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THE DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY'S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT
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THE DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY'S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE: EXPLAINING AID BEHAVIOR OF NON-DAC DONORS
THROUGH AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH OF FRAMING AND
CONSTRUCTIVISM


A Master's Thesis

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August 2020

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APPROACH OF FRAMING AND CONSTRUCTIVISM**



The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
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ABSTRACT

THE DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY’S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: EXPLAINING AID BEHAVIOR OF NON-DAC DONORS THROUGH AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH OF FRAMING AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

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This thesis focuses on aid behavior of non-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors by using an alternative approach which is largely overlooked in the aid literature: constructivist IR theory. Turkey’s official development assistance (ODA) behavior in terms of its motivations between 2003 and 2019 is analyzed by using seven aid frames established by Van der Veen (2011), which are ‘security’, ‘political and diplomatic influence’, ‘economic interests’, ‘altruistic/developmental’, ‘prestige/image’, ‘obligation’, and ‘humanitarianism’. The research results overall show a hybrid character of Turkish ODA oscillating between models about aid modalities that are OECD DAC donors, and ‘South-South Development Cooperation’ providers.

The results of content analysis of my primary dataset, which is the legislative/parliamentary debates on the budget and policy-action of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the official organization undertaking development assistance operations abroad, reveal that ‘obligation’ and ‘altruistic/developmental’ purposes are the main drivers of the Turkish ODA. While ‘influence’ (political and diplomatic) and ‘image/prestige’ considerations mark other

important motives in Turkish ODA behavior, particularly for motives framing ODA in Africa region, the 'economic interests', 'security', and 'humanitarianism' appear surprisingly less in framing the motives of Turkish ODA. This study also compares Turkey's official aid motives with those of Russia and China, two other non-DAC donors, specifically in the African continent. The comparison of Turkish ODA with two other major non-DAC donors in Africa demonstrates that constructivist IR theory is more plausible in understanding and explaining the aid behavior of donors, when there are too many interacting factors at play simultaneously.

Keywords: Constructivism, Determinants of Aid Behavior, Framing, Non-DAC Donors, Official Development Assistance.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’NİN RESMİ KALKINMA YARDIMININ BELİRLEYİCİ FAKTÖRLERİ: ÇERÇEVELEME VE İNŞACILIK ALTERNATİF YAKLAŞIMI İLE KALKINMA YARDIM KOMİTESİ ÜYESİ OLMAYAN ÜLKELERİN YARDIM DAVRANIŞINI AÇIKLAMAK

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Bu tez, Kalkınma Yardımları Komitesi (KYK) üyesi olmayan ülkelerin resmi yardım davranışlarını literatürde büyük ölçüde göz ardı edilen ve alternatif bir yaklaşım olan inşacı uluslararası ilişkiler kuramı ile analiz etmektedir. Ülkelerin yaptığı kalkınma yardımlarının ardındaki motivasyonlar, Van der Veen (2011) tarafından belirlenmiş olan yedi yardım çerçevesi (‘güvenlik’, ‘siyasal ve diplomatik nüfuz’, ‘ekonomik çıkarlar’, ‘fedakar/kalkınmaya yönelik’, ‘prestij/görüntü’, ‘yükümlülük’, ‘yardımseverlik’) kullanılarak açıklanmıştır. Araştırma sonuçları, Türkiye’nin resmi kalkınma yardımlarının Ekonomik Kalkınma ve İşbirliği Örgütü (OECD) KYK üyesi yardım yapan ülkeler ve ‘Güney-Güney Kalkınma İşbirliği’ (South-South Development Cooperation) kapsamında yardım sağlayan ülkeler arasında orta bir yerde hibrit bir karakterde olduğunu göstermektedir.

Ana veri setimin (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı’nın bütçesi ve politika eylemi üzerine yapılan yasama/meclis tartışmaları) içerik analizi sonuçları, Türkiye’nin resmi kalkınma yardımlarını şekillendiren ana etkenlerinin ‘yükümlülük’ ve ‘fedakâr/kalkınmaya yönelik’ amaçlar olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. ‘Nüfuz’ (siyasal ve diplomatik) ve ‘prestij/görüntü’, Türkiye resmi kalkınma yardımları davranışını motive

eden diğ er  nemli  er evelerdir ve  zellikle T rkiye'nin Afrika kıtasına yaptıėı resmi kalkınma yardımlarını  er eveleyen motivasyonlar arasındadırlar. 'Ekonomik  ıkarlar', 'g venlik', ve 'yardımseverlik '  aşırtıcı bir  ekilde T rk resmi kalkınma yardımlarını  er eveleyen motivasyonlar arasında  ncelikli deėildir. Bu  alıřma ayrıca T rkiye'nin yardım motivasyonlarını KYK  yesi olmayan ve resmi yardım yapan  lkelerden Rusya'nın ve  in'in motivasyonlarıyla Afrika b lgesi  zelinde karřılařtırmıřtır. T rkiye gibi KYK  yesi olmayan bu diğ er iki  nemli  lkenin T rkiye ile karřılařtırılmasının sonu ları, aynı anda birbirini etkileyen  ok fazla fakt r olduėu zamanlarda, inřacı uluslararası iliřkiler kuramının KYK  yesi olmayan  lkelerin yardım davranıřını anlamada ve analizinde daha a ıklayıcı olduėunu g stermektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler:  er eveleme, İnřacı Uluslararası İliřkiler Kuramı, Kalkınma Yardım Komitesi (DAC)  yesi Olmayan Resmi Yardım Yapan  lkeler, Resmi Kalkınma Yardımı (ODA), Yardım Davranıřının Belirleyici Fakt rleri.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	i
ÖZET.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	 1
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY	5
2.1 Characterizing Non-DAC donors.....	6
2.2 The Literature Review	9
2.3 Self-Interests in the Provision of Development Assistance and Non-DAC donors	11
2.4 Common-Interests in the Provision of Development Assistance and Non-DAC donors.....	15
2.5 Multiple-Factors (Hybrid Model) Approach to the Provision of Development Assistance	18
2.6 Constructivism as an Alternative Approach in the Provision of ODA/ODA-like Aid Flows.....	19
2.7 Methodology	24
2.8 Frames Used in the Provision of ODA/ODA-like Aid and Correlated Indicators	30
CHAPTER 3: THE DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY’S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: PROMINENT FRAMES FROM 2003 TO 2019	37
3.1 The Determinants of Turkish ODA: Pattern of Frames	45
3.2 Restructuring Phase of Turkish ODA	53
3.3 Proactive Phase of Turkish ODA.....	56
3.4 Reactive Phase of Turkish ODA	61

3.5 Characterizing Turkey's ODA behavior: A Hybrid Model Oscillating between DAC and SSDC.....	68
CHAPTER 4: COMPARING TURKEY WITH OTHER NON-DAC DONORS IN AFRICAN CONTINENT: THE MOTIVATIONS AND PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN AND CHINESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA.....	76
4.1 Russia's Development Assistance in Africa	81
4.2 China's Development Assistance in Africa	89
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION	96
REFERENCES	107
APPENDIX	122

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Frames and the goals of development assistance as used in Van der Veen (2011). The table is created by the author based on table used in Van der Veen (2011).	24
Table 2: Aid Frames as used in this thesis. The table is created by the author.	36
Table 3: Number of Frame Occurrences between 2003 and 2019. The table is created by the author.....	48
Table 4: European Commission's Progress Reports for Turkey between 2005 and 2018. Data Source: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The table is created by the author.....	72
Table 5: Number of each frames occurred during the restructuring phase of Turkish ODA. The table is created by the author.....	122
Table 6: Number of each frames occurred during the proactive phase of Turkish ODA. The table is created by the author.....	122
Table 7: Number of each frames occurred during the reactive phase of Turkish ODA. The table is created by the author.....	123

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Turkey's net ODA disbursements, total between 2003 and 2018, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.	41
Figure 2: Turkey's ODA/GNI ratio by percentage between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author. Note: 1.10 ratio in 2018 is a grant equivalent.	42
Figure 3: Sectoral Distribution of Turkey's ODA between 2003 and 2018, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.....	43
Figure 4: Regional distribution of Turkey's ODA, between 2003 and 2018, Total Net, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.	44
Figure 5: Frequency of Aid Frames in Turkey between 2003 and 2019. Data Source: Data is acquired by the author from debates at TBMM. The figure is created by the author.....	47
Figure 6: Turkey's ODA: Total Net Distribution by countries' income, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.....	50
Figure 7: Turkey's Bilateral Assistance towards Haiti and Chile between 2009 and 2012, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.....	52
Figure 8: Turkey's ODA Total and Humanitarian Assistance total, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.....	62
Figure 9: Turkey's ODA to Syrian Arab Republic in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.	63

Figure 10: Turkey's Bilateral ODA to Developing Countries (Syria Excluded), in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.	64
Figure 11: Turkey's bilateral ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.	77
Figure 12: Number of Sub-Saharan African Students coming to Turkey between 2002 and 2013. Data and the figure are compiled by the author. Data Source: OSYM.	80
Figure 13: Russia's ODA Total and Bilateral ODA total in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2004 and 2019. Data and the figure are compiled by the author. Between 2004 and 2010, data is gathered from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking System. From 2010 onwards the OECD dataset is used.	82
Figure 14: Russia's ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa and to Developing Countries, Unspecified, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.	86
Figure 15: Russia's Wheat Export to Sub-Saharan Africa between 2007 and 2018. Data Source: UN comtrade. The figure is created by the author.	88
Figure 16: China's ODA-like commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa, in 2014 US Dollars, between 2000 and 2014. Data Source: AidData (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, & Tierney, 2017). The figure is created by the author.	91
Figure 17: China's Export to Sub-Saharan Africa (All Products Total, 2000-2017). Data Source: UN Comtrade. The figure is created by the author.	95
Figure 18: Turkey's Total ODA and Bilateral ODA (Syria Excluded), in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.	123

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Development assistance has been widely used since the 1950s when it began as an act of diplomatic solidarity and emerged as a mechanism to promote economic development and temporary relief for the European countries in the aftermath of the Second World War. During the cold war, most industrialized nations, mainly the United States and Europeans, have structured aid policies and in 1961 grouped together in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which has become the source of rules regulating the Official Development Assistance (ODA). Since 1961 DAC members have monopolized development assistance accounting for around 95% of total flows allocated. They largely imposed their way of doing things; opting primarily for conditionality in ODA provision by making allocations contingent upon implementation of political and economic transformations at domestic level.

This trend has begun to change in the early 2000s with the emergence of new centers of economic growth and the rising number of new donors operating outside of DAC rules. Countries that not long ago were aid recipients have channeled resources to the ODA/ODA-like aid flows and turned themselves into aid donors. There are currently more than thirty countries, which include those introduced as emerging economies in the early 2000s such as China, Brazil, India Russia as well as others like Turkey, South Africa, and South Korea.

These new donor countries' ODA/ODA-like aid flows marked as a mechanism in their course of more assertive foreign policy through which they would increase political and economic influence and build or restore their international position (Robledo, 2015, p.2). The non-DAC countries' growing importance in terms of the scale of the projects that they undertake, the vast population that they represent, the principles that they adopt like 'non-interference' in domestic affairs of the recipients and aid 'void of political conditionality' as well as other shared features like dynamic economy, colonial past (either as a colonizer or a colonized) and the past experience as an aid recipient mark these donors as real alternatives to the traditional DAC donors (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2011, p.1950). Such increasing relevance of the non-DAC donors to the aid regime and their aid practices raise questions about which factors shape non-DAC donors' development assistance. Thus, in this study my research questions are; "what motives do shape the aid behavior of the non-DAC donors?" and "how can aid behavior of the non-DAC donors be explained by using International Relations (IR) theories?"

Explanatory factors shaping aid behavior in one case appears insignificant in another case. The case studies of different donors, regardless of whether it is DAC or non-DAC donor, display often incompatible patterns mainly because, as Lancaster (2007, p.9) concludes, too many interacting variables are at play simultaneously. In other words, when one model that works for one case is applied to another case, empirical pattern seems incompatible since there are likely to be different factors at play at a certain time period. In this regard, ideational forces shaping the goals and purposes of aid provision, an alternative approach, which is overlooked in the aid literature as Van der Veen (2011, p.2) argues, can be central in understanding and explaining aid behavior.

Tracing the ideas of policy-makers about the goals of development assistance through the use of 'frames' at different points in time and through an in-depth content analysis of legislative/parliamentary debates about the development assistance and policy action of the major development assistance agency can reveal how different motives

shape aid behavior of the donors including non-DAC ones and how the goals and patterns change at different points in time.

In this regard, in order to answer what motives shape aid behavior of the non-DAC donors, the case of Turkey in the time period between 2003 and 2019, I use main axioms of constructivist IR theory as a theoretical framework. And, by applying 'framing', I present an in-depth content analysis of legislative/parliamentary debates at 'the Grand National Assembly of Turkey' (TBMM) about the Turkish Coordination and Cooperation Agency (TIKA)'s development assistance, the main implementer of Turkish ODA program since 1992. As explained in the next chapter in detail, speakers delivering speeches at TBMM during parliamentary meetings about Turkish ODA provide invaluable insights with regard to different ideas about aid and how these have been changing over time.

Through categorizing the information derived from content analysis of the legislative/parliamentary debates into the 'seven frames', this research shows the most frequent frames and the changing pattern of these frames in the Turkish ODA within the time period in question. These seven frames are 'security', 'political and diplomatic influence', 'economic interests', 'altruistic/developmental', 'prestige/image', 'obligation', and 'humanitarianism' which were generated by Van Der Veen (2011). He defines frames as organizing units that specify goals and particular policy choices (Van Der Veen, 2011, p.5). I apply this definition and his pre-established frames in my content analysis to trace the most frequent frames and the changing pattern of these frames and to show how these frames construct the motivations of Turkish ODA between 2003 and 2019. The results of the content analysis of the Turkish case are then compared with the other two major non-DAC donors in the context of the African continent; Russia and China, whose motives in aid allocation are already present in the literature. The African continent is selected because it is a distinct region for observing donors' motives in aid behavior given that this continent appears as a new and distant target compared to the most of non-DAC donors including Turkey, Russia, and China's

neighboring regions or their traditional trading partners, which can be directly related to immediate economic and foreign policy interests.

In the following chapter, first non-DAC donors are characterized based on three categories and then the literature review on the determinants of aid is given by visiting mainstream IR theories as well as their application to the case studies specifically to the non-DAC donors. These sections are followed by the description of the seven broad frames as used in Van der Veen (2011) and in this study, and by the methodology subsection. In Chapter 3, first a brief history of how the Turkish ODA program and the Turkish Coordination and Cooperation Agency (TIKA), the main implementer of Turkish ODA provision, has evolved is presented. Then, the findings about the determinants of Turkish ODA for 2003-2019 period are presented by demonstrating the patterns of frames in the relative weight and number of frame occurrences between 2003 and 2019. Here, the changing pattern of Turkish ODA between 2003 and 2019 is divided into three phases; 'restructuring phase' between 2003 and 2005, 'proactive phase' between 2006 and 2011, and 'reactive phase' from 2012 onwards. After showing the changing patterns of Turkish ODA behavior in these three phases, I argue that Turkey's ODA behavior indicates a hybrid model oscillating between the DAC and South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) providers. In Chapter 4, the motivations that drive Turkish ODA in Africa are revisited and Turkey is compared with Russia and China. Accordingly, Turkey's aid behavior diverges from that of China in terms of motivations and practices, but it converges with that of Russia to an important extent. In the last chapter, concluding remarks and suggestions for further research are offered.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

The rising number of new actors in international development cooperation, along with the increase of ODA and ODA-like aid flows, show that foreign assistance is still at the very heart of International Relations (IR). As such, academic interest has been steadily growing on development assistance or ODA/ODA-like aid provision¹. The origins of foreign assistance takes its roots from the second half of the 1940s. At that time the United States (US) poured large amount of foreign assistance into European countries under the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan aimed to support post-World War II recovery of the devastated European continent. Since then for the most part, foreign assistance has evolved into the academic debates that largely center on the donor motivations behind the provision of ODA/ODA-like aid flows, 'aid effectiveness', and 'aid-development paradigm'. The focus of this research is on the latter but solely on 'non-DAC donors' amongst all. Before moving into the existing literature and how IR theories and different methodological approaches have been applied to the donor countries and in explaining the donor motivations behind aid allocation, characterizing non-DAC donors is essential for the purpose of this study.

¹ I use the terms aid provision, foreign assistance, development assistance, ODA provision, and development cooperation interchangeably in this study in order to avoid redundant repetitions. In addition to that, I use the phrase 'ODA-like' aid in order to categorize the development assistance/aid flows of the countries that do not use the OECD glossary. The majority of the non-DAC donors do not use the glossary of the OECD, and thus the term official development assistance (ODA). Therefore, the use of 'ODA-like' aid phrase is important in explaining their development assistance/aid that resemble the DAC donors' ODA flows.

2.1 Characterizing Non-DAC donors

With more than 30 countries operating as non-DAC donor and claiming an increasingly important share in the global ODA flows, their characterization in terms of ODA/ODA-like aid behavior is significant. Among the non-DAC aid providers, some can be identified as ‘emerging donors’ in the sense that their ODA/ODA-like aid policies and structures are substantially similar to most traditional donor countries; basically similar to DAC members, whereas other non-DAC aid providers use different policy tools and concepts to structure their development assistance. The differences in policy tools and concepts, which are mostly based on a reflection of their views on global governance and international system, leads to different motivations while delivering aid. In this regard, three main type of non-DAC aid providers can be identified; ‘emerging donors’, ‘South-South Development Cooperation’ (SSDC) providers, and ‘Arab donors’ (Ferreiro, 2017).²

To begin with the ‘emerging donors’, the evolution of their ODA policies mainly originates from a conscious effort to reproduce the models and structures that belong to the traditional DAC donors. But, reproduction embodies a smaller scale in terms of the amount of ODA possibly because of limited state capacity to deploy. The non-DAC European Union member states (Central and Eastern European Countries) are the most prominent members of this category. Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), as being the European Union (EU) members after latest enlargement, are required to comply with the EU Acquis *Communautaire* on international development cooperation by fulfilling three main criteria set by the EU; ‘the quantity of aid’, ‘the geographical focus’, and ‘the institutional structure’. The compliance basically means ubiquitous resemblance to the OECD DAC standards as there are overlapping standards between the DAC and the EU.

² This categorization is comprised with exceptions Turkey and Russia which are not solely belong to any of these categories as both show hybrid model taking one or few characteristics from categories of emerging donor and SSDC providers.

As the EU is itself a 'development actor' and accounts for around two thirds of DAC members, whose compliance with the EU standards are legally bound by the treaties and thus activities are regularly monitored by the EU, this influences the decision making and the process of determining the standards in the DAC to an important extent (Verschaeve & Orbie, 2018). Collective actions concerning the international development cooperation are also taken at European level, which marks the EU Commission as an alternative venue to discuss issues that are at the very heart of DAC. And this leads members of both organizations to bypass the DAC in some occasions as happened in the concessionality issue or as it became evident in 'policy coherence for development' standard (Verschaeve & Orbie, 2018, p.53). This ubiquitous link very much explains the resemblance.

The second category of new ODA/ODA-like aid donors is the South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) providers. They represent the most revisionist group in the aid regime from the point of view that their stance towards how cooperation should be defined and implemented largely challenge the existing aid architecture, eventually might be leading to a 'silent revolution' (Woods, 2008, p.1221), or a 'transition' (Saraiva, 2012, p.115) in the aid regime. Although their stance is not something unprecedented as the few key elements is already present in the principles of 'Non-Aligned Movement' in the Bandung Conference in 1955, there are few prominent and distinctive features of the SSDC providers.

First, aid is delivered 'peer-based' in which actors see each other as peers and thus involve in a horizontal relationship as opposed to traditional DAC donors highlighting beneficiary distinction. Second, in terms of mutual accountability, donor-recipient relationships are 'mutually beneficial' that both sides fully respect the sovereignty of the other; donor eschews political conditionality; and benefits are explicitly defined at the outset. In the traditional donor-beneficiary relationship, mutual accountability is ensured through transparent aid which is assessed by targets and indicators determined by the donor, and thus the agenda concerning benefits might be hidden and not defined from the outset. Third, with respect to harmonization principle, the

SSDC providers cut administrative red tap in order to minimize burden and occasionally use multilateral frameworks, whereas multilateralization is commonly used to minimize burden within the framework of DAC.

Fourth, alignment principle is also different in SSDC providers in that tying of aid is common and permissible whereas in DAC members tying is discouraged. Fifth, 'technical cooperation' plays an important role along with few other modalities including infrastructure and concessional financing. Lastly, relations are significantly maintained 'bilaterally' rather than the use of multilateral channels. Although multilateral frameworks are not non-existing for the SSDC providers, most of them abstain from any multilateral framework, whereas those who are not avoiding from multilateral channels abstain from 'infamous' multilateral bodies like the United Nations (UN) and prefer to conduct relations via new frameworks just as Brazil does through the New Development Bank and MERCOSUR.

Among the members, Brazil, China, India, and South Africa are at the forefront in terms of the amount and geographical scope of aid. China is the chief in terms of amount and geographical scope of aid, and therefore is a defining force. It acts through bilateral channels and uses different modalities of aid (technical, infrastructure, concessional funding, and development finance) based on rapidly expanding number and needs of beneficiary countries. Another important aspect of Chinese cooperation, which is also a common feature of India's policy, is that concessional funding mechanisms is at the core of its aid policy and the aid disbursements are largely tied to development of trade relationships with beneficiary countries. While Brazil demonstrates many features of SSDC providers, it deviates from others as it channels an important share of aid as contributions to multilateral frameworks: MERCOSUR and the New Development Bank. South Africa on the other hand is more geographically concentrated than the other members of this group (Ferreiro, 2017).

The last category of non-DAC aid donors is the Arab Donors, particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE. By ways of defining aid relationship as well as with a strong focus on

project delivery and lightweight administrative structures, they are necessarily different from traditional donors (Ferreiro, 2017). Most of ODA allocation is done bilaterally but cooperation and partnership schemes amongst them are significant; e.g. Arab Donors Coordination Group (AGFUND). The predominance of work is substantially in Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa region.

2.2 The Literature Review

The existing literature that explains the donor motivations behind aid allocations is immensely vast. The single DAC donor studies include Germany (Arvin & Drewes, 2001), Denmark (Tarp, Bach, Hansen, & Baunsgaard, 1999), UK (McGillivray and Oczkowski, 1992), Ireland (O'Neill, 2013), the US (Gang & Lehman, 1990; McGillivray, 2003), Australia (McGillivray and Oczkowski, 1991), Japan (Tuman & Ayoub, 2004; Tuman & Strand, 2006; Tuman, Strand, & Emmert, 2009), and Korea (Koo & Kim, 2011; Kim & Oh, 2012).

Amongst the multiple donor studies concerning the motivation of ODA allocation of the DAC members, Shishido and Minato (1994) research on G7 countries, whereas Dollar and Levin (2004) study all OECD/DAC members in their quantitative study. Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor (1998) make a comparison of American, Japan, Swedish, and French development assistance. While Berthelemy and Tichit (2004), and Berthelemy (2006) cover twenty-two DAC donors in their studies, Potter and Van Belle (2009) compare just the US and Japan. The analysis by Grilli and Riess (1992) covers all European Community countries and their aid towards African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries.

However, the existing literature has some gaps and unanswered questions or understudied cases to understand and explain further the non-DAC donor motivations in the provision of foreign assistance. Almost forty non-DAC donors operate outside of OECD DAC norms, principles, and practices, and most of them share a double identity as being both donor and recipient at the same time (Quadir, 2013, p.332). The non-DAC donors have been increasing their shares steadily in total ODA/ODA-like aid provision,

which raises questions centered on whether their motivations differ from traditional Western donors, especially in terms of aid given to Africans, which receive substantial amount of total ODA/ODA-like aid provision. The presence of non-DAC donors and their growing influence in the provision of aid has led some to label such change in the number and features of donor countries as a 'silent revolution' (Woods, 2008, p.1221), or 'transition' (Saraiva, 2012, p.115) in the aid regime. These studies argue that the non-DAC donors' increasing presence will eventually force traditional Western donors to revise or change the OECD DAC norms, principles, and practices. By pouring billions of dollars on various development projects from construction to health or to the training of personnel in the recipients, these non-DAC donors merit more attention in terms of explaining the motivations behind their aid allocation.

Scholars of IR discipline have used various IR theories to explain what drives the allocation of development assistance of aid donors including both DAC and non-DAC donors. Amongst the precursors, Morgenthau (1962), Mason (1964), Huntington (1970; 1971), Thorbecke (2000), and Lancaster (2008; 2015) admit that 'development' itself is one of the motives of ODA/ ODA-like provision but it is not the sole one, and even not a prominent one. Starting from this point of view, the studies in the literature have initially oscillated between two camps which employ the main axioms; realist and liberal IR theories. The realist arguments explain that development assistance is provided based on self-interests of donors, aka 'donors interests' (DI) approach. Liberal arguments on the other hand demonstrate that common-interests prevail in the provision of aid, aka 'recipients need' (RN) approach.

These main approaches in the aid literature assume that the foreign policy is the product of rational actors. Accordingly, foreign policy is the outcome of a process in which preferences of the actors are contingent upon a set of constraints. In modeling the cases, the contenders of both theories rest on two key variables; the preferences of actors, and the set of constraints actors encounter.

2.3 Self-Interests in the Provision of Development Assistance and Non-DAC donors

To a large extent, the self-interests or DI approach is concerned about how donors pursue their strategic self-interests featuring an ‘egoistic behavior’, and builds a causal link between strategic interests (as independent variable) and the foreign aid (as dependent variable). It is an approach that largely uses the axioms of the Realist IR theory in explaining the donors’ motivations.

Realist arguments emphasize ‘actors’ and ‘the set of constraints encountered by them’ (Van der Veen, 2011). States are the rational actors in the international system and their preferences are solely determined by the anarchical state of international system. In an anarchic international environment states have no other choice but to strive for survival by achieving national interests through obtaining and maintaining power. Given a range of various national interests (‘security’ in terms of economic and military, ‘wealth’ in the form of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) opportunities, ‘political interests’ by means of influence on the recipients) foreign aid is nothing but a foreign policy instrument to advance states’ national interests. Classical studies of realism highlight that foreign assistance is employed when military force (and diplomacy) are not sufficient to achieve the national interests, and thus it should be an integral part of countries’ political weaponry (Morgenthau, 1962, p.301). However, national interests can be beyond major concerns of security and wealth by focusing on political influence, such as voting alignment at the UN or prestige seeking behavior (Morgenthau, 1962, p.301; Gilpin, 1987; Hollis & Smith, 1990; Wendt, 1995; Schareder et. al, 1998).

In fact, a specific motivation of donors classified under ‘political interests’ has been extensively studied within the DI approach. For example, some recent studies focus on the allocation of foreign aid to secure the recipient countries’ votes at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) according to donors’ political interests. Accordingly, the relationship between foreign aid and votes is explained by foreign aid as a ‘reward’ for recipient countries based on their UNGA voting affinity with the donor countries

(Lundborg, 1998; Rai, 1980; Wang, 1999). In other words, the closer the affinity with the donor by the recipient, the more the aid recipient will receive from donor. Similarly, foreign aid can be an 'inducement' "for those who are not (yet) voting in ways that a donor country would prefer" (Woo & Chung, 2017, p.1003) and change the voting preferences of the recipient countries.

The 'donors' interests' argument as a major motivation for foreign aid has been applied to numerous non-DAC donors to explain their aid determinants. Amongst the cases, substantial amount of studies focus primarily on China, the chief villain of non-DAC donors, simply because of its giant economic power and the vast capabilities it holds. Naim (2007) argues that Chinese development assistance is a 'rogue' one, driven solely by China's national interests: to access natural resources in the recipients, and to boost political alliances against Western camp in the international arena. In a similar vein, Tull (2006) and Davies (2007) indicate that the one of main goals of Chinese aid is to ensure economic and energy security of China by accessing natural resources of oil, mineral, and timber, which are central resources for Beijing's industrial policy.

There are also studies that include political motivations of Chinese aid (Taylor, 1998; Tull, 2006; Davies, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). Davies (2007) argues that Chinese aid is motivated to build alliances with other countries, specifically with Africans over the Taiwan issue at the United Nations. Taylor (1998) and Brautigam (2009) confirm that the main motivation behind Chinese aid is to reward African countries, which do not officially recognize Taiwan as an independent country. Tull (2006) on the other hand sees these efforts as 'to build coalitions' with Africans to accommodate Western criticism towards China's policies including human rights, environment and alike. In their quantitative analysis, Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, & Tierney (2018) explain that Chinese aid is driven by foreign policy interests that are mainly recipient countries' stance on 'One-China' Policy at the UN General Assembly, and China's economic interests including trade patterns and recipients' wealth in terms of natural resources and loan repayment capacity.

Brazil is another case which is to an extent understudied since there are limited studies to explain the main motives behind Brazilian foreign assistance and allocation pattern. Amongst few studies, a case study by Bry (2017) indicates that Brazilian aid is used in creating a 'positive image' in the eyes of the target countries and overall donor community highlighting considerations for 'prestige' as major donor motivation in the case of Brazil. Magnoni (2010) and Burges (2014) discuss how Brazil drives its aid to gain access to new markets abroad for its national companies.

Similar limitation applies as well to cases of Turkey, Russia, India, and South Africa. Concerning Turkey's case, Çevik (2016) argues that Turkish aid is used as a sort of diplomacy tool both in Turkey and abroad in order to exhibit Turkey as a benevolent country in the eyes of public and international community. İpek and Biltekin (2013) argue that Turkish aid provided to Africans through both state-led and non-state led institutions has a primary motive of achieving Turkish foreign policy objectives. Dal (2014) suggests that Turkey uses development assistance to strengthen its position in the global governance, while Ozkan and Orakçı (2015) sees Turkey's development cooperation efforts as politically driven. Bayer and Keyman (2012), and Tank (2013) explain humanitarian side of Turkish aid. However, their studies confirm findings of Dal (2014) that humanitarian side is just to display Turkey as a humanitarian peace actor in the eyes of international community highlighting 'prestige' considerations rather than altruistic behavior of Turkey. The latter point is also acknowledged in regards to Turkey's aid allocation to Africa.

Many studies that examine the Soviet Union's aid have shown that rational cost-benefit calculations based national interests are the main drivers of the Soviet aid during the Cold War era – e.g. as a tool for deployment of communist ideology or buying votes in UNGA (Rai, 1980). But, today Russian aid is subject to further exploration. The studies by Bakalova & Spranger (2013) and Mesquita & Smith (2016) touch upon interest-driven side of Russian aid, though both add that national interests are not the sole motive. The former indicates that Russian aid serves the Moscow's soft power tool in 'building a positive image' of Russia abroad, whereas the latter argues that Russia

achieves policy concessions from the recipients through foreign assistance provision (Mesquita & Smith, 2016).

With regard to India's development assistance, for some it appears as a part of a long-term strategy (Asmus, Fuchs, & Müller, 2017). Agrawal (2007) suggests that energy and infrastructure-related projects that India finances are driven by India's seeking for long-term benefits such as energy exports. Cheru & Obi (2011) see 'resource security' and 'development of new market opportunities' as one of the main drivers behind the allocation of Indian aid. Both resource and energy considerations by India manifest India's engagement with West African countries (Beri, 2008; Mawdsley, 2010). Mullen & Ganguly (2012) argues that aid projects in Nepal and Bangladesh are part of India's foreign policy strategy to counter Chinese influence in the region. Adhikari (2014) further adds about India's presence in Nepal that India's projects are perceived as strategic, originated from political agenda of India rather than the accommodating needs of Nepalese. Quantitative approach by Fuchs & Vadlamannati (2013) demonstrates that commercial and political interests are at play in Delhi's foreign assistance program: ensuring voting alignment at the UNGA and building trade ties with the recipients.

Concerning South Africa's aid provision, institution-building, peacekeeping, and efforts concentrated on post-conflict development are at the backbone of the development program (Grobbelaar, 2014). These motives mainly originated from South Africa's considerations over its self-interest: ensuring a peaceful and prosperous region (Hendricks & Lucey, 2013; Vickers, 2013; Hengari, 2016). Along with this, Besharati (2013) shows another motive behind aid allocation: keeping undesired migrants away from South Africa. Lastly, Yanacopulos (2013) puts forward that South Africa allocates aid to buy votes of the recipients to gain a seat at the UN Security Council.

The motive of 'buying votes' is also the case for the Arab donors as Neumayer (2003) demonstrates. In another study covering the Arab donors – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE – Villanger (2007) shows that aid is used to achieve foreign policy objectives

among which Arab donors primarily use aid either to build strategic alliances or to reward their alliances during military conflicts. He also outlines the commercial interests playing a role in Arab aid allocation: export opportunities and stimulation of trade and investment (Villanger, 2007, p.251-252).

Overall, the studies that have a one-sided approach towards foreign aid and follow major realist and neo-realist arguments about the determinants of aid and non-DAC foreign aid literature have significant limitations. The limitations can be summarized into two groups. First, by considering states as sole influential actors in the international system, the existence of other influential agents including international organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is neglected. Secondly, the role of moral values, ideas, identities, and social structures that may have a profound impact on both state and human behavior are also disregarded.

2.4 Common-Interests in the Provision of Development Assistance and Non-DAC donors

The common-interests or 'recipients' needs' (RN) approach on the other side largely employs the axioms of the Liberal IR theory and considers ODA provision as a collaborative state activity featuring an 'altruistic behavior' as a donor. The collaborative activity by donors highlights humanitarian side of aid allocation and mainly includes providing assistance based on 'the needs' and 'merits' of recipients which are largely determined by the following indicators: 'poverty reduction', 'economic development of the recipient', 'accommodating basic needs of the recipients (e.g. access to shelter, education, food, and water), and 'the environmental degradation' in the recipients as well as concomitant global challenges these indicators are associated with (Lumsdaine, 1993; Kegley, 1993; Lancaster, 2007, p.4; Haan, 2009, p.64).

Alongside the humanitarian side of aid provision at the recipient level, another major and connected premise this approach holds is that states act cooperatively in this way also because of the recognized global benefits to be gained by being part of

international regimes and networks (Cooper & Flesher, 2013, p.948). These global benefits mentioned in the literature embody themselves in the studies as indicators of 'the regime type' and 'free-market access level'. This premise is also reflected in the provision of development assistance in such a way that cooperative action by states or interstate cooperation facilitates both bilateral and multilateral relations, enables information transfer, and ultimately designate the conditions in the achievement of common global goals. Therefore, provision of development assistance is treated as a contribution to global public goods (GPGs), and thus seen as a 'legitimate' instrument in bringing overflowing global benefits (Martin, 1999). That's also argued as a major answer for the question of why rich countries should provide ODA to poor countries. Furthermore, the proponents of RN approach and liberal theory also point out that it should be the interest of the international community to help out poor nations through ODA flows not just because of 'altruism' but also for transforming today's poor nations to tomorrow's public good contributors.

Among existing studies on non-DAC donors and Chinese aid provision, those that use the arguments of RN approach are scarce. Brautigam (2009; 2011) argues that Chinese aid is more influential with respect to promoting economic growth in the recipients compared to those of traditional Western aid donors. The author claims that China's aid has a lower tendency towards 'waste, fraud, and abuse' simply because China does not relinquish control over the activities in the recipients from beginning to end. Similarly, Strange, Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, & Tierney (2017) show that Chinese aid is effective in terms of promotion of economic growth in the recipients, and the study by Dreher et al. (2016) confirm their findings about Africa and add that China's aid is effective in bringing regional development in Africa.

There are other studies that are considered within the RN approach regarding other non-DAC cases such as Turkish, Brazilian, Russian, and Indian aid allocation. To begin with Turkey, Bayer and Keyman (2012) show how humanitarian aid provided by Turkey responds to international crises and contribute to the creation of a better and stable humanitarian and global order, and thus to GPGs, while Donelli & Levaggi (2016) make

a similar argument for Turkey's aid that provides a GPG in Balkans, Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America. Tank (2013) and Ozkan & Orakçı (2015), on the other hand, use Somalia as a case study to demonstrate Turkey's humanitarian and developmental engagement in Africa.

Regarding the case of Brazil, the study of Zondi (2013) shows that the debt of twelve African countries were written off by Brazil in order to support Africans' endogenous growth. Semrau and Thiele (2017) in their study confirm that Brazilian development assistance targets countries with a lower GDP per capita to contribute to their economic development. In the case of Russia, Asmus, Fuchs, & Müller's (2017) study can be considered within RN approach. Their study describes Russian aid as debt relief and debt-for-development in the recipient countries (Asmus, Fuchs, & Müller, 2017, p.12). Moreover, they also touch upon the humanitarian side of Russian aid: deployment of humanitarian trucks to Afghanistan, provision of assistance to Guinea in preventing the spread of Ebola, and sending humanitarian and food aid to Syria (Asmus, Fuchs, & Müller, 2017, p.12-13).

As for India, some studies argue that Delhi's aid allocation is demand-driven to some extent and provided within the framework of South-South Cooperation (Samuel & George, 2016). For instance, a study on India's engagement in Africa highlights the collaborative action with recipients since the aid provision by India is done through a collaborative platform, namely the India-African Forum Summit (IAFS), where recipients make themselves heard on the part of India (Asmus, Fuchs, & Müller, 2017, p.15). In fact, Mawdsley (2010) shows how India is involved in development projects that accommodate needs of the recipients through for example personnel training, loans for services, equipment, education, and information technology. Lastly, the results are mixed regarding the Arab donors (i.e.; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE). As Villanger (2007) shows regime and governance of the recipients are not issues that concern Arab donors, whereas corruption and efficiency and sound tendering processes in the recipients are important areas on the part of Arab donors (Villanger, 2007, p.238).

2.5 Multiple-Factors (Hybrid Model) Approach to the Provision of Development Assistance

Although both self-interest and common-interest approaches have some explanatory power in explaining the goals of development assistance, Lancaster's study candidly underlines that, "there are too many interacting variables to justify a model that would be both parsimonious and insightful" (Lancaster, 2007, p.9). Moreover, there are other studies that question the sharp distinction in explaining donors' motivations in aid allocation either as a result of self-interests or common interests. In other words, the literature "has been trapped in something of an intellectual vacuum" (Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998, p.295). Apparent contradictions between both approaches have resulted in an inclination to argue that one particular category of aid motivations is dominant over all others. This has led explanatory factors shaping the development assistance to appear important in one case study and insignificant in others, and thus caused explanatory factors to remain ill-understood (Van der Veen, 2011, p.2).

In order to transcend this problem and avoid biased results, another approach has begun to be applied. Berthelemy (2006) calls this as 'hybrid model' in the aid provision. This has basically come to life by including the full range of possible motives derived from and used in both 'self' and 'common-interest' approaches, and then examining multiple determinants of the aid provision. These combined motives behind aid allocation basically appear as 'security' (e.g. in the form of military and economic, regional stability, fighting terrorism), 'power/influence' (e.g. building strategic alliances, buying votes at international *fora*, affecting political and institutional structures in the recipients), 'wealth/economic interests' (e.g. trade and investment opportunities), 'obligation' (e.g. colonial ties, historical background with recipients), 'humanitarianism' (e.g. ensuring access to shelter, education, food, and water), and 'prestige' (e.g. to appear cooperative or generous in the eyes of international community as well as recipients) (Van der Veen, 2011, p.10).

Substantial amount of existing studies on hybrid model to explain donors' motivation apply quantitative methods. For example, these studies run regression tests either following 'OLS (linear), or 'two-part model', or 'Heckman procedure', or a 'Tobit regression' to capture multiple motivations among cross sectional data on foreign aid allocation (Berthelemy, 2006, p.179).

2.6 Constructivism as an Alternative Approach in the Provision of ODA/ODA-like Aid Flows

There are other studies that focus on the ideational forces; and apply a constructivist approach in understanding and explaining these multiple motivations of foreign aid based on the notion that "ideas about the goals and purposes of aid policy shape its formulation and implementation". (Van der Veen, 2011, p.2). Constructivism differs from other approaches that use realism and liberalism by rejecting that the preferences of actors (states, domestic interests groups, or individuals) are 'exogenous' and 'fixed'. Constructivist studies ultimately emphasize that preferences of actors cannot simply be restrained into 'fixed' material goals, as realists contend, or to common goals like liberals use. Such an approach by constructivism questions in the first place the variation in ODA-ODA-like aid flows throughout the years.

Constructivism suggests that the ideas, beliefs, and moral values can equally shape the policies including development assistance (Lumsdaine, 1993; Lancaster, 2007; 2008). While (neo)-realism considers the international system as made of material capabilities, constructivism includes social relationships and consequent ideational nature of preferences, such as norms, ideas, and beliefs, which are socially constructed, in any equation (Wendt, 1995, p.73).

Although the constructivist approach often accepts major axioms of the conventional approaches used in IR theory, it eludes itself from others and their limitation on the ideational nature of preferences. For instance, realist assumptions – except the realism's disdain of the ideational nature of preferences – are often retained by constructivists (Wendt, 1995), whereas some other constructivists appear more aligned

with idea-oriented strands of liberal IR theory (Keck & Sikkink, 2014). All constructivists, however, explicitly retain the notion that preferences of actors are constructed through interactions with others in the both domestic and international structures, and preferences of actors are inclined to change over time (Van der Veen, 2011, p.26). To prefer one thing over others, one has to have ideas about what makes that one thing more preferable compared to others (Van der Veen, 2011, p.26). In the simplest example, how states define their national interests are not automatically determined by the structure of the international system in which independent sovereign states strive for survival. Even states' actions are driven by the ideas of realists rather than by the system's constraints as neo-realists think (Johnston, 1999).

Within this framework, constructivism and the use of ideas appear as an alternative approach for explaining the policy choices of actors including the motivations behind the provision of development assistance. This becomes more apparent when there is unavailable or incomplete data over ODA/ODA-like aid flows as evident in many non-DAC donors. Amongst the three categories of 'ideas' as studied in the literature: 'core beliefs', 'frames/general attitudes', and 'issue-specific ideas' in relation to peculiar policy outcomes (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Van der Veen, 2011), this study focuses on 'frames' specifically.

The 'frame' concept takes its origins from the cognitive sciences and it has been begun to be successfully applied as well to social sciences by the academics studying political issues both at domestic and international level (Tarrow, 1994; McAdam et. al., 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Van der Veen, 2011). In basic terms, frames are the ideas both specifying goals and suggesting particular policy choices (Van der Veen, 2011). They are organizing units that help actors to interpret, prioritize, and classify different pieces of information, and thus to make a better sense of the issues emerging around themselves. They can also be used as a metric in the assessment of different policy option available to that issue (Rein & Schön, 1993; Van der Veen, 2011). In the simplest form, when a policy issue emerges, it can be perceived from various perspectives by the actor(s), each of these perspectives having implications for multiple considerations

(Chong & Druckman, 2007, p.104). These multiple considerations in the individual's evaluation of an issue eventually generates 'frame in thought' (Chong & Druckman, 2007), and then reflected in discursive practices of the actors generating 'frame in discourse'. The studies that use 'frame' as a concept have established that human beings' and politicians' way of thinking about an issue and how that issue is framed in their minds and reflected in their speeches can have a profound impact on their attitudes and policy choices (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Van der Veen, 2011).

Within three categories of 'ideas', frames are positioned at the intermediary level in the hierarchy of policy-ideas, and connect 'core beliefs' concerning the national identity to 'issue-specific ideas' shaping policy decisions (Van der Veen, 2011, p.15). The core beliefs reside in the identity of the nation, and circumscribe the purposes of nations and its 'type' by specifying what kind of nation it represents or would like to represent (Van der Veen, 2011, p.15). They are, in basic terms, associated with nations' history and culture which are shaped over time and subjected to change. For example, Wallace (1991) argues that foreign policy can be shaped by national identity, and directly relevant to core ideas, values, and beliefs that nations stand for and seek to promote abroad. From the point of Anderson (1983), nations are concerned about the image of their countries that is conveyed through the international actions they take (as used in Van der Veen, 2011, p.27), and this can shape their engagement with other states as for example other nations may possibly emulate from their actions (Jervis, 1970). Therefore, states' identity perceptions can help to understand how states will act (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.309).

The 'issue-specific ideas' on the other hand are causal ideas that actors may hold about policy option helping them to decide what action to take given preferences and interests shaped within their interpretation of material and social world. Both categories are connected to each other through 'frames'. Ideas and beliefs concerning the national identity are embedded in policy-makers' perceptions of different issues, and "set the limits to the transferability of new ideas" (Schmidt, 2000, p.287). The

frames are constituted compatible with these core ideas which are transferred to the causal ideas of the actors through frames by shaping their preferences and interests.

Though the use of frames is recently becoming popular in the social sciences with a growing number of studies published on this subject (e.g. EU integration process as studied in Jones & Verdun, 2005), the aggregate number is not that large. It is not something widely used in order to grasp development assistance phenomenon except for the work of Van der Veen (2011). A novel contribution by Van der Veen (2011) to the development assistance literature appears as the main study that uses 'frames' to measure ideas of policy elites, and to analyze donors' motivations of foreign aid provision. His study covers four DAC donors; Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway, which are selected based on most similar system design, and explains the variation in these countries' development assistance programs from 1950 to 2000.

He generates seven 'frames' to explain the motivations behind aid provision which are mostly derived from the indicators that are used in 'self-interest' and 'common-interest' approaches (see Table 1 below). These seven frames are: 'security', 'power & influence', 'economic self-interest' (wealth), 'enlightened self-interest', 'prestige/reputation', 'obligation', and 'humanitarianism' (Van der Veen, 2011, p.10). Each of these frames are said to be used by policy-makers in providing development assistance, and to reflect motivations behind aid allocation.

The 'security' frame draws insights from *realpolitik* and highlights donors' consideration for its military security while providing assistance to recipients. Assistance may come for the purposes of gaining military alliances, for example with those whose borders abut on enemy nations, or addressing international security threats like 'terrorism' or 'rogue nations' whose possession of weapons of mass destruction may pose a threat to donors' physical security.

In a similar vein, 'power/influence' presents insights from *realpolitik* but the goals of aid are mostly on pursuit of power through gaining leverage over others, or winning alliances and strengthening donors' influence in global governance and at *international*

fora, for instance by purchasing votes at the UNGA. The frame of 'economic self-interest' basically includes developing and securing export markets, investment opportunities, and trade partnerships, or ensuring employment in the recipient country for workers from donor countries (Van der Veen, 2011).

The frame 'enlightened self-interest' is a tricky one amongst all as far as the work of Van der Veen (2011, p.12; p.42) is concerned. His explanation and the importance of economic dimension in this frame is vaguely explained and not clear. However, considering the discussions in the aid literature and his matchmaking of this frame with the goals for aid (see Table 1 below), this frame is likely to highlight the pursuit of contribution to global public goods (GPGs) highlighting 'needs and merits' of the recipients as explained above. The contribution to global public goods mainly includes acting collaboratively as a donor by being involved in attempts to address global challenges such as ensuring global peace and stability, environmental standards, health, access to free market. Although it is not mentioned by Van der Veen (2011), it would be feasible to assume that this frame refers to inclusion of multilateral channels in the provision of development assistance as well as bilateral channels simply because addressing global challenges through contribution to GPGs transcends single states' capacity and requires 'collaborative' action with the participation of multiple states to some extent.

As to 'prestige' frame, how the donor is perceived in the eyes of international community and of the recipients is important here as emphasized by Morgenthau. This frame mainly refers to establishing or expressing certain donor identities such as 'generous', 'benevolent' or 'respectful' (e.g. to sovereignty of recipients as highlighted in South-South Cooperation). The 'obligation' frame largely takes its origins from donors' historical position in the international system and underlies donors' duties to provide aid which might for instance be contingent upon colonial background, or filling the gap between poor and rich nations.

Lastly, ‘humanitarianism’ frame underscores promotion of well-being of poor nations, and it is expected to be correlated with the basic needs of population (e.g. access to education, food, shelter, and alike) from recipients at home or alternatively in a host country if there is a population displaced (Van der Veen, 2011).

Table 1: Frames and the goals of development assistance as used in Van der Veen (2011). The table is created by the author based on table used in Van der Veen (2011).

Frame	Goals of the ODA/ODA-like Aid flow
Security	Increasing Donor's 'Physical Security'
Power/Influence	Increasing Leverage Over Others, Winning Alliances, Strengthening Relative Position at Global Scene
Economic Self-Interest	Economic Contribution to Donor's Economy
Enlightened Self-Interest	Contribution to Global Public Goods (e.g. Peace and stability, environment, market access, alike)
Reputation	Improvement of Donor's International Status
Obligation	Historical or Colonial Association with the Recipients
Humanitarianism	Promoting Well-being of the Recipients

2.7 Methodology

In order to analyze the ideas of policy-makers regarding motivations behind the provision of development assistance in certain time period, this study counts on ‘frames’ as explained above and uses ‘content-analysis’ as a research technique to analyze the primary data collected in this study from the ‘legislative/parliamentary debates’ in TBMM. However, measuring ‘frames’, like using discourse for data interpretation, is a significant problem for one to overcome since there is no way to measure ‘frames (or ideas) in thought’. ‘Frames in communication’ can be measured on the other hand by using data analysis techniques including discourse analysis and content analysis.

Frames in ‘thought vs communication’ instantly invokes the notion that what the actor(s) hold(s) in his/her mind may not be the same with what he/she speak(s) of

largely because of, for example re-election concerns or avoiding political cost of any hypocritical behavior. However, this problem is likely to be minimal in my particular study area of development cooperation policy because it is a policy area mostly distant to what majority of voters are interested more in a given country. Moreover, by using legislative/parliamentary speeches, which are also distant to significant amount of voters, any concern over re-election or political cost of any hypocritical behavior are largely ruled out. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that frames in 'thought' and in 'communication' do not largely diverge from each other in this specific policy area at least not leading to significant measurement error. Lastly, speeches delivered at legislative/parliamentary debates are perhaps the best and only sources for analyzing ideas of policy-elites in the provision of development assistance (Van der Veen, 2011).

In this regard, the primary data source of this research is speeches delivered at 'parliamentary/legislative debates' (particularly annual debates concerning the budget of development assistance and institutions providing aid). The speeches are remarkable sources not just because they give valuable insights into prominent ideas hold and thus frames used by policy-makers concerning aid provision over time, but also because they appear as the best resource to analyze since the debates are held annually in a regular basis and thus enable one to sample the content of the discourses in similar conditions. The second advantage is that legislative/parliamentary debates on budget brings implicitly about the budget constraints, which can force policy-makers to weigh importance to particular proposals. Third, as this sort of speeches are not same as public speeches and delivered by those who are assumed to be better informed than the public, the quality of speeches will often be higher and provide more contribution than the other type of speeches, and thus any risk of disingenuousness is minimized (Larson, 1988; Van der Veen, 2011).

Although not all legislators are decision-makers on development assistance provision, some legislators including from both ruling and opposition parties can be and act like decision-makers. These legislators including those in my case of Turkey are involved in policy-making or policy-action of the main institution responsible for aid assistance.

Even if this particularity is not evident to a country in question, still legislative/parliamentary debates offer a valuable insight into representative elite discourse which provides information on policy directions like the motivations of development assistance.

Likewise, speeches delivered by policy actors outside of legislative/parliamentary debates (e.g. at international level) regarding development assistance are also important sources. But, the speeches in this type are occasionally and irregularly delivered. Thus, the variation in the provision of development assistance cannot be explained solely counting on this type of speeches because such collected data are significantly dispersed compared to those collected from the legislative debates. Along with the latter point, as this type of speeches are basically public speeches, the risk of disingenuousness is evident, which can potentially lead to measurement errors. In order to compensate for potential bias in the data collected from legislative/parliamentary debates on aid budget and policy-action, my primary dataset, is supported by secondary sources including policy papers, articles, and books.

Regarding the descriptive quantitative data concerning the ODA/ODA-like aid flows of the cases, OECD datasets – ‘Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions’, ‘Aid (ODA) by sector and donor’, ‘Official and Private Flows’ – are used. OECD datasets are reliable and valid. They have been used by scholars in this literature and other relevant literatures for decades displaying their reliability. More importantly, OECD datasets are highly correlated with other datasets on the indicators in question, and thus mark themselves as both valid and reliable sources.

The data analysis method in this study is content analysis rather than discourse analysis. Both techniques are closely related to each other. The general assumption about the two techniques is that ideas are reflected in statements and causally important to actions (Van der Veen, 2011, p.52). However, as shown by Foucault and Derrida, discourse analysis focuses on different dimensions of a discourse such as style, syntax, gestures, and idioms, as well as the conscious or unconscious use of specific

words and their way of influencing the actions and constructing perceptions of reality (Milliken, 1999; Van der Veen, 2011). Content analysis, on the other hand, focuses on specific policy concepts and motivations/aims/goals expressed in discourse; e.g. roles, beliefs, and frames (Van der Veen, 2011). In this regard, content analysis is interested in textual content rather than textual meaning and thus does not require researcher's interpretation as it is the case in discourse analysis. This feature of content analysis mitigates the internal validity problem, also known as author's subjectivity.

In the case of Turkey, this thesis examined a total of 2295 'parliamentary/legislative debates' from 2003 to 2019 at the 'the Grand National Assembly of Turkey' (TBMM). In this time period, Turkey's ODA is perhaps the most vibrant in terms of the amount of ODA, the scale and number of projects, and the regional focus. Most of these speeches did not contain specifically the 'development assistance' issue on the agenda. However, the speakers³ at TBMM do often deliver occasional and irregular 'one minute speeches'. Therefore, all speeches available were examined.

Among 2295 documents, only 59 'parliamentary/legislative debates' on budget and policy action of the main institution, TİKA which delivers development assistance⁴ abroad, were relevant. These speeches delivered at the TBMM are directly about the budget and policy plan of the TİKA. A total of 229 explicit arguments for ODA provision were tallied. The debates and relevant speeches are coded accordingly to the frames used in this study (see Table 2 below), and the number of occurrences of frames is questioned to observe correlation, if any, between ideas reflected through frames (in

³ Speakers include the legislators and the members of parliament who represent a political party at the TBMM and speak about TİKA's budget and policy-action for the next year, bureaucrats working at TİKA, and ministers whose ministries incorporate TİKA and TİKA's actions. Until TİKA was linked to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 2018, it was linked to the Prime Ministry, and in all years from 2003 to 2018 ministers of state, as being responsible for TİKA's activities, delivered speeches on TİKA, its activities, and its policy objectives for the next year. The ministers' names include Beşir Atalay, Bekir Bozdağ, Faruk Çelik, Numan Kurtulmuş, and Mustafa Said Yazıcıoğlu.

⁴ Turkish Coordination and Cooperation Agency (TİKA) is the leading state institution for Turkish development assistance abroad from 1992 onwards.

speech texts) and volume of foreign aid allocation by regions/countries (the descriptive statistics coming mostly from the OECD dataset).

Regarding textual context, in this study neither specific words or phrases concerning the provision of development assistance nor the references to ODA motivations/goals without an explicit motivation is focused. Therefore, statements that do not specify any goal concerning the frames or that have vague appeals are excluded (Van der Veen, 2011, p.53). Arguments referring to specific reasons and motivations in aid provision are coded: e.g. “TIKA should engage in required and adequate action in Turkish speaking countries” (TBMMa, 2005, p.408). Or, “development assistance provided to Turks and related communities, and to the states in Balkans should increasingly continue” (TBMM, 2007a, p.227). Or, “African opening out program, through social projects that win people’s hearts and support activities of our businessmen, should be extended and deepened” (TBMM, 2007a, p.227). Or, “TIKA should pay more attention to the Turkic Republics as specified in its founding purpose and increase its presence through projects reaching directly out the Turkic people” (TBMM, 2006a). Or, “projects that grant scholarships to the foreign students coming to Turkey should continue” (TBMM, 2013c, p.431).

The case of Turkey is then compared to two other prominent non-DAC donors, namely Russia and China, in Africa (excluding North African countries). African continent is focused here for a number of reasons. First and foremost, Africa is a distant region in terms of regional influence to most of non-DAC donors including Turkey, Russia, and China. Therefore, second and linked to the latter, it would help us to better show the motivations that would not normally appear or would appear occasionally in donors’ aid allocations to the other regions. For example, as will be shown in the following sections, regarding Turkey’s case, while the motivations driving Turkey’s ODA in Balkans and Caucasus and Central Asia have been more or less same since the initiation of Turkey’s international development cooperation program in 1992, the motivations that enter into agenda with the changing nature of Turkish Foreign Policy, namely ‘influence’ and ‘image/prestige’ considerations, can be mostly realized in Turkey’s ODA

to Africa. Hence, thanks to the absence of a path dependency with regard to Africa, just as evident in Turkey's case, looking at the African continent would do better in understanding the motivations in development assistance allocation.

Third, studying Africa would contribute to the theoretical discussions in the literature. To exemplify, by showing non-DAC donors' considerations of the material and political/diplomatic interests in Africa, if any, liberals' argument; development is the main motivation of development, would be weakened to an important extent. Similar logic would also be established vice versa weakening realists' assumptions. Fourth, explaining the aid motivations of non-DAC donors in Africa is a mere glimpse of discussions pertaining to whether 'a new scramble for Africa' is on the horizon or not.

Lastly, understanding non-DAC donors' motivations in Africa is essential for the future of aid architecture. In retrospect, African continent has been the main target of donor countries, particularly the DAC donors, which have established the long-lasting aid architecture easily by leaving no room and other choice for the recipients including Africans thanks to the monopoly they have created and through aid with a political conditionality. But, the non-DAC donors, all of which being aid recipients in that monopoly of the DAC members, and thus, knowing and experiencing the defects of the existing aid architecture, deliver substantial amount of aid to Africa outside of the DAC norms and standards, and appear as the real alternatives to the DAC donors.

Eventually, the non-DAC donors might force the existing aid architecture for a modification or a revolution. Therefore, understanding the non-DAC donors' motivations would shed a light on the future of aid architecture.

There are already studies in the literature that explain the determinants of Chinese and Russian aid. However, none of the existing works uses 'framing' in tracing the patterns of constructed motivations of donors. But, the analysis of Russia and China goes beyond the scope of a master's thesis mostly because of language barrier in translating relevant legislative documents and time limitation to complete my thesis. In short, primary data collection and analysis through 'framing' covers only the Turkish case.

2.8 Frames Used in the Provision of ODA/ODA-like Aid and Correlated Indicators

Broad frames used by policy actors concerning development assistance have been already generated by Van der Veen (2011) as explained above. This study follows the footsteps of Van der Veen (2011) but diverges from his work in terms of some indicators used to analyze each category of frame (see Table 2 below).

To begin with the 'security' frame, this study draws insights from *realpolitik* just as used in the literature but considers economic security of donors along with military/territorial security. Development assistance with a security consideration may be provided by donors for the purpose of expanding physical security of the donor through; 'creating military alliances' (e.g. Israel & Egypt) , 'establishing or using military bases' (e.g. in Turkey and Pakistan by the US), 'addressing international security crises and threats' like terrorism or rogue nations (e.g. Syria, Iran, Iraq), 'containing expansion of communist regimes (e.g. Korea and Vietnam), and simply 'bringing stability to the regions which are at the utmost importance of the donors (Morgenthau, 1962, p.303; Huntington, 1971; Lasensky, 2003; Van der Veen, 2011).

Furthermore, instability in the region in question for donor country may bring economic insecurity to the donor country alongside physical security (e.g. increasing risk concerning investments in the recipients and concomitant unexpected economic burden on donor, cut in donors' production line in the recipients, dispersion of trade pattern, intrusion of terrorists into the borders of donor, cut of energy supply etc.). Hence, not only physical/military/territorial dimension of security but also economic security of the donors is included in this frame.

In this regard, I expect donors to provide ODA/ODA-like aid to the regions or countries where instability in terms of security is present and concomitantly donors' economic and physical security are imperiled, or to those who experience international crisis or conflict, or to those abutting enemy countries. Therefore, with respect to regional distribution of aid, recipient countries that are expected to receive development assistance by donors with a security consideration appear as those which belong to the

least developed countries (LDCs), lower middle-income countries (LMICs) echelons, and the fragile state category. Such categorization then marks countries located mostly in Africa, the Middle East, and Central and East Asia regions as well as special cases of 21st century like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Bosnia, and Syria. In addition to regional distribution of aid, I expect allocated aid to be delivered bilaterally rather than multilaterally and directly to the recipients' governments rather than sub-groups in the recipients like NGOs since security is a state level objective (Van der Veen, 2011, p.41). Lastly, the modality of aid can be both technical and disbursement in the form of money or equipment depending on the relations between donor and recipient.

Similarly, frame of 'power/influence' takes its origin from *realpolitik*. In this study, it is named as 'political-diplomatic influence' as it slightly diverges from Van der Veen (2011) by adding cultural dimension of aid. Aid is often used to gain political and diplomatic leverage over other countries and to strengthen relative position of donors in the global governance and at the international organizations like UNGA and UNSC through for example ensuring high voting affinity at the UNGA or obtaining votes for a seat in UN Security Council (Alesina & Dollar, 2000, p.46). Additionally, assistance can be provided to build political or military alliances with recipients, or to increase donors' sphere of influence in some countries and regions that share historical or colonial ties with the donors (Mason, 1964; Lancaster, 2007). Allocation of aid may come also as a 'cultural aid' and be used as an instrument of 'cultural diplomacy'. It refers to the aid provided to recipients in order to promote language, traditions, heritage, ideology, social structures or for expanding and assisting religion or Diasporas, all of which in return is expected to provide a leverage to donor over others (Lancaster, 2007, p.15).

Moreover, there is a difference between major and relatively small state donors or donors with moderate state capacity. While ODA/ODA-like aid provision for the latter appears amongst few means available to influence others, major powers have a great choice of means to influence other countries. Therefore, for smaller or moderate states as donors, it is expected that development assistance can have a greater impact, if it is more concentrated in the sense that aid is disbursed mainly to the selected countries

or region(s), or to a region by ensuring almost all countries there receive aid even if the amounts allocated are considerably moderate. In this regard, it is expected by these donors to allocate aid to regions and countries who share historical, cultural or colonial relations with the donors, and expected that aid is squeezed in a few countries or in a single region or a specific region(s) depending on the course of foreign policy and the history of the donor.

Additionally, the aid with 'political-diplomatic influence' motivation behind can sometimes be provided outside of DAC standards, for instance through void of 'conditionality' while accommodating direct needs of the recipients which are expected to appear in sectors of 'social' and 'economic' infrastructure and services, and production sectors. The main reason for aid provided outside of DAC standards, which is seen as synonym to international standards by many⁵, originates from the perception invoked on the part of recipient countries and their governments. In fact, when aid has come with certain conditionality (most of the time based upon human rights and democracy in the recipients), the aid can be perceived by the recipient governments as a direct interference with their domestic politics by instantly invoking a sort of sovereignty 'threat' notion. Such 'anti' attitude towards aid donors and their conditional aid may also come from the political losers of the recipient countries, as evident in the US foreign aid in non-democratic countries, and hamper the process of gaining leverage (Tokdemir, 2017). Another reason can be the following; as the control of money will not be at the hand of recipient governments, whether the aid indeed intends to address the needs of recipients or not may surround in the recipients by concomitantly hampering credibility and the image of the donor on the part of recipients. Hence, in order to avoid any backfire related to these perceptions, in the search of political-diplomatic influence in the recipient countries, donors may choose to behave outside of DAC or international standards.

⁵ By some authors in the literature and by the policy-makers including the Minister of Internal Affairs and the legislators in Turkey, OECD-DAC standards and international standards in the provision of development assistance/ODA are synonyms and are used interchangeably (TBMM, 2007a, p.228; 2007b, p.94; 2009b, p.58; 2010b, p.5).

'Economic interests' frame is an obvious one. In basic terms, donors allocate aid with the objective of obtaining economic benefits. These benefits basically appear as opening a trade channel or expanding trade volume, particularly export markets, accessing raw materials and investment markets as well as natural and energy resources of countries (Schraeder et al., 1998; Lancaster, 2007; Van der Veen, 2011). In this regard, to track this frame in donors' allocation of ODA/ODA-like aid, one should go after trade and investment patterns and look at the correlation between trade & investment volume and allocation of aid.

As to 'enlightened self-interest', this study deviates from the study of Van der Veen (2011) in explaining this frame. As mentioned above, his study does provide explanation to this frame, but it is kind of insufficiently explained to the extent that the distinction between altruistic motivations under 'enlightened self-interest' frame and 'humanitarian' motivations is not clear. Therefore, in this study both motivations are clearly separated from each other. Instead of using vague 'enlightened self-interest' frame, it is named as 'altruistic/developmental' in this study and makes references to the pursuit of contribution to global public goods (GPGs), which includes the pure objective to accommodate the needs of the recipients like 'poverty reduction', enhancement of 'economic development of the recipient', 'accommodating basic 'needs' of the recipients (e.g. access to shelter, education, food, and water), 'the environmental degradation', 'ensuring post-conflict development in the recipients' (e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan), and 'improving quality of life'. It is the allocation of aid on soft terms and in long-terms basis to contribute to GPGs in order to address the common global challenges that every country faces such as peace and stability, environmental standards, economic development, health, pandemics, access to free market etc. (Morgenthau, 1962, Lumsdaine, 1993, p.38; Hook, 1995).

In this regard, I expect donors to provide aid through both multilateral and bilateral channels though multilateral channels can be more than bilateral channels in some special cases simply because addressing global challenges through contribution to GPGs sometimes transcends most of states' capacity and requires 'collaborative' action

with participation of multiple states. Yet, bilateral channels can equally enter into picture when donors target specific recipients, and aim to increase the well-being of selected recipients because of for instance regional reasons as it became evident in the Middle East with Iraq or in Asia with Afghanistan or specific reasons such as historical or colonial background. In this regard, I expect ODA/ODA-like aid to be canalized into infamous regions including the Middle East, Africa, and Asia and thus into where the LDCs and LMICs are located most. In country basis, aid can also be more concentrated which have historical or colonial background with the donors or where well-being and quality of life of population is below the average. The aid is also expected to be provided in social and economic infrastructure and service of the recipients as these areas are the ones that increase the overall well-being of populations. The modality of aid here can be technical including capacity building and capacity development and in the form of disbursement through money or equipment.

The 'prestige' frame is also crystal-clear. Donors may offer ODA/ODA-like aid to gain reputation and respect from the international community, or to obtain a specific donor identity such 'generous', 'benevolent', 'respectful' or 'friendly' insofar as prestige may bring political returns (Morgenthau, 1962, p.304). Where the 'prestige' frame is prominent, it is expected that donors may offer aid to improve their images, or to compensate past failures (Bauer, 1998; Kragelund, 2008). Additionally, prestige aid can be provided by contributing to GPCs which can portray donors as 'good global citizens' or 'generous' (Mawdsley, 2012). To fulfill this goal then, it is expected by donors to meet international standards and the needs of recipients in the provision of ODA/ODA-like aid, and to provide relatively 'larger amounts of aid' to countries and regions which can potentially increase the prestige of donor by international community such as Somalia where most countries have been stepping out, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and regions including Africa, East and Central Asia, and the Middle East.

'Obligation' frame underscores the (felt) requirement to allocate assistance by the donors based on for example historical or colonial background with the recipients or to catch up their peers in the international donor community, or to comply with the

standards imposed by an organization such as the European Union and its *Acquis Communautaire*. In this regard, it is expected that donors, in which ‘obligation’ frame is prominent, provide aid to regions and countries that have historical or colonial background with donors, or to those which are stated by international organizations like the EU (e.g. ACP countries, and LDCs and LMICs), and/or to adjust the amount of aid to the standards as evident again in the EU case with ODA/GNI ratio.

Lastly, ‘humanitarianism’ frame is the other one that differs from Van der Veen’s work. Unlike his work, this study distinguishes humanitarian aid from his ‘enlightened self-interest’ frame, which is referred to as ‘altruistic/developmental’ frame in this study. The main difference between them is that the former is provided in cases of emergency and mostly in short-term basis, whereas the latter is provided to seek sustainable development in the recipients and in the long-term (Morgenthau, 1962; Lumsdaine, 1993; Hook, 1995).

In basic terms, ‘humanitarianism’ frame highlights the assistance provided to alleviate human suffering and protect or increase the well-being of population in the recipients during the crisis. It is provided on a short-term basis. It is expected here that the quantity of aid to be correlated with the basic needs of population in the recipients and should concentrate specifically on e.g. access to education, food, shelter, and alike. And this type of aid should appear on the agenda unexpectedly, reflecting a ‘reactive’ policy action rather than ‘proactive’. The recipient countries then should be amongst those where governments are unable or unwilling to provide basic needs of population or where civil war is present and either government is not evident or unable or unwilling to provide basic needs as recently evident in Syria case. It is also expected that the number of recipients should be large including governments, NGOs, and other sub-state groups, and the flow channels should include both bilateral and multilateral. In a nutshell, Table 2 below provides an overview of each frame and the indicators used to analyze, and matches each frame with relevant indicators.

Table 2: Aid Frames as used in this thesis. The table is created by the author.

Category of Frame	Indicators Used to Analyze the Frame	Correlation between Indicators and Distribution of ODA/ODA-like Aid and (e.g. By Income, Region & Country, and Sector)
Security	Presence of International Crisis or Threat, Location, Regime Type	Correlated with the Regions and Countries experiencing crisis, with LDCs and LMICs, with Social Infrastructure and Services, Technical Cooperation and Disbursement
Political & Diplomatic Influence	UN Voting Affinity, Historical or Colonial Tie, Cultural Tie and Diplomacy (e.g. language, religion, tradition, ethnicity etc.)	Correlated with the Regions and Countries that have Historical, Colonial, Cultural Tie to Donor, with UN Voting Affinity
Economic Interest	Trade and Investment, Access to Raw Material, Energy, and Natural Resources	Correlated with Trade and Investment with the Recipients (mostly from LDCs and LMICs)
Altruistic/Developmental	Contribution to Global Public Goods; e.g. peace and stability, environmental standards, health, pandemics, access to free market, enhancement of economic development and of life standards of citizens	Correlated with the Regions and Countries where LDCs and LMICs are located, with Level of Economic Advancement of the Recipients, with Sectors of 'Social' and 'Economic' Infrastructure and Services, and Production Sector, and Education sector, technical cooperation, capacity building and enhancement, disbursement
Prestige/Image	Contribution to Global Public Goods	Correlated with the Regions and Countries where LDCs and LMICs are located as well as Countries Seen Needy in the Eyes of International Community, with the quantity of aid, and with Sectors; 'Social' and 'Economic' Infrastructure and Services, 'Production' and 'Education' sector
Obligation	Historical or Colonial Tie, Cultural Tie, Requirement to comply with Standards of IOs, Peer Aid Volume	Correlated with the Regions and Countries that have Historical, Colonial, Cultural Tie to Donor, with the standards of IOs (e.g. The EU), with the quantity of aid provided by rival donors
Humanitarianism	Presence of International Crisis or Conflict, Wealth, GDP per capita, Short-term Basis,	Correlated with the Regions and Countries experiencing crisis, with LDCs and LMICs, with fragile states, with displaced population

CHAPTER 3

THE DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY'S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: PROMINENT FRAMES FROM 2003 TO 2019

The history of Turkish development assistance to foreign countries began through multilateral channels in 1957 when Turkey got involved into the technical cooperation program of the UN (Ipek, 2015, p.179). The first instance of Turkish bilateral assistance becomes evident in 1971 when Turkey offered assistance to Iran and Pakistan based on its agreements to Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Regional Cooperation for Development (Ipek, 2015, p.179). Despite early appearance in development assistance scene, Turkey's early activism and assistance have been heavily limited in amount and geographic scope until the establishment of The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) based on Statutory Decree Law No. 480 within the structure of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 1992.

TIKA, as being an agency interrelated to MFA, was given a primary mission to plan, coordinate, and implement policies that aim to integrate newly independent Turkic states in the Caucasus and Central Asia into the world. The so-called 'Turkish experience', which has gone through liberalization of its economy and its on-going democratization processes was considered to be a good example for improving these states' socio-economic status in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991.

Behind such accreditation, following main objectives can be underscored; 1) restraining possible Iranian influence after power gap created by the USSR, 2) further weakening of Soviet influence in the region (Özkan & Turgut Demirtepe, 2015, p.648), 3) an endeavor to establish a sphere of influence for Turkey (Köstem, 2019, p.112) and 4) finding new export markets for Turkish businesses that have steadily increased their export volumes since the mid-1980s after adopting an export led growth model. In this regard, beyond its mission to provide development assistance, TİKA was planned to act as a new instrument for Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP), which could be restructured based on the changes in the international environment and on the direction of TFP (Ipek, 2015; Özkan & Turgut Demirtepe, 2015, p.648).

Although concentration on newly independent Turkic states was highlighted as the only principle of TİKA by major studies in the literature and by the many legislators speaking at the TBMM, and indeed priority was given to these states based on the international environment in which TİKA was founded, another founding principle of TİKA, which is often-ignored in the academic literature and in political circles as underlined by ministers of state like Faruk Çelik in 2010 and Bekir Bozdağ in 2012, is to provide assistance to countries that are underdeveloped and needy ones regardless of its origin, region, religion, and ethnicity (TBMM, 2010a, p. 210; 2012a, p.318).

However, TİKA has been largely ineffective and can be considered as unsuccessful throughout the 1990s in fulfilling the main objectives it has been assigned to. Barring few (in numbers) and small (in amounts) foreign aid projects orchestrated in *ad hoc* manner in the immediate neighborhood, TİKA has been not able to make its presence felt in the regions and countries targeted. The political and economic instability during conflict-ridden coalition governments in Turkey was amongst the main impediments before the well-functioning of TİKA. The low degree of interest alignment over who to control and rule TİKA (as evident in many other policy areas of that time period) among

political parties of coalition governments has turned TİKA into an agency that diverted from its primary objective hindering TİKA to structure itself in organizational terms⁶.

As the political and economic atmosphere in Turkey has begun to change through introducing a series of reforms to recover from instability and crises, the fate of TİKA has begun to change in a positive way especially when a majoritarian government was established after a long time period in Turkish politics. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) took the power in 2002 as a single ruling-party. The AKP showed commitment to implementing the reform package Kemal Derviş initiated. Accordingly, disciplined and tightened fiscal and monetary policies were enacted. Therefore, the economic means of the AKP government were enhanced and consequently reflected in TİKA's activities. Meanwhile, before the AKP rose to power, in 2001 TİKA was renamed as 'Organization and Tasks of Turkish Cooperation and Development Administration Directorate'⁷ and restructured under the supervision of the Prime Ministry after the ratification of the Law no 4668. The improving economic environment both at domestic and global level has enabled Turkey to pool sufficient resources to readjust and pursue its foreign policy objectives. In this new environment the policy elite under AKP government reshaped TFP from crisis-oriented reactive foreign policy into a diversified foreign policy, what other calls multi-vector (Özkan & Turgut Demirtepe, 2015) or multidimensional (Onis & Yilmaz, 2009; Ozkan, 2012; Tank, 2013), or multifaceted (Hatipoğlu & Palmer, 2014).

Being the main coxswain behind such diversified or multidimensional foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu⁸ and a group of policy elite, who shared his ideas mainly based on his vision of so-called 'Strategic Depth', have put great emphasis on normative elements of

⁶ These conflicting relations have also reflected to the legislative debates in such a way that throughout 1990s and in the early 2000s till 2005, legislative debates concerning the budget and policy action of TİKA have been either largely not existed or have not gone beyond few perfunctory sentences.

⁷ The abbreviation of the agency is currently and has always been TİKA since its establishment in 1992.

⁸ Ahmet Davutoğlu was the chief advisor on foreign affairs to the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic of Turkey in the years between 2003 and 2009. He then became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009 and continued his duty as minister till 2014 when he was appointed as the Prime Minister and served as PM until 2016.

the soft power and having 'zero problems' with neighbors (Onis & Yilmaz, 2009; Ipek, 2015). This has also meant "a deviation from the classical fixed positions of TFP" (Onis & Yilmaz, 2009, p.9) and become evident in many foreign policy choices such as Turkey's unorthodox attitude towards Cyprus dispute and the Annan Plan. The major premise of the multidimensional foreign policy according to Davutoğlu is that for a formulation of a long-lasting strategic perspective, foreign policy should be taken beyond bilateral relations and be perceived as "mutually reinforcing and interlocking process" (Onis & Yilmaz, 2009, p.9) in which policy-makers are expected to focus on country's: 'historical depth', an assessment that connects the past, present, and future relations of a country, and 'geographical depth', the construction of these relations based on geo-cultural, geopolitical, and geo-economic factors that are simultaneously at play in domestic, regional, and global levels (Davutoğlu, 2001; 2008, p.78-80; 2010; 2012; 2013).

In regard to Turkey's case and the application of multidimensional foreign policy based on so-called Turkey's 'Strategic Depth', this embodies a 'visionary approach'. It is basically a consistent and systemic framework that would serve the determined interests of Turkey all around the world through the adoption of a new discourse and diplomacy with an emphasis on normative aspect, and would adopt itself to historic political transformations at all levels (domestic, regional, and global) by underlining the active involvement in new areas and the use of new policy instruments which have been largely absent in orthodox foreign policy toolkits of Turkey such as 'international development assistance' (Davutoğlu, 2010; 2012; p.4-6). The reflection of this perspective and concomitant calls for the use of new foreign policy toolkits, 'international development assistance' in this case, has led TİKA to be restructured in organizational terms and to redefine its mission and vision.

In fact, since 2003, the amount of Turkish ODA has multiplied by more than twenty-five times of its size; from \$ 73 million in 2003 to \$ 8.75 billion in 2019 (Figure 1 below). Such an increase in the amount of ODA is also reflected in the number of projects TİKA has undertaken. Between the years 1992 and 2002, the number of total projects TİKA

completed is 2241, whereas the total number of projects done solely in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 are respectively 265, 486, 562, and 931 (TBMM, 2005a, p.432; 2007a, p.226-227; 2012a, p.318). Such a linear increase continued from 2006 onwards as well, and the total number of projects completed only in 2018 reached approximately 2000 (TBMM, 2018b, p.22).




Figure 1: Turkey's net ODA disbursements, total between 2003 and 2018, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.

Similar increase is also evident in another ODA relevant figure; ODA/GNI ratio (Figure 2 below). While the ODA/GNI ratio of Turkey was 0.04% in 2003, this ratio appeared as 1.10% in 2018⁹, being higher than the OECD DAC average¹⁰ and overtaking the top EU-15 donor countries including the United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, Ireland, and some other prominent non-DAC donors like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Russia (OECD, 2020a).

⁹ The ratio in 2018 is a grant equivalent.

¹⁰ The OECD DAC average in 2018 was 0.31%.




Figure 2: Turkey's ODA/GNI ratio by percentage between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author. Note: 1.10 ratio in 2018 is a grant equivalent.

As to the sectoral distribution of Turkish ODA between 2003 and 2017, 'the social infrastructure and services, and 'humanitarian aid' comes at the forefront. While the former has been prominent in amounts, its share began to decrease after 2012 and 'humanitarian aid' becomes prominent from 2012 onwards (Figure 3 below). This change in the prominence of these two sectors can be explained with the change in the phases of Turkish ODA determined by this study (explained below). As compared to these two sectors, the shares of 'economic infrastructure and services', and 'production sectors' have been limited throughout the time period in question.




Figure 3: Sectoral Distribution of Turkey's ODA between 2003 and 2018, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.

Moreover, the regional distribution of Turkish ODA shows a consistency in terms of the top region that received utmost attention of Turkey from 2003 to 2018 (Figure 4 below). Since 2003, Asia¹¹ was the top recipient of Turkish ODA. South and Central Asian countries including Turkic speaking Republics and the Middle Eastern countries were amongst those who were allocated the majority of ODA. Similarly, Europe ranks among the top recipients of Turkish ODA; the 2nd region that received ODA from 2003 to 2011 and from 2016 to 2018. The main concentration in Europe has been primarily the Balkan countries that Turkey shares proximity in terms of linguistic, ethnicity, and historical and cultural ties.

¹¹ OECD dataset includes the Middle East within the Asia region.

Africa began to receive significant amount of Turkish ODA substantially after 2005. This merely coincides with a declaration of 2005 as the 'Year of Africa' and Turkey's opening out to Africa. The volume of ODA allocated to Africa was \$ 0.2 million in 2003, whereas this number has risen to \$ 9.55 million in 2005 and continued to increase constantly till 2013 when Turkey poured \$ 498.39 million to African countries in total. Between the years 2011 and 2016, Africa was the second largest recipient of Turkish development assistance, relegating Europe to the third position. However, the amount of ODA towards Africa began to decrease after 2013, again marking a change in the phases of Turkish ODA. Lastly, Turkish ODA towards America and Oceania is present from 2003 onwards but the amounts allocated to both regions have been really low.




Figure 4: Regional distribution of Turkey's ODA, between 2003 and 2018, Total Net, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.

The constant rise in ODA amounts, in number of projects, and all other relevant figures including ODA/GNI ratio and the sectoral and regional distribution of ODA from 2003 onwards can be divided into three major phases based on ‘framing’ analysis that reveals the determinants of Turkish ODA: 1) ‘the restructuring’ period in terms of technical and policy-based aid, between 2003 and 2005, 2) ‘the proactive’ period from 2006 to 2011 in which Turkey proactively used the ODA and TIKa as an instrument to achieve TFP objectives abroad, and 3) ‘the reactive’ period from 2012 onwards in which Turkey has been primarily able to use the ODA and TIKa reactively rather than proactively as Turkey’s existing capacity has been substantially restricted by the international developments, mainly by the Syrian refugee crisis and the high influx of refugees crossing Turkish border. Before moving into these three phases of Turkish ODA, the thesis will demonstrate the pattern of frames that reveals the determinants of Turkish ODA.

3.1 The Determinants of Turkish ODA: Pattern of Frames

As mentioned above, Turkey’s activism in development cooperation scene speeds up after 2005 along with the domestic and international changes in the political and economic aspects. Therefore, legislative debates on the budget and policy-action of TIKa and development assistance in general have not been substantially evident until 2005. Development assistance has not been discussed at all or has been rarely discussed separately from the budget of TIKa until 2005, usually appearing in the discussions pertaining to the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but taking up only small part of discussions. This explains the low number of frames appeared in 2003 and 2004; only 3 in total and covering only two frames (Table 3 below). Hence, these two years do not reveal much concerning the motives of Turkish ODA in 2003 and 2004. This limitation applies as well to whole pre-2005 period including the 1990s. The main reason behind this limitation is likely to be that there was no political unity due to coalition governments, and thus either no important policy/project was initiated or development assistance’s turn has not come in the discussions because of political disputes prevalent during the pre-2005 period.

There are also other important points to be highlighted. First, the same few speakers¹² at the TBMM speak of development assistance during certain periods of time and raise same issues year after year, though their contributions have sometimes varied. Second, linked to the latter point, in Turkey's case some legislators speaking about TIKa at the TBMM have been those who were either actively involved in TIKa's activities through for instance opening an overseas office like Sinan Oğan (2011a, p.284) or are currently active in TIKa's activities. Therefore, their speeches are likely to be influential in the policy-action of TIKa.

As Figure 5 and Table 3 below show, throughout the time period covered in this study, the most frequently mentioned frame for development assistance is 'obligation' (28.82% of the total 229 coded frames). It is followed by 'altruistic/developmental' (22.71%), 'influence' (15.28%), 'image/prestige' (13.30%), 'economic interest' (10.04%), 'humanitarianism' (7.86%), and 'security' (2.18%). It is not a surprise seeing 'obligation' at the top given the founding principle of TIKa to deliver assistance to those that share common history, linguistic, culture, religion and ethnicity with Turkey. The Turkic Republics in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Balkans are the top receiver of Turkish ODA under the frame of 'obligation', mainly following the internalized and institutionalized idea of 'Turkic World' in the 1990's TFP (Köstem, 2017, p.723). These ODA receivers are mainly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Meskhetian Turks, Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia. During the debates, such obligation is mainly and explicitly linked to the obligation under 'shared history, linguistic, culture, religion, and ethnicity' by the speakers.

¹² Speakers include the legislators and the members of parliament who represent a political party at the TBMM and speak about TIKa's budget and policy-action for the next year, bureaucrats working at TIKa including Serdar Çam, and ministers whose ministries incorporate TIKa and TIKa's actions. Until TIKa was linked to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 2018, it was linked to the Prime Ministry, and in all years from 2003 to 2018 ministers of state, as being responsible for TIKa's activities, delivered speeches on TIKa, its activities, and its policy objectives for the next year. The ministers' names include Beşir Atalay, Bekir Bozdağ, Faruk Çelik, Numan Kurtulmuş, and Mustafa Said Yazıcıoğlu.




Figure 5: Frequency of Aid Frames in Turkey between 2003 and 2019. Data Source: Data is acquired by the author from debates at TBMM. The figure is created by the author.

Table 3: Number of Frame Occurrences between 2003 and 2019. The table is created by the author.

Year	Security	Political & Diplomatic Influence	Economic Interest	Altruistic/Developmental	Image/Prestige	Obligation	Humanitarianism	Total
2003	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
2004	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
2005	1	3	2	4	4	6	2	22
2006	0	2	1	5	1	5	1	15
2007	1	5	2	3	2	8	0	21
2008	0	2	2	4	2	4	1	15
2009	1	3	0	4	3	5	1	17
2010	0	4	3	4	3	2	1	17
2011	0	1	3	4	1	3	1	13
2012	0	1	1	1	4	6	1	14
2013	0	0	1	2	1	8	1	13
2014	0	3	1	5	0	4	1	14
2016	0	2	2	7	4	4	3	22
2017	1	6	1	4	2	3	3	20
2018	1	1	1	1	2	4	0	10
2019	0	2	1	4	1	3	2	13
Total	5	35	23	52	30	66	18	229

In addition to these countries, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece have small Turkish population within their borders and speakers at the TBMM have articulated Turkey's obligation to deliver ODA to these countries (TBMM, 2006a; 2007a; 2007b; 2008; 2009a). However, these countries are members of the EU and there are barriers hindering Turkey to deliver ODA to these countries as well as to other EU members, as explicitly indicated by the Minister of State Beşir Atalay at the time (TBMM, 2006a, p.393). Therefore, Turkish foreign aid has not been and cannot be present in these three countries. Lastly, with veering TFP towards multidimensional foreign policy as explained above, some speakers have articulated the 'obligation' to allocate ODA to Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan, West Bank and Gaza, and Lebanon based on

the historical legacy and identity that Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire. This has mainly come with ‘obligation’ under ‘solidarity with the Third World’, as well as ‘a felt responsibility when others have been stepping out’ and ‘a sense of responsibility as a rich country’, as stated at the debates at the TBMM (TBMM, 2012a; 2013a; 2013b; 2014a; 2014b; 2016a; 2016b; 2017a; 2017b; 2018a).

In a similar vein, second ranked frame, ‘altruistic/developmental’, is in line with the founding principle of TİKA. Here, in addition to the Turkic Republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia and Balkans countries with which Turkey’s proximity is high, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs) from other regions including (North and Sub-Saharan) Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia (particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan) have received Turkish development assistance. The primacy of this frame is positively correlated with Turkey’s ODA distribution by income (Figure 6 below). As Figure 6 demonstrates below, Turkish ODA is concentrated dominantly on LMICs and LDCs, though Upper-Middle Income Countries (UMICs) were amongst top recipients from 2003 to 2012. The share of LMICs increased while the share of LDCs decreased accordingly especially after 2012 coinciding with the Arab Spring which substantially compelled Turkey to pour ODA into Syria from LMICs due to the refugee flow towards Turkey. This is also in the same direction with the phases that will be explained in the next sub-sections. Moreover, among the arguments related to this frame, Turkey’s contribution to Global Public Goods have been often highlighted during debates. This includes contribution to international stability and peace, post-conflict development efforts, health and pandemics as well as enhancement of economic development and life standards of the recipients.




Figure 6: Turkey's ODA: Total Net Distribution by countries' income, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.

The 'influence' and 'image/prestige' come respectively as third and fourth prominent frames in Turkish ODA, which are mainly in line with TFP and one of its main objectives; Turkey's aspirations for a more important role in global governance. 'Economic interest' shows up in the fifth place, noticeably a bit surprising given Turkey's increasing trade volume with Africa and with the number of Turkish companies investing in African countries. Another surprising finding regarding 'economic interest' is that reference to the export/import interests of Turkey is not often made but few instances. Speakers have shallowly preferred to talk about economic interests behind the provision of ODA.¹³

¹³ This is not limited only to discussions pertaining TIKa and development assistance. In other debates such as those including foreign economic policies, economic interests behind the provision of ODA is not mentioned from 2003 to 2019.

Although this might come as a surprise to those who are familiar with the Turkish activism in the trade aspect and indeed trade volume has significantly expanded in the time period studied in this paper, Turkey's ODA provision and its economic interests might be separated from each other to some extent. To exemplify, Turkey is not a participant donor to 'Aid for Trade'¹⁴ regime either as a member of World Trade Organization or as the European Union candidate country. Many donor countries in the development assistance cooperation area including the EU members, DAC members, and some non-DAC donors have become a part of 'Aid for Trade' regime either through their membership of the EU or of the WTO or of the OECD DAC. Their participation to this particular regime is also reflected in their determinants of ODA as revealed in some studies published in the literature.

Sixth in overall importance, 'humanitarianism' is puzzling the extent to which official figures suggests in terms of ODA allocated to humanitarian aid, especially after 2012 and more than 4.5 million Syrian refugee living in and receiving humanitarian assistance from Turkey (Figure 8 and 9 below). This striking result in regard to the 'humanitarianism' frame is in line with the 'reactive' phase of Turkish ODA as explained in the next-sub sections. However, the number of occurrences are positively correlated with the OECD data evidencing Turkey's allocation of 'humanitarian aid'. For example, during the debates in 'proactive phase' of Turkish ODA, Turkey's deployment of humanitarian aid for the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile in 2010 have been asked for by the speakers. Then, Turkish ODA towards Haiti and Chile increased from respectively \$ 0.01 million and \$ 0.03 million in 2009 to \$ 4.65 million and \$ 1.57 million in 2010. In the following year, amounts respectively declined to \$ 0.17 million and \$ 0.03 million (Figure 7 below).

¹⁴ "Aid for Trade is about helping developing countries, in particular the least developed, to build the trade capacity and infrastructure they need to benefit from trade opening. It is part of overall Official Development Assistance (ODA) — grants and concessional loans — targeted at trade-related programmes and projects" (WTO, 2020).

Similar story applies as well to Syria case as Turkey's allocation of ODA in the form of humanitarian aid increased from \$ 5.89 million in 2010 to \$ 103.35 million in 2011 and around \$ 649 million in 2012. But unlike other instances mentioned it has turned into a long-term assistance since the humanitarian crisis still lasts today in 2020¹⁵ (see Figure 9 below). These examples – showing unexpected and short-term appearance of ODA allocation to certain countries – are also important for seeing an accurate classification of 'humanitarian' frame, which deviates, as explained above earlier, from the study of Van Der Veen, which does not take short-term and unexpected appearance of ODA into consideration and not clearly distinguish humanitarian aid from his classification of 'enlightened self-interest'.




Figure 7: Turkey's Bilateral Assistance towards Haiti and Chile between 2009 and 2012, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.

Finally, 'security' frame has not been too important in Turkey's agenda as it ranked in the last position, though it is a bit unexpected especially given the fact that Turkey is located in a region which has become infamous with unending conflicts. However, relative secrecy of data and information might be lying behind such low occurrences of

¹⁵ Turkey's allocation of ODA to Syria in the form of humanitarian aid has been constantly increasing since 2010.

‘security’ frame. For example, as reported in one report, legislators question the lack of data regarding the use of ODA and TIKa for the security purposes (TBMM, 2018b).

These figures and changes in the frames can be explained by the three major phases of the Turkish ODA between 2003 and 2019: ‘restructuring phase’ from 2003 to 2005, ‘proactive phase’ from 2006 to 2011, and ‘reactive phase’ from 2012 onwards.

3.2 Restructuring Phase of Turkish ODA

The sharp increase in total ODA between 2003 and 2005 is from \$ 73.02 million to \$ 488.13 million that such an increase can be explained by the moment that TIKa was restructured and redefined based on TFP objectives determined by the AKP elites and by the following capacity development process through which TIKa has begun to collect data for the expansion of Turkish development assistance policy (Ferreiro, 2017). This process in the first phase has also included standardization of Turkish ODA, which brought Turkey’s harmonization of its development assistance program with the OECD DAC’s rules in terms of data gathering, classification of the assistance, and reporting (Ipek, 2015, p.179). An electronic data gathering program has been initiated under TIKa. This program has gathered data not only of TIKa itself but also of other relief agencies including The Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), and Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs. By this means, the lack of data on development assistance and underreporting has been largely eliminated and international standard has been substantially fulfilled (TBMM, 2014b).

However, the tangible results of such restructuring was reflected to legislative debates only in 2005 that aforementioned above 2003 and 2004 were not really productive in terms of debates at the TBMM and of the number of frames occurred. While the number of frames occurred in 2003 and 2004 were only 3 in total (two for ‘economic interests’ and one for ‘obligation’), with the restructuring of TIKa and concomitant rising awareness on the part of legislators, the number of occurrences rose up to 22 total in 2005.

Although restructuring is not reflected to debates immediately, behind the scenes restructuring with respect to policy-action was being done from 2003 onwards. This became evident when opening out to Africa region was included in the agenda of TFP and TİKA. By following footsteps of the emerging economic powers of the early 2000s like China and Brazil, Turkey has turned its face towards Africa region. A strategy prepared by the Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade; 'The Development of the Economic Relations with African Countries' was adopted in 2003, which was followed by the declaration of 2005 as the 'Year of Africa' by Turkey. In the same year, Turkey gained the observer status in the Africa Union (AU). The reflection of these initiatives led to increase total Turkish ODA disbursements to Africa from \$ 0.2 million in 2003 to \$ 9.55 million in 2005, multiplying more than 47 just in 3 years, though the amounts were still low.

The bilateral ODA disbursed during 'restructuring period' from 2003 to 2005 (included) was \$ 732.28 million in aggregated total, of which around 74.8% (\$ 548.35 million) was dispersed to Asia region, mainly to South and Central Asian countries including Turkic Republics and others that Turkey shares history, language, ethnicity, culture, and religion (OECD, 2020c). These countries were mainly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Georgia, and Tajikistan, and they consisted of 65.82% of total Asia (OECD, 2020c). This is in line with the most prominent frame appeared at the TBMM; 'obligation' which takes 28% of aggregated total between 2003 and 2005 (included) (OECD, 2020c).

Similarly, positive correlation between 'obligation' frame and official ODA data is evident in specific to Balkan countries, Europe region. Turkey's bilateral ODA disbursed to Europe region was \$111.41 million, 15.2% of aggregated bilateral total between 2003 and 2005 (included) (OECD, 2020c). The 70% of \$111.41 million ODA disbursed to Europe was allocated to Balkan countries that share history, language, ethnicity, culture, and religion with Turkey. These countries included Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Ex-Yugoslavian states from Balkans (OECD, 2020c).

‘Altruistic/developmental’, ‘image/prestige’, and ‘economic interest’ frames appear frequently during this phase, all taking 16% share of total separately in the years between 2003 and 2005 (included) (Table 5 in appendix). Concerning ‘altruistic/developmental’ motives of Turkish ODA, it is argued that Turkey should aim to improve the economic development and life standards of not only the countries that Turkey has proximity in many aspects but also of other countries that are belong to LDCs and LMICs echelon. This broad inclusion applies as well to ‘image/prestige’ frame. It is explicitly stated during the debates that TIKA and Turkey should be present not only in Turkic Republics but also in others in order to represent Turkey and Turkish people by increasing the Turkey’s prestige and drawing a better donor image and an influential actor in the eyes of international community (TBMM, 2005a, p.407).

As to the ‘economic interest’, as mentioned above, most speakers did not explicitly refer to what constitutes Turkey’s economic interests behind ODA allocation. Yet, Onur Öymen raised questions over the negotiations with Croatia concerning free trade and customs unions agreements in which he implicitly referred that TIKA, as being an agency already operating in Croatia, should be more influential in the development of economic relations and signing of these agreements with Croatia as well as other Balkan countries in the future (TBMM, 2003a, p.34-35). The ‘influence’ frame ranks in 5th by only taking 12% of aggregated total for the years between 2003 and 2005 (included) (Table 5 in appendix). It is mostly related with the Turkey’s geostrategic interests of deepening and enhancing economic, political and diplomatic power projection capacity of Turkey in the Turkic Republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia and in the Balkan countries (TBMM, 2003a; 2005a; Köstem, 2019).

Lastly, ‘security’ and ‘humanitarianism’ are also the frames that showed up during the ‘restructuring’ phase of Turkish ODA. Though limited in number of occurrences, and thus having the lowest shares in total between 2003 and 2005 (with 4% and 8% respectively) (Table 5 in appendix), ‘security’ and ‘humanitarianism’ are largely related with the 9/11 and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by the US. Turkish ODA to

Afghanistan has aimed not only ensuring security for the country and the region but also to provide humanitarian aid for Afghan people after invasion (TBMM, 2005a).

In a nutshell, during the 'restructuring' phase of Turkish ODA, the frames occurred at the TBMM and the official ODA data of Turkey were positively correlated with each other. While TIKA, as being main implementer of ODA provision, has provided most of development assistance to the Caucasus and Central Asian countries and Balkan countries having the main motives of 'obligation', 'altruistic/developmental' and 'image/prestige', as a part of restructuring, TIKA has become active in Africa. Additionally, Turkey has provided ODA to Afghanistan for the purpose of security and humanitarianism.

3.3 Proactive Phase of Turkish ODA

Between 2006 and 2011 Turkey's ODA continues to increase progressively as a result of the use of ODA proactively and the expansion of the role of development assistance in advancing TFP interests abroad. The total ODA disbursed in 2006 was \$ 566 million, of which \$ 509.26 million allocated bilaterally to developing countries, whereas this amount increased to around \$ 812 billion in 2011, of which \$ 782.15 million bilaterally delivered to developing countries (OECD, 2020c). Between 2006 and 2011 (included), the aggregated total of Turkey's ODA disbursed to developing countries was around \$3.1 billion; 77.46% to Asia, 12.34% to Europe, 9.57% to Africa, 0.5% to America, and 0.01% to Oceania in total (OECD, 2020c).

In Asia, South and Central Asian countries received 70% of total Asia, whereas the Middle East region was allocated 26.62% of total Asia (OECD, 2020c). The rest was disbursed to other sub-regions included in Asia total according to OECD dataset (OECD, 2020c). A country specific look in Asia shows that Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Georgia, and Tajikistan from South and Central Asia, and Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and West Bank and Gaza Strip from the Middle East are the main receivers of Turkish ODA. These 14 countries accounted for around \$ 2 billion of total between 2006 and 2011 (OECD, 2020c). Among these

countries, the concentration was more on Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Iraq and West Bank and Gaza Strip as their shares were more than the others (OECD, 2020c).

Concerning Europe region (particularly Balkans), the regional share in total ODA decreased to around 12.3% of total, which was slightly more than 15% of total during the 'restructuring' phase (OECD, 2020c). This decline was also reflected in the number of Turkish ODA recipients. Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Kosovo appeared as the main recipients in terms of amount of ODA. Similar to 'restructuring phase', the amount of ODA allocation to these Balkan countries that Turkey shares proximity in terms of linguistic, ethnicity, and historical and cultural ties is positively correlated with the 'obligation' frame, which was the most prominent between 2005 and 2011 accounting for 27.55 % of total 98 frames occurred within this time period.

In addition to Turkey's obligation to provide ODA to the countries in Balkans and in Asia that have 'common cultural values and language' (TBMM, 2007a, p.230), their economic and social development and independence was another motive behind the provision of ODA, highlighting 'altruistic/developmental' frame, which accounted for 24.5% of 98 total in this period (TBMM, 2007a, p.230; 2008; 2009a; 2010a; 2010b; 2011a). For example, among these countries, as stated by the minister of state Beşir Atalay, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were targeted for 'altruistic/developmental' motives.

Specifically, contribution to global public goods (e.g. international stability and security), post-conflict state building, and technical assistance for peace keeping in these countries were the main arguments highlighted in his speech and others' speeches (TBMM, 2007a, p.230; 2008; 2009a; 2010a). These speeches are also reflected in the sectoral distribution of Turkish ODA. As explained in the previous chapter based on a consensus reached in the literature, 'altruistic/developmental' aid motive is positively correlated with the distribution of ODA into the 'social infrastructure and services' and 'economic infrastructure and services'. The

prominence of 'altruistic/developmental' frame in Turkish case is also positively correlated with sectoral distribution of ODA that between 2006 and 2011 50% of Turkish ODA was provided to these two sectors (Figure 3 above).

The total share of Africa region during this phase was 9.57% of total, considerably higher than its share during the 'restructuring' phase, which was around 1.8% of total (OECD, 2020c). It seems that the 3% decrease in Europe region meant increase for Africa region. Except Capo Verde, all African countries including North and Sub-Saharan ones have received Turkish ODA between 2006 and 2011, though the amount of ODA allocated to most of African countries have been really low (OECD, 2020c). Turkey's ODA allocation to Africa during this period was squeezed into few countries, implying limited deployable capacity of Turkey but also a strategy to increase its political & diplomatic influence as explained previously. The main African recipients of Turkish ODA during this phase were Somalia, Sudan, Libya, and Ethiopia which consisted around 60% of total ODA disbursed to Africa between 2006 and 2011.

This substantial increase in amount of ODA allocated to Africa region can be mainly explained by the Turkey's quest for more active role in global governance based on TFP interests and investment opportunities that African countries provide as the minister of state Beşir Atalay explicitly mentioned (TBMM, 2007a, p229-230). Turkey, as a country relatively doing better in economy, ruled by a single majority party recently consolidated its political power, and substantially lost its chance to become the EU member after the stalemate, has begun to pursue proactive engagement in the international organizations (IOs), mainly the UN and its bodies, by proactively participating the meetings, trying to set the agenda, and thus seeking for making its presence felt in the global scene. Regarding this for example, the Prime Minister Davutoğlu, whom said to be the main architect of TFP, stated in 2011 that;

We think that in the UN there should be a much more participatory political order, a much more justice-oriented and economic order and a much more inclusive cultural order....Turkey wants to play a much bigger role in the United Nations. (MFA, 2011)

‘African opening out’ initiated in 2003 was a crucial part of this proactive engagement in the IOs by Turkey. It is not a mystery that in order to be proactive in the IOs, especially in the UN, getting the support of Africans and the AU as representing substantial proportion of world population, is highly significant. However, in order for getting support of a continent, one should ‘influence’ the countries and leaders located in that continent. This is what Turkey did during this period. In order to acquire the UNSC non-permanent membership seat for 2009-2010, as ministers of state Beşir Atalay, Faruk Çelik, and Mustafa Said Yazıcıoğlu explicitly stated, Turkey used its development assistance and TİKA as a foreign policy tool and for lobbying activities to create an influence on African countries and poured significant amount of ODA into all African countries except one (TBMM, 2007a, p.228; 2008; p.332; 2009a). Although, the influence was primarily put on countries in the Africa region, some other countries from different regions including Asia and Europe were also targeted for the same purpose (TBMM, 2007a; 2009a; 2010a). This very much explains the positive correlation between ODA data and ‘influence’ frame occurred during this period.

The share of ‘influence’ frame is 17% of total between 2006 and 2011 (Table 6 in appendix). Just before Turkey’s candidacy for the UNSC non-permanent membership seat for 2009-2010, the number of occurrences rises and the speeches delivered at the TBMM explicitly refer to the link between the acquiring the seat and the ODA towards Africans (TBMM, 2007a; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2010a). Additionally, the use of cultural diplomacy as a part of ‘influence’ appears also what Turkey sought to achieve during this phase (TBMM, 2007a; 2008; 2009; 2010a).

Along with ‘influence’, Turkey’s ‘economic’ (11.22% of total 98) and ‘image/prestige’ (12.24% of total 98) considerations were amongst the motives behind ODA poured into Africa region. While ‘economic interests’ were mainly highlighted as investment and natural resource opportunities in African countries and the creation or completion of industrial sites in the recipients that Turkey could take economic advantage of (TBMM, 2007a; 2008, p.332), the ‘image/prestige’ considerations mostly embodied in ODA

provision to Somalia, which received the largest Turkish ODA in Africa during this period. The economic interests became evident in the sectoral distribution of ODA that between 2006 and 2011 Turkey's ODA allocation to 'production sector', which includes activities like industrial sites in the recipients, accounted for 4.7% of Turkish ODA; which was 0.20% during 'restructuring phase' (Figure 3 above).

Moreover, the special Turkish interest in Somalia was mainly connected to what 'image/prestige' Turkey will potentially present to the international community. While many traditional Western DAC donors have been stepping and pooling out resources from Somalia, by being actively present in Somalia Turkey has demonstrated its 'benevolent' face and advertised itself as the brother of 'Third World' (TBMM, 2007a; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2010a; 2010b; Tank, 2013, Ferreiro, 2017).

Just as in 'restructuring phase' of Turkish ODA, 'security' (2% of 98 total) and 'humanitarianism' (5.1% of 98 total) frames ranks at the bottom during this phase (Table 6 in appendix). The number of occurrences of 'humanitarianism' frame is highly correlated with the official data in terms of their shares in relevant totals that the Turkish humanitarian aid accounted for 14% of aggregated total ODA between 2006 and 2011. The humanitarian activities in this phase mainly included response to the Lebanon humanitarian crisis began in 2006, to the Syrian refugee crisis (only in 2011), to Afghanistan, to West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as to few African countries, whose names are not often explicitly mentioned in the documents (TBMM, 2007a; 2008; 2009a; 2009b). Concerning 'security' frame, same issues highlighted during the first phase were also evident during 'proactive phase', however, in addition these, the economic and social cooperation with Turks abroad and related communities were also often argued as a part of national security of Turkey (TBMM, 2009b, p.59).

All in all, during the 'proactive phase' of Turkish ODA, Turkey has extensively used the ODA and TIKa as foreign policy tools based on TFP interests abroad. These interests mainly consisted of keeping and protecting Turks abroad and related communities in the South and Central Asia and in Balkans through the economic and social

cooperation, and of more active role in the global governance through IOs. Seeking more active role in global governance embodied in deployment of ODA and TIKa to Africa; mainly for 'political & diplomatic influence' purposes to acquire the UNSC non-permanent membership seat. 'Economic interests' and 'image/prestige' considerations in Africa followed the 'political & diplomatic influence' motivation of Turkey. Just like previous phase, 'security' and 'humanitarianism' have not been prominent in the motivations of Turkish ODA as both official data and frames showed. In this regard, it can be safely argued that Turkey has been largely able to use its limited amount of ODA proactively. However, things have changed in the third phase of Turkish ODA as explained in the next sub-section.

3.4 Reactive Phase of Turkish ODA

From 2012 onwards, Turkey's ODA has risen progressively; from around \$ 1.6 billion in 2012 to more than \$ 8.75 billion in 2019. The number of projects completed just in 2018 accounted for approximately 2000, which is almost same with the number of all projects done during the 'restructuring phase'. Between 2012 and 2019 (included), Turkey has provided approximately \$ 39 billion ODA; \$ 38 billion to developing countries (OECD, 2020c). However, 'humanitarian aid' has consisted majority of the total Turkish ODA, \$ 31.6 billion and 81% of aggregated total between 2012 and 2019 (included) during the 'reactive phase' (Figure 8 below). This was primarily as a result of Syrian refugee crisis out broke in 2011 and concomitant high influx of refugees coming into Turkey.¹⁶

This also explains the change in the sectoral distribution of Turkish ODA towards humanitarian aid (Figure 3 above). Between the year 2003 and 2011, Turkish ODA was fundamentally provided to 'social infrastructure and services', particularly areas

¹⁶ The most of ODA, in the form of humanitarian assistance, allocated to Syria and Syrian refugees can be classified under 'in-donor refugee costs in ODA', meaning that the amounts are actually delivered to the recognized refugees who are residing in Turkey whose protection is legally ensured by international legal definitions. Cost items for reportable ODA in this kind include only temporary sustenance like shelter, food, and training, and exclude costs for integrating refugees in donor country's economy (OECD, 2020e).

including health, education, and government and civil society, to 'production sectors' linked to trade regulations and industrial sites, and to 'economic infrastructure and services' in which aid was evenly disbursed to transportation and communications areas (OECD, 2020b). Yet, from 2012 onwards, humanitarian aid takes the top position in sectoral distribution of Turkey's ODA.




Figure 8: Turkey's ODA Total and Humanitarian Assistance total, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.

By regional distribution of Turkey's ODA, between 2012 and 2018 (included) Asia has surpassed all other regions, accounting for 88.2% of total ODA disbursed to developing countries, of which 92% of total Asia went to the Middle East and 89.3% of provided only to Syria (Figure 9 below). Aside from Syria, other Asian countries (including the Middle Eastern countries) receiving significant amount of Turkish ODA were Afghanistan, Iraq, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan, though their shares in total Asia accounted only for 5.2% of total Asia. As to the other regions, while Africa's share amounted 3.43%, most of it (55.3%) going solely to Somalia, Europe's share was only 3.25% of total ODA disbursed to developing

countries. Around 45% of total ODA disbursed to Europe was allocated to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia just as in the previous phases.

However, Turkey's reaction to the crisis in Syria leads the official ODA figures to be artificially high, and thus, non-reflective of the real motivations of Turkey's ODA during this phase. In order to avoid potentially ill-understood motivations of Turkey's ODA during the reactive phase, mainly because of the disbursements to Syria, a figure that demonstrates Turkey's total bilateral ODA to developing countries without Syria flows is created (Figure 10 below). This figure will help us to realize more accurate numbers and motivations of Turkey's development assistance and to solidify the argument presented in this thesis.




Figure 9: Turkey's ODA to Syrian Arab Republic in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.




Figure 10: Turkey's Bilateral ODA to Developing Countries (Syria Excluded), in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.

As Figure 10 illustrates above, Turkey's bilateral ODA (total net) to developing countries are considerably moderate and not constantly increasing without disbursements to Syria¹⁷. Except 2018, Turkey's bilateral assistance to developing countries with Syria excluded does not exceed a billion dollar, whereas from 2012 onwards the ODA figures of Turkey with Syria included are at least one and a half billion dollar (Figure 1 above). Although Turkey's development assistance delivered to Syria cannot be ignored, the question here is that would Turkey have allocated around \$ 23 billion to Syria (or to other countries and regions) between 2011 and 2018, if the Syria crisis had not broken out.

Answering this question is a pure projection, but by reviewing the path that TIKA has taken since its key moments; when it was established in 1992 and when it was begun to be restructured in 2003, the answer would be no. Turkey would not probably have spent billions of dollar (neither) for Syria (nor for any other country and any region), if the crisis had not broken out, because no point of time in TIKA's history or Turkey's

¹⁷ To view Turkey's Total ODA (Syria Excluded) and Bilateral ODA (Syria Excluded) in the same graph for 2003 to 2018, please see Figure 18 in Appendix.

path in development cooperation a single country has received the attention that Syria has received.

Turkey's such reactionary attitude towards Syria crisis is reflected in the relationship between frames occurred and the official ODA data. Unlike the previous phases, incompatibility between frames and the official ODA data is observed in this phase. As the Turkey's ODA became reactive to respond the Syrian refugee crisis, policy directives concerning development assistance were substantially overshadowed by the assistance delivered to Syria. Although 'humanitarian aid' constituted 81% of total ODA between 2012 and 2018, the share of frame 'humanitarianism' is only 10.38% of total in the same time period (11 occurrences out of 106 in the reactive phase of Turkish ODA, see Table 7 in appendix). Similar inconsistency is also evident in the speakers' reference to Syria that during the debates Syria was not often mentioned despite its prominent share in Turkey's ODA between 2012 and 2018.

Yet, when bilateral ODA allocated to Syria is excluded from the official ODA data, observed incompatibility is eliminated to an important extent, which also solidifies the main argument of this thesis. With Syria excluded flows, during the reactive phase, the share of Asia total decreases to 57.8 % of total bilateral aid to developing countries, whereas Europe total and Africa total increase respectively to 19.9% and 21% of total bilateral aid delivered to developing countries. The shares of America total and Oceania total rise respectively up to 1.2% and 0.4%. These adjusted regional shares are more or less similar to the shares observed in two other phases of Turkey's ODA, and the occurrences of each frame appear quite compatible with the Syria excluded adjusted ODA figures.

The most referred frame in this phase is again 'obligation' constituting 30.2% of total with 32 reference out of 106 (Table 7 in appendix). This is the highest percentage that obligation frame has taken in all three phases. Just like previous phases, same countries from Central and South Asia and from Balkans that share proximity to Turkey and have large Turkish/Turkic populations within their borders have been often mentioned.

However, the type of references made by legislators to these countries is different from the previous phases, which can potentially explain one of the main reasons of the highest share that ‘obligation’ frame takes in addition to the fact that this phase is the longest one of all. Unlike the other phases in which references to these countries have been done in the form of policy direction by specifying a clear goal to provide ODA, during the ‘reactive phase’ these references have been mostly replaced with the explicit criticisms towards Turkey’s decreasing presence in these countries in terms of the amount of ODA and number of recipients. For example in 2014, the Member of Parliament Mr. Reşat Doğru has criticized lowering level of Turkish ODA in Kyrgyzstan, East Turkistan, Crimea, and Azerbaijan and asked the government for more ODA in these countries/regions and Turkish population living inside them (TBMM, 2014a, p.324-325). Similar critics and calls were made in 2016 and in 2017 respectively by the Members of Parliament Mr. Mevlüt Dudu and Mr. İsmet Büyükataman. Mr. Mevlüt Dudu highlighted Turkmens living in Iraq and Syria as well as those living in Greece and Bulgaria (TBMM, 2016a, p.378-380), whereas Mr. İsmet Büyükataman in 2017 mentioned Turkistan, Caucasus, Balkans, and Turkmens living in Iraq and Syria (TBMM, 2017a, p.296).

‘Altruistic/developmental’ is the second-ranked frame in this phase having 22.6% of total with 24 occurrences (Table 7 in appendix). Likewise other phases, most of references were made to Turkey’s contribution to overall Global Public Goods including peace and stability, environmental standards, health and pandemics as well as to enhancement of economic and social development in the recipient countries, especially in those that Turkey is close in terms of history, culture, language, religion, and ethnicity. For instance, in terms of Turkey’s contribution to economic development of the recipients, the initiated projects over fishery, agriculture and technical training in some countries like Niger, Gambia, and Sudan are mentioned (TBMM, 2016a, p.408).

‘Influence’ and ‘image/prestige’ frames rank third and fourth by respectively taking the share of 14.15% and 13.21% (Table 7 in appendix). The latter is often mentioned as complementary to the former. For example, during the debates, speakers often argue

how Turkey uses ODA and TIKa as 'cultural diplomacy' tool by potentially influencing the recipient government and creating a positive 'image' on the part of recipients. The countries that referred by the speakers for these motivations were those that Turkey is 'obliged' to provide aid either because of the proximity aforementioned above or due to the felt 'obligation' under 'solidarity with the Third World' and 'responsibility as a rich country' (TBMM, 2012a; 2013a; 2013b; 2014a; 2016a; 2017a; 2018a; 2019a). Lastly, 'economic interest' and 'security' frames rank at the bottom as in the other phases; respectively constituting 7.55% and 1.89% of total (Table 7 in appendix). While the 'security' frame have been largely non-existed except two occurrences, one in 2017 and in 2018, 'economic interests' behind ODA allocation were shallowly discussed without specifying clear motive like 'trade' or 'natural resources'.

In a nutshell, from 2012 onwards, Turkey's ODA became reactive to the regional crisis out broke in the immediate neighborhood; Syria. Increased amounts in ODA are fundamentally as a result of the humanitarian crisis on the Syria border and Turkey's need to manage the incoming refugee flow. The reflection of this is evident in the correlation between the official ODA figures and frames occurred at the parliament. While 81% of total ODA since 2012 has been provided as 'humanitarian aid' and mainly to Syria, neither 'humanitarianism' frame nor Syria have been referred to as much in the legislative debates showing that Turkey has been largely unable to pursue its policy objectives concerning development assistance. Despite preponderance of other frames as compared to 'humanitarianism', Turkish ODA was largely concentrated on 'humanitarian aid'. However, when Syria and the bilateral flows poured to Syria are excluded from the official ODA data, low correlation and observed incompatibility largely evaporates and frames and the official ODA (with Syria excluded) appear compatible with each other just as two other phases of Turkey's ODA. Another explaining reason for low correlation between frames and ODA data can be Turkey's transition to presidential system, which has pooled significant proportion of political power at the hand of country's president and largely made parliament and its members inactive in all levels of policy-making. But, this requires an extensive further research.

3.5 Characterizing Turkey's ODA behavior: A Hybrid Model Oscillating between DAC and SSDC

Among the three categorization of non-DAC aid providers as discussed in chapter 2, Turkey is more close to 'emerging donors' category as far as the some modalities of Turkish ODA and the relations with the DAC and the EU are concerned and to the extent its institutional structure, type of projects conducted and motives behind ODA provision demonstrate. However, this should not be simplified as Turkey belongs to emerging donor category since Turkey's model is actually a hybrid one carrying few characteristics of 'South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) providers as well.

On the one side, Turkey and its ODA program show commitment to the global consensus on aid delivery and effectiveness established by the DAC. Turkey participates in key structures of the global aid governance and holds observer status in OECD DAC since 1991. In fact, Turkey has already fulfilled criteria to become a full DAC member, and offers have been directly made by the OECD to register Turkey as DAC member, as articulated by minister of state Bekir Bozdağ (TBMM, 2012a; p.318; 2013c, p.404). As far as the legislative debates at TBMM are considered, the ministers of state explicitly mention that Turkey's ODA program is implemented in convenience with 'international standards' (TBMM, 2005a, p.432; 2006a, p. 393; 2007b, p.94) by having modalities of traditional donors, following UN goals and OECD DAC rules (TBMM, 2009b, p.58; 2010b, p.5), and complying with the EU standards as a candidate country (TBMM, 2007a, p.228).

To start with the modalities of Turkish ODA, just like many other traditional/DAC donors, the most significant form of Turkey's support is 'project type assistance', the share of which varies from at least 50% to 94% of total ODA flows (OECD, 2020a). Although the size of projects vary widely in terms of amount of ODA, most of the undertakings are small projects rather than comprehensive development programs. Training and advisory services in the area of capacity building takes an important place in Turkey's ODA program just as financing of infrastructure which is a part of many

projects Turkey undertakes. In terms of other in-donor expenditures, disbursements for refugees in donor country have taken relatively important share between 2008 and 2016, which has risen especially after 2011 as a result of the Syrian Civil War. However, from 2016 onwards, after the signing of migration deal with the EU its share has begun to decrease. Moreover, Turkey's support is often structured around grants with a co-financing components attached to them either in cash or contributions from the recipient country, though whose contributions are rather small.

In terms of the design and implementation of ODA, Turkey operates with a 'whole government approach' – a model also used by France and South Korea – in which sectoral ministries are heavily involved in all stages of the project management cycle (Ferreiro, 2017). Just as other traditional/DAC donors, the institutionalization of Turkish ODA embodies with an official state institution named TIKA, which is positioned under the Office of the Presidency and Ministry of Culture and Tourism and operates in coordination with other departments and relief agencies being responsible for more than 90% of Turkey's ODA. TIKA is highly integrated in the decision-making processes of the government. While this feature on the one hand brings high policy coherence with other foreign policy objectives and the use of aid as a significant public diplomacy tool by the government, on the other hand it hampers the organizational independence of TIKA, especially when it comes to identifying policy priorities.

Concerning the relations with the EU, Turkey is subjected to comply with EU *Acquis Communautaire* as a candidate country just like two thirds of DAC donors. Although 'international development cooperation' has not often seen as a 'deal breaker' by the academia since it has not constituted a separate pillar in the EU *Acquis* (Olsen, 2005; Vittek & Lightfoot, 2009), Lightfoot (2010) shows in his detailed work that the EU has actually this particular policy area on the accession agenda and compliance of both candidate and member states are monitored in the EU *Acquis* under policy chapter 'External Relations'. Progress of each country is evaluated in 'Progress Reports' annually. Principles and details concerning what are the EU standards and how to comply with them are outlined in EU Commission Reports like 2003 Monitoring Report

and 2005 Finance for Development paper as well as other reports including Agenda 2000, European Consensus on Development in 2005, and Monterrey Conference in 2002 (Lightfoot, 2010).

Monterrey Conference in 2002 and 2005 Finance for Development paper by European Commission set the threshold for 'the quantity of aid' for both candidate and member states. While this threshold is set for old members (EU-15) as 0.56% ODA/GNI ratio by 2010 and 0.7% by 2015, new and candidate states are required to reach 0.17% ODA/GNI ratio by 2010 and 0.33% by 2015 (European Commission, 2006; Vittek & Lightfoot, 2009; Lightfoot, 2010). Second EU standard, 'regional focus and the goals of aid' is determined by the European Consensus on Development in 2005 as elimination of poverty in the recipient countries, particularly in LDCs and LMICs from ACP countries (European Commission, 2006; Lightfoot, 2010, p.339-340). As to the last standard, a proper 'the institutional set-up' that would embrace '3Cs' principle (complementarity, coherence, coordination) in donor countries is asked by the EU.

Despite these standards, however, the EU display looseness in terms of 'regional focus and the goals of aid' and 'the institutional set-up'. A clear reference to ACP countries as beneficiary/recipient countries in the EU documents does not simply restrict regional focus that as long as substantial amount of any increase in ODA compared to last year is allocated to Africans as well as to LDCs and LMICs, the EU standard concerning 'regional focus and the goals of aid' indicator is considered as fulfilled by the EU (European Parliament, 2007; Lightfoot, 2010). Similar looseness is also evident in 'institutional set-up' indicator prior to accession period. For candidate countries, the Commission keeps its demands minimal and largely disregards embracement of '3Cs' principle by looking only for the existence of an official institutional and administrative structure that has a specific ODA strategy and composes annual reports showing its activities and strategies for the next term (Lightfoot, 2010, p.343).

In terms of Turkey's compliance with the EU standards on development cooperation, these three indicators sought by the EU are largely fulfilled. First, Turkey performed

well enough to meet the EU threshold for ‘the quantity of aid’ through ODA/GNI ratio by achieving threshold before the deadline in 2015 (Figure 2 above). Second, although at first glance Turkey’s regional focus shows a deviation from what the EU asks, the EU is loose in this indicator. As long as disbursements target LDCs and LMICs, among which African countries takes a share in every increase in total ODA of the donor, the EU considers this indicator as fulfilled (Lightfoot, 2010). Lastly, the existence of TIKA and its specific ODA strategy and composition of annual reports showing its activities and strategies for the next term qualify Turkey to fulfill the EU standard in the last indicator as well. Turkey’s compliance with the EU standards about development assistance is also evident in Turkey’s Progress Reports (Table 4 below). From 2005 onwards, Turkey’s level of alignment with the EU’s standards is on positive trajectory and no modification concerning compliance has been asked. A reference to Turkey’s positive progress was made between 2006 and 2012 (see Table 4). After “considerable improvement” in 2006, from 2007 onwards Turkey’s level of alignment was evaluated as “satisfactory”. And, reports in 2015 and 2016 have made a direct reference to Turkey’s ODA/GNI ratio showing its compliance with the EU standard.

Table 4: European Commission's Progress Reports for Turkey between 2005 and 2018. Data Source: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The table is created by the author.

European Commission's Progress Reports on Turkey, 2005-2018	
2005	No new figures are available on development aid and humanitarian aid. Turkey, has however, provided some humanitarian assistance (European Commission, 2005, p.126-127).
2006	In the field of development policy and humanitarian aid, some progress was made. Overall, Turkey's level of alignment with the EC's development and humanitarian aid policy improved considerably (European Commission, 2006, p.71).
2007	Turkey's level of alignment in the field of development and humanitarian aid policy is satisfactory (European Commission, 2007a, p.73).
2008	In the field of development policy and humanitarian aid, some progress has been made. Turkey's level of alignment remains satisfactory in this field (European Commission, 2008, p.81).
2009	Turkey made some progress in the fields of development policy and humanitarian aid. The level of alignment has remained satisfactory in this field (European Commission, 2009, p.85).
2010	Turkey made some progress in the field of development policy and humanitarian aid. The level of alignment has remained satisfactory in this field (European Commission, 2010, p.95).
2011	Turkey made some progress in the field of development policy and humanitarian aid. The total amount of official development aid granted by Turkey in 2010 was about € 730 million, reaching approximately 0.15 ODA/GNI. The level of alignment in this field remained satisfactory (European Commission, 2011, p.106).
2012	Turkey made some progress in the field of development policy and humanitarian aid. The level of alignment in this field remained satisfactory (European Commission, 2012, p.87).
2013	The level of alignment in this field is satisfactory (European Commission, 2013, p.74).
2014	The level of alignment in this field is satisfactory (European Commission, 2014, p.74).
2015	In the fields of development policy and humanitarian aid, the total amount of official development aid granted by Turkey reached EUR 2.8 billion or 0.46% of ODA/GNI in 2014. Most of this was for Syria related action (European Commission, 2015, p.81).
2016	As for development policy and humanitarian aid, official development aid granted by Turkey stood at EUR 2.8 billion or 0.46% of ODA/GNI in 2015, mostly on Syria-related activities (European Commission, 2016, p.91).
2018	As for development policy and humanitarian aid, official development aid granted by Turkey increased to EUR 5.3 billion or 0.8 % of ODA/GNI in 2016 (European Commission, 2018, p.95).

In this regard, as far as the few modalities of Turkish ODA and Turkey's formal alignment with the global agenda on aid delivery and effectiveness and compliance with three EU standards are concerned, it can be argued that Turkey displays traditional/DAC donor behavior to some extent. However, beyond these Turkey's ODA program has important elements from SSDC providers.

Among these, first Turkey's aid highly coherent with and driven largely by TFP objectives. Second, the relationships Turkey established with the recipients are in most cases highly political and based on project identification through high level political dialogue, which is contrary to most of traditional donors who establish the relations with beneficiaries through technical process of alignment. Similarly, Turkey establishes relationships with beneficiaries horizontally and 'peer-based' in which 'mutual accountability' is ensured through putting mutual advantage and benefits at the backbone of all projects. This feature of Turkish ODA is evident in projects done especially in Africa and Central Asia where Turkey fully respects to the national sovereignty of the recipient, eschews political conditionality, and defines benefits explicitly at the outset of the relationship. In addition to these, loans are not prominent feature of Turkish ODA though the use of concessional lending appears occasionally as evident in support to Egypt in and Tunisia in 2012 (Ferreiro, 2017).

Budget support is not preferred by Turkey for the implementation of ODA. It does not appear in Turkish ODA for the most of years. Since 2003 only in four years budget support has been made by Turkey and the total amount has been considerably low; almost \$ 233 million of total ODA between 2003 and 2019. Lastly, just like many SSDC providers, Turkey prefers to maintain relations bilaterally rather than the use of multilateral framework and aims to deliver ODA quickly and at low cost, and thus to minimize any burden while delivering the ODA. For example, with respect to administration costs and in donor management expenditures, Turkey keeps the rates reasonably low, often between 2% and 4% of total ODA, whereas in most traditional/DAC donors same rates considerably higher.

By drawing and implementing this kind of hybrid model, Turkey seems to achieve two non-complementary dimensions/objectives/policy goals at the same time. First, by adopting characteristics of traditional donors and showing commitment to global aid regime, Turkey appears along with the West and thus avoid criticisms of the West; and complies with the EU on one important policy area as a candidate country. Second, by not becoming a member of DAC and adopting few characteristics of SSDC providers Turkey avoids risks that would inevitably draw itself as a Western donor and would hamper Turkey's leverage in the eyes of Third World.

This hybridity in implementation of Turkish development assistance program abroad is also in line with the main motives of Turkish ODA from 2003 to 2019. Just as traditional/DAC donors and those non-DAC donors like CEECs¹⁸ whose models are similar to the traditional DAC donors, Turkey makes its presence felt in the regions and countries that historically have proximity to Turkey like Balkans or like Turkic Republics in Central and South Asia by providing aid with motivation of 'obligation'. Among traditional/DAC donors, such 'obligation' embodies in colonial relationship and colonial background; and in Turkey's case it takes its origins from the legacy of Ottoman Empire. This does not simply mean that 'obligation' motive is peculiar to just traditional donors; thus, does not apply as well to non-DAC donors like SSDC providers. Nevertheless, the latter in most cases does not have a colonizer role in their history and the nature of obligation motive in non-DAC donors is likely to vary from traditional donors. That is to say that while obligation motive comes as a result of shared features between donors and recipients in most of traditional donors' cases, when it comes to the most of non-DAC donors, especially those which lack colonizer history, obligation motive is more likely to come under 'solidarity with the Third World', or 'a felt responsibility under South-South Cooperation' or simply 'a sense of responsibility as a rich country'.

¹⁸ Concerning more information on non-DAC EU member emerging donors, Lightfoot (2009; 2010) can be visited.

As shown above, though limited in numbers and not reflecting the general picture of obligation motive of Turkey, this sort of ‘obligation’ motives have been articulated at the TBMM. For example, there have been speeches framed through obligation to provide ODA towards Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan, West Bank and Gaza, and Lebanon based on changing nature of TFP (TBMM, 2012a; 2013a; 2013b; 2014a; 2014b; 2016a; 2016b; 2017a; 2017b; 2018a).

Similarly, just like traditional/DAC donors, Turkey provides aid to LDCs and LMICs under ‘altruistic/developmental’, and ‘humanitarianism’ frames. On the other side, by featuring SSDC providers’ behavior, Turkey seeks ‘political and diplomatic influence’ and puts ‘image/prestige’ and ‘economic interests’ considerations at the forefront from time to time. This mostly embodies itself in regions that Turkey recently opened out; mainly Sub-Saharan Africa and limitedly Latin America region, though regions that are in Turkey’s sphere of influence based on common history are also occasionally included for image/prestige building.

CHAPTER 4

COMPARING TURKEY WITH OTHER NON-DAC DONORS IN AFRICAN CONTINENT: THE MOTIVATIONS AND PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN AND CHINESE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA

As mentioned in Chapter 2, looking at Africa for the motivations shaping aid behavior of the non-DAC donor countries is important for a number of reasons; to realize motivations that would not mostly appear in the aid allocations to the other regions because of the continent's distance to regional influence of the donors, and that would appear concomitant with the changes in foreign policy directions; to the extent that its contribution to the theoretical discussions in the literature and to the discussions pertaining to 'a new scramble for Africa'; and lastly, for the future implications concerning the existing aid architecture.

To begin with Turkey, as presented in Chapter 3, all African countries except one have received Turkish ODA between 2003 and 2019. Though moderate in aggregated numbers, by delivering ODA to all African countries except one, Turkey tries to use its limited capacity in a most efficient way for the achievements of desired foreign policy outcomes (Figure 11 below).

While discussing ‘influence’ frame in Chapter 2, it is indicated that relatively small state donors or donors with moderate state capacity, which is Turkey in this case, would deploy more concentrated development assistance by focusing on selected recipients or selected region(s), which is Africa in Turkey’s case, to achieve a greater results for the motivations driving their allocation of ODA/ODA-like flows.




Figure 11: Turkey’s bilateral ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.

The main motivations behind allocation of Turkey’s ODA to African countries are political and diplomatic influence including soft power building and image/prestige considerations, which are followed by economic interests though the latter is limited and shallowly discussed at TBMM. These motivations are the ones that either have not come out at all or occasionally appear in regard to Turkey’s aid allocations to the other regions, and thus confirm the importance of looking at Africa. Concerning political and diplomatic influence, for instance, Beşir Atalay, the minister of state in 2007, explicitly mentioned Africa’s importance as a continent having 53 countries and its concomitant importance for the international platforms such as the United Nations (TBMM, 2007a, p229-230). In line with this, it is also stated quiet often that ODA was allocated to Africa region for lobbying efforts to get the continent’s support for Turkey’s candidacy for the

UNSC non-permanent seat (TBMM, 2007a; 2007b; 2008, p.332; 2009b; p.59). Despite successful lobbying effort for the UNSC non-permanent seat, Turkey has not always succeeded in lobbying efforts as became evident in Cyprus issue. In spite of development assistance poured into Africa region, a parliamentary member from opposition party Mahmut Tanal highlights the fact that none of African countries has internationally recognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent country (TBMM, 2016a, p.508).

Beyond getting support for the UN votes, Turkish ODA was delivered to African countries for soft power purposes. All the projects done in social infrastructure and services sector in Africa have been enhancing Turkey's soft power in the region (TBMM, 2016a, p.407) and strengthening the relationships with Africans. To exemplify, African bureaucrats were brought to Turkey and trained here as part of these projects, which has eventually helped Turkey to "win Africans' hearts and minds" (TBMM, 2007a, p.226-227). Additionally, the relationships have been managed on an equal basis, according to minister of foreign affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, in turn contribute to Turkey's soft power capacity in the region (TBMM, 2017b, p.12).

Image/prestige considerations are also a part of ODA provided to Africa. Both the amount of ODA and projects done in the social infrastructure and services sector (including construction of libraries, hospitals, laboratories and clinics) have contributed to Turkey's prestige a lot in the eyes of African people as well as of Turkish people in domestic sphere (TBMM, 2007a, p. 226-227). While the Africans distancing themselves with traditional Western donors, Turkish people are loved, accepted, treated differently in Africa unlike the other 'whites' (in their expression as articulated by the ministers of state), who are basically traditional donors (TBMM, 2007a; 2007b; 2008; 2009a; 2010a; 2011a; 2013a; 2014a; 2016a). In fact, TİKA is considered by the Somalian government as "best thing ever happened to Somalian people" (TBMM, 2014a, p.300). It is also important for Turkey to make Africans to tell that a project is done by the Turkish state, as Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu stated in 2008 (TBMM, 2008, p.326-327).

Education exchange and scholarships granted to African students and Turcology departments opened in the recipients are also equally important for Turkey's image and prestige as well as soft power building as stated at TBMM (2007a, p. 232; 2008; 2009b, p.59; 2010a; 2011a; 2012a; 2013a; 2014a; 2015a). However, educational projects have been common also in other regions. Nevertheless, the minister of state Beşir Atalay underscored, for example, the contribution of education exchange, scholarships, and Turcology departments opened in the recipient African countries to Turkey's image and prestige as well as soft power. He argues that education exchange at both student and scholar levels, and African students and scholars coming to Turkey thanks to Turkey's scholarship grants are enabling Turkish language to spread across the regions, which eventually contribute to Turkey's image and prestige, and enhance soft power capacity of Turkey on the part of recipients (TBMM, 2007a, p. 232).

This motive can also be seen in official numbers that show scholarships granted to African students between 2002 and 2013¹⁹. The number of Sub-Saharan African students in Turkey were 385 in 2002, whereas this number appeared as 2931 in 2013, steadily rising from 2002 onwards and reaching the top level in 2013 (Figure 12 below). As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey revealed, the total number of scholarships granted in few years row has been around 6000 from 2013 onwards (MFA, 2020). Although this does not necessarily mean that scholarships have been granted to all Africans coming to Turkey, at least around one-third of students have received scholarship (İpek & Biltekin, 2013).

¹⁹ The official data by the Assessment Selection and Placement Center (OSYM) is only evident till 2013.




Figure 12: Number of Sub-Saharan African Students coming to Turkey between 2002 and 2013. Data and the figure are compiled by the author. Data Source: OSYM.

‘Economic interests’ are also considered while allocating ODA to Africa, though the details are not explicitly discussed or mentioned by the speakers, especially by the ministers of state and bureaucrats working at TIKA. Amongst few mentioned, increasing support of Africans for Turkish businesses in the region have been considered as a result of ODA provided to Africa²⁰ (TBMM, 2007a, p. 226-227). For example, great trade and investment opportunities that the continent provides was mentioned in one case, namely Senegal²¹ (TBMM, 2007a, p.229-230), while natural resources (TBMM, 2008, p.332), and economic cooperation (TBMM, 2009b, p.59) were also specified in framing economic interests.

²⁰ Concerning increasing support of Africans for Turkish businesses in the region, although it is explicitly mentioned by the speakers, to what extent this support has occurred and its link with the ODA provision is not explained. To establish any sort of link, I tried to track changing number of Turkish businesses operating in Africa region. Yet, as I am told by a government official working at the Ministry of Economy and Finance, most of companies operating abroad including Africa region do not register themselves to local schemes that enables one to track numbers. Therefore, the real number of Turkish companies operating in Africa is likely to be much higher than the official figures, which creates a significant problem for the potential link that I am trying to build.

²¹ To exemplify the investment opportunities, Beşir Atalay, the minister of state, mentions Senegal as a country that comes at the forefront with respect to its central transportation TBMM, 2007a, p. 229-230).

In summary, the political and diplomatic influence (including soft power building), image/prestige considerations, and economic interests are the motives that have been driving Turkey's ODA in Africa. While first two of these motivations in Africa and in overall Turkey's ODA allocation mostly enter into agenda with the change in the course of TFP, to achieve the foreign policy goals like support for the UNSC non-permanent seat, Turkey has involved in projects in social infrastructure and services sector in Africa, allocated ODA to education sector, and developed economic cooperation with Africans. As will be shown in Russia's case below, similar motives have been driving Moscow's ODA in African continent.

4.1 Russia's Development Assistance in Africa

Between 1991 and the early 2000s Russia was a net aid recipient and has not provided any sort of aid until 2001-2002 when Moscow began to write off debts lent by the USSR to African countries. The size of write-offs was so large that in 2003 Russia marked as the country that gave more debt relief in Africa than any other worldwide (Ratcliff, 2017). Russian development assistance program was initiated in 2004 through project named 'Russia as Emerging Donor', conducted jointly by the UN Development Program and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to assist Russia to establish a development assistance agency. In 2005 Russia joined the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, a fundamental international document defining the principles of development aid, which was created by the OECD. Then, Russia declared adherence to the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. It has also continued to be part of international aid commitments as being a G8 member.

The major landmark for Russian development assistance was in 2007, when President Putin signed a concept paper outlining Russia's participation in international development assistance titled; 'Russia's Participation in International Development

Assistance'²². By signing this concept paper, Russia pledged to be consonant to internationally determined motives as set out for instance in the UN with Millennium Development Goals. So, Russia committed normatively to build a stable and safe world by adhering to sustainable development which includes motives like eradication of poverty and corruption as well as ensuring democracy and human rights in the recipients (Government of Russian Federation, 2007). The first report of Russia's development assistance to the OECD was revealed in 2010 (see Figure 13). Pre-OECD reporting period, Russian ODA has been considerably low between 2004 and 2008 till its peak in 2009 reaching up to \$ 785 million, mainly because of debt reliefs (Wierzbowska-Miazga & Kaczmarek, 2011). During the OECD reporting period, Russian ODA shows a consistent increase from 2010 onwards; from \$ 426 million in 2010 to around \$ 1.1 billion in 2019 (Figure 13 below).




Figure 13: Russia's ODA Total and Bilateral ODA total in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2004 and 2019. Data and the figure are compiled by the author. Between 2004 and 2010, data is gathered from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking System²³. From 2010 onwards the OECD dataset is used.

²² Very similar concept paper was also signed in 2014. Russia's vision and the goals of aid provision shows very much resemblances to the concept paper signed in 2007.

²³ Same data and numbers are also used in the literature by at least four authors. Please see Wierzbowska-Miazga & Kaczmarek (2011), and Brezhneva & Ukhova (2013).

In terms of institutional setting of Russian development assistance, Russia is distinguished from traditional donors as well as some non-DAC donors because there is no single aid agency in Russia²⁴. In most of the donor countries, development assistance is provided by a government institution incorporated to a ministry – for example the ministry of foreign affairs or a specialized ministry. In Russia aid provision is split between the ministries of foreign affairs, finance, economic development, education and science, and civil defense and emergencies (EMERCOM) depending on the type of aid to be allocated (Brezhneva & Ukhova, 2013, p.5). For example, humanitarian assistance is solely distributed by the EMERCOM.

Russia is also distinct from BRICS members as non-DAC donors in other several ways. Rather than aligning itself under South-South Development Cooperation as its BRICS allies do, Russia sees itself as a northern power. It wishes to display its strength while helping the weak countries, and thus does not align itself with recipients. Further, it aligns itself with the OECD through several commitments as shown in concept papers.

Despite adherence to global regime and declared motivations, Russia's main purpose of providing development assistance towards developing countries worldwide is mostly self-interested; political and economic benefits. The political benefits include 'image/prestige' building and motive of 'political & diplomatic influence' by touching upon strengthening Russia's international position and credibility. Such self-interested motives are not hidden. In the introductory section of the 2007 Concept paper, such self-interested aid provision²⁵ is explicitly referred to as follows;

²⁴ In Turkey's case, as explained above the responsible official body for official development assistance is TIKa. However, in some cases other relief bodies, The Turkish Red Crescent, AFAD, and Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs can also enter into scheme and provide aid through cooperating with TIKa as Serdar Çam, TIKa's president, and Numan Kurtulmuş, the minister of state of the time explained (TBMM, 2011b, p.5; 2014b, p.5).

²⁵ Same or very similar self-interested motives behind aid allocation is also explicitly revealed in Concept 2014 Paper signed by Russian President. Please visit the following link to read whole 2014 document; https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/64542

The Concept of Russia's participation in international development assistance presents a strategic vision of the substance and priorities of Russia's policy concerning the provision of international financial, technical, humanitarian and other aid to facilitate socioeconomic development of recipient countries, help resolve crisis situations caused by natural disasters and/or international conflicts, and strengthen Russia's international position and credibility. (Government of Russian Federation, 2007, p.2)

The Concept implies a clear lack of Russia's sufficient 'international position and credibility'. In other words, it seems that there is an explicit motivation to restore Russia's international standing by providing aid and using donor status of Russia and development assistance as a policy tool.

The Concept places "fair and democratic world order based on the universally acknowledged international law and partnership relations between countries" (Government of Russian Federation, 2007, p.6) in the first place and before poverty elimination, which comes as the next goal. Accordingly, the Concept Paper indicates that unfair world order is essential to be tackled since without it poverty eradication cannot be possible. Also by including other goals in the Concept Paper, such as reducing risk of instability, insecurity, disease, migration, and environmental disasters Russia prioritizes 'modern collective security system' (Government of Russian Federation, 2007, p.3).²⁶ The final goal is stated as "to promote an unbiased attitude to the Russian Federation in the international community" (Government of Russian Federation, 2007, p.6). The desired outcomes of Russia's development assistance are then stated as:

.....strengthen Russia's international position and credibility;
stabilize socioeconomic and political situation in the partner
countries; establish a belt of good neighborliness; prevent the

²⁶ This is a way to convey the message that the main and valid purpose of aid provision is to increase donors' standing. In other words, the concept describes that the aid of DAC donors is also self-interested, just like Russia, as their main motives are also to reduce risks of instability, insecurity, disease, migration and environmental disasters, all of which in return serve to increase donors' standing rather than the alleviation of poverty (Government of Russian Federation, 2007, p.3; Ratcliff, 2017, p.152).

occurrence of potential focal points of tension and conflict, primarily in regions neighboring the Russian Federation; and ultimately create a favorable external environment for Russia's own development. (Government of Russian Federation, 2007, p.5)

In order to achieve the main objective, which is strengthening Russia's international position and credibility, along with others, the sectoral priorities of Russia in development assistance are outlined as food security, health, education, environmental protection, natural disaster prevention, anti-terrorism activity (Government of Russian Federation, 2007, p.9-10). Here, food security and education are important for understanding Russia's interests in Africa. Russia is the world's third largest wheat supplier and seeks to strengthen its position as it shows the scale of Russia's power in food resources to the world (Makarychev & Simao, 2014, p.2). Therefore, in order to strengthen its position, Russia ties its development assistance provision to Russian producers as will be explained below in specific to Africa region. Education is also equally import tool for Russia to regain its 'international position and credibility' echoing image/prestige building and soft power building and enhancement.

The regional priorities in the 2007 concept are outlined in line with Russia's interests; starting with post-Soviet area, specifically the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (just like traditional donors which also tend to cooperate with former colonies and with those speaking the same language), followed by the Asia-Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, the MENA, and Latin America. Yet in practice the amount allocated to the regions appeared different in 2011; Sub-Saharan Africa receiving as much development assistance as the CIS with each taking around 30 % of total, which are followed by Latin America and the Caribbean with each marking 20% of total (Russian Ministry of Finance, 2012; Makarychev & Simao, 2014, p.2).




Figure 14: Russia's ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa and to Developing Countries, Unspecified, in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.

Between 2010 and 2018, as reported by the OECD (Figure 14 above), Russia delivered around \$ 255 million to Sub-Saharan African countries and \$ 502 million to 'unspecified' developing countries, among which substantial amount of unspecified total is likely to be provided to African countries by increasing the total amount delivered to Sub-Saharan African countries²⁷.

Africa, in Russian case, appears at the forefront for a number of reasons. First, in terms of economic interests, trade is among one of the main motives that Russian government takes into consideration most. As the world's one of the largest wheat supplier, in order to strengthen its position, Russia ties its ODA to support for Russian producers by the recipients in the Africa region where is also a potential big market to export its wheat (Makarychev & Simao, 2014). The reflection of this motive is evident in the official figures. As seen in Figure 15 below, Russia's wheat export volume to Sub-Saharan region has been expanding since 2007. The number of partner countries have also been rising since 2007. While in 2007 the number of partners importing Russian

²⁷ The details on 'unspecified' allocations of Russia are not present in OECD dataset. Although this creates a reliability problem for the comparisons, as far as the national reports on Russia's ODA, as published by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, e.g. 2011 Report, are concerned, the most of 'unspecified' allocations are assumed to be delivered to Africa.

wheat was just 10 countries, the number of partners marked as 33 in 2018 (UNComtrade, 2020). In a similar vein, Russia ties its ODA towards Africa to exemption from customs duties (Makarychev & Simao, 2014, p.2).

This move by Russia is in line with the Moscow's endorsement of another concept in 2008, entitled 'a concept for the long-term social and economic development of the Russian Federation until 2020 (herein after referred to as 'Strategy 2020'). Strategy 2020 shows Russia's commitment to help Russian producers and businesses to sell their goods and services abroad including Africa region, and to invest in Africa insofar as it is predicted by Moscow that African countries could grow fast with sufficient investment and provision of capital goods, which could eventually mean more supply resources to Russia. Continuing debt relief is likely to be a part of this strategy. Being in line with the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, Russia – in coordination with the World Bank's 'debt relief in exchange for development' program – continues to write off debts of Africans. This in the first place brings more speedy economic growth to African countries and consequently more available supply resources to Russia indicating an economic motive. Second, this helps Russia to restore its image/prestige on the part of international community and the Africans illustrating itself as a benevolent country.

Developing deepened economic relations with the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community and Economic Community of West African States is also a part of the Strategy 2020 as well (Rakhmangulov, 2010, p.59). In order to establish the more deepened economic tie with the region, in 2009 Russia established AfroKom, a coordination committee consisting of ministries, companies, organizations, and government departments for economic cooperation with countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This initiative was supplemented by President Medvedev and more than a hundred Russian businessmen's visiting the African countries including Nigeria, Angola, Egypt, and Namibia in 2009. During this rally of visiting, billions dollar agreements were signed for major infrastructure projects in these countries.




Figure 15: Russia's Wheat Export to Sub-Saharan Africa between 2007 and 2018. Data Source: UN comtrade. The figure is created by the author.

Strategy 2020 is not only limited with the Russia's economic interests but also includes support for education. Russia aims to continue to fund foreign students who wish to study in Russia or already studying in Russia by granting thousands of scholarships each year through Russian Education Aid for Development (READ). The number of scholarships granted to foreign students for instance in 2011-2012 academic year was around ten thousand scholarships, of which around 10% were from Africa region (Ratcliff, 2017, p.26). The amount of scholarships, for example provided by READ in 2008, was approximately \$ 32 million in total, of which Angola, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Mozambique were amongst received the most (Makarychev & Simao, 2014, p.2). In specific to Africa region, in addition to READ, scholarship provisions for African students are also administered by Rossotrudnichestvo, Inkorvuz, and the Association of Foreign Students (Makarychev & Simao, 2014, p.2).

Through scholarships to Africans, Russia would benefit from this educational engagement in the future with respect to soft power and image/prestige building. Beyond the crystal-clear positive impact of such educational exchange on Russia's image/prestige, the African students returning home with a positive view on Russia and Russian people have a great potential to be future's Alexander Yakovlev, a Soviet

politician studied at Columbia University as an exchange student in the US where he was said to be influenced by ideas that turned him to be the intellectual force behind Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms of glasnost and perestroika (Cox & Stokes, 2012, p.101).

In a nutshell, while Russia has been developing its development assistance program, it has put itself as a donor in the traditional donors' mold in appearance and rhetoric since it has endorsed principles and normative commitments that were established by the traditional Western donors in the IOs. However, in practice Russian development assistance is interest-oriented seeking to restore Russia's international credibility and position. In Africa, in order to achieve its stated goals such as; economic interests including trade preferences, image/prestige building, and soft power enhancement, Russia engages in activities like wheat export, economic cooperation agreements, high level political visits that include businessmen, infrastructure investment projects that are worth billions of US dollar, and scholarship grants that are worth millions of US dollar.

4.2 China's Development Assistance in Africa

China's engagement with Africa through foreign assistance is not a new phenomenon as it can be traced back to the 1950s. Since then, the aid relations with Africa has had few key moments, among which China's aid and development policies towards Africa under 'Afro-Asian Solidarity' comes at the forefront for the pre-millennium period. 'Afro-Asian Solidarity' turned itself an organization named Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) in 1957, two years after holding its first conference in Indonesia in 1955 (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012). This solidarity movement included Chinese technical assistance towards Africa through sending more than 150.000 Chinese workers to the region between the 1960s and early 1980s and through sending medical assistance and Chinese doctors during 1970s (Hsu, 2007).

With Mao's death in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping coming into power in the early 1980s, such limited engagement with Africa regarding foreign assistance has nearly stopped until the turn of the millennium. Between the 1980s and the early 2000s, China has

undergone several important developments which have laid the bricks for today's Chinese vast engagement with Africa through ODA/ODA-like aid and other official flows (OOF). Through rural and market-oriented reforms enacted by Deng during 1980s, China has initiated its 'Open Door Policy', also known as 'Invest-In' (inflow FDI); a policy that aims to attract foreign investors who would invest in Chinese huge market (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012; Kesselman, Krieger, and Joseph, 2013). Thanks to successfully implemented rural reforms and with further several legal regulations like allowing foreign investors to build up joint ventures with local Chinese companies, the village and town enterprises in China have become a magnet for FDI, comprising one third of Chinese GDP of the time (Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012, p.92; Kesselman, Krieger, and Joseph, 2013). Complemented with the creation of Special Economic Zones, Open Coastal Cities and Open Coastal Economic Areas, and with the lowered labor wages for internationally demanded goods, China has expeditiously appeared as the assembly factory of the world during the 1990s (Kesselman, Krieger, and Joseph, 2013).

Within this framework, thanks to rising earnings from exports and their use for modernization and industrialization of the country, by the turn of the millennium China has emerged as a newly rising economy and promising to be world's leading economy in terms of GDP in the near future. The reflection of such economic heft of China was basically asking for gradual modification of the world order in which China would have a greater role in global governance through balancing the Western powers (Scheweller & Pu, 2011). Balancing has mainly included denouncing the US unilateralism and promoting multilateralism, especially in IOs where China would proactively set the agenda that could serve the Chinese policy objectives like getting support from the developing countries for the 'key votes' in the UN. It has also included proactive soft power diplomacy to win hearts and minds of the developing countries through forming coalitions that would denounce the US unilateralism (Scheweller & Pu, 2011).

In order to achieve greater role in global governance and advance its concomitant foreign policy interests, China has begun to engage extensively with Africa and

deployed development assistance as one of the key means. Between 2000 and 2014, China provided \$ 47.05 billion ODA-like aid to Sub-Saharan African countries, which accounts %58.04 of total ODA-like flows allocated in the same time period (Figure 16 below).




Figure 16: China's ODA-like commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa, in 2014 US Dollars, between 2000 and 2014. Data Source: AidData (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, & Tierney, 2017). The figure is created by the author.

China uses its official financial commitments including ODA-like aid flows for the purpose of 'political & diplomatic influence' in the Africa region. Chinese assistance is largely tied to recipients' stance on the UNGA votes that have utmost importance to China; e.g. stance on the 'One-China' policy through whether the recipients recognize Taipei as a part of China or not (Rich, 2009). Indeed, China provide less assistance to Africans that officially recognizes Taiwan. Moreover, a statistical analysis done by Dreher et. al (2018) confirms Rich (2009) that the relationship between the voting alignment and Chinese ODA-like aid flows is statistically significant.

Beyond the motivation of 'political & diplomatic influence', Chinese 'economic interests' drive China's assistance towards Africa to an important extent. In order to sustain its economic level, raw materials and iron and steel are the main commodities that China needs. A clear access to energy sources is also what China seeks (Dreher et.

al, 2018). Additionally, stimulating business for Chinese firms in other countries and promoting trade with others are equally important for China. Last but not least, the high economic return that China seeks to reap on its investments made in Africa marks as another main motive that drives Chinese development assistance²⁸ in Africa (Dreher et. al, 2018).

China seeks to invest foreign exchange reserves in sectors and commercial activities that would bring high economic returns (Corkin, 2011; Yu, 2013; Dreher et. al, 2018). China finances most of the projects in the Africa region by using the China Exim Bank and the China Development Bank, two government-led sources. Projects are financed according to the recipients' commercial criteria; sovereign credit rating, the political situation, and its economic and financial stability so that China can secure payment of its credits and higher returns of Chinese investments (Brautigam, 2011; Corkin, 2011, p.72, Sun, 2014; Dreher et. al, 2018). Even, in 2001 the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a promulgated guidebook – 'Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment' – for both the state-owned enterprises and private-owned enterprises to support the motive of high economic returns from investments as a part of 'Go-Out' strategy. This guidebook shows the destinations and sectors to invest in.

Moreover, securing access to raw materials and energy resources are amongst economic interests that drive Chinese assistance to Africa as shown by many studies (Mohan & Power, 2008; CRS, 2009; Marysee & Geenen, 2009; Taylor, 2009; Berthelemy; 2011). While China pours billions into resource-rich African countries by funding much-needed infrastructure projects like roads, railroads, ports, and other

²⁸ China does not align itself with OECD DAC rules and not use the glossary of OECD unlike other non-DAC donors; Turkey and Russia. A clear explanation whether China considers ODA/ODA-like aid commitments, which is concessional in terms and primarily intended for development and welfare, and Other Official Flows (OOF), which is non-concessional in terms and primarily intended for commercial or representational purposes separately from each other is subjected for more exploration. Therefore, in this study all Chinese official commitments are included.

facilities in the recipients²⁹, these resource-rich African countries provide China the access to their natural resources; minerals, metals, crude petroleum, zinc and copper ore, cobalt, iron and steel, titanium, and etc.

This relationship between development assistance and access to natural resources is also reflected in official figures. Among the top recipients of total Chinese official finance commitments as well as those receiving substantial amount of assistance, some resource-rich African countries appear at the forefront; Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, Eritrea, DR Congo and Sierra Leone (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Stranger, & Tierney, 2017). For example Angola, one of the top destinations for Chinese development assistance with more than \$ 13 billion in total between 2000 and 2014 (Dreher et. al, 2017)³⁰, provides China the access to its crude petroleum, making China the largest export partner for Angola (e.g. with 61% in 2017). Between 2000 and 2016, the share of crude petroleum in total exports to China has been above the 99% without an exception, while its share marked 97% of total exports to China in 2017 (United Nations, 2020). Similar story applies as well to other countries that are rich in crude petroleum; Cameroon, Nigeria, and Ghana.

Cameroon and Nigeria sell crude petroleum to China but the share of the commodity in total exports to China has not been constant between 2000 and 2017 (United Nations, 2020). Concerning Cameroon while between 2000 and 2004, its share in total exports to China varied between 45% and 93%, in the following three years, it has been replaced with raw cotton and rough wood (United Nations, 2020). And from 2008 onwards, crude petroleum has taken its first place back in total exports to China. As to Nigeria, crude petroleum has been at the top between 2000 and 2017, except 2003, 2015 and 2017 in which petroleum gas, second important commodity that China imports from Nigeria, relegated crude petroleum to second rank (United Nations,

²⁹ These high cost projects also mean 'debt trap' for some nations and can be linked to another economic interest of China; the high economic return that China seeks to reap on its investments made in Africa.

³⁰ Data on Chinese official financial commitments is available only between 2000 and 2014 in AidData (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Stranger, & Tierney, 2017).

2020). Since 2011, China has been importing crude petroleum from Ghana together with other important raw material; manganese ore, the share of which in total exports to China has been at the top for the most of years between 2000 and 2017 (United Nations, 2020).

In addition to these countries, Ethiopia has been an important source for Niobium, Tantalum, Vanadium and Zirconium ore, together with other resources like oily seeds and titanium (United Nations, 2020). China appears as the biggest export partner of Eritrea and DR Congo. For example, China's share was respectively 58% and 45% in 2017. While Eritrea provides access to its zinc and copper ore, DR Congo exports cobalt to China. Additionally, a part of demand for iron and titanium is accommodated from Sierra Leone (United Nations, 2020).

Lastly, in most cases China's development assistance is delivered to African countries being contingent upon purchase of Chinese goods and services, through which promoting exports and stimulating business for Chinese companies operating abroad are aimed (Brautigam, 2011; Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012, p.137; Huang, 2015). As Hubbard (2008) shows that

The Chinese insist that the Chinese contractor appointed by MOFCOM should purchase and import from China as much equipment, technology and services as possible, which is similar to the earlier Japanese model. Moreover claims abound about the importation of Chinese labor, which is part of the tying agreement. (quoted in Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins, 2012, p.137)

The official statistics concerning Chinese export to Sub-Saharan Africa confirms the 'tied aid' to an important extent that from 2000 onwards, Chinese export to the region has been rising (Figure 17). While in 2000 total export to Sub-Saharan Africa was around \$ 3.5 billion, in 2014 it reached the highest volume with around \$ 78.5 billion, and in 2017 it marked around \$ 68.3 billion.




Figure 17: China's Export to Sub-Saharan Africa (All Products Total, 2000-2017)³¹. Data Source: UN Comtrade. The figure is created by the author.

In short, Chinese development assistance to Africa region has been largely determined by the ‘political and diplomatic influence’ and ‘economic interests’ as China seeks more proactive role in global governance in order to balance the Western-led world order and seeks to sustain its economic growth. For the latter motivation, Beijing deploys development assistance for a clear access to energy sources of resource-rich African countries, ties its aid to the purchase of Chinese goods and services, which promotes export and stimulate business for Chinese firms, and invests in countries and sectors that would potentially reap high economic returns. Whereas concerning ‘political and diplomatic influence’, what China basically does is to buy the votes of Africans in return for its development assistance.

³¹ Data is available till 2017.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Explaining the donor countries' aid policy patterns and the factors shaping their behavior has been often challenging for academia. Various theories and models have been used to bring plausible explanations for donors' aid behavior. However, most of the studies have competing and partial explanations for the observed differences among donor countries' behavior across regions. The aid literature has initially oscillated between two competing approaches: (i) 'donors' interests', which uses the main axioms of realist IR theory; and (ii) 'recipients' needs', which mainly employs liberal IR theory axioms. Accordingly, explanatory factors shaping aid behavior in a model based on one approach appear important in one case but insignificant in another model based on the second approach. This inconsistency in the empirical findings of these studies has largely led explanatory factors to remain ill-understood. One major argument highlighting the current status of research on donors' aid behavior states that "there are too many interacting variables to justify a model that would be both parsimonious and insightful" (Lancaster, 2007, p.9).

Bringing plausible explanations for the motivations shaping aid behavior of a given donor has become even more challenging recently due to the rising number of donors operating outside of DAC rules and norms.

The main question of the aid literature that has been asked a number of times for the DAC donors has now begun to be asked in relation to the non-DAC donors: What motives do shape the aid behavior of the non-DAC donors? The initial approaches that have aimed to explain the DAC donors' behavior have been largely unable to explain the non-DAC donor countries' different aid policy patterns because the non-DAC countries' observed aid policies have unorthodox features to those of DAC donors. For example, divergent features include the amount of assistance non-DAC countries allocate, the number and the scale of projects that they undertake, the vast population that they represent, the principles and modalities that they embrace like 'non-interference' in domestic affairs of the recipients and aid 'void of political conditionality' as well as others like vibrant economy, colonial past and dual character as being aid donor and recipient at the same time.

In order to offer a more plausible explanation in understanding and explaining donors' aid behavior including both the DAC and non-DAC ones, an alternative approach has been sought by the academia. This has mostly meant an inclusion of the full range of possible motivations derived from both 'donors' interest' and 'recipients' interests' approaches, and then examining multiple determinants of the aid. In this 'hybrid model', as called by Berthelemy (2006), combined motivations behind aid allocation are basically; 'security', 'power/influence' (diplomatic and political), 'common interests' (e.g. contribution to Global Public Goods), 'wealth/economic interests', 'obligation' (e.g. colonial ties, historical background with recipients), 'humanitarianism', and 'prestige' (Van der Veen, 2011, p.10).

While some researchers have applied quantitative methods like regression tests to show the motives shaping donors' aid behavior, this has largely remained limited to the DAC donors given the advantage of availability of aid data. Accordingly, this thesis focused on using constructivist theory and applying 'framing' in understanding and explaining the multiple motivations of donors' aid since there are some theoretical and practical advantages.

The first, in theoretical terms constructivism underlines that preferences of the policy-makers rather than the structural constraints do matter in the formulation of a policy. According to constructivists, preferences of actors cannot simply be restrained into 'fixed' material goals, as realists contends, or to common goals like liberals use.

The second, constructivism argues that what shapes preferences is mostly ideas, among which frames or ways of thinking about a particular policy area matter most (Van der Veen, 2011, p.211). That is, in order to prefer one thing over others, one has to have ideas about what makes that one thing more preferable compared to others (Van der Veen, 2011, p.26). When individuals including policy-makers are making a decision concerning the world around them, they rely mainly on frames, which are mental constructs that specify goals and purposes of the policy (Van der Veen, 2011, p.211). And, this can explain what is causing a variation in any decision over time including the decisions concerning ODA/ODA-like aid flows. The third, the use of constructivist IR theory and applying 'framing' are practical especially when unavailable or insufficient data is the case, which is evident in many non-DAC donors. For example, when a researcher does not have an appropriate aid dataset to run regression analysis to show multiple motivations shaping a donor's aid allocation, it becomes very challenging to explain aid patterns of that donor. Yet, in constructivist approach, aid patterns can be largely explained by mainly using the discourses of relevant policy-makers.

In this thesis, analyzing Turkey's ODA policy between 2003 and 2019 by considering the main axioms of constructivist IR theory and applying 'framing' to identify aid patterns systemically revealed results about the main motivations driving Turkey's ODA as well as a hybrid character of Turkish ODA oscillating between traditional donors (DAC donors) and 'South-South Development Cooperation' (SSDC) providers. Indeed, the hybrid character is described by Turkish government as 'Turkish model of development assistance' (TBMM, 2014a, p.392) or 'Turkish type development assistance (TBMM, 2019c; p.12). On the one hand, Turkey aligns itself with the OECD DAC norms and rules; adopts some modalities of the DAC, such as preference of grants over loans; complies

with the EU Acquis *Communautaire*; and features traditional/DAC donor behavior (e.g. providing substantial amount of its ODA to LDCs and LMICs with the purpose of ‘altruistic/developmental’, and ‘humanitarianism’). On the other hand, Turkey displays also SSDC providers’ behavior by largely tying its ODA program to TFP objectives, establishing horizontal and ‘peer-based’ relationships with the recipients, through which ‘mutual accountability’ is ensured, showing respect to the national sovereignty of the recipient, eschewing political conditionality, and defining benefits at the outset.

In terms of motivations shaping Turkey’s ODA, this study shows that ‘obligation’ based on shared history, linguistic, culture, religion and ethnicity is what drives Turkish ODA most in general between 2003 and 2019. It has retained its first place in all three phases of Turkish ODA. Both with respect to the amount of ODA and regional distribution of ODA, Turkic Republics in the Caucasus as well as Central and South Asian and Balkan countries receive Turkish ODA under this type of ‘obligation’. Mainly these countries are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan as well as Meskhetian Turks from Central Asia, and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia from Balkans. Though limited in number with respect to the occurrences of ‘obligation’ frame, some Turkish policy-makers have also felt ‘obligated’ to provide ODA to Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan, West Bank and Gaza, and Lebanon based on the identity that Turkey inherited from Ottoman Empire. But, this ‘obligation’ has come mostly under ‘solidarity with the Third World’, as well as ‘a felt responsibility when others have been stepping out’ and ‘a sense of responsibility as a rich country’.

Along with the ‘obligation’, Turkey provides aid for ‘altruistic/developmental’ purposes, particularly for the purpose of contribution to Global Public Goods, which mainly include international stability and peace, post-conflict development efforts, health and pandemics, enhancement of economic development and life standards of the recipients. These ‘altruistic/developmental’ motivations appear as the second main motivation driving Turkey’s ODA allocation and lead Turkey to provide ODA into LDCs and LMICs most. The top regions that Turkey allocates ODA for

‘altruistic/developmental’ purposes are Central and South Asia (particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan) and Balkans, which invoke the notion that ‘obligation’ and ‘altruistic/developmental’ coexist frequently in Turkish context. North and Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, where most of LDCs and LMICs located, are also targeted for ‘altruistic/developmental’ purposes.

While these two prominent motives are directly in line with the two main founding principles of TİKA, third and fourth prominent frames in Turkish ODA, respectively ‘influence’ (political and diplomatic) and ‘image/prestige’ considerations, enter into picture with the changing nature of TFP. ‘Influence’ (political and diplomatic) and ‘image/prestige’ considerations are the main factors that have led Turkey to open out to Africa when TFP turns into a multidimensional foreign policy from crisis-oriented reactive foreign policy. For example, the purpose of vote buying at the UNSC for a non-permanent seat leads Turkey to involve in projects in social infrastructure and services, and education sectors in Africa. With regard to other regions, particularly Central and South Asia and Balkans, ‘influence’ (political and diplomatic) and ‘image/prestige’ motivations have also existed. For example, some references have been made to the cultural diplomacy Turkey sought in these regions but the number of references were considerably low as compared to those made specific to the African continent.

Fifth in overall importance, ‘economic interests’ do not appear as one the main motives affecting Turkey’s ODA allocation. It might be surprising given the fact that Turkey’s attempts to increase overall trade volume; for example with African countries in the same time period, 2003 and 2019. Equally surprising, the instances that establish a link between ODA allocation and the export/import interests of Turkey are scarcely any at the debates; or speakers in the parliament have shallowly talked about. Amongst few instances that establish this link, increasing support of Africans for Turkish businesses in the region and trade and investment opportunities were referred few times without giving any detail. One plausible explanation can be that Turkey’s ODA provision and its economic interests are separated from each other to an important extent. For example, unlike many other donors, Turkey’s is non-participant to ‘Aid for Trade’

regime either through World Trade Organization or through the European Union. Thus, this may indicate separation of ODA provisions and its economic interests in TIKA's policy orientation. However, more detailed research should be conducted to lay down whether such separation is considered clearly in Turkish aid provision. Another plausible explanation can be that Turkey might be using other government institutions or agencies to achieve its foreign economic goals, which is also subjected to further research.

In a similar way, the frequency of 'humanitarianism' frame, which ranks the 6th in overall, is unexpected given the fact that humanitarian assistance consists more than 50 percent of total ODA from 2012 onwards. Although positive correlation between the number of occurrences of 'humanitarianism' frame and the official data is established during the 'proactive phase' of Turkish ODA; e.g. Turkey's deployment of humanitarian aid for the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile in 2010, this correlation largely evaporates from 2012 onwards. During the 'reactive phase' of Turkish ODA, the speakers do not refer to Syria or humanitarian assistance as much as it should have been when considering the official aid figures. However, as the Turkey's ODA became reactive to respond the Syrian refugee crisis, it is quite expected that policy directives concerning development assistance were substantially overshadowed by the assistance delivered to Syria. Therefore, by extracting reactionary disbursements to Syria from the official ODA figures, plainer and more accurate picture of Turkey's ODA motivations can be taken. When Syria disbursements are taken out, observed inconsistency between the occurrences of humanitarian frame and the official ODA data disappears and is replaced with a higher consistency, just as observed in two other phases.

One important plausible conclusion to be reached from the comparison of Syria included and excluded figures is that Turkey and its ODA policy are vulnerable to regional and international developments, especially when Turkey's limited state capacity and not well-performing economy are considered. Additionally, the role of the EU-Turkey Migration Deal signed in 2016 should be inquired in explaining the inconsistency concerning the reactive phase. The source of the some amounts provided

to Syrians under humanitarian assistance might be coming from the migration deal signed between Turkey and the EU in 2016. Therefore, the speakers at TBMM, being aware of this, might not be touching about the issue and not specifying 'humanitarianism' as a policy goal. As stated in the 'EU-Turkey Statement', both sides agreed to stop irregular migration from Turkey to the EU borders. Turkey in return was ensured to be granted €3 billion humanitarian assistance by the EU to keep Syrians within Turkish borders and take back those illegally crossed the EU borders (European Commission, 2017). While this can be a contributing factor to the observed inconsistency between the number of occurrences of 'humanitarianism' frame and the official ODA data to a limited extent, it requires further research that can be conducted at the TBMM or at TIKA through interviews.

Lastly, 'security' does not seem an important factor shaping Turkey's ODA behavior as it ranks at the bottom given that the number of occurrences for 'security' frame has been quite low. While 'security' consideration seems not to be a major force driving Turkish ODA, incomplete data and unavailable information about security and potentially intelligence dimensions should be taken into consideration. In fact, some speakers at the parliament have complained about the secrecy over some of TIKA's activities. One plausible explanation to this can be that the security motivated budget allocations and activities such as the provision of military equipment and services, anti-terrorism activities, and peacekeeping expenditures are not considered under ODA classification by the OECD and thus these cannot be reportable as ODA (OECD, 2020d). The only activity that can be reportable as ODA under the security motivation is the cost of using armed forces of the donors in delivering the humanitarian aid (OECD, 2020d).

Within the framework of my findings, the aid pattern of Turkey's ODA and policy-makers' preferences between 2003 and 2019, I argue that the use of constructivism and applying 'framing' as an alternative approach overall bring plausible explanations in understanding donors' ODA motivations, as observed in the case of Turkey. During the 'restructuring phase' between 2003 and 2005 and the 'proactive phase' of Turkey's

ODA between 2006 and 2011, the preferences of policy-makers and the aid pattern seem highly compatible with each other. However, during the 'reactive phase' from 2012 onwards, the level of compatibility decreases to some extent, particularly concerning the 'humanitarianism' frame. Although observed incompatibility in the reactive phase creates a gap in my argument concerning the use of constructivism as an alternative approach in explaining the non-DAC donor behavior and Turkey's ODA behavior, such incompatibility, which I discussed above, is eliminated to an important extent when reactionary disbursements to Syria are excluded from the equation. Yet, still a further research on this matter, and whether the source of Turkish humanitarian aid to Syrians is the EU or not; and if the latter is the case, whether speakers do not refer 'humanitarianism' knowingly or not, will help me to extend theoretical considerations and argument in my research.

The comparison of Turkey and Russia in terms of ODA character and motivations in Africa demonstrates that hybridity is evident in both cases. However, Russia in terms of donors' motivations diverge from Turkey to some extent. In rhetoric, Moscow adheres to the OECD DAC norms and rules, and to committed goals like the pursuit of sustainable development goals. Nevertheless, in practice Russia's development assistance is more self-interested as it aims to restore Russia's 'international position and credibility' in the first place. While this aim largely explains Russia's increasing presence in Africa, where Moscow provides development assistance for image/prestige considerations and soft power enhancement, economic interests of Russian firms are also equally important for Russia. In comparison, image/prestige considerations and soft power enhancement are also evident in Turkey's presence in Africa. But unlike Russia, Turkey provides aid to African countries for altruistic/developmental purposes and economic interests are not at the forefront as much as those of Russia.

The comparison of Turkey and China, the leader of the SSDC providers and a defining force, show that China differs from Turkey and Russia to a significant extent. China does not use the glossary of the OECD DAC, and Chinese aid modalities draw a completely different picture from traditional/DAC donors, and thus from hybrid cases

like Turkey and Russia. Concessional funding mechanism is at play in Chinese official finance flows and its aid is much tied to the policy objectives; both economic and political. These objectives become most evident in Africa which appears as a new backyard for almost all non-DAC donors. Concerning 'economic interests', China provides assistance to Africans for a clear access to energy sources of resource-rich African countries. Beijing also ties its aid to the purchase of Chinese goods and services which in return promotes export and stimulates business for Chinese firms. Further, China channels official flows in the form of investment mainly into the infrastructure projects in aid recipient countries and sectors that would potentially reap the high economic returns for China. Additionally, for the purpose of 'political & diplomatic influence', China basically buys the UN votes of Africans in return for its development assistance, particularly for the key votes like Taipei issue and human rights.

In the light of the comparison of Turkey's ODA with two other major non-DAC donors in terms of motivations driving them in African continent, this study concludes that aid behavior, regardless of being a DAC or non-DAC donor, is largely shaped by countries' own preferences constructed through divergent frames rather than the DAC or non-DAC status as a donor. This basically means that being a non-DAC donor does not attribute to fixed motivations for development assistance. In addition to the advantageous use of constructivism and applying framing – along with other advantages I discussed earlier – especially when there is no fixed motivations for development assistance as just highlighted, this conclusion indicates limitations at the same time.

As the donor status, the DAC or non-DAC, does not attribute fixed motivations for development assistance, generalizable conclusions concerning aid behavior of donors might not be reached by classifying countries based on their donor status. That is, one of the main limitation of the aid literature that has been prevailing since the beginning, which is reaching generalizable conclusions concerning aid behavior of donors, is still out there. Therefore, other factors rather than aid donor status should be considered for reaching more generalizable conclusions, if it is possible above all.

Additionally, contrary to the some advantageous use of constructivism and applying framing, incomplete or missing data can be the biggest limitation for using constructivism and applying framing in explaining aid behavior of donors. As the parliamentary debates or alike are used as the primary data, creating a dataset for the analysis by reviewing/reading parliamentary discussions can be arduous, especially: if the donor country does not regularly keep records of the debates; or if the donor country's language is hard to overcome for researchers in a limited time period; or if the country's parliament and its members are non-functional in the sense that their explicit arguments concerning development assistance are not taken into consideration at all in policy implementation, which underscores considerations for the donor countries' regime type.

In this research, all these three 'if' are evident, particularly for Russia and China cases. Both of these non-DAC donors are considerably authoritarian as compared to others and reaching out regularly kept records of the debates requires plenty of time and a field research. The language barrier surrounding Russian and Chinese cases are also hard to overcome in a limited time and for anyone who does not speak their languages. Even if these two impediments are eliminated somehow, the relevance of explicit arguments concerning development assistance to the policy implemented will always be a question mark. Given these limitations, conducting a cross-country analysis by using constructivism and applying framing would be a tough attempt and require a concerted effort that would include multiple researchers. The last point made here highlights the significance of a single case study. By analyzing a donor's aid behavior through using constructivism and applying framing in a single case, the single case studies accumulate in time, and pave the way for a cross-country analysis, and thus for reaching a more generalizable conclusions. Lastly, in addition to these limitations, ODA/ODA-like aid data is also a limitation that creating reliability concerns. Most of non-DAC donors' ODA/ODA-like aid data is incomplete or missing, as evident in Russia's case, or created by using different methodologies, as in China's case with Tracking

Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) method. This after all puts impediments before a reliable comparison of the non-DAC donors.

Concerning the further research implications, in the first place this research can be extended in understanding and explaining the tools used by countries to achieve their foreign economic strategies. For example, Köstem (2018) covers two main economic tools, trade and investment, in explaining Turkish and Russian foreign economic strategies to become a regional power respectively in the Middle East and Eurasia. The use of foreign aid for the purpose of political and diplomatic influence and economic benefits is becoming increasingly prominent for the donors and thus it can be another main economic tool in countries' foreign economic strategies that aim to claim regional hegemony. Therefore, its inclusion in such studies and explaining how these three main economic tools, foreign aid, trade and investment, coexist are important. In a similar vein, energy trade and investments can also be included in the same equation, and the relationship between the foreign aid and energy trade and investments of countries can be inquired in a more detailed way.

Lastly, this study marks itself as a useful starting point for any further research that aims to gauge aid effectiveness of Turkish development assistance, for which the presentation the determinants of Turkey's ODA is essential. In regards to aid effectiveness, in theory, development assistance is assumed to be commonly provided to increase economic growth and improve the lives of poor in the recipients through the provision of goods and services (Briggs, 2017, p.189). If this is the case, for example when a donor builds a health clinic in the recipient country, that clinic must be built near people who need it in order foreign aid to be considered as an effective aid. In this regard, for those who would aim to examine the extent to which Turkish foreign aid reaches its targets, one should first match the information concerning the purposes of Turkish ODA, as presented in this thesis, to the possibly household survey data that should be collected based on subnational distribution of the aid. Same process like survey data collection in the recipients applies as well to any further research that would seek to measure whether Turkish development assistance is successful in soft

power projection like winning hearts and minds in the recipient countries. In addition to measuring Turkey's success in soft power projection, also just as highlighted by a parliamentary member, Turkey's success in the achievement of high voting affinity with African countries at the UN General Assembly concerning the key votes for Turkey like Cyprus can be studied.



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APPENDIX

Table 5: Number of each frames occurred during the restructuring phase of Turkish ODA. The table is created by the author.

Year	Security	Political & Diplomatic Influence	Economic Interest	Altruistic/Developmental	Image/Prestige	Obligation	Humanitarianism	Total
2003	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
2004	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
2005	1	3	2	4	4	6	2	22
Total	1	3	4	4	4	7	2	25

Table 6: Number of each frames occurred during the proactive phase of Turkish ODA. The table is created by the author.

Year	Security	Political & Diplomatic Influence	Economic Interest	Altruistic/Developmental	Image/Prestige	Obligation	Humanitarianism	Total
2006	0	2	1	5	1	5	1	15
2007	1	5	2	3	2	8	0	21
2008	0	2	2	4	2	4	1	15
2009	1	3	0	4	3	5	1	17
2010	0	4	3	4	3	2	1	17
2011	0	1	3	4	1	3	1	13
Total	2	17	11	24	12	27	5	98

Table 7: Number of each frames occurred during the reactive phase of Turkish ODA. The table is created by the author.

Year	Security	Political & Diplomatic Influence	Economic Interest	Altruistic/ Developmental	Image/Prestige	Obligation	Humanitarianism	Total
2012	0	1	1	1	4	6	1	14
2013	0	0	1	2	1	8	1	13
2014	0	3	1	5	0	4	1	14
2016	0	2	2	7	4	4	3	22
2017	1	6	1	4	2	3	3	20
2018	1	1	1	1	2	4	0	10
2019	0	2	1	4	1	3	2	13
Total	2	15	8	24	14	32	11	106




Figure 18: Turkey's Total ODA and Bilateral ODA (Syria Excluded), in constant prices 2018 US Dollar, Millions, between 2003 and 2018. Data Source: OECD Development Statistics. The figure is created by the author.