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REPRODUCTION OF TURKISHNESS ON TELEVISION: AN
ANALYSIS OF TRT SERIES

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REPRODUCTION OF TURKISHNESS ON TELEVISION: AN ANALYSIS OF TRT SERIES

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by

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyses two different TRT series to reveal when and how Turkishness is reproduced on television. These two series are *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* and *Seksenler*. The thesis makes use of an interpretative approach in which the components of themes, music, contexts, characters and narratives are analysed within the social and political context of the post-putsch era in Turkish politics. The analysis demonstrates that Turkishness is reproduced as its banal and hot forms; both separately and conjoined together. In this regard, Turkishness is reproduced through homeland deixis, the dichotomy of us vs. them and references to common history and Ottoman past.

Keywords: Reproduction of Turkishness, Banal Nationalism, Hot Nationalism, Television and Nationhood

ÖZET

TÜRKLÜĞÜN TELEVİZYONDA YENİDEN ÜRETİMİ: TRT DİZLERİ ÜZERİNE BİR ANALİZ

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Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu çalışma, Türklüğün televizyonda ne zaman ve nasıl yeniden üretildiğini ortaya çıkarmak için iki farklı TRT dizisini analiz etmektedir. Bu iki dizi, Sevda Kuşun Kanadında ve Seksenler'dir. Bu tez; tema, müzik, bağlamlar, karakterler ve anlatıları, Türk siyasetinin kalkışma sonrası dönemi içinde inceleyen yorumlayıcı bir yaklaşım kullanmaktadır. Analiz, Türklüğün sıcak ve banal formlarının hem birbirinden ayrı olarak hem de iç içe geçmiş olarak yeniden üretildiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Türklük; anavatan gösterimi, bize karşı onlar ikiliği ve; ortak tarih ve Osmanlı geçmişine atıflar aracılığı ile yeniden üretilmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Türklüğün Yeniden Üretimi, Banal Milliyetçilik, Sıcak Milliyetçilik, Televizyon ve Millet

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It was the summer of 2017. I was in Didim, Aydın for a summer vacation just right after I returned to Turkey from my exchange studies in the Netherlands. One of the most famous beaches of Turkey, Altinkum was jampacked with people from all around Turkey and Europe. Everyday, around 16:00 o'clock, a seemingly 'banal' for the ones who have witnessed before yet a very 'hot' ritual for the new comers was taking place while the daily tour boats at the area were on their way back to the harbour. All of the boats were playing a particular version of a nationalistic march known as İzmir March combined with a highly nationalist passage within. While the boats were passing by playing the march as loud as possible, the cheerful crowd in the beach and even the people at the sea at that particular moment were clapping their hands as hardly as they can and singing along the march in their swimsuits. The scene was pretty spectacular and odd at the same time. While a daily environment of a beach creates a mundane space for this ritual, it was highly emotionally charged at the same time. When I first experienced this, I remember being shocked yet, I felt proud at the same time without even thinking about and started taking part in it by clapping my hands and singing along with the crowd almost with a drop of tear in my eyes. This shared experience was bringing all people together on the beach as a nation creating a passionate moment of nationalist pride. Yet, as the days had passed the

event felt almost neutral and natural to me; in other words, the ritual was banalized because of its everydayness. Recently, I have been to a daily tour boat in Kuşadası in which they have also played a similar march. Yet, this time, there was neither clapping nor singing along and I felt disappointed and sad. Retrospectively, these experiences got me thinking. Why did I feel pride in Didim and disappointed in Kuşadası? There was not a special event or a national commemoration in those particular moments. There was nothing nationally special about the days and the places which these experiences occurred. Yet, how and why was nationalism relevant and salient in a day of my casual beach vacation? How can such a nationalistic act be banal after some time for the people on the beach while it seemed surprising and emotionally charged to the new comers? It would perhaps seem very hot and emotional moment for someone who is just passing by and observing the event from outside. With all these questions in mind, in this research, I will try to answer highly similar questions.

Billig (1995) asks similar questions in his famous book called *Banal Nationalism*. Embarking upon my personal experience and depending upon Billig's thesis of banal nationalism, I will attempt to answer how and when Turkish nationalism is flagged in two TRT (Türk Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu) series, *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* and *Seksenler*. This question aims at revealing the ways and contexts in which the reproduction of Turkish nationalism occurs. Billig (1995) suggests that we need to analyse several media outlets for a long period of time in different countries to reveal the reproduction processes. Basing upon this suggestion, this study will analyse two television series in Turkey broadcasted on Turkish PBS (Public Broadcasting Service), TRT.

The study aims at exploring one main and three related questions in the study of nationalism:

- 1 How is Turkish nationalism reproduced on screen?
- 2 What are the contexts in which Turkish nationalism is reproduced?
- 3 What is the nature of this reproduction? Only banal, only hot or mixed?
- 4 Do peripheral nations reproduce their nationhood banally?

To explore these four questions, in the second chapter, I will start by positioning my research questions in the study of nations and nationalism. I will argue that the persistency and saliency of nationalism can only be understood through studying the nations in its reproduction, in processual, dynamic, contextual and eventful terms.

Then, I will review significant pieces from banal nationalism literature to be able to position my research in banal nationalism literature specifically. Third chapter will lay out related theoretical debates and arguments. I will discuss banal nationalism thesis of Billig. I will argue that banality and everydayness are two important pillars of Billig's thesis. I will present two main debates regarding banal nationalism: the categorisation of hot vs. banal nationalism and established vs. peripheral nations.

After setting the general debates, I will try to demonstrate the role of television in the reproduction of nationhood and claim that television as one of the most quotidian medium in our daily lives has a vital role in interpellation of people as nationals in everyday domestic settings. I will continue with the significance of studying PBS in the reproduction of the nationhood by referring its roles and hegemony of Turkish

state over TRT. Then, I will discuss the main characteristics of post-putsch context in Turkey explaining three key elements: heavy hegemony of AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) over media, the narrative of Üst Akıl (Master Mind) and the mythification of 15th July. I will continue the third chapter by describing the two series I have analysed and the selection process of these specific series. I will end that chapter by laying out the limitations of my study by taking attention to the reproductive nature of my study as well. In the fourth chapter, I will present my findings and discuss the findings. I will discuss the findings from the two series in question by analysing examples with respect to several profound topics related to banal nationalism and with reference to the literature. The chapter consists of three major sections. The first section questions the hot vs. banal dichotomy by looking at five illustrative examples from both series where Turkey and Turkishness are reproduced through the invocation of the ‘little words of deixis’, which is called homeland deixis by Billig. The second section will explore the reproduction of Turkishness in terms of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ by drawing upon the topics of differences in lifestyles and cultural distinctiveness; stereotyping; value-laden nature of nationalism; inside and outside enemies; the atmosphere of paranoia and conspiracy and lastly, rhetoric of Turks as heroes. In the third section of that chapter, I will analyse how these two series reproduces the claim to a common national history and, particularly praises and glorifies the Ottoman past.

Depending upon the analysis, I will argue and demonstrate that Turkishness is reproduced in both banal and hot ways separately and, banal and hot infused together as well. Although these two television series reproduce Turkishness banally at some contexts, not all examples of these reproduction from the series are confined with it. In this regard, I will claim that Turkishness needs to be

understood contextually and in its processual reproductive terms to be thoroughly made sense of without prior assumptions of hot and banal.



CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

‘Nation, nationality, nationalism — all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyse’ quotes Anderson (2006, p. 3). There is an immense amount of scholarship on nationalism yet, the debates relating to define it are far from coming to an agreement. For the purposes of this research here, I will briefly try to touch upon the debates that is related to my research and position my research question into the nationalism literature.

Firstly, I will try to demonstrate the modernism debate in the literature by touching upon the related arguments of Gellner, Hobsbawm and Anderson. Then, I will mention the major criticism to the modernists by referring to Smith. Thirdly, I will attempt to lay out the arguments regarding the definition of nation and nationalism. Fourthly, I will argue that these major accounts have three shortcomings regarding the study of nation and nationalism: too stretched conceptualisation, inability to explain the persistency of nationalism and reification of the concept. Through laying out the problems, I will position my research in the debate basing upon Billig and Brubaker. After conceptualising nationalism in general depending upon the literature, I will present significant pieces from banal nationalism literature and show that since Billig’s first

enterprise, banal nationalism literature has expanded in terms unit of observation and methodology.

It is warranted to argue that although there have been arguments which dates back the nations to pre-modernity (see primordialists on the debate such as Shils, Geert and van den Berghe), the question of ‘when is the nation?’ have been answered mostly in relation to modernity. As a matter of fact, it seems that most of the debate regarding the nation and nationalism revolves around the question of when. One of the most prominent nationalism scholars, Gellner (1983) answers the question in relation to transformation from agrarian society to industrial society. Gellner (1983) argues that the industrial society is a must for nationalism to emerge. With a similar trajectory, Hobsbawm (as cited in Özkırımlı, 2010) links the origin of nationalism to the intersect of technological, political and social transformations brought by modernity. Hobsbawm (1990, p. 14) puts that “the basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its modernity”. In this regard, Hobsbawm (2012) points out to three vital processes brought by modernity, which plays a peculiar role for the nationalism becoming the common ground for social and political organization: the development of primary education, the invention of public ceremonies and the mass production of public monuments. In his book called *Imagined Communities*, which is highly cited and, the theory in it has been immensely utilised in empirical studies, Anderson (2006) claims that nations and nationalism emerged when the religious communities and dynastic empires declined in the 18th century once again answering the question of when in relation to modernity.

One of the most intense and prominent objection to modernists comes from Smith. Smith (1986) argues that nations are not wholly a modern phenomenon

nor primordial totally. What modernists are mistaken is that they only define a specific kind of nation which is the modern nation, Smith (1986) claims.

According to Smith (1986), there are ethnic cores, which Smith (1986) calls *ethnie*, that can be dated back to the pre-modern era through myths, memories, symbols and values and these ethnic cores were transformed to modern nations.

In this context, Smith(1986) criticises modernists in terms of the fact that modernist theories are unable to explain the passion aroused by nationalism which makes the member as willing as to sacrifice thyself for the community and, believes that antiquity of collective cultural ties and sentiments can explain this phenomenon.

While as it can be noticed that most of the debate centres around the question of ‘when’, only vague and catch – all definitions have been made when it comes to the question of what. Hobsbawm (1990) defines nationalism as an ideology that overrides all other obligations without taking much attention to the question of what, while Gellner (1983) defines it as a sentiment of anger aroused by violation and, it depends on shared culture and mutual recognition of one another among the group members. Anderson (2006), on the other hand, provides a more definitive answer by arguing that nations are imagined political communities that are limited and sovereign. Also, nationalism is modular according to Anderson (2006), it can be transplanted anywhere once it emerges.

There are three major problems in these accounts. Firstly, these accounts are too vague to define and more importantly, there is lack of analytical value because the definition can be applied to many other communities such as ethnic and linguistic categories of community. Especially, Smith’s argument is too stretched to be made use of analytically because with the claimed antiquity of

the nations, it overrides the ruptures in history and assumes a continuity which creates a strict teleological account without taking the historical contingencies into account. Furthermore, Gellner's definition of nationalism in relation to anger falls short to make sense of the current persistence of nationalism. Billig (1995) criticises that nationalism has been mostly understood as chauvinistic bursts of hot encounters and thus relating nationalism to periphery, yet; nationalism of the established nations of the West goes unnoticed. Hence, understanding nationalism as a sentiment of anger aroused by violation cannot explain why I feel pride and joyful when I see a reference to Turkey and its achievements in an international environment for example in a foreign television show. Secondly, related to the persistency of the nationalism, these accounts have historicised the debate too much, yet they are not able to explain the question of 'then, what?'. In other words, yes, the nations and nationalism were originated at some point in somewhere but then, what happens? How can these historically originated national attachments still make sense today and provide a set of assumptions and ideas when we make sense of ourselves and the people around us? What can explain its persistency? It seems that the question of how appears as neglected in these accounts. Billig (1995) argues that nationhood and the world of nations are reproduced everyday through banal reminders of our place in the world and hence, this reproduction can explain the persistency, because we are constantly getting reminded our nationhood without even noticing it. This reproduction goes banal and thus unnoticed so without even realising, the world of nations and individual nations still stay salient and relevant in our lives (Billig, 1995). Thirdly, these accounts essentialise and reify the concept of nationalism which turns nations and nationalism an outside object. This results in reproducing the category of

nation as an objective reality rather than explaining it. In other words, “the partition of the social world into the putatively, deeply constituted, quasi – natural intrinsic kinds (Hirschfel, 1996) – is a key part of what we want to explain, not what we want to explain *with*; it belongs to our empirical data, not to our analytical toolkit” (Brubaker, 2004, p. 9). Hence, Brubaker (2004, p. 11) suggests that we need to analyse ethnicity, race and nation “in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful and disaggregated terms rather than substances or things” and we need to think ethnicity, race and nationalism in terms of “practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemes, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects and contingent events”.

Considering all these three remarks, thus, by going beyond the historicism and essentialism by looking into the reproduction processes in a processual and dynamic manner, we can understand the persistency and saliency of nations and nationalism. Özkırımlı (2010, p. 170) asserts that “this new understanding of nationalism enables us to focus on nationalist practices and representations and the previously neglected aspects of nation”. In this regard, my research question is positioned in relation to this new understanding of nationalism studies and will focus on the question of how by exploring the reproduction of Turkish nationhood in two TRT series, *Seksenler* and *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*.

Billig (1995) argues that banal nationalism is an endemic way of being in the established nations of the West and, it operates in unnoticed and unintended ways by reminding the citizenry their place in the worlds of nations.

Furthermore, Billig (1995) suggests that banal nationalism is reproduced through discursive formations which Billig (1995) calls ‘little words of deixis’

such as 'we, us, here' and 'they, them, there'. To reveal the processes and these discursive formations of reproduction, Billig (1995) analyses British national newspapers on 28 June 1993 – the date is chosen to be an ordinary day to ensure the validity of banal nationalism in terms of flagging the nation mindlessly in a mundane way. With the banal nationalism thesis and specific research agenda, Billig has opened up a new era in the study of banal nationalism. Redirecting the attention from hot encounters, xenophobic claims and outbursts of chauvinistic feelings in nationalism to banal reproduction of nationalities in everyday settings, banal nationalism has induced a booming in empirical and theoretical discussions in the literature.

Billig's thesis has inspired many researchers in terms of increasing the attention to iconographic studies where the various symbolic and geographic icons are analysed through banknotes, license plates, postage stamps, maps and flags. In this regard, First and Sheffi (2014) argue that State of Israel issue a new series of banknotes to represent the territorial identity of Israel in an era of globalisation. Especially, First and Sheffi (2014) interpret the usage of several geographic landmarks appearing on newly issued banknotes to this end. With a very similar aim, Penrose and Cumming (2011) explore Scottish banknotes in terms of their symbolic construction of Scotland. The study shows that several different banks that issued the banknotes invoke Scottish national identity through their usage of icons in the banknotes.

Penrose (2011), in a study just by himself, again investigates Scottish banknotes in 2007 and argues that banks with their corporate aims invoke Scottish national identity in an unintended and unconscious manner confirming the banality of the reproduction processes revealed.

Other than banknotes, Leib (2011) studies license plates issued by US and Canadian governments to create a territorial nationhood. Wallach (2011) studies Palestinian postage stamps and currency issued by Britain during 1920s to create an imagination of Palestine ruled by British in which Palestine was articulated as home of Jews. Culcasi (2016) with a very similar aim, explores different maps that were drawn and disseminated by Jordanian state to render a Jordanian nation. Also, US flag is studied by Webster (2011) to show that the flag was used heavily in invasion of Iraq by US to invoke national identity. These empirical studies have expanded the discussion on banal reproduction of nationalities in terms of unit of observation by opening up different areas to be studied to reveal the processes of reproduction.

Booming of empirical studies has not only expanded the literature in terms of unit of observation. Phillips (2012) investigates how Al-Jazeera constructs an idea of New Arabism through the coverage of 2008 Olympics in a mundane manner. The significance of Phillips' study is that while Billig only considers everyday reproduction of nationhood in the media within the established nations of the West, Phillips applies this study to authoritarian regimes as well. Analysing another authoritarian regime, Elhan (2016) looks at the use of banknotes, coins, and postage stamps by Iranian state which aims at reproducing Iranianness in daily life confirming that banal reproduction of nationalities is possible in authoritarian regimes as well one more time. Militz and Schurr (2016) conduct an ethnographic study in Azerbaijan during a commemoration ceremony for a martyr and present how national identity is embodied through its encounters with bodies and objects. The study is particularly significant by presenting two valuable arguments in the study of banal nationalism. Firstly, Militz and Schurr (2016) argue that affective dimensions

of nationalism – where encounters of bodies and objects are analysed in terms of the embodiment of national attachment and belonging – also should be studied within the banal nationalism literature but not only mundane practices and objects thus, offering yet another unit of observation. In a theoretical piece, Calhoun (2007, pp. 23-24) warns that nationalism should not be understood as an ideology that is embedded in the language as a syntax but as “representations embedded and reproduced in action”. In other words, “...it is also a matter of action, of phenomenologically inhabiting the world, not only of engaging with representations” (Calhoun, 2007, p. 24). In this regard, the study presents that there is indeed more to banal nationalism than language – which is action embedded in the performativity of everyday life. Secondly, it warns the banal nationalism literature that seemingly peripheral nation, Azerbaijan also reproduces their nationality in an everyday manner. These studies open up a discussion in the banal nationalism literature on the universality of banal nationalism presenting case studies from variety of nation-states.

Billig (1995) calls for studying different nation states within different media outlets for different periods of time to reveal and analyse the occurrences of banal nationalism. Enriching the scope of analysis and coupling with the Calhoun’s suggestion on understanding the reproduction of nationalism as a matter of action, scholars conduct several empirical researches not only within different media outlets but also daily occurrences of everyday life as well. In this regard, Fukuoka (2016) explores Japanese youth nationalism in everyday life by conducting several surveys and interviews with young Japanese people. Skey (2010) studies England- born white people and how they invoke the concept of otherness in the case of threat to feel secure and safe in day-to-day manner.

Antonsich (2016) shows how Italians create the dichotomy between ‘we here’ and ‘they there’ in his study of Italianness through the focus groups. Ayuandini and Duyvendak (2018) observe doctors during hymenoplasty consultations and present how doctors render a specific type of Dutch national identity by rejecting to conduct hymenoplasty to the women who came to consult about the operation and see this as a daily encounter of women with migrant background vs. doctors with Dutch origin. The significance of these studies is that they use different methodologies to reveal how ordinary people reproduce their nationhood through mundane practices in mundane spaces. While Billig interprets and analyses the content of the newspapers with a wholistic interpretative approach, these studies make use of surveys, interviews, focus groups and ethnographic observations. The difference comes from the fact that unit of observation in the latter is groups of people while it is a media outlet in the former. In this regard, the literature in fact presents a path for the researchers to utilise the appropriate methodology in accordance with their unit of observation.

In their highly cited study, Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) apply Billig’s strategy directly to the Turkish case. Yumul and Özkırımlı analyse 38 daily newspapers on a randomly selected day, 16 January 1997. The findings are remarkable. Whether Turkey can be counted as an established nation in Billig’s terms is another discussion, yet the study reveals that naturalness of nationalist propositions are reproduced in the media. In this regard, Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) shows that Turkishness is reproduced in terms of religion of Islam evoked as, ‘our’ shared religion, the issue Cyprus, the internal and external enemies coupling with the perception of their collaboration, cultural

distinctiveness, glorification of ‘our’ past with a nostalgic longing of the ‘golden ages’, ‘our’ international prestige vis-à-vis other countries and lastly ‘our’ achievements in economy and sports. 13 years later, Köse and Yılmaz (2012) replicate the study of Yumul and Özkırımlı. 36 daily newspapers dated 3 February 2010 have been analysed. What is particularly significant is that this study also reveals similar reproduction patterns despite changing context and time. The study presents that Turkishness is reproduced in terms of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ distinction, praise of ‘our’ country/nation, its achievements, its huge potential and abilities, the emphasis on the idea of common interest and history, underlining where ‘we’ live and its values by pointing to a cultural distinctiveness and lastly mentioning the issue of Cyprus once again. In a recent study, Özçetin (2019) analyses highly popular television show called *Diriliş: Ertuğrul* and argues that the show has opened up discursive spaces by presenting an exclusive nationalist outlook where there is a constant search for internal and external enemies, politics is reimagined in a moralistic manner and Ottoman past is glorified. In this regard, all these there studies reveal recurring reproduction processes for the study of Turkishness in media. By depending upon the literature yet, filling a gap in terms of study of Turkishness on PBS, my study will reveal how Turkishness is reproduced on two TRT series, *Seksenler* and *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* by employing a wholistic interpretative approach in accordance with the unit of observation being two television series.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Banal Nationalism

Billig (1995, p. 6) proposes that unlike the common understanding that nationalism is outbursts of chauvinistic claims to identity and place, it is a framework that consists of “complex set of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices” regarding ourselves and ‘others’. In this regard, our assumptions and beliefs regarding ourselves and others forms the ideas surrounding what the nation is and what it should be (Billig, 1995). In this way, Billig (1995) claims that nationalism is not a possession of periphery but also the very endemic condition of established nations of the West. Moreover, the complex set of habits, representations and practices that we perform on a day – to – day basis connote our nationhood, reproduce both our nation and also the world of nations, in general, by reminding our place in the world (Billig, 1995; Skey, 2014). Yet, this whole process of reproduction is not a separate entity that needs a juxtaposition of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices , rather, it is itself what we understood from nationhood (Brubaker, 2004). In other words, the nation is to be understood and studied in “relational, processual, dynamic, eventful and disaggregated terms” (Brubaker, 2004, p.11) through the study of

constant reproduction of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices in daily contexts (Antonsich & Skey, 2017; Billig, 1995; Edensor, 2006; Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008). Thus, we need to look at this very process of everyday reproduction to understand what a specific nation claims what it is.

In his study of Egyptian television, Abu-Lughod (2005, p. 14) puts that:

I argue in this book that rather than studying “the nation” or any particular nation, we must admit that we are always studying nations at particular moments in their histories. The dynamics within and the forces that shape a nation are always in flux, even if there are periods of relative stability.

Since nations are not separate entities and/or objects that we can find outside and own or claim (Brubaker, 2004), and constant everyday reproduction involves various competing and overlapping claims (Brubaker, 2004; Edensor, 2002; Edensor, 2006; Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008; Gallie in Billig, 1995; Yuval-Davis in Özkırmı, 2010) (see Bonikowski, 2017; Leib, 2011; Pratsinakis, 2017; Sumartojo, 2012 and Watson, 2017 for a few significant case studies), every nation can only be studied within its reproduction in various contexts under specific circumstances at a particular time.

The matter of specific socio-cultural and political context comes forth here in the sense that no social phenomenon can be separated from its specific context. As it is put by Billig (1995, p. 108) that “the banal utterance of 'the kitchen' , (or 'the living- room' or 'the stairs') not only assumes the boundary of the home as the context of the utterance, but it also helps to renew this homely context”. Szulc (2016), agreeing with the idea, explains this as that neither the context nor flagging the nation is the effect or the result; rather, they are co-constitutive of each other through a constant reciprocal reproduction process. Thus, it is utterly important to look at the context to be able to make sense of in a what kind of

context, the nationhood is reproduced and what kind of context is reconstituted within this process. In other words, the question of the reproduction of nationhood should be studied in relation to its specific socio- cultural and political context. In this regard, this study will look at what Turkish nation claims to be just right after 15th July 2016 failed coup attempt by analysing two TRT series, *Seksenler* and *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* under the premises of banal nationalism thesis.

3.1.1 Two pillars of banal nationalism: Banality and everydayness

When Billig proposed the term ‘banal nationalism’, he specifically stressed two significant points as main pillars of his thesis. One is that the reproduction of the complex set of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices are banal in the sense that the process is mundane, seems natural and unnoticed to the eye yet, it is the very core of this endemic way of being in the world (Billig, 1995). Billig (1995, p. 6) says:

The ideological habits, by which 'our' nations are reproduced as nations, are unnamed and, thereby, unnoticed. The national flag hanging outside a public building in the United States attracts no special attention. It belongs to no special, sociological genus. Having no name, it cannot be identified as a problem. Nor, by implication, is the daily reproduction of the United States a problem.

Thus, this reproduction occurs as banal by reminding our place in the world of nations. These banal reminders are named as flaggings by Billig (1995) stressing that not only the actual flag reproduces the nations rather, the acts of flaggings which are able to reproduce the nations such as the language, the invocation of discursive formations of ‘we vs. they’, ‘us vs. them’ and ‘here vs. there’. In this context, my research aims at identifying these flagging incidents on TRT series,

Seksenler and Sevdâ Kuşun Kanadında.

Second point that Billig stresses is the everydayness of this reproduction.

Although it seems that nationalism comes forth in special occasions such as commemorations, national days or extreme social movements, it is actually in the everyday routines of our daily lives in the contemporary world of nations (Billig, 1995). Embarking upon this idea of everydayness, Skey (as cited in Skey & Antonsich, 2017, p. 4) emphasizes “the importance of attending to the everyday as a way to understand when, where and how people call into existence the nation in order to make sense of their life worlds”. Brubaker (2004) also takes attention to everyday in terms of nationhood as a category of practice to make sense of ‘ourselves’ and ‘them’ in everyday settings. Edensor (2002, p. 18) notes that “when we consider that there have been several important accounts of the importance of temporal schemes to the construction of national identity, it is all the more curious that the everyday has not been considered”. To this aim, Edensor (2002, p. viii) explores the relationship between popular culture and nationalism basing his thesis on the nationalism reproduced through the “popular competencies”, “embodied tasks” and “synchronised enactions” to demonstrate how nationhood is grounded in quotidian practices. With similar attention to the popular culture and media, it is noted:

Everyday trivia (currency, TV news, flags, tipping conventions, conversational styles, and so on), notes Eriksen, ‘often goes without saying because it comes without saying, and shared implicit conventions and notions, or taken-for-granted, create a sense of community which is linked with space rather than time’. (Eriksen as cited in Özkırmı, 2010, p. 211)

To illustrate the viability of that the nations are reproduced in everyday settings

banally, Billig (1995) makes an empirical study that had been reproduced with similar trajectories and aims by several different researchers (see Dekavalla, 2010; Higgins, 2004; Köse & Yılmaz, 2012; Law, 2001 and Yumul & Özkırımlı, 2000 for few examples). In the study – which Billig (1995) calls the Day Survey – Billig (1995) looks at the flagging incidents on the British national newspapers on 28 June 1993 which is a date chosen as to be ordinary without having any special meaning for the purpose of making sure of the banality – and demonstrates that the homeland is flagged banally and daily in the newspapers through the usage of words ‘we, us, our, here’ vs. ‘they, them, their, there’. Billig (1995, p. 94) puts:

A case study, which examines one nation's newspapers on one day, shows that the deixis of homeland is embedded in the very fabric of the newspapers. Beyond conscious awareness, like the hum of distant traffic, this deixis of little words makes the world of nations familiar, even homely.

As Billig (1995) calls those ‘homeland-making deixis’, the deixis reminds the citizenry their place in the world of nations and reproduces them as nationals by ‘making the home homely’ in the sense that the invocation of ‘we, us, here’ articulates the idea of being at home meaning the homeland, the nation. Furthermore, Billig (1995, p. 109) stresses:

To demonstrate this systematically, it would be necessary to sample the various forms of mass media and mass culture over a lengthy period in a number of countries. Of particular interest would be the quotient of flagging on 'ordinary' days, which are not days of national celebration or intense electoral campaigning.

Getting by upon the banality and everydayness of nationalism where nationhood is reproduced through and in everyday practices in a mundane way emphasizing the flaggings in daily settings and taking upon Billig’s suggestion on further research, I have formulated my research question as ‘When and how is Turkish

nation flagged in two TRT series, *Seksenler* and *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında?*'. The question aims at answering what Turkish nation claims to be in everyday occasions to understand how Turkishness is flagged and whether these flaggings are banal, hot and/or mixed. Also, the analysis will shed light on how we portray 'ourselves'; 'ourselves' vis-à-vis 'others'; what kinds of values are laden into 'ourselves' and 'others' in this portrayal while placing 'ourselves' in the world of nations.

These arguments combined lead us to a vital yet contestable dichotomy and an important conclusion: 1) Then, there is hot nationalism which is chauvinistic including outbursts of xenophobic feelings, and also a banal nationalism which is endemic way of being in the world in established nations of the West, 2) Banal nationalism is basically the nationalism of established nations. In this regard, in the following section, I will try to lay out the hot vs. banal debate in the literature of nationalism referring to significant case studies.

3.1.2 Hot nationalism vs. banal nationalism

The binary resulting from this banality argument between hot vs. banal has been an important debate topic in the study of nationalism especially for the last couple of decades. While some use the binary as it is, several others contest the dichotomy through case studies. The binary has been contested in terms of neglecting the interactions between the two, the blurred lines between two categories, infusion of two categories into one another and that banal is politicised or hot is banalized. In this regard, depending upon the numerous case studies contesting this binary, I argue that depending on the context, such a binary can at times be incapable of making sense of the complexity of social

reality without twisting and oversimplifying the social phenomenon. Thus, relying only on the distinction which the binary creates can be counter-productive in some cases.

In order to lay out the crucial points in the debate and position my research question in relation to it, I will, first, demonstrate the case studies that make use of the binary as it is. Then, I will provide several case studies which contest the binary with reference to various shortcomings.

There are two significant case studies worthy for the purposes of this study, which uses the binary as it is. Although there are numerous studies which utilises banality of Billig's thesis, these two studies specifically touch upon the debate by making the distinction between hot and banal. In this vein, Kešić and Duyvendak (2016) utilise this dichotomy and show that there are indeed two kinds of Dutch nationalism; while intellectuals try to articulate a banal cultural Dutch nationalism, there are also chauvinistic and xenophobic claims articulating a hot Dutch nationalism which intellectuals try to counter. Feischmidt and Pulay (2017) specifically stress the usefulness of the dichotomy and study a Hungarian rock genre as a cultural artefact that is able to invoke Hungarian nation in a banal way underlining not politicised patterns.

Whereas these two case studies confirm the analytical value of the dichotomy, several other studies challenge it by demonstrating the complexities such a binary may produce. As one the most influential studies regarding the hot vs. banal debate, Jones and Merriman (2009) demonstrate the very blurred line between hot and banal nationalism with an analysis of bilingual road signs in Wales and explain how a banal reproduction of Welsh nation with bilingual road

signs can stir hot encounters and confrontations between the residents. Their study shows that banal can be politicised and thus, the line is analytically not easy neither useful to be utilised.

Paasi (2016) and; Christian, Dowler and Cuomo (2016) following a similar trajectory as Jones and Merriman claim that cold/banal and hot are in fact fused together. Reaching to a similar conclusion with his study, Paasi (2016) shows that banal is politicised creating hot encounters. Paasi (2016) analyses the banal reproduction of Independence Day of Finland in the media, festivals, textbooks and education yet, these seemingly banal reproductions result in hot encounters among protestors who tried to create a competing view of the Independence Day of Finland. The study of Christian, Dowler & Cuomo (2016) conclude that, this time, hot is banalized. Christian et al. (2016) case-study experiences of fear among U.S. college students and U.S. soldiers and, demonstrate that hot violence and fear are indeed banalized, thus simply showing that hot is banalized.

Drawing upon the complexities emerging from the binary of intimate vs. global in feminist geopolitics, Christian et al. (2016) argue that the binary created as hot vs. banal also creates complexities in understanding social phenomena. Rather, Christian et al. (2016) suggest researchers to study the two together.

Following a similar trend and proving the complexity of the binary, Culcasi (2016) offers a new term for the idea of infused hot and banal nationalism: warm nationalism; by analysing Jordanian First Campaign in which various national maps were produced to give a response to Israeli – Palestinian conflict resulting in the loss of West Bank in particular.

Nieswand (2012) and Maly (2016) use the binary in a twisted manner stressing upon

the relationship between the two. Nieswand (2012) show the interaction between banal and non-banal forms of nationalism through the study of fiftieth anniversary of Ghanaian independence in Berlin in 2007. Nieswand (2012) argues that seemingly a politicised identity category, diaspora, is in reality banalized and became embedded in migrants' everyday lives shaping their life worlds. Maly (2016), on the other hand, argues that a kind of social scientific discourse is utilised and used by spokespeople of N-VA – a right wing party in Belgium – to banalize the hot Flemish nationalism. In this regard, Maly (2016) looks at the statements of De Wever and shows that how he presents himself as an intellectual and uses arguments of Anderson, Calhoun, Hrouch and Billig to render a banalized Flemish nationalism. This time, the hot is banalized for political purposes by a political party creating a highly entangled interaction between two categories. With a similar understanding but particular to Turkish nationalism, Çırakman (2011) in her study of nationalist best sellers, TV series, public displays of slogans, and flagging incidents in the 2000s in Turkey, claims that banal and overt are fused together in Turkish case. Çırakman (2011, p.1906) asserts:

The new ethnic nationalism may seem like an exceptional situation that is fiercely expressed rather than an everyday banality. Billig thinks that societies can have either banal or overt nationalism (Billig 1995, p. 16), but that the two can clash or fuse, so that overt nationalism can be lived as an everyday phenomenon and be taken for granted.

Çırakman (2011) uses an example of a racist phrase – ‘the world should turn Turk’ (*Dünya Türk Olsun*) – displaced hugely in everyday public settings as a business as usual. Thus, Turkish case is indeed a case of banal and hot infused together and demonstrate that hot/overt nationalism can be also seen as business as usual (Çırakman, 2011). In other words, hot/overt nationalism

can be a part of everyday life making the lines between the banal and hot very much entangled, blurred and impossible to analytically separate without trivialising the data.

Although the hot vs. banal dichotomy seems useful analytically at first glance, the complexity of the social reality makes the dichotomy impossible to use efficiently. Moreover, the binary has been challenged and contested with reference to several case studies in the literature. There is a blurred line between what counts as hot and what as banal. Moreover, it has been shown that the two can transform and be transformed to one another creating a much complicated relation. In some cases, they are infused together making it impossible to separate from one another. In this regard, such binaries have a huge risk of oversimplifying the social phenomenon resulting in understudying or omitting some cases and, twisting the social reality at hand. Moreover, such a binary can limit our categories of thought and analysis. In this regard, it is epochally substantial to study the cases that have a potential to challenge the binaries. By drawing upon the idea of intertwined binary of hot and banal nationalism and considering the Çırakman's argument of Turkish nationalism being an infused case of this dichotomy, I would like to explore the case of Turkish nationalism on television as a seemingly banal reproduction site of nationhood. I aim at seeing whether hot and banal are infused together or they can indeed be separated as analytical categories and be utilised to study complex social phenomenon.

3.1.3 Established nations vs. peripheral nations

Billig's argument of banal nationalism being the endemic condition of established nations of the West creates another debate topic in the literature.

The argument implies that banal nationalism is that of established nations of the West excluding peripheral nations and relating them with hot nationalism. In other words, two interrelated questions arise here as 1) Does banal nationalism belong to the West? 2) Can we observe this phenomenon in the periphery?

The argument has been tremendously challenged with several case studies in the literature. Furthermore, while what counts as periphery and what differentiates nations as established are also problematic, diverse range of case studies have demonstrated that banal nationalism can be also found in seemingly peripheral nations. In this regard, I will provide significant case studies demonstrating that banal reproduction of nations can be also seen in assumingly peripheral nations and stateless nations as well. Thus, studying one of this nations, Turkey, will contribute to the debate to a great extend.

Billig's methodology and thesis has been used by several scholars to study varied nation states ranging from Israel to Japan. In this context, First and Sheffi (2014) use Billig's argument and methodology in their study of Israeli nation-state. First and Sheffi (2014) analyse a new series of banknotes which the State of Israel issues in 2014 and, conclude that the banknotes aim at representing the territorial identity of Israel in the era of globalisation with the specific uses of selected landscapes that connote Israeli nation-state. Perkins (2010) analyses an episode from a Japanese television comedy and demonstrates that several banal bordering processes are at play in rendering the distinction between us vs. them. Phillips (2012) particularly claims that Billig's methodology can be applied to non-Western and even authoritarian regimes as well. Phillips (2012) studies the coverage of Beijing Olympics in Al-Jazeera and shows that a kind of New

Arabism connoting a supranational Arabic identity does not undermine but rather promotes national state identities. Analysing another authoritarian regime, Elhan (2016) looks at the use of banknotes, coins, and postage stamps in Iran by Iranian state which aims at reproducing Iranianness in daily life. Two interrelated passages from Elhan's study summarise the criticisms crystal clear. Elhan (2016, pp.122-123) puts:

However, what about the 'East'? Moreover, there is no 'Western' uniformity in terms of how identity is flagged. Do not the movements in Catalonia (Spain) or Quebec (Canada) have separatist aspects? Another remark concerns the concept of 'established nation-state'...

What is an established nation? He counts France, the US, and Great Britain as established nation-states. What are the requirements of being an established nation-state? Is banal nationalism seen only in these states? There are studies about daily production of nationalism in Turkey, Greece, Cameroon, Syria, and Jordan (Philips, 2013), the authors of which apply almost the same methods as did his study and achieve almost the same results. Is it possible to count Turkey and Syria as established nation-states within the same category as the US and Great Britain? Or what about Iran, where nation and religion are re-produced and flagged daily?

Embarking upon Elhan's criticism, three case studies regarding Turkey can be provided. One is a heavily cited research on banal reproduction of Turkishness in Turkish press by Yumul and Özkırmılı in 2000. Yumul and Özkırmılı (2000) use the very same methodology as Billig's and analyse 38 daily newspapers of 16.01.1998 – as to choose an ordinary date. Yumul and Özkırmılı (2000) find similar results in their research that of Billig, such as use of deixis in similar manner, invocation of internal and external enemies, claim to cultural distinctiveness and so on. With a similar trend, Köse and Yılmaz (2012) almost replicate Yumul and Özkırmılı's research by analysing 36 daily newspapers of 03.02.2010 and not surprisingly or surprisingly - despite of changing economic, social and political conditions- reach same results as Yumul and Özkırmılı. With a similar mindset but with a careful attentiveness to the changing contexts in

media outlets due to the technological advancements, Szulc (2016) analyses LGBTQ websites from Turkey and Poland.

Szulc (2016) identifies almost same processes and representations in the websites which reproduce the nationalities while the LGBTQ communities do not challenge the hegemonic national discourses rather, they turn the nation more homely for queers.

In addition to seemingly peripheral nations, the stateless nations have been also studied by scholars. Penrose and Cumming (2011) intensely read and interpret the Scottish banknotes issued over 300 years by various banks and, argue that even though there is not a Scottish nation-state, the banks have also reproduced Scottish national identity through the symbolic constructions of Scotland. Higgins (2004) explores the coverage of elections in the Scottish newspapers and concludes that newspapers differentiate between Scottish dimension vs. the British dimension of the issue reproducing the Scottish nationhood separately that of British. With a similar aim, Dekavalla (2010) compares the national identity construction in UK and Scottish newspapers concluding that while Scottish newspaper touch upon the topics and news related to UK, they make a distinction between 'our' (Scottish) problems vs. others' problems interpellating readers as the members of Scottish nation.

To conclude, the case studies show that banal nationalism can be observed also in seemingly peripheral and even stateless nations. With these case studies on mind and the complications that may result from the differentiation between established and non-established nations, it seems possible to argue and acknowledge that banal nationalism can also be seen in the peripheral nations and

stateless nations. Thus, it is significant to study different cases throughout different media outlets and cultural products to reveal the processes that make world of nations and individual nationhood persistent, salient and most importantly natural in the eyes of the people. Hence, my study will reveal the processes of daily reproduction of Turkish nationalism by contributing to these two debates in the literature about the hot/banal dichotomy and the banal nationalism in non-established nations. It is utmost priority to note here that although the Turkish case has been studied, there is the lack of studies regarding television series on the basis of banal nationalism and particularly TRT series.

3.2 Television and The Reproduction of Nationhood

Television has become one of the most quotidian medium in our daily lives especially considering its accessibility, low cost and its ability of maximum penetration in our everyday lives (Hutchings & Miazhevich, 2010). As one of the key players in dissemination of information and entertainment, it is necessary to study television's relationship with nationalism.

Hutchings and Miazhevich (2010, pp. 175-176) note:

Still more prevalent, perhaps, are the television serials, sitcoms and soap operas grounded in the everyday lives of ordinary families dominating national schedules throughout Europe. They serve a vital function in perpetuating national stereotypes of normality (for example, that of the nuclear family) as well as in facilitating a nation's ability to absorb social change (the sympathetic treatment of characters from ethnic minorities in soap operas; changing national attitudes to gender roles and sexuality as in serials like *Sex and the City* for instance), and in promoting, via their narrative trajectories, nationally acceptable myths of success and social mobility (the Latin American serial, with its "escape route" for the "poor girl from the provinces").

Television becomes a space for national narrative and a site of identification by connecting people virtually across wide spaces and, compressing space and time

into national space/time nexus (Blandford & Lacey, 2011; Hutchings & Miazhevich, 2010; Radcliffe & Westwood, 1996; Van Den Bulck, 2001). It taps into the very routines in our everyday lives in two ways: 1) Its vast penetration enables television- watching to become a mundane, quotidian and banal part of our daily lives – as a matter of fact, at most homes, television is what all other furniture are pointed at, 2) The very content of the television is highly grounded in the everyday life of ordinary families through the stories told and presented which draw on established social categories and cultural repertoire of the individual nations and, uses national stereotypes to enable people to make sense of the story without having to think on it (Blains, 2016; Edensor, 2002; Hutchings & Miazhevich, 2010; Perkins, 2010). Bhabha (1990, p. 297) asserts:

...We then have a contested cultural territory where the people must be thought in a double-time; the people are the historical 'objects' of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pre given or constituted historical origin or event; the people are also the 'subjects' of a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principle of the people as that continual process by which the national life is redeemed and signified as a repeating and reproductive process. The scraps, patches, and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of a national culture, while the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a growing circle of national subjects. In the production of the nation as narration there is a split between the continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative. It is through this process of splitting that the conceptual ambivalence of modern society becomes the site of *writing the nation*.

The very performativity of national identities with constant repetition makes the people into subjects. Thus, national identities and individual nations are performed on television through the stories told and presented drawing on cultural repertoire.

Perkins (2010, p. 391) explains this as:

...by predicting and presenting TV material that is easy to watch, the program makers show that they do not stand above the nation and feed it information; instead, it can be asserted that they are embroiled in the performative aspects of national identity constitution over time.

Considering the performativity, it is significant to put here that television content is not just a reflection of what is already out there in terms of nationhood. Since nation is itself the process of reproduction, television content is a part of this process.

Hence, television is a reproduction site for nationhood not only a mere reflection (Altın & Yenigün Şen, 2018; Porto, 2011). The ongoing repetition of national narrative on television through this very process of constant reproduction perpetuates, naturalises and makes the national stereotypes neutral thus, unnoticed; as a result, television enables a banal form of representation of nationhood (Castelló as cited in Jones & Woodward, 2011; Hutchings & Miazhevich, 2010; Peris, 2016; Perkins, 2010). “The performance then goes on to solidify the salience of the socially held representations that “this is the right way to talk about x” or “this is how x happened,” through both what is said and what is omitted” (Perkins, 2010, p. 391).

Moreover, as Anderson (1990) takes our attention to the consumption of a cultural product by masses, home life of citizens gets connected to the collective live of the nation (Peris, 2016) as “individuals place their biographies within the larger stage of the nation-state” (Radcliffe & Westwood, 1996, p. 87). When it comes to the television series particularly, it is put:

By addressing the national/regional audience in its own language, speaking about domestic situations/matters and communicating values/common-sense assumptions and understandings, soaps engage in a process of enculturation

that promotes a sense of community and identity among a particular group of viewers within a national territory (Franco, 2001, p. 435).

Franco ascribes these roles to the soap operas particularly, nevertheless television series in general do what Franco explains, through the usage of characters, narratives and events that are derived from and based on cultural repertoire of the particular nation.

Thus, considering all these, television in fact interpellates people as nationals within a domestic setting (Chan, 2011; Peris, 2016). “The formation of everyday life in contemporary Turkish society can be clearly observed through an analysis of the relevant genres, including television dramas, adaptations of fiction, reality shows, health programmes and magazine programmes” (Erol Işık, 2013, pp. 565-566).

Going one step further, White (2013, p.183) notes that “Turkishness is as much a product of the media and market as of the educational system”. In this context, my research will contribute to the debate regarding the relationship between the reproduction of nationhood and television, and media – at a larger scale – by identifying the ways in which Turkish nation and the world of nations are reproduced on two television series selected.

3.2.1 Studying the public broadcasting service (PBS)

Public broadcasting services (PBS) are specifically significant to study when considering their role in reproduction of the nationhood and their close relationship with the particular nation-state. In this regard, I will first try to provide insights into the roles and significance of PBS in the reproduction of nationhood by referring to three crucial case studies. Secondly, I will continue

with explaining the relationship between TRT – Turkish PBS – and AKP since TRT Law has been transformed enormously under AKP rule resulting in a heavy hand of AKP over TRT.

Starting with a significant study, in his study of Flemish PBS in creating and maintaining a Flemish national identity, Van Den Bulck (2001, p. 54) explains the aim of his study as:

The aim of this article, then, is to study in what way public service broadcasting – as a typical modernist project of a cultural elite – has tried to create and maintain a national culture by offering a uniform, high culture as a vehicle to ‘educate’ its citizens to become the citizens of the community which the broadcasting service claims to represent.

In this regard, PBS has indeed a role in reproducing the nationhood through the creation and maintenance of a uniform national culture. Moreover, it claims to represent the national community. Van Den Bulck (2001, p. 57) identifies three roles of PBS “as education – as an extension of national education –, as information to create a political consciousness and as entertainment to articulate national culture. In this aim, the study of Van Den Bulck (2001) reveals that Flemish PBS indeed contributes to the recognition and development of Flemish national identity through its content and programming. Similarly, in his famous study of television fiction in Catalan PBS in between 1994 – 2003, Castelló (2007) demonstrates that a cultural and linguistic Catalanness has been promoted through the fictional space that television fiction offers on Catalan PBS. In his analysis, Castelló (2007, p. 63) identifies five main roles of the production companies in relation to nationhood as “language promotion, cultural promotion, territorial promotion, promotion of social awareness and promotion of national normalisation and, finds the footprints of all five in television fiction broadcasted in Catalan PBS”. Castelló (2007) takes attention to the importance

of cultural policy and production dynamics in determining the kind of nation that is being represented and, argues that the productions were in line with the cultural policy in promoting a specific Catalanness. In a similar study, Jones and Woodward (2011) analyse a television series called *Pen Talar* broadcasted in Welsh PBS and show the centrality of cultural discourses in the series that draw upon the Welsh nationalist narrative through the usage of shared past, rural landscapes and fictional lives merged with real, past events. The case studies mentioned above provide insights into the question regarding the role of PBS on the reproduction of nationhood. They show that indeed PBS has an significant role in terms of reproducing nationhood on screen by using the content and programming to create and promote a specific national culture and, educate citizens. Furthermore, it taps into the nationalist narratives. While these are few studies showing the significance of PBS in Flemish, Welsh and Catalan cases, there is lack of studies regarding the current role of Turkish PBS – TRT – in reproducing the Turkish nation. In this regard, it will be highly fruitful to look at the ways in which two TRT series reproduce the Turkish nation.

3.2.2 Relations between TRT and AKP

It is worthwhile to position of TRT in relation to AKP in Turkish media because TRT has been restructured after 2007 election with enormous changings in TRT law by AKP. Sümer and Adaklı (2010, p. 1) put that “in the history of Turkish politics, there has not been any government that was this much directly involved in how media operates”. Not only TRT but there has been a radical transformation in the media during AKP rule such as the liquidation of Uzan Group, privatisation of Türk Telekom, changes in ownership structure in the

media (Adaklı, 2019). Moreover, ATV was confiscated by TMSF first and then, sold to Çalık Group known with its close relationship to AKP (Adaklı, 2019). In addition to these, with the changing TRT law, the government is now able to get involved in decision-making process with the ability of changing the co-ordinator of Executive Board directly, the operational structure has been centralised and the powers of the Director General has been strengthened (Sümer & Adaklı, 2010). Furthermore, tax revenues of TRT has been increased creating a strong dependence to the state (Sümer & Adaklı, 2010). Kaya (2015) argues that consent has been manufactured through popular culture during AKP. This is realised by putting pressure on critical media and giving penalties to the critical media by RTSC; furthermore, Islamising the content in public channels in every kind of content – even the ones which are not religious programmes (Çetin, 2014; Kaya, 2015; Sümer & Adaklı, 2010). To illustrate, a highly rated TRT series *Leyla and Mecnun* was cancelled shockingly due to claimed low ratings and high costs yet, later, it has been revealed that a video of the cast in which the demolition of Gezi Park was being criticised by the actors had bothered the executives (Çetin, 2014). Thus, it can be argued that the content in TRT is under pressure and hugely scrutinised by AKP.

While AKP has a dominance over TRT content and programming, TRT has had a specific function in terms of pushing the media market to self-regulate. To clarify, Sümer and Adaklı (2010) argue that TRT has become a strategic actor in the media market and pushes the market to self-regulate itself resulting in strengthening AKP's hegemony over media. In this sense, TRT does not only contribute to the reproduction of Turkish nationhood with its own content and programming but, through impacting the other players in the media market, it

leads to the circulation of a specific kind of a content production and programming in which there is the heavy hand and dominance of AKP. This creates a triangle between AKP's policies, TRT and private media channels, and, the reproduction of Turkish nationhood sits right in the centre of this triangle.

Considering the role of PBS in the reproduction of nationhood through creating, promoting and maintaining a national culture in line with the cultural policies at one hand and the relationship between the state and the PBS on the other, the analysis of television series broadcasted on TRT will reveal both of the ways in which the reproduction occurs and the kind of nationhood that is being reproduced since the nations can only be studied at particular moments. In this regard, this study will answer both of these questions of how and what kind of Turkish nation is reproduced at a particular moment focusing on the two TRT series just right after the putsch of 15th July, 2016.

3.3 Political and Social Context

As it has been put before (see Chapter III section 3.1), nations are not separate entities and/or objects that we can find outside and own or claim (Brubaker, 2004), and constant everyday reproduction involves various competing and overlapping claims (Brubaker, 2004; 1996; Edensor, 2002; Edensor, 2006; Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008; Gallie as cited in Billig; Yuval-Davis in Özkırımlı, 2010) (see Bonikowski, 2017; Leib, 2011; Pratsinakis, 2017; Sumartojo, 2012 and; Watson, 2017 for a few significant case studies), every nation can only be studied within its reproduction in various contexts under specific circumstances at a particular time. In this regard, understanding and making sense of the context prior to analysis is utmost

priority. Hence, in this section, I will try to provide an overview of the socio-political context in Turkey specifically post – putsch by referring to the literature. In this regard, firstly, I will try to explain the relationship between AKP and Gülen movement regarding the events that lead to the putsch and the night of the putsch. Then, I will continue with the following key events regarding the putsch. I will move onto explaining the three key elements of post-putsch context in Turkey which will provide a socio-political framework to make sense of the analysis. These three key elements of the post-putsch context is : 1) the heavy hegemony of AKP over media changing the language of politics 2) the narrative of Üst Akıl – Master Mind – feeding into the anti-Western and anti-US (the United States) sentiments and; 3) the mythification of 15th July as a national day and of Erdoğan as the saviour of the nation causing the re-configuration of Turkish national identity.

Although I have experienced the coup attempt at first hand in terms of the fact that I live in Ankara and specifically very close to a set of military facilities, what happened in the night of 15th July seems like a little blurred and somewhat mysterious. Many crucial questions have yet remained unanswered (Akın, 2016; Küçük & Türkmen, 2020; Taş, 2018) despite the passing four years. 15 July has definitely had significant effects for Turkish politics and even it is mentioned as the 9/11 of Turkey by Joe Biden (Akın, 2016).

Starting with the relationship between AKP and Gülen, it is mentioned as marriage of convenience in the literature referring to them being close allies in a manner that AKP benefited from the bureaucratic infiltration of Gülenists into the state and Gülenists benefited from the AKP's power allowing them to prosper in

many areas from media to judiciary and, the alliance was effective in terms of weakening the power of Kemalists in the state, the military and the bureaucracy (Akın, 2016; Küçük & Türkmen, 2020; Taş, 2018; Waldman & Çalışkan, 2017). The alliance started cracking down in the late 2013 when a corruption scandal broke out with the tapes leaked to the media regarding the prominent AKP members and even including the family of Erdoğan himself. Gülenists were blamed in terms of the release of the tapes and, a wave of arrests and discharges in the bureaucratic posts and the military followed the events. Following this first crack between the two, in the evening of 15 July, a set of strange events occurred in the most strategically – important cities in Turkey including İstanbul and Ankara. The Bosphorus Bridge was blocked, several jets flew at a very low altitude creating bomb-like sounds and the parliament was targeted with fires by a faction of military whose identities and connections are still unclear yet, the Gülenists were accused of all the events although Fethullah Gülen ignored all the accusations. With the call of Erdoğan on Habertürk TV channel, ordinary citizens took on the streets to fight back and resist the plotters. This was the first in the military coup – rich Turkish history, hence creating atmosphere of victory and pride among Turkish citizens in terms of resisting the plotters. “More than 240 people had lost their lives resisting the plotters, Turkey’s major cities had experienced a war-like atmosphere for several hours” (Akın, 2016, p. 4). Following the events, tens of thousands of suspects have been investigated and persecuted including journalists, academics, top generals, military officers, judicial officers and even baklava producers (Akın, 2016; Küçük & Türkmen, 2020; Taş, 2018; Waldman & Çalışkan, 2017). Furthermore, there has been a great rapprochement between AKP and MHP following the events and they have

formed a coalition in the upcoming elections and formed an alliance in the parliament as well to this date.

The first element of the post-putsch context is the heavy hegemony of AKP over media and, its repercussions on public perception and language of politics. Over 100 media outlets have been dismissed and thousands of journalists have been persecuted including Gülenists, Kemalists, pro-Kurdish and other critical views. Furthermore, in his analysis of media content following two months after the events, Akın (2016) demonstrates that the content of several media outlets worked as a justification of state of emergency, only recirculated the stories and information provided by the government as the official narrative of the 15th July and, exchanged opinions more than the knowledge in the debate programs connecting ISIS attacks, YPG attacks and the putsch all together under the umbrella of terrorism. In this regard, Akın (2016) mentions that excessive amount of information causes a dizziness in the public who is hungry for ‘true’ account of the events creating an environment where there is a confusion of truth with lies. Following the same trajectory, Taş (2018) argues that this altered the language and grammar of the politics where the regime of truth is replaced by regime of common sense. In other words, a climate of post-truth politics haunts Turkey where national media outlets are disseminated with fabricated content and poured with conspiracy theories (Taş, 2018). In this, fact-based questions and knowledge are dismissed by a flood of conspiracy theories which mobilize emotions regarding the created national myth of 15 July (Taş, 2018). Thus, the Turkish public is left with narratives of the event but neither knowledge nor the facts (Akın, 2016).

The second element of the post-putsch context is the narrative of ‘Üst Akıl’

(Mastermind) referring to an alleged connection between the foreign powers and the putsch and, its repercussions on Turkish politics. In this regard, thriving on Turks' Sevres Syndrome (Taş, 2018), the putsch has been linked to the Üst Akıl. Üst Akıl is an abstract term used by Erdoğan and his followers and, refers to the Western powers and the US which is alleged to orchestrate the events behind the putsch (Akın, 2016). The first use of the term dates back to 2014

(Karaosmanoğlu, 2021), although “from 2016 onwards, it became widespread on a popular scale in Turkey to explain and analyse social and political events”

(Karaosmanoğlu, 2021, p. 78). In his analysis on the discourse of ‘Üst Akıl’ in Turkish mainstream media, Karaosmanoğlu (2021) shows that the term has been utilised as a superconspiracy to which different elements of conspiracy theories can be linked and it has also been instrumental to give an account of Gezi Park protests by columnists.

Through this narrative, the perception of the threat by foreign powers has immensely increased making the 15th July a liberation war against Western powers and their in- house proxies (Taş, 2018). Coupling with the flood of conspiracy theories, this cancels out all criticism and challenge to the regime, packs all opposition together as the servant of foreign powers and, everything becomes secondary in importance compared to the survival of the nation against an ambiguous and all-encompassing enemy that we may confront anywhere (Küçük & Türkmen, 2020; Taş, 2018).

Furthermore, the fact that Gülen resides in Pennsylvania and AKP's demand for him to be handed over to Turkey creates a friction and challenges for Turkey – US relationship (Waldman & Çalışkan, 2017). This debate causes tension between the two countries worsening the relations. Hence, it seems warranted to

argue that the post-putsch context in Turkey is highly anti-Western and anti-US.

The third element of the post-putsch context in Turkey is the mythification of the 15th July as a national day. Following the putsch, several monuments have been constructed; the stories of ordinary citizens as heroes in resisting the plotters have been circulated, interpellating them as martyr and constructing a myth of martyrdom around the events and; Erdoğan is reimagined and reconstructed as the saviour of the Turkish nation (Akın, 2016; Küçük & Türkmen, 2020; Taş, 2018; Sen, 2020;

Yılmaz, 2018). Furthermore, this specific narrative of 15th July has been added to the textbooks. The narrative consists of that the state – nation union is emphasized, Erdoğan is demonstrated as the saviour of the nation against the foreign powers and the concept of Turkish nation is cleansed from all foreign elements (Küçük and Türkmen, 2020). Yılmaz (2018, p. 55) asserts:

After the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016, new nationalistic rhetoric about the victory of national will, resembling the victory of Turkey's war for independence, was created. If Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was born as the founding father after the first war for independence, Erdoğan can be considered the father of the New Turkey following the 2016 coup attempt.

Heroizing Erdoğan is also a part of the this new nationalistic rhetoric interpellating him as a charismatic leader ensuring public's devotion to him (Küçük & Türkmen, 2020).

Together with this, Taş (2018, p. 11) notes:

...in the hands of the populist elite, the victimhood rhetoric emanating from 15 July becomes a political commodity that translates a sense of powerlessness into brute force – asking for compensation with an iron fist while blocking sound reasoning and taking stock of the political situation. This narrative overwhelmed the public with a deluge of emotion-laden conspiracies in the pro-government media.

Thus, the narrative also includes a victimization and post-coup trauma surrounding the post-putsch atmosphere resulting in entire seizure of public sphere with an iron fist to secure the survival of the nation (Küçük & Türkmen, 2020; Taş, 2018). Restoring the glorious Ottoman past by bringing back the power of Turkish nation against the ‘jealous’ and ‘evil’ foreign powers and their ‘sinister’ in-house pawns has been a significant component of this narrative (Küçük & Türkmen, 2020; Taş, 2018).

Consequentially, this specific narrative of 15th July offered a re-configuration and re- conceptualisation of Turkish national identity coupling with the post-putsch narratives of enemy where anti-US and anti-Western feelings are fed with the term of Üst Akıl and; a climate of post-truth politics where the language of politics has increasingly become emotion-laden with a blurred line between truth/facts and narratives/opinions. Thus, the analysis in this study should be seen with these insights and socio-political context in mind to be able to make sense of the specific references to Turkish nationalism in the series.

3.4 Selection of Seksenler and Sevdâ Kuşun Kanadında

Two TRT series have been chosen for the analysis in this study. The series are 1) Sevdâ Kuşun Kanadında (translates as Love in the Wings of the Bird) and 2) Seksenler (translates as The Eighties). The series, Sevdâ Kuşun Kanadında and the specific season of Seksenler analysed in this study have been selected purposefully to reflect the post-putsch context in Turkey. With their time of airing, both of the series are able to reflect the post – putsch atmosphere in Turkey socio-politically.

Significantly, the second season of *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* and the analysed season of *Seksenler* start with a reference to the putsch. In *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, the character of Fethi Hoca making plans to infiltrate into the state institutions and to plot against Turkey ‘evilily’ is introduced to the series, who symbolizes Fethullah Gülen and FETÖ. In this way, a specific narrative is created in terms of building a bridge between past and the present by featuring symbolic Fethullah Gülen back in the 1970s. In *Seksenler*, the season starts with a flash-forward to the night of the putsch featuring Fehmi¹ and his family watching Erdoğan’s call for taking the streets to resist against plotters and, they do as they are told by running to the streets to show that ‘the homeland is not unprotected’ in their own words. In this regard, it is crystal clear that the two of the series reflects the post-putsch socio-political atmosphere quite accurately.

Although *Seksenler* is mostly focused on the everyday lives of the neighbourhood residents, the narrative of the putsch finds a way into the series combining the banality of the comedy series featuring the ordinariness and everydayness of Fehmi’s family spending the night watching the TV and the politicisation of the events and their reaction to the situation taking on the streets. *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* on the other hand, has a more political tone from the very beginning of the series featuring the political events of 1968 – 1970 era and it refers to the putsch by building a bridge between past and the present featuring

¹ It is noteworthy here is that although my analysis does not cover other seasons of *Seksenler*, in earlier seasons, September 12 military coup is shown in a whole episode in the Show. What is significant here is that it is common knowledge in Turkey that especially conservatives and apolitical people at the time supported and even celebrated the military coup because they believed that the coup would end the chaotic and violent activities on the streets thus bringing peace and quiet. Yet, in the series, Fehmi as being wise hero of the show openly expresses his opposition regarding the coup by arguing that a lot of people have been arrested with false and empty accusations resulting an atmosphere of fear. While everyone in the neighbourhood even clap enthusiastically the soldiers roaming the streets, Fehmi’s objection as the hero of the series feeds into the idea of the politics being free from military interventions under any conditions.

Fethi Hoca in the era of 1968 – 1970 and constructs a narrative in which the past and present is connected to each other to tell a teleological story of the nation from a post – putsch perspective. The political tone in *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* and the banality of *Seksenler* together give this study a strong foundation in terms of revealing the intersections and infusions between hot and banal reproduction of Turkish nationhood contributing to the debate of hot vs. banal nationalism in the literature. To be able to demonstrate the intersections and blurred lines between the two, these two series have been selected purposefully by paying attention to their dominant atmosphere and background.

Regarding the images of the past on the banal space of television, especially for the past decade, there have been an increasing trend in the production of historical dramas telling storylines as old as the founding moments of Ottoman Empire (*Kuruluş: Ertuğrul* and *Diriliş: Osman*) to storylines of recent history of 1980s and 1990s (*Bu Kalp Seni Unutur mu*, *Seksenler* and *Doksanlar*). “ Yet the past does not simply await discovery: it is reconstructed in and for the purposes of the present” (Sturken as cited in Neyzi, 2002). In a more detailed manner, Edensor (1997, p. 186) asserts:

National(ist) narratives resonate with particular imaginative complexes concerning the demonisation of enemies, amazing feats of heroism, and collective purpose, and, most typically, suggest continuity between past and present. They naturalise the national spatiopolitical entity by suggesting its primordiality, and provide exemplary feats, characters, and collectivities that can be summoned in appeals to future national achievement or self- determination.

In this regard, these two series ‘summon’ past events and characters to claim a continuity in the history of the nation. Moreover, in her book called *The Future of Nostalgia* which two types of nostalgia are identified, Boym (2001) argues that restorative nostalgia draws a highly particular image of the present in which the

complexity of history and the specificity of modern history is erased in the name of the fulfilment of an ancient prophecy from a conspiratorial worldview. Thus, the television series are able to build a bridge between the past and the present by featuring the past with a teleological narrative of the nation from a viewpoint of the present. In their analysis of a Spanish historical science fiction series, Rueda Laffond and Coronado Ruiz (2016) demonstrate that the history is decontextualized in the series through bypassing specific yet significant details to present a peculiar view of the history of Spanish Civil War and transition to democracy and; assert that “This idealized presentist assessment exemplifies the mythical use of memory articulated by Peter Burke (64): a “conscious object” that makes the past heroic with the aim of “producing the present – our present”” (Rueda Laffond & Coronada Ruiz, 2016, p. 96). In this regard, through the selective images of the past, the present is made into ‘our’ present, in other words, the present of this individual nation interpellating the history as ours as well.

Considering the implications of the specific visualisation of the past and the recent boom in historical dramas and television shows on Turkish television, it seems warranted to argue that it is indeed significant and fruitful to study historical television series to make sense of the present. In this regard, Seksenler and Sevda Kuşun Kanadında as “juggling with the myths and historical facts” (Middleton & Edwards as cited in Edensor, 1997, p. 185) have been selected for this study to reveal the processes in which the Turkish nationhood is reproduced.

3.5 A General Outlook for the Series

Two TRT series have been chosen for the analysis in this study. The series are 1) Sevda Kuşun Kanadında (translates as Love in the Wings of the Bird) and

2)Seksener (translates as The Eighties). In this regard, I will try to provide a general outlook for these two series. I will first describe Sevda Kuşun Kanadında and then, I will continue with Seksener.

Sevde Kuşun Kanadında is historical drama which includes several love stories at the same time. It consists of 31 episodes in total of two seasons. The series was aired in between 26th April 2016 and 28th March 2017. After six episodes in the first season, second season began airing right after the putsch of 15th July 2016.

According the website of TRT1 (n.d.), the series tells the story of 1968-70s era in a nationalist viewpoint for the first time. The website (TRT1, n.d.) claims that the series blends together interesting love stories and, political and social context of the time. The main storyline of the series features a love story between a religious, nationalist and middle class young boy named Arif and, a communist and upper class young girl named Tümay. The father of Tümay, Zafer Erbay, is the villain of the series, who is an ex-military officer depicted as counter-insurgency in the series. Furthermore, Zafer Erbay was drummed out of army because of shooting Arif's father. Arif's grandfather was an imam and he wanted to recite the azan in Arabic although at the time, it was prohibited by law and azan could only be recited in Turkish. Because of that, a clash rises between a couple of military officers and Arif's grandfather.

During this chaotic situation, Zafer Erbay shoots Arif's father to death causing him to get fired from the army. After that, Arif is raised by his aunt and aunt's family as an orphan. This storyline draws the base for the dominant atmosphere in the series where it is centred upon the events that surrounds victimised Arif. Later in

the series, Arif also gets killed by Zafer Erbay causing Tümay's suicide as well and from then on, the series centres around the storylines related to the revenge of Arif's death and struggles against counter-insurgencies by Ömer and later, Asım. Ömer and Asım become the heroes of the series after Arif's death. Ömer is the closest friend of Arif from the neighbourhood and the leader of nationalist rightist student association called Ülkü Ocakları. Asım is an intelligent young engineer from Cyprus and a member of MTTB. The series mostly takes place in Arif's neighbourhood featuring urban yet, traditional middle class families who are highly religious and have close neighbour relations with one another. The families are depicted as moral and loving people who take care of each other without having blood ties but being neighbours. Moreover, the series features several historical figures which are Mehmet Zahit Kotku, Sami Efendi, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Sezai Karakoç, Cemil Meriç, Şule Yüksel Şenler and Necmettin Erbakan. The series also includes various characters who signifies some other historical figures: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan through Kasımpaşalı, Fethullah Gülen through Fethi Hoca, Deniz Gezmiş through Parkalı and İsmail Kahraman through İbrahim Kahraman. In this regard, the series tries to build a strong connection between past and the present bringing back the national collective memory through the depiction of well-known Turkish political and cultural figures.

Seksenler is a historical comedy series which features the 1980s. The series began airing in 24th January 2012 and still continues as a daily serial with its seventh season. The season analysed – sixth season – in this study was aired in between 24th September 2016 and 27th May 2017, starting right after the putsch of 15th July 2016. The season analysed consists of 35 episodes. The series displays the life in an imaginary neighbourhood in İstanbul. The series tries to

tell the stories of the 1980s touching upon social, political and economic aspects of the time with humour. The storylines are always located in the imaginary neighbourhood and occur in between the residents. It is a compact snapshot of a neighbourhood life in 1980s told by a microcosm created to symbolise the nation. In this regard, the series depicts a huge variety of characters including the watchman, the baker, the police, the university students, the mukhtar, the realtor, the butcher, the greengrocer of the neighbourhood and their families as well. Similarly to *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, the families have intimate relations with one another depicting them as a one big family at times. The main storylines of the series centre around the hero of the series named Fehmi and his family. Fehmi is the mukhtar of the neighbourhood in the analysed season and the father of Ahmet who, in fact, narrates the story at the present time. This narration draws the dominant atmosphere of the series where the past is told with a nostalgic viewpoint (Seksener, n.d.) and is connected to the present in this way.

These two series have been watched in between 26th April and 1st June 2020 through video platform YouTube (<https://www.youtube.com/?hl=tr&gl=TR>). The total amount of data which have been watched and analysed is 8765 minutes approximately, of which *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* makes 4294 minutes and *Seksener* makes 4471 minutes.

3.6 Limitations

It is highly significant to acknowledge the limitations of this study particularly considering the fact that this study makes uses of an interpretative approach although it also heavily relies on the prior literature on the issues discussed. The fact that I consider myself belonging to the Turkish nationhood and I study

Turkish nationalism in this research may seem both productive and counter – productive. On the one hand, being highly familiar to the context as an insider is helpful to make sense of the data analysed. On the other hand, being this familiar to the context and the society I am researching on brings about its own risks in terms of missing some of the points, finding normal and neutral some of the reproduction examples in the series analysed and, feeling proud of my Turkishness in some examples without even realising affecting the analysis of the data and/or being an example of the banal reproduction process myself unconsciously and out of habit. Billig (1995, p. 95) asserts that “if the banal depths of nationalist consciousness are to be understood, a confessional tone is also required. In crucial respects, nationalism is 'here', close at home”. The nature of my study requires a confessional tone as Billig suggests in the sense that I need to turn to what I feel pride of and how this contributes to the flagging of the homeland unobtrusively, simply I need to ‘confess’. Billig (1995, p. 125), later in the same chapter, notes:

Traces of nationalism and flag-waving are not merely to be found in others. Analysts, too, should confess. The language of confession demands a switch from the plural to the singular. I read the sporting pages, turning to them more quickly than is appropriate, given the news of suffering on other pages. Regularly I answer the invitation to celebrate national sporting triumphs. If a citizen from the homeland runs quicker or jumps higher than foreigners, I feel pleasure.

In this regard, while I have tried to use a ‘confessional tone’ in this study, I am well aware of the fact that it is possible that I have missed some flaggings simply taking them for granted without noticing. Yet, I have especially concentrated on whenever I feel pride or pleasure and, as the phrase goes, I have split hair when it comes to those.

Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that this study is limited to two series –

Seksenler and Sevdâ Kuşun Kanadında – analysed and it does not aim at making a rigid and unchangeable generalisation about Turkish nationhood but rather, uses these two series as cases to contribute to the debates on the banal reproduction of nationhood on television by identifying the ways in which this reproduction occurs within its social and political context. In this regard, what I have tried to reduce the limitations that may compromise my analysis is tremendously crucial to acknowledge. Firstly, I have re-watched some of the scenes over and over again in order to try to capture the ‘unwaved flags’ of Turkishness since the nature of the research I have partaken upon is to reveal what is unnoticed, unintended and seemingly natural and neutral to the eyes of the member of the individual nationality. Secondly, I have tried to make myself almost an outsider who is able to understand the context without blurred with judgement and emotions that the identity of the researcher may have brought about. Thirdly, I have discussed some of the examples and scenes with my friends and family to enable myself to capture different viewpoints. Lastly, I have come back and forth between the theoretical literature and case studies several times while doing the analysis to make sure that I have indeed a strong base for what I have been studying and concluding about the data at hand.

Even though I have attempted to reduce the limitations via these methods mentioned above, the nature of my research topic is still open to the limitations explained above. Social science research is inseparable from its social reality which includes complex grid of identities, networks, groups, societies, events, ideologies, institutions, contexts and alike. Hancké (2009, p. 13) puts, as referring to the contemporary constructivist approaches:

In this tradition, social science is less about uncovering the deep structure

of society and politics, and much more—almost exclusively, in fact—about understanding how the world was ‘made’ through the meaning that actors gave to the different elements of the social world. Understanding the world as a social scientist required, in this view, putting yourself in the position of the actor, seeing the world as he or she did, and thus making sense of their actions.

In this regard, being an insider in Turkish nationhood helps me to make sense of the meanings that the actors put forward, yet, the nature of my study is inseparable from the meanings I, as a researcher, put forward as well. Thus, it seems warranted to argue that it would be immature to defence that my study is purely objective, neither it aims at to be. Basing upon the social science tradition as Hancké puts above, this study aims at making sense of the social reality as the actors make of, while being aware of the limitations at hand. In this sense, it is best to make sense of this study within its social context, its scope and keeping the identity of the researcher in mind.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

In this chapter, I will lay out my findings and discuss the different ways in which Sevda Kuşun Kanadında and Seksenler reproduce Turkish nationhood. The ways identified and analysed here are not exhaustive. They are just some of the ways that Turkish nationhood is reproduced on screen contextually. I have tried to categorize the examples in different sections to make a coherent flow of discussion and the sections are categorised in line with the literature on both banal nationalism in general and Turkish nationalism in particular. Furthermore, each section is centred around a recurring and repeating pattern or a theme regarding the reproduction of Turkishness on screen.

I will start with discussing five illustrative examples from both of the series to demonstrate that Turkish nationalism is flagged through the invocation of deixis in three ways depending on the context: only banally, only overtly and, as banal and hot infused together. Depending on this, I argue that it is not possible to claim that the nationhood is reproduced in only one way rather, we need to take the context into account to be able to demonstrate a full picture. Then, I will

continue with a nuanced analysis of the reproduction of Turkishness through the reproduction of the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’. In this, I will discuss how Turkishness and the world of nations are reproduced by demonstrating examples from both of the series in terms of emphasis on differences on life-style and cultural distinctiveness; stereotyping; value-laden nature of the reproduction; the narrative of enemies in the reproduction of ‘them’; atmosphere of paranoia and conspiracy around this reproduction and; the narrative of ‘Turks are heroes’. Lastly, I will present how Ottoman past is glorified in terms of claiming a common and shared history and argue that both of the series demonstrates the Neo-Ottoman tendencies of the post- putsch context.

4.1 Homeland Deixis

One of the ways in which the reproduction of nationhood occurs is the ‘daily homeland – deixis’. In this process, the invocation of the words, ‘we, us, our, ourselves, here and now’ flags the homeland and the particular nation daily and reminds the citizenry their nationhood in the world of nations (Billig, 1995). Billig (1995, p. 94) asserts that “the crucial words of banal nationalism are often the smallest: ‘we’, ‘this’ and ‘here’, which are the words of linguistic ‘deixis’”. “These little words of deixis” often “go unnoticed and circulate unobtrusively” by “invoking the national ‘we’ and shutting the national door on the outside world” (Billig, 1995, pp. 11-109). Most importantly, the particular name for the nation does not have to be even mentioned to be understood by the audiences (Billig, 1995). “Being Turkish, like being Balinese, is a form of knowledge acquired and filtered through socialization, education, and other life experiences” (White, 2013, p. 18). In this regard, television, as a space for socialisation, adds to the life

experiences of the audiences making them to understand the incidents which flag Turkish nationhood without having to mention the specific name of it.

In the context of daily homeland – deixis, both of the television series, *Seksenler* and *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* provide numerous flaggings of Turkish nationhood through the invocation of ‘we, us, this country, this homeland, our and ourselves’. Since the data gathered from two series is huge, instead of giving all of the cases of daily homeland – deixis, I will provide examples from both of the series for these little words of linguistic deixis. Most of the times, the examples include several little words of deixis conjoined together, nevertheless, the result is the same as they reproduce the Turkish nationhood by evoking ‘our’ place in the world yet, without having to use the specific country and/or nation’s name, Turkey and/or Turkish in the analysis at hand. Moreover, rather than trying to demonstrate only whether Turkish nationhood is flagged in the series, by providing a small set of illustrative examples and offering a deep insight to the contexts in which the flaggings occur, I will attempt to explore when and how these incidents occur to enable the debate contribute to whether these flaggings are purely banal and/or hot and banal conjoined together.

Firstly, I will list five different examples from both of the series, *Seksenler* and *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*. Then, I will argue that Turkish nationhood is flagged in both of the series through the invocation of ‘little words of deixis’. Lastly, I will discuss whether the flaggings are hot or banal by engaging with the contexts in which they occur, and claim that depending on the contexts where the flaggings occur, hot/overt and banal are conjoined together; furthermore seemingly banal television space provides a banal transmission for these mixed flaggings.

Firstly, in the case of Seksenler, several examples can be listed in terms of daily homeland – deixis where Turkish nation is reproduced without mentioning the country name, Turkey as:

Ex. 1) a character called Seçil comes back to Turkey for a short period of time after she flees from the country due to political reasons after 1980 military coup. When watcher Bekir sees her, the dialog occurs.

Watcher Bekir: ... it seems that you came back to *your country*!

Haven't they denationalise you?

Seçil: I had not committed any crime. I am still the citizen of *this country*.

Ex. 2) A remark made upon finding out that a newly entering character named Zeynel is a singer. The remark is put: "There are obviously plenty of singers in *our homeland*".

Ex. 3) The butcher named Bahtiyar negotiates with a German to sell his homemade sucuk – a Turkish meat product – and during the negotiation, a person comes with the German businessman starts speaking Turkish and the butcher comments in very glad and happy way, that "Oowh, this one is from *us*."

Ex. 4) When a character named Çağatay starts practicing yoga, another character named Alper says him that "Yoga is not in *our culture*."

Ex. 5) During a discussion about being a leftist or a rightist, Alper asserts strongly that "Let's leave out the right or left, I am a lover of *this homeland*."

Secondly, the case is same when it comes to Sevda Kuşun Kanadında in terms of

invocation of national we by daily homeland – deixis. Examples can be listed as:

Ex. 1) During a discussion on fleeing from the country, a character named Leyla says that “If you leave and, if s/he leaves, who will defend *this country*?”

Ex. 2) During a discussion regarding the hot encounters in Cyprus, the dialog occurs as:

Necmettin Erbakan:... *This nation* will not accept this

abasement. Zahid Efendi: *This country* should not fall

behind.

Ex. 3) President of MTTB says to Arif that “One day, *this nation* will pray for the youngsters like you.”

Ex. 4) During the funeral ceremony of Arif, Imam tells that “Let’s pray for all the martyrs and Arif who sacrificed their lives for the sake of religion, *the homeland and the flag*.”

Ex. 5) During a debate regarding how to find money for the protests and the organisation, a character named Parkalı who signifies Deniz Gezmiş in the series put that “We continue to be the independent voice of *the people/the folk*.”

It seems warranted to argue that Turkish nationhood is flagged in both of the series considering the illustrative examples given above yet, as Billig (1995) suggest and, Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) explore in the Turkish daily newspapers, I expect to find out these flaggings incidents in the Turkish context. It is understood from the examples that the adjective of Turkish is unmentioned and silent yet, we understand that *the country, homeland, us, we, our* is Turkish

without having to ask the question of which. This shows that even though Turkey is not an established nation of the West according to the argument of Billig (1995) regarding the established and peripheral nations, it is possible to find similar flagging incidents in a peripheral nation like Turkey that of established nations of the West.

Although television as a banal space may lead us to conclusion of banality, it is not enough to suggest that all of the flaggings are banal. In order to have a further insight to the issue, we need to approach to the flaggings in terms of the question of when and how by considering the contextuality of the each particular flagging.

I argue that depending on the contexts where the flaggings occur, it seems that hot/overt and banal are conjoined together; furthermore seemingly banal television space provides a banal transmission for these mixed flaggings.

Çırakman (2011, pp. 1898-1899) asserts that “in the Turkish case, the flag hangs out mindfully rather than mindlessly, but it is nonetheless readily recognized as natural, as ‘business as usual’”. It is not possible to make a conclusion regarding the recognition of the flaggings in this study because analysis of how they have been received by the people is beyond the aim of this research. However, by analysing how and when these flaggings occur, we can understand the process of reproduction on television. In this regard, when considering the Ex. 1 and Ex. 5 from *Seksenler* and, Ex. 1, Ex. 2 and Ex. 5 from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, I propose that some flaggings have indeed a political context to them as adding a hot character to their representation.

Firstly, Ex. 1 from *Seksenler* occurs in a context where the character named Seçil comes back to Turkey after she flees from the country because of political

reasons and prior to the coup, moreover, her previous encounters with the watcher have a political context in which the watcher tries to catch her because of her political actions. Also, when she first encounters with the watcher in this particular scene, she tries to run away because of old habits. Yet, she actually does not have to because the context has changed. Thus, this encounter is not a casual and ordinary one but it has a political context to it. The Ex. 5 from *Seksenler* has even more of a overt political tone to it. The flagging occurs during a discussion on supporting leftist or rightist politics on the one hand; on the other hand, the claim of leaving out those and being a lover of this homeland by the character named Alper suggests that the character sees being patriotic superior to the politics and unpolitical in this sense.

Billig (1995) demonstrates that especially right-wing politicians play the patriotic card in the sense that they show themselves as the conveyors of patriotic sentiments purified of politics. It seems that the character Alper plays the patriotic card as Billig (1995) calls, especially considering the fact that Alper is a rightist character in the series and even, he was prisoned during the military coup of 1980. Thus, the flagging in this example portrays a significant example. While Alper tries to present himself as purified from politics by playing the patriotic card, he in fact demonstrates an example for overt nationalism.

Secondly, Ex. 1 from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* has a very similar context to that of Ex. 1 from *Seksenler* revolving around the issue of fleeing from the country. The character named Işık contemplates on fleeing because of her complex relationship with a leftist political student organisation and the flagging occurs when she discusses the issue with the character named Leyla who finds this as not a viable option pointing out the necessity to defend one's own country even

though there is not a hot encounter or a war in Turkey at the time. Hence, the context of the example has a political atmosphere to it rather than banal. Ex. 2 from Sevda Kuşun Kanadında has a highly obvious political overtone to it because it occurs during a debate regarding the hot encounters in Cyprus between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. To simply put, the context of which is not ordinary and banal but rather, political.

The characters discuss how Turkish nation should and will react to what is happening in Cyprus, thus adding a hot dimension to the flagging. Ex. 5 from Sevda Kuşun Kanadında occurs in a context where a leftist student organisation debates how they will finance their political protests. In this context, it seems that being the voice of the Turkish people has a political connotation to it in terms of implying defending the nation.

While hot/overt and banal are conjoined in the flaggings explained above, there are also banal flaggings as Billig (1995) suggests. The banal flaggings do not have a political overtone and they can easily go unnoticed as Billig (1995) suggests. In this regard, Ex. 2, Ex. 3, Ex. 4 from Seksenler and Ex. 3 and Ex. 4 from Sevda Kuşun Kanadında flag Turkishness banally.

Firstly, Ex. 2, Ex. 3 and Ex. 4 from Seksenler do not connote anything political or overt but rather, they shut the national door on the outside world by bordering what is national and what is included in Turkishness in a banal way. Ex. 2 simply flags the Turkish homeland without mentioning the name of the homeland, rather basically calling it onto being by referring it to as 'our'. Ex. 3 from Seksenler suggests that speaking Turkish provides an inclusiveness to the nation making the speaker 'from one of us'. Ex. 4 draws the borders for what is not included in 'our'

culture meaning Turkish culture. These flaggings may easily seem natural and neutral, hence making the flaggings banal.

Secondly, Ex. 3 from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* follows a similar trajectory that of Ex. 2, Ex. 3 and Ex. 4 from *Seksenler*. In Ex. 3 from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, the president of MTTB evokes Turkish nation through the invocation of ‘this nation’ to praise the qualities of the character named Arif suggesting that he is as good as that ‘this nation’ will pray for. It simply flags Turkish nationhood banally through the invocation of little word of deixis.

To conclude the debate of hot/overt vs. banal nationalism, I will demonstrate how blurred the lines might be between the two by analysing Ex. 4 from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*. In this context, Ex. 4 provides a complex case for the debate at hand. The flagging in Ex. 4 occurs in a very banal and ordinary setting of a funeral on the one hand. On the other, the death of the character named Arif is due to the bombing of MTTB adding a political dimension to it. The bombings occurs because of an ideological warfare between two political groups in the series. Thus, while the funeral is a banal space to evoke the nation, the bombing adds a hot dimension to it. Furthermore, the invocation of *the homeland* and *the flag* in the example centres around the martyrdom signifying the sacrifice for one’s own homeland and flag and thus, it adds a hot and violent dimension to it. The example provides a blurred reproduction for the Turkish nationhood by combining banal and hot elements together. In this respect, by depending on Ex. 1 and Ex. 5 from *Seksenler* and Ex. 1, Ex. 2, Ex. 4 and Ex. 5, I argue that hot and banal are sometimes conjoined together in Turkish case and as a matter of fact, the lines between the two are highly blurred depending on the context, it is not possible to separate between the two without disturbing the social reality. On

the other hand, banal flaggings of Turkish nationhood also occur as Billig (1995) suggests evoking *our* place in the world of nations and shutting the national door on the outside world, depending on the context. Thus, it is always necessary to take into account the contexts in which the flaggings occur to fully understand the situation. Claiming that all flaggings are either hot or banal or infused all together is a simplification of the social reality. Depending on the context, it is possible to find examples for all three of these claims.

4.2 Dichotomy of ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’

“The world, in which 'the sovereignty of the people' is to be politically realized, is a world of different nations: it is a world which has institutionalized 'them' and 'us'" (Billig, 1995, p. 94). Thus, the invocation of ‘we’ occurs generally against the invocation of ‘them’ as ‘others’ interpellating other nations by placing both ourselves in the world of nations and; bordering and differentiating in between who counts as ‘us’ vs. who counts as ‘them’. According to Özkırımlı (2010, p. 208), “the nationalist discourse divides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘friends’ and ‘foes’, positing a homogeneous and fixed identity on either side and stressing the characteristics that differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them’”. In this regard, there is the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ in the reproduction of the nationhood and thus, through the reproduction of this dichotomy, nationalism is reproduced. Moreover, “representations of ‘our’ national identity become more pointed when used to define ‘us’ against ‘them’ – usually other nations in political or sporting conflict – when stereotypes are more likely to be bandied about” (Edensor, 2002, p. 140). In this respect, the dichotomy also is tightly related to the assumptions about ‘ourselves’ and ‘others’ considering the portrayal of ‘ourselves’ and

‘others’ based upon stereotypes.

In this section, I will argue that in the Turkish context, the dichotomy is reproduced in several ways by emphasizing differences in life-style, cultural distinctiveness, stereotyping, the ‘evilness’ and ‘immorality’ of ‘them’, the ‘benevolence’ and ‘morality’ of ‘us’ and by interpellating ‘them’ as ‘enemies’ and ‘us’ as ‘heroes’.

Furthermore, an atmosphere of paranoia and conspiracy surrounds the reproduction especially considering the booming of conspiracy theories in the post-putsch context (Taş, 2018).

Firstly, I will try to demonstrate how the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ is reproduced through an emphasis on the differences in life-style and cultural distinctiveness by engaging with the examples from *Seksenler* and *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*. Secondly, I will provide examples from both of the series which show stereotyping tendencies regarding both ‘ourselves’ and ‘others’. Thirdly, I will continue with the value-laden nature of this reproduction in terms of connoting ‘us’ positively and ‘them’ negatively by giving examples from *Seksenler*. Fourthly, I will show how *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* creates a grifted and entangled reproduction by interpellating ‘them’ as ‘enemies’ all the time through connoting ‘them’ negatively at the same time. I will provide examples for both ‘enemy-within’ and ‘enemy-without’ in this process from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*. Then, I will focus on examples of enemy- without from *Seksenler* and demonstrate how *Seksenler* taps into the old enmities in this reproduction reminding the nationals of the ‘national memory’. Sixthly, I will argue that the West and the US are reproduced as ‘enemy-without’ particularly confirming the

literature and recirculating the enmities of post-putsch context by presenting examples from both of the series. Then, I will continue with the general atmosphere of paranoia of losing land which stems from the Sevres Syndrome and, booming of conspiracy theories by engaging with the examples from both of the series. Lastly, I will argue that ‘Turks are heroes’ narrative is reproduced through the stories of three heroes of *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* in a more politicised way and through the stories circling around the character named Fehmi in a banal way thus, demonstrating the intersections between hot and banal nationalisms.

4.2.1 Life-style and cultural distinctiveness

The concept of ‘culture as a specific way of life’ is nurtured and fostered through the reproduction of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dichotomy by emphasizing what ‘we’ do and how ‘we’ do things vs. what ‘they’ do and how ‘they’ do things (Yumul and Özkırımlı, 2000). In their analysis of reproduction of Turkishness in the Turkish press, Köse and Yılmaz (2012, p. 921) point out that “in the news explored we can see many news items which evoke various features of national identity considered to have such life style and characteristics which separate us from other communities and nations”. In their study of representation of Irishness on a television series, RAW, Tobin and Neville (2011) demonstrate that judgements and unacceptable behaviours are often passed on the representation of ‘other’ by drawing the border between what is acceptable and what it is not for a certain national community.

Embarking upon these, I will demonstrate how the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ is reproduced through an emphasis on the differences between life-

style and cultural distinctiveness. Firstly, I will provide examples from Seksenler and then; I will continue with Seveda Kuşun Kanadında. I will argue that especially the dichotomy becomes more pointed as Edensor (2002) suggests with an actual existence of a foreigner in both of the series.

Firstly, there are various examples for the reproduction of the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ in Seksenler revolving around the emphasis on difference in life-styles and culture. This reproduction draws the border between ‘us’ and ‘them’ by focusing on what is included in Turkish culture and what is acceptable in Turkish society vs. what relates to ‘otherness’. In Seksenler, there is a character named Şahin who came back to Turkey from Germany where his parents have migrated during the labour migrations of 1960s and have still lived. The recurring assumptions differentiating between ‘us’ and ‘them’ centre around the assumptions about Germany vis-à-vis Turkey because Şahin as a returned migrant repeatedly compares Turkey and Germany in the series. When Şahin claims that in Germany, they celebrate Valentine’s Day; they go on double dates; there are lots of pizza restaurants in Germany, he gets fierce reactions from the residents in the neighbourhood for all of these claims. The residents of the neighbourhood claim that Valentine’s Day is not in *our culture* and that people *here* would not eat pizza. Moreover, they do not even make sense of what double date is, let alone to go on. Thus, these three life experiences which Şahin went through in Germany on a typical daily life have been seen different and meaningless by the residents pointing out to a difference in life style between ‘us’ as Turks vs. ‘them’ as Germans. In this sense, these examples reproduce Turkishness banally by drawing upon the differences in daily life and reproducing the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ as well.

Şahin works in a bakery in the neighbourhood where the owner, Sami, is his future father-in-law. During a clash about excessive working hours with Sami, Şahin remarks that “it is not possible for the employers make the employees work more than eight hours in Germany”. The reaction from Sami draws a strong line between the two nation-states, when Sami assert angrily that “*here* is Turkey, not Germany; if you want so, go *there*!”. This example explicitly separates Turkey from Germany on the basis of working conditions marking a significant difference in work cultures of the two nations.

Not all bordering is related to difference between Germany and Turkey in the series. A different example can be given, which occurs between an engaged couple – Funda (female) and Çağatay (male). In the series, Funda has a male pen friend from Australia. When Çağatay and his friends learn this, Şahin reacts to the situation by commenting that this is unfavourable for *us*; suggesting what is not an acceptable behaviour for Turkish society. Here, the invocation of ‘us’ is peculiar; because, firstly, the word is simply an example of homeland deixis; secondly, this particular invocation occurs vis-à-vis another culture through an Australian character thus, reproducing the dichotomy; thirdly and most significantly, the context where the example occurs draws the borders of Turkish culture by discrediting a mixed-gender friendship and, neutralising and normalising partner’s intervention with each other’s personal relationships suggesting that a male partner has a say in female partner’s life.

“The reproduction of ‘us’ becomes more pointed with the actual existence of the ‘other’” in the series as Edensor suggests (2002, p . 140). The dichotomy has been reproduced further when this pen friend comes to Turkey to visit Funda and a Spanish student comes with an exchange to the house of one of the residents of

the neighbourhood for 23rd April celebrations. Everybody in the neighbourhood try to show how hospitable the Turkish are to both of the visitors throughout the related episodes. The visitors are always under huge interest by the residents of the neighbourhood who try to make the visitors try lots of different Turkish food and it is even suggested that ‘we’ need to teach the visitors ‘our’ traditions and culture by a character named Alper. These recurring events revolving around the presence of a foreign visitor suggest cultural distinctiveness based upon cuisine. Furthermore, the explicit claim to ‘our’ traditions and culture makes the idea of having a distinct culture crystal clear; concurrently, the need to teach them to the visitors implies pride in ‘our’ traditions and culture.

Revolving around the presence of a foreign visitor, one striking example sheds light on the idea of differences between cultural practices. When the pen friend from Australia enters the Çağatay’s house, Çağatay warns him to take off his shoes because as he puts “we take off our shoes.” Here, a banal practice of taking off shoes in the house is used to connote Turkishness, through the invocation of a homeland deixis ‘we’, by reproducing what is an acceptable behaviour and cultural marker in Turkish society. Thus, the example reproduce Turkishness banally and emphasizes the cultural distinctiveness in the reproduction of the dichotomy as well.

Similarly, in *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs ‘them’ becomes obvious, especially during the encounters between Turkish characters and ‘foreigners’. Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) point out that the cultural distinctiveness is manifested in language, tradition and religion. In the series, US consul, English ambassador and a couple of American spies make appearance. During these encounters, first thing that takes attention is that the foreign

characters either speak in English or even though they speak Turkish, they have a very heavy accent that would differentiate them from any other Turkish speaker. Here, the language becomes an identity marker in the reproduction of the dichotomy and cultural distinctiveness manifest itself in language particularly as Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) suggest. In another example, Fethi Hoca is offered milk with his tea during his visit of a foreign character. He replies putting that he never gets used to drink tea with milk while the foreigner expresses enjoying it a lot. What is more significant here is that drinking tea is demonstrated as such a banal part of people's daily life throughout the series by showing characters drinking tea together and offering tea to each other in every episode yet, no one mentions milk during these recurring scenes. This specific scene featuring a foreigner and tea with milk is put as a deviation from the 'usual' way suggesting a difference and marking cultural borders alike. Here, even a taste preference reproduces the dichotomy taking attention to different life-styles.

Traditional way of drinking tea in Turkey does not include milk thus, the dichotomy of 'us' vs. 'them' is pointed out through the depiction of how 'we' drink tea vs. how 'they' drink tea referring to a difference in culture. In this regard, Turkish culture is differentiated from what is portrayed as 'other' and foreign. Both the context and the content of the example is banal thus, reproduces Turkishness banally.

The examples from both of the series show that the dichotomy of 'us' vs. 'them' is reproduced by emphasizing that there is a 'normal' way of doing things as 'we' do vs. there are 'other' ways of doing things as 'they' do. Here, the differences in life- style, cultural distinctiveness such as language and cultural identity markers are pointed thus, reproducing both these already existed assumptions and assumed

differences and, the dichotomy as well.

4.2.2 Stereotyping

“TV fiction’s banal nationalism is situated in a social context rooted in daily life and larded with stereotypes” (Peris, 2016, p. 39). As Özkırımlı (2010, p. 208) emphasizes that “the nationalist discourse posits a homogeneous and fixed identity on either side”, thus during the reproduction of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’, the stereotyping plays a huge role. Furthermore, the stereotypes are more likely to be bandied about when the reproduction of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ is more pointed out through the actual existence of other, (Edensor, 2002). Edensor (2002, p. 142) puts that “global news networks, tourist marketing, advertising, films and television all provide often stereotypical representations of otherness which feed into forms of national belonging by providing images which can be reworked in (re)constructing ‘our’ identity as *not like* this otherness”. In this sense, stereotypes perpetuate and fix the identities by reproducing the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ based upon established national repertoire of stereotypes about both ‘ourselves’ and ‘others’. To this end, there are examples which show stereotyping tendencies in both of the series.

I will, first, provide examples from *Seksenler* in which the stereotypes are reproduced by pointing out the dichotomy as well. Secondly, I will show how *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* taps into the stereotypes in this reproduction process.

Starting with *Seksenler*, a physical stereotype for Germans manifests itself in *Seksenler* when Şahin’s wife-to-be, Elvan, tries to get a German visa. One of

the residents of the neighbourhood remarks that it should be easy for Elvan to get the visa because she just looks like German. Elvan has blonde hair, blue eyes and a light skin colour. Elvan's father Sami reacts to this strongly suggesting that her daughter is a 'full Turkish'. It seems that remarks offend Sami on the one hand, and Germans are assumed to be blonde with coloured eyes and light skin on the other. Here, through a reproduction of a physical German stereotype, the example achieves two things that feeds into the reproduction of the dichotomy in a nuanced way: one is that through physical appearance, Germans and Turks are situated in difference from one another and as two distinct nations as well and; other is that to be likened to another nationhood creates an hot and emotional reaction demonstrating the significance of nationalism in individual's perception perpetuating the resilience of nationalism.

Moreover, the example demonstrates the intersections between hot and banal nationalisms through the reproduction of the dichotomy by stereotyping banally and creating a hot reaction to the remark by Sami.

In another stereotyping, when Fehmi decides to buy a dish washer, he wants to buy a Japanese one remarking that "Japanese are short but they do the best dish washer."; thus, suggesting that Japanese people are good at technology and they are short. This example sounds ridiculous, in the sense that being short and being good at technology are odd to be linked together, yet; it feeds into a stereotypical view regarding the Japanese people all together through fixing 'their' identity by erasing the heterogeneity of the specific population mentioned. Another example, regarding Japanese nationhood, appears when all shopkeepers in the neighbourhood decide to make their apprentices exercise. In this, it is suggested throughout the episode that

Japanese people exercise every morning and, they are disciplined and hardworking thus, exercising is good and helpful to be more energised and disciplined. Şahin reacts to this remarking fiercely that he is not Japanese but Turk so he does not want to exercise. In this context, even exercising becomes related to nationality showing one being disciplined and hardworking. Here, the explicit mentioning of these two nationhood coupling with the assumed stereotypical ideas separates two nations from each other on one hand and feeds into the reproduction of the dichotomy on the other. Similarly to previous example, it demonstrates a stereotypical bordering between Turks and Japanese by fixing their identity through generalised assumptions.

In a similar manner, in *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, there are examples of stereotyping in the reproduction of the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’. In an example, during a conversation between a character named Nesteren and an American sociologist named Thomas, the stereotyping goes two ways. Thomas accuses Nesteren of being emotional like a Turkish and not being professional and also, praises another character named Leyla acting professional like ‘themselves’. Here, a set of stereotypes comes together demonstrating the linkage between stereotypes and the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ effectively. In the example, Turks are stereotyped as being emotional on the one hand and Americans are stereotyped as being professional on the other. In this way, similar to other examples, two nations are separated through a stereotypical characterisation and while one is deemed, other is praised. Furthermore, what is praised is linked to the character’s own nationhood implying pride in one’s own nationhood marking the very base of nationalistic worldview.

Another example reproduces Americans as Christians all together without paying attention to diversity thus, once again fixing their identity bounding it with Christianity. Later in the series, Zafer Erbay murders Thomas due to a personal conflict and during a conversation about this incident; he mentions that ‘they’ – as referring to friends of Thomas – can light candles for the memory of Thomas. Here, Americans are assumed to be Christians through the metaphor of lighting candles in the Church erasing the diversity and packing together the religious identity and nationality. Moreover, through the usage of deixis, the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ is reproduced.

The examples from these two series provide a significant depth into the stereotypical tendencies in the reproduction of the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’. Ranging from physical stereotypes to religious identity, the stereotypes seem to occur in a wide range, yet; they all fix the identities assuming rigid and unchangeable characteristics regarding the nations. In other words, through stereotypes, the world is divided into two distinct categories of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ by reproducing generalised assumptions ignoring the diversity.

In addition to that ‘they’ is reproduced both by stereotyping and in reference to differences in life styles, as I have explained above; the reproduction of the dichotomy ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ is highly value-laden in terms of ascribing certain positive values to ‘us’ and negative values to ‘them’. In the next section, I will try to present the value-laden nature of this reproduction process where ‘us’ is connoted positively and ‘them’ is connoted negatively.

4.2.3 Value-lade nature of the reproduction of the dichotomy

The reproduction of the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ is significantly value-laden.

In other words, during this reproduction, certain values and characteristics are laden into ‘us’ and ‘them’ alike. While positive qualities such as being good and moral are ascribed to ‘us’, negative qualities such as being evil and immoral are laden into ‘them’ (Altın & Yenigün Şen, 2018; Arman, 2007; Baruh & Popescu, 2008; Carlson & Kancı, 2017; Köse & Yılmaz, 2012). “This positive evaluation of the national self is accompanied by open or hidden messages of the inferiority of others” (Yumul and Özkırımlı, 2000, p. 797).

In their analysis of Irish TV series RAW, Tobin and Neville (2011) show that the ‘other’ is eroticised in the series and immoral deeds such as having an affair, blackmailing and being assertive are passed onto ‘them’. In this regard, including ‘them’ in the series do not mean multiculturalism but rather, the demonstration of ‘them’ is exploited to discuss controversial issues of sexuality and morality while not connoting the national self with those kinds of unacceptable behaviours and values. Furthermore, the group which has been reproduced as ‘them’ with negative qualities can indeed be an internal other. Williams (2011) shows that the BBC Wales TV series Torchwood reproduces the established binary of rural vs. urban in Welshness by attributing the values of backwardness, parochialism and danger to the internal other in rural Wales, whereas, the self is portrayed through the depiction of urban and modern Cardiff. In their analysis of Turkish newspapers, Köse and Yılmaz (2012) demonstrate through the examples that in the analysed newspapers, there is also a tendency to polarise ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ by connoting ‘us’ with patriotism, national awareness and bravery and ‘them’ with ‘bad’ ethical values. Hence, assumptions surrounding what it means to be a Turkish and what it does not goes hand in hand with positive connotations regarding ‘us’ and negative connotations regarding ‘them’.

Embarking upon these, I will start with providing examples from Seksenler to demonstrate the value-laden nature of this process. Then, I will argue that Sevda Kuşun Kanadında shows a more nuanced and entangled examples in which the dichotomy is reproduced in two ways together: ascribing ‘them’ with negative values and interpellating ‘them’ as ‘enemies’ specifically at the same time. Because of this, I will try to present this tangled reproduction from Sevda Kuşun Kanadında in the following section titled as Reproduction of ‘Them’ as ‘Enemies’ (section 4.2.4).

Firstly, in Seksenler, a couple of theft incidents occur and the first person whom most of the residents in the neighbourhood suspect turns to be a newly entered character to the series, named Zeynel. Zeynel portrays a broke musician without an apparent job and has a rural accent so he becomes the suspect. Yet, when the residents get open about their allegations to Fehmi, Fehmi fiercely opposes the allegations by remarking that Zeynel is a poor young fellow from Anatolia, he could not do this. Furthermore, later in the episode, he says that “Without understanding and listening, because the young fellow is poor, you all accused the poor boy. What a shame! Is this how we are as a neighbourhood?”. Here, being from Anatolia – more rural part of Turkey than İstanbul – is associated with being honest and innocent, hence moral. Fehmi’s reaction suggests that being from Anatolia makes Zeynel from one of ‘us’ even though he has a rural accent, thus moral. Another example involves an incident when Suat has been sent some historical artefacts found during the construction of summer houses for the residents of the neighbourhood. Even though Suat is best known for his tricks and fiddles to make money, he refrains from smuggling the artefacts implying moral high ground regarding ‘us’. Moreover, during the regarding episode, Fehmi finds

out the situation and sets up a trap for historical artefact smugglers by luring them into his house and gets them arrested by the police. Fehmi fiercely shouts at the smugglers that “ Don’t you know that smuggling historical artefacts is a crime, huh? Don’t invent something new, don’t invent (here he uses his famous phrase “İcat çıkarma, icat çıkarma yav!”). These artefacts are the heritage of these lands, they aren’t going anywhere”. Through this, he emphasizes the idea of national heritage. On the one hand, the historical artefacts are owned by ‘us’ referring to nationhood and on the other, being responsible and sensible is linked to the Turkish nationhood through the embodiment of ideal Turkishness by the hero of the series, Fehmi. Thus, ‘us’ is reproduced as moral and honest by taking responsibility in such situations as a Turkish citizen.

In another example, ‘they’, as connoted through the ‘outside of homeland’, is reproduced as unsafe and dangerous connecting ‘them’ with negative qualities. When Çağatay decides to become a sailor in international ships, the residents of the neighbourhood remark that it is ambiguous whether he will be able to come back or not, because it is *foreign land* anyways. Here, foreign land as outside of the homeland is reproduced as dangerous and unsafe by connoting ‘them’ also as dangerous.

Similarly and more strongly, two dramatic examples fully demonstrate what kind of values are laden into ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ in the reproduction of the dichotomy. One of which occurs when Şahin comes back to Turkey from Germany after he goes there because his mother gets hospitalized. Şahin vigorously puts that he missed Turkey so much, because there is no bidet nozzle there so ‘they’ are filthy, also the cheese is very bland, the olives are bad and ‘they’ do not even know how to cook eggs; furthermore ‘they’ don’t sit around the table and eat together as ‘we’

do in here. In this example, a lot is tied together. Şahin's remarks lead to that 'they' is reproduced in relation to being filthy, and 'their food' being not delicious by ascribing negative qualities to 'them' while what and how 'we' do things is reproduced as the ideal and good. Especially, the last part of the example underlines that there is a way of doing things 'here' by 'us' and it is the 'normal', 'regular' and 'ideal' way of doing as in eating together; while their way is 'abnormal' and 'bad'. Moreover, this marks a daily habit as national at the same time, together with the value-laden character of the dichotomy.

Another example appears in an episode where the Australian pen friend of Funda comes to Turkey. In the example, when Çağatay's mother Rukiye asks Çağatay whether the pen friend is hungry, Çağatay tells that "I don't know but don't worry. *They* do not have shame; if he was, he would tell it. *We* go hungry, *they* won't." Here, the dichotomy is reproduced as 'us' having manners not to tell if 'we' are hungry vs. 'them' having no shame telling that 'they' are hungry. The example demonstrates the value-laden nature of the reproduction unambiguously using something as banal as talking about one's hunger creating a sharp differentiation of 'us' from 'others' in the world of nations.

The examples from *Seksenler* clearly show that in the reproduction of 'us' vs. 'them' dichotomy, the negative qualities are attributed to 'them' while the positive qualities are associated with 'us'. Furthermore, the examples occur in a banal way reproducing Turkishness banally in the sense that they do not have a political tone to it and they occur in everyday settings. When it comes to *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, the situation gets more entangled. The series has a more overall political tone to it. This political overtone of the series creates an intersection for the reproduction of Turkishness where banal and hot is infused

each other. The series does not simply attribute negative qualities to them but rather; it reproduces the dichotomy by signifying all of the ‘them’ as enemies sharply within its value-laden character at the same time demonstrating a more entangled reproduction. In other words, in *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, during the reproduction of the dichotomy ‘us’ vs. ‘them’, two different aspects of the binary are reproduced as a complex set of grid. The series follow a highly sharp and distinct reproduction of the dichotomy by almost always reproducing ‘them’ as either enemies-within or enemies-without and, the negative qualities are attributed to ‘them’ in this polarised reproduction of ‘them’ as enemies. This polarised reproduction in the series, thus, provides examples for both the reproduction of ‘them’ as enemies and attribution of negative qualities to ‘them’.

Yet, the same trend is followed in the series when it comes to the reproduction of ‘us’ connoting ‘we’ with positive qualities. Due to this entangled reproduction, I will present the examples from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* by both explaining the reproduction of ‘enemies’ and value-laden aspect together in the next section.

Moreover, after providing examples from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, I will analyse the examples from *Seksenler* regarding the reproduction of ‘enemies’.

4.2.4 Reproduction of ‘them’ as ‘Enemies’

To be able to make sense of the examples from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, it is noteworthy to explain how the reproduction of enemy is understood and studied in the literature. In this regard, the reproduction of enemy can take two different forms: enemy-within through the representation of internal other and enemy-without through the representation of external other. Williams (as cited in

Arman, 2007, p. 134) stresses that “others can be categorized spatially-territorially in this process as internal and external others”. When it comes to Turkish nationalism, it is put that “built around a sense of external threat (especially from the European powers) the constitutive discourse of Turkish nationalism based itself on Exclusion and otherness” (Bali, 2006; Özcan, 2006, pp. 63-83 as cited in Batuman, 2010, p. 223). In their analysis of Turkish daily newspapers, Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000, p. 795) assert that “by identifying ‘our’ enemies both within and without, the press produces a dichotomous – and mutually exclusive – vision of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’”. Moreover, in the last few decades Turkishness has been re-emphasized with reference to ethnicist and culturalist definitions of the Turkish citizen who would be ready to perceive threats against the regime and identify enemies within and without (Ersanlı, 2002; Bermek, 2003; Üstel, 2004, pp. 289-304 as cited in Çırakman, 2011, p. 1898). In this vein, it seems warranted to argue that in the reproduction of Turkish nationalism, there is a tendency to identify ‘others’ as enemy-within and enemy- without by also emphasizing the need to be aware and wise to perceive and act upon these threats. Firstly, I will analyse the examples from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* in terms of the reproduction of ‘them’ as enemy-within. Secondly, basing upon the literature, I will demonstrate how enemy-without is depicted through its close ties with enemy- within in *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* by analysing the example events and storylines. As I engage in the examples from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, I will show the value- laden character of this reproduction in the series which attribute a sharp evilness to ‘them’ interpellating ‘them’ as enemies. Thirdly, I will present how *Seksenler* reproduces ‘them’ as enemy-without in the analysed season with an absence of a

particular enemy-within through the depiction of external threats by deeply engaging in the examples from the series.

4.2.4.1 Enemies-within and Sevda Kuşun Kanadında

The constant reproduction of enemies-within has been circulated through the depiction of various internal others depending on the context and situation in the series. In their analysis of Turkish daily newspapers, Yumul and Özkırmılı (2000) demonstrate that the press warns ‘us’ against internal enemies, traitors and collaborators. While the identified internal enemies vary from intellectuals, human right activists, politicians and so on, the perception that they engage “in activities that might endanger ‘our’ national unity” is persistent (Yumul and Özkırmılı, 2000, p. 795). Furthermore, regarding changing internal others coupling with the paranoia of disintegration, Arman (2007) shows which parts of the Turkish society are reproduced as internal others, ‘enemies-within’, in relation to changing context. In this regard, non-Muslims such as Greeks in İstanbul, Armenians and Jews, Kurds, and Alawis have been reproduced as the enemy within depending on the context (Arman, 2007).

In Sevda Kuşun Kanadında, there are countless amounts of examples which ‘they’ is reproduced in two ways by confirming the literature as enemies-within and enemies- without, I will try to explain the reproduction of the enemies and value-laden aspect of this reproduction by providing the most striking examples.

In this context, I will demonstrate how three groups of internal others; leftists, counter-insurgencies and FETÖ, are reproduced as enemies-within together with ascribing negative values in Sevda Kuşun Kanadında. Furthermore, I will claim

that two of these enemies share an important characteristic in their depiction reproducing a specific narrative of Turkish nationalism: ‘they’ are driven by self-interest, putting their interests first vis-à-vis national interest.

Embarking upon this, the first group which are highly reproduced as enemies-within is leftists in the series. Considering the time when the series is located, it is no surprise that the leftist groups are reproduced as enemies-within. In this regard, the leftists are depicted almost always violent in the series, starting with the opening credits of the series. In the opening credits, the leftists are shown as protesting and flames surround these scenes. Here, protests and flames together imply violence to start with. Furthermore, just in the first theme of the first episode, leftists protest newly appointed US consul with violence and the protest includes acts of vandalism with the destruction of the automobile of US consul and setting it on fire. In this scene, the members of MTTB pass by together with the little children for whom they organize a circumcision ceremony. MTTB members react to the leftists furiously by asserting that there are children around but the leftists seem indifferent to this reaction. While the protest is getting out of hand more and more, the character named Arif steps in and tries to prevent a leftist to burn down the automobile fully. In this example, the leftists are obviously depicted as violent and careless, but what is significant is that MTTB members are depicted as good and moral by caring the children and standing up against the vandalism and violence. Thus, while ‘us’ is reproduced through the depiction of MTTB members with the association of positive qualities, the leftists are depicted as enemies-within with the association of negative qualities. In another example, leftists abduct the president of a rightist association, Grey Wolves (Ülkü Ocakları), a character named Ömer, and they torture him

ruthlessly. Later, Arif saves Ömer and the leftists are criticised as not being manful and valiant thus, being immoral because they attack one person not one-on-one but a group of leftists together ambushed Ömer. Here, ‘us’ is reproduced, this time, also including a rightist – Ömer – together with a MTTB member – Arif. Also, ‘us’ is depicted as moral and heroic while ‘they’ is reproduced as immoral and coward demonstrating the reproduction of enemies and the value-laden aspect of it at the same time. Throughout the series, the leftists are shown to use violence in their protests while the MTTB members always stand against it as a recurring theme intensifying the value-laden character of the dichotomy and reproduction of ‘us’ as MTTB members. Also, other than thematic enrichments, the series chooses more nuanced and subtle ways to strengthen this specific reproduction. In this context, whereas vigorous and nervous soundtrack is used during the scenes including the leftists, soft and soothing soundtrack is used during the scenes including the MTTB members. As a result, it seems possible to claim that the leftists are reproduced as internal others by depicting them violent, immoral and evil connoting them as the enemies-within through various thematic war-like encounters between the two groups.

Another group who is reproduced as enemies-within revolves around the depiction of counter-insurgencies. This depiction especially is represented through a character named Zafer Erbay. Zafer Erbay is an ex-military member who is also the father of Tümay. He is a rich businessman doing illegal activities such as bribing government and parliament members, and; providing and selling armament to the illegal groups. He has networks with every group in the country including military, police force, media and even the mafia. In the series, Zafer Erbay is almost always behind most of the evilness associating negative qualities

with 'them' and reproducing 'them' specifically as enemies-within. He implants spies in every political association: leftists, rightists and MTTB. Through these spies, he tries to provoke the groups towards violent actions which will result in chaos leading to a military coup that he himself controls and takes over the control of the country as a result. To this end, he does everything ruthlessly and immorally. He tries to ambush the leaders of the every political association, plans out bombings – one of which causes Arif to get killed – and violent protests causing harm to the country overall. He is always depicted as selfish and putting his personal interests first, while 'us' is depicted as moral, good and putting interests of the country before themselves, through the depiction of MTTB members and religious people who stand up against him and try to block his actions heroically throughout the series.

While every other political association gets provoked by Zafer Erbay's spy, MTTB never falls for it and even they find out who the spy is, which implies MTTB members as wise. In this regard, Zafer Erbay, as the representation of counter- insurgency, becomes 'the arch enemy-within' trying to destroy Turkey within. At the same time, MTTB members are reproduced as 'us' associating them with morality and positive qualities.

Later in the series, another character named Şeref enters as another counter- insurgency. He is also a very close friend of Zafer Erbay and they together plan actions which will lead a chaos in the country. Later, it turns out that Şeref secretly plans a communist coup in Turkey behind Zafer's back and he has different spies in the leftist group. All of a sudden, Şeref turns into the nemesis in the series and MTTB members, the Grey Wolves and even Zafer Erbay come together to defeat Şeref. Here, the possibility of a communist coup and a regime

is depicted as the vilest of all implying what is not accepted by Turkish nation. This example has a particular significance in reproducing Turkishness in the series. According to the survey by Özkırımlı and Uyan-Semerci (2011), a good respectable national is expected to be a non-communist if possible, since communism was not associated with being a Turkish in the survey. Moreover, Arman (2007) claims that the communists have been perceived as external other during Cold War era and the several internal others such as Alawis, Greeks on the island of Cyprus and Rums in İstanbul were linked with communism in their portrayal and reproduction as internal enemies. Most importantly, Ongur (2015, p. 422) asserts that “the ‘threat’ of communism, understood as anything that was against the sacred ideals of nationalism and religion and the objective of protecting the Turkish nation from ‘Moscow agents’, appeared to become a significant dimension of this strain of thought” – referring to Ottoman- Islamist thought. Büyük Doğu as the media outlet of MTTB is listed as one of the journals for anti-communist propaganda (Ongur, 2015). Considering the main characters of the series who are all members of MTTB and the perception towards communism in the Turkish society basing upon the studies by Arman and, Özkırımlı and Uyan-Semerci, the example of Şeref and the struggle against him reproduces the Turkish nationalism through the depiction of communism as the ultimate enemy. In the series, Şeref is defeated by the weird coalition of Grey Wolves, MTTB members and Zafer Erbay. Yet, after Şeref’s defeat, Zafer Erbay tries to implement his own plan still persisting his status as the enemy-within but he is defeated by MTTB members and the Grey Wolves this time. The example of Şeref and fight against him offers a good example for infused hot and banal nationalism. On the one hand, the fight against Şeref has a political overtone

adding a hot dimension to the example; on the other hand, that communism is presented as the ultimate enemy is a banal part of Turkish nationalism depending upon the literature. In this regard, the example shows an infusion between the two.

Embarking upon all these, a recurring theme of counter-insurgency is present in the series thus, ‘they’ is reproduced as enemy-within by associating them with negative qualities and violence whereas ‘we’ is reproduced including MTTB members, rightists and religious people by attributing the positive qualities such as being heroic, moral and benign to ‘us’.

Another internal other is depicted through a character named Fethi Hoca who symbolizes Fethullah Gülen in the series. The depiction is particularly worthwhile considering the fact that the second season of the series was aired just right after the failed coup attempt of 2016. In this regard, the frictions and clashes between the AKP government and the Gülen movement are incredibly visible in the second season through the depiction of the character of Fethi Hoca. Fethi Hoca is depicted as an immoral person who exploits Islam to achieve control in the country by developing networks in every government agency, training innocent youngsters and provoking them for violent actions. For that matter, he tricks Arif’s cousin, Halit, to attack the leftists. Kandiyoti (1991) argues that in the Muslim societies, the others- within can be easily drawn as the deviated Muslim. In this regard, although Fethi Hoca tries to present himself as a devoted Muslim, ‘true’ Muslims in the series such as MTTB members, religious people like husband of Arif’s aunt and Zahid Efendi do not fall for his arguments and even reprimand him. According to Yılmaz (2018), Erdoğan’s regime created a rigid distinction between who counts as desirable Turkish citizen and who counts

as enemies and traitors on the basis of whether they are pro or anti-Erdoğan, Sunni, Islamist, neo-Ottomanist, anti-Western and Turkish nationalist. In this context, especially Gülenists are left out in this formula connoting them as traitors and enemies criticising their morality and interpretation of Islam (Yılmaz, 2018; Yılmaz and Bashirov, 2018) particularly post-putsch. Furthermore, Fethi Hoca and Zafer Erbay have a complex relationship where they foster their evil plans by collaborating on some occasions. In this regard, Fethi Hoca as a ‘deviated’ Muslim is reproduced as enemy-within vis-à-vis MTTB members and, ‘real’ Muslims is reproduced as ‘us’, the ideal Turkish individual who is wise enough not to fall for his lies. This time, another positive quality which is being wise is attributed to ‘us’ through the depiction of MTTB members and religious people in the series.

Two of the enemies-within of *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, counter-insurgencies and Fethi Hoca share a significant characteristic in their depiction. Both of them are individual/personal interest driven in the sense that they put their personal interest before national/common interest. This idea is depicted through these characters’ lust for money and power and, the evil deeds – such as selling and/or providing armament to violent groups illegally, doing business with ‘foreigners’ just for money even though it would hurt the national interest – that they have undertaken to this end. This is particularly important considering the role of idea of sharing common interests as a nation in the banal reproduction of nationhood. In their analysis of Turkish newspapers, Köse and Yılmaz (2012) demonstrate that the idea of national interest was highly cited either directly and/or messages were given related to national interest and, views are defended ‘for the nation’ and ‘in the name of the nation’. Furthermore, Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000), in their

analysis of the newspapers in terms of banal reproduction of Turkish nationalism, show that several internal enemies identified by newspapers such as some media outlets, private channels and politicians are harshly criticised and blamed for putting their ‘personal’ and ‘petty’ interests over the interests of the nation. In this regard, what separates ‘us’ from ‘them’, enemies-within in this case, is sharing and working towards national interests and, putting the interests of the nation before individual ones.

Thus, the examples in the series reproduce the Turkish nationhood banally through the invocation of the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ by implying a moral hierarchy in terms of a clash between individual and national interests.

The examples from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* show both the value-laden nature of this reproduction and ‘them’ is reproduced as particularly enemy-within through the depiction of three different groups of internal others. This entangled reproduction process also is present in the depiction of enemy-without through the representation of ‘them’ as connected to enemy-within.

4.2.4.2 Enemies-without and *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*

As it is mentioned before, in *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, the enemy-within is always connected to enemy-without and, they have a confirming and reinforcing relationship in their evil plans of disintegrating Turkey. Çırakman asserts (2011, p. 1907) that “the enemy-within usually has close ties with the enemy-without”.

Furthermore, Üstel (2004) demonstrates how these two are perceived as related and work together in her analysis of Turkish citizenship education textbooks.

Üstel (2004, p. 299) argues that “the perceived collaboration between these two enemies has a significant function in interpellating the fight against ‘them’ as national”. To this end, enemy- without is generally depicted through their close ties to enemy- within Embarking upon this, I will, first, demonstrate how US and English Embassies and, Americans are reproduced as enemy-without through their close ties with Zafer Erbay, Şeref and Fethi Hoca. Furthermore, I will argue that ‘them’ is connoted negatively ascribing evilness to ‘them’ in terms of ‘them’ making evil plans about Turkey.

In the series, Zafer Erbay has networks with US and English embassies. Furthermore, both Zafer Erbay and Şeref talk about their security related training in the US. They mention on remembering how to approach chaotic situations and manipulate public in certain events based on what ‘they’ teach them in the US. Here, ‘they’ implies the enemy-without who trains counter-insurgencies to trouble Turkey.

In this regard, the example suggests a link between enemy-within and enemy-without through the characters’ background. Moreover, Fethi Hoca also mentions his ties with the US several times in the series. Thus, another enemy-within appears as having a relationship with enemy-without reproducing the US as the enemy-without.

In another example, the enemy-without is presented as having a complex dynamics with enemy-within by suggesting that enemy-without have also their own evil plans about Turkey. A character named Nesteren appears to have a close ties with an American sociologist, Thomas, who is shown as preparing evil plans about Turkey a couple of times in the series. What is significant here is

that Nesteren has in affair with Zafer Erbay and as a matter of fact, they live together secretly. Furthermore, in the series, Nesteren is a graduate of a US college and Thomas mentions that ‘we’ place you near Zafer to spy on him. In this regard, enemy-without is depicted as having close ties with enemy-within on one hand and, having their own spies and plans on the other, making Nesteren also a traitor. In addition, in the series, it is mentioned that one cannot trust the friendship of an American; there are no friends for Thomas but the interests of his country; Americans planned the incidents related to Menderes and, the plans regarding a gun prototype which will allow Turkey manufacture home-grown armament got stolen by Americans. In all these examples, the US is particularly reproduced as enemy-without by depicting ‘them’ as making evil plans about Turkey. Thus, the examples here demonstrate the complex set of grid in the reproduction of the dichotomy of us vs. them by displaying ‘them’ as enemy-without and associating ‘them’ with negative qualities.

The examples here show the connectedness between two groups of enemies: enemy- within and enemy-without. Moreover, as enemies-without is reproduced, ‘them’ is ascribed with evilness at the same time; presenting the gifted process of the reproduction of the dichotomy.

4.2.4.3 Enemies-without and Seksenler

In the season of Seksenler which I have analysed, ‘they’ is reproduced as ‘enemy- without’ through the representation of perceived external threat. In the analysed season, it has not been found any examples which reproduces ‘them’ as enemy- within yet, it is important to acknowledge that this study is not exhaustive considering that only one of the seven seasons has been

analysed for the purposes of this study. In this regard, the examples provided below is not to say that the series does not assume any enemy-within but rather, the examples show one of the reproduction processes which contributes to the overall reproduction of Turkish nationalism through the interpellation of ‘them’ as enemy-without specifically on the basis of external threats. In this regard, I will argue that *Seksenler* reproduces enemy-without through reminding the old enmities of the past thus, tapping into the idea of shared past and national memory. Moreover, I will demonstrate how a specific narrative of Turkish nationalism is recirculated through the depiction of external others: ‘they’ are jealous of ‘us’.

One of the examples occurs when Suat tries to convince Sami to sell his land located in Eastern Thrace. During the discussion between the two, Suat tries to scare Sami by reminding the Balkan Wars and puts that “Remember what happened in Bulgaria, remember what Greece did to Turks!”. Also, Suat suggests that the situation in Thrace is still obscure so the outbreak of a war is always a possibility which may result in Sami losing his land. Although, Suat tries to trick Sami into selling his land by taking advantage of Sami being naive, the example demonstrates who is perceived as enemy by referring to the past events which taps into the national memory of a specific nationhood. In their study of banal reproduction of Turkish nationalism, Köse and Yılmaz (2012) demonstrate that the newspapers tap into the reservoir of the dichotomies and alliances of the past. With the same trend, the example reminds the old enmities assuming that every Turkish citizens will make sense of it due to the idea of shared past and memory. Thus, in the example, Bulgaria and Greece are reproduced as external threat and enemy with reference to the national memory.

Moreover, the Thrace is assumed to be dangerous and ambivalent at the same time implying an atmosphere of continuous external turbulence and insecurity.

Another example involves young long-time lovers of the series, Butik Ali and Dilek. For the background information, the young lovers try to convince Dilek's parents to give permission them to marry since the very beginning of the series. Having tired of the wants and wishes of Dilek's parents and frustrated still not getting the permission, Butik Ali resembles Dilek's parents to Allied Powers from First World War. Here, the example reproduces Allied Powers of the past as evil and enemy today by suggesting a similarity between the evilness of Dilek's parents, even though the war has been long gone and Turkey now has close relations with the Allied Powers of the war. In a similar vein with the previous example, the example taps into the national repertoire of enemies referring the old enmities relying on the national memory of the people.

Another example revolves around a constantly recurring theme in the series in which it is perceived that 'they' do not and will not let 'us' do certain things and, thus, undermining our path to prosper and develop. In this constant theme, mentioned 'they' is just a 'they' with an absence of a specific name of an 'enemy' or an 'other' bundling all other than 'us' together, wiping out all the heterogeneities and differences and most importantly, strengthening an acute polarisation in 'us' vs. 'them' binary. Köse and Yılmaz (2012) demonstrate that news items and columns analysed ,in their study of Turkish newspapers, display 'they' and 'their actions' as the main axis of the conflict. Embarking upon this, the sharp polarisation in the series reproduces 'them' as an enemy-without through passing the responsibility of the conflicts to 'them' and justifying 'our' perception and feeling of insecurity. In other words, this recurring storyline

contributes to the reproduction of Turkish nationalism in two interwoven ways. One is that ‘they’ is reproduced as enemy- without blocking ‘our’ capacity to develop. The second is that the recurring theme implies that ‘they’ are evil, thus ‘they’ is connoted with negative qualities making their enmity indisputable. The perception of that ‘they are jealous of us’ and ‘they do not want us to be powerful’ is not unique to this series; as a matter of fact, it has a significant connotation. In her analysis of Turkish citizenship education, Üstel (2004, p. 307) provides a striking example from an analysed textbook which says that “having the ability to change the destiny of the South West Turkey, the GAP project caused many countries to envy us leading them to immediately create an environment of terror in the region”. In this regard, it is perceived that there is a jealousy towards ‘us’, ‘our’ potential and ‘our’ possible achievements. In the series, during several discussions between the residents of the neighbourhood, it is remarked by various characters that ‘they’ do not want ‘us’ to produce ‘our’ own energy; ‘they’ won’t let ‘us’ drill and process oil even though ‘we’ find it; ‘they’ won’t let us build third bridge in Istanbul because ‘they’ do not want İstanbul to prosper. All these perceptions regarding the recurring theme of Turkey having limited by ‘them’, ‘the enemies’, demonstrate that there is a strong perceived external threat in the series intensifying the reproduction of ‘them’ as enemy- without.

Considering all the examples given above regarding the reproduction of ‘them’ as enemies in two of the series, enemy takes two forms: enemy-within and enemy- without confirming the literature. In both of its forms, the specific enemy changes from time to time and context to context displaying a huge range of enemies. The leftists, counter-insurgencies and

FETÖ are reproduced as enemies-within characterizing ‘them’ with negative qualities, immorality and violence and also, featuring ‘them’ as making evil plans about Turkey. Having close ties with enemy- within in *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* and featured on its own in *Seksenler*, enemy-without is also reproduced with similar characteristics and aims as enemy-within, ranging from Americans, English, Allied Powers, Greek and Bulgarians and, sometimes an ambiguous, omnipotent and evil ‘they’ in general. Although the enemy-without changes quite often and becomes a vague idea of general external other at times, two specific external others are recurrently stand out in both of the series through specific references and repeated examples in both of the series: the West and the US. In the next section, I will engage in the reproduction of these two specific enemies-without basing my argument upon the contextuality of these particular enemies.

4.2.4.4 The West and the United States vs. Turkey

The both of the series include a recurring theme that reproduces two particular enemies through constant repetitive examples intensifying the enemy status of them. This recurring theme reveals the ways in which ‘them’ is particularly reproduced as enemy-without through the depiction of the West and at some cases specifically US. In this reproduction, the West and the US are reproduced with a negative connotation as malign. This has a huge significance considering the post-putsch context. In this regard, I argue that both of the series reproduce the West and the US as enemy- without recirculating the anti-Western and anti-US sentiments of the post-putsch context in Turkey.

Arman (2007) argues that anti – European movement related to Sevres Syndrome is indeed a strong narration in mainstream Turkish nationalism. Bora (2003, p. 449) puts that “anti – Western xenophobia is the common denominator of Turkish nationalism and Islamism”. Considering the AKP’s political ideology as strongly combining elements of nationalism and Islamism (Bora, 2003) especially after the attempted coup of 2016 (Yılmaz, 2018) and AKP’s intense hegemony over the media and particularly TRT content (Çetin 2014; Sümer & Adaklı, 2010), it is possible to see the reproduction of anti – Western xenophobia in both public perception and particularly in the media as well. Yılmaz and Bashirov (2018, p. 1823) note that “today, Erdoğan and his media constantly propagate the existence of a holy warfare between the Muslims and the Christian West and claim that the latter is bent on the former’s destruction”. Moreover, Çırakman (2011) claims that there is a rising politicisation of Turkishness against the West through developing a negative image

of the West with the increasing critical and even hostile perception towards Western interests, values and institutions coupling with the allegations of that West tries to disintegrate Turkey. In this sense, EU (European Union) is also highly connoted negatively. Going one step further, Yılmaz (2018, p. 57) asserts that “JDP – AKP – promotes anti – Western hatred”. Furthermore, in their analysis of Turkish popular culture through the examination of Cola Turka advertisement, the novel called *Metal Storm* and the TV series – movie named *Valley of the Wolves*, Gökçen, Homer and Oates (2006) reveal the rising anti – Americanism in Turkey and, Gökçen, Homer and Oates, (2006, p. 266) argue that “the Turkish state of mind is highly prone to anti – Americanism”. Similarly, in her analysis of flagging incidents of 2000s in Turkey, Çırakman (2011) demonstrates that the US is one the

top external enemies.

Depending upon these, I will provide and analyse examples from the series to see to what extent *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* and *Seksenler* contribute to this anti-Western and anti-US phenomenon. In this regard, firstly I will touch upon the examples from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* and then, move to *Seksenler*.

Sevda Kuşun Kanadında demonstrates significant examples regarding Anti-Americanism. The second season of the series starts with the theme of Cyprus issue featuring the events through a character named Asım. Regarding the events and the conflicts surrounding the issue, the position of the US is criticised several times by different characters as fostering the conflict and enabling the Greek side to do ‘evil’ things. Furthermore, later in the series, it is vigorously mentioned that the US cannot be friend once again in the context of Cyprus issue. Another particular example makes the perception towards the US crystal clear. In the series, the leftists led by a character named Parkalı kidnaps an American soldier. When the rightists learn about the issue, one of them – named Mahir – remarks that he will almost thank the leftists because for the first time, they did something beneficial. Here, although the two groups are as polarised as murdering each other, the US becomes a common and the most malign enemy referred through the kidnapped American soldier. Thus, the Anti-Americanism is highly salient in the series. When the US is specifically reproduced as the enemy-without with negative connotation, sometimes the West in general is reproduced as the enemy-without and malign without particularly referring to any individual nation-state. *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* provides a striking example in the matter. The series features an author called Şule Yüksel Şenler in the second season. The author gives a conference about Turkey making its own

cinema and remarks that “the imperialist West tries to capture our hearts and souls with their cinema and fashion”. Here, the West is reproduced as imperialist, the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is emphasised and the West is reproduced as malign through the metaphor of capturing the hearts and souls of ‘us’. Thus, the West is made into the main axis of the conflict by trying to denigrate ‘us’ through the metaphor. As one of the dimensions of AKP’s ideology, “the questioning of the compatibility between western and Turkish moralities” (Ongur, 2015, p. 425) is implied in the example by referring to ‘our’ morality with ‘our’ hearts and souls.

Özkırmı (2008) points out the rising anti – EU perception in Turkey. Basing upon the strong fear of loss of sovereignty and disintegration, data shows that support for EU membership steadily decreases in Turkey (Gökçen, Homer & Oates, 2006, p. 261; Özkırmı, 2008, p. 67) and, more than 60% of the people in the survey believe that EU tries to disintegrate Turkey and enables the terrorist groups like PKK strengthening their power (Özkırmı, 2008, p. 109).

In this sense, *Seksenler* specifically provides examples for anti – EU perception. In the series, European Economic Community is mentioned several times because the series is located during 1980s, the European Union did not exist at the time. Various characters mention that EEC is amusing with ‘us’ and wasting ‘our’ time, ‘they’ won’t let ‘us’ in EEC anyways and, even remarked that ‘we’ should establish ‘our’ own Turkish community. Here in these repetitive examples, firstly the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ is reproduced through the invocation of deixis. Secondly, ‘they’ has a specific identity this time referring to EEC and hence, the EU. Thirdly, EEC is perceived as doing ‘evil’ to ‘us’ in the matter of ‘our’ membership thus, referring to and making a connection with the

current struggles of Turkey's membership process to the EU. Thus, a continuity between past and present of the nation is created implying a perpetuality and, a shared national biography and destiny. In this sense, the example displays the anti-EU perception on a more shallow level, yet; it functions in a much more nuanced and interwoven way in the reproduction of Turkish nationalism overall. Moreover, strikingly, Çağatay teases Şahin saying that "Sami is amusing him in the matter of Şahin and Elvan's marriage, just like the EEC is playing with Turkey". Thus, anti – Western and particularly anti – EU feelings are reproduced in the series by referring to Turkey's accession process into the community.

The examples from the series demonstrate the anti-US and anti-West feelings strongly. While *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* specifically reproduces anti-US sentiments through the depiction of Cyprus issue due to that it features 1970s; *Seksenler* reproduces anti-West and particularly anti-EU sentiments through the discussions between the residents and humorous comparisons. In this way, although featuring the past, both of the series recirculate anti-West and anti-US sentiments of the post- putsch context also building a bridge between past and the present.

4.2.5 The atmosphere of paranoia and conspiracy

The depiction of 'them' making evil plans about Turkey has a significant aspect in some of the examples reproducing a particular common perception flagging Turkish nationalism. The enemy is not only reproduced making evil plans but, specifically making attempts to disintegrate and scramble the Turkish land. This common perception is significant to understand the reproduction of Turkish nationalism because Bora (2003, p. 434) asserts:

...for modern Turkey, established during a grave crisis in which its very existence was threatened, has a nation-state tradition that subsequently perceived surrounding countries as a severe threat rectified by the Cold War. This condition regarding survival and threat had a considerable effect on the way in which Turkish nationalism and the Turkish national identity took shape.

In other words, as Özkırımlı (2008) argues, the concept of survival and a constant perception of disintegration coupling with a constant paranoia of external and internal threats are persistent aspects of official nationalism in Turkey.

Furthermore, especially in 2000s onwards, it has been put that “Turkey suffers from Sevres Syndrome” in which “a perception of threat or a fear of the scrambling and disintegration of Turkey” (Çırakman, 2011, p. 1903) is constant and, “new internal and external enemies are created in the process” (Özkırımlı, 2008, p. 51). In her analysis of citizenship education in Turkey, Üstel (2004) also points out that it is persistently referred to destructive and dividing forces both inside and outside of Turkey implying a salient paranoia of disintegration. These all together lead to an explosion in conspiracy theories regarding the enemies preparing evil plans about Turkey’s disintegration (Çırakman, 2011; Gökçen, Homer & Oates, 2006; Özkırımlı, 2008). In this regard, ‘the enemy’ is reproduced as not only constantly making ordinary evil plans but plans about disintegrating the Turkish land particularly.

Embarking upon the arguments about the Turkish paranoia of disintegration and scrambling in the literature, firstly I will provide storylines from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* where this atmosphere of paranoia and conspiracy is well depicted through the relationship between enemy-within and enemy-without. Then, I will continue with *Seksenler* through the analysis of examples from the series which reproduces this phenomenon in a more direct way than *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*.

In *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, all of the groups and nation-states who are reproduced as enemies are depicted as threatening the national unity thus, implying disintegration and scrambling of the country. In the series, leftists, on the one hand and one of the counter-insurgencies, Şeref, on the other, are depicted as having relationships with USSR and trying to make their own communist revolution threatening the national unity and opening up the country for communist influence and dominance as it has been perceived and shown in the series. Moreover, both Zafer Erbay and Fethi Hoca try to take over the power in the country, as explained with the examples in section 4.2.4.1, which will leave the country vulnerable thus, open to outside threats and disintegration as it has suggested in the series by several different characters repeatedly. US, in its reproduction of the enemy-without in the series, is depicted to attempt to disintegrate Turkey through cooperating counter-insurgencies and Fethi Hoca, and leading the country into chaos by planning incidents related to Menderes. In this sense, the themes related to evil deeds of the reproduced enemies occur in the context of the constant paranoia of disintegration and scrambling.

Furthermore, the themes related to these enemies are depicted under a conspiracy – like atmosphere in the series confirming the literature. The enemies discuss the issues in secret behind closed doors in the series, they all have seemingly respectable jobs but in reality, their aim and actions are always related to leading Turkey into chaos and, although the moral and benign Turkish people try to reveal their fiddles, ‘they’ still manage to stay in secret through the use of illegal means such as murdering, blackmailing and threatening ‘good’ Turkish people such as Arif, Ömer, Arif’s family and Ömer’s family. To this end, in the series,

Arif, the husband of Arif's aunt, a character named Tarık and a 'benign and heroic' military officer have been murdered in different occasions to keep things in secret. Thus, these adds to the conspiracy-like atmosphere in the series.

Seksenler touches upon this paranoia from a more direct angle. In the series, it is remarked that 'they' are trying to take 'our' land with tricks and 'they' are trying to disintegrate 'our' land by sowing discord among 'us' because 'they' couldn't do it with warfare. These remarks are persistently occur in the series several times by different residents of the neighbourhood suggesting that this is the common understanding and perception regarding the issues of threat and survival. Here, 'they' is reproduced as enemies-without once again with an absence of a specific identity, on one hand, and this reproduction centres around the constant paranoia of disintegration, on the other, leading to a mindset where Turks should constantly perceive others as possible threat to national unity and harmony with a conspiracy theorist's standpoint. In this regard, the repetition of these perceptions in the series reminds the viewers constantly that 'we' are in danger and 'our' survival is threatened reproducing the common perception.

The examples from the two series demonstrate how an atmosphere of paranoia and conspiracies surrounds the reproduction of the dichotomy of 'us' vs. 'them'. The examples from *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* provide repetitive storylines in this regard, whereas the examples from *Seksenler* overtly recirculate this narrative. Thus, through the recirculation of this specific narrative, Turkish nationalism is flagged. Also, the repetitiveness of these themes banalizes the reproduction as repetition is one of the aspects of it according to Billig (1995).

4.2.6 Reproduction of 'Us' as 'Heroes'

During the reproduction of the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dichotomy, a specific pattern takes attention when considering the various studies in the literature regarding Turkishness. In this, Turks are depicted as fierce warriors and more importantly, heroes in general interpellating their struggles and fights as national through repetitive storylines. In his analysis of Valley of the Wolves, Erol Işık (2013) takes attention to how, through the stories of these so-called heroes, a moralistic outlook is drawn by depicting these heroes as sacrificing themselves for the motherland and nationhood selflessly. Thus, morality, heroism and national fight are all conjoined together in the depiction of main characters as the embodiment of ‘us’. With a similar trajectory, Çırakman (2011) claims that Turks are portrayed as fierce warriors in fight with the both enemy-within and enemy-without, in her analysis of Valley of the Wolves. Furthermore, Üstel (2004) clearly shows the recurring concept of heroism in her prominent analysis of Turkish citizen education going as far as to the II. Constitutional Era in Ottoman Empire. Üstel (2004) argues that especially starting with the education program of 1939, Turkishness is strengthened with an increasing cult of heroism; in the program of 1949, one of the main aims of the citizenship education is put as to teach the students that Turks are heroes and; in the program of 1985, the teacher is expected to mention the heroism of Turks by using the example of Çanakkale victory when explaining the subject of the “Characteristics of Turks”. These findings from Üstel’s analysis shows that the heroism of Turks is a repeated phenomenon in Turkish citizenship education. Hence, considering these case studies, it can be claimed that the concept of heroism as a positive quality is connoted with Turkishness quite often.

As, ‘Turks are heroes’ phenomenon flags Turkish nationalism; an ideal image of Turk is reproduced through the stories of the heroes. Pembecioğlu Öcel (2006, p. 211) asserts that “each society has cultivated some fundamental patterns through the films to be modelled and through the heroes/heroines of these films, the individuals of the society were given the rights and wrongs, obedience and disobedience, etc”. In this regard, who counts as hero/heroine and what kinds of deeds the heroes/heroines perform becomes peculiarly related to morality and reproduces the values of particular society. Thus, it is possible to argue that a conglomerate is created between morality, the stories of heroes and the individual nation through the depiction of heroes and their deeds.

Basing upon the literature, firstly, I will explain the heroes of *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* as they are depicted and try to show how they are built as the ideal Turkish person with their moralistic outlook and fighting for national interests. I will mention three main heroes of the series: Arif in the first season, Ömer and Asım in the second season particularly. Also, through the storyline Asım, I will demonstrate how the series reproduces a specific aspect of Turkish nationalism where Cyprus issue has a particular banal connotation in the reproduction. Then, I will continue with the unusual yet, banal hero of *Seksenler*, Fehmi. I will show how through the ‘family man’ phenomenon, Fehmi is depicted as a moral and wise hero being the voice of wisdom and reason in the series. Lastly, I will try to conclude that a bridge between personal and national biography has been built through the stories of these heroes thus, reproducing ‘Turks are heroes’ narrative and flagging Turkishness.

4.2.6.1 Three heroes of *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*

In *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, the recurring theme of ‘us’ as heroes fighting against ‘the evil’ Zafer Erbay reproduces this routinely formed assumption. In the series, all three main male characters, portrayed as the hero of the series at different times and contexts, try to reveal the true identity of Zafer Erbay as the counter – insurgency. Arif as the hero of the first season is always depicted as heroic and fierce fighter in the series. Arif finds out that Zafer Erbay murdered his father when Arif was a little boy. He also witnesses the murder of Tarık – a spy implanted in the leftist group by Zafer Erbay – by Zafer Erbay because Tarık threatens Zafer Erbay to reveal his identity to his daughter Tümay. After these incidents, while Arif tries to reveal the identity of Zafer Erbay and to kill him, Zafer Erbay achieves to murder Arif through the bombing of MTTB building. What is particularly depicted as heroic here is that Arif does not care when he is threatened by Zafer Erbay and proceeds to fight with him for national interests in terms of attempting to prevent Zafer Erbay’s plans on leading the country into the chaos. Furthermore, during the bombing, Arif is not in the building but he enters to the building to save his cousin ending up sacrificing himself and getting killed. Thus, Arif as a hero sacrifices himself for the national good and at the same time, a moral outlook is drawn around the storyline of bombing in which Arif saves his young and innocent cousin Halit who is tricked into an illegal and violent actions by Fethi Hoca. This specific example bands together three aspects of the reproduction process. Firstly, Arif is depicted as the hero because he sacrifices himself for the nation, making his fight national. In this regard, it is implied that a hero is a hero because he fights for the nation but not for personal interests.

Secondly, through the storyline of saving Halit, it is implied that a hero also should be moral. Thirdly and most importantly, the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’

is sharpened via the depiction of hero and innocent 'us' vs. evil and violent 'them' in this stark bombing incident by 'them'. 'Us' is represented in two ways. One is that Arif, as a hero, saves the day by sacrificing himself thus, connoting 'us' with positive qualities of heroism and morality. Other is that Halit, as an innocent youngster, is fooled into violence because of an evil 'them', Fethi Hoca, thus, connoting 'us' as innocent and open to be deceived yet able to be saved by a hero. Furthermore, 'them' is bundled up together through the involvement of both Zafer Erbay and Fethi Hoca to the events and they are depicted as the main axis of the conflict separating those as 'them' from 'us' distinctly. After this event, Halit happens to be saved both as physically and also spiritually leading him to rethink his life choices, he stays away from violence and even, leaves his home to go to Cairo to get religious education. In this regard, even with his killing, Arif becomes a hero with a moral high ground in the series saving the Halit spiritually as well.

With the killing of Arif, the series starts to build its main narrative around a character named Ömer who is depicted as the main hero in the series for the rest of it. Ömer is a very close friend of Arif from the neighbourhood and also, he is the leader of the rightist student association called Grey Wolves (Ülkü Ocakları). The most significant narrative centring around Ömer is that Ömer joins mafia and due to a set of fortunate events and coincidences, he becomes the leader of one of the most prevalent mafia groups in the city. What is significant here is that at first, Ömer is not interested and even critical of getting into the mafia but when he learns that Arif gets killed because of Zafer Erbay, he suddenly decides to join it at the expense of destroying intimate relations with his family. After this, Ömer swears by murdering all the 'bad' guys in the series including Zafer Erbay and

many others who in fact is featured as hurting national unity and harmony, and causing chaos in the country for their personal power and interest, coupling with the idea of revenge for Arif's death. From that point on, Ömer indeed becomes the main hero of the series and fights with all of the 'bad' and 'evil' characters in the series for the sake of Turkish nation. He mentions several times that he will not be relieved without destroying all the 'evil' people, he knows, who plot against the country's peace and harmony. While Ömer succeeds in killing the villains in the series and destroying their influence and power over the country, this storyline which is built around the heroic deeds of Ömer demonstrates an example for the reproduction of 'us' being heroes fighting the national fight against 'them' being evil plotting against the peace and harmony of Turkey. To simply put, the dichotomy of 'us' vs. 'them' is reproduced again with the value-laden nature but this time, 'us' is reproduced specifically as heroes confirming the literature on Turkish nationalism. Furthermore, Ömer is depicted with a moral high ground in the series through various storylines. He helps the poor people in the series through offering one of them a job in his grocery shop and promising to provide the expenses of the children of another poor guy. When he becomes the leader of the mafia, he goes against the conventional ways and gets into a confrontation with other mafia leaders who makes money by threatening weak and poor people. In this regard, Ömer is depicted as a moral and benign good hero who fights for the nation against evil 'them' and, helps the poor and the weak at the same time by using his power over mafia gang.

Lastly, a character named Asım is introduced to the series in the second season around the storyline of Cyprus issue. Cyprus issue has a particular connotation in Turkish nationalism and especially for MTTB. In their analysis of online

discussion platforms, Baruh and Popescu (2008) identify metaphors of sacrifice and heroism in discussions related to Cyprus issue connoting Turks as heroes. What is significance here is that this study reveals a strong connection between the concepts of heroism and sacrifice and, the Cyprus issue peculiarly. Furthermore, Özkırmı (2008, p. 52), regarding the arguments about rising nationalism in Turkey, puts that “in fact Turkey is surrounded with its enemies as it always is; traditional enemies such as Greeks, Greek Cypriots, Armenians have never been off the agenda”. Thus, the Cyprus issue particularly reproduces the Turkish nationalism referring to Greek Cypriots as enemies and external threat creating a constant paranoia relating the issue. The studies by Yumul and Özkırmı (2000) and, by Köse and Yılmaz (2012) show the persistency of the issue in the banal reproduction of Turkish nationalism through invocation of the issue by the daily newspapers. Yumul and Özkırmı demonstrate that an idea of renewed threat related to Cyprus issue is present in the news stories regarding the Greeks buying missiles. Köse and Yılmaz reveal that a news report regarding the flag in Beşparmak had proliferated several news headlines and columns in the newspapers reproducing the dichotomy of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ in an overt way.

What is significance here is that although these two studies are 13 years apart from each other and the date of the analysed newspapers have been selected randomly, the salience of the Cyprus issue is remarkable making it to an important aspect of Turkish nationalism and shows the banality. Moreover, the role of MTTB is well- known in the issue. MTTB had been mobilised as a youth group after a press campaign by Hürriyet in 1950s where the issue was likened to Turkish independence War (An, 2002; Stefanidis, 1999 as cited in Baruh & Popescu, 2008). Considering all these, the introduction of Asım, as an intelligent

young boy from Cyprus having strong connections to MTTB, to the series seems peculiarly significant in the reproduction of Turkish nationalism. All these characteristics of Asım coupling with the storyline around Cyprus issue reproduces various aspects of Turkish nationalism making Asım a perfect example. Asım is a remarkably intelligent engineer in the series from Cyprus. Starting from his first scene, he is depicted as a Turkish hero who fights a national war against both internal and external enemies. In his very first scene, Asım saves a little girl named Zeliş from getting killed by Greek Cypriots in Cyprus when he is on his way to Turkey to deliver armament to Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus who fight against the Greek in the island. The scene and the plot here is highly significant because it depicts the heroic role of Asım in a national fight on the one hand and on the other, it draws a moral outlook to the character as the saviour of an innocent little child similar to the storyline where Arif gets killed. Later in the series, Asım is shown as designing a national armament project. His project promised to end Turkey's dependence to the outside in terms of armament production. In the series, several different groups including Zafer Erbay, Americans and Greek Cypriots and later, a coalition between Zafer Erbay and Americans try to steal the plans of the projects thus, depicting a struggle against both external and internal enemies. So, during these storylines, Asım fights with all of these internal and external enemies to get his plans back and to realize his project. Furthermore, in the last main storyline of the series, Asım plays the main role to reveal a hiddenly accumulated armament which will be used to make a communist revolution in Turkey, ending up destroying these 'evil' plans about Turkey and preventing the communist revolution. With this last storyline, Asım becomes an ultimate Turkish hero fighting against the 'evilest'

which is communism.

All of these three characters are depicted as Turkish heroes in terms of fighting a national war against either or both enemy-within and enemy-without. Thus, the national ‘us’ is reproduced as heroes with good morality who fight for the country against ‘them’ as internal and/or external enemies who plot against the well-being of the nation and the country. It is warranted to argue here that Sevda Kuşun Kanadında follows the same trend that it has been found in the literature in terms of depicting Turks as heroes referring to the themes of self-sacrifice for the nation, being selfless and being moral especially considering the studies by Erol Işık (2013), Çırakman (2011) and, Baruh and Popescu (2008).

Sevda Kuşun Kanadında reproduces the ‘Turks are heroes’ narrative relating to Turkish nationalism with hot storylines such as bombings, mafia warfare and Cyprus issue, yet; the banal environment of television also adds a banal element to this reproduction creating an infused and entangled relationship between hot and banal nationalism. Furthermore, the narrative of that ‘Turks are heroes’ is itself banal part of Turkish nationalism repeated and reproduced in various ways as it has been demonstrated with case studies in the beginning of this section. Thus, I argue that hot and banal is infused together in these storylines.

4.2.6.2 A banal hero: Fehmi of Seksenler

Seksenler contributes to the reproduction of Turks as heroes through a character named Fehmi. In their study of the concept of ‘family man’ in Turkish nationalism, Özkırımlı and Uyan-Semerci (2011, pp. 60-68) claim that “nationalism is embedded in the fabric of society, delimiting the boundaries of

responsibility and providing a template that lays down the standards of morality” through the concept of ‘family man’ who “is a good, responsible man working for the sake of his family, and accordingly a good responsible citizen serving his country and his nation”. I argue that the character of Fehmi is a great example for the concept of ‘family man’ reproducing the Turkish nationalism on one hand and linking the positive qualities of being heroic, responsible, wise and moral to being an ideal Turkish individual.

Fehmi is generally the epicentre of the series. He is the mukhtar of the neighbourhood and father of three main characters in the series. He is an affectionate father to his children and a loving husband to his wife and, depicted as the head of the household as confirming to be a ‘family man’. His heroism is bond with his wisdom and his rational standpoint to the events, and is displayed through various storylines in the series. In the series, whenever someone in the neighbourhood needs to make an important decision, s/he always consults to Fehmi and, s/he does not decide or take action without his approval. Every resident in the neighbourhood follows his reasoning in their decision making and tries to implement what he does in almost every occasion. Throughout the season I have analysed, Suat and his apprentice Çağatay try to persuade the residents of the neighbourhood for several projects. They attempt to sell new sofas, steel doors and summer houses to the residents and, make the residents get carpeted their apartments. In every one of these attempts, the residents want to consult to Fehmi and to do what Fehmi does.

Although at first, some of the residents decide to buy steel doors and get their apartments carpeted, when they find out Fehmi thinks that those are unnecessary, they immediately give up on the idea. They accept to buy summer houses and

new sofas when only they see Fehmi also buying. Suat even makes a remark that because of Fehmi, they are going to go bankrupt so they need to persuade Fehmi for every project first. In this sense, Fehmi is depicted as hero in the series not in the usual sense but in a banal way that the ideal Turkish person is reasonable, wise and respected by the others. Thus, Seksenler reproduces Turks as heroes through the depiction of Fehmi with basing his heroism upon his wisdom. Furthermore, same moral outlook that it has been found in the heroes of *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* can be observed in the depiction of Fehmi in *Seksenler* as well. As mentioned before, in the section 4.2.3, by setting up a trap, Fehmi gets historical artefact smugglers caught by the police. In this storyline, Fehmi gives a speech about how important to protect ‘our’ cultural and historical heritage and, how a Turkish should act in such a situation as a responsible citizen. Özkırımlı and Uyan-Semerçi (2011, pp. 68-69) note that “nationalism has intrinsic moral significance in Turkish society, and as such forms part of the arsenal of positive values members of the Turkish nation are expected to possess”. In this regard, the example depicts Fehmi as a hero who acts morally and responsibly as an ideal individual in Turkish society and, does not hesitate to act upon for the nation and the country even against dangerous and illegal people. Furthermore, the wisdom of Fehmi here once again is emphasized because when Suat and Çağatay are given the historical artefacts, they could not know what to do with them other than hiding the artefacts unlike the reasonable and responsible act of Fehmi. In this regard, the example gathers several positive qualities as being responsible, wise, reasonable, moral and heroic through the depiction of Fehmi as the idealised Turkish individual associating Turkishness with heroism, morality and wisdom.

The storylines of heroes have another specific function in the reproduction of the nationalities. Through the individual stories of heroes displayed, a connection and bridge is made between personal biographies and national biography.

Radcliffe and Westwood (1996, pp. 87 – 88) put that “popular culture contributes to the ways in which individuals are able to place their biographies within the larger stage of the nation-state producing a correlative imaginary which is so important in the generation of national identities”. Furthermore, Kuryel (2015), in her analysis of several popular culture products in terms of everyday nationalism in contemporary Turkey, takes attention to ways in which the recent popular culture products such as a book called *Immortal Atatürk* and a movie called *Mustafa* follow the conventional nationalist-hero-making. In this, Kuryel asserts (2015, pp. 157-158) that “they explain politics on the basis of the individual psychology of the protagonist and, at the same time, restrict the meaning of the personal stories to what they allegorically represent about the nation”. In this regard, both of the series create a bridge between the personal biographies of the heroes presented and the national biography through specific storylines where the protagonist gives a struggle against an enemy for his country hence, the nation.

Arif fights against Zafer Erbay, Ömer fights against all of the internal enemies including Zafer Erbay and Asım fights against both internal and external enemies including Americans, Zafer Erbay, Greek Cypriots and communists. Different than these overt struggles, Fehmi does not fight against a specific enemy yet, through being the voice of reason and wisdom, he depicts an ideal Turkish person via the stories of him displayed. Thus, with their stories and qualities, the nation is embodied in the depiction of these heroes reproducing ‘Turks are heroes’

narrative and flagging Turkishness.

4.3. The Claim to a Common History and Neo-Ottomanism

Nationalistic narrative tends to settle accounts with the past and claims to a common history of the people in the reproduction of the individual nationhood. Billig (1995) takes attention to the claim to a common history as a national ‘we’ together in the reproduction of banal nationalism where the national ‘we’ remember the past and celebrate the antiquity of their claimed common history forgetting the recency of the their individual nationhood. Although national commemorations, national days and ceremonies disrupt the ordinariness of the this remembering and forgetting (Billig, 1995), banal space of media and television particularly contributes to it to a great deal by reproducing the claim in different ways and stories. In this regard, the Turkish case also reproduces this claim by asserting that ‘we’ have a particular common history. In their study of Turkish daily newspapers, Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) show that the newspapers praise ‘our’ glorified past. Furthermore, the newspapers warn ‘us’ not to fail ‘our’ glorious past thus, evoking an idea of common history (Yumul and Özkırımlı, 2000). Similarly, Köse and Yılmaz (2012) demonstrate that there is an emphasis on ‘our’ history by tapping into the reservoir of the dichotomies and alliances of the past.

In this process, it is particularly significant to look into what kind of past has been evoked because the remembrance and glorification of the past is in fact very much related to the present in the sense of being contextual. In this regard, contextually, the Ottoman past has been glorified especially in the academia and the media (Saraçoğlu as cited in Çetin, 2014). White (2013, p.

183) takes attention to romanticised Ottoman past and styles in recent Turkish society and notes:

Some participate in an “Ottoman” national identity by purchasing genuine antiques for their homes or modern art with Ottoman references. Others make do with Oriental-style knickknacks, not infrequently made in China. A television soap opera about the life of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent has become so popular that shopping malls have set up stands where customers can dress up as “Ottoman characters” like the sultan’s wife, Hürrem, and have their pictures taken. Demand for Ottoman-style costumes is exceeding the ability of ateliers to produce them. It won’t be long before brides and grooms begin to don Ottoman court dress for their wedding photos.

To simply put, “...post-Ottomanism or Ottomania, as some call it, has now infected all sectors of society, pious and secular alike” (White, 2013, p. 183).

Yılmaz (2018) mentions neo-Ottomanism as one of the ideological pillars in the education during AKP period especially post-putsch period. Not so surprisingly, in their study of Turkish textbooks, Carlson and Kancı (2017) prove this to be the case with their findings. Their findings demonstrate that a narrative of tolerance has been created around Ottoman Empire referring to is as ‘Homeland of Tolerance’ (Carlson and Kancı, 2017). Furthermore, one can easily observe the heightened interest in Ottoman past on television by simply looking at the television series created and broadcasted currently from PBS to private channels, such as *Diriliş Ertuğrul*, *Kuruluş Osman* and *Payitaht Abdülhamid*. Ongur (2015, p. 417) calls this “banal Ottomanism” as which Ongur (2015, p. 417) identifies as a “not a blatant but rather a ‘banal’ part of the current re-identification of Turkish society that includes various symbolic elements of Ottoman heritage in daily routines, printed and visual media, political discourse and public policies”. In this sense, it seems warranted to argue that the reinvention of glorious Ottoman past has been infused into the every sector and aspect of the Turkish society in the

recent years. Contributing to this argument, both *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* and *Seksenler* offer examples of romanticization and glorification of Ottoman past.

Embarking upon these, firstly, I will try to show the Neo-Ottoman tendencies in *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında* by referring to different examples. Then, I will continue with the examples from *Seksenler* to show that both of the series demonstrate a strong case in the issue. I will argue that a bridge is built in between the past and the present through the glorification and remembrance of Ottoman past. I will demonstrate that Ottoman Empire is evoked as ‘our’ ancestor together with praising the traditions, morality and achievements of it thus, creating an entangled reproduction.

Firstly, in *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*, there are numerous references to the common history of Turkish nation particularly mentioning the glory of Ottoman Empire. In the series, Ottoman Empire has been mentioned as the ‘golden age of Turkish nation’. Moreover, Necmettin Erbakan in the series gives a long speech in which he long for the loss and glory of Ottoman Empire by attributing to the reasons for the loss as that “*our* hearths has been deviated” indicating a deviation from the traditions and morality that the Ottoman Empire had. Fatih Sultan Mehmet is one of the primary reference points in the series in connecting present Turkish nation to a common Ottoman past. In this regard, Fatih Sultan Mehmet has been praised several times especially for conquest of İstanbul and mentioned as Hazreti Fatih in the series making him spiritually, religiously and nationally significant and unique at the same. With a more overt reproduction, during their protests, MTTB members shout as “We are the generation of Fatih!” (Biz Fatihlerin Nesliyiz) by directly linking Ottoman Empire to current Turkish nationhood. Abdülhamid II has been also praised by Asım specifically during a dispute between him and

Zafer Erbay. The context of this dispute is particularly worth mentioning. In the series, thanks to the network of MTTB, Asım gets a chance to present his project for nationally-produced armament to a minister yet, right before presentation, his drafts have been stolen. Furthermore, Zafer Erbay is both behind the theft and one of the listeners for Asım's presentation. After, Asım heroically gets his drafts back and dramatically arrives at the very last minute, Zafer Erbay tries very hard to undermine his presentation criticising anything and everything about his project. Getting furious and frustrated, Asım gives a long and hot speech about the potentialities of 'this nation' referring to the several projects of Abdülhamid and how others try to undermine him. In this regard, Asım's speech reproduces several aspects of Turkish nationalism. Firstly, the speech simply connects Turkish nation with one another through a claim to a common history and remembrance of this particular history as well. Secondly, this common history is particularly glorious Ottoman past thus, confirming the literature regarding Neo-Ottomanism. Thirdly, the example reproduces the narrative of "Turks have the potential but it has been inhibited by *others*" at the same time, through building a bridge between past and the present. Thus, the example implies that the present is the recurrence of the past. In other words, 'we' as a nation go through similar things today as 'we' had gone through in the past. Simply, his speech reminds the viewer of the common Ottoman past connecting them through an idea of shared history at a banal level and at the same time, because this past is not a random but an Ottoman one, it confirms the literature in terms of rising Neo-Ottomanism in current Turkish nationhood.

Seksenler similarly reproduces the claim of common history with reference to glorified and praised Ottoman past confirming the literature. In the series,

Ottoman past has been praised by touching upon various aspects of the empire. In the series, one of the episodes features a story line of decaying highly symbolic plane tree which is located right in the centre of the neighbourhood and the tree is displayed every episode. Regarding the decay of the tree, everyone in the neighbourhood try to come up with a solution and, some offer to cut down the tree. A character named Basri known for his wise words in the series uses the example of Ottoman Empire to emphasize the importance of the plane trees specifically. He mentions that Ottoman Empire had been planting plane trees everywhere it goes. Through this example, the series achieves a complex grid of reproduction. Firstly, it praises the Ottoman past in terms of valuing the environment. Secondly, it uses the Ottoman past as the good example to the present situation implying a moral ground. Thirdly, it implies a historical bridge between the Ottomans as ‘our’ ancestors and ‘us’ the Turks today claiming to follow ‘our’ ancestors’ actions. Thus, the example taps into the morality, shared history and Neo-Ottoman aspects of the reproduction of Turkish nationalism all at once offering a rich and interwoven reproduction.

In another nuanced example, the ‘tolerance narrative’ that Carlson and Kancı (2017) find in their study of Turkish textbooks is reproduced in the series. The example features a conversation between several residents in which they comment that the Muslims are being tortured in Bulgaria at the moment and they furiously argue that ‘they’ could not endure even for a hundred years after the Ottoman Empire collapsed, 600-years empire had done none of these types of things. In this example, Ottoman Empire has been glorified in terms of being tolerant and free from violence towards different groups of the society particularly implying attitude towards minorities. Furthermore, a distinction and

connection has been made at the same time through the example. The distinction lies down in the reproduction of the dichotomy of 'us' vs. 'them' by referring the Bulgarians as 'they' separating 'them' from 'us'.

More importantly, a connection is created by linking 'us' with the tortured people of the present and with the tolerant Ottomans of the past as well thus, building a bridge between two groups of population together with 'us' those who live in present Turkey. In another overt example, it is simply put that 'we' are the grandchildren of Hezarfen clearly linking the national 'we' today to a historical personality who is believed to be live in Ottoman Empire and known for his flying trial. By simply and overtly connecting Ottoman past to the present, the example clearly shows the Neo- Ottoman tendencies of the present.

The examples confirm the literature with regard to peculiar remembrance and recirculation of Ottoman past. As it has been dealt above, the examples range from just simply evoking Ottomans as 'our' ancestors to creating complex grid of reproduction binding morality, claim to a common history and Neo-Ottomanism together.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This study aimed at analysing and identifying how and when Turkishness is reproduced on the banal space of television by looking at two TRT series: *Seksenler* and *Sevda Kuşun Kanadında*. The analysis demonstrates that Turkishness is reproduced both in banal and hot forms and, banal and hot conjoined together as well. In this regard, it seems warranted to argue that the reproduction of Turkishness needs to be analysed contextually without presumption of hot or banal. While Turkishness is flagged through homeland deixis, the examples show that the flaggings are neither completely banal nor hot in the analysed television series. With a similar vein, analysed television series reproduce Turkishness in terms of differences in life-styles, cultural distinctiveness and stereotyping as expected by the literature yet, the reproduction demonstrates an infusion of hot and banal. Furthermore, the analysis underlines the importance of contextuality in the study of nationalism. In this regard, I argue that Turkishness is reproduced in terms of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dichotomy as the literature suggests yet, the identity of ‘them’ reflects the post-putsch context in Turkey with a heightened anti- American and anti-European sentiments within an atmosphere of paranoia and conspiracy. The analysed television series build a bridge between past and the present by reproducing the claim to a particular common national history reflecting the contextuality with

the appraisal of the Ottoman past. In this regard, I argue that the reproduction of Turkishness on television is in line with what the literature suggests in terms of topics yet, the social, political and economic contexts of the time and, the context of the specific flagging add different twists and elements to this reproduction process within the context of post-putsch era in Turkey in Turkish PBS. Thus, the study contributes to the literature of banal and everyday nationalism by presenting reproductions of hot and banal both separately and mixed together within post-putsch context in Turkey.

The literature has an extensive and long-running debate on the topic whether it is analytically useful to depend upon the distinction between the categories hot vs. banal nationalism as I have discussed in section 3.1.2 in a detailed manner.

According to the literature of nationalism, some argue that there is indeed two types of nationalism that can be separated from each other as Kešić and Duyvendak (2016) and, Feischmidt and Pulay (2017) have shown through the case studies on Dutch and Hungarian nationalism respectively. On the other hand, the studies by Jones and Merriman (2009), Paasi (2016), Christian, Dowler and Cuomo (2016), Nieswand (2012) and Maly (2016) have contested the analytical use of the dichotomy by offering a much more complex grid of relations between the two.

Moreover, specific to the Turkish case, Çırakman (2011) argues that hot and banal are infused together in Turkish nationalism. Through the study of two TRT television series, I offer a three-cornered fight in my thesis. I claim that under these specific scope conditions which have been established in my

research as post-putsch Turkey, it is possible to find examples supporting both of the views in the literature yet; neither of them is right completely on their own when the case is analysed within the specifics of contexts of the particular flagging. Thus, while making contribution to the hot vs. banal nationalism debate, the findings are specific to the context and two analysed television series particularly. Furthermore, the analysed series are broadcasted on Turkish PBS, TRT; in this sense, analysing series from private channels will be both fruitful and yield different findings. In this regard, my study compliments the studies on the banal nationalism by highlighting the attention to the both socio-political contexts of time and the contexts of the particular flagging.

The discussions within the study of nationalism and specifically banal nationalism are far from coming to a conclusion. This study contributes and enriches some of these discussions within the study of banal nationalism; mainly periphery vs. established nations debate, hot vs. banal debate and the validity of studying television as a space of reproduction of nationalities. This study analyses two selected television series with a wholistic approach. In other words, this study does not include a comparative analysis. In this regard, it seems fruitful to study television series in a more comparative approach to reveal the similarities and differences in the reproduction processes. A comparative study between television series from different type of channels (public vs. private) can shed light on whether there are any effects of type of ownership on the reproduction process. Moreover, the reproduction of nationalities are not a one-way street. The viewers are also a vital part of this reproduction. In this regard, studying the reception of television series can also reveal what the viewer makes of these reproductions. To understand the reception of the series, it is vital to be able to

see the reactions and meanings that audiences give towards a particular flagging. In this regard, it can be useful to watch the series together with the audiences. Furthermore, social media platforms can be fruitful to see the reactions of the audiences especially, if the platform offers anonymity. For instance, Twitter, as a social media platform, offers a place where audiences can share and discuss their thoughts and feelings anonymously without the fears of being judged. Thus, it presents an opportunity to collect data to study the reception of television series. These kinds of studies can enable researchers to reveal the different ways in which the reproductions of nationhood occur.

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