

A COMPARISON OF TURKEY'S AND IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICIES
TOWARDS YEMENI AND LIBYAN WARS IN THE LEVEL OF REGIONAL
ANALYSIS

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REGIONAL ANALYSIS**

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ABSTRACT

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Civil wars broke out in Libya and Yemen after the Arab Uprisings and increased the instability in the region. As non-Arab regional actors, Turkey and Iran pursued active foreign policies towards the conflict countries. Their policies and involvements are considerable and critical factors on the courses of events in the Middle East regional security complex. This thesis questions “why” and “in what ways” Turkey and Iran are involved in the civil wars in the region. It examines the regional foreign policy patterns and interests of the actors in a comparative way by putting Libya and Yemen wars into perspective. To do so, this study evaluates the involvement process in the wars of the actors considering the involvers’ motives, methods, and timing in a regional perspective. The motives are determined as strategic interests and humanitarian purposes, while the methods are classified as use of force and whether the involvement is biased or non-biased. The study concludes with the argument that the enmity/amity relations in the region and the foreign policy decisions of the actors have impacts on that of the other. The actors involve in the cases regarding their

regional interests and developments, and they determine their involvement tools and priorities them with respect to their interests.

Keywords: Turkey and Iran's regional policies, Yemen and Libyan conflicts, Middle East Regional Security Complex, regional powers involvement in civil wars.



ÖZ

TÜRKİYE VE İRAN'IN YEMEN VE LİBYA SAVAŞLARINA YÖNELİK DIŞ POLİTİKALARININ BÖLGESEL ANALİZ DÜZEYİNDE KARŞILAŞTIRILMASI

Okumuş, Esra

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
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Arap Ayaklanmalarının patlak vermesinin ardından Libya ve Yemen'de iç savaşlar ortaya çıkmış ve bu durum bölgedeki istikrarsızlığı artırmıştır. Arap olmayan bölgesel aktörler olarak Türkiye ve İran, savaş halindeki ülkelere karşı aktif dış politika izlemiştir. Aktörlerin politikaları ve müdahaleleri, Ortadoğu bölgesel güvenlik kompleksindeki olayların gidişatı üzerinde kritik faktörlerdir. Bu tez Türkiye ve İran'ın bölgedeki iç savaşlara “neden” ve “ne şekilde” dahil olduklarını sorgulamaktadır. Libya ve Yemen savaşlarını değerlendirmeye alarak bölgesel aktörlerin dış politika davranışlarını ve çıkarlarını karşılaştırmalı bir şekilde incelemektedir. Bunu yapmak için bu çalışma, aktörlerin savaşlara dahil olma sürecini, müdahillerin motivasyonlarını, yöntemlerini ve zamanlamalarını dikkate alarak bölgesel boyutta değerlendirmektedir. Motivasyonlar, stratejik çıkarlar ve insani amaçlar olarak belirlenirken, yöntemler ise müdahalelerde güç kullanma durumlarına ve müdahalenin taraflı veya tarafsız olmasına göre sınıflandırılmıştır. Çalışma, bölgedeki düşmanlık/dostluk ilişkilerinin ve aktörlerin dış politika kararlarının bir diğer aktörünki üzerinde etkili olduğu argümanı ile son bulmaktadır.

Aktörler, bölgesel çıkarları ve gelişmeleri ile ilgili vakalara müdahil olmakta, çıkarlarına göre önceliklerini ve politika araçlarını belirlemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye ve İran'ın bölge politikaları, Yemen ve Libya savaşları, Ortadoğu Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi, iç savaşlara bölgesel müdahale





To my beloved father

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

GNA	Government of National Accord
HoR	House of Representative
LNA	Libyan National Army
MERSC	Middle East Regional Security Complex
NTC	National Transitional Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PKK	Kurdistan Worker's Party
UAE	United Arab Emirates
USA	United States of America
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
YPG	People's Protections Unit

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Arab Uprisings is a milestone in Modern Middle East History. The countries in the region have still been under the effects of it. After the uprisings, civil wars erupted in Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Thousands of people died and were wounded because of these wars. Millions were forced to migrate to other countries or became internally displaced. Rising insecurity in the war-stricken countries threatens the neighbouring countries' security due to the security interdependency prevalent among them. These human disasters and intensified instability attracted the region's attention for interfering in conflicts, and some actors got involved in the crisis. Therefore, the countries in the region have significant roles in the process of the civil wars since they also have policies that alter the courses of the events towards the conflictual countries. This thesis explains the positions and policies of the two regional actors, Iran and Turkey, in the Yemen and Libya Wars within the framework of motives, policy tools and timings of intervention.

The research question is formulated as to how and to what extent have Turkey and Iran involved in the region's security status considering the Libya and Yemen crisis as cases after the Arab Uprisings and what are their positions and regional foreign policies within the ongoing transformation process of the security environment regarding the selected civil wars.

1.1. Research Design

1.1.1 Purpose of the Research

The regional actors have a significant impact on the regional dynamics. Their foreign policies alter the situation of places in conflicts. The question of how they decide on

their policies towards the ongoing wars is a leading issue in this thesis. The regional rivalry, other regional actor's interests, and foreign policy agendas make differences in the behaviours of actors and regional developments. The purpose of this study is to scrutinize over and compare how Iran and Turkey engage in the region's security complex by getting themselves involved in the selected civil wars as regional non-Arab states.

1.1.2. Selection of Cases and Actors

Iran and Turkey are non-Arab state actors who actively participate in the regional crisis by taking their own interests and chance of affecting on the conflict zone and perceived threats of the outcomes of ongoing wars in Arab states and humanitarian disasters into an account. The two have divergent agendas on the same cases and frequently confront each other with regional issues. Their contrasting perceptions converge on some occasions, which is one phenomenon of this thesis. Iran and Turkey's behaviours are valuable to be evaluated, accounting for the regional security environment. The intervention methods and motives will help us understand why and how the regional powers engage in the regional civil wars. Their positions and approaches have shifted from one way to another based on their politics with the other regional actors and incidents, so that it has been affected by the region's dynamics. Thus, as non-Arab leading states in the region, Iran and Turkey are selected to be scrutinized. As the other non-Arab state in the area, Israel is not analysed for this examination since its position and policies over the wars have not been influential at the level of Iran's and Turkey's.

In the period of Arab Uprisings, there emerged three civil wars, and Iran and Turkey were involved in these wars in various ways. For the Syrian case, both of them were geographically proximate to Syria and had identified direct interests. Turkey has been involved in Syria's internal affairs initially for the sakes of reforms, then for supporting the opposition groups to overthrow the Assad regime. During the crisis, Turkey's primary interests have also changed. The insecurity in Syria is highly reflecting in the terrorist activities in Turkey and gives rise to irregular forced migration. For Iran, Syria is a historical ally and is on its agenda for several purposes. Also, the Syrian case has been a critical topic for foreign intervention examinations

and in Turkey-Iran relation analyses given academic literature. However, these two countries have been involved and intervened in the Yemen and Libyan Wars in varying degrees and intensity as well. The two wars are the other prominent examples that could not complete the revolutionary process and end up in civil wars. Turkey and Iran have had foreign policy and security agendas in both cases. Turkey has played an active role in Libya, while Iran has not been that influential in there. At the same time, Iran prioritizes the Yemen crisis in its agenda, meanwhile to Turkey, Yemen is at a lower level of its foreign policy list. They did not define direct interests in these wars. They take conflicting steps in Yemen comparing to their converging policies on Libya. Both of their actions had an impact on the other one's foreign policy decisions.

Yemen and Libyan Wars are selected for this thesis to be examined in terms of the motives behind the policy decisions and the way their involvement worked in the wars. The indirect involvements of Iran and Turkey differentiate the Yemen and Libyan wars from the Syrian War. Therefore, the Syrian case is excluded from this thesis. Another reason of the exclusion of it resides in the fact that an increase in the number of actors and cases lead to more complication. Therefore, the actors and the cases are limited regarding to their feasibility.

1.1.3. Data Collection and Methods

This research is conducted through a desk study. This thesis aims to answer the research question by conducting a cross-examine comparative case study of Iran and Turkey's policies within the transformation process of the selected Middle East security sub-complexes. The reliable information on the crises in Libya and Yemen and agendas of the actors are found by reviewing academic literature, official announcements and statements, and primary and secondary sources.

The theoretical framework of the involvement of foreign actors in civil wars and the regional security complex theory will be used. Motives, methods, and timing of involvement will be the determining variables to explore how the two states are involved in the Yemen and Libyan War. The theoretical framework is based upon

existing academic literature related to regional security and third-party involvement/intervention in civil wars. In conclusion, the policies of Iran and Turkey in the sub-complexes of the Middle East Regional Security Complex, which are the Gulf and Maghreb and their involvement process in the two wars will be compared respectively.

1.1.4. Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is made up of three chapters in addition to introduction and conclusion sections. In the introduction, the general view of the thesis is given by point out at the goals of the research, the research question and design, and the conceptual framework of the study.

The first chapter is divided into two sections. The first section is about the regional security complex of the Middle East with its historical background. The subcomplexes of the region, the Maghreb and the Gulf, are also touched upon, considering their position in the ME territory. Countries of the subcomplexes and the primary security issues are identified to provide a general perception in capturing the ongoing wars and the relations with the regional actors. The second section briefly renders the history of Libya and Yemen until the Arab Uprisings, the revolutionary processes, and a description of the dynamics and actors of the current wars.

The second and third chapters scrutinize Turkey's and Iran's position in the ME regional security, respectively. Their relations and policies towards the Arab states before the uprising are explained in the first place. In the following sections, bilateral relations between Iran-Libya and -Yemen, and Turkey-Libya and -Yemen are analysed. Methods, motives, and timing framework are applied to the regional foreign policies of Turkey and Iran subsequently in these chapters. Turkey and Iran have been involved in the Yemen and Libyan War due to various motives. The motives led them to specify the methods illustrating how they will interfere in the conflicts. Finally, policies towards the wars are analysed within the concept of regional security.

In the last chapter, the conclusion section, the entire analyses provided in the previous chapters are discussed comparatively. The conclusion chapter presents the findings on the conflictual and converging points of the policies of Turkey and Iran. The security understanding and their military and diplomatic methods for being in the equation of the security complex are demonstrated. It is also shown that regional rivalry and enmity relations are one of the leading factors of the conflicts.

1.2. Conceptual Framework

1.2.1. Regional Security Complex

In order to define subjects for security studies, Buzan and Wæver offer to create a hierarchy with analytical levels in the international system. “Region” is a unit of analysis between the state level and international level which has its security dynamics, although superpowers have an impact on it. The region is defined as “a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations existing among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.”¹ Buzan argues that security is not self-contained but relational and dependent on that of other states. The threats and developments are less influential in the case of the existence of a long-distance between states than geographically proximate ones. Thus, the regional perspective approaches the events in the security complex in detail without being shadowed by focusing on acts of superpowers. The regional dynamics determine the features of the Regional Security Complex. These dynamics consist of the foreign policy patterns of the actors, their positions in the relationships, and their threat perceptions. Albeit the cultural, historical and religious backgrounds operate the regional dynamics, the patterns of relations are path-dependent².

The power relations within the region are defined by the pattern of amity and enmity relations. While one to other states’ supportive or protective actions is considered amity, enmity is defined as the fear and threat that are prevalent and put the opposite

¹ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. Vincent Hoffman-Martinot, Second (Colchester: ecpr classics press, 1991), 158.

² Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 50, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491252>.

sides at stake. These emerged from salient features like border disputes, ethnic and religious differences. In this way, regional conflicts and insecurities are grounded upon these patterns. Buzan uses “security complex” to indicate the amity and enmity interdependency between the countries “whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently and closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.”³ The security interdependencies of states are either positive or negative as well as it can make states unite with each other against a common threat in some cases. To define a group of states as a regional complex requires existence of a high level of trust or threat among the states mutually.

The RSCT functions to explicate a region by considering four levels. Firstly, the status of individual states in terms of their domestic vulnerabilities, which generate security concerns, is significant to indicate something or a group of states as a threat for itself or the region. The correspondence of strong or weak individual states is one level of generation of the RSC. Secondly, as it was mentioned above, interstate relations are the other level. Amity and enmity patterns, the polarity between regional powers (whether bipolar or multipolar) and their geographical proximity account for a region primarily. Although the third and fourth ones are not significant for regional analysis regarding the region’s internal affairs, the relations with neighbouring regional complexes and involvement of global powers can mould regional structure. The theory looks at these four levels in detail and the way they relate to each other in order to constitute a region⁴. Regional complexes might have subcomplexes that have the same definition as the RSC but additionally need to be part of an RSC. Distinctive patterns of interdependence which do not represent the whole region’s pattern necessitates having subcomplexes. A region also is expected to include some features. Buzan separates the world with boundaries as regions; thus, a district should have borders to differentiate it from its neighbours. RSC should embody autonomous structure which refers to possess more than two autonomous units and polarity among the units referring distribution of power in the region. Finally, there

³ Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 160.

⁴ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, 51.

must be a social construction, which consists of relations patterns between units like enmity and amity.

The RSCT will be used in this thesis for drawing a regional perspective. It provides a lens with criteria for how a territory is counted as a region and emphasizing regional actors and dynamics. However, in order to examine the policies of the regional actors, the theory is inadequate. Regional powers are the actors who have an or impact on neighbouring countries but do not possess any influence on the global level. The classification needs to be expanded by examining the policies and strategies of regional powers towards the region. Therefore, third-party intervention types and motives concepts will be used for further analyses.

1.2.2. Civil War and Foreign Involvement

One of the prominent insecurity generation dimensions is war. Regan identifies “intrastate conflict as armed, sustained combat between groups within the state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities.”⁵ According to Gleditsch’s work, wars are separated into two groups: inter-state, and the others are intrastate conflicts in the literature. However, he defines civil wars as not only domestic struggles⁶ because states do not exist in isolation, but they interact with each other. The positive or negative interaction increases due to the geographical proximity⁷ because there are risks to a contagion of domestic conflicts to neighbouring states. Kathman’s work indicates that the literature on wars so far points “increased levels of instability, refugee flows, cross-border ethnic ties, the territorial aspirations of rebel groups, and the level of violence” can diffuse quickly to countries that are adjacent to the warfare ones. Instability in a state resonates with regional economic growth and relation along with regional security⁸. Therefore, he considers civil wars as international

⁵ Patrick M Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 2 (1996): 338.

⁶ Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 3 (2007): 294, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307076637>.

⁷ Gleditsch, 295.

⁸ Jacob D Kathman, “Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 6 (2011): 850, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711408009>.

events⁹ that international actors are also involved in the civil wars. The motives and methods behind the third-party intervention may vary depending on the intervenor's interests.

Hoffman gives a broad definition for intervention: "anything can constitute an intervention; indeed, even non-acts can constitute interventions". He argues that the aims of interventions are not different to that of foreign policies¹⁰. Regan points at a definition for intervention "as convention-breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeting at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces."¹¹ Notwithstanding, as Rosenau points out, the word of intervention is used imprecisely in the literature. "Ambiguous and contradictory formulations characterize the voluminous moral, legal, and strategic writings on the subject, and as a result, intervention has come to be treated as synonymous with influence."¹² Involvement of the third parties could be several ways. Adopting a particular foreign policy towards the warfare state is one of them, aside from intervention.

Foreign involvements are one of the primary leading factors of political transition. Aidt and Albornoz study how "the economic causes of foreign intervention and the incentives of a foreign government could trigger political regime transitions in another country."¹³ Regan indicates the foreign intervention's role in the duration of the civil wars. He presents a correlation between prolonged conflicts and foreign interventions¹⁴. In the literature, there are other assumptions that third party

⁹ Kathman, 849.

¹⁰ Stanley Hoffmann, *Janus and Minerva*, Westview Press (Boulder and London, 2019), 179, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429036606>.

¹¹ Patrick M Regan, "Choosing to Intervene : Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts," *The Journal of Politics* 60, no. 3 (1998): 756, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2647647> Internal Conflicts.

¹² James N Rosenau, "The Concept of Intervention," *Journal of Interna* 22, no. 2 (1968): 166.

¹³ Toke S. Aidt and Facundo Albornoz, "Political Regimes and Foreign Intervention," *Journal of Development Economics* 94, no. 2 (2011): 192, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.01.016>.

¹⁴ Patrick M Regan, "Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002): 57.

involvement in civil wars have influences on the courses of intrastate conflicts. Although there is no official intervention of a third party, adapting and implementing a particular foreign policy is also a way of involvement that has more or less an impact on the process. Therefore, the motives behind the foreign policy decisions and the applied methods are critical in terms of the regional political equation.

In light of the intervention definitions, I draw a framework to analyze the interventions and regional foreign policy of the actors towards the warfare states in the region within the context of regional security theory. The independent variables are motives, methods and timing of the third parties' foreign policy decisions if they do not intervene in the conflictual countries. In the following parts, the three features of the foreign policy decisions will be elaborated upon respectively.

1.2.3. Motives, Methods and Timing

This section will identify policy decisions' characteristics and present the variables that modify each party's decisions and behaviours. What triggers an actor to be a third party in a conflict, how and when they engage in the process, and what kind of involvement it is are the concepts that this section will discuss.

Kim presents the intervention concept as a puzzle in his thesis hypothesis that repercussions of intervention are modified by its goals¹⁵. Motivations, which are either humanitarian or self-interests, lead to intervention in a civil war. Methods of the intervention could be whether biased or non-biased, or military or economic intervention. He argues that the decisions are made strategically; therefore, the results and effects of the interventions are impacted by the goals and methods applied¹⁶.

¹⁵ Sang Ki Kim, "Third-Party Intervention in Civil Wars : Motivation , War Outcomes , and Post-War Development" (University of Iowa, 2012), 4, <https://doi.org/10.17077/etd.0qlwaypl>.

¹⁶ Kim, 5.

This thesis will examine the relations with the motives and tools of the foreign policies and their time to apply in the foreign country. I will use these concepts in a broader way adding different dimensions.

1.2.3.1. Motives

Numerous constituents lead a third party to be involved in a conflict with its foreign policy decisions or intervention decision. As Regan summarized the literature in his work in 1998, the dominant argument over the reason to intervene is apparent national interests. On the other hand, ethical considerations and domestic politics are at stake when a state wants to decide to intervene¹⁷. Prior studies provide possible motives behind an intervention which are classified as strategic interests and humanitarian concerns.

1.2.3.1.1. Strategic Interests

Why and when a state considers to be involved in a case is a complicated question to answer empirically. The motives behind an intervention or a policy decision lie behind the facts discussed in previous studies. The outcome calculation of the foreign policies leads political actors to either take action or not. Regan argues, the primary leading factor of the intervention is that decision-makers must have a reasonable expectation for prosperous outcomes of their policies¹⁸. It is expected that the cost and benefit calculations strategically should give positive results for the intervenors. The intervenor expects utility from the intervening state's post-war policies or reaching other foreign goals at the international level. Therefore, culmination of international calculations is an indication of strategic interests. In this section, strategic interests will be examined under four headlines.

One way the potential third party considers an outcome to be effective is to be influential. Lemke and Regan apply Singer's "international influence" theory to the intervention concept in civil wars. Intrastate conflicts are more open to be influenced

¹⁷ Regan, "Choosing to Intervene : Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts," 755.

¹⁸ Regan, 757.

by the foreign policy agendas of neighbouring states ethnically, politically or ideologically. This geographically proximate countries would determine their foreign policies towards the conflictual states by considering their goal of regional influence. Therefore, civil conflicts are the situations that attract the third parties' attention in taking intervention opportunities into an account to influence the outcome and the region¹⁹.

The regional equation is a notable dimension to reach strategic interests, which means that the regional equation is the relations of states and regional dynamics. Geographically proximate countries are prone to have historical enmity and amity relations or current regional rivalries, which could be shaped depending on the region's stability. The regional equation will be explained with three lines: those are intervenor state's (1) relations with conflictual state, (2) relations with other regional states and (3) ramifications of the other regional wars and conflicts on intervenor state.

To begin with, the linkages with the intervenor state and the target country, Mitchell presents a "transnational theory" of interventions which is taken place in Regan's work. He gives two kinds of linkages as motives for a third party involved in the conflictual process. One is tangible links like military, economic and political cooperation, and the other refers to ideological, ethnic or religious ties²⁰. Actors may consider protecting and keeping their previous relations; therefore, they could determine active policies and be involved in various ways. Along with the previous linkages, the characteristics of the target country is significant. The geopolitics, natural resources, its alliances with the other states would be a potential utility for the third party. Another point is common components of the two countries. The civil wars might be emanated from ethnic or religious competition within the society. A third party might have ethnic and religious affiliates with the target state's community. It is assumed that in the studies, conflictual parties in civil wars and

¹⁹ Douglas Lemke and Patrick M Regan, "Interventions as Influence," *The Scourge of War*, 1963, 148.

²⁰ Regan, "Choosing to Intervene : Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts," 756.

‘who fight for’ and ‘for what reasons’ are significant for the third party²¹. The cultural or ethnic link makes the conflict an attractive target for coethnic actors to intervene²². The third-party and either government of the warfare state or opposition groups might have convergent interests or ethnic/cultural ties, which paves the way for them to cooperate.

Secondly, inter-nation relations take place as a determining factor of the regional equation. The ties of the regional states and one’s foreign policy implementation put the other side in action to identify a particular policy on the warfare territory. Some intervenors decide to intervene as a reaction to the other third party’s entry into the same conflict. Also, Findley and Teo argue that “Interrelated interventions are reflections of the interaction between a potential intervener’s interests and the interests of other states.”²³ This argument is applicable to the foreign policy decision on the warfare states. Actors take positions depending on the opposing or converging interests of the other third parties.

The third factor in the regional equation, which I add to the framework, is wars that also impact on intervenor’s decision over the other civil war in the region. In the Middle East region, currently, there are three wars ongoing. Assumed the fact that there are other wars in the area. In that case, since the impacts of those wars will influence the regional dynamics, they will also be influential in determining the foreign policy of the intervenor actor. For example, due to the guidelines developed against the Syrian War and its consequences, the country involved may set different approaches to the other conflict zone like Yemen. Therefore, to analyze, for instance, Turkish foreign policy towards Yemen, Turkish foreign policy towards the Syrian War should be explained in relation to Yemen.

²¹ Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts,” 338.

²² Michael G Findley and Tze Kwang Teo, “Rethinking Third-Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor-Centric Approach,” *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 4 (2006): 832.

²³ Findley and Teo, 831.

To sum up, the strategic interests have covered the history of the actors' relations, benefit expectations and interests, regional rivalry, and other conflicts in the territory. On the other hand, some scholars indicate humanitarian reasons to intervene or adopt a certain policy for the warfare states considerably.

1.2.3.1.2. Humanitarian Concerns

Humanitarian concerns are the other leading factor for actors to intervene in civil conflicts. Finnemore explains in her study that the international community is increasingly expected to intervene to protect citizens during humanitarian disasters in their country after the Cold War. He argues that in most intervention cases, intervenors do not have apparent national interests to burden military intervention²⁴. Normative and ethical understandings could provide an inductive approach to interventions. Humanitarian norms like understanding who the human is, the way of intervening and the definition of success have changed sporadically so the pattern of humanitarian intervention behaviours²⁵. He exemplifies the US intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s. The US had no apparent economic or security interests in Somalia even it was hesitant to intervene; however, with the increase in humanitarian disasters, the US intervened in Somalia²⁶.

The international communities have also tried to change the intervention norms by considering human rights. The UN charter underlines the sovereignty of the states and the duty to protect civilians. In 2005, the UN General Assembly World Summit emphasized the respect of state sovereignty and their responsibility to protect civilians. If states are not able to protect their citizens from war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide, the international community should encourage and help protecting the populations. The communities could cooperate and provide security for citizens with appropriate means²⁷.

²⁴ Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention* (Cornell University Press, 2003), 52.

²⁵ Finnemore, 53.

²⁶ Finnemore, 55.

²⁷ United Nations, "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005," 2005, 30.

The protection of human rights has become a duty in the international area. To prevent human suffering from various causes, third parties can incline to intervene or pursue an active policy towards the war-stricken territories with humanitarian suffering.

1.2.3.2. Methods and Timing

As Kim points out in his study, the intervention methods studies are based on three categories: unilateral/multilateral, biased/non-biased and use of force/diplomatic tools²⁸. It is expected that the methods used by the actors are dependent on the motives. The dimensions are shaped up by the goals of the third parties.

Whether the intervention is done in a multilateral or unilateral way is one dimension of the methods. Multilateral intervention refers to the collective action of the international community or more than one state's involvement in a foreign state. Finnemore examines the positive and negative aspects of multilateral and unilateral interventions. Multilateralism provides advantages to third parties with shared responsibility, resource procurement and costs for intervention and transparency. However, on the other side, it is expected to have coordination problems and a clash of interests of the involved states. States need to give up on the control of the operations, which might cause a lack of outcome for themselves as well²⁹. Unilateral intervention might be preferred chiefly for self-defence.

Another dimension is whether the intervenor supports a conflictual side or stay neutral to the conflict. Third parties can take side with either target country's government or the rebels during the intervention, which is called biased. Regan argues that the interventions are generally for containing the conflict or international influence. He questions that supporting opposition groups is for "an intervention on behalf of the opposition is designed to alter pre-conflict status quo ante." Meanwhile, taking side with the government is an "attempt to restore the pre-conflict status quo

²⁸ Kim, "Third-Party Intervention in Civil Wars : Motivation , War Outcomes , and Post-War Development," 26.

²⁹ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, 74.

ante.”³⁰ Whom to support is significant in determining a foreign policy for the creation of regional or national order.

Lastly, using force is another component to determine the policy decision of the third parties. Military interventions are where the troops are provided aid with the military support to a foreign state³¹. In studies, generally, we encounter interventions by using military forces³². Economics is another tool for intervention. It could contain financial aid or cancelling a deal that provides production or trade for the conflictual state³³, or a third party could financially help specific groups in the conflict. Additionally, third parties prevail their influence over foreign states through political or diplomatic tools. Third-party countries may mediate the dispute with international meetings or make an official announcement for the declaration of their side. They may deny recognizing an established government after a revolution or preparing a hostile propaganda or moral support in the international and home countries³⁴.

Regan makes an assumption that the involvement of the third parties impacts the duration of the civil war. The interventions cause the civil war to be prolonged or shortened than the expected duration³⁵. For this reason, timing is significant for the process tracing. In this thesis, the date of involvement will be considered to examine the changes of the third party behaviours depending on the developments in the civil war and other actors' actions.

1.3. Conclusion

Previous studies drew frameworks for understanding the ramifications or objectives of the interventions. From these studies, I identify independent variables to examine

³⁰ Patrick M Regan et al., “Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts” 46, no. 1 (2002): 59.

³¹ R. J. Vincent, “Nonintervention and International Order” (Princeton University Press, 1974), 9.

³² Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts,” 339.

³³ Vincent, “Nonintervention and International Order,” 10.

³⁴ Vincent, 10.

³⁵ Regan et al., “Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts,” 59.

the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the foreign policy behaviour of Iran and Turkey towards the Yemen and Libya War. Are they intervening in these civil wars or involving as active players who alter the courses of the events? While determining the foreign policies, other events in the region and other countries foreign policies influence the decision-making process is another question of this thesis. The independent variables are motives, methods, and timing. The variables are components of the foreign policy behaviours, which this thesis can scrutinize the given questions.



CHAPTER 2

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY COMPLEX AND ARAB UPRISINGS

This chapter firstly presents the Middle East Regional Security Complex based upon the explanation of Buzan and Wæver. The commonalities of the region and its history are demonstrated. There are three subcomplexes in the MERSC; notwithstanding, I focused on the only Maghreb and the Gulf. The dynamics and characteristics of the subcomplexes are significant to understand the policy drivers of regional actors. The dynamics have changed after the Arab Uprisings, which is a milestone of the complex's history. Therefore, the Arab Uprisings and following developments, which are the Libyan and Yemen Wars, are explained briefly in sections bellowed.

2.1 Middle East Regional Security Complex

Determining the regional commonalities that draws regional borders by including or excluding the countries is a controversial issue. Area specialists dispute on what criteria determines which geography can be defined as a region. According to the map of Buzan and Wæver, which separate the world into parts, the Middle East as a security complex consists of countries ranging from Iran to Morocco. It includes Arab states, Israel, and Iran, while it excludes Turkey, which is determined as an insulator state between Europe and the ME³⁶. In the literature, the insulator role of Turkey has been revisited, and Turkey is taken as part of the MERSC in some articles³⁷. The thesis considers Turkey as part of the MERSC, and the rationale behind this decision will be elaborated in the following chapter.

³⁶ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, 187.

³⁷ André Barrinha, "The Ambitious Insulator : Revisiting Turkey ' s Position in Regional Security Complex Theory," *Mediterranean Politics* (Taylor & Francis, 2014), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2013.799353>.

MERSC is identified as perennial conflict formation by Buzan and Wæver. The existence of rich oil and gas sources and being on the trade routes give geopolitical importance to the area and, therefore, the attraction and involvement of international powers. Although global actors influence and intervene in the region, the region also has an autonomous regional security complex. The area is made up of abundant resources, a large population with mixed ethnicities and religions, and covers vast geography with almost 24 independent states with different regime types³⁸. It is intertwined with more significant dynamics and divergences, which generates security formation.

The conflict formation of the region traces back to the interwar years and the decolonization process. The modern states in the area are generally post colonized ones who still are under the influence of tribe, ethnicity, and religion. The security interdependence of countries and these groups, which have sub-state identity with these elements, is high³⁹. In order to elaborate on the dynamics of the MERSC, it is necessary to take the demographic character in hand. After World War I, new states emerged worldwide, as in the Arabian Peninsula, most of which was a hitherto part of the Ottoman territory⁴⁰. These lands contained various ethnic and religious divergences, which were the groups' identities before getting under state authorities. Due to the drawing of the new borders, minorities disbanded in different states. For instance, the countries where Berbers currently reside range throughout North Africa, while Kurds spread between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Sunni Muslims are the majority in general in the ME; however, Shia Muslims are the majority of the population of some countries like Iran, Bahrain, and also branches of Shia, namely Druze, Ismailis, and Alawis, have been significant sub-groups in Syria and Lebanon. Branches of Christian minorities spread through the region as well⁴¹. The arbitrary

³⁸ Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Middle East Middle Powers : Regional Role , International Impact," *International Relations* 11, no. 42 (2014): 30.

³⁹ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, 188.

⁴⁰ Eugene L. Rogan, "The Emergence of The Middle East into the Modern State System," in *International Relations of Middle East*, ed. Louise L'Estrange Fawcett, third (Oxford University Press, 2016), 44.

⁴¹ Raymond Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, 1st ed. (New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), 56.

border drawing of the colonial powers culminated in inter-state affairs due to the same identity groups within different states. This led states to have an influence upon the other one and invoke the groups for specific purposes⁴².

Since multiple powerholders dominate the region, there is more than one rivalry across it. Intra-block relations vary depending on the positions they take in incidents and their security considerations rather than being fully cooperative, which led to divergent alliances in the region. The region is separated into three subcomplexes in Buzan's work to determine the conflicts by narrowing them down. The subcomplexes are called the Maghreb, Levant and Gulf. This study will explain the historical security affairs of the Maghreb and Gulf in the following sections to grasp the MERSC broadly.

2.1.1.1 Maghreb Security Complex

The Maghreb subcomplex is defined as the weaker one among the other subcomplexes by Buzan. It is made up of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco (and Western Sahara). Due to their proximity with African countries, regional dynamics are obscure and reach out to Chad and Mauritania. Maghreb's major security problem was Western Sahara's annexation to Morocco in 1975, which escalated the conflict among Libya, Morocco, and Algeria for twelve years. Also, the Maghreb countries got involved in the other subcomplex' security crisis. They were engulfed in the Israeli dispute and Gulf wars by either providing troops or mediating with the Arab nations, while Mashreq Arab countries did not involve in Maghreb disputes⁴³.

The Maghreb was the western edge of the ME region before the Arab Spring. The Gulf was at the centre of the discussion on regional security. With the 9/11 attacks, international actors have become more interested in the MENA region's security.

⁴² Hinnebusch, 5.

⁴³ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, 193.

The sub-regional incidents got intertwined, and especially after the Arab Uprisings, the Maghreb gained importance in the international community's eye⁴⁴.

The non-state violent groups also were regarded as global threats by the US. John McLaughlin, former deputy and acting CIA director, said the Maghreb was a "more fertile environment for terrorist development, plotting, and activity than most parts of the world." The geopolitics of the Maghreb, which has roads to Africa and Europe, made Maghreb valuable in the Middle East region⁴⁵.

The uprisings and revolutions altered the security formation of the Maghreb sub-complex. The revolutionary process in Tunisia took place in a short time, and it was less struggling compared to that of Libya and other regional countries. It has spent efforts to rebuild its capabilities in terms of state running and providing state security⁴⁶. Algeria and Morocco did not experience changes in their regime. They tried to protect their safety and worked for counterterrorism against Jihadi Salafist groups by military and non-military tools. Recently the ISIS forces have shifted their activities from the Persian Gulf, Syria, and Iraq to the Maghreb⁴⁷. For instance, a mass amount of fighters has joined ISIS in Iraq, Syria and Libya⁴⁸. To respond to the escalation in terrorist activities, Moroccan officials regulated the legal system for counterterrorism and worked for some religious terms, which were considered as contributing ideas for extremism⁴⁹.

The revolution that happened in Libya challenged and led to civil war and regional insecurity. After the tension was exacerbated between the protestors and the

⁴⁴ Ramazan Erdağ, *Libya in the Arab Spring: From Revolution to Insecurity* (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017), 22, <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58772-5>.

⁴⁵ CSIS Middle East Program Conference Report, "Security in the Maghreb," 2018, 2.

⁴⁶ Report, 4.

⁴⁷ Bahija Jamal, "Moroccan Counter-Terrorism Policy : Case of Moroccan Female Migrants to ISIS," *International Annals of Criminology* 56 (2018): 146, <https://doi.org/10.1017/cri.2018.12>.

⁴⁸ Jamal, 146.

⁴⁹ Jamal, 150.

government and the increase in violence in Gaddafi's response to the protestors, NATO intervened in Libya, which led to an internal and regional transformation⁵⁰. In the post-Gaddafi period, the power gap in Libya enabled anti-revolutionary groups and terrorist organizations to have the ability for free movement and, therefore, spread the worldwide threat. ISIS deployed its forces in Derna city, which is near the Egyptian border. The increase in violent groups and insecurity within Libya threatened neighbouring countries. Therefore, as a sequence Egypt launched airstrikes on ISIS targets in Libya⁵¹. The security of Egypt also became dependent on that of Libya significantly. The crisis in Libya turned into a primary source of insecurity for the Maghreb and a threat for countries in other subcomplexes. That opened the Maghreb to foreign intervention by international and regional actors. Therefore, Libya has become a case that has shaped the actors' regional security situation and security interdependency.

2.1.2 Gulf Security Complex

The second subcomplex is the Gulf, created after 1971 with the withdrawal of Britain from the area. Gulf's significant hostility is formed among Iran and Saudi-led Gulf states mainly. Along with central rivalry, local wars and conflicts between the Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and Yemen or the Iraq-Iran war had taken place for a long time. The enmity relation between Iran and Iraq in 1980 emanated from several parameters like border disputes, the Kurdish minority living in both countries, and a sizeable Shia population in Iraq. The conflict was one of the reasons that led to the Gulf Cooperation Council's establishment in 1981 as a regional organization to protect the region's security and stability with decreasing foreign support consisting of six countries: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and the UAE⁵². These countries have similarities in terms of regime type, economic resources, and political

⁵⁰ Erdağ, *Libya in the Arab Spring: From Revolution to Insecurity*, 17.

⁵¹ Erdağ, 51.

⁵² A K Pasha, "The Gulf Cooperation Council : A Regional Approach to Peace , Security and Development," *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 8, no. 1 (2012): 90, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2012.683630>.

stance⁵³. One of the reasons for the GCC establishment was that member states wanted to control the oil prices against Iraq's violating moves. Another border dispute created by Saddam's Iraq against Kuwait exacerbated the tensions between Gulf Arab countries due to the threat of using and controlling oil sources. Managing the oil resources and sectarian separation are still security considerations in today's regional complex. These several disputes in the Gulf had led it to be the ME regional security complex's centre for decades. Therefore, the international community considered the insecurities of Gulf states with respect to Middle East security. The centre has disappeared, and the security concerns diversified, especially after the Arab Uprisings; meanwhile, the security formation of the Gulf also has changed.

The wave of the Arab Uprising reached these Gulf states as well in a few months. The impact of the uprisings was not the same on the oil-rich Arab Gulf States. Oman and Bahrain are the states which were impacted the most. In Bahrain, the peaceful protests for democratic demands of the majority of the society turned into a conflict of sectarian divisions. The Bahraini government called Saudi Arabia to intervene in the escalated dispute. Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided military support to Bahrain. Though let it not remain unsaid that the protests in Oman did not turn into a crisis. They made necessary changes in government and did an economic boost with the help of GCC countries⁵⁴.

On the one hand, Oman and Bahrain have direct impacts of the Arab Spring; on the other hand, Saudi Arabia- although it had not experienced protests- was affected by the uprisings across the region. It became an active actor in the area and adopted an assertive foreign policy⁵⁵. Saudi Arabia provided aid to Bahraini and Omani governments to stop the protests, while for Syria, it interacted with anti-government groups. In 2013, when Morsi was toppled down in Egypt, Saudi Arabia promised 5

⁵³ Esra Pakin Albayrakoglu, "Gulf Integration in Post-Arab Spring : Deepening or Decaying ?," *Security Strategies*, no. 19 (2014): 2.

⁵⁴ Silvia Colombo, "The GCC Countries and the Arab Spring . Between Outreach , Patronage and Repression," 2012, 4.

⁵⁵ Saud Mousaed Al Tamamy, "Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring: Opportunities and Challenges of Security," in *Regional Powers in the Middle East*, ed. Henner Fürtig, 2014, 178.

billion dollars for emergency aid to the new regime. There while, it has made investments militarily and financially to other regional countries after the uprisings erupted. Saudi Arabia also played a mediator role between GCC countries⁵⁶. Arab Uprisings paved the way for Saudi Arabia to influence the region's security with challenges and opportunities.

Qatar and the UAE had not witnessed any protests; thus, both were not impacted directly by the Arab Spring. The two states had contradictory policies over the region, which led to disputes between them. Although Saudi Arabia was trying to mediate the conflicts, in 2017, the Gulf crises erupted by severing diplomatic relations. The states in the region put a blockade on Qatar since Egypt and Saudi Arabia led coalition accused Qatar to be a supporter of terrorism due to its ties with Iran and its host to escaped Muslim Brotherhood members⁵⁷. Opposite security perception of the GCC countries which lead their foreign policy decisions caused contradiction and insecurity in the region.

Another most major security problem of the Gulf is the Yemen War. With the Arab Uprisings, Yemen also had experienced protests and regime change. The conflict between the confronting groups had not been solved, thus, caused a civil war. Yemen has a long-distance borderline with Saudi Arabia that created interdependency in terms of security. Instability in Yemen is seen as threatening in the GCC countries' eyes, especially Saudi Arabia. The Yemeni War also resonated with the sectarian differences and hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Other international and regional states take action for Yemen by considering their regional alliances and interests. Therefore, Yemen is a case that moulds the security dynamics and formation of the Gulf subcomplex.

2.2 Regional Crisis

⁵⁶ Tamamy, 198.

⁵⁷ Daren Butler and Tülay Karadeniz, "Turkey Sends Qatar Food and Soldiers, Discusses Gulf Tensions with Saudi," *Reuters*, June 22, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-turkey-saudi-idUSKBN19D0CX>.

2.2.1 Arab Uprisings

The Arab uprisings of 2010-2011 altered state authorities' perception and domestic state operations while also changed regional and international politics. The region had previously gone through upheavals. Nevertheless, the Arab Uprisings became a compelling phenomenon. The masses start to protest in desire of withdrawal of leaders or having reforms⁵⁸. Although there are differences depending on countries, in general, these upheavals were a response to economic instability, high unemployment rate, income gaps in society, lack of freedom, and pressure from autocratic regimes. According to some scholars, after the colonization period in the region, consecutive wars, violence, and uncontrolled liberalization of economies are behind the unrest. The wave of the Tunisian revolution reached all-region.

Tunisian uprisings were the starting point and the earliest one. Tunisia was relatively developed in terms of the education system and organized labour movements compared to other states in the region⁵⁹. However, the repression of society, lack of freedom of speech, unemployment, and crony capitalism led to a corrupted state and citizens being angry with the government⁶⁰. In December 2010, a university-educated street vendor Mohamed El Bouazizi committed suicide in front of the government building by burning himself because he was humiliated by the police. He became the sign of the protests⁶¹. The protests grew and spread to neighbouring countries Egypt, Libya, and across the region in a short time without planned organization. People on the streets were from different ideologies like seculars and religious groups, both Muslims and Christians⁶².

⁵⁸ P.R. Kumaraswamy, "The Arab Spring," *India International Centre Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (2011): 57.

⁵⁹ Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (2011): 3.

⁶⁰ Anderson, 7.

⁶¹ Hafez Ghanem, "Roots of the Arab Spring," in *The Arab Spring Five Years Later: Toward Greater Inclusiveness* (Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 63.

⁶² Kumaraswamy, "The Arab Spring," 58.

The responses of leaders of the states to the protests were not the same. While long-standing Tunisian and Egyptian leaders left their rule with military pressure, militaries of Libya, Syria, and Yemen preferred to stand against protests and the countries were spurred into civil wars. On the other hand, in oil-rich monarchies, the states engaged in limited reforms and distributed financial aid to society to manage the unrest⁶³. The uprisings led to several political changes within the region. Even though the emergence of a new democratic Arab world order possibility was intended at the beginning of the protests, the following events culminated in the formation of similar oppressive or corrupted situations as they were previously in the region. For instance, the democratic transition happened in Egypt. Eventually, it ended up with a military coup and the creation of another dictatorship. Syria, Libya, and Yemen have civil wars and instability in their countries. Tunisia is still trying to achieve political stability⁶⁴. This period is seen as a learning process for all sides to consider new strategies within this unique political atmosphere.

Relations of these countries have become complicated and incalculable. Regional and international actors got involved in the process by considering their perspectives and interests. Therefore, we can find shifting of alliances and changes in strategies at a regional level. So Arab Uprisings has become a distinctive point in Middle East history in terms of the emergence of new dynamics in regional security. For instance, Basher Assad's future and the stance of Turkey and Iran towards this conflict or Saudi's support to anti-revolutionary sides in Yemen and Bahrain are critical for further regional changes and security⁶⁵. The security interdependency amid the regional countries was shaped regarding the events related to Arab Uprisings. Therefore, in this thesis, Arab Uprisings will be taken as a starting point to understand Turkey and Iran's security concerns and roles in the crisis of Yemen and Libya. The security formation of the Middle East region will be held by regarding the two actors in these cases. To understand the current civil conflicts in Yemen and

⁶³ Kumaraswamy, 60.

⁶⁴ Curtis R. Ryan, "The Arab Spring Protests in Jordan," in *Jordan and the Arab Uprisings: Regime Survival and Politics Beyond the State* (Columbia University Press, 2018), 4.

⁶⁵ Asif Mohiduddin, "The Arab Uprisings," *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 20, no. 2 (2016): 78.

Libya, I will briefly examine the particular events of Yemen and Libya's history tracing back to the 1960s in the following sections of this chapter.

2.2.2 Brief History of the Libyan Civil War

2.2.2.1 Libya's State Formation and Before the Uprisings

Libya is a country located in the West of the Middle East, which is called the Maghreb. It is geographically covered by deserts and lacks rivers. Thus, the geographic conditions that led to transportation struggles caused differentiation in the regions that are distant from each other⁶⁶. Its location is one driver of the current conflict along with its modern history of the Gaddafi administration period.

Libya was colonized by Italy in 1911 when it was an Ottoman province under invasion. During the Second World War, France and the UK governed Libyan territories until 1951, which Libya gained its independence. After the discovery of oil resources in 1959, Libya is prevailed by its geophysical opportunities. The administrative system had changed rapidly with the transformation of economic opportunities. The monarchy was getting rich while society was becoming poor. The inequality in income and distribution of wealth led the community to follow General Muammar Qaddafi for doing a coup in 1969⁶⁷.

Qaddafi's rule was embodied by the "Green Book", which he pointed out social, political, and economic ideologies as the constitution of Libya. He indicated a system called Jamahiriyya that refers to statelessness, in which people could govern themselves directly in theory⁶⁸. As Schnelzer says in her work, Gaddafi presented a direct democracy system with the book. However, Libya did not experience a democratic political system since Gaddafi established a totalitarian regime⁶⁹. El

⁶⁶ Erdağ, *Libya in the Arab Spring: From Revolution to Insecurity*, 26.

⁶⁷ Nadine Schnelzer, *Libya in the Arab Spring The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi* (Erlangen: Springer VS, 2016), 33.

⁶⁸ Dirk Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, second (Cambridge, 2012), 6.

⁶⁹ Schnelzer, *Libya in the Arab Spring The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi*, 33.

Fathaly and Palmer's quotation in Hweio's article "[p]olitical institutions do not have legitimacy except through his blessing" indicates that the state institutions were directly committed to Gaddafi's rule⁷⁰. As Mansour El-Kikhia's description placed in the article, his ideology was affected by socialism, Islam and Nasserist Arab nationalism⁷¹. He emphasized the importance of family and tribes and society's equality.

In the colonial period of Libya, tribes did not lose their power over the society. After Gaddafi came to power, he worked to eliminate the elite tribes' role in the government and society. However, within a decade, he started to use tribes to consolidate his power. He empowered tribe identities and made them loyal to its authority⁷². The weak state institutions also facilitated the tribes to have influential roles in political and social affairs. So, tribalism was intense during the Gaddafi rule, and state institutions were weak.

The socialist approach was considered a solution to economic problems, which Gaddafi expressed in his Green Book. He controlled private and public enterprises and initiated redistribution of lands in the 1970s. He intended to be radically socialist until the first half of the 1980s⁷³. After 1985, Libya's isolation reflected on the economy. Several reasons led the economy to go on corruption. The state-run market system suffered from shortages, and oil revenues plunged⁷⁴. The US and European countries' existence and dominance in the region lacked Gaddafi's foreign and domestic activities. The international community, including Arab countries in the area, led Libya to be isolated diplomatically and economically. Therefore, the Libyan

⁷⁰ Haala Hweio, "Tribes in Libya: From Social Organization to Political Power," *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 2, no. 1 (2012): 119.

⁷¹ Hweio, 119.

⁷² Hweio, 117.

⁷³ Ronald Bruce St John, "Linked References Are Available on JSTOR for This Article : The Changing Libyan Economy : Causes and Consequences," *Middle East Journal* 62, no. 1 (2008): 77.

⁷⁴ John, 79.

leader started to decrease the restrictions on the economy and politics after 1986⁷⁵. In 1988, The Great Green Charter of Human Rights” was announced, which declared that private property is “sacred and protected⁷⁶.” Notwithstanding, the charter was not fully implemented.

Libya’s neighbouring relations were not close. Ramazan Erdağ summarizes Libya’s enmity relations in his article, indicating the neighbouring countries of Libya. Algeria was accusing Libya of supporting the terrorist groups in Algeria. Along with ideological differences between Morocco and Libya, there was a dispute on Sub-Saharan land. Tunisia was also accusing Libya of supporting terrorism in the region and disagreed on coastal borders⁷⁷. The regional countries were uncomfortable with Libya’s foreign policy behaviours like competing in oil and gas export and supporting the region’s rebel groups. Therefore, the Arab countries were also isolating Libya. The relations with the West got tensed by accusation to Libya of promoting international terrorism after bombings on the US and French civil airliners⁷⁸. The UNSC had put an arms embargo in 1992⁷⁹. The US adopted the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1996 to restrain foreign trade relations with Libya and Iran⁸⁰.

The tensioned relations with the US and Europe settled down by the end of 2003, lifting the sanctions with Libya’s acceptance of the Lockerbie bombings and condemnation of the 9/11 attacks. As Vandewalle indicates, the time between 2003 and 2011 was that Libya reintegrates into the international area. It gave up the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction⁸¹. Its strategy towards the West and

⁷⁵ Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 138.

⁷⁶ Vandewalle, 142.

⁷⁷ Erdağ, *Libya in the Arab Spring: From Revolution to Insecurity*, 28.

⁷⁸ UNSC, “Resolution 748 (1992),” 1992, 52.

⁷⁹ UNSC, 53.

⁸⁰ The US 104th Congress, “Public Law 104 – 172 104th Congress An Act,” 1996, 1543.

⁸¹ Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 173.

neighbouring countries had changed with normalization policies. In domestic politics, the Libyan government adopted opening policies for liberalization and privatization in 2003 and accepted the IMF's consultations⁸² for attracting foreign investments and cutting down the corruption, as Prime Minister Ghanem referred⁸³. Gaddafi did not approve the new economic strategy and dissolved the cabinet since they could not distribute the state revenue to the citizens⁸⁴. Despite the uncertainty, the country demonstrated slow growth and reforms with the increase in oil revenue by the end of 2010⁸⁵. Although Gaddafi got close to the Western powers, even Libya was elected non-permanent member of the UNSC and slowed healing in economy and politics in the last decade, the revolts throughout the region spread to Libya.

2.2.2.2 Revolutionary Period

Gaddafi had ruled the country for 42 years. In 2011, with the effect of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Libya began to pass through regime transformation. Mass protests started in February 2011 in Benghazi, demanding human rights, dignity, political freedom, economic equality, and the Gaddafi regime's end. Although Libya was an oil-rich country, Libyans were unsatisfied at the low development level of Libya and the lack of share from the state revenues⁸⁶. After the protests began, Gaddafi did not propose any reforms, and he declared that he would fight with rebels⁸⁷. The demonstrations spread to other cities, and Cyrenaica Transitional National Council (TNC) emerged against Gaddafi rule as a legitimate power in Libya. It was recognized by the international community soon later⁸⁸.

⁸² Vandewalle, 183.

⁸³ Vandewalle, 185.

⁸⁴ Vandewalle, 191.

⁸⁵ Vandewalle, 193.

⁸⁶ Middle East/North Africa Report N°107, "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East: Making Sense of Libya," 2011, 1.

⁸⁷ Middle East/North Africa Report N°107, 1.

⁸⁸ Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 204.

Growing internal pressure and civil casualties led the international organizations to condemn Gaddafi and take measures in Libya. Arab League suspended Libya's membership in the organization⁸⁹. Other regional organizations and the UN condemned Gaddafi's aggression on civilians. In February 2011, the UN adopted Resolution 1970, which demanded the end of violence and put an embargo on Libyan officials' assets⁹⁰. However, an increase in violence led the UNSC to meet for Libya again. They adopted Resolution 1973 in March 2011 and imposed a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation and allowed intervention in order to protect civilians, and put travel bans on some officials and froze assets of state institutions⁹¹. French-led coalition group started to attack regime targets applying the UN resolution and responsibility to protect⁹². Eight months after the protests' eruption, Gaddafi still vowed to fight against the rebellions by accusing foreign powers. He called tribes to resist foreign intervention by saying, "Even if you cannot hear my voice, continue the resistance," and be loyal to him⁹³. The humanitarian intervention continued till October 2011. It became controversial in the international community's eye since the NATO attacks caused civil casualties and country infrastructures like oil installations and bases⁹⁴. Also, French and British forces assisted rebels with military training and strategic intelligence⁹⁵. The insurgents and NATO coordinatedly operated on the same areas which Gaddafi controlled. The rebels took control of Tripoli on 20 August when the NATO forces launched strikes on the city⁹⁶. 20

⁸⁹ Geir Ulfstein and Hege Føsum Christiansen, "The Legality of the NATO Bombing in Libya," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 62, no. 01 (2013): 160, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589312000565>.

⁹⁰ UNSC, "Resolution 1970 (2011)," vol. 1970, 2011.

⁹¹ UNSC, "Resolution 1973," vol. 1973, 2011.

⁹² Ulfstein and Christiansen, "The Legality of the NATO Bombing in Libya," 161.

⁹³ Al Jazeera, "Gaddafi Vows to Carry on Fighting," *Al Jazeera*, September 2, 2011, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/9/2/gaddafi-vows-to-carry-on-fighting>.

⁹⁴ Vijay Pradhad, *Arab Spring, Libyan Winter*, 2012, 212.

⁹⁵ Ulfstein and Christiansen, "The Legality of the NATO Bombing in Libya," 168.

⁹⁶ Ulfstein and Christiansen, 168.

October 2011 Gaddafi was executed by rebel forces while he was hiding in Sirte⁹⁷. After the death of Gaddafi, the UNSC held a meeting to adopt the resolution 2016 for the new situation. They terminated the decision of no-fly zone and protection of civilians in the resolution 1973⁹⁸.

In the other Arab Spring revolutionary countries like Egypt and Tunisia, the state institutions kept running after the regime change. According to Boduszyski and Pickard's article, however, Gaddafi left none of the institutions alive in Libya. The "stateless society" concept made Gaddafi the only authority to govern all state institutions. His ideology in the Greenbook contributed to increasing his power and lacked democratic values. Therefore, his absence caused the institutions to become unable to work⁹⁹. Another exception for Libya was that the leader was toppled down with NATO intervention. In Egypt, the military took side with the protestors; thus, Mubarak was gone in a short time. For Libya, the army was loyal to Gaddafi since the military elites had common ground and interests with the Gaddafi regime¹⁰⁰. After Gaddafi's left, there appeared a power vacuum in Libya. The absence of authority and institutions and the increase in militias left the country in catastrophe. The security forces of the country consisted of militias that were organized by tribes or families. During the revolution, the militias cooperated with the NTC government, and after the revolution, they kept getting state salaries but were not loyal to NTC¹⁰¹. Along with providing security and unified arm forces, NTC struggled to establish a proper government and constitution and eliminated the old regime supporters. The political divisions resonate in the cities. The local actors turned some cities like

⁹⁷ BBC news, "Libya's Col Muammar Gaddafi Killed, Says NTC," *BBC*, November 20, 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15389550>.

⁹⁸ UNSC, "Resolution 2016 (2011) Adopted," vol. 2016, 2011.

⁹⁹ Mieczysław P Boduszyski and Duncan Pickard, "Libya Starts from Scratch," *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 4 (2013): 87, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2013.0073>.

¹⁰⁰ Erdağ, *Libya in the Arab Spring: From Revolution to Insecurity*, 31.

¹⁰¹ Boduszyski and Pickard, "Libya Starts from Scratch," 88.

Misrata into a stronghold for supporting revolutionaries, while Bani Valid was affiliated with Gaddafi supporters¹⁰².

In July 2012, the democratic election was held, and General National Congress was constituted with a coalition of varied political groups replacing the NTC¹⁰³. GNC consists of mixed blocks: Muslim Brotherhood supporters, Salafists, and exiled oppositions to the regime. However, it also included some representatives who were with Gaddafi or did not support the revolution¹⁰⁴. The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated political party called the “Justice and Construction party” was not as successful as its affiliation in Egypt and Tunisia. However, it did not mean that secular values were found their way into in congress. In Libyan politics, every party indicates Islam as a source of their political perception¹⁰⁵.

Congress struggled to establish a democratic system and formal state institutions. The new government failed to unify the armed groups and contain insecurity in the country. There generated many actors and battles between them. Along with the failure in domestic affairs, an incident of that oil tanker under the naval blockade, escaped from the port and reached the international water, led GNC to dismiss Prime Minister Ali Zeidan and appoint the defence minister as interim prime minister till the elections¹⁰⁶. In 2014 elections, Ahmed Maetig was elected as prime minister; however, the interim minister did not remove since Supreme Constitutional Court claimed the elections were unconstitutional. Maetig retired from the office because of escalation of rivalry after Haftar self-declared campaign for fighters against GNC¹⁰⁷. The congress held an election to create the House of Representatives, but it

¹⁰² Schnelzer, *Libya in the Arab Spring The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi*, 60.

¹⁰³ Erdağ, *Libya in the Arab Spring: From Revolution to Insecurity*, 34.

¹⁰⁴ Schnelzer, *Libya in the Arab Spring The Constitutional Discourse since the Fall of Gaddafi*, 62.

¹⁰⁵ Boduszyski and Pickard, “Libya Starts from Scratch,” 94.

¹⁰⁶ BBC World Africa, “Libya PM Zeidan Dismissed as Oil Tanker ‘Breaks Blockade,’” *BBC*, March 11, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26533594>.

¹⁰⁷ Ahmed, Elumami, and Ulf Laessing, “Libyan Court Says PM’s Election Invalid, Raising Hopes of End to Stalemate,” *Reuters*, June 9, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-libya->

was constituted in Tobruk as another congress in Libya due to the controversial elections; meanwhile, the GNC continued to work in Tripoli¹⁰⁸. The civil war tension was exacerbated with Haftar forces' attacks.

2.2.2.3 The Civil War and Actors

In May 2014, retired General Khalifa Haftar, commanding Libyan National Army militias, launched airstrikes with "Operation Dignity" against Islamists groups¹⁰⁹ and GNC to restore security. Haftar explained the army's mission:

We have begun the offensive to eliminate the terrorist movement that is present in Libya. It must be eliminated. We started about a week ago with all the organized army units, and now we are taking this mission forward.¹¹⁰

In light of this mission, the militia forces captured Tripoli, in opposition to it, the Misrata militias retook Tripoli with an operation called "Dawn"¹¹¹. After these operations, Libya had two opposed governments. The government of "Operation Dignity" controlled Cyrenaica, Tobruk and Benghazi while the "Operation of Dawn" coalition, GNC, held Tripoli and the Western side of Libya¹¹². Both had their parliaments, militias, Central Banks and institutions that they ran.

politics/libyan-court-says-pms-election-invalid-raising-hopes-of-end-to-stalemate-idUKKBN0EKOW320140609?edition-redirect=in.

¹⁰⁸ Paul Fraioli, "Domestic Divisions and External Actors in Libya's Civil War," *Strategic Comments* 26, no. 6 (2020): 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13567888.2020.1830509>.

¹⁰⁹ Gökhan Tekir, "Russian-Turkish Involvement in the Civil War in Libya," *Turkish Journal of Russian Studies* summer, no. 3 (2020): 194.

¹¹⁰ Sharif Abdel Kouddous, "A Q&A with Khalifa Hifter, the Mastermind behind Libya's New Revolt," *Washington Post*, May 21, 2014, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/05/20/a-qa-with-khalifa-hifter-the-mastermind-behind-libyas-new-revolt/>.

¹¹¹ Tekir, "Russian-Turkish Involvement in the Civil War in Libya," 194.

¹¹² Tekir, 195.

The division in Libya led to an increase in armed groups, insecurity, and political instability. The war turned out to be the regional insecurity which threatens its neighbours accordingly. The Libyan branch of ISIS fighters took advantage of political chaos in the country and captured the control of Derna city adjacent to Egyptian borders¹¹³ and Sirte in the following year¹¹⁴. Al Qaida and local extremist group Ansar al-Sharia are the other major militant groups that spoiled the country with military attacks. The insecurity in Libya alarmed regional and international communities to prevent the spread of violence to Europe and Africa. International actors were involved in providing peace and stability between the rival groups. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, called for peace during his surprise visit to Tripoli in 2014 and pointed out to dialogue by saying that “The fighting must stop... Enough of killings, enough of displacements of people.”¹¹⁵ At the end of 2015, the UN gathered representatives from Libyan society to sign an UN-brokered agreement. “Libyan Political Agreement” signed in Skhirat, Morocco, for forming a national unity government and protect the democratic rights of Libyan people by saying that “The agreement will lead to the establishment of a single Government of National Accord and national institutions that will ensure broad representation. It is a critical step in continuing Libya’s post-revolution transition after months of turmoil and uncertainty.”¹¹⁶ According to the agreement, House of Representatives became the legislative authority, and the GNA was the executive authority which they shall work in cooperation and consent¹¹⁷. In February 2016, GNA was nominated by Libya’s

¹¹³ Paul Cruickshank et al., “ISIS Comes to Libya,” *CNN*, 2014, <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/18/world/isis-libya/index.html>.

¹¹⁴ BBC, “Islamic State Militants in Libya ‘Seize Sirte Airport,’” *BBC*, May 29, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32935412>.

¹¹⁵ BBC Staff, “UN Chief Calls for Peace in Libya during Surprise Visit,” *BBC*, October 11, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29583614>.

¹¹⁶ Peace and Security Department, “UN Welcomes ‘Historic’ Signing of Libyan Political Agreement,” *UN News*, 2015, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/12/518412-un-welcomes-historic-signing-libyan-political-agreement>.

¹¹⁷ “Libyan Political Agreement,” in *UN*, 2015, 4, [https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/Libyan Political Agreement - ENG .pdf](https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/Libyan%20Political%20Agreement%20-%20ENG.pdf).

presidential council, and the UN Secretary-General backed it¹¹⁸. National unity was expected as a culmination of the agreement, but it required “continued support from all parties” to GNA’s performing appropriately and HoR’s vote of confidence for GNA’s validity after one year term¹¹⁹. HoR did not accept the GNA as legal power after the expiration of the permitted period. In March 2015, HoR, an internationally recognized government as well, appointed Haftar as the army chief¹²⁰. During that period, Haftar continued to fight over Islamists in Benghazi and took control of it in 2017¹²¹. In April 2019, LNA, led by Haftar, began its offensive attacks to capture Tripoli from GNA with the “Flood of Dignity” operation¹²². UN envoy Ghassan Salame said, Haftar attempted to do a coup over GNA, prime minister Sarraj considered military confrontation in Tripoli. The airstrikes caused massive civilian casualties noted in Reuters news as “More than 18,000 people have been displaced by the fighting, 2,500 alone in the past 24 hours” by hitting schools and hospitals¹²³.

Both LNA and GNA got support from international actors. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Egypt supported LNA while Turkey, Qatar and the US till 2019 helped GNA financially and militarily. The rise in conflict led international actors to yield a ceasefire between the sides. The UN secretary-general visited Libya to meet with

¹¹⁸ Tekir, “Russian-Turkish Involvement in the Civil War in Libya,” 196; UNSMIL, “Martin Kobler Congratulates Libyans on Govt Nomination: A Peace Opportunity That Should Not Be Missed,” UNSMIL, 2016, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/martin-kobler-congratulates-libyans-govt-nominationa-peace-opportunity-should-not-be-missed>.

¹¹⁹ “Libyan Political Agreement,” 6.

¹²⁰ Ayman Al-Warfalli, “Libya’s Haftar Appointed Army Chief for Recognized Government,” *Reuters*, March 2, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-army-idUSKBN0LY1AB20150302>.

¹²¹ BBC Staff, “Libyan Islamists Lose Benghazi District to Haftar’s Forces,” *BBC*, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38752742>.

¹²² Melissa Salyk-Virk, “The Conflicts in Libya from 2011-2020,” in *Airstrikes, Proxy Warfare, and Civilian Casualties in Libya*, 2020, 20, https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/Airstrikes_Proxy_Warfare_and_Civilian_Casualties_in_Libya_2020-05.pdf.

¹²³ Ahmed Elumami and Ulf Laessing, “U.N. Libya Envoy Says Haftar Made Coup Attempt with Advance on Tripoli,” *Reuters*, April 15, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-idUSKCN1RR1NI>.

the internationally recognized government GNA and the supporters of Commander Haftar. After the meetings, he could not reach any promises from Haftar to stop the violence¹²⁴. UNSC adopted a resolution for a ceasefire, and the peace talks kept continued during 2020. In October, the warring sides agreed on signing a ceasefire agreement under the monitoring of UNSMIL¹²⁵.

According to the 2020 data of Human Rights Watch, more than 300.000 people have been displaced since Gaddafi was ousted in 2011. After the beginning of Haftar 's violence in Tripoli, attacks on civil areas and infrastructure caused over 200 people to be killed, 300 people to get injured, and 120.000 people displaced¹²⁶. In the same timeframe, strikes of GNA caused between 38 and 58 civilian deaths¹²⁷. The conflict yielded human disasters that led international actors to involve in the battle. Turkey became more involved in the period by supporting GNA forces to quell LNA from Tripoli and prevent civil casualties in 2019. In this thesis, the main actors of the conflict are GNA and LNA, and Turkey as a regional key player.

2.2.3 Brief History of the Yemen Civil War

2.2.3.1 Yemen's State Formation and Pre-uprising Era

Geographically, Yemen attracts foreign attention because it is proximate to oil-rich country Saudi Arabia and borders upon the Red Sea. Its location brings Yemen into prominence by making it a transition point for marine transportation and oil barrels transfers¹²⁸. Notwithstanding, its economy and political stability have been

¹²⁴ UN Peace and Security Department, "UN Committed 'to Support the Libyan People' as Guterres Departs 'with Deep Concern and a Heavy Heart,'" UN News, 2019, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/04/1036161>.

¹²⁵ Peter Kenny, "Libya's Warring Sides Sign 'Permanent' Cease-Fire Deal," AA, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/libya-s-warring-sides-sign-permanent-cease-fire-deal/2016472>.

¹²⁶ Human Rights Watch, "Libya Events of 2019," 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/libya>.

¹²⁷ Salyk-Virk, "The Conflicts in Libya from 2011-2020," 21.

¹²⁸ Jeremy M. Sharp, "Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations," *Congressional Research Service*, 2015, 1.

deteriorated due to the lack of natural sources, tribalism, terrorism, foreign intervention, and internal competition for years. The social and historical background of Yemen paved the way for being influenced by Arab Uprisings.

The society consists of mainly Arabs and 99% Muslims. Almost half of the Muslims are Sunni, and the other half is Shiia¹²⁹. Zaydi Shi'ite Muslims are a majority of the Northside of Yemen, and Sunnis live in the south. Although Zaydism is a branch of Shi'ism, in terms of practices and faith, it is close to the Sunni sect more than other sects of Shia like Twelver Shi'ism, which are primarily located in Iran and Iraq. In the history of Yemen, the essence of the conflicts is not based upon the sectarian division; instead, it is significantly caused by political, cultural, and social divergences¹³⁰. Natural sources' usage and competition for powerholding were primary causes of conflicts tracing back to the time Yemen was separated into two regions.

After the 1962 revolution, due to escalation in political and tribal competition, Yemen Arab Republic was established in North Yemen with a civil war between the royalist backed by Saudi Arabia and republicans advocated by Nasser of Egypt¹³¹. In South Yemen, the British mandate was ended in 1967 with the help of Egypt. Then the People's Republic of South Yemen was founded as a socialist state¹³². The two rules had disputed relations and used their sources to support each other's oppositions¹³³. Abdullah Saleh got power in 1978, and the administration lasted three

¹²⁹ Jiadong ZHANG, "Terrorist Activities in Yemen and the US Countermeasures," *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)* 4, no. 1 (2010): 108, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19370679.2010.12023150>.

¹³⁰ Sarah Phillips, *Yemen's Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective*, 2008, 41.

¹³¹ Phillips, 44.

¹³² Phillips, 45.

¹³³ Phillips, 46.

decades¹³⁴. He governed the regime with a balanced approach by being in cooperation with various tribes and oppositional leaders¹³⁵.

With the end of the Cold War in 1990, the two states unified. As the North's leader, Saleh became the president, and the South's leader Ali Salim al-Beedh became the vice president. Since the population of the north side consisted of the majority, North Yemen dominated the new republic so that there emerged political unrest and civil war, which lasted till 1994 ended with the Northern's victory¹³⁶. By 2011, the situation worsened with poverty, an increase in nepotism, and a lack of freedom of speech. The gap between the wealthy life of ruling elites and the population's poverty ascended during this period¹³⁷. The authority violently responded to the oppositional groups, including the Houthi movement, which emerged in 1990. The group's main aims were to oppose the government's discrimination against Zaydis and seek economic equality and status in government. The tension gradually escalated between the Houthis and Saleh administration, and a war erupted after Saleh's troops killed their leader in 2004¹³⁸. The war had lasted till 2010, and throughout the six rounds, the Houthis power and their supporters increased. The local conflict turned out a regional affair by the intervention of Saudi Arabia to block the ability of allegedly the Iran-backed Houthi group in the North¹³⁹. The war ended with a ceasefire agreement in 2010¹⁴⁰. However, the unrest in the society led them to rise

¹³⁴ Daniel Martin Varisco, "Helen Lackner (Ed.): *Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition*. (SOAS Middle East Studies.) Xviii, 334 Pp. London: Saqi Books, in Association with the British Yemeni Society and London Middle East Institute, SOAS, 2014. £21.99. ISBN 978 0 86356 777 3.," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 77, no. 3 (2014): 25, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0041977x14000718>.

¹³⁵ Thomas Juneau, "Iran ' s Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen : A Limited Return on a Modest Investment," *International Affairs* 3, no. July 2011 (2016): 651.

¹³⁶ Phillips, *Yemen's Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective*, 47.

¹³⁷ Helen Lackner, *Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition* (SOAS Middle East Institute, 2014), 27.

¹³⁸ Juneau, "Iran ' s Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen : A Limited Return on a Modest Investment," 651–52.

¹³⁹ Juneau, 652.

¹⁴⁰ Lackner, *Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition*, 29.

against Saleh in 2011 with Arab uprisings. The following section will elaborate on the revolutionary process.

2.2.3.2 Revolutionary Period

The unrest prevailed on the Yemeni people during the Arab Uprising period, and peaceful demonstrations spread through Yemen's squares. The regime also split into two groups that support demonstrators, and the other side kept up with Saleh. The political elites in the government realized that Saleh is not a proper leader for Yemen anymore. Saleh resigned in 2011 along the deal made by Saudi-led GCC countries with the participation of the UN secretary¹⁴¹. He was replaced by his vice-president Hadi. Hadi's administration was planned to last for two years as a transition government. The Saleh's GPS and opposition Joint Meeting Parties, including women and youth representatives, evenly took responsibilities in the new institutions. Reforms were done in the military, and a security structure was established in Saleh's period¹⁴². These changes provided Yemenis aspire to solve rooted economic and political problems. With the initiation of GCC countries and the transition government, a National Dialogue Conference was held to address social, economic and political issues and Houthi grievances¹⁴³.

Notwithstanding, although negotiations were done in NDC, the government was unable to officiate the duties. The attacks of violent groups caused mass civil casualties and increased the insecurity in both Yemen and the region. Along with security issues, the Hadi government was incapable of dealing with corruption and poverty. In 2014, Houthis captured Sanaa, the capital city of Yemen and spread their

¹⁴¹ Juneau, "Iran's Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen : A Limited Return on a Modest Investment," 653.

¹⁴² Lackner, *Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition*, 33.

¹⁴³ Gerald M. Feierstein and Joshua Koontz, "Iran Ramps Up Its Exchange Programs for the Houthis in Yemen," the Middle East Institute, 2017, 13, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-ramps-its-exchange-programs-houthis-yemen>.

influence over the country to pave the way for Hadi to depart from Yemen¹⁴⁴, consequently, the civil war began.

2.2.3.3 The Civil War and Actors

Along with former president Saleh's group, Houthi forces captured Sanaa from the interim government of Hadi in 2014¹⁴⁵. Hadi resigned four months later and left Yemen¹⁴⁶. The civil war has escalated between various armed groups and blocks till today. Houthis are the ones that had an active role since the outbreak of the uprisings. The group emerged as an ideological movement by a prominent Zaydi cleric Abdulmalik Badr al-Din al-Huthi and turned out to become an armed group called Ansarallah that fought against Saleh forces for six years¹⁴⁷. The armed group declared itself as anti-American and Western, raising a slogan of "Allahu akbar, Death to America, death to Israel, curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam"¹⁴⁸. Basically, as they declared in the report of Crisis Group, Houthis and their alliances want to eliminate Saudi aggression in Yemen and terminate the war¹⁴⁹.

The Houthis had been enemies of the Saleh administration for years; however, Saleh's party (GPC) and Houthis allied against the Hadi government and Sunni Islamist party, Islah, in 2014. They had fundamental problems regarding their togetherness. GPC saw itself as an umbrella political party and Houthis as a

¹⁴⁴ Vincenzo Ruggiero, "Yemen: Civil War or Transnational Crime?," *Critical Criminology* 27, no. 3 (2019): 504, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09472-6>.

¹⁴⁵ Crisis Group, "Discord in Yemen 's North Could Be a Chance for Peace," *International Crisis Group*, 2017, 1.

¹⁴⁶ Yara Bayoumy Mohammed Ghobari, "Yemen President Quits, Throwing Country Deeper into Chaos," *Reuters*, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-houthis-idUSKBN0KV0HT20150122>.

¹⁴⁷ International Crisis Group, "Rethinking Peace in Yemen, Middle East Report N°216," *International Crisis Group*, 2020, 5.

¹⁴⁸ Keyhan Barzegar, Seyyed Morteza, and Kazemi Dinan, "Iran's Political Stance toward Yemen's Ansar Allah Movement : A Constructivist-Based Study," *Journal of Politics and Law* 9, no. 9 (2016): 78, <https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v9n9p77>.

¹⁴⁹ International Crisis Group, "Rethinking Peace in Yemen, Middle East Report N°216," 10.

religious-based armed group backed by Iran¹⁵⁰. On the other hand, Houthis considered GPC responsible for the corruption and raising of Salafism in Yemen. Also, the two groups' perceptions of the US and Western countries are contradicting¹⁵¹. The differences were contained, and the common enemy perception was featured by the leaders of both groups until 2017. The coalition was damaged by which Saleh rallied his supporters and called Houthis "militia"¹⁵². After Saleh died in 2017, Houthis became more dominant in local institutions and national affairs.

There are also oppositional groups in addition to the Houthis and Hadi governments. Those anti-government and anti-Houthi factions, Salafist militias, STC, and Joint Resistance Forces led by Tareq Saleh, are commonly against the Hadi government and Houthis. The groups reside and control different parts of Yemen and generally have ties with the UAE¹⁵³. Thus, they are also playing roles in the civil war and creation of regional insecurity. In opposing these groups, the Hadi government and its supporters try to secure its legal existence in the international community's eye. President Hadi has lived in Riyadh since 2015, and he relied on family members and a small group of political elites. Its proponents are from different parts of the society like revolutionary youths, middle-class professionals, some journalists and women groups. The government wants to end the war and take entire control of all the institutions of the state¹⁵⁴.

The regional and international actors were highly effective in the internal conflict and made it an international case. Saudi Arabia has been inclusive of Yemen's politics due to geographical proximity and security interdependency. It did a military intervention in Yemen in 2015. It narrated that Houthis are a proxy of Iran, and Saudi

¹⁵⁰ Crisis Group, "Discord in Yemen 's North Could Be a Chance for Peace," 2.

¹⁵¹ Crisis Group, 3.

¹⁵² Crisis Group, 5.

¹⁵³ International Crisis Group, "Rethinking Peace in Yemen, Middle East Report N°216," 16.

¹⁵⁴ International Crisis Group, 15.

Arabia aims to contain Iranian influence. According to officials of Iran, they have not particular connections with Houthis militarily but political ties¹⁵⁵.

All these actors are actively getting involved in the course of the war. One of the conflict-triggering events was the Hadi government's new constitution that separated the territory into six federal regions. Houthis found this discriminatory and did not accept the plan; thus, Houthis forced the Hadi government to be dissolved and Hadi to leave the presidency¹⁵⁶. The international community kept support on as legitimate president Hadi with UN Security Council Resolution in 2015¹⁵⁷. The UN-led peace talks continued in 2016 in Kuwait to resolve the war¹⁵⁸. In 2018, the domestic conflictual sides got together under UN partnership in Stockholm. According to the agreement, the control of Hodeida Port was left to a third party. Prisoner exchanges and creating a humanitarian corridor were decided. However, Houthis were accused of violating the agreement's decisions¹⁵⁹.

Considering the military process of the war, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on Sanaa after Houthis took it over for defending the legitimate government in 2015¹⁶⁰. Following the Saudi intervention, Iran's political and diplomatic support for Houthis has increased along with allegedly military equipment supports. According to the reports that Juneau indicates in his work, Houthi fighters frequently visited Iran and Lebanon, but it is not defined that Houthis entirely depended on Iran. The western view and media have demonstrated deep relations between the two¹⁶¹.

¹⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, 22.

¹⁵⁶ Gerald M Feierstein, "Yemen: The 60-Year War," *Middle East Institute*, 2019, 15, [https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2019-02/Yemen The 60 Year War.pdf](https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2019-02/Yemen%20The%2060%20Year%20War.pdf).

¹⁵⁷ UNSC, "Resolution 2216 (2015)," vol. 2216, 2015.

¹⁵⁸ Mohammed Ghobari, "U.N.-Sponsored Yemen Peace Talks Begin in Kuwait," *Reuters*, April 21, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-talks-idUSKCN0XI2B2>.

¹⁵⁹ International Crisis Group, "Rethinking Peace in Yemen, Middle East Report N°216," 17.

¹⁶⁰ BBC Staff, "Saudi Arabia Launches Air Strikes in Yemen," *BBC*, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32061632>.

¹⁶¹ Juneau, "Iran's Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen : A Limited Return on a Modest Investment," 657.

The war has continued with the largest humanitarian crisis and food scarcity for six years. According to the Human Rights Watch report, more than 18.000 civilians were killed. Thousands of Yemenis have been internally displaced¹⁶². The humanitarian disaster became a motive for international actors to be involved in the conflict. Turkey is one country that sent humanitarian aid since the beginning of the crisis. In this thesis, Houthis, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Turkey would be focal points considering the Yemen case. Turkey and Iran's approaches to the Yemen War will be elaborated in in the following chapters.



¹⁶² HRW Staff, "Yemen, Events of 2020," Human Rights Watch, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/yemen>.

CHAPTER 3

TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY IN YEMEN AND LIBYA WARS

Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East changed after the Arab Uprisings. The policies have become more assertive and shifted from soft power to hard one. This chapter firstly traces Turkey's policies back to the period before and during the uprisings in order to identify its position in the region. Following sections, Turkey's policies are narrowed down to that of the Libyan and Yemen Wars, respectively. Turkey's relations with Yemen and Libya are demonstrated focusing on periods of their previous and while civil war era the civil war within the framework of motives, methods and timing.

3.1. Turkey's Position Before and During the Arab Uprisings in the Middle East Region

According to Buzan and Wæver's Regional Security Complex Theory, Turkey's geographic location and interaction with multiple regions made it an insulator state, which means it cannot belong to any region. However, in the literature, the insulator role of Turkey has been revisited, and for some, Turkey is taken as a part of the MERSC¹⁶³. In this thesis, Turkey will be considered as part of the MERSC. This part presents Turkey's previous relations with the region before the uprisings and its position in the complex.

With the JDP rule since 2002, Turkey has gained a proactive role in the Middle East region with the policy called "zero problems with neighbours" and "security for everyone". It brought attention to the Ottoman Empire's historical heritage and tried to build a political and economic dialogue with Arab and Muslim countries. In

¹⁶³ Barrinha, "The Ambitious Insulator : Revisiting Turkey ' s Position in Regional Security Complex Theory."

addition, it diversified its foreign policy towards both the Middle East and Europe. The geopolitics of Turkey in terms of proximity with the Middle East Arab states and Europe allowed it to be a bridge between the “East and West”¹⁶⁴ and a vital role to deal with regional challenges respectively. Furthermore, Turkey’s democratic identity and unwillingness to use hard power paved the way for Turkey to be seen as a role model of a democratic country in the area¹⁶⁵. Therefore, Turkey’s environment was adequate to engage in the region with soft power instruments as an actor balancing Islamic, secular, and democratic identity¹⁶⁶.

Turkey tended to be a mediator for conflictual states to sustain the region’s political stability¹⁶⁷. This approach sought to have a regional role by building peace for everyone considering political, economic, health, and societal security within global insecurity¹⁶⁸. Prior to the Arab upheavals, Turkey was emphasizing economic interdependency and political dialogue with high-level official meetings and investments in divergent businesses in regional countries. The increased relations, challenges, and opportunities of the region rendered Turkey a regional actor and made it part of the Middle East RSC. Regional dynamics have become highly interdependent and influential in Turkey’s foreign affairs regarding its economic and political security, as Buzan describes the interdependency requirement for being part of a regional security complex.

The foreign policy patterns, perceptions, and roles of the actors feature regional dynamics as well as the security complex’ frame. Changes coming with the upheavals in Arab countries created new dynamics within the region. At the beginning of the

¹⁶⁴ Nikolaos Raptopoulos, “Rediscovering Its Arab Neighbours? The AKP Imprint on Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” *Les Cahiers Du RMES* 1 (2004): 7.

¹⁶⁵ Thowhidul Islam, “Turkey’s AKP Foreign Policy Toward Syria: Shifting Policy During The Arab Spring,” *International Journal on World Peace* 33, no. 1 (2016): 25–26.

¹⁶⁶ Fuat Keyman, “A New Turkish Foreign Policy: Towards Proactive ‘Moral Realism,’” *Insight Turkey* 19, no. 1 (2017): 58.

¹⁶⁷ Aaron Stein, *Turkey’s New Foreign Policy : Davutoglu, the AKP and the Pursuit of Regional Order*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2015), 9, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315657110>.

¹⁶⁸ Ibrahim Natil, “Turkey ’ s Foreign Policy Challenges in the Syrian Crisis,” *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 27 (2016): 76, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3318/isia.2016.27.8>.

transformation process, Turkey adopted a foreign policy that was interpreted as promoting democracy in countries with uprisings because of their authoritarian regimes. However, in the case of Libya and Syria, Turkey was in a quandary over supporting opposition groups demanding democracy since Turkey had advantageous relations with existing regimes¹⁶⁹. In the first place, Ankara's reactions were not the same for every country undergoing political turmoil; instead, the response had changed depending on Turkey's previous interaction levels with aforementioned countries. Turkey's foreign policy, which had peaceful relations with some countries before the uprising, started to be assertive and reactive. The region's dynamics affected Turkey's policies and means, as they also modify the region's security equation. Turkey's high-level engagement in the region's politics and influential role caused Turkey to concern about its position and well-being. Thus, it decided to take action depending on its interest level with the countries.

The geographical proximity with the Arab Spring countries headed Turkey to be more related to the region and take proactive policy. Turkey's border with so-called failed states directly challenged its national security. Iraq and Syria, which border on Turkey, experienced authority gaps, aggressive acts of violent groups, and civil wars after the eruption of protests. These failed countries were not capable of reducing threats and protecting border security¹⁷⁰. For instance, as a non-government violent group, ISIS got control of some parts of the region and expanded its sphere of influence. The group's violent activities resulted in the death of a massive amount of people and forced migration, which led to further human disasters. The failed states surrounding Turkey became a national security threat to Turkey as well, which directly bound Turkey to the MERSC.

Turkey interpreted the Arab Uprisings as a democratic movement so that its discourses were generally supportive of the rebel groups against oppressive authorities. During the revolutionary process, civil wars erupted in Libya, Syria and Yemen. Turkey planned its foreign policy by prioritizing the cases regarding which

¹⁶⁹ Alexander Murinson, "Turkey and the 'Arab Spring', Turkish Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century," 2012, 17.

¹⁷⁰ Keyman, "A New Turkish Foreign Policy: Towards Proactive 'Moral Realism,'" 60.

one would provide higher national and regional interests. It adopted a more assertive policy toward proximate countries like Libya and Syria, while it took a less proactive policy to the others such as Yemen. Turkey was directly involved in the Libyan case militarily and diplomatically. In the Yemen crisis, Turkey only took a position by using political tools only and considering other regional actors' attitudes. In this section, Turkey's relations with Libya and Yemen will be examined by demonstrating pre-war and revolutionary periods.

3.2. Turkey's Policies Towards Libya

3.2.1. Turkey-Libya Pre-War Relations

Due to its historical connections and geographical proximity, considering their Mediterranean maritime border, Turkey has close ties with the North African countries. Turkey and Libya have had partnerships in various areas such as economy, culture, science, and security since the Cyprus crisis¹⁷¹. The previous connections, along with other motivations, led Turkey to be involved in the Libyan crisis. Thus, the pre-war period will be elaborated on in this part.

In the 1980s, former president Turgut Özal period, the economy had become a priority in Turkey's foreign policy towards the region¹⁷². The trade volume and cooperation between the two countries increased thanks to several agreements. Thousands of Turkish citizens resided in Libya to establish businesses and work mainly in the construction sector¹⁷³. During the JDP period, the relations were open to being developed through high-level official meetings. In 2009, President Erdoğan visited Libya and signed agreements for cooperation in banking, visa exemption, and

¹⁷¹ Tankut Öztaş and Ferhat Polat, "Turkey - Libya Relations: Economic and Strategic Imperatives," 2019, 8.

¹⁷² András Málnácssy, "Change of Direction in Turkey's Africa Policy. What Is Behind the Turkish Intervention in Libya?," *Strategic Impact* 1, no. 22 (2020): 75.

¹⁷³ Öztaş and Polat, "Turkey - Libya Relations: Economic and Strategic Imperatives," 13.

investments in Africa¹⁷⁴. Before the uprising, the economic and political relations between Turkey and Libya were in their utmost level. Twenty-five thousand workers and billions of dollars of bilateral trade investment existed¹⁷⁵. According to Zafer Çağlayan, former economy minister, in 2011, more than 200 contracting companies worked with 214 projects in various cities of Libya. Turkey's export to Libya was 1.9 billion dollars in 2010¹⁷⁶.

At the first stage of the upheaval in Libya, Turkey anticipated that Gaddafi was a strong leader; thus, it would be challenging to be toppled down. Furthermore, the Turkish government thought that as this crisis happened in Libya, it should be solved internally without external intervention; therefore, Ankara was opposed to NATO intervention in February¹⁷⁷. The previous positive relations between the two countries made Turkey to stay neutral and protected the status quo. Considering the massive business scale with Libya, Ankara advised Gaddafi to apply reforms by offering itself a mediator between government and protestors. However, Gaddafi did not intend to do reforms and heal the relations with rebels. Escalation of the tension caused Turkish people and their businesses to be at stake. Many construction yards were damaged. Therefore, Turkey prioritized evacuating its 25.000 citizens from Libya¹⁷⁸. The heightening of the tension and damage had led Turkey to approve taking the "all necessary measures" and agree to join the operation with the second resolution of the UNSC.

¹⁷⁴ Hüseyin Bağcı and Ali Serdar Erdurmaz, "The Middle East Seen From Ankara," in *Turkey's Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East : Under the Shadow of the Arab Spring*, ed. İdris Demir (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 14.

¹⁷⁵ Málnássy, "Change of Direction in Turkey's Africa Policy. What Is Behind the Turkish Intervention in Libya?," 78.

¹⁷⁶ Ceyhun Kuburlu and Uğur Ergan, "Libya'daki Olaylı Bölgede 28 Şirketin 3 Milyar Dolarlık İş Var, 14'ü Zarar Gördü," *Hürriyet.Com.Tr*, February 22, 2011, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/libya-daki-olayli-bolgede-28-sirketin-3-milyar-dolarlik-isi-var-14-u-zarar-gordu-17085520>.

¹⁷⁷ Bağcı and Erdurmaz, "The Middle East Seen From Ankara," 15.

¹⁷⁸ Mustafa Aydın and Cihan Dizdaroğlu, "Levantine Challenges on Turkish Foreign Policy," *International Relations* 15, no. 60 (2018): 97.

After the Gaddafi regime collapsed, Turkey tried to continue the economic relations with the newly emerged and recognized government GNA. The Turkish government began to follow a different foreign policy with the emergence of conflict and new regional dynamics.

3.2.2. Turkey's Motives for Policy Towards the Libya Crisis

With the escalation of the conflict, Turkey endorsed the UNSC Resolution 1970 and became part of international intervention in Libya. Turkey has had an active role in the Libyan Crisis from the dawn of the uprising. In this part of the thesis, the motives behind the Turkish foreign policy and intervention in the Libyan Civil War will be explained. The two types of motives will be described for the intervention, and also, Turkish foreign policy towards Libya will be elaborated respectively. The first motive is the humanitarian concerns, based upon the formal speeches, in which the will of people and democratic values are regarded. The second one is the strategic interests of Turkey, considering its regional objectives and regional rivalry.

From the word go, Ankara has indicated Turkey's respect to Libya's territorial integrity and national unity. According to the government's discourse, Ankara's first motive is a concern for humanitarian and democratic values. President Erdoğan emphasized that their aim in Libya was to put a stop to the people's struggle and to consider their demands of democracy by stating that "The fundamental purpose of our policy regarding Libya is the creation of necessary conditions to ensure a transition to constitutional democracy which is in line with the legitimate demands of the people and the preservation of Libya's territorial integrity and sovereignty"¹⁷⁹. It was frequently stated that Ankara was aiding the Libyan people to heal them¹⁸⁰. Therefore,

¹⁷⁹ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "Speech Delivered by H.E. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Libya (Ankara, 7 April 2011)," 2011, 1.

¹⁸⁰ Erdoğan, "Speech Delivered by H.E. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Libya (Ankara, 7 April 2011)."

Libya's political process was at stake, and Turkey was providing aid in various areas like education, training, or military support for the legitimate government¹⁸¹.

Secondly, strategic interest is the other significant dimension determining the policy towards Libya. Turkey's national concerns and the regional equation, including international and regional rivalry, will be the two headlines in this part to explain Turkey's incentives. To begin with the national concerns, Turkey-Libya hitherto relations were at stake. Libya's geopolitics, historical links, and previous economic and political ties made Turkey and Libya interdependent. After the revolution and elections in Libya, Turkey allied and cooperated with the internationally recognized and elected government GNA to continue the relations.

The previous relations constitute tangible and intangible dependency. One of the primary tangible motives is economic relations. According to the TUIK data, the trade volume with Libya has decreased since the eruption of the civil war,¹⁸² and the trade deficit occurred. Repercussions of the downward slope impacted Turkish merchants and contractors, thus negatively affected the Turkish economy. Their pecuniary injury was almost \$18 billion, with the ongoing projects like constructions of shopping malls, airports and universities were suspended, and many were unpaid¹⁸³. Therefore, Ankara wanted to recover the loss of investors in Libya immediately. However, defiance of Haftar forces increased the country's instability and created a dichotomy in government.

Furthermore, since Turkey recognized GNA as the official government of Libya in the post-Gaddafi period, what Haftar forces with the LNA party did to try to capture Tripoli as a coup attempt was condemned by Turkish officials. It is claimed that Muslim Brotherhood members existed in the GNA government coalition, which

¹⁸¹ Sarp Ozer, "Turkey Will Continue to Support Libya," *Anadolu Agency*, November 4, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-will-continue-to-support-libya/2032094>.

¹⁸² "Turkey-Libya Economic and Trade Relations," MFA, n.d., http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-libya.en.mfa.

¹⁸³ Recep Yorulmaz and Şerife Akıncı, *Kaddafi Döneminden Günümüze Türkiye-Libya Ekonomik İlişkileri* (ORSAM, 2020), 17.

includes Islamist views and elements inside¹⁸⁴. This ideologically made Turkey to have close ties with GNA. The LNA became a threat to Turkish interests in Libya and the region. The Tobruk government wanted Turkish citizens to leave the country, which caused Turkish companies to stop their works¹⁸⁵; thus, it curbed the economic interests. Also, Libya's infrastructures and superstructures got harmed due to the civil war. After the end of the war, Libya would be an open field for international actors to be rebuilt in providing functionality to the country. Turkey's previous contracts done with Libya has still valid. The companies would progress the uncompleted projects. Thus, Turkey would reap the benefit of the opportunity for reconstruction, which is potentially valued at \$120 billion¹⁸⁶. According to the head of the Turkish Contractors' Association, it would also boost exportation with the increase in Turkish materials usage in the projects¹⁸⁷. Keeping the previous projects in progress and making a deal for the new ones to get economic benefits are of motives for Turkey to be involved in the Libyan Crisis and support GNA.

In addition, natural sources are one component of Libya's importance that attract international actors' attention and would be a motivation for constructing strong relations. Libya is one of the oil-rich countries in North Africa, and primary export goods are mineral fuels and oils. It made Libya one of the significant resource providers in the region and stake in oil and gas exploration affairs. Cooperation in the energy sector was sought by Turkey as well. Turkish Petroleum Overseas Company (TPOA), which carried out oil exploration works out of Turkey, "signed Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements ("EPSA") with the National Oil Company

¹⁸⁴ Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey's Libya Policy: Militarization of Regional Policies and Escalation Dominance," *China International Strategy Review*, 2020, 4, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-020-00060-w>.

¹⁸⁵ Hüseyin Bağcı and Serdar Erdurmaz, "Libya and Turkey's Expansion Policy in Africa," *E-Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 2 (2017): 43.

¹⁸⁶ Uğur Aslanhan, "Turkey Eyes \$120B Investment Potential in Libya," *Anadolu Agency*, March 5, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkey-eyes-120b-investment-potential-in-libya/1755932>.

¹⁸⁷ Seda Sezer Bilen, "Turkey's Strategic Play in Libya to Help Reap Economic Gains," *Deutsche Welle*, July 3, 2020, <https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-strategic-play-in-libya-to-help-reap-economic-gains/a-54037623>.

(“NOC”) of Libya”¹⁸⁸ before the beginning of the civil war. The company had carried out research in Sirte and Sebha by spending 100-150 million dollars and found several petroleum resources. However, due to the conflicts, the exploration work had to be suspended¹⁸⁹. Turkey aimed to continue the oil exploration research in the country and energy cooperation, which was another motive related to economic concerns that led Turkey to be involved in the Libya crisis.

Seeking the natural sources in the East Mediterranean Sea is an intersecting interest for Turkey from both regional and national perspectives. Libya’s importance in the eye of international actors is inextricably related to the Mediterranean natural sources. Gas resources of the East Mediterranean have been a current disputed topic in regional politics after the discovery of gas sources in Israel in 1999 and 2000¹⁹⁰. The discovery led regional actors and international powers to do more exploration work in the Mediterranean waters. This rose the international rivalry in the region between the US, Europe, and Russia¹⁹¹. The other regional actors were Greece, Egypt, Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, and Libya, in energy competition. Greece, Egypt, and Greek Cyprus acted against Turkey because of a dispute in the usage of offshore water in the Mediterranean Sea. In January 2020, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel signed the East Med pipeline project¹⁹² that connected East Mediterranean energy sources to Europe by excluding Turkey and North Cyprus to secure their offshore pipeline¹⁹³. Turkey stood against this deal due to violation of

¹⁸⁸ Turkish Petroleum, “Turkish Petroleum Annual Report’15,” 2015, 71.

¹⁸⁹ Olcay Aydılek, “Türkiye’nin Libya’da Petrol Keşfi,” *Haber Türk*, 2020, <https://www.haberturk.com/son-dakika-haberler-turkiye-nin-libya-da-petrol-kesfi-2716317-ekonomi>.

¹⁹⁰ “Exploration History,” Ministry of Energy of Israel, n.d., [https://www.energy-sea.gov.il/English-Site/Pages/Oil And Gas in Israel/History-of-Oil--Gas-Exploration-and-Production-in-Israel.aspx#:~:text=The Noa field was the,BCM of gas in place](https://www.energy-sea.gov.il/English-Site/Pages/Oil%20And%20Gas%20in%20Israel/History-of-Oil--Gas-Exploration-and-Production-in-Israel.aspx#:~:text=The%20Noa%20field%20was%20the,BCM%20of%20gas%20in%20place).

¹⁹¹ Ahmed Elbassoussy, “East Mediterranean Gas : A New Arena for International Rivalry,” 2018, 70, <https://doi.org/10.1108/REPS-07-2018-005>.

¹⁹² Reuters Staff, “Greece, Israel, Cyprus to Sign Deal on Gas Pipeline on Jan 2,” *Reuters*, December 22, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/greece-cyprus-israel-idAFL8N28W0DK>.

¹⁹³ Angeliki Koutantou, “Greece, Israel, Cyprus Sign EastMed Gas Pipeline Deal,” *Reuters*, January 2, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-cyprus-israel-pipeline/greece-israel-cyprus-sign-eastmed-gas-pipeline-deal-idUSKBN1Z10R5>.

Turkey and North Cyprus' rights on the waters and stated that no projects could come true without including Turkey. As a national affair, Turkey adopted the Blue Homeland doctrine, which referred to sovereignty on a country's territorial waters. Diplomatic and coercive tools were at stake¹⁹⁴ to refer to Turkey's national rights on allocation of resources in the East Mediterranean region. In order to secure the rights, Turkey sought an ally in the region. Thus, cooperation with Libya and signing agreements to a demarcation of sea line were crucial.

The assertive foreign policy using coercive power has also been impacted by the fragile countries that surrounded Turkey and became a national threat. After the Arab Uprisings, the Middle East morphed into a war-torn and insecure region. Non-state violent actors emerged with the absence of or vulnerable authorities in many countries, predominantly in Syria. The armed groups expanded their sphere of influence across the region so that in Turkey as well, and they triggered the terrorist actions of PKK and PYD forces. The conflicts have become regionalized and internationalized. Militarization in regional countries' foreign policies also paved the way for Turkey to have a game-changer role. Therefore, Turkey started to operate extra-territorial military operations in Syria with highly invested Turkish defence forces concerning national security and regional interests. As it will take place in the following parts, Turkey has been in Syria since 2016. Repercussions of foreign policies on the other wars are leading Turkey to shape its foreign policy to another crisis in the region. Due to military operations' success, Turkey was emboldened to be involved in the Libya crisis with military forces with the escalation in international competition on the East Mediterranean case and the Libyan war. In addition to Turkey's foreign decisions, the invitation of Libya became a driver for Turkey to intervene in Libya. There is an invitation of the UN-recognized Government of National Accord for Turkish involvement. The government was struggling to handle attacks of Haftar forces in Tripoli. According to international law, to engage in military intervention in another country's territory, there must be either an invitation of the legal government or UNSC authorization¹⁹⁵. If a country is unable to protect its

¹⁹⁴ Kardaş, "Turkey's Libya Policy: Militarization of Regional Policies and Escalation Dominance," 7.

¹⁹⁵ Karine Bannelier and Theodore Christakis, "Under the UN Security Council's Watchful Eyes : Military Intervention by Invitation in the Malian Conflict," *Leiden Journal Of International Law* 26 (2013): 856, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156513000447>.

sovereignty, its legal authority can call the international community to demand aid to restrain conflict. In Libya's case, Prime Minister Serraj of GNA evoked Turkey to provide and sustain the state's sovereignty¹⁹⁶. Erdoğan stated earlier that Turkey could intervene in Libya by invitation, which gave the right to do so¹⁹⁷. The invitation became a legal reason for Turkey to implement a military intervention in Libya. Thus, along with agreements and military types of equipment support to Libya, Turkey intervened militarily in the Libya crisis.

Another motive that could be counted as part of national interest is the international influence goal in the region. Since the relations established in the Muslim Brotherhood period with Egypt deteriorated after the Sisi's military coup, Turkey was inclined to sustain and develop ties with Libya as the other significant country in the Maghreb sub-complex. It opened the Turkish embassy in Tripoli to continue the relations till the 2014 Haftar's coup¹⁹⁸. In the following years, the alliance with the GNA coalition increased with agreements and high-level meetings, especially in 2016 when GNA run the state institutions in the capital city, and Ankara sent special envoy Emrullah İşler to consolidate the relations.

In following the strategic interest concept from the regional equation perspective, the policies of the regional actors will be considered. Foreign policy decisions and attitudes of the actors in the civil war have an impact on that of other countries. Accordingly, the regional rivalry is one dimension which is motivating Turkey for foreign policy decision making. The UAE-led coalition and Turkey are the active actors considering the Libyan Civil War. Both are engaging in an assertive policy supporting counter sides in Libya. The UAE, especially Abu Dhabi, is vital for the LNA government to sustain its existence in the conflict. It funded the military weapon

¹⁹⁶ Ece Toksabay and Ahmed Elumami, "Turkey to Send Troops to Libya at Tripoli's Request: Erdogan," *Reuters*, December 26, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-libya-erdogan/turkey-to-send-troops-to-libya-at-tripolis-request-erdogan-idUSKBN1YUOEZ>.

¹⁹⁷ "Erdoğan'dan 'Libya'ya Askerimiz Gider Mi?' Sorusuna Yanıt: Yönetimden Davet Gelmese Bizim İçin Hak Doğurur," *BBC*, December 10, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-50722336>.

¹⁹⁸ Bağcı and Erduramaz, "Libya and Turkey's Expansion Policy in Africa," 43.

payments from Russia, France and China. The LNA army increased its size and developed by the UAE's effort¹⁹⁹. The UAE and Egypt pursue their regional and national interests in cooperation in accordance with the LNA government as they do for other regional crises. Both the UAE and Egypt complied with staying against the Arab Uprisings and Islamist elements in addition to following their economic interests in Libya²⁰⁰. However, inside this coalition, there were divisions that Saudi Arabia was hesitant to apply intensive anti-Turkish policy because of the Yemen crisis²⁰¹. This divergence led the coalition to be loosen and embolden Turkey in taking action as a counterbalance actor through the alliance of Qatar.

The last regional interests of Turkey are on the African continent in relation to Libya. Countries in the African continent have been on Turkish foreign policy and strategies for North Africa. In line with Turkey's general foreign policy statement of the revival of historical connections and following multidimensional FP, the African continent has been a strategic location to increase the friendship and partnership in Turkey's eye²⁰². Regional countries are open to development and cooperation in terms of economy, military and diplomacy. Turkey adopted the "Opening up to Africa Policy" in 1998, which aimed to prompt up relations with African countries²⁰³. Exportation and the construction sectors are the main investment opportunities for Turkey. As it happened in Libya, construction companies had interests in this region. In 2008, Turkey became a strategic partner of the African Union, accelerating the cooperation between the partners. The trade volume reached \$26.2 billion, and the project investments of Turkish companies were indicated \$70 billion in 2019²⁰⁴.

¹⁹⁹ Ali Bakir, "The UAE 's Disruptive Policy in Libya," *Insight Turkey*, no. October (2020): 160, <https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2020224.10>.

²⁰⁰ Tarek Megerisi, "Geostrategic Dimensions of Libya's Civil War," 2020, 4.

²⁰¹ Kardaş, "Turkey's Libya Policy: Militarization of Regional Policies and Escalation Dominance," 6.

²⁰² Mehmet Özkan and Birol Akgün, "Turkey's Opening to Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 48, no. 4 (2010): 526, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X10000595>.

²⁰³ Özkan and Akgün, 532.

²⁰⁴ Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum (TABEF), "Turkey-Africa Economy and Business Froum Online Edition," DEİK, n.d., <https://www.deik.org.tr/press-releases-turkey-africa-economy-and-business-forum-online-edition>.

Along with economic ties, to sustain the region's stability and security, military cooperation was provided. Under the peacekeeping program of the UNSC, Turkey deployed personnel and provided training²⁰⁵. Somalia and Niger agreed with Ankara to building a military base. It aimed to gain momentum in relations with countries on the African continent. North African countries have been a gateway to open to the Horn of Africa. Considering the rift between Turkey and Egypt and the geopolitics of Libya, bilateral relations with Libya are salient within the context of Turkey's regional interests.

3.2.3. Turkey's Methods and Timing for Policy Towards the Libya Crisis

In 2011, the revolutionary process started in Libya with upheavals in other Arab countries. Turkey has been actively involved in the transition period of Libya. In this part, Turkey's methods for its foreign policy and intervention will be explained. The methods will be classified based upon the tools used and whether Turkey took a side in the conflict. Turkey made diplomatic and military involvements. The intervention and policy formulations are biased by taking the side of internationally recognized the Government of National Accord administrated by Fayeze al-Sarraj against the opposition groups, precisely Khalifa Haftar's forces.

One component of the methods is acting biased or neutral. Turkey acted biased in favour of the GNA since it is an internationally recognized government for protecting its interests. It contributed to the activities of GNA, which was seen as the sole authority in Libya, and increased bilateral relations politically, economically, and militarily. In international meetings on the Libya crisis, Turkey took initiatives to protect its own and Libya's national interests. Since the onset of the conflicts, Turkey got included in Ministerial Meeting for Libya Joint Communique in 2016. The MFA of Turkey stated that "We are committed to supporting all efforts of the GNA in order to enhance political outreach throughout the country." It is emphasized that Libya's

²⁰⁵ "Turkey-Africa Relations," MFA, n.d., <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>.

security, national unity and transition to democracy would be supported.²⁰⁶ It was considered that lack of security and act of democracy in Libya are of severe problems, and the Libyan army was unable to deter the threats. Therefore, Turkey indicated that it was ready to provide the necessary tools to sustain stability²⁰⁷.

The other component of the methods is the tools that the actors use for involvement. The first one is humanitarian tools. Turkey has provided humanitarian help to Libya since the beginning of the crisis which was triggered by humanitarian concerns. With Turkish state institutions and civil societies, Turkey delivered the aids. It sent a humanitarian ship at the first stage of the conflicts. Many wounded people from Libya were brought by this ship to Turkey for providing medical service²⁰⁸. The former prime minister Davutoğlu visited Libya to have meetings with National Transition Council. During this visit, Turkey also provided immediate cash aid and promised to provide military and fiscal support²⁰⁹.

Following years, Turkey kept supplying aid in areas of education, construction, and military. President Erdoğan stated that Turkey is ready to help the Libyan people. NGOs like the Turkish Red Crescent and state institution AFAD sent medical equipment and medicine to Libya's health ministry²¹⁰. TİKA has completed hospital and school construction, providing education and training in various areas²¹¹. The

²⁰⁶ "Ministerial Meeting for Libya Joint Communiqué, 16 May 2016, Vienna," MFA, 2016, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ministerial-meeting-for-libya-joint-communique_-16-may-2016_-vienna.en.mfa.

²⁰⁷ Ozer, "Turkey Will Continue to Support Libya."

²⁰⁸ "Türkiye Libya'ya Yardım Eli Uzattı.," NTV, April 4, 2011, <https://www.ntv.com.tr/galeri/dunya/turkiye-libyaya-yardim-eli-uzatti,51du0BZX9EaT6QP5EOfmJQ/c3z9xCozKUygGFJd0l407A>.

²⁰⁹ İrem Köker, "Libya'ya Yardımda Türk Modeli: Para Elden Veriliyor," *Hürriyet.Com.Tr*, August 23, 2011, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/libyaya-yardimda-turk-modeli-para-elden-veriliyor-18560084>.

²¹⁰ "Kızılay'dan Libya'ya Sağlık Malzemesi Desteği," Türk Kızılay, accessed January 20, 2021, <https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Haber/HaberDetay/3612>.

²¹¹ TİKA, "TİKA in Libya," TİKA, n.d., <https://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/ara?s=Libya>.

humanitarian aid and development projects in determining the foreign policy towards Libya were always on the case.

Along with humanitarian aid, politically, Turkey gained a mediator role at the onset of the conflict. It endorsed the UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973, which adopted a “no-fly zone” over Libya and authorized “all the necessary measures” to protect the civilians²¹². Turkey followed a roadmap for a ceasefire and humanitarian assistance in accordance with NTC and the international community²¹³. To keep the diplomatic relations alive, Turkey had kept its embassy open in Tripoli until the 2014 conflicts. After three years of suspension, the embassy was reopened in 2017²¹⁴. The diplomatic dialogue was used as a method to end the conflict. Turkey’s Special Envoy Emrullah İşler had a meeting with the leader of the House of Representatives²¹⁵. It is articulated that the peace talks initiated by the UN were also supported during the visit of Kobler, Special Representative of UN for Libya, in Turkey²¹⁶. At the end of the year, the UN talks had ended with a political solution and led the Libyan Political Agreement to be signed. The agreement was signed in Skhirat, Morocco, by a wide range of political elites of Libya. With the agreement, the establishment of Government of National Accord as the authority of national institutions and representatives was expected entirely.²¹⁷. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs attended the agreement and stated their support by saying that “Turkey will contribute by any means to the efforts

²¹² UNSC, “Resolution 1973.”

²¹³ “Press Statement by H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, The Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey on Libya, 3 May 2011,” MFA, 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/press-statement-by-h_e_-recep-tayyip-erdogan_-the-prime-minister-of-the-republic-of-turkey-on-libya_-3-may-2011.en.mfa.

²¹⁴ “Bilateral Relations between Turkey and Libya,” MFA, n.d., <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/bilateral-relations-between-turkey-and-libya.en.mfa>.

²¹⁵ “Türkiye, Libya’da El Hasi Ile Görüşen İlk Ülke Oldu,” *BBC*, October 22, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/10/141022_turkiye_libya_emrullah_isler.

²¹⁶ “No: 304, 8 December 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit of H.E. Martin Kobler, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Libya, to Turkey,” MFA, 2015, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-304_-8-december-2015_-press-release-regarding-the-visit-of-h_e_-martin-kobler_-special-representative-of-the-un-secretary-general-for-libya_-to-turkey.en.mfa.

²¹⁷ Peace and Security Department, “UN Welcomes ‘Historic’ Signing of Libyan Political Agreement.”

of the Government of National Accord to establish security and stability in the country during the transition process.”²¹⁸

As part of the diplomatic method in policy-making, economic relations were revived after five years of suspension. The construction sector, which was distorted during the war, was kept in progress. To protect the Turkish economy and businesspeople, the Minister of Customs and Trade of Turkey and the Minister of Planning of Libya met in August 2020 and signed a memorandum of understanding. Minister Pekcan evaluated that the Turkish firms can continue their works, which were suspended due to Libya’s security conditions with this memorandum²¹⁹. They foresee that with the agreements and meetings, the previous economic relations were to be revived, and the firms’ damage would be covered.

Furthermore, coercive tools were also used by Turkey in the civil war. According to the intervention definitions, Turkey’s involvement in Libya could be identified as an intervention. After Greece, Israel and Cyprus, because they reached a cooperation agreement for oil and gas seeking and a pipeline project by excluding Turkey and Libya, Ankara and GNA signed cooperation in November 2019. “On Nov. 27, Ankara and Tripoli reached two separate memorandums of understanding (MoU), one on military cooperation and the other on maritime boundaries of countries in the Eastern Mediterranean.”²²⁰ These include military training, consultancy, providing material services, and joint cooperation in defence and security²²¹. In January 2020, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey decided to send troops to Libya²²². By invitation of the GNA, the first brigade was sent at the beginning of 2020, and Ankara kept sending

²¹⁸ “No: 311, 18 December 2015, Press Release Regarding the Signing of the Libyan Political Agreement,” MFA, 2015, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-311_-18-december-2015_-press-release-regarding-the-signing-of-the-libyan-political-agreement.en.mfa.

²¹⁹ “Türk Firmalarının Libya’daki Sorunları Çözülüyor,” Ticaret Bakanlığı, 2020, <https://ticaret.gov.tr/haberler/turk-firmalarinin-libyadaki-sorunlari-cozuluyor>.

²²⁰ Waleed Abdullah, “Libya’s GNA to Activate Security Deal with Turkey,” Anadolu Agency, 2019, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/general/libyas-gna-to-activate-security-deal-with-turkey-/27818>.

²²¹ Emrah Kekilli and Bilgehan Öztürk, “Turkey’s Position in the Libyan Crisis,” *Insight Turkey* 22, no. 2 (2020): 58, <https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2020222.04>.

²²² Adem Ocak, Seval Adıyaman, Balta et al., “Libya Tezkeresi TBMM Genel Kurulu’nda Kabul Edildi,” AA, January 2, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/libya/libya-tezkeresi-tbmm-genel-kurulunda-kabul-edildi/1690170>.

Turkish soldiers and military equipment. Also, according to the pentagon's report, Turkey sent approximately 3500 paid Syrian fighters in the first three months of 2020²²³. The artillery and drones that Turkey deployed were used for curbing the military capabilities of LNA²²⁴. Hereby, Turkey was involved in the civil war with military intervention. The deployment changed the balance of Libya in favour of GNA. In 2021, the maritime borders deal was renewed, and Erdogan said, "The memorandum of understanding concerning the maritime jurisdiction in the Mediterranean that we signed with our neighbour Libya has secured the interest and future of both countries."²²⁵ The agreement between the two countries led them to cooperate in seeking energy sources and providing regional security.

Parallel to Turkish foreign policy goals, Turkey's defence industry was funded and developed in recent years. Persuasion of militarily self-sufficiency led Turkey to invest in artillery, drones, aircraft and high-tech weapons within the "Turkification" theme²²⁶. Thus, Turkey became a deterrent and dominant actor in the region, which encouraged it to involve regional affairs.

3.3. Turkey's Policy Towards Yemen

3.3.1. Turkey-Yemen Pre-War Relations

With the adopted policy called "zero problems with neighbours" since 2002, Turkey has gained an active role in the Middle East region. It brought attention to the Ottoman Empire's historical heritage and tried to build a political and economic dialogue with Arab and Muslim countries.

²²³ Isabel Debre, "Pentagon Report: Turkey Sent up to 3,800 Fighters to Libya," *Washington Post*, July 17, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/pentagon-report-turkey-sent-up-to-3800-fighters-to-libya/2020/07/17/0736c972-c86d-11ea-a825-8722004e4150_story.html.

²²⁴ Jason Pack and Wolfgang Puszta, "Turning the Tide How Turkey Won the War for Tripoli," 2020, 11.

²²⁵ Aljazeera, "Turkey and Libya Renew Commitment to Contested Maritime Deal," *Aljazeera*, April 12, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/12/turkey-and-libya-renew-commitment-to-contested-maritime-deal>.

²²⁶ Edebali Murat Akca and Enes Yavuz, "Turkey's National Defence Industry: Origins, Transformation, and Achievements," 2020, 8.

During this period, Turkey and Yemen also establish economic and political relations. There had been high-level visits with people in business to increase the bilateral trade volume²²⁷. Former president Gul encouraged businesspeople to invest in Yemen by holding meetings, signing visa lifting agreements²²⁸, and institutions like TİKA developed construction projects that aimed to repair the Ottoman heritage²²⁹. The visit emphasized historical ties going back to the Ottoman period considering former minister Gul's comments on Yemen visits by saying, "Our peoples have shared the same fate and lived their joy and sorrow together in their 400-year common history. Mutual love and attachment have always prevailed in our relationships."²³⁰ While former foreign affairs minister Babacan's visit, the Yemeni leaders applied traditional Ottoman high-level official visit protocols as if the minister was Ottoman governor²³¹. The historical ties were recalled in the official meetings.

The eruption of the conflict led the relations to be loosened. From the beginning of the war, Turkey only released speeches that "supports Yemen's national unity, territorial integrity and stability"²³².

3.3.2. Turkey's Motives for Policy Towards the Yemen Crisis

As in line with Turkish foreign policy doctrine in the early 2000s, Turkey was trying to expand the sphere of influence in the Middle East by soft-power tools. The policy towards Yemen was to strengthen the relations in economy and politics by

²²⁷ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, *Yeni Türkiye Vizyonu Ezberleri Bozarken-2* (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Yayınları, 2019), 41, <https://mk.gov.tr/GalleryFiles/242/Ezberleri-Bozarken-2-net-e89d2b55-9f11-44a5-9bc3-434c665d129f.pdf>.

²²⁸ MFA, "Yemen'le Vize Muafiyeti Anlaşması Hk.," 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-10_-11-ocak-2011_-yemen_le-vize-muafiyeti-anlasmasi-hk_.tr.mfa.

²²⁹ Abdullah Gül, "Yemen," 2011, <http://www.abdullahgul.gen.tr/ziyaretler/yemen/ozel>.

²³⁰ Gül.

²³¹ Dünya Bülteni, "Türk Dışişleri Bakanına 'Osmanlı Valisi' Protokolü," 2009, <https://www.dunyabulteni.net/arsiv/turk-disisleri-bakanina-osmanli-valisi-protokolu-h67473.html>.

²³² MFA, "Press Release Regarding the Situation in Yemen," 2009, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_97_-18-june-2009_-press-release-regarding-the-situation-in-yemen.en.mfa.

emphasizing the Ottoman bonds between the two. After the eruption of the crisis in Yemen, Turkey's activities towards it have got slow down. As Turkey did in other countries during the Arab Uprising process, it also supported opposition groups' freedom demands in Yemen. However, after the protests turned into a crisis, Turkey stepped back and supported the GCC coalition's policy towards Yemen. Deterioration in the relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE led Turkey to alter its policy towards Yemen. While its interactions were slightly intense with Yemen, after the changes in relations with the GCC countries, Turkey's involvement decreased.

In this part, Turkey's motives for policies towards Yemen will be explained on the basis of strategic interests and humanitarian concerns. The determinants of strategic interests in Yemen are Turkey's national security and regional equation, which means the other regional actors' decisions and other regional dynamics, primarily considering repercussions of the Syrian Civil War²³³. The agendas of Saudi Arabia and Iran towards the region and their acts run the region's security and the crises. Egypt became another influential actor considering the Yemen case. Therefore, Turkey's amity or hostility with regional actors in relation to their interests in the crises will be approached for examining the motives.

Several motives have shaped Turkey's policy towards the Yemen crisis. One of those is the relations and cooperation with Saudi Arabia in the Syria War. From this point of view, cooperation with Saudi Arabia is one motive to explain the Turkish policy. Turkey and Saudi Arabia had developed a partnership in the region since 2003²³⁴. The close relations continued after the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings at first. Changes in priority of interests, Turkey's close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, and opposing sides of two in regional camps led the relations to deteriorate²³⁵. In the following years, the relations went ups and downs.

²³³ Özlem Tür, "Turkey and Egypt in the Yemen Crisis," in *Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis*, 2020, 179, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35578-4>.

²³⁴ Meliha Altunışık, "Turkey's Relations With Egypt and Saudi Arabia: From Hopes of Cooperation to The Reality of Conflict," in *Aspiring Powers, Regional Rivals*, ed. Gönül Tol and David Dumke (The Middle East Institute, 2019), 22.

²³⁵ Altunışık, 33.

The two countries cooperated to topple down the Assad regime in Syria. Notwithstanding, with the Arab Uprisings, new regional threats were emerged for Turkey's national security, like the creation of violent armed groups and accessible areas for PKK activities. At the onset of the uprisings, Turkey advised the Assad regime to adopt reforms and to include the Muslim Brotherhood for power share²³⁶ to prevent mass demonstrations and conflicts. The Assad regime was concerned about the possible increase in Ankara's influence over Syria and the region. Assad uttered that "Ankara will never again become the decision-making centre of the Arab world."²³⁷ The amity relations morphed into enmity very quickly. Turkey's priority had become to topple the Assad regime since Turkey claimed that Assad lost its legitimacy due to human rights abuse, violence, and his incapability in protecting civilians²³⁸. The threats of those, the Kurdish Question, increase in extremist groups' influence, and refugee flow led Turkey to be concerned about its national security and took action against it. On Saudi Arabia's side, the policy decision to stand against the Assad regime was immediate due to its rivalry with Iran, Iran-Assad regime alliances, and Syria's involvement in Lebanon instead of Saudi interests²³⁹. The major concern of Saudi Arabia was the possible spread of uprising into the Kingdom. At the end of 2011, both Saudi Arabia and Turkey made sure of the necessity of toppling the Assad regime. They started to support the rebel groups in Syria against the regime. Thus, Saudi Arabia and Turkey were on the same page and cooperating regarding to the Syrian Crisis and on the contrary to Iran's agenda. Their alliances reflected Turkey's policy decision on Yemen as cooperating with Saudi Arabia.

²³⁶ Min Wei, "Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Syrian Crisis : Dynamics of Transformation Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Syrian Crisis : Dynamics of Transformation," *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* 13, no. 3 (2019): 469, <https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2019.1630573>.

²³⁷ Özlem Tür, "Turkey's Role in Middle East and Gulf Security," *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* 0, no. 0 (2019): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2019.1682305>.

²³⁸ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *2014 Yılına GİRerken Dış Politikamız, Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nın 2014 Mali Yılı Bütçe Tasarısının TBMM Genel Kurulu'na Sunulması Vesilesiyle Hazırlanan Kitapçık*, 2013, 70.

²³⁹ Birol Başkan, "Turkey between Qatar and Saudi Arabia," *International Relations* 16, no. 62 (2019): 90, <https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.588947>.

Notwithstanding, the two countries did not compromise on the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. While Turkey was supporting them in Syria, Saudi Arabia was against the rise of brotherhood and saw them as a threat if they expand their influence area, which breaks the region's stability. Thus, Saudi Arabia and Turkey reacted to Morsi's ousting in Egypt in contradictory way from one another. Saudi Arabia supported the military coup in Egypt; meantime; Turkey condemned the incident²⁴⁰. The rifted perceptions on providing stability and ideological interests impacted their alliances in Syria and Yemen case, and their relations were distorted. However, the deteriorated relations calmed down with Turkey's high-level visit to Saudi Arabia²⁴¹, in an attempt to seek a joint path. It is considered that Assad's weakness is contributing the rise of ISIS threat through the region; therefore, anti-Assad policies got prior and were followed by regional actors together.²⁴²

In March 2015, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition intervened in Yemen with the "Decisive Storm" against the rebel Houthi forces²⁴³. Turkey had already recognized the Hadi government and was against the attacks of the Houthi forces. Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia to cooperate with them on various grounds. He announced his support for intervention and could provide logistical and intelligent help for the Saudi-led coalition for Yemen operation to defeat the terror organizations and Shiite rebel groups²⁴⁴. According to the news, the Saudi king expressed thanks to him for the support and offer²⁴⁵ and rejected it.

²⁴⁰ Özden Zeynep Oktav, "The Arab Spring and Its Impact on Turkey-GCC States Partnership," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültes Dergisi* 1, no. 1 (2016): 59.

²⁴¹ Istanbul (AA), "Turkish President Completes Hajj Prayer, Arrives in Turkey," *Anadolu Agency*, October 17, 2013, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkish-president-completes-hajj-prayer-arrives-in-turkey/210913>.

²⁴² Başkan, "Turkey between Qatar and Saudi Arabia," 94.

²⁴³ BBC news, "Yemen Crisis: Saudis Lead Fresh Air Strikes on Houthis," *BBC*, March 28, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32096934>.

²⁴⁴ France24, "Turkey Supports Saudi Mission in Yemen, Says Iran Must Withdraw," *France24 Exclusive*, March 26, 2015, <https://www.france24.com/en/20150326-turkey-support-saudi-yemen-erdogan-interview-france-24>.

²⁴⁵ Hurriyet Daily, "Turkey to Provide Intelligence, Logistics to Saudi-Led Operation in Yemen," *Hurriyet Daily News*, March 26, 2015, <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-provide-intelligence-logistics-to-saudi-led-operation-in-yemen-80246>.

Yemen was not a priority for Turkey's agenda; however, the motives behind the decision of supporting Saudi Arabia in Yemen is related to regional security perception and regional equation. Firstly, Houthi rebel groups were seen as the main actor of the conflict since they wanted to oust the legitimate government, which is opposite to democratic values and the cause of the crisis. The officials in Ankara emphasized the importance of territorial integrity and unity of Yemen and citizens' well-being²⁴⁶. Protection of unity and integrity is the primary consideration of regional stability and security in Turkey's eye.

The other one is regional relations. In 2015, Turkey was confronting with Iran in Syria. Thus, expanding Iran's influence area in Yemen would threaten Turkey's interests in the region. While Erdogan states his support to Saudi Arabia, he said Iran's dominance in the region is not tolerable "it has to withdraw any forces, whatever it has in Yemen, as well as Syria and Iraq and respect their territorial integrity"²⁴⁷. Saudi Arabia became an ally against the Assad regime and Iran.

After 2015, Turkey shifted its policy towards Syria from the aim of collapsing the Assad regime to protect its national security due to the increase in YPG and ISIS attacks. It took military measures with cross border operations called "Operation Euphrates Shield" in 2016 against DAESH, "Operation Olive Branch" in 2018, and "Operation Peace Spring" in 2019 to deter the threats by PKK/YPG²⁴⁸. Meantime the decrease in GCC countries' effects on Syria and military operations, Turkey participated in high-level meetings with significant stakeholders of Iran and Russia, to provide a ceasefire and discuss Syria's future²⁴⁹ in Astana and Sochi. Turkey's

²⁴⁶ Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, *2016 Yılı Başında Dış Politikamız* (MFA, 2016), 71.

²⁴⁷ Humeyra Pamuk, "Turkey's Erdogan Says Can't Tolerate Iran Bid to Dominate Middle East," *Reuters*, March 26, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-turkey-idUSKBN0MM2N820150326>.

²⁴⁸ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Relations between Turkey–Syria," MFA, accessed February 20, 2021, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-syria.en.mfa>.

²⁴⁹ Saman Zulfqar, "Competing Interests of Major Powers in the Middle East : The Case Study of Syria and Its Implications for Regional Stability," *Perceptions* 23, no. 1 (2018): 136.

criticism of Iran's policy over Yemen diminished with rapprochement on Yemen and the consensus on the KRG referendum issue in Iraq²⁵⁰.

It was a period of changes in relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Turkey's relations with Saudis and the UAE had been disrupted due to the different agendas on the Muslim Brotherhoods and Qatar Crisis. Qatar crises erupted by severing diplomatic relations and putting a blockade on Qatar since Egypt and Saudi Arabia led coalition accused Qatar to be a supporter of terrorism due to its ties with Iran and hosting Muslim Brotherhood members. While the Saudi-led regional states cut their relations with Qatar short, Turkey supported it economically and militarily in cooperation²⁵¹.

After the intervention, according to reports, Saudi-led strikes caused a death toll that rose more than 100.000 since the beginning of the intervention²⁵². The increase in humanitarian disasters led Turkey to keep delivering humanitarian aid to Yemen. Turkey's policies towards Yemen were shaped around humanitarian considerations after 2016. The divergent agendas of Turkey and Saudi-the UAE prevented them from cooperating. Turkey refrained from using hard power in the Yemen crisis; instead, it used soft power tools indicating and focusing on human suffering.

Another issue that made Turkey hesitant to operate with hard power tools in Yemen is regional affairs. Turkey pursued assertive foreign policies in Syria and Libya, which it budgeted and allocated resources for the operations. The conflicts in the proximate neighbourhood, and security environment and resource allocation to other operations led Yemen to be of a lesser priority for Turkey.

²⁵⁰ Reuters Staff, "Turkey, Iran, Iraq Consider Counter-Measures over Kurdish Referendum," *Reuters*, September 21, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-kurds-referendum-minis-idUSKCN1BW1EA>.

²⁵¹ Butler and Karadeniz, "Turkey Sends Qatar Food and Soldiers, Discusses Gulf Tensions with Saudi."

²⁵² Samy Magdy, "Report: Death Toll from Yemen's War Hit 100,000 since 2015," *AP News*, October 31, 2019, <https://apnews.com/article/b7f039269a394b7aa2b46430e3d9b6bc#:~:text=The project said the Saudi,of all reported civilian deaths>.

3.3.3. Turkey's Methods for Policy Towards the Yemen Crisis

Turkey has no direct interest and motives in Yemen. Since it has indirect interests, it used soft power tools to follow its agenda. Diplomatic involvement and speeches determined the role of Turkey in the civil war. Humanitarian concerns also led it to aid millions of Yemeni people. Its policy determination in crisis was biased by supporting the government against the Houthi movement²⁵³.

Turkey recognized the Hadi government as the legitimate power in Yemen after the outbreak of the uprising and resignation of President Ali Abdallah Saleh. The Turkish government condemned the coup attempt of Houthis and their protests²⁵⁴. The legitimate government and territorial integrity of Yemen were supported by Turkey. The rebel groups and their activities were tried to be limited by joining the UN's decision on Saleh and the three Houthi leaders. They got travel bans, and their financial assets are frozen²⁵⁵. Every year the decision was renewed by the UN, and Turkey also joined there to apply the sanctions²⁵⁶.

In 2015, Erdogan vowed that they could provide logistic support to the Saudi-led coalition group during the intervention. In the same year, Turkey's Foreign Minister attended the OIC Contact Group meeting in New York and Jeddah to discuss Yemen's situation²⁵⁷. Also, Turkey demonstrated its support of Yemen to president Hadi by welcoming him to Turkey twice in 2016²⁵⁸. On the other side, Erdoğan criticized Iranian dominance in the region and Yemen viciously. He said, "Iran has to change

²⁵³ MFA, "Bilateral Political Relations between Turkey and Yemen," MFA, accessed March 7, 2021, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-yemen.en.mfa>.

²⁵⁴ Deutsche Welle Türkçe, "Türkiye'den Yemen Açıklaması," *Deutsche Welle*, 2015, <https://www.dw.com/tr/türkiyeden-yemen-açıklaması/a-18342865>.

²⁵⁵ United Nations Security Council, "Security Council 2140 Sanctions Committee Designates Three Individuals as Subject to Assets Freeze, Travel Ban," *UN Press*, November 7, 2014, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11636.doc.htm>.

²⁵⁶ DW Türkçe, "Türkiye Salih ve Husilere Yaptırımını Uzattı," *Deutsche Welle*, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/tr/türkiye-salih-ve-husilere-yaptırımını-uzattı/a-48385412>.

²⁵⁷ Çavuşoğlu, *2016 Yılı Başında Dış Politikamız*, 72.

²⁵⁸ MFA, "Bilateral Political Relations between Turkey and Yemen."

its view. It has to withdraw any forces, whatever it has in Yemen, as well as Syria and Iraq and respect their territorial integrity.”²⁵⁹

Along with diplomatic rapprochements, Turkey provided aid to Yemen’s humanitarian crisis with NGOs and state institutions. For example, TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) has projects of development in several cities in Yemen by providing training in the healthcare system, police forces and education, and the establishment of field hospitals²⁶⁰. The Turkish Crescent and AFAD (Ministry of Interior’s Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency) raised the donation campaign as well²⁶¹.

Turkey did not involve itself in the crisis by using hard power but vowing to support alliances’ intervention by providing military help if it was demanded, needed. Therefore, its policies were not identified as intervention. However, diplomatic, and military involvements were at stake with keeping the existence in its low profile.

3.4. Conclusions

This part of the thesis has discussed Turkey’s foreign policy and its position in the Middle East Security Complex. The security interdependency is based upon geographical proximity and interest relations. In this perspective, taking the last two decades into consideration, Turkey was regarded as a part of the security complex since its national security considerations are related to the region’s dynamics in the thesis. The interdependency has changed the target country’s geographical location and their previous relations accordingly. The findings of this chapter provide insights into Turkey’s response to two civil wars and its motivations behind it. The main finding is that Turkey did not describe Yemen War as part of its primary security

²⁵⁹ Humeyra Pamuk, “Turkey’s Erdogan Says Can’t Tolerate Iran Bid to Dominate Middle East,” *Reuters*, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-turkey-idUSKBN0MM2N820150326>.

²⁶⁰ Ahmet Furkan Mercan, “Turkey Carries out over 90 Projects in Yemen,” *AA*, December 18, 2018, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-carries-out-over-90-projects-in-yemen/1342147>.

²⁶¹ AFAD, “Yemen Yardım Kampanyası,” AFAD, accessed March 18, 2020, <https://www.afad.gov.tr/yemene-yardim-kampanyasi>; Türk Kızılay, “Humanitarian Relief for Yemen.,” Turkish Crescent, n.d., <https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Bagis/BagisYap/51/humanitarian-relief-for-yemen>.

considerations and dynamics. On the other hand, for the Libyan War, Turkey related its national security to it. Therefore, Turkey has become a stakeholder in the crisis with its assertive foreign policy.

One of the primary results to emerge from this part is whether Turkey had any sort of intervention in this matter. As the intervention concept was identified in the introduction, how Turkey's foreign policy would be described is that it intervened in Libya with coercive tools and by invitation. On the other hand, in Yemen, it did not intervene but followed indirect foreign policy. The differences in the responses depend on Turkey's motives and objectives behind it. Therefore, this part aimed to determine the motives to examine the foreign policy behaviours of Turkey in different sub-complexes.

The motives were examined, mainly focusing on the strategic interests of Turkey in Yemen and Libya and humanitarian concerns. Firstly, the relevance of previous relations and proximity with the target country are supported. Turkey had built close ties with Libya's former government and generated projects that provide economic and political interests. Since Libya is located in the enlarged East Mediterranean region, it is part of the regional competition and possibly benefits Turkey's national interests. Compared with Libya's opportunities which could be provided to Turkey, Yemen is less attractive for Turkey. The relations onset of the Yemen Crisis was not close with Turkey, which led Turkey less directly active in responding to the war. The motives for pursuing the foreign policy built on the regional equation in general. The other regional crisis, the Syrian War, was a priority for Turkey to shape its relations with other regional actors like Saudi Arabia and Iran. Therefore, the regional rivalry and the attitudes of the regional actors in the same case were influential on Turkey's decision making in Yemen.

This chapter has also provided evidence to the argument that motives are defining the methods of the intervener. The motives of Turkey led it to be assertive or less proactive in the foreign policy decisions. In Yemen, Turkey progressed its policies with humanitarian, diplomatic, and political tools. Official statements on Saudi Arabia and Iran helped us examine Turkey's position for the Yemen case. In contrast to the

Yemen Case, Turkey used diplomatic and military tools to be involved in the Libyan crisis. To keep the relations alive, it followed biased policies by supporting the GNA government.



CHAPTER 4

IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN YEMEN AND LIBYA WARS

Iran is an actor in the Middle East Regional Security Complex with strong enmity and amity relations with other regional actors. This chapter presents Iran's position in the Middle East region firstly and its role in the balance of the reshaped region after the Arab Uprisings. Iran pursued an active foreign policy in the Arab Uprisings process. So, the chapter follows with Iran's foreign policy decisions towards wars in Libya and Yemen, considering its motives and tools that are used in decision making.

4.1 Iranian Position Before and During the Arab Uprisings in the Middle East Region

According to the security complex theory of Buzan and Waever and the geographical proximity, high level of security interdependency with other regional countries, and long-lasting enmity-amity patterns of relations, Iran has been part of the MERSC. It is one of the stakeholders influencing the dynamics of the region. Explaining Iran's position and relations with other regional states are essential in addressing Iran's motives in regional foreign policy decisions. This part demonstrates Iran's characteristics as a regional actor and previous relations with the other regional countries.

After the Islamic Revolution, the foreign policy of Iran has dramatically changed. The exportation of the revolution and becoming the Islamic countries' leader and protector evolved into one of the main goals. On the other hand, Iran followed a non-alignment policy in the Cold War to curb the influence of superpowers in the region²⁶². After

²⁶² Özüm Sezin Uzun and Muharrem Ekşi, "Continuities and Changes in Iran's Foreign Policy: Analysis of Syrian Case," *ANKASAM Regional Studies Journal* 1, no. 3 (2017): 208.

the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, the foreign policy patterns morphed into pragmatic ones to end the isolation from the international community by putting economic interests into priority. This policy continued until the 9/11 attacks and the 2003 Iraq war. The US coalition group obliterated Saddam's 30-year Sunni government in 2003. The removal of the Saddam regime constituted new power structures and the role of actors in the region. Iraq's traditional Sunni minority's power was replaced by the Shia majority administration²⁶³. The new geopolitics provided Iran to play an influential role and be involved in Iraq's internal dynamics²⁶⁴. Iraq's new Shiite government need the support of Iran in terms of economy and military²⁶⁵ because of the fact that the new government was not welcomed by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni governments. It used its close ties with Iran to provide Iraq strategic leverage in its regional and international affairs. Rising in Shia power, considering Hezbollah in Lebanon, Assad administration in Syria, Iraq's consolidation of the Sunni Arabs, and Israel's fear of coalition of Shia factions in the Persian Gulf, made Iran become able to control so-called "Shia Crescent" and regional dynamics²⁶⁶. For instance, it provides aid to Hezbollah and Hamas to alter the regional dynamics. In the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war, Hezbollah's victory led Iran to gain legitimacy in the eye of Arab populations as a supporter of Palestine²⁶⁷. Iran's sphere of influence has broadened especially in the Gulf after the 2000s. Its aspiration to be an influential actor in the region and its nuclear energy projects and growing military power were regarded as regional threat and aggression. As Ehteshami argued in his work, after the Iraq War, the role of Iran in the Lebanon crisis demonstrated how easily Iran reached the Arab East. Although Iran has been in relation with Hezbollah

²⁶³ Kayhan Barzegar, "Iran, the Middle East, and International Security," *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 1, no. 1 (2009): 32.

²⁶⁴ Mahjoob Zweiri, "Yemen in the Context of Iran-Gulf Relations," in *Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis*, ed. Helen Lackner and Daniel Martin Varisco (Gerlach Press, 2018), 85.

²⁶⁵ Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran's Regional Politics since the End of Cold War," in *Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics*, ed. Ali Gheissari, 2009, 336.

²⁶⁶ Barzegar, "Iran, the Middle East, and International Security," 36.

²⁶⁷ Ehteshami, "Iran's Regional Politics since the End of Cold War," 340.

for years, with the 2006 war, Iran's capability to involvement and change the course of events in favour of its interest were shown²⁶⁸.

After the eruption of the Arab Uprisings, the dynamics of the region have changed. Iran's national security and regional aspirations were shaped around developments in the region. Its attitude towards the Arab countries has been highly affected by the current context, which created significant security interdependency.

At the first stage of the uprisings, the protests were viewed as "Islamic Awakening," as it happened in Iran in 1979²⁶⁹. However, Iran's responses to uprisings in different countries were not the same. While it was supporting the Egyptian and Tunisian revolution and giving support to the protestors' will, by contrast, in Syria, the regime has been propped against the rebellion group. Iran adopted a foreign policy based upon its regional interests that Tehran used its anti-imperialist and Shia discourse to reach²⁷⁰.

Iran was involved in the Syrian crisis, both diplomatically and militarily, using cultural and sectarian bonds. Shiite Hezbollah forces in Syria were funded by Iran in favour of the Syrian regime. Other Shia groups in the Arab Uprisings, such as Yemen and Bahrain, were supported against the authorities as well. Iran's policies have been considered to promote instability and insecurity in the region's eye, Sunni GCC countries significantly²⁷¹.

The interdependence of geographically proximate states shapes up Iran's behavioural patterns regarding its territorial unity and security. Some of Iran's neighbouring countries have been in inside conflict. American military existence in Iraq, the

²⁶⁸ Ehteshami, 336.

²⁶⁹ Uzun and Ekşi, "Continuities and Changes in Iran's Foreign Policy: Analysis of Syrian Case," 213.

²⁷⁰ Tugba Bayar, "Multiple Dualities: Seeking the Patterns in Iran's Foreign Policy," *All Azimuth* 8, no. 1 (2019): 47–48.

²⁷¹ Jianwei Han and Hassan Hakimian, "The Regional Security Complex in the Persian Gulf : The Contours of Iran ' s GCC Policy," *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* 0, no. 0 (2019): 497, <https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2019.1682300>.

previous war between Iran-Iraq, and the dispute with the Gulf countries precipitated Iran to securitize its foreign policy over the region. Especially after the Arab Spring, Lebanon's Hezbollah was considered an ally to cooperate in the Syrian conflict²⁷². In order to involve in regional affairs and protect its security, Iran sent the regime's troops to conflictual zones and supported allied actors with military equipment. Security of Syria and Iraq have been highly influential in the national security and regional patterns of Iran²⁷³. As an immediate neighbour state, security dimension within Turkey is also at stake, considering forced migration and violence of armed groups in the Syrian conflict. Therefore, the failed and conflict-prone states around Iran are the prominent actors for its assertive foreign policy.

The other dimension of the regional complex is enmity-amity relation patterns that led to power struggles. Iran has enmity relations with politically and ideologically differentiated Saudi-led southern Gulf states and Israel respectively. The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia escalated with the Arab Uprisings and has been one of the vital issues affecting regional security. For instance, Iran and Saudi Arabia supported opposite groups in the Yemeni, Libyan, and Syrian wars²⁷⁴. Also, the Shia populations in Bahrain started to protest during the uprisings and were militarily suppressed by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia narrated that these protests had been prompted by Iran. The officials depicted Iran as a regional threat due to its regional hegemony ambitions with the Shia solidarity agenda²⁷⁵. Both blocks accused each other of pursuing sectarian aims through the region. Iran has been a significant regional actor of the MERSC with its active foreign policy and long-lasting enmity relations.

²⁷² Mehran Kamrava, *The International Politics of Persian Gulf* (Syracuse University Press, 2011), 185–86.

²⁷³ Hazal Muslu El Berni, "Iran's Security Dilemma in The Middle East: A Neorealist Approach to Iran's Foreign Policy in Syria," *The Journal of Iranian Studies* 1, no. 2 (2017): 132.

²⁷⁴ Han and Hakimian, "The Regional Security Complex in the Persian Gulf : The Contours of Iran ' s GCC Policy," 494.

²⁷⁵ Ruth Hanau Santini, "A New Regional Cold War in the Middle East and North Africa : Regional Security Complex Theory Revisited," *The International Spectator* 52, no. 4 (2017): 104.

In the following section, Iran's relations with the two crucial wars, Yemen and Libya, will be examined. Iran's motives and methods for identifying foreign policy will also be elaborated.

4.2. Iran's Relations with Libya

4.2.1. Iran-Libya Pre-War Relations

In 1979, Islamic Revolution took place in Iran. The revolution entailed radical changes in both domestic rules, legislations and foreign policy of Iran. The regime adopted an Islamic perspective and non-western oriented ideology of management. In line with this, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi supported the Iranian revolution. Gaddafi was also against western hegemony in the region and claimed that they could stand against the US dominance as regional countries²⁷⁶. The political rapprochement between Iran and Libya started with the revolution since they shared a common perspective on the Western world. In 1980, Saddam, former leader of Iraq, waged war against Iran, which continued for the subsequent eight years. During the war, Iraq broke ties with the Qaddafi regime due to its support for Iran. Even ambassadors of Libya were called to leave Baghdad to restrain all the diplomatic relations²⁷⁷. The political support of Gaddafi during the war led to maintain warm relations with Iran.

On the other hand, one of the Shia clerics of Lebanon disappeared in Libya, which caused to restrain relations between Libya and Iran. The cleric Musa al-Sadr was a significant figure for Lebanon's Hezbollah, an Iran-affiliated armed group. Once he travelled to Libya, he was kidnapped, and since that time, no news has been received on the cleric²⁷⁸. Gaddafi's reluctance to solve this incident's obscurity had always

²⁷⁶ Oriana Fallaci, "Iranians Are Our Brothers," *The New York Times*, December 16, 1979, <https://www.nytimes.com/1979/12/16/archives/iranians-are-our-brothers-an-interview-with-col-muammar-elqaddafi.html>.

²⁷⁷ "Iraq Breaks Ties With Libya Over Support for Iran," *Los Angeles Times*, June 27, 1985, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-06-27-mn-10776-story.html>.

²⁷⁸ The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Mūsā Al-Ṣadr," Britannica, accessed January 28, 2021, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Musa-al-Sadr>.

been an affair in bilateral meetings. Iran is still willing to get information about the fate of Musa Sadr from Libya in 2020²⁷⁹. However, the shared values on regional and international dynamics like membership in OPEC, non-western and anti-Zionist views paved the way for keeping political and economic relations.

In the 2000s, the two countries had smooth relations to augment cooperation in various areas. High-level diplomatic meetings were held. In 2006 Libyan ambassadors and Iranian foreign minister met to cooperate in oil and gas exploration and nuclear non-proliferation with also giving place to their concerns on Musa Sadr and oppressed Palestinians during the meeting²⁸⁰. In order to ascend the ties in economy and culture, the two countries signed ten agreements in 2007, during Iran's vice president's trip to Libya. They agreed to expand their cooperation in Africa and Latin American regions²⁸¹. In the following years, the meetings were kept to further cooperation in oil, and gas projects and development projects in Libya by emphasizing their common ground on the Islamic view and the significance of the revolution²⁸².

When the UN-imposed sanctions on Iran for nuclear proliferation, Gaddafi supported Iran's right to proceed with its nuclear program. nuclear sanctions' adaption was on the agenda in 2008 at the UN Security Council meeting that Libya chaired. Libya stated that Libya would be "constructive" dealing with Iran's nuclear program case; however, further sanctions would be "uncomfortable"²⁸³. Along with the international area, Gaddafi's support continued in Iran's domestic affairs. In 2009, Iran had an

²⁷⁹ "Spokesman: Iran Deems Case of Imam Musa Al-Sadr as Important," *Fars News Agency*, August 29, 2020, <https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/13990608000436/Spkesman-Iran-Deems-Case-f-Imam-Msa-Al-Sadr-as-Impran>.

²⁸⁰ "Confer Envoy Libyan Muttaki," *IRNA*, July 12, 2006, <https://en.irna.ir/news/8903902/confer-envoy-Libyan-Mottaki>.

²⁸¹ "Iran and Libya Sign 10 Cooperation Agreements," *Payvand*, December 29, 2007, <http://www.payvand.com/news/07/dec/1274.html>.

²⁸² "Iran, Libya to Expand Cultural, Political and Economic Ties," *IRNA*, January 16, 2010, <https://en.irna.ir/news/8564577/ties-cultural-and-political-economic-expand-to-Libya-Iran>; Tehran Times Economic Desk, "Libya Beckons Iranian Investment," *Tehran Times*, January 17, 2010, <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/212297/Libya-beckons-Iranian-investment>.

²⁸³ Louis Charbonneau, "Libya Hesitant on New Iran Sanctions at U.N.," *Reuters*, January 4, 2008, <https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-31235420080103>.

election period that ended with Ahmadinejad's victory. Iranians put the validity of the election under question, and this proceeded with the Green Movement²⁸⁴. Gaddafi congratulated the new leadership period of Ahmadinejad and supported his promises²⁸⁵.

The relations up to Arab Spring were neither close nor chaotic. Both sides tried to increase the cooperation and solidarity through diplomatic meetings. Notwithstanding, Gaddafi was seen as a dictatorial leader by Iranian officials, and he would be a threat to regional affairs. With the eruption of upheavals, violence against the opposition groups escalated. Iran criticized the oppressive behaviours of Gaddafi; as the Jerusalem's Post news, Khamanei said, "We condemn 100 percent how Gaddafi was and is dealing with the people ... the killing of civilians". Although Iran sided with Libyan people to gain their wants, it was opposed to NATO intervention. Ayatollah accused NATO of being after the oil sources and indifferent to people²⁸⁶. They encouraged the Libyan people and praised their acts as heroic. Iran emphasized that they are ready to help with the democratic transition process²⁸⁷.

Iran was not active in the Libyan War for years. Recently, it became involved with diplomatic and political attempts. The motives and methods behind its foreign policy decision towards Libya will be examined in the following parts.

4.2.2. Iran's Motives for its Policy Towards the Libya Crisis

Although Iran was close to the new government earlier in the revolutionary process after the civil war eruption in Libya, Iran's policy became limited. In the last two

²⁸⁴ Robert F. Worth and Nazila Fathi, "Protests Flare in Tehran as Opposition Disputes Vote," *New York Times*, May 13, 2009, <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14iran.html>.

²⁸⁵ "Libyan Leader Congratulates Ahmadinejad," *Tehran Times*, August 17, 2009, <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/201131/Libyan-leader-congratulates-Ahmadinejad>.

²⁸⁶ Reuters Staff, "Iran's Khamenei: West Should Arm Rebels, Not Bomb Libya," *The Jerusalem Post*, March 21, 2011, <https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Irans-Khamenei-West-should-arm-rebels-not-bomb-Libya>.

²⁸⁷ "Larijani: I Hope a Popular Government Will Come to Power in Libya," Islamic Consultative Assembly News Agency, 2012, <https://www.icana.ir/En/Newsamp/175974/Larijani-I-Hope-a-Popular-Government-Will-Come-to-Power-in-Libya>.

years, Iran started to take steps in building a relationship with the GNA. The motives behind Iran's policy will be explained, considering its economic drivers and regional equation. Repercussions of other crises in the region were one of the impacting factors in decision making. Iran prioritized its policies regarding its strategic interests. Libya was not a priority for Iran; however, the deteriorated economy due to the sanctions and its regional ambitions led Iran to take a position in the Libyan case with maintaining a low profile.

The regional equation concept is a primary factor for pointing out the foreign policy motives of Iran towards Libya. Since the revolution, it has had regional interests for international influence in the Middle East to transform the region according to its revolutionary image²⁸⁸. It kept its assertive Levant policy towards the shores of the East Mediterranean. After the Arab Spring, Iran started to keep a high profile in the Syrian crisis, Iraq and continued its ties with Lebanon. The Shia groups in these countries have established connections with Iran²⁸⁹. Iran has control over the East Mediterranean route and creates an expanded security buffer zones reaching Lebanon's southern borders²⁹⁰. With this strategic depth concept, Iran faces adversaries outside of its territories using Hezbollah, the Syrian and Iraqi government, and other low profile anti-Western groups²⁹¹. Hereby, Iran's influence reaches the Mediterranean Sea with its presence in Syria and Lebanon. Despite the fact that Iran has no direct relations with and concerns on national security regarding Libya, which plays a significant role in the East Mediterranean, these long-term goals in the region trigger Iran to build affiliation with it and join the Mediterranean equation and have a word in its international politics.

²⁸⁸ F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader, "Turkey and Iran in a Changing Middle East," in *Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East*, 2013, 6.

²⁸⁹ Jianwei Han and Hassan Hakimian, "The Regional Security Complex in the Persian Gulf : The Contours of Iran ' s GCC Policy The Regional Security Complex in the Persian Gulf : The Contours of Iran ' s GCC Policy," *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* 13, no. 4 (2019): 503, <https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2019.1682300>.

²⁹⁰ Kayhan Barzegar and Abdolrasool Divsallar, "Political Rationality in Iranian Foreign Policy," *Washington Quarterly* 40, no. 1 (2017): 48, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302738>.

²⁹¹ Barzegar and Divsallar, 49.

Iran's economic isolation is one of the main drivers which shapes the Iranian foreign policy agenda. It has been receiving sanctions imposed by the international community for years, especially after the Iranian Revolution. The sanctions were put on Iran's various sectors like nuclear energy and banking²⁹². In 2015, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the UN Security Council, which lifted all sanctions on trade, energy, and finance that were imposed due to Iran's nuclear program²⁹³. Although the agreement extended for ten years in 2016, Trump announced the US withdrawal and reimposed sanctions accusing Iran of violating human rights and supporting international terrorism²⁹⁴. The sanctions negatively reverberated Iran's economy. While with the JCPOA, the 7% economic growth was achieved and crude oil exports increased, after the US withdrawal, Iran's economy declined by about 8%, and the oil export rate dropped dramatically²⁹⁵. The worsening economy led Iran to seek a position in the Mediterranean region in order to curb the repercussions of the economic sanctions. Libya was a significant country in North Africa that opened an economy-related path. New energy sources were found in the East Med, and regional actors competed and cooperated to find out them. Since Libya is located geographically contiguous to research areas for gas exploration, it is significant in the competition. Therefore, this thesis argues that willingness to have a word and role in Mediterranean energy and economics would be a driver for Iran to intensify its diplomacy towards Libya in the international area which is a contributing factor to Iran's long-term East Mediterranean geopolitics.

Along with its economic concerns and regional aims, the regional rivalry has also influenced Iran to take a side in the conflicts. In regional disputes and polarization have been at stake in discussions on the wars. The external actors engaged in clashes

²⁹² Joseph Pelzman, "The Spillover Effects of The Re-Imposed United States Sanctions on Iran on MENA, The PRC, Russia, and Turkey," *Global Economy Journal* 20, no. 1 (2020): 2, <https://doi.org/10.1142/S2194565920500037>.

²⁹³ "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Vienna , 14 July 2015" (Vienna, 2015).

²⁹⁴ Paul K Kerr and Kenneth Katzman, "Iran Nuclear Agreement and U . S . Exit," *Congressional Research Service*, 2018, 22–23.

²⁹⁵ Kerr and Katzman, 51.

with the direction of their ideologies and policies. Taking account of the Libyan War, both regional and international actors were involved by supporting the conflictual groups. One alliance group consists of the UAE, Egypt and Russia, which support General Haftar, while the other group, including Turkey and Qatar, sided with the GNA. Egypt and the UAE claimed that they were against radical Islamist forces and the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya by supplying Haftar forces. According to several sources, the UAE deployed airstrikes with pro-Haftar militias²⁹⁶. In 2020, the pro-Haftar assembly announced their support to Egyptian intervention in case of need against Turkish deployment²⁹⁷, and according to the Anadolu Agency's news, Haftar forces received weapons from Egypt²⁹⁸. So, the UAE and Egypt gave open support to the LNA government. They are historically hostile to Iran because of ideological incompatibility. Iran has anti-Western policies, while the UAE and Egypt are politically close to Western countries. The adversity gave rise to Iran choosing the GNA for support in the conflict. However, the alliances with Russia in the Syrian case are one factor that put difficulties before Iran to be active in the War.

The uncertainty in Libya led Iran to take silence for a long time. In addition to its regional goals and economic difficulties, the increase in relations and cooperation with Turkey and the GNA's dominance over Libya became prominent factors for Iran to embark upon supportive diplomacy. On the other hand, Russia's position, geographical distance, and high profile in the Syrian and Yemen Wars prohibited Iran from becoming one of Libya's main actors.

4.2.3. Iran's Methods and Timing for Policy towards the Libya Crisis

²⁹⁶ Arturo Varvelli, *Foreign Actors in Libya's Crisis*, ed. Arturo Varvelli Karim Mezran (Milano: Atlantic Council, 2017), 18.

²⁹⁷ AFP, "Libya's pro-Haftar Assembly Backs Egypt Intervention If Needed," *France24*, July 14, 2020, <https://www.france24.com/en/20200714-libya-s-pro-haftar-assembly-backs-egypt-intervention-if-needed>.

²⁹⁸ Diana Shalhoub, "Libya Army Spots Arrival of Egyptian Weapons for Haftar," *Anadolu Agency*, July 15, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/libya-army-spots-arrival-of-egyptian-weapons-for-haftar/1911215>.

Libyan revolution and civil war were not Iran's priority in its foreign policy agenda. Therefore, Iran did not intervene in Libya by using hard power. Iran's tools for its role in the Libyan crisis were only soft power ones: diplomatic meetings and speeches about Libya in the media. Iranian officials emphasized the territorial integrity and national unity of the country. The policy that Iran generated was biased at the beginning of the revolutionary process by supporting rebels. During the civil war, Iran's stance was speculative in the regional arena due to the complexity of alliances between Russia, the UAE, and Turkey in the crisis. In 2020, Iran announced that they recognize GNA as the legitimate actor in Libya like Turkey. Therefore, Iran's methods on Libya have shifted from non-biased to biased.

As Iran did with respect to other protests in the region during the Arab Spring, it used the "expansion of Islamic revolution" narrative to explain the Libyan revolution. The officials congratulated the Libyan people and supported them in their attempt seeking a way to reach a democratic administration. After the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, a transition government was established. Iran recognized TNC, and Iran's former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi and TNC leader Mustafa Abdel Jalil discussed the bilateral relations²⁹⁹. In the revolutionary process, the Libyan government was also eager to strengthen the ties. Libyan Foreign Ministry Spokesman Saad al-Shalmani emphasized Iran's significance in his interview with an Iranian media source in the world³⁰⁰. Additionally, he supported the nuclear energy generation of any country, including Iran, for peaceful purposes³⁰¹.

On the other side, Vice-President Mohammad Reza Rahimi congratulated the elected president, Ali Zeidan. He expressed their "readiness to share experiences with Tripoli to reconstruct economic infrastructures in that country" in his message³⁰². For both

²⁹⁹ "Iran Reaches Out to Libya's Rebels," *VOA News*, August 29, 2011, <https://www.voanews.com/world-news/middle-east-dont-use/iran-reaches-out-libyas-rebels>.

³⁰⁰ FNA, "Saad Al-Shalmani :Libya Favors Expanded Ties with Iran," *Ahlul Bayt News Agency*, August 29, 2012, <https://en.abna24.com/service/nam/archive/2012/08/29/341219/story.html>.

³⁰¹ "Iran Felicitates Libyan PM on Election," *IRNA*, October 29, 2012, <https://en.irna.ir/news/80391588/Iran-felicitates-Libyan-PM-on-election>.

³⁰² "Iran Felicitates Libyan PM on Election."

sides, the diplomatic speeches were done in the period of the transition government. Each side was willing to forge a partnership. Iran generated a policy to support the government in diplomatic ways with Islamic narratives.

Notwithstanding, after the civil wars erupted around the region, Iran was not involved in Libyan's affairs. The Iranian embassy in Tripoli was suspended in 2012. ISIL related group attacked the Iranian ambassador's residence in Tripoli in 2015³⁰³. In this period, Iran only condemned the terrorist attacks on the Libyan people and the empty Iranian embassy³⁰⁴. Since Libya was a lesser priority for Iran on its regional agenda, the bilateral relations were lowered, and Iran was not clear was hesitant to support a group in Libya. Although Israel claimed that Iran sent anti-tank missiles to Haftar forces secretly³⁰⁵, neither Iran acknowledged it nor were the claims evidenced. However, Libya was always a case in international meetings to provide stability. After the coup attempt of Haftar, Iranian foreign minister Zarif visited Turkey to confer on bilateral and regional issues, including the Libya case in 2019³⁰⁶. Few months later, during a telephone call with Erdogan, President Rouhani expressed the importance of cooperation with Turkey for regional security. He said, "Iran and Turkey can end this unfortunate and dangerous process and settle the issues and the problems of the region and the Muslim world well."³⁰⁷. In 2020, in another meeting between foreign ministers of Turkey and Iran, Zarif reiterated the possible cooperation on regional security and stated that "We support the legitimate government in Libya, and it is able

³⁰³ Reuters Staff, "Islamic State Militants Claim Attacks on Iranian Ambassador's Residence in Libya," *Reuters*, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-iran-idUSKBN0LQ0DX20150222>.

³⁰⁴ "ISIL-Linked Group Claims Iran Embassy Attack in Libya," *Aljazeera*, February 22, 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/2/22/isil-linked-group-claims-iran-embassy-attack-in-libya>.

³⁰⁵ Betül Yuruk, "Israel Claims Iran Sent Libya's Haftar Anti-Tank Arms," *AA*, May 20, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-claims-iran-sent-libyas-haftar-anti-tank-arms/1848229>.

³⁰⁶ "Iran's Top Diplomat in Turkey to Discuss Syria, Libya," *Press Tv*, April 17, 2019, <https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2019/04/17/593615/Iran-Turkey-Syria-peace-initiative-Astana-process-Ankara-Assad>.

³⁰⁷ "Iran-Turkey Cooperation Vital for Region's Stability, Security: President Rouhani," *IRNA*, June 8, 2019, <https://en.irna.ir/news/83344577/Iran-Turkey-cooperation-vital-for-region-s-stability-security>.

to end the ongoing war. We have common views with the Turkish side on ways to end the crisis in Libya and Yemen.”³⁰⁸. Later, he said they recognized and supported the GNA and invited every group to a political solution³⁰⁹.

In October, a ceasefire was achieved with the UN’s effort, which Iran welcomed and hoped to be long-lasting³¹⁰. The bilateral relations started to be built with the attempt of ambassadors. In 2021, the Iranian ambassador met with Libyan FM to cooperate in various areas by emphasizing “historical and brotherly and Islamic ties” between them³¹¹. The Islamic discourse and anti-American approach were placed in diplomatic speeches of Iranian officials. For instance, an Iranian parliamentary official accused the US of involvement in Libya to cause destabilization in the region and call for diplomatic solutions only³¹².

Iran determined its policy by considering its relations with other regional actors and their links by only discourses. Non-Western views and Islamic approaches were used in building the ties, and a low-profile policy was followed to the Libyan crisis. However, in 2020, Iran’s announcement of its side and readiness to cooperate with Turkey were expected that Iran would become more active in regional affairs.

4.3. Iranian Policy Towards Yemen

³⁰⁸ “Iran FM Voices Support for Turkey-Backed Libya Government,” *Middle East Monitor*, June 17, 2020, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200617-iran-fm-voices-support-for-turkey-backed-libya-government/>.

³⁰⁹ Mehmet Kurşun, “İran, Suudi Arabistan ile Ön Koşulsuz Diyaloga Hazır,” *Anadolu Agency*, June 22, 2020, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/iran-suudi-arabistan-ile-on-kosulsuz-diyaloga-hazir/1885799>.

³¹⁰ “Iran Welcomes Ceasefire Deal between Libya’s Warring Factions,” *Tehran Times*, October 25, 2020, <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/453877/Iran-welcomes-ceasefire-deal-between-Libya-s-warring-factions>.

³¹¹ “Iran’s Ambassador Submits Credentials to Libyan Presidential Council Chief,” *Tehran Times*, January 24, 2021, <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/457333/Iran-s-ambassador-submits-credentials-to-Libyan-Presidential>.

³¹² “Amir-Abdollahian Warns of US ‘Destabilizing Efforts’ in Libya,” April 7, 2019, <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/143825/Amir-Abdollahian-warns-of-US-destabilizing-efforts-in-Libya>.

4.3.1. Iran -Yemen Pre-War Relations

Iranian revolution brought Iran to have an Islamic identity, which also connects the other Muslims, predominantly Shia communities. Yemen also has a Shia population, most of which are from the Houthi tribe. After the revolution in Iran, Houthi family members frequently visited Qum for religious education and discussions³¹³. Meanwhile, Yemen's and Iran's governments had cordial relations with having cooperation in trade and customs³¹⁴. In 2004, they signed several agreements to elevate the cooperation in economic and cultural areas³¹⁵. Following years, high-level meetings were held to keep the existing relations and improve the ties. Along with bilateral ties, Yemen was significant for Iran regarding regional issues. For instance, the former FM of Iran pointed out the role of Yemen in the Palestinian cause indicating its initiative to reconcile Palestinians³¹⁶ and the importance of cooperation in the region's Muslim countries when he visited Yemen in 2008³¹⁷. The political and economic ties led Yemen to support the nuclear energy work of Iran in the international area. Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh defended the Iran's right of owning nuclear energy for peaceful purposes³¹⁸.

On the other hand, despite some positive relations, after 2004 Yemeni government was intolerable toward Iran's support Houthis. It has always presented Iran as a power that supports Houthi rebels and other regional non-state actors with the eagerness of exporting its political values and influence on Arab heartland³¹⁹. The Yemeni

³¹³ The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), "Yemen," in *Iran's Networks of Influence in the Middle East* (Routledge, 2020), 77.

³¹⁴ The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 161.

³¹⁵ IRNA, "Iran, Yemen Ink Seven Agreements on Various Fields," *IRNA*, June 22, 2004, <https://en.irna.ir/news/8940986/fields-various-on-agreements-seven-ink-Yemen-Iran>.

³¹⁶ SABA, "Iranian Foreign Minister Arrives in Yemen," *Yemen News Agency (SABA)*, April 10, 2008, <https://www.saba.ye/en/news151471.htm>.

³¹⁷ IRNA, "Iran-Yemen-Relations," *IRNA*, February 3, 2008, <https://en.irna.ir/news/8895364/Iran-Yemen-Relations-POL>.

³¹⁸ SABA, "President Saleh Stresses Iran's Right of Owning Nuclear Energy," *Yemen News Agency (SABA)*, January 31, 2008, <https://www.saba.ye/en/news146223.htm>.

³¹⁹ Zweiri, "Yemen in the Context of Iran-Gulf Relations," 86.

government often denounced the Iranian interference in Yemen's internal affairs while the Iranian foreign minister rejected the accusations³²⁰. The Iranian hospital was suspended due to the Iranians' help to Houthi rebels and providing intelligence services³²¹. After that, one Iranian boat was seized due to carrying Iranian weapons to rebel groups, according to Yemeni officials. As to the UN Security Council's Iran Sanctions report in 2015, Iran has helped Yemeni rebels since 2009. In 2011 another Iranian fishing vessel was sealed off by Yemeni officials and "found to be carrying 900 Iranian-made anti-tank and anti-helicopter rockets"³²².

Iran sustained its ties with both the Yemeni government and Houthi rebel groups during the conflict period. The FM always emphasized their respect for Yemen's national unity and pursued peace for both sides with a cordial relationship until the outbreak of the Arab Spring. Tehran increased its support to the Houthis onset of war and toppling of the president in 2014. In the following parts, Iran's motives, and methods in policy decisions towards Yemen will be explained.

4.3.2. Iran's Motives for its Policy Towards the Yemen Crisis

The Yemen war is generally presented as a proxy war between historical rivals -Saudi Arabia and Iran- by Saudi Arabia, the US, and the Yemeni government. However, in contrast to Saudi and the US media claims, Iran does not seem to be a gamechanger in the Yemen crisis. It has limited influence on Houthis and changes in the situation of Yemen. Although Yemen is not a priority for Iran, Iran was involved in the conflict process and supported the Houthi rebel group³²³. The motives behind Iran's act on

³²⁰ Sudarsan Raghavan, "Yemen Denounces Iranian 'interference' in Its Internal Affairs," *Washington Post*, November 11, 2009, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/11/AR2009111126674.html>.

³²¹ AFP, "Forces Surround Yemen Hospital," *The National News*, October 13, 2009, <https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/forces-surround-yemen-hospital-1.504272>.

³²² Juneau, "Iran's Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen : A Limited Return on a Modest Investment," 656.

³²³ Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, "Yemen : An Opportunity for Iran – Saudi Dialogue ?," *The Washington Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (2016): 155.

Yemen are varied. In this part, Iranian policy's reasons towards the Yemen war will be explained by considering humanitarian purposes, which Iranian officials uttered, and strategic interests considering the national interests and regional aims.

The first motive is the humanitarian concerns of Iran if it is limited and not a prior one. In 2015, Saudi Arabia started a military intervention in Yemen with a culmination in many Yemeni people's death. Iranian officials accused Saudi Arabia to harm civilians and the country's institutions, and the intervention was condemned. Therefore, the officials announced a program for building peace with a four-point program to the UN. In the program, the FM Zarif mentioned the humanitarian crisis in Yemen "This critical situation is escalating and the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is approaching catastrophic dimensions"³²⁴ to demonstrate the need for dialogue and peace. The officials emphasized their willingness to protect territorial integrity and unification in accord with supporting the ceasefire between the units. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Abbas Mousavi said, "Iran supports united Yemen and its effort in preserving its territorial integrity"³²⁵. Taking the officials' explanations into account, Iran's policy included humanitarian purposes and protecting territorial integrity.

The other type of motive is the strategic interests of Iran. From the national level perspective, one of Iran's significant issues is that it sees itself as economically isolated in the international area³²⁶. The US's embargo on its economy put pressure on the country and caused the economy to be disrupted. Internationally, financial limitations paved the way for isolation. Another reason for isolation would be the war experience with Iraq as a neighbouring country that attacked Iran in 1980 and led to a war that lasted for eight years. The war caused devastating results for Iran and impacted its threat perception. The feeling of being isolated influenced the decision-

³²⁴ Louis Charbonneau, "Iran Submits Four-Point Yemen Peace Plan to United Nations," *Reuters*, April 17, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-iran-idUSKBN0N823820150417>.

³²⁵ Journalist ID: 2374, "Mousavi: Iran Supports Yemeni Solidarity, Territorial Integrity," *IRNA*, April 29, 2020, <https://en.irna.ir/news/83769767/Mousavi-Iran-supports-Yemeni-solidarity-territorial-integrity>.

³²⁶ Esfandiary and Tabatabai, "Yemen : An Opportunity for Iran – Saudi Dialogue ?," 160.

making process throughout the region. Iran followed a policy to expand the national self-defense area and curbed the isolation. Therefore, it aimed to become a stakeholder in neighbouring countries, Syria and Iraq, along with Lebanon with cooperating with like-minded actors. The non-state actors are generally willing to cooperate with Iran like Hezbollah in Lebanon, rather than state actors³²⁷. It is the same in Yemen; to increase its bonds, Iran cooperates with the Ansarullah (Houthis) group to have long term influence.

Iran's national ideology indicates that the Shiite Islamic state of Iran is the Islamic world leader that also takes sides with non-Muslims in case of oppression³²⁸. This ideology of Iran, placed in the constitution, is a driver of international influence over the region. Considering Yemen, although the crisis is not based upon sectarian differences, and it is a reflection of the power struggles of the groups, the sectarian differences were used as means. Saudi Arabia alleged Iran in imposing a Shia policy in Yemen to mobilize the Houthis³²⁹. The Houthi group is mainly Zaydis, which are counted as Shia but alike with the Iranian understanding of Twelver Shiism. Anyhow, there established religious ties as well. Iran used Shia doctrine as a soft power to create a channel to communicate and link with the oppressed Houthis as a non-state actor of Yemen, although to a lesser extent than Saudi Arabia has claimed. The group also has similar slogans like the Iranian revolutionary mind, which is against the Western hegemony, Israel's activities, and any oppression of Muslims. The like-minded discourses made Houthis an attractive and cooperative partner for Iran.

Escalation of disorder in Yemen, which gave opportunities for the external powers to intervene in, attracted Iran's attention. The new government by president Hadi did not meet the demand of the Houthis, and the group thought their rights were abused³³⁰.

³²⁷ Esfandiary and Tabatabai, 160.

³²⁸ Barzegar, Morteza, and Dinan, "Iran's Political Stance toward Yemen's Ansar Allah Movement : A Constructivist-Based Study," 79.

³²⁹ May Darwich, "The Saudi Intervention in Yemen: Struggling for Status," *Insight Turkey* 20, no. 2 (2018): 129, <https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2018202.08>.

³³⁰ Juneau, "Iran ' s Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen : A Limited Return on a Modest Investment," 656.

Political tension increased with this incomppliance. After the Houthis toppling the government, Saudi Arabia militarily intervened in 2015 and began to attack Houthis. Therefore, Houthis also looked for an external ally against the Saudi attacks and alliances of the US and Yemeni governments³³¹. The demand of the group paved the way for Iran's policy-shaping; thus, it was in line with its constitution, which was against Western dominance and gave a mission to protect the oppressed ones.

The historical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is another driver regarding their contrasting regional security perceptions. The intervention of Saudi Arabia with the pretext of curbing Iranian influence in Yemen and throughout the region paved the way for Iran to take counteraction. The Saudi intervention was interpreted as causing more chaos and manipulating regional security³³². Iran considered that Saudi Arabia was trying to sustain the status quo that the US and Saudi elites dominated the region after the Arab Spring protests. On the other hand, Iran was against this status quo and Western domination as it has been after the revolution. In order to balance the Saudi move, Iran got close to its Houthi allies to stand against the rival alliance³³³. Also, Saudi Arabia's attacks lost its reputation in the region due to the cause of civilians. The situation has turned in favour of Iran to take action as a balancing and humanitarian actor³³⁴.

To sum up, the role of Iran in Yemen was motivated by various reasons. The national self-defence strategy and ideology were triggered Iran to have a role even it was only limited. The reciprocal interests of Houthis and Iran, their like-mindedness led Iran to be allied with the rebel group and tried to imply balance in the regional order against Saudi Arabia's interests.

³³¹ Juneau, 660.

³³² Barzegar, Morteza, and Dinan, "Iran's Political Stance toward Yemen's Ansar Allah Movement : A Constructivist-Based Study," 80.

³³³ Juneau, "Iran ' s Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen : A Limited Return on a Modest Investment," 660.

³³⁴ Elisabeth Kendall, "Iran's Fingerprints in Yemen: Real or Imagined," *Atlantic C*, 2017, 4.

4.3.3. Iran's Methods and Timing for Policy Towards the Yemen Crisis

With the Arab Spring protests, Yemen got into a revolutionary process, and in 2012, the president changed. However, the Houthi movement was not satisfied with the new government. They called the president to resign and then took over the control. After this coup, Iranian influence and support to the Houthi movement have increased despite it is still restricted. The methods that Iran used on its Yemen involvement are both soft and hard power tools. The sectarian and cultural ties were used to keep interacting with the non-state actor of Yemen in addition to the political discourse of the Iranian regime on the support of the Houthis. For hard power, Iran was not directly involved in the Yemen crisis with its military forces, but it provided military equipment to the Houthis' armed forces. Iran's foreign policy was biased. It took sides with Houthis against the new government.

As it was referred to in the previous section, after the Iranian Islamic revolution, Iran started using religious commonalities, precisely Shia doctrine and anti-western perception, to influence the countries in the region and expand its revolutionary ideology. It supported mainly the Muslims or oppressed, and dissatisfied groups of a nation or groups opposed to Western domination and Saudi and Israel partnership³³⁵. Iran became an ally with them which means that the supported groups did not need to be Shi'i.

Regarding the Yemen case, the non-state actors are the Houthi group, supported mainly through Zaydis³³⁶. The oppression against the Zaydis led them to mobilize against the Saudi backed Yemeni government³³⁷. The movement's slogan is close to that of Iran: "God is great. Death to America. Death to Israel. A curse on the Jews.

³³⁵ Juneau, "Iran's Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen : A Limited Return on a Modest Investment," 648–49.

³³⁶ Maria-louise Clausen, "Understanding the Crisis in Yemen : Evaluating Competing Narratives," *The International Spectator* 50, no. 3 (2015): 22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2015.1053707>.

³³⁷ Clausen, 23.

Victory to Islam.”³³⁸. With their criticism of the US and Saudi Arabia, they gained an attraction to Iran. The previous ties built with religious context also helped increasing relations between Iran and the Houthis. However, Yemen was not a priority for Iran, and the Zaydis were, despite being part of the Shia sect, divergent from Iran’s Twelver Shia doctrine. Iran politically supported the Houthi protestors in Yemen. When Houthis took over Sanaa, Rouhani said it is a “brilliant and resounding victory.”³³⁹ Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also supports the protests periodically and condemns the Saudi intervention in Yemen. The intervention was displayed as Saudi Arabia’s wrongdoing and threats to the Yemeni people. Ali Larijani, the speaker of parliament, also condemned Saudi attacks in 2015 and said, “Our support for the Yemeni people is an Islamic support”³⁴⁰. Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, a former Iranian FM official, also described Iran’s act on the protests in 2013 as “its basis is land its base is lack of foreign intervention and domestic dialogue for reform.”³⁴¹. Iran used Islamic and anti-western discourses to support the Houthi movement.

In 2015, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, sent a letter to the UN secretary, which contained a four steps program for solving the Yemeni problem. He condemned Saudi intervention and offered a dialogue between the groups for a political solution. The officials emphasized the harm of military involvement³⁴². In press conferences, the Iranian government officials also advocated Yemen’s territorial integrity and the essentiality of the provision of peace³⁴³. In the 2018 Stockholm Conference, the deputy of Iran said, “It shows that both sides understand the

³³⁸ Charles Schmitz, “The Rise of Yemen’s Houthi Rebels,” *BBC World News*, February 28, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31645145>.

³³⁹ Juneau, “Iran’s Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen : A Limited Return on a Modest Investment,” 658.

³⁴⁰ Barzegar, Morteza, and Dinan, “Iran’s Political Stance toward Yemen’s Ansar Allah Movement : A Constructivist-Based Study,” 79.

³⁴¹ Barzegar, Morteza, and Dinan, 80.

³⁴² Charbonneau, “Iran Submits Four-Point Yemen Peace Plan to United Nations.”

³⁴³ IRNA, “Iran Supports Yemeni Territorial Integrity: Dy FM,” *IRNA*, January 25, 2015, <https://en.irna.ir/news/81478926/Iran-supports-Yemeni-territorial-integrity-dy-FM>.

catastrophic situation faced by the innocent people of Yemen as a result of the conflict” for the ceasefire between the groups³⁴⁴.

After 2015, Iran continued expanding its influence and ideology through the media even though it is limited. In 2015, the first direct flights began between Iran and Yemen, and many Houthi members visited Iran³⁴⁵. Iran-based channel “Al-Alam” started to broadcast in Yemen by criticizing the Yemeni government and the US policies³⁴⁶. The Houthi delegates visited Iran frequently, and it is reported in the Iranian agency that, in addition to Iranian institutions in Yemen, Houthis demanded the establishment of Iranian cultural centres and services³⁴⁷. According to the Middle East Institute’s report, Iran established cultural centres and Persian literature schools and academic programs at Yemeni universities during the civil war period³⁴⁸.

The policy of Iran also consists of material support to the Houthis. Houthis confirmed the Iranian regime to financially supports them, and the movement’s delegates declared that Iran pledged for economic aid package and construction of institutions³⁴⁹. While Iran denied the allegations of military help to Houthis, a UN panel of experts on Yemen reported Iran’s financial and military support, which the scale of aid is unknown³⁵⁰. The report directed that “Some of those weapons have

³⁴⁴ Maimaitiming Yilixiati, “Iran Voices Support for Yemen Peace Talks in Stockholm,” *Anadolu Agency*, December 14, 2018, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-voices-support-for-yemen-peace-talks-in-stockholm/1339341>.

³⁴⁵ Aljazeera Arabic, “وصول أول رحلة جوية مباشرة من إيران إلى اليمن,” *Aljazeera*, 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2015/3/1/وصول-أول-رحلة-جوية-مباشرة-من-إيران-إلى-اليمن>.

³⁴⁶ Juneau, “Iran ’ s Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen : A Limited Return on a Modest Investment,” 658.

³⁴⁷ AA, “Houthis Ask Iran to Establish Cultural Centers in Yemen,” *Anadolu Agency*, March 7, 2015, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/houthis-ask-iran-to-establish-cultural-centers-in-yemen/68913>.

³⁴⁸ Feierstein and Koontz, “Iran Ramps Up Its Exchange Programs for the Houthis in Yemen.”

³⁴⁹ Al Jazeera, “Houthis Say They Have Secured Aid Package from Iran,” *Al Jazeera*, March 14, 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/3/14/houthis-say-they-have-secured-aid-package-from-iran>.

³⁵⁰ United Nations Security Council, “Letter Dated 27 January 2020 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council The,” *UN*, vol. 8, 2020, 8, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300030599>.

technical characteristics similar to arms manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, referring to Houthis’ weapons³⁵¹. According to the US report, Iranian weapon ships to Yemen were seized several times³⁵². UN panel of experts traced “supply to the Houthis of unmanned aerial vehicles and a mixing machine for rocket fuel” and found that Iranian origin individuals and entities financed them³⁵³. In support of the UN report, the UAE Presidential Guard forces intercepted military UAVs, determined as Iran manufactured weapons in 2017 up to the Conflict Armament Research report³⁵⁴. The US intelligence services said the Revolutionary Guards were training and equipping the Houthis armed forces³⁵⁵. These reports and news indicate the Iranian existence in Yemen through its military and financial backing to Yemeni rebel forces even though Iran has limited capacity to be involved directly in the crisis. Also, it is known that indirect way, Iran’s proxies like Hezbollah are involved in the crisis by supporting and training the Houthis. Iran-affiliated Hezbollah helped Houthis for guerilla war. Hezbollah’s leader Nasrallah emphasized their expertise in guerilla strategy, which is a model for non-state actors. Houthis also confirmed the help of Hezbollah in conferring each other’s ideology and experiences³⁵⁶.

In contrast to Iranian assertions, the reports demonstrate the Iranian military and financial assistance to Houthis. Along with the political discourses and supports, Iran increased to provide material equipment and training to Houthis directly or indirectly. Despite the increased aid, Iran’s influence on Yemeni dynamics stayed limited since

³⁵¹ United Nations Security Council, 8:2.

³⁵² Peter Bergen, “US Intercepts Multiple Shipments of Iranian Weapons Going to Houthis in Yemen,” *CNN*, October 29, 2016, <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/28/politics/us-intercepts-iranian-weapons/index.html>.

³⁵³ United Nations Security Council, “Letter Dated 25 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” *UN*, vol. 00348, 2019, 40.

³⁵⁴ Conflict Armament Research, “Iranian Technology Transfers to Yemen,” *Conflict Armament Research*, no. February (2017): 2–3.

³⁵⁵ Warren Strobel and Mark Hosenball, “Elite Iranian Guards Training Yemen’s Houthis: U.S. Officials,” *Reuters*, March 28, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-houthis-iran-idUSKBN0MN2MI20150327>.

³⁵⁶ Esfandiary and Tabatabai, “Yemen : An Opportunity for Iran – Saudi Dialogue ?,” 165.

Yemen was not a priority for Iran and Iran's presence in Syria and Iraq's ongoing wars.

4.4. Conclusions

This chapter of the thesis has shown Iran's foreign policy attitudes towards Yemen and Libya Wars. Iran has been a regional actor in the Middle East Security Complex. Its national security is interlinked to the other state's securities in the region. It has close connections with the actors of neighbouring states to be involved in internal affairs; thus, it can protect its self-interests and security. From this perception, one finding is that it is vital to export Iran's revolutionary view and compress Western dominance throughout the region. However, the responses to the crisis are different in a number of respects. Considering various dimensions, Iran is involved in the Yemen Crisis more than the Libyan War. Geographical proximity, ideologic connections, and previous relations help understand the motives and methods behind Iran's behaviours and their differences respectively.

The first thing that should be analyzed is the existence of intervention. Iran did not officially intervene neither in Yemen nor in Libya. It is inferred that Iran progressed active foreign policy towards Yemen while persuasion of policies was limited in Libya. The involvement in Yemen was through tangible and intangible sources. Thus, Iranian existence was presented as crucial in the eye of Western media. This thesis complies with the information that argues Iran's existence as limited in Yemen and not as an intervenor. One result is that Iran is active in the two crises with different levels due to divergent motives.

The motives of Iran are shaped around its strategic interests and humanitarian concerns. One strategic interest is based on national concerns related to its economy. The economic sanctions imposed on Iran paved the way for Iran to have economic struggles and be isolated from the international market. This limitation is one motive to increase its activities in multiple countries and participate in regional competition in the East Med. The other motive is previous cultural and ideological ties that make Iran be in close link with the oppressed groups. For instance, Houthis in Yemen are previously, religiously, and ideologically related to Iran. Thus, these ties motivated

Iran to support the Houthis. Along with national affairs, regional equation and international influence objectives caused intensification in Iran's foreign policy decision towards the crises. The decisions and activities of other actors in the region became a motive for Iran to increase its activities. For Libya, Iran was not involved since the beginning of the civil war and did not announce its side officially. Escalation in resource seeking in the East Med and the rival countries' existence in Libya led Iran to demonstrate its presence in Libya. In the other case, in Yemen, the support to Houthis has increased after Saudi Arabia's military intervention. The relevance of the regional rivalry in foreign policy decision making about regional crises is clearly supported.

The involvement types vary with respect to Iran's motives. More relations and interdependency lead to the more intensive usage of different tools in involvement in the crisis. Therefore, Iran was more active in Yemen than Libya. It provides tangible sources and political support to Yemen while it only declared its political support to GNA in Libya with its official discourses. Iran does not determine its policies neutral way but a biased one.

So, Iran determines its priorities regarding geographical proximity, actions, and blocs of regional actors on the crisis and national interests. Its regional role has changed up to its preferences in foreign policy agenda. Considering the methods and motives of Iran's policy towards Libya and Yemen, it has low and intermediate roles respectively.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Buzan's and Weaver's security complex theory offers an understanding of regional security. The countries in a regional complex are highly interdependent on each other in terms of their security due to geographical proximity, power relations, and shared interests. A case of insecurity in the region might directly or indirectly affect the regional states' security situations. Civil war is an example of the creation of insecurity in the region. Gleditsch states that civil wars are not only about their domestic affairs³⁵⁷. A war can provide opportunities or cause threats to other regional actors. Therefore, the regional actors have incentives to involve in and/or lead the crisis. In order to expand the interdependency concept, Kathman argues a civil war is an international event because it impacts not only bilateral relations between the warfare state and the third party, but also relations and situations of the other countries³⁵⁸. Thus, an actor's involvement in a civil war could alter the equation of regional power relations. In this thesis, the foreign policy decisions are examined with the "security interdependency" concept of the RSC theory. One of the main points of the thesis is that countries' regional foreign policy decisions towards civil wars in the region are highly interdependent. Each actor made their foreign policy decisions considering both the bilateral ties, the other actors' position in the crisis, and strategic interests. One's involvement in a civil war has an impact on policy decisions and actions of the other regional states.

In this thesis, news and primary state announcements are used as resources. Using the media presses was a limitation since the news are not always neutral. However, the

³⁵⁷ Gleditsch, "Transnational Dimensions of Civil War," 294.

³⁵⁸ Kathman, "Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention," 849.

national presses also gave the sense to understand the motives of the states from their perspective. Also, a comparison between international media's approach and the national media is made which provides the study to put the countries' opinions in perspective. Turkey emphasized the importance of democratic values and humanitarian disasters for its involvement in the civil wars. Iran was accused of having policies to expand its influence considering the Yemen War and its close ties with Houthis by the Western media and Saudi Arabia. In Iranian media, they are not accepting international media's accusation of "helping to terrorists" or military aid to Yemen. However, the US reports showed their evidence on Iran's military supplies to Houthis. The data from different perspectives are evaluated comparatively.

The Arab Uprisings, which started at the end of 2010, is one milestone of the Middle East's modern history. It has left the region open to conflicts and foreign intervention. The countries which were leading the Arab region, like Syria and Egypt, have changed into weaker states. Syria, Libya, and Yemen have been struggling with civil wars and a lack of authority. Therefore, other regional states consider civil wars a regional conflict, impacting their national security, well-being, and international/regional relations. For this reason, Arab Uprisings is taken as the beginning point of Turkey and Iran's foreign policy examination in this thesis. Since the wars still continue and the results are not certain, the study put a time limitation. The time span chosen to study on is up to the current date, which is the end of 2020. In Libya, sides signed a ceasefire agreement in October. The agreement provides us to have an endpoint for examination. There is no agreement between the rival sides for Yemen, but in order to make a symmetrical comparison, Libya's date is used as a time limitation.

The Libya and Yemen wars are the two cases that cause insecurity in the Middle East Regional Security Complex. Iran and Turkey as regional actors directly or indirectly involved with varied types like militarily and diplomatically in these wars. The involvements fed the course of the civil wars. The actors' policies towards the civil wars influenced not only bilateral relations between the warfare state and the third party but also regional equation and decisions of the other regional actors.

In this thesis, regional security complex theory was used to draw a regional perspective. It helped to emphasize the “relative autonomy of regional relations”. Iran and Turkey’s policies towards the Libya and Yemen Wars are examined from a regional perspective. Using the RSCT diminished the effects of international actors on regional dynamics. Regional actor’s actions and motives highly depend on each other and the developments of regional affairs. Although an actor has no direct interests in a crisis, the regional dynamics and relations let it involve in the situation. For instance, Turkey has a lack of interest in the Yemen War. Its national security concerns regarding the threats coming from the Syrian War caused a commonality of security concerns with Saudi Arabia. The security interdependency of the two led Turkey to tend to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in Yemen as well. So, one’s security concerns and foreign policy interacts with that of the other ones in the same region. The theory brings a perspective on the regional dynamics and interdependency on security relations. However, it was inadequate to explain how the actors determine their regional interests and foreign policies. Therefore, I use other concepts inferred from the "foreign intervention" articles to put criteria for an explanation of foreign policies.

The concepts of motives, methods, and timing used for intervention cases in the literature are applied to determine regional foreign policies for comprehension of their decisions. In this framework, I put Iran and Turkey’s regional foreign policies in perspective to understand their decision based on their internal and regional motives and methods they used. The motives were classified as strategic interests and humanitarian purposes. Methods were categorized based upon the use of force, biased or non-biased, and multilateral or unilateral involvement. According to the literature, the motives behind the interventions or policies are defining the methods and timing. Therefore, they are the independent variables to examine the regional foreign policy determination of the countries.

The motives behind the policies are divergent. Geopolitical interests and regional rivalry are considered by saying strategic interests. Although domestic factors are significant points of strategic interest, they are not to be elaborated in the thesis in order to focus on the developments in regional politics and countries’ determination

of their interests accordingly. As Kathman states, actors intervene when crises threaten their well-being or give opportunities to improve their capabilities³⁵⁹. So, the opportunities and threats from the civil war also develop the policies towards warfare as geopolitical interests. In the regional securities and their subcomplexes, historical or ideological enmity-amity relations and rivalry shape the behaviours of the regional countries. This thesis focuses on interpenetrating connections as a significant motive for the determination of regional foreign policies. The reason is that in civil wars, there are multiple actors involved rather than only one prominent one; thus, each actor acts according to the others.

Turkey and Iran are the regional powers in this thesis to examine their foreign policy choices based upon their motives and methods. Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab region had been soft and it aimed to increase the relations in economic and political ways. For this reason, Turkey is considered a part of the Middle East RSC. After the Uprisings, the foreign policy of Turkey has turned into an assertive one. It pursues regional leadership considering its stance in the regime changes in Egypt, Syria, and Libya. Turkey has applied an active regional foreign policy towards the uprisings. The Libyan war is an example that Turkey highly intervened in the crisis in contrast to the Yemen War. On the other side, Iran's expansionist policy and leadership aspirations have been considered after the Islamic Revolution. The Arab Uprising became an opportunity for Iran to get involved in regional affairs. It has an active role in the crisis, which is ideologically and geographically proximate to Iran, such as Syria and Iraq, and has a low profile in other cases like Libya. For Yemen, Iran's profile is open to discussion since it is not a gamechanger, but the role is considerable for regional security.

The methods and motives of Turkey and Iran in Yemen and Libya are varied. While Turkey has a high profile in Libya, Iran keeps its profile low. Conversely, Turkey was less involved in the Yemen crisis; meanwhile, Iran was considered a prominent actor. At the outset of the protests, people were demanding freedom and dignity from their authoritarian states. The democratic wills of the citizens entailed Turkey and Iran to

³⁵⁹ Kathman, 849.

support them against the regimes. With the protests turning into civil wars in Libya and Yemen, the wars caused human disasters and a massive number of people to suffer, considering the number of refugees and deaths from the wars. Both Iran and Turkey condemned attacks on civilians and sent humanitarian aids and financial help. Therefore, the humanitarian cause has been regarded in determining their policy towards the wars, although it is not the main motive behind it. It is inferred from their political speeches and humanitarian help. The thesis did not neglect the countries' humanitarian concerns and involvement methods as they give place in their diplomatic announcements.

As the thesis states from a regional perspective, one of the drivers is regional proximity and interests. Regarding the North African Sub-complex and competition in the East Mediterranean, Libya has become a bargaining chip and a key country that determines the region's (in)security. The geographical proximity, maritime borders and previous economic and energy-based relations between Libya and Turkey led Turkey to relate its national interests and security to that of Libya. Turkey's investments in Libya deteriorated with the increase in conflict in Libya. In order to protect the investments and economic relations, Libya's security is needed to be protected. Therefore, Turkey's economic interest is dependent on Libya's security and stability. Turkey is one of the game changers and leading countries in Libya's internal and international affairs. It has had an active role in the Libya case at the beginning of the uprising because of high-level interactions established with her previous foreign policy strategy. After the revolution in Libya, Turkey allied and cooperated with the GNA government. Also, being an ally with Turkey in the war field was beneficial for the GNA government against the Haftar forces' alliance. The security relations became interdependent with each other. For Turkey, mutual understandings are essential to protect the energy demand security of Turkey in the Mediterranean. Regional states sought energy sources in the Mediterranean region in a competitive way; therefore, Turkey guaranteed its legal rights under international law on the sea with these agreements. Turkey's national and geopolitical interests intersected in the Libyan case that paved Turkey for pursuing an active foreign policy.

In comparison to Turkey, Iran had little motive towards Libya. Iran and Libya are geographically distant to have immediate effects on each other's security; thus, Libya is not Iran's priority on its regional agenda. However, it supported the revolution on account of its general perception regarding the Arab Uprisings as an Islamic Awakening. Since Libya's previous relations were not intense and economic cooperation was limited, Iran did not relate itself to Libya's new government. The former ties before the crisis and geographical distance mattered while setting priorities on their foreign policy agenda. Since the opportunities and threats were not the same for the two countries considering their geopolitical situation, the regional positions and roles differed.

These roles reversed considering the Yemeni crisis. Although Turkey's national security and interests are highly dependent on regional events, geographical proximity is critical for prioritizing Turkey's regional policy. Due to the geographically distant and shifting in alliances, Turkey altered its activity in Yemen. At the first stage, Turkey had close relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but distorted relations caused a lack of interest and involvement in Yemen for Turkey. On the other hand, Iran was one of the active players. Despite the fact that it cannot be explained by geographical proximity, the ideological connections and religious commonalities triggered Iran to generate an active policy towards the war. Iran's Twelver Shia is not the same as the belief system of Yemen's Houthis, and they do not directly have links to each other. However, Houthi religious leaders and students make visits to Iran previous to the crisis, which led them to build a connection. Houthis are ideologically close to Iranian foreign policy as staying against the Western dominance in the regional order. The vision of the Houthis led them to get close to each other, considering the crisis. Ideological proximity was one of the motives for Iran's involvement in Yemen by supporting the rebel group. The involvement was limited due to other regional conflicts and a trace of interest in Yemen. However, comparing to Turkey, in the international media, Iran was seen as one of the active players in Yemen.

Both Iran and Turkey's foreign policy decisions towards the crises were motivated by national and regional interests. This thesis also concludes that the motives are highly

affected by the regional power relations that refer to the other regional actors' foreign policy decisions. In the Libyan case, Turkey wanted to protect its national interests in the Mediterranean Sea. The foreign policy agendas of regional actors and their active support of oppositional groups in Libya led to the escalation of the crisis; thus, the region's balance has been affected by the regional actors' act. International rivalry in the Mediterranean Sea for seeking energy sources and their exclusion of Turkey from the quest project made Turkey increase relations with the GNA. Its support to GNA government militarily and financially increased GNA's power in domestic rivalry as well. While Turkey is openly supporting the GNA, Russia, Iran's ally in the Syria case, facilitates Haftar forces' actions, which are also supported by Iran's regional rivals Egypt and the UAE. The complicated situation in terms of alliance groups in Libya led Iran to be hesitant to support a group for years. However, in 2020, Iran announced that it is on the same side as Turkey and its willingness to cooperate with Turkey for Libya and the other regional cases were meant to be clarified Iran's determination of Libyan policy was directly affected by the territory's enmity-amity relations. The hostility between Gulf countries and Iran and the UAE's role reflected on this decision for decreasing the power of rival alliances in the region.

The regional hostility of Saudi Arabia and Iran influenced the course of the Yemen War. Iran had little interaction with the Houthis before the intervention of Saudi Arabia in Yemen in 2014. Due to Iran's active role in Syria, little interest in Yemen, and divergence in religious doctrines, Iran's support was not adequate to shape Yemen's situation in a robust way. Although Houthis are not an obedient proxy of Iran and are fully integrated into the Iranian regional schedule compared to other non-state actors like Hezbollah, Iran increased its presence after the intervention. It supported the rebel groups in order to strengthen its influence and curb Saudi dominance. Their anti-Western and anti-Israeli stance and Iran's previous connection with the Houthis led them to cooperate. The Iranian role in Yemen was formed by the actions of Saudi Arabia and its allies. Yemen is included in Iran's "axis of resistance" group. Iran contributed to the anti-Western identity of the Houthis and strengthened its military capability.

Iran's policy towards Yemen was considered as a threatening fact for regional security due to its ambitions to expand its ideology and impact. Turkey was one of the actors who felt the hazard for Iran's empowerment. Since the events in different sub-complexes are interrelated and affect each other, the Syrian Crisis was the primary factor that Ankara considered while taking action towards the Gulf security complex. Turkey prioritized Syria's stability due to direct contact with it. Turkey's decisions on the Yemen war were also based on relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Egypt's political situation, the Qatar Crisis, and the Syrian War have altered the regional actors' position and alliances. Therefore, in the Yemen case, Turkey was not the main actor who led the courses of the events. However, it demonstrates its existence by delivering formal speeches in favour of protecting opportunities and threats from the Syrian Crisis. Turkey and Iran are on opposite sides, while Turkey cooperated with Saudi Arabia in the Syrian Crisis. Thus, Turkey supported Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen and offered military and financial aid if it is necessary until 2016 which the incidents that caused Saudi-Turkey relations to worsen came up.

Turkey and Iran found common ground in the Libya case, even if they have different engagement levels. On the Yemen Crisis, the situation is reversed. Their interests and perception regarding the Yemen affair were incompatible. The activities of regional stakeholders led Turkey and Iran to find involvement strategies in warfare states, especially when they lack national interests in the crisis. For instance, Turkey has fewer interests than Iran in Yemen. It took a side according to its ally's position but by a low profile. It is similar for Iran, considering Libya; however, it demonstrated a lower profile compared to Turkey in Yemen. Another conclusion is that while the two countries have the opposite view of Yemen, Iran announced they could collaborate in Libya. The reason is that Turkey and Iran have no perpetual hostile or amity relations. In modern history, they have had ups and downs in their bilateral affairs. Therefore, both Iran and Turkey pragmatically made their foreign policy decision in cooperation or thwarting each other. However, when it comes to the regional equation, Iran has enmity relations with Saudi Arabia and West-related countries in the region after the Islamic Revolution. This long-lasting power competition between them triggered Iran to act in Yemen against Saudi intervention and in Libya against the UAE-led alliance. Considering Turkey, it has no permanent hostile links in the area. International

competition and cooperation catalyzed Turkey to take a position in Libya. The regional affair of Syria led Turkey to determine a policy towards Yemen in Saudi Arabia's countenance initially. This perspective indicates that regional rivalry and power relations gain importance in the decision-making process.

The motives trigger the way of methods to involve in the crises. The higher importance and priority the places have in Iran's and Turkey's foreign policy schedule, the more they have tendencies to use force and militarily involved in the crisis. Turkey's motives for Libya are more intensive than that of Iran; meanwhile, the situation is the vice-verse in Yemen. The reasons led Turkey and Iran to find methods they use in their foreign policy. Turkey considers the Libya case an opportunity to be influential in the Mediterranean region. Therefore, it has got an active role in Libya. With the memorandum of understanding, Turkey and the Tripoli government reached security cooperation. Concerning this agreement and invitation of the Tripoli government, Turkey has started to send military troops to Libya, supporting the GNA. Along with financial and diplomatic aid, Turkey joined with coercive tools. Turkey's involvement led the GNA to be strengthened, thus, impacted the security situation of the Maghreb. Iran, which lacked interest in Libya, was involved in the crisis by only political speeches. Its support was only diplomatically without any coercive means, and its effectiveness in the Libya crisis was not significant. Therefore, the Iranian involvement was not influential on the duration of the problem.

In Yemen, Iranian involvement in the crisis reflected the complex's security equation despite the fact that it was limited. The collaboration between Iran and the non-state actors in the region led regional rival Saudi Arabia to accuse Iran of driving conflict in Yemen. However, the relation between the Houthis and Iran is incontrovertible. It was increased after the escalation of the country's tension. Iranian officials congratulated Houthis for taking over the control of Sanaa and expressed their support for them. Their anti-Western and Israeli stance and previous connection with Houthis led them to cooperate. Iran was involved in the Yemen war with coercive tools and military training. However, the Iranian government did not accept the help formally but gave merely political support to Houthis and condemned the Saudi existence in

Yemen. Turkey was not the main actor who led the courses of the events; however, it has demonstrated its existence through diplomatic and humanitarian tools. Turkey did not affect the Gulf security with the Yemen war but through other cases like cooperation with Qatar. Turkey prioritized Syria's stability due to direct contact with it. Thus, Turkey's decisions on the Yemen war were also based on relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. In 2015, the Syrian War led Iran and Turkey to stay against each other. Therefore, Turkey politically supported Saudi intervention in Yemen against the rebellions. Although Erdoğan declared that Turkey could give military support to Saudi intervention, it has not been militarily involved since the Saudis declined the offer. Turkey's presence did not ascend after the deteriorated relations because Yemen was not the main target of Turkey and lacks relations. However, after getting positive results from the Libya operation, the possibility of Turkey's plan to prepare operation went under question in the regional countries' eyes.

The timing of their foreign policies is related to both sides' actions on the particular crisis. Turkey in Libya case strengthened its position persistently after the other regional actors agreed on seeking energy resources. It could be one triggering point coming from the other actors for Turkey to determine a policy and militarily intervening in Libya in 2020. The position of Turkey that is against the Haftar forces, supported by the UAE-led coalition group, paved Iran the way for declaring its side in Libya case by supporting Turkey. It is also interpreted as a result of a decrease in the alliance between Turkey and Saudi Arabia due to Qatar and other regional crises, and an increase in the GNA power, which could be said to favour the winning side. The policies regarding the Yemen War's time is also significant. Iran was not significantly affecting Houthis before the Saudi intervention. Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen in 2014, and there observed an increase in interaction between Iranians and Houthi leaders. Iran adopted more interactive and interventionist behaviour. Regarding Turkey, the Syrian War was placed in higher priority in Turkey's foreign policy agenda. Therefore, the timing was compatible with Turkey's policy determination.

In the long term, Turkey and Iran's regional influence goals led them to be active in regional affairs. Iran wanted to protect its newly expanded East Mediterranean

dominance; in line with this, it wanted to have a hand in the Mediterranean competition. Likewise, Turkey wanted to preserve its regional alliances and influence over the Red Sea; it determined its position in the Yemen War. Their interests, both Turkey and Iran, either decided to intervene in the civil wars or resolve a soft foreign policy by supporting one side as biased behaviour respectively. Based upon the time and regional power equation in the region, Iran and Turkey, found common or conflictual grounds. Even though they have conflictual policies, they did not directly come face to face. This gives credit to cooperate in the long run. Thus, the methods they use in their involvements are significant in regional affairs.

This study contributes to the literature with a comparison of two regional powers' regional foreign policy decisions by framing methods, motives, and timing with a regional approach. The framework is eligible to examine the regional actors according to each other's positions. Civil wars are open to being intervened by multiple actors. Multiple involvements became a motive to lead the other regional actors to decide how to involve in the crisis. Therefore, regional rivalry and geographical proximity of the regional security complex theory are added to the motive variable of the framework. In this way, the study brought a regional approach to the individual states' policy determination process.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Arap Ayaklanmaları modern Orta Doęu tarihinin dnm noktalarından biridir. Ayaklanmalar srecinde Arap lkelerinde birok i deęişiklik meydana gelmiştir. Libya, Suriye ve Yemen’de ise i savař ıkmiř, btn blgeyi etkileyen insani krizlere ve gvenlik sorunlarına sebep olmuřlardır. Savařların uluslararası ve i dinamikleri kadar, blgesel aktrlerin dıř politika ıkarları ve uygulamaları da savařların seyri ve blge gvenlięi konusunda etkili unsurlardır. Tekil aktrn kararı blgedeki dięer aktrn aynı problem zerindeki kararında ve hareketini belirlemesinde ynlendiricidir. Literatrde uluslararası mdahalelerde aktrlerin davranıřları konu alınmıřken, blgesel aktrlerin birbirleri zerindeki etkileri zerinde durulmamıřtır. Bu sebeple, bu alıřmada blgedeki aktrlerin ıkarlarını tanımlamasına ve politikalarını uygulamalarına odaklanılmıřtır. Trkiye ve İran’ın, Yemen ve Libya savařları rnekleminde blgesel gvenlięe nasıl ve ne kadar dahil olduęu arařtırılmıřtır. Savařlardaki pozisyonları ve dıř politikaları incelenmiř, bunların savařların seyri ve birbirlerinin karar alma sreleri zerindeki etkileri belirtilmiřtir.

Blgede Arap olmayan ve bu srete ayaklanmaların yařanmadıęı lkelerden olmaları sebebiyle, bu tezde Trkiye ve İran blgesel iki aktr olarak seildi. Blgedeki krizlerden yakinen etkilenmeleri sebebiyle birok kez karřı karřıya gelmiřlerdir. Bazı durumlarda dıř politika kararları ortak zeminde ilerlerken, blgedeki bařka bir olayda birbirlerine tam zıt kararlar alabilmektedirler. Blgesel rekabet, bloklařma, tarihi dostluk ve dřmanlık iliřkileri birbirlerinin politikalarını da etkilemiřtir. Trkiye ve İran blgedeki birok lkeyle negatif ve pozitif doęrultuda iliřkilerde bulunmaktadırlar. Blgesel politikaları, blgedeki lkelerin politikalarını ve olayların dinamiklerini etkilemektedir. Dolayısıyla blgesel kararlarının ve ıkarlarının belirlenmesindeki faktrleri incelemek iin bu iki lke

seçilmiştir. Müdahale yöntemleri ve nedenleri, bölgesel güçlerin bölgesel iç savaşlara neden ve nasıl girdiğini anlamamıza yardımcı olacaktır. Bölgedeki diğer Arap olmayan devlet olan İsrail, savaşlar üzerindeki duruşu ve politikaları İran ve Türkiye düzeyinde etkili olmadığı için bu tezde analize dahil edilmemiştir.

Arap Ayaklanmaları döneminde üç iç savaş çıkmış ve İran ve Türkiye bu savaşlara çeşitli şekillerde dahil olmuştur. Suriye örneğinde, her ikisi de coğrafi olarak Suriye'ye yakındı ve çıkarlar doğrudan belirlenmişti. Ayrıca Suriye örneği, akademik literatürde yabancı müdahale vakası olarak ve Türkiye-İran ilişkilerini açıklamada birçok kez incelenmiştir. Diğer yandan Türkiye ve İran; Yemen ve Libya savaşlarına da farklı boyutlarda ve yoğunlukta müdahil olmuştur. Suriye krizinin yanında bu iki savaş da devrim sürecini tamamlayamayan ve iç savaşlara dönüşen diğer öne çıkan örneklerdir. Türkiye Libya'da aktif bir rol oynarken, İran daha düşük düzeyde müdahil olmuştur. Aynı zamanda İran, Yemen krizini gündeminde öncelik sırasına koyarken, Türkiye'ye göre Yemen dış politika listesinin alt sıralarında yer almaktadır. Bu savaşlarda doğrudan çıkarları tanımlamadılar. Libya'da ortak politikalar belirlemelerine kıyasla Yemen'de karşı politikalar uygulamaktadırlar. Her ikisinin de eylemleri diğerinin dış politika kararları üzerinde etkili olmaktadır. Bu tezde Türkiye ve İran'ın politikalarının arkasındaki güdüler ve savaşlara dahil olma biçimleri açısından incelenmek üzere Yemen ve Libya Savaşları seçilmiştir. İran ve Türkiye'nin dolaylı müdahaleleri Yemen ve Libya savaşlarını Suriye Savaşı'ndan ayırmaktadır. Bu nedenle Suriye örneği bu tezin dışında tutulmuştur. İncelemeye alınmamasının bir başka nedeni de aktör ve vaka sayısındaki artışın daha fazla analiz sürecinde karışıklığa yol açmasıdır. Bu nedenle, aktörler ve vakalar, uygulanabilirlikleri açısından sayıları sınırlandırılmıştır.

Bu tez, araştırma sorusunu İran ve Türkiye'nin politikalarının çapraz incelemesini Libya ve Yemen vakalarında karşılaştırarak yanıtlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bunun için, bölgesel güvenlik kompleksi teorisi ve yabancı müdahaleler konsepti ile teorik bir çerçeve oluşturulmuştur. Müdahalenin nedenleri, yöntemleri ve zamanlaması, iki devletin Yemen ve Libya Savaşı'na nasıl dahil olduğunu araştırmak için belirleyici değişkenler olarak belirlenmiştir. Ortadoğu Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi'nin alt

kompleksleri olan Körfez ve Mağrip'te; İran ve Türkiye'nin politikaları ve iki savaşa dahil olma süreçleri sırasıyla karşılaştırılmıştır.

Kuramsal Çerçeve

1- Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi Teorisi

Barry Buzan ve Ole Wæver, güvenlik çalışmalarını bölgesel düzeyde inceleyen bir teori ortaya koydular. Bu teori bölgeyi, “birincil ulusal güvenlik endişeleri, birbirinden bağımsız olarak çıkarılamayacak veya ele alınamayacak kadar iç içe geçmiş bir grup devlet” olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu, bir aktörün güvenlik endişelerinin öncelikle yakın çevresinde ortaya çıktığı anlamına gelir. Bölgesel perspektif, güvenlik kompleksindeki olayları, süper güçlerin eylemleri göz ardı eder, bölgesel aktörlere odaklanarak inceler. Buzan, dünyayı bölgeler olarak sınırlarla ayırır; bölgeyi komşularından ayırt etmek için sınırları olmalıdır. RSC, bir bölgenin ikiden fazla özerk birime sahip olmasını ve bu birimler arasında özerk güç ilişkilerinin olmasını bekler. Son olarak, bölgede düşmanlık ve dostluk gibi birimler arasındaki ilişki kalıplarından oluşan bir bölgesel yapı olmalıdır.

Devletlerin birbirini destekleyici veya koruyucu eylemleri dostluk olarak kabul edilirken, düşmanlık, tarafların birbirlerini tehdit olarak algılamasıdır. Bir grup devleti bölgesel bir kompleks olarak tanımlamak, devletler arasında karşılıklı olarak yüksek düzeyde bir güven veya tehdidin olmasını gerektirir. Dostluk ve düşmanlık kalıpları, bölgesel güç ilişkileri (iki kutuplu veya çok kutuplu) ve bunların coğrafi yakınlığı bir bölgeyi ifade eder. Bu tezde bölgesel bir perspektif çizmek için BGKT kullanılacaktır. Bir bölgenin bölge olarak nasıl sayılacağına ilişkin kriterlere sahip bir mercek sunar ve bölgesel aktörleri ve dinamikleri vurgular. Ancak bölgesel aktörlerin politikalarını incelemek için bu teori yetersiz kalmaktadır. Bölgesel güçlerin bölgeye yönelik politika ve stratejileri incelenerek sınıflandırmanın genişletilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu nedenle, dış politika analizleri için müdahale türleri, nedenleri ve zamanlama kavramları kullanılacaktır.

2- Motivasyonlar, Metotlar ve Zamanlama

a. Motivasyonlar

Devletler başka bir ülkeye karşı politika belirlerken çeşitli motivasyonları vardır. Bu çalışmada motivasyonlar stratejik çıkarlar ve insani sebepler olarak iki başlıkta incelendi. Hedef ülkedeki insani krizler ve insan hakları ihlalleri, komşu ülkelere tehdit oluşturur. Ayrıca insan hakları ihlallerini önlemek uluslararası kamuoyunun da görevidir. Bu sebeple insani sebepler, kriz içerisindeki bir ülkeye müdahale için temel motivasyonlardan biridir. Stratejik çıkarlar ise üç başlıkta incelendi. Birinci uluslararası etki motivasyonu. Ülkeler coğrafi olarak yakın diğer ülkelere etkilerini artırmak isterler. Bu sebeple de aktif dış politika takip edebilirler. İkincisi, potansiyel üçüncü ülke ile hedef ülke arasındaki savaş öncesi ilişkiler, müdahale için motivasyon oluşturur. Önceki ilişkileri ve yatırımları korumak, savaştan gelecek tehditleri önlemek için bölgede aktif olurlar. Üçüncü sebep ise potansiyel üçüncü ülkeler arasındaki ilişkidir. Üçüncü ülkeler arasındaki dinamik ve çıkar ilişkisi, savaş olan ülkedeki dengeyi sağlamak veya kendi bölgesel çıkarlarını korumak adına dış politika adımı atmasına sebep olur. Dördüncü ise bölgedeki diğer krizlerin etkisini ele almaktadır. Bölgede birden fazla savaş veya kriz ortamı var ise bu, üçüncü tarafların karar alırken göz önünde bulundurması gereken bir konudur. Çünkü bölgesel olaylar birbirine bağlıdır. Aktörler de bu savaşlardan etkilenir ve diğer savaş üzerinde kararlarını bunu gözeterek alır.

b. Metotlar

Devletlerin dış politikalarını uygularken kullandıkları metotlar üç kriter gözetilerek incelenmiştir. Birincisi, müdahalenin objektif olup olmaması noktasıdır. Müdahaleci ülke savaşta belli bir grubu destekleyebilir veya nötr kalarak politikalarını uygulayabilir. İkinci olarak müdahalede güç kullanılmasına bakılır. Üçüncü ülke hedef ülkeye sadece politik ve diplomatik politikalar benimseyebilir veya askeri ekipman sağlayarak ve direkt askeri müdahale gerçekleştirme yöntemi uygulayabilir. Son olarak da müdahalenin tek bir aktör tarafından yapılıp yapılmaması incelenmektedir. Savaş halindeki ülkeye üçüncü ülkeler tek başlarına müdahale

edebilirlerken bölgedeki diğer aktörlerle iş birliği yaparak da müdahil olabilmektedirler.

Orta Doğu Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi

Dünyayı bölgelere ayırarak inceleyen Buzan ve Wæver'in haritasına göre Ortadoğu bir güvenlik kompleksi olarak İran'dan Fas'a kadar uzanan ülkelerden oluşuyor. Bölge Arap devletlerini, İsrail ve İran'ı içerirken, Avrupa ile ME arasında yalıtkan bir devlet olarak belirlenen Türkiye'yi hariç tutuyor. Literatürde Türkiye'nin yalıtkan rolü yeniden gözden geçirilmiş ve bazı makalelerde Türkiye bölgenin bir parçası olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu tez de Türkiye'yi Orta Doğu'nun bir parçası olarak incelenmiştir.

Üç alt kompleksi vardır: Körfez, Levant ve Mağrip. Bu çalışmada sırasıyla Yemen ve Libya'nın dahil olduğu Körfez ve Mağrip'e odaklandım.

1- Bölgesel Krizler

a. Arap Ayaklanmaları

2010-2011 Arap ayaklanmaları, devlet yetkililerinin algısını ve iç devlet operasyonlarını değiştirirken, bölgesel ve uluslararası siyaseti de değiştirdi. Kitleler, liderlerin değişmesi veya reformların yapılması arzusuyla protesto etmeye başladılar. Ülkelere göre farklılıklar olsa da genel olarak bu protestolar ekonomik istikrarsızlık, yüksek işsizlik oranı, toplumdaki gelir uçurumları, özgürlük eksikliği ve otokratik rejimlerin baskısına bir tepkiydi. İlk protestolar Tunus'ta başladı ve bölgeye yayıldı. Liderlerin protestolara karşı tepkileri farklıydı. Tunuslu ve Mısırlı liderler askeri baskıyla yönetimlerinden ayrılırken, Libya, Suriye ve Yemen'in askerleri protestolara karşı durmayı tercih etti ve ülkeler iç savaşa sürüklendi. Yemen ve Libya'daki mevcut sivil çatışmaları anlamak için, Yemen ve Libya'nın 1960'lara kadar uzanan tarihinin belirli olaylarını kısaca inceleyeceğim.

i. Libya Savaşı

Libya, Orta Doğu'nun batısında ve Mağrip alt kompleksinde yer alan bir ülkedir. General Muammer Kaddafi 1969'da yaptığı askeri darbe ile ülkeyi 42 sene boyunca yönetmiştir. 2011 yılında Tunus ve Mısır'daki ayaklanmaların da etkisiyle Libya'daki rejim dönüşüm geçirdi. Ayaklanmalar başladıktan sonra, 20 Ekim 2011 Kaddafi, Sirte'de saklanırken isyancı güçler tarafından idam edildi.

Mayıs 2014'te Libya Ulusal Ordusu milislerine komuta eden emekli General Halife Haftar, güvenliği sağlamak için İslamcı gruplara ve Ulusal Mutabakat Hükümeti'ne karşı "Onur Operasyonu" ile hava saldırıları başlattı. Görevini teröristleri devletten uzaklaştırmak olarak tanımladı. Bu operasyonlardan sonra Libya'nın iki karşıt hükümeti oldu. LUO Sirenika, Tobruk ve Bingazi'yi kontrol ederken, UMH Trablus'u ve Libya'nın batı yakasını kontrol etti. Her ikisinin de parlamentoları, milisleri, Merkez Bankaları ve yönettikleri kurumları vardı. İki grup da uluslararası aktörlerden destek aldı.

ii. Yemen Savaşı

Yemen, Körfez alt kompleksinde yer almaktadır. 1962 devriminden sonra Yemen, Kuzey ve Güney Yemen olmak üzere ikiye ayrıldı. 1990'da Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesiyle bu iki devlet birleşti. Kuzey'in lideri olarak Salih başkan oldu ve Güney'in lideri Ali Salim el-Beedh başkan yardımcısı oldu. 2011 yılına gelindiğinde, durum yoksulluk, adam kayırmacılıkta artış ve konuşma özgürlüğü eksikliği ile daha da kötüleşti. Yönetici seçkinlerin zengin yaşamı ile nüfusun yoksulluğu arasındaki uçurum bu dönemde arttı. Otorite, ayaklanmalara, Husiler de dahil olmak üzere muhalif gruplara şiddetle karşılık verdi.

Husilerin temel amaçları, hükümetin Zeydilere karşı yaptığı ayrımcılığa karşı çıkmak ve hükümette ekonomik eşitlik ve statü aramaktı. Salih, 2011 yılında Suudi liderliğindeki KİK ülkelerinin BM sekreterinin katılımıyla yaptığı anlaşmayla istifa etti. Yerine başkan yardımcısı Hadi geçti. Hadi hükümeti yolsuzluk ve yoksullukla başa çıkamadı. 2014 yılında Husiler, Yemen'in başkenti Sana'yı ele geçirdi ve iç savaş başladı. Savaş, altı yıldır en büyük insani kriz ve gıda kıtlığı ile devam ediyor.

Bu tezde Yemen örneğinde Husiler, İran ve Suudi Arabistan ile Türkiye odak noktalar olacaktır.

Türkiye'nin Libya ve Yemen Savaşı'na Karşı Dış Politikası

2002 yılından bu yana AKP iktidarı ile Türkiye, “komşularla sıfır sorun” ve “herkes için güvenlik” politikasıyla Ortadoğu bölgesinde aktif bir rol edinmiştir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun tarihi mirasına dikkat çekilmiş, Arap ve Müslüman ülkelerle siyasi ve ekonomik diyalog kurmaya çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca dış politikasını hem Ortadoğu hem de Avrupa'ya yönelik olarak çeşitlendirmiştir. Buzan'ın bölgesel bir güvenlik kompleksinin parçası olmak için karşılıklı bağımlılık şartını tanımladığı gibi, bölgesel dinamikler ekonomik ve siyasi güvenliğiyle ilgili olarak Türkiye'nin dış ilişkilerinde oldukça bağımlı ve etkili hale geldi. Türkiye'nin başarısız devlet olarak adlandırılan ülkelerle olan sınırı, doğrudan ulusal güvenliğine tehdit haline geldi. Artan ilişkiler ve güvenlik anlamındaki bölgeyle bağı Türkiye'yi Orta Doğu bölgesel kompleksinin bir parçası haline getirmiştir.

Türkiye, Arap Ayaklanmalarını demokratik bir hareket olarak yorumlamış ve genellikle baskıcı otoritelere karşı protestocu grupları desteklemiştir. Libya ve Suriye gibi yakın ülkelere karşı daha yoğun bir politika benimserken, Yemen gibi diğer ülkelere karşı daha az aktif politikalar izlemiştir. Türkiye, Libya krizine askeri ve diplomatik olarak doğrudan müdahil olurken, Yemen krizinde, Türkiye sadece siyasi araçları kullanarak ve diğer bölgesel aktörlerin tutumlarını dikkate alarak pozisyon almıştır. Bu bölümde Türkiye'nin Libya ve Yemen ile ilişkileri savaş öncesi ve devrim dönemleri gösterilerek incelenecektir.

1- Türkiye-Libya

Libya Türkiye'nin denizden sınır komşusudur. Ayaklanmalardan önceki dönemlerde, iki ülke arasında ticari ve ekonomik bağlar kurulmuştur. Milyon dolarlık karşılıklı ticari anlaşmalar yapılmış, Türkiye Libya'da inşaat sektöründe önemli bir aktör olmuştur bu sebeple yaklaşık yirmi beş bin işçi Libya'da çalışmaktaydı. 2009 yılında vize muafiyeti ve bankacılık alanlarında anlaşmalar imzalanmıştı. Ayaklanmaların başlamasıyla beraber artan iç karışıklıklar sebebiyle

Türkiye vatandaşlarını tahliye etmiştir. Bununla beraber NATO'nun “gerekli bütün araçları kullanarak” Libya'ya müdahale etme kararını onaylamıştır.

Libya'daki krizin başından beri Türkiye krizi yakından takip edip, çeşitli motivasyonlarla aktif dış politika takip etmiştir. İlk motivasyonu insani kaygılar ve demokratik değerleri korumaktır. Ankara her zaman Libya halkının yanında olduğunu vurgulamıştır. Diğer stratejik sebepler ise, savaş öncesi kurulmuş yakın ekonomik ve politik ilişkilerdir. Türk iş adamları Libya'da büyük yatırımlar yapmış, ekonomik olarak Libya önemli bir ülke haline gelmiştir. Karışıklıkların artmasıyla beraber, bütün projeler durmuş, Türk büyükelçiliği kapanmak durumunda kalmıştır. Bu sebeple Türkiye zararlarını karşılamak, projelerini devam ettirmek için resmi bağlantılarını korumuş ve desteklemiştir. Diğer bir motivasyon, Libya'nın sahip olduğu enerji kaynaklarıdır. Deniz Aşırı Limited Şirketi ile ülkede petrol arama çalışmaları başlamış fakat karışıklıklar sebebiyle proje askıya alınmıştır. Türkiye bu çalışmalarını devam ettirmek için UMH ile resmi ilişkiler kurmuş ve hükümeti bölgesel ve iç dinamiklere karşı desteklemiştir. Doğu Akdeniz'deki petrol ve doğal gaz arama çalışmaları ise Türkiye için diğer bir motivasyondur. Bölgedeki diğer ülkelerin Türkiye'yi dışarda bırakarak deniz sınırı anlaşmaları yapması ve kaynak arama çalışmalarına başlaması, Türkiye'yi Libya ile iş birliği yapmaya itmiştir. Türkiye denizdeki hakkını korumak için Libya ile deniz sınırı ve güvenlik iş birliği anlaşmaları imzalamıştır. Bu motivasyonlar ışığında Türkiye UMH'yi destekleyerek savaşa müdahil olmuştur. Hem diplomatik hem de askeri alanda yardım sağlamış, hükümetin Türkiye'yi çağırması üzerine de 2020 yılında askeri müdahale gerçekleştirmiştir.

2- Türkiye-Yemen

Yemen ve Türkiye'nin savaş öncesi ilişkileri yoğun değildir. 2002'den itibaren eski Osmanlı toprakları ile bağları güçlendirme politikasıyla üst düzey ikili ilişkiler kurulmuştur. İkili ticaret hacmini artırmak için iş adamlarıyla üst düzey ziyaretler yapılmıştır. Eski Cumhurbaşkanı Gül, toplantılar düzenleyerek, vize kaldırma anlaşmaları imzalayarak iş adamlarını Yemen'de yatırım yapmaya teşvik etmiş ve TİKA gibi kurumlar Osmanlı mirasının onarılmasına yönelik inşaat projeleri

geliştirmiştir. Savaş sonrasındaki dış politika motivasyonları genel olarak Türkiye'nin Suriye politikasına ve Suudi Arabistan ile ikili ilişkisine göre düzenlenmiştir.

Yemen'de krizin patlak vermesinden sonra Türkiye'nin buna yönelik faaliyetleri yavaşladı. Türkiye Arap Ayaklanması sürecinde diğer ülkelerde olduğu gibi Yemen'de de muhalif grupların özgürlük taleplerini desteklemiştir. Ancak protestoların krize dönüşmesinin ardından Türkiye geri adım attı ve KİK koalisyonunun Yemen politikasını destekledi.

Yemen, Türkiye'nin gündeminde bir öncelik değildi; ancak Suudi Arabistan'ı Yemen'de destekleme kararının arkasındaki sebepler, bölgesel güvenlik algısı ve bölgesel denklem ile ilgilidir.

Suriye Savaşı'nda Türkiye, Suudi Arabistan ile Esed hükümetinin devrilmesi önceleyerek iş birliği yapmıştır. Mart 2015'te Suudi Arabistan öncülüğündeki koalisyon, isyancı Husi güçlerine karşı “Kararlılık Fırtınası” isimli operasyon ile Yemen'e müdahale etti. Erdoğan, Suudi Arabistan ile çeşitli gerekçelerle iş birliği yapmak için Suudi Arabistan'ı ziyaret ettiğinde, müdahaleye desteğini açıkladı. Terör örgütlerini ve Şii isyancı grupları yenmek için Yemen operasyonunda Suudi liderliğindeki koalisyona lojistik ve akıllı yardım sağlamayı teklif etti. Haberlere göre, Suudi kralı destek ve teklif için kendisine teşekkür etti ve reddetti. Bu teklifin arkasındaki bir diğer motivasyon da bölgede İran'ın nüfuzunun genişlemesini önlemektir.

Politika kararlarının başka bir motivasyonu da Türkiye'nin Suriye ve Libya'da iddialı dış politikalar izlemesidir. Bu savaşlar için askeri ve ekonomik alanda kaynak kullanılmıştır. Yakın çevredeki çatışmalar, güvenlik ortamı ve diğer operasyonlara kaynak tahsisi, Yemen'in Türkiye için daha az önceliğe sahip olmasına neden oldu. Dolaylı olarak bölgeden edineceği çıkarlar sebebiyle Türkiye Yemen'e askeri araçlarla değil sadece politik yollardan destek vermiştir. Yemen'in legal hükümeti desteklenmiştir. Siyasi desteğin yanında, STK'lar ve devlet kurumları aracılığıyla insani yardımlar yapılmıştır. TİKA çeşitli kalkınma projeleri üstlenmiştir.

İran'ın Yemen ve Libya Savaşlarına Karşı Dış Politikası

Buzan ve Waever'in güvenlik kompleksi teorisine göre coğrafi yakınlığı, diğer bölge ülkeleriyle yüksek düzeyde güvenlik bağımlılığı ve uzun süreli düşmanlık-dostluk ilişkileri modelleri bağlamında bakıldığında İran, ODBGK'nin bir parçasıdır. Bölge dinamiklerini etkileyen paydaşlardan biridir.

İslam Devrimi'nden sonra İran'ın dış politikası önemli ölçüde değişti. Devrimin ihracı ve İslam ülkelerinin lideri ve koruyucusu olmak ana hedeflerden biri haline geldi. Süper güçlerin bölgedeki etkilerini azaltmaya yönelik politikalar izledi.

2011'de Arap Ayaklanmalarının ilk aşamasında protestolar, 1979'da İran'da olduğu gibi “İslami Uyanış” olarak görülüyordu. Ancak İran'ın ayaklanmalara tepkisi her ülkede aynı değildi. Mısır ve Tunus devrimini desteklerken, Suriye'de rejim, isyancı gruba karşı desteklendi. İran, bölgesel çıkarlarına dayalı bir dış politika benimsedi.

1- İran-Libya

İran ve Libya arasında devrim öncesinde yakın ilişkiler yoktur. Batı karşıtı ideolojileri sebebiyle ortak alan bulmuşlardır. Enerji arama ve ekonomik alanda iş birliği yapmak için görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Fakat ayaklanmaların başlamasıyla, İran Kaddafi rejimini desteklememiş, diktatör olarak ilan etmiştir. Protestoları ise İslami Uyanış olarak yorumlamıştır.

Savaşın başında itibaren İran Libya'ya karşı aktif bir politika uygulamamıştır. 2020 yılında Türkiye'yi Libya'da desteklediğini açıklamıştır. Bu politikasının arkasında çeşitli motivasyonlar bulunmaktadır. İran, kendi toprakları dışında Hizbullah, Suriye ve Irak hükümeti ve diğer düşük profilli Batı karşıtı grupları kullanan düşmanlarla karşı karşıya. Böylece İran'ın nüfuzu, Suriye ve Lübnan'daki varlığıyla Akdeniz'e ulaşmaktadır. İran'ın Doğu Akdeniz'de önemli bir rol oynayan Libya ile doğrudan ilişkisi ve ulusal güvenlik kaygısı olmamasına rağmen, bölgedeki bu uzun vadeli hedefler İran'ı Libya ile yakın ilişkiler kurmaya ve Akdeniz denklemine katılmaya itmektedir. Bunun yanında bölgesel rekabet, İran'ın bölgedeki rakipleri BAE ve Mısır'ın Libya'da etkin rol üstlenmesi, İran'ı karşı gruba destek olmaya itmiştir.

Libya'daki belirsizlik İran'ın uzun süre sessiz kalmasına neden oldu. Bölgesel hedeflerinin ve ekonomik zorlukların yanı sıra Türkiye ile ilişkilerin ve iş birliğinin artması ve UMH Libya üzerindeki hakimiyeti, İran'ın destekleyici diplomasi uygulamasında öne çıkan faktörler oldu.

Libya devrimi ve iç savaş, İran'ın dış politika gündemindeki önceliği değildi. Bu nedenle İran, Libya'ya sert güç kullanarak müdahale etmemiştir. İran'ın Libya krizindeki rolü için sadece UMH'ye politik olarak destek vermiştir.

2- İran-Yemen

Savaş öncesi dönemde İran ve Yemenli Husiler'in tarihi ve kültürel bağları vardı. Husilerin öğrencileri ve liderleri sık sık Kum şehrinde eğitim almak için İran'ı ziyaret ediyorlardı. Yemen hükümeti ile İran arasında dengeli bir ilişki kurulmuştu, fakat Yemen hükümeti İran'ın Husiler ile olan bağından ve onlara desteğinden rahatsızdı. Savaş sırasında İran Husiler'in yanında yer almıştır. Önceden kurulmuş kültürel ve ideolojik bağlar bunun ana sebeplerinden biridir. Politikalarının diğer bir sebebi de insani kaygılardır. Suudi Arabistan'ın askeri müdahalesinden sonra Yemen'deki insani krizin boyutu ciddileşmiştir. İran bu müdahaleyi kınamış ve Husilere desteğini artırmıştır. Ayrıca bölgesel rekabetten dolayı, Suudi Arabistan'ın etkisini kırmak için, karşı güç olarak da varlığını göstermek istemiştir.

İran'ın Yemen'de aktif politikalar benimsemesi stratejik çıkarları için de uygundur. Ekonomik ve politik olarak uluslararası alanda izole edilen İran, etki alanını genişletmek istemektedir. Bu nedenle, benzer düşüncedeki aktörlerle iş birliği yaparak Lübnan ile komşu ülkeler, Suriye ve Irak'ta paydaş olmayı hedeflemiştir. Devlet dışı aktörler genellikle devlet aktörlerinden ziyade Lübnan'daki Hizbullah gibi İran ile iş birliği yapmaya isteklidir. Yemen'de de İran, bağlarını artırmak ve uzun vadeli nüfuz sahibi olmak için Ensarullah (Husiler) grubuyla iş birliği yapmaktadır.

İran'ın Yemen müdahalesinde kullandığı yöntemler hem yumuşak hem de askeri araçlardır. İran rejiminin Husileri destekleyen siyasi söyleminin yanı sıra, Yemen'in devlet dışı aktörü ile etkileşimi sürdürmek için mezhepsel ve kültürel bağlar

kullanılmıştır. İran, Yemen krizine askeri güçleriyle doğrudan dahil olmadı, dolaylı olarak Husilerin silahlı kuvvetlerine askeri teçhizat sağladı. Mali yardımlarda bulundu ve politik olarak, İslami ve Batı karşıtı söylemleri kullanarak da destek verdi.

Sonuç

Bölgedeki iç savaşlara yönelik bölgesel dış politika kararları büyük ölçüde birbirine bağımlıdır. Bu tezde, İran ve Türkiye'nin Libya ve Yemen Savaşlarına yönelik politikaları bölgesel bir perspektiften incelenmektedir. Türkiye ve İran'ın Yemen ve Libya'daki yöntemleri ve güdeleri çeşitlidir. Türkiye Libya'da yüksek bir profile sahipken, İran profilini düşük tutmaktadır. Tersine, Türkiye Yemen krizine daha az dahil olmuşken; İran önemli bir aktör olarak görülmüştür.

İnsani kaygılar her iki aktör tarafından da her iki durumda da dikkate alınmıştır. Bölgesel yakınlık, her iki ülkenin önceliklerini ve çıkarlarını belirlemek açısından önemlidir. Türkiye'nin Libya ile deniz sınırları olması nedeniyle, Yemen bölgesel siyasette bir öncelik değilken, Türkiye yüksek profil ve katılımı devam etti. Türkiye'ye kıyasla İran'ın Libya'ya karşı çok az motivasyonu vardı. İran ve Libya, birbirlerinin güvenliği üzerinde doğrudan etkilere sahip olmak için coğrafi olarak uzaklar; dolayısıyla Libya, İran'ın bölgesel gündemindeki önceliği değil. İdeolojik yakınlık olarak da İran'ın isyancı grubu destekleyerek Yemen'e girmesinin sebeplerinden biriydi.

Doğrudan çıkarları olmasa da hem İran'ın hem de Türkiye'nin krizlere yönelik dış politika kararlarının arkasındaki motivasyon, bölgedeki diğer aktörlerin hareketleri ve kararları olmuştur.

Akdeniz'de enerji kaynakları aramak için yaşanan uluslararası rekabet ve Türkiye'yi projenin dışında tutmaları Türkiye'nin UMH ile ilişkilerini artırmasına neden oldu. Libya hükümetine askeri ve mali olarak verdiği destek, UMH'nin iç rekabetteki gücünü de artırdı. Libya'daki ittifak grupları açısından karmaşık durum, İran'ın yıllarca bir grubu desteklemekte tereddüt etmesine neden oldu. Ancak 2020 yılında İran, Türkiye ile aynı safta olduğunu ve Libya ve diğer bölgesel vakalar için Türkiye

ile iş birliği yapma isteğinin açıklığa kavuşturulmasını amaçladığını açıkladı. Yemen Savaşı'ndaki duruma bakıldığında, Türkiye de İran'a kıyasla Yemen'e yönelik politikalarını Suudi Arabistan ile iş birliği yaparak ve İran'ın nüfuz genişlemesine karşı belirlemiştir.

Motivasyonlar, krizlere dahil olma metotlarını belirlemede önemli bir etkindir. İran ve Türkiye'nin dış politika çıkarlarının önceliği ne kadar yüksekse, krize askeri olarak dahil olma eğilimleri de fazla olmaktadır. Türkiye'nin Libya'da yoğun çıkarları vardı. Diplomatik ve siyasi araçlarıyla birlikte Libya'ya askeri müdahalede de bulunmuştur. Öte yandan İran, Yemen savaşına askeri ekipman desteği ve askeri eğitimler sağlayarak dahil oldu.

Uzun vadede Türkiye ve İran'ın bölgesel nüfuz hedefleri, bölgesel ilişkilerde aktif olmalarını sağlamıştır. İran genişleyen Doğu Akdeniz hakimiyetini korumak ve bu doğrultuda Akdeniz rekabetinde de söz sahibi olmak istedi. Aynı şekilde Türkiye, bölgesel ittifaklarını ve Kızıldeniz üzerindeki etkisini korumak istedi; Yemen Savaşı'ndaki konumunu buna göre belirledi.

Bu çalışma, bölgesel bir yaklaşımla iki bölgesel gücün, dış politika kararlarını yöntem, motif ve zamanlama çerçevesi çizerek karşılaştırmalı olarak inceleyerek literatüre katkıda bulunmaktadır. İç savaflara çoklu katılımlarda, diğer bölgesel aktörlerin krize nasıl dahil edileceğine karar vermelerinde bir motivasyondur. Bu nedenle, bölgesel güvenlik kompleksi teorisinde yer alan bölgesel rekabet ve coğrafi yakınlık terimleriyle beraber, motivasyon, metot ve zaman konseptleri eklenerek bir çerçeve oluşturuldu.

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