

MADELYN JEANETTE BEACHAM

TURKEY'S GOVERNANCE OF SYRIAN REFUGEES

BILKENT UNIVERSITY 2022

TURKEY'S GOVERNANCE OF SYRIAN REFUGEES: A CASE
OF TRANSFORMATION TOWARDS REGULATORY
STATEHOOD

A Master's Thesis


by
MADELYN JEANETTE BEACHAM

Department of
International Relations
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
June 2022

To my family



TURKEY'S GOVERNANCE OF SYRIAN REFUGEES: A CASE OF
TRANSFORMATION TOWARDS REGULATORY STATEHOOD



The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

MADELYN JEANETTE BEACHAM

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY ANKARA

June 2022

ABSTRACT

TURKEY’S GOVERNANCE OF SYRIAN REFUGEES: A CASE OF TRANSFORMATION TOWARDS REGULATORY STATEHOOD

Beacham, Madelyn Jeanette

M.A., Department of International Relations

Advisor: Asst. Prof. Selver Buldanlıoğlu Şahin

June 2022

Ten years following the initial wave of Syrian refugees into Turkey, Turkey’s governance of this displaced population is heralded by some as an example to follow and prescribed policy reforms by others. However, among these technocratic approaches, there is a lack of challenging this neo-Weberian, state capacity conceptualization of governance. We instead approach this subject with the mindset that governance is not organic, but a purposeful process that functions to privilege certain interests and minimize others. Seeking an explanation of Turkey’s governance of Syrian refugees, we place this process within the state’s broader neoliberalization. First, this project problematizes the mainstream theoretical approaches to analyzing Turkey’s governance of Syrian refugees and

posit the State Transformation Approach (STA) as an alternative. We then apply this framework to empirical evidence received from Gaziantep, a municipality of Turkey that where Syrians are concentrated. We conclude this project with three main take-aways: Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees cannot be understood outside of a critical analysis of its capitalist development, Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees constitutes one process in the transformation of the Turkish state towards Regulatory Statehood, and the future of Syrians in Turkey will continue to be determined by Turkey's capitalist development, and its transformation into regulatory statehood.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’NİN SURİYELİ MÜLTECİ MESELESİNİ İDARESİ: DÜZENLEYİCİ DEVLETE DÖNÜŞÜM ÖRNEĞİ

Beacham, Madelyn Jeanette

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Selver Budanlıoğlu Şahin

Haziran 2022

Türkiye'ye doğru ilk Suriyeli mülteci dalgasının ardından geçen on yıllık sürede, Türkiye'nin söz konusu yerinden edilen nüfusa yönelik muamelesini bazı kesimler örnek alınması gereken bir davranış olarak överken, bazıları ise politika reformları yapılması gereğini vurgulamıştır. Ancak, neo-Weberyen bir bakış açısından kavramsallaştırılan devlet kapasitesi anlayışının hakim olduğu mevcut teknokratik yaklaşımlarda bu kavramsallaştırma sorgulanmamıştır. Bu çalışmada, yönetim olgusunun organik olmadığı, aksine birtakım menfaatlere hizmet ederken diğer bazılarını asgariye indiren şekilde işleyen maksatlı bir süreç olduğu düşüncesi ile meseleye yaklaşmaktayız. Türkiye yönetiminin Suriyeli mültecileri muamele tarzını açıklamayı amaçlayan bu çalışmada, bu süreç devletin neoliberalleşmesi bağlamına oturtulmuştur. Bu çalışma, öncelikle, Türkiye

yönetiminin Suriyeli mültecilere yönelik yaklaşımına ilişkin mevcut değerlendirmeleri şekillendiren ana akım kuramsal yaklaşımları tartışmaya açmakta ve Devlet Dönüşüm Yaklaşımı (DDY) kavramını alternatif olarak önermektedir. Sonrasında, bu kavramı Suriyeli mültecilerin yoğun olduğu Gaziantep ilinden gelen ampirik veriler yolu ile gelişmelerin incelenmesinde kullanmıştır. Şu üç temel sonuç ile bu çalışma tamamlanmıştır: Türkiye yönetiminin Suriyeli mültecilere yönelik muamelesi, ülkenin kapitalist gelişiminin eleştirel değerlendirmesinin dışında tutularak anlaşılamaz. Türkiye yönetiminin Suriyeli mültecilere yönelik muamelesi Türk devletinin düzenleyici devlete yönelik dönüşümünde yaşanan bir süreci oluşturmaktadır. Türkiye'nin kapitalist gelişimi ve düzenleyici devlete dönüşümü ülkedeki Suriyelilerin gelecekteki durumunu şekillendirmeye devam edecektir.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Selver B. Şahin, for her constant guidance and support in the writing of this thesis in the earliest days of its formation. This project could not have been successful without her confidence in its potential. I would also like to thank those who were willing to volunteer their time to participate in and help arrange interviews for this project, whose perspectives and contributions made this thesis immensely richer. Of course, I must thank all of my family and friends both in the US and in Dorm 75 for the emotional support they provided through the months that went into the writing of this thesis. I would especially like to thank Asfandyar Khan for always being happy and eager to help me solve all the technical difficulties that came with this thesis and keeping a smile on my face while doing so.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	V
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	VI
LIST OF FIGURES	X
CHAPTER 1	1
1.1 A Brief Overview of the Literature.....	3
1.1.1 Regime Theory Approaches	3
1.1.2 Securitization Theory.....	4
1.1.3 Neoliberal Theories.....	6
1.2 A Novel Approach	13
1.3 Background	14
1.3.1 Turkish Syrian Relations (1980-1998).....	15
1.3.2 Turkish Policy Post- Syrian Civil War (2011-Present).....	17
1.4 Methodology	21
1.4.1 Process Tracing: A Brief Overview	21
1.4.2 Suitability of Process Tracing	23
1.5 Conclusion	24
CHAPTER 2	26
2.1 The Evolution of Security	28
2.1.1 Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Issues	29
2.2 The Political Economy of NTS.....	30

2.2.1 Dependency Theory	31
2.2.2 International Labor: Commodity or Security Threat?	33
2.2.3 The French School of Regulation	35
2.2.4 Authoritarian Neoliberalism	37
2.2.5 Majone's Regulatory Model	38
2.2.6 Transformation Towards Regulatory States	40
2.3 STA Major Assumptions	41
2.3.1 Problematizing the Weberian/Neo-Weberian State	41
2.3.2 Politics of Scale.....	45
2.3.3 Defining Transformation	47
2.4 Theoretical Framework.....	48
2.4.1 Establishing Economic Context.....	49
2.4.2 Identifying Goals of Central Leadership.....	51
2.4.3 Identifying the Three Transformation Mechanisms	52
2.4.4 Assessing Goal Actualization	53
2.5 Conclusion	54
CHAPTER 3	56
3.1 Authoritarian Neoliberalism and the AKP.....	58
3.1.1 AKP: More Continuity than Divide in Authoritarian Neoliberalism....	59
3.1.2 The 2001 Crisis: the AKP's Opportunity.....	62
3.1.3 The AKP's Modalities of Authoritarianism.....	65
3.2 Turkey's Dependent Position in the Global Market	67

3.2.1 The 2008 Crisis	68
3.3 Turkey's Current Economic Position.....	71
3.3.1 The Currency Crisis	71
3.3.2 Current Account Deficit.....	73
3.3.3 The Tools Available.....	74
3.4 State Transformation in the Face of Crisis	89
3.4.1 Broad Policy Goals	90
3.5 The Case of Gaziantep.....	103
3.5.1 Gaziantep Historical Background.....	104
3.5.2 Formalization Hurdles in Gaziantep	106
3.5.3 Governance Mechanisms of Transformation.....	109
3.5.4 ILO Information Center	118
3.5.5 International Organization for Migration: Background.....	120
3.5.6 Social Cohesion: the Ensar Community Center.....	124
3.5.7 Further Goal Assessment	131
3.5.8 The Possibility of Return from Gaziantep's Perspective	132
CHAPTER 4	135
4.1 Findings	136
4.1.1 Finding One	136
4.1.2 Finding Two.....	140
4.1.3 Finding Three.....	143
4.2 Conclusion	145

REFERENCES	146
------------------	-----



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Current Account Balance of Turkey in percentage of GDP from the years 2004-2020 (according to World Bank data).....	74
Figure 2: Construction sector's share of the total GDP of Turkey (according to TURKSTAT data).....	78
Figure 3: Share of labor in construction sector's in the total labor of Turkey (according to TURKSTAT data)	79
Figure 4: Percentage of informal labor in each sector, compared to the overall share of informal labor (according to Turkey Ministry of Social Security data)...	86
Figure 5: Percentage of overall informal labor in the Gaziantep, Adiyaman, Kilis region compared to Turkey's overall informal labor (according to Turkey Ministry of Social Security data).	87
Figure 6: Some of the actors affecting the governance of Syrians in Gaziantep, organized by whether they are a government or non-government entity and whether they are Turkish in origin or foreign.	130
Figure 7: Politics of Scale that affect Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees..	131

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

According to the UNHCR, as of 2020 Turkey hosts more than 3.6 million Syrian refugees. While the exact number of Syrian refugees in the country is difficult to measure, it is clear that the way that the Turkish government has addressed this immigration has remained of interest to both academics and policy practitioners. This thesis problematizes existing analytical approaches to this area of study for their various explanatory weaknesses. First, studies that take regime theory angles have focused heavily on Turkey's adherence or lack thereof to international norms (see for example, Çelik and White, 2021; Sariteke, 2019) without meaningfully acknowledging the power hierarchies that affect international regimes. Second, studies that use securitization theory focus on discourse around policy formation (Secen, 2021; Lüleci-Sula and Sula, 2021) without curiosity about tensions over the management of the issues securitized, and the outcomes following from the implementation of related policy measures adopted. Finally, studies that have taken an institutions-focused conceptualization of the state has emphasized the capacity or quality of the Turkish state institutions to design and implement effective migration management policy (see for example, İçduygu, 2015; İçduygu and Millet, 2016; İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016; Hoffmann and

Samuk, 2016) without acknowledging the patterns of social relations and interests that institutions are built to serve. While offering significant descriptive insights into the specifics of the Turkish government's response to the influx of Syrian refugees, existing approaches have not provided satisfactory explanation to a seemingly simple but highly critical unanswered question: why has Turkey governed Syrian refugees as it has?

In seeking causal explanation, this thesis proposes the use of the State Transformation Approach (STA) to place this area of governance within the context of the Turkish Regulatory State¹. In doing so, it contextualizes this area of governance within a larger examination of the political-economic development of the Turkish state and posits that the state, institutions, and policy that together constitute Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees are products of "strategic selectivity," (Hameiri, 2020) in that they always privilege certain interests over others, leaving some issues prioritized and others marginalized. In this thesis, we argue that causal explanations for Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees lies within its transformation into its own version of Regulatory Statehood, in which

¹ We adopt and modify Hameiri and Jones coinage of the "Chinese Style Regulatory State" by similarly suggesting that the Turkish case does not represent an identical iteration of the theoretical model of the Regulatory State Model, but instead a version of it tailored to its own political context, which includes power highly consolidated within the central government. For details on the Chinese experience, see Hameiri and Jones, 2019; Hameiri and Jones, 2021.

its capitalist development is a key factor that has yet to be addressed in other studies on this particular area of governance.

1.1 A Brief Overview of the Literature

1.1.1 Regime Theory Approaches

Keohane and Nye define regimes as “sets of governing arrangements” that include rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects (Krasner 1982). Jervis emphasizes that regimes are more than one-time interactions and set precedent for long-term actions (Krasner, 1982).

Furthermore, regimes in Keohane and Nye’s interdependence theory are proposed as intervening variables that facilitate inter-state cooperation; this framework cannot account, however, for the significant changes in the balance of power conditions following the decline of the Bretton Woods system. Our research adopts these definitions of regime to an extent but seeks further explanation as to why a specific regime, the Syrian refugee regime, operates as it does. We identify Turkey as a key actor that prefers cooperation to conflict in this regime. In seeking explanation to why this regime looks like it does, that is, fragmented at different points of implementation, we might first look to different regime theories. In surveying our options, we see the problematic assumptions that regime theories make in all the popular IR schools of thought. Many existing studies on Turkey’s governance of Syrian refugees use regime theories to describe

Ankara's policies. These studies fall short of thorough explanation because their theoretical framework ignores the power structures that exist in maintaining these regimes.

1.1.1.1 Regime Theories in Explanatory Cases

Abdelaaty, in their piece on the use of “guesthood” status of refugees in Turkey, discusses how semantically identifying Syrians as guests rather than refugees allows policymakers greater freedom to “maneuver in response to international and domestic political incentives,” (Abdelaaty 2019, 1). Abdelaaty's evidence supports the argument that regimes do in fact impact state behavior, but how and why they do so remain unanswered in his piece. The author uses the international refugee regime as an intervening variable without accounting for the mechanisms behind its power. For this reason, we cannot confidently categorize his study as aligning with one of the schools of thought discussed above. However, his conclusions support the need for our research: Turkish policy makers saw the norms and rules of the international refugee regime as significant enough that they needed to find a loophole around them. Why?

1.1.2 Securitization Theory

We pinpoint one major issue with how securitization scholars analyze non-traditional security (NTS) issues, among which refugee crises are often categorized in securitization studies. Securitization studies place too much power

on the central policy makers of a state without regarding the roles of other institutions and agencies, both public and private and operating both within and outside of the state's territorial boundaries, involved in policy making and implementation. In doing so, they overemphasize discourse without acknowledging the contestations over securitization and the social tensions that result from contestations. According to the Copenhagen school, once securitized, a securitizing actor (the state) has the approval of its audience (the state population) to use exceptional measures to handle this threat (Wæver, 1995). This notion focuses solely on a unitary "state" and assumes its monopoly on violence without considering other actors that affect, push against, or accelerate the implementation of policy. Nor does it consider that different governments may have different "exceptional measures" available to them depending on their status in the global economic structure.

Neither regime theories nor the school of securitization considers with any analytical sincerity that the rise of issues governed in a "transnational" manner may not be a natural consequence of globalization, but rather an intentional process conducted to protect capital interests. In contrast, the STA is an alternative to these traditional theories to explain how the proliferation transnational issues is part of a broader, dynamic process of state transformation, as it embraces imagining a multitude of actors and interests playing a role in all governance. By adopting the State Transformation Approach, our theoretical

framework addresses this shortcoming by identifying the political economic structure as the explanatory variable behind these intentional labels such as “transnational” and “non-traditional security.” We will elaborate on the pillars of the STA framework in three parts: the centrality of the global political economy in the trend of state transformation, how the STA conceptualizes the state, and how contests in politics of scale are the building blocks for shifts in power arrangements.

1.1.3 Neoliberal Theories

Studies that assume a neoliberal ideation of the state are heavily prescriptive, diagnosing weak institutions as the problem and their improvement as the solution, and overwhelmingly problematizes policy implementation without exploring the socio-economic environment of which policymaking plays a limited role. In this sense, neoliberal literature on refugee governance is highly concerned with two types of governance identified by Fukuyama: international governance and good governance. The impact of this is not limited to academia; it has set the tone in development discourse among the technocratic community, such as reports by the World Bank and the OECD. The result has been such organizations focusing on the quality of institutions and banking instead of the social relations and economic dynamics that actually form these institutions.

First, international governance refers to cooperation between states facilitated by “nonsovereign bodies outside the state system,” such as supranational governments and international organizations (Fukuyama 2016, 90). Some authors discuss the role Turkey plays in the international governance of refugees in terms of how Turkey does or does not cooperate within the global refugee regime (Aras and Mencütek, 2020; Skribeland, 2021; Terry 2018) his regime prescribes certain norms and rules that apply to the treatment of refugees and the moral obligation that states share. Second, Fukuyama identifies “good governance,” which he defines as the “effective implementation of state policy,” (Fukuyama 2016, 91). Other studies that opt for a more domestic focused analysis, measure Turkey’s policies and treatment of Syrian refugees in terms of “good governance” standards (Brandt, Erdoğan, Kirişci, 2018; Elitok, 2018; İçduygu, 2015; World Bank Group, 2021). Good governance itself is not a settled term; some frame good governance as a matter of means of implementing policy, while others focus on the ends and question whether a non-liberal regime is capable of good governance (Fukuyama, 2016). Regardless, many studies on Turkey’s Syrian refugee regime focus their analysis domestically and make arguments about quality of governance. The shortcoming with this approach lies in that it ignores the strategic building of institutions and the way they are purposefully established to protect certain interests and social relations over others.

1.1.3.1 Neoliberalism and Structural Realism

Robert Keohane's 1984 book, *After Hegemony*, is a thorough summary of the neoliberal perspective on regimes. Keohane argues that states opt for cooperation because they know that interactions with states will be repeated, so they will have to deal with the consequences of non-cooperation. In other words, cooperation is the rational choice for states, and out of this cooperation institutions are born. Enough institutions then comprise a given regime. However, Keohane presents the puzzle of compliance, where he questions why states follow the rules established by regimes. He offers two possible answers. First, institutions represent sunk costs, or investments that the state cannot get back if it abandons the institution. Therefore, they are willing to sacrifice their preference for the sake of upholding the institution. Second, states may comply to avoid tit-for-tat, in where they may be hurt in another situation if they are not willing to compromise in the present situation.

Structural realism holds a similar view to neoliberalism in that it concedes that regimes do matter, but only under certain conditions; specifically, "under circumstances that are not purely conflictual" (Krasner, 1982). Similar to neoliberalism, structural realism holds that states comply with regimes because it is a rational, utility maximizing thing to do. Regimes are useful because there are some issues that a single state cannot manage on its own. The main point on which neoliberals and neorealists (or structural realists) disagree is determining when and how much regimes actually influence behavior. For neoliberals, a

proliferation of regimes makes sense as states realize the common interests they share and are durable because of their “sunk costs.” For neorealists, situations where regimes are highly effective are rarer than neoliberals suggest, and more difficult to maintain.

The most blatant shortfall in both the neoliberal and structural realist approach to regimes is its neglect of discussing power dynamics that orchestrate some of the mechanisms that facilitate regime creation and preservation. For example, in addressing the puzzle of compliance, Keohane does not engage in any discussion of the political economy hierarchies (Panitch, 2000) that may cause compliance; everyone in the regime does not equally worry about suffering the consequences of tit-for-tat. The hegemonic stability theory comes closest to answering for the power dynamics involved in regimes but fails to explain the conditions under which a hegemonic might effectively enforce a regime.

Lastly, structural realists give a specific set of conditions under which states are willing to cooperate in a regime, namely, those issues which are not purely conflictual. Where does leave non-traditional security issues, of which the refugee crisis is part of? While refugees are not inherently threatening, if they overwhelm a state’s borders then they that state’s sovereignty over its borders is at risk. Specific to the Turkish case, the state is concerned about Kurdistan Worker’s Party/Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) terrorists and its Syrian affiliate, the

People's Protection Forces/Yekineyen Parastina Gel (YPG) crossing the border under the guise of refugee status (Hoffman and Makovsky, 2021). The concept of non-traditional security threats finds no easy place to land in structural realism's conditions for regime formation.

1.1.3.2 State Capacity and Good Governance

State capacity and national governance are similar concepts in that they both deal with assessing how the state implements policy and responds to its population's needs. Furthermore, both are iterations of the domestic lens through which many studies use to describe how Turkey has responded to the wave of Syrian refugees entering its borders.

State capacity is a term originally coined by historical sociologists and referred explicitly to a state's ability to raise revenue for itself (Besley and Persson, 2010).

As the Political Science and International Relations disciplines have become increasingly concerned with state capacity as it concerns development studies, state capacity has broadened beyond just revenue raising to mean, perhaps most generally, "the state's ability to implement a range of policies," (Besley and Persson 2010, 1). Fukuyama's definition of domestic governance is strikingly similar: "effective implementation of state policy," (Fukuyama 2016, 89). The issue we hold with many studies on Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees that use the state capacity/domestic governance framework is that they often take for granted factors that are considered a limit on state capacity; Turkish policymakers

themselves insist that their governance in this area is limited by lack of funds and by a faltering economy and therefore asks for external support from the international community (Simsek, 2021). One analytical route that goes one step further in the pursuit of explanation is the study of domestic institutions and their impact on governance. Let us now discuss how these institutions are used as an independent, or at least intervening, variable in determining state capacity or quality of governance.

1.1.3.2.1 Measuring Governance: Domestic Institutions as Independent Variables

In their 2019 article, Bohmelt, Bove and Gleditsch present compelling research exploring the conditions under which intake of refugees is related to non-state violence. Their argument ultimately makes the quality of institutions the independent variable in determining the impact of refugee resettlement (Bohmelt et. al. 2019, 77). Specifically, the authors argue that “countries with more professional institutions are likely to be in a better position to minimize the negative social and economic aspects linked to refugee populations,” (Bohmelt et. Al. 2019, 77). Of course here we return to the original problem that comes with defining “good” governance; who gets to determine what qualifies an institution as “professional,” and whose interests are these institutions constructed to serve? To answer this question, we need to expand our vision to include the international regimes that may impact the domestic institutions in question.

Acemoglu and Robinson argue in their book, *Why Nations Fail*, that extractive economic institutions cause states to fail while inclusive economic institutions encourage economic growth (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Acemoglu and Robinson's analysis of institutions is based on the New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach developed by Douglas North (1990, 1995), which defined institutions as "constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions," which may be both formal (laws, constitutions) as well as informal (customs) and together regulate social life (North 1990). The importance of institutions, then, is derived from their capacity to facilitate social life to the degree that economic development is possible.

Acemoglu and Robinson depend on this understanding of institutions and their relevance to the economy to argue that 1) by state failure, we are actually talking about the economy of the state and 2) this failure is brought on by institutions that only allow the elite to participate in the economy, while excluding the vast majority of the population. This dynamic allows the elite to stay in power at the expense of everyone else in the country (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). This book does not specifically discuss the governance of refugees, it does make conclusions about state capacity and good governance more broadly. However, its unique emphasis on the relationship between institutions and the political economy is relevant to our research. While the authors' arguments encompass the

political economy aspect of state capacity and institutions more than most, it still disappoints in putting these issues into the greater context of the power dynamics in the international political economy. The authors mention that many of the “failed states” come from colonial backgrounds, though not all. Here, their point was not to seek explanation for extractive economic institutions, but to point out that it is not just one type of state that may have extractive institutions. In our research, we would like to add to this intersection of institutions and the political economy and broaden it beyond the purely nationalist context.

It is not enough to assume institutions as an organic independent variable that affects governance, we will explore them as an expression of social relations and a mechanism in a greater process of the global refugee regime. As Jayasuriya and Rodan (2007) suggest, the significance of institutions is not because of their effectiveness or health, but rather because of their potential to either allow or deny the expression of interests in spaces where policy decisions are made (Jayasuriya and Rodan, 2007). Furthermore, in a state that is situated in a global capitalist structure, we must understand how “domestic” institutions cannot be analytically isolated from the global economy in which they exist.

1.2 A Novel Approach

The current literature on Turkey’s governance of Syrian refugees is built on the theoretical foundations discussed in this introduction and thus they assume the

same shortcomings prevalent in these theories. Existing studies on Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees do not pay due attention to power hierarchies, to contestations and the social tensions they cause, nor to the strategic construction of institutions to privilege certain interests over others. By introducing the State Transformation Approach to this topic, we seek to remedy these shortcomings and present a causally connected synthesis of Turkey's political economic development and its governance of Syrian refugees. We argue that this governance area represents one example of a process in the Turkish Regulatory State model.

In the next chapter we will explain in depth the pillars of the STA, but in the remainder of this chapter we will give a brief historical background of Turkey's role in the Syrian refugee regime to illustrate why it is a relevant and long-lasting policy issue for the Turkish government. We will then continue with our methodology section, in which we will explain why process-tracing is compatible with our research question and theoretical framework.

1.3 Background

Keohane's puzzle of "compliance" in the case of Turkey and this regime is especially perplexing if we consider Turkey's historic relations with Syria.

Whereas structural realists would argue that a state will not participate in a regime if it compromises their security interests (Krasner, 1982), a review of Turkey's

history with Syria and the history of security issues at the Turkey-Syria border proves that this regime does involve Turkey's security. We can better understand how Syrian refugees can be framed as a non-traditional security issue, a concept that the STA is able to explain in a way that none of the previously discussed regime theories can, by briefly introducing the history of Turkish-Syrian relations. As we will see, security concerns have dominated relations between the two states for most of their histories. Additionally, we refer to the Syrians migrating to Turkey for the last decade as "refugees," according to the 1951 Refugee Convention's definition of "someone who is unable or unwilling to return their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion," (UN, 2021). This definition is also a part of the regime that we will analyze as a mechanism in the empirical analysis of this research, but for now it is worth briefing the history of the Syrian civil war to illustrate how the actions of the Assad administration justify Syrian migrants as refugees according to this definition.

1.3.1 Turkish Syrian Relations (1980-1998)

Turkey and Syria's opposing positions on the PKK has been a critical point in the contention between the countries. The Kurdish people, a stateless ethnic group spread out primarily among Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran (Aras and Köni, 2002), have had their fair share of independence movements in Turkey since the

establishment of the state, but the most notable of these efforts arose in Turkey in the 1980s and brought national attention to what Turkey, among other countries, recognize as a terrorist group: the PKK (James and Özdamar, 2009). James and Özdamar stress the PKK as the “foremost” explanatory factor in understanding Turkish-Syrian relations pre-Syrian Civil War by connecting foreign policy decisions in Syria back to concerns for PKK terrorism (James and Özdamar 2009, 25). Their argument is convincing as we note how the current administration in Ankara has repeatedly identified the PKK as an existential threat, making allies of the group similarly threatening. The authors explain that in the 1980s, as Turkey became increasingly concerned of the existential threat that the PKK posed on Turkish sovereignty, Syria was providing the PKK with strategic support, helping PKK members to enter Turkey through Syria in addition to providing sanctuary for PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in Syria for nearly two decades (Olson 2000, 2001). Over the course of a series of negotiations, threats of full-scale war increased until 1998, when the two countries signed the Adana agreement, in which Syria officially ended their support for the PKK and agreed to return Öcalan to Turkey (James and Özdamar, 2009). Following this agreement, scholars mark a period of “normalization” in Turkish-Syrian relations, marked by increased diplomatic interactions, economic ties, and even joint military exercises by 2009 (Kanat, 2010). This period is also marked by former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s self-proclaimed “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy agenda. Davutoğlu argued in a 2008 article that the new era of relations

between Damascus and Ankara is evident of the success of this policy agenda (Davutoğlu, 2008). The beginning of the Syrian Civil War marked the end of this period of high cooperation, and Turkey's historical anxiety over Syria hosting Kurdish terrorists eager to carry out violence against the Turkish state returned as a serious concern.

1.3.2 Turkish Policy Post- Syrian Civil War (2011-Present)

Amidst the beginning of the 2011 uprisings sprouting among Arab countries, what later would be called the Arab Spring, in Syria groups from many different backgrounds united in their discontent with the Assad administration to protest the regime; not to overthrow it, at least initially, but to push for reform (Joya, 2012). When the government responded with hard and fast indiscriminate violence, Islamic opposition groups rapidly came out of the woodwork pursuing regime overthrow and some seeking support of the international community in this goal (Joya, 2012).

Violence against civilians sparked more protests, which were met with more militant reciprocation from the regime and by May 2011, security forces were conducting raids in Homs, Damascus, and Daraa, among other cities where protests persisted despite state violence (Szybala, 2014). The initial small group of refugees crossed Turkey's border under laws that did not require Syrians to have a visa to enter Turkey, and soon after this initial group Ankara announced an

open-door policy that allowed all Syrians into the country, regardless of how they got there (Koca, 2016). Later the same year, as numbers of arrivals continued to increase, Ankara announced it would grant Syrian refugees “temporary protection,” (Koca, 2016). By 2012, several opposition and rebel groups had organized. When a ceasefire agreement between these groups and the Assad regime fell through, Syria collapsed into all-out civil war (Szybala, 2014). With this destabilization following a brief period where return to some normalcy seemed possible (indicated by some refugees returning from Syria to Turkey). With this breaking point, Turkey went from closing a brief emergency to facing a disaster with no politically expedient end in sight.

1.3.2.1 Shifting Messages and Managing the Unthinkable (2012-2016)

In October of 2012, the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey (including arrivals and births) surpassed the 100,000 mark that Ankara formerly claimed was the maximum number of refugees the country could handle (France-Presse, 2012). In reaction to these rapidly climbing numbers (by 2015, new arrivals numbered more than 500,000) Ankara began to sporadically close the border beginning in 2012 (Koca, 2016). However, after a series of terrorist attacks around the border beginning in 2015, the Turkish government became more committed to limiting movement across the border (Montague, Rosen and Williams, 2016). Following these attacks, Turkey took several steps to formally secure its border with Syria that was once relatively permeable for refugees. In direct response to these

heightened terrorist risks, Turkey amended the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection so that those arrested for association with terrorism or deemed a threat to public order could be deported on these grounds (Koca, 2016). Additionally, Turkish border patrol began to specify where exactly Syrians were allowed to cross the border, limiting legal immigration to official border posts and making those who crossed elsewhere at risk for deportation on grounds of illegal immigration (Batalla and Tolay, 2018). Finally, beginning in 2016 and completed in 2018, Turkey constructed a new security barrier that would reinforce the mandate for Syrians to only cross using official border posts (Aldroubi, 2018). All of these steps contributed to a growing number of Syrians living in make-shift camps on the Syrian side of the Turkey-Syria border (Nas, 2019).

1.3.2.2 Integration and Other Long-Term Solutions (2016-Present)

The stream of Syrians fleeing their home country did not only affect Turkey, but also quickly became a concern for the European Union when EU member states began experiencing a flow of Syrian refugees from 2015 onwards, as well (Spindler, 2015). In 2016, the EU and Turkey signed a deal aiming to limit the number of Syrians that were illegally entering the EU by initially fleeing to Turkey and then crossing the Aegean sea into Greece (Nas, 2019). According to the deal, Greece could return all irregular arrivals to Turkey, and for each person returned the EU promised one refugee from Turkey would be resettled in the EU (Nas, 2019). Additionally, the EU also conditionally promised to pay Turkey,

over the course of the next 4 years, 6 billion euros in aid for Syrian resettlement in Turkey (Terry, 2021). This element of the deal has been a point of major contention in EU-Turkish politics, as many Turkish politicians argue that the full payment schedule remains unfulfilled to this day (Simsek, 2021). Additionally, the deal has been criticized by many non-governmental organizations, politicians, and private individuals alike for being inhumane and ignoring the safety of the refugees in question. Measurements of success of the deal is checkered and there is no resounding consensus of how the deal has impacted the greater refugee crisis. Nevertheless, the general blueprint that the deal lays out as a way of controlling irregular Syrian passage into the EU remains today in 2021 (Terry, 2021).

Today, Turkey hosts more than 3.5 million Syrians under the “temporary protection” status (UNHCR, 2020). Furthermore, the steady increase despite efforts to limit migration can be explained by the children born to these families in Turkey, estimated in 2019 at 465 babies per day (Erdoğan, 2019). The growing number of Syrians born in Turkey, a growing population under temporary protection status though they have never personally lived in Turkey, illustrates the pressure Ankara is under to make policy which responds to the possibility of a long-term Syrian population in Turkey. Indeed, the decline in arrivals but increase in births combined with the lack of returns to Syria confirm that what was

considered a decade ago as a temporary situation is today a new dimension of the permanent Turkish resident population.

1.4 Methodology

This research uses process tracing as a way of illustrating the dynamic processes between actors, institutions, and their interests that constitutes the particular international regime in question. Process tracing has been subject to criticism because of the wide variety of ways it is applied by different field of the social sciences. Researchers criticize the wide misuse and misunderstanding of process tracing (the whole purpose of Collier's 2011 article on how to effectively use process tracing). Thus, we will be clear here to explain the most important pillars of process tracing, how its flexibility makes it a versatile approach, and why it is well suited to answer the questions posed in this study.

1.4.1 Process Tracing: A Brief Overview

Process tracing is a methodological approach chiefly concerned with investigating causal claims behind both macro and micro social phenomena (Mahoney, 2010). This approach departs from method that focuses on isolating variables in order to find correlational relationships and instead acknowledges phenomena as a result of the interplay between processes and events (Robinson, 2017). In explaining how process-tracing is an under-utilized resource in securitization literature, Robinson refutes arguments that process-tracing is inherently positivist because of

its commitment to causal explanations by explaining how process tracing can be used to “examine the social mechanisms which brought a social phenomenon into being,” (Robinson, 2017, referencing Balzacq, 2010a, 49).

It is especially useful for within-case analysis and is a nice pairing with quantitative analysis precisely because it prods the relationships that quantitative data alone is unable to explain (Collier, 2011). To accomplish this, process tracing demands two main requirements: thorough description and thorough sequencing (Collier, 2011, Mahoney, 2010). When understanding exactly what proper description and sequencing entails for process tracing, Collier offers an insightful explanation: “the descriptive component of process tracing begins not with observing change or sequence, but rather with taking good snapshots at a series of specific moments” (Collier 2011, 824). In other words, time and context should always be recognized as relevant to describing any event. As we are seeking to understand how events are “unfolding over time,” (Collier 2010, 824), Collier’s so-called “snapshots” are important in that they allow us to deeply explore multiple dimensions of one event without being overwhelmed by the scope of time. In this way, we need not try to superficially isolate time, place, and agent when investigating a given event, but rather we understand that events are complicated in themselves and operate as mechanisms that constitute greater social processes (Mahoney, 2010).

Another important element of process tracing is the kind of tests available to disprove possible hypotheses. The strongest test that process-tracing may use is rarely successful in the social sciences: the doubly decisive test, which at once confirms one hypothesis and eliminates others (Collier, 2011). Instead, this project will primarily seek to use two other tests that encourage further research by propagating more questions as opposed to claiming final conclusions: hoop tests and smoking gun tests.

1.4.2 Suitability of Process Tracing

Having established the most basic and important tenants of process tracing, we can elaborate on why this methodological approach is especially appropriate for this research project and how it enables a contextualized analysis of the emerging outcomes as a result of a series of processes and events – that is, the outcomes in the governance of Syrian refugees that has developed in a context of transformative processes and events that Turkey has experienced over time. First, it may go without saying that this project is basically concerned with investigating causal claims that are suggested by our theoretical framework, the STA. Second, this project is essentially a case study, investigating governance of refugees in the case of Turkey. The selection of this case follows a “most likely” logic (Mahoney, 2010), in that we are, at the outset, identifying the Turkish case as most likely to reject mainstream IR theories and require a novel theoretical approach. Specifically, we identify it as most likely to be compatible with the State

Transformation Approach. As a case study, we are able to conduct the appropriately thorough descriptive work required by process tracing necessary for analysis which would be considerably more difficult, if not impossible, for a project of much greater scope.

The emphasis process-tracing places on description makes it especially attractive to our research. Though we ultimately will offer explanatory hypotheses, description is a key element of this research in that we seek to redefine the fundamental building blocks at different levels of analysis commonly addressed in refugee governance literature (the state, the international community, international orgs, etc). Another specific point of suitability lies in how process tracing allows us to focus on mechanisms that are inextricably intertwined as opposed to isolated variables. Although this research is not on securitization, we take inspiration from Corey Robinson's 2017 piece on how process tracing might be used in securitization. Specifically, Robinson explains how this focus on social mechanisms gives the researcher freedom to incorporate the dynamic characteristic of social phenomena even into causal arguments (Robinson, 2017). Similarly, the nature of STA requires that we seek out dynamic explanations.

1.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have pointed out the shortcomings of existing theoretical approaches used to study Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees, and briefly

alluded to how the State Transformation Approach responds to these problematic elements. In sum, regime theories do not pay enough attention to the hierarchies that sustain international regimes, securitization theories do not acknowledge the contestations among securitizing actors and the social tensions around these contestations, and studies that assume neoliberal conceptualizations of the state are often prescriptive in that they focus on the qualities of institutions without critically examining how these institutions are intentionally constructed to serve certain interests. We posit that the STA brings a novel perspective to this subject and allows us to explore how this governance area serves as an example of a process of the Turkish Model of the Regulatory State.

In the following chapter, we will outline our theoretical framework in greater detail, especially focusing on the robust political-economic dimensions of the STA. In the third chapter, we will apply this framework to Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees, narrowing our empirical exploration to Gaziantep, a municipality in Southeast Turkey with an exceptionally high concentration of the Syrian refugee population. Finally, in the fourth chapter, we will discuss the conclusions we can draw from this project.

CHAPTER 2

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

In their study on using the State Transformation Approach to study the Chinese state and other “rising powers,” Hameiri and Jones identify three mechanisms of transformation: internationalization, decentralization, and fragmentation (Hameiri and Jones, 2016). These mechanisms are the result of a broader transformation of states around the world into “regulatory states,” in which a state’s central leadership “sets broad targets for diverse national, subnational, and private bodies,” (Hameiri and Jones, 2016 referencing Majone, 1994). As Hameiri and Jones explain, this trend of transformation towards regulatory statehood is a product of the neo-liberal world order, in which “the state’s role was fundamentally reconfigured from supporting a social-democratic compact through the developmentalist intervention to securing global competitiveness,” (Hameiri and Jones, 2016 referencing Cerny, 1997). In other words, increased privatization and capital liberalization was presented as the answer to capitalism crises of the 1970s, and as a result state governance became more about promoting and protecting itself in the global market, and thus protecting capital interests. Under this shift, states less and less fit descriptions of “monoliths” or “unitary actors” prescribed by traditional IR theory, and have become “fragmented, decentralized,

and internationalized” to the ends of first and foremost protecting capital interests (Hameiri and Jones, 2016).

In their study of China, Hameiri and Jones focus on the broad goals and interests of the central Chinese state, and how these initiatives are realized through these transformation mechanisms. The authors suggest this framework be applied to other rising powers in explaining their strategies, which may prove to be more disaggregated than grand. However, we argue that this theoretical framework could be especially useful for explaining a state’s governance of irregular migration issues because of the inherently transnational nature of irregular/forced migration and refugee crises in the globalized economy. To explain a state’s governance of such issues, we must have a theoretical framework that allows for internationalization as an expectation, not an exception. Of course, more specifically we focus on the case study of Turkey’s governance of Syrian refugees because of the lack of diverse or rigorous theory that has been applied to this case, especially.

In this chapter, we will elaborate on how we modify Hameiri and Jones’ theoretical model for this study. First, we must discuss the connection between non-traditional security issues, refugee crises among them, and the global economy, as well as why other IR theories struggle to explain governance of these issues. Second, we will describe the major assumptions of the State

Transformation Approach (STA), which is the broader theoretical school that Hameiri and Jones adopt in their China study. Finally, we will explain the framework we will use in the next chapter to examine our case study.

2.1 The Evolution of Security

Before discussing in-depth the concept of a non-traditional security (NTS) issue, let us briefly note what “tradition” denotes in the subfield of Security Studies within International Relations. In their 2009 book *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Buzan and Hansen chronicled the major events of the 20th century that shaped how IR scholars defined and studied the topic of “security.”

The authors label the camp that advocate for a military state-centric agenda as security “traditionalists.” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). Traditional security issues in IR literature were at once limited to those issues that concerned state survival and the behavior between the military arms of states (Hameiri and Jones, 2013).

Critical security scholars argue that security studies must be “deepened,” in that we must ask whose security is being threatened besides the state’s, and “widened,” in that military threats do not constitute all possible threats to security (Buzan, Waeber, and de Wilde, 1998; Krause and Williams, 1996). In short, the traditional ideas about security that proliferated during and after the interwar period of the 20th century often disappoint when faced with explaining and analyzing phenomena that pose a threat to both states and individuals that cannot be eliminated militarily.

2.1.1 Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Issues

NTS issues share certain traits that Hameiri and Jones initially identify in their 2013 article, “The Politics and Governance of International Security,” and these authors expand their discussion on defining NTS in several subsequent works we also reference in this project. Whereas traditional security issues are based on interstate conflict, NTS issues are often labeled as “transnational” because they have the potential to impact any state in the international system. They cannot be addressed by targeting one state or coalition force, but instead they require “post-national governance” because they are deemed “beyond the capacity of individual states to manage” (Hameiri and Jones, 2015: 51). In their 2013 article, Hameiri and Jones call NTS issues “mostly transnational issues...thought to traverse national borders and operate beyond the scope of conventional state action.” Additionally, the authors note that these issues do not always pose an existential threat to the state, but they may instead be perceived or framed as inhibiting the state sovereignty and its capacity to protect its population (Hameiri and Jones, 2013: 462). Regime theories as well as securitization theories have tried to address the proliferation of NTS issues, but here we will discuss the theoretical weaknesses of these approaches.

2.1.1.1 Theoretical Approaches to NTS

The regime theories we critiqued in the last chapter draw causal arrows between NTS issues and regime formation, and with it interstate cooperation within these regimes. However, their discussion of NTS tends to be limited to the identification of these issues in their role in regime formation. Not only do these theories not venture into exploring the power dynamics between states within international regimes, analytically indifferent towards the economic hierarchies embedded in these institutions, they also do not explore *why* these issues have been deemed beyond the capacity of the state to manage unilaterally. In other words, regime theories discuss transnational issues as the origin of regimes without exploring why certain issues are deemed too large for states to handle individually.

2.2 The Political Economy of NTS

Our explanation of state transformation is rooted in the assumption of power structures embedded in the global political economy (Hameiri and Jones 2013). Hameiri and Jones note that scholars and politicians alike have called NTS threats “undesirable side effects of economic development,” and “the dark side of globalization,” (Hameiri and Jones, 2015, referencing G8 1999; Smith, 2001; Mittelman, 2010). Instead of treating this trend as a natural consequence of globalization, we use the STA to show how the treatment of certain issues as transnational purposefully privileges capital interests. This critical lens is based on Marxist theories of development, such as Latin American dependency theory.

2.2.1 Dependency Theory

Latin American dependency theory was the response to the increasingly popular use of “modernization theory,” in explaining the development of states in the 1950s and 60s. According to modernization, any state must go through certain stages of economic and social stages to eventually become a fully “developed” country, with each stage working towards increasingly open economic engagement with the international market (Gilman, 2018). The school of modernization relied on David Ricardo’s thesis of comparative advantage, in which national economies benefit from specialization and trade (Aydinli and Bitekin, 2018). Meanwhile, Argentinian economist Raul Prebisch did not see this to be the case for South American economies being exploited by larger economies, and coined the term “declining terms of trade,” in which certain economies had to export more of their primary goods than larger economies to afford the same exports (in Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory terms (1976), these are known as core and periphery states, in which larger economies rely on the exploitation of other economies). As a result, only a select number of the largest economies benefited from this trade (Aydinli and Bitekin, 2018). Even as it describes this economic structure in which states are key actors, Latin American Dependency Theory is not state-centric. In their 1969 article, “Dependency and Development,” Cardoso and Faletto argue that the government actors in peripheral economies privilege the interests of the international economic

structure, and in doing so form international alliances with other global actors that hold the most capital (Cardoso and Faletto, 1969).

In 1970, Theotonio Dos Santos of Chile published “The Structure of Dependence,” in which he argues that “the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected,” (Dos Santos, 1970). Dos Santos, similar to Prebisch, disagrees with development literature that places the blame for “underdevelopment” of certain countries exclusively on the quality of institutions and cultural values of the state. Dos Santos identifies two kinds of states: dependent and dominant. The economies of dependent states expand and contract only in reaction to the dynamics of the dominant economies (Dos Santos, 1970). As we will explore in our next empirical chapter, the 2008 financial crisis and its impact of the world’s economies despite its direct origin in the US is a resounding endorsement of this theory.

Dependency theory offers two guiding observations for better understanding how any issue might come to be deemed “transnational.” First, the forces that affect the size and power of any national economy is not limited to the actors inside its borders; class alliances are made that transcend political territory and can either impede or protect economies. Second, we should not underestimate the degree to which most of the world’s national economies are at the mercy of the world’s few

largest economies. We can apply these observations by recognizing that capital interests already transcend national government and therefore national governments are limited in their choice of policy tools according to their position as either a dominant or dependent economy. This international economic structure that promotes alliances based on capital interest, and in doing so determines the policy tools available to any given national government, continues to transform power arrangements and with them the notion of what it means for any issue to be “transnational.”

2.2.2 International Labor: Commodity or Security Threat?

Our study touches on one such issue that is considered by policy practitioners and academics alike as transnational: forced or irregular migration. Because the global economic structure demands free movement of capital, national governments loosen their sovereignty claims on what goods and currency goes in and out of its borders. On the other hand, the same governments that encourage the free movement of capital have doubled down in using the protection of sovereignty as justification for restricting the movement of people. The promotion of the movement of capital contrasted with the restriction of the movement of people is not natural, but an intentional construction that privileges certain socio-economic interests over others.

At the turn of the 21st century and at a time of higher optimism for the neo-liberal “globalization” order, Henk Overbeek recognized the emergence of a global labor market incompatible with individual national labor migration systems and proposed a “new, multilateral, democratically screened, global migration regime,” (Overbeek, 2002). Twenty years later, such a regime has not emerged and traditional IR theories fail to explain the complexity around the simultaneous commodification of labor and the securitization of migration. Because there is no clear international migration regime with rules and norms on the migrant labor, migrants are securitized by some political actors and commodified by others.

This paradox of neoliberal capitalism comes to a head in Turkey’s refugee regime, as well, as refugees and irregular migrants (Syrians included) are simultaneously regarded as security threats by some political actors and highly useful for the economy by others. Belanger and Saracoglu, in their 2020 study on the AKP government’s leniency towards the use of refugees as informal labor, argue that this leniency is a product of the state-capital nexus, in which the state seeks to protect capital interests first (Belanger and Saracoglu, 2020). While we agree with their emphasis on the limits that capital interests place on governance, the article falls into the same trap as most traditional IR theories: personifying the state as a unitary actor with unified interests based on the dynamics of the global market. We posit, instead, that there may be multiple “capital interests” that may conflict with each other, producing fragmented government agencies and uneven

use of decentralized power across localities. In other words, it is possible for some to seek to securitize migrants for the sake of protecting their capital interests, while others may seek to commodify migrants in the sake of their respective capital interests. Thus, in order to explain governance of this population that is inarguably of some kind of interest to markets and the state, we must be able to analytically disaggregate this mythical monolithic state.

2.2.3 The French School of Regulation

In French economist Michel Aglietta's *A Theory of Capitalist Regulation*, he proposes that, "capitalism has the inherent ability to mobilize human energy and transform it into growth, but it does not have the capacity to convert the clash of individual interests into a coherent global system," (Aglietta, 1998). Because capitalism comes with inevitable periods of crisis of social relations, state involvement is required for its production and reproduction (Akçay, 2021, referencing Boyer, 1990). Akçay (2021) succinctly summarizes this Regulation Theory by calling it a mid-range theory that is interested in the "mechanisms and tendencies that create stability and crisis," (Akçay, 2021). Furthermore, because crises are inevitable in capitalism, eventually contradictions emerge from the state's regulation efforts, resulting in breakdown of social relations between groups of society (Hein et al. 2015 referencing Brenner and Glick, 1991). In sum, scholars of the Regulatory School argue that capitalism on its own is conflict-ridden and unsustainable without state intervention.

Regulation theory is highly compatible with any study that posits a Gramscian conceptualization of the state because, like the Gramscian state, it emphasizes the economic activities that constitute a society and the cause conflictual social relations because of contradictory interests (Hein et al., 2015). Indeed, the nature of crises identified by Regulatory School scholars are never detached from the social relations that constitute any economy.

2.2.3.1 Accumulation Regime and Mode of Regulation

Robert Boyer, another proponent of the French Regulation School, wrote on the crises that arise from “modes of development,” which he describes as the combination of the “capital accumulation regime” and “mode of regulation,” (Boyer, 1987; Hein et al., 2015). Boyer defines a capital accumulation regime as, “the whole set of regularities which allow a general and more or less consistent evaluation for capital formation” (Boyer, 1987). Akçay paraphrases this definition as “the political-economic model used by a society in a certain time period,” (Akçay, 2021). Any state’s capital accumulation regime is not organic, but rather established through inter-class and intra-class struggles, or the “power bloc” (Akçay, 2021; Poulantzas, 2008).

The mode of regulation describes the “emergent ensemble of rules, norms, conventions, patterns of conduct, social networks, organizational forms and

institutions which can stabilize an accumulation regime,” (Hein et al., 2015 quoting Jessop, 1997). While the accumulation regime and the mode of regulation of regulation are compatible, capitalism is reproduced. However, when inevitable contradictions arise between the social interests that make up the society in which the mode of development exists, a structural crisis occurs (Poulantzas, 2008; Hein et al., 2015; Akçay, 2021).

2.2.4 Authoritarian Neoliberalism

By using the term “authoritarian neoliberalism” in this project, we reiterate three important points: first, that the economic cannot be removed from the political (Tansel, 2018). Instead, as a Gramscian perspective of the state understands (which we will elaborate on further later in this chapter), both the economic and political are composed of the same social relations that constitutes the state itself (Gramsci, 1971; Poulantzas, 1976; Jessop, 1990). Second, “neoliberalization” or the process of imposing neoliberal reforms, is inherently anti-democratic, as it purposely redistributes power to those with the most capital (Tansel, 2018). On a global scale, we see how global neoliberalism produces “dependent” and “dominant” actors- a structure based on the need for inequality, as opposed to the one person = one vote prescribed by democratic ideals. Finally, by using the term “authoritarian neoliberalism” we posit that authoritarianism is not a crisis for neoliberalism to solve, but rather a crisis that neoliberalism causes (Tansel, 2018; Yalman, 2021). This goes back to the French Regulation School, in that there will

inevitably be structural crises between the capital accumulation regime and the modes of regulation because of the social tensions caused by the necessary structure of winners and losers under globalized capitalism. Our study echoes many other authors (Akçay, 2021; Tansel, 2018; Yalman, 2021) who have borrowed Offe's (1976) term "crisis of crisis management" to describe the structural crises that arise from trying to quiet the social crises inherent in capitalism.

2.2.5 Majone's Regulatory Model

The French Regulatory school is not to be confused with Italian political scientist Giandomenico Majone's "Regulatory State" model, in which "central government merely sets broad targets and regulations for diverse public and private actors," (Hameiri and Jones, 2020 summarizing Majone, 1997). Thus, "regulation" in this context refers to the central government's deferral to other actors along with a set of rules as opposed to direct intervention. However, the two are related in that they both describe the necessity of structures of control in order to keep up with the crises and contradictions that come with neoliberal capitalism. In Majone's Regulatory state, we are interested in how the central government harnesses a large diverse group of public and private actors to affect the "mechanisms of stability and crisis" to which Akçay alludes. For example, a capital accumulation regime in Majone's Regulatory Model may include a free-floating exchange rate so that it is more under the influence of global capitalists than under control of the

central government. The mode of regulation will include reliance on a large network of actors to maintain this accumulation regime. Additionally, they both disaggregate the state into a network of actors and coalitions of conflicting interests under neoliberalism. Finally, both schools focus on how the hegemony of neoliberalism has transformed the very nature of states.

However, Majone's regulatory state model more specifically describes a trend of change in the actors involved in this intervention; failures of the government to resolve crises have shifted the locus of control so that, "public utilities and other industries deemed to affect the public interest are left in private hands, but are subject to rules developed and enforced by specialized agencies," (Majone, 1997).

Majone's work focuses on this trend in European states, where he frames it as a response to "increased international competition and deepening economic and monetary integration within the European Union," (Majone, 1997).

2.2.5.1 Dependent Regulatory States

Hameiri and Jones reference how the trend that Majone wrote on specifically in Europe has spread to the Global South and to "rising powers," using the State Transformation Approach as their framework for analysis. The authors point out how both the IMF and the World Bank have played a crucially influential role in the growing trend toward regulatory statehood, as the structural adjustment programs it imposed with its aid packages encouraged environments in which

globalized neoliberal could thrive (Hameiri and Jones, 2016 referencing Harrison, 2004). This aspect of the Regulatory School is one of the ways it calls back to South American Dependency Theory; the trending nature of regulatory statehood is due in part to the power relations of the globalized economy.

2.2.6 Transformation Towards Regulatory States

Our research seeks to explain the ways in which Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees constitutes a process in the transformation towards Regulatory Statehood as described first by Majone (1994) and adopted later by Hameiri and Jones (2016). However, the French Regulatory School also influences our research, as we posit that this transformation is based on the compulsion of the Turkish state to reproduce and maintain capitalism. We also echo arguments that authoritarian modes of governance are a product of neoliberalism, as opposed to a threat to it, and neoliberalism has indeed encouraged authoritarianism (Yalman, 2021). That being said, we will illustrate how in pursuit of the "hegemonic project of recomposition of the rule of capital in most areas of social life," (Yalman, 2021) a state may simultaneously feature a central government with highly consolidated power and a large group of diverse public and private actors (Hameiri and Jones, 2016 referencing Majone, 1994) responsible for governance. With this argument, we offer an alternative to frameworks that use institutional strength/weakness, or state capacity, as the causal mechanism behind governance outcome, instead focusing on the structural conditions that determine whose interests will be

privileged and whose are ignored or minimized. The purpose of this theoretical framework is to give a roadmap for tracing the processes that constitute this transformation.

2.3 STA Major Assumptions

2.3.1 Problematizing the Weberian/Neo-Weberian State

The reason mainstream IR theories struggle to explain the ways states handle migration is because of their reliance on the neo-Weberian conceptualization of states, which proposes institutional capacity as the independent variable that affects policy as opposed to the economic conditions that create the social relations that constitute institutions. That is Weberian and Neo-Weberian states are considered “sovereign monoliths, coherently ruling bounded territories” (Hameiri and Jones 2016, 78). Max Weber framed his conceptualization of the state in terms of the means that a state is uniquely entitled to in order to secure a defined territory, this means namely being violence (Weber, 1918). Second, Weber emphasizes the collectivity of the state; this monopoly of violence is not divided amongst actors within a given territory, but rather the collective power that holds this monopoly of violence constitutes the state (Weber, 1918). However, the problems that faced new, post-colonial states in the twentieth century proved this question of who is and is not entitled to violence, or who is and is who is not “the state” much murkier than Weberian theory allows.

Nevertheless, Weberian state ideas and their assumptions about state power have persisted in IR theories and have been reiterated; the field of public administration has adopted Weberian concepts around the centrality of the state as the “main facilitator to the new problems of globalization” (Lynn Jr., 2009) and supplements it with the additional importance of state institutions and bureaucracy in delivering state services to citizens (Lynn Jr., 2009).

A great deal of Neo-Weberian literature is dedicated to improving the quality of state institutions for the sake of meeting the needs of citizens better. Thus, it is not surprising that many analyses of governance of refugees or other cases of irregular/forced migration largely take a neo-Weberian approach, in which state capacity is central and assessed in terms of institutions (we touched on one such example in the first chapter: Acemoglu and Robinson’s *Why Nations Fail* (2012)). When studying national refugee regimes, authors echo the logic of modernization theorists by placing great importance on assessing internal institutions without discussion on the international political economic context in which state institutions exist, all while comfortably separating “the state” from its institutions without critical engagement of either.

Both classical Weberian and neo-Weberian theories ignore the history of the formation of most modern states and the role of the political economy in determining what power any entity is actually afforded. Perhaps neo-Weberian

theorists try to compensate for classical Weberian theory's neglect of decentralized actors within the state, but it still does not go far enough to question why the state does not operate as a unitary actor as Weber theorized. The State Transformation Approach proposes a radically different conceptualization of the state, in which it is not taken for granted as a unitary actor and is recognized as inextricable from the global political economy. Therefore, it offers a uniquely compelling framework by which to study non-traditional security issues, which we have discussed as defiant of political boundaries. Let us now describe in-depth the tenants of the STA, which is the foundation of our theoretical framework.

2.3.1.1 In Contrast: Gramscian Conceptualization of the State

To understand the dynamic influence of the power structure within the global political economy, we need to conceptualize the state in a way that accounts for the state not just as an outcome or as a unitary actor, but as a process itself. For example, some might reasonably cite the institution of sovereignty when explaining the securitization of NTS issues like migration in the 21st century. Sovereignty for the state is commonly defined as its ability to “control actors and activities within and across its borders” (Thomson, 1995: 213). However, if we consider other conceptualizations of the state outside of it being a unitary actor, then the question of *who* gets to exercise sovereignty remains up for debate. This uneven distribution of sovereignty is a more accurate picture of world politics, but we need a non-Weberian, post-Westphalian theory of the state to explain it.

To address such issues, the STA is grounded in a Gramscian conceptualization of the state (Gramsci, 1971), which was later elaborated by Poulantzas in 1978, and again by Jessop in 1990 (Hameiri and Jones, 2013). According to this model, the state is defined not as an inevitable apparatus, nor as the sum of its political institutions, but as a “social relation,” (Hameiri, 2020). In other words, we cannot separate the state from society, nor society from the economy it constitutes (Tansel, 2018). We adopt Hameiri and Jones’ succinct description of the Gramscian state in their study on the transformation of China, which explains that states are “neither the unitary actors of IR theory, expressing a ‘national interest’ or ‘identity’, nor politically neutral, rationally designed, problem-solving instruments; rather, they are institutional ensembles that reflect and embed historically evolving social power relations,” (Hameiri and Jones, 2016). As such, the dynamics of social relations intentionally protect certain interests over other and there is a constant conflict often between social classes to identify whose interests should be put in this privileged position (Hameiri and Jones, 2015). Furthermore, these social classes are not limited to political borders; class unites interest groups to defend their own agendas and in doing so affect inter-state relationships and hierarchies (as fleshed out by Dependency Theory scholars). Thus, the competition of interests that constitute any state do not happen in a vacuum; social classes are inherently international in a global economy.

When we look at the world through this lens, a puzzle emerges as to how anything can be sorted as “domestic” or “transnational;” in a structure where class interest groups already transcend national borders, why do some issues fall more so on the responsibility of the international community than others? Fortunately, the Gramscian/Dependency Theory lens also provides a solution to this puzzle: the political economy. NTS issues often summon efforts to regulate or control specifically the economic activity connected to these issues because if an issue affects one state’s economy, other economies will most likely feel the shockwaves in the current highly interconnected liberal world order. Furthermore, states that are more vulnerable in this structure face economic consequences for not conforming to the norms and rules set by the states in which the most capital is held. In short, issues that are deemed transnational are those which somehow concern the movement of capital. The ways in which state actors create international networks in the governance of these issues changes the power structures within the state as well.

2.3.2 Politics of Scale

The STA argues that the governance of NTS issues involves politics of scale, a concept coming from critical political geographers based on the notion that “power relationships run through the construction of space, and in turn, the spatial organization of political and economic governance helps (re)produce particular power relations in society” (Hameiri and Jones, 2015, referencing Massey, 1992;

Harvey, 2006). In other words, critical geographers submit that the physical territory involved in political power is more important than traditional IR theories have allowed. The STA emphasizes the fact that the jurisdiction to which any issue is assigned, ranging in possibility from local to international with many levels in between, has major consequences on the power of the political actors involved. The answer to who controls space informs how power structures are organized, and determining this organization is a process wrought with conflict (Hameiri and Jones, 2015). Again, let us remember the Gramscian idea of the state, which is itself built on the idea of competing interests between social classes. Politics of scale, then, is an extension of this process.

Hameiri and Jones discuss how governance over any NTS issue involves “politics of scale,” in which actors work out “the appropriate scale” at which these transnational issues should be governed (Hameiri and Jones 2015, 51). In this process, new scales of governance may be created which integrate actors and institutions that formerly were more distinct from each other (Hameiri and Jones, 2015). Importantly, “rescaling” does not mean power is completely confiscated from certain actors and reassigned to others, but rather power is reconfigured among existing institutions and creates new functions of international governance (Hameiri and Jones, 2015). This rescaling process and the importance of space are inextricably connected in the STA, in that “scales” of governance refer to the territory over which any actor has power.

The complexity for IR scholars of NTS issues, and especially migration, is most often in how they are dynamic in the space they concern. Because they do not limit themselves to national borders, they challenge any state centric model of explanation. As no mainstream IR theory accounts for these processes, it should be no surprise that they are not fit to explain highly space-dependent issues like migration. Politics of scale, and with it spatial politics, tells the story of how political actors attempt to reckon with this territorial fluidity of NTS issues.

2.3.3 Defining Transformation

The changes enacted through politics of scale constitute state transformation, defined by Hameiri and Jones as “institutionalized and/or routinized shifts in the distribution, production, and reproduction of state power in particular states, (Hameiri and Jones, 2015: 73). The State Transformation Approach, then, examines these shifts in light of how we have already explained the state: a dynamic contest of interests set in a political economic structure that privileges capital. When we discuss changes to arrangements of power within the state and between states, it is important to keep this conceptualization in mind, as transformation is not a novel or alien malady for the state, but an extension of what it already is: a dynamic competition of interests.

2.3.3.1 Transformation Mechanisms

Hameiri identifies three possible forms of state transformation: shifts in the location of state power (domestic/international/supranational institutional changes), shifts in ideological rationalization for use of state power (or changes in rules and norms), and shifts in actors and agencies exercising state power (Hameiri, 2020). Concerning a trending transformation towards the “regulatory state,” the first and third forms of state transformation are most apparent, as a diverse, disaggregated array of actors are practically responsible for seeing out the initiatives of central leadership. In their 2016 study on Chinese transformation, Hameiri and Jones identify three mechanisms by which shifts in location of state power and shifts in actors exercising state power are manifested: fragmentation of state institutions, decentralization of state power, and internationalization of governance (Hameiri and Jones, 2016). These are the three mechanisms we seek to identify in our theoretical framework, on which we will go into greater elaboration.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

This study’s theoretical framework is based on the STA’s ideas about inherently and constantly conflictual nature of the state and its implications of the political economic structure in explaining the dynamics of the social relations that constitute the state and its activity. Thus, the empirical data we are interested in encompasses all three traditional levels of analysis (individual, state, and system)

because our theoretical foundations insist on the inseparability of the state from the global economic structure, as well as the disaggregated nature of the state itself. That is to say, we reject the theoretical isolation of mechanisms according to these three levels of analysis. Instead, we propose a framework that first locates a state within the international economic power structure and then, within this context of either limited or unlimited policy tools, determines the degree to which this state exhibits “regulatory statehood.” To this end, our framework questions the degree to which the Hameiri and Jones’ three mechanisms of state transformation towards regulatory statehood are present: fragmentation, decentralization, and internationalization. If these mechanisms are indeed active, a diverse group of individual and collective actors should be apparent. Finally, to test for the process of the transformation towards regulatory statehood, we must analyze how these actors affect the realization of the broad goals of national central leadership. To be clear, this theoretical framework is tailored to testing specifically for transformation towards regulatory statehood, a trend which has been cited as a trend even outside of STA literature (i.e.: Dubash and Morgan (2013)). It does not represent the only kind of transformation possible according to the State Transformation Approach, but rather one transformative process that may explain the puzzle of seemingly disaggregated governance even within authoritarian states.

2.4.1 Establishing Economic Context

Our theoretical framework follows the argument that that transformation towards the regulatory state, as a global trend, is largely the result of the globalization of neoliberalism through both diffusion and the imposition by institutions like the IMF and World Bank (Hameiri and Jones, 2016). At this scale of globalized neoliberalism, there are winners and losers of capitalism and, to borrow from Dependency Theory's terms, "dependent and dominant" states. A state's capital accumulation regime may indicate where it falls on this spectrum and thus help us determine how vulnerable it is to shocks in the global economy. With this in mind, we must first identify the state in question's (for our study, Turkey) position within the global economy. This is crucial because we argue that this position greatly determines the policy tools available to it for any issue, but maybe even more so transnational issues. If the stakes are higher for the entire global economy, then the state will be more limited based on its position.

Furthermore, as we insist on a framework that does not separate the political from the economic, and thus neither the state from the society, part of establishing the economic context of a state undergoing transformation is also discussing in-depth the political outcomes of social relations forming around any given economic structure. We cannot understand any state in the global neoliberal structure's institutions outside of its mode of regulation.

2.4.2 Identifying Goals of Central Leadership

The idea that governance is not the outcome of some unitary state actor nor coherent state institutions, as Weberian and neo-Weberian theories would argue, but rather a process enacted by a large group of diverse public and private actors, underpins the State Transformation Approach (Hameiri and Jones, 2016; Jones, 2019). However, in keeping with the Regulatory State model (Majone, 1997), this network of actors does not act randomly, but in response to the directives and goals set by the central leadership that is composed of a power bloc (Poulantzas, 2008) with certain interests in mind. In a state that has developed under a regime of authoritarian neoliberalism, we can expect these goals to reflect the interests of capitalists; producing winners and losers.

To map out state transformation, then, we must identify the expressed goals of the power bloc and analyze how these goals speak to the state's mode of development. That is, how do these goals compliment the state's capital accumulation regime and mode of regulation? Hameiri and Jones (2016) and later Jones (2019) are interested in illustrating how state transformation is apparent specifically in China's foreign policy. Likewise, we focus our study on a specific process in the state: Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees. Having identified and analyzed the goals of central leadership regarding this governance process, we can then identify the transformation mechanisms that Hameiri and Jones posit:

fragmentation, decentralization, and internationalization (Hameiri and Jones, 2016).

2.4.3 Identifying the Three Transformation Mechanisms

2.4.3.1 Fragmentation and Decentralization

It is useful to discuss fragmentation and decentralization (as used by Hameiri and Jones) together as they represent two mechanisms that, together, change the location of power within the state. For both, the idea of politics of scale is important, as both mechanisms are concerned with *who* has influence and authority *where* within territory defined by political borders. Fragmentation refers to the break-up of political authority from the central government to local government entities. This does not only include structures like provinces and municipalities, but also iterations of central government agencies within these localities. Decentralization, then, is how power is dispersed amongst these fragmented institutions away from the central leadership. This decentralized power is not limited to government actors, local private actors may play a role in governance, as well. Finally, a state may experience fragmentation but not decentralization if there is an abundance of local entities, but they have little or no agency over governance and totally defer to the power of the central leadership.

2.4.3.2 Internationalization

Perhaps unsurprisingly given the global nature of class interests, rescaling is not limited to actors only within the state's territorial borders. The state is transformed via shifts in power arrangements as governance is assumed not only by "domestic" actors, but foreign actors as well, public and private alike. This process is what Hameiri and Jones describe as the "internationalization" of the state. As issues are deemed "transnational" and rescaled to the international level of politics, we should expect international actors to be present even within the state's territory, as they claim responsibility for governing the issue at hand. Thus, in empirical analysis, we must account for international actors, both private and states, that play a role in actively governing an issue in a foreign state.

2.4.4 Assessing Goal Actualization

Finally, we see the ultimate effects of these transformation mechanisms by assessing how each of these actors treat the initial goals established by the central leadership. To do so, we will consider the projects, policies, and initiatives of the network of actors identified in the transformation mechanism analysis. We will then compare these outcomes against the goals identified as those of the central leadership. Goal actualization may be assessed on a scale from totally aligned with to totally against the central leadership's broad goals. Because the political economy is such a strong causal mechanism in our theoretical framework, we expect that the position policy outcomes assume on the scale of goal actualization depends on the compatibility of the goal with global capital interests. If findings

support this hypothesis, then our theoretical framework takes on a feedback loop nature; as capital interests are served, the state's place in the global economic structure is further cemented.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we proposed a theoretical framework for understanding two trends that traditional IR scholarship fails to explain. First, as the economic interests of certain global social classes have blurred the line between domestic and international, there has been a proliferation of “transnational” issues. However, few have asked who benefits from this proliferation. Second, at the end of the 20th century, some scholars noted a trend in “regulatory statehood,” in which the central government established broad initiatives for decentralized actors to realize. Traditional IR theories fail to explain both of these trends, so we heed Hameiri and Jones’ advice and use the State Transformation Approach (STA) to explain the modern era of states and their governance.

The STA comes with critical assumptions about the nature of the state and emphasizes the importance of the political economy and the power arrangements within it. In keeping with a Gramscian lens, states themselves are not fixed, but malleable social manifestations. Thus, we cannot ignore the economic interests that are privileged by considering certain issues “transnational.” This project focuses on the rescaling and consequent state transformation of one issue and one

state in particular: Turkey and Syrian refugee resettlement. In the next chapter, we will construct this case study and explore the possible presence of the three transformation mechanisms identified in this chapter.



CHAPTER 3

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this chapter, we will examine how Syrian refugees are governed in Gaziantep using the STA-based theoretical framework outlined in the previous chapter, with the hypothesis that this governance is a dynamic process and part of Turkey's transformation into regulatory statehood. We will identify events indiscriminate of the level of analysis in which they fall in traditional IR scholarship (that is, individual, national, or international), that constitute the mechanisms of this governance process. In keeping with our theoretical framework, we will first discuss how the Turkish state and political economic context in which it exists are analytically inseparable from each other by describing the history of the current ruling party's rise to power as a continuation, rather than an exception, in Turkey's neoliberal capitalist development. In doing so, we recognize the patterns of social tensions and pressures rooted in the global economic structure that have been political determinants in the Turkish political landscape. With empirical data, we argue any explanation of Turkey's governance of refugees discussed outside of its political economic context is weak.

Because our theoretical framework suggests that the state and the political economic context in which it exists are inseparable, we describe Turkey's position

in this global economic system and the domestic economic concerns that proliferate as a result of this position. Indeed, we argue that leader personality or party ideology pales in significance in light of the structure in which institutions operate (the structure being the global political economy). Furthermore, in this chapter, we will allude to how the global political economy is relevant to understanding how governance of migrants and refugees is telling of the greater transformation of Turkey's political regime, a topic many of studies have attempted to explain without using the theoretical framework we posit.

For example, Esen and Gumuscu describe the Turkish state as a “competitive authoritarian” regime, in which elections do occur but the playing field for potential opposition the ruling party is not level and civil liberties are not respected by the state (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016). In terms of the party's governance modalities for holding office and dealing with the malcontent of the voting population through censorship, we do not disagree with their central argument. However, our analytical approach differs in its interest to understand the social relationships that are grounded in Turkey's capitalist development, which we argue underpin the way institutions operate. Hence, the authoritarian turn invoked in Esen and Gumuscu's work as well as many others, as well as the coalition support for the AKP, must be contextualized in Turkey's longer history of social dynamics under capitalist development. In other words, we explore the political economic foundations for the AKP's initial electoral success, and how its

responses to socio-economic pressures over the last twenty years reflect global capitalist relations and the authoritarian neoliberal nature of the Turkish state.

Having illustrated the underlying power dynamics of the global economic structure and the necessarily authoritarian features of neoliberalism, we will place the Turkish government's expressed goals regarding Syrian refugees within this socio-political landscape. We will discuss how these goals constitute a mechanism of the state's regulation of neoliberal capitalism and how they attempt to reconcile the social tensions and the economic benefits that we expect to rise out of authoritarian neoliberalism. Finally, we will identify the three main mechanisms of transformation discussed in the previous chapter: internationalization, decentralization, and fragmentation. To illustrate each of these mechanisms in appropriate detail, we will identify the multitude of diverse actors involved in the governance of Syrians. We will explore how these mechanisms are a product of the state's inextricable position within a global political economy, and how these mechanisms affect the actualization of the state's goals within its context of authoritarian neoliberalism.

3.1 Authoritarian Neoliberalism and the AKP

While most studies that examine the authoritarian aspects of the AKP government identify a "turn" from their early democratizing era to their latter authoritarian

rule, we posit that Turkey's transformation towards regulatory statehood has been in process since the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s. Since these reforms, from party to party there are more continuities than differences in terms of efforts to manage the crises that are part and parcel of neoliberal, capitalist development. In keeping with our Gramscian framework of the state, we will contextualize the AKP's ascension as part of the social tensions that come with periods of economic turmoil.

3.1.1 AKP: More Continuity than Divide in Authoritarian Neoliberalism

While many studies have used frameworks of the AKP's rule that divide into it into the former democratization era and the latter era of democratic "backsliding," we build on the literature of critical scholars who contextualize the AKP's governance into a longer trend of Turkey's authoritarian neoliberalism development. Instead of isolating the AKP government from society, we observe how the history of the AKP government is simply one manifestation of the continuous underlying neoliberal capitalist development shaping the social relations that constitute the Turkish state. In the last theory chapter, we discussed critical scholars' arguments that problematize neoliberalism as requiring authoritarianism to reproduce capitalism. Authoritarian modalities must deal with "the crisis of crisis management." Akçay (2021) depicts the AKP government in two alternative periods based on these assumptions: "establishment of authoritarian neoliberalism," roughly 2002-2013, and "the structural crisis of

Turkish capitalism,” including the years after 2013 to present day. We differ from Akcay in that we point out how capitalist crisis characterizes the AKP’s initial electoral success in 2002. Let us review the political-economic events leading up to the AKP’s electoral success beginning from the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s to illustrate how the party was not an exceptional political force, but rather a part of the state’s efforts to reproduce capitalism and solve capitalism’s crises.

3.1.1.1 1980s: The Precursor to Authoritarian Neoliberalization

Neoliberal economic reforms of the 1980s brought on a new degree of capital accumulation than had been seen before some, and different scholars have tried to aggregate these businessmen under names such as the “Anatolian Islamic bourgeoisie” (coined by Hale and Özbudun, 2009), or “Islamic Capitalists” (Fabbe and Özale, 2019). On January 24, 1980, the Turkish government declared the dawn of a new era of economic liberalization, in which it would pursue an export-led growth model (Ertuğrul and Selçuk, 2001). This strategy was quite successful in terms of economic growth; between 1981 and 1988 the average annual GDP growth rate was 5.8% (Ertuğrul and Selçuk, 2001). The Turkish industrial sector especially saw growth, averaging 8.1% annual growth in the same years (Ertuğrul and Selçuk, 2001). The IMF praised Turkey in its reports during this period for being an exemplary model of the success of market liberalization (Ertuğrul and Selçuk, 2001). However, this liberalization was not the result of popular support, but rather imposed in a top-down fashion (Öniş, 2003). In contrast to the popular association with neoliberalism and democracy,

we see from the beginning of the IMF technocrats' involvement in Turkey the emergence of authoritarian neoliberalism. In support of the elite's economic restructuring endeavors, over the period of 1980-1985, the IMF, World Bank, and the OECD made 1.7 billion available in SDR and extended 1.6 billion USD in structural adjustment loans (Kopits, 1987). An IMF report following this period describes the goals of the reform regime as, "aimed at opening up the economy and promoting its reliance on market forces," (Kopits, 1987).

As a result of this export-driven growth model, formerly small-scale businessmen in the industry sector grew their businesses quickly. Hale and Özbudun describe this new class as both committed to "traditional moral values" and the neo-liberal economic policies that were instrumental in their new wealth accumulation (Hale and Özbudun, 2009). Acquisition of capital allowed a formerly disenfranchised social group to access political efficacy, and thus altered Turkey's social fabric around the perceptions of a depoliticized free market and its potential to generate wealth. Those with similar ideological leanings but without the capital to engage in politics themselves, namely the urban poor, found a new legitimate political movement to vote with. It was this coalition of voters – the "Islamic Capitalists" and the urban poor - that elected the AKP into power over the Turkish state in 2002. A new socio-economic group was able to mobilize their pursuit of their interests because of their possession of capital through widespread economic liberalization.

3.1.1.2 Dependent Financialization

While the IMF reforms of the 1980s were noteworthy in their impact on capital distribution and the social relations around the neoliberal market, they also set into motion the structural contradictions that are inherent in the maintenance of neoliberal capitalist development. As mentioned in our previous chapter, the Regulatory School uses the term “capital accumulation regime” to describe the political-economic model used by a given society in a certain time period.

Prescribed by the IMF-led reforms of the 1980s, Turkey developed what Akçay (2021) calls a capital accumulation regime of “dependent financialization” and describes its formation in three steps. First, exchange rate controls were abolished and the TL was allowed to float freely. Second, high interest rates were established to control inflation and create tight government austerity. Third, foreign capital flows became the primary source of economic growth (Akçay, 2021).

3.1.2 The 2001 Crisis: the AKP’s Opportunity

Under the newly forged dependent financialization capital accumulation regime, foreign capital flows became the fuel for growth of the Turkish economy. Thus, higher interest rates made Turkey’s economy more attractive to foreign investors. On the other hand, interest rates set too high hurt local economic growth. Akçay (2021) identifies this dilemma as one example of a “crisis of crisis management”

that is inherent in the reproduction of capitalism and should be expected in any neoliberal regime.

In 2001, the Turkish economy shrank by a remarkable 9.5% from the prior FY, the Turkish lira was volatile in the 1990s undergoing massive devaluation, and the banking sector was struggling as a result (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). The AKP's campaign answers to the economic woes of 2001 were based on leaning further into the IMF's program of market liberalization that would attract more foreign investment (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). By this point, the initial neoliberal reforms that had transformed Turkey's capital landscape was embedded in the fabric of Turkish social relations. Thus, the AKP's campaign was effective in as far as it promoted the reproduction of the capitalist development and growth seen in the previous decade, which were by then attractive to numerous sectors of society (Oniş, 2006; Akçay, 2021).

Erdogan once famously stated at a AKP rally that, "In this country there is a segregation of Black Turks and White Turks. Your brother Tayyip belongs to the Black Turks," (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2020 referencing Recep Tayyip Erdogan). The term was coined by the late journalist Ufuk Güldemir in his 1992 book *Texas Malatya*, in which imposed the American WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) concept on the Turkish socio-political context. In the 2000s, the concept became popularized in the mainstream Turkish mainstream media and

later Acemoglu and Robinson used it to explain the history of Turkey's exclusionary institutions. Erdogan's invocation of the Black Turk/White Turk distinction shows that the president is keenly aware of how the political cannot be separated from the economic, and that the social relations founded on economic tensions are potent for gaining electoral support. While this dichotomy may be expedient in political rhetoric, it is a reductionist and inconsistent framework for understanding the reality of the socio-economic relations that constitute the Turkish state. Instead, it is more valid to retrace the AKP's economic reforms back to the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and note how coalitions formed around capital interests spins a web both more complicated and all-encompassing than the "Black Turk/White Turk" deceptively suggests.

The AKP's campaign forged an unusual but powerful coalitional support for the AKP consisting of both the losers (the urban poor) and the winners (capital holders) of neoliberalism (Şahin, 2021; Oniş, 2006). This could not have happened without the reforms of the 1980s that gave secular capitalists and conservatives in Anatolia and capitalist interests to unite around. The AKP filled a space left by former parties closed by the constitutional court after being deemed too Islamic (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). It managed to avoid the same fate as the parties with conservative support that preceded it by branding itself around the economic liberalization and engagement with the global economy (Rabasa and

Larrabee, 2008). Thus, the party's success cannot be understood outside of its promises to produce and reproduce capitalism.

3.1.3 The AKP's Modalities of Authoritarianism

In their explanation of Turkey's shift into "competitive authoritarianism," Esen and Gumuscu (2016) summarize the ways in which the AKP, since their coming into power in 2002, have usurped power from formerly some institutions while empowering once politically disenfranchised interest groups. We do not refute this point but add to it by pointing out how the shifts in power between institutions is a mechanism of authoritarian neoliberalism, in that institutions were transformed to align with protection of capitalism. For example, the authors explain that while the military and judiciary arms of the Turkish government once held "virtual veto power" over elected officials, the AKP gradually reduced both the military and judiciary's powers through constitutional referendums so that by 2010 the AKP had eliminated most possibility of their decisions being vetoed by other actors in government (Esen and Gümüşü, 2016). We argue that this change was not motivated purely by ideology, but more importantly by the government's need to maintain the control needed to reproduce capitalism and handle the social tensions that come with it.

Second, as the AKP tightened its fist around all forms of popular dissent, social tensions erupted in a major way in 2016 with a failed coup attempt by a faction of

the Turkish military (Esen and Gümüüşü, 2017). This event triggered President Erdogan to declare a state of emergency, in which he ruled with less oversight than ever before. It was under this state of emergency, in which freedom of speech and expression of dissent was strictly controlled, that Turkish voters went to the polls on 16 April 2017 to either cast a “yes” or “no” vote on a referendum that would drastically change Turkey’s constitution from a parliamentary to a presidential system (Esen and Gümüüşü, 2017). The referendum included nine critical changes that, when combined, spelled an unprecedented amount of power for the ruling AKP and especially its leader, President Erdogan. While many have used this referendum and the events leading up to it, we frame these changes as consistent with Turkey’s capitalist development, in which authoritarian modalities of governance are simply a part of the “crisis of crisis management” we should expect with the maintenance of the neoliberal state (Offe, 1976; Yalman, 2021).

3.1.3.1. Enfeeblement of Labor

The authoritarian modalities of neoliberalism is not limited to forceful strike-downs of public dissent amidst economic strife; policies that limit the collective bargaining capacity of workers also erodes the Turkish state’s democracy. Indeed, anti-democratic developments began to unfold in the state began to take root in the foundation of neoliberalism as early as the IMF reforms of the 1980s. Soon after coming into power with campaign promises of resolving the crises of the turn of the new millennia, the AKP government doubled down on Turkey’s commitment to IMF principles of stability and growth. Legislation that ultimately

enfeebled labor made business in Turkey that much more profitable for capital holders and potential foreign investors (Akçay, 2018). The new government's New Labor Act Number 4857 of 2003 legalized flexible part-time work and subcontracting. Additionally, as a part of the central bank's inflation targeting strategy, wage increases were limited (Akçay, 2018). To further prove how the collective bargaining of the working class was indeed weakened, Akçay points to the decrease in trade union density from 29.1% in 2001 to 6.3% in 2015 (Akçay, 2018 referencing OECD data). However, perhaps wary of the significance of maintaining socio-economic tensions, the party also began a partial welfare program (Akçay, 2021) and would later lead construction projects undertaking building homes for the urban poor.

3.2 Turkey's Dependent Position in the Global Market

We highlighted in the outline of our theoretical framework the relevance of dependency theory to the STA and how a state's position in the global economy determines what policy tools are available to it. As a reminder, Dos Santos describes two kinds of states: dominant and dependent. Dominant states can expand their own economies and can be "self-sustaining," while dependent countries are limited in their expansion by the development of these dominant countries (Dos Santos, 1970). Dependent countries are more vulnerable to shocks in the global system because dominant countries are able to shift the weight of market failures to dependent states. It is also worth noting that dependent states

cannot become dominant by will power and austerity alone because the already dominant states benefit from and even rely on these states to remain in their dependent positions (Dos Santos, 1970). With that in mind, let us review Turkey's position in this structure.

The position of any state in this structure is not something that is determined overnight, but rather, in keeping with Dos Santo's description of this structure as self-perpetuating, it is a process of entrenching states deeper and deeper in their position as either dependent or dominant. The IMF reforms we have discussed that were adopted by Turkey during the 1980s entrenched Turkey further into this dependent position in the global economy, and its development of a dependent financialization capital accumulation regime (Akçay, 2021) cannot be minimized in this process. With a free-floating exchange rate and a growth strategy reliant on foreign investors and buyers, we cannot isolate the social tensions in the Turkish state from the global social tensions founded on precarious capital accumulation. In this section, we will briefly review snapshots of the Turkish currency crisis, which illustrates its dependent position in the global economic structure. This review is not exhaustive but highlights crucial moments in recent developments of its currency which underline this point of structural vulnerability and how this position has affected authoritarian neoliberalism.

3.2.1 The 2008 Crisis

All of the crises that come with a dependent financialization regime are international to a degree because they necessarily tie the fate of markets in one state to the prospects of markets with more capital. However, some events illustrate with exceptional clarity just how insecure dependent states are in the face of disasters in dominant markets. One such event in the history of Turkey's neoliberal capitalist development was the 2008 global financial crisis.

When the American housing bubble popped, it led to macro capital market failures that quickly translated to a global recession, now known as the 2008 global financial crisis. Turkey felt the shock of this crisis hard and fast; by the first quarter of the 2009 fiscal year industrial activity fell by 40% and unemployment rose by 5% (Yeldan, 2010). Turkey was especially vulnerable because of the drastic fall in demand of exports by EU economies, who were among the first economies hit first by the financial crisis and major customers for Turkish exports (Rawdanowicz, 2010; Uygur, 2010). In 2006 and 2007, Turkey already had a high current account (CA) deficit at more than 6% of its GDP (Uygur, 2010). Because of this high deficit, capital flows were and continue to be important to the Turkish economy, making volatility in exchange rates dangerous for the Turkish Lira (Rawdanowicz, 2010; Uygur, 2010). Another part of this overall high CA deficit was Turkey's heavy reliance on imported fuel; in 2007 the Turkish economy had already suffered from the oil price shock (Rawdanowicz, 2010). Additionally, the Turkish economy suffered from the drop in foreign

investment, also a direct result of the capital crisis in the US and Europe due to Wallstreet's fallout (Rawdanowicz, 2010; Uygur, 2010). This global decline in foreign investment was exacerbated by Turkey's already falling investment growth, which was negative even before the 2008 crisis hit Turkey (Uygur, 2010). In all, Turkey's combined tight integration into the global economy and its dependence on foreign capital flows combined with an already slowing growth resulted in a perfect storm for the Turkish economy.

3.2.1.1 2008: The Government's Response

The AKP government's response to the 2008 financial crisis and its impact on the Turkish economy is an event that serves as evidence of how neoliberal institutions are necessarily created with a degree of government control to handle the crises that will inevitably come in globalized neoliberalism. The response was two-fold: monetary and fiscal (Rawdanowicz, 2010). On the monetary front, the Central Bank slashed interest rates at levels that were unseen among other emerging economies at the time; nominal rates were cut to record lows and real interests rate neared zero (Rawdanowicz, 2010). As for fiscal policy, government spending increased in infrastructure and construction projects, public sector salaries, and payment to local governments (Rawdanowicz, 2010). Some pinpoint this moment as a key in the "authoritarianization" of Turkey (Kuyucu, 2017), but we reframe this strategy as a product of neoliberalism as opposed to a threat against it, echoing the description of neoliberalism as "characterized by the systematic use of state power to put into effect a hegemonic project of recomposition of the rule

of capital in most areas of social life,” (Yalman, 2021 referencing Saad-Filho and Yalman, 2010; Ginder et al. 2011).

In response to the decrease in spending from former European buyers of Turkish products now struck by the financial crisis, Turkey began to engage in more business with MENA countries, though this shift proved a short-lived solution when the Arab Spring began in 2011 and destabilized these new partners (Kuyucu, 2017). This goes to prove the insecurities and precarities of globalized neoliberalism; no one flow of foreign capital is immune to structural crisis.

In sum, the Turkish government’s response to the 2008 global financial crisis illustrates two important points: how neoliberalism requires state intervention to sustain itself and the continued importance of foreign capital flows to the Turkish state. Given these two realities, the AKP government’s authoritarian modes of governance in the years to come are not in opposition to neoliberal capitalist development, but rather a feature of it. Let us now discuss Turkey’s current position in the global economy and the social relations that constitute its economic strife.

3.3 Turkey’s Current Economic Position

3.3.1 The Currency Crisis

Since 2018 to today in 2022, the Turkish Lira has undergone episodes of extreme devaluation. In 2018, the AKP's expansionary fiscal policies, involving major government spending in the construction sector, was cause for concern about sustainability among investors (Nelson, 2018). As a result of this wariness along with political tensions between Turkey and some Western leaders, the demand for the Turkish Lira fell and the currency depreciated (Nelson, 2018). Although the Central Bank was able to stabilize the currency in 2018, the Lira saw another free-fall in 2020 as interest rates were again slashed, this time to encourage growth in the wake of the dawn of the COVID-19 pandemic (DW, 2020). The most recent rounds of devaluation began towards the end of 2021, when it reached an all-time low of 16.42 USD for one TL (Trading Economics, 2022; Lammersen, 2022). While the central bank was able to stabilize it following this low, it began to slowly sink again and depreciated to 14.9 USD by March of 2022 (Trading Economics, 2022). As in 2020, the depreciation was largely the result of Erdogan's pursuit of what many economists and analysts graciously call "unorthodox" monetary policy of slashing interest rates to record lows (O'Sullivan 2021). The rapid devaluation of the Turkish lira, prompting high inflation and savings converted into USD and Euros, has simultaneously been evidence of Turkey's dependent position in the global market and the AKP's commitment to support the businessmen that comprise an important part of their electoral base with interest rates that are a dream for anyone interested in taking out loans in TL.

Erdogan's response to the consequences of the Lira's plummeting devaluation has framed the burden of price spikes as part of the West's dominance over Turkey, telling reporters on 22 November, 2021: "We see the games being played on the exchange rate and interest rates. We came out of every struggle we entered honorably by taking a strong stance. With the help of Allah and the support of our nation, we will emerge from this economic war of independence with victory," (Dalloul, 2021). Apart from the political strategy of placing the blame on external sources instead of himself in the face of rapidly rising inflation, these comments also serve as evidence of Turkish central leadership's keen awareness of just how much the Turkish economy is ingrained in the global market. The irony of this statement is that by lowering interest rates, not only does borrowing become easier for the businesses that make up the AKP's coalitional support, but Turkish exports also become cheaper for foreign buyers, potentially further solidifying Turkey's reliance on global capital.

3.3.2 Current Account Deficit

Today, the Turkish economy remains highly integrated in global markets and largely import-dependent. According to the OEC's 2021 report, Turkey's trade balance in October of 2021 was -\$1.83 billion, meaning that they imported \$1.83 more worth of goods than they exported. Turkey's CA increased from 2.4 billion USD in January of 2021 to 7.1 billion USD in January 2022, the greatest increase

since 2017 (Trading Economics, 2022). Turkey's main export recipients in October 2021 were, in order from most to least, Germany, the United States, Italy, and Iraq (OEC, 2021). In 2015, Turkey imported more than 90% of its liquid fuel, primarily from Iraq but also from Iran and Russia, among others (US Energy Information Administration, 2017). Together, all of these metrics paint a picture of a state both highly ingrained in and highly indebted to the global capital market. Below, we illustrate the fluctuating CA balance during the AKP government, which has been in deficit all but one year.




Figure 1: Current Account Balance of Turkey in percentage of GDP from the years 2004-2020 (according to World Bank data)

Turkey's high reliance on both European and MENA markets as export customers and for fuel sources limits the policy tools available to the state. If the state does not conform to the rules and norms established and protected by the EU, it faces

the risk of economic sanctions. If the 2008 financial crisis is any indicator of the importance of the EU to Turkey's economy, a measured, forced decrease in European demand could be detrimental to the Turkish economy. On the other hand, the Arab Spring is an indicator that MENA economies are also crucial for Turkish business. Pursuing policies that go against the grain of the interests of the ruling elites of neighboring states could also result in loss of business from MENA states, which could also be detrimental.

In the AKP's Syrian refugee response, we see efforts to manage the social tensions on the basis of economic crisis combined with efforts to protect a dependent financialization capital accumulation regime. The Turkish government protected capital flow from Europe and the US by conforming to the UN's rules and norms regarding asylum seekers. Turkey is a unique case among the ratifiers of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as it ratified the Convention and its Protocol with the optional geographical limitation (Skribeland, 2021). This means that only refugees from Europe qualify for the rights guaranteed to refugees according to the Convention, while refugees coming from elsewhere have "conditional refugee" status, under which they are afforded more limited rights while they wait for third country resettlement by UNHCR (Skribeland, 2021). This differentiation is reflected in Turkish law's use of the term "guest" applied to Syrians as opposed to refugee.

Still, the AKP's government approach to Syrian admission has followed the principle of non-refoulment, which prohibits the forceful return to a country where they have reasonable fear of harm (UNHCR, 2020). The only possible exception is in cases where an asylum seeker poses a threat against their host community (UNHCR, 2020), which Turkish authorities still have taken of sparingly in cases of violence in areas near the border compared to the now millions of Syrians that have been able to remain in Turkey. The government's plan to move Syrians in Turkey was predicated on creating a "safe zone" in northeast Syria, which ultimately did not materialize (Yackley, 2019). This initiative certainly also served other political purposes for the government, but it is worth mentioning since some may argue that this was a concerted effort to get around the principle of non-refoulment. While this may be true, ultimately it shows the government's awareness that forcing refugees to return without establishing some semblance of security would result in serious consequences from the West, which would almost certainly translate to disruptions to the flow of foreign capital.

3.3.3.1 Construction Sector Growth

Another way which the AKP government has maintained the reproduction of capitalism is its activity and spending in the construction sector. The construction sector includes building of infrastructure, housing, and international construction services contracting, and the government has had a hand in stimulating growth in all of these areas. The domestic pay-off of this growth strategy and the ways in

which it has maintained the neoliberal fabric of Turkish social relations are multiple. First, many projects have included constructing housing for low-income families, increasing access to housing for many whose collective action capacity has been cut down with labor regulation. Second, by spending in the construction sector, the government has indirectly poured capital into the 200 subsectors connected to construction (Mordor Intelligence, 2022). Third, some construction projects overseen by the government include “redevelopment,” in which spaces that do not generate profit, such as parks or residential areas, are reconstructed as “profit-generating spaces” such as shopping centers or tourist attractions (Dorroll, 2015). Dorroll points to such projects as examples of the government “turning to neoliberalism,” but we argue that on a deeper level, it is an example of the present government attempting to preserve an existing structure of neoliberalism, which always requires a degree of government intervention. We would be remiss not to note the notable and consequential Gezi Park protests as an example of this kind of redevelopment project, especially because it illustrates the kind of social crises that become inevitable in the pursuit of maintaining capitalism.

Öniş (2019) describes the way in which the government’s activity in construction has benefited both capital holders and the working class as having both vertical and horizontal dimensions that bolster each other: the Mass Housing Authority (Toplu Konut İdaresi/ TOKİ) organizes “lucrative business” for large firms, while at the same time increasing housing access to “middle income or lower income

groups in society,” (Öniş, 2019). Besides being a major source of economic growth for domestic markets, the government has also promoted Turkish construction in the international market through subsidies that support Turkish construction’s competitiveness in the international market (Tekçe, 2021), establishing construction as another route for foreign capital to flow.




Figure 2: Construction sector’s share of the total GDP of Turkey (according to TURKSTAT data)




Figure 3: Share of labor in construction sector's in the total labor of Turkey (according to TURKSTAT data)

The construction sector is highly sensitive to the Turkey's dependent financialization capital accumulation regime, as many materials and technology have to be imported. Thus, with the depreciation of the TL, construction activity began a down-turn in 2018 in tandem with the beginning of the Lira's currency crisis era. The government's pushing down of interest rates boosts the borrowing power of actors in the construction sector, but with the extra blow of global economic stagnation and supply chain delays from the COVID-19 pandemic, the construction sector has yet to return to the rate of growth seen pre-currency crisis. Again, this is another example of the inevitable crises faced by neoliberal societies: mechanisms for growth are ultimately unsustainable, so governments must look for other ways to reproduce capitalism. Still, even with market

retractions, today construction continues to be vitally important in the social network of Turkish authoritarian neoliberalism. In a state in which the collective action of labor is already minimized, migrant labor is primed to play a crucial role in supporting capital accumulation through the construction sector.

3.3.3.2 The Cost that Labor Pays

Given the way labor has been necessarily enfeebled in the pursuit of the reproduction of capitalism, labor has served as a shock absorber in the midst of the various crisis the Turkish economy has faced over the last 20 years in the forms of unemployment, stagnating wages, and exploitative work conditions. The definition of unemployment used by the Turkish Statistical Institute to measure the official unemployment rate is “jobless persons of working age who have actively searched for a job through at least one channel in the preceding four weeks and are available to start work in two weeks’ time,” (Sonmez, 2021). Importantly, this definition excludes those who have given up on a job search or, as was the case because of the COVID-19 pandemic, did not work because of fear for their health (Sonmez, 2021). Thus, organization like the International Labor Organization argue that a more valid rate of unemployment, including discouraged workers and the underemployed (Sonmez 2021), is much higher than the Turkish Statistical Institute, a public agency, reports. Increasing unemployment predates the economic shock of the COVID-19 pandemic, with overall unemployment increasing by 2.78% from 10.89% in 2018 to 13.76% in

2019. In 2020, unemployment reached a 30 year high of 13.92%, but has decreased slightly since this high to around 11.4% as of February 2022 (Trading Economics, 2022). Under the pressure of the economic tumult from the pandemic in 2021, the Turkish Statistical Institute released a report which reflected the suggestions from the ILO and DİSK trade union, in which they reported “labor underutilization” at 30.2% for January 2021, compared to the 13.4% “unemployment” rate reported by the institute (Sonmez, 2021).

Youth unemployment, or the percentage of people between the ages of 15 and 24 who are seeking employment but are unable to procure a job, has been a global trend since the 2008 global financial crisis (Fergusson and Yeates, 2021).

Turkey’s youth unemployment has remained relatively stable with exception to increasing during the 2018 recession and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 (ILO, 2021). However, the Syrian population is notably younger than the Turkish native population; while the 15-24 age group constitutes 15% of the Turkish population, more than 23% of the Syrian population in Turkey belong to this age group. In this way, Syrians particularly increase job competition in this sector of labor. To mitigate the chances of youth uprising as a result of this particular sector of unemployment, the AKP has invested in opening universities across the country, offering an alternative to those young people struggling to find employment. During the AKP administration, the number of universities in Turkey has tripled

(Tokyol, 2020), and the Higher Education Student Loan and Housing Board rarely denies scholarships to those who apply (Tokyol, 2020).

Second, wages (as well as government-granted scholarships) have struggled to keep up with rapid inflation since the major currency crises beginning in 2018 to today. Although wages have steadily increased, the rate of this increase has not matched inflation, evident at least in Erdogan's own acknowledgment of this disparity in the form of the minimum wage being increased by about 40% in following the plummeting Turkish Lira devaluation in December 2021 (Celik and Geybullayeva, 2022). Still, workers have been vocal about their dissatisfaction of wages in the face of still skyrocketing inflation, as protesters across business sectors have taken to the streets in the first months of 2022 (Celik and Geybullayeva, 2022).

3.3.3.2.1 Growth of the Informal Sector

By nature, the informal economy, or those transactions that take place outside of government-documented regulation and taxation, is difficult to measure. Toker Dereli argued in his 2007 article on informal market in Turkey that while estimates vary considerably even when the same methods are used, it is widely agreed upon that the true size is not less than 50% of the GNDP (Derli, 2007). In a 2020 study, Belanger and Saracoglu estimated the informal sector as accounting for 21% of the total economy (Belanger and Saracoglu, 2020). One of the reasons Dereli cites for individuals choosing to engage in the informal market rather than

the formal is inflation's impact of taxation: inflation may move businesses superficially up to higher tax brackets that does not actually reflect their relative wealth (Dereli, 2007). Thus, entrepreneurs avoid these taxes by keeping their business unregistered. With that in mind, the inflation that has come as the result of currency crashes since 2018 may be an indication that the informal market has only grown in Turkey since this study was conducted. However, the second and most important reason for the informal market that we would like to highlight is Turkish exports' struggle to compete in the global market, a function whose importance to the Turkish economy we have already stressed in length in this chapter. According to interviews compiled by Belanger and Saracoglu in Ankara, Gaziantep, Hatay, and Izmir between 2016 - 2018, many employers expressed that they find the large supply of informal workers extremely useful because of the "stiff competition" especially in the textile industry against Chinese and other Asian producers (Belanger and Saracoglu, 2020).

The chief reason for laborers seeking work in the informal market is lack of access to legal employment and lack of open positions in the formal sector (Dereli, 2007; Baskya and Hulagu, 2011; Belanger and Saracoglu, 2020). Indeed, the exploitative nature of the informal sector makes it an option of last resort to those without access to the formal sector, which includes many Turkish city dwellers but in areas with a high Syrian population density is compromised of mostly Syrians (Belanger and Saracoglu, 2020). In their 2011 study, Baskaya and

Hulagu estimated a 20% average difference between wages for workers in the informal sector and the formal sector, or, in other words, informal workers in Turkey make on average 80% of the wage of workers in the formal economy (Baskaya and Hulaga, 2011). With the inflation and currency crises that have occurred since 2011, it is likely that this gap is even wider today. While the government raised the minimum wage in December of 2021, it essentially raised the wages of the lowest-earning employees in the formal market by more than 40%, while employers in the informal market have no incentive or mandate to raise their wages, further widening this gap.

3.3.3.2.2 Labor: Relevance to the AKP and to Migration

In the midst of these economic crises of the last two decades that have undeniably hit labor the hardest, cue the absorption of a migrant population with no expedient legal access to the job market; the result being a “refugee supply shock,” (Icduygu and Diker, 2017), or a tremendous surplus in the labor markets of the urban areas where most Syrians live. In a state with an already large informal sector of the economy, the introduction of thousands of people with a very difficult, if not impossible, access to the formal economy only grew the informal economy in the cities where they settled.

On the one hand, extremely poor conditions and too much exploitation of informal workers in urban centers could cause discontent among a key portion of the AKP’s coalitional support- the urban poor. This is clear by the government’s

fiscal policy since 2008 of major infrastructure projects in urban areas, which we have already discussed as strategic in the AKP's maintenance of the urban poor as part of its coalitional support. Additionally, according to TURKSTAT data, the construction sector constitutes the backbone of the AKP's economic growth strategy and in 2021 employed approximately 6.2% of total registered workers (see Figure 1). This is a conservative estimate, as it only includes registered workers and does not include employment in sectors directly linked to the growth of the construction sector. Indeed, the construction sector has been the AKP's primary strategy for reproducing capitalism, and the push for lowering interest rates in order for construction firms to maintain access to cheap loans can be seen as evidence of this (Akçay, 2021).

Just as access to cheap loans supports the growth of the construction sector, a large informal labor force also allows construction projects to maximize profits and the state benefits from the increased competitiveness of Turkish goods caused by minimal wages (Belanger and Saracoglu, 2020).




Figure 4: Percentage of informal labor in each sector, compared to the overall share of informal labor (according to Turkey Ministry of Social Security data).




Figure 5: Percentage of overall informal labor in the Gaziantep, Adiyaman, Kilis region compared to Turkey’s overall informal labor (according to Turkey Ministry of Social Security data).

3.3.3.2.3 Refugees and Capital Reproduction

Migration poses potential problems to any authoritarian neoliberal regime because of the social stress it can put on an already enfeebled labor force with limited political efficacy. On the other hand, migrants represent shock absorbers for capital interests, as they can offer cheap, unregulated labor and therefore play an important role in reproducing capitalism and maintaining market growth. This socio-economic tension could not be any clearer than in Turkey, where refugees make up a large portion of labor in Turkey’s ever-important construction sector. Because so many of the Syrians working in the construction sector are working

without permits, it is difficult to say exactly how much of this labor force is made up of refugees. However, the IOM director we interviewed noted that many Syrians in Gaziantep work in these high-risk construction jobs in which they are exposed to dangerous chemicals. The prevalence of unregistered migrants in these high-risk jobs are also not unnoticed by political actors.

In April of 2022, Victory Party/Zafer Partisi² chairman Umit Ozdag shared a video to his social media of Interior Minister Suleyman Soyulu in which he asks to a crowd of listeners around him, “who will work in heavy jobs” if all Afghans and Pakistanis were deported from Turkey. The minister’s comments echo the sentiment of Turkey’s former deputy prime minister in 2017, who stated in response to an increase in reported cases of tensions between Syrians and local Turks: “Turkey should also regard these 3 million people as a human capital. Among these 3 million, there are higher educated people and experts. Currently, there is no-one apart from Syrians who do the unskilled work in many provinces such as Kahramanmaras, Adana, Osmaniye, even Ostim in Ankara [i.e, the industrial zone in Ankara]. Our factories would stop working,” (Firat, 2017).

² The Victory Party (Zafer Partisi, in Turkish) is an ultranationalist political party established August 26, 2021 by former IP lawmaker, Ümit Özdağ. Özdağ’s accusations of the current government as well as other opposition parties not taking the presence of Syrian, Pakistani, and Afghan immigrants to Turkey as a serious national threat is the primary motivation behind the party’s formation (Daily Sabah 2021). The party’s growing popularity on social media such as Twitter has come with its inflammatory and provocative anti-refugee rhetoric.

The Victory Party chairman shared the 2017 video following anti Pakistani and Afghan hashtags going viral on twitter in Turkey, including “Pakistani Get Out,” (Çinçin, 2022). This explains both the chairman’s motivation to share the video and the minister’s reasoning for specifically naming Pakistanis and Afghans in his comments. However, we may easily also apply these comments to Syrians who are also heavily involved in hard labor industries such as agriculture and construction. Soylu’s comments are compelling because they represent an explicit acknowledgement by the government of the importance of irregular migrants and refugees in Turkey’s economy. Likewise, chairman Ozdag’s weaponization of these comments against the current powers that represent the social nature of economic turmoil. Together, this online face-off of two political actors may seem to represent a clash in ideology, but in reality it constitutes the very social crisis-ridden nature of neoliberal capitalism.

3.4 State Transformation in the Face of Crisis

Turkey’s governance of Syrian refugees stands at the nexus of social tension under economic turmoil and the state’s compulsion to produce and reproduce capitalism. This is another example of the “crisis of crisis management” so often noted in the literature on authoritarian neoliberalism (Akçay, 2021). Here is where the STA’s emphasis of spatial politics becomes important: who actually is governing the actual space where Syrians live and engage with the economy? How might local governments and their economies serve as shock absorbers for

international events in which the state's policy tools are limited? To answer these questions, we will first outline the government's expressed goals around Syrians in Turkey as well as the implicit goals regarding Syrians in an authoritarian neoliberal regime. If the Turkish state is under transformation towards regulatory statehood as a way of maintaining neoliberalism, we should expect to see the central state setting broad policy goals in the interest of capital reproduction and a large, diverse collection of actors responsible for realizing these goals.

3.4.1 Broad Policy Goals

As a reminder, our theoretical model follows Hameiri and Jones' use of "regulatory statehood," which they define as a system in which "central executives withdraw from 'command and control' activities to merely set broad targets for diverse national, subnational and private bodies," (Hameiri and Jones, 2016 referencing Majone, 1994). Furthermore, we discussed the background of the Regulation School, which is rooted in the idea that "realization that capitalist social relations of production and reproduction are inherently unstable and destined for crises. Therefore, regulation is the key component for producing and reproducing capitalist social relations," (Akçay, 2021). The first step in our model, then, is identifying these broad policy goals set by the central leadership and how they fit into the regulation of capital reproduction. Only by doing so can we evaluate how the central government's initiatives are treated through the transformative mechanisms of decentralization, fragmentation, and

internationalization. We will identify these expressed goals by using data from a combination of speeches from the president and laws passed.

3.4.1.1 Goal One: Brother's Host

From the beginning of the conflict and with the first Syrians arriving in Turkey as a result of it, the AKP government was clear about its openness to the migrants as it announced an open-door policy to all Syrians entering Turkey and established “temporary protection” status for these newly arrived Syrians (Koca, 2016). It was during these early years, when return to Syria was thought to be inevitable by politicians, that the goal of being a good host to religious kin was most heavily emphasized in public speeches.

In a speech in Gaziantep in 2014, Erdogan remarked that, "Bizler de ensar olduk sizin için," ("We too have become your ensar"). Ensar is the term referred to the residents of the city of Medina (in today's Saudi Arabia) who welcomed Prophet Mohammad and his followers that migrated from Macca to escape from persecution. In the same speech, Erdogan also stated that: "Misafir berekettir, misafir şereftir." (Translation: "Guests are a blessing, guests are an honor to host.") Erdogan made this speech in 2014, well after the number of Syrians traversing across the Turkish border had surpassed the 100,000 mark. This speech summarizes the rhetoric and word choice Erdogan used extensively in the early years of the crisis and continues to use today when referring to the relationship between the Turkish state and Syrians: the host and the guests. These religious references clarify the ideational pillar of the AKP's approach to the governance of

refugees to diffuse the material basis of the social tensions/power relations exacerbated by the arrival of millions of refugees that provide a significant source of cheap labor.

As it became increasingly evident that the Syrians who had fled to Turkey would not be able to return as quickly as many had initially hoped, the Turkish government began to introduce legal infrastructure that would straddle the line between fully complying with international laws on refugees and political palpability. Although Syrians and Palestinian refugees were granted “temporary protection” in 2011, this label did not come with a clear legal framework and instead reflected the general open-door policy afforded to Syrians (Bastaki, 2018).

In April of 2014, Turkey’s parliament endorsed the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, which established the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) as the chief entity responsible for all proceedings regarding foreigners in Turkey (UNHCR, 2022). Later the same year, Temporary Protection Status became available to Syrians in Turkey (UNHCR, 2022). The DGMM defines Temporary Protection Status in Article 91 of Law 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection as:

“Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have

arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection.”

The law clarifies for Syrians under provisional article one, stating:

“The citizens of the Syrian Arab Republic, stateless persons and refugees who have arrived at or crossed our borders coming from Syrian Arab Republic as part of a mass influx or individually for temporary protection purposes due to the events that have taken place in Syrian Arab Republic since 28 April 2011 shall be covered under temporary protection, even if they have filed an application for international protection. Individual applications for international protection shall not be processed during the implementation of temporary protection.” (Ministry Interior of Turkey 2022).

While those with temporary protection identity cards have access to services within official refugee camps, or “temporary accommodation centers,” 88% of the Syrians in Turkey live in major cities, where economic opportunities, albeit in the informal economy, are more accessible (Bastaki, 2018; ILO, 2020). In response to this trend, Ankara passed two regulations in 2016: the first gave Syrians who have lived in Turkey for more than six months the ability to apply for a work permit in the province they initially registered for temporary protection status (Bastaki, 2018). The second placed the responsibility of requesting work permits for prospective Syrian workers on the employers (Bastaki, 2018). Often times these

employers are reluctant to cover the costs or endure the hassle of making these requests on behalf of Syrian job applicants, and other times are simply uninformed as to how this process is supposed to work (Refugees International, 2019). As a result, most Syrians continue to turn to the informal job market for employment. Thus, although the revised 2014 “temporary protection status” along with the 2016 legislation for work permits may reflect the leadership’s goal of hosting, problems with access to services and access to the formal economy remain.

3.4.1.2 Goal Two: Long-Term Integration

Since 2016, President Erdogan has alluded to plans to make pathways available for Syrians to attain Turkish citizenship, albeit actual policy action on this goal has not matched the rhetoric. This goal has not been expressed as vocally as a more ambiguous and temporary rhetoric of hosting Syrians, but it remains notable as a mechanism that the government may use to harness the support of Syrians to counter-balance the discontented Turkish members of their electoral coalition.

In a speech in Kilis province, one of the provinces on the Syrian border, Erdogan announced that “We are going to help our Syrian friends in offering them the chance, if they want it, to acquire Turkish nationality,” (Erdogan, 2016, reported by AlJazeera). Additionally, in the same speech he addressed the Syrians in the audience and stated, “We regard you as our brothers and sisters...Turkey is also your homeland,” (Erdogan, 2016, reported by AlJazeera). This is a clear shift

from rhetoric around Turkey being a temporary host, and these remarks were met by backlash on social media from those against the naturalization of Syrians in Turkey (AlJazeera, 2016). The actual execution of these ideas was not as straightforward as the president's speech provoked.

Turkey's last Prime Minister Binali Yildirim told journalists in 2018 that "around 30,000 Syrians have received Turkish citizenship so far...they have the right to vote but I do not know how many of them will use that right," (Yildirim, 2018, quoted by Hurriyet). Interestingly, in the same remarks, the PM reminded these journalists that if these new citizens did not obey Turkish law, "we will take them by their hand back to where they came from," (Yildirim, 2018, quoted by Hurriyet). With these statements, the former PM seemed to want to straddle the line between integrating Syrians into Turkish politics while also maintaining their status as "guests." This summarizes the AKP's efforts for the last decade to reap potential electoral benefits that this population has to offer while also managing concerns about integrating this population into Turkish society.

According to Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu, as of 31 March 2022, a total of 200,950 Syrians have been granted Turkish citizenship. This figure comes as a moderate increase from the 193,293 Syrians granted citizenship as of 31 December 2021 and 110,000 as of 30 December 2019 (Mülteciler Derneği, 2022). Of the Syrians with Turkish citizenship, Soylu announced that as of 31 March

2022, 113,654 have the right to vote (Mülteciler Derneği, 2022). It suffices to say that selective legal integration seems to remain a goal of the current government, albeit a quiet and downplayed one. However, the government is more open about policies that make it easier for Syrians to legally study and work in Turkey. In the 2021-2022 academic year, the Ministry of National Education reported that 48,192 Syrian students were registered in universities in Turkey (Mülteciler Derneği, 2022). As of 8 June 2021, the total number of Syrian students registered in Turkish kindergarten, elementary school, middle school, and high school combined was 771,428 children (Mülteciler Derneği, 2022). Thus, we identify integration in general as a goal of the government, be it social or legal.

3.4.1.3 Goal Three: Leverage Against EU

Third, the AKP government has and continues to aim to use their Syrian “guests” as leverage against the EU. As early as 2014, President Erdogan began to point out the hypocrisy of the EU claiming to be committed to human rights protection while also severely limiting the number of Syrians they admitted into the EU. However, this leverage has not consisted of words; Erdogan has used both words and actions to use Syrians in Turkey to pressure the EU.

In addressing Gaziantep in 2014, President Erdogan stated to the audience that “Batı ne yazık ki buna seyirdi. Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Komisyonu bu işe seyirdi. Sadece konuşuyorlar.” (Translated: Unfortunately, the West was watching this. The UNHCR looked into this. They just talk.) The same year, the president

addressed the UN General Assembly on the topic of the quickly spiraling security situation in Syria and was blunt in pointing out that Turkey had already spent \$4.5 billion to host around 1.5 million Syrians (UN, 2014). Erdogan has continued to be vocal up to today about the failures and hypocrisy especially of the EU in addressing waves of involuntary migration, most recently focused around Afghani refugees. In 2019, Erdogan's words did not only condemn, they threatened; in response to the EU's criticism of Turkey's new offensive in north Syria following the US' withdrawal of troops in the region, Erdogan promised to "open the gates and send millions your way" if the EU labeled the military move an occupation (Turak, 2019). After years of being critical of the EU for not sharing their due burden of refugees, Erdogan brought to the table the possibility of forcing the burden on the EU when politically cornered.

In 2020, these threats transcended words and ventured into action particularly in a 2020 episode in which the EU and Turkey disagreed upon the amount of funds still due Turkey at the conclusion of a payment plan that came with a 2016 EU-Turkey Syrian refugee agreement, Erdogan bussed "thousands of migrants from refugee camps" to Turkey's Greek border. In this 2016 agreement, Turkey was noted as responsible for accepting "all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands," as well as taking "any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU," (European Council, 2016). In return, the EU promised in this deal to settle one

Syrian in the EU for every Syrian returned from Greece to Turkey, to speed up EU visa liberalization plans for Turkey, and a total of 3 billion euros by the end of 2018 (European Council, 2016). In 2020, Erdogan vocally took issue with the lack of materialization of the benefits Turkey was promised, claiming that the EU had yet to complete their 3 billion euro promise. Over this issue, the President began transporting Syrians to the Greek border in accordance with breaking Turkey's responsibilities in the deal (Terry, 2021). Today in 2022, the situation for Syrians at the Greek border seems static at best and tragic at worst. It is difficult to find reliable estimates of numbers of refugees that have been pushed back to Turkey or refugees in harsh conditions at the Greek border because Greece seems to be interested in minimizing these claims while Erdogan continues to accuse Greek authorities of cruel treatment to Syrians left in harsh weather conditions (AFP, 2022).

While the reality at the border remains cloaked in the respective interests of the leaders on either side of it, Erdogan's rhetoric around the situation remains the same as it has for a decade now: Greece and the EU are still not carrying their weight to handle the Syrian refugee crisis. From both his words and actions, it is clear that one of the Turkish president's goals is using Turkey's large population of Syrians to pressure and condemn the EU.

3.4.1.4 Other Goals of a Turkish Model Regulatory State

Although rhetorical commitment to global market integration has not remained consistent throughout the last two decades of AKP rule, it clearly played a significant role in the AKP's sweeping 2002 electoral wins (Rabasa and Larabee, 2008) and entrenched Turkey further yet into a capital accumulation regime defined by dependent financialization, which continues today. Indeed, the AKP's electoral success does not represent an ideological shift in the society as much as a continuation of the social consensus in favor of what Yalman (2021) describes as the core of neoliberalism: "a hegemonic project of recomposition of the rule of capital in most areas of social life," (Yalman, 2021 referencing Saad-Filho and Yalman, 2010; Ginder et al., 2011), and while their modalities of governance has changed over the years, the government faces the same "crisis of crisis management" inherent in neoliberalism. It is this pattern of crisis management that Turkey's transformation into "regulatory statehood" arises.

The AKP's involvement in the construction sector would help offset the inevitable next capitalist crisis for several years because it guaranteed capital flow for the construction businesses and also soothed socio-economic tensions by ultimately sponsoring projects aimed at those who being burned by the laws that enfeebled labor (Kutaly, 2019). With the introduction of millions of new participants in this social-economic-political fabric that constitutes the Turkish state, we see governance of Syrian refugee as the management of yet another crisis under the unstable reproduction of capitalism. This wave of migrants has

certainly been productive in maintaining the government's strategic construction activity, but their contribution to the reproduction of capitalism cannot be understood outside of the social tensions that their involvement in the economy has caused in the wake of increasing economic turmoil. As we will illustrate through Gaziantep's data, this particular crisis of crisis management brings into focus the nexus of an enfeebled labor force and a dependent financialization capital accumulation regime.

3.4.1.5 Opposition Towards Expressed Goals

After more than a decade of welcoming rhetoric from the central government, anti-immigrant/refugee sentiments have only increased as the economy has faced crises. This is evident not only in the promises from opposition parties to send Syrians back to Syria if elected, but also in instances of anti-refugee sentiments shared among AKP supporters. One such example occurred in September 2021 in the Altındağ district in Ankara, historically an AKO stronghold (BBC, 2021). After a fight between one Syrian refugee and two Turkish men resulted in the death of one of the Turkish teenagers involved in the fight, hundreds of locals began to attack the houses, workplaces, and cars of their Syrian neighbors (BBC, 2021). Riot police eventually extinguished the mob and some Syrian residents of the area were transported away from the scene by police (BBC, 2021). This is just one example, but it is powerful evidence for the growing unpopularity of the AKP's historical support of hosting Syrians under the economic hardship that has intensified with the currency crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. These social

tensions only raises the stakes for how fragmented and international actors adopt and adapt these broad goals of hosting.

3.4.1.6 Summary of Goals

We can summarize the government's expressed goals around Syrians in Turkey as aiming to remain a welcoming host to Syrians, to the point of periodically flirting with integration strategies, while simultaneously using Syrians as leverage against the EU. Note the evolution of the leadership's "host" rhetoric: at once guesthood was meant to stress the temporary nature of the Syrians' visit, but as time has progressed and the conditions in Syria have not improved as once hoped, Erdogan has shifted to emphasizing the friendly hospitality that guesthood connotes.

However, as social tensions have mounted in the face of economic crisis, leaders have begun to outline the possible routes forward for voluntarily return. Notably, these strategies have cautiously not violated the principle of refoulment by emphasizing that safety must be established in order for Syrians to return.

Turkey's status as a dependent country in the global economy is entangled with each of these goals. Its position in the global economic structure has limited the tools, and therefore viable goals, available to it in the initial stages of the crisis. In his critique of the English School, Chris Brown points out some grave consequences if an exclusive club of states continues to head towards forming a community while the rest of the world remains in a society: those in community will increasingly be able to ignore the issues felt intensely by the rest of the world

(Brown, 1995). Brown borrows from Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky to call this reality the zone of peace versus the zone of turmoil (Brown, 1995). In other words, not all states experience common global NTS issues the same and migration is a clear example of this phenomenon: according to the UN, as of 2021 there are just over one million Syrian refugees in the EU, while approximately 3.6 are thought to live in Turkey (UNHCR, 2021). Dominant states are able to use power arrangements in the global political economy to keep certain issues at a distance, while simultaneously writing the norms and rules of how any country must handle displaced migrants. In this sense, Turkey is in the “zone of turmoil” when it comes to forced migration, as it has been essentially forced to accept Syrian refugees. Erdogan’s host rhetoric is thus not made in a vacuum, but within the economic power structure in which he leads.

Second, irregular migrants become part of informal labor markets quickly when they need an income but lack legal working status (Toksöz, 2018), and Erdogan’s ambiguous integration goals touch on these issues around the complexity of temporary protection status and pressure to make taxable, formal work more accessible. Informal labor is crucially important to the sustainability of the growth strategy of the AKP, such as the construction sector. In order for Turkish exports to maximize their competitiveness in the global market, livable wages are sacrificed.

Finally, Erdogan's use of Syrians as leverage against the EU can be understood as one of the few tools available to a country pushed to the periphery of a political-economic structure. Kelly Greenhill's argument that forced displacement is a coercive weapon that is most commonly used by less powerful states on more powerful, liberal states supports this idea; although Turkey is the host of a displaced population, Erdogan has threatened the EU with the movement of Syrians in a similar way to the cases Greenhill offers (Greenhill, 2010).

Having analyzed these broad goals of the central government and their relationship to the general motivations of neoliberalism, we can now examine their realization, what agents are responsible for realizing them, and question what may explain how they are handled by these agents. In keeping with our theoretical framework modified from Hameiri and Jones' study on the transformation of China, we will investigate three mechanisms of transformation of the Turkish state as evident in its governance of Syrians within its borders: internationalization, decentralization, and fragmentation.

3.5 The Case of Gaziantep

To accomplish this goal assessment and to identify what actors are directly involved with Syrian refugee governance, we must focus in on *where* Syrians are in Turkey that are being governed. For the purposes of this study, we suggest Gaziantep as a case study revealing of the overall structures of refugee

governance in Turkey. In selecting a more focused case study for analyzing this process, we have selected a city rather than an official refugee camp, or “temporary accommodation center,” because data from multiple sources concur that many more refugees live in urban areas than official refugee camps because of the economic opportunities that cities offer (ILO, 2021). According to the Mülteciler Derneği (Refugees Association), approximately 98.7% of all Syrians living in Turkey live in cities as opposed to Temporary Accommodation Centers. Again, this measurement is stated while keeping in mind that estimating this refugee population is precarious. Nevertheless, even if the reality is slightly less than the Mülteciler Derneği’s 98.7% estimate, it suffices to conclude that most Syrian refugees fall under the governance of municipalities. While there are other Turkish cities in which many Syrians reside (such as Istanbul and Ankara), Gaziantep’s close geographical proximity to the Syrian border along with its smaller Turkish population as compared to Turkey’s larger metropolitans makes it a strong “most likely” case to need some kind of governance strategy concerning the growth of the Syrian refugee population. By focusing on the transformative dynamics in Gaziantep more narrowly, we are able to be more thorough in our analysis and take highly descriptive screenshots of the mechanisms that constitute state transformation.

3.5.1 Gaziantep Historical Background

Since Turkey opened its borders to Syrians at the dawn of the conflict in Syria, Gaziantep has been a highly relevant city because of its close proximity to the northern Syrian border. Gaziantep has hosted a large number of Syrian refugees since early in the crisis, and the Migration Management Directorate (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü) now reports that of the approximately 2.2 million total population in the municipality, 400,000 are Syrians. It is worth repeating that the Syrian population is highly approximated since it is assumed that many other Syrians may live unregistered in and around Gaziantep, but the most recent attempt at a precise population of Syrians in the municipality was reported by the Migration Management Directorate on March 24, 2022, at 462,261 people. Because of the massive influxes of Syrians that Gaziantep has seen over the last decade, it has received international attention from EU affiliated organizations, international NGOs, and other states. Thus, there is ample available data recording efforts to govern this growing migrant population and strategies to address the concerns that governing this population has come with.

3.5.1.1 Organized Industrial Zones in Gaziantep

Turkey's Ministry of Industry and Trade defines an Organized Industrial Zone (OIZ) as "settlements which meet the necessary physical requirements for the foundation of a specific economic scale, provide an environment for the improvement of networks among industrial enterprises, and direct entrepreneurs to appropriate areas" (Ofllazoğlu, 2016). In other words, OIZs are established to encourage the growth of industries by arranging the means of production and

other businesses of similar scale and sector in close proximity to each other (Ofllazoğlu, 2016 referencing Eyüboğlu, 2003). The first OIZ was established in Turkey in 1962 in the province of Bursa (Ofllazoğlu, 2016). In Gaziantep, there are five OIZs, four of which were established before the Syrian refugee crisis began in the years 1969, 1986, 1994, and 2002 (Gaziantep Sanayi Odası, 2022). The most recent OIZ was established in 2013. This data helps us better understand why, in the southeast region of Turkey, Gaziantep specifically became a major destination for Syrian refugees. An official from IOM's Gaziantep office pointed out in an interview that for Syrian refugees moving their businesses from Aleppo to Turkey, Gaziantep already offered the necessary infrastructure for industry and export. Later in this chapter, we will go into the ramifications of these Syrian-owned industries in Gaziantep, but for now we emphasize this as another point supporting Gaziantep as a "most likely" case study among municipalities that would have a Syrian refugee regime.

3.5.2 Formalization Hurdles in Gaziantep

The process of a Syrian refugee applying for a work permit is costly in terms of time and money. First, once a Syrian has begun their process of applying for temporary protection (TP) status, they must wait six months before being eligible to apply for a work permit. There are multiple types of work permits available to Syrians under TP, but the UNHCR reports the most common are for wage employment and self-employment. Those seeking a wage employment permit

must have their employer apply for the permit. Self-employment permits can only be obtained once an individual has registered their business according to the Turkish Commercial Code (UNHCR, 2022). Both of these permit processes bolster the power of the decentralized, provincial governments in that all work permits are province-exclusive, meaning that a person may only work in the province in which they registered for their work permit. Furthermore, an individual may only register for a work permit in the province in which they registered for TP.

An IOM official stated in an interview that they perceive three main obstacles to Syrians trying to obtain a permit to work in Turkey: the price of the permit, the language barrier, and the requirement to renew the permit annually. Additionally, in 2016 Syrians became eligible recipients of the European Social Safety Net (ESSN) cash assistance, in which households are automatically exempt if one member is employed in the formal sector (Kirisci and Uysal, 2019). Especially in Gaziantep where Syrian-owned businesses tend to hire other Syrians regardless of work permit status, refugees are not incentivized to seek out a work permit.

Another policy that serves as a disincentive for Syrians to seek out work permits is the employment quota by which, for all sectors except agriculture, a company's total employees must not consist of more than 10% of Syrians under temporary protection status (Caro, 2020). According to ILO data, 49.1% of total Syrian

refugees in Turkey work in non-agricultural companies of less than 10 people.

Assuming they are not the only Syrian in these small businesses, they are ineligible for a work permit (Caro, 2020). This policy is an example of an attempt on the part of the central government to answer to the social tensions around job contestations, by officially disapproving of companies hiring Syrians over Turks. Conveniently, this policy actually just helps to incentivize informal labor, which ultimately supports the inherent neoliberal goal of maximizing profit by minimizing wages.

Syrian entrepreneurs face their own obstacles as they try to operate within bureaucratic processes. In a 2018 TEPAV research project on the Syrian entrepreneurship in Turkey, the researchers found that partnerships between Syrian and Turkish businessmen seem to be mutually beneficial to the parties involved because one offers exporting connections and skills while the other offers knowledge about navigating the Turkish bureaucratic red tape (Güven et al., 2018). For those who are unable to obtain a permit to operate their own business, another major obstacle that comes from this barrier is access to banking systems. In the same TEPAV study, it was reported that 38.5 percent of Syrian companies in Turkey use a “hawala system,” a type of informal money transfer system that replacing money wiring with a network of trust between international money brokers (Güven et al., 2018). The study shows how this access to banking disproportionately affects Syrian businesses by reporting that 28 percent of Syrian

employers cited problems with opening a commercial bank account, whereas 10 percent of Turkish employers cited the same problem (Güven et al., 2018).

3.5.3 Governance Mechanisms of Transformation

Having reviewed the ways in which the Turkish government has actively propped up capital interests through its activity in the construction sector and highlighting the crucial role that Syrians and other refugee and migrant populations play in this sector, it is clear that Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees cannot be understood outside of the context of the inherent crisis management of any neoliberal state. Thus, it is a process that engages in the managing of social relations as well as the exploitation of labor with the end goal of regulating the production and reproduction of capitalism. Likewise, the mechanisms that constitute this governance process actively contribute to Turkey's transformation towards regulatory statehood, in which the state collectively produces and reproduces capitalist social relations in the way that refugees are woven into Turkey's socio-economic fabric. Borrowing from Hameiri and Jones (2019) in their framework of China's transformation toward regulatory statehood, we identify three mechanisms in this governance process: internationalization, decentralization, and fragmentation.

3.5.3.1 Fragmentation and Decentralization

Following the passing of the 2017 presidential referendum, many elements of policymaking and implementation became ambiguous, agencies were

restructured, and new agencies were created. However, we can outline the overall structure of Turkey's government according to the law and discuss later how this system operates in practice. Despite President Erdogan's strong influence over all state policy, decentralization remains in the constitution as there are two tiers to Turkish government: central administration and local government (European Committee of the Regions 2017 referencing Article 123ff of Turkey's Constitution). The central government includes agencies and ministries and appoints the heads of the 81 provinces (in Turkish, *vilayet*) in Turkey (European Committee of the Regions, 2017). Each province is divided into districts (in Turkish, *ilçe*), which are governed by governors or sub-governors (in Turkish, *vali* and *kaymakam*), who are extensions of the central administration. Within these districts, there are municipalities (in Turkish, *belediye*) of different degrees based on size, each which elect their own mayor (European Committee of the Regions, 2017). The municipality type with the largest population is called a metropolitan municipality (*büyükşehir belediyesi*), of which there are 30, and require a population of at least 750,000 to qualify as a municipality (European Committee of the Regions, 2017). Each municipality, regardless of its size, falls under the government of a larger district. The mayor of each municipality is elected in contrast with the governor of each province and sub-governor of each district, who are appointed by the central government. This opens up the potential for policy directives carried out by these mayors that may or may not align with the previously discussed broad policy goals of the central government.

Given this noteworthy characteristic of mayors of municipalities, it is worth briefly reviewing what exactly falls under the power and responsibility of any given Metropolitan Municipality, according to Article 7 of the Law on Metropolitan Municipalities titled “Duties and responsibilities of metropolitan and district municipalities.” We have paraphrased each responsibility below, but they might be summarized as including management of public services and resources along with oversight that all construction activity complies with regulations.

Metropolitan municipalities have the following responsibilities and duties:

- Responsible for the municipality’s strategic plan, including all financial management and goals.
- Ensure that all construction meets regulations regarding environmental standards, scale, and land use permits.
- Assume responsibility for enforcing laws around Squatter Houses.
- Issue permits to and inspect businesses operating on public zoned land.
- Construct and maintain public transport systems.
- Construct and maintain infrastructure on public zoned land.
- Set up geographic and urban information systems.

- Oversee environmental protection including protection of agricultural land, water basins, and conducting pollution and health inspections of businesses.
- Provide police services with a jurisdiction of the municipality.
- Construct and oversee construction of and operate or oversee operation of passenger and freight terminals and public parking lots.
- Build and support the construction and maintenance of parks, zoos, animal shelters, libraries, museums, and any other public recreational facilities.
- Construct healthcare, education, and cultural facilities.
- Ensure water and sewer services.
- Construct and operate cemeteries.
- Conserve cultural and natural assets.
- Construct and operate wholesale food markets and slaughterhouses.
- Plan and oversee operations in case of natural disasters.
- Provide, install, and operate central heating systems.
- Evacuate and oversee the demolition of buildings that pose a public danger.

Gaziantep and its local leaders constitute one of these 30 metropolitan municipalities. Gaziantep's mayor is, Fatma Şahin, was elected in 2014 and was also elected as the President of the Union of Municipalities of Turkey in 2018 (Büyükşehir Gaziantep 2021). Şahin had a considerable political career before becoming mayor; in 2001 she became the founding member of the Gaziantep Provincial Organization of the AK Party and in 2002 she was elected as the first woman member of Turkey's Grand National Assembly from Gaziantep (Büyükşehir Gaziantep, 2021). In her time in Grand National Assembly, Şahin served in the EU-Turkey joint parliamentary committee as well as several committees dedicated to social services such as the protection of women and families (Büyükşehir Gaziantep, 2021).

Much of Şahin's mayoral leadership has been based on the idea that by meeting the basic needs and providing services to everyone in Gaziantep regardless of nationality, the GMM can extinguish any potential flames of hatred or radicalism (Şahin, 2019). Interviews by watch groups such as Refugees International reveal that the social cohesion that the mayor wants to confront is a real issue for Syrians, who reported discrimination from their Turkish neighbors in housing and business (Leghtas. 2019). Reports of tension against Syrians nationally is reported to have increased along with economic stress (ILO, 2021). Additionally, in a 2019 roundtable discussion, the mayor argued for education as a security measure, as

children without access to education are easy targets for recruitment by violent groups such as ISIS (Şahin, 2019). The projects the GMM has taken on seem to reflect Şahin's goals of making Gaziantep a safe place for Syrians by ensuring services for everyone.

The Observatory of Public Sector Innovation, an organization that collects data on how governments at all levels address public problems, identified The Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality (GMM) in 2016 as a municipality that has “established a local refugee response model that involves cooperating with local authorities, UN Agencies, NGOs and INGOs to provide direct assistance to refugees,” (OECD, 2016). The GMM established its own local Migration Management Directorate (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü) meant to serve foreigners only in Gaziantep; the first of its kind in Turkey (OECD, 2019). The GMM established this Directorate in efforts to organize all of the tasks involved with registering newly arrived Syrians and addressing their needs and concerns. Essentially, the GMM modified an agency of the central government by constructing their own local iteration of it for the sake of efficiency and therefore lessening their dependency on bureaucracy in Ankara.

3.5.3.2 Internationalization

The mechanism of internationalization is also apparent in Gaziantep through the active presence of many international actors on the ground who each aim to positively impact the lives of Syrians. We may organize these actors in two

groups which sometimes overlap: actors involved in the implementation of projects dedicated to the wellbeing of Syrians in Gaziantep, and actors who investigate and report the conditions of Syrians in Gaziantep. Among these international actors, some are directly associated with state governments (or state delegates), some loosely tied to another state (such as supranational organizations), and others are private (such as non-governmental humanitarian organizations and foreign private companies). One example of a project headed by the former group is the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) which gives cash assistance to Turks and Syrians alike in Turkey. This project operates across all of Turkey, including Gaziantep. The ESSN was first founded and is funded by the EU but is overseen through cooperation between the Turkish Red Crescent, the World Food Program, and local municipalities (including the GMM) since 2016 (European Commission, 2020). In this project, local Turkish actors collaborate with two international actors, the EU and the World Food Program, to provide in-cash and in-kind aid to those in need regardless of nationality across Turkey.

An example more specific to Gaziantep is Japan's presence in the municipality through its economic aid agency, JICA. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is a Japanese government agency who states their purpose as aiming to "contribute to the promotion of international cooperation as well as the sound development of Japanese and global economy by supporting the socioeconomic development, recovery or economic stability of developing

regions” (JICA, 2021). In 2015, JICA approved a loan of up to 45 billion JYP (approximately 345 million USD at current prices) with the Turkish İller Bank, a state-owned bank that provides financial support to municipalities for construction projects, to go towards improving the infrastructure services in localities that host Syrians under temporary protection (JICA, 2020). One project that came out of this investment in Gaziantep is the Advanced Biological Wastewater Treatment Plant, the result of collaboration between Gaziantep Water and Sewage Administration (GASKI) and JICA (JICA, 2020). In 2020, staff from the Japanese embassy came and visited the site to show their support for displaced Syrians by supporting the advancement of infrastructure in Gaziantep (JICA 2020). In this press visit, the Japanese visitors specifically met with the Mayor of Gaziantep, Ms. Fatima Şahin, who stated that the municipality was willing to work with JICA more on future projects (JICA, 2020). A Japanese flag flies at the wastewater treatment plant beside a Turkish one, painting a poignant picture of how deep internationalization of governance runs in Gaziantep.

As mentioned, there are other international actors present in Gaziantep that do not exclusively work for or create aid infrastructure, but primarily aim to report on conditions for Syrians and the progress of efforts by the municipality and non-government organizations in Gaziantep (although this reporting is often intended to support and improve ongoing projects). For the purposes of full disclosure, we should mention here that the reporting from these actors was instrumental to this

research in our gathering data on conditions, programs, and projects in Gaziantep. These actors include but are not limited to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNHCR, UNICEF, Save the Children, Refugees International, and the World Food Program. This group includes supranational and inter-governmental organizations (UN agencies), such as the International Migration Organization (IOM) as well as NGOs and watch groups that have praised the GMM's efforts to smooth legal labor issues and resolve business hurdles for informal workers. Additionally, these groups report on the GMM's work to promote harmony between the Turkish and Syrian populations in Gaziantep, which often involves ensuring equal access to resources regardless of nationality.

3.5.3.2.1 Paradiplomacy

The ways in which foreign governments, especially Germany, Japan, and the EU, partner with local actors in Gaziantep represent instances of “paradiplomacy” (Aldeco and Keating, 2009) in which agencies and organizations at the “decentralized,” or local levels establish their own international relationships apart from state foreign policy, making themselves “quasi-autonomous foreign policy actors,” (Hameiri and Jones, 2016 referencing Aldeco and Keating, 2009). This phenomenon is especially fascinating in light of the AKP's rising tensions with Western powers such as the EU and the US in foreign policy and its declaration of a war of economic liberation. Furthermore, the activity of international actors in Gaziantep does not support Erdogan's attempt to use Syrians as leverage against the EU but instead encourage the cooperation between

the EU and Turkey as opposed to tension. In stark contrast, local government is extending invitations for foreign investment and support in the governance of Syrians. Ironically, this “paradiplomacy,” while in contrast with the central government’s foreign policy goals, does support the central government’s goals regarding hosting Syrians.

Let us now look at two examples of projects in which all three of these mechanisms- decentralization, fragmentation, and internationalization- work together that offer striking implications about how and why Syrians are governed as they in Gaziantep. In both of these examples, paradiplomacy takes place by way of involvement of foreign governments through funding. What’s more, fragmented government agencies work with a diverse group of actors to carry out the missions of these projects.

3.5.4 ILO Information Center

We have already identified and explained the issues that the informal economy poses to Turkey and workers alike as well as how Syrian migrants contribute to this growing economy. Local actors have partnered with international actors in Gaziantep to address this issue and its impact on Gaziantep. In October of 2021, the first Information Center opened in Gaziantep with the goal of supporting the formalization of workers in the municipality; while the center serves both Syrians and Turks, Syrians especially make up a large portion of informal enterprises

because of the legal hurdles they face to work legally. According to a press release from the International Labour Organization (ILO) on the center, the services offered by the Information Center include providing guidance and counsel to businesses to help them navigate the rules and regulations in the labor market, providing work permit applications for Syrians under Temporary Protection, and providing referrals to training and opportunities for Turks and Syrians seeking work alike (ILO, 2021). The center is the product of collaboration between the Gaziantep Union of Chambers of Tradesmen and Craftsmen, leadership from the ILO, and the Turkish Confederation of Tradesmen and Craftsmen. The Center is a part of a larger ILO project, “Promoting Decent Jobs for Syrians under Temporary Protection and Turkish citizens,” which is funded by Germany via the KfW Development Bank (ILO, 2021).

This project and the establishment of the Information Center encapsulates how the governance of Syrians is at once dynamically fragmented, decentralized, and internationalized. Local government agents along with national agencies worked together with a non-governmental organization, the ILO, to ultimately establish a center funded by a foreign government. This is not the result of diplomacy and coordination between the Turkish head of state and the international community, but rather between the fragmented parts of the Turkish state and specific interest groups and both state (Germany) and multi-lateral government organizations (ILO).

This project directly targets the issues around informal employment that the central state does not address; namely, getting employers and labor alike to understand how the work permit process works. Second, the center works with Gaziantep's own Migration Management Directorate (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü), an agency that previously had only operated solely out of Ankara. This cooperation helps to resolve the issue of permits getting stuck in Ankara with no way of reaching workers in Gaziantep. In these ways, the information center supports a more sustainable version of Erdogan's "hosting" goal by also spearheading issues around the informal sector.

In this project, we see an example of the interests of an international organization, the ILO, and the local authorities, the Gaziantep Municipal Government, along with local businessmen, that are compatible with each other. The formalization of labor matters to the ILO for the normative reasons of protecting labor. For the local government, placing all labor on an even wage playing field accomplishing the goals that Mayor Şahin stresses around promoting social cohesion. Similarly, the Turkish Confederation of Tradesmen and Craftsmen are similarly interested in protecting the job security of legal workers.

3.5.5 International Organization for Migration: Background

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is a UN organization that partners with and establishes missions within partner countries. While the IOM first opened offices in Turkey following the Gulf War in the 1990s, the mission was formalized in 2004 when Turkey was granted member status to the IOM (IOM, 2022). According to the IOM official website, besides addressing the needs of migrants during crises, it also works in close collaboration with the Turkish government to address longer term issues of migration such as social cohesion and integration, border management, and data collection of migrant movement (IOM, 2022). As reported by an IOM official, the IOM and the Turkish government have a contract in which the IOM has blanket permission to respond to migration-related crises however they deem fit. An important distinction that this official made between the IOM and other migration-adjacent UN agencies such as the UNHCR is that the IOM is not normative policy based, in that they do not necessarily campaign for certain policies in favor of the movement of people, but rather they focus on responding to the needs that migrants face on the ground and the conditions they pose for their host communities. This makes their work especially interesting to consider in terms of governance, as they do not have any expressed agenda apart from addressing expressed needs related to migration.

The IOM now has six offices including its head office in Ankara and its sub-offices in Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul, Izmir, and Sanliurfa and over 1000 workers. Among the network of full-time IOM employees, there are international staff,

Turkish employees, and Syrian refugees. Among the IOM offices, the Gaziantep office is the largest in terms of number of employees. The IOM also contracts private international companies for certain projects involving special skills such as construction. IOM funding works on a project- by- project basis and are largely single-donor funded, most of whom are European and American donors. These donors consist of both government agencies (such as USAID and European development banks) and private philanthropic organizations. The international nature of the IOM's funding makes its output in Gaziantep all the more compelling as we explore the impact that these donors have on the experience of Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Among the services that the IOM offers, an IOM official highlighted in our interview the in-cash incentives, which are often used as capital for starting a business or regenerating a business that was lost in the migration from Syria. Recipients of this assistance are not required to obtain a permit before receiving cash assistance, and instead the IOM sees it the responsibility of the Syrian business owners to seek out proper permits. In one interview, an IOM official expressed that is more so the IOM's priority that refugees are able to start making their own income and integrating into the local economy as quickly as possible, and regularization is a secondary issue. We will dedicate a latter section of this chapter to discuss the significance of Gaziantep's informal sector and international actors' influence on it later in this chapter.

3.5.5.1 The IOM and Syrian Employment

In an interview, an IOM official described a former project run by the IOM in which Syrians in Gaziantep in search of employment were matched with existing businesses in Gaziantep under the condition that the IOM would provide a temporary salary subsidy and take care of the legal logistics of acquiring the work permit. The IOM acted as a liaison between these companies and their refugee clients, whom they essentially vouched for by providing the salary subsidy. The project resulted in a relatively high retention rate of placed workers in these companies, with around 70% of cases resulting in the company paying them and keeping them on as employees even after the IOM salary subsidy ran out.

3.5.5.1.1 Informal Employment

However, this IOM official also described that most of the assistance the organization provides is in-cash, aimed at helping Syrians start businesses without attaching the requirement of work permits or legalization to this aid. In an interview, this official stated that to the IOM and other organizations providing assistance on the ground, the concept of regularization is an “academic issue,” not a practical one. From the IOM’s perspective, their goal is to help refugees become economically stable as efficiently as possible, and because of the hurdles to formalization we have already discussed, making this a requirement would make assistance distribution too slow for the expectations of project donors. This is an important element of the IOM’s work to note: the organization is not bypassing

permits because of any explicit directive from the government, but rather because the global economic structure privileges the shortest path to capital production. In doing so, they accomplish the same implicit goal of neoliberalism.

3.5.6 Social Cohesion: the Ensar Community Center

Another issue that Mayor Şahin has expressed specific concern is violence as the product of social tension between the Turkish and Syrian residents of Gaziantep. The Ensar Community Center was founded in response to this concern by the GMM in collaboration with the IOM, Welthungerhilfe (a private German NGO for development and aid), UNHCR, UNICEF, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (the German government's development agency), the Association for Solidarity with Asylum-Seekers and Migrants (a private Turkish non-profit), the International Blue Crescent Organization (a private international NGO), and GMM's public education centers (UNHCR, 2019). Funding for the center is administered by the IOM but comes from the Japanese government (IOM 2018). Services at the center include language courses (in both Arabic and Turkish) designed for both adults and children, as well as awareness-raising sessions on subjects such as laws that directly affect Syrians, women's health and rights, child wellbeing and protection, parenting skills, and vocational training (UNHCR, 2019). Additionally, the center hosts events and activities open to the whole community included but not limited to the arts, sports, and cooking (IOM, 2018).

The Ensar Community Center is a fascinating example of a product of a very diverse group of agents collaborating to support a common goal that does not explicitly come from the central government; Erdogan has not mandated social cohesion, but local actors in Gaziantep have identified it as an important component of governing a city with such a relatively large population of Syrians. What's more, private Turkish groups, private international groups, and foreign governments also deem this a cause worth investing in. The closest of Erdogan's goals this project gets to is his goal of integration for Syrians, but there is an important difference between Erdogan's remarks about integration and the mission of the Ensar Center; whereas Erdogan seems focused on integration at the nominal, legal level as he mentions possible pathways to naturalization, the Ensar Community Center and initiatives like it focus on the social integration of Syrians. The latter is not purely cosmopolitan- it has been discussed by Ms. Şahin in the same breath as security measures (Şahin, 2019). Social tensions on the basis of contestations over jobs and public facilities, and the violence that assumably follows, is an example of a policy issue that has only been seriously acted upon at the local level even in the absence of clear policy recommendations from the central government.

Still, we cannot ignore how politically beneficial such "social cohesion" projects, and initiative in general that offer services and aid to Syrian and Turkish residents

alike, are to the AKP government. We have already discussed the importance of the urban poor to the central government because of their participation in the AKP's coalition support. In this way, decentralized actors in Gaziantep support the AKP's goal of preventing electoral defeat in a period of economic turmoil. Not only has Ms. Şahin emphasized how important is for her to serve all residents of Gaziantep (Şahin, 2019) projects based on the collaboration between the GMM and local government actors that we have discussed in this chapter all frame missions in terms of assisting and uplifting the entire Gaziantep community as a whole, in which Syrians may be especially vulnerable but not the only people who are struggling.

Some of the Actors Affecting Governance of Syrians in Gaziantep

Governmental		Non-Governmental
Turkish Government		Turkish Civil Society
Central	Provincial	Labor unions
Disaster and Emergency Management (AFAD)	Office of the Mayor	Facebook groups for networking/finding work
Ministry of Interior (T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı)	Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality (GMM)	Turkish aid organization (informal labor unions)
	Social Research Center (Sarmer)	Orange for NGOs
Directorate General of Migration Management	Temporary Education Centers	
	Ensar Community Center	

(Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü)	Women's Shelter	SGDD-ASAM (Sığınmacılar ve Göçmenlere Dayanışma Derneği- Association for Solidarity with Asylum-Seekers and Migrants)
	Art and Vocational Training Courses (Gasmek)	KAMER Foundation
		Kırkayak Culture House
General Directorate of Security (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü)	Gaziantep Chamber of Industry (GCI)	Bülbülzade Foundation
		Gaziantep Union of Chambers of Tradesmen and Craftsmen
Turkish İller Bank	Gaziantep Migration Management Directorate (Gaziantep Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü)	TİSK (Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations) Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK)
Office of the President		TÜSİAD
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dışişleri Bakanı)		International Middle East Peace Research Center Humanitarian (IMPR)
Turkey-Syria Business Council (established by Turkey's Foreign Economic Relations Board (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Konseyi - DEİK))	Gaziantep Water and Sewage Administration (GASKİ)	
Kalkınma Yatırım Bankası (Development Investment Bank of Turkey)	Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality Education Centers	

Ministry of Labor and Social Security		
Ministry of Family and Social Policy		
Foreign State Agencies		Profit-Generating
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)	Construction companies (268)	
German KfW Development Bank	Plastic Manufacturers	
US Agency for International Development (USAID)	Syrian-owned micro-businesses (less than 10 employees)	
German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ)	Textile Manufacturers	
	Footwear Manufacturers	
	Agricultural Production	
Intergovernmental/Supra-National Agencies		NGOs
International Association for Relief and Development (ONSUR) Turkey	Turk-Operated	Internationally-Operated
IYD International Humanitarian Relief Association (IYD)	Gülümseme ve Zeytin	Syrian American Medical Society Foundation
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Muzun for Humanitarian and Development	
International Labour Organization (ILO)		Amal Organization for Relief and Development
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	İnsana Değer Derneği	
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	MIDMAR	Welthungerhilfe (WHH)
Emissa for Development	Relief Experts	Hope Revival
	Association (Yardim	Organization

EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT)	Uzmanlari Yardimlaşma ve Kalkinma Derneği- UDER)	Syrian Expatriate Medical Association
The World Bank		
EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development)		Rahma Worldwide Aid and Development
		Mercy Without Limits
		International Rescue Committee
		CARE International
		Relief International
		Syrian Economic Forum
		Syrian International Business Association
		Syria Relief and Development
		Save the Children
		Relief International
		Bonyan Organization
		Space of Peace
		Takaful Al Sham Charity Organization
		GOAL Global
		Islamic Relief
		Sened Organization
		Ataa Humanitarian Relief Organization

		Ihsan for Relief and Development
		People in Need
		Human Appeal
		International Network for Aid Relief and Assistance (INARA)
		Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU)
		Bahar
		Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations
		Syrian Civil Administration Development Center
		Nasaem Khair Organization
		Ghiras Al Nahda
		Hand in Hand for Syria
		Olive Branch

Figure 6: Some of the actors affecting the governance of Syrians in Gaziantep, organized by whether they are a government or non-government entity and whether they are Turkish in origin or foreign.

Politics of Scale in Turkey's Governance of Syrian Refugees




Figure 7: Politics of Scale that affect Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees.

3.5.7 Further Goal Assessment

Besides these goals expressed by leadership which directly speak to the governance of Syrians in Turkey, we must also note the goals of the state concerning the reproduction of capitalism and the regulation of neoliberalism. Growth through the construction sector is clearly a strategy the government has

pursued for economic growth and political support (which are both expressions of social relations). In tandem with this focus on the construction sector, hyper-low interest rates have also been used to support Turkish exporters, as the TL has depreciated and made Turkish products more globally competitive. Together, these strategies are an attempt to maintain the state's capital accumulation regime, which is dependent on foreign capital flow.

3.5.8 The Possibility of Return from Gaziantep's Perspective

During the research for this project, strategies of the government to incentivize Syrians to voluntarily return quickly increased, primarily in the form of the establishment of a new "safe zone." As recently as May of 2022, President Erdoğan announced a project that will "secure the voluntary return of 1 million of our Syrian brothers," (Tastekin, 2022). However, analysts doubt that the project will be much more successful than a similar plan announced in 2019, mentioned earlier in this chapter. The plan is clearly a response to the rapid increase in anti-immigrant sentiments shaping social life amidst job contestations and a suffering economy, with the AKP aware of the upcoming elections. Still, Turkey's transformation points us to two important points to consider in the face of possible return: the influence that businesses have over the possibility of voluntary return, and the influence of Turkey's vulnerable position in the global economy.

3.5.8.1 Business Owners and Voluntary Return

Regarding the potential of Syrians returning to Syria, Interior Minister Soylu pointed out, “Do you know who will rebel? Those are the business owners,” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2022). The government is aware of the value that businesses see in an abundance of informal Syrian workers. However, it is important to remember that Syrian refugees are not a monolith; there are also Syrian-owned businesses, especially in the Gaziantep region (Güven 2018). One IOM official refuted the idea that the Turkish government would force any exporting business out of Turkey, and businesses will not soon move back to Syria unless incentivized. In Gaziantep, they have enjoyed quality infrastructure at their disposal. The government’s new “safe zone” proposals are still residential in their best ambitions, and thus offer no incentives for these businesses to relocate. When asked in the 2018 TEPAV report on Syrian entrepreneurship, 71.7 percent of Syrian business owners reported that they would not return back to Syria even after the war is over. For this group, it will take much more than the establishment of security for them to voluntarily return. Likewise, the Turkish government is clearly not making efforts to incentivize this exodus, either.

3.5.8.2 Politicians and the Principle of Refoulment

There is a reason the government has emphasized the established of “safe zones” as the precursor to voluntary return; according to the principle of nonrefoulment, which states that “those who seek asylum may not be returned to a country in which there are reasonable grounds to believe they will be subjected to

persecution,” (UNHCR, 2022). Commenting on the houses built in this new safe zone, Interior Minister Soylu stated, “We must ensure a voluntary, dignified and safe return.” The government recognizes the backlash it could face, and the further economic that could be done, if accused of violating the non-refoulment principle.

Even the CHP, the mainstream opposition party against the AKP, in their plan to return Syrians, emphasizes that security must be established in Syria before Syrians can return; in a four-step plan outlined by CHP chairman Kılıçdaroğlu, the first two steps deal with restoring security in Syria. This is evidence that even the most powerful opposition party who is vocal about returning Syrians recognizes that the Turkish economy cannot afford the international backlash that would come with unabashedly forcibly returning Syrians to an environment in which their security is at risk. Of course, time will tell how an opposition party may go about actually executing such a plan, but it is clear that they are wary of the international eyes watching them.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

The mainstream literature on Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees since the beginning of the Syrian civil war most often assume a neo-Weberian stance, in which they focus on policy and institutional capacity. However, we problematize this approach as it isolates state from society, and therefore cannot answer questions of social tension and economic stress that shape global refugee governance, including that of Turkey's. As an alternative, we use the State Transformation Approach and the Regulatory State Model to explain how Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees is a dynamic process as opposed to a static product of a network of institutions, and this process is set in motion by the social relations founded on the neoliberal capitalist development of Turkey. Furthermore, this process is one piece of the broader transformation of Turkey into a regulatory state, in which the central government sets goals and rules for a large group of diverse public and private actors. The actors to which the government defers governance shapes whose interests have been privileged and whose have been marginalized. In keeping with its goals around the reproduction of capitalism, its governance of Syrian refugees has prioritized the interests of capitalists and business owners and minimized those of labor.

Using a State Transformation Approach theoretical framework, we echoed the argument that globalized capitalism is inherently unstable, and state control is a feature of it, rather than a threat to it. Thus, the unfolding fragmented, decentralized, and internationalized power distributions are purposeful in that they are the state's strategy of producing and reproducing capitalism. Even in a state with power consolidated to one party, we can see how a wide network of actors and agencies are active in accomplishing this end, refugee governance not excluded.

4.1 Findings

4.1.1 Finding One

Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees cannot be understood outside of a critical analysis of its capitalist development.

Existing studies of Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees, among which include regime theory angles, securitization studies, and heavily neoliberal lenses, fall short of explanatory power because they fail to first acknowledge the social tensions built on the political economic development which comprises the Turkish state. This particular area of governance is highly affected by these social tensions as they have increased during economic crisis. Furthermore, while many have cried "democratic backsliding" and a shift in the AKP from a democratic to an authoritarian regime, we situated the party in a longer timeline of Turkey's

capitalist development marked by “authoritarian neoliberalism.” “Authoritarian neoliberalism” relies on the notion that the economic cannot be removed from the political and so “neoliberalization” or the process of imposing neoliberal reforms, is inherently anti-democratic, as it purposely redistributes power to those with the most capital, making authoritarianism not a crisis for neoliberalism to solve, but rather a feature of it (Tansel, 2018; Yalman, 2021). There will inevitably be structural crises between the capital accumulation regime and the modes of regulation because of the social tensions caused by the necessary structure of winners and losers under globalized capitalism (Aglietta, 1998; Boyer, 1987). Authors in the Regulation School have borrowed Offe’s (1976) term, the crisis of crisis management, to describe this conflict between capital reproduction and social cohesion.

4.1.1.1 Crisis of Crisis Management

Turkey’s governance of its new Syrian population represents another “crisis of crisis management,” as capital interests insist on lowest possible wages and exploitative conditions of vulnerable, informal labor. On the other hand, Turkish labor suffers as well, as they lose jobs to low wages that they cannot compete with or take unfavorable conditions for need of wages. These social tensions on the foundation of economic destitute create a crisis for the state.

4.1.1.2 Winners and Losers

Because of its capitalist development, the Turkish state compulsively produces and reproduces capitalism in all areas of governance. As such, in this particular area of governance, there are winners and losers of capitalism. From a nationalistic methodological perspective, it may be tempting to try to align the winners and losers with nationality; in other words, identify Syrians as the losers in this structure because of their exploitation in the informal labor sector, or perhaps Turks as the losers because of their job or wage loss to informal workers. However, the reality is more complicate than this, as Syrian refugees nor Turkish workers are monoliths. As data from the TEPAV study on Syrian entrepreneurship exemplified, Syrians also constitute a portion of business owners, just as there are Turks both working informally under exploitative conditions and overseeing large construction firms. What's more, businesses with at least one Syrian owner are especially important to Turkey's dependent financialization, as proportionally they tend to export more than their Turkish-owned counterparts (Güven et al., 2018). In sum, the winners and losers of capitalism that Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees creates constitute social groups that are global, just as Dependency Theory would suggest.

4.1.1.2.1 Informal Labor

Turkey's informal sector, and refugees' participation in it, is not due to incapable institutions, but institutions that support exploitation of labor by design to the end of reproducing capitalism. In our empirical chapter, we cited several occasions of members of the central government's Ministry of the Interior pointing out the

necessity of refugees and immigrants in the maintenance of industries such as agriculture, manufacturing, and construction, that require hard labor. Minister of the Interior Suleyman Soylu went as far as to say that without Syrians in the labor force, both as workers and as business owners in the manufacturing sector, “our factories would stop working,” (Firat, 2017). In light of the government’s most recent project to encourage voluntary return by constructing “safe zones,” Minister Soylu admitted, “A million people will return. Do you know who will rebel? Those are the business owners,” (Hürriyet Daily News, 2022).

Additionally, an IOM official stated in an interview with us that the first priority for their organization is getting refugees economically stable as efficiently as possible. The bureaucratic red tape of securing work permits (including, but not limited to, the six months waiting period on temporary protection before being eligible to apply for a permit) means that formalization is not a priority for their organization, nor for many other assistance agencies in Gaziantep. These hurdles are not the result of the quality of Turkey’s institutions or policy, but the structure of a state that privileges the interests of capital over the interests of labor.

4.1.1.2.2 Global Vulnerability

However, that is not to say that there is no social cost to this structural crisis; social tensions around refugees have only increased as Turkey’s economy has soured, especially since its 2018 currency crisis that has resulted in massive inflation. Still, any attempts to promote the return of Syrians in response to these

tensions are lined with an awareness of the world's eyes on the AKP's next moves regarding refugees, especially since the most recent increase in flow of refugees from Afghanistan. Turkey's dependent financialization regime makes it vulnerable in the global economy and therefore limits the tools available for intervention. Even parties who are vocally anti-immigrant admit that security must be established in Syria before any refugees can be urged to return. This represents the social awareness of the potential consequences of going against international norms regarding refugees/asylum seekers.

4.1.2 Finding Two

Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees constitutes one process in the transformation of the Turkish state towards Regulatory Statehood.

A diverse group of actors are responsible for regulating capitalism as it pertains to refugees, and in doing so protect the central government- evident in the way that the central government has deferred to localities in terms of governance and the power that the Interior Ministry admits capitalists hold in the return of Syrians. The unique way that the central government continues to consolidate its power while also leaving day-to-day governance issues to a diverse localized network of actors indicates an emerging Turkish version of Regulatory Statehood.

In this study, we have illustrated three mechanisms that constitute Turkey's governance process of Syrian refugees and contribute to its transformation

towards the Regulatory State model (Majone, 1997): fragmentation, decentralization, and internationalization (Hameiri and Jones 2016, 2021). Each of these mechanisms are conducive to Turkey's neoliberalization, and we will briefly summarize how each of these mechanisms can be identified in this governance process specifically occurring in Gaziantep.

4.1.2.1 Fragmentation

Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees represents fragmentation in how there is an abundance of public agencies that contest with each other over who actually makes decisions that affect Syrian refugees' lives in Turkey. This is what the STA refers to as "spatial politics" occurring within the state; several actors claim governance over the same physical territory. For example, while there is central Migration Management Directorate (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü), Gaziantep also has its own Migration Management Directorate that works together with the Gaziantep Municipal Government on projects aimed at migrants in the Gaziantep municipality. The Ministry of the Interior, though it has different responsibilities than the Migration Management Directorate, continues to be vocal on the issues surrounding Syrians. Specifically in Gaziantep, there are also several smaller agencies including but not limited to: the Gaziantep Water and Sewage Administration, the Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality Education Centers, and the Gaziantep Chamber of Industry, among others. Each have different priorities, interests, and responsibilities but each affect the Syrian population in Gaziantep.

4.1.2.2 Decentralization

Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees represents decentralization in how most of the decisions that impact the day-to-day lives of Syrians are made by the local governments and the organizations operating in these localities, as opposed to central government agencies. In Gaziantep, this looks like the Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipal government launching their own projects to address social cohesion problems, such as the Ensar Community Center, as well as establishing relations with foreign agencies and foreign investment banks to provide services to their population, citizens and refugees alike. This partnership leads us to the third mechanism, internationalization.

4.1.2.3 Internationalization

Turkey's governance of Syrian refugees involves internationalization as it engages a large group of foreign actors, both public and private, in the day-to-day as well as long-term projects that impact the lives of Syrians in Turkey. As a result, the localities that are empowered through decentralization carry out their own foreign policy agenda with these foreign actors. This is an example of the "paradiplomacy" (Aldeco and Keating, 2009), which is a clear instance of how, under globalized capitalism, alliance formation is not limited to central governments alone, but also other agencies that share capital interests. Furthermore, according to one IOM official, international donors will play an important role in the potential of Syrians voluntarily returning to Syria. If these

donors are willing to invest in projects on the Syrian side of the border, it could help to incentivize otherwise unmotivated refugees to return to Syria.

Additionally, top-down authority still does not have control over the many international actors who clearly play a role in the governance of Syrians in Gaziantep. Fragmented government and decentralized power in the GMM have enabled the local government to partner with and welcome these international actors; it is not that foreign governments have come and unilaterally intervened.

4.1.3 Finding Three

The future of Syrians in Turkey will continue to be determined by Turkey's capitalist development, and its transformation into a regulatory state.

Recent comments from the Ministry of the Interior clearly indicates the government's awareness and allowance of the way the manufacturing and construction sectors use informal labor, of which Syrians and other refugees make up a large portion. The government's "safe zone" projects do not include any mechanisms for these businesses to stop hiring these individuals, nor any incentive for these workers to leave their jobs in Turkey to return to unemployment in Syria. Additionally, the government has been quiet about encouraging the return of the businesses that relocated from Syria to Turkey. In sum, in the wake of new rhetoric from AKP officials on facilitating safe return, it

is clear that the mechanisms of regulating the reproduction of capitalism is still solidly in place.

4.1.3.1 Critical Time for Turkey's Refugee Governance

The relevancy of this project will only increase in the near future, as we have discussed the already evolving change in rhetoric of the AKP government with an increase in anti-immigrant sentiments even among the party's supporters (evident at least in such incidents such as the recent violence in AKP stronghold Altındağ). With the upcoming 2023 elections, the party seems to recognize the rising social tensions around its approach to the future of its refugee governance. While many of the upcoming analyses of this evolution will likely focus primarily on the AKP central government, our project makes an appeal to not forget the large network of actors that handle the day-to-day realities for refugees in Turkey, especially those in areas with high concentrations of refugees such as Gaziantep.

We have yet to see how Turkey will manage the new wave of Afghan refugees, but we can be sure that it will not happen outside of Turkey's transformation nor its authoritarian neoliberal regime. The fragmentation, decentralization, and internationalization of the Turkish state cannot be undone overnight, especially considering these mechanisms' role in maintaining neoliberalization. Turkey's economy will continue to rely on a level of informal labor to maximize the profits of exporting businesses, and it will also continue to be vulnerable in the international economy. Furthermore, as an IOM official commented and TEPAV

data echoed, the Syrian-owned businesses in Gaziantep will not be forced to leave, nor will they likely leave Turkey without incentive to do so.

4.2 Conclusion

Ten years following the initial wave of Syrian refugees into Turkey, Turkey's governance of the Syrians displaced within its borders cannot be understood as a static policy outcome or the sum of many initiatives, but instead a dynamic process taking place within a broader context of the transformation of the Turkish state towards Regulatory Statehood. In this project, we have illustrated in detail how Turkey's governance of Syrians has supported the reproduction of capitalism that Regulatory Statehood demands, and the inevitable social crisis that has erupted as a result. By applying the State Transformation Approach to the case study of Gaziantep, a large and diverse group of actors emerges as affecting this governance. Our application of this theoretical framework to a migration issue is novel and represents a way forward for the field of IR to take the study of migration as seriously as any issue that affects the very way we conceptualize the state. In the Turkish case of its governance of Syrians, even in the wake of pressure on the government from economically frustrated citizens increasingly hostile towards refugees, we submit that the capital interests represented in this diverse group of actors will continue to be a long-term factor in the evolution of Turkey's governance of its refugee population.

REFERENCES

Abdelaaty, L. (2019). Refugees and Guesthood in Turkey, *Journal of Refugee Studies*,

34(3), 2827-2848 doi: 10.1093/jrs/fez097

Akcay, Ü. (2018). Neoliberal Populism in Turkey and Its Crisis, *Institute for International Economy, Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Recht Berlin, IPE Working Papers*.

Akcay, Ü. (2021). Authoritarian Consolidation Dynamics in Turkey, *Contemporary Politics* 27 (1), 79–104.

doi:10.1080/13569775.2020.1845920

Aldroubi, M. (2021). Syria-Turkey Border Wall Completed. Retrieved from:

<https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/syria-turkey-border-wall-completed-1.738637>.

Aras, B. and Hasan, K. (2002). Turkish-Syrian Relations Revisited, *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 24(4), 47–60. Retrieved from:

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/41858424>.

- Aras, N. Gökalp, E. and Mencütek, Z. (2020). Refugee Protection Regimes: Turkey Country Report. Retrieved from: <https://respondmigration.com/wp-blog/refugee-protection-regimes-turkey-country-report>.
- Atar, E., Hossain F., and Sumnaya Kumasey, A. (2022). Public Service Provision for Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Challenges and Prospects, *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 30(1), 82–98. doi: 10.1080/02185377.2022.2047080.
- Avşaroğlu, N. (2021). Syrians in Turkey Face Major Obstacles Navigating the Labor Market. Retrieved from: <https://www.duwarenglish.com/syrians-in-turkey-face-major-obstacles-navigating-the-labor-market-news-55821>.
- Baskaya, Y. S., and Hulagu, T. (2011). Informal-Formal Worker Wage Gap in Turkey: Evidence from a Semi-Parametric Approach, *Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey*. Working Papers 1115.
- Bastaki, J. (2018). Temporary Protection Regimes and Refugees, *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees*, 34(2), 73–84. Retrieved from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48648706>.
- BBC. (2021). Turkish Capital Reels from Violent Protests against Syrians. Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58185612>.
- Bedirhanoğlu, P. (2021). Global Class Constitution of the AKP's 'Authoritarian Turn' by Neoliberal Financialization. In Routledge, *Regime Change in Turkey*, (pp. 68–84). Abingdon: Routledge, n.d.

Bélanger, D. and Saracoglu, C. (2018). The Governance of Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The State-Capital Nexus and Its Discontents. *Mediterranean Politics*, 25(4), 413–32. doi: 10.1080/13629395.2018.1549785

Besley, T. and Persson, T. (2010). State Capacity, Conflict, and Development. *Econometrica*, 78 (1), 1-34. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25621395>.

Birbilen, E. (2019). Municipality Improves Inclusion of Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Global Compact on Refugees: Digital Platform. Retrieved from: <https://globalcompactrefugees.org/article/municipality-improves-inclusion-syrian-refugees-turkey>.

Burgen, S. (2019). How a Small Turkish City Successfully Absorbed Half a Million Migrants. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/jun/19/gaziantep-turkish-city-successfully-absorbed-half-a-million-migrants-from-syria>.

Buzan, B. and Hansen, L. (2009). *The Evolution of International Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Böhmelt, T., et al. (2018). Blame the Victims? Refugees, State Capacity, and Non-State Actor Violence, *Journal of Peace Research*, 56(1), 73–87. doi: 10.1177/0022343318804592.

Cansız, M., Kurnaz, Z., and Çağlar, E. (2019). Progressing Towards 2023: The Transformation of Organised Industrial Zones in Turkey. Retrieved from:

<https://www.undp.org/turkiye/publications/transformation-organized-industrial-zones-turkey-towards-2023>.

Celik, D. and Geybullayeva, A. (2022). Workers in Turkey Are Pushing Back on Low Wages amid Economic Crisis. Retrieved from <https://globalvoices.org/2022/02/15/workers-in-turkey-are-pushing-back-on-low-wages-amid-economic-crisis/>.

Collier, D. (2011). Understanding Process Tracing, *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 44(4), 823–830. doi:10.1017/s1049096511001429.

Côté-Boucher, K., Infantino, F., and Salter, M. (2014). Border Security as Practice: An Agenda for Research, *Security Dialogue*, 45(3), 195–208. doi:10.1177/0967010614533243.

Daily Sabah. (2021). Former IP Lawmaker Özdağ Announces New Party Details. Retrieved from: <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/elections/former-ip-lawmaker-ozdag-announces-new-party-details>.

Dalloul, A. (2022). The Turkish Economy's War of Independence. Retrieved from: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20211210-the-turkish-economys-war-of-independence/amp/>.

Davutoğlu, A. (2008). Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, *Insight Turkey*, 10(1), 77–96. Retrieved from: <https://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/ahmet-davutoglu-turkeys-foreign-policy-vision-an-assessment-of-2007.pdf>.

Dereli, T. (2011). Informal Employment in Turkey, *Journal of Social Policy*

Conferences, 53, 65–82. Retrieved from:

<https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/iusskd/issue/898/10075>.

Deutsche Welle. (2020). Erdogan Warns 'Millions' of Refugees Heading to

Europe. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/en/erdogan-warns-millions-of-refugees-heading-to-europe/a-52603580>.

Directorate General of Migration Management. (2022). Temporary Protection in

Turkey. Retrieved from:

<https://en.goc.gov.tr/Hata/Page404.aspxerrorpath=/temporary-protection-in-turkey>.

Dos Santos, T. (1970). The Structure of Dependence, *The American Economic*

Review, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 60(2), 231–36. Retrieved from:

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/1815811>.

Efe, İ. and Jacoby, T. (2022). Making Sense' of Turkey's Refugee Policy: The

Case of the Directorate General of Migration Management, *Migration Studies*, 82–98. doi: 10.1093/migration/mnac008ç.

Elitok, S. P. (2018). Turkey's Migration Policy Revisited: (Dis)Continuities and

Peculiarities, *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, IAI Paper, 1–18. ISBN: 978-88-9368-083-7ç

Ercan, H., Taymaz, E., and Yeldan, E. (2010). Crisis and Turkey: Impact Analysis of Crisis Response Measures, *International Labour Organization*. ISBN 978-92-2-024460-9.

Erdoğan, M. (2019). Syrian Refugees in Turkey - Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Retrieved

from:<https://www.kas.de/documents/283907/7339115/Syrian+Refugees+in+Turkey.pdf/5d3d4091-e56d-3c42-2a9c-4e7f5d98706f?version=1.0&t=1571303379232>.

Esen, B. and Gumuscu, S. (2016). Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey, *Third World Quarterly*, 37(9), 1581–1606.

doi:10.1080/01436597.2015.1135732.

Esen, B. and Gümüşçü, S. (2017). A Small Yes for Presidentialism: The Turkish Constitutional Referendum of April 2017, *South European Society and Politics*, 22(3), 303–326. doi:10.1080/13608746.2017.1384341.

European Commission. (2020). The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN):

Offering a Lifeline to Vulnerable Refugees in Turkey. Retrieved from:

https://ec.europa.eu/echo/emergency-social-safety-net-essn-offering-lifeline-vulnerable-refugees-turkey_en.

European Committee of the Regions. (2022). Turkey - Candidate Country.

Retrieved from:

<https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/Pages/Turkey.aspx>.

European Construction Industry Federation. (2020). Turkey. Retrieved from:

<https://fiec-statistical-report.eu/turkey>.

European Council. (2016). EU-Turkey Statement, Consilium Europa. Retrieved

from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/>.

Fabbe, K. (2019). Islamic Capitalism in Turkey. In *Business, Ethics and Institutions: The Evolution of Turkish Capitalism in Global Perspective*.

New York City, New York: Routledge.

Fergusson, R. and Yeates, N. (2022). *Global Youth Unemployment: History, Governance and Policy*. Edward Elgar Publishing,

Gaziantep Büyükşehir Belediyesi. (2020). About Mayor. Retrieved from:

<https://www.gaziantep.bel.tr/en/about-mayor>.

Gaziantep Sanayi Odası. (2018). Industrial Zones. Retrieved from:

[https://gso.org.tr/en/general-page/the-industry-of-gaziantep/industrial-zones-](https://gso.org.tr/en/general-page/the-industry-of-gaziantep/industrial-zones-56.html#:~:text=Organized%20Industrial%20Zone%2C%20which%20is,there%20are%2085%20industrial%20parcels)

[56.html#:~:text=Organized%20Industrial%20Zone%2C%20which%20is,there%20are%2085%20industrial%20parcels](https://gso.org.tr/en/general-page/the-industry-of-gaziantep/industrial-zones-56.html#:~:text=Organized%20Industrial%20Zone%2C%20which%20is,there%20are%2085%20industrial%20parcels).

Gilman, N. (2018). Modernization Theory Never Dies, *History of Political Economy*, 50(1), 133–51. doi:10.1215/00182702-7033896.

Güven, S., Kenanoğlu, M., Kadikoy, O., Kurt, T., Doğanay, C., Kulaksız, A.,

Erdem, V., and Peker, Y. (2018). Syrian Entrepreneurship and Refugee

Start-Ups in Turkey: Leveraging the Turkish Experience. Retrieved from:
<https://www.tepav.org.tr/en/haberler/s/10023>

Hale, W. M. and Özbudun, E. (2010). *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP* (1st ed.). London, UK: Routledge.

Hameiri, S. and Jones, L. (2015). *Governing Borderless Threats Non-Traditional Security and the Politics of State Transformation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Hameiri, S. and Jones, L. (2017) Beyond Hybridity to the Politics of Scale: International Intervention and ‘Local’ Politics, *Development and Change*, 48(1), 54–77. doi:10.1111/dech.12287.

Hameiri, S. and Jones, L. (2015). Rising Powers and State Transformation: The Case of China, *European Journal of International Relations*, 22(1), 72–98. doi:10.1177/1354066115578952.

Hameiri, S. (2019). Institutionalism beyond Methodological Nationalism? The New Interdependence Approach and the Limits of Historical Institutionalism, *Review of International Political Economy*, 27(3), 637–57. doi:10.1080/09692290.2019.1675742

Hameiri, S., & Jones, L. (2012). The Politics and Governance of Non-Traditional Security, *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(3), 462–73. doi:10.1111/isqu.12014.

Hameiri, S., Jones, L., & Heathershaw, J. (2019). Reframing the Rising Powers Debate: State Transformation and Foreign Policy, *Third World Quarterly*, 40(8), 1397–1414. doi:10.1080/01436597.2019.1594182.

Hein, E., Dodig, N., & Budyldina, N. (2016). The Transition towards Finance-Dominated Capitalism: French Regulation School, Social Structures of Accumulation and Post-Keynesian Approaches Compared. In *Demise of Finance-Dominated Capitalism*, (pp. 7–53). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Hessler, U. (2020). Why the Turkish Lira Is in Free Fall. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/en/erdogans-credit-binge-fuels-lira-depreciation/a-54524078>.

Hoffman, M., & Makovsky, A. (2021). Northern Syria Security Dynamics and the Refugee Crisis. Retrieved from: <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/northern-syria-security-dynamics-refugee-crisis/>.

Hoffman, S., & Samuk, S. (2016). Turkish Immigration Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis, *Working Paper Research Division Global Issues*, (1), 1–30. doi:10.13140/RG.2.1.3320.6003.

Hürriyet Daily News. (2012). Başbakan Erdoğan'ın Konuşmasının Tam Metni. Retrieved from: <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/basbakan-erdoganin-konusmasinin-tam-metni-21388292>.

Hürriyet Daily News. (2018). 30,000 Syrians Eligible to Vote in Turkish Elections: PM - Turkey News. Retrieved from:

<https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/30-000-syrians-eligible-to-vote-in-turkish-elections-pm-133488>.

Independent European Council on Refugees and Exiles. (2021). Content of Temporary Protection - Asylum Information Database: European Council on Refugees and Exiles. Retrieved from:

<https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/content-temporary-protection/>.

International Labour Organization. (2022). Youth Employment (ILO-Ankara).

Retrieved from: <https://www.ilo.org/ankara/areas-of-work/youth-employment/lang--en/index.htm>.

International Labour Organization. (2022). The First Information Centre Opens in Gaziantep to Support the Formalization of Syrian and Turkish Informal Enterprises and Employees. Retrieved from:

https://www.ilo.org/ankara/news/WCMS_823872/lang--en/index.htm.

IOM UN Migration. (2018). Why Gaziantep Still Matters Seven Years after Start of Syrian Conflict. Retrieved from: <https://www.iom.int/news/why-gaziantep-still-matters-seven-years-after-start-syrian-conflict>.

James, C., & Özdamar, Ö. 2009. Modeling Foreign Policy and Ethnic Conflict: Turkey's Policies Towards Syria, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 5(1), Oxford University Press, 2009, 17–36, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24909869>.

Japan International Cooperation Agency. (2020). “Topics & Events.” Retrieved from:

<https://www.jica.go.jp/turkey/english/office/topics/200313.html>.

Jones, L. (2010). Theorizing Foreign and Security Policy in an ERA of State Transformation: A New Framework and Case Study of China, *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 4 (4), 579–97. doi:10.1093/jogss/ogy030.

Kirişci, K. (2021). As EU-Turkey Migration Agreement Reaches the Five-Year Mark, Add a Job Creation Element. Retrieved from:
<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/17/as-eu-turkey-migration-agreement-reaches-the-five-year-mark-add-a-job-creation-element/>.

Kirişci, K., Brandt, J., & Erdoğan, M. (2022). Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Beyond the Numbers. Retrieved from: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/06/19/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-beyond-the-numbers/>.

Kopits, G. (1987). Structural Reform, Stabilization, and Growth in Turkey, *International*

Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 52. ISBN: 0939934841

Kubilay, M. (2021). Turkey's Self-Made Currency Crisis. *Middle East Institute*. Retrieved from: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkeys-self-made-currency-crisis>.

Kudłacz, M. (2017). The Neo-Weberian Approach as a Public Management Model in Urban Areas, *Public Policy and the Neo-Weberian State*, 152–61. doi:10.4324/9781315187945-11.

- Kuyucu, T. (2017). Two Crises, Two Trajectories: The Impact of the 2001 and 2008 Economic Crises on Urban Governance in Turkey, Neoliberal Turkey and Its Discontents. doi:10.5040/9781350987326.CH-002.
- Lammersen, J. (2022). Turkey Exchange Rate December 2021: Focus Economics Economic Forecasts from the World's Leading Economists. Retrieved from: <https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/turkey/news/exchange-rate/turkish-lira-ends-2021-on-a-rollercoaster-ride>.
- Leghtas, I. (2019). Insecure Future: Deportations and Lack of Legal Work for Refugees in Turkey. Retrieved from <https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2019/9/18/insecure-future-deportations-and-lack-of-legal-work-for-refugees-in-turkey>.
- Lynn Jr., L. E. (2008). What Is a Neo-Weberian State? Reflections on a Concept and Its Implications, *NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy*. Retrieved from: <https://lbj.utexas.edu/publications/5662>.
- Lüleci-Sula, Ç., & Erkam, İ. (2021). Migration Management in Turkey: Discourse and Practice, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*. doi:10.33458/uidergisi.1000756.
- Macrotrends. (2022). Turkey Unemployment Rate 1991-2022. Retrieved from: <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/TUR/turkey/unemployment-rate>.
- Mahfudh, A. (2012). Syria and Turkey: a turning point or a historical bet? *Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies*. Retrieved from:

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12703>

Makovsky, Alan. (2019) Turkey's Refugee Dilemma. Retrieved from:

<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/03/13/467183/turkeys-refugee-dilemma/>.

Mahoney, J., & Goertz, G. (2006). A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and

Qualitative Research, *Political Analysis*, 14(3), 227–49. Retrieved from:

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25791851>.

Majone, G. (1997). From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance, *Journal of Public Policy*, 17(2), 139–67. doi:10.1017/s0143814x00003524.

Montague, Z., Kenneth, R., & Williams, T. (2017). Recent Terrorist Attacks in Turkey. Retrieved from:

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/31/world/europe/turkey-recent-attacks.html>

Mordor Intelligence. (2022). Turkey Construction Market: 2022 - 27: Industry Share,

Size, Growth - Mordor Intelligence. Retrieved from:

<https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/turkey-construction-market>.

Mülteciler Derneği. (2022). Türkiye'Deki Suriyeli Sayısı Nisan 2022. Retrieved from: <https://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi/>.

Nelson, R. M. (2013). Turkey's currency crisis.” United States Congressional Research Service. IF10957.

News Wires. (2022). Turkey Says More Migrants Have Frozen to Death Close to the Greek Border. Retrieved from:

<https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220203-turkey-says-more-migrants-have-frozen-to-death-close-to-the-greek-border>.

Panitch, L. (2000). The New Imperial State, *New Left Review*, 2, 5–20. Retrieved from: <https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii2/articles/leo-panitch-the-new-imperial-state>

OECD. (2020). Turkey (TUR) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners. Retrieved from: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/tur>.

Offe, C. (1976). Crisis of Crisis Management: Elements of a Political Crisis Theory, *International Journal of Politics*, 6(3), 29–67. Retrieved from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27868833>.

Oflazoğlu, S. (2016). Organized Industrial Zones and their Effects on Regional Development. In *Entrepreneurship: Practice-Oriented Perspectives*, London, U.K.

Olson, R. W. (2000). Turkish and Syrian Relations Since the Gulf War: The Kurdish

Question and the Water Problem. In LIT Verlag Munster *The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy*. Berlin, Germany: LIT Verlag Munster.

Olson, R. W. (2001). *Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, and Russia, 1991-2000*:

The Kurdish and Islamist Questions. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers.

OPSI. (2021). Refugee Response Program of Gaziantep. Received from:

<https://oecd-opsi.org/innovations/refugee-response-program-of-gaziantep/>.

Osterlund, P. B. (2022). Turkey's Plan to Forcibly Relocate Syrian Refugees

Gains Momentum. Retrieved from:

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/27/turkeys-plan-to-forcibly-relocate-syrian-refugees-gains-momentum>.

Overbeek, H. (2002). Neoliberalism and the Regulation of Global Labor Mobility,

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,

581(1), 74–90. doi:10.1177/000271620258100108.

Pinedo Caro, L. (2020). Syrian Refugees in the Turkish Labour Market: A Socio-

Economic Analysis, *ILO Office in Turkey*, 1–57.

doi:10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2020.04.03.

Rabasa, A., & Larabee, S. (2008). *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*. Santa

Monica, CA: RAND.

Rawdanowicz, Ł. (2010). The 2008-09 Crisis in Turkey: Performance, Policy

Responses and Challenges for Sustaining the Recovery, *OECD Economics*

Department Working Papers, 81, 2–29. Retrieved from:

<https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5km36j7d320s-en>.

Rodan, G., & Jayasuriya, K. (2007). The Technocratic Politics of Administrative Participation: Case Studies of Singapore and Vietnam, *Democratization*, 14(5), 795–815.
doi:10.1080/13510340701635662.

Robinson, C. (2017). Tracing and Explaining Securitization: Social Mechanisms, Process Tracing and the Securitization of Irregular Migration, *Security Dialogue*, 48(6), 505–23. Retrieved from:
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26294208>.

Sariteke, İ. (2019). Syrian Refugees Imbroglio: An Analysis of The Reception and Integration of Displaced Syrian Population in Turkey, *Ortadoğu Etütleri Middle Eastern Studies*, 262–277. Retrieved from:
<https://www.orsam.org.tr/en/syrian-refugees-imbroglio-an-analysis-of-the-reception-and-integration-of-displaced-syrian-population-in-turkey/>.

Secen, S. (2020). Explaining the Politics of Security: Syrian Refugees in Turkey and Lebanon, *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 6(3).
doi:10.1093/jogss/ogaa039

Selcuk, F., & Ertugrul, A. (2001). A Brief Account of the Turkish Economy: 1980-2000, *Russian & East European Finance and Trade*, 37(6), 6–30.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.262957.

Simsek, A. (2021). EU's Pledges to Turkey Remain Largely Unfulfilled. Retrieved from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/eus-pledges-to-turkey-remain-largely-unfulfilled/2179384>.

- Skribeland, Ö. G. (2021). Turkey: Party or Non-Party State? Turkey: party or non-party State?, *Forced Migration Review*. Retrieved from: <https://www.fmreview.org/issue67/skribeland>.
- Somer, M. (2016). Understanding Turkey's Democratic Breakdown: Old vs. New and Indigenous vs. Global Authoritarianism, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16 (4), 481–503. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1246548.
- Sonmez, M. (2021). Turkey Lifts Veil on Unemployment Data, Revealing Bigger Army of Jobless. Retrieved from: <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/03/turkey-unveils-unemployment-data-pandemic-army-of-jobless.html>.
- Soylu, R. (2019). Turkey Deports Hundreds of Syrian Refugees to War-Torn Idlib Province. Retrieved from: <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hundreds-syrian-refugees-deported-idlib-turkey>.
- Soylu, R. (2021). Turkey: Erdogan Vows Not to Deport Syrian Refugees. Retrieved from: <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-erdogan-not-return-syrian-refugees-amid-opposition-campaign>.
- Spindler, W. (2015). 2015: The Year of Europe's Refugee Crisis. Retrieved from: <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-crisis.html>.
- Tansel, C. B. (2018). Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding in Turkey: Beyond the Narratives of Progress, *South European Society and Politics*, 23(2), 197–217. doi:10.1080/13608746.2018.1479945

Tekçe, M. (2010). Impacts of COVID-19 Pandemic on Turkish Construction Sector, *Crisis and Fragility: Economic Impact of COVID-19 and Policy Responses*, 223–38.

Terry, K. (2021). The EU-Turkey Deal, Five Years on: A Frayed and Controversial but

Enduring Blueprint. Retrieved from:

<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/eu-turkey-deal-five-years-on>.

Thomson, J. E. (1995). State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap

between Theory and Empirical Research, *International Studies Quarterly*, 39(2), 213–33, doi:10.2307/2600847.

Tokyol, G. (2020). Turkey: University Numbers Soared during AKP Term, but 9 out of 10 Students Need Financial Aid. Retrieved from:

<https://goncatokyol.medium.com/turkey-university-numbers-soared-during-akp-term-but-9-out-of-10-students-need-financial-aid-81d6d6e5fbfb>.

Trading Economics. (2022). Turkey Current Account. Retrieved from:

<https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/current-account>.

Turkish Heritage. (2019). Migration Flux and Local Governance: A Conversation with Gaziantep Mayor Fatma Sahin, 2019. Retrieved from:

<https://www.turkheritage.org/en/events/migration-flux-and-local->

Turak, N. (2019). Turkey's Erdogan Threatens to Release Millions of Refugees into Europe over Criticism of Syria Offensive. Retrieved from:

<https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/10/turkeys-erdogan-threatens-release-of-refugees-to-europe-over-syria-criticism.html>.

Umraz, U. (2016). *Erdogan: Syrian Refugees Could Become Turkish Citizens*.

Retrieved from: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/7/3/erdogan-syrian-refugees-could-become-turkish-citizens>.

UNHCR. (2022). Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey. Retrieved from:

<https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey>.

United Nations. (2014). In Address to UN Assembly, Turkish President Urges

Support for Victims of Terrorism. Retrieved from:

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/09/478552-address-un-assembly-turkish-president-urges-support-victims-terrorism>.

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2022). U.S. Energy Information

Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis. Retrieved from:

<https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/TUR>.

Uygur, E. (2010). The Global Crisis and the Turkish Economy, Discussion

Paper, *Turkish Economic Association*. Retrieved from:

<http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81736>.

Walt, S. M. (2021). The World Has No Answer for Migration, *Foreign Policy*.

Retrieved from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/30/belarus-europe-migration-refugees-global-order/>.

World Bank Group. (2021). 10 Years on, Turkey Continues Its Support for an

Ever-Growing Number of Syrian Refugees. Retrieved from:

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/06/22/10-years-on-turkey-continues-its-support-for-an-ever-growing-number-of-syrian-refugees>.

Yacoubian, M. (2021). Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising against Assad. Retrieved from: <https://www.usip.org/syria-timeline-uprising-against-assad>.

Yalman, G. (2021). Crisis in or of Neoliberalism? A Brief Encounter with the Debate on the Authoritarian Turn. In Routledge, *Regime Change in Turkey: Neoliberal Authoritarianism, Islamism and Hegemony*, (pp. 15–31). Abingdon: Routledge.

Çelik, Ç, & White, H. (2021). Forced Migration and Protection: Turkey's Domestic Responses to the Syrian Refugees, *European Review*, 30(3), 353–73. doi:10.1017/s1062798721000028

Çinçin, B. Y. (2022). Ümit Özdağ'ın Soylu ile Sert Tartışmasının Ardından Zafer Partisi'nden Tüm Teşkilatlara Talimat: Sükunetinizi Koruyun. Retrieved from: <https://www.haberler.com/politika/umit-ozdag-in-soylu-ile-sert-tartismasinin-14920262-haberi/>.

İçduygu, A. (2015). Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Long Road Ahead, *Migration Policy Institute*, April. Retrieved from: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/syrian-refugees-turkey-long-road-ahead>.

İçduygu, A., & Millet, E. (2016). Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Insecure Lives in an Environment of Pseudo-Integration, *Global Turkey in Europe*, Working Paper 13, August 2016, 2–7. Retrieved from:
https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/gte_wp_13.pdf.

İçduygu, A., & Şimşek, D. (2016). Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Towards Integration Policies, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 15(3), 59–69. Retrieved from:
http://turkishpolicy.com/files/articlepdf/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-towards-integration-policies_en_2781.pdf.

Öktem, K., & Akkoyunlu, K. (2016). Exit from Democracy: Illiberal Governance in Turkey and Beyond, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16(4), 469–80. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1253231.

Öniş, Z. (2019). Turkey under the Challenge of State Capitalism: The Political Economy of the Late AKP Era, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 19(2), 201–25. doi:10.1080/14683857.2019.1594856.