

To my loving parents,
Orhan and Gönül Özgediz



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SECURITY IN THE THIRD WORLD

by

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THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.




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ABSTRACT

This thesis traces the development of thinking about security in the Third World from its Cold War past to its post-Cold War present. For this purpose, it examines three main approaches (traditional, Third World and critical) to the study of security in the Third World. It begins with a critical overview of political realism-based traditional (Cold War) approaches to security which treated Third World security problems as a mere extension of the superpower rivalry and shows how this served to marginalize the security concerns of Third World states and peoples. Next, it examines the contributions of Third World security scholars whose studies challenged the reductionist understanding, Western-centric character and military-focus of traditional approaches by theorizing security. Thirdly, the thesis examines the criticisms directed at Third World approaches by the students of critical security. Drawing upon the works of critical security scholars, the thesis argues that security should be conceptualized in a way that perceives the state as a means of security and gives primacy to the security needs of individuals and social groups. It concludes by underlining the importance of recognizing specific historical, social and political conditions of different contexts while adopting a global perspective for the academic study of security in the Third World.

ÖZET

Bu tez, Soğuk Savaş döneminden günümüze Üçüncü Dünya'da güvenlik düşüncesinin gelişimini ele almaktadır. Bu amaçla, Üçüncü Dünya güvenliği konusunun çalışılmasında üç ana yaklaşımı (geleneksel, Üçüncü Dünya ve eleştirel) incelemektedir. Tez, siyasal realizm üzerine kurulu olan ve Üçüncü Dünya güvenlik sorunlarını süpergüç mücadelesinin yalnızca bir uzantısı olarak gören geleneksel (Soğuk Savaş) güvenlik yaklaşımlarına eleştirel bir genel bakışla başlamakta ve bu yaklaşımların Üçüncü Dünya devletlerinin ve insanların güvenlik sorunlarını nasıl marjinalize ettiğini göstermektedir. Ardından, geleneksel yaklaşımların indirgemeci anlayışını, Batı-merkezci yapısını ve askeri-odaklı karakterini sorgulayan Üçüncü Dünya güvenlik yaklaşımlarının katkılarını incelemektedir. Tez, üçüncü olarak, güvenliği eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla ele alan akademisyenler tarafından Üçüncü Dünya güvenlik yaklaşımlarına yöneltilen eleştirileri incelemektedir. Eleştirel güvenlik akademisyenlerinin çalışmalarına dayanarak tez, güvenlik olgusunun, devleti yalnızca bir araç olarak algılayarak bireylerin ve sosyal grupların güvenlik gereksinimlerine öncelik veren bir anlayışla kavramsallaştırılması gerektiğini ileri sürmektedir. Tez, duruma özgü tarihsel, sosyal ve siyasal koşullara duyarlı olan, ancak bunun yanısıra küresel bir perspektif benimseyen yaklaşımların Üçüncü Dünya'da güvenlik sorunun akademik olarak çalışılmasındaki öneminin altını çizerek sonuçlanmaktadır.

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INTRODUCTION

Clearly, the vast bulk of the Third World remains very much mired in history, and will be a terrain of conflict for many years to come. But let us focus for the time being on the larger and more developed states of the world who after all account for the greater part of world politics.¹

This thesis emerged out of a discontent with the stereotypical characterization of the Third World² as the ‘terrain of conflict’ without searching for the structures that underlie these visible manifestations. Conceptions of the Third World³ are mostly shaped by images of poverty, political violence, ethnic strife, domestic social conflicts, civil wars and ensuing humanitarian disasters. Third World regions are represented as areas of chaos and turmoil, and are portrayed as trouble-spots of world politics. These representations, generally organized around elements of ‘deficiency,’⁴ continuously refer to ‘absences’ of Third World histories and ‘failures’ of Third World states to replicate the Western experience.⁵ While Third World peoples and

¹ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest 16 (1989) 15.

² ‘Third World’ is an umbrella term used to depict a group of more than 120 states that are geographically located in Africa, Asia and Latin America. These states share a number of common features in the economic, political and social arena (such as colonial background, acute problems of political and economic development, a peripheral role in world politics) which distinguish them from the states in Europe and North America. Among these shared characteristics, endemic and chronic insecurity appears as a significant defining characteristic of Third World states. Evidence show that the overwhelming majority of the world’s conflicts since 1945 took place within the Third World. Yet, security problems of the Third World are paid limited attention, or, attached importance only within the context of the risks (e.g. dangers of spill-over and diffusion) they pose to the security of the rest of the world, mostly to that of the major powers in the international system.

³ Alternative terms (e.g. ‘developing states/world’, ‘periphery’, ‘South’) are also used in the literature to refer to the same group of states. Due to the general usage of the ‘Third World’ in Security Studies literature, this thesis prefers using this term to indicate this category of states. On the other hand, ‘First World,’ ‘Developed World’ and ‘North’ are used interchangeably to refer the developed states of the West. Discussions on these terms will be examined in Chapter III.

⁴ Pinar Bilgin and David Adam Morton, “Historicizing Representations of ‘Failed States’: Beyond the Cold War Annexation of the Social Sciences?” Third World Quarterly 23:1 (2002) 55-80.

⁵ Steve Niva, “Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East,” in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger, eds. Jutta Weldes et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 147-172; Mark Berger, “The End of the ‘Third World’?” Third World Quarterly 15:2 (1994) 257-275.

their practices are relegated to marginal status, Third World insecurities are constantly essentialized.⁶

This thesis is based on the idea that there is a need for a better understanding of the problems confronting Third World states and peoples if we want to answer the question 'how can security be achieved in the Third World?'. For this purpose, it examines the ways in which Third World security is studied in International Relations (IR) literature.⁷ It focuses on the issue of how the Third World, which is so closely associated with conflict and insecurity, is handled from the 'security' side of IR—its sub-field Security Studies. To this end, this thesis looks at three main approaches to the study of security in the Third World, namely traditional, Third World, and critical approaches. The aim is to see how they conceptualize Third World security. Since every theoretical approach is the product of a certain context and reflects certain interests and purposes, this study also explores the contexts within which these conceptualizations and understandings have been developed and looks into the underpinning interests and purposes. Drawing upon the understanding that recognizes the power of theory in shaping practice, it investigates the implications of these conceptualizations to the practice of security in the Third World.

Traditional approaches refer to established ways of thinking about security that dominated the sub-field of Security Studies during the Cold War.⁸ From the

⁶ Bradley S. Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 13-38.

⁷ 'International Relations' refers to the academic study of 'international relations'. Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997) 3-10.

⁸ The label 'Traditional Security Studies' is used to indicate the sub-field of Security Studies during the Cold War period. However, it is important to note that there was a serious body of non-traditional literature before the end of the Cold War, as modes of traditional security thinking still remain today. Steve Smith, "The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years," *Contemporary Security Policy* 20:3 (1990) 72-101; Bilgin and Morton, "Historizing Representations," 67; Pinar Bilgin, Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, "Security Studies: The Next Stage?," *Nação e Defesa* 84:2 (1998) 141.

perspective of traditional approaches to security, Third World states were usually viewed as 'bit-players' in the larger drama of world politics—weak members which did not possess the capabilities needed to affect the structure of the international system.⁹ When attention was paid to the Third World, the general tendency was to reduce the consideration of Third World security issues to their impact on the strategic balance between the East and West, and define them in terms of the security priorities of the First World.¹⁰ Security concerns of Third World states and peoples were left largely unexamined by scholars working within this framework.

Third World approaches to security emerged during the Cold War as a reaction to traditional approaches' neglect of the Third World. Third World security scholars expressed the need to 'see' the Third World and explicitly adopted the perspective of Third World states. Their work highlighted the point that Third World states are different from those in the developed world, therefore, security issues in the Third World need different treatment. In other words, due to its different characteristics, the Third World requires a different type of theorizing. Consequently, these studies provided different explanations for the security problematique of Third World states and offered different answers to the question of how the security condition of the Third World could be improved.¹¹ However, besides its significant

⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979) 199-204.

¹⁰ For example, see Steven David, "Why the Third World Matters," International Security 14:1 (1989) 50-85; "Why the Third World Still Matters," International Security 17:3 (1992/93) 127-159; Robert S. Litwak and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., eds., Superpower Competition and Security in the Third World (Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1988).

¹¹ Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder and London: Westview, 1985); Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon eds., National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats (Hampshire: Edward Elgar, 1988); Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995); Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble eds., The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World (London: Macmillan, 1993); Yezid Sayigh, "Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries," Adelphi Papers 251 (1990); Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987).

contributions to the study of Third World security in IR, the perspective provided by Third World approaches remained weak and inadequate in some other aspects.

These weaknesses and inadequacies have been pointed out by critical approaches to security. The academic study of international relations has been marked by lively theoretical debates and stimulating discussions generated by scholars from a variety of critical perspectives in the post-Cold War era. They challenged the ontological and epistemological foundations of International Relations, asked novel questions and addressed a range of issues that were previously neglected. Analysts from differing theoretical backgrounds subjected the theory and practice of security to serious rethinking.¹² Besides problematizing traditional accounts of security, they also subjected the works of Third World security scholars to careful scrutiny.¹³ Their studies offered alternative ways of approaching the question of Third World security and propounded a broader intellectual terrain for discussing both constraints and possibilities for security in the Third World.¹⁴

¹² For example, see David Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," Review of International Studies 23:1 (1997) 117-141; Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, "Security Studies: The Next Stage?" 131-157; Ken Booth ed., New Thinking About Strategy and International Security (London: Harper Collins, 1991); Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Keith Krause and Michael Williams eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Ronnie D. Lipschutz ed., On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Nana Poku and David T. Graham eds., Redefining Security: Population Movements and National Security (Westport and London: Praeger, 1998); J. Ann Tickner, "Re-visioning Security," in International Relations Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995) 175-197; Richard Wyn Jones, "'Travel Without Maps': Thinking About Security After the Cold War," in Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Jane Davis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1995) 196-218.

¹³ Michael Barnett, "Radical Chic? Subaltern Realism: A Rejoinder," International Studies Review 4:3 (2002) 49-62; Pinar Bilgin, "Beyond Statism in Security Studies? Human Agency and Security in the Middle East," The Review of International Affairs 28:1 (2002) 100-118; Ken Booth, review of The Third World Security Predicament, by Mohammed Ayoob in Australian Journal of Political Science 30:3 (1995) 603-604; Keith Krause, "Theorizing Security, State Formation and the 'Third World' in the Post-Cold War World," Review of International Studies 24 (1998) 125-136.

¹⁴ For example, Pinar Bilgin, "Alternative Futures for the Middle East," Futures 33 (2001) 423-436; Bilgin and Morton, "Historizing Representations," 68-75; Ken Booth, "A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations," Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper, February 1994; Ken Booth and Peter Vale, "Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Southern Africa," in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) 329-358; Larry Swatuk and Peter Vale, "Why Democracy is not Enough: Southern Africa and Human Security in the Twenty-

The structure of the thesis reflects this division in the literature; it is divided into three chapters. Chapter I explores how Third World was studied by traditional approaches. It provides a critical overview of traditional approaches to security in the Third World and points to their major shortcomings. It examines the epistemological and ontological foundations of traditional security thinking which was dominated by the outlook of political realism and its variant neo-realism, and analyzes its core concepts. The aim is to demonstrate how the dominant assumptions of the era served to marginalize the indigenous security needs and interests of Third World states and peoples from the field of study.

Chapter II focuses on Third World approaches to security and presents their contributions to the study of Third World security. For this purpose, it provides a comprehensive literature review of prominent Third World security scholars. It points to the conceptual limitations and empirical deficiencies of the realist paradigm as expressed by these scholars, and examines the alternative conceptual tools that were developed in these works to better reflect and study the security predicament of the Third World.

The purpose of Chapter III is to highlight the issues on which Third World approaches remained inadequate and to raise the points that the conceptual lenses adopted by those scholars were not equipped to see. It addresses the major weaknesses of Third World approaches through an examination of the criticisms directed at the works of Third World security scholars. It also provides alternative understandings of Third World security that are presented by critics.¹⁵

First Century," *Alternatives* 24 (1999) 361-389; Eli Stamnes and Richard Wyn Jones, "Burundi: A Critical Security Perspective," *Peace and Conflict Studies* 7:2 (2000) 37-56.

¹⁵ Critical approaches to security encompass a range of perspectives that are critical of the ways security has been conceptualized by traditional Security Studies. While these perspectives are distinguished by their epistemological and ontological foundations that are radically different from those of traditional approaches, there are considerable differences within this broad approach. A

The overall aim of the thesis is to show how thinking about Third World security has developed in IR. It argues that the study of security in the Third World has come a long way since Security Studies first emerged, and is still in the process of evolution. The point it has reached now is promising. Works of critical scholars herald an emerging approach to security which privileges historical particularity while embracing a global perspective. This approach could pave the ground for new ways of thinking about and acting for security that the Third World needs in order to remove the structural causes of insecurities. To examine the contemporary history of Third World security thinking has a crucial importance, because “it is only by looking at the human past, and rethinking it, that we can fully appreciate the potentiality for human becoming, rather than merely human being.”¹⁶ A sound knowledge of the literature is considered as a good starting point for further studies which could produce new ideas regarding the subject. The strength of new ideas lies in their potential to be turned into more secure futures through opening up space for alternative practices that can establish the conditions for genuine security in the Third World.

detailed analysis of critical approaches is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, the thesis aims to benefit from their alternative conceptualizations of security in general and to make use of their ideas on Third World security in particular.

¹⁶ Ken Booth, “Three Tyrannies,” in *Human Rights in Global Politics*, eds. Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 60.

CHAPTER I: TRADITIONAL SECURITY THINKING AND TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO THIRD WORLD SECURITY

1.1 Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to analyze the study of Third World security in traditional Security Studies. It begins by laying out the conceptual foundations of traditional security thinking. It provides a critical examination of the main assumptions, core arguments and central concepts that are introduced by realism (and its variant neo-realism), which was the dominant theoretical framework of the Cold War era. It also discusses the relationship between security theories and practices during the Cold War. The aim, here, is develop an understanding of the effects of this relationship on traditional Third World security analyses.

The second section examines the basic features of traditional approaches to Third World security. It tries to demonstrate the deficiencies of traditional approaches in grasping local security dynamics in the Third World and providing an account of the regional political context of Third World security problems. It also examines Cold War superpower practices regarding the Third World, and purports to show how the assumptions and findings of traditional Security Studies provided the background for and helped to legitimize these practices.

1.2 Traditional Security Thinking and Cold War Politics

Security Studies flourished in the Anglo-American world in the aftermath of the Second World War as an academic sub-field of International Relations. Security was studied under the title “National Security Studies” in the United States and “Strategic

Studies” in Britain and the subject was almost exclusively concerned with superpower rivalry and its nuclear manifestations.¹⁷ There was a symbiotic relationship between Security Studies and the Cold War.¹⁸ Having focused on the security of states and military stability, the field was in many ways a direct product of the Cold War. In other words, “it was the perceived exigencies of Cold War competition that encouraged Security Studies to flourish in Western academia and research institutes.”¹⁹ While “the academic field...thrived upon the Cold War environment;...the concepts, assumptions and findings of Cold War security studies helped sustain the Cold War.”²⁰

Traditional security thinking has been associated with the intellectual hegemony of (political) realism and its variant neo-realism, and dominated the field for half a century.²¹ Despite the differences that have divided traditional Security Studies into rival camps, the works of the participants in these debates share broadly similar ontological and epistemological assumptions.²² Epistemologically, they all share a similar conception of what constitutes knowledge about the world with which they are trying to engage. All the arguments have been premised on a *scientific objectivist* understanding of knowledge.

This epistemology aims to describe the world “as it is”, claims to distinguish sharply between fact and value and between subject and object, and seeks objective knowledge of the world, untainted by the analyst’s own standpoint and predilections.²³

Four interrelated assumptions underlie positivism: The first is that there is an objective truth that can be discovered. Secondly, the means of discovering that truth is reason and there is only one correct form of reasoning. According to the third

¹⁷ Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, “Security Studies: The Next Stage?,” 133-135

¹⁸ Pinar Bilgin, “Security Studies: Theory/Practice,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 12:2 (1999) 34.

¹⁹ Stamnes and Wyn Jones, “Burundi,” 38.

²⁰ Bilgin, “Security Studies: Theory/Practice,” 35.

²¹ Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” Review of International Studies 17 (1991) 318.

assumption, the tool of reasoning is empiricism and it enables the analyst to test propositions. Finally, there is assumed to be a distinction between observer and observed.²⁴

Methodologically, the model of the natural sciences exists as a regulative norm to be approximated. The intent, here, is to set aside one's own subjective bias and values and to confront the world on its own terms with the hope of gaining mastery of that world through a clear understanding that transcends the limits of personal determinants.²⁵ The rationalist basis of the scientific method in disciplinary terms coincided with the rationalism of post-war Western society, particularly in its emphasis on science as the potential solution to all problems.²⁶ This epistemological choice is based on the possibility of finding timeless and objective causal laws that govern human phenomena.²⁷ Kenneth Waltz, the key figure of neo-realism, argues that "theories explain laws" and that "the urge to explain is not born of idle curiosity alone, [i]t is produced also by the desire to control, or at least to know if control is possible."²⁸ This conception of theory advanced by Waltz borrows its epistemology from natural sciences, makes a radical separation between subject and object, facts and values.²⁹ Then it proceeds to identify the objective laws of international relations

²² Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999) 95.

²³ Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, 100.

²⁴ Terry Teriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James and Patrick M. Morgan, Security Studies Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) 100.

²⁵ Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order, 16.

²⁶ Wayne S. Cox and Claire Turenne Sjolander, "Critical Reflections on International Relations," in Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations, eds. Claire Turenne Sjolander and Wayne Cox (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 2.

²⁷ Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies" in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) 37.

²⁸ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 6.

²⁹ Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory," in Theories of International Relations, eds. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (London: Macmillan, 1996) 149.

by uncovering regularities in human behaviour³⁰ while excluding subjective and intersubjective phenomena such as behaviour motivated by norms and values.³¹

Robert Cox makes a distinction between 'problem-solving' and 'critical' theories according to the purpose they serve. For Cox, neorealism is the typical example of 'problem-solving theory' which "takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action."³² Its general aim is to make the existing order "work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble."³³ On the other hand, 'critical theory'

stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing.³⁴

The post-positivist turn in international theory provides a critique of traditional thinking. In contrast to the conception of neo-realism that takes material reality as given, critical theory³⁵ sees the social world as a construction of time and space and views theory as always situated in a particular time and place. Since world politics is constructed rather than discovered, there is no fundamental distinction between subject (the analyst) and object (the focus of analysis).

For critical theorists, knowledge is always biased because it is produced from the social perspective of the analyst. Andrew Linklater argues that all social analysts reflect upon the cognitive interests and normative assumptions which underpin their

³⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," *Journal of International Affairs* 44:1 (1990) 26.

³¹ Markus Fisher, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," *International Organization* 46:2 (1992) 429.

³² Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10:2 (1981) 128.

³³ Cox, "Social Forces, State and World Orders," 129.

³⁴ Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders," 129.

³⁵ 'Critical theory' refers broadly to post-positivist approaches to international relations.

research.³⁶ In contrast to the traditional Security Studies conception of theory as an explanatory tool, critics suggest that theories help organize knowledge which, in turn, enables, privileges, or legitimizes certain practices whilst inhibiting or marginalizing others.³⁷ For critical theory, the world is not something external to our theories, but our theories actually help construct the world. To put it another way, theory is not external to the things it is trying to explain. By contrast, the very concepts we use to think about the world and the language through which we use to transmit our thoughts help to make the world what it is.³⁸ In this sense, theory is taken to be constitutive rather than merely explanatory.³⁹

When theory is viewed as constitutive of reality, the distinction between theory and practice dissolves. In other words, “theory is regarded as a form of practice, and practice is seen as always being informed, whether consciously or not, by theory.”⁴⁰ This dialectical relationship between theory and practice indicates that theorising is an inherently political activity.⁴¹ According to Steve Smith,

Theories do not simply explain and predict, they tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention; they define not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and practical horizons.⁴²

Realism underestimates the role of the theorist in shaping the practice and the power of theory in constituting the reality. However, as Barry Buzan maintains, where realists see themselves as rationally pursuing the goal of studying ‘what is’, they are, in fact, an active part of the process they describe. It means that, far from being

³⁶ Andrew Linklater, “The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point of View,” *Millennium* 21:1 (1992) 91.

³⁷ Bilgin, “Security Studies: Theory/Practice,” 33.

³⁸ Steve Smith, “Reflectivist and Constructivist Approaches to International Theory,” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 226-227.

³⁹ Scott Burchill, “Introduction,” in *Theories of International Relations*, eds. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (London: Macmillan, 1996) 13-15.

⁴⁰ Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, “Security Studies: The Next Stage?,” 153.

⁴¹ Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, “Security Studies: The Next Stage?,” 153.

objective observers, realists in general, and the practitioners of strategic studies in particular, help to legitimize and reproduce the structures and relations they talk about.⁴³ Pinar Bilgin argues that “this objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship resulted in an essentially normative theory of security studies masquerading as an ‘objective’ approach to human phenomena” and glossed over the constitutive relationship between strategic theorizing and Cold War political and security practices.⁴⁴

Traditional security thinking is also status-quo oriented. Cox argues that problem-solving theory, despite its claims to value-neutrality, is “value-bound by virtue of the fact that it implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own framework.”⁴⁵ Therefore, where traditional security scholars see themselves as describing the world ‘as it is’, in fact, they make a choice in favor of reifying the prevailing status-quo.⁴⁶

Ontologically, those who have adopted the traditional security thinking share a similar view of the world they are trying to account for. According to this view which is dominated by the outlook of realism, the meaning of security is subsumed under the rubric of *power*—simply the combined capability of a state⁴⁷—and is synonymous with the security of the state against external dangers, which is to be achieved by increasing military capabilities.⁴⁸ While ‘power’ is focused on as a key variable in accounting for political behaviour and is central in the development of international relations, states are considered as the key actors in the realist world

⁴² Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond,” in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 13.

⁴³ Barry Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?” in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 53-54.

⁴⁴ Bilgin, “Security Studies: *Theory/Practice*,” 34.

⁴⁵ Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 130.

⁴⁶ Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, 149, 165.

⁴⁷ Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” 36.

because they are assumed to represent the greatest concentrations of power, especially in having the greatest capacity to use military force.⁴⁹

In searching for the sources of continuities and regularities, particularly at the international level, classical realists such as Morgenthau tend to emphasize the permanence of human nature as reflected in the political construction of states.⁵⁰ On the other hand, to explain the uniform behaviour of different nation-states and the constancy of international political life across centuries, neorealists focus on the system level and find the continuities in the anarchic structure of the international system.⁵¹ In neo-realist theory, international structure emerges from the interaction of states and then prevents them from taking certain actions while propelling them toward others.⁵² Waltz distinguishes the structure of the international system from the structure of domestic political systems according to three criteria: the ordering principle of the system, the character of the units and the distribution of capabilities across the units. In contrast to the domestic political systems where the ordering principle is hierarchy, the international system is decentralized and anarchic, which implies that there is no overriding authority or government to discipline the interaction of independent sovereign states.⁵³ Thus, a sharp boundary is drawn between domestic order and international anarchy. This construction of the inside/outside separation by realism practically defines the discipline of International Relations.⁵⁴ Change is expected in the form of development and progress inside the state where time is a meaningful measure, whereas the anarchic structure of the

⁴⁸ Tickner, "Re-visioning Security," 176.

⁴⁹ Teriff et al., Security Studies Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) 30, 39.

⁵⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985) 4.

⁵¹ Buzan, "The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?" 50-51.

⁵² Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," 29.

⁵³ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 93-97.

⁵⁴ R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

outside is assumed to “reproduce itself endlessly so that there is no progress, and time does not signify change.”⁵⁵

The assumption that relations between states are necessarily driven by a logic of anarchical competition justifies a second assumption that security can be provided only within states.⁵⁶ The state, accordingly becomes the primary locus of security, authority and obligation.⁵⁷ This leads to the state-centric conceptualization of security where the state is both the primary referent (who is to be secured) and the agent (the provider of security).⁵⁸ Nevertheless, this state-centric approach helps reinforce ‘statism’ which is defined as “the concentration of all loyalty and decision-making power at the level of the sovereign state.”⁵⁹ Different from state-centricism, statism involves a normative claim that in political terms, states should be accorded a high value in themselves.⁶⁰ The state is taken for granted as a unified, relatively homogenous and peaceful community. The security of the state is regarded as synonymous with the security of its inhabitants and a normative justification for focusing on the state as the referent object of security discourse emerges depending on the claim that states are the agents which provide citizens with security at the domestic level.⁶¹ While the security of the citizens is identified with and guaranteed by that of the state, those who stand outside it represent potential or actual threats.⁶²

For neorealism, states are the units whose interactions form the structure of the international system. Even though they vary in size, wealth, power and form and

⁵⁵ Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?,” 53.

⁵⁶ R. B. J. Walker, One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988) 118-119.

⁵⁷ Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,” Mershon International Studies Review 40:2 (1996) 232.

⁵⁸ Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 102.

⁵⁹ Ken Booth, “Cold Wars of the Mind,” Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond, ed. Ken Booth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 52.

⁶⁰ Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, 95.

⁶¹ Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, 98-99.

⁶² Krause and Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies,” 232.

differ vastly in their capabilities, they are characterized in neorealism by sameness, or by being 'like' units.⁶³ All states in the international system are made functionally similar by the constraints of structure.⁶⁴ In the anarchic realm, all states are required to pursue security for their survival before they can perform any other function.⁶⁵ Following this top-down approach, the analyst who adopts a traditionalist outlook does not need to know much about the domestic politics within a state in order to understand that state's international political behaviour. One does not need to worry about what goes on inside the units of the system because the units are bound to conform to the demands of the system.⁶⁶ The need to 'open the box' is neglected and the state, particularly its internal dynamics and the pattern of state-society relations, is black-boxed.⁶⁷ As one author summarizes the realist argument, "a state (any state) will behave in certain statelike ways no matter what its internal composition because of constraining influence of international anarchy."⁶⁸ Since there is no higher authority to resort to when resolving conflicts, the international system is characterized by *self-help* in which states ultimately can only rely on their own efforts to keep safe.⁶⁹

The self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening. This is called 'the security dilemma'.⁷⁰ The effort to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the

⁶³ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 95-97.

⁶⁴ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 93.

⁶⁵ Scott Burchill, "Realism and Neo-realism," in Theories of International Relations, Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater eds. (London: Macmillan, 1996) 87.

⁶⁶ Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990) 96.

⁶⁷ Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble, "The Analysis of National Security in the Arab Context: Restating the State of the Art," in The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World, Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble and Rex Brynen eds. (London: Macmillan, 1993) 10.

⁶⁸ Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, 96-98.

⁶⁹ Teriff et al., Security Studies Today, 32.

power of the others renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. It results in the vicious circle of search for security and power accumulation. Simon Dalby summarizes the traditional notions of a security dilemma as follows:

The traditional notions of a security dilemma refer to the observation that military preparations in one state, made in the name of providing for protection of a population, often have the unintended consequence of alarming policy makers in other states. Increased power in one state makes other state policy makers react by taking military and political actions to protect their state against the possibilities of military threat from the first state. Thus, unilateral action stimulates unintended consequences that aggravate rather than improve the situation.⁷¹

According to Buzan, the security dilemma provides an essential link between realism and strategic studies.⁷² Realism emphasizes the competitive and conflictual side of international relations, because relations between states are assumed to be insecurity-driven, and because the anarchic structure is supposed to provide few constraints on states pursuing power to the best of their ability. This is directly reflected in the security dilemma. Based on a zero-sum notion of security (in the sense that states are viewed as competing with one another for security and more security for one actor means less for another⁷³), security is seen as essentially deriving from military strength.⁷⁴ States' mistrust of each other is expected to result in an action-reaction cycle that may lead to destabilizing arms races and a decrease in the overall security of the system. The mechanism known as the 'balance of power' is emphasized as the primary means of minimizing conflict and war by realists⁷⁵, and seen as crucial for

⁷⁰ John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2:2 (1950) 157.

⁷¹ Simon Dalby, "Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse," in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) 12.

⁷² Buzan, "The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?," 51.

⁷³ Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," 22.

⁷⁴ Ken Booth, "Introduction The Interregnum: World Politics in Transition," in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, ed. Ken Booth (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991) 16.

⁷⁵ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 116-128, 163-170.

the operation of the international system.⁷⁶ The workings of this mechanism, whereby states act so as to prevent any one state dominating⁷⁷, permit at least some degree of stability and peace. Hence, stability is attributed to the balance of power.⁷⁸

Bradley Klein argues that the classical realist concern for power politics in securing the state is transformed into what he calls 'strategic violence'. This transformation is necessary to secure one's own survival against the threats posed by all other states and is embedded into a structure of global relations—namely the security dilemma—preparing the ground for the concept of anarchy to become the definitive characteristic of International Relations.⁷⁹ At this point, security policy acquires a very special character. It becomes the site at which "democracy, openness, and legitimate authority must dissolve into claims about realpolitik, raison d'état, and the necessity of violence."⁸⁰

The legitimacy of state power is claimed to derive from the state's capacity to bring order to the conflict that results from the insecurities of competitive self-interested behaviour. Security is, then, associated with a particular form of politics and defined as 'national security'. National security is based on the premise that security is a matter of the defense of the citizens of a sovereign territory.⁸¹ Based on this statist outlook, the idea and practice of national security is concerned with the safety of particular political communities that are sovereign states, and postulates

⁷⁶ Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, 97; John Baylis and N.J.Rengger, "Introduction: Theories, Methods and Dilemmas in World Politics," in Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, eds. John Baylis and N.J.Rengger (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992) 9-10.

⁷⁷ Steve Smith and John Baylis, "Introduction," in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 4.

⁷⁸ Michael Nicholson, International Relations: A Concise Introduction (New York: New York University Press, 1998) 93.

⁷⁹ Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order, 19-20.

⁸⁰ R.B.J. Walker, "Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics," Alternatives 15 (1990) 11-12.

⁸¹ Walker, One World, Many Worlds, 118-125.

states as moral communities worth preserving in their own right.⁸² It arises from the supposed demands of the security dilemma in the states system and becomes the boundary between inside and outside, order and chaos, and community and anarchy. Moreover, defined as national security, security becomes the preserve of *state elites*. Security is often identified with the interests of states elites and governments rather than with society as a whole.⁸³ Hence, equating security exclusively with the security of the state and the use of the language of national security cloaks the interests of sectional groups.⁸⁴

The assumptions about the nature of the international system and the security-seeking behaviour of states fit the grim mood and temper of international politics in the Cold War era. Realist thinking was absorbed by strategic thinkers⁸⁵ and the ideology of the Cold War corresponded with that of realism⁸⁶. Drawing on the neorealist assumption that the crucial factor in the international system is the distribution of power among units, which is defined by the number of poles or great powers,⁸⁷ international security was equated with the strategic relationship between the great powers. The escalation of the arms race between the US and the Soviet Union was characterized as a classic case of the security dilemma and tight bipolarity was considered to have produced a balance which was assumed to assure a considerable measure of security.⁸⁸ The meaning of security was further cemented into a statist and military framework.

⁸² William Bain, "The Tyranny of Benevolence: National Security, Human Security, and the Practice of Statecraft," *Global Society* 15:3 (2001) 277-278.

⁸³ Walker, *One World, Many Worlds*, 119, 124.

⁸⁴ Booth and Vale, "Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity," 335.

⁸⁵ John Garnett, "Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions," in *Contemporary Strategy* 2nd ed., Vol.1, eds. John Baylis et al. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987) 11.

⁸⁶ Robert Cox argues that neorealism, which he calls 'the new American realism', is the ideological form abstracted from the real historical framework imposed by the Cold War. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders," 131.

⁸⁷ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 97-99.

⁸⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus* 93 (1964) 881-909.

Adopting a realist worldview and heavily dominated by US strategic thinking about nuclear weapons and the security problems of the US and its NATO allies, the field of national security was based on the assumption that, since nuclear wars were too dangerous to fight, security was synonymous with nuclear deterrence and nuclear power-balancing.⁸⁹

While security was equated with order and maintenance of international boundaries, strategic studies was systematically biased both towards narrowly military conceptions of security and the perceptions and policies of the status quo powers.⁹⁰ The field was entirely taken up with questions of military balance and the relations between conventional and nuclear weaponry.⁹¹ The literature was concerned with military aspects of nation-state goals, alliance-building processes, independence and sovereignty of states, conflict spots in the world arena and problems of system maintenance. Essential issues such as the physical and psychological quality of life, social equality and justice, democratization, development and human rights were either excluded from the agenda or attached less importance and were referred to as 'low politics'. The state apparatus was provided superiority over society and instead of examining deep structural conditions, the focus was kept on overt evidence of power or insecurity.⁹²

As the field identified itself more with power, with the modern state and with the management of great power relations, it converted to a narrower, more technocratic enterprise where highly technical modes of study based on abstract formulations—such as game theory and systems analysis—have come to predominate.⁹³ Although the field “armored against critical reflection,”⁹⁴ strategic

⁸⁹ Tickner, “Re-visioning Security,” 177.

⁹⁰ Barry Buzan, “‘Change and Insecurity’ Reconsidered,” Contemporary Security Policy 20:3 (1999) 1.

⁹¹ Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order, 1.

⁹² Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, 18-19, 33-34.

⁹³ Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order, 27.

⁹⁴ Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order, 27.

thinking was not without its critics even during the Cold War period.⁹⁵ Hedley Bull criticized the strategists for leaving morality out of account, taking for granted the existence of military force and confining themselves to considering how to exploit it. For Bull, the assumptions of the strategists were inclined to oversimplify and distort political reality, and not to allow for change. In the name of being objective, the strategists were acting as “collaborators in the system and were speeding its movement toward catastrophe.”⁹⁶

Strategic ideas and policies were designed to deal with a bipolar world of the two superpowers within a hostile relationship.⁹⁷ However, as Ken Booth maintains, this was a confrontation between nations or states that ceased to be simply a matter of a political clash of interests but instead took on the character of a political culture which he calls ‘the Cold War of the mind’.⁹⁸ For Mary Kaldor, the East-West conflict in the post-war political order was an ‘imaginary war’ through which the two social systems—namely Atlanticism and Stalinism—were consolidated and reproduced.⁹⁹ Borrowing from Foucault’s terminology, Kaldor presents this imaginary war as “a discourse which expresses and legitimizes power relationships in modern society.”¹⁰⁰ As Hugh Gusterson points out:

The dominant discourse in security studies embodied a ‘Cold War narrative’ in which drama and meaning derived from an unending, but constantly shifting, clash between two global empires, and from the repeated introduction of new technological possibilities and threats into the story line.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ Stamnes and Wyn Jones, “Burundi,” 38.

⁹⁶ See Hedley Bull, “Strategic Studies and Its Critics,” *World Politics* 20:4 (1968) 593-605.

⁹⁷ Garnett, “Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions,” 15.

⁹⁸ Booth, “Cold Wars of the Mind,” 31.

⁹⁹ Mary Kaldor, *The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) 112-115.

¹⁰⁰ Kaldor, *The Imaginary War*, 4.

¹⁰¹ Hugh Gusterson, “Missing the End of the Cold War in International Security,” in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, eds. Weldes et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 327.

The very usage of notions of order, stability, deterrence and balance of power served to reproduce and reify the structure of the international system which the powerful found congenial. In Booth's words, "Strategic theory helped to constitute the strategic world, and then strategic studies helped to explain it—self-reverentially and tautologically."¹⁰² Since realism has set the terminological agenda within International Relations, alternative and dissenting discourses have been effectively occluded and marginalized.¹⁰³

1.3 Traditional Approaches to Third World Security

During the Cold War, the majority of the work produced by analysts in Security Studies concerned issues of deterrence and security pertaining to the superpowers and their allies, namely NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Third World security issues acquired relevance only insofar as they could be slotted into the overall pattern of major power geopolitical global conflict.¹⁰⁴ Traditional Security Studies distinguished the 'central strategic balance' from 'regional conflict and regional security'. The former focused on superpower nuclear deterrence and their European allies while the latter involved conflict and conflict management issues arising primarily in the Third World. Problems of regional instability in the Third World were given attention to the extent that they had the potential to affect the superpower relationship.¹⁰⁵ In doing this, the general tendency was to address the fundamental

¹⁰² Ken Booth, "Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist," in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) 96.

¹⁰³ Burchill, "Realism and Neo-realism," 83; Andrew Linklater, "Neo-realism in Theory and Practice," in International Relations Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity, 1995) 256.

¹⁰⁴ Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order, 13; Stephanie G. Neuman, "International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?," in International Relations and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (London: Macmillan, 1998) 1.

¹⁰⁵ Amitav Acharya, "The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies," in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) 300.

security problems of Third World states within an intellectual framework that was shaped by dominant paradigms of International Relations based mostly on the realist conception of security. The conceptual framework that was applied to developed states was transposed to the Third World. In other words, security problems of the Third World were either “reduced...to an analysis of their impact on the strategic balance between East and West”¹⁰⁶, or tended to be “explained with theoretical models that derived from the international relations of the West.”¹⁰⁷ The worst case was, as Michael Barnett states, that the Third World was ignored altogether.¹⁰⁸

While the Third World was incorporated into Security Studies from the point of view of major powers and advanced states, the underlying purpose of traditional approaches was to preserve the status quo.¹⁰⁹ In Buzan’s words, “being essentially a theory of Great Power politics, neorealism did not have much time for the weaker players in the system.”¹¹⁰ According to Waltz, the structure of international politics is defined in terms of major powers.¹¹¹ Stability means the capacity of a system to maintain itself and systemic instability can only result from major power wars.¹¹² The weaker members of the system, such as the Third World countries, do not possess the capabilities needed to affect the system structure.¹¹³

¹⁰⁶ Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, “Security Studies: The Next Stage?,” 139.

¹⁰⁷ Michael Barnett, “Radical Chic?” 49.

¹⁰⁸ Barnett, “Radical Chic?” 49.

¹⁰⁹ Steve Smith, “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies,” 82; Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 165.

¹¹⁰ Barry Buzan, “Conclusions: System versus Units in Theorizing about the Third World,” in International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (London: Macmillan, 1998) 214.

¹¹¹ Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” 29.

¹¹² Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 161-163, 199-204.

¹¹³ According to Lloyd Pettiford, the Third World became a consideration within Strategic Studies in the context of its attempts to acquire nuclear weapons based on the concern that certain Third World states would try to throw their weight around in this way and the growing power and influence of these states would require a re-examination of prevailing assumptions about their role and impact on global security. L. Pettiford, “Changing Conceptions of Security in the Third World,” Third World Quarterly 17:2 (1996) 292.

As Buzan maintains, it was this logic that excluded the Third World from neorealist theory.¹¹⁴ Accordingly, the traditional literature concerned itself with questions of superpower objectives in the Third World and the compatibility of American and Soviet security interests in various Third World regions. Instruments and obstacles in managing and regulating the superpower competition, zones of influence, possible sources of superpower confrontation, development of codes of conduct in regional conflicts and superpower crisis prevention systems became the main foci of these studies.¹¹⁵ The main concern was that the superpowers might be drawn into regional conflicts in support of local clients through inadvertent escalation or policy miscalculation and this confrontation might have led to a nuclear war.¹¹⁶

During the Cold War, the vast majority of the world's conflicts occurred in the Third World. According to Amitav Acharya, the 'permissibility' of Third World conflicts was an important feature of the Cold War order. He maintains that the fear of the escalation potential of any East-West confrontation prevented even the most minor form of warfare between the two blocs in Europe.¹¹⁷ On the other hand, local conflicts were not only permitted, but even encouraged¹¹⁸ in the Third World where the danger of nuclear escalation was perceived as more remote. It was assumed that with stability at the center (Europe) came new pressures on the periphery (the Third

¹¹⁴ Buzan, "System versus Units," 215.

¹¹⁵ For a typical example for traditional external-oriented study of security in the Third World, see Roy Allison and Phil Williams, eds., Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Litwak and Wells, Jr., eds., Superpower Competition and Security in the Third World.

¹¹⁶ Robert S. Litwak and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Introduction," in Superpower Competition and Security in the Third World, ix.

¹¹⁷ Amitav Acharya, "Beyond Anarchy: Third World Instability and International Order after the Cold War," in International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (London: Macmillan, 1998) 165.

¹¹⁸ Mohammed Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World," in Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia and the Middle East, ed. Mohammed Ayoob (London: Croom Helm, 1986) 14.

World).¹¹⁹ According to Mohammed Ayoob, stability of the central balance rendered Third World conflicts necessary, because these conflicts were viewed “as a way of letting off steam which helps to cool the temperature around the core issues which are directly relevant and considered vital to the central balance and, therefore, to the international system.”¹²⁰ Thus, in contrast to the neo-realist understanding that the Cold War and bipolarity ensured a stable international order¹²¹, as Acharya puts it, “the superpower rivalry, while keeping the ‘long peace’ in Europe, served to exacerbate the problems of regional conflict and instability in the Third World.”¹²²

In practice, both superpowers perceived the Third World as an arena “where ideologies would clash without the immediate and obvious dangers attendant upon any attempt to change the status quo in Europe.”¹²³ The Third World has provided a relatively permissive and attractive environment for superpower competition which seemed to hold out far greater possibilities for making gains at the expense of the adversary. Thus, the Cold War manifested itself as the exportation of great power conflicts to the Third World, “whether as wars by proxy or as exacerbation of indigenous Third World conflicts...in order to cool down the political temperature around the core areas of the globe.”¹²⁴ Diplomacy, economic assistance, ideology, arms transfers, and various forms of direct and indirect intervention were the principal superpower instruments deployed in this struggle. Superpower diplomacy

¹¹⁹ Litwak and Wells, “Introduction,” x.

¹²⁰ Ayoob, “Regional Security and the Third World,” 14.

¹²¹ Waltz, “Stability of a Bipolar World,” 881-909; John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Post-War International System,” *International Security* 10:4 (1986) 99-142; Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” *International Security* 18:2 (1993) 44-79; John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security* 15:1 (1990) 5-57.

¹²² Acharya, “The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies,” 305-306.

¹²³ Roy Allison and Phil Williams, “Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World,” in *Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World*, eds. R. Allison and Phil Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 2-3.

¹²⁴ Mohammed Ayoob, “Unravelling the Concept: ‘National Security’ in the Third World,” in *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World*, 37.

tended to sustain the status quo since both superpowers sought influence with established states and since ruling regimes had an interest in the territorial status quo.

¹²⁵ The transfer of arms to Third World states through sales, credits and aid was a foreign policy tool of the superpowers which was used to gain allies from the adversary superpower and its clients. ¹²⁶ Furthermore, as Mary Kaldor argues, the two blocs sought to substantiate the 'imaginary war' and uphold perceptions of military power through violent forays into the Third World.¹²⁷

Acharya maintains that "opportunism and influence-seeking by the superpowers...led to the internationalization of civil wars and contributed to the prolongation of regional wars" in the Third World.¹²⁸ Seeking to extend their control and influence in the Third World, superpowers militarily intervened in many of the armed conflicts in the Third World. According to Waltz, the bipolar structure encouraged both Moscow and Washington to impose an East-West framework on local and regional rivalries. As he pointed out: "In a bipolar world there are no peripheries. With only two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happens anywhere is potentially of concern to both of them."¹²⁹ The security of a particular Third World state or region was not seen as an end in itself and therefore a contribution towards global security, but rather as a means to enhance the security interests of the superpower itself.¹³⁰ Since the superpowers were guided more by their own rivalry than by concern for local outcomes, and since their access to local

¹²⁵ S. Neil MacFarlane, "Taking Stock: The Third World and the End of the Cold War," in The Third World Beyond the Cold War: Continuity and Change, eds. Louise Fawcett and Yezid Sayigh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 16, 23.

¹²⁶ Joanna Spear and Stuart Croft, "Superpower Arms Transfers to the Third World," in Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Cold War, eds. Roy Allison and Phil Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 89-91.

¹²⁷ Kaldor, The Imaginary War, 25.

¹²⁸ Acharya, "Beyond Anarchy," 165-166.

¹²⁹ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 171.

influence often depended on their taking sides in local conflicts, the outcome of their intervention in the Third World ended up perpetuating local rivalries.¹³¹ Third World states were viewed as pawns in the ‘great game’ being played by the major powers rather than as actor in their own right. In Ayoob’s words, they “possessed only instrumental value for the superpowers in the sense that they can be used to enhance the latter’s global objectives, including those regional objectives that are related to the global strategies of the superpowers.”¹³²

The debate over the significance of the Third World—for International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular—was carried on almost exclusively in the United States and from the perspective of United States policy interests.¹³³ In academic discussions regarding the issue of whether Third World was worth studying, the main criteria was the importance (centrality) of the Third World for U.S. interests.¹³⁴ In other words, disciplinary generalists and area studies specialists were encouraged to analyze the Third World “within the global security considerations and practices of the USA.”¹³⁵ The prioritising of US security concerns when conceptualising regional security was coupled with the neglect of the regional political context of security problems. Joseph Nye and Sean M. Lynn-Jones argue that the development of security studies in the United States more than in other countries caused many analyses to suffer from ethnocentric biases. For them, the predominance of American perspectives on security issues was due to the central role the U.S. played in international politics since the Second World War. Accordingly,

¹³⁰ Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, “Alliances, Bases and Security: A Southern Perspective,” in Conflict and Consensus in South/North Security, eds. Caroline Thomas and P. Saravanamuttu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 81.

¹³¹ Barry Buzan, “People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World,” in National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats, eds. Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988) 38-39.

¹³² Ayoob, “Unravelling the Concept: ‘National Security’ in the Third World,” 41.

¹³³ Neuman, “International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?,” 14.

¹³⁴ For example, David, “Why the Third World Matters,” 50-85.

they argue, many of the major concepts and theories have been developed by U.S. scholars.¹³⁶

The nomothetic universalism of social sciences (the claim to be producing universal social knowledge) is reflected in traditional approaches to Third World security and has allowed “theories and models developed in and devised for the ‘First World’ to be applied confidently in the ‘Third World’.”¹³⁷ The conviction that Western experience alone is empirically sufficient to establish general laws of individual, group or state behaviour irrespective of time and geographic location is the cause for the Eurocentric and normative character of the literature despite its claim of universal relevance.¹³⁸ As Klein argues,

When the security problems of the Third World were addressed by the Strategic Studies community, the dominant intellectual framework has been a regionalized version of the global strategy/security paradigm, so that the dilemmas facing ‘small’ or ‘less powerful’ states are analogized to that of the states system of the major powers. In other words, Third World conflicts have been explained in terms that pit each of the actors against one another, so that the relevant model is of clearly articulated states that stand over their own civil societies and seek to fend off nascent security dilemmas that manifest themselves in the external, anarchic world of potentially hostile neighbours.¹³⁹

The greater emphasis put on the *state* as a centralized governing organization (and less on the individuals and social groups existing within that state) contributed to the widening of the gap between the state organization and society and citizens in Third World.¹⁴⁰ The external-oriented conception of security (which focused on war, the ability to fight wars and the external threats to the state that might give rise to wars)

¹³⁵ Bilgin and Morton, “Historicising Representations of ‘Failed States’,” 56.

¹³⁶ For a critique of the field from within, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Sean M. Lynn Jones, “International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field,” *International Security* 12:4 (1988) 23.

¹³⁷ Peter Taylor, “Embedded Statism and the Social Sciences,” *Environment and Planning A* 28:11 (1996) 1921.

¹³⁸ Neuman, “International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?,” 2.

¹³⁹ Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order*, 13-14. For example, Walt applies balance of power—alliance—theory (though with some modification) to the Middle East. See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987).

¹⁴⁰ Buzan, “People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World,” 16.

adopted by traditional approaches was “used to justify keeping internal order at any cost.”¹⁴¹ This led to policies of repression and patterns of expenditure that served narrow sectional interests in the Third World. The language of ‘national security’ became the cloak for the interest of the regime¹⁴² in power and “lend[ed] it an air of legitimacy internationally.”¹⁴³ Consequently, the survival of a particular regime became the essence of Third World security and proved useful both to the superpowers and Third World governments.

To summarize, traditional approaches did not try to define Third World security issues distinct from the superpower rivalry. Regional events were viewed through the superpower template with a military focus. Either the superpowers, or the state elites—under the name of ‘national security’—were recognized as the referents for security. An important point, though neglected, is that “most of the salient regional security issues in the Third World had a life of their own independent of superpower rivalry.”¹⁴⁴ The tendency of the states of the North to define security issues of the Third World in terms of their own security priorities led to an underestimation of local security dynamics and neglect of the local patterns of regional security.¹⁴⁵ An external-oriented conception of security which privileged the security of states and military stability was adopted while regional sources of insecurity and regional peoples’ multiple and contending conceptions of security were not given attention.¹⁴⁶ Conceiving security in the Third World in solely

¹⁴¹ Pettiford, “Changing Conceptions of Security in the Third World,” 293.

¹⁴² Brian Job defines ‘regime’ as “the small state of persons who hold the highest offices in the set and/or are the elite that effectively command the machinery, especially the coercive forces, of the state. Brian L. Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World,” in *Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, ed. Brian L. Job (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992) 15.

¹⁴³ Pettiford, “Changing Conceptions of Security in the Third World,” 293.

¹⁴⁴ Ayoob, “Regional Security and the Third World,” 15.

¹⁴⁵ Buzan, “People, States, and Fear,” 41.

¹⁴⁶ Pinar Bilgin, “Re-visioning Security in the Middle East: A Critical Security Studies Perspective,” paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop ‘Re-defining Security’, Mannheim, 26-31

military-stability oriented terms from a top-down approach contributed to a glossing over of economic, political and societal security concerns that are structurally-based and afflict the region.¹⁴⁷

1.4 Conclusion

Traditional approaches to security viewed the Third World through the prism of East-West relations. It was the position of the Western states or the superpowers which were given prominence and priority in security debates and analyses while the concerns and priorities of Third World states were regarded as secondary or derivative.¹⁴⁸ Questions of military balance and matters related to weaponry were placed 'high' on the agenda, whereas vital issues that formed the main security concerns of Third World regions and peoples almost fell outside the paradigm's focus.

When Third World states were taken into consideration, "they were supposed to fit into the established paradigm, and assigned the role of junior partners in the power game."¹⁴⁹ Attempts to extend the dominant conceptual framework to the Third World failed to grasp the inherent complexities and pluralism of Third World issues. Neither the regional sources of Third World conflicts and nor their socio-historical background were explored. External-oriented understanding of security "turned analysts' attention away from domestic security concerns."¹⁵⁰ Security concerns of social groups and individuals in the Third World states did not appear in these analyses. The statist conception of security helped to legitimize government's

March 1999, 2-4, available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/joint_sessions/Manpapers/w18/bilgin.pdf. Accessed 15.11.2002.

¹⁴⁷ Bilgin, "Re-visioning Security in the Middle East," 20.

¹⁴⁸ Caroline Thomas, "Introduction," in *Conflict and Consensus in South/North Security*, eds. Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 4.

domination over society¹⁵¹ and served to justify the oppressive behavior of some Third World regimes. In practice, Third World security became increasingly associated with the survival of particular regimes, especially those that acted in line with the security interests of the superpowers.

Having provided a critical overview of traditional approaches to security in the Third World, the next chapter will turn to look at Third World approaches to security. The latter emerged as one of the main strands of thought that challenged the mainstream thinking. Third World security scholars drew attention to the deficiencies of traditional approaches in understanding and dealing with the Third World security problems. They expressed the need to 'see' the Third World and to theorize for the Third World context. They sought to understand and address the 'unique' security needs and requirements of Third World states through incorporating into their analyses historical and regional characteristics of the Third World as well as domestic variables peculiar to Third World states.

¹⁴⁹ Bahgat Korany, "Strategic Studies and the Third World: A Critical Evaluation," International Social Science Journal 38:4 (1986) 549.

¹⁵⁰ Bilgin, "Re-visioning Security in the Middle East," 5.

CHAPTER II: THIRD WORLD SECURITY SCHOOL

2.1 Introduction

Third World emerged as a challenge to mainstream Cold War security consensus both in practice and theory.¹⁵² In theory, this challenge has been clearly articulated by Third World approaches to security. Students of Third World security criticized traditional approaches basically on three grounds. First, automatic categorization of Third World problems into an East-West framework was rejected. In Caroline Higgins's words, "to study the 'Third World' was to protest against a reductionist paradigm in which developments everywhere were seen in the light of Cold War preoccupations."¹⁵³ As stated in Chapter I, the task behind the "consideration of all security problems to an analysis of their impact on the strategic balance between East and West"¹⁵⁴ was one of managing the situation by taking the existing system for granted and making it function more smoothly. However, many of Third World states considered a possible change in the status quo not as a threat to, but as an integral part of, their security.¹⁵⁵ They assumed a dissident role in the global system of states¹⁵⁶ where they had no way of improving the terms under which they participated.¹⁵⁷ The present global system was seen as ensuring relative stability, security, freedom, access to resources and quality of life for the states of the North at the expense of the Third World where the states remained ossified at the base of the

¹⁵¹ Pinar Bilgin, "Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security," *International Studies Review* 5:2 (2003) 206.

¹⁵² Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, "Security Studies: The Next Stage?" 138-141.

¹⁵³ Caroline Higgins, "North-South Relations," in *Peace and World Security Studies: A Curriculum Guide*, ed. Michael T. Klare, 6th ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 150.

¹⁵⁴ Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, "Security Studies: The Next Stage?" 139.

¹⁵⁵ Thomas, *In Search of Security*, 5; Thomas, "Introduction," 3.

¹⁵⁶ Acharya, "Periphery as the Core," 305.

global structure and permanently condemned to the periphery.¹⁵⁸ The collective aim of the Third World was to establish a new international order with new rules and institutions that would express their aspirations.

In practice, the rejection of the bipolar outlook of the superpowers and their allies was manifested in the formation of the Non-Aligned movement by Third World states.¹⁵⁹ The majority of Third World states viewed the superpower competition and the Cold War alliance systems with profound mistrust and as a major threat to international security in general and their own security in particular.¹⁶⁰ The overarching geopolitical structure of the East-West divide was perceived as further exacerbating Third World insecurity by limiting the possibility of autonomous decision-making and action for Third World states that were already suffering from an acute lack of control over the international environment in which they had to function.¹⁶¹ Joining the non-aligned movement, Third World states attempted to maintain a distance and independence from the two superpower blocs in the formulation of their own foreign policies and sought to represent their own security agendas that stood outside the global contest conducted by the superpowers.¹⁶² Despite de facto alignment of some non-aligned states with one of the superpowers, membership in the NAM provided many Third World states with some room to maneuver in their relationship with the superpowers,¹⁶³ and the

¹⁵⁷ Kaldor, *The Imaginary War*, 97.

¹⁵⁸ Aswini K. Ray, "The International Political System and the Developing World: A View from the Periphery," in *Conflict and Consensus in South/North Security*, eds. Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 24-25.

¹⁵⁹ Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, "Security Studies: The Next Stage?," 138-139.

¹⁶⁰ Acharya, "Beyond Anarchy," 166.

¹⁶¹ Thomas, *In Search of Security*, 5.

¹⁶² Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, 102-105.

¹⁶³ Mohammed Ayoob, "The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?" *International Studies Quarterly* 33:1 (1989) 75.

ideology underlying the movement constituted a direct challenge to the mainstream security thinking.¹⁶⁴

According to the second criticism, traditional approaches to security did not have much relevance to the Third World. Students of Third World security argued that there existed an apparent fissure between empirical reality in the Third World and established paradigms of mainstream International Relations Theory in general and Security Studies in particular. As will be discussed later in this chapter, these scholars noted that many of the most central concepts—such as anarchy, security dilemma, national security—did not fit easily into the Third World context and did not prove adequate for understanding the majority of threats, conflicts and violence plaguing the Third World. This was due to the fact that theory had derived from the experiences of Western states whose conceptions and experiences differed from those of Third World states. In contrast to the Western realist conception of the state, the Third World state is characterized by weak and divisive social, economic and political structures. Again, contrary to the predominant conception of security as the physical protection of nation states from external military threats, these structures are insecure domestically because threats usually emanate from inside. It was argued that this empirical reality required the incorporation of domestic variables—such as socio-political cohesiveness, political legitimacy, incomplete state-making and nation-building processes, and perceptions of state elites—into security analyses in the Third World context where internal-external distinctions made little sense and the problems of internal and external insecurity rendered one another more acute. These

¹⁶⁴ Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, "Security Studies: The Next Stage?," 139.

scholars also discussed the practical implications and possible outcomes of transposing certain concepts onto Third World states without empirical foundation.¹⁶⁵

The third criticism was directed towards the military focus of traditional Security Studies. Traditionally, the military ability to deter external threats to a nation's territory (and previously acquired values) was seen as the essence of security.¹⁶⁶ However, the accumulation and maintenance of military force is not enough by itself to solve the security problems of Third World states since threats facing the Third World are diverse and complex.¹⁶⁷ Deterrence against external attack ceases to be an adequate representation of security objectives when it is internal insecurity that is the greatest threat.¹⁶⁸ In the words of Caroline Thomas,

Security in the context of the Third World states does not simply refer to the military dimension, as is often assumed in the Western discussions of the concept, but to the whole range of dimensions of a state's existence which are already taken care of in the more-developed states, especially those of the West.¹⁶⁹

A broader notion of security is required to understand the security predicament of the Third World where nonmilitary threats such as resource scarcity, overpopulation, underdevelopment, environmental degradation are at the heart of insecurity.¹⁷⁰ The prevalence and interconnectedness of internal fragility and external vulnerability of the state converts problems such as ethnic conflicts, erosion of state legitimacy, food

¹⁶⁵ For example, see Stephanie G. Neuman ed., International Relations and the Third World (London: Macmillan, 1998); Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon, "Rethinking Third World National Security," in National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats, eds. Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon (Hampshire: Edward Elgar, 1988) 1-13; Brian L. Job ed., Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Caroline Thomas, "Conclusion: Southern Instability, Security and Western Concepts—On an Unhappy Marriage and the Need for a Divorce," in The State and Instability in the South, eds. Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989) 174-191; Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) 121-146.

¹⁶⁶ Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962) 150.

¹⁶⁷ Azar and Moon, "Rethinking Third World National Security," 11.

¹⁶⁸ Tickner, "Re-visioning Security," 179.

¹⁶⁹ Thomas, In Search of Security, 1.

¹⁷⁰ Acharya, "The Periphery as the Core," 304.

shortages, decline of water resources and debt into formidable threats to the state's survival and its basic values.¹⁷¹ This explains why students of Third World Security have called for the inclusion of economic, social, political and environmental issues in the security agenda. Issues related to economic security have been especially stressed since deteriorating economic conditions affect internal political stability of the Third World state and result in foreign impositions on state sovereignty and action, which in turn exacerbate internal divisions and increased the internal and external vulnerability of the Third World state. Special emphasis was made on the role of the structure of the international economic system in engendering insecurity in the Third World.¹⁷²

In practice, as Third World states increasingly perceived themselves as vulnerable to the workings of the international economy which was beyond their control and to decisions and policies they did not own, their dissent turned into action. They called for a structural reform of the global economic system through participating in the "Group of 77" forum where they expressed their economic grievances and demands, which included the creation of orderly and stable commodity markets, increased access to Northern markets, increased aid flows on improved terms, greater accountability of transnational corporations and more effective participation in the international decision-making process.¹⁷³ Since the liberal international economic order is an extension of a political order and is subject

¹⁷¹ Korany, Brynen and Noble, "The Analysis of National Security in the Arab Context," 2.

¹⁷² For example, see John Simpson, "The International System and the Developing World," in *Conflict and Consensus in South/North Security*, eds. Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 29-42.

¹⁷³ Caroline Thomas, "Where is the Third World Now?" *Review of International Studies* 25: 5 (1999) 226.

to political challenge, the campaign of the Third World states was a political action for reform where the legitimacy of the prevailing order was called into question.¹⁷⁴

Having provided the basic features of Third World security thinking and practice, this chapter aims to examine the works of prominent Third World security scholars in detail and elaborate on the major arguments that are developed in their work. It is organized around five overriding themes central to these studies, each of which corresponds to a separate section. Accordingly, the first section is about the question of system-level analysis within the Third World context. It focuses on studies that contest the main assumptions of neorealism—especially on the ‘unitary’ nature of the international system—within the Third World context and define the Third World as a separate security realm. It examines the ‘Two-Worlds’ approach which assumes that substantial differences between states in the Third World and states in the West require the application of different theoretical models.

The second section focuses on the domestic political dimension of insecurity in the Third World. It presents an overview of debates over the nature of the Third World state and its implications for both security thinking and security practices in the Third World. Students of Third World security have also explored the linkages between domestic insecurities and external vulnerabilities of Third World states. Accordingly, the third section looks into this relationship and examines its effects on regional security dynamics in the Third World.

The fourth section focuses on studies that examine the specific experience of Third World state-making and underline its relation to the security predicament of the Third World. The fifth section examines attempts of Third World security scholars to develop a more inclusive understanding of security that covers those

¹⁷⁴ Marc A. Williams, “The Developing Countries and the International Economic Order: A View from the South,” in Conflict and Consensus in South/North Security, eds. C. Thomas and P.

issues (such as starvation, malnutrition, economic deprivation, and social injustice) which are not considered to fall within the purview of traditional Security Studies, but constitute the main sources of insecurity in the Third World. It also presents an overview of discussions on the relationship between security and development in the Third World context.

2.2 Neorealism and the Third World: Hierarchy vs. Anarchy, Unit vs. System

There is a consensus among scholars of Third World security that neorealism does not apply to Third World states and does not help in understanding the security problems of the Third World.¹⁷⁵ The two main assumptions of neorealism (that the political world inside the state is characterized by hierarchy while the political universe between states are characterized by anarchy, and that there is no functional differentiation among units in the anarchic international system even though there are huge variations in their capacity to perform the tasks they are faced with) are especially questionable within the Third World context. Barry Buzan¹⁷⁶ summarizes these arguments as follows:

One is that many Third World states are too weakly developed to qualify for hierarchy, and that de facto much of their domestic politics has anarchic qualities. The other is that there are significant elements of hierarchy in relations between states, and that these elements are particularly strong in relations between the more developed core and less developed periphery.¹⁷⁷

According to the first argument, the neorealist distinction between anarchy among states and hierarchy within them is not valid for the Third World context because of the non-Westphalian character of Third World states. They are assumed to be

Saravanamuttu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 45-58.

¹⁷⁵ Neuman, "International Relations Theory and the Third World," 15.

¹⁷⁶ Barry Buzan is a celebrated scholar of Security Studies and a prominent advocate of realism at the same time. Although he mainly writes on international security, he has presented valuable insights on security in the Third World and his works have deeply influenced Third World security students.

clustering around an image of a distorted, incomplete or weak copy of the original Westphalian model. It is argued that they do not conform to a homogenous view of the units in the system and do not maintain the sharp inside/outside distinction the model presumes.¹⁷⁸

The point of functional differentiation in the international system due to the existence of major differences between states in the Third World and those in the West links with the argument that the structure of the international system is characterized more by hierarchy rather than anarchy.¹⁷⁹ Waltz does not deny the possibility of finding evidence of functional differentiation and hierarchy within the international system and the possibility of identifying elements of anarchy within many domestic political systems.¹⁸⁰ However, he sees anarchy as the prevailing structure and concludes that “hierarchic elements within international structures limit and restrain the exercise of sovereignty but only in ways strongly conditioned by the anarchy of the larger system.”¹⁸¹

Carlos Escudé develops a model of “peripheral realism” through which he tries to correct the conceptual error of neorealism in attributing an anarchic structure to the interstate security order. He argues that for issues related to peace and security, hierarchy describes the structure of the international system better than anarchy and this is more evident in the periphery than in the core. He contends that

contrary to the neorealist model the interstate system is not characterized by ‘anarchy’, but by an incipient and imperfect ‘hierarchy’ in which we find states that command, states that obey, and states, without the power to command, that refuse to obey. The foreign

¹⁷⁷ Barry Buzan, “Conclusions: System versus Units in Theorizing About the Third World,” in International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (London: Macmillan, 1998) 215.

¹⁷⁸ Buzan, “System versus Units,” 216-217.

¹⁷⁹ Aswini K. Ray makes a similar argument where he presents a picture of a structurally hierarchical international political system. Ray, “The International Political System and the Developing World: A View from the South,” 13-28.

¹⁸⁰ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 114.

¹⁸¹ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 115-116.

policy options of those that 'obey' are, therefore, constrained by that hierarchy in ways that do not apply to Great Powers.¹⁸² He asserts that Waltz is wrong in assuming that there is no functional differentiation of states since the differences in capabilities are so great that they are translated into functional differentiation. In this sense, he finds the dichotomic categorization of states into "Great Powers" and "weaker states" as a useful analytical tool which helps in acknowledging the functional differences between them.¹⁸³ He favors the insights of classical realism over contemporary realism in assessing world politics and demonstrates this by quoting the famous theoretical remark of Thucydides, that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."

In Escudé's model, there exists three types of states which are functionally differentiated according to whether they rule, obey or rebel. Although a structure of anarchy prevails among them, Great Powers tend to preside over the weaker states on issues related to international peace and security and impose order on their relationships. Weaker states are divided into two groups: those which obey the rule of the Great Powers and avoid high-cost foreign and defense policies in favor of the welfare of its citizens, and those which rebel against this rule and play a high-risk game in international politics in which the level of tolerable costs to their citizenry is very high. The majority of the interstate community, including the Third World and advanced but militarily weak industrialized states, form the group of "states that obey". Finally, a small number of Third World states challenge the domination of the Great Powers by refusing to obey. The main point is that there is anarchy among the Great Powers, but between the Great Powers and the rest of the world, there is hierarchy. It is this hierarchy that constrains the external behaviour of most Third

¹⁸² Escudé, "An Introduction to Peripheral Realism and Its Implications for the Interstate System: Argentina and the Condor II Missile Project," in International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (London: Macmillan, 1998) 61.

¹⁸³ Escudé, "An Introduction to Peripheral Realism," 64-66.

World states, and in order to develop their own political and economic systems, the majority accept the hierarchical character of the international system led by Great Powers.

As Escudé and Buzan maintain, the division of the world into Great Powers and weaker states as such, is based on the functional differentiation of units in the system and the existence of different types of states due to different types of political, economic, and cultural development. It is assumed that there are significant differences among the units in the international system, in other words, between the states in the Third World and the states in the West; not just of population size, power, ideology and geography, but in the way in which they are constituted as states. This assumption gives rise to partial application of concepts and theoretical frameworks geographically and historically and stimulates thoughts about significantly different subsystems of International Relations. According to Buzan's argument, the "two worlds" perspective assumes that the international system, rather being a single politico-strategic space with a single set of rules of the game, is divided into two worlds and implies that different kinds of rules apply to different parts of the world.¹⁸⁴ Two versions of this perspective will be discussed here.

First, Buzan develops a two worlds view¹⁸⁵ based on a division of the contemporary universe of states into three types, namely postmodern, modern, and premodern. The modern state corresponds to the standard Westphalian model which is defined by strong government control over society and restrictive attitudes towards

¹⁸⁴ Buzan, "System versus Units," 223.

¹⁸⁵ Buzan's arguments on "two-worlds" are extracted from his two pieces. See Buzan, "System versus Units," 220-226; Buzan, " 'Change and Insecurity' Reconsidered," 9-11. He argues elsewhere that the whole world has not reformed itself in the same way that the most advanced parts of the world have. He expresses his view as "the world is really divided into two or three spheres in which the rules of the game are quite different because the level of globalization is very differently distributed." See Barry Buzan and David Held, "Realism vs Cosmopolitanism: A Debate Between Barry Buzan and David Held," debate conducted by Anthony McGrew, in *Review of International Studies* 24:3 (1998) 390.

openness. The modern state is the prevailing type of state in many parts of the Third World. The leading states and all of the great capitalist powers, on the other hand, have evolved beyond the modern model and have taken on a postmodern form in the pursuit of wealth, democracy, and individual rights. They are characterized by an open and tolerant attitude toward cultural, economic, and political interaction, an influential civil society, pluralism and multiculturalism, prosperity, and economies linked to transnational global economy. Still maintaining borders, sovereignty, and national identity, the postmodern states do not ascribe importance to these products of modernity. They keep their security agendas narrow. At the opposite end of the spectrum stand premodern states, dispersed throughout the Third World and most notably in Africa and Central Asia, with low levels of sociopolitical cohesion and poorly developed structures of government. Although they are headed towards modernity, there are serious tensions between the elements of modernity and traditional political and societal patterns in these states. In extreme cases such as 'failed' states, anarchy much more than hierarchy prevails inside.

One world (call it the zone of peace) is defined by a postmodern security community of powerful industrial democracies, and international relations within this world no longer operate according to old realist rules. In the zone of peace, states do not expect or prepare for war against each other, and since this zone contains most of the Great Powers this is a very significant development for the whole of the international system. Reflecting the character of postmodern states, economies and societies are highly open and interdependent, transnational players are numerous and strong, and international relations is heavily institutionalized.¹⁸⁶

He defines the other world, the zone of conflict, as a mixture of modern and premodern states:

In relations among (and within) these states classical realist rules still obtain, and war is a usable and used instrument of policy. In this zone, international relations operate by the traditional rules of power politics that prevailed all over the world up to 1945. States expect and prepare

¹⁸⁶ Buzan, "System versus Units in Theorizing," 223.

for the possibility of serious tension with their neighbours. Some restraint is provided by deterrence (in a few places nuclear deterrence) but economic interdependence between neighbours is generally low, populations can often be easily mobilized for war...and use of force among some of them cannot be ruled out.¹⁸⁷

A similar approach of two worlds is developed by James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, with reference to the post-Cold War context.¹⁸⁸ The main argument of the authors is that in the post-Cold War international environment there exists two worlds: the core and the periphery. They differentiate the goals and behaviours of the states in the core from those of the states in the periphery. The core is made up of the industrialized states of Western Europe, North America, and Japan in economic terms and Great Powers dominating the international system politically. They constitute a “great power society” gathered around liberal economic and democratic political norms and institutions. It is argued that broad economic interdependence within the core and the existence of well-functioning democracies promote the abolishment of the use of military means to settle disputes between Great Powers. Although conflicts still occur, they are settled through negotiation and compromise rather than through the use or threat of force. Economic interdependence, political democracy, and nuclear weapons lessen the security dilemma and balance of power politics is no longer the defining feature of interactions among states in the core. This results in a relationship consistent with a liberal model of international politics.¹⁸⁹

However, liberal rules defer to those of realist politics in the periphery where realism seems more relevant for understanding regional security systems. The authors use the term “periphery” for the agriculturally based, industrializing states of the developing world which are relatively “weak” when compared with Great Powers of the core. States in the periphery do not share a common political and economic

¹⁸⁷ Buzan, “System versus Units in Theorizing,” 224.

¹⁸⁸ James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era,” *International Organization* 46:2 (1992) 467-491.

system, and the norms and institutions associated with them. Due to the fact that many regional security systems comprises a diversity of states with radically different governments, economies, cultures, ethnic groups and religions, predictability based on a set of shared norms does not exist in the periphery. "A variety of political systems ranging from democracies to monarchies exists side by side, and interdependence between peripheral states is subordinate to dependence on core states."¹⁹⁰ Since sovereignty is newly acquired and often challenged both from within and without, and military threats from neighbours and internal threats from insurgents continue to endanger national security in the periphery, military force is still seen as a valuable means for influencing outcomes and increasing state power by the leaders. As a consequence of all these factors, the security dilemma is alive and paramount in the periphery.¹⁹¹

According to Barry Buzan, the two worlds approach carries the risk of oversimplifying the empirical picture since there are states in the core which behave like peripheral states (such as Albania, Northern Ireland and ex-Yugoslavia) and vice versa (such as the ASEAN states). An alternative look enables us to see that the two worlds—core/periphery, or zone of peace/zone of conflict, First World/Third World—do not exist as distinct and separate territorial spaces operating in isolation from each other, but are "interleaved modes of living".¹⁹² For Buzan, the key point regarding the two-worlds formulation is the issue of "how the zone of peace and the zone of conflict relate to each other."¹⁹³

To summarize, even though a complete separation of the two worlds is highly impractical, the spatial organization of zones and the claim for distinct modes of

¹⁸⁹ Goldgeier and McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds," 468-470, 478-481.

¹⁹⁰ Goldgeier and McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds," 469.

¹⁹¹ Goldgeier and McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds," 477-480.

¹⁹² Buzan, " 'Change and Insecurity' Reconsidered," 10.

theorizing for these zones can be interpreted as “an attack on the attempts of system theorists, especially neorealists, to impose a single, global theory on the study of International Relations.”¹⁹⁴ It turns our attention from systemic analysis to the analysis of specific state/society relations and to domestic factors which have direct implications for security and related foreign policy preferences. In Buzan’s words, “contrary to neorealism, the two worlds view rests on the assumption that the overall character of International Relations is generated more by the internal character of the units comprising the system than by the system structure.”¹⁹⁵ He argues that

There are fundamental qualitative differences in the way in which the states and societies of Europe, North America, and Japan relate both to one another and to their populations on the one hand, and the way in which states in the Middle East, South Asia, and many other places do so. These differences are rooted deeply in the form and character, and therefore also the history, of the states and societies within the two zones.¹⁹⁶

Similarly, Ayoob expresses the need for historicizing the state and delving deeper into the historical record of Third World to comprehend the security predicament suffered by the majority of states which is much more complex and driven by domestic factors than the security dilemma that neorealism posits.¹⁹⁷ He criticizes neorealism for its ahistorical stance, focus on the present and its preoccupation with the systemic level of analysis and Great Power relations, while he appreciates classical realism for its primary concern with the formation and ordering of political communities and only secondary interest in the analysis of international structures.¹⁹⁸ He calls for theorizing on the basis of adequate knowledge of historical and geographic contexts in order to explain the behaviour of the units constituting the

¹⁹³ Buzan, “System versus Units in Theorizing,” 225.

¹⁹⁴ Buzan, “System versus Units in Theorizing,” 224.

¹⁹⁵ Buzan, “System versus Units in Theorizing,” 223.

¹⁹⁶ Buzan, “System versus Units in Theorizing,” 224.

¹⁹⁷ Mohammed Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World,” in *International Relations and the Third World*, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (London: Macmillan, 1998) 42, 47.

¹⁹⁸ Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism,” 37-43.

international system.¹⁹⁹ There is a consensus among students of Third World security that questions of security in the Third World (both internal and external) require an understanding of the nature of the Third World state and domestic variables which fall largely outside the domain of neorealism. The next section elaborates these issues and focuses on the domestic political dimension of insecurity in the Third World.

2.3 Weak State, the Insecurity Dilemma and Regime Security

The notion of national security derives from the Western realist conception of the state²⁰⁰ which is identified with Western, democratic, constitutional political institutions, an effective government, inviolate geographical boundaries, and a monopoly over the use of force within those boundaries.²⁰¹ The optimal situation for the statehood, and for local and international security, is where boundaries of state and nation (defined as a collective of people who identify themselves on the basis of common ethnicity, language, race and historical experience²⁰²) coincide.²⁰³ According to Brian Job, national security, in the traditional sense, implies the relations between a population viewed as a nation and its government, state institutions and officeholders that are perceived to be legitimate. Second, the capacity of the state to protect against external threats arising in an anarchic international system is indicated.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁹ Mohammed Ayoob, "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism," *International Studies Review* 4:3 (2002) 29-30.

²⁰⁰ Azar and Chung-In Moon, "Rethinking Third World National Security," 1-2; Buzan, "People, States, and Fear," 14-17.

²⁰¹ Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in the Statehood," *World Politics* 35:1 (1982) 1-24.

²⁰² Brian L. Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World," in *Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, ed. Brian L. Job (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992) 15.

²⁰³ Thomas, "Southern Instability, Security and Western Concepts," 175.

²⁰⁴ Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma," 12.

The Western notion of national security is inextricably linked with the Western image of a liberal polity and the idea of the operation of a competitive Western style democracy.²⁰⁵ Borrowing from the work of Berki, Robert Jackson argues that the concept of security is presumed to begin in personal security and culminate in a general or political security of one's homeland, which is the "state" in the contemporary world. The state has become the mechanism by which people seek to achieve adequate levels of security against societal threats. It becomes both the referent and the agent of security in the sense that we expect to find relative security within our country and expect it to be provided by our government. It is assumed that states and governments exist for the benefit of their population and not the reverse.²⁰⁶

However, we find a different picture in many parts of the Third World where the state is frequently in opposition to the society and is a major source of insecurity for the lives of the people.²⁰⁷ It is because the concept of statehood described above does not fit easily into the Third World context. Third World states are artificial constructs with arbitrarily drawn boundaries by the colonial powers within which borders of nation and state do not coincide and the sense of a common national identity does not exist. The process of decolonization can be said to have created states in the Western image, but it failed to create nations that fit them. According to Barry Buzan, "the political legacy of most Third World governments was a state without a nation, or even worse, a state with many nations. It is this legacy that

²⁰⁵ Thomas, "Southern Instability, Security and Western Concepts," 180.

²⁰⁶ Robert H. Jackson, "The Security Dilemma in Africa," in Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, ed. Brian L. Job (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992) 86.

²⁰⁷ Barry Buzan calls it "the paradox of the state" which implies that as state power grows the state becomes a source of threat against the individual. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 38.

defines the problem of weak states in the Third World.”²⁰⁸ This political entity has been often defined as uncertain and insecure.²⁰⁹

The roots of Third World insecurity are found in these weak state structures that emerged from the process of decolonization, where the state’s territorial dimensions do not coincide with its ethnic and societal composition.²¹⁰ There failed to emerge a sense of identification of certain communities and regions with the new state especially in cases where individuals belonged to a nation which remained partly across an inter-state border. The problem of division of political power between groups of varying ethnic and sectarian origins often manifested itself as the establishment of minority rule, which resulted in a further alienation from the state. New concepts of state, central government and citizenship contradicted with existing (traditional) social and political structures and mechanisms, generating dual loyalties and creating ineffective civil societies.²¹¹ The inability to develop the capacity to ensure the habitual identification of their inhabitants with the post-colonial structures is the primary reason for the suffering of many states in the Third World from crises of self-definition and problems of political and historical legitimacy.²¹²

While there exists a variety of communal groups contending for their own securities within the borders of the state, the regime in power lacks the support of a significant proportion of the population because it represents the interests of a particular ethnic or social segment or an economic or military elite that has gained control. Even though the state lacks effective institutional capacities to provide order and the conditions for satisfactory physical existence and fails to achieve any national consensus, it does not become vulnerable to the primary threat of anarchy in

²⁰⁸ Buzan, “People, States, and Fear,” 26.

²⁰⁹ Sayigh, “Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries,” 3.

²¹⁰ Acharya, “The Periphery as the Core,” 302.

²¹¹ Sayigh, “Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries,” 10-11.

the international system due to the fact that it has an existence guaranteed by the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention in a supposedly anarchic international environment.²¹³

Sub-Saharan African states exemplify this point quite clearly. Robert Jackson calls them as “quasi-states” which possess juridical statehood derived from a right of self-determination, but do not possess empirical statehood in the sense that they lack the capacity for effective and civil government.²¹⁴ Many of these entities in reality are little more than juridical shells and have already disintegrated empirically. These states enjoy external protection and their sovereignty is generally respected by other states within and outside of Africa. However, the state does not have the capacity to ensure internal security for its population. International society underwrites the existence of the states regardless of whether these states convert this into domestic security for their citizens or not.²¹⁵

Sovereign-citizen relations break down and give rise to something like a domestic state of nature. However, the sovereign does not fall because international society strictly refuses to recognize any claimant sovereign other than that of the existing jurisdiction—even if that claimant might in fact be more effective or more domestically legitimate or both.²¹⁶

As a result of the granting of international legitimacy to states which lack domestic legitimacy, the Third World state is preoccupied with internal rather than external security since it is protected by the norms of the international community from the threats originating from outside. Thus, the logic of the security dilemma metaphor is turned on its head with regard to the weak Third World state. Instead of the security dilemma which assumes inside the state to be safe and threats to emanate from

²¹² Ayoob, “Regional Security and the Third World,” 9.

²¹³ Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma,” 17-18.

²¹⁴ Robert H. Jackson, “Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World,” *International Organization* 41:4 (1987) 529.

²¹⁵ Jackson, “The Security Dilemma in Africa,” 88-93.

²¹⁶ Jackson, “The Security Dilemma in Africa,” 93.

outside, an alternative framework of “insecurity dilemma” is offered by Brian Job, which provides a more appropriate analytical tool to develop an understanding of the security problems of the Third World, where “the sense of threat that prevails is of internal threats to and from the regime in power, rather than externally motivated threats to the existence of the nation-state unit.”²¹⁷

The case of African states show that a political space is established for domestically insecure Third World states to emerge and survive. International support for the existing African jurisdictions, argues Jackson, perpetuates domestic and personal insecurity by preventing the formation of alternative jurisdictions that might be less arbitrary, more cohesive and more legitimate. It also preserves underdevelopment since there is a strong connection between domestic insecurity and economic deterioration.²¹⁸ Ayoob raises the same point by stating that international norms have made the security problems of the Third World states more acute by preventing the political demise of even the most unviable entities. In his words,

Since states, once established, have an open-ended guarantee on the part of the international system that their legal existence is assured, the traumas they suffer in the process of translating juridical statehood into empirical statehood take on the garb of challenges to their security rather than threats to their existence.²¹⁹

The analytical tool of insecurity dilemma thus enables us to see how the security problems of the Third World states are created by other states, starting with colonial powers, and sustained by the norms of international society.²²⁰

Buzan questions the appropriateness of the concept of national security (which he defines as “the security of a whole socio-political entity which concerns

²¹⁷ Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma,” 18.

²¹⁸ Jackson, “The Security Dilemma in Africa,” 92-93.

²¹⁹ Mohammed Ayoob, “The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective,” in Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, ed. Brian L. Job (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992) 77.

the way of life of a self-governing people, including their social, cultural, political, and economic modes of organization, and their right to develop themselves under their rule”²²¹) for the Third World context by differentiating the nature of states in the West from those in the Third World according to their socio-political cohesiveness. Accordingly, the states in the West are mostly characterized as strong states, where there is a widely accepted idea of the state and a single source of authority that has a broad legitimacy within the population. Indigenous domestic issues play a minor role in national security concerns since state and society are closely linked together. Thus, they provide a relatively clear referent for national security. “For strong states, the concept of national security is primarily about protecting its independence, political identity and way of life from threats posed by other states, rather than from threats arising within its own fabric.”²²²

On the other hand, Buzan labels most of the Third World states as weak states due to the low degree of socio-political consensus in them. He argues that in ‘relatively strong’ weak states (such as India, Brazil, Argentina), it can be observed that there are both a strong identification with the idea and institutions of the state and a clash of strong local political identities with the central government at the same time. In ‘ordinary’ weak states (such as Pakistan, Syria, Turkey and Zaire) political cohesion seems to rest more on power than on a socio-political consensus on the nature of the state where “political loyalties are more strongly directed towards tribal, ethnic, political or religious groups than they are to the state.”²²³ In very weak states (such as Lebanon, Afghanistan, Angola, Uganda) there is neither a widely accepted

²²⁰ Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma,” 31.

²²¹ Buzan, “People, States, and Fear,” 16-17.

²²² Buzan, “People, States, and Fear,” 22.

²²³ Buzan, “People, States, and Fear,” 19.

and coherent idea of the state among their populations, nor an effective governing power to impose unity. Buzan's words are reminiscent of the insecurity dilemma.

The fact that they exist as states at all is largely a result of other states recognizing them as such and/or not disputing their existence. When viewed from the outside they look like states because they have embassies, a flag, boundaries on maps, and a seat in the United Nations. But viewed from within, they are anarchic, with different armed self-governing groups controlling their own territories and contesting central government by force.²²⁴

The important point here is that the referent object for security becomes difficult to define in weak states and the primarily external orientation of the concept of national security is replaced by an increasingly domestic agenda of threats.²²⁵

This point directs attention to the internal threats and the perceptions of the governments in weak states which view domestic threats as targeting their own authority. Ayoob makes important points with regard to differing notions on the part of ruling regimes concerning the definitions of threats and consequent responses. Due to the absence of a consensus on fundamental issues and the absence of open political contests, many Third World states are ruled by regimes with narrow political bases which command the state machinery mostly by coercive force. Since it is these regimes which define threats to the security of their respective states, it is no surprise that they will define it in terms of regime security rather than the security of the society as a whole. Self-preservation at the center of their concerns, the values that are aimed to be protected by these regimes differ vastly from the core values of the large segments of the population over whom they rule.²²⁶

Buzan expresses serious concerns about whether domestic threats should be considered as a part of the national security problem. He has doubts as to whether these threats are directed to the state or the nation, or to the interest of the ruling

²²⁴ Buzan, "People, States, and Fear," 19.

²²⁵ Buzan, "People, States, and Fear," 23.

²²⁶ Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World," 11.

group. The following “danger in using national security for politically weak states is that it easily legitimates the use of force in domestic politics.”²²⁷ Caroline Thomas also stresses this point by arguing that the concept of national security cannot be applied to the Third World as it is utilized in the developed world because it “lends an air of legitimacy to policies of repression and patterns of expenditures that serve an extremely narrow sectional interest in these states” and “is dangerous to the very people whose security is being considered.”²²⁸ She argues that the concept of national security is divorced from the notion of a liberal democracy when it is applied to the Third World. It means nothing more than policies carried out by governments in the name of a non-existent nation in order to legitimize those policies—whatever they are—in the eyes of Western states.²²⁹

Thomas suggests that ‘state security’ seems to be a more appropriate tool of analysis for many Third World states than national security. She argues that it is more entrenched in the empirical reality of social and political formations in the Third World where the nation-state model does not apply.²³⁰ Buzan also states that state security is one of the tools to analyze Third World politics, but does not favour the usage of this concept because he identifies it with totalitarian regimes. He also maintains that since the concept of state security puts more emphasis on the state as a centralizing governing institution and less on the individuals and social groups existing within the state, it is an easier (and less ambiguous) concept to apply to Third World where the distance between the state organization and society (and citizens) is

²²⁷ Buzan, “People, States, and Fear,” 24-25.

²²⁸ Caroline Thomas, “New Directions in Thinking About Security in the Third World,” in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, ed. Ken Booth (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991) 271.

²²⁹ Thomas, “Southern Instability, Security and Western Concepts,” 179-180.

²³⁰ Thomas, “Southern Instability, Security and Western Concepts,” 181.

broadier than it is in the Western polity.²³¹ However, once again there appears the danger of the blurring of distinctions between the security of the state and the security of the regime. As Yezid Sayigh argues, the ruling cliques, by a management of policy and resources in a manner ultimately designed to protect themselves, albeit under the guise of achieving state security, may obscure the distinctions between their own regime security and that of the state as a whole. It perpetuates the 'crisis of the state', which he defines as the continuous challenges faced by Third World in consolidating state structures that are both viable and stable.²³²

Amitav Acharya aims to strip the pejorative connotation usually attached to the meaning of regime security by defining it basically as "a question of the ability of the government of the day, the ruling group or elite, to successfully manage and overcome the problems of governance while maintaining the continuity of its authority and hold on to power."²³³ He points to the possibility that regime insecurities may (or may not) be reflected in the tendency of the regime to use political power for its narrow ends or preserve itself through the use of violence. However he also notes that such practices are common in the Third World and the distinction between state security and regime security is difficult to make in the case of Third World countries. He argues that a careful look at the so-called "national" security policies of many authoritarian Third World states would show that "regimes try and frequently succeed in presenting their own legitimacy problems as national and state security problems."²³⁴

²³¹ Buzan, "People, States, and Fear," 16.

²³² Sayigh, "Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries," 6,17.

²³³ Amitav Acharya, "Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World: Comparing the Origins of the ASEAN and the GCC," in Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, ed. Brian L. Job (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992) 144.

²³⁴ Acharya, "Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World," 144-145.

Azar and Moon share this point of view and consider the trade-off between regime security and national security as a manifestation of the legitimacy crisis, which they explain as follows:

Faltering legitimacy and the erosion of political authority increase internal threat to regimes in power in the form of political protests, sabotages, revolts and rebellions. As regimes in power try to respond to and control these threats in the name of national security, they employ several methods. The troubled political leadership may invent a new national security ideology and attempt to indoctrinate and contain those who oppose the regime.²³⁵

They argue that the methods employed by ruling regimes in this trade-off often result in an eventual weakening of regime security that is supposed to be fostered and undermines national security per se.

Brian Job points to three intertwined strategies that are adopted by Third World regimes to maintain their regime security in response to domestic threats: militarization, repression, and diversionary tactics.²³⁶ Militarization corresponds to developing and arming substantial military and police forces through structuring military doctrines and creating certain societal institutions and practices in the form of civil-military relations, patterns of military recruitment and education.²³⁷ The issue of militarization poses the question of guns versus butter in the Third World context, referring both to the direct costs of security needs in armaments and standing armies, and to the opportunity costs that indicate the costs of security responsible for depriving the society of alternative security systems.²³⁸ Keeping in mind the empirical fact that the military is the effective wielder of power in the regime in a large number of Third World states, the capacity to coerce, kill, and destroy becomes an important

²³⁵ Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon, "Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The 'Software' Side of Third World National Security," in National Security in the Third World, eds. Azar and Moon (Hampshire: Edward Elgar, 1988) 82-83.

²³⁶ Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma," 28-30.

²³⁷ Keith Krause, "Insecurity and State Formation in the Global Military Order: The Middle Eastern Case," in European Journal of International Relations 2:3 (1996) 329-330.

²³⁸ Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, 25.

source of power and the pre-eminent safeguard for “national security”.²³⁹ Thus, repression becomes another important strategy a substantial portion of Third World regimes—both military and civilian—undertake consciously and systematically against significant portions of their populations.²⁴⁰

The third strategy, to focus upon external enemies, is a card often played by insecure rulers. They tend to ensure regime security by inciting national security concerns. By trying to create a common national concern and strengthen national unity, the aim is to mobilize support around the state/regime and its efforts against this threat at the risk of cultivating external frictions and conflicts.²⁴¹ Regular attempts of the ruling regimes to stimulate perceptions of external enemies aim at justifying their internal security policies in general and the buildup of military forces in particular.²⁴² The Falklands crisis is an example in which the Argentinian military junta responded to domestic crisis threatening its survival by precipitating a new national security crisis that involved the use of the Argentinian forces to regain the Falkland Islands from the British. While the Falklands has been a persistent security issue for Argentina, the timing of the invasion was motivated by the survival of the regime that faced a serious legitimacy crisis at home. The invasion resulted in the collapse of the Argentinian regime, and a further destruction of national security.²⁴³

According to Ayoob, it is often the case that “internal threats are ‘externalized’ by regimes which are the targets of such threats.”²⁴⁴ By portraying these threats as emanating from outside and violating the norm of sovereignty, they represent them as illegitimate and their repressive actions as legitimate. He argues

²³⁹ Azar and Moon, “Rethinking Third World National Security,” 4.

²⁴⁰ Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma,” 28-29.

²⁴¹ Buzan, “People, States, and Fear,” 32.

²⁴² Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma,” 29.

²⁴³ Azar and Moon, “Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity,” 83.

²⁴⁴ Ayoob, “Regional Security and the Third World,” 8.

that through the help of securitization process—by turning a political, economic or social problem into a military one, in other words—and by presenting the military threat as coming from external sources, Third World regimes try to confront domestic dissidents by military means which they favor.²⁴⁵

Within this framework, Carlos Egan investigates the complex relation between national security and regime security in the Argentina case. He argues that the two Dirty Wars (in the 1920s and 1970s), which occurred at key conjunctures in the development of capitalism, were waged in the name of national security and carried out to protect the interests and privileges of the dominant class which dependent capitalism had created and reproduced. These regimes institutionalized state terrorism in the name of economic development and justified gross violations of fundamental human rights in the name of national security. They invoked the national security threat to launch their Dirty Wars as a fig leaf for an armed attack by the dominant elites against a sector of population whom they considered as threatening the system of capitalism. The growing social unrest was characterized as a “foreign threat” to national security.²⁴⁶ This case is illustrative of how the concept of national security is employed to enable and legitimize certain policies in the Third World.

Drawing upon the writings of Third World security scholars, this section examined the nature of the Third World state and the internal security predicament of the Third World, which limit the applicability of most common concepts of IR and Security Studies to the Third World setting. It tried to demonstrate the misfit between Western conceptual categories and observed evidence in the Third World, and

²⁴⁵ Ayoob, “Regional Security and the Third World,” 9.

²⁴⁶ Carlos Egan, “National Security Regimes and Human Rights Abuse: Argentina’s Dirty Wars,” in National Security in the Third World, eds. Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon (Hampshire: Edward Elgar, 1998) 189-226.

discussed the practical implications of their usage. It showed how the concept of (Westphalian) state, the idea of national security and the security dilemma metaphor have been called into question by these scholars.

Students of Third World security have also examined the relationship between internal and external dimensions of security in the Third World. Accordingly, the next section focuses on this relationship and directs attention to the potential of the internal security problems of Third World states to generate inter-state conflicts and cause regional insecurity in the Third World. It also discusses the role of regime security concerns in the formation of regional security arrangements.

2.4 The Relationship Between Internal and External Dimensions of Security in the Third World and Regional (In)Security

Given the fact that the state in the Third World does not fit into the Westphalian model, security becomes a complex phenomenon and achieving the condition of security becomes a different task in Third World. Strong linkages between domestic and external aspects of security deserves more attention in this regard.²⁴⁷ Caroline Thomas defines insecurity in the Third World framework as “the relative weakness, the lack of autonomy, the vulnerability and the lack of room for manoeuvre which Third World states have on economic, political and military levels.”²⁴⁸ She establishes a relationship between the two dimensions of insecurity where the problem of internal insecurity renders the problem of external insecurity more acute and vice versa. She emphasizes the search for security on the part of the Third World state as the major determinant of its external and internal behaviour. However, she underlines that the task of Third World states is qualitatively different from those of

²⁴⁷ Sayigh, “Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing World,” 3; Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma,” 30.

other states, because states in the Third World are domestically insecure and have weak political, economic and social structures that are often penetrable. Besides, Third World states suffer from an acute lack of control over the international environment in which they must function, and this directly affects their ability to control domestic economic, social and political domain.²⁴⁹

According to Yezid Sayigh, the weak and unstable state structure forms the “connecting thread between the problems faced by developing countries in achieving social, economic and political progress and those posed by the problems of managing their external environment.”²⁵⁰ He describes the linkage between internal and external levels of security in the Third World as follows:

For countries suffering from economic and infrastructural underdevelopment, unstable political systems which are for the most part post-colonial, and ethnic and other social cleavages, a wide variety of problems pose security threats because they undermine the autonomy and the survival of the state from within. Indeed, these various internal dilemmas form the main security challenge to most developing countries, or at least are the main cause of vulnerability to external or military threats.²⁵¹

He argues that the internal vulnerability of these countries makes them more vulnerable to various forms of external pressure, manipulation and intervention. He notes that the penetrability of their economies, societies and political processes as well as their physical vulnerability have invited external military involvement, either in the form of superpower rivalry or in pursuance of private commercial or strategic aims in the past.²⁵²

The connection between internal and external dimensions of security in the Third World is also underlined by Mohammed Ayoob. According to Ayoob, emphasizing the fact that threats usually emanate from within the boundaries of the

²⁴⁸ Thomas, *In Search of Security*, 4.

²⁴⁹ Thomas, *In Search of Security*, 4.

²⁵⁰ Sayigh, “Confronting the 1990s,” 6.

²⁵¹ Sayigh, “Confronting the 1990s,” 3.

Third World states does not mean that external threats are totally absent, for they are not. However, internal threats weigh heavier in the mix of internal and external threats to the state structures and their regimes in the Third World. Moreover, threats emanating from outside often augment the problems of insecurity that exist within state boundaries, which would be quite ineffective if the Third World state was domestically secure.²⁵³

Ayoob also highlights the potential of the internal dimension of Third World states' security problems to generate interstate conflict. It directs our attention to how intra-state conflicts turn into inter-state conflicts and cause regional insecurity in the Third World. Ayoob argues that when external threats exist, they acquire prominence basically because of the insecurities and conflicts that are rife within Third World states.²⁵⁴ In other words, the external dimension is secondary in character and comes into play largely because of the existence of sources of conflict that inhere within these states. Colonially crafted boundaries often divide populations that are tied to each other on the basis of precolonial affinities and loyalties such as kinship, tribe and religion. Therefore, "domestic conflicts in postcolonial states can easily spill across political boundaries into contiguous states whose populations may provide aid and succor to protagonists in such conflicts, thus involving neighboring populations and eventually neighboring states into these conflicts."²⁵⁵ These domestic insecurities emanating from colonial legacies and weak state structures lead to frequent interstate conflicts in post-colonial regions that radically undermine the regional order. However, although Ayoob acknowledges the primacy of the role of domestic factors, he also underlines the symbiotic relationship between internal and external aspects.

²⁵² Sayigh, "Confronting the 1990s," 12.

²⁵³ Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," *World Politics* 43:2 (1991) 263; Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World," 8.

²⁵⁴ Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," 263.

He argues that in many of the regional conflicts that have originated as intrastate in character, it can be observed that one set of factors could not have thrived without the presence of the other.²⁵⁶

In the previous section, regime security was defined as a key component of the national security perceptions and agenda of individual states in the Third World. It was also highlighted that regime survival dictates the official definition of what constitutes a threat to national security in these states. In contrast to the orthodox logic of national security that defines those acts by neighbours or extraregional powers as a threat to national security only if they raise the prospect of military attack, there have been many cases in the Third World where governments have portrayed an external act as a threat to national security even though it did not carry such a danger. Revolutionary upheavals in a neighbouring state—mostly in cases where revolutionary events create alternative models of political order and carry the potential to aggravate domestic vulnerabilities already extant within the neighbouring societies—often dominate the national security agenda of the regimes in the region and are perceived as threats to regime survival. This results in policy responses that involve the full range of national security apparatuses of the state, including military force.²⁵⁷ The Iraqi regime perceived Iran as constituting an ideological and political threat after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 on the grounds that it was encouraging Iraq's Shi'a majority to revolt and topple the Sunni-dominated state elite.²⁵⁸ According to Ayoob, this fear led Saddam Hussein to launch his invasion of Iran, which was designed to pre-empt an anticipated movement against the Iraqi regime from within. He argues that threat perception of the Iraqi

²⁵⁵ Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism," 42.

²⁵⁶ Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, 50-51.

²⁵⁷ Acharya, "Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World," 145-146.

²⁵⁸ Korany, Brynen and Noble, "The Analysis of National Security in the Arab Context," 14-15.

regime would not have reached the level of launching an invasion of Iran and that the Iran-Iraqi dispute would not have certainly gone beyond border-demarcation and resulted in an inter-state conflict if the government in Baghdad had been more representative of the majority of its population.²⁵⁹ In this regard, the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war clearly illustrates the role of domestic dynamics and concerns for regime survival in creating regional conflicts.

Regional security in the Third World has generally been conceptualized as the 'regional relations of weak states'. The sources of regional conflict in the Third World have been attributed to the problem of domestic instability—including regime vulnerability. As Buzan delineates:

A local security environment composed of weak states contains within itself many sources of instability. A state within such an environment cannot count on the political continuity of its neighbours, and therefore cannot easily build up a durable and stable set of local political relations...In good part, because Third World states themselves are unstable, conflicts between them are rife, alliances are temporary and unreliable, and security communities like ASEAN are rare.²⁶⁰

Unlike Buzan's pessimistic outlook regarding the prospects for 'weak state regionalism', Amitav Acharya presents a rather different picture that portrays regime security concerns (arising from common domestic vulnerabilities and legitimacy problems) as a motive force of regionalism in the Third World. Through a comparative analysis of the security orientations of two regional organizations, ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and GCC (the Gulf Cooperation Council), Acharya arrives at the conclusion that weak states with internally vulnerable regimes enter into security arrangements with like-minded

²⁵⁹ Mohammed Ayoob, "Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?" International Affairs 60:1 (1983) 43.

²⁶⁰ Buzan, "People, States, and Fear," 32.

regimes in the region to counter common threats to regime security and to ensure their self-preservation.²⁶¹

In both cases, members of the regional associations considered internal challenges, including threats to regime survival fueled by discontent over ideological, political, and economic issues, with far more seriousness than the possibility of external threats. The ruling regimes perceived the security implications of major geopolitical events in wider region in terms of the latter's possible or actual impact on their own domestic vulnerabilities. In both cases, these supposedly external events did not constitute a likely threat of military invasion. But they were regarded as security threats because of their potential to aggravate the existing domestic challenges to ruling regimes, in part by presenting models of political systems that were radically at variance with, and potentially more mass-based, than their own.²⁶²

Since regime security concerns dictate the overall security policy framework of the state, he argues that a convergence of regime security interests overrides the animosities and conflict that would normally arise within a local security environment composed of weak states. The common vulnerabilities of these states provide the basis for regional/subregional security arrangements that are regarded as useful for coping with their domestic challenges and countering common threats to regime survival as well as dealing with the regional security environment.

Unlike Acharya, Ayoob argues that even though regional security cooperation based on common regime security concerns assure the security of these regimes, it does not add much to regional security. It may even contribute to regional polarization since the creation of common (internal and regional) enemies is an indicator of the conflict creation potential of regime solidarity in the regional context. He also maintains that the dynamics of regional security in the Third World are influenced by both the variables functioning at the domestic level and the operation of global balance of power including rivalries among the major powers. Regional state elites attempt to utilize issues relating to the global balance to enhance their

²⁶¹ Acharya, "Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World," 148-149.

²⁶² Acharya, "Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World," 161.

own state and regime security interests. According to Ayoob, this leads to the intertwining of the domestic, regional and global dimensions of security.²⁶³

[N]arrowly-based and insecure Third World regimes, particularly those under increasing challenge domestically and regionally, use the idea of regional security to form cooperative arrangements with similar regimes in their regions to defend themselves as well as to justify their strategic and political links with external powers whose interests converge with the interests of these regimes.²⁶⁴

For Ayoob, one can only talk about “genuine” regional security in the Third World when these states become less fragile than they are today. It requires the strengthening of state structures and regimes through the grant of unconditional legitimacy by their populations. He argues that this is the only means that can provide Third World regions the autonomy from major powers and the capacity to influence the international system, and thus establish strong linkages between the security of Third World states and the global security as a whole.²⁶⁵

As examined, the majority of the Third World security scholars point to the internal fragility of Third World states—due to the specificity of the historical pattern of their state-formation—as the main source of insecurity in the Third World. As a result of this understanding, consolidating their nation-states and developing viable political systems are perceived as the best way for Third World states to reduce their vulnerability and to achieve security both internally and externally. State making and nation-building enterprises are, in this sense, regarded as valid attempts to consolidate the authority and to secure the existence of the state in order to act as a viable political unit in the international scene. The next section focuses on the specific experience of state-making and nation-building in the Third World which is

²⁶³ Mohammed Ayoob, “From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 53:3 (1999) 253.

²⁶⁴ Ayoob, “Regional Security and the Third World,” 20.

²⁶⁵ Ayoob, “Regional Security and the Third World,” 21.

conceived as both the cause of and the panacea for the prevailing insecurity in the Third World.

2.5 Security Through State-Making and Nation-Building

Third World security scholars, in general, established a relationship between the twin processes of state-making and nation-building and Third World security. Mohammed Ayoob's contribution is of significant importance, since his work is based on an in-depth analysis of this relationship. According to Ayoob, a large majority of conflicts in the international system can be explained by focusing on the premier political endeavor of state-making in the Third World which constitutes the primary cause and the beginning point of these conflicts.²⁶⁶ Therefore, he develops a theory that places the process of state-making and the building of political communities at its center by examining the history of state-creation in the Third World under the light of the preceding European experience. His theory, namely 'subaltern realism', seeks to "combine the fundamental insights of classical realism with an appreciation of the dynamics of conflict currently clearly visible in large parts of the international system."²⁶⁷ The choice he makes in favor of classical realism emanates from classical realist thinkers' primary interest in the formation and ordering of political communities (domestic order) as well as their sensitivity to international order issues. He argues that "classical realism captures the security predicament of the majority of the states in the international system that are currently at an early stage of the state-making process more clearly and honestly than either neorealism and neoliberalism does."²⁶⁸

²⁶⁶ Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism," 34.

²⁶⁷ Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism," 43.

²⁶⁸ Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism," 40.

Ayoob treats the states in Western Europe and North America as “finished” products and argues that today’s modern states “went through a long period of gestation before they acquired their functional capacities as well as the legitimacy they have today in the eyes of the populace that they encompass territorially and over which they preside institutionally.”²⁶⁹ He argues that the only commonality between these states and the states in the Third World is their formal possession of juridical statehood. Unlike the centuries available to most European state-makers to complete their process of state-making, the various stages of state making and nation building are compressed into a combined and drastically shortened time frame of only three or four decades in the case of the Third World. It has put today’s Third World state makers under tremendous pressure and sped up the process of central state power accumulation as well. According to Ayoob, this difference in the pace of state making “provides the primary explanation for the sharp internal challenges to the centralizing state structures in the developing countries and for the high level of violence endemic in the current phase of state making in the Third World.”²⁷⁰ Adopting the terminology of Azar and Moon, he argues that due to the inadequate time that has been available for state makers in the Third World, the elites of these states failed to develop the ‘software’²⁷¹ side of national security including the identification of the populace with the state (legitimacy) and the identification of

²⁶⁹ Ayoob, “The Security Problematic of the Third World,” 266.

²⁷⁰ Ayoob, “The Security Problematic of the Third World,” 269.

²⁷¹ Azar and Moon argue that the realist paradigm has traditionally focused on the two variables of national security management: security environment (external threat and alliance pattern) and the availability and readiness of hardware (physical capabilities such as military and economic power, tangible policy infrastructure comprising strategic doctrine, force structure, intelligence, weapons choice and etc.). They suggest that attention needs to be paid to the software side of security management, which involves “the political context and policy capacity through which national values are defined, threats and vulnerabilities are perceived and assessed, resources are allocated, and policies are screened, selected and implemented.” They regard the software side of national security as the conversion mechanism linking security environment and hardware to the final policy outcomes and the overall security environment, and point out its most useful components as legitimacy, integration and policy capacity. See Azar and Moon, “Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The ‘Software’ Side of Third World National Security,” 77-78.

people with each other (integration), and had frequent recourse to the 'hardware' instruments of security (military force) to meet the political challenges from alienated groups within their populations.²⁷²

Moreover, the enterprise of Third World state making is not conducted in a vacuum, and external variables had tremendous influence in determining the outcomes of specific attempts at state building. This is a factor that further exacerbates the security problems of Third World states. The technologies of communication and destruction of the contemporary era have reached such a level that renders the impact of international military, political, economic and technological forces more influential than they were in any previous historical epoch. This "makes a substantial and substantive difference to the fortunes of the state making enterprise and to the larger security problematic of Third World states".²⁷³

Ayoob also touches upon a very important point that the history of state creation in the Third World has always been subject to major external influences and determinants. He underlines the fact that, because of the colonial experience of most Third World societies, external factors have traditionally had a predominant influence in shaping their politics and their security environments.

In fact, it would not be wrong to say that many Third World states, particularly in Africa and the Middle East but also elsewhere in Asia, emerged into the postcolonial era as sovereign entities with recognized boundaries only because they had been consolidated into separate colonial proto-states by the European imperial powers in the nineteenth century.²⁷⁴

He argues that decisions taken by colonial powers for reasons of administrative convenience or intrainperial trade-off had major consequences for both the internal and external security of Third World states. The ethnic mix inherited by many postcolonial states and the creation of new communal identities have constituted the

²⁷² Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," 267-268.

²⁷³ Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," 271.

reasons for the internal (in)cohesiveness of the Third World states, the intensity of internal challenges to their boundaries and institutions, and the emergence of many postcolonial interstate conflicts. Ayooob further notes that

unlike their counterparts in early modern Europe, political entities in the Third World that have emerged into independence have had no choice in determining the organization of their polities according to their felt needs. They have been obliged to adopt the model of the sovereign, territorial state (with the corollary that every state must evolve into a nation-state) as the exclusive form of organization to order their political lives...The sovereign state, having triumphed over its competitors several centuries ago in Europe, had become the only legitimate form of political organization sanctioned by the international system and it was the benchmark of a political community's existence. Therefore, sovereign state-making became absolutely imperative for the participation of the Third World countries in the international system. Building states and controlling them became synonymous not only with political order but with political existence itself.²⁷⁵

For Ayooob, since no other institution can provide order that is essential for routine social interactions to be stable and predictable, the state forms the cornerstone of tolerable political life within discrete political communities. Following this path of thought, the road map for weak Third World states is "to create political structures that approximate to a much greater degree than at present the Westphalian ideal type by increasing both their effectiveness and legitimacy."²⁷⁶ He presents it as the only way that the postcolonial states can provide stable political order domestically and participate on a more equal footing in writing and rewriting the rules of international order.²⁷⁷ He also perceives the strengthening of the Westphalian order as the only way for the effective management of most conflicts in the international system.²⁷⁸

According to Ayooob, the states of the Third World are subject to diverse pulls and pressures as a part of their interaction with the international system. The international system requires them to create effective institutions in a much shorter

²⁷⁴ Ayooob, "The Security Predicament of the Third World," 271.

²⁷⁵ Ayooob, "Subaltern Realism," 41.

²⁷⁶ Ayooob, "Subaltern Realism," 40.

²⁷⁷ Ayooob, "The Case for Subaltern Realism," 39-40.

time compared to their European predecessors in order to be able to act as full members of the system. On the other hand, it compels them to emulate the behaviour of the established members by internalizing their value system. International norms “require the state elites to treat the domestic opponents of the state humanely.”²⁷⁹ Ayoob argues that these norms enforce standards of ‘civilized’ behaviour on Third World states which are mostly fragile and weak polities incapable of carrying out even the minimum function of maintaining political order. These contradictory demands leave many Third World states that are trying to adjust to the international system in a perpetual state of schizophrenia.²⁸⁰

Buzan is one of the authors that equate long-term security of the Third World with the creation of stronger states. He sees this task as “the only way in which the vicious circle of unstable states and an unstable environment can be broken.”²⁸¹ He holds weak state structures of the Third World responsible for the conditions of insecurity of their citizens, and for the insecurity of the broader region. He argues that although the existence of stronger states would not by itself guarantee security, their continued absence will doubtlessly undermine both security in the Third World and international security as a whole. This is due to the fact that the presence of weak states and continued instability in the Third World not only constitutes a threat to its own peace, but also a threat to the security of the North, which is seriously endangered by the risk of being dragged into Third World conflicts.²⁸² Yezid Sayigh also proposes a similar route for Third World states. He notes that these states have been exposed to various forms of external pressure, manipulation and intervention because of their internal vulnerability. According to his argument, these states can

²⁷⁸ Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism,” 49.

²⁷⁹ Ayoob, “The Case for Subaltern Realism,” 45.

²⁸⁰ Ayoob, “The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?,” 76.

²⁸¹ Buzan, “People, States, and Fear,” 40.

achieve social and economic development and promote a stable security environment only by consolidating their nation-states and developing viable political systems. He underlines the primary task of these states in the post-Cold War era as to achieve greater integration and viability within the international system “without suffering unacceptable diminution of sovereignty”.²⁸³

Likewise, Caroline Thomas highlights nation-building as an important dimension of the internal security of Third World states whose success or failure has great implications for both these states themselves, and for regional and international relations and security. She argues that the problems suffered by most Third World states and especially the ones in Africa, which emanate from the artificial and self-serving territorial boundaries, will not be solved “until either nation-building within states totally succeeds, or until the central governments of various states are strong enough to impose their will on all parts of their territory”.²⁸⁴ She notes that

[i]f the problems associated with nation-building in the Third World are to be ameliorated, with positive effects at the domestic, regional and international levels, then states must embark on efforts to endow themselves with the attributes of separate, individual nations. Political allegiance must be transferred from lower levels of group identity to the national system, and governmental authority must receive legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Nation-building must be seen as a valid attempt to consolidate the authority of, and to secure the continued existence of, a new state. Until this is achieved, a new state cannot act as a viable political unit in the international scene.²⁸⁵

In her examination of the Tanzanian example of nation-building, Thomas reaches the conclusion that national integrity by itself does not make a state an influential actor in world politics. However, the lack of national integrity increases the temptation of external powers to intervene. Therefore, the success of the nation-building process

²⁸² Buzan, “People, States and Fear,” 40.

²⁸³ Sayigh, “Confronting the 1990s,” 12-13, 54.

²⁸⁴ Thomas, “Conclusion: Southern Instability, Security and Western Concepts,” 177.

²⁸⁵ Thomas, *In Search of Security*, 13.

renders the state advantageous in its struggle for increased autonomy, economic development and security.²⁸⁶

To summarize, the process of state-making (and nation-building) is considered as a significant aspect of Third World security. Through an examination of the history of state creation in the Third World in comparison with the European state-making experience, these arguments suggest that the peculiarities of this history constitute the root cause of the Third World security predicament. International systemic pressures that emanate from their late entry into the Westphalian states system and demands of mass politics inside render this already thorny process more difficult in the Third World.²⁸⁷ To achieve security, Third World states should complete the twin processes of state-making and nation-building as soon as possible, in a much shorter time than their Western counterparts.²⁸⁸ As discussed, the central concern that lies behind these arguments is "...to bring the Third World state up to the Westphalian standard, by correcting its distortions, weaknesses, and lack of completeness...[i]n other words...to make Third World states into strong states."²⁸⁹

Because of their internal fragility (especially infrastructural weakness) and external vulnerability (mainly their peripheral position in the international economy), a whole range of non-military issues turn into formidable threats to the survival of Third World states. Economic and social dimensions of insecurity immediately come to the security picture of the Third World where societies are stricken with poverty and individuals are living in great misery. As will be examined in the next section, this led Third World security scholars to address also these fundamental concerns of

²⁸⁶ Thomas, *In Search of Security*, 35.

²⁸⁷ Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, 21-45.

²⁸⁸ Ayoob, "The Case for Subaltern Realism," 40; Buzan, "People, States, and Fear," 40.

²⁸⁹ Buzan, "System versus Units," 218.

the Third World, and investigate the linkages between security and socio-economic development in the Third World context.

2.6 Economic and Social Dimensions of Third World Security

Adopting a comprehensive understanding of security becomes a necessity in the face of the Third World experience, where issues like underdevelopment, resource scarcity, overpopulation have been at the heart of insecurity from the outset and more intimately linked to the security predicament of the Third World than that of the developed countries. According to Jeff Haynes, “what separates most Third World countries from their Western industrialized counterparts is their *peripherality*, [which] refers to the division of the vast majority of Third World economies from, and their subordination to, the pivotal industrial economies of Western Europe, the United States and Japan.”²⁹⁰ In other words, Third World indicates a group of countries that constitute the marginalized strata of the international system and the term indicates a continuous struggle to escape from underdevelopment within the ambit of a rapidly changing global economy.²⁹¹ For these countries economic factors constitute an immediate determinant of survival and of the relative place that the state occupies within the system.²⁹² Accordingly, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the emergence of a growing body of literature about Third World security that underlines the primacy of a socio-economic development strategy for security.²⁹³ The general tendency was towards the incorporation of the real concerns of poorer states—such

²⁹⁰ Jeff Haynes, *Third World Politics: A Concise Introduction* (Oxford and New York: Blackwell, 1996) 65.

²⁹¹ Acharya, “The Periphery as the Core,” 317.

²⁹² Escudé, “An Introduction to Peripheral Realism and Its Implications for the Interstate System,” 64.

²⁹³ Thomas, “New Directions in Thinking About Security,” 274.

as the provision of food and basic needs—into academic studies in order to provide greater security for Third World in the long term.²⁹⁴

Caroline Thomas is one of the authors that has attempted to broaden the scope of the discussion of Third World security. She perceives the provision of basic human needs as an important dimension of internal (national) security and defines security in terms of secure systems of food, health, money and trade.²⁹⁵ She emphasizes that Third World states have found themselves born into an economic structure that worked against their needs and they perceive themselves as locked into this structure “from which for many there has seemingly been no escape.”²⁹⁶ They are dissatisfied with the rules of the international trade and their efforts to obtain a more secure position in the international trading regime have not resulted in any significant improvement.

Third World states also suffer from financial insecurity since most of them are burdened by a huge amount of international debt. They have a thorny relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) whose main function is to provide short-term finance to correct temporary balance of payments problems and to facilitate the smooth functioning of the international free-market economy.²⁹⁷ The Fund is perceived by Third World states as the symbol of the present unjust system. The economic policies of the IMF are informed by the liberal—and particularly neo-liberal since the 1980s—political ideology. This ideology presents global economic integration through the liberalization of trade, investment and finance as the natural and universal path toward economic growth and therefore toward development for all

²⁹⁴ Pettiford, “Changing Conceptions of Security in the Third World,” 301.

²⁹⁵ In her latest writings, Thomas sets comprehensive and equitable development as the precondition for security and shifts the primary object of security from state to human beings and their complex social and economic relations. See, Caroline Thomas, Global Governance, Development and Security (London: Pluto, 2000).

²⁹⁶ Thomas, In Search of Security, 44, 72.

humanity.²⁹⁸ The IMF has generally used international indebtedness as a lever to force indebted countries of the Third World to change economic direction. IMF financial assistance to governments of ailing economies comes with a panoply of conditions known as stabilization packages and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). They have enormous social and political costs for these countries which lack sound welfare systems to cushion their populations against the harsh consequences of these policies that include the lowering of trade barriers, reduction in subsidies and price controls, privatization of state-owned enterprises, minimization of the provision of social services and implementation of deflationary policies.²⁹⁹ Hence, the adjustment programmes imposed by the Fund have been the main obstacle to the achievement of basic welfare and the provision of basic needs such as food, shelter, health and education.

Issues of food and health security deserve great attention because the most fundamental cause of insecurity for the great majority of people in the world, mostly the ones in the Third World, stems from the fact that these two most basic needs cannot be fulfilled. According to Thomas, the food problem in the Third World where overpopulation is a widespread phenomenon appears more as a problem of distribution than one of availability. Starvation and malnutrition—primary causes of poor health together with the lack of clean water—is a man-made situation related to ownership and exchange in addition to production possibilities. At the domestic level, landownership, particularist interests and ethnic dimensions can determine who eats and who starves. At the international level the policies and activities of global governance institutions and multinational corporations intensify food insecurity.³⁰⁰ In

²⁹⁷ Thomas, *In Search of Security*, 39-42.

²⁹⁸ Thomas, *Global Governance, Development and Human Security*, 13.

²⁹⁹ Haynes, *Third World Politics*, 84-85.

³⁰⁰ Thomas, *In Search of Security*, 92-105.

the field of health care, profit-maximization motivated multinational drug companies further complicate the already complicated picture in which drugs reach only a very limited segment of the population.³⁰¹

The widespread inability of Third World governments to fulfill the basic needs of their populations have directed attentions to the relationship between security and development.³⁰² Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat examines the relationship between the physical quality of life and the level of security in a state and argues that there emerges a negative correlation between the two unless the government responds to the psychological needs of the population through greater distributive justice and democratization of the political system. To put it in another way, the failure to accompany improvements in basic needs with greater political participation results in an increase in instability.³⁰³

The same point is also elaborated by Korany and Thomas. They agree that all Third World countries have immediate necessities such as increasing per capita income, a fairer distribution of wealth and the provision of basic needs as food, health and education. However, Thomas maintains that “in contrast to industrialization pattern of the older, advanced Western states, development is expected to take place in Third World states before the unity of the nation is really under way.”³⁰⁴ Moreover, generating balanced economic growth is a long-term process but Third World populations are impatient to receive the benefits of development. There emerges a widening gap between mass demands and the capacity of political systems to cope with these demands. Unsatisfied expectations

³⁰¹ Thomas, *In Search of Security*, 106-117. For arguments that link food and health security with globalization debates in the Third World, see the special issue of *Third World Quarterly* 23:2 (2002) on “Global Health and Governance: HIV/AIDS”.

³⁰² For example, see Emmanuel Hansen, ed., *Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1987).

³⁰³ See Al-Mashat, *National Security in the Third World*.

result in social frustration in the Third World. In Korany's words, "even Third World states that can do well in the enterprise of economic development are not guaranteed escape from the spectre of political instability and insecurity."³⁰⁵ Economic and social development is regarded as a double-edged sword which carries the risk of political instability for Third World governments.³⁰⁶

Thomas points to another danger and argues that the pattern of economic growth militates against unity in many Third World states since the benefits of development are often differentially enjoyed by particular regions, ethnic groups, political party members and government officials.³⁰⁷ She argues that the success of states, measured in terms of GDP per capita, is not reflected in the societies at large and this aggravates socio-economic divisions within weak states. Stratification at the intrastate level becomes an additional source of social tension and unrest.³⁰⁸ Ayoob points to the same issue by arguing that increasing economic disparities in both absolute and relative terms between the developed and underdeveloped states and between the rich and the poor within Third World states renders the issue of elite-mass identification within Third World countries an impossible task to achieve and increases the alienation of large segments of society both from their ruling elites and from the state structures that these elites control.³⁰⁹

Ali Hillal Dessouki is another author that investigates the linkage between security and development in the Third World context in general and in the Arab

³⁰⁴ Thomas, *In Search of Security*, 2.

³⁰⁵ Bahgat Korany, "National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence of Dualism," in *The Arab World Today*, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 171.

³⁰⁶ Sayigh, "Confronting the 1990s," 25.

³⁰⁷ Thomas, *In Search of Security*, 2.

³⁰⁸ Thomas, *Global Governance, Development and Human Security*, 26-27.

³⁰⁹ Ayoob, "Regional Security in the Third World," 12.

world in particular.³¹⁰ He takes underdevelopment as a frame of reference which is bound to influence security conditions and policies in the Third World. He presents a developmental perspective on security which he defines in opposition to the military perspective, and places issues other than military ones under this category. Accordingly he identifies three interrelated elements of the developmental dimension of (national) security in the Third World: the contradiction between societal fragmentation and the need for security consensus, the crisis of low institutionalization and weak legitimacy, and asymmetry between increasing population and available resources. What he calls the 'developmental dimension of security' roughly corresponds to the 'software side of national security' that was discussed in the previous section. He argues that this perspective demonstrates the link between internal and external aspects of security and the importance of non-state actors (different social and political groups contending for security and international institutions like IMF) in threat perceptions and security policies.

Moreover, he borrows from the terminology of peace research and makes a distinction between negative security and positive security.

The negative meaning refers to the prevention of war and the existence of relative balance of power between states and blocs. The positive meaning refers to the termination of violence in all its forms—physical, structural and psychological. In this view, security is a process and condition of human self-fulfillment and social welfare. Like peace, security promotes the values of equality, fairness and distributive justice; its normative aspects aspire for a human world, a world whose security ultimately rests on the quality of its social relations.³¹¹

For Dessouki, positive security can be achieved through development. However, he refrains from establishing a linear or causal relationship between development and security and maintains that development may not necessarily lead to security in all

³¹⁰ See Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "Dilemmas of Security and Development in the Arab World: Aspects of the Linkage," in *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World*, eds. Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble, and Rex Brynen (London: Macmillan, 1993) 76-90.

situations. Like the others, he directs attention to the destabilizing effects of development and modernization. His argument suggests that these two processes carry the risks of unleashing social forces in new directions with potential spillover to other countries, increasing the potential for arousing group sentiments and creating an environment for communal conflicts. He also argues that economic development is a necessary but insufficient condition for the maintenance of security, and that it should not be separated from policies of distributive justice and avenues for political participation. However, he notes that accompanying political development, understood as democratization, may cause further instability in these countries. Although democratic structures are more conducive to stability and security, political pluralism and multipartism may lead to political paralysis and further fragmentation in an already fragmented society.³¹²

Ayoob expresses the same concern and claims that “democratization by itself is unlikely to solve the problem of conflicts within states unless it is accompanied by a concentration of the instruments of violence in the hands of the state.”³¹³ For Ayoob, security enjoyed by the state together with the maintenance of internal political order is the precondition for development.³¹⁴ This is in sharp contrast with the arguments that perceive development as a prerequisite for security. Besides, he argues that economic and social issues such as debt burdens and famine can become integral components of the security calculus in the Third World only if they become acute enough to take on overtly political dimensions and threaten “the survivability of state boundaries, state institutions, or governing elites or dramatically weaken the capacity of states and regimes to act effectively in the realm of politics, both

³¹¹ Dessouki, “Dilemmas of Security and Development in the Arab World,” 82.

³¹² Dessouki, “Dilemmas of Security and Development in the Arab World,” 82-83.

³¹³ Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism,” 49.

³¹⁴ Ayoob, “The Security Predicament of the Third World State,” 64.

domestic and international.”³¹⁵ He criticizes Thomas for offering a too-broad definition of security which is analytically useless and politically dangerous.³¹⁶ This criticism rests on the idea that an expanded threat agenda will overload Third World regimes when they are still busy providing internal order.³¹⁷

2.7 Conclusion

Chapter II has argued that Third World security scholars considered the Third World as a distinct collective entity and a separate security realm, and Third World states as a different category of international actor. They drew a distinction between the security needs and interests of the states in the Third World and those in the West. They aimed to re-conceptualize security for Third World settings and from Third World states’ point of view. Their studies focused on domestic variables and regional factors peculiar to the Third World in order to better capture the complex nature of Third World security needs. These studies also examined the impact of the international system, its norms and structure on the security condition of the Third World.

The writings of Third World security scholars have provided an alternative framework for analyzing various dimensions of the Third World security predicament through addressing a whole range of issues not found in traditional analyses. Their work has made significant contributions to the academic field by bringing the analysis of the state back into Security Studies, broadening the security agenda, and emphasizing the role of existing power structures (especially the structure of the international economic system) in engendering insecurity in the Third

³¹⁵ Ayoob, “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective,” 130.

³¹⁶ Ayoob, “The Security Problematic of the Third World,” 259.

World.³¹⁸ These writings constitute a crucial corrective to the external-oriented Cold War conceptions of security and shed light on the neglected domestic political dimension of insecurity in the Third World.³¹⁹

There is a consensus among these writers that Third World states face a struggle in every dimension of their domestic activity and also face a great challenge in consolidating their state structures. Since these weak state structures are considered as the cause for Third World states' internal and external vulnerability, their work has generally been preoccupied with strengthening these structures and maintaining political order and stability. The economic and social elements of security have been elaborated within the parameters of this political framework and according to their political outcomes. They continued to place the state at the center of their analyses and have been concerned, to a great extent, with the security of the Third World state. In other words, their analyses remained largely state-centric. The criticisms directed at the works of Third World security scholars, and the alternative views are examined in the next chapter.

³¹⁷ Bradley S. Klein, "Conclusion: Every Month is 'Security Awareness Month'," in Critical Security Studies, eds. Michael Williams and Keith Krause (Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 366-367.

³¹⁸ Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, "Security Studies: The Next Stage?" 152.

³¹⁹ Bilgin, "Beyond Statism," 106.

CHAPTER III: CRITICS AND ALTERNATIVES

3.1 Introduction

The end of the Cold War opened up both political and academic space for a critical review of long-held assumptions about politics and security. It fuelled the already existing discontent with the way security was conceptualized during the Cold War and served as a catalyst for a revival in security thinking.³²⁰ The post-Cold War era has witnessed lively debates within the academy in general and within IR in particular, about how the concept of security—contested even during the Cold War—should be reformulated to adapt to new circumstances.³²¹ The disciplinary debate over the object of study has been accompanied with discussions on the content and purpose of the sub-field of Security Studies.³²²

Established ways of thinking about security have been challenged by a wide range of perspectives in the post-Cold War era. Academics who were critical of the statist and positivist assumptions of traditional security thinking expressed the need to problematize the ‘state’, to rethink the nature of the ‘political’, and to reflect upon the process of ‘theorizing’ itself in Security Studies.³²³ For these scholars, “the traditional assumption that security could be understood and practiced within an inter-state framework...is no longer...considered fit for the study of the security problems faced by a variety of actors around the globe.”³²⁴ Studies provided by these

³²⁰ Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security,” 207; Buzan, “‘Change and Insecurity’ Reconsidered,” 7.

³²¹ Dalby, “Contesting an Essential Concept,” 4.

³²² Krause and Williams, “From Strategy to Security,” 33-59; Smith, “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies,” 72-101.

³²³ Booth, “Security and Self,” 109-112; Walker, “Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics,” 3-27; Dalby, “Contesting an Essential Concept,” 3-31.

³²⁴ Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security,” 207.

scholars offered an understanding of International Relations that does not restrict the terrain of study to political relations between nation-states, but rather takes into consideration various patterns of political relations between states as well as non-state actors that characterize contemporary world politics. They pointed to the security problems faced by non-state actors besides states and put emphasis on the individual, societal and global dimensions of security.³²⁵

These scholars also subjected the arguments developed by Third World security scholars to critical scrutiny, pointing out their relative strengths and weaknesses. This chapter aims to present these criticisms and point out the issues that were not addressed by Third World security scholars. It builds upon the alternative conceptualizations of security offered by critical approaches and makes use of their insights on Third World security.

This chapter is divided into four sections. Each section begins by problematizing the concepts, categories, processes and assumptions on which Third World security scholars built their arguments. Then, examples of alternative understandings are provided. Accordingly, drawing upon the studies of critical scholars, the first section investigates the origins of the concept of 'Third World', questions its explanatory power as a category for analysis and presents the possible consequences of over-reliance on this category. It examines the linkages between the concept of 'Third World' and the development discourse, and reflects upon the relationship between policy making and academic research in the context of Third World theorizing.

The second section examines the arguments of Third World security scholars on the process of 'state-making', whose completion is perceived as the precondition

³²⁵ Bilgin, "Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security," 207.

for security in the Third World. The section is based on a critique of the underlying understanding which ignores the continuity of this process, projects an evolutionary path for Third World state formation that is identical to that of Western states, and fails to take into consideration different possible trajectories for the state-making enterprise. Benefiting from the works of critical scholars, it presents alternative understandings of state formation that account for historical specificities and variations between state formation in different contexts and direct attention to how different types of state-civil society relations relate to the process of state-making.

The third section focuses on the concept of security. It is structured around five key questions ('What is security?', 'Whose security?', 'What threats does the security agenda include?', 'Which principle is the organizing concept for security policies?', 'What are the agents of these security practices?') whose answers constitute the ground for a critical analysis of the assumptions underlying the conceptions of security provided by Third World security scholars. It also elaborates the answers offered by critics and argues that they are more able to address the real security concerns of individuals and social groups in the Third World.

The fourth section casts a critical eye on the strong-state argument and its implications for regional security in the Third World. Drawing upon the works of critical security scholars, it presents an alternative regional security perspective that incorporates the idea of building regional security communities and suggests moving beyond Westphalian state forms in the search for security.

3.2 "Third World" as the Object of Study

As Chapter II showed, Third World security scholars consider the Third World as a distinct collective entity and Third World states as a different category of

international actor. While acknowledging the existence of diversity—especially on economic grounds—among this group of states, these scholars argue that the similarities between them exceed their differences and there remain compelling criteria for using the term ‘Third World’ as an analytical category. Mohammed Ayoob defines Third World as “the underdeveloped, poor, weak states of Asia, Africa and Latin America”³²⁶ and argues that the term “has assumed a life of its own” independent of its original usage to distinguish the rest of the world from the advanced capitalist states of the First World and the centrally planned states of the Second World. He contends that while the end of the Cold War rendered the terms First World and Second World redundant, Third World retains its conceptual relevance because of the persistence of its distinctive characteristics.³²⁷

Within this framework, the experience of colonial rule, a fractured social order, extreme weakness in economic, military and technological capabilities compared to the industrialized states of the West are regarded as objective criteria for the continued existence of a ‘Third World’.³²⁸ The most important objective criterion is the striking similarities between these states’ security predicament and the common experiences they share in the security arena, because the chronic insecurity and vulnerability these states face are the determining conditions of their foreign and security policies. Additionally, the subjective criteria point to these states’ sense of belonging to the same category and their conception of a common identity which is based on a perception of peripheralization and victimization.³²⁹

On the other hand, after the 1970s, the demise of collective solidarity in the Third World and the weakening of the ties that bind these states raised the question

³²⁶ Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, 12.

³²⁷ Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, 12-13.

³²⁸ Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, 14-15.

³²⁹ Thomas, In Search of Security, 1-4; MacFarlane, “Taking Stock,” 18-22.

of whether a cohesive Third World coalition still existed. Forums provided by Third World states, such as the G-77 and the NAM, did not live long. Since the 1970s, which saw the climax of Third World efforts at international economic reform with the launch of demands for a new International Economic Order, the collective bargaining power of the Third World has been drastically reduced. It has been argued that the Third World has become less homogenous due to the wide and growing diversity within and between this group of states. This has raised the question as to whether the category 'Third World' might be an impediment than an aid to analysis.³³⁰

The conceptual category of 'Third World' is a locus of contention between Third World security scholars themselves. The term has been mainly criticized for reflecting the structural hierarchy of the Cold War global system which created the Third World problems.³³¹ As MacFarlane maintains, "the recent literature proposes numerous alternative terms to describe this group of states, among them the 'South', in a North-South dichotomy; the 'Periphery', in a 'Core-Periphery' juxtaposition; and the 'Developing States', in a 'Developed-Developing' dyad."³³² However, these options have also received various criticisms. It is argued that 'the South' is essentially a geographic expression and some states which are categorized under the label 'the North' (e.g. Australia, New Zealand) are in fact located in the geographical south.³³³ Peripherality in the world capitalist economy offers another basis for a definition of the Third World. However, it creates a boundary problem likewise; since some Third World states appear to be leaving the periphery and joining the core (e.g. the Southeast Asian states) while there exist reasonably well-defined

³³⁰ Louise Fawcett, "Regionalism in Historical Perspective," in Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and Internal Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 26-27.

³³¹ Ray, "A View From the Periphery," 18.

³³² MacFarlane, "Taking Stock," 18.

peripheries within the core (e.g. the Scottish Highlands, the Canadian Maritimes, Appalachia, and the decaying urban peripheries of many American and European cities).³³⁴ The term 'Developing States' is criticized on a rather different ground, for having a connotation of development towards some pre-ordained end state or goal which is devoid of a clear definition.³³⁵ In the end, for most of the Third World security analysts the 'Third World' has remained as their central category for analysis.

In the social sciences, general theoretical categories are useful for capturing common elements. Therefore, the merits of using the category of 'Third World' and its explanatory power are recognized to an extent. However, like all categories, it suffers from the exceptions. Krause gives the examples of the newly industrialized countries of East Asia and the case of Latin America (where independence was gained from the colonial powers a century earlier than the African and Asian states and therefore more progress has been made at nation-building) as posing difficulties for this classification.³³⁶ Ayooob does not neglect this point and takes pre-emptive measures against possible criticisms by underlining the fact that "the concept of the Third World may suffer from a degree of inexactness and may be surrounded by controversy. This is more true when the concept is applied to cases that fall at the margins of this category."³³⁷ Therefore he defines the concept as having flexible boundaries which "helps the analyst use the term to encompass marginal and recent cases without losing sight of the contested nature of the concept's application to such cases."³³⁸

³³³ Haynes, Third World Politics, 5.

³³⁴ MacFarlane, "Taking Stock," 18-19.

³³⁵ Haynes, Third World Politics, 5.

³³⁶ Keith Krause, "Theorizing Security, 133.

³³⁷ Ayooob, The Third World Security Predicament, 13.

³³⁸ Ayooob, The Third World Security Predicament, 13.

Nevertheless, the main criticism asserts that over-reliance on the concept of Third World results in the reification of this category. As Krause argues, the potential danger here is that it can serve to “reinforce Western tendencies to see these regions as an undifferentiated zone of turmoil contrasted to the Northern zone of peace.”³³⁹ In other words, it bears the possibility of strengthening the Two-Worlds view which, according to Buzan, traditionally carries a strong element of inequality and can be perceived as a formal attempt to classify Third World states as ‘unequal’.³⁴⁰ Pinar Bilgin and A. David Morton have argued that the practical implication of the Two Worlds approach is that it obscures the mutually constitutive relationship between the two spheres.³⁴¹ It fails to question the historical process through which security in the zone of peace emerged at the expense of insecurity at the zone of conflict. This understanding also lacks appreciation of certain practices within the global political economic context (such as arms exports from the ‘zone of peace’ to the ‘zone of conflict’) that sustain the unequal structural relationships between the two zones. Instead, becoming ‘strong’ and joining the ‘liberal’ world is presented as the only alternative for the ‘weak’ states of the world.³⁴² A similar kind of criticism goes for the literature’s unquestioning adoption of and over-reliance on the category of ‘weak’ state, its continual reference to ‘absences’ of Third World histories and preoccupation with ‘failures’ of Third World states to replicate the Western experience.³⁴³ These are criticized for lacking a critical examination of the colonial experience of these states and “the aftereffects of the unequal encounter with

³³⁹ Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 133.

³⁴⁰ Buzan, “System versus Units,” 220.

³⁴¹ Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 68.

³⁴² Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 68-69.

³⁴³ Niva, “Contested Sovereignties,” 149-151.

Western colonialism,”³⁴⁴ therefore, missing the crucial point of how “these states have become ‘weak’ while other gained ‘strength’.”³⁴⁵

Viewing the concept of ‘Third World’ with critical lenses, Bilgin and Morton argue that the term reflects “particular ways of thinking about, acting upon and (re)presenting post-colonial states, which, in turn, facilitated certain policies while marginalizing others.”³⁴⁶ According to the writers, the study of the non-Western world under the label ‘Third World’ is a continuation of the imperial understanding and the Orientalist approach which gave an intellectual backing to Western domination over these lands by helping to keep the distance and reinforcing inequalities between the Western colonial powers and peoples of the colonies.³⁴⁷ During the Cold War, the hegemonic pretensions of the USA urged US social scientists to produce knowledge about the non-industrialized world. Hence emerged the development and modernization models, and various attempts to apply it to the states under the crude classification of ‘Third World’. The political development literature was the product of a certain relationship between policy making and academic research whose primary task was “engendering a ‘doctrine for political development’, based on containing demands for mass participation as a prelude to the dissemination of liberal democracy throughout the post-colonial world.”³⁴⁸ The corollary aim was producing knowledge that would “enable the maintenance of political control over societies that threatened the institutional capacities of ‘Third World’ states.”³⁴⁹ Since US strategic interests favored securing elite power and maintaining obedient and depoliticized civil societies open to capitalism, these works

³⁴⁴ Niva, “Contested Sovereignties,” 150.

³⁴⁵ Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 66.

³⁴⁶ Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 56-57.

³⁴⁷ Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 58.

³⁴⁸ Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 60.

³⁴⁹ Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 61.

underlined the importance of strong state capabilities within post-colonial states to shape and contain societal forces and establish political order. Moreover, as Bilgin and Morton maintain, state strength was simplistically reduced to an “empirically observable capacity to manipulate (usually) coercive resources resulting in an anti-democratic overtone of control and subordination.”³⁵⁰ State political institutions and societal forces were persistently counterpoised in these studies while specific patterns of state-society relations in post-colonial states were overlooked.

The work of Bilgin and Morton reflects upon the relationship between policy making (power) and academic research (knowledge) in the context of “Third World” theorizing, and illustrates clearly how various representations of post-colonial states enable certain policies which serve the economic, political and security interests of those who employ them.³⁵¹ Their piece investigates how ‘Third World’ was constituted and reproduced through the production of knowledge, discursive practices and certain policy preferences. The writers argue that ‘Third World’ is one of those generic representations that abstracts the post-colonial state from its socio-historical context. And more importantly, it bears the potential to facilitate certain security practices while marginalizing the security interests of social groups and individuals living in these states. In a similar way, Arturo Escobar contends that the production of the Third World through the articulation of knowledge and power, and with the help of the discourses and practices of development creates an image that universalizes and homogenizes socioeconomic, cultural and political specificities / particularities of post-colonial states in an ahistorical fashion.³⁵² Even worse, this

³⁵⁰ Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 63.

³⁵¹ Bilgin and Morton argue that the logic of this labelling process continues to show itself in the representations of ‘failed’ and ‘rogue’ states and provides the intellectual background for the post-Cold War security policies of the USA.

³⁵² Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) 5-8.

image creates certain mind-sets that do not seem to go away. As Escobar states, even today most people in the West (and many parts of the Third World) have great difficulty thinking about Third World situations and people in terms other than those stereotypical signifiers (such as underdevelopment, overpopulation, poverty, famine, illiteracy and the like) that are provided by the development discourse.³⁵³

These critical voices suggest moving beyond oversimplified categories and grand generalizations and indicate the need for the reconstruction of post-colonial states through alternative representations that can develop into alternative practices. According to Bilgin and Morton, this can be possible with a more historicized understanding of post-colonial statehood which takes into consideration historical and contemporary circumstances that have been constitutive of these states.³⁵⁴ This argument links this section to the next one, which questions the assumption that Third World states need to follow the Western model of state development in order to achieve security.

3.3 Understanding of the State-Making Process

Academic studies that examine the relationship between the process of state-making and Third World security, which are mostly advanced by Mohammed Ayooob, are appreciated for their inclusion of the historical dimension of state formation in analyzing the security predicament of Third World states, and therefore for their acknowledgement of the historicity of security.³⁵⁵ However, they are criticized mainly on two grounds. First, it is assumed that the process of state-making has a

³⁵³ Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 12.

³⁵⁴ Bilgin and Morton, "Historicizing Representations," 70. Mustapha Kamal Pasha develops a similar argument that calls for a reconstruction of state-civil society relations inside the state, in which both state and civil society are accorded important roles. Mustapha Kamal Pasha, "Security as Hegemony," *Alternatives* 21:3 (1996) 293.

definable end point. This is evidenced in Ayoob's treatment of the Western state as a "finished" project. However, a critical understanding asserts that state formation (and transformation) is an ongoing process. After all, the state is always in the process of being constituted and re-constituted by the practices of statecraft and never arrives at a final moment of completion.³⁵⁶ This is not the case only for Third World states but for every state. As Sorensen puts it,

There is no point where states can sit back, relax and exclaim, 'We are finally there! We have made it to strong statehood, let us go no further.' Both juridical and substantial aspects of statehood change over time in response to the external as well as the internal interplay between states and societies. Current changes in Western Europe exemplify these developments. They point to a situation in which the military threats is in increasing retreat, while there are new dangers and security problems to confront.³⁵⁷

Keith Krause argues that if Ayoob had recognized the continuity of this process, his analysis of state-making would not have been confined to the Third World but the entire problematic of Security Studies would have been recast, for both the North and the South, around the concept he develops.³⁵⁸

Another flaw related to the historical end point argument is Ayoob's ahistorical understanding of legitimacy. In a way similar to his conception of the Western industrialized states as 'complete', he argues that these states and regimes which preside over these state structures have, unlike their Third World counterparts, acquired 'unconditional' legitimacy in the eyes of their own citizens. He sets it as the ideal to be approached. Nevertheless, it reflects a static understanding of legitimacy, which, once gained, becomes fixed and invariable. However, in contrast with Ayoob's assertion, conditionality lies at the heart of legitimacy. The claim of the

³⁵⁵ Krause, "Theorizing Security," 130; Krause, "Insecurity and State Formation in the Global Military Order," 324.

³⁵⁶ Richard Devetak, "Incomplete States: Theories and Practices of Statecraft," in Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations, eds. John Macmillan and Andrew Linklater (London: Pinter, 1995) 19-39.

state to loyalty and legitimacy is conditioned by its ability to remove organized violence from political life, to provide at least the minimal conditions for order, and to support some measure of representativeness in its political institutions.³⁵⁹ Thus, the legitimacy of a state or a regime may be lost if they fail to fulfill the conditions mentioned above. The issue of legitimacy, like the state and state formation, is located in an evolving context and is subject to historical change.

Second, Ayoob is criticized for projecting an evolutionary path for Third World state formation that is identical to that of Western states.³⁶⁰ Smith argues that Ayoob's understanding "involves a teleological assumption that Third World states need to follow the Western model of state development."³⁶¹ According to Krause, Ayoob's Western-centric presentation of state-making is

a linear process that can be compressed or extended, but which has only one outcome. This argument echoes now-discredited modernization theory and is in harmony with a Waltzian realism that sees stasis after the historical crystallization of the state system.³⁶² However, critics suggest that it is a mistake to posit parallel historical paths between the European experience of state formation and that of the Third World. Drawing on the works of Charles Tilly and Robert Jackson, they argue that Third World state formation will be different from Western state formation because it is occurring in a different historical context.³⁶³ Although Ayoob does not neglect circumstantial differences, he insists on replicating the historical experience of European state-making in a much shorter time.

Nevertheless, as Bilgin reminds, the Western European state-building experience was "a long, brutal and often violent process" in which "there is very

³⁵⁷ Georg Sorensen, "Individual Security and National Security: The State Remains the Principal Problem," *Security Dialogue* 27:4 (1996) 380.

³⁵⁸ Krause, "Theorizing Security," 133-134.

³⁵⁹ Krause, "Theorizing Security," 132.

³⁶⁰ Krause, "Insecurity and State Formation," 324.

³⁶¹ Smith, "The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies," 83.

little...to be idealized.”³⁶⁴ According to Barnett, by perceiving the use of force as an integral part of the state-making enterprise that inevitably accompanies the process of state consolidation, Ayoob gives political backing to state repression carried out in the name of state-making.³⁶⁵ When compounded with his explicit argument that any outside interference is both unwelcome and counterproductive when Third World leaders are still busy with state-making, Ayoob’s move sounds like a request for Western states to turn a blind eye to intrastate violence and predatory behaviour of some ruling regimes in the Third World for the purposes of consolidation of state authority.³⁶⁶ This is why Barnett criticizes Ayoob’s theory for being in alliance with authoritarian leaders that oppress their people in the quest for domestic order.³⁶⁷

Moreover, Krause criticizes Ayoob for failing to benefit adequately from the valuable insights provided by scholars of state formation on the complex matrix of state/society relationship and different possible paths for the state-making enterprise.³⁶⁸ Ayoob borrows mainly from the work of Charles Tilly regarding the historical experiences of state-making in Western Europe.³⁶⁹ As summarized by Krause, the main argument of Tilly’s work is that the main impetus for consolidation of national states in Europe was preparation for and actual fighting of wars. The need of the state-makers to extract and mobilize resources from the society in order to feed their war machines resulted in the development of new political and socio-economic institutions; in other words, professional bureaucracies. Although state-makers started

³⁶² Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 132.

³⁶³ Barnett, “Radical Chic? Subaltern Realism: A Rejoinder,” 61; Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 132.

³⁶⁴ Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 108.

³⁶⁵ Barnett, “Radical Chic?” 61.

³⁶⁶ Barnett, “Radical Chic?” 60-61.

³⁶⁷ Barnett, “Radical Chic?” 61.

³⁶⁸ Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 130-133.

³⁶⁹ For the original work of Charles Tilly, see “War-making and State-making as Organized Crime,” in *Bringing the State Back in*, eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990*

by extracting sources for war-making in return for providing security to the society against both internal and external threats, over time this required the forging of broader alliances with the society. The bargain between agents of states and civilian groups that controlled these resources gave the civilian groups enforceable claims on the state and resulted in a civilianization of government and domestic politics.³⁷⁰

According to Krause, while it provides a valuable analysis of the European state-making process, "Tilly's European 'model' of state-formation had many historical variations and...does not encompass the only possible historical paths for newly-independent or emerging states."³⁷¹ He points to three analytic difficulties of a straightforward application of this model to the developing world. First, its evolutionary dynamics do not work in *quasi-states*. Since their judicial sovereignty is sustained by international norms, they are not affected by the contradictions of their politics and societies. Second, the model fails to explain the emergence of *rentier* or predator states such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia or other resource-rich new states. Since these states have autonomous revenue sources, they do not need to extract sources from their population and do not need to negotiate their state power with social groups. Instead, state power is imposed on the society. Third, different international circumstances in which most post-1945 states undertake their state-building projects (characterized by the extreme subordination, dependence and powerlessness of these states, and the general absence of major interstate wars) prevents the creation of states in the strict European image.³⁷²

An alternative understanding of state formation is found in Bilgin and Morton's study. Accounting for historical specificities and variations between state

(Cambridge: Basic Blackwell, 1990); The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

³⁷⁰ Krause, "Insecurity and State Formation," 325-326.

³⁷¹ Krause, "Insecurity and State Formation," 326.

formation in different contexts, and accomodating state-civil society relations in a broader framework of production relations and accumulation processes, they direct attention to how social forces relate to state formation.³⁷³ Building upon the work of Antonio Gramsci, they argue that an understanding of 'integral state' provides an opportunity to re-conceptualize the process of state-formation and to consider different forms of state.

The state should be understood...not just as the apparatus of government operating within the 'public' sphere (government, political parties, military) but also as part of the 'private' sphere of civil society (church, media, education) through which hegemony functions.³⁷⁴

"Hegemony" is the keyword here, which expresses

a unity between objective material forces and ethico-political ideas—in Marxian terms, a unity of structure and superstructure—in which power based on dominance over production is rationalised through an ideology incorporating compromise and consensus between dominant and subordinate groups.³⁷⁵

When the state is perceived, from a Gramscian perspective, as the instrument through which ruling social classes establish hegemony, then alternative scenarios for state formation appear as a result of the struggle over hegemony between social forces.³⁷⁶

Benefiting from the works of Jean François Bayart and Crawford Young, Bilgin and Morton cite possible scenarios of state formation for post-colonial states under the light of their distinct historicities, political trajectories and social foundations. These are

scenarios of "conservative modernisation", where already established groups maintain their power (ie Nigeria, Burundi); "social revolution", where the downfall of dominant groups might transpire (ie Zambia, Rwanda); "paroxytic repression", based on a recurring lack of hegemony (ie Angola, Chad, Mozambique); or, most likely, the "reciprocal assimilation of elites", indicating the absorption of

³⁷² Krause, "Insecurity and State Formation," 326-327.

³⁷³ Bilgin and Morton, "Historicizing Representations," 70-74.

³⁷⁴ Bilgin and Morton, "Historicizing Representations," 71.

³⁷⁵ Robert Cox, "Labor and Hegemony," *International Organization* 31 (1977) 387.

³⁷⁶ Bilgin and Morton, "Historicizing Representations," 71-73.

challenges to dominant elites through state-civil society relations (ie Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania).³⁷⁷ In contrast to the conventional understanding that separates the state from civil society, this alternative understanding conceives the post-colonial state "in relation to the social structure on which it is built."³⁷⁸ The authors further assert that this is not a static analysis of state formation. Far from that, it is a generative conception of state formation that is cognisant of the fact that this process is subject to both specific historical conditions and contemporary influences.³⁷⁹ They also emphasize the role of informal networks in places where bureaucratic state institutions cease to function effectively. They note the possibility that these patrimonial networks, which already operate as shadow states (such as warlordism in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zaire; clan-based forms of identity in Somalia, or other ethnic and religious forms of identity including kinship and witchcraft) may reorganize political authority and create alternative forms of sovereignty with their practices.³⁸⁰

3.4 Conceptualization of Security

Academics from critical perspectives draw attention to the derivative character of the concept of security. They maintain that our conceptions of security depend on the particular philosophical and political worldview we have.³⁸¹ In other words, often unvoiced assumptions and deeper theoretical inclinations shape our understanding of what and to whom the term security refers.³⁸² Ken Booth and Peter Vale argue that answering the questions 'What is security?', 'Whose security are we concerned

³⁷⁷ Bilgin and Morton, "Historicizing Representations," 73.

³⁷⁸ Bilgin and Morton, "Historicizing Representations," 72.

³⁷⁹ Bilgin and Morton, "Historicizing Representations," 73.

³⁸⁰ Bilgin and Morton, "Historicizing Representations," 74.

³⁸¹ R.B.J. Walker, "The Subject of Security," in *Critical Security Studies*, eds. Michael Williams and Keith Krause (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 61-81; Booth, "Security and Self," 106-107; Stamnes and Wyn Jones, "Burundi: A Critical Security Perspective," 41; Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, "Security Studies: The Next Stage?" 151-153.

³⁸² Krause and Williams, "From Strategy to Security," 34.

with?', 'What threats is the security agenda composed of?', 'What is the organizing concept for security policies?' and 'What are the agents of these security practices?' is not a value-free, objective matter of describing the world 'as it is'. Instead, it is a profoundly political act that has enormous implications for the theory and practice of security in specific places.³⁸³ Drawing upon these arguments, this section focuses on different answers given to these five questions. It examines the assumptions that underlie these answers and their theoretical and practical implications for security in the Third World. Especially the first three questions are closely intertwined, therefore they will be elaborated on together.

When Mohammed Ayoob's formulation of security is elaborated within this framework, it is observed that his definition of security is "explicitly political in character."³⁸⁴ Since the state is the primary actor of his conceptualization of political space, he restricts the definition of security to the political survival and effectiveness of states and regimes, and defines the concept in terms of how state institutions and regime survival will be affected.³⁸⁵ However, Krause criticizes Ayoob for conflating state security and regime security, and maintains that playing down the differences between these two is analytically unhelpful within the Third World context. According to Krause, there is no explanatory value in placing the case of Africa in the same category with South America since threats are directed to the state structures that possess only low levels of legitimacy in the former, whereas threats are mostly directed to the authoritarian and repressive regimes rather than state boundaries and institutions in the latter. Moreover, he indicates that these cases have different implications. Different prescriptions might be made in each case, for

³⁸³ Booth and Vale, "Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity," 335.

³⁸⁴ Ayoob, "Defining Security," 130.

³⁸⁵ Ayoob, "Defining Security," 128-130.

“regime insecurities can be caused simply by the behaviour of the regime itself, while *state* insecurities have deeper...roots.”³⁸⁶

Ayoob’s conception of ‘the political’ from which he derives his understanding of security, has also received criticism for being too narrow and privileging the state.³⁸⁷ First, borrowing from the work of David Easton, Ayoob maintains that “political life concerns all those varieties of activity that influence significantly the kind of authoritative policy adopted for a society and the way it is put into practice.”³⁸⁸ He defines ‘the political’ as “the arena of human activity that is concerned with ‘the authoritative allocation of values for a society.’”³⁸⁹ Because he thinks that it is the ‘state’ which is, or is “supposed to be”³⁹⁰ engaged in this business, he places the state at the center of his analysis. However his conception of political is based on an understanding that separates the public sphere from the private sphere of (civil) society³⁹¹ in which the state is perceived only as the apparatus of government operating within the public sphere. Therefore, his understanding of security does not incorporate the security needs and practices of civil society. On the other hand, as discussed in the previous chapter, critics maintain that the realm of the political is inseparable from the realm of civil society within modern states. According to this line of reasoning, rather than restricting the definition of the state to the government apparatus, the state should be perceived also as a part of the private sphere of civil society.³⁹² If the meaning of political is

³⁸⁶ Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 129.

³⁸⁷ Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 129; Booth, review of The Third World Security Predicament, 603.

³⁸⁸ Ayoob, Defining Security, 129.

³⁸⁹ Ayoob, “Defining Security,” 129.

³⁹⁰ Ayoob, “Defining Security,” 129.

³⁹¹ From a Gramscian perspective, ‘civil society’ can be defined as “the network of institutions and practices in society that enjoy some autonomy from the state, and through which groups and individuals organize, represent and express themselves to each other.” Stephen Hobden and Richard Wyn Jones, “Marxist Theories of International Relations,” in The Globalization of World Politics, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 210.

³⁹² Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 69-71.

extended to include the network of complex social and economic relations, institutions and practices of groups and individuals in a society as such, a more comprehensive understanding of security can be developed.³⁹³

Second, Ayooob equates security with order and perceives the state as the “sole and indispensable provider of order within territorially organized polities.”³⁹⁴ Therefore, the state becomes the primary referent of security in his studies.³⁹⁵ However, as Bilgin notes, giving primacy to the security of the state just because it is the state that acts for security is confusing agents and referents, and therefore means and ends.³⁹⁶ Stamnes and Wyn Jones also underline that while states may in some cases be providers of security, and are regarded as an important element in the politics of security, this does not mean that they should be privileged as referents for the theory and practice of security.³⁹⁷

The answer to the question ‘whose security?’ frames the threat agenda. As a result of accepting the state as the ultimate security referent, Ayooob resists the creation of a broader security agenda and does not address threats that are relevant at levels of individual and group living other than the state.³⁹⁸ He opposes an expanded concept of security that includes its horizontal (economic, societal, gender and environmental issues as well as political and military) and vertical dimensions (the security of individuals, relevant groups of all kinds including states and humankind

³⁹³ Bilgin and Morton, “Historizing Representations,” 69-71; Thomas, Global Governance, Development and Human Security, 5-7.

³⁹⁴ Ayooob, “The Case for Subaltern Realism,” 39.

³⁹⁵ Ayooob, “Defining Security,” 129.

³⁹⁶ Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 109.

³⁹⁷ Stamnes and Wyn Jones, “Burundi,” 42.

³⁹⁸ Drawing upon the work of Hedley Bull, Ayooob explains his lack of attention for the security concerns of social groups and individuals in the Third World on the grounds that “the international system has not yet progressed from being an international society to that of a world society.” Ayooob, “The Case for Subaltern Realism,” 46. According to Bull, ‘international society’ is composed of sovereign states that share some common interests and conceive themselves as being related to each other in the context of common rules and institutions. On the other hand, ‘world society’ points to a normative order that gives priority to the cosmopolitan value of justice for individuals rather than

as a whole).³⁹⁹ His rejection is based on the assumption that without the provision of internal political order by the state, every other form of security remains elusive, and social and individual values cannot be realized.⁴⁰⁰ Mustapha Kamal Pasha is critical of Ayoob's assumption that state security will provide the achievement of other societal goals in the Third World. On the contrary, he argues that the pursuit of security through state-making and nation building has neither created a more viable and democratic polity nor a vigorous civil society in the South Asian case. Even worse, civil society has bought into the agenda of the 'national security' project and has become the site of reproduction of statist discourses.⁴⁰¹

Ayoob is criticized for presenting a statist conception of security which prioritizes the security concerns of the states and its representatives while marginalizing those of individuals and social groups in the Third World.⁴⁰² According to Michael Barnett, this understanding celebrates postcolonial states in a way that completely excludes their citizens. He suggests that Ayoob's theory fails to represent the 'subaltern' because his framework does not express the concerns of the 'less powerful majority,' but serves to silence them. Instead, Ayoob's perspective elevates the interests of Third World regimes which find themselves beset by security challenges, and are obsessed with preserving an order that benefits them. Even worse, it is the societal groups and individuals—the true subalterns, which are

states. See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

³⁹⁹ Barry Buzan made the key move to broaden the security agenda by presenting a framework that encompasses political, economic, societal, environmental dimensions of security as well as the military sector. He also mentioned the sub-state (the individual) and supra-state (international system as a whole) levels of security. Nevertheless the state remained as the referent object that stands at the interface between the security dynamics operating at these two levels. See, Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983).

⁴⁰⁰ Ayoob, "Defining Security," 128-134.

⁴⁰¹ Pasha, "Security as Hegemony," 284-287.

⁴⁰² Bilgin, "Beyond Statism," 107.

constructed as 'threats' by these regimes.⁴⁰³ Ayooob defends his argument on the grounds that his main task is to explain "the dominant concerns of Third World state elites and the major determinants of Third World state behaviour."⁴⁰⁴ However, as Booth and Krause maintain, it does not justify his problematic conception of security which sacrifices reality at the altar of analytical neatness.⁴⁰⁵

The crucial problem with this understanding is that it is not in accordance with the empirical picture since "the most important threats to security in the Third World arise *from* states and regimes, and are directed *against* individuals and communal groups."⁴⁰⁶ The case study of Burundi by Eli Stamnes and Richard Wyn Jones clearly illustrates that any attempt to privilege the state as the provider of security is "simply grotesque"⁴⁰⁷ in the Burundian context because the state with the minority-ruled government has been the major source of insecurity for the greater proportion of its population ever since it gained its independence in 1962. The Hutu majority has been excluded from public life, knowledge and wealth, and on several occasions the state's armed forces have carried out massacres against the majority in which tens of thousands have been slaughtered and many others have been forced to flee the country.⁴⁰⁸ Another example is provided by Ken Booth and Peter Vale's analysis of southern Africa which indicates that the state has been the main problem rather than a solution, and state security has often been hostile to human security in the southern African context. They maintain that the states in this part of the world do not match the textbook images of Anglo-American political science and they

⁴⁰³ Barnett, "Radical Chic?" 56-57.

⁴⁰⁴ Ayooob, The Third World Security Predicament, 11.

⁴⁰⁵ Booth, review of The Third World Security Predicament, 604; Krause, "Theorizing Security," 128-129.

⁴⁰⁶ Krause, "Theorizing Security," 129. For a similar argument, see Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 140.

⁴⁰⁷ Stamnes and Wyn Jones, "Burundi," 46.

⁴⁰⁸ Stamnes and Wyn Jones, "Burundi," 43-48.

“have not stood as reliable watch-keepers over the security of their inhabitants.”⁴⁰⁹

Additionally, they remind as of the fact that during the apartheid years, ‘national security’ for the South African state meant security only for the white minority and insecurity for the vast majority of citizens.⁴¹⁰

Behind these criticisms lies an understanding of security which gives primacy to the security of human beings over that of states. It signals a change in the referent of security. Security scholars adopting critical lenses acknowledge that ‘human security’ is the primary concern for the overwhelming majority of people on this planet,⁴¹¹ and the state is the major source of insecurity for the lives of the people in many parts of the world. In Booth’s words,

For many people and groups in the world, their chief security threat is the very government under whose sovereignty they live, either through its power and oppressive policies, or as a result of its incapacity to sustain the infrastructure of life for everybody.⁴¹²

According to Caroline Thomas, the state is not the only form of ‘existing power structures’ which she holds responsible for human insecurity. She argues that

Human insecurity is not some inevitable consequence...Rather, [it] results directly from existing power structures that determine who enjoys the entitlement to security and who does not. Such structures can be identified at several levels, ranging from the global, through the regional, the state and finally the local level.⁴¹³

When examined under the light of Thomas’s arguments, the operation of these structures become even more obvious in most parts of the Third World, where discrimination and oppression is widespread and extreme insecurity is manifested in areas of life that are not usually considered to fall within the purview of traditional security specialists (such as provision of basic needs, economic deprivation,

⁴⁰⁹ Booth and Vale, “Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity,” 333.

⁴¹⁰ Booth and Vale, “Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity,” 333-335.

⁴¹¹ Thomas, Global Governance, Development and Human Security, 4; Nana K. Poku, Neil Renwick and John Glenn, “Human Security in a Globalising World,” in Migration, Globalisation and Human Security, eds. David T. Graham and Nana K. Poku (London and New York: Routledge, 2000) 9-22.

⁴¹² Ken Booth, “A Security Regime in Southern Africa,” 5.

⁴¹³ Thomas, Global Governance, Development and Human Security, 4.

environmental degradation, mass migration and refugee flows, drug traffic, social injustice, human rights violations, internal violence and politics of identity).⁴¹⁴ According to the proponents of critical approaches, if the lack of provision of basic needs such as subsistence, housing, health and education, or oppressive power structures (whether at the local, national or global level) are the main sources of insecurity for, and have life-and-death relevance to, many people on the planet, and if the search for security is an attempt to create a less threatening structural context for life's ordinary struggles, then these issues should be included in the security agenda.⁴¹⁵ Therefore, they favor a horizontally and vertically expanded notion of security to have fuller agendas that covers all those issues that endanger insecurity.⁴¹⁶

As Booth and Vale maintains,

[i]f we are serious about human rights, economic development, the lot of women, and so on—all priority security problems for somebody—then we must simply accept the problems of an expanded agenda. We must ask why some security experts might want to keep an issue such as human rights or environmental matters off the security agenda. We must ask it with more than normal curiosity if the person concerned is a supporter of the region's traditional insecurity establishments.⁴¹⁷

Since the term security has an enormous political significance, placing an issue on a state's security agenda gives it priority. Booth and Vale acknowledge that a broadened security agenda risks becoming overloaded. However, they assert that it cannot be a justification for leaving the agenda in the hands of traditional security specialists that maintain statist, militarized and masculinized definitions of what should have priority in security terms. After all, they think that placing threats in order of priority is a problem that has to be resolved in the political process.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁴ Stamnes and Wyn Jones, "Burundi," 40, 49.

⁴¹⁵ Booth, "A Security Regime in Southern Africa," 6.

⁴¹⁶ Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, "Security Studies: The Next Stage?" 155; Ken Booth, "A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations," Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper, February 1994, 4.

⁴¹⁷ Booth and Vale, "Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity," 336.

⁴¹⁸ Booth and Vale, "Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity," 336.

However, scholars of critical security do not simply confine their task to broadening the scope of the subject matter. In fact, they expressed explicit dissatisfaction with the way “new issues and challenges are being subsumed under old (and unexamined) approaches,”⁴¹⁹ such as broadening the security agenda, but staying within a realist framework,⁴²⁰ or expanding the concept of security to include domestic security concerns while retaining a Two-Worlds vision.⁴²¹ Building upon this understanding, in addition to supporting moves to broaden notions of security, critics have also called for its *deepening*.⁴²² Deepening can be explained as “investigating the implications and possibilities that result from seeing security as a concept that derives from different understandings of what politics is and can be all about, and specifically, politics on a global scale.”⁴²³ These scholars reject the definition of politics that places the state and its sovereignty at the center of the subject and the belief that the state is and should be the key guardian of people’s security. Methodologically, they reject the presumptions of positivism and favor an approach which reflects on the process of theorizing itself and raises the possibility

⁴¹⁹ Michael C. Williams and Keith Krause, “Preface: Toward Critical Security Studies,” in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Michael C. Williams and Keith Krause (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) xix.

⁴²⁰ According to Ken Booth, the work of Barry Buzan is a typical example of this. Booth, “Security and Self,” 106.

⁴²¹ Mustafa Kamal Pasha is critical of the emphasis put on the internal aspect of security in the case of Third World states. He argues that this inversion of the standard realist thinking of international relations is no more than bringing the Hobbesian paradox to its original home. He implies that turning the logic of the security dilemma on its head while remaining in a Two-Worlds vision does not help, since inside is assumed to be anarchic now, but threats coming from outside—at least from the zone of conflict—cannot be eliminated. Accordingly, expanding the concept of security to include domestic concerns within this context means tailoring realism to fit the domestic politics and societies of Third World. As a consequence of the attempt to invert the concept of security, “the politics of danger now invades both domestic and international society”, and civil society is abolished altogether. See Pasha, “Security as Hegemony,” 286-287.

⁴²² Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 102-104. It is important to note that the term ‘deepening’ has been also employed to indicate moving up or down to various vertical levels of security (individual, societal, regional and international) in the literature. See, Krause and Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies,” 230. However, it is used to refer to a rather different meaning in this section.

⁴²³ Booth, “Security and Self,” 111.

of choosing a different perspective.⁴²⁴ Thus, a deepened understanding of security “involves a shift from a political perspective rooted in the status quo to one that conceives security in terms of *change*.”⁴²⁵ It “dislodges the state as the primary referent”⁴²⁶ and embraces multiple referents that are in need of security. It also accepts that human security is ultimately more important than state security, and perceives states as the means, not the ends of security.

This understanding is in sharp contrast with the zero-sum notions of the Cold War era, and recognizes the fact that the security of the state is not necessarily synonymous with the security of everyone living within that state, and is even less synonymous with the security of those living in other states. It acknowledges that when the security of *some* is at the expense of *others*, tension is predictable; therefore the correct policy to pursue is one that aims to achieve security *with* others, not *against* them. This cooperative, holistic conception of security embodies an alternative conceptualization of the political which is based on *inclusion* rather than exclusion, and *openness* rather than closure.⁴²⁷ Critics argue that this understanding is more compatible with the security picture of the Third World where internal and external dimensions of security are closely linked with each other. It is also more in accord with the necessities of contemporary world politics marked by interdependence and globalization, since security cannot be secured by the application of traditional national security practices in most cases and many significant threats can only be dealt with through cooperation.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁴ Booth, “Security and Self,” 106.

⁴²⁵ Ken Booth and Peter Vale, “Security in Southern Africa,” *International Affairs* 71:2 (1995) 293.

⁴²⁶ Booth and Vale, “Security in Southern Africa,” 293.

⁴²⁷ Booth, “Security and Self,” 111; Stamnes and Wyn Jones, “Burundi,” 41.

⁴²⁸ Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, “Security Studies: The Next Stage?” 148; Dalby, “Contesting an Essential Concept,” 3-31; R. B. J. Walker, “The Subject of Security,” 65.

The fourth question, 'What is the organizing concept for security policies?' (which principle, or value, is security equated with) constitutes another important point for inquiry. As discussed in Chapter I, traditional security studies have privileged power, order, and the preservation of the status quo in security policy. Mohammed Ayoob adopts this vision and equates security with order. On the other hand, critical voices suggest that the quest for power and order cannot produce genuine security because "absolute power implies no change, and where there is no allowance for change, there is unlikely to be justice."⁴²⁹ Similarly, a particular status quo can deliver order; but in many parts of the world justice requires change.⁴³⁰

The alternative organizing principle introduced by critics is 'emancipation.'⁴³¹ It is defined as "the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do."⁴³² Those constraints involve war and the threat of war, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. The term refers to

an open-ended and ethical conception of politics, the rejection of false necessities in social life, justice as fairness, empowerment and choice, mutual respect of rights, the acceptance of common duties, and the promotion of world-order values such as economic justice, nonviolence, humane governance, ecological sustainability, and human rights.⁴³³

Booth reconceptualizes security as a process of emancipation and argues that privileging emancipation as the main value leads to a focus on people, justice and

⁴²⁹ Ken Booth, "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice," *International Affairs* 67:3 (1991) 539.

⁴³⁰ Booth, "A Security Regime in Southern Africa," 13.

⁴³¹ A specific variant within critical approaches to security is distinguished from the others by its guiding principle, 'emancipation'. Mostly based on the works of Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, and known as the capital C-Critical Security Studies or the Welsh School, this variant not only expresses explicit dissatisfaction with the statism and positivism of traditional Security Studies, but also provides a clear alternative foundation for thinking about security, that is, 'human emancipation'. Smith, "The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies," 89-90.

⁴³² Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991) 319.

⁴³³ Booth and Vale, "Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity," 337.

change.⁴³⁴ He maintains that emancipation can also be conceived as a theory of human self-creation and a guidance for a politics of resistance.⁴³⁵ According to Wyn Jones, it corresponds to a commitment to the development of unfulfilled potential within the actual conflict situation.⁴³⁶ In this sense, the struggles of the oppressed majority in South Africa and the people of southern Africa to emancipate themselves from the apartheid regime and racism exemplifies the ways emancipation is operationalized in practice.⁴³⁷ However, it is also emphasized that emancipation does not have a fixed and timeless meaning, since it may mean different things to people from different cultural surroundings and socio-political contexts.⁴³⁸ It is not a static concept, but contains a theory of progress and is a condition of becoming. As material and other conditions change, so will the goals of emancipation. Therefore, it is more suitable to use the term in its adjective form, as “emancipatory politics,” since it implies movement rather than a condition of being.⁴³⁹

Mohammed Ayoob criticizes the notions of emancipation and emancipatory politics for encouraging divisiveness, carrying a neocolonial bias and tending to impose a model of contemporary Western politics that are far removed from Third World realities.⁴⁴⁰ He argues that while security may be equated with emancipation in Western Europe, “it is intellectually disingenuous to do the same in the case of Third World where basic problems of state legitimacy, political order, and capital accumulation are not only far from being solved but may even be getting more acute.”⁴⁴¹ Ayoob confines the meaning of emancipation to ‘the right of every ethnic group to self-determination’, and argues that its practical implication is disorder and

⁴³⁴ Booth and Vale, “Security in Southern Africa,” 297.

⁴³⁵ Ken Booth, “Three Tyrannies,” 46.

⁴³⁶ Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*, 24-27.

⁴³⁷ Booth and Vale, “Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity,” 337-338.

⁴³⁸ Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, “Security Studies: The Next Stage?” 153.

⁴³⁹ Booth, “Three Tyrannies,” 43-46.

anarchy for Third World states.⁴⁴² However, as highlighted above, the concept of emancipation cannot be restricted to a static, fixed meaning because it is assumed to be 'continuously contextual.'⁴⁴³ In other words, "different peoples in different cultural surroundings and socio-political contexts will attach different meanings the idea."⁴⁴⁴ Ayoob's vision comes from his state-centric lenses and his narrow conception of the political. Nevertheless, emancipation has little to do with state-making; on the contrary, it hints at the diffusion of power above and below the state level and the creation of alternative political communities.⁴⁴⁵ Moreover, Booth underlines the point that while the conception of emancipation recognizes the contributions of Western thinking in developing ideas on human flourishing, it cannot be simply equated with Westernization. He argues that such an act would be contrary to the spirit of emancipation in which there are no final answers and nobody has a monopoly of ultimate truth.⁴⁴⁶ In Booth's words,

There is no reason to suppose that what is taken as Western society today represents the best of all possible worlds, not least because that society does not attain its own best standards, is full of hypocrisy, and in relation to the rest of the world, many of its citizens flourish without questions in the midst of injustice.⁴⁴⁷

In a way that responds to Ayoob's criticisms, Booth further notes that if emancipation is seen as timeless, or as a cloak for Westernization, it is *false* emancipation.⁴⁴⁸ In the end, as Smith concludes, the clash of Ayoob's and Booth's

⁴⁴⁰ Ayoob, "Defining Security," 126-128; 140-141.

⁴⁴¹ Ayoob, "Defining Security," 127.

⁴⁴² Ayoob, "Defining Security," 127.

⁴⁴³ Booth, "Three Tyrannies," 41.

⁴⁴⁴ Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, "The Next Stage?" 153.

⁴⁴⁵ Booth, "Security in Anarchy," 539-542.

⁴⁴⁶ Booth, "Three Tyrannies," 42.

⁴⁴⁷ Booth, "Three Tyrannies," 42.

⁴⁴⁸ Booth, "Three Tyrannies," 41.

visions is a matter of whether one sees the state or the individual as the referent point of security.⁴⁴⁹

Finally, the last question, ‘Who are the agents of security practices?’, leads to a reconsideration of the agency problem in Security Studies. Traditional conceptualizations of security do not pay attention to the agency of non-state actors (such as social movements, non-governmental organizations and intellectuals) in providing for different security needs of those other referents. This is also evidenced in the works of most Third World security scholars.⁴⁵⁰ However, the state cannot be assumed as the only agent for security because there are different agents at different levels that act to promote both their own and wider security. The examples of the 1980s peace movements, 1990s environmental movements, and the case of the 1989 revolutions in Europe are illustrative of how social movements—especially when in relationship with intellectuals—can help in moving beyond statist, military, and zero-sum practices of security and bring about change.⁴⁵¹ Other various examples show that

[w]here some humanitarian groups operate at the domestic level, others cross borders to provide famine relief (e.g. Oxfam). Some movements operate beyond borders to help bring change at home (e.g. Palestinian groups or the Chiapas) whilst others are transnational both in character and scope (e.g. Greenpeace, Amnesty International).⁴⁵²

Bilgin maintains that the organized activities of these non-state actors (referred as ‘foreign policy from below’ or ‘grassroots statecraft’) aim to influence both their

⁴⁴⁹ Steve Smith and Amitav Acharya, “The Concept of Security Before and After September 11,” Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies Working Paper, 23 (2002) 5., available at <http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/WorkingPapers/W23.pdf>. Accessed 24.3.2003.

⁴⁵⁰ The work of Caroline Thomas is an exception, where she calls for the participation of civil societal actors in policy-making at the global level. She also argues that policies imposed by global governance institutions (such as the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization) and adopted by national governments can be altered by the organized resistance of non-state actors to power structures existing at different levels. Thomas, *Global Governance, Development and Human Security*, 13-21; 46-52.

⁴⁵¹ Stamnes and Wyn Jones, “Burundi,” 38-40; Bilgin, “Security Studies: Theory/Practice,” 31-42, Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 113.

⁴⁵² Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, “The Next Stage?” 154.

own and other governments to alter their foreign and security policies.⁴⁵³ In this way, they pose a direct challenge the top-down perspectives of Cold War security thinking. Moreover, “by connecting the personal, political and international, they introduce a new understanding of what it means to act politically.”⁴⁵⁴

Revisioning security in the Middle East from a Critical Security Studies perspective, Bilgin directs attention to the agency of women’s movements and networks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which aimed at bringing alternative futures. Drawing upon the works of Simona Sharoni and Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi, she demonstrates that the Intifada movement can be perceived as a politics of resistance on the part of Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish women in which their cross-border cooperation demonstrated itself in the “adoption of non-statist, non-military practices that questioned and challenged the boundaries of their political communities as they dared to explore new forms of political communities.”⁴⁵⁵ She further notes that their activities included organizing conferences which brought Palestinian and Israeli women together, and taking direct action to alleviate the condition of Palestinians, in which they were aided by their Western European counterparts in terms of financial, institutional and moral support.⁴⁵⁶

In a similar way, Stamnes and Wyn Jones argue that civil-society based initiatives, such as the establishment of a multi-ethnic radio station, have great importance in transcending ethnic boundaries and therefore helping to prepare the ground for a general process of communication and reconciliation in Burundi. The establishment of the Center for Women is also viewed as a hopeful development,

⁴⁵³ Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security,” 216. See also, Pearl-Alice Marsh, “Grassroots Statecraft and Citizens’ Challenges to U.S. National Security Policy,” in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 124-148.

⁴⁵⁴ Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, “The Next Stage?” 154.

⁴⁵⁵ Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 111.

⁴⁵⁶ Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 111-112.

whose efforts range from providing administrative infrastructure and meeting facilities, to training women from different regions and ethnic communities in peaceful conflict resolution techniques. They argue that including individuals and groups—who are not traditionally considered as political actors—in the communication process has an enormous effect on reinforcing and dynamizing the negotiations taking place at both national and provincial levels.⁴⁵⁷

However, it is important to note that these alternative views do not suggest an uncritical reliance on the agency of non-state actors.⁴⁵⁸ Booth points to the agendas and practices of some associations—fascist groups, some fundamentalist religious sects, and so on—that can subvert the process of security building and bring about the very opposite the civilizing of international politics, which he defines as the delegitimizing of the use of force and the promotion of common human values like peace, human rights and justice.⁴⁵⁹ When handled within this context, the case of some Islamic grass-roots movements appears rather problematic. As Bilgin maintains, certain Islamic movements and organizations, such as the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and Hamas in Gaza, offer an alternative social infrastructure (like the provision of food, education, medical treatment and employment opportunities) that delivers security to some people who are often neglected by their own states for political or infrastructural reasons. On the other hand, the violent practices they adopt, often as a part of their strategies that are designed to capture the state mechanism, constitute major threats to the security of some others.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁷ Stamnes and Wyn Jones, "Burundi," 50-52.

⁴⁵⁸ Bilgin, "Re-visioning Security," 23.

⁴⁵⁹ Booth, "A Security Regime," 19.

⁴⁶⁰ Bilgin, "Beyond Statism," 112.

At this point, Bilgin argues, the role of intellectuals becomes crucial in serving as “guides for social movements to lead them to defy traditional forms of resistance that are based on exclusionist identities, that solely aim to capture state power or that adopt zero-sum practices.”⁴⁶¹ Having a special and privileged position within civil society, the roles intellectuals may play range from teaching and writing to getting personally involved in social movements. Likewise, Booth defines the task for academics as

to provide new knowledge and more helpful accounts of world affairs and human lives;...to expose the hypocrisies, inconsistencies, and power plays in language, relationships, and policies;...to engage in dialogues with policy makers in order to try to open the latter’s imaginations and minds about the ways in which concepts might be translated into better (more friendly to people and nature) policies; to expose false ideas and reveal the unstated assumptions of policies; to open up space for thought and action; to help students think for themselves; to develop new and more rational theories about global security; to cast a critical eye on all theories and all exercises of power, including one’s own; and to speak for cosmopolitan values and to speak up for those who do not have a voice.⁴⁶²

He also directs attention to how the teaching of history has served a variety of social and political functions in all southern African countries, especially in South Africa where history teaching was intimately associated with the perpetuation of apartheid regime.⁴⁶³ Taking into consideration the influence academics have on generations, he asserts the need for the idea of teaching a history which stresses the importance of regional cooperation and brings ordinary people to recognize that understanding their shared past is part of the guarantee for a shared future.⁴⁶⁴ This understanding rests on the idea that human beings can *learn* to see themselves as potential common victims

⁴⁶¹ Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 112.

⁴⁶² Booth, “Security and Self,” 115.

⁴⁶³ Booth and Vale, “Regional Insecurity,” 331.

⁴⁶⁴ Booth and Vale, “Security in Southern Africa,” 291-292.

of life's dangers rather than as potential victims of each other.⁴⁶⁵ Further alternative views on regional security will be examined in the next section.

3.5 Strong States, Reification of the Westphalian Order and Regional Security

As examined so far, Buzan and Ayoob equate security with 'strong statehood.' According to their arguments, long-term international and domestic security requires weak states of the world to become stronger (Buzan), and the inadequate states of the Third World to be given time and space to develop their effective and legitimate political apparatuses capable of providing order within their territories (Ayoob).⁴⁶⁶ According to Richard Wyn Jones, Buzan does not remain blind to the fact that states are often a source of danger to their own citizens. However, he argues that the problem is not states themselves but rather particular kinds of states. Buzan's argument suggests that individual security can be obtained where "strong states" (states with a higher degree of internal stability and cohesion) coexist in a "mature anarchy" (a developed international society composed of strong states).⁴⁶⁷

The attempt to distinguish between strong and weak states is acknowledged for its move beyond traditional analyses which assume that the state is a unitary and unproblematic actor.⁴⁶⁸ However, both the logic of the strong state argument and its relation to the theory and practice of security receive various criticisms. First, although the need for building strong states is argued within the Third World context, the underlying assumption is that the strong states of the developed world—Western liberal democracies which are perceived as models to be approximated by the Third World—are successful providers of security. It renders the argument refutable from

⁴⁶⁵ Booth, "A Security Regime in Southern Africa," 17; Booth, "Security and Self," 109.

⁴⁶⁶ Bilgin, "Beyond Statism," 106-107.

⁴⁶⁷ Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory*, 113.

⁴⁶⁸ Tickner, "Re-visioning Security," 186; Bilgin, "Beyond Statism," 106.

within, because “the record of strong states in the developed world does not always back Buzan and Ayooob’s arguments regarding the desirability of building strong states when viewed from the perspective of individuals and social groups.”⁴⁶⁹ As Tickner states

Buzan’s claim that strong states can successfully provide security might be challenged by marginalized groups such as women and minorities, whose economic security is often compromised when military security takes priority...even strong states implement dubious policies that are not always formulated democratically.⁴⁷⁰

Moreover, if a few ‘strong’ states are able to provide relatively more security for their citizens, this is due to their privileged position in the international economic system, “which further deepens the economic insecurity of some others who live in the peripheries of the world.”⁴⁷¹

Ayooob defines adequate stateness as “a balance of coercive capacity, infrastructural power, and unconditional legitimacy.”⁴⁷² Critics acknowledge the need of Third World states to strengthen their infrastructures and boost their legitimacy.⁴⁷³ However, bearing in mind that the process of state consolidation itself is a thorny one, the attempts to strengthen the state apparatus often end up increasing coercive power in a way which detrimentally affects the security of other potential referents at the sub-state level.⁴⁷⁴ In practice, the reasons of (strong) state-building and national security discourse become the pretext for coercive behaviour on part of the state.⁴⁷⁵

The strong-state argument is further criticized for having highly uncomfortable implications in multi-ethnic regions. Booth argues that one possible

⁴⁶⁹ Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 108.

⁴⁷⁰ Tickner, “Re-visioning Security,” 186.

⁴⁷¹ Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 107.

⁴⁷² Ayooob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, 4.

⁴⁷³ Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 107.

⁴⁷⁴ Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 107.

⁴⁷⁵ Barnett, “Radical Chic?” 61-62.

corollary of the concept for southern Africa is 'ethnic cleansing' due to the racist and hypernationalist logic persistent in the region.⁴⁷⁶ Second, bearing in mind that security literally begins at home in this region, Booth and Vale maintain that "those states that can successfully organize diversity will be better able to adapt to the demands of global interdependence than those which look towards the twenty-first century with simple nineteenth-century ethnic nationalist identities."⁴⁷⁷ In other words, the fear of fragmentation should not preclude the celebration of diversity and multiple (often overlapping) identities in a region such as southern Africa which offers a perplexing patchwork of states and identities.⁴⁷⁸

Ayoob expresses the principle concern of the Third World states as "moving toward the ideal of the effective and legitimate state that can become the true repository of sovereign power as envisioned in the Westphalian discourse."⁴⁷⁹ For him, the sovereignty regime seems better than the imaginable alternatives; although it does not promote equality, it at least reduces growing inequalities by protecting Third World states from economic and political penetration of powerful external forces.⁴⁸⁰ He further asserts that moving beyond Westphalia and creating regional confederations based on weak states cannot be a remedy for the security problems of Third World states.⁴⁸¹

As indicated above, the strong-state argument is the reification of the Westphalian order, because according to its underlying assumption, the sovereign state is the only legitimate form of political organization for a community to exist. This understanding obscures some of the post-Westphalian opportunities for wider

⁴⁷⁶ Booth, "A Security Regime," 9-10.

⁴⁷⁷ Booth and Vale, "Security in Southern Africa," 298.

⁴⁷⁸ Booth and Vale, "Regional Insecurity," 349-350.

⁴⁷⁹ Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism," 38.

⁴⁸⁰ Ayoob, "The Case for Subaltern Realism," 38-39; Barnett, "Radical Chic?" 59-60.

⁴⁸¹ Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism," 48.

patterns of governance and excludes the consideration of more positive future alternatives including decentralized and regionalized ones.⁴⁸² Critics maintain that states are social forms that were created at a particular place and time in history due to particular needs, and thus, can be uncreated in the face of different needs.⁴⁸³ It is argued that the very creation and the defense of the Westphalian state form is at the heart of regional insecurity for the most parts of the Third World. Therefore, sovereignty appears as both a source and a site of insecurity that has to be problematized. Hence, any political project which regards the Westphalian state form both as a given and a locus for the realization is claimed to be “inherently flawed.”⁴⁸⁴ In a case study of southern Africa, Larry Swatuk and Peter Vale point to the fact that the states of the region—unlike the ones established under the Treaty of Westphalia—were imposed by colonial powers which disarticulated historical regional relations and disunited the region’s people while serving the interests of these foreign powers. In this sense, “independence” and the acceptance of colonial boundaries reinforced the foreignness of policy decisions. As Swatuk and Vale maintain,

The practice of Westphalian-state foreign policy has always been destructive in the region...entrenching regional elites whose antidemocratic tendencies were justified in terms of defending the “national interest”. Foreign policy, then, has rarely been about people or fostering human security; it has always been about ensuring the security of material things, thereby fostering elite continuity.⁴⁸⁵

They argue that wealth coming from valuable and abundant minerals has allowed state-makers to continue to maintain the fiction of the Westphalian state-form in the

⁴⁸² Barry Buzan, review of *The Third World Security Predicament*, by Mohammed Ayoob, in *International Affairs* 72:2 (1996) 369-370; Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 134.

⁴⁸³ Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, “The Social Construction of Sovereignty,” in *State Sovereignty as a Social Construct*, eds. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 1-21; Jan Aart Scholte, “The Globalization of World Politics,” in *The Globalization of World Politics*, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 20-24.

⁴⁸⁴ Swatuk and Vale, “Why Democracy is Not Enough,” 365, 372.

⁴⁸⁵ Swatuk and Vale, “Why Democracy is Not Enough,” 368.

region. In each case, minerals have made borders and entrenched elites, but have had little actual positive impact on the lives of these states' citizens. Furthermore, interstate rivalries and regional insecurities deriving from race-specific nationalist struggles have allowed state-makers to cloak the defense of their more particularistic ethnic and class-based interests in the holistic language of "state security" and "national interest."⁴⁸⁶ As a consequence, people whose needs are marginalized are increasingly turning to other loci of identity (to warlords, religious movements, renewed tribalism, and family relations) for assistance and support. The region is increasingly being dragged into fragmentation at a time when many hope to see it move toward cohesion.⁴⁸⁷

Critical approaches express the need to reconsider political organization in a way that will best deliver security.⁴⁸⁸ Thinking in terms of possible territorial arrangements, the idea of redrawing borders is often debated in terms of whether it would be a remedy for the security predicament of the Third World.⁴⁸⁹ For some analysts, it holds the potential for creating more stable and cohesive political communities and therefore contributing to the building of stronger states. Many others reject the idea because it would lead to new boosts of violence and create more problems than it would solve. Warning against the potential dangers of territorial change and pointing to the costs and violent historical experiences, they find it preferable to maintain these unsatisfactory boundaries rather than to try and change them. Other viewpoints argue that each case has to be taken on its merits. However, in multi-ethnic regions (such as southern Africa and the Middle East) political life is shaped by the fear of fragmentation. Policy-makers and other state-

⁴⁸⁶ Swatuk and Vale, "Why Democracy is Not Enough," 369.

⁴⁸⁷ Swatuk and Vale, "Why Democracy is Not Enough," 373.

⁴⁸⁸ Booth, "Security and Self," 109.

⁴⁸⁹ Sorensen, "Individual Security and National Security," 378-379; Booth "A Security Regime," 14.

level actors generally support the maintenance of the status-quo as the primary territorial principle. Nevertheless, a status quo which provides relative order, but fails to provide justice, is not likely to deliver security in the long run.⁴⁹⁰

Yet, critics do not limit the possibility of change to the redrawing of borders and creation of new states. Regional community-building—together with the creation of regional frameworks for governance—exists as another alternative for the establishment of regional security besides those of fragmentation and maintenance of the status quo. It offers a viable opportunity for peaceful change and constructive transformation at a time when regionalization of contemporary world politics and the rise of regionalism have become the characteristic features of the present stage of international relations.⁴⁹¹ *Regionalization* can be described as ‘the growth of societal integration within a region’⁴⁹² which

can also involve increasing flows of people, the development of multiple channels and complex social networks by which ideas, political attitudes, and ways of thinking spread from one area to another, and the creation of transnational regional civil society.⁴⁹³

Similarly the term *regionalism* refers to

the proneness of the governments and peoples of two or more states to establish voluntary associations and to pool together resources (material and nonmaterial), in order to create common functional and institutional arrangements.⁴⁹⁴

These trends can be regarded as a component of globalization, which indicate its operation at the local scale. At the same time, they can be seen as responses to

⁴⁹⁰ Booth, “A Security Regime,” 8-9.

⁴⁹¹ Booth, “A Security Regime,” 8-11; 12-17.

⁴⁹² Arie M. Kacowicz, “Regionalization, Globalization and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?” *Alternatives* 24 (1999) 531. According to Arie Kacowicz, regionalization can be best understood as “a continuing process of forming regions as geopolitical units, as organized political cooperation within a particular group of states, and/or as regional communities such as pluralistic security communities.”

⁴⁹³ Andrew Hurrell, “Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,” in *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*, eds. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 39-40.

⁴⁹⁴ Kacowicz, “Regionalism, Globalization and Nationalism,” 531. He further defines the term as “a process occurring in a given geographical region by which different types of actors (states, regional institutions, societal organizations and other nonstate actors) come to share certain fundamental values

globalization that attempt to mitigate its effects.⁴⁹⁵ One can assume that the product of earlier stages of globalization was the universal spread of the Westphalian sovereign state as the principal political form, which was designed to promote domestic interests and act as a protective barrier against external intrusions.⁴⁹⁶ On the other hand, the contemporary era of intensified globalization requires looking beyond the confines of the Westphalian state and adopting post-sovereign forms of governance by devolving sovereignty, depending upon circumstances, upwards to supra-state level (regional governance arrangements) and downwards to sub-state level.⁴⁹⁷

This shows that forces of fragmentation and integration operate at the same time in the contemporary world. Therefore, Booth argues that one should avoid making a choice between fragmentation, consolidation or the status quo, but rather seek all three in different ways. He suggests that there are some issues (such as macro-economics, the environment, migration) which can be best settled at the regional level, but there are other issues where power should be devolved below the state level to local settings (development, redistribution, culture, education and so on). Yet, existing state boundaries can continue to function in different fields, such as policing and arms control.⁴⁹⁸ It can also be argued that such a devolution of power will increase direct transborder links and cooperation between sub-state, state and supra-state actors and contribute to the development of a sense of regional identity.⁴⁹⁹

and norms...[and] also participate in a growing network of economic, cultural, scientific, diplomatic, political and military interactions."

⁴⁹⁵ Kacowicz, "Regionalism, Globalization and Nationalism," 533-536; Pinar Bilgin, "Inventing Middle East? The Making of Regions through Security Discourses," paper presented at Society for Middle Eastern Studies Annual Conference, Oslo, 13-16 August 1998, 1, available at <http://www.hf.uib.no/smi/pao/bilgin.html>. Accessed 21.12.2002.

⁴⁹⁶ Scholte, "The Globalization of World Politics," 20-24.

⁴⁹⁷ Ian Clark, "Globalization and the Post-Cold War Order," in *The Globalization of World Politics*, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 639-642.

⁴⁹⁸ Booth, "A Security Regime," 10-11.

⁴⁹⁹ Scholte, "The Globalization of World Politics," 24.

Swatuk and Vale focus on natural resource management as an opportunity that would constitute a locus for a common regional identity and create an alternative political space for post-Westphalian forms of governance in southern Africa. The recent community-based management of natural resources (CBMNR) projects aim at popular participation and people's empowerment at village level, and involves the devolution of authority over natural resources to affected communities in order to facilitate the realization of shared benefits from natural-resource use.⁵⁰⁰ These projects were government-initiated at first, but later NGOs and rural communities themselves came to be involved in all stages and at all levels.⁵⁰¹ While CBMNR challenges states to devolve power and restore authority to groups at the substate level, Swatuk and Vale highlights water management as another issue that encourages active state involvement at sub- and transnational levels.⁵⁰² Water, besides valuable minerals, has served as a boundary to divide the region into juridically acknowledged state forms. Therefore, the creation of water-transfer schemes (as long as it privileges the interests of rural people and shows sensitivity to the possible effects on the natural environment) is a crucial attempt to transcend the Westphalian-type sovereignty and construct an alternative type of sovereignty that can be referred as 'water sovereignty'. It also offers a strong basis for a regional identity and cooperation by portraying water as a common property. This radically deviates from state-centric analyses that frame issues in binarist terms; such as "*our* 'state' must secure *our* water supplies and, if necessary, do so at the expense of *them*."⁵⁰³ Instead, natural resource and water management helps to provide an understanding of security that combines common security (security has to be

⁵⁰⁰ Swatuk and Vale, "Why Democracy is Not Enough," 374-77.

⁵⁰¹ Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Namibia, Mozambique, Botswana and South Africa are involved in CBMNR projects.

⁵⁰² Swatuk and Vale, "Why Democracy is Not Enough," 377-384.

achieved with others, not against them) and human security (fulfillment of basic material and non-material needs of the individual human being as the ultimate security referent) approaches for the region.⁵⁰⁴

Bringing the notions of security, community and emancipation together, Booth conceives regional security as the extension of the notion of community.⁵⁰⁵ Together with Peter Vale, he argues that “the road to emancipation is through community in southern Africa,”⁵⁰⁶ and suggests that the key for the region to transform itself into a ‘security community’ lies in the development of a common sense of purpose among the region’s peoples. Following the work of Karl Deutsch and his associates on security communities,⁵⁰⁷ Booth maintains that a security community is created by

mutual compatibility of values; strong economic ties and the expectation of more; multifaceted social, political and cultural transactions; a growing amount of institutionalized relationships; mutual responsiveness; and mutual predictability of behaviour.⁵⁰⁸

A successful security community is reached when states in the region cease to prepare for war against one another, and sustain stable expectations of peaceful change. Links of social communication among the members of the region is also essential for the attainment of security communities.⁵⁰⁹

Kacowicz argues that somewhere beyond the nation-state, security communities offer a possible convergence among the forces of globalization, regionalization and nationalism. First they are partly motivated by the forces of globalization, which includes transnational links among people composing different member states. Second, these people from different states form security communities

⁵⁰³ Swatuk and Vale, “Why Democracy is Not Enough,” 383.

⁵⁰⁴ Swatuk and Vale, “Why Democracy is Not Enough,” 369.

⁵⁰⁵ Booth, “Security and Self,” 109-112.

⁵⁰⁶ Booth and Vale, “Security in Southern Africa,” 290, 297.

⁵⁰⁷ See Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

without ruling out the political independence of their respective states. Third, by establishing regions of common identity, security communities epitomize the trends toward regionalization and regionalism.⁵¹⁰

Buzan's concept of 'security complex' provides a useful analytical tool to start with, when a regional security perspective is adopted.⁵¹¹ Security complex can be defined as "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another."⁵¹² Bilgin argues that the concept "is useful in bringing together a group of states to show their securities are interdependent upon one another's policies" and paves the way for the idea of establishing a security community.⁵¹³ The region's peoples starting to see themselves as common victims of structural and geographical insecurities rather than as traditional victims of each other constitutes a second step.⁵¹⁴ This point is elaborated by Bilgin, Booth and Vale within Middle Eastern and southern African security contexts. Their argument suggests that the potential for these regions to transform themselves into security communities passes through a shared understanding of security. For a shared understanding to develop, regional actors have to become aware of their own and each other's security concerns and be willing to address them.⁵¹⁵

A third step may be the creation of security regimes, as suggested by Booth.⁵¹⁶ According to Booth, a security regime "involves the promotion of 'peace' not through the accumulation of weaponry and the primacy of deterrence but through

⁵⁰⁸ Booth, "A Security Regime," 14-15.

⁵⁰⁹ Kacowicz, "Regionalism, Globalization and Nationalism," 542; Booth, "A Security Regime," 15.

⁵¹⁰ Kacowicz, "Regionalism, Globalization and Nationalism," 542-544.

⁵¹¹ Bilgin, "Inventing Middle East?" 10.

⁵¹² Buzan, "People, States and Fear," 190.

⁵¹³ Bilgin, "Inventing Middle East?" 10.

⁵¹⁴ Booth and Vale, "Security in Southern Africa," 290.

⁵¹⁵ Bilgin, "Inventing Middle East?" 10; Bilgin, "Re-visioning Security," 26-27; Booth and Vale, "Regional Insecurity," 337-342; Booth and Vale, "Security in Southern Africa," 290-293, 300-301.

reciprocity and restraint based on a shared sense of security interdependence.”⁵¹⁷ He also notes that rather than a single security regime, “it is instead more helpful to think of a complex of different regimes, with each one attempting to deal with different but overlapping sectors of the security problem.”⁵¹⁸ These security regimes on different issue areas may provide a ground for various visions (including those of non-governmental actors) to address their principle security concerns. At the end, these steps may establish the notions of regionalism and contribute towards building a security community.⁵¹⁹

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter examined the basic arguments of Third World security scholars from a variety of critical perspectives. It addressed the main criticisms directed at their studies. Drawing upon these criticisms, it provided an account of alternative approaches to the question of security in the Third World. As demonstrated, critiques clustered around elements of static and statist thinking in the literature. Critical scholars aimed to de-naturalize the taken-for-granted assumptions, problematize oversimplifying categories and historicize fixed concepts by asking how they emerged, what their practical implications are, whose interests they serve and which policies they help to legitimize. They criticized studies that privileged the security of the state “without even raising the question whether or not it should be the proper *subject* of security.”⁵²⁰ They suggested that only by asking these questions and examining their answers it becomes possible to consider alternative ways of studying

⁵¹⁶ Booth, “A Security Regime,” 11-12.

⁵¹⁷ Booth, “A Security Regime,” 11.

⁵¹⁸ Booth, “A Security Regime,” 12.

⁵¹⁹ Bilgin, “Inventing Middle East?” 10.

⁵²⁰ Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 129

security and to offer alternative understandings of security that will inform and develop into alternative practices and policies.

As demonstrated, not all critiques remained at the theoretical level. Drawing on the understanding that security is a “historically variable condition”⁵²¹, and “has to be defined with reference to a subject (or subjects) situated in a particular time and place, and in relation with practice”⁵²², some scholars applied their conceptual insights to “real people in real places.”⁵²³ Perceiving Third World security as a part of a broader framework of global security, their studies focused on the security concerns of social groups and individuals living in these most distressed and insecure regions of contemporary world politics.

Academics with critical lenses problematized the ‘Third World’ as a conceptual category and tool for analysis. They investigated its origins, practical implications and explanatory power for the study of security. Their studies suggested that over-reliance on this categorization reinforces the Two-Worlds view that lacks an appreciation of the historical processes through which the ‘security’ of the zone of peace emerged at the expense of ‘insecurity’ in the zone of conflict. They further criticized the literature’s exclusive focus on failures, absences and weaknesses for failing to reflect upon the colonial background of these states and reinforcing stereotype representations that hinder more than they reveal. They called for dropping stereotypical signifiers and developing alternative representations of ‘Third World’ states that can potentially translate into alternative practices and ‘desired futures’ in the Third World.⁵²⁴

⁵²¹ Krause and Williams, “From Strategy to Security,” 36.

⁵²² Bilgin, “Re-visioning Security in the Middle East,” 1.

⁵²³ Booth, “Security and Self,” 114.

⁵²⁴ Bilgin, “Alternative Futures for the Middle East,” 423-436.

Proponents of the critical approaches examined the arguments regarding Third World state-making which are based upon an understanding of the Western state as a 'finished project' and an 'ideal' to be approached by Third World states. On the contrary, these scholars conceptualized state-making as an ongoing process which never arrives at a final moment of completion. They also criticized the Eurocentric and teleological assumption that Third World states should replicate the Western experience of state-making. According to this criticism, such line of reasoning lacks an appreciation of the radically different socio-historical context within which Third World state formation occurs and obscures different possible trajectories of state formation that results from these historical specificities and variations. Instead, critics argued that the question of state formation in the Third World should be elaborated under the light of distinct historicities, political trajectories and social foundations of these states. Their work also showed that a wider conception of the state, not just as the government but also as a part of civil society, provided an opportunity to consider alternative types of state formation.

According to students of critical security, state-centric perspectives do not provide a helpful analytical framework to explore the multifaceted security predicament of the Third World. By according primacy to states in their analyses, state-focused studies help reinforce a statist conception of security which renders security needs (as referents) and practices (as agents) of non-state actors, such as individuals and social groups, almost invisible. Privileging the state as the primary referent and agent of security sharply contrasts with the empirical situation in the Third World where human beings suffer from extreme insecurity due to the oppressive policies of the state (and other existing power structures) and/or its infrastructural incapacity to provide security for its citizens. Furthermore, at a time

when the Westphalian state system and Westphalian-type sovereignty are being problematized and reconsidered all around the world, equating security with strong statehood and placing the state at the center of security theorizing and security practice, is an even less appropriate way to approach the security problematique of the Third World where the state itself is an artificial construct.

Critics have underlined the point that security is intimately linked with the process of human development, especially in the Third World context. The relationship between security and development was already noted by some Third World security scholars. However, scholars of critical security took a further step by identifying the individual human being as the primary security referent and equating security with human emancipation. They maintained that, to promote human security, it is important to address the immediate causes of human insecurity (armed militias, corrupt elites, lack of basic food and medical supplies etc.), but this is not enough in itself. Long-term objectives should also be set to eliminate the structural causes of insecurity (alleviation of poverty, establishment of effective systems of education, housing, health care, democratic and accountable governance etc.).⁵²⁵ As discussed above, these long-term objectives in particular, the idea of human security in general, immediately bring issues of political governance into the security picture. It also leads us to reconsider human agency and the potential of alternative political communities (local, regional, transnational) besides the dominant form of political community, the nation-state, in delivering different aspects of security. The Southern African experience is an illuminating one which shows that the people of the region have not waited for their governments to act, but have themselves initiated the long process of providing security.

⁵²⁵ Paul Williams, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: Getting Critical?" *Politikon* 27:1 (2000) 73-91.

As discussed in the final section, critics have also directed attention to the importance of adopting a regional security perspective for the study of Third World security, since the security of most Third World states and their citizens cannot be regarded in isolation from the security of those other states and their respective citizens in their regions. However, their understanding of regional security is radically different from that of Third World security scholars who conceptualize Third World regional security as 'regional relations of weak states' or present regime security concerns as the motivating force of regionalism in the Third World. A critical perspective on regional security draws upon the understanding that human security is ultimately more important than state security. It identifies a particular region as the primary security referent and perceives the security of human beings and regions as integral components of global security. It incorporates the idea of building regional communities and moving beyond self-regarding Westphalian state forms and state-makers in the search for security. These scholars maintained that an identity that derives from belonging to the same region and facing the same problems provides an opportunity to include a multiplicity of identities and to embrace the security interests of the marginalized groups and people that are alienated from the Westphalian state structures. As opposed to state-building, community-building in the regional context implies a shift from the pursuit of national security to an approach based on notions of common security, which seeks security in cooperation with others. Entailing intensified interactions between regional, state and sub-state levels, it opens an avenue for the development of a non-violent conflict culture in inter-state relations and moves closer to the realization of long-term human security objectives.

CONCLUSION

Shifting our gaze from the few powerful actors in world politics to the many who are less powerful may help us to revise and strengthen the conceptual foundations upon which IR Theory is built, so that it better reflects what is happening today. The study of 'small' states may answer big questions.⁵²⁶

Security Studies has undergone a significant change since it first emerged. The field, which has been very closely linked to the state and to the practice of ensuring military security, turned to question its own foundations by problematizing the state, rethinking the nature of the political, re-conceptualizing security, and most importantly, by reflecting on the nature of theorizing itself. From a narrow technocratic enterprise, it became an intellectual platform where security has begun to be viewed as an issue of political philosophy and a guide for strategic action at the same time.

This transformation is clearly reflected in the academic study of security in the Third World, which is the subject of this thesis. This thesis examined the evolution of security thinking on the Third World by exploring the main approaches to its study. It showed that each of these approaches aspired to overcome the shortcomings of the preceding ones. Third World approaches corrected the deficiencies of traditional approaches to a certain extent, whereas critical approaches managed to overcome the limitations of both traditional and Third World approaches to security. Developments in the study of security in the Third World have also contributed the transformation of the field.

Traditional approaches viewed the Third World through the superpower template and adopted a military focus. Scholars working within this framework did

not try to define Third World security issues as distinct from the East-West rivalry. This bias resulted from the assumption that Third World states did not possess the capabilities to make a significant impact on the international system. As a result of this understanding, the Third World was perceived simply as “the backdrop for the competition of the superpowers and medium-sized powers and [was] relegated to the status of clients who benefit or suffer commensurately with their protectors.”⁵²⁷ Consequently, Third World security problems were treated as a mere extension of system-level dynamics.

The political realist (and neo-realist) thought had a number of qualities that made it appealing to the states of the North. Most notably, it “legitimized their dominant position in the existing international system by equating it with a natural state of affairs.”⁵²⁸ Yet, the majority of Third World political and security elites were coopted into the realist tradition and accepted the security agenda set by the North.⁵²⁹ Security behaviour of Third World governments generally followed the tenets of realism, which provided the intellectual background for their statist practices. They pursued policies that aimed at enhancing the security of the regime rather than dealing with the major sources of insecurity, such as socio-economic underdevelopment and environmental degradation.⁵³⁰ This “parasitical elite, inducted during the Cold War and sustained largely by external aid, has created a vicious circle of domestic repression and external dependence.”⁵³¹ Their security policies compounded the instability and violence in the Third World.

⁵²⁶ Neuman, “International Relations Theory and the Third World,” 17.

⁵²⁷ Azar and Moon, “Rethinking Third World National Security,” 5.

⁵²⁸ Simpson, “A View from the North,” 35.

⁵²⁹ Thomas, “Introduction,” 5-6.

⁵³⁰ Acharya, “The Periphery as the Core,” 322.

⁵³¹ Ray, “A View from the Periphery,” 24.

The tendency of traditional Security Studies to focus on a particular segment of the international system to the exclusion of another is ironic given the fact that it was in the neglected arena that the vast majority of conflicts have taken place.⁵³² It was Third World security scholars who significantly altered this process of security theorizing. They placed the Third World at the core of their studies as the central category for analysis. These scholars perceived the Third World as a distinct entity and separate security realm whose conditions were markedly different from the West. According to their argument, these differences—especially the primacy of internal threats—required the application of different notions of security to the Third World; so security should be re-conceptualized for the Third World context.

The studies of Third World security scholars challenged the ethnocentric character of Security Studies through incorporating the experiences and problems of Third World states into security analyses. They also challenged the field's military focus by including a wide range of non-military issues into the security agenda and addressing the multiple dimensions of insecurity in the Third World. The distinction they made between the security needs and interests of Third World states and developed states was an important and helpful conceptual move in reflecting and studying the security problematique of the Third World. However, these works, in general, relied on an essentialist differentiation between states in the Third World and states in the West, and postulated a fundamental bifurcation between the Third World and the West. Although these scholars had developed an awareness of the external dimension of insecurity, they generally regarded weak state structures as the root cause of the Third World security predicament. Therefore, their studies were concerned with strengthening these structures and maintaining political order and

⁵³² Acharya, "The Periphery as the Core," 300. He further notes that between 1945 and 1986, 98 percent of all international conflicts took place in the Third World.

stability. A strong state was considered to be the most likely organization to provide long-term domestic and international security. As a result, not all, but most of these analyses remained largely state-centric. Security needs and interests of states were given the highest priority “until governmental mechanisms become strong enough to allow them to compete with other states.”⁵³³ Thus, they ended up reinforcing a statist conception of security and helped to constitute a statist view of world politics.

This conceptual deficiency is corrected by students of critical security whose studies are based on an understanding of security which recognizes differences as well as commonalities, and is sensitive to diversity but comprehends that “such distinctions are not primordial forces.”⁵³⁴ Besides an appreciation of unique historical, social and political conditions of different contexts, these scholars underlined that “there are fundamental elements of the security problematique which are universal.”⁵³⁵ Their work highlighted basic principles which should be guiding the study and practice of security in every part of the world. These principles contribute the establishment of a ‘culture of security’ based on universal human rights.⁵³⁶

Third World was not the exclusive focus of critical security scholars. Rather, they applied their conceptual insights to different parts of the world, including various Third World regions. These case studies, together with pieces of work that reviewed the writings of Third World security scholars, argued that the security of individuals are ultimately more important than the security of states, therefore issues that have life-and-death relevance for the majority of people living in the world should be included in the security agenda. What it implies for the Third World, is

⁵³³ Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security,” 210-211.

⁵³⁴ Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, 116.

⁵³⁵ Booth, “A Security Regime,” 1.

that “the need for strengthening existing state mechanisms in the Third World should not be made an excuse for marginalizing individuals’ and social groups’ needs.”⁵³⁷ In other words, reasons for state-making cannot be used as a pretext for limiting the exercise of democratic freedoms and violating basic human rights.

Critics also underlined the point that “states should be treated as means, but not the only means.”⁵³⁸ Their studies directed attention to the agency of non-state actors and pointed to the potential of alternative political communities (local, regional, transnational) in delivering different aspects of security. They put special emphasis on the role of academics and intellectuals in informing and guiding human agency. Building upon the rich tradition of critical theory on the relationship between theory and practice, and inspired by the writings of Edward Said, scholars of critical security define their purpose as emancipating ‘the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,’⁵³⁹ and set their task as

placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than *raison d’etat* the prism through which problems are viewed.⁵⁴⁰

This orientation has significant implications for the study and practice of security in the Third World. It has a special importance nowadays, after the September 11 attacks, which are regarded as the events that have shifted the course of international relations from a ‘peaceful’ age of globalization to a global ‘War on Terror.’⁵⁴¹ Yet,

⁵³⁶ Ken Booth, “Nuclearism, Human Rights and Constructions of Security (Part 1),” *The International Journal of Human Rights* 3:2 (1999) 1.

⁵³⁷ Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security,” 210.

⁵³⁸ Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security,” 216.

⁵³⁹ For the original work of Said, see Edward Said, *Representations of the Intellectual* (London: Vintage, 1994) 84.

⁵⁴⁰ Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*, 159.

⁵⁴¹ Douglas Kellner, “Theorizing September 11: Social Theory, History and Globalization,” available at www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/papers/theorizing911.htm. According to Amitav Acharya, by creating a growing sense of insecurity within America, September 11 “blurs the once fashionable distinction between Western and Third World security approaches, in which the latter focused on their

the Third World experience clearly shows that this 'peace', if it has ever prevailed, involved only restricted dimensions of global life and has left largely untouched vast peripheral stretches of the globe.⁵⁴² The contrast between the "fully-reported horror of 9/11 in the United States and the generally unreported daily horror faced by the world's poor" becomes more evident when one recognizes that "those killed in New York, Pennsylvania on 9/11 added up to less than half the number of children who die somewhere in the world each day from diarrhoea, as a result of the lack of clean water."⁵⁴³ As Ken Booth puts it,

Nobody should forget what happened in and to the United States on September 11, 2001. As it happens, there is no fear of that, because it will be kept alive by the world's most powerful media. Equally, nobody should ignore what happens in and to the world's oppressed people(s) between January 1 and December 31 every year. We may well because this is the suffering of the largely silenced majority.⁵⁴⁴

As he points out, the largely silenced majority suffers because of the political and economic choices made by governments—their own and others. These children do not die from natural causes; they are 'made to die' by international politics. They are not victims of diarrhoea, but victims of poverty. This extreme human insecurity—manifested in the deaths of thousands every day from preventable diseases—is a direct consequence of the way human society is politically organized on a global scale. 'Third World' insecurity is neither a geographical phenomenon, nor a destiny. It rests on political choices. So does the reduction of insecurity.⁵⁴⁵ What is needed, then, is theories that "delineate and clarify the choices being faced in the practical realm,"⁵⁴⁶ and "reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities."⁵⁴⁷

domestic front while the former pursued defence against foreign military aggression." Smith and Acharya, "The Concept of Security Before and After September 11," 25-26.

⁵⁴² Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order*, 30.

⁵⁴³ Ken Booth, "Two Terrors, One Problem," in *Paradigms in Transition: Globalization, Security and the Nation State*, eds. Ersel Aydinli and J.N. Rosenau (New York: SUNY Press, forthcoming) 73.

⁵⁴⁴ Booth, "Two Terrors, One Problem," 74.

⁵⁴⁵ Booth, "Two Terrors, One Problem," 73-74, 85-86.

⁵⁴⁶ Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*, 76.

The integration of critical approaches into the study of security has opened new horizons in the field of Security Studies. Insights provided by scholars of critical security help us move beyond the spatial differentiation of the 'Third World' and claims for distinct modes of theorizing for this entity. Their conceptual framework removes the risk of essentializing differences by perceiving 'Third World security problems' as 'global insecurities,' and melting the question of 'security in the Third World' within the broader template of 'global security.' It also eliminates the risk of oversimplifying differences by dropping the 'Third World' as the central category of analysis and focusing on more specific areas instead. Their approach to security privileges historical particularity, but also adopts a global perspective. However, it is crucial for critical scholars to develop their studies more in the direction of case studies of particular regions through which they can "engage [more] with the real by suggesting policies, agents and sites of change, [and]...help human kind in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs."⁵⁴⁸ If Security Studies is to help us meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, it seems only possible by students with area specializations, a sound knowledge of the theory and practice of human rights together with comparative politics, and a comprehensive understanding of environmental issues and problems of economic development.⁵⁴⁹ Even if the field cannot "sing a more secure world into existence,"⁵⁵⁰ it can assist policies that aim at expanding human security, and become an important voice informing and legitimating those political practices that might bring about the development of a peaceful, secure and a just order.

⁵⁴⁷ Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1990) 172.

⁵⁴⁸ Booth, "Security and Self," 114.

⁵⁴⁹ Booth, "Security and Emancipation," 324; Booth, "Security and Self," 113-114.

⁵⁵⁰ Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 168.

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