

MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY AND ALGERIA: THE SUCCESS
OR FAILURE OF THE EU'S MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

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
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
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ABSTRACT

MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY AND ALGERIA: THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE EU'S MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

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This thesis analyzes the relationship between the militaries and democratization in Algeria and Turkey within the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Turkey and Algeria are the two countries which have a history of military's involvement in politics and whose armies are in an important position in terms of their political influence. In the thesis, the military-democracy relationship in Turkey and Algeria is incorporated into the framework of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the impacts of the Mediterranean policy of the EU over this relationship are analyzed by dealing with its basic premises, strengths and weaknesses in terms of promoting the establishment of democratic control over the militaries in the region.

Key Words: Military, Democracy, Democratic control of the armed forces, Turkey, Algeria, EU, EUROMED.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE VE CEZAYİR'DE ORDU-DEMOKRASİ İLİŞKİSİ: AB'NİN AKDENİZ POLİTİKASININ BAŞARI YA DA BAŞARISIZLIĞI?

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Bu tez, Avrupa Birliği-Akdeniz Ortaklığı çerçevesinde Türkiye ve Cezayir'de ordu-demokrasi ilişkisini incelemektedir. Türkiye ve Cezayir, ordunun siyasete müdahalesinin ve ordunun politik bir aktör olarak hareket etmesinin gözlemlenebildiği iki ülkedir ve bu tezde; iki ülkedeki ordu-siyaset ve ordu-demokratikleşme ilişkisi AB-Akdeniz ortaklığı ışığında ele alınmakta ve AB'nin Akdeniz politikasının bu ilişkiler üzerindeki etkileri açıklanmaktadır.

Bu tezin yazılmasındaki amaç; AB'nin Türkiye ile Cezayir'deki ordu-siyaset ilişkisine bakışını karşılaştırmak ve AB'nin Akdeniz politikasının ana hatlarını, etkili olduğu alanları, başarı ve başarısızlıklarını saptamaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ordu, Demokrasi, Ordunun demokratik kontrolü, Türkiye, Cezayir, Avrupa Birliği, AB-Akdeniz Ortaklığı.

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INTRODUCTION

Today, democracy is mostly accepted as the ideal form of government and as a means of establishing a secure and peaceful environment in the world. The newly emerging understanding of security among the states which makes democratization and promotion of democracy a foreign policy tool, is influential in the way in which the international relations are conducted and it also reflects itself upon the way in which the supranational organizations are formed and upon their basic premises and the European Union is an important test case for analyzing the promotion of democracy as a policy tool because of the way in which the importance of democracy is stressed by the EU headquarters, in the declarations and official documents.

The concept 'democratization' can be analyzed from various perspectives by using different variables. In this thesis, the democratization policy of the EU is analyzed in relation to the militaries in terms of establishing the democratic control of the armed forces. In other words, the civilian control over the power and responsibilities of the militaries is assumed to be an integral part of the overall democratization of a given country and this assumption is tried to be combined with the policy of promoting democracy within the framework of the EU.

In this context, the individual countries chosen for the analysis of the military-democracy relationship are Turkey and Algeria and these country analyses are combined with the impacts of the EU's Mediterranean policy in which the promotion of democracy in the region plays an important role. The reason for choosing these two countries is the fact that both Turkey and Algeria have militaries, which are politicized to a certain extent in the sense that both Turkish and Algerian

armies have a history of intervention to the politics and are political actors in their countries. In addition to this, taking Turkey and Algeria as cases for studying the military-democracy relationship and the impacts of the EU over this relationship provides a basis for analyzing the essence of the Mediterranean policy of the EU and for determining whether this policy is a consistent one or not and the successes and deficiencies of this policy as both countries are the Mediterranean Partners of the EU. However, at this point, it should be noted that, although Turkey and Algeria provide a common ground for the analysis of the EU's Mediterranean policy, these two countries are two different levels of analysis. Turkey is a country which is on the membership track, while Algeria is an associate country of the EU. Throughout the thesis, this difference of position between these two countries will be emphasized and the EU's policies will be evaluated according to this difference.

The aim of the thesis is to give an account of the military-democratization relationship in Turkey and Algeria and to determine the impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership over this relationship. In order to give the whole account of this issue, various questions are asked and tried to be answered in the thesis. The thesis explores the implications of the importance of democracy for the EU over the foreign policy of the Union and over the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which can be regarded as an aspect of the EU's foreign policy. Then, the civilian-military relations and democratization problems in Turkey and Algeria are evaluated in the context of the EU's policies and the interaction between the individual cases and the EUROMED is explored in order to draw some conclusions about the character of the Mediterranean Policy of the EU.

The first chapter of the thesis deals with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED), which is the official framework of the Mediterranean policy of the

EU. In order to facilitate the analysis of the military-democracy problematique in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, first, the chapter explores the context which made democracy of strategic importance for the EU and its impacts over the Mediterranean region. Then, the basic character of the EU's Mediterranean policy is explored in relation to the second and third waves of enlargement which made the Mediterranean region the backdoor of the EU. The chapter makes a comparison of the past and present policies of the EU in the region and analyses the significance of the democratic control of the militaries in these policies and under the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU in order to clarify the policies of the EU towards the individual Mediterranean Partners, two of which are Turkey and Algeria.

The case studies of Turkey and Algeria in terms of the military-democracy relationship constitute the second and third chapters of the thesis. In these chapters, for both countries, first the context, which led to the politicization of the armies, is analyzed and then the significance of this situation in relation to the EU is explored. The third chapter also contains the comparison of the EU's policies towards the civilian-military relations in these two countries in order to determine whether the EU has a consistent Mediterranean policy in terms of promoting democracy in the region or not and in order to illustrate the different positions of the two countries in their relations to the EU.

In the conclusion part, the questions asked about the importance of the promotion of democracy within the EU framework, its implications over the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in terms of affecting the military-democratization relationship in the region and the basic features of the Mediterranean policy of the EU are revisited and tried to be answered. The thesis is finalized with some conclusive remarks about the successes and failures of the EU's Mediterranean

policy in terms of helping to establish the democratic control of the militaries in the Mediterranean Partners and some remarks about promoting democracy in the future, as a policy tool in the EU-Mediterranean relations.



CHAPTER I

THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE MILITARIES AND THE MEDITERRANEAN POLICY OF THE EU

The Mediterranean region is one of the areas which are of strategic importance for the European Union. The second and third waves of enlargement of the Community, which included Greece, Spain and Portugal, made the EC a neighbor of the region and the security interests of the new Southern members required a specific Mediterranean policy for the Community. The Mediterranean policy of the EU is a multi-dimensional one and this chapter deals with this policy in terms of promoting the establishment of the democratic control over the militaries in the region.

In this chapter, the first Southern enlargement of the EU including Greece, Spain and Portugal and its implications over current Mediterranean policy of the EU will be explored and the importance of the promotion of democracy in the region and the role of the democratic control of the militaries for democratization will be analyzed within the context of first the EUROMED and then the CFSP which is the general framework of the EU's foreign policy.

However, in order to make the analysis of the past and present Mediterranean policies of the EU in terms of promoting democracy and establishing the democratic control over the militaries, first, we need to understand the context that led to the current importance of democracy in the domestic and foreign policy of the EU. For this reason, before analyzing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the chapter begins with a brief historical

account of the formation of the European Community and of the conditions which made the promotion of democracy a policy tool in the EU.

1.1 Europe in Search For Peace

In the twentieth century, the European states suffered from two devastating world wars. After the First World War, a lasting peace system could not be established in the continent and the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany and the expansionist policies of its leader Hitler led to the outbreak of the Second World War, which lasted, between 1939 and 1945. This second war taught the Europeans that they had to establish such a system for the interaction among themselves that it would prevent the occurrence of another war and more destruction throughout the continent.

When the war ended, a new world order emerged which led to a bipolar power structure with the United States on one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. This division reflected a conflict between the democratic regimes and the communist regimes that took the form of a cold war and Europe had to place itself appropriately within that structure. As a result of this polarization, Europe was also divided into two parts according to the regime types as the democratic Western Europe and the communist Eastern Europe, which soon became known as the satellites of the Soviet Union.

1.2 The Origins of the European Community

The desire to establish a lasting peace system triggered some sort of cooperation and union among the European states, which would make it harder to engage in conflicts for them. However, the idea of a union did not come out

of the blue over night. As Winston Churchill stated in his famous speech "The Tragedy of Europe" in Zurich University on September 19, 1946, the initial desire was to form a partnership between France and Germany in order to prevent a Franco-German war. In his speech, Churchill stated that "Europe had to unite before war destroyed the continent and its civilization"(1974) and he called for a *United States of Europe* which had to be led by France and Germany who were long-term rivals. It was expected that the peace between these two countries would contribute to the peace and security of the whole continent. Thus, the starting point of today's European Union was the desire to moderate the conflict between France and Germany in order to prevent the occurrence of another intra-European war (Arter, 1993: 127).

In addition to the desire to incorporate Germany into Europe for preventing the recurrence of war, within the polarized world order led by the United States and the Soviet Union, the smaller states had a fear of threat of the domination of these two super powers and they were searching for economic resources for the post-war reconstruction of Europe (Wegs, 1991:150). In this context, forming a union could both give Europe an identity and strength in the international politics and provide economic advantages and support for each state in addition to decreasing the possibility of emergence of another war. Certain concrete steps were taken towards forming a unified Europe right after the war for an immediate peaceful settlement in Europe and at this point, it can be useful to give some examples in order to clarify the post-war political situation in Europe.

In 1947, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was formed for economic purposes of distributing US financial aid for the reconstruction of Europe under the Marshall Plan and the promotion of trade in

Europe. After the foundation of the OEEC, there emerged a desire for further ties between the European states and in order to determine the possible strategies for political and economic cooperation, the Council of Europe was established in 1948 and during 1950s, "the unstable international situation, the re-emergence of the German state, ongoing Cold War, the outbreak of the Korean War and US demands for rearming Germany created pressure for integration"(Wegs, 1991: 153) and in 1952, the first step of the European integration was taken with the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which bound France and Germany together with Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg- or the Benelux- by pooling of the coal and steel resources of each country in a single hand and these countries later became *the original six* of the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC was established in 1955 as a result of the success of the ECSC and aimed to create a common market for the industrial and agricultural products in Europe through the elimination of customs barriers.

These organizations were the major peace settlement efforts in Europe in the early post-war years and as it can be seen, they were mainly initiated for economic rather than political cooperation. However, the initial economic cooperation among the European states after the Second World War had political and security implications for today's EU and by using the basic premises of the functionalist approach, it is possible to explain the process which made democracy a part of the political understanding within the EU.

1.3 The Function of the Economic Integration: A More Democratic Europe?

The functionalist explanation of the European integration stems from the famous book of David Mitrany (1966); "A Working Peace System", where the main aim of Mitrany was to develop ideas that could help to make the war impossible and to achieve a working peace system. According to Mitrany's theory, coordination among the states along technical lines, i.e. the low politics, will generate cooperation in other areas and as the number of these functional agencies increases, the states will become more interdependent and eventually a political agency will be created to supervise the deeper cooperation among the states. According to Mitrany (1966), various functional agencies can play an important role in the wide understanding of security as when the cooperation begins with the economy and spreads to the other areas of policy making, the states become more dependent on each other and the war itself becomes a threat for their interests.

Today's EU can be regarded as a supranational body which is the result of the evolution of the functional cooperation among the European states. As indicated above, the European integration began in the form of economic cooperation and now it has come to the point where a European Constitution is being prepared for the conduct of relations and policies. In this context, we can regard the promotion of democracy within the EU and abroad as an outcome of the deepening of integration and as a way of conducting the rules of integration and provide a common ground for further integration.

As Jean Monnet stated in his article "A Ferment of Change" that appeared in the Journal of Common Market Studies (1962: 203-211), for peaceful

international relations, nations had to adopt common rules governing their behavior and create common institutions to apply these rules and in the European Union case, the common ground for the inter-state relations was democracy and while forming the institutions of the community and shaping its policies and rules, the concept of democracy has always been a key issue and it is still important in the debates about the EU institutions, policies and its relations with the member and candidate countries.

In the last thirty years there has been a trend towards democracy in Europe especially with the disappearance of the dictatorships in Spain, Greece and Portugal, the collapse of communism and the popularity of the market economy and this democratic revival in Europe is mostly visible in how the EU evaluates the potential candidates and how it designs its relations with the third parties. Thus, the level of democratization in these countries is a significant criterion for accepting them as EU members and for carrying out the economic and political relations.

Although the necessity of being a democratic state for gaining EU membership has been stated in various previously mentioned treaties, summits, conferences and the like, it is the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 which formalized democracy as one of the political criteria of membership. In this council meeting, the member states designed the membership criteria, which are now known as the Copenhagen Criteria, and it was stated that "the accession would take place as soon as an applicant is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required"¹. According to the Copenhagen Criteria:

¹ Taken from the official site for EU ENLARGEMENT, europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm

"Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership including the adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union; and the conditions for its integration through the adjustment of the administrative structures, so that the European Community legislation transposed into national legislations implemented effectively through the appropriate administrative and judicial structures."²

After 1993, these criteria have been the basis for the assessment of the candidate countries that would like to join the EU and the Commission began to submit regular reports on the progress achieved by each candidate country regarding the Copenhagen Criteria which form the basis for the negotiations between the EU and these countries.

The enlargement of the EU is towards two directions. One is towards the formerly communist, Eastern European countries and the other is towards the Southern Europe or the Mediterranean region. In the approach of the EU towards the candidates in these regions, the political criterion is basically how democratic they are and the level of democracy is assessed according to certain conditions.

The Eastern European candidates, having fulfilled the democratic criteria, have gained the right to membership recently. However, there are still some concerns about the democratization level in the Mediterranean region and the EU's Mediterranean policy, which will be discussed in detail in the following sections, is based on these concerns about the region. In the context of this policy, various initiatives are taken by the EU and these policies enable one to analyze the democracy-military relationship as the lack of democratic control

² Ibid.

over the militaries is assumed to be an obstacle against the democratization of the Mediterranean region.

1.4 The Pre-condition of Democracy and the Militaries: An Introduction to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The role of the militaries is important for the democratization of a country and in the European Union case, it has a special importance because the idea of the EU emerged out of the desire to prevent a potential military threat and to control the military. In order to prevent war and to settle the disputes peacefully, military should be controlled through democratic means by the decision-makers. For this reason, a state in which the institution of army has a political role or shapes the state policies is an undemocratic one for the EU. The Mediterranean region consists of countries in which military plays a strong role in politics and that is why in the EU-Mediterranean relations, the political role of the military is a source of debate and as it will be discussed in the following sections, the relationship between the militaries and democracy in the Mediterranean region is a crucial aspect of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED).

In order to understand the importance of the militaries with respect to the issue of democratization for the Mediterranean partners of the EU, it could be useful to examine the first Mediterranean enlargement or the second and third waves of enlargement of the European Union which included Greece, Spain and Portugal. The reason for starting with these three countries is the fact that the enlargement processes of these countries were the periods during which the democratization problem of the potential members came into agenda and which

shaped the attitude of the EU towards the future applications for membership coming from the Mediterranean region and the nature of the relationships between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. For this reason, the rest of the chapter deals with the second and third waves of enlargement of the EU and the emergence of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership which will be the context of the analysis of the political role played by the militaries in the Mediterranean countries and its effects over the EU's Mediterranean policy and the debates about the issue of democratization.

1.5 The Second and Third Waves of Enlargement

The possibility of a Southern enlargement for the European Union came into agenda with the application of Greece for joining the EC for the first time. Greece has applied for signing an association agreement with the EC in 1959 and this agreement was signed in 1961. Between the years 1967 and 1974, Greece was governed by a military regime and during this period the EC has suspended the association agreement with Greece. This suspension of the agreement can be considered as a sign of the importance given to the limitation of the political power of the military and the desire to keep the military under the control of the democratic civilian authority as while the military authority was in power in Greece, the EC has given a reaction to this situation by the suspension of the association agreement and did not want to engage in relationships with an undemocratic military authority. In short, by suspending the agreement, the EC has created a sort of sanction for Greece, which would continue unless the democracy was restored in the country. With this attitude towards Greece, the EC revealed its future policy towards the other demands

for membership, which stressed the existence of a democratic regime as the first condition of being an EC member.

Having understood this condition, Greece applied for membership in 1975 soon after the restoration of democracy in 1974. In 1976, the European Commission reported that it was against the Greek membership as Greece was seen as lacking certain economic and political conditions, which were necessary for the EC membership. However, the Council favored the Greek application and in 1976, the negotiations for entry began which resulted in joining of Greece with the EC in 1981.

One reason for this situation might be the perceptions of some important European political leaders of that time. For these leaders, "Greece was seen as the source of most civilization in Europe at an intellectual level, and deserving privileged treatment within the union in its drive to re-establish democracy" (Pettifer, 1996: 18). In other words, because of some perceptions of history, although Greece had many deficiencies with respect to the Community criteria, it was regarded as having the potential of reforming itself and this put Greece in an advantageous position with respect to the other applicant Mediterranean countries in the entry negotiations.

Here, the important point is that, although Greece had lacked many required conditions for joining the EC, it began the negotiations of entry almost immediately after applying for membership and this situation shows that the EC had political motives for accepting the Greek application which formed the basis of the Mediterranean policy of the EC at that time and which affected the way in which the EC dealt with the applications of Spain and Portugal which came right after the Greek application.

Until the Greek application, the EC did not have a concrete Mediterranean policy and a Southern enlargement strategy, therefore, when Greece applied for

membership, the Community considered Greek's inclusion as a necessary step for the "development of a Mediterranean security policy [and] from the community perspective, the Greek application was significant because it presaged further Mediterranean enlargement" (Preston, 1997: 47-60). In other words, with the Greek application, the EC has opened the way for further Southern enlargement and it felt the need for designing a specific policy for dealing with the other Mediterranean countries which would demand to join the European Community. In designing its Mediterranean policy, the main challenges for the EC were economic and political. While dealing with the application of first Greece and then Spain and Portugal, one problem of the EC was the fact that these countries were poorer than the EC members and the other problem was the weakness of the democratic institutions in these countries, which is the main focus of the argument of this thesis.

Leaving the economic implications of the Southern enlargement aside, the desire to strengthen the democratic institutions and to consolidate the newly established democratic regime, were the basic political motives of both the EC and the applicant countries for engaging in negotiations beginning with Greece. "For Greece, the possibility of community membership was seen as a way of strengthening its Western political orientation and the EC was keen to be seen taking an active role in consolidating democracy in the Mediterranean region which was still very fragile" (Preston, 1997: 48-53).

The basis of the Mediterranean policy of the European Community was to encourage the strengthening of the newly established democratic institutions in the region. Although the three applicant Mediterranean countries had many economic obstacles for joining the EC, they managed to join the community for the sake of the preservation of the democratic institutions as we can observe in the accession periods

of Spain and Portugal who constituted the third wave and the second Mediterranean enlargement of the European Community.

As mentioned earlier, the Greek application for joining the EC in 1975 created the possibility of enlarging the community towards the South and opened the way for future applications from this region. The Greek application was followed by that of Spain and Portugal in 1977 who, like Greece, wanted to consolidate their newly established democratic regimes in addition to their desire to end their international isolation, to take part in the world politics and to develop their weak economies.

For Spain and Portugal, "applying for membership was a major political move, implying a choice of framework within which all political and economic decisions would, in future, be exercised" (Preston, 1997: 65). In other words, pursuing the EC membership was a national policy for these countries that shaped the actions of their governments and it was seen as a means of reinforcing reform and creating a new state structure and a new political culture, which aimed to place Spain and Portugal together with the EC countries as a part of Europe.

The negotiations of accession began with Portugal in 1978 and with Spain in 1979. Portugal and Spain applied for membership despite the existence of the EEC Treaty stating that democracy is a precondition for membership (McCormick, 1996: 60). Although these countries lacked the stable democratic institutions, the EC started negotiations with them and this situation reveals the EC's desire to assist the consolidation of democracy in the Mediterranean countries. As Preston (1997) points out, the third enlargement was a "test of capability of the EC model to act as a stabilizing influence in the region and to establish a framework for the development of pluralist political and economic structures and processes"(63) and the EC felt it

necessary to play a crucial role in "helping [the Mediterranean applicants] overcome their internal resistance to economic and political reform" (Pierros, Meunier, Abrams, 1999: 223) and for this reason, although these countries had a long way to go to meet the political criteria of democratization for the EC membership and although their accession would create many economic problems because of the competition of agricultural products in the Mediterranean region especially with France, the EC began entry negotiations with Spain and Portugal as a part of its Mediterranean policy which aimed to make the community an international political actor that would have a positive effect over the establishment and consolidation of democratic institutions in the region.

The negotiations lasted for eight years with Portugal and for seven years with Spain and in 1986, both countries joined the European Community and the third wave of enlargement was complete. The boundaries of the community have shifted towards the South, as the three Mediterranean countries became members of the EC. The period during which the negotiations of accession took place with Spain, Greece and Portugal has led to the formation of a Mediterranean policy for the EC as it dealt with three countries from a common region with similar internal political situations and in all three cases, the basic political problem was the consolidation of democratic institutions. In sum, in the second and third waves of enlargement, both for the applicant countries and for the EC, the basic motive of starting the negotiations was democratization and the following section deals with the way in which the issue of democratization was perceived by the EC and the three Mediterranean countries during the accession process.

1.5.1 The Democratization of the Mediterranean Region

The previously mentioned three countries which made the EC shift its boundaries towards the South have many experiences in common with respect to their process of integration with the EC. These common experiences are mainly the result of the similar internal political situations in Greece, Spain and Portugal, which led them to the willingness for being a member of the EC.

First of all, for all three countries, pursuing the EC membership was a political move, which afterwards became a national policy. "Post-authoritarian governments in Spain, Greece and Portugal were progressively oriented to Western Europe, with formal membership of the Common Market as an ultimate goal" (Holman, 1996: 5). This goal shaped the national politics of these countries and re-oriented the political objectives of the newly established democratic regimes in these countries.

The basic political motive of this new national policy was to secure the stability and the continuation of the democratic institutions, which were still fragile in the post-authoritarian regime period. The community membership was a means of returning to democracy and a guarantee for the preservation of the new democratic institutions and democratic evolution (Bidelux, 1996; Arter, 1993).

Being governed by the authoritarian regimes has led to an international isolation for Greece, Spain and Portugal and these countries desired to participate in the future shaping of Europe and to end the isolation they experienced in the international arena. Being an EC member would give these countries the chance "to become internationally respected political actors" (Holman, 1996: 65) and would provide recognition as equal partners in the international affairs. However, in order to achieve these goals, the precondition was to have well-functioning, stable

democratic political systems and this shows that for Greece, Spain and Portugal, democratization was both the means and the end within the process of European integration.

On one hand, in order to join the EC, these countries needed to democratize themselves. On the other hand, in order to achieve a stable democratic political system, these countries also needed to be a part of the EC as their policy was "democratization through internationalization"(Holman, 1996: 65). In other words, becoming an EC member would provide an incentive for preserving the democratic institutions. For the post-authoritarian governments of Greece, Spain and Portugal, joining the EC was necessary for a successful transition and consolidation of democracy. When these countries were trying to restore democracy, they felt the need of forming a new political culture that would give them an identity on the international scene and in the search for new identities, pursuing the EC membership provided the basis for the new political culture based on democratic ideals.

In sum, the integration of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the European Community was "both cause and effect of economic, social and political change, redefinition of national identities and orientations as liberalization and modernization" (Bidelux, 1996: 127) for them. The negotiations and the development of the relationships with the EC helped these countries to reconstruct their economic and political systems and made them partners in the European politics. However, if the EC side had not been willing to provide support for this reconstruction process, Spain, Portugal and Greece could not have had the chance to consolidate their democratic institutions, so the Mediterranean policy of the EC at that time had a facilitating effect over the integration processes in the second and third waves of enlargement.

1.5.2 The Mediterranean Policy of the EC During the Second and Third Waves of Enlargement

The decision to enlarge the European Community towards South was a major move for the community because it had important economic, political and institutional implications for the EC. The reason why the Southern enlargement could be problematic was the fact that it dealt with the countries, which were poorer than the other EC members, and that it brought “political and military security tensions” (Preston, 1997: 46).

Despite the economic burden that it would create, the Southern enlargement was perceived as a political move by the EC first for the security concerns and second for the aim of promoting democracy in the Mediterranean region. As the period was the Cold War years, the security of Europe was very important and the Mediterranean region was a critical area for the European security. For this reason, having close ties with the countries of the region could help the EC to secure peace.

The main threat of the period was the threat of communism and the strategy of the European Community against this threat was the promotion of the democratic institutions in the continent. For this reason, the EC started to negotiate accession with Greece, Spain and Portugal although they had not improved their democratic institutions to the level required by the EC as promoting democracy in these countries would provide the security of the continent in the long run.

In addition to these, the European Community had the image of the promoter of peace and democracy, and more concretely, of democratic peace and rejecting the applications of these three countries would damage this image, as the EC would

contradict with itself by rejecting to support the newly restored democracies in Greece, Spain and Portugal. Also rejecting their application could create a reaction in these countries and could stimulate the anti-democratic forces that could destroy the democratic system before it was consolidated (Seers, 1982: 7).

The political conditions of the late 70s and early 80s urged the EC to consider a Southern enlargement towards the Mediterranean and to accept negotiating with Greece, Spain and Portugal although they were way behind the membership criteria set by the EC both in economic and political aspects. The EC was willing to support the process of democratic consolidation in these countries and its Mediterranean policy was to become an influential political actor in the region, which had a democratizing effect. However, whether this policy is being continued by the EU today or not is a matter that needs to be discussed and which will be analyzed in the following sections.

1.6 The Change in the Objectives: A Shift in the EU's Mediterranean Policy?

It is currently argued that "the European Union has recently become more sensitive to Mediterranean problems [and] the reinforcement of EC's Mediterranean policy reflects a growing understanding that if Europe does not concern itself with the problems of its Southern neighbors, then these problems will be exported northwards" (Gillespie, 1994:1). However, despite these newly emerging concerns about the stability of the Mediterranean region, the EU has taken a different approach from its policy during the second and third waves of enlargement and today, we can observe a shift in the Mediterranean policy of the EU and the reason why the political role of the militaries in the countries of the region are seen as an obstacle for integration is this shift in the EU's Mediterranean policy. In other words, the EU is

no longer willing to be a political actor that assists democratic consolidation in the Mediterranean but on the contrary, it expects the Mediterranean countries to democratize themselves and sees democratization as a precondition for deepening of the EU- Mediterranean relations.

There can be several reasons for this policy change. Firstly, it is possible to argue that during the past twenty years, the European Union faced many democratization problems regarding its institutions and decision making mechanisms and this led the community to set more strict criteria for membership and partnership regarding democratization in order to avoid further intra-community problems. In other words, the EU no longer has the luxury to help the countries to consolidate their democratic systems but it demands them to manage this in accordance with the political criteria set by the Union. This change of attitude is reflected upon the EU's new Mediterranean policy and that is why the reports of the European Commission determine the defects of democracy in the countries of the region which are taken as obstacles against deepening of relationships and one of which is the political role of the institution of military. Secondly, we can also look at the situation from a broader perspective: During the first and second Mediterranean enlargement of the EU, the region was a domain of the Community, since the three countries would eventually become a part of the Union. For this reason, the democratization problems of Greece, Spain and Portugal were in a way the domestic problem of the EC and the Community had to take a more active role in the democratization of these countries as a part of its domestic policy. However, today, since there is no prospects for a Mediterranean enlargement for the EU, the Union remains more passive and as an outside partner in the democratization issues of the region. The Mediterranean region

is a domain of the foreign policy of the EU, thus the EU follows different policies towards the region in terms of promoting democracy.

In order to have a closer look at the current situation of the EU's Mediterranean policy of promoting democracy, first we need to analyze the Euro-Mediterranean partnership which is the official framework of the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries as the analysis of the EUROMED may be useful to understand how the militaries of the Mediterranean region are perceived by the EU in relation to the understanding of democratization.

1.7 The Emergence of the EUROMED

Since the second wave of enlargement that integrated Greece with the Community, the Mediterranean region has been strategic for the European Community. One reason is the fact that the Mediterranean countries are EU's third largest trading partners after EFTA and USA (Blair, 1999: 147). Because of its economic concerns, the European Union has an interest in the region and gives importance to the establishment of stability in the Mediterranean area as "the stability of the Southern Mediterranean often has a direct impact on the EU's member states" (Pierros et.al, 1999: 27).

The stability of the Mediterranean region is important for the security concerns of the EU as one dispute or conflict arising in this region affects the EU closely because of the nearness of the boundaries and "the security issues stem from the crucial role that the Mediterranean plays in European trade access to the wider world" (Joffe, 1997: 17). In short, the Mediterranean region is of strategic importance to the EU because of the economic and security concerns and a key external relations priority for the EU is thus to promote prosperity, democracy,

stability and security in the Mediterranean basin (Tovias, 2000). "The members of the European Parliament have been especially critical for the lack of democratic institutions and respect for human rights in the region" (Pierros et. al, 1999: 17) but there is a change of policy for the European Union in the promotion of these principles in the region. When the EU first became a political actor for the Mediterranean basin, it aimed to integrate the three Mediterranean countries in itself and help them to stabilize their political and economic systems as the members of the community. When it comes to the current Mediterranean policy of the EU, we can see that the community no longer wants to have members and partners with political and economic problems and prefers to support the stabilization process of the Mediterranean region as an outer partner. The Mediterranean program of the EU aims "to strengthen cohesion and develop economic ties between the EU and Mediterranean countries and to promote cooperation between these countries and their regional integration" (Blair, 1999: 147).

The shift in the Mediterranean policy of the EU indicates that the EU sees the Mediterranean region as a strategic area with which it has economic and political ties and that for the security of its interests, the EU prefers to support cooperation, stability and peace in the region. However, at the moment, unlike the cases of Greece, Spain and Portugal, the EU prefers to give its support to the region as an outside partner and the official framework of this support was determined by the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

The Euro-Mediterranean process began with the joint French- Spanish proposal to the Community in 1995, which formed the basis of the partnership between fifteen EU members and twelve Mediterranean partners. The countries, which participated in this partnership, were Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon,

Malta, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey with Libya as an observer country. The principles of this partnership were determined in the Barcelona Conference in November 1995 where the EU member states and the twelve Mediterranean states agreed to the Barcelona Declaration.

1.7.1 Barcelona Declaration

"Barcelona Declaration aimed to lead to strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures" (Hutchence, 2000: 37). In other words, the aim of the Barcelona Declaration was to guarantee security in the Mediterranean region. In order to achieve this goal, three pillars were established for the declaration. In order to guarantee human rights and basic political freedoms, a political and security partnership was formed as the first pillar. The second pillar was the economic one with the aim of establishing a Euro- Mediterranean free trade area by the year 2010 and the third pillar dealt with cultural and social issues, including mutual respect for culture and religion (Blair, 1999: 264).

The launching of the Barcelona Declaration is significant in the sense that the EUROMED Partnership was institutionalized with its political, economic and cultural aspects and the Barcelona Process beginning in 1995 became "the means through which the EU supports the Mediterranean partners in their political, economic and social reforms while at the same time building a closer EU-Mediterranean Partnership" (Tovias, 2000). Afterwards, the strategy of the EU has been the furtherance of the Barcelona Process and with its Mediterranean policy, the EU aimed to assist the establishment of peace and stability based on respect for

human rights and democracy together with the creation of a free trade area and respect for different cultures and religions. The political and security pillar of the Barcelona Declaration is an important issue in the sense that the concerns of the European Union regarding the democratization of the region stem from the principles set out in the political pillar of the Declaration.

1.7.2 The Political and Security Pillar of the EUROMED and the Role of the Militaries

The Political and Security Partnership has the aim of establishing a common area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean region. According to the principles of the political and security pillar of the Barcelona Declaration, the Mediterranean partners have to

"act in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems; respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms; settle their disputes by peaceful means; and refrain from developing their military capacity beyond their legitimate defense requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible level of troops and weaponry"³

As it can be understood from the principles of the Barcelona Declaration stated above, for the security of the Mediterranean region, democracy is seen as the basic requirement through which peaceful resolution of disputes can be arranged among the Mediterranean partners. Again when we look at the principles of the Political and Security Partnership, we also see that the limitation of the military power is also a necessary ingredient of the security of the Mediterranean region and the limitation of the military power includes not only the decrease in weaponry and troops but also the limitation of the internal power and influence of the military over

³ Barcelona Declaration <http://europa.eu.int>

domestic political issues which have to be the responsibility of the civilian authority in principle. In other words, according to the perspective of the European Union, democratic institutions of the Mediterranean partners should be strengthened and democracy should be consolidated and one requirement to achieve this is to manage the democratic control of the military.

1.7.3 The Democratic Control of the Militaries in the EUROMED

The countries in the Mediterranean region have various historical experiences with respect to the systems of government and most of the partners have been centralist, authoritarian and conservative states where the army had a strong role in political life traditionally and in its relations with these states, the EU expects them to liberalize their political systems. The European Union has increasingly underlined that respect for human rights is a fundamental element of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and expects from the Mediterranean partners to take concrete steps for democratization including putting the military under the control of the elected political authority and establishing a system where military is no longer a political actor as the principles agreed with the Barcelona Declaration have revealed.

At this point, it is necessary to underline the distinction between the civilian control and the democratic control of the armed forces as the establishment of the civilian control over the militaries does not necessarily mean that there exists the democratic control of the armed forces. For instance, under an authoritarian regime, the army can be under the control of a civilian leader but this does not mean that the state is a democratic one. The criteria for the existence of the democratic control of the armed forces in a given country are that there exists parliamentary control over the promotions of the military personnel, over the war decisions, defense budget and

that there exists a civilian defense ministry (Eeken, 2002: 40) and the situation in the Mediterranean Partners and the responses of the EU to this situation should be evaluated according to these criteria; not merely according to the existence of the civilian authorities above the military ones.

In a way, the current Mediterranean policy of the EU resembles the initiation process of the European Community. The basic reasons of the formation of the idea of a union of European states were to establish long-lasting peace and stability in the continent, to prevent the occurrence of another war and to solve the disputes peacefully. Since the beginning, for peaceful conflict resolution, the promotion of democracy and keeping military under the control of the political authority have been the strategies of the European Community and now, the EU tries to apply the same strategy in the Mediterranean region by trying to assist the strengthening of the democratic institutions and solving the problems without the actual use of force for the sake of the security of the region.

One of the objectives of the Political and Security Partnership is "to increase confidence in the [Mediterranean] region through positive measures which are basically of civilian character "(Tovias, 2000). Stressing the importance of the civil measures is another indicator of the importance of refraining from the use of military force and from including the military in the solution of the conflicts in the EU's political understanding. This principle is valid not only in the external relations but also in the domestic matters of the countries. The military's sole responsibility is the external defense of the country and it is not a legitimate political actor who affects the state policies according to the perspective of the European Union and the EU tries to promote this principle in the Mediterranean region with the political and security pillar of the Barcelona Declaration.

The Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs which is the third pillar of the Barcelona Declaration, also helps to promote the principles set in the political and security pillar. The third pillar aims to "encourage actions of support for democratic institutions and for strengthening of the rule of law and civil society"⁴. The Mediterranean policy of the EU aims to make the civil society organizations more influential actors in politics of the Mediterranean partners as democracy requires the participation of people to the decision-making process and the civil society organizations are an effective way of influencing the state policies and the government decisions. In a well-functioning democratic system, the decisions are taken by the elected civilian political authorities, the institution of military is not a political actor, is responsible for only the external defense of the country and is under the control of the civilians. For this reason, in order to create stable democracies in the Mediterranean region, the EU encourages the strengthening of the democratic institutions, increasing of the civil society organizations for active participation of the people in politics and discourages the political systems in which the military is considered as a political actor.

In order to create an incentive for the Mediterranean partners to fulfill the principles determined by the Barcelona Declaration, the EU gives the message that it can suspend its relations with the partners in case of breaking of one of these principles. As stated in the Barcelona Declaration, "the European Union's relations must remain conditional on each country's commitment to achieving respect for the principles underpinning the Barcelona Process, namely, strengthening of democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, promotion of good-neighboring relations, respect for obligations under international law,

⁴ Barcelona Declaration <http://europa.eu.int>

intensified regional cooperation and integration, furthering of sustainable market economies and promotion of greater understanding between cultures"⁵.

The extent to which the Mediterranean partners are able to comply with the principles they accepted with participating the EUROMED affects the nature of the relationships between the EU and the individual countries. As mentioned earlier, the Mediterranean policy of the EU is a part of the foreign policy of the Union and for this reason, the principles, the institutional design and the policy objectives of the CFSP need to be analyzed in order to understand the importance of democratization and the significance of the democratic control of the militaries in the Mediterranean partners for the EU better.

1.8 The CFSP and the EUROMED

1.8.1 The Security Understanding in Europe

Especially after the Cold War, it is possible to argue that a new security understanding emerged in Europe. This is partly because of the fact that as the Communism threat disappeared, the risk of a direct, external attack decreased in Europe but more importantly, new forms of possible threats emerged in terms of security, which led to a broader conceptualization of security. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communism and after the unification of Germany, "a more comprehensive security policy" (Eeken, 2002: 10) emerged in Europe and "if security is understood broadly as the absence of a threat to major social values, rather than protection against armed attack, then it assumes different meanings for different societies" (Lahav, 1993: 74) and it is possible to argue that this has been the security

⁵ Barcelona Declaration <http://europa.eu.int>

understanding of Europe after the Cold War which gave importance to the promotion of democracy, freedoms, rights and other social values and which preferred the civilian, peaceful solutions for conflicts instead of the use of military force.

In Europe, security is not only understood in military terms but it also covers the areas of civil society, non-military threats and economic and environmental issues⁶ and the aims of the European security policy are now to preserve peace and security and to promote freedom and democratic ideals.⁷ "The essential motivation of each European nation's foreign policy is to preserve its fundamental values" (Lahav, 1993: 74) and in the case of Europe, this fundamental value has been democracy because as Jonathan Dean (1993) argues, after the Cold War, there have been four general objectives of European security which are "to promote a functioning democracy and market economy; to institutionalize the security of the international system; to be an autonomous community in defense and to establish confidence building measures" (106-107) all of which can be observed in the emerging security structure of the EU. The new forms of threat like separatist ethnic and religious conflicts, international terrorism, mass migration require a joint action and consistent measures and when we look at the EU policies, we can see that promotion of democracy and the rule of law is seen as a means of dealing with these threats.

"The EU has based its dominant understanding of international conflicts on liberal chains of equivalence: democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are seen as the basis of a stable and secure world. The EU's diagnosis of concrete conflicts is often that there has been a break with these principles and their re-establishment is seen as central to the solving of conflicts" (Larsen, 2002: 291). This outlook to world problems can be observed in the objectives and the

⁶ Taken from the speech of Anders Oljelund-the Swedish Ambassador to Belgium and NATO in the conference held in Istanbul in June 2001 on European Security and Cooperation.

instruments of the CFSP and in the regional policies of the EU, especially in its relations with the Mediterranean partners.

Under the CFSP structure, the promotion of democracy is again very important in terms of the establishment of the civilian democratic control over the military power, and the way in which the military bodies are adopted to the CFSP framework can contribute to the argument that the democratic control of the militaries is a key aspect of the security and democracy understanding in the EU.

1.8.2 The Democratic Control of the Military in the CFSP

As many spokespeople of the EU member states explain, the European Security and Defense Policy is designed to contribute to conflict prevention and international crisis management and it is not the same as building a European army or an autonomous military capacity.⁸ Because of its defense objectives, CFSP implies the creation of military bodies but it is claimed that these military bodies are not the indicators of an army but they are for providing strategic planning.⁹ As Ana Bolin (2002) argues:

"Instead of territorial defense, the main or the most frequent task of today's armed forces is that of military operations other than war and then peace support operations. The task of the military is instead more often that of in a practical way hindering war and its consequences. [.....] The missions for which the military is called also often involve several more and very differing aims [like] humanitarian considerations, rehabilitation of political institutions, economic reconstruction etc. This broad nature of the missions, in its turn implies the presence of a number of different actors besides the armed forces, at the field of operations." (Bolin, 2002: 2)

⁷ Speech of M. Hakkı Çarın in the same conference.

⁸ Taken from the speech of Anders Oljelund-the Swedish Ambassador to Belgium and NATO in the conference held in Istanbul in June 2001 on European Security and Cooperation.

⁹ Ibid.

This understanding affected the goals and the structure of the CFSP and the very basic aim of the CFSP was to strengthen the political instruments of the EU as an international actor and for this end, new bureaucratic and institutional bodies, both civilian and military, were created (Missiroli, 2001: 181). The result of this process has been the combination of "soft policy instruments (and) hard policy instruments" (Piona, 2002: 209), which are the civilian tasks and the military operation capabilities.

Under this structure, it is possible to argue that the civilian instruments and military instruments are "unbalanced in terms of power and integrity" (Rummel, 1996: 211). In other words, the civilian measures are more widely used and are more effective and the military instruments are not that strong. The EU has not stressed only the military aspect of the CFSP but rather; it was always expressed in combination with the civilian instruments and tasks. As Henrik Larsen (2002) suggests, "the EU has so far predominantly had a regional focus in its policies and had downplayed the use of military means in its policies even when the EU had the possibility of drawing on military means" (284). Because the EU has set itself up as a civilian international actor, democratic principles and the promotion of democracy in the world are an important part of the CFSP concept and this is reflected over the institutional design, the decision-making mechanism and the division of labor between the civilian and military bodies under the CFSP structure.

"The increased complex and political nature of the conflicts and crises for which the military is called upon means that political judgments are present in more decisions and all through the planning and execution of military missions" (Bolin, 2002: 4) and this reality of the present time reflects itself upon the way in which military operations are perceived and decided under the umbrella of the CFSP where

the military operations are just one means of solving the conflicts, the military instruments "have no special status (or) role" (Larsen, 2002: 297) and they are "embedded in a civilian power context" (Larsen, 2002: 292). This situation influences the institutions created for the CFSP and the way in which the decisions are taken.

The creation of the institutions is a necessary task in order to make the CFSP a credible and operational policy. For this purpose, the EU has been creating civilian and military institutions which cover the responsibilities of the CFSP and which aim to coordinate the political and military aspects of the European foreign and defense policy (De Nooy, 1996: 171) and in this framework, the role of the military is to provide recommendations on defense issues through the Military Committee and has no authority to make decisions about the operations.

The broad understanding of security, the newly-emerging threats, the principles of promotion of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law which were mentioned earlier can be combined with the internal decision-making mechanism of the CFSP structure requiring the civilian, democratic control of the military in order to understand the foreign policy of the EU with respect to particular regions which can pose potential threats for Europe and thus which are of strategic importance for the European security like the Mediterranean region.

1.8.3 The Implications of the CFSP over the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

As the new understanding of security is based on factors other than a direct external attack and it has non-military aspects, for the EU, the political and economic stability of its neighbors become crucial and in the relationship of the EU with the Mediterranean region, the political and economic stability form an important aspect

of the initiatives taken by the Union as it is believed that an unstable political and economic system in this region can create pressures and threats in Europe in terms of mass migration, religious fundamentalism and terrorist activities (Algieri, 1996: 195).

The fact that an unstable and unpredictable security environment exists in the Mediterranean and the "alarming political and economic trends" (Carpenter, 1999: 69-70) made the EU include the Mediterranean region as one of the strategic areas of the CFSP and in this process, the Southern members of the EU played a major role. "The Mediterranization of EC" (De Vasconcelos, 1988: 135) and the historical existence of France in the region made the Mediterranean an area of interest for the EU. "The colonial, economic, cultural and strategic ties" (De Vasconcelos, 1988: 136) of France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece with the Mediterranean basin made the Southern members of the EU lobby for a Mediterranean strategy for the EU that in a way reflected their national interests as they are the immediate recipients of a possible threat coming from this region.

With the efforts of these Southern members, "ethnic and religion-based violence, organized crime, migratory pressures, terrorism" (Calabrese, 1997: 88) in the Mediterranean region were added to the security agenda of the EU. It is possible to argue that "the EU's southward enlargement set in motion two processes: first, a search by the Maghreb states for regional approaches to arrest their socio-economic decline; and second, a search by the Southern EU members to develop a formula for expanding the Community's role in the Mediterranean" (Calabrese, 1997: 97). In other words, both the EU with the lobbying of its Southern members and the countries of the Mediterranean region were willing to cooperate with each other for

the sake of their economic, political and security interests and this willingness led to the initiative of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

As Javier Solana (1999), the High Representative of the CFSP points out; “while the countries along the northern rim are increasingly prosperous as they move forward in the process of European political integration, many countries of the other side of the Mediterranean are experiencing a decline in standards. This trend is characterized by ever-increasing birth rates, declining prosperity, and a tendency towards less stable political environments” (36). Solana believes that “the political evolution in this region should be steered in a positive direction. Instead of clinging to existing patterns, European institutions should seek proactive, constructive, and specially tailored approaches to the region” (Solana, 1999: 37). It is argued that the EU can decrease tensions in the Mediterranean region through cooperation and economic and social aid (Carpenter, 1999: 84) and these ideas show the importance given to the civilian instruments within the CFSP context in the establishment of peace and order and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the Barcelona Process may be regarded as one of the projects of the civilian aspect of the CFSP designed for the promotion of democracy and order in a peaceful manner. The significance of the EUROMED, which was analyzed in detail in previous sections, is its non-military emphasis on the solution of conflicts and problems (Calabrese, 1997: 106). Instead of emphasizing its military capabilities for conflict prevention and for pursuing its economic, political and security interests, EU remains as a civilian political actor in the Mediterranean region which uses non-military instruments like the Association Agreements and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership based on peaceful solutions, economic cooperation and promotion of democracy, human rights, basic freedoms and the rule of law in the region and because of the

importance given to the non-military tasks in the Mediterranean policy, the lack of the democratic control of the militaries in the region becomes a major problem for the EU in terms of regional security.

However, as it was mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter, since the Mediterranean region is not directly under the scope of the domestic concerns of the EU and since it is a part of the foreign policy, the promotion of democracy in the region becomes of secondary importance and the general policy towards South is the preservation of the status quo instead of initiating a democratization wave because of the security concerns of the Union.

In order to understand this situation better, it can be useful to look at the specific cases of relationships between the EU and the Mediterranean partners where the democratic control of the militaries is considered as a problem. The following chapters deal with the cases of Turkey and Algeria who face with some problems in their relationships with the European Union because of the issue of the democratic control of the militaries in order to illustrate the impacts of the EU policies on the establishment of the democratic control over the armed forces and in order to illustrate the flexibilities of these policies.

CHAPTER II

THE CASES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS I:

TURKEY

Turkey-EC relations officially began with the Ankara Treaty of 1963 and Turkey has been pursuing membership for the European Union since the last official application in 1987. The Turkish experience in the road to the EU has a history of almost thirty years and although it was the first country to apply for the membership among the thirteen candidate countries, Turkey is the only country who did not get a certain date for starting the entry negotiations while the other twelve countries now have taken the date on which they will become the members of the European Union.

Like the other potential member states, EU's relations with Turkey consist of certain bargaining processes and demands of both sides. The main concern of the European Union is to maintain certain standards in political, economic and social conditions among its members in order to prevent the adjustment problems in the integration process of the Union. The EU is experiencing the process of establishing an independent identity and these standards are the basis of this identity. The member states are expected to have similarly functioning political and economic systems and for this reason, the candidate countries are evaluated according to the political, economic and social criteria of the European Union and they are expected to meet the standards that are determined by the EU.

One aspect of these criteria is, as mentioned above, the political standards set by the EU. These political standards are based on the principle of democracy, which is the very initial reason of the formation of the idea of a union in Europe. As it was mentioned in the first chapter, the principle of democracy was a key concept in the

formation process of today's European Union and it still plays a key role in determining the EU's approach towards the potential member countries as a criterion to evaluate the eligibility of these countries for membership.

In the case of Turkey, the issue of democratization has an important part in shaping the nature of EU-Turkey relations. There have been and are certain demands of the EU regarding the reforms for democratization from Turkey in order to adjust the Turkish political culture to that of the EU and one of these demands is about the modification of the role of the military in Turkish politics. As one of the Mediterranean partners, the case of Turkey will illustrate certain aspects of the problem of the political role of the militaries in the region and its implications over the democracy policies of the EU and the proper starting point of these analysis is to begin with examining the political role of the military in Turkey.

2.1 "A Political Army"?

The Turkish armed forces are defined as "a political army"(Güney, 2002: 162) by some scholars. As Ümit Cizre (1997) states in 'The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy', "the most profound contradiction marking Turkish democracy in the 1990s is the demonstrated inability of the civilian politicians to control the military. The Turkish military enjoys a strong degree of political autonomy" (151). It is a well-known truth that the Turkish military is some sort of a political actor who has an influence over the state policies and in order to find out the reasons lying behind this influence, we should look at the historical context in which the Turkish state developed and which shaped the current political position of the army.

First of all, the Ottoman heritage still has an impact over the military-civilian relations and military's involvement in politics in Turkey. The enlargement of the Ottoman Empire was based on the conquests and it was necessary "to conquer in order to establish a state"(Halpern, 1981: 277). This gave the army an important power because it was the institution that made the greatest contribution to the development and strength of the state. The conquests also increased the legitimacy of the army in the eyes of the citizens, as the soldiers were the heroes who gained new lands for the empire. Moreover, there was no tradition of separating military authority from the civilian one and the rulers of the empire were at the same time commanders. The lack of distinction of the authority areas of the civilian and the military powers in the Ottoman Empire can be seen as an underlying factor that shaped the contemporary military-civilian relations in Turkey and this historical fact can serve as a legitimacy source for the military interventions in the political matters.

In addition to these, when the Ottoman Empire began to lose power, the rulers felt the need to modernize the state institutions and the modernization attempts first began with the army. However, these attempts were not aimed at changing the role and status of the army but they aimed to modernize the army in order to increase its strength and this enabled the army to be more influential over the policy matters (Kayalı, 1994: 26). Today, the modernization of the army still has a great deal of importance as it is seen as necessary for the national security of the country and having the latest technology gives power to the institution of military over the civilian institutions.

Like the traditions of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish War of Independence also played a role in increasing the political influence of the military and it mostly

had a legitimizing effect for the presence of the army in the discussions and decisions of the political matters. After the World War I, people in Anatolia were disorganized and incapable of giving reaction to the invasion of their land and it was the soldiers who mobilized the masses (Güney, 2002: 163) to cope with the invasions and when the War of Independence ended with the Turkish victory, the army became a hero in the eyes of people. The soldiers were the rescuers and this provided the legitimacy basis for the further actions of the soldiers. They founded the republic and carried out the reforms by using the support coming from the legitimacy they gained with the victory in the war.

As mentioned above, during the Republican period, the modernization project was led by the officers and army was seen as a backup in the modernization of the republic. The state elites saw the military as a means of Westernization, the army was seen as a reformer and the elite had a positive image about the influence of the military in politics (Kayalı, 1994: 71). This situation is valid in today's Turkey as the military is identified with the modern face of Turkey with its high technology and with the values that it advocates.

Although the army was the founder and the modernizer of the republic, there were also attempts to separate politics from the army in the early republican period. As Halpern (1981) stated in "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class", the Turkish army created the modern state and left the political arena in 1924. With the 1924 Constitution, the commanders and officers who were at the same time members of the parliament were forced to choose between being a soldier and being a politician. In one of his speeches, Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the Turkish Republic, stated that "Commanders should avoid the effects of politics while they are fulfilling their duties as soldiers. They should remember that there are people

who will fulfill the political obligations. The separation of the army from politics is an important principle of the republic"(Öztürk, 1993: 58). However, M. Kemal also defined military as the "ultimate guardian of the republic"(Güney, 2002:163) and the army has seen and still sees being the guardian of the state as their primary duty in the sense that they see themselves as responsible for the protection of secularism, democracy and the integrity of the republic. "The ultimate justification for the military's political predominance rests on its guardianship of the national interest, of which maintaining national unity is considered to be the most important component" (Cizre, 1997: 154). This guardianship role made the army a political actor in Turkey and an example of this situation is the position of the military in the clash between the Democrat Party (DP) and the Republican People's Party (RPP) during 1950s and 1960s in which the military took the side of the RPP and in a way cooperated with the state elite and this led to the first military intervention in the Turkish Republic in 1960.

In the history of the Turkish Republic there are three military interventions to politics in 1960, 1971 and 1980. These interventions may be seen as the most important determinant of the contemporary political role of the military because in each intervention, the military was the institution who made the constitutions of the republic and although they re-established the democratic system after each coup, they determined how the system would function and while leaving the political scene they gained important exit guarantees which enabled the military to legalize or constitutionalize its guardianship role. "The economic and political instability led to the military interventions to re-establish order and the military was seen as the guardian over the state and society" (

legitimized the political role of military and the most important institution of this role is the National Security Council.

2.2 The National Security Council and the Concept of National Security

The National Security Council is the organ through which the military commanders take part in taking decisions regarding the security matters of the Turkish Republic. It was created by the 1961 Constitution and in a way legalized the role of the military in politics. The 1982 Constitution "enlarged the constitutional role of military"(Güney, 2002: 164) and the guardianship role of the military was institutionalized. The composition and the duties of the NSC are defined by the constitution and the related laws. Ümit Cizre (1997) argues that:

"it has been the most decisive leg of a dual system of executive decision-making, the other leg being the council of ministers. The concrete decisions of the council cover an unprecedented spectrum: determining the curriculum in schools; regulating television stations' broadcasting hours; abolishing the penal immunity of members of parliament from the (Kurdish) Democrat Party; closing down certain prisons and television stations; making bureaucratic appointments of the ministries of public works in the southeast; postponing the termination date of military service for current conscripts [...]" (158).

As it can be understood, the NSC is capable of influencing a wide range of issues from daily life as well as political life, which makes the military a decisive political actor dealing with areas which are elsewhere under the responsibility of the civilian authorities. The NSC consists of the president, prime minister, the ministers of defense, interior and foreign affairs, the chief of general staff and the other three top military commanders. Also according to the agenda, other related ministers and bureaucrats can participate in the meetings. In the 1982 Constitution, the duties of the NSC were defined as:

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1. to determine the national security policy of the state,

2. to determine the measures related to national security policy,
3. to follow social, political, economic, cultural and technological developments that will influence the national security policy,
4. to determine the fundamental principles of directing the national objectives,
5. to determine the measures to maintain the constitutional order, to ensure national unity and integrity, to unite Turkish nation around the principles and reforms of Atatürk,
6. to determine the measures to maintain the existence, independence of the state; the integrity and indivisibility of the country and public peace and security,
7. to determine the views for states of emergency, martial law, mobilization and state of war,
8. to determine the necessary principles for budgets and funds for those measures,
9. to propose options to the Council of Ministers who is obliged to consider the decisions of NSC with priority.¹⁰

The National Security Council is an advisory organ to shape the policies of government but " the decisions of the NSC regarding the existence, independence of the state; integrity and indivisibility of the country; the protection of the peace and security of the society are considered by the Council of Ministers with priority"(İba, 1998: 184) and this makes the NSC stronger than an advisory organ.

In the past years, NSC has been "a means of controlling the civilian authority"(Özdemir, 1989: 241) and it has been an organ, which influenced the government policies without being accountable to the people. It is a fact that the NSC is not purely a military organ and the civilians and the soldiers take the decisions together. However, the military wing of the NSC is more stable with respect to the values and ideals shared by the military as a whole institution. The position of the military regarding the state matters does not change when the commanders change while the civilian side changes hand in every election and the military wing of the NSC remains well-informed and more experienced on the political matters than the civilian wing. Moreover, theoretically, the president sets the

agenda of the NSC but in practice, it is the military who does this and the agenda setting power of the military in the NSC, makes the military wing more powerful and the council more than an advisory organ and this is seen as an obstacle against the democratic consolidation in Turkey.

As mentioned earlier, the Turkish military acting as a political actor through the NSC is seen as one deficiency of the Turkish democracy and at this point it is worth to analyze the understanding of the concept of national security in Turkey because the way in which the national security is defined, enables the military to be legitimately present in the political scene.

The redefinition of the national security concept in the 1990s by the inclusion of domestic threats like Kurdish separatism and rise of political Islam, expanded the influence of military over politics and its autonomy from the civilian actors" (Cizre, 2003). In 1990, in "The Concept and the Scope of the State", the General Secretariat of the National Security Council defined national security as "equal to the existence of a state and a nation and as the protection of the existence and unity of a state against internal and external threats"(İba, 1998: 102-103). Here, including both the external and internal threats and how these threats are perceived provide a wide range of areas to which military can interfere legally and legitimately as in the Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law No. 211 it is stated that "the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect the Turkish country and the Turkish Republic defined by the constitution... Turkish Armed Forces is responsible for the maintenance of the national security and realization of the national objectives."(Öztürk, 1999: 13).

¹⁰ Taken from the official website of the National Security Council. www.mgk.gov.tr

In the case of Turkey, the concept of national security is not merely the protection of the country from the external enemies but it also covers the internal threats which can vary in a broad range and can be perceived in various ways and this broad understanding of national security provides the legitimate ground for the military to intervene to the politics. In order to clarify how broadly the concept of national security is understood in Turkey, it might be helpful to examine *Milli Güvenlik Siyaseti Belgesi*- The Document of National Security Politics which states the perceived actual and potential threats and the issues that are considered as related with the national security of the state. The document is revised whenever it is seen necessary or there occurs a new perception of threat and by some, this document is regarded as "the secret constitution"(İba, 1998) of the state.

In the summer of 2001, the Document that was prepared on 31st October 1997 was published in one of the daily newspapers; *Hürriyet* and it stated the threats of that time which the army wanted to emphasize. According to the document, "the religious fundamentalism, political Islam, extreme nationalism, extreme left, the activities of 'the extreme nationalist mafia' and Greece and Syria"(Yeni Düşünce, 2001) were defined as the potential threats for the Turkish national security. Also in January 1999, the organized criminal groups of economic activities were also added to this list of the potential threats. The crucial point of this document is that it shows how the army deals with various aspects of the social, political and economic life in Turkey and that it does not merely deal with the external defense of the country. Whenever a new government comes to the power, the military authorities give a briefing about the document in the first month of the government and it is expected from the government to comply to this document with its policies (Yeni Düşünce, 2001). In a way, the security policies and objectives are defined by the army and the

government has to obey these objectives and the Document of the National Security Politics becomes a means of shaping the state policies for the army.

2.3 The Other Symptoms of the Political Influence of the Turkish Military

While the political role of the military in Turkey is criticized, the basic point is the role of the National Security Council which stems from the understanding of the national security as mentioned in the previous section. However, there are other factors which are regarded as the indicators of the importance and power of the army as a political actor and as an institution in addition to the existence of the NSC.

First of all, the military is an autonomous institution in Turkey and there is no civilian control over its affairs. The promotions, retirements, appointments and sanctions for the military personnel are determined by the army itself and the army has its own court for the crimes committed during the military service. In addition to being free from the control of the civilian institutions, the Chief of General Staff is not responsible to the Minister of Defense and this feeds the autonomous existence of the army. Moreover, the share of defense expenditures in the national budget is determined by the military authorities, sent to the Great National Assembly and usually ratified without any debates. The military owns some firms as an economic support for its personnel and this makes the army an economic actor as well as a political one. In addition to these, the power of the army can be observed at the society-level. The Turkish men have to fulfill an obligatory military service when they come to the age of twenty and this provides a linkage between the civilians and the army which helps to transmit the values that the army defends to the people. Another transmitting device for these values is "the course of national security"

which is a compulsory course in the Turkish high schools and which is taught by the army officers instead of regular civilian teachers.

In addition to these indicators, there are several factors that increase the autonomous power of the military. The army has a great deal of popular support and is one of the most trusted institutions by the people. The army is seen as the symbol of stability, honesty, modernity and discipline. Also the geopolitical position of Turkey requires it to have powerful armed forces and Turkey's painful experience of terrorism makes people sensitive to both external and internal threats and they expect protection from the armed forces. It can also be argued that the failure of the civilians in governance and solving the problems leaves space and provides legitimacy for the army to act as a political actor.

In the past six years, after the NSC decisions of 28th February 1997, the civilian- military relations and the political influence of the army have taken a new route. The decisions of the NSC were urging the government whose head was the leader of Islamist view, Necmettin Erbakan to take important measures against the rise of religious fundamentalism and the process which started with these decisions has finally led to the resignation of the government. For some scholars, the 28th February process is another coup in Turkish politics but whether it is a coup or not, it has revealed an important aspect of the military's presence in Turkish politics. In this process, instead of a direct intervention and a break in the regime, the military propagandized about its views and organized meetings like a pressure group in order to share these views. These actions of the military were supported by some political leaders, civil society groups, business associations and the media whose actions justified the army's involvement in politics. Whether it is the fourth coup in Turkish politics or not, this process reveals that Turkey has to face serious adjustment

problems with the EU in terms of the duties and the authority of the army as "while the military's guardian role by definition requires that it remains as the final source of authority in Turkey, this prominence is one critical factor negatively affecting Turkey's full inclusion into the EU" (Cizre, 2003).

In Turkey, the military is at the center of the debates about Turkey's integration with the EU. Unlike the situation in Europe where military raises its voice only in defense matters, in Turkey, the commanders of the army share their opinions about the political agenda of Turkey with the public and in the debates about the EU in Turkey, the views of the army are easy to encounter in the media which sometimes causes tense situations between the military and the government.

The top commanders of the Turkish military often state that they are not against the European Union and that Turkey has to join the EU¹¹. However, they have some security concerns which make the commanders be suspicious about the reforms made in order to fulfill the membership criteria. The recent discussions on the new reform package for the EU have shown that the military and the civilian authorities have different views about the accession process of Turkey to the EU.¹² These debates and the warnings coming from the top commanders in terms of regime and continuation of the system raise doubts about the consolidation of democracy in Turkey for the EU and create various adjustment problems in the road to the EU.

For the several reasons stated above, Turkish military is highly involved in the political matters as a decision-maker and as an agenda-setter and this situation is one of the key issues shaping the nature of Turkey-EU relations as it is seen as a sign of the lack of the democratic culture in Turkey by the European Union and in

¹¹ Hürriyet (daily newspaper), 30th May 2003.

¹² Hürriyet (daily newspaper), 30th May, 10th- 11th June, 2003.

the following sections, the approach of the EU towards the political situation in Turkey with respect to the position of the army in politics will be discussed.

2.4 The EU's Approach Towards the Turkish Armed Forces

The underlying reason of the criticisms coming from Europe towards the National Security Council and the political power of the army in Turkey is that the concept of national security is understood differently in Europe from Turkey. After the World War II, the concept of the national security was redefined in Europe. As mentioned in detail in the previous chapters, when the war ended, the main objectives of the European states were to prevent another intra-European war and to reconstruct Europe. In order to realize these objectives, the European states had to cooperate instead of perceiving each other as potential threats and they believed that their security could be established through peace. The main threats of that time were the Soviet Union and the danger of communism for the Europeans and establishing peace through the promotion of democracy was the solution of Europe to protect itself against these threats.

In addition to these, Europe's approach to the institution of military is also different as a result of the experiences of wars. Because of the two world wars, extreme armament and the strong military are seen as undesirable for the European states and in the post-war period, they felt the need to control the armament of each other as it was in the case of de-militarization of Germany. Military is an institution that has to be under the control of the civilian political authority in order to prevent the occurrence of the armed-conflicts among the states and to find peaceful solutions to the emerging conflicts.

In Europe, army is a professional institution which is "ascribed by law the duty of defending the country against external attack and which is under the control of the civilian political authority"(Edmonds, 1990: 6). The armed forces are away from political activity and their engagement in these activities is considered as illegitimate and undemocratic.

"As a general rule, armed services are prevented from taking decisions about the security of the society independently. This is the responsibility of the government who, in democracy, is accountable to people"(Edmonds, 1988: 118) in Europe. Because of the democratic principles, the crucial decisions affecting the society should be taken by the institutions which are directly accountable to the citizens and whose decisions can be questioned and criticized through democratic means. Military, being responsible for the defense of the country must be under the control of the political authority because if it is an autonomous institution, when it makes a wrong decision affecting the citizens negatively, citizens have no means to question this decision. This is the general understanding of the armed forces in democratic states for Europe and as it can be seen, this understanding is completely different from the one in Turkey.

In Europe, military plays a little part in domestic policies of the states while in Turkey; it is considered as the guardian of the regime and the savior of the state, which has been an alternative to the democratic regime. The security understanding of both the EU and Turkey can be considered broad but this broad understanding has had different outcomes for the two parties in terms of the duties assigned to the militaries. In the EU case, this broad understanding led to the emphasis on the non-military aspects of defense and security, while in Turkey the broad definition of the national security concept enabled the institution of military to be more influential in

the political matters. In addition to that, the security risks of Turkey are very different from those of the European Union. Because of its geo-political position, Turkey has to consider certain threats carefully while formulating its foreign and security policies and if it joins the EU, these policies might be incompatible with the security organization of the European Union because of different threat perceptions and one recent statement of the former Chief of General Staff, Hilmi Özkök, demonstrates this situation. The statement of the former Chief of General Staff which appeared in Jane's Defense Weekly, in January shows that Greece is perceived as a threat by Turkey. In his statement, Özkök argues that although there has been a progress in Turkey-Greece relations in the recent years, the Greek officials and politicians still see Turkey as a threat to their security and that in this case, it is reasonable that Turkey sees Greece as a potential threat, too.¹³ However, in case of joining the EU, Turkey is required to change this perception. In addition to that, terrorism is also an important threat for the Turkish national security with which military and state have been coping but the EU wants Turkey to find a peaceful solution to this problem which is against the defense understanding of the Turkish army and state.

The way in which the CFSP of the EU is designed also reveals the differences in the understanding of security and role designed for the militaries between EU and Turkey. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Cologne European Council of June 1999 determined the decision-making mechanism in the CFSP. According to the Council decisions, CFSP organization consists of a General Affairs Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a Politics and Security Committee, a Military Committee providing advice and the EU military staff to

¹³ Taken from Hürriyet (daily newspaper), 22.01.2003.

inform these bodies (Udum, 2002: 83). The important point about this structure is that it keeps the military under the civilian control and the final decisions are made by the politicians elected by and accountable to the people while the military authorities only provide advice for these decisions. This structure is again different from the process of taking decisions about the security issues in Turkey where military is both an actor and an agenda-setter and this situation may create another adjustment problem in Turkey-EU relations. However, the most widely discussed issue regarding the role of military in Turkey-EU relations is its political power which is seen as an obstacle against democracy.

Turkey has been given the official candidate status in the Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December 1999 and as a candidate country, Turkey is being evaluated by the progress reports prepared by the EU Commission regarding its performance in realizing the Copenhagen Criteria. In these reports and on other occasions, one of the criticisms towards Turkey is about the status and the power of the National Security Council and the interference of military to politics. By the EU authorities, NSC is regarded as an undemocratic institution and they criticize the lack of parliamentary control over defense and security issues and criticize the Chief of General Staff for not being responsible to the Ministry of Defense like the democratic countries. "The ability of the General Chief of Staff to influence the civilian bureaucracy in Turkey is facilitated by the lack of career civil servants specializing in military affairs who could provide a buffer between the military and society" (Cizre, 1997: 159) and under these circumstances of Turkey, the EU authorities argue that the current role of Turkish army in politics is one of the obstacles against starting the negotiations for membership with Turkey for it does

not meet the necessary political conditions for membership defined by the Copenhagen Criteria.

In the year 2000, The Accession Partnership Agreement was signed between the EU and Turkey and the aim of this agreement was "to determine the areas of priority for further progress in the areas determined in the Annual Report 2000 of the Commission on Turkey for Turkey's membership"¹⁴. In this agreement, the short-term and medium-term objectives for Turkey were determined in order to meet the required criteria for the EU membership and the National Program was prepared in the light of the Accession Partnership Agreement.

In the agreement, one of the political criteria that had to be met in the medium-term on which the government had to start working by the year 2001, was making the NSC's constitutional role of being an advisory body to the government compatible with its counter-parts in the EU members. In the National Program, one of the middle-term objectives was dealing with the NSC and it was stated that "National Security Council, which is a constitutional organ, is an advisory body regarding the issues of national security and the Constitution and the related laws will be re-examined in the middle-term period in a way that will define the structure and duties of the Council in a more clear way"¹⁵. As a concrete step to realize these objectives, in 2001, the number of civilian members in the NSC was increased, the NSC was assigned an advisory role and the exit guarantees given to army by the 1982 Constitution were eliminated by the amendments of law. However, the recent developments show that these proposed changes are not easy to realize as when the government proposed to change the duties and the composition of the NSC as a part of the reform package for EU accession in way which will decrease the influence

¹⁴ Source: The EU Commission Representative in Ankara www.belgenet.com

¹⁵ www.belgenet.com

and power of the military wing of the council, the army has opposed this initiative immediately in order to preserve their position.¹⁶ However, despite the oppositions of the military wing of the NSC, by the 30th July 2003, with the 7th Reform Package for the EU, major changes were made in the duties and responsibilities of the NSC. According to the new law, the duties and authority of the Secretary General of the NSC were redefined and the possibility of a civilian to be the Secretary General was created¹⁷. These changes can be considered as a major step towards increasing the democratic control over the security issues but it is a known fact that these changes are still an outcome of the process of bargaining between the military and civilian authorities and the consent of the military wing of the NSC has to be taken before making any changes in the duties and composition of the Council. This situation shows that the civilian authorities lack the power to change the existing balance of power and a change in the composition of the NSC, the reduction of the defense expenditures or the size of the armed forces is likely to occur only if it is initiated by the military like the recent reduction in the duration of military service which was a proposal coming from the military wing of the power structure in Turkey.

It needs to be accepted that the organization of the armed forces is different in Turkey from Europe as well as the way in which the concept of national security is understood and this situation is a serious obstacle against Turkey's possible accession to the EU since, as a candidate country and as a potential member of the Union, the problems of Turkish democracy is considered as a part of the domestic policy of the EU and this creates various adjustment problems between the two parties on Turkey's membership track.

¹⁶ Hürriyet (daily newspaper), 18-19 July, 2003.

¹⁷ www.abhaber.com

However, in Turkey, this adjustment problem is often analyzed as an unfair treatment towards Turkey. Most of the politicians, army head quarters and some civil society leaders in Turkey argue that Turkey is a democratic republic governed according to the rule of law and while the negotiations with Spain, Greece and Portugal began despite the absence of a consolidated democratic regime; counting the National Security Council which is a constitutional advisory organ consisting of both civilians and soldiers as one of the reasons preventing democratic consolidation in Turkey and preventing the beginning of the negotiations for membership does not seem like a reasonable claim for the EU. One example of this view is the press release of the Chairman of the Turkish Union of Chambers (TOBB), Rıfat Hisarcıklıoğlu on 19th November, 2002¹⁸, which criticized EU for its approach towards Turkish army by claiming that Turkish military is loyal to democracy and has proved this loyalty by leaving the political scene to the civilians after all three military interventions. In Turkey, the EU's criticisms towards the political role of the Turkish army are mostly seen as an excuse for not accepting Turkey for membership and they are regarded as lacking reasonable grounds. However, "only when a democratic and legitimate civilian-military relationship is established can political decision making, the power and status of the representative institutions; the style of leadership, and the ways of exercising political power become more democratic" (Cizre, 1997: 163) and the current nature of the civilian-military relations in Turkey is completely illegitimate and undemocratic according to the understanding in Europe and unless this situation is altered, the political role of the Turkish Armed Forces is likely to remain as a serious obstacle against Turkey's full membership to the EU.

¹⁸ Hürriyet (daily newspaper).

2.5 The CFSP and the Turkish Armed Forces: More Adjustment Problems?

As mentioned earlier, one of the reasons that the political role of the army in Turkey is criticized by the EU is the fact that the national security concept is understood differently by the two parties. In Europe, one basic aspect of the establishment of security is peace among states through cooperation and spread of democratic regimes while in Turkey, there is a different security understanding which approaches to the security cooperation with other states in a more suspicious manner. Because of the geo-political position of Turkey, the military assumes an important role in Turkey while in the EU, the civilian institutions are more important in the solution of conflicts. Because of the political and security environment in Europe, defense budgets have been shrinking but this has not been the case in Turkey¹⁹ and this situation indicates the fact that the concepts of security and threat are understood differently in Turkey and EU and they are in different security environments and this situation poses an adjustment problem for the future of EU-Turkey relations.

In relation to this, another adjustment problem is the preferences in terms of solution of conflicts. As we have seen, in the CFSP of the EU, the civilian instruments are dominant over the military ones for various reasons and the military operation is the last way of solving the problems. However, in Turkey, the army is in such strong position that, the military capabilities are likely to be preferred in case of a crisis and this is contrary to the understanding in Europe, as the recent Iraq crisis has demonstrated. When Turkey wanted to send troops to Northern Iraq for its territorial security and to prevent mass migration, EU was totally against it and it was

¹⁹ Taken from the speech of Onur Öymen, former Turkish representative to NATO, in the conference held in Istanbul in June 2001 on European Security and Cooperation.

perceived as a further threat for the stability of the region as in the European Council in Brussels (20-21 March 2003), the member states "called on the countries of the region to refrain from actions that could lead to further instability"²⁰ and this statement was specifically directed to Turkey's desire to intervene the crisis through military means and reflected the general tendency of the CFSP of the EU.

Another adjustment problem in terms of the integration of Turkey to the EU and to the CFSP is the decision-making mechanism of the CFSP and the democratic control of the military in this context. As we know, the major criticism towards the Turkish Armed Forces is based on their political role in terms of the National Security Council. In Turkish case, "the major factor contributing to the difficulty in establishing civilian control over the military is the failure of the civilian forces to question the prevailing power configuration" (Cizre, 1997: 162) and unless the existing power structure is challenged by the civilians, the status quo is likely to be preserved and the armed forces are likely to remain outside the civilian control and this situation is seen as a major obstacle for Turkey's EU membership for being contrary to the democratic principles of the Copenhagen Criteria. One recent statement of Günther Verhaugen, the EU Commissioner responsible for enlargement demonstrates this situation. Although Verhaugen states that Turkey can begin the negotiations for full membership by the end of 2004, in order for this to happen, "the role of the army has to be regulated and there should not be any military representatives in the civilian institutions and the army should be under political control; not the contrary."²¹

Besides the political aspect of the issue, the situation creates adjustment problems in terms of Turkey's place in the CFSP because in case of a Turkish

²⁰ <http://europa.eu.int> Presidency Conclusions-Brussels European Council

accession to EU, the individual security interests of Turkey will become a domain of the CFSP and like the other member states, Turkey will want to retain its full sovereignty in security matters. The Turkish case can be more problematic because, in Turkey, in the decisions and actions regarding the security matters, the military plays a major role and in the National Security Council, it is not the recommender but the agenda setter and decision maker while in the CFSP, the military institutions do not have such power and this situation is likely to create problems in terms of the future participation of Turkey to CFSP framework as a full member.

In addition to these, being a part of the CFSP may also be contrary to the security policies of Turkey because although it has to be admitted that Turkey-Greece relations are less tense than the past and the Greek-Turkish rivalry seems to be less serious, this does not guarantee that there will not emerge a crisis situation between the two countries which can create various problems under the CFSP body as in the past although both sides were NATO members, this fact could not prevent crisis between the two parties. In the past, "Greece conditioned its support for the Euro-Mediterranean initiative on assurances that the EU would commence structured dialogue on the accession of Cyprus and Malta following the Barcelona Conference. For six months, Greece obstructed the release of MEDA funds in an effort to win EU support in its dispute with Turkey over two disputed Aegean islands" (Calabrese, 1997: 104). At the moment the relations between the two countries seem to be friendlier and Greece seems to support Turkey's accession to the EU. However, there is the Cyprus issue that has to be solved and the accession of Cyprus to the EU by 2004 without the solution to the conflict between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots may be perceived as a threat for Turkish security and create a dispute between

²¹ Hürriyet (daily newspaper), 29 April 2003.

Turkey and EU because of the existence of Turkish soldiers in the Northern Cyprus. In addition to this possibility, there has been going on a tense situation between Turkey and Greece nowadays because of the claims of Greece about Turkish F-16 planes harassing the Greek civilian airplanes. The Greek authorities have been criticizing the Turkish army for this situation and they have taken this issue to the agenda of both EU and NATO. This situation shows that Greece-Turkey relations are still very fragile and there can be problems about this issue in a possible Turkish integration with the CFSP.

The accession of Turkey to the EU and to the CFSP structure has both advantages and disadvantages for the EU. On one hand, with its strong armed forces, Turkey is an important component of the European security and can contribute to the EU's defense capabilities with its well-trained military personnel and military infrastructure. In addition to these, Turkey's participation in the CFSP can also have an "image moderating effect"²² for the EU especially in case of a military operation as inclusion of a Muslim country saves the CFSP from being accused for being a project of the Christian civilization. On the other hand, Turkey's participation can be problematic mainly because of the different security understanding as explained above, the less importance given to non-military aspects of security by Turkey and the political role of the army in Turkey for being against the democratic requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria.

To conclude all these, it is possible to claim that Turkey's accession to the EU poses a dilemma in terms of the future character of the CFSP and the faith of the accession will in part be determined by the EU's institutional preference in the international arena. The EU's preference for being a civilian political actor or a

²² Taken from the speech of Ali Karaosmanoğlu in the conference held in Istanbul in June 2001 on European Security and Cooperation

military actor will have a direct effect over its relations with Turkey. So far, EU has been of a civilian character and for this reason it is hard to reconcile the security understandings and the views about the position of the army in politics of the two parties. If the EU goes on to prefer to be a civilian international actor and not to use its military capacity in solving crisis situations, Turkey is likely to remain outside of this body without changing its existing political structure in which the army is one of the major political actors.



CHAPTER III

THE CASES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS II:

ALGERIA

Algeria is the country which can provide another case for analyzing the role of the militaries in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership with respect to the democracy promotion policies of the European Union. Although like Turkey, Algeria can also be regarded as having a politicized army, it has certain special characteristics with respect to this issue as a result of its specific historical experiences. In addition to this, because of the differences in the status of Algeria and Turkey in their relations with the EU, where the latter is a candidate country, while the former has an associate status, the role of the Algerian military has to be considered in a different context as the EU has different responses and policies towards the status and the actions of the army in Algeria when compared with the case of Turkey mainly because of the fact that Turkey and Algeria belong to different domains of policy making for the EU despite the fact that they are both the Mediterranean partners.

This chapter deals with the historical context and the other factors which made the Algerian army an important political actor, the means through which the army exercises its political power and with how this situation is perceived and responded by the European Union within the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the Barcelona Process and the interests of the individual member states, particularly of France who has ties to Algeria as the former colonizing power.

3.1 The Historical Background of the Army-Politics Relationship in Algeria

Algeria has been one of the colonies of France for a long period, until 1954 when the Revolutionary War or the War of Liberation began. The war lasted for eight years and in 1962, the independence of Algeria was declared. However, the legacy of the war of independence as well as the colonial history have shaped the political structure of Algeria after it gained its independence. The main legacies of these experiences were the supremacy of the military and the authoritarian tendencies in the governance. As a result of its role in the independence, army became "a remote, unaccountable elite group"(Entelis, Arone, 1994: 175) and it went on to influence and shape the political life in Algeria either by coups and overthrowing the presidents or by taking active roles in the political institutions and decision-making mechanisms.

One significant aspect of Algerian political system is the fact that the political power is concentrated in the hands of a few institutions. As John P. Entelis (1982) argues, "particularly significant has been the emergence of a powerful and interlocking technocratic system with its tripartite mobilizational, managerial and military components working collectively to ensure a relatively effective and unchallenged operation of the state" (93). In other words, Algeria is governed by a three-fold structure which consists of the military, the bureaucracy and the single party. These three institutions are dependent on each other for the continuation of the regime and because of the weakness of the civil society and the democratic means, they are able to function without being accountable to the people. Moreover, these three institutions share "a common socializing background" (Entelis, 1982: 93) because of the independence struggle during which they have all taken part. They share the same ideology and the outlook and this might have prevented the definition

of independent responsibilities and duties for the three main institutions and this situation enables the military to take part both in the party and in the bureaucratic apparatus.

Because of the way in which the independence struggle was led, the army and the party could not develop separate identities in Algeria. "The war endowed the army (ALN- National Liberation Army) with considerable ideological authority and soldiers were held up as models to be emulated. So that, while the party, FLN (National Liberation Front) in political platform emphasized the primacy of 'the political' over 'the military', this view rapidly would be contradicted by discourse and practice" (Malley, 1996: 127). The army could justify its presence in the political arena and could determine the rulers, the policies and the structure of the state institutions in the way that it wanted as the historical data from Algeria illustrates.

After Algeria became independent of France in 1962, Ahmed Ben Bella became the first president of the state. However, unsatisfied with his policies and decisions, the army overthrew Ben Bella with a coup in June 1965. He was replaced by Houari Boumediene who had the support of the military and the technocratic elite. In fact, it was this support of the two part of the three-fold state structure that made Boumediene the president and this proves the power of the army over the party and over the country. In addition to this, after the 1965 coup, the military dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the 1963 Constitution. The political power was left in the hands of the Council of Revolution which was predominantly military.

In 1975, with the decision of the army, the country returned to the constitutional system. However, the army was still represented in the assembly and the president was backed up by the military institutions as he was named as the commander in chief, the minister of security and defense and the secretary general of

the party in addition to being the president of the country. This shows the level of interdependency between the civilian political authority and the military authority and the inability of the civilian power to make decisions independently of the military influence as a result of the structure of the state apparatus and its decision making mechanism and this constitutes an important obstacle against the establishment of a democratic regime in Algeria.

The army's political influence can also be observed during the period when the president Boumediene became ill and when Chadli Benjedid was named as the new president in 1979 after Boumediene's death, however, during Benjedid's presidency between the years 1979 and 1988, there were important political developments in Algeria which redefined the role of the Algerian army in politics but before going into that, it is worth to emphasize the way in which the Algerian army justified its political role in the governance of the country.

3.2 The Guardians of the State?

As mentioned earlier, the military is one of the most decisive and key elite groups of Algerian politics. The military has constituted a guardianship role for itself through the military interventions and strengthened this role through gaining representation in the political institutions at national and local levels. While its role in the revolutionary struggle gave the army a popular support and legitimized its presence in politics, its activities after the independence also contributed to its legitimacy.

For instance, the army took an active role in rural development projects and this gave them a popular support and an internal prestige. The military monopolized the nation's coercive instruments of force, it was some sort of a hero in the eyes of

the citizens because of the independence struggle, it was perceived as the establisher of the law and order, it possessed the special organizational and managerial skills for the development of society (Entelis, 1982: 96-97) and all these contributed to the legitimacy of the Algerian army in politics and the army was defined by the Algerians as "the mirror of the people, a reliable model and an example to be followed"(Malley, 1996: 128).

The Algerian army also justified the political role it has taken over by its internal principles. Entelis (1982) argues that the military identified itself with the people, the revolution, the unity of the state and the strong state structure (110) which were also important for the Algerian citizens and this made people feel that they were at the same camp with the army and this might have provided additional civilian support for the political actions of the Algerian army.

As a result of all these factors, the army was represented in the civilian decision-making institutions and the military strengthened its position as the third leg of the tripartite state structure. However, the 1980s brought a change in the strength and presence of the army in the political sphere under the presidency of Chadli Benjedid whose policies had important effects on the position of the military in Algeria in 1980s and 1990s up to present time.

3.3 The Benjedid Period: The Reversal of the Political Power

The Benjedid Period (1979-1988) is significant for the political and economic liberalization process which led to the polarization of society (Entelis, Arone, 1994: 184). During the 1980s, Algeria faced with the problems stemming from economic crisis and the rise of political Islamism and the more liberal atmosphere in the

country during Benjedid's presidency led to various protests and strikes of mainly university students, workers and Islamist groups.

In the October of 1988, the political climate changed significantly in Algeria. The violent protests of people led to the state of emergency and the use of force. The army suppressed the events rather harshly and the incident became known as 'the Black October' because of the bloody clash between the army and the people. With these events, the Algerian military lost its legitimacy and popular support and became the target of people's reactions. The role of the army was being reversed because president Benjedid responded to the protests with further democratization instead of suppressing them with the use of force. The years between 1988 and 1992 witnessed a wave of democratization in Algeria.

In 1989, a new constitution was made which brought important changes to the way in which the state functioned, at least in principle. With the new constitution, the term 'socialist' in the title of the state was removed, people were given new rights and freedoms and there was no special emphasis on the role and importance of the FLN, the single party of Algeria but most importantly, with the 1989 constitution, the army no longer had a political status and was assigned to the duty of national defense (Toth, 1994: 63). In other words, under Benjedid's presidency, the army was pushed out of politics as a result of its response to the protests of the civilians. The army's "favorable image based on its role in the War of Independence and in the creation of Post-war Algerian state, was badly tarnished by the ruthless way in which it suppressed the strikes and riots of Black October" (Tortter, 1994: 255). However, the events following 'the Black October' and the political situation that emerged as a result of the democratization wave in Algeria also enabled the military to return to politics and to rebuild its political strength.

3.4 The Army Comes Back: The 1992 Coup and Its Implications

The re-establishment of the military power in Algerian politics after the political liberalization process can be linked to the foundation of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) as the main opposition party against the National Liberation Front (FLN) and to the rise of political Islam with the FIS. The Islamic Salvation Front gained the support of many opposition groups and it provided a popular support for coming to power in the free elections. However, in 1991, the FLN made changes in the election system in order to protect its power after the elections and this led to various strikes and protests in Algeria. These strikes and protests made the army come out of its barracks and the state of emergency was declared in September 1991. On the other hand, the preparations were also made for the new elections. The first tour of the elections was held and the possibility of the FIS coming to power emerged.

The FIS and the political Islam were perceived as threats to the state by the army (Willis, 1996) and they used this situation as the means to regain their political position. The second tour of the elections was suspended and the military coup took place on 11 January 1992. "As the threat of Islamic militancy became more acute, the power of the army re-emerged as the primary bulwark against the religiously inspired violence. The role of the armed forces was legitimated" (Tortter, 1994: 255) with the declaration of the state of emergency. People who feared the Islamist government supported the coup. After the coup, the political authority was transferred to the High Security Council which consisted of six military officers and which was soon replaced by the High Council of State of five members which was dominated by

military officers who had almost unlimited political powers (Entelis, Arone, 1994: 189).

The 1992 coup reasserted the presence of the Algerian military in politics up until now and the army has important effects on the way in which the Algerian state functions and thus on the possibility of establishing democratic institutions and the future of democracy in Algeria.

The major consequence of the 1992 military intervention can be summarized as the reversal of the process of the reduction of the military authority with the 1989 Constitution through usage of the security of the state. The soldiers found the rise of political Islam as contrary to the security of the state and the three-fold state structure was re-established with the army coming back to the political scene.

As Morgan (1994) argues, "in ousting President Benjedid, canceling elections, and imposing a state of emergency, the military and the military-backed government set in motion a sweeping reversal of the democratic drive that had been in motion since 1988" (81). In other words, after the 1992 coup, "the virtual elimination of constitutional government and the resurrection of military authoritarianism have returned to Algeria" (Entelis, Arone, 1994: 175) and the authoritarian state structure was strengthened and today, it poses a considerable obstacle against the establishment of democratic institutions and political liberalization in Algeria.

The long-existing ties between the Algerian army and the single party contribute to the military's desire to cut off the political liberalization process because democracy would mean for the army to lose its privileged position and to stay in its barracks for all the time, so in Algeria, there is a "tension between the role of the military and the requirements of the political and economic liberalization"

(Morgan, 1994: 70) which means that Algeria has a long way to go for liberalizing its political and economic system and this liberalization has to start with the elimination of the political role of the army which is not an easy task to fulfill in a country like Algeria.

During the period after the 1992 coup, the rule of law almost did not exist in Algeria and the state became a military autocracy with the ongoing state of emergency and the existing decision making institutions. For instance, the High Security Council of military officers provided advice on national security matters, it had to be asked for its advice before a war decision was made and was capable of shaping all state policies (Tortter, 1994: 257). This shows the level of military's involvement in Algerian politics. However, this does not mean that the army regained the popular support it had in the early years of the independence. As Entelis and Arone (1994) argue, "majority of the Algerians were caught in the middle, distrusting the army as much as the Islamists" (190) during the coup and afterwards.

The Algerian case is significant in the sense that both sides of the conflict are perceived equally dangerous and are equally undesired by the people. People do not want the radical Islamists to come to power; however, they also do not want to be governed by a military regime. Yet, it is an undeniable fact that there is a long military tradition in Algerian national life and "tension, crises, resistance, dissidence and revolution have characterized Algeria's development" (Tortter, 1994: 250) and all these features of Algerian politics enabled the army to have a secure and strong position in the political life of Algeria.

All the above-mentioned historical and current context show that the rise of the military especially since 1990s "pose substantial challenges for Algeria's future development and stability because the administrative elite and top party functionaries

have been relegated to a subordinate position" (Entelis, Arone, 1994: 204) together with people and as Robert Malley (1996) argues in his book "The Call From Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution and the Turn to Islam", "while most states have armies, Algeria's army has a state" (247) and this situation is clearly contrary to the ideal model of the state based on democratic principles in Europe and to the principle of the establishment of democratic control over the militaries, thus, it is a matter that concerns the European Union because of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which includes Algeria. The next section deals with these concerns of the EU and its response and approach towards the ongoing situation in Algeria.

3.5 The EU's Approach to Algeria: Promotion of Democracy, the EUROMED and France

The foreign policy of the EU and its main concerns in the international arena are characterized by promotion of democratic principles, political stability and respect for human rights as well as the economic development (Roberts, 2002: 106) and with respect to the Mediterranean region, these concerns are put into practice with the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the Barcelona Conference in November, 1995 which has provided the official context for the EU policies with respect to Algeria.

The Southern Enlargement of the EU made the community neighbors with North Africa and thus with Algeria and the region became crucial for the security concerns of Europe. As an implication of the peace through democracy policy, the European Union now has an interest in the political stability of Algeria as the violence and political polarization in this country may become a threat for the European security in the future (Gillespie, Whitehead, 2002: 204). However, the

security matters have such priority for the EU that this may lead to leaving the authoritarian regimes as they are for the sake of security and stability instead of promoting democracy and the main reason for this is the fear of the rise of political Islam in a more liberal atmosphere. This situation creates doubts about the seriousness of the EU in the matter of promoting democracy as although "during 1990s promoting democracy abroad was a high profile issue on the EU's foreign policy agenda, the significances of this particular goal diminished considerably, whereas other priorities such as conflict prevention and conflict management became the order of the day"(Olsen, 2002: 311) and this shows that the promotion of democracy in the world lost its priority for the EU because of the emergence of the other security concerns like the spread of regional conflicts, political and economic stability and migration. In fact, instead of being a policy priority, promotion of democracy became a policy instrument for the resolution of these new concerns which was used on occasion. As Bechir Chourou (2000) argues, "despite its professed claims in favor of democracy, Europe gives the impression that it does not wish its emergence in the South, because it suspects what the outcome would be, and does not want to take the risk of having its suspicion confirmed" (188).

As Brynjar Lia (1999) argues, the presence of authoritarian and repressive regimes in the Southern neighbors of the EU has security implications in the sense that the aims of establishing political stability, expanding economic and military cooperation may lead to support for the undemocratic regimes in the region (27). In other words, the fear of the rise of violence is crucial for the security understanding of Europe and the EU does not want to damage the existing status quo and prefers to secure its interests instead of leading a wave of democratization which is likely to bring political instability mainly because of the tension between the army and the

opposition groups. This situation gives the idea that the EU is hesitant over whether to promote democracy in the Mediterranean or not and behind this "lies an unresolved contradiction between preferences for legitimate, responsible and democratic government or political stability as a basis for economic development" (Joffe, 1994: 31) and the EU seems to prefer to preserve the status quo for the sake of the economic ties with the Mediterranean region.

Because of the colonial history, "European countries and the community bear some historical responsibility for the consolidation of authoritarian regimes in North Africa, and may thus be duty-bound to make amends. Europe did nothing to promote democracy as the region's regimes became consolidated after independence, and in more recent years the EU may be seen, in practice, as having bolstered elite coalitions rather than promoting political pluralism" (Gillespie, Whitehead, 2002: 196). We can test the plausibility of this argument by looking at the actions and policies of the EU in order to decide on whether the EU is an effective international actor in Algeria or not with respect to promoting democracy and controlling the army through democratic means.

If we go back to the Barcelona Declaration which is the starting point of the EUROMED, we can see the stated aims of the EU as an international actor in the Mediterranean region within the political and security pillar of the declaration which states that the Mediterranean Partners have to strengthen the rule of law and democracy in their countries²³. However, while being a member of the EUROMED, Algeria still suffers from the absence of the rule of law and is still not a democratic state and this may be considered as an indication of the failure of the EU as an effective international actor in Algeria.

²³ http://europa.eu.int/barcelona_declaration

As mentioned earlier, "during the 1990s, there were clear limitations on the European Union's policy to promote democracy in North Africa. The limits were mainly imposed by the high priority given to security, by the EU's institutional structure, and by its political bureaucratic culture" (Olsen, 2002: 316) and many scholars argue that "the EU is not a fully coherent and effective force in international affairs vis-à-vis the Mediterranean" (Stavridis, Hutchence, 2000: 36). As the Algerian case illustrates, the democracy promotion efforts of the EU have no tangible results and the authoritarian regimes go on to exist as some other factors like economic interests, emigration and the fear of Islamist alternatives affected the EU policy and limited the EU's power as a political actor in the region.

When the coup took place in 1992, "the essence of European discourse on Algeria had been the critique of the regime on democratic grounds" (Roberts, 2002: 119). There were various resolutions and declarations emphasizing the negative views of Europe with respect to the undemocratic character of the Algerian regime. On many occasions, "the European Union re-confirmed its willingness to support a policy of democratic development and economic restructuring in Algeria"²⁴. However, despite the declarations which condemned the political situation and violence, "little has been done in the way of pursuing the EU's stated aims. The EU has not attached any political conditionality to the aid, trade and financial relations it already has with Algeria" (Stavridis, Hutchence, 2000: 51).

The European Union did not create any pressure on Algeria for political liberalization. In fact, the military power was preferred over a possible FIS government and the EU supported the status quo instead of promoting democracy because the economic relations had priority and the existing trade agreements and

²⁴ CFSP, Declaration on Algeria, 23 January 1995.

business with Algeria were not used as instruments for pushing economic and political liberalization. These relations were not conditional on the development of human rights and democracy in Algeria. On the contrary, despite the existence of the authoritarian regime and the internal violence, the negotiations for the association agreement were carried on between the EU and Algeria, were concluded in 2001 and finally the agreement was signed in Valencia, in April, 2002 whose principles were based on the economic concerns with no mentioning of promotion of human rights and democracy.²⁵

While analyzing the EU policies towards Algeria, one important factor that has to be taken into account is the influence of France. Having colonial ties with the region and having governed Algeria for a long time, made France some sort of an expert in the EU in the formulation of the policies about Algeria and France played a significant role in shaping the attitude of the EU towards this country.

After the coup in 1992, France supported the military as a power against the threat of religious fundamentalism (Ciment, 1997: 124) and this led to the undermining of promotion of democracy in Algeria by the EU. In other words, the security concerns and the threat perceptions of France in a way became the security concerns of the EU and they shaped the community policy. It was France who defined the nature of the problem in Algeria as it was perceived as the only foreign country to understand the situation in Algeria (Roberts, 2002: 127). As a result, it can be argued that the European Union failed to develop a policy that reflects the concerns and interests of all of its members in Algeria and the discourse was dominated by the interests of France.

²⁵ <http://europa.eu.int/comm/externalrelations/algeria/docs/index.htm>

While criticizing the lack of effectiveness of the EU as an international actor in Algeria and in North Africa, in general, we should also consider the status of the region in its relations with the EU which determine the methods and sanctions available for the EU to promote democracy. In its previous experiences of Southern Enlargement (and also the Eastern Enlargement), EU had the advantageous position because the issue was the accession of the countries that had the problems of democratization. The desire of these countries- Greece, Spain, Portugal- to join the Community provided them an incentive for making reforms of democratization. On the other hand, there is no such incentive for Algeria because of the experience of Morocco who applied for the EC membership in 1987 and was denied. With this case, the EC had determined its geographical boundaries, so currently, there is no such incentive of membership for the democratization of Algeria. However, there are still the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Barcelona Declaration which can provide the framework for the EU to promote democracy in Algeria.

Barcelona Declaration provides the instrument for the EU to encourage democracy and "the bilateral trade area agreements have requirements for democratic governments and respect for human rights [but] these are usually treated as formalities by both parties to the agreement" (Joffe, 1997: 20). As a result, the EU fails to be effective in promoting democracy and establishing the democratic control of the military in Algeria. There are some declarations which state the EU's concerns about the situation in Algeria but there are no coercive actions. There is no serious policy of the EU to promote democracy in Algeria. For instance, the EU has not called for "the executive branch of the state to be accountable to legislature, the army to withdraw from political sphere, the judiciary to be independent of executive, the proper measures to be taken for fair elections" [and never mentioned the existence

of] "the state of emergency and the weakness of civil society" (Roberts, 2002: 127) in Algeria which are the crucial aspects of a well-functioning and stable democracy. For the EU, in Algeria, the economic interests have priority and the Community prefers to preserve the status quo by supporting the undemocratic regime.

3.6 The Implications of the CFSP in the Algerian Case

The Algerian case is different from that of Turkey because of its different status with respect to the EU as for being a candidate country, Turkey has to fulfill strict political criteria and receives severe criticisms for the political role of its army while Algeria, as a trading partner and as a part of the foreign policy of the EU, feels the political pressure less despite the military coup and the state of emergency because of its economic ties with the EU. However, as "the stability of North Africa is of strategic importance to Europe, particularly Southern Europe" (De Vasconcelos, 1988: 145), possible security challenges coming from Algeria are taken seriously by the EU and these challenges contribute to the adjustment problems for the future of the EU-Algeria relations.

It is important to note that the security problems with Algeria form the non-military aspect of the CFSP because the economic interests of the EU provide the basic motive for the relations with Algeria together with the ties of France to this country. For this reason, the political instability in Algeria may create a problem in the future when it begins to threaten the economic interests of the EU.

The mass migration from Algeria to the EU countries is a major adjustment problem because the immigrants have entered the economic systems of the European countries during a time of recession and this led to the revival of racism and xenophobia as the Europeans felt that their jobs and well-being were threatened by

these immigrants and this led to the rise of the right-wing parties (Calabrese, 1997: 92) which created the possibility of political instability within the territories of the EU. For these reasons, the EU feels the need to preserve the stability in Algeria (and in North Africa generally) in order to preserve its own stability as it is believed that if there exists no political instability in the North African countries, then there will be no migration to Europe. In addition to the mass migration problem, the extreme nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism in relation to terrorism in Algeria create potential threats for Europe and the EU tends to support the regime which is capable of dealing with these problems which does not necessarily have to be democratic.

Algeria is an interesting case in terms of testing the effectiveness of the CFSP because it creates dilemmas for the security understanding of the EU. On one hand, the threats of mass migration, nationalism, religious fundamentalism and terrorism require the EU to preserve the status quo in Algeria in which military seems to have established political control because of the EU's concerns of domestic political stability and economic interests. On the other hand, the desire to preserve the status quo contradicts with the promotion of democracy principle of the CFSP because in Algeria, democracy tends to create chaos which poses threats over European security and for this reason, the EU members refrain from pursuing policies of promoting democracy in Algeria.

As Antonio Marquina (1988) suggests, although the Algerians accept the role played by the EU in the Mediterranean region, they do not want to feel obliged to follow its directives in their domestic affairs (179) and this shows that the EU has no politically binding power over Algeria in terms of the promotion of democracy because of its economic interests and the risk of chaos coming with the wave of democratization.

In sum, it is possible to argue that Algeria is another example of the civilian character of the CFSP of the EU as it reflects the broad security understanding in Europe which includes non-military threats and it demonstrates that the economic interests of the EU are crucial in shaping the European reaction to domestic instability in the strategic regions but most importantly, it reveals the fact that the promotion of democracy is not always the basic principle of the CFSP as sometimes, for the sake of political and economic stability and for the sake of the other aspects of security, it can be victimized as in the case of Algeria.

In the light of all these factors, we can regard Algeria as a failure of the EU as an international actor in the Mediterranean region. The European Union has failed to put the principles of the Barcelona Declaration into practice in the Algerian case and this shows that "there is still a long way to go before the Union can be seen as a coherent international force in the Euro- Mediterranean area" (Stavridis, Hutchence, 2000: 42).

3.7 Turkey and Algeria: A Brief Comparison

Turkey and Algeria are two Mediterranean Partners whose militaries are an important actor in their political life. While the initial legitimizing process for this situation is similar in both countries, as the two cases show, there are important differences in the way in which the Turkish army and the Algerian army use their political power. In addition to that, because their status are different in their relations to the Community, the EU has different policies and reactions towards the political role of the Turkish military and towards that of the Algerian military.

In both countries, the underlying reason of the political power of the army is their struggles for independence which are the Turkish War of Independence and

Algeria's Revolutionary War against French colonization. In both cases, when the struggle ended with victory, army got an important position in the society because of their success and this position enabled the officers to take part in the state-building process after the war. In Turkey, the army was the founder and the modernizer of the new Turkish state and in Algeria; it became one leg of the three-fold state structure and governed the country together with the single party and the bureaucratic apparatus. In Turkey and also in Algeria, the historical background of the country enabled the military to engage in politics with a legitimate claim to political power. However, there are some differences in the way in which the Turkish army and the Algerian army use this power.

The armies of these two countries both assume the role of the guardian of the regime and they have intervened to the political life whenever they thought that the existence of the regime and the security of the country were in danger. However, while the Turkish military never intended to establish an authoritarian regime and preferred to leave the political scene and to take part in politics through less direct means, the Algerian army created a military regime after the 1992 coup and continues to govern the country through authoritarian means.

The Turkish army stated that it planned to return to civil political life and to rebuild democracy as soon as the order was restored. On the other hand, the Algerian army's intention was to come to power and it never planned to leave the office to the civilians and this closed the possible channels of democratization in Algeria, especially after the 1992 coup.

When it comes to the relationships of the two countries with the EU, there are important differences in terms of the demands and policies of the Union concerning the promotion of democracy. The European Union prepares progress reports and

makes statements about the level of democratization in Turkey and the political role of the Turkish army is brought up as one of the problems with the Turkish democracy. As Turkey is one of the candidate countries for the EU membership, it is expected to fulfill certain conditions for being a part of the Union and diminishing the political role of the army is one of these conditions.

On the other hand, Algeria is a Mediterranean Partner who is tied to the Union mainly through economic relationships. In the Algerian case, the EU does not use any sanctions or push for democratization reforms through the suspension of the relationships because it also has interests in these relations as well as Algeria. In other words, the trade bonds with Algeria are not sacrificed for the sake of democracy and the EU fails as an international actor who promotes democracy in Algeria.

The brief comparison of the Turkish and Algerian cases shows that the promotion of democracy is important for the EU only when it directly affects the community. The policy of promoting democracy is a domestic policy tool for the EU rather than being a foreign policy objective. The members of the Union are expected to have well-functioning democratic systems because of the idea that a problem in one member country can affect the whole community but when it comes to the associates or the trade partners like Algeria, promotion of democracy becomes of secondary importance and it is used as a policy tool when it is seen as necessary for the economic interests of the EU. As a candidate country, Turkey belongs to the domestic concerns of the EU while Algeria is a part of international security interests of the Union. The priority of economic interests and the fact that the two countries belong to different areas of policy making explain why the military regime in Algeria is not challenged by the EU while the Turkish democracy is highly criticized for

giving too much political power to the army and for the lack of democratic control over its armed forces.



CONCLUSION

This thesis has made an analysis of the EU's Mediterranean policy within the context of EUROMED and the effects of the political role of the militaries over this policy in the context of the democratization principles of the EU by evaluating the influence of the Turkish and Algerian armed forces over the relations of these countries with the EU and certain conclusions were drawn from these analysis.

First of all, the analysis of the CFSP and the foundation principles of the EU shows that the promotion of democracy in the world is a strategy of security for the EU which has been used in the Union's foreign policy whenever it was felt necessary. A closer look at the EU history and structure has shown that the initial democratic cooperation among the European states had served for the function of a deeper integration at the political level and in the EU democracy became a rule of conduct and a criterion especially in the domestic matters of the Union.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership provides a good case of study for analyzing the implications of the democracy promotion policy of the EU. The basic premises of the Mediterranean policy of the Community were shaped by the aim of democratization of the region as the analysis of the accession processes of Greece, Spain and Portugal have revealed and this aim reflects itself in the principles of the EUROMED, too.

The study of the EUROMED showed that the EU has some concerns about the peace and stability of the Mediterranean region and sees the lack of democratization as a source of the problems in the region. Thus, under the EUROMED framework, the EU has been trying to promote democracy by setting

certain principles. One aspect of these principles is controlling the militaries through democratic means and limiting the influence of the army in politics.

The study of Turkey and Algeria has helped to clarify 'the problem of the militaries' in the EUROMED and the two cases revealed the fact that the different security understandings, different threat perceptions and different duties assigned for the militaries exist in the EU and the Mediterranean Partners which result from different historical experiences and internal dynamics and that the political role of the militaries is likely to remain as an important problem in the future of the EU-Mediterranean relations.

However, the main conclusion that can be derived from the comparison of the Turkish and Algerian cases in terms of the EU's responses towards the political influence of the military is the fact that the EU is not that consistent about the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy and although democracy is an important pre-condition of both membership and partnership, it is possible to observe some flexibilities in this policy. While in the Turkish case, the political weight of the military is seen as an important obstacle against democratization and accession to the EU, in the Algerian case, although there is no democratic regime and the military rules the country, the EU does not use the sanctions stated in the Barcelona Declaration in order to promote democracy in Algeria and the basic reasons for this situation are the economic relations between the EU and Algeria and the danger of religious fundamentalism which can arise under a democratic system.

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