

MASS MIGRATION MOVEMENTS TO TURKEY: THE CASES OF TURKS OF BULGARIA, NORTHERN IRAQIS, AND SYRIANS

A Master's Thesis

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Ankara

August 2018



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BULGARIA, NORTHERN IRAQIS, AND SYRIANS

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

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In partial fulfillments of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

August 2018

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
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ABSTRACT

MASS MIGRATION MOVEMENTS TO TURKEY: THE CASES OF TURKS OF BULGARIA, NORTHERN IRAQIS, AND SYRIANS

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August 2018

This thesis analyzes the Turkish migratory responses towards three different mass migration movements, namely Turks of Bulgaria, Northern Iraqis and Syrians, to reveal similarities and differences. While doing so, it will design an analytical framework built on an existing study, explaining motives of the Turkish state responses. The thesis, by tracing the history of the given cases, will also try to demonstrate whether refugees are used as tools of Turkish Foreign Policy or not.

Keywords: Northern Iraqis, Mass Migration, Refugee, Syrians, Turks of Bulgaria

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE'YE YÖNELİK KİTLESEL GÖÇ HAREKETLERİ: BULGARİSTAN TÜRKLERİ, KUZEY IRAKLILAR VE SURİYELİLER

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Ağustos 2018

Bu çalışma benzerlik ve farklılıkların ortaya çıkarılması adına, Türkiye'nin üç farklı kitlesel göç hareketine yönelik göç politikalarını analiz etmektedir. Bu süreçte, Türkiye devlet politikalarının motiflerini açıklayabilen ve mevcut akademik bir çalışma üzerine inşa edilmiş analitik bir çerçeve tasarlamaktadır. Çalışma ayrıca, seçilen vakaların süreç takibini yaparak mültecilerin Türk dış politikasında araç olarak kullanılıp kullanılmadığını göstermeye çalışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bulgaristan Türkleri, Kitlesel Göç, Kuzey Iraklılar, Mülteci, Suriyeliler

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to those with whom I have had the pleasure of discussing the pearls and pitfalls of the topic. It may not be possible to successfully complete this study without their enlightening contributions.

Nobody has been more important to me in the pursuit of the present thesis than Duygu Ekin Şimşek, whose love and compassion are always with me.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Migration is a complex phenomenon stabilizing and destabilizing economic, social and political structures of both sending, transit and destination countries. The term “migration”, being subject to different interpretations, though, can be described as:

“The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international order, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification (Perruchoud & Redpath-Cross, 2011).”

So basically it is a movement across and within the given borders of a state. Today the term has been used more than ever with the rapidly increasing number of people being part of different waves of migration all around the world. Everyday, 44.400 people have been forced to flee homes due to rising conflicts or persecution (UNHCR, 2018). In total, there are 68.5 million people who have been forcibly displaced around the world. Thus, the issue of migration is now a hot topic in terms of governance (emergency response, protection, integration etc.), domestic politics (societal conflict, employment/unemployment), and foreign policy (international pressure/support, bilateral agreement, joint actions –intervention, aid deliveries, etc.). Moreover, it has also become a hot topic in scholarly world especially in the 21st century. The wars and internal conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, South Sudan and Myanmar caused millions to flee their homes while deteriorating living conditions for special age groups like pregnant, elderly or children. So, it is not only the causes

and the outcomes of war in terms of international theories that have been studied but also the human movements and its follow-ups in the destination or transit countries. Concordantly, a whole process of receiving thousand or even millions of people from opening the borders to emergency response, and from integration to naturalization is a subject of scholarly works in International Relations, Political Science, Sociology, and Economy.

Turkey is at the center of the migratory movements receiving thousands of people since the early 20th century. Although it has been more like a transit country where asylum seekers or refugees stay for a while, Turkey could also be identified as a destination country hosting mass-arriving people. Today, Turkey is the leading country in the world receiving more than 3.5 million Syrians who have fled the war since 2011. Yet, it was not the first time Turkey received huge numbers of people. The leading host country of the world has a migratory history composed of different responses towards different groups. This study analyzes three mass migration movements towards Turkey to analyze above-mentioned differences between state responses. To do so, the present study traces, elaborates and analyzes the (i) 1989 migration of Turks of Bulgaria, (ii) 1991 migration of Northern Iraqis, and (iii) post-2011 migration of Syrians. These cases are chosen since they are the three biggest population movements towards Turkey in recent decades. Although there have been significant population movements from Iran and former Yugoslavia, these cases are more suitable for analysis in terms of scale and impact on Turkish economy and foreign policy.

The ongoing crisis in Syria and Syrian refugees around the world have focused the attention of the scholars interested in Turkey. The abundance of studies on different pillars of state response such as health, education, employment or integration –in

general- of Syrians forms the big portion of migration studies in Turkey.

Nevertheless, 1989 and 1991 cases have not been covered in details, although they are the previous mass migration movements towards Turkey, requiring attention to compare and contrast state response towards mass migration movements. It is clear that the framing or generalizing Turkish state response just focusing on the post-2011 Syrian migration is not an efficient way of science. This comparative study purports to document how the Turkish official response varied in times of mass migration crisis. By tracing the historical processes of the selected cases, the aim of the present study is to find similarities and differences in the Turkish state response towards migrant groups to build a general framework. While doing so, this study also aims to reveal a causal nexus between factors affecting the Turkish state policy and the outcomes in times of mass migration movements.

While tracing the historical processes of the selected cases, a standard set of questions is a requirement to operationalize the acquired knowledge. Therefore, these are the questions appealed throughout the study:

- How did the Turkish State act to the migration crisis in question? What kinds of services were provided for these people? What causal factors shaped the official policies?

Herein, the term “mass migration” needs a clear definition before moving on to the cases. In his typology of migration, William Peterson (1958) defines mass migration as a collective movement of people driven by social momentum. Although he praises the developments in transportation for being a deterrent of migration, his primary focus is on the collectivity of the movement builds itself on migration as a social pattern in a community. When there is a primary migration epitomic for future ones,

migration could become a social pattern for people where individual motivations are not of importance. In 1996, this time putting refugees at the center, Jacobsen defines “mass refugee influx” as “that which occurs when, within a relatively short period (a few years), large numbers (thousands) of people flee their places of residence for the asylum country.” He notifies the importance of civil wars, insurgencies and persecution in his definition while making a well-grounded analysis of the movement from beginning to the end (Jacobsen, 1996). The only conceivable caveat of this definition for the present study is its primary emphasis on refugees or naming subjects of the migratory movement as refugees in legal terms since in none of the three cases examined below the term “refugee”¹ is applicable due to Turkey’s maintaining of a geographic limitation to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter referred as the 1951 Convention), which will be elaborated below. Therefore, an inclusive definition of mass migration, corresponding better with this study, proposed by IOM is accepted: “the sudden movement of large number of persons.” (Perruchoud & Redpath-Cross, 2011). Independently of their legal status, The Turks of Bulgaria, Northern Iraqi and Syrian refugees are all consequences of sudden movements of large numbers arriving at Turkey.

1.1 The Contents of the Chapters

Chapter I introduces brief information on the international refugee regime and Turkey’s positioning with it, along with the research design, methodology and the set of questions guiding the research. Chapter I introduces the framework constructed based on Jacobsen’s categories of factors affecting refugee policies of states by integrating Turkey’s characteristics in the given responses towards refugees.

¹ For the purpose of this study, I will define all-three categories as “refugees”, although Turks of Bulgaria were referred as cognates, Northern Iraqis as asylum seekers and Syrians as “guests” under temporary protection in official documents.

Chapter II covers the mass migration of Turks of Bulgaria happened in 1989. Before explaining the details, it first briefly summarizes the history of bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Turkey. It then provides basics of the migration waves of 1912-13, 1923-29, 1950-51, and 1968-79 since these were the preliminary waves of migration stimulating the migration of next generations and affecting the post-migration social conditions in Turkey. Starting with the escalation of the conflict within Bulgaria, this chapter looks at the Turkish Government's response towards Turks of Bulgaria, the international response and the foreign policy aspect of the migration.

Chapter III covers the second case examined in this study: mass migration of Northern Iraqis in 1991. Like the case for the previous chapter, this chapter first focuses on the preliminary waves of migration from Iraq which may have had an effect upon the 1991 migration in the eyes of both Turkish State and Northern Iraqis. The first flow of migration following a chemical attack in 1988 and the second one during Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's annexation of Kuwait, August 1990 to April 1991 are briefly explained at the beginning of the chapter. Then it looks at the 1991 migration concentrating on the same variables like the previous chapter. It refers to some security arguments conceptualized for Turkey (Gaza syndrome, Palestinianization, PKK and the fight against terrorism) in the scholarly world while evaluating the threat perception of the Turkish State.

Chapter IV illustrates the last and the recent case of mass migration emanated from Syrian civil war in post-2011 period. From the early phases of the civil war to late 2016, this chapter summarizes important steps of the state response and looks at the uncertainty of their permanence, which seems important to indicate their status in Turkey. Thereafter, explaining the security aspect of Syrian migration, this chapter

analyzes the concept of safe haven and Turkey's relative open door policy focusing on discourses of the leading figures in the Government. As a final point, foreign policy pillar of migration, EU-Turkey Joint Action, will be elaborated to see the causal nexus between foreign policy and migratory response.

Chapter V summarizes previous chapters and restates the framework of the Turkish Migratory Response. It leaves some space for alternative explanations and the falsifiability of the framework, while paving the way for future studies focusing on the construction of a comprehensive framework or a theory that explains the logic of the Turkish State response towards different waves of migration.

1.2 International Refugee Regime and Turkey

International refugee regime² is conducted by multiple actors like sovereign states, UNHCR, IOM, other national and international NGOs and individual actors. Yet, the most important actor is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) created in 1950 with the aim of protecting and assisting those fled their homes. The key documents of UNHCR, ratified by 145 different countries worldwide, is the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Additional Protocol, setting core principles of non-discrimination, non-penalization and non-refoulement. Although, different conventions and agreements are of significant importance and widely referred within the international refugee regime, the 1951 Convention considered as the key document. It is also more relevant for the present study in terms of Turkey. Turkey, as a signatory of 1951 Convention,

² "the collection of conventions, treaties, intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies, precedent, and funding which governments have adopted and support to protect and assist those displaced from their country by persecution, or displaced by war in some regions of the world where agreements or practice have extended protection to persons displaced by the general devastation of war, even if they are not specifically targeted for persecution." Keely (2001).

retained a geographical limitation, accepting only people fleeing from Europe as refugees within its territories even though the 1967 Additional Protocol removed geographical and time limitations. Abiding by the three core principles, Turkey is a country arbitrarily deciding the legal basis of those coming from other parts of the world.

Turkey used the Settlement Law of 1934 until 1994, naming those having Turkish ethnic origin as *muhacir* and others as *mülteci* (refugee). With “Regulation No.

1994/6169 on the Procedures and Principles related to Possible Population

Movements and Aliens Arriving in Turkey either as Individuals or in Groups

Wishing to Seek Asylum either from Turkey or Requesting Residence Permission in order to Seek Asylum From Another Country”, Turkey set the procedures for mass

arriving asylum seekers. This regulation was an outcome of 1991 migration from Northern Iraq which caught Turkey unprepared and caused domestic and external problems. Regulation introduced the two-tiered system for non-European asylum

seekers to file two different asylum claims, one to UNHCR and one other to the

Turkish State. It was on 25 March 2005, together with the EU integration process,

“National Action Plan of Turkey for the Adoption of EU Acquis in the Field of

Asylum and Migration” was adopted. These developments did not help Turkey to

deal with millions of people who sought protection after the civil war broke out in Syria. Increasing number of Syrians urged the Government to create a new law

regulating the issues of foreigners in detail while setting up further basis for

temporary protection. The “Law No. 6458 of 2013 on Foreigners and International Protection” (LFIP) restating Turkey’s commitment to the principle of non-

refoulement legalized all procedures regarding the entry, residence, and work permit for foreigners. It also defines temporary protections status and assigns the Council of

Ministers for issuing a directive for temporary protection beneficiaries. Thus, the LFIP led to the ratification of 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation, regulating admission, identification, benefitting from health, education and other services together with the work permit and the responsibilities of temporary protection beneficiaries. It is the recent document specifically designating all relevant issues for Syrians living in Turkey.

Not only the history of asylum and migration practices of the Turkish Republic does not chase a linear progress, but it has also been developed on arbitrary practices until 1994. Thus, state practices towards refugees in different time periods may require an assessment of the existing procedures or regulations. One could claim that a State treats migrants, refugees or asylum seekers in accordance with its own laws. This is a certain fact to consider while examining the state response. Yet, each state due to its proximity to the conflict areas, unresolved societal conflicts, economic problems, ethnic or religious tensions, nationalist sentiments or identity issues may have idiosyncratic applications towards foreigners, although some of them do not compromise with international refugee rules and norms. Should the issues of refugee admission, integration and naturalization apply to a State, the “sovereignty” may become the determinant, overruling practices stemmed from existing laws. If we consider the density of the scholarly work focusing on European Union’s unwillingness for receiving refugees and border closures (Jacobs, Lamphere-Englund, Steuer, Sudetić, & Vogl, 2015; Trauner, 2016; Bhambra, 2017), it may become clearer that legal-based assumptions on the analysis of state response may not always reflect a reality, and even mislead the study. In this sense, the present study is distinctive going beyond the “sovereignty” argument and predicates Turkish state responses to some determinant variables.

1.3 Research Design

The present study is based on the examination of archival documents and secondary resources like official reports to extract data on behaviors and statements of former Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers and some other state officials. Archival research requires a scientist to acquire, process and analyze the findings. I mainly look at historical texts by which I could interpret and adjudicate for a process this study focuses on. It is clear that the extraction of information from archives lead to the augmentation of alternative explanations in most disciplines. Thus, archival research is well-suited for the present study in which historical, cultural, and national practices are quite important and which is also far away from being conceptualized in a structured manner so far. To this end, I look at the archives of newspapers in Turkish National Library for the first two cases (1989 Turks of Bulgaria and 1991 Northern Iraqis) since the dates are not digitally accessible for the given period for all newspapers. I also look at the online archives of a newspaper whose issues are all scanned and granted access for users. In addition to that, I also examined parliamentary minutes with a focus on one minute speeches in which officials and party members express their concerns, willingness or demands in a given agenda. All parliamentary questions, statements, one-minute speeches, laws and other related documents have been recorded and published online by the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Under the restrictions imposed by the Library, I examined the period of the selected cases day by day with a time span of 30 days before and after. I collect data from 441 newspaper articles total for three different cases. The core newspapers analyzed are *Ortadoğu*, *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*. Yet, I also look at *Sabah*, *Tercüman* and

Hürriyet newspapers to collect data if the primarily chosen newspapers are not published within the given time period or lack information about the case. The criteria for choosing above-given newspapers is to eliminate bias since there is a broad political spectrum these newspapers form. *Ortadoğu* is a nationalist-conservative, *Milliyet* is more of a centrist and *Cumhuriyet* is a leftist and Kemalist newspaper. Covering articles in these newspapers, I create a pool where different ideological approaches towards state policies are brought together. I examined the period between April 1989 and October 1991 from *Ortadoğu*, *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*. On the other hand, I looked at *Sabah*, *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* for the time period between February 2011 and December 2012, replacing *Ortadoğu* with *Sabah*. To add up an external dimension towards state policies of Turkey, articles from the *New York Times*, an American newspaper influential worldwide, are also examined and referred throughout the study. The reason for choosing the *New York Times* is two-fold: it provides digital access for articles from 1851 to the present time and it has an American perspective which seems significant for the present study due to the US role in the selected cases and decisive bilateral relations with Turkey.

Another source of the archival research is parliamentary minutes. One-minute speeches, interpellations and written and oral parliamentary questions together with their answers (if provided) are the basic records I concentrated on. Since the focus of this study is the state response towards three different migration flows, what I need to acquire from the parliamentary minutes is the statements, remarks or written/oral answer to the questions of the Government officials. Speeches of other party members are just important to understand the nature of the discussions regarding migration. Government as the fundamental bodies shaping policies towards migrants, asylum seekers and refugees is at the center of analysis. And above-given three

categories of parliamentary documents are the ones involving ideas, thought and future considerations of the Government officials. Beyond these, reports, scholarly articles, books, conference proceedings and online documents are also part of the secondary resources this study benefits from.

Turkey has historically been a place of migration, which makes it convenient to make a comparative study on. Therefore, this study systematically analyzes the mass migration flows towards Turkish territories in a comparative way. There are specific concepts that will be analyzed. They follow pretty much the same patterns in the field of migration. The similarities and differences between these patterns will guide the study till the end. At the same time, such patterns will lead the study to come up with a generalizable framework. Instead of looking at the all social, political and economic factors that might have the potential to affect Turkey's policies towards refugees, I will focus on some specific ones, namely "security, international assistance and the foreign policy". I have derived these variables from the emergency and long-term responses towards refugees. This is not to say that there is a fourth pillar of integration but to say that the response of the Turkish state towards these people during their duration of stay matters so much in a way to affect the above-given three pillars. So, I will categorically present services provided by the Turkey like education, health or employment in order to demonstrate similarities and differences between the three selected cases.

Process tracing is the "systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator." (Collier, 2011). By using the process tracing, this study aims to demonstrate the different manifestations of state response within different migration flows.

Using the process tracing method could compensate the potential deficits and increase the internal validity of the research since tracing the process is a toilsome and detailed way of doing a research in which the researcher has full grasp of almost all details of the case/s. Process tracing allowed me to examine a wave of migration with the concealed social, political, environmental and cultural factors influencing both the movement and the state policies towards it.

1.4 Framework for the Turkish Migratory Response

The framework used in the present study is based on Karen Jacobsen's (1996) factors influencing state responses towards mass refugee movements, which she explained in her article "Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes". These factors are international assistance, bilateral relations with the sending state, absorption capacity of the local community and the national security. Taking into account that the state response could vary from one group to another, she first identifies sources of pressure on the receiving state and the possible policy choices that seem durable in the international migration regime. While doing this, she defines "government response", as I also use in the present study, as "actions (or inactions) taken by the government and other state institutions that include specific refugee policies, military responses, unofficial actions, and policy implementation." (Jacobsen, 1996).

Bureaucratic choices is the first pillar of the analysis and emphasizes the allocation of responsibility to one of the civilian agencies in the country. The reason for such practice is that the migration is not part of the "high politics" such as security or foreign policy (Jacobsen, 1996). So, it is up to the personnel working in that civilian agency to set out standards for refugees. The second pillar of the analysis,

international relations, is composed of two sources: the international refugee regime and the bilateral relations with the sending country. Due to the standardized norms and rules in the international refugee regime, states may have concerns about the lack of international assistance, lack of resettlement opportunities and the threat of bad international publicity should they not treat refugees in good terms. The third pillar, the local absorption capacity has two variables: economic capacity of the community and the social receptiveness. If there is a decline in economic well-being of a community, the response towards incomers may not be as good as it is during the times of high welfare. On the other side, social receptiveness has four factors: the cultural meaning of refugees, ethnicity and kinship, historical experience and the beliefs about refugees (Jacobsen, 1996). The last factor influencing state response is the security threats, which Jacobsen explains with three dimensions: strategic (military response towards external threats), regime (protection from internal threats) and structural dimension (balance between resources and the overall population) (Jacobsen, 1996).

Although it is clear that all above-given factors are influential on state responses, I have identified deficiencies in Jacobsen's factors to explain Turkey. Starting with the bureaucratic changes, Turkey allocated responsibility to a Minister of State, assigned some Ministers as the Coordinator Minister, included other Ministers to Coordination Committees and also set up Directory General for Migration Management under the Ministry of Interior. As Jacobsen states, it is important for Turkey to allocate responsibility to an agency for smooth functioning of the reception and the follow-up procedures. Nevertheless, temporary shelters, tent and container cities have been under the control of security forces who from time to time have restricted access for outsiders. The spillover of conflict from the country of origin to Turkey and the

threat to national borders from terrorists who have the ability to infiltrate Turkey among civilians have always been given priority in the political agenda. Turkey also pursued different practices in its foreign policy to gain some leverage in international politics by using the migration card. So, it has been clear that refugees have been a matter of security or foreign policy, or high politics as Jacobsen says, and that is actually why the coordination and the control of the migration have always been under the control of a government body. Therefore, giving credit to the ability of explaining a phenomenon, “bureaucratic choices” factor seems incompatible with the Turkish state response.

International relations is a significant pillar of state responses both for Turkey and other countries. As mentioned above, the international refugee regime and the bilateral relations with the sending country are the two sources of influence here. The assumption that the good bilateral relations generates well reception and hosting procedures for the refugees in the receiving state may not always be true. Although Turkey and Bulgaria stayed at the different blocs of the Cold War rivalry and Turkey condemned assimilation practices of Jivkov’s Government so many times, and Turks of Bulgaria were welcomed and well-treated in Turkey. The ethnic and religious identity seemed to play a more significant role while bilateral relations remained unimportant for 1989 migration case. Another factor is the international refugee regime consisting of financial assistance, resettlement and the threat of bad international publicity. Jacobsen’s conceptualization of the international refugee regime is in “negative” terms, prioritizing stick or carrot approach. According to her, the threat is the stimulating force behind a state policy, affecting reception and integration of refugees. Briefly stated, losing opportunities for having financial assistance, resettling people to third countries and being well-publicized in

international arena urge states to respond better. In the Turkish case, there seems to be a slight difference in the approach towards these elements. First of all, the whole process tracing of three different cases do not demonstrate a clear sign that Turkey treated refugees well due to a fear that financial assistance would be cut. Turkey did not even get financial assistance in the early phases of Syrian migration. Yet, this is not to say that Turkey does not seek financial assistance. Turkey, in all three cases, appealed to international community to share the burden. The US financial aid in 1989, UN aid in 1991, and the EU-Turkey deal of 2016 are clear examples of Turkey's seeking of international assistance. However, receiving assistance has been a step for Turkey after the opening of borders. There is even a causal nexus between the international assistance (UN Resolution 688) and the opening of borders in 1991 migration. Secondly, for Turkey, it is not only the financial but also the military assistance Turkey sought. The military assistance includes military intervention, establishment of a safe haven or no-fly zones. Thus, it is better for Turkey to consider both types of assistance, renaming them as "international assistance" as a separate variable.

When it comes to the resettlement and the threat of bad international publicity, there might again be a difference in the approach of the Turkish state. Turkey considered these practical reasons in "positive" terms and used them as part of its foreign policy. Resettlement was not a cause but an effect of the migration policies. Although Turkey criticized Western countries due to their unwillingness for resettling people, the state did not orient its policies on such a fear. Instead, resettlement has been an issue for bilateral agreements improving cooperation between Turkey and third countries. Such processes have also created an atmosphere that Turkey could stress its importance in the eyes of the Western world. State officials have drawn attention

to the political role Turkey plays by being a so-called “buffer zone” between Western countries and refugee-producing Middle East countries in 1991 and post-2011 periods. State officials also state the important role Turkey playing by receiving Turks of Bulgaria and standing against a Communist regime in 1989. Therefore, resettlement and the above given publicity threat has been a part of a foreign policy understanding, in which Turkey has tried to achieve future gains by improving bilateral ties. It was not the fear but the possible achievements shaping state response of Turkey.

The third pillar of Jacobsen’s analysis is the security threats, which seems to be pretty much consistent with the Turkish case, except for the structural dimension. Although Turkey tried its best to balance between resources and the population, it, most of the time, received people escaping from persecution, internal conflict or civil war -even if the border policies and provided services have differed from one group to another- irrespective of numbers. Thinking of more than 3.5 million Syrians in Turkey, it seems unobservable that the structural dimension does really matter in Turkey. Although some scholars assert that the economic burden of Syrians cost too much to the Turkish economy, some others underline the positive effects of Syrians by increasing business initiatives and joining the labor force. Considering that there is no food or water scarcity since 2011, the structural dimension is unobservable for Turkish case.

Jacobsen (1996) defines the strategic dimension as the “ability of state to defend itself militarily from external aggression”. The underlying emphasis is on the protection of the national borders. So, I can also name it as the border security. The regime dimension is “the capacity of the government to protect itself from internal threats arising from domestic disorder and conflict” (Jacobsen, 1996). What the

author concentrates is the ethnic conflicts that may arise within the society after the arrival of refugees. The tension between the host community and the newcomers is a significant portion of the analysis for Turkey too. Yet, Jacobsen's explanation is insufficient to grasp the core idea of internal conflict. For the Turkish case, this study needs a more comprehensive conceptualization to explain the different responses towards Turks of Bulgaria, Northern Iraqis and Syrians. Ole Wæver's concept of societal security which "concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats" is a good starting point at this point (Wæver, 1993). If a group of people start thinking that its basic identity (ethnic, national, religious. etc.) is under threat, it could start to act what Wæver says in "security mode" since society is all about the identity. Based on this concept, Heisler and Layton-Henry (1993) explains how immigration causes societal insecurity by saying that the host community may not have "firmly bounded quality" which formerly existed among people and increases in the number of distinctive people naturally resulted in insecurities. And it is the whole of political actors, institutions and rules that is responsible for the emergence of such insecurity. It is therefore upon the states to eliminate threats to societal security, protecting the identity of the host society. In line with this concept, internal threats that may arise from possible conflicts between the host community and newcomers can be analyzed as "societal security" dimension instead of the "regime dimension" since it is any kind of identity problem needs attention as the cause of internal conflict.

The last factor affecting state response is the absorption capacity of a local community. Again, accepting economic capacity or social receptiveness as two important sub-factors in the analysis of state responses during mass migration periods, I could examine these variables within the societal security. First, societal

security does deal with economic stringencies which may be attributed to the outsiders by the host community. And secondly, cultural meaning, ethnicity, kinship or historical experiences with refugees, which Jacobsen (1996) lists, are essentially elements of an identity pillar framed under societal security approach. So, for Turkish case, I could integrate the absorption capacity factor into the societal security approach.

Eventually, I eliminate “bureaucratic choices” for its incompatibility, revised “international relations” along foreign policy lines, integrated “local absorption capacity” into societal security and let the “security threats” remain the same way except earmarking “structural dimension” due to its unobservable situation in the Turkish case. In this context, the following analytical framework is to be built:

	SECURITY PERCEPTION		INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE		FOREIGN POLICY ACHIEVEMENTS		OUTCOME
	BORDER and SECURITY	SOCIETAL and SECURITY	MILITARY or ECONOMIC	PROMOTING TURKEY	FUTURE or GAINS		
TURKS OF BULGARIA	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	INTEGRATION
NORTHERN IRAQIS	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	MANDATORY REPATRIATION
SYRIANS	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	TEMPORARY PROTECTION

Figure 1: Framework for the Turkish Migratory Response

For the migration of Turks of Bulgaria, Turkish state did not see a threat neither to its border nor to the societal security since there is no sign of military conflict along the borders and the arriving people were ethnically Turks forming no threat to the identity of the existing society. This led the state to open its borders for Turks of Bulgaria with easing their arrival through administrative regulations. Following the opening of borders, the state sought financial assistance in forms of foreign aid till the closure in August 1989. After receiving more than 300.000 people to its territories, state officials also highlight Turkey's role as an important partner for the Western world looking after people escaped from the persecution of a Communist regime. By doing so, Turkey promoted itself as a country abiding by the 1951 Convention.

For Northern Iraqis' migration, Turkish state perceived that the migration of people was a threat, both to its borders and the domestic stability. It was a period of Turkey's fight against PKK terrorist organization peaked and the infiltration of terrorists among other people to Turkey worried state officials. Iraqi army's assault on people fleeing was also a matter of concern since the escape of thousands towards the Turkish border was also bringing fire. That is why security measures increased along the borderline. In addition to that, the "Kurdish" identity, which Turkey already had problems adopting in those years, caused pressure on state officials who seemed to frame refugees as a spark for the possible identity conflict among the society. Although Turkey's security concerns were so clear, it was the UN Resolution to create a safe zone, or the military assistance of the UN, that made Turkey opened its borders. Together with the international financial assistance it received, Turkey hosted almost half a million people for a short period of time.

Turkey, then insisted on improved partnership especially with USA³, from whom Turkey bought military equipment⁴.

For Syrians' migration, government believed that the protests inside Syria would end soon and nothing would threaten Turkish borders. That is one of the reasons making Turkey open its borders even if the incoming "Arab" population had the potential to threaten the Turkish identity. Starting from 2012, Turkey received financial aid from international organizations and foreign countries but was not able to orchestrate international effort to create a safe or no-fly zone. For being the top country hosting the biggest number of refugees in the world, state officials have always stressed Turkey's strategic importance between Syria and the West. Starting with the EU-Turkey deal, Turkey also initiated a process to ease visa regime for Turkish citizens within Europe in exchange for keeping refugees within borders. Although not having concrete results, hosting Syrians led Turkey bargain for a diplomatic gain.

³ ""Stratejik işbirliği arayışı", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 10.05.1991; "Özal, stratejik işbirliğinde ısrarlı", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 09.06.1991

⁴ "Türkiye Stinger füzesi alacak", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 05.05.1991

CHAPTER II

TURKS OF BULGARIA

Refugee movements to Turkey are important to understand state responses and how they shape the foreign policy in times of crises. Although innumerable movements of refugees from different countries could be arrayed, there is one specific country from which Turkey has always welcomed newcomers: Bulgaria. Yet, the official state discourse has not referred to people coming from Bulgaria as refugees at all. Those people have been descendants of the Ottoman Empire who were left behind once the Empire collapsed. So, when they immigrated from Balkans to Anatolian territories, they were settled and treated as part of the society not as foreigners in the beginning of the 20th century following the Balkan Wars. It should also be noted that there are also some immigration waves recorded in late 19th century. When it comes to the history of the Turkish Republic, 3 relatively important periods are marked with the immigration of Turks of Bulgaria:

- ✓ 1945-1951 : Escape from Eastern Bloc
- ✓ 1968-1979 : Close Relative Migration
- ✓ 1989 : Mass Migration

Autonomous Principality of Bulgaria was established in 1878 with the Treaty of Berlin. Article 25 of the aforementioned treaty indicated that Turks living in Bulgaria can keep their own properties even if they had moved away and Bulgarian authorities do not have the right to confiscate those properties (Konukman, 1990). It was only thirty years later, in 1908, that Bulgaria became an independent country. Following the establishment, they signed the İstanbul Agreement with the Ottoman Empire in April 19th, 1909, stating that the rights of the Turkish people living in Bulgarian

territories are guaranteed. In the aftermath of a period of war between the Ottoman Empire and Balkan countries, the “Treaty of Istanbul” was signed in September 29, 1913. According to the Treaty, Turks who wish to stay in Bulgaria will benefit from freedom of religion and Turkish language will be taught in schools to Turks beside Bulgarian as an official language (Yinanç & Taşdemir, 2002). By the end of the First World War, the Treaty of Neuilly was signed on November 27, 1919. Beyond its territorial provisions, the document was important in the sense that it was the first time in the history of minorities, especially Muslim/Turkish community to gain some distinctive rights (Tahir, 2012). Article 55 of the treaty indicated that the Bulgarian Government will ease the conditions for education in the mother tongue for those whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian. This set the direction of the relations between Bulgaria and Turkey in the inter-war period. In 1925, a “Treaty of Friendship between Bulgaria and Turkey” was signed in Angora. The rights of the minorities in both countries were guaranteed one more time with the following article:

“The two governments undertake to ensure that Muslim minorities in Bulgaria shall benefit by all the provisions concerning the protection of minorities laid down in the Treaty of Neuilly, and that Bulgarian minorities in Turkey shall benefit by all the provisions concerning the protection of minorities laid down in the Treaty of Lausanne.”

İskan Kanunu, the “Resettlement Law” was prescribed and entered into force in June 1934. According to the law, Turkey referred to those who come with the purpose of living in Turkey and who also have Turkish origin as *muhacir*, “immigrant”. And the ones who come not with the purpose of living in Turkey but because of an urgency

are referred as *mülteci*, “refugee”.⁵ Immigrants who did not demand any settlement were free to choose their place of living whereas refugees were settled into zones indicated by the law.⁶ This was a policy of increasing the integration within the society to eliminate any social conflict. It might be noted that it is also seen as a project of Turkification.

Turks of Bulgaria kept coming to Turkey after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. 198.688 Turks of Bulgaria arrived at Anatolia from 1923 to 1939 (DPT, 1990). During the Second World War, a total of 21.553 people came (DPT, 1990). That was the lowest rate of incoming migrants from Bulgaria. Turkey and Bulgaria have taken parts in different blocs following the Second World War. The Communist regime that was established in post-war Bulgaria was an obstacle for bilateral relations to move in the right direction from Turkey’s perspective (Önal B. , 2011). Creating a unified Bulgarian nation meant to assimilate minorities across the country. That policy was first initiated by Prime Minister Georgi Dimitrov who stated that all signs of the Ottoman rule will be destroyed (Konukman, 1990). Transgressing the Helsinki Final Act of 1947 and previous agreements protecting the rights of minorities within the country, the Communist regime massed approximately 250.000 Turkish people up to the Turkish border starting from 1950. Sent a diplomatic note that Turks must be received in three months.⁷ Önal (2011) states that the effective pursuit date of such a policy is significant since it is overlapping with Turkey’s announcement of sending troops to the Korean War. The Soviet backed-Bulgarian government was a stabilizer country against Turkey at the beginning of the Cold War. Moscow invested a lot in Bulgaria while providing financial assistance (Karpas,

⁵ İskan Kanunu, Article 3

⁷ “Bulgar Hükümetinin Şiddetli Bir Notası”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 11.08.1950

2004). In this sense, it might be seen as a sign to deter Turkey from its decision. Upon the failure of this policy, an agreement for migration was signed on December 2, 1950 with the initiatives of Turkey who reminded Bulgaria of the duty of protecting fiscal rights of the migrants according to the 1925 agreement. According to the official records, 52.185 people arrived at Turkey in 1950 (DPT, 1990). This number was doubled when by 1951. Turkey hosted 102.208 newcomers until the end of 1951 (DPT, 1990). Yet it should be noted that Turkey closed its borders on October 7, 1950 and on November 8, 1951. Closure of the borders lasted about a month for the former. When officials captured 126 spies who were trying to enter Turkey with fake passports in late 1951, borders were closed and did not open again in the short term (Konukman, 1990). However, the borders opened again on February 20, 1953 when Bulgaria took back those 126 people (Şimşir, 2009). This is a hint to understand how the Turkish state perceives security threats resulting from migration. Accordingly, only 93 people crossed to Turkey between 1952 and 1960 (DPT, 1990).

Bulgaria's policy of keeping Turks inside after 1952 and Turkey's closing of borders made members of families fall apart from each other. Most of the relatives of Turks of Bulgaria stayed in Bulgaria after 1951. A bilateral notice was published in 1966 stating that two countries built consensus to make an agreement for voluntary migration of people of Turkish origin. The "Agreement on Close Relative Migration" was signed on March 22, 1968. Starting from October 8, 1968 groups had arrived to Turkey and 116.521 (up to 130.000 in different sources) Turks of Bulgaria settled in Turkey until 1979 (Doğanay, 1996). What was important about the 1968 agreement was that Turkey, for the first time controlled the influx of people by accepting only 300 per week (Konukman, 1990). By doing so, Turkey strengthened its authority on

checking the identities, controlling the stuff accompanied by newcomers and directing the settlement process.

Turkey signed a cooperation agreement with Bulgaria in 1976.⁸ It is interesting to see a rapid amelioration of relations between parties of different blocs during the Cold War. Bulgaria realized the need for a labor force to accelerate its industrial developments, and so, they prohibited the migration of Turks after 1952. However, this was a short-term phenomenon. The Bulgarian government, starting from 1978, implemented tough policies of assimilation and unbalanced the bilateral relations again. So, it could be asserted that, from 1878 to 1978, Turks in Bulgaria have faced policies of Bulgarianization and evangelization most of the time, which led to so many waves of migration by ruining the lives of thousands of people.

2.1 Escalation of the Conflict

The Bulgarian regime, after a short period of intimate relations with Turkey, started to forcibly change the names of Turks living in Kırcaali in 1983. It did not seem to attract reaction from Turkey since Turkish officials attended the 40th celebration of the establishment of Bulgarian Communist regime in 1984 (Yinanç & Taşdemir, 2002). However, the situation was getting even worse for Turks in those years. In August 3, 1984, speaking Turkish in public places and wearing traditional Turkish clothe *şalvar* were prohibited (Yinanç & Taşdemir, 2002). Turkey was following the events with a silent diplomacy until 1985. However, pre-1985 events were just the beginning of the assimilationist policies of Bulgarian regime. They were trying to dissolve Turkish identities in a nationalist ideology led by communists (Bojkov,

⁸ "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Bulgaristan Halk Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında Uzun Vadeli Ekonomik, Teknik, Sınai ve Bilimsel İşbirliği Anlaşması Hakkında Kararname", Resmi Gazete, 28.01.1976

2004). In neighborhoods predominated by Turks, officials came early in the mornings with new identity cards on which Bulgarian names were already written and forced Turks to sign documents that they accepted these new identity cards voluntarily (Poulton, 1991). A Member of the Parliament from Tekirdağ, Salih Alcan, provided examples for such changes like, *Mümin Şerif* to *Mladen Şenkov Çavusof* or *Emine Mustafa* to *Elena Atanasava Çavuseva*.⁹ This campaign started in December 1984 and lasted until March 1985. People who objected this practice were charged 5 to 50 Leva (Lütem, 2000). Circumcision feast and burying according to Muslim traditions were also prohibited in those days (Şirin, 2011). Turks who were put into prison were around 12.500.¹⁰ Turks were clearly Bulgaria's *persona non grata* but nothing more. Muslims, especially in the South of Bulgaria, mounted passive resistance against regime forces. According to State Planning Organization, regime forces commenced fires against the ones resisting them (DPT, 1990). These were being done in order to accelerate the rebirth of Bulgaria and to create a homogeneous nation. Yet, Turkey pursued silent diplomacy at the beginning of 1985. Former Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoğlu commented on this by saying that it was Turkey's will to take care of the problems in Bulgaria without damaging the relations and the level of relations between two countries require problems to be solved through dialogue.¹¹ However, the continuing internal pressure and worsening of the situations in Bulgaria pushed the government to take an action. Turkey sent a diplomatic note on February 22, 1985 (Yinanç & Taşdemir, 2002). A far-reaching agreement was offered to the Bulgarian regime. There was an immediate response that they declined the offer. Turkey then sent another note on March 4, 1985. This time, the Communist regime announced that Turkey's attempts were nothing but

⁹ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 23.01.1985

¹⁰ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 23.01.1985

¹¹ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 12.02.1985

interfering in the internal affairs of Bulgaria. In the following month, Turkey requested bilateral meeting to discuss possible solutions. Bulgaria did not accede Turkey's offer again. Turkey's initiatives were not significant in the sense that it could not even bring Bulgaria to sit around the table. Another note on August 24, 1985 was another part of this failure.

Turkey, realizing that diplomatic attempts were in vein, brought the issue to the interest of the international community. With the initiatives of the Turkish delegation, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe condemned the Bulgarian Government's assimilationist policies towards Turkish and Muslim communities on July 2, 1985. FM Halefoğlu explained what was going on in Belene camp and Bulgaria's policies towards the Turkish minority in Council Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Islamic Countries in New York on October 9, 1985 (Kemaloğlu, 2012). In addition to that, Prime Minister Turgut Özal, in his speech on October 22, 1985, by enunciating his thoughts about Bulgaria, condemned Bulgaria's ongoing implementations. In the same year, it was reported that 10 Turks were killed in the *Veletler* neighborhood and 128 others in rural areas of the *Sofular* neighborhood by Bulgarian soldiers.¹² By the end of December 1986, the numbers of Turks killed by Bulgarian forces were around 800.¹³ Although this bad situation received reactions from the international community, no practical solution was at the table. The reason for Turkey not to get a practical political solution at an international level might be due to Bulgaria's accusations against Turkey's so-called unfair policies towards Kurds in domestic affairs and Turkey's critical position in international arena because of the Cyprus Operation. Even though Turkey denied such accusations and accused Bulgaria with racism, it was clear in the minds of state

¹² "Göçmen Heyeti: ANAP Yöneticileriyle Görüşmedik", Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 29.01.1985

¹³ "Bulgar Zulmü İkinci Yılını Tamamladı", Hürriyet, 24.12.1986

officials that Turkey should re-attain its strategic position, which was lost due to aforementioned events, in the Western bloc by strengthening its own power along with democratic principles. Korkud (1986) states, cited in Vasileva, Turkey was trying to demonstrate an image of a new democratic country in spite of the accusations on Turkey's attitudes towards Kurdish people.

2.2 The Great Migration

Protests began on May 20-21, 1989 in North Bulgaria with a special motto of "*Türklüğümüzden asla vazgeçmeyiz, Bulgar isimlerini almayız*" (We never give up our Turkish origin and we do not accept Bulgarian names) (Konukman, 1990). Following the protests, 72 people on May 24, and 180 others on May 30-37 were deported (Konukman, 1990). Lots of people were detained and killed¹⁴ during protests while so many others were injured¹⁵. Turkish villages were surrounded by tanks. On April 1989, Bulgaria started to send small numbers of people to Turkey due to the impaired relations between the two countries¹⁶. 6 people (April 4), 11 (April 26), 9 people (May 12) were sent to Turkey (Kemaloğlu, 2012). Turkey, meanwhile, sent 8 diplomatic notes to Bulgaria within 10 days on May 1989 (In chronological order: May 16, 18*3, 19, 22*2, 24).¹⁷ Starting from May 24, Bulgaria deported Turks in groups by disregarding all former agreements on a unilateral determination¹⁸. Todor Jivkov asked Turkey to open gates if it was willing to take Muslims on May 29, 1989.¹⁹ PM Özal answered by saying that Turkey's borders

¹⁴ "203 Soydaşımız daha geldi", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 08.06.1989

¹⁵ "Bir Bulgar hainliği daha", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 17.05.1989

¹⁶ "Bulgaristan 6 Türk'ü gönderdi", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 06.04.1989

¹⁷ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 7.06.1989

¹⁸ "Bulgaristan'dan gelenler 400'ü buldu", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 03.06.1989

¹⁹ "Zorlama", Milliyet Gazetesi, 30.05.1989

were open and Turkey was ready to make a migration agreement.²⁰ The group that arrived at Turkey in the previous day claimed that Bulgarian forces killed 12 Turks in Şumnu²¹ district. Jivkov, in a speech he made in a TV program on June 2, 1989, stated that Bulgaria would give passports to those who were unwilling to stay. Following his announcements, FM Peter Mladenov declared that visas would be provided for those willing to go (Konukman, 1990). According to FM Mesut Yılmaz, a total of 3035 Turks of Bulgaria crossed to Turkey until June 7th²². The existing visa requirements were removed from Turks of Bulgaria to arrive easily in Anatolian territories on June 2nd. In a month, 135.000 Turks of Bulgaria arrived at Turkey²³. The daily arrival was around 2.000²⁴. As the Minister of State Ercüment Konukman announced, there were 157.377 people who crossed the border as of July 21, 1989²⁵. In early August, the number increased up to 231.000²⁶. As a result, the influx of people reached up to massive amounts, and Turkey welcomed 312. 475 Turks of Bulgaria until the end of August, when Turkey closed its borders²⁷.

²⁰ "Jivkov, Açık Konuş", Milliyet Gazetesi, 31.05.1989

²¹ "Şumnu'da 12 Türk Öldürüldü", Milliyet Gazetesi, 31.05.1989

²² TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 7.06.1989

²³ "Soydaş sayısı 135 bin oldu", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 13.07.1989

²⁴ "Bulgaria Forces Turkish Exodus of Thousands", The New York Times, 22.06.1989

²⁵ "Göçmenlerin bir yıllık ev kiralalarını devlet ödeyecek", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 21.07.1989

²⁶ "Rusya, Türk-Bulgar diyalogundan ümitli değil", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 05.08.1989

²⁷ "Turkey Closing Borders to Refugees From Bulgaria", The New York Times, 22.08.1989

Table 1: The number of Turks of Bulgaria arrived by month

DATE	ARRIVALS		TOTAL
	<i>With VISA</i>	<i>Without VISA</i>	
May 1989	-	1630	1630
June 1989	22	87599	87621
July 1989	79	135237	135316
August 1989	512	87396	87908
GRAND TOTAL	613	311862	312.475

Turks of Bulgaria who were sent with Tourist Visas were allowed to take a limited amount of money (50\$) and the Bulgarian Government announced that their properties are going to be confiscated if they do not return in six months (DPT, 1990). Till August 22nd, when Turkey implemented visas back, over 300.000 people crossed the borders. According to Minister of State, Ercüment Konukman, Turkey stopped accepting people without visas in order to force Bulgaria to make comprehensive migration agreement and secure the properties and rights of people who had already arrived in Turkey²⁸ (Konukman, 1990). From August 1989 to May 1990, 34.098 Turks of Bulgaria came to Turkey by taking visas. Simultaneously, there was a reversed migration from Turkey to Bulgaria due to a number of reasons like concerns about losing properties, concerns for families who left back and so on. Until May 1990, 133.272 people returned back to Bulgaria according to the state records (Konukman, 1990).

²⁸ "Muhalefet göçü siyasi malzeme yapıyor", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 25.08.1989

The influx of Turks of Bulgaria in 1989 was the biggest wave of migration in Europe since the Second World War²⁹. “Refugee emergency response” was so crucial to provide food, shelter and healthcare to newcomers. Yet, it was also difficult due to the high number of people arriving every day. An additional clause was added to the Resettlement Law stating that all people who have come following 1.1.1984 and are of Turkish origin are counted as immigrants. Additionally, with a circular letter no 1989/10 of Directorate General of Personnel and Principles, Coordination Committees were established to locate the places where immigrants would be placed (DPT, 1990). Another immediate issue was the regulation made in law no 3294 “Law on Social Assistance and Solidarity”. With the change in the law, the scope of the people who could benefit from social aid fund was expanded.³⁰ Article 1313 of the Customs Regulation was also changed for newcomers to bring their vehicles without paying any tariffs.³¹ Starting from October 1989, Turks of Bulgaria were also exempted from railway and ferry charges.³²

To set the ground for institutional settlement process, Ministry of State was held responsible for coordination of all procedures regarding the migration, which provided a centralized management process. The Ministry performed duties of providing temporary shelters, permanent housing, transporting to permanent places of living, finding jobs proper to the skills of newcomers, solving problems of education and healthcare and providing housing benefits (Konukman, 1990). Turkish Red Crescent, in coordination with the Ministry, provided immediate aids to the

²⁹ “Flow of Turks Leaving Bulgaria Swells to Hundreds of Thousands”, The New York Times, 15.08.1989; “Bulgaria Persecutes Its Turkish Minority”, The New York Times, 22.07.1989

³⁰ “3294 Sayılı Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışmayı Teşvik Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun”, Resmi Gazete, 4.7.1989

³¹ “23.8.1989, 3/2/1973 Gün ve 14437 Mükerrer Sayılı Resmî Gazete’de Yayımlanan Gümrük Yönetmeliğinin 1313 üncü Maddesinin Değiştirilmesine ve 1333 üncü Maddesinin Kaldınmasına Dair Yönetmelik”, Resmi Gazete

³² Resmi Gazete, 27.10.1989

people settled in temporary shelters. Minister of Health and Social Assistance mobilized all staff in emergency areas.

Effective from 3rd June 1989, 500 tents were set up near city station in Edirne as a temporary staging center. This area, then, became an area for prefabricated houses. For the ones entering from *Kırklareli - Dereköy* border gate, tent cities hosted 21.740 Turks of Bulgaria in the first period. Post and Telegraph Corporation established a branch office in tent cities, while infirmaries and public-soup kitchens were built by the state. Due to the increasing number of people coming per day, tent cities became inadequate so some people were settled in schools and dormitories of Ministry of National Education. The total number of people who settled in these facilities was 43.838 by September 1989 (Konukman, 1990).

2.2.1 Housing

When Turks of Bulgaria first arrived to Turkey, they were filling a form and asked whether they have a place to stay or need government's assistance³³. Those having at least a relative were free to go while others were placed in schools and temporary shelters for short-term³⁴. The distinctive feature of Turks of Bulgaria from other migrants and refugees was that they have relatives spread around Anatolia. These were the people who settled in Turkey from the previous migration waves. Some newcomers found their relatives and started living with them. Some others found new homes with the help of their relatives. To make the settlement process easier, the government provided housing benefit from 100.000 to 300.000 Turkish Liras per month (Scott, 1991). The total housing benefit made between September 1989 and May 1990 was 72.101.452.000 Turkish Liras (Konukman, 1990). By December 18,

³³ "Göçmenlerin bir yıllık ev kirasını devlet ödeyecek", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 21.07.1989

³⁴ "Göç devam ediyor, Kapıkule anababa günü", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 14.06.1989

1989, 48.684 people benefited from housing benefit (DPT, 1990). This number rose up to 212.688 by the end of May 1990 (Konukman, 1990). Regarding the housing issue, Ministry of State started a work on August 10, 1989 and was dedicated to the decision no 89/T 74 of High Planning Council, Housing Development Administration of Turkey (formerly named as *Toplu Konut ve Kamu Ortaklığı İdaresi*) was held responsible for the construction of houses. Construction of first 2000 houses started in Bursa/Kestel, where Turks of Bulgaria were mostly populated in 1989. According to Minister Konukman, 1 out of every 4 people settled in Bursa (Konukman, 1990). The regular budget for the construction project was 500 million US\$, half of which was taken from the European Housing Fund. The Turkish state accepted to take the rest as credits from contractor companies. Ministry of State also started “Build Your Own House” project (Konukman, 1990). Financial and material aid were provided for beneficiaries. The Total amount of money spent for the project was 8 million Turkish Liras. The Minister of State Ercüment Konukman also issued a circular to provincial governorates to locate empty villages and direct immigrants to those places³⁵.

2.2.2 Employment

The employment of Turks of Bulgaria was a crucial problem for the Turkish labor market. Yet, a significant portion of them had vocational education and had work experiences. So, it might be claimed that they were used to compensate the lack of intermediate stuff in the labor market. 95 percent of the people who made job application were skilled people. Working areas and numbers of people who were hired by the end of May 1990 are listed in below-given table (Konukman, 1990).

³⁵ “Özal: Bulgar’dan hesap sorulacak”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 15.06.1989

President Özal promised some small businesses to be free of tax providing that they hire immigrants (Şirin, 2011) while Ekrem Pakdemirli, the Minister of Finance and Customs, announced that those helping Turks of Bulgaria would get tax deductions³⁶. So many businesses in Thracian region preferred immigrants as workers.

2.2.3 Education

Education is another trivet of overall facilities provided to Turks of Bulgaria. 1.613 students were placed in 27 different provinces according to the announcement made by the Ministry of National Education on November 10, 1989 (Konukman, 1990). An additional university entrance exam was held on September 24, 1989 for young Turks to make them pursue their education³⁷. 910 students out of 937 passed the exam and started their education in Turkey. The right to make lateral transfer for the ones who already started universities back in Bulgaria was also granted (Konukman, 1990).

2.3 State Perception towards Turks of Bulgaria

Although not a well-developed country, Turkey did not seek continuous international assistance neither for economic nor military purposes. There were some domestic and international aids made to cover the costs of the facilities. Some banks, Meat and Fish Authority and so many donors collected around 10 trillion Turkish Liras. The United States, nevertheless, assisted Turkey by giving 10 million US dollars (Konukman, 1990). But as Eric Rouleau, the Ambassador of France to Turkey, highlighted that “It is clear that Turkey did not appeal international support”³⁸, it

³⁶ “Göçmenlere yardım eden vergiden düşüyor”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 27.06.1989

³⁷ “Göçmen çocuklarına Ü. Sınavı açılıyor”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 06.08.1989

³⁸ “Bulgar Zulmünü BM’ye götürüyoruz”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 29.08.1989

seems obvious that Turkey mostly tried to bear the burden on its own³⁹. It did not also apply for a military solution in order not to tighten bilateral relations and not to depict a hawkish image in the eyes of the Western world. There was only two attempts to bring the issue to the UN General Assembly⁴⁰ and to the Security Council to impose sanctions on Bulgaria⁴¹.

2.3.1 The Security Perception

In terms of security, we can witness a low level risk assessment due to ethnic and kinship relations between host community and the newcomers. The historical and cultural bonds between people of Anatolia and Bulgaria, as facilitators of integration, played a significant role for the quick emergency responses of the Turkish state toward Turks of Bulgaria. Using the word “*soydaşlar*” (cognates) to describe these people, state officials sought to shape local’s perceptions in order both to avoid any further conflict between locals and newcomers and to promote unity within the society. Although a significant portion of them lived nearby their relatives, it was crucial to consider such issues to promote peace and stability in times of crisis. Lots of news were made to tell people the tragic stories of cognates, most of which ended happily when they arrived Turkey⁴². Such use of rhetoric might be listed as one of the reasons why locals embraced Turks of Bulgaria much easier than they did for other people who had arrived before to Anatolia. Thus, there seemed to be no direct threat perceived to the societal security with their arrival.

³⁹ “Flow of Turks Leaving Bulgaria Swells to Hundreds of Thousands”, The New York Times, 15.08.1989

⁴⁰ “Ankara, at the U.N., Will Press Bulgaria on Turks”, The New York Times, 01.10.1989

⁴¹ “Bulgar Zulmünü BM’ye götürüyoruz”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 29.08.1989

⁴² “Bulgaristan’daki trajedi tüm insanlığın sorunudur”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 16.06.1989

2.3.2 Foreign Policy Achievements

Turkey might be said to have a responsibility of being a transit country for refugees during the Cold War and stretching the limits of such responsibility, by being a host country, was not very welcomed by authorities due to economic and political reasons. The relatively low number of people coming from Eastern Europe and the existence of their applications to seek international protection, which means that they were temporarily living in Turkey, were lessening Turkey's burdens and eliminating its concerns in economic and social terms in the previous times. Yet in 1989, Turks of Bulgaria, who outnumbered all previous groups of immigrants and refugees in Republican history, became a matter of politics for Turkey to demonstrate its upright position against the Eastern bloc although the economic conditions were not so much different than before except Turkey's implementing of the free market economy. Newcomer Turks of Bulgaria, around 310.000, began to be perceived as the Ottoman legacy, whose protection should be provided by new democratic Turkey. Furthermore, it seems that Turkey tried its best to achieve superiority over Bulgaria in strategic terms by using liberal discourses. This was due to Turkey's ideological stance and its willingness to give a good self-image to the practitioners of Western ideologies. Briefly here, there were some efforts to claim Turkey as a power that was adopting democratic principles and implementing liberal policies against the Eastern bloc. As a democratic country, Turkey's conflict against Bulgaria meant Turkey's ubiquitous support to West through fighting over a country of a rival bloc.

First, the Turkish state response was ideological in the sense that Turkey demonstrated to the West that, as a democratic state, Turkey opened its borders and removed visa requirement as a signatory to the 1951 Convention. This was also a responsibility of Turkey given the related articles of 1951 Geneva Convention and

1967 Additional Protocol. What happened was not surprising for a liberal democratic country that observes international rules and norms and Turkey, as part of the Western bloc, should do to demonstrate its own power against the rival bloc, which could result in increasing support of Western countries and decreasing threat of the Eastern bloc. As such, the ideological pillar of the Cold War affected Turkey's migration policy in 1989. While foreign countries praised Turkey's open door policy they condemned Bulgarian Government. One of the first statements came from the White House followed by 12 European countries⁴³. The US Congress also called for immediate end of the racist practices towards the Turkish minority in Bulgaria⁴⁴ and issued a second warning two months later⁴⁵. Turkey's attempts were due to fact that the West did not have sympathy for Turkey that was trying to become part of the European Community. The existing bias towards Turkey due to the human rights issues stimulated by the Kurdish problem was the biggest obstacle for the Turkish state in the way of membership. As Haberman states "(...) Europeans do not discuss the touchy questions of religion, ethnicity and history. What dominates their conversation is that the Turks had better clean up their human-rights act if they hope to join the club"⁴⁶. Thus, Turkey sought to promote itself as a democratic state and an important partner to the West.

Second, it was the *sine qua non* for new revisionist Turkish Foreign Policy laying a strong emphasis on ethnic Turkish identity. Foreign policy of Turkey between 1989 and 1991 was built not only on nation-state principles but also on being influential on former Ottoman territories. The most significant principle of this understanding, called as Neo-Ottomanism, was its emphasis on strong ethnic Turkishness (Balçı,

⁴³ "Bulgarlara Kinama Bombardımanı", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 28.06.1989

⁴⁴ "ABD Kongresi Bulgaristan'ın dersini verdi", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 28.06.1989

⁴⁵ "ABD Sofya'yı uyardı", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 13.08.1989

⁴⁶ "Turkey Wants More Pity and Less Criticism", The New York Times, 20.08.1989

2017) Turks of Bulgaria were never referred as refugees even though they were according to Turkey's definitions. They were reminiscent of Ottoman Empire carrying the Turkish identity. The determinants of neo-Ottomanist understanding were historical heritage and Islamic identity. As Özal stated it was the religion bounding Muslims of Anatolia with the ones in Balkans (Yavuz, 1998). So, along with the above-given determinants, hosting Turks of Bulgaria or opening the border in other words was the expected outcome of this new foreign policy understanding. They were Muslims and they were part of a historical heritage of the Great Ottoman Empire. How Özal conceptualized such foreign policy was that he approached the Balkans not only in terms of economic relations but also identity. Thus, one can say that the state response was identity-driven since the proclivity of Turkish state –in its foreign policy- to the consolidation of strong ethnic Turkishness was meaningful within the identity context. Newcomers were the relatives of already settled immigrants in Turkey. They were seen as the descendants of the Ottoman Empire, whose legacy was sustained in the Turkish Republic. There are two important elements in this context. Ethnically, these people were Turks. Although most of the children did not know Turkish because of the policies implemented by Communist regime, large parts of them were speaking Turkish with slight differences in accents. That is why referring to them as “cognates” made an overwhelming impression among Anatolian people and they supported government's attempts to offer support and services to the newcomers. Another thing is that they were Muslims. Religious identity of Turks of Bulgaria also matched with local Turks (Vasileva, 1992). They were practicing in the same mosques. There were prospective pilgrims who went to Mecca with local Turks. They were breaking the fast together at the same table. These were all signs of coalescence in the society. There was no doubt that the

Islamic religion was an element of the unification within the society (Vasileva, 1992). Cognizant of this situation, the Turkish state opened its borders to “cognates” and provided as much facilities as possible in a very short time following the start of the crisis⁴⁷.

2.4 Conclusion

In some cases, due to inextricable and protracted conflict, migration might result as a byproduct. Yet, in the case of 1989, forced migration was the ultimate aim of the Bulgarian regime. The whole process was formulated as a refugee-generating conflict so that the perpetrators could achieve ethnic unity in line with their ideology. Turkey welcomed Turks of Bulgaria not as “refugees” but as “immigrants” and even “cognates” in non-legal terms. With all legal, social and material assistance, the flow of people became a primary issue of the government. In addition to alternative conceptualization of immigrants, the issue was used as an opportunity to demonstrate Turkey’s strength in regional politics and harmonization with democratic norms and principles. Standing as a representative of the West, Turkey also drove its policies based on the identity factors. Two things have not been revealed so far about 1989 migration: its reflection of the domestic political environment of Turkey and the monopoly of Özal on migratory policies. Tracing the history in much detail may guide future research in explaining these causal nexuses.

⁴⁷ “Bursa Journal; Turks Are Back Among the Minarets, but as Exiles”, The New York Times, 30.08.1989

CHAPTER III

NORTHERN IRAQIS

Although the migration from Bulgaria was referred to as the largest movement since the Second World War, it was only after two years that Turkey received another wave of migration with a magnitude greater than before. In 1991, almost half a million from Iraq left their homes and sought asylum in Turkey in almost two weeks. As Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees between 1991 and 2001, stated, UNHCR in its 40-year history had never witnessed such a movement of migration in such a rapid way. Although she specifically pointed out to the influx of Iraqis following April 2, 1991, it was not the first time they showed up in Turkish borders. Being small in numbers though, there were some Kurds fleeing Iraq during 1960s and 70s (Sheikmous, 1992). However, they did not pose a threat or at least were conceptualized as a threat by the ruling governments. This chapter explains 1991 migration of Northern Iraqi people by focusing on the Turkish state response. After covering services provided for these people, security and foreign policy dimensions are analyzed. It is important to note that Turkey's approach towards Iraqi people was, from the very beginning, not a policy of settlement but a repatriation, where Turkey sought international support in economic and military terms while prioritizing its own security. The Turkish state response towards Iraqi refugees was shaped by the following factors: economic burdens of refugees and seeking of international assistance, fear of having a new "Gaza" along the Turkish borderline and the fight against terrorism (PKK).

There were actually 3 periods of migration starting from August 1988 ringing the alarm bells for the Turkish state (Çakmak, 2015; Latif, 2002). The very first flow

started at the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, when the people of Northern Iraq fled from the brutality of the Iraqi Army as a matter of survival. The second time Northern Iraqis appeared in Turkish borders is the period between 2 August 1990, the time Saddam Hussein's army started the invasion of Kuwait, known as the Persian Gulf Crisis, and 17 October 1991, the time international coalition launched a joint military operation against Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, namely the Operation Desert Shield, authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The last and the massive influx of people from Northern Iraq, which this study sheds more light on, was following 2 April 1991, when people escaped from Saddam's army by having the previous memory of the use of chemical weapons in 1988, thus fearing that the same would happen again. It was one of worst tragedies of humanity the world had witnessed since the Second World War and Turkey was caught unprepared to overcome with a flow of migration in such magnitude though having received thousands in the previous years both from its southeastern and northwestern borders. This time, there were too many parameters; ethnic tensions, cultural differences, economic incapability, security of borders, perspectives of the Turkish Armed Forces, Western pressure, etc., to consider while sudden flow of almost half a million happened in such short notice, around two weeks. Yet, a comprehensive analysis of the two previous migration flows is necessary to draw conclusions for the last one. Even though the third flow is the point of comparison for the overall study, an adequate process of tracing the previous ones may reveal supplementary hints paving the way for a better normative analysis of the Turkish migratory regime.

3.1 First Flow: The Case of 1988

With the support of Iraqi Kurds, Iran captured Hirmal and Halabja cities of Iraq during the last phase of the Iran-Iraqi War. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein took his revenge on the Kurdish people with a chemical attack in March 1988 on Halabja, military operation known as al-Anfal (Hiltermann, 2008; Ihlamur-Öner, 2013), where about 5.000 people died. The chemical attack was then repeated again on August in Badinan region (Hooglund, 1991; Sheikmous, 1992). Following the later attack, despite the worldwide attention it attracted, Iraqi forces attacked Kurdish people of Northern Iraq in late August. Thousands, fearing that a new Halabja attack would happen again, fled their homes and took the roads towards Turkey⁴⁸. Starting from 28 August 1988, Turkey received 51.440 people only in one week (Kaya, 2009), as Interior Minister Mustafa Kalemli stated, and set up temporary camps and portable hospitals to meet the urgent needs of incomers⁴⁹. Nevertheless, it is worth to mention that Turkey closed the borders when they first arrived and send those who already passed to Turkish territories back to the Iraqi side. Turkish Minister of Defense Ercan Vuralhan initially underlined that they opposed granting asylum to these people (Latif, 2002). It was no sooner than international pressure increased and urged PM Özal to make an announcement on the importance of humanitarian aid, and opening the borders. Nevertheless, Turkey announced that Iraqi people would be given temporary residence permit but no refugee status (Oran, 2013). The Turkish state named these people as *de facto* asylum seekers⁵⁰ (Kaya, 2009), who entered Turkish territories from 16 different points. Although Western sources generally

⁴⁸ "Akın akın peşmerge", Milliyet Gazetesi, 31.08.1988

⁴⁹ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 01.11.1988

⁵⁰ Öztığ (2016) argues that Turkey saw them as temporary guests while Kirişçi (1996) identifies them as "non-convention" refugees.

label some as refugees and others as migrants, all agreed that they were part of a “complicated human movement” in Sirkeci’s (2005) words and were identified as asylum seekers⁵¹ due to Turkey’s geographic limitation to 1967 Additional Protocol⁵². These people were first gathered in 10 camps⁵³ and then settled into 5 different temporary shelters, 1 in Mardin city center, 1 in Silopi, 2 in Yüksekova and 1 in Diyarbakır city center (Latif, 2002). 12.980 people were in Diyarbakır, 4.655 were in Mardin city center, 10.554 were in Silopi while 23.353 in Yüksekova (Kaynak, 1992). In February 1990, as the numbers provided by Mehmet Yazar, Minister of State, 31.580 of Iraqis were still living in Turkey⁵⁴.

One of the temporary shelters established was the one in Yenikent/Diyarbakır, which was originally built for earthquake victims of Lice. There were 450 apartments and the rent per apartment was 150.000 TL, paid by the Turkish state. There were 36 staff providing medical and administrative services (Kaynak, 1992). More than 160.000 refugees underwent medical screening while more were vaccinated. Yet, it was not enough to prevent 414 people from dying in Diyarbakır.

⁵¹ For the purpose of this study, I use the term “refugee” to avoid any confusion.

⁵² Turkey only accept refugees coming from the West thus excluding people coming through its eastern borders from the legal rights of being a refugee.

⁵³ There were 12 camps according to Baskın Oran (Oran, 2013)

⁵⁴ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 20.02.1990; “Kurdish refugees from ’88 exodus still languishing in Turkish camps”, The New York Times, 13.04.1991

Table 2: Number of Iraqi refugees residing in camps, 1990

PROVINCE AGE DISTRIBUTION	DİİYARBAKIR	MARDİN	MUŞ	TOTAL
0-6	2.862	2.674	1.466	7.002
6-14	2.854	3.686	1.195	7.735
14+	4.333	4.748	2.052	11.136
TOTAL	10.049	11.108	4.716	25.873

(Geçici Barınma Merkezi Müdürlükleri, August 1991; Kaynak, 1992)

Electricity was provided and people had access to clean water. Approximately half of the apartments had refrigerators enabling refugees to store foods. Further, there was a market-place where vegetables and fruits were being sold by the locals (Kaynak, 1992). Although being limited, dry food, wood and coal were provided to most of the families.

When they first arrived in camps, officials gave temporary residence permits for the duration of 6 months while allowing travels within and beyond Turkish borders⁵⁵.

This policy was maintained for all Iraqi refugees in the following processes. A Turkish language course was opened for those who were willing to learn in 1990-1991 academic year, from which almost 2.000 students benefited (Kaynak, 1992).

Another camp was established in Kızıltepe/Mardin. There were 2.039 tents as of August 1991. The number of Iraqis residing there was 11.108. 28 medical staff and 21 administrative workers were on the camps providing service. Some people sent

⁵⁵ "Sığınanlara geçici iskân", Milliyet Gazetesi, 02.09.1988

their children to mosques in order for them to continue their education in Arabic, while some other syllabus courses were also opened in elementary level.

The Last camp in Yenikent/Muş, consisting of apartments built within “village-city” projects initiated by the Ministry of Development and Housing, hosted more than 8.000 Iraqis, 4.052 of whom turned back by 30 July 1991 (Kaynak, 1992). Everyday around 300 people worked as day laborers in the surrounding farms. Facility in Muş was much better than others in terms of security, and education. There was an elementary school in which 1.035 students continued their education (Kaynak, 1992). Every month, officials delivered dry food packages to the residents while providing bread per day. Wood and coal in different scales were also provided as it was the case in other facilities.

Temporary shelters were established within the authority of the Law for Provincial Administration. The aids provided for these shelters were managed through the Commissions (The Commission for Receiving and Sending Aid Materials) set up in Diyarbakır and Hakkari by the Governorship of the State of Emergency of the region. Governors were held responsible in the name of the state in order to manage all aid processes.

As can be understood, some facilities were ready while others required some pre-work and management to be available for refugees. 1.214.582.089 TL spent for the preparation process of three different camps, including water delivery, asphalt pavement of the rocky roads and environmental luminance. Yet it was just the beginning of a relatively long term of spending. Although some returned, there were still 20.000 refugees as of October 1991. From August 1988 to June 1991,

3.649.421.381 TL spent for medical services⁵⁶ (1.224.522.533 in Diyarbakır, 166.512.480 in Hakkari, 1.416.152.868 in Mardin and 861.536.400 in Muş) (Kaynak, 1992). Additional 1.999.000.000 TL was spent from the fund for the encouragement of social cooperation and solidarity. Yet, the big portion of the spending was made from the national budget with a total amount of 51.809.436.930 TL until June 6, 1991⁵⁷ (21.982.776.000 in Diyarbakır, 600.000.000 in Hakkari, 20.247.089.780 in Mardin and 8.979.571.150 in Muş) (Kaynak, 1992). When combined all together, adding up foreign aid and aid in kind, 80.406.347.452 TL was spent for those who sought protection after August 1988⁵⁸.

3.2 Second Flow: August 2, 1990 – April 2, 1991

Since the causes and the background of the war is subject to other studies, I will generally focus on the ensuing days of the Persian Gulf War its costs for Turkey. Starting from august 2, 1990, for less than a week, Saddam's forces, composed of 150.000 troops, annexed Kuwait (Amiri & Soltani, 2011) by asserting some cover-up reasons to the international community (Greenwood, 1991). When Saddam declared Kuwait as the 19th province of Iraq, the Gulf Crisis was internationalized and economic sanctions were imposed by United Nations (Kavak, 2013). UN Resolution 661⁵⁹ imposed sanctions (Hale, 1992) while Resolution 678 authorized Member States to use all necessary means unless Iraq would not withdraw from Kuwait until 15 January 1991⁶⁰. Before then, President Turgut Özal issued a statement demanding Iraq to unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait in National Security Council (Oran, 1996). Turkish Grand National Assembly authorized the Cabinet to

⁵⁶ Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği Raporu, 12.07.1991

⁵⁷ ibid

⁵⁸ ibid

⁵⁹ UN Resolution 661 (1990) of 6.08.1990

⁶⁰ UN Resolution 678 (1990) of 29.11.1990

prepare and send Turkish Armed Forces to foreign soils, allow foreign troops' entry to Turkey, and declare war when necessary in a closed session on August 12, 1990⁶¹. This was followed by the resolution passed on September 5, 1990 with 136 votes against and 246 in favor, expanding the authority of the Government regarding the previous resolution⁶². And finally, with the resolution passed on 17 January 1991 in support of the UN Resolution 678, Turkey set the ground for taking all necessary measures against the threats along its borders⁶³. And it was the same date that due to the end of time the for Iraq's withdrawal, joint military operation started. At this point, the period between the annexation of Kuwait (02.08.1990), and the beginning of the military operation, namely the Desert Shield, (17.01.1991) was the time slot when the second flow of migration occurred.

This flow involved people from different nationalities other than Iraq, who had been working in Iraq and Kuwait before the annexation. It was stated that most had Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani origin with also 4.778 Turkish individuals. Some sources indicated that there were approximately 200.000 people⁶⁴ waiting in Habur and Cilvegözü border gate⁶⁵ although the official overall number of people was 62.922 (Kaynak, 1992). When they arrived to Turkey after the first days of the annexation, the Minister of State Mehmet Keçeciler stated that Turkey has already started providing care for 25.000 people and already spent 15.000.000.000 TL received from the fund for the encouragement of social cooperation and solidarity⁶⁶. Increasing numbers pushed the Turkish state to look for other alternatives making applications to UNHCR, World Food Program, and International Red Crescent.

⁶¹ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 12.08.1990

⁶² TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 05.09.1990

⁶³ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 17.01.1991

⁶⁴ "Kapımızda 200 bin Asyalı", Milliyet Gazetesi, 29.08.1990

⁶⁵ "Can Kapısı Habur", Milliyet Gazetesi, 02.09.1990

⁶⁶ "Mülteci Sancısı", Milliye Gazetesi, 07.09.1990

With Kızılay's (Turkish Red Crescent) first responders team on Habur border gate, urgent patients including children were tried to be examined⁶⁷. Most of these people were hosted for a short-term period before their departure to their own countries (İçduygu, The Politics of International Migratory Regimes: Transit Migration Flows in Turkey, 2000). In this sense, Turkey had just become a transit state for these people; their presence did not pose significant economic problems for the Turkish state when compared to other refugees.

The second group of people who came following 2 August 1990 settled first in temporary camps in Şırnak, Van, Mardin and Diyarbakır. Then additional asylum centers were prepared and some were moved to other places. Although it is not clear how many of them were there at the beginning and how many returned, the total number for this group was 7.489 according to the Governorship of the state of emergency of region on July 1991.

Table 3: Number of Iraqi Refugees residing in camps, 1991

TEMPORARY SHELTERS	NUMBER OF REFUGEES
TATVAN	889
KAYSERİ	1.122
KANGAL	795
SİİRT	684
VAN	241
HAKKARİ	2.123
OTHERS	1.635
TOTAL	7.489

(Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği, Brifing Notları, 12 Temmuz 1991)

⁶⁷ "Habur'da Buruk Özgürlük", Milliyet Gazetesi, 06.09.1990

Kangal, one of the temporary shelters listed above, was put into service on February 1991. Starting with the refugees coming after the annexation of Kuwait, this shelter hosted around 2.000 people including the ones who came with the third flow. 1.159 Refugees staying there were given residence permit; many of them later traveled to İstanbul and Ankara. The criteria to provide residence permit was three-fold: having enough resources to manage daily life or having first or second degree relatives living in Turkey; being able to prove that s/he can manage her/his daily life not having a relative though; being able to prove that s/he can manage her/his daily life with the financial opportunities obtained abroad (Kaynak, 1992). Dry food deliveries and portable kitchens, where continuous flour deliveries were being made, were included while 33 security officers and 6 medical staff were working in shifts (Özdemir, 2017). This shelter was different in the sense that it was hosting refugees who were soldiers back in Iraq, most of whom returned or went near their families in other shelters after it was thought that their departure would be safe (Kaynak, 1992). The total number of military personnel was around 1.800 (Kirişçi, 1994). The same procedure was followed after the third flow and Iraqi soldiers were taken to different camps as required by Law 4104 with the supervision of Ministry of National Defense (Ulutaş, 2006).

Another shelter located in Tatvan hosted more than 1.000 people in early January 1991 and received more following April as it was the case for Kangal temporary shelter. By August 1991, only 16 of them left and the situation of the residents were relatively better than much of the rest. 8 security officers and 3 medical staff served in the shelter throughout the process.

Although we do know a little about these temporary shelters, it is clear that it was a patchwork solution of the Turkish state whose limited resources restricting its ability

to provide more. Some of these shelters were previous guesthouses while some are building complexes constructed for different purposes. Borders were open and contrary to the rumors that Turkey closed its border gate, Minister of Interior Abdülkadir Aksu stated that it is out of question for Turkey to close borders⁶⁸. The initial policy of the state was to settle these people to specified places in order not to cause social unrest along the borders. While they were taken to their temporary homes, the government was dealing with Saddam Hussein who had already waged a new war and complicated regional dynamics. President Özal was in search for international support conducting a shuttle diplomacy between his foreign counterparts⁶⁹ while trying to solve the crisis in which almost a thousand Turkish workers were taken hostages by Iraq⁷⁰. There were fierce conversations in the assembly -opposition parties being skeptical thus standing against any military involvement at the beginning-. Bülent Ecevit, leader of DSP (Democratic Left Party), went to Iraq and met Saddam⁷¹ to mitigate the atmosphere between Turkey and Iraq caused by Saddam Hussein's condemnation of President Özal for opening Turkey's military bases, allying with the West, to foreign troops for an operation. In parallel with these developments the crisis in the Gulf costed 38.5 billion dollars to the Turkish economy just in two months⁷². This was not only due to the costs of refugees but some other factors as well like the sharp decrease in the trade volume with Iraq because of the sanctions, losing transportation fees of Kerkük-Yumurtalık oil

⁶⁸ "Sınırdaki rehinelere", Milliyet Gazetesi, 25.08.1990

⁶⁹ "Turgut Özal: 'Bush'a tavsiyede bulundum", Milliyet Gazetesi, 05.08.1990; "Özal Bush'u terletecek", Milliyet Gazetesi, 22.09.1990; "4. Durak Kahire", Milliyet Gazetesi, 17.10.1990; "Özal, İran'ın nabzını yoklayacak", Milliyet Gazetesi, 03.11.1990; "Paris çıkarması", Milliyet Gazetesi, 18.11.1990

⁷⁰ "960 Türk rehin", Milliyet Gazetesi, 28.08.1990

⁷¹ "Milliyet ve Ecevit, Bağdat'ta Sarayda", Milliyet Gazetesi, 18.09.1990

⁷² "Körfez zararı 38.5 trilyon", Milliyet Gazetesi, 28.09.1990

pipeline⁷³ from which Iraq reduced the flow by 35 percent, cutback from exports to Kuwait, crisis' repercussions on tourism sector and so forth. Yet, daily costs of refugees were always at the forefront for policy-makers, which we can understand from their willingness to intervene in Iraq and provide all necessary grounds⁷⁴ for the troops-to-come for a possible military operation within Turkish territories⁷⁵. Under these circumstances, relatively low number of refugees –when compared to Turks of Bulgaria arrived in the previous year- had constituted a major obstacle for the stability of politics and economy.

All in all, it was quite clear that Turkey had already started seeking international military support and taking security measures in and outside the camps before the mass migration of Northern Iraqi people started. While the security personnel were ready inside the camps, quick repatriation of incomers was the ultimate goal in order not to cause any threat to the existing local communities. At the same time, the establishment of camps and the infrastructure works carried out before 1991 taught Turkey how to respond to the migration relatively better than before.

3.3 Third Flow: The Case of 1991

As stated earlier, UN Resolution 678 imposed a deadline for Saddam regime to withdraw from Kuwaiti territories and allied forces composed of 29 countries started Operation Desert Storm –first aerial bombardment, and then land operation- on January 17, 1991 when Saddam refused to obey. In late February, President Bush announced that the war was over and Kuwait is freed from Iraqi troops⁷⁶. Declaration of ceasefire by the US President on February 27, 1991 marked the beginning of a

⁷³ "İrak, boruyu kapadı", Milliyet Gazetesi, 07.08.1990

⁷⁴ "14 F-111 uçağı İncirlik'te", Milliyet Gazetesi, 08.08.1990; TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 05.09.1990

⁷⁵ "Nereye kadar gideceğiz?", Milliyet Gazetesi, 13.08.1990

⁷⁶ "US halts offensive combat; Kuwait freed, Iraqis crushed", The New York Times, 28.02.1991

shift in “enemy” prioritization for Saddam Hussein. It was Saddam who approved UN Resolution 686 on April 3, 1991 (Öztüğ, 2016) and suspended the offensive while accepting all previous resolutions regarding the annexation of Kuwait⁷⁷. Now, the domestic agenda was to shape the mindset of his politics, especially in the ensuing days of the ceasefire when Kurds rebelled in the North (Çakmak, 2015). The use of combat aircrafts and missiles was prohibited by the Resolution 686 and this led Saddam to suppress the rebellion by using helicopters which heavily bombarded Kurdish villages, crushed the rebellion and forced thousands, defenseless against the bombardment, to escape from their homes (Avşar and Tunçalp, 1995; Oran, 1996). On April 1, 1991 Iraqi forces captured Erbil, Dohuk and Zakho, places where rebels took control a short time ago, banishing thousands to the mountainous areas⁷⁸ between Turkey and Iraq (Özdemir, 2017). Although there was this expectation by Kurdish leaders that the US would intervene and block Iraqi assault, Bush did not compromise⁷⁹. His remarks on the issue summarized his initial position: “Iraqi people must decide their own political future”⁸⁰. Thus, the “Great Migration” of Northern Iraqis began (Danış, 2009).

Iraqi people starting from April 2, 1991 arrived to Turkey, entering from 14 different points at the borders.

⁷⁷ UN Resolution 686 (1991), 02.03.1991

⁷⁸ “Kuzey Irak Saddam’ın”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 02.04.1991

⁷⁹ “Kürtleri Bush sattı”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 01.04.1991

⁸⁰ “Bush defends non-intervention in Iraq”, Washington Post, 14.04.1991

Table 4: Number of Iraqi refugees according to their point of entrance, 1991

The Point of Entrance	Number of Refugees
Işıkveren	194.000
Kayadibi	12.000
Yıldız	27.000
Yekmal	10.000
Andaç	13.000
Ortaköy	4.000
Asmaköprü	30.000
Üzümlü	50.000
Işıklı	3.000
49 Nolu Sınır taşı	65.000
Karasu	20.000
Çayirli	5.000
Pirinçeken	12.000
Yeşilova	15.000
TOTAL	460.000

(Kaynak, 1992)

Although different numbers have been put forward about the arrivals per day, we can precisely say that it summed up to 460.00 on 14 April 1991, meaning that Turkey received almost half a million people in less than two weeks⁸¹. There were Turkmens, Christians from different ethnic backgrounds and Arabs among the refugees.

Turkey was initially reluctant to open its borders with the decision taken in National Security Council (Kirişçi, 1994; Damış, 2009). On April 2, 1991, National Security Council decided to close the borders while almost 200.000 people drifting in the Turkish border⁸² (Latif, 2002; Öztığ, 2016). Özal explained the situation by saying

⁸¹ "Sınırlarımızdan giren göçmen sayısı 400 bini geçti", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 15.04.1991

⁸² "Iraqi revolts abate as Kurdish forces flee to mountains", The New York Times, 03.04.1991

that Turkish soldiers in accordance with the order they had been given were trying to stop refugees⁸³. Chief spokesman for the Foreign Ministry Murat Sungar said that Turkey was taking necessary measures which would make entries more difficult⁸⁴. Such remarks were due to the perception of state officials designating Iraqi people as a threat, as Deputy Foreign Minister Tugay Özçeri stated⁸⁵. Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin, Foreign Minister of Turkey, said that they would not allow the international community to burden the costs of hundreds of thousands of people to Turkey like it happened in 1988⁸⁶ since the burden of the first flow of refugees were still damaging the economy and making the Government reluctant to welcome more people (Özdemir, 2016). The Turkish state clearly did not want to repeat the same “mistake” it did in 1988 and 1990⁸⁷. This explains why the first and second flows of people from Iraq are significant to examine the state response in 1991.

President Özal was complaining about the West’s unwillingness to share the burden in an interview he made on British Channel Four Television. He stated that he was asked from Europe to receive half of the refugees then Turkey would take care of the rest⁸⁸. The hesitation was clearly reflected in his words when he said “We cannot settle these people to Turkey”, although he emphasized Turkey’s willingness to help these people with food and shelter⁸⁹. He also took one step forward and told the Parliament that Turkey does not completely open the borders⁹⁰. National Security Council calls for assessment meetings together with the Ambassadors of the

⁸³ “Gerekirse askeri müdahale yaparız”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 07.04.1991; Nevertheless, they were not successful to stop the flow.

⁸⁴ “Turkey is keeping frontiers closed”, The New York Times, 05.04.1991

⁸⁵ “Kurds on Turkey border scramble for the basics”, The New York Times, 06.04.1991

⁸⁶ “Müdahale edebiliriz”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 06.04.1991

⁸⁷ “Refugees escaping to Turkey rely on fellow Kurds for aid”, The New York Times, 07.04.1991; “Kurds on Turkey border scramble for the basics”, The New York Times, 06.04.1991

⁸⁸ “Olan bize oldu”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 05.04.1991; “Turkey is keeping frontiers closed”, The New York Times, 05.04.1991

⁸⁹ *ibid*

⁹⁰ “Müdahale edebiliriz”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 06.04.1991

Members of UN Security Council⁹¹. Although there were some people raising voice in support for Turkey's call for help like the Rapporteur of the European Parliament Raymonde Dury⁹², negligence of others forced Özal to attract the attention of the rest of the world by introducing a proposal to the United Nations demanding Iraq to end all oppressive practices⁹³. By doing so, he initiated a set of decisions that was to follow regarding Iraqi refugees. In parallel with these developments, USA, as Turkey's preferential choice to look for help in any kind, was in touch with the Turkish Government via Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz. Government officials were repeatedly stating him that Turkey "could not afford to permit a mass entry of perhaps as many as 500.000"⁹⁴. Nevertheless, the very first response to the Government's call came from the United Kingdom. The British Government summoned Turkish Ambassador Nurver Nurses and conveyed their message that UK was ready to help only if Turkey opens its borders⁹⁵. Earlier that day, \$1.77 million emergency public relief was announced⁹⁶. It was the day Turkey opened the borders, not just only due to an announcement of international aid but also due to the UN Resolution 688 (mentioned below), and started receiving Iraqi people into Turkish territories (Öztiğ, 2016).

At the same time there were heated debates in the Turkish public opinion questioning whether closing the border was because of the fear that newcomers would provoke Kurds living in Turkey and subvert the social dynamics since their presence seemed to make Kurds in Turkey more noticeable or not (Uçar & Akandere, 2017). While

⁹¹ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 03.04.1991; "MGK BM'yi acil yardıma çağırıldı", Milliyet Gazetesi, 03.04.1991

⁹² "Trajedi Türkiye'ye fatura edilemez", Milliyet Gazetesi, 06.04.1991

⁹³ "Türkiye'nin BM'ye sunduğu Kürt karar tasarısı", Milliyet Gazetesi, 06.04.1991

⁹⁴ "U.S. urges Turkey to open borders to fleeing Kurds", The New York Times, 05.04.1991

⁹⁵ "Sınırları açın, yardım alın", Milliyet Gazetesi, 05.04.1991

⁹⁶ "U.S. urges Turkey to open borders to fleeing Kurds", The New York Times, 05.04.1991

some columnists were touching upon that argument⁹⁷, some others already started to mention the costs inflicted by refugees in 1988⁹⁸. The mounting pressure on the Government was remarkable when it was reported that the number of refugees increased up to 200.000⁹⁹. It was under this atmosphere UN Resolution 687 came into force inviting Iraq to affirm all the obligations it went under by signing a list of agreements which were violated through the use of chemical and biological weapons and violating a sovereign state's boundaries¹⁰⁰. Yet it just made an invitation to facilitate repatriation of displaced persons but nothing more which had no footprint in practice. It was Özal's plan, as stated earlier, to bring the USA to the field and that's why he said the United States should deploy both naval and land forces to the Gulf on ABC Television in the following day of the first arrivals¹⁰¹. It was again Özal who proposed a "Safe Haven" for Iraqi people on the Iraqi side of the border thus, shuttled back and forth between Western countries (Çakmak, 2012; Galbraith, 2007; Danış, 2009). French Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Michel Bonnot, after visiting Iraqi-Turkish border, verified the need for a buffer zone which would serve as a temporary home for displaced persons¹⁰². According to the US Ambassador to Turkey, it was even Özal's idea to shut down pipelines which he talked on the phone with President George Bush (Kirişçi, 2000). When British Prime Minister John Major proposed a two-step proposal projecting the establishment of a Kurdish enclave on Luxembourg Summit of the European Economic Community¹⁰³, Turkish-

⁹⁷ "Kabahat kimde?", Milliyet Gazetesi, 05.04.1991

⁹⁸ "Mültecilerin aylık faturası 390 bin", Milliyet Gazetesi, 06.04.1991; "Göçün Türkiye'ye faturası 333 milyar", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 20.04.1991

⁹⁹ "Peşmergeler sınırımızda", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 04.04.1991; "Turkey rejects mass entry of Kurds", The New York Times, 04.04.1991

¹⁰⁰ UN Resolution 687 (1991), 03.04.1991

¹⁰¹ "Bağımsız Kürt Devleti olmayacak", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 02.04.1991; "Gerekirse askeri müdahale yaparız", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 07.04.1991

¹⁰² "Çözüm tampon bölge", Milliyet Gazetesi, 11.04.1991

¹⁰³ European Union in current terms

led idea was put into action (Oran, 1996). On the other side, UN Security Council Resolution 688 assigned Secretary General to address all needs of displaced Iraqi population while demanding Iraq to allow all humanitarian aid to be delivered to those in need¹⁰⁴. Based on that, a memorandum of understanding¹⁰⁵ between United Nations and Iraq stating that the Government of Iraq was accepting (welcoming) UN efforts to “promote the voluntary return” signed on 18th of April¹⁰⁶, 1991 by Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive Delegate of UN Secretary General, and Ahmed Hussein, Foreign Minister of Iraq which was later renewed by a new one on November 1991¹⁰⁷. British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd expounded the issue by saying that it broke a new ground while respecting the authority of a sovereign state within the given borders but also not leaving behind those suffering from inhumane treatments (Sheikmous, 1992). But Resolution 688 also meant that there was now a ground for a possible operation with which a process of repatriation may be conducted in the following days. It was only after Resolution 688 that Turkey opened its borders when it was thought that the return of refugees is guaranteed. It also brought US Foreign Minister (Secretary of State) James Baker to Turkey¹⁰⁸ where he and his counterpart Alptemoçin visited the border area and made a joint statement calling the word for help¹⁰⁹ (US-Department-of-State, 1991). The following process was marked with the Operation Provide Comfort within which allied troops intervened in Northern Iraq and set up camps for displaced people. The announcement by US President Bush after having an agreement on the roadmap with

¹⁰⁴ UN Resolution 688 (1991), of 5 April 1991

¹⁰⁵ Memorandum of Understanding, 18.04.1991

¹⁰⁶ “Bağdat-BM anlaştı”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 19.04.1991

¹⁰⁷ Memorandum of Understanding, 24.11.1991

¹⁰⁸ “Yardıma müdahaleye izin vermeyiz”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 09.04.1991

¹⁰⁹ “Baker dünyayı yardıma çağırdı”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 10.04.1991

his European counterparts¹¹⁰. It was due to this operation that the US humanitarian aids sent via ships to İskenderun port were conveyed safely¹¹¹.

The magnitude of the migration was a great danger for a state which is not only suffering from economic backlashes due to the costs of the previous refugees and migrants but also had no structural administration assigned specifically to dealing with these issues. So, it was not easy to coordinate the emergency response plan for thousands of people piling up along the borderline. To this end, Minister of State Vehbi Dinçerler was assigned as the Minister of Coordination on April 3, 1991 and managed all related works in coordination with the Governorship of the state of emergency of region in Diyarbakır (Kaynak, 1992). Under his supervision, an administration center was established in the following days under which representatives from most of the ministries together with National Intelligence Service (MİT) and Kızılay conducted weekly meetings.

The Administration center aimed at stimulating the coordination between ministries and governing provincials while supporting centers in line with the government's policies. These centers were primarily responsible for the distribution of aid and ensuring the security of the shelters. The administration center was extinguished on 10 July, 1991 when people were re-settled into the camps set up in Northern Iraq. Until that time they coordinated up to 20 different temporary shelters including the ones already established for previous refugees (Lyman, Update on Iraqi Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1991). Beside provincial coordination and support centers,

¹¹⁰ "Bush sees Accord on 'Safe Haven' for Kurds in Iraq", The New York Times, 12.04.1991

¹¹¹ "Rahatlama operasyonu", Milliyet Gazetesi, 14.04.1991

governors were making public announcements to ask all citizens having large passenger vehicles especially trucks to help transferring the goods to refugees¹¹².

Medical problems together with the high death rates on the very first days of the arrival (50 per day in Işıkveren camp) posed a great danger for the refugees (Lyman, 1991). The rising number of refugees having bloody diarrhea resulted in 1.500 death in 5 days¹¹³. And it was not the only epidemic spreading in the region. Dysentery¹¹⁴ and cholera¹¹⁵ epidemically was diagnosed among hundreds of refugees. In late April, the spokesman of the US State Department announced that 510 people were dying on a daily basis average¹¹⁶. In the first three days of the flow, the Ministry of Health sent injectors, serums, medicines, compression bandages and portable hospital tents to the borderline in order to make immediate treatments (Kaynak, 1992). With Kızılay and local medical teams' vigorous efforts, most people were treated and the death rate was gradually decreasing (Lyman, Update on Iraqi Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1991).

When masses reached Turkey, two biggest problems were raised: shelter and food. Four portable bakeries were set up by Turkish General Staff and the daily bread output increased up to 150.000 for Şırnak¹¹⁷. This number also includes individual efforts of local residents who have shared basic foodstuff of their own with refugees. Until the end of December 1991, 420 tons of flour; 3.950 tons of bread, 600 tons of blanket, 320 tons of tent, 360 tons of medicine and other medical stuff, 240 tons of shoes, and 2.140 tons of garment were delivered to refugees in Hakkari and

¹¹² "Çocuklarımız bombalandı", Milliyet Gazetesi, 07.04.1991

¹¹³ "Sınırdaki 1.500 ölü", Milliyet Gazetesi, 07.04.1991

¹¹⁴ "Silopi kampında dizanteri salgını", Milliyet Gazetesi, 27.04.1991

¹¹⁵ "Kamplarda salgın hastalık", Milliyet Gazetesi, 29.04.1991

¹¹⁶ "Günde 510 sığınmacı ölüyor", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 25.04.1991; "Bölgede her gün 510 sığınmacı ölüyor", Milliyet Gazetesi, 24.04.1991

¹¹⁷ "Kurds on Turkey border scramble for the basics", The New York Times, 06.04.1991

Şırnak¹¹⁸. At the same time, the huge amount of public relief was “a shot in the arm” and helped to manage the continuity of services to an extent. The total amount of public relief made by the Turkish society was 582.047.712.840 TL while the overall public relief was 681.597.008.840 TL¹¹⁹. This corresponds to 85.4 % of the total amount of the public relief made until the end of May. Social Insurance Institution that donated medicine amounted for 25 million TL. İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Governorate of Ankara, and Directorate of Religious Affairs organized aid campaigns while Sultan Airlines announced it would donate 2.225 TL per every return ticket bought¹²⁰. The Ministry of Health’s public relief was 82.000.000.000, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs’ 908.296.000, Kızılay’s 10.026.000.000, TEKEL (Turkish tobacco and alcoholic beverages company) General Directorate’s 6.500.000.000, and TÜRKİŞ (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions) General Directorate’s was 115.000.000 TL¹²¹.

Moreover, there were financial aids spent mostly for infrastructure, health and security services. General Directorate of Rural Services spent 39.734.000.000 TL for infrastructure services in camping areas. General Directorate of PTT (Post and Telegraph Directorate) came after with a total spending of 28.530.700.000 TL again until the end of May. The total amount of money spent for infrastructure works was 71.796.720.495 TL¹²². In addition to that, the Ministry of Health’s spending was 201.882.800.000 TL taking the lead in financial aids, followed by Ministry of Interior with 36.818.199.012 TL. When combined, Turkish General Staff and Ministry of Defense spent 26.910.691.068 TL in the same period (Kaynak, 1992).

¹¹⁸ T.C. Başbakanlık, Güvenlik İşleri Başkanlığı Raporu, 19.07.1991

¹¹⁹ ibid

¹²⁰ “Mültecilere yardım kampanyası hızla devam ediyor”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 13.04.1991; “Mültecilere yardım hızla devam ediyor”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 19.04.1991

¹²¹ T.C. Başbakanlık, Güvenlik İşleri Başkanlığı Raporu, 19.07.1991

¹²² ibid

Total amount of financial aid used for health, security, and other services was 276.488.465.080 TL. Overall the financial aid officially recorded until the end of May was 348. 285.185.575 TL, making the total amount of money spent by Turkey, including all actors (public relief + financial aid), 1.029.882.194.415 TL. So more than 1 trillion Turkish Liras spent by the Turkish state. In order to clarify the amount of money spent for Iraqi people, we can look at the Gross Domestic Product of Turkey in 1991 and compare the two. GDP in purchasers' value was 630.116.960.000.000 TL, which means the ratio was approximately 1:630 in a state where the population was more than 57 million (TÜİK, 2017).

Table 5: Government spending by agencies, 1991

AGENCY	SPENDING
General Directorate of Rural Services	39.734.000.000 TL
Post and Telegraph Directorate	28.530.700.000 TL
Ministry of Health	201.882.800.000 TL
Ministry of Interior	36.818.199.012 TL
Turkish General Staff & Ministry of Defense	26.910.691.068 TL
Others	14.408.795.495 TL
TOTAL	348.285.185.575 TL

According to US reports on the situation of displaced individuals, Turkey spent \$ 93.4 million just in April alone (Lyman, Update on Iraqi Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1991). \$93.4 million that Turkey spent correspond to 375.928.462.000

Turkish Liras when multiplied by the exchange rate¹²³ dated 30 May 1991. So we can presume that more than two thirds of the overall state spending made in April, the first month of the Iraqi mass migration.

As soon as the encampments were ready for Iraqis in Zakho¹²⁴, 10.000 Iraqis per day returned back to Iraqi territories¹²⁵. It was a rapid process in which, for instance, the first camp in Talkabar was prepared just in 5 days¹²⁶. Immediately, the first group of refugees to be transferred was composed of 250 people who arrived in Zakho¹²⁷. In the following days, officials supervised an accelerated process of return from Turkey to Iraq,¹²⁸ resulting in 193.269 refugees' return until the end of April¹²⁹. As of May 25, 1991, UNHCR announced the return of nearly 320.000 refugees to camps in Northern Iraq¹³⁰. Üzümlü temporary shelter was hosting only 15.000 in mid-May (Lyman, Update on Iraqi Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1991). In the first day of June, Turkey was hosting only 11.000 Iraqi refugees¹³¹. On the 14th of April 1992, in an answer to a member of the parliament, the Minister of Defense Nevzat Ayaz stated that Turkey received 8.063 Iraqis during the second flow and 451.937 in the third, 448.845 of whom had returned to their own country¹³². In other words, 11.155 refugees remained in Turkey in 1992, one year after the third flow of migration. It is known that the last camp in Çukurca / Hakkari was closed on 3 July 1991 (Öztüğ, 2016).

¹²³ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası - Elektronik Veri Dağıtım Sistemi, Kurlar, 30.05.1991

¹²⁴ "Over steep Turkish passes, the Kurds start back to Iraq", The New York Times, 28.04.1991

¹²⁵ "Sığınmacılar geri dönüyor", Milliyet Gazetesi, 11.04.1991

¹²⁶ "Milliyet Talkabar kampında", Milliyet Gazetesi, 23.04.1991

¹²⁷ "Kampa ilk yerleşim", Milliyet Gazetesi, 28.04.1991; "Kuzey Irak'ta ilk kamp", Milliyet Gazetesi, 30.04.1991; "Irak'ta ilk kamp Zaho'da kuruldu", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 24.04.1991; "Kürtler geri dönüyor", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 30.04.1991

¹²⁸ "Sığınmacılar dönüş yolunda", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 04.05.1991; "Dönüş hızlandı", Milliyet Gazetesi, 11.05.1991; "Sığınmacı dönüşü hızlandı", Milliyet Gazetesi, 18.05.1991

¹²⁹ "200 bin sığınmacı Irak'a geri döndü", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 29.04.1991

¹³⁰ "Irak boyun eğdi", Milliyet Gazetesi, 25.05.1991

¹³¹ "Türkiye'de 11 bin sığınmacı kaldı", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 29.05.1991

¹³² TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 14.04.1992

3.4 State Perception towards Northern Iraqis

Against the commonly-held idea that Turkey treated Iraqi refugees, most of whom were from Kurdish ethnic origin, differently than Turks of Bulgaria, I have listed the humanitarian and financial aid made by the government, which were of course vital for the survival of those fleeing. Yet, this is not to say that the treatment was similar. It is just to point out that Turkey did, to some extent, what was necessary in humanitarian terms. However, it was not, from the very beginning, a policy of settlement but a repatriation, where Turkey sought international support to do so. In this process, there are a number of reasons behind the Turkish policy towards Iraqi refugees within the above-given mindset. These reasons are “drivers” of the Turkish policy since they affected the process in which Turkish borders only opened when conditions were met.

3.4.1 Economic Burden and International Assistance

On mid-April 1991, together with 51.542 refugees¹³³ who had arrived and remained in Turkey before the crisis, the total number of Iraqis was 511.542 (Ihlamur-Öner, 2013). This was a historic flow of people that happened with a short notice. The daily cost of one asylum seeker was said to be 15.000 TL costing 180 billion TL per month for all refugees when combined¹³⁴. It was a period when the unemployment rate for those who were between 20 and 24 was 16.8%¹³⁵. The governor of the State of Emergency Kozakçıoğlu said that it was impossible to provide employment opportunity for refugees in a state where there was already a high level of

¹³³ This number is around 30.000 in some other sources (Danış, 2009)

¹³⁴ “Sığınmacıların günlük faturası GAP’a eşit”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 16.04.1991

¹³⁵ Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, İş Gücü İstatistikleri Veritabanı, 1991

unemployment¹³⁶. At the same time, as Kaynak (1992) mentions, they caused 399.754.200.000 TL damage to the economy when damages to private and public properties, environment and labor loss are all included. In addition to that, more than 1 trillion TL was spent throughout the period of Turkey host to Iraqi refugees in terms of public relief and financial aid. There was a significant damage to the economy of the state as it did not have the capacity for a quick recovery. Even after the beginning of Operation Provide Comfort, the period where refugees started to go back, president Özal's attempts continued. Following a phone call with Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission, the general director of external relations J. P. Coll visited Turkey to make observations in the frontiers¹³⁷. Turkey was looking for more international support to cover up all the costs. Additionally, Turkey was concerned about being a "buffer zone" between refugee source countries and European countries that had no good history accepting significant amounts of people from Iraq (Kirişçi, 1994; Ihlamur-Öner, 2013). This caused uncertainty in the markets and the exchange rates fluctuating a lot. And all these consequences were already estimated before the opening of borders which, as one of the factors, explains Turkey's initial reluctance. As Bülent Akarcalı, a member of the parliament, stated that international organizations and society would ignore Turkey after having received all those refugees and would confine itself to praise the efforts of Turkey¹³⁸. The overall foreign aid from the European Economic Community reached \$125 million in the third week of April¹³⁹. Nevertheless, Ender Tomer, Vice President of

¹³⁶ "İrakililer geri dönmeli", Milliyet Gazetesi, 11.04.1991

¹³⁷ "Mültecilere yardım hızla devam ediyor", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 19.04.1991

¹³⁸ "Turkey is keeping frontiers closed", The New York Times, 05.04.1991

¹³⁹ "AT yardımı 125 milyon dolara ulaştı", Milliyet Gazetesi, 22.04.1991

Kızılay, stated that Turkish aid was still four times bigger than the overall foreign aid¹⁴⁰.

On the other hand, foreign aid constituted a big portion of the spending made for Iraqis. The US committed almost \$208 million half of which was provided as public relief (Lyman, Update on Iraqi Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1991). The US started to deliver vital foodstuff by dropping them from air on April 7, 1991¹⁴¹. Their assistance to refugees continued when most of the Iraqis were repatriated to Iraq (Wolcott, 1991). Although a portion was spent during Operation Provide Comfort, here is the list of foreign aid both in forms of financial or public relief until mid-April 1991:

Table 6: Amount of aid by foreign countries till April 1991

Country	Kind of Aid	Amount
USA	Public relief	600.000 blanket, 2.800 tents, 80.000 coats ¹⁴²
Germany	Public relief + Financial	\$10 million + 100 tons of
Belgium	Financial aid	\$300.000
Denmark	Financial aid	\$1.5 million
Finland	Financial aid	\$2.5 million
South Korea	Financial aid	\$30.000
Japan	Public relief	\$775.000

(“Yardım bombardımanı”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 14.04.1991)

¹⁴⁰ “Kürtler garantili bölge istiyor”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 25.04.1991

¹⁴¹ “U.S. will airdrop food and clothes to Kurds in Iraq”, The New York Times, 06.04.1991

¹⁴² “Mültecilere yardım hızla devam ediyor”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 19.04.1991

3.4.2 The Security Perception

3.4.2.1 Gaza Syndrome and Border Security

The “Gaza Syndrome” was the fear that much like the camps once established for Palestinians long time ago, new ones would be built along Turkish borderlines and it would transform it into a new Gaza triggering new conflicts (Oran, 1996; Özdemir, 2016). Long (2010) discusses, based on the information received from UNHCR Ankara Branch office, that closing of the borders was a political not a “capacity-based” decision since there was a fear of “Palestinianization”. Even the American Director of the Bureau for Refugee Programs stated that a long-time stay along the borderline “conjures up” scenarios of Gaza Strip (Lyman, 1991). And this seems to be another motive for the Turkish policy towards Iraqi refugees. The analysis of Gaza syndrome for Turkey requires a close look on emerging international developments regarding the fate of Kurds in Northern Iraq since it was the possibility of Kurds having a state, thus stimulating conflicts and resulting in new waves of migration.

The domestic agenda of opposition parties reflected a fear that there would be a future entity along the Turkish border which could trigger everlasting conflicts. Erdal İnönü, leader of Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP), highlighted that actors should forestall the creation of a second Palestine¹⁴³. Bülent Ecevit, leader of Democratic Left Party (DSP), on the other hand, foreseeing that the end of this process might result in a new state within Iraq¹⁴⁴. His concerns were mostly focusing on *de facto* US rule arising from the Operation Provide Comfort. The leader of the Nationalist Working Party (founded after the coup d’état in 1980 replacing the

¹⁴³ “İnönü: İkinci Filistin yaratılmasın”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 08.04.1991

¹⁴⁴ “Bunun sonu karşı devlet”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 14.04.1991

Nationalist Movement Party) was also pointing out to a threat that there would be a puppet Kurdish state¹⁴⁵.

Such concerns did not only belong to opposition parties but also the government itself. PM Yıldırım Akbulut, in an interview, discussed that they would stand against the idea of a Kurdish state no matter what. The following day, the governor of the State of Emergency Kozakçıoğlu indicated how important it was to return these people back to their own places rather than relocating them within Iraq¹⁴⁶. Such a statement should not be neglected due to an indirect meaning it reserves beside the humanitarian one with warm wishes. What Kozakçıoğlu meant is not a return technically including a trans-border movement to leave Turkey but a return from relegated areas to previous homes. There was an emphasis on internally displaced people and the ones resettled into camps after being sent by Turkey as part of the operation. A process of demographic engineering with international support may cause unchecked problems he thought. To clarify this point, the following examples might be useful. The former Foreign Minister of the US Henry Kissinger stated that US troops should leave those camps and the ones inside and let them decide their own faith in that region. He was supporting autonomy for Kurds in Northern Iraq¹⁴⁷. At the same time, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in a recommendation, stated that Kurdish people should be granted autonomy¹⁴⁸ and the British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd notified that they can pressure Iraq for the Kurdish autonomy¹⁴⁹. It was not also much time ago that the Belgium Parliament approved the bill that Belgium will not accept Turkey's application to European

¹⁴⁵ "Batı, kukla devlet istiyor", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 30.04.1991

¹⁴⁶ "Silopi Karargâhı", Milliyet Gazetesi, 21.04.1991

¹⁴⁷ "Kürtlere otonomi şart", Milliyet Gazetesi, 27.04.1991

¹⁴⁸ "Kürtlere özerklik verilsin", Milliyet Gazetesi, 27.04.1991; "Avrupa Kürt devleti istiyor", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 21.04.1991

¹⁴⁹ "Irak'a baskı yapabiliriz", Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 10.05.1991

Economic Community unless the Kurdish identity was recognized by the Turkish state¹⁵⁰. Therefore, a scenario of a future Kurdish state, perceived as a threat along Turkish borders, inevitably became the hot topic for the Cabinet and the President. Özal, while saying that a Kurdish state is impossible, was referring to refugees as Iraqis. When a journalist asked why he had not used the word “Kurd” at all, he replied by saying that there were Turkmens and Christians among those Turkey has received. According to Özal, those who were thinking that a Kurdish state would be established and the next was going to be for the Kurds in Turkey were totally wrong since it was not a fight for self-determination but a fight for democracy, thus nobody wanted a Kurdish State¹⁵¹ (Uçar & Akandere, 2017). When President Saddam Hussein met with Masoud Barzani¹⁵², leader of Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the idea of a Kurdish state had an extensive coverage in both domestic and international media, he replied by asserting it is not only the Kurds but also the Turkmens deserving autonomy¹⁵³. He was leading astray during times when the return of thousands was ongoing and Ecevit was holding on this issue¹⁵⁴. He even assigned Kızılay to set up a private camp for Turkmens in Şemdinli/Hakkari¹⁵⁵. The fear that any formation of an entity belonging to Kurds was actually a fear that a clash environment would erupt just like it did in Lebanon few years ago giving rise to constant migration flows towards Turkey which could at the same time enkindle the early sparks of terrorism. This is why he proposed and advocated a “safe haven” to demolish “Gaza syndrome” and its extensions. The underlying idea was to eliminate

¹⁵⁰ “Belçika’dan küstahlık”, Tercüman Gazetesi, 16.03.1991

¹⁵¹ “Turkey’s chief urges global aid to resettle Kurds”; The New York Times, 17.04.1991

¹⁵² “Barzani Saddam’la görüştü”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 06.05.1991

¹⁵³ “Özal: Türkmenlere özerklik verilmeli”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 19.05.1991

¹⁵⁴ “İraklı Türkler gözardı ediliyor”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 21.05.1991

¹⁵⁵ “Türkmenler için”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 25.04.1991

a possible threat to Turkish borders in case there would be a Gaza-like situation which would trigger armed conflict in the region.

3.4.2.2 PKK and the fight against terrorism

Although I tried to demonstrate the effects of a Kurdish state to-be on Turkish migratory policy within Gaza Syndrome, the Kurdish issue was commonly held in conjunction with PKK. Just in 1990, 244 military personnel and 233 civilians were killed by PKK militants¹⁵⁶. The motives for avenging for the people killed were visibly increasing within the society while counter terrorism operations were being pertinaciously conducted by Turkish Armed Forces in an atmosphere where these terror incidents were steering the domestic politics. It was also a matter of discussion that there was a policy convergence between President Saddam and PKK. One of the primary sources for Iraqi secret service during the Kurdish rebellion was said to be a PKK militant who remained silent during Iraqi army's assault on Kurdish people (Kavak, 2013). Exact locations of US troops located in Turkey were demanded by Iraqi intelligence from PKK. Such complicated movement of thousands also led PKK to confiscate stronger bases in the North of Iraq after civilians fled (Ihlamur-Öner, 2013). Saddam's implicit cooperation with PKK raised concerns in Turkey heating the debate that PKK militants would infiltrate Turkey among refugees. Following the same line of thought, some circles argued that the increase in the number of terrorist attacks was associated with the refugees living in the temporary shelters (Aridemir & Acar, 2018). This was one of the reasons why President Özal urged UN to intervene in Northern Iraq thus blocking a power vacuum, which would in the end limit PKK's mobility. At the same time, a peacekeeping operation was able to divert the attention of the international society from the criticisms directed

¹⁵⁶ "26 yılın kanlı bilançosu", Milliyet Gazetesi, 24.06.2010

towards Turkey on its Kurdish policy and provide a ground for self-legitimization which at the same time was meeting security-related demands of Turkey (Kirişçi, Huzur mu Huzursuzluk mu: Çekiç Güç ve Türk Dış Politikası, 1994). The emphasis on “international society” is remarkable here since it was the pressure of some countries urging Turkey to grant autonomy to Kurds in order to solve the problem both before and after the migration flows. Therefore, the Turkish policy towards refugees was attentive not to spark any criticism especially within the European Economic Community while incorporating them to a solution in which there was this perfect outcome for Turkey by both initiating a humanitarian project of repatriation helping Turkey to develop better bilateral relations with USA and eliminate a possible power vacuum for PKK.

3.4.3 Foreign Policy Achievements

As Graham E. Fuller stated, the only benefit of 1991 war for Turkey was that it secured closer relations with Washington by proving itself as a reliable ally (Fuller, 2008; Uçar & Akandere, 2017). As Özal mentioned, there was a clear link between American and Turkish interests in the region (Fuller, 1992). He was insisting upon strategic partnership with the USA¹⁵⁷. It was also evident in the expression of government officials that there is an establishment of new ties between the two countries¹⁵⁸. The US President Bush delivered his message to President Özal that he was pleased with Turkey’s efforts¹⁵⁹. Bill was introduced to the American Congress for the sale of Stinger missiles to Turkey was thus interpreted in this manner¹⁶⁰. At the same time, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Belgium praised President Özal’s

¹⁵⁷ “Özal, stratejik iş birliğinde ısrarlı”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 09.06.1991

¹⁵⁸ “Körfez Krizindeki kazanç beklentilerin gerisinde”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 27.04.1991

¹⁵⁹ “Bush’tan Özal’a memnuniyet mesajı”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 29.04.1991

¹⁶⁰ “Türkiye Stinger füzesi alacak”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 05.05.1991

efforts to protect the Kurdish people of northern Iraq¹⁶¹. Turkey was referred to as a heaven for refugees escaping from the brutality of Saddam regime¹⁶². While orchestrating an international collection action towards Saddam regime to protect its own borders, Turkey also promoted itself as a significant actor playing a key role in the crisis.

3.5 Conclusion

The Turkish state response towards Iraqi refugees was shaped by the above given factors, namely: economic burdens of refugees, seeking international assistance, fear of having a new “Gaza” along the Turkish borderline and the fight against terrorism (PKK). These factors caused an initial reluctance to open the borders for Iraqi refugees and urged Turkey to compensate the deficiencies by orchestrating international support. Until the support was provided for Turkey, there was a *wait and see policy* during which Turkey’s willingness to help and respect for humanitarian norms were constantly highlighted. Together with the international support and UN Resolution 688, Turkey opened its borders and settled refugees for a short period of time. When Özal’s initiatives got the foothold he desired, the world witnessed a process of repatriation when more than 95% of all refugees returned back to the camps set up in Northern Iraq by military forces formed within the Operation Provide Comfort. Thus, the most rapid flow of migration since the Second World War was followed by the most rapid repatriation process in the same period. During this process, Turkey moderately provided humanitarian aid under the coordination of an administration center directed by a Minister and also did much to repatriate the aid recipients.

¹⁶¹ “Özal’ın Kürt politikasına alkış”, Milliyet Gazetesi, 16.04.1991

¹⁶² “Türkiye mülteci cenneti oldu”, Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 13.04.1991

Turkey principally focused on its border security and perceived refugees as a threat to its society. Even in some camps, security officers wired the area in order to prevent escapes¹⁶³. In such an atmosphere, the prerequisite for opening the borders was to take guarantee that these people would be repatriated soon. That is why the international military support played an important role shaping the state response towards refugees. Turkey received significant economic and military supports during the crisis from foreign countries to ease the burden of half a million people. Although the amount of international support was much bigger than 1989, due to aforementioned security perceptions, the overall process resulted in mandatory repatriation of Iraqi refugees, being the opposite of Turks of Bulgaria.

¹⁶³ "Sığınmacı kampına dikenli tel", Ortadoğu Gazetesi, 23.04.1991

CHAPTER IV

SYRIANS

The ongoing Syrian Civil War started on March 2011 with civil protests in different regions of the country and people gathering to utter their demand for the removal of President Bashar al-Assad, democratic reforms, more freedoms and an end for corruption. The initial response of the government was to detain protestors, some of whom were tortured in prisons. Such practices triggered more reaction and sparked the light for a migration crisis which has mostly affected Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Before the beginning of the Civil War, improving bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria was salient. Two parties, after a long period of unresolved problems, were strengthening ties with agreements they began to sign. The two countries signed a cooperation agreement on terror issues¹⁶⁴, which was highly criticized by the opposition parties in the Turkish Parliament¹⁶⁵ since it also allowed Syrians to come to Turkey without a visa during a period of civil conflict. The main concern of opposition parties was the inflow of Syrians who might have relations with terrorist groups by means of this agreement.

When the conflict began in Syria, Turkey demanded Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to use careful measures against protestors and pay attention to the demands of thousands since the continuation of the use of oppressive measures by the Assad regime already triggered reactions from most other countries, as well as Turkey. The deteriorative situation inside Syria, accordingly, caused Turkey to change its perspective about president Assad and paved the way for a support given to the

¹⁶⁴ T.C. Hükümeti ile Suriye Arap Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında Terör ve Terör Örgütlerine Karşı Ortak İşbirliği Anlaşması

¹⁶⁵ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 06.04.2011

opposition groups in order to remove him from the position. From the early days of this conflict, Turkey, at the same time, has been a home for Syrians fleeing from the brutality of the armed conflict mainly between the government and the insurgent groups. By June 2018, 3.576.337 Syrians were living in Turkey¹⁶⁶. Turkey provided healthcare, education, and employment facilities to Syrians. However, unlike Turks of Bulgaria, they were not naturalized at the first hand. Yet, they were not also treated like Iraqi people of 1991. They were relatively free to travel around Turkey providing that they take permission from the Governorate they registered with. So, it is clear that the state response towards Syrians is not completely the same neither as Turks of Bulgaria nor as Northern Iraqis. In the light of this information, this chapter addresses the Syrian migration in post-2011 period by focusing on the Turkish state response. After covering services provided for Syrians, I will evaluate the uncertainty of their permanence based on the legal status they have been given and the role of international support in shaping state policies. The precarity in the legal status is significant to understand the mindset of the government towards Syrians. Then I analyze the security aspect of the migration by examining opposition armed groups, relative open door policy, the issue of safe haven and the negative public opinion towards Syrians. Finally, the foreign policy dimension of the migration will be elaborated under EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, along which Turkey gained some benefits.

The very first group of Syrians fleeing from the newly erupted civil war in Syria composed of 252 people who arrived in Turkey on April 29, 2011 (TBMM, 2012a; TBMM 2012b; TBMM, 2013; Ilgıt & Davis, 2013; Özden, 2013; ICG, 2013; Erdoğan, 2015; World Bank, 2015). Those people were placed in a sports hall

¹⁶⁶ "Yıllara Göre Geçici Koruma Kapsamındaki Suriyeliler", Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, 19.06.2018

located in Hatay province and provided emergency response. Considering this, Cilvegözü border gate became the first crossing of the Syrian influx to Turkey. As a procedural act, security forces searched incomers and registered them in company with translators (TBMM, 2012a). The Turkish government immediately designated an area in Yayladağı district of Hatay to be the first tent city¹⁶⁷ (ICG, 2013). In June 2011, when numbers started to increase, additional tent cities in Altınözü and Boynuyoğun districts were set up to host Syrians. At the beginning of the 2012, there were 7 different tent cities in Hatay where 2.456 Syrians were accommodated (TBMM, 2012a). In the same year, tent cities were also established in Gaziantep, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye, Adana, Adıyaman and Malatya provinces (TBMM, 2012b). It is important to note at this point that there have been 3 different types of residences for Syrians: tent cities, container cities and temporary shelters. Memişoğlu and Ilgıt (2017) name them as “accommodation centers” in general but I will use the word “camps” for the sake of simplicity.

The Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) was in charge of the management of the flows and the planning of necessary coordination between related agencies and institutions (Amnesty, 2014; Kirişçi, 2014) while the governor of Hatay was (and still is) the ultimate authority in the city (ICG, 2013; Orhan, 2014). It was AFAD that was registering Syrians with the technical assistance of the Turkish police, which then started to record “biometric identities” of Syrians (Dinçer, et. al., 2013). Under its authority, Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Health, National Education, Transport and Finance; Turkish General Staff, Directorate of Religious Affairs, Undersecretariat of Customs, Governorate of Hatay, and Turkish Red Crescent worked together for an efficient emergency response

¹⁶⁷ “Suriyeliler için Sınırdaki Çadırkent”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 01.05.2011

(TBMM, 2012a). Turkish Red Crescent was actively involved in the field, providing tents, containers, meals and some other services.

The circular on “Admission and Accommodation of Mass-Arriving Citizens of Syrian Arab Republic and Stateless Persons Residing in Syrian Arab Republic”¹⁶⁸ which was not published but effective from March 2012 onwards, set the basis for the regulation of services provided for Syrians (Amnesty, 2014). It was followed by the Ministry of Interior’s move to allow passport-holding Syrians an extension for stay up to one year (Özden, 2013). They had even the right to acquire residence permits if meet the necessary criteria (Ferris, Kirişçi & Shaikh, 2013; Dinçer, et. al., 2013). Beşir Atalay, Deputy Prime Minister, was assigned responsible for the coordination committee comprised of ministries and some government agencies, which held weekly situation assessment meetings (Kirişçi, 2014). In this early phase of migration, UNHCR praised the Turkish circular for guaranteeing the stay and abiding by the *non-refoulement* principle.

¹⁶⁸ There are different translations of the circular. Ineli-Ciger (2014) translates it as “Guideline with regard to the reception and admission of stateless and Syrian nationals” while Kirişçi (2014) as “Regulation on Reception and Accommodation of Syrian Arab Republic Nationals and Stateless Persons who reside in Syrian Arab Republic, who arrive to Turkish Borders in Mass Influx to Seek Asylum”.




Figure 2: Number of Syrians in Turkey
(DGMM, 2018)

Besides people living in tent cities set up by the government agencies, there were people living across Turkey who crossed the border with their own visas for a period of three months. Like Turks of Bulgaria, some Syrians had relatives across Turkey, which was a factor stimulating their decision for non-camp housing. They chose to remain with their families rather than being placed in one of the camps and had the opportunity to extend their duration of stay with 6 more months by paying an extra amount of money¹⁶⁹ (ICG, 2013). As another part of an emergency refugee response, necessary food was delivered to Syrians who had a long walk from Syria to Turkey. Hot meals were served 3 times a day in most tent cities of Hatay (Özden, 2013). Via water supply network, clear water was also provided to the camping areas in addition

¹⁶⁹ Yet, I should mention that the ones living in camps have also freedom of movement to an extent. They were allowed to move freely within Turkish borders after filling the leave form in the camps (TBMM, 2012a). However, a person who leaves the camp cannot be settled back, though being willing to do so, after 15 days of his/her departure.

to sewerage system that was constructed immediately. Tent cities were lightened up even during night times and electricity was provided to common use areas (TBMM, 2012a; TBMM, 2012b). In Altınözü and Yayladağı tent cities of Hatay, there were hairdresser salons, TV rooms, playgrounds for children and prayer rooms (ICG, 2013). Residents can drink hot and cold beverages which seemed perfect especially during long hot days in Southeastern Turkey (TBMM, 2012a; TBMM, 2012b). Refrigerators and washing machines, in a considerable amount, were provided to families. People were allowed to go outside the camps within specific time periods of the day. Nonetheless, we know that authorities in some camps like the one in Islahiye, did not give permission to leave the camp area except for the period when plantation owners need seasonal workers (Özden, 2013).

In Adıyaman and Şanlıurfa, every Syrian was given an identity card, *tanıtım kartı*, which is not the equivalent of the national identity card but a simpler one for identifying the holder. Hot meals also were served 3 times a day in these tent cities. In Adıyaman, the whole tent city was divided into 6 neighborhoods, each of which was represented by a headman while in Harran container city was divided into 4 and Akçakale tent city in 10 neighborhoods and representation systems being the same (TBMM, 2013). TV rooms, laundry rooms, playgrounds and prayer rooms were also ready for use for Syrians (TBMM, 2013). Public shower cabins and toilets were reported to be in a good condition. In all cities, tailoring, hair dressing and language courses were being given to those willing to take them (TBMM, 2013).

As mentioned above, there were also temporary shelters different from those of tent and container cities, being relatively in a low-standard compared to others. In Midyat and Nusaybin districts of Mardin and in Viranşehir district of Şanlıurfa, the Turkish government set up temporary shelters for Syrians and Iraqis. I mentioned Iraqis here

because it was reported that especially Nusaybin temporary shelter was prepared for a possible Iraqi migration (TBMM, 2014). Since most of them had nothing helpful to declare their identity, above-given identity cards, *tanıtım kartı*, were handed over to every person by the authorities (TBMM, 2014). Hot meal delivery service was not carried out in Mardin. Instead each Syrian was given a special card¹⁷⁰ with 80 TL credits in it to make them shop and cook for themselves. 60 of 85 TL was provided by the World Food Program (WFP) and the rest by the AFAD (TBMM, 2014). There were same practices in other camps like Nizip/Gaziantep, Öncüpınar/Hatay¹⁷¹.

UNHCR again praised Turkey for the camping areas and the management of them by saying “emergency response of a consistently high standard” (World Bank, 2015).

The number of camps was proportionate to the number of Syrians coming to Turkey for a while. When the capacity became a problem, the construction of a new one started immediately¹⁷². At the beginning of 2014, after almost two years of the first arrival, there were 22 camps and an additional gathering center, mostly along border provinces.

It should be noted, though, that only around ten percent of all Syrians were living in camps in 2015 (Ferris & Kirişçi, 2015) even though there was no support for non-camp Syrians’ housing needs (Baban, Ilcan, & Rygiel, 2017). The Foundation of Social Help and Solidarity made a housing benefit only once with an amount of 100-300 TL (Karaca, 2017). This was the only financial aid they could get from the government and nothing concrete was made until 2016. In 2016, president Erdoğan

¹⁷⁰ Later on, The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) program initiated on November 2016 by which Syrian families could receive 120 Turkish Liras per person and meet daily needs. DGMM, Kızılay, WFP and EU are partners of the Project.

¹⁷¹ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 10.04.2012

¹⁷² “Fearing assault, more Syrians flee into Turkey”, The New York Times, 09.06.2011; “Turkey scrambles to accommodate Syrian refugees”, The New York Times, 13.06.2011; “Suriyelilere Konteynır Kent Kurulacak”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 13.12.2011; “Konteynır Kent Çalışması Sürüyor”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 07.02.2012

announced that TOKİ apartments could be given to Syrians who had lived more than 3 years in their temporary residence province¹⁷³. He reminded Meskhetian Turks, who became homeowners with a similar system in Turkey. Considering that it was the 5th year of migration, even this announcement does not seem to mean much in terms of non-camp housing opportunities.

The magnitude of the migration, when compared to Iraqi people of 1991, was not that big for the government to raise serious concerns. Before the end of 2011, Turkey was only hosting 8.000 Syrians (Özden, 2013), while Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reported around 10.000.¹⁷⁴ In August 2012, the daily arrival of Syrians raised up to 5.000¹⁷⁵, alerting UN agencies for future aids¹⁷⁶. At the beginning of 2013, the number of Syrians surpassed 600.000 (Ilgit & Davis, 2013; Dinçer, et.al., 2013) and reached up to a million later that year¹⁷⁷. As of October 2014, there were 1.627.000(TBMM, 2014), and in 2018, 3.576.357 Syrians were registered in Turkey. This was the biggest number of people Turkey has ever received from a country but because the migration has extended over a period of time, it was expectable that the Turkish state response has attuned to the *ex post* developments in Syria and the Turkish state did not give immediate response to reverse the migration. Instead of reversing the migration, the state response aimed at hosting them with some level of precarity, which will be elaborated below.

¹⁷³ "Suriyelilere 'ev' formülü", Sabah Gazetesi, 12.07.2016

¹⁷⁴ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 08.07.2011

¹⁷⁵ "Syrian Refugees Flood Into Jordan and Turkey in a Sharp Rise", The New York Times, 28.08.2012

¹⁷⁶ "U.N. Says Syrian Refugee Numbers Are Surging", The New York Times, 27.09.2012

¹⁷⁷ "One Million Syrian Refugees", The New York Times, 05.03.2013

4.1 Syrian Migration

The initial response of the Turkish state towards Syrians has been complemented by the goods and services provided for them. Although the increasing number of Syrians has been a topic of debate causing unrest among the Turkish society due to the economic burden they added, Turkey tried its best to provide sufficient, if not excellent, services since 2011.

4.1.1 Education

In the first two years of their arrival, not being common in all tent and container cities though, Syrian children had some opportunity to take education. In Yayladağı/Hatay, the first tent city, 1030 student were educated by 47 teachers most of whom were Syrians (TBMM, 2012a) while in Adıyaman, 3021 students were given education by 83 teachers (TBMM, 2013). Another 10.303 student received education in Akçakale tent city and Harran container city of Şanlıurfa (TBMM, 2013). A Syrian curriculum was the basis for this education and Quran courses were the primary courses to be provided.

In Mardin-Midyat temporary shelters, authorities were able to reserve a prefab for education in which voluntary Syrian teachers taught with their Turkish counterparts¹⁷⁸. The bilingual education system was implemented; students had additional Turkish lectures. It was a good opportunity for those children at the time a most Syrian children had only Arabic courses.

As can be noticed from these data, Turkey's initial education policy was based on the assumptions that Syrians would go back soon. Hence, the regulation of the education policy was not conducted in line with a long-term integration perspective. As Ömer

¹⁷⁸ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 14.05.2013

Dinçer, the Minister of National Education, said the concerted efforts for Syrian children's education was to meet the needs without encouraging a long-term stay for their parents (Öner & Genç, 2015). This may be one of the reasons why Quran courses occupied an important place and the rest was not given that much attention for the education of Syrian children.

KAGEM, Woman and Family branch of the Turkish Religious Foundation (TRF), was the first institution that started formal education initiative in addition to Quran courses in Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Kilis. However, due to the technical incapability, they passed on the responsibility to the TRF. At the same time, some Syrian entrepreneurs opened some schools in the provinces where they mostly populated. These schools were not under the responsibility of the Ministry of National Education and had different registration systems (with or without tuition fee). TRF, when Quran courses seemed inadequate for the education of the growing number of Syrians, started to cooperate with Provincial Directorates of National Education. Provincial directorates' involvement could be seen as the footsteps of a more integrated and organized educational system. Yet, it was not easy for the Turkish government to do so. First, the transfer of authority from religious authorities to the Ministry required a change in the content of the education. The Syrian Education Foundation summoned scholars to revise all textbooks from 1st to 12th grade with a committee, formed on March 2013 (Topçu, 2017). The revision included a process of removing Bashar al-Assad and things associated with him while replacing the Syrian flag with the one that the Syrian opposition started to use. Then Syrian teachers were subjected to an exam in order to qualify for teaching. Concurrently, school buildings were under preparation for Syrian children. To this end, in 2013-2014 academic year,

6 schools in Gaziantep, 1 in Kilis and 1 other in Şanlıurfa were allocated for them (Topçu, 2017).

Nevertheless, there was no systematic procedure regulating the envisaged education system for Syrian children. Therefore, the Ministry of National Education issued a circular No.2014/21 in September 2014, namely the Circular on “Education Services for Foreign Nationals”¹⁷⁹. With the circular, the Ministry declared authority on aforementioned issues and, as the first significant action, established Temporary Education Centers (TEC) by mostly turning single shift schools into double shift ones. Yet, some other TECs continued to operate in municipal buildings as one shift (World Bank, 2015).

TECs have been the places where Syrian students from 1st to 12th grade received their education since 2014. The monitoring of TECs has been made by provincial commissions which also bridged between international actors and Syrian students. Syrian teachers working in TECs were working with very low wages; some call it a donation. Starting from April 2016, they have been paid by UNICEF, earning almost 1300 TL per month (Topçu, 2017). In TEC’s, Syrian children were taught with the Syrian curriculum prepared under the supervision of the Ministry of National Education (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016). There are also 5-hour Turkish language courses whose materials were provided by Yunus Emre Institute.

When Temporary Protection Regulation entered into force in 2014, Turkey also removed the requirement for families to hold a residence permit to enroll their children in a school. The only prerequisite for education is to be registered by the Turkish authorities and have a foreign national ID number. In 2015, the Ministry of National Education made additional regulations to provide education for Syrian

¹⁷⁹ Yabancılarla Yönelik Eğitim-Öğretim Hizmetleri – 2014/21, MEB, 23.09.2014

children as second shift programs (Kirişçi & Ferris, 2015). In the same year, all Syrian children were obliged to enroll into schools. To eliminate the language barrier between Syrian and Turkish students, some preparatory language courses were offered in public education centers, *Halk Eğitimi Merkezi*. Directorate General for Life-Long Learning of Ministry of National Education was held responsible for the organization of the mother tongue education¹⁸⁰. The Ministry in cooperation with EU Turkey Delegation, further, invested in a project called “Promoting integration of Syrian children into Turkish education system” (PICLES) on 03.10.2016. For two years period, the parties were making contribution for Syrian children’s access to education by providing language courses both in Turkish and Arabic, make-up courses, giving psychological counseling and guidance, aiding with stationery equipment and course books, training teachers for a better education and so forth. Higher education has also been part of the discussion in Syrians’ education. In the first period of 2013, Syrian students could register in seven different universities in Turkey with no need for former proof of enrollment in a Syrian university (Özden, 2013). Nevertheless, 1.700 high school graduates’ diplomas were recognized which enabled these students to attend universities in Turkey after completing the Turkish language courses provided in cooperation of Gaziantep University and Turkish and Foreign Languages Research and Application Center (TÖMER) (Dinçer, et. al., 2013; Orhan, 2014). By the beginning of 2018, there were 19.650 (Erdoğan, 2018) and as of June, there were 20.701 Syrian students enrolled in Turkish universities¹⁸¹.

In March 2014, the total number of Syrian children registered in state schools was only 6.000 while 69.150 were enrolled in camp schools (UNICEF, 2014). As of May

¹⁸⁰ “Suriyeli çocukların eğitimi için yol haritası belirlendi”, MEB, 22.08.2016

¹⁸¹ “Uyruğa Göre Öğrenci Sayıları Raporu 2017-2018”, Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi

2018, 611.524 Syrian children out of 976.200 are taking education, corresponding to almost 63% of all school-age Syrian children. 384.292 children are in public schools while 227.232 are in TECs. The total number of TECs established in 21 provinces is 318¹⁸². The lack of full schooling rate among Syrian children seems to be primarily due to financial difficulties which forced children to work in order to look after their siblings and parents (Ayaşlı, 2018,).




Figure 3: Educational Services Provided to Syrian children in Turkey

(Ayasli, 2018)

Temporary protection beneficiaries can also attend, without any restriction, training and language courses. By the end of 2016, 75.000 Syrians attended these courses (Çavuşoğlu, 2016).

4.1.2 Health

When the conflict erupted in Syria, Turkish ambulances waited along the borderline to carry Syrians in need of urgent treatment to hospitals (Özden, 2013). Emergency response to those in need of help has been given just like it was during 1989 and 1991 migration flows. Not being legal at the beginning though, the Turkish state

¹⁸² "Bakan Yılmaz: Türkiye'deki Suriyelilerin okullaşma oranı yüzde 63'e yaklaştı", MEB, 23.05.2018

provided free health care services¹⁸³ (Özden, 2013; ICG, 2013; Ahmadoun, 2014; World Bank, 2015). Circular no 374 issued in January 2013, entitled 11 border provinces to provide free health care for Syrians who had not been registered after their entry to Turkey¹⁸⁴. In March 2013, AFAD began to register non-camp Syrians (Amnesty, 2014). Thereafter with the circular issued in September by AFAD, all non-camp Syrians across Turkey and the ones to-come were registered in free health care system, whose expenses would be covered by the governorates of the provinces where treatment was offered¹⁸⁵. It was perceived as an important element of Turkey's temporary protection regime (Dinçer, et. al., 2013). Syrian doctors were hired to work both in and outside the camps while in Migration Health Centers, they have mostly been in charge of providing healthcare services (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016).

TPR states that necessary arrangement for the services to be provided for temporary protection beneficiaries will be made effective within three months¹⁸⁶. This led AFAD to issue the Circular 2014/4¹⁸⁷, regulating issues regarding temporary shelter, education, access to labor market, social aids, and also the basics of healthcare services for temporary protection beneficiaries, re-highlighting its free-of-charge aspect. AFAD Circular 2015/8¹⁸⁸ reassured the free treatment of temporary protection beneficiaries in the provinces they registered. This Circular organized treatment procedures together with medicine expenditures set the framework for inter-ministerial and inter-agency relationships.

¹⁸³ Local people were uncomfortable with Syrians' getting of free health care while they have to pay: "On Edge as Syria's War Knocks Ever Harder on the Door to Turkey", The New York Times, 12.10.2012

¹⁸⁴ "Suriyeli Misafirlerin Sağlık Hizmetleri Hakkında Genelge", AFAD 2013/1, 18.01.2013

¹⁸⁵ "Suriyeli Misafirlerin Sağlık ve Diğer Hizmetleri Hakkında Genelge", AFAD 2013/8, 08.09.2013

¹⁸⁶ Article 58

¹⁸⁷ "Geçici Koruma Altındaki Yabancılar İlişkin Hizmetlerinin Yürütülmesi", AFAD, 18.12.2014

¹⁸⁸ "Geçici Koruma Altındaki Yabancılar İlişkin Sağlık Hizmetlerinin Yürütülmesi", AFAD, 12.10.2015

The first field hospital (50-bed) constructed in Boynuyöğün/Hatay while tent hospitals were constructed in other tent cities following the first flow of Syrians. Medical teams vaccinated primarily the kids and families who crossed the border. In the field hospital of Adıyaman, dental clinic and psychiatry service were also opened for some days in the week (TBMM, 2013). Field hospitals were also ready in Mardin and Şanlıurfa to meet the increasing need for treatment (TBMM, 2014).

Besides all these, in order to improve the quality of medical services, in cooperation with World Health Organization and ASAM, Provincial Public Health Directorates of the Ministry of Health started a project called “Migrant Health Training Centers” which has two main purposes: (i) Training 300 Syrian physicians and 300 Syrian nurses for six-week period who can be then employed in these centers, (ii) providing healthcare services to Syrians under temporary protection in four given provinces¹⁸⁹.

4.1.3 Employment

So many Syrians, in the aftermath of their arrival, started to work with low wages in factories, construction sites, farms and restaurants. Seasonal agricultural works or construction in rural areas, and the textile industry in metropolitan cities were the most preferred lines of work by Syrians. They have even replaced Turkish workers in the cities they mostly populated and assumed to increase the level of unemployment by 2 percent by 2016 (Nowrasteh, 2016). According to a study by Esen and Binatlı (2017), “for every 100 Syrian refugees in the region, 20 fewer people are formally employed”. They were paid less than the Turkish workers for the same low-skilled jobs they did, and thus increasing the share of Syrians in informal economy.

According to a survey quoted in World Bank (2015), they gained 5.6 TL average per

¹⁸⁹ Göçmen Sağlığı Eğitim Merkezleri, <http://sgdd.org.tr/gocmen-sagligi-egitim-merkezleri/>

day in Hatay (STL, 2014) and 406 TL per month in Gaziantep (IMC & ASAM, 2014). On the other hand, Syrians invigorated local economies to some extent by setting up new businesses and associating with the existing ones with their own capital (ICG, 2013). Establishment of new companies was assumed to boost Turkey's GDP (Kuyumcu & Kösemataoğlu, 2014).

By the end of 2015, only 6.858 Syrians obtained legal work permit, meeting the requirements in Turkish Labor Laws (TLL), from Turkey (World Bank, 2015). In line with TLLs, a Syrian has too much obstacle to obtain a work permit. Those who have arrived at Turkey in legal terms and have received residence permits might be qualified for obtaining a work permit, a laborious process. That seems to be one of the reasons why they prefer (or have to) to work illegally to meet their daily needs.

The Turkish Government took a concrete step at the beginning of 2016 by issuing the Regulation on work permits of foreigners under temporary protection¹⁹⁰ which for the first time allowed Syrians who had not have permanent residence to work within the law regulations. It first implements an obligation for employers to make sure their Syrian workers have a work permit¹⁹¹. And it also tasks employers to appeal for Syrians through e-state system¹⁹². Moreover, they should pay attention to the employment quota. The number of Syrian workers cannot exceed ten percent of all Turkish workers, and there can be only one Syrian worker if the overall staff is less than ten¹⁹³. By doing so, Syrians secured their right to work by law and earned a degree of certainty for their permanence in the places they work in. This regulation staged a process for Syrians in which they eliminated their doubts on whether to be fired or keep working in the next day.

¹⁹⁰ Geçici Koruma Sağlanan Yabancıların Çalışma İzinlerine Dair Yönetmelik, 15.01.2016

¹⁹¹ Article 4

¹⁹² Article 5/2

¹⁹³ Article 8/1

Another thing to consider is that those who have a temporary protection status in Turkey became eligible to work in Turkey after six months of their registration¹⁹⁴. They can work in the province they registered themselves with, while exceptions are excluded.

Karaca (2017) asserts that between 15.01.2016 and 27.12.2016, approximately 1-year period following the issuing of the Regulation, 5.016 Syrians were given work permits. However as quoted in İçduygu & Diker (2017), Ministry of Labor and Social Security indicates that 13.298 people were granted work permit in 2016. When the regulation and the ongoing civil war are considered together, it seems likely that there will be more Syrians obtaining work permit in the upcoming future.

Table 7: Number of Syrians granted work permit

YEAR	WORK PERMITS
2011	105
2012	231
2013	794
2014	2.538
2015	4.015
2016	13.298
TOTAL	20.981

(İçduygu & Diker, 2017)

¹⁹⁴ Article5/1

4.2 State Perception towards Syrians

4.2.1 Economic Burden and International Assistance

When the second year of the civil conflict almost ended, Turkey had already spent 280 million TL for temporary protection beneficiaries¹⁹⁵. In the first quarter of 2013, monthly costs of Syrians were around 50 to 60 million dollars for Turkey (ICG, 2013) while total amount of money spent was 609.5 million TL¹⁹⁶, 533 million of which was spent for Syrians in Turkey¹⁹⁷. Turkey's overall spending for Syrians exceeded \$2.5 billion as of April 2014 (Orhan, 2014; Kirişçi, 2014). Ahmadoun (2014) says that it was \$4 billion by mid-2014, as also confirmed by the Minister of Finance, Mehmet Şimşek¹⁹⁸ and Minister of Defense İsmet Yılmaz¹⁹⁹. This number increased up to \$5 billion by 2015 (İçduygu, 2015) and almost \$6 billion late in that year when the number of Syrians reached almost up to 1.9 million (Kirişçi & Ferris, 2015). Yet, as Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu states, the number is much more than all these scholars said. According to Çavuşoğlu, Turkey spent \$12 billion by mid-2016 (Çavuşoğlu, 2016).

At the beginning of the Syrian migration, there were different opinions on not receiving international aid. Some argue that it was because of the unwillingness and making of difficulties for sending and receiving the aid by both sides. As one field officer states “(...) traditional donor countries have very strict criteria for giving aid, and Turkey has very strict criteria for receiving it.” (ICG, 2013). Yet, it was not sustainable for Turkey to deal with the crisis on its own. The first time Turkey

¹⁹⁵ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 05.12.2012

¹⁹⁶ “Suriye’ye 609.5 Milyon TL Yardım”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 14.01.2013

¹⁹⁷ It was 482 million TL as of December 17, 2012, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 17.12.2012; “Sığınmacılara 533 Milyon TL”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 28.01.2013

¹⁹⁸ “Suriyeli Göçmene 4.5 Milyar Dolar”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 05.11.2014

¹⁹⁹ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 02.10.2014

applied for aid from EU was in April, 2012, almost one year after the beginning of migration (ICG, 2013).

The government did not include Turkey to the first Syrian Regional Response Plan (RPP) of the United Nations (Kirişçi & Ferris, 2015). However, in the aftermath of changing its course of policy, Turkey became a part of the RPP in March 2012 (Dinçer, et. al., 2013; Amnesty, 2014; Memişoğlu and Ilgıt, 2017). Yet, Turkey has not received what has been earmarked for it annually since 2013. Turkey could only get \$69.525.074 million in 2013 (UNHCR, 2013), \$73.190.244 million in 2014 (UNHCR, 2014), \$65.434.142 million in 2015 (UNHCR, 2015) from UNHCR. For a better understanding of the insufficiency of the international aid, we can note that only in 2014, \$497 million was earmarked for Turkey (Amnesty, 2014). EU Commission spent more than UNHCR with €187.5million until December 2014 (EMN, 2014). Turkey also received €179 million of €3 billion promised by the European Union in October 2016²⁰⁰. Moreover, the United States via international organizations aided around \$31 million in the same period (USAID, 2014).

The state policy towards Syrians under temporary protection took shape by different factors. First, the uncertainty of their permanence set the basis for initial policies which than be replaced by more integrative ones when the duration of their stay exceeds 3 years. Correspondingly, their legal status was clarified and the “uncertainty” of their permanence was legalized while they were being registered for fundamental services like education, health and employment. The logic of “guest” did not substantially change but was reframed with basic provisions. This is what this study calls a “precarious legalization”, granting rights generously on legal grounds

²⁰⁰ “Erdoğan: AB sözünü tutmadı”, DW, 03.10.2016

but leaving it open-ended for the permanency, hinged upon a decision of the Council of Ministers.

At the same time, security has been an issue of concern causing temporary closures of border crossings while inciting fierce debates among members of the parliament. The security aspect of Syrian migration harbors different dynamics which propounds 3 point of analysis: Syrian armed groups and their encampment, relative open door policy, and the concept safe haven.

The last element for the conceptualization of Syrians is the EU-Turkey Joint Action plan which produced the Readmission Agreement between two parties. It is the most recent step Turkey has taken as part of its foreign policy. It is both protective and restrictive in its nature while giving Turkey a hand to gain future rights (visa free travel etc.) by using Syrians as a foreign policy tool.

4.2.2 Uncertainty of Syrians' Permanence and the Legal Status

Among 21.625 Syrians who sought asylum in Turkey, 12.212 returned back until the beginning of 2012 (TBMM, 2012a). Throughout 2011, more than 5.000 people went back to Syria²⁰¹. The ratio between incoming and outgoing Syrians was again high during the first quarter of 2012. Among 273.133 Syrians placed in temporary shelters, 85.494 returned back (TBMM, 2013). Returns were conducted under the supervision of UNHCR. As Ilgıt & Davis (2013) stated, there was this thought that Syrians came in search for safety and treatment following an attack to their villages, but then went back at the time they thought danger was averted. A member of the Free Syrian Army was a good example of such returns: "A month after joining the FSA, some shrapnel hit me in the eye and I had to come to Turkey for an operation.

²⁰¹ "Mülteciler geri dönüyor", Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 04.07.2011

As soon as my treatment here is over, I will go back Syria to continue to fight the regime.” (Özden, 2013). Moreover, as a report reveals, 91.4% of Syrians who took refuge in Turkey traveled back and forth in the first two years of the civil war (Güçer, Karaca, & Dinçer, 2013). Such movements had a role in shaping the mindset of state officials while framing Syrians as guests.

The inflow of Syrians was an unprecedented incident for the Turkish government. Although few thousands arrived at Turkey in 2011, the government did not expect the number to boost up to millions. They were rather expecting the migration to be short and the crisis to end soon²⁰² (Kirişçi, 2014; Ahmadoun, 2014; Kirişçi & Ferris, 2015; İçduygu, 2015). Thus, Turkey named these people as “guests”²⁰³ by making reference to the temporariness of the conflict (ICG,2013) and generosity of the Turkish state (TBMM, 2012a; TBMM, 2012b). As Özden (2013) states it was a policy of Turkey based on discourse of generosity not on the rights. Turkish authorities were just highlighting Turkey’s global role as a humanitarian actor, which did not have a purpose for long-term integration with legal rights (Memişoğlu & Ilgıt, 2017).

However, the ever increasing numbers of Syrians dissuaded authorities to renounce their approach, which, after a while, complicated the control and monitoring of so many people spread across the country and brought a shift towards the government-financed approach, which has long-term regulations though not comprehensive. Yavcan (2016) states that with Turkish government’s implemented policies, especially following the TPR, there has been a transition from a security perspective to a governance perspective. Erdoğan (2016) and İçduygu & Evin (2016) thinks that

²⁰² “Başbakan Erdoğan Türkmani’yle Görüştü”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 16.06.2011

²⁰³ Or “temporary protection beneficiaries” as Ineli-Ciger (2014) names.

Syrians will probably stay in Turkey permanently. İçduygu & Evin (2016) take it further by naming post-2016 period as a period of integration which is to evolve into a period of naturalization. Accordingly, the relation between the duration of stay and the shift towards the governance perspective is a mutually inclusive process.

When they arrived in Turkey, Syrians were and still are granted temporary protection status, whose basic elements²⁰⁴ are: an open door policy, non-refoulement and access to fundamental registration arrangements (İlgiç & Davis, 2013; Özden, 2013; Dinçer, et. al., 2013; Koca, 2016). Turkey extended the temporary protection regime to all Syrians in October 2011 (Dinçer, et. al., 2013; HYD, 2012). The caveat here is the restriction imposed on Syrians not having the right to seek international protection in third countries (TBMM, 2012a; ICG, 2013; Koca, 2016). They cannot appeal to UNHCR to seek asylum in other countries (Özden, 2013). So, if a Syrian wants to benefit from services provided in Turkey, s/he has to register here but if s/he does so, there is no future chance to seek international protection²⁰⁵.

The 1994 regulation²⁰⁶, ratified after the experience of 1991 migration of Northern Iraqi people, was the only legal basis for Turkey to treat mass-arriving foreigners in 2011. Hence, Turkey promulgated a non-published 2012 regulation and government agencies acted in line with it for a period of time. In 2013, the Ministry of Interior drafted the first extensive law regulating issues regarding foreigners and international protection. The Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) was approved by the Parliament on 04.04.2013 and entered into force on 11.04.2013. It

²⁰⁴ İçduygu (2015) takes “open door policy” as an approach rather than taking “temporary protection” and lists three policy elements of open door approach as the following: “ensuring temporary protection, upholding the principal of *non-refoulement*, providing optimal humanitarian assistance”.

²⁰⁵ Only EU-Turkey deal provides a chance for some Syrians to be placed in Europe.

²⁰⁶ Türkiye İltica Eden veya Başka Bir Ülkeye İltica Etmek Üzere Türkiye İkamet İzni Talep Eden Münferit Yabancılar ile Topluca Sığınma Amacıyla Sınırlarımıza Gelen Yabancılar ve Olabilecek Nüfus Hareketlerine Uygulanacak Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetmelik, 30.11.1994

regulated necessary procedures for international protection while, at the same time, limited the time for the application of residence permit after the date of entry if a person does not want to seek protection elsewhere. It also defined different types of residence permits²⁰⁷ foreigners can have. The importance of the LFIP for Syrians is that it opened a way for future temporary protection regulation/directive after providing a clear definition of being a temporary protection beneficiary. According to Article 91 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (2013), temporary protection status could be provided

“(...) for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection.”

On the basis of Article 91 of the LFIP, Turkey published the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) on 22.10.2014 containing sections regulating all necessary provisions regarding the temporary protection beneficiaries and foreseeing the establishment of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), which is now the leading authority on temporary protection issues²⁰⁸. First of all, what is clear in the TPR is that Council of Ministers is the sole authority reserving the right whether to designate specific groups of people as temporary protection beneficiaries or not, the time limit for the effectiveness of the status, extension, limitation and complete suspension of it. Not giving a specific time limit for the temporary protection status, TPR could be seen as the legal ground of the above-given uncertainty of the permanence in which uncertainty sustains while its regulation is

²⁰⁷ Short-term, long-term, family, student, humanitarian residence permits.

²⁰⁸ “Turkey Strengthens Rights of Syrian Refugees”, The New York Times, 29.12.2014; “Syrian Refugees in Turkey Get More Rights”, The New York Times, 30.12.2014

systematized. Article 16 of the TPR clearly asserts that beneficiaries of this regime is not in a position to seek international protection, invalidating of those who already filed. TPR is granting only “temporary protection status” to the Syrians and excluding them from obtaining refugee, conditional refugee or secondary protection status.

With TPR’s entry into force, governors started to issue temporary protection identification documents²⁰⁹. After being registered, regardless of being a camp or non-camp person, all Syrians were provided to access for accommodation, education, food, health and social assistance²¹⁰. Simultaneously, registration of non-camp Syrians led to the start of “Aid Delivery System”, a data set showing names of Syrians in need of help for donors who are willing to help (Orhan, 2014). Yet, the temporary protection identification document is not the equivalent of residence permit and does not entitle a person to obtain long-term residence permit²¹¹. This precarity is the primary point of analysis to understand whether there is going to be a long-term integration or not.

4.2.3 The Security Perception

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu announced the Turkish state’s readiness to welcome Syrians escaping the civil war inside Syria in 2011. At the same time, there was this back-door diplomacy with which the Turkish government was trying to convince Syrian president Bashar al-Assad to make a “shock therapy” and soften his methods against public demands²¹². This period was marked with Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy (Ferris, Kirişçi & Shaikh, 2013). One of the trivets

²⁰⁹ Article 22, Temporary Protection Regulation, 2014

²¹⁰ Article 38, Temporary Protection Regulation, 2014

²¹¹ Article 25, Temporary Protection Regulation, 2014

²¹² “Turkey calls for Syrian reforms on order of ‘Shock Therapy’”, The New York Times, 25.05.2011; “Syrians flee to Turkey, telling of gunmen attacking protestors”, The New York Times, 08.06.2011

of his foreign policy understanding is what he refers to as humanitarian or conscientious diplomacy which aims to make Turkey a global humanitarian power embracing all people who are oppressed by cruel governments (Davutoğlu, 2013). As Faruk Çelik, the Minister of Labor and Social Security, said they were willing to stand against those who oppress innocent people even if s/he is a sibling.²¹³ Davutoğlu highlighted two elements of his understanding: balance between national interests and universal norms, and creating a belt for peace, security and stability around Turkey²¹⁴. In line with his conscientious diplomacy understanding, he and his cabinet together with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, former Prime Minister and the current president, saw no harm in welcoming Syrians for a short period of time. They built camps and made zero-point deliveries and sought no international aid for almost a year. Yet, what is significant to point out is the government's reluctance to allow observers, NGO representatives or journalists for examining the living conditions inside the camps²¹⁵ (Özden, 2013; ICG, 2013; Ferris, Kirişçi & Shaikh, 2013). Although some international delegations visited camps accompanied by officials, none was allowed to operate (ICG, 2013). The government was selective in granting permission for visits especially for the camps in Gaziantep and Kilis while also restraining access to the ones in Hatay. Critics on this issue peaked when parliamentarians from the Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition party, were refused to enter in Apaydın camp in August 2012.

²¹³ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 27.10.2011

²¹⁴ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 26.04.2012

²¹⁵ There was one exception: İHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation. İHH members were at the camps delivering goods and services to Syrians. In January 2014, some members of the İHH detained due to alleged terrorist links with Jabhat al-Nusra (which is an affiliate of al-Qaeda in Syria). Government accused the Gulen Movement, a terrorist group responsible of coup attempt in 2016, of "disrupting the humanitarian efforts" (Ahmadoun, 2014).

In accordance with Turkish Law No 4104²¹⁶, on “Belligerent Foreign Army Members Who Take Refugee in Turkey”, soldiers who escaped from Syria and sought protection in Turkey were taken to a separate tent city (Apaydın/Hatay) together with their families²¹⁷. Members of parliament from CHP accused the AKP government of setting up a zone for military exercise for members of the Free Syrian Army, an armed group founded in 2011 to topple the Assad regime in Syria²¹⁸ (Ilgit & Davis, 2013; Ahmadoun, 2014). As widely covered in Turkish media²¹⁹, Apaydın camp was mostly reserved for Syrian soldiers and their families²²⁰ (ICG, 2013). In the border villages, their movement back and forth between Turkey and Syria were recorded by residents²²¹ (Dinçer, et. al., 2013). Wounded soldiers who were treated in day time went back to fight afterwards. Furthermore, weapon transfers were said to be made in and out of Turkish territories via these fighters²²² (Kirişçi, 2014). Ali Edipoğlu, CHP MP went further by saying that the government was providing weapons to these groups²²³. These debates set the basis for the establishment of a link between refugees and terrorism. The rising fear of terror, especially after the attacks of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria²²⁴ (ISIS) near the Turkish border started to shape the mindset of Turkish officials on the permanence of Syrians, which led to a precarious legalization as mentioned above.

With the permission of local authorities, Syrian soldiers who chose to remain in Turkey rather than to continue fighting in Syria could also go outside the camps for

²¹⁶ Muharip Yabancı Ordu Mensuplarından Türkiye’ye İltica Edenler Hakkında Kanun, 11.08.1941

²¹⁷ “23’ü Asker 443 Suriyeli Geldi”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 12.07.2012

²¹⁸ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 09.12.2011

²¹⁹ “In Slap at Syria, Turkey shelters anti-Assad Fighters”, The New York Times, 27.10.2011

²²⁰ “Davutoğlu’ndan Apaydın kampı açıklaması”, BBC, 29.08.2012; “Çadırkent karargâh oldu”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 10.03.2012; “İşte Apaydın Kışlası”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 03.09.2012

²²¹ “Gelgeç’ Sınır”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 22.08.2012

²²² “Syrian Refugees in Turkey Long to Rejoin the Fight”, The New York Times, 04.07.2012

²²³ “İslamcı Harekete Silah”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 10.11.2011; TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 17.12.2011; TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 30.03.2012

²²⁴ Or referred as “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”

one day set by the authorities (TBMM, 2012b). They were not allowed to leave the camp whenever they requested to do so. It was already a policy of authorities not to take back people who left the camp and did not return in 15 days. Their records were deleted and this rule did not bend even if it was an issue of family reunification (TBMM, 2014).

Additionally, Turkey recognized the “Syrian National Council” as the legitimate body representing Syrian people by the end of 2011 and hosted the first meeting of it in İstanbul²²⁵ (Ferris, Kirişçi & Shaikh, 2013; ICG, 2013; Kirişçi, 2014). Then, U.S.A²²⁶ and Qatar started to fund the “National Coalition for Syrian Revolution” while Turkey’s relations with Muslim Brotherhood tightened (ICG, 2013). Turkey also gave its support to the newly founded National Coalition which replaced the Syrian National Council²²⁷. Moreover, different Syrian opposition groups came and arranged meetings in Turkey during the first years of the conflict²²⁸. All these events and the Government’s support for them provoked debates among political parties, in which the government was accused of making Turkey part of the war²²⁹.

4.2.3.1 A Relative Open Door Policy

Although the open door policy of Turkey has been at the center of most discussions regarding refugee integration in academia and the parliament, it has not always been the case. Turkey periodically closed its borders (İlgıt & Davis, 2013). The shift in the open door policy was implemented in two situations. First, Turkey closed borders when the incapacity of existing camps raised concerns for the authorities that decided

²²⁵ “Syrian opposition council forms in İstanbul”, The New York Times, 15.09.2011; “Suriye Ulusal Meclisi İstanbul’da Kuruldu”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 16.09.2011

²²⁶ “Obama Says U.S. Will Recognize Syrian Rebels”, The New York Times, 11.12.2012

²²⁷ “Turkey Grant Recognition to Coalition of Syria”, The New York Times, 15.11.2012

²²⁸ “Türkiye Suriye’ye de Model”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 02.06.2011; “Suriyeli Muhalifler Türkiye’de”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 26.06.2011; “İstanbul’da muhalifler buluştu”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 17.07.2011

²²⁹ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 10.04.2012

to keep incomers wait on the border until they could make some available space (Ferris, Kirişçi & Shaikh, 2013; ICG, 2013). This shift foreshadowed the makeshift camps²³⁰ built across the Turkish border, where Turkey made zero point deliveries such as the ones in Atmeh, Bab al-Hawa, and Bab al-Salame (Dinçer, et. al., 2013). The zero point delivery system started in early 2012 and worked efficaciously until November of that year when the Syrian regime forces attacked Atmeh camp (Ahmadoun, 2014). Trucks carried goods to the border, where agencies picked them up and carried them further inside Syria (ICG, 2013; İçduygu, 2015). At the end of 2013, an estimated number of 135.000 Syrians was assisted by Turkey (Dinçer, et. al., 2013). It was IHH and Kızılay²³¹ carrying the logistical work beyond the borders (Orhan, 2014). In addition to this, in 2016, when nearly 60.000 people flocked to the Turkish border in a short period of time, initial response was not to let them inside but to assist the Syrian side by building makeshift camps as in 2013. This is thought to be done in order to prevent further migration flows towards Turkey in an atmosphere where there were already more than 2 million Syrians.

Some observers stated that some Syrians, especially those without passports, were not allowed to cross the border from time to time (Özden, 2013). Even the people staying in Atmeh camp, a makeshift camp, complained about Turkey's obstructiveness for the entry policies (Orhan, 2014). According to the Amnesty International (2014) report, the border crossings in Suruç, Akçakale, Ceylanpınar and Nusaybin had been closed occasionally since the beginning of the migration wave, especially between 2013 and 2014. This, as being the second situation, was surmised to be due to an upsurge of conflict in Syria (Kirişçi, 2014). When the conflict, in which PYD/YPG took an essential role, escalated near the border crossing, Turkey

²³⁰ There were 25 camps on the Syrian side of the border as of April 2014 (Orhan, 2014).

²³¹ "Kızılay Suriye'ye Girecek", Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 23.06.2011

chose to close its borders considering the possibility of incomers being PYD/YPG terrorists and the spread of conflict to its own territories which had already killed 5 civilians in Akçakale/Şanlıurfa²³² and 51 others in Reyhanlı/Hatay. This was one of the reasons why all of the border crossings were closed between March and June 2015. Therefore, people were directed to other countries to seek protection which also augmented the human smugglings between Turkey and Syria. It is also argued that Turkey did not specifically allow Kurdish people to cross the border during such processes, thus directing them to northern Iraq²³³ (Ferris, Kirişçi & Shaikh, 2013; ICG, 2013). Furthermore, as Amnesty International delegates allege, some Kurds were detained during the siege of Kobane/Ayn al-Arab²³⁴ (Amnesty, 2014). While calling such processes as “push-back” operations, delegates draw attention to the rise of irregular crossings in 2013 and 2014 (Amnesty, 2014). Nevertheless, it did not take long when Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Prime Minister, announced the re-opening of borders across Kobane/Ayn al-Arab region on his visit to Baku (Kirişçi & Ferris, 2015). Yet, none of the people fled from Tel Abyad region was placed in the nearest camp in Suruç (Kirişçi & Ferris, 2015). They were rather placed in other camping areas, at least relatively from the border.

4.2.3.2 Safe Haven

It was Russia’s and China’s vetoes in the UN Security Council blocking the first international attempt with a possibility of sanctions imposed to be against Damascus

²³² TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 03.10.2012

²³³ The Turkish Government’s basic concern was the possible future territorial gains of Kurdish militants who to who Assad shut his eyes to. Any help for Kurdish militants could accelerate their process of sominating the Northern Syria, near Turkish border. (“Time to Dial the Turkey-Syria Hotline”, The New York Times, 10.04.2012)

²³⁴ Turkey was also said to deport 600 Syrians on March 2013 based on security concerns, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29.03.2013

on October 4, 2011²³⁵. They kept vetoing resolutions projecting sanctions in 2012²³⁶. The political deadlock, thus, allowed Turkey to attract an international attention to Syria from other channels by raising voice on different platforms where it gained some support from Western countries²³⁷. However, it was not enough to mobilize a military action. Nevertheless, the Turkish parliament passed a Resolution on the fourth of October 2012 to authorize the deployment of Turkish forces to foreign territories and allow foreign troops to be deployed within Turkish territories²³⁸. The rules of engagement after Syria shot down a Turkish jet fighter were altered and “any military asset approaching from Syria would be considered a threat” by Turkish authorities²³⁹ while the border controls were tightened²⁴⁰ (İlgi & Davis, 2013; ICG, 2013). This process raised questions about a no-fly zone as it was the case during 1991 migration²⁴¹. But before that, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu had already raised the issue of safe haven at the UN General Assembly in August 2012 which was not embraced by the international community (ICG, 2013). Prime Minister (currently the president) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also called for the establishment of a safe haven both in domestic and international arenas²⁴² while Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç²⁴³ and Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay²⁴⁴ stating that the safe haven was among the government’s agenda²⁴⁵. The government officials also discussed an appeal to NATO in case there is a considerable increase in the number

²³⁵ “UN Resolution on Syria Blocked by Russia and China”, The New York Times, 04.10.2011

²³⁶ “Friction at the UN as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syria Sanctions”, The New York Times, 19.07.2012

²³⁷ “New Calls to Press Syria from France and Turkey”, The New York Times, 18.11.2011

²³⁸ “Turkey’s Parliament Backs Military Measures on Syria”, The New York Times, 04.10.2012

²³⁹ “Syria Shoots Down Turkish Warplane, Fraying Ties Further”, The New York Times, 22.06.2012; “Türk Jeti Düşürüldü”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 23.06.2012; “Uçak Suriye Hava Sahasında Vuruldu”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 01.07.2012

²⁴⁰ “Turkey Strengthens Forces on Syrian Border”, The New York Times, 30.07.2012

²⁴¹ “Güvenli Bölge Planı”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 19.05.2011

²⁴² “Türk Vatandaşları Çıksın”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 17.03.2012

²⁴³ “Suriye’ye Tampon Bölge Masada”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 02.12.2011

²⁴⁴ “Bir Günde Bin Sığınmacı”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 16.03.2012

²⁴⁵ “Suriye’ye Tampon Bölge Masada”, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 02.12.2011

of Syrians²⁴⁶. Turkey appealed to the UN one more time when the number of Syrian refugees crossed the 100.000 mark²⁴⁷ (Ilgit & Davis, 2013). And yet, the United States government was by then unwilling to take responsibility for the lead position in an international coalition against Bashar al-Assad's government²⁴⁸ despite the AKP government's repeated calls for a no fly zone to be established in Syria²⁴⁹. After this disagreement with the US, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu stated for the first time that it would be necessary to host these people inside Syria²⁵⁰. Nonetheless, he was also re-affirming Turkey's willingness to help by saying "We will stand by the Syrian people until they live with honor in all around Syria"²⁵¹.

It was against this backdrop that the vacuum created by the Syrian regime's withdrawal from Northern Syria was filled by Kurdish forces, mainly YPG²⁵² (People's Protection Units), who fought against ISIS. With the US choice to cooperate with PYD, although there was a discussion between US and Turkey to create an ISIS free zone²⁵³, fight against ISIS was conducted with no need of international safe zone but with a need of Kurdish fighters. Turkey understood that it was not in a position to marshal an international coalition for the establishment of a safe zone anymore²⁵⁴.

On the other hand, there was a process in the United Nations paving the way for greater humanitarian assistance which would ease the burden of the Turkish state, if

²⁴⁶ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 26.04.2012

²⁴⁷ "Mülteci sayısı psikolojik sınırı aştı", Sabah Gazetesi, 16.10.2012

²⁴⁸ "In Turkey, Biden Talks About Iran and Syria", The New York Times, 02.12.2011

²⁴⁹ "A Strategy for Syrian Refugees in Turkey is on Clinton Agenda", The New York Times, 10.08.2012

²⁵⁰ "Bölgede yüzyılın tasfiyesi yaşanıyor", Milliyet Gazetesi, 30.07.2012

²⁵¹ "Foreign Minister Davutoğlu 'We will stand by the Syrian people until they live with honor in all around Syria'", MFA – Press & Information

²⁵² YPG is the armed unit of PYD (Democratic Union Party), the Syrian branch of PKK terrorist organization.

²⁵³ "Turkey and U.S. Plan to Create Syria 'Safe Zone' Free of ISIS", The New York Times, 27.07.2015

²⁵⁴ "Despite Bold Talk on Syria, Turkey Sees Limits of Its Power", The New York Times, 16.03.2012

not foresees a safe haven. Adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2139²⁵⁵ condemns the violation inside Syria and called for the rapid improvement of the humanitarian situation by demanding authorities to allow humanitarian assistance. This was the first international reaction Turkey was expecting since 2012. In 2014, with UN Security Council Resolution 2165, humanitarian assistance is also orchestrated exclusively across border crossings of Bab al-Salam, Bab al-Hawa, Al Yarubiyah and Al-Ramtha, where Turkey made zero point deliveries²⁵⁶. Although these resolutions did not foreshadow an establishment of a safe zone, they created pressure on conflicting parties while increasing humanitarian assistance.

4.2.3.3 Societal Security

As Koca (2016) discusses, the governance of Syrian integration has been made under a “security architecture” in which risky groups are controlled by the Turkish state. She also thinks, unlike Erdoğan (2016), Syrians will return since the “return” is imposed upon them with legal frameworks and international agreements which do not secure permanent living in Turkey (Koca, 2016). The “risk” underlined here is a risk towards the societal security in Turkey. The already existing problems between the Turkish society and Syrian communities are the evidence of such analysis. As an interview conducted by the Crisis Group (2018) states “[t]he lack of interaction between refugees and hosts reinforces the latter’s conviction that Syrians do not conform to Turkish societal norms”. The risk of conflict between societies seems to be high in low-income regions where there also some other minority groups (ICC, 2018). According to the surveys, the negative perception of Syrians among Turkish people has increased (ICC, 2018). Almost 63 percent of the Turkish people feel

²⁵⁵ UN Resolution 2139, 22.02.2014

²⁵⁶ UN Resolution 2165, 14.07.2014

“distant” or “very distant” from the Syrian people living in Turkey (Erdoğan, 2018).

Although some government officials emphasize the tolerance and hospitality of Turkish people in times of societal conflicts²⁵⁷, it does not seem to be embraced by the society. 80% of the participants in a survey reported that Syrians cannot be integrated into the Turkish society (ICC, 2018). This highlights the threat perception against Syrians under temporary protection which the state officials should give more importance to.

4.2.4 Foreign Policy Achievements

Although Turkey-EU relations after 2014 and the recent readmission agreement (2016) are approached from a humanitarian perspective in international studies due to the sharp decrease in the number of people dying in the Aegean Sea while being carried by human smugglers, it has a deep security perspective affecting Turkey’s approach towards Syrians. Turkey, after failing to convince international actors to create a safe zone where it could create more makeshift camps and host Syrians there like it did in 1991, started pursuing a progressive but restrictive policy towards Syrians by using them as a foreign policy tool. This use is evident in the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 with which Turkey accepted to take irregular migrants back in exchange for pledged 3 billion Euros and opening of the way for visa liberalization for Turkish citizens within Schengen area. Although the agreement did produce significant humanitarian results with a considerable decrease in human smuggling and loss of lives in the Aegean Sea, its analysis in terms of foreign policy demonstrates a follow-up process in which Turkey seeks benefits that it did not get from the West since 2012. Nevertheless, Turkey promoted its policy towards Syrians

²⁵⁷ “Başbakan Yardımcısı: Hoşgörüyü elden bırakmayalım”, Hürriyet Gazetesi, 05.07.2017; “İçişleri Bakanlığı: Suriyeli misafirlerimizle yaşanan gerginlikler çarpıtılıyor”, Anadolu Ajansı, 05.07.2017

in the international arena to prove its commitment to the international norms and rules²⁵⁸.

As Sert and Türkmen put forward (2016), the EU-Turkey statement has three fundamental objectives. First, it aims to prevent people from dying in the Aegean Sea. Three years old Alan Kurdi, whose dead body came ashore near Bodrum, became a symbol of migrants' misery while trying to reach Europe via the Mediterranean route. Second, it focuses on precluding human smugglers and their network. With EU countries' reluctance to accept Syrians and closing the borders especially after 2014²⁵⁹, human smugglers actively advertised themselves to illegally carry them to Greek shores²⁶⁰. Lastly, it tries to set up a legal migration procedure by replacing illegal channels. Every person caught while trying to illegally enter EU countries is sent to Turkey, and the same number of registered refugees is settled in EU countries according to EU-Turkey deal. By doing so, Turkey will deal with vetted people of whose history Turkey has no knowledge of while sending EU the people whose security checks have already been done. EU also expected Turkey to further increase the border controls in order to halt irregular migration and control terrorists leaking in EU. It was the Charlie Hebdo attack²⁶¹ process that Turkey was highly criticized for because of its the lack of border security.

Therefore, two points are clear: Turkey did not get what it aimed to get in terms of foreign policy (no visa liberalization and full delivery of the promised financial aid) and a security approach underlies EU's perception regarding the EU-Turkey deal,

²⁵⁸ "Mültecilere 10 milyar dolar harcadık örneği yok", Hürriyet Gazetesi, 11.05.2018; "BM: Ankara'nın mülteci politikası örnek", Sabah Gazetesi, 17.02.2018; "Erdoğan'ın Guardian makalesi: Dünya mülteci yükünü Türkiye'yle paylaşmalı", BBC News, 23.05.2016

²⁵⁹ "Here Are The European Countries That Want To Refuse Refugees", Huffington Post, 09.09.2015

²⁶⁰ "Daring human smugglers use social media to lure migrants fleeing Syria", USA Today, 26.01.2016

²⁶¹ Charlie Hebdo attack or shooting was on January 7, 2015, when 12 people killed while 11 others injured.

which Turkey has already adopted. In return to the promised financial assistance, the EU aimed not to integrate but to securitize Syrians (Yavcan, 2016). Even though Turkey developed better internal structural mechanisms for long-term integration, what was expected from it was not consistent with the outcomes. Building a 564 km long wall along the border could be one of the indicators of this inconsistency.

4.3 Conclusion

Although we have discussed the precarity about the future of Syrians, it was known that DGMM was carrying on a work to grant citizenship to some Syrians (Karaca, 2017). Efkân Ala, former Minister of Interior, announced in his speech at the parliament that Syrians who had indigenized the Turkish understanding and who were thought to be beneficial for the country would be granted citizenship²⁶². In July 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan repeated that Syrians, starting from high-skilled people, might be granted citizenship²⁶³ (İçduygu & Evin, 2016; İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016). As Veysi Kaynak, the Deputy Prime Minister explained, there were approximately 80.000 people matching the criteria provided by the government (Karaca, 2017). This issue is now a hot topic in the government's agenda. However, with the recent military operations²⁶⁴, there has also been a reversed migration to the secured areas facilitated by government agencies. Deputy General Manager of the DGMM Abdullah Ayaz stated that more than 162.000 Syrians returned back to their country²⁶⁵. In the following processes, more Syrians are expected to return to regions controlled by Turkish-backed rebel groups. So, the citizenship issue might be just a

²⁶² "Bakan Ala: Suriyelilere vatandaşlık vereceğiz", 12.06.2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wBuTBaQrpUo>

²⁶³ "Suriyelilere Vatandaşlık Vereceğiz", Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 03.07.2016

²⁶⁴ Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch

²⁶⁵ "Suriyeli 162 bin sığınmacı ülkesine geri döndü", Dünya Gazetesi, 11.04.2018

plan to integrate qualified Syrians, whose contribution could be helpful for development of the country.

Turkish state response towards Syrians calls upon 3 points of analysis. First there is this uncertainty of Syrians' permanence. The legal status granted to Syrians with the Temporary Protection Regulation of 2014 results in precarious legalization in which Syrians have the right to benefit from most state services like education, and health while their future is uncertain. The Council of Ministers has the right to suspend their right to live in Turkey whenever necessary.

Secondly, Syrians, contrary to all above-given services, are part of a security architecture. Starting with the armed resistance groups hosted in Turkish camps, the link between refugees and terrorism was established. Their presence in Turkey, although being welcomed at the beginning, was not welcomed by opposition parties and later on by the government, causing transfer of their headquarters back to Syria because of the international concerns that Turkey was supporting jihadist groups²⁶⁶. This is also related to the so-called open door policy of the Turkish state. As mentioned above, Turkey's border policy was a relatively open one, aiming to prevent terrorists from infiltrating into Turkey. The periodical closures also prevented some other people whose timing overlapped with the armed conflict between PYD and ISIS in 2014. So, some people were canalized to Iraq while some other illegally crossed the border. These were the periods when Turkey perceived threats to its borders. In relation to this threat perception, there is this third aspect of the security architecture, which is the concept of safe haven planned to be established for Syrians. Even though the government officials have repeatedly mentioned their

²⁶⁶ "ÖSO üssü Şam'a taşındı", Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 01.09.2012; "ÖSO: Türkiye bizi kovdu", Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 27.09.2012

hospitality and generosity towards Syrians, starting from the early phases of the migration, the state tried to establish an international safe zone where Syrians could be hosted as it happened in 1991 for Northern Iraqis. However, Turkey's call this time did not draw attention from international community and along with the course of events in Syria, significant actors like USA chose to cooperate with PYD instead of such an establishment. So, it is clear that the perceived security threats towards Turkish borders have caused shifts in policies towards Syrians from time to time.

The societal security is another pillar of the security perception. The increasing negative perception towards Syrians is an evidence that the Turkish society is not in a position to embrace the Syrian community. Thus, the Turkish state, although trying to promote tolerance, considers the possibility of a domestic conflict that could emerge from political (identity, ethnicity, etc.) or economic (unemployment, low-income, etc.) reasons.

The third and the last point of analysis, which can also be considered within the above-given security architecture, is the foreign policy dimension of the state policy: EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and the EU-Turkey deal. EU, as being the first choice for most Syrians since 2011 as the destination, did not receive a huge number of Syrians. Some countries even closed their borders, causing thousands to get stuck between countries. EU, therefore, assigned a responsibility to Turkey in exchange for financial assistance and assurance for the acceleration of visa liberalization process for Turkish citizens. According to the deal, Turkey agreed to receive all illegal migrants seized in the Mediterranean route and had the right to place the same number of Syrians, registered in Turkey, to EU countries. What is also significant in the deal is that EU expected Turkey to increase border controls and halt more illegal migration movements and prevent human smuggling activities. As it is seen, there is

an underlying security perspective in the deal which Turkey agreed to implement. This security perspective outpaced the possible achievements Turkey could make from the EU deal. Not only did Turkey receive only a small portion of the financial assistance it was promised, but also it was not granted visa-free travel for its citizens. Nevertheless, state officials have been highlighting the important role that Turkey has played so far at an international level and have been underlining the relative value of Turkey for the Western countries by keeping more than 3.5 million Syrians inside its borders.

Throughout the Syrian migration process, Turkey tried to meet its security needs by seeking international support for a safe haven by which threats along the borders would be eliminated and Syrians would be hosted outside Turkish territories. This strategy instrumentalized Syrians in foreign policy making processes to get financial assistance, as evidenced by the EU-Turkey deal of 2016. The government neither completely integrated Syrians on legal terms nor forcibly repatriated or deported them to their country of origin. Providing the temporary protection status, Turkey initiated a process of harmonization in which there is precarity about the future. The whole process is progressive but also restrictive for Syrians under temporary protection.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The present study analyzes three different mass migration flows towards Turkey. The objective is to explore similarities and differences in state responses in a comparative manner. By doing so, this study aims to offer an analytical framework which could explain state response depending on the strength of independent variables influence. To this end, I first looked at services provided by the Turkish state. It clearly states that Turks of Bulgaria are the most privileged group gaining all rights in a short term while keeping them since then. On the other hand, refugees coming from Northern Iraq, who stayed for a very short-term period in Turkey, were provided only with shelter, food and healthcare within the boundaries of established camps. Syrians constitute another category, which had better conditions compared to Northern Iraqis while not being integrated as much as Turks of Bulgaria. The below-given table displays the fundamental pillars of integration in both short and long term periods.

Table 8: Opportunities provided to 3 different groups of refugees by Turkey

	TURKS OF BULGARIA		NORTHERN IRAQIS		SYRIANS	
	Short Term	Long Term	Short Term	Long Term	Short Term	Long Term
Healthcare	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
Education	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓
Work Permit	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓
Housing	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗
Citizenship	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓
TOTAL NUMBER	312. 475		460.000		3.576.337	

This table demonstrates similarities and differences between Turkish state response towards different refugee groups. Beyond these provisions, the present study also reveals that in each crisis there was a period of “open-door” policy Turkey received huge numbers of refugees. In all three cases, Turkey opened its borders for a certain period of time although the path for opening includes different perceptions and policies. Secondly, this study shows that the issue of refugees has always been a matter of domestic politics. While people were demonstrating on the streets for Turkey to help Turks of Bulgaria who were being suppressed by the Communist

regime in 1989, Northern Iraqi refugees were discussed by many in the public opinion as facilitators of terrorist attacks, among whom PKK terrorists were thought to infiltrate. Similarly, for many, the existence of Syrians is the reason for rising unemployment, the increase in prices of goods and services, societal conflicts and so on. So, it is clear that the public opinion has all shaped state policies in the given three cases.

Above-given table is a preliminary hint to understand state response towards different groups arriving in the Turkish borders. Yet, the study reveals that it is not the inclusive or exclusive policies that should be focused on but the government's political concerns behind them. It was Jacobsen's (1996) analysis that first identified determinant factors of state response towards mass migration flows. Re-evaluating her four factors²⁶⁷ within the Turkish case, I offer three alternative factors affecting the migratory policy-making, based on my findings: security perception towards refugees, international assistance, and foreign policy achievements. The security pillar of the framework consists of two variables: border security and societal security. Turkish state officials did not perceive a direct threat to the Turkish borders while Turks of Bulgaria were migrating to Turkey. At the same time, ethnic and religious similarities between Turkish citizens and new coming Turks of Bulgaria led state officials to feel comfortable regarding issues of identity in the society. There were already thousands of immigrants having Turkish-origin, who migrated before 1989, living in Turkey. However, 1991 migration of Northern Iraqi people was an element of conflict threatening both borders and societal security. The fear that a power vacuum in Northern Iraq may result in a Gaza-like situation where military conflicts would erupt and PKK would gain leverage made Turkey cautious towards

²⁶⁷ Bureaucratic choices, international relations, national security, local absorption capacity.

welcoming people escaping from the Iraqi army. This coincided with Turkey's fight against terrorism and the growing negative public opinion against the Kurdish minority that caused domestic conflicts. Under these circumstances, Turkey kept its borders closed until the UN Resolution 688 guaranteed military operation and the security of Turkish borders. When it comes to the Syrians, Turkey's initial response was an open door policy. This situation can be explained by Ahmet Davutoğlu's, the Foreign Minister, conscientious diplomacy understanding in which he saw no harm welcoming siblings of faith from Syria. Unlike opposition parties in the Turkish Parliament, the Government did not perceive a threat to its borders. In the meantime, the presence of armed groups in Turkish camps who were free to travel back and forth was a hot topic in the domestic and international agenda. The government also tried to promote hospitality for the Turkish society to embrace "Muslim brothers and sisters" in order to prevent any societal conflict. However, it seems clear that many sensed a societal threat posed by Syrian migrants. Most studies assert the discomfort among Turkish citizens due to the rising number of Syrians, which is thought to create problems like unemployment, low-income wages, and increase in rents.

The international assistance pillar also consists of two variables: economic and military assistance. In 1989, Turkey did not specifically search for economic assistance although some foreign aid was received. At the same time, except for the statement of the Foreign Minister that UN Security Council may take a decision on Bulgaria, there were no initiatives to receive military support. On the other hand, high-level security perception due to the threat of PKK resulted in a military action orchestrated by Turkey to intervene in Iraq and protect Turkish borders. Foreign troops deployed within and beyond Turkish borders with the permission of the Turkish Parliament. At the same time, so many countries and international

organizations delivered financial aids to improve the humanitarian conditions in camps. However, in the early phases of the civil war in Syria, Turkey was not willing to take international assistance like it did in 1989. This policy changes after a year when they realized that protracted conflict would not end soon. Turkey received financial aid from European countries and international organizations. This time IO's delivered direct aids to the people in need, while the cost of the increasing number of Syrians was mainly covered by the Turkish State.

The last pillar of the analysis is the “foreign policy achievements”, which again consists of two variables: promoting Turkey and future gains. In all three cases, Turkey demonstrated itself as an important actor to the West by showing how it adheres to the international norms and rules. In 1989 it was ideologically driven that Turkey as the representative of the Western bloc was doing something in line with democratic principles which it had already adopted. In 1991 and post 2011 periods, it was economically and politically driven that Turkey displayed the how it deals with a migration of such magnitude and stay as a buffer zone between refugee producing countries and the West. Underlining the key role it plays, Turkey promoted itself as an vital actor to gain leverage in foreign policy issues. And only with the Syrian migration, the state had the chance to get some future benefits such as visa-free travel for Turkish citizens which is far from being accomplished. Nevertheless, the foreign policy dimension of migration always existed in Turkey, not only in economic or political but also in ideological, social and cultural aspects. In line with the above-given explanation, this study offers an analytical framework²⁶⁸.

²⁶⁸ See Figure 1: Framework for the Turkish Migratory Response

The framework also provides a causal nexus between three pillars and the outcome of the state response. It is clear that the security perception sets the basis for either integrating or repatriating refugees. If there is no existing border and societal security threats perceived by Turkey, it paves the way for integration even in case there is no international assistance. If both threats exist, it blocks the way of integration, letting the state repatriating refugees although there are both economic and military assistance provided to Turkey. In this regard, state responses to Turks of Bulgaria and to Northern Iraqis seem to be the exact opposite. And if there is only one existing security threat as in the case of Syrians, it brings neither integration nor repatriation. The optimal solution is the temporary protection system, providing vital services while keeping the right to decide the future of refugees. This is what this study calls precarious legalization. Yet, this study highlights that the role of ethnicity plays an important role in understanding the logic of this causal nexus. This research covers it under societal security perspective and leaving an open door for future studies focusing on the role of ethnicity.

Unlike the “security perception”, the foreign policy pillar does not stand as the primary reason producing one of the above-given outcomes. It is more like a factor not affecting the outcome but affecting the way Turkey manages refugee issues. Turkey has promoted the provisions it granted to refugees to the West to give a good image of itself which may have, at the end, resulted in future gains for Turkey. So, it seems that Turkey could shape the foreign policy pillar of migratory response in line with the security perception or the international assistance. To give an example, refugees could be used to get economic assistance from the international society. But if the channels of economic assistance have already been set up, then Turkey could use refugees either to promote itself or to get future benefits. Turkey’s deal with EU

to start visa-free travel talks in exchange for keeping Syrian refugees within its own borders is a good example of how Turkey tries to get benefit from its response towards Syrian refugees. Thus, this framework makes it clear that Turkey has the capability to reorient its foreign policy achievement processes considering the circumstances affected by other pillars. All in all, what essentially matters to understand the outcome of the state response is the security perception. Other pillars have complementary effects on the state response providing leverage for Turkey.

Although the analytical framework offers a structured way to read state responses, the applicability of it for alternative migration waves might be questionable. It is not clear that the Turkish state response will be the same if there is another migration wave identical with one of the three cases examined in this study. In this sense, the analytical framework is descriptive and explanatory given the selected mass migration movements. In addition to the process tracing, most similar systems design might be applicable to actually see the differentiating factors of the state policy. It is clear that ethnicity plays a significant role in policy making processes. Yet it is a whole other research area to focus on and it was only analyzed within the societal security perspective for the present study. The foreign policy decision making processes also require close attention to analyze the responses towards different ethnic groups. The strategic culture of decision makers sets the basis for open-door or close-door policies while shaping the scope of services that could be provided to the refugees. These issues are left for future works to be conducted in the scholarly world.

By offering an analytical framework, this study paves the way for future studies examining the Turkish state response towards mass migration movements. This framework might be also the beginning of a discussion among scholars to categorize

countries with their response towards mass migration movements and to classify common characteristics of a certain group in the eyes of a state. To do so, the causal nexus between the characteristics of a state and its migratory response towards different mass migration movements could be revealed. These are the preliminary steps to offer a grant framework or theory to explain state responses.



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