PRINT MEDIA AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN GREECE AND TURKEY

A PhD. Dissertation

By

DUYGU ÖZTÜRK

Department of Political Science
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
September 2014

To my father and mother,

Sezai and Gülsen Öztürk

PRINT MEDIA AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN GREECE AND TURKEY

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

DUYGU ÖZTÜRK

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA
September 2014

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Professor Dr. Metin Heper
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Professor Dr. Aylin Güney
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Associate Prof. Dr. Haldun Yalçınkaya
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Assistant Prof. Dr. Ioannis Grigoriadis
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Assistant Prof. Dr. Esra Çerağ Çuhadar
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences

---
Professor Dr. Erdal Erel
Director

ABSTRACT

PRINT MEDIA AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN GREECE AND TURKEY

Öztürk, Duygu

Ph.D., Department of Political Science

Supervisor: Professor Dr. Metin Heper

September 2014

This study investigates how Greek and Turkish newspapers columnists interpreted and framed military takeovers in their countries after the takeovers had happened. Refuting arguments in the literature asserting that Greek columnists kept their silence during the military regime due to censorship, while there was strong and open support in Turkey among newspaper columnists for the 12 September coup and the subsequent rule, this study argues that the situations in both countries were much more complex than these studies have claimed. Directed by this approach, it focuses on the pieces published in the Greek newspapers *Akropolis*,

Eleftheros Kosmos, and *Ta Nea* during the first six months of the military interregnum (after the 21 April 1967 takeover), and the ones published in the Turkish newspapers *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet*, and *Milliyet* (after the 12 September 1980 takeover). It shows that important similarities existed between Greek and Turkish officers' approach to the media in their countries during their respective periods of rule. In addition, Greek and Turkish columnists shared both similarities and differences in their framings and interpretations of the military's takeover in their countries and the subsequent interregna. This study argues that these similarities and differences can be better understood by examining the development of journalistic profession in Greece and Turkey, as well as by analyzing the development of civil-military relations and the role and position of the military in politics in both countries since their establishments as nation-states.

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations, 12 September 1980 takeover, 21 April 1967 takeover, Greece, Turkey, Political Communication, the media, newspapers, newspaper columns.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE VE YUNANİSTAN'DA YAZILI BASIN
VE SİVİL-ASKER İLİŞKİLERİ

Öztürk, Duygu

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Profesör Dr. Metin Heper

Eylül 2014

Bu çalışma Türk ve Yunan gazete köşe yazarlarının ülkelerinde askerlerin yönetimi ele geçirmelerini darbeler olduktan sonra nasıl yorumladıklarını ve çerçevelediklerini araştırmaktadır. Literatürde mevcut olan Yunan köşe yazarlarının askeri rejim döneminde sansür nedeni ile sessiz kaldıklarını Türk köşe yazarlarının da 12 Eylül darbesini ve de sonrasında kurulan yönetimi açık olarak desteklediklerini savunan argümanları reddederek, bu çalışma her iki ülkedeki durumun da mevcut çalışmaların iddia ettiğinden çok daha karmaşık olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu yaklaşımın ışığında, askeri yönetimlerin ilk altı aylık süreleri

boyunca (21 Nisan 1967 darbesi olduktan sonra) Yunanistan'da *Akropolis*, *Eleftheros Kosmos* ve *Ta Nea* gazetelerinde, Türkiye'de ise (12 Eylül 1980 darbesi olduktan sonra) *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet* ve *Milliyet* gazetelerinde çıkan köşe yazılarına odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışma Türkiye ve Yunanistan'da askerlerin yönetimleri sırasında medyaya yaklaşımlarında önemli benzerlikler olduğunu göstermektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, Türk ve Yunan köşe yazarlarının ülkelerinde askerlerin yönetimi ele geçirmesini ve de sonrasında izleyen askeri yönetimleri çerçevelemelerinde ve de yorumlamalarında hem benzerlikler hem de farklılıklar olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bu benzerlik ve farklılıkların Türkiye ve Yunanistan'da gazetecilik mesleğinin gelişimi, her iki ülkenin bağımsız ulus devletlerini kurmalarından itibaren sivil-asker ilişkilerinin gelişimi ve askerin her iki ülkenin siyasi hayatındaki yeri ve de rolü incelenerek daha iyi anlaşılabileceğini savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil-Asker İlişkileri, 12 Eylül 1980 darbesi, 21 Nisan 1967 darbesi, Türkiye, Yunanistan, Siyasi İletişim, Medya, Gazeteler, Gazete Köşe Yazıları.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Doing a PhD is not a smooth and easy path; it is full of bumps, ups and downs, successes, failures, joys, happiness, stress, tiredness, and anxiety. Although it is a lonely journey, it would not have been possible without the support of several people in my life.

First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Professor Metin Heper, who believed in me and my completing this path successfully. Without his guidance and support, this thesis would not have been completed. He was always reachable despite the tons of work he had, whenever I needed his advice and support. In addition to his invaluable intellectual contribution to developing my academic skills, I learned from Professor Heper the importance of working hard; patience; and maintaining a strong academic will, curiosity, and excitement for achieving success in the academic world during the period I worked on my thesis.

I would like to express my gratefulness to the other members of the examining committee, Professor Aylin Güney, Assoc. Professor Haldun Yalçınkaya, and Assist. Professor Ioannis Grigoriadis, for their fruitful contributions to my thesis through their comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Assist. Professor Esra Çerağ Çuhadar not only for her invaluable comments as a

member of the examining committee but also as a professor who conveyed to me her belief in me and her support of my intellectual and academic development. I am also thankful to Dr. Nilgün Fehim Kennedy, Dr. Zerrin Tandoğan, and Assist. Professor Başak İnce for their support of me in reaching success along this long path.

I am deeply thankful to Assoc. Professor Mitat Çelikpala, who witnessed my academic and intellectual development from the first years of my undergraduate studies and supported me in pursuing an academic career. He was always sincere, accessible, insightful, and generous in sharing his experiences and advice with me. I feel lucky for knowing him, being a student of his, and having the chance to have worked with him.

I completed an important part of this thesis in Athens. I am thankful to Dr. Ekavi Athanassopoulou for her support to my field work in Athens, and sharing her office with me. I also owe sincere thanks to Stephanos Vallianatos for his support of my research in Athens, friendship, and enjoyable coffee chats. I am grateful to my friend Esra Dilek, who left her vacation in the lovely island Rodos and came to Ankara, stayed with me despite her allergy to cats, and helped me in understanding the materials in Greek. Without her help, it would not have been possible to complete this thesis by the scheduled time. I am also grateful to Lisel Hintz for her support in improving the English of my thesis. She was in fact the second person who read my thesis line by line, and one of the few people who witnessed my stress and anxiety during the last two months of completing the thesis. I am also thankful to her for the sincere support during her reading of my drafts.

In addition to the all difficulties, white hairs, and wrinkles on my face, this PhD process made me realize that I have wonderful friends in Ankara. I owe special

and deep thanks to Senem Yıldırım. Words would not be enough to express what her friendship and support meant to me during this long path. She was the closest one who felt all my worries, anxiety, stress, joy, and happiness in Ankara. In addition, I am also thankful to Nazlı Şenses, Selin Akyüz, and Duygu Ersoy for being so supportive and positive during this period. In the final steps along this path, I came to know Betül Akpınar and Nazlı Pınar Kaymaz. I would like to thank them for making me feel their sincerity and support. I also owe a thank you to my other friends from the Bilkent family, Murat Ardağ, Ertuğrul Tulun, and Çağkan Felek, for their support and positivity in this difficult process.

I owe a big, in fact an indescribable, debt to my parents for their support during this long and difficult path. Despite the fact that we have been living in different cities for fourteen years, they never made me feel this distance. They always supported me in making my dreams come true. Their support always strengthened my belief in myself. At least three times a day on the other end of the telephone, they calmed down me and encouraged me tirelessly in continuing along this path. I also owe a big thanks to my brother Onur and his wife, my sister-in-law Sezen, for making me feel their belief in me eventually achieving success. I would also like to thank the youngest member of our family Alper, my sweet nephew, for bringing the feeling and joy of being aunt to my life in this difficult period.

Perhaps the only one who will not be able to read this acknowledgment but deserves thanks is my cat Kontes. Without being aware of what she has been witnessing for years, she was in fact the only one who stayed awake until late hours, keeping me company during my studies.

You never know what will make you feel better while writing a thesis, where you will better concentrate on what you do. In this regard, I would like to

thank Bilkent University Library, my office at Bilkent University AZ29-C, and most of all Konutkent Starbucks, which provided a peaceful atmosphere with its staff's warm and caring communication along with the tasty coffees and snacks.

Lastly, I would like to express my gratitude to the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) for supporting the research of this thesis through the National Scholarship Program for PhD students.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GLOSSARY OF ACRYNOMS

AP – Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)

CHP – Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)

DP – Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti)

EDA –The United Democratic Left (Eniea Dimokratiki Aristera)

EK – United Center (Enosis Kentrou)

ERE – National Radical Union (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis)

ES – Greek Rally (Ellinikos Synagermos)

IDEA – Sacred Bond of Greek Officers (Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon)

KKE – Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistiko Komma Elladas)

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSC – National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi)

NUC – National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi)

PCS – Press Control Service

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Purpose of the Study

The media has an indispensable place in the development of democratic culture and institutions. They perform a watchdog role on the policies of governments by adopting a critically evaluative approach. In addition they provide the reader with wide-ranging news, evaluations, and analyses. Being among the most reliable sources of information, particularly about subjects to which much of the public does not have first-hand access, they possess the power to influence people's views and values, contributing to shaping and reshaping them.

In this regard, the media in Greece and Turkey have played a crucial role in the political communication in their countries. Along with their main functions of

monitoring the policies of the government on behalf of the public and providing news, the media in these two countries have served not only as neutral transmitters of information, but also as key actors producing meanings through interpretative journalism. Because of their place in the functioning of democratic regimes, the stance of the media at times of political crises becomes even more important for the development of a democratic culture. Motivated by this argument, this study has aimed to research in depth the attitude of Greek and Turkish columnists toward military takeovers in those countries, i.e., 21 April 1967 in Greece and 12 September 1980 in Turkey, following the militaries' coming to power.

The literature that has examined editorial columns in newspapers, in particular the columns published in Greece and Turkey during the military interregna, has not adequately covered the role the media have played in these countries' political communication. Those that have delved into the subject have weaknesses that affect their ability to convey a convincing and thorough argument. In the Turkish case, for example, Söğüt and Tek, examined several newspapers that were published during the 12 September rule (Söğüt 2010; Tek 2006), demonstrating that the newspapers in question failed in performing their professed duty. In these researchers' view, the newspapers neither acted like a watchdog for the government, nor did they criticize the takeover. Other studies (Mazıcı 1989; Neziroğlu 2003) analyzed the newspapers in a broader framework, highlighting the role of the press and journalists in democratic societies. They, too, arrived at the conclusion that the press did not carry out the role that was expected from it during the military interregna under study. The main weakness of these studies, however,

was that they failed to take into account the fact of the military's strict control over the media during its rule, which mostly explained why explicit opposition and criticism against the takeover and the subsequent interregnum did not exist in newspaper columns. In addition, these studies did not go beyond stating that the main attitude of columnists was supportive; they did not intend to explain why columnists expressed this particular attitude towards the takeovers and the military interregna.

Different from the Turkish case, the focus of the studies that scrutinized the Greek press' function during the junta's rule was on the control and censorship of the military's rule over the media. Some of these studies argue that the press could not fulfill its duty of monitoring and criticizing the policies, functions, and activities of the military's rule because of the strict censorship introduced by that rule (Vlachos 1970, 1972). McDonald (1983) analyzed the censorship over the press across time during the junta's rule, and Stratos (1995) studied the headlines, news, and editorials of Greek newspapers to see whether any opposition or criticism existed implicitly. However, none of these studies attempted to analyze the way columnists perceived the takeover and the colonels' rule that followed.

This study takes the militaries' control over the media as one of the main factors that shaped the content of the newspapers and in particular their opinion columns. Specifically, this control can explain what was not reported in the newspapers. Focusing on this factor answers the question of why there was almost no opposition to the takeovers and no explicit criticism about the militaries' rules in both countries. However, when taken on its own, this control could not explain why

the newspapers covered some developments and not others. Nor could it successfully explain columnists' evaluations in their daily pieces and the particular framing of the issues they chose among a wide range of possible alternatives. Thus, addressing this gap in the literature regarding the content of editorial columns, this study focuses on answering the question of how Greek and Turkish columnists interpreted and framed the military takeover and the subsequent military interregnum in their respective countries after the takeover occurred.

1.2. Case Selection and Methodology

In this essay's analysis of editorial column content related to military takeovers, the cases of Greece and Turkey were selected for a number of reasons. First of all, and most importantly, the military has been an important actor in politics in both countries. Since their establishment as nation-states, the military has intervened in politics a number of times in both countries. The similarities in the two countries' civil-military relations record has generated numerous studies that have compared and contrasted these relations (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006; Gürsoy 2008, 2009; Karabelias 1998, 2003). These studies mainly adopt the Huntingtonian perspective (1957), which idealized civil-military relations in democratic countries – i.e., the total separation of the military from the political and the subordination of the former to the latter. In doing so they focus on officers or political elites to explain why the military intervened in politics in terms of the similarities and/or

divergences between the two countries. This present study also compares and contrasts aspects of civil-military relations within the states, but adds a unique contribution to the literature by highlighting the importance of meanings as created by the media, in particular by columnists. This approach is based on the assumption that columnists' creation of meanings about the military takeovers is also important for deepening our understanding of civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey.

The unit of analysis of this study is the opinion column pieces published in Greek and Turkish daily newspapers. Columns are the focus of this study for several specific reasons. First, columnists writing in the daily newspapers in both countries cannot be considered as objective transmitters of news and facts to their reader. Instead, they produce representations of an issue based on their own information. Promoted with the view that columnists have access to first-hand information about issues that majority of the people do not have direct access to, their evaluations are assumed to have high credibility for the reader. This credibility lends weight to the information readers gain from columns and consider when forming their opinions about the civil-military relations in their respective countries.

Three newspapers were selected for both Greece and Turkey, based on their political tendencies and circulation numbers during the first six months of military rule in each country. The research period is limited to the first six months of the militaries' rules in Greece and Turkey, i.e. from 21 April 1967 to 21 October 1967 in Greece and from 12 September 1982 to 12 March 1983 in Turkey. The assumption underlying this decision is that these six months would comprise the period during which the main attention of columnists would be on interpreting why

the officers took over the government, what the officers' objectives were, and what their plans for the near future were. The Turkish dailies *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet*, and *Milliyet* were selected because of their high circulation rates, based on the circulation data of the Turkish Press and Advertisement Institution (*Basın İlan Kurumu*), as well as on their political inclinations..Each of these papers was among the top five newspapers of the press market at the time the military took over the government, and continued to be so during the first six months of the interregnum. Combined together, these newspapers had dominated more than half of the market before the military takeover. *Cumhuriyet*, defined as having center-left inclinations, is selected because of its long history in the political communication of Turkey, dating back to 1924, and its leading role in the spreading of republican reforms since its establishment. *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet*, which are defined as centrist papers, were selected based on the argument that the attitudes and values of pro-system actors are critical for the consolidation of democracy (Heper and Demirel 1996, 112; Linz 1978, 50).

For the Greek case, the data from Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association (*Enosi İdioktiton Imerision Efimeridon Athinon*) was used for the selection of newspapers. Similar to the selection of Turkish newspapers, Greek newspapers are also selected based on their circulation numbers and political inclinations. As a result, *Acropolis*, *Ta Nea*, and *Eleftheros Kosmos* were selected. *Akropolis* had been one of the leading pro-royalist, conservative newspapers, and *Ta Nea* was one of the leading newspapers of the Greek press with its center-left political inclination that supported George Papandreou and his party Center Union

(*Enosis Kentrou* – EK). *Eleftheros Kosmos* was known for its rightist stance that became one of the strong supporters of the officers' takeover and their rule.

This study employs a qualitative content analysis method that enables the researcher to interpret content of the text data using a systematic classification process. To carry out this analysis, firstly a sample is drawn from the data using systematic sampling method. Of those newspapers identified above, one issue in every three days of publication was selected for the analysis.

As stated, the main research question that led this study's inquiry on newspaper columns is how Greek and Turkish columnists interpreted and framed the military takeover and the subsequent military interregnum in their respective countries after the takeover occurred. This question was supplemented by other questions that are seen valuable in explaining columnists' interpretations of the takeovers and the subsequent military interregna. These questions are: What were the reasons for the military's takeover? What were the objectives of the officers once having taken over the government? What were the expectations of columnists from military's takeover and its rule? How did the columnists describe the military's takeover? What did columnists think about politicians and politics in their countries? What did columnists think about democracy, democratic regimes, and military regimes? Finally, how did columnists evaluate the military's takeover and the subsequent interregnum with a view to democracy?

These questions have informed the coding of the column excerpts carried out in this study. In light of these questions, an inductive approach was followed in the coding process. That is, using the terminology of Hsieh and Shannon (2005),

this study conducted a conventional qualitative content analysis in which the coding categories were derived from the text data inductively, without a theory or relevant research findings to inform the coding process. Thus while the research questions determined the major coding themes, the coding of Greek and Turkish newspapers was developed during the reading of the data. In this regard, it should also be noted here that this approach is also the one followed in the Grounded Theory (Strauss & Corbin 1990) tradition.

1.3. Organization of the Study

The next chapter conducts an overview analysis of the military's intervention in politics in Greece and Turkey since their founding as nation-states. Following a historical perspective, it demonstrates the development of military institutions in Greece and Turkey, and explains why previous interventions took place in those countries. These historical similarities and differences were expected to have influence on columnists' interpretations of the 1967 and 1980 takeovers.

The third chapter presents a theoretical framework of how the media has been studied in social sciences and in journalism. It aims to briefly explain the different ways meaning is produced by the media and how information can be manipulated in the presentation of the news. The profession of journalism is not performed the same in every country. The economic, political, and social factors that differ from one country to another are argued to create different types of journalism and media systems across countries. These differences are reviewed and

the development of the journalism profession in Greece and Turkey is discussed from a historical perspective.

The fourth chapter analyzes Greek columnists' presentations of the 21 April takeover and the subsequent rule of the colonels. The chapter in particular considers the junta's control over the media as an important factor influencing the content of the newspapers and opinion columns. Additionally, it analyzes which matters were selected to be addressed in the opinion columns.

Chapter Five follows a similar pattern for the analysis of daily pieces by Turkish columnists. It first shows the limits of the military's control over the press and then, in that light, scrutinizes the content of the opinion columns published in the daily newspapers.

The concluding chapter takes up the similarities and differences in the presentations of the militaries' takeovers and the subsequent military interregna in the Greek and Turkish opinion columns. The conclusion ties together the analysis conducted in this study, suggesting the probable reasons for these outcomes.

CHAPTER 2

THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN GREECE AND TURKEY

This chapter aims to review the military's intervention in politics in Greece and Turkey since their founding as nation-states – 7 May 1832 and 29 October 1923, respectively. Despite those studies that compare Greece and Turkey in terms of military interventions (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006; Gürsoy 2008, 2009; Karabelias 2003), the development of military institutions within the formation of these nation-states is mostly ignored. This study therefore pays particular attention to this issue to demonstrate how the two countries' nation-states and military institutions differed in their processes of development. Militaries' interventions in politics before the 1967 coup in Greece and 1980 coup in Turkey are analyzed to explain the conditions under which Greek and Turkish military decided to intervene. Lastly, officers' views about their profession and military interventions in

politics are considered briefly to see whether their professional self-images differed from each other across the Greek and Turkish cases.

2.1. The Military and Politics in Greece

Since the formation of the Modern Greek State in 1832, the military and its officers played a major role in Greek politics. The military retained this role until 1974, when democracy was restored after the collapse of the military regime established in the wake of the colonels' coup on 21 April 1967. Numerous successful coups and unsuccessful coup attempts took place during this period that significantly affected political life, the structure of the military, and the development of civil-military relations. A large majority of these attempts aimed to replace a group of politicians in power with another group instead of bringing the military to power as a ruling institution. The major coup that diverged from this aim was the colonels' coup in 1967, which effectively brought colonels to power as the ruling actors. The successful military interventions that are examined in this chapter are the 1843, 1862, 1909, 1916, and 1922 interventions. In addition, several unsuccessful coup attempts are also considered because of their importance in Greek politics.

To understand the dynamics of the modern Greek political system, a brief discussion of its previous religio-political predecessor is in order. Before forming

their own independent state, Greeks belonged to the Orthodox *millet* in the Ottoman Empire, the second largest group in the *millet* system after the Muslim population. The *millet* system provided a wide degree of administrative autonomy to each religious group under their own religious authorities. In return, religious leaders and authorities were expected to guarantee the loyalty of their *millet* to the Ottoman Sultan. Although the Orthodox *millet* of the Empire also included Bulgarian, Romanian, Serbian, Albanian, and Vlach Orthodox populations, the administrative positions were dominated by Greeks; the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, who was the senior patriarch of the Orthodox Church and the head of the *millet*, as well as other upper levels of the Church hierarchy were invariably Greek (Clogg 1992, 10).

Turning to the modern Greek military's predecessors, the roots of Greek irregular armed forces can be traced back to the formation of *klefts* and *armatoloi*, centuries before the Greek struggle for independence began in the 1820s. The *klefts* were bandit forces who attacked tax collectors and other officials who were viewed as symbols of Ottoman power, regardless of these officials were Greeks or Turks. *Klefts* were therefore perceived among the Greek *reaya* as defenders of oppressed Greeks against Muslim overlords (Clogg 1992, 15). *Armatoloi*, on the other hand, were members of the Greek militia formed by the Ottoman Empire to ensure the safety of trade and communication channels through mountain passes (Clogg 1992, 15–16). However, their role in the development of national consciousness remained limited when compared to the role of Greek merchants and Greeks living in Europe for commercial and educational reasons. The latter were the ones who had

experienced contact with the ideas of the Enlightenment, French Revolution, and nationalism and supported the creation of a Greek nationalism based on developing awareness about ancient Greeks. An important group of educated Greeks in the Ottoman Empire were the Phanariots and the high clergy, who served in the central state administration or as governors of various provinces in European lands of the Empire (Legg 1969, 44). However, except for a few of them, this group lacked a developed national awareness, and thus did not play a leading role in the struggle against the Ottoman Empire for the establishment of a Greek national state. Despite their negative attitudes toward the struggle and even denunciations of it, the high clergy could not save themselves when accused of failing to ensure the loyalty of the Greek portion of the Orthodox *millet* to the Sultan.

The Greek uprising, which began in 1821 as unconnected outbursts in various places, eventually developed into a struggle for independence. The independent Greek state was established in 1832 as a result of the Treaty of Constantinople, which was signed between the Ottoman Empire on the one hand, and Russia, France, and Britain on the other. The Great Powers decided that the independent Greek state would be a monarchy and designated Otto Friedrich Ludwig von Wittelsbach, the second son of King Ludwig I of Bavaria, as the first king of the state, who would reign until 1862.

The triumvirate regency that escorted the juvenile Bavarian King initiated a state-building process that aimed to establish a centralized administration system based on European, modern institutions that would replace those based on clientelistic ties. In order to break the existing chain of clientelism, the King with

his Bavarian regents staffed the government with foreigners and subjected the church to the transfer of its land to state ownership. He also appointed officials to provinces and districts who did not have any personal ties to other authorities, thus tearing major party figures from their administrative strongholds for new positions in Athens and abroad (Legg 1969, 53–54). Along with these strategic changes in personnel, the imported administration of the Greek state targeted the irregular armed groups to establish modern regular armed forces. In fact, the first efforts to form a regular army by uniting the irregulars under the central authority were exerted during the last years of the Greek War of Independence under Ioannis Kapodistrias. Kapodistrias was born the son of a notable family of the Corfu Island and was involved in politics from a young age. By the time he was elected by the first Greek National Assembly as the first head of the state in 1827, he had already made a name in European politics. He had served as a Russia's diplomat to Switzerland where he worked toward gaining independence for Swiss people and establishing their unity. Kapodistrias introduced a period of reform and modernization in Greece that aimed at centralization and targeted various aspects of life, from politics to the military, economy, education, and health sectors. Kapodistrias' efforts' toward the formation of a regular state-controlled army failed after his death in 1831.

For the young King, Otto, the dissolution of irregular armed groups meant a loss of power for chieftains and a strengthening of the central authority (Veremis 1997, 3). The young king had arrived in the country with 3,500 Bavarian troops, while 5,000 Greek irregulars and 700 regulars were already present (Veremis 1997,

26). When the state disbanded the irregular forces, they allowed only the veterans who fought in the War of Independence to join the regulars. The excluded irregulars did not disappear immediately, however; they withdrew to countryside where the state's power was weak and continued to exist, though weakened, throughout the nineteenth century.

While the Bavarian troops formed the core of the regular army of the Greek state when it was established, Hellenization of the army was introduced through the Military Academy, which was established in 1828 by Kapodistrias. Despite all efforts to create a professional army that would show absolute loyalty to the state, in other words to the king himself, Otto could not succeed in this aim. He had to leave the post a result of the military coup in 1862.

With the purpose of increasing the recruitment of soldiers, the Military Academy expanded its socio-economic foundations. Families were sending their sons to the academy because they saw it as a proper choice of career (Veremis 1997, 32). After the Balkan Wars, the dominance of middle and lower-middle socio-economic strata in the army was strengthened when prominent families chose to have their children pursue professions as brokers and dealers rather than officers (Veremis 1997, 78). Mouzelis (1986, 98) argues that the quantitative growth in and enlargement of recruited officers from lower socio-economic strata weakened the fusion between civilian and military elites that had been based on a shared upper-middle class background. He views this condition of individuals lacking strong feelings of corporate identity as the basic reason for the officers' interventions in politics during the nineteenth century. Different from the interventions of the

nineteenth century, Mouzelis argues that the interventions during the first few decades of the twentieth century resulted from officers' acts as a relatively cohesive interest group with a predominantly middle-class outlook and professional demands (Mouzelis 1986, 98).

The first two involvements of Greek officers in politics occurred during the reign of Otto. Both involvements took place amidst wide public support; however, they were neither planned nor initiated by the military (Veremis 1997, 43). The first mobilization on 3 September 1843 was directed against the absolute rule of the King and dominancy of Bavarians in the political system. Traditional leaders, their employees, and veteran politicians of Athens were among the major actors of the mobilization asking for the proclamation of a constitution (Legg 1969, 55–56). As a result, a constitutional monarchy was proclaimed in March 1944 by the King that introduced male suffrage and the replacement of remaining Bavarian advisers with Greek equivalents. In less than two decades, however, Otto faced with another rebellion. Along with the growing dissatisfaction within society, the increasingly negative judgments of the monarchy and failures in foreign policy to accomplish the 'Great Idea' – which aimed at uniting the Hellenes under the newly formed independent state – opened the way for mutinies and street demonstrations in 1862 (Legg 1969, 56–57). According to Woodhouse, simultaneous revolts had occurred in a number of military garrisons in February of the same year when the king tried to hinder the implementation of a new political program by Admiral Kanaris, who had been designated by the King as the Prime Minister (Woodhouse 1991, 169). While these revolts were suppressed, a more general revolt with wider public

participation broke out after a few months, not only in Athens but also in other provincial centers. As a result, the first King of Greece Otto, who did not have an heir, had to abdicate. The son of the King of Denmark was proclaimed by the Great Powers as the new King of Greece with the title of King George I of the Hellenes. After the new king came to reign, a new constitution that extended democratic freedoms, but also preserved the king's prerogatives and powers in matters of foreign policy, was produced in the Second Athens National Assembly and accepted by King George I (Clogg 1992, 61).

The remaining half of the nineteenth century was filled with political and economic difficulties that formed the basis for a military intervention in politics in 1909. Since 1841, the tension in Greece's relationship with the Ottoman Empire had increased due to the uprisings in Crete demanding the unification of the island with the Greek state. The crisis in the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire drew the attention of the Great Powers and Greece to the Balkans. The 1877-1878 war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia was terminated with the involvement of the Great Powers. The Berlin Treaty signed at the war's end created new independent and autonomous states in the Balkans, and expanded Greece's territories with the annexation of Thessaly. Along with these events, another prominent element of the nineteenth century's turmoil was the war between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, known as the Thirty Days' War in, 1897. This war broke out due to Greece's sending of troops to Crete to support the uprising in the island for unification with Greece. The war was terminated with the forced armistice of the Great Powers. Despite Greece's defeat, the agreement granted Crete autonomous

status under Ottoman suzerainty and appointed the son of King George I as High Commissioner. In addition to these political developments, the economic situation of Greece was not improving. Increased external debt bankrupted the state, and hundreds of thousands of Greeks immigrated to the United States.

The Ottoman Empire proclaimed a constitutional monarchy for the second time in 1908. A religious uprising took place in 1909 with the aim of terminating the second constitution era, but was quickly suppressed by the Army of Action of the Committee of Union and Progress. Taking advantage of this political crisis in the Empire and the withdrawal of the Great Powers' troops from Crete, the island proclaimed its unification with Greece (Woodhouse 1991, 188). Considering the defeat of 1897 and existing economic problems in the country, Greece's reactions to the Cretan proclamation were prudent. Prime Minister George Theotokis, did not officially acknowledge the proclamation and he was forced to resign from his post under nationalist pressure (Woodhouse 1991, 189). However, his successor Dimitrios Rallis did not act any differently. This situation turned into a catalyst for the intervention of officers who had been already dissatisfied with the royal patronage in the armed forces, political corruption, and failures in foreign policy. The Military League (*Stratiotikos Syndesmos*), which was formed in May 1909 by mostly middle-ranked officers, declared a memorandum on 27 August of the same year. The memorandum demanded political and economic reforms, including removal of the royal princes from the armed forces and members of the cabinet, and threatened to use force if they were not implemented. The coup enjoyed public support, as manifested in huge demonstrations. The officers' demands were met by

the parliament and the King without a single shot being fired. This coup diverged from the 1843 and 1862 coups, both of which had been civilian-driven coups. In this regard, the 1909 intervention represented the first instance of independent military action against the political establishment in modern Greek history (Veremis 1997, 87).

The 1909 coup marked the beginning of a new era in Greek politics. As a result, Prime Minister Rallis resigned from his post. Officers did not have faith in former politicians of the old regime, but in Eleftherios Venizelos, who had established a good reputation in Cretan politics in the meantime. Venizelos earned the trust not only of the officers but also the public. In the elections of December 1910, he secured the control of 300 out of 362 seats in the parliament with his Liberal Party. The situation did not change much in the 1912 elections; more than 80 percent of the seats in the parliament belonged to Liberal Party members (Clogg 1992, 76–79).

According to Veremis, the military's involvement in Greek politics during the inter-war years conforms largely to Huntington's ascription of the soldier as guardian. According to Huntington, militaries in societies with civilian elites and developed civilian cultures do not act as modernizers of society or creators of new political orders, but rather as the guardians of the existing order (Huntington 1957, 222–256). Thus, the Greek military acted to replace one civilian order with another one rather than handing the government over to officers (Veremis 1997, 89).

Venizelos' strong – and strongly supported –entry into the political scene formed a watershed in Greek politics. Disagreements between Venizelos and King

Constantine, who replaced his father in 1913, sowed the seeds of a political schism, which is referred to as "national schism" (*Ethnikos Dichasmos*), in Greek politics that was to last until the 1960s. The military did not remain detached from this political schism; officers, too, were divided into two camps: supporters of the monarchy and supporters of Venizelos who held pro-republican views against royalist regime.

It is worth stating here that although most supporters of Venizelos were against the monarchy, not all were. Even Venizelos himself had given support to the monarchy before 1915 when he came into conflict with the King regarding Greece's entry into the First World War. For this reason, the division between monarchists and republicans did not always map perfectly onto the division between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists.

The roots of the decades-long political schism were grounded in the disagreement between Venizelos and the King about which foreign policy Greece should follow during the First World War. Venizelos supported entering the war on the side of the Entente – i.e., Britain, France, and Russia – with the expectation that it would bring significant territorial gains that would contribute to actualizing the 'Great Idea.' King Constantine, who was married to the sister of Kaiser Wilhelm II, supported Greece's neutrality during the war, believing that the Greek naval force would not be able to withstand the British if they entered the war with the Central Powers (Legg and Roberts 1997, 34–35).

Due to this major differing of views, the King forced Venizelos to resign from the premiership both in 1915 and 1916, after having been elected twice to the

position. Venizelos' reaction to the King generated an uprising against the King's policy and the establishment of a provisional government in Thessaloniki in 1916. This anti-monarchical mobilization gained support from politicians, officials, and military officers, including Admiral Kountouriotis, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (Woodhouse 1991, 200–201). Veremis mentions a mobilization at the same time by the junior officers of 'National Defense' (*Ethniki Amyna*), which was formed in 1915 against the neutrality policy of the King and supported Venizelos' decision to enter the war on the side of the Entente powers (Veremis 1997, 53–54). Unable to stand against these mobilizations and existing British and French pressures for Greece to enter into the war, the King fled the country in July 1917. His son Alexander replaced him as monarch and Venizelos returned to the premiership.

The schism between the King Constantine and Venizelos was reflected in the composition of state institutions and affected much of the population as well. After Venizelos' forced resignation from the premiership in 1915 and his departure from Athens, individuals known to hold pro-Venizelist attitudes were purged from civil service and government (Legg and Roberts 1997, 35). After Venizelos return to power, a corresponding shift in personnel was targeted toward pro-royalists in the same positions. The royalist-Venizelist schism in the army also deepened after Greece entered the First World War on the side of Entente. The uprisings of royalist officers were suppressed, they were purged from their positions, and pro-Venizelist officers were appointed to higher ranks (Veremis 1997, 63).

The purges in the army according to officers' political affiliations continued during subsequent coups and countercoups. This situation strengthened patron-client relationships in the army, which in fact had already existed in other state institutions and Greek society. The view that only by depending on individuals of higher status could one achieve one's end was prevalent not only among civilians but also among officers (Veremis 1997, 75). Rising to a higher rank depended more on officers' personal and political affiliations than their professional development. For instance, officers who supported Venizelos in his decision to enter the First World War on the side of the Entente were rewarded with a bonus of ten months' added seniority, while those who stayed neutral or supported the King found themselves surpassed in seniority by some of their juniors (Veremis 1997, 108).

Power was turned over from Venizelos' Liberal to the conservative Popular Party through the 1920 elections. King Constantine returned to rule and the vicious circle of appointments in the civil service and military happened once again, with royalists replacing Venizelists. The defeat of the Greeks in the Asia Minor mobilized another coup in 1922 by those who blamed the King and the royalists for the defeat. A group of officers was mobilized under Colonel Nicholas Plastiras, who would be one of the major figures on the political scene until the 1950s. Officers seized power on 11 September and forced King Constantine to abdicate. One of his sons ascended to rule with the title King George II. Influential individuals in the previous government and the Commander of the Army, who were deemed by the revolutionary committee of the coup to be responsible for the Asia Minor defeat, were tried for high treason and executed (Legg and Roberts 1997, 36). Despite the

installation of a civilian government, the revolutionary committee retained its control over politics (Clogg 1992, 100).

During the inter-war years, officers continued to be among the main actors in politics. Numerous successful coups, unsuccessful coup attempts, and counter-coups took place during the 1926-1933 period. High-ranking army officers and colonels such as Generals Plastiras, Pangalos, Kondylis, Gonatas, and Metaxas, as well as Colonels Zervas, Saraphis, Bakirdzis, and Psaros collaborated either with royalist or republican politicians to seize power when it was in the hands of the opposing political front (Woodhouse 1991, 214). General Pangalos, who was actively involved in the 1922 coup that forced King Constantine to abdicate, staged a coup in June 1925. He established a dictatorship that would last until August 1926, when he was removed from power through another coup by General Kondylis. The 1928 elections brought Venizelos back to the premiership where he remained for four and a half years. With the 1933 elections, power was again turned over from the Liberal Party to the Popular Party, which was led by Panayis Tsaldaris. On the day of the elections, when preliminary results showed that royalists would be the winners, an unsuccessful coup was staged by General Plastiras attempting to prevent royalists from coming to power. General Plastiras staged another unsuccessful coup on 1 March 1935. This time, however, Venizelos was directly involved in the planning and organization of the coup attempt along with his adherents in the army (Veremis 1997, 101–129). The failure of the coup had significant results for both republicans and royalists. Venizelist Generals Anastasios Papoulas and Miltiadis Koimisis and Cavalry Major Stamatis Volanis

were executed. Venizelos and Plastiras, who fled the country after the failure of the coup, were also sentenced to death *in absentia*. In total, more than 1000 officers and civilians were tried under the martial law that was announced after the coup attempt. Almost 1,500 officers known to hold pro-Venizelos and republican attitudes were purged from the armed forces. This personnel shift brought about the dominance of pro-royalist officers and, from an ideological perspective, the most homogenous military in Greece during the twentieth century (Veremis 1997, 129–132).

The general elections in June 1935 delivered an absolute victory to the Populist Party as a result of pro-Venizelists' boycotting the elections. Gaining 65 percent of the popular vote, Populist Party controlled 96 percent of the seats in parliament (Clogg 1992, 113). From June to October, Greek politics was pre-occupied with the question of restoration of monarchy, which had been abolished following a referendum in 1924. Prime Minister Tsaldaris decided to arrange a plebiscite that would give the power to the people to choose between a republic or a monarchy. However, not wanting to risk the re-introduction of the monarchy, a revolutionary committee of high-ranking officers led by General Kondylis, who used to be a pro-Venizelist but later turned out to be a strong supporter of the King, staged a coup on 10 October 1935 that forced Tsaldaris to resign from premiership (Spyropoulos 1993, 46). Kondylis seized the post of premiership, abolished the republic, proclaimed a constitutional monarchy and set a referendum for the ratification of the constitutional monarchy to be held on 3 November (Woodhouse 1991, 229). As a result of the referendum, constitutional monarchy was restored in

Greece and King George II returned to the country. A caretaker government was established under Konstantinos Demertzis, a law professor at the University of Athens, and general elections were held on 26 January 1936.

The results of the 1936 elections were significant both for royalists and republicans. The number of seats the anti-Venizelist parties won exceeded those of the liberals and republicans by only two, while 15 seats were garnered by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE- *Kommunistiko Komma Ellados*). General Alexander Papagos who was the Minister of Army Affairs of the caretaker government visited the King on 5 March 1936 with the ultimatum that the armed forces would not tolerate any deal with the Communist Party (Veremis 1997, 133). The King's response to Papagos' ultimatum was to replace him with Metaxas who was a retired general and the leader of the nationalist and monarchist Freethinkers' Party (*Komma ton Eleftherofronon*), which had gained seven seats in parliament in the last elections. During the two months following the elections while Greece still lacked a government based on a popular vote, Metaxas became a dominant figure in the caretaker government. A historical coincidence of deaths of leading figures in Greek politics including Venizelos, Kondylis, Tsaldaris and premier of the caretaker government Demertzis, boosted Metaxas' role in politics. Despite his weak existence in parliament, the King appointed Metaxas as the deputy premier in April 1936 (Woodhouse 1991, 230). Metaxas not only won a vote of confidence in the parliament, but also gained the right to govern by decree as a result of the adjournment of the parliament for five months (Papandreu 1977, 66–67). However, the parliament did not meet again during the next ten years.

The 1930s were also the years that Greek economy continued to worsen due to the effects of the Great Depression. The influx of refugees; the economic crisis; and the street demonstrations, strikes, and occasional violence led by organized workers and refugees all strengthened support for the KKE among disadvantaged groups. The massive demonstrations of tobacco workers in Thessaloniki on 9 May 1936, which left many wounded and around thirty dead, showed how fragile the public authority was when faced with an organized and frustrated population (Spyropoulos 1993, 50). During June and July, workers' demonstrations and strikes supported by the KKE broke out at different places in Greece including Athens. A nation-wide general strike was organized by the communist party and supported by worker groups, and was to take place on 5 August 1936. The day before the strike, under the pretext of a communist threat Metaxas, supported by the King, dissolved the parliament without setting a date for elections, proclaimed martial law, and suspended civil liberties. Thus, 4 August marked the beginning of the authoritarian regime of Metaxas which was to last until his death on 29 January 1941.

As already discussed, the dominance of patron-client relationships within Greece's political schism explains its officers' interventions in politics. In addition, exploring officers' views about their professions and the military's involvement in politics is valuable in uncovering officers' motivations. Interviews conducted with officers who served in the army during the interwar period show that officers highlighted the moral character of their profession, describing it as virtuous and heroic (Veremis 1997, 70). They viewed selecting the profession of becoming an officer as a decision to give up a prosperous future and embrace the hardship of

military life. With the perception that becoming an officer meant serving the nation, interviewees expressed that officers would not act according to selfish motives. With regard to the military's interventions, they made a differentiation between military interventions for personal gains and for the good of the country in times of crisis (Veremis 1997, 71). Thus, while they condemned interventions in politics in principle, they left the door open for those they saw as necessary to restore order**.**

2.2. The Military and Politics in Turkey

Studying the history of Turkey, one will quickly notice that the military in Turkey has been an important actor in Turkish politics since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, though with significantly diminished influence during the last decade. Not only did officers win the War of Independence, but they also took a leading role in the establishment of the republican regime. Since then, they acted as the guardians of the state and Atatürkist principles against perceived external and internal threats.

The roots of the military's involvement in politics in Turkey can easily be traced back to structure of the Ottoman state and the place of its military in it. The Ottoman state is referred to as a patrimonial state, which differed from the feudal structure of Western European states (Hale 1994, 304–305; Heper 1988, 5, 2006, 38–40; Özbudun 1994, 189). Within its patrimonial structure, Ottoman society was

divided into two major strata: the ruling stratum, which was named as *askeri* to indicate the military, and the ruled one, *reaya*. The ruling stratum consisted of officers of the army and the *ulema* (doctors of Islamic Law), to whom the Sultan delegated executive and religious powers, whereas *reaya* comprised all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Empire who were paying taxes and had no involvement in the government (İnalcık 1964, 44). In contrast to the feudal systems of Western countries, the peripheral administrations or estates in Ottoman lands were not structured to balance the power of the central ruling class (Heper 2006, 38). A large part of the land was left to benefice-holders, who were tasked with both local administrative and military duties. There was also no clear-cut distinction between the military and civilian bureaucrats of districts; the district governors, both *sancakbeyi* and *beylerbeyi*, were also military commanders. Janissaries formed the core of the military power of the Ottoman Empire. They were the slave army of the Sultan, which was formed based on the *devsirme* (conversion) system. The *devsirme* system was an organized method of compulsory recruitment based on the gathering of boys from the Christian communities of the Empire to be raised for the Sultan's army (Hale 1994, 3). These boys were forced to convert to Islam and underwent special training that was not limited to just martial arts; they were educated in a broad range of issues, intended to prepare them not only to serve in the army but also in administrative posts such as senior government advisors, civil servants, and provincial governors (Hale 1994, 3–5).

The beginning of Ottoman imperial decline led to the initiation of reforms aimed at modernizing state institutions to save the Empire from entire collapse.

Modernization efforts began with reforming the army and the bureaucracy, since corruption in these institutions was seen as the main reason for the decline of the Empire. Education and the training of Ottoman soldiers were reformed on the basis of the Western European model. The Western form of education eventually created a new generation of soldiers who believed that the salvation of the state lay in its modernization and stood against the absolute rule of the Sultan. Thus, the military, which had been once the object of reforms in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, became subject of change in the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Heper and Güney 1996, 619). Officers had a determining role in the declaration of a constitutional monarchy in the Ottoman Empire, first in 1876 and again in 1908. The idea of the constitutional monarchy was developed by the Young Ottomans, and its declaration came along with the officers' intervention (Karpat 2010, 10). Similarly, military officers led activities of the Young Turks organized in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which brought about a re-declaration of the constitutional monarchy in 1908 by ending the absolutist regime of Abdülhamid II (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006, 410).

During the Turkish War of Independence, the role of officers was not limited to the battles they fought; they played a dominant role in decision-making processes by taking part in the Ankara government (Harris 1965, 55). According to Harris, the reason for this participation arose both from the particular conditions of the war and from the narrowness of the base of leadership (Harris 1965, 55). Officers' involvement in day-to-day politics changed after the war was won and the republican regime was proclaimed. A law that necessitated the resignation of active

duty officers before they run in elections to become a deputy was introduced in December 1923. This also meant that those already in parliament had to make a choice between the parliament and army. The main reason for introduction of this law was Atatürk's aim to keep the army away from the influence of political opposition and loyal to the republican regime and to himself, rather than to keep politics away from the influence of officers (Hale 2011, 192–194; Harris 1965, 56–60).

During single-party era, the relationship between decision makers and the military was free of problems; top figures of the state shared a common military background. For Atatürk, the military was the ultimate base of power for the regime, source of progressive practices, guardian of the ideals of the nation, and the intelligentsia, which would lead the spread of modernization reforms all over the country (Harris 1965, 55–56).

The military, which played a vanguard role in the introduction of modernization reforms during single-party rule, became the most prominent guardian of these reforms and Atatürkist principles after 1946 when a multi-party political system was introduced. Officers attached particular importance to secularism among Atatürkist principles as forming an indispensable dimension of modernization and the republican regime. For them, the main reason behind the demise of the Ottoman Empire was Islam, which had prevented rational judgment and formed the basis of opposition to modernization efforts (Heper and Güney 2000, 636). Along with secularism, the military perceived democracy as another important component of modernization. As Cizre (1997, 153) notes, despite its high

level of political autonomy, acceptance of democracy and civilian rule has been one of the most defining features of the Turkish military. However, it is important to note how the Turkish military perceived democracy. The military favored "rational democracy," which is defined as a system that enables enlightened debate among the educated with the purpose of selecting the best policy among alternatives (Heper and Güney 1996, 620). Thus, for the military democracy was an end, i.e., rational policy making, rather than a means for popular representation (Heper 2000, 74). Officers and the rest of state elites believed that rational democracy would not serve the personal and party interests of politicians who were preoccupied with short-term populist policies, but rather the long-term interests of the state and nation.

With the importance attached to pursuing Atatürkist principles, particularly secularism and rationalist version of democracy, the Turkish military intervened directly in politics in 1960, 1971, and 1980 to safeguard the secular-democratic state (Heper and Güney 2000, 636). The most prominent common characteristic of these three interventions was military's reluctance to establish indefinite military dictatorships. Each time the officers took power, they formed a transitional administration or supported a civilian transitional government (as in1971), to save and restore a secular democratic regime. Each period was concluded by the military's returning to its barracks by its own volition and leaving power to civilians through democratic elections.

Along with the basic and overarching reason of saving a secular-democratic regime from itself, each intervention also had particular reasons that need to be considered for a better understanding of the military's intervention in politics in

Turkey. The year 1946 marks a turning point in Turkish politics with transition to multi-party system after the unsuccessful experiences of Atatürk's period. The first experience with a multi-party system took place in 1924 with the establishment of the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*). This party was formed by deputies who had resigned from the Republican People's Party (CHP – *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*) and led by former officers such as Ali Fuad Cebesoy and Rauf Orbay (Ahmad 1993, 57). The party did not last long; it was dissolved in June 1925 under the Law for the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*). This law was proclaimed as a result of *Şeyh Sait* Rebellion in 1925, which had a strong Kurdish nationalist element but was launched and sustained in religious terms (Ahmad 1993, 58).The second experiment with a transition to a multi-party regime came in 1930, this time with Atatürk's specific support for the establishment of an opposition party led by Fethi Okyar. The new party was named the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*), which diverged from the CHP by supporting liberalization in economy. However, in a short time the party became the center of criticism and opposition to republican reforms – in particular, secularism. Three months after its establishment, the party dissolved itself on 17 November 1930.

The Democratic Party (DP) was founded in January 1946 by Celal Bayar, who had replaced İsmet İnönü as prime minister in 1937 and served until 1939, along with Refik Koraltan, Fuad Köprülü, and Adnan Menderes. These individuals had all been former deputies of the CHP,[1] but had become distanced from it mainly

[1] The name of *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası* was changed to *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* in 1935. In their English translations, there is no difference; both names are translated as Republican People's Party.

because of its economic policies. The establishment of the DP did not cause any concern in CHP circles, since its leaders were perceived to share the common political philosophy based on Atatürkist principles (Ahmad 1993, 103–104). The party program emphasized a commitment to Atatürkist principles and cited advancing democracy as the main goal. According to Celal Bayar, there were no ideological differences between the DP and the CHP, but they differed in their methods for developing a modern and prosperous Turkey. He even made an analogy to explain the absence of difference between the two political parties, likening the DP and the CHP to chefs who were preparing *helva* (a traditional Turkish dessert) with different recipes (Ahmad 1993, 109).

In the first, and highly controversial, multi-party national elections held in July 1946, the DP entered parliament by gaining 65 of the seats. The 1950 elections became a victory for the DP, which was to stay in power for the next ten years. The second half of the 1950s became a period plagued not only by economic problems but also political ones. Economic development in the first half of the decade left in its place problems arising from increasing inflation rates and state debts due to the change in balance of payments with increased imports, as well as a shortage of foreign currency and goods in the market. The government's discontent with the increasing opposition from the CHP, public bureaucracy, universities, and different parts of society led it to extend undemocratic measures. These were manifested in increasing control over the press and suppression of opposition in the last three months before the military's intervention (Özdağ 2004, 55–62).

The military's intervention in politics took place on 27 May 1960, and resulted from an initiative taken by colonels to restore democracy and support Atatürkist principles in reaction to the DP's increasing authoritarianism. Officers made their intention clear that they would hand power over to civilians "once the mess created by politicians was cleaned out" (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006, 411). Cleaning out the mess meant the creation of a new constitution by the Constituent Assembly that involved military-civilian cooperation.

The 1961 Constitution, which is referred as the most liberal constitution in Turkey's history, produced an institutional configuration in which it would be difficult to establish an authoritarian, partisan regime based on parliamentary majorities (Tachau and Heper 1983, 22). Instead, by introducing a proportional representation system, the constitution supported a more just distribution in the parliament in accordance with the votes parties won in the elections. Thus, the new electoral system enabled the representation of minor parties in the parliament. This representation served to restrict the power of the CHP and the Justice Party (AP – *Adalet Partisi*), which was founded in February 1961 and acted as an extension of the DP. The new constitution also produced a distribution of power between elected and non-elected bodies with the aim to restrict the power and actions of the elected. In this regard, the Grand National Assembly was comprised of two chambers: the National Assembly, which consisted of 450 popularly elected members, and the Senate, composed of 150 popularly elected senators and fifteen senators who were appointed by the President. In addition to these senators, members of the National Unity Committee and former presidents were lifetime members in the Senate.

Along with the Senate, the Constitutional Court was created with the main function of reviewing legislation according to the Constitution.

As stated, the 1960 intervention aimed to restore a liberal system in which the power of the elected executive was to be balanced with non-elected state institutions. Along with it, broadened rights and liberties that were provided to universities, professional chambers, associations, and clubs strengthened organized civil society against the state. Within the newly created system, the members of the National Unity Committee (NUC), were provided with 'exit guarantees' for themselves and for the military as a whole, which enabled them to maintain an element of control over politics. Firstly, each member of the NUC was guaranteed to become a member of the Senate for life, while all other members of the Senate (except former presidents) were to serve for six years. Secondly and more importantly, the National Security Council (NSC) was created to provide an institutionalized channel for the military's access to the topmost political authority (Tachau and Heper 1983, 22). As stated in Article 111 of the Constitution, the Council was composed of ministers to be determined by law, the Chief of the General Staff, and representatives of the armed forces. The main function of the NUC was determined in the same article to be assisting the Council of Ministers in making decisions on issues of national security. The Constitution did not define what was meant by 'national security' and thus the concept was left to so unspecific that anything could be considered as an issue of national security by the military. For instance, the broadness of the interpretation of national security was noted by Orhan Erkanlı, who had joined the colonels' takeover as a staff commander, in an

interview years after the coup. He stated that every problem in Turkey could be considered as related to national security; issues ranging from the price of the rice and the maintenance of roads and touristic sites to the works of intellectuals could all constitute matters of national security (Ahmad 1993, 130).

The 1960s witnessed the establishment of new political parties on the right and left sides of the political spectrum as well as a religiously-oriented one. The decade was also characterized by an increase in the number of labor unions and student clubs, whose members led street mobilizations and acts of violence including bank robberies, kidnappings of foreigners, and murders. By 1971, in addition to all these events, Islamist organizations and the religiously-oriented National Order Party had started to openly reject Atatürkist principles, in particular secularism. Perceiving the secular-democratic regime at danger once again, the military intervened in politics for the second time on 12 March 1971. Different than the 27 May takeover, this time the military intervened by maintaining the chain of command. However, instead of a direct takeover, the military's intervention came via a "communiqué," which demanded the formation of a strong and credible government that would be able to implement the reforms envisaged in the constitution and threatened that the military would step in if these measures were not taken (Ahmad 1993, 147). Under these conditions, the AP government resigned and a caretaker government was appointed under the leadership of Nihat Erim, a former deputy of the CHP. Amendments to the constitution were introduced to strengthen the executive (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006, 411) and State Security Courts were established. The military also strengthened its place in the NSC by

changing the wording of the relevant constitution article. Thus, the NSC, which was established to *assist* the Council of Ministers in the formulation of national security policies, was now to *advise* the Council of Ministers in the same task (Özbudun 2012, 82). After two and half years, democratic elections were held and a new civilian government was formed in accordance with the results of the elections. However, the transitional administration under the technocrat government supported by the military did not guarantee the consolidation of democracy. The second half of the 1970s turned out to be years of political instability, increasing violence, and economic crisis. One more time, with the same reason of saving the secular-democratic regime, the military intervened in politics on 12 September 1980 – this time, by taking power into its hands.

As stated above, despite lacking the intention to establish a permanent military regime, the military intervened in politics three times. In all these interventions, the military acted as an actor above politics. In other words, the armed forces intervened in politics as a rule-maker rather than to become a player of the game. Scholars have explained the Turkish military's intervention as deriving from its self-imposed mission, which developed in the wake of the declining years of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, as also noted above, the military did not see its mission as limited to defending the country against external threats, but also held the perception that it was the ultimate protector of the republican regime and the legacy of Atatürk (Cizre 2004, 107; Demirel 2003, 4; 2004, 128). Birand demonstrated the formation of this particular self-perception of officers in his study on education in military high schools. In one of the meetings he had with students in

their last year at the military academy, he asked whether they believed that the military should intervene when they see that it is necessary. Surprised to be facing this question, students answered (Birand 1989, 51):

> [W]e are the army of the regime. We are entrusted with protecting this homeland. It is always our duty to keep the state strong and the regime away from destruction. (…) We are against everyone who intends to attack Atatürkist principles. We have the right to do so [to intervene to politics] for the good of our people.

Along with the internalization of the guardianship role of the regime and Atatürkist principles, Birand also revealed military high school students' belief in democracy in ideal terms and how this belief changed when it came to its actual practice in Turkey. The same group of students expressed that democracy was the best regime type. However, when they were asked about politicians, they responded with a negative point of view in the Turkish context. For these students, politicians were self-centric individuals who could deceive people to save their own interests, while the general public was illiterate and would believe the lies of politicians (Birand 1989, 51–52). Nevertheless, the negative perceptions about politicians did not create a view that soldiers should be governing the country instead of politicians (Birand 1989, 52). While the education in military high schools strengthened their view that the military was entrusted with the task of protecting the republican regime and the legacy of Atatürkist principles, students' statements showed that their negative views about politicians did not arise from the education they had at the military school, but from what they read in newspapers and heard in their close social environments (Birand 1989, 52–53).

Military's guardianship role was not simply self-imposed but instead was expected, waited for, and supported by large segments of civilians at all levels – but particularly by some academics and journalists – at times when they perceived that the country was in a form of danger with which civilians would not be able to deal. There was no consensus among civilians, in particular political elites, to resist the military; neither was there any denial of the military's guardianship role after transition to democracy. As stated by Demirel (Demirel 2005, 246), there was a positive perception of military interventions in Turkey among a significant number of people. The military's interventions were rarely seen as repressive or as failures in political, economic, or military terms. Instead, they were viewed as result-oriented moves that offered quick, clear-cut, and less costly solutions to existing problems rather than trying to solve crises within a democratic regime in a longer and more costly period of time. Along with this positive perception of military interventions, the military also experienced cooperation with civilians during transition periods.

The 1960 intervention had the support of the political elites of the CHP, as well as "intellectuals" (Cizre Sakallioğlu 1997, 154). The Constituent Assembly – comprised by the National Unity Committee and the House of Representatives, which itself was composed of representatives from various institutions such as the judiciary, universities, bar associations, and the press demonstrated the collaboration among officers, state, and political elites, and such "intellectuals" during the drafting of the 1961 constitution.

The intervention in 1971 also had civilian support, but with a much narrowed-down version when compared to support for the 1961 intervention. This discrepancy in levels of support can be explained by the changing political context, i.e., the existence of political parties on the left and right of the political spectrum; differences in political parties' evaluations of political developments and their expectations from the interventions; and the timing and type of the intervention. Acceptance of the military's intervention in politics at times of crisis is demonstrated by the criticisms of a CHP representative for the inaction of the military before 12 March (Birand, Dündar, and Çaplı 1994, 171; also cited in Demirel 2003,13):

> I had made such reproaching statements [to commanders] as "the homeland is falling apart (…) [Y]oung patriots are dying in the streets. And you are watching. Do you know any other solution that we do not know? Will you not do anything?" We thought it was beneficial to involve the army in the process. Not only was the law convenient for such an interpretation, but also there was a precedent.

The first reactions to the 12 March intervention from individuals from the left wing were positive, but they quickly changed when it was made known that the intervention was not the one that they expected to occur; officers who were known with their pro-leftist ideas were purged from their active duties. The center-right was displeased with the intervention, as it was the second time that its faction had been removed from power through undemocratic methods. The majority of the CHP did not show any reaction against the communiqué other than Bülent Ecevit and a few of his supporters. These individuals who represented the left-of-center,

perceived the military's intervention to be targeted against themselves (Sunay 2010, 166). The communiqué included the warning that the military was ready to perform its duty of protecting the Republic by taking power unless an impartial government was established to take the necessary measures. This explicit statement left politicians no option other than to carry out the military's demands if they wanted to keep the parliament functioning and political parties open. As a result, Prime Minister of the AP government Süleyman Demirel resigned from his post, the government was dissolved, and a non-partisan government was formed with deputies and bureaucrats under the premiership of Nihat Erim as noted above.

Also noted above, one of the important characteristics of both transition periods, i.e., 1960-1961 and 1971-1973, was the creation and strengthening of 'exit guarantees' for the military. With regard to civilian views about these exit guarantees, there was no solid resistance against their creation. In fact, civilian resistance to their creation and strengthening might have been difficult when the power was in the hands of the military. However, after power was handed over to civilians in each time, civilians neither showed any strong criticism of such exit guarantees nor took any initiative to block them.

It is clear that civilian attitudes and behavior toward the military's guardianship role, its intervention in politics at times of crisis, and its exit guarantees cannot be considered independent from historical and cultural factors, including the construction of national narratives containing concepts such as "the military-nation," "the nation on horse," and "every Turk is born a soldier." As Heper (2006, 41) states, Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire a strong state

and a weak society. Like in the Ottoman Empire, society in Turkey looked up to state elites, including military officers, as the leaders of progressive steps toward a better future. Modernization reforms were introduced by this stratum, which was comprised of the most educated people of the nation and therefore considered by society to know what the best was for the good of the country.

Education in military high schools and in the Military Academy was one of the factors strengthening the popularity of and long-held respect for the military in society. Students who wanted to go to a military high school had to pass written, oral, and athletic skills entrance exams. Military high schools and the academy offered conditions and facilities that were lacking in most public schools and universities. Students in these schools were not only taught courses related to the military profession, but also those such as Political Science, International Relations, World Politics, History, International Law, and Sociology (Birand 1989, 60–70).

The discourse of the "military-nation" concept is reproduced in various aspects of daily life by multiple actors in addition to its reproduction in military schools. The popular saying "Every Turk is born a soldier," (*Her Türk asker doğar*) is repeated not only in military service but also in civilian school textbooks, daily conversations, and the speeches of public officials and intellectuals (Altınay 2004, 13). Turkey's conscription is spiritually glorified as the hearth of the Prophet (*peygamber ocağı*) as well as service to the nation. Serving in the military also constitutes an important experience in the lives of Turkish men, for whom conscription is perceived in the society as a step to become "real man."

To sum up with a few concluding remarks, this chapter reviewed the role of the Greek and Turkish militaries in the politics of these countries since their founding as nation-states. It paid particular attention to the state-building processes of Greece and Turkey, the development of the military institution as an institution, and the relationships between officers and politicians with a focus on their influence on the development of civil-military relations. In light of this view, military interventions in the politics of those countries before the 21 April 1967 takeover in Greece and the 12 September 1980 takeover in Turkey are analyzed. It is seen that although the two countries resembled each other in terms of their respective militaries' interventions in several ways, they diverged from each other in terms of the role of the military in politics as well as officers' motivations and goals regarding military interventions. These similarities and differences in the development of the civil-military relations in those countries are expected to influence the way Greek and Turkey columnists evaluated the 1967 and 1980 takeovers.

CHAPTER 3

NEWSPAPERS, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, AND THE GREEK AND TURKISH CASES

A huge literature exists regarding the development and characteristics of the media in different countries, their roles in political communication, and the extent and limits of their influence on opinion formation. This chapter presents a theoretical framework for understanding how the media has been studied in social sciences and in journalism to-date. It first discusses how meaning is produced in the media through different methods of manipulation of information, and then identifies several classifications of media systems. It concludes by analyzing the development of the journalistic profession in Greece and Turkey from a historical perspective.

3.1. Media and Opinion Formation

In media studies, the media are considered to produce meanings, realities, and truths. While conveying a message, the media provide a representation. In this representation, they create a reality – a truth by means of what is included, what is excluded, and the way what is included is framed (Bainbridge 2008a, 187–189). The structural parts of a text – i.e., the words, accompanying pictures, and typeface – produce a particular meaning. The reader is exposed to the structural parts that lead to abstractions in the minds of the audience. Thus, the meaning that is produced depends on the relationship between the media text and the resultant abstraction. The link between the text and the abstraction is not natural; it is socially constructed. Therefore, there is always more than one possible abstraction of the same media text. However, among the possible abstractions there exists a more likely one, depending on the context in which these physical parts appear, the framing of the text, the relationship between the text that is being studied and other texts, and also the nature and background of the audience (Bainbridge 2008b, 160–167).

Various empirical studies have shown that the media influence and shape public opinion particularly in terms of what is known and what is valued as important. In addition, there are studies that demonstrate that the media can influence what people think about particular issues. However, it should be noted here that the influence of the media on its audience is not always at the same level;

other factors such as the political and historical context, background information of the audience, and reliability of the source of information also make a difference.

In addition, empirical studies show that people are particularly vulnerable to persuasion when dealing with subjects in which they do not have direct experience (Curran and Seaton 2003, 326). It has also been demonstrated that people's trust in the source of the message increases their willingness to believe what is presented (Druckman, 2001). With regards to politics, about which very few people have first-hand information and experience, it is assumed in the literature that the media's effects on opinion formation is strong since the media are considered by many as authoritative and reliable sources of information on political issues (Curran and Seaton 2003, 326). It is also known that political persuasion is more successful when it is used to reinforce the public's preferences rather than to alter them (Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982, 848). That is, people's views may get stronger when they are reinforced by the media. With regards to situations when the views of people are not supported by the media, there can be a negative effect; in this way, people's views that are not reinforced may diminish or disappear completely (Curran and Seaton 2003, 326).

Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann's (1974) "theory of spiral of silence" is also worthy of consideration in explaining the role of the media on people's (re)formation of their opinions. Noelle-Neumann stresses how public opinion affects individual behavior and thinking, and how the individual who is influenced contributes to the (re)formation or maintenance of public opinion in turn. According to the theory of a spiral of silence, the assumption is that society threatens

individuals with isolation and exclusion if they deviate from the consensus. Therefore, individuals constantly check to see which ideas and forms of behavior are on the rise or decline in society, with the fear of being isolated or excluded. People's assessments of which ideas and behaviors are rising or declining affect, in turn, their own willingness to express their views and the manner in which they act. Thus, if they believe that their opinions are shared within the general public opinion, they feel confident to express their opinions in both public and private spheres. If they believe the situation is the reverse, they will be more cautious about making their opinions known and may even keep silent.

With regards to the role of the media in this spiral relationship, Noelle-Neumann (1992, p. 80) bases her argument on existing empirical research investigating the role of the media as a major source of information. She argues that the media demonstrate to people what is accepted or acceptable, and what majority and minority opinion are. Thus, in addition to providing information, the media become an actor in the (re)formation and maintenance of public opinion by making some opinions more salient, and thus reflecting them as the majority or the consensus, and overlooking some others, which contributes to their being perceived as the minority and forces them into silence.

As stated above, it is difficult to measure precisely the media effect on people's opinions and behaviors, due to the influence of other various factors. Therefore, most empirical research aims to control the independent and intervening variables also affecting behavior as much as possible in order to highlight the media's effect. Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2009), for example, aimed to explore

the effect of being exposed to newspapers on people's political behavior and opinions. They discovered that even short exposure to one of two main newspapers, such as *The Washington Post* or *The Washington Times,* meaningfully changed people's voting behaviors.

The influence of the media on creating a sense of what is more important among issues on the agenda as a result of their news coverage has been another question researchers tried to tackle. Defined as "agenda-setting," it is argued that people learn from the media not only about issues but also how much importance is attached to them based on the amount of information provided in news stories, columns, and editorials (McCombs and Shaw 1972). In their research, McCombs & Shaw compared the key issues highlighted by American voters to the content of the mass media during the 1968 presidential campaign. They discovered that there was a strong relationship between the campaign issues that the media emphasized and the issues judged by voters as the important issues of the elections.

Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder (1982, 182) discuss the "priming effect" of the media. They argue that by highlighting some issues at the expense of others, the media not only change what people see as an important issue on the agenda, but also they may affect the standards by which people evaluate their governments and candidates. Scholars see agenda-setting and priming as being interrelated; in fact, they view priming as an extension of agenda-setting. They make the assumption that people's attitudes are formed based on those pieces of information that are more salient and more accessible to them when they make decisions (Hastie and Park 1986). Thus, the media make some issues more accessible and salient in

people's mind through an agenda-setting effect, which may in turn have a priming effect by shaping what people take into account when making judgments about political issues (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 11).

Social scientists also investigated the media's "framing effect" on its audience. The concept of a framing effect is based on the assumption that the presentation of an issue can influence the way it is understood by the audience (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 11). Entman (1993, 52) defines the framing effect as selecting some aspects of a perceived reality of an issue and making them more salient than other aspects. The framing effect also entails promoting a particular definition, causal interpretation, evaluation, or recommendation for the described item (Entman 1993, 52). Thus, different than agenda-setting and priming effects – which stress the influence of the media's attention to an issue, i.e., how the *quantity* of information they present and the amount of time/space they allocate for particular issues, affects the audience's views about what is important – framing emphasizes the influence of the media's presentation of an issue in a particular way on the audience's opinion about it. In their experimental study, Sniderman & Theriault (2004) found that individuals' support for government spending for the poor varied according to how that spending was framed. They discovered that when government spending for the poor was framed as enhancing the chance of the poor to advance, individuals tended to support increased spending. However, when government spending for the poor was framed as increases in taxes, individuals tended to oppose it.

It is also important to note that framing differs from persuasion, though in practice it may become very difficult to differentiate the two from each other. Framing influences the range of considerations the audience takes into account when forming opinions. It is information weighting that aims to alter the importance an audience attaches to different information about an issue. Thus, framing effects can be seen as a change in belief *importance* (Druckman, 2001, p. 1044). Persuasion, on the other hand, aims to bring about a change in the belief *content* of an audience. In other words, the source of information attempts to convince the audience by "replacing or supplementing favorable thoughts with unfavorable ones" (Nelson and Oxley 1999, 1041). It is assumed that, in persuasion, information provided by the source is new to the audience; it has not been part of audience's existing constructed knowledge base. In framing, however, it is assumed that it is not a process of providing new information but rather activating the information that is already at the audience's disposal (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997, 225).

3.2. Different Media Systems

In their study *Four Theories of the Press* (1963), Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm ask why different press systems appear in different countries around the world. They see a close relationship between the press and the social and political structures within which the press operates. They argue that the press evolved within these social and political structures, and thus reflect the control mechanisms of

these structures that shape the relationships among institutions and individuals (1963, pp. 1–2). Considering the social and political structures, Siebert et al. introduced four types of press systems: the authoritarian model, the libertarian model, the social responsibility model, and the Soviet communist model.

The authoritarian model is the oldest press system, which functioned in authoritarian political regimes during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In these regimes, the press was seen as a servant of the ruling power (the king, emperor, pope, etc.). It was seen as a tool to inform people about issues that the ruling power thought people should know about. While there could be private ownership of the press, this did not mean that they were outside of the control of the ruler. All newspapers, regardless of who owned them, were subject to the close control of the ruling power. Obviously, the press functioning in these societies did not have a watchdog function over the ruling power.

Siebert et al. argue that a new type of the press, the libertarian model, started to emerge in the eighteenth century when the development of political democracy, religious freedom, laissez-faire economics, and the expansion of free trade and travel began to undermine authoritarian regimes and societies. The press was no longer seen as a tool in the hands of the ruling power to be used for its own interests. Instead, the press was now freed from such control. It became a free market place in which different views and arguments were presented. The press served people in their search for truth, influencing their choices and forming their opinions. This type of press also served as a watchdog that served as a check on governments. According to Siebert et al., the presses functioning in the United

States and United Kingdom for approximately the last two hundred years are examples of the libertarian model.

As Mancini (2000, 285) has noted, at the heart of the Anglo-American model of journalism lies objectivity. The entire process of news-making from information collection, processing, and dissemination is based on the principle of neutrality (McQuail 1994, 145; Papathanassopoulos 2001a, 507). According to McQuail (1994, 145), objectivity necessitates adopting a position of detachment in reporting, attachment to accuracy, lack of partisanship, and avoidance of hidden or obvious service to a third party.

The objectivity in question does not develop independently from the socio-historical developments of societies (McNair 1998, 64). Thus what is understood from objectivity may change from one society to another, since it will reflect a particular historical and social reality. Professional journalism, a significant characteristic of which is objectivity, is viewed by a large majority of journalists around the world as the ideal form of journalism; in reality, however, the actual practice of journalism varies from country to country.

Siebert et al. have labeled the authoritarian and the libertarian models as fundamental models, and considered the other two models to be their developments or modifications. In this sense, the social responsibility model of the press is a modification of the libertarian model and the Soviet communist model is the development of the authoritarian model. The social responsibility model delineates for the press the same functions that the libertarian theory envisaged. However, the former is a product of twentieth-century political and social developments, as well

as and the communication revolution. Different than the era when libertarian press systems were functioning and there was a multiplicity of small media units representing different political viewpoints, the ownership of media units in the twentieth century became concentrated in the hands of a few powerful people. This situation eliminated the press' characteristic of being free market-place of ideas, because it was now the owners and managers of the media units who determined what should reach the public. Siebert et al. argue that it was these circumstances that led to the development of the social responsibility model. One of the outstanding characteristics of social responsibility theory is that the near-monopoly conditions it envisages imposes on the media the social responsibility of behaving fairly to all sides in their presentation of different ideas. In this way, it would act as the fourth estate – as a watchdog – by providing people the necessary information they need to make informed choices and form independent preferences. The social responsibility model was not simply a demand and expectation created by the public; instead, these functions of the press were promoted by media publishers and editors themselves who believed that the freedom of press and its privileged position in societies concomitantly carries the obligation of being responsible to society while also carrying out the functions of mass communication.

Similar to the social responsibility model, the Soviet communist model also came into existence in the twentieth century. Similar to the authoritarian model of the press, the Soviet communist theory also saw the press as an instrument of the ruling power, i.e., the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. One of the differentiating characteristics of the press in the Soviet system was its ownership.

While the press was almost entirely privately owned in other authoritarian systems, it was state-owned in the Soviet system. This situation eliminated the market-based profit motive behind newspaper publishing and competition for high circulation rates. In addition, the major mission of the Soviet press was to increase political awareness of the people, to promote their support for leaders and the party program (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1963, 140–141). According to Siebert et al., one of the ways the Soviet system differed from the Anglo-American system is in terms of its view of mankind. The Soviet system saw its audiences as needing cautious guidance from caretakers, whereas the American system saw its audiences as free, rational human beings who were able to make their choices and preferences based on differentiating between truth and falsehood (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1963, 5–6).

Siebert et al.'s categorization of press systems formed a starting point for other scholars to explain the existence of different media systems in various countries. Hallin and Mancini (2004, 8–9) criticized Siebert et al. for adopting a normative approach toward press systems. That is to say, they considered the libertarian theory of the press as the ideal type and evaluated other systems in comparison to that theory. Moreover, they emphasized that Siebert et al. considered the press as a dependent variable that reflected a system of social control. In recent studies, the tendency has been to treat the press less as reflective of social structures and more in terms of their effects on them (Daniel C. Hallin and Mancini 2004, 8–9).

Similar to Siebert et al., Hallin and Mancini (2004), also ask why media systems vary across different countries. They too argue that the media systems of various countries are linked structurally and historically to the development of their economic, political, and social, systems. However, Hallin and Mancini limited their research to media systems in European and Northern American countries. They argued that *Four Theories of the Press* was inadequate to understand the European experience because the press systems in European countries were in some ways combinations of the libertarian, authoritarian, and social responsibility models (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 10). They introduced three models to classify the media systems in Western and Central European as well as Northern American countries: the liberal (North Atlantic) model, the democratic corporatist (Northern and Central European) model, and the polarized pluralist (Mediterranean) model.[2]

Hallin and Mancini considered the media systems functioning in the United States, Britain, Ireland, and Canada as the liberal models of the media.[3] Accordingly, these countries experienced the early development of press freedom

[2] Hallin and Mancini introduced these models as a result of comparing media systems in Western European and Northern American countries according to the four dimensions of media system characteristics and five dimensions of political system characteristics they determined. The four dimensions of media system characteristics are: The development of a media market (development of strong or weak mass circulation press), political parallelism (the links between the media and political parties and the extent to which the media system reflects the major political division in the society), development of journalistic professionalism, and the role of the state in the media system. Political system characteristics considered in the study are: Development of political history (patterns of conflict and consensus, e.g. early or late democratization, polarized or moderate pluralism), existence of a consensus or majoritarian government, development of individual or organized pluralism (e.g. individualized representation like in the United States, organized pluralism, weak or strong political parties), role of the state in the economy, and development of a rational legal authority or clientelistic relationships). For more information about these dimensions, see Hallin and Mancini, 2004, pp. 22-65.

[3] Hallin and Mancini explained how these three models of the press were related to each other with a triangular schema. While each edge represented one press model, the countries were placed within this triangular schema according to their closeness to the three models. The triangular method of presentation is helpful to see that not all countries considered under the same model have the same distances to the edges of triangle; media systems in countries, even if categorized under the same model, did not completely resemble each other.

and enjoy a high mass circulation of newspapers. Neutral commercial newspapers dominate the market and there is strong journalism professionalism, which reveals itself as information-oriented journalism. Journalists' autonomy is more likely to be limited by commercial and market pressures rather than political manipulation or state control. There is low political parallelism between newspapers and existing major political groups in society. Instead, there is internal pluralism in media institutions, meaning that these organizations maintain their neutrality either by avoiding institutional ties to political groups or by balancing their content by allocating equivalent space to the views and news of different groups.

Hallin and Mancini considered the media systems functioning in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France as cases of the polarized pluralist model. In these countries, freedom of the press and the commercial media developed relatively late. Mass circulations of newspapers are low and there is high political parallelism between media institutions and political groups in society. Therefore, there is manipulation of the media institutions by the government and political parties. Clientelistic relations in political and social relations influence the media system. Commentary-oriented or advocacy journalism is prevalent rather than neutral commercial journalism. The development of the professionalization of journalism has been weak, journalism in these countries not being strictly differentiated from political activism. The state plays an important role in the media system as an owner –for many years, radio and television were state-owned in these countries– regulator, and also as a funder.

Hallin and Mancini consider the media systems functioning in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland to fit the democratic corporatist model. They argue that in these countries there was a synchronous development of characteristics of the liberal and polarized pluralist models, a situation which set their media systems apart from the ones considered under both of those models. Like the liberal model, these countries experienced an early development of the newspaper industry and press freedom. They are characterized with a higher level of mass circulation when compared to the mass circulation rates in countries classified under the liberal and Mediterranean models. Influential party newspapers coexisted with the commercial press during most of the twentieth century, while the neutral commercial press was the rising trend. Political parallelism was historically high but has been diminishing. While professionalization of journalism is high and there has been a shift towards information-oriented neutral journalism, commentary-based journalism still exists. With regards to the role of the state in media system, a strong welfare tradition brings the state in. State interventions in the media of these countries take place through regulations and the provision of subsidies.

As already stated, the media system in Greece is included in the study of Hallin and Mancini and defined as a case of the polarized pluralist model. With regards to the media system in Turkey, Mine G. Bek (2011, p. 173) argues that it resembles the South European and Latin American media systems. Like Bek, Stylianos Papathanassopoulos (*Interview*, Athens, 12.01.2013) and others (Kaya and Çakmur 2010; Özcan 2007) also argue that the media system in Turkey shows

similarities with the Mediterranean countries and that it too may be categorized under the polarized pluralist model.

According to Hiebert, Ungurait, and Bohn (1982, 40–43), the press (and the media in general) in any country do not develop independent from political, social, and economic conditions; population; and cultural traits of that country. As a result, they develop different characteristics influenced by the interplay of multiple factors. From this perspective, the next two sections take up development of newspapers and journalism in Greece and Turkey and their place in political communication in both countries.

3.3. Greek Newspapers and Political Communication

Since the first appearance of newspapers, the print press has been an important medium of expression of opinion in Greece. Its history dates back to the nineteenth century, to the years of struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire. The first papers were published by rival individuals and competing organizations to promote their causes (McDonald 1983, 15). The development of political parties in Greece in the late-nineteenth century affected the development of the modern press. Newspapers became an important medium of communication for political parties to reach wider groups. Each party had its own paper and the party leader was often the editor of party's newspaper (McDonald 1983, 15). A gradual

separation of political parties and newspapers had occurred by this time. However, the press' division along party lines continued under the heavy influence of the political schism that split the country into two camps as republicans and royalists. The situation started to change in the 1980s when partisan journalism started to decline as more market-oriented newspapers have come to dominate the market, privatization was introduced in television and radio, and ownership of the press was transferred from journalist families to entrepreneurs and ship owners.[4]

Advocacy journalism developed and remained dominant in practice in Greece for decades. In advocacy journalism, the news-making process is dominated by interpretation and value attribution. Newspapers represent distinct political tendencies and their journalism tends to emphasize opinion and commentary (D. C. Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002, 177). Political affiliations of Greek newspapers are good predictors of their interpretation of political issues (Papathanassopoulos 2001b, 118); the same event could easily be presented with entirely different narratives in newspapers that supported different political parties.

The partisanship of Greek newspapers was reflected in different ways. The major opinion article was generally written either by the owner of the newspaper or the editor-in-chief, and was published on the first page of the newspaper. This article presented an evaluation of the daily political developments in line with the political tendency of the paper. These political leaning were not only evident in the

[4] However, research shows that commentary journalism was still the dominant type of journalism in practice, despite many journalists citing professional journalism as the ideal type (Papathanassopoulos 2001a; Tılıç 1998) .

editorial, in other columns as well. Further, the headlines, narratives, pictures, and illustrations all reflected the political inclination of the newspaper.

In this regard, the dominance of advocacy journalism in practice will become clearer with an example relevant to this study that is drawn from the presentation of the same event in different newspapers on the same day. A few weeks before the military's takeover on 21 April 1967, the King asked Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, the leader of the conservative party ERE (National Radical Union) to form a new government. This happened after the caretaker government resigned when the coalition in the parliament collapsed during the voting to lift the parliamentary immunity of Andreas Papandreou. This lifting would have enabled charging him for the *Aspida* affair, which erupted surrounding allegations of the existence of a left-wing secret group in the army led by George Papandreou's son Andreas Papandreou (Athenian 1972, 59). The conservative and pro-royalist newspaper *Akropolis* set aside the entire front page to the establishment of the new government. The news about the new cabinet was supplemented with a photograph of its members. The unsigned column that appeared on the front page also evaluated the new government, criticizing George Papandreou and the EK (Center Union) and explaining why the King asked the second party of the parliament – the ERE, the first one was the EK – to form the government. The column defined the members of the ERE as not only politicians but also statesmen with high political morals and democratic consciousness, and argued that the new period would be one of political evenness (*Akropolis*, 4.04.1967).

To Vima, a center-left, pro-Papandreou paper that belonged to the Lambrakis family informed its readers about the new government with a completely different story. It presented the establishment of the government by the ERE with the headline of "the ministers of the King." The news about the new cabinet consisted of a two columns, taking up half a page. The King was stated in the columns' narrative to be acting like a party leader by appointing the leader of the second party in parliament to form the government. No pictures of the members of the new cabinet were printed, but an image of George Papandreou was quite in large size, drawing the attention to his criticism of the situation. The unsigned column published on the front page defined the establishment of an ERE government as a coup by the King and the right-wing against the popular will (*To Vima*, 04.04.1967).

Research based on interviews conducted with Greek journalists and newspaper editors generated interesting insight regarding journalists' views about objectivity (neutrality) and journalistic professionalism. First, Greek journalists believe in theory that journalism should be neutral, objective, and independent from political, social, and economic influences so that it can perform its watchdog function. However, in practice their methods of performing journalism diverge from these ideals (Papathanassopoulos 2001a, 513). Papathanassopoulos (2001a, 513) argues that, like many journalists in various countries, Greek journalists did not have a clear and a common definition of neutral journalism and a clear understanding of the notion of objectivity. According to Papathanassopoulos (2001a, 513), many Greek journalists believe objectivity in journalism to be closely

linked to freedom of expression and accountability in news reporting, rather than factuality.

Tılıç, too, (1998, 176) states that objectivity in journalism seem to be an abstract concept that is not reflected in the practice of journalism in Greece. He highlights that Greek journalists were critical of the feasibility of achieving objectivity in practice. A senior Greek reporter whom Tılıç interviewed refuted the concept of objectivity in journalism. S/he argued that the journalist may come close to being objective by openly expressing his/her subjectivity and stance toward issue. The reporter argued that the important thing in journalism was to write the facts as they are and not to bring them together in a way to support the journalist's own views (Tılıç 1998, 176–177). Another Greek reporter stated that it was difficult for the journalist to be neutral or objective, particularly because of the relationship between the source of information and the fact itself, and difficulties in information gathering. S/he argued that different sources of information may generate a different story. The reporter elaborated that it would not be possible for the journalist to check each source and that there is no measure to decide on which one to trust (Tılıç 1998, 176–177).

Researchers view the non-existence of objectivity in journalism in Greece as closely related to the weak development of a separate journalistic profession. As stated, newspapers appeared and developed as important tools of communication and propaganda in the hands of political actors. This meant that the mass media in Greece have been supply-driven rather than consumer-demanded; since the early times of the modern state, there have always been more newspapers, television

channels, and radio stations than such a small country can support (Papathanassopoulos 2001b, 113). In 1979, the population of Greece was less than ten million, while three and a half million of the population was living in the Athens metropolitan area. The same year, the total number of newspapers published daily was 120, while there were almost 900 non-daily newspapers. The Athens metropolitan newspapers were comprised of40 dailies and approximately 600 non-dailies (Paraschos 1983, 338).

One of the main characteristics of journalism in Greece that negatively affected the development of journalistic professionalism is the late establishment of media schools; they were established at the university level only in 1991. This meant that, up until that point, journalists in Greece did not have formal education about and training in journalism, unless they obtained it abroad. After 1991, private schools of journalism began to appear. However, this situation did not produce a consensus among journalists about the necessity of having formal education to become a journalist. Instead, during the 1990s and 2000s, many Greek journalists still thought that journalism was a profession that was closely related with the personality of individuals, and that it was learnt on the job rather than at school (Tılıç 1998, 120–124).

It would be a shortcoming of this discussion if the influence of clientelistic relations on journalism in Greece is not mentioned. In fact, extreme politicization of the press on the one hand increased the press' vulnerability to clientelistic relationships and, on the other hand, negatively affected the development of a separate journalism profession. In this regard, Papatheodorou and Machin (2003,

35) describe newspapers as political enterprises rather than economic ones. They point out that the national newspapers were published by the powerful families of Greece who had close ties with political parties and a long tradition in publishing as their major activity (Papatheodorou and Machin 2003, 35).

Hallin and Papathanassopoulos argued that the situation did not change after the newspapers' ownerships were transferred from journalist families to industrialists with interests in the shipping, travel, construction, telecommunication, and oil industries (D. C. Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002, 178). Patron-client relationships continued to rule the media in Greece.

3.4. Turkish Newspapers and Political Communication

The history of newspaper printing in Turkey dates back to nineteenth century. The first Turkish newspapers, *Takvim-i Vekayi* (Calendar of Events) was published in 1831, which in fact happened long after the French started publishing the *Gazette Française de Constantiople* in 1797 (Karpat 1964, 257). Like other reforms and progressive steps taken within the Ottoman Empire, the first Turkish newspapers were published as a result of the state's initiative (Gürkan 1997, 26). Thus, *Takvim-i Vekayi* was published by the Ottoman state authorities as a result of Sultan Mahmut II's request, which was based on his view that publishing a newspaper was necessary to inform Ottoman society about particular issues (Altun 2006, 22). It was

in fact like an official bulletin rather than a newspaper in the modern sense; it included the information about issues such as trade and domestic affairs that the Ottoman sultan wanted the people of the Empire to know about. The newspaper was succeeded by *Ceride-i Resmiye* (Official Newspaper), which began to be published by the Ankara government in 1920 and was renamed as *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette) in 1927.[5]

The real beginning of newspaper publishing and journalism in the Ottoman Empire is commonly said to commence with the publication of *Tercüman-ı Ahval* (Interpreter of Events) in 1860. The paper was published by Agah Efendi without any financial support from the government, and represented the first case of advocacy journalism. Unlike the previous two papers, *Tercüman-ı Ahval* aimed "to express opinion and educate the citizenry" (Karpat 1964, 258). Both Agah Efendi and İbraim Şinasi, who played a significant role in the publication of the newspaper, were among the Young Ottomans. Members of this group saw the salvation of the Empire in the establishment of a constitutional monarchy that would limit the absolute rule of the Sultan (Şapolyo 1971, 115–117). Şinasi started to publish his own paper in 1862, *Tasvir-i Efkar* (Mirror of Opinion). Like *Tercüman-ı Ahval*, it also represented a case of advocacy journalism. Some other Young Ottomans followed in the tradition started by Agah Efendi and Şinasi, publishing newspapers in which they interpreted current events and advocated the proclamation of a constitutional monarchy. However, journalists in the Ottoman Empire did not

[5] The second Turkish paper, *Ceride-i Havadis*, began to be published in 1840 by William Churchill. Although it was a commercial enterprise, it was financially supported by the Ottoman government. It reached a small readership since it mainly provided translations, news, and discussions of the Western parliamentary system (Karpat 1964, 258).

always perform their profession in a free atmosphere. During the despotic rule of Abdülhamid II (1878-1908), the press was censored and the freedom of speech of journalists was suspended. Most leading journalists escaped arrest and went to Europe, where they continued publishing newspapers. After the proclamation of a constitutional monarchy for the second time in 1908, they were able to return to the Ottoman Empire and continued their work.

Journalists of the nineteenth century were predominantly Young Ottomans. As leading thinkers, they assigned to themselves a particular role: the creation of public opinion that would reflect public morality. Namık Kemal, a leading Young Ottoman thinker, novelist, and journalist, defined public morality as an aggregation of feelings for liberty, justice, and patriotism – the last of which was defined as one's loyalty to the fatherland instead of the sultan, his ministers, or the Islamic community (Heper and Demirel 1996, 109). In the creation of such public opinion, journalists viewed themselves as "didactic intermediaries" between an idealized West and "a backward society" that accordingly needed reform (Groc 1994, 200; Heper and Demirel 1996, 109). This self-assigned role of both journalists and newspapers in educating people and forming public opinion continued during the War of Independence and early years of the Republican regime. However, newspapers were not always monotonic: opposition newspapers were published but advocacy journalism did not change.

During the War of Independence (1919-1922), the press was divided into two groups. There were newspapers that supported the War of Independence and those which were against, the latter of which were mostly the Istanbul papers. The

newspapers in support of the War of Independence became fundamental tools for propaganda and information sharing to create a national, united spirit (Altun 2006, 30). Accepting the newspapers' role of educating and informing the people, Mustafa Kemal established another newspaper, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, to spread the ideas of the Association for the Defense of the National Rights Groups (*Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri*). *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, which was renamed as *Ulus* in 1934, became an important tool at the disposal of the government during the War of Independence, and later in the introduction and dissemination of republican reforms (Şapolyo 1971, 197).

During the single-party years, the press continued to fulfill its role of educating the people and popularizing the republican reforms. A large majority of journalists who had witnessed the establishment of the new Republic ardently supported it (Özcan 2007). *Cumhuriyet,* which was established in 1924, and *Ulus* were the leading papers of the period that ardently defended republican ideology and reforms. Not unexpectedly, the press' positive role in the dissemination of republican reforms was not only a self-assigned responsibility; but it was also one that was more than welcomed by the political leaders of the time including Atatürk and İsmet İnönü. Both Atatürk and İnönü, at least for the long term, acknowledged the importance of having a free press for the development of the country. But their emphasis was mostly on the mission of the press to consolidate republican reforms rather than on press freedom. In this regard, Atatürk stated in several speeches that the press should act to enlighten people and guide them; journalists should be careful about what they write, keeping in mind the high interests of the state and the

nation. He also emphasized that they had the mission of contributing to the progress of Turkey (Gürkan 1997, 75).

Although the press that had ardently supported the republican reforms dominated the press market, it did not mean that there was no opposition press. The Istanbul press of the time, as opposed to the Ankara press, continued to criticize the republican reforms, particularly the abolition of the Caliphate (Demir 2012, 126). The opposition press supported the short-lived Progressive Republican Party (1924) and then Free Republican Party (1930) against the Republican People's Party (CHP). The opposition press, however, was seriously weakened by introduction of various laws that forbade any activities in conflict with "state interests" and "common good of the people." For instance, the Law for the Maintenance of Order, which was introduced in 1925 after the *Şeyh Sait* Rebellion, enabled the government to close six newspapers that were considered to have supported the rebellion (Gürkan 1997, 43). The control of the government over the press continued during the Second World War with the aim of preventing the publication of materials that could damage Turkey's non-belligerence policy of these years. However, it did not prevent the opposition press from acting as supporters of the Allied powers and those that supported closer relations with Germany (Gürkan 1997, 51).

The transition to a multi-party system in 1945 with the establishment of the Democratic Party (DP) also marked the beginning of a new period for the newspapers. Advocacy journalism continued to split the newspapers into those that supported the DP government and others that followed a critical approach toward

DP policies. An interesting point regarding advocacy journalism and their readers was that the reader did not want to see newspapers' associations with a particular party; when they did, the circulation of those papers dropped immediately (Karpat 1964, 280). For instance, *Vatan* was one of the newspapers that mainly supported the DP. Its circulation reached high numbers when the DP was in opposition during the 1946-1950 period. The newspaper lost readers when Ahmet Emin Yalman, the publisher and editor-in-chief, continued to support the DP after it came to power. *Vatan* regained its readers after 1954, when the newspaper started to criticize the DP government because of the restrictions it introduced over press freedoms and associations (Karpat 1964, 280).Taking a critical approach towards the DP government, Yalman described the forthcoming elections of 1957 as a national struggle for freedom and modernization. Exaggerating the situation, he likened the importance of the elections to the Gallipoli Battle War in 1915 and the War of Independence (Karpat 1961, 440).

While advocacy journalism continued, a new type of press also appeared with the establishment of *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet*, in 1948 and 1950, respectively. These newspapers are defined as a new kind of commercial press that had the sole aim of making money rather than serving a particular political cause (Kaya and Çakmur 2010, 524). They targeted a wider readership base in order to obtain high circulation rates. As a result, their content, printing style, and marketing policies were all formed to draw the attention of the average reader (Altun 2006, 80). They are defined as neutral papers that aspired to represent the general public (Şapolyo

1971, 242). In addition, they held sympathy towards business individuals and groups rather than the intelligentsia.

The dominance of advocacy journalism in Turkey prevented the development of the Anglo-American type of journalism until recent years. This latter form, which demands objectivity in the practice of journalism, has been weakly developed in Turkey under the influence of close relationships between politicians and newspaper owners, as well as the legal and illegal (informal) restrictions over the press. The particular way in which the press and journalism developed in Turkey also influenced how Turkish journalists view their profession. When journalists were asked to define their profession, most of them made a distinction between the ideal-type of journalism they had in mind and the journalism in Turkey. Most of the journalists emphasized the social responsibility of journalists. They noted that the journalist's mission was to guide society, inform and educate the people, and contribute to the ongoing transformation of society. They had to do all this by adopting a critical approach to the course of events (Tılıç 1998, 101–109). These journalists were skeptical about being neutral conveyors in political communication. One of them, the chief editor of a news agency and of a newspaper, stated that practicing journalism as a neutral conveyor of a message would not differentiate journalism from the press office of a governmental ministry (Tılıç 1998, 103). On a different note, a large majority of the journalists who were interviewed by Mine Gencel Bek, professor of journalism at Ankara University, questioned the possibility of objectivity in journalism. They argued that, like other people and many other things, journalists, the news, and their production processes

were under the influence of economic, political, and social systems (Bek 2011, 172). According to a journalist of *Hürriyet*, evaluations always exist in the news; the selection of the words, questions asked, even the decision of what is news and what is not all reflect the views of the journalist and his/her institution (Bek 2011, 172).

The relatively early emergence of media schools in Turkey did not help the flourishing of the journalistic professionalism. The first instruction in journalism at the university level was established at Istanbul University in 1950. It was followed by Ankara University, which introduced education in the field of communication in 1965. Despite their decades-long existence and the opening of journalism departments in various universities and, in later years, in private institutions, a majority of the journalists interviewed by Bek thought that university education did not prepare students for practicing the profession. They argued that the curricula of the journalism departments did not prepare the students for the journalistic profession in Turkey (Tılıç 1998, 123), seeing a large gap between teaching and practice. For this reason, there was no major difference in practice between journalists who had formal education and those who learned the profession in practice (Tılıç 1998, 123).

Finally, the journalist-columnist (non-)differentiation is also important to be considered, both for their place in political communication and for this study. There is not a separate literature that particularly focuses on newspaper columnists in order to understand their role in the political communication of various countries. However, columnists who represent cases of advocacy journalism have a particular

role in the transmitting of messages, shaping of public opinion, and informing people not only about facts but also how to interpret them. Regarding the Turkish case, Andrew Finkel, who has worked in Turkey for many years as a columnist and journalist in different newspapers, has made a distinction between being a columnist and a journalist in Turkey. He states the main difference between the two as the former's rare subjection to editing by the chief editor. Columnists make a name for themselves with their commentaries and aim to sustain their reputation. According to Finkel, in Turkey commentary, rather than reporting, has far more prestige and status in the press and other circles (Finkel 2000, 155).

In conclusion, this chapter first aimed to develop a theoretical framework of how the media create meanings through various ways of manipulating information. In assembling this framework, *agenda setting*, *priming*, and *framing* effects have been discussed. The following chapters will analyze Greek and Turkish columnists' evaluations of the military takeovers in their countries and the subsequent military interregna through the lens of this framework. Secondly, this chapter discussed classifications of media systems that vary across countries. In terms of these classifications, this chapter demonstrated that media systems in Greece and Turkey are best explained through the polarized plural model (Mediterranean model). In this regard, the two countries shared important similarities in the development of journalistic profession and the place of newspapers in political communications in both countries.

CHAPTER 4

THE 21 APRIL 1967 TAKEOVER IN GREECE AND GREEK COLUMNISTS

This chapter aims to conduct a thorough analysis of the daily columns of *Akropolis* and *Eleftheros Kosmos* in terms of how columnists writing in these dailies evaluated the 21 April 1967 takeover. As explained in Chapter One, *Ta Nea* had initially been selected as the third Greek newspaper to be considered in this dissertation, in addition to *Akropolis* and *Eleftheros Kosmos.* However, due to the termination of the columns' publication after the junta's takeover, *Ta Nea* could not be included in this chapter. Nevertheless, its situation provided important insights for various ways of displaying the opposition to the takeover and the military's rule.

Before analyzing columnists' views about the takeover and the junta administration, a short analysis of the period from the Second World War to the

junta's takeover on 21 April was deemed to be necessary in understanding the conditions under which Greek colonels took over the government, and the reasons those examining the topic have highlighted as being behind the intervention. After this discussion, the junta's control over the press, which formed the framework for what columnists could write about, is elucidated. The evaluations of columnists are analyzed in three subcategories that were seen to be important in understanding the way columnists viewed the takeover and their expectations from it.

4.1. Historical Background of the 1967 Takeover

The Second World War marked the beginning of a new era in Greece. During the war, Greece was occupied by German, Italian, and Bulgarian forces; the legitimate government and the King were in exile; the resistance to occupation was organized by guerilla forces led by communist leaders; and the regular armed forces was divided between the officers who left the country and those who stayed and joined the resistance movement. Liberation of the country from occupation started a new armed conflict – i.e., the Greek Civil War, this time between Greek communists and anti-communists – for the post-war political order. The Civil War, lasting from 1946 to 1949, was the most disastrous and the bloody armed conflict Greece had experienced. Fighting was terminated with the victory of the anti-communist forces, which had obtained US assistance in its own fight against the spread of communism.

The schism in Greek politics between monarchist and Venizelists continued after the Civil War, assuming a new dimension under Cold War conditions. While the polarization between monarchist-conservatives and republicans continued, communists, although they were militarily defeated in the Civil War and their party was outlawed, became an important actor in the political arena through the EDA toward the end of the 1950s.

Thanks to the single-member district electoral system, which was introduced in 1952 with US pressure to replace the proportional representation system, the conservative political parties controlled the government during the 1952-1963 period (Legg and Roberts 1997, 45–46). First the Greek Rally (*Ellinikos Synagermos –ES*), established by former Marshal Alexandros Papagos, and then the National Radical Union (ERE) formed governments during the period. The ERE was in fact are named version of the Greek Rally under the leadership of Constantine Karamanlis, who replaced Papagos after his death in 1955. The composition of the parliament started to change with the elections in 1958, challenging the palace and the right-wing. The EDA emerged from the elections as the second party by gaining 24 percent of the popular vote. It became the main opposition party in the 300 seated-parliament with 79 seats.

The parliament's make-up continued to change in the 1961 elections to ERE's disadvantage, even though the party increased its votes by 9 percent and seats in parliament from 171 to 176. This was the case because the elections made the newly established Center Union (*Enosis Kentrou*– EK) the main opposition party with 100 seats in parliament. EK was formed by George Papandreou, who had

been a strong supporter of Venizelos since the First World War. The 1963 elections were the preview of Papandreou's coming victory in 1964. In this election, none of the parties could attain a majority; the new government was formed by the EK and supported by the EDA, which had come in third in the elections. Not pleased with the fact that he depended on communist votes to sustain the government, Papandreou resigned from the premiership (Woodhouse 1991, 285). The ERE, which was led by Panagiotis Kanellopoulos after Karamanlis resigned from the leadership, failed to form a government. King Paul then dissolved the parliament, appointing a caretaker government until new elections would be held.

The 1964 elections marked the beginning of a new period in Greek politics. Gaining both the majority of the popular vote and the majority of parliamentary seats, Papandreou's EK came to power and thus ended the decade-long period of conservative governments. According to Danopoulos (1992, p. 41), the reason behind the success of Papandreou was the support of the rising middle-class and workers living in the big cities of Athens and Salonika who demanded greater participation in decision-making processes and a more equitable distribution of wealth. However, the government entered a new crisis in May 1965, which would be ended with the military's takeover in April 1967.

The crisis broke out in the wake of rumors circulating about the existence of a left-wing secret group, *Aspida* (Shield), within the army. According to Woodhouse(1985, p. 5), this was a group of radically-minded officers, mostly majors and captains, who aimed to promote their own careers given the frustrating circumstances of the time. However, it was alleged at the time that the group aimed

to take over the army, depose the King, and install a dictatorship in Greece (Legg 1969, 223). More important for Prime Minister Papandreou was the fact that at least three ministers in his government including his son, Andreas, were claimed to be associated with *Aspida*. Andreas Papandreou, who had worked in the United States for years as an economics professor and then returned to Greece to pursue a political career, was a minister in his father's government. It was alleged that he was the secret leader of the group (Woodhouse 1991, 287).

George Papandreou's reaction to the allegations was to ask for the replacement of the Chief of Defense Staff, General Ioannis Ghennimatas, whom he considered as the main person responsible for the negative atmosphere generated by the rumors. Papandreou's demand was met with opposition from Defense Minister Petros Garoufalias, who also refused to resign from his position(Athenian 1972, 52–53). As a result, Papandreou dismissed Garoufalias and sought to assume the post of Defense Minister himself. Papandreou's move increased suspicions on the part of right-wingers and conservatives that he was trying to cover up the investigation of the *Aspida* affair.

The crisis deepened with the active involvement of 23-year-old King Constantine II. Constantine had succeeded his father Paul, who had been on the throne since 1947 and died just after the EK government was formed in 1964. In a step that revitalized the historical schism between royalists and republicans, the King approved the dismissal of the Defense Minister but did not appoint Papandreou to the post, on the grounds that to do so would be improper when the latter's son was under investigation for the *Aspida* conspiracy (Woodhouse 1972,

12). A period of instability started with the withdrawal of Papandreou from the premiership. After two failed attempts, the new government was formed by Stephanos Stephanopoulos, who resigned from the EK, with the support of the right-wing ERE. This government was short-lived; it fell in December 1966 when ERE leader Kanellopolos declined to support to it. A caretaker government was formed under the leadership of Ioannis Paraskevopoulos, who was the governor of the National Bank of Greece, and new elections were proclaimed to be held on 28 May 1967. Before these elections could be held, however, the colonels intervened to take power on 21 April 1967.

Regardless of whether the *Aspida* rumors arose from reality, at that time they strengthened the belief of right-wing and conservative people, including the young King himself, that the country was threatened by a formidable conspiracy that included hundreds of officers led by the Prime Minister's son (Athenian 1972, 52). Along with the *Aspida* affair, policies of the short-lived EK government favoring the left-wing had increased the concerns of the palace and conservative officers. The release of some prisoners of the jailed due to communist activities during the Civil War, a partial thaw in the frozen relationships with Eastern Bloc countries (Clogg 1992, 160), the entrance of an EDA member into the government, and rumors that Papandreou accepted an invitation from Moscow (Woodhouse 1991, 287) were the leading issues that concerned officers as indicators of a communist threat.

As briefly discussed in Chapter 2, secret organizations in the army formed under patron-client ties had a long history that dated back to 1909 coup. Indeed,

Aspida was not the only secret group in the army. Another well-known secret group was IDEA (*Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon*– Sacred Bond of Greek Officers). IDEA was organized soon after the Second World War by officers who, on the one hand, had strong loyalty to the King and supported conservative nationalist political leaders and, on the other hand, aimed to fight against communism (Zaharopoulos 1972, 24–25). IDEA fell into inactivity during Karamanlis' premiership but was revitalized after the 1958 elections through Colonel George Papadopoulos, who would be the leader of the 1967 junta. As stated above, as a result of the 1958 elections, the leftist EDA had become the main opposition party in parliament. This situation made IDEA officers reconsider communism as a major threat that was still alive for Greece (Zaharopoulos 1972, 25).

The existence of this threat and the possibility of communists' seizing of power after the elections in May 1967 were cited among the main reasons for the colonels' move on 21 April. In interviews conducted with 100 middle- and upper-ranking army officers in 1968 and 1969, the majority of the officers saw the communist threat, political decay, and social decadence of society in general as the main reasons behind the takeover (Kourvetaris 1999, 138). Research has also found that regardless of whether there was a real threat of a communist takeover or it was only the perception of officers and right-wingers, the idea of such a threat formed one of the main reasons for the intervention (Woodhouse 1972, 11; Zaharopoulos 1972, 27–29). In this regard, for instance, the takeover was described by the first Prime Minister of the military regime, Constantinos Kollias, as a "counter-

revolution" intended to prevent a communist revolution, which was considered imminent, from taking place (Roufos 1972, 148).

The military announcement made on the morning of 21 April, however, did not include an open reference to a communist threat. It pointed out that an abnormal situation had developed after midnight that endangered the internal security of the country, and that the army had therefore taken over the government (Vlachos 1970, 27). The first communiqué of the junta, which was broadcast the same day, did not make reference to a communist threat either. The text referred instead to the following as reasons for the intervention: Great disagreement between political parties, an onslaught against institutions, the moral decline of Greek youth, widespread confusion, demagogues, and collaboration with destructive hooligans had all disrupted the calm of the country and produced a climate of anarchy and chaos, hatred and division (Clogg 1972, 37–38). The communist threat that Greece had allegedly faced before 21 April began to be mentioned only several days later. Officers published a statement in newspapers on 24 April explaining what had prompted the takeover. They stated that large numbers of communists had been gathering in Thessaloniki to cause disturbances in conjunction with the opening of Papandreou's electoral campaign (McDonald 1983, 42). Following this statement, a propaganda campaign was initiated to demonstrate the severity of the communist threat prior to the takeover. Allegations against the *Aspida* group in the army and its relationship with the younger and elder Papandreous were presented to strengthen this argument.

The timing of the intervention, less than a month before the elections, supports the claim that one of the main aims of the colonels was to prevent the elder Papandreou from coming to power. According to Zaharopoulos, there was a strong suspicion among right-wing politicians and conservative officers that Papandreou's victory would push Greece towards a 'neutralist' foreign policy that would threaten its relationships with the US and the wider Western bloc (Zaharopoulos 1972, 23). Other scholars also draw attention to the colonels' aim to prevent an election victory for Papandreou's EK, but for corporate reasons rather than foreign policy concerns. Sharing this view, Danopoulos (1992, p. 41) stated that during 1950-1963 period, the parliament acted like a puppet institution, with the palace and the military standing behind and holding the strings of the ruling conservative political parties of the Greek Rally and the National Radical Union. Legg and Roberts' also supported this argument. They stated that the colonels aimed to prevent Papandreou's victory because it would change the balance of power between extra-parliamentary institutions, namely the palace and the military, with the parliament favoring the latter (Legg and Roberts 1997, 52). The EK government had cut the defense budget by ten percent to finance its increased expenditures on social services and education (Woodhouse 1991, 285). This situation strengthened the perception that the EK's coming to power would continue to damage the corporate interests of the army.

The possibility of intervention was also being considered by the generals at the time the colonels took over. The generals were worried that no matter whether the ERE or the EK would win the elections in May, there could be violent

disturbances that could lead to a breakdown of public order (Woodhouse 1972, 14). Chief of the General Staff Grigorios Spandidakis met with senior generals to discuss the possibility of an intervention. The generals agreed that, before formalizing the decision to intervene, Spandidakis would ask for the consent of the King (Woodhouse 1972, 14). Within twenty-four hours of this meeting, however, the colonels had taken over the government. Woodhouse argues that one of the generals in the meeting presumably informed Papadopoulos about the decision of the meeting (Woodhouse 1972, 14), which, in turn, must have speeded up the colonels' timetable and immediately precipitated their intervention.

The 21 April takeover, which was in fact an army undertaking while the navy and air force played a very limited role, marked the start of the seven-year military dictatorship in Greece. From the very beginning there were both strong support and opposition to the takeover. The King initially unwillingly cooperated with the junta, but later attempted to bring it down on 13 December 1973 in cooperation with some army generals. The failure of this attempt forced him to leave the country; the King remained in exile for the duration of the junta regime in Greece.[6]

[6] In fact, the King could not return to Greece even after the collapse of the junta regime in July 1974. Following this collapse, in addition to a transition to multiparty politics, a referendum was held in December 1974 on the future of the monarchy. At the polls, the majority of Greek people demonstrated their preference for the republican regime. As a result, the monarchy was dissolved.

4.2. The 21 April Administration's Control over the Press

As explained in Chapter Three, the press in Greece was an important medium for expression of political opinion. Before the takeover, the deep-rooted cleavage in the political life of the county was also present in the press sector; the newspapers were largely divided into two main camps, as pro-Papandreou papers supporting the center-left and pro-Karamanlis papers supporting the conservative policies of the National Radical Union (*Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis* – ERE). In addition, there were also pro-communist papers that supported the extreme-left EDA (*Eniea Dimokratiki Aristera* –United Democratic Left), which became the representative of communists in the political arena after the Communist Part was outlawed in 1947. The 21 April takeover terminated this situation with the censorship it introduced.

After taking over the government, the junta immediately imposed martial law, suspended key sections of the constitution, and froze all political activity. The press was a particular focus of attention for the officers since the first days of their rule. They were brought under strict control of the junta and claimed by the military to play a particular role within its rule.

When the colonels seized power on 21 April, one of the first things they did was to assert their own control over the media. This in fact did not much bother the newly emerging television and radio stations, which had already become state mechanisms through governmental interventions aimed at using them as instruments of propaganda before the takeover occurred (Stratos 1995, 20).

Newspapers, which had acted as an open podium for the expression of different political views, were the main target of the officers' control. On the night of the takeover, officers seized the publication houses of newspapers, terminated printing, and collected morning copies from the kiosks, which had already been distributed. The military administration prohibited publication during the first two days of its rule. Newspapers' publications and circulations began again on 23 April 1967.

Before the colonels seized power, 14 newspapers were being circulated nation-wide in Greece.[7] On the third day of the junta's rule, when publication was allowed to restart, nine newspapers appeared at kiosks. Of these, three were morning papers –*To Vima* (Tribune)*, Akropolis,* and *Eleftheros Kosmos* (Free World) –and six were afternoon papers – *Apoyevmatini* (Afternoon Paper), *Ta Nea* (The News), *Vradyni* (Evening Paper), *Ethnos* (Nation), *Estia* (Hearth) and *Athinaiki* (Athenian). Extreme leftist papers *Avgi* (Dawn) and *Dimokratiki Allaghi* (Democratic Change) were closed down by the junta in the first hours of its rule. Some of their publishers were arrested, while others went underground where they started publishing "illegal" papers. The centrist paper *Eleftheria* (Freedom) stopped publication based on the decision of its publisher Panos Kokkas. The center-left paper *Athinaiki* continued to be published until June 1967 by a group of its journalists, after its publisher escaped arrest in the first hours of military rule (McDonald 1983, 24–25).Two leading conservative, pro-royalist, and pro-

[7] These newspapers were *Ta Nea* (News), *Ethnos* (Nation), *To Vima* (Tribune), *Akropolis*, *Kathimerini* (Daily), *Mesimvrini* (Noon Paper), *Apogeymatini* (Afternoon Paper), *Vradyni* (Evening Paper), *Athinaiki* (Athenian), *Avgi* (Dawn), *Dimokratiki Allaghi* (Democratic Change), *Eleftheros Kosmos* (Free World), *Estia* (Hearth), and *Eleftheria* (Freedom).

Karamanlis papers, *Kathimerini* (Daily) and *Mesimvrini* (Noon Paper), stopped publication as a result of their owners' decisions.

On the morning of 23 April, when newspapers resumed publication, they were all four pages in length and identical in content. This was mainly comprised of the statement of the new government, the Prime Minister's message to the country, and a list of the new cabinet members (McDonald 1983, 41–42). Newspapers' content was put under censorship review by a designated committee, which was transformed into an official Press Control Service (PCS) in the first days of the military's rule. The PCS, headed by an officer, was tasked with the preventive control of newspapers' content including news reports, headlines, pictures, and opinion columns (McDonald 1983, 44). As stated in the Mandatory Regulations of the government dated 29 April 1967, the PCS' mission aimed to prevent publication of all information, comments, illustrations, and cartoons that would defame the general policy of the military administration and constitutional institutions, or harm the internal or external security of the country.

This censorship review process was important in the sense that it necessitated the control of a newspaper's copy before it went to press. All materials had to obtain approval from the controller of the PCS order to get published. The PCS had the authorization to prevent publication of any materials that were considered as violating the instructions of the junta. In the case that some materials were prohibited from publication, the regulations forbade leaving blanks in place of the banned content. This was seen as a measure that could remind the reader of the existence of censorship and indicate that the newspaper had attempted to publish

some form of sensitive or critical material. Moreover, blank spaces could easily be manipulated by newspapers to display their opposition to the takeover and its censorship (Interview 8, Athens, 14.02.2013).

In addition to restrictions on the materials newspapers could publish, there were also some materials that they were required to publish. As stated in the Mandatory Regulations of 29 April, newspapers had to publish the speeches of the King (while he held office) and statements from the palace; speeches, declarations, and communiqués by government members; and photographs distributed by the PCS regarding the work of the government.

During the first days of the military administration, the PCS was given the complete texts for some issues. This situation produced content in center-left newspapers that completely differed from that published during the pre-21 April period. For instance, the PCS provided newspapers with texts about the relationship between *Aspida*, George Papandreou, and his son Andreas Papandreou that included the accusation that they had aimed to seize power and establish a communist regime (McDonald 1983, 44–45). However, this overt propaganda for the 21 April takeover and the subsequent military administration was abandoned in late May 1967,based on the idea that it might have had a negative effect on the audience. The PCS then started to prepare detailed notes for publication of information about particular issues. The notes determined what should be written for particular subjects, but did leave a tiny amount of room for interpretation in the news.

Under the censorship review introduced by the junta, and given the perceptions about the role of the press during the military's rule, the most shocking

situation was created by the cessation in publication of conservative newspapers *Kathimerini* and *Mesimvrini* as a result of the decision of their owner, Helen Vlachos. Vlachos was reacting against the censorship review and the mandatory publication of texts prepared by the junta (Vlachos 1970, 37). Vlachos' papers not being published actually generated a significant loss of support for the junta, because they were both respected conservative papers and together formed the strongest center-right standing in the market. For officers, this kind of reaction could have been expected from leftist and pro-Papandreou papers but not from Vlachos' publications, which had supported the monarchy and Karamanlis in the pre-21 April period and expressed positive views about a military intervention led by the generals and consented to by the King (McDonald 1983, 27).

Not only for the officers but also for the readers of *Kathimerini* and *Mesimvrini*, the removal of their papers from circulation was an unexpected situation. Vlachos let it be known that she was criticized by readers siding with colonels against communism, and evaluated the censorship as coming from the right-wing direction. They argued that the censorship would not do much harm to right-wing papers, and that it was not meaningful not to publish when the center-left papers *Ta Nea* and *To Vima* maintained publication (Vlachos 1970, 37–40).

The colonels in fact evaluated the situation as a temporal one that would be terminated with Vlachos' resuming publication of her two papers. In this regard, officers including Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, who was the leader of the junta's takeover and became the Minister of the Presidency for the junta's rule, and Brigadier Stylianos Pattakos, who was appointed as the Minister of Interior, visited

Vlachos at her apartment to persuade her to re-initiate publication. According to Vlachos, when the issue of censorship was brought up in his visit, Pattakos exclaimed (Vlachos 1970, 41):

> Censorship?.. What censorship?.. There is not going to be any censorship for you. You are good Greeks. You will be allowed to write what you wish. We know that you will write the right things. You will not be treated like the others. You will help us, guide us! We will create a new Greece together!

None of the officers could persuade Vlachos to resume publication of her papers. Vlachos not only refused this request but also become a strong anti-junta person, giving interviews to foreign press outlets to call the attention of European countries to the situation in Greece. These anti-propaganda efforts of Vlachos lasted until 4 October 1967, when she was put under house arrest.[8]

Although *Ta Nea* continued its publication after the colonels took over the government, its content and the way news was presented changed completely when compared with the pre-21 April period. The main opinion column of the newspaper, written by Dimitris Psathas disappeared and no columns evaluating political developments were added. *Ta Nea* continued publication only by giving place to the obligatory content as designated by the officers, along with news from other countries, and social and cultural news. Because of its pre-21 April stance, *Ta Nea* was controlled by the PCS line by line leaving no room for any evaluation that could imply opposition to or criticism of the existing government (Interview 2, Athens, 06.02.2013).

[8] Vlachos escaped to London from house arrest and continued her propaganda there against the military regime in Greece. Her papers resumed publication in 1974 after transition to multiparty politics.

While Greek newspapers were under strict control, foreign newspapers did not face any restrictions, except the newspapers of Cyprus. Since Cypriot newspapers were published in Greek, the junta did not allow their entry to Greece. Newspapers published in foreign languages were not banned from entering to Greece. However, their arrival was often problematic. Most of the time foreign newspapers arrived with delays, only becoming available for sale in Greece several days after publication (Interview 12, Athens, 25.02.2013). Journalists working for the foreign press were also operating in a safer and freer environment when compared to their colleagues working for Greek newspapers. The main reason for the junta's allowance of foreign newspapers and magazines was their view that censorship of foreign language publications would do more harm than their unrestricted circulation in Greece (Roufos 1972, 155). This was particularly the case because only a small number of Greeks could afford to buy them and would understand them. Most of these Greeks were highly educated people who did not count among the targets the colonels thought could be persuaded with propaganda (Roufos 1972, 155).

Along with the introduction of the censorship review, the military administration clearly defined the role it foresaw for the press during its rule. The junta viewed the press as an extension of the government that would contribute to the "national mission" rather than an independent medium of information and communication. In this regard, the mission of the press was to disseminate the thoughts of the executive, shape public opinion, monitor state activity, and criticize administrative action (McDonald 1983, 31). George Georgalas, the Undersecretary

at the Ministry to the Prime Minister detailed the mission envisaged for the press by the junta, stating that the press was an integral part of the state's machinery, an instrument for instilling ethics into society (McDonald 1983, 36). He argued that the average individual could not make his/her way through the plethora of news available, and it was therefore the responsibility of the press to filter the news in a way to allow him/her to become a responsible citizen (McDonald 1983, 36–37).

The mission set by the junta for the press was approved by some columnists, who took up the censorship in this context in their daily columns. For instance, Savvas Konstantopoulos, who was the publisher and editor-in-chief of *Eleftheros Kosmos* and one of the strong supporters of the colonels' takeover, argued that the newspapers should be acting to serve the ultimate goals of society (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 01.06.1967). Although he accepted that the suspension of press freedom was an unpleasant situation, he emphasized that the power of the press could be destructive when manipulated, and that some precautions were thus needed to prevent abuses of the press so that it could serve the national mission (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 19.07.1967). Nikos Tsiforos, who had a column in *Eleftheros Kosmos*, was the only columnist who displayed criticism of the censorship. Tsiforos stated that although censorship could be seen as necessary during the military's rule, the limits of it extended too far. This included, for example, the prohibition of compound words that contained prohibited words within them, regardless of whether the overall meaning of the compound word was related to the prohibited word's meaning (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 10.06.1967).

The censorship review stayed in force until October 1969. There was no longer censorship after that date, but the press law was still in effect. This therefore commenced a period in which journalists and columnists practiced self-censorship to avoid being caught in violating the law. As a result, during the first six months of the military's rule, columnists' pieces were previewed by the officers before they were published. This censorship prevented the existence in newspapers of criticisms about the takeover and the junta administration, which thus drew the framework of what columnists could write about.

4.3. Representation of the 21 April Takeover in Newspaper Columns

4.3.1. Reasons for and Objectives of the Takeover and Expectations for the Military Administration

This study's research on newspaper columns in Greece that were published during the first six months of the junta's rule shows that columnists presented the communist threat as the main reason for the colonels' takeover on 21 April. They wrote long passages regarding the pre-coup period to prove that the communist threat was real and serious, and that the army had been considered to be the last hope the people had to save the country from falling under communist rule.

The Communist Party (KKE –*Komunistiko Komma Ellados*) had been outlawed in Greece after the Civil War, from1946 to 1949, and could function again after democracy was restored in 1974. Most of its prominent members, however, had left Greece after the war. Those remaining in Greece were either prosecuted and jailed, or went underground during the 1950s. The left wing was re-organized in 1951 under EDA, which became an important actor in Greek politics toward the end of the 1950s. EDA was represented in newspaper columns after the military takeover as the political organization of communists who could not be organized under the Communist Party. Along with EDA, George Papandreou, Andreas Papandreou, and EK were evaluated as abettors of the EDA, who wittingly or unwittingly collaborated in reaching the party's aim of seizing power.

Konstantopoulos explained why colonels took over on 21 April in eight bullet-points, four of which were directly related to the perceived communist threat. According to Konstantopoulos, communism was not only an external threat to Greece but also an internal one. This threat was organized under the EDA, which had infiltrated into the state machinery and aimed to bring communist tyranny to Greece. EK was seen to be acting like a bridge for the EDA to realize this aim (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 25.04.1967). In addition to the communist threat, Konstantopoulos pointed out that the "ERE did not comprehend the seriousness of the situation; political parties and politicians had focused on their own interests, ignoring the economic problems of the country; people no longer respected the parliament; and there was an ethical crisis in the country that included the press, which was not reflecting reality" (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 25.04.1967). He argued that

the army's intervention took place when the country was at a critical point. If the army had not intervened and that critical line had been crossed over, the independence and territorial integrity of Greece and its democracy would have been in danger (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 04.06.1967). Konstantopoulos also described the course of events that would have led to a communist takeover had the army not intervened. He stated (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 01.08.1967):

> [Ioannis] Paraskevopoulos [Prime Minister of the interim government] came to power as a result of a change in government on 22 December 1966. (…) It was announced that the elections would be held in May 1967. The nationalist camp was worried about the issue [of elections]. The polls in May 1966 showed that the left-wing parties would win the elections. The EDA announced that it would support the EK. The sustainability of the regime was left to the Communist Party. The extreme left had found a way to pursue its own interests. Who would have saved [us from] this situation? Of course, the army.[9]

Ioannis Athanasoulias defined the pre-21 April period as a process approaching a deadlock, with communists and center-leftists agitating for a revolution (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 25.04.1967). He stated that communism in Greece had infiltrated into one of the biggest parties and continued its activities under it, hiding its true face and real objectives (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 17.10.1967). He argued that the military would not even think of intervening if communists had not taken a central place in politics and dragged the country into a deadlock (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 19.07.1967). Athanasoulias argued that communism was at the heart of all the other problems Greece faced. He stated (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 05.05.1967):

> Even if communism did not directly threaten Greece, its existence and activities caused problems. They created psychological pressure over the society and created fear, led people to pessimism about their

[9] All translations of excerpts from Greek columns belong to the author unless otherwise specified.

> future, and created hatred among people. [Communists'] support for strikes did not support the workers but contributed to creating uneasiness in the society, stopped production, and weakened the economy. Because of these reasons, [the communist threat] should have been suppressed much earlier but political parties could not produce efficient policies in order to not end up being anti-democratic. Under these circumstances, intervention of the army became a necessity; the army did what the parties could not do.

Columnists paid particular attention to the relationships between the EDA, the EK, and the Communist Party KKE– which did not officially exist at that time due to being outlawed– to strengthen their arguments that Greece faced a real communist threat at the time of the takeover. According to Athanasoulias, the archives of the EDA, which were publicized after the takeover, showed that by holding the aim of spreading communist ideas across Greece, EDA did not have an identity that was separate from the KKE; in fact it was the KKE merely organized under another appearance (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 30.08.1967). The anonymous column in *Akropolis* titled "Lakonika" spared the widest space among all columns to mention the relationships between the EDA, the EK, and communism. It referred to confessions of parliamentarians, but didn't explain who these parliamentarians were, nor what they confessed. It was expressed in Lakonika that the confessions showed that the EDA, which worked to establish a one-party communist system in Greece, was like a disguise of the KKE (*Akropolis*, 30.08.1967). It was indicated in the same column that the relationship between the EDA and the EK was not at the grassroots level, as argued by the EK's claim that the same people were voting for the EK and the EDA. Rather, this relationship was at the institutional level, which was understood with the publicizing of the EDA's secret documents and archives

after the takeover (*Akropolis*, 12.07.967). The column argued that these secret archives demonstrated the EDA's negotiations with EK ministers, showed how EK was used as a step to reach power, and proved that George Papandreou and his son Andreas Papandreou were involved in the secret organization of the EDA as leading figures for increasing youth support for the party (*Akropolis*, 17.05.1967; 16.07.1967).

Although columnists shared the view that Greece faced a serious communist threat in the pre-21 April period, and that the army's intervention saved the country from falling under communist rule, they reflected different views about the strength of the communist threat – i.e., whether it was powerful in quantity or in quality. According to Konstantopoulos, the Communist Party had infiltrated every aspect of life; their members and supporters were everywhere, from state institutions and political parties to commercial activities (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 27.08.1987). Athanasoulias pointed out the numerical data regarding EDA's members to depict how serious the communist threat was before the takeover. He stated that the members of EDA totaled around 92 thousand in 1965, and increased to 120 thousand in 1967 (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 28.05.1967). According to Konstantopoulos, numerical proof for the power of the Communist Party could be found in the youth organization of the EK, which was under the influence of communists (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 17.09.1967). The column Lakonika argued that the power of the communist threat in Greece was more than mathematical calculations, however (*Akropolis*, 17.05.1967). The column accepted that the number of communists in Greece was in fact few, but emphasized that this should not be considered as they

did not pose any danger to the regime. It argued that communists differed from other small groups in terms of their strong internal organization and methods, which enabled them to reach their target quickly and confidently (*Akropolis*, 17.05.1967).

Columnists did not refer to the worsening economic situation of the country as a reason for the military's intervention. Only Konstantopoulos referred briefly to the tough economic situation in the pre-coup period, and even then not as a reason for the takeover. He argued that the results of the non-programmatic, ad hoc policies of Papandreou government had begun to take effect during the 1966-1967 period, and that the situation would have become worse had the elections been held (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 09.08.1967).

The objectives of the junta's rule as expressed by columnists were broader than the elimination of the communist threat. In fact they did not make much reference to this objective when compared to the space spared for other goals. This was mostly because they evaluated the communist threat as having been largely eliminated with officers' takeover on 21 April. According to Athanasoulias, the military aimed to restructure political life along with the aim of preventing Greece from drifting towards communism again in the future (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 22.07.1967).

Emphasizing the goals of drafting a new constitution and taking the first steps for the restructuring of the state, the column Lakonika also cited the elimination of a communist threat and eradication of political and state mechanisms that supported communism among the objectives of the junta administration (*Akropolis*, 16.07.1967). The column expressed that the first objective of

eliminating the communist threat had already been realized. The second objective, namely the eradication of political and state mechanisms that supported communism, was about to be completed; the constitution-making and restructuring of the state were the objectives the junta administration was working on (*Akropolis*, 16.07.1967). Lakonika referred to the junta's successes within a short time in terms of transforming the structure of the state structure to produce efficiently functioning institutions. It expressed that the military government had shouldered the responsibility of solving the inefficiency and lethargy of state institutions, and that the first steps had already been taken by closing down useless working groups in different state institutions (*Akropolis*, 22.07.1967).

Athanasoulias, too, mentioned the inefficient functioning of state institutions due to lacks in control mechanisms and discipline, and that this was targeted by the military's rule. He indicated that the military administration considered this situation seriously and was fighting against the snails' pace of state institutions with the aim of modernizing them to prevent any return to old habits (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 14.10.1967).

Columnists also expressed that the military administration aimed to improve the economy. They allocated a large amount of space to report the successes of the economic policies of the military administration, which began to be observed in a short time. The column Lakonika stated that the ultimate aim of the junta was to improve the living standards of Greeks, and it expressed that the realization of this objective was important in securing public support for the junta's rule (*Akropolis*, 05.05.1967). Athanasoulias saw the transformation of state institutions as necessary

to improve the economy. He stated that transforming backward state institutions was a prerequisite for economic development (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 09.05.1967) and referred to the economic program of the junta as an indication of how seriously the government considered economic issues (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 25.07.1967).

The objective of economic improvement came to forefront in columnists' evaluations of the successes achieved by the military administration in the short run. According to Athanasoulias, the government immediately took steps to increase trade activities and laid the foundations of a long-term program (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 23.09.1967). He emphasized that the trade deficit had begun to narrow and that the continuation of increases in exports was closely related to political developments (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 05.10.1967). Lakonika stressed the improvements in the economy as an indication of the junta reaching its objectives, noting that relations with the European Economic Community were continuing on good terms (*Akropolis*, 01.08.1967), an increase in foreign investment, and improvements in the industry and construction sectors (*Akropolis*, 20.09.1967) in the economic situation of farmers (*Akropolis*, 17.10.1967).

The expectations of columnists from the 21 April government stayed in line with the objectives they had identified; they, too, included but were not limited to the elimination of the communist threat. Konstantopoulos, for example, stated that neither the communist party nor its alternative should be tolerated in the new regime that was being established (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 14.05.1967). He suggested that all communist activities be outlawed and communists should not be cooperated with on any account (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 17.05.1967). Konstantopoulos, however,

perceived the takeover as the beginning of broader changes in Greece (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 03.05.1967). The takeover obliged the military administration to deal with economic problems of the country, work for the prosperity of the people (Konstantopoulos, *Eleftheros Kosmos*, 03.05.1967; 20.09.1967), and make a clear-cut distinction with the pre-21 April period's actors and organizations if officers wanted to be successful (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 04.06.1967). Athanasoulias emphasized the importance of education for the sustainability of the changes that the colonels aimed to bring, noting that fundamental changes should be enacted in the education system (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 01.06.1967). The column Lakonika brought the Greek Church under scrutiny, suggesting that an intervention of the government in the Church was necessary if the 21 April revolution was to build a new spirit (*Akropolis*, 11.05.1967). Both officers and conservative columnists emphasized religion as an important component of Greek identity. Konstantopoulos argued that religion was one of the fundamental points that united Greeks, but that Greeks' religious values had started to weaken after 1961 (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 26.04.1967). This situation of raising a generation of youth that was distanced from Orthodox-Christian values was believed to have made them vulnerable to communist propaganda. Thus, both for the elimination of the communist threat and the building of a new spirit for the Greek nation, regulations were seen as necessary for the Church, which was portrayed in columns as having degenerated (Athanasoulias, *Eleftheros Kosmos*, 11.05.1967).The expectations of columnists from the 21 April government and the objectives they saw for it become more meaningful when we consider the characteristics columnists attributed to the takeover and the military regime.

4.3.2. Columnists' Representation of the Characteristics of the 21 April Administration

Konstantopoulos defined the colonels' takeover as a revolution that aimed to bring about profound changes in Greece and was not merely limited to the political life (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 25.04.1967; 03.05.1967; 14.05.1967). He likened the intervention to a surgical operation that would help Greece get rid of its wounds and sins in order to make significant progress (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 03.05.1967). He referred to the junta government mostly as a "revolutionary government." The column Lakonika defined the military government mostly as a "national government" in discussing its policies and activities. Athanasoulias, on the other hand, did not use distinguishing adjectives or descriptions for the military government; he referred to it as the "21 April government," "today's government," or the "new government."

According to Konstantopoulos, the intervention of the military was seen as inevitable by every rational person (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 29.09.1967). In his view, the intervention did not overthrow a healthy functioning democracy; instead, officers prevented a total collapse of the democratic regime through their intervention (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 01.06.1967). Officers were seen as the last hope of the people to save the country from such a collapse (Konstantopoulos, *Eleftheros Kosmos*, 07.06.1967). Konstantopoulos drew attention to the impartiality of the intervention, arguing it did not take place to preserve the interests of any particular classes or groups. In this regard, he stated that the 1967 takeover differed from

previous military interventions in Greece. He mentioned that the military's intervention on 21 April was not to support individual interests of officers or party interests (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 23.06.1967). For him, the objectives of the leaders of the takeover were not personal objectives but the ones that were in the hearts of the Greek people (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 04.06.1967). He likened the political situation in Greece to a condition of gangrene that was expanding rapidly throughout a body, stating that the army, as the protector of the country from external and internal enemies, had no other choice but to intervene (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 23.06.1967). Konstantopoulos argued this was because politicians had been in neither the position nor the mood to make a move toward preventing political collapse (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 01.08.1967).

Athanasoulias evaluated the takeover as a "preventive" move. He stated that every country that faced a communist threat would consider using force to obstruct its own deterioration (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 28.07.1967). He compared the situation of officers in Greece to American police who were authorized by defusing leaders of rival groups to prevent fighting between whites and blacks (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 09.08.1967).

Columnists rarely referred to the temporality of the junta's rule. This may have resulted from the conditions of censorship, since officers did not want to an emphasis to be placed on a quick transition to democracy. In this context, Konstantopoulos stated that the existing administration was a preparatory period in which to formulate enduring principles for a functioning democratic regime (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 14.05.1967). He also referred to junta administration Prime

Minister Konstantinos Kollias' statement that the junta's rule aimed to form a functioning parliamentarian system (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 11.06.1967). Konstantopoulos expressed that the military's rule was not a totalitarian regime, nor did it aim to establish such a regime (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 07.06.1967). He stated that the junta's rule cannot be considered anti-democratic in essence, because it suspended the democratic regime only temporarily to prevent its entire collapse (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 03.08.1967). He compared the situation in Greece with Germany when Nazis came to power. He argued that Germany should have considered military intervention to save the country from National Socialism. He stated (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 03.08.1967):

> [Germany] needed to act in an illegal manner for a while to prevent Nazis from coming to power. (…) I do not support military dictatorship but if German officers had come to power in 1933, Germany could have overcome the economic crisis. If German officers had come to power, there would have been dictatorship on the surface but the Germans would have continued their lives. In my view, a return to democracy can be guaranteed with these kinds of interim regimes.

With regard to a transition to democracy, the column Lakonika highlighted the junta's plan to review the constitution and hold a referendum for its acceptance. The column argued that these plans were strong indicators that the transition to democracy would produce a regime stronger than the previous one (*Akropolis*, 23.05.1967). However, in none of the columns was a date for such a transition mentioned.

Nikos Tsiforos used metaphors to describe the 21 April takeover and the subsequent military administration. The interesting aspect of his daily pieces was

that he almost never referred openly to the existing government or other political issues. The way he considered and narrated non-political issues at the time, however, gave rise to the idea that he was giving implicit messages. In one of his pieces in May, for example, he wrote about Easter and people's preparations for vacation. He mentioned that people were considering the possibility of rain when making their preparations. He wrote (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 03.05.1967):

> In fact the rain is always a possibility and it should be expected. It is good for nature and for plants. We pay attention to our short-run happiness and goodness but we do not consider what is good for us in the long-run. The rain might upset you at that moment but if it is to bring better situations, is that moment so important? What might happen with April rain? It does not last long: one day or two days, then it will leave its place to the sun, having increased the fertility of the soil.

Because of the political context and the time the piece was published, this passage can be considered as Tsiforos' description of how he perceived the 21 April administration. Implicitly likening the military's takeover and its rule to April rain, he evaluated the junta's rule as a temporary one that was expected to have positive effects in the long run for the country even if it did not have pleasant outcomes for that particular moment. In another piece, Tsiforos wrote about the earthquake that hit Greece on 1 May 1967 and caused damage in numerous villages.[10] He stated that it was a big earthquake that had caused a deep crack, but that it was time to grow flowers from that crack. He wrote that people knew the promises of the government would not turn into empty promises and that flowers would emerge from the destroyed villages (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 12.05.1967). Like his previous piece, he

[10] The earthquake was 5.9 in magnitude. It caused 9 deaths and damage costs totaling around 5 million US dollars.

referred to neither the takeover nor the military government, but the earthquake can be seen as a metaphor used to signify the takeover. Thus, like an earthquake destroys a village, the takeover is portrayed as having destroyed the existing political system, but Tsiforos assures his readers that a new system will be established in the place of the one destroyed. When his other pieces are considered from this perspective, one additional text attracts attention. In this piece, Tsiforos wrote about the illegal parking in Athens that blocked roads and caused problems for other people. He expressed how towing agencies removed these cars and thus provided continuation of the traffic (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 17.05.1967). From the same perspective, it can be argued that the towing agencies' provision of order, facilitated by removing the cars that blocked the roads, can be thought as metaphors used by Tsiforos to describe the 21 April takeover. Tsiforos' tactic of making implicit arguments through metaphor did not last long. After 10 June 1967 when he wrote a piece criticizing the country's censorship, his pieces no longer carried any hidden meanings.

One of the ways Athanasoulias and the column Lakonika used to define the characteristics of the junta's rule was to compare it with the pre-coup situation. Athanasoulias pointed out that the military administration differed from the previous ones in terms of being impartial and serving the good of the whole nation. He mentioned that the military administration did not have to garner votes of the people and therefore it did not need to pursue interests of particular groups and individuals (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 26.04.1967). In this regard, he pointed to instances from economic life and the public sector to show how the government was working

for national interests. He gave the example of Greece's signing of an agreement with the Litton Company for the economic development of Crete and Western Peloponnesus after the officers come to power. He mentioned that negotiations with the company had started three years ago but could not be completed because the issue had become politicized for partisan reasons (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 17.05.1967). He argued that the junta, which had an objective attitude to work for the good of the country, completed these negotiations with the signing of an agreement a short time after it came to power, an achievement that the previous governments could not accomplish in three years (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 17.05.1967).

Athanasoulias also mentioned the changing situation of the municipalities and local governorships with the junta's rule. He argued that the municipalities and local governorships had become tools of political parties to pursue their own interests rather than serving the people (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 25.04.1967). The public sector was so corrupted that people had to pay bribes to get their work done (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 26.04.1967). Athanasoulias indicated that the new administration was not a partisan government and did not have the characteristics of the previous administrations. He pointed out that the military administration developed a public sector program that aimed to rectify its bad habits and reestablish a functioning system (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 05.05.1967). The column Lakonika contrasted the 21 April administration with the previous administrations in terms of the efficiency and development it brought to economic life. It argued that the success of the military administration in the economy arose from the fact that it took decisions for the development of economic conditions, while previous

governments had taken decisions for their own interests (*Akropolis*, 27.05.1967). It mentioned that the positive atmosphere and the stability created by the junta's rule would break the unwillingness of business people, including foreigners, to invest in Greece. The columns emphasized that private investments had already tripled those of 1965 in just a few months under the junta's rule (*Akropolis*, 22.08.1967), and that the government took tangible steps to solve the problems of the construction sector and facilitate people's acquisition of loans to buy apartments (*Akropolis*, 30.08.1967).

Columnists paid particular attention to reactions to the takeover from abroad. More than the support for and positive evaluations of the 21 April takeover abroad in general and in foreign newspapers specifically, columnists presented foreign criticisms of and demonstrations against the takeover and the military administration in Greece. They not only expressed that there were reactions abroad to the takeover and the junta's rule but also outlined specifically what was criticized. These depictions were important in the sense that the censorship review did not prevent their publications. This is mainly because these criticisms were presented to show that they were wrong and did not reflect reality. Nevertheless, these depictions formed important sources of information for those Greeks who were critical of the takeover and the military administration to learn about reactions from abroad to the situation in Greece (Interview 9, Athens, 18.02.2013).

Columnists displayed different reactions to criticisms according to the source of the criticism. The first group of sources was composed of communist states and communist people living in the Soviet Union, other communist countries

and, European countries. They indicated that protests and mobilizations in different countries condemning the 21 April takeover and the military's rule in Greece were organized by communists and their collaborators. In this regard, Konstantopoulos argued that the mobilizations were organized by communists and included crypto-communists, whom he defined as humanists, democrats, emotional people, and others who were easily influenced by communist propaganda because of their superficial knowledge about what had been going on in Greece (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 05.05.1967). He mentioned the reactions from the communist countries neighboring Greece and argued that the takeover upset them by terminating their plans in Greece (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 26.05.1967).

The other group that was considered by columnists because of its criticisms of the takeover and the military's rule was comprised of non-communist European states. For example, when Denmark recalled its ambassador from Athens because of the takeover, Konstantopoulos criticized Denmark for this move. He evaluated Denmark's policy as a way of intervening in Greece's domestic politics, noting that such selective targeting was particularly uncordial given that Denmark did not intervene in any other state's domestic politics (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 20.10.1967). The column Lakonika also criticized the negative stance of European states toward the 21 April government's policies. It argued that these states were intervening in the domestic affairs of Greece through unethical means under the pretext that there were violations of human rights and undemocratic practices (*Akropolis*, 14.05.1967).

Columnists argued that the reactions from abroad were formed in order to mobilize reactions to Greece, and were mostly based on falsified news and disinformation that did not reflect the real situation in Greece. The news from abroad aimed to present Greece as an unsafe country with continuing clashes and street conflicts (Konstantopoulos, *Eleftheros Kosmos*, 16.07.1967), armed soldiers in the streets ready to shoot down the ones who refused to obey commands (Konstantopoulos, *Eleftheros Kosmos*, 13.06.1967), and violations of human rights including the right to live (Lakonika, *Akropolis*, 20.05.1967). As already noted, the main aim of columnists here was to criticize foreign news media for not reflecting reality and to emphasize that law and order had been restored in Greece with the 21 April takeover. However, they also significantly contributed to the dissemination of these foreign reports across the Greek public in Greek, most of whom did not have access to foreign resources to learn about the reactions abroad and the reasons for their criticisms.

According to Konstantopoulos, the reactions of business people and capital holders were the true indicators of the existence of law and order, and that from this perspective things were going well in Greece. He argued that their reactions significantly differed from those of the communists, because these members of the business community investigated the developments in Greece from close quarters. In doing so, they saw that the reality was totally different than what communists and their supporters were arguing (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 05.05.1967).

As stated, columnists stressed that the military took over on 21 April to save the country from full collapse for the common good of the country. They did not

perceive it to be related to group or political interests, nor to derive from officers' personal or corporate interests. In this regard, columnists referred to the public's support with the argument that people had supported the takeover from the very beginning because it was for the common good of the country. Developing this view, columnists came up with the army-nation unity argument within the Greek context. According to Konstantopoulos, the army had been gaining the sympathy of the people since the first moments of the takeover (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 16.06.1967); people were pleased with the army's intervention because they had expected to see widespread change in political life, and the army responded to this demand by taking over (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 14.05.1967). He also argued that the lack of serious opposition to the takeover and military rule also demonstrated that the intervention responded to a societal need (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 28.06.1967). Konstantopoulos explained why people did not react to the military's takeover and its rule subsequently by emphasizing structure of the army. He stated (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 16.06.1967):

> Principally, the social structure of the army is important. Before, the aristocratic class was dominant in the army. Generals were coming from old and well-known families of Greece. With social developments, the middle class people replaced the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie [within the army]. The ones coming from the poor families can now reach higher status in the military schools. In other words, generals coming from the people of Greece know the pain of the people since they also had lived through the same poverty. They were away from politics and role-playing. For this reason, when the 21 April [takeover] took place, people knew that those who were of themselves obtained power, and supported them blindfolded. In other words, the revolution had a populist structure.

In addition to the social structure of the army and people's trust that the army would act for the good of the people, Konstantopoulos also argued that people did not react to the takeover not because they did not have the power to do so but because they did not want to do so – aware as they were of the pre-21 April situation that was leading the country toward a collapse (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 06.08.1967).

Athanasoulias, too, drew attention to the support for the military's rule. He demonstrated people's support during public speeches of officers as an indication of the people's contentment with the existing situation and their acceptance of the military administration's plans (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 30.05.1967). The column Lakonika drew attention to people's support for the 21 April government by demonstrating that Papandreou and his supporters were not as powerful as they once had been thought to be. For example, a "silent protest" was organized against the 21 April takeover that demanded people stay in their apartments on Sunday, in order to show their reaction to the military government. The column Lakonika expressed that the protest failed; Athenians were all out in the streets, cafes, and beaches displaying their support for the 21 April government (*Akropolis*, 30.05.1967). Konstantopoulos also mentioned the silent protests as a failure. He stated that people who were against the takeover were very few and the majority of the people wanted to see the military's rule reach its targets (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 30.05.1967).

The column Lakonika demonstrated that the military government was inclusive in that it did not exclude anyone for supporting Papandreou in the pre-21

April period and acted as the national government for the whole country. In addition to the inclusiveness of the military administration, the column emphasized that people who had supported Papandreou in the pre-21 April period also displayed their support for the 21 April government. It mentioned the support of Cretans, who were seen to be a traditional stronghold for Papandreou and the EK, for the members of the 21 April government that had visited the Crete. The column stated (*Akropolis*, 04.06.1967):

> [Before 21 April] Cretans would have even held their guns in order to keep Papandreou in power. This is what the [EK] was stating. But Cretans showed that it was not as argued [by the EK]. The warm welcoming of Cretans [for the military government members] is exactly its indication. Cretans showed that their feelings were nationalist but not partisan. When the members of the [military] government that represented the whole country visited Crete, Cretans were also aware of [that the government was a national one].

In addition to analyzing how Greek columnists perceived the 21 April takeover and the military administration, columnists' evaluations of politicians, their definitions of democracy, and where they situated the takeover and the military's rule within the democratic tradition of Greece will contribute to a better overall understanding of columnists' perceptions of the 21 April takeover and subsequent military rule. The next section will therefore focus on these elements.

4.3.3. Democracy, Politicians, and the Transition Period in the Newspaper Columns

The main attention of columnists following the 21 April takeover was focused on explaining the magnitude of the communist threat Greece had faced before the takeover, and demonstrating that the military's rule as the "national government," or the "revolutionary government," started working for the common good of the country by emphasizing the effectiveness of the policies they pursued. Although the reason for the takeover was stated as saving the democratic regime from total collapse, and the ultimate aim as the restoration of democracy, columnists, as analyzed above, did not discuss when and under what conditions the transition should take place or how long the military government should stay in power. In this regard, Tsiforos hinted that, like the spring rain, the military government was expected to stay in power for a short time, but did not clarify what he meant by short (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 03.05.1967).

Konstantopoulos mentioned several times that the 21 April administration was an interim one that did not aim to establish a totalitarian regime, but rather restore a stronger democratic regime (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 07.06.1967; 03.08.1967; 08.10.1967). He also referred to the words of Karamanlis, who had left the country after the takeover. Karamanlis stated that the officers should not forget that they were leading a transition period and the 21 April administration was an interim government if they wanted to be successful in reaching their objectives (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 08.10.1967). The column Lakonika indicated the temporality of the 21

April administration by referring to the constitution-making process. As stated, it expressed the junta's will to review the constitution and hold a referendum for its acceptance as important indicators for the transition to democracy (*Akropolis*, 23.05.1967). However, it did not present any opinion about what the content of the constitution should be.

Konstantopoulos allocated much space in his column to discussing the situation of politicians whom he saw as the main guilty party for the creation of the political crisis in the pre-21 April period. According to him, politicians from the pre-21 April period therefore had no place in the political system that was being established (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 14.05.1967). He argued that these politicians were not aware that Greece was going through a major change; they thought that the current situation would last for a few months and then power would be handed back to former politicians (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 14.05.1967). He stated that some politicians could not even imagine a situation in which all the deputies in parliament would not be reinstated, but emphasized that none of these 300 deputies was irreplaceable (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 04.06.1967).

In addition to former politicians, Konstantopoulos argued that the new political system should not allow the existence of the Communist Party – either in its form at the time or in a proxy party – if one wanted Greece to sustain its existence in the future (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 14.05.1967). He made a clear distinction between the communist parties and politicians and all the rest with the argument that communists were against democracy in essence and supported tyranny; they were governed by external powers and therefore did not consider the national

interests of Greece (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 26.04.1967). He explicitly referred to the EDA as the proxy party of communists and argued that Papandreou's EK had become a servant of the communists. Konstantopoulos also referred to the religious factor while he was differentiating communists from the rest of Greeks. He stated that communists, as non-believers who fought against the church, did not realize that religion was a uniting power among Greeks (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 26.04.1967). He argued that communists aimed to divide Greek society into democrats and nationalists in order to strengthen their position in Greek politics. He argued, however, that they could not calculate that Greeks as believers and nationalists, regardless of whether they had supported Karamanlis' ERE or Papandreou's EK, would act together when the territorial integrity and the interests of the country were in danger (*Eleftheros Kosmos*, 16.04.1967).

In conclusion, this chapter analyzed how Greek columnists writing in *Akropolis* and *Eleftheros Kosmos* evaluated the 21 April takeover and the subsequent military administration in their pieces published after the takeover occurred. It demonstrated that colonels' control prevented publications from taking a stand against their takeover and rule, but that opinion columns still contained evaluations of the takeover and the junta's rule. In their evaluations, columnists discussed their interpretations of the reasons for the officers' takeover as well as their objectives, and defined the takeover and the junta's rule in particular ways. The next chapter will analyze Turkish columnists' evaluations of the 12 September takeover and subsequent military rule.

CHAPTER 5

THE 12 SEPTEMBER 1980 TAKEOVER IN TURKEY AND TURKISH COLUMNISTS

This chapter aims to conduct a thorough analysis of the daily columns of *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet*, and *Milliyet* in terms of how columnists evaluated the 12 September coup. It starts by constructing an overall framework with the main arguments that highlight different reasons for the 12 September takeover. The chapter continues by analyzing the military administration's control over the press to provide an understanding of the borderline drawn by officers in terms of what newspapers could and could not write about. Next, Turkish columnists' evaluations of the takeover and subsequent military rule that were published after the takeover occurred are analyzed in three subcategories, which were deemed to be important to this study's understanding of how columnists formulated their evaluations.

5.1. Historical Background of the 12 September Coup

There are numerous studies that explain why the 12 September coup happened. Some of these studies highlight macro-level reasons such as Cold War conditions and the socio-economic reasons, while others focus on micro-level explanations that particularly highlight the military and political actors (Demirel 2001, 47). Explaining in detail why the military took over the government of Turkey on 12 September 1980 is beyond the scope of this paper. It does not aim to construct a narrative for the developments leading towards the takeover in order to support or deny existing arguments. Instead, this chapter seeks to draw an overall framework of those dominant arguments in the literature highlighting different factors, ranging from macro-level reasons to micro-level ones, as motivations behind the generals' decision to assume power on 12 September.

Methodological concerns necessitated following this approach in this paper. Although many primary and secondary sources of information have become available during the time that has passed following the coup, specifying crystal clear explanations for the coup remains difficult. This situation is closely related to the difficulty of revealing how the relevant actors had been affected by the complex interactions among the developments before 12 September. Memoirs, biographies, autobiographies, and books written by politicians, journalists, and officers to highlight the developments preceding the coup constitute important sources of information for researchers in their efforts to understand its origins. However, issues of concern about the objectivity of these sources arise for researchers due to

their authors' selective memories and reevaluations of the developments with the intention of justifying particular acts. Researchers may overcome this handicap by referring to various primary and secondary sources. In these studies, however, the researchers themselves cannot refrain from bringing another representation which presents the researchers' own valuing of the interactions between pre-coup developments and their influence on the actors. Despite these challenges, the question of whether the coup was in fact the outcome of a more complex or a simpler interaction of the developments making the actors behave in particular ways continues to stay in the agendas of the researchers.

As stated above, there are arguments in the literature that explain the 12 September coup with particular emphasis on structural reasons. Some of these arguments highlight Cold War conditions – in particular, American interests in the Middle East (Arcayürek 1989; Güldemir 1986; Sunay 2010; Yetkin 1995) – while others emphasize the change in macroeconomic policies, namely the transition from the import substitution industrialization to an export-oriented economy (Kaya Özçelik 2011; Özkazanç 2005). According to structure-based arguments, regime change in Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan increased the importance of stability in Turkey for securing America's Middle East interests (Sunay 2010, 226–227). In this regard, short-term coalition governments of the 1970s and increasing economic problems were hindering Turkey from being a stable ally in the region for the United States. In addition, policies of the National Front coalition government of the center-right and right-wing political parties, such as the usage of the military bases in Turkey by American soldiers and Turkey's insistence on

maintaining its veto regarding Greece's turning back to the military wing of NATO, were not in harmony with US interests (Sunay 2010, 234–235). Within the challenging security conditions, it is argued that retaining Turkey as an ally of the West became more important for the United States than preserving the democratic regime (Demirel 2003b, 257). The possibility of a military intervention had begun to be discussed within American decision-making circles in 1979. Military rule was seen as a quick and a certain way of establishing stability and making Turkey a more promising ally in the Middle East. Although the signals from the United States could be evaluated to have been favoring the military's intervention and that it would support military rule, it would be a weak argument to state that the United States planned the coup, or was even notified before the takeover (Birand 1986, 92–102). However, this view is not meant to imply that the attitude of the United States did not have any influence on generals' decision regarding intervention; indeed, knowing that they would not face any serious reaction from the Western world, particularly from the United States, might have easily strengthened the generals' motivations.

Researchers who consider the root causes of the 12 September coup to be US discontent with the developments in the Middle East and the need to ensure its regional interests by keeping Turkey closer explain the escalation of violence and anarchy in the second half of the 1970s as the outcome of Americans' behind the scenes provocations (Demirel 2001, 47–48; Mumcu 1993, 139). The aim of such provocations was explained to be bringing the military to power. The logic underlying this assumption is that the United States considered that working with a

military government would be much easier than working a democratically elected one, since the military would not be accountable to the public and could thus prioritize issues of security and stability at the expense of democracy, individual rights, and freedoms (Demirel 2001, 49). Along with these explanations, politicians from both right- and left-wing political parties, including Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel, expressed that they believed that the United States played a role in the military takeover (Birand, Bila, and Akar 1999, 70; Yetkin 1995, 198–199).

One of the main characteristics of the second half of the 1970s in Turkey was the worsening economy, which was manifested both in statistical abstractions and in the daily lives of the people. The American embargo after Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the international oil markets crisis, and the increase in the prices of oil-based products negatively affected Turkey's international trade and balance of payments, and decreased GDP growth rates in the last years of the 1970s. People were struggling with high inflation rates while at the same time wages remained stagnant, fuel shortages and power cuts were frequent and widespread, and vital commodities including medicine, cooking oil, bottled gas, and light bulbs disappeared from shops only to appear on the black market (Hale 1994, 223–224). The government saw the solution to economic problems in bringing fundamental change in the economy, which took shape as a transition from import substitution industrialization to an export-oriented model. Popularly known as the 24 January 1980 decisions, the National Front government announced the economic program, which aimed to diminish the state's role in and support of the economy to create a more open market economy, on 24 January 1980.

Some researchers argue that the reason for the 12 September coup was the 24 January decisions, because only a regime like a military one would be able to implement this program (Kaya Özçelik 2011, 77; Şenses 1991, 214). Evren, too, made reference to the implementation of the 24 January decisions in his memoirs. He accepted that the implementation of these decisions would not be easy with a democratic government (Evren 1995, 12). However, he did not point to the 24 January decisions as the reason for the takeover, stating instead that the implementation of these decisions was a pragmatic policy rather than the major aim of military rule. Evren stated that economic reforms had the support of international financial entities and that military rule did not run the risk of dealing with deeper economic problems that would have resulted from failing to implement the reforms (Evren 1995, 12).

Turkey's economic crisis was not denied by most of the researchers in their assessments of the reasons for the 12 September coup. However, this did not mean that they considered the implementation of the 24 January decisions as the basic reason for the takeover. According to Demirel (2001, p. 48), the fact that the military rule facilitated implementation of the 24 January decisions was not enough evidence to assume a causal relationship between the military's takeover and the implementation of these decisions. Hale considers increasing economic problems in the last years of the 1970s as being among the basic reasons for the coup, along with political reasons, but he does not emphasize the 24 January decisions and their implementation in this context (Hale 1994, 222).

Increasing tension in the political and social arenas – manifested in the uncompromising attitudes of politicians; weak coalition governments; ideological cleavages within society as well as in state institutions such as schools and universities, the police, and the bureaucracy; escalating street violence between rightist and leftist student groups as well as different factions of the left; mass killings; bombings; robberies; and kidnappings – defined life in Turkey in the last three years of the 1970s. In light of these events, Hale states that reasons for the coup were more related to the internal developments in Turkey than to its foreign relations and other external factors (Hale 1994, 239). While Hale does not ignore socio-economic and external explanations of the escalation of violence, he highlights state's failure to end the violence as the major contributor to the worsening of the situation (Hale 1994, 227). Similar to Hale's point of view, Itzkowitz-Shifrinson and Heper (2005, 238) argue that the main reason for the 12 September coup was the failure of the civilian governments to respond to political, ethnic, and religious violence.

Besides different explanations in the literature regarding why the military took over on 12 September, it is also particularly important for this study to consider the reasons the generals have given to explain why they decided to take power. Birand (1986, p. 69) states that the generals did not begin to consider the necessity of an intervention or discuss when and how this intervention should take place before 1979. Before the 12 September takeover, the Turkish Armed Forces conveyed their discontent with recent developments to politicians in a letter signed by Kenan Evren as Chief of General Staff and the four force commanders and

handed to President Korutürk on 27 December 1979 (Evren 1990, 332). The letter was important in terms of reflecting an institutional standing, bearing the signatures of the top generals, and referring to the internal service law of the armed forces as the legal basis of this warning. Though the letter contained no explicit mention of the possibility of a military takeover, it expressed the armed forces' insistent demands that politicians take the necessary measures in order to end the violence and restore peace and safety.

The content of the first public statement of military's rule, which was read on the radio during the early hours of 12 September, did not differ substantially from its letter of warning; the same issues were expressed as the reasons for the military's decision to takeover. Domestic and external threats to the existence and unity of the state and nation, the malfunctioning of state institutions and the incompatibility between them, the ideological cleavages in society and state institutions threatening to bring the country to the brink of civil war, and the uncompromising behaviors of rival politicians that prevented them from taking the necessary steps to get the country out of deadlock were all factors cited by the military in its first public statement in power (*Milliyet*, 12 September 1980). Similar to the warning letter, Evren referred to the responsibility that arose from the internal service law of the armed forces to protect the unity of the country and the republican regime. It was also expressed that the takeover was carried out in chain of command, which was important in displaying that it was the military institution, rather than individual officers, who took the initiative.

Evren's evaluations of the reasons for the takeover did not change during the years following the coup. He consistently referred to the officers' increasing concerns caused by the armed clashes between leftist and rightist groups, inability of politicians to deal with the problem, and the possibility of civil war (Evren 1990, 1995). The possibility of the creation of a parallel army, given the deepening of ideological cleavages that had already divided state institutions and the bureaucracy, was also a point of concern for officers. Factors such as the increasing number of students who were expelled from military schools because of their involvement in political activities and the escape of Mehmet Ali Ağca, who was charged with the killing of journalist Abdi İpekçi, from a military prison were perceived by high ranking officers as indicators of this possibility (Demirel 2003b, 259). In addition, Evren also referred to the discontent and uneasiness of junior officers and the possibility of another colonel-led intervention, if higher ranking officers did not take the initiative to represent the entire institution (Evren 1990, 276).

5.2. The 12 September Administration's Control over the Press

Birand et al. states that the generals of the 12 September administration believed that the press should act in unity, just as they did during the national soccer team's international matches despite their intra-national rivalries, when presenting news and their views about the 12 September administration (Birand, Bila, and

Akar 1999, 214). In fact, however, the generals did not retain this belief in their hearts. Since the first day of the military's rule, the press was brought under the generals' strict control, both through the written statements of the Martial Law Command and through informal methods of warnings such as telephone calls to editors and visits to newspaper offices.

Martial law and the public statements proclaimed by the Martial Law Command formed the legal basis of military's control over the press. Martial law commands had the power to control the press, ban publications of newspapers and their circulations, censor the content of publications, and close down publication houses. A separate statement for the press was proclaimed on 25 September 1980 by the İzmir Martial Law Command. With this statement, the press was banned from writing criticism against the government; stating negative views about the armed forces; and publishing news and caricatures that did not reflect an objective point of view, conflicted with statements proclaimed by the National Security Council and the Martial Law Command, or contradicted Atatürkist principles (Cemal 1992, 70).

Three daily newspapers *Demokrat*, *Aydınlık*, and *Hergün* were closed down permanently on the first day of military rule (Çağdaş Gazeteciler Derneği [Association of Modern Journalists] 1984, 150). *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet*, *Günaydın*, *Güneş, Milli Gazete*, *Milliyet*, *Tan*, and *Tercüman* were all newspapers that were banned from publication or circulation in some cities for certain periods, because of particular presentations of the news or columnists' opinions found to conflict with the martial law or Atatürkist principles. After *Milli Gazete, Cumhuriyet* was the

newspaper that stayed closed for the second longest time, between 12 September 1980 and 12 March 1984; it was banned from publication four times for a period of 41 days in total (Kabacalı 1990, 219). During the first six months of the military's rule, *Cumhuriyet* was banned from publication twice, for a period of 15 days in total. The first ban lasted for 10 days and was introduced because of İlhan Selçuk's column on 11 November 1980, and also because of news about economic life in Istanbul published on the same day. The Martial Law Command deemed Selçuk's piece to be insulting Atatürk and the economic news to be groundless and causing needless worry among the people (Cemal 2000, 140). The second ban prohibited circulation of *Cumhuriyet* in the six major cities of Southern and Southeastern Turkey for five days because the Martial Law Command similarly assessed that the newspaper published groundless news that might have provoked people. *Milliyet* stayed closed for 10 days in August 1983 because of Metin Toker's column in general. *Hürriyet* was banned from publication for seven days in total in 1982 and 1983 for similar reasons (Kabacalı 1990, 216–219).

Along with the martial law articles and statements proclaimed by the Martial Law Command, commanders' warnings made via informal methods of communication formed alternative ways to sustain control over the press. As noted earlier, commanders consistently expressed their discontent with columns published via telephone calls, by visiting the columnists and the editors at their offices, and inviting them to the Martial Law Command. Through these informal channels, commanders reminded columnists that they were closely watched by the military administration. That these warnings came after opinions and the news had been

published was important, as the aim of such informal warnings was to prevent publication of similar news and opinions in the following days. As an example of commanders' warnings to columnists, then-editor of *Cumhuriyet* Turhan Ilgaz received a call from one of the martial law commanders before *Cumhuriyet* was banned from publication on 12 November 1980. The commander expressed to Ilgaz the discontent caused by the way news was presented in *Cumhuriyet* and by İlhan Selçuk's column. The call concluded with the warning that the newspaper might be closed down if its publications continued in the same manner (Cemal 1992, 89–90).

An important number of columnists and editors received similar kinds of warning calls from commanders during military rule that would hinder the publication of content similar to what had been already published. Just as these warnings could pertain to censorship of news and opinions about general subjects, they could also be very specific for non-usage of particular words and concepts. The word 'blue' forms an interesting example of this situation, which is referred to in memoirs of different columnists to explain the extent of the military's control over the press. Before the constitutional referendum held on 7 November 1982, the Martial Law Command banned the publication of any news and any opinions in support of voting against the constitution. As the color of the 'no' voting paper in the referendum was designated to be blue, its usage became an issue of concern for the commanders. Any news and columns that included the word 'blue' were deemed by commanders to be declaring, however covertly, support for a 'no' vote in the referendum. Thus, columnists and editors were consistently warned by

commanders whenever the word ‘blue’ was used in their publications, and even when the color blue was used in illustrations (Cemal 2000, 9–24).

The commanders’ warning not only took into consideration what the columnists published but also those individuals and groups with whom they had personal relationships. In this regard, columnists’ relationships with former politicians were an issue of discontent for the commanders. Mehmet Barlas was one of the columnists who was directly warned by a general of the National Security Council about his visits to Süleyman Demirel. He was notified that he must terminate those relationships that were perceived as unfavorable to the military administration (Birand, Bila, and Akar 1999, 215).

This control over the press via martial law and warnings did, in fact, push the columnists to self-censor both how they behaved and what they wrote. As there was no systematic mechanism to preview the content of the newspapers before publication, columnists and editors had to pay particular attention to what they published, since the closing down of the newspapers depended on the commanders’ reading and evaluation of the printed materials. Columnists could not know whether their pieces were evaluated as violating martial law until they were warned by commanders or the newspaper was banned from publication. Further, it was also difficult for columnists and editors to believe that the reason for the publication ban was really as the commanders had stated (Yıldırım 2006, 9). In some instances, columnists pointed out that the real reason for the commanders’ decision to ban the newspaper from publication differed than the proclaimed reason. For instance, *Günaydın* was closed down on 30 October 1983, ostensibly because it did not attach

enough importance to the 60th anniversary of the Republic. According to Cemal, however, the real reason for this punishment was the publication of a public poll about the forthcoming elections that was not welcomed by the commanders (Cemal 2000, 449–450).

5.3. The 12 September Takeover in Newspaper Columns

5.3.1. Reasons and Objectives of the Takeover and Expectations for the Military Administration

As noted above, generals publicized the reasons for their takeover in the first public statement made on 12 September. This section demonstrates that reasons highlighted by columnists did not differ from the reasons stated by the generals. This was an understandable situation not only because the columns considered in this paper were written under military rule and thus columnists' criticism of the head of the operation would be impossible, but also because the reasons cited included developments that columnists had addressed in their daily pieces before 12 September as well.

These reasons given by columnists for the intervention can be organized under the categories of a lack of personal safety due to street violence and terrorist

acts, the possibility of a civil war erupting, the lack of a dialogue between politicians and other irresponsible behaviors including legal and constitutional violations, and the weaknesses of state institutions including the malfunctioning of the bureaucracy. Along with highlighting these reasons for the generals' move, columnists were of the same opinion on two points. Firstly, they saw no solution within the existing political system; 12 September and the generals' takeover thus came as the only way to resolve the political deadlock. Secondly, they perceived the takeover as a situation forced on the generals' shoulders, i.e., the generals felt that they had to act under the obligation of protecting the country from total collapse.

Örsan Öymen was one of the columnists who drew attention to street violence and death casualties in the pre-12 September period within the framework of the right to live as an inalienable human right. Öymen stated that personal safety and the right to live had been taken away from society and thus the 12 September operation became inevitable (*Milliyet*, 25.10.1980). İlhan Selçuk also emphasized the priority of personal safety in human life. He wrote that if personal safety had not existed, everything else would have lost importance (*Cumhuriyet*, 28.09.1980). Selçuk argued that on 11 September Turkey was at a point where anarchy and terrorist acts had threatened its citizens' personal safety, and the state could not guarantee it because the constitutional order had crumbled (*Cumhuriyet*, 28.09.1980; *Cumhuriyet* 25.10.1980). Some columnists drew attention to the possibility of a civil war as a next step after street violence had the takeover not happened. Mümtaz Soysal, a professor of constitutional law, stated that the army took power because people had been no longer able to walk in the streets and

Turkey had been at the brink of civil war (*Milliyet*, 04.10.1980). *Milliyet*'s editorial also drew attention to the possibility of a civil war because of anarchy and terrorism in the streets. It stated that democracy in Turkey would not be able to survive the ongoing violence, and that the armed forces undertook the 12 September operation to prevent civil war and save democracy from anarchy and terrorism (*Milliyet*, 27.11.1980; *Milliyet*, 25.02.1981).

In the first public statement, General Kenan Evren, the leader of the operation and the military administration, mentioned the weakness and malfunctioning of state institutions and the uncompromising attitude of political parties as the main reasons behind the increase in destructive and separatist activities that threatened people's lives and properties. Columnists, too, expressed that the power of violent groups arose not solely from the groups themselves but from the ineffectiveness of state institutions. Columnists also mentioned international links of violent groups as another source of their strength. *Milliyet*'s editorial piece also argued that the reason for the country-wide spread of violent acts was not because terrorists were very powerful but because the government was weak and the terrorists were externally supported (*Milliyet*, 03.11.1980). In emphasizing the international links of violent groups, Bedii Faik pointed to the Soviet Union as the external center of anarchy and terrorism in Turkey (*Hürriyet*, 28.09.1980).

Despite Faik's mentioning of the Soviet Union as an external sponsor of violent groups, none of the columnists held any political group or a particular politician as the responsible for the takeover. In fact, columnists were careful not to

accuse any ideology or single personality as the reason behind the coup. Selçuk particularly emphasized that it would be a mistake to consider one political group or political view as responsible. He stated (*Cumhuriyet*, 07.02.1981):

> It might be said that anarchy and terrorism developed because some "extreme ideas, dangerous books, views against our customs" were let free. Is this argument valid? We see the shadows of all kinds of thoughts behind anarchy and terrorism. Some with traditionalist, some with nationalist, some with communist, some with fascist, some with sectarian, some with rightist, some with leftist, some with centralist, some with ideas of vandalism, and some with liberal ideas were incited into an adventure. One thought cannot be seen as the sole reason of anarchy and terrorism. (…) A historical delusion will emerge if we see anarchy and terrorism in Turkey as the product of one thought.[11]

While no particular ideology or politician was accused, columnists saw politicians and their behaviors as one of the main reasons for military's takeover. They instead emphasized the lack of dialogue between politicians in bringing the regime to a deadlock situation (*Milliyet*, 18.12.1980). Öymen stated there was no dialogue before 12 September in Turkey; people were grumbling all the time instead of talking to each other, precipitating the takeover (*Milliyet*, 03.12.1980). Politicians both in power and in opposition were seen as the main actors responsible for the malfunctioning of democracy in the pre-12 September period. Haldun Taner asserted that since 1950 when the multi-party regime was introduced, political traffic was obstructed because of politicians who did not play the democracy game according to its rules, and necessitating the army's intervention every ten years (*Milliyet*, 16.10.1980). Müşerref Hekimoğlu's column quoted an assessment from Luxembourg radio and television broadcasts whose commentators argued that the takeover had not toppled the government since there had not been a government to

[11] All translations of excerpts from Turkish columns belong to the author unless otherwise specified.

speak of (*Cumhuriyet*, 19.09.1980). She stated that the same was true for the opposition before 12 September.

The weak, inoperative condition of state institutions was also highlighted by different columnists in bringing about the military's move. Oktay Ekşi stated that it was common to hear the outcry that the state was not functioning – indeed, that had been dissolving and decaying in the five to six years prior to the coup. He argued that this outcry was not heeded by politicians and thus the 12 September intervention had taken place (*Hürriyet*, 09.11.1980). Öymen argued that almost everyone shared the view that democracy was not functioning on 11 September; it existed only on paper (*Milliyet*, 07.02.1981).

There is no reference to any economic reasons for the military's takeover in the first public statement of the military regime. While the second statement, which was read by Evren on the radio on the same day, did mention economic problems. Evren did not state any detailed information about what these problems were. The main focus of the second statement was on political threats, ideological cleavages, and the high level of violence threatening people's lives in the pre-12 September period. In line with the statements of the military's rule, columnists – except Ali Sirmen – did not refer to economic factors in the military's takeover.[12]

As stated in Chapter Two, the military in Turkey intervened to politics for the first time in 1960. After the 1960 coup, a new constitution was implemented under military rule. The 1961 constitution aimed to prevent the re-emergence of an

[12] Sirmen was the only columnist who referred to economic factors in the military's takeover. Without going into details, he counted poor economic conditions and the economic depression as among the reasons for military's takeover (*Cumhuriyet*, 01.02.1981).

authoritarian partisan rule (Itzkowitz-Shifrinson and Heper 2005, 238) and attempted to install a more liberal political regime in Turkey. Columnists of *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet*, and *Milliyet* did not accuse the 1961 constitution of the anarchy and the malfunctioning of the state institutions; to the contrary, they defended the 1961 Constitution against such accusations. Columnists stressed that the army's concern was not the freedoms assured in the constitution but the terrorism and anarchy that resulted from abuses and irresponsible behaviors. Selçuk argued that Turkey came to 11 September not because the constitution was implemented but because it was not implemented (*Cumhuriyet*, 03.11.1980), and that the 12 September intervention was not against the constitution but against terrorism (*Cumhuriyet*, 25.10.1980). Similarly, Uğur Mumcu also defended the 1961 constitution against criticisms. Mumcu wrote that the 1961 constitution should have been praised because of its democratic characteristics. He pointed out that practices that contradicted the soul, essence, and goals of the constitution had occurred in the last 20 years; the constitution had thus become alienated from its original philosophy and grown different (*Cumhuriyet*, 17.01.1981).

Columnists shared the view that the political system had come to a deadlock by 11 September and that there was no civilian way to resolve the situation. They argued the military's intervention happened at a time when it was seen that civilians were not able to solve this problem. This justification of the coup was important in the sense that it was seen as one of the major characteristics that distinguished 12 September from military interventions that took place in other countries. The absence of a civilian solution by 12 September was also cited by columnists as the

main reason for why they did not see the takeover as a military coup. Oktay Akbal detailed the deadlock by 12 September on the first day of the military's rule. He wrote (*Cumhuriyet*, 13.09.1980):

> A parliament that could not elect a president in six months… A minority government that was approaching a dead end…An unsuccessful political leader who had been tried many times…A main opposition that has been busy with internal controversies… Two retrogressive parties, one close to fascism and the other one close to religious fanaticism, and both with unreliable leaders… Small parties on the left fighting each other… Apart from them, many self-ordained "factions"… Daily increasing numbers of casualties. [Several] "rescued" neighborhoods, towns. A state that had degenerated along with all its institutions… We were heading towards somewhere. The place we were approaching was where we arrived today.

According to Teoman Erel, all civilian methods had been wasted by 11 September. He stated that the military's intervention happened at a time when it became obvious that the parliament was not able to elect a new president and early elections were off the agenda (*Milliyet*, 25.02.1981). Erel expressed that the deadlock situation was also accepted by former parliamentarians. He referred to the answer by a former parliamentarian whom he had asked whether there had been any civilian methods for solving the deadlock. The parliamentarian said to him (*Milliyet*, 25.02.1981):

> To tell you the truth there was no solution. There was no hope. Previously, we had had hope when a candidate for presidency got 303 votes and only needed 15 more votes to be elected as president. But if it had not been completed at that point, then it was our fault, not the armed forces.

Çetin Altan wrote in his column that he was abroad on 12 September and his first reaction when he heard that the military took over in Turkey was that 'there was no other solution' and military's intervention was an expected situation (*Milliyet*, 20.01.1981). Similar to Altan, Akbal mentioned that the military's take over had been expected. He wrote that given this possibility, journalists, writers, intelligentsia, and some prudent politicians had expressed their concerns that all these developments were heading towards the military's intervention (*Cumhuriyet*, 16.10.1980).

Öymen expressed the inevitability of the 12 September takeover by referring to Turan Güneş. He wrote (*Milliyet*, 07.02.1981):

> It is impossible to disagree with Turan Güneş's identification: "the things that were missing in the political and social life of Turkey until the night of 11 September were living together, respecting each other and each other's existence, and tolerance." Institutions turned into the ones that could not tolerate each other's existence and attempted to abolish others.

Similar to the reasons for the military's actions, the goals of the takeover were declared in the military's first public statement on 12 September. It was stated that the Turkish Armed Forces took over in chain of command to provide national unity and to protect the integrity of the country, to prevent a possible civil war, to reestablish state authority, and to eliminate the reasons that obstructed the functioning of the democratic system (Birand 1986, 288). Columnists too wrote in this way, confirming the goals stated by the military.

Although columnists highlighted street violence and terrorism among the major reasons for the coup, they did not pay similar attention to them in terms of its goals. This situation is understandable in the sense that columnists did not feel the need to restate the goal of bringing safety to the streets because of two reasons. First, they were sure that anarchy and terrorism would be terminated under the extraordinary security measures taken by the military administration. Thus it was out of question to consider whether safety could be brought or not. Second, terminating street violence was a goal of the military rule but it was not an ultimate goal. In this sense, Burhan Felek and İlhan Selçuk stated that eradicating anarchy and terrorism were the primary responsibility of the military rule (Burhan Felek, *Milliyet*, 28.09.1980; İlhan Selçuk, *Cumhuriyet*, 28.09.1980). Other columnists mentioned ending anarchy and terrorism as a short term success of the military's rule. For instance, Altan Öymen wrote that acts of terrorism had significantly decreased in the previous few months and that suspects of terrorism were arrested rapidly (*Cumhuriyet*, 27.12.1980).

The main attention of columnists was on the military administration's restoration of a functioning democratic system as the ultimate goal of the coup. The editorial in *Milliyet* stated that the parliament was shut down in order to remove its malfunctions and install a better working system (*Milliyet*, 16.09.1980). Akbal evaluated 12 September as the beginning of a new era that was to establish new concepts of the state and democracy that would rely on a new constitution (Cumhutiyet, 22.09.1980). Ekşi drew attention to the abuses of the 1961 constitution and stated that the new rule committed itself to doing away with such

abuses and establishing a liberal rule of law that would respect the necessities of a democratic parliamentarian system (*Hürriyet*, 13.10.1980). Altan Öymen implicitly mentioned his discontent with the intervention by referring to a piece written by Abdi İpekçi in 1977. In this piece, İpekçi was criticizing the developments in 1977 by stating the possibility of a military intervention similar to the one that took place on 12 March 1971. In this sense, Öymen stated that the only consolation for the events of 12 September was the junta's stated goal of reestablishing a democratic regime (*Cumhuriyet*, 01.02.1981).

While columnists were stating their views about the goals of the military's rule, they underlined that the military' rule was a temporary one; it had come to power to achieve certain goals and it would return to its barracks by restoring power to civilians after these goals were achieved. Örsan Öymen indicated the temporariness of the military's rule by referring to Evren's statements. Öymen pointed out that Evren, as the head of the junta and also head of the state, had expressed that the Turkish Armed Forces came to power to bring democracy back on track and would leave power to civilians via elections (*Milliyet*, 17.01.1981). *Milliyet*'s editorial column emphasized this characteristic of the 12 September administration by linking it with the previous interventions. It stated that all interventions by the military were to bring democratic regime back on track (*Milliyet*, 19.09.1980).

Along with the reasons and the objectives, columnists also expressed their expectations from military rule. This study anticipated that columnists' expectations would be parallel to their explanations of why the military took over and what the

generals were aiming to achieve during their stay in power. However, the interesting point with the expectations of columnists was that they varied widely, from very abstract and broad ones to concrete and minor ones. Furthermore, the columnists displayed contradictions in their expectations and criticized each other for the differences they had.

Erel expressed that the major issue pending was the creation of a climate in which everyone would be able to talk to each other, discuss with each other, and understand each other. He stated that reinstalling democracy and resolving other problems depended on the creation of this in particular (*Milliyet*, 16.02.1981). According to Hekimoğlu, the work of the generals was a difficult task because it would not be easy to transform a decayed and fossilized structure into a healthy entity (*Cumhuriyet*, 19.09.1980). Mehmet Kemal attributed a difficult mission to the 12 September administration. Expecting to see a settling of accounts with the former government's damages, Kemal expressed that files needed to be taken down from their dusty shelves, and that everyone should be accountable for corruption and political abuses in their personal interests (*Cumhuriyet*, 19.09.1980).

While some columnists expressed broad and abstract missions for the military's rule, there were also columnists who criticized this point of view. According to these critiques, it was unreasonable to expect the military's rule to solve all problems because it was a temporary government that came to power to address particular issues. Mumcu was one of those columnists who opposed bringing everything before the military with the expectation of having every issue solved. He stated that (*Cumhuriyet*, 07.10.1980):

> The resolution of all postponed political and social issues should not be expected from a ruling power that had declared itself as temporary. The resolution of these issues is the task of civilian governments. We hope that the forthcoming civilian government resolves these issues as soon as possible. Otherwise, this will not get us anywhere.

One of the issues that Mumcu wrote about consistently was arms smuggling. He argued that there was a direct link between arms smuggling and terrorism. For this reason he suggested that, during its rule, the military should focus on this problem in its fight against terrorism to get permanent results (*Cumhuriyet*, 16.09.1980; *Cumhuriyet* 25.10.1980).

Although economic problems were cited neither by the Armed Forces nor by the columnists (except Ali Sirmen, as noted above), they counted some columnists' expectations from military rule. The editorial column of *Milliyet* argued that, in addition to the task of eradicating terrorism, the 12 September administration should also deal with economic issues, as well as Turkey's energy deficit (*Milliyet*, 24.12.1980). Burhan Felek (*Milliyet*, 28.09.1980) and Hekimoğlu (*Cumhuriyet*, 25.09.1980) perceived solving economic issues as a secondary task for the military administration, after eradicating anarchy and terrorism. Refik Erduran altogether opposed views that saw economic issues among the tasks of military rule. He argued that maintaining order and safety was the mission of the military, not economic issues (*Milliyet*, 16.09.1980). According to Erduran, a task for the military administration that could be related to the economy was the creation of a legal basis for a properly functioning free market economy (*Milliyet*, 16.09.1980). While Erduran did not see the economy among the tasks of the government, he

highlighted the Cyprus issue as an important task of the military, suggesting that the military government should take decisive steps on the issue (*Milliyet*, 16.09.1980). Mehmet Kemal was another columnist who expected specific tasks from military rule. He argued that the military administration should urgently focus on the land regulation issue, and that issues of taxes and education should also be improved under its tutelage (*Cumhuriyet*, 19.09.1980).

5.3.2. Columnists' Representation of the Characteristics of the 12 September Administration

Immediately after the generals' takeover, the tendency of columnists was to distinguish it from military coups and dictatorships in other countries. They also compared it with the previous interventions in Turkey, drawing attention mostly to similarities between them and the12 September takeover. Some columnists, however, argued that 12 September differed from the 1960 takeover in some ways. Finally, some columnists compared the 12 September administration with the previous parliamentarian system to support arguments about the strengths of the military's rule to achieve its targeted goals.

The 12 September takeover was presented in *Milliyet*'s editorial column as the state's protection of itself rather than a military coup (*Milliyet*, 19.09.1980). Similarly, the military's rule was expressed to be a state rule rather than a military

regime (*Milliyet* editorial, 17.01.1981). Columnists emphasized the impartiality and the inclusiveness of the 12 September military government by expressing it as a state rule. Erel defined its inclusiveness with an analogy (*Milliyet*, 12.12.1980):

> The 12 September operation more resembled a sailing ship that aimed to bring salvation to the whole nation rather than a train that followed a particular path and excluded some while included some others.

The aim of protecting Atatürkist principles and the restoration of a new political system in accordance with these principles were among the most highlighted characteristics of the 12 September government by columnists. They assessed these characteristics of the military's rule as indicators of its impartiality, in other words supporting neither the political and social right nor the left. Thus, they perceived that the military's rule would serve the common interests of the whole nation but not the interests of particular groups. On the first day of its rule, Akbal wrote that it was an indispensable reality that the military, as the followers, soldiers, and guardians of Atatürkist principles, would not overlook what had happened during the last years of the 1970s and would carry out its sacred mission one more time (*Cumhuriyet*, 13.09.1980). *Milliyet*'s editorial column emphasized that the official ideology of the Turkish state was Kemalism and the Turkish Armed Forces was undoubtedly the guardian of Kemalism (*Milliyet*, 03.11.1980).

Columnists drew attention to the temporary nature of the 12 September government. They expressed that it was a national imperative rather than the result of personal ambitions of the generals. In this regard, Erduran compared the

generals' takeover to the reaction of a dentist to a decayed tooth (*Milliyet*, 13.09.1980):

> Unusual behaviors that happen as a result of developments in societies that are living organisms are not subject to the will [of its actors]. A dentist does not pull out a tooth because he/she wants to do so. He/she does so because the tooth was decayed and its pain could no longer be withstood.

Like Erduran, Ekşi also offered an analogy to explain the necessity of the takeover. He compared the military's actions on 12 September to a surgery, likening the generals to the doctors and the political system in Turkey to the patient on the operation table. He stated (*Hürriyet*, 13.09.1980):

> Turkey is undergoing serious surgery on all political and apolitical institutions. Our country is now on the operation table under the lights. The ones who perform the surgery opened up the wound. The ones who want to see Turkey to survive through this surgery and to regain its health should take into account their behaviors in accordance with this reality.

Compared it with the military takeovers in European and South American countries, columnists argued that the 12 September coup was not a typical instance of a military coup. They stated that the 12 September government differed from military rule in other countries in terms of its objectives and timing. *Milliyet*'s editorial pointed out the possibility that the 12 September takeover might have been perceived in European countries the same way the military takeovers in Chile, Greece, and South Korea were perceived. This possibility was refuted in the column by emphasizing that the parliament in Turkey was abolished by the military with the aim of restoring a functioning democracy (*Milliyet*, 16.09.1980). It contrasted the

takeover in Turkey with the one happened in Spain and argued that it would be a mistake to form parallels between them (*Milliyet*, 25.02.1981). According to the column, there was a basic difference between the two countries in terms of state institutions' loyalty to democracy. It argued that democracy was the official ideology in Turkey that was accepted by all state institutions and citizens. In this regard, the 12 September takeover aimed to save democracy from anarchy and terrorism. But in Spain, democracy was perceived by some sections of the Spanish army, police, and bureaucracy as the reason for anarchy and terrorism (*Milliyet*, 25.02.1981). Erel compared the military takeover in Turkey with the military coups in Pakistan, Portugal, and Spain. He argued that different than the Turkish Armed Forces, the militaries of Pakistan, Portugal, and Spain did not have a tradition of loyalty to a democratic regime and therefore move not to save democracy but rather to rule the country (*Milliyet*, 25.02.1981). Erel also drew attention to the deadlock on 11 September as a distinguishing characteristic of the 12 September takeover by arguing that civilians could not deal with the shootout between leftist and rightist militants. He wrote (*Milliyet*, 25.02.1981):

> When General Ziya-ül Hak overthrew [Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali] Butto, the decision to hold new elections had already been taken. That is to say, there was a democratic method to be tried. When the fascist groups in Spain dissolved the parliament, there was a vote of confidence for a new prime minister and a new government. There was a way to be tried in Spain, too. The similarity between these two interventions was the intention to prevent a civilian remedy. When the Turkish Armed Forces began their intervention in the last hours of 11 September 1980, was there any democratic way that could prevent a possible civil war?

Along with comparisons of the 12 September coup to the coups that took place in other countries, columnists also compared 12 September with the 1960 and 1971 interventions in Turkey, generally highlighting similarities. From the first day of the military's rule, columnists stated that all the military interventions in Turkey had the same aim: to restore a functioning democratic regime (*Milliyet* editorial, 19.09.1980; Oktay Ekşi, *Hürriyet*, 13.10.1980; Oktay Akbal, *Cumhuriyet*, 16.10.1980; Teoman Erel, *Milliyet*, 12.03.1981). Mumcu emphasized that the Turkish military did not have a tradition of establishing permanent dictatorship; each time that the officers had come to power ended with their returning to the barracks by handing over power to civilians (*Cumhuriyet*, 17.01.1981). Akbal pointed out that the military's interventions were carried out not because the officers wanted to do so but they had to do so (*Cumhuriyet*, 16.10.1980). He stated that the military had continuously called on civilian governments to return to the path of Atatürkist principles with its warning letters in the pre-12 September period, emphasizing it had been a known fact that the military would not neglect the worsening situation and would intervene as they had done on 27 May 1960 (*Cumhuriyet*, 13.09.1980). Erel argued that people in Turkey were familiar with the military's intervention; when things got complicated, politicians drew back and the officers came forward to tidy up, drawing back to return power to the politicians once their task was completed (*Milliyet*, 12.03.1981).

Along with the similarities between the 12 September takeover and the military's previous interventions, Erel stressed that 12 September differed from the 1960 takeover (*Milliyet*, 16.02.1981). He underlined the fact that the chain of

command was sustained on 12 September and criticized the 27 May intervention in this regard. He argued that 12 September was an institutional initiative that was directed by reason, whereas the lieutenant and colonel members of the National Union Committee in 1960 had personal motivations on 27 May 1960 (*Milliyet*, 16.02.1981). According to Erel, Turkey's population was also happy to see that the chain of command was maintained in the intervention because they knew it meant that reason would dominate and no adventurous or emotion-driven steps would be taken by the military junta (*Milliyet*, 16.02.1981). Erel argued that this was one of the reasons for public's support for the intervention. He wrote (*Milliyet*, 03.03.1981):

> There could have been a dominant political attitude if the takeover had been realized by a secret revolutionary group as it had been on 27 May. In this case, some citizens could have considered the intervention as being for them while others would have seen it as being against them.

Columnists compared the 12 September military government with the pre-coup parliamentary regime in order to highlight some of its characteristics. In these comparisons, columnists occasionally presented the democratic regime as becoming the source of the deadlock, having been exploited by politicians for their personal and party interests. Additionally, they were sympathetic to the authoritarianism of the military's rule because it facilitated dealing with the necessary problems. Comparing the 12 September government with the pre-coup regime, Kemal stated that whatever befell the country was because of democratic craftiness of politicians who had exploited the system (*Cumhuriyet*, 19.09.1980). He pointed out that the 12 September government did not act in the same manner, arguing instead that their

rational behavior would open the way for the flourishing of a modern society by working for the interests of the large majority (*Cumhuriyet*, 19.09.1980). Similar to Kemal, Faik also compared the 12 September government with the pre-coup regime. He stated that the former lacked, by its very nature, democratic institutions, and the success of the military's rule depended on breaking the malfunctioning chain of instabilities of the pre-coup period (*Hürriyet*, 22.09.1980). He continued by criticizing the democratic institutions of the pre-coup period, positively evaluating their nonexistence after 12 September by referring to the efficiency of military rule in terms of taking decisions and putting them into force. He stated (*Hürriyet*, 22.09.1980):

> The 12 September government could immediately install a new director of the press who shared the same mentality with the generals; it could make changes from the Anatolian Agency to city governors, undersecretaries, and general directors at the moment it wanted to do so. Which of the political powers had this opportunity? (…) The 12 September administration is without a parliament… without a constitutional court… without opposition… is without unions… The 12 September administration is far away from the troubled organized networks that were witch cauldrons full of professional chambers, unions, federations.

Columnists also evaluated public reactions to the takeover and reactions from European countries in order to support their evaluations about the characteristics of the 12 September takeover and the military's rule. According to columnists, 12 September was welcomed by the vast majority of the public. They evaluated ending the anarchy and street violence as the main reason for people's contentment. Kemal expressed that people were pleased to see the efficient practices of the military's rule and the reestablishment of public order and safety

(*Cumhuriyet*, 19.09.1980). According to *Milliyet*'s editorial, the main reason behind popular support for the 12 September government was the public's belief and trust in the military to restore a functioning political system and democratic regime as soon as possible (*Milliyet*, 22.09.1980). It was argued in the same column that people perceived the military's rule as an objective administration that represented the integrity of the state and that was working for the common good of the people (*Milliyet*, 21.11.1980). For these reasons, the column argued that people who had supported the Justice Party or the Republican Peoples Party before the takeover could leave aside their differences and welcome Evren during his visits to different towns when they saw the integrity of the state (*Milliyet*, 21.11.1980). *Milliyet*'s editorial pointed out that the former cadres of political parties also supported the military's rule and displayed this support in various occasions, including in international platforms (*Milliyet*'s editorial, 17.01.1981).

The 12 September takeover was interpreted as the nation's rebirth, a vigorous waking up and shaking off that was full of excitement (Editorial, *Milliyet*, 26.01.1981). The success of the military government was equated with the success of all people in the country (*Milliyet*, 22.09.1980). The views of columnists that the military took over for the common good of the state and the people, and that the military would act in line with national interests, contributed to the reproduction of the army-nation unity argument. This argument emphasized the perception that the military was seen by people as an organic [integral] part of the Turkish society (Narlı 2000, 120). In this regard, Soysal argued that the Turkish army was unlike the Western armies, which were monopolized in the hands of particular social

classes and families that were disconnected from the rest of the people (*Milliyet*, 4.10.1980). Similar to Soysal's point of view, Erel stated that the army in Turkey was like a sampling of Turkish society; one in every hundred wore the uniform and members of the National Security Council were raised in military schools, not isolated from the realities of the country (*Milliyet*, 03.03.1981).

Assessments of the 12 September takeover within the army-nation unity framework were also useful in understanding columnists' evaluations of the reactions against the takeover. The interesting point about columnists' representation of these reactions was not that the number of instances was few but that the reactions were framed by columnists to emphasize societal support rather than to highlight objections. For instance, Faik discussed objections to the takeover while, in fact, aiming to highlight people's support for the military's rule. He cited reactions to a placard defining the military's rule as fascist rule and calling people to revolt. He wrote (*Hürriyet*, 28.09.1980):

> A lady was asking "Is it pressure?" Is there a pressure more terrifying than yours? An elderly shouted out "You are the vagrants! How dare would you think you are the people? Was it not part of the people whose homes you entered and shot people to death?" A friend from the Black Sea region too saw similar situations. People spit when they saw similar slogans.

Another representation of the reactions to the takeover that also referred to the army-nation unity can be detected in Ekşi's surgery analogy noted above (*Hürriyet*, 13.09.1980). He presented the nation and the military as working for the common goal, i.e., the patient's recovery from the illness, and singled out those who

did not contribute to the surgery or objected to it. He wrote that (*Hürriyet*, 13.09.1980):

> Like any others, this situation too has opportunists. They enter in the operating room without anybody noticing and wait for the moment to confuse the surgeons. (…) It is also [among] the first and most important tasks of the surgeons to diagnose the real intention of the ones both waiting inside the surgery room and outside of it. Just as there are people who want to see the patient regain its health, there are also those who have longed to possess its inheritance.

Columnists also described how the 12 September takeover was evaluated in European countries. In their assessments, they highlighted that the takeover was approved in various European countries and criticized opposition to the takeover as biased or inaccurate. Similar to the domestic reactions, columnists contributed to increase the visibility of the criticisms of the 12 September takeover in European countries without specifically intending to do so. Sami Kohen noted that European Community had an insightful standing. He referred to Gaston Thorn, then-president of the European Commission, and quoted a speech in which he addressed the other members of the community. Thorn stated (*Milliyet*, 21.11.1980):

> We have to get the reality. We know the pre-coup situation [in Turkey], the place of Turkey [in the region] and other realities. To pressure Turkey at the moment is inconvenient; it will bring harm instead of reviving it.

This quotation is also important, as it was the only instance when the word 'coup' was used for the 12 September takeover by columnists during the first six months of the military's rule. Kohen expressed that critical views also existed in Europe about the military's rule, evaluating such criticisms as ruthless or resulting

from lack of information about what had been going on in Turkey. In his view, any right-minded person knew that the 12 September takeover saved Turkey from the brink of disaster (*Milliyet*, 21.11.1980). Like Kohen, Mehmet Ali Birand noted that both positive and negative views about the 12 September takeover existed in European countries. However, he argued that the criticisms did not consider the military rule in Turkey in the same line with the Greek junta or Chilean dictatorships (*Milliyet*, 31.10.1980).

Altan Öymen evaluated the support and the criticisms from Western countries in reference to claims of torture. He stated that the torture claims in Turkey caused concerns and confusions in foreign press (*Cumhuriyet*, 22.02.1981). He gave the example of an article published in the weekly *Economist*. Öymen explained that the article started by pointing out that the military's move had become inevitable in Turkey, but continued by mentioning the case of Ahmet İsvan[13] as a worrisome development. Öymen emphasized the importance of the news about cases of torture and suggested that these claims needed to be clarified by the state authorities to prevent any mutterings about groundless claims (*Cumhuriyet*, 22.02.1981).

[13] Ahmet İsvan was a politician of the Republican People's Party who had served as the mayor of Istanbul during the 1970s. He was taken into custody in 1980 by the military government and tried for the DİSK case. He was imprisoned for 27 months and was acquitted on 22 January 1983.

5.3.3. Democracy, Politicians and the Transition Period in Newspaper Columns

Columnists emphasized that democracy had been an indispensable way of life for Turkish people and thus that democracy was the only regime accepted both by the people and by state institutions including the military. None of the columnists reflected concerns about military's commitment to democracy. Instead, the Turkish Armed Forces was perceived to be loyal to democratic principles as much as civilians were. This view was given credence by the military's guardianship of Atatürkist principles. The editorial of *Milliyet* stated (*Milliyet*, 3.11.1980):

> Anybody in Turkey and abroad would share this point of view: The official ideology of Turkish State is Kemalism and the Armed Forces is undisputedly the guardian of Kemalism! Kemalism, which substantially aims for Westernization, also includes democracy among its principles. In this regard, the Armed Forces that intervenes in democracy from time to time is in reality against anti-democratic forces.

Along with military's loyalty to democracy, columnists also displayed certainty that the military's rule was a temporary rule to restore a functioning democratic regime. Thus, they did not indicate any doubts about whether the military would leave power to civilians and return to their barracks. This view was supported by columnists with quotations from Evren's statements, and by adducing previous interventions as proof of how the military would act again. Erel openly displayed openly his certainty in transition to democracy beginning in the first days

of the military's rule. He stated that the novelty of the coming year was not the promise for a democratic transition, because precise and convincing statements on this issue had been made since the first days of the 12 September government (*Milliyet*, 02.01.1981).

The main concern of columnists in fact was about when and under which conditions a transition to democracy would happen rather than whether or not this transition would actually take place. Erduran was the only columnist who openly expressed that the transition period should be kept as short as possible (*Milliyet*, 16.09.1980). Most of the columnists refrained from specifying a date for the transition, suggesting the process should take neither a very short nor a very long time. What they meant by short time or long time remained vague in their columns. Columnists argued that some time should be allocated to allow the military to introduce the necessary conditions for a functioning democratic system before the transition. They believed that some preconditions needed to be taken by the military within the transition period to ensure a solidified democracy. Felek suggested being patient with those things the military had to do during the transition. He wrote (*Milliyet*, 19.09.1980):

> The constitution, the elections, and the political party laws will be changed, and a constituent assembly will be formed. These cannot be done in two days or within two months. For this reason, asking to the Security Council when they will leave power to civilians is an early and inopportune question.

According to the columnists, the impatience for a democratic transition was coming from more European countries than domestic actors. Birand wrote that the

main question asked abroad was when democratic elections in Turkey would be held (*Milliyet*, 31.10.1980). Kohen also highlighted the impatience abroad for a transition to democracy. However, he displayed a critical attitude toward their impatience. He wrote (*Milliyet*, 21.11.1980):

> There are a lot of things to be said to the ones abroad who are impatient and have started to murmur. First of all, they should be told what might have happened to Turkey if this operation had not happened or it had failed, and what effects this could have had on regional and world politics. Then, they should be reminded of how swiftly the Turkish Armed Forces has provided transitions to democracy in its previous interventions. And [they] should be reminded that it would be ruthless to show impatience and distrust when only two months have passed since the operation.

Some columnists specifically mentioned the pre-12 September situation in criticizing those views that demanded a swift transition. They argued that such a rapid institutional shift would not be able to establish the necessary conditions for a functioning democracy, and would leave the door open for other interventions after the democratic regime was established. Kemal was one of these columnists highlighting the malfunctioning of the democratic regime in the pre-12 September period. He stated (*Cumhuriyet*, 26.01.1981):

> Many people in Europe and in our country are talking about democracy. Because 12 September happened, they are asking "when will democracy be brought back?" I am wondering which democracy they miss. They are asking as if democracy had existed before 12 September and it does not exist after then.

Erel, who was in favor of a smooth and slow transition, also referred to the pre-12 September period in arguing that impatience in Turkey for a transition to democracy did not exist. He stated (*Milliyet*, 02.01.1981):

> In this issue [about the transition to democracy] there is no impatience in the domestic public at all. There is wide consensus about creating the necessary conditions before any transition to democracy. Since the pre-12 September period is well remembered, no one is saying "no matter what, democracy right away!" This time a democracy that will not be deadlocked, that will balance its defects with its ability to produce solutions, in short a functioning democracy is demanded.

According to columnists, the establishment of a constituent assembly and the drafting of a new constitution were the main missions of the transition period. They agreed that the constituent assembly, which would be in charge of drafting the new constitution, should be formed in the shortest time possible. The structure and the formation of the constituent assembly were underlined by some columnists as important to achieve overall acceptance within society. Erel offered suggestions about the structure of the assembly, arguing that it be representative and inclusive. He wrote (*Milliyet*, 18.12.1980):

> The constitution should be prepared by a constituent assembly, which will be formed by elections. The members of the assembly should be the ones who had [professional] experience in political life, state institutions, and in the implementation of the constitution. Participation of representatives of prominent political views in the constituent assembly and their contribution to the making of the new constitution with free discussion should be permitted. In this way everybody will support the new constitution.

In another piece, Erel restated the importance of the existence of different political views in the constituent assembly. He pointed out that although harmony and impartiality could be necessary to achieving a united standpoint in the bureaucracy, a monolithic assembly would raise problems in the long run (*Milliyet*, 17.01.1981). Mumcu, too, supported an inclusive approach in the formation of the

constituent assembly, which he saw as a factor that would strengthen the hands of the 12 September government (*Cumhuriyet*, 17.01.1981).

While these views were mostly concerned with obtaining top-down permission for broader inclusion in the constituent assembly, some columnists also highlighted the importance of bottom-up cooperation between the civilians and the military. It was suggested that bureaucrats, former politicians, the intelligentsia, experts, and the public in general should cooperate with the transition regime and support the military in its efforts. This view was strengthened with the argument that the basic reason for the deadlock caused in the pre-12 September period was a lack of dialogue and any common ground between policymakers (Editorial, *Milliyet*, 18.12.1980). The editorial column of *Milliyet* touched upon the necessity of cooperation between the military government and civilians several times. It stated that the healthiest way would be for all the military and civilian cadres of the state to cooperate during the transition period (19.09.1980). It emphasized that not only the state cadres but the people too should support the existing rule for a successful transition (28.09.1980). Particular responsibility was also laid on the intelligentsia. As the major mission of the intelligentsia was seen as acting as a mentor for the rest of society, they should side with the state against terrorism during that period (*Milliyet* editorial, 27.11.1980). It also underlined that supporting the military during the transition period did not mean that the intelligentsia was supporting the establishment of a permanent authoritarian regime (*Milliyet* editorial, 27.11.1980). Ekşi, too, emphasized that supporting the 12 September government did not mean supporting authoritarianism. He pointed out that, as long as the goals

stated in the first day of the military's rule were sustained, it was the responsibility of everyone who believed in democracy by heart to support the transition period (*Hürriyet*, 13.10.1980). While columnists were stating that the people should act in cooperation with the military's rule, Erel detailed how this cooperation and support should be put into practice. He suggested (*Milliyet*, 03.03.1981):

> The press is careful. But it does not leave out criticizing. Politicians should be patient but they should also share their experiences when it is necessary. Workers, businessmen, peasants, craftsmen should raise their warnings by keeping in mind that there will be a slow transition to a multivocal [democratic] regime.

Although columnists supported the drafting of a new constitution as a precondition for transition to a functioning democracy, they did not state any opinions about what the content of the constitution should include. Support for a new constitution may seem paradoxical at first glance, since none of the columnists accused the 1961 constitution of being inadequate or responsible for the deadlock in political life. The rationale behind columnists' support for a new constitution was their belief in creating a new system that would be implemented word for word and would be able to protect itself from the abuses and manipulations of politicians. A constitution drafted with this rationale was seen as the sole guarantee for a stable democracy.

Columnists saw politicians of the pre-12 September period as the major guilty actors for this disturbance of democracy. Metin Toker explicitly stated that disturbances in democracies were the results politicians' behaviors. Using the Spanish case as an example, Toker wrote (*Milliyet*, 25.02.1981):

> Democracies are not regimes that end on their own. People keep them alive or kill them. These people are the politicians. Politicians have an opportunity when their countries get into major crisis: the opportunity of getting over the crisis all together. If the Spanish parliament had given the vote of confidence to Calvo Sotelo for the prime ministry, an adventurous colonel would not have dissolved the parliament and would not have mobilized the mechanism of the military.

Columnists evaluated the way politicians had acted as against the soul and rationale of the 1961 constitution. Politicians were criticized for pursuing personal interests and neglecting the common good of the people. Vedat Nedim Tör argued that democracy had degenerated because of politicians' endless demands for getting more and more votes (*Cumhuriyet*, 12.12.1980). Similar to Tör, Kemal described politicians as 'vote-hunters' and claimed that the interests of politicians were in conflict with the common interests of the people (*Cumhuriyet*, 19.09.1980). Akbal and Mumcu were two columnists who generated the concept of ugly and bad politicians. According to Akbal, the actors truly responsible for the military takeover were the ugly politicians who had compromised Atatürkist principles for the sake of getting more votes (*Cumhuriyet*, 26.01.1981). Similarly, Mumcu stated that bad politicians had corrupted the democratic system in the pre-12 September period. According to him, the practical way of separating the bad politicians from the good ones was examining corruption cases. He argued that bringing the corruption cases of the last fifteen years before the court would be the soundest method of achieving this separation (*Cumhuriyet*, 01.10.1980).

Along with the columnists who underlined the importance of drafting a new constitution that would be able to protect itself from abuses, there were also

columnists who pointed out the importance of the existence of a particular mindset for a democratic regime's survival. As Hekimoğlu wrote (*Cumhuriyet*, 19.09.1980):

> What will happen next? Constituent Assembly, constitution, election law, political parties will be reactive but will the democratic system be established in such a way that it will not be corrupted again? It is not easy to ask this question with hope and good faith. The laws are not enough. The ones who are occupied with politics need to reach a particular way of thinking, a modern understanding of democracy.

The editorial of *Milliyet* asked a similar question about politicians' mindsets (*Milliyet*, 18.12.1980). The establishment of a constituent assembly and the drafting of a new constitution were perceived as the primary preconditions for transition to democracy. However, the editorial questioned whether these steps would be enough to keep democracy stable and undisturbed. It emphasized the importance of the mindset of politicians and argued that as long as previous habits and ways of thinking persisted, any new democracy would end in a way similar to previous practices (*Milliyet*, 18.12.1980).

In conclusion, this chapter analyzed how Turkish columnists writing in *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet*, and *Milliyet* evaluated the 12 September takeover and the subsequent military government in their daily pieces published during the first six months of the military's rule. It showed that the officers controlled the media through various formal and informal methods to avoid publication of opposition and criticisms against the 12 September takeover. Since, the military carried out no formal censorship review process as was the case in Greece, Turkish columnists had to censor themselves in order not be caught violating the restrictions in place. The columnists' evaluations of the takeover and subsequent military rule were

considered under three subcategories, which are in parallel with the ones used to analyze Greek columnists in the previous chapter. In this way it is possible to analyze the two cases through a comparative perspective in the following, and concluding, chapter.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Since the appearance of first newspapers across the world in the sixteenth century, the media have become important actors in the political lives of countries and also the social lives of the people. They have been important sources of information, particularly in issues to which people do not have direct access themselves. Not surprisingly, due to their power in influencing people's opinions and even political behaviors, the media have become an issue of concern for rulers. Regardless of the methods – either democratic or undemocratic – through which they came to power, rulers have wanted to control the media in their communication with people at the mass level.

In democratic countries, the media is referred to having a watchdog role in which they check, or keep tabs on, a government's policies. This role requires journalists to have an objective and critical stance in their evaluations of

governmental behavior and political developments. News production and its presentation of information, in particular editorials and commentary columns, have become particularly important in this respect. This is especially the case during times of crises due to their capacity to form a channel of dynamic communication between the government and the public and, of course, because of their power in influencing public opinion. For this reason, the media have been an important subject of research for scholars investigating the meanings created in the interpreted news, columns, and editorials.

In this regard, this study scrutinizes the columns in Greek and Turkish newspapers that were published after the militaries' takeovers: on 21 April 1967 in Greece and 12 September 1980 in Turkey. The study was informed by the main research question of how Greek and Turkish columnists framed and interpreted the military's takeover in their countries during the period immediately after the takeovers occurred.

When scrutinizing the media, one of the important issues that needs to be taken into consideration is the issue of censorship and self-censorship. Even in the most democratic and liberal countries, journalists and columnists feel restricted by working under a complex interplay among various economic and political factors. Therefore, it was expected at the beginning of this study that both the Greek and Turkish militaries, which envisioned particular missions for their media, would restrict the freedom of the press by introducing various regulations. The newspapers were particularly important for the officers because, in both countries during the time their respective military's intervention, newspapers formed the main medium

for the transmission of information, that had not already been controlled by the government. For this reason, studying the control of the military junta over the press in each country was seen as necessary in this essay to understand the framework that drew the lines within which Greek and Turkish columnists expressed their views.

This research on officers' control over the press in both countries has shown that the military regimes in Greece and Turkey held similar views about how the newspapers should be acting during the interregna. When the relationships between the military regime and the media, and particularly the way officers viewed the media, are considered in light of the various media models discussed in this study, it is seen that they came closer to the authoritarian model. In both countries, officers viewed the printed press, along with radio and television, as the main medium in their communication with the public. They thought that the main mission of the press was to support their rule; constitute a channel for transmission of their governments' objectives, policies, and activities to the public; and thus help maintain the public's support for the military regimes.

As the authoritarian model suggests, the military regimes in Greece and Turkey also held the view that the media should not be acting in a way that could humiliate the government or weaken its order. Thus, Greek and Turkish officers did not want to see publications that would damage the "national unity" and "national interests" in their respective countries. The principles of "national unity" and "national interests" are thought to be in the military's objectives, policies, and activities; expressing critical and opposing views about them were thus prohibited.

It follows that the officers placed censorship on those publications that they thought could have harmed "national unity" and "national interest," rather than placing complete restrictions on press freedoms.

In this regard, one of the first things Greek and Turkish officers did when they took over the government in their countries was to control the publication houses and offices of newspapers and close down leftist and extreme leftist newspapers, based on the reasoning that these were producing "harmful" publications. For those newspapers that were allowed to continue publication, the Greek junta established a process of censorship review, which necessitated the control of newspapers' content before they were printed. With this censorship, officers controlled which subjects were taken up, as well as the framing of news and issues, i.e., what journalists and columnists wrote about them.

Different from the Greek junta, the military regime in Turkey did not introduce a censorship review process. Instead, officers drew the framework for subjects that could not be written about in the newspapers with the regulations proclaimed by the Martial Law Command. As a result, they restricted the agenda-setting of newspapers by prohibiting publications about particular issues. This situation can be seen as a negative type of agenda setting in which some issues were made less salient than others by columnists as a result of officers' control over the press.

In addition, the military administration affected the way columnists presented and framed the issues through formal statements and regulations of the Martial Law Command. This control was also administered through informal channels of

communication such as telephone calls to columnists and newspaper editors-in-chief, visits to newspapers' offices, and inviting columnists to the Martial Law Command headquarters. Turkish officers' control over the media did not always succeed in preventing publication of materials considered harmful, however. Columnists' views and interpretation of events and the way news was presented brought warnings from officers and consequently the prohibition of newspapers' printing for several days. This type of control obliged the columnists in Turkey to practice self-censorship while stating their views about the military regime. This situation differed in Greece, in which censorship review process noted above prevented the need for the junta to shut down any newspaper for publishing prohibited content.

While the relationships between the military regime and the media can be explained within the authoritarian model, neither this model nor any other can explain columnists' supportive interpretations of the takeover and the subsequent military interregna. Both Greek and Turkish columnists' ways of acting during the military regime can be best explained by examining the development of the journalistic profession in both countries. In Hallin and Mancini's typology of media systems, the media in Greece and Turkey constitute cases of the polarized pluralist model. Instead of the Anglo-American type of neutral commercial journalism, advocacy journalism has been dominant in both countries. During the military regimes, journalists – and in particular columnists and editors – continued to act like a bridge between the political and mass level just as they had before these regimes'

establishments, directing the public with their interpretations of how the political change in their countries should be evaluated.

In both countries, the reaction of Greek and Turkish newspapers to the military's attitude towards the media was to continue publication while accepting the limits and restrictions set by the military regime. In the Greek context, the two conservative newspapers of *Kathimerini* and *Mesimvrini* and the centrist paper *Eleftheria* diverged from this tendency. These papers decided to suspend their publication because of the censorship review process. *Ta Nea*, a leading pro-Papandreou newspaper of the pre-21 April period, continued its publication but stopped including any commentaries in its dailies. In Turkey, none of the papers opted to cease publication and columnists continued to write their columns.

Greek and Turkish columnists shared important similarities but also differences in their framings of the militaries' takeovers and subsequent periods of rule. These similarities and differences in columnists' framings and interpretations of the events surrounding these takeovers can be better understood when the Greek and Turkish militaries' previous interventions, their militaries' place in politics, and the status of politicians in the eyes of the columnists are taken into account.

The columnists in the Greek newspapers *Akropolis* and *Eleftheros Kosmos* and the Turkish newspapers *Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet*, and *Milliyet* all framed the military takeovers as the only solution to the political impasses in their countries. The circumstances under which the officers came to power, however, produced different explanations between Greek and Turkish columnists. In both countries,

however, the reasons for the takeovers presented by columnists as being behind the takeover were no different than the reasons offered by the officers.

In this regard, Greek columnists emphasized the severity of the communist threat before 21 April and politicians' blindness to it. They framed the takeover as the only solution at the time that could save Greece from the falling into the hands of communists. To strengthen their presentation of the takeover as the sole remedy, they constantly posed the counterfactual question of what might have happened in Greece if officers had not intervened. The takeover was mainly referred to as "preventive action" by the military to save the country and its democratic regime from total collapse before it was too late.

Turkish columnists also emphasized that the military's intervention had become an inevitable option because there was no solution within the existing system to overcome the political deadlock and save the country from falling into a possible civil war. Based on the existing political and social circumstances of the late 1970s, Turkish columnists emphasized broader and diverse reasons for military's intervention that extended beyond the communist threat. The columnists in Turkey expressed the lack of personal safety due to street violence and terrorist acts, the possibility of the eruption of a civil war, a lack of dialogue between politicians and their irresponsible behaviors including legal and constitutional violations, the malfunctioning of the bureaucracy, and the weakness of state institutions as the reasons for military's takeover.

Turning to the performance of the two militaries once in power, Greek columnists paid particular attention to the economic developments achieved during

the junta's rule. This was an important instance of the media's agenda-setting efforts, which might have aimed to have a priming effect on the reader in terms of shaping their evaluations about the military's rule. By highlighting the economic developments achieved by the military's rule after they took over the government, columnists made these achievements more salient to the reader than other matters.

Turkish columnists, in contrast, did not present a united point of view regarding the economic responsibilities of the 12 September administration. Some columnists believed that economic issues did not rank among the expected tasks of the military while in power. These columnists attributed a narrow mission to the military administration –ending violence in the streets, bringing back personal safety, and enacting the fundamental measures that would prevent an interruption of the democratic regime in the future. Other columnists, including the editorial of *Milliyet*, envisioned a wider mission for the military's rule and set broader expectations for it. These columnists expected the 12 September rule to consider the resolution of economic problems as part of its responsibilities. They did not, however, move economic issues ahead of the main mission of eradicating anarchy and terrorism and taking the necessary measures for the restoration of a functioning multi-party regime.

One of the main differences between Greek and Turkish columnists in their evaluations of the military's rule in their countries derived from the way they presented the period. Turkish columnists clearly defined the 12 September rule as a temporal period in which particular goals and missions were to be achieved. This presentation was in absolute harmony with the officers' statements about their rule,

which emphasized that the military had taken over to resolve the political deadlock and restore a functioning democracy. This harmony of viewpoints provided columnists with broad space for making evaluations in this direction. Columnists constantly pointed out that the military had intervened to clean up the mess that the politicians had created; they would introduce the necessary measures to do so before the transition back to multi-party politics so that it would not be disrupted again, would then return to their barracks. Thus, the columnists presented the 12 September rule as a reconstruction period, rather than a typical instance of the military coups that occurred in other European and Latin American countries. Columnists supported their argument by referring to the military's previous interventions, which they viewed as indicators for the lack of existence of a military tradition of seizing power for its corporate interests and/or establishing long-term dictatorships. The earlier interventions also had the common objective of safeguarding the secular-democratic state. In this regard, it can be argued columnists also gave messages to the officers in addition to the public regarding the duration of their stay in power.

The Greek columnists did not refer to the temporality of the military's rule as much as their Turkish colleagues did, rarely stating that the ultimate aim of the military's rule was the restoration of a functioning multi-party system. In the Greek case, the officers did not want to see an emphasis in the newspapers on a quick transition to multi-party system. Thus columnists in Greece, not unlike a few columnists in Turkey, only implicitly mentioned the temporary duration of the takeover by resorting to some clever analogies.

Both Greek and Turkish columnists compared the takeovers in their countries to the experiences of countries. In this regard, Greek columnists referred to the situation in Germany when the Nazis came to power, and argued that Germany could have been saved from falling under National Socialism if German officers had considered the option of intervention. Within similar framing, Greek columnists argued that having the officers in power was preferred to leaving Greece to fall under communist rule. In their turn, Turkish columnists compared their country's takeover with military interventions in European and Latin American countries. In doing so, they framed the takeover as the Turkish military's above-politics way of acting after all of the options within the multi-party system were exhausted.

Columnists in both countries refrained from framing the military's takeover in their own countries as anti-democratic. Instead, they framed them as an extraordinary situation that had to be tolerated for the good of their democracies in the long run. This particular framing was important in the sense that it helped both Greek and Turkish columnists avoid falling into the dilemma of supporting an anti-democratic regime as being among the leading "fighters for democracy" in their countries. They both depicted the military takeover in their countries as not being in contradiction with democracy in its essence in two ways. Firstly, they emphasized that the officers' intervention in politics did not end a problem-free, functioning democracy and, secondly, that the ultimate aim of officers was not to establish an authoritarian regime.

In their evaluations of the military's takeover and its rule, both the Greek and Turkish columnists also referred to the way their politicians had acted in the pre-takeover period. Both Greek and Turkish columnists blamed politicians in their countries as the main guilty actors responsible for bringing the democratic system to the brink of collapse. In Greece, the center-left political party EK, and in particular George Papandreou, was openly and repeatedly blamed for being the actor who had endangered the country's political present and future.

Different than their Greek colleagues, Turkish columnists did not signify any politician or political group as the only actor responsible for bringing about the military's intervention. Rather, they blamed all politicians in abstract terms without personalizing the matter.

To add a few concluding observations, this essay has been an attempt to discover how Greek and Turkish columnists framed and interpreted the military takeovers in 1967 and 1980, respectively. In the process, it has attempted to refute earlier assumptions positing that Greek columnists kept quiet following their 1967 military takeover, while in the post-1980 coup environment the Turkish columnists had openly supported the coup. As this study has demonstrated, the situation in both countries was far more complex than previous studies have claimed. At least one aspect of that complexity highlighted in the essay is that the political system in Turkey seems to have been more institutionalized as compared to the situation in Greece. As a consequence, while in Greece the temporality of the takeover could not be suggested by the media, in Turkey the transition back to the civilian rule was

widely discussed. Also as a point of contrast, while the responsibility for the takeover in Greece was personalized, the takeover in Turkey was not personalized.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahmad, Feroz. 1993. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London and New York: Routledge.

Akbal, Oktay. 1980. "Her Şeyi Daha İyi Kurmalı" [Everything Should be Restored in a Better Way]. *Cumhuriyet*, October 16.

———. 1980. "Yeni Bir Tarih Yaprağı" [A New Leaf for the History]. *Cumhuriyet*, September 13.

———. 1980. "Yeni Bir Yapıyı Kurarken" [While Forming a New Structure], *Cumhuriyet*, September 22.

———. 1981. ""Çirkin Politikacı" Tuzağına Düşmeden…" [Before Falling into the Trap of "Ugly Politician"]. *Cumhuriyet*, January 26.

Altan, Çetin. 1981. "Karamsarlık Kısırlaşma demektir" [Pessimism Means Becoming Barren]. *Milliyet*, January 20.

Altınay, Ayşe Gül. 2004. *The Myth of the Military Nation*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Altun, Abdülrezak. 2006. *Türk Basınının Değişen Yüzü* [The Changing Face of the Turkish Press]. Ankara: Başbakanlık-Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü.

Arcayürek, Cüneyt. 1989. *Darbeler ve Gizli Servisler* [Coups and Secret Services]. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.

Athanasoulias, Ioannis. 1967. "Aisiodoksoi Prooptikai" [Optimistic Outlook]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, September 23.

———. 1967. “As Leipoun” [Let Them Disappear]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, April 25.

———. 1967. “Dinamis Kakopoios” [The Power Making the Bad]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 5.

———. 1967. “Dioikitiki Matarrythmisis” [Administrative Reforms]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 11.

———. 1967. “I Anavligikotis” [Procrastination]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, October 14.

———. 1967. “I Dioikisis” [Administration]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 9.

———. 1967. “I Epivevaiosis” [Confirmation]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, August, 30.

———. 1967. “I Eytheia” [Straight]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, July 28.

———. 1967. “Rythmos kai Rythmos” [Rhythm and Rhythm]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 17.

———. 1967. “Sfazesthe Eleftheros” [You Shall be Slaughtered Freely]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, August 9.

———. 1967. “Ta Parasita” [Parasites]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, April 26.

———. 1967. “Thanasimos Apeili” [Fatal Threat]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 28.

———. 1967. “Thymata Allon” [Others’ Victims]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, July 19.

———. 1967. “Ti Simainoun” [What do They Mean?]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May, 30.

———. 1967. “To Emborikon Isozygion” [Foreign Trade Balance]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, October 5.

———. 1967. “To Pentaetes” [The Five Year Program]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, July 25.

———. 1967. “To Programma” [The Program]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, June 1.

———. 1967. “Treis Mines” [Three Months]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, July 22.

———. 1967. “Tria Dedomena” [Three Data]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, October 17.

Athenian. 1972. *Inside the Colonels’ Greece*. London: Chatto & Windus.

Bainbridge, Jason. 2008a. “Audiences and Respresentations.” In *Media and Journalism: New Approaches to Theory and Practice*, eds. Jason Bainbridge, Nicola Goc, and Liz Tynan. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 174–94.

———. 2008b. “Media Texts.” In *Media and Journalism: New Approaches to Theory and Practice*, eds. Jason Bainbridge, Nicola Goc, and Liz Tynan. Oxford, UK: Oxford university Press.

Bek, M G. 2011. “Turkish and International Journalists Comparing the Media Systems, Journalistic Practices and News Production Processes.” *Medijska Istrazivanja* 17: 163–76. http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84862977845&partnerID=40&md5=f8001334dcd6c2f05e00ce3816a6d132.

Birand, Mehmet Ali. 1980. “Yeni Yönetimin Dışarıdaki 1,5 Aylık Bilançosu” [The New Government's Achievements Abroad in 1.5 Month]. *Milliyet*, October 31.

———. 1986. *12 Eylül Saat: 04:00* [12 September Time: 04:00]. 14th ed. Istanbul: Karacan Yayınları.

———. 1989. *Emret Komutanım* [Yes Sir]. 11th ed. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları.

Birand, Mehmet Ali, Hikmet Bila, and Rıdvan Akar. 1999. *12 Eylül Türkiye’nin Miladı* [12 September Turkey's Turning Point]. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.

Birand, Mehmet Ali, Can Dündar, and Bülent Çaplı. 1994. *12 Mart İhtilalinin Pençesindeki Demokrasi* [Democracy at the Grasp of 12 March Revolution]. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.

Cemal, Hasan. 1992. *12 Eylül Günlüğü: Tank Sesiyle Uyanmak* [12 September Diary: Waking up with the Tanks]. 8th ed. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.

———. 2000. *Demokrasi Korkusu: 12 Eylül Günlüğü* [Democracy Fear: 12 September Diary]. 5th ed. İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık.

Cizre Sakallioğlu, Ümit. 1997. “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy.” *Comparative Politics* 29: 151–66. http://www.jstor.org/stable/422077.

Cizre, Umit. 2004. “Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and the European Union Enlargement Zone.” *European Journal of Political Research* 43: 107–25.

Clogg, Richard. 1972. “The Ideology of the ‘Revolution of 21 April 1967.’” In *Greece Under Military Rule*, eds. Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos. New York, NY: Basic Books, 36–58.

———. 1992. *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Curran, James, and Jean Seaton. 2003. *Power Without Responsibility: The Press, Broadcasting and New Media in Britain*. 6th editio. London and New York: Routledge.

Çağdaş Gazeteciler Derneği [Association of Modern Journalists]. 1984. *Basın'80-84* [Press '80-84]. Ankara: ÇGD Yayınları.

Danopoulos, Constantine P. 1992. "Farewell to Man on Horseback: Intervention and Civilian Supremacy in Modern Greece." In *From Military to Civilian Rule*, London: Routledge, 38–62.

Demir, Şerif. 2012. "İktidar-Basın İlişkilerinin Türkiye'de Görünümü (1918-1960) [The Appearance of Government-Press Relations in Turkey (1918-1960)." *The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies* 5(6): 119–37.

Demirel, Tanel. 2001. "12 Eylül'e Doğru Ordu ve Demokrasi" [The Military and Democracy Towards 12 September]. *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 56(4): 43–74.

———. 2003a. "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Two Patterns of Civilian Behavior towards the Military." *Turkish Studies* 4: 1–25.

———. 2003b. "The Turkish Military's Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980." *Armed Forces & Society* 29(2): 253–80.

———. 2004. "Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy." *Middle Eastern Studies* 40(1): 127–50.

———. 2005. "Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective." *Armed Forces & Society* 31: 245–71.

Druckman, James N. 2001. "On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?" *The Journal of Politics* 63.

Duman, Özkan, and Dimitris Tsarouhas. 2006. "'Civilianization' in Greece versus 'Demilitarization' in Turkey." *Armed Forces & Society* 32: 405–23.

Editorial. 1980. "Yarını Düşünürken" [Thinking About Tomorrow]. *Milliyet*, November 3.

———. 1980. ""12 Eylül"ün Dış Dünyadaki İlk Sınavı" [The First Trial of "12 September" Abroad]. *Milliyet*, September 16.

———. 1980. ""Crisis Management"." *Milliyet*, December 12.

———. 1980. "Asker-Sivil İşbirliği" [Civil-Military Cooperation]. *Milliyet*, September 19.

———. 1980. “Aydınların Görevi” [The Mission of Intellectuals]. *Milliyet*, November 27.

———. 1980. “Başarı Dilerken” [Wishing Success]. *Milliyet*, September 22.

———. 1980. “Bir Gezinin Ardından” [After a Trip]. *Milliyet*, November 21.

———. 1980. “Politikaya Hazırlık” [Preparations for Politics]. *Milliyet*, December 18.

———. 1980. “Yeni Hükümet ve Program” [The New Government and Its Program], September 28.

———. 1981. “12 Eylül ve Toplum” [12 September and Society]. *Milliyet*, January 17.

———. 1981. “İspanya-Türkiye” [Spain-Turkey]. *Milliyet*, February 25.

———. 1981. “Yeni Bir Model” [A New Model]. *Milliyet*, January 26.

———. 1981. “Zor Bir Arayış” [A Difficult Search]. *Milliyet*, January 19.

Ekşi, Oktay. 1980. “Amacından Sapmadıkça” [As Long As it Does not Diverge from its Aim]. *Hürriyet*, October 13.

Ekşi, Oktay. 1980. “Gerçeğin Işığında” [Under the Lights of Reality]. *Hürriyet*, September 13.

Ekşi, Oktay. 1980. “Kantarın Topuzunu Kaçırmamak” [Not to Overstep the Limits]. *Hürriyet*, November 9.

Entman, R M. 1993. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” *Journal of communication* 43: 51–58.

Erduran, Refik. 1980. “Fırsatlar” [Opportunities]. *Milliyet*, September 16.

———. 1980. “Serinkanlılıkla” [Dispassionately]. *Milliyet*, September 13.

Erel, Teoman. 1980. “Mart” [March]. *Milliyet*, December 18.

———. 1980. “Tren ve Gemi” [The Train and the Ship]. *Milliyet*, December 12.

———. 1981. “Deli Fişek Değil Akıllı Türk” [Not the Madcap Rather the Clever Turk]. *Milliyet*, February 16.

———. 1981. “Dışa Teminat İçe Direftif” [Warrant to Outside, Direction to Inside]. *Milliyet*, March 3.

———. 1981. “İlk Altı Ay” [The First Six Months]. *Milliyet*, March 12.

———. 1981. “İspanya, Pakistan ve Türkiye” [Spain, Pakistan, and Turkey]. *Milliyet*, February 25.

———.1981. “Köhne Yılın Ardından Taze Müjdeler” [Fresh Good News After a Musty year]. *Milliyet*, January 2.

———. 1981. “Siyasetin Yeni Kadrosu” [The New Cadre of Politics]. *Milliyet*, January 17.

Evren, Kenan. 1990. *Kenan Evren’in Anıları-1* [Memoirs of Kenan Evren -1]. İstanbul: Milliyet.

———. 1995. *Unutulan Gerçekler* [Forgotten Realities]. Ankara: Tisamat Basım.

Faik, Bedii. 1980. “Aklın Yolu” [Path of Mind]. *Hürriyet*, September 28.

———. 1980. “Bir Fotoğraf” [One Photograph]. *Hürriyet*, September 22.

Felek, Burhan. 1980. “45 Milyon Tüketiciyi Kim Düşünecek?” [Who Will Think about 45 Million Consumers?]. *Milliyet*, September 28.

———. 1980. “Üç Basın Toplantısı” [Three Press Meetings]. *Milliyet*, September 19.

Finkel, Andrew. 2000. “Who Guards the Turkish Press?” *Journal of International Affairs* 54: 147.

Gerber, Alan S, Dean Karlan, and Daniel Bergan. 2009. “Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions.” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 1: 35–52.

Groc, Gérard. 1994. “Journalists as Champions of Participatory Democracy.” In *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin. Boulder: Westview Press, 199–210.

Güldemir, Ufuk. 1986. *Çevik Kuvvetin Gölgesinde Türkiye* [Turkey under the Shadows of Anti-Riot Forces]. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi.

Gürkan, Nilgün. 1997. *Türkiye’de Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın* [The Press in Turkey During Transition to Democracy]. İstanbul: İletişim.

Gürsoy, Yaprak. 2008. “Civil-Military Relations as a Component of Democratic Consolidation in Turkey: A Comparison with Greece.” In *Turkey-European Union Relations, Dilemmas, Opportunities, and Constraints*, eds. Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Yiannis A. Stivachtis. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 303–24.

———. 2009. “Civilian Support and Military Unity in the Outcome of Turkish and Greek Interventions.” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 27(1): 47–75.

Hale, William. 1994. *Turkish Politics and the Military*. London: Routledge.

———. 2011. “The Turkish Republic and Its Army, 1923–1960.” *Turkish Studies* 12(2): 191–201.

Hallin, D. C., and S. Papathanassopoulos. 2002. “Political Clientelism and the Media: Southern Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective.” *Media, Culture & Society* 24: 175–95.

Hallin, Daniel C., and Paol0 Mancini. 2004. *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Harris, George S. 1965. “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics.” *Middle East Journal* 19(1): 54–66.

Hastie, Reid, and Bernadette Park. 1986. “The Relationship between Memory and Judgment Depends on Whether the Judgment Task Is Memory-Based or on-Line.” *Psychological Review* 93: 258–68.

Hekimoğlu, Müşerref. 1980. “Ulusu İyi Karşılandı, Kırca Yadırgancı” [Ulusu was Welcomed, Kırca was Found odd]. *Cumhuriyet*, September 25.

———. 1980. “Yasalar Değil Kafalar” [Not the Laws, But the Minds]. *Cumhuriyet*, September 19.

Heper, Metin. 1988. “State and Society in Turkish Political Experience.” In *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin. Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1–10.

———. 2000. “The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics.” *Journal of International Affairs* 54: 63.

———. 2006. *Türkiye’de Devlet Geleneği* [The State Tradition in Turkey]. Ankara: Doğu Batı.

Heper, Metin, and Tanel Demirel. 1996. “The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 32: 109–23.

Heper, Metin, and Aylin Güney. 1996. “The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic.” *Armed Forces Society* 22: 619–42.

———. 2000. “The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience.” *Armed Forces & Society* 26: 635–57.

Hiebert, Ray Eldon, Donald F. Ungurait, and Thomas W. Bohn. 1982. *Mass Media III*. 3rd ed. London: Longman.

Hsieh, Hsiu-Fang, and Sarah E Shannon. 2005. "Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis." *Qualitative health research* 15: 1277–88.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

İnalcık, Halil. 1964. "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey." In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 42–63.

Itzkowitz-Shifrinson, Joshua R., and Metin Heper. 2005. "Civil-Military Relations in Israel and Turkey." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 33(2): 231–48.

Iyengar, Shanto, MD Peters, and DR Kinder. 1982. "Experimental Demonstrations of the' Not-so-Minimal' Consequences of Television News Programs." *The American Political Science Review* 76: 848–58.

Kabacalı, Alpay. 1990. *Başlangıçtan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın Sansürü* [Press Censorhsip in Turkey from the Beginning to Present]. İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları.

Karabelias, Gerassimos. 1998. *Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the Militray in the Political Transformation of Post-War Turkey and Greece: 1980-1995*. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/karabeli.pdf.

———. 2003. "A Brief Overview of the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Albania, Greece, and Turkey during the Post-WWII Period." *Journal of Political Military Sociology* 31: 57–70. Karpat, Kemal H. 1961. "The Turkish Elections of 1957." *The Western Political QUarterly* 14(2): 436–59.

———. 1964. "The Mass Media -Turkey." In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 255–82.

———. 2010. *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Asker ve Siyaset* [The Military and Politics from the Ottoman Empire to Present]. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları.

Kaya Özçelik, Pınar. 2011. "12 Eylül'ü Anlamak" [Understanding 12 September]. *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 66(1): 73–93.

Kaya, Raşit, and Barış Çakmur. 2010. "Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 11(4): 521–37.

Kemal, Mehmet. 1980. "İvedi İşler" [Urgent Works]. *Cumhuriyet*, September 19.

———. 1981. “Birinci Seçim” [The First Choice]. *Cumhuriyet*, January 26.

Kohen, Sami. 1980. “Biz ve Onlar” [Us and Them]. *Milliyet*, November 21.

Konstantopoulos, Savvas. 1967. “Ta Okto Aitia” [The Eight Causes]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, April 25.

———. 1967. “Ai Efimerides” [The Newspapers].]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, June 1.

———. 1967. “Akomi kai Plastografoi” [Still Counterfeiters]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, July 16

———. 1967. “Alhtheiai Lismonitheisai” [Forgotten Truths]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, April 26.

———.1967. “Apantisis eis ton u. p. Kanellopoulon” [Answers to Former Prime Minister Kanellopoulos]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, September 29.

———. 1967. “Athliotites” [Miseries]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, June 13.

———. 1967. “Dyo gegonota” [Two Events]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 5.

———.1967. “Eis tin Gyaron…” [In Gyaron]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 17.

———.1967. “Fos Eis ta Politika Paraskinia: Ai Treis Theoriai dia ton Straton” [Lighting the Political Backstage: Three Theories for the Army]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, August 1.

———.1967. “H Ithousa Taksis” [Steering Class]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 3.

———. “I Anaklisis tou Danou Presbeytou” [Recovating the Danish Ambassador]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, October 20.

———.1967. “I Kampsis tis Oikonomias” [Reviving of Economy]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, August 9.

———.1967. “I Katapliksis tou K. Mpreznief [The Wonders of Mr. Breznief]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, August 6.

———.1967. “I Proeidopoiisis” [Alerts]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, June 23.

———.1967. “I Teleythaia Profiteia” [The Last Prophecy]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, June 7.

———.1967. “Ipirkse Xeiroteron” [Was there a Worse Situation]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, September 17.

———.1967. “Kai Palin peri Typoy” [And Again About the Press]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, July 17.

———.1967. “Keimena Kai Gegonota” [Texts and Events]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, April 16.

———.1967. “O Karamanlis dia tin Epanastasin tis 21is Apriliou” [Karamanlis’ Views for the 21 April Revolution]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, October 8.

———.1967. “O Vasileys, o Stratus Kai to Mellon” [The King, Army and the Future]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, June 28.

———.1967. “Omologia” [Confession]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, September 20.

———.1967. “Pote tha exi Epitixei i Metavoli tis 21is Apriliou? [When will the 21 April Change be Successful?]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, June 4.

———.1967. “Pros Tous Ksenous Antapokritas” [Responding the Foreign Press]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 30.

———.1967. “Stratos kai Demokratia” [The Army and Democracy]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, August 3.

———.1967. “Stratos kai Laos” [The Army and the People]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, June 16.

———.1967. “Ta Kommata” [Political Parties]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 14.

———.1967. “Ta New Grammi tou KKE” [The New Route of KKE]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, August 27.

———.1967. “Theatrinismoi” [Playing Theatre]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 26.

———.1967. “To Neon Syntagma” [The New Constitution]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, June 11.

Kourvetaris, George A. 1999. “The 1967 Coup and the Role of the Military in Greek Politics.” In *Studies on Modern Greek Society*, Boulder, CO: Columbia University Press, 129–51.

Lakonika. 1967. “Ai Apokalypseis” [Revelations]. *Akropolis*. July 12.

———. 1967. “Ai Mystikai Epafai” [Secret Contacts]. *Akropolis*, July 16.

———. 1967. “Aksios” [Worthy]. *Akropolis*, May 14.

———. 1967. “EDA Kai Sxoleion” [EDA and Education]. *Akropolis*, May 17.

———. 1967. “Ellas kai NATO” [Greece and NATO]. *Akropolis*, May 20.

———. 1967. “I Diavevaiosis” [Assurance]. *Akropolis*, May 23.

———. 1967. “I Omologia” [Confession]. *Akropolis*, August 30.

———. 1967. “Iper Tis Ekklisias” [About the Church]. *Akropolis*, May 11.

———. 1967. “Katatheseis kai Paragogi” [Deposits and Production]. *Akropolis*, September 20.

———. 1967. “O… Symvoulos!” [The Adviser]. *Akropolis*, October 17.

———. 1967. “Oi Krites” [The Cretans]. *Akropolis*, June 4.

———. 1967. “Oikonomika Kritiria” [Economic Criteria]. *Akropolis*, May 27.

———. 1967. “Taxitati Efarmogi” [Rapid Application]. *Akropolis*, August 1.

———. 1967. “To “Ftoxo Komma Tou Laou”” [The Poor Party of the People]. *Akropolis*, May 5.

———.1967. “To Metaferomenon” [Transfer]. *Akropolis*, August 22.

———. 1967. “To Skliron Mathima” [The Tough Lesson]. *Akropolis*, May 30.

———. 1967. “Treis Mines” [Three Months]. *Akropolis*, July 22.

Legg, Keith R. 1969. *Politics in Modern Greece*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Legg, Keith R., and John M. Roberts. 1997. *Modern Greece: A Civilization on the Periphery*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Linz, Juan. 1978. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Re-Equilibration*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Mancini, Paolo. 2000. “Political Complexity and Alternative Models of Journalism: The Italian Case.” In *De-Westernizing Media Studies*, eds. James Curran and Myung-Jin Park. London: Routledge, 268–78.

Mazıcı, Nurşen. 1989. *Türkiye’de Askeri Darbeler ve Sivil Rejime Etkileri* [Military Coups in Turkey and Its Effects on the Civilian Regime]. İstanbul: Gür Yayınları.

McCombs, Maxwell E, and Donald L Shaw. 1972. “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36(2): 176–87.

McDonald, Robert. 1983. *Pillar and Tinderbox: The Greek Press and the Dictatorship*. New York and London: Marion Boyars Publishers.

McNair, Brian. 1998. *The Sociology of Journalism*. London: Arnold.

McQuail, Denis. 1994. *Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction*. London: Sage.

Mouzelis, Nicos. 1986. *Politics in the Semi-Periphery*. London: Macmillan.

Mumcu, Uğur. 1980. "Erteleme" [Postponement]. *Cumhuriyet*, October 7.

———. 1980. "İşte İpucu" [Here is the Hint]. *Cumhuriyet*, October 25.

———. 1980. "Kötü Politikacı" [The Bad Politician]. *Cumhuriyet*, October, 1.

———. 1980. "Tam Zamanıdır" [It is High Time]. *Cumhuriyet*, September 16.

———. 1981. "Kurucu Meclis" [The Constituent Assembly]. *Cumhuriyet*, January 17.

———. 1993. *Suçlular ve Güçlüler* [Guilties and Powerfuls]. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi.

Narlı, Nilüfer. 2000. "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 1(1): 107–27.

Nelson, Thomas E, Zoe M Oxley, and Rosalee A Clawson. 1997. "Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects." *Political Behavior* 19: 221–46.

Nelson, Thomas E., and Zoe M. Oxley. 1999. "Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance and Opinion." *The Journal of Politics* 61: 1040.

Neziroğlu, İrfan. 2003. *Türkiye'de Askeri Müdahaleler ve Basın [Military Interventions in Turkey and the Press]*. Ankara: Türk Demokrasi Vakfı.

Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. 1974. "The Spiral of Silence." *Journal of Communication* 24: 43–51.

———. 1992. "The Contribution of Spiral of Silence Theory to an Understanding of Mass Media." In *The Mass Media in Liberal Democratic Societies*, ed. Stanley Rothman. New York, NY: Professors World Peace Academy, 75–83.

Öymen, Altan. 1980. "Madalyanonun İki Yüzü" [The Two Sides of the Medallion]. *Cumhuriyet*, December 21.

———. 1981. "Durum" [The Situation]. *Cumhuriyet*, February 1.

———. 1981. "İsvan Örneği" [The Case of Isvan]. *Cumhuriyet*, February 22.

Öymen, Örsan. 1980. "Bir hikaye" [An Anecdote]. *Milliyet*, December 3.

———. 1980. "Polis ve İşkence" [The Police and Torture]. *Milliyet*, October 25.

———. 1981. “Bir soru” [One Question]. *Milliyet*, February 2.

———. 1981. “Çapraşık düzen…” [Intricate Order…]. *Milliyet*, January 17.

Özbudun, Ergun. 1994. “State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey.” In *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, ed. Larry Jay Diamond. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 189–210.

———. 2012. *The Constitutional System of Turkey: 1876 to the Present*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Özcan, Esra. 2007. “The Role of the State in Turkish Media in Light of Hallin and Mancini’s Comparative Media Systems.” *Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association, TBA, San Francisco, CA (2007, 23 March)*, http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p170690_index.html.

Özdağ, Ümit. 2004. *Menderes Döneminde Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali* [Civil-Military Relations during Menderes Period and the 27 May Revolution]. İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları.

Özkazanç, Alev. 2005. “Türkiye’nin Neo-Liberal Dönüşümü ve Liberal Düşünce” [Turkey's Neo-Liberal Transformation and Liberal Thought]. In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasal Düşünce: Liberalizm Cilt 7*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 634–57.

Papandreu, Andreas. 1977. *Namlunun Ucundaki Democracy* [Democracy at Gunpoint]. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.

Papathanassopoulos, Stylianos. 2001a. “Media Commercialization and Journalism in Greece.” *European Journal of Communication* 16(4): 505–21.

———. 2001b. “The Decline of Newspapers: The Case of the Greek Press.” *Journalism Studies* 2(1): 109–23.

Papatheodorou, Fotini, and David Machin. 2003. “The Umbilical Cord That Was Never Cut: The Post-Dictatorial Intimacy Between the Political Elite and the Mass Media in Greece and Spain.” *European Journal of Communication* 18(31): 31–54.

Paraschos, Manny. 1983. “Greek Mass Media: A Critical Appraisal.” *Journalism Quarterly* 60(2): 338–42.

Roufos, Rodis. 1972. “Culture and the Military.” In *Greece Under Military Rule*, eds. Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos. New York, NY, 146–62.

Scheufele, Dietram a., and David Tewksbury. 2007. “Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models.” *Journal of Communication* 57: 9–20.

Selçuk, İlhan. 1980. “Kendi Kendimizi Sorguya Çekelim” [We Shall Interrogate Ourselves]. *Cumhuriyet*, November 3.

———. 1980. “Terör Sorununun Çözümlenmesi” [Resolving the Terror Problem]. *Cumhuriyet*, September 28.

———. 1980. “Yirminci Yüzyıl Anayasa Hukuku” [Twentieth Century Constitutional Law]. *Cumhuriyet*, October 25.

———. 1981. “Terör ve Özgürlük” [Terror and Freedom]. *Cumhuriyet*, February 7.

Siebert, Fred S., Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm. 1963. *Four Theories of the Press*. Normal, IL: Illini Books edition.

Sirmen, Ali. 1981. “İki Karar” [Two Decisions]. *Cumhuriyet*, February 22.

Sniderman, Paul M., and Sean M. Theriault. 2004. “The Structure of Political Argument and the Logic of Issue Framing.” In *Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error, and Change*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 133–65.

Söğüt, Mine. 2010. *Darbeli Kalemler 27 Mayıs - 12 Mart - 12 Eylül: Askeri Müdahalelerin İlk Haftasında Yazılan Köşe Yazılarından Seçmeler* [Coup in the Pens 27 May - 12 March - 12 September: A Selection of Columns Written During the First Week of the Military Interventions]. İstanbul: Getto.

Spyropoulos, Evangelos. 1993. *The Greek Military (1909-1941) and the Greek Mutinies in the Middle East (1941-1944)*. Boulder: East European Monographs.

Stratos, C. 1995. *Antithesi Kai Diafoni: I Stasi Ton Efimeridon Sti Diktatoria 1967-74* [Opposition and Disagreement: The Attitude of Newspapers in Dictatorship 1967-74]. Athens: Ekdoseis Kastanioti.

Strauss, Anselm, and Juliet Corbin. 1990. *Basics of Qualitative Research Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Sunay, Cengiz. 2010. *Türk Siyasetinde Sivil Asker Ilişkileri: 27 Mayıs - 12 Mart - 12 Eylül ve Sonrası* [Civil-Military Relations in Turkish Politics: 27 May - 12 March - 12 September and Afterwards]. Ankara: Orion Kitabevi.

Şapolyo, Enver Behnan. 1971. *Türk Gazeteciliği Tarihi: Her Yönüyle Basın* [The History of Turkish Journalism: The Press with its All Aspects]. Ankara: Güven Matbaası.

Soysal, Mümtaz. 1980. "Brüksel Koridorları ve Türkiye Sokakları" [The Corridors of Brussels and the Streets of Turkey]. *Cumhuriyet*, October 4.

Şenses, Fikret. 1991. "Turkey's Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program in Retrospect and Prospect." *The Developing Economies* 29(3): 210–34.

Tachau, Frank, and Metin Heper. 1983. "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey." *Comparative Politics* 16: 17–33.

Taner, Haldun. 1980. "Oyunun Kuralları" [The Rules of the Game]. *Milliyet*, September 21.

Tek, Hayati. 2006. *Darbeler ve Türk Basını* [Military Coups and Turkish Press]. İstanbul: Bilge Oğuz.

Tılıç, L. Doğan. 1998. *Utanıyorum Ama Gazeteciyim: Türkiye ve Yunanistan'da Gazetecilik* [I am Embarrased to Say but I am a Journalist: Journalism in Grece and Turkey]. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Toker, Metin. 1981. "Avrupa Demokrasilerinde Ders Alması Gerekenler Politikacılardır" [It is the Politicians Who Need to Learn Their Lessons in European Democracies]. *Milliyet*, February 25.

Tör, Vedat Nedim. 1980. "İdeolojik Bunalım" [Ideological Depression]. *Cumhuriyet*, December 12.

Tsiforos, Nikos. 1967. "Anthi" [Blossoms]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 12.

———. 1967. "Geranoi Polloi Petousan" [Many Cranes Flew]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 17.

———. 1967. "Sxolastika" [Scholastic]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, June 10.

———. 1967. "Vroxoula" [Rain]. *Eleftheros Kosmos*, May 3.

Veremis, Thanos. 1997. *The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy*. London: Hurst & Company.

Vlachos, Helen. 1970. *House Arrest*. London: Andre Deutsch.

———. 1972. "The Colonels and the Press." In *Greece Under Military Rule*, eds. Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos. New York, NY: Basic Books, 59–74.

Woodhouse, Christopher M. 1972. “The ‘Revolution’ in Its Historical Context.” In *Greece Under Military Rule*, eds. Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1–16.

———. 1985. *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*. London: Granada.

———. 1991. *Modern Greece: A Short History*. London: Faber and Faber.

Yetkin, Çetin. 1995. *Türkiye’de Askeri Darbeler ve Amerika, 27 Mayıs, 12 Mart ve 12 Eylül'de Amerika'nın Yeri* [Military Coups in Turkey and the United States: The role of the United States in 27 May, 12 March and 12 September]. Ankara: Ümit Yayınevi.

Yıldırım, Zafer. 2006. “Basın Özgürlüğü ve 12 Eylül Müdahalesinde Ordu-Basın Ilişkisi” [Press Freedom and the Press-Military Relationship at the time of 12 September Intervention]. *Mevzuat Dergisi* 9(103): 1–14.

Zaharopoulos, George. 1972. “Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece.” In *Greece Under Military Rule*, eds. Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos. New York, NY: Basic Books, 17–35.