism. This, being foreshadowed by Poincaré’s solution of the three-body problem, explained as how the same result could be achieved through a different path or the same path could produce a different result; all in regards with implications of our understanding of ‘casual necessity’.

⁶¹ Çağla Gül Yesevi. “Examining Social Constructivist Approach in the International Relations Discipline”. *Elektronik Siyaset Bilimi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, January 2021, Vol:12, No:1. Accessed August 3, 2022. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348900105_Uluslararası_Iliskiler_Bilim_Dalında_Sosyal_İnsancılık_Yaklaşımının_Incelenmesi p. 52, 60.

⁶² Friedrich Kratochwil. “Constructivism: what it is (not) and how it matters”. *Chapter 5, Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective*, edited by Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, 80–98. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008). Accessed 10 January, 2023. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511801938.006 p. 81.

Thus Kratochwil indicates, as how it is in nature, different possibilities exist for social systems to ensure reproduction and the whole process is based on increasing differentiation through evolutionary jumps. What is meant by reproduction is the ability of a system to go on, rather than its existence in the equilibrium. The existing old vocabulary, efficient causality or general laws were no longer enough to explain how systems functioned; therefore the attention had to be shifted towards the translation and reception of external stimuli, also pointing towards the logic of a system and its ability to handle irritations through coming up with new responses, hence constructivism.⁶³

In an article Kratochwil co-authors together with Rey Koslowski, they explain that constructivism is centred on practices that are based on norms and rules. Both Kratochwil and Koslowski indicate that all political systems are changed or remade through actors' practices. Therefore, the fundamental change within the international system occurs when actors aim to change the norms and rules constitutive of international interaction through their practices.⁶⁴

Kratochwil and Koslowski actually argue strongly against the elimination of the domestic level from international analysis. They indicate that it is not possible to know whether international structures or domestic ones will be more significant for international change. They emphasize that the importance is the way in which differentiating practices arise from new conceptions of identity and political community that are adopted by individuals, alongside the way in which interactions between states change. In fact, the approach of constructivism articulated as a response to Neorealism's inability to explain the end of the Cold War.⁶⁵ To better understand this, it can be explained that the Neorealist perspective dictates that other states will balance against the United States (US) because offsetting US power is a means of guaranteeing one's own security. Achieving a balance of such will lead towards the emergence of newer and greater powers in a multipolar system. But this has not happened since the end of the Cold War. This is another example of how constructivism emerged within the discipline of international studies.⁶⁶

⁶³ Ibid., p. 84, 85.

⁶⁴ Maja Zehfuss. "Intersubjectivity and the Normative: Kratochwil's Constructivism and German Military Involvement Abroad." *Chapter 3. In Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality, 94–150. Cambridge Studies in International Relations.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Accessed 10 January, 2023. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511491795.003. p. 94.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 95.

⁶⁶ Robert Jackson, Georg Sorensen. "Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches". *Oxford University Press, Chapter 6, 161-177* (2012). Accessed 10 January, 2023. <https://faculty.ontariotechu.ca/kapralos/csci5530/Papers/socialConstructivism.pdf> p. 163.

According to Kratochwil, two basic commitments can be identified as the minimal core of constructivism. The first one is that agency matters within social life and therefore, agents are not simple throughputs of structures, in other words, they are not material or ideal. He indicates that all states have to choose similar organizational forms to be recognized and taken seriously in the international field, also known as the international political game. But this does not explain as much as experiences of failed states and political development literature from actual politics. Therefore, these types of adoptions might not resonate with local traditions and in fact they could most likely cause engender resistance. The second core belief of constructivists is related with how if we accept that the human world is one of artifice, the notions actors have about their actions matter. These actions cannot be solved through assumption. Interests are neither universal nor self-explanatory and they actually depend on the ‘game’ the actors are participating in. For example, what is considered as resources could change dramatically, depending on the conditions of the international field.⁶⁷

After describing constructivism’s place in the discipline of international relations, the study will summarize some of the other views of different theorists who have contributed to the development of constructivism in international relations. Starting with Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, he was one of the first to come up with this approach, which he considered as a theory, and his perspective focused on how humans are constantly building social reality, which results in the re-construction of the international relations discipline.⁶⁸ In other words, his model claims that there is a consistency where humanity constantly reinvents and confronts in its own social existence. His model explains that humans constantly build social reality, leading to the re-construction of the international relations discipline.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Ibid., Kratochwil. “Constructivism: what it is (not) and how it matters”. p. 86.

⁶⁸ Şükrü Alper Yurttas. “Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği Üyeliği Sürecinde Lobi Faaliyetleri”. *İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Avrupa Birliği Anabilim Dalı Doktora Tezi* (2019). Accessed December 23, 2021. <http://nek.istanbul.edu.tr:4444/ekos/TEZ/ET000092.pdf> p. 34.

⁶⁹ Nicholas Onuf. *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. (Routledge, 1st ed., 2012). Accessed December 23, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203722428> p. 36, 37.




Figure 4: Onuf's explanation of social constructivism.⁷⁰

Besides Onuf, Alexander Wendt, who is a major advocate of social constructivism theory, goes more in depth with different versions of constructivism that involve materialistic, idealistic, structuralist and individualist approaches. The core of Wendt's argument is the rejection of the neorealist view, which is that anarchy eventually leads up to 'self-help'. For neorealists, interests and identities are given and states know what they want, therefore they end up interacting with one another. But Wendt indicates that the interaction between states is essential in order for them to actually determine their interests and identities. He believes that this is what creates the structure of interests. Both neorealists and constructivists agree that states want to survive and be safe, but they differ when it comes to the interaction process. While neorealists point out that states' interests are all realistically given, constructivists explain that they are constructed through interaction within the international field.⁷¹ According to Wendt's discourse, the concepts of power and interests are to be redefined and the notion of "identity" is given prominence in order to explain international relations.⁷² Actors tend to define

⁷⁰ Figure prepared by the writer of this thesis.

⁷¹ Valentina Fietta. "Constructivist Theories of International Relations: Wendt, Finnemore and Katzenstein". *Academia*. Accessed 10 January, 2023.
https://www.academia.edu/4179790/Constructivist_Theories_of_International_Relations_Wendt_Finnemore_and_Katzenstein p. 2, 3.

⁷² Ibid., Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics*.

their identity and determine their interests in accordance with their identities in the first phase, and as a result, can set their policies in the light of those identities and interests.⁷³

Continuing with Wendt's different versions of constructivism, he explains that the materialistic approach prioritizes topics that involve environment, science and technology while the idealistic approach focuses on social norms with emphasis on how distribution of ideas structure human interaction. The structuralist approach, also known as the holistic approach, targets a comprehensive view on developing powers within social structures, which is opposite to the view of the individualist approach where social structures are downsized to the individual. It is also notable to mention that international politics is ordinarily defined as being "socially constructed". With this knowledge, it can be referred to how social constructivism comes from "structural idealism".⁷⁴

Moving on from Wendt, Emanuel Adler sees social constructivism as a bridge or a 'middle ground' in his words, between the relativist and rationalist approaches. He indicates that there is never a reasonable explanation for social situations, which results in a common understanding within society.⁷⁵

On the other hand, Peter J. Katzenstein further develops a constructivist argument about the role of domestic norms in the area of national security. His analysis is focused on the domestic normative structure and how it influences state interests, identity and policies. He explains the shift from a militaristic foreign policy before 1945 to a pacifist foreign policy after the World War. His analysis indicates that there was a broad consensus that favored the militaristic foreign policy before the war and how norms on which the consensus was based on became profoundly contested after the war.⁷⁶

⁷³ Birgöl Demirtaş Coşkun. "The Politics of Secularism in International Relations". *Book Review (Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics) Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi Derneği | Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*. Accessed August 2, 2022. <https://www.uidergisi.com.tr/uploads/yazilar/4957-7-b-demirtas-a-wendt-pdf.pdf> p. 190.

⁷⁴ Ibid., Wendt. *Social Theory of International Politics*. p. 18, 19.

⁷⁵ Emanuel Adler. "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics". *SAGE Publications, European Journal of International Relations*, 3(3), 319–363 (1997). Accessed December 24, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066197003003003> p. 3, 4.

⁷⁶ Ibid., Fietta. "Constructivist Theories of International Relations: Wendt, Finnemore and Katzenstein". p. 5.

The journey of social constructivism in international relations has been marked with a number of key contributions, where two of them stand out specifically. In the beginning there was no “constructivism”, but rather as Robert Keohane explains (1988), many different approaches were grouped under the rational and reflective views. The latter includes what became known as constructivism. Nicholas Onuf did bring the term to the field of international relations, and is often considered as one of the ‘fathers’ of constructivism, but still, no single individual alone could be credited for social constructivism’s emergence in international relations.

Both Adler and Wendt’s views consolidated constructivism and allowed it to open to a wider audience through staking the “middle ground”. They were the ones who emphasized constructivism as ‘via media’. Their aim in describing it this way was to build the bridges between other approaches and constructivism, also targeting to overcome the abyss between the reflective (epistemological) and rational views. Their mainstreaming of constructivism enabled this view to solidify its presence and move it from a ‘dissent’ position to a ‘normal science’ one.⁷⁷

On the other hand, Jeffrey Taylor Checkel expresses that actors go through extensive social learning, where they decide on their identities, preferences and interests, all shaped and impacted by their communication with one another, especially in the absence of material encouragement. He mentions that whether it is because of constant meetings and involvement with each other, having common backgrounds, during a crisis or under political tension, there is always a social learning. Emphasizing the dominant notion that the role of communication is crucial, he indicates that social constructivism is institutional theorizing, a method rather than a theory, related closely with institutionalism.⁷⁸

Subsequently, Martha Finnemore comes forth with the view that constructivism is about the hidden notions that shape the social and political world. She similarly explains that this theory is an approach where actors and states act accordingly with their social and material

⁷⁷ Hannes Peltonen. “A tale of two cognitions: The Evolution of Social Constructivism in International Relations”. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 60(1): e014 (2017). Accessed 10 January, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201700105> p. 3.

⁷⁸ Jeffrey T. Checkel. “Social Construction and Integration”. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6:4, 545-560, Vol 6, (1999). Accessed December 24, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1080/135017699343469> p. 551.

needs related to their interests.⁷⁹ She focuses mainly on behavior of states and their interests and also explains how shared knowledge can motivate or shape actors. She compares the neorealist view about states' desire for security, power and wealth with other views and analyses how states are socialized in the international society to want specific matters.⁸⁰

Finnemore's analysis evolves around three case-studies; the first one being the adoption of science policy bureaucracies by states after 1955, the second one being acceptance of rule-governed norms of warfare by states, and the third one being states' acceptance of limiting the economic sovereignty through allowing redistribution aiming to take priority over production values. The first case study focuses on how the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) taught some states to develop science bureaucracies with considerable success, propagating the belief about how becoming a "modern civilized" state would require having this science policy bureaucracy as an essential. The second study Finnemore worked on was about how states come to accept "rule-governed norms of warfare", where international organizations are of high importance when it comes to promoting the humanitarian norms in warfare, and in this case it was the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC succeeded in prescribing what was considered as appropriate behavior for civilized states taking part in war.

This second case Finnemore observed was actually considered tough in terms of the constructivist approach, due to ICRC's push of new norms in an area that neorealists could consider critical, national interest wise; in other words, the right to use unconstrained force during war. The final case study Finnemore worked on concerned the acceptance of a 'Third World' in which underdeveloped states of poverty was a central norm of economic policy. The change from late 1960s to the early 1970's is significant for this case. Back in the 60s the objective of an economic policy targeted to always increase production by focusing on economic growth, while by early 70s, welfare improvement through economic redistribution became the main goal of economic policy. Finnemore indicates that this normative shift was caused by the push of the World Bank.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Jeffrey T. Checkel. "Review of The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory", by Martha Finnemore, Peter Katzenstein, and Audie Klotz. *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998): 324–48. Accessed December 24, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054040> p. 325, 326.

⁸⁰ Martha Finnemore. *National Interests in International Society*. (Cornell University Press, 1996). Accessed December 24, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1rv61rh> p. 1, 2, 15.

⁸¹ Ibid., Fietta. "Constructivist Theories of International Relations: Wendt, Finnemore and Katzenstein". p. 4.

Therefore, Finnemore's perspective argues that international norms promoted by international organizations can decisively influence national guidelines by pushing states to adopt these norms in their national policies. She also argues that neorealism cannot be explained by pure strengthening, power searching national interests. Instead, she indicates that these targets need to be explained by a constructivist analysis, emphasizing the central role of norms in international society.⁸²

Considering the combination of all of the above indicated approaches, social constructivism brings out the sociological perspective within world politics with specific reference to how social relations are the main part of human association. People decide on what the world is through interaction with one another by sharing ideas and acting on it. This connection and movement results in construction of societies, social structures, unions or even countries.⁸³ Social constructivism is an important theory for this study, both in the way of how it has emerged within international relations and how it will contribute to the argument of lobbying and Turkey's accession to the European Union. The main aim in studying social constructivism is to show the relation between social learning, constructivism and lobbying, in order to get a deep understanding of how lobbying impacts decision-making within societies, countries and institutions.

Social learning can be described as the collective act or act of individuals within societies, who interact with one another to exchange ideas or understand each other's behaviours.⁸⁴ Sharing of best practices among countries is also enabled through interaction with each other in the international field. Lobbying on the other hand can be defined as an exchange interaction between an advocate and someone who is being persuaded. It involves the target of influencing social policies through being active members of groups, which gets you in close association with people, their ideas and behaviours that are usually towards a common goal.⁸⁵ These goals can involve common social, economic, political, cultural or other values that are figured through communication, generally aiming to endorse or resist social change.⁸⁶ When

⁸² Ibid., p. 5.

⁸³ Abdullah Kıran. "Uluslararası İlişkilerde Sosyal İnşacılık". *EKEV Akademi Dergisi* (2011). Accessed December 24, 2021. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265478999_Uluslararası_İlişkilerde_Sosyal_İnşacılık p. 3.

⁸⁴ Rana Juwel & Ali Md. Ahsan. "Social Learning and Governance". *Springer, Cham. In: Farazmand A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance* (2019). Accessed January 13, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_1977-1 p. 2.

⁸⁵ Willard C. Richan. *Lobbying for Social Change*. (Routledge 3rd ed., 2006). Accessed January 13, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203051573> p. 144, 146, 147.

⁸⁶ Ibid., Scott. *Lobbying and Society: A Political Sociology of Interest Groups*. p. 15.

all of these are merged together, it can be said that there is a chain bond between social constructivism, social learning and lobbying; where lobbying is an element of social learning, which is an aspect of social constructivism. Overall, this relation and different perspectives related to them will be combined and examined throughout the study to support the arguments involved as well as to help understand the main point.

But how does the theory of social constructivism impact decision-making? In order to address how the social constructive theory may impact decision-making processes, it is useful to reveal how decision-making mechanisms and structures of rational actors work before making decisions in international politics. Two types of approaches for decision-making processes are addressed. One of them is regarding the logic of consequences which means considering of the alternatives and assessing the outcomes of the options. Comparison is made through rationally calculating gains and losses. The other one is logic of appropriateness, which prioritizes some norms and rules for guidance in political decisions.⁸⁷ According to the theory of social constructivism, actors refer to logic of appropriateness while making foreign policy decisions.⁸⁸

There have also been studies which address the mechanism of decision and policy making in both international and national arenas. In the international arena, foreign policy decision-making deals with how the nations design and legislate foreign policies which are based on a series of certain processes for decision-making. As a result, policies which are conducted towards other states and the international system emerge. Although those processes are perceived as regulated and concluded by one actor, states have a transformation period in order to adapt to the globalized economic system and newly founded structures, which push their weight towards decision-making processes.⁸⁹ This is because the international system includes international organizations and non-state actors such as persons, civil society, non-governmental organisations, members of parliament, the media and so on.

⁸⁷ Martin Schulz. "Logic of Consequences and Logic of Appropriateness". *Sauder School of Business University of British Columbia* (2014). Accessed August 8, 2022.

http://www.martinshub.org/Download/LoC_LoA_PrePub.pdf p. 2.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 58.

⁸⁹ Cansu Güleç. "Decision Making Processes and Decision Making Models in Foreign Policy Analysis", *COMU International Journal of Social Sciences* 3(1), 79-102 (2018). Accessed August 9, 2022. <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/465997> p. 80.

Therefore, since social constructivism envisages an interaction among the actors, it is inevitable that decision-making processes are also affected by this interaction. Various models have been designed and determined for the decision-making process. It has been noted that some cognitive limitations impact and shape the processing of information for actors, such as groups, organizations and individuals. This means that characteristic biases are introduced into these actors' behaviours and decisions.⁹⁰

Social constructivism is actually a broad theory (or an approach according to some thinkers) and it is considered a theory that is able to explain complex cases. In fact, it is a theory that acknowledges the identities and interests of states as well as transnational and international organizations.⁹¹ Accordingly, it is also a theory that explains how social reality is built rather than being data based, hence mentioning that international relations is socially constructed. In this theory, there is no fixed single reality in the international field, therefore, international relations is treated as a matter that is constructed in various ways like historically and socially. Both social and cultural dimensions of change are examined by constructivists. Relations between states have intersubjective meaning and social constructivism places emphasis on this as well as collective consciousness and shared understandings in order to define and make sense of the linkage.⁹² Relatedly, identities are also not given, they are constructed and can change over time. Cultural elements such as race, ideology, gender, religion can all impact and shape identity, just like how relations between states involve a norm-making process where rules are formed, institutions are constructed, all impacting and shaping the subject's behaviour.⁹³

According to Wendt, the overall structure of international politics is shaped through social basis, which is what impacts interests, identities and actions of actors in this field. It is important to state here that international politics is formed through decisions that are made. States and other formed unions are in an interactive process in the international system and constructivism considers these actors as a social being.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Ibid., Schulz. "Logic of Consequences and Logic of Appropriateness". p. 6.

⁹¹ Ibid., Yesevi. "Examining Social Constructivist Approach in the International Relations Discipline". p. 3.

⁹² Ibid., p. 5.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 6.

⁹⁴ Helin Sari Ertem. "Kimlik ve Güvenlik İlişisine Konstrüktivist Bir Yaklaşım: "Kimliğin Güvenliği" ve "Güvenliğin Kimliği"". *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi* 8, (2012): 177-237. Accessed September 29, 2022. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/guvenlikstrti/issue/7527/99168> p. 183, 184.

On the other hand, according to constructivism, shared beliefs, knowledge and norms set the priorities, interests and identities of states and other actors. Interests in fact, depend on the social identity of these actors.⁹⁵ Additionally, in social constructivism, the actor and the structure impact and shape each other equally.⁹⁶ This theory emphasizes that actors in the international field have different identities and different styles of behaviour. Actors do not just stick with the norms, they legitimize and internalize them, which become a part of their identities.⁹⁷

Once again, according to Wendt, social structures are constituted by the self-understandings and practices of actors, hence ontologically dependent upon them, making them and their interests and powers also constituted. There are two unique kinds of constitute agents; external / social structures and internal / organizational structures. Additionally, agents occupy three deep-seated capacities or powers in relation to their internal organizational structure; 1) having a theoretical understanding of activities, 2) reflexively monitoring and adapting its behaviour, 3) making decisions. These capacities differentiate between actors and accordingly actors can be considered goal-driven. This is how social constructivism can impact the making of decisions. Then again, it is also important to keep in mind that the individual or organizational decision-making pathologies in the state or the union should be considered when determining its social structure or objective targets. This is because actors' "real interests" could refer to subjective interests.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Nilüfer Karacasulu, Elif Uzgören. "Explaining Social Constructivist Contributions to Security Studies". *PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs* 12 (2007): 27-48. Accessed September 29, 2022. <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/perception/issue/48995/625097> p. 3.

⁹⁶ Bahar Rumelili. "İnşacılık/Konstrüktivizm". Evren Balta. *Küresel Siyasete Giriş: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Kavramlar, Teoriler, Süreçler, İletişim Yayınları*, İstanbul (2014). Accessed October 3, 2022. https://www.academia.edu/19166568/İnşacılık_Konstrüktivizm p. 158.

⁹⁷ Ibid., Yesevi. "Examining Social Constructivist Approach in the International Relations Discipline". p. 7.

⁹⁸ Alexander Wendt. "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory." *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (1987): 335–70. Accessed October 2, 2022. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706749> p. 26.

So, how does the social constructivism theory relate with society and opinions? In today's world, public opinion is of high importance and in fact very powerful in terms of governments, political scientists and businesses. It has the power to strongly influence or decide an election, impact the public reputation of a political leader, famous person or a business in favor or against them. This especially goes for political candidates, they have to try and win the public opinion, which has its costs.⁹⁹

When examining the collective behavior of the public, which impacts or directs the dynamics of society, it is important to keep track of how ideas are formed and what is targeted with them. For example, pressure groups, money flows to political parties, lobbies, town hall meetings, demonstrations, riots, petitions, popular media content and other related areas must be considered when trying to understand a society.¹⁰⁰ Specifically, social constructionism is what people construct between them, through daily interactions with one another. In other words, knowledge comes from social interaction of all kinds, which is shared between people through constant engagement with each other.¹⁰¹ Berger and Luckmann state that “*the sociology of knowledge must concern itself with everything that passes for ‘knowledge’ in society*”. They explain that everyone lives in a world of some sort where they are part of a society that contributes to ‘knowledge’ in one way, while only some within society are concerned with the theoretical interpretation of the world. They emphasize that “the sociology of knowledge” must concern itself with what people know as “reality”, noting that no society could exist without “knowledge”. Particularly, the sociology of knowledge must be related with the social construction of reality. Hence, all of this is connected with socially constructing opinions and society.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Klaus Krippendorff. “The Social Construction of Public Opinion”. *Kommunikation über Kommunikation. Theorie, Methoden und Praxis. Festschrift für Klaus Merten*, Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, (2005). Accessed October 26, 2022. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228375961_The_Social_Construction_of_Public_Opinion p. 3.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁰¹ Vivien Burr. *Social Constructionism*. (Routledge, Third Edition, 2015). Accessed October 26, 2022. p. 4.

¹⁰² Peter L. Berger. Thomas Luckmann. *The Social Construction of Reality*. (Penguin Group, 1966). p. 26, 27.

On the other hand, Goidel mentions Herbert Blumer's explanation regarding the formation of public opinion as a process that is driven by "functional" groups and group interests.¹⁰³ These groups could be related to interest, ethnicity, class, race or other characteristics, which are binding. He states that the modern human society involves a complexity of moving relations that are too detailed and fast. He explains that the public opinion has a character and is confined to a society that is in progress. In other words, as he states "*the formation of public opinion occurs as a function of a society in operation*".¹⁰⁴

However it is important to keep in mind that both in theory and practice, knowledge is considered ultimately provisional and actors cannot know of all possible consequences that could occur as a result of their actions.¹⁰⁵ With that being said, not only do people constitute their own social worlds, but they also remake themselves in this social reality.¹⁰⁶ It is also important to be aware that every different social construction brings an action from people, and constructions in the world are bound up with power relations.¹⁰⁷

As it was explained in the previous chapters, lobbying is defined as any sort of attempt from interest groups or individuals who aim to influence government decisions. The activities of lobbying usually target public officials through official or unofficial channels, which could include acts such as bribery, contributions to election campaigns, powerful organization or association influence and many other ways. Power relations are what drive these public officials or leaders to take part in lobbying activities.¹⁰⁸

On the contrary, there are occasions where interest groups can impact the public opinion through campaigns, endorsements or other methods in the desired directions. They are especially significant in influencing voting choices of the public. When an interest group strongly supports a certain policy but is not able to convince policy makers in this direction, they might attempt to have an indirect impact on the decision-making mechanisms through

¹⁰³ Herbert Blumer. "Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling". *American Sociological Review* 13, (1948): 242–49. Accessed October 20, 2022.

¹⁰⁴ Kirby Goidel. *Political Polling in the Digital Age, The Challenge of Measuring and Understanding Public Opinion*. (Louisiana State University Press, 2011). Accessed October 20, 2022. p. 91, 92.

¹⁰⁵ Ian Parker. *Social Constructionism Discourse and Realism*. (Sage Publications, 1998). Accessed October 30, 2022. p. 92

¹⁰⁶ John Shotter. *Cultural Politics of Everyday Life – Social Constructionism, Rhetoric and Knowing of the Third Kind*. (University of Toronto Press, Toronto and Buffalo, 1993). Accessed October 30, 2022. p. 13

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., Burr. *Social Constructionism*. p. 5

¹⁰⁸ Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Lobbying". Accessed October 28, 2022.
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/lobbying>

shaping and mobilizing the opinion of the public. This can be conducted by them through the traditional media or other ways and research actually suggests that outside lobbying matters because political elites can shape individual attitudes.¹⁰⁹ But it is important to also be aware of how an interest groups influence on public opinion could result in both ‘deception’ and ‘enlightenment’.¹¹⁰

Socially constructing opinions and the society is very much involved with these particular acts. The public’s trust in a government provides foundation for impactful policy-making and good governance. This is notably significant for post-crisis situations, where there are structural reforms that involve hard decisions and where the assurance of the public is critical for fostering social and economic development.¹¹¹

Therefore, like mentioned, trust in the government is highly essential to achieve social progress and economic growth. Those who are part of the government such as citizens, businesses, civil societies or non-governmental organizations, all have the right to know about what influences the public decision-making processes. Here is where lobbying comes to place and lies at the heart of influencing the identified risks and concerns regarding achieving social and economic growth. Having a transparent environment for lobbying would encourage and allow the promotion of accountability as well as informed participation.¹¹²

Overall, it can be said that whether the actor be a state, union or an individual, there are collective acts by them, which are guided by interests and formed through interaction, making a socially constructed structure that involves cultural elements and conceptualised norms. Therefore, social learning being an aspect of social constructivism, impacts and shapes the decisions that are made in the international field. Hence, this study will aim to show how the role of lobbying is highly connected with socially constructing relations and how this is a significant observation for the relation between the EU and Turkey in terms of Turkey’s efforts for membership.

¹⁰⁹ Andreas Dür. “How Interest Groups Influence Public Opinion: Arguments Matter More than the Sources”. *European Journal of Political Research*, No: 58 (2019). Accessed October 27, 2022. <https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-6765.12298> p. 2, 3.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 18.

¹¹¹ OECD. “Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust – Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying”. Vol: 3, *Highlights*, OECD (2014). Accessed October 30, 2022. <https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/lobbyists-governments-trust-vol-3-highlights.pdf> p. 2.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 38.

CHAPTER TWO

Decision-Making Mechanisms and the Informal Processes

2.1. The EU's Structure and Decision-Making Mechanisms

Before getting into the decision-making mechanisms of the EU, it is important to explain the history behind the formation of this Union to understand its characteristics as a supranational structure constructed of many countries. There is a long history and process of how the EU was constructed and it was clearly not an easy formation. After years of wars and hardship, European countries found a way to live in peace with each other.¹¹³ European thinkers believed in a humanist and peaceful unification of the European countries where both economic and political matters would yield joint beneficial results. That was actually the main political priority of forming a union, to prevent wars and live in peace as well as combining powers of economy.

On the other hand, there were other targets of leading European countries such as France, where this Union was seen as an opportunity to become the leader of European nations. Nevertheless, Germany's equal efforts and participation within European institutions increased the country's trustworthiness through positive and peaceful relations despite its Nazi background.¹¹⁴

European leaders increased their efforts to establish lasting peace within Europe after the Second World War. This was initiated in 1950 through the Schuman Plan, the first step towards becoming a union, aiming to end century-long conflicts between France and Germany and establish peace within Europe.

¹¹³ John Pinder. Simon Usherwood. *The European Union, A Very Short Introduction*. (Oxford, 2013). Accessed April 14, 2022. p. 28.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p.29.

Assuring the collaboration of member states through mutual production of coal and steel, after the Schuman Declaration, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in 1951, with the participation of 6 European states including France, Federal Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Luxembourg.¹¹⁵ Alongside this, there was an attempt to establish the European Defence Community (EDC) with the goal to promote western European cooperation but this was not possible and failed due to trust issues from the French side related to Germany's history the possible backlash of allowing them to be rearmed, as well as Britain not being included, making it impossible to have a common defence force without common foreign policies.¹¹⁶

This was the first step towards a political and economic unification. Further on, in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC), which involved the formulation of a common external tariff and common market, was established by the Treaty of Rome and this was the pathway towards an economic integration. This was also the first initiative that provided the states with motivation in terms of creating a community.¹¹⁷

The establishment of both the ECSC and EEC were big steps towards creating a 'supranational organization' with the target of achieving integration among European countries. Creating these communities would require member states to transfer part of their sovereignty to the organization with the idea that members would follow decisions made within the community. This does not mean that they abandon their sovereignty. In the case of members not following decisions or breaching agreements, this organization would have the power to impose sanctions on them. Sanctions would aim to ensure the compliance of all member states to the organs.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ "History of the EU, Chronology of the European Union". *Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate for EU Affairs Website*. Accessed September 25, 2022. https://www.ab.gov.tr/history-of-the-eu_105_en.html

¹¹⁶ John McCormick. *Understanding the European Union*. (Palgrave Macmillan 2nd Edition, 2002). Accessed September 24, 2022. p. 66.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., Pinder, Usherwood. *The European Union, A Very Short Introduction*. p. 31.

¹¹⁸ Martin J. Dedman. *The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-2008, A History of European Integration*. (Routledge 2nd Edition, 2010). Accessed September 25, 2022. p. 7.

To continue the history of the Union and its formation, the study will move onto the establishment of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), which happened in 1958. This community was established with the aim of limiting the use of nuclear energy, to ensure a safe and peaceful ground for coordination of research by the member states. Creating a common market for nuclear energy was the main target of the EURATOM Treaty but this community turned out to remain a small actor in the process of Europe's integration, focusing mainly on conducting research.¹¹⁹

Effective as of 1967, it was decided that these three communities (ECSC, EEC and EURATOM) should be combined, making the Merger Treaty. This was the adoption of a single treaty, which targeted the merge of these communities into a single entity. The treaty resulted in the formation of a single Commission and Council, making it a big step towards becoming a union.¹²⁰ After the advancement of the Merger Treaty, the custom unions were initiated, where common policies related to trade and agriculture were adopted by the member states. This created a stable environment in terms of cooperation between member countries, allowing The first enlargement of the Union occurred in the 70s with United Kingdom (UK), Denmark and Ireland formally joining the European Communities.¹²¹

The next expansion occurred with the participation of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 80s and then Austria, Finland and Sweden's participation in the 90s. The largest enlargement of EU happened in 2004 with the participation of 10 countries including Czech Republic, Estonia, Greek Administration, Southern Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Finally in 2013, Croatia also joined, making the total number of member countries twenty-eight.¹²² After UK's leave, the current member number is twenty-seven. The final step of strengthening the roots of this Union was The Treaty of Lisbon, which was entered into force in 2009 and it aimed to get rid of barriers within the decision-making system of the EU, alongside influencing a more democratic and efficient structure.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., McCormick. *Understanding the European Union*. p.67

¹²⁰ Giulano Amato, Enzo Moavero-Milanesi, Gianfranco Pasquino, Lucrezia Reichlin. *The History of the European Union, Constructing Utopia*. (Hart Publishing, 2019). Accessed September 25, 2022. p. 144.

¹²¹ "History of the European Union 1970-79". *The European Union, Europa Website*. https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1970-79_en

¹²² "History of the EU, Chronology of the European Union". *Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate for EU Affairs Website*. Accessed September 25, 2022. https://www.ab.gov.tr/history-of-the-eu_105_en.html

Overall, it can be said that this community's history was built on achieving integration among European countries, whether it is through creating an internal market where there is free movement of people, goods and services or to make common policies in which member countries would be advantageous. The common market itself especially is of high significance in this integration, in terms of making it possible and allowing member countries to produce, move freely, and therefore generate the maximum efficiency, increasing wealth through labour opportunities, capital and enterprise. It can also be said that this integration has mostly reached the form of economic integration among members.¹²³



Figure 5: Up-to-date map of the European Union member countries.¹²⁴

¹²³ Armin Cuyvers. "The EU Common Market." *In East African Community Law: Institutional, Substantive and Comparative EU Aspects*, 293–302, Brill (2017). Accessed September 25, 2022 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w76vj2.22> p. 3.

¹²⁴ Figure from "The European Union." *The European Union, Europa Website*. https://european-union.europa.eu/easy-read_en

But to go even further and express the importance of the formation of the European Union and its history, it is essential to explain how this relates to the study itself. Throughout the history of the establishment of the Union, it can clearly be seen that this is a distinctive entity which has tried to develop itself and its progress in different fields. In fact, the European Union doesn't only make internal agreements and laws for its member states. It also acts as a strong, growing and concrete external contributor within the international system.

In other words, the EU basically socially constructs itself through engaging in activities that allows development both internally and externally. It is significant to keep in mind how the EU has advanced itself throughout history before examining the structure of its decision-making mechanisms. This will help better understand the values of the Union alongside giving insight on how this socially constructed structure uses the role of lobbying to impact its decision-making mechanisms in line with its interests.

The EU manages to keep itself highly relevant through taking part in international practices and negotiations with third parties, all in significant foreign policy areas. Therefore, the EU is not merely a vague regional entity, but it also plays important roles in different areas of global politics through its developed institutional structures. It has especially had a gradual increase in its stance in all policy areas within the international field, ever since the foundation of the European Community (EC). Both the Single European Act of 1986 (SEA) and the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 upgraded the image of the EC, but it was especially the Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 that had a significant breaking point for the destiny of the Union, especially in terms of its efforts to achieve establishing a political identity for all European states at a supranational level.¹²⁵

To start off with the first one of these major turning points for the EU, the Single European Act was the first Intergovernmental Conference that culminated in the adoption of the Single European Acton.¹²⁶ SEA is an international agreement rather than a statute, which was signed by the EC Heads of Government. SEA amended the Treaty of Rome with the

¹²⁵ E. Sare Aydın Yılmaz. "Political Identity Building in the EU: A Constructivist Approach". *Journal of Academic Inquiries*, Volume: 9, Issue: 1 (April, 2014). Accessed 10 January, 2023. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/17678> p. 50.

¹²⁶ Official European Parliament Website. "Single European Act (SEA)". Accessed 8 January, 2023. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/in-the-past/the-parliament-and-the-treaties/single-european-act>

purpose of achieving “concrete progress towards European unity”. This agreement also set the goal of completing the internal government. In addition to all of these, it also articulated fresh objectives for the EEC in cooperation with the economic and monetary policy, targeting to harmonize and improve the health and safety of workers, especially within the working environments. Strengthening economic and social cohesion as well as technological and scientific basis of the European industry, with particular interest in reducing the disparities between regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions, the top priority of SEA was to achieve European unity.

On top of all of this, SEA provided European co-operation in the sphere of foreign policy. The most significant change that could be indicated is that SEA officially designated the European Parliament for the first time in the Treaty of Rome, giving it a real place and say in legislation, allowing for it to propose amendments or to reject common position initially communicated to it by the Council. On the other hand, the Parliament gained the power to veto over the accession of new possible Member States. It also brought changes in voting majorities through introducing a qualified majority instead of unanimity on various matters, which are not considered ‘fundamental’.¹²⁷ Thus, this was all a huge step in terms of giving the parliament a huge place in its decision-making mechanism as well as European integration and getting a lead on socially constructing the European unity, through aiming to achieve a joint identity among European people.

The second big turning point for the EU was the Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty on European Union. This Treaty is considered as “marking a new stage in the process of creating an even closer Union among the people of Europe, where decisions are taken as close as possible to the citizens”. In other words, Ludlow described it as “Maastricht Treaty confers on the Union’s important responsibilities in relation to all of the major functions of a modern sovereign state”.¹²⁸ This Treaty was important in terms of member states of the EC embarking on a far-fetched enterprise to enhance the authority of Community institutions. The Treaty on European Union aimed to continue the process which began with the SEA. This Treaty increased the powers of the European Parliament even more. It allowed for the

¹²⁷ A. Campbell. “The Single European Act and the Implications.” *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (1986): 932–39. Accessed 10 January, 2023. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/759881> p. 933, 934.

¹²⁸ Daniel Wincott. “Federalism and the European Union: The Scope and Limits of the Treaty of Maastricht.” *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique* 17, no. 4 (1996): 403–15. Accessed 8 January, 2023. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601277> p. 403, 404.

establishment of mechanisms where EC countries were able to seek to improve their policy coordination's in various areas such as border controls, immigration, social affairs, anti-crime efforts and high technology.

Alongside all of this, it committed the members of the EC to work towards establishing a common security and foreign policy. Most significantly, it paved the way towards achieving the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by the end of the 1990s. In other words, it laid the foundations for the Unions currency, 'Euro', through establishing rules and introducing criteria on how this currency would work in practice. In the first half of 1980s, EC institutionalization was accelerating and in fact moving well beyond trade issues that were an interest to the Community traditionally. Achieving EMU would allow the Community to advance to a higher level of centralized coordination within a strategically important area. Having common foreign policy and common defence identity as well as achieving EMU, would mean accomplishing the true launch of Europe with a genuine supranational authority.¹²⁹

To further explain, the Maastricht Treaty significantly increased cooperation among European countries in a number of new areas such as bringing the European Citizenship, allowing citizens to reside in and move freely between member states; achieving a common foreign and security policy, aiming to safeguard the common goals, values and fundamental interests as well as independence of the Union; and developing close cooperation within the Union about home affairs and justice, ensuring the security and safety of all European citizens. Overall, making it a huge leap towards a way forward to European integration by moving Europe closer together.¹³⁰

The third major breaking point for the EU was the Copenhagen criteria, established at the European Council meeting in 1993. It included respect towards minorities, rule of law, human rights and stable democratic institutions. Considering that entering the EU is a complex process, observation towards practices of democratic conditions regarding what must be unconsolidated in new regimes was brought with the Copenhagen criteria. The mentioned

¹²⁹ Joseph M. Grieco. "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme." *Review of International Studies* 21, no. 1 (1995): 21–40. Accessed 8 January, 2023. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097394> p. 21, 22.

¹³⁰ European Central Bank, Eurosystem Website. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/educational/explainers/tell-me-more/html/25_years_maastricht.en.html#:~:text=The%20Maastricht%20Treaty%2C%20officially%20known,orders%20with%20Belgium%20and%20Germany.

observation period usually lasts around a decade, but in some cases countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) may require more time before an accession is accomplished. In fact, it is not easy to apply the notion of democratic practices and Copenhagen criteria conditionality, which is a pre-accession strategy to the EU. Therefore, the Copenhagen criteria has actually been criticised for being too broad and difficult to measure in practice. On the other hand, there can be issues that arise when new democracies are less than fully committed to entering the EU.¹³¹ But EU conditionality cannot be fully limited to only enlargement.

Describing these major turning points and the details within the EU's history aims to help identify and understand its values today and how these values are associated with its structure in terms of both social constructivism and lobbying, as well as its approach in the foreign policy field towards Turkey. For example, the Copenhagen criterion includes certain values that are set, which are to be followed and achieved in order for a country to have a chance at becoming a part of the Union. But are these values actually set fairly in terms of Turkey's accession and its efforts to influence the EU through using the role of lobbying? In other words, is Turkey able to successfully use the role of lobbying to meet these values, influence and convince the EU that they got what it takes to join the Union? Learning about all of these details of the EU will target indicating the significance of an established legal ground of lobbying, especially in terms of how the role of lobbying can successfully influence decision-making mechanisms.

So, the EU has both negative and positive forms of "conditionality" for third world countries, in terms of its benefits and interests such as trade, political contacts, cooperation agreements, concessions and aid. The conditions that are put forth with the Copenhagen European Council, were actually designed to achieve minimizing the risk of new entrants who are both politically and economically unstable, as well as burdensome towards the existing Union. The target was to ensure that new countries joining the Union would be qualified to meet all of the EU criteria, with only temporary and minimal exceptions. These conditions were formulated with the aim of guiding CEE applicants alongside reassuring that the possible disruption risks from reluctant member states would be minimal.

¹³¹ Geoffrey Pridham. "Complying with the European Union's Democratic Conditionality: Transnational Party Linkages and Regime Change in Slovakia, 1993-1998." *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 7 (1999): 1221-44. Accessed 10 January, 2023. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/154120> p. 2.

The conditions also have to reassure the EU member states that if the CEE countries end up becoming members, they have to be similar towards the west European countries and not bring any economic collapse, instability, authoritarianism into the Union. But there are cases where member countries don't even fit the set criteria, which brings up the question of fairness and whether there are double standards or not. For example, Greece doesn't have a very stable economy, which is against the criteria conditions, but is still valuable member of the Union.¹³²

These Copenhagen Conditions that came into place in 1993 included three main points, first one being that membership to the EU requires that the candidate country has stability of institutions, which guarantee democracy, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities as well as rule of law. The second point was that membership would require the presence of a functioning market economy, alongside a capacity to cope with the existing competitive market forces and competitive pressures within the EU. Third conditional point was that the membership would presuppose the candidate country's ability to undertake obligations of its membership, including its adherence towards the targets of economic, politic and monetary union. But all of these conditions are considered very broad and open, and it can be elaborated that meeting these criteria has progressively widened and this is something that strongly impacts the process of decision-making within the EU.¹³³ It could also be said that the EU actually socially constructs its own agenda in line with its interests, resulting it the Union broadening the criteria for joining them.

It must also be indicated that it is not possible to explain the European integration in only the way, which is becoming suitable with the Copenhagen criteria. When the integration of Europe is examined, it can be observed that the EU actually sometimes implements differentiated integration when it aims to expand. For example, regarding the common market policy of the EU, sometimes the impact of its policies change among its member countries. This creates a complication in terms of the topic of integration itself and understanding the degree of impact on integration that requires a supranational decision-making mechanism as well as an authority. This complication results in a limited integration of Europe. And once again, it would be important to mention that despite the differentiated, complicated and limited

¹³² Heather Grabbe. "European Union Conditionality and the 'Acquis Communautaire'". *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique* 23, no. 3 (2002): 249–68. Accessed 10 January, 2023. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601310> p. 249, 250, 251.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 251.

integration methods of Europe, the conditions and procedures of being applicable to the integration change is in accordance with the timing of it.¹³⁴ Hence, it can be said that this is similar to how the EU's Copenhagen conditions are broadened throughout the Union's progress, accordingly with its interests. The integration of Europe also hints at how all of this is related with the social construction of the EU, in line with its interests. Thus, it's approach towards Turkey today is also in line with how the EU's values as well as interests are reflected throughout its history and internal mechanisms such as decision-making, which is influenced by the role of lobbying due to a strong transparent ground that has regulations for it.

For example, the European integration has been experiencing this 'differentiated' integration ever since the Maastricht Agreement in a widely reflected scope. In fact, with this agreement, the Union has also been more flexible towards its member countries in terms of their adaptation in military, monetary and social areas. Then, the Amsterdam Agreement brought more flexibility in terms of cooperation within the fields of justice, economy and security. Subsequently, the Nice Agreement allowed differentiation to find its path in the implementation of common foreign and security policies.¹³⁵ This flexibility within the integration shows that the EU constructs its integration accordingly with its interests.

But what exactly is meant by differentiated integration? For example, sometimes the capacities and preferences regarding common policies and integration may differ for new EU member states and in fact show weakness compared to its former members. When this occurs, it results in a 'cost of non-integration' for the Union. Therefore, sometimes differentiated integration is the path the EU follows when it aims for enlargement, so that such costs are reduced, allowing a cost-efficient expansion. This differentiation may involve 'exempt differentiation', which refers to the postponement of compliance with the membership and standards required by the membership for the benefit of new member countries, hence, environmental policy standards of the EU. Alongside this, it may also involve 'discriminatory differentiation', which is when new member states are temporarily excluded from the benefits and rights provided by the EU through transitional arrangements.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Sezgin Mercan. "Polonya'nın İkilemi Olarak Avrupa Birliği ve Farklılaştırılmış Avrupa Bütünleşmesi". *Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Topluluğu Enstitüsü Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Cilt: 28, Sayı: 2, (2020): 285-316. Accessed 30 December, 2023. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/maruaad/issue/60380/882735> p. 289.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 287, 296.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 292, 293.

In Mercan's article, Poland is given as an example for a member state that has been part of a differentiated integration. Poland has had a slow development regarding its bourgeoisie and social classes. The service sector is considered as one of the most important sectors in the Union, and Poland was weak in this term. Despite the efforts of Poland over time, it has not been easy for Poland to erase the traces of its slow developed background within the Union. But he states that Poland was given an exemption by the Union in terms of switching to the Euro currency. Due to fluctuations within currencies, Poland has still not been able to switch to Euro, despite it being a member of the EU. Therefore, today the differentiated integration of Poland is also questioned.¹³⁷ It might also be significant to mention that Poland was one of the countries that suffered the most in World War II, making the EU and especially its member Germany very supportive and understanding towards them. Overall, it can be said that there are political and economic issues that the EU faces within itself, and despite it aiming to achieve similarity among all of its members, not all of them are in the same condition. In fact, there are lots of differences between member states, both in the economic and political way, resulting in the Union approaching methods such as 'differentiation' throughout its integration process. All of these treaties and agreements have contributed highly towards the development process of the Union, in a way which has allowed it to configure its targets when making decisions alongside expanding and strengthening its integration.

Moving on, it is important to explain the supranational structure of the Union. The Union is considered an alternative to a nation-state and it has a multi-level structure where there are transnational allies as well as strong policy networks.¹³⁸ The EU gets its power from its member states and the scope of how this power is used is actually defined in the treaties signed between the member states. These treaties, also known as 'basic treaties', represent the way the Union uses its power. Also previously explained above, the basic treaties are namely 'The Treaty of Maastricht' also known as 'The Treaty on European Union' (TEU) and 'The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union' (TFEU), which came into force in 1957 as the Rome Treaty that established the European Community and was renamed through the Lisbon Treaty, also known as the 'reform treaty'. These treaties alongside the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights make up the constitutional basis of the Union.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 306.

¹³⁸ Anton Pelinka. "The European Union as an Alternative to the Nation-State." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 24, no. 1/2 (2011): 21–30. Accessed September 28, 2022 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41478273> p. 3.

The way the structure was formed at first was considered complex, and the target was to adopt one single document to simplify this situation. The structure of the treaty has evolved throughout time, introducing supranational arrangements within Europe. It was noted in the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 that the target was to build a common future through the will of the citizens and states of Europe, making the EU a lot more than an international organization. As mentioned before, these treaties and agreements have highly shaped the way decision-making mechanisms work within the Union throughout its history. It is no doubt that the EU makes decisions in line with its international agenda and interests, sometimes enabling flexibility for its members and sometimes complicating it for those who want to join the Union. The evolution of the EU treaty structure can be seen in the below table.¹³⁹




Figure 6: Evolution of the EU treaty structure.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ Edward Best. *Understanding EU Decision-Making*. (Springer, 2016). Accessed August 28, 2022. p. 5, 6.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

To further understand how the EU functions and makes decisions as a supra-national entity, both intergovernmentalism and supranationalism must be examined. The EU is a unique formation because it shows aspects of both of them. Supranationalism is considered as the most important achievement of the European integration process after the Second World War. It represents the organized cooperation among democratic civil states under independent supra-state law and institutions. Throughout history, supranationalism has developed gradually and it also mainly represented the idea of ‘peaceful world federation’ or in other words a ‘world federal union’. Supranationalism developed as an opposition to the existing colonial empires and authoritarian sovereign states that were characterised by cultural, economic, military imperialism as well as wars for power and hegemony. But how was supranationalism reflected within the EU?¹⁴¹ To explain this, the European Community successfully achieved and surpassed the classical idea of a sovereign state. In fact, the European states ended up dividing their sovereign powers in certain common fields without actually dissolving. On the other hand, they were able to establish a union of peace.

European supranationalism has allowed European states to overcome the challenges they faced after the Second World War, such as the problems in economy, military, transcend nationalism and cultural expansionist policies of the European nation states as well as national empires both in the continent and worldwide. The main target was to establish a union of peace in Europe and in the world. The way supranationalism was reflected in the EU was when national governments could safeguard their sovereignty in line with their national interests, but through being subordinated to European law in all fields. The idea of ‘multilevel governance’ meant that the Union must act through ‘cooperation’ and ‘common actions’ among member states. These common actions indicated that all acts would be managed by the supranational institutions of the EU with exclusive competences of the Union. Cooperation referred to actions that would be undertaken by member states in the European Council. The Union could only act if the member states transferred their necessary competences to the supranational institutions. In fact, this subsidiarity served as compromise between the intergovernmentalists and federalists. The intergovernmentalist and federalist compromise made it possible to establish and achieve an intergovernmental and supranational union of states.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Éva Bóka. “The European Idea of a Supranational Union of Peace”. *Society and Economy* 34, no. 3 (2012): 387–97. Accessed 9 January, 2023. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/90002264> p. 389.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 391.

Intergovernmentalism is what allows states to cooperate in certain fields whilst retaining their sovereignty. Compared to supranational bodies where authorities are formally delegated, states who are a part of intergovernmental organizations do not actually share power with other actors who are members of it. In fact, decisions are taken by unanimity. But for the EU, there are aspects of both intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. The Union itself is supranational and the Council of Ministers can be given as an example of a purely intergovernmental body. The remaining other institutions; the European Parliament, Commission, European Court of Justice all represent the supranational mode of decision-making. The EU is a unique example because it includes aspects of both of them, while all other integration initiatives including ones in developing countries are almost fully intergovernmental.¹⁴³

In the European Union, the extent to which the member countries have agreed to act together within the Union limits their national sovereignty. Specifically, the Union can replace its member states' level of authoritative decision-making. For example, in Germany the Basic Law includes a statement like 'establishing a united Europe'. This is because the members have decided to unite for a common future. But the extent of how much power each member state gives to the EU changes and EU countries are considered diverse.¹⁴⁴

On the other hand, this is especially due to the differences in financial power of member states not being balanced. The financial and economic power of states impact their contribution towards the Union in terms of voting power in decision-making within the EU institutions and this can cause difficulties for the integration process of Europe. Balance of power within the EU Parliament's decision-making procedures can focus on different dimensions of member states such as their ideological and national structure.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Oxford Reference. "Intergovernmentalism".

<https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110810105138102;jsessionid=556BE442AFA0A515738DE0E93A9B0E9A>

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., Best. *Understanding EU Decision-Making*. p. 7, 8.

¹⁴⁵ Nedžad S. Basic. "Allocation of Power in The European Union - From National Decision-making to Influence on Supranational Decision-making". *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, Vol 20 No:2 (2012). Accessed September 30, 2022 <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/1307> p. 3.




Figure 7: A simple scheme of the EU institutions.¹⁴⁶

To move on to the EU's decision-making mechanisms, the figure above explains how the European Union functions during its decision-making processes. The institutions located inside the triangle produce EU law through interaction with one another. It can be mentioned that the triangle in the figure is the core part of the decision-making within EU. The existence of institutions indicates shared values and rules, which member countries recognise and respect.¹⁴⁷ The Treaty of Maastricht identified enhancing the democratic functioning of these institutions in the Union as a primary objective.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., Best. *Understanding EU Decision-Making*, p. 9.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p.31.

¹⁴⁸ Christophe Crombez. "The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union". *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (1997): 97–119. Accessed 7 January, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.2307/440293> p. 97.

The first step of decision-making in the EU is usually always through a proposal, which is elaborated by the commission. The Commission is the executive organ of the European Union, meaning it is responsible for initiating and enforcing laws of the Union as well as managing policies. It is based in Brussels and is made up of 27 commissioners, which includes one commissioner from each member state. Each member state nominates a commissioner and the nominated candidates must be approved by the European Parliament. On the other hand, the Parliament must also approve the President of the European Commission. There are also nearly thirty-two thousand people employed by the Commission, which includes staff such as lawyers, researchers, translators or officers, in order to assist the commissioners' performance of their duties.¹⁴⁹

The Commission's purpose is to identify and find the best possible path for the Union. But it is important to note that not all ideas come from the Commission. Both the Council and the Parliament can ask for a proposal. After the Commission elaborates the proposal, it is also defended by the Commission throughout negotiations with the Parliament and the Council. There are regular requests for proposals by The European Council. The incentive of proposals can also come from member countries, citizens, interest groups, judicial rulings or international commitments. So the process that starts from the Commission is actually open and not isolated. In other words, it is not 'technocratic', which means that it is not lead by a team of elite technical experts. The process of the work programme of the Commission is openly shaped.¹⁵⁰

The European Council on the other hand, consists of the heads of government of each EU member state, the European Council President and the President of the European Commission. While the Commission is responsible of doing the drafting work for proposing an EU legislation, The European Council focuses on the general priorities and political directions. This institution sets out the Union's political priorities and direction. It does not make laws and it is significant to note that it is a separate institution from the Council of the European Union. The European Council also sets the EU's foreign and security policies, alongside nominating and appointing important EU roles. It has a formal role in the EU's European semester

¹⁴⁹ Citizens Information Website, European Commission.
https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/government_in_ireland/european_government/eu_institutions/european_commission.html

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., Best. *Understanding EU Decision-Making*. p. 39.

process.¹⁵¹ The European Council brings together the leaders of the member states alongside the Commission President, which strongly shapes part of EU decision-making. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ensures that EU laws are followed and treaties are properly applied. The CJEU reviews the acts of EU institutions and whether they apply to legality, also ensuring that all EU countries comply with their obligations under the Treaties alongside interpreting EU law at the request of national courts.¹⁵²

The Council of the European Union plays an important role in the law-making process of the Union, usually meeting around specific policy areas. It shares the decision-making power together with the European Parliament, particularly in areas of budget approval and law-making. The Council consists of a government minister from each member state and is a single legal entity. But, it is important to mention that its members are not fixed term and the government ministers will depend on the types of policies or laws that are discussed. The Council has the power to pass laws and it shares this power with the Parliament. In most cases, for a law to become an actual legislation, it must get passed by both the Parliament and the Council. Additionally, the Council drafts guidelines for economic policies of the member states, develops the Union's security and foreign policies, has a supervisory role in negotiating international agreements with countries or international organizations and adopts the budget together with the Parliament. Further on, The EU Parliament also plays an important role in shaping proposals from the Commission.

To briefly explain it all together; The Council and The Parliament consider, amend, negotiate and adopt EU legislation, which is proposed through the European Commission and this is the ordinary legislative procedure. It is the direct representation of EU citizens. Under this ordinary procedure, both the Council and the Parliament are equals and if they reach agreement they can adopt the legislation in the first reading. If the first reading doesn't work out, they adopt it through the second reading. But if this doesn't work either, then they use a conciliation committee. There are also the 'consultation' and 'consent' procedures. Once the reading is adopted, some legislation has to be adopted into the national law. This depends on the legislation, therefore sometimes it takes time to adapt or in other times it is directly

¹⁵¹ Citizens Information Website, European Council.

https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/government_in_ireland/european_government/eu_institutions/european_council.html

¹⁵² Official European Union, Europa Website. "Types of Institutions and Bodies". https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/institutions-and-bodies/types-institutions-and-bodies_en

applicable.¹⁵³ The Parliament and Council have to approve the proposed law before it becomes official.

To continue with the structure of how things work in the Parliament; The legislative procedures take place against an institutional matrix, which is formed by the standing committees and political groups. European parties are considered loose associations and national parties are the key actors in political groups that impact how Members of the European Parliament (MEP) vote. There is usually a strong Left-Right spectrum but this is diluted through the differences in issues, nationalities and identity-politics. In other words, there are differences over some policies due to varying national understanding and interests.¹⁵⁴

On the other hand, the Council functions through a rotating Presidency, which is supported by the General Secretariat. The Council is where there are negotiations of national interests. The Commission's proposal is in the management of this rotating Presidency and it is examined through a working party that is usually chaired by the Presidency. The Presidency brings together representatives from each member country alongside experts and can ask for written inputs from them. The Commission is expected to take each country's interests into account, therefore targeting a balanced outcome, and this is why decision-making in the Council is not based on 'out-voting' the minority. Rather, it focuses on an institutional norm of consensus within the Council and the Commission has the power to defend the minority's interest through insisting on unanimity to be overruled.¹⁵⁵ Having different configurations and making decisions accordingly with unanimity, majority or qualified majority votes, the Council shares most of its legislative decision responsibilities with the Parliament.¹⁵⁶

Furthermore, the relation between these three core parts of the EU will be explained in more detail. The Commission exchanges views with the Council and the Parliament on its annual work programme. This is to prioritize multiannual goals and allow a long-term successful planning in line with Political Guidelines of the President of the Commission. On the other hand, the Commission seriously considers all requests and inputs from both the

¹⁵³ Council of the EU. "Council Animation Decision Making (EN)". *Council of the EU on Youtube* (2015). Accessed November 3, 2022. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BUMyjiwCMzSI>

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., Best. *Understanding EU Decision-Making*. p. 46, 47, 48.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 51, 52.

¹⁵⁶ "Kurumlar ve Karar Alma Mekanizması". *İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Websitesi*. Accessed September 28, 2022. <https://oldweb.ikv.org.tr/icerik.asp?konu=kurumlar&baslik=Kurumlar>

Parliament and Council before submitting any policy proposals. In the case of the Commission not submitting a proposal, it will ensure to inform the institutions about why the proposal has not been submitted. Based on the annual work programme of the Commission, all three institutions will mutually agree on a list of proposals that will be prioritized during the legislative processes. This will allow reducing regulatory burden as well as ease in updating existing legislations.¹⁵⁷

To briefly explain, there are three principal legislative procedures in the EU. These are consultation, cooperation and co-decision and they all apply to different policy areas. The consultation procedure is the easiest and oldest one. In it, a nonbinding opinion is received from the Parliament and then the Council makes a decision on a proposal from the Commission. In order for Commission proposals to be approved, the Council ends up using the qualified majority rule. This is when the member states' votes are weighted to take their populations into account. Then, under the qualified majority rule, a proposal is approved and if it receives at least 62 out of 87 votes. Christophe Crombez indicates that the Council's use of unanimity and qualified majority rules gives the Commission a considerable amount of power. In order to be adopted, the Commission proposal needs to satisfy two requirements, firstly being preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority and secondly it has to be preferred to all other policies among all members. The Parliament is considered powerless and the use of unanimity and the qualified majority rules, limited the EU's ability to reach decisions.¹⁵⁸

The cooperation procedure, which is introduced during the 1980s, eventually ends up adding some stages to the consultation procedure. This procedure involves the Council's decision, also called the 'common position' being sent back to the Parliament for a second reading. The Parliament then gets the opportunity to amend, accept or reject this common position. If there is a decision to amend, this must be examined by the Commission and if there is a rejection, this can only be overturned by a unanimous Council. Under the cooperation procedure, the Parliament actually acquires substantial power through its right to veto. Even though a veto could be overturned by a unanimous Council, it is very unlikely that there would be a member state that would support such a veto. The Parliaments right to veto reduces the set of policies that the Commission can successfully propose, making the Commissions power decrease, resulting in the increase of indecision.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., Best. *Understanding EU Decision-Making*. p. 42.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., Crombez. "The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union". p. 98, 99.

Finally, the co-decision procedure also adds a few stages to the consultation procedure. Once again, the Parliament has the right to either amend, accept or reject the common position. Amendments are sent to the Council and if the Council accepts the amendments, the common position as amended by the Parliament ends up becoming an EU policy. If the Parliament ends up rejecting, the status quo can prevail. If the Council doesn't accept the amendments, a Conciliation Committee is convened. This committee includes equal numbers of both the Council and the Parliament. The main task of this committee is to reach an agreement on a joint text. In order for a joint text to be approved, a qualified majority from the Council and a simple majority from the Parliament must agree on the passage. Once approved, the joint passage then becomes an EU policy.¹⁵⁹

But where is lobbying in all of this and how is its role influential in terms of the EU's decision-making mechanisms? The EU and its structure as well as its decision-making mechanisms are highly associated with the role of lobbying. For example, there are thousands of private sector representatives in expert committees of the Commission. The role of lobbying here is used to bring complaints related with unfair market behaviour and this is done through private groups who are frustrated about it. Another example for how lobbying is associated with the EU's decision-making mechanisms is that every membership of a private European federation (EuroFed) involves the vector of 'from the national private sector to the European private sector'. So, members of groups like EU Pharma Group are all national professional pharmacists and they discuss their issues in this federation with the aim of monitoring and influencing each other. This same sectoral approach is followed by thousands of other national private organisations that range from telephone companies to consumer groups and they try to orchestrate their influence on more than one European sector whether the target is profit-oriented or not.¹⁶⁰ It is important to note that some channels are considered more powerful than other ones. For example, national ministries and EuroFeds tend to be more powerful compared to Commission officials if they are used as channels of influence and information.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 99.

¹⁶⁰ Rinus van Schendelen. *Machiavelli in Brussels, The Art of Lobbying in the EU*. (Amsterdam University Press, 2002). Accessed January 22, 2023. p. 34.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 254.

On the other hand, the EU uses the role of lobbying to improve the Unions democracy. For example, through group formations, lobbies contribute to the integration across borders of public and private interests and organizations. Then again, direct settlements by these groups can sometimes create irritating differences in fields like labour relations. The standards that are created by lobbying groups aims to contribute to the EU's economic welfare and growth. They promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the decision-making machinery, described in this part of the study. Lobbying groups have their specific impacts on the formation of the EU's special policies regarding agriculture, the environment or research and development. The role of lobbying makes information and manpower available to the Commission in order to achieve all of this. All of these sorts of impacts on different values can contribute positively or negatively towards the EU's democracy. Sometimes there may be the selfish ambition to win or to not lose a desired outcome, which could result in negative outcomes. And in the EU, nobody can prevent a lobby group, wilfully or otherwise.¹⁶²

The EU's decision-making machinery is full of variables, which can be influenced or manipulated to get a desired outcome. But there are limits related to pressure of time and efficiency, which ensures that not everything is variable nor easily manageable. Real decision-making processes consist of negotiations, which can take place in inner rooms, far away from public platforms. The EU has an open decision-making system in which many competitive groups compete with one another, and in fact, despite its supranational structure; in reality, national governments who are part of the Union are each only one player acting as a part of the Council. So, it can be said that the EU is firmly in the hands of public and private interest groups despite it being seen as a centralist.¹⁶³

To sum it up, these are the ways in which institutions within the EU make decisions. There is a strong functional process between each one of these institutions and it is important to note that the final decision of the Commission proposal is unavoidably impacted by external lobbying. The departments of the Commission naturally tend to be related with and influenced by different views, but this does not mean that it is expected to be in favour of specific interests.¹⁶⁴ To conclude this part, the below figure shows the overall process of decision-making in the European Union as defined in this chapter.

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 302.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 241, 246, 247.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., Crombez. "The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union". p. 45.




Figure 8: A brief presentation of the decision-making mechanism within EU.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵ Figure prepared by the writer of this thesis.

2.2. Turkey's Decision-Making Mechanisms and Criticisms by the EU

Before getting into Turkey's decision-making mechanisms, it is important to keep in mind that Turkey is a country compared to EU, which is a Union with member countries. Although EU is formed in a different way representing the mutual priorities of its members, it is a supranational entity with similar decision-making processes of countries. It is also important to note that Turkey went through a big change within its system. Turkey was previously using the parliamentary system, but today it is using the presidential system to make decisions. But both of the systems will still be discussed in this thesis to have a better view of the decision-making process in Turkey.

To start off with the parliamentary system, in Turkey, this was accepted since the establishment of the Republic in 1923.¹⁶⁶ But before explaining the decision-making processes in Turkey during its parliamentary days, it is essential to share a brief definition of what this system means. The parliamentary system is a system in which a parliament that is elected by citizens plays the central role in representing them in political processes.¹⁶⁷ This system can also be described as the type of constitutional democracy in which the executive branch derives from and is responsible to the legislature. It is considered the most widespread and continuous government system, which came out as a victory against totalitarian and authoritarian regimes throughout history. In systems defined as parliamentary, the sovereignty belongs to the people and the government is recognized, supported and, if necessary, overthrown by the parliament. On the other hand, in parliamentary administrative systems, the executive and the legislature are mixed but the links in this system are not just between the Executive and the Legislative Organs. In parliamentary democracies, particularly parliamentary monarchies, the duties of the head of state do not go beyond being representative. Therefore, in the parliamentary system, the president or the ruling person is in a position of balancing power or in other words, neutral power.¹⁶⁸ It would also be important to note that differences in political cultures, different party and election systems lead to diversity among parliamentary systems around the world.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Hüseyin Yıldız. "Türkiye'de Parlamentarizm Uygulamaları" *İnönü Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt: 4 Sayı:1 (2013). Accessed September 28, 2022. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/208292> p. 3.

¹⁶⁷ Mustafa Yıldız. "Başkanlık, Yarı Başkanlık ve Parlamenter Sistem Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme". *Türkiye Siyaset Bilimi Dergisi*, 1 (2), 89-108 (2018). Accessed September 28, 2022. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/784088> p. 10.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 11, 12.

¹⁶⁹ Hakan Özdemir. "Türkiye'nin Parlamenter Hükümet Sistemi Tecrübesine Kısa Bir Bakış". *Bingöl Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Sayı: 20 (2010). Accessed September 28, 2022. <http://busbed.bingol.edu.tr/tr/download/article-file/1086661> p. 3.

In Turkey, the Parliamentary System was in function throughout 1923-2018. As described above, the President was symbolic, there was also a Prime Minister and decisions were made through cooperation and mutual influence between the legislative and executive organ. In Parliamentary systems, the legislative organ questions, interrogates, asks for parliamentary inquiry, monitors and oversees the executive organ. While the Parliament could overthrow the government through vote of no confidence, the executive organ also has the opportunity to dissolve the parliament. This is important because it creates balance and control mechanisms within the parliamentary system, constituting solutions towards possible bottlenecks that could be experienced along the way of decision-making. Because in case there is some sort of a crisis between the legislature and the executive power within the parliamentary system, it is possible to resolve this crisis through the means in question. In this system, the conflict between the parliament and the government is resolved by the citizens. In addition to this, in case the Prime Minister is believed to have mismanaged in this system, he/she either loses his/her job due to reactions from his own party or the parliament, or is forced to hold early elections. Therefore, the Parliamentary system is accepted as a mechanism that balances the executive power against the legislature one and it allows the possibility to implement a regime that is more flexible and more adaptable to the reactions of the voters.¹⁷⁰ The following figure is to better understand how decision-making works in this system.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 3, 4, 5.




Figure 9: Decision-making in the Parliamentary System.¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ Figure prepared by writer of this thesis.

After years of using this system, Turkey switched to the presidential system as of 2018. The presidential system has a stricter separation of powers compared to the parliamentary system. The executive organ can be formed and dissolved completely independently of the parliament, therefore there is no centre of political power in the presidential system. The power of the president depends on two factors. The first is the parliamentary majority, and the other is the relationship between this majority and the president. Accordingly, if the president is the chief of the group that also forms the majority in the parliament, he/she is in the most effective position. But if the majority is in opposition, it can be mentioned that the president's power of influence is at weakest. The presidential system requires three conditions to be met; First is that the President must be elected by the people, second is that he/she cannot be dismissed by any parliamentary decision during the term of office, and third is that he/she leads the government he/she has appointed to lead or administers it in a different way. In other words, the general consensus regarding the presidential system is the existence of a strong and effective government with an elected president for a certain period of time.¹⁷²




Figure 10: The selection processes of each system.¹⁷³

¹⁷² Ibid., Yıldız. “Başkanlık, Yarı Başkanlık ve Parlamenter Sistem Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme”. p. 5.

¹⁷³ Figure prepared by writer of this thesis.




Figure 11: Organizational Chart of the Presidential System of Turkey.¹⁷⁴

It is important to note here as well that the presidential systems may differ from country to country. In this case, the Turkish system inspires from the US presidential system but it does have its unique differences compared to it and therefore is called the ‘Turkish Type’. Like mentioned above, the President is elected by the people, the President may initiate a decree on the executive power and the appointment of senior public officials are carried out by these decrees. The Prime Ministry and the Council of Ministers have been abolished, and dualism has ended, and the executive body now consists only of the president. The President appoints his/her deputies and ministers. The President and the Parliament may abolish each other.

¹⁷⁴ “Erdogan Takes Total Control of “New Turkey””. *Center for Strategic and International Studies Website*. Accessed September 28, 2022. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/erdogan-takes-total-control-new-turkey>

However, due to the rule of co-election and in the event of a possible termination pursuant, re-election will be held for both bodies. In this system, the president is responsible towards the citizens. Decision-making in the Presidential System is done through the boards and them conducting the development of policy recommendations, monitoring policy implementation processes, carrying out demands, needs and impact analysis and increasing number of stakeholders throughout policy making processes. Overall, the decision is made by the president and carried out through the deputies and ministries he/she has appointed in the boards. The below organizational chart explains the shift of changes in the system from parliamentary to presidential.¹⁷⁵



¹⁷⁵ “Erdoğan Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sistemini Anlattı”. *Anadolu Ajansı Websitesi*. Accessed September 28, 2022. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gunun-basliklari/erdogan-cumhurbaskanligi-hukumet-sistemini-anlatti/1181673>

Parliamentary System

Dual Executive Ruling

- Symbolic Presidency Chair (President) and Council of Ministers.
- Ministers are selected through the recommendation of the Prime Minister and approval of the President.
- Ministers can be relieved of duty with the same method above.
- Ministers have responsibility in the Parliament.
- The executive organ is chosen by the Parliament and the Council of Ministers are usually formed in the Parliament.
- The President is chosen by the Parliament.
- The Executive Organ depends on the trust of the Legislative Organ.
- The President does not have any responsibility about his duty unless its related to treason.
- The Council of Ministers is responsible towards the Legislative Organ.
- The Legislative Organ can inspect the Executive Organ and if needed, it can relieve it of duty.
- The President can cancel the Legislative Organs decision in certain cases.
- The members of the Council of Ministers can join the Legislative Organ's activities.
- The Council of Ministers can draft a law and suggest it.
- The members of the Council of Ministers can take part in all sorts of voting or presenting an opinion within the Legislative Organ.

Presidential System

Monocracy / One-Person Ruling

- No symbolic Presidency Chair, the President is the leader of the country.
- The President chooses his/her own facilitators and these facilitators get approved by the Parliament.
- Vice-presidents cannot form a cabinet.
- Vice-presidents are independent and have no responsibility in the Parliament nor a political identity.
- Vice-presidents cannot make decisions by themselves.
- The President can dismiss vice-presidents without any explanation.
- Ministers are only responsible towards the President.
- The President is directly chosen by the citizens.
- The chosen President remains throughout their duty and cannot be dismissed until their duty term is over.
- The same President can only be chosen twice.
- The President does not come from the Legislative Organ and has no connection with it.
- The President is only responsible towards citizens, not the Legislative Organ.
- The Executive Organ does not depend on the trust of the Legislative Organ.
- The President does not have the power to cancel the Legislative Organ.
- The President could be removed from duty on exceptional occasions such as accusations.
- The Executive Organ cannot interfere with the Legislative Organ's work.
- The President and Ministers cannot take part in the Legislative Organ's work.
- The President cannot make a legislative proposal.

Figure 12: Overall brief summary of both the Parliamentarian and Presidential system.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ Figure prepared by writer of this thesis.

The importance of describing the decision-making systems of Turkey is to see the EU's criticisms and try to understand why its accession to the union is not so easy. It must be noted that there is recognition that Turkey has a role in the construction of Europe but whether this still remains true or not is debated. It is also significant to note that there is a strong history of Turkey and EU relations in regards to both of their decisions and connection to each other today.

Turkey's vocation towards Europe emerged back in the Ottoman Empire when modernisation and westernization began to be associated with one another. Back in the day, the Ottoman Empire was admitted into the Concert of Europe. Even in the last few decades of the Empire, the reforms introduced brought Turkey and Europe closer to each other. In fact, the Ottoman Empire was the very first Muslim country to adopt a constitution as well as representative institutions in 1876. This process naturally accelerated after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Turkey underwent a big transformation and the European model was followed throughout this process. The Administrative Code was taken from France, the Civil Code was taken from Switzerland and the Criminal Code was taken from Italy. In each case, the most advanced piece of legislation of the time was chosen for implementation in Turkey. Therefore, as Kunalalp emphasizes in his article, it could be said that Turkey is no stranger to adopting European legislations, which would be a handy practice in terms of its process of preparing for the membership to the Union.¹⁷⁷

But why has Turkey taken Europe as an example? The reason for this is because Turkey's values are very much similar to the West, and especially to those of Europe. The European model of society relates a lot more to the structure of Turkey compared to other models found around the world. Therefore, Turkey has taken an interest in the efforts to achieve a united Europe, even before the EEC. Turkey is one of the founding members of the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), alongside an early member of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In their own ways, each of these institutions were devoted to bringing Western states together. Turkey even asked to become a part of the EEC back in 1959, and the principle that Turkey could one day join the EC was recognised in the first agreement. But Turkey was not able to join the EEC in 1963. Turkey's economy was far from being capable of withstanding competitive pressures that could possibly occur from being a member of the EEC. Therefore, through agreement a

¹⁷⁷ Selim Kunalalp. "Joining The European Union: A Process Underway". *Il Politico* 65, no. 3 (194) (2000): 355–62. Accessed 6 January, 2023. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24005556> p. 355.

transition period was foreseen for Turkey. The path of economic integration was targeted to be reached through the gradual establishment of the customs union. In 1970, an Additional Protocol was signed between the EEC and Turkey, which entered into force in 1973, providing for a customs union between two of the parties. Establishing a customs union was envisaged as a first major step towards the integration of Turkey with the Community. Achieving a customs union would demonstrate that the Turkish economy is strong enough to bear the burden of competition from the European industry, which was considered to be a requirement of its membership to the EEC eventually. But due to the not so good situation of the Turkish economy, a long transitional period was envisaged. For many years, Turkey and EU have had ups and downs. In fact, it is the only candidate country that has fully opened its economy to competition from the European industry as well as the only one to have completed a customs union with the EU. All of these achievements were made without Turkey receiving any sort of help financially.¹⁷⁸

After the end of the Cold War, large parts of the continent that was a part of the Soviet Block ended up integrating with the EU. Turkey was supportive of this process since it would help guarantee stability within the international field. Turkey was very much aware that it needed to fulfil the requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria after the 1993 EU Summit when they were adopted. Therefore, knowing these will be the requirements for membership, Turkey asked for the candidate status alongside equal treatment. Unfortunately, Turkey could not meet the expectations of the EU. After crucial decisions were taken at the Luxembourg meeting in 1997, the EU decided to divide applicant countries into three separate groups. Groups consisted of those who are closest to fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and those who were not considered ready for accession negotiations but would still benefit from the pre-accession strategy intended to prepare them for the next stage. But Turkey was deprived of both clear accession and a strategy to help it reach the goal of membership, which meant that it was left in a category of its own. This was indeed a disappointment for Turkey. A special European strategy for Turkey was designed to bring it closer to the EU in every way possible, with a view to preparing it for membership. However, Turkey's goal of membership was not set out in clear terms, but only by implication. This absence of concrete outcomes meant that the efforts had failed to produce any appreciable results for Turkey.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 357.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 358.

All of this meant that Turkey and the EU could be moving in different directions. This was considered a risk and made the EU question the wisdom of the policies that were adopted in the Luxembourg Council. Turkey, being located in a troubled geopolitical region, was actually a valuable partner to have for the EU. Therefore, the EU rectified their earlier committed mistakes in the Helsinki Committee. Through this committee, to describe Turkey as a candidate, the EU adopted a similar strategy to the ones devised for its existing candidates.¹⁸⁰

Turkey has never argued that it fulfils the terms of membership. The ‘candidate’ status has helped improve Turkey’s relations with Greece, who for many years tried to use its membership as a means to block or slow Turkey’s possible advancements with the European Community. The situation with Greece is especially sensitive due to the Cyprus problem, but that is irrelevant to this study.¹⁸¹ All in all, the reason why this was all briefly described was to gain a sense of how the relations between Turkey and EU have developed throughout history. Through this, it could even be said that because Turkey has a history of trying to adapt towards modernization, or in other words westernization; it has taken the West / EC as a lead when it comes to targeting to achieve a democratic decision-making system.

On the other hand, in order to present how the decision-making systems of Turkey is important and what it means for this study, the criticisms of the Union relevant to this study must be examined. According to the Commission Staff Working Document, which is a report on Turkey’s advancements and progress regarding its process of adapting to the EU, it is observed that there are certain criticisms from the Union side. The relevant criticisms are the EU’s concerns related with Turkey’s decision-making system, democracy, backwardness in developments regarding CSOs, adaptation to the European Court of Human Rights and problems in transparency within institutions.

It is indicated that there are serious deficiencies in Turkey’s democratic institutions, mentioning that the ‘democratic backsliding’ is an ongoing issue. The EU also criticises the Presidential System of Turkey, indicating that there are structural deficiencies. By this, it is explained in the report that the Turkish Parliament lacks the necessary means to hold the government accountable. The way the current decision-making system is set up centralises power at the level of the Presidency without ensuring that there is an effective separation of

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 359.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 360, 361.

powers between the executive, legislative and the judiciary. This is considered as a big deficiency in the EU's progress report. The absence of the separation of powers and unbalanced mechanism makes the EU question Turkey's democratic accountability. For example, the executive branch is only limited to elections and according to the EU, this is not considered as transparent nor democratic.¹⁸² Therefore, it could be mentioned here that the decision-making mechanisms of Turkey has been highly judged by the EU for a long time, making it one of the major problems in its accession process. The report indicates that the Presidential System has weakened the Parliament's legislative and oversight functions. The EU considers the President being granted extensive legislative powers allowing him to make decisions across a wide range of policy areas as a limitation towards the Parliament's role. In the report, it is explained that the Parliament's legislative role has been hampered by the Presidential System, because of the widespread use of Presidential decisions and decrees. Furthermore, it is indicated that the Parliament's oversight of the executive has remained at a weak level and does not have the means to hold the government accountable. It has been observed that the Members of Parliament can only submit written questions to the Vice President and ministers are not allowed by law to formally question the President. On top of this, Presidential decrees have not been subject to parliamentary scrutiny, which has resulted in the EU emphasizing that the Parliamentary oversight of public spending must be improved significantly.¹⁸³

The EU also criticises Turkey due to the Judiciary targeting members of the opposition parties within the Parliament, which leads to political pluralism. It is indicated that the existing system does not allow for an adequate legal protection of opposing parliamentarians. The boundaries of freedom of speech is also criticised by the EU because expression of opinions is not free. The EU gives the example of how a high number of parliament officials remain in prison.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸² European Commission. "Commission Staff Working Document: Türkiye 2022 Report". *European Commission, Brussels, SWD, 333 (2022)*. Accessed 30 December, 2022. <https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-10/Türkiye%20Report%202022.pdf> p. 5.

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

Another area the EU criticises Turkey in is how there is a backslide regarding the Civil Society environment. The EU indicates that there is a continuous pressure to CSOs and their ability to operate freely. The Union emphasizes that both inclusive and systematic mechanisms need to be put into place to achieve impactful consultation of the civil society regarding their views on new legislation and policies. The EU considers CSO participation crucial in terms of achieving and ensuring a full participatory approach which is a constitutive element of a functioning democracy.¹⁸⁵

On the other hand, in this progress report, the accountability of the military, the police and intelligence services are judged due to being very limited. In the current presidential system of Turkey, the executive branch has been granted broad powers over the security forces and Parliamentary oversight of these security institutions are considered weak. It is indicated that the Parliamentary oversight of them must be strengthened. Subsequently, the EU indicates that security personnel seem to enjoy overreaching administrative and judicial protections in cases of alleged human rights violations, with disproportionate use of force. The Union also criticises the ongoing investigations of alleged military offences committed by military personnel, mentioning that this requires a prior authorisation from civilian superiors. The EU also closely monitors Turkey's respect for human rights, rule of law and democracy through the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly. There are many other concerns and issues regarding the judiciary's adherence to the European and international standards, with mention to specific events. The Union also mentions more issues like terrorism in the report, but since it is irrelevant to this study, it is important to remain in line with the criticisms relevant to the study, which is the ones made specifically towards the presidential system and its decision-making processes in Turkey.¹⁸⁶

One of the other criticisms about Turkey's decision-making mechanisms is related with the low levels of participation by women, both in employment and politics. It is indicated that there is an increased conservative attitude towards equality and the ideology of gender, which is resulting in worsened socio-economic conditions for women. These deteriorating economic conditions increases female poverty, unemployment and hunger, all judged in relation with Turkey's respect for human rights.¹⁸⁷ Once again, it is indicated that women organizations,

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 16, 18.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 42.

CSOs must be protected and even the rights of children in relation to the juvenile justice system must be fixed in order for Turkey to advance its accession process.

To sum this up, Turkey's decision-making mechanisms are of importance to this study in terms of understanding what exactly the EU criticises concerning it. Knowing the criticisms would provide a broader perception of what is needed to achieve advancing towards accessing the EU. On the other hand, describing these mechanisms will provide a better view in order to understand Turkey's side of lobbying.

2.3. Informal Ways of Decision-Making and Lobbying in the EU

As explained in the previous chapters, lobbying has its various methods and techniques that range from formal to informal ways. When discussing the topic of Turkey's possible membership to the EU, it would be relevant to explain the informal ways of decision-making as it is what relates to the study. According to Vannoni's study, in the EU, informal modes of governance are considered to frame the 'elite forum-based' relationship with emphasis on transparency and reputation emerged between the Commission and interest groups.¹⁸⁸

Lobbies can operate both formally or informally. Its objective is not to preserve benefits and interests or to remove the state from commercial or economic affairs. Lobbyists usually target using the government as a partner and supporter of corporate policies and businesses to attract support.¹⁸⁹ Lobbies try to identify all factors that impede development and growth of firms by analysing the governments' performance. Those who conduct lobbying activities try to assist government decision-makers to make good decisions by using statistics and providing scientific information. Alongside this, they work in the interest of the employers and the state.¹⁹⁰ And like mentioned many times in this study, it is important to note that transparency has been

¹⁸⁸ Matia Vannoni. "The European Informational Lobbying System as an Informal Mode of Governance: a Dynamic Principal-Agent Perspective". *4th Biennial ECPR Standing Group for Regulatory Governance Conference*. Accessed 21 January, 2023.

<https://regulation.upf.edu/exeter-12-papers/Paper%20043%20-%20Vannoni%202012%20-%20European%20Informational%20Lobbying%20System%20as%20an%20Informal%20Mode%20of%20Governance.pdf> p. 19.

¹⁸⁹ Heike Klüber. *Lobbying in the European Union: Interest Groups, Lobbying Coalitions and Policy Change*. (Oxford University Press, 2013). Accessed January 13, 2022.

¹⁹⁰ Ghadir Golkarian. "Iran's Strategy and Perspectives in Lobbying". *Near East University, Faculty of Art and Science, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*, Vol: 9, Issue: 2 (2019): 383-299. Accessed 21 January, 2023. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/820095> p. 385.

at the centre of approach EU institutions have employed to regulate lobbying and ‘lobbying regulation’ refers to a broad spectrum of arrangements like detailed legislations.¹⁹¹

Informal ways of decision-making can be described as ‘invisible lobbying’, which involves the interpersonal rhetorical transactions of information. These transactions are considered important in terms of public policy decision-making. Invisible lobbying is a type of informal lobbying tactic that is used by interest groups who engage in ‘informal contacts’ with officials. The use of this influential tactic is considered to be more important than other commonly studied lobbying techniques such as political protests, litigation or campaign contributions. This is because there are strong results for invisible lobbying in policymaking processes. It is important to note that interest groups would not spend their resources to participate in this process unless it involves benefits for them.¹⁹² According to Cooper and Nownes, informal lobbying is described as an “insider” technique, which means that only interest groups who know whom to contact alongside those who know when and how to make the contact are likely to lobby public decision-makers using these ‘invisible’ tactics.¹⁹³

In this case, there are many approaches to observe when analysing the EU’s decision-making processes. Most decisions taken at the EU level are the result of negotiations, which are conducted at various levels such as local, central, governmental and ministerial. But there is an important place in terms of the role of informal negotiations, consultations and exchanges.¹⁹⁴ The informal approach is ontologically prior to formal social international activities¹⁹⁵ and informal decision-making is highly related with the social constructivist theory, in terms of how the learning involves a complex process of participation in society, which includes social, individual and cultural dimensions.¹⁹⁶ The EU’s structure is considered as a soft type of integration, which targets developing commitments to specific practices, norms, values and

¹⁹¹ Ibid., Vannoni. “The European Informational Lobbying System as an Informal Mode of Governance: a Dynamic Principal-Agent Perspective”. p. 12.

¹⁹² Doris Dialer. Richter Margarethe. *Lobbying in the European Union: Strategies, Dynamics and Trends*. (Springer, 2019). Accessed January 12, 2022.

¹⁹³ Susan Webb Yackee. “Invisible (and Visible) Lobbying: The Case of State Regulatory Policymaking.” *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 15, no. 3 (2015): 322–44. Accessed 20 January, 2023. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24643837> p. 324, 325.

¹⁹⁴ Florin Popa. “Formal and Informal Decision-Making at EU Level”. *Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest* (2010). Accessed 20 January, 2023. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235246099> p. 2.

¹⁹⁵ Thomas Kwasi Teku. “Informal International Relations”. *The University of Western Ontario, International Studies* (2021). Accessed 20 January, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.613> p. 2.

¹⁹⁶ Gianvito D’Aprile, Plerpaolo Di Bitonto. “Social, constructivist and informal learning processes: Together on the edge for designing digital game-based learning environments”. *Journal of E-Learning and Knowledge Society* (2015). Accessed 20 January, 2023. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282335940> p. 25.

attitudes. The concept of integration within EU is based on the complex legislative and institutional framework which aims to achieve a common space of shared policies, values, administrative structures and values in which people, services, ideas and products can freely circulate.¹⁹⁷

The diversity of decision-making procedures as well as the diversity of stakeholders is what contributes towards the EU's integration. The model used in the EU provides a decentralized, flexible context, which is able to accommodate a variety of viewpoints and interests of actors who try to claim a greater role in different levels of authority and political decision-making.¹⁹⁸ When informal ways of decision-making are observed, it can be seen that there are many forms of it such as insider dealings, bribery, under table deals, patronage, backroom deals, political dialogue and many more. These ones are the most relevant to this study and it would be important to emphasize that informal decisions cannot successfully exist in organizations or countries that aren't completely transparent.¹⁹⁹ It can be said that lobbying related to informal ways of decision-making therefore is held behind closed doors.²⁰⁰

These informal ways are also used by Turkish lobbies located in Europe and they are well integrated in Eurogroups. Examples will be discussed in the third chapter of this study, but it would be significant to indicate that both Turkey and the EU use informal ways to try and achieve their goals. Turkey's use of lobbying groups in the EU usually consists of improving its image through private meetings or business opportunities, in line with the Europeanisation approach, which covers a large spectrum.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., Popa. "Formal and Informal Decision-Making at EU Level". p. 3.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁹⁹ Metatheory of Change. "Observation of Informal Decisions".

<https://metatheorie-der-veraenderung.info/wpmtags-en/observation-of-informal-decisions/?lang=en#:~:text=There%20are%20many%20names%20and,to%20name%20just%20a%20few.>

²⁰⁰ Ibid., Golkarian. "Iran's Strategy and Perspectives in Lobbying". p. 392.

²⁰¹ Sandrine Devaux, Imogen Sudbery. "Europeanisation: Social Actors and the Transfer of Models in EU-27". *Centre français de recherche en sciences sociales*, (2009). Accessed 21 January, 2023. <https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00496157> p. 97, 98.

To conclude this chapter, overall, the structure of the EU and criticisms towards Turkey as well as both of their decision-making mechanisms were described to give a broad perspective of how their relations have developed throughout their history. Observing their structures in terms of their decision-making mechanisms and the informal ways in decision-making aimed to provide the link between how lobbying informally is related with the social construction of interests and actions in this approach, within the decision-making system of the EU, its approach towards Turkey and Turkey's reason for approach towards joining the EU.



CHAPTER THREE

Lobbying, Decision-Making and Turkey's Efforts

3.1. Lobbying and Decision-Making

Lobbying is a broad term and it varies widely. It is political and involves the persuasion of political decision makers. The decision makers do not have to entirely be in politics, they could be party leaders, ministers, presidents of institutions, hospitals, CEO's (Chief Executive Officer) of businesses and many other people with the power to influence people.²⁰²

Like mentioned in the previous parts of the study, healthiest democratic societies allow lobbying activities. A democracy is a system where everyone is equally entitled to take part in the decision-making processes. If everyone agreed on one idea or that political values are fundamentally unjustifiable, there would be no rational movement to participate in democratic decision-making and the democratic competition would be purely about the struggle for achieving power.²⁰³

In today's world, the advancements in decision, behavioural, cognitive and social sciences show how the human behaviour is a complex matter that is driven by logic, many facts and influence specifically towards political decision-making. Social relations, values, facts, concerns, interests all shape and drive the political behaviour as well as decision-making alongside the interplay between group and individual decision-making.²⁰⁴ Decision-making is the thought process that people go through and are engaged in to reach policies. At the individual level, decisions are to solve personal problems. But at the governmental level they are made for the problems people face. Just like how no one can live without making decisions, a government cannot handle any domestic nor foreign problems without making decisions, and

²⁰² "Lobbying Decisionmakers". *Community Tool Box Website*. Accessed December 29, 2022. <https://ctb.ku.edu/en/table-of-contents/advocacy/direct-action/lobby-decisionmakers/main>

²⁰³ E. Lagerspetz. "Democracy". *Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics (Second Edition)*, Academic Press, 2012. Accessed December 20, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-373932-2.00197-6> p. 2.

²⁰⁴ Laura Smillie. "Understanding the Drivers of Political Decision-making in 21st-century Government". *Apotitical Website* (2021). Accessed December 18, 2022. <https://apolitical.co/solution-articles/en/understanding-the-drivers-of-political-decision-making-in-21st-century-government>

sometimes, when the government makes decisions to achieve successful solutions for domestic or foreign problems, lobbying occurs.²⁰⁵

Lobbying which is the practice of influencing, opposing, promoting or attempting to influence the political system before any legislative body, aims to successfully persuade those in authority such as an elected member of a government or organization.²⁰⁶ In other words, lobbying is the written or oral communication with public officials such as civil and public servants, holders or employees of a public office located within the executive or legislative branch, in order to impact policies, administrative decisions or the legislation. It not only takes place in the legislative field but also the executive branch, both at sub-national and national levels.²⁰⁷ The reason lobbying is usually considered a healthy act within democratic societies is because lobbyists who target influencing governments represent valid interests, which bring much needed data and insights to the policy makers' attention. Therefore, lobbying can actually have positive impact decision-makings. It is a legitimate act of political participation that allows stakeholders to access the implementation and development of public policies whilst also providing learning for the policy makers.²⁰⁸

Interest groups employ lobbyists to protect, advance or achieve their interests. The more policies the government produces, the more lobbyists become involved in the system.²⁰⁹ The impact of lobbying on decision-making mechanisms can be highly significant since it involves the process described above that explains how lobbyists aim to influence the legislative and executive body depending on its motivation. Lobbyists have a wide range of connections that are politically connected to members of interest within the political system.²¹⁰ They use these personal relationships to impact decision-making mechanisms, especially through regular contact. Lobbyists don't tend to threaten and force public officials but rather take their time to

²⁰⁵ "Decision-making at the Governmental Level". *StudyCorgi Website* (2020). Accessed December 20, 2022. <https://studycorgi.com/decision-making-at-the-governmental-level/>

²⁰⁶ Definition of lobbying from the *Cambridge Business English Dictionary*. Accessed 21 December, 2022. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/lobbying>

²⁰⁷ OECD Legal Instruments. "Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying". *OECD/LEGAL/0379*. Accessed December 20, 2022. <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/256/256.en.pdf> p. 7.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁰⁹ "Lobbying: The Art of Influence". *American Government and Politics in the Information Age Website*. Accessed December 16, 2022. <https://open.lib.umn.edu/americangovernment/chapter/9-2-lobbying-the-art-of-influence/>

²¹⁰ Tim Veen. *The Political Economy of Collective Decision-Making: Conflicts and Coalitions in the Council of the European Union*. (Springer, 2011). Accessed January 12, 2022. <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-642-20174-5>

explain the importance of what they are rooting for, trying to convince the official through informing them. They go through explaining possible impacts and use other methods to convince these connections.²¹¹ All of these different efforts in lobbying are what impact decision-making mechanisms as well as their processes.

In terms of Turkey's membership process to the EU, the role of lobbying and its impact towards decision-making mechanisms is essential to observe and understand. Europeanisation is an objective route for modernization in Turkey, therefore the EU has a special place. Achieving membership is in line with Turkey's interests regarding modernization, therefore Turkey tries to use the role of lobbying beyond European accession by trying to be a part of the integration.²¹² This indicates the relation between lobbying, social constructivism and the connection to Turkey's accession to the EU. There are many efforts from Turkey's side that advocate EU membership for Turkey, but is it actually enough to improve the country's image and help towards an accession? This brings the study to the point of how transparency and established regulations are of importance in terms of successful acts of lobbying towards a specific goal, and in this case, its Turkey's efforts to join the EU.

3.2. Lobbying Efforts from Turkey in terms of its Accession to the EU

The EU has an authority to make regulations and set binding rules in fields where it is authorized with the founding treaties. All the EU institutions work in accordance with the duties and responsibilities stipulated in those regulations. The decision-making process of the EU contains procedures in which there is more than one institution involved. Those institutions work together in order to jointly legislate new laws. EU Commission, EU Parliament and the Council of Ministers share responsibilities in the legislation process. This decision process is initiated with the submission of law proposals by the EU Commission to the EU Parliament and the Council of Ministers.

²¹¹ "How do lobbyists influence public policy decisions?". *CliffsNotes Website*. Accessed December 26, 2022. <https://www.cliffsnotes.com/cliffsnotes/subjects/american-government/how-do-lobbyists-influence-public-policy-decisions>

²¹² Ibid., Devaux, Sudbery. "Europeanisation: Social Actors and the Transfer of Models in EU-27". p. 95.

Legislative activity in the European Union is carried out through cooperation between the Union's three main institutions; the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. The EU Commission is a driving force which proposes draft legislation, which also then initiates the legislative process. However, there may be situations in which other institutions such as the European Central Bank, European Investment Bank, European Parliament and member states could propose for new legislation.²¹³ It is important to mention that the EU is fully inclusive for its member states, involving them in the structure and allowing them full voting rights.²¹⁴

It is not possible to exactly compare Turkey and the EU's decision-making systems, considering that one of them is a state and the other is a Union, which is formed by member states. But briefly, the only particular similarities between their methods of decision-making that could be mentioned are the following; a) Turkey's old Parliamentary system used to have its Parliament elected by its citizens, which is similar to EU citizens electing the EU Parliament and, b) Once again in the old Turkish Parliamentary system, the Parliament President was elected by the members of the parliament, same as how the EU members of the Parliament elect the EU Parliament president.²¹⁵ The situation mentioned in 'a)' changed in 2014 for Turkey, when for the first time ever the citizens started to also elect the President alongside the Parliament whilst still remaining in the Parliamentary system. Then by 2018, with the switch to the Presidential system, Turkey's President was no longer symbolic, and the system changed entirely. Decisions during the Parliamentary system were made through the elected parliament, but now decisions are made through the elected president of choice.²¹⁶

The EU on the other hand, does not have one single president. Instead, the three main EU institutions have their presidents, which are all elected differently. The European Commission President is appointed by national leaders who are the heads of member states / EU Countries, The European Council President is also appointed the same way, and finally the European

²¹³ Mehlika Özlem Ultan. "Decision-Making Process in The European Union Legislative Procedure and Transitional Period Analysis". *AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Vol:17, Year:17, No: 3, 17 (2017). Accessed August 12, 2022. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/529728> p. 2.

²¹⁴ Sinan Ülgen. "Avoiding a Divorce: A Virtual EU Membership for Turkey" *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (2012). Accessed 25 October, 2022. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13084> p. 7.

²¹⁵ "European Institutions and Consultative Bodies of the Union". *Assembleia Da Republica Website*. <https://www.parlamento.pt/sites/EN/ForeignAffairs/Paginas/ConsultativeBodiesUnion.aspx>

²¹⁶ Şadiye Ay. "Türkiye'de Parlamenter Sistem ve Hükümet Sistemi Tartışmaları". *Mevzuat Dergisi*, Yıl: 7, Sayı: 77 (2004). Accessed 26 October, 2022. <https://www.mevzuatdergisi.com/2004/05a/01.htm>

Parliament President is elected by the members of the parliament, who are chosen by the citizens of EU.²¹⁷

The European Union does carry many of the characteristics of a typical country, but it is not a state, but rather a political system. This is because the EU has a clearly-defined set of institutions that make the rules and decisions together as one. On the other hand, there are lots of political parties and interest groups within this union, which represents member states. Citizens and social groups of the EU are able to voice themselves and make political demands through political parties or interest groups. This is important because the decisions made in EU impact the daily lives of people who live in Europe.

Any collective decisions that are made within its political system can affect the EU society as a whole. And just like any other society and political system within a state, the EU's political system is in continuous interaction, always discovering new demands and making new decisions. Like mentioned, these decisions can impact the lives of those who live there, or allow the EU citizens to create pressure on the system for new changes through demands. The biggest difference about EU and a state is the fact that a state has the power of coercion through police and other security forces. Because EU is formed through participation from member states, this power belongs to the individual decisions of member states. To explain this in a different way, the EU relies on its member states to enforce and follow the policies and regulations that are decided. Therefore, EU is more decentralized compared to a state. The power is not concentrated on a single authority instead it is spread to other parties such as individual nation-states.²¹⁸

Western Europe has especially become more transnational, with a unique degree of continental economic integration, a single market, with a single currency for most of its members.²¹⁹ It is important to signify that the EU has differences between member countries when it comes to financial and economic power as well as institutional developments. It is not exactly balanced and this makes it difficult to follow up during decision-making processes

²¹⁷ "Presidents". *Official European Union Website*. https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/leadership/presidents_en

²¹⁸ "Introduction: The EU – A Political System, but not a State". *Carleton University Website*. <https://carleton.ca/ces/elearning/politics/introduction-the-eu-a-political-system-but-not-a-state/>

²¹⁹ Michael Mann. "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?". *Review of International Political Economy* 4, no. 3 (1997): 472–96. Accessed 25 October, 2022. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4177235> p. 10.

because there are so many member states that all differ in terms of economic power alongside voting power. This complication results in additional difficulties for the integration process of the Union.²²⁰

Overall, the EU and Turkey do not have many similarities, considering one is a union and the other one is a state. The case of decision-making highly differs for both sides rather than being similar. It is important to acknowledge that EU has different mechanisms that impact its process of decision-making, such as social and interest groups, which are able to influence its institutions. There are also regulations that follow this up and enable it. But all in all, it is notable that EU has an area where it is possible to conduct lobbying activities, whilst Turkey doesn't have any proper impact in this area, nor any regulations regarding it. For Turkey, it is not possible to say that there are significant interest groups who impact the decision-making processes. It is significant to keep in mind that Turkey is not so similar to EU in terms of its decision-making system as well as the way this system is impacted through interest groups, hence, lobbying.²²¹

Turkey has had the candidate country status for longer than any other EU candidate country.²²² Achieving EU full membership is not only a state policy that has been adopted for more than fifty years, but also a social transformation project for Turkey. The role of institutions and civil society in this aspect is extremely important. In fact, Turkey has accelerated its efforts to increase the dialogue between civil society elements in the process of trying to achieve membership to the European Union. The concept of institutions and understanding of civil society in Turkey is changing due to the participatory democracy understanding accepted in EU. The existence of democracy and democratic culture where there are democratic institutions has become of more importance, especially in order to reach the goal of harmonization with the EU.²²³

²²⁰ Nedžad S. Basic. "Allocation of Power in The European Union – From National Decision-making to Influence on Supranational Decision-making". *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, Vol: 20, No: 2 (2012). Accessed September 30, 2022. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/1307> p. 3.

²²¹ Heinz Kramer. "Turkey and EU: The EU's Perspective". *SWP Berlin* (2006). Accessed March 22, 2022. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/fachpublikationen/Heinz_Kramer_ks.pdf

²²² Şükrü Alper Yurttaş. "Lobbying Activities of Interest Groups During The EU Membership Process of Turkey". *Dicle Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol: 12, No: 24, p. 149-177. Accessed December 28, 2022. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/2517695> p. 152.

²²³ Ahmet Yatkın. "Avrupa Birliği Üyelik Sürecinde Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları: Güçlü Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları, Avrupa Birliği Üyesi Türkiye". *Fırat Üniversitesi Doğu Araştırmaları Dergisi* 6 (2008): 29-38. Accessed December 21, 2022. <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/fudad/issue/47149/593584> p. 1.

After the legislative, executive, judiciary and the media, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) are trying to become a power mechanism described as the “fifth power” in Turkey. In Turkish literature, NGOs can also be called Voluntary Organizations, Civil Society Organizations (CSO), foundations, associations, unions or chambers. NGOs are considered as a “third sector” after the public and private sectors. Organizations based entirely on volunteerism, such as associations, foundations, platforms, citizens' initiatives, industry and chambers of commerce, unions and cooperatives serve as the main non-governmental organizations in Turkey.²²⁴ These can also be called intermediary institutions, which conduct lobbying activities. But intermediary institutions that are used for lobbying in Turkey, are not exactly sufficient.²²⁵ Then again, Turkey does not have any regulations regarding lobbying, therefore it is not conducted in an organized way like within the European Union.

According to a research paper by Tülay Yılmaz, despite Turkey having a population advantage overseas, there are about 5 million Turkish citizens living in 118 countries who are not able to engage in effective lobbying. Experts have indicated that the biggest reason for this is due to the lack of determination of common goals. The efforts of Turkish people overseas are not strong enough and in fact, insufficient. Associations and Turkish people need to properly communicate about lobbying and its promotion, and it is imperative that the state and private sector should financially support these activities.²²⁶

On the other hand, main institutions in EU are the ones explained in chapter two within this study, which are; The European Commission, The European Parliament and The Council of the European Union. There is a strong transparent and democratic environment within the EU, where the Commission’s initiatives related to interest groups allow lobbyists to register with both the Commission and the Parliament.²²⁷ Special interest actors desire to influence the EU agenda through active groups with special interests.²²⁸

²²⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

²²⁵ Tülay Yılmaz. “Türkiye’nin Kullanamadığı Stratejik Güç; Lobicilik...” *Türkiye Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (TASAM)*, 2009. Accessed December 21, 2022. <http://baskanlikreferandumu.siyasaliletisim.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/Turkiyeninkullanamadigiguclobicilik.pdf> p. 3.

²²⁶ Ibid., p. 5.

²²⁷ Michelle Cini. “Ethical Governance and Lobbying in the EU Institutions”. *School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol*. (2011). Accessed December 21, 2022. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228465514> p. 4.

²²⁸ Alexandra Pop. “Book Review: Lobbying in the European Union: Institutions, Actors and Issues, David Coen and Jeremy Richardson”. *Oxford University Press, UK, 2009, ISBN 978-0-19-920735-0. Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, Vol 13, No 1, 2013. Accessed December 23, 2022. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2233828> p. 3.

While government refers to formal institutions of decision-making, governance is what EU as a union follows. Governance is considered a more inclusive term, which implies that the process of governing eventually cuts across the private and public spheres. This allows the incorporation of a wide range of actors whom can form networks that are involved at various levels of governing. Governance could involve interest organizations, research institutes, the military, political parties, religious leaders or businesses alongside regional and local authorities.²²⁹ All of these types of formations can impact the way lobbying reaches out to the decision-makers.

It can be said that any decision which is to be implemented usually involves multi-layered processes. These processes cover a wide range of dimensions that range from what a society desires for the future to a country's or in this case, a union's general political, cultural and economic aspects. It is important that policy implementation and political decision-making processes aren't defined as the same thing. The implementation of policies imposes responsibilities by giving significant power to implementers although the increase of participation or intervention within decision-making processes can make it difficult for a decision or exercise to advance.²³⁰

It is important to also keep EU's perception of Turkey in mind when making a comparative analysis regarding the efforts of the EU institutions. Europe has become a reference point for Turkey in terms of democratic, transparent and human rights segments within its society.²³¹ European decision-makers have always privileged their core targets as achieving European integration through constructing the European identity. It is one of the top priorities even during times of crisis. 'European Identity' is what represents the European values such as rule of law, human rights, social justice, representative democracy and commitment to the economic progress. These can be described as the characteristics of the European Community. Institutions located within EU also work in line with these European identity features and prioritise promoting them. So, the European identity can be described as something that was characterised by persistent fluctuations, something which was socially constructed in order to increase the

²²⁹ Ibid., Cini. "Ethical Governance and Lobbying in the EU Institutions". p. 3.

²³⁰ Hüseyin Şirin. "Sivil Toplum Örgütlerinin Eğitime İlişkin Karar Alma Süreçlerine Katılımları Üzerine Bir Araştırma". *EĞİTİM VE BİLİM, [S.l.]*, v. 34, n. 153, 2010. ISSN 1300-1337. Accessed December 20, 2022. <http://egitimvebilim.ted.org.tr/index.php/EB/article/view/582/70> p. 3.

²³¹ Çiğdem Nas. "Turkish Identity and The Perception of Europe". *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, Vol: 9, No: 1, 2001. Accessed December 26, 2022. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/maruaad/issue/339/1723> p. 10.

low levels of public trust alongside finding effective responses towards the democratic legitimacy crisis throughout EU circles.²³² Therefore, EU institutions also work in line with the priority of protecting its European identity.

Throughout the history of the formation of the EU, increase in unemployment due to economic crisis and the migration of many people from Eastern European countries to Western European countries due to economic concerns, increased ethnocentrism within the union, which also caused far-right parties to increase their votes in the elections.²³³ Although, Turkey has had actions that were perceived positively from the EU side, such as applying for an association or showing interest in European Communities that targeted a route towards Westernization. Turkey was also included in the reconstruction of Europe, despite not actively taking part in WWII (World War II).²³⁴ But problems related to the economic and political system within the World began to emerge by 1970s. Priorities of Turkey had to change because of the world problems which impacted Turkey as well, causing civil unrest, political instability, economic problems and radicalization of anarchy and politics. To overcome these problems, Turkey had to focus on achieving industrialization and socio-economic development and most industrialists were not for the rapid integration with the EC due to the possible impacts it could cause in terms of industrialization and liberalization processes.²³⁵ On the other hand, today, there are many other concerns regarding Turkey's accession to the EU, such as its large population and religious beliefs. Lobbying activities from the EU side can find many aspects to be against Turkey's membership, creating blockage throughout this process.

It is inevitable to indicate that EU institutions target protecting the European identity, which means there are lobbying activities conducted against Turkey's accession to the union. Within EU, Turkey is considered as a country that needs to develop more and in line with the European values. It is evident that lobbying in EU highly impacts the process of Turkey's possible membership. It is also clear that Turkish people and institutions located in EU are not able to get together and properly conduct lobbying activities, at least not strong enough to influence

²³² Uğur Tekiner. "The 'European (Union) Identity': An Overview". *E-International Relations Website* (2020). Accessed December 27, 2022. <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/04/15/the-european-union-identity-an-overview/> p. 1, 2.

²³³ Hakan Sağlam. "Türk Medyasının Türkiye - Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerine Yaklaşımının Okurların Tutum ve Kanaatleri Üzerindeki Etkileri". *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi*, Cilt:17, No: 2, s. 389-430. (2018). Accessed December 29, 2022. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/624853> p. 9.

²³⁴ Ibid., Nas. "Turkish Identity and The Perception of Europe". p. 6.

²³⁵ Ibid., p. 7.

the decision-makers there, in order to endorse the EC gaining positive views about Turkey's accession to the union.

It has gotten more apparent that the EU's networks have developed throughout the changing environment of European integration. Many large firms set up their offices to take part in national or European trade associations, making a substantial amount turn towards public affairs companies, asking them to lobby on their behalf. Influencing the process of legislation got a lot more important, especially for the internal market. The EC's competencies grew steadily, especially policy wise and this had a direct impact on businesses. Regulations, decisions, directives and recommendations were all becoming a daily occurrence in areas like telecommunications, financial services, biotechnology and environmental law. Therefore, this resulted in a strong increase of group activities to further impact and increased the number of active consultants at the European level. A change occurred in the attitude of institutions regarding business demands. There was a wide scoped push in the direction of promoting competitiveness and deregulation. Subsequently, the heads of state and European institutions themselves actually ended up requiring businesses to promote the movement towards achieving a single currency. The observed drastic increase in lobbying brought significant implications alongside it. The lack of accountability and transparency within the EU's decision-making system was noticed and indicated in the European political processes. Therefore, this led up to the lobbying profession getting various codes of conduct by the EU industry and institutions. By the end of 1990s, achieving a regulation for lobbying and the demand of greater transparency were the main targets. The Treaty of Amsterdam was envisaged as an opportunity to prepare the institutional framework for enlargement alongside bringing the Union closer to its citizens. Progress was made regarding social policy, justice, employment, common foreign and security policy decision-making and home affairs. The EU shifted to a new chapter of employment, catching the interests of companies. There was a new institutional balance created by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was very important for lobbyists in the EU. There was also a shift from secret diplomatic negotiations towards a more public and open procedure in European policy-making.²³⁶ Hence, the emphasis and work on transparency.

²³⁶ Mark Gray. "Lobbying the EU institutions: New rules, new game". *Journal of Communication Management*, Vol. 3 No. 3, pp. 303-309 (1999). Accessed 7 January, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1108/eb026054> p. 303, 306.

Major trends both internally and externally impacted the way the EU developed the functioning and role of each institution. External trends such as globalisation, technological and scientific developments as well as enlargement had an important impact on the EU and lobbyists. At the EC level, the changes between the citizens and the government would produce a demand for consultation, monitoring and openness. Lobbyists who aim to influence the EU usually undertake three main objectives. The first one is gathering intelligence, second one is analysing it in line with the requirements of the client and the third one is developing and implementing a strategy to influence these subsequent decisions. Most of the lobbying before the Treaty of Amsterdam focused on influencing the European Commission. This was because only the Commission is present and permanent everywhere, at all stages such as the European Council working groups, Parliamentary committees, or conciliation committees. This treaty provided significant new opportunities for lobbyists. To sum this up, it can be said that both public affairs consultants and interest groups have become more successful in their lobbying of the EU. As Mark Gray states, the rule of the game is continuously changing, therefore those who aim to influence the process must quickly learn to adapt to the institutional frameworks that are introduced.²³⁷

The Lisbon Agreement was a milestone in terms of lobbying in the EU because it extended the scope of the legislative, making the European Parliament's area of authority wider and equal to the Council, also resulting in strengthening the EU's democracy.²³⁸ It was considered important to include lobbies in the decision-making processes in order to close the gap between citizens and decision-makers. This also aimed to ensure citizen participation in the decision-making process in a way that would strengthen democracy in the Union. Lobbying serves to open up the complex EU law-making process to its citizens and organizations from different sectors. When EU institutions interact with the lobbyist, they try to incorporate comprehensive and diverse inputs into the law. Such interactions with lobbyists make EU policies more recognizable. Lobbyists also want to be involved in the EU decision-making process in order to have a say in the issues that fall within their field, through considering their own interests and to have an impact on positively influencing the said decisions or preventing them from being taken. Thus, lobbying in the EU can be defined as a mutual political

²³⁷ Ibid., p. 306, 307, 308.

²³⁸ Tuba Arslan Kantarcıoğlu. "Avrupa Parlamentosu'na Lobilerin Etkileri: Ambalaj Ve Ambalaj Atıkları Direktifi Özelinde Bir İnceleme". *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi* 18 (2019): 35-70. Accessed 5 January 2023, <https://doi.org/10.32450/aacd.601833> p. 40.

consultation process in which lawmakers and stakeholders exchange information on the subject in question. Naturally, the expectation is to ensure that new legal problems do not arise in new laws or decisions in this process. Correctly, lobbying means that stakeholders express their interests to political decision-makers in an open political dialogue with legislatures. That is why both lobbyists and the EU institutions use this process to evaluate each other in terms of information exchange and ultimately to obtain beneficial outcomes for both parties. Lobbies have been accepted by all EU institutions in order to strengthen democracy and over time they have become one of the main elements of the EU decision-making process. While the concept of lobbying was summarized as informal negotiations between national authorities in the EU until the Lisbon Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty brought a new dimension to this issue and enabled lobbying to become a part of the political decision-making process and participatory democracy at the EU level. The Lisbon Treaty also states that the Commission is specifically obliged to "consult broadly with interested parties" to ensure that the Union's actions are consistent and transparent. Thus, lobbying, understood as the participation of interest representatives in the dialogue with EU institutions, has a clear legal basis in the Treaties as an element of participatory democracy.²³⁹

The transparent character of this dialogue (open, transparent and organized dialogue) is also clearly arranged. Moreover, all EU institutions are required to carry out their work as openly as possible in order to ensure the accountability of the EU institutions on the issue of transparency and thus increase the possibilities of democratic control. When looking at the benefits of lobbying, it is necessary to rule out the risk that some groups, due to their size and breadth of resources, will be given greater consideration by EU institutions than others. For this reason, transparency regarding lobbying activities, how much is spent, and the necessity of a mandatory code of conduct are a subject that is emphasized a lot. Despite all of these doubts, there is a belief that the realization of lobbying activities in Brussels constitutes a solution to the EU's democracy shortfalling problem and that the representation of interests through lobbying activities is seen as a tool to increase the confidence of citizens in EU institutions.

Moving onto Turkey's efforts, it must be mentioned that there is an emergence of a negative Turkish image in Europe. This, known as the 'Turcophobic' propaganda, started in Europe centuries ago but it was mostly directed at towards the illiterate European public opinion and it was not concealed nor refined for a long time. When the Ottoman Empire was at peak of its

²³⁹ Ibid.

power back in the 15th and 16th centuries, Turks were presented as a punishment of God, relying on the bigotry and ignorance of masses. According to K hlmann & Co an, this spread over a period of several centuries and ended up becoming a permanent part of the European folklore. The anti-Turkish propaganda continued in the 18th century when the Ottoman Empire stopped being a menace for Europe.²⁴⁰ Till this day, this anti-Turkish attitude still remains in Europe and therefore this attitude is a negative impact in terms of Turkey's image as well as accession process.

After Turkey gained the status of candidate country in 1999, business people and organizations primarily focused on how the sectors were affected economically by this process. In the process, these organizations began to evaluate Turkey's integration with the EU, not only in terms of its economic aspects, but also in a multidimensional way. It was believed that the candidacy of Turkey would serve to preserve democracy and stability in Turkey.²⁴¹ While big businesses in Turkey consistently supported the EU membership, Anatolian capital had previously opposed to this, but then began to support the process. The representation of Anatolian capital by anti-Western Islamic groups in Turkey in the early 1990s caused for the Anatolian capital to stay away from European integration for ideological reasons as well as financial constraints. Among the businesspeople organizations in Turkey, the first organization to open its Brussels representative office is Economic Development Foundation (IKV). IKV Brussels Representation is the first agency established to represent a non-member country in the European Community institutions communicating with equivalent organizations in Europe as well as the business world.²⁴²

So, despite the problems, Turkey has important CSOs which shows efforts to achieve this membership through lobbying by finding ways to compromise with the EU criteria's. The three main CSOs that carry out their efforts and conduct activities of lobbying for Turkey are namely IKV, The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) and The Turkish Industry & Business Association (T SIAD).

²⁴⁰ Kaan Sahilyol. "Turkish Image and Anti-Turkish Lobbies in Europe". *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, Vol: 16, No: 1-2 (2008): 91-106. Accessed 5 January, 2023. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/1358> p. 93, 94.

²⁴¹ Zuh l Unalp Cepel. "T rkiye'deki İ adamları  rg tlerinin Avrupalıla ma S reci". *Ege Akademik Bakı *, Cilt: 15, Sayı: 2 (2015): 275-283. Accessed 4 January, 2023. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304467745>

²⁴² IKV Br ksel Temsilcili i (2013).

Continuing with organizations actively contributing to lobbying; TOBB, on the other hand, started to actively support the deepening of EU-Turkey relations with the start of its candidacy process. TOBB's work in Brussels started in 1998, and the TOBB Brussels Permanent Representative was opened in 2006. TOBB, which became a member of the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry (EUROCHAMBERS) in 1996, aims to direct the European economy and reach EU decision makers in cooperation with European chambers.²⁴³ TÜSİAD, which is another business organization, has been supporting relations with European integration since the early 1990s. The association gained membership status to the Confederation of European Business (BUSINESSEUROPE) and lobbied for Turkey's membership. This membership also provides mutual information and exchange of views between business circles in Turkey and the EU. After gaining membership to BUSINESSEUROPE, TÜSİAD changed its organizational structure by taking into account the organizational scheme of the European Confederation of Employers and opened its Brussels office in 1995. In this way, the association aimed to strengthen its presence in the Confederation and to represent TÜSİAD in EU institutions.²⁴⁴

TÜSİAD and Turkish Confederation of Employers Association (TISK) have been a member of the Industrial and Employers' Confederation of Europe (UNICE) since the 1980s and still have the status of "full membership" to it. Both TÜSİAD and TISK became part of a governance structure, which guaranteed their formal participation in policy making processes. By the end of the 1980s, TÜSİAD began to exert pressure on the Turkish government regarding their demands of expansion in political liberalisation and for deepening democratisation, making it a keen advocate for Turkey's accession to the EU, not only economically but also politically. Another example would be that there are four Turkish Trade Unions affiliated to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and alongside this there is the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK), all of which has established great relations with the ETUC. Moreover, DISK actually plays the role of mediator between other Turkish Trade Union members and European organizations.²⁴⁵ The role of lobbying can be clearly observed in the informal ways these organizations all use to improve Turkey-EU relations.

²⁴³ TOBB (2013).

²⁴⁴ Ibid., Cepel. "Türkiye'deki İşadamları Örgütlerinin Avrupalılaşma Süreci".

²⁴⁵ Ibid., Devaux, Sudbery. "Europeanisation: Social Actors and the Transfer of Models in EU-27". p. 98.

To summarize the lobbying efforts of some of these Turkish business associations and trade unions of Turkey; IKV was established shortly after the Ankara Agreement and it was formed by the private sector organizations of many provinces under the leadership of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Starting its activities in 1966, IKV specifically focused on the researching and publishing work related with the EEC.²⁴⁶ In fact, TOBB, which is also on the board of trustees of IKV, is the biggest supporter of the foundation. IKV forms an opinion on every aspect of Turkey's EU accession process, and carries out studies to become one of the main actors of this process and to take part in decision mechanisms. The Foundation makes an effort to influence the decisions taken both at home and at the EU level by bringing together other elements of civil society during critical periods of the accession process of Turkey. Together with TÜSİAD, IKV stands out as one of the two institutions that carry out regular and active lobbying activities at the EU level. Another similarity of IKV with TÜSİAD is its approach to collective lobbying. Despite the tendency in the literature to see collective lobbying as an element that increases the effectiveness of lobbying, IKV does not use this method except in obligatory situations. One-to-one contacts play an important role in the lobbying activities of IKV. Establishing permanent relations with the Union institutions thanks to its representation in Brussels, the foundation intensifies its contacts with the participation of delegations from Turkey at important turning points in the process. On the other hand, the foundation is trying to create a change in attitude with the reports it prepares for both the EU and Turkey. When the work of IKV is evaluated, it can be said that it uses both of these methods intensively in terms of direct lobbying and indirect lobbying, but one-on-one meetings with decision makers seem to be much more effective than indirect methods.²⁴⁷

When TOBB's lobbying efforts for EU institutions are evaluated in general, the first thing that stands out is the diversity of lobbying methods and tools that are used. The Union has benefited from many tools in different periods, from supranational organizations to Turkey-EU partnership bodies, from professional lobbying firms to private consultants. TOBB's lobbying activities are similar to TÜSİAD in terms of the diversity of the tools used and the contribution of supranational organizations. The approaches of the two institutions during the crisis periods of Turkey-EU relations are also similar. Similar to TÜSİAD, TOBB prioritizes more technical issues by focusing on its own field of work in such periods.

²⁴⁶ İlhan Tekeli. Selim İlkin. *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu: Ulus Devletini Aşma Çabasındaki Avrupa'ya Türkiye'nin Yaklaşımı*. (Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993) p. 23-25.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., Yurttaş. "Lobbying Activities of Interest Groups During The EU Membership Process of Turkey".

Both the views of TOBB and TÜSİAD differ on the approach to collective lobbying. The EU sees the accession process as a whole and emphasizes the importance of all institutions working together. In addition to its own institutional structure, TOBB's close relationship with institutions such as İKV and The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) has enabled it to benefit from different mechanisms in lobbying.²⁴⁸

Finally, TÜSİAD usually conveys its messages to the internal public regarding the EU process through its press releases, newspaper advertisements as well as reports that it has prepared especially through academics and experts. These reports and press releases also have the function of lobbying tools, through which the association conveys its statements in order to put pressure on decision makers in Turkey during the EU process. BUSINESSEUROPE stands out as one of the institutions that TÜSİAD uses to direct its lobbying efforts. TÜSİAD also receives support from business organizations in member countries for its lobbying efforts. When TÜSİAD's lobbying activities are viewed from a general perspective, it is seen that although it is basically a business world organization, it conducts very active lobbying activities aimed towards both domestic and political actors, the international public and the decision makers at the EU level. TÜSİAD heavily uses both direct and indirect lobbying tools in its lobbying activities at the EU level. The face-to-face meetings of the association with decision makers at EU level are examples of direct lobbying activities. Efforts to create public opinion through advertisements and published reports in member countries' newspapers from time to time, and efforts to influence decision-makers through business circles through BUSINESSEUROPE membership stands out as indirect lobbying tools used by TÜSİAD. TÜSİAD's focus on the economy, which is its main field of work, during periods of when political problems come forth, both ensures the continuity of the relations it has established with the EU institutions and helps to overcome the crisis periods more quickly.²⁴⁹

All in all, to conclude this part can be concluded by indicating that Turkey and Europe both have their own efforts. The EU has achieved a regulation regarding lobbying activities and successfully conducts them in a transparent environment and while Turkey does not have any regulations but has strong efforts through these organizations and their informal processes in

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Bulut Gürpınar, Semra Cerit-Mazlum, Erhan Doğan. "Türkiye Dış Politikasında Bir Aktör: TÜSİAD". *Sivil Toplum ve Dış Politika: Yeni Sorunlar, Yeni Aktörler*, Ed. Semra Cerit Mazlum, Erhan Doğan, Bağlam (2006). p. 235.

terms of contributing to the accession process to the EU. There are definitely good developments, observed from the achievements of these Turkish organizations, but it doesn't seem to be enough in the eyes of the Union considering there are still ups and downs in terms of criticisms towards Turkey's different aspects such as decision-making. The lobbying efforts of Turkey, which aim to construct a good image through these mentioned institutions, business associations and unions are valuable, but unfortunately not enough in achieving the main goal of becoming a member to the EU because there isn't proper guidance from the state in terms of regulations that settle these activities in a proper and organized way. All of this links to the connection between lobbying, social constructivism and Turkey-EU relations; Turkey socially constructs its interests and uses the role of lobbying in regards to trying to achieve membership to the EU.

3.3. Lobbying Efforts' Impact on Turkey-EU Relations and the Accession Process

Turkey has been trying hard to follow the Europeanisation process for years now and as an EU candidate state, the economic integration process and Customs Union have played a key role in increasing the number of Turkish interest groups in European issues. If it is put this way, new Turkish interest groups are created in Brussels to follow the integration of Turkey to European Programmes such as framework programs in fields of research. But the institutional timing of the relationships between the EU and Turkey doesn't exactly match up to how the Turkish lobbies settle in Brussels.²⁵⁰

It is important to briefly touch on the result of lobbying and social constructivism to understand the impact of it in the EU and Turkey's efforts in terms of possible membership. As explained in the social constructivism theory, social structures are created by specific actors and processes. Society is continuously produced by those who live in it and it undergoes constant transformation. Alain Touriane, explains that social movements especially play an important role for the construction of representations within a society. Use of powerful political strategies, competing for control of a cultural field and planning a future society are all in relation with social movements and the social constructivism that comes with it.²⁵¹

²⁵⁰ Ibid., Devaux, Sudbery. "Europeanisation: Social Actors and the Transfer of Models in EU-27". p. 95.

²⁵¹ Ulf Hjelmar. "Constructivist Analysis and Movement Organizations: Conceptual Clarifications". *Acta Sociologica* 39, no. 2 (1996): 169–86. Accessed November 12, 2022. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4194816> p. 4, 5

On the contrary, Sabine Saurugger states in her article that constructivist approaches have mushroomed since the 1990s in the theoretical accounts of various areas of European integration.²⁵² The social constructivism that is studied within this thesis is related to a ‘strategic way’ of social construction. Strategic social construction is related with rational actions, where actors calculate their moves in line with their priorities so that they can maximise their utilities. This way of constructivism combines the idealistic and rationalist logics of influence, where the logical plans and calculations made by actors are socially embedded in institutions.²⁵³

Lobbying is considered a part of any healthy democratic society.²⁵⁴ Although it is considered a positive force in democracies, lobbying can also result in powerful groups influencing the regulations and laws at the expense of public interest. This could cause unfair competition, policy capture or undue influence. Therefore, there are regulations in most countries regarding lobbying.²⁵⁵ But there aren’t any regulations in Turkey and even though it somehow manages to keep itself relevant in the international field through its institutions and agencies such as Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information General Directorate or Turkish Radio and Television Company (TRT) there is a big deficiency in terms of lobbying regulations. There aren’t any rules regarding lobbying in Turkey and this creates limits in terms of a legal basis and achieving successful lobbying of the country.

²⁵² Sabine Saurugger. “Constructivism and Public Policy Approaches in the EU: from Ideas to Power Games”. *Journal of European Public Policy* 20:6, 888-906 (2013). Accessed October 23, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.781826> p. 1.

²⁵³ Theodore Baird. “Interest Groups and Strategic Constructivism: Business Actors and Border Security Policies in the European Union”. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44:1, 118-136 (2018). Accessed October 23, 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1316185> p. 3.

²⁵⁴ “Lobbying”. *Transparency International EU Website*. Accessed November 22, 2022. <https://transparency.eu/priority/eu-money-politics/lobbying/>

²⁵⁵ “Lobbying”. *OECD Website*. Accessed November 22, 2022. <https://www.oecd.org/corruption/ethics/lobbying/#:~:text=Although%20lobbying%20can%20be%20a,detriment%20of%20effective%20policy%20making>




Figure 13: Timeline of lobbying regulations.²⁵⁶

Regulations can include things such as clearly defining that the lobbyist and lobbying activities are unambiguous, rules and guidelines that are set for standards of expected behaviour, avoiding conflict of interest or misuse of confidential information.²⁵⁷

All things considered, lobbying has positive outcomes in many social movements and policy areas.²⁵⁸ On the other hand, lobbyists have expertise, which politicians don't have and they can influence politicians by strategically sharing this expertise with them.²⁵⁹ Political representation is not always tied to elections and it can occur in a wide range of settings by various agents, including lobbyists, activists or bureaucrats.²⁶⁰ Actions of representatives are supposed to be determined by the preferences of their constituents, which are related with constructivism since preferences construct and result in their actions.²⁶¹ This is because lobbying is an element of social learning and this is an aspect of the social constructivism theory.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., Figure from "Lobbying". *OECD Website*.

²⁵⁷ OECD. "Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying". *Lobbying Brochure*, OECD (2013). Accessed November 20, 2022. <https://www.oecd.org/corruption/ethics/Lobbying-Brochure.pdf> p. 1.

²⁵⁸ Ren Springlea. "The Challenges with Measuring the Impact of Lobbying". *Effective Altruism Forum Website* (2022). Accessed November 22, 2022. <https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/XyEKTdtfMH4DukhaF/the-challenges-with-measuring-the-impact-of-lobbying>

²⁵⁹ Nauro F. Campos, Francesco Giovanni. "Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence". *Discussion Paper Series, IZA DP*, No. 2313 (2006). Accessed 19 November, 2022. <https://docs.iza.org/dp2313.pdf> p. 1.

²⁶⁰ Thomas Fossen. "Constructivism and the Logic of Political Representation". *Leiden University, American Political Science Review*, 113(3), 824-837 (2019). Accessed November 20, 2022. doi:10.1017/S0003055419000273 p. 1.

²⁶¹ Ibid., p. 11.

As Saurugger explains, ‘strategic (actor-centred)’ constructivism allows strategic thinking to be taken into account when understanding the influence of norms, world views or ideas. By combining both rational and idealist logics of influence, it is explained that actors strategize rationally and reconfigure their priorities, identities, preferences or the social context.²⁶² Actor-centred constructivism goes beyond the opposition between agent behaviour based logic of consequences (consideration of alternatives and assessing outcomes of options) and logic of appropriateness (prioritization of norms and rules in political decisions).²⁶³

Therefore, the results of both lobbying and social constructivism are in relation with each other. Lobbying is conducted in healthy democratic societies, which means that it is a part of the social reality people live in. It can influence the decisions of leaders who are responsible of laws and international decisions. These are all connected with the social learning people experience in our daily lives. Lobbying is constructed through the social learning that human beings go through, with a target to influence the decision-making system through various channels. Lobbying results in the influence of political decision-making mechanisms, impacting the fate of upcoming decisions and these mechanisms impact the society. This involves the construction and transformation of social relations, all in relation to both social constructivism and lobbying.

Therefore, in Turkey’s accession efforts to Europe, Turkey does try to socially construct the opinions of the EC through engaging and interacting with them via its various institutions, business associations and organizations. There are significant lobbying efforts seen in their work, and both constructivism and lobbying are combined by Turkey to try and impact the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU. But unfortunately, due to the missing regulations and transparency within Turkey, these efforts remain insufficient.

²⁶² Ibid., Baird. “Interest Groups and Strategic Constructivism: Business Actors and Border Security Policies in the European Union”. p. 4.

²⁶³ Ibid., Saurugger. “Constructivism and Public Policy Approaches in the EU: from Ideas to Power Games”. p. 7.

CONCLUSION

As Grabbe states, it is said that “readiness to join lies in the eye of the beholder” and the EU’s entry requirements or in other words, its conditions. The conditions to enter the Union are actually considered very general. In fact, the requirements to join the EU are actually considered complicated, meaning they do not define what creates a market economy nor a balanced democracy. Once again as she mentions, do the new ‘to-be’ member states need a German economy, be a welfare state like Sweden or have an electoral system like France? But what about the member state Greece’s economy or the Italian electoral system? The EU doesn’t actually seem to provide a uniform model of capitalism or democracy. On the other hand, while diversity is considered as a main principle, a key aspect of the EU, and one of the main targets of integration, how far do these aspect of differences actually go? This must be emphasized and is all a food for thought, because the kinds of political systems and economies that would meet the Copenhagen criteria are not self-evident. It is hard to even mention that some of the current EU member states actually meet their own Copenhagen criteria, since they have never even been judged on them. Industrial policies of France, state aids of Germany or Belgium’s public administration might have made them objectionable if they were applicants. In fact, some of the Commission officials even say that currently no member state actually fully complies and implements more than “80 percent” of the EU regulations. Therefore, it must be asked whether or not it is fair to demand an even higher percentage of adherence from countries who want to join the Union. When it is put this way, it seems like the question of double standards is very apparent.²⁶⁴

On the other hand, the three main Copenhagen Criteria that was set back in 1993, has progressively widened and evolved into a broader scope, making it harder to actually consider what is needed to meet its requirements. The conditions seem to have gotten much more detailed, widened, making the EU a “moving target” for its applicants. The Union ‘changes the rules of the game’ accordingly with its progress and benefits, making it hard to catch the ‘moving target’. In other words, the Union is not only a referee but also a player in the accession processes of its applicants.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ Ibid., Grabbe. “European Union Conditionality and the ‘Acquis Communautaire’”. p. 250.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 251.

This study aimed to bring a different perspective to the long running open-ended Turkey – EU relations that have been ongoing on for a long time, through examining the reason and impact of the role of lobbying. The first chapter of the study was focused on explaining the methods and techniques of lobbying in order to achieve a better understanding of the term itself, alongside its connection to social constructivism, public communication and different decision-making mechanisms. The second chapter aimed to define the decision-making mechanisms of the EU and Turkey, with a view of the EU criticisms made towards Turkey's decision-making system. Aside this, the EU and Turkish history was briefly examined to understand and show the idea that their relations have had many ups and downs, eventually always leading up to realisation of how both sides actually contribute to one another.

The third chapter combined the information gained from chapter one and two, and aimed to explain the impact of lobbying on decision-making mechanisms through describing how lobbying emerged and how it works for both sides. Efforts of Turkish institutions, business associations and unions were explained in detail to show samples of how Turkey uses lobbying to contribute to its accession process to the EU. The EU regulations were explained in detail and the importance of both the Treaty of Amsterdam and Lisbon Agreement was emphasized in terms of how lobbying has developed in the Union. It was significant to mention how despite one being nation-state and the other being supranational, both Turkey and the EU have their own styles and approaches of socially constructing their agendas in line with their interests and how they both try to use the role of lobbying in relation to this. This final chapter targeted to give an overall view of the main connection between social constructivism, lobbying and Turkey-EU relations. The result of both lobbying and social constructivism and how it relates Turkey's membership process to the EU, as well as how both sides have different approaches regarding lobbying regulations was explained to indicate that Turkey's efforts remain insufficient, which achieves the argument of this dissertation.

To wrap things up, Turkey has held the candidate country status for a very long time, in fact, the longest among any other EU candidate country. This brought out the idea that observing this relation from the view of lobbying and social constructivism would deliver a different perspective to those who are interested. The power of social constructivism was observed through how the EU has constructed its own European identity, despite having different nations as members. This identity and the European values that come with it have become a priority area included in EU policies and its integration. On the other hand, the EU

has become an international sample for developing countries in terms of fields such as human rights, democracy, transparency, social justice and rule of law. Turkey's accession efforts regarding lobbying its way into the EU seems to be insufficient due to unestablished regulations for it, whilst the EU has a strong priority of protecting its European identity and following the European values, which is strongly supported by the unions transparent nature and lobbying regulations that easily allow lobbying activities.

Still, the efforts of organizations, associations and unions from Turkey were described in this study to observe and understand that lobbying is considered as the activity of directly or indirectly and formally or informally being influential on the legislative and executive decision-making bodies that are part of the political system. Defending the interests of the country or a country against foreign governments and international organizations, and creating legal regulations in this direction shows the broadness of the role of lobbying. The success of lobbyists stems from both the fact that they come from within the legislative and executive processes and in which they know the legal legislation very well. It can also be said that the chance of success is higher if the lobbying activities are carried out by professional lobbyists in an effort to ensure that the authorized persons in the political mechanisms make the desired decision.²⁶⁶

In conclusion, lobbying is one of the integral and indispensable parts of democratic societies, but it is important to establish the principle of democratic equality, ethical rules and creating transparency in order to achieve the goals more effectively. In order for the role of lobbying to have a healthy and beneficial outcome for everyone in a society, actors who aim to conduct lobbying must all have equal social, political and financial terms. There needs to be a balance between actors who are considered socio-economically strong and weak. With this in mind, after establishing the connection between social constructivism, lobbying and EU-Turkey relations, as explained in this study, lobbying in the EU has been placed on a legal basis and rules. Therefore, lobbying activities in the EU are effectively balanced and fair when trying to achieve the objectives, but in Turkey, there is a lack of a legal basis for lobbying, alongside a lack of transparency and ethical rules, which results in lobbying activities to be carried out in a dispersed manner, away from a collective structure, remaining weak in reaching its targets; hence in this case, a membership to the EU.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., Aslan. "Siyasal İktidarı Etkileme Yöntemlerinden Biri Olarak Lobcilik". p. 3.

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