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THE STRATEGIC CULTURE AND POLITICAL BELIEFS OF
TURKEY'S FAR-RIGHT LEADERS

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THE STRATEGIC CULTURE AND POLITICAL BELIEFS OF TURKEY'S FAR-
RIGHT LEADERS: AN OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS OF ALPARSLAN
TÜRKER AND DEVLET BAĞÇELİ

A Master's Thesis

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To My Beloved Gül Family



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DEVLET BAHÇELİ

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By Kerem Gül

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality,
as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

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ABSTRACT

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Far-right parties with strong nationalist tendencies have occupied a central role in Turkish politics. Sometimes as the radical voice of the opposition parties, sometimes as the minor coalition partner, Turkish nationalism has found itself a strong grip on the political scene since the 1950’s. Alparslan Türkeş and Devlet Bahçeli are viewed as the pioneer figures in the long journey of Turkish nationalism. Both leaders have served as party leaders for more than two decades through several coups, domestic and international changes. In this regard, understanding their belief systems becomes a must in order to understand the foreign policy culture of the Turkish far-right. By utilizing the operational code, a quantitative leadership assessment method that maps the political beliefs of leaders in order to identify causal mechanisms in foreign policy decisions (George, 1969); (Walker, 1983) the study looks to identify the general patterns of Turkish far-right leaders in foreign policy. While analysing the belief systems of Türkeş and Bahçeli, the thesis also looks at the foreign policy events that the leaders experienced. Thus, the quantitative results that stem from the automated coding system ProfilerPlus will be combined with a qualitative aspect that

will shed light to the events that give meaning to the beliefs. Three main sets of hypotheses are tested in the thesis. First, Bahçeli is expected to have more stable views on the nature of political universe; Türkeş is believed to have a more hostile understanding of the political universe compared to Bahçeli; and both leaders are expected to see their political other more hostile than the average world leader. Secondly, the study hypothesizes that Türkeş and Bahçeli select more cooperative strategies during their governmental terms but remain conflictual compared to the average world leader in any setting. Third and finally, the thesis argues for the two leaders to possess lower self-control over the course of historical development compared to the average world leader; and expects them to have similar control levels during the 1990's –a time period in which both leaders ruled their Parties. The findings of the study reveal that Türkeş and Bahçeli possess high levels of hostility towards the political universe, adopt conflictual strategies compared to the average world leader, and their level of historical control remain slightly over the average world leader. While there are minor differences among the two leaders, a clear party orientation can be spotted in the field of foreign policy. Approaching the strategic culture debate from a theoretical perspective, their typologies correspond with a 'realist-other' approach on the nature of political universe alongside 'mixed self-strategies' that swing between moderate 'idealism' and 'realism.' Nevertheless, the findings also show that most deviations from their career averages have occurred during governmental power and brief opportunity windows. In adopting a longitudinal approach, the thesis analyses the belief systems of the two leaders in several time-frames.

Key Words: Foreign Policy Analysis, Operational Code Analysis, Strategic Culture, Turkish Far-Right, Turkish Foreign Policy

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’NİN AŞIRI-SAĞ LİDERLERİNİN STRATEJİK KÜLTÜRLERİ VE POLİTİK İNANÇLARI: ALPARSLAN TÜRKEŞ VE DEVLET BAHÇELİ’NİN OPERASYONEL KOD ANALİZİ

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Güçlü milliyetçi eğilimlere sahip aşırı-sağ partiler Türk siyasetinde merkezi bir yer kaplamıştır. Kimi zaman muhalefetin marjinal sesi olarak, kimi zaman ise küçük hükümet ortağı olarak, Türk milliyetçiliği 1950’li yıllardan beri siyaset sahnesine sıkı bir şekilde tutunmuştur. Alparslan Türkeş ve Devlet Bahçeli Türk milliyetçiliğinin uzun yolculuğunun öncüleri olarak görülmektedirler. İki lider de partilerinin başında yirmi yıldan fazla kalmış, çok sayıda askeri müdahale görmüş, yerel ve uluslararası değişimlere şahit olmuşlardır. Bu açıdan, liderlerin politik inançlarını anlamak, Türk aşırı-sağının dış politika kültürünü anlamak için bir zorunluluk haline gelmektedir. Kantitatif bir lider değerlendirme metodu olan, liderlerin siyasi inançlarının haritasını çizen ve dış politika kararlarındaki nedensellikleri tanımlayan Operasyonel kod analizi (George, 1969); (Walker, 1983) vasıtasıyla bu çalışma Türk aşırı-sağ liderlerin dış politikadaki genel eğilimlerini tespit etmeyi hedeflemektedir. Türkeş ve Bahçeli’nin inançlarını incelerken, bu çalışma aynı zamanda liderlerin tecrübe ettiği dış politika olaylarına da değinecektir. Böylelikle

bilgisayar temelli kodlama sistemi ProfilerPlus'tan gelen veriler kalitatif bir bakış açısıyla birleştirilecek ve politik inanç sistemlerine hayat veren olaylar mercek altına alınacaktır. Bu tezde üç ana hipotez öne sürülmektedir. Birincisi, Bahçeli'nin siyasetin doğası hakkında daha stabil inançlara sahip olması; Türkeş'in siyasetin doğası hakkında daha hasmane bir yaklaşıma sahip olması; ve iki liderin de 'öteki' liderleri ortalama dünya liderinden daha hasmane tanımlaması beklenmektedir. İkinci olarak, bu çalışma Türkeş ve Bahçeli'nin hükümet ortaklıkları dönemlerinde daha işbirlikçi stratejiler yürütmelerini ancak ortalama dünya liderine kıyasla çatışmacı kalmalarını beklemektedir. Üçüncü ve son olarak, bu tez iki liderin tarihsel gelişim üzerinde ortalama dünya liderinden daha düşük kontrol seviyelerine sahip olmalarını ve iki liderin de parti liderliği yaptığı 1990'lı yıllarda benzer kontrol seviyelerine sahip olmalarını beklemektedir. Çalışmanın sonuçları Türkeş ve Bahçeli'nin siyasetin doğasına oldukça düşmancıl yaklaşıtlarını, çatışmacı stratejiler benimsediklerini ve tarihsel gelişim üzerinde ortalama dünya liderinden hafif yüksek seviyelerde kontrol inancına sahip olduklarını ortaya koymaktadır. İki lider arasında ufak çaplı farklılıklar bulunsa da dış politika alanında net bir parti çizgisi saptanabilmektedir. Stratejik kültür tartışmalarına teorik bir perspektiften yaklaşıldığında, liderlerin tipolojileri siyasetin doğası hakkında 'realist bir diğer' yaklaşımı benimsemekteyken kendi stratejileri ise 'ılıman idealizm ve realizm' arasında değişkenlik göstermektedir. Öte yandan, analiz sonuçları liderlerin kariyer ortalamalarından en çok hükümet ortaklıkları dönemlerinde ve kısa fırsat-pencerelerinde saptıklarını göstermektedir. Bu tez kesitli bir yaklaşım benimseyerek liderlerin inanç sistemlerini farklı zaman aralıklarını göz önünde bulundurarak incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dış Politika Analizi, Operasyonel Kod Analizi, Stratejik Kültür, Türk Aşırı-Sağı, Türk Dış Politikası

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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

Any assessment of political activity that neglects the human factor is doomed to remain deficient. Considering that individuals tend to shape their behaviours based on their pre-existing beliefs (Jervis, 1976), the cognitive framework of an individual and his belief system gain primary importance in the process of decision making. As beliefs constitute a subjective representation of the real world, understanding them becomes essential in terms of understanding human decisions and making healthy forecasts. While this is true for any individual being, its importance stands out even more in politics where the decision of one leader has an effect on large numbers of population. Despite the impact and influence of agency in politics and international relations, the longstanding debate in social sciences on structure and agency goes on.

With different assumptions on the source of influence in foreign policy, International Relations theories have differed in terms of what components play key roles in foreign policy decision making. For neo-realists, the power balance between the states is of primary importance; liberal and neo-liberal camps, on the other hand, focus on institutions with global prominence; concerned with casual linkages in the context of social factors, cultural settings and international norms, constructivists point out the inter-subjective nature of inter-state relations (Ruggie, 1998); (Walker

& Schafer, 2006a). Combined, all these theories have attributed some degree of influence to outside factors in foreign policy. The leaders deciding on policies, in other words, are said to be bounded by certain external factors imposed by the environment they are operating in. This focus on the outside factors, therefore, has suppressed the visibility of psychological factors, beliefs and actor-based approaches, at least during the first centuries of the International Relations discipline on the mainstream theoretical level.

Among these theories, while the mainstream International Relations discipline has been mostly dominated by realist approaches and their emphasis on structure, the main challenges have come from liberal and constructivist camps in terms of creating room for agency and the actor in international relations. Going beyond the mainstream theories, it has been foreign policy analysis and its midrange theories that enabled agency-based theories to shine. Originating in the mid-1950's out of dissatisfaction with realist simplifications on foreign policy, the field of foreign policy analysis gained ground from the 1960's onwards (Smith, 1989). As the reputation of foreign policy analysis grew as a subfield of International Relations throughout the following decades, national leaders and other actors at the sub-national level gained importance on an international scale. Especially with the failure to predict the end of the US-Soviet conflict and the events that followed in the early 1990's, "more scholars and policy makers have come to appreciate the need to study belief systems as causal mechanisms in the post-cold war world" (Walker & Schafer, 2006a, p. 4)

Among various foreign policy analysis theories, operational code analysis –which will be used as the main method of this study- attributed special importance to the 'leaders' in the process of foreign policy decision making. Originally rooted in

Nathan Leites' study (1951) on Soviet Politburo members and their decision making mechanism, operational code analysis is a leadership assessment method that maps the political beliefs of leaders in order to identify causal mechanisms in foreign policy decisions (George, 1969); (Walker, 1983). It provides a research tool that relies on a quantitative intersection of psychology and political science. By drawing inferences from the belief systems of leaders, operational code analysis enables the researcher to make educated guesses on the decision maker's behaviours. It looks at "how leaders interpret information, perceive the social environment, and make decisions" (Renshon, 2008, p. 821) and thereby illuminates the "microfoundations of macro-behaviour in international affairs" (Özdamar & Ceydilek, 2020, p. 139).

Following Leites' study, the operational code has been developed further by (George, 1969), (Holsti, 1977), (Walker, 1983) and others. Ever since, several scholars have used the operational code to analyse the belief systems of different leaders in order to map their foreign policy orientations. Different leadership styles, typologies, strategies, preference orderings and other components of leaders were addressed in the search for belief systems' role in foreign policy decision making.

The construct of the operational code is built on two sets of philosophical and instrumental beliefs that are concerned with the leader's image of a political 'other' and of a 'self' respectively. By answering the philosophical questions on the nature of the political universe, we see the external attributions of a leader and how he perceives other political actors. Instrumental beliefs, on the other hand, reflect the internal attributions of the leader, how he approaches politics and what strategies are adopted. "Taken together, we have a picture of the leader's belief system regarding acts of conflict and cooperation by self and others in the political universe. In short, we have his operational code." (Walker and Schafer, 2006a, p. 32)

1.1. Significance of the Study

While the content and the usage of operational code analysis has grown over the years, these studies have also had their deficiencies. Among such deficiencies, the lack of non-Western cases has stood out. Despite the fact that the operational code was initially developed in order to study a non-Western case, that is, the study of Leites on the Soviet leadership in 1951, the rest of the field grew in a North-American-centric fashion. Leadership studies and operational code experiments on the global south remained limited. In the context of operational code analysis, there have been only a handful studies on non-Western leaders (Özdamar, 2011). Therefore, one of the primary goals of this thesis is to add further operational codes of non-Western leaders to the literature. By analysing the Turkish case which is neither completely Western nor totally Middle Eastern, the thesis offers a rich non-Western cultural and political setting which digs into a region that binds the Balkans to the Caucasus, the Middle East to Europe.

While there has been foreign policy analysis-related studies on the Middle East region and leaders affiliated with political Islam (Malici & Buckner, 2008); (Özdamar, 2017) studies on Turkish nationalist far-right leaders in terms of foreign policy behaviour have been non-existing. Leadership-based academic studies on the Turkish far-right's foreign policy orientation have been lacking not only in the foreign policy analysis literature but in any kind of literature, including domestic studies in Turkey. Therefore, this thesis intends to contribute to the literature by observing far-right leaders' foreign policy orientation through their belief systems. Considering that most studies on nationalism/nationalist leaders are qualitative in nature, the study also stands out by its quantitative aspect.

Though predominantly Western-oriented, several world leaders have been subject to academic studies in the field of foreign policy analysis. These studies, however, have been mostly limited to state leaders. The research also varies from most of the existing studies as it will focus not on state leaders but on party leaders who are regarded as the leading figures of the nationalist far-right movement in Turkey. Other noteworthy studies that do not focus on state leaders include Holsti's study on previous US Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dulles (1970) and Starr's (1984) study on previous US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.

Nationalist movements in Turkey are not a new phenomenon, some even dating back to the late Ottoman period. Such movements continued to operate without a party organization during the early years of the modern Turkish Republic. The late 1940's saw the first attempts for nationalists to group under political parties with the establishment of the Nation Party (MP) in 1948. Following the MP years that proved to be the antecedent of Turkish nationalist parties, we see a later transformation into the Republican Nation Party (CMP) first, and then to the Republican Villagers Nation Party (CKMP) in the following years (Limoncuoğlu, 2018). The left-right divide in Turkish politics and the emergence of a more radical far-right movement on a party level, however, did not emerge until the 1960's. In this regard, the Republican Villagers Nation Party (CKMP) operated from 1958 until 1969, the year when the party transformed into the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) which is still active today despite a temporary closure in the aftermath of the 1980 coup in Turkey. While there is no clear-cut separation of where nationalist parties fall on the left-right spectrum that includes the far-right, radical-right, extreme-right, ultranationalist-right and many other adjectives that could come before 'right,' this study approaches Turkish nationalist parties under the scope of 'far-right.' Following the reasoning of

Çınar and Arıkan (2002), the different combinations of ethnic, racial and cultural components of Turkish nationalism in different time periods lead to an ambiguity of conceptualization that makes it hard to situate these parties in any single setting. In this regard, they have a wide electorate profile that has ranged from central-right voters to ultra-nationalist groupings, from religious conservatives to secular nationalists depending on the political setting and the time period. Furthermore, as other categorizations of the party remain rather subjective and open to controversial debates that differ according to ideological positions, the categorization of ‘far-right’ places it on the political spectrum that ranges from the far-left to the far-right, making it more unbiased and relatable. Thus, the thesis addresses the MHP and the parties that came before as far-right nationalist parties.

Among several different party organizations, there have been two leaders that stood out among others throughout all these decades: Alparslan Türkeş and Devlet Bahçeli. While Türkeş has been regarded as the pioneer and the father of the nationalist movement since the times he became the chairperson of CKMP in 1965 and later the MHP in 1969 & 1993, Bahçeli has been the lead figure following the mid 1990’s as he replaced Türkeş upon his death.

Ever since nationalist far-right parties were founded in Turkey, they have had a say in domestic politics as well as foreign policy related issue areas. Sometimes as the minor coalition partner, sometimes as the harsh opponent of the ruling government, nationalist movements and far-right parties have always had some sort of an impact on Turkish politics which have been predominantly conservative. In this regard, the study attributes great importance to this essential part of Turkish politics and looks to add to the literature a detailed analysis of two influential figures that had a deep impact on the Turkish far-right. Furthermore, considering that the Turkish political

environment “has always been ‘a stage for leader-based politics’” (Heper and Sayari, as cited in Brummer, 2020, pp. 7-8), the importance of the study increases considering the country’s political culture. Evaluated all together, despite being party leaders rather than state leaders, Türkeş and Bahçeli’s positions within the party are widely regarded as the pioneer figures in Turkish far-right movements, making their influence felt and worth studying.

The importance of Türkeş’s career does not only stem from his alignment with the party, but also due to his long tenure occupied with several different positions and numerous different domestic and international settings. Here, we are talking about a political career that ranges from coup involvements, party establishments and leadership changes during the 1960’s to leading a renewed party in the 1970’s during one of the most chaotic domestic environments in Turkey both as a government partner and as opposition; flying under the radar during yet another post-coup period in the 1980’s while the international environment was shook by a neoliberal wave, a period which also saw the emergence of the PKK problem that occupies a great deal of attention of the Turkish far-right ever since; and a rather hectic political ending during the 1990’s that saw the end of the cold war and the independence of new Turkic republics, awakening long-standing Turanist expectations of Türkeş. By encompassing such a long time period, the study will entail a longitudinal aspect in terms of identifying shifts in certain beliefs and policies of the leaders.

Bahçeli, on the other hand, has a similar length of party rule as Türkeş, an ongoing rule that is about to pass 25 years as the chairperson of MHP. The Bahçeli era witnessed also very unique and different conditions, ranging from coalition partnerships to fierce opposition. In this regard, a longitudinal aspect will be applied for Bahçeli as well, enabling us to identify shifts in his belief scores, changes in his

political ‘other’s and in-group partners, differing strategies in different contexts, and the impact of key political events in the realm of foreign policy. Furthermore, changes within the party during the transition from the Türkeş era to the Bahçeli era, differences stemming from the military background of Türkeş and the academic background of Bahçeli, differences in the coalition partners they worked with, the characters of the leaders and their principles will be among the main themes that will be addressed during the interpretation of the belief scores. Combined, the scores of Türkeş and Bahçeli will allow us to draw a broader picture of the Turkish nationalist far-right culture, their belief systems, and their foreign policy strategies.

1.2. Research Questions and Overview

Building on this background, the thesis aims to find answers to the following questions: What are the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of Alparslan Türkeş and Devlet Bahçeli? To what extent and how did these leaders’ beliefs impact Turkish foreign policy? Since we are analysing a six-decade long time period, did the belief system of these leaders go under any change based on certain instances or situations? Can we identify a continuity in terms of a greater party strategy within the MHP? How did the leaders operate when they were in opposition and how did it change during times of governmental power? How did the coups impact their belief system and policies? All these questions are related to certain degrees and can be divided into further sub-questions. In line with these questions, three main hypotheses will be tested which are detailed in the fourth chapter.

In order to test the hypotheses, I will be using VICS (Verbs in Context System) that was developed by Walker, Schafer, & Young (1998) which allows the researcher to use a content analysis technique based on public speeches and statements, drawing

inferences from leader decisions. To assess the cognitive beliefs of leaders, VICS analyses how they address political relations between the ‘self’ and the political ‘other’: “The premise for the system is that the way individuals speak about power relationships in the political universe will tell us much about their beliefs regarding the exercise of power” (Walker and Schafer, 2006a, p. 30). In this system, verbs are coded for their direction and intensity. The subject, the tense and the category of the verb, the domain, the target and context of the action are all identified. Thereby, the system allows the researcher to encode transitive verbs into the categories of ‘self,’ ‘other,’ ‘cooperative’ and ‘conflictual.’ Thus, the focus on the power interaction among the self and the other leads to a distinctive approach compared to other cognitive theories: “These features orient the analysis explicitly toward the decisions rather than the perceptions of leaders as a dependent variable and conceptualizes these decisions within a process of tactical and strategic interactions” (Walker et al., 1998, p. 177).

In order to accelerate the process of coding, the study will make use of the ProfilerPlus system that enables the use of VICS coding in an automated way. This way, a more reliable study will be conducted where comparisons between cross-case belief scores will be possible as the scores of the norming group will originate from the same automation (Walker & Schafer, 2006a). Furthermore, this study will be only the second thesis that have used the Turkish version of the ProfilerPlus, aiming to contribute to the further development of the software that works now with the Turkish op-code.

1.3.Organization of Chapters

Building on this introductory chapter, the upcoming sections will proceed as follows.

The next chapter will provide a comprehensive literature review that will consist of two main parts. First, the development of the operational code and its important turning points will be addressed in a chronological manner; and second, the literature on Turkish nationalism, the MHP and its two influential leaders will be analysed.

Following the literature review, chapter three will focus on the historical background of the far-right and nationalist circles in Turkey, the developments at the party level and what part Türkeş and Bahçeli played in it. While looking at the historical development of the Turkish far-right, both domestic and international contexts in which the parties and leaders operated will be taken into account, but the main emphasis will be on foreign policy behaviour.

The fourth chapter will be on research design and methodology, including the research puzzle, the methods used in the study, the rationale behind the case selection, the temporal and spatial domains of the study, the hypotheses and variables, and how the data is gathered. Method wise, a multi-method approach will be adopted with the use of automated coding on the one hand and the theoretical interpretation of the strategic culture on the other. VICS will be adopted in order to draw inferences from the speeches collected through the automated at-a-distance approach of the ProfilerPlus program. The coded material that makes up the main data of the thesis consists of books written by Türkeş and Bahçeli, their speeches at the Turkish parliament, party assemblies, interviews, writings and other public statements.

In the fifth chapter I will be providing the findings and results of the study. The belief scores of Türkeş and Bahçeli will be addressed in a comparative manner which

also takes into account the scores of the average world leader. In addition, a longitudinal aspect will be included in terms of comparing the behaviour of the leaders on certain topics during different time periods. As both leaders served as opposition parties as well as government partners, the possible shifts or continuities in strategy will be essential to explore. Significant changes such as the high number of coups in Turkish political history or the impact of electoral periods and governmental changes will also be addressed.

The sixth chapter will adopt a theoretical approach and address the strategic culture of the Turkish far-right through the lenses of International Relations theories, and then elaborate on the foreign policy events that gave life to the belief scores in the first place. In this regard, the chapter will provide a qualitative interpretation of the quantitative results. The seventh and final chapter will revisit the findings of the study, identify its shortcomings and offer alternative trajectories for future research with concluding remarks.

Overall, the initial point that pushed me towards conducting this study stems from my research interest which is centred on nationalism. In order to combine my interest in nationalism and my educational background in International Relations, I have decided to analyse nationalist far-right leaders' foreign policy orientation in my country of origin. The significance of the thesis, on the other hand, rests on the understudied aspect of Turkish far-right leaders in terms of foreign policy behaviour. In this regard, it will not only be a contribution to the fields of foreign policy analysis and the operational code literature, but also a contribution to the general literature on Turkish nationalism for the post WWII period until the 1980's which has been mostly neglected (Aytürk, 2014). Considering that the Turkish far-right has been on the political scene for more than half a century, its foreign policy strategy is worth a

look, and what better way to do so than analysing the belief systems of their pioneers. By doing so, the study will also challenge the understanding that foreign policy analysis approaches are geographically bounded to North America in an exclusive way.



CHAPTER 2:

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on political leaders with an emphasis on the leader itself dates back to earlier times than International Relations as a discipline. There has been studies as early as 1841 conducted by Carlyle which were based on the assumption that the history of mankind is but the history of great men, where pre-destined leaders determine the fate of history and world politics. This approach, however, contained rather religious elements and represented “Less a theory than a statement of faith ... [it] does not fit into the rigorous scholarly theory and research that makes up the contemporary canon of leadership discourse” (Spector, 2016, p. 250). While such an approach is rather scientifically weak and methodologically deficient, more comprehensive studies emerged under foreign policy analysis.

2.1. The Development of Foreign Policy Analysis

Although foreign policy related analyses date back even further, the first steps of it as a subfield of International Relations did not come until the 1950's. At the time, the influence of the realist school and its dominance within the discipline were at top. States were seen as the primary actors and systematic approaches were more than common. With little to no room for individual or psychological influence in foreign policy decision making, early studies on foreign policy were more descriptive and

interpretative in nature (Levy, 2003). In such an environment, political figures were seen as mere extensions of the state apparatus where the common denominator 'state interest' was all that mattered regardless of the leader. For some scholars, such as one of the leading classical realists, Morgenthau, the claim was that it was possible to know even better than the leader himself about his beliefs and actions: "Thinking in terms of interest defined as power, we think as he does, and as disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself" (1978, p. 5). Accordingly, the motivations on the state level were indifferent to any leader: In a system of self-help, any leader would act the same way in line with the so called state interest.

Dissatisfied with the "simplistic nature of realist accounts of foreign policy," Smith (1989) argued that the initial development phase for foreign policy analysis arose in the mid-1950's to mid-1960's (p. 375). In line with this timetable, Hudson (2007) pointed out three important works that shed more light on how the decision maker's perception played a role in foreign policy. First, in (1954) Snyder, Bruck and Sapin illustrated 'decision making' as a central proponent in foreign policy processes. They focused on the dual aspect of decision making and took the "decision maker's worldview and predispositions toward political action" as an important set of variables (Walker et al., 1998, p. 175). In other words, while analysing foreign policy events, they put greater emphasis on the 'process' instead of the 'outcome.' The focus was below the state level, identifying the reasoning behind certain policies and state action.

Secondly, a decade later, Rosenau's work on comparative foreign policy integrated information at different levels of analysis with generalizations applicable on a cross-nation level (Rosenau, 1966). His study paved the way for mid-range theories that

were actor-oriented. Similar to Synder et al., Rosenau distinguished between the identification of factors and their influence. Accordingly, he pointed out the need for a middle-range approach that goes beyond simply identifying internal and external factors. The goal was to make up for the asymmetries among principles and reality through a multilevel foreign policy approach with multi-causal linkages.

Third, the Sprout couple in (1965) analysed how decision-makers' 'psycho-milieu' played a role in perceiving and interpreting information. The environment the decision-makers operate, and more importantly, how the decision-maker perceives the environment –rather than the environment itself- was of primary importance. As a whole, the three studies provided essential milestones in the development of foreign policy analysis. By approaching foreign policy decision making as a process, looking into its particularities, covering the trajectory from the micro-variables to the macro-setting in a multi-level fashion, these works shifted the focus to smaller groups in a comparative and psychological way. The further development of foreign policy analysis models and theories have developed in two main camps: the Rational Actor Model (RAM) and its critiques. While the RAM has been the mainstream approach in the field, several other models were born from the challenge against it.

2.2. The Rational Actor Model

Within the domain of FPA studies, rational actor models that were influenced by realist assumptions occupied the primary seat. Early works on the rational actor model include Russett in (1967), Brams in (1975) and Altfeld & Bueno de Mesquita in (1979). Born in the cold war environment, there was not much of a need to analyse the micro foundations of belief systems as the choices were set in a strictly bipolar international setting. It was rather intriguing to make use of the simplifying nature of

bipolarity where “beliefs performed a mirroring role in the calculus of foreign policy decisions” (Walker and Schafer, 2006a, p. 6). Thus, taking into account the motives and policies of the counter-bloc was the main logic of politics.

Nevertheless, the rational paradigm did more than mirroring others’ beliefs. At its origins, the rational actor model basically takes the state as the main unit of analysis where political leaders act in accordance with state interest, ignoring the micro fragmentations below the state level. This kind of a model allows no room for decision makers’ perceptions or any other psychological variable that could account for change in decision making. Embracing the ‘billiard-ball’ metaphor of Waltz (1979), each unit –that is the state in this case- acts in line with the necessities of the system they operate in, and each decision maker is taken as a rational actor that carries out ‘similar cost-benefit calculations’ in order to assess the right strategy among the given options rather than acting in line with personal beliefs (Fearon, 1998). This unitary actor is considered to be moving in a direction with all of its parts coming up as a single decision-making unit. The particularities of the components such as the leaders or bureaucratic figures have little to no influence on the process as a whole.

This line of reasoning approaches foreign policy as an environment of ‘reality’ where certain circumstances are met with certain behaviour. Among the given alternatives, the decision-maker is expected to act rationally. Considering that the rationality of an individual is constrained by his environment and other factors such as knowledge asymmetries, the decision-maker is still expected to act in line with preference orderings that serve his goals. Based on foreseeable motives and moves of rational-others operating in the same environment, the ‘expected utility’ model and rational choice theory expects the leader to act with the primary goal of survival (Bueno de

Mesquita, 1997) that is common for any political setting and actor, applicable to any time period.

By attributing all decision-making to one unitary actor "...who acts only after carefully weighing all options, the rational actor method allows scholars to filter out extraneous details and focus attention on central issues" (Drake, 2002, p. 24).

Following the same logic, we see the utility of rational choice theory in the field of economics and game theory variations (Morrow, 1997). In its application to international relations, we see the famous study of (Allison, 1969) on the Cuban missile crisis and the subsequent moves of Kennedy and Khrushchev as well as the army officers on ground that carry out the orders. In this regard, while rational actor theory is useful for studying a single case or a specific interaction, it still lacks generalizable features.

While the Rational Actor Model was on the international stage, there were also scholarly works produced putting the emphasis on the decision maker rather than taking a state-centric systemic approach. Considering that "Each individual possesses religious, political, and moral belief systems, as well as historical memories and experiences which create a bias in their decision making" (Richter, 2016, p. 18), the need for alternative approaches in the field of FPA continued to grow. Among different models and theories that have aimed to fulfil this void, cognitive studies have provided a psychological criticism to RAM-influenced approaches.

2.3. Cognitive Approaches to FPA

The shortcomings of the RAM became more apparent with the emergence of cognitive studies on foreign policy. The alternative that cognitive models provide was an insight on how the decision makers process information rather than taking

interest and decision making as a given. Cognitive models highlighted the shortcomings of rational actor models by pointing out the over-simplifying nature of RAM, the inevitable tendency to draw parallels from the past in a biased way, emotional biases and the tendency to value losses more compared to gains (Neack, 2003).

While the intersection of psychological variables with political studies date back to the 1930's (Lasswell, 1930), more comprehensive studies emerged in the 1970's with the 'cognitive revolution' based on the idea that "it is possible to make testable inferences about human mental processes through developing rigorous functions in computer science and artificial intelligence" (Canbolat, 2014, p. 22). In line with the cognitive revolution, Steinbruner (1974) pointed out the role of 'cognitive operations' and the interaction between the human mind and organizational structures. According to him, the uncertainty and complexity of the real world prevented a generalizable application of the RAM; and the role of the decision maker increased accordingly.

Similarly, Jervis (1976) focused on miscalculations of the human mind and the information asymmetries that may result in deficient decision-making through misjudged situations. More importantly, by incorporating the role of biases, the cultural and political settings of a leader, and the key part that 'perception' plays in decision-making, Jervis emphasized the misleading nature of the self-and-other images of leaders. Considering that misrecognition constitutes the essence of interpersonal communication among human beings (Lacan, 1997), misperception and information asymmetries will always constitute a part of any human interaction, let alone political interaction. Thus, as leaders operate in an imperfect environment of information, they will inevitably rely on already existing biases and experiences,

according to Jervis. Khong's study in (1965) emphasizes the role that analogies play in decision-making and how leaders deal with complexity. By looking at the Vietnam policy of the US and the appeasement policies of the 1930's in a comparative way, Khong points out the simplifying nature of analogies and the inconsistencies they present in decision-making. Here again, we see the filtering of complex outside information into simplified versions of reality through personal and historical experiences.

The repeating emphasis on casual mechanisms and pre-existing beliefs in the process of decision-making can also be identified in the comparison between cognitive models and RAM-influenced structural theories:

Whereas the latter assign to beliefs the endogenous role of transmission belts ... conveying information about the environment at home and abroad, cognitive theories allow for the possibility that beliefs have an exogenous role. That is, they can and often do operate as causal mechanisms independently of the realities that they are assumed to mirror in other theories. (Walker and Schafer, 2006a, p. 5)

In other words, beliefs do not simply reflect the external reality, but direct decision-making by shaping perceptions of the outside world. The flow of information is thereby filtered and distorted with cognitive bias. The filtering role of beliefs, therefore, intensifies in the case of ambiguity. The same mechanism can be viewed when the newly acquired information does not fit with the existing beliefs of a leader. The interaction between old and new information, therefore, takes place in the framework of different beliefs. In this environment, a leader can refuse to revise existing beliefs and rather engage in biased behaviour.

Under the scope of cognitive studies, different approaches were born with varying degrees of importance attributed to concepts, images and policy outcomes. Among them, 'cognitive mapping' emerged as a network of concepts "designed to capture

the structure of the person's causal assertions and to generate the consequences that follow from this structure.” (Axelrod, 1976 p. 55). Similarly, ‘image theory’ focused on patterns, the filtering of information according to the patterns, and the linkage between the filtered information and the behaviour of the decision maker (Cottam, 1977). On another note, ‘conceptual complexity analysis’ and ‘operational code analysis’ paid more attention to belief systems of decision makers and the impact of belief systems on policy outcomes.

2.4. Leadership Studies

Parallel to the rise of cognitive studies, leadership studies occupying an ‘at-a-distance’ approach became prominent (Winter & Stewart, 1977). Focusing on the characteristics of leaders, at-a-distance studies provided the opportunity to analyse individuals by going beyond the problem of direct access to leaders (Taber, 2000). While psychobiographic analyses focused on leaders’ careers through single case studies in a holistic/wire-to-wire fashion, this approach was gradually replaced by nomothetic approaches and the broadening of quantitative studies through the use of at-a-distance methods (Schafer, 2000). With the analysis of written material and the use of content analysis, more generalizable findings emerged from a greater pool of sources that enabled cross-case comparisons. Among studies that adopted at-a-distance approaches, Leadership Trait Analysis emphasized politically relevant aspects and personality traits of leaders.

2.4.1. Leadership Trait Analysis

Based on the works of Hermann (1976; 1978; 2003), in order to understand the traits and motives of leaders, this approach looked at the quantitative indicators of a leader

and typologized their foreign policy stance with reference to their personalities by using a coding scheme to calculate traits. Instead of analysing the biographical content of leaders in a qualitative way, Hermann (1999) sought to find measurable answers on how leaders were reacting to their political environment, whether they were open to information and why they were seeking certain positions in terms of a specific cause/ideology/relationship through seven different traits. These traits included (Hermann, 1999, p. 10):

(1) the belief that one can influence or control what happens, (2) the need for power and influence, (3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in one's environment), (4) self-confidence, (5) the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others' ideas and sensitivities, (6) an individual's general distrust or suspiciousness of others, and (7) the intensity with which a person holds an ingroup bias.

Accordingly, these traits provide the necessary input in terms of how information is proceeded, how leaders react to their environment and how they are motivated.

Building on these traits, Hermann profiled how leaders react in general and how they behave in specific circumstances: "...the general profile indicates where a specific leader fits in a broader discussion of leadership style; the contextualized profile suggests how that leader has individualized his or her responses to manifest more unique characteristics" (1999, pp. 41-42). Combined, a more comprehensive portrait could be drawn of the leaders that accounts for contextual variances.

While earlier studies of the leadership trait analysis used hand coding, later studies shifted to automation and a wide range of leaders were analysed: Mastors (2000) looked into Gerry Adams and the peace process in Northern Ireland; Preston (2001) analysed several US presidents in different time periods; Preston, this time with Taysi together (Taysi & Preston, 2001) studied Khatami in Iran; Kille & Scully (2003) focused on leaders in the context of intergovernmental organizations such as

the United Nations and the European Union. The development of LTA studies also influenced the operational code, which has a similar approach towards belief systems of leaders but differ in coding not all words but transitive verbs.

2.4.2. Operational Code Analysis

Operational code analysis identifies a casual mechanism between a leader's belief system and his foreign policy decisions. Despite the existence of other external factors, the operational code takes the decision maker as the main unit of analysis in the wake of the need for actor-specific approaches. Accordingly, by analysing the belief system of a leader, by identifying how he perceives the nature of political universe, how he selects goals and strategies, how much control he believes can be possessed on the course of history, one can make educated guesses on the foreign policy decisions a leader is going to make.

2.4.2.1. The Historical Development of the Operational Code

Despite its growing importance in the post-cold war era with the increasing emphasis on actor-specific theories, the history of the operational code goes further back to the 1950's with the initial works of Nathan Leites on the Soviet Politburo (1951) and Bolshevism (1953). In his studies, Leites made use of cognitive heuristics and traits of the Soviet leaders that had an impact on Soviet foreign policy, aiming to "study the spirit of a ruling group" (1953, p. 15). He basically de-coded the belief system of Soviet officials and linked their personalities and experiences to concrete policy outcomes. By doing so, Leites approached the operational code as a set of rules that the decision maker believes to be necessary for carrying out impactful decisions and a political strategy (1953, p. 15). While his study turned out to be an interdisciplinary

approach upon politics and psychology, it nevertheless represented more of a ‘qualitative content analysis’ that possessed problems of validity, reliability and lack of structure about the relationship between beliefs and rules of conduct.

The next milestone in the development of operational code analysis came with George who refined Leites’ studies in (1969). According to George, Leites “did not clarify sufficiently the order, hierarchy, and interrelationships among the various elements of the code” (p. 196). Instead, George was aiming to base his study on politically relevant beliefs which have functional interdependence: “George’s intent was to factor out the psychoanalytically based, characterological aspect of operational code analysis and focus upon the ‘maxims of political strategy’ solely as beliefs” (Walker, 1990, p. 404).

George believed that particular importance should be attributed to politically relevant beliefs within the operational code and he intentionally left out politically less relevant features. Thus, George (1969, pp. 201-216) shifted the focus of the operational code to ten questions divided by philosophical and instrumental propensities of the decision maker (Table 1). While the philosophical questions referred to epistemological premises on the nature of politics, conflict and the role of the decision maker in shaping history; the instrumental questions focused on mapping the ‘ends-means’ relationship within the framework of political action.

	Philosophical Beliefs
P-1	What is the ‘essential’ nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
P-2	What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the one and/or the other?

P-3	Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
P-4	How much 'control' or 'mastery' do self and other have over historical development? What is self and other's role in 'moving' and 'shaping' history in the desired direction?
P-5	What is the role of 'chance' in human affairs and in historical development?
	Instrumental Beliefs
I-1	What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
I-2	How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
I-3	How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
I-4	What is the best 'timing' of action to advance one's interests?
I-5	What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

Table 1. George's Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

According to the answers to these questions, the leaders differed in their beliefs and traits. These characteristics shaped their analysis of alternatives, and the choices of the leader were made in line with his principles, drawing the boundaries of rational behaviour:

This paradigm is really a variant of the classical rational-actor paradigm of decision-making that informs much of mainstream political scientists' professional understanding of national policy decisions. Actions are explained by reference to the actor's goals and by reproducing the calculations which led to the decision. Instead of making the classical rational-actor assumption that all decision-makers operate with the same approach to rationality under conditions of uncertainty, however, operational code analysis emphasizes their idiosyncratic features across different decision-makers (Allison, as cited in Walker, 1990, p. 407).

With these 'idiosyncratic' features among different decision makers, George introduced to decision making theory a psychological variant and from the 1970's onwards, it paved the way for a typology of codes and comparable case studies (McLellan, 1971); (Johnson, 1977); (Stuart & Star, 1981).

Building on George's work, Holsti (1977) developed the operational code further by introducing a typology of codes which he thought to be the ideal types of the operational code, and identifying a pattern where the behaviour of the decision maker

is constrained by his belief system. For Holsti, the beliefs were not only reinforcing each other but also impacting the final decision by limiting the alternative choices. With these propositions in mind, Holsti perceived the philosophical and instrumental beliefs not separately but in a linked way and introduced six different operational code types which range from ‘A’ to ‘F.’ This typology was based on master beliefs and their intersection on whether the fundamental nature of the political universe was ‘harmonious/conflictual,’ and whether the fundamental source of conflict lay on ‘human nature/nation behaviour/international system’ (Holsti, 1977). Deriving from this 2*3 matrix, 6 different types of decision-making emerged, serving as a consistent manual for the different combinations of the beliefs (p. 158), (Table 2):

	What is the fundamental nature of the political universe?	
What are the fundamental sources of conflict?	<i>Harmonious</i>	<i>Conflictual</i>
<i>Human Nature</i>	A	D
<i>Attributes of Nations</i>	B	E
<i>International System</i>	C	F

Table 2. *Holsti’s Operational Code Typology*

Both George and Holsti were acting with the assumption that operational code beliefs were based on cognitive consistency theory: “[They] were guided in their thinking ... which assumed that a leader’s operational code beliefs were internally consistent with one another and that a leader’s decisions were consistent with these beliefs” (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2008, p. 217). Furthermore, they both took the approach that the decision maker’s beliefs on the nature of the political universe were serving as master beliefs which in return shaped the remaining beliefs in a consistent way. Accordingly, a pessimist leader, for instance, would adopt limited goals,

flexible tactics and cautious risks while an optimist leader would adopt grand strategic goals, inflexible tactics and long-term risks (Walker et al., 2008). In other words, the differences in the conceptualization of the nature of political world resulted in different political actions taken by the leader.

While Holsti's typology also followed this reasoning, it differed from George's earlier works by making use of quantitative content analysis instead of its qualitative counterpart, and by providing a coherence in belief systems that overcome the problem of indirect validity: "It synthesized the case studies of decision-making inspired by George's (1969) article and defined new lines of inquiry into the cognitive consistency, the psychodynamic origins, and the behavioral consequences of operational code belief systems" (Walker, 1990, p. 409). While the multi-method validity approach by Holsti proved to be valid in revisiting most of the studies conducted since George's work in 1969, Stuart's study on J.F. Kennedy in (1979) brought some overlapping beliefs and ambiguities in Holsti's typology to the surface, and paved the way for a revision of the typology which took place in 1983 with Walker.

George and Holsti's approaches were conceptualizing belief systems in line with Converse's (1964) definition: "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence" (pp. 207-208). Walker et al. (1998), on the other hand, conceptualized the operational code as "a set of alternative 'states of mind' ... [allowing] for the possibility of incoherence among beliefs ... compartmentalization of beliefs... learning over time ... and an idealized, 'default' state of mind" (p. 176). This kind of a more flexible approach is not looking at a specific belief but focuses on 'alternative schemata' for a single leader, "aroused in different domains of the

political universe defined by issue areas and targets” (Walker & Schafer, 2007, p. 754). The internal consistency of a leader’s belief system is accompanied by an external consistency between his beliefs and decisions.

In his study in 1983, Walker analysed the relationship among motivational theories and the beliefs of the operational code, and looked to answer the question of whether individuals possess belief systems which allow them to act consistent with their need for achievement, affiliation and power. He aimed to close the gap between the approach of ‘psychological motivations’ and the ‘operational code.’ While there had been studies on the overlapping areas of these two approaches before (Etheredge, 1979), Walker (1983) went one step further by identifying “linkages among needs, beliefs and decision-making behaviour” (p. 179). In a comparative manner, he argued that:

Operational code theorists use variations in beliefs regarding these issues to account for differences in bargaining tactics and risk-taking styles, the selection of political goals, and the use of different means to pursue these goals. By contrast, motivational theorists account for features of an individual's political behavior by attributing them to personal needs for achievement, affiliation, or power. (Walker, 1983, p. 180).

The decision making model of Walker, on the other hand, draws a framework of motives, beliefs and behaviour to form a coherent personality:

(a) motives account for variations in the development of belief systems; (b) belief systems account for the arousal of motives in a decision-making situation; (c) once aroused, the dominant motives reinforce the stability of the belief system against dissonant information from the environment and account for the persistence of some aspects of decision-making behavior. (Walker, 1983, p. 189).

In other words, motives were not competing with beliefs, but rather shaping their influence on behaviour, which in return enhances the consistency of the established beliefs. This leads to a mutually reinforcing structure built on the joint effect of motives and beliefs. The consistency of the beliefs, however, differ among

philosophical and instrumental beliefs where philosophical beliefs are more prone to change compared to the rather stable nature of instrumental beliefs (Schafer & Crichlow, 2000). Walker et al. (2008) explains the stability of instrumental beliefs by following the linkage between beliefs and the character which was also identified by Leites and Holsti, arguing that instrumental beliefs “are partly expressions of the leader’s identity in the form of motivational biases rather than simply the products of lessons learned from changing experiences in the political universe” (p. 221).

Walker (1983) also trimmed down the six different types of Holsti into four by taking the D, E and F types as one. He analysed the frequency of agreement over consensus/dissensus among different types and realized that types D, E and F “tend to share beliefs over which the majority disagree. These three belief systems are based upon a common master belief in the permanence of conflict in the political universe...”and that “the overlap in the derivative beliefs of belief systems D, E, and F is also much higher for those beliefs shared by a majority of the six OPCODE types” (p. 185). They share the belief that conflict is permanent, but differ in terms of its cause, whether it is caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E) or international anarchy (F). As a result, Walker (1983); (1986) decided to collapse Holsti’s typology into a fourfold structure (Walker, 1990, p. 411), (Table 3):

Type A: <i>Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit</i> <u>Philosophical</u> Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and miscommunication. A "conflict spiral," based upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger of war. Opponents are often influenced by non-rational conditions, but tend to respond in kind to conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader's ability and willingness to shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible. <u>Instrumental</u> Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interest. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force.	Type C: <i>Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit</i> <u>Philosophical</u> Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, because predictability and control over historical development is low under anarchy. <u>Instrumental</u> Establish optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when conciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory actions whenever possible; other resources than military capabilities are useful.
Type DEF: <i>Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit</i> <u>Philosophical</u> Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E) or international anarchy (F). Power disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary, and responses to conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short run depends upon the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control over historical development. <u>Instrumental</u> Seek limited goals flexibly with moderate means. Use military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only as a final resource.	Type B: <i>Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit</i> <u>Philosophical</u> Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical development is possible. <u>Instrumental</u> One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risk.

Table 3. *Holsti's Revised Operational Code Typology by Walker*

The 'A' and 'C' types possess a cooperative understanding of the political universe, but the former believes in lower control levels over the course of history compared to the latter, type C, who believes in higher degree of control. Thus, type C represents a 'utopian reformer' who believes that "big changes are possible with sufficient historical control but is relatively unwilling to employ violent means to get there" (Walker and Schafer, 2007, p. 753) whereas type A represents an idealist leader. The

B and DEF types, on the other hand, have a conflictual understanding of the political universe where type B attributes more control to itself than type DEF who attributes less control. Accordingly, type B who believes in a conflictual world with a belief in more degree of control, reflects a ‘revolutionary’ worldview, and type DEF illustrates a moderate realist approach with low degree of control over history.

2.4.2.2. The ‘Verbs in Context System’ and Coding

The next important milestone in the development of the operational code occurred once again with Walker and his colleagues in 1998. In their work ‘Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis,’ Walker, Schafer and Young measured and modelled previous US president Jimmy Carter’s operational code while also using a new scoring system named ‘VICS’ that stands for ‘Verbs in Context System.’ This system is “a content analysis system for retrieving and identifying attributions in speeches” (p. 177) which allows for more generalizable quantitative analyses. By drawing inferences from public statements of leaders, VICS enables the researcher to make educated guesses on the preferences of the decision maker. Thus, the indices of the leaders are identified according to the master beliefs and they are mapped on the horizontal P4 and vertical P1/I1 axes. Accordingly, the preferences of ‘settle,’ ‘submit,’ ‘dominate,’ and ‘deadlock’ are identified on the above mentioned four-fold typology.

In its initial version proposed in 1998, Walker et al.’s manual coding scheme (p. 183) followed four steps (Table 4) focusing on the ‘subject,’ ‘tense and category’ of the verb, the ‘domain’ and the ‘target/place’ in context. The first step was to identify the subject either as ‘self’ or ‘other.’ In the second step, the tense of the transitive verb was identified as ‘past,’ ‘present’ or ‘future,’ and the category of the verb is

identified as either positive or negative, which range from -3 to +3 according to cooperative/conflictual words and deeds. The third step identified the domain as ‘domestic’ or ‘foreign;’ and the fourth step identified the target and place in context (Walker et al., 1998). As a whole, the criteria for foreign policy content included the following: “(1) the subject and object are international in scope; (2) the focus of interaction is a political issue; (3) the words and deeds are cooperative or conflictual” (Walker et al., 1998, p.182).

STEPS IN THE VERBS IN CONTEXT SYSTEM		
1. IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT AS		
SELF	OR	OTHER
2. IDENTIFY THE TENSE OF THE TRANSITIVE VERB AS		
PAST	PRESENT	FUTURE
AND IDENTIFY THE CATEGORY OF THE VERB AS		
POSITIVE (+)	OR	NEGATIVE (-)
WORDS	APPEAL, SUPPORT (+1)	
	OR	
	OPPOSE, RESIST (-1)	
	OR	
	PROMISE BENEFITS (+2)	
	THREATEN COSTS (-2)	
DEEDS	REWARDS (+3)	
	OR	
	PUNISHMENTS (-3)	
3. IDENTIFY THE DOMAIN AS		
DOMESTIC	OR	FOREIGN
4. IDENTIFY TARGET AND PLACE IN CONTEXT		
An Example		
A quote taken from President Carter's January 4, 1980, address to the nation: "Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan . . ."		
1. Subject. The subject is "Massive Soviet military forces" which is coded as other, that is, the speaker is not referring to his or her self or his or her state.		
2. Tense and Category. The verb phrase "have invaded" is in the past tense and is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish.		
3. Domain. The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the speaker's state (the United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.		
4. Target and Context. The action is directed toward Afghanistan; therefore, the target is coded as Afghanistan. In addition, we designate a context: Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979-88.		
The complete data line for this statement is: other -3 foreign past afghanistan soviet-afghanistan-conflict-1979-88.		

Table 4. Steps in the Verbs in Context System

According to the subject, the verb category, the political domain, the tense of the word, the target and the context, the value of the verbs could be quantified. By encoding the transitive verbs into categories of ‘self,’ ‘other,’ ‘cooperative’ and ‘conflictual,’ it became possible to illustrate the “linguistic representation of

perceived power relationships” (Malici and Buckner, 2008, p. 778). While the hand-coding followed the steps mentioned above, this thesis will follow an automated coding program named ‘ProfilerPlus’ (Levine & Young, 2014). A more detailed explanation of how the ProfilerPlus program will function in relation to the VICS will be addressed in the fourth chapter (research design and methodology).

2.4.2.3. Operational Code Indices and Distributions

In order to interpret the belief scores of the leaders, the indices of the system are explained below (Walker et al. 1998, pp. 175-190), (Table 5):

	Beliefs	Index	Distribution
P-1	NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE (Image of others)	%Positive minus %Negative Transitive Other Attributions	+1.0 friendly to -1.0 hostile
P-2	REALISATION OF POLITICAL VALUES (Optimism/Pessimism)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Other Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 optimistic to -1.0 pessimistic
P-3	POLITICAL FUTURE (Predictability of others’ tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Other Attributions	1.0 predictable to 0.0 uncertain
P-4	HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (Locus of control)	Self (P-4a) or Other (P-4b) Attributions divided by [Self plus Other Attributions]	1.0 high to 0.0 low self-control
P-5	ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence of control)	1 minus [Political Future×Historical Development Index]	1.0 high role to 0.0 low role
I-1	APPROACH TO GOALS (Direction of strategy)	%Positive minus %Negative Self Attributions	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-2	PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity of tactics)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Self Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-3	RISK ORIENTATION (Predictability of tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Self Attributions	1.0 risk acceptant to 0.0 risk averse
I-4	TIMING OF ACTION (Flexibility of tactics)	1 minus Absolute Value [%X Minus %Y Self Attributions]	1.0 high to 0.0 low shift propensity
	a. Coop v. Conf tactics	Where X = Coop and Y = Conf	
	b. Word v. Deed tactics	Where X =Word and Y = Deed	
I-5	UTILITY OF MEANS (Exercise of power)	Percentages for exercise of power Categories a through f	+1.0 very frequent to 0.0 infrequent
	a. Reward	a’s frequency divided by total	
	b. Promise	b’s frequency divided by total	

	c. Appeal/Support	c's frequency divided by total	
	d. Oppose/Resist	d's frequency divided by total	
	e. Threaten	e's frequency divided by total	
	f. Punish	f's frequency divided by total	

Table 5. VICS Indices for Beliefs

The calculation of the index for each element, and the meaning attached to scoring ranges are detailed. While the indices for P1, P2, I1 and I2 vary between -1 to +1, the remaining belief indices range from 0 to 1. The meaning attached to different scores, on the other hand, can be found below (Walker et al., 2008, pp. 227-231), (Table 6):

P-1. NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE (Hostile/Friendly)								
Hostile Extremely -1.0	Very -0,75	Definitely -0,5	Somewhat -0,25	Mixed 0	Somewhat +0,25	Definitely +0,5	Very +0,75	Friendly Extremely +1.0
P-2. REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES (Pessimism/Optimism)								
Pessimistic Extremely -1.0	Very -0,75	Definitely -0,5	Somewhat -0,25	Mixed 0	Somewhat +0,25	Definitely +0,5	Very +0,75	Optimistic Extremely +1.0
P-3. PREDICTABILITY OF POLITICAL FUTURE (Very Low/Very High)								
Predictability		Very Low		Low	Medium	High	Predictability Very High	
		0		+0,25	+0,5	+0,75	+1.0	
P-4. CONTROL OVER HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (Very Low/Very High)								
Control		Very Low		Low	Medium	High	Control Very High	
		0		+0,25	+0,5	+0,75	+1.0	
P-5. ROLE OF CHANCE (Very Low/Very High)								
Chance		Very Low		Low	Medium	High	Chance Very High	
		0		+0,25	+0,5	+0,75	+1.0	
I-1. DIRECTION OF STRATEGY (Conflict/Cooperation)								
Conflict Extremely -1.0	Very -0,75	Definitely -0,5	Somewhat -0,25	Mixed 0	Somewhat +0,25	Definitely +0,5	Very +0,75	Cooperation Extremely +1.0
I-2. INTENSITY OF TACTICS (Conflict/Cooperation)								
Conflict Extremely -1.0	Very -0,75	Definitely -0,5	Somewhat -0,25	Mixed 0	Somewhat +0,25	Definitely +0,5	Very +0,75	Cooperation Extremely +1.0

I-3. RISK ORIENTATION (Very Low/Very High)				
Risk Averse				Risk Acceptant
Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0	+0,25	+0,5	+0,75	+1.0

I-4. FLEXIBILITY OF TACTICS (Very Low/Very High)				
A. BETWEEN COOPERATION AND CONFLICT				
Flexibility				Flexibility
Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0	+0,25	+0,5	+0,75	+1.0

B. BETWEEN WORDS AND DEEDS				
Flexibility				Flexibility
Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0	+0,25	+0,5	+0,75	+1.0

I-5. UTILITY OF MEANS (Very Low/Very High)				
A. COOPERATIVE MEANS: APPEAL/SUPPORT, PROMISE, REWARD				
Utility				Utility
Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0	0,08	0,16	0,24	0,32

B. CONFLICT MEANS: OPPOSE/RESIST, THREATEN, PUNISH				
Utility				Utility
Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0	0,08	0,16	0,24	0,32

Table 6. *The Interpretation of VICs Indices*

2.4.2.4. Theory of Inferences

During the last decades, another important development took place with the increasing amount of studies that combined game theoretical models with the operational code. By constructing a set of preferences, scholars used beliefs as casual mechanisms in order to analyse the relationship between beliefs and behaviours. Walker and Schafer's works in 2004 and 2006 enabled a theory of inferences about preferences (TIP) that functioned as a 2*2 strategic game (Table 7) based on the master beliefs of leaders in comparison to the average world leader.

Self	Other	Values	Preference Order	Interpretation
I-1 & P-4a	P-1 & P-4b	+ & <	Settle > Deadlock > Submit > Dominate	Appease
I-1 & P-4a	P-1 & P-4b	+ & =	Settle > Deadlock > Dominate > Submit	Deter/Reward
I-1 & P-4a	P-1 & P-4b	+ & >	Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit	Exploit
I-1 & P-4a	P-1 & P-4b	- & <	Dominate > Settle > Submit > Deadlock	Bluff

I-1 & P-4a	P-1 & P-4b	- & =	Dominate > Settle > Deadlock > Submit	Punish/Compel
I-1 & P-4a	P-1 & P-4b	- & >	Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit	Bully

Table 7. *Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP)*

The values of these indices are evaluated in comparison to the average world leader that is taken as the norming group. Depending on whether the values for self and other are above (>), below (<) or equal (=) to the norming mean, the preference orderings take shape. The mean values for the norming group are P1=0.3, P4=0.22 and I1=0.4, derived from 164 speeches carried out by various world leaders, based on a study by Malici and Buckner in 2008.

Operating with TIP, if the researcher takes a top-down deductive approach, the inferences are based on beliefs. If, on the other hand, a bottom-up inductive approach is adopted, then the inferences are based on tactics: “In the first instance, as we ask what beliefs and strategic preferences imply different strategies, tactics, and moves. In the second instance, we ask what a particular sequence of moves (tactics) reveals about antecedent beliefs and strategies” (Walker and Schafer, as cited in Walker and Schafer, 2006a, p. 57).

2.4.2.5. Change and Continuity in the Operational Code

Connected to the development of TIP, another important aspect that has to be addressed with regards to the development of the operational code is the theme of ‘change’ and the consistency of belief systems. As time goes on, the changes and shifts in beliefs present an essential challenge in identifying the current state of the operational codes of leaders. How long a given belief system can be taken as ‘up to date,’ for instance, is open to debate. Once a change occurs, how sharp of a turn it leads to is yet another question. As this thesis will address different time frames of

two leaders who reigned their parties over 25 years respectively, longitudinal aspects will be needed in order to identify which changes occurred in different time periods and different political settings.

Within the literature of cognitive theory, we can identify three main points on the theme of change and continuity. Firstly, not all beliefs are seen as equally important to the decision maker. Secondly, more central beliefs are less prone to change. Third, the magnitude of change in central beliefs directly impact how the rest of the belief system is shaped (Rokeach, 1968). Building on these main premises, the cognitive approach splits into two competing camps that approach change and continuity oppositely. One stream of literature that follows the lines of cognitive consistency theory more closely, argues that belief systems are rather stable, change occurs seldom, and when changes occur, they do not come by small margins but with huge shifts (Jervis, 1976). This relative stability stems from the tendency to assimilate new information in order to conform pre-existing beliefs (Deutsch & Merritt, 1965), acting as a filter that absorbs confirming evidence for established beliefs. In line with the cognitive consistency theory, several studies emerged (Canbolat, 2014):

Holsti (1970) claim that Dulles's enemy image of the Soviet Union was fundamentally constant throughout his term in office. Heradstveit (1979) observed consistency in Israeli and Arab images towards each other during the 1970s... Starr (1984) also analyzed the political beliefs of Kissinger and found consistency pattern between his pre-office, incumbent office, and post-office beliefs. Moreover, Schafer and Crichlow (2000) argue that the operational code beliefs of Bill Clinton remained stable during his terms of office despite a set of radical events in international politics that occurred in the 1990s (pp. 45-46).

However, not all studies on continuity and change of the operational codes followed the lines of cognitive consistency. There were also studies that conceptualized beliefs not as strongly interconnected and consistent but rather fragile, open to change and more inconsistent. Walker et al.'s study in 1998, Feng's findings on the Korean War

and its impact on Mao's philosophical indices (Feng, 2006) all suggest that decision makers' operational codes can change in time, identifying shifting belief patterns according to different time frames. Likewise, Renshon's study in 2008 focused on 'belief changing events' and their impact on the operational code. Nevertheless, "it is safe to argue that there are more studies in the literature which underline the stability of the leaders' operational code and most of the political beliefs of decision makers inclined to remain unchanged" (Canbolat, 2014, p. 47); and we are still left "without a theoretical basis for understanding how and why beliefs change" (Renshon, 2008, p. 821).

Walker et al. (2008), on the other hand, argued that depending on the domain and political environment a decision maker is engaged, the typology of operational codes can coexist in the same belief system while getting called into being differentially (p. 223):

Any generalizations about a leader's general operational code will depend on whether and to what extent his or her beliefs regarding self and others are consistent across domains and over time. In turn, predicting a leader's behaviour from operational code beliefs will require careful attention to scope conditions that specify the level of generalization on which the prediction is based.

Thus, in order to make healthy forecasts on the decision makers' strategies, the VICS model adopted a 'bottom-up' approach in mapping the operational code beliefs.

This thesis will not directly address the 'how' and 'why' questions on the way that change occurs, but it will take into account changing times and circumstances, identify whether the codes of Türkeş and Bahçeli went under any significant changes, and if so, analyse the rationale behind shifting beliefs with reference to events in Turkish politics.

2.5. The Turkish Far-Right

Unlike the operational code, the literature on the operational code analysis of Turkish far-right leaders has been non-existing. Considering that the operational code literature on nationalist leaders as well as non-Western leaders is limited in the first place, it should not come as a surprise that the combination of non-Western leaders and nationalist orientations are understudied. Looking at the few studies that have dealt with the operational codes of non-Western leaders, we see Crichlow's work on Rabin and Peres (1998), Malici & Malici's study on Castro and Il Sung (2005), Feng's analysis of Chinese leaders (2006), Devlen exploring Iran's nuclear policies (2010), Özdamar's study on Erbakan, Khomeini, Qaddafi, Erdoğan, Ahmadinejad and Meshal (2017). The literature on far-right leaders' operational codes, on the other hand, include Liang's study on European radical-right leaders (2007), Chrysogelos's study on populist foreign policy (2017) and Özdamar & Ceydilek's comparative study on the populist radical right leaders of Europe (2020).

2.5.1. Historical Studies on Turkish Nationalism

Although there is little scholarly work conducted on the foreign policy behaviour of Turkish politicians in general, there are studies on Turkish nationalism that are mostly non-academic in nature –such as biographies, collection of speeches, partisan interpretations of leaders and the party. Diving into different branches of the existing literature on the MHP, we see that its history, the change and continuity in party ideology and its chronological development have been studied by different scholars. Landau (1985) addressed MHP policies with an emphasis on its pan-Turkist tendencies whereas Poulton (1997) originated his studies dating back to the Ottoman Empire with a focus on the identity crisis between secular and Islamic notions of

nationalism. Bora (1995), on the other hand, studied the development of MHP since the end of the 1960's when the party transformed from its predecessor CKMP with Türkeş. In his studies with Can, covering the period from the aftermath of the 1980 coup to the end of the 1990's, Bora also investigated the fragmentations within the party, the ideological shifts in politics and discourse, the developments within Idealist groups, the impact of the 1980 coup on party-state relations and the place of the MHP on the Turkish right (Bora & Can, 1991); (2004). Going into the details of the ideological components of the MHP, Bora (1999) explored the intertwined relationship among nationalism, conservatism and religion in Turkey. Other historical approaches to the history of MHP include figures such as Öznur (1999) and Feyizoglu (2000).

2.5.2. Ideological Tenets of Turkish Nationalism

Besides studies that provided a historical review of the party in a chronological way, the party's political and ideological orientation on nationalism has been also subject to study. MHP's position on the Turkish right, and where it lies on the ideological spectrum of different understandings of nationalism have been subject to research. Among such studies, Çınar & Arıkan (2002) looked at different approaches on how to situate the MHP among other nationalist ideologies. In their study, they addressed the 'ideological tenets' of the party that are the 'Turkish Islamic synthesis,' 'idealism' and 'nationalism' respectively. Building on these three tenets, the authors touched upon Türkeş and Bahçeli's personalities, their political styles and principles, and how their relevance impacted key issues in the Turkish society such as the head-covering, the Kurdish issue or Islam's place in politics and the society.

In another study, Limoncuoğlu (2018) put the emphasis on how the Turkish nationalists provided a third way for the Turkish society dating back to the 1950's and 1960's as they prevented the emergence of a two-party system in Turkish politics, offering alternative policies between the Kemalist-conservatist camps in the early multi-party years of the republic. Uslu (2008), on the other hand, covered the strengthening nationalist tendencies during the early AKP years as a response to increasing Islamist and ethnic identities, what he calls a neo-nationalist surge by radical nationalists.

There were also studies that address the similarities and differences of MHP with its European counterparts in the far-right. Heper & İnce (2006), for instance, provide a detailed analysis of MHP's far-right orientation in the post 1980 period and the changes during the transition from Türkeş to Bahçeli as well as analysing MHP policies in comparison to the ethnocentric views of European right wing extremists. Likewise, Arıkan (2003) discusses whether the MHP displays similar characteristics to its counterparts in Europe, and if so, in which part of the far-right spectrum they belong with references to historical developments and shifts in party ideology. The development and changes in the doctrine of 'Nine Lights' –that will be analysed in detail in the next chapter- occupies a central theme in this context.

Finally, the party's ideological stance has also been subject to studies within the greater socioeconomic context that is time and space-bound. Among such studies, Balım-Harding (1995) shed light on the post-cold war environment whereas Eralp, Tunay and Yeşilada (1993) analysed the new-right policies in the post-1980's and the consequent neoliberal changes in the 1990's.

2.5.3. Turkish Nationalism and Islam

Turkish nationalism has been associated with Islam in different degrees in different time periods. Depending on the historical time frame and the spirit of time, the so called ‘Turkish-Islamic ideal’ has occupied an extensive ground in discussions on the Turkish right and its relation to nationalist circles. Covering the period from 1944 to 1969, Aytürk (2014) addressed the development of Turkish far-right parties and the divisions that these movements faced alongside fragmentations based on religion. Looking at the impact of figures such as Gökalp and Atsız on the fragmentations among Kemalists, racists/Turanists, and Idealists, Aytürk studied the clash between the secular and Islamic-leaning branches while also accounting for the impact of cold war and the ‘communist’ threat. On another note, Uzer (2016) approached the religion-nationalism debates on the Turkish far-right from an identity point of view. Looking at ethnic, conservative and Kemalist camps in Turkish nationalism, Uzer provides a comprehensive view of Islam’s role in Turkish conservatism and the impact of the combination of different identities.

Other scholars that studied the relationship between nationalist and religious identities include Bora & Can (1991) on Sunni Islam in Turkish nationalism and Tepe (2000) on different practices of Islam conducted over different Anatolian regions, their intersections, clashing identities and identity crisis with relation to Kemalist nationalism. Scholars such as Özbudun (2006), on the other hand, looked at changes in the Turkish party system and how different parties on the Turkish right approached Islam differently and the impact of the AKP period in the post-2002 era. Finally, Aras & Bacık (2000) studied the Islamization of Turkish nationalism and the glorification of the Ottoman past within the greater context of MHP’s relations with the Kemalist establishment of the state.

2.5.4. Recurring Themes in the Literature of Turkish Nationalism

While the above mentioned literature on Turkish nationalism followed more of a historical approach and longstanding discussions like religion's role in Turkish nationalism or the party's ideological stance in general, case-specific studies are also to be seen that are theme-based. The party's position on certain policies and key issues in the Turkish political environment include topics such as the communist threat in the 1960's and 1970's, the Kurdish issue and PKK-threat from the 1980's onwards, and the EU process as well as the globalization process in the late 1990's and 2000's that led to issue-specific and time-limited studies on the MHP, their party programs, party politics and the shifting rhetoric that followed.

Among such studies, the overlapping theme of clashing identities comes to the front again. Yılmaz, Shipoli & Demir (2021) have studied the relationship between the ruling party AKP and the MHP through the securitization of Kurdish citizens and the pro-Kurdish party HDP while also making use of the so called 'authoritarian resilience' theory. Lindenstrauss (2018) addressed the rapprochement between the AKP and MHP through the lenses of the Kurdish issue and its impact on the voting patterns of the Turkish far-right. Yavuz (2002), on the other hand, called the military dominated stance of the Turkish state on Kurdish and Islamic identities as 'ideologically rigid.' For Yavuz, the failure to cope with such identities led the state apparatus to define them as 'existential threats' that are directed to the core values of the Turkish state. Thus, he looked at how the MHP policies aimed to broaden its appeal on the broader society among clashing identities and rigid state policies. Other issue-related studies on the party and its leaders include Şahbudak (2015) and Güler (2017).

The literature on the 1980's and 1990's are more diversified according to different themes. Heper & Evin (1988) analysed the post-coup period policies in Turkey, how the state approached nationalist circles and the democratic consequences of the coup. Öniş (2003) focused on how the MHP approached globalization and the EU process in late 1990's/early 2000's. Likewise, Makovsky's work (1999) builds on MHP's position on issue areas such as Cyprus, Kurdish separatism; and Cizre-Sakallıoğlu (1992) looked at the anti-Western tendencies within the party. In a more comprehensive study, Canefe & Bora (2003) addressed a period that ranges from the early 1990's with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of post-Soviet Turkic states to the 2002 elections in Turkey, the EU process and anti-European ideas, and how the MHP's line fared in comparison to Turkish foreign policy on the state level.

2.5.5. Studies on Türkeş and Bahçeli

Despite being low in volume, the comparison of the leadership styles of Türkeş and Bahçeli and changes in their ideology have also been a point of interest for scholars. The above mentioned pieces by Çınar & Arıkan (2002), Yavuz (2002), Öniş (2003), Heper & İnce (2006) and Uzer (2016) provide an analysis of intra-party changes, the continuity and changes between the Türkeş and Bahçeli periods, how they fared during different governments; how the personalities and principles of the two leaders shaped the party orientation. Nevertheless, the majority of the literature on these leaders consist of non-academic studies, non-systematic research, biographic pieces and simple collections of speeches.

Among such studies that draw rather snapshots of the leaders through a combination speeches, Turhan's works (2016), (2017) provide a vast source. Likewise,

Nalbantoğlu (1986), Turgut (1995), İzci (2016) and Uzman (2017) conducted studies on Türkeş's memoirs and speeches, and Uğur (2009) compiled the speeches of Türkeş in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. While there are also studies of the Idealist branches of the MHP such as (Ülkü Ocakları Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı, 2017), there are also more academic studies on Türkeş including pieces such as Tekin (2001) and Yalçın (2017), but their scope is limited and their qualitative approach had its deficiencies as well. As the ruling term at the top of his party goes on, studies on Bahçeli differ in terms of the time and contexts they are written. There are biographical studies that cover the period before the AKP as well as the opposition days of Bahçeli including Kılıçaslan (2011), Cengiz (2014) and Çapkıner (2017).

Looking at the studies at the Ph.D. level, again, we see a limited number of studies that address the nationalism of MHP with different degrees of attention attributed to the two leaders. The dissertations by Çalık -which was published as a book later as well (1995)- and Erken (2013), for instance, provide an insight on the party approach based on cultural components and the development of nationalist rhetoric/strategy respectively, but only limited to the period prior to the 1980 coup. Likewise, Uzun's (2000) study focusing on the institutionalization of Turkish nationalism does not proceed the millennium turn and the upcoming AKP years. While all these studies are based on fragmented topics and limited time periods, a more comprehensive study was produced by Kıldal (2020) who not only investigated the trajectories followed by the two leaders, but also accounted for the differences in their ideologies and how they evolved in comparison to the foundational claims of the party. By doing so, Kıldal enabled a framework that covers both continuity and change within the party ideology in terms of civic, cultural and ethnic components of nationalism. Operating in this context, she traced the changes in party ideology and the

approaches of leaders based on the needs and requirements of their times, changing perceptions of threats and different historical settings. Nevertheless, Kidal's dissertation is also limited in terms of the time period the thesis covers since it does not address the governmental partnership between the MHP and the ruling party AKP in the post-2016 period.

2.5.6. Conclusion

All in all, the literature on Turkish nationalism, the MHP and the two leaders does not include many systematic studies. Most of the works are non-academic in nature and even the low number of academic studies do not go further than adopting historical and comparative methodologies with an emphasis that is mostly on the party rather than the leaders themselves. This thesis differs from previous studies as it adopts a quantitative aspect in calculating the belief scores of the two leaders through operational code analysis while also making use of a qualitative approach in terms of extracting meaningful insight from the indices that the leaders possess and the historical contexts they operate in. Furthermore, the explicit attention on foreign policy will also differ from the literature as the existing literature on Turkish nationalism has not gone further than addressing single events or processes such as the Cyprus issue or the EU process. Foreign policies related issue areas have not been subject to separate research, and the low number of studies have treated them as mere extensions of general party policies without taking into account the differences in terms of leader preferences.

As a whole, this study aims to fill the gaps in the field of foreign policy analysis in terms of non-Western leaders, the low number of studies adopting operational code analysis in Turkish politics, and by offering a quantitative study of Turkish far-right

leaders and their foreign policy orientation that takes into account both party strategies and the impact of the leaders' belief systems.



CHAPTER 3:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3.1. Development of Turkish Nationalism

3.1.1. Early Republican Years

The official establishment date of the MHP originates in 1969. The history of the nationalist movements in Turkey, however, goes further back to the late Ottoman period. There are different accounts of history with regards to where to locate the origins of Turkish nationalism. While one can go back as far as the early 19th century revolts in the empire and minority based nationalist movements, the origins of the early generation of Turkish nationalists is more closely connected to the late 19th-early 20th century.

In this context, scholars such as Cizre-Sakallıoğlu (1992) and Aytürk (2014) take the impact of young Turks from 1908 onwards as a common point in acknowledging the continuity of Turkish nationalism to the early years of the republic in terms of the establishment of the Turkish identity as an alternative to previous Islamist and Ottomanist approaches in the empire. Accordingly, the roots of Turkish nationalism as a political movement can be found during the second constitutional period of the late Ottoman period. This approach that takes Turkish nationalism initially as an

alternative to religious and Ottoman based identities also reflect that the famous ‘Turkish-Islamic ideal’ was not there at the beginning and cannot be taken as a given. On the contrary, since these movements did harm the empire rather than helping, their existence opened the way to nationalism as a separate way out. In line with their ideological goals, this group of initial nationalists supported the reforms of the newly established Turkish Republic. As Aytürk (2014) argues, “the first generation of Turkish nationalists were, again with few exceptions, a secular and secularizing elite.” Similarly, Cizre-Sakallıoğlu (1992) argues that the nationalist circles at the time saw religion as a road block to westernization.

3.1.2. The Transition to a Multi-Party System in Turkey and the First Formations of Turkish Nationalist Parties

During the first decades of the republic, Turkish nationalism continued to remain influential at the societal level but did not proceed to become a political movement at a party level until 1948. The role of religion served as a social glue but was not welcomed at the political level by the Kemalist state elite. The common theme of anti-communism gathered wide appeal within nationalist groups but divisions emerged under the clashing claims on identity and ethnicity. The discussions on ethnicity and accusations of racism became especially problematic with the 1944 trials on racism-Turanism which became gradually a greater point of fragmentation within nationalist groups. In this context, Aytürk (2014) calls 1944 a ‘turning point’ in terms of the trials that marked the first serious disagreement between the Kemalist groups within the state and the Turanist establishments within nationalist groups.

In this political environment, the Nation Party (MP) emerged in 1948 representing Turkish nationalists on a party level for the first time. The 1950’s saw a multiparty

system with the ending of CHP monopoly as the sole governing party. In this environment, the opposition of MP continued during the Democrat Party era (DP) with its successors Republican Nation Party (CMP) and the Republican Peasant Farmer's Nation Party (CKMP). Alongside the divisions between Kemalism-Turanism, communism-capitalism and secularism-religion, nationalist groups continued to operate on a lower level of political attention.

3.1.3. Coups and the Turbulent 1960's/1970's

On the morning of May 27th, 1960, it was Alparslan Türkeş who read the coup declaration on the radio. The 1960 coup d'état opened a new chapter in Turkish politics not only for the nationalists but for every actor and citizen. The country experienced bicameralism for the first time, social rights expanded and the relatively freed intellectual environment enabled the growth of alternative ideas throughout the country. Student movements increased in number and university campuses became the stage for protests. Similarly, the working class and various unions became more active in defending their rights.

The shift in the socio-political environment and state-society relations led to a weakening Kemalist grip on the society. Despite the fact that the 1961 constitution was born through a coup, the social features and citizen rights it introduced allowed new thoughts and ideologies to grow quickly and awakened mostly leftist leaning groupings on the social sphere to become more proactive. The nationalist groups, on the other hand, became increasingly disturbed by the communist-influenced youth movements. As a response to the radical left, the radical right gained strength as well. Opposing identity claims fed off each other, and the first signals of political violence

emerged in the late 1960's, a phenomenon that would occupy the political agenda even more in the 1970's.

Türkeş, who took actively part in the 1960 coup at the time, was distanced from the coup administration due to his thoughts on how long the military administration should take control during the transformation process to the ordinary democracy life. His appointment abroad took a few years until 1963, and in 1965 he became the chairperson of the CKMP. During the brief period as the chairperson of CKMP until 1969 when the MHP was established, the reign of Türkeş was occupied mostly with intra-group discussions on the role of religion and the extent of Islam in Turkish nationalism.

With the emergence of MHP, the final confrontation took place and Islam established a firm grip in the party as the last Turanists and the group led by Atsız were expelled from the party. Despite the fact that the relationship between the secular non-Kemalist Turanists led by Atsız and Türkeş dates back to the 1930's, the increasing impact of Islam led to a road split that seemed inevitable. Aytürk (2014) calls this confrontation in 1969 "the most important turning point in the history of Turkish nationalism since 1944" (p. 711) as the clash between religious-leaning and secular branches was solved for once and all. The secular response to Islamic ideas within Turkish nationalism was slowly but gradually replaced by an increasing role for religion. While this combination of religiously influenced nationalism was labelled as the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis' by 'Aydınlar Ocağı'-influenced groups, the term 'Turkish-Islamic ideal' which was preferred by Seyyid Ahmet Arvâsî-led figures received more recognition within the party. For Arvâsî, the term 'synthesis' could not be used as syntheses could only occur between opposing poles, which was not the case with Turkishness and Islam.

The 1970's experienced even further confrontation between leftist and rightist groups led by nationalists. Youth branches of the MHP and para-military groups that received combat training led to several discussions throughout the country. The turbulence of the 1970's was felt both in domestic and international politics. On the domestic side, the Turkish Republic experienced its second military intervention on the political scene in 1971, just eleven years after Törkeş read the coup declaration in 1960. Political violence and internal tensions increased with each passing year as coalition government prevented the establishment of a stable political environment. Among these short term governments, Törkeş served as the deputy prime minister from 1975 to 1977, which will be also addressed in the upcoming part that looks more closely to Törkeş.

On the international stage, the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971, the Turkish intervention on Cyprus in 1974 led to embargos led by the US, and the OPEC oil shocks in 1973 and 1977 served fuel to fire. In these circumstances, the main agenda of the Turkish far-right was dominated by clashes with the leftist groups and the rhetoric was mostly on the communist threat inspired by the cold war environment; and the role of Islam served as a glue that held conservatist leaning groups together with the nationalists. In other words, the Turkish-Islamic ideal enabled a third way in the turbulent capitalist-communist dichotomy, and the nationalist saw themselves acting in line with state interests, a quasi-state organization that ensured the integrity and continuity of the Turkish state on the social sphere. This line of thinking changed after the 1980 coup, but until the 1980's, the 1970's were dominated by the anti-leftist/communist discourse parallel to government policies.

3.1.4. The 1980 Coup and the Closure of MHP

The 1980's began once again with a military intervention, the coup on September 12th, 1980. While the internal fighting and the bloodshed stopped with the coup and the left was the primary group that was hit by the measurements and sentences, the nationalist circles received their share of punishment as well. Accordingly, the post-coup era signalled the split between state policies and the MHP more clearly. Arıkan (2003) calls this a period in which the nationalist circles “found themselves, for the first time in their history, having to question their unconditional support of the Turkish state” (p. 359). Considering that the party envisioned itself “as an organization with a mission to protect the Turkish state in the name of the Turkish nation and visa versa” (Canefe & Bora, 2003, p. 130) the difference in expectations and reality became more apparent.

In this political climate, the authoritarian and militancy aspect of the party decreased in terms of street violence and the previously mentioned combat training of the youth organizations: the violence and extremism of the earlier MHP turned into more moderate nationalism that was blended with conservatism. Nevertheless, the aggressive discourse continued on other issue areas. The anti-communist rhetoric continued to receive interest but an increasing attention was passed to the newly emerging PKK issue alongside the Kurdish problem at the political scene.

In the wake of the neoliberal wave in the 1980's, the nationalist groups reorganized and re-entered the political scene under Türkeş in 1987. As the new-right policies hit the rather lower social groups, the party policy that emerged against individualism represented more of a communitarian nationalism understanding. The party aimed to offer an alternative to such groups by staying away from military struggles,

maintaining its anti-communist rhetoric, support the fight against PKK-led terrorism and by pursuing closer ties with the rising Islamist sections in the country.

3.1.5. Post-Soviet Developments in the 1990's and the Emergence of Bahçeli

The 1990's came with a wind of change as the international scene was shook with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. The newly independent countries that included Turkic republics received the interest of not only the MHP but also the Turkish governments of the time. The Pan-Turkist discourse came alive after a long break since the expulsion of the Atsız group in 1969, and the MHP rhetoric as well as the Turkish foreign policy orientation shifted to the Caucasus and Central Asia. The former Soviet Union members also attracted interest in terms of potential economic ties and cooperation in other fields as “external economic relations provided a new lease of life for the ultra-nationalist MHP” (Öniş, 2003, p. 34).

As the former enemy, the so called ‘communist threat’ was eliminated, nationalist circles were in search for a new identity. While the Turkic republics led to a new policy orientation abroad, the increasing terror events in Turkey and the discussions on political Islam filled quickly the absence of the anti-communist discourse. The country experienced a turbulent decade with coalition governments, though not as devastating as the 1970's. At the end of the century with the passing of Türkeş, a new era opened for the MHP and Turkish nationalism when Devlet Bahçeli became the new chairperson of MHP in 1997. As the new party leader distanced the party from its violent image of the earlier decades, electoral success followed quickly.

At the turn of the century, the newly elected Bahçeli received the opportunity to join the government and serve as the deputy prime minister until 2002. Looking at the electoral success of the MHP at the time, the adaptation capability in a quickly changing environment stood out in party policies, especially in terms of the perception on political Islam in Turkey. In a time period where the social influence of religious groups grew and at the same time the military pressure intensified on religious reactionism, the MHP offered kind of an amalgam that neither pushed the religious conservatives away, nor the secular nationalist branches. Öniş (2003) reflects on the electoral success of the MHP as an “adaptive capacity to build on the failures of political Islam in Turkey” ... where the party “managed to distinguish itself rather skilfully from the Islamists and presented itself as pro-systemic party of the centre” (p. 33).

As the millennium came to a close, Turkey was hit by two important events. On the one hand, the 1999 earthquake had a devastating impact on the already crumbling economy that experienced several inflationist waves throughout the 1990's. On the other hand, the 2001 economic crisis signalled the end of a decade full of coalition governments and economic shocks. The brief term of Bahçeli's MHP in the government is remembered mostly with the discussions on the EU application process, the death penalty issue with regards to the capture of the PKK leader Öcalan and the economic crisis. While the MHP did not oppose directly the candidacy of Turkey and a possible partnership with the EU, there were still roadblocks in terms of the party's hard stance on the Cyprus issue, accusations of human rights violations in Turkey in its fight against terrorism, the expected reforms on minority rights, the abolishment of the death penalty and the Christian club image of the

Union. Although these issue areas illustrated the main lines of confrontation between the EU and MHP, the party did not allow the positive relationships to be sabotaged.

3.1.6. The AKP Government and the Opposition Years of the MHP in the 2000's

As the AKP government came to power in November 2002, the nationalists were pushed to the opposition once again. The broad appeal of the AKP surpassed the previous Islamist parties and the center-right votes that carried the MHP to a brief coalition government were now gone in the aftermath of years with economic demise. As Özbudun (2006) touches upon, “AKP is not a simple continuation of previous Islamist parties, but a new political force with a broad appeal to the former centre-right, centre, nationalist, as well as a portion of Islamist voters” (p. 129). Nevertheless, the majority of the nationalists were not happy with the early pro-American stance of the AKP that distanced itself from a nationalist discourse and presented a moderate image of political Islam.

In this environment, the MHP discourse did not change much throughout the 2000's, adopting an anti-EU stance and a pro-active approach on terrorism. The party heavily criticized the rapprochement with the US during the Iraqi war but supported the trans-boundary operations conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in Northern Iraq. The division between the ruling AKP and Turkish nationalist became more evident with the Balyoz and Ergenekon trials on the Turkish army with allegations of coup plans. At the same time, with the longstanding contact between the religious Gülenist groups and the AKP as well as the increasing communication between the Kurds and the AKP, the MHP rhetoric became more and more

aggressive that was reinforced with an anti-reactionary and anti-terrorism based discourse.

3.1.7. 2015 Elections and the AKP-MHP Rapprochement

The scene began to change in the aftermath of the 2015 elections. As the AKP failed to establish a government by its own for the first time in its history, the MHP refused to take part in any of alternative coalition scenarios and willingly accepted the role of ‘main opposition party.’ In this controversial political environment, however, Bahçeli’s position was in jeopardy with leadership challenges within the party. Figures such as Meral Akşener, who would later become the chairperson of Good Party (İYİP), and Ümit Özdağ, who would lead the Victory Party (Zafer Partisi), voiced their criticisms over Bahçeli’s post-election policies at the time. The transition period until the renewal of the elections experienced a large wave of terror attacks in the country as domestic violence increased. The so called ‘peace process’ ended and the PKK announced the continuation of its activities against the Turkish state. At the end of 2015 the AKP was re-elected with a larger portion of votes than ever. In this environment, internal divisions became deeper within the MHP and Bahçeli survived due to AKP’s electoral success.

The year of 2016 introduced even more drastic changes both in the country and within the MHP. The alleged coup attempt in July 2016 and the state of emergency that followed brought with it a ‘witch hunt’ in the country. Gülenists as well as the PKK were now the common enemies of the AKP and the MHP. At the same time, the activity of radical religious groups and Syrian Kurdish groups increased at the southern border of Turkey. A couple weeks after the coup attempt, the TAF begun its operations in Northern Syria against ISIS. These operations were followed in the

coming years with operations against the YPG-led armed Kurdish groups. The main motivation was now to ‘eliminate’ the main threats directed to the survival of the Turkish state which was ‘surrounded’ with internal as well as external enemies, and the MHP-AKP rapprochement became more evident. Presidential decrees targeted Gülenist related figures and institutions, operations were carried out against Kurdish terrorist groups under state of emergency policies and large scale military operations were conducted at the Syrian border against Kurdish affiliated armed groups and religiously influenced extremists.

In this political climate of high tensions, the AKP and MHP collaborated first during the 2017 referendum for a presidential system in Turkey, and then the presidential elections itself in 2018. While some MHP voters approved these close relations with the AKP, the ones that were disturbed formed another nationalist party under Meral Akşener’s İYİP. In this type of a chaotic political environment, the MHP adopted a ‘survival’ (*beka*) discourse alongside an emphasis on being ‘domestic and national’ (*yerli ve milli*). Entering the presidential elections in 2018 on opposing sides, the Turkish nationalists were split now in half and the MHP started to lose ground. Although initial electoral results did not reflect much of a loss for the MHP, the share of protest votes against the AKP government gave a boost to the MHP.

In the aftermath of the 2018 elections, the socioeconomic downfall escalated in the country. The domestic currency in the country, the Turkish Lira, lost rapidly value. Turkey strengthened its relations with the Russian Federation amid the sale of S-400 air-defence systems, tensions increased in the Eastern Mediterranean, corrupt business relations emerged on the issue of Iranian sanctions. In the meantime, the electoral alliance named ‘Cumhur İttifakı’ between the AKP and MHP lost the 2019 municipal elections in İstanbul and in the Turkish capital, Ankara. Soon after, the

Covid-19 pandemic arrived and the already damaged Turkish economy took its share.

With the unorthodox interest-rate policies of the Turkish government beginning at the end of 2021, inflation in Turkey peaked to record-breaking levels. On the international scene, the increasing escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict turned into a full-scale war in early 2022 and an energy crisis emerged, especially for the European countries. In the wake of a global energy crisis, recession fears around the world intensified. In an environment where almost all countries increased their central bank interest rates, the Turkish government continued to pursue its own agenda that aimed to sustain domestic growth at the expense of lower purchasing-power and higher inflation. Combined with the growing refugee problem in Turkey, the crisis resulted in decreasing support for the MHP.

Building on this historical background of Turkish nationalism, the MHP and its antecedents, the next sections will cover Türkeş and Bahçeli's careers in more detail before proceeding to the research design and its findings.

3.2. Alparslan Türkeş

Born in Nicosia -the capital of Cyprus- and raised in a family that migrated later to Turkey, Türkeş received a military-dominant education from the beginning of his career with institutions that include the Kuleli Askeri Lycee, the General Military School, the Infantry Shooting School and the Military Academy (Landau, 1985). Completing these initial steps in his early career in Turkey, the next destination was the Turkish NATO committee in the US in 1955, followed by an education in 1957 in Germany on nuclear issues (MHP, n.d.). Soon after, 27th of May 1960 occurred

and Türkeş took actively part in the first military coup in the modern Turkish Republic.

In the aftermath of the coup, however, disagreements emerged within the coup administration, and Türkeş with 13 others were distanced from their positions because they advocated a longer period of military rule before returning to normal democratic life. Ironically, however, as Türkeş returned from his position abroad, this time he was the one that took the democratic route: Refusing to take part in a new coup proposed by Aydemir, according to Akpınar (2005), Türkeş was thinking about entering politics. Considering that he took actively part in a coup just a couple of years ago with the intention of an even longer military-based rule, Türkeş's choice was rather unusual at the time and represented a radical turning point.

In the year of 1965, Türkeş was now the chairperson of CKMP. In the same year, he published the first version of his doctrine named 'The Nine Lights.' Based on nine main fields that are 'nationalism/patriotism,' 'idealism,' 'morality,' 'corporatism/communitarianism,' 'scientism/scientific mentality,' 'freedom/personalism,' 'peasantism,' 'progressivism and populism' and 'industrialism and technological advancement,' Türkeş offered a political approach that was the mixture of populist, realist and liberal aspects. While these themes seem unconnected and rather disconnected, Türkeş was looking to find a middle way between "racist pan-Turanists, who were distant to Islam, and pro-Islamic pan-Turanists, who embraced Islam as a cultural component of Turkishness" (Balçı, 2011, p. 160). Approached as a whole, Türkeş's Nine Lights represent an overarching emphasis on developmentalism.

Looking into some of these ‘lights’ more in detail, for instance, we see that although ‘idealism’ points out a superior Turkish nation with rather racist tendencies, the more liberal principles include all of the freedoms that were present in the charter of the UN. While the ‘moralism’ principle addressed Turkish ethics and attributed varying degrees of importance to Islam in Turkish nationalism in different versions of the Nine Lights, ‘scientism’ and ‘progressivism’ emphasized science as a guide. Nevertheless, in the eyes of Türkeş, the principles were not mutually exclusive but possessed an internal coherence. In this regard, Kıldal (2020) points out that the doctrine “reflects Gökalp’s trilogy or synthesis of Turkification, Islamization, Modernization- the idea that being a Turk, a Muslim, and modern (the scientific and technological developments) are not mutually exclusive” (p. 90). Nevertheless, considered as a whole one can argue that the Nine Lights illustrate a spectrum of different and sometimes clashing themes that reflect an attempt to draw a comprehensive policy orientation for different sections of the party.

As the CKMP turned into the MHP, Türkeş’s position on the Turkish-Islamic ideal became sharper as well. Following the expulsion of the Atsız led Turanist groups, Türkeş followed a religiously influenced discourse. In foreign policy related issues throughout the 1970’s, the main focus was on relations with NATO, the Cyprus issue, Western Thrace Turks, and the communist threat continued to occupy front pages in the book of the nationalists. During his term as a deputy prime minister from 1975 to 1977, however, the emphasis in his rhetoric shifted to nuclear issues, the balance of power in international relations, Turkey’s relations with the Third-World and Chino-Soviet relations. In a period full of political tensions, a politicized and polarized society, violence and oppression, a nation torn between the right and

the left, Türkeş's MHP did not last long in the National Front governments of late 1970's.

In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, he was sentenced to prison and served his penalty for almost 5 years. As he returned to ordinary politics following the end of the political ban on political parties and figures of the coup era, he abandoned his earlier political posture and pursued more passive policies in the shadow of Özal years and the neoliberal transformation in Turkey. At the same time, as the relations with the European Communities continued with fluctuations, Türkeş's MHP was holding on to the belief that Westernization and relations with the EC could be beneficial as long as it did not mean a total break from the core components of the Turkish culture. In other words, Türkeş was against the simple copying Western values that would contradict Turkish values, but supported the idea to take the technological advancements of the West, an idea that was replicated in the following decades by Bahçeli as well.

The 1990's meant a Turanist surge for Türkeş with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The anti-communist discourse was replaced with a pan-Turkist one. Calling for an active Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans as well, he had high hopes but his ambitions remained mostly at the discourse level as the relations with the post-Soviet Turkic states did not precede low levels of cooperation. In domestic politics, he focused mostly on the Kurdish issue and economic problems. As he passed away in 1997, a new chapter opened in the MHP history with Devlet Bahçeli.

3.3. Devlet Bahçeli

In the aftermath of Türkeş's death, Bahçeli was elected as the new leader of the nationalist movement following a series of tense party elections and intra party discussions with groups supporting Türkeş's son, Tuğrul Türkeş. Despite an initial problematic Congress process, Bahçeli quickly gathered the support of different nationalist circles. Coming from an academic background, the change at the top of the party represented a drastic shift considering the military background of Türkeş. Illustrating a cleaner and more respectful image that is distanced to the earlier decades' MHP that was involved with political violence, Bahçeli did not lose time by attracting the interest of conservative Anatolian voters. The change begun within the party and Bahçeli demanded a change in even the simplest behaviours and principles: "Moustaches running down to the chin, the special ülkücü greeting that involved the banging of each other's heads, refusal to wear ties, wearing of white socks, and other markers of being a 'true ülkücü' were all banned" (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002, p. 33). Beyond the symbolic changes, the policy understanding among different party branches went through a rebuilding phase as well: the Idealist youth groups were directed towards cultural activities instead of political violence.

A few years later, Bahçeli's MHP was the coalition partner of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi). During his time as the deputy prime minister (1999-2002), Bahçeli adopted a progressive discourse with the claim of putting national interests ahead of party interests. Despite having deep disagreements, he did not prevent the abolishment of the death penalty during the early accession process with the EU. This kind of an approach, despite sometimes leading to contradicting rhetoric, can also be seen in later periods of Bahçeli's career. In 2007, for instance, he did not oppose the road leading to Abdullah Gül's

presidency in a period where he totally opposed AKP policies. Likewise, arguing that this was the best for the country, he refused to take part in any kind of a coalition government after the 7th of June elections in 2016. In the same year, he supported the referendum on the transformation to the presidential system based on the argument that the time was right and the spirit of time required it, a theme that he strictly opposed in earlier years. Before the 2018 elections, this time he formed officially an electoral alliance with the AKP that he criticized for tens of years. Erdoğan, who has ‘forgiven terrorists’ (MHP, 2007), harmed the country worse than a ‘colonial mind’ (MHP, 2009), should be ‘put on trial’ in front of the Supreme Court (Hürriyet, 2010) and who is not ‘capable of’ being a president (Habertürk, 2014) was now the candidate to support in 2018 and the years to come. For Bahçeli, these contradictions were not invalidating his previous comments on AKP and Erdoğan but rather represented a shift in AKP’s policies (Sözcü, 2018). In other words, he supported policies that even contradicted directly his earlier party policies as long as he thought the change was in line with the so called national interests.

Overall, the discourse of Bahçeli throughout the 2000’s were shaped along an anti-Western, military friendly, anti-PKK rhetoric. The distanced but still positive approach towards the EU and the international society at the beginning of the century was quickly replaced with direct hostility and accusations of ‘being tools of the West’ as a critic of AKP policies. The TAF operations and the fight against the PKK were unconditionally supported by him, regardless of MHP being at the opposition or the government. Another overarching commonality was the search for internal as well as external enemies. Some internal ‘traitors’ changed, ranging from the AKP (MHP, 2010) to the Gülenists (Türkiye Gazetesi, 2022) or the alliance of ‘abasement’ between the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Good Party

(İYİP) (TRT Haber, 2022), and external enemies ranged from the EU (MHP, 2004) to NATO (MHP, 2018), the US (MHP, 2018), Russia (MHP, 2020) and other unnamed ‘outside powers.’

The post-2016 period which still goes on is mostly marked with the ‘domestic and national’ (*yerli ve milli*) discourse and with several internal and external enemies.

This type of an ‘us versus them’ understanding has been the constant in Bahçeli’s as well as Türkeş’s approach to politics. Operating in the earlier mentioned crisis environment during the last years, Bahçeli and his party has mostly provided an appealing alternative to previous AKP voters that were not happy with the present status-quo. Nevertheless, these years also reflect a more passive Bahçeli that could not go beyond Erdoğan’s shadow which was also a side-effect of the presidential system that left not much of a room for other figures besides the executive.

The next chapter will touch upon the research design and the methodology of the study.

CHAPTER 4:

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis is built on the understanding that leaders possess a primary role in decision making and international politics. Accordingly, an important aspect in understanding leaders' foreign policy decisions rests on understanding his beliefs. Belief systems provide leaders with frameworks to operate with, and at the same time, they shape how leaders think and respond to different situations. Therefore, this study will adopt operational code analysis for the analysis of the strategic culture of two Turkish far-right leaders, Türkeş and Bahçeli.

The chapter will begin with the research puzzle and the questions that stemmed from it. Following the detailing of the design and the methodology, the chapter will elaborate on the operationalization of VICS, the use of ProfilerPlus and its Turkish version as well as its relevance as a quantitative research tool. Next, the hypotheses of the study will be outlined. Likewise, the reasoning behind the case selection, the criteria for the selected data, how the speeches were chosen and the different domains of the study will be addressed in detail.

4.1. Research Puzzle and Research Questions

The main puzzle that ignited the will to conduct this study stems from the quest to identify the belief systems of nationalist far-right leaders in the field of foreign policy. In an attempt to understand how nationalist leaders approach their ‘other’ in international politics, and in response, what type of instruments they adopt, this thesis looks to shed light on the decision making and foreign policy preferences of the analysed leaders. The study looks at two long-term serving party leaders that have dominated the Turkish far-right for several decades. In this regard, the main research question of the thesis are concerned with how T rke  and Bah eli make sense of international relations; how and in what regards they differ from each other and the average world leader; whether their belief systems went under any significant change; the impact of being at the opposition or being a government partner; the influence of coups and military interventions; the parallels and opposites compared to their party lines and how much of an overall impact they possessed over Turkish foreign policy:

1. What are the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of Alparslan T rke  and Devlet Bah eli?
2. Where do they stand compared to each other: Can we locate a continuity in terms of party policy and strategic culture?
3. In what regards do they differ from the average world leader?
4. Did the belief systems of the leaders go under any significant change? If so, on which instances and situations?
5. To what extent and how did these leaders’ beliefs impact Turkish foreign policy?

4.2. Research Design and Methodology

In order to analyse the belief systems of the two leaders, the study will make use of operational code analysis, a quantitative coding scheme that reflects how leaders see the political nature, how much control they think they possess over the course of history and what policies they adopt accordingly. This being said, the thesis does not claim that there is a causal relationship between all foreign policy decisions and a leader's belief system. Alongside this disclaimer, we also have to acknowledge that there will be always other actors and factors that shape a leader's decisions, his initial intentions and the policy outcomes. Nevertheless, the role of human agency and the importance of the leader in foreign policy does not disappear in these conditions. On the contrary, due to the remaining ambiguities, understanding a leader's belief system becomes even more important in order to make predictions about future decisions. The calculated belief scores by VICS and the automated coding of ProfilerPlus also enable cross-national studies and contribute to the search of generalizable patterns for far-right leaders.

Besides the use of operational code analysis, this study also adopts a multi-method research design as it utilizes a qualitative aspect through the historical background it provides and the interpretation of the belief scores by addressing them in relation to foreign policy events. By combining the quantified belief scores with qualitative interpretations of the foreign policy events that took place, the study enables the researcher to test his hypotheses and support the findings with factual observation.

4.2.1. VICS and ProfilerPlus

The main research tool of the study is the Verbs in Context System (VICS) that draws inferences from the public statements of leaders. The bottom-up approach of

VICS enables predictions that are based on the coding of beliefs through the analysis of ‘transitive verbs.’ While the comprehensive detailing of the VICS has already been shared in the literature review section, this part will serve more as a reminder but also touch upon the Turkish version of the ProfilerPlus program and it will shed more light on the computer-based research tools of the thesis.

The ProfilerPlus based coding scheme allows the identification of key words through ‘tag and retrieve,’ the significance of the words through a ‘frequency analysis,’ the coding of different ‘concepts,’ and the extraction of relevant ‘information’ (Hudson, 2007). While the system follows these coding steps, it attributes positive and negative values depending on the degree of threat or promise that ranges from the value of -3 to +3. By providing quantified results and statistical evidence, it opens the way for comparative studies. Language wise, the current version of the system allows for the coding of five different languages that are English, Spanish, Arabic, German and Turkish, which will be used in this thesis.

In 2020, Özdamar, Canbolat and Young have introduced the Turkish version of the operational code through ProfilerPlus:

Because individuals and their leadership style matter in Turkish politics, a nuanced and scientific explanation of Turkey’s foreign and domestic policy-making requires a systematic approach to leadership analysis. We contribute to efforts in broadening the scope of FPA by creating a Turkish coding scheme for operational code analysis (OCA). (Brummer et al., p. 8)

Despite the challenges that the Turkish language present with its ‘agglutinative’ character and cultural/religious symbols, it also provides opportunities by highlighting context-specific indicators, enabling the analysis of non-translated speeches by Turkish politicians from the past and to help scholars to revisit

established studies on Turkish foreign policy. Thus, with its pros and cons, this study looks to contribute to the further development of the Turkish operational code.

4.2.2. Temporal and Spatial Domains

The temporal domain of the thesis includes the time frames during which these two leaders have served as the leaders of their parties and their place in the parliament as opposition parties or parties with –governmental- power. Türkeş has served as a party leader for three different parties (CKMP, MHP, MÇP) from 1965 to 1997 whereas Bahçeli only led the MHP from 1997 to date. The detailed time frames and their roles in the parliament are listed below (Table 8):

Alparslan Türkeş			Devlet Bahçeli		
<u>Year</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Parliamentary Position</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Parliamentary Position</u>
1965-1969	CKMP	Opposition	1997-1999	MHP	Opposition
1969-1975	MHP	Opposition	1999-2002	MHP	Government partner
1975-1977	MHP	Government partner	2002-2018	MHP	Opposition
1977-1980	MHP	Opposition	2018-2022	MHP	Government partner
1980-1987	-	-			
1987-1993	MÇP	Opposition			
1993-1997	MHP	Opposition			

Table 8. Time frames of Türkeş and Bahçeli's Party Leadership

Accordingly, at least two speeches are coded from each of the stated time periods.

More information on the selection process for the speeches will be shared in the data section of this chapter.

The spatial domain of the study is the Turkish Republic. Besides the contributions to non-Western studies on the operational code, other reasons for the selection of the Turkish domain include language-based opportunities, the long-tenured character of Turkish political leaders, the leader-based policy environment in Turkey and the politicized nature of the Turkish society.

4.3. Case Selection

This study looks to profile the beliefs systems of two nationalist far-right leaders in the Turkish case, covering a time period from 1965 to 2022. The rationale behind this case selection will be addressed in two aspects that are the choice of nationalist leaders and the choice of Turkey. Firstly, the choice for nationalist leaders rests on several factors. During the last decade, populist, authoritarian and nationalist leaders have gained prominence and electoral success in several countries, including Le Pen in France, Orban in Hungary, Morawiecki in Poland, Wilders in Netherlands and Hofer in Austria (Özdamar and Ceydilek, 2020). Likewise, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the refugee waves that followed, nationalist discourses increased especially in European democracies. Finally, the global pandemic, its socioeconomic consequences, the need for self-sustainability in a global and interdependent world where logistic lines got broken led to a surge in nationalist discourses as well (Vogel, 2020). In such conditions, exploring the belief systems of far-right leaders presented an intriguing opportunity.

Secondly, the reasoning behind the selection of Turkey should also be addressed. Beyond the fact that I am Turkish, possess the native language and have access to greater sources on Turkish politicians compared to politicians from other origins, the trajectory of Turkish nationalism in Turkish politics present various reasons to

analyse. As a country where leaders have always been influential in both domestic and foreign policy (Brummer et al., 2020), Turkey has represented several opportunities for charismatic leaders to take the political stage and long periods of ruling. Looking at the first five parties with the largest voting share in the last general elections of 2018, we see that the length of their terms range currently from 5 years to 25 years, reflecting how much a party leader plays a role in shaping party policies. In this context, considering the influence Türkeş and Bahçeli had on their constituency, their belief systems over six-decades present an exciting opportunity to dig into. Finally, the politicized nature of the Turkish society and the quickly changing political agendas in the country served as yet another reason to choose this case.

4.4. Data

In order to analyse Türkeş and Bahçeli's belief systems, I have used a collection of public statements, press conferences, speeches, parliamentary gatherings and books written by the leaders. Almost all of the speeches that were coded on Bahçeli can be find on the web as well, and they are shared at the bibliography and appendix sections of the thesis. In line with the instructions and guidance introduced by Walker et al. (1998), the selection criteria for the coded speeches rest on contents that are political in nature, predominantly foreign-policy related, and include words and deeds of cooperation and/or conflict. In order to avoid a subjective sampling bias, the selection of speeches does not rest on an attempt to gather speeches that support one another. Instead, regardless of the specifics of the content, the speeches were coded if they suited the above mentioned criteria.

The speeches are also prepared texts instead of spontaneous thoughts. While spontaneous statements may seem more sincere and healthier to rely on with lower possibilities for an alternative/hidden agenda, they often do not represent the political line that the leader wants to proceed with his party. Accordingly, the prepared messages represent a healthier image of what the leader and the party aims to achieve, what kind of an image they want to represent. It should be also noted that these prepared speeches also carry more responsibility as the leaders and their parties are more likely to be held accountable where their subsequent actions are “likely to be interpreted by their audiences against the backdrop of these statements, which makes it likely that their contents will mirror their definitions of the international situation and steer their foreign policy decisions” (Tetlock, 1985, 1992; Schafer, 2000; Farnham, 2002; as cited in Walker and Schafer, 2007, p. 757).

Another important aspect of the speech selection is about the timing of the speech and the historical context it takes place. Since the political careers of the leaders cover a vast time period, at least two speeches were included for each decade except the 1950’s where Türkeş was not affiliated with a political party and the 1980’s where seven years passed with a closed MHP and the lack of marginal lines in the field of foreign policy in a post-coup political climate. In other words, the sample is stratified by decades that makes the belief scores more representative over time. As a whole, among the twelve Türkeş speeches that were coded, one belongs to the 1950’s; three belong to the CMKP years between 1965 and 1969; five speeches were carried out in the turbulent 1970’s where two of them belong to the period in which he served as deputy prime minister, and the final three speeches belong to his late political career in the 1990’s. Similarly, covering the coalition years in the pre-AKP era, two speeches from 1999 to 2002 are coded for Bahçeli; five speeches belong to

the opposition years between 2002 and 2015; and the last five speeches belong to the post-2018 period where the MHP established an electoral alliance with the ruling AKP and the country shifted from a parliamentary system to a presidential one. As a whole, the twenty four speeches that were coded cover all the opposition and government-partnership time frames of both leaders.

4.5. Variables and Hypotheses

The dependent variable of the study will be the foreign policy orientation and the strategic culture of the Turkish nationalist parties (CKMP, MÇP and MHP); and the independent variable will be the operational codes and belief systems of Türkeş and Bahçeli. While a dependent variable of ‘foreign policy decisions’ would be more fitting for the study of state leaders, the ‘chairman’ status of the two leaders eliminate such a possibility for this study. Since Türkeş and Bahçeli have served their times mostly at the opposition and even their periods in the government occurred as minor coalition partners, it would be rather misleading to account them for a direct impact on Turkish foreign policy decisions at the state level. Nevertheless, by taking the ‘policy orientation’ of nationalist parties as the depending variable, the thesis aims to identify the impact of the belief systems of leaders on the strategic culture of Turkish far-right.

Based on these variables and the earlier mentioned research questions, the thesis adopts three sets of hypotheses to be tested. Concerning the beliefs on the nature of the political universe, the first set of hypotheses begin with the argument that Türkeş’s P-1 beliefs have experienced more fluctuations compared to Bahçeli throughout his career:

Hypothesis 1a: Bahçeli's beliefs on the nature of political universe are more stable (less prone to change) than Türkeş's.

This argument stems from the eventful political career of Türkeş that experienced three coups, civil-war-like domestic struggles, trials, political exiles, the cold war environment, the collapse of the Soviet Union and many other instances that are expected to lead to shifts in his understanding of the political world.

Secondly, the study will test whether Türkeş and Bahçeli differ among each other on the way they see the nature of the political universe, and how they fare compared to the average world leader:

Hypothesis 1b: Türkeş has a more hostile understanding on the nature of political universe than Bahçeli.

Hypothesis 1c: Türkeş and Bahçeli possess more hostile views on the political world than the average world leader.

Here, *Hypothesis 1b* is related to the cold-war environment and the military background of Türkeş. In comparison, the end of the cold-war era, the globalization discourse at the turn of the century and the academic background of Bahçeli makes him more likely to have a higher P-1 than his antecedent party leader. Accordingly, I expect Türkeş to have a more hostile approach on the nature of political universe than Bahçeli.

Hypothesis 1c, on the other hand, is based on a reasoning that views far-right leaders as more hawkish on politics and thus expects a lower P-1 score. Nevertheless, it does not make a claim on the strategy that the leaders adopt. In this regard, the second set of hypotheses are directed to the I-1 scores of the leaders:

Hypothesis 2a: Türkeş and Bahçeli's approach for selecting goals and objectives are more cooperative during their terms at the government compared to their terms at the opposition.

With its focus on different periods of parliamentary power, this hypothesis expects higher I-1 scores for the leaders during their terms in the office as they are expected to be more open to compromise and cooperation in a coalition setting. Furthermore, both leaders' coalition periods come soon after certain military interventions that will also be kept in mind while addressing this hypothesis.

Secondly, *Hypothesis 2b* expects lower I-1 scores for both leaders when compared to the average world leader:

Hypothesis 2b: Türkeş and Bahçeli follow a more conflictual strategy compared to the average world leader.

Similar to *Hypothesis 1b* that expected lower P-1 scores than the average world leader, this hypothesis follows the logic that more hostile understandings would result in more conflictual strategies.

The third set of hypotheses address the theme of control and historical development.

Firstly, *Hypothesis 3a* expects a lower locus of control for both leaders in comparison to the norming group:

Hypothesis 3a: Türkeş and Bahçeli will have a lower self-control over history than the average world leader.

Accompanied by a higher degree of faith which has also religious connotations with the Turkish-Islamic ideal, I expect to find lower P-4a scores for both leaders.

Finally, *Hypothesis 3b* argues for similar P4-a scores for Türkeş and Bahçeli during the 1990's, the only decade that saw both leaders as chairmen:

Hypothesis 3b: During the 1990's, Türkeş and Bahçeli have similar beliefs in terms of the control they exert over historical development.

This argument expects to find a continuity in party orientation in the wake of the newly independent Turkic republics.

4.6. Conclusion

Despite acknowledging the disclaimer that the belief systems of leaders do not account for all of the foreign policy decisions, it nevertheless plays a vital role in determining the policy orientation of a leader alongside other external factors. In order to make educated guesses on how a leader behaves in foreign policy, understanding his belief system provides a valid starting point. This research looks to profile the belief systems of the Turkish far-right leaders, calculate their operational codes through an automated coding system, attribute meaning to the quantified scores through the interpretation of foreign policy events, and understand the strategic culture of the Turkish far-right leaders in a non-Western setting.

CHAPTER 5:

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. Introduction

Following the chapter on research design and methodology, this chapter presents the findings of the study and aims to answer the research questions that were detailed before. Accordingly, the chapter begins with the belief scores of the two leaders and then builds on interpretation the interpretation of scores. By analysing the belief scores of the leaders in comparison to the average world leader, the first part of the chapter addresses the following research questions: (1) What are the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of Alparslan Türkeş and Devlet Bahçeli? (2) Where do they stand compared to each other: Can we locate a continuity in terms of party policy and strategic culture? (3) In what regards do they differ from the average world leader? Building on the belief scores, the leadership styles of Türkeş and Bahçeli will also be located in terms of where they fall on the revised four-fold typology of Walker (1983).

The second part of the chapter will address the theme of change and continuity: (4) Did the belief systems of the leaders go under any significant change? If so, on which instances and situations? In this part, the careers of the leaders will be analysed in four different time frames, mostly centred on their government and opposition periods.

5.2.Results: The Belief Systems of Alparslan Türkeş and Devlet Bahçeli and their Leadership Typology

The belief scores of Türkeş, Bahçeli and the average world leader are shared below (Table 9). How the indices are calculated and which meaning is attributed to which score is already explained in the Literature Review chapter. In order to make it easier for the reader to interpret the beliefs, the meanings are shared beneath the scores:

	Türkeş	Bahçeli	Norming Group	Standard Deviation
Philosophical beliefs	n=12	n=12	n=164	
P-1 Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	-0,69 (Very Hostile)	-0,52 (Definitely Hostile)	0,30 (Somewhat Friendly)	0,29
P-2 Realization of political values (pessimism/optimism)	-0,65 (Very Pessimistic)	-0,49 (Definitely Pessimistic)	0,15 (Somewhat Optimistic)	0,22
P-3 Political Future (unpredictable/predictable)	0,74 (High Predictability)	0,33 (Low Predictability)	0,13 (Very Low Predictability)	0,07
P-4 Historical development (low control/high control)	0,38 (Low-Medium Control)	0,24 (Low Control)	0,22 (Low Control)	0,13
P-5 Role of chance (small role/large role)	0,68 (High Chance)	0,89 (Very High Chance)	0,97 (Very High Chance)	0,04
Instrumental beliefs				
I-1 Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	-0,08 (Mixed Conflictual)	0,06 (Mixed Cooperative)	0,40 (Definitely Cooperative)	0,43
I-2 Intensity of tactics (conflict/cooperation)	-0,28 (Somewhat Conflictual)	-0,20 (Somewhat Conflictual)	0,18 (Somewhat Cooperative)	0,28
I-3 Risk orientation (averse/acceptant)	0,91 (Very High Risk Acceptant)	0,83 (High Risk Acceptant)	0,33 (Low Risk Averse)	0,24
I-4 Timing of action				
a. conflict	0,08 (Very Low Flexibility)	0,19 (Low Flexibility)	0,50 (Medium Flexibility)	0,31
b. words/deed	0,41	0,76	0,46	0,31

	(Medium Flexibility)	(High Flexibility)	(Medium Flexibility)	
I-5 Utility of means				
a. Reward	0,00 (Very Low Utility)	0,00 (Very Low Utility)	0,16 (Medium Utility)	0,18
b. Promise	0,14 (Medium Utility)	0,00 (Very Low Utility)	0,08 (Low Utility)	0,12
c. Appeal/support	0,32 (Very High Utility)	0,53 (Very High Utility)	0,47 (Very High Utility)	0,23
d. Oppose/resist	0,17 (Medium Utility)	0,00 (Very Low Utility)	0,15 (Medium Utility)	0,18
e. Threaten	0,00 (Very Low Utility)	0,29 (Very High Utility)	0,03 (Very Low Utility)	0,06
f. Punish	0,38 (Very High Utility)	0,18 (Medium Utility)	0,11 (Low Utility)	0,15

Table 9. Belief Scores of Trke, Baçeli and the Average World Leader

The belief scores of Trke and Baçeli provide mixed results. First, looking at their image on the ‘other’ in the political universe, the master beliefs of P-1 and P-4b reflect similar findings for both leaders. Based on the P-1 scores, Trke sees the nature of political universe ‘very hostile’ (P-1= -0,69) and Baçeli follows with a ‘definitely hostile’ (P-1= -0,52) understanding that has a negative image of the other but not as powerful as in Trke’s case. This supports the *Hypothesis 1b* which argues that Trke has a more hostile understanding than Baçeli when it comes to the image attributed to the ‘other.’ Comparing these scores to the average world leader who sees the nature of political universe ‘somewhat friendly’ (P-1= 0,3), both leaders fall on the opposite side of the (y) axis by a healthy margin, supporting also *Hypothesis 1c* that argues for Trke and Baçeli to possess a more hostile view of the political world than the average world leader.

Second, regarding the image of the other, the P-4b scores reflect a higher degree of control attributed to the political other for both leaders. For Türkeş, the other leader possesses an understanding of ‘high-medium control’ over the course of history (P-4b= 0,62) whereas for Bahçeli, the political other has an even greater control over historical development, reflecting a ‘high control’ with a P-4b score of 0,76.

Combined, what the P-1 and P-4b scores of the leaders tell us typology-wise is the following: Both leaders’ image on the ‘political other’ corresponds with the lower-right part of the typology quadrant that stands for ‘Type B’ leaders. In other words, by attributing a hostile view alongside a higher locus of control for the political other, they expect to find a ‘Revolutionary’ leader to deal with. Accordingly, for Türkeş and Bahçeli, the image of the other presents a tendency to ‘dominate’ first; if domination is not possible, then seek ‘deadlock;’ followed by the options of ‘settle’ third; and the option of ‘submit’ last. Similar to the two leaders, the P-4b score of the average world leader attributes a ‘high control’ over history to the political other as well. Nevertheless, due to the ‘friendly’ approach to P-1, the ‘other’ image of the average world leader does not correspond to the Type B leader but to Type C that illustrates an ‘utopian reformer’ who “shares a belief that big changes are possible with sufficient historical control but is relatively unwilling to employ violent means to get there” (Walker and Schafer, 2007, p. 753).

Looking at the image on ‘self,’ differences start to emerge between the two leaders. Türkeş has a ‘mixed conflictual’ understanding on his strategic approach to goals (I-1= -0,08). Bahçeli, on the other hand, possesses a ‘mixed cooperative’ approach in strategy (I-1= 0,06). Although the margins between the two scores are pretty close, they fall on different sides of the cooperative/conflictual line of the quadrant.

Maintaining a ‘definitely cooperative’ self-image (I-1= 0,4), the average world leader

sits far above on the (y) axis of cooperation/conflict. This supports *Hypothesis 2b* that argues for the two leaders to follow more conflictual strategies than the average world leader.

While it is understandable that the far-right leaders possess a more conflictual worldview on their strategy compared to the norming group, it is nevertheless interesting to spot both Türkeş and Bahçeli almost exactly on the zero point of mixed strategies. One reason for the relatively positive I-1 value of the leaders is the strong in-group cooperation among nationalist circles. Likewise, considering the interest in newly independent Turkic republics in the 1990's, the Pan-Turkist tendencies have a positive impact on the cooperative scores of the two leaders who shared the 1990's as well. Despite acknowledging similar views and very close I-1 scores with Bahçeli, Türkeş is still the more conflictual strategist among the two. On the one hand, he was not in a position to pursue such policies in the 1990's as he was not a government partner like Bahçeli, so his opportunity to influence Turkish foreign policy was more limited. On the other hand, the majority of his career took place in the cold war atmosphere of a bipolar worldview and a constant communist threat both domestically and abroad.


Regarding the self-image on historical development, we find the P4-a scores of Türkeş (0,38) and Bahçeli (0,24) as 'low-medium control' and 'low control' on historical development respectively. Compared to the average world leader who believes in 'low control' with a P4-a score of 0,22, the leaders show similar results to the norming group. This falsifies *Hypothesis 3a* that argued for a lower control for the far-right leaders than the average world leader based on the 'faithful/determinist' approach of a common/greater goal that stems from the Turkish-Islamic ideal as well as Pan-Turkist tendencies. *Hypothesis 3a* argued for a predestinarian expectation

followed by the logic of a fixed destiny regardless of the characters that take place at the political scene. In other words, it expected the leaders to feel less in control due to the pre-determined historical setting they operate in. One reason why the hypothesis is falsified could stem from the same destiny approach that gives the leader the courage to pursue goals they believe they can change, precisely because it is written on their destiny.

Combined, the self-image of Türkeş falls on the bottom-left quadrant that corresponds to Type DEF leaders who possess a strategy wise conflictual worldview accompanied by a low locus of control. This type of a leader can be interpreted as a moderate realist who sees conflict permanent, has a declining understanding of optimism over the long run, and is ready to use force if needed though as the lender of last resort. Bahçeli's image, on the other hand, reflects the Type A leaders who also believes in a limited degree of control over the course of history, but differ from DEF leaders by believing in a cooperative strategy. Different from Türkeş, Bahçeli's self-image believes in temporary conflict and seeks common goals and cooperation when opportunities arise, avoiding the use of force and the threat of escalation.

The average world leader's self-image also remains on the same typology as Bahçeli's with low control and definite cooperation. While it should be noted that Bahçeli's I-1 score falls just slightly on a cooperative side, more meaningful interpretations of the I-1 scores will be analysed through a stratified approach by diving into different time periods in Bahçeli's career. In doing so and adopting a longitudinal aspect, we will be able to identify which instances pulled Bahçeli's

cooperative to the positive side. Below, Figure 1 locates the two leaders' images of self and other in comparison to the average world leader (AWL):



To sum up, looking at the master beliefs of the two leaders and the typology that responds to their leadership style, we see that the hostile image on 'other' overlap between Türkeş and Bahçeli, but differ from the average world leader who sees the world more friendly. Regarding the image on self, small differences are spotted: Türkeş has a slightly conflictual strategy compared to Bahçeli who has a slightly cooperative strategy that is more close to the average world leader. As a whole, the belief scores support the following arguments;

- *Hypothesis 1b* that argues 'Türkeş has a more hostile understanding on the nature of political universe than Bahçeli.'
- *Hypothesis 1c* that argues 'Türkeş and Bahçeli possess a more hostile view on the political world than the average world leader,' and

- *Hypothesis 2b* that argues ‘Türkeş and Bahçeli follow a more conflictual strategy compared to the average world leader.’

On the other hand;

- *Hypothesis 3a* that argues ‘Türkeş and Bahçeli will have a lower self-control over history than the average world leader’

is falsified. The next part of the section will analyse the micro foundations of the belief scores by analysing different periods of their party rules with an emphasis on their role as opposition parties or government partners.

5.3.Change and Continuity

With the aim of identifying changes in the belief systems of the leaders, this part will take a chronological look at the historical development of the belief scores (Figure 2a & 2b). By looking at shorter stints through different time frames in their political careers, this section will draw a more precise line on the development of their belief systems. Considering that both leaders ruled for more than two decades, going into further detail than the simple average of all those years becomes a must.

Beginning with Türkeş, we see that his hostile image on the political universe kept only getting stronger in his early-to-mid career. Averaging a P-1 score of -0,44 from 1965 to 1969 during his CKMP years, Türkeş had already a ‘definitely hostile’ understanding of the political world. This negative trend turned into ‘extremely hostile’ in the 1970’s as it hit the bottom -1 score which lasted until the 1980 coup. Following the political ban in the 1980’s, the 1990’s came with somewhat conflictual results (-0,33) which reflected an improvement towards a less conflictual approach. Nevertheless, bearing in mind his decade long hostile understanding (a

career P-1 average of -0,81 except the 1990's) these findings reflect a stable hostility that only differs in intensity. This leaves us with a 'u' shaped graphic where the earlier and later stages of his career were relatively less hostile compared to his extreme hostility in the 1970's.

Türkeş's strategic approach, on the other hand, reflected more fluctuating episodes. While the CKMP years begun with a 'somewhat conflictual' understanding (I-1 = -0,33), the early 1970's after the 1971 military declaration turned into a 'somewhat cooperative' I-1 score of 0,33. Here, one can point out the impact of the coup that forces a far-right leader with a military background to follow a more cooperative line in terms of foreign policy strategy. Similarly, while the second half of the 1970's reflected a 'definitely hostile' Türkeş (I-1 = -0,50), his post-1980 coup average returned back to a 'somewhat cooperative' (I-1 = 0,33) score. Although the 7-year long political ban and the post-Soviet era of the 1990's makes it difficult to distinguish the impact of the 1980 coup, the evolving trends before and after the coups in 1971 and 1980 show similar directions. In the aftermath of coups/coup attempts/military interventions, Türkeş followed more cooperative strategies.

Türkeş's most consistent master belief is the P4-a score. Starting with 0,3 in the late 1960's, his belief in control reached first 0,35 in the early 1970's, then 0,37 in the second half of the 1970's, and finally in the 1990's reaching the level of 0,42. Dissociating itself from the fluctuating trends in P-1 and I-1 scores, Türkeş' belief in historical control reflected a slow but steady increase from low to medium degrees, which remained nevertheless above the average world leader (P4-a = 0,22).




Figure 2a. *Türkeş's Belief Scores Chronologically*

In terms of Türkiye's beliefs during his opposition days versus his days as a deputy prime minister, we see the lowest P-1 and I-1 scores of his career during the 1975-1977 era. In other words, as Türkiye gained the position to influence politics the most, he saw the nature of the political universe as hostile as ever and his strategies turned very conflictual. This contradicts *Hypothesis 2a* on the side of Türkiye as it called for higher I-1 scores for the leaders during their terms at the government.

While the reasoning behind this argument was based on the fragile coalition dynamics, the internal as well as external turmoil in the 1970's which would require a more cooperative understanding, and the expectation that the party would abandon its aggressive policy stance once in power, the findings falsified this hypothesis on the side of Türkiye. The main reasons behind his hawkish approach –which will be detailed more in the next chapter- lies in the Cyprus issue of the 1970's, the US embargo that followed, and the civil war-kind of environment domestically, which all contributed to a more conflictual I-1.

Bahçeli's career, on the other hand, reflects a gradually increasing P-1 value that starts with a 'very hostile' -0,75 at the turn of the century, followed by 'definite'

hostility in the mid 2000's and early 2010's (-0,61), resulting in a 'somewhat hostile' understanding after 2017 with a -0,33 value. With this slow but steady increase in the P-1 value, the findings illustrate a weakening hostility by Bahçeli regardless of his political position or the era. The stable increase in the P-1 score of Bahçeli combined with Türkeş's u-shaped image of others provide support for *Hypothesis 1a* that argued for more fluctuation in terms of P1 scores for Türkeş. Bahçeli's P-1 scores, however, remained more moderate compared to Türkeş during most of his career. His image on the political other improved throughout his career and experienced less hostility towards the nature of political universe, but still did not manage to see a friendly political environment at any point of his career.

Regarding I-1 scores, Bahçeli's strategic approach to political goals started extremely friendly in the late 1990's and early 2000's until the AKP government came to power. The period from 2002 to 2017, however, reflect a sharp decline in the I-1 score by falling as low as the -0,56 point that stands for a 'definitely conflictual' political strategy before recovering in the post-2018 era with a 'somewhat cooperative' I-1 score (0,3). The only positive I-1 scores of Bahçeli came during his government periods of 1999-2002 and the electoral alliance from 2018 onwards. Unlike Türkeş, here we see support for *Hypothesis 2a* on the side of Bahçeli as it expects the leaders to behave more cooperative during their terms in the government compared to opposition periods. The momentum gaining Turkish-EU relations contributed to the rather high cooperative score in the 1999-2002 era, at least on the discourse level. The cooperative I-1 scores after 2017, however, could be regarded as somewhat of an anomaly due to the crisis environment both domestically and internationally. As addressed in earlier paragraphs, the same

hypothesis was falsified for Türkeş due to similar internal and external crises that he experienced during his role as deputy prime minister.

Contrary to Türkeş whose P4-a increased slow and steady, Bahçeli's approach to historical control experienced a slight decline throughout his career. The P4-a score of Bahçeli started with 0,35, followed by 0,24 in the 2000's and early 2010's, and 0,2 in the post-2018 period. Nevertheless, neither leaders' control understanding over the course of events and the level of impact they think they can insert saw any significant changes throughout their long careers. In terms of the post-1990 era until the turn of the century, a time period that experienced the party administration of both leaders, we see similar scores for Türkeş (P4-a= 0,42) and Bahçeli (P4-a= 35) which are both career highs and also support *Hypothesis 3b* that argues for similar understandings of historical control in the same time period they ruled their parties.




Figure 2b. Bahçeli's Belief Scores Chronologically

In terms of the opposition and government periods of Bahçeli, we see cooperative strategies with the only positive I-1 scores of his career, both in 1999-2002 and 2018-2022. Regarding the nature of politics, however, Bahçeli has a very hostile

understanding during his first coalition period (P-1= -0,75), but only a somewhat hostile approach after 2018 (P-1= -0,33). This can be attributed to the stronger in-group cooperation that was shaped under the ‘survival’ (*beka*) discourse of MHP. The P4 scores remained stable in both periods. The interesting point in these periods can be spotted in the comparison of P-1 and I-1 scores throughout time. Looking at the direction of these scores from 2003 onwards, we see that the P-1 and I-1 beliefs followed similar lines: Whenever P-1 scores became more hostile, I-1 followed with a more conflictual line; likewise, with friendlier P-1 scores, I-1 followed in a more cooperative fashion. The outlier, in this regard, is the 1999-2002 period in which Bahçeli’s ‘very’ hostile P-1 was met with an ‘extremely’ cooperative I-1. Digging into the reasons, the hostile environment stems from the escalating terrorism in the 1990’s, the chaotic Balkans, the rising religious-secular tensions and the 1998 military declaration in Turkey, all having some sort of an impact on the hostile P-1 score. Regarding the cooperative I-1, however, we find strong in-group cooperation at the time with a focus on the young Turkic republics on the one hand and the cooperative nature of improving EU relations on the other. In this context, it can be argued that Bahçeli saw a hostile world and still acted cooperatively.

5.4.Conclusion

As a whole, both Türkeş and Bahçeli’s careers reflect mostly hostile understandings of a ‘political other.’ Nevertheless, both leaders’ P-1 scores relatively increased in their late-careers. Strategy wise, both leaders’ approach fluctuated between cooperation/conflict depending on the requirements of the time and the strength of their in-group cooperation. Finally, both leaders’ P-4 scores followed relatively

stable lines of low control over history with Türkeş gradually increasing and Bahçeli slowly declining.

Among the three sets/seven arguments of hypotheses tested, we see the following results:

- In line with our expectations for *Hypothesis 1a*, Bahçeli's beliefs on the nature of politics are more stable through time compared to Türkeş's fluctuating approach. In fact, while we see a slow but gradual increase in the P-1 scores of Bahçeli, Türkeş's P-1 scores experienced changes with a magnitude of 0,56 from 1960's to 1970's, and a 0,67 point shift from the 1970's to the 1990's.
- We also find support for *Hypothesis 1b* that expected Türkeş to have a more hostile world view than Bahçeli.
- Likewise, we find support for *Hypothesis 1c* that argues both leaders to have a more hostile sense of their political other compared to the norming group of world leaders.
- We find mixed results for *Hypothesis 2a*: There is no indication of Türkeş selecting more cooperative strategies during governmental power, but both government periods of Bahçeli came with his highest I-1 scores.
- *Hypothesis 2b* is also supported as the two leaders' strategy remained more conflictual in comparison to the average world leader.
- Contrary to our expectation in *Hypothesis 3a*, Türkeş and Baheçli's locus of historical control are higher than the average world leader.
- In line with our expectations for the 1990's, the only time-frame in which both leaders served as chairmen, Türkeş and Bahçeli had a similar sense of control over history.

CHAPTER 6:

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC CULTURE OF THE TURKISH FAR-RIGHT

6.1. Introduction

The chapter begins with a theoretical look at the leader types from an International Relations perspective and addresses the strategic culture of the leaders through the lenses of IR theories. Following the theoretical discussion on strategy, the chapter will focus on the foreign policy events that give meaning to the belief systems of the leaders and the attributed values. The political careers of the two leaders will be covered end-to-end with an explicit look on the foreign policy events during the time frames in which they possessed governmental power. In other words, the periods from 1975 to 1977, from 1999 to 2002 and from 2018 to 2022 will stand out more. Building on the quantified results of the previous chapter, a qualitative interpretation of the foreign policy instances will be offered and it will be discussed whether the beliefs of the leaders had an impact on Turkish foreign policy.

6.2. Strategic Culture

From a broader theoretical standpoint, we can revisit the typologies of the two leaders through mainstream International Relations theories in order to identify their

strategic culture. Both Türkeş and Bahçeli see their political ‘other’ with a ‘hostile’ understanding on the nature of political universe accompanied by a high locus of control over historical development. This combination, according to Walker & Schafer (2007), is associated with “the Revolutionary who blends a mix of utopian goals with Realist conceptions of strategies and tactics and a definition of the political universe as a dangerous place” (Walker and Schafer, 2007, pp. 751-753). They see the root causes of conflict and war in the behaviours of ‘warlike states’ and their ‘miscalculations.’ This kind of a leader believes that conflict is temporary and opponents act within the borders of rationality. Thus, he believes in a predictable and controllable future where any strategy would be appropriate to limit the means of opponents and to reach goals through the use of force if necessary.

Combined, they share the views of a ‘revolutionary realist’ as they expect other leaders to utilize violence and conflict alongside a belief that historical change is possible. Hereby, we can argue that the realist ‘other’ image of far-right leaders in Turkey corresponds with a preference ordering of ‘domination’ first, ‘deadlock’ second, ‘settlement’ third, and ‘submission’ as only the last option. This tendency can also be seen in the discourses of Türkeş on the Greek behaviour regarding the Cyprus issue, or Bahçeli’s anti-Western comments on regional issues where both leaders have pursued an agenda of blaming the political other such as the ‘evil Soviets,’ ‘expansionist Greeks’ or ‘separatist outside powers’ with a constant accusation of a hostile other.

Their image on ‘self,’ on the other hand, differ in terms of the typology they represent. Türkeş’s image on ‘self’ remains close to his image on the ‘other’ as he adopts conflictual strategies, but differ in terms of attributing only low-to-medium levels of ‘self’ control over historical development. Operating in an environment

with limited predictability, leaders such as Türkeş adopt rather flexible strategies where the use of hard-power is seen only as the last resource. His belief in a conflictual strategy with low control makes him a ‘moderate’ realist that seeks to make use of power imbalances and changes in the power equilibrium. This kind of a strategy can be seen in the turbulent 1970’s with military operations on the island where Türkeş had his lowest I-1 scores of his career. Similar results could be expected for the 1990’s with the changing power-equilibrium in the post-Soviet era, but the strong in-group tendencies and the support for the newly independent Turkic republics have raised the I-1 scores of Türkeş at the time.

Bahçeli’s ‘self’ image corresponds with the Type A leader who represents a ‘moderate idealist.’ This leader-type believes that conflict is temporary, seeks common goals and cooperation when opportunities arise, and avoids the use of force/the threat of escalation. While this seems to contradict the realist strategy of Türkeş, it should be noted that the ‘in-group’ effect is also to be seen in Bahçeli’s case which raises his I-1 scores, and that the +0,06 I-1 score falls much lower than the average world leader who has a ‘definitely cooperative’ strategy with a I-1 score of +0,4. At the end of the day, both Türkeş and Bahçeli represent mixed strategies that fall very close with scores of -0,08 and +0,06 respectively. Therefore, it would be misleading to represent Bahçeli as a mere idealist. Instead we see that both leaders’ mixed results reflect context-dependent strategies that differ in accordance with the necessities of the time, and that they remain on the conflictual side compared to the average world leader.

Overall, we can argue that the strategic culture of far-right leaders in Turkey functions in a strongly realist context whereas their self-strategies illustrate the arousal of different states of minds in different settings. Their realist understanding

on the nature of political universe is met with mixed strategies that swing among moderate realism/idealism. Therefore, it would more appropriate to address them in a context and time-specific fashion instead of situating them under one-strict categorization of a single-theory. In this regard, “structural theories are underspecified without including agent-oriented models of beliefs to capture the microfoundations of strategic interactions ... [and] a ‘theory complex,’ created by an agent-centered analysis of beliefs plus a structural analysis of contexts, provides the best model.” (Walker and Schafer, 2007, p. 771).

6.3. Foreign Policy Instances and the Composition of ‘Other,’ ‘In-group’ and ‘Threat Perception’

The main foreign policy topics in the agenda of Turkish far-right parties have changed through time. In different time periods, we have seen a detailed focus on themes such as the Cyprus issue, the communist threat, the cold war environment, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, emerging possibilities with globalization, the Iraqi invasion, the Arab spring, Turkish military operations on the southern border and several other issue areas. Within the context of these issue areas, the identification of the other, the components and members of the in-group and the strategy adopted against different others’ with different in-group combinations have all been subject to change.

The political other and the threat they present shifted from the Soviets with the communist threat to radical Kurdish groups and the PKK terror, from reactionism by extremist-religious groups to outside powers with separatist agendas, from the EU to the US and many others. The in-group composition, however, did not go through drastic changes. With an encompassing embracement of Turkish nationalism, the in-

group dynamics mostly included Turanists, Islamists, Turkic republics, oppressed nations and people around the world regardless of the time period analysed. The only changing theme was the intensity and extent of the different in-group partnerships. From this point on, the chapter will address these changes through foreign policy instances in a chronological manner.

6.4.1950's to 1970's: Türkeş's Approach to the Communist Threat, the Cyprus Issue and the Turkish Intervention

Going back to 1950's and the first speech of Türkeş that the study coded, we see an open criticism of Islamization within nationalist circles. Although Türkeş has not been politically involved at the time, his views reflect sharp differences from his later views on Turanism and the relation between Turkish nationalism and Islam. At the time, Türkeş argued that "Being a Turk in Turkey and speaking of Turkism has become something to be feared of" (Türkeş, 1977, p. 17). He saw the Islamization of the society as the main reason for the forgotten Turks in Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, Iraq and Palestine. And the solution for him was the ultimate goal of the unification of all Turks over the world under one state and one flag. In line with the Turanist views, Türkeş pursued an aggressive discourse calling for the independence of Turkish groups abroad, but saw diplomatic means as the initial way to follow. Furthermore, young Türkeş at the time possessed a belief in a high level of control with a P4-a score of 0,67. As he saw the unification of Turks inevitable, a struggle with Soviets as a 'matter of destiny' and the victory of Turks definite (1977, p. 23), his confident discourse raises the P-4a to unusual levels.

The 1960's increased the focus on the Soviet threat and the fear from spreading communism on the one hand, and the internationalisation of the Cyprus issue on the other. In the CKMP years where Türkeş served as the chairperson of the party, the

party declarations focused mostly on the Cyprus issue. While Türkeş claimed that the Turkish diplomacy is capable of defeating the Greeks and Makarios on the negotiation table he still argued that “Turkey should not act against international law... [and] the activities [on the island] should not lead Turkey beyond war” (Türkeş, 1996, p. 192); he also reminded the international audience that the last but definite solution lies at a military operation (p. 175) and that military capabilities should be ready in the case that diplomacy fails. At the time, Türkeş also pointed out the need for pursuing effective propaganda on the international level (p. 179).

Contrary to the ‘Enosis’ thesis of the Greek Cypriot groups that asked for a unified island under Greek influence, the Cyprus policy of Türkeş and the party was based on a “geographically separable and independent federal Cyprus” (1996, p. 184). He did not differentiate between the Cypriots and Greeks on the negotiation table and evaluated the Greek/Cypriot approach under the Greek ‘Megalo Idea’ (Uğur, 2009, p. 142). The discouraging theme for Türkeş and the party was the perceived Greek support in international organizations (p. 145) despite the internal belief that Turkey was the party that acted in line with international law. While the I-1 scores of Türkeş were somewhat conflictual in the late 1960’s with support and advocacy for military operations on the island, the emphasis on international law, diplomacy and multilateral agreements as first options (Türkeş, 1996, pp. 185-186); (Türkeş, 1998, p. 28) prevented his strategy from turning into extreme conflictual. Thus, the constant emphasis on Turks being the victim on the island justified the cause, resulting in a strong hostility of the other and a victimized in-group which sees violence as a mean but only as a last resort.

The early 1970’s passed once again under a certain level of military influence resulting from the 1971 military intervention. Though not as severe as the 1960 coup,

the volatile international and domestic settings strengthened the military influence and a rather unified foreign policy stance of the country. For Türkeş, once again, it was the Greek government that violated not only the UN laws but also the Lausanne Peace Treaty as well as their own Greek constitution (Türkeş, 1996, p. 201). The emphasis on multilateral solutions, cooperation beyond the West and a humanitarian discourse increased drastically (Türkeş, 1977, p. 52); (Türkeş, 1986, pp. 94-95); (Türkeş, 1996, pp. 32-36); (Ülkü Ocakları Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı, 2017, p. 250) which is also reflected in the somewhat cooperative strategy scores from 1971 to 1974. The hostile understanding of the political universe increased as the conflict prolonged, leading to more conflict. Türkeş argued that “Greeks slaughtered and destroyed the Turks with the most brutal and wild methods” (Türkeş, 1986, pp. 93-94); “The Greek goal has been to expand at the expense of Turkey since the day it was established” (Uğur, 2009, p. 143); “Greeks have been extremely cruel and intolerant to foreigners under their control throughout their history” (Türkeş, 1986, pp. 93-94) and labelled the Greeks as “the spoiled child of Europe” (p. 97). Overall, this repeating understanding of Greek violence, the claims on Turkish compliance with international norms and standards and the support for the Turks on the island shaped the unusual ‘hostile other/cooperative self’ strategy combination in the P-1 and I-1 axes. In other words, the perception of an extremely hostile environment, the justification of military interventions and the solidarity with the in-group that involved the Turks on the island led to a policy rhetoric where the conflictual other required the cooperation of the self. Theoretically, therefore, the realist worldview was accompanied by mixed self-strategies that fall in line with moderate idealism/realism, depending on the changing context.

The 1975-1977 period experienced the first and only government period of Türkeş's long career. Despite being the minor coalition partner with a rather limited influence, his position as a deputy prime minister was still an impactful place to be. While the extremely hostile understanding on the nature of political universe continued in this period, the overall strategy of the self (I-1) experienced the most conflictual era of Türkeş's career as a party leader (-0,5). Considering the aftermath of the military interventions on Cyprus in 1974 and the reaction and embargos that followed, the more hawkish approach to strategy becomes more understandable. Accordingly, the earlier emphasis on diplomacy, cooperation and international law decreased and the emphasis on self-sufficiency with national values increased (Türkeş, 1986, p. 180). This line of thinking reflected heavily realist notions both on the understanding on the political world and the self-strategy that is adopted. Furthermore, with the understanding that the nation has to take matter into hands without external help, the period reflects a slight increase in the belief in historical control as well (P4-a= 0,37). In 1975, Türkeş argued that: "Justice belongs to the powerful. A nation that wants to live independently and protect its rights and country has to provide its own security" (1975a, Türkeş, p. 8). While "We, the Turks, are of good will... nevertheless, our good will does not change the reality of the world. Good will does not protect us from the attacks of the aggressor." (p. 8).

Following the realist discourse and strategy throughout the period, Türkeş has pointed out several times that the era they were experiencing was one of 'nationalism and the struggle between nations' (Türkeş, 1975a, p. 8); (Türkeş, 1975b, p. 8); (Türkeş, 1977, p. 183); (Turhan, 2016, p. 93). Overall, the nuclear threats and the changing power balance has been portrayed as the main threats of the time alongside the propaganda war and economic attacks (Türkeş, 1979, p. 20); (Turhan, 2016, p.

229). The continuing problems in the Middle East and the wider MENA region and the security of the Eastern Mediterranean occupied a greater agenda as Turkey was distanced by the West. In 1977 Türkeş once again reminded everyone that there are several instances in the history of mankind where changing power balances resulted in the breaking of alliances; and in order to not to fall into these mistakes, nations should rely on their own power. (Turhan, 2016, p. 235). Thus, the association of European countries under the umbrella of the European Community was seen as the “dead born child of the European countries that continuously have a conflict of interest, trying to gain advantage at the expense of each other, and cannot bear each other (pp. 235-236). The hostile views and conflictual strategies were not limited to the West though. Türkeş also mentioned the power of nationalism through the struggles within the Sino-Soviet relations (Türkeş, 1977, p. 184; Turhan, 2016, p. 93).

Following the coalition period, the rest of the 1970’s did not see any drastic changes in the realist approach and policies of the MHP. Despite all the emphasis on nationalism, self-sufficiency and the failure of a variety of alliances, Türkeş still supported the Turkish-Western cooperation and the NATO partnership of Turkey (Uğur, 2009, pp. 260-262) a theme that he voiced even back during the 1960 coup declaration where he reaffirmed the Turkish commitment to the Western alliance of NATO and CENTO. The geopolitical position of Turkey was seen as a key attribution in a region that binds the MENA region to Europe, acting as a buffer zone against the Soviet threat, and the key actor for regional peace (Türkeş, 1979, p. 48).

As a whole, the 1970’s have reflected more of a defensive realist understanding by Türkeş with a hostile understanding of the political universe and the belief in self-defence and armament through defensive means. The hostile other was the evil

Soviets. The belief in a pro-Western positioned Turkish foreign policy was still on the front page, but the confidence in its sustainability and the Cyprus issue led to an increasing reliance of self-sufficiency and a rhetoric that does not see alliances as effective defensive mechanisms on their own. As the internal turmoil increased in the country as well, the focus shifted more to domestic issues at the end of the decade.

6.5. The Post-1980 Coup Era, the Collapse of the Soviet Union and Emerging Opportunities in the Turkic World

The 1980's begun with the 1980 coup that shattered the political setting in Turkey. Türkeş was sentenced to several years of prison, but the 7 year departure from politics did not prevent his return in 1987 with the MÇP. As Turkey leaned towards new-right policies within the neoliberal wave, there was not much of a say for any political party in a post-coup setting. While the relations between Turkey and the EC continued with ups and downs, Türkeş and his MÇP continued their precautious approach towards the 'European ideal.' Meanwhile, a new 'political other' emerged with the strengthening of PKK-led radical Kurdish groups. The domestic struggle against leftist groups were directed now against the separatist PKK threat. The military-based security understanding was still in line with realist approaches. The in-group of armed Idealist youth groups, however, went into a relative dissolution phase in the aftermath of the coup and its harsh measurements.

The 1990's experienced the revival of the MHP and the last term of Türkeş as the chairperson of his party. With the wind of change in 1991, the foreign policy orientation of the party switched completely to outside Turks in ex-Soviet countries (Turhan, 2016, pp. 262-263); (Ülkü Ocakları Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı, 2017, pp. 264, 280-281), and the struggle in Balkans (Uğur, 2009, pp. 332-333). Interestingly, not

only did the strategy of Türkeş turn into somewhat cooperative (I-1= 0,33), his view of the political other (P-1) improved from the earlier -1 in the 1970's to -0,33 in 1990's as well. The struggle of the Turkic republics and the conflicts in the Balkans were illustrated as a matter of 'human rights' (Ülkü Ocakları Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı, 2017, p. 264) and 'self-determination' (Turhan, 2016, p. 263). In this context, the action to be taken was a 'radical shuffle-diplomacy' and to increase economic and cultural cooperation (Uğur, 2009, p. 337). All these developments led to more liberal policies –at least compared to the heavy realist strategies in earlier decades. Despite the increasing ambiguities in a rapidly changing environment, Türkeş's belief in historical control continued to increase to a career-high as a party leader (P-4a= 0,42) with the intriguing opportunities for these republics. Furthermore, there were also attempts to make use of this changing political setting by widening the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2009, p. 335).

Although the end of the cold war marked the end of an era where the geopolitical position increased the Turkish importance for the West, for Türkeş, the newly shaped political status-quo also provided opportunities in international relations. Turkey could act now as a bridge for the post-Soviet countries and the West: "In her relations with the Turkic republics and especially the Russian Federation, Turkey should focus her efforts on the fields of [technological] information transfer, economy, trade, industry, transportation, communication, tourism and culture" (Ülkü Ocakları Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı, 2017, p. 280). With an emphasis on technology and information, we see that the party tracked the changing dynamics of the time and combined it with the political developments.

6.6. Bahçeli's First Coalition, the EU Process and the Opposition Against AKP-led Foreign Policy

As Türkeş's life came to an end in 1997, Bahçeli was elected as the new chairperson of the party. Just like Türkeş, the early term in Bahçeli's rule was mostly occupied with the Turkic republics and the new opportunities that arose with the globalization process. Accordingly, the highest P4-a scores of Bahçeli came in the period before 2002 with 0,35. Nevertheless, he also pointed out the increasing conflict possibilities in the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus (Bahçeli, 1998, p. 2). In the wake of these rising dangers, Bahçeli addressed the Turkic world as a family which has to develop a common strategy based on their common history and culture (pp. 3-4). Accordingly, the hostile understanding of the 'other' was met with a cooperative 'self' that stemmed from a strong in-group cooperation. This combination of a cooperative strategy in a hostile-perceived environment shows similarities to Türkeş's scores in the early 1970's. While the Cyprus issue lowered the P-1 scores and the emphasis on the compliance with international law increased the I-1 scores; in Bahçeli's case, the volatile post-Soviet era initiated both the hostile other and the cooperative self through the Turkic republics.

During the coalition period from 1999 to 2002, the foreign policy approach of the party shifted more to international organizations including NATO and the EU. Following the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) meeting in 1999, Bahçeli stated the need for international cooperation and solidarity (Bahçeli, 1999) and pointed out the importance of the Baku-Ceyhan pipe line, the natural gas route of the trans-Caspian pipe line through Turkmenistan-Turkey and Europe with several multilateral deals. In this regard, the moderate-idealist strategy for Bahçeli's career average receives a strong boost in this era. Likewise, the emphasis on NAFTA and

the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Bahçeli, 2000) also reflect a cooperative strategy early in Bahçeli's foreign policy strategy as a deputy prime minister.

Nevertheless, the positive approach of Bahçeli towards such organizations have always been cautious (Bahçeli, 2002a, pp. 30-31). Just like Türkeş, Bahçeli always maintained a distance to international organizations and their reliability. He did not completely oppose them, but pointed out the need to receive what they need without sacrificing their national values. The same was true for the relations with the West and the newly emerging alternative cooperation possibilities with the Turkic countries:

We cannot close ourselves out of the [globalization] process... What we need to do is, build new organizations within the Turkish-Islam cultural geography that responds to global needs on the one hand, and on the other hand to realize our own potential within existing global bodies such as the EU... Turkey should neither break away from the West, nor become dependent on it. (Bahçeli, 2000, p. 23).

Bahçeli aimed to develop policies that were based on multilateral relations where Turkey could seek new cooperation fields without leaving her already existing partners. During a time period which saw the full-candidacy of Turkey to the EU, the aggressive strategies of the earlier decades within the party seemed to be eased with the newly formed coalition. This illustrated the shifting tendencies in his self-strategy as well.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Bahçeli's focus shifted to differentiating between terrorism and Islam, advocating Turkey to play a pivot role in terms of saving the face of the Muslim countries on the one hand, and to make use of the war on terror rhetoric in the fight against PKK on the other (Bahçeli, 2002a, p. 24). The emphasis on foreign Turks switched from an independence/Turkic union rhetoric to a warmer discourse of 'co-existence' (Bahçeli, 2002b). Bahçeli positioned Turkey's foreign

policy in a 'strategic triangle' among the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East (Bahçeli, 2013a, p. 40). As the coalition period of the MHP ended and the AKP-era began, however, the approach to US operations in the Middle East and the war on terror changed. For Bahçeli, the main concern in foreign policy was now to prevent the establishment of a 'Kurdish puppet regime' in Northern Iraq, and the Turkish Armed Forces should not take part in a war that was not theirs (Bahçeli, 2006a, p. 93).

The stance against the EU was sharpened as well. In the softest way, the process was seen as a 'disappointment' (Bahçeli, 2004, p. 46). More openly, the harmonization process was seen as an imposition that is a 'surrender package under the make-up of compliance' (Bahçeli, 2006a, p. 97). Accordingly, the ones who supported the candidacy-process were now conducting a historical crime in front of national consciousness, and they were waging a feud against the national cause (p. 99). Still, it is not healthy to cherry-pick certain statements out of Bahçeli's speeches due to the several number of contradicting statements. It should be kept in mind that the party line was always careful in addressing the EU process, and that the coalition dynamics limited their playground.

Compared to the extremely friendly strategy until 2002 which was rather an outlier with the circumstances of the time, the MHP strategy of the mid 2000's turned 'definitely conflictual' ($I-1 = -0,56$). With the increasing number of terrorist attacks and cross-border operations, the hard power-based 'realist' discourse of Bahçeli intensified. In the rest of the 2000's, the issue areas of human rights, the Kurdish question, cross-border operations in Iraq, debates on the fate of Cyprus and the confrontations in the Aegean Sea came to surface once again. The MHP continued to see Turkey as a regional-hub with the potential to extract the most out of regional

imbalances, acting as a regional leader (Bahçeli, 2006b, p. 162), but the political other shifted completely to the EU and the US, as the former was reflected as a 'Christian Club' who 'wastes the time of the Turks' with deceiving tactics (2006b, p. 165) and the latter was seen as the main threat to regional separation that originated from Iraq (Bahçeli, 2008, pp. 217-220). Domestically, the PKK conflict intensified and Bahçeli pointed out the financial network of the organization within some of the European countries that were supposed to be the allies of Turkey (2008, pp. 222-226). On the other side of the southern border, Bahçeli accused the US for keeping blindfolded against the Kurdish-separatist armed groups that posed a national-security threat to Turkey (Bahçeli, 2008, p. 224); (Bahçeli, 2013b, pp. 126-128).

The Arab Spring and the period that followed after 2011 led to serious complications not only for the MHP but Turkish foreign policy as a whole. In 2011, while acknowledging the quest for democracy and reform in the region, Bahçeli warned about the outside factors that would be in play in shaping the region (Bahçeli, 2011, pp. 139-142). With the Iraqi experiment fresh in minds, the MHP was not so sure about the freedom wave of the Arab Spring. In this chaotic environment, Bahçeli made rather reaching interpretations of the Greater Middle East Project of the US (Bahçeli, 2011, pp. 147-148); (Bahçeli, 2012, pp. 58-59). In accordance, the strengthening anti-US stance was reflected in the opposition to 'harsh US sanctions on Iran that darken the fog over the Persian Gulf' (Bahçeli, 2012, p. 54). Overall, Bahçeli addressed the Arab Spring and the Middle East through the framework of human rights. The emphasis was on the rights of Turkmen and Muslim groups in the region, the democratic quest of oppressed nations, the separatist agenda of the Western countries and the humanitarian crimes of the Esad regime and of ISIS-led radical groups (Bahçeli, 2014); (Bahçeli, 2016); (Bahçeli, 2019). The same

humanitarian discourse could also be seen in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict over the Crimea in 2014 (Bahçeli, 2014). While this value and norm-based approach may be associated with constructivist self-strategies, the political other was still approached from a realist worldview.

6.7. The AKP-MHP Electoral Alliance and the Presidential System: Turbulent Foreign Policy in relations with Syria, Russia and the US

Despite the coup attempt in the domestic setting and the military operations of the Turkish Armed Forces on Syrian soil that begun in 2016, the following years saw an increasing trend for both P-1 and I-1 scores of Bahçeli. While it seems like an anomaly at the beginning, when we dive into the speeches of Bahçeli at the time and the reality on ground, we see the mediator role that was suited for Turkey in foreign policy and a strong in-group cooperation under the concept of ‘domestic and national’ that covered a wide range of policy topics both internally and externally. With calls for several ceasefire in Syria (Bahçeli, 2017, p. 44); (Bahçeli, 2021a, p. 121) and an active Turkish role in the conflict through multilateral efforts in the Astana Summits and Sochi Meetings (2021a, p. 16), Turkey aimed to increase its regional influence by cooperative means. The anti-US rhetoric increased through issues in foreign policy issue areas such as the purchase of S-400 missile systems from Russia, the support for armed-Kurdish groups in the fight against ISIS and different policies in the Eastern Aegean. The Kurdish armament also led to a questioning of NATO partnership within the MHP (Bahçeli, 2021a, p. 19); (Bahçeli, 2021b).

An interesting continuity throughout the long career of Bahçeli that is also to be seen during the period is the search for diversified partners and new alternative cooperation possibilities:

Instead of choosing between the East and the West, Turkey should have an understanding and goal of both. Turkish foreign policy should be based on the idea of the ‘two headed eagle.’ One of the heads of the eagle verges to the East with its feet turning West, and the other head of the eagle looking West and its feet turning East. (2021a, p. 128)

Adopting a realist understanding and the idea of no permanent allies or enemies, Bahçeli pointed out once again that Turks did not have any other friends beside Turks (2021a, p. 128).

Following the pandemic, the Russian-Ukrainian war and the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan from 2021 to 2022, the MHP threat perception in Turkish foreign policy shifted from a regional understanding towards a global one (Bahçeli, 2022). On the other hand, in the wake of increasing Greek armament in the Aegean, the emphasis on diplomacy and international law alongside the threat of the use of force as a lender of last resort reminded the Türkiye policies in the 1970’s on Cyprus and Greece:

The Aegean will be either a sea of peace and tranquillity, or the Turkish nation will write a new chapter of victory, be it with blood or its life... This [Greece] country should turn back to the boundaries of friendship and neighborhood laws while it has still time, and prove its side on virtue and maturity” (Bahçeli, 2022, para. 5).

As can be seen, while he calls the Greek side to peace and compliance with international laws and standards, the tone and cross-references embedded in the speech contains a much sharper line. Such variances in discourse and the content account for the mixed-strategy results of Bahçeli as it makes it harder to evaluate his beliefs and the real intent of his actions. The study has adopted a multi-method approach to have a better grasp on these kind of instances and in order to have a

more profound understanding of the belief scores, the foreign policy strategy and their relation with foreign policy events as this chapter has addressed.

6.8.Conclusion

Overall, we see a continuity in foreign policy strategies of the leaders within the party line. Although there are differentiations according to the requirements of the era and the spirit of the time, the rather hostile understanding on the political world accompanied by a conflictual self-strategy is closely associated with both T rke  and Bah eli. While the previous chapter has addressed the statistical differences between the leaders, the average world leader and different time periods, this chapter shed more light on specific foreign policy events that gave life to the analysed beliefs. From a theoretical perspective, an overall realist understanding can be spotted on the image of ‘other,’ and the self-image represents mixed strategies between moderate realism and idealism that makes a stratified approach with different time periods more valuable.

Looking at the foreign policy events, themes and how the leaders responded, we see certain commonalities and differences among the leaders. In this context, the political other shifted from the Soviets, the communist threat, leftist leaning groups and the Greeks to the PKK, radical separatist groups or G lenists; from the US, EU, NATO to the AKP in its earlier years; from opposition parties and internal enemies to outside powers with non-benign intent. Theme-wise, the Cyprus issue and the Soviet threat was of primary importance for T rke  while the issues in the Aegean/East Mediterranean with Greece and the armed conflicts with PKK constitute a common point in T rke  and Bah eli’s foreign policy orientation. During the Bah eli period, on the other hand, the anti-Western stance against the US, EU and NATO, cross-

border operations against armed radical groups and the fight against outside powers constituted the main themes in foreign policy.

The in-group composition of the leaders also experienced some shifts. More Turanist tendencies were to be seen before the establishment of the MHP in 1969, but from the 1970's onwards the Turkish-Islamic ideal enabled the involvement of a religious fraction under a greater scope of the Turkish conservatist-right. Despite the somewhat shaken relations with the state in the post-coup era of the 1980's, the 1990's saw closer relations with the state and the end of the century the MHP became the minor partner in the coalition government. During the first part of the AKP government from 2002 to the 2015 elections, the in-group included the nationalist circles that were rather more distanced to AKP's political Islam. The closer ties between the two parties in the era of the first presidential system in Turkey, however, led to a grouping under the motto 'domestic and national' that encompassed the centre-right in the Turkish society, accompanied by a sympathy towards underdeveloped/oppressed groups in foreign policy.

Evaluated together, it remains questionable how much of an impact the two leaders had on Turkish foreign policy. Firstly, the short stints of governmental power as minor-coalition partners did not provide much of a chance for policy influence. Secondly, the long-standing and stagnant nature of the foreign policy topics in Turkish foreign policy such as the Cyprus issue or the fight against the PKK does not leave much of a chance for radical shifts. Perhaps the biggest overlap between the MHP agenda and the state policy was to be seen during the 1990's on relations with the Turkic republics, but one could argue that regardless of the stance of MHP who was an opposition party at the time anyway, the same steps would be taken. The coalition period of 1975-1977 came a year after the Cyprus intervention during a

timeframe of domestic turmoil and international pressure; the 1999-2002 coalition struggled with crises, instability and the EU process which had requirements such as the human rights issues and the abolishment of the death penalty that the MHP did not favour; and the era since 2018 is being dominated by the extensive executive powers of the Turkish President Erdoğan. Therefore, it can be argued that the foreign policy line of the MHP did not directly shape Turkish foreign policy. Instead, minor twists have been observed in line with the necessities of the time.



CHAPTER 7:

CONCLUSION

The final chapter will first address the motivations, goals and the contributions of the study. The second part of the chapter will revisit the findings, provide a brief review and touch upon the strategic culture of the leaders and the foreign policy events that gave life to the analysed beliefs. Third and finally, the shortcomings and limitations of the study will be shared alongside suggestions for future research.

7.1. Motivations and Contributions of the Research

In this thesis I have aimed to achieve two main objectives. Firstly, in order to add to the operational code literature that is already thin outside North-American studies, I have looked to broaden the literature by analysing Turkish far-right leaders that have had influence on Turkish politics. Furthermore, considering that most of the existing op-code literature is on state leaders, the research on the two party leaders also contributes to the literature of non-state leaders. Secondly, the literature on the Turkish far-right's foreign policy has been lacking not only in the operational code field but in any kind of study, including qualitative approaches. In this regard, I have looked to provide a multi-method study that looks at the statistical indices of the leaders' beliefs on the one hand, and provide a theoretical interpretation on how their strategic culture is shaped on the other. By making use of the Turkish version of

ProfilerPlus, the study also aims to contribute to the further development of the Turkish version of the coding software.

7.2. Review of the Study and Implications

Overall, both Türkeş and Bahçeli's views on the political 'other' has been hostile, accompanied by a pessimist realization of political values compared to the somewhat friendly and optimist average world leader. Control-wise, they believed to possess low-to-low/medium levels of control which still placed them over the average world leader's P4-a scores. Among the two leaders, Türkeş differed from Bahçeli mainly in possessing a slightly more hostile view on the nature of political universe, being more pessimistic, attributing to himself a higher locus of historical control and believing in higher predictability.

In terms of the instrumental beliefs, Türkeş's strategic approach to goals are slightly conflictual (-0,08) whereas Bahçeli's I-1 scores turned out to be slightly cooperative (+0,06). While both leaders seem to be possess mixed strategies that fell very close to the origin of the I-1 axis, the main reason that their strategies turned time to time slightly cooperative is mostly due to higher in-group cooperation and partly due to issue-and-time specific policies. Compared to the average world leader, however, they both remained on the conflictual side almost all the time. Their high levels of risk orientation also differ from the risk-averse average world leader. Regarding the I-5 scores and the utility of means, we see that on positive attributes both Türkeş and Bahçeli tend to 'appeal/support' instead of 'reward' and 'promises.' On the negative side, while Türkeş leaned towards 'opposing/resisting' and a very high level of 'punishment,' Bahçeli had a high utility of 'threatening' and a tendency to 'punish.'

The implications of these scores have differed in different periods and contexts. Raised with a military education and operating in the cold-war context, the peak of the Cyprus issue, international embargos/sanctions and domestic violence/instability, Türkeş's understanding of the political universe became constantly more hostile in the 1960's and 1970's until the 1980 coup. His strategy was mostly conflictual during this period with the exception of 1971-74 where multiple references to international law, the victimization the Turks in Cyprus on several occasions and the justification of the Turkish stance based on compliance with international treaties led to rising I-1 scores. Towards the end of his career, both the P-1 and I-1 scores of Türkeş escalated upwards. In the aftermath of the collapse of Soviet Union, Türkeş's Turanist ideals reignited in high hopes for strong relations with the newly independent Turkic republics. His P-4 scores which increased gradually over the course of his career also saw its peak during this period.

Bahçeli's career saw a constantly decreasing level of hostility towards the political universe but never reached the 'friendly' side of the axis just like Türkeş. The constant search for internal and external 'enemies' and 'traitors' within the 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy led to low levels of P-1 scores throughout his career. His I-1 scores showed a positive correlation with his time in coalition governments and electoral alliances. The only cooperative strategies of Bahçeli came during the 1999-2002 and 2018-2022 periods where he participated in the ruling coalition/alliance. One factor for this has been the in-group cooperation with the government-partner; other factors include the positive climate towards the EU accession in the late 1990's-early 2000's, the solidarity with oppressed countries in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and the support for Turkic groups outside Anatolia.

Among the leaders, the hostile and conflictual approach prevailed most of the time simultaneously. Looking from a party perspective, we see that the trend of a hostile political universe and a conflictual strategy can be easily identified as the common norm. Despite the radical differences between Türkeş's military background in the cold-war setting and the domestic violence in his period compared to Bahçeli's academic background in a globalized setting and the abolishment of armed Idealist groups, the fact that the two leaders still managed to achieve similar belief scores reflects a clearly visible party orientation. The same can be voiced in terms of the quickly changing political environment in Turkish politics which nevertheless failed to alter huge shifts in the belief systems of the leaders.

Combining these results with a theoretical perspective, we see that the strategic culture of both leaders represent a realist-heavy understanding on a political 'other' combined with a 'self' strategy of moderate idealism/realism that swings according to different contexts. While the way they see their political other is more stable in this sense, their strategies differ in different historical settings and different in-group compositions. In order to benefit from brief opportunity windows, their strategies reflect more flexibility that makes them harder to categorize under one clear theoretical approach. Thus, adopting a longitudinal approach with a stratified sample that covers different time periods provides us more meaningful results on strategic behaviour. This kind of an approach allows for incoherence among beliefs with the conceptualization of the codes as 'alternative states of mind' that are 'aroused in different contexts and political domains depending on the issue area (Walker et al., 1998; Walker and Schafer, 2007).

The most radical shifts from their career averages came perhaps during the brief governmental eras where they had not much of a say regardless of their real political

agenda. These deviations did not reflect anomalies, but rather illustrated short term concessions in line with greater agendas. In this regard, the contradictory statements on certain issues such as Islam's role in Turkish nationalism before the 1960's and after 1969, the respect for international law before and after the 1974 intervention, the stance towards the EU during the coalition government and the developments that came afterwards, the relationship with the AKP and in many other instances we see fluctuations that stem from the requirements of the time and the opportunity it proposes. In the longer run, however, the direction of the beliefs remain closer to realist interpretations of strategies in both cases.

This, however, leaves us with the question of what use the general average of a leader's beliefs are if they cannot account for these necessary changes where the brief opportunity window forces the leader to behave differently. In this regard, the coalition dynamics and the belief scores of the leaders gain primary importance. Therefore, the study has approached the beliefs in a longitudinal fashion and accounted for varying parliamentary positions of the party, military coups and other major political events. Analysing the coalition and ruling periods of the leaders, interestingly, we see that Türkeş's lowest strategy scores have come in the 1975-1977 coalition period whereas Bahçeli's highest I-1 scores belong to his two separate government partnerships. Here, we can identify that once in power, Türkeş tends to behave more radically in foreign policy compared to Bahçeli who follows a more reconciliatory strategy in a governmental position of power.

As a whole, the study argues that the career averages of the Turkish far-right leaders show a similar pattern of a hostile universe, conflictual strategy and a low to medium level of control over history which remains above the average world leader.

Depending on the parliamentary position and executive power, however, individual differences emerge.

7.3. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

This part of the chapter will address the deficiencies of the study and touch upon further suggestions for future research. Firstly, the automated coding of the study is conducted through the Turkish version of ProfilerPlus, a manual designed by Özdamar. Due to the structure of the Turkish language, the coding of transitive verbs can be in conflict with certain verbs and sentence structures. In his own words, Özdamar (2017) describes the situation as follows:

Perhaps the most pressing issue with the operational code construct is related to languages. When coding Turkish texts and texts translated into Turkish from Arabic and Farsi, it was obvious that the logic of operational code analysis is based exclusively on English. Sentences in English texts are usually relatively short, sentence structures are straightforward, and use of the passive voice is minimal. This kind of simple yet efficient writing seems exclusive to English; French and German political and academic literatures seem unnecessarily complicated. The situation is similar for Turkish, Farsi and Arabic. (p. 186)

These features of the language inevitably limits the reliability of the study in comparison to English texts.

A second and related shortcoming of the Turkish language can be identified with its metaphor-rich nature that is full of expressions and imitations. Furthermore, considering that Türkeş and Bahçeli are leaders that use especially complex metaphors in their speeches, it remains difficult even for the average Turkish citizen to read into the real meaning of their statements, let alone coding. Nevertheless, the absence of English speeches by these leaders that fit the analysis criteria forces the researcher to carry out a study with the Turkish version of the operational code.

While hand-coding could provide a way-out, the amount of analysed data and time

constraints prevent such a possibility. Despite these language struggles, I see this as an opportunity to highlight the coding areas which require development, and thereby look forward to contribute to the Turkish version of ProfilerPlus.

A third point that needs to be pointed out is the audience effect. With regards to far-right leaders, future research on the difference between domestic and international audiences can shed more light on their level of consistency in their speeches. By looking at leaders' rhetoric and the degree of contextuality they possess, one can achieve very different discourses in different contexts by the same leader.

Considering that this kind of an audience effect is especially powerful in polarized countries such as Turkey (Kesgin, 2019), it becomes more important to account for context-and-audience-specific rhetoric. In this regard, Özdamar, Canbolat and Young in Brummer et al. (2020) point out the audience effect in Erdoğan's speeches:

For example, toward his own constituency, President Erdoğan uses inordinately humble language populated by self-effacing utterances such as "Bu fakir hiçbir zaman Sultan olma gayretinde olmadı." (This destitute person (I) never tried to become a Sultan). Erdoğan's foreign policy speeches in Turkish have been the most vitriolic and belligerent during critical electoral cycles such as the 2015 and 2018 general elections and the 2017 constitutional referendum. In these periods, Erdoğan clung to hawkish foreign policy themes in his campaign speeches and threatened Syria with military interventions, which are more pronounced in his domestic speeches in Turkish targeting Western countries and Israel. (pp. 9-10)

The influence of the audience effect in foreign policy related issue areas, therefore, has to be analysed for more valid results. Similar to the audience effect, the intertwined nature of domestic and foreign policy related political content also plays a toughening role in the study. Due to the combination of domestic and foreign policy matters within the same speeches, the analysis has required some filtering and sorting out of irrelevant statements.

Fourth, the norming group for the average world leader comprises of the 2008 study by Malici and Buckner. Despite providing a valid resource with a large sampling size, the past 14 years reflect a sizeable missing data. Considering the important events of the 2008 economic crisis, the Eurozone crisis in the early 2010's, the Arab Spring after 2011, the global Coronavirus pandemic from 2020 onwards and the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022, important events that shape leaders' foreign policy orientation remain left out from the average norming. At the same time, the impact of leaders such as Esad during the Syrian war or Putin and Zelensky in the Russian-Ukrainian war show us once again the need for understanding the belief systems of leaders. In order to catch up with the changing spirit of the time, an updated version of the norming score of average world leaders is a must for future research and healthier comparisons across countries.

Finally, while the amount of coded and analysed speeches of the study and the long ruling periods of both leaders provide a healthy sample size for the CKMP and the MHP, it nevertheless remains deficient in terms of the sheer amount of analysed leaders. Despite covering almost 60 years, the findings of the thesis are still based on only two leaders. In this regard, the foreign policy strategy and culture of the Turkish nationalist far-right still requires many other instances and personalities to be analysed in the future.

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APPENDIX

Speeches Coded:

Alparslan Türkeş

Türkeş, A. “Turkism and Turkish Unity” November 1950.

-----, “The 1st Memorandum of CKMP on Cyprus” September 1965.

-----, “The 2nd Memorandum of CKMP on Cyprus” January 1966.

-----, “Statement over the Cyprus Issue by Alparslan Türkeş at the Turkish Grand National Assembly” January, 1969.

-----, “The Opening Speech of the 11th MHP Congress by Alparslan Türkeş” June, 1973.

-----, “Alparslan Türkeş’s Interview with Sabah Gazetesi,” August, 1974.

-----, “Turkey’s Affairs and Cyprus” November 1974.

-----, “Alparslan Türkeş’s Article in Devlet Gazetesi” May, 1976.

-----, “Alparslan Türkeş’s Interview with Ülkücü Kadro Dergisi” May, 1977.

-----, “Alparslan Türkeş’s Interview with Bizim Ocak Dergisi” July, 1991.

-----, “Statement over Foreign Policy Developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cyprus by Alparslan Türkeş at the Extraordinary Session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly” August, 1992.

-----, “Tomorrows Belong to Turkishness” October, 1996.

Devlet Bahçeli

Bahçeli, D. “Statement by Devlet Bahçeli at the MHP Group Meeting” November, 1999.

-----, “Devlet Bahçeli’s Speech at the Congress Organized by the Austrian Turkish Federation” May, 2002.

-----, Statement by Devlet Bahçeli at the MHP Group Meeting” December, 2007.

-----, Statement by Devlet Bahçeli at the MHP Group Meeting” March, 2008.

-----, Statement by Devlet Bahçeli at the MHP Group Meeting” February, 2011.

-----, Statement by Devlet Bahçeli at the MHP Group Meeting” February, 2013.

-----, Statement by Devlet Bahçeli at the MHP Group Meeting” December, 2015.

-----, Statement by Devlet Bahçeli at the MHP Group Meeting” November, 2018.

-----, Statement by Devlet Bahçeli at the MHP Group Meeting” January, 2019.

-----, Statement by Devlet Bahçeli at the MHP Group Meeting” February, 2020.

-----, Statement by Devlet Bahçeli at the MHP Group Meeting” October, 2021.

-----, Statement by Devlet Bahçeli at the MHP Group Meeting” January, 2022.