

T.C.
ISTANBUL UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Ph. D. DISSERTATION

THE IMPACT OF THE THIRD-PARTY STATES
ON THE DYNAMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF
THE TURKISH-RUSSIAN CONFLICTS
(1917-2015)

(A Subsystemic Case Study on Balance of Threat)

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SUPERVISOR
Prof.Dr. Ahmet ÖZTÜRK

ISTANBUL - 2020

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ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF THE THIRD-PARTY STATES ON THE DYNAMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF THE TURKISH-RUSSIAN CONFLICTS (1917-2015)

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KAZIM BATMAZOĞLU

This study aims to examine the impact of the third-party states on the dynamics and management of the Turkish-Russian conflicts between 1917 and 2015. A single case study method was used to test the hypotheses within a subsystemic framework through the lenses of the theory of balance of threat. The theory of balance of threat was modified as to examine tripartite relation in the subsystem consists of the great power balancing and the behavior of the lesser power. The membership composition of the subsystem was conceptualized to compare the impact of different subsystemic spatial dimensions on conflict dynamics and to define patterns of interaction in the subsystem. The traditional concepts of the foreign policy behavior of Turkey were reconceptualized to prevent confusion in the international relations literature and to develop further the explanatory power of these concepts.

The research concludes that the individual relations of Turkey and Russia with other powers influence their respective foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis each other in the form of an extension of the system level great power balancing into the subsystem. Similar membership compositions of the Black Sea Subsystem produce similar dynamics of the conflicts with the proviso that structural modifiers and relational variables provide more determinate directions of behavior. The centralized and decentralized management of the Turkish-Russian conflicts are shaped often by the level of Turkish-Russian mutual threat perception within the framework of the dynamics produced by the subsystem membership composition reinforced with the structural modifiers and relational variables.

Key Words: Turkey, Russia, Neorealism, Balance of Threat Theory, Subsystem, Conflict, Conflict Management.

ÖZ

ÜÇÜNCÜ-TARAF DEVLETLERİN TÜRK-RUS UYUŞMAZLIKLARININ DİNAMİKLERİNE VE YÖNETİMİNE ETKİSİ (1917-2015)

(Tehdit Dengesi Üzerine Alt Sistemsel Vaka Çalışması)

KAZIM BATMAZOĞLU

Bu çalışma, üçüncü taraf devletlerin 1917-2015 yılları arasındaki Türk-Rus uyuşmazlıklarının dinamikleri ve yönetimi üzerindeki etkilerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Hipotezleri güç dengesi teorisi merceğinden alt sistem çerçevesinde test etmek için tek vaka çalışması yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Tehdit dengesi teorisi, alt sistemdeki büyük güç dengelemesi ile daha küçük gücün davranışından oluşan üç taraflı ilişkiyi incelemek amacıyla değiştirildi. Alt sistemin üyelik kompozisyonu, farklı alt sistemsel mekansal boyutların uyuşmazlık dinamikleri üzerindeki etkisini karşılaştırmak ve etkileşim modelini tanımlamak için kavramsallaştırılmıştır. Türkiye'nin dış politika davranışına ilişkin geleneksel kavramlar, uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründe karışıklığı önlemek ve bu kavramların açıklayıcı gücünü daha da geliştirmek için yeniden düşünülmüştür.

Araştırma, Türkiye ve Rusya'nın diğer güçlerle olan bireysel ilişkilerinin birbirlerine yönelik dış politika hedeflerini, sistem düzeyindeki büyük güç dengelemesinin alt sisteme yansımaları şeklinde, etkilediği sonucuna varıyor. Karadeniz alt sisteminin benzer üyelik kompozisyonları yapısal değiştiricilerin ve ilişkisel değişkenlerin daha belirleyici davranış yönleri sağlaması şartıyla benzer uyuşmazlık dinamikleri üretmektedir. Türk-Rus uyuşmazlıklarının merkezi ve yerinden yönetimi, sıklıkla yapısal değiştiriciler ve ilişkisel değişkenler tarafından anlamlandırılan alt sistem üyelik kompozisyonunca üretilen dinamikler çerçevesinde Türk-Rus karşılıklı tehdit algısı düzeyine göre şekillenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Rusya, Neorealizm, Tehdit Dengesi Teorisi, Alt Sistem, Uyuşmazlık, Uyuşmazlık Yönetimi.

PREFACE

The dissertation process marked a period of living the dissertation but not anything for me. My goal behind this challenging period was to produce a good work which should satisfy first and foremost me. Now, its value is up to the readers.

In this process, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof.Dr. Ahmet Öztürk, for his encouragement and patience for the free development of my ideas during the research process. I would like to thank Prof.Dr. Burak Gülboy for his instructive critics and Assoc.Prof.Dr. Mehmet Bardakçı for stimulating debates. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Assoc.Prof.Dr. Şakir Dinçşahin for his taking a close interest in my dissertation.

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Istanbul, 2020

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	: Anti-ballistic Missiles
ACV	: Armored Combat Vehicles
AKEL	: The Progressive Party of the Working People (South Cyprus)
Armenian SSR	: Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic
Azerbaijan SSR	: Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic
Art.	: Article
BLACKSEAFOR	: Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group
BMENA	: Broader Middle East-North Africa
BOT	: Balance of Threat Theory
BSEC	: Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSS	: Black Sea Subsystem
BTC	: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline
BTE	: Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline
BTk	: Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway
CBM	: Confidence Building Measure
CCAR	: Caucasus and Central Asian Republics
CENTO	: Central Treaty Organization
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
CFE	: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFSP	: Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)
CHEKA	: Extraordinary Commission for combating counter-revolution, sabotage and speculation
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	: The Composite Index of National Capability
CIS	: Commonwealth of Independent States
CM	: Centralized Management
CMEA	: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance or COMECON
CoE	: Council of Europe
COMECON	: The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COMINFORM	: Communist Information Bureau
COMINTERN	: The Communist International (The Third International)

COW	: Correlates of War Project
CSCP	: Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact
CPSU	: Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE	: Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSP	: Caucasus Stability Pact
CSTO	: The Collective Security Treaty Organization
DCA	: Defense Cooperation Agreement
DCFTA	: Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Area
DM	: Decentralized Management
DoS	: Department of State (US)
EaP	: Eastern Partnership (EU)
ENP	: European Neighborhood Policy
EOKA	: National Organization of Freedom Fighters
ESA	: European Security Architecture
ESS	: European Security Strategy
EST	: European Security Treaty
EU	: European Union
EurAsEc	: Eurasian Economic Community
FDI	: Foreign Direct Investment
FM s	: Foreign Ministers
FO	: Foreign Office (UK)
FSA	: Free Syrian Army
FTA	: Free-Trade Area
GASC	: Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus
GBR	: Great Britain
GUAM	: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova
GUUAM	: Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova
HE	: His Excellency
HUS	: Hegemonic Unipolar Subsystem
IMO	: International Maritime Organization
INF	: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
IPAP	: Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) (NATO)
IR	: International Relations

IRBM	: Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile
ISAF	: International Security Assistance Force
ISIL	: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	: Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
JDP	: Justice and Development Party
KARAKOL	: Secret Turkish Nationalist (Intelligence) Organization
KAVBURO	: Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party
LoN	: League of Nations
MAP	: Membership Action Plan (NATO)
MDS	: Missile Defense System
MEC	: Middle East Command
MEDO	: Middle East Defense Organization
MoD	: Minister of Defense
MoU	: Memorandum of Understanding
MI6	: Secret Intelligence Service of the UK
MIRV	: Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle
MLF	: Multilateral Force
MNC	: Multinational Corporation
MRBM	: Medium-range Ballistic Missiles
NAC	: North Atlantic Council
NACC	: North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAP	: Near Abroad Policy
NARKOMINDEL	: (Soviet) Peoples' Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCR	: Neoclassical Realism
NEP	: New Economic Policy (1921-1928)
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
NHUS	: Non-Hegemonic Unipolar Subsystem
NIS	: Newly Independent States
NKID	: People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (before 1946)
NMC	: National Material Capabilities
NMD	: National Missile Defense
OAE	: Operation Active Endeavor

OBSH	: Operation Black Sea Harmony
OEEC	: The Organization for European Economic Co-operation
OSCE	: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PM	: Prime Minister
PKK	: <i>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (The Kurdistan Workers' Party)</i>
PRC	: People's Republic of China
PYD	: Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party) (Syria)
R2P	: Responsibility to Protect
RCP	: Russian Communist Party
RKP (b)	: Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
RF	: Russian Federation
RPP	: Republican People's Party (Turkey)
RSFSR	: Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SALT	: Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SAM	: Surface-to-air Missile
SDI	: Strategic Defense Initiative
SIBTEX	: Systemic Bilateral Threat Complex
SNC	: Syria National Coalition
SOVNARKOM (SNK)	: Council of People's Commissars
SSBN	: Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSR	: Soviet Socialist Republic
SU	: Soviet Union
Sublime Porte	: Bâb-ı Âli (High Gate) (Government of the Ottoman State)
SUBTEX	: Subsystemic Bilateral Threat Complex
SUMEX	: Subsystem Member Complex
TANAP	: Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline
TASS	: Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union
TAP	: Trans-Adriatic Pipeline
TDFR	: Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic
TGNA	: Turkish Grand National Assembly
TLE	: Treaty-limited Equipment
TPGP	: Third-Party Great Power
TRACECA	: Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia

UK	: The <i>United Kingdom</i> of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	: United Nations
UNFICYP	: United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNGA	: United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
UNSG	: United Nations Secretary-General
US	: United States of America
USA	: United States of America
U.S.	: United States of America
USCGC	: United States Coast Guard Cutter
USNS	: United States Naval Ship (for non-Commissioned Ship)
USS	: United States Ship (for Commissioned Ship)
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VTSIK	: The Soviet Pan Russia Central Executive Committee
WARSAW PACT	: Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance
WBSR	: Wider Black Sea Region
WEU	: Western European Union
WMD	: Weapon of Mass Destruction
WWI	: First World War
WWII	: Second World War

INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION

Beginning from the first contacts between the Ottoman State and the Principality of Muscovy in 1492 until the signature of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, the Black Sea was an Ottoman lake without any foreign ship sailing on its waters and there was no Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean in question which could endanger the interests of other powers during that period.

The establishment of Muscovy on the shores of the Black Sea in 1774 gave birth to the Black Sea Subsystem composed of two states which became the stakeholders of its distinct dynamics. The distinct characteristics of the Black Sea subsystem and Russia's great power status made the Black Sea a zone of constant great power balancing to which Russia was always one of the parties. At the beginning, the regime of the Ottoman Straits was formed through bilateral agreements of the Ottoman State until the signature of the London Convention in 1841. Until the armistice of Mudros, the Black Sea was closed to the warships of the non-Black Sea powers. The Lausanne and Montreux conventions modified the structure of the Black Sea Subsystem by granting rights for the transit of the warships in varying weight either to the Black Sea littoral powers or to non-littoral powers and authorized Turkey with varying competence on these transits. The membership composition of the Black Sea Subsystem also changed in time which deeply influenced the capability of involvement of the non-Black Sea great powers in the affairs of the Black Sea Subsystem which had also consequences for Turkish-Russian relations.

Turkey's in-between position among Russia as the imminent threat and her rivaling powers as the potential threats has been described variously by many authors or statesmen. According to the British diplomat Harold Nicolson (as quoted in Gökay 1997, 145), a representative of a *potential threat state*,

“Turkey knows neither gratitude nor resentment; her only consistent political emotion is fear. For a century she was afraid of Russia and made friends with us; when we in our turn made friends with Russia Turkey sought refuge with Germany; now that she is afraid of us... It is probable that in a few years she will be afraid again of Russia and will turn again to Great Britain.”

Whereas Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Secretary General of the USSR and a representative of the *imminent threat state*, referred to the concept of “*to play the Turkish card*” as a tool of the rivals of the Soviet Union (Sezer 1997, 21). Turkish general Kazım Karabekir, as representative of Turkey - a state seeking *to equilibrate the imminent and potential threats*, describes Turkey’s difficulty during the *process of equilibrating*, as “*to burn in the fire*” or “*to be drowned in the water*” (Sonyel 1995, 87). According to Necmettin Sadak (as cited in Oran 1970, 59-60), the cause of the conflict between the UK and the USSR is not the Straits, on the contrary, there is a *Straits Question* since they are in bad with each other. Therefore, the Straits should not be considered as a subject having ability to influence the acts of great powers but as an object of great power rivalry.

Now then, in the light of the above-mentioned contradictory definitions of this tripartite relation among Russia, her great power rivals and by extension Turkey, the purpose of this research is to examine the impact of third-party states on the dynamics and management of the Turkish-Russian political, economic, and military conflicts occurred between 1917 and 2015. The objectives of the research are as follows:

- To investigate the influence of the third-party states on the formulation of the foreign policy objectives of Turkey and Russia vis-à-vis each other.
- To investigate the impact of third-party states on Turkey and Russia’s mutual threat perceptions.
- To investigate and distinguish between different dynamics exerting influence on Turkish-Russian conflicts
- To investigate and distinguish between different management types of the Turkish-Russian conflicts.
- To seek to establish pattern of interaction in which parties operate in order to predict the dynamics, scope, and limitations of the great power involvement in Turkish-Russian conflicts.

The question of the research is: What is the impact of the third-party states on the dynamics and management of the Turkish-Russian conflicts? The hypotheses of the dissertation are as follow:

1. Different Black Sea Subsystem membership compositions demonstrate different patterns of interaction.
2. The dynamics of the Turkish-Russian conflicts are mostly the extension of the great power balancing in the Black Sea Subsystem. As a result of great power influence, Turkey and Russia implement their respective re-formulated foreign policy objectives *vis-à-vis* each other which pave the way for the dynamics of the conflicts between them.
3. While centralized management of the Turkish-Russian conflicts is sign of Turkey's third-party backed/centered assertive foreign policy towards Russia or Turkey's efforts to equilibrate Russian threat, decentralized management of the Turkish-Russian conflicts is a sign of a crack in Turkey's alliance connections due to clash of interest between Turkey and her alliance partner's interests.
4. Turkey and Russia's common threat perceptions emanated from the third-party states lead to a tendency to resolve/prevent their mutual conflicts in a friendly and peacefully or at least cautiously manner.

The dissertation aims to contribute to the academic research at the theoretical level around the following elements:

- Application of the Balance of Threat Theory to a sub-systemic relations.
- Modification of the Balance of Threat Theory by distinguishing threat into *imminent threat* and *potential threat*; and distinguishing offensive intention into *offensive* and *destabilizing* intentions.
- Construction of pattern of relations based on the membership composition of the subsystem.

- Reconceptualization of certain concepts to increase their explanatory power and to diffuse inconsistency between the concepts of IR theory and Turkish history.

The dissertation aims to contribute to the field of Turkish-Russian relations at the empirical level by the following objectives:

- The hypotheses about the third-party state impact on Turkish-Russian relations will be tested through the lenses of Balance of Threat Theory.
- New periodization of bilateral relations will be applied to the research subject based on membership composition of the subsystem and on the regime formations referred to as *structural modifiers*.
- Patterns of relations regarding the third-party-state involvement on the Turkish-Russian relations will be used to identify dynamics and management of the conflicts.
- The validity of certain concepts used to define Turkish-Russia relations will be tested.

As Paul Schroeder identifies, the standard social science approach covers the following stages during the explanation of a phenomenon:

- Formulation of a hypothesis.
- Identification of a relevant theory.
- Choosing and explaining a research strategy.
- Testing the hypothesis.
- Confirming or refuting the hypothesis toward better theory and generalizations (Schroeder 1997, 68).

Actually, this approach of the social sciences creates the main difference between the political science and the history discipline as outlined by Schroeder with respect to the tasks and goals of the political scientist and the historian:

- The political scientist looks for regularities and broad patterns, whereas the historian is concerned with richness of detail.
- The difference between the two disciplines reflects the difference between nomothetic and idiographic disciplines – establishing laws and predicting on one hand, and portraying particular situations on the other.
- Political scientist assign specific causes to the occurrence of events whereas historian sees the events from inside empathetically (Schroeder 1997, 64-65).

Despite it is clear that the above-mentioned differences make history and political science two different disciplines, Schroeder strongly criticizes neorealism and balance of threat theory on the basis of the approach of the history discipline that he had presented. According to him (1994, 147), the central problem of neorealism is that it prescribes and predicts a determinate order without having adequately checked the historical evidence. Neorealism is too static and fails to account for change in the international system and does not explain or predict everything (Schroeder 1994, 113). This unchanging and structurally determined nature of international politics make it unhistorical (Schroeder 1994, 148) and thus neorealist theory does not provide a thorough model for understanding the nature of international politics (Schroeder 1994, 112). Needless to say that neorealism as other theories of international relations is criticized also within its own discipline from other aspects.

As Snyder (1996, 167) argues, a theory embraces only a fraction of causal variables. No theory can give a full explanation of reality. It can only spell out the logical relations of the variables within its scope. Any single theory highlights “*a small number of big and important things*”. It is accepted that neorealist theory does not explain international politics enough. Anarchy and polarity place broad constraints on state behaviour but these constraints are much weaker than other causal factors that the theory omits.

The author of this dissertation, as a student of the political science discipline, is after seeking to examine the possibility of establishing patterns of interaction with regards to third-party state impact on the Turkish-Russian relations. To this end, taking

into account the limited explanatory power of neorealism as argued by Schroeder and others, the dissertation sought to apply *process variables* proposed by Glenn Snyder (1996) to increase the explanatory range of neorealism to the extent that it is possible.

The unit of analysis to be used in this dissertation will be the subsystem level constructed for the examination of the great power balancing in the subsystem and by extension behavior of the lesser states. The dissertation does not adopt neoliberal institutional theory since the author of the dissertation believe that the international organizations and regimes serve for the interest of the states and they survive as long as states need them. Likewise, security issues are always at the top of the agenda contrary to the arguments of Complex Interdependence Theory. Since state is the dominant and final decision maker in international relations, the channel of multiple contacts between societies have trivial role in power and interest dominant character of international relations. International rivalry is often for the material resources that countries would like to obtain in which identity does not bear any significance. Therefore, since material factors and balance of threat are the dominant paradigm of international relations, the ideational perspective of constructivism is also irrelevant with the facts of international system.

I have collected data from primary and secondary resources. While memoirs, international treaties, official government publications, and publications of the international organizations constituted my primary resources; books, conference papers, dictionaries, journal articles, magazine articles and online news were my secondary sources.

A disciplined-configurative case study method has been used in this dissertation since the dissertation also develops theoretical ideas and models of certain processes and test them by historical materials. This study has been conducted with theoretical guidance to distinguish the critical from trivial. This dissertation is in one sense a heuristic case study since it is also about theory building with generalizable relations. My direction of reasoning in this research project followed hypothetico-deductive logic in which a theoretical framework was developed and tested with the findings.

There were a few theoretically informed study dealing with the examination of the Turkish-Russian relations. I could not run across to any one study specifically written on the third-party state impact on the Turkish-Russian relations. I found only one work, a section of a book chapter, written by Demiryol (2015) shortly referred to balance of threat variant of neorealism. I could not come across a work examining the topic through a subsystemic perspective. The contradictions in the conceptualization of the terms in foreign policy, and lack of sufficient concepts regarding the application of subsystemic perspective also complicated my research.

In the literature, the evolution of international issues are often examined in its own entirety, for example, covering a period of ten years, from beginning to the end. However, the dissertation chose to examine the phases of the evolution of any issue in its actual context. Therefore, it chronologically divided the issue, placed its phases into its own context and tried to assess it in connection with other issues occurring in the same time frame. This method created many difficulties. For example, a certain phase of the issue which was narrated with only one sentence in this or that works was sought to be complemented with other one sentence in other works. In this case, I was unable to reach to a complete information explaining the very causes or results of that phase.

It is most suitable to distinguish the most cited and older works at the beginning of the research and start to assimilate the literature with them to be able to grasp their many different interpretations in the succeeding works. Almost all of the recent works dealing with the Cold War period of the Turkish-Soviet relations cited the earlier most prominent a few works.

Lack of advanced Russian language prevented me to access Russian sources which influenced gathering of the data reflecting Russian perspectives to the events. However, I tried to compensate this gap with materials written in English by Russian scholars. My desire to examine a long period of Turkish-Russian relations was time consuming and exhausting, however, I was able to scan a great volume of the literature.

The new perspective of the dissertation required a new model and new concepts. According to the model, the subsystem has *spatial* and *power configuration* aspects. This is emanated from the necessity to refer to the subsystem membership

composition in a given time because the number of the subsystem members often changes the extent of non-subsystem third-party great power involvement in the subsystem affairs. This membership composition, coined as *subsystem member complex (sumex)*, is related to the distribution of lands and seas, transportation routes and raw materials in the subsystem. Whenever a new state enters into the subsystem or disappears from the subsystem the sumex changes. Since the distribution of geographical assets also change, dynamics of the conflicts change too. In the period subject to the examination, the memberships composition changed three times in 1917, 1922 and 1991. These changes occurred so tough that the dissertation distinguished two types of sumex as *hegemonic unipolarity* and *non-hegemonic unipolarity*. In the dissertation, the term *hegemonic unipolarity* was defined as a situation of disappearance of lesser states from the international scene under the hegemonic rule of a great power in a subsystem. Since local dynamics of the conflicts are absorbed within a much bigger administration apparatus, the dynamics of the great power balancing occurring in the subsystem emanate mostly from the system level interaction. The *non-hegemonic unipolarity* in a subsystem refers to the complexity of relations with the intermingling of multitude of dynamics of the conflicts and local and foreign actors despite the structure of the subsystem remains unipolar. To the extent that a sumex is *hegemonic*, the dynamics of conflicts are often emanated from system level balancing acts. In the *non-hegemonic sumex*, a TPGP involvement in the subsystem affairs becomes easier and there are more dynamics of the conflicts to manipulate.

The *sumex* may be internally or externally transformed. *Internal transformation* of a subsystem refers to change in the number of the members of the subsystem through reconfiguration of power internally. Change in the sumex change the magnitude of the subtex and change in the dynamics of the conflicts. *External transformation* of the subsystem is related to the regimes which modify the structure of the subsystem or military occupation.

Distribution of power in the subsystem highlights the dynamics of the conflicts with regards to the distribution of seaways, raw materials, transportation routes. The régimes, multilaterally agreed rules of conduct, modifies the structure in the subsystem

and limit or expand the capabilities not only of the subsystem members but also non-subsystem powers. In this framework, the régimes of the Straits will be considered in the dissertation as structural modifiers.

This model assumes that two subsystem states interact in a *subsystem bilateral threat complex* (subtex) which is defined as *the sum of any foreign policy objectives or outputs of two states in a subsystem which could be perceived as threat*. Change in the sumex change the magnitude of the subtex. A change in the subtex refers rather to the change in the dynamics of the conflicts rather than management of the conflicts. The *systemic bilateral threat complex* (sibtex) refers to the bilateral threat complex emanated from the dynamics of the great power balancing in the subsystem and in other subsystems. This may be in the form of establishment of bases, deployment of troops in a subsystemic state, sending troops to overseas as part of the alliance objectives, naval visits, and manipulation of the local discords.

Establishing relationship among the three concepts would be useful. The sumex constitutes the geographical infrastructure of the subsystem. The subtex, bilateral conflict zone, is the superstructure of the sumex. The sibtex dynamics of the conflicts prevail under the hegemonic unipolarity. In the non-hegemonic unipolarity, subsystemic dynamics of the conflicts shape the balancing acts of the great powers.

The balancing acts of the great powers occur in the subsystems. A trilateral frame of relations in a subsystem composed of subsystem and non-subsystem great powers, and a lesser power can be best analyzed through the Balance of Threat variant of Neorealism. However, the theory should be modified as to form (geographical proximity) and type (offensive intentions) of the threat perception in order to adapt the theory to the equilibrating process of the lesser state. The modified theory provides several descriptive identifier concepts. The threats perceived from the subsystemic great power will be coined as *imminent threat* whereas the threat perceived from non-subsystemic great power(s) constitute(s) the *potential threat* for the lesser state. In an intra-alliance relationship the non-subsystem power(s) may not have always offensive intentions towards her partner due to the divergence of global and regional interests between them. Since these divergent interests of the non-subsystem great power partner may not carry *offensive intentions*, this attitude may be coined as *destabilizing*

intentions which have the power to destabilize the security and foreign policy objectives of the lesser partner.

A comprehensive analysis of balance policy in the Turkish and foreign literature is needed to eliminate some controversial definitions. During the 19th century, the weak Ottoman State sought to preserve its existence through leaning on a great power against dangers directed by other great powers. This policy which continued also during the republican era has been defined as *denge politikası* which was translated into English as *balance policy*. It was translated into the French as *politique d'équilibre*. However, the literature demonstrates that there is a contradiction in terms.

In the Turkish definition, *denge politikası* is defined as an act of foreign policy resembling to the movement of a pendulum moving from one side to the other side to seek a protection when threatened from the other side. There is a triple relationship in this definition: the threatening state, the threatened state, and the protector state. This is an act of triple foreign policy rather than bilateral one. On the other hand, an international relations concept which imply dual relationship is also translated into Turkish by using the term *denge*. The Theory of Balance of Power is translated into Turkish as *Güç Dengesi Teorisi*. In this theory, a dual relationship is in question. The states balance each other in order to survive.

In order both to increase the explanatory power of the concept of the “*balance policy*” and to eliminate the controversial use of the term *denge*, this dissertation will use the *equilibrium policy* (eşitleme politikası) to define the policies of a small power under the influence of imminent and potential threats of the great powers. In the literature, while balance policy is resembled to the movements of a pendulum, equilibrium policy is characterized as a *pair of scales* which is equilibrating two different forces applying weight simultaneously. The *equilibrium policy* in this dissertation covers both meanings and corresponds a suitable Turkish term to eliminate the contradiction also in the Turkish language.

The concept of *equilibrium policy* is distinguished into two types: The *policy of threat equilibrium* (tehdit eşitleme politikası) which have been coined in the

literature as *balance policy* (denge politikası) will be used to refer to any policy to equilibrate any threat posed by one state with another state. According to the policy of threat equilibrium, a small power acting under the pressure of imminent and potential threats may implement strategies between alliance and alignment where neutrality is placed in the middle. The small power state often does not prefer to enter into an alliance relationship with the subsystemic great power since this would mean to bandwagon the imminent threat.

The *policy of interest equilibrium* (Çıkar Eşitleme Politikası) refers to any policy of the small power to equilibrate interests of one great power with another by providing justice between their expectations. This policy includes strategies coined as “*active neutrality*” or “*equilibrium policy*”. The purpose of this policy is to establish close relations with both opposing parties to make gains whatever great power party wins the competition. This resembles sticking to the pro-status quo policy and international norms. The principles of the policy of both equilibriums should be in the framework of pro-status quo policies and for defensive purposes.

The dissertation argues that the policies of a lesser power, which is located in a subsystem together with a great power, to seek to expand sphere of influence which exceeds its real capability or to create a threat perception in order to get foreign economic assistance should be considered anomaly and a very dangerous game. She may be betrayed by her partner or may be punished by another great power.

The dissertation also conceptualizes the *zoning policy* to define geographically differentiated foreign policy vis-à-vis another state. This may signify two meanings: To rank regions different priority in the relations with one state or to equilibrate the interests of the great powers geographically, or to equilibrate perceived threat in one zone with the threat perceived in another zone. This equilibration works as creating separate common interest regions with both the imminent and potential threats.

In the literature, *compartmentalization policy* is used to define situations where economic relations are not affected from tense political relations. According to the idea, bilateral economic developments continue despite increasing tension in the political arena. However, I argue that economic relations cannot be separated from the

political relations. In an asymmetrical power relationship in a subsystem, some economic sectors may constitute strategic part of the political relations, such as, nuclear power plant, gas and oil pipelines projects which imply an extension of the great power rivalry and a tool of conflict management during the tense relations. Economic investments may be used, in one sense, as political bribe to neutralize or to pull the lesser state into one's side as a great power balancing strategy. Therefore, compartmentalization is not the correct term to define economic strategy for the subsystemic great power balancing and must be distinguished from other routine commercial activities.

Many historians begin the examination of the Turkish Foreign Policy as of 1774 which corresponds to the date of the birth of the BSS. When the BSS emerged in 1774 it was consisted of the Ottoman State and the Russian Empire. There are currently six littoral countries in the Black Sea: Turkey, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria. The area of Black Sea region is variously defined by many authors. The region is often defined in relation with other regions which can influence political relations in those regions or influenced by the political developments in those regions. Therefore, the regions of the Caucasus, Caspian, eastern and southeastern Europe and even the Mediterranean is associated with the Black Sea definition.

Some scholars use the *Composite Index of National Capabilities* (CINC) scores collected from the *Correlates of War Project National Material Capabilities Data Documentation* (NMC-v5.0) to differentiate the structures of the international system. The figures demonstrate the absolute unipolar character of the BSS between 1917 and 2004. Between 2005 and 2012, the power ratio between Russia and Turkey ranges between minimum 2.56 and maximum 2.78 which is slightly below three which is the accepted level indicating unipolar status.

In the literature, it is often argued that changes in the Russian foreign policy represents typical reactions to changes in the distribution of power in the international system. Correspondingly, it is also argued that Russia threatens Turkey whenever she feels powerful and seeks Turkey's friendship whenever she is isolated and weak thus validating the argument that Turkish-Russian relations constitute the dependent variable of the international system.

The great power balancing in the BSS gradually evolved through bilateral regulations of passage through the Straits to the multilateral regimes limiting or expanding the capabilities of the Black Sea littoral states or the non-BSS states. The régime formations as a tool of the management of conflict altered the capability of great powers *vis-à-vis* each other and their calculations of interests in the Black Sea. The first modification of the BSS structure in the 20th century occurred with the signing of the Armistice of Mudros in 1918 which opened the Black Sea waters completely to the Entente Powers. The Lausanne Convention relating the Régime of the Straits dated 1923 and the Montreux Convention regarding the Régime of the Straits dated 1936 also modified the structure of the BSS and changed the capabilities of the BSS and non-BSS powers. The alliance relationship as a variable of situational context will be dealt in the dissertation as complementary of the structural modifier.

This dissertation is composed of an introduction, four parts including seven chapters, conclusion, and an annex. In the introduction part a general review of the dissertation was presented. The substantial parts have been formed in line with the composition of the *sumex* which was shaped in 1917, 1922, and 1991. The chapters of the dissertation have been formed in line with the changes in the structural modifiers of the subsystem which happened in 1923 and 1936, and in line with the relational variables as Turkey's joining NATO in 1952. As an exceptional case, the period between 1 January 1923 and 24 July 1923, despite deserves to be a chapter according to logic of the dissertation, has been added to the previous chapter (chapter three) due to its short period.

The first part of the dissertation includes one chapter. This chapter refers to the literature review and the Research Design of the dissertation including the research problem, purpose and objectives of the research, research question and hypotheses, delimitation and importance of the research, research method, theoretical approach including the definitions of terms and concepts and discussions of existing approaches, assumptions, and limitations of the research.

The second part of the dissertation is composed of the second and third chapters delving into the period between the Bolshevik October revolution (7 November 1917) and the signature of the Lausanne Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits on

24 July 1923. The *sumex* of the BSS became non-hegemonized and the Turkish-Soviet *subtex* was expanded following the withdrawal of Russia from the war after the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917 when new national entities and new neighboring subsystem formed in the Caucasus. The new *sumex* allowed the increasing involvement of the TPGPs to manipulate proliferated subsystemic dynamics.

The second chapter refers to prelude to modern Turkish-Russian relations covering the period between the Bolshevik October revolution (7 November 1917) and the inauguration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 23 April 1920. The story of the first chapter between 1917 and 1920 evolved in two stages as pre- and post-Mudros stages. During the first stage, Germany was the primary non-subsystem third-party great power (TPGP) influencing the course of the Ottoman-Bolshevik relations. The important events of the first stage were the signature of separate peace at Brest-Litovsk between the RSFSR and the Central Powers which made the recognition of the pre-1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian border by furthering the pre-1914 border by force of German arms. In this stage, the Ottoman State pursued a policy of establishing a buffer state between her and the RSFSR as a safety measure to the imminent Russian threat under the influence of the sometimes faciliatory and sometimes preventive policy of Germany.

The second stage of the second chapter begins with the unconditional surrender of the Ottoman State at Mudros on 30 October 1918 which had also negative implications also for the RSFSR. In this stage, the UK replaced Germany as the primary non-subsystem TPGP influencing the course of the Ottoman-Bolshevik relations. The UK occupied the Caucasus creating a corridor between Batum and Baku and separating the Bolsheviks and the Ottomans from each other. The Entente Powers provided arms and ammunitions to the White Army in the Russian civil war. The use of Greece as a suitable candidate to fill the vacuum of power in Thrace, Istanbul and eastern Mediterranean was met with concern by the RSFSR since a powerful Greece allied with the Entente Powers could block the Soviet access to the Mediterranean in the long run. The UK also contemplated an independent Armenia as a permanent barrier against Bolshevik expansion towards the Mediterranean. During the beginning of the Turkish resistance movement in May 1919, the RSFSR began to contact with

the Turkish nationalists. In January 1920, establishment of a Transcaucasian Barrier to prevent the unification of Anatolian movement with the Soviets came to the agenda in the UK. Assuming some sort of link between the Turkish resistance and the RSFSR, the Entente forces occupied Istanbul on 16 March 1920. Following new general elections, the Turkish Grand National Assembly was inaugurated in Ankara on 23 April 1920 and the Turkish-Russian relations entered into a new phase.

The third chapter refers to the period between the inauguration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 23 April 1920 and the signature of the Lausanne Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits on 24 July 1923. According to the methodology of the dissertation, this chapter should have been ended with the signature of the Treaty of Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 30 December 1920, whereas it was terminated with the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923 for practical reasons. This period covers the process of the establishment of the legal basis of modern Turkish-Russian relations. In April 1920, the disastrous peace conditions for the Ottoman State had been published. Greece had been selected to fill the vacuum of power in the western Anatolia, and Armenia was a candidate for a similar job in eastern Anatolia. Even, Iran had been casted to play a role in Batum. Coincidentally, the Bolsheviks were engaged in dominating the Caucasus. However, this project was interrupted due to the attack of the Polish army to the RSFSR. Although, the Bolshevik government was stating that it was ready to support every revolutionary struggle against the UK, it also needed to improve its relations with the UK as part of the reconstruction of its economy. According to the RSFSR, the Straits ought not to be in the hands of any country in confrontation or competition with itself. The RSFSR was the only source of help for the new Turkish government in Ankara. There were two problems ahead of the Ankara government: to wipe out the Caucasian barrier and to obtain military and economic assistance from the RSFSR. However, harmonization of the Turkish and Bolshevik policies was taking time and the Entente Powers were applying various maneuvers to dissociate Ankara government from the Bolshevik Russia. The Treaty of Moscow was signed between Ankara and Moscow amidst many tactics involving triple relations among Ankara, Moscow, and London. Whereas, the Treaty of Moscow was not sufficient for the

Soviet aid and the Ankara government should have to wait the visit of Frunze to Ankara. Following the final Turkish victory against the Greeks, the Ankara government alienated from Moscow not to damage the negotiation process at the Lausanne peace conference at the cost of Moscow's disillusion. The above mentioned dynamics exerted influence on Turkish-Soviet relations in the form of Sovietization of the Caucasus, Treaty of Moscow, Treaty of Kars, increasing Soviet aid to the Turkish National Struggle, and the non-invitation of the RSFSR to the Lausanne peace negotiations.

The third part of the dissertation is composed of the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters and covers the period between the signature of the Lausanne Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits on 24 July 1923 and the official dissolution of the USSR on 30 December 1991. The main characteristics of this period with respect to the BSS is signified by the transition to a hegemonic unipolarity which led to the prevalence of the sibtex dynamics.

The fourth chapter begins with the signature of the Lausanne Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits on 24 July 1923 and ends with the signature of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Régime of the Straits signed on 20 July 1936. The Lausanne Convention not only modified the structure of the BSS legally in favor of the non-riparian Black Sea powers for the first time since 1841 London Convention but also suspended the main dynamic of the Turkish-Russian conflicts-the Straits, by delegating the Turkish sovereignty over the Straits to an international authority. Thus, the Turkish-Soviet dynamics of the conflicts were not emanated from the subtex but sibtex and systemic great power rivalry which manifested themselves in the form of security formations, disarmament, and prohibition of war agreements, rising fascism and armament, and collective security efforts, and their individual issues with those Powers. The foremost developments emerged as taking form of these dynamics were the signature of Locarno Treaties, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, rising German and Italian fascism, and Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. All the above mentioned dynamics exerted influence on Turkish-Soviet relations in the form of Treaty of Paris and additional protocols, the Litvinov Protocol, Convention on the Definition of Aggression, the Balkan Pact, and the memberships of Turkey and the

USSR in the LoN. The Montreux Convention constitutes the final section of this chapter. The Montreux Convention established new code of conduct regarding the Straits and modified the capability of the Powers in the BSS. Turkey's re-assuming her authority over the Straits revived traditional Soviet objectives over Turkey.

The fifth chapter covers the period between the Montreux Convention Regarding the Régime of the Straits signed on 20 July 1936 and Turkey's joining the North Atlantic Treaty on 18 February 1952. The Montreux Convention reinstated the Turkish sovereignty over the Straits and paved the way for the transition of Turkey from the non-aligned status to an alliance member due to the revival of great power rivalry over the Straits in the aftermath of Turkey's assuming the authority of the Straits Commission. The architect of this transition was the UK who noticed that the sole tool to be used to separate Turkey from the USSR was to revive traditional hostility over the Straits.

The first stage of the fifth chapter covering the period between July 1936 and August 1939 deals with the events leading to the failure of the collective security against the German threat and consequently the signature of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939. The second stage of the fifth chapter deals with the impact of the Nazi-Soviet Pact on the Turkish-Soviet rupture. This stage ends with the invasion of the USSR by Germany on 22 June 1941. The third stage deals with the Turkish-Soviet relaxation due to the prevalence of the German armies over the Soviet armies until the Soviet victory at the Stalingrad battle on 2 February 1943. The fourth stage signifies Turkey's being an object of Allied negotiations until the Potsdam Conference on 2 August 1945. The fifth stage which continued until the Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947 deals with the process of inter-allied conflicts regarding the post-war settlements and Turkey's being a part of east-west divergence as to the Soviet pressure for the realignment of the Caucasian borders, the review of the regime of the Straits and the establishment of Soviet bases at the Straits, and the establishment of the security ties between Turkey and the US which replaced the UK as the most influential TPGP over Turkey. The sixth stage deals with the developments began with the American policy of containment of the USSR until September 1949-the end of the US atomic monopoly. The seven stage ends with Turkey's joining the North Atlantic Pact on 18 February

1952. This stage examines the impact of the systemic developments on the transition of Turkish-American relations from a unilateral economic and military assistance based Turkish-American relationship into an alliance partnership based Turkish-American relationship and its impact on the Turkish-Soviet relations.

The sixth chapter covers the period between Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty on 18 February 1952 and the dissolution of the USSR on 30 December 1991. This chapter although covers a long period, amounts to almost similar number of pages with other chapters due to compression of the Turkish-Soviet conflicts into the sibtex. The first stage deals with the events between Turkey's joining NATO and the breakout of the Cyprus crisis in June 1964. In this stage, Turkey saw the American interests identical to hers. The US-centered Turkish foreign policy created US-centered conflicts with the USSR. The establishment of American bases in Turkey, the process regarding the foundation of regional security organization in the Middle East, the visits of ally warships to Turkey, American intelligence gathering activities, the Syrian crisis, the advance and deployment of the nuclear weapons were the important issues of this stage exerting influence on Turkish-Soviet relations. The Cuban Missile Crisis was the beginning of the end, and the Cyprus conflict constituted the end of this period.

The second stage of the sixth chapter between June 1964 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 corresponds to the détente period of international relations which gradually reduced American leverages on Turkey. The Turkish-Soviet rapprochement in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis was the main theme of this stage. This stage signifies Turkey's need to diversify her relations with the Third World and eastern bloc countries due to her alienation in the western camp.

The third stage of the sixth chapter between 1979-1986 signifies the gradual restoration of the Turkish-American ties in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy in 1980 and the F-16 jet fighter project beginning in 1983 were the main themes of the Turkish-American reconciliation. Despite this, Turkey's developing economic relations with the USSR were important characteristics of the era. The long term natural gas

agreement signed in 1984 may be considered among the important economic developments between Turkey and the USSR.

The fourth stage of the sixth chapter corresponds to the reform and dissolution process of the USSR. Beginning from 1986, the USSR started a series of domestic reform projects of which *sine qua non* was a new détente in international relations. The Soviet reform projects brought about the revival of independence movements in the Soviet republics in 1990. In November 1990, with the signature of the CFE Treaty and the Paris Charter, the USSR compromised her superiority in conventional weapons to the new political architecture of the world. The Gulf war of 1990 had a discord effect on Turkish-American relations especially due to Turkey's economic losses and the US support for a Kurdish entity in northern Iraq. The Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and the USSR signed in March 1991 was approving the principles of the Paris Charter at the bilateral level. The year 1991 signified the dissolution year of the USSR and emergence of new independent states in the former Soviet geography.

The fourth and final part of the dissertation consists of the seventh chapter and covers the period between the dissolution of the USSR on 30 December 1991 and Turkey's shooting down the Russian SU-24 jet in Syria on 24 November 2015. Main development shaping the future interactions in the BSS was the change in the sumex with the emergence of 15 independent states in the former Soviet geography. This change also expanded the Turkish-Russian subtex in a geography stretching out from the eastern Balkans through the Caucasus to the Central Asia. The dynamics of the sibtex in the BSS began to evolve on the subsystemic dynamics of the conflicts. Turkey, losing its strategic position as a NATO wing, regained its strategic importance due to her location at the crossroads of many regional strategies developed by the great powers. The involvement of the TPGPs in the BSS affairs increased due to the proliferation of the dynamics of the local conflicts extending from the exploitation and transportation of the energy resources to the ethnic conflicts.

The dissolution of the USSR and the re-emergence of many entities in the former Soviet geography created geopolitical and geo-economic vacuum of power, diversified the dynamics of the conflicts, and facilitated the intrusion of other great powers into this geography. This stage represents continuous political, economic, and

military expansion of the West at the expense of the RF in Eurasia until 2007. The stages of this chapter until 2007 which denotes the date of the intrusion of the second western entity into the BSS after NATO in 1952, were dated by certain events which do not determine the course of developments but more or less help to give meanings to the forthcoming developments with the combination of other issues.

The first stage refers to the period beginning with the dissolution of the USSR and ending with the announcement of the Near Abroad Doctrine on 23 April 1993. In this stage, the RF was busy with forming the Collective Security Treaty and joining the international organizations, such as, IMF and World Bank. The RF also announced her intention to join G-7, NATO, and the EU in this stage. Turkey was announced as a model by the US and assigned certain duties in the NIS. The discourse of the Turkic world from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China belongs to this stage. This stage represents Turkey's endeavor to challenge the Russian Federation in the CCAR with the support of her western allies despite the insufficiency of her own capacity to tackle this duty.

At the second stage continued until 1997, while NATO was endorsing enlargement and the PfP program, the RF was proposing that the CSCE replace the Atlantic alliance. The US proclaimed the Black Sea region as its sphere of vital interest to prevent the region to become exclusionary sphere of influence of the RF. The Chechen and Kurdish separatism were linked to BTC and Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline projects. Turkey enacted its first Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Straits in January 1996. Russia viewed this move as a deliberate attempt to undermine the Novorossiysk route. Turkey accepted under the American pressure the modifications to the CFE done in favor of the RF. NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual relations was signed on 27 May 1997. Both parties would consult over security issues with respect to the Euro-Atlantic area.

At the third stage continued until the NATO Washington Summit in 1999, main developments were the invitation of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the NATO and EU's closure the doors to Turkey in the Luxembourg Summit. Disillusioned from their individual relations with the West, Turkey and Russia were pushed to a more balanced relationship towards the end of 1997. Turkey and Russia

signed the Blue Stream agreement in December 1997. The most profited from the S-300 missile sale to Greek Cypriot Administration was the RF due to her causing conflict between two NATO ally Greece and Turkey. The Charter of the BSEC was signed in June 1998. The US ended its military aid to Turkey in 1998 due to Turkey's negative human rights record. The BTC agreement was initialized in October 1998 with the attendance of the US. Russia's denial of asylum for Öcalan in November 1998 was a step for Turkish-Russian rapprochement. NATO's unauthorized military action in Yugoslavia in March 1999 was a slap to RF since it had guaranteed the security of Yugoslavia. The RF suspended its participation to the Founding Act and the PfP. At the NATO Washington Summit in April 1999, out of area operation and the European Security and Defense Identity were approved which had negative consequences for Turkey and the RF.

During the fourth stage continued until the NATO at 20 formula in 2002, main developments were the enactment of the Silk Road Strategy Act to assist the CCAR in various areas in May 1999, definition of the Turkish-American relations as strategic partnership in September 1999, the revisal of the Turkish maritime traffic regulation in November 1999 due to the objections of the RF, adaptation of the CFE Treaty to the post-Cold War status quo in November 1999 upon RF's exceeding the limitations, the signature of the BTC project in November 1999 and Turkey's Caucasus Stability Pact proposal in January 2000. The resurgent thinking of the RF against the NATO-led world reflected to its January 2000 National Security Conception. The BLACKSEAFOR agreement proposed by Turkey was signed in April 2001 by excluding the non-Black Sea powers. In the aftermath of the 9/11 Turkey gradually developed separate policies from its allies towards Russia in the face of new US assertiveness in the Black Sea. Turkey and the RF signed Joint Action Plan in November 2001. The US withdrew from the ABM Treaty in June 2002. NATO and RF adopted a new quality of relations in May 2002 and the NATO-Russia Council was formed based on NATO at 20 formula.

At the fifth stage continued until the expansion of the EU in 2007, the Bush Doctrine of September 2002 proclaimed the Black Sea and the Caspian region as vitally important. The Charter of the Collective Security Treaty was signed in October

2002. In November 2002 at the Prague Summit, NATO invited seven east European and Balkan states to begin accession talks. The US started to deploy troops in the CCAR states. Diverging Turkish-American interests over Iraq damaged their partnership. In 2004, the US suggested the BMENA project at the G-8 summit. Turkey initiated OBSH in March 2004 in the Black Sea to deter terrorism and asymmetric threats as a counter measure for the American suggestion to extend the OAE to the Black Sea. In March 2004, seven eastern European states joined the NATO. The color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine between 2003 and 2005 changed threat perceptions of Turkey and the RF. In December 2004, Turkey and Russia signed a declaration on multidimensional partnership. The US counter move came with the *Structured Dialogue* with Turkey in April 2006. The US updated the Silk Road Strategy Act in May 2006 and drew the framework of American security cooperation in the CCAR states. The EU became part of the BSS with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007. This was the last western expansion. The RF would react harshly towards any attempts of expansion in the former Soviet geography and would start to assert her great power status in the eastern Mediterranean thence on.

The period after 2007 signifies the gradually increasing Russian endeavor to stop the western intrusion into the former Soviet geography and to re-claim her great power status. The dynamics of the BSS became more complex with the NATO enlargement, EU expansion and bilateral defense agreements between the West and the BSS countries. The Turkish-Russian reaction to the US unilateralism passed into a different stage with the Russian counter assertiveness in this period.

The Russian discomfort about the US unilateralism was disclosed first at the Munich Conference in February 2007. The RF continued to demonstrate its reaction with the suspension of the CFE and the announcement of the return to the Mediterranean. The 2008 began with the independence of Kosovo and the invitation of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO. The new European security architecture proposal of the RF did not receive positive response. The RF defined the CIS as her priority area. The Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 was the first military reaction of the RF against the Western intrusion into her priority area. This led Turkey to reformulate her foreign policy towards the Caucasus particularly in the form of Armenian opening.

The war brought Turkey and the RF together as status quo powers for the maintenance of the balance of power in the Black Sea and the prevention of the violation of the Montreux regime against the US and the rest of the Black Sea littoral powers which were seeking to increase American military presence in the Black Sea. Russian assertiveness continued with the renovation plans of the Tartus port in Syria as a permanent facility for the Russian navy in September 2008 which alarmed both Israel and the US. The EU's eastern partnership initiative towards former Soviet geography in May 2009 was also met with strong criticism. The gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean and the American Missile shield system were new sources of tension including Turkey and the RF. The western counter move as a reaction to Russian revival was to seek to topple pro-Moscow government in Syria which led Turkey and RF to launch a proxy war against each other. Turkey started to pursue *zoning policy* towards the RF and US. While acting together with the RF against the US naval presence in the Black Sea, Turkey pursued a proxy war against the RF in Syria with the support of the US. The dissertation will end with a conclusion in which the hypotheses will be tested with the findings in the chapters and the overall assessment of the research will be made.

PART ONE
THE RESEARCH DESIGN



CHAPTER ONE

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction

A research design refers to overall strategy to integrate the different components of a research in a coherent and logical way. It constitutes the blueprint for the collection, measurement, and analysis of data. The research problem determines the type of research design (University of Southern California 2019e).

In this chapter, the purpose statement of the dissertation, the objectives of the research, the research question and the hypotheses, delimitations of the research, importance of the research, research method of the dissertation, theoretical approach of the dissertation, definition of certain terms and concepts, discussion of the existing theories in the international relations field on conflict and conflict management, critical evaluation of the current methods, discussion of the subsystems, conceptualization of the Black Sea Subsystem, and parts and chapters of the dissertation will be introduced.

1. The Purpose Statement

The purpose of this research is to assess the impact of third-party states on the dynamics and management of Turkish-Russian conflicts between 1917 and 2015.

2. The Objectives of the Research

The objectives of the research pertaining to the research are as follow:

- To investigate the influence of the third-party states on the formulation of the foreign policy objectives of Turkey and Russia vis-à-vis each other.
- To investigate the impact of third-party states on Turkey and Russia's mutual threat perceptions.
- To investigate and distinguish between different dynamics exerting influence on Turkish-Russian conflicts
- To investigate and distinguish between different management types of the Turkish-Russian conflicts.

- To seek to establish pattern of interaction in which parties operate in order to predict the dynamics, scope, and limitations of the great power involvement in Turkish-Russian conflicts.

3. The Research Question, Dependent and Independent Variables, and Hypotheses

The question of the research is: What is the impact of the third-party states on the dynamics and management of the Turkish-Russian conflicts? The dependent and independent variables of the dissertation can be inferred from the following phrases:

- The characteristics of hegemonic and non-hegemonic BSS creates different alliance dynamics between Turkey and her alliance partner, different dynamics of the great power balancing in the subsystem, and different management of the conflicts between Turkey and Russia.
- Turkey and Russia's assertive foreign policy vis-à-vis each other demonstrates differences in case of Turkey's non-aligned or allied status.

The hypotheses of the dissertation are as follows:

1. Different Black Sea Subsystem membership compositions demonstrate different patterns of interaction.
2. The dynamics of the Turkish-Russian conflicts are mostly the extension of the great power balancing in the Black Sea Subsystem. As a result of great power influence, Turkey and Russia implement their respective re-formulated foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis each other which pave the way for the dynamics of the conflicts between them.
3. While centralized management of the Turkish-Russian conflicts is sign of Turkey's third-party backed/centered assertive foreign policy towards Russia or Turkey's efforts to equilibrate Russian threat, decentralized management of the Turkish-Russian conflicts is a sign of a crack in Turkey's alliance connections due to clash of interest between Turkey and her alliance partner's interests.

4. Turkey and Russia's common threat perceptions emanated from the third-party states lead to a tendency to resolve/prevent their mutual conflicts in a friendly and peacefully or at least cautiously manner.

4. Delimitations of the Research

Delimitations refer to limiting the scope and defining the conceptual boundaries of a research by conscious exclusionary and inclusionary decisions made about how to investigate a research problem. They are not inherent failures or shortcomings in the research. They refer to initial choices made about the design of the study. In the delimitation part, not only one should tell the reader what the study is about and why but must also acknowledge why alternative approaches were rejected that could have been used to examine the topic. Examples of delimitation choices may be as the following:

- The key aims and objectives of the study.
- The research questions.
- The variables of interest.
- The method(s) of investigation (University of Southern California 2019a).

The research examines the dynamics and management of the Turkish-Russian political, economic, and military conflicts occurred between 1917 and 2015. Third-party states are either great powers or lesser powers of the subsystem or contiguous subsystems. The research will be done in a Subsystemic Framework. Domestic causes of conflicts will only be mentioned as far as they represent an anomaly in the patterns of interactions modelled according to the theoretical perspective of the dissertation.

5. Importance of the Research

5.1. Theoretical Contribution

The dissertation aims to contribute to the examination of the research problem around the following elements:

- Modification and application of the Balance of Threat Theory to a tripartite relation in the sub-system.
- Construction of pattern of relations in a subsystem.

- Review and formulation of relevant concepts: Reconceptualization of certain concepts to increase their explanatory power and to diffuse inconsistency between the concepts of IR theory and Turkish history.

5.2. Empirical Contribution

The dissertation aims to contribute to the field of Turkish-Russian relations as mentioned below:

- Assessment of the TPGP impact on Turkish-Russian conflicts through balance of threat theory.
- Constructing a model including a new periodization by using subsystem membership and process variables in Turkish-Russian relations.
- Analyzing different dynamics exerting influence on Turkish-Russian relations in different subsystem compositions.
- Analyzing the management of conflicts in different subsystem compositions.

6. Research Method of the Dissertation

6.1. Level and Unit of Analysis

Yurdusev (1993, 77-78) distinguishes the two terms of *level of analysis* and *unit of analysis* which have been customarily used interchangeably in the literature of IR. According to Yurdusev, the question of how the subject can be analyzed leads us to the *level of analysis*. For him, there are three levels of analysis: At the philosophical level, “most general beliefs, assumptions, postulates, principles and premises ... together form and define the background of the subject in question” (Yurdusev 1993, 78). At the theoretical level, “the problem is defined in a more concrete way upon the basis drawn at the first level. The issue is given identifiable and distinguishable boundaries”, and rules replace principles. At the practical level, the student works with the realm of reality and concentrates on everyday manifestations of the philosophical background or theoretical content of the problem (Yurdusev 1993, 79).

The problem of the *unit of analysis* is basically related to the question of what is being studied. It denotes an entity. Waltz first enumerated three *images* of international relations, individual, states and the international system, and neglected the individual and state levels and concentrated on the third level (Yurdusev 1993, 80). The unit of analysis to be used in this dissertation will be the subsystem level constructed for the examination of the great power balancing in the subsystem and by extension behavior of the small powers.

6.2. Method of Data Collection

A research method refers to techniques for gathering information such as interviews, surveys, and observations. Data may be collected by using qualitative or quantitative methods or the data collected by others may be used (Halperin and Heath 2012, 165). I have collected data from primary and secondary resources. While memoirs, international treaties, official publications constituted my primary resources; books, conference papers, dictionaries, journal articles, magazine articles and online news were my secondary sources.

6.3. Research Approach

Although there is a wide range of methodologies in the international relations field, generally four of them cover most of the arena. Each of these approaches may also include many methods. *Rational Choice and Game Theory* approach assumes that decisions are important in the governing of international relations and decision makers act rationally to maximize their goals. This approach uses mathematical tools to model processes which are composed of available alternative policies which would provide the highest expected utility to the decision makers. *Simulation and Experimental Approaches* use laboratory models of international processes, such as conflict, negotiations and decision making which serve as reference to real world settings. Scholars using these approaches try to identify key attributes and characteristics of the issues and processes, convert them into controlled environments, and play them out using humans, computers, or their combinations. *Quantitative approaches* or *Large-N studies* direct the researchers to collect and process large amounts of data and apply

the statistical estimation methods to determine whether the hypotheses are supported or rejected (Maoz 2004b, 6-7).

In a case study, the available information is much more than other methodologies. A more complete account of the case is possible since other methodologies reduce the case to a series of numeric variables. The case study method also says what did not happen. However, if this study is not conducted with theoretical guidance, it will be difficult to distinguish the critical from trivial. If there are more variables than cases, increasing number of cases would help to identify important factors. However, case selection is also complicated if a researcher would like to control for many variables (Stoll 2004, 358-360).

Case studies are used to develop theoretical ideas and models of certain processes and to test hypotheses by using historical materials. With a *single case study*, a researcher examines a single case in the context of a given theory or model, or a set of different models. With *comparative case approach*, multiple cases are used to examine theoretical issues (Maoz 2004a, 273). There are also several types of case study methods. *Exploratory* case studies develop or refine hypotheses inductively whereas *confirmatory* case studies test hypotheses derived from a well-specified theory (Maoz 2004b, 7). Eckstein (as cited in Walker 2004, 281-282) distinguishes five kinds of case studies (Table 1.1). *Configurative-idiographic case study* is not guided by a theory with general concepts linked as propositions about empirical regularities. It is simply a historical narrative of information. It does not make a theoretical contribution. When the information is reinterpreted as a confirming or a deviant case within the context of a theory it becomes a *disciplined-configurative case study*. A *heuristic case study* is about theory building and concerned with generalizable relations. *Plausibility probes* and *crucial-case studies* contribute to the theory testing. They both examine the validity of hypotheses derived from a theory. The difference between them is the stage of theory testing.

Case study is also one of the approaches of the qualitative research. The word qualitative implies that the qualities of entities, processes and meanings are not experimentally measured in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency. Therefore, the organization of a qualitative research study demonstrates a considerable

variation unlike experimental or positivist research. There exists “*a reflexive process underpinning every stage of a qualitative study to ensure that researcher biases, presuppositions, and interpretations are clearly evident...*”. The goals of a qualitative research are to identify general patterns and relationships, to test and refine theories, and making predictions. Conceptual Framework will guide the research. Usually research problems frame the qualitative study and that influence the “*decision about what methods to use, but qualitative designs generally lack an accompanying hypothesis*”. Therefore, more specific research questions are generally the result of the design process. Structured approaches “*help to ensure that there is comparability of data across sources and researchers...*”. “*An unstructured approach allows the researcher to focus on the particular phenomena*”. In contrast to quantitative researchers, “*qualitative researchers must attempt to rule out most threats to validity after the research has begun by relying on evidence collected during the research process ...*” (University of Southern California 2019d).

Table 2.1. Case Study Types

Case Study Type	Empirical Contribution	Theoretical Contribution
Configurative-Idiographic	Information Narrative/Inventory	A-Theoretical
Disciplined-Configurative	Interpret Case with A Theory	Theory-Confirmation
Heuristic	Find General Problems / Solutions	Theory-Building
Plausibility Probe	Probe Candidate-Theories	Specify Rival Theories
Crucial	Accept or Refute A Theory	Assess Rival Theories

Walker, Stephen G. 2004. “The Management and Resolution of International Conflict in a “Single” Case: American and North Vietnamese Exchanges during the Vietnam War.” In *Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations: Methodology in the Study of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution*, edited by Zeev Maoz, Alex Mintz, T. Clifton Morgan, Glenn Palmer and Richard J. Stoll, 277-308. Lexington Books, 281-282.

A disciplined-configurative case study method has been used in this dissertation since the dissertation also develops theoretical ideas and models of certain

processes and test them by historical materials. This study has been conducted with theoretical guidance to distinguish the critical from trivial. This dissertation is in one sense a heuristic case study since it is also about theory building with generalizable relations. My direction of reasoning in this research project followed hypothetico-deductive logic in which a theoretical framework was developed and tested with the findings based on the evidence.

7. Assumptions

In this dissertation, it is assumed that a subsystem, with its distinct characteristics, shapes the balancing acts of the great powers in it which in turn influence the dynamics and management of the conflicts between the subsystem units.

8. The Literature Review (1917-2015)

A literature review “*surveys books, scholarly articles, and any other sources relevant to a particular issue, area of research, or theory, and by so doing, provides a description, summary, and critical evaluation of these works in relation to the research problem*”. A literature review “*usually has an organizational pattern and combines both summary and synthesis, often with specific conceptual categories*”. The literature review reveal any gaps and locate one’s own research within the context of existing literature. Methodological, systematic, and theoretical literature reviews are among many types of literature reviews. Methodological review reviews methods of analysis, such as, “*theory, substantive fields, research approaches, and data collection and analysis techniques*”. Systematic review overviews “*existing evidence pertinent to a clearly formulated research question*”. Theoretical review examines “*the corpus of theory that has accumulated in regard to an issue, concept, theory, phenomena*” (University of Southern California 2019b).

This review provided both systematic review of the literature pertinent to my research question and theoretical review regarding the examination of the dissertation topic with a critical approach to make feel gaps in the literature with respect to modelled analysis of Turkish-Russian relations, use of balance of Threat Theory, and third-party state impact on Turkish-Russian relations as a preparatory step of the research problem. As seen from the following review, I could not see any research

based on some kind of modelling of Turkish-Russian relations. I could also not notice use of Balance of Threat Theory except in one section of a book written by Demiryol (2015). There were a few theoretically informed study dealing with the examination of the Turkish-Russian relations. I could not run across to any one study specifically written on the third-party state impact on the Turkish-Russian relations. I could not come across a work examining the Turkish-Russian relations through a subsystemic perspective.

Halil Ibrahim Karal's (1967) dissertation named *Turkish Relations with Soviet Russia during the National Liberation War of Turkey, 1918-1922: A Study in the Diplomacy of the Kemalist Revolution* deals with the evolution of Turkish-Bolshevik cooperative and conflictual relations. Adaptation of Marxism to international politics on one side and formulation of anti-imperialist Kemalist régime on the other, drew the framework of the relations of the period. Karal argues that the joint challenge against western imperialism was not a sufficient basis for cooperation and convergence of interests was also needed for such cooperation (Karal 1967, ix-xi). The Turkish National Struggle which represented the connection between nationalism, communism and imperialism was part of the similar struggles which took place around Russia, such as national revolution in China under the leadership of Sun Yat-Sen, was subsumed under the all-inclusive term, "*the East*". The emergence of Soviet régime in the international arena has had two repercussions in Turkey in 1918. First, the new régime removed one of the main architects of the *Eastern Question*, the Tsarist Russia, which had finally come to terms with the European Powers on the partition of the Ottoman State. Secondly, Leninist theory provided an explanation for the phenomenon that the Ottoman State had experienced with the European Powers for so long- *the imperialism*. Just about the time that Turkish resistance to the partition begun in 1918-1919, Leninist theory focused on another concept, *national liberation*. Thus, Bolshevik ideology by using these two concepts, namely, imperialism and national liberation, added to the term "*the East*" a positive and revolutionary connotation comprising all of the colonial and semi colonial world (Karal 1967, 1-3).

Bülent Gökay (1997) in his book named *A Clash of Empires: Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British imperialism: 1918 -1923* delves into the period with

reference to the impact of the great power struggle on the Turkish National Struggle. According to Gökay (1997, 164-169), the British failed to materialize her scenario projected in the region five years ago: a regional system consists of enlarged Greek state, a Kurdish state, and independent Caucasian states. Soviet security in Turkey was not directly at stake contrary to the Caucasus. The Soviet objective was weakening the British position in Turkey, therefore, it was not after a deep involvement in Turkey. In this period, Ankara exploited the divergence of policy among the West and the antagonism between the UK and the Bolshevik Russia. Bülent Gökay (2006) in his other book named *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism* analyses the foundations, rationale and history of Soviet Eastern Policy towards the Turkish Communist movement and the impact of the movement on the course of Turkish politics.

Durmuş Karaman (1997) in his dissertation named *Milli Mücadele Döneminde Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri ile Yapılan Antlaşmaların Meclisteki Akisleri (1920-1922)* [*The Repercussions in the Turkish Grand National Assembly of the Agreements concluded with the Soviet Republics During the National Struggle (1920-1922)*] examines the debates over the agreements concluded with the Soviet Republics during the Turkish National Struggle between 1920 and 1922 in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Çağatay Benhür (2008b) in his dissertation named *Stalin Dönemi Türk-Rus İlişkileri (1924-1953)* [*Turkish-Russian Relations in the Stalin Period (1924-1953)*] examines the political, military, economic and cultural relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union during the term of Stalin.

Mehmet Perinçek (2014) in his book named *Atatürk'ün Sovyetler'le Görüşmeleri: Sovyet Arşiv Belgeleriyle* [*The Interviews of Atatürk with the Soviets: The Soviet Archival Documents*] examines the 1919-1938 period of Turkish foreign policy with reference to the interviews of Atatürk with the Soviet officials by disclosing the archival materials of *Russian States Archives of Social and Political History* unknown to Turkish academy until then. He argues that these documents highlights the role of the Turkish-Soviet friendship which influenced the course of the world history. The attachments of the book include the minutes of the interviews and the relevant reports informing the higher authorities. Perinçek argues that Turkish and

Russian revolutions have been realized by leaning on each other and this active togetherness demonstrated itself in the philosophy of the establishment of two states, groupings in the world politics and the comfort in the goals of two revolutions (Perinçek 2014, 237). According to him, this alignment was based on the principles but not on the conjunctural necessities. Whenever Turkey diverted from “*national state*” strategy, it also renounced from the Soviet friendship that Atatürk underscored as part of the national state strategy; and whenever Turkey decided to be a “*little America*”, the terms “*independent Turkey*” and Soviet friendship were put away. Likewise, when the Soviet Union broke off its ties with Leninism and gained a social-imperialist character especially after 1960s, it also renounced from the Turkish friendship (Perinçek 2014, 241-242). Tahir Kumkale (1997) in his book titled *Tarihten Günümüze Türk-Rus İlişkileri* [Turkish-Russian Relations from the Past to Present] describes the historical development of the Turkish-Russian relations from the beginning until the aftermath of the Cold War with special reference to Caucasus and Central Asia.

Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, i) argue that Soviet relations with Turkey since 1917 have been determined by three fundamental considerations: defensive, expansionist, and economic. The main fear of the USSR was that a major power hostile to the USSR (such as England, Germany, or the US) might use Turkey to threaten Soviet interests. Therefore, Soviet Union devised various schemes to prevent major anti-Soviet powers from using Turkey. Soviet leaders supported Turkey whenever it defied anti-Soviet powers (Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, iii). Tactics of the Soviet expansion vis-à-vis Turkey varied depending on time and circumstance. The USSR pursued two distinct approaches of expansionism. These two expansionist approaches were used interchangeably:

- Traditional tsarist type of expansionism: Seeking to acquire new territories or new spheres of influence for the USSR.
- Leninist type of expansionism: Seeking every possible means to impose on Turkey Leninist ideology, the Soviet political, economic and social system (Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, iv).

The bulk of Soviet economic decisions affecting Turkey was determined by political and strategic considerations (Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, vii-viii). The USSR deliberately pursued two major objectives:

- To maintain close economic, technical, industrial, and cultural ties, to intertwine the border state economy with the Soviet economy.
- To establish political and military relationships to protect financial investments or to secure the borders instead of pursuing a profitable economic policy (Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, xii).

The period between Montreux and Turkey's accession to NATO demonstrates distinct dynamics in Turkish-Russian relations. Remzi Öner Özkan (2010b) in his thesis named *The Soviet Territorial Demands from Turkey: 1939-1946* constructs his thesis on the neorealist theoretical framework. He argues that the Soviet demands from Turkey were expansionist in nature as opposed to the view that they were defensive. Ildir Lika (2015) in his thesis named *The Quest for Security: Soviet Union's Demands from Turkey, 1945-1946* argues that Soviet demands from Turkey such as jointly administering Straits' defense, requesting land/naval bases in the Straits and modifying Turkey's eastern borders on one hand, and the firm American stance towards the Soviet Union on the other, played a key role in the beginning of the Cold War. Therefore, Turkey has adopted a completely new orientation in its foreign policy.

Veysel Karani Şüküroğlu (2008) in his thesis *1945-1960 Soğuk Savaş Dönemi Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri ve Ortadoğu'ya Yansıması [Turkish-American Relations in the Cold War and its Reflection to the Middle East]* argues that Turkey's Middle Eastern policies between 1945 and 1960 were the extension of its Western oriented policies and this submissive policy did not start during the Democratic Party era as generally accepted, on the contrary, it had already started in 1945 during the Republican Party era. M. Ali Gemuhluoğlu (2003) in his dissertation named *Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkisi (1945-1965) ve Türk Dış Politikası [Turkey-Soviet Union Relations during the Cold War (1945-1965) and Turkish Foreign Policy]* examines the role of Turkey in the containment policy of the US between 1945 and 1960, and the influence of Turkish-American conflicts on the

improvement of Turkish- Soviet relations. There is no mention of any IR theories in the dissertation.

R. Melih Aktaş (1998) in his dissertation named *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinde Amerikan Faktörü (1950-1960)* [*The American Factor in the Democratic Party Period Turkish-Soviet Relations (1950-1960)*] does not have any theoretical framework and even did not mention any IR theory. He narrates Turkish-Russian relations considering the influence of the US during the ruling Democratic Party period between 1950 and 1960. He refers to the interaction of three factors: Involvement of the US into Turkish Foreign Policy beginning from 1945, change in the Soviet foreign policy upon the death of Stalin in 1953, and coming into the power of Democratic Party in 1950. He argues that Turkey could not follow a balanced security policy between the US and the SU and always opted for the West which created increasing security concerns for the Soviet Union. He adds that Turkey's security buildup was more than its actual needs and therefore created security concerns for the Soviet Union. When Democratic Party tried to balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, it was exposed to a military coup.

Ayfer Yazkan Kubal (2013) in her dissertation named *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Détente Period of the Cold War* examines Turkey's goals and strategies with regards to its internal dynamics such as the need for industrialization and foreign support for the Cyprus case by making a comparison with the foreign policy of German Federal Republic in the framework of changing international dynamics during the détente period. She does not mention any IR theories in her research, and she does not have a theoretical framework.

Hüseyin Çakal (2006) in his thesis named *The Origins of the Cold War in the Middle East: The Turkish Case* argues that the main characteristic of the Middle East – the continuous great power rivalry in the region, happened to be a catalyst in the deterioration of the war time partnership between the USA and the Soviet Union. Thus, security concerns of the free world in the Middle East during the Cold War did arise not so much from the threat of direct Soviet aggression but from continuation of unfavorable historical trends. Hence, he contends that the origins of the Cold War in the region emanates from the imperial rivalries which explains most part of the postwar

situation in the Middle East. Tolgahan Akdan (2014) in his thesis named *A Systemic Analysis of the Cold War and Turkey's Postwar Drive to the West* conceptualizes Cold War as an inter-systemic (between different economic systems) conflict and integrates the geopolitical relations between Turkey and Soviet Union in this conflict. He argues that geopolitical tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union should not be conceived as an “‘ontologically autonomous’ ahistorical geopolitical tension but rather as a derivative of the Cold War as a wider systemic conflict”. In this way, he shows “the systemic character of Turkey's drive to the Western alliance, which amounted to a profound socio-economic integration into the international capitalist system”.

İbrahim Çağrı Erkul (2010) in his thesis named *Soğuk Savaş'ın Üç Büyük Kırılma Noktası: Kore, Vietnam ve Afganistan Savaşları, Savaşların Sonuçları, Günümüze ve Uluslararası İlişkilere Etkileri* [Three Great Turning Points of the Cold War: Korean, Vietnamese and the Afghanistan Wars, the Results of the Wars, the influences on the international relations until today] defines the Korean, Vietnam and Afghanistan wars as the turning points of the Cold War which until today exerts influence on international relations. Rahime İğdeci (2014) in her thesis named *Cold War in the Middle East: Soviet Interests in the Middle East and the American Effect* examines the influence of the US on the interests of the Soviet Union and Russia in the Middle East. Galia Golan's (1990) book titled *Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War Two to Gorbachev* and Vladimir Wozniuk's book named *Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy* are useful to understand systemic and regional influences on the formulation of Soviet foreign policy.

İhsan Bakar (2006) in his dissertation named *Jeopolitik Yaklaşımlar Çerçevesinde, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Türk-Rus Yönelişleri* [Post-Cold War Turkish Russian Orientations in the Framework of Geopolitical Approaches], tries to explain post-Cold War geopolitical tensions and cooperation areas within the framework of paradigmatic transformation model in the context of new conjuncture where ambiguity prevails. He argues that the Turkish and Russian geopolitical rivalry encompassed in an inter-bloc ideological tensions re-emerged immediately following the end of the Cold War. However, since today's world is different than that of the 19th or 20th centuries, the validity of the struggle solely based on geography should be

interrogated. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a geopolitical vacuum has emerged in the areas surrounding Turkey. He enumerates the following areas of geopolitical tension in the post-Cold War period:

- Ethnic geopolitics: Chechen and Kurdish problem.
- Geopolitical mixing: Russian-Greek geopolitical relations within the framework of orthodoxy.
- Energy geopolitics: Pipelines.
- Classical / traditional straits geopolitics: Discussion over the Montreux Convention.
- NATO expansion to the East.

Ali Başaran (2013) in his dissertation named *Dış Siyasi, İktisadi İlişkiler Etkileşimi Çerçevesinde Yeltsin Dönemi Rusya-Türkiye İlişkileri* [The Yeltsin Period Russia-Turkey Relations within the Framework of the Interaction of foreign Political and Economic Relations] argues the existence of a high interaction between political and economic relations and therefore examines the influence of economic relations on the political relations. He follows a pluralistic research methodology since pluralism mostly underlines the interaction of economic and political relations. In the first chapter, he explains the influence of new Westernism and new Eurasianism on the Russian Foreign Policy where the latter prevails after the middle of the 1990s. In the same period, Kemalism prevailed over the new Ottomanism in Turkey. In the second chapter, he argues that private persons have special influence on the Turkish-Russian relations. He adds that economic interest leads rulers to behave modestly, and free elections make bilateral relations peaceful. In the third chapter, he examines the topics having both economic and political dimensions, such as, arms sales, competition over oil and gas pipelines, sale of S-300 missiles to Greece and Cyprus and the establishment of Black Sea Economic Cooperation. He argues that Turkey acts with the West in the multilateral conflicts. In this sense, Turkey has participated in the Kosovo war with the West but could not intervene into Azeri- Armenian conflict since the West did not extend its support. In the same vein, contrary to Turkey's demands, the Russian Federation did not confirm to some of the provisions of the European Conventional Forces Agreement upon the consent of the West. Turkish-Russian

economic relations harness the negative influences of multilateral political conflicts. In the fourth chapter, the harnessing effect of economic relations also on the bilateral relations reiterated. He explained how pipelines, an economic subject, constituted a spiral with the political conflicts such as Chechnya and PKK.

Andrew David Haimen (2014) in his thesis named “*American-Turkish Relations in the 1990s: Continuity and Changes in the Post-Cold War Era*” argues that the end of bipolar confrontation provided for the potential split or changes in the bilateral ties between Turkey and the US. Despite the disappearance of the initial cause of their connection via existential fear, they sought to maintain tactical ties. Therefore, the US goals still heavily affects Turkey’s external and internal policies. He has used a liberal realist theoretical framework devised by Ikenberry and Kupchan.

Erhan Canikoğlu (2010) in his dissertation named *Putin Döneminde Rusya Federasyonu’nun “Yakın Çevre” Politikası [The Near Abroad Policy of the Russian Federation during the Putin Period]* examines RF’s foreign and security policies from the perspective of “near abroad”. Emre Erşen (2009) in his dissertation named *Sovyet Sonrası Rus Avrasyacılığı ve Rusya-Türkiye İlişkileri Üzerinde Etkileri [Post-Soviet Russian Eurasianism and its influence on Russia-Turkey Relations]* examines the historical development of Russian Eurasianism and its influence on T-R relations beginning from the Ottoman-Russian relations till 2008. Merve İrem Yapıcı (2009) in her dissertation named *Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde İç Etkiler Açısından Rus Dış Politikasının Yönelimleri: Yeltsin ve Putin Dönemleri [Russian Foreign Policy Orientations in the post-Cold War Period with regards to Domestic Factors]* examines the influence of domestic factors on the foreign policy of Russia. Tuğçe Varol (2012) in her dissertation named *Analysis of Russian Energy Policy* argue that Russia can use energy as a weapon anytime it feels threatened. Although Russia used energy weapon on many occasions against former Warsaw Pact states, it did not use it against Turkey and Germany.

Fatma Aslı Kelkitli (2012) in her dissertation named *Post-Cold War Turkish Russian Relations: The Limits of Competition and Cooperation in Eurasia* connects Turkish- Russian rapprochement to their disappointment with the US and the EU, and the influence of growing economic relations on the reduction of political tensions. She

argues that although T-R relations cannot be evaluated without taking into account their own relations with the USA and the EU, bilateral relationship has its own distinctive characteristics and dynamics. Therefore, Turkey will always need to pay attention to Russian views regarding regional issues. She also contends that increasing economic cooperation can induce convergence in the foreign policy outlook of these states.

Olesya Özkan (2010a) in her thesis named *The Transformation of the NATO-Russian Relations from Yeltsin to Putin-Medvedev Leadership between 1991 and 2009* attempts to portray the continuity and change in the Russian Foreign Policy in lights of the events such as dissolution of the Soviet Union, Bosnian war, Kosovo conflict, internal transformation and extension of NATO. She argues that while Yeltsin promoted multilateralism on an equally footing between the US and Russia, Putin and Medvedev's multilateralism aimed to undermine American hegemony.

Gülşah Güreş (2011) in her thesis named *Security Dimension of Turkey's Relations with Russia: 2000-2010* examines the political, military and energy aspects of the Turkish-Russian security relations. She argues that both countries “*have developed their bilateral relations in the form of pragmatic cooperation due to the existing limits to the deeper levels of cooperation in the security field*”, and thus denies the conceptualization of bilateral rapprochement as “*strategic partnership*”. She contends that “*the euphoria of rapprochement between two countries is resulted from the diminution of mutual threat levels as well as the proliferation of common interest areas*”.

Aslıhan Anlar in her dissertation named *Security in the Black Sea Region: Continuity and Change* (2013, 2) argues that ordering discourse of Neorealism (explaining international political order by means of anarchy and hierarchy) is “*insufficient to explain the relationship between two states, one of which is superior to the other in terms of economic and military capabilities*”. Therefore, she reformulated the ordering principle by coining the concept of *anarchical hierarchy* to measure the level of external intervention in politics, economics, and security sectors of other states (Anlar 2013, 4). Thus, the existence of different variants of anarchical hierarchy leads to the formation of different regional structures which in turn influences regional

security in addition to the dynamics of international system and the adjacent regions (Anlar 2013, 53-56). In this way, she attempts to explore the influence of different regional structures and the international system on regional security in the Black Sea during three periods, the Cold war, the 1991-1999 period and from 2000 to 2012 (Anlar 2013, 1-2). She argues that the hierarchical relationship in the Black Sea region prevails within a wider anarchical international system (Anlar 2013, 41). She argues that “*a relatively secure situation in the Black Sea Region has been maintained owing to the specificity of the dynamics between regional security and regional structure*” (Anlar 2013, 4).

Some Soviet resources dealing with the Turkish-Russian relations have been also scrutinized. *Ekim Devrimi Sonrası Türkiye Tarihi [History of Turkey after the October Revolution]* (SSCB Bilimler Akademisi 1978) which was published by the Eastern Research Department of the Academy of Sciences was translated into Turkish by A. Hasanoğlu. The book has two volumes, and they cover the period between 1918 and 1960. It starts with a brief introduction to the Ottoman State. It argues that semi-colonial status of the Ottoman State has been completed towards the end of the 19th century. Turkey became the first bourgeoisie republic of the Near and the Middle East which established the political, economic, and legal position of the bourgeois class. Following the establishment, Turkey followed an anti-imperialist policy demanding implementation of the principles and spirit of the Lausanne Peace Treaty. To this end, Turkey had to lean on the Soviets. Gradually in Turkey, national bourgeoisie under the influence of the rapid intrusion of foreign capital tended to reconcile with the local religious reactionary currents. A. Hasanoğlu has translated two Soviet pieces about Turkish-Soviet Relations in a single volume named *Bir Karagün Dostluğu: Kurtuluş Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri [A Dark Day Friendship: Turkey-Soviet Union Relations during the National Struggle Years]*. The translation comprises the *Soviet Union-Turkey Relations during 1920-1922* section of Abdullah Mardanoviç Şemsutdinov's (1979) book named *National Liberation War in Turkey (1918-1923)* and, Yusuf Alioğlu Bagirov's (1979) book named *History of the Turkish-Soviet Relations (1920-1922)* according to the resources of Azerbaijan SSR.

Harry N. Howard (1974) in his book titled *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy* narrates the development of the US policy towards the Straits beginning from 1830 till the postwar period. Şarika Gedikli Berber's (2008) dissertation named *Tarihi açıdan Türk Boğazlar Meselesi (1833-1936) [The Turkish Straits Question from the Historical Dimension]* deals with the evolution of the dynamics of the Straits. Anthony R. de Luca (1973) in his dissertation named *The Montreux Conference of 1936: A Diplomatic Study of Anglo-Soviet Rivalry at the Turkish Straits* examines the Montreux diplomacy beginning from the Turkish informal probes for the revision of the Lausanne Convention on the Straits until the Soviet demands in 1946. Süleyman Seydi (2001) in his dissertation named *The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers: From the Montreux Convention to the Early Cold War, 1936-1947* examines the Turkish Straits in the framework of the interplay between the Great Powers' diplomacy and the regional dynamics which constituted the origins of the Cold war in the Near East. Bülent Gökçicek (2009) in his thesis titled *The Montreux Convention regarding the Turkish Straits and its importance after the South Ossetia War* argue that the Montreux régime is ideal for safeguarding the interests of Turkey, Russia and the US.

Authors variously coined Turkish-Russian relations during the Cold War. Oran (1970) defined Turkish-Russian relations as “*Turkey's great neighbour issue*” and Bilge (1992) defines it as “*difficult neighbourliness*”. Bilge (1997, 92) also coins the term “*cold peace*” to characterize Turkish-Russian relations. According to him, the responsibility to develop friendly relations lies on Russia's shoulders. As long as Russia does not relinquish the ambition of a military power, it will be difficult for Russia to fulfil this responsibility and a sort of cold peace will continue to characterize this relationship. Trenin (1997, 57) defines the Turkish-Russian relations in 1997 as “*schizophrenic*” in order to remind the revival of 400 year old competition, the discovery of Turkey's role as Russia's natural geopolitical rival and Ankara's eagerness to take the revenge of its historical defeats despite the developing relations in the high magnitude in commercial, tourism and construction sector.

Sezer (2001, 4) defines Turkish-Russian relations in the 1990s as “*virtual rapprochement*” due to the coexistence of the drastic diminution in Turkey of the

enemy image of Russia and the emergence of the Turkish-Russian geopolitical rivalry in the newly opened-up Eurasia which represents:

“ a state of bilateral relations in which public manifestations of state-level adversity and hostility have nearly completely disappeared; the importance of cooperation in a range of fields for furthering respective national interests is mutually perceived and publicly articulated; governments desist from using inflammatory rhetoric so as not to arouse public opinion; and officials keep the lines of communication open in order to safeguard relations against the impact of sudden crisis”.

Despite this, mutual fear, distrust, and suspicion are maintained. Two important but directly opposed dynamics, “*managed geopolitical rivalry*” and “*unique economic co-operation*”, underpinned this process. Managed competition aimed at limiting the role and influence of the other in the newly independent states of south Eurasia. Competition for the transportation of Kazakh, Turkmen and Azeri oil to the west was a good example of this race.

Hill and Taşpınar (2006, 81) describes Turkish-Russian rapprochement, particularly after March 2003, as “*axis of the excluded*”, since it was emanated more out of frustration with the US than a new vision of world strategic affairs, like one of the odd pairings aimed at counter-balancing the US as the unspoken object of alignment. The authors denote this rapprochement as quasi-alliance with little strategic depth.

Öniş and Yılmaz (2015, 17) argue that economic interdependence may coexist with continued political conflicts and geopolitical rivalries between states. In this case, states tend to “*compartmentalize*” economic issues and geopolitical rivalries in order to avoid the negative spill-over of certain disagreements into areas of bilateral cooperation. Erşen (2017, 149) adds that Turkish PM Ecevit’s referring to the war in Chechnya as Russia’s domestic issue during the second Chechen war in 1999 despite western harsh critics can be stated as the early sample of the compartmentalization strategy. In this dissertation, it is argued that economy is integrant part of political relations and it cannot be compartmentalized.

Some important issues went unnoticed or were given minimum attention in the literature. For example, as Armaoğlu (1991, 184) stated, the *Agreement effected by*

exchange of Notes related to mutual security between Turkey and the US dated 7 January 1952 was ratified at the TGNA on 10 March 1954 with a different title which did not refer to the political and military character of this agreement. The detailed information about this subject will be dealt in the fifth Chapter.

The original documents demonstrated that some authors misinterpreted the dates of some events. For example, it is argued that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established on 21 December 1991 (Tellal 2015f, 543) and (Keylor 2001, 459). Whereas the CIS was originally established on 8 December 1991. *Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States* (CIS) was signed in Minsk on 8 December 1991 among Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus as one of the four agreements, named “*Belovezhskiie Agreements*”. First article of the agreement stipulates that “[t]he High Contracting Parties hereby establish the Commonwealth of Independent States”.

Whereas *Protocol to the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, signed on December 8, 1991 in the city of Minsk, by the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation (RSFSR) and Ukraine* was signed in Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991. The *Protocol*, as quoted below, stipulated that the above-mentioned “*Agreement*” would be put into effect by the parties; the “*Agreement*” would constitute the basis of future regulations, and the “*Protocol*” would be an *integral part* of the “*Agreement*”. The *Protocol*, as mentioned below, did not abolish the *Agreement* but referred to it as a basis for future cooperation. In reality, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan joined the CIS on 21 December by signing the following “*Protocol*” in Alma-Ata:

“The Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Armenia, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation (RSFSR), Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Republic of Uzbekistan and Ukraine on equal grounds and as High Contracting Parties hereby shall form the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States shall enter into force for each of the High Contracting Parties from the time of its ratification.

Based on the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States and with consideration of the reservations made upon its ratification, documents will be drafted that will regulate cooperation under the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

This Protocol shall be an integral part of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States” (as quoted in Melville and Shakleina 2005, 7).

Various periodization patterns in Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-Russian relations demonstrate inconsistency with regards the approaches of the authors to the subject. Armaoğlu (1988) divides the interwar period of Turkish foreign policy into the temporary peace period (1923-1930) and period of crisis (1931-1939). Uçarol (2013) divides the interwar period into the 1923-1932 and 1932-1939 periods. Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, 459) divides Turkish-Soviet relations into four phases between 1918 and 1985: 1918-1920, 1920-1940, 1940-1960, and 1960-1985. Gürün (2010) distinguishes the periods of Turkish-Soviet relations into 1923-1933, 1934-1941, and 1941-1953 periods. Bilge (1992) distinguishes the periods of Turkish-Soviet relations into 1923-1936, and 1936-1946 which is the most proximate periodization to the periodization model of the dissertation.

As seen above, almost all Turkish foreign policy literature underestimates the importance of the Montreux Convention of 1936 while making periodization for Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-Russian relations. However, the context of the interwar period was coined essentially to define European history between the two world wars. The Montreux Convention not only modified the ground of great power balancing in the Black Sea but also influenced the course of the great power relations in Europe. Therefore, this dissertation coins *inter-regime period* (1923-1936) for a specific pattern of not only Turkish foreign policy but also Turkish-Russian relations instead of using the inter-war periodization.

Many concepts in the literature are erroneously used to explain some events. Some authors use “*the end of the Cold War*” and “*dissolution of the Soviet Union*” interchangeably. Whereas, both phrases demonstrate different consequences. While “*the end of the Cold War*” have systemic consequences, the “*dissolution of the Soviet Union*” has both unit and region level consequences. For instance, the *end of the Cold War* altered the management of international conflicts but most of the new dynamics of the conflicts emerged in the BSS did not emanate from this structural change but from the unit level change. Therefore, in this dissertation, “*end of the Cold War*” phrase will have system level connotation whereas “*dissolution of the Soviet Union*”

phrase will have subsystem level connotation. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union was a unit level event, decrease in the Russian power had system-wide structural effects which left the US as the only pole of the international system. Regional dynamics of the conflicts have proliferated following the dissolution of the Soviet Union not due to the end of the Cold War.

As Sezer (1998, 69) rightly argues, the disintegration of the USSR is a turning point for the Black Sea politics more so than the end of the Cold War. Sözen (2010, 116) wrongly argues that “... *the end of the Cold War expanded Turkish foreign policy horizons. The playing field of maneuver for Turkish foreign policy-in terms of geography, number of issues, and tools-has dramatically expanded*”. As it was explained, dissolution of the USSR was the only factor expanding Turkey’s engagement area which had nothing to do with the end of the Cold War. Altunışık (2009, 176), as it can be seen from the examination of the following quotation, associates the “*new sources of uncertainties and also opportunities*” with the end of the Cold War. However, it is clear that “*the emergence of new possible areas of influence around Turkey*” was directly related to the dissolution of the USSR rather than the end of the Cold War:

“On the international level, the systemic change of 1989 has had a profound impact on Turkey and unveiled a new context to re-think Turkish foreign policy. As Saunders argues, ‘a major international transition triggers a domestic struggle to redefine state interests and reshape understanding of the international system.’ The end of the Cold War with its new sources of uncertainties and also opportunities challenged the traditional paradigm of Turkish foreign policy and led to the surfacing of strong alternative viewpoints. The emergence of new possible areas of influence around Turkey also led to the re-emergence of a historical/cultural dimension in Turkish foreign policy and freed the country from the shackles of the Cold War.”

The subjective nationalist discourse is also widespread in the Turkish literature. The discourse “*from Adriatic to the Great Wall of China*” is an example of nationalist foreign policy outlook which does not correspond to the realities of the world. The dissolution of the USSR was seen as an historical opportunity which paved the way for Turkey’s becoming a regional power extending *from Adriatic to the Great Wall of China*. However, as Çelikpala (2010b, 97) argues, it was understood sooner that Turkey’s resources were not sufficient enough to respond to all the Turkic republics

coincidentally despite the western support. Therefore, the Caucasus were given priority as a result of her changing expectations and priorities.

Similarly, Davutoğlu (2008, 78-79) argues that Turkey's new position having an ideational and a geographical basis make her a "*central country*" in the aftermath of 9/11. According to him:

"In terms of its area of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country. ... Turkey's diverse regional composition lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate environs. ... A central country with such an optimal geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive manner. ... Given this picture, Turkey should make its role of a peripheral country part of its past and appropriate a new position: one of providing security and stability not only for itself, but also for its neighboring regions".

The response to this ambitious assessment comes from Hale (2013, 255) as he argues that Davutoğlu's ambitious conception of Turkey as a "*central country*" with interests and engagements in any of the Balkans, Transcaucasia and the Black Sea, Central Asia and the Middle East was challenged by the developments proving that Turkey was not the most influential external actor in these regions:

"In south-east Europe, this role was clearly played by the European Union, while in the Black Sea, Transcaucasia and central Asia, Russia was still the dominant power, despite the demise of the Soviet Union. In the Middle East there was no dominant power, but instead a group of roughly equal powers – consisting of Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel and (in normal times) Iraq, plus a number of smaller and weaker states ...". Turkey's ability to project its power into any of these regions could be limited. Thus, being a 'central country' meant negotiation and compromise, with no certainty of being able to achieve ideal results for Turkey – relations with Russia, Iran, Armenia, Cyprus and Iraqi Kurdistan being apt examples".

Power analysis is often used to explain fluctuations in bilateral relations. A slight change in the balance of power is expected wrongly to explain some developments in international relations. This is a kind of abusing the explanatory power of a theory. For example, Aktürk (2014, 15) argues that "*[t]he unprecedented rise in Turkish-Russian cooperation can be explained primarily by the tremendous change in the balance of power between the two states, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the significant decline of the Russian threat to Turkey that accompanied this change*". However, a change in the level of threat perception is not

always dependent variable of the change in the balance of power. The increasing economic relations between Turkey and the USSR towards the end of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s occurred when there was no change in the balance of power in favour of Turkey. The cause of increasing cooperation should be sought in their threat perceptions posed by the third parties.

Aktürk (2014, 20) also interestingly connects the Russian assertiveness in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria to a change in the balance of power between Russia and Turkey in favor of Russia while Russia actually challenged the American unilateralism during these conflicts: *“Following the Realist framework outlined earlier, I would emphasize that Russian assertiveness in these three conflicts was very much accompanied by the significant growth in Russia’s latent (economic) and actual (military) power vis-à-vis Turkey between 2008 and 2014”*.

The review of Turkish-Russian relations demonstrated that the TPGP involvement is inherent feature of Turkish-Russian conflicts since 1774. The TPGPs not only involve in the dynamics and management of the Turkish-Russian conflicts but also in the establishment of codes of conduct related to the Straits ultimately changing capabilities, interest calculations and objectives of the parties. During the review of the works, the terms used to define the situation of the Turkish-Russian relations were critically assessed. The controversial and flawed assessments in the field were discussed. Many different periodization of the Turkish-Russian relations were exemplified. The misuse of the concepts and theories in the literature were paid attention. The samples of the nationalist narrative were given. And finally, the substance and methodologies of the selected dissertations and theses were reviewed.

9. Conceptual Framework of the Dissertation

The concepts in investigating the dynamics and management of conflicts will be used for the following objectives:

- Defining subsystem membership composition.
- Distinguishing the dynamics exerting influence.
- Distinguishing types of management of conflicts.

- Examining strategies of the lesser power in a tripartite relationship.

9.1. Definitions of Certain Terms and Concepts

Conceptualization is important because it helps us to apprehend foreign policy. However, conceptualization makes foreign policy abstract which lead them to move away from concrete plane, from the real world. In that case, if it is insisted on the same policy to protect the concept at the implementation stage, one will be moved away from the realist framework (Sanberk 2010, 105). In this section, main theories, terms, and concepts in the field of international relations will be discussed.

9.1.1. The “Cold War”

There are several major explanations of the Cold War^{1,2}. The term *Cold War* was first used by the British writer George Orwell in 1945 to criticize the USSR and the US for the undeclared state of war. *“Historians first took up the term ‘Cold War’ in the late 1940s when attempting to explain how the wartime alliance between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union had collapsed.”* The term was mostly used by American historians in the first postwar decade (Westad 2010, 3).

If the use of the term of the *Cold War* by the actor states is adopted, the *Cold War* *“began in 1947 and ended shortly after the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962. If the Cold War is understood to be the overt or covert antagonism which existed between the Soviet Union and the United States, between socialism and capitalism, ... then the Cold War began in October 1917 and ended with the collapse of the USSR in 1991”*. ... If the Cold War is seen as *“the period during which the overt antagonism between Moscow and Washington dominated world affairs, then it began in 1943 and ended sometime in the 1960s or even as late as the end of the Vietnam War in 1975”* (McCauley 2008, 105).

According to *orthodox (traditional)* accounts of the origins of the Cold War the wellsprings of the Cold War is found in Marxism-Leninism with its doctrine of

¹ For the detailed account of orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist views of the Cold War, see, McCauley (2008, 10-29) and Saull (2012, 63-65).

² For realist, ideational, and socio-economic approaches to Cold War and the American Foreign Policy, see, Saull (2012, 60-63).

class struggle leading to revolution on a world scale (McCauley 2008, 10-11). The USSR sought world domination and the US responded to this threatening and expansionist behavior. The blame for the Cold War was of the USSR. The US had no choice but to respond which formed the basis of containment. This view is popular with many American historians (Schmidt 2012, 17-18). The *revisionists* reject the traditional analysis as western-oriented. The USSR cannot be held responsible for the Cold War. The Soviet economy by 1945 was near economic ruin. It was confronted by a prosperous US also enjoying a monopoly of atomic weapons whose “*security needs led it to seek governments in contiguous states which were not anti-Soviet... .*” The reasons for the confrontation is found in the American political and economic system which needed ever-increasing trade and investment implying the expansion of American political influence. This produced the open-door policy (McCauley 2008, 13). Therefore, the US’ economic expansionist and even imperialist behavior was responsible for the onset of the Cold War (Schmidt 2012, 18). The orthodox view, seeing US diplomacy as rather passive and reactive in the face of acts of Soviet aggression in east-central Europe, highlights the sovietization of the region between 1945 and 1948. The revisionist view stress the conservative and defensive character of Soviet foreign policy and the more proactive and expansionist policies of the US (Saull 2012, 66).

According to *systemic* viewpoint, the second world war created a vacuum of power in Europe that was filled by the only two great powers of the time. The ensuing rivalry and competition can be explained in terms of bipolar distribution of powers that existed after 1945 (Schmidt 2012, 17).

Keylor (2001, 334) argues that the Cold War in Europe begun over the issues of Germany and Berlin. Hasanlı³ (2011, 8) argues that the Cold War started with the

³According to Hasanlı (2011, 8), the argument, that the Cold War had started in Eastern Europe in relation to Berlin crisis by the end of 1940s, has been emanated from the assessment of the early post-war events in Eastern Europe and the Balkans as actions based on the consents of the war-time allies. Since the Allies already determined their spheres of influence in this region, the events and developments occurred at the beginning did not demonstrate a confrontation. Therefore, there is a delay in the beginning of the Cold War in the Eurocentric history writings. The other approach that the Cold War started with certain events in certain regions over which the Allies did not consent is more realistic. It can be said that the Cold War started with the first inter-allied disputes of Iranian Azerbaijan events and the international reactions caused by the Soviet demands towards Turkey in the fall of 1945.

first disputes regarding Iranian Azerbaijan events and the international reactions caused by the Soviet demands towards Turkey in the fall of 1945. Turkey became the first country that encountered the Cold War psychological tension and foreign threat when faced with the Soviet demands following the WWII (Hasanlı 2011, 11). The USSR's policy based on force and coercion and propaganda based on intimidation and blackmail made Turkey the strategic ally of the US (Hasanlı 2011, 465). Robert Rossow (as cited in Hasanlı 2011, 278-280) argues that the Cold War started on 4 March 1946. He mentions that while Churchill was making his famous *iron curtain* speech, Czechoslovakia had not surrendered, Berlin had not been blockaded and China had not changed. Rosser (1969, 236) argues that the USSR must assume the major share of guilt for the Cold War. It was Stalin's growing appetite for territory and power finally aroused the West to action. The western leaders were ready to grant the legitimate security needs of the USSR. But Stalin did not stop. The demands regarding Turkey, Iran and Libya looked illegitimate.

9.1.2. The “*Post-Cold War*”

The term “*post-Cold War*” refers to a new world order following the bipolar international system which was shaped in line with the principles of the Yalta Conference in 1947 and ended with the Malta Conference in 1989. There are disagreements about the duration of the post-Cold War era. One view asserts that the post-Cold War era ended with the terrorist attacks on 11 September. Another view argues that the post-Cold War international system is still in progress (Aka 2014, 57).

9.1.3. The “*Great Power*”

Despite disputes in the literature of international relations as to what constitutes a great power, great powers are generally those that can maintain their security independently and against all others. They are first rank military powers. In addition to military and economic strength, great powers normally have global interests and they usually have political will to pursue them. The great power status has undergone a revival as a consequence of the collapse of the superpower typology following 1989 (Evans and Newnham 1998, 210).

9.1.4. The “Pivotal State”

Makovsky (1999, 102-107) argues that Turkey has a geostrategic regional pivotal role and it gives support to the vital US interests in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. The US interests will suffer in each of these regions if one day Turkey alienates from the West. However, it is doubtful that Turkey plays her political pivotal role in her region because it does not assume a leadership role for any bloc of states. According to Makovsky (1999, 109), this difference between the geostrategic and political pivot state brings partial explanation to Turkey's complaints against the US. Turkey always become a function of the American policy directed at any other country, such as Russia, Iraq or Iran. The US does not have an integrated Turkish policy because it is inclined to assess Turkey through her real estate value and does not have interest in her disputed regional leadership much.

9.1.5. The Foreign Policy Paradigm

A state's foreign policy approach is based on its foreign policy paradigm. This paradigm is shaped according to the national interests “*in the light of the factors such as the state's régime, geo-political position, history, economic and political activities...*”. Many factors may change the foreign policy, such as, “*the decision-making preferences of foreign policy actors, intergovernmental relations, [and] change in the balance of power in the international system*”. However, the nature of the international system is the most important determinant of a change in a state's foreign policy paradigm. Turkey attempted to redefine its position and role in the international system following the end of the Cold War (Aka 2014, 58).

9.1.6. The “Capability”

According to Waltz, “‘*capability*’ meant the amount of military forces, and resources transformable into military forces”, such as, size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength. Snyder redefines capability as a relationship between states rather than a property of separate states. The revised definition of capability “*provides an explicit link between the static resources of a state and the political power which they may generate*” and permits the subsuming of geographic factors within capability (Snyder 1996, 180-183). If structural polarity

is defined in terms of resources, capabilities refers to the relational aspects of applying these resources. In this case, it becomes possible to take into account features such as geography (Donnelly 2004, 123-124).

9.1.7. The “*Hegemony*”

Hegemony is a leadership of a state in a system possessing sufficient capability to fulfill this role (Evans and Newnham 1998, 221). This concept will be used to define a pattern of relations in the Black Sea Subsystem between 1923 and 1991 due to the creation of the Russian Bolshevik hegemony over some of the Black Sea littoral states.

9.2. Conceptualization of Conflict

Conflict is a pursuit of incompatible goals by the parties by peaceful means or by use of force (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005, 27). Galtung (as cited in Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005, 9) suggests that a conflict can be viewed as a triangle with contradiction I, attitude (A) and behavior (B) (Figure 1.1). Contradiction refers to the conflict situation. Attitude is the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other and themselves. Behavior includes cooperation or coercion which are signifying conciliation or hostility (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005, 9-10).




Figure 2.1. Conflict Triangle

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall. 2005. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Cambridge: Polity Press. Reprint, 2007, 9.

Conflict behavior may vary among cultural perspectives and value systems (Jeong 2008, 29). Conflicts attracts the attention of third parties. Some of them help to solve the conflict others try to benefit from it. There are many linkages and many motives to side with any party to the conflict (Wallensteen 2002, 203-204).

9.2.1. Forms of Conflict

International conflicts may have different forms. A conflict dynamic without conflictual attitudes or behavior is a latent conflict. Latent conflicts may be feelings of hatred and mistrust and lack of contact. Overt conflicts may include, violence, display of force, verbal threats, diplomatic or economic sanctions and other forms (Maoz 2004b, 12).

9.2.2. Stages of Conflict

Conflicts pass through a series of stages as seen in (Figure 1.2) (Brahm 2003, 1). Although these stages are formulated and described differently by various authors, they are most commonly listed as latent conflict, emergence, escalation, stalemate, de-escalation, settlement/resolution, post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation. However, the progress from one stage to another may not occur smoothly since stages may repeat many times in a conflict (Brahm 2003, 1).




Figure 2.2. Stages of Conflict

Brahm, Eric. 2003. "Conflict Stages." Accessed November 30. <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict-stages>.

The latent stage of the conflict may be described as the existence of a potential for conflict among states since they have different needs, values or interests. The conflict may not be obvious if a starting event does not cause to its emergence. The emerged conflict may be settled, or it may escalate. De-escalation may be temporary, or it may lead to a resolution. Parties understand that they will not win if escalation leads to a stalemate. Following the parties reach to an agreement, they try to repair their damaged relationship in a peacebuilding process to attain the long term goal of reconciling (Brahm 2003, 1-2).

9.2.3. Types of Conflict

International conflicts⁴ may be divided into four types: *Geopolitik*⁵, *Realpolitik*⁶, *Idealpolitik*, and *Kapitalpolitik* (Wallensteen 2002, 95). A particular conflict may contain all these four types of conflicts. Geopolitik is a method of foreign policy analysis which seeks to understand, explain, and predict behaviors of states in terms of geographical variables such as, location, size, and demography. Regarding the spatial distribution of land and sea two names stand out: while Mahan (1890) advocates the importance of controlling the sea in order to ascend to primacy in world politics, Mackinder (1919) advocates the importance of controlling the heartland to achieve world hegemony (Evans and Newnham 1998, 197-198). In Geopolitik conflicts, “*particular types of territory are afforded such significance by one or more states as to give rise war*” (Wallensteen 2002, 95). Realpolitik is about the military power. In Realpolitik conflicts, “*prime importance is attached to power and the power capabilities of the actors.*” This refers to alliance patterns, military instruments, and the latest military technology (Wallensteen 2002, 95). In idealpolitik, emphasis is made on ideological and legitimacy issues (Wallensteen 2002, 95). Idealpolitik conflicts have high potential to inflame population, therefore, they have higher mobilizing ability than other categories of conflicts. The nation, god, or democracy deserves much more than others to die. In kapitalpolitik, economic issues, such as oil

⁴ In Conflict Resolution Theory and theories of causes of war, German concepts of the types of conflicts are used. See, Wallensteen (1981).

⁵ The *Geopolitik* was introduced by Swedish scholar Rudolf Kjellen in 1916 (Wallensteen 1981, 61).

⁶ *Realpolitik* was coined by a German journalist, August Ludwig von Rochau, in a book published in 1848 (Wallensteen 1981, 61).

prices, the drawing of pipelines, transportation routes are central issues (Wallensteen 2002, 95). Kapitalpolitik conflicts are likely to be resolved if dealt with in isolation (Wallensteen 2002, 127-128).

9.2.4. Analyzing Conflict

Conflict analysis is the systematic study of the actors, causes and dynamics of the conflict. Conflict dynamics and relationship patterns are important elements of conflict analysis (Lucade 2012, 13) as indicated in the schematized conflict mapping in (Figure 1.3) (Jeong 2008, 21).




Figure 2.3. Conflict Mapping

Jeong, Ho-Won. 2008. *Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis*. Los Angeles: SAGE, 21.

9.3. Conceptualization of Conflict Management

According to Maoz (2004b, 14), there are three basic assumptions which are essential to the practice of conflict management. First, parties do not believe that their mutual objectives and preferences can be removed partially or wholly. Secondly, parties view the conflict to be non-zero-sum, at least temporarily. Third, parties believe that some kinds of tacit coordination or explicit negotiation is possible and bilateral or multilateral coordination are preferable to unilateral action. During the conflict

management, either parties must accept upon themselves, tacitly or explicitly, some restrictions on the level, scope, location, and nature of force they use.

There is no generally accepted definition of the concept or the process of the conflict management (Maoz 2004b, 22). Conflict Management refers to many actions, such as, controlling and limiting the level, geographical scope, and number of participants of the conflict, and types of weapons systems or the size of armed forces. It also refers to negotiate issues explicitly or tacitly to minimize escalation and employ a third party (Maoz 2004b, 13). Conflict management may reduce the dangers of crisis, but conflict resolution, such as peace agreements, tries to affect the basic incompatibilities (Wallenstein 2002, 5). Conflict management may occur in different forms. Firstly, it may be a tacit process. In this process, parties may develop rules of conduct (self-imposed limitations) without any forms of verbal coordination. Secondly, bargaining and the use of force may continue together at the same time. Thirdly, conflict management may be a continuous process, but its forms may change over time (Maoz 2004b, 15).

9.3.1. Approaches to Conflict Management

There are three approaches to conflict management which have also been incorporated into the structure of the United Nations to provide a comprehensive dispute settlement system as seen in (Figure 1.4) (Peck 1996, 14). These are *power-based approaches* (violence and deterrence), *rights-based approaches* (adjudication), and *interests-based approaches* (accommodation) (Bercovitch and Regan 2004, 249).

Diplomacy is the main instrument of the conflict management between states. The term diplomacy refers to interaction between states. Diplomatic communication and regular political contacts are the primary instruments of managing the incompatibilities between states.

Diplomatic activities may be classified according to the positions of the participants. The official government diplomacy, conducted by the official representatives of a state such as head of state, foreign minister, diplomats, and governmental departments that provide communication between states, is defined as *track-one (tier-one) diplomacy*.

Track-one diplomacy may take place bilaterally between two states or multilaterally between several states. The official track one diplomacy may also take place regionally or globally through intergovernmental organizations. Diplomatic communications may be at different levels ranging from head of states to lower level officials which shows the importance of the negotiations. In addition to formal diplomatic meetings, informal conversations may also be implemented together. Although main types of diplomatic communication include mediation and negotiation, there are many other types of communication categorized according to purpose. The purpose of track-one diplomacy may vary: it may be used coercively and involve sanctions, ultimatums and intimidation or may be used persuasively and involve compromise. It may escalate or deescalate a conflict.




Figure 2.4. Major UN Dispute Settlement Approaches

Peck, Connie. 1996. *The United Nations as a Dispute Settlement System: Improving Mechanisms for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 14.

Track two diplomacy is an unofficial problem-solving diplomacy implemented by influential academic and civil society actors that aims at “*building relationships and encouraging new thinking that can inform the official process*”. *Track Three Diplomacy* is a “*people-to-people diplomacy undertaken by individuals and private groups to encourage interaction and understanding between hostile communities...*”. This type of diplomacy includes organizing meetings and conferences (Aall 2011, 51).

Multitrack Diplomacy is a term for using several tracks of diplomacy simultaneously. This type of diplomacy includes official and unofficial conflict resolution efforts including international citizen exchanges, business meetings, and cultural and sportive activities.

9.3.2. Decentralized versus Collective Conflict Management

Collective conflict management is defined as “*a pattern of group action, usually but not necessarily sanctioned by a global or regional body, in anticipation of or in response to the outbreak of intra- or interstate armed conflict*” (Lepgold and Weiss 1998, 5). Collective conflict management works if some of foreign policy interests can be protected multilaterally, domestic political needs are satisfied, and domestic popular support is enjoyed. Differences between individual and collective conflict management is presented in (Table 1.2) (Lepgold and Weiss 1998, 6).

Table 2.2. Decentralized and Collective Types of Security Systems

	Decentralized Conflict Management	Collective Conflict Management
State behavior is	unconstrained by general norms	coordinated with others, based on general norms
Decision criteria are	individualistic self-help; what particular states think is best	pursuit of broad, group-based self-interest
Goal of action is	pursuit of narrowly defined self-interest	what is best for group or system
Military forces are	independent: no need to share resources, command, etc.	part of a collective force: resources, command, etc. are joint
Action occurs when	state's individual interests are at stake	peace and stability of self or others is threatened

Lepgold, Joseph, and Thomas G. Weiss. 1998. “Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics: An Overview.” In *Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics*, edited by Joseph Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss, 3-30. Albany: State University of New York Press, 6.

In the dissertation, centralized management of the conflicts means management of the conflicts with strong coordination in an alliance and pursuit of group-based interests. Decentralized conflict management means individualistic self-help and pursuit of self-interest.

9.4. Studying Conflict Management

According to Maoz (2004b, 15), there are several substantive approaches to the study of conflict management as distinct from methodological approaches.

9.4.1. The Strategic Studies

The underlying motive of this approach is to choose most effective conflict management strategy. Therefore, this approach focuses on decision making. The topic covers “*the effects of stress and information overload*”, “*bureaucratic and inter-organizational struggles*”, “*group dynamics*” and “*leadership personality*”. Success or failure defined by objectives and goal attainment and escalation avoidance are conceptualized as the management outcome (Maoz 2004b, 15-16).

9.4.2. The Negotiation and Mediation Studies

This perspective views conflict as a bargaining process and focuses on the process of negotiation and mediation, and on the relationship between the use of force and negotiation. The success or failure of the conflict management is defined in terms of the emergence of agreement and its effect on the relations between the conflicting parties (Maoz 2004b, 16-17).

9.4.3. The Structural Studies

The structural studies approach examines the management of the conflicts by units from the systemic perspective using positional and system-related variables (Maoz 2004b, 17). Conflict management demonstrates different patterns in different international structures. The conflict dynamics and the management and resolution of the conflicts are affected by international structural changes, sub-systemic changes, or changes in the characteristic of the units (Maoz 2004b, 10).

10. Theoretical Framework of the Dissertation

10.1. Discussions of Existing Approaches/Theories relating to the International Relations Theory on Conflict

A theory facilitates “*explanation and prediction concerning regularities and recurrences or repetitions of observed phenomena*” (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 3). Theories not only define the concepts and explain the motives of the states but also determine the expected actions. Donnelly (2005, 30) describes theories as lenses “*that direct us to what, according to theory, is essential for understanding some part of the world*”. According to Cox (1981, 128) “*theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective*”. Waltz (1990, 22) suggests that theory is an artifice. It is an intellectual construction by which we select facts and interpret them. The challenge is to construct it in a way to permit explanation and prediction which can only be accomplished by distinguishing between theory and fact.

Theory comes into existence “*only if various objects and processes, movements and events, acts and interactions, are viewed as forming a domain that can be studied in its own right*” (Waltz 1990, 23). Theory cannot explain the accidental or account for unexpected events. Theories “*deal in regularities and repetitions and are possible only if these can be identified. A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain and of the connections among its parts*”. A theory indicates that some factors are more important than others, and “*isolates one realm from all others in order to deal with it intellectually*” (Waltz 1990, 26). “*Since theory abstracts from much of the complication of the world in an effort to explain it, the application of theory in any realm is a perplexing and uncertain matter*” (Waltz 1990, 29). The following International Relations theories present theoretical perspectives and conceptual frameworks for the analysis of international relations.

10.1.1. The Classical Works as the Precursors of International Relational Theories

The first writer of the realist tradition, Thucydides, argued in his book *The History of the Peloponnesian War* that change in the balance of power is the very cause

of fear and suspicion among states towards each other. He analyses in his book the notions of arms races, deterrence, balance of power, alliances, diplomacy, strategy and concern for honor (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 58). Another pioneer of the realist tradition, Machiavelli, contended that war is necessary to protect national interest. His book *Prince* is about how to gain, maintain, and expand power. According to him, security of the state justify certain acts by the prince that would be forbidden to other individuals (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 59). Hobbes in *Leviathan* argues the necessity of a powerful and centralized political authority. Since humans live in a “*state of nature*” – a condition of war of “*everyone against every one*”, people could escape from this situation by agreeing to place all power in the hands of a sovereign or *Leviathan* (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 60). According to Clausewitz, war is “*a continuation of political activity by other means*”. He argues that rationally made plans often run into obstacle when implemented (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 62).

10.1.2. Liberal Internationalism

Liberal ideas, developed by Fabians in England, “*stressed the failure of diplomacy, and in particular the slowness of the great powers in mobilizing an international conference on the problems of Balkans*” which paved the way for the first world war. “*Liberal internationalism offered a two-part diagnosis of what went wrong in 1914 and a corresponding two-part prescription for avoiding similar disasters in the future.*” The first stage of this diagnosis and prescription was about domestic politics: “*War comes about because the people are led into it by militarists ...*” or because undemocratic, multinational imperial systems block legitimate aspirations to nationhood. If democratic political systems (liberal-democratic, constitutional régimes, principle of self-determination) are promoted there would be no war. Second stage of diagnosis was about international institutional structures. The basic idea was that the anarchic pre-1914 system of international relations undermined the prospects for peace. Secret diplomacy led to an alliance system, and there was no mechanism in 1914 to prevent war other than balance of power politics. Therefore, establishment of new principles and new institutional structure for international relations was necessary. The League of Nations would provide security. These two packages of reforms were liberal in the sense that “*constitutional government and the*

rule of law were principles of universal applicability both to all domestic regimes and to the international system...” (Brown and Ainley 2005, 21-22).

10.1.3. Realism

In the 1930s the flaws in the roots of liberalism were suggested by Reinhold Niebuhr, E.H. Carr and in the 1940s by Morgenthau among others (Brown and Ainley 2005, 25). Morgenthau laid the basis of realism in his six principles as the following:

- Politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.
- The main signpost in international relations is interest and it is defined in terms of power.
- Interest depends on the political and cultural context.
- Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states.
- Realism does not recognize the moral aspiration of a particular state.
- Political sphere has the autonomy from moral and legal viewpoints (Donnelly 2004, 7).

According to classical realism, nation-state is the principal actor in international relations. There is no central authority in international relations, and self-help is the main notion in the anarchic state system. Since the purpose of the state is survival in a hostile environment, acquisition of power is the ultimate goal of its foreign policy. Therefore, national interest is defined in terms of power. The favored technique of the management of the state system is balance of power and the great powers are the dominant. Stability and order results from the manipulation of alliance system but not from international law and international organizations. Therefore, state behavior is derivative of anarchic state system. The state system is logical consequence of human nature where quest for power and self-interest is inherent in it (Evans and Newnham 1998, 465-466).

Classical realism explains political outcomes by analyzing differences/the attributes of states, such as, governmental forms, economic systems, social institutions and ideologies (Waltz 1990, 34). Classical realists assume that causes flow in one direction from states to the “*outcomes their acts and interactions produce*” (Waltz 1990, 33-34).

Classical realists view power as an end in itself. States define their interests in terms of power and seek to maximize power as well as their security. For classical realists, the international system is composed of units, interactions, and structure. Interaction includes process variables (such as institutions, norms, or rules) and structural variables (Schweller 2003, 330-332). Classical Realism is based on four key assumptions:

- States are the principal or most important actors (key unit of analysis).
- State is a unitary actor (one voice for the state as a whole).
- State is essentially a rational actor (statement of objectives in terms of capabilities, benefits, and costs of associating with each alternative).
- National security tops the list of the hierarchy of issues (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 6-7).

Classical realism lacks of methodological consistency since it “*hosts authors who differ greatly from one another in assumptions, objectives, and methodologies*” (Rose 1998, 153). Therefore, classical realism is not a coherent research program (Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009, 16). Michael Doyle, (as cited in Rose 1998, 153), divides classical realism into three strands: “*Machiavelli’s ‘fundamentalism,’ which emphasizes the importance of individual ambition; Hobbes’s ‘structuralism,’ which emphasizes the importance of the international system, and Rousseau’s ‘constitutionalism,’ which emphasizes the importance of unit-level factors such as the nature and strength of state-society relations*”.

The realist-liberal dispute focuses especially on the goals of actors in world politics and on the nature of their environment. For liberals, economic incentives are important as well as concerns for security. For realists, power is important for security and survival (Keohane and Nye 1987, 729).

10.1.4. Structural Realism (Neorealism⁷)

Although neorealism retains the basic tenets of classical realism, they have different assumptions and paradigms. Regarding philosophical roots, traditional

⁷ Richard Ashley first distinguished “classical realism” and “neorealism” (Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009, 16).

realism rooted in sociology and history (with some notice to psychology, theology, and economics) whereas neorealism borrows from microeconomics (Schweller 2003, 330). Classical realism has a “*behavioral*” and neorealism has a “*systemic*” research agenda (Waltz 1997, 913). Contrary to classical realism’s “*inductive approach*”, neorealism’s approach is “*deductive*” (Waltz 1990, 33). “*Means and ends*” and “*causes and effects*” are different in realism and neorealism (Waltz 1988, 616).

10.1.4.1. The System and Structure in Neorealism

The Neorealist system theory deals with the forces (system dynamics) at system level which explain the constraint and incentives on units (Waltz 1988, 618). Neorealism first explains international outcomes, in addition to this, it also suggests few things about the foreign policies of the states (Waltz 1986, 344). The theory describes what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by different structures of the system (Waltz 1979, 71). Systemic forces and effects change from one system to another (Waltz 1979, 41).

A system is composed of a “*structure*” at one level, and “*interacting units*” at another level (Waltz 1979, 40). States interact and these interactions form the structure, and the structure in turn affects the states (Waltz 1997, 913). The scene of actions is set by the units of greatest capability (Waltz 1979, 72). Structures do not determine state’s actions. They “*shape and shove*”. Structures “*encourage states to do some things and to refrain from doing others*” (Waltz 1997, 915). Structure describes the pressure on states (Waltz 1979, 71). However, structure does not explain everything. The capabilities, the actions and the interactions of the states, and the structure of the international system altogether explain the outcomes (Waltz 1979, 174-175).

The structure have three components. The “*ordering principle*” of the system is anarchy. Anarchy is a general condition of international politics (Waltz 1990, 36). It is the absence of a central legitimate authority which would impose order. The conflict and competition among states emanates directly from anarchy (Waltz 1988, 618-619). Second, “*specification of functions of differentiated units*” is omitted because all the units are alike in neorealism (Waltz 1988, 619). “*Attributes*” and “*relations*” of the units should be omitted from the definition of the structure to be able

to distinguish between system level and unit level variables (Waltz 1979, 79). Political leaders, social and economic institutions and ideologies are the attributes of the states that should be omitted from the structure. Cultural, economic, political and military relations should also be omitted from the structure of a system (Waltz 1979, 80). However, relations defined in terms of groupings explain the positions of the states in the system (Waltz 1979, 98). Third is the *distribution of power* across units which determines the structure of the system. Power is the combined capability of the state. The distribution of power in the system, the number of great powers in the system, determines the structure, and when the number changes the structure of the system changes (Waltz 1990, 29). Structural change begins in a system's unit, and then unit-level and structural causes interact (Waltz 1993, 49). Change in structure changes the expectations of the states and the outcomes of their interactions (Waltz 1979, 97). The costs and benefits of implementing expectations vary as systems change. Change of the system structure also alters old ways of thinking (Waltz 2000, 5).

Neorealist theory holds that the international system affects all units in similar ways (Press-Barnathan 2014, 357-359). Neorealism explains "*why states similarly placed behave similarly despite their internal differences*" (Waltz 1996, 54). However, "*explanations of behaviors and outcomes of the units are indeterminate because both unit-level and structural causes are in play*" (Waltz 1986, 343). "*To the extent that the dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its units, their behavior and the outcomes of their behavior become predictable*" (Waltz 1988, 618). However, changing weight of system level and unit level causes in different international structures (Waltz 1979, 48) prevents thorough analysis of the system dynamics. Lake and Morgan (1997a, 348) argue that system level explanation has less explanatory power for structures outside bipolarity. Competition differs in different international structures. Great Power competition is greatest in bipolar, less severe in multipolar, and least intense in unipolar structures (Lake 1997, 61).

During bipolarity, regional conflicts were absorbed into the US-Soviet struggle (Stein and Lobell 1997, 109). Each superpower suppressed conflict in their sphere of influence out of a fear of escalation which could pave the way for other superpower to intervene. The superpowers followed a type of conflict management to keep

regional conflicts within bounds and sometimes impose settlements (Lake and Morgan 1997b, 4). Superpowers restrained their clients, controlled weapon supply, applied political pressures and used economic rewards and punishments to extract certain behavior (Stein and Lobell 1997, 104-105). The interaction of structural and regional dynamics differentiated the nature of superpower penetration during bipolarity. This differentiation still have impact in the post bipolar structure (Stein and Lobell 1997, 121). Conflict management was a matter of relations between the two poles. Only few of the issues had been brought to UN system (Wallenstein 2002, 242).

Waltz (1986, 342) defines “*dynamics of the units*” as changes in the system, such as, intensity of interactions (sparser or denser), mutual adaptations and alliances shift which changes behaviors and outcomes. Units cannot reconstruct systemic effects because the units behave differently than system.

10.1.4.2. Theory of Balance of Power

Waltz’s balance of power theory assumes that states, in an adaptive behavior, respond to systemic incentives and engage in balancing and emulation (Waltz 2000, 38). There is a strong tendency of major states to balance in the system or in the regional subsystems. However, balancing theory does not predict uniformity of behavior. States try various strategies for survival: balancing and bandwagon are two of them (Waltz 2000, 38). Waltz claims that there are two ways for states to pursue balancing: External efforts- “*moves to strengthen and enlarge one’s own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one*” and internal efforts- “*moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies*” (Waltz 1979, 118). Balancing may not occur everywhere. A dominant power may suppress balancing as the United States has done in Europe (Waltz 2000, 37).

Great power balancing is done differently in different international structures. In bipolarity balancing is done mainly by internal means. Allies are desired, but they are not essential in bipolarity. In a multipolar world, “*a state has to compare its strength with a number of others and also has to estimate the strength of actual and potential coalitions*” (Waltz 1993, 73). Waltz (as cited in Wohlforth 1999, 24) argues that “*unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others*”. The

dynamics of balance of power emerges in the framework of use, threat, and fear of force (Jervis 2009, 207).

10.1.4.3. Polarity and State Behavior in Neorealism

Polarity is a theoretical construct. It implies a threshold value of the distribution of capabilities in the international system. Real international system only approximate various polar ideal types (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009, 5). A pole is defined as the following:

“Commands an especially large share of the resources or capabilities states can use to achieve their end; Excels in all the component elements of state capability, conventionally defined as size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capacity, military might, and organizational-institutional ‘*competence*’” (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009, 4).

In multipolar system, four is the lowest number of units for balancing to occur (Waltz 1979, 163). The characteristic of great power politics in a multipolar world is “*independence of parties*”, “*diffusion of dangers*” and “*confusion of responses*” (Waltz 1988, 624). Competition in a multipolar system is more complicated than competition in a bipolar one (Waltz 2000, 5-6). “*Who is a danger to whom and who can be expected to deal with threats and problems*” is often unclear (Waltz 1979, 170). The origins of Crimean war demonstrate a multipolar system can create ambiguity about the rank of the states and leads to “*fight over a minor and readily divisible issue that comes to symbolize relative status*” (Wohlforth 2009, 44). Miscalculation is the source of danger in a multipolar world and it causes unfolding of events that would threaten to change balance of power (Waltz 1979, 172).

Tripolar systems have “*distinctive and unfortunate characteristics*”. Two poles “*can easily gang up on the third, divide the spoils, and drive the system back to bipolarity*”. In Tripolarity the third member can act as a mediator or balancer, or sometimes can act as an instigator or kingmaker (Schweller 1998, 35).

In bipolar systems, the characteristics of great power politics is “*self-dependence of parties*”, “*clarity of dangers*”, and “*certainty about who has to face them*” (Waltz 1988, 624). There are no peripheries in a bipolar world. “*Anything that happens anywhere is potentially of concern to two powers*” (Waltz 1979, 171).

“Bipolarity blocks or at least complicates three common paths to war in neorealism: uncertainty, free riding, and fear of allied defection” (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009, 22). In bipolar system, foreign policies of the great powers are more predictable and the most constrained (Lake 1997, 62). Bipolar international system tend to globalize regional conflicts (Lake 1997, 61). Alliance leader’s own interest prevail in the bipolarity. There are constraints also on the alliance leader but this stems from the main adversary and not from its own partners (Waltz 1979, 170). Jervis argues that states balance through *“internal balancing”* rather than *“external balancing”* in bipolar systems. Internal balancing requires mobilization of own resources, on the other hand, external balancing requires alliances (Jervis 2009, 190). Waltz argues that bipolarity is less stable than multipolarity. However, multipolarity is more war-prone (Waltz 1993, 45).

A unipolar system is said where a single country excels in the indicators of power such as population, resource endowment, economic capacity and military might (Schenoni 2017, 74-75). In Unipolar systems *“the pole’s security and values cannot be threatened by others”* (Jervis 2009, 191). Unipolarity refers to a particular distribution of power between hegemony and bi or multi-polarity. Unipolarity does not entail a relation of domination. However, unipoles are in a situation of relative primacy (Schenoni 2017, 75). Jervis argues that unipolar systems may not be identical because many things depend on the particular characteristic of the superpower (Jervis 2009, 192). Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth (2009, 18) argue that three general behavioral patterns may be shaped by the unipolar structure for secondary states: *“strategies of resistance to or insulation from the unipole’s overweening capabilities, alliances and alignments, and the use of international institutions”*.

“Weaker states tend to participate in institutional arrangements defined and dominated by one or the other of the major players” (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009, 21). There is more managerial effort in a bipolar world than in a multipolar one (Waltz 1979, 205). Jervis (2009, 197) argues that common error of states in multipolarity is *“to underreact to threats or allow themselves to be drawn into others’ quarrels”*; in bipolarity *“to overreact and engage in unnecessary conflicts*

along the peripheries"; and in unipolarity *"excessive expansion, although not necessarily involving the annexation of territory"*.

10.1.4.4. Modification of Neorealism: Process Variables

It is accepted that neorealist theory does not explain international politics enough. Anarchy and polarity place broad constraints on state behavior but these constraints are much weaker than other causal factors that the theory omits (Snyder 1996, 167). In Neorealism, causal influences on state behavior are found either in system structure or in the internal characteristics of states. However, the process by which these influences make themselves felt are not specified and the behavior is not analyzed in detail (Snyder 1996, 171).

Glenn Snyder (1996, 168) reserves the term *process* for the political relations and interactions that occur between sovereign states. As Donnelly (2005, 44-45) argues process variables about state behavior produce more determinate realist explanatory theories. *"Process variables focus on patterns of interaction that are neither structural nor at the level of the unit."* They are *"systemic but not structural"*. Waltzian structural realism allows to predict that balances will form. However, taking process variables into account, helps to predict which particular balances are likely or unlikely to develop. Snyder (as cited in Donnelly 2004, 122-123) argues that *relational process variables* provide *"the situational context for behavior"* through which structural effects are transmitted to behavior. Process variables engage in patterns of interaction that are neither structural nor at the unit level (Donnelly 2005, 44). While structure influences all states, particular process variables influence only some parts of the system (Donnelly 2005, 45). Adding process variables results in greater complexity and less generality (Donnelly 2005, 45).

Snyder (as cited in Donnelly 2004, 122) adds three categories of process variables to the Waltzian conception of international structures:

- Structural modifiers.
- Relationships (Alignment, interests, capability, and interdependence).
- Interactions.

The term *structural modifier* modifies the effects of the structural elements on the interaction process. They are analogous to macroeconomic influences like interests rates and governmental regulations (Snyder 1996, 169). These structural modifiers are weak compared to the structural components. They would distort the calculation of the structural components (anarchy and distribution of power) if they are given structural status (Snyder 1996, 169). Snyder enumerates norms and institutions, and military technology (nuclear weapons) as structural modifiers (Snyder 1996, 170). Once the effects of anarchy and power distribution is established theoretically, outcomes that deviate from these effects may be explainable in terms of norms and institutions (Snyder 1996, 170). Keohane and Nye (1987, 742-743) argue that régimes can alter units' calculations of their interests or change their capabilities and may constrain state behavior by prohibiting certain actions. The definition of the *régime* is one of the controversial issues in international relations theory. A number of definitions of the concept reflect the general debates between IR theories. Krasner (1982, 186) defines régimes as “*sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations*”.

According to neorealist theory, régimes are dependent on the power structure of international relations and are epiphenomena. Régimes survive as long as it is consistent with the power structure of international relations (Arts 2000, 518). According to Waltz, “*international institutions are created by the more powerful states, and the institutions survive in their original form as long as they serve the major interests of their creators...*”. The effects of the international organizations on national decisions are just one step back from the capabilities of the major states (Waltz 2000, 26).

Snyder (as cited in Donnelly 2004, 122-123) argues that relationship variables pose more specific constraints on behavior, within the broad constraints established by structure, thus permits richer predictions and explanations (Snyder 1996, 172). Relationships are not interaction and action, they establish the context of interaction (Snyder 1996, 172). Relationships permits a richer and more detailed analysis of interactions. It also meets a principal criticism of Waltzian neorealism that it is

insensitive to change. We can get explanations for events by introducing a concept of relationships. Most important changes in international relations are changes in relationships after the structural ones (Snyder 1996, 173). While Waltz says that system structures do not determine but only shape and shove, Snyder argues that relationship patterns give a more decided push (Snyder 1996, 186).

Interests are unit attributes and when they are in conflict or shared with other states a relationship is formed. Interests are strongly affected by system structure (Snyder 1996, 175-180). Conflicting interests may prevent states from balancing, even in response to a common threat. Alliances can create common interests (Donnelly 2004, 123). Both allies and adversaries may have common or competing interests which make predictions more determinate. Common interests facilitate cooperation whereas competing interests may be impeding balancing against a common enemy (Donnelly 2005, 44).

Alignments marks the lines of enmity and amity in the system and subsystem. It determines the focus and significance of conflicts, capabilities, and interdependence. Alignments are relationships that are affected by structure. Flexible or rigid alignments are produced by different structures. Alignments modify the consequences of system structure. Alliances may also create interest that did not previously exist. The state acquires interest in defending its chosen ally and in resisting expansion by its designated opponents. An alliance tends to cancel or weaken strategic conflicts that may have previously existed between themselves (Snyder 1996, 173-178). Alignments shape how resources and capabilities are aggregated in the system. Alliances play a special role among alignments (Donnelly 2004, 123).

Interdependence is considered between politico-military allies. Interdependence is defined as the amount of harm that the allies can do to each other by deserting the partnership or failing to meet the expectation of support. Dependence is the most important source of intra-alliance influence, another is the strategic interest that the parties have in coming to each other's aid (Snyder 1996, 184). Snyder (as cited in Donnelly 2004, 124) defines a state's interdependence in the context of political-military allies as a "function of the degree of threat it faces from its adversary". A

state's respond to a threat is partly a function of the options which may be constrained by its allies and adversaries.

There is a two-way connection between relationships and interaction. While relationships shape interaction choices, interactions may also change relationships. Interaction may take many forms: wars, crises, arms races, alliance agreements, visits and summit meetings (Snyder 1996, 186-187). Snyder explains interaction as a process by which alignments, interests, capabilities, and dependence are translated into outcomes. These interactions are theoretical patterns of behavior. Whereas Waltz consigns interactions and relationships to the unit level, Snyder puts them to the system level (Donnelly 2004, 125). Interaction choices and outcomes are constrained by the relational pattern. System structure establishes broad constraints on the behavior of states. The relationships and interaction serve as intervening variables to explain and predict state behavior in some detail. Relationships are situational. They change slowly but faster than system structure (Snyder 1996, 192).

10.1.4.5. Balance of Threat Theory: A Variant of Neorealism

Stephen Walt proposed the Balance of Threat Theory first in the article titled *Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power* and later further elaborated it in his book *The Origins of Alliances*. According to balance of power theory, states join alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat. The balance of threat theory modified the balance of power theory. According to the theory, states' perception of threat from other states determine her alliance behavior. Although power is important part of the equation, it is not the only factor and "it is more accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that poses the greatest threat". Basic hypotheses of his theory were defined in terms of threats rather than power alone to make a complete picture of the factors in making alliance choices (Walt 1990, 18-26). Waltz (1996, 56) states that "balance of threat variant of realism" "makes the idea of power balancing more precise" and enhances the theory's explanatory power. According to Walt there are four criteria that states use to assess the threat posed by another state (Walt 1985, 9):

- Aggregate power (size, population, economic capabilities).

- Geographic proximity.
- Offensive capability.
- Offensive intentions.

Since the greater a state's total resources (aggregate power: size, population, industrial and military capability, and technological prowess, etc.) the greater a potential threat it can pose to others, thus may provide a motive for balancing or bandwagoning (Walt 1990, 22-23). States that are nearby pose a greater threat than that are far away. Proximate threats as with aggregate power can produce either a balancing or a bandwagoning response (Walt 1985, 10). Geographical proximity provides states powerful incentive to seek alliance somewhere to deter such an attempt or to defeat it should it occur (Walt 1985, 36). "*Offensive power is the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost*" (Walt 1990, 24). States having large offensive capability are more likely to provoke an alliance with others. If balancing alliances are simply not viable against a rapid conquest, a state may be forced to bandwagon. In this situation, a sphere of influence may form by the bordering strong power (Walt 1985, 11).

Walt (1985, 4-15) argues that states enter into an alliance either to balance or bandwagon. Walt means with *balancing* as "*ally[ing] in opposition to the principal source of danger*" and with *bandwagoning* as "*ally[ing] with the state that poses the major threat*". This contradicted policies depict very different policies. The view that balancing is alignment with the weaker side and bandwagoning is to choose the stronger is flawed. Because power is not the only one factor in the calculations of the states. "*States facing an external threat overwhelmingly prefer to balance against the threat rather than bandwagon with it*" because "*an alignment that preserves most of a state's freedom of action is preferable to accepting subordination under a potential hegemon*". Bandwagoners may have two distinct motives. Bandwagon may be adopted as a form of appeasement. By aligning with the threatening state, the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack on himself by diverting it elsewhere or to share the spoils of war. Therefore, bandwagoning may be used for offensive and defensive reasons.

The balance of power theory "*predicts the absence of counterbalancing under unipolarity.*" Yet, Walt contends that balance of threat theory "*highlights the role of*

soft balancing and other subtler strategies of resistance” to counterbalance the unipole, and *“balancing dynamics remain latent within a unipolar structure and can be brought forth if the unipole acts in a particularly threatening manner”* (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009, 19). Soft-balancing measures can delay, complicate, or increase the costs of the implementation of unipolar military superiority. Application of non-military tools, such as international institutions, economic statecraft, and strict interpretations of neutrality may have indirect impact on the unipolar (Pape 2005, 17). Mechanisms of soft balancing also include territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling of resolve to participate in a balancing coalition (Pape 2005, 36).

Turan and Barlas (1994, 425-426) argue that states join an alliance in order to reach to their foreign policy objectives. Therefore, the foreign policy objective pursued prior to joining in an alliance is the objective which carries the state to that alliance. The inferences made from these objectives should not demonstrate important divergence. However, there are some factors to demonstrate the likely influence of an alliance membership despite these factors may constitute a long list:

- States obtain more resources after joining an alliance. Thus, they implement some policy actions that they could not realize prior to their alliance membership.
- The alliance partners may support each other in their extra-alliance relations or avoid from action that may damage each other’s foreign relations.
- The alliance partners may resolve their own conflict in a more reconciliatory way than their conflicts with extra-alliance states.
- The alliance membership may require reorganizing the foreign policy tool of the members.

10.1.5. Neoliberalism (Neoliberal Institutionalism)

Neoliberalism, sometimes referred to as neoliberal institutionalism, is distinguished from earlier varieties of liberalism, such as commercial liberalism which link free trade with peace; republican liberalism which link democracy and peace; and

sociological liberalism which is about international integration. Although neoliberalism does not deny anarchic character of the international system it argues that cooperative behavior is possible in the system. Instead of military and geopolitical reading of the term security, they attach equal importance to wealth, welfare, and environmental issues. Instead of a single agency (state), neoliberals favor a mixed-actor model which would include international organizations, NGOs, MNCs and other non-state actors (Evans and Newnham 1998, 361-362). Liberalism or sometimes referred to as *pluralism* assume that non-state actors are important entities in international relations, the state is not a unitary actor and agenda of international politics is extensive and it is not primarily dominated by security issues (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 7-8).

As Demiryol (2015, 76) suggested, the fact that political relations between countries deteriorate despite continuing economic interdependence undermines the explanatory capacity of the liberal theories that trade promotes cooperation. Since neoliberal institutionalism says that institutions can prevent or shape conflicts and they can do that independent of the rights and interests of particular states, it is not suitable for my task because it is the states which determine the policy of the institutions and there is no argument in the literature that any institution has shaped the third-party state impact on Turkish-Russian relations.

10.1.6. The Complex Interdependence Theory

According to Complex Interdependence Theory, actors, environments, structures, processes, and outcomes of international relations are less certain and more complex than the unitary and static insights offered by realism. The theory challenges three main assumptions of realism. First, states are not always dominant actors in international relations, second, force now may be an ineffective instrument of policy, hierarchy of issues (the precedence of military and security matters over economic and social ones) is now largely anachronistic (Evans and Newnham 1998, 88).

Multiple channels of contact among societies expand the range of policy instruments and limit the ability of states to control foreign relations. States cannot monopolize these contacts. There is no stable hierarchy between the goals but they are

subject to “*trade-offs*” (Keohane and Nye 1987, 737-738). Harrison Wagner (as cited in Keohane and Nye 1987, 734) argues that asymmetrically less dependent countries do not have either necessary or sufficient condition to exert influence on its weaker partners. Because a weaker country can attain its core preference by making great concessions on other matters. Nye argues that interdependence is “*unevenly balanced mutual dependence*”. Interdependence is “*often balanced differently in different spheres such as security, trade, and finance*”. Creating linkages between the issues is the “*art of the power game*” (Nye 1990, 158). Relationships between powerful and weak actors are often defined by multilateral rule or convention, without bilateral bargaining (Keohane and Nye 1987, 734). Manipulation of interdependence becomes costly for each side. If Japan refuses to buy US bonds this would disrupt financial markets and become costly both for the US and Japan (Nye 1990, 168).

10.1.7. Constructivism

According to Constructivism, normative or ideational structures are as important as material structures. Systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values also have structural characteristics, and they exert a powerful influence on political action. Identity, ideology and structures of friendship and enmity lend the material balance of power different meanings (Reus-Smit 2005, 196). There are three different forms of constructivism: systemic, unit-level, and holistic constructivism. Holistic constructivists seek to bridge two other forms which represent the classical dichotomy between the international and the domestic (Reus-Smit 2005, 201).

According to the Constructivism, social realm has been constituted by social rules and inter-subjective meanings. Social actions do not have an objective existence, they are understood through interpretative lenses. Constructivism criticizes liberalism and realism for their ignoring social structures in the definition of state identities and interests. Constructivists accepts that states are the primary units in international relations. They reject the realist assumption that states have the same *a priori* interests. They argue that identity, determined in a social and historical context, is the most proximate cause of state preferences, choices, and action. State policy is influenced by historical, cultural, political, and social factors. International institutions are “*constitutive entities*” which can influence perceptions and preferences of the states.

Constructivism differ from liberalism and realism in a fundamental epistemological sense. Realism and liberalism are based on objectivist epistemology, constructivism is based on interpretivist epistemology. Realism and liberalism share a neo-positivistic approach to social sciences which argues that social science data have an objective existence (Ratti 2006, 90-91). Three aspects differ constructivism and rationalism: While rationalists treat actors as egoists, constructivists identify them as social. Rationalists treat interests as exogenously determined whereas constructivists treat interests as *“endogenous to such interaction, as a consequence of identity acquisition, as learned through process of communication, reflection on experience and role enactment”*. Thirdly, rationalist view society as *“strategic realm”*, whereas constructivists view society as *“constitutive realm”* (Reus-Smit 2005, 199).

10.1.8. Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical realism⁸ (NCR) merges theoretical insights of neorealism with the insights of classical realism. NCR assumes that the influence of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, and therefore, system effects must be translated through intervening unit level variables (Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009, 5). A country's relative material power shapes the magnitude and ambition of its foreign policy over the long run (Rose 1998, 152). Yet, *“there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behavior”*. For that reason, “power analysis” also examine “perceptions of political leaders”, and “strength and structure of state apparatus” besides “systemic pressures and incentives”. Thus, examination of the context in which foreign policy is devised and carried out is necessary to assess the links between power and policy (Rose 1998, 146-147). Domestic structure and leadership are two important intervening variables between the distribution of power and foreign policy behavior (Schmidt 2012, 13). NCR seeks *“to explain variation in the foreign policies of the same state over time or across different states facing similar constraints”*. A neoclassical realist hypothesis might *“explain the likely diplomatic, economic, and military responses of particular states to systemic*

⁸ Neoclassical realism was coined by Gideon Rose.

imperatives, but it cannot explain the systemic consequences of those responses” (Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009, 21).

Rose (1998, 155) argues that during the 1980s, the first wave of neoclassical realist writers used relative power as the ordering principle of international politics over centuries. Michael Mandelbaum, in his book titled *The Fate of Nations: the search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, underscores that “*similar security policies recur throughout history and across the international system in states that, whatever their differences, occupy similar positions in the system*”. Paul Kennedy in his book titled *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* presents a clear connection between economic rise and fall and military growth and decline of the great powers. Robert Gilpin in his book titled *War and Change in World Politics* indicates that states always tried to control their environment.

The second wave neoclassical realist writers- Aaron L. Friedberg in his book titled *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905* and Melvyn P. Leffler in his book titled *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* pointed out that shift in relative power shifted foreign policy of a particular state (Rose 1998, 155).

Third wave neoclassical realist writers continued to apply similar analysis. Fareed Zakaria in his book titled *From Wealth to Power* argues that “*there is a tendency of states to use the tools at their disposal to gain control over environment*”. William Curti Wohlforth in his book titled *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* states that “*state behavior is an adaptation to external constraints conditioned by changes in relative power*”. Thomas J. Christensen, in *Useful Adversaries*, referred to the importance of influence of the shifting distribution of power in early Cold War US-Chinese relations. Schweller in *Deadly Imbalances* describes the critical impact of international structure on foreign policies and alliance patterns (Rose 1998, 156-157).

Telhami (2002, 170) argues that the neorealist theory does not provide a theory of foreign policy. A new theory which explains the motives of states and their constituent components is needed to explain the specific foreign policies of most

states. He contends that, *“power and security alone cannot explain the varied motives of the states”*. Yet, he admits that rejection of neorealism as a foreign policy does not mean that *“insights derived from it have no consequences for the study of foreign policy”* (Telhami 2002, 159). Telhami also objects to the modifications of neorealism, such as, substituting *“influence”* for *“power”*, *“balance of threat”* for *“balance of power”*, *“misperception of power”* for *“real power”*, if one is explaining a norm rather than exceptions (Telhami 2002, 162). He argues that *“material power is the primary variable for neorealism”*. *“If balancing is the expected tendency of states, it must be the balancing of power”*. If balancing is the expected reaction to threat, then, the explanation of the meaning of balancing requires an entirely different theory. Because, *“balancing is derived precisely from the notion of material power, entailing equalization of power”* (Telhami 2002, 163). Therefore, Telhami argues that the works of Christensen, Rose, Schweller, and Zakaria are neither alternatives nor refinements of neorealism (Telhami 2002, 158).

10.1.9. Regional Approaches to Conflict

The end of the Cold War removed the global security overlay that had influenced patterns of regional security in many parts of the world. Regional concerns for the production of insecurity prevailed because regions were set free (Hurrell 2005, 45). The absence of a common enemy removed much of the discipline imposed by the Cold War alliance system (Cooper 1997, 2). The end of the Cold War altered the character of the conflicts. While interstate conflicts decreased, intrastate conflicts proliferated in all over the world after bipolarity. One of the common sources of internal conflicts was the breakup of the states along the lines of ethnicity, religion and affiliation with a region (Hopmann 2001, 113).

Since tensions receded between the superpowers, international management of conflict also changed. The necessity of the management of international conflicts under the UN or within the framework of great power concert arouse (Lake and Morgan 1997b, 4). The great powers became unwilling to carry the burdens of conflict management by rejecting even limited costs also in their traditional areas of engagement (Lake and Morgan 1997b, 5). Regarding the management of insecurity, incentives for regional states to deal with their own problems increased, and for outside

powers to intervene or to become involved decreased (Hurrell 2005, 45). Conflict management within regions started to be driven largely by regional considerations (Ayoob 1999, 247). New concepts such as humanitarian intervention, preventive diplomacy, war crimes, bans for land mines and others marginalized the Cold War concepts such as balance of power, deterrence, escalation, pre-emption, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and first and second strike capability (Wallensteen 2002, 218).

10.1.9.1. Regional Security Complex Theory

Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver developed the *Regional Security Complex Theory* (RSCT) analyzing international relations based on international system composed of subsystems (Ayoob 1999, 252). The theory deals with different factors at four levels of analysis which constitute the “*security constellation*”: Domestic vulnerabilities of the states, bilateral state relations, interaction between the regions, and the interplay between the global and regional security structures (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 51). Buzan and Wæver argue that they “*combine neorealist, globalist and regionalist perspectives to understand post-Cold War global or regional security orders*” (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 13).

The theory is defined as “*a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another*” (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 44). According to the theory, the regional structure of international security is divided into three types of regional spaces: *Overlay* is a region shaped by outside forces such as the colonialism and the superpower rivalry during bipolarity. In the *unstructured regions*, there is no structure of interdependence, they may be the residual space left by all other security complexes (for example, the South Pacific), and regional security complexes (RSCs).

According to Buzan and Wæver (2003, 40), the Regional Security Complexes have mediating effect between dynamics of the international structure and the units. Process of global power intervention can be understood through understanding the subsystemic security dynamics (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 43). The structure of a RSC

is determined by four variables, namely, a boundary of RSC, anarchy, polarity, and social construction (*amity and enmity*) (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 48-53). The RSCs are formed through the interplay between balance of power and the pressures of local proximity. A regional rivalry provides opportunities for great power penetration into the region. The balance of power mechanism links local patterns conflicts into international ones (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 45-46). Buzan and Wæver describes distribution of power in the international system as “1+4+x”: At the top there is US; EU, Japan, Russia, and China follow her, the rest are at the bottom. There are 11 RSCs and they are divided into three main categories based on the number of great powers located in them: The first one is “*Centered RSCs*” which are made by one great power (North America, the CIS, and the EU). The second is a “*great power complex*” (East Asia) since there are more than one global-level power. The third is *standard* and characterized by the absence of any global-level power in the complex. There are seven standard RSCs (South America, South Asia, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, West Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa) (Acharya 2007, 631).

10.1.9.2. The Conflict Complexes

The term “*Conflict Complex*” is a way of “*describing how conflicts are connected to one another*”. When the conflicts in two different areas but in the same geographical region are interconnected this is defined as *regional conflict complexes*. For example, while Kurdish conflict complex covers Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria, the Caucasus conflict complex covers Azerbaijan, Georgia, Chechnya, and Dagestan. The three complexes (Palestine, Kurdish complex, Gulf region) in the Middle East are interrelated (Wallensteen 2002, 203-205).

There is also a global conflict complex between major powers. With their involvement, conflicts may be interconnected otherwise this is would not be the case. For example, bipolarity connected distant areas in the same strategic and political thinking (Wallensteen 2002, 204). Intense great power rivalry limits the chance of solving regional conflict complexes. Great powers block such moves due to their global concerns or embrace them to use for their aims (Wallensteen 2002, 227).

Regional conflict complexes and regional security systems may be connected through regional frameworks. *Tailor-made frameworks* are composed of states to fit a regional concept such as the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). The Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) is also a tailor-made framework used in many conflicts. The EU may be demonstrated as sample to the *need-based framework* which tied two enemy states France and Germany to each other. It may be established before serious conflicts are escalated (Wallenstein 2002, 210-212).

However, the utility of intra-regional framework is limited. The resolution to the regional conflicts are driven often by extra-regional actors. One reason is that distribution of power may be more important in a regional context than in a global extent. The existence of a dominant actor in the region renders difficult to make regional initiatives. Strong rivalries between regional powers may also paralyze the regional efforts. Extra-regional approaches also carry the danger of bringing regional rivalries and unrelated agendas to the forum. However, it has some diplomatic strength to mobilize resources which may contribute to finding solutions and financing. Since it is formed on particular needs, it is temporary. They are not easily transformed into an organization. It is also a less transparent process. It may authorize the more powerful states (Wallenstein 2002, 214-216).

10.2. Evaluation of the Current Approaches

The dissertation does not adopt neoliberal institutional theory since the author of the dissertation believes that the international organizations and regimes serve for the interest of the states and they survive as long as states need them. Likewise, security issues are always at the top of the agenda contrary to the arguments of Complex Interdependence Theory. Since state is the dominant and final decision maker in international relations, the channel of multiple contacts between societies have trivial role in power and interest dominant character of international relations. International rivalry is often for the material resources that countries would like to obtain in which identity does not bear any significance. Therefore, since material factors and balance of threat are the dominant paradigm of international relations the ideational perspective of constructivism is also irrelevant with the facts of international system.

10.3. The Subsystems as the Primary Explanation of the International Conflicts

Kenneth Waltz (as cited in Schenoni 2017, 74) argues that “*a general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers*”. Waltz (as cited in Schenoni 2017, 74) also argues that “*the theory, once written, also applies to lesser states that interact insofar as their interaction is insulated from the intervention of the great powers of a system*”. Press-Barnathan (2014, 357-359) also argues that neorealism does not have a framework for the analysis of sub-systems. Whereas, Schweller (1998, 4-9) argues that “*Waltz’s focus on abstraction and aggregation often obscures ... the processes by which states respond to threats and opportunities presented by their external environment*”. Thus, predictions about “*outcomes, i.e., system stability, alliance patterns, individual foreign policies*” can be made based on the “*unit-structure interactions*”, namely, “*arrangement of the units, and their interests or identities*”. Schweller mentions that the study of both unit and structural attributes explains the dynamics of the system.

As Modelski (as cited in Thompson 1973, 103) argues, regional sub-systems occur as a result of changing power configuration. It is characterized by a certain *distinctiveness* and *proximity* in the geographical, economic, and political senses. There is nothing permanent about them (Väyrynen 1984, 340). Thompson (1981, 213-214) affirms that sub-systemic boundaries and member positions change over time as units move in and out of various subsystems.

Subsystems are both the objects of great power rivalries and subjects which may be able to shape the development of international system (Väyrynen 1984, 351). As Väyrynen (1984, 352) argues, primary explanation of the international conflict process should be sought in the characteristics of the regional sub-systems. Acharya (2007, 630) mentions that the study of interactions that occur both within and between sub-systems is vital to understand how the world works. Waltz (1979, 43) argues that results of the international conflicts are found at the system level and the causes are found at the subsystem level.

Sub-systems are not little international systems since they do not behave identically with them (Lake and Morgan 1997b, 7). Dissimilar sub-systems ensure different outcomes in the interplay between systemic and sub-systemic factors (Väyrynen 1984, 352). The nature and the intensity of the linkages between the regions and the global system varies (Väyrynen 1984, 337).

Structural and great power impacts on local conflicts cannot be thoroughly analyzed without taking into account the specific features of each sub-system (Väyrynen 1984, 351). Structural changes lead to changes in regional interests and types of threats (Press-Barnathan 2014, 357-359). Subsystems mediate between unit level and system level dynamics (Breslin and Higgott 2003, 172). Subsystemic dynamics are influenced by the systemic balance of power and the rivalries among the major powers (Ayoob 1999, 252).

External impulses create opportunities for regional units to provide external partnerships which can alter regional dynamics (Prys 2013, 271). Relations of the sub-systemic states with external states are important since these relations influence the actions of the sub-systemic units as “*facilitating*” and “*constraining*” factors (Prys 2013, 273).

10.3.1. The Causation of Regional Conflicts

According to Väyrynen, “*causation of regional conflicts is conceptualized in three different ways*”. The “*impact of the global system and its major actors as the external catalysts of regional conflicts*” are “*claimed to foster such economic, political and cultural frictions which would not otherwise explode into violent conflicts*”. It is also asserted that regional conflicts are “*reflection of the strategic and economic interest of major powers and their mutual competition*”. This impact cannot be meaningfully analyzed in isolation from the specific features of regions (Väyrynen 1984, 351). Whereas *regional causation approach* “*does not reject the impact of global or domestic factors, but argues that the characteristics of the regional system itself constitute the primary explanation of the conflict process*”. Patterns of great power involvement matters ultimately but it is the regional dynamics best explain the

situation. On the other hand, *internal causation approach* explains the domestic conditions as the main causation of regional conflicts (Väyrynen 1984, 352).

10.3.2. The Problem of Studying Subsystems

As de Lombaerde et al. (2010, 731) argues, there are three interrelated conceptual, theoretical, and methodological problems in the study of subsystems.

10.3.2.1. Definition of the subsystem and the Conceptual Problem

The first problem is the conceptual problem. Since subsystems have many meanings, a conceptual analysis is needed. Zartman (as cited in Thompson 1981, 213) notes that “*regions tend to be assumed first and identified later*”. From this point of view, “*all regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested*”. Adler and Crawford (as cited in Acharya 2007, 634) argue that regions should be conceptualized “*rather in terms of purposeful social, political, cultural and economic interaction among states...*” instead of geographic contiguity. Nevertheless, “*conceptual pluralism is not necessarily problematic*”, since “*minimal common understandings are necessary*” for academic works. There is a “*link between the conceptual problem and the problem of comparability in empirical research*”. Conceptualization of a phenomenon identifies relevant comparators. Therefore, conceptual pluralism becomes inevitable (de Lombaerde et al. 2010, 740).

Hettne and Söderbaum (2002, 39) mentions that there are no “*natural*” or “*given*” regions, but these are created and re-created in the process of global transformation. Definition of the region first depends on the discourse concerning a certain geographical area and secondly on the research question, therefore, the concepts about subsystems should not be taken for granted (de Lombaerde et al. 2010, 736,741). Nye (as cited in Manoli 2016, 14) defines region as “*a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship by a degree of mutual interdependence*”. Hettne and Söderbaum (2002, 37) defines region as “*a particular area which constitutes a distinct entity in various respects “which may be distinguished as a relatively coherent territorial subsystem (...) from the rest of the global system”*”. According to Donnelly (2005, 44), “*a system is a bounded space defined (a) by units*

that interact with each other much more intensively than they interact with those outside the system; (b) the structure within which they interact; and (c) the characteristic interactions of the units within that structure”.

De Lombaerde et al. (2010, 740) define regions according to their external characteristics (“*exogenous*” definition) or internal characteristics (“*endogenous*” definition). Prys (2013, 271) underlines two common characteristics or patterns of a region as “*geographic proximity*” and the existence of the “*insiders*” and “*outsiders*”. Thompson (as cited in Thompson 1973, 107) argues that a regional subsystem has “*antagonistic actor heterogeneity, unstable interaction patterns and inconsistent normative boundaries*”. Ayooob (1999, 249) identifies geographical proximity and intensity of interactions as core variables that define a sub-system. The measurement of intensity of interaction must include competition, conflict, and cooperation.

10.3.2.2. The Theoretical Problem

The second difficulty comes from the theoretical problem. Since identification of sub-systems through geography is impossible (Morgan 1997, 20), “*most of the theories are not ‘competing’ in the sense that they try to ‘explain’ identical phenomena in different ways, but rather they tend to focus on different (related) aspects of the phenomena...*” (de Lombaerde et al. 2010, 741).

10.3.2.3. The Problem of Empirical Methodology

The third problem comes from empirical methodology. The regions, as in any other social sciences, are studied through either “*idiographic research*” – a single case study with an emphasis to the historical process of the case, or “*nomothetic research*” – a multiple case study aiming to find general explanations (de Lombaerde et al. 2010, 744). The complexity of the regional phenomenon and the lack of comparable cases explain the preference of the single case study method in regional studies (de Lombaerde et al. 2010, 745). In this framework, “*many scholars tend to use specific contextual language to describe rather similar phenomena in different regions instead of applying general concepts and developing questions and hypotheses that can be transferred to cross-regional comparisons*” (de Lombaerde et al. 2010, 745). That is

to say that “*there is a tension in the field of regionalism between regional specialization and comparative analysis*” (de Lombaerde et al. 2010, 745-746).

10.4. Contemplating the Context of the Research: Great Power Balancing in the Subsystem

Oran (1970, 43-44) argues that the key concept of Turkish-Russian relations is the geographic location. According to him, Turkey is under the influence of Russia and any great powers which are rivaling Russia in this geography. This feature of the Turkish-Russian relations make the region a region of continuous great power balancing.

Turkey and Russia are two of the stakeholders of a same subsystem emerged around the Black Sea in 1774 due to the new power configuration which was endorsed with the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca between the Ottoman State and the Russian Empire. From then on, the distinct characteristics of the Black Sea Subsystem (BSS) shaped the foreign policies not only of the subsystem members but also other great powers. The dissertation will apply a subsystemic context to examine the third-party state impact on the dynamics and management of Turkish-Russian conflicts. As Gülboy (2009, 34) suggests, a new perspective requires a new model and it is important to determine the context and coin the concepts to be used in the new model at the very beginning. Lake and Morgan (1997b, 7) also argue that theories, concepts and analogies used for the understanding of great power politics should be modified in order to be applied to different sub-systems. The subsystem model of this research has two pillars: The Spatial Dimension and the Power Dimension.

10.4.1. The Aspects of the Subsystem: The Spatial Dimension and the Distribution of Power Dimension

As Jeong (2008,21) suggests, appearance and disappearance of the units in the subsystem changes the interests, goals, and strategies of the parties. Therefore, the spatial dimension of a regional subsystem needs to be conceptualized to enable us to compare and contrast various spatial configurations of the subsystem, to establish more

accurate patterns of interactions among the subsystemic and non-subsystemic powers, and the sources of conflicts stimulating the interests of non-subsystem powers.

Turkey and Russia are two of the stakeholders of a same subsystem emerged around the Black Sea due to the new power configuration which was endorsed with the signing of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca between the Ottoman State and the Russian Empire in 1774. From then on, the Black Sea Subsystem (BSS) witnessed the balancing actions of the great powers while Russia became constant on one side and Turkey became the object of great power rivalry.

The new perspective of the dissertation required a new model and new concepts. According to the model, the subsystem has spatial and power configuration aspects. This is emanated from the necessity to refer to the subsystem membership composition in a given time because the number of the subsystem members often changes the extent of non-subsystem third-party great power involvement in the subsystem affairs.

This membership composition of a subsystem, coined as *subsystem member complex (sumex)*, is related to the distribution of lands and seas, transportation routes and raw materials in the subsystem. Whenever a new state enters into the subsystem or disappears from the subsystem the sumex changes. Since the distribution of geographical assets also change, dynamics of the conflicts change too. In the period subject to the examination, the memberships composition changed three times in 1917, 1922 and 1991. This change occurred so tough that the dissertation distinguished two types of sumex as *hegemonic unipolarity* and *non-hegemonic unipolarity*. In the dissertation, the term *hegemonic unipolarity* was defined as a situation of disappearance of lesser states from the international scene under the hegemonic rule of a great power in a subsystem. Since local dynamics of the conflicts are absorbed within a much bigger administration apparatus, the dynamics of the great power balancing occurring in the subsystem emanate mostly from the system level variables. The *non-hegemonic unipolarity* in a subsystem refers to the complexity of relations with the intermingling of multitude of dynamics of the conflicts and local and foreign actors despite the structure of the subsystem remains unipolar. To the extent that a sumex is *hegemonic*, the dynamics of conflicts are often emanated from the sibtex

dynamics. In the *non-hegemonic sumex*, non-TPGP involvement in the subsystem affairs becomes easier and there are more dynamics of the conflicts to manipulate. While the sibtex dynamics prevail under hegemonic unipolarity, the subtex dynamics mostly shapes the extent of great power balancing in the subsystem. Sibtex is shaped rather around subtex in non-hegemonic unipolarity.

The subsystem member complex (*sumex*) may be internally or externally transformed. *Internal transformation* of a subsystem refers to change in the number of the members of the subsystem through reconfiguration of power internally. *External transformation* of the subsystem is related to the regimes which modify the structure of the subsystem or military occupation.

Distribution of power in the subsystem highlights the dynamics of the conflicts with regards to the distribution of seaways, raw materials, transportation routes. The régimes, multilaterally agreed rules of conduct, modify the structure in the subsystem and limit or expand the capabilities not only of the subsystem members but also non-subsystem powers. In this framework, the régimes of the Straits will be considered in the dissertation as structural modifiers.

This model assumes that two states interact in a *subsystem bilateral threat complex* which is defined as “*the sum of any foreign policy objectives or outputs of two states in a subsystem which could be perceived as threat*”. The subtex changes when sumex changes. The mapping of distribution of power and distribution of geographical assets in a subsystem reveals most of the likely dynamics of the conflicts among the members of the subsystem. The *subtex* is shaped by the distribution of power and comprises the neighboring states and subsystems of the smaller powers. Change in the sumex change the magnitude of the subtex. A change in the subtex refers rather to the change in the dynamics of the conflicts rather than management of the conflicts.

The dynamics of the conflicts emanated from the acts of the great powers balancing in the subsystem is called *systemic bilateral threat complex (sibtex)*. This may be in the form of establishment of bases, deployment of troops in a subsystemic

state, sending troops to overseas as part of the alliance objectives, naval visits, and manipulation of the local discords.

Establishing relationship among the three concepts would be useful. The sumex constitutes the geographical infrastructure of the subsystem. The subtex, bilateral conflict zone, is the superstructure of the sumex. The sibtex dynamics of the conflicts prevail under the hegemonic unipolarity. In the non-hegemonic unipolarity, subsystemic dynamics of the conflicts shape the balancing acts of the great powers.

In sum, while general characteristics of the subtex refers to expanded engagement area, proliferated actors, and dynamics of the conflicts, and increased TPGP involvement in the BSS Affairs in NHUS; it refers to narrowed engagement area, diminished actors and Dynamics of the Conflicts, and TPGP involvement is reduced to bilateral affairs in the HUS. Whereas general characteristics of the sibtex refers to great power balancing in the subsystem through subsystem level dynamics of conflict in NHUS, while great power balancing in the subsystem becomes an extension of the system level dynamics of conflict among great powers in HUS. The general characteristics of the NHUS are as follows:

- Conflict or cooperation intermingle with respect to geography, actors, and issues.
- Complexity and inconsistency of relations due to the prevalence of subtex dynamics
- Increasing divergence of interests and likely occurrence of confrontation in weak alliance ties.
- Self-interest and decentralized (uncoordinated) management of conflicts prevail
- Increased range of cooperation between subsystem states
- Sibtex dynamics gains subsystemic character.

The general characteristics of the HUS are as follows:

- Conflict or cooperation is more obdurate.

- Simplicity of relations due to the prevalence of sibtex dynamics.
- Tight alliance dynamics
- Collective interests and centralized management of conflicts prevail.
- Decreased range of cooperation between subsystem states.
- Subtex is absorbed by the sibtex.

10.4.2. The Theoretical Framework: The Modified Balance of Threat Theory

The balancing acts of the great powers occur in the subsystems. A trilateral frame of relations in a subsystem composed of subsystem and non-subsystem great powers, and a lesser power can be best analyzed through the Balance of Threat variant of Neorealism. However, the theory should be modified as to form (geographical proximity) and type (offensive intentions) of the threat perception in order to adapt the theory to the alliance relationships of the lesser state. The modified theory provides several descriptive identifier concepts. The threats perceived from the subsystemic great power will be coined as *imminent threat* whereas the threat perceived from non-subsystemic great power(s) constitute(s) the *potential threat* for the lesser state. In an intra-alliance relationship the non-subsystem power(s) may not have always offensive intentions towards her partner due to the divergence of global and regional interests between them. Since these divergent interests of the non-subsystem great power partner may not carry *offensive intentions*, this attitude may be coined as *destabilizing intentions* which have the power to destabilize the security and foreign policy objectives of the lesser partner.

A comprehensive analysis of balance policy in the Turkish and foreign literature is needed to eliminate some controversial definitions. During the 19th century, the weak Ottoman State sought to preserve its existence through leaning on a great power against dangers directed by other great powers. This policy which continued also during the republican era has been defined as “*denge politikası*” which was translated into English as “*balance policy*” (Armaoğlu 1988, 43). Armaoğlu (1988, 43-44) divided the balance policy into the following periods:

- 1791 (1798)-1878: Leaning on the UK against the Russian danger.
- 1888-1918: Leaning on Germany against the Russian and British danger.
- 1920-1936: Leaning on Soviet Russia against the danger of western powers.
- 1936-1945: Leaning on the UK against the danger of fascist Italy.
- 1945- [today⁹]: Leaning on the US against the Soviet danger (Armaoğlu 1988, 43-44).

Oran (2015e, 49) argues that Turkey applied two different types of balance within the established status quo. First, Turkey always sought to establish a balance between the West and its opposing powers due to the requirements of her geostrategic position despite her westernist foreign policy. Second, Turkey sought to establish this balance even between the elements forming the West due to the same reasons.

Balcı (2017, 25) defines the balance policy as “*to use one power against another power*”. Hale (2013, 14) referred to the Ottoman balance policy as stating that the “*Ottoman statesmen had two broad options in policies towards the major powers. One would be to avoid both conflicts and firm alliances with any of them, meeting each crisis as it arose, and relying on the workings of the balance of power to preserve the status quo.*” According to Hale (2013, 53), “*Turkish foreign policy-makers, like their Ottoman predecessors, exploited the balance of power and the divisions among their opponents, besides a measure of good luck.*” As seen, Hale used the verbs “*rely on*” and “*exploit*” as a policy to get benefit from the balance of power established between great powers. On the other hand, there is no any definition about *balance policy* in the *Dictionary of International Relations* edited by Evans and Newnham (1998). Dağ (2004, 53) defines the balance policy, by using also its French translation “*politique d’équilibre*”, as “*a moderate type of policy developed by a state in order both to protect its political, economic and strategic interests, and to seek protection against the dangers directed to itself*”.

All these literature demonstrate that there is a contradiction in terms. I noticed the concept of *equilibrium policy* only in the book section of Yenigün (2010) titled

⁹ The book was published in 1998.

“*Türk Dış Politikasında Üçüncü Dalga*”. The only thing what Yenigün (2010, 65) argues very briefly about the equilibrium policy was that “some authors coin the policy pursued by İnönü during the second world war as balance policy, however, this is not true, this policy should be coined as equilibrium policy of which any equivalent term in Turkish is not available”. If we remember above-mentioned translation of balance policy into French as “*politique d’équilibre*”, we see that we are unable to work out considering the French translation of balance as “*équilibre*”.

As seen from the above-mentioned considerations, it is clear that there is a problematic in the conceptualization of the balance policy in the Turkish language and in its translation to the English language. There is also a controversy in the Turkish literature with respect to the conceptualization of the *balance policy* and its harmony with the current international relations literature. In the Turkish definition, *denge politikası* is defined as an act of foreign policy resembling to the movement of a pendulum moving from one side to the other side to seek a protection when threatened from the other side. There is a triple relationship in this definition: the threatening state, the threatened state, and the protector state. This is a multilateral foreign policy rather than bilateral one. On the other hand, an international relations concept which imply dual relationship is also translated into Turkish by using the term “*denge*”. The theory of balance of power is translated into Turkish as “*Güç Dengesi Teorisi*”. In this theory, a dual relationship is the question. The states balance each other in order to survive. Therefore, the *policy of balance* concept does not correspond to the definition in the international relations literature.

In order both to increase the explanatory power of the concept of the balance policy and to eliminate the controversial use of the term *denge*, this dissertation will use the *equilibrium policy* (eşitleme politikası) to define the policies of a lesser power under the influence of imminent and potential threats of the great powers. In the literature, while balance policy is resembled to the movements of a pendulum, equilibrium policy is characterized as a *pair of scales* which is equilibrating two different forces applying weight simultaneously. The *equilibrium policy* of this dissertation covers both meanings and corresponds a suitable Turkish term to eliminate

the contradiction also in the Turkish language. The concept of *equilibrium policy* is distinguished into two types.

10.4.2.1. The Policy of Threat Equilibrium

The “*policy of threat equilibrium*” (tehdit eşitleme politikası), which have been coined in the literature as *balance policy* (denge politikası), will be used to refer to any policy to equilibrate any threat coming from one state with another state. According to policy of equilibrium, a lesser power acting under the pressure of imminent and potential threats may implement strategies between alliance and alignment where neutrality is placed in the middle as shown in (Figure 1.5). The lesser power state often does not prefer to enter into an alliance relationship with the subsystemic great power since this would mean to bandwagon the imminent threat.




Figure 2.5. Equilibrium Policy

10.4.2.2. The Policy of Interest Equilibrium

The “*policy of interest equilibrium*” (Çıkar Eşitleme Politikası) refers to any policy of the lesser power to equilibrate interests of one great power with another by providing justice between their expectations. This policy includes strategies coined as “*active neutrality*” or “*equilibrium policy*”. The purpose of this policy is to establish close relations with both opposing parties to make gains whatever great power party wins the competition. This resembles sticking to the pro-status quo policy and international norms. The principles of the policy of both equilibriums should be in the framework of pro-status quo policies and for defensive purposes. Upholding self-interest in the form of expansion or to pit one great power to another in order to gain economic assistance should be considered anomaly and a very dangerous game for a

lesser power. She may be betrayed by her partner or may be punished by another great power.

The dissertation also conceptualizes the *zoning policy* to define geographically differentiated foreign policy *vis-à-vis* another state. This may signify three meanings: To rank regions different priority in the relations with one state or to equilibrate the interests of the great powers geographically or to equilibrate the perceived threat in one zone with the threat perceived in another zone. This equilibration works as creating separate common interest regions with both the imminent and potential threats.

In the literature, *compartmentalization policy* is used to define situations where economic relations are not affected from tense political relations. According to the idea, bilateral economic developments continue despite increasing tension in the political arena. However, I argue that economic relations cannot be separated from the political relations. In an asymmetrical power relationship in a subsystem, some economic sectors may constitute strategic part of the political relations, such as, nuclear power plant, gas and oil pipelines projects which imply an extension of the great power rivalry and a tool of conflict management during the tense relations. Economic investments may be used, in one sense, as political bribe to neutralize or to pull the lesser state into one's side as a great power balancing strategy. Therefore, compartmentalization is not the correct term to define economic strategy for the subsystemic great power balancing and must be distinguished from other routine commercial activities.

The RF applied many economic sanctions on Turkey following the downing of SU-24 jet in 2015. However, Turkey and Russia signed the Turkish Stream and Akkuyu Nuclear Power plant projects in this period. The projects cannot be counted as part of pure economic relations. They have strategic value and they constitute a part of the political relations. This confirms that economic relations cannot be separated from political relations.

10.5. The Black Sea Subsystem

10.5.1. The Spatial Dimension of the Subsystem

The signature of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) following the defeat of the Ottoman State during the 1768-1774 Ottoman-Russian war endorsed the new power configuration between the parties and allowed Russian Empire to establish on the northern shore of the Black Sea which had been an Ottoman lake until that time. This changing power configuration around the Black Sea gave birth to the Black Sea Subsystem with its distinct characteristics and conflict dynamics. The historians, such as Anderson, in his book (1966a) titled *The Eastern Question (1774-1923)*, and Hale (2013) in his book titled *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774* begins the examination of the Turkish Foreign Policy as of 1774 which corresponds to the date of this birth. In the geographical sense, there are currently six littoral countries in the Black Sea: Turkey, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria. The evolution of the BSS membership is seen in (Figure 1.6).




Figure 2.6. Black Sea Subsystem Units (1774-2018)

When the BSS emerged in 1774 it was consisted of the Ottoman State and the Russian Empire. The units of the BSS increased with the independence of Romania in 1878 and Bulgaria in 1908. The retreat of the Russian troops following the October

revolution in 1917 from Caucasia caused the emergence of the Caucasian subsystem composed of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia between 1917 and 1922 temporarily. When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, Ukraine and Georgia also took part in the BSS. Several subsystems emerged following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, such as, Caucasia, the Baltics, and the Central Asia.

The area of Black Sea region is variously defined by many authors. The region is often defined in relation with other regions which can influence political relations in those regions or influenced by the political developments in those regions. Therefore, the regions of the Caucasus, Caspian, eastern and southeastern Europe and even the Mediterranean is associated with the Black Sea definition. The six countries' inclusion in other regions is also important in this respect (Ereker and Özer 2013, 167). Sezer (1998, 70) defines the Black Sea region in broader terms, not simply covering the littoral states, because of network of military, commercial and demographic interactions and numerous interrelationships, as the area covers the eastern Balkans, Black Sea littorals, Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea. Büyükkakıncı (2004, 18) defines the Black Sea Region as “*the area covered by the eleven states participating in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Area (BSEC)*”¹⁰. Both the *American German Marshall Fund* and the *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies* define the Black Sea region as the “*wider Black Sea region*” (Çelikpala 2010a, 300-301).

Russia is essentially a landlocked country. Its longest coastline opens into icy Arctic Ocean. The neighboring seas include the Baltic and the Black Sea both of which pass through narrow straits away from Russian borders (Riasanovsky 2000, 4-5). Leading Russian scholars such as Kliuchevsky and Soloviev and prominent western writers such as Kerner and Sumner persistently emphasize the significance of this geography in Russian history (Riasanovsky 2000, 8).

The landlocked position of Russia made the Russians concerned with the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits (Riasanovsky 2000, 9). Russia in Europe is seen in (Figure 1.7) (University of South Florida 2020). Control of the Turkish Straits has had great significance for preventing the entry of hostile fleet into the Black

¹⁰ Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkey, and Ukraine.

sea. This traditional defensive interests was also frequently augmented by great power aspirations which sought influence to expand power (Golan 1990, 9). Thus, the Straits formed a part of Russia's vital defense and commercial interests (Golan 1990, 244). Napoleon underscored the supreme strategic value of the Straits saying that he would concede *"to abandon mastery over half the world rather than yield Russia those narrow straits"* (Váli 1972, ix).



Figure 2.7. Physical Map of Europe

University of South Florida. 2020. "Physical Map of Europe." Accessed January 1. <https://etc.usf.edu/maps/pages/4600/4642/4642.htm>.

The strategic position of Turkey, *"affecting vital Soviet interests such as defence, navigation, and world influence, has been so pervasive as to compel the SU to use every device to subvert and dominate, to win over, or at least to neutralize Turkey at all costs"* (Karpát 1975b, 74-75). During the nineteenth century, the struggle for control of the Ottoman State in general and the Straits in particular was the major part of the struggles of European diplomacy (Aydın 1999, 168). Therefore, the

Ottoman State “even though militarily weak, economically bankrupt and politically anomalous” was able to subsist another century “on the conflict of interests between Russia, on the one hand, and Austro-Hungary, France, Britain, on the other” (Eren as cited in Aydın 1999, 168).

10.5.2. The Power Dimension

10.5.2.1. Distribution of Power in the BSS

As Schenoni (2017, 75) suggests, some scholars use the *Composite Index of National Capabilities* (CINC) scores collected from the *Correlates of War Project National Material Capabilities Data Documentation* (NMC-v5.0) to differentiate the structures of the international system. This convention envisages that “if the power of a leading state is more than three times that of the second biggest state, then the system is said to be unipolar”. The scores of the CINC aggregate the six components of national material capabilities into a single value per state-year by using demographic, military, and industrial indicators. These indicators are military personnel, military expenditure, total population, urban population, steel production, and energy consumption. The CINC reflects state’s share of the international system. The CINC ranges between 0 and 1 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). The overall view of the scores of the BSS members and the EU in the international system structure between 1812 and 2012 is seen in (Figure 1.8).




Figure 2.8. Share of the BSS Units in the World Distribution of Power (1774-2018)

The figures illustrated in the (Table 1.3) demonstrates the absolute unipolar character of the BSS between 1917 (Russian power is 18.43 times higher than Turkey) and 2004 (Russian power is 3.28 higher than Turkey). Between 2005 and 2012, the power ratio between Russia and Turkey ranges between minimum 2.56 and maximum 2.78.

Table 2.3. Power Ratio between Turkey and Russia (1917-2012)

Years	RUS/TUR	(+) 10	(+) 20	(+) 30	(+) 40	(+) 50	(+) 60	(+) 70	(+) 80	(+) 90
1917	18.43	17.84	19.33	12.54	22.50	20.58	16.66	13.45	3.40	2.68
1918	5.63	17.19	21.00	13.99	22.75	20.98	17.32	13.17	3.11	2.70
1919	10.86	18.61	25.77	15.84	23.27	20.74	16.79	11.18	3.14	2.66
1920	19.76	19.59	34.66	17.71	24.13	20.80	17.75	10.49	3.51	2.56
1921	23.83	21.12	18.00	21.40	24.85	19.89	17.43	7.55	3.96	2.66
1922	18.81	20.02	16.05	22.35	24.73	19.62	17.12	4.93	3.46	2.63
1923	15.87	21.49	18.05	25.00	22.80	20.20	15.87	4.11	3.42	
1924	11.98	18.69	18.49	27.11	22.02	19.73	15.80	4.38	3.28	
1925	14.64	23.10	22.14	25.96	20.70	19.40	15.46	4.09	2.78	
1926	14.70	18.69	10.72	23.67	20.95	18.08	14.35	3.68	2.71	

Moore (ac cited in Rosser 1969, 20) suggests that “*main outlines and twists and turns of Soviet foreign policy ... represent typical reaction to changes in the distribution of power in the world*”. Mearsheimer (as cited in Haas 2012, 281), argues that “*Soviet foreign policy behavior over time was driven mainly by calculations about relative power, not by communist ideology*”, because, intense ideological antipathy of the Soviet leaders to the other states by no means precluded close interactions with them. Oran (1970, 86-87) argues that Moscow’s Turkey policy constitutes a part of her general foreign policy. Esmer (as cited in Ülman 1961, 23) argues that the USSR threatened Turkey whenever she felt powerful and sought Turkey’s friendship whenever she was isolated and weak.

Turkey fits into the definition of both middle and regional power (Müftüler and Yüksel 1997, 187). According to Cooper (1997, 19), Turkey’s claim to be a middle power rests on its geographical position as much as its economic status and role in international organizations. For him, Turkey’s middle power status comes from its situation both as a bridge between East and West and balancing its interests across a

broad spectrum of issue-areas. The EU, if it were accepted as a unit, would become the unipole in the BSS following the membership of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, as seen in (Figure 1.9).




Figure 2.9. Share of the BSS Units in the World Distribution of Power (2007-2012)

Despite EU's ascendance as the unipole of the BSS in 2007 (Table 1.4), the dissertation will continue to treat Russia as the unipole of the BSS considering the premises of the neorealist theory.

Table 2.4. Power Ratio between the European Union and Russia and between Russia and Turkey (2007-2012)

Year	EU/RU	RU/TR
2007	3.566	2.682
2008	3.450	2.702
2009	3.337	2.664
2010	3.228	2.559
2011	3.112	2.663
2012	3.035	2.630

Derman and Kurban (2016, 455) argues that Turkish-Russian relations constitute the dependent variable of the international system. According to Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay (2006, 284-285), the course of the Turkish-Russian relations was

dependent variable of their relations separately or coincidentally with the West: Rapprochement occurred between them when their relations deteriorated with the West and alienation occurred when their relations improved with the West. One aspect of Turkish-Russian relations is that when required this relationship may be used by Turkey to balance her relations with the West. The combined explanation of above-mentioned phrases indicate that the Turkish-Russian relations is a derivative of the great power rivalry in the international system.

Waltz (as cited in Schweller 1998, 16) states that both the 1914 and 1939 international systems are multipolar. Christensen and Snyder (as cited in Schweller 1998, 17) also assume that the system of 1914 and 1939 are structurally comparable, if not entirely same. On the other hand, Schweller (1998, 17) argues that the multipolar system changed during the 1930s moving to tripolarity (the US, the SU, and Germany).

10.5.2.2. The Regimes as Structural Modifiers of the BSS

The great power balancing in the BSS gradually evolved through bilateral regulations of passage through the Straits to the multilateral regimes limiting or expanding the capabilities of not only the Black Sea littoral states and also the non-BSS states. The régime formations as a tool of the management of conflict altered the capability of great powers vis-à-vis each other and their calculations of interests in the Black Sea. The first modification of the BSS structure in the 20th century occurred with the signing of the Armistice of Mudros in 1918 which opened the Black Sea waters completely to the Entente Powers. The Lausanne Convention relating the Régime of the Straits dated 1923 and the Montreux Convention regarding the Régime of the Straits dated 1936 also modified the structure of the BSS and changed the capabilities of the BSS and non-BSS powers.

10.5.3. The Relationship as the Situational Context

The alliance, alignment and non-alignment constitute the relationship variables which denotes the relations of Turkey with other countries and create a situational context and determine the range of third-party state involvement in Turkish-Russian relations. Turkey's alliance relationships with Germany (1917-1918) and in NATO (1952-2015); alignment relationship with the USSR (1925-1936); and non-alignment

relationship (1918-1925) and (1936-1952) will serve as a situational context in which TPGPs operate within the determined limits presenting distinct constraints and opportunities for them. Russia's relations with other TPGPs matters, however, the said effect is also translated to the Turkish-Russian relations through the prism of a Black Sea threat complex.

11. Limitations

The limitations of the research influence the interpretation of the findings of the study. They are the constraints on generalizability, application to practice and/or utility of findings resulted from the initial design of the study. The acknowledgement of the limitations in a study is an opportunity to connect them to suggestions for further research. The limitations should be restricted to the research problem under investigation. Since the limitations are discovered after the completion of the research they should be stated in the past tense. Possible *methodological limitations* may be lack of available or reliable data, lack of prior research on the topic and measure used to collect the data. Possible *limitations of the researcher* may be the limited or denied accession to data, longitudinal effects (a research problem should be chosen which “*does not require an excessive amount of time to complete the literature review, apply the methodology, and gather and interpret the results*”), cultural and other types of bias and fluency in a language (University of Southern California 2019c). The limitations of the research are numerated as follows:

- Lack of prior research on patterned relationship in this subject.
- A few prior research using the Balance of Threat Theory in this subject.
- Difficulty to obtain information linking the issue to its own context with respect to research question.
- The problems specific to studying subsystems.
- Contradiction in or misuse of the current concepts in the literature.

There were a few theoretically informed study dealing with the examination of the Turkish-Russian relations. I could not run across to any one study specifically written on the third-party state impact on the Turkish-Russian relations. I found only

one work, a section of a book chapter, written by Demiryol (2015) shortly referred to balance of threat variant of neorealism. I could not come across a work examining the topic through a subsystemic perspective. The contradictions in the conceptualization of the terms in foreign policy, and lack of sufficient concepts regarding the application of subsystemic perspective also complicated my research.

In the literature, the evolution of international issues are often examined in its own entirety, for example, covering a period of ten years, from beginning to the end. However, the dissertation chose to examine the phases of the evolution of any issue in its actual context. Therefore, it chronologically divided the issue, placed its phases into its own context and tried to assess it in connection with other issues occurring in the same time frame. This method created many difficulties. For example, a certain phase of the issue which was narrated with only one sentence in this or that works was sought to be complemented with other “one sentence” in other works. In this case, I was unable to reach to a complete information explaining the very causes or results of that phase. It is most suitable to distinguish the most cited and older works at the beginning of the research and start to assimilate the literature with them to be able to grasp their many different interpretations in the succeeding works. Almost all of the recent works dealing with the Cold War period of the Turkish-Soviet relations cited the earlier most prominent a few works.

Lack of advanced Russian language prevented me to access Russian sources which influenced gathering of the data reflecting Russian perspectives to the events. However, I tried to compensate this gap with materials written in English by Russian scholars. My desire to examine a long period of Turkish-Russian relations was time consuming and exhausting, however, I was able to scan a great volume of the literature.

12. Organization of the Study (Contents and Chapters)

This dissertation is composed of an introduction, four parts including seven chapters, conclusion, and an annex. In the introduction part a general review of the dissertation was presented. The substantial parts have been formed in line with the composition of the *sumex* which was shaped in 1917, 1922, and 1991. The chapters of the dissertation have been formed in line with the changes in the structural modifiers

of the subsystem and the formation of alliances which happened in 1923, 1936 and 1952. As an exceptional case, the period between 1 January 1923 and 24 July 1923, despite deserves to be a chapter according to logic of the dissertation, has been added to the previous chapter (chapter three) due to its short period.

The first part of the dissertation includes one chapter. The first chapter refers to the literature review and the Research Design of the dissertation including the research problem, purpose and objectives of the research, research question and hypotheses, delimitation and importance of the research, research method, theoretical approach including the definitions of terms and concepts and discussions of existing approaches, assumptions, and limitations of the research.

The second part of the dissertation includes two chapters. The second chapter refers to prelude to modern Turkish-Russian relations covering the period between the Bolshevik October revolution (7 November 1917) and the inauguration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 23 April 1920. The third chapter refers to the period covering the process of the establishment of the legal and political basis of modern Turkish-Russian relations. Theoretically, this chapter ought to end with the signing of the Treaty of the Creation of the USSR dated 30 December 1992, whereas it was terminated with the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923, for practical reasons.

The third part of the dissertation covers the period until the dissolution of the USSR on 30 December 1991. The fourth chapter refers to the period until the signature of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Régime of the Straits signed on 20 July 1936 which modified the structure of the Black Sea Subsystem. The fifth chapter covers the period until Turkey's joining the NATO on 18 February 1952. The sixth chapter covers the period until the dissolution of the USSR on 30 December 1991. The fourth part of the dissertation having a chapter covers the period until Turkey's shooting down the Russian jet in Syria on 24 November 2015.

Conclusion

The research examines the impact of the third-party states on the dynamics and management of the Turkish-Russian political, economic, and military conflicts

occurred between 1917 and 2015. The unit of analysis to be used in this dissertation is the subsystem level constructed for the examination of the great power balancing in the subsystem and by extension behavior of the small powers. Primary and secondary resources are used for the examination of the research topic. A disciplined-configurative case study method has been selected since the dissertation also develops theoretical ideas and models of certain processes and test them by historical materials.

Since the new perspective of the dissertation requires a new model and new concepts, a trilateral framework of relations in a subsystem composed of subsystem and non-subsystem great powers and a lesser state has been constructed based on the Balance of Threat variant of Neorealism with some modifications and several descriptive identifier concepts.

This dissertation is composed of an introduction, four parts including seven chapters, conclusion, and an annex. In the introduction part a general review of the dissertation was presented. The substantial parts have been formed in line with the composition of the *sumex* which was shaped in 1917, 1922, and 1991. The chapters of the dissertation have been formed in line with the changes in the structural modifiers of the subsystem and the formation of alliances which happened in 1923, 1936 and 1952. As an exceptional case, the period between 1 January 1923 and 24 July 1923, despite deserves to be a chapter according to logic of the dissertation, has been added to the previous chapter (chapter three) due to its short period.

PART TWO
THE NON-HEGEMONIC UNIPOLAR 1.0 BSS
(1917-1922)



CHAPTER TWO

THE PRELUDE TO THE MODERN TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS (1917-1920)

Introduction

During the First World War, the Ottoman State and the Russian Empire were fighting with each other in the opposing warring groups. While the Ottoman State was among the *Central Powers* with Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria; Russia was among the *Entente Powers* with the French Third Republic and the UK. By 1917, the Russian Empire had already occupied eastern Ottoman state reaching to a line between Trabzon and Van.

The withdrawal of Russia from the war following the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917 and the emergence of new national entities in the BSS and neighboring subsystems, particularly in the Caucasus, changed the Black Sea Subsystem Member Complex (*sumex*) and the period of Russian *hegemonic unipolarity* ended. In the new *non-hegemonic unipolarity*, the conflict dynamics of the Turkish-Russian subsystemic bilateral threat complex (*subtex*) proliferated. This proliferation in the *subtex* facilitated the intrusion of the TPGPs into the BSS and their manipulation of local discords. The systemic bilateral threat complex (*sibtex*) was shaped rather around the local discords.

This chapter deals with the research question in two sections as pre-Mudros and post-Mudros stages in which the UK replaced Germany as the main non-subsystem third-party great power (TPGP) involving in the BSS affairs. The important events of the first stage were the signature of separate peace at Brest-Litovsk between the RSFSR and the Central Powers which made the recognition of the pre-1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian border by furthering the pre-1914 border by force of German arms. Almost simultaneous announcement of the Wilson Principles and the Bolshevik Decree calling for the self-determination for Turkish Armenia in January 1918 was the product of new *subtex* and *sibtex*. In this stage, the Ottoman State pursued a policy of

establishing a buffer state between her and the RSFSR as a safety measure to the imminent Russian threat. The Russian civil war which broke out in May 1918 facilitated the implementation of this policy. Germany became both triggering and braking factor during the Ottoman expansion.

The unconditional surrender of the Ottoman State at Mudros on 30 October 1918 had implications also for the RSFSR. The entente powers sent warships to the Black Sea through the Straits and provided arms and ammunitions to the White Army through the Black Sea.

The conflicts of interest among the victorious Entente Powers regarding the partitioning of the Ottoman State and controversial commitments given to the local ethnic and religious entities delayed a settlement with the Ottoman State. For the UK, Greece emerged as a suitable candidate to fill the vacuum of power in Thrace, Istanbul, and eastern Mediterranean. The RSFSR regarded the Greek expansion in Anatolia as a threat to the Soviet régime. A powerful Greece could block the Soviet access to the Mediterranean in the long term. The UK also supported the Armenian independence which would stretch from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean as a friendly state and a permanent barrier against Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean.

The beginning of the Turkish resistance movement came on 5 May 1919 when General Mustafa Kemal was appointed inspector general of the Ninth Army from its center at Samsun. The RSFSR began to contact with the Turkish nationalists already at this time and issued an appeal to the Turkish workers and peasants in September 1919 in which announced that the Bolsheviks stretched a brotherly hand to them in the fight against the imperialists. In January 1920, establishment of a Transcaucasian Barrier to prevent the unification of Anatolian movement with the Soviets came to the agenda in the UK. On 12 January 1920, the Entente Powers recognized the *de facto* independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan to pull them off Russia and postponed their decision regarding Armenia until the negotiations of the Turkish issue.

On 28 January 1920, the newly elected Ottoman Chamber of Deputies adopted the *National Pact* as the principles of national liberation. Assuming some sort of link between the Turkish resistance and the RSFSR, the Entente forces occupied Istanbul

on 16 March 1920. Following new general elections, the Turkish Grand National Assembly was inaugurated in Ankara on 23 April 1920. Thus, the Turkish-Russian relations entered into a new stage.

1. A Brief Recent Background (1914-1917)

As Feroz Ahmad argues (as cited in Hale 2013, 27), the Ottoman State had backed the wrong horse in 1914, since it had “*no other horse to back*”. On 10 August, two German battle cruisers, *Goeben* and *Breslau*, were transferred to Ottoman navy¹ in Istanbul by a fake sale (Hale 2013, 26). On 29 October, the Ottoman Black Sea fleet under the German admiral Souchon shelled Odesa, Sevastopol, Kerch and Novorossiysk ports and installations (Girgin 2014). On 2 November, Russia declared war on the Ottoman State, and Britain and France followed Russia on 5 November (Hale 2013, 26).

The German strategy dictated the Ottomans be kept away from their objectives in the Balkans and instead be used to serve the German interests of diverting the Russians and British from the main war theatres in Europe. Therefore, the Ottoman State was to advance into Egypt and to invade the Caucasus (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 313-314).

During the war, the Entente Powers concluded secret agreements for the partition of the Ottoman State comprising four sets of commitments. The *Constantinople Agreement*² consists of diplomatic correspondence of Russia, Britain and France between 19 February and 4 March 1915. Russia demanded the definite resolution of the Straits question according to its “*time-honored aspirations*”, in return for the demands of the said powers with regards to the other parts of the Ottoman State. Russia also informed Britain that it desired to separate Caliphate from Turkey (Hurewitz 1956, 7-11).

¹ *Goeben* was called *Yavuz Sultan Selim* and *Breslau* was called *Midilli* (Girgin 2014, 36).

² For the essential documents of the *Constantinople Agreement* (Secret diplomatic exchanges recognizing the annexation of Istanbul and the Straits to Russia between Great Britain and Russia, and between France and Russia) between 4 March-10 April 1915, see, Hurewitz (1979, 16-21).

*The London Agreement*³ (26 April 1915) was concluded between Britain, France, Russia, and Italy to meet the Italian demands in order to pull Italy to the Entente side (Hurewitz 1956, 11-12). *Sykes-Picot Agreement*⁴ is a tripartite understanding of Britain, France and Russia comprising eleven letters exchanged between 26 April and 23 October 1916. It is mentioned with the last names of the British negotiator Sir Mark Sykes and the French negotiator Charles François Georges-Picot. The Anglo-French understanding concerning the partition of Adana, Syria and Mesopotamia was endorsed by Russia in return for the approval of its claims in north eastern Anatolia (Hurewitz 1956, 18-22). The partition of Turkey through secret agreements is seen in (Figure 2.1) (Anderson 1966a, 342).



Figure 3.1. Partition of Turkey by the Entente Powers according to the Secret Agreements of 1915-1917
Anderson, M.S. 1966a. *The Eastern Question (1774-1923)*. New York: St Martin's Press.

The Petrograd Protocol was signed between Britain, France, and Russia. Russia obtained the Black Sea coastal line until Trabzon, and the provinces of Erzurum, Van

³ For the full text of the *Treaty between the Entente Powers (Britain, France and Russia) and Italy for the partition of the Ottoman Empire*, dated 26 April 1915, see, Hurewitz (1979, 21-24).

⁴ For four essential documents among many others regarding the *Sykes-Picot Agreement* (officially known as the *Asia Minor Agreement*) between 26 April – 23 October 1916, see, Hurewitz (1979, 60-64).

and Bitlis, in addition to the Straits zone (Uçarol 2013, 612). Although Russia had promised the Armenians an autonomous state including the areas both under Russian and eastern Anatolia, any obligation to give Armenians autonomy was not mentioned in the negotiations for the Russian annex to the Sykes-Picot Agreement (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 314, 323).

*Saint Jean de-Maurienne Agreement*⁵ is the reconciliation of British, French and Italian Prime Ministers who convened at St. Jeanne de Maurienne on 19 April 1917 decided to incorporate the Italian claims into the broadened Sykes-Picot agreement to be detailed later. The three governments endorsed the draft in an exchange of Notes between 18 August and 26 September 1917 subject to the Russian assent. However, Russia never approved the agreement and also repudiated all the Tsarist agreements following the Bolshevik revolution on 7 November 1917 (Hurewitz 1956, 23-25).

2. The Pre-Mudros Stage (1917-1918)

2.1. The Impact of Germany on the Realignment of the Ottoman-Russian Frontier (7 November 1917- 3 March 1918)

By the summer of 1916, the Russian army had advanced to Anatolian interior to a line lying from the west of Trabzon towards Lake of Van through Erzincan and Dersim (Yerasimos 2000, 11) as seen in (Figure 2.2) (Omniatlas 2020a).

Following the Russian revolution of March 1917, the Entente Powers had recognized the new government in Petrograd which announced its intention to recognize the military and diplomatic engagements of the previous régime. However, the overthrow of the Russian provisional government and the proclamation of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) by the Bolsheviks on 7 November 1917 was “widely viewed in Allied countries as the first successful application of the German policy of instigating insurrection behind the lines of the Entente” since

⁵ For certain documents regarding the Agreement of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, between 19 April-26 September 1917, see, Hurewitz (1979, 94-96).

German government had funded Russian revolutionary groups in exile and granted safe transit to the Bolshevik Leader V.I. Lenin by railway across German territory from his haven in Switzerland to Russia (Keylor 1996, 61-62).



Figure 3.2. The Eurasia Map (01.12.1917)

Omniatlas. 2020a. "The Eurasia Map (01.12.1917)." accessed January 1. <https://omniatlas.com/maps/europe/19171201/>.

The *Decree on Peace*⁶, written by Vladimir Lenin and adopted by the *Second Congress of the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies* on 8 November 1917, addressed all warring parties for the immediate beginning of negotiations leading to a just and democratic peace without forcible annexation of foreign territories and without indemnities. It also undertook to publish the secret treaties and conduct all future negotiations open. The *Decree on Peace* embodied two themes. Besides "immediate end to the war" which might be called as the short-term aspiration, the longer-term aspiration was the class-appeal part of the Decree (Ulam 1969, 52-53)

⁶ For the full text of the *Decree on Peace*, passed by the *Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies*, see, Degras (1951, 1-3).

particularly addressing to the workers of Britain, France and Germany that their resolute and vigorous activity could secure peace and liberation of the workers from exploitation and slavery (Degras 1951, 2-3).

The *Decree on Peace* did not receive any response from the warring parties. The UK and its allies considered the Bolsheviks' call for peace as an adverse blow to their war efforts. In case of Bolsheviks' making a peace with the Central Powers, it would be difficult to expect decisive result against Germany and its allies in the near future (Gökay 1997, 10). George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in St Petersburg, was authorized to prevent peace at any rate (Kılıç 2015, 41). The Ottoman State and Austria wished to use this opportunity to separate RSFSR from its allies by launching negotiations immediately whereas Germany intended to advance to the Ukrainian interior and the Don basin (Yerasimos 2000, 12-13).

According to the Art.2 of the *Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia*⁷ dated 15 November 1917, which recognized “the right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, even to the point of separation and the formation of an independent state”, many nations proclaimed their independence beginning from 19 November 1917 (Gürün 2010, 1).

Separate peace negotiations were launched among the RSFSR and the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk on 3 December 1917. On the same day, *Appeal of the Council of People's Commissars to the Moslems of Russia and the East* aiming to encourage Russia's southern neighbors to revolt against European imperialism was issued (Hurewitz 1956, 27-28). The *appeal* also declared the abolition of secret treaties pertaining to the annexation of Istanbul by Russia:

“... We declare that the secret treaties of the dethroned Tsar regarding the annexation of Constantinople, confirmed by the deposed Kerensky, are now null and void. The Russian Republic and its government, the Council of People's Commissars, are opposed to the seizure of foreign territory; Constantinople must remain in the hands of the Moslems. ... We declare that the treaty for the partition of Turkey, which was to despoil it of Armenia, is null and void. Immediately after the cessation of military operations, the Armenians will be guaranteed the right freely to determine their political destiny...” (as quoted in Degras 1951, 16-17).

7 For the full text of the *Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia*, dated 15 November 1917, see, Marxists Internet Archive (2019a).

An armistice between Germany and Russia was signed on 5 December 1917 in Brest-Litovsk. A second armistice, this time by including the allies of Germany, the Ottoman State, Austria, and Bulgaria was signed in Brest-Litovsk on 15 December 1917. A separate agreement had to be done to determine the conditions of the truce at the Caucasus Front to cease the hostilities and to change the prisoners of war. This armistice was signed between the Ottoman State and the representatives of the *Transcaucasian Commissariat* in Erzincan⁸ on 18 December 1917. By this armistice, the war ended, and a borderline drawn by the Ottoman General Staff was agreed. With the signing of the armistice, the idea of gathering the Caucasian Turks under the Ottoman umbrella aroused in the minds of the leaders of the ruling Ottoman *Union and Progress Party* (Yüceer 2016, 47).

The British war cabinet adopted a memorandum on 21 December to remove the dichotomy in British policy, while seeking conciliation with the Bolsheviks on one hand, supporting the anti-Bolshevik forces on the other. According to the memorandum, the Bolsheviks would be informed that the Allies had no desire to take any part in Russian internal politics. The memorandum also expressed the necessity of continued regular contacts with the Ukraine, the Cossacks, Finland, Siberia, and the Caucasus due to the strategic importance of these regions. This meant that the contacts with the anti-Bolshevik movements would be done as quietly as possible so as not to create impression that Britain was preparing to launch war on the Bolsheviks. This memorandum became an Anglo-French Convention on 23 December 1917. There were two central elements of the convention: to prevent Germany and its allies from obtaining rich material sources of Azerbaijan (oil) and Ukraine (wheat) and to stop the prevalence of the Ottoman influence in the region. The German-Soviet negotiations had provided the Ottomans an opportunity to put further claims towards the Caucasus. Thus, an imminent Ottoman expansion would be a new danger for the UK. The Anglo-French Convention also determined the spheres of influence among the British and the French. The Cossack territories, the Caucasus and Kurdistan were assigned to the UK whereas Ukraine and Bessarabia were allocated to France. The immediate British aim

⁸ For the full text of the *Armistice of Erzincan* in Turkish, see, Yerasimos (2000, 38-40).

was to keep the Transcaucasia⁹ from the Germans and Turks. The Bolshevik government considered the involvement of the British in the Caucasus and in the southern RSFSR as a direct military act against the sovereignty of the Soviet state although it did not have control there (Gökay 1997, 14-17).

The Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations concluded in three rounds. The first round of the negotiations of the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk began on 20 December 1917. The negotiations lasted long, the reason of which was Germany's extreme demands and Russia's expectation of a revolution in Germany (Yüceer 2016, 44). Soviet Russia demanded the acceptance of the principles of the Soviet thesis, e.g., peace without annexation and indemnity and self-determination right of the nations. Germany would concede to these principles in case of their acceptance also by Britain and France. Upon the demand of the Soviet delegation, conference made a pause for a period of 10 days for the invitation of France and Britain to the peace conference one more time (Kılıç 2015, 423).

Germany demanded that the meetings of Turkish-Soviet delegations be held separately except some general issues. The first confrontation during the Turkish-Russian negotiations emerged from the issue of the evacuation of Eastern Anatolia and the Armenian question. The Ottomans put forward the principle of the resolution of the domestic issues according to its own constitution and rejected the Russian proposal of making a referendum in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman State. When Germany linked the evacuation of eastern Europe to the evacuation of Caucasus, the Russian delegation returned to Petrograd to get new instructions. While the Russian Delegation was in Petrograd, Stalin, Commissar of the Nationalities, issued a statement about

⁹ The Caucasus dominated by Russia was governed by a general administration until the February revolution of 1917. The *Transcaucasian Committee* (Ozakom - Osoby Zakavkaski Komitet) which was established after the February revolution as a provisional government by Petrograd did not recognize the Bolshevik government following the October Revolution. The representatives of the Allied powers and Georgian, Azeri and Armenian representatives established a *Transcaucasian Commissariat* on 28 November 1917 and replaced the Ozakom. The *Transcaucasian Commissariat* cut the relations with the Bolsheviks and established a legislative assembly (*Sejm*) on 23 February 1918 (Kurban 2017, 15). Sejm proclaimed the *Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic* on 22 April 1918. Later, the Mensheviks in Georgia, the Dashnaks in Armenia, and the Musavat Party in Azerbaijan established independent states in May 1918. Democratic Republic of Georgia declared its independence on 26 May 1918. Establishment of the Democratic Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic followed on 28 May 1918.

Turkish Armenia on 31 December 1917 explaining the intention to issue a decree about the self-determination rights of the Turkish Armenia (Yerasimos 2000, 14-16).

Meanwhile, Woodrow Wilson, president of the United States, in his address to the Joint Session of the Congress on 8 January 1918, proposed fourteen principles for world peace. Wilson argued that the military and imperialistic marginal parties of the Central Empires forced Turkey and the Balkan states to become their associates in the war. He praised the “*perfectly definite statement of the principles*” of the RSFSR (Decree on Peace) upon which to conclude peace. Relevant provisions of the Fourteen Points concerning the Ottoman State and RSFSR were as follow:

“VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees” (as quoted in Yale Law School 2020b).

In the second round of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations¹⁰ which started on 9 January 1918, Britain and France did not send delegation and did everything to prevent a separate peace (Kılıç 2015, 423). Three days after Wilson announced his principles, RSFSR issued the *Decree of the Soviet Council of Peoples’ Commissars on Self-Determination and Independence for Turkish Armenia* (No:13) on 11 January 1918:

“The Council of People’s Commissars announces to the Armenian people that the Workers’ and Peasants’ government of Russia supports the right of the Armenians who live in ‘Turkish Armenia’ for free self-determination including complete independence.

The Council of Peoples’ Commissars maintains that the realization of this right is possible only if a number of prerequisite guarantees, absolutely indispensable for a free referendum of the Armenia people, are satisfied.

¹⁰ For the detailed examination of the process of the negotiations of the truce and the treaty of Brest Litovsk, see, Kılıç (2015).

The Council of Peoples' Commissars sets forth the following guarantees:

Article 1. The evacuation of armies from the territory of 'Turkish Armenia' and immediate organization of Armenian national militia in order to guarantee individual and property security of the inhabitants of 'Turkish Armenia'.

Article 2. The uninhibited return of Armenian refugees and Armenian immigrants who have been dispersed through various countries into the 'Turkish Armenia'.

Article 3. The unhindered return to the territory of 'Turkish Armenia' of Armenians who during the war were had been forcibly evacuated by Turkish authorities deep inside Turkey proper....

Article 4. The organization of a Provisional Peoples' government of 'Turkish Armenia' in the form of a Council of Deputies' of the Armenian People elected on the basis of democratic procedures. ...

Note: The geographical frontiers of 'Turkish Armenia' will be determined by the democratically-elected representatives of the Armenia people in agreement with the democratically-elected representatives of the adjacent and disputed (Muslim and other) regions in cooperation with the Extraordinary Provisional Commissar on Caucasian Affairs" (as quoted in Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 463-464).

The Ottoman Delegation in Brest-Litovsk protested the Declaration expressing that organizing the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia meant to resort to a hostile policy against the Ottoman State. A memorandum was dispatched to Russian side on 3 February 1918 in which replacement of the Russian military forces in the Caucasus with the troops composed of Armenians and Georgians, and the killings of Muslims by these troops were condemned, and Russia was informed that the Ottoman Government would be obliged to take the necessary measures in case of a continuance of this situation (Öke 1991, 125).

Öke (1991, 124) argues that the expected outcome on behalf of Russia in the long run was to form an intensive Armenian population in eastern Anatolia which would be put under Russian protectorate with a referendum and annex later. However, the Caucasus was being ruled from Tbilisi not from Petrograd anymore at that date. The Ottoman strategy regarding the Caucasus was to sign an agreement with the Soviet government which would form the legal basis of her expansion by seeking shelter under the German military might in Brest-Litovsk (Yerasimos 2000, 16-17).

Although the Transcaucasian Commissariat did not recognize the Soviet government in Petersburg, she saw herself as part of the Soviet Russia. The Ottoman State primarily sought to resolve the issue of the Armenian oppression over the Turks through diplomatic channels with Russia but could not get any result. The Ottoman

military advance in eastern Anatolia started two days after Trotsky interrupted the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk on 10 February (Kılıç 2015, 416-420). Meanwhile, the Government of the Transcaucasian Commissariat declared its readiness to make separate peace negotiations with the Ottoman State in Trabzon. However, the Ottoman State preferred to wait for the conclusion of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk (Kılıç 2015, 346-351).

Germany renewed its military operations on 17 February to give an end to the Russian tactics at the negotiations (Yerasimos 2000, 18). Meanwhile, the Ottoman State had already responded to Armenian massacres in Eastern Anatolia with a general offensive and taken Erzincan on 14 February 1918 (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 325-326). The German seizure of all Latvia and Estonia, and an important part of Ukraine was sufficient enough to prompt Lenin to sue for peace (Yüceer 2016, 44-45). Lenin believed what Russia needed was to end the war with Germany at any rate since a world revolution would occur over many years (Kurban 2017, 7).

The immediate Ottoman objectives during the negotiations were to reach to the pre-war frontiers of 1914, however, the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Caucasus led Ottomans to demand also *Elviye-i Selase* (a common name for Batum, Kars and Ardahan) which had been seized by the Russian army during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878. The Ottoman State's struggle to regain the Elviye-i Selase met with the opposition of Germany more than Russia. Only last minute strong protests secured the inclusion of a relevant provision in the Treaty (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 325). The German ultimatum dated 21 February had been delivered to the Russian side on 23 February and the latter had accepted these new conditions under the threat of using force. The evacuation of the Ottoman territories in eastern Anatolia which were under Russian occupation had taken place in the ultimatum, however, evacuation of Kars, Ardahan and Batum had not been stated clearly. The Ottoman demands were transmitted to German side on 24 February. German Foreign Minister Kühlmann replied on 25 February as the following:

"I surprised in the face of these demands especially about the return of Batum. I think, realization of these demands will cause an Ottoman-Russian conflict in the future. However, to oppose to the Ottoman demands does not seem suitable to the purpose" (Kılıç 2015, 343-344; my translation).

The Russian representative Sokolnikov expressed the following at the final Plenary Session of the Brest-Litovsk Conference:

“In the Caucasus, plainly violating the conditions of the ultimatum of 21 February drawn up by the German Government itself, and ignoring the real wishes of the population of the districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, Germany detaches these areas for the benefit of Turkey, whose armies had never conquered them” (as quoted in Degras 1951, 49).

A general peace treaty, “*Peace Treaty between the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire) and the Soviet Russia (Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk)*” and separate peace treaties were signed between the four Central Powers and the RSFSR on 3 March 1918. The *Peace Treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Soviet Russia (appended to the general Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk)* was signed¹¹ by all Central Powers and Russia. The Russian representatives expressed that they signed the treaty under the pressure and the threat of German imperialism for the purpose solely to protect the revolution. With the treaty, three centuries of Russian expansion was undone (Ulam 1969, 71).

Compared to the Empire of the Romanovs, new Russia lost Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Polish territories as independent countries, and lost western Ukraine and western White Russia to Poland, Bessarabia to Rumania, and the Kars-Ardahan area to Turkey (Riasanovsky 2000, 487-488). Vernadsky (as cited in Riasanovsky 2000, 477-478) sums up the results of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk for the RSFSR as follows:

“The peace conditions were disastrous to Russia. The Ukraine, Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia received their independence. Part of Transcaucasia ceded to Turkey. Russia lost 26 per cent of her total population; 27 per cent of her arable land; 32 per cent of her average crops; 26 per cent of her railway system, 33 per cent of her manufacturing industries, 73 per cent of her iron industries; 75 per cent of her coal fields”.

The military advance of Germany into the power vacuum changed the balance of power in eastern Europe radically (Keylor 1996, 62-63). The Ottoman-Russian

¹¹ The Treaty was ratified by the Central Committee of the Communist Party on 16 March 1918. The Ottoman Parliament ratified the treaty on 28 March 1918.

border was restored as it had been before the Turkish-Russian war of 1877-1878 (Öke 1991, 127-128). General Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk stipulates the following:

“... Russia will do all within her power to insure the immediate evacuation of the provinces of eastern Anatolia and their lawful return to Turkey. The districts of Ardahan, Kars and Batum will likewise and without delay be cleared of Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the reorganization of the national and international relations of these districts, but leave it to the population of these districts to carry out this reorganization in agreement with the neighboring states, especially with Turkey” (Art.4) (as quoted in Degras 1951, 53).

The Ottoman-Russian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk also stipulated the following:

“... the frontier shall be restored there as it existed before the Turkish-Russian war of 1877 and 1878” (Art 2.). ... All the treaties, conventions, undertakings, or other instruments and agreements previously existing between the contracting parties having been made null and void, pro facto, by the very occurrence of the war...” (Art 4.) (as quoted in Hurewitz 1979, 114).

The history of the Soviet Russia began to develop in 1918 around three cases: the Civil War, foreign intervention and the attempt to export revolution through the formation and activities of the Third Communist International (Ulam 1969, 76). While Comintern “*worked through its local branches to overthrow the capitalist governments of other countries, the Soviet government ... endeavored to establish normal diplomatic relations with the same governments*”. Therefore, the Soviet Russia had problems with this dual policy (Carr 1990, 73). This dual character of the Soviet foreign policy after 1917 can be defined as a confrontation of policies between “*more aggressive and assertive pursuit of revolutionary goals versus more accommodation toward, and interaction with, non-communist forces*” (Wozniuk 1990, 3-4).

Following the failure of the Decree on Peace, a certain duality appeared in the Soviet foreign policy whether the priority should be given to Soviet national interest or to the world revolution (Carr as cited in Wozniuk 1990, 40). During the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk Treaty, it was understood that “*the dogmatic absolutism which assumed that the Soviet régime must maintain an attitude of equal and unqualified hostility to all capitalist governments..., and objection on this ground even to the conclusion of a separate peace, was not seriously tenable*”. Lenin explained this Soviet attitude as: “*By concluding a separate peace, we are freeing ourselves in the largest measure possible at the present moment from both warring imperialist groups: by*

utilizing their mutual enmity we utilize the war, which makes a bargain between them against us difficult” (Carr as cited in Wozniuk 1990, 41-42). Brest-Litovsk was the first example that the new Soviet régime would be compelled to conform the conditions of international relations and it was a prototype of the future Soviet foreign policy outputs. This change, fitted with the needs of the desperate situation, was explained by Lenin in a confidential memorandum:

“The foreign policy of the Soviet power must not be changed in any respect. Our military preparation is still not completed, and therefore our general maxim remains as before- to tack, to retreat, to wait while continuing this preparation with all our might...” (Carr as cited in Wozniuk 1990, 43).

The new policy was to promote world revolution and the national security coincidentally. World revolution was the sole guarantee of the state, but national security was also a condition of a world revolution. These two aspects of the Soviet foreign policy were “*different instruments of a single consistent and integrated purpose*” (Carr as cited in Wozniuk 1990, 42).

2.2. The German Dominance in the Caucasus and the Ottoman-Russian Relations (3 March 1918-30 October 1918)

For the few months after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet government was incapable of offering serious resistance to any foreign invader. German troops entered Ukraine and Finland to help the local governments to put down Communists. Romania annexed Bessarabia (Ulam 1969, 79). The independence movements in the former Russian Empire appealed Germany for economic and military support. By supplying military protection, Germany “*hoped to achieve by indirect means two of the principal goals of its original war aims program, namely, the removal of Russian power from Europe and the extension of German economic domination to the non-Russian border zone*” (Keylor 1996, 62).

Maisky (as cited in Ulam 1969, 84-85) explains the allied attitude between Brest-Litovsk and late summer of 1918 as the following:

“... the powers of the Entente exhibited during the first months of its existence relatively little activity toward the Soviet Republic. True, they refused to acknowledge the new régime and

exhibited toward it open hostility, but they did not fight it openly. This is explained by the fact that during that period the Western Allies were too much absorbed in the war and did not have the means or the strength to conduct a very active policy in the East.... The Western Powers did not lose the hope of using Russia for war against Germany”.

Peace negotiations began in Trabzon between the Ottoman State and the Georgian, Armenian and Azeri representatives of the Sejm of the Transcaucasian Republic on 14 March 1918. The Ottoman State demanded the recognition of the Ottoman reacquisition of the eastern Anatolian provinces at Brest-Litovsk. The Armenians refused the Ottoman demands and the hostilities resumed (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 326). The Ottoman forces reached to the 1914 frontier on 24 March 1918 (Kılıç 2015, 416-420). Meanwhile, Armenian military units became the chief political ally of the Bolsheviks in Baku. On 24 March, a Muslim rebellion started against the authority of the Baku Soviet. More than three thousand Muslims were killed in the clashes. Following the victory of the Bolsheviks, the Armenian troops were absorbed in the Red Army (Gökay 1997, 22-24).

The Ottoman policy was clear. If Transcaucasia does not recognize the Bolshevik Russian government and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, then it should define itself as an entity and then negotiate with the Ottoman representatives following obtaining a legal status. The Ottoman army captured Sarıkamış on 5 April. The day after, the Ottoman State dispatched an ultimatum to the Transcaucasian government and demanded the recognition of the Brest-Litovsk and to separate itself from Russia as an independent state to be able to continue to negotiations (Yerasimos 2000, 20-21). The Ottoman forces seized Batum on 14 April and Kars on 25 April. Few days later the Ottoman forces reached to the 1877-1878 frontier (Kılıç 2015, 416-420). The Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) was set up in Baku on 25 April and declared itself as the first plenipotentiary Soviet government body in Transcaucasia (Gökay 1997, 22-24). The *Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR)* proclaimed its independence on 26 April. The Ottoman government recognized the new government and invited her to a conference in Batum. Meanwhile, Galip Kemali Bey has presented his credentials as the first and the last Ottoman Ambassador to the Soviet government on 26 April. Despite many correspondence, a Soviet official representative has never been sent to Istanbul (Yerasimos 2000, 21-25).

The Ottoman advance in the Caucasus did not halt even after reaching to the 1877-1878 frontier. The aim of the Ottoman Government was to establish a barrier between the Ottoman State and the Bolshevik Russia by establishing a great “*Islamic State*”. For this, the Muslim populated areas should have been cleaned from the Bolshevik or Russian armies. Whereas, Baku was in the hands of the Bolsheviks and their Armenian partners since the middle of March 1918 and the Germans had dominated Georgia (Kurat 1990, 527).

The capture of Baku either by the Ottomans or Germans could lead to disastrous results for the British. The German war industry could obtain great benefits from the oil to be carried by pipelines to Batum. Besides, in case of the realization of the Pan-Turkist ambitions of Enver Paşa, the Turks could threat India as well. For this reason, the seizure of Baku by the Turk should have been prevented. On the other hand, Stalin ordered the local Bolsheviks in Baku not to invite the British army to the city against the Ottoman threat. He thought that the British army would never leave the city when it entered once (Kurat 1990, 533-534).

The efforts to consolidate the Soviet rule following the Brest-Litovsk Treaty entered into a new stage with the emergence of counter revolutionary forces so called the White Army led by former Tsarist generals in Omsk in May 1918 (Keskin 2015, 157). The civil strife begun with the revolt of the Czechoslovakian troops against the Bolsheviks. These troops were composed of the Slavic soldiers taken prisoners from the Austrian army (Kurat 1990, 591).

The Ottoman-TDFR negotiations began in Batum on 11 May. Neither the Ottoman Government nor the TDFR paid attention to Bolshevik demands in the Conference. The Ottoman policy changed again in Batum. Since the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk did not bind the parties anymore, the continuing wartime situations led to the emergence of new Ottoman demands. Thus, the Ottomans wished to reach to 1828 frontiers by taking Ahıska, Ahılkelek, Iğdır, Gümrü, and Gümrü-Culfa railway (Yerasimos 2000, 21-22). The peoples of Ahıska and Ahılkelek had already demanded the annexation of their districts into the Ottoman State on 26 April 1918 (Öke 1991, 128). Meanwhile, the Ottoman armies entered Gümrü on 15 May (Yerasimos 2000, 21-22). The Ottoman delegation expressed that it would conclude peace agreement

only if the Caucasian nations establish three independent nation-states. Thus, the TDFR was dissolved on 26 May. With the German encouragement, Georgians formed their own independent state under German guarantee on 26 May 1918 (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 326). Subsequently, Armenia and Azerbaijan proclaimed their independence¹² on 28 May. Following the seizure of Gümrü by the Ottoman forces, Soviet Russia protested the violation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in a Note dated 28 May 1918, stating that Russia would not leave any territory to the Ottoman State henceforth (Kurat 1990, 529-530). Meanwhile, the Baku Soviet issued an appeal¹³ on 1 June 1918 to the Armenians and Transcaucasians to oppose against Turkish domination (Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 465). The Batum Conference was concluded with the signature of three separate agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia on 4 June 1918. The Ottomans reached to its 1828 frontier (Figure 2.3) (Omniatlas 2020d).



Figure 3.3. The Eurasia Map (18.07.1918)

Omniatlas. 2020d. "The Eurasia Map (18.07.1918)." accessed January 1. <https://omniatlas.com/maps/europe/19180718/>.

¹² Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Baku became the capitals of the three Caucasian Republics. However, Gence become the temporary capital of Azerbaijan since Baku was still under the control of Bolsheviks since 18 March 1918.

¹³ For the full text of the *Appeal of the Baku Soviet* dated 1 June 1918, see, Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, 465-469).

Although all the conflictual issues had been resolved, Germany, in addition to the Bolshevik Russia did not recognize the agreements. Germany started to deploy troops in Batum to protect its interests in the oil reserves in Baku (Kurat 1990, 474-478). According to Article four of the Treaty with Azerbaijan dated 4 June¹⁴, the Ottoman government would send military assistance to Azerbaijan to restore order and security when demanded by the Azeri government (Yerasimos 2000, 23-25). Meanwhile, the determination of the Allied Powers to “strangle Bolshevism in its cradle” became a reality in the summer of 1918 when the British landed¹⁵ at Murmansk in June (Carr as cited in Wozniuk 1990, 43-44) as seen in (Figure 2.4) (Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) 11/11/2017, 2).




Figure 3.4. The Entente Intervention in Russian Civil War (1918-1920)

Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist). 11/11/2017. “Supplement: Imperialist Countries’ Response to Russian Revolution.” *The Marxist-Leninist Weekly*, 2.

¹⁴ For the full text of the *Treaty of Friendship between the Sublime Porte and Azerbaijan*, in Turkish, see, Kurat (1990, 662-666).

¹⁵ British and French troops landed at Archangel, American troops joined the British and French troops in the North, and the Japanese landed at Vladivostok in August 1918 (Carr as cited in Wozniuk 1990, 43-44).

The Allies originally wanted to prevent the Germans from seizing war materials in the ports such as Archangel and Murmansk (Riasanovsky 2000, 483). While the Americans and the British confined their activities to protecting the army stores, France hoped that several anti-Bolshevik groups could overthrow the Bolsheviks and resume the war against Germany (Keylor 1996, 86-87).

The Ottoman's taking the initiative to establish a new order in the Caucasus concerned other powers deeply (Öke 1991, 129). Kurat (as cited in Öke 1991, 132) argues that the policy of Turanism establishing Turkish-Islamic states in the Caucasus or beyond it under the Ottoman protectorate was not a conquest, indeed, it aimed to safeguard the Ottomans against Russia. Thus, a great Islamic state to be established in the Caucasus, would serve as a buffer state between Turkey and Russia and protect Turkey against Russia (Berber 2006, 247).

In the mid-June 1918, a delegation from the National Assembly of Azerbaijan demanded military assistance from the Ottomans to rescue Baku from the Red Army (Yüceer 2016, 51). To prevent the reaction of Germany, a force under the name of *Islam Army* composed of regular Ottoman troops and reinforced with Azeri volunteers interfered in Azerbaijan instead of a direct engagement of the Ottoman army. The Islam army inflicted heavy casualties to Bolsheviks on 26 June (Yüceer 2016, 50-51). Upon the advance of the Ottoman army towards Baku on 20 July, Moscow¹⁶ demanded from the Germans on 25 July to halt the Ottoman advance in accordance with her previous commitments (Kurat 1990, 544). Meanwhile, the Baku Soviet, contrary to the order of Stalin, invited British troops to defend Baku on 25 July. The Baku Soviet toppled the ruling Bolsheviks and a small British contingent occupied the city (Yüceer 2016, 53).

Germany, too, concerned from the Ottoman's having a voice in the Caucasus, especially over the Baku oil. To prevent this, Germany assumed the protectorate of Georgia and supported it against the Sublime Porte (Yüceer 2016, 50). Many casualties have been given during the clash of the German and Ottoman troops on the Tbilisi

¹⁶ Moscow became the capital of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Russian SFSR or RSFSR) as of 5 March 1918 instead of Petrograd (Petrograd was called before St. Petersburg, and later as Leningrad).

road. The Soviet government, noticing the situation, tried to halt the Ottoman State by reaching an understanding with Germany (Yerasimos 2000, 25-26). In accordance with the *Annex to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk*¹⁷ dated 27 August 1918, Russia accepted the recognition of the independence of Georgia. Germany accepted not to help third-party military operations in Kars, Ardahan and Batum. Germany would take the necessary measures to prevent the passage of the troops of the third parties behind a line around Baku. Russia would supply one fourth of the oil exploited in Baku to Germany (Yerasimos 2000, 80). A *Secret Protocol* was concluded through the exchange of Notes¹⁸ in the same day. Russia accepted that “*any military encounters between Russian troops and a third power in the Caucasus, apart from Georgia, ... shall give Germany no cause for intervention, provided Russian troops do not cross the Turkish frontier, ...*” (Degras 1951, 97). The Ottoman State directed strong criticisms towards Germany when it learned that the Germans sided with the Soviets pertaining to Baku. The Ottoman State became resolute to resolve the Baku issue unilaterally after learning this agreement (Kurat 1990, 536). This agreement seemingly normalized the relations of Germany and Soviet Russia in the aftermath of the German advance towards the Caucasus (Kurat 1990, 550).

In accordance with the article four of the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, self-determination rights of three provinces would be determined through a plebiscite. The plebiscite was realized on 15 August 1918 by using the Russian records to specify the men who were above 19 years old and eligible for voting. According to the records, there were 138.582 Muslim and 23.326 non-Muslim people were living in the area. Out of the votes casted, there were 87.048 votes in favor of the Ottoman annexation, 441 no votes, and 1693 abstains. Upon the result of the plebiscite, Elviye-i Selase was annexed to the Ottoman State (Kurat 1990, 491-492). Moscow did not protest the annexation but argued the occurrence of a series of irregularity during the plebiscite (Kurat 1990, 493-494).

¹⁷ For the Turkish text of the Caucasus part of the *Annex to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk*, signed in Berlin, see, Yerasimos (2000, 80).

¹⁸ For the Russian Note constituting the *Secret Protocol*, see, Degras (1951, 96-98).

Upon the request of the Azeri government¹⁹, the Ottoman troops started to advance to Baku on 14 September (Yüceer 2016, 52). Several hours after the withdrawal of the British army, the Ottoman army entered Baku on 15 September 1918 and made it into the new capital of the Azerbaijani Republic instead of Gence (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 326). The Bolshevik Government dispatched a Protest Note²⁰ to the Sublime Porte on 20 September 1918 demanding the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from Baku (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 326). Soviet Russia also notified the parties that it abrogated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Ottoman State (Yüceer 2016, 53):

“... the Soviet Government hereby declares that it cannot concur in the results of the so-called referendum of the population of districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, and considers that the right of this population to establish a new régime in their districts has not been exercised and that the question of the new régime of these districts is still open...

In the course of the past six months the Ottoman Government has persistently violated the Brest-Litovsk treaty, despite all the protests of the Soviet Government. ... The Ottoman Government by this act has shown that the Brest-Litovsk treaty between Russia and Turkey is no longer in force. The Government of the Russian Federal Soviet Republic is compelled to recognize that the actions of the Ottoman Government have in fact destroyed the peaceful relations between Russia and Turkey established between these two States by the Brest-Litovsk treaty” (as quoted in Degras 1951, 109-110).

Baku was a loss for both the UK and the Bolshevik Russia. The control of rich oil reserves by the Central Powers would be a serious threat against the British dominance in Asia. This was also end of the sole Bolshevik rule established in the Caucasus and a potential danger posed by the possible anti-Bolshevik Muslim mobilization to spread to the Caspian area and Central Asia (Berber 2006, 247). On 23 September 1918, the Ottoman State succumbed to German pressure and signed an agreement promising withdrawal from the Caucasus (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 326). Meanwhile, the British army, advancing from Egypt to the north, seized Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo by the end of September 1918 (Kurat 1990, 560).

Finally, the Ottoman State informed Russia on 3 October that it started to withdraw its forces from Baku. Moscow, after the news of 3 October, demanded also the return of Ahiska, Ahılkelek and Gümrü on the basis of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

¹⁹ For the full text of *Azerbaijan's demand for Military Assistance from the Ottoman Empire*, in Turkish, see, Kurat (1990, 669-670).

²⁰ For the full text of the *Protest Note*, in English, see, Degras (1951, 109-110), for French and Turkish texts, see, Kurat (1990, 688-692).

The Ottoman Note²¹ sent to Russia on 6 October, informing the latter that an order was given to Ottoman troops for the withdrawal to the frontier of Brest-Litovsk, was the last Ottoman Note sent to the RSFSR (Yüceer 2016, 54). Meanwhile, Lenin suspected whether the Ottomans made a secret agreement to deliver Baku to Britain. Although there was no such an agreement, the result would not differ in a month, as a result of the Armistice of Mudros (Yerasimos 2000, 32-33). In the Soviet Note²² dated 10 October, the unjustness of the Ottoman military operation was expressed and the demand for delivering Baku to the Soviets was reiterated (Yüceer 2016, 54-55).

In this period lasted shorter than a year, the Ottoman State tried to benefit from the weakening of the Russian power in the Caucasus by establishing counter revolutionist groups and governments in the region which paved the way for the involvement of the European great powers. After a while, the new Turkish Government in Ankara would be obliged to terminate these governments, established by the Ottoman government against Soviet Russia, in cooperation with Soviet Russia (Yerasimos 2000, 32-33).

The Ottoman victories in the Caucasus were gained at the expense of other fronts. Damascus and Aleppo lost, and Bulgaria accepted the Allied surrender terms on 2 October, direct Ottoman connection with Germany severed. *“The British gained the right to send their forces from Salonica through Thrace to Istanbul”* which *“gave Britain control of Istanbul and the Straits on land and sea, enabling them to impose the final armistice terms on the Ottomans”*. The French fleet occupied Iskenderun on 14 October and the Ottomans began to retire quickly into Anatolia toward Adana to make a new front in the home territory (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 327). The Ottoman State called for armistice after the establishment of its new government on 14 October 1918 (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 64-65).

Following the withdrawal of Russia from the WWI, military activities of the allied forces in the Middle and Near East had devolved around the British army which led to topping of British stakes over all the combined Allied stakes. This new situation caused a clash between the French and British Middle East objectives (Hurewitz 1956,

²¹ For the full text of the Note, in Turkish, see, Kurat (1990, 693-695).

²² For the full text of the Note, in Turkish, see, Kurat (1990, 696-699).

50). Britain determined the conditions of the armistices on behalf of the allies since Russia had been eliminated and Britain remained the only fighting Entente force in the Near and the Middle East (Hurewitz 1956, 36). The talks of the Armistice of Mudros sharpened the controversies among the Entente powers. Lloyd George said that “*the talks of the armistice regarding Turkey seriously created rift among us and Clemenceau for the first time*” (Şamsutdinov 1999, 27).

The “*Armistice between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente Powers*” (*Armistice of Mudros*) was signed on the British battleship *HMS Agamemnon* anchored off Mudros, on the island of Lemnos, on 30 October 1918 (Hale 2013, 28). When the Ottoman State signed the armistice on 30 October, Germany and Austria-Hungary had not signed an armistice yet (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 64-65). Several provisions of the armistice which had implications not only for the Sublime Porte but also for the Soviet Russia were as follows:

“I. Opening of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and secure access to the Black Sea. Allied occupation of Dardanelles, and Bosphorus forts.

VII. The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.

XI. Immediate withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Northwest Persia to behind the pre-war frontier has already been ordered and will be carried out. Part of Trans-Caucasia has already been ordered to be evacuated by Turkish troops; the remainder is to be evacuated if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation there.

XV. Allied Control Officers to be placed on all railways, including such portions of the Trans-Caucasian Railways as are now under Turkish control, which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities, due consideration being given to the needs of the population. This clause to include Allied occupation of Batum. Turkey will raise no objection to the occupation of Baku by the Allies.

XXIV. In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets²³, the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them” (as quoted in Hurewitz 1979, 128-30).

As French journalist Pertinaks stated, the armistice of Mudros would turn the Ottoman State into a base for the Allied Powers for a future campaign against the RSFSR (Perinçek 2014, 20). Many articles of the Armistice of Mudros meant direct involvement in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Russia. Article 11 stipulated the evacuation of Dagestan, Azerbaijan and Armenia by the Ottoman army and the

²³ Six Armenian provinces (Vilayet-i Sitte) were Erzurum, Sivas, Elazığ, Diyarbakır, Bitlis and Van.

occupation of all the Transcaucasia and Dagestan by the British troops (Şamsutdinov 1999, 29). In accordance with article 15, Britain attained the right to occupy Batum, Baku, and other cities of Transcaucasia. Lenin said that “*Now, Britain captured Baku to strangle us by seizing our raw materials*” (Şamsutdinov 1999, 29). *The Times* correspondent stated the anti-Soviet character of the armistice as the following (as quoted in Şamsutdinov 1999, 30):

“Passing through the Dardanelles is more precious than everything that the Turks can give us. Passing through the Straits not only grants us the possibility to control Black Sea and protect the transportation route to India but the most suitable way to influence the events in Russia”.

3. The Post-Mudros Stage (1918-1920)

3.1. The Intrusion of the Entente Powers into the BSS: From the Armistice of Mudros to the Occupation of İzmir (30 October 1918-15 May 1919)

The official relations between the Ottoman and Russian governments interrupted following the Armistice of Mudros. Turkish-Russian relations would restart with the establishment of the Government of the TGNA in Ankara on 23 April 1920 (Yerasimos 2000, 101). The Armistice of Mudros “*provided for a total and unconditional surrender, a considerably harsher arrangement than that imposed on the Christian members of the Central Powers*” (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 328). Gökay (2006, 14) expressed this situation very clearly as the following:

“The end of the First World War effectively destroyed the power centers in the Near East by excluding tsarist Russian, German and Ottoman empires from the political scene for the foreseeable future. The most likely solution appeared to be for Britain to impose order as the victorious force in the lands stretching from the Caspian in the East to the European hinterland of the Black Sea Straits in the West. These vast lands, which had been partly under the sovereignty of the former Russian Empire and partly under the Ottoman Empire, suddenly became an area of British interest”.

Britain reached to two of its objectives in the Middle East politics by taking the control of the Iraqi oil and the Turkish Straits with the armistice of Mudros. The next objective was to isolate Bolshevik Russia from Anatolia and prevent its influence in the region. For this, Britain supported General Wrangel fighting against the

Bolsheviks in Crimea, the Menshevik government in Georgia, the Dashnak Armenians and the Egalitarians in Azerbaijan (Sönmezoğlu 1994, 41-42).

The allied powers occupied various areas in the Ottoman State in conformity with the Article 7 of the Armistice of Mudros (Sönmezoğlu 1994, 33). The allied fleet jointly occupied Izmir on 7 November 1918 because of the conflicting claims by Italy due to the wartime agreements and by Greece to fulfil its old dream of restoring the Byzantine Empire (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 329). The Entente powers occupied Mosul and Iskenderun three days after the armistice and anchored in the Golden Horn on 13 November 1918. British troops landed in Istanbul on 14 November and the Italian and French troops followed them (Şamsutdinov 1999, 31-32). Some of the British warships passed through the Bosphorus on 13 November and sailed towards Batum. French and Greek warships followed them. The régime of the Straits had been changed and the Russian shores in the Black Sea had been exposed to the threats of the Entente powers. Not long after, the French landed troops in Odessa and started to operate against the Red Army, and the British tried to throw the Bolshevik army out of Sevastopol (Kurat 1990, 585).

The British established a corridor extending from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea by occupying Batum and Baku and controlling Batum-Baku railway before the end of 1918 (Tellal 2015g, 166). There were arsenals in Kars, Sarıkamış, Trabzon and other cities left by the withdrawing Russian army. The British command seized these arsenals and equipped the Denikin army, Mensheviks, Dashnaks, Egalitarians, Buhara and Hive khanates fighting against the Bolsheviks (Şamsutdinov 1999, 29-30). Since Britain was unable to deploy huge numbers of forces in the Caucasus, it supported Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Pontus as their local collaborators and each of them was transformed into an international question in order to encircle Soviet Russia and destroy its régime, to blockade Anatolia, to prevent Turkish-Soviet relations and to establish the status quo of the Sèvres (Doğanay 2009, 280-281).

The armistice among the Entente Powers and Germany was signed in Paris on 11 November 1918. It stipulated that “*Germany renounce the treaties of Brest-Litovsk*” and “*withdraw all of her military forces from Russia, Romania, Austria-Hungary and Turkey*” (Keylor 1996, 65-66). Thereupon, the RSFSR announced that the General

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was not binding anymore (Yüceer 2016, 45). Following the armistice of 11 November, Lenin told that “*now the world capital will start an offensive against us*” (Ulam 1969, 92). The allied intervention in Russian civil war vastly increased in December 1918 (Ulam 1969, 98). The allied occupation confirmed and intensified the ideological aspect of Soviet foreign policy and made international revolution its main objective. It became clear that the coexistence of the capitalist and socialist states was impossible. The revolutionary aim was paramount factor in the Soviet foreign policy between 1918 and 1920 than at any other time (Carr as cited in Wozniuk 1990, 43-44). The withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from the Caucasus would be ended on 30 December 1918 in accordance with the agreement made with the British army. The frontier in the Caucasus in January 1919 is seen in (Figure 2.5) (Omniatlas 2020c).



Figure 3.5. The Eurasia Map (10.01.1919)

Omniatlas. 2020c. “The Eurasia Map (10.01.1919).” accessed January 1. <https://omniatlas.com/maps/europe/19190110/>.

The military and political situation in Transcaucasia changed radically with the occupation of the British army. Britain took the Dashnak Armenians and the

Menshevik Georgians under her protection. The Armenians promptly moved to seize lands as much as possible with the support of the British army (Kurat 1990, 587).

Beginning from 1919, the White troops advancing from Siberia under Admiral Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak, from the Baltics under General Nikolai Yudenich and from the Don under General Denikin towards Petrograd were rebuffed by the Bolsheviks (Keskin 2015, 157). The British has supplied arms, ammunition and money to Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin in the Kuban region in the North-east Black Sea. The French sought to support Ukrainian nationalist government by deploying the French troops in Odessa. However, since both countries were obliged to demobilize their armies, they were seeking troops to send to Russia. Greece had given several troops to the command of France as the price of the permission given for the occupation of Izmir, but they were not enough (Yerasimos 2000, 101-103). The Russian *“objective was to stop the flow of arms and men which the British and the Greeks were sending through Istanbul and the Black Sea to support the White Russian armies”* (Gökay 2006, 14). The general situation in the Middle east was as follows:

“[E]specially Great Britain, showed a disposition to divert a part of the vast resources released by the armistice to the waging of a campaign against Bolshevism. This meant a shift in the major field of activities from Europe to Asia. ... British contingents in the Caucasus and in central Asia made in the first months of 1919 several moves openly directed against Soviet forces. Through this British action, the Middle East became in 1919 the theatre of an all but declared war between Great Britain and the RSFSR. In these circumstances the RSFSR soon found itself committed, in default of other means of defense, to a general diplomatic offensive against Great Britain in Asia” (Carr 1985, 235).

As the Paris Peace Conference²⁴ began to meet on 18 January 1919, only conflicts of interest among the victors delayed a settlement with the Sublime Porte (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 330). Britain, France, and Italy were at odds among themselves regarding the spoils of the First World War. Britain’s renouncement from her promises given to France and Italy caused alienation of these countries. Italy was acting in the Adriatic and Antalya without consulting to Britain. France was disturbed from Britain’s soft policy towards Germany and the British occupation of Antep after Mosul

²⁴ The Allied powers dealt first with the European affairs and signed peace agreements with Germany on 28 June, with Austria on 10 September, with Bulgaria on 27 November 1919 and with Hungary on 4 June 1920 (Carr 1990, 3).

(Oran 2015a, 99). The issues arose from the secret treaties done among the Entente Powers. These were the partitioning²⁵ of the Ottoman State and controversial commitments given to the local ethnic and religious elements (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 63). The slowness of the Turkish settlement made it possible a remarkable growth of Turkish nationalism from the spring of 1919 onwards (Anderson 1966a, 363-364).

On 15 February 1919, Soviet Russia sent an *Aide-Memoire*²⁶ to Istanbul. This was the latest document sent by the Soviets to the Sublime Porte. In the Soviet *Aide-Memoire*, the events occurred following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was reviewed; the corruptions during the plebiscite made in the Elviye-i Selase were mentioned; the Sublime Porte was accused for imperialist ambitions due to the Baku campaign; and finally friendship of the Turkish and Russian peoples was expressed at the end. Soviet Russia had also wanted to guarantee that it did not have any bad intention towards Turkey. Kurat (1990, 565-566) argues that the purpose of sending this *aide-memoire* to a state which was expected to collapse should have been to determine the principles for the future Turkish governments about how to behave against Russia. It was also an appeal to the eastern Muslim peoples. This *aide-memoire*, so to speak, was including the common points which would occupy an important place in the foreign policy of the Ankara government (Kurat 1990, 566). Whereas there was no possibility to think about these principles in Istanbul. The Istanbul government had adopted a hostile attitude against Bolshevism to satisfy the Entente powers and started to seek to prove that Bolshevism was against Islam religion after all (Kurat 1990, 567).

With the foundation of third²⁷ or the Communist International known as Comintern in the founding Congress in Moscow on 6 March 1919, a *Manifesto*²⁸ of the *Communist International to the Proletariat of the Entire World* was issued which called upon the working masses of all countries to press upon their governments by all

²⁵ The French landed in Mersin, Tarsus and Adana on 19 January 1919. Italians landed in Marmaris, Antalya, and Burdur on 29 April 1919, and the Greeks landed in Izmir on 15 May 1919 (Hurewitz 1956, 59).

²⁶ For the full text of the Soviet Aide-Memoire in French and Turkish, see, Kurat (1990, 700-714).

²⁷ The Third or Communist International (Comintern) was founded in Moscow, on 2 March 1919 and was dissolved on 15 May 1943. The First International had been founded by Karl Marx and existed between 1864 and 1872, and the Second or Socialist International had existed between 1889 and 1914.

²⁸ The manifesto was described by Zinoviev as a second Communist Manifesto following the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels which was issued in 1848.

available means to demand the withdrawal of armies from Russia and the recognition of the Soviet régime (Carr as cited in Wozniuk 1990, 44). At the end of the Congress, operational goals of Comintern were accepted as “*to make international propaganda to spread communist ideas, to support and help communist parties in other countries, [and] to prepare the world communist revolution*” (Kurban 2017, 9-10).

The British did not have enough troops to control the Caucasus, Istanbul, and the Straits at the same time. Thus, Lloyd George was in favor of consolidating its position in Turkey at the expense of the Caucasus. By March 1919, Britain decided to withdraw from the Caucasus except for Batum by the end of 1919. The British forces would confine themselves to the control of the Black Sea and the Straits. A powerful stronghold in İstanbul and the Straits and the Black Sea would enable Britain still to continue to exercise influence in the Caucasus (Gökay 1997, 60,62).

Greece demanded to occupy Izmir and much of southeastern Anatolia because of a long historical link between the eastern and western shores of the Aegean. Britain supported the Greek claim because of the strong anti-Muslim sentiment at home and also a desire to have a friendly state in control of the Aegean to counter any possible future Russian move (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 330). According to Lloyd George’s scheme, “*the power vacuum that had previously been filled by the Ottoman Empire in Thrace, Constantinople and the eastern Mediterranean should now be filled by a friendly power*”. Britain itself could not do this since there were not enough troops or funds available to pacify Turkey. Therefore, Greece emerged as a natural candidate as a proxy to police Turkey (Gökay 1997, 44).

The British supported the Armenian independence claim “*which would stretch from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean ... in the hope of maintaining a friendly vassal state in eastern Anatolia ... to fulfill its longstanding hope of establishing a permanent rampart against Russian expansion to the Mediterranean from that direction*”. The early French support “*turned to hostility when the claims were extended to include the French-occupied areas of Cilicia*” (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 330-331).

In the spring of 1919, France offered the Ottoman government to soften the stipulations of the peace treaty in return for allocation of an Ottoman army to the

French command to be used against the Bolsheviks. Likewise, the British agent J.G. Bennett, proposed Mustafa Kemal in Istanbul to send a Turkish army to fight with Denikin against the Bolsheviks in return for leaving Thrace and Istanbul to Turkey. These possibilities concerned the Soviets. Thus, the first contacts between the Turkish nationalists and Russian Bolsheviks started in this period (Yerasimos 2000, 101-103).

The European liberals believed that the League of Nations would provide the democratic control of foreign policy with *open diplomacy* (Sander 1989, 18-19). The *Covenant of the League of Nations* was incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles at the Paris Peace Conference. Article 22 of the Covenant created a mandate system under the League's supervision. Paragraph four of the article 22 related to the Ottoman State was as follows:

“Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory” (as quoted in Yale Law School 2019a).

The Covenant provided for three classes of mandates graded according to the stage of development of the populations to which they are applied. The ex-Ottoman mandates were placed under “A” mandates. The role of the mandatory was to render administrative advice and assistance until such time as they are able to stand alone. The mandate for Syria was assigned to France and Iraq to Great Britain (Carr 1990, 16-17).

The position of the United States became crucial. President Wilson's “*insistence on self-determination conflicted with all the claims being made at the peace conference, with the exception only of those of the Arabs and the Turks*”. Britain proposed the idea of “*getting the United States to assume a mandate over the disputed provinces or all of Anatolia, officially proposing it in mid-May just as the Council of Ten*²⁹ *decided on a mandate system for the Arab provinces of the empire. In response, Wilson sent two investigative commissions to the Middle East, one to Syria under the*

²⁹ The allied and associated powers met in the *Council of Ten* during the Paris Peace Conference.

leadership of Henry C. King ... and Charles Crane, ... and the other to Anatolia under Major General James G. Harbord” (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 331).

By 5 May, it became obvious that Italians had already started to occupy İzmir that they regarded as rightfully theirs (Gökay 1997, 45). The British, French and American approval for the Greek landing in Izmir emanated partly from the fear of an Italian seizure of Izmir, if Greece were not allowed to act (Anderson 1966a, 364). Article 7 of the Armistice of Mudros which allowed the Allies “*to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies*” provided for the basis of legal justification. On 14 May 1919, British, American and French warships brought an entire Greek division into the harbor of Izmir (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 342). The Allied promises had been limited due to Italian interests in southeastern Anatolia and those of Britain in Istanbul (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 330).

3.2. The Impact of the Entente Powers on the Development of Turkish National Resistance and the Roots of Developing Turkish-Russian Relations (15 May 1919 – 23 April 1920)

The beginning of the Turkish resistance movement came on 5 May 1919 when General Mustafa Kemal “*was appointed inspector general of the Ninth Army, encompassing much of eastern and north-central Anatolia from its center at Samsun His instructions were to restore order and security, gather the arms and ammunition laid down by the Ottoman forces, ... exactly what the Allies had been pressing the Istanbul government to do. ... [H]e was given command not only over the army but also over all the civil servants in the area*” (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 342).

Meanwhile, a new agreement clarifying the Sykes-Picot agreement was signed between France and Britain on 22 May 1919. In return for bringing the Palestine and Mosul under British sphere of influence, Adana and Syria were returned to French occupation zone (Şamsutdinov 1999, 52).

The Bolsheviks believed that “*Greek operations in Anatolia were directly controlled by the British Empire and Greek expansion in Asia minor was thus regarded as a threat to the Soviet regime. A powerful Greece extending into Asia minor could have blocked the Soviet access to the Mediterranean in the long term. ... There was a*

danger that the Greeks 'would try to create a Great Armenian-Byzantine state' in eastern and northern Anatolia which 'could serve as a gable to hold on the fire of imperialism' on the borders of the Soviet Russia" (Gökay 2006, 16). Russian Colonel Budiyenni met with Mustafa Kemal in Havza and pledged orally to send money, arms and ammunitions (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973b, 66). It was clear that Colonel Budiyenni wanted to make the Bolshevik system accepted by the Turkish leaders. Mustafa Kemal was replying evasively not to lose the Bolshevik assistance totally and saying that he was thinking a system *"based on a state socialism similar to Soviet Republics"* (Sonyel 1995, 83).

Meeting in Amasya between 18 and 22 June 1919 to take the necessary measures against the occupation of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Paşa and his friends issued a circular called *Amasya Tamimi* which contained the principles of national resistance. With this circular, as Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) told, *"nation's union against the danger directed at homeland had been demonstrated to the interior and exterior"* (Sonyel 1995, 79-81). Mustafa Kemal told his ideas to Kazım Karabekir Paşa on 23 June. In case of strengthening of the Bolsheviks, it would be suitable to force the Entente powers to retreat from Turkey with a neutral policy, if this did not succeed it could be argued that the Entente would cause the invasion of Turkey by the Bolsheviks (Yerasimos 2000, 123).

On 23 June 1919, Prime Minister Damat Ferid Paşa appealed to the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference for the preservation the territorial integrity of the Ottoman State. The Ottoman State claimed Edirne in Thrace, the pre-war borders with Russia and Iran including Diyarbakır, Mosul and a part of Aleppo in the south. The Aegean islands near the coast of Anatolia were claimed in return for great measure of autonomy. The Sublime Porte would discuss the new border line with the Armenian Republic. The Arab provinces of Syria, Palestine, the Hejaz, the Asyr, the Yemen, Iraq and all other regions would have a large measure of autonomy. The Ottoman State would enter into negotiations with Britain to determine the status of Cyprus and Egypt (Hurewitz 1956, 59-61). On 28 June, the Entente Powers announced that they needed time to prepare the peace conditions stating that *"much benefit would not be obtained from the overstaying of the Ottoman delegation in Paris"* (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 69).

The war time coalition of the Entente did not survive till the end of the Paris Conference due to the British and French divergent interests. Following the signing of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of Versailles) on 28 June 1919, the divergence between them became apparent. While the British interpreted its provisions in the broadest and most lenient sense, French governments struggled to adhere to the treaty strictly. The most notable cause was the reparation section. Britain believed that prosperous Germany was essential to the resumption of Britain's prewar trading patterns with Europe. Large reparation debts to be paid to France would reduce Germany's capability to import thereby deprive British industry from a valuable customer. Germany's transfer of her wealth to France could also be generating a foreign trade surplus which would damage Britain's export trade (Keylor 1996, 84). As early as July 1919, Britain suspected that the French were trying to achieve a dominant position in Turkey (Anderson 1966a, 363-364). An agreement delimiting the frontiers of the spheres of influences in Anatolia and the Balkans between Greece and Italy was signed on 29 July 1919 (Şamsutdinov 1999, 53).

The Congress of the *Eastern Provinces Society for the Defense of National Rights* held in Erzurum between 23 July and 7 August 1919 proclaimed that "*the entire country within its national frontiers is an indivisible whole*" and elected Mustafa Kemal as the chairman of its Representative Committee.

The *King-Crane Commission*³⁰ which had begun work in June 1919 submitted its report to Paris on 28 August 1919. It reported that "*almost all the Arab inhabitants wanted an independent and united Arab state, including the Lebanon, but that if full independence could not be achieved, they preferred a mandate controlled by the United States or Great Britain. ... The commission therefore recommended an American mandate over Syria, or otherwise that of Britain, which also would establish mandatory rule over Iraq*" (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 331).

In the Congress of Sivas (4-11 September 1919), a national organization under the title of *Society for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia* was established and repeated the same objectives of the Congress of Erzurum. In both congresses, the

³⁰ The official name of the *King-Crane Commission* was the *Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey*.

principles of the Turkish National Struggle were determined. The Congress of Sivas demanded the recognition of the integrity of Turkish territory within the frontiers set by the armistice terms, which meant an end to efforts to create an Armenian state and to the allied and Greek occupation (Anderson 1966a, 365). As Hurewitz (1956, 75) underscored, Mustafa Kemal was “*realistic enough to accept the loss of the non-Turkish Ottoman provinces but dedicated to the defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace*”. A Soviet representative was also available in the Sivas Congress as an observer. During the Congress, Mustafa Kemal Paşa sent Halil Paşa (Kut) to Moscow to develop relations with Moscow and get arms, ammunitions and money (Benhür 2008a, 279). Halil Paşa would inform the Russian officials that a national government would be established in Anatolia sooner and this government was ready to sign a friendship and peace agreement with the Bolshevik Russia (Şamsutdinov 1999, 188).

Georgy Chicherin, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, issued the *Soviet Appeal to the Workers and Peasants of Turkey* on 13 September 1919, two days after the closure of the Congress of Sivas (Armaoğlu 2016, 277):

“Comrade workers and peasants of Turkey!...

The Great European Powers, who refer to you as “the sick man”, have never thought of healing you, but have deliberately kept you in your unhealthy condition, for each of them tried to clear you out of the mainland of Europe, to seize the Straits, or, at the least, to sap you of your blood, to deprive you of your individuality, and to enslave you. ... Therefore, the workers’ and peasants’ Government of Soviet Russia hope that you, workers and peasants of Turkey, having gone through all this, will at such a decisive and critical hour stretch forth a brotherly hand, in order with combined forces to drive off the European robbers and destroy and make powerless those within the country who are accustomed to building their happiness on your misfortune” (as quoted in Degras 1951, 164-167).

Yerasimos (2000, 107) points out that this address does not have a direct link with the Anatolian movement but it can be said that it has been published in relation with the Congress of Sivas. Carr (1985, 246) argues that this appeal “*cannot have been wholly agreeable to the aspiring Turkish national leader. Attempts actively promoted from Moscow to create a Turkish communist party were still less likely to be regarded with favor. Nevertheless Kemal at this time desperately needed help and support, which he found nowhere but in Soviet Russia; and traditional Turkish mistrust and hostility towards Russia were outweighed by the recognition of an overriding, though*

perhaps transient, common interest". Meanwhile, the British army have been withdrawn from the Caucasus except Batum between August-September 1919 with all the British hopes tied to Denikin (Yerasimos 2000, 111). The British policy to withdraw her army from the Caucasus was a tactical political retreat derived partly by choice, partly by necessity and partly against their will (Gökay 2006, 19). The allied forces blockaded the Soviet coastline beginning from October 1919 and helped the white movements by providing military supplies despite they avoided actual fighting (Riasanovsky 2000, 483).

The *Harbord Commission* issued its report in October 1919. The Commission found that "*most of the existing population was, indeed, Turkish and recommended that in view of the minority claims a single mandate be established over the entire area, including the Caucasus, to provide political and economic unity*" (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 331).

Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal and Salih Paşa (Minister of Navy of the Istanbul government) signed the *Amasya Protocol* on 23 October 1919. They agreed that a new Chamber of Deputies to be elected under the Ottoman constitution would be convened outside Istanbul and accept the declarations of the Sivas Congress.

In this period, *Karakol Society (Karakol Cemiyeti)*³¹ was the leading organization which made way in the relations with the Soviets (Yerasimos 2000, 107). In the report of the Russian Communist Party Caucasian Regional Committee in Baku, titled *Turkish Upheaval Movement*, dated 19 November 1919, the center of the nationalist movement in Turkey had been demonstrated as Karakol Cemiyeti (Yerasimos 2000, 109-110). If the meetings of Enver Paşa and Karl Radek³² are also taken into account, it can be seen that the Soviets primarily established relations with the *Union and Progress* and its branches. If one reason of this was that these

³¹ The *Karakol Society* has been founded in November 1918 as an extension of the former Union and Progress Party to establish solidarity among them and to protect the Turkish people from the attacks of national minorities and foreign occupation forces. Baha Sait and Kara Vasıf were among the prominent members of the society.

³² The leaders of the Union and Progress Party had fled to Germany to be saved from their war criminal position. The first connection with the Bolsheviks had been realized by these persons (Yüceer 2016, 57). Karl Radek, who was rescued from the prison in Germany with the assistance of the Unionists, committed to make assistance to the Anatolian movement through these persons (Yüceer 2016, 58).

institutions were more organized, the other was the hesitance of the group of Mustafa Kemal regarding the foreign policy (Yerasimos 2000, 109-110). Following the Congress of Sivas and under the influence of the meetings with the Unionists, Lenin sent a representative to Istanbul to meet with the representatives of the Karakol Society (Yüceer 2016, 58-59).

Akşin (1991, 50-51) explains the reasons why the Bolsheviks proposed assistance to the Anatolian movement through the senior officials of the *Union and Progress Party* residing in Berlin. The officials of the *Union and Progress* had had reputation and influence over the eastern Islamic nations. Soviet Russia sought to benefit from them in this way: By pledging independence and freedom to the Islamic World through Enver Paşa and his comrades, Soviet Russia would obtain support for the struggle against the British imperialism in Central Asia and India and strengthen the new regime in Russia.

By the end of 1919, despite serious conflicting views especially regarding the Straits among the Entente Powers, Turkey's destiny had been determined. According to the draft treaty of peace, southeastern Anatolia would be put into Italian sphere of influence, İzmir and eastern Thrace would be given to Greece, an autonomous Kurdistan would be established under the British protectorate, and seven eastern Anatolian provinces would be given to Dashnak Armenia under the American mandate (Şamsutdinov 1999, 53). The Straits would be put under some form of international regime and the Sultan would be allowed to retain Istanbul as his capital (Anderson 1966a, 363-364).

As of 27 December 1919, Mustafa Kemal moved his headquarters to Ankara. Eliava, the commander of the Russian Caucasian Army, was sent to Istanbul to examine the latest situation of the Ottoman State about one or two months after the Congress of Sivas. Eliava informed the secret representatives of the National Government that Soviet Russia recognized the Turkish national rights and would urgently start assistance to the national government.

According to Stalin, "*the importance of the Caucasus for the revolution does not emanate from being a source of raw materials, oil and food but also its location*

between Russia and Turkey, and having important strategic transportation routes” (Batum-Baku, Batum-Tabriz, Batum-Tabriz-Erzurum) (Perinçek 2011, 51-52). When Soviet Russia offered a military alliance to Musavat and Menshevik governments against Denikin on 2 January 1920, they applied to the Entente Powers to learn what to do (Aralov 1985, 15). On 3 January 1920, Oliver Wardrop³³, the British envoy in Transcaucasia, proposed Lord Curzon to establish a Transcaucasian Barrier to prevent the unification of Anatolian movement with the Soviets (Perinçek 2014, 22). Wardrop argued that the seizure of Transcaucasia by the Bolsheviks was a matter of moment and if urgent measures were not taken, they would make their demands accepted in Transcaucasia, Iran and farther (Yerasimos 2000, 130). The Caucasus Barrier “*might boomerang in the event that the states in the region decided to cooperate either with Turkey or Russia. This possibility could be avoided only if the Caucasus Barrier, including Iran, was achieved*” (Kurban 2017, 19).

Meanwhile, Baha Sait, representative of the Karakol Cemiyeti introduced himself as the representative of the Anatolian movement and initialed an agreement³⁴ with the Russian Communist Party Caucasian Regional Committee in Baku on 11 January 1920 (Yüceer 2016, 59). However, Baha Sait’s agreement was rejected by the headquarters of the two parties (Yerasimos 2000, 109-110). The objection of Mustafa Kemal here emanates from Karakol Society’s unilateral move to drag Turkey into another dependency. This event may also be assessed as a move of the Unionists to take control of the Anatolian movement. However, it should be also added that the Unionist leaders’ talks with the Bolsheviks have been realized within the knowledge of Mustafa Kemal (Yüceer 2016, 60).

On 12 January 1920, the Entente Powers promptly recognized the *de facto* independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan to pull them off Russia and postponed their decision regarding Armenia until the negotiations of the Turkish issue (Aralov 1985, 15). Since Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin had strongly opposed to the recognition of these states, the Allied powers had not recognize the Caucasian

³³ For the full text of the Letter of Oliver Wardrop regarding the establishment of Caucasus Barrier dated 3 January 1920, in Turkish, see, Yerasimos (2000, 130).

³⁴ For the full text of Baha Sait’s *agreement*, in Turkish, see, Yerasimos (2000, 127-129).

republics until January 1920 largely for this reason (Anderson 1966a, 362). Upon the emergence of the impossibility of sending British troops for overseas campaigns, the Entente powers convened in Paris on January 19, and decided not to send troops but military equipment, and benefit from the human resources there. The instrument that Britain would use to prevent the unification would be Georgia and Azerbaijan. All the British officials have done their best to make Turkey as part of the Caucasian Barrier (Yerasimos 2000, 112-114).

The newly elected Ottoman Chamber had been convened in Istanbul on 12 January 1920 despite the contrary provision of the Amasya Protocol. On 28 January 1920, the Chamber adopted the *National Pact* inspired from the principles of national struggle adopted in the congresses of Erzurum and Sivas. The relevant articles of the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) was as the following:

“Art 1. ...the whole of those parts whether within or outside the said armistice line which are inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority, united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other and of sacrifice, and wholly respectful of each other’s racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance. ...

Art 4. The security of the city of Constantinople, which is the seat of the Caliphate of Islam, the capital of the Sultanate, and the headquarters of the Ottoman Government, and of the Sea of Marmora must be protected from every danger. Provided this principle is maintained, whatever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and all other Governments concerned, regarding the opening of the Bosphorus to the commerce and traffic of the world, is valid” (as quoted in Hurewitz 1979, 210-211).

Mustafa Kemal’s assessment of the current situation in a telegram dated 5 February 1920 was most striking:

“The Entente Powers re-postponed the peace agreement to an indefinite time. It has been understood that they want to deem their fait accompli that they have created for a period of one and a half year, as the basis of peace with us. ... However, the issue has emerged clearly as the issue of delivering the Straits to Britain. France and Italy opposed to this British policy, since this meant leaving the sovereignty of all Turkey and the Black Sea to the Britain. Therefore, lack of harmony among the Entente Powers regarding the Straits has become one of the reasons that postponed our peace....

Success of the Bolsheviks in the civil war has also become the most important impediment in front of our peace. While this possibility was assessed as the triggering factor of making our peace during December, the over expansion of the Bolshevik success beyond hopes have become a cause of postponing our peace. The influence of the Bolshevik success on our peace is that it has become dubious whether we will accept the peace conditions with a total subjugation. ...

Our most suitable front to resist against unsuitable peace conditions is the Caucasus front. If Turkey facilitates the Bolshevik expansion in the Caucasus and enters into an operational unity with them, it will have opened the doors of Anatolia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and India from west to east. In the face of this situation, the Entente Powers have devised a plan to separate the Turks and Bolsheviks using the Caucasian nations. By recognizing the independence of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and may be the north Caucasian governments, the Entente powers pulled them to their side. If this plan succeeds, and our country remains under the siege with the Caucasian nations' becoming a precise set against us, the reasons of resistance for Turkey will have been destroyed from the basis....

Therefore, we are obliged to assess the construction of the Caucasian Barrier as a project of Turkey's total annihilation, and resort to most final remedy and venture and any forms of danger not to make the Entente Powers establish this barrier" (Yerasimos 2000, 134-136; my translation).

The new attitude which began to develop in the Soviet foreign policy in the first months of 1920 was to defend not the interests of world revolution but national interests (Carr 1985, 157). This incipient *rapprochement* with the West was to replace diplomatic contacts by revolutionary propaganda. But here one striking difference became apparent. The Bolshevik propaganda was not organized on an international scale in 1919. Whereas, Comintern was capable of forming an effective focus for revolutionary propaganda in many countries in 1920 (Carr 1985, 165).

The intention of Britain to prevent Soviet expansion was brought to light by Lloyd George at the *House of Commons* in 1920. "Lloyd George said: 'The act against Turkey is not about Turkish-British or Turkish-Greece relations. This is just a struggle between Britain and Russia'. ... He was just pointing out Soviet expansion in the fields in which Britain was interested, and the Turkish-Soviet cooperation which was developing. He was saying that such cooperation might cause Britain to lose all the benefits it had obtained from Turkey and its immediate vicinity" (Kurban 2017, 19). The British policy against the Bolsheviks was interpreted in an Italian newspaper dated 2 March 1920 as the following (Yüceer 2016, 73-74; my translation):

"The British policy towards the Bolsheviks has been shaped by the concerns caused from the advance of the Red Army towards the frontiers of Anatolia and India. Britain seeks to withdraw the majority of the Red Army towards Poland on one hand, and seeks to reinforce the Caucasian republics on the other."

Assuming some sort of link between the Turkish resistance and the RSFSR, the Entente forces occupied Istanbul beginning on 16 March 1920 (Gökay 1997, 77-78). Mustafa Kemal now formally disowned the authority of the Istanbul government,

issued a proclamation calling for elections to a Grand Turkish National Assembly (Carr 1985, 248).

The British occupation of Istanbul caused a change in the attitude of the Anatolian movement (Yerasimos 2000, 118). Despite all, the Anatolian movement did not want to lose hope from the Entente and sought for pretexts not to approach to the Soviets. There had been a difference between Mustafa Kemal and other commanders of the Anatolian movement beginning from the first days of 1920. While Mustafa Kemal argued that the only way for the movement was to establish relations with the Soviets, others hoped reconciliation with the Entente. Only after the occupation of Istanbul, Red Army's reaching to the Caucasus, emergence of the danger that Union and Progress implement the Turkish-Soviet relations, a change occurred. In this period, Moscow too did not attempt to establish relations with the Anatolian movement (Yerasimos 2000, 121-122). The British aggression strengthened the tendency to expand the areas of cooperation with the Bolsheviks. The same day, Mustafa Kemal ordered, upon the proposal of Karabekir, to carry out works for the proclamation of Bolshevism in Batum and also its realization in Elviye-i Selase, Georgia and Azerbaijan (Yüceer 2016, 80). The occupation of Istanbul created deep concern in Russia as well as in Turkey. The perception that they entered in an imminent danger was reinforced. One of the outlet routes of the country had been closed by the enemy forces. The control of this region in the hand of the Turks was the lesser evil (Yüceer 2016, 83). Meanwhile, following ideas of Karabekir dated 28 March was approved by Mustafa Kemal in the day after:

"It is estimated that the Bolshevik armies will occupy the southern Caucasus furthest in a month. If we wait this army at our frontiers, it will negatively affect our moral and put the coming army in a dominant position against us. Besides, we will be responsible in the eyes of nation and history if we miss the opportunity to occupy our frontier with the Russians determined with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The army corps will move when the time comes. The preparations are in progress" (Yüceer 2016, 81-82; my translation).

When the Entente forces started to arrest nationalist deputies, 92 of them escaped from Istanbul. 232 new deputies elected by local branches of the *Defense of Rights (Müdafaa-i Hukuk)* societies and the 92 deputies escaped from Istanbul met in the first session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in Ankara on 23

April 1920 (Hale 2013, 34). The assembly conferred on Mustafa Kemal the functions of head of government. The Istanbul government, now under foreign duress, was pronounced incompetent to act in the name of the Turkish people (Carr 1985, 248).

The Polish-Russian border had been determined at the Paris Peace Conference by the proposal of the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, and therefore was named as *Curzon Line*. This line had left the eastern Polish territory to Russia. However, that land had been the territory of the 1772's Poland. Therefore, the Poles did not recognize the Curzon line (Kurban 2017, 18). The Soviets were eager for peace with Poland because its internal situation required peace. Russia was ready to make significant concessions in February 1920. But Poland opened an offensive against Russia in April 1920 to regain its old territories (Rosser 1969, 108-109).

Conclusion

The withdrawal of the RSFSR from the first world war following the October revolution led to the emergence of national entities and the Russian hegemonic unipolarity disappeared in the BSS. This signified an increase in the number of actors and dynamics of conflicts between the Ottoman State and the RSFSR. This situation also facilitated the increasing involvement of the TPGPs in the BSS affairs generally and in the Ottoman-Bolshevik relations particularly. The signature of the Armistice of Mudros had modifying effect on the structure of the BSS in favor of the non-riverain powers allowing them to send warships into the Black Sea without any limitation. This modified structure enhanced the capabilities of the Entente powers enabling them to interfere to the dynamics of the Black Sea Subsystem. Therefore, this period was distinguished into two stages as pre and post-Mudros period which changed the capability and the interest calculations of the parties radically.

The findings support the first hypothesis since the expanded Turkish-Russian subtex in the NHUS led to the emergence of new conflicts of state formation, alignment of the borders and control of oil. The structural effect of the Armistice of Mudros led to an increased involvement of the TPGPs in the dynamics and management of the Turkish-Russian conflicts. The Turkish-Russian sibtex dynamics

gained more local character with the project of the Transcaucasian barrier towards the end of the period.

The second hypothesis is supported by the evidence for the pre-Mudros stage. The second sentence of the hypothesis is confirmed with respect to the Ottoman State. The restoration of the Ottoman border at the Caucasus to the 1877-1878 border and the ensuing Ottoman challenge to establish an Islamic state in the Caucasus as a buffer state against the RSFSR were the consequence of the German prevalence over the RSFSR. The German existence at the Caucasus even encouraged the Ottoman State to reach to the 1828 border. However, the expansionist policy of the Ottoman State aiming to establish a buffer state in the Caucasus was not only resisted by the RSFSR but also by Germany, thus, the Ottoman State became obliged to step back due to the German pressure. This Ottoman retreat demonstrates an anomalous foreign policy act since a lesser power pursuing an expansionist policy leaning on her great power ally becomes obliged to retreat when the same power objects to this policy. Germany, as a great power partner, demonstrated that it could also be a potential threat at the same time that would act contrary to the interests of her lesser partner. At Brest-Litovsk, the Ottoman State reformulated her objectives leaning on the German power as to reach to the 1877-1878 border despite her prior objective was to reach to the pre-1914 border with the RSFSR. This led to a strong criticism by the Bolshevik side and as it is known the subject was brought to the agenda later in 1945 by the Soviet Union.

The third hypothesis is also supported by the findings as far as the pre-Mudros stage is concerned. There is no finding to support or refute the occurrence of a decentralized conflict management between the Ottoman State and the RSFSR at the first stage. The restoration of the Ottoman-Soviet border to the 1877-1878 line was a sample of centralized resolution of a conflict. The fourth hypothesis is untestable in this period due to the lack of relevant cases.

CHAPTER THREE

THE STRAINED COMPROMISE

(1920-1922)

Introduction

This chapter, albeit considered as the continuation of the previous chapter due to the non-emergence of any structural modifier or relational variable following the Armistice of Mudros, was opened with the intention to deal with the Turkish-RSFSR relations due to the inauguration of the TGNA in Ankara and the development of the Turkish-Russian relations between the Ankara government and the RSFSR while the Ottoman government still existed. Thus, this period of the Turkish-Russian relations was examined as the continuation of post-Mudros NHUS.

The chapter refers to the period between the inauguration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 23 April 1920 and the signature of the Lausanne Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits on 24 July 1923. According to the methodology of the dissertation, this chapter should have been ended with the signature of the Treaty of Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 30 December 1922, whereas, it was terminated with the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923 due to the unnecessary of opening a different chapter for a period of seven months.

This period covers the process of the establishment of the legal basis of modern Turkish-Russian relations. The foremost developments emerged during this period were the British-backed Greek invasion of Turkey, the French-backed Russo-Polish war, the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Turkish-Armenian war, the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement, the Chanak crisis, the Lausanne peace negotiations and the signature of the Lausanne Convention Related to the Straits. All the above mentioned dynamics exerted influence on the Turkish-Soviet relations in the form of the Treaty of Moscow, the Treaty of Kars, the visit of Frunze to Ankara, increasing Soviet aid to Turkish National Struggle, the non-invitation of the RSFSR to the Lausanne peace negotiations and the Sovietization of the Caucasus.

While the Entente Powers were dominant in the Black Sea and going after the dismemberment of the Turkish motherland and strangling Bolshevism in its cradle, Greece and Poland appeared as two proxies to be used for the achievement of the Entente objectives. The RSFSR was the only source of help for the new Turkish government in Ankara. The Entente Powers applied various maneuvers to prevent the association of Ankara government with the Bolshevik Russia. The Treaty of Moscow was not sufficient for the start of the Soviet aid and the Ankara government should have to wait its victory in the battle of Sakarya and the visit of Frunze to Ankara.

The final Turkish victory against the Greeks led to the distancing of the Ankara government from Moscow not to damage the negotiation process at the Lausanne peace conference. Contrary to the centuries of stable policies, the UK and the RSFSR reversed their objectives regarding the regime of the Straits. This time, the RSFSR was defending the closure of the Straits to the non-Black Sea littoral powers whereas the UK was for the free transit of the warships through the Straits. Turkey's position was to obtain security guarantees in return for the free transit of the warships.

1. The Western Impact on the Reversal of Hostile Dynamics in Turkish-Russian Relations (23 April 1920 -16 March 1921)

The Entente powers met in San Remo between 19 April and 26 April 1920 finalized the peace conditions for the Ottoman State (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 70). The San Remo Conference authorized Greek occupation of Aydın and eastern Thrace (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 357). With the *San Remo Resolution* dated 25 April 1920, the administration of the lands formerly ruled by the Sublime Port in the Middle East were put under the mandate of the Allied Powers. Whereas the precise boundaries of all territories left unspecified. The Resolution was the basis of the Treaty of Sèvres.

1.1. Beginning of Official Relations between the Ankara Government and the RSFSR

As Gökey expressed (2006, 9), Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey, “[d]rawn together by a mutual fear of the plans and activities of the Western powers in the region, ... moved to an uneasy rapprochement”. On 26 April 1920, the TGNA took a

resolution under the title *First Proposal of the TGNA to the Moscow Government* (Tellal 2015a, 166-167) in which the following were communicated:

“1. We accept union of action with the Bolshevik Russians pursuing operation against imperialist governments to rescue the oppressed peoples which are under their domination and exploitation.

2. If the Bolshevik forces ... launch a campaign towards Georgia or provides the inclusion of Georgia into the Bolshevik Union and make them to start operation against the British forces for their withdrawal from Georgia, the Government of Turkey undertakes to launch a military operation against the imperialist Armenian government and to put the Government of Azerbaijan into the group of the Bolshevik states;

3. It is requested for now as a first installment ... five million gold, weapon, ammunition, and medical equipment primarily to expel the imperialist powers occupying our national territories, and to organize our domestic forces for our common struggle against imperialism in the future” (Yerasimos 2000, 223; my translation).

While the British and their allies concentrated all their attention upon Anatolia, the Bolsheviks engaged themselves in the final stages of total domination in the Caucasus with a pronounced determination. The Bolshevik leadership showed their clear interest in the Caucasus through the creation of the high-powered *Caucasian Bureau (Kavburo)* in April 1920 through the direct initiative of the *Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party*. The principal tasks of the Kavburo were the establishment of Soviet rule throughout the Caucasus, the economic unification of the area, and the management of relations with the revolutionary movements in the Near East, particularly with the Turkish nationalists. The first job of the Kavburo was to seize power in Azerbaijan. To this end, Kavburo prepared a strategy on two levels. Mobilization of public opinion and secret underground work went hand in hand (Gökay 1997, 80-81).

Mustafa Kemal tried to take counter measures against the *Cordon Sanitaire in the Caucasus*: “It is for sure that future of our country depends on the neighborhood with the Russians and the Islamic world. We will work seriously to establish this border partnership” (Perinçek 2014, 24). The disposal of the Caucasian Set between Turkey and Russia would provide comfort in bilateral relations and rescue Turkey from the British siege. Thus, Turkey’s policy of expulsing Britain from the Caucasus was overlapped with Russia’s policy of establishing Soviet republics in the Caucasus. The Turkey Turks who were active in Azerbaijan decided to act together with the

Bolsheviks upon Ankara's instructions. A committee was formed under the name of the *Turkish Communist Party*. This organization is also mentioned in the official documents as the *Turkish Committee*. The Turkish Committee and the Red Army Committee reconciled over the entrance of the Red Army into Azerbaijan (Yüceer 2016, 86-87). *"The leading nationalists and Turkish officers ... tried to convince the Azerbaijani authorities and leading Muslim leaders that the Bolsheviks had no desire to abolish the independence of the republic and that the basic aim of their activities was to guarantee a safe passage for military aid to the national movement in Anatolia"* (Gökay 1997, 82).

On 28 April, following the news arrived at Baku that the Bolshevik Eleventh Army crossed the border, *Temporary Revolutionary Military Committee of Azerbaijan* was declared as the ruling power in Azerbaijan. Sultan Galiev stated that *"[f]rom Azerbaijan we could hurt the British in Persia, reach out to Arabia and lead the revolutionary movement in Turkey"*. This was providing a good summary of the importance of Azerbaijan as a Soviet state (Gökay 1997, 82). The seizure of Azerbaijan by the Bolshevik forces was assessed by Lenin as the following:

"We all know that our industry suffers continuously from oil supply, but now, according to the news, the proletariat seized power in Azerbaijan. We finally reached to economic basis which will give life to our economy" (Yüceer 2016, 89; my translation).

The Bolshevik campaign in the Caucasus was called off following the seizure of Azerbaijan due to an emergency on the Polish front. The Polish state had launched a major offensive against the Bolshevik on 25 April 1920 (Gökay 1997, 83). The aim of Poland was to gain much of western Ukraine and White Russia which the Poles considered part of their historic heritage, although ethnically the areas were not Polish. The Poles were assisted with the Allied supplies and the French credit (Riasanovsky 2000, 484). The beginning of the war with Poland resumed the civil war in the South between the Red Army and the white forces of Baron Pyotr Nikolayevich Wrangel whose base was in Crimea (Keskin 2015, 157).

Until May 1920, Moscow had not started to send assistance to Turkey. There were many reasons for the delay in the Soviet military assistance. Soviet Russia was

skeptical about the future of Turkish national movement. An alliance with Ankara would prevent the conclusion of the commercial treaty with Britain to which Russia needed to provide many materials. Moscow did not deem suitable to enter into alliance with non-communist nations. RSFSR was engaged in the Polish war and in the civil war with Wrangel in the south and the Mensheviks in Georgia (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973b, 66).

On 5 May, new Turkish government decided to send a delegation to Moscow in its first session (Aslan 2002, 15). Meanwhile, fall of Azerbaijan had led Georgian Mensheviks and Armenian Dashnaks to make agreements with Russia despite the British instigations. An agreement was signed in Moscow between Russia and Georgia on 7 May. According to article four of this agreement, Moscow accepted that Batum was part of Georgia (Yerasimos 2000, 144). The instructions¹ of the first Turkish delegation to visit Moscow was prepared on 8 May (Tellal 2015a, 167), a day after the Poles captured Kiev on 7 May (Gökay 1997, 83). Some of the provisions of the instructions are as the following:

- “1. We have a reason for Russia’s extending assistance to and making an agreement with us if Russia sees Turkey’s falling under the slavery of the western states against its basic interests.
2. The Turkish demand is to live under full independence internally and externally in the current national frontiers, and to establish a union of destiny and future with Russia on the condition that these basic demands are accepted by the latter”. ...
4. The use of the Straits will be free to all the Black Sea states. For this, we can defend the Dardanelles together with the Russians on the condition that Russia will not fortify the Bosphorus, and the visit of the Russian navy to Istanbul will depend on our discretion. ...
6. External assistance needed: Money, war equipment, machines, if necessary military troops” (Yerasimos 2000, 224; my translation).

In the instruction, “*current national frontiers*” was mentioned instead of the National Pact frontiers, and joint defense of the Dardanelles was proposed in case of exigency. The first point became the precursor of the concession to be given over Batum. The second point was relinquished during the Lausanne negotiations. These two points demonstrates the influence of the conditions on the bargaining power and demands (Tellal 2015a, 168). On 9 May 1920, the Soviet *Appeal to the Moslems of the*

¹ For the full text of the *instructions*, in Turkish, see, Yerasimos (2000, 224).

Russia and the East dated 3 December 1917 was recited with applause at the TGNA (Armaoğlu 2016, 278).

The disclosed allied peace terms for Turkey in May demanded “for the unconditional opening of the Straits and the granting of free access to the Black Sea for the warships of all nations was as frankly menacing to Soviet Russia as it was humiliating to Turkey; and the offer to Persia of a free port at Batum was construed as part of a far-fetched design to make Britain, the would-be patron and protector of Persia, a Black Sea power to the detriment of both” (Carr 1985, 249). Meanwhile, the Armenian attacks against east Anatolian Muslim peasants began in May too. TGNA hesitated to move because of the Greek threat and limited its action to a diplomatic protest (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 356-357). The situation in Europe on 04 June 1920 is seen in (Figure 3.1) (Omniatlas 2020b).



Figure 4.1. The Eurasia Map (04.06.1920)

Omniatlas. 2020b. “The Eurasia Map (04.06.1920).” accessed January 1. <https://omniatlas.com/maps/europe/19200604/>.

Chicherin replied Mustafa Kemal's proposals with a letter dated 3 June 1920. The belated reply was related to the visit of an Armenian delegation to Moscow. According to Russo-Armenian understanding, Moscow would demand Van and Bitlis from Ankara to settle the displaced Armenians (Yerasimos 2000, 145). This correspondence between Mustafa Kemal and Chicherin is accepted as the beginning of relations between the two new administrations. Chicherin accepted direct contact and cooperation, and underlined the self-determination rights of the peoples living in Anatolia and the necessity of the resolution of the Straits question in a conference to be held with the participation of the Black Sea Coastal states (Tellal 2015a, 167). The relevant points of the Soviet Note² are as follows:

"... The Soviet Government with satisfaction has familiarized itself with the basic principles of the foreign policy of the new Turkish Government. ... These principles are as follows:

1. Declaration of independence of Turkey.
2. Inclusion in the Turkish state of undisputed Turkish territories
4. Decision adopted by the Grand National Assembly to grant Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, Lazistan, the Batum region, eastern Thrace and all territories with mixed Turco-Arab population the right to determine their own fate
5. Granting to national minorities in territories included in the new Turkish government represented by the Grand National Assembly all rights enjoyed by national minorities in European countries with the most liberal forms of government.
6. Transfer the problem of the Straits to the jurisdiction of a Conference of Riparian States of the Black Sea.

... The Soviet Government hopes that diplomatic negotiations will allow ... [between Turkey and Armenia and Persia] precise frontiers, which justice and the right of nations for self-determination demands. The Soviet government is prepared at any time, upon the invitation of interested parties to assume the role of intermediary; ... In order to establish amicable relations and permanent friendship between Turkey and Russia, the Soviet government proposes to establish immediately diplomatic and consular relations..." (as quoted in Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 470-472).

Chicherin stated in the letter that the Soviet Russia had been informed of the principles of the Turkish foreign policy. However, Ankara's letter had not contained these principles. The principles enumerated in the reply contains the Soviet view much more than the Turkish National Pact and it had the characteristics of a counter proposal

² For the full text of the Soviet reply dated 3 June, see, Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, 470-472) and Degras (1951, 187-188). For the texts in French and Turkish, see, Kültür Bakanlığı (1992, 157-161).

(Yerasimos 2000, 146-147). Lenin expressed the following in the report of VTSIK (*The Soviet Pan Russia Central Executive Committee*) dated 17 June 1920:

“We are entering into the friendship relations with Turkey on the condition of determination of the borders between Turkey and its neighboring peoples, such as Armenia, and termination of mutual massacre. We are here to reconcile” (Şamsutdinov 1999, 192; my translation).

In June 1920, the US Congress formally refused mandate over Armenia but it had become obvious long before this (Anderson 1966a, 362). From that time on, the Bolsheviks, with the support of the Turkish nationalists, determined the course of events with a Sovietization plan in the region (Gökay 1997, 83). On 20 June, a day after the Armenians started to attack Muslims at the border region on 19 June, Mustafa Kemal replied Chicherin with a letter³ (Tellal 2015a, 170):

“1. The principles you have enumerated are essentially our sincere and serious principles indeed.

2. We accept with great delight the intermediary of the Republic of Soviet Russia for the determination of our frontiers with Armenia and Persia and we prefer the resolution of the existing difficulties through political talks.

3. However, we concern deeply and complain from our neighbors’ efforts to create artificial masses and majorities by devastating the inarguably Turkish territories and slaughtering the people with the methods of western imperialists. Therefore, while we were obliged to take a decision to make military operation to the Elviye-i Selase, we postponed the operation upon receiving your letter. We request you to halt the Armenian assaults and put forth proposals for the mediation urgently.

4.... Our representatives entrusted with extraordinary authority to arrange the regular political relations and future relations between the two countries are delayed due to our neighbors’ preventing transportation between our two countries. We request the facilitation of the transportation to accelerate the establishment of our relations.

5. We do not confine ourselves to assert our independence against the western imperialists, at the same time, we are preventing the western imperialists to use the Turkish nation as an instrument of imperialism through their power and all their known tools...” (Yerasimos 2000, 230-231; my translation).

The Greek attack started on the western front on 22 June 1920 following the Armenian attack already began in the east. The Ankara government delivered a protest Note for the Armenian attack on 9 July and did not reply militarily. First of all, to wage war at two fronts could lead to a total dissolution. Secondly, Britain could intervene.

³ For the complete text of the letter, in Turkish, see, Yerasimos (2000, 230-231). For the Ottoman manuscript and Turkish translation, see, Kültür Bakanlığı (1992, 162-166).

Thirdly, the Bolsheviks could intervene or at least renounce from military aid (Tellal 2015a, 170). When Mustafa Kemal's reply reached to Moscow⁴ on 11 July, different views over Armenia and the doctrinal difficulties were the main obstacle in front of cordial relations between the two countries (Carr 1985, 250). Meanwhile, first parcel of Soviet weapons was sent to Trabzon in the summer of 1920 (Şamsutdinov 1999, 191).

In the summer of 1920, the international environment had turned sharply against Turkey, while the prospects for Soviet Russia had brightened considerably. The civil war in Russia was almost over with only Wrangel's army at the north of the Black Sea. British forces had evacuated Batum on 7 July 1920. From the end of May, a trade agreement negotiation with Britain was being conducted in London. By contrast, Turkish national government in Ankara was experiencing the worst onslaught of external forces (Karal 1967, 227-228). The Greek offensive launched into eastern Thrace was completed between 20 and 27 July 1920 and only the allied pressure kept them from taking Istanbul. The Greeks captured Gallipoli and Uşak in August (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 358).

1.2. The Anglo-Russian Trade Negotiations and the First Round Moscow Negotiations between Ankara and Moscow (19 July – 24 August 1920)

Lenin's several staged tactics to support anti-imperialist national movements regardless of they are communist or not was adopted in the Second Congress of the Third International held between 19 July and 7 August 1920. According to Lenin's idea, in the first stage, nationalist revolutionary movements would seize power in their respective countries. In the second stage, the revolutionary forces would participate in the government and share the power. In the last stage, the revolutionary forces would purge non-revolutionary forces from the government and seize the power in the country. With the support of anti-imperialist movements, flow of raw materials from colonies to the metropolises would be interrupted, crisis would be erupted in the Western

⁴ The Russian ambassador, Natsarenus, had presented his credentials to Mustafa Kemal Paşa on 27 June 1920 (Eudin and North 1957, 188).

European economies and the workers' aristocracy would re-attain its proletarian quality and seize the power (Tellal 2015h, 159).

The Turkish delegation headed by Foreign Minister Bekir Sami arrived at Moscow on 19 July soon after the first round of the Anglo-Soviet trade negotiations ended with an initial agreement in London (Gökay 1997, 102). The aim of the visit was to give a formal status to the bilateral relations and accelerate the shipment of arms and money to Turkey. For this, a land-bridge was needed between Turkey and Russia as soon as possible. The use of the railway between Erzurum and Baku would facilitate the transportation of the material assistance, however, the greater part of this line was controlled by the Armenian Republic (Gökay 1997, 83).

On 20 July, the *Summons to the Congress of the Peoples of the East*, to be held in Baku between 1 and 7 September 1920, was issued. The *Summons* was addressing to the *Enslaved Popular Masses of Persia, Armenia, and Turkey* as stated below:

“Peasants of Anatolia! The British, Italian and French governments hold Constantinople under the muzzles of their guns: they have made the Sultan prisoner and forced him to agree to the partition of purely Turkish territory and to the placing of Turkey's finances at the disposal of foreign financiers, so as more easily to plunder the Turkish people who have already been impoverished by six years of war.

Peasants of Anatolia! You are being urgently summoned to rally under the flag of Kemal Pasha, to fight against the foreign invaders, but at the same time we know that you are trying to form your own people's party, your own peasants' party, which will be able to carry forward the fight in the event that the pashas make peace with the predators of the Entente” (as quoted in Marxists Internet Archive 2019b).

While the Turkish delegation was in Moscow, the Ottoman peace treaty was signed in Sèvres on 10 August 1920. There was a long period between the armistice of Mudros (October 1918) and the Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920). Although there were many factors influential at the delay, the preoccupation for the drawing-up of peace with Germany, its practical application and the division of the Habsburg Empire and redrawing of Balkan frontiers, the real factor was the delusive hope that the US might accept a mandate under the LoN for the Armenian state and perhaps also for Istanbul and the Straits area (Anderson 1966a, 361).

The Treaty of Sèvres was described by Lloyd George as “a policy of releasing all non-Turkish populations from Turkish sway” (Gökay 1997, 84). Hale (2013, 32)

describes the actual situation of Turkey as of 10 August 1920 as: *“In effect, the treaty envisaged that the future Turkish state would be reduced to a rump including only Istanbul and central and northern Anatolia, with very few resources and practically no freedom of action in the economic sphere”*. Shaw and Shaw (2002, 356) also describes the remaining Turkish state as the following: *“The Turkish state that survived, thus, would be under the financial and military control of the Powers, whose subjects would continue to exploit it”*. The Entente Powers severely limited Turkey’s national sovereignty and preserved the pre-war arrangement of extra-territorial rights under the Treaty of Sèvres (Gökay 2006, 14). The Turkish Grand National Assembly immediately declared all those who signed it, including the Grand Vizier, as traitors (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 356).

Main difference between the 1915-1917 secret partition agreements and Sèvres was that it divided Turkey not completely among great powers but among minorities which supported them (Karal 1967, 229). According to the Treaty, the Arab provinces were detached from the Ottoman State. Greece received eastern Thrace only 40 kilometers away from Istanbul. *“The city of Izmir and its environs were put under Greek administration for a period of five years, after which what was left of the population would be allowed to request permanent incorporation into the Greek state if it wished. The Aegean Islands were given to Greece outright, while the Dodecanese, including Rhodes, went to Italy. ... The territory called Kurdistan, east of the Euphrates, was to gain autonomy with the right to opt for independence within a year”* (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 356). However, the Sublime Porte which signed the treaty had no authority in Anatolia, and the Allies who imposed it were not in a position to provide troops to enforce certain provisions of it especially regarding the establishment of independent Armenia in eastern Anatolia (Gökay 1997, 84).

The Treaty of Sèvres directly influenced the course of the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement by sharply increasing anti-British feelings in Turkey (Gökay 1997, 84). Soviet historian Bagirov asserts that the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres under the image of independent Armenia and Kurdistan would provide bases in Anatolia for a future Russian campaign (Perinçek 2014, 20). Several articles of the Treaty of Sèvres were touching the Russians. Article 27 determined the former frontier

between the Ottoman State and Russia subject to the provisions of articles 88 and 89 as follows:

“Turkey, in accordance with the action already taken by the Allied Powers, hereby recognizes Armenia as a free and independent State.

Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the Vilayets of [Erzurum], [Trabzon], Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulation he may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea, and as to the demilitarization of any portion of Turkish territory adjacent to the said frontier” (HMSO 1920).

The Treaty of Sèvres also abolished the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in accordance with Article 132:

“Outside her frontiers as fixed by the present Treaty Turkey hereby renounces in favor of the Principal Allied Powers all rights and title which she could claim on any ground over or concerning any territories outside Europe which are not otherwise disposed of by the present Treaty” (HMSO 1920).

The Treaty of Sèvres also radically changed the régime of the Turkish Straits. According to article 37, the navigation through the straits would be open, both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or of war and to military and commercial aircraft. There would be no blockade, any belligerent right or act of hostility within the waters of the Straits unless in pursuance of a decision of the Council of the League of Nations. The *Commission of Straits* would assume the authority to control the waters of the Straits on behalf of Greece and Turkey (Art 38 and 39). The Allied forces would preserve the freedom of the Straits (Art. 44) (HMSO 1920).

A separate *Tripartite Agreement between the British Empire, France and Italy Respecting Anatolia*, signed on 10 August 1920, was to help avoid the international rivalries over the partition and exploitation of Turkey. The signatory parties recognized the special interests of Italy in Southern Anatolia and of France in Cilicia and the western part of Kurdistan bordering on Syria. The Tripartite Agreement was a complementary to the Treaty of Sèvres and nothing but legalization of the wartime secret treaties for the partitioning of the Ottoman State (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973b, 24):

“Article 1. ... perfect equality in Turkey between the contracting Powers in the composition of all international commissions... .

Article 2. ...the nationals of the contracting Powers, their ships and aircraft, and products and manufactured articles coming from or going to the territories, dominions, colonies or protectorates of the said Powers, shall enjoy in the said areas perfect equality in all matters relating to commerce and navigation, and particularly as regards transit, customs and similar matters.

Article 3. ... the contracting Powers undertake to render diplomatic support to each other in maintaining their respective positions in the areas in which their special interests are recognized” (as quoted in American Society of International Law Apr., 1921, 153-154).

First round Turkish-Soviet talks in Moscow continued parallel to the talks between the Soviets and the Dashnak Armenians (Şamsutdinov 1999, 191). A temporary Armenian-Soviet agreement⁵ signed in Tbilisi on 10 August 1920 was the third agreement signed while the Turkish delegation was continuing to negotiate with the Russians in Moscow. The agreement was based on “*the premise of recognition of the independence and full self-determination of the Republic of Armenia*”. The Russian troops would occupy Nakhichevan and Karabakh. By this temporary occupation, the RSFSR would provide “*the creation of favorable conditions for the peaceful resolution of the disputed territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan*” (Hovannisian 1996, 95).

First official meeting between the Ankara and Moscow delegations was hold on 13 August (Yerasimos 2000, 160-162). The determination of the Caucasus border emerged as a source of conflict between the two countries (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973b, 76). Territorial demands of both parties were irreconcilable. Turkish delegation demanded the recognition of Brest-Litovsk frontiers whereas the Armenian delegation defended *Great Armenia* ideal extending from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Since Soviet Russia abolished the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 20 September 1918, it categorically rejected the Turkish claims (Şamsutdinov 1999, 192).

Main concern of the Turkish Delegation was opening of the road needed for the transportation of the Soviet assistance but controlled by the Armenians. Karakhan, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, argued that Russia started political attempts to open the road since using force in Armenia would negatively influence the public opinion in the West and in the US (Dışişleri Bakanlığı

⁵ For the full text of the *Temporary Agreement between Soviet Russia and the Democratic Republic of Armenia*, see, Hovannisian (1996, 95).

1973b, 67). Turkish delegation expressed the necessity of the Turkish occupation of Sarıkamış and Şahtahtı to maintain the contact between the Turkish army and the Red Army. This proposal was accepted by the Russian side (Yerasimos 2000, 159).

Chicherin expressed his concerns regarding the Turco-French armistice and also demanded from Ankara to use its moral influence on the Muslims who were against communism. Chicherin also expressed that Russia would resolve the Armenian issue itself adding that they would not approve Ankara's Armenia campaign (Bilge 1992, 43-44).

The Turco-Soviet negotiations ended on 24 August with a draft treaty of friendship⁶ initialed by Bekir Sami and Chicherin (Gökay 1997, 102). According to the draft treaty:

- Neither party was to recognize treaties imposed by force on other party (Art.1).
- The two parties agree to declare all the treaties hitherto concluded between them null and void (Art.2).
- Both parties accept to take the necessary measures to clear the obstacles over the railway transportation between them.
- Both parties decided to entrust the final elaboration of the régime of the Black Sea and the Straits to a conference of delegates of the littoral states on the condition that this decision would not harm in any way Turkey's sovereignty and her capital Istanbul (Art.6) (Yerasimos 2000, 237-238).

As it can be seen from the examination of the draft treaty, there was no article regarding the determination of the borders (Bilge 1992, 48). The military experts of the both sides met on 27 August to discuss the details of the Soviet military assistance. It was decided that for the time being military equipment would be sent through the Black Sea, since the land route that went through the Armenian republic had not been yet controlled by the Bolsheviks. However, it was apparent that the military assistance of Moscow would not be satisfactory for Turkey since the Black Sea was still under the control of the British whose headquarters were in Istanbul (Gökay 1997, 103). On

⁶ For the *Draft Treaty*, in Turkish, see, Yerasimos (2000, 237-238).

28 August, four days after the initializing of the draft agreement, Chicherin told Bekir Sami that the signing of the treaty would be conditional upon the cession of the provinces of Van, Muş and Bitlis to the Armenians (Karal 1967, 210). This Russian demand which created a temporary but serious impasse in Turkish-Soviet relations, was part of a Soviet policy of seeking a rapprochement with Erivan (Karal 1967, 210-211).

Meanwhile, a twenty-day long cease-fire had been signed between the Ankara government and France on 30 May 1920. However, Moscow was not sure that the weapons to be provided with this agreement would not be used against itself. Because the Entente Powers were trying to instigate the Ankara Government against Bolsheviks. While RSFSR was gaining strength in the Transcaucasia, situation was getting worse for Ankara. The future of the Anatolian movement was suspicious. Greek troops were advancing in Anatolia and had captured Bursa on 8 July (Tellal 2015a, 169).

According to Cebesoy (2017, 144), the reason why Chicherin did not sign the treaty that he had initialized was to open a way for a Russo-British compromise:

“Unfortunately, the Turkish delegation in Moscow had not comprehended the lowdown of the interruption between us and the Russians. ... Because, Soviet Russia did not want to hurry up to recognize a national Turkish state under our conditions that the western states did not want to recognize” (Cebesoy 2017, 194; my translation).

In late August, Mustafa Kemal informed the deputies at the TGNA that the Bolsheviks were extremely reluctant to enter into a full commitment in their relations with Turkey (Gökay 1997, 103). Meanwhile, Yusuf Kemal, leaving Moscow on 2 September, carried 1 million gold ruble and a wagon of ball cartridge (Yerasimos 2000, 163-164).

Gürün (2010, 57) argues that the termination of the western blockade and the normalization of the relations with England and other countries were vital for Russia. If the idea that the Turks carry out the struggle in Anatolia with the Russian aid and that the relief of Britain in this region is at the hands of Russia were rooted in the West, Russia could play this trump against Britain easily. Besides, if Russia could do what the western states could not and seize territory from Turkey for Armenia, it could

stabilize its relations with the West with the prestige it gained. Russia would lose all these cards in case of the signing of the draft treaty. Furthermore, in a stage that the civil war started to develop in favor of Russia, and the time to advance to Caucasus became closer, it would not be a reasonable to act for Russia to recognize the National Pact and dispose the possible gains in the future.

On 2 September the TGNA took a decision⁷ (Cebesoy 2017, 121-124) upon the arrival of Bekir Sami's report dated 14 August to Ankara. This decision meant the upset-down of Ankara's policy towards the RSFSR (Yerasimos 2000, 165). According to this decision, Turkey's policy objectives against Russia would be the following:

- To resist against communist instigations, to put communism under the control of the government explicitly and moderately, and especially to prevent the intrusion of the Bolshevik organizations into the army.
- All the eastern nations think that Turkey is aligned with Russia and expect salvation from Russia. It is impossible to pursue this unreal situation. If Turkey could align itself with Russia, we have to hammer out this situation promptly and proclaim it. If it is impossible to make an alignment, we have to know this and act accordingly.
- Turkey should use the first opportunity to make *fait accompli* against the Armenians without waiting the approval of Moscow.
- To start promptly the transportation of the Soviet assistance through the Black Sea. Without any doubt, Russia has gold even if it does not have sufficient war materials (Cebesoy 2017, 121-124).

1.3. The Inter-Negotiations Period (2 September 1920 – 19 February 1921)

The *Congress of the Peoples of the East* was held in Baku between 1-7 September 1920 (Tellal 2015a, 158). Ankara government sent Memduh Şevket Bey to the Conference. His main instruction was to prevent other people purported to work in the congress on behalf of Ankara (Yüceer 2016, 94-95). “*The task before the Baku*

⁷ For the full text of the decision of the TGNA dated 2 September 1920, in Turkish, see, Cebesoy (2017, 121-124) and Yerasimos (2000, 239-241).

Congress was to apply the principles of world revolution to the eastern peoples” and “to strengthen the revolt under the leadership of the RSFSR against British imperialism”. The Baku Congress “found itself confronted with two sets of theses on the national and colonial question presented respectively by Lenin and by Roy. The general theme of the liberation of the oppressed peoples through a world-wide proletarian revolution was common to both”. However, there were some tactical differences appeared between them⁸ (Carr 1985, 251-252).

The Soviet attempts to arouse the Turkish Armenians to revolt ended at the Baku Congress (Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 459). The Baku Congress approved the issuing of the Soviet *Appeal to the Peoples of the Middle East*⁹ as an instrument of propaganda throughout the Muslim World against Britain which emerged from the WWI with the strength and intention to dominate the oppressed peoples of the East (Gökay 1997, 100). Relevant points of the *Appeal* regarding the Kemalist movement were the following:

“... Comrades! You know that the Soviet Government is supporting Kemal. We are not forgetting for a moment that the movement which Kemal heads is not a Communist movement. We know that. ... Kemal himself says, ‘the Person of the Caliph and the Sultan is sacred and inviolable’. The movement that Kemal heads wants to free ‘the sacred’ person of the Caliph from the hands of the enemy. This is the point of view of that party. Is this a Communist point of view? No. ... We believe that the time of the Sultan has passed. ... Yet ... we are ready to assist every revolutionary struggle against the English government. ... We support and will support national movements in Turkey, Persia, India and China not because of some advantages that may accrue but because a conscious worker says to himself those Turks who have not yet understood their own interests today may understand them tomorrow” (as quoted in Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 7-15).

The letter of Mustafa Kemal dated 16 September summarizes the general situation at that time:

“Russia’s position towards Poland is difficult, and for this reason, it treats Armenia softly. Russia started to assist us despite it did not have sufficient equipment. It tries to gain time against us to make compromise with the West following the Russo-Polish war. At the same time, it shows extraordinary effort to establish a Bolshevik organization in Anatolia. In return for this, the government decided to defy communist organizations, to take whatever Soviet Russia gives, and create a fait accompli in Armenia. Our government intends to maintain a

⁸ For the discussions of Lenin-Roy, see, Carr (1985, 251-257).

⁹ For the full text of the Soviet *Appeal to the Peoples of the Middle East*, see, Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, 7-15).

low level relation with the British until the conclusion of the Russian question, and oppose the Unionist and Communist opposition” (Yerasimos 2000, 171-172; my translation).

Beginning from the autumn of 1920, France pursued a different policy from that of Britain. France was in pursuit of rescuing its old economic interests in the Ottoman State. Since France also could not have accept losing its interests also in Russia, it contemplated a new barrier in the Caucasus by using Turkey (Yerasimos 2000, 187). In September 1920, the *Communist Party of Turkey* which was established in Baku under the leadership of Mustafa Suphi¹⁰ started to struggle for the development of the communist movement in Anatolia (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 119).

Soon after the draft Turco-Soviet treaty arrived at Ankara in September 1920, a full-scale war broke out between the Turks and the Armenians. On 10 September 1920, the Armenian Social Democratic Party sent a letter to Lenin accusing the Turks of pursuing a policy of genocide with the aim of total extermination of the Armenian nation and demanded the protection of the integrity of the Armenian lands. However, no immediate protection was offered to Armenians at this stage (Gökay 1997, 85).

On 20 September, the Ottoman Grand Vizier Damat Ferit informed the Entente High Commissars that he could sent forty thousand troops against the Ankara government. The Commissars replied that this kind of attempt could not bear fruit and demanded that a delegation should have been sent to Ankara instead. Upon the objection of Damat Ferit, a new Ottoman cabinet was established under Tevfik Paşa on 21 October who could mediate between the European powers and Ankara (Yerasimos 2000, 175). This strengthened the hand of Ankara government and contributed to TGNA in two ways. First, appointment of the new Istanbul cabinet was assessed as a maneuver to draw the Anatolian movement to Britain’s side and alienate it from the Bolshevik and Islamic world. This strengthened the hand of the Ankara government since the Bolshevik government should have renounced from its demands about Armenia for the continuation of Ankara’s war against imperialism. Secondly,

¹⁰ For the activities of the Communist Party of Turkey and Mustafa Suphi, see, Okyar (1998, 111-127) and Perinçek (2011, 101-109). Mustafa Suphi was killed off the shore of Trabzon on 28 January 1921. Whether he was killed by the order of the Ankara government has always been a topic of discussion (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 119).

Britain's attempts to contact with the Ankara government via Istanbul government created room for maneuver (Tellal 2015a, 170-171).

In a circular Note issued on 26 September, the Ankara government explained the objectives of the Armenian campaign as to take the strategic points. This was the first operation of the TGNA troops against Armenians (Yerasimos 2000, 176). It was a measure against the Armenian Government to put an end to the persecution of the Muslim population. The move against Armenia was made at a moment when the Red Army had fully engaged with the Wrangel offensive in southern Russia. The Soviet Government found itself restricted to diplomatic action (Carr 1985, 294-295). On 30 September, the Dashnak Foreign Ministry demanded from Moscow to stop Turkish attacks (Yerasimos 2000, 178).

In the beginning of October, while the Entente Powers was seeking the possibilities to establish relations with the Ankara government to separate it from Moscow, Ankara was seeking to make Moscow agree to a second Armenian operation. After some time, Ankara decided to launch a new operation against Armenia when it was understood that the Entente Powers would not act to rescue Armenia. Russia attributed the indifference of the Entente Powers to a secret compromise between them and Ankara (Yerasimos 2000, 177). The political reason of the decision taken by the Turkish government on 7 October was that a final strike could prepare the peaceful resolution of the enmity between Ankara and Armenia either directly or through the Bolsheviks. The purpose of the campaign on Armenia was to direct the Armenians and the Bolsheviks to serious meetings (Yerasimos 2000, 180).

Karal (1967, 231-232) argues that changed international environment increased the bargaining power of Ankara and decreased the advantaged position of the Soviet Russia between the two rounds of negotiations in Moscow. These were the military reversal in the Polish war in August and the disruption of the Anglo-Soviet trade negotiations in London. The slight changes in the Allied policy which were mere probing to seek compromise instead of military confrontation with Ankara increased Soviet suspicion that Ankara might reach to an understanding with the Allies.

Moscow sought to establish peaceful relations between Georgia, Armenia and Ankara (Yerasimos 2000, 178). RSFSR proposed the following points to the Dashnak government:

- Armenia would allow the use of its railways by Azerbaijan, Soviet Russia and Ankara.
- Armenia would announce that it did not recognize the Treaty of Sèvres and sever its diplomatic relations with the Entente.
- Armenia would leave the border dispute with Ankara to the mediation of Russia.
- In return, Zangezur and Karabakh would be given to Armenia (Yerasimos 2000, 178-179).

The Armenian government rejected the Soviet proposal upon consultations with Britain. Lenin stated on 9 October that the situation in the Caucasus was complicated and the Turks intended to occupy Batum and Baku. For him, the remedy against this situation was to establish Soviet order in Armenia (Yerasimos 2000, 179). War with Poland tied up the Soviet armies until 12 October 1920 when the armistice was signed in Riga (Gökay 1997, 83). After the Polish War, Soviet Russia turned its attention to the colonies of the western powers to use these bourgeois nationalist revolutions to deprive imperialist powers of the raw materials and markets that it believed necessary for their survival (Gökay 2006, 7).

The Ankara government, assuming that Britain would not intervene in Transcaucasia, launched the second military operation on 27 October against the Armenians and seized Kars and Gümrü (Tellal 2015a, 170-171). Meanwhile, a third Greek offensive resumed in the west in late October (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 358). On 19 November, Chicherin demanded from Mustafa Kemal not to go further in Armenia (Yüceer 2016, 91). On 20 November, Lenin anxiously contemplated the possibility that “*war may be forced on us from one day to the next*” (Carr 1985, 296).

Soon after negotiations between Ankara and Armenians were opened in Alexandropol (Gümrü) in the aftermath of the Turkish advance, the Kavburo finally decided that it had to act. On 27 November 1920, Stalin instructed to launch operations

against Armenia immediately (Gökay 1997, 86). On 29 November, an ultimatum was handed to the Armenian government demanding the transfer of authority to the *Military Revolutionary Committee* founded by a revolt on the same day. This was followed by the advance of the Eleventh Army crossing the Armenian border from Azerbaijan toward the capital (Gökay 1997, 86). On the same day, the Military Revolutionary Committee located in Kervansaray proclaimed the Soviet government in Armenia (Eudin and North 1957, 109). Again, on 29 November, a fulsome telegram was addressed by Mustafa Kemal to Chicherin, once more referring to Chicherin's Note of 2 June and expressing admiration for "*the magnitude of the sacrifices which the Russian nation has accepted for the salvation of the human race*". The telegram ended with a significant passage:

"The high moral authority of the government of the RSFSR among the toilers of Europe and the love of the Muslim world for the Turkish nation give us the assurance that our close alliance will suffice to unite against the imperialists of the west all those who have hitherto upheld their power through a subservience based on inertia and ignorance" (as quoted in Carr 1985, 296).

Although the Soviet invasion of Armenia became the first crack between Ankara and Moscow, "*both acted with reason; despite their apparent conflicting interests over Armenia they could not afford to give up 'the special relationship' . More than ever their co-operation now resembled a business partnership rather than unity of principles*" (Gökay 1997, 86). Armenia was effectively divided into two between the Russian Bolsheviks and Turkish nationalists (Gökay 1997, 87). The Turkish offensive against the Armenian Republic was not accomplished in coordination with the Red Army as was alleged (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 357). Pavlovich (as cited in Eudin and North 1957, 109) argues the following:

"The Soviet revolution in Armenia means a breach in the front which capitalist Britain is erecting against us. ... [A] Soviet coup in Armenia will serve as the first step toward the creation of a Soviet federation in the Caucasus, ie., of Georgia, Armenia, and Anatolian Turkey, a federation which, on its part, will serve as the starting point around which there will soon be united other Eastern states".

Stalin expressed the following in an interview published in *Pravda* on 30 November (as quoted in Eudin and North 1957, 110):

“The routing of Armenia by the Kemalists, with the Entente maintaining an absolute ‘neutrality’; rumors that Thrace and Smyrna will be returned to Turkey; rumors concerning the negotiations between the Kemalists and the Sultan, who is the agent of the Entente – all these are the symptoms of a serious currying of Kemalists favor by the Entente, and perhaps even of a certain deviation to the Right by the Kemalists. How this game by the Entente will end, and how far the Kemalists will go in their deviation to the right, it is difficult to say. ... [T]his struggle [the struggle for the liberation of colonies] will lead to victory, together with the Kemalists if they do not betray the cause of the oppressed peoples, or in spite of the Kemalists if they join the camp of the Entente”.

The British used every tool to drive a wedge among the TGNA and the Bolsheviks. Among others, there was a fabrication that the Turks would open a front against the Bolsheviks at the Caucasus in return for a commitment for the transfer of Azerbaijan to Turkey (Kültür Bakanlığı 1992, 188). The Turkish government denied on 2 December 1920 that it had entered into a cooperation with the Entente powers to organize an anti-Soviet bloc in the Caucasus (Şamsutdinov 1999, 202). Ankara’s Note sent to Moscow on 2 December also stated that a firmer tie could be established between the two states with the signing of the already initialized agreement between the delegations of both states. This date is important because both parties would try to prove that the first proposal for the reopening of bilateral negotiations had been come from the other side. One day before this Note, Moscow also sent a Note to Ankara which could only reach to Karabekir on 5 December (Yerasimos 2000, 192).

The negotiations between the Ankara Government and the Dashnak Armenian government resulted with the signing of the *Peace Treaty between the Government of Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Democratic Republic of Armenia (Treaty of Alexandropol/Gümri Anlaşması)*¹¹ on 2 December. It was the first international treaty signed by the Government of the TGNA (Tellal 2015a, 170-171). According to Art. 2, a local administration would be established in Nakhichevan, Şahtahtı and Şarur under Turkish protectorate. According to Art. 13, the government of the TGNA could take temporary military measures within the Armenian territories against any attacks threatening the territorial integrity and independence of the Armenian state. According to Art. 14, Armenia had undertaken to abolish provisions of its international agreements damaging Turkey’s interests. Finally, article 17 stipulated that the

¹¹ For the full text of the *Treaty of Alexandropol/Gümri Anlaşması*, in Turkish, see, Soysal (1989, 19-23).

evacuation of the Armenian territories under Turkish occupation and the return of the prisoners would have been realized after Armenia implemented its own obligations (Soysal 1989, 19-22).

The Red Army moved into Yerevan (Erivan) only after the Turkish-Armenian peace agreement was concluded (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 357). On 2 December, an agreement was signed between the RSFSR and the Soviet Armenian government which stipulated that the Red Army would defend Armenia's independence. Meanwhile, the Dashnak government continued to exist in Yerevan (Eudin and North 1957, 109). The RSFSR Government did not recognize the Treaty of Alexandropol (Tellal 2015a, 170-171). The new Armenian government sent a Note to Ankara on 10 December stating the invalidity of the Treaty of Alexandropol (Yerasimos 2000, 194). In response to the Note, Ankara stated that the Turkish army did not evacuate Gümrü since the communist order had not been established in Armenia completely (Yerasimos 2000, 200). One of the two territorial issues was resolved through the *fait accompli* of Ankara. The Turkish armies not only reached to the borders of the National Pact but also seized some extra territories including Alexandropol for a future bargain (Yerasimos 2000, 190). Lenin expressed in the All Russian Congress RKP fraction meeting that "*the Turkish attack had been calculated against us. The Entente had set a snare for us, whereas, it fell on its sword, because we gained a Soviet Armenia*" (Yerasimos 2000, 196).

By the end of 1920, Britain and France had similar views in preventing the Turco-Russian alignment, however, they had diverging views about how to reach to this objective. Britain believed that Ankara would be brought to its knees through Greece. In return, France was of the opinion that Ankara could be alienated from the Soviet Russia by mutual understanding (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 171).

In December, Moscow started to believe that Ankara was on the verge of reaching to an agreement with Istanbul and the Entente powers (Yüceer 2016, 135). Just after the Anglo-Soviet Draft Treaty was formally handed to the Soviet Side by the British, the Turkish FM Ahmet Muhtar demanded information with a Note dated 15 December about the details of the negotiations from Chicherin. Chicherin immediately replied by saying that "*Britain wants us ... to cease all our contacts with Turkey*", but

affirmed that the Soviet government would not yield to this pressure (Gökay 1997, 102). Chicherin suggested that Ankara and Moscow could prevent seeds of dispute sewn by their enemies through exchanging information regarding their policies towards Europe (Yerasimos 2000, 263-265). The Commission of Foreign Affairs in Britain concluded the following on 20 December 1920:

“The Commission draws the attention of Mr. Lloyd George to the Turkish situation and the Commission hopes that the necessary steps will be taken to re-establish a regular government in Turkey and, if opportunity occurs, to modify the Treaty of Sèvres thus separating the Nationalists from the Bolsheviks” (as quoted in Gökay 1997, 124).

Ankara informed Soviet Russia with a Note dated 27 December 1920 that all mutual cooperation projects would be pointless if the Bolsheviks’ position regarding the allocation of Van and Muş to Armenians would not be clarified. Furthermore, getting the Armenian border closer to the British settled Mesopotamia would mean unpleasant surprises for both Ankara and Moscow (Kültür Bakanlığı 1992, 242-245).

Georgia was the third and the final domino in the Sovietization scheme in the Transcaucasia. However, Lenin hesitated to act in Georgia primarily for two reasons. First, the last days of 1920 and the early days of 1921 coincided with the time when Lenin sought to improve relations with the West as part of the reconstruction of country’s economy. Thus, negotiations were under way with the British government in London, therefore, a military attack on Georgia might have had a harmful effect on the prospects of the Soviet government in its relations with the West. Secondly, deterioration of relations with Turkey caused further suspicion about the success of an attack on Georgia. In the early days of 1921, the Bolsheviks suspected from the political motives and military position of the Ankara government. They believed that Turkish intervention might seriously endanger the Bolsheviks’ campaign in the Caucasus since the Caucasian Red Army was considered unready for any large-scale operations against another regular army. On the other hand, reports from London informed that the British now saw the entire Caucasus as lying within the Soviet sphere of influence (Gökay 1997, 87-89).

A.R. (as cited in Adıgüzel 1985, 19-23) argues that the Turco-Greek war was the extension of the war that the Entente Powers waged against the Soviet Russia.

Following the first major Turkish victory over the Greeks at the first battle of İnönü, the Greeks began to retreat towards Bursa on 10 January (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 358).

Beginning from 1921, RSFSR pursued a policy based on *peaceful coexistence* due to the deep internal economic crisis of the country (Tellal 2015a, 158) and “*to gain recognition and more normal relations with potentially hostile powers*” (Stephen Walt as cited in Haas 2012, 295). The country was exhausted, transport was almost totally devastated and the stocks were depleted (Carr as cited in Wozniuk 1990, 45). The war had terminated and the expected revolution in Europe had not been realized. This situation led the Bolsheviks to strengthen their rule in their own country. Socialism in one country began in 1921 (Tellal 2015a, 158-160). The beginning of change in the Russian foreign policy towards Turkey is seen in the letter of Russian Ambassador Budu Mdivani to Turkish Ambassador Ali Fuat dated 14 January 1921. Mdivani informed Ali Fuat that all the disputes could be resolved swiftly if the Turkish delegation arrive at Moscow as quickly as possible. He also informed that any transfer of Turkish territory to Armenia was not a concern of the Russian government (Cebesoy 2017, 165-166).

The Allied powers met in Paris between 24-29 January concluded that the “*unnatural and dangerous*” alliance between Turkish nationalists and the Bolsheviks could only be prevented by a more conciliatory approach towards the Kemalists (Gökay 1997, 124). Holding a conference in London was also decided in Paris. The Entente powers hoped to include Kemalists into an anti-Soviet coalition by softening the terms of Sèvres. The French newspaper *Victoire* commented on the decision: “*The best castle in Asia against the Russian Bolsheviks is to reconcile with the Turkish nationalists. The Turkish army will rescue the oil zones of Baku in the first instant*” (Şamsutdinov 1999, 247). There were mainly two reasons of review of Sèvres. The first one is to prevent the Turco-Soviet rapprochement. Second was the financial crisis that prevent Britain and France to increase their military power in Anatolia (Şamsutdinov 1999, 245).

The issue of establishing a barrier in the Caucasus was reduced to the Batum issue following the establishment of the Soviet rule in Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Soviets, seeing the danger in Batum explicitly, sought to reach an understanding with

Ankara and establish the Soviet order in Georgia (Yerasimos 2000, 203-204). At the end of January 1921, Lenin ordered to the Communist Party of Georgia to organize an uprising (Gökay 1997, 89). In February 1921, the Entente Powers invited the Sublime Porte to a Conference to be held in London between 21 February-12 March 1921, on the condition that its delegation would also include the representatives of Ankara. However, the Entente Powers became obliged to invite Ankara directly following the talks between Istanbul and Ankara failed (Şamsutdinov 1999, 247-248). This meant *de facto* recognition of the Ankara government by the Allies (Gökay 1997, 124-125). The invitation of both Istanbul and Ankara governments meant to take up the policy of trying to get its hooks on moderate nationalists. The Ankara government felt obliged to explain its taking part in the London conference to Moscow not to fall into the trap of the Entente stating that its participation aimed solely at proving its good intention to the world (Yerasimos 2000, 201-202) The purpose of the conference was to discuss the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres and to end the Turco-Greek war. Mustafa Kemal assessed the situation in the secret meeting of the TGNA on 12 February:

“It is common knowledge that Anglo-Russian rivalry is entering on a new phase in the East. For the purpose of hastening the conclusion of an alliance with the Russians, the English have invited us to the Conference of London, and we have sent our delegates there... I am not placing great hopes in it. I am not sure of the good faith of England... Russia wishes to establish a Soviet government in Anatolia, and I have learned lately the Russians have financed various committees in the interior of Anatolia... We are now engaged secretly in tracing them down... Our national government, however, has seriously considered all these points and adopted the necessary measures” (as quoted in Gökay 1997, 124-125).

Coş and Bilgin (2010, 50) argue that during the period of interruption covering seven months the Turkish leaders refrained from portraying Soviet Russia's move as a threat despite her demands over the provinces of Muş, Bitlis and Van. Hale (2013, 36) argues that the Soviet leaders believed until early 1921 that communist forces could take over in Turkey, therefore, there was no need to make an agreement with the TGNA.

1.4. The Second Round Moscow Negotiations and the Signature of the Treaty of Moscow (19 February – 16 March 1921)

The new Turkish ambassador Ali Fuat Paşa together with the Turkish delegation arrived at Moscow on 19 February 1921. The second Turkish delegation^{12,13} was welcomed with a big ceremony in Moscow contrary to the negative greeting deemed proper for the visit of the first Turkish delegation (Tellal 2015a, 171-173).

The Soviet policy was to make a friendship agreement with Turkey instead of an alliance treaty due to the fact that making trade agreements with Britain and other capitalist countries was a priority for the Soviet government in order to rescue central Russian cities from starvation (Şamsutdinov 1999, 204). Any kind of alliance with Turkey against the British could hamper these agreements (Armaoğlu 1988, 310-311). The British and the Greek aid sent to White Army through the Straits had demonstrated one more time that the Straits should not be at the hands of any country in confrontation or competition with Russia. For this reason, Russia demanded the inclusion of a provision in the Treaty of Moscow stipulating the resolution of the Straits issue among the Black Sea littoral states (Ereker and Özer 2013, 180-181).

Meanwhile, the Russian eleventh army crossed the Georgian frontier on 16 February and entered Tbilisi on 25 February (Gökay 1997, 89-90). The Menshevik government anticipating the Russian attack for a period of time, had already sent a delegation to Ankara to make peace since the Treaty of Batum had been invalidated by the Armistice of Mudros and the Georgians had occupied some parts of Elviye-i Selase. The Georgians accepted to deliver Ardahan and Artvin but refused to surrender Batum. During the negotiations, making a plebiscite for Batum was accepted. On 23 February, Ankara informed Moscow that the Georgian government would evacuate Artvin and Ardahan immediately and the Turkish army seized Ardahan (Gürün 2010, 66-67). The Turkish army intervened in Georgia following the advance of the Red

¹² For the detailed discussion of the second round negotiations, see, Bilge (1992, 64-78).

¹³ Three Turkish representatives taking part in the negotiations have published their memoirs. See, Cebesoy (2017), Nur (1967-1968) and Tengirşenk (1981).

Army, similar to the Soviet intervention following the Turkish offensive against Armenia three months earlier (Gökay 1997, 90).

The conclusion of a treaty of alliance between Rumania and Poland on 3 March 1921 as a result of French encouragement was to confirm Soviet suspicions that Rumania, like Poland, had become a pawn in the French diplomatic and military game (Carr 1985, 346). On 8 March, Ankara decided to occupy Batum, Ahıska and Ahılkelek arguing that these towns belonged to the Kars province before 1829, following the demand of the Menshevik Government in this direction. Meanwhile, Lenin was concerned from the Turkish delegation's tactic to procrastinate the issue of Batum and ordered the conclusion of the issues on 9 March. Turkish army and the Red army entered Ahıska on 9 March coincidentally. On the same day that the Turkish delegation accepted to leave Batum to Russia, the Ankara government decided to occupy it and the occupation started on 11 March. On the other hand, Stalin ordered on the same day, to avoid clashes with the Turks at all costs, if needed, Batum, Ahıska and Ahılkelek should have to be occupied by both armies together (Yerasimos 2000, 212-216).

Meanwhile, at the London Conference, Lloyd George proposed that all the Transcaucasia including the Baku oil fields could be put under the Turkish protectorate. Lloyd George also reminded that this proposal could cause the deterioration of Turkish-Soviet relations and Turkey's deprivation from the Soviet assistance (Kurban 2014, 148). Turkish FM Bekir Sami described the Turkish-Soviet relations as temporary and something they would gladly rid of if they could come to terms Britain while another Turkish delegation was seeking to ensure the Bolsheviks' support in Moscow. The gap between the demands of the Turkish nationalists and what the Greeks were prepared to concede was unbridgeable. The Allies for different reasons were unwilling to force a solution at that stage. Thus, the London conference failed to find a solution (Gökay 1997, 125-126).

Chicherin complained Bekir Sami's statements in the *Petit Journal* in London with a Note¹⁴ sent to Ambassador Ali Fuat on 12 March. With reference to Bekir

¹⁴ For the full text of the Note, in Turkish, see, Yerasimos (2000, 299-300).

Sami's statement saying he would be happy to see the establishment of an alliance between Poland, Romania and Turkey which would increase the French influence in eastern Europe, Chicherin stated that while French, Polish and Romanian combination had been an anti-Bolshevik instrument, and France had been Russia's the most relentless enemy, Bekir Sami's explanation had constituted the most actual and urgent axe to grind. In response, Ali Fuat informed Chicherin on 13 March that this could be a lie masterminded to hamper the conference in Moscow and added that the best remedy against this was to sign the agreement as soon as possible to reinforce both party in the war against imperialism (Yerasimos 2000, 299-300).

The Turkish-Soviet relations during the National Struggle period covers the process full of discrepancies. On one side hope, rapprochement and friendship, and on the other hand mutual distrust and suspicion formed the general characteristics of the relations in this period (Aslan 2002, 11). While both parties were negotiating with the western states at the same time, they were interpreting these developments to the detriment of the other. Both parties were becoming obliged to defend that these talks did not contain anything which could damage friendly relations with each other. The documented friendship emerged with the signing of the Treaty of Moscow did not take away mutual suspicion, apprehension, and distrust and did not prevent the emergence of new crises (Aslan 2002, 14-17). The issues in the relations were not turned into big problems due to the mutual requirement of the parties (Aslan 2002, 57).

When the news about the signing of the agreement reached to Ankara on 18 March, the clashes in Batum were continuing. As the Red Army entered Batum the day after, the Turkish troops started to surrender against superior forces. The evacuation of Batum, Ahıska and Ahılkelek by the Turkish troops terminated on 23 March (Yerasimos 2000, 220).

The Treaty of Moscow was signed eight months after the Comintern had drawn up its policy of cooperation with national liberation movements and the first Turkish delegation had arrived in Moscow (Karal 1967, 202). Yusuf Kemal, the head of the Turkish delegation, wrote in his memoirs that the treaty was signed either on 22 March or on 23 March. He stated that he had suggested to Chicherin that the Treaty should carry the date of 16 March to mark the opening of a new era of friendship between the

two countries on the first anniversary of the formal occupation of Istanbul by the Allied Armies on 16 March 1920 (Gökay 1997, 101-102). Gökay (1997, 102) argues that 16 March might have been accepted in order to clear the suspicions of the Turkish side about a British-Soviet rapprochement behind their back.

1.4.1. The Provisions of the Treaty of Moscow

Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood between the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic^{15, 16, 17} (*Treaty of Moscow*) was signed on 16 March 1921. According to its preamble, the parties signed the treaty by “*taking into consideration ... the common struggle undertaken against imperialism, ... foreseeing that the difficulties arising for the one would render worse the position of the other*” (Hurewitz 1979, 252). The eastern boundaries set by the Alexandropol Treaty was recognized with the exception that Batum was left to the Soviet Republic of Georgia (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 358-359). The provisions of the Treaty shaping the future relations of the both countries were as follows:

- Parties agreed not to recognize treaties imposed by force on other party. Moscow recognized the Ankara government with all the territories claimed in the National Pact (Art.1).
- Turkey agreed to yield sovereignty of Batum on the condition that it would be entitled to free transit of all goods, whether *en route* to or through Turkey, through the Batum port (Art.2).
- Nakhchivan shall be an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, providing Azerbaijan does not cede this protectorate to a third Power (Art.3).
- Both parties decided to entrust the final elaboration of the régime of the Black Sea and the Straits to a conference of the littoral states on condition

¹⁵ For the full text of the *Treaty of Moscow*, see, Degras (1951, 237-242) and Hurewitz (1979, 251-253).

¹⁶ The Treaty entered into effect on 22 September 1921 with the exchange of the ratification documents.

¹⁷ Soviet Russia ratified the Treaty on 20 March 1921 (Şamsutdinov 1999, 211). TGNA ratified the treaty on 22 July 1921.

that the decision adopted by it does not harm in any way Turkey's sovereignty, and the security of Turkey and her capital Istanbul (Art.5).

- The two parties agree to declare all the treaties hitherto concluded between them null and void (Art.6).
- The Soviet government accepted to undertake all necessary steps to secure endorsement of this treaty by the Transcaucasian Republics (Art.15).

According to article four of the National Pact, the passages through the Straits would be resolved in a conference by the participation of the “*concerning states*”. It is not possible to interpret the term “*concerning states*” as only the littoral states of the Black Sea. This provision was in controversy with the article five of the Moscow Treaty.

1.4.2. The Soviet Economic and Financial Assistance to Ankara

The issue of financial and military aid to Turkey was not included in the text of the Treaty as requested by the Soviet side as a measure not to undermine their treaty with the British. It was agreed that the amount and the nature of the Soviet financial and military aid should be finalized through the exchange of secret letters¹⁸ as an inseparable part of the treaty. The nature and amount of the Soviet material aid to Turkey is obscure¹⁹ (Gökay 1997, 109). There is not a complete list in the Soviet archives. The information gathered from the Soviet and Turkish sources support the view that the money sent from Moscow to the Turkish nationalists never exceeded 10 million gold rubles. The main disagreement seems to be related to the nature of the agreement. While many Turkish sources claim that the Bolsheviks promised to give 10 million rubles a year, the Soviet sources insist that this was the total amount they agreed to pay (Gökay 1997, 111).

¹⁸ For the texts of the five *Note Signé* exchanged on 16 March, in Turkish, see, Yerasimos (2000, 307-311). The first Note is about the Russian commitment for financial and military assistance to Turkey. Two other Notes mutually reiterate the undertakings of both parties to inform each other immediately in case of a change in the direction of one of the party's foreign policy towards the other party. In the last two Notes, each party undertook to inform the other party regarding every different proposal and explanation of the third parties in Asia than the foreign policy of the other contracting party.

¹⁹ For the detailed account of the Soviet aids to Turkey during the Turkish National Struggle, see, Gökay (1997, 109-111) and Müderrisoğlu (2013, 493-520).

1.4.3. The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement and the Ankara Government

The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement (*Trade Agreement between His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic*), signed on 16 March 1921, represented the first resumption of *de facto* relations if not *de jure* between Soviet Russia and a major capitalist power. The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement functioned as the cornerstone of the *New Economic Policy* of the RSFSR and the peaceful coexistence with the capitalist states as the basis of Soviet Security (Gökay 1997, 97). It is argued that the RSFSR was able to survive in its first three years due to the divisions and jealousies between the western allies. Lenin said that the whole foreign policy of the RSFSR during the first three years was to “*utilize the division between capitalist countries*”. However, the retreat from the constant promotion of world revolution characterized the Soviet foreign policy after March 1921 (Carr as cited in Wozniuk 1990, 48-49).

Following the signature of the Trade Agreement, there was a growing tendency on both the British and Russian sides to manage their relations without committing their military forces to a regional war. Thus, both avoided direct involvement in the Anatolian conflict (Gökay 1997, 139). According to the following provision of the Preamble of the Agreement, Russia was relinquishing from its support to national liberation movements only seven months after the Second Congress of the Third International. While the Bolsheviks gained time to strengthen their rule, Britain maintained the status quo by preventing the expansion of the revolution to the East (Tellal 2015a, 161). The treaty was subject to the fulfillment of the following condition in conformity with the article (a) of the preamble:

“(a) That each party refrains from hostile action or undertakings against the other and from conducting outside of its own borders any official propaganda direct or indirect against the institutions of the British Empire or the Russian Soviet Republic respectively, and more particularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains from any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire, especially in India and in the Independent State of Afghanistan. The British Government gives a similar particular undertaking to the Russian Soviet Government in respect of the countries which formed part of the former Russian Empire and which have now become independent” (as quoted in Brigham Young University 2019).

Lenin told that “*It is important for us to open one window after another. ... Thanks to this treaty we have opened a certain window*”. Thus, a beginning had been made for the breathing space for economic reconstruction through peaceful cooperation with the Entente Powers (Carr 1985, 289). Stalin expressed that by signing trade agreement with Britain, the RSFSR would lead to a competition among Britain and France which objected to the signing of the treaty. This competition would scatter their secret alliance formed against Russia (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973b, 110).

1.4.4. The Consequences of the Treaty of Moscow

The Treaty of Moscow was the first treaty in the history of Turkey and Russia which was not imposed upon one party by the military power of the other. It was the military power of the third party which brought Ankara and Moscow together despite their differences and competition in various cases, such as Soviet propaganda activities in Anatolia and the competition over Armenia. It was expected to serve both to strengthen their international positions and diminish the suspicions and animosities between them (Gökay 1997, 113-114). Yüceer (2016, 147) argues that Russia, when it was weak, preferred the maintenance of Turkish existence in Anatolia rather than the existence of a strong state since the existence of a great power in Anatolia would threaten the security of Russia. The long-term reason is that seizing the Straits and the strategic points in Anatolia from the Turks would be easier. Thus, the Bolsheviks denied the existence of the West in Anatolia with the signing of the Treaty of Moscow which cannot be solely assessed as an opposition to the western imperialism. Gökay (1997, 86) suggests that the Treaty of Moscow was “*a business partnership rather than a unity of principles*”. The Treaty of Moscow was a diplomatic victory for the Government of the TGNA. For the first time, a state officially recognized the existence of the Government of the TGNA. Váli (1971, 168) argues that the RSFSR sacrificed the greater part of Armenia to please the Ankara government which was the only friendly government at that time.

The Kemalists attached importance to the relations with the Bolsheviks in which they could form joint struggling areas against western imperialism. They also did not fail to use the Bolshevik régime as a tool for threat against the West from time to time. They implemented policies in different areas to reach to full independent

Turkey. They made use of every opportunity that could increase the bargaining power with the Entente Powers. One of these strategies was to implement joint policies with the Bolsheviks in various areas in the framework of the principle of reciprocity and equality (Yüceer 2016, 86). The Ankara government used all the advantages of the international dynamics, such as different political approaches of England, France and Italy, and the greater antagonism between the Western powers and the Soviet Union (Aydın 1999, 161-162), and acted as an anti-revisionist force in European politics (Hale 2013, 42).

Despite the signature of the Treaty of Moscow, the Soviets preferred to wait the result of the life and death struggle between the Turks and the Greeks to start aid. On the other hand, the Anglo-Soviet trade negotiations raised a question mark in the minds of the Turks regarding the future of the Turco-Soviet common front in the fight against imperialism (Okyar 1998, 12-13).

The Caucasus ceased to be a crisis area in the relations between Turkey, Soviet Russia and Great Britain on 16 March 1921 because it witnessed the first official agreements of the Soviet government with London and Ankara on the same day (Gökay 1997, 92). The Treaty of Moscow was considered by Ankara a major diplomatic achievement which secured a favorable position in its eastern frontiers and strengthened its diplomatic and military position. For Soviet Russia, it was anticipated that the treaty would increase the prestige of the Soviet régime in the East and disperse suspicions among the Muslim population of the Caucasus. Lenin said after the signature of the treaty that *“a few days ago we signed a peace agreement with the Turks, which alone will rid us of interminable wars in the Caucasus”*. However, it cannot be said that the treaty indicated a total trust on both sides (Gökay 1997, 111).

The Treaty with Turkey, together with similar treaties with Persia (26 February) and Afghanistan (28 February) regularized Moscow's relations with its immediate neighbors, which it considered the foundation stone for a Soviet security system built upon close relations with key states in sensitive border zones (Gökay 1997, 112). These treaties encouraged these states to resist the pressure of British influence (Carr 1990, 74).

The Soviet Russia definitely pulled the Caucasus within the Bolshevik sphere of influence with the seizure of Georgia on 18 March 1921 (Gökay 1997, 128-129). The Treaty of Riga of 18 March 1921 gave Poland many of the lands it desired (Riasanovsky 2000, 484). However, these agreements did not contribute to the establishment of normal relations between the RSFSR and the outside world (Carr 1985, 339).

2. The Repercussions of Events During the Greco-Turkish Wars on Turkish-Russian Relations (16 March 1921 – September 1922)

In the aftermath of the Treaty of Moscow Ankara government adopted a more militant anti-British policy. The Ankara government tried a British spy named Mustafa Saghir on a serious charge of espionage and executed him. The Nationalist militants raided the British ship *Palitana* at Adalia (Antalya). The British Company *Abbot's Emery Mines* in the Italian zone was closed down. The British steamship *Elpiniki* was denied access to the nationalist controlled port of Scala Nova (Kuşadası). Therefore, the British government started to discuss harsher policy to make a strong impression on Kemalists (Gökay 1997, 127-128).

2.1. After the Turkish Victory at the II. İnönü Battle (23 March-1 April 1921)

The second Battle of İnönü was fought between 23 March and 1 April 1921 in Eskişehir Province and resulted with the Turkish victory. Meanwhile, Moscow warned the Transcaucasian republics on 30 March 1921 not to enter in any dealings with Turkey and wait for the directives of Moscow (Gökay 1997, 112). The first conflict emerged between Ankara and Moscow was regarding the implementation of the Treaty of Moscow. On 3 April, the RSFSR demanded the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Alexandropol. Ankara wanted first the endorsement of the Treaty of Moscow by the Armenia as a basis of mutual relations. On 13 April, Moscow informed Ankara that unless the Turkish troops withdrew from Alexandropol, the Red Army would force them to do so. However, both sides had good reasons to keep the relations at a

reasonable level. On 15 April, Ankara decided to evacuate Alexandropol in a week. The last Turkish soldier left the city on 23 April (Gökay 1997, 114-115).

Next dispute between the Ankara Government and the RSFSR occurred at the end of May 1921. On 18 May, Soviet Russia protested the maltreatment of Molokans which had been settled forcefully by the Tsarist authorities in Kars in 1896 due to their refusal to do military service. This time, Ankara had imposed military service upon the Molokans²⁰ to mobilize all human resources in its fight against the Greek army. The Soviet protest was considered as an intervention to domestic affairs by Mustafa Kemal and ordered Karabekir to take all necessary measures. Karabekir assessed the hearsays about Russian troop concentration on the eastern border as an Allied propaganda that aimed to prevent the transfer of Turkish troops from the Eastern front to the West (Gökay 1997, 115).

Another conflict was about the adoption of the Treaty of Moscow by the three Caucasian republics. In accordance with the article XV of the Treaty of Moscow, a conference should have been held between Turkey and the Transcaucasian states. The Transcaucasian Soviet Republics wished to sign only one joint agreement whereas Turkey demanded separate agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (Şamsutdinov 1999, 220).

Italy evacuated its occupation zone in Anatolia on 1 June 1921. The French envoy Franklin Bouillon visited Ankara on 9 June and France evacuated Zonguldak on 21 June (Ateş 1989, 8). The first visit of French envoy Franklin Bullion to Ankara proved inconclusive due to his assessment of the relations through the lenses of the Treaty of Sèvres. Essentially, Russia's suspicion of Ankara was not baseless. Because, Bullion offered to extend support to reinstate the former governments in the Caucasus but the proposal was rejected by Ankara definitely (Aslan 2002, 18-19).

The Allies, met in Paris in June 1921, decided to renew the mediation between the belligerents. This time, their proposal included the Caucasus to pit the Turks against the Bolsheviks. The Allies challenged the Bolsheviks' authority in the area as

²⁰ The Molokan issue was resolved with the migration of the large part of the Molokans to Russia in November 1922 (Aslan 2002, 59).

a last chance. The Allies expected that a number of concessions and some assistance to the Kemalists would be enough to encourage them to expand in the Caucasus at the expense of the Bolsheviks. Since the Greeks were in a state of euphoria and unaware of the Allied plans, they refused the Allied mediation and decided on a new offensive with the intention of pursuing the Kemalists to Ankara (Gökay 1997, 127-129).

2.2. The Results of the Turkish Victory at the Battle of Sakarya (23 August – 13 September 1921)

The Greek offensive beginning on 11 July reached to Sivrihisar some 60 miles short of Ankara by the end of July (Gökay 1997, 130). In this precarious atmosphere, Enver was reported to be in Batum waiting to enter Anatolia to challenge Mustafa Kemal's leadership in the Turkish National Struggle²¹. Soviet ambassador Natsarenius informed Chicherin that the supporters of Enver in Ankara were preparing a coup d'état against Mustafa Kemal. British intelligence report also indicated that Natsarenius himself was involved in the plot. Ali Fuat confirmed the Soviet involvement in this conspiracy in his memoir (Gökay 1997, 116).

On 4 August, Ankara proposed²² cooperation to Moscow in all the issues over which the interests of both governments were as close as identical. The Ankara government demanded the establishment of a common front against imperialism and capitalism in accordance with the article four of the Treaty of Moscow. Ankara proposed the establishment of a bloc between Turkey and Russia for the destruction of the capitalist régime in the west; protection of the Soviet régime in Russia; and liberty for the eastern peoples since western government were the implacable enemy of the two countries despite their different attitudes in their worldly interests (Yerasimos 2000, 377). The central factor in Ankara's approach to Soviet Russia had been the military threat of the Greek army supported by Britain. As Soviet Russia was the only external power willing to provide Ankara military and diplomatic assistance, the government of the TGNA attached top priority to the relations with Moscow

²¹ The Turkish National Struggle (1919-1922) was conducted against Greece, Armenia, Britain, France and Italy (Coş and Bilgin 2010, 48).

²² For the full text of the Note in Turkish, dated 4 August 1921, in Turkish, see, Yerasimos (2000, 377-380).

(Gökay 1997, 122). Ankara demanded urgently 10 million gold ruble and requested information about what Moscow could do for the implementation of the article five of the Treaty of Moscow regarding the Straits. Ankara argued that Britain wanted to hold control on the religious influence of the khalifate by making the lineage of King Hussein of Hejaz as a rival to the khalifate of the Ottoman dynasty. The English put forward the religious ideology against the national ideology to direct the peoples of the east to oppose national liberation movements (Yerasimos 2000, 378-379).

On 10 August 1921, Allied powers declared their neutrality for the oncoming Turco-Greek battle and issued a notification prohibiting the warring parties to enter to the neutral zone around the Straits (Gönlübol and Sar 1993, 35). The retreat of the Kemalists which might be resulted in an anti-Kemalist revolution in Anatolia would pave the way for the intervention of Bolshevik-Enver combination aiming to keep up the war. The British, feared from this, advised the Greeks to show moderation and to conclude a peace with Ankara (Gökay 1997, 130).

Meanwhile, Chicherin in mid-August suggested to Ali Fuat that Enver should enter Anatolia at the head of an Islamic army to save the nationalists (Gökay 1997, 116). Ali Fuat Paşa, informed Chicherin that the establishment of a force abroad under Enver Paşa would be against the stipulations of the Treaty of Moscow (Cebesoy 2017, 275-277). By sending Azeri infantries and Caucasian cavalries to Anatolia headed by Enver Paşa and his comrades for the purpose of reinforcing the Turkish national army, Soviet Russia would benefit from the likely disputes between the Ankara government and the supporters of Enver Paşa, and finally establish a Soviet government in Anatolia. Thus, Turkish national resistance would be used as a leverage against the British imperialism and whole western world (Akşin 1991, 50-51).

The biggest battle of the Turkish National Struggle took place along the Sakarya²³ river between 23 August and 13 September. The situation in Europe on 23 August 1921 is seen in (Figure 3.2) (Omniatlas 2020e). According to Carr (1985, 474), “*while the Greeks were still advancing, and the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement was in its honeymoon stage, Moscow held conspicuously aloof. It was only in the autumn,*

²³ The battle is known as the *Officers' Battle* due to the high rate of the officer casualties in the Turkish army (70-80%). Mustafa Kemal coined the battle as *Melhâme-i Kübrâ* (Armageddon).

when an acrimonious correspondence had begun with Great Britain, and the Greek advance in Anatolia had been checked, that the Soviet Government began cautiously to give support to Turkey”. This can be seen in the long memorandum of protest sent by Curzon to Moscow on 7 September 1921²⁴ while the battle of Sakarya was continuing. This protest was about a series of activities of the Soviet Government and of Comintern which were declared to be contrary to the undertakings in the Anglo-Soviet agreement to refrain from propaganda. These activities had been cited in India, in Persia, in Turkey and in Afghanistan (Carr 1985, 344-345).



Figure 4.2. The Eurasia Map (23.08.1921)

Omniatlas. 2020e. “The Eurasia Map (23.08.1921).” accessed January 1. <https://omniatlas.com/maps/europe/19210823/>.

The Turkish victory not only stopped the Greek advance but also pushed the Greek troops to the west of Sakarya river (Hale 2013, 37). The victory upset the plans of Enver and diminished the hopes put upon him by Moscow. The victory at Sakarya

²⁴ The reply of the Soviet Russia on September 27 and a counter-reply from the British Government on November 12 closed the correspondence for the time being (Carr 1985, 344-345).

raised Turkish self-confidence to an unprecedented level and felt less dependent upon Soviet assistance than before (Gökay 1997, 120-122). In Churchill's words, the Greeks had involved in an Anatolian adventure where "*anything short of a decisive victory was defeat*"; and the Turks were in a position where "*anything short of overwhelming defeat was victory*". The Greek troops remained in a position watching for the Turks' next move since they were under no circumstance were ready to take the initiative (Gökay 1997, 132).

2.2.1. The Treaty of Kars (13 October 1921)

The Treaty of Kars²⁵ was signed on 13 October 1921 in conformity with the article 15 of the Treaty of Moscow. The contents of the two treaties were almost identical. The Kars Treaty also removed the barriers in front of the Soviet assistance (Hale 2013, 37). With this treaty, Turkey effectively settled its eastern borders (Gökay 1997, 112). Article 1 of the Treaty of Kars was the implicit abolishment of the Treaty of Alexandropol between Turkey and Armenia.

2.2.2. The Ankara Agreement (20 October 1921)

The Ankara government needed to open a window to Europe. One week after the Treaty of Kars, the *Agreement for the Promotion of Peace between France and the Government of Turkish Grand National Assembly* (Franco-Turkish Agreement /Ankara Agreement) was signed between Ankara and France on 20 October 1921. France withdrew its forces from south Anatolia and left important amount of military equipment back (Hale 2013, 37). Natsarenius, the Russian ambassador in Ankara, informed Moscow about the developments of the Turco-French negotiations by sending daily one copy of all the *process verbals* (Aslan 2002, 18-19).

The agreement promoted the nationalist policy of splitting the Allies by dealing with each one separately (Gökay 1997, 123). The Ankara agreement also shook the British Caucasus policy and damaged her interests in the region. The British policy pursuing a prevalence over the Caucasus and the Central Asia by controlling Turkey

²⁵ For the full text of the *Treaty of Friendship between the Socialist Soviet Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on the one side, and Turkey on the other, with the Participation of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic* (Treaty of Kars), see, Degras (1951, 263-269). The Treaty of Kars was signed as one common text among the parties (Yerasimos 2000, 327).

became inapplicable. The British press condemned the Franco-Turkish agreement arguing that every article of which harmed the British interests in the Middle East. Britain criticized France harshly in a Note regarding the insufficient protection of the minorities, the withdrawal of the French troops from Cilicia, the Turco-French railway agreement, the economic privileges given to France and the existence of a secret agreement (Heinz Neuman as cited in Adıgüzel 1985, 30-34). Ankara was leaving Hatay to French Mandate Administration. Relevant provisions of the Treaty were as follows:

“Art. VII. A special administrative régime shall be established for the district of Alexandretta [Hatay]. ... The Turkish language shall have official recognition”.

Art. X. the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey agrees to the transfer of the concession of the section of the Baghdad railway between Bozanti and Nisibin as well as of the several branches constructed in the vilayet of Adana to a French group nominated by the French government, with all the rights, privileges and advantages attached to the concessions...” (as quoted in Hurewitz 1979, 263-265).

The Ankara agreement which ended the war with France was a success for the Ankara government. Before anything else, a breach was made at the ally ranks due to the emerging conflict between France and Britain. This agreement meant the recognition of the Ankara government as the legal representative of the Turkish nation by one of the allied powers (Ateş 1989, 5).

2.2.3. Unfreezing the Turkish-Russian Relations: Frunze’s Ankara Visit^{26, 27} (13 December 1921- 5 January 1922)

The decisive battle against the Greek army near the Sakarya river was considered by the Soviet Russia as a firm evidence of Turkish authority in Anatolia (Gökay 1997, 112). Ambassador Ali Fuat told that “*the real meaning of the Turco-French agreement could not be interpreted by anything but to separate one of the two strong enemy from one another in our common front and case*” in response to a

²⁶ For the detailed account of Frunze’s visit and relevant documents, see, Aslan (2002).

²⁷ Following the Treaty of Moscow, Soviet Ukrainian Government had proposed a conference to the Ankara government to conclude a friendship agreement. The Ukrainian government appointed Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze-the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of all Crimea and Ukraine and deputy president of SOVNARKOM, as an extraordinary and plenipotentiary representative for this duty in August 1921 (Aslan 2002, 31).

question of Stalin regarding the real meaning of this agreement. Nevertheless, the agreement created tension in Turco-Soviet relations largely due to the British propaganda that the agreement had secret aspects (Aslan 2002, 20). Ankara and Moscow wanted to normalize their tense relations. A relaxation has already been seen in the aftermath of the victory of the Turkish army in Sakarya and the signature of the Treaty of Kars (Aslan 2002, 32).

On 19 November 1921, Chicherin wrote a letter to Lenin in which he stated that “*in order to be successful in our Turkey policy which could not be freed from the monopoly of political considerations, it should be integrated with an efficient economic policy*”. For this reason, he proposed to send factories with technical and administrative staff to Turkey and collect Turkish students in order to raise technical and agricultural experts. The proposal was accepted by Lenin (Yerasimos 2000, 330).

On the eve of Frunze’s visit to Ankara, the RSFSR accepted the inevitability of the Turco-French agreement (Yerasimos 2000, 330). The main mission of Frunze was to resolve bilateral issues, reestablish mutual trust and remove suspicions. Frunze arrived at Ankara with one million gold ruble on 13 December 1922 (Aslan 2002, 33). Following negotiations, Frunze informed Stalin with his report²⁸ dated 22 December, about the necessity of maintaining assistance to Ankara (Aslan 2002, 34):

“Kemal’s strategy to use France resulted with a fiasco. He is unable to defeat the Greeks, therefore, he refrains from the opposition’s gaining strength. It is difficult for him to make an agreement with Britain. Therefore, his all hopes are directed towards us. ... I believe that the remaining 3.5 million gold ruble should be sent; our assistance should be kept going; the amount of the whole assistance that we can supply should be informed without losing time” (Yerasimos 2000, 425; my translation).

On 2 January 1922, *Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood between the Government of the TGNA and the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine*²⁹ was signed. According to Carr (1985, 474-475), this treaty was merely a cover for the transaction of military business. The Treaty contained many provisions of the Treaty of Moscow. Neither party was to recognize treaties imposed by force on

²⁸ For the full text of Frunze’s report, in Turkish, see, Yerasimos (2000, 424-425).

²⁹ For the full Turkish text of the *Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood between the Government of the TGNA and the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine*, dated 2 January 1922, see, Aslan (2002, 96-100).

other party. Kiev recognized the Ankara government with all the territories claimed in the National Pact. Ukraine accepted the frontiers of Turkey determined by the Treaty of Moscow and also totally accepted the Treaty of Kars. A novelty separating this treaty from the Moscow and Kars treaties was its reference to the international rivers flowing to the Black Sea. Both parties agreed that in case of the formation of any régime regarding these rivers without the participation of both parties into the negotiations, the régime would not be applicable.

Turco-Soviet relations gradually developed following the visit of Frunze³⁰. Except raiding the building of Turkish military attaché³¹ in Moscow by Cheka, any tense situation did not emerge (Aslan 2002, 60). The visit of Frunze led Britain to adopt more conciliatory policies towards Ankara to counter-balance the Bolshevik influence among the Kemalists. At the Allied meeting held in Paris on 22 March 1922, it was agreed that the highest priority should be given to alienate Turkey from Moscow. The Allies agreed to propose an armistice to the Turkish and Greek governments at a time Greek government was having great financial and military difficulties. Mustafa Kemal transmitted the copy of the terms of the armistice to the Russian ambassador Aralov. Aralov wrote in his memoirs that Mustafa Kemal described the terms as “*condemnation to hard labor*”. Greece felt that she had to rely on Britain. Ankara accepted the armistice by demanding the evacuation of Anatolia in advance (Gökay 1997, 133-134).

2.3. Towards Turkish Great Offensive

The Genoa Economic and Financial Conference³² was held between 10 April and 19 May 1922. The Soviet initiative to secure an invitation for Turkey was rejected by the British on the grounds that the conference would in no way be concerned with

³⁰ Frunze's efforts provided the delivery of remaining 3.5 million gold ruble to Ankara on 3 May 1922. He also played an important role in the increase of Soviet assistance regarding arms, ammunitions and medical equipment (Aslan 2002, 58).

³¹ For the detailed account of the *espionage affair*, see, Yerasimos (2000, 336-337) and Cebesoy (2017, 374-394).

³² In October 1921, Moscow had promised that the RSFSR would assume responsibility for the Tsarist loans taken before 1914 if the Allies recognize the Soviet government and conclude a final treaty of peace with the RSFSR. At a meeting of the Allied Supreme Council in Cannes on 6 January 1922, Britain called for a general economic and financial conference at Genoa to settle all of Europe's economic problems (Rosser 1969, 130-131).

the Turkish question, and the issue of an invitation to the Turkish government did not concern the Soviet Government (Gökay 1997, 118). Lloyd George sought to use this conference to make agreement between the Soviet Russia and the other powers. France and Belgium insisted on recognition of Russia's pre-war debts as a condition of future talks (Carr 1990, 75). The Genoa conference "*brought none of the concrete results which the Soviet Government had sought – de jure recognition, foreign capital investments, credits and settlement of claims*" (Carr 1985, 379-380).

During the sidelines of the conference, German and Soviet delegations signed a treaty of friendship at Rapallo³³ on 16 April 1922. Not the terms of the treaty but the signature of the treaty was an important event. It secured the first official recognition of Soviet Russia by a great power. It was also the first overt attempt by Germany to break the ring drawn round her (Carr 1990, 75). Soviet Russia was dividing the capitalist bloc which sought to isolate her (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 238). Germany and Soviet Russia agreed on mutual recognition, cancellation of debt claims, normalization of trade relations and secret cooperation in military development (Gökay 2006, 36). The Rapallo Treaty was not a treaty of alliance and the Soviet Russia continued to preoccupy developing relations with other western countries especially Great Britain and the United States (Carr as cited in Wozniuk 1990, 48-49).

Britain used the conference to secure the co-operation of the Soviet government for the purpose of establishing peace in the Near East. The British believed that a settlement in the Near East is contingent on a settlement with Russia. A draft agreement prepared by the British Foreign Office demanded "*the Russian Soviet government ... to adopt an attitude of strict neutrality towards Greece and the Grand National Assembly at Ankara and to cease all state assistance in money and munitions to either party*" (Gökay 1997, 118-119). The western states proposed Russia to be neutral against the warring parties in Anatolia during the Genoa Conference. Soviet Russia replied to these proposals as the following:

"The Russian delegation is surprised that the issue of peace in Anatolia was put on the agenda despite the non-invitation of Turkey to the conference. Russia, too, with its respect, could help

³³ For the full text of *The Agreement between the German Government and the Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (Treaty of Rapallo)*, see, League of Nations (1923).

to reach to this objective within the framework of its close friendship ties with Turkey. As regards to the maintenance of neutrality demanded from Russia, this neutrality cannot be different than that wanted from other states in accordance with international law and treaties” (Yerasimos 2000, 460-461; my translation).

The Kemalists interpreted the developments in Genoa as an Allied attempt to separate the Bolsheviks from Turkish nationalists. The Treaty of Rapallo was interpreted by Mustafa Kemal as a great victory for Russia against Britain. The Genoa conference collapsed on 19 May without achieving a general agreement (Gökay 1997, 119). After the Genoa conference the transfer of armaments and ammunition to Anatolia continued regularly (Gökay 1997, 120). After the Soviet Government demonstrated its friendship for Turkey in Genoa, Turkey reciprocated with a surprising concession by lifting the ban on the Turkish Communist Party, which would enjoy a second period of activity between March and October 1922, after fifteen months of intensive persecution (Carr 1985, 475).

On 4 June 1922, French colonel Mougin came to Ankara to discuss the possibility of further collaboration between the two sides. The aim of this visit was described by the Turkish Press as an investigation of the Bolshevik influence in Anatolia and to counteract the high-profile presence of Aralov in Ankara. According to Aralov, Mougin proposed a military alliance and a compromise peace with Britain in return for Turkey’s severance of her relations with the RSFSR (Gökay 1997, 123). Mustafa Kemal rejected this proposal. France, contrary to England, sent armaments to Ankara and used this situation to drive a wedge between Ankara and Moscow (Aralov 1985, 137-138). Aralov argued that Ankara created difficulties for opening of the Russian consulate in Mersin under the influence of the French because France was afraid of Moscow’s influence over Syria (Aralov 1985, 140-141). Britain informed Russia of her Straits policy on 29 July 1922 as the following:

“The provisions regarding the neutrality of the Straits became null and void following the war. The reason of this was the passage of the cruisers of Goeben and Breslau through the Straits to the Black Sea and Turkey’s voluntarily entering into war against the Allies. For this reason, the Straits will be open to the warships of all nations, except the events incompatible with the armistice that Turkey had signed in 1918, until the signing of a new international treaty” (Yerasimos 2000, 466; my translation).

Lloyd George encouraged the Greeks to wage war with their full strength on 4 August. The last attempt of the Ankara government in the Entente capitals ended with failure on 19 August in London since “*the British were set on the destruction of the independence of Turkish homeland*” as Interior Minister Fethi informed (Gökay 1997, 134). This left Ankara to resort to force as the only choice. The Soviet Ambassador’s residence at Ankara was burnt down on 15 August 1922. Ambassador Aralov asked Moscow to review its Turkish policy and advised a sharp curtailment of supplies until Ankara provided some explanation. Aralov in his memoir puts the blame on the Prime Minister Rauf Bey who was said to have advocated anti-Soviet policies for a long time (Gökay 1997, 122).

The *Turkish Great Offensive* launched on 26 August 1922. İzmir was rescued from the Greek occupation on 9 September (Gürün 2010, 82). The Bolshevik agents within the Greek army carried out an extensive propaganda campaign which contributed to some extent to undermine the morale of the Greek army³⁴(Gökay 1997, 135). Kousulas (as cited in Gökay 1997, 136) points out that the militants of the Communist Party of Greece were instrumental in spreading confusion and panic among the Greek troops when the Turkish army broke through the Greek lines.

3. The Organization of the Peace Conference by the Allied Powers and the Reaction of the RSFSR

Following the news that the peace conference would be held in Venice reached to Moscow, the Soviet government sent the following Note to the Entente Powers on 12 September 1922:

“... the latest developments have weakened the position of Greece in the Near East ... [and] reduced the danger of a disturbance of the peace in the Black Sea by her. ... The Russian government considers that the Entente Powers are responsible for the disturbance of peace in the Black Sea by opening the Straits to the Greek fleet. ... The only international agreement since the war of 1914 on the question of the Straits, which is in force, is the Russo-Turkish Treaty concluded in Moscow in 1921. This treaty provides for the free passage through the Straits only of the mercantile fleets of all nations. ... Russia cannot consent to the Straits being opened to naval vessels of all nations and especially with the fact that Great Britain and her allies, should have control of the Straits without the consent and contrary to the wishes of those

³⁴ The centre of this propaganda campaign was the *Balkan Communist Federation* set up in Sofia in January 1920 which had urged all communists to oppose Greek campaign in Anatolia (Gökay 1997, 135).

states who have vital interests in the Black Sea and who should have the decisive voice in resolving the fate of the Straits. ... Russia, Turkey, the Ukraine, and Georgia, to whom belongs nearly the whole of the Black Sea, cannot admit the right of any other government to interfere in the settlement of the question of the Straits. ... in connection with the about-to-be convened conference at Venice on the Near Eastern problem where the question of the Straits will be examined, the Russian government declares in advance that it will not recognize any decision contrary to a point of view expressed above and all the more so since Russia is not being considered as a participating member of the conference” (as quoted in Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 481-483).

Meanwhile, Anatolia was totally cleaned from the Greek troops by 18 September 1922 (Gürün 2010, 82). With the advance of the Turkish army towards the Straits a series of events, called in the West as “*Chanak Crisis*”, started. Turco-Soviet relations were developed in line with this crisis over the Straits question (Yerasimos 2000, 469). Gökay (1997, 139) argues that British-Soviet relations between March 1921 and September 1922 represented a regional system in which certain restraints and norms were present. Both parties sought to prevent the further spread of the influence of the other. However, Britain and Soviet Russia were drawn into likely confrontation during the Chanak crisis. When the Turkish troops moved to British positions at Chanak, Britain considered the role of the Bolsheviks in this advance.

On 18 September, the Allied commanders asked the Turkish forces to move back from the Straits and to observe the neutral status of the Straits. “*The British cabinet decided to resist the Turks if necessary at the Dardanelles and to ask for French and Italian help to enable the Greeks to remain in eastern Thrace*”. On 19 September, French troops abandoned the Straits, leaving the British alone to face the Turks (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 363). While correspondence with British General Harrington and Mustafa Kemal Paşa continued, Britain sent troops to the Straits and instigated Yugoslavia and Romania for a war against Ankara (Yerasimos 2000, 472). An official press release from Ankara indicated that the Turks were in favor of the Soviet military involvement. The Turkish Government requested Soviet action against the Balkan states if they intervened in the Chanak conflict alongside Britain. Aralov demanded that the Turkish army should endeavor to liberate Istanbul and the Straits (Gökay 1997, 140).

The UK was convinced that if the conference opens as soon as possible, this would remove Turkey out of Soviet Russia’s sphere of influence (Gökay 1997, 146).

The Entente Powers invited the relevant states and Japan, by excluding the RSFSR, to the peace conference with a Note dated 23 September 1922, on the pretext that Russia did not join the war against Turkey (Şamsutdinov 1999, 305) and arguing that it had already settled its issues with Turkey with the treaties of Moscow and Kars in 1921 (Tellal 2015a, 126).

On 23 September, the Entente powers proposed an armistice to the Ankara government (Soysal 1989, 61). On 24 September, Turkish troops moved into the Straits zones and refused British requests to leave (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 363). Soviet Russia sent a Note on 24 September to England, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Egypt and Greece with a proposal to convene a conference regarding the Near East questions (Şamsutdinov 1999, 304-305). In this Note Soviet Russia left aside the view that other countries should not intervene to the régime of the Straits and demanded the invitation of the Black Sea littoral states to the conference (Gürün 2010, 85-86). In this reiteration Note to the previous Note dated 12 September, Moscow further notified the parties that:

“The Russian government considers that, at the moment, the central issue of the crisis in the Near East is the acknowledgement of the right of the Turkish people to re-establish their complete sovereignty over Turkish territories and in the first place, over the Turkish capital, Constantinople and the Straits.

The European Powers, in particular the most implacable of them, Great Britain, refuse to return to Turkey the territories and Straits indisputably belonging to her, allegedly in order to safeguard the freedom of the Straits but actually in order to continue their domination over them. ...

Russia is, after Turkey, the country occupying first place among the powers concerned with the freedom of the Straits. The European Powers have never denied this right... . This recognition of Russian interests went so far that in 1916 the Entente Powers allied to tsarist Russia obligated themselves by a special agreement to transfer the Straits and Constantinople to her. The Soviet government does not consider that Russian interests demand the enslavement of a portion of the Turkish people and therefore she annulled the old treaties of the tsarist government with western countries. ...

No decisions on the Straits taken without Russia will be final and enduring. It will merely sow the seeds of new conflicts. The freedom of the Straits which Great Britain has in mind signifies only the desire of a strong naval power to control a route vitally necessary to other states in order thereby to keep them under a constant threat. The threat is directed in the first place against Russia and Turkey. Great Britain is dispatching military forces to the Near East, and is trying to drag France and Italy, as well as Yugoslavia and Romania, into the war with Turkey. ...

...[T]he defence of the neutral zone by European military forces must be considered as a violation of Turkish sovereignty over historical Turkish lands without which the leaving of

Constantinople in Turkish hands is only a means of placing the capital of the Turkish people under a constant threat" (as quoted in Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 486-489).

However, Moscow's behavior was the most restrained and cautious among the parties to the Chanak crisis. It largely restricted itself largely to diplomatic *démarches*, political contacts, and the signaling of intentions through policy statements and the media. The Soviet Russia placed the burden of initiating the use of force on the British. When Turkey demanded Moscow's direct involvement, the latter advised Ankara to communicate directly with the Ukraine. However, Turkey's *démarche* with reference to Treaty dated 2 January 1922 resulted with no response (Gökay 1997, 141-142).

On 25 September, a Turkish cavalry unit entered the neutral zone at Erenköy. When the British demanded the clearance of the zone, Mustafa Kemal stated that "*up to the present I have not been informed of any neutral zone having been established between the governments concerned and the government of the TGNA*" (Gökay 1997, 143). The Communist International announced the following on 27 September 1922 (Adıgüzel 1985, 55; my translation):

"Workers! Especially you, workers of England, France, Italy, Serbia and Romania! Your duty is to challenge with all your strength and perseverance against a military step aiming Turkey. Your duty is to exhibit all your strength to prevent the preparation of new wars by the Entente Powers by forcing Turkey to open the Straits to the Allies".

In the name of the Allied Powers, Henry Franklin-Bouillon visited Mustafa Kemal in İzmir on 28 September and presented the Allied memorandum asking for a conference in Mudanya or İzmit. Franklin-Bullion said that there was no likelihood of Soviet-Turkish military cooperation in the Straits. The crisis ended when Mustafa Kemal accepted the Allied offer at the end of September (Gökay 1997, 143-144) on the condition that Greece evacuate eastern Thrace and Edirne up to the west of the Maritsa river and chose Mudanya for negotiations to be held beginning from 3 October (Soysal 1989, 61).

The Soviet government strongly protested Entente Powers with a Note dated 30 September 1922 for the non-allowing of the Soviet delegation's participation to the peace conference, the Entente siege over the Straits, and the seizure of the Soviet commercial ships. The Soviet government also informed them that it would not

recognize any régime of the Straits accepted against the interests of Turkey and in the absence of the Soviet Russia. Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia also sent Notes protesting the siege over the Straits. Ukraine claimed that the siege caused starvation in the Ukraine (Şamsutdinov 1999, 306-307). Harold Nicolson, a British diplomat, said on 3 October 1922 that (as quoted in Gökay 1997, 145):

“Turkey knows neither gratitude nor resentment; her only consistent political emotion is fear. For a century she was afraid of Russia and made friends with us; when we in our turn made friends with Russia Turkey sought refuge with Germany; now that she is afraid of us... It is probable that in a few years she will be afraid again of Russia and will turn again to Great Britain”

Ankara started to discuss many issues concerning the interests of the Black Sea countries with the Entente Powers without informing Russia (Aralov 1985, 158). The Soviet Embassy in Ankara, in its Note dated 3 October, complained about this issue:

“My government surprised that the Turkish government did not support the Soviet Note and did not inform it about her participation to the Mudanya conference and her concession for the occupation of Thrace and the Straits. Since mutual foreign policy harmony was not implemented, a suitable situation emerged for England. The Entente Powers, walking through this way, try to weaken Russia as well as Turkey. ... My government fears that the great victory of the Turkish army could not be carried out to the desired end” (Yerasimos 2000, 473-474; my translation).

On 4 October, Turkey responded to the Entente Note regarding the holding of a peace conference. The paragraph of the Note regarding the Turkish support for the participation of the Black Sea littoral states was as follows:

“We cannot but express surprise that Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia, who are deeply interested in this, should not have been invited, as the participation of these would only help to make the settlement more lasting, and to avoid all future cause for conflict we definitely propose that they should be invited ... and we hope that the invitation will be addressed to them before the conference” (as quoted in Gökay 1997, 146-147).

Meanwhile, a *Military Convention*³⁵ (armistice) was signed in Mudanya on 11 October 1922 among the Ankara Government, Britain, Italy and France. Greece informed Ankara through the Allied Powers that it joined the Convention three days later. The Convention entered into effect beginning from 14/15 October midnight and

³⁵ For the full text of the *Military Convention*, in Turkish, see, Soysal (1989, 63-66).

the Greco-Turkish war ended (Soysal 1989, 61-62). On 19 October, Moscow sent a further Note to Britain and Italy with reference to Aaland islands and the Pacific question also complaining her non-invitation to the conference:

“... systematic ignoring by the Powers of the elementary interests and lawful demands of Russia will not lead to the stabilization of peace. An attempt to place before Russia the fait accompli of a decision taken without her participation would mean that she would not, of course, recognize these decisions. ... Russia announces its demand to participate in it on an equal footing with other contracting parties” (as quoted in Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 491-493).

On 27 October, Britain, France and Italy invited the Ankara government (together with the Sublime Porte³⁶ in Istanbul) to the conference in Lausanne “*to bring a final peace to the east*” (Soysal 1989, 68). Following the victory, Ankara did not further need of Soviet support. The chances of a favorable settlement with the West might be prejudiced by the close association with the Soviet Government. Therefore, Ankara sought to demonstrate its ideological independence with a renewed persecution of Turkish communists which began in October (Carr 1985, 476). Turkey did not consider establishing a common diplomatic front with Russia and believed that Russia’s taking part in the conference would weaken the possibilities to reach to an understanding with the West (Yerasimos 2000, 477). Following his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs to attend to Lausanne peace conference as head of the Turkish delegation, İsmet Paşa had an interview with the Russian ambassador Aralov regarding Russia’s desire to take part in the whole works of the conference on 31 October (Gürün 2010, 91). İsmet Paşa explained the situation as the following:

“Turkey’s view regarding the straits is the view of the National Pact. We cannot go further. Fortification of the Straits by Turkey and its prohibition to the warships cannot be wanted from Turkey. Turkey deems it natural to sign an individual peace agreement with the warring parties. Turkey does not want the participation of the Soviet Russia to all of the conference. Turkey will get into a scrape if it asserts Russia’s arguments on its own name. Turkey is of the view that Russia and its allies should participate in the meetings of the conference regarding the straits” (Aralov 1985, 197-200; my translation).

³⁶ The Ottoman Sultanate was abolished by the TGNA on 1 November 1922. The Lausanne Conference recognized Ankara’s sovereignty over Turkey on 11 November 1922.

İsmet Paşa's explanation regarding Turkey's position reflects deep differences between the diplomatic patterns of the Ottoman State and the Government of the TGNA:

"Turkey is on the verge of concluding a peace treaty with the states that it waged war. There is a Treaty of Moscow between Turkey and Soviet Russia. Attendance of Russia to all phases of the conference may create a situation that would remind the agreements of the Ottoman Empire concluded with the great powers. In this case, we might fall in a position as if having adopted the politics of the Ottoman administration. However, attendance of the Soviet Russia and other Black Sea littoral states to the negotiations of the régime of the straits is a reasonable formula for us" (Gürün 2010, 91; my translation).

The stark attitude of Soviet Russia had broken the diplomatic boycott of the Entente Powers, and the British government had invited it for the negotiations of the Straits question on 27 October 1922. The Soviet Russia also demanded the invitation of Ukraine and Georgia with a Note³⁷ dated 2 November (Şamsutdinov 1999, 308). According to the copy of the Note presented to Turkey on 5 November, Russia was complaining about her non-invitation to the whole works of the conference:

"Soviet Russia cannot accept her non-invitation to the whole works of the conference while she was invited to the negotiations of the straits issue. She is of the view that formation of any régime in the straits cannot be separated from the general order to be created in the Near-East. Soviet Russia is obliged to attend to the conference to assure the realization of Turkish independence which is an indispensable condition for a durable order in the Near-east. There is no doubt that if the Entente states wish the establishment of a real peace, they would not leave Soviet Russia outside of the international agreements during the resolution of the Near-eastern conflicts" (Kültür Bakanlığı 1992, 451-454; my translation).

The Soviet Note of 2 November reveals that Soviet Russia adopted the manner as if she were the protector of Turkey despite the explanations of the inconveniences of this manner. Soviet Russia does not accept that this manner would be the violation of Turkey's sovereignty rights and she deems Turkey incapable of protecting her interests and law. Ankara did not welcome this manner with understanding and pleasure (Gürün 2010, 91-92). On 5 November 1922, Trotsky made a statement regarding the Straits:

³⁷ For the full text of the Note, see, Degras (1951, 342-345).

“The Tsar’s Miliukov plans³⁸ were to break through the Straits and enter the Mediterranean, where a clash with Britain some time or other was inevitable. Our intention is to prevent England from breaking through the Straits from the other end and thus avoid an inevitable clash some time or other in the Black Sea. The freedom of the Straits is nothing but a military dictatorship of the Black Sea for the country possessing the biggest fleet. Therefore, we insist on the neutralization of the Straits by international agreement on the one hand and military measures on the other” (as quoted in Degras 1951, 345).

A British Foreign Office memorandum dated 15 November 1922 confirmed the deviation³⁹ from the original British policy:

“Since the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, the circumstance under which the Treaty was drafted have been radically altered. Turkey has recovered; Russia has again become a serious menace, and the Allied Powers have failed, on several important occasions, to maintain a united front” (as quoted in Gökay 1997, 164-165).

As the national struggle had been won, Ankara was keen to strike a deal with the West and the life-support urgency of Soviet help lost its appeal for Ankara. The Bolshevik leaders believed that a satisfactory settlement acceptable by all sides would need time, therefore, it was not wise to politically offend and even upset Ankara and preferred not to issue a strong official protest over the anti-communist campaign⁴⁰. Soviet Russia advised its representatives in Turkey to adopt a more conciliatory approach with the Ankara government (Gökay 1997, 150).

4. The Straits Negotiations at Lausanne and the Turkish-Russian Divergence

The Lausanne peace conference was held from 20 November 1922 to 4 February 1923, and from 23 April to 24 July 1923 (Gökay 1997, 153). Participation of the Soviet Russia in the conference regarding the Straits provided Turkey an important room for maneuver. Turkey obtained relatively advantaged diplomatic

³⁸ Milyukov was a Russian politician. He was mockingly called “*Milyukov of the Dardanelles*” by his opponents since he was staunch supporter of the conquest of Istanbul during the WWI.

³⁹ Following the WWI, a regional system, consisted of an enlarged Greek state extending to western Anatolia, independent states of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, and an autonomous Kurdish state controlled by the British Empire could be established. The Bolshevik Russia had not been considered as an important factor at this stage by Britain (Gökay 1997, 164-165).

⁴⁰ Between 30 August and 20 November 1922, the government of the TGNA violently suppressed and virtually brought to an end the left-wing and communist activity in Anatolia (Gökay 1997, 149).

position while the theses of the West and Russia confronting each other (Sönmezoğlu 1994, 46).

On 3 December, Russia-Ukraine-Georgia Delegation sent the following Note to the Chairmanship of the Conference:

“... Great powers were seeing the Near East problem as an indivisible whole since before now. As for today, these states leave aside this century old tradition and decides that the participation of Russia and its allies is not necessary for the establishment of the long-term peace in the Near East. These states see the straits issue a separate issue and believe that this issue can be resolved separately from the near eastern issues. ... Russian delegation protests this situation and states that all the decisions taken in the absence of Russia and its allies do not bind them” (Yerasimos 2000, 543; my translation).

There were three different views confronted at Lausanne (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973c, 49): The View of the Allied Powers was freedom of the Straits for both commercial and military ships; demilitarization of the both shores of the Straits as a guarantee of this freedom and administration of the passage by an international authority. The Soviet view was freedom of transit only for the commercial vessels; closure of the Straits for military vessels; fortification of the Straits by Turkey. Turkey’s view was freedom of transit through the Straits on the condition of securing Istanbul and Marmara in accordance with the article four of the National Pact.

Britain and the Soviet Russia changed the roles at the Lausanne straits negotiations. Britain advocated the free transit of warships through the straits instead of its century old policy of opposing the opening of the Straits to warships. Bolshevik Russia tried to close the straits to all warships leaving centuries of Tsarist policy of reaching to the Mediterranean. The reason of the reversal of these policies were the bad experiences of both states during the First World War. Britain negatively affected from the Turkish control of the Straits during the war and favored free transit of warships through the internationally controlled straits to hold the Soviet Union in check (Shotwell and Deák 1941, 111). For Britain, the Soviet project would close the Straits to foreign warships and convert the Black Sea into a Soviet *mare clausum* (Gökay 1997, 153). Gökay (1997, 155) argues that “*the lesson Turkey learned from history was that in order to maintain a balance of power in the Black Sea, the presence of other European warships was essential*”. Therefore, the Turks were ready to back

up British proposal against the Soviets. İsmet Paşa reported to Ankara on 2 December 1922 that the support for the Soviet point would isolate Turkey and threaten the settlement with the Western Powers.

The Turkish demands expressed by İsmet Paşa was guarantee against the threats emanated from the sea and land for the security of Istanbul and Marmara; Limitation of the warships not to endanger in the Straits and the Black Sea; Freedom of transit of commercial ships both in peace and war (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973c, 53). The Allies alleged that demilitarization of the straits was the mandatory necessity of the freedom of transit whereas İsmet Paşa argued that demilitarization was not mandatory on the contrary it could be dangerous for the peace both in Turkey and in the world (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973c, 56).

Turkey pursued various diplomatic tactics⁴¹ and strategies during the Conference. A wide detention campaign of the communists and the İzmir Economy Congress were two of them. Despite opposing the capitulations, the purpose of the İzmir Economy Congress was the expression of the non-refusal of the foreign capital (Sönmezoğlu 1994, 45).

On 18 December 1922, the Soviet delegation presented a draft^{42, 43} concerning navigation through the Straits composed of five section and 22 articles. Some of the important provisions were as the following:

“Art 2. Sovereignty of Turkey over the straits is confirmed.

Art 4. In virtue of long-established principle, the Straits are recognized as closed to the war vessels, including submarines, of all fleets, except that of Turkey.

Art 11. In time of war, Turkey being neutral ... No warship of the belligerent Powers, including submarines, as well as no military aircraft belonging to the belligerent Powers and no aircraft belonging to a neutral Power shall have the right to pass the Straits.

Art 14. In time of war, Turkey being a belligerent ... In exceptional individual cases for special definite reasons, the Turkish government may authorize the passage of the Straits by light neutral naval vessels, except submarines... .

⁴¹ For the details of the negotiations over the Straits, see, Yerasimos, (2000, 478-498).

⁴² For the full text of the Soviet draft convention on the Straits, dated 18 December 1922, see, Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, 494-500) or Degras (1951, 353-356).

⁴³ For the statement by Chicherin dated 19 December on draft proposals for the straits convention, see, Degras (1951, 356-358). For the extracts from Memorandum of the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian Delegation, dated 30 December, see, Degras (1951, 359-366).

Art 16. ... in order to guarantee its sovereignty and to enforce the principle of the closure of the Straits to warships and military aircraft, will have the right to take all the necessary measures ... to organize the defense of the Straits..." (as quoted in Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 494-498).

According to Art 17, 18 and 19 of the Soviet draft, an international commission would be established under the chairmanship of Turkey the statute of which would be laid down in a special convention. In conformity with the article 21, the contracting powers would make an act recognizing the Black Sea as a *mare clausum* of the littoral powers (Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 498-499). Soviet draft did not find support in the conference. Lord Curzon contended that the purpose of the Soviet draft was to strengthen the Soviet hegemony in the Black Sea and to turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake under the guardianship of Turkey over the Straits (Şamsutdinov 1999, 323).

When it became apparent that the Turks were ready to accept the British proposal with some minor modifications, the Soviet government accused Turkey of a capitulation which would put Turkey under the political yoke of British imperialism. The Soviet delegation officially warned İsmet Paşa that the admission of the war vessels through the Straits would be a hostile act against the Black Sea states (Gökay 1997, 155).

There were bitter discussions during the private talks between İnönü and Chicherin. Chicherin accused İnönü of pursuing the policy of Damat Ferid Paşa, and İnönü argued that closing the straits meant renouncing from the possibility of peace. İnönü asked: "*I can deny whatever I said during the Straits negotiations tomorrow, and the day after war starts, are you ready?*" Chicherin replied: "*Come to Moscow and talk this there.*" İnönü said: "*I will explode the war and we will talk later... something like that will never happen. We are not in a position to make war for an issue to be resolved in time. The Straits issue depends on the relation between us. Even if the straits are open, it is impossible to launch a military operation against Russia by leaving Turkey behind*" (İnönü 2014, 347).

Meanwhile, the *Treaty of Creation* officially created the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) on 30 December 1922 among the Transcaucasian

SFSR⁴⁴ (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR and Russian SFSR. Therefore, Turkey's neighbors at the beginning of 1923 was limited to seven states, including four great powers: Greece, Bulgaria, Soviet Union, Iran, Great Britain (mandate in Iraq and possession of Cyprus), France (mandate in Syria), and Italy (possession of the Dodecanese Islands) (Aydın 1999, 166-167).

The last session of the Straits negotiations was held on 1 February 1923. Final draft of the Allied powers was concluded with some modifications (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973c, 56). The Lausanne negotiations interrupted on 4 February due to the dispute regarding the abolition of the capitulations. Russia was satisfied from this situation since the conference had dissolved without signing an agreement about the Straits. In order to pursue a new diplomatic war regarding the straits, Russia applied to conference secretariat for invitation to the second round of the talks. However, the Turkish delegation had accepted to sign the straits convention before the dissolution of the conference (Yüceer 2016, 242).

The changes in Ankara-Moscow relations is summarized in the letter of the Russian ambassador Aralov dated 4 February 1923:

“Our relations with the Turks are worsening day after day, actually it gains a tense even sometimes hostile character. We are facing resistance in every area beginning from the routine works of the embassy to the high politics and they seek to infuriate us with little sarcasms. For several months, we do not see any official. ... It seems that we are flattering the Turks. The Turks feel, understand and they did not ask our perspective to the issues discussed in Lausanne. ... To be able to exert influence in Turkey, sole diplomatic and political force is insufficient, it is obligatory to do strengthened economic and at the same time cultural works” (Meyer 2009, 262-263; my translation).

The representatives of the Soviet Russia followed the discussions at Lausanne as observers after February 1923. In this period many events increased the tensions between Britain and the Soviet Russia. Head of the unofficial Soviet delegation, Vorovsky, was shot dead in his hotel on 10 May 1923. This event represented the nadir

⁴⁴ The Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian SSRs founded the *Federative Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia* on 12 March 1922. On 13 December 1922, this federation of states was transformed into a unified federal state and renamed as the *Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic*. The TSFSR became a founding member of the Soviet Union on 30 December 1922. In December 1936, the TSFSR was dissolved and divided again among the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani SSRs.

in the fast deterioration of British-Soviet relations during the Lausanne Conference. On 8 May 1923, Britain dispatched a Note (later called “*Curzon’s Ultimatum*”) to the Soviet Russia including complaints about the detention of British fishing vessels and the trials of the priests and asked the Soviet government to stop all anti-British propaganda in Asia. Britain pointed out that unless the Soviet government comply fully within 10 days with its requests, it would consider itself free from obligations of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement. The Note gave the impression that the British government was determined to follow a hardline policy. Curzon’s attitude towards the Soviet delegation at Lausanne combined with the Note was claimed as a war policy. Soviet Union considered the Note as a provocation, but they could not afford a rupture. The correspondence and meetings between the parties ended with the Note of Soviet Russia dated 18 June after the Soviet government having complied the essential conditions of the British government (Gökay 1997, 157-161).

The peace conference of Lausanne produced *Lausanne Peace Treaty*⁴⁵ and a separate *Convention Relating to the Régime of the Straits*⁴⁶ signed on 24 July 1924. It is argued that the reason for making separate treaties was to ensure the viability of the straits régime independent from the peace treaty which was dependent upon the international dynamics of the era (Rozakis and Stagos 1987, 93). According to Erkin (1968, 56), the *Lausanne Régime* has been constructed on the article 12 of the Wilson Principles announcing the principle of free navigation.

Russia signed the Straits Convention on 14 August 1923 in Rome but did not ratify it arguing that the Convention did not provide peace and security for the Black Sea littoral states (Gürün 2010, 100). The most serious objection of Moscow was about limitations of naval forces entering the Black Sea. In case of a war between Britain and Russia when Turkey was neutral, said limitations would be lapsed and the entire British navy would legally enter the Black Sea (Váli 1972, 33). The SU neither entered the International Commission since it viewed the regime of the Straits a menace to

⁴⁵ For the full text of the *Peace Treaty between the Government of Turkish Grand National Assembly and British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Rumania, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Lausanne Peace Treaty)*, see, League of Nations (1924b).

⁴⁶ For the full text of the *Convention Relating to the Régime of the Straits*, see, League of Nations (1924a).

Russian security. Thus, Moscow resorted a policy of expanding its fleet in the Black Sea which by 1924 became the strongest fleet in the region (Kapur 1966, 128).

The new régime did not introduce new novelties since its main principles were actually the extension of the aborted Treaty of Sèvres, but these principles were re-arranged and developed according to new international dynamics emerged following the Turkish victory in August-September 1922 which provided for the cleaning of the Greek army from western Anatolia, Gallipoli peninsula and eastern Thrace. The Lausanne Convention was composed of two articles and an annex (20 article). The Lausanne Convention on the Straits provided for the following points which were more or less the extension of the Sèvres régime:

- Principle of freedom of transit and navigation through the Straits by sea and by air (Art.1) (Sèvres: Art.37).
- International Straits Commission as an international legal entity which assumed authority to govern the Straits and responsible to the League of Nations to oversee the execution of the convention (Annex, Art.10) (Sèvres: Art.38).
- Establishment of a zone so called “*the Straits*” comprising the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus (Sèvres: Art.179).
- The demilitarization of the Straits Zone and several islands in the Aegean (Annex, Art.4) (Sèvres: Art.178).
- International guarantee for the security of the Straits by Britain, France, Italy, and Japan (Annex, Art. 18) (Sèvres: Art.37 and 178).

The formation of the new Straits régime coincided with the recognition of the new independent Turkish nation-state on the Turkic remnants of the multinational Ottoman State in eastern Thrace and Anatolia (Rozakis and Stagos 1987, 93). The period of the Lausanne Conference was the end of the privileged era of the Turkish-Russian relations. The Turkish rulers used the Russian power until they passed through the bridge. Let alone the establishment of permanent anti-imperialist front, the parties did not want to afford a long term economic cooperation (Yerasimos 2000, 498). The political discord between Ankara and Moscow in Lausanne was emanated from different expectations of the parties. While Turkey wanted a peace recognizing its

independence, Moscow sought to use Lausanne for its world politics. However, Russia could not see that its foreign policy objectives could not be attained through ideological speeches unless it was supported by actual power (Bilge 1992, 97).

Conclusion

This period confirms the first hypothesis since it demonstrates the same characteristics of the post-Mudros NHUS pattern. The enhanced capability of the Entente Powers with the Armistice of Mudros and the Turkish-Russian sibtex's gaining more local characteristics directed the Bolshevik government to cooperate with the Ankara government in its fight against imperialism as far as possible. In the formulation of Moscow's policy, the catalytical effect of the hearsays that Ankara government would opt for a Caucasus campaign with the support of the Entente powers can be counted. Thus, the Ankara government found the opportunity to equilibrate the actual threat of the Entente powers through the cooperation with the Bolsheviks.

Excluding minor conflicts, such as, Turkey's supporting the non-invitation of the RSFSR to the peace negotiations in Lausanne and the alienation of Ankara and Moscow during the Lausanne peace negotiations, it seems that there is no sufficient finding to support the second hypothesis.

Ankara and Moscow opted for the resolution of their conflicts bilaterally in this period, such as, the alignment of the Caucasus frontier and the regime of the Straits. Therefore, decentralized type of conflict management occurred in this period was not the consequence of a crack in Turkey's alliance ties, but the pattern of the post-Mudros NHUS mentioned above. Therefore, there is no sufficient finding to support the third hypothesis in this period. Since Ankara and Moscow resolved their conflicts in a peaceful and more cautiously manner, such as, the alignment of the Caucasus border and the Straits regime, the findings support the fourth hypothesis.

PART THREE
THE HEGEMONIC UNIPOLAR BSS
(1923-1991)



CHAPTER FOUR

THE INTER-RÉGIME PERIOD

(1923-1936)

Introduction

This chapter should have to begin with the Treaty of Creation of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics dated 30 December 1922 but for practical reasons it begins with the signature of the Lausanne Convention Relating to the Régime of the Straits signed on 24 July 1923 and ends with the signature of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Régime of the Straits signed on 20 July 1936.

The Treaty of Creation of the USSR changed the composition of the BSS *sumex* by erasing Georgia and Ukraine, and the Caucasian subsystem from the international scene. The beginning of the Soviet hegemonic unipolarity in the BSS reduced the dynamics of the Turkish-Soviet *subtex*. In addition, the new Lausanne regime delegated the main dynamic of the conflict between Turkey and the USSR to an international authority due to the establishment of an International Straits Commission, the demilitarization of the Straits zone, and the joint guarantee provided by the great powers for the security of the straits zone. Thus, the Lausanne Convention served as a structural modifier and the infrastructure of Turkish-Soviet *subtex* of which super structure would be the Treaty of Paris of 1925 which positioned Turkey, together with its additional protocols, in an alignment relationship with the USSR. Therefore, the stage of this pattern was coined as *alignment-based threat complex*. Due to this threat complex, the Turkish-Soviet *sibtex* shaped their relations.

Within the above-mentioned framework, Turkish-Soviet conflict dynamics were influenced from the European developments in this period which manifested themselves in the form of regional security formations, disarmament, and prohibition of war agreements, rising fascism and armament, and collective security efforts. The foremost developments emerged as taking form of these dynamics were the signature of Locarno Treaties, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, rising German and Italian fascism, and Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. These developments

exerted influence on Turkish-Soviet relations in the form of Treaty of Paris and additional protocols, the Litvinov Protocol, Convention on the Definition of Aggression, the Balkan Pact, and the memberships of Turkey and the USSR in the LoN.

1. Convergence of Threat Perceptions: Paris via Mosul and Locarno

The incorporation of Armenia into the USSR in December 1922 led to occurrence of serious tensions between Ankara and Moscow. Moscow requested the withdrawal of the Turkish diplomatic mission from Yerevan. Since Ankara did not recognize the new government of the USSR, it maintained its representation in the Armenian capital. Long correspondence between the parties did not produce satisfactory resolution. Meanwhile, another crisis broke out in September 1923 when Moscow claimed war damages on behalf of the Armenians during the works of the Turco-Soviet commission. Turkish delegation promptly rejected the claims and unilaterally suspended the session until it prepared counterclaims against the Armenians. In October 1923, local Soviet authorities encouraged certain Armenians to attack the Turkish diplomatic mission. Only then, the Turkish mission departed from Yerevan. Ankara demanded the settlement of the whole incident in Yerevan in conformity with Turkey's national honor. However, these tensions did not last since the international situation begun to change in August 1924 which encouraged both parties to turn to each other (Kapur 1966, 132-133).

The negotiations of Lausanne had created mutual distrust and resentment between Turkey and the USSR. However, in 1924 both states wished to develop tighter relationship due to several reasons. For the Soviet Union, the utmost important subject was to establish political relations with the western countries and to prevent the establishment of alliances against itself. The most frightening issue for the SU was the German-French rapprochement (Gürün 1992, 181-182). Turkey reverted to a policy of neutrality between all the main European powers in the aftermath of Lausanne. This was partly because an alliance was not necessary (Hale 2013, 250). Main items on the Turkish foreign policy agenda were problems left over from the

Lausanne Conference (Hale 2013, 54). Turkey had problems with Britain concerning Mosul and with France concerning Hatay (Aydın 1999, 167).

The disputed bilateral issues of the period were bad treatment of the Turkish nationalities in the Caucasus, status of the Russian trade representation in Turkey, negotiations on consular agreement and the communist activities in Turkey. İnönü, in a letter to Chicherin dated 22 January 1924 said that “*our mutual loyalty builds an unsurpassable barrier to some approximations knitted by common enemies and whispers aimed at poisoning everything between us*” (Gürün 2010, 104). In 1924, both parties left these issues to normal course and came to understanding to create a closer cooperation by clearing off the mutual distrust (Gürün 2010, 107).

According to article 64 of the Treaty of Sèvres, Mosul had been included in the independent Kurdistan (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 64). Lausanne peace Treaty left open the delimitation between Turkey and the British mandate Iraq due to the conflict regarding the future status of the Mosul province. In conformity with the article 3 (2) of the Treaty, if Turkey and Britain failed to conclude an amicable arrangement within nine months, the dispute should be referred to the Council of the League of Nations (Hurewitz 1979, 372). For the British, Iraq would not be viable without Mosul thanks to its significant strategic position and anticipated oil resources (Hale 2013, 42).

Following inconclusive talks between Turkey and Britain, the Mosul issue was referred to the Council of the LoN in August 1924 (Hale 2013, 43). Turkey and Russia began to negotiate a non-aggression pact in September upon Russian proposal to renew and develop the Treaty of Moscow (Benhür 2008a, 296). Russia, concerned from alignments targeting itself, attached utmost importance to its relations with Turkey. For this reason, the USSR defended the Turkish theses against the West during the negotiations of the Mosul conflict. Meanwhile, some European states sought to disrupt Turkish-Soviet relations, but they proved desperate struggles. Two of these attempts were the so called Soviet signature of a secret treaty with Italy to the detriment of Turkey and Soviet massing of troops along the Turkish border (Benhür 2008a, 297). However, Turkey was not ready to accept the Soviet proposals which would have left no scope for Turkish maneuverability. Ankara proposed a draft containing only one article providing for the military neutrality of either country if and when the other

involved in a war. Since this did not exclude Turkey from any political or economic alliance with the western countries, the Turkish draft did not completely satisfy Moscow (Kapur 1966, 136).

In a meeting between Turkish FM and Soviet Ambassador on 13 January 1925, Turkey requested the Soviet government to participate in the Straits Commission which it had so far boycotted since it had been isolated in the Commission by Great Britain, and felt that the Soviet presence would stop Britain to further enlarge the powers of the Commission (Kapur 1966, 135).

The serious Kurdish revolt which broke out in 1925 eliminated the Turkish hesitations and Ankara proposed another draft containing four articles which met most of the points contained in the original Soviet draft (Kapur 1966, 136). The text of the treaty was ready by the end of July 1925, whereas Turkey deliberately postponed its signing until making the decisive leap in the Soviet direction due to the expected verdict of the LoN on the Mosul question. There was still some hope in the Turkish official circles that an amicable solution could be found for the Mosul dispute which might make the neutrality treaty with the SU unnecessary (Kapur 1966, 136-137). Also the Russian inaction until September was due to unnecessary of the signing of a non-aggression pact with Turkey since a chance for making an agreement with Britain was available (Gürün 2010, 113).

A commission established by the LoN awarded Mosul to Iraq in July 1925. Upon Turkey's rejection of the Council's right of jurisdiction, the conflict was referred to the Permanent Court of Justice which decided on 21 November 1925 that the decision of the Council was binding for both parties. On 16 December 1925, the LoN Council unanimously transferred Mosul to Iraq (Hale 2013, 43). İnönü (as cited in Bilge 1992, 100-101) states that there was no actual assistance of Soviet Russia during the Mosul conflict except her political support during the debates at the League of Nations. Actually the USSR had not intended to involve in the Mosul crisis. Bilge (1992, 101) argues that Turkey understood for the second time following the Lausanne conference that it could not get an actual assistance from the Soviet Union. This reality became the important factor in the future orientation of the Turkish foreign policy.

The same day, on 16 October 1925, the Locarno treaties^{1,2,3} were signed in London. The mutual borders between Germany and France, and, Germany and Belgium were acknowledged in a process through the mediation of Great Britain. Germany acknowledged her territorial losses (Alsace-Lorraine to France and some small districts to Belgium) and endorsed permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland. These points were also guaranteed by Great Britain and Italy. In return, Germany received from France the promise of the prompt evacuation of Cologne, the scaling down of the occupation forces, and a reduction in the size and authority of the Allied inspection team (Keylor 1996, 117).

Germany, refusing to recognize political settlement in Eastern Europe, reserved the right to redress of its objections there in the future. Britain and France seemed to be tacitly acquiescing Germany's search for territorial compensation in that direction. The fact that neither Poland, Czechoslovakia, nor the Soviet Union had participated in the drafting of the agreement on European security aroused fears on these countries that the western powers had settled with Germany at their expense (Keylor 1996, 118).

Locarno was appeared to be a *“starting point for another and much more elaborate plan, namely the encirclement of the Soviet Union by states which will consistently pursue an anti-Soviet policy”* (Eudin and North 1957, 260). Moscow began to suspect that this process was to be followed by similar efforts to bring other countries, particularly those on Russia's borders, back into the fold of Western European economic, political, and military systems. Moscow started a diplomatic offensive towards the Asian countries to counteract this eventuality. Turkey, having problems with the West, was the first towards which Soviet diplomacy turned its attention (Kapur 1966, 134-135). The USSR also sought to form a strategy of rapprochement towards Germany to divide the front of potential enemies (Sönmezoglu 2015, 300).

¹ For the full text of the *Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy* (The Locarno Pact), dated 16 October 1925, see, League of Nations (1926).

² The Locarno treaties were seven agreements negotiated at Locarno between 5-16 October 1925 and formally signed in London on 1 December 1925.

³ The Locarno treaties entered into effect upon the admission of Germany to the League of Nations on 10 September 1926 (Keylor 1996, 118).

Turkey was discontent from Locarno in anticipation of England, France and especially Italy's obtaining freedom of action outside of western Europe. The Mussolini Italy had explicitly expressed that western and south-western Anatolia were the most suitable place for Italian emigrants (Gürün 1992, 186).

The Locarno treaty was an end to all provocational rumors about secret Soviet agreements against Turkey and secret Turkish agreement against the Soviet Union (Eudin and North 1957, 260). Moscow's distrust from the Locarno Treaties matched Ankara's dislike of the Council of the LoN decision on Mosul (Hurewitz 1979, 368). Among the reasons directing Turkey to SU were the attitude of Britain during the Mosul dispute, the attitudes of France and Italy during this dispute, domination of the League of Nation by Britain, and Turkey's feeling isolated. Locarno may only be added as the last factor (Gürün 2010, 116). Turkey's experiencing troubles with Italy due to the Mediterranean security and the islands, and with France due to the border disputes were also influential in directing Turkey to the USSR (Çelikpala 2015, 120).

The proposal of signing a friendship and neutrality treaty came from the Soviet Union. In case of a signing of an agreement was likely, the Soviets always wanted that the proposal should come from the other party, or they demonstrated as if their proposal had come from the other party (Gürün 2010, 113). Carr (as cited in Bilge 1992, 99) argues that the treaty constituted the linchpin of the Soviet security system. The book named *Soviet Foreign Policy* published by the Soviet Foreign Ministry explains the preparation of this treaty as the following (Gürün 1992, 183-184; my translation):

“The Turkish tendency to establish closer relations with us emanates from the intensification of English intrigues against Turkey and the hostile policy of England push Turkey to the view that Turkey could only rely on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union proposed to strengthen political cooperation by extending the provisions of the 1921 Treaty. According to the proposal, in the case of a war between one of the contracting party and a third state, the other contracting party would be friendly neutral and would not join any groupings to the detriment of the other side. Turkey objected at the beginning alleging that the proposal not to join opposing groups would violate the principle of independence. When the Locarno agreements were signed two parties accelerated the negotiations. Turkey was aware of the fact that the Locarno treaties would also constitute a threat to Turkey as well”.

The British Government made a final attempt to prevent the Treaty of Paris. In November 1925, Turkey got an invitation from Greece to join with the collaboration

of the Balkan states in the context of the Locarno Treaties (Kurban 2017, 27). Gürün (2010, 115) argues that since it was impossible for Greece to gather the Balkan countries due to its tense relations with Bulgaria and Turkey, it was logical that Britain made Greece to do this attempt to prevent the Turkish-Russian agreement.

The *Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality between Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*⁴ signed on 17 December 1925 was the first non-aggression treaty of the both parties (Armaoğlu 1988, 330). The official document establishing the political relations between Turkey and Soviet Russia was the Treaty of Moscow. The Treaty of Moscow did not contain any provision stipulating political or economic cooperation. The treaty establishing the political relations in an institutionalized form became the Treaty of Paris (Gürün 1992, 181). The principles of *nonaggression* and *neutrality* in the 1925 treaty were added to the principle of *non-intervention* enshrined in the 1921 treaty. This agreement would remain in force for three years (Hurewitz 1979, 369). The Treaty was composed of a preamble and three articles. There were also three annexed protocols. Relevant provisions of the Treaty are as follows:

“Art 1. In the case of military action being taken against either Contracting Party by one or more other Powers, the other Contracting Party undertakes to maintain neutrality as towards the first Contracting Party.

Note: The expression “military action” shall not be held to include military maneuvers, since they do not cause any prejudice to the other Party.

Art 2. Each Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from any aggression against the other; it likewise undertakes not to participate in any alliance or agreement of a political character with one or more other Powers directed against the other Contracting Party, or in any alliance or agreement with one or more other Powers directed against the military or naval security of the other Contracting Party. Furthermore, each of the two Contracting Parties undertakes not to participate in any hostile act by one or more other Powers directed against the other Contracting Party” (League of Nations 1935b).

The first, second and third protocols were as follows:

“... [E]ach Contracting party retains full freedom of action as regards its relations of all kinds with other Powers outside the limits of the undertakings the conditions of which are laid down in the present Treaty”.

⁴ For the text of the *Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality between Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, dated 17 December 1925, and the annexed three protocols, see, League of Nations (1935c).

“[T]he two contracting parties agree that the expression “of a political character” as used in Article 2 of the Treaty of to-day’s date should include all such financial or economic agreements between Powers as are directed against the other Contracting Party”.

“[T]he two Contracting Parties also undertake to enter into negotiations to determine the methods of settling disputes which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle through the ordinary diplomatic channels” (League of Nations 1935b).

There was a secret letter annexed to the Treaty unilaterally written by Chicherin to Aras. It was revealed with a language not easy to understand that Russia would not confine itself to being neutral in case of Turkey’s entering into war by demonstrating the friendship established by the 1921 Treaty as a basis in bilateral relations (Gürün 1992, 185-187). Soysal (as cited in Tellal 2015b, 316), considering the continuing Anglo-Turkish tension in that period, argues that the letter was an insufficient assurance that the Turkish government obtained from the USSR. Litvinov’s (Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs), press statement was mentioning the following:

“... [T]he Soviet Government was aware of the activities of certain States who were trying to attract Turkey into an alignment hostile to the USSR. The signature of the agreement should put an end to those alarmist rumors and dispel any fears or doubts about the firmness of Soviet-Turkish friendship among the public of both countries” (as quoted in Degras 1952, 80).

In the aftermath of the Treaty of Paris, Britain wanted to prevent Turkish-Russian rapprochement by applying financial sanctions and economic boycott as a tool for pressure to alienate Turkey from the USSR. However, the British pressure on the contrary caused further rapprochement between the two countries (Sarıçoban 2009, 225). Whereas, the USSR granted Turkey the privilege of license-free transactions at several border points in the aftermath of the Treaty of Paris (Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, viii).

The USSR wanted to retaliate the Locarno treaties with a series of neutrality and non-aggression treaties with its neighbors⁵ to secure its borders in Europe. The Paris Treaty of 1925 was the first of these treaties (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 11).

⁵ The USSR sought to expand these treaties with numerous proposals to Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and France respectively but could not make progress. However, it signed non-aggression and neutrality agreements with its eastern neighbors, namely, Afghanistan on 31 August 1926 and Iran on 1 October 1927 (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 11).

There were two common provisions of the non-aggression and neutrality pacts: “*each state would pledge that it would remain neutral if the other were attacked by a third state*”, and “*each state would promise not to commit aggression against the other*” (Rosser 1969, 148).

Since Locarno posed an imminent and serious threat for the USSR for leaving Germany free on its eastern borders, the USSR sought to make a non-aggression pact with Germany. Both parties signed the *German-Soviet Neutrality and Nonaggression Pact (Treaty of Berlin)*⁶ on 24 April 1926 which would be in effect until Hitler’s coming to power in 1933 (Gürün 2010, 116-117). According to the Treaty of Berlin, both parties pledged neutrality in case of an attack upon either of them (Ulam as cited in Wozniuk 1990, 65). While SU was concerned with the Eastern Europe becoming as a staging base for intervention, the eastern European countries were just as worried about Russian intervention. Poland, chief rival of Russia in eastern Europe, attempted to forge a defensive bloc against Russia. Russia’s counter strategy was to isolate the border states from each other and from their western European allies by using their varying interests in mutual cooperation and territorial disputes (Rosser 1969, 147). Meanwhile, Turkey resolved the Syrian question with France by signing the *Friendship and Good Neighborliness Agreement between Turkey and France*⁷ in Ankara on 30 May 1926 (Benhür 2008a, 299).

When a speculation that Turkey might defy the LoN decision concerning Mosul heightened the tension. Britain prepared plans to blockade the Dardanelles (Hale 2013, 43). Finally, the tension in the Turkish-English relations was defused with the signing of the *Treaty between the United Kingdom and Iraq and Turkey regarding the settlement of the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq*⁸ in Ankara on 5 June 1926 (Benhür 2008a, 299). Turkey recognized the LoN decision in return for 10 % of the oil royalties of Mosul for the next 25 years (Hale 2013, 43) and reluctantly assented to the new frontier with Iraq (Hurewitz 1979, 372). Moscow did not concern from the

⁶ For the text of *German-Soviet Neutrality and Nonaggression Pact (Treaty of Berlin)* dated 24 April 1926, see, Yale Law School (2020a).

⁷ For the full text of the *Friendship and Good Neighborliness Agreement between Turkey and France*, dated 30 May 1926, in Turkish, see, Soysal (1989, 285-303).

⁸ For the full text of the *Treaty between the United Kingdom and Iraq and Turkey regarding the settlement of the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq*, dated 5 June 1926, see, HMSO (1927).

Turco-British agreement on Mosul since it could not be considered as a definite proof of Turkey's orientation towards the West (Kapur 1966, 140).

Turkish-Soviet friendship strengthened in Odessa on 11 November 1926 during the meeting of Chicherin and FM Aras. The boycotting of the LoN and the denial of railway concessions to England along the Caucasian frontier were discussed (Kapur 1966, 140). Aras and Chicherin also discussed the signing of a trade agreement and the Italian threat over Turkey (Sarıçoban 2009, 225). Chicherin gave Tevfik Rüştü a letter addressing president Mustafa Kemal, in which the Soviet Union undertook not to intervene in the Balkans which might jeopardize Turkish interest there (Kurban 2017, 29).

Bilge (1992, 103) coins the period between the Odessa meeting and the Montreux Conference as a “*balanced relations period*” between Turkey and the USSR because bilateral disputes relatively decreased and bilateral and multilateral relations were balanced in this period. Turkey began to take part in the international arena actively and the friendship with Soviet Russia was no longer an obstacle to establish friendship with other states. Turkey got out of being a state over which great powers challenged. It can be said that the decrease in the strife between Soviet Russia, and Britain and France played a facilitating role in this. The most important result of these developments was Turkey's establishing a balance between two blocs. In this period, mainly four topics emerged between Turkey and the USSR: trade agreement, mutual visits, disarmament, and the League of Nations.

The British-Soviet relations became tense after the UK argued that the USSR endorsed a general strike in Britain in 1926 (Haas 2012, 294). By 1927, official relations had been established by the Soviet government with all the principal Powers except the United States (Carr 1990, 201). In 1927, Turkish-Soviet relations were further normalized with the resolution of some of the non-political issues⁹ (Kapur 1966, 140-141). The status of the Soviet trade missions in Turkey created tension between the two states since the USSR demanded diplomatic immunity for the

⁹ Agreement pertaining to the use of waters of the frontier rivers, streams, and springs (8 January 1927) and agreement regarding the return of the inhabitants of the areas which had been ceded to Turkey by the Treaty of March 1921.

members of the missions due to their civil servant status in the Soviet government (Tellal 2015b, 316).

The *Trade and Navigation Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Turkish Republic*¹⁰ was signed in Ankara on 11 March 1927. The impact of the tension between the Soviet Union and Britain on the Turkish-Soviet commercial treaty cannot be ignored. In response to the economic and political pressure put by Britain on the USSR, Russians sought a way out by entering into an agreement with Turkey. Russia, now on the brink of war with Britain, attempted to improve its relations with neighbors. Turkey agreed to sign the Treaty so as to avoid possible damage to their friendship with the Soviet Union. The commercial treaty principally aimed to prevent Turkey from being influenced by Britain (Kurban 2017, 28-30). Finally, the political relations between Russia and Great Britain was severed on 24 May 1927 by the Great Britain (Gürün 2010, 125). With the conclusion of the treaty, two countries granted each other most-favored nation status which paved the way for the close economic relations (Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, viii).

Under this Treaty, Turkey acknowledged the establishment of Soviet commercial representation in Istanbul, Izmir, Trabzon, Mersin, Erzurum, and Konya or Eskişehir (article 15) and agreed that they could benefit from diplomatic privileges. In return, the Soviets agreed to transport the goods that would be sent to a third country through the territories of the contracting parties without being subject to customs. This provision enabled Turkey to use the harbor of Batum (Kurban 2017, 30).

The trade between Turkey and the Soviet Union showed a two-fold increase within the three years after the signing of the 1927 Treaty. The commercial activities between the two countries were crucial for Turkey's financial relief during the world economic crisis. In 1928, the Russian Vneštorgbank joined the bank consortium established by Turkey and contributed to the Turkish economy. During this period, Soviet foreign trade institutions transferred \$6,000,000 to Turkish banks in order to purchase Turkish products. However, the share of the USSR in Turkey's foreign trade

¹⁰ For the full text of the *Trade and Navigation Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Turkish Republic*, see, Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, 536-556).

did not exceed 6-7 % during even the best periods of trade relations (Kurban 2017, 30).

2. The Application of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in Eastern Europe: The Litvinov Protocol and Turkey

After 1928, the relations between Turkey and Russia gained a more international dimension. Soviet support in the international arena was of primary importance for Turkey. Turkey had not joined the *Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference* until 1928. On 6 March 1928, prior to the 5th session of the Commission at Geneva, Litvinov demanded from the League of Nations the invitation of Turkey to the Preparatory Commission. However, that initiative by the Soviet Government did not create a favorable impact. Same request was later repeated by Polish FM Zalesski. The League of Nations invited Turkey to take part in the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference on 9 March. The League denied the role of the Soviet Union. Rumors were spread arguing that it was not the Soviet Union but the Poland Government's initiative that laid behind the invitation (Kurban 2017, 31-32).

The Soviet Union had proposed the dissolution of the armed forces, destruction of the arms, abolishment of the conscription, and termination of the military expenditures at the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. Whereas, the western powers had maintained that disarmament cannot be separated from security (Bilge 1992, 110). The Soviet project was envisaging that the armies of all countries to become unable to organize combat operations within a year after initiation (Kurban 2017, 43). At the meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference on 19 March, FM Tevfik Rüşti expressed that the Soviet project was too radical (Kurban 2017, 34). An article published on the front page of *Akşam* on 22 March 1928 stated that the Soviets were not sincere about the armament issue because their aim was to avoid disarmament by keeping disarmament on the agenda as an unsolved issue (Kurban 2017, 33). However, in the meeting of April 1929, Turkey supported the negotiation of the Soviet proposals despite Turkey had put forward a little different view (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 301). According to the Soviets, the

Turkish delegation that attended the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference for the first time in March 1928 initially had taken an incomplete and inconsistent stand regarding the Soviet global disarmament project (Kurban 2017, 38).

The Italian-Soviet rapprochement has been a source of tension in Turkish-Soviet relations. The Soviet officials informed Turkey many times that there was not any element against Turkey in the development of Italian-Soviet relations (Benhür 2008a, 307). In 1928, Italy launched friendship offensive towards Turkey and Greece to counter French influence in the Mediterranean and to contest with Yugoslavia over Albania. Turkey signed a *Treaty of Neutrality, Mediation and Judicial Settlement*¹¹ with Italy on 30 May 1928 (Hale 2013, 45) which relieved Turkey considerably. This situation reflected to the Turkish Soviet relations positively (Benhür 2008a, 307).

The USSR did not welcome Turkey's signing an agreement for the liquidation of the Ottoman debts with the western states on 13 June 1928 (Gürün 2010, 120). The Soviet Union who did not recognize the debts of the Tsarist Russia, wanted Turkey to act similarly not to set an example (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 16). Russia had agreed to pay its debts on the condition that it received compensation for the territorial and financial damages caused by civil war and foreign intervention. According to the calculations of the Bolsheviks, the damages were higher than the debts (Kurban 2017, 24-25). Turkey's avoiding from the liquidation of her debts that it had accepted at Lausanne would mean to cause a stalemate in her relations with the West. That was what Russia wanted (Gürün 2010, 121).

Despite the existence of the Locarno treaties, France attempted to reinforce the Franco-German détente by recruiting outside assistance. French FM Briand had proposed the US to sign a bilateral treaty rejecting war between them on 6 April 1927. The ulterior motive of France was to bolster French security in Europe since the likelihood of armed conflict between France and the US was zero at that time. Despite unwillingness of the US FM Kellogg to sign such a treaty, the public pressure forced him to respond. Kellogg thereupon seized the initiative in December 1927 and dispatched a draft treaty to France transforming the French bilateral proposal into a

¹¹ The Treaty has become a model for a similar treaty to be signed with Greece in 1930. Turkish-Italian treaty was renewed in 1932 (Hale 2013, 45).

multilateral one. The draft treaty was further weakened by provisions for self-defense and regional security when the French complained that such a treaty would nullify regional arrangements such as the Locarno. Finally, a multilateral renunciation of war pact emerged with the absence of precise commitments and enforcement tools. Fifteen states signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact¹² on 27 August 1928 (Keylor 1996, 120).

The USSR was not permitted among the original signatories due to the fear that she might exploit the formal ceremony with polemics on disarmament. Chicherin labelled the Pact as “*a constituent part of the policy of encircling the USSR*” (Rosser 1969, 148). The US, France and other major countries which were involved in this Pact introduced it as a tool of protection against the USSR. The USSR joined the Pact on 31 August 1928 due to the fear of being attacked by western states (Kurban 2017, 35) and became the first state that ratified it (Benhür 2008a, 304). According to the Soviet perspective, “*the Pact has loaded certain responsibilities on the capitalist countries in the face of public opinion ... that is why the Soviet Union agreed to sign the Pact*” (Kurban 2017, 36).

Since the developing relations between the western powers and Turkey distressed the Soviet Union due to the possibility of losing Turkey, Lev Karakhan, the Deputy Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, visited Istanbul and Ankara on 12-13 December 1928 to strengthen Turkish-Soviet relations further (Kurban 2017, 37). The Briand-Kellogg Pact provided a real Soviet progress in her European security system (Rosser 1969, 148). Wishing the quick implementation of the Pact in eastern Europe, the USSR put the pact into effect through the *Litvinov Protocol*¹³ signed among Poland, Romania, Latvia, and Estonia in Moscow on 9 February 1929. TGNA approved Turkey's accession to the Protocol on 1 April 1929 (Benhür 2008a, 305) upon the Soviet request for the participation of Turkey to this protocol (Sarıçoban 2009, 226).

¹² For the full text of the *General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (The Kellogg-Briand Pact)*, see, League of Nations (1929a).

¹³ For the full text of the *Protocol for the immediate entry into force of the Treaty of Paris of August 27, 1928, regarding Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Litvinov Pact)*, see, League of Nations (1929b).

In 1929, the issues negatively influencing the Turkish-Soviet bilateral relations were, the signing of the Turkish-Italian Friendship and Neutrality Agreement, the understanding between Turkey and the western states regarding the payment of the Ottoman debts, visit of the British Mediterranean fleet to Istanbul on 12 October 1929 and reception of the fleet commander by Mustafa Kemal, and mass detention of communists in Turkey (Tellal 2015b, 317). Meanwhile, political relations between Russia and Great Britain was reestablished on 3 October 1929 which had been severed on 24 May 1927 by the Great Britain (Gürün 2010, 125).

The Great Depression began with the stock market crash on 29 October 1929 known as *Black Tuesday* in the US. The US ended the investments in Europe and stopped its loans granted to Germany. Until then, Germany was paying with this loan its reparation debt to Britain and France, in return, Britain and France were paying their war debts to the US with the same money. This system which created economic vitality of the 1925-1929 period was destroyed with the great depression. This led to a decrease in the purchasing power, prices fell, and unemployment increased. Germany was the foremost country affected by the depression. Finally, with the bankruptcy of Kredit-Anstalt Bank in Wien the international payments mechanism totally collapsed. This depression led to an important decrease in the international trade, dragged the nations into an extreme economic nationalism and facilitated the coming into the power of extremist fascist currents (Sander 1989, 23-25). The great depression was met with great pleasure in Moscow since it was the vindication of the communist predictions about the internal contradictions of capitalism (McCauley 1994, 132).

The momentum of the developing relations between Turkey and the western powers, led to the creation of a mechanism for consultations between Turkey and the SU during the visit of Karakhan to Ankara on 17 December 1929. Turkey and the USSR prolonged the Paris Treaty of 1925 for two years with a *Protocol Concerning the Prolongation of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of December 17, 1925 between Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* on 17 December 1929:

“Art 2. Each of the two Parties declares that no agreement other than those already made public exists between itself and other States in the immediate neighborhood by land or sea of the other Party.

Each of the two Parties undertakes not to institute, without referring to the other Party, any negotiations for the conclusion of political agreements with States in the immediate neighborhood by land or sea of the said Party, and only to conclude such agreements with the consent of the latter, it being understood that acts for the purpose of establishing or maintaining normal relations with the said States and intended to be made public shall not be affected by the above undertaking” (League of Nations 1935b).

The states “*in the immediate neighborhood by land or sea*” were determined by a secret protocol. These states were Iran, Iraq, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, England and France on behalf of Syria for Turkey; and Iran, Afghanistan, China, Mongolia, Japan, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania and England for the USSR (Gürün 1992, 187). Second paragraph of article 2 of the 1929 protocol reflects a different understanding than the first protocol of the 1925 Treaty by stipulating that “... *each Contracting party retains full freedom of action as regards its relations of all kinds with other Powers outside the limits of the undertakings the conditions of which are laid down in the present Treaty*” (League of Nations 1935b).

There were reasons of accepting this kind of provision for Turkey. The aim of the protocol was to satisfy Moscow which concerned from Turkey’s developing relations with the West after reaching to an agreement with Britain over Mosul in 1926, signing a treaty of friendship and neutrality with Italy in 1928, support of the western states for the membership of Turkey in the League of Nations, the hearsays about the establishment of an alignment among Turkey, Poland and Romania under the leadership of France. The obligation to get mutual approval carried more importance to limit Turkey’s attempts, whereas, it was observed that the USSR did not comply to this protocol in some instances¹⁴ (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 302).

3. The League of Nations and the Turkish-Soviet Relations

The population exchanges between Turkey and Greece had created complicated conflicts over the disposition of the properties left in each country by the emigrants. The 1926 agreement between Turkey and Greece had not fully resolved the issue and it even appeared that they might resort to force in 1929. In order to resolve

¹⁴ The 1929 protocol shows how close were Turkey and Russia in early 1930s (Tellal 2015b, 318). Turkey consulted with Soviet Union before it signed a pact with Britain and France in October 1939 whereas Soviet Union did not consult with Turkey when it signed the Mutual Assistance Agreement with France on 2 May 1935 and during the alliance talks with Bulgaria in 1940 (Tellal 2015b, 318).

the bilateral issues, two countries signed a *Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Mediation and Arbitration* together with other agreements during the visit of Greek Prime Minister Eleutherius Venizelos to Ankara on 30 October 1930 (Hale 2013, 43-44) which contributed to the development of better relations between Turkey and the Western Powers (Hale 2013, 54-55).

Beginning from 1931 Turkey had two issues in its agenda: to develop cooperation among the Balkan states and to join to the League of Nations (Gürün 2010, 128). Turkey delved to steer itself back into a cooperation with the western powers without breaking its links with Moscow. The main sign of this reorientation was Ankara's decision to join the LoN (Hale 2013, 44). Turkey had found it more suitable to postpone its membership¹⁵ in the LoN for a while despite British attempts to pull Turkey to the LoN to alienate it from the Soviet Union. The first reason was the decision of the LoN favoring England in the Mosul case which offended the Turkish public opinion (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 287). Turkey had not got the best of the resolution regarding the population exchange and Mosul disputes where the LoN had intervened and had obliged to give concessions to make peace. Despite this, Turkey desired to access to the LoN since it wished to follow a pro-status-quo foreign policy (Alantar 1994, 62).

The USSR was dissatisfied from Turkey's developing her relations with the western states and the discussion of her prospective membership in the LoN. Since the USSR never considered its own membership in the LoN dominated by Great Britain with which she had many disputes regarding the eastern policy, she also wanted to make Turkey to act similarly (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 287-288).

Turkey stated that she would not accede to the LoN unless it would not be granted permanent membership in the organization. Britain suggested that Turkey should first apply for the membership, then, following its acceptance, it could apply for the Council membership. The reason why Turkey insisted on the permanent membership in 1931 was that it did not want to join the organization at that time.

¹⁵ Mustafa Kemal had expressed on 1 March 1924 that Turkey could think of joining to the LoN only after the completion of the agreements (Mosul, Syria and other issues with the western countries) and on the condition that the organization should not be a tool in the hand of the strong (Alantar 1994, 63).

Because being a friend of Russia was cheaper than deploying hundred thousand troops at the Soviet border. In fact, the reason why Turkey insisted for the permanent or semi-permanent memberships was its paying attention to its relations with the USSR. İnönü told Venizelos that the Soviet government could appreciate Turkey's accession to the LoN as permanent or semi-permanent member, but, a simple membership might offend the Soviet government (Alantar 1994, 64-65).

On 7 March 1931, Turkey and the USSR signed the *Protocol between Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Naval Armament in the Black Sea and in the Seas Contiguous to Black Sea Supplementing the Ankara Protocol dated 17 December 1929*. The parties agreed to add the following supplementary protocol to the article 2 of the Protocol of 17 December 1929:

“... [B]eing desirous of strengthening the peaceful and friendly relations between them, being firmly convinced that the only reliable guarantee of permanent peace is the effective reduction of all kinds of existing armaments ... have considered it desirable ... to supplement Article 2 of the Protocol of December 17th, 1929...”

“Neither of the High Contracting Parties shall proceed to lay down any naval fighting unit whatsoever for the purpose of strengthening its fleet in the Black Sea or in neighboring seas, or to place orders for any such unit in foreign shipyards, or to take any other measure the effect of which would be to increase the present strength of its war fleet in the above-mentioned seas, without having notified the second Contracting Party six months previously” (as quoted in Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 572-573).

Since the contiguous sea to the Black Sea was the Sea of Marmara, this protocol seemed to put Turkey rather than Soviet Union under commitment. Consequently, these protocols influenced the relations between Turkey and the western states negatively (Sarıçoban 2009, 226-227).

In 1931, a commission founded within the LoN with the initiative of France started to establish a European Union. Turkey and USSR who were not members of the LoN were not invited to these works. Upon the attempt of Turkey, both Turkey and Russia were invited to the meetings of the European Union Commission which took place in May 1931, despite some objections to the invitation of the USSR. Thus, Turkey reciprocated the USSR who had made Turkey invited to the disarmament commission (Gürün 2010, 126).

While the disarmament efforts were continuing, Japan started to invade Manchuria on 18 September 1931 and established a puppet state. Despite the application of China to the LoN, great powers were unwilling to declare Japan as an aggressor and apply enforcement measures (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 4-5).

The next Protocol signed between Turkey and the USSR dated 30 October 1931¹⁶ extended the 1925 treaty and the protocols for a period of five years as from their date of expiry. Should one party not notify the other six months before the end of the period of five years of its intention to terminate, they will be regarded as automatically renewed for a further period of one year.

The visit of Prime Minister İsmet İnönü to Moscow between 25 April – 10 May 1932 was one of the most significant diplomatic incidents between the two countries. This visit took place due to the insistence of the Russian side rather than the desire of Turkey. Main reasons of the Soviet Union's invitation included Turkey's carrying out various loan talks with the western powers and her potential membership to the League of Nations (Kurban 2017, 42). İnönü, during his visit to Moscow, got the approval of the Soviet Union in accordance with the Treaty of Paris for the accession of Turkey to the LoN.

The Assembly of the LoN invited Turkey upon the proposal of Spain and with the support of 28 countries during its extraordinary meeting on 6 July 1932. Turkish Grand National Assembly accepted this invitation on 9 July 1932 (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 291). Turkey's membership in the LoN was officially accepted on 18 July 1932 (Alantar 1994, 64-65).

On the other hand, Turkey was obliged to take part in the enforcement measures to be taken against the aggressive powers in conformity with the article 16 of the Covenant of the LON (Alantar 1994, 63). Turkey guaranteed with a Note (undated) sent to the Soviet Embassy in Ankara that she would not take part in the

¹⁶ For the full text of the *Protocol concerning the Prolongation of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of December 17th, 1925, the three annexed Protocols of the same Date, as well as the Protocol of Prolongation of December 17th, 1929, and the Protocol of March 7th, 1931*, dated 30 October 1931, see, League of Nations (1935a).

application of the coercive measures against the USSR unless the latter proclaims a war to a third state (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 290). The Turkish Note is as follows:

“The Government of Turkey’s faithful compliance with its obligations emanating from the articles 16 and 17 related to the implementation of the procedure of the sanctions of the Covenant shall not prejudice to the determination of the principles of the Turkish policy with regards to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics following its accession to the League of Nations. The procedure of the sanction applicable to the Soviet Union in conformity with the said articles, regardless of other conditions, may be considered only in case of Soviet Union’s proclamation of a war to a third state. ... Therefore, the allegations, directed by other states against the Soviet Union that Turkey cannot justify, shall not compel Turkey to join any measure to be taken in conformity with the article 16” (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 290-291; my translation).

4. The Establishment of the Balkan Pact and the Turkish-Soviet Relations

Gönlübol and Sar (1993, 92) argue that Turkey started to follow a more dynamic foreign policy after her membership in the LoN. On 27 September 1932, Atatürk expressed his remarks about the current European situation during his meeting with the US Chief of Staff, General Mac Arthur:

“The European question has already been ceased to be a question of disputes between England, France and Germany. A new power, emerged today in eastern Europe, is threatening the whole civilization and even the whole humanity. This formidable power which is mobilizing all its material and moral means for the sake of the world revolution goal is implementing brand-new political tactics yet unknown to Europeans and the Americans and knows how to benefit from the smallest mistakes of its rivals. The victor of the likely war in Europe will be neither England, France and Germany, but the Bolshevism. We, the Turks, as the close neighbor of Russia and the most fought nation with this country, are following the events happening there closely and see the danger starkly. The Bolsheviks, perfectly exploiting the minds of the awakening nations, caressing their national passions, knowing to incite their hatreds, has become the principal power threatening not only Europe but also Asia” (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 8; my translation).

Germany, with the coming of Hitler to power beginning from 1933, had three objectives in the foreign policy: to rescue Germany from the limitations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles; to establish “*one nation, one state*” by integrating all the Germans into the German borders; to create a *Lebensraum* (Living Space) to maximize German welfare. The first two of these objectives were limited thus Britain did not perceive an imminent threat. The third objective was abstract since the beginning (Sander 1989,

27). Meanwhile, Japan withdrew from the LoN on 24 February 1933 due to the accusations it was exposed over the events in Manchuria.

Turkey's request for amending the status of the Straits first emerged at the *Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments* in Geneva. On 24 March 1933, Turkey indicated the existence of military provisions in the Lausanne Convention which should naturally share the same destiny with the military provisions of the peace treaties signed in the aftermath of the great war (Meray and Olcay 1976, 1). More frequent Turkish demands on the Straits issue received cold response from other states. Britain, knowing that the defeated states of the WWI were seeking to overcome the limitations for armaments, any amendment in the Lausanne Straits Convention would lead to the emergence of similar demands in the agreements ending the WWI despite it did not object directly to the remilitarization of the Straits (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 366).

On 3 July 1933, the dissatisfied states of the Four-Power Pact¹⁷ signed two conventions regarding the definition of aggression at the sidelines of the World Economy Conference which took place in London. First convention, *Convention on the Definition of Aggression*¹⁸, was signed among Turkey, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, USSR, Iran, and Afghanistan. Second convention was signed among Turkey, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Russia, and Yugoslavia. Although both conventions are identical, there is an extra article in the second convention stating that the convention is open to the signature of all the states. Russia signed a non-aggression pact with Italy on 2 September 1933. Italy felt the necessity to normalize its relations with Russia when it was left alone in excluding Russia from Europe (Gürün 2010, 131-132). Meanwhile, Germany withdrew from the LoN on 4 October 1933.

On 27 October 1933, Voroshilov¹⁹ stated that the Turco-Soviet friendship was “*tried and tested in the years of armed struggles, in the years of peaceful*

¹⁷ The Four-Power Pact which was signed among Italy, Britain, France and Germany on 19 March 1933 had brought back the negative atmosphere of the Locarno agreements due to their reaffirming adherence to the LoN, the Locarno Treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Gürün 2010, 130).

¹⁸ For the full text of the *Convention on the Definition of Aggression*, dated 3 July 1933, see, League of Nations (1934a).

¹⁹ People's Commissar for Military and Navy Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR until he was appointed as People's Commissar for Defense in 1934.

reconstruction that followed, and in the efforts of both ... governments to guard peace from all threatening dangers” (Degras 1953, 32). Meanwhile, the US recognized the USSR on 16 November 1933. This resulted in a new turn for the Soviet foreign policy which caused a rapid rapprochement with France based on common fear of Germany (Carr 1990, 202). Litvinov stated the following in the Soviet Central Executive Committee on 29 December 1933:

“We regard our relations with the great Turkish Republic as a model of relations with foreign States. ... When either side makes a proposal aimed at the consolidation of peace, it can count beforehand on the support and co-operation of the other side. ... If all nations could establish similar relations between themselves, the question of peace would be settled. ...” (as quoted in Degras 1953, 52).

As a result of the first contacts between Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania a protocol was signed on 28 November 1933 in Belgrade. According to the Protocol, the parties agreed not to make any political attempts in the Balkans without informing each other and not to undertake any commitment before taking written consent of the parties until the signing of the prospective agreement²⁰ (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 323).

A small-scale coolness emerged in the Turkish Soviet relations during the preparation process of the Balkan Pact (Benhür 2004, 328). Turkey’s obligation to get Russia’s accord in conformity with the 1929 Protocol caused considerable difficulties in the finalization of the Balkan Pact. Main Soviet objection was about the definition of the borders of the Balkans (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 325-328). Litvinov’s objections were the following:

“Turkish FM Aras had told me that a prospective non-aggression pact among the Balkan states was under discussion. I had not objected to him since the contents of such pacts were known. However, he now told that the pact would be a treaty of reciprocal guarantee, a defensive alliance comprising the Balkan frontiers. Furthermore, it also comprises the third-party attacks. If any non-Balkan power attacks to any contracting party and a Balkan state associates itself with such aggression, then the Pact will operate. This article will expose Turkey many dangers in Europe. This article may politically reinforce Romania against us [regarding the Bessarabia

²⁰ The idea that the Balkan states could form a union was voiced for the first time by Greek Prime Minister Papanastasiou in 1929. In a meeting which took place in Athens on 5 October 1930, an organization under the *Balkan Conference* title was established. There was no idea of the Balkan Pact that time (Gürün 2010).

question]. Therefore, we don't like this pact, and we will never like it" (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 330; my translation).

Turkish FM Aras told that “[w]hen the Soviets concluded a treaty with France, we made things easier for them. Likewise, regarding their treaty with Italy, we consented to a summary and this was right because we had full confidence towards the Soviets, but I learned some further details in the newspaper later. Atatürk said that “the distortion of the Pact, which gained great appreciation of Britain, France and the League of Nations, under the influence of Russians would be a smudge against the position and future of Turkey.” Following the Soviet objections, Turkey also assessed the possibility of excluding Romania from the Pact (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973a, 331-339).

According to Aras, “main spirit of this pact was to guarantee any Balkan State’s inability to act as an instrument of an external state against any other Balkan state”. The real purpose of the Pact was to deter Bulgaria to be an instrument of a great power. However, action to a Balkan state would possibly drag them to war with a great power, but this situation could also lead to a European war. The makers of the Pact took this risk to be able to deter Bulgaria. At the end, only the mutual borders of the six Balkan countries were guaranteed with the Pact (Soysal 1989, 449). The Balkan Pact^{21,22} was signed on 9 February 1934, by which “Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia mutually guaranteed the security of each and all of their Balkan frontiers”. The protocol annexed to the Pact was indicating the following:

- “1. Any country committing one of the acts of aggression to which Article 2 of the London Conventions of July 3rd and 4th, 1933, relates shall be treated as an aggressor.
2. The Pact of Balkan Entente is not directed against any Power. Its object is to guarantee the security of the several Balkan frontiers against any aggression on the part of any Balkan State.
3. Nevertheless, if one of the High Contracting Parties is the victim of aggression on the part of any other non-Balkan Power, and a Balkan State associates itself with such aggression, whether at the time or subsequently, the Pact of Balkan Entente shall be applicable in its entirety in relation to such Balkan State” (League of Nations 1934c).

²¹ For the full text of the *Pact of Balkan Entente between Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania, and Turkey (The Balkan Pact)* and the annexed protocol, see, League of Nations (1934b).

²² For the detailed account of the *Pact of Balkan Entente between Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania, and Turkey (The Balkan Pact)*, dated 09 February 1934, see, Gönlübol and Sar (1993, 99-106).

Turkey undertook not to accept obligation to join any action against the USSR with a secret Declaration entrusted to Litvinov by Aras. This declaration was also endorsed by other contracting parties. The 1929 Protocol had authorized the USSR to demand such a guarantee²³. The translation of the French original text of the Turkish reservations (as quoted in Soysal 1989, 450) is as follows:

“At the moment of signing the Pact of Balkan Entente, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, HE Tevfik Rüşti Bey, made the following statement: On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Turkey, I have the honor to declare that in no case will Turkey allow itself to be held to engage in any acts directed against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. ... The present Declaration is an integral part of the Pact of the Balkan Entente.”

Italy's most overt threat against Turkey came with the speech of Mussolini in the Fascist Congress in March 1934 where he told that Italy's historical ambitions lay in Asia and Africa (Hale 2013, 46). Turkey's concerns increased with the news stating that Italy was militarizing the Dodecanese Islands and constructing aircraft fields and submarine bases. While these concerns were prevailing in Turkey, Italy's attempts to make pact together with Turkey and Greece became inconsequential (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 6-10).

Ankara's need for Britain emerged explicitly. However, the most important issue for Turkey was how to realize this rapprochement because Britain, contrary to France, was against the idea of the establishment of anti-German alignment chains in which Russia existed (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 327). Turkey had real anxiety about the lack of collective security arrangements among other European powers. Turkey assumed that its good relations with the USSR would give it security to the north and it was vulnerable to an attack from the Balkans, or in the Mediterranean by Italy. In this framework, Turkey pursued three objectives:

²³ The Turkish reservation, given upon the insistence of the Soviet Union, which was coined as *Litvinov Formula*, did not have either necessity or meaning. This reservation led Greece to put similar reservation in favor of Italy, and this made the Pact inoperative when the WWII broke out. This Greek reservation had the utmost role in the inaction of the Balkan states following Italy's invading Greece on 28 October 1940. The fault of this belonged to Russia to the great extent (Gürün 2010, 139-140). According to Hale (2013, 55), the Balkan Pact failed partly because of its technical weaknesses and partly because none of the Balkan states except Greece were prepared to raise against the Axis.

- To remove the demilitarization restrictions contained in the Lausanne Convention.
- To build up and modernize its armed forces.
- To reach an accommodation or a defensive alliance with Britain and France while preserving the entente with the USSR (Hale 2013, 47).

Under these conditions, Turkey's position was eased when the USSR also joined the LoN on 18 September 1934 (Hale 2013, 44), since it realized that it could get its bilateral pact with France only if she became a League member (Rosser 1969, 163). Litvinov advocated disarmament and collective security against fascist aggression in the League of Nations (Gökay 2006, 38). The USSR would try three tactics to launch the new anti-Nazi coalition:

“The Soviets would attempt to make the League of Nations function as a true collective security organization. The League could be buttressed with an Eastern Locarno system providing immediate mutual assistance to any victim of aggression in eastern Europe, and the eastern Locarno scheme could be supplemented with a bilateral treaty of mutual assistance between Russia and France. The Comintern would order communists in the west to fight against fascism joining with liberal and even conservative groups” (Rosser 1969, 162).

Eastern Locarno project failed not because of Germany's refusal to join due to its aversion to multilateral agreements that would restrict Germany, but by the announcement of Poland on 27 September 1934 that it would refuse to grant Russian troops transit rights across Polish territory to fulfill Soviet commitments (Keylor 1996, 147).

On 5 December 1934, Soviet Russia and France signed the *Franco-Soviet Protocol on the Conclusion of an Eastern Pact*²⁴ not to engage in negotiations with third parties which might compromise the conclusion of the Regional Pact of the East (Degras 1953, 96). On 28 January 1935, Molotov argued that Japan and Germany withdrew from the LoN “to leave their hands free in the matter of armaments and preparations for war”:

²⁴ For the full text of the *Franco-Soviet Protocol on the Conclusion of an Eastern Pact*, dated 5 December 1934, see, Degras (1953, 96-97).

“... [T]he Washington agreement on naval armaments, concluded thirteen years ago by America, Great Britain, Japan, and other states, collapsed because certain people had come to regard it as a hindrance in the race for naval armaments, and in the preparations for a new armed conflict for the Pacific. ... [The USSR displayed wide initiatives] in the matter of the pacts of non-aggression. ... Such pacts have been signed by all the European states bordering on our frontiers, and also by Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia” (as quoted in Degras 1953, 104-105).

On 16 March 1935, Germany passed conscription despite the counter provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 4-5). On 14 April 1935, Britain, France, and Italy signed the Stresa Agreements²⁵ to establish a joint front against German revisionism. With the Stresa agreements, three countries opposed any unilateral repudiation of the agreements, reiterated their commitments to the Locarno agreements and guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of Austria (Sander 1989, 28).

5. The Threat Coming from the Mediterranean and the Turkish-Soviet Relations: Amendment of the Straits Régime

On 17 April 1935, Turkey presented to the Council of the League of Nations a plan for the restoration of the fortifications of the Straits²⁶. According to the plan, Turkey had been prepared for the continuing application of the régime of the Straits with the single condition that clauses on the demilitarization of the Straits zone would be abolished (Rozakis and Stagos 1987, 101). About this time, Britain’s need to Turkey increased due to the increasing tension in the Mediterranean. The re-militarized Straits’ control by a friendly Turkey was acceptable for Britain rather than totally converging it with the Soviet Union (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 368).

Upon the refusal of Germany and Poland to access to *Eastern Pact*, the USSR and France signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance²⁷ on 2 May 1935 replacing the Franco-Russian Non-aggression Pact of 1932 (Akşin 1991, 225). Ankara had requested from Moscow to encourage Paris to conclude a mutual assistance pact with

²⁵ For the full text of the *Joint Resolution of the Stresa Conference, including the Anglo-Italian Declaration and the Final Declaration*, see, HMSO (1935).

²⁶ Turkey repeated her requests in the Council of the Balkan Pact between 10-13 May and in the General Assembly of the League of Nations in September 1935 (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 367).

²⁷ For the full text of the *Treaty of Mutual Assistance between France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, dated 2 May 1935, see, League of Nations (1936b).

Turkey (Gürün 2010, 145) which was included in the agenda of the negotiations of Franco-Soviet Treaty of 2 May 1935. Laval told that France could not sign mutual assistance pact with Turkey not to offend Italy. In return, Litvinov rejected Laval's proposal to conclude a pact with Italy since this might concern Turkey (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 14-15). Meanwhile, Britain who did not welcome the Franco-Soviet Agreement, signed an agreement with Germany on 18 June 1935. This British attitude helped the alienation of the French from Britain and the rapprochement of Italy and Germany (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 5).

When attempts to make a mutual assistance pact with France failed, Turkey attempted to make such an agreement with Moscow following the Russian-Czechoslovak Mutual Assistance Pact of 16 May 1935 (Gürün 2010, 145). The SU's view regarding this subject was that Italy would not dare to attack Turkey. The USSR also did not have a mind to make an agreement with Turkey which may require that it should help Turkey against a threat coming from the Mediterranean. The USSR would naturally defend Turkey against Italy, however, a mutual assistance pact would apprehend Italy and make it getting closer to Germany. The USSR also did not want to be dragged in a war against Italy for Turkey's close relations with Yugoslavia (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 15-16).

In June 1935, Britain signed an agreement that legalized Germany's violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles disarming the German navy. Mussolini found a proof that Britain was not demonstrating good faith towards its other allies. Thus, *"the cynical and selfish stance of Great Britain encouraged the Italian plans against Ethiopia"* (Rozakis and Stagos 1987, 40-41). In August, Comintern, at its Seventh Congress, adopted the policy of cooperation with socialists and liberals against fascism, thus reversing its line of the early 1930s (Gökay 2006, 38). On 14 September, Turkish FM Aras told in the Assembly of the League of Nations that *"in case of the occurrence of changes in the international situation determined by the agreements in effect, Turkey will be obliged to make amendments in the military régime of the Straits as a result of these changes"* (Meray and Olcay 1976, 1).

On 3 October 1935, Italy started to invade Ethiopia. The collective security provisions of the LoN proved empty against the Italian aggression (Rosser 1969, 165-

166). France and Britain tried to reconcile their action with the need to remain united against Germany because a likely emergence of Berlin-Rome axis would shake the balance of power in Europe (Akşin 1991, 228). On 10 October 1935, the League of Nations decided to take collective measures against Italy. Great Britain and France were unwilling to support collective measures (Rozakis and Stagos 1987, 40-41).

Turkey became one of the prominent advocate of the sanctions against Italy. Turkish request for aid from Britain to build a navy against Italy was turned down (Hale 2013, 45). Main common factor in Anglo-Turkish policies was to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia became one of the factors which brought Britain and Turkey closer (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 25). On 7 November 1935, Turkey and the USSR signed a Protocol²⁸ extending the *Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of December of 1925 and the Protocols relating thereto of 1925, 1929, and 1931* for a period of ten years. Italy warned Turkey with a Note dated 11 November 1935 that Turkey's participation in the sanctions would result serious consequences at the end of the LoN sanctions. Following this Italian Note, Britain undertook to extend assistance²⁹ to Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey in case of an Italian attack (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 12,20).

Germany observed the weakness of France and Britain in their concessions to Italy and occupied the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 by justifying its action arguing that France had been the first to upset the balance by signing the treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR on 2 May 1935. France, aware of the danger to the security of Europe, did not dare to proceed to an armed confrontation without the British consent. Britain was even opposed the imposition of economic sanctions against Germany and merely advised the condemnation of Germany as an aggressor by the LoN. The failure of Britain and France to resist Germany strengthened the authority of Hitler both at home and abroad (Rozakis and Stagos 1987, 40-41).

²⁸ For the full text of the *Protocol Concerning the Prolongation of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of December 17, 1925 between Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Protocols relating thereto of December 17, 1925, December 17, 1929, and March 7, 1931*, see, Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, 598-599).

²⁹ Entering into effect on 22 January 1936 and known as *Turco-British Mediterranean Alliance*, the agreement was terminated unilaterally by Britain on 27 July 1936 following the League of Nation's terminating the sanctions against Italy on 15 July 1936 (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 329).

On 17 March 1936, Litvinov stated, with regards to the German assertion that the Franco-Soviet Pact and the Locarno Treaty are incompatible, that “*neither the SU nor France has any claims to German territory... [and if] Germany undertakes no aggression against ether France or the Soviet Union, the Pact will not begin to operate*” (Degras 1953, 172). On 19 March 1936, Litvinov stated that “*... should France be the victim of the aggression by a European State, all the necessary assistance arising from the Franco-Soviet Treaty, which in this respect is completely unrestricted, would be given by the Soviet Union*” (Degras 1953, 183).

5.1. Changing International Dynamics as Argued by Turkey

The changing international dynamics during the 1930s brought forth the obsolescence of the provisions of the Lausanne Convention Relating the Régime of the Straits (Rozakis and Stagos 1987, 101). The demilitarization of the straits and the guarantees given for its security in return had become unrealistic since the equilibrium of the entire convention had been collapsed. This change was emerged as a result of treaty repudiations, failure of disarmament conferences, world economic crisis and the collapse of the collective security system. One of the four guarantor powers, Japan, had ceased to be a member of the League of Nations and the other Italy had been subjected to the sanctions because of its conquest of Ethiopia (Váli 1972, 35-36).

Turkey, with the prior support of the USSR and Britain, invited the signatories of the Lausanne Straits Convention to a conference (Bilge 1992, 114) with a Note addressing to the Signatories of the *Lausanne Convention regarding the Straits*, dated 10 April 1936, which was also sent to the General Secretary and to the members of the LoN (Erkin 1968, 65). The Turkish Note was stating the following:

“[I]n 1923... the general situation of Europe, from the political and military point of view, presented an aspect totally different from that of to-day. Europe was progressing towards disarmament...”. Since then “... uncertainty has gradually arisen, ... naval conferences have shown a tendency towards rearmament in the Mediterranean and naval shipyards will soon launch upon the seas vessels of a power never previously attained. In the air, the curve of increase has shown a swift upward turn, and continental and insular fortifications are constantly being multiplied” (as quoted in Váli 1972, 195-199).

When “*Turkey signed the restrictive clauses of the Straits Convention ... she had the assurance given her by Article 18, which added to the guarantee afforded by*

Article 10 of the Covenant of League of Nations". Article 18 of the Lausanne Convention had stipulated the following: "*Should the freedom of navigation of the Straits or the security of the demilitarized zones be imperiled by ..., the High Contracting Parties, and in any case France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, acting in conjunction, will meet such violation...*" (as quoted in Váli 1972, 195-199).

Since Turkey had not found adequate to put Turkey's territorial integrity and independence under the League of Nations' joint guarantee, it had seen that the conjunct guarantee of the four great powers might provide the minimum security required under the circumstance of that time (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 3-4):

"... (T)he guarantee in question formed an integral part of the clauses regarding demilitarization and freedom of transit. ... During this complete change of conditions, the only guarantee intended to guard against the total insecurity of the Straits has just disappeared. ... if this guarantee becomes inoperative or uncertain, the equilibrium of the whole Convention is overthrown, to the prejudice of Turkey and to that of European peace" (as quoted in Váli 1972, 195-199).

The 1923 régime had not taken account the threat of general war:

"(T)he Straits Convention mentions only a state of peace and a state of war, Turkey being a neutral or a belligerent in the latter case but does not provide for the contingency of a special or general threat of war or enable Turkey in such case to provide for her legitimate defense. ... (H)owever, ... a state of war may arise unexpectedly and without any formality. This omission may in itself render the guarantees contemplated ineffective. ...

In view of the above considerations, The provisions of Article 18 ... have become uncertain and inoperative and they can no longer in practice shield Turkey from an external danger to her territory ... (Turkey) is prepared to enter into negotiations ... for regulation of the régime of the Straits under the conditions of security which are indispensable for the inviolability of Turkey's territory, in the most liberal spirit, for the constant development of commercial navigation between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea" (as quoted in Váli 1972, 195-199).

Soviet Union replied the Turkish proposal positively in a Note³⁰ dated 16 April 1936 stating that it "*... considered that Turkish sovereignty should be fully maintained in this zone as the essential condition for the maintenance of peace an order in the Straits*" (Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 600).

The Romanian reply Note, dated 28 April 1936, led to a tension between Moscow and Ankara. Romania replied that it "*... accepted to enter into negotiations*

³⁰ For the full text of the *Soviet Note*, dated 16 April 1936, see, Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, 600-601).

... since Turkey never discussed and would never discuss the provisions of the agreements regarding the Romanian territory ...”. When the USSR learned the Romanian Note, it demanded clarification from Ankara but was not satisfied from the explanations and guarantees of Turkey. Turkey met the request of the USSR by sending a Note written that the Romanian Note cannot be interpreted as Turkey recognized the annexation of Bessarabia by Romania (Gürün 2010, 148-149).

5.2. The Positions of the Parties at the Montreux Negotiations

An international conference of all the signatories³¹ of the Lausanne Convention, except Italy which refused the invitation, convened at Montreux on 22 June 1936. There were four basic different approaches at the Montreux Conference³².³³ The Turkish draft³⁴ had been prepared in consultations with the Soviet Union. However, the USSR argued that it could not accept that the draft convention had been prepared in consensus with the Russian side (Gürün 2010, 149-150).

Already on 23 June 1936, at the beginning of the sessions at Montreux, Litvinov asked Aras his assessment regarding a treaty of alignment for the defense of the Straits. However, Ankara instructed Aras not to delve into this issue at Montreux and suggested that if the Russians had a serious proposal they could do this in Ankara (Bilge 1992, 120).

The Turkish attitude was to totally eliminate the Straits Commission, the demilitarization, and the international guarantee. Turkey suggested the total closure of the straits to aircrafts and submarines and also demanded the modification of the passage of the warships while leaving the provisions for commercial vessels intact.

³¹ Since the British Empire had become British Commonwealth and the dominions became independent, the UK and Australia were individually represented. Canada, New Zealand, India and Irish Free State informed that they would accept the conclusions of the Conference (Váli 1972, 36).

³² For the records of the negotiations of the Montreux Convention, see, Meray and Olcay (1976). For the positions of the parties, see, Rozakis and Stagos (1987) and Bilge (1992, 114-119).

³³ The records of the Montreux Convention do not reflect the distresses emerged during the meetings of Aras and Litvinov. These distresses can be read in the telegrams of Aras and the instructions of the Turkish government signed by İnönü (Bilge 1992, 115).

³⁴ For the Turkish Draft, distributed in June 1936 before the beginning of the conference, in Turkish, see, Meray and Olcay (1976, 437-440) or (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 60-64).

Turkey also proposed for itself the sole authority of closing the straits to foreign warships in case of war or a threat of war (Rozakis and Stagos 1987, 102).

Although the Soviet attitude was fully in accord with Turkey regarding remilitarization of the Straits and the limitation of the passage of warships, it objected to the limitations with regards to warships of the Black Sea states. Moscow sought unconditional passage of warships in time of Turkey was not belligerent to maintain peace and security to fulfil international obligations in line with the decision of the League of Nations. Clearly, this last proposal had been emanated from the stipulations of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance concluded against the German threat (Rozakis and Stagos 1987, 102-103). Despite almost common understanding over the Turkish draft, Russia became the only trouble maker for Turkey during the Montreux negotiations (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 35). While Russia defended the thesis that the straits should be closed to warships of all states and the straits should be under only the Turkish control in Lausanne, she defended in Montreux complete freedom for the warships of Black Sea littoral states and moved away from the thought that Turkey should be the only authority on the straits (Gürün 2010, 151).

The UK³⁵ represented the traditional Allied position based on European balance of power opposing a Soviet supremacy in the Black Sea. Although Britain did not object to remilitarization and abolishment of international guarantee, it favored the preservation of the Straits Commission and defended the maintenance of free passage for belligerent warships stipulated in the Lausanne Convention. Turkey and the Soviet Union objected to the British demands to avoid transforming the Black Sea into a theater of naval warfare (Rozakis and Stagos 1987, 103). The Turkish delegation accepted the British draft as the basis of negotiations (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 94).

During the conference, France and Romania supported whatever Russia proposed, whereas Britain did not object too much for the issues that Turkey could accept. This situation led USSR to acquire much more than they thought before coming to conference (Gürün 2010, 150-151).

³⁵ For the British draft dated 6 July 1936 which was prepared based on the Turkish draft, in Turkish, see, Meray and Olcay (1976, 441-454) or (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 86-94).

The USSR tried to open bilateral negotiations with Turkey parallel to the Montreux negotiations. Turkish side did not want to enter into bilateral negotiations with the Russian side. The negotiations were tough, and the Turkish and Russian representatives quarreled very often during the conference. The Soviet Tass news agency started provoking publications and the Turkish press responded. Even certain articles published in the Cumhuriyet newspaper with the signature of Yunus Nadi had been dictated by Atatürk himself. Prime Minister İnönü told Aras if the Russians took the responsibility to spoil the friendship, Ankara will not stay unwary (Gürün 2010, 149-150).

At the closing session of the Montreux Convention on 20 July, Litvinov³⁶ stated the following:

“[T]he conference has recognized, although inadequately, the special rights of the Black Sea riverain countries in that sea in regard to the passage of the Straits, as well as the special geographic situation of the Black Sea, to which the general conceptions of the complete freedom of the seas cannot be applied in full. ... The Soviet delegation note with great satisfaction that, to a very large extent, if not completely, these objects have been achieved...” (as quoted in Degras 1953, 200-201).

The Montreux conference ended on 20 July 1936 with the signing of the treaty by accepting almost all the demands of the USSR. Turkish-Russian relations received wound partly from the Russian manner during the conference negotiations but to a large extent from the bilateral talks implemented parallel to conference works between two states' foreign ministers (Gürün 2010, 152). All the parties of the Lausanne convention became signatory of the Montreux Convention³⁷.

5.3. The Impact of the Montreux Régime³⁸ on Systemic and Subsystemic Dynamics

The Montreux Convention decreased the power of outsiders with respect to the Lausanne Convention. This was partly due to Britain's understanding that both Turkey

³⁶ For the full text of the Statement by Litvinov at the Closing Session of the Montreux Conference, see, Degras (1953, 200-202).

³⁷ Italy, which did not attend to the conference, acceded to the Convention on 2 May 1938 (Gürün 2010, 152).

³⁸ For the full text of the *Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits*, see, League of Nations (1936a).

and the Soviet Union should be satisfied against the Italian and German threats and to obtain their future cooperation against the revisionist powers. Meeting of the demand of Turkey regarding the immediate entry into force of the Convention rather than waiting for its ratification process was actually adoption of the conflated international political dynamics.

According to Esmer (1947, 301-302), *“the Straits present a triangular question, in which the strategic exigencies of the Black Sea Powers, of the other Powers and of Turkey must all be met. The Montreux Convention provided a balance between these three sets of interests, in so far as that was possible in 1936”*. The Montreux régime safeguarded the interests and strategic exigencies of the riparian Powers, the non-riparian Powers, and Turkey.

One of the four principles of the Lausanne régime—the freedom of transit and navigation was affirmed and re-regulated, and other three principles—demilitarization, international guarantee, and the International Straits Commission were totally abolished. The Lausanne Convention had revoked the Turkish sovereignty in the straits including specified maritime and territorial zones by transferring its authority to an international organ. Whereas the Montreux convention was an international agreement signed between a state exerting full sovereignty over the Straits including its territorial and maritime zones and the states interested with the determination of the procedure of the passage of ships in these straits (Rozakis and Stagos 1987, 105).

The functions of the International Commission were transferred to Turkey with a responsibility to supervise the execution of the convention regarding the passage of vessels through the Straits. The type of war vessels, defined precisely in the annex with regards to its displacement and category, was the first limitation on the transit. The number and tonnage of the warships that may pass through the straits at one time was the second limitation. However, the Black Sea littoral states had favorable treatment regarding these limitations. The transit of vessels of war would be preceded by a notification given to Turkey through the diplomatic channel. The period of notice for the Black Sea Powers was eight days, for the non-Black Sea powers it was fifteen days. Each Black Sea power would inform Turkey on the 1st January and 1st July of each

year of the total tonnage of its fleet in the Black Sea. Turkey would transit this information to the contracting parties and to the Secretary General of the LoN.

The only power which could change the balance of power in the Black Sea set up by the convention was Turkey as it was authorized to call for ally warships to the Straits and the Black Sea when it was belligerent or when it considered it was threatened with imminent danger of war. However, in case of Turkey's consideration of imminent threat of war should not be justified by two thirds majority of the Council of the League of Nations or by the majority of the signatories of the Convention, then Turkey would be obliged to revoke the measures. In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, warships of belligerent powers would not pass through the Straits except the obligations arising out of the Covenant of LoN.

The Montreux conference could not be possible without the support of Britain or at least without prevention of its opposition in those days. Thus, in the period following Montreux, the importance of Britain in the eyes of Turkey increased compared to the importance of the USSR (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 329). The decline in the Turkish-Russian relations beginning from 1930, became apparent following the Montreux Convention (Gürün 2010, 133). Montreux was the beginning of a new era in Turkish-Russian relations because interests of the both parties entered into a turning point. Turkey was in search for providing its security against Italy. Since the USSR did not provide sufficient support, it appeared that the support would come from Britain who faced the same threats (Bilge 1992, 113).

Following the signing of the Montreux Convention balance of power changed in favor of Turkey in the Mediterranean (Akşin 1991, 227). *“Although the USSR gained tangible advantages by the Montreux Convention she was not fully satisfied. The Convention did not provide complete security on its southern borders because Turkey had obtained effective control of the Straits to allow or hinder the passage of warships. Moscow's fear was that if Turkey aligned herself with a hostile bloc then the security of the USSR would be in danger”* (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 25).

Conclusion

The creation of the USSR with the signature of the Treaty of Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 30 December 1922 erased many states and subsystems from the international relations. This signified a decrease in the number of the actors and the dynamics of the conflicts between Turkey and the USSR. This meant that the dynamics of the conflicts between Turkey and Ankara would be shaped mostly by the sibtex. The Lausanne Convention related to the Straits delegated the Turkish authority over the Straits Zone to an international commission, and the security of the zone was entrusted to the jointly guarantee of the great powers of the era. This regime formation as a structural modifier under the HUS almost erased the main dynamics of the conflicts between Turkey and the USSR. The Treaty of Paris signed in December 1925 should be considered as a relational variable which shaped the pattern of relations between Turkey and the USSR until 1936 when its foundations were annihilated *de facto* with the formation of the Montreux regime. This *alignment-based threat complex* variant of HUS pattern led Turkey and USSR to develop common responses to their perceived threats from the third parties as far as possible. The Treaty of Paris and its protocols signified the peak of rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow which was comparable only to Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. This situation confirms my judgement that the peak of rapprochement between subsystem states could only be in the form of an alignment while the peak of rapprochement with a non-subsystem power can reach to an alliance relationship.

The findings support the first hypothesis since the narrowed Turkish-Russian sibtex in the HUS led to the disappearance of local dynamics of conflicts to a great extent. The Turkish-Soviet sibtex dynamics were translated into the relations of Turkey and the USSR through the prism of the Treaty of Paris in this period.

The alignment-based threat complex did not give sufficient ground for the TPGP involvement in Turkish-Soviet relations in this period. Due to this alignment-based threat complex between Turkey and the USSR, test of the second hypothesis did not become possible in this period for lack of sufficient data. Undoubtedly, shared threat perceptions were influential for the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement in this period. The 1927 trade and navigation agreement between Turkey and the USSR was the

consequence of the latter's tense relations with the UK. On the other hand, the alignment-based threat complex produced tension in Turkey's relations with the western powers. The UK's applying economic sanctions on Turkey following the Treaty of Paris in 1925 constitutes an example to this argument. Therefore, this pattern created backflipping effect: the TPGPs could not damage Turkish-Soviet relations but there is evidence demonstrating that close Turkish-Soviet relations damaged Turkey's relations with the TPGPs.

Turkey did not need to enter into an alignment against the USSR in this period. Turkey and the USSR sought to resolve their bilateral issues themselves. Therefore, the third hypothesis is untestable with the conditions and the developments of the period. In other words, it was the alignment-based threat complex which provided the decentralized management of the Turkish-Soviet issues not a crack in an alliance.

The fourth hypothesis that common threat perceptions lead to a tendency to resolve mutual conflicts in a friendly or at least cautiously manner is also supported by the findings. The issues emerged due to Turkey's LoN membership, the establishment of the Balkan Pact and the 1931 protocol regarding the limitation of naval armament constitute an example.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE HARBINGER OF THE COLD WAR

IN THE BLACK SEA SUBSYSTEM

(1936-1952)

Introduction

This chapter delves into the period between the signature of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Régime of the Straits signed on 20 July 1936 and Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty on 18 February 1952. The signature of the Montreux Convention in July 1936 not only modified the structure of the BSS but also brought back the main dynamic of the conflict into the Turkish-Soviet relations due to the abolition of the International Straits Commission, the demilitarized zone and the joined guarantee of the great powers provided for the security of the Straits. Not the Montreux Convention but the abolishment of the Lausanne Convention actually annihilated the alignment relationship between Turkey and the USSR and left the Treaty of Paris of 1925 as scrap of paper. As the Lausanne Convention had prepared the background of the Treaty of Paris, the Montreux Convention prepared the background of Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. Due to the annihilation of the Treaty of Paris at Montreux, the period between Montreux and Turkey's NATO membership will be coined as *non-alignment-based threat complex* in the BSS. I argue that the architects of the Montreux Convention were actually perpetrators of the alienation of Turkey and the USSR.

This period signifies nothing but a transition of Turkey from alignment with the USSR to an alliance membership in the North Atlantic Treaty. This chapter may be distinguished into several stages due to so many different or opposite impacts of the TPGPs on the Turkish Soviet relations:

- 1936 (July) – 1939 (August): The process of groupings in Europe.
- 1939 (August) – 1941 (June): The Nazi-Soviet Pact period.
- 1941 (June) – 1943 (February): The German Supremacy over the USSR.

- 1943 (February) – 1945 (August): The turn of the tide and the Allied negotiations over Turkey.
- 1945 (August) – 1947 (March): The Process of the Containment of the USSR.
- 1947 (March)-1949 (September): The Berlin Crisis, the Atlantic Pact, and the end of the US atomic monopoly.
- 1949 (September)-1952 (February): The Korean war and the change in the military strategy of the US.

The above mentioned course of events and developments were the bird's eye of the process dissociating Turkey from the USSR and dragging her into the Western camp. However, one should not forget that the architects of the Montreux Convention were responsible for this process.

1. The Final Alienation of Turkey and the USSR: From Montreux (20 July 1936) to the Nazi-Soviet Pact (23 August 1939)

The Montreux Dynamics had already revived the Soviet projects over the Straits during the negotiations of the Montreux Convention. In October 1936, Soviet FM Litvinov offered an agreement on general mutual assistance to Turkish FM Aras on the sidelines of the General Assembly meetings of the League of Nations suggesting to erase the coolness emerged during the Montreux negotiations. Turkey refrained from exposing herself to commitments that she was unable to implement as far as the European affairs were concerned which could also paralyze her economic relations with the third-party states without any preparation. The main issue was to reconcile her new commitments with that of the Montreux Convention. It was also likely that the Mediterranean states could collectively stand against Turkish-Soviet front (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 135-139). The Soviet proposal was concerning the remilitarization of the Straits by the USSR itself and Turkey's undertaking an obligation to prevent the passage of third-party powers which were likely to attack the USSR through the Straits. In return, Turkey demanded a promise of assistance against

any attack at the Mediterranean with a minimum power corresponding to that of the aggressor. The USSR did not undertake this obligation (Tellal 2015b, 321).

Turkey informed the UK about the Soviet proposal. The British view regarding a likely Turkish-Soviet Pact was as the following:

“This agreement will either provide benefit to Russia apart from the Montreux Convention or will not infringe the Convention. Since an attempt to change the Convention will be opposed by other states, this would be very dangerous. If this project will not go out of the Convention, it will not have any meaning. In this case, it is not likely that the Soviets will assist Turkey in the Mediterranean. This initiative will reach to a military situation in which Turkey will join one of the groups under formation. This alliance means the extension of Soviet forces to the Mediterranean. In this case, Turkey’s perceived threat from the Mediterranean becomes more concrete. However, Turkey’s current strength is emanated from its neutrality” (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 139-140; my translation).

According to Turkish view, the ground of a joint defense agreement could not be only the Straits and the target country of the agreement could not be only one country (Germany). Turkey was demanding the inclusion of her Mediterranean shores in the agreement to provide Soviet assistance against Italy in return for closing the Straits in case of an attack against the USSR through the Straits (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 340-341). As a result, the USSR resented from Turkey’s informing Britain about the bilateral negotiations and argued that Turkey renounced from the agreement upon the British advice (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 149). Soviet Russia also urged Turkey that the Anglo-Turkish friendship should not be a tool for Britain to obtain Italian friendship (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 141).

1.1. The Spanish Civil War and the Turkish-Soviet Divergence

The Spanish civil war was one of the causes bringing Turkey, France, and Britain closer to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean. During the Spanish civil war, which began on 18 July 1936, Turkey supported the Republican side and backed the League of Nations decisions. Turkey condemned the military intervention of foreign nations in the Spanish civil strife and prohibited direct or indirect export or re-export of all arms, munitions, airplanes, ships of war and materials of war from its territory to Spanish territories (Güçlü 2002, 53-55).

Meanwhile, the threat of fascist militarism to the USSR augmented when Germany and Japan signed the *Anti-Comintern Pact* on 25 November 1936 (Gökay 2006, 38). Conclusion of the Four-Power Non-Aggression Pact¹ on 8 July 1937 between Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Turkey with the assistance of the UK further estranged Turkey from the Soviet Union (Gökay 2006, 61).

On 3 August 1937, the nationalist general Franco appealed for Italy's help "to intercept Soviet shipments of vast quantities of tanks, aircraft and machine-guns from the Black Sea ports to the Republican Spain". When Russians used British merchant ships for trade a new phase in the Spanish civil war began, "which was marked by indiscriminate attacks upon merchant ships using the Mediterranean as a highway, without warning or inquiry and without regard to the nationality of the vessel attacked, the nature of its cargo, or its port of destination". This campaign of piracy was conducted also by submarines whose identity were unknown. "Each of the parties in Spain disclaimed responsibility for the acts of these pirate submarines. The attacks were obviously of great strategic importance in cutting the flow of supplies from the Soviet Union to the Spanish government, as both of those governments violently denounced the attacks and openly accused Italy of being responsible for them" (Güçlü 2002, 55).

Operation of these submarines inside the Straits alarmed Turkey. On 14 August 1937, "the Spanish ship *Ciudad de Cadiz* was sunk by an unidentified submarine near the mouth of the Straits. Four days later, another Spanish vessel, the *Armero*, was torpedoed and sunk half a mile from *Bozcaada*" (Güçlü 2002, 56).

Mussolini's announcement on 20 August that "Italy would not tolerate the establishment in the Mediterranean of 'Bolshevism or anything of a similar nature'" and his disclosing the names of 12 Italian generals fighting with General Franco's forces made it "difficult for other governments to defend the policy of non-intervention" in the Spanish civil war (Güçlü 2002, 59).

¹ For the full text of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between the Kingdom of Afghanistan, the Kingdom of Iraq, the Empire of Iran and the Republic of Turkey (*Sa'dabad Pact*), see, League of Nations (1938).

On 24 August, Turkey announced that the presence of a foreign submarine in the Turkish waters would be a violation of the Montreux Straits Convention following the *démarche* of the Spanish government in Ankara. Turkey, concerned from the danger of the extension of Spanish civil war to the eastern Mediterranean, decided to sink the submarines found in the Straits without warning. Towards the end of August, the attacks on merchant ships increased in number and caused mounting anger in London and Paris. Rome denied the engagement of Italian submarines in the acts of piracy in the Mediterranean. The Soviet government was the only country supporting accusations of the Spanish government directed against Italy. The restraint of other states were probably determined by policy rather than by a conviction of Italy's innocence. Britain and France called for a special conference to find a solution to this problem (Güçlü 2002, 56-59).

The Nyon Conference was held between 10 and 14 September with the participation of Albania, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Greece, Romania, the UK, the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. Italy and Germany rejected to participate in the conference (Güçlü 2002, 60). All the countries except Albania signed the *Nyon Arrangement* on 14 September 1937. Relevant provisions of the Arrangement were as follows:

“Art 2. Any submarine which attacks such a ship [all merchant ships not belonging to either of the conflicting Spanish parties] in a manner contrary to the rules of international law ... shall be counter-attacked and, if possible, destroyed.

Art 4.2. (b) ... the British and French fleets will operate up to the entrance to the Dardanelles The other Participating Governments possessing a sea border on the Mediterranean undertake, within the limit of their resources, to furnish these fleets any assistance that may be asked for; in particular, they will permit them to take action in their territorial waters and to use such of their ports as they shall indicate” (League of Nations 1937-1938).

Turkey permitted Britain and France to use her naval bases to curb piracy in the Mediterranean (Güçlü 2002, 53). Submarine piracy disappeared following the Nyon Conference. “*By its signature of the Nyon Agreement, Turkey stressed its interest in preserving the status quo and the principle of collective security*”. Turkey, “*therefore, irresistibly drawn towards closer co-operation with Britain and France, the two pillars of the European status quo*”. The rapprochement was reciprocal since these two countries also needed Turkey's cooperation. Nyon “*drove the Turks and*

British closer together by associating them in ... an informal alliance against Italy". The Nyon Arrangement would keep the USSR out of the Aegean Sea since it had not been assigned a patrol zone in the Mediterranean. However, Litvinov warned that the Soviets had as much right in the Mediterranean as anyone else and would protect her rights also in the Mediterranean. Turkey supported Britain's resolute policy at the conference and rejected the Soviet attempts to dominate the Turkish foreign policy (Güçlü 2002, 62-67).

1.2. The German Effect in Turkish-Soviet Relations: *Lebensraum* and the Nazi-Soviet Pact

Turkey's effort to establish alliances with both England-France and the USSR was the product of the conditions of 1938-1939 created by the German-Italian threat (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 187). Following *Anschluss*- the incorporation of Austria in Germany on 12 March 1938, Litvinov expressed on 17 March that the Soviet government adopted a system of collective security within the framework of the LoN and regional pacts of mutual assistance. He added that such pacts concluded with France and Czechoslovakia did not menace any State in the absence of aggression (Degras 1953, 276). On 23 June 1938, Litvinov argued that "*the entire diplomacy of the western Powers in the last five years resolves itself into an avoidance of any resistance to Germany's aggressive actions, to compliance with its demands and even its caprices, fearing to arouse its dissatisfaction and disapproval even in the slightest degree. Such tactics of non-resistance naturally encourage Germany to further aggression...*" (Degras 1953, 284). On 21 September 1938, Litvinov stated that the Soviet proposal for an immediate collective deliberation on the possible consequences of *Anschluss* and to adopt collective preventive measures did not receive appreciation from the European Powers (Degras 1953, 302-303).

On 29 September 1938, the heads of states of Germany, Britain, Italy and France gathered in Munich and divided Czechoslovakia by giving Sudetenland to Germany (Kurban 2017, 25). It can be said that the chain of events leading to the Turkish-English-French Joint Declaration began with the emergence of the Czech crisis. The USSR was inspiring Turkey to join the *Treaty of Mutual Assistance between*

France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated 2 May 1935. First attempt for the Turco-French Declaration came from France in September 1938. Turkey's precondition was the participation of England in the Declaration and the liquidation of the Hatay dispute (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 188-189).

The UK rejected Turkey's demand to join this Declaration on 27 November 1938. This agreement might require the signing of a similar agreement with Greece. In this case, Germany and Italy would not welcome this agreement and Germany would see an application of a containment policy against itself and Italy in this agreement. Therefore, a General Mediterranean Pact which could include also Italy was not desired by Britain under current situations (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 188-191).

A serious change in the attitude of England was seen following Germany's passing from *Ein Volk Ein Reich* policy to the *Lebensraum* policy by seizing whole of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 232). Thereafter, Britain started to pursue *policy of guarantees* towards eastern European countries leaving aside the policy of *appeasement* (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 332). Turkey was concerned about Germany's forcing Romania to sign a commercial agreement on 23 March 1939, because Turkey's neighbors were in Germany's *Lebensraum* (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 321).

Meanwhile, Mussolini's invasion of Albania on 7 April 1939 persuaded Turkey to abandon non-alignment between Axis powers and Allied Powers (Váli 1971, 28). Upon the hearsays that Italy would attack Corfu, Britain felt the need to give a guarantee to Greece. On 11 April, Britain desired also Turkey's participation to this guarantee (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 191). Anglo-French guarantees of assistance to Greece and Romania against any act of aggression made it more urgent for Britain and France to secure the co-operation of Turkey (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 26). Britain offered Turkey a treaty of mutual assistance on 12 April (Hale 2013, 50). On 13 April, the UK informed Turkey that the Italian occupation of Albania was the first step of the Axis Powers to expand the Axis domination in Europe. On 14 and 16 April, Britain and France demanded Turkey to join to the guarantee they had extended to Romania (Dışışleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 193).

Germany, facing encirclement from the south as the result of British-French agreements with Rumania and Greece, tried to secure at least Turkish neutrality to prevent Britain from sending assistance to Rumania through Turkey (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 397). According to Ankara, taking a position against the Axis Powers in advance would mean to call the enemy to the Straits in a shortest time. Therefore, Turkey decided to pursue a policy including the following elements:

- To announce that it would maintain its neutrality unless an aggression occurs by the Axis from the Mediterranean or the Balkans.
- To obtain British aid for the defense of the Straits against an Axis aerial attack.
- To obtain the cooperation of the Soviet Union.
- To obtain British support to reconcile Bulgaria and Romania (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 194).

The Turkish-Soviet negotiations regarding the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact started on 15 April 1939 (Gürün 2010, 188). On 15 April, the USSR requested from Turkey to make consultations pursuant to new situation emerged in the Balkans and the Black Sea (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 217). At the beginning, the USSR proposed a quick meeting in Tbilisi or Batum but later insisted on the visit of Saraçoğlu to Moscow (Esenbel 2000, 24-25)

While Anglo-Turkish negotiations for a defense treaty were in progress, Britain and France also opened negotiations for a treaty with the USSR. Turkey hoped that an alliance comprising all four countries would establish a common security front against German and Italian aggression (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 27). The USSR had three alternatives: to sign a military agreement with Britain and France, to become isolated, or to sign an agreement with Germany (Kurban 2017, 26). The USSR proposed a draft treaty² to Britain and France for joint action against aggression on 18 April 1939 in which article eight included to enter into joint negotiations with Turkey to conclude a special agreement on mutual assistance. The UK, France and the USSR would extend

² For the full text of the Soviet Proposals to Britain and France for *Joint Action Against Aggression* and counter proposals of Britain and France, see, Degras, (1953, 329-351).

assistance to each other including military nature in case of aggression in Europe against any one of the contracting Powers (Degras 1953, 329).

Meanwhile, deputy commissar Potemkin held meetings in Ankara between 28 April-5 May since the USSR was in a hurry to make consultations with Turkey (Gürün 2010, 188). Turkey found it suitable to conclude a limited mutual assistance agreement and demanded a draft treaty from the Soviet ambassador in Ankara (Esenbel 2000, 24-25)

In the counter proposal of Britain and France received by Moscow on 8 May, it was stated that “*the Soviet Government shall give immediate assistance to Great Britain and France should these latter be drawn into hostilities in carrying out the obligations they have assumed towards Poland and Rumania*”. However, the British-French proposal did not mention any help “*which is to be received on a reciprocal basis by the Soviet Union from France and Great Britain, if it likewise should be drawn into hostilities in carrying out the obligations it has assumed in regard to any eastern European state*” (Degras 1953, 330).

Turkey and Britain issued a *Joint Declaration*³ (*Déclaration Commune*) on 12 May 1939 (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 26). The Declaration was seen as a step for an Anglo-Soviet treaty in both countries (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 219). According to the Anglo-Turkish Joint Declaration, pending a long-term agreement, the two sides would give each other all aid and assistance in the event of an act of aggression leading to a war in the Mediterranean (Hale 2013, 50). While the Declaration was found positively in the Soviet press, it was criticized by the German press (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 335). During the negotiations, the UK demanded the application of this cooperation to the Balkans, but Turkey rejected due to her obligations to the USSR and Bulgaria. The reason of the British demand was if the UK became obliged to assist Romania due to her previous guarantees, this assistance could only be realized through the Turkish Straits. Whereas it was impossible for the warring parties to use the Straits in accordance with Montreux. This could be possible only in case of Turkey’s becoming a warring party. Turkey, seeing this possibility which would engage her with the

³ For the full text of the *Turco-British Joint Declaration* dated 12 May 1939, in Turkish, see, Soysal (1989, 592-593).

USSR, refrained from giving guarantee to Romania and rejected the British proposal (Aydın 2015a, 417).

The German ambassador in Moscow was describing Potemkin's April meetings in Ankara in a telegraph as follows:

"Deputy Commissar Potemkin's hurried visit to Ankara between 28 April and 5 May was to prevent the signing of the Turco-British agreement. He prevented the agreement but not the declaration. Soviet Union does not object to Turkish-British agreement in principle. However, the Soviet Union attaches importance to Turkey's move with her at the same time and in the same way, but not free and alone" (Gürün 2010, 188; my translation).

The failure of transforming the Anti-Comintern Pact into a tripartite military alliance was emanated from divergent German and Japanese views regarding the target country. While Japan insisted that any such pact be directed specifically and exclusively at the Soviet Union, Germany's target was France and the UK. The *Pact of Steel* signed between Germany and Italy on 22 May 1939, confirmed the breakdown of the German Japanese negotiations and signaled Germany's intention to attack France and the UK. Thus, the USSR hoped to escape an immediate German invasion and obtain considerable advantage by abstaining from a war between Germany and France-Britain that was likely to result in their mutual exhaustion. This was the reason of Soviet double game in the spring and summer of 1939 when Britain and France belatedly requested Soviet assistance against Germany (Keylor 2001, 172-173).

Following France's conceding Turkey's claims over Hatay⁴, a *Declaration*⁵ almost identical to Anglo-Turkish one was signed on 23 June despite all the contrary efforts of Germany (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 336). Following these declarations, Turkey undertook the task of integrating this future treaty and its commitments and expectations with the USSR (Hale 2013, 50).

On 16 July 1939, the USSR criticized the provisions of Franco-British proposal as follows:

⁴ For the full text of the *Arrangement for the Final Settlement of Territorial Questions between Turkey and Syria*, dated 23 June 1939, see, Hurewitz (1979, 546-548).

⁵ For the full text of *Franco-Turkish Joint Declaration*, dated 23 June 1939, see, Hurewitz (1979, 546).

“France and Britain consider that Soviet Union should render immediate assistance to Poland, Rumania, Belgium, Greece and Turkey in the event of an attack on them by an aggressor and in the event of England and France being involved in hostilities in connection therewith, whereas England and France would not render obligations to render immediate assistance to Soviet Union in the event of USSR being involved in hostilities with an aggressor in connection with an attack by the latter on Latvia, Estonia and Finland which border on the USSR” (as quoted in Degras 1953, 349-350).

The basis of disagreement among the USSR and France-Britain was Poland. The Polish Government openly stated that it did not need and would not accept military aid from the USSR, and this condition made military cooperation between the USSR and, France and England impossible. For this reason, the negotiations were broken off (Degras 1953, 361-362). On 15 August, Germany communicated to the USSR its desire for a serious improvement in the political relations. The USSR reply was as the following:

“... [T]he Soviet Government up till very recently has proceeded on the assumption that the German Government is seeking an occasion for a clash with the Soviet Union, is preparing itself for such a clash [T]he German Government by using the so-called anti Comintern Pact was endeavoring to and did establish the united front of a number of states against the Soviet Union [This] has compelled the Soviet Union to take serious steps in the preparation of defense against possible aggression by Germany against the Soviet Union and consequently to participate in the organization of a defensive front of a number of States against such aggression. ... Soviet Government can only welcome such a change and is for its part prepared to revise its policy in the sense of a serious improvement in respect of Germany. ... the first step towards such an improvement ... could be the conclusion of a trade and credit agreement. ... the second step ... could be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact or the re-affirmation of the neutrality pact of 1926, with the simultaneous conclusion of a special protocol defining the interests of the contracting parties in this or that question of foreign policy...” (as quoted in Degras 1953, 357).

The USSR also demanded answers from Turkey to several questions before the preparation of the draft treaty of mutual assistance. Turkey sent her answers. The counter-reply coming from the Turkish ambassador in Moscow to Ankara was the news about the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression on 23 August. Without any doubt, the USSR was simultaneously making talks with both Germany and the UK-France (Esenbel 2000, 24-25). However, Haas (2012, 284) states that the interests of the USSR in the cooperation with Britain and France against Germany was genuine, and that it only abandoned this goal with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact as a last resort, after Britain and France had rejected an alliance with the USSR.

On 23 August 1939, Treaty of Non-Aggression between the USSR and Germany⁶ was signed in Moscow having already signed a trade and credit agreement on 19 August. According to Art.1, two parties would “*refrain from any act of force, any aggressive act, or any attack against each other, either individually or in conjunction with other Powers*”. According to Art.4, “*neither of the contracting parties will join any group of Powers which directly or indirectly is directed against the other party*”. Two parties delimited their respective spheres of interest in Eastern Europe with a secret additional protocol (Degras 1953, 359-361). This was the fourth partition of Poland. Finland, Latvia and Estonia had been allotted to the Russian sphere of influence⁷ (Keylor 2001, 174-175). With regard to South-Eastern Europe, the Soviet side emphasized its interest in Bessarabia and the German side declared complete political *désintéressement* in these territories (Degras 1953, 359-361).

2. From the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the Operation Barbarossa (23 August 1939 – 22 June 1941)

The Nazi Soviet-Pact levelled the way for German attack on Poland and assured Germany that the USSR would stay out of any European war. Stalin believed that the Pact provided security and allowed for territorial expansion for the Soviet Union at the expense of Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states (Wozniuk 1990, 61). The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact removed the hazards of a two-front war for Germany. The USSR would provide Germany raw materials crucial for the latter’s war efforts (Haas 2012, 291). On 1 September 1939, Germany began to occupy Poland⁸. On 3 September, the UK and France proclaimed war on Germany⁹ (Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu 2015, 276).

⁶ For the full text of *The Treaty between the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact / The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact)* and *Secret Additional Protocol*, dated 23 August 1939, see, Degras (1953, 359-361).

⁷ Lithuania which was placed to Germany’s sphere in the Nazi-Soviet Pact, was transferred to the SU in a subsequent agreement on 28 September (Keylor 2001, 174-175).

⁸ Danzig had been separated from Germany and included in the newly established Poland to provide it an exit to the Baltics Sea following the WWI. In March 1939, Germany demanded Danzig. Poland rejected this demand with the support of the UK and France which gave a guarantee against a German attack (Aydın 2015a, 409).

⁹ Turkey’s wartime diplomacy demonstrated significant shifts adapted to the changing circumstances (Hale 2013, 57). Between 1939 and 1940, Turkey was an ally of Britain and France and was expected to carry out its alliance commitments. With the signature of the non-aggression Pact with Germany in

The Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact was a serious shock for both Turkey and the western powers (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 27). Lenczowski (as cited in Sönmezoğlu 2015, 419) argues that one of the main foreign policy objective of Germany at the beginning of the WWII was to prevent Turkey's cooperation with Britain and France who were trying to form a chain of alliances to encircle Germany from the Balkans and the Middle East. Turkey was at a key point in this encirclement because Anglo-French assistance should have to pass to Romania through the Straits. In the beginning of the war, if Turkey could be neutralized, Turkey should have to close the Straits to the battle ships of Britain-France in accordance with the article 19 of the Montreux Convention. The USSR did not want to take part directly in a war between Germany and Britain/France, thus wished the neutralization of the Black Sea by welcoming the German demands in this direction. Therefore, the USSR wanted neutralization of Turkey to appease Germany and hold war away from her frontiers.

The draft treaty of 1 September between Britain, France and Turkey assured Turkey of Anglo-French assistance if it were attacked by a European power in return for Turkish assistance to other two parties if they were involved in a war in the Mediterranean resulting from an act of aggression by any European power or they found themselves at war as a result of their guarantees to Greece and Romania. Turkey delayed the signature of the final treaty until it reach a comparable agreement with the USSR which had been proceeding for some time (Hale 2013, 51-52).

On 4 September 1939, the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara informed that the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact was signed to prevent any conspiracy of Britain and France against the USSR following the failure of the negotiations. He also added that *"it is without any doubt that the completely changed international situation requires*

1941, Turkey moved to a more neutral position referred to as "*active neutrality*". In 1943, Turkey shifted back towards the Allies remaining non-belligerent. Turkey turned its weakness to a diplomatic asset by stressing its military unpreparedness thus heading off pressure for joining the war. Turkey also benefitted from the differences between the US and Britain in bringing Turkey into the war. During the war, while the Allies had only one identifiable enemy, Turkey faced threats from both the Axis and the USSR. Turkey turned these threats to its advantage by using the German threat as a reason for not joining the war on the Allied side, and possible Soviet attack for not carrying its commitments under the 1939 treaty in 1940. The danger of a Soviet attack was also used against Germany to deflect assistance in 1941. The failure to reach an agreement between Germany and the USSR in 1940 to carve up near east was a life saver for Turkey (Hale 2013, 76-77).

dealing with the current friendly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in a different way than stated by the parties two weeks ago” (Dışışleri Bakanlıđı 1973d, 225-226).

In response to Soviet demands, Turkey proposed a draft agreement¹⁰ composed of four articles. According to Art.1, the parties would cooperate against an act of aggression directed to Turkey in the Straits and the Black Sea zone and directed to the Soviet Union by a European power. According to Art.3, the commitments undertaken according to articles one and two would not force Turkey to enter into a dispute with Britain and France (Dışışleri Bakanlıđı 1973d, 226-227).

On 15 September, Turkish FM Saraçođlu was invited to Moscow one more time (Dışışleri Bakanlıđı 1973d, 229). On 17 September 1939, the USSR attacked Poland in accordance with the secret provision related to her share of sphere of influence (Sönmezođlu 2015, 395). It seemed possible that both Germany and the USSR might also go on to overrun Turkey (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 397). The Anglo-French-Turkish tripartite agreement was initialized on 23 September but the signing of the agreement was postponed until after the Moscow negotiations (Gürün 2010, 199). Turkey’s expectation from the Moscow negotiations was to seek a connection point between the triple pact and the Turkish-Soviet friendship. The objectives of the USSR were to amend Montreux in favor of herself, to learn the details of the triple pact and to obtain Turkey’s neutrality. It was difficult to find a common ground for two countries having different aims (Aydın 2015a, 419).

The visit of Saraçođlu to Moscow started on 25 September. On 26 September, at the first day of the negotiations, Molotov’s paper containing the Soviet proposals for the amendment of Montreux was rejected by Saraçođlu. The negotiations was interrupted when the German FM Ribbentrop also came to Moscow on 27 September (Aydın 2015a, 419).

A new agreement and secret protocols, signed on 28 September, finalized the framework of the alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union (Dışışleri Bakanlıđı

¹⁰ For the full text of the *Turkish Draft Agreement*, in Turkish, see, Dışışleri Bakanlıđı (1973d, 226-227).

1973d, 229). The new German-Soviet border and friendship treaty laid down a new demarcation line on Bug on the river Vistula. Lithuania became part of the Soviet zone of influence (McCauley 2008, xii). According to the *Joint Declaration* issued on 28 September 1939, both governments established that England and France bore responsibility for the continuation of the war between Germany and France-England (Degras 1953, 379-380).

On 1 October, at the second day of the negotiations, when Molotov brought the paper¹¹ on Straits once again to the table, Saraçoğlu asked whether the proposed mutual assistance agreement and the proposals over Straits are connected and got the reply that they were connected (Aydın 2015a, 420). Saraçoğlu rejected the Soviet proposal saying that any demand related to an international document cannot be met through bilateral talks or correspondence (Gürün 2010, 200-208). Upon Saraçoğlu's demand for the facilitation of his return to Turkey, Stalin withdrew the paper (Aydın 2015a, 420). Stalin demanded the following amendments for the draft of the triple pact:

- Turkey's commitments for Romania and Greece would be turned into consultations.
- In case of a war between the USSR and the UK-France, the triple pact would not be implemented (Aydın 2015a, 420).

Following the acceptance of the Soviet amendments by the UK and France, the Turkish-Soviet negotiations continued on 13 October, as the third day of the negotiations. Meanwhile, Germany had demanded from the USSR to put a reservation to the Turkish-Soviet agreement regarding the Soviet obligation to assist Turkey in case of a German attack. Saraçoğlu said that this kind of reservation would make the agreement meaningless. The meeting was dismissed following the disagreements over the Straits and the German reservation (Aydın 2015a, 420-421).

On 15 October, at the fourth and last meeting, Molotov wanted to give once more a substantially same but formally different paper on the Straits but Saraçoğlu even rejected to take it (Aydın 2015a, 421). The gap between Turkey's new friendship

¹¹ For the text of the Soviet draft amendments regarding the Montreux Convention, in Turkish, see, Bilge (1992, 138-139), Gürün (2010, 204-205), Dışişleri Bakanlığı (1973d, 235) and Aydın (2015a, 421).

with the West and with the USSR emerged unbridgeable (Hale 2013, 52). Before Saraçoğlu's return to Turkey on 20 October the two parties agreed on a declaration prepared by the Soviet side. The Declaration was issued in Moscow and in Ankara on 18 October. In the declaration, it was mentioned that the exchange of views between the two parties was held within a friendly atmosphere (Gürün 2010, 200-208).

The Soviet draft on the Straits was creating a new regime granting itself equal rights with Turkey on the Straits leaving the responsibilities about third parties on Turkey (Gürün 2010, 200-208). The Soviet proposals over the Strait were related to putting limitations on the passage of the war ships and commercial ships of the non-Black Sea powers through the Straits and establishing a joint decision mechanism. The reason of the breakdown of the talks between the parties was explained in the TGNA as follows:

- It was not possible to undertake any obligations other than Turkey's international commitments on the Straits.
- There had been imbalances between the assistance extended to and demanded from Turkey.
- It was not possible to accommodate this kind of agreement with Turkey's commitments to Britain and France (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 245).

The main reason for the breakdown of the talks in Moscow was stated in the Turkish Foreign Ministry as the hesitation of the USSR whether to make an agreement or not. This hesitation had been emanated from the political and military events occurred between the date of invitation of the Turkish delegation to Moscow and the date of its arrival to Moscow. These developments were the occupation of Poland and first frontier demarcation agreement between Germany and the USSR. During the Moscow talks, the visit of Ribbentrop, the second frontier demarcation agreement, and the agreements made with the northern countries followed. Another reason was that the USSR did not take the military campaigns at the western front into account seriously. The last reason was the German initiatives in Moscow (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1973d, 246-247).

While Saraçoğlu was on his way to Ankara, British-French-Turkish tripartite agreement was signed on 19 October (Gürün 2010, 200-208). Upon the breakdown of the talks in Moscow, the final document on the “*Treaty of Mutual Assistance between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom, the President of the French Republic and the President of the Turkish Republic*” and two annexed protocols and the Special Accord¹² was signed on 19 October (Hale 2013, 52). The relevant provisions of the treaty were as follows:

“Art I. In the event of Turkey being involved in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by that Power against Turkey, France and the United Kingdom will co-operate effectively with Turkey and will lend her all aid and assistance in their power. “

Art II/1. In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom are involved, Turkey will collaborate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power.

Art II/2. In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which Turkey is involved, France and the United Kingdom will collaborate effectively with Turkey and will lend her all aid and assistance in their power.

Art II. So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and Romania by their respective Declarations of the 13th April, 1939, remain in force, Turkey will co-operate” (HMSO 1940).

Protocol No.2 of the Treaty stipulated that “*the obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union*”. The three parties also signed a special agreement on the same date to regulate certain issues relative to financial and economic nature and delivery of war materials to Turkey in connection with the Treaty.

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov was arguing on 31 October that Turkey, by pushing neutral politics aside, had entered the European war trajectory, whereas Soviet Union had preferred to pursue neutral policy (Gürün 2010, 209). Germany and Italy threatened Turkey with all kinds of economic and other reprisals due to the signing of the Triple Pact (Váli 1971, 30). On 31 October 1939, Molotov explained Soviet-Turkish relations as follows:

¹² For the documents including the *Military Convention*, see, Soysal (1989, 591-599).

“... All kinds of tales are being spread abroad about the substance of these negotiations. Some allege that the USSR demanded the cession of the districts of Ardahan and Kars. Let us say for our part this is a sheer fabrication and lie. Others allege that the USSR has demanded changes in the international convention concluded at Montreux, and a privileged position as regards the Straits. That is also a fabrication and a lie. ...

As a matter of fact, the question at issue was the conclusion of a bilateral pact of mutual assistance limited to the regions of the Black Sea and the Straits. The USSR considered, firstly, that the conclusion of such a pact could not compel it to take actions which might draw it into armed conflict with Germany; secondly, that the USSR should have a guarantee that in view of the war danger Turkey would not allow warships of non-Black Sea Powers through the Bosphorus to the Black Sea. Turkey rejected both these stipulations and thereby made the conclusion of a pact impossible. ...

[Turkey] has concluded a pact of mutual assistance with Great Britain and France, who, for the past two months, have been waging war on Germany. Turkey has thereby definitely discarded a cautious policy of neutrality and has entered the orbit of expanding European war. ... Whether Turkey will not come to regret it we shall not try to guess. ... The Soviet Union prefers to keep its hands free in future as well, to go on consistently pursuing its policy of neutrality... (as quoted in Degras 1953, 397-398).

Finland refused both to grant Russia the strategic bases it sought for the protection of Leningrad and to regard itself as part of the Soviet sphere of interest. On 30 November the USSR attacked Finland (Keylor 2001, 177). The League of Nations ruled that the Soviet Union was the aggressor in the war with Finland and passed a resolution expelling the USSR from the organization on 14 December 1939 (Degras 1953, 413).

Turkey's efforts to transform the Balkan Entente into a more effective instrument remained fruitless in early 1940 (Váli 1971, 30). The war spread to the Mediterranean with Italy's entry into the war on the German side on 10 June 1940. Turkey had to go to the war as required by the Triple Alliance (Kurban 2017, 38). France surrendered on 22 June 1940 after the surrender of Holland and Belgium (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 396). The Turkish declaration of non-belligerence on 26 June which cited the second protocol to the treaty absolved Turkey from joining the war¹³ if this would involve it in an armed conflict with the USSR. Turkey also argued that the drop of France out of the war relieved it of its obligations. The real reason for Turkey was that Britain alone would be unable to give any support and Turkey would be left to fight with Italy and Germany on its own. The fear that the USSR would take the advantage of the situation was a further reason (Hale 2013, 59). Meanwhile, the

¹³ For the basic tactics of Turkey not to enter war, see, Oran (2015b, 394-396).

USSR occupied Bessarabia and northern Bukovina in Romania on 28 June (McCauley 2008, xiii).

On the other hand, Germany was exerting effort to drive a wedge between Turkey and the USSR. Germany revealed some information obtained from the archives of France on 4 July 1940. According to this information, France and Britain had planned to strike Soviet oil plants in Baku and oil refineries in Batum to prevent oil exportation to Germany with aircrafts taken up from the bases in Iraq and Syria using the Turkish air space. The Allies had applied to Turkey for the implementation of this plan. The USSR having received this intelligence promptly ended the war with Finland. Although this event contributed to the deterioration of the Turco-Soviet relations, it cannot be said that a serious crisis broke out between the parties. Because, Turkey's neutrality worth despite everything (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 427-429).

In July 1940, the USSR accepted the British mediation for an improvement in its relations with Turkey on the condition that this would be based on the participation of the Black Sea powers in the defense of the Straits. Turkey expectedly rejected the proposal (Hale 2013, 61). On 1 August 1940, Molotov explained that a foreign airplane coming from Turkey flew over Batum where there were many oil refineries and the warning of Moscow to Ankara that it could not tolerate such future incidents. At first, Turkey denied that any such airplane had not come from Turkish territory. Subsequently, Turkey promised to adopt measures to prevent flights of this kind in the future (Degras 1953, 467).

Germany, Italy, and Japan concluded the *Three Power Pact for Mutual Aid between Germany, Italy, and Japan* in Berlin on 27 September 1940. Since they were confident that Britain would lose the war, they wanted to define in advance their sphere of influence. Germany invited the USSR to join the three-powers proposing the delimitation of their interests on a world-wide scale (Hurewitz 1979, 559). However, Hitler had already ordered to begin preparing for war against the Soviet Union on 21 July 1940 (McCauley 2008, xiii).

The German moves towards Romania beginning from October 1940 alarmed the USSR. The distrust of the USSR emanated from the falling of the Balkans under

the German influence weakened the Nazi-Soviet Pact (Ertem 2013, 165). During the German-Soviet talks in Berlin between 12-13 November 1940, the *Draft Agreement between the Axis Powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) and the Soviet Union* and two secret protocols was submitted by Ribbentrop to Molotov. The Draft aimed to establish spheres of influences in Europe, Asia, and Africa. According to Draft Secret Protocol No. 2, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union would undertake the following:

“1. Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union agree in the view that it is in their common interest to detach Turkey from her existing international commitments and progressively to win her over to political collaboration with themselves. They declare that they will pursue this aim in close consultation, with a common line of action which is still to be determined.

2. Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union declare their agreement to conclude, at a given time, a joint agreement with Turkey, wherein the Three Powers would recognize the extent of Turkey's possessions.

3. Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union will work in common toward the replacement of the Montreux Straits Convention now in force by another convention. By this convention the Soviet Union would be granted the right of unrestricted passage of its navy through the Straits at any time, whereas all other Powers except the other Black Sea countries, but including Germany and Italy, would in principle renounce the right of passage through the Straits for their naval vessels. The passage of commercial vessels through the Straits would, of course, have to remain free in principle” (as quoted in Váli 1972, 224-226).

In case of Turkey's declaring herself as willing to join the Four-Power Pact, Turkey's independence and territory would be guaranteed by Germany, Italy and the USSR. In case of Turkey's refusing to join the Four Powers, three states would apply though military and diplomatic measures. The USSR also proposed a fifth secret protocol recognizing that Bulgaria is located inside its security zone in the Black Sea (Degras 1953, 477-478). Moscow delivered its Counter-Draft containing its conditions to join the *Four-Power Pact*, on 25 November 1940:

“1. Provided that the German troops are immediately withdrawn from Finland, which under the agreements of 1939, belongs to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. ...

2. Provided that within the next few months the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits is assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which geographically is situated inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union, and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles on a long-term lease.

3. Provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union”. ... (as quoted in Degras 1953, 477-478).

However, Germany did not want to hand over control of the Straits and Bulgaria to the USSR which would have encircled Germany from the south and ruled out a German attack on the British in the Middle East (Hale 2013, 61). According to Hitler, the most suitable route to access to warm waters was not the Straits but the Persian Gulf. For the security of the Black Sea, amendment of Montreux so as to close the Straits to non-Black Sea riparian states was sufficient. The Soviet demands regarding the Soviet control of Kars and Ardahan was also rejected by Germany (Ülman 1961, 32).

Therefore, Hitler did not respond to this Note (Ertem 2013, 165) and signed the instruction no.21 for the preparations of the invasion of the USSR (*Operation Barbarossa*) on 18 December 1940 (Hale 2013, 61). All preparations for an attack on the USSR would be finished by 15 May 1941 (McCauley 2008, xiii). Following the concentration of German troops in Romania in great numbers, Soviet Russia presented the following statement to Germany on 17 January 1941:

“... German troops ... concentrated in Rumania ... are now quite ready to march into Bulgaria, having as their objective the occupation of Bulgaria, Greece, and the Straits. There can be no doubt that Britain will try to forestall the action of German troops, by occupying the Straits, and by starting military operations against Bulgaria in alliance with Turkey, turning Bulgaria into a theater of war. The Soviet Government on several occasions stated to the German Government that it considers the region of Bulgaria and both the Straits to be the security zone of the USSR and therefore it cannot remain indifferent to events which threaten the security interests of the USSR. ...” (as quoted in Degras 1953, 482-483).

Bulgaria joined the Axis Powers on 1 March 1941 and the German army occupied the country (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 434). The isolationist policy of the US gradually evolved into a pro-British strategy to prevent damaging consequences of the German victory over Britain to American national interests (Keylor 2001, 184). The exhaustion of the British dollar reserves led the US to enact Lend-Lease Act (*An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States*)¹⁴ on 11 March 1941 which authorized

¹⁴Since Germany had failed to resume the reparations payment, the European debtors of the US, six countries including France and Belgium defaulted for the first time on 15 December 1932. In June 1933, the UK and Italy reduced payments and within a year all of the European debtors except Finland ceased payment altogether. The US denied the connection between German reparations and the European war debts and retaliated with the Johnson Act of April 1934 which prohibited the Americans from purchasing the securities from default European governments. In addition, the Neutrality Act of 1935 banned the sales of munitions to belligerents and required cash payment for all exports. Britain and

the sale of American products on credit to any country (Keylor 2001, 184). Turkey was among the first benefitted countries from this Act. However, this aid to Turkey was implemented through the intermediary of the UK by taking into consideration their close ties. The US started to deliver military equipment to the UK to be sent to Turkey as of March 1941 (Ülman 1961, 35).

The USSR, seeing that the Balkans would fall under the occupation of the Germans, noticed the importance of the resistance of Turkey against Germany, and tried to clean the bad memoirs of the Şükrü Saraçoğlu's visit to Moscow (Armaoğlu 1988, 409). Seeing the softening Soviet attitude towards Turkey, Germany leaked the Soviet demands over Turkey. Turkey learned the German-Soviet bargain for the first time on 17 March 1941 with Hitler's transmitting the Soviet demands to the Turkish ambassador Gerede (Ertem 2013, 165-166). Therefore, the USSR officially declared on 25 March that she did not have any intention to attack Turkey (Ertem 2013, 166). On 25 March 1941, Turkey and the USSR announced the "*Joint Soviet-Turkish Statement on Neutrality*". The Statement mentioned the following:

"In view of the rumors appearing in the foreign press to the effect that, if Turkey were forced into war, the Soviet Union would take advantage of the difficulties Turkey would have to face to attack her, and in reply to an inquiry, the Soviet Government has informed the Turkish Government that:

1. These rumors are wholly at variance with the attitude of the Soviet Government.
2. Should Turkey really be attacked and forced into war for the defense of its territory, it could then, in accordance with the non-aggression pact existing between Turkey and the USSR, count on the complete understanding and neutrality of the USSR.

The Turkish Government has expressed to the Soviet Government its most sincere thanks for that declaration and has in its turn declared that, should the USSR find itself in a similar situation, it could count on the complete understanding and neutrality of Turkey" (as quoted in Degras 1953, 484).

Wishing to stabilize its southern flank in preparation for Barbarossa, Germany occupied Romania and Bulgaria in April and May 1941 (Hale 2013, 63). Turkey confronted with the German pressure following her relief from the Soviet pressure.

France were forced to reduce their imports from the US to conserve their gold and dollar reserves. As American public support for the Anglo-French cause increased, the US Congress lifted the arms embargo in November 1939. On 11 March 1941, the Lend-Lease Act supplanted the cash-on-delivery requirement and allowed for the postponement of the payments of the American exports to the UK and her allies until the end of the war (Keylor 1996, 136).

Germany wanted to seize Iraq and Iran oils benefitting from the Raşid Ali revolt which had started in Iraq in April 1941. Germany offered territories from Thrace and the Aegean islands to Turkey in return for permission to pass her soldiers through Turkey. Turkey rejected German proposals stating that she could not act contrary to the Anglo-Turkish agreement. When the revolt in Iraq terminated by the British at the end of May 1941, Germany renounced from this request (Ülman 1961, 33-34).

Turkey informed the UK regarding the German initiatives and got her support to maintain her contact with Germany. The UK also warned Turkey to avoid from a German trap to set Turkey and the USSR each other (Aydın 2015a, 441). On 18 June 1941, *Treaty of Non-aggression*¹⁵ was signed between Turkey and Germany for a period of ten years. Each state agreed to respect each other's territorial integrity and to abstain from all action aimed directly or indirectly against one another. Since the preamble of the Treaty stated that these commitments were subject to the already existing arrangements of each party, it marked Turkey's move towards a *full* rather than *de facto* neutrality (Hale 2013, 64).

The main factor in signing of an agreement between Turkey and Germany was the USSR. When Germany reached the border with Turkey, there were two possible policies to be followed by Germany at that point: to come to terms with Turkey, or to invade Turkey. Germany was not willing to divide its powers, and thus preferred to settle with Turkey. In addition, Germany did not want to cease the shipments of chrome and copper needed for the war industry (Kurban 2017, 39). Germany got Turkey to close the Straits to the ships of all nations, preventing the allies from helping the USSR (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 397).

On 22 June 1941, German troops attacked the USSR without a declaration of war¹⁶. The signing of the Turkish-German Pact only four days before the *Operation Barbarossa* extremely irritated the US and the latter halted aid to Turkey delivered through *Lend-Lease Act*. Acting more realist, the UK continued to transfer some of the aid it received from the US to prevent Turkey's getting out of hand (Armaoğlu 1991,

¹⁵ For the full text of the *Treaty of Non-Aggression between the Republic of Turkey and the German Reich*, see, Hurewitz (1979, 571).

¹⁶ This event relieved Turkey from her biggest fear: the *Poland Syndrome* – exposing to common invasion of Germany and the USSR (Oran 2015b, 388).

144). The UK did not want to push Turkey into the arms of Germany despite her suspects but could not succeed to persuade the US to renounce from her decision. Another reason of the interruption of the arms delivery was Germany's likely dominance in Turkey. The US deemed it unnecessary to deliver arms to a country which would be momentarily fall under the control of Germany (Ülman 1961, 34-35).

3. From the Operation Barbarossa to the Battle of Stalingrad (22 June 1941 – 2 February 1943)

On 25 June 1941, Turkey proclaimed her neutrality in the German-Soviet war in accordance with the Turco-Soviet Declaration of 21 March (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 444-446). Following the German attack on the USSR a reverse pressure on Turkey emerged. Before the German-Soviet war, both parties were pressing Turkey not to allow the passage of Ally warships through the Straits. At one stage Turkey had concerned from the Soviet occupation of the Straits. The event halting the Soviets was Hitler's rejecting the Soviet demands over Bulgaria and the Straits and the hesitation of the USSR to confront with Germany (Aydın 2015a, 445-446). Turkey was concerned from the Anglo-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance¹⁷ of 12 July 1941 and the attempts of the US and Britain to deliver aid to the USSR. Both Britain and the USSR informed Turkey with a Note of 10 August 1941 that they would not be in any idea and action that would bother Turkey regarding the Straits and Montreux (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 444-446).

On 14 August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill signed the *Atlantic Charter* and agreed to oppose all postwar territorial changes that violated the wishes of the peoples concerned (Keylor 2001, 191). On 25 August 1941, Britain, and the USSR occupied Iran to make shipments through Iran since Turkey would not allow the transit of the battle ships through the Straits in accordance with Montreux. Turkey concerned from the idea that the occupation of Iran¹⁸ could set an example for her (Sönmezoğlu 2015, 444-446).

¹⁷ Unilateral peace negotiations or armistices with Germany were ruled out (McCauley 2008, xiii).

¹⁸ For the full text of the *Treaty of Alliance (with exchange of Notes)* among UK, USSR and Iran, dated 29 January 1942, see, United Nations (1951).

The USSR was unprepared for the German attack. Over half of the Soviet army was killed, wounded, or captured in the first three months of the battle. *“At the farthest extent of the German army’s three-pronged advance- toward Leningrad in the north, Moscow in the center, and the Ukrainian grain fields and Caucasian oil wells in the south- almost half of Russia’s industrial resources and cultivated land”* passed to German control. Kiev fell and German armies laid siege to Moscow and Leningrad in the autumn of 1941. The non-aggression pact that the USSR had signed with Japan on 13 April 1941 freed the USSR from threat of two-fronted war (Keylor 2001, 182-183).

On 9 October 1941, Turkey and Germany concluded the Clodius agreement, according to which, Turkey would export various important raw materials to Germany, including 90,000 tons of chrome in 1943 and 1944 in return for war equipment (Gökay 2006, 54). On 6 November 1941, the US extended a \$ 1 billion lend-lease credit to the USSR. In this way a considerable resources was extended to the major powers in the anti-Axis coalition during the last months of the American neutrality. Germany intended to rout the Red Army and topple the Stalinist regime before the arrival of the winter snows, however, the German offensive came to a halt in December 1941. The newly constructed factories east of Urals began to compensate during the winter of 1941-1942 (Keylor 2001, 183-184). In December 1941, the USSR suggested to Britain that Turkey should be given the Dodecanese, certain territory in Bulgaria and possibly in northern Syria but Britain replied that it could not commit itself to any post-war re-drawing of frontiers (Hale 2013, 68).

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on 7 December 1941, the US entered the war on the side of the Allied powers. Turkey began to fear from Soviet preponderance in eastern Europe after the US came into the war as a full belligerent and joined the UK in supporting the USSR. This triggered Turkey to secure a compromise peace between the UK and Germany. Turkey worried about the possibility that either the USSR or the UK would make a separate peace with Germany which would eliminate Turkey (Deringil 1989, 137-138).

In 1942, Germany encouraged Pan-Turanism to undermine the USSR by agitating its Turkic minorities. Turkey avoided a commitment stating that Turkey’s support might cause the massacre of entire Soviet Turkic population since Armenians

were very influential in the Soviet administration (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 398). Turkey's signing a new trade agreement¹⁹ with Germany on 1 June 1942 regarding the exportation of 45 thousand tons of chromite in return for buying weapons created a negative influence on the US (Esmer and Sander 1993, 160). On 11 June 1942, the *Mutual Aid Agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* was signed (Kurban 2017, 53). The US replaced Britain as the major foreign supplier of the USSR by shipping foodstuffs, clothing and mechanized vehicles (Keylor 2001, 185).

The USSR continued to cooperate with Turkey until the end of the Stalingrad battle. Following the defeat of the German army in Stalingrad on 2 February 1943 and the change in the course of war in favor of the USSR, the Soviet attitude towards Turkey started to be harsher (Ertem 2013, 166).

4. The Period of Allied Conferences and the Turkish-Soviet Relations (1943-1945)

The UK and the US accepted Turkey's neutrality early in the war in view of its military and economic weakness and rendered economic and military assistance to keep her neutral until she could join the Allies (Gökay 2006, 54). Whereas, Moscow

¹⁹ Turkey's foreign policy in the aftermath of the Turkish-German trade agreement of 1 June 1942 until the end of the battle of Stalingrad (2 February 1943) has been coined as *active neutrality* by Menemenciöglü. Turkey would export 45 thousand tons of chromite in return for weapons. According to British War Cabinet memo on 20 July, the UK and the US could not supply the materials that Germany was giving to Turkey. It was impossible for them to outbid the German offer. It was at this time that Turkey began to speak of her policy of *active neutrality*. Clutton from the British FO criticized the *active neutrality* as the following: "*An active neutral has a foot in both camps. It is permissible for him to have an alliance with one of the belligerents so long as he has a pact of friendship with the other. This policy enables the country to preserve its neutrality, but at the same time gives an opportunity for cashing in on the side of whichever belligerent wins the war*" (Deringil 1989, 136). Turkey achieved to procure arms from both sides by convincing them that their interests laid in arming Turkey (Deringil 1989, 135). Turkey not only avoided involvement in the war, but she was able to influence both warring camps in her favor. Turkey also made each of the parties pay a price for Turkey's continuing resistance to the demands of others. Turkey managed to convince the Powers that she would defend herself if she were attacked and did not take refuge behind piecemeal concessions (Deringil 1989, 184). Following the British success at El Alamein in October and the Soviet success at Stalingrad in November 1942, Turkey became a tool for shortening the war. Since the Axis were retreating, Turkey had to find a new formula to counter British pressure as she could no longer claim that she was blocking the way to the Axis advance into the Middle East. The new reason was that Turkey still short of all necessary war material (Deringil 1989, 141). Military inadequacy was pushed forward as a legitimate way of gaining time (Deringil 1989, 187). On the other hand, Özkan (2017, 59) argues that the term *chameleon neutrality* coined by Niyazi Berkes has more explanatory power than the concept of *active neutrality* coined by Selim Deringil.

started to criticize Turkey's non-participation to the war following the Stalingrad battle arguing that Germany, benefiting from Turkey's neutrality in the Balkan wing, concentrated her all troops on the Russian front (Ülman 1961, 41).

4.1. The Casablanca Conference (14-24 January 1943)

The policy of demanding the unconditional surrender of Germany, announced at the Casablanca Conference, precluded a possibility of a negotiated peace between Germany and the Western allies. Turkey would have preferred a situation in which Germany accepted a peace deal with the western allies before the USSR completed its conquest of Eastern Europe which would have left some German power in the region to balance that of Russia (Hale 2013, 69). The doctrine of unconditional surrender reinforced Turkish distrust. The Turks knew that "*the Soviet could use their entry into the war as a pretext for entry into Turkey*". Therefore, Turkey had to resist to entry into the war at all costs (Kuniholm 1994, 33).

At Casablanca, the US and the UK agreed on the principle of preparing the way for Turkey's active participation in the war with the prior consent of Moscow. Turkey was given to Britain's theater of responsibility (Kuniholm 1994, 28). Churchill arranged a meeting with İnönü at Adana on 30–31 January and made clear to him the importance and the necessity of Turkish participation in the war before the end of 1943 (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 28). İnönü told that the Turkish Armed Forces should have to be equipped at a certain level to be able to participate in the war, Turkey was not secure from the USSR, and Turkey worried from the Soviet dominance in Europe following the defeat of Germany. The UK and Turkey agreed to make necessary preparations for Turkey's resistance to a likely German attack and her equipment with necessary war materials. The existence of different views regarding the post-war position of the USSR emerged during the negotiations of Adana. The common points were the necessity of supporting Turkey militarily and Turkey's non-belligerent status was even to the benefit of the Allies (Aydın 2015a, 452). Churchill informed Stalin

regarding the Adana²⁰ talks. In response to Churchill's report, Stalin replied²¹ that he could not know how Turkey would reconcile its obligations to Britain and the USSR with that of Germany. He added that if Turkey wanted close and friendly relations, the USSR would meet her in the half-way (Uğurlu 2003, 144). After the Adana meeting, Turkey turned *Operation HARDIHOOD*-the British plan for supplying Turkey in preparation for its entry into the war, into a foot dragging operation (Kuniholm 1994, 32). Meanwhile, Stalin dissolved the *Cominform* on 15 May 1943 to demonstrate that the USSR has no expansionary aims (McCauley 2008, xv).

4.2. The Quebec Conference (11-24 August 1943)

At the Quebec Conference held between 11-24 August 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to maintain the delivery of arms and equipment to enable Turkey to resist against the German pressure since the time for the participation of Turkey into the war did not come. In return, Turkey was requested to halt delivery of chromite to Germany and not to allow to passage of the German warships through the Straits (Ülman 1961, 41). The allies also decided to demand from Turkey opening of airfields required for the new front to be opened in the Balkans. The USSR opposed to the idea of opening of a new front in the Balkans, and instead insisted on the immediate entry into the war of Turkey. The Soviet attitude was emanated from the Soviet policy to prevent the deployment of the Allied troops in the Balkans because the USSR saw the region as her natural sphere of influence (Aydın 2015a, 455).

4.3. The Moscow Conference-III (19 October – 1 November 1943)

At the meetings of FM's of the US, Britain and Russia between 19 October and 1 November 1943 in Moscow. Russian FM Molotov proposed that Turkey should be told peremptorily to join the war since Russia estimated that Turkish participation in the war would draw off 15 German divisions from the Russian front (Hale 2013, 70-71). The American Secretary of State Hull demanded that all the troops should have

²⁰ For Churchill's Personal Message to Stalin regarding the Adana Interview dated 1 February 1943, in Turkish, see, Uğurlu (2003, 139-141).

²¹ For Stalin's Reply Message to Churchill regarding the Adana Interview, dated 6 February 1943, in Turkish, see, Uğurlu (2003, 143-144).

to concentrate in the second front to be opened in northern France and objected to any concessions to be made about its preparations (Ülman 1961, 42). The UK was in favor of Turkey's remaining non-belligerent for a while since Turkey would demand equipment in an amount impossible to supply. Finally, the UK and the USSR decided to demand from Turkey to entry into war before the end of 1943 and allocation of bases for the Allied forces (Aydın 2015a, 456). Assessing Turkey's relieving the USSR by entering into the war was not important as much as it was in 1941 for the USSR, some authors argued that the reason of the Soviet insistence was the idea to rescue a Turkey occupied by Germany (Aydın 2015a, 457).

While the British FM Eden was still in Moscow, he requested a meeting with Menemencioğlu in Cairo. The meeting was held on 5 November. The debate was focused on the post-war Soviet intentions. Eden told that the USSR had not expansionist policies. Menemencioğlu told that Turkey had to be persuaded that the USSR would continue to cooperate with the Allied Powers in the post-war era and would not attempt to any act that the Allied Powers could not prevent. Eden demanded Turkey's immediate participation to the war. Menemencioğlu rejected Eden's proposal telling that the Adana pledges had not been met. He also refused the establishment of bases in Turkey since this would mean Turkey's entry into war directly. Turkey's diplomacy preference was directed towards the US following this Cairo meeting (Ertem 2013, 169-171).

4.4. The Teheran Conference (28 November – 1 December 1943)

At the Tehran Conference held between 28 November and 1 December 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met together for the first time to plan the strategy and timing of the projected invasion of Western Europe (Keylor 2001, 187). It was agreed, in principle, on the partition of Germany. The Curzon line was to be the Polish-Soviet frontier (McCauley 2008, xv).

The Teheran Conference crystallized the Soviet attitude²² toward Turkey which began to shape after Stalingrad on a geopolitical level (Kuniholm 1994, 42). The USSR opposed any diversion of forces to Turkey if this would mean the postponement of *Operation Overlord* (Hale 2013, 71). In conformity with the military conclusions of the conference related to Turkey, the parties undertook the following:

“(2) Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year.

(3) Took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria. The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war” (Yale Law School 2019b).

For the first time, Stalin raised the question of “warm water ports” at the Tehran Conference in a conversation with Churchill and Roosevelt. All three agreed that the Straits should be free to the commerce of the world. Molotov said to Churchill that the USSR, as a Black Sea power, had a special interest in the Straits, but his government had no intention of pressing the matter at that time (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 30). The Big Tree agreed to invite İnönü to a meeting in Cairo on the last day of the Teheran conference. The Allies decided at Teheran to bring Turkey into the war by 1 January 1944 which was later changed to 15 February by the British general staff (Kuniholm 1994, 43-44).

4.5. The Cairo Conference (4 – 6 December 1943)

At the Cairo Conference held between 4 – 6 December 1943, Churchill told İnönü²³ that 15 February was the deadline for Turkey’s decision to entry into war and

²² The Ottoman-Russian defensive alliance of 1805 was used by the Soviet government between 1943-1947 as the legal basis for pressing the Soviet claim for having joint responsibility with Turkey for the defence of the Straits and the closure of the Black Sea to the naval vessels of all but the riparian powers. However, it was later discovered that the so called “old principle” rested on a diplomatic and literary fraud first perpetrated by Sergei Gorianov with his book *Bosfor i Dardanelly* published in 1907 which served Russian, Turkish and western scholars as an authentic Russian source for lack of alternative evidence. The key was the so called article 7 of the secret treaty which was absent in the Ottoman text and also in the French text ratified by the tsarist government: “*It is understood that the free passage through the Canal of Constantinople will continue in effect for the vessels of war and military transports of His Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, to which in every instance the Sublime Porte will furnish every assistance and grant every facility that may be required*” (Hurewitz 1975, 162-163).

²³ Esenbel (2000, 34) indicates that four transport planes arrived at Adana on 4 December. One of the planes was the private plane of Roosevelt and the other was the private plane of Churchill. Colonel John

Britain would not stand in Russia's way at war's end. Turkey was prepared to enter the war in principle, but was prevented from doing so due to the fact that Turkey had to receive the arms and equipment necessary for its defense and it had to have a general plan of collaboration with the Allies in the Balkans (Kuniholm 1994, 46-48). Turkey only committed itself to accept a military mission to discuss the preparation of bases and reserved the right to decide by 15 February 1944 whether it would allow the Allies to use them (Hale 2013, 72).

On 12 December, Turkey informed the Allies that it would not receive Allied air detachments by the target date of 15 February (Hale 2013, 72). Kuniholm (1994, 46) argues that *"Turkey's decision was complicated by its erroneous belief that the Russians were trying to push them into the war, and that the British and American were the unwitting tools of Moscow"*. However, according to Kuniholm, all evidence indicated that the British, not the Soviets, were trying to push Turkey into the war.

Roosevelt and Churchill had different views regarding the Soviet threat (Kuniholm 1994, 49). By the end of 1943, the Soviet emphasis on OVERLORD coincided with a desire to avoid British interference in the Soviet designs in the Balkans and the Near East. Britain's hope for a campaign in the Balkans aimed to ensure her interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The US was not interested in Turkey because it did not want their resources diverted from the Normandy attack (Kuniholm 1994, 50).

The British military delegation, arrived at Ankara in January 1944, suddenly left Turkey on 3 February as a result of inconclusive talks. This increased tension between Turkey and the UK. The day after, the UK demanded from the US to suspend her relations with Turkey. On 7 February, Washington instructed her ambassador in Ankara to cool down the relations. The UK halted the arms assistance on 2 March. The US did so on 1 April. Thus, the relations between Turkey and the Allies decreased to the lowest level (Aydın 2015a, 465). Turkey felt isolated and began to modify her position. The first phase of her wartime diplomacy had been to meet military threats

Boettiger (son-in-law of Roosevelt) and Randolph Churchill (son of Winston Churchill) were in the respective planes. Their aim was to take İnönü off to Cairo. İnönü preferred the American plane.

from Nazis and Soviets alike. Now, the second phase of her diplomacy was to limit Russian influence in Eastern Europe at the end of the war (Kuniholm 1994, 51).

On 14 April, the embassies of the UK and the US in Ankara sent a Note to Turkey and stated that they would apply measures of blockade to Turkey in case of Turkey's maintenance of giving strategic materials to Germany. Turkey ceased the chromite export to Germany on 21 April 1944 (Aydın 2015a, 466).

The first official attempt of Turkey for a rapprochement with the USSR occurred on 22 May 1944 (Aydın 2015a, 468). Turkey suggested to negotiate a treaty that would guarantee the independence and neutrality of the Balkan states after the war as a means of probing Soviet intentions (Kuniholm 1994, 52). On 26 May, Turkey reduced its shipments to Germany of strategic materials by 50 per cent and gave preferential orders from Allied sources (Hale 2013, 73). The USSR agreed with the Turkish idea and even hoped to sign general agreement of mutual assistance but only if Turkey would enter the war at once. This justified the Turkish fears that the assisting Soviet forces would never leave the Turkish soil (Kuniholm 1994, 52). Meanwhile, *D-Day* landing of Allied troops in Normandy (*Operation Overlord*) started on 6 June 1944 (McCauley 2008, xv).

The USSR argued that the German vessels passed through the Straits as commercial vessels on 5 June 1944 were in effect auxiliary war vessels. This situation created a new tension between Turkey, and the USSR and the UK. Turkish FM Menemencioğlu resigned and Hasan Saka became the new FM. It is argued that Menemencioğlu known as a German sympathizer was removed from his post by İnönü as a move for a rapprochement with the Allied powers and the USSR in a period German defeat was certain (Ertem 2013, 172).

On 25 June 1944, Britain suggested that Turkey break economic and diplomatic relations with Germany as a first step toward entering the war. The USSR replied that such a proposal was not in accordance with the Moscow decisions. Since the Allied powers had expected Turkey to enter the war, to reduce that demand was illogical for Moscow. According to the US, the rupture in relations between Turkey and Germany would be a first step toward active belligerency. The British concern

over the postwar situation in Eastern Mediterranean was increasing and they believed that the break with Germany would place Turkey in a better position at the peace table. On 27 June, Turkey attempted again to confirm friendly relations between Turkey and the USSR. This time, Turkey wanted to prolong the 17 December 1925 Treaty with a protocol. The Soviets responded that such proposals were no substitutes for action against Germany (Kuniholm 1994, 55-57). On 11 July 1944 Churchill wrote to Stalin the following:

“... Turkey is willing to break relations immediately with the Axis Powers. I agree with you that she ought to declare war, but I fear that if we tell her to do so she will defend herself by asking both for aircraft to protect her towns, which we shall find it hard to spare or put there at the present moment, and also for joint military operations in Bulgaria and the Aegean, for which we have not at present the means. And in addition to all this she will demand once again all sorts of munitions, which we cannot spare because the stocks we had ready for her at the beginning of the year have been drawn off in other directions. It seems to me therefore wiser to take this breaking off relations with Germany as a first instalment. We can then push a few things in to help her against a vengeance attack from the air, and out of this, while we are together, her entry into the war might come. The Turkish alliance in the last war was very dear to the Germans, and the fact that Turkey had broken off relations would be a knell to the German soul” (as quoted in Churchill 2002, 104).

On 3 July, Turkey demanded her inclusion in the post-war settlements, resume of the aids and fulfilment of her economic needs in return for her proclaiming war on Germany (Ertem 2013, 172). Stalin’s reply to Churchill on 15 July 1944 was the following:

“You of course will remember how insistently the Governments of our three countries proposed to Turkey that she should enter the war against Hitlerite Germany on the side of the Allies as long ago as in November and December of 1943. Nothing came of this. As you know, on the initiative of the Turkish Government in May-June of this year we again entered into negotiations with the Turkish Government, and twice we proposed to them the same thing that the three Allied Governments had proposed to them at the end of last year. Nothing came of this either. As regards these or other half-measures on the part of Turkey, at the present time I see no benefit in them for the Allies. In view of the evasive and vague attitude with regard to Germany adopted by the Turkish Government, it is better to leave Turkey in peace and to her own free will and not to exert fresh pressure on Turkey. This of course means that the claims of Turkey, who has evaded war with Germany, to special rights in post-war matters also lapse....” (as quoted in Churchill 2002, 105-106).

This was the sign of Soviet post-war plans for a general Soviet takeover of south-eastern Europe (Hale 2013, 72). The widening rift in the Allied diplomacy over Turkey was caused by a strategic issue. “*The essential factor in both Russia’s and*

Britain's policies toward Turkey by July 1944 was a desire to ensure their interests in the Eastern Mediterranean in the postwar world." The *"Soviet desires to bring Turkey into the war lessened when such action was connected to the ... use of British forces in the Balkans"* (Kuniholm 1994, 59). Despite the Soviet attitude, the US and Britain accepted Turkey's demands (Ertem 2013, 172) and as a result, Turkey severed her economic and diplomatic relations with Germany on 2 August. On 20 July, the US agreed with *"the British position regarding the severance of economic and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany"* and *"to share with them the burden of any military, financial, and economic assistance they would jointly determine as being necessary for Turkey"* (Kuniholm 1994, 57-58).

The USSR invaded Bulgaria on 8 September 1944 (McCauley 2008, xvi). The role of the Straits in the postwar world and the role of Balkans in the power alignments that were taking shape began to emerge more clearly. Turkish neutrality was a response to repeated attempts by the USSR to seek advantages at Turkey's expense (Kuniholm 1994, 68-70).

4.6. The Moscow Conference-IV (Tolstoy Conference) (9-17 October 1944)

As the Ally armies *"approached Germany's western frontier in the autumn of 1944, Soviet forces overran Bulgaria and Romania"* (Keylor 2001, 188). Churchill was in Moscow between 9 and 17 October 1944 to confirm and extend an informal understanding on the future political orientation of the Balkan countries and *"obtained Stalin's consent to a gentlemen's agreement allotting Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary more or less to the Soviet sphere of influence, Greece to the Anglo-American sphere, with Yugoslavia to be split between them"* (Keylor 2001, 192). This *"informal partition of liberated Europe into pro-western and pro-Soviet spheres was dictated by the military situation at the moment of Germany's collapse"* (Keylor 2001, 252). The idea of involving Turkey in south-eastern Europe that would block the USSR was pushed off the agenda (Hale 2013, 72).

The second Soviet attempt *"on the Straits issue came out at the meetings between Churchill, Stalin and Molotov in Moscow between 9 and 17 October 1944. ...*

Stalin put forward the Russian claims for a new regime more forcibly than he had a year previously", in Teheran. Churchill asked Stalin *"what kind of changes on Montreux he had in mind and suggested that Stalin should tell Washington what was in his mind as well"*. Stalin said that *"he would make constructive proposals in due course"*. On 17 October, Churchill indicated that *"there was a need to compromise between Russian aspirations and Turkish territorial integrity and sovereignty"* and *"further explained to Stalin that he was in favor of Russia's having free access to the Mediterranean for her merchant ships and warships"* (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 30).

It was only after the Moscow Conference that Turkey came to know formally Moscow's intentions over the Straits, which it had predicted long ago (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 31). The revision²⁴ of the Montreux Convention should have taken place during the period of 1945 to 1946 (Howard 1947b, 36). According to the US, a major change in the Straits régime would adversely affect the strategic and political balance in the Balkans and the Near East (Kuniholm 1994, 218). Meanwhile, on 12 January 1945, Turkey opened the Straits for Allied supplies to Russia. However, the USSR was not willing to forget the previous closure (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 339).

4.7. The Yalta Conference (4-11 February 1945)

The last war-time conference was held in Yalta²⁵ on 4-11 February 1945. Yalta Conference produced an agreement on the temporary partition of Germany into military occupation zones (Keylor 2001, 193). *"From the Tehran Conference of November 1943 to the Yalta Conference of February 1945, the initial British attitude was to seek a compromise with the Soviets when the latter raised the question of the revision of the Montreux Convention. ... The Yalta Conference convinced Churchill's administration that there was no way of coming to an agreement with the Soviets"*. Britain *"realized that Turkey was the last barrier against Russian expansion into the Middle East, where Britain's vital strategic and economic communications and*

²⁴ The Montreux Convention, signed on 20 July 1936 and came into force on 9 November 1936, is subject to revision at the expiry of each five-year period from the date of entry into force in accordance with article 29 (Howard 1947b, 36).

²⁵ For the *Excerpt from the Minutes of the Yalta Conference relating to the Discussion of the Turkish Straits*, see, (Váli 1972, 231-233).

interests existed” (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 49). Bilgin and Morewood (2004, 44) argue that a firm show of British support for Turkey against Soviet encroachment began with the Yalta Conference.

At Yalta, Stalin said that “*it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia’s throat*” and added that “*it should be done in such a manner as not to harm the legitimate interests of Turkey*” (Váli 1972, 231). The USSR agreed that it would not make any approach to Turkey without consulting its allies and it would take no action likely to damage Turkey’s independence and integrity (Hale 2013, 74). Churchill stated that the Soviet needs “*should be accompanied by appropriate assurances to Turkey regarding the maintenance of her independence and integrity. In the end, it was agreed that the revision of Montreux should be discussed in London at the first meeting of foreign ministers*” (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 31).

According to a decision taken at Yalta, the membership of the UN would be restricted to those states that had joined the war on the Allied side before the end of February 1945. Therefore, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan on 23 February 1945 (Hale 2013, 75). On the same day, Turkey signed two documents. First, Turkey signed the *Declaration of the United Nations*. Second, a military assistance agreement²⁶ was signed between Turkey and the United States. This agreement placed the American aid in a contractual relationship by taking it out of an indirect and unilateral act (Soysal 1989, 641).

During the final phase of the war, Turkey focused its position in the post-war political order and the Soviet ambitions at the Straits (Hale 2013, 74). Turkey was isolated because of the Allied displeasure over Turkish delay in engaging war against Germany (Karpas 1975b, 79-80). This situation left Turkey’s future status in ambiguity. This ambiguity made Turkey a tempting target for USSR’s post-war expansionism (Aydın 2000, 107).

²⁶ For the full text of the *Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on the Principles Applying to Aid under the Act of March 11, 1941* and Exchange of Notes, dated 23 February 1945, see, United States Government Printing Office (1944).

The USSR tried to take advantage of the fluidity of the war time and immediate post-war international situation (Golan 1990, 32). In early March 1945, the Soviet army took Budapest on its way to Vienna, and destroyed retreating German contingents along the Baltic coast in preparation for the march on Berlin (Keylor 2001, 188).

On 19 March, Moscow delivered a Note to the Turkish Ambassador Sarper that it would terminate the Treaty of Paris²⁷ since “*fundamental changes had occurred during the war and the treaty was no longer in accordance with the new existing conditions*”. Turkey immediately sought British advice (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 32). London advised Ankara to reply that she could examine any proposal which Moscow might make for an improved treaty. However, the Montreux regime could only be discussed multilaterally (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 33). Turkey informed the USSR with a Note dated 4 April 1945 that she accepted the Soviet proposal to replace the 1925 Treaty with a new treaty responding the current interests of both parties and would examine the Soviet proposals to be made to this end with due attention (Gönlübol and Ülman 1993, 192).

The USSR did not withdraw her troops from Poland and other countries which were under her occupation as had been agreed in the Yalta conference (Ertem 2009, 381). On 23 April 1945, President Truman warned Molotov that Moscow must keep to the Yalta agreements (McCauley 2008, xvii). Churchill desired to become in a strong position in Eastern Europe “*to bargain with the Russian over the political future of the former Nazi satellites*”. However, the US rejected his plans “*as it had earlier turned down his project for a Balkan landing during the conference in Teheran, on the grounds that it was unwise from a military point of view*” because Roosevelt was “*counting on Russian assistance in the war against Japan in the Far East*”. Thus, the US forces “*were instructed to halt their eastward march at the Elbe River while the*

²⁷ According to Gürün (1992, 188), there is an interesting situation in Russia’s declaring to abolish the Treaty of Paris. It is difficult to find in the Treaty of Paris a provision disturbing Russia. With this treaty, Turkey was not allowed to make agreement with any of the western states without informing Russia and getting its approval in some circumstances. If this treaty were in effect, Turkey’s membership in NATO could be beside the point. Actually, Russia gave freedom of action to Turkey by abolishing the Treaty of Paris. However, according to the Soviet view, the principal treaty which was nonconcurrent to the conditions of the day was the Treaty of Moscow whereas Russia had not thought of abrogating this treaty.

Soviet army proceeded to liberate Berlin and Prague". On 25 April 1945, the US and the Soviet soldiers met at Elbe. On 1 May, the US and Soviet "*commanders agreed on a temporary military occupation line that left Soviet forces in control of all of Eastern Europe including the eastern halves of Germany and Austria*" (Keylor 2001, 190). On 2 May 1945 Berlin capitulated to the Red Army (McCauley 2008, xvii). When Germany surrendered on 7 May 1945, the main challenges of the US were to bring about the end of the war with Japan and to deal with the USSR (Leffler 2010, 69). In a telegram, dated 12 May 1945, Winston Churchill summarized the European situation to Harry Truman as the following:

"I am profoundly concerned about the European situation. I learn that half the American Air Force in Europe has already begun to move to the Pacific theatre. The newspapers are full of the great movements of the American armies out of Europe. Our armies also are, under previous arrangements, likely to undergo a marked reduction. ... Anyone can see that in a very short space of time our armed power on the Continent will have vanished, except for moderate forces to hold down Germany.

... Meanwhile what is to happen about Russia? ... I feel deep anxiety because of their misinterpretation of the Yalta decisions, their attitude towards Poland, their overwhelming influence in the Balkans, excepting Greece, the difficulties they make about Vienna, the combination of Russian power and the territories under their control or occupied, coupled with the Communist technique in so many other countries, and above all their power to maintain very large armies in the field for a long time. What will be the position in a year or two when the British and American Armies have melted and the French has not yet been formed on any major scale, when we may have a handful of divisions, mostly French, and when Russia may choose to keep two or three hundred on active service?

... An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind. There seems little doubt that the whole of the regions east of the line Lübeck-Trieste-Corfu will soon be completely in their hands. To this must be added the further enormous area conquered by the American armies between Eisenach and the Elbe, which will, I suppose, in a few weeks be occupied, when the Americans retreat, by the Russian power. All kinds of arrangements will have to be made by General Eisenhower to prevent another immense flight of the German population westwards as this enormous Muscovite advance into the center of Europe takes place. And then the curtain will descend again to a very large extent, if not entirely. Thus, a broad band of many hundreds of miles of Russian-occupied territory will isolate us from Poland.

... To sum up, this issue of a settlement with Russia before our strength has gone seems to me to dwarf all others" (as quoted in Churchill 2002, 677-678).

On 7 June 1945, during the discussions with Turkish ambassador Sarper, Molotov said that his government demanded certain criteria be met before a new treaty could be negotiated (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 33). The Soviet criteria were "*a new straits convention, negotiated solely between Turkey and the Soviet Union*" based on "*the free passage of Soviet warships through the straits and their closure to non-Black*

Sea states, the establishment of Soviet bases at the Straits and the retrocession to Russia of the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan that had been returned to Turkey in 1921” (Hale 2013, 80). The Soviet territorial demands²⁸ would include the Black Sea coastal area including Trabzon (Golan 1990, 32) as seen in (Figure 5.1) (Kuniholm 1994, 289).




Figure 6.1. Soviet Claims on Turkey

Kuniholm, Bruce Robellet. 1994. *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 289.

²⁸ Özkan (2017, 59) argues that the USSR did not demand officially a military base and land from Ankara in a threatening manner. These demands were brought on the table as Soviet proposals due to Turkey's demand to renew the Treaty of Paris. There is a Soviet proposal but not a demand. He also argues that these proposals were spoken in a private meeting between the Turkish ambassador Sarper and the Soviet FM Molotov and underlines the inexistence of a written and official text (Özkan 2017, 55). Özkan argues that various authors have similar views. For example, Yalçın Küçük (as cited in Özkan 2017, 56) argues that the Soviet threats directed to Turkey at the end of 1945 was a fairy tale created by Ankara because the Turkish government of the era pursued a policy of joining in the western camp by producing the Soviet threat. Küçük connects this fairy tale to the lies of Feridun Cemal Erkin and Selim Sarper. Mahmut Dikerdem (as cited in Özkan 2017, 56-57), a veteran Turkish diplomat, also argues the inexistence of an official document regarding the Soviet demand of bases and land from Turkey. He argues that the rulers of Turkey always sought to connect Turkey's destiny to the West, and for this reason, they sought to hold the Soviet threat vivid in the public opinion. The explanations of Grew dated 7 July and of Churchill dated 22 July 1945, mentioned here below, are demonstrated as evidence by these authors.

Sarper replied that his government was not in a position to reopen the 1921 Treaty and it could not even consider granting Russia bases in the Straits (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 33). Yalçın (2013, 924-925) argues that the Soviet demands also include some reallignments at Turkey's Thracian borders in favor of Bulgaria and Greece.

The Turkish refusal on 7 June *“triggered a vociferous anti-Turkish campaign in the Soviet media, amplifying territorial claims against Kars and Ardahan. ... Alarmed by the situation, Turkish authorities approached London and Washington in search of diplomatic support to counter Moscow”* (Gökay 2006, 61). Britain *“observed the Soviet's bilateral move towards Turkey as in direct conflict with Stalin's assurances given at Yalta for the maintenance of Turkey's independence. ... For this reason, Britain immediately sought an agreement with the USA for a joint approach”*. The Soviet troop concentrations in Romania and Bulgaria would be used to put pressure on Turkey to accept the Soviet proposals. Since Soviet expansion in the Balkans further increased the British concerns about Moscow's future intentions, Britain saw Turkey as a last bulwark in the way of Soviet aggression further south (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 34).

Sarper, in his meeting with Molotov on 18 June, stated that negotiations at Moscow was over and further negotiations could take place in Ankara (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 35). The crisis that Turkey confronted with the USSR in the aftermath of the WWII became the main determinant of her post-1945 foreign policy (Özkan 2017, 55). Under these circumstances, Turkey's roadmap against the USSR was formed *“to make sure that the USA and the other western powers would not support the Soviet demands; second, to obtain western financial support that would make it possible to maintain the mobilization of the armed forces ... and third, if possible to construct an effective alliance with security guarantees with the West”* (Hale 2013, 81).

The Soviet demands over the Straits *“would completely upset the balance between the great land power in the north and the great sea power in the south. ... If the Straits can be a bulwark of defense, they could also be a strong base for offense. With Russia on the Straits, Eastern Mediterranean Powers would be at her mercy”*

(Esmer 1947, 302). Britain, having obtained the Turkish Government's agreement, proposed to Washington a joint approach to the Soviets on 18 June. However, the US was not in favor of this method on the grounds that a joint approach might damage the preliminary exchange of views between the USSR and Turkey. Britain acted alone on 7 July. The British ambassador in Moscow wrote a letter to Molotov in which he pointed out that the USSR's initiative on the Straits and other questions could not be regarded as merely a matter between the USSR and Turkey (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 35). Following the British attempt, Turkey also wanted to learn American attitude regarding the Soviet demands. American foreign undersecretary Grew told to the Turkish ambassador Baydur on 7 July that the Moscow interview looked like a friendly exchange of views and the Soviets did not direct a concrete threat to Turkey adding that Truman's face to face talk with Stalin in Potsdam could produce a better result (Ülman 1961, 58-59).

4.8. The Potsdam Conference (12 July – 2 August 1945)

The post-war Soviet policy was to keep Germany weakened and to gain territories which Russia had lost after the World War I and repossessed in 1939-1941. In order to further increase its defense, a strip of friendly states was envisioned along the western borders. In the southwest, the USSR wanted to build up a "*Soviet enclave in northern Iran, along with acquiring a controlling influence over the Turkish straits, and strongholds in the Mediterranean via trusteeship over former Italian colonies*". This very ambitious program was in line with traditional Russian imperial policy. The USSR envisaged that "*the United States would dominate the western hemisphere and the Pacific, while the UK and the Soviet Union would ... reach 'an accord' based on an 'amicable separation of security spheres in Europe according to the principle of geographic proximity'*". When in early May 1945, the US abruptly terminated lend-lease shipments to the USSR, Moscow perceived this step as an act of political pressure (Pechatnov 2010, 92-95).

The Potsdam Conference²⁹ took place between 12 July and 2 August 1945 to discuss the post-war world order (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 35). “*At the Potsdam Conference, the Allies rebuffed Soviet reparation demands as well as Soviet requests for internationalization of the Ruhr, for a trusteeship in the Mediterranean, and bases in the Turkish straits. Yet Soviet leaders was able to achieve much of what they wanted.*” The overall balance of the Potsdam agreements was quite satisfactory for the USSR (Pechatnov 2010, 96). The Allied Powers confirmed their decision to divide Germany and Berlin into zones of occupation until such time as the Allies would permit Germany to establish a central government (Gökay 2006, 64-65).

In Potsdam, Churchill said the following regarding the Turkish Straits on 22 July:

“... Undoubtedly Turkey was very much alarmed by a strong concentration of Bulgarian and Soviet troops in Bulgaria; by continuous attacks in the Soviet press and radio; and, of course, by the turn which the conversations between the Turkish Ambassador and Mr. Molotov had taken in which modifications of Turkey’s eastern frontier were mentioned, as well as a Soviet base in the Straits. This led Turkey to fear for the integrity of her empire and her power to defend Constantinople. ... However, ... these were not demands on Turkey by the Soviet Government but that the Turks had asked for an alliance and then Molotov had stated the conditions for such an alliance. ...” (as quoted in Váli 1972, 234).

Molotov delivered a text³⁰ regarding Soviet views over the Straits on 22 July. Stalin said the following on 23 July:

“... [T]his question of the restoration of frontiers would not have been brought up if the Turks had not brought up the question of an alliance. ... If this were not done the question of an alliance would be dropped. What was there to be afraid of? ... [With regards to the Straits] a small state supported by Great Britain held a great state by the throat and gave it no outlet. [If] ... naval bases in the Straits were unacceptable to the Turks, then let them give the Soviet Union some other base where the Russian fleet could repair and refuel and where in cooperation with its allies the Russian fleet could protect the Straits” (as quoted in Váli 1972, 238).

Truman³¹ said the following on 23 July:

²⁹ For the Excerpts from the Minutes of the Potsdam Conference relating to the discussion on the Turkish Straits, see, Váli (1972, 233-243).

³⁰ For the text delivered by Molotov at Potsdam in Turkish, see, Gürün (2010, 293-294).

³¹ For the official texts of the policy making process of the US regarding the Straits and Turkey prior to the Potsdam Conference, see, Armaoğlu (1991, 128-139).

“... [T]he Montreux Convention should be revised. ..., the Straits should be free waterway open to the whole world and that they should be guaranteed by all of us. ... the question of territorial concessions was a Turkish and Russian dispute which they would have to settle themselves... the question of the Black Sea Straits concerned the United States and the whole world” (as quoted in Váli 1972, 239-240).

Churchill said the following on 23 July:

“[F]reedom in the Black Sea Straits by merchant and warships alike should be guaranteed by all of us ... and Stalin would consider this alternative in contrast to that of a base in close proximity to Constantinople” (as quoted in Váli 1972, 239-240).

At the dinner on 23 July, Stalin asked Churchill whether they might get a base at Dedeağaç if a fortified position in Marmara was not possible. Churchill stated that the British support for a regulation at the Straits in line with the Soviet desire depended on the condition of the preservation of Turkey’s territorial integrity (Tellal 2015c, 503). *“On 24 July, President Truman proposed that the Straits should be demilitarized and the freedom of the Straits should be governed and guaranteed by an international regime including the three Great Powers. Stalin however, refused to consider this suggestion and added that ... his government would resume their ‘interrupted talks’ with Turkey”* (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 36). The US delegation’s memorandum on the results of the Conference was the following:

“... [T]he subject ... was dropped with the understanding that each of the three Powers would consult the Turks, the British and Americans with a view to establishing an international guarantee of free passage of the Straits for all nations at all times; the Russians presumably with a view to obtaining either exclusive Soviet-Turkish control of the Straits or Soviet-fortified bases on the Straits (as quoted in Váli 1972, 243-244).

The Potsdam conference ended with no solution to the Straits question. Turkey did not satisfy from the conference and worried about the American proposal of internationalization (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 37). The straits issue was not included in the Final Declaration of the Potsdam Conference upon the request of Stalin. The decision regarding the Straits took place in the article XVI of the conference protocol (as quoted in Armaoğlu 1991, 140):

“The Three Governments recognized that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions. It was agreed that as the next step the matter

should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government”.

The Russian text of this decision differs from the English version a little bit. According to the English text, each of the three states would communicate their views to Turkey separately. Whereas, according to the Russian text, separate direct negotiations would be held between Turkey and every one of the three states. This difference would lead to the emergence of dispute between the US and the USSR in the future (Gönlübol and Ülman 1993, 196).

The US gained a voice on the Straits issue at Potsdam although she was not one of the signatories of Montreux (Ülman 1961, 62). For Britain, who long wished to associate the US with itself in the affairs of the Near and Middle East, *“the result was a success since it persuaded the US Government to declare its intention to join in a guarantee of the freedom of the Straits”* (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 37). Western opposition to the USSR over Turkey did not become explicit at the first post-war meeting at Potsdam. Churchill pointed out that these proposals were well beyond what had been suggested at Yalta (Hale 2013, 81).

5. The Road to the Containment and the Period of Correspondence (August 1945 – March 1947)

Meanwhile, the US dropped atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan on 6 August. The USSR declared war on Japan on 8 August. The US dropped the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan, on 9 August (McCauley 2008, xvii). The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki *“shattered the previous image of the United States as a distant power unable to present a direct military threat to the USSR”* (Pechatnov 2010, 96). The USSR began to see the US *“as a potential rival for hegemony over the European continent ... and Japan [which] would mean a drastic shift in the global balance of power”*. Therefore, Stalin did not want *“to withdraw his troops from the lands they occupied in exchange for accepting a problematic US proposal to demilitarize Germany”* (Pechatnov 2010, 97-98).

On 11 August 1945, Turkey informed Britain that it *“accepted in principle the internationalization of the Straits provided that it would not impair Turkish*

sovereignty and as a consequence of this Russia should modify its hostile attitude to Turkey". Meanwhile, the US *"had already dropped the idea of internationalization"* and started to think that *"the control of the Straits should be exercised within the framework of the world security organization"* (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 38).

The USSR had two basic objectives regarding the Middle East in the aftermath of the WWII. The first one was to ensure some sort of presence in the northern tier in the south of its border. This might be in the form of physical presence by means of expansion in the periphery or political presence by means of participation in international agreements and recognition of the USSR as an interested party. The second was to weaken if not eliminate the western presence (British) in the region (Golan 1990, 29). The territorial demands made against Turkey along with a request for bases at the Straits was very much along the lines of the demands Stalin had made to Hitler on 25 November 1940 (Kissinger 1994, 451). On 18 August 1945, the Soviet Foreign Commissariat determined the borders of the lands to be pulled from Turkey and decided to share these territories between Armenia and Georgia as 80% and 20% respectively (Hasanlı 2011, 9). Concerning from the vague position of the US and Britain, Turkey sent a Note both to Washington and London on 20 August 1945 in which stated the following:

- The US should take part in the guarantee of the freedom of transit and the maintenance of peace in the Straits zone.
- The formula of the Straits issue should not preclude Turkey's sovereignty and security.
- A *détente* in Turco-Soviet relations should not leave a room for any conflict (Armaoğlu 1991, 141).

Meanwhile, in the fall of 1945, the USSR set up an autonomous republic in Iranian Azerbaijan and created a Kurdish People's Republic drawing on the Kurdish tribes in eastern Turkey (Rosser 1969, 237). At the September 1945 Foreign Ministers' meeting in London, Molotov suggested that the Soviet troops pull out of Iran in exchange for British withdrawal from Egypt and Palestine which demonstrated Moscow's relative priorities with an aggressive and expansionist manner within the region at that time (Golan 1990, 29).

By October 1945, Moscow Radio and the Turkish press began to attack each other. Meanwhile, reports of the Red Army troop concentrations near the Turkish border alarmed Turkey. Nevertheless, Britain “*believed that these threats were part of the Soviet tactics of a war of nerves against Turkey*”. Meanwhile, Molotov “*dismissed the rumors of possible Soviet action against Turkey in his communication to the American Ambassador on 29 October 1945*” (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 40). President İnönü, during his speech at the opening of the TGNA on 1 November 1945, stated the following regarding the intensified anti-Turkey propaganda:

“Soviet Union informed Turkey on 19 January 1942 that Turkey’s situation was really benevolent for the Allies. Our Treaty of Non-aggression with Germany has been criticized. How dare we are expected to deny putting on a paper that Germans would not attack us, while Turkey was standing alone against the Germans, the US had not been in war yet, Britain holding its all forces in the island against the German invasion, and the Soviets tied to Germans with a Non-aggression Pact. In this treaty, Turkey’s loyalty to her alliance obligations were explicitly underlined, and German assistance to Syria and Iraq via Turkey had been definitely rejected. The dates that the Soviet Union, England and the US extended appreciations to Turkish situation was after the signature of this treaty.

It has been also argued that deploying our armies to our eastern borders following the advance of German armies to Volga created distrust for the Soviet Union. However, the reality fully contradicts the allegations. Our defense frontier has been expanded from Rodos to Hopa following the German advance to Volga. Our decision was to take measure against the possibility that Germans circumvent the Caucasian border by landing to Trabzon and Hopa. We received feelings of satisfaction from the Soviet Union.

It is also told that our proclamation of war on Germany and Japan was uninfluential and it was made after the Ally victory seemed definite. We do not have any claim about the influence of our proclamation of war. We decided to proclaim war on Germany and Japan only after the Allies wished so.

The allegations that we did not allow the transit of the assistance ships sent to the Soviets are completely without any foundation. If the Allies could not help the Soviets through the Straits the reason was that the Axis Powers held the Mediterranean sea routes by sea and air until 1945” (Hasanlı 2011, 219-221; my translation).

Upon the insistence of Turkey, the US eventually conveyed its proposals to the Turkish Government on 2 November 1945 (Howard 1947a, 47). This Note was the first document demonstrating the new American attitude regarding the Turkish Straits explicitly (Gönlübol and Ülman 1993, 197-198). The American Note, with reference to the agreement between the United States, the UK, and the USSR at Potsdam, underlined that the Montreux Convention required revision and “*that the matter would be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish*” Government (as quoted in Howard 1947a, 47):

“... [T]he problem of the control and use of the Straits could be solved in a manner which will promote international security, will show due consideration for the interests of Turkey and all Black Sea riparian powers, and will assure the free use of this important waterway to the commerce of all nations ... [on the following principles]:

- the Straits to be open to the merchant vessels of all nations at all times,
- the Straits to be open to the transit of the warships of Black Sea powers at all times,
- save for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, passage through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, except with the specific consent of the Black Sea powers or except when acting under the authority of the United Nations, and
- certain changes to modernize the Montreux Convention, such as the substitution of the United Nations system for that of the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory.”

According to Turkey, “*the American proposals would turn the Black Sea into a Russian naval base from which the Soviet Navy could easily run expeditions into the Mediterranean*”. Britain agreed to accept the American proposals “*in principle for the sake of having an American involvement in the Straits question*” though it did not entirely welcome these proposals. In a memorandum sent to Turkey on 21 November 1945, Britain explained that it “*agreed with the US view on the necessity for the revision of Montreux, but it regarded the question as not particularly urgent*”. Britain also sent its views to Moscow on the same lines on 23 November (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 39-40).

On 4 December 1945, tension between Turkey and the USSR increased when students from Istanbul University devastated leftist *Yeni Dünya*, *Tan* and *La Turquie* newspapers, and *Berrak* bookstore which belonged to a Soviet citizen. The Soviet government protested these events and claimed that the Turkish police collaborated with the demonstrators and therefore the responsibility belonged to the Turkish government (Armaoğlu 1988, 427).

On 6 December 1945, Turkey accepted the US Note of November 2 as a basis of discussion. Turkey also announced publicly that it would participate in an international conference on the Straits and accept any decisions reached there, provided Turkey’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity are not infringed (Howard 1947b, 37).

In December 1945, Moscow announced that the Armenians living in France, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey could apply to the Soviet consulates and settle in the USSR. On the second day of the announcement by the Soviet Consulate General in Istanbul, several hundred Turkish citizens of Armenian origin were seen waiting in the consulate garden to start the visa process. The Ministry of Interior issued a notification on 21 December 1945 to facilitate the process for those who would apply to enter the USSR. However, the applications ended after that notification (Kurban 2017, 64). Feridun Cemal Erkin (as cited in Kurban 2017, 65) argues that the main goal of such invitation was to enhance the Armenian population in Soviet Armenia to provide a good demographic base for the territorial claims regarding the east of Turkey.

Two Georgian professors from the Georgian Academy of Sciences, namely Dzahansi and Berdsehisyl, demanded that Turkey render all the lands that it took from Georgia, in their article titled *Our Legitimate Requests from Turkey* published in the *Daily Tbilisi Communist* newspaper on 14 December 1945. They repeated those requests on 20 December 1945 in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* published in Moscow (Kurban 2017, 102):

“The Georgian people has to retake its lands that it never renounced and cannot renounce. We mean eastern Lazistan including Ardahan, Artvin, Oltu, Tortum, Ispir, Bayburt, Gümüşhane and Giresun Trabzon regions, that is to say a part of lands broken off from Georgia” (Tellal 2015c, 503-504; my translation).

Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave private assurances to the Turkish government in reaction to the territorial claims put forward by these Georgian professors. For Turkey, this was the first concrete proof of effective US interest in Turkey (Gökay 2006, 61).

The Moscow Conference among the FMs held between 16-26 December 1945 demonstrated the deepening of the conflicts among the parties. Since the term Cold War was not spoken to a large extent, the situation between Turkey and the USSR had been coined as *war of nerves* and *psychological war* (Hasanlı 2011, 196).

The following sentences of General Kazım Karabekir, expressed at the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 20 December 1945, reflected the sentiments of Turkish nation regarding the Soviet demands:

“The straits are truly the throat of our nation. We shall not permit to be grabbed there. But this should also be known that the Kars plateau is also our national backbone. We will be perished if we make it break” (Armaoğlu 1988, 427; my translation).

As the main Turkish preoccupation was to secure itself from Soviet encroachment, the Anglo-Turkish alliance of 1939 became the main anchor of Turkish foreign policy. Britain was the only country on which Turkey relied for support against the Soviet threat. Until the beginning of 1946, the US remained indifferent towards Turkish affairs (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 49). The events in Iranian Azerbaijan made Turkey increasingly worried. Turkey believed that the Iranian problem was a test case by which it could assess the extent that the Anglo-Americans would go to appease the Soviets (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 41). Moscow’s intensifying her campaign regarding the return of some Turkish provinces in December 1945 and the Soviet pressure exerted on Iran made the US to deal with the Middle East closer (Ülman 1961, 69). The suspects of Truman confirmed as the USSR reinforced its military presence in Iranian Azerbaijan and strengthened its forces in Bulgaria. The US adopted a much tougher approach by the beginning of 1946 than it had been at Potsdam (Hale 2013, 82).

On 5 January 1946, US President Harry S. Truman sent a longhand draft letter to his Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, in which he also underlined the situation of Turkey as the following:

“There isn’t a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand-`How many divisions have you?’” (CVCE 2019).

In his speech on 9 February, Stalin said in his first public message since September 1945 that the second world war was the result of the second crisis of world capitalism. He told that the West could easily fuel a new global conflict and the Soviet

people had to be prepared for any eventuality. This was the signal of a turning point in the Grand Alliance (Rosser 1969, 238-239).

Necmettin Sadak (as cited in Oran 1970, 59-60) argues in his article published in *Akşam* newspaper dated 2 February 1946 that the cause of the dispute between the UK and the USSR is not the Straits, on the contrary, there is a Straits question since they are in bad with each other. There is no role of the Turkish-Soviet tension in the relations of the allied powers but on the contrary Turkish-Soviet friendship is under suspension since the allied powers do not trust each other.

On 21 February 1946, in response to the Turkish request, the British Foreign Secretary, in his speech in the House of Commons “*expressed the view that the Anglo-Turkish Treaty was still valid and he wished Turkey not to be converted into a satellite state*” (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 43). Turkey’s post-war isolation ended with this speech (Aydın 2000, 107-108).

On 22 February 1946, George Kennan, the US *chargé d’affaires* in Moscow was describing the sources of Soviet conduct in his *Long Telegram* as the following:

“...[W]e have here, a political force committed financially to the belief that with [the] U.S. there can be no *modus vivendi*, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. ... In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” (as quoted in Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 85-86).

On 5 March 1946, Winston Churchill, former British Prime Minister, made the following speech on the “*Sinews of Peace*” (Iron Curtain Speech) referring to the current situation of the era in the Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri in the presence of President Truman:

“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow. ... Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government. ... I do not believe that Soviet Russia

desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines” (International Churchill Society 2020).

The *Iron curtain* coined in Churchill’s speech is seen (Figure 5.2) (Roberts 1999, xiii). Washington reacted to Churchill’s warning with a silence. The US was not ready to admit the necessity of an Anglo-American alliance (Rosser 1969, 239). E. Wilson, the American Ambassador in Ankara, wrote the following in his report in March 1946:

“[T]he real intention of the USSR regarding the Straits is not to review the Straits régime, but to establish physical sovereignty over Turkey. Turkey means a vacuum in the security strip composed of the countries extending from the Baltics to the Black Sea” (Hasanlı 2011, 286; my translation).



Figure 6.2. The Soviet Territorial Gains in Europe and the Iron Curtain

Roberts, Geoffrey. 1999. *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945–1991*. London: Routledge, xiii.

Whereas, Necmettin Sadak stated the following (Oran 1970, 60; my translation) in *Akşam* on 10 March 1946:

“The cannon shot in last June tinkling in the American and British press for ten months. These news consist of new seasoning of the ideas and ambitions put forward last summer. Why does this issue is freshened whenever tension increases in the world? Do they want not to make forget our issue since Turkey represents the best example regarding the intentions of the Soviet Russia?”

Meanwhile, the USS Missouri carried the remains of the Turkish ambassador Ertegün³² to Istanbul on 15 April 1946 (Aydın 2000, 107-108). There is no doubt that American move regarding the remains of Ertegün was a demonstration aiming the USSR (Ülman 1961, 74).

Following the American demand for an immediate withdrawal from Iran on 6 March (Ertem 2009, 382), the USSR announced on 25 March 1946 that she would move their troops out of Iran in six weeks and the withdrawal was completed in April 1946 (Aydın 2000, 107-108). However, signing of an agreement between the governments of south Azerbaijan and Kurdish autonomous administration in Iran in April disturbed Turkey. While Turkey was considering the Azerbaijan issue as the violation of the territorial integrity of Iran, the Kurdish issue was perceived from now on as the violation of security of Iran, Iraq and Turkey. According to Turkey, the Kurdish autonomous administration in Iran could be a base to send insurgent troops to bordering countries. Establishment of a semi-independent Kurdistan in Iran was an anchor to threat the internal security of Iraq, Turkey and Syria in the future. In the report of the Soviet Embassy in Ankara dated 5 May 1946, it is said that the Turks have understood that they could not deal with the Kurdish population through security measures. The US Embassy informed its government that the USSR believed that the movement of Kurdistan in Iran and Iraq would start instigation of the Kurds in Turkey which was the continuation of the psychological war against Turkey in a new front (Hasanlı 2011, 297-301).

The USSR published selected documents to demonstrate Turkish sympathy for the Nazis. In the face of the previous tactics of the USSR in the Balkans and Iran, it

³² Ambassador Ertegün died 16 months before the visit of Missouri (Oran 1970, 69).

appeared very likely that a Soviet attack on Turkey might follow (Shaw and Shaw 2002, 400). According to the agreement³³ signed between the US and Turkey on 7 May 1946, Turkey's debts arising through Lend-Lease (except the commodities which were bought through requisitions requiring cash payment) were erased only in return for the payment of the \$4.5 million in 30 days.

The Soviet maneuvering over Turkey and Iran significantly influenced the development of American foreign policy. The Iran crisis conditioned the US reaction to Soviet Notes delivered to Turkey. The US gave positive encouragement and assistance to Turkey and prepared to meet armed aggression by the force of arms in the event that the UN was unsuccessful in stopping the Soviet aggression (Kuniholm 1994, 378). Before correspondence began in August 1946, the US had already decided about the following:

“‘Turkey must be preserved for reasons of Middle East strategy’ as well as to prevent the falling of other dominoes in Western Europe and in the Far East. ... If war occurred Turkey could slow down a Soviet advance to Suez and North Africa, attack Soviet oil resources, provide fighter cover for bombers heading toward Moscow, bottle up Soviet submarines in the Black Sea, destroy Soviet shipping, and launch a possible ground offensive into the Soviet heartland” (Leffler 1985, 815).

5.1. The Soviet Note (7 August 1946)

The USSR sent her views regarding the Straits with a Note to Turkey, the US, and the UK on 7 August 1946. The USSR argued that the Montreux Convention did not provide safety of the Black Sea powers. During the WWII, admission of battle ships belonging to the Axis Powers to the Black Sea was an obvious violation of the Convention. For this reason, the Turkish Government could not be able to escape from the responsibility of this situation. Thus, the USSR proposed five principles:

“The first three of these principles were in general agreement with the first three principles of the Note of the United States Government of November 2, 1945. Points 4 and 5, however, called for the establishment of a new regime of the Straits by the Black Sea powers and the development of a joint Turco-Soviet system of defense for the Straits, on the ground that the

³³ For the full text of the *Agreement between the Government of Republic of Turkey and the Government of the United States of America regarding Lend Lease and Pretensions*, dated 7 May 1946, in Turkish, see, Resmi Gazete (25/05/1946).

Black Sea powers were primarily concerned and that only a joint defense system could offer genuine security to the countries of the Black Sea” (Howard 1947a, 39).

These principles were as follows:

- “The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.
- The Straits should be always open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea Powers.
- Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea Powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.
- The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage, leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers.
- Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea Powers” (as quoted in Howard 1947a, 47-49).

Moscow demanded from Turkey what the Allies had refused at Potsdam- the control of the Straits. Twenty five Soviet divisions paraded along the Turkish border and the Soviet fleet held manoeuvres. The Turkish army mobilized (Rosser 1969, 241). The US decided to encourage Turkish opposition to Soviet demands as part of its overall toughening strategy towards the USSR during 1946. On 15 August 1946, the Joint War Plans Committee finalized the strategic plan “*known as ‘Griddle’*” which emphasized the following:

“Turkey [was important] as a base for Allied operations against the Soviet Union should war unexpectedly erupt. ... The Cairo-Suez area was the most desirable place on the globe from which to launch an air attack against Soviet targets. ... Turkey’s great importance would be that it provide a cushion, absorbing the initial Soviet blow and deterring Soviet advances, while the United States prepared to undertake the counteroffensive, particularly from the Cairo-Suez area” (Leffler 1985, 812-814).

Therefore, Turkey was of vital interest, and, if it fell, the Soviets would have a clear advance to Persian Gulf and Suez. The USSR, if successful, would move to control Greece and the whole of the Near and Middle East. The only thing which will deter the Soviets was the conviction that the US should be prepared, if necessary, to meet aggression with force of arms (Gormly 1990, 182-183).

5.2. The American Note (19 August 1946)

The first response came from the US with a Note on 19 August 1946, expressing its general agreement, while not in entire accord, with the first three principles of the USSR and rejecting the fourth and fifth:

“The fourth proposal set forth in the Soviet note does not appear to envisage a revision of the Montreux Convention as suggested in our Note to the Turkish Government of November 2, 1945, but rather the establishment of a new regime which would be confined to Turkey and the other Black Sea powers. It is the view of this Government that the regime of the Straits is a matter of concern not only to the Black Sea powers but also to other powers, including the United States. This Government cannot, therefore, agree with the Soviet view that the establishment of the regime of the Straits should come under the competence of the Black Sea powers to the exclusion of other powers.

The fifth proposal set forth in the note of the Soviet Government was that Turkey and the Soviet Union should organize joint means of defense of the Straits. It is the firm opinion of this Government that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. Should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations” (as quoted in Howard 1947a, 49-50).

For the US, the first Soviet Note was not threatening in tone (Leffler 1985, 810). The US suggested that “*the regime of the Straits should be brought into appropriate relationship with the UN*” and reaffirmed her willingness to participate in a conference for the revision of the Montreux Convention.

5.3. The UK Note (21 August 1946)

The UK delivered its Note to the USSR on 21 August in which it stated its policy as the following:

“... [I]s of the opinion that a revision of the Montreux Convention is desirable.

... [W]ish to point out that the agreements reached ... at the Potsdam Conference, ..., were that as a next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government. It was not, ... agreed at Potsdam that the matter should be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three Powers and the Turkish Government.

... [N]ote that there is no mention in these proposals of the United Nations. His Majesty's Government desire to place it on record that in any modification of the Montreux Convention the regime should be consistent with the purpose and principles of the United Nations.

... [W]ish to offer no comments at the present stage upon the first three proposals made by the Soviet Government.

... [W]ould point out that it has for long been internationally recognized that the regime of the Straits is the concern of other States besides the Black Sea Powers. His Majesty's Government cannot therefore agree with the Soviet view that the future regime should be the concern of the Black Sea Powers and Turkey alone.

... [C]onsider that Turkey, as the territorial power concerned, should continue to be responsible for the defense and control of the Straits" (as quoted in Howard 1947a, 50).

5.4. The Turkish Note (22 August 1946)

Turkey's Note dated 22 August 1946 was also on the same lines as those of the US and the UK. This demonstrated the firm and close collaboration between Turkey, the UK, and the US for the first time since the Soviets had raised the Straits question in June 1945 (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 45). Although Turkey did not accept the Soviet charges concerning the passage of Axis vessels through the Straits during the WWII, it admitted that the definitions and provisions of warships in the Montreux Convention were "*bypassed by events and weakened by experience, need to be adapted to technical progress and present conditions*" and added the following:

"... Turkey observes that the first three points take up in more or less identical terms the suggestions presented on November 2, 1945 by the government of the United States... . . . [T]he Turkish government received favorably the American suggestions which, under certain conditions and reservations, were worthy of being taken as a basis for discussion..." (as quoted in Howard 1947a, 50-55).

According to Turkey, the Soviet point four which envisaged to establish a new regime among the Black Sea littoral powers sets aside the remainder of the duration of the Montreux Convention which is scheduled to exist at least until 1956 and the procedure for revision. The Soviet proposal also ignored the interests of other powers signatory to the Convention. Turkey indicated the following as for the fifth proposal set forth in the Soviet note:

"[T]he Government of the Republic states that this proposition aims at nothing less than organizing the security of the Straits against all aggression coming from the Mediterranean, by means of the establishment of a combined Turco-Soviet defense. [Thus, it is not] "compatible with the inalienable rights of sovereignty of Turkey nor with its security, which brooks no restriction. The acceptance of the Soviet thesis would result in the suppression of the role of factor of equilibrium and liaison played by Turkey in the Straits and in building the so-called security of the Black Sea Powers upon the annihilation of the security of Turkey. ... The Government of the Republic considers that Turkey is herself interested in defending by all her means the country against all aggression, no matter whence it comes. History gives no example

of a war in which Turkey has been involved without the Turkish nation's having accomplished its duty to the country" (as quoted in Howard 1947a, 50-55).

After the first official Turkish reply, the USSR moved its army near the Turkish border (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 45).

5.5. The Second Soviet Note (24 September 1946)

The USSR answered the Turkish Note on 24 September 1946, substantially reiterating the position taken in the previous Soviet Note of 7 August 1946. The USSR expressed her satisfaction with the fact that Turkey accepted first three principles as a basis for negotiations. Regarding the points 4 and 5, the Note indicated that the Black Sea had a special situation as a closed sea and Turkey had accepted the special position of the Black Sea powers in the Straits with the Treaty of Moscow dated 16 March 1921 and Kars dated 13 October 1921 and, in the Turco-Ukrainian agreement of 2 January 1922. For the USSR, "*only a joint system of defense could offer genuine security to all parties directly concerned, namely Turkey and the Black Sea states*" (Howard 1947a, 41):

"[T]he refusal of Turkey to assure the defense of the Straits jointly with the Soviet Union deprives the Black Sea Powers of the possibility of guaranteeing the necessary security in this region. ... If Turkey, after having declined the proposal of the USSR, were to set about taking military measures in the Straits by common accord with several Powers non-riverain of the Black Sea, this obviously would be in contradiction with the security interests of the Black Sea Powers" (as quoted in Howard 1947a, 55-58).

5.6. The Second American Note (9 October 1946)

Although the US was not addressed by the Soviet Note of 24 September, "*the American Government again expressed its views in a Note of October 9 1946, reiterating its earlier position, expressed on November 2, 1945 and August 19, 1946*" (Howard 1947a, 41). For the US, the second Note was even milder and more restrained than the first Soviet Note (Leffler 1985, 810). The American ambassador in Moscow conveyed his government's view as the following:

"... [T]he regime of the Straits is a matter of concern not only to the Black Sea powers but also to other powers, including the United States. The Soviet Government, ... in its Note of September 24, apparently continues to take the position set forth in its Note of August 7 to Turkey that "the establishment of a regime of the Straits ... should come under the competence

of Turkey and the other Black Sea powers”. My Government does not consider that it was contemplated at the Potsdam Conference that the direct conversations which might take place between any one of the three signatory governments and the Turkish Government with regard to the regime of the Convention of the Straits concluded at Montreux should have the effect of prejudicing the participation of the other two signatory powers in the revision of the regime of the Straits. On the contrary, my Government considers that the Potsdam Agreement definitely contemplated only an exchange of views with the Turkish Government as a useful preliminary to a conference of all of the interested powers, including the United States, to consider the revision of the Montreux Convention. As stated in its note of August 19, my Government stands ready to participate in such a conference” (as quoted in Howard 1947a, 59).

5.7. The Second UK Note (9 October 1946)

The British Ambassador in Moscow replied to the Soviet Government with a Note dated 9 October as the following:

“The Potsdam Agreement laid it down that as the next step this matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government. But it is the view of my Government that this “next step” has been completed by the exchange of views which have now taken place between these Governments. My Government therefore see no need for, or purpose in, continuing direct correspondence on the subject. While my Government’s attitude towards proposals 4 and 5 of the Soviet note of August 8th remain as stated in the British note of August 21st, my Government remain ready to attend a conference of the four Powers (namely the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France) and all other signatories of the Montreux Convention, excepting Japan, to consider the revision of that Convention” (as quoted in Howard 1947a, 59-60).

5.8. The Second Turkish Note (18 October 1946)

After consultation with London and Washington (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 46), Ankara reaffirmed its earlier position with a Note dated 18 October 1946. According to Turkey, annex II of the Montreux Convention which defined warships, required technical revision (Howard 1947a, 42-43):

“[T]he provisions of the Montreux Convention relative to the League of Nations would have to give way to the system established by the United Nations. ... Japan should be removed from the list of contracting parties, and the United States should become a signatory of the revised convention. ... The three principles for the revision of the convention proposed by the United States, supported by Great Britain, Turkey, and the Soviet Union offered the possibility of ‘giving greater satisfaction to the Soviet desiderata’”.

Turkey stated that the direct conversations contemplated by the Potsdam Conference had been fulfilled:

“... [I]f the Soviet Government nonetheless considered that it could raise complaints concerning the execution of the Montreux Convention, the Government of the Republic ... is of the opinion that, given the definite position taken by the two parties as regards the appreciation of the substance and the reality of the facts, it would be desirable to consider discussion on diplomatic grounds to be exhausted, the Turkish Government holding itself at the disposition of the Soviet Government to have recourse to arbitration.

The Black Sea, as a closed sea, is said to have a special situation. The Montreux Conference has already established a preferential regime in favor of the riverain Powers.

... Article 5 of the Treaty of Moscow has today only a historic character.

With regard to point five of the Soviet Note of August 7, ... the right to defend itself against all aggression is, beyond denial, for an independent State which respects itself the most essential attribute of its sovereignty. The acceptance by Turkey of a joint defense of the Straits would mean no less than the sharing of her sovereignty with a foreign power.

... [I]n the event of an attack against the Black Sea, the most perfect solution which mankind has yet found to repel aggression, that is the joint defense by national forces and the forces of the United Nations Organization charged with preventing all aggression, from wherever it comes” (as quoted in Howard 1947a, 60-68).

On 26 October, the USSR informed Britain that a conference would be premature since its attempts to persuade Turkey and western powers proved fruitless (Hale 2013, 82). According to the UK, the Soviet policy of “*a war of nerves aimed to break the Anglo-Turkish Alliance and to bring Turkey into the Russian sphere of influence in the same way as Poland and Finland. ... The firm British and American actions forced the Kremlin to drop its demands for the time being*” (Bilgin and Morewood 2004, 46).

There are various views regarding Turkey’s western orientation following the end of the second world war. The semi-official geopolitically oriented realist approaches constitute the dominant paradigm. According to this approach, security considerations caused Turkey’s western orientation. The prominent authors of this approach are Kamuran Gürün, A. Suat Bilge, Fahir Armaoğlu, Selim Deringil, Mehmet Gönlübol and Haluk Ülman. The revisionist approach, despite nuances in the description, argue that Soviet purpose was not expanding the sphere of influence but consolidating its own security. Turkey’s third-party rapprochement made the USSR insecure which in turn results in the insecurity of Turkey. Baskın Oran and Erel Tellal represent this approach. On the other hand, leftist approaches tell Turkey’s western orientation based on deliberate exploitation of Soviet threats to adjust to the capitalist order (Akdan 2014, 47-133).

In the first days of 1947, the USSR encouraged Syria to apply to UNSC regarding Hatay to prevent the rapprochement of some Arab countries with Turkey. The Soviet Embassy in Ankara prepared a report regarding Turkey's relations with the Arab countries following the visit of Jordanian King Abdullah to Ankara in January 1947. According to the report, the beginning of the formation of the *Eastern Bloc* as the extension of the UK's anti-Soviet policy in which Turkey played her part could be seen in the Turco-Iraqi friendship agreement and Turco-Jordanian mutual assistance agreement. The visit of British Chief of General Staff to Moscow in January 1947 and his warm welcome by the Soviet officials were interpreted by Turkey as a Soviet attempt to divide the western front (Hasanlı 2011, 385-389).

The special relationship between the US and Turkey originated with the inception of the Cold War and the globalization of the American foreign policy (Váli 1971, 125). Throughout the first two months of 1947, reports from Greece and Turkey indicated that growing economic chaos increased instability and created opportunities for the extension of Soviet influence (Gormly 1990, 207). On 24 February 1947, the British Ambassador in Washington sent two Notes to the US Administration (one for Turkey and the other for Greece) informing that it could no longer furnish the economic and military assistance it had been providing to Greece and Turkey since the end of the WWII and requested the US to assume this duty. The British government was stating that aids should have been started immediately otherwise the independence of Turkey and Greece would be threatened. According to UK, loosing these countries would mean leaving the Middle East to the Soviet control. This attempt was not a surprise for the US but she had not guessed that events would develop so quickly (Hasanlı 2011, 390). The intention of the UK was to terminate all financial assistance to Greece and Turkey and to remove the 40,000 British troops from Greece as of 31 March 1947 (Keylor 2001, 260).

In a memorandum presented to Truman on 27 February, it was reported that the Greek and Turkish crises exerted direct influence on the security of the US. There was no doubt that a likely civil war in Greece would turn Greece into a communist state under Soviet direction. Turkey would be encircled and the situation in the country

would be worsened. Thus, the Soviet domination would extend from all the Middle East to India. Any power but the US could overcome this crisis (Hasanlı 2011, 390-391). The US had difficulty to make their case for aid to Turkey. Because, Turkey was not experiencing terrible economic conditions, it was not facing financial stringencies, the USSR had not recently exerted pressure on Turkey and the US did not expect an imminent Soviet attack on Turkey. The most effective argument was that “*the Turkish military establishment constituted a serious burden on the Turkish economy; that burden had to be eased to ensure that the Turks would not acquiesce to Soviet demands*” (Leffler 1985, 816).

President Truman’s address before a joint session of Congress, on 12 March 1947, passed into history as *Truman Doctrine*. This was a clear signal to the USSR that the US was prepared to make a material contribution to the defense of Turkey as seen in the following (Hale 2013, 83):

“The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid.

Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support. Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.

The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help. ...

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. ... In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel...” (Yale Law School 2020c).

Based on the suggestion of Kennan, the *Truman Doctrine* formed the basis of the US strategy of containment (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 85-86). The inclusion of Turkey and Greece to the security zone of the US frustrated the USSR. The package of proposals presented to Molotov on 25 March was stating the importance of the

strengthening of the Soviet Embassy in Ankara and the Soviet Consulate in Istanbul with the skilled personnel able to organize flow of information with the intelligence services, and military and naval attachés and reinforcement of the TASS bureau in Turkey with an announcer and a translator (Hasanlı 2011, 395).

6. Turkey as a Tool of the US Containment Policy

*An Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey*³⁴, as the legal framework of the Truman Doctrine, passed from the US Congress on 22 May 1947. According to the Act, “*the national integrity and survival of these nations [were] of importance to the security of the United States and of all freedom loving peoples*”. Within the framework of the Truman Doctrine, the US designed the “*aid program to enhance the fighting capabilities of the Turkish army, air force, navy, to help build strategic roads, and to restock Turkish arsenals and war reserves*”. From air bases in Turkey, fighter bombers and attack planes could interdict Soviet troops moving through Iran and Iraq toward Persian Gulf oil or sweeping widely toward Cairo-Suez. During 1948, the US transferred over 180 F-47, 30 B-26 and 86 C-47 aircrafts to Turkey (Leffler 1985, 817). From the middle of 1947, the USSR accused the US of making military assistance to Turkey. For the USSR, the US was undertaking aggressive action and establishing bases from which attacks on the USSR could be launched easily and effectively. Actually, the US war plans and military assistance programs demonstrated that the USSR had reason to worry about the US aid to Turkey (Leffler 1985, 824).

Oran (2015c, 496) argues that the interrogation of Stalin’s intention whether the USSR would invade Turkey after 1945 is not meaningful because the important thing in international relations is the perception and Turkey subjectively perceived Soviet threat at that time. He enumerates the reasons of his argument that “*Turkey was rescued from the Soviet intervention as a result of American intervention*” is wrong, as the following:

³⁴ For the full text of the *An Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey*, dated 22 May 1947, see, United States Senate (1950a).

- The visit of Missouri on 5 April 1946 which was the first indication of American support is ten months after the Molotov-Sarper meeting of 7 June 1945. Turkey resisted itself against Soviet demands totally on her own in these 10 months.
- To accept the visit of Missouri as the American intervention is contentious because the USSR delivered first of its Notes four months after this date on 7 August 1946. Thus, Missouri did not deter the USSR.
- If the Truman Doctrine is accepted as the American intervention, the Doctrine was addressed on 12 March 1947 five months after Turkey's rejection on 18 October 1946 of the Soviet Note (Oran 2015c, 496).

Since the world gradually looked as if it would become bipolar in 1946 and 1947, establishment of a strong and economically integrated Europe emerged as a strategic option to encourage a multipolar postwar system in which Germany was integrated into a unified Europe. This view paved the way for the announcement of the *Marshall Plan* of massive American aid which would be administered to promote European unity (Ikenberry 2001, 180-183). On 5 June 1947, Secretary of State Marshall announced the administration's readiness to provide substantial assistance for a European Recovery Program (ERP) in his address³⁵ at Harvard University (Leffler 2010, 77).

The inclusion of the USSR in the unprecedented offer of foreign economic assistance within the framework of Marshal Plan prompted France and the UK to solicit Moscow's participation in the conference in Paris to be held on 27 June to draw up a collective response to the American initiative. The USSR was represented with Molotov and his eighty-nine economic specialists. However, Molotov abandoned the conference following few days of fruitless negotiations on 2 July. The USSR denounced the project and forbade the Eastern European countries to have anything to do with it. The Soviet reasons for rejection were twofold: The US "*had insisted on access to, and some degree of advisory authority over the internal budgets of the recipient states. ... This requirement was denounced in Moscow as an intolerable*

³⁵ For the full text of *The European Recovery Program: Remarks by Secretary Marshall*, dated 5 June 1947, see, United States Senate (1950c).

infringement of the national sovereignty of the participating states". Secondly, the US investigations would "have revealed how vulnerable the postwar economy of the Soviet Union was, a circumstance that the Kremlin was desperately trying to conceal" (Keylor 2001, 263). According to the USSR, she stood little chance in an open competition against American economic power. The Western economic penetration would be followed by political inroads. Therefore, the Marshall Plan would prove to be a Trojan horse, designed to undermine her security zone in Eastern and Central Europe (Pechatnov 2010, 104). The participants³⁶ of the conference established the *Conference of European Economic Co-operation* on 12 July 1947 in line with the American plan (Ertem 2009, 391). Turkey also took part in this conference and requested foreign aid in the amount of \$615 million (Gönlübol and Ülman 1993, 220-221).

Turkey and the US determined the framework of the use of the American aid with the *Agreement on Aid to Turkey*³⁷ signed on 12 July 1947 in accordance with the US Act (related to the Truman Doctrine) dated 22 May. Art.4 of the *Agreement on Aid to Turkey* was as the following:

"The Government of Turkey will not transfer, without the consent of the Government of the United States, title to or possession of any such article or information nor permit, without such consent, the use of any such article or the use or disclosure of any such information by or to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of Turkey or for any purpose other than that for which the article or information is furnished" (Department of State 1950, 1266).

Although the *Agreement on Aid to Turkey* established a military link between the parties, this link was not in the form of an alliance. Because the Truman Doctrine was a unilateral declaration of intention, it was only establishing a contractual situation for the aid to be extended. However, Turkey's intention was to obtain America's concrete and binding support in the face of Soviet threat (Armaoğlu 1991, 181).

³⁶ Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Holland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK and France (Ertem 2009, 391).

³⁷ The American assistance influenced the foreign policy of Turkey. While Turkey together with the Arab countries opposed to the partition plan of the UN for Palestine in 1947, she recognized the state of Israel on 28 March 1949 following her receiving the American assistance (Gönlübol and Ülman 1993, 228).

Following the Truman Doctrine and the signing of the Turkish-American agreement, Soviet psychological war against Turkey turned into a sharper character moving behind press campaign (Hasanlı 2011, 419). The Soviet Embassy in Ankara was informing Moscow with its report dated 12 July 1947 that the Turkish Government chose to subordinate her country to the American military and political objectives and moved in the direction of American directives in the resolution of important internal issues (Hasanlı 2011, 409).

Beginning from August 1947, Turkey negotiated with the US and the UK to decrease the manpower of her army from 485.000 to 330.000. The American FM Marshall informed his Ambassador Wilson in Ankara as the following:

“We do not think that general demobilization of the Turkish army would influence the general situation in the region too much. It would be suitable to reflect this as part of the process of restructuring the Army. Even though the number of the conscripts would be decreased, the strength of the army will increase with the procurement of new equipment from the US. General demobilization should not create an impression as change in the foreign policy or weakening of the determination on the protection of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Turkey” (Hasanlı 2011, 413; my translation).

According to the USSR, the US had decided to “*rebuild Western Europe ... as a junior partner in a transatlantic bloc against the USSR. Instead of a multipolar system, in which the Kremlin could play off capitalist powers against each other, it now had to reckon with an American-led anti-Soviet global coalition.*” Therefore, the USSR “*tried to disrupt the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe and to consolidate its own control over Eastern Europe*”³⁸ (Pechatnov 2010, 106). A Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM) was created on 22 September 1947 replacing the Communist International (COMINTERN) which had been dissolved by Stalin in 1943 to allay the ideological fears of his allies in the war against Germany (Keylor 2001, 266).

On 7 November 1947, the Soviet MoD, Bulganin, in his meeting with the Turkish Ambassador Akdur, seriously criticized Turkey for her actively involvement in the anti-Soviet plans of the US and the establishment of US bases in Turkey. This

³⁸ Identical treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance would be signed in early 1948 between the USSR and Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary (Pechatnov 2010, 105-106).

meeting was the first in which the Soviet demands were not dealt between high level Turkish-Soviet officials in the last one and a half year (Hasanlı 2011, 417).

The February 1948 Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia precipitated the final rupture in relations between the USSR and the US that had been building up since the end of the war (Keylor 2001, 266). The US did not care the inclusion of Turkey to the Marshall Plan which was envisaged to ameliorate the economies of the war weary countries of Europe (Hasanlı 2011, 408-409). Turkey's economic appetite started after Marshall Plan to grant large-scale economic aid to European countries. Then, Ankara started a campaign to overcome Washington's initial inclination to leave Turkey outside of the economic assistance program (Harris 1975, 53).

The US Congress adopted the *Economic Cooperation Act of 1948*³⁹ on 3 March 1948 to finance the Marshall Plan (Armaoğlu 1991, 168). Title III of the Act was coined as the *Greek-Turkish Assistance Act of 1948*⁴⁰. According to the Act, the US would aid in the form of grants or upon payment in cash, or on credit terms, or on such other terms. Third group states would pay cash for their needs. Turkey, together with Switzerland and Portugal was in the third group. The reasons for Turkey's inclusion in this group were, Turkey's harsh domestic political regime, development of the balance of foreign trade during the war in favor of Turkey, maintenance of the pre-war production level and low-level budget deficit (Hasanlı 2011, 427). The USSR denounced Turkey as a country that had lost its independence and become "*Marshallized, a colony of Wall Street and a base for capitalist aggression against the Fatherland of Socialism*" Váli (1971, 173-174).

On 17 March 1948, less than a month after the Czech coup (Rosser 1969, 261), the *Brussels Pact* (WU-Western Union⁴¹) was signed among Great Britain, France and the Benelux countries to repel an armed attack against any one of the signatories. On 17 March 1948, Truman requested authorization to reinstate conscription from the

³⁹ For the full text of the *Economic Cooperation Act of 1948*, see, United States Senate (1950b).

⁴⁰ For the full text of the *Greek-Turkish Assistance Act of 1948*, see, United States Senate (1950d).

⁴¹ The *Western Union* became the *Western European Union* in 1954 with the modification of the Treaty of Brussels.

Congress. These first steps toward American rearmament and west European collective defense were to provoke a Soviet response (Keylor 2001, 267).

On 29 March 1948, the Politburo instructed the new Soviet Ambassador to Ankara, Alexander Lavrishov, with the following nine articles:

- Considering Turkey's turning her own country into a theatre of British and American military operation against the USSR and the new democratic regimes in the Balkans, the Embassy shall not take initiatives for the amelioration of the relations with Turkey.
- The Embassy shall interact with only the ruling RPP administration.
- The Embassy shall be cautious in the relations with the opposition since the Turkish government could infiltrate its agents to the Embassy under the name of opposition.
- The Soviet policy regarding the Straits shall be in effect as in the Notes of 7 August and 24 September 1946.
- If the Turks bring forward the Turkish-Soviet border, they will be replied shortly that the issue has not been resolved yet and it continues.
- If the Turks bring forward mutual commercial relations, they will be replied that this depends on the Soviet interests.
- The Ambassador shall carefully follow the US-British policy and the competition between them, and the works implemented under the Truman-Marshall Plans concerning Turkey.
- The British and the US activity to form an Eastern Pact will be observed closely.
- Turkey's relations with Greece, Iran and the Arab countries will be followed closely (Hasanlı 2011, 428).

The US Congress adopted on 3 April 1948 *"to appropriate \$6 billion to cover the combined deficit for the first year and agreed to make three annual grants later"* to all the European states outside the Soviet sphere. *"In mid-April, the recipient nations*

established the Organization for Economic Cooperation to supervise the allocation of the American aid” (Keylor 2001, 263).

On 11 June 1948, the US Senate opened the way of collective arrangements for security with the adoption of the *Vandenberg Resolution* by leaving aside the Monroe Doctrine (Armaoğlu 1991, 188). Some of the provisions of the resolution were as follows:

“... the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President ... should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

2. Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

4. Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

5. Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation” (Department of State 1950, 197).

In late 1947 and early 1948, Western powers decided to unify the French and British–American zones, rebuild German industrial power, and establish a separate West German state. This was seen in Moscow as a threat to the existence of the USSR (Pechatnov 2010, 106). On 24 June 1948, the USSR halted all surface traffic crossing from the western zone through the Soviet zone to West Berlin. The Berlin blockade started. The evident purpose of the Berlin blockade was to expel the western occupation forces from the city (Keylor 2001, 271) and to force the allies to reverse their decisions regarding western Germany. However, on the contrary, it provided a stronger impetus for the Western powers to establish a separate West German state (Pechatnov 2010, 107). The UK and the US responded with the support of an airlift (Gökay 2006, 65). The Berlin blockade “*accelerated the progressive involvement of the United States in the defense of Western Europe that had begun on the rhetorical level with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the adoption of the containment policy during the Greek and Turkish crises in 1947*” (Keylor 2001, 271).

The institutional structures of the Cold War began to shape with the Berlin blockade (Hale 2013, 84). Neither the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, nor the Mutual Aid Treaty between Britain, France and the Benelux countries were powerful enough to stop Soviet expansion (Gönlübol 1975, 24-25). Since the Berlin blockade increased the need to establish a common military force to defend western Europe, the western European countries initiated secret military talks with the US (Rosser 1969, 261).

On 4 July 1948, Turkey and the US signed the *Economic Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the United States of America*^{42,43} in the context of the Marshall Plan (Armaoğlu 1991, 168). Turkey applied for the NATO membership in November 1948 (Oran 2015c, 496). Main reasons preventing Turkey's original membership in NATO were the following:

- Defense of the Eastern Mediterranean had been contemplated under a different pact.
- The membership of Greece and Turkey would widen the defense zone of the alliance into a width impossible to defend.
- The members were concerned from the decreasing assistance in case of joining new members (Turan and Barlas 1994, 429).

The USSR established the *Council for Mutual Economic Assistance* (CMEA or COMECON) in January 1949 for the economic unification of the Soviet bloc (Pechatnov 2010, 106). The purpose of COMECON was to develop an integrated economic bloc in Eastern Europe to counterweight to the Marshall Plan and the OEEC (Keylor 2001, 339).

The draft of the Atlantic Pact was announced in March 1949 (Hasanlı 2011, 435). The Soviet reaction against the establishment of NATO was explained in a TASS statement on 1 April 1949. The USSR declared that it was not threatening anyone and the NATO treaty disrupted previous agreements signed between NATO members and

⁴² For the full text of the *Economic Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the United States of America* dated 4 July 1948, in Turkish, see, Armaoğlu (1991, 168-180).

⁴³ For information related to the American assistance extended to Turkey within the context of the Marshall Plan, see, Sezer (1993, 447-452). The American economic assistance extended to Europe within the framework of Marshall Plan terminated in the summer of 1952 (Sezer 1993, 452).

the USSR (Wozniuk 1990, 109). The North Atlantic Treaty^{44,45} (Washington Treaty) was signed amidst these conditions on 4 April 1949 with the participation of twelve North Atlantic countries (Gönlübol 1975, 24-25).

The US took some time to assess the geographical scope and intensity of the Cold War. Britain sought to use Turkey to preserve some of its previous role in the Middle East (Hale 2013, 101). Turkey sought to establish a *Mediterranean Alliance* to enter the North Atlantic Pact through the back door (Harris 1975, 54-55). On 14 April 1949, Turkish FM Sadak announced that the Atlantic Pact was insufficient for establishing peace in Europe and its completion with a Mediterranean Pact was a serious requirement. The SU was considering the entrance of Turkey, Greece and Italy into the Atlantic Pact or their forming regional pacts with the assistance of the US and Britain as a serious danger to its interests in the Balkans and the Middle East (Hasanlı 2011, 436-437).

Forming a pro-western alliance in the Middle East or a Mediterranean pact to include Britain, France, Greece, and Turkey with the US support were the alternatives. Inclusion of Italy in the Atlantic security system severely weakened the utility of a second structure. A bilateral defense agreement between the US and Turkey was also blocked by budgetary limitations put on the US defense spending by the Congress. Therefore, the only viable solution for Turkey was to seek full membership of the Atlantic Alliance (Hale 2013, 84).

On 12 May 1949, the SU terminated the Berlin blockade with face-saving gesture that the roads and railroads were closed for repair. The SU's failure to remove the island of Western influence was due to the transfer of sixty American B-29 bombers to British bases at the height of the crisis (Keylor 2001, 271).

⁴⁴ For the full text of the *North Atlantic Treaty*, see, United States Department of State (1957b).

⁴⁵ The founders were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US.

7. The Impact of Non-Structural System Dynamics on Turkey's Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty

The grand strategy of the US “*focused on binding the industrial core areas of Western Europe and Northeast Asia to the United States*”. The success of this also required the implementation of “*containment in the underdeveloped periphery*”. The Western Europe “*depended on access to the petroleum of the Middle East and the natural resources of former and current colonial possessions in Asia and Africa*”. “*... Japan's rehabilitation depended on supplanting its former ties with Manchuria, North China, and Korea with new markets and raw materials in Southeast Asia*” (Leffler 2010, 82). Rearmament and remobilization of the US and its European allies was not produced with the Berlin blockade and formation of NATO. “*It was originally assumed that throwing a 'nuclear cloak' over Western Europe, the United States could dissuade Moscow from interfering with the economic recovery and political stabilization of the countries receiving Marshall Plan assistance*” and balance the superiority of the Soviet conventional forces composed of 175 divisions over 14 divisions of the Western powers (Keylor 2001, 275-276).

Two events changed Soviet strategic calculations and the general Cold War stalemate in the fall of 1949. “*The first one was the end of the US atomic monopoly, publicly acknowledged by President Truman on September 23*”. The other change was “*the new Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance, signed on February 14, 1950*”. The emergence of the new ally in Asia made it possible to assist North Korea and in the process to lock China firmly into the Soviet orbit by setting it against the United States. These events of late 1949 and early 1950 “*prompted Stalin to endorse North Korea's attack on South Korea*”. Most likely the USSR “*was tempted to make up for the Soviet retreat in Europe*” (Pechatnov 2010, 108-109).

America's deterrent power was compromised when the SU exploded its first atomic bomb on 14 July 1949 soon after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (Keylor 2001, 275-276). With the detonation of an atomic bomb, the Soviet proclivity for risk-taking might increase (Leffler 2010, 83). The risk of massive destruction

resulted in restraint and changed the terms of the competition between the US and the USSR (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 86).

On 5 May 1949, the members of WU together with Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and Sweden established the Council of Europe (CoE). The CoE Committee of Ministers invited Turkey, Greece, and Iceland to join the organization. Despite Turkey's accession to the CoE alleviated the sorrow of Turkey due to her exclusion from NATO, it did not eliminate her apprehension against the Soviet threat (Gönlübol and Ülman 1993, 226-227). Meanwhile, as soon as he came to power on 21 May 1950, the Turkish PM Menderes announced that he was going to turn Turkey into a "*little America*" (Gökay 2006, 71).

Considering "*the West would not defend the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Stalin encouraged the Soviet-equipped forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) to invade South Korea*" (Gökay 2006, 66). On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces launched an all-out armed invasion of South Korea⁴⁶ (Gökay 2006, 73). On 27 June, the UNSC invited members to repel the armed attacks of Northern Korea (Váli 1971, 37).

The Korean War "*contributed significantly to the remilitarization of Europe and an intensification of the Cold War*" and "*became a catalyst in accelerating Turkey's integration to the Western security system*" (Gökay 2006, 74-75). Aydın (2000, 111) argues that by 1950 the main Soviet threat had already been averted. However, Turkey applied for the NATO membership on 11 May 1950 for a second time (Oran 2015c, 496). Contrary to most of the other Middle East states, it was not Turkey which had to be persuaded to join the western alliance, but the western powers had to be persuaded to admit Turkey. Turkey's main motivation for joining NATO was the existence of a distinct Soviet threat to its security and independence (Hale

⁴⁶ The Allies had declared in December 1943 that the USSR was to occupy the northern section of Korea, down to the 38th parallel, and that US forces would occupy the area below that. "*On 6 September 1945, before the US troops arrived, the South Korean people established a People's Republic of Korea. ... The Soviet Union responded ... in February of 1946, by installing a civilian North Korean government. ... By December 1948, the Soviet military had completely withdrawn from North Korea, but the US military stayed in the South until June 1949*" (Gökay 2006, 73). The successful conclusion of the Soviet nuclear tests, victory of the Chinese revolution, and other events increased the demands for unification in the North (Hasanlı 2011, 448-449).

1997, 254-255). On 25 July 1950, Turkey announced to send a 4,500-man brigade to Korea⁴⁷ (Gökay 2006, 74). Turkey formally applied for admission to NATO on 1 August 1950 (Váli 1971, 116) through the American, French and British embassies in Ankara (Gökay 2006, 75) for the third time⁴⁸ (Oran 2015c, 496).

The communist expansion across geographical borders in the context of Vietnam (the US intervention began in support of the French between 1950-1954) “gave rise to the idea of the ‘domino theory’ whereby those countries neighboring a newly-created revolutionary or communist state would become ‘infected’ with the ‘communist contagion’ and would fall over like dominoes”. Therefore, those countries in the frontline would be important to contain the spread of communism (Saull 2012, 74). The North Korean attack confirmed the suspicions “that the Soviets were becoming bolder as they gained strategic might. The United States, therefore, not only had to thwart the attack, but also needed to reestablish the aura of military superiority that was deemed critical for the success of their diplomacy ...”. The aim of the US was “to contain and roll back the USSR without risking all-out war” (Leffler 2010, 85). The Korean War demonstrated that the threat to western security was a global one and not confined to Western Europe (Hale 2013, 85-86).

The communist revolution in China and the outbreak of the Korean war propelled the US towards a much bolder and ambitious containment policy (Saull 2012, 71). Truman’s approval of NSC-68 (National Security Council Report number 68) in September 1950 moved the US towards containment by military means (Saull 2012, 71-73). NSC-68 recommended the expansion of American and West European conventional forces and the mobilization of the American economy to sustain this military buildup. In order to strengthen NATO, stationing of large numbers of American ground forces in Europe, installation of air bases in Europe, and closer

⁴⁷ On 15 September 1950, the US counter-attacked against the Korean army and by 26 October 1950 the US military had defeated the Korean army and approached the border with China. China counter-attacked and the United States withdrew back to the 38th parallel by January of 1951 (Gökay 2006, 73). The Soviet Union avoided direct participation in the conflict (Gökay 2006, 66).

⁴⁸ For Gönübol and Ülman (1993, 228-229), this was Turkey’s second application after her first application in May 1950.

integration of national armies of the alliance and the development of procedures for joint military planning were required (Keylor 2001, 275-276).

The establishment of nuclear balance between the US and the SU led to conventional forces regaining priority and the existence of twenty-two Turkish divisions increased Turkey's importance (Gönlübol 1975, 26). Leffler (1985, 808) argues that strategic imperatives played an important role in shaping the US foreign policy actions and alliance relationships. At the beginning, although the US did not expect an imminent Soviet attack on Turkey, it sought to enhance its strategic interests in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean to wage war against the USSR without undertaking specific guarantees to defend Turkey's territorial integrity. The US soon found that its investment in Turkey might be wasted if it did not accept more binding commitments in the form of Turkey's admission into the NATO.

The US feared that Turkey might adopt a more neutral position due to the rebuffing of their requests for concrete military guarantees and for inclusion in the NATO alliance. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the US, facing with the emergency in the Far East and fearing a full-scale war in Europe, did not wish to incur commitments that might embroil the US in another localized conflict. *"The real dilemma for the United States was to find a means to ensure the availability of Turkey's strategic assets to the West without extending commitments that might be both beyond the capabilities of the United States and disproportionate to the advantages that might accrue from a formal alliance"*. Therefore, not to risk the loss of a key prospective ally in wartime, the US wanted to minimize the disadvantages by giving an associate status to Turkey and Greece. In September 1950, the Defense Committee of the North Atlantic Council voted to invite Turkey and Greece to coordinate their military planning with NATO (Leffler 1985, 820-821).

During the visit of the US Assistance Secretary of State George McGhee in February 1951, President Bayar told McGhee that *"Turkey was unhappy with its status and sought reciprocal guarantees; Turkey would not be content with anything less"*. According to McGhee, there was a *"reason to believe that Turkey will veer towards a policy of neutralism, which will always have a strong basic appeal; and, until commitment is extended to Turkey"*. Thus, fear of Turkey's neutrality *"played a*

decisive role in compelling another appraisal of Turkey's relationship to NATO". In May 1951, the US "finally decided to accede to an expansion of United States commitments" due to "the critical role Turkey could play in protecting the West's southern flank in Europe, in diverting large numbers of Soviet troops to the Turkish theater, and in facilitating defense of the Mediterranean and the Middle East" (Leffler 1985, 822-823).

On 15 May 1951, Washington proposed to its NATO partners that Greece and Turkey be accepted as full members (Gökay 2006, 75). Norway, Denmark, and Belgium concerned from their being dragged into a war in the Mediterranean where they did not have interest and relation in case of the widening of NATO's area. Their second concern was a likely decrease in the assistance they received from the US. They also argued that NATO was not only an alliance for defense but also it was a document forming the core of unification among the countries of Atlantic civilization. The US replied to these arguments saying that Turkey and Greece were also members of CoE and OEEC. The biggest objection came from the UK. The UK argued that the extension of NATO to the Caucasus would be dangerous, therefore, Turkey and Greece could be included in the plan for the defense of the Middle East (Gönlübol and Ülman 1993, 230-231) due to her intention to stay at the Suez Channel and not to give up oil in the region (Armaoğlu 1988, 518-519). For the UK, Turkey ought to be the nucleus of the pact in the Middle East (Oran 1970, 68). Therefore, the UK was opposing putting Greece and Turkey under the commandship of the US (Gönlübol and Ülman 1993, 231).

The political atmosphere in the summer of 1951 and the Iranian crisis weakened the resistance about the expansion of NATO (Gönlübol and Ülman 1993, 231). The NATO Council of Ministers meeting, held at Ottawa between 16-20 September 1951, adopted an unanimous statement that an invitation should be addressed as soon as possible to the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to accede to the Treaty (Gökay 2006, 75). Despite this, the issue of Turkey's participation to NATO could not be resolved for a while due to the clashing opinions whether Turkey and Greece would be under the British command as the UK wanted or under the US command as Turkey wanted. The second reason suspending the

accession was the attitude of Egypt which finally eliminated the Middle East Command (MEC) project (Gönlübol and Ülman 1993, 233).

The US believed that the next region where the Soviets would continue to create problems would be the Middle East. The war in Korea undermined the confidence in Washington that Britain alone could protect the Middle East against Soviet aggression (Yeşilbursa 1999, 72-73). When Anglo-Egyptian talks (June 1950-July 1951) turned out to be inconclusive, *“the United States took the initiative in persuading Britain, France and Turkey to become with itself co-sponsors of an Allied Middle East Command with which Egypt would be invited to associate itself as a founder member”*. It was hoped that *“substituting a joint allied for an exclusive British base in the canal zone, would meet at once Egyptian demands for the elimination of British hegemony”*. The four-power invited Egypt to participate in a new Middle East Command on 13 October 1951. Egypt wanted to rescue itself of foreign controls and rejected the four-power proposal. The Egyptian parliament repudiated the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian condominium agreement over Sudan and the treaty of 1936 on 15 October 1951. *“The four allies issued on 10 November a fresh set of principles under which any Near and Middle East state might voluntarily join the proposed allied-sponsored organization”* (Hurewitz 1956, 329).

The announcement of the Middle East Command despite on paper aroused profound hostility in the USSR. The immediate strategic objective of the USSR in the post-war period was to eliminate British and French preferential rights and military bases and to prevent the US from filling the resultant power vacuum in the Near and Middle East due to its location adjacent to principal Soviet industries and petroleum sources (Hurewitz 1956, 332).

Council of Ministers of NATO accepted the memberships of Turkey and Greece with separate protocols on 17 October 1951⁴⁹ (Armaoğlu 1991, 189). The Protocol on the accession of Greece and Turkey was signed in London on 22 October

⁴⁹ For the full text of the *Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey*, see, United States Department of State (1957d).

1951 (Váli 1971, 116). On 4 November 1951, the USSR stated the following in a Note sent to Turkey regarding her membership in NATO:

“Since NATO has aggressive aims, it cannot serve the cause of peace and international security. The increasing armament efforts, establishment of American bases in other countries and other military measures left no room for doubt that the Atlantic bloc becomes an instrument of imperialist powers led by the US. According to various data, air and naval bases under the American command are established in Turkish territories. Especially, wide air bases are established near to the Soviet border.

It is obvious that the establishment of bases in Turkey which does not have any connection with the Atlantic carries a hostile objective against the USSR. The Soviet Government cannot remain indifferent to such acts and expects an explanation from the Turkish government regarding the above-mentioned points. The Soviet Government, similarly, would like to draw attention of the Turkish Government to the responsibility that it assumed by joining the aggressive NATO bloc and allowing her territory for the establishment of military bases for the use of foreign forces” (Aktaş 1998, 196; my translation).

Turkey stated the following in a reply Note dated 12 November 1951:

“The Atlantic Treaty was born from the need to provide self-defence. The Soviet assessments regarding the objectives of NATO do not reflect the reality. Turkey aims to guarantee her own national security by joining in the Atlantic Community. However, as far as the military preparations of the Soviet Union and other states closely tied with it in the region concerned, the above-mentioned situation valid for Turkey cannot be deemed valid for them.

The military measures adopted by Turkey do not aim at any other country. Besides, Turkey took these legal measures already before the preparations of her inclusion in the Atlantic Treaty started. It is an undeniable reality that Turkey encounters elements threatening her independence and territorial integrity. Under these conditions, Turkey, conscious of it cannot be held responsible from the Turkish-Soviet coolness, will not only serve to its own security but also will serve for the peace and security of all the peoples by preventing those having aggressive intentions, through her inclusion in the Atlantic Treaty” (Aktaş 1998, 197-198; my translation).

On 24 November 1951, the Soviet Ambassador in Sofia was instructed to transmit the decision for the closure of Bulgaria’s border with Turkey (Hasanlı 2011, 459-460). The USSR also referred to the *Middle East Command* in her Note of 24 November sent to the US, France, the UK and Turkey as a new aggressive plan (Hurewitz 1956, 332-333):

“The Soviet Government deems it necessary to explain the following to the Turkish Government with reference to the message of Turkey, the US, the UK, and France [four countries] to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Israel and Jordan regarding the so called Middle East Command.

The declaration issued by these four countries on 10 November is nothing but a probe to form a war bloc from the Near and Middle east countries. The four countries seek to make the Near

and Middle East countries an arsenal of the Atlantic Bloc armed forces. The danger posed to the independence and sovereignty of these countries cannot be emanated from any country but the entrepreneurs of the Middle East Command project. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to draw the attention of the Turkish Government that it cannot remain indifferent towards a new aggressive formation to be deployed closer to the Soviet borders and to state that the responsible of the situation in the region from now on would be Turkey and other three countries which are the entrepreneurs of the so called Command” (Aktaş 1998, 201; my translation).

On 30 November 1951, the USSR stated the following with the second Note sent to Turkey regarding her membership in NATO:

“The Soviet Government did not find Turkish Government’s reply satisfactory and totally rejects her allegations that an existential threat emanating from the USSR legitimize the efforts of the Turkish Government. Turkish Government’s approximating her country to the aggressive objectives of the Atlantic bloc will seriously damage the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union and the responsible of this will be Turkey” (Aktaş 1998, 199-200; my translation).

Turkey did not reply the second Soviet Note on NATO’s invitation of Turkey dated 30 November 1951 which was composed of the reiteration of the points in the previous Note (Bilge 1993b, 394). The US replied to the USSR with its Note dated 18 December 1951 that the decision whether to participate in the MEC project belonged to those states not to the USSR, and the recent Soviet threats to these states constituted an interference in the affairs of these countries (Hurewitz 1956, 333-334). Meanwhile, Turkey rejected the Soviet allegations regarding the MEC with its Note sent to the USSR on 19 December 1951 (Bilge 1993b, 395).

An Agreement effected by exchange of Notes related to mutual security between Turkey and the US was made through exchange of Notes signed in Ankara on 7 January 1952. According to Art.1 of the Turkish Note, Turkey “*expressed its adherence to the purposes and policies of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 as heretofore amended, including the statement of purpose contained in section 2 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951*” (U.S. Department of State 2019a). The purposes and policies of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 to which Turkey expressed its adherence was aiming the following:

“[T]o promote world peace and the general welfare, national interest, and foreign policy of the United States through economic, financial, and other measures necessary to the maintenance of conditions abroad in which free institutions may survive and consistent with the

maintenance of the strength and stability of the United States” (Department of State 1950, 1299).

Sec. 2 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 to which Turkey expressed its adherence was as follows:

“The Congress declares it to be the purpose of this Act to maintain the security and promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interest of the United States and to facilitate the effective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for collective security” (United States Government Publishing Office (GPO) 2019a).

This meant that Turkey almost gave its land title to the US to become a member of NATO although the system dynamics was favourable for Turkey not to be insistent so much on the NATO membership. Therefore, this agreement was ratified at the TGNA on 10 March 1954 with a different title⁵⁰ which did not refer to the political and military character of this agreement (Armaoğlu 1991, 184).

On 28 January 1952, the USSR stated the following with the second Note sent to Turkey regarding the Middle East Command:

“The execution of the plan demonstrating the ambitions of the imperialist forces to put the world under their hegemony means the dragging of the Near and Middle Eastern countries into a new world war. The implementation of the Middle East Command Plan by the powerful Anglo-American group with the participation of Turkey is nothing but the implementation of aggressive plans. There is no threat directed at the Near and Middle East countries and these countries did not want the establishment of this Command. On the contrary, these countries resist to being dragged into the military actions of the aggressive countries like the US, France, the UK and Turkey.

Turkey explains this situation as if it is a necessary act required for the security of the free world but not as the wish of some powers to intensify colonialism and semi-colonialism in the Middle East and indirectly to contain the USSR. The Soviet Government, in the face of the efforts to pick a new war, elicits the firm determination of the peoples of the USSR for the maintenance and protection of peace. The Soviet Government declares that Turkey and other entrepreneur countries will be held responsible from the implementation of this plan” (Aktaş 1998, 202-204; my translation).

⁵⁰ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile A.B.D. Hükümeti Arasında Mün’akid Muaddel Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşmasını Tadil Eden 7 Ocak 1952 Tarihli Anlaşmanın Onanmasına Dair Kanun. (Law on the ratification of the Agreement of 7 January 1952 amending the Agreement on Economic Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the US).

Turkey and Greece were officially admitted to NATO⁵¹ at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon on 18 February 1952 (Hale 2013, 85-86). Following its NATO membership, Turkey became the site of the US military bases and the cornerstone of the western alliance in the Middle East. However, it was the SU's attempted expansionism which brought about the very situation it sought to avoid. The dependence of Turkey and Iran upon western protection were the direct result of the Soviet policies which were not easily undone in the ensuing decades (Golan 1990, 34).

NATO gathered its defense policies under main titles so called *NATO Strategy*. The first strategy adopted during the foundation years was to obtain numerical military balance with the USSR since the American nuclear capability was not sufficient. With this approach determined in the Lisbon conference between 20-25 February 1952 and generally known as *Limited War Strategy*, a rapid increase in the number of the NATO soldiers was planned. This strategy envisaged that Turkey would soak a possible Soviet attack up and hold up the enemy forces with her forces composed of 22 divisions and then the American army would blow the final strike by using also aerial superiority on the weakening Soviet army. Since Turkey was in a hurry to join NATO, she did not object to this approach which would have grave results for her (Erhan 2015b, 570).

Oran (1970, 73-74) argues that Turkey struggled to join NATO despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat after 1946. The aim of Turkey was to obtain foreign assistance rather than seek security. The purpose of the American assistance was to increase the strength of the Turkish army but not support her economic development. While the defense expenditures in the Turkish national budget did not decrease, the development of defense industry in Turkey in the long run was prevented. For this reason, Turkey became dependent on US for arms, private equipment, and organization of the army. Turkey's search for the western support during the 1945-1946 period can be explained by the security considerations. However, western countries did not show a special affinity to Turkey in this period. The American

⁵¹ According to a secret clause in the initial NATO treaty of 1949 which required the establishment of a national security authority to fight communism through clandestine citizen cadres, a contra-guerrilla centre was established in Turkey in September 1952 (Gökay 2006, 76).

assistance within the framework of Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan came when the Soviet threat lapsed. All these concessions given to West and all provocative acts directed to the USSR have been done to receive economic assistance from the western countries who did not want to take Turkey among themselves until their interests arouse. Oran argues that the new ruling party DP pursued a foreign policy in line with her domestic economic and political considerations.

No comprehensive strategy for confronting the USSR had emerged anywhere in the capitalist world before 1945 due to the fragmented capitalism which legitimated Stalin's diagnosis that divisions among capitalists prevented their devising a plan against the USSR. However, with the success of the Marshall Plan and the establishment of NATO, Stalin's strategy of exploiting capitalist rivalries had been disappeared (Gaddis 2010, 4-7).

Conclusion

The second variant of the HUS came with the Montreux Convention. Despite it regulated the rule of conduct in the Straits and changed the capabilities of Turkey, the riverain states of the Black Sea and the non-riverain TPGPs and other powers, its importance is emanated from reinstating Turkey's sovereignty over the straits zone. Thus, Montreux made the straits as the main dynamic of Turkish-Soviet conflicts one more time due to the incompatible security considerations of the parties. The Montreux Convention virtually annihilated the Treaty of Paris and turned the Turkish-Soviet subtex into a non-alignment-based threat complex for Turkey. From that time on Turkey gradually sought candidate states in order to equilibrate threats posed from different states. Turkey sometimes resorted to a policy of threat equilibrium and sometime resorted to an interest equilibrium policy during this period towards various TPGPs.

The findings support the first hypothesis. With the local dynamics of the conflicts mostly disappeared under the HUS, the structural effect of the Montreux Convention strictly led Turkish-Soviet sibtex to absorb the subtex. The Turkish-Soviet alienation in this period evolved in three stages. Firstly, the unbridgeable security priorities of Turkey and the USSR emanated from geographically differentiated threat

perceptions prevented the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty between Turkey and the USSR. Secondly, the course of the relations between the USSR and Germany led to the fluctuation of the course of Turkish-Soviet relations. Thirdly, the post-war allied threat perceptions shaped the final rupture in Turkish-Soviet relations.

The first part of the second hypothesis is supported by evidence. During this period, the USSR's relations with Germany, the UK and the US were the main determinant of the dynamics of the conflicts between Turkey and the USSR. Germany was influential in USSR's reformulation of her policy against Turkey during the war years. This supports the second sentence of the second hypothesis for the USSR. During the post-war years, the UK and the US were influential in Turkey but this did not lead Turkey to change her foreign policy towards the USSR.

In the period until 1946, the UK and the US acted like intermediary between Turkey and the USSR in the resolution of their conflicts, but this did not imply the existence of a centralized management of Turkey's conflicts with the USSR. It can be said that centralized management of the Turkish-Russian conflicts began during the period of correspondence regarding the Straits in 1946. The fourth hypothesis is untestable due to the lack of relevant findings in this period.

CHAPTER SIX

THE IMPACT OF TURKEY'S ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP ON THE TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS (1952-1991)

Introduction

This chapter covers the period between the accession of Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty on 18 February 1952 and the official dissolution of the USSR on 31 December 1991. Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty added a relational variable to the Turkish-Soviet relations. This membership created the situational context for behavior through which the effects of the modified BSS structure was transmitted to the behaviors of both Turkey and the USSR. Therefore, the pattern of this stage was coined as *alliance-based threat complex* in order to point out this variant of relations in the HUS pattern.

This chapter although covers a long period, amounts to almost similar number of pages with other chapters due to the simple and pre-bordered interactions in the BSS. The causes of this simple pattern of interaction were emanated firstly from the hegemonic unipolarity of the BSS, secondly, the restoration of the Turkish sovereignty at the Straits with Montreux, and Turkey's alliance membership as a relational variable shaping the interaction in the BSS. These three factors made the Turkish-Soviet sibtex almost fully an extension of the Soviet-US competition with centrally produced and managed dynamics of the Turkish-Soviet conflicts. The degree of tension/détente between the USSR and the US shaped the dynamics of this period. There were also some anomaly in Turkey's foreign policy applications emanated fully from her domestic considerations occurred in the form of pursuing an assertive foreign policy against the USSR in order to obtain economic assistance from the US.

The first stage of the chapter covers the events between Turkey's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty in February 1952 and the Cyprus crisis in June 1964. Although the Cuban missile crisis also deserves to be start of a section, the reason of selecting the Cyprus crisis was due to the beginning of so many mutual visits between

Turkey and the USSR in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis. In this stage, Turkey saw the American interests identical to hers. The US-centered Turkish foreign policy created US-centered conflicts with the USSR. The establishment of the American military bases in Turkey, the efforts to found regional security organizations in the Middle East, the visits of ally warships to Turkey, American intelligence gathering activities, the Syrian crisis, the advance and deployment of the nuclear weapons were the important issues of this stage exerting influence on Turkish-Soviet relations.

The second stage covers the period between the Cyprus crisis in June 1964 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 which corresponds to *détente* period of relations between the USSR and the US. This stage signifies Turkey's need to diversify her relations with the Third World and eastern bloc countries due to her alienation with the US as a result of the Cuban missile and the Cyprus crises. Turkey's gradual rapprochement with the USSR enabled Turkey to obtain Soviet economic assistance for industrial development and some political support in the international organizations.

The third stage of the seventh chapter between 1979-1986 signifies the gradual restoration of the Turkish-American ties in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy in 1980 and the F-16 jet fighter project beginning in 1983 were the main themes of the Turkish-American reconciliation. Despite this, Turkey's developing economic relations with the USSR were important characteristics of the era. The long term natural gas agreement signed in 1984 may be considered among one of them.

The fourth stage corresponds to the series of domestic reform projects of the USSR under the name of *glasnost* and *perestroika* beginning from 1986 of which *sine qua non* was a new *détente* in international relations. The Soviet reform projects brought about the revival of independence movements in the Soviet republics in 1990. In November 1990, with the signature of the CFE Treaty and the Paris Charter, the USSR compromised her superiority in conventional weapons to the new political architecture of the world. The Gulf war of 1990 had a discord effect on Turkish-American relations especially due to Turkey's economic losses and the US support for a Kurdish entity in northern Iraq. The Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and the

USSR signed in March 1991 was approving the principles of the Paris Charter at the bilateral level. The year 1991 signified the dissolution year of the USSR and emergence of new independent states in the former Soviet geography.

1. The US-Dominated Turkish Foreign Policy and the Turkish-Soviet Relations (1952-1964)

Turkey's membership in NATO formed a political resource with respect to her foreign policy objectives. Turkey's links in NATO contributed to her accession to western European institutions and developing links with the European integration process (Turan and Barlas 1994, 438). The NATO connection also led to a proliferation of US activities in Turkey (Harris 1972, 49). Turkey saw the US rather than NATO as a guarantee of her security. Turkey's foreign policy became totally a product of Western alignment and an extension of Western policies towards both the USSR and the non-aligned countries (Aydın 2000, 113-114). Turkey's brief activism in the Middle East in the 1950s was "*determined by the western bloc's security perceptions in the region- namely the containment of the Soviet Union and Arab nationalism, as well as the protection of access to Middle Eastern oil*" (Altunışık 2009, 173). According to Bağcı (1994, 89), Turkey perceived the western interests in the Near and Middle East as identical to her security interests between 1950 and 1960.

Aknur (2012, 28) argues that Turkey's NATO membership brought political and economic dependency. Turkey closed her airplane factories in 1952 on the ground of economic loss following the US started to donate airplanes to Turkey. However, this decision meant the renouncement from the arms technology required as one of the most important elements of a strong foreign policy (Yenigün 2010, 65-66).

The US wanted to rearm and link West Germany to NATO. When the French reacted with anxiety, the US involved in the French plan to establish a *European Defense Community* (EDC) which was created including the West Germany with the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 27 May 1952. The overarching design of the US was "*to lock West Germany and Japan into permanent association with a Western alliance system*" (Leffler 2010, 86). The US gained comparative superiority when it exploded the first hydrogen bomb on 1 November 1952. When the USSR tested its first

hydrogen bomb successfully on 12 August 1953, the nuclear superiority era of the US ended. However, the US had the strategic superiority against the USSR since it had the ability to deploy short and medium range missiles around the USSR (Sönmezoğlu 2016, 21-22). On 28 February 1953, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia signed a *Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation*¹ in Ankara which was not an alliance but a step in this direction (Armaoğlu 1988, 521-524).

1.1. The Renouncement of Soviet Territorial Claims Over Turkey (30 May 1953)

Almost immediately after Stalin died on 5 March 1953, “*the collective leadership began altering the conduct of Soviet foreign policy to permit better relations with the West and new approaches to the non-aligned countries*” (Gökay 2006, 69). Soviet *peaceful co-existence theory* replaced the two-camp theory. The new theory shifted competition to less provocative, less doctrinaire, and more pragmatic means. This meant the ruling-out of East-West direct confrontation and emergence of an indirect competition for the Third World. The USSR was satisfied with the Third World neutrality since it was the West rather than the USSR which was seeking overseas bases and the creation of a network of regional alliances. Neutrality meant the refusal to join in alliances with a great power and refusal to grant military bases. Thus, encouragement of non-alignment meant encouragement of anti-western policy (Golan 1990, 9-10). With the new policy, the USSR adopted the economic competition and development of each nation according to its characteristics instead of expansion and augmenting influence through use of force (Bilge 1993a, 396-397).

Soviet Union’s Turkey policy was harmonious with its general policy (Bilge 1993a, 396-397). On 30 May 1953, the USSR informed Turkey with a Note that she was dropping her demand for a revision of Montreux and her claims on Turkey’s eastern provinces:

¹ For the full text of the *Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece and Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia*, dated 28 February 1953, see, United States Department of State (1957f).

“... In the name of preserving good neighborly relations and strengthening peace and security, the Governments of Armenia and Georgia have found it possible to renounce their territorial claims on Turkey.

Concerning the question of the Straits the Soviet Government has reconsidered its former opinion on this question and considers possible the provision of security of the USSR from the side of the Straits on conditions acceptable alike to the USSR and to Turkey. Thus the Soviet Government declares that the Soviet Union has not any kind of territorial claims on Turkey” (as quoted in Váli 1971, 174).

Bilge (1993a, 397) contends that the USSR renounced her territorial claims over Turkey but did not express its view whether it also renounced from the idea of joint defense of the Straits. The first reaction of the UK was to establish a link between the Note and Turkey’s NATO membership by interpreting the Soviet Note as an attempt to separate Turkey from her NATO allies and hamper attempts to establish the Balkan Pact and the Middle East Command. France was thinking that the Soviet attempt had been emanated from its demand for an east-west détente (Tellal 2015c, 512-513).

According to Turkey, the Note had both positive and negative sides. Although the possibility of limiting military expenditure emerged, there was also a possibility of a decrease in the western assistance extended to Turkey. At that time, Turkey was busy with strengthening her position in NATO and transform her strategic situation into economic assistance rather than reviewing her relationship with the neighbors (Tellal 2015c, 512-513). Turkey did not risk the reduction of western aid which might occurred as a result of closer economic relations with the USSR. The balance of power between Turkey and the USSR was so heavily in favor of the latter that the risk of political subordination would have been serious if Turkey had been neutral (Hale 2013, 102-103). Turkey replied the Soviet opening with a Note dated 18 July 1953 (Váli 1971, 175) in which it informed its taking note of the Soviet declaration with pleasure. Turkey also reminded that the Straits was subject to the provisions of the Montreux Convention (Aktaş 1998, 205). Turkey expressed that it required material proof of the Soviet friendly approach (Bilge 1993a, 397) and regarded these peace moves as a new Soviet tactic designed to separate it from the West (Aydın 2000, 113).

Oran (1970, 76-77) suggests to look at the Turkish-Soviet relations of the period through the lenses of Turkish-American relations. The unplanned and

unmeasured economic activities of the Menderes government had created foreign currency shortage. However, the visit of President Bayar to the US in January 1954 to provide \$300 million assistance resulted with failure. The Menderes government believed that appearing distrustful from the USSR would make gain herself more reputation and, thus, more American assistance. Therefore, Turkey wanted to maintain the Cold War almost alone.

1.2. Turkey's Western-oriented Regional Security Arrangements and the USSR: The Balkan Pact and the Baghdad Pact

In May 1953, American FM Dulles visited the Middle Eastern countries to establish a regional defense pact to contain the south flank of the USSR. However, according to Egypt, imminent and open threat was not the Soviet danger but the British and Israeli imperialism. For Syria, Turkey's imperialist aims, the issue of Palestinian refugees and Arab-Israeli conflict were the main issues (Ataç 2017, 81). Since the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations collapsed in June 1953, the UK proposed to the US on 18 June to create a planning, coordination and liaison organization which would eventually evolve into a full-fledged defense organization and suggested changing the name of MEC to the *Middle East Defense Organization* (MEDO). However, faced with the ongoing debates over the structure of MEDO and the continuing difficulties with the Arab states, the US began to lose interest in MEDO (Yeşilbursa 1999, 96).

Despite transition from Stalinist to post-Stalinist diplomacy, the new Soviet diplomacy was no less concerned than its predecessor about western access to Near and Middle East bases. Upon Turkey's giving information to the USSR regarding the visit of 10 US ships to Istanbul between 22-27 July and the visit of 22 British ships to Istanbul between 27 July -3 August, the USSR complained with a Note sent to Turkey on 20 July 1953 that the visit of foreign formations of vessels including large vessels became more frequent and the above-mentioned visits may be viewed as a kind of military demonstration. Turkey, in its reply Note dated 24 July 1953, stated that these visits were courtesy visits, adding that, articles 14 and 17 of the Montreux Convention granted naval forces courtesy visits to the Straits complete freedom as to tonnage.

Turkey also informed its surprise for the USSR demanded additional information on the subject and stated that the demand for additional information may be viewed as a kind of intervention on a question which was left by international custom to the discretion of the countries concerned (Hurewitz 1956, 343-344). The USSR, in its second Note dated 31 July 1953, listed the following visits of foreign naval forces as an evidence of increase in the number and tonnage of the visiting vessels and stated that there was no foundation for a conclusion of any intervention by the USSR:

- 1950: 33 foreign naval vessels with a displacement of 197.800 tons.
- 1951: 49 foreign naval vessels with a displacement of 378.800 tons.
- 1952: 69 foreign naval vessels with a displacement of 587.727 tons.
- 1953 (seven months): 60 foreign vessels with a displacement of more than 300.000 tons (Hurewitz 1956, 344-345).

Turkey reiterated her strong support for the containment of the USSR from the south. As a result, the US concentrated on Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan for the formation of a regional pact. The *Northern Tier* would be a defense pact composed of the countries perceiving direct military threat from the USSR with the minimum Arab participation (Ataç 2017, 81-82). On 18 March 1954, the USSR sent a Note to Turkey regarding the prospective Turkish-Pakistani Pact:

“The prospective agreement between Turkey and Pakistan, envisaging a cooperation in every field including the military one damages the interests of their neighboring countries. Especially, this agreement would form the core of the Middle East Military Bloc by including other countries. As far as the nonexistence of any threat to Turkey and Pakistan is concerned, this agreement cannot be qualified as defensive. On the contrary, the agreement is closely related to the military plans of the Atlantic bloc. The US had stated with its previous Notes that the purpose of the military blocs to be founded in the Near and Middle East was to turn the regional countries into the arsenal of the Atlantic Alliance.

It is striking that Turkey’s recent activities to form military bloc in the Near and Middle East and South-eastern Asia coincides with the measures taken by the USSR and other countries to alleviate international tension and develop international relations. Turkey’s activities worsen the situation in the region. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to draw the attention of the Turkish Government that it is impossible that such a policy will not disrupt Soviet-Turkish relations” (Aktaş 1998, 210; my translation).

Meanwhile, the *Agreement for Friendly Cooperation Between the Dominion of Pakistan and the Republic of Turkey*² was signed on 2 April 1954 (amended on 19 August 1954). Turkey replied the Soviet Note on the Turkish-Pakistani Pact with a Note dated 9 May 1954:

“Turkey observes with anxiety that the USSR always accuses Turkey for its every attempt to strengthen peace, security and cooperation. These accusation are made not only through diplomatic channels but also through all kinds of broadcast and propaganda. It seems that the USSR seeks to disseminate the belief that the efforts of the countries, such as Turkey, to preserve peace as the cause of international tension. The dispatch of the above-mentioned Soviet Note before the signing of the Turkish-Pakistani agreement is the clear indication of this propaganda activity to create a psychological influence. The objectives of the agreements of the Turkish Government have constructive, peaceful, and defensive nature in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. While the USSR is telling that Turkey should assume the responsibility from the disruption of bilateral relations, it reverses the roles. Exhibiting misleading displays rather than resolving the issues do not create an environment of trust and Turkey cannot be held responsible for this issue” (Aktaş 1998, 211-212; my translation).

Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia signed a treaty of alliance³ in Bled on 9 August 1954 (Armaoğlu 1988, 521-524) which became a dead letter⁴ soon after its signing. Meanwhile, the armistice negotiations in Korea were completed in July 1953 on the terms that denied the North Korea the political gains it had sought in the south (Keylor 2001, 289). On 8 September 1954, the US established a collective defense system for South Asia to contain Soviet and Chinese expansion in the aftermath of France’s defeat in Indochina (Keylor 2001, 296). NATO adopted *Massive Retaliation Strategy* on 22 November 1954 envisaging to respond the USSR with nuclear weapons since deploying large numbers of troops was expensive and the USSR had rapidly developed its atomic weapon capacity which would not be halted with conventional forces. Thus, the US needed military bases to deploy her nuclear missiles around the USSR (Erhan 2015b, 570). According to *Massive Retaliation Strategy*, the US would activate

² For the full text of the *Agreement for Friendly Cooperation Between the Dominion of Pakistan and the Republic of Turkey*, dated 2 April 1954, see, United States Department of State (1957a).

³ For the full text of the *Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Balkan Pact)*, dated 9 August 1954, see, United States Department of State (1957e).

⁴ In 1955, peace between the USSR and Yugoslavia removed the pact’s *raison d’être*. The emergence of Cyprus problem made it difficult for cooperation between Turkey and Greece. Thus, the second Balkan Pact collapsed quickly than the first one (Hale 2013, 90-91). The rapid death of the Balkan Pact demonstrates the Soviet influence in the region which improved relations with Yugoslavia and caused Yugoslavia’s losing interest in Pact (Karpāt 1975b, 89).

immediately her total nuclear power in case of an attack on any member of the alliance (Gönlübol 1975, 41).

Following the establishment of the Balkan Pact, Turkey started to activate a similar defense web in the Middle East (Armaoğlu 1988, 524-528). In the context of the visit of the American SS Dulles to the Middle Eastern countries in 1953, Turkey and Iraq tried to strengthen their defense against the USSR with a Pact^{5,6,7} signed in Baghdad on 24 February 1955 (Ataç 2017, 82). The UK supported this initiative in order to bridge the geographical gap between NATO and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (Keylor 2001, 296).

In March 1955, the USSR proposed Syria to send military equipment while Turkey and Iraq were making military exercises at the Syrian border. This was the first Soviet proposal to an Arab country to extend arms assistance (Ataç 2017, 82).

The first official reaction of the USSR regarding the establishment of Baghdad Pact was her official declaration dated 16 April 1955. The USSR was rejecting the military groupings made establish by western powers in the Near and Middle East and the Turkish suggestions concerning the necessity of a military agreement in the Near and Middle East to prevent Soviet danger (Bağcı 1994, 100).

The Soviet support of the countries which were in the process of anti-colonization gained momentum after the Bandung Conference. The USSR emerged as the only candidate to fill the power gap in the Third World which were unified in the anti-westernism ground (Ataç 2017, 82). The Bandung Conference held with the participation of 29 Asian and African states on 18 April 1955 constituted the beginning

⁵ For the full text of the *Pact of Mutual Cooperation between the Kingdom of Iraq, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Dominion of Pakistan, and the Kingdom of Iran (Baghdad Pact)*, dated 24 February 1955, see, United States Department of State (1957c), and Hurewitz (1956, 390-391).

⁶ The UK joined on 5 April 1955, Pakistan joined on 23 September 1955, and Iran joined on 23 October 1955.

⁷ The attempts of Ankara and Baghdad to establish a Middle East Defense system was met with the reaction of Arab countries notably Egypt which desired to establish an Arab bloc under its own leadership. Thus, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia strongly opposed the idea. Egypt and Syria showed the pact as a tool of western imperialism and an instrument of serving to Israel. Lebanon and Jordan did not participate in either Baghdad Pact or Egypt-Syria bloc. Due to the opposition of Arab countries, the US did not venture to participate in the Baghdad Pact. When Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen signed a defense agreement on 21 April 1956 a new bloc emerged against Baghdad Pact in the Middle East. While Lebanon and Jordan abstained, the Middle East was divided into three parts (Armaoğlu 1988, 524-528).

of the non-aligned movement. The US rejected this new formation as labeling it immoral. Turkey joined the conference to defend the western bloc. Turkey sought to warn⁸ these countries against communist threat instead of seeking to obtain their friendship (Aktaş 1998, 103).

The *Warsaw Security Pact*⁹ was established on 14 May 1955. Although the membership of Western Germany in NATO on 9 May 1955 was argued as a main reason for the establishment of Warsaw Pact, its foremost reason was to legitimize the presence of Soviet troops in Central and Eastern Europe after the signing of *Austrian State Treaty* on 15 May 1955 which enabled Soviet withdrawal from Austria (Wozniuk 1990, 134). The first postwar meeting in Geneva in July 1955 of Eisenhower, Bulganin, Eden and Faure did not produce practical results regarding the east-west conflicts (Keylor 2001, 290-291).

On 4 February 1956, the USSR sent a Note to Turkey concerning observation balloons sent by Americans through Turkey arguing that they violated the Soviet airspace, jeopardized the air traffic (Kurban 2017, 133) and pursued secret intelligence gathering activities (Tellal 2015c, 514). Turkey replied as the following with a reply Note dated 14 February 1956:

“Turkish and American scientists are collecting meteorological data at high altitude through the balloons for a scientific research for some time. However, lack of full control over the balloons causes problems in determining the landing place. The Soviet balloons used for similar purposes had been found in the Turkish territory in the past. Thus, landing of these balloons in the Soviet territory was only an accident. The Turkish Government surprised that it received a Note interpreting the events in a different way despite these works are done within the public information. The Turkish officials in concurrence with the American officials will take necessary measures not to launch more balloons” (Aktaş 1998, 242; my translation).

The USSR stated the following in the second Note dated 20 February 1956:

“The Soviet Government had drawn the attention of the Turkish Government to the balloons, manufactured in the US and equipped with aerial photo shooting, automatic receiver and

⁸ Turkey’s attitude in Bandung created distrust in the long run. Turkey could not get support from this group members during the negotiations of the Cyprus issue at the UN (Aktaş 1998, 104).

⁹ For the full text of the *Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the People’s Republic of Albania, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People’s Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People’s Republic, the Rumanian People’s Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic* (The Warsaw Security Pact), dated 14 May 1955, see, United States Department of State (1957g).

sender and other devices, coming from Turkey and entered into the Soviet air space. The Turkish arguments do not legitimize the violation of the Soviet air space. The Soviet Government draws the attention of the Turkish Government one more time that sending balloons to the Soviet airspace constitutes aggression to the inviolableness of the Soviet territory and International law. At the same time, it is obvious that a box weighed between kg 200-300 falling from high altitude freely could damage buildings, telephone and electric lines, various constructions, and cause casualties. The Soviet Government declares that it is prepared to open exhibitions of the balloons in the Soviet Union and in relevant countries in case of a doubt arose about the trueness of the Soviet argument” (Aktaş 1998, 243-244; my translation).

Turkey replied the second Soviet Note with a second Note undated in which it stated the following:

“While the balloons passing from Turkey to the Soviet Union are made a matter of discussion in the Soviet Notes, the balloons passing from the Soviet Union to Turkey are not mentioned. The Turkish Government does not find the Soviet argument that these balloons are used in activities other than the meteorological works convincing. The Turkish Government does not have the intention to send experts to Moscow to examine the balloons. The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, believing that the technical and political debates regarding this issue will not bring practical benefits, informs the latter that Turkey will rule out within the bounds of possibility the passing of the balloons to the Soviet air space during the tests to be made in the future ” (Aktaş 1998, 245; my translation).

1.3. The Crises in the Middle East and the Turkish-Soviet Relations

Khrushchev advocated peaceful coexistence (Gönlübol 1975) and endorsed the liberalization in the Eastern European states at the 20th Congress of the CPSU held between 14-25 February 1956 (Keylor 2001, 292). Khrushchev gave Lenin’s concept of peaceful coexistence a new wind with a corollary thesis: “*peaceful coexistence could continue between socialism and capitalism until the communist millennium*”. Despite Lenin’s prediction, war was no longer “*fatalistically inevitable*” (Rosser 1969, 305). Khrushchev proclaimed the major tasks of Soviet foreign policy as the following:

- “A policy of peaceful coexistence.
- [B]uilding stronger relations among the socialist states, including Yugoslavia.
- [S]trengthening friendship and cooperation with neutralist and peace-loving states in Europe and the Third World.
- [P]ursuing closer relations with the United States and its allies.
- [S]trengthening the USSR’s defense potential and exposing the activities of the enemies of peace” (Donaldson, Noguee, and Nadkarni 2015, 79).

Turkey did not interpret this as a symptom and evidence of a real thaw in international relations (Gönlübol 1975). On 18 April 1956, Cominform was dissolved. Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to solicit Turkey's neutrality however this was part of overall policy of peaceful coexistence (Sezer 1985, 119).

1.3.1. The Suez Crisis (The Arab-Israeli War) (29 October-7 November 1956)

The process of the Suez crisis coincides with the setbacks in the new Soviet diplomacy. The USSR reluctantly recognized the change in the communist party leadership of Poland in October 1956. The Soviet army crushed the Hungarian revolt demanding "a multi-party political system and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact early in November 1956. This *"demonstrated that the Soviet Union would use force, if necessary, to maintain control over its satellite states in Eastern Europe"* (Gökay 2006, 69).

The Soviet-American competition for influence in the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli Conflict, and Egyptian efforts to speed up the departure of Anglo-French power converged in the Suez Crisis (Keylor 2001, 299). The Suez crisis¹⁰ undermined the political cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance by revealing that the European states no longer had right to pursue foreign policies that Washington did not back. The USSR *"acquired a reputation as the champion of Arab aspirations at the expense of the Western powers and their Israeli ally"* which *"enabled Kremlin to renew its ideological offensive in the Third World"* (Keylor 2001, 300).

Following the Suez crisis, a suitable ground was formed for the intrusion of the USSR to the Middle east where the reputations of Britain and France were reset. Meanwhile, the US seemed to distance herself from the policies to show herself with the colonialist powers. The US believed that her own idea of Baghdad Pact was grasped by Britain and transformed into a tool serving her regional interests. Losing optimism about the success of a regional defense organization in the Middle East, the US suggested Britain to keep the Baghdad Pact on paper (Ataç 2017, 83). Thus,

¹⁰ For detailed information about the Suez Crisis, see, Keylor (2001, 295-300).

Turkey's engagement in two regional alliance formations to extend western defense structures proved to be unsuccessful (Hale 2013, 90-91).

The Suez imbroglio posed serious challenge to Turkey's alliance with the West. Despite concerns that the Suez crisis could create undesirable precedents for Turkey in the Straits, it supported the US efforts to form a *Canal Users Association* following Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company (Harris 1975, 55). When the term of the Montreux Convention expired in November 1956, none of the signatories applied for its abrogation or amendment and it was considered to have been automatically renewed (Hale 2013, 88-89).

Towards the end of 1956, Turkey was in a serious economic crisis and was seeking to overcome her economic problems through the American foreign assistance. Therefore, Turkey sought to instrumentalize Soviet expansion within the framework of regional security concerns over which the US was most sensitive (Ataç 2017, 83). Meanwhile, the US President Eisenhower sent a *Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East* on 5 January 1957 which would be coined as *Eisenhower Doctrine*¹¹:

"In 1955, Soviet traffic through the Canal represented only about three fourths of 1 percent of the total. The Soviets have no need for, and could provide no market for, the petroleum resources which constitute the principal natural wealth of the area. Indeed, the Soviet Union is a substantial exporter of petroleum products. The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics. ...

This region has always been the crossroads of the continents of the Eastern Hemisphere. ... The Middle East provides a gateway between Eurasia and Africa. It contains about two thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world and it normally supplies the petroleum needs of many nations of Europe, Asia and Africa. The nations of Europe are peculiarly dependent upon this supply, and this dependency relates to transportation as well as to production. ...

These things stress the immense importance of the Middle East. If the nations of that area should lose their independence, if they were dominated by alien forces hostile to freedom, ..., [w]estern Europe would be endangered just as though there had been no Marshall Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization. ... All this would have the most adverse, if not disastrous, effect upon our own nation's economic life and political prospects" (Miller Center 2019).

Following Eisenhower's message, the Congress approved the *Eisenhower Doctrine* in a joint resolution on 9 March 1957. Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a country could request American economic and military assistance against overt armed

¹¹ For the full text of the *Eisenhower Doctrine*, see, National Archives (2019).

aggression from any nation controlled by communism. The motivation of this doctrine was in part “*an increase in Arab hostility toward the West, and growing Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria following the Suez Crisis of 1956*”. According to the US, “*a power vacuum had formed in the Middle East due to the loss of prestige of Great Britain and France*” which might open the Middle East to Soviet influence. Eisenhower wanted this vacuum filled by the US before the USSR (U.S. Department of State 2019b). Turkey announced her participation in the Eisenhower Doctrine on 22 March 1957 (Armaoğlu 1991, 249).

1.3.2. The Syrian Crisis (12 August 1957 – 29 October 1957)

The Soviet policy towards Syria can be understood within the framework of her policy towards Middle East and the Third World (Tellal 2015c, 515). A Syrian delegation signed a series of agreement in Moscow in July 1957. These agreements were announced in August (Golan 1990, 246-247). The breakdown in Turkish-Syria relations began with Turkey’s accusing the latter becoming a Soviet satellite (Abou-El-Fadl 2013, 39). Eisenhower announced that he would deliver weapons to Turkey, Iraq and Jordan if they were obliged to move against Syria in case of the attack of the latter. Turkey started to concentrate troops on the Syria border (Armaoğlu 1991, 251).

The Syrian crisis, occurred between 12 August and 29 October 1957, was a result of series of events started at the beginning of 1950s (Ataç 2017, 80). Turkey’s accession to NATO and her promotion of the Baghdad Pact shaped her policies at the international and regional levels. The Eisenhower Doctrine was the public face of the new tactics of the US and the UK on settling the Arab-Israeli question. This new tactic involved tightening economic sanctions on Egypt, fostering its rival Saudi Arabia, and drawing its allies most notably Syria into the Western camp (Abou-El-Fadl 2013, 41-43).

The *Operation Straggle* which was planned for the same day as the tripartite invasion of Egypt in October 1956, was an Anglo-American intelligence collaboration with Iraq aimed at toppling the Syrian government. The plan was uncovered by Syrian intelligence and fell victim to the US-UK break over Suez after which Eisenhower rejected the proposals that the US join the Baghdad Pact (Abou-El-Fadl 2013, 44).

Eisenhower's January speech in 1957 which referred to Soviet threat was not merely reflected but exaggerated by Turkey. Soon after the announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Menderes told that "*Turkey is the main element assuring security and stability in the region, it seems logical and normal that she have her share*". The Eisenhower Doctrine led to a change in the Turkish tactic. Instead of directly inviting the US to join the Pact, Turkey aimed to play on Anglo-American fears of a regional Soviet threat which prepared the ground for the Syrian crisis (Abou-El-Fadl 2013, 45-46). Main axis of Turkey's foreign policy was to prove that Turkey was an indispensable value for the US by holding threat perception emanated from the danger of Syria's turning into a Soviet satellite at the highest level (Ataç 2017, 87). An opportunity for Turkey came with the two events emerged in April-May 1957 which exerted catalyzer effect on the Syrian crisis. The US demanded from Turkey in April to concentrate troops on the Syrian border to alleviate the Syrian pressure on Jordanian King who was seeking to protect his throne by taking shelter in the Eisenhower Doctrine. Turkey implemented this request with great enthusiasm (Ataç 2017, 90).

In May, Syria-Soviet rapprochement was also alarming for the US (Ataç 2017, 90). The Syrian announcement of the conclusion of its first economic agreement with the USSR triggered the Syrian crisis. Turkey concerned at the flow of Soviet aid to Egypt and Syria while the US aid to Turkey was not forthcoming at a time of economic difficulty (Abou-El-Fadl 2013, 44-45). On 12 August, the Damascus radio revealed the US attempt for a coup in Syria. A possibility of intervention to Syria within the context of the Eisenhower Doctrine begun to be discussed afterwards (Ataç 2017, 91).

Although the Anglo-American preference was for an Arab partner since the Turkish intervention would have been unpopular with Arab audiences, Turkey communicated her most willingness to participate in any military solution and begun new troop maneuvers on the Syrian border. Meanwhile, Iraq, the proposed linchpin of American plans, proved reluctant for a military intervention to Syria after the replacement in June of PM al-Said with pan-Arabist PM Ali Jawdat (Abou-El-Fadl 2013, 48). There were mutual accusation between the USSR and the Western alliance about Syria. The USSR complained that the West was plotting to encourage its

regional allies to attack Syria. The US and Turkey believed that Syria was in grave danger of takeover by local pro-Soviets (Hale 2013, 94-95).

Mufti (as cited in Altunışık 2009, 174) argues that the doctrine of the FM Zorlu, contrary to the *İnönü Doctrine*, was characterized by “*engagement rather than reserve*”, “*alignment rather than neutrality*”, “*flexibility rather than rigid adherence to the status quo*”, and “*linkage rather than compartmentalization*”. Exchange of letter became important diplomatic tool in dealing with the conflicts between Turkey and the USSR. Bulganin sent three letters to Turkey in 1957 (Tellal 2015c, 516). When Turkey threatened to invade Syria should the Soviet Union gain control of the Syrian government, on 10 September 1957, Prime Minister Bulganin sent a Letter directing threat to Turkey. This threat was backed-up by troop movements on the Soviet-Turkish border. Khrushchev commented in an interview that Turkey concentrated so many troops against Syria that it left its frontiers with the SU almost bare (Golan 1990, 247). The Letter was the sign of globalization of the Syrian crisis (Ataş 2017, 95):

“Many newly independent states in the Near and Middle East, such as, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Lebanon seek to strengthen their independence despite the preventive acts of the foreign powers, as Turkey did. Many great powers seek to exploit the natural wealth of these countries by using imperialist principles. Main cause of the tension in the region is the foreign intervention to the domestic politics of the regional countries by disregarding their historical evolution. The US wants to use Near and Middle East countries such as Jordan and Iraq for a military intervention to Syria. Without exemption, all the peoples of the Arab countries do not accept the Baghdad Military Pact.

It is openly told that Turkey would also be given a role within the framework of bad plans to be attempted against Syria. We concerned deeply regarding Turkey’s seemingly positive assessment of this role. We have been informed with deep concern that the Turkish forces had been concentrated on the Turkish-Syria border and the transfer of American weapons to the region to be used in the invasion of Syria.

The Soviet Union will not remain indifferent to these events. Any armed conflict will not remain within the boundaries of the region. Therefore, we call upon Turkey not to join any intervention to be attempted against Syria for the sake of the peace of the region and the world. The USSR is of the opinion that Turkey will solely harm itself in joining this adventure. We are sure that Turkey will receive the biggest wound in a war in the region.

As a result, the USSR wishes to maintain friendly and good neighborly relations with Turkey. We hope that Turkey will scrupulously examine our above-mentioned assessments and we are also ready to assess Turkey’s considerations in this subject” (Aktaş 1998, 218-221; my translation).

On 17 September, the US and the UK agreed for implicit operations over Syria (Ataç 2017, 96). The reply letter of PM Menderes to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Bulganin dated 30 September 1957 was as the following:

“The destructive events in Syria reached to the highest point. This country takes arms behind its defense requirements. More precisely, Syria becomes an arsenal to be used by other powers when required. The Middle Eastern policy of the USSR and your wish to place Turkish-Soviet relations on a real friendship basis carries controversies. We do not have any aggressive intentions towards our neighbors. It will be contrary to the reality to load an aggressive character to the Baghdad Pact and accuse western powers with imperialism. Characterizing Turkey’s measures towards Syria as offensive and aggressive is unfounded. As regards to your warnings regarding the maintenance of peace, Turkey does not need to learn much thing from others in this subject. I would like to assure you that our main request is the maintenance of good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, in case of the elimination of our above-mentioned national security concerns, our mutual relations will be able to change” (Aktaş 1998, 222-225; my translation).

On 5 October, Syria requested from the UNGA to take necessary measures since Turkish troops at the Syrian border constituted a clear threat to the Syrian security (Ataç 2017, 98-100). On 9 October Khrushchev expressed to the American press that *“In the event of a war, we are closer to Turkey, not you. Once the guns are fired, missiles will fly, and it will be too late to think”* (Bilge 2002, 190). On 11 October 1957, the US Department of State (as cited in Armaoğlu 1991, 251-252) responded to this threat with the following statement:

“... If Turkey is exposed to an act of aggression, the United States will not leave this country alone, whatever the distance between. ... It is indubitable that the United States, ally and friend of Turkey, will fulfill her commitments and duties emanated from the North Atlantic Pact no matter how long the distance between is. ... The argument that the United States encourages Turkey or any other country to a war with Syria is ridiculous and meaningless”.

On 16 October, Egypt landed on Latakia a force of 1500 troops. On 18 October, the 6th fleet warships visited Izmir (Ataç 2017, 98-100). On 22 October, negotiations started at the UNGA. The parties accused each other harshly. Indonesia proposed the resolution of the issue through negotiations between the parties. Besides the majority at the UNGA, Turkey and Syria also accepted this resolution (Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu 2015, 631). On 23 October, the USSR appointed Marshall Rokossovski, famous hero of the WWII, as the commander of the Trans-Caucasus Military Zone. The USSR launched military exercises both in the Caucasus and the Black Sea (Ataç 2017, 98-

100). Unexpectedly, Khrushchev's explanation at the Turkish Embassy in Moscow at the Turkish national day reception on 29 October that "*there was no threat to the Middle East at all and that the whole affairs had been misunderstood*" defused the crisis and Turkey withdrew its troops (Hale 2013, 94-95).

The USSR merely seemed to seek with bellicose statements to reinforce its credibility in the region as a counter to the recently introduced Eisenhower Doctrine. The developments regarding the Syrian crisis, suggested as at least a partial reason for the USSR to leap over the northern tier and concentrate on the Arab states of the southern tier (Golan 1990, 248).

The superpowers used many tools including threat, military measures, international mediation, carrying the issue to the UN agenda and covered operations. The crisis led to the increasing Soviet prestige despite the US built a barrier against Soviet expansion. The arms transfer of the eastern bloc to Egypt and Syria increased. During the crisis, Turkey veiled heavy economic and financial issues with the issues regarding Middle East's security. Turkey used the thesis that Syria turned into a Soviet satellite to obtain American assistance. Turkey's attitude during the crisis strengthened the Arab attitude that Turkey was a castle of the West and led Arab countries to position against Turkey and Iraq (Ataç 2017, 105-106). The US made efforts behind scenes to persuade Ankara to demobilize its troops in order to avoid further escalation with Moscow while publicly defending Turkey (Abou-El-Fadl 2013, 49). Second Letter of Bulganin to Menderes on Syria Events dated 22 November 1957 was as the following:

"Unfortunately, Turkish troops continue to replacement movements at the Syrian border, Turkish jet fighters systematically intrude Syrian airspace and Turkish military units attack Syrian villages and border stations. Turkish media continues to hostile and provocative campaigns towards Syria. Turkey's policy is nothing but dangerously playing with the fire. Does Turkey have a real interest in making this region the tensest area of the world and resembling it a powder keg which could explode at any time?

Turkey accuses the USSR for its selling required weapons to some Arab countries for their defense. It is this USSR that had sent arms and ammunitions to Turkey while fighting for her independence and freedom in 1920. Turkish nation had greeted this assistance at that time. Then, for which reasons Turkey objects to the assistance extended by the USSR to the Arab states. Does Turkey want from the USSR to follow the policy of some colonialist powers and cut its commercial relations with Egypt and Syria which follow independent national policy?

It is known that Turkey refrained from interfering the domestic affairs of the Arab countries before her joining NATO. However, now, Turkey has become a kind of representative of the western countries known as the colonialists of the east and acted as one of these countries from time to time. In case of a need to reach a conclusion, which country is the arsenal of the Near and Middle East, not small and peace-loving Syria but Turkey emerges as the arsenal which subordinates its economy and all life to the demands of the founders of the military blocs for a long time.

In July, the Soviet ambassador in Ankara had presented official proposals to establish personal relations between Turkish and Soviet statesmen for the purpose of providing a high level discussion of mutual proposals including the examination of the current situation of the Turkish-Soviet relations, the establishment of close relations and real good neighborly relations and economic cooperation. However, unfortunately, we observed that our friendly request did not find the required echo, and the Turkish Government reacted with hesitance to our any or even the smallest steps for the improvement of relations. We hope that the Turkish Government gives due consideration to the above-mentioned opinions of the Soviet Government (Aktaş 1998, 226-232; my translation).

Turkey's aggressive attitude to Syria in 1957 almost certainly promoted the Soviet cause rather than obstructing it (Hale 2013, 103). Turkey now disturbed by growing Soviet political penetration into Middle East in addition to Soviet military presence on its northwestern and northeastern borders (Hale 2013, 88). Abou-El-Fadl (2013, 41) argues that Turkey used foreign policy as a leverage to attract foreign assistance from external powers which was illustrated in the Syrian crisis.

Prime Minister Menderes announced on 9 December 1957 that the US decided to send *Nike* anti-aircraft missile systems and *Honest John* surface to surface rockets to Turkey upon her request (Armaoğlu 1991, 252). The US would station strike aircraft armed with tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey (Hale 1997, 256-257). Increasing American assistance, though very little, due to the different factors delayed Turkey's approaching to Soviet overtures until the end of 1959. The first factor was Turkey's gaining strategic importance with respect to the Middle East during 1956 and 1957. It is argued that Turkey would have militarily intervened in Syria if the US had not prevented Turkey. While the US military assistance granted to Turkey in 1956/7 period was \$152.4 million, it increased to \$249.4 in 1957/8 period and decreased to \$196.4 in the 1958/9 period. Similarly, the US economic assistance granted to Turkey in 1957/8 period was \$63.7 million, it increased to \$132 in 1958/9 period and decreased to \$67.9 in the 1959/60 period (Oran 1970, 77-79).

1.3.3. The Advance of the ICBMs

The USSR tested successfully an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on 26 August 1957 and launched Sputnik satellite to the earth orbit on 4 October 1957. This demonstrated the leadership of the USSR in rocket technology in 1957 (Wozniuk 1990, 143) and created widespread fear among the US and her allies (Stergiou 2007, 90). The USSR proved that she had long range missiles while the US was possessing only medium range missiles (Gönlübol 1975, 41). Respectively, letter of Bulganin to Menderes on the international situation dated 12 December 1957 which touched the new nuclear plans of NATO was as follows (Aktaş 1998, 246-251; my translation):

“The mutual dependency doctrine which was explained recently by the US and UK demonstrates that it will load new obligations on NATO members as opening their territory and economic resources for the preparations of atomic warfare and it will even further limit their independence in the foreign policy arena. According to this doctrine, some countries will remain as the suppliers of dollars and weapons, and other NATO members will be considered as sandbag as the target of first strike.

After Turkey’s NATO membership, her territory is used for the implementation of the military plans of the US. The number and nature of the numerous airports, military and naval bases established in Turkey are clearly beyond the needs of the Turkish armed forces. All the bases in Turkey will be used to strike the Soviet Union’s vital centers by NATO. Furthermore, the Turkish Government approved the deployment of American atomic task forces in her territory. It is clear that these bases do not serve to the defense needs. In reality, all the functions of the bases are nothing more than to provide a short range attack capability to the aggressor.

I would like to point out the complete invalidity of the theory developed in the NATO circles envisaging that the wars could be localized, and small wars could be made. However, it became impossible to isolate war into a determined geographical borders with the development of military technics.

I would like to warn Turkey in a most friendly manner about the results of her participation in the military preparations of the NATO alliance and draw the attention of the Turkish Government to the threat posed to the world peace of plans to be dealt in the NATO council meeting. The dissemination of the fabrication of the Soviet danger by those who permanently reject the signing of non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is an explanatory indicator per se.”

The Eisenhower administration gained NATO’s approval for the deployment of missiles in Europe to avoid confidence or deterrence gap (Bernstein 1980, 98-99) between 16-19 December 1957 (Stergiou 2007, 90). Most NATO allies, except Italy and Turkey, fearful of antagonizing the USSR, refused the weapons (Bernstein 1980, 99). Consequently, the US launched the *Atlas* ICBM in December 1957 and then launched its first space satellite, the *Explorer*, in February 1958. However, “until the

Americans could construct a large numbers of ICBMs, they would be forced to rely on obsolete long-range bombers ... and on intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) launched from bases in friendly countries close to the Soviet Union". By the early 1960s, the US begun to expand its arsenal of medium-range bombers and IRBMs in allied countries (Keylor 2001, 301). The Sputnik contributed to an increase in Turkey's strategic importance. The US became forced to reattach importance to the neighboring countries of the USSR to establish bases for the deployment of medium range missiles to balance the long range missiles of the USSR. Turkey accepted the US demands immediately. As a result of this development, Turkey attained high foreign assistance in comparison with the other years (Oran 1970, 79-80). Letter of Bulganin to Menderes on the international situation dated 8 January 1958 was referring to the issue of deployment of nuclear weapons in Turkey (Aktaş 1998, 252-258; my translation):

"Turkey's tendency to deploy missile and nuclear armament by stepping ahead of other NATO members emanates from your country's disability to predict the results of this dangerous act. This kind of developments bring Turkey, which has little industrial potential and scientifically insufficient, to a deadlock.

May be, you will find my word harsh. However, I should frankly state that in case of a nuclear war, we do not need to use ICBMs and IRBMs to reach to the NATO bases in Turkey because the distance may be traversed by the simplest missiles. The scientists draws the attention to the destructive power of the thermo-nuclear weapons, for example, its destroying power over a relatively small area such as the area of Turkey without leaving behind any living thing. It is difficult to imagine the existence of statesmen who endangers the life of her compatriots by making her country an atomic and nuclear arsenal. Therefore, Turkish FM's intention to open Turkey urgently to the atomic weapons of NATO is seen as an unexplainable intention to call danger. Let me remind you an eastern proverb: a single match may start a fire but first it burns itself.

The free arms procurement leads to the fall of the living standards of people, increase in the tax load and domestic and foreign borrowing and expensiveness. If Turkey suffered due to the German imperialism during the first world war, now, Turkey is pushed to some ways due to the geographical causes. The only demand of the Soviet government is to live together in a friendly and good neighborly relations."

Menderes' reply letters to Bulganin on Syria Events dated 17 January 1958 and on the international situation dated 23 February 1958 were as follows in the first and second paragraphs:

"Your government associates Turkish-Soviet relations with the Middle East generally, and with Syria and Egypt in particular. Your starting in the letter as the defender of Syria is the first remarking subject. The military maneuvers implemented at the Syrian border as a precautionary measure had been terminated already before your letter reached to us. We are

required to determine our diverging and converging points for the development of the Turkish-Soviet relations. Seen from this respect, it cannot be said that our correspondence did not bring benefit” (Aktaş 1998, 233-235; my translation).

“The two countries [the US and the UK] referred in your letter as following a policy of war and using NATO to reach to their objectives are, actually, two of the four countries proposing a large-scaled disarmament plan to the USSR and the UN Nuclear Disarmament Subcommittee. The Turkish Government has the right to take necessary defense measures in any part of the country. If you find aggressive attitude in these defense measures, how do you explain the existence of every kind of bases and weapons in the USSR? I believe that a non-aggression pact will not bring important results” (Aktaş 1998, 259-262; my translation).

1.3.4. The Iraqi Coup d'état (14 July 1958)

In July 1958, the US rejected another Turkish request for Baghdad Pact membership, and committed to enter bilateral agreements with its regional members instead (Abou-El-Fadl 2013, 51). A coup d'état made by General Kasım in Iraq on 14 July 1958, while the presidents of the Baghdad Pact were meeting in Ankara, became a blow to the Baghdad Pact. With the first Declaration¹² of the Baghdad Pact dated 17 July 1958, pro-Moscow culprits were accused for the *coup d'état* in Iraq and the American support for the Pact was demanded (Armaoğlu 1991, 255-257). Following the *coup d'état*, Iraqi monarchy was toppled and Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact¹³ (Armaoğlu 1988, 524-528).

Meanwhile, “*the first real test of the Eisenhower Doctrine came in 1958 in Lebanon, where the threat was not armed aggression or a direct Soviet incursion. Lebanon’s President, Camille Chamoun, requested assistance from the United States in order to prevent attacks from Chamoun’s political rivals, some of whom had communist leanings*”. The US sent troops into Lebanon to help maintain order (U.S. Department of State 2019b).

¹² For the texts of the *Declaration of the Baghdad Pact Members regarding the pro-Soviet Coup d'état in Iraq*, dated 17 July 1958 and 28 July 1958, in Turkish, see, Armaoğlu (1991, 255-257).

¹³ Following Iraq’s withdrawal, the Baghdad Pact was renamed as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) on 21 August 1959 (Harris 1972, 70) and its activity areas were also changed to include only economic, cultural and technical cooperation. Following this change in quality, the US started to cooperate more closely with the Pact (Armaoğlu 1988, 524-528). The CENTO name was given to the organization due to its geographical position between NATO and SEATO (Gönlübol and Ülman 1993, 307). Anderson (1966b, 52) argues that CENTO mutually supported NATO “*by providing an extension of the best defensive positions against a Soviet attack directed toward the Middle East oil fields, the Suez Canal, and Africa*”.

Turkey reacted to the Soviet support of the coup d'état in Iraq. The hearsays regarding a likely Turkish intervention in Iraq strained the Turco-Soviet relations. The reason for the increasing Turkish concern was the emergence of a new element increasing the current pressure of the USSR from the North and South via Syria (Armaoğlu 1991, 258). On 16 July, Khrushchev explained that the USSR would respond militarily to Turkey in case of the latter's attempt to change the current status quo. Turkey moderately responded to the USSR. Turkey's allies were influential in this reply (Tellal 2015c, 515). The US guaranteed the defense of the 3000 miles of borders of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan from Turkey's Caucasian border to the Pakistani Khyber Pass. On 28 July 1958, the PMs of the Baghdad Pact countries met in Iraq convened in London with the participation of the US Secretary of State Dulles and issued the second Declaration announcing their determination to maintain their common security and opposition to any direct and indirect aggression (Armaoğlu 1991, 255-258).

A new bilateral treaty was concluded between Turkey and the US in November 1958 for the construction of a base for fifteen Jupiter missiles at the Çiğli Air Base (Gönlübol 1975, 42). *“At the height of the Berlin crisis in the winter of 1958-1959, Moscow explicitly warned half a dozen West European nations that their partnership with the United States guaranteed their total destruction in the event of a nuclear war between the two superpowers.”* This *“intended to discourage the European members of NATO from agreeing to the establishment of medium-range missile bases on their own soil”*. The NATO countries unanimously rejected the Soviet Ultimatum (Keylor 2001, 302-303).

In accordance with the Art.5 of the Baghdad Pact Declaration, Turkey and the US signed the *Turkish-United States Agreement for Cooperation in Promoting the Security and Defense of the Members of the Baghdad Pact Organization*¹⁴ on 5 March 1959. Kunalalp (as cited in Abou-El-Fadl 2013, 52) argues that *“for Turco-American relations, the year 1959 proved to be a pinnacle never again attained”*. According to

¹⁴ The text of the agreement is identical with the agreements signed by the US with Iran and Pakistan.

the Art.3 of the Agreement, Turkey undertook to use the American assistance for the defense of the Baghdad Pact members:

“[Turkey] undertakes to utilize such military and economic assistance as may be provided by the Government of the United States of America in a manner consonant with the aims and purposes set forth by the Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, and for the purpose of effectively promoting the economic development of Turkey and of preserving its national independence and integrity” (Department of State 1963, 1023).

The 1959 agreement meant the application of Eisenhower Doctrine to Turkey (Oran 1970, 80). However, according to the preamble of the agreement, Baghdad Pact members would request US military assistance against either *direct or indirect* Soviet aggression: “*Recalling that, in the above-mentioned Declaration, the members of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation making that Declaration affirmed their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect; ...*” (Department of State 1963, 1023). Ataöv (as cited in Abou-El-Fadl 2013, 52) states the following regarding the *indirect aggression*:

“The Eisenhower Doctrine had referred to open aggression whereas the 1959 bilateral agreement introduces the new, flexible concept of ‘indirect aggression’, which cannot be found in the agreements that any other NATO country has signed with the United States. No Western European country, even though she may be a part of the Western system of war, has given the additional right to the United States of sending troops to her territory under the guise of meeting what is termed as ‘indirect aggression’.”

Turkey and the US signed a secret agreement regarding the installation of Jupiter missiles armed with nuclear warheads in Turkey on 25 April 1959 and the agreement took effect without the authorization of the TGNA (Turan and Barlas 1994, 436). The US aircrafts armed with tactical nuclear weapons had been operating from Turkey for some time. Jupiters would enhance Turkey’s military strength as a symbol of the alliance’s readiness to use atomic weapons against any Soviet attack on Turkey (Hale 2013, 98). “*The missiles would be owned by Turkey; the nuclear warheads would be owned by the United States ...; the weapons could be launched only on the order of the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (an American) on the approval of both the American and Turkish governments; and the sites would be manned by soldiers of both nations*”. The Jupiters were liquid-fuel IRBMs, taking hours to fire and hence only useful militarily for a first strike and thus provocative. According to

Turkey, the Jupiters “*emphasized Turkey’s key role in NATO, and exaggerated the warmth of relations with a great power*” (Bernstein 1980, 99). Turkey refused to participate in a Soviet scheme in 1959 to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Balkans and the Adriatic (Karpas 1975b, 86).

Avoiding responding the peace overtures of the USSR until 1959, Turkey suddenly softened, and Menderes announced that he would visit Moscow in July 1960. The stabilization program of 1958 forcefully dictated by the US not only slowed down inflation but also the development which forced the Menderes government to seek a new foreign assistance source. Because of the Polaris missiles which could be launched by the submarines made the Turkish Jupiters obsolescence and Turkey’s indispensability for the US diminished (Oran 1970, 81).

1.4. The U-2 Affair (5 May 1960)

On 1 May 1960, a U-2¹⁵ high-altitude reconnaissance plane was shot down by Soviet forces near the city of Sverdlovsk (Gökay 2006, 70). On 3 and 5 May, NASA announced that a meteorological research aircraft, took off from the Incirlik air base, could have crashed around the lake Van. On 5 May, Khrushchev announced that an American aircraft was shoot down. On the same day, the Department of State (DoS) announced that the aircraft could be the lost meteorological aircraft. On 6 May, the USSR asked with a Note whether the pilot sought was Garry Powers. On 7 May, DoS admitted the reality and confessed that the aircraft was a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft (Armaoğlu 1991, 261-262). The USSR also accused Turkey since the aircraft had taken off from Turkey. Following the demystification of the events, Turkish MFA stated the following on 8 May 1960:

“The Turkish government has not granted a permission of flight for any American aircraft to fly over Soviet territories for reconnaissance or any other purposes. It is known that such aircraft did not enter Soviet Russia crossing the Turkish borders. Actually, the Soviet authorities did not claim in contravention of this. It is for sure that, Turkey can be responsible

¹⁵The US long-range U-2 (*Dragon Lady*) reconnaissance aircrafts had the duty to control the USSR against unexpected long-range missile attacks. These U-2 aircrafts were out of the reach of radars and jets due to their flying at 30 km altitude. The US located these reconnaissance aircrafts in the UK, West Germany, Japan and Turkey (Armaoğlu 1991, 261). Moscow had denounced the U-2 reconnaissance flights since their inception in the summer of 1956, but had been unable to prevent them because of their high altitude beyond the range of Soviet weapons (Keylor 2001, 305).

only for her aircrafts out of her air space. This flight in no way binds Turkey” (Armaoğlu 1991, 262; my translation).

Following the visit of Khrushchev to the US in September 1959, who was the first Soviet leader visiting the US, a summit conference had been planned to be held in Paris in the spring of 1960. Upon the shooting down of an U-2 American spy plane over Soviet territory on 5 May 1960, Khrushchev announced that he would refuse to participate in the meeting envisaged to be held on 16 May unless Eisenhower formally apologize for the violation of Soviet air space and promise to discontinue flights (Keylor 2001, 304). Meanwhile, the USSR protested Turkey due to incident with a Note dated 13 May 1960:

“On 1 May 1960, a military aircraft was shot down in the 2000 km interior of the Soviet border in the Sverdlovsk region. The Soviet authorities determined that the aircraft violating our borders belonged to the US, based permanently in Turkey, and sent to the Soviet Union via Pakistan for hostile purposes. This Lockheed U-2 type aircraft is equipped to make reconnaissance and diversion over the Soviet territory. At the board of the aircraft there are aerial photo shooting devices, radio location network, and a private radio included in the anti-aerial defense system. The route of the aircraft as obtained from pilot Powers is Peshawar – Aral lake – Sverdlovsk – Arkhangelsk – Murmansk – and Norway. The pilot Powers also informed that he flew many times along the Turkish-Soviet border. The US confessed that the aircraft was sent to Soviet Union for military intelligence purposes.

The Soviet Government does not stay without noting the role of Turkey in the preparation and implementation process of this hostile act. The Soviet Government is obliged to declare to the Turkish Government that her acts such as allocating her territory to the US for aggressive purposes makes her a partner of the US having grave responsibilities possibly to be born from these kinds of actions. All these do not comply with the statements of the Turkey regarding her wish to join the efforts for the strengthening of peace, relaxation of international atmosphere, and improvement of the Turkish-Soviet relations.

The Soviet Government protests Turkey regarding the state of affairs pertaining her allowing the foreign military aircrafts to benefit from the Turkish territory in order to violate Soviet airspace. The Soviet Government warns Turkey that the USSR would be obliged to take necessary counter measures if these kinds of provoking acts are repeated. As it is known, the USSR has the capability to completely disarm all the bases used for the purpose of aggression against itself” (Aktaş 1998, 273-274; my translation).

Turkey replied the Soviet with a Note dated 24 May 1960:

“The Turkish government would like to inform the Soviet Government that the dispute regarding the flight of an American aircraft in the Soviet airspace will not be a subject of debate between Turkish and Soviet governments. The Turkish airspace was not used for the flight to enter into the Soviet airspace. Essentially, the Turkish government is in a position to declare definitely that it never allowed any aircraft to pass from the Turkish airspace to the Soviet airspace. Turkey’s responsibility do not exceed the Turkish airspace borders. Turkey may assume the responsibility of flights out of her airspace only for the Turkish aircrafts. Therefore,

Turkey is unable to accept the accusations stated in the Soviet Note. As regards to the warning for Turkish bases used by other governments, Turkey has the right to allocate her bases to her allies' order for totally defensive purposes in line with the Un Charter and the principles of international law. It is obvious that Turkey will reject the accusations and warnings stated in the Soviet Note under the present conditions" (Aktaş 1998, 275-276; my translation).

This event did not lead to an important crisis between the USSR and Turkey. The announced visit of Menderes, who could not find what he hoped from the American assistance, to Moscow in July was influential in this (Tellal 2015c, 517). Following coup d'état in Turkey, Khrushchev one more time sought to improve relations with Turkey with a Letter sent to General Cemal Gürsel dated 28 June 1960:

"... The most sincere relations between our two neighbor countries would develop if Turkey embarked upon the road of neutrality. ... Turkey would receive an opportunity to use her resources, not for war preparations, on which huge funds have so far been squandered, but for raising the level of country's national economy and the wellbeing of its national economy. ... This, of course, is not a condition for beginning the improvement of our relations. ... If the new Turkish Government really abides by the policy of Atatürk, we shall all see Soviet-Turkish relations return to the high level of the true good-neighborliness and genuine friendship at which they were in the days of ... Lenin ... and ... Atatürk. ...

Being desirous of improving its relations with neighboring Turkey, the Soviet Government pointed out in its well-known statement of May 30, 1953, that the policy of the USSR is based on the Leninist principles of complete respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of the Turkish state, on the principles of equality of large and small nations, on the principles of peaceful co-existence and co-operation between states with different social and economic systems. Now, too, we abide by this position and believe it is necessary and useful to confirm this once again. ... We must search for points on which our views coincide so as to advance along the road to rapprochement" (as quoted in Váli 1972, 302-305).

Khrushchev's request for Turkey to opt for neutrality demanding the Finlandization of Turkey (Hale 2013, 89) met with a refusal (Hale 1997, 256). The meeting of Khrushchev with the Turkish FM Sarper in New York in October 1960 was the first high level Turco-Soviet meeting after the visit of Turkish FM Saraçoğlu to Moscow in 1939 (Qasımlı 2013, 24). The demand for talks came from Khrushchev. Sarper rejected the proposals of Khrushchev such as economic assistance and invitation of Gürsel to Moscow, one by one. The most important proposal was the withdrawal of the Soviet forces hundreds km back from the common border in return for a little withdrawal of Turkish soldiers from the border. Khrushchev stated that the USSR was ready for a joint control. Although Turkey rejected the Soviet proposals, she gave up refraining from bilateral talks (Tellal 2015d, 774). General Cemal Gürsel replied Khrushchev with a Letter dated 8 July 1960:

“... The policy of alliances, pursued by Turkey, has nothing incompatible with good-neighborly relations between our two countries. ... I do not think that the pursuance of neutral policy can free the government from military expenditures. ... I can confirm to you that in the sphere of international relations, too, my government will abide by the principles of Atatürk. ... I note with great satisfaction, ..., that the Soviet government desires to confirm its statement of May 30, 1953 [N]othing in Turkish policy obstructs the improvement of relations between our two countries” (as quoted in Váli 1972, 306-308).

In June 1961, Khrushchev demanded an end to the occupation regime and the transformation of the West Berlin into a free city setting the end of the year as a deadline and increasing the military budget one-third which underlined his determination to dislodge the Allied garrisons from Berlin. In response, Kennedy reaffirmed his commitment to defend west Berlin by armed force if necessary and requested from the Congress \$3 billion increase for defense expenditures. At the end of the summer of 1961, Moscow announced the resumption of the nuclear tests that had been suspended by mutual agreement of the USSR, the US, and the UK since the fall of 1958. Meanwhile, the USSR began to construct a barrier that would block all access between east and west Berlin on 13 August 1961. Thus, the Berlin stalemate led to heightened international tension and Soviet-American competition on nuclear weaponry (Keylor 2001, 307-309). In November 1961, Turkey turned down a \$500 million aid program from the USSR since it feared a demand of political concession in return (Hale 2013, 89).

1.5. The Beginning of the Turkish-American Divergence: The Impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis¹⁶ on the Turkish-Soviet Relations

Starting from 1959, deployment of Jupiters in Turkey had been complained by the USSR to US. The missiles were installed at a base near İzmir in 1961. In April 1961, the US President John F. Kennedy asked for the reviewal of the deployment of missiles because they would be outdated by the Polaris submarine-launched system. Turkish FM Sarper refused the withdrawal of Jupiters since the TGNA had just

¹⁶ The US plan to use Cuban immigrants to liberate Cuba from Communist control failed in the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 (Wozniuk 1990, 156). After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the US attempted to isolate Castro through diplomatic and economic pressures. The Soviet military build-up in Cuba began in July 1962 (George 1971, 90).

approved the expenditures for installing them and it would be embarrassing to go right back and say that they would be taken out. He added that *“it would be very bad for the morale of Turkey as a member of NATO if they were taken out before a Polaris submarine were in the Mediterranean to take their place”*. *“If the Jupiters were removed this would be seen as a sign of weakness, after Khrushchev’s diplomatic offensive at the Vienna Summit”* early June 1961 (Hale 2013, 99). The missiles in Izmir became operational in the spring of 1962. The missiles together with those deployed in Italy were targeted on 45 of the 129 Soviet medium and intermediate range missiles targeting Europe (Hale 2013, 99). President Kennedy raised the issue of withdrawing the Jupiters in early 1962 but the Turks still objected on political grounds. There is also no evidence that the US offered a Polaris as a substitute (Bernstein 1980, 102).

1.5.1. The US-SU Bargain¹⁷ During the Crisis

On 23 August 1962, Kennedy ordered a study of the feasibility of the withdrawal of Jupiters from Turkey in the context of Cuba, fearing from Soviet efforts to equate new Soviet missiles in Cuba with the Jupiters. The missile sites in Cuba were discovered before the Soviet missiles achieved operational readiness (Bernstein 1980, 102). A U-2 reconnaissance flight on 14 October revealed secret Soviet preparations of medium range (MRBM) missile sites in Cuba (George 1971, 86). The 42 MRBMs and the 24 to 32 IRBMs that were already in Cuba or on the way increased the destructive power that the Soviets could deliver on US targets by about 50 per cent (George 1971, 92).

From 16 to 21 October, the US Administration considered how it should respond and trade missiles to settle the crisis (Bernstein 1980, 104). On 22 October Kennedy announced to impose a quarantine over Cuba which would begin on 24 October in a blockade line that stretched out 500 miles around Cuba. Kennedy chose the blockade option to postpone and control the risk of a major war (George 1971, 95-108). Meanwhile, the MRBM sites became operational on the same day. On 24

¹⁷ For the detailed examination of the management of the crisis, see, Bernstein (1980) and George (1971). For the examination of the crisis through the US domestic processes based on three conceptual models (Rational Policy Model, Organizational Process Model and Bureaucratic Politics Model, see, Allison (1969).

October, the US Administration inquired whether Turkey accede to withdrawal of the Jupiters in return for the deployment of Polaris¹⁸ or establishment of seaborne, multilateral force (MLF¹⁹) within NATO. The American ambassador in Ankara Haare argued that the removal of the Jupiters as part of an explicit trade would weaken NATO and injure American relations with Turkey (Bernstein 1980, 108-110). Meanwhile, Turkey joined the American blockade of Cuba by ordering two transport ships carrying Soviet wheat to Cuba to unload their wheat to the nearest ports (Oran 1970, 82-83).

The Turkish Ambassador in Washington expressed on 25 October that Turkey strongly resented being equated with “*a country in the Caribbean, run by a bearded pirate, who had turned his island into a base for aggression against the free world*”. On 26 October evening, Khrushchev wrote to Kennedy saying that he would withdraw the Soviet missiles from Cuba if the US lifted its blockade on the island and agreed not to attack Cuba. Khrushchev, in a second letter delivered on the morning of 27 October, made withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba contingent on American withdrawal of the Jupiters from Turkey (Hale 2013, 99-100). The Soviet message of October 27 mentioned the missiles in the UK and Italy but specified only those in Turkey as a requirement for a trade (Bernstein 1980, 113). Khrushchev’s letter²⁰ dated 27 October 1962 was offering to give reciprocal guarantee to the territorial integrity of both Turkey and Cuba:

“Your missiles are located in Britain, are located in Italy, and are aimed against us. Your missiles are located in Turkey. You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have the right to demand security for your own country and the removal of the weapons you call offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations between our great states? This is irreconcilable. ...

¹⁸ The invention of the American Polaris nuclear submarine, a seaborne nuclear-weapon (SSBN) launcher induced the SU to deploy its fleet forward to meet this challenge relying heavily on the development of anti-submarine warfare (Golan 1990, 12).

¹⁹ The establishment of Multilateral Nuclear Naval Force in NATO was proposed by Kennedy in May 1961 to increase the deterrent power of the NATO alliance (Erhan 2015a, 691).

²⁰ For the texts of all the correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev between 16-28 October 1962, see, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (2019).

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of time needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made. Of course, the permission of the Governments of Cuba and Turkey is necessary for the entry into those countries of these representatives and for the inspection of the fulfillment of the pledge made by each side. Of course it would be best if these representatives enjoyed the confidence of the Security Council as well as yours and mine-both the United States and the Soviet Union-and also that of Turkey and Cuba. I do not think it would be difficult to select people who would enjoy the trust and respect of all parties concerned.

We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidences in their security, will make a statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neighboring states. The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba" (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum 2019).

Since the Soviet demand was made public, Kennedy lost the chance "*to talk privately to the Turks about the missiles*". He also did not want "*to appear to be yielding to a Soviet demand, lest he lose prestige and credibility, injure Turkey and NATO, and give the Soviets a public victory*". The suggested trade of 42 Soviet MRBMs for fifteen obsolete Jupiters was attractive on military grounds. The White House statement "*left the door open for some future agreement on the Jupiters*" despite it was widely interpreted as an outright rejection. It asserted that "*the current crisis in Cuba and European security could not be linked, but mentioned the possibility of postsettlement discussions on arms limitation in Europe*". For the US, negotiations were impossible until work stopped on the missile sites and they were rendered inoperative (Bernstein 1980, 118-119).

Meanwhile, Kennedy reiterated his earlier theme to persuade the Turks to suggest the US that it withdraw its missiles. However, that would not be easy, "*since they had just issued a statement sharply rejecting the Soviet demand for an explicit trade*". He also decided to activate 24 air reserve squadrons in preparation for the invasion of Cuba and to frighten the Soviets. The NATO members were informed that "*an American attack on Cuba was near but that the president still hoped that the crisis*

could be settled 'within the framework of the Western Hemisphere' (Bernstein 1980, 119-121).

Robert Kennedy, the attorney general, under the directions of the President, invited Soviet ambassador Dobrynin to a private meeting at the Justice Department on 27 October. There were two points mentioned during the talks. Robert Kennedy delivered both an ultimatum if the Soviets did not remove the missiles, the US would remove them and, a loose private promise that if some time elapsed these matters could be resolved satisfactorily since *"it was completely impossible for NATO to take such a step under the present threatening position"* (Bernstein 1980, 122). Robert Kennedy revealed in his memoirs that *"within a short time after the crisis was over, these missiles would be gone"*. This meeting was held before Khrushchev's first letter was received. It also appeared that Robert Kennedy had made a more specific commitment that the US would have been prepared to make it public but Khrushchev backed down first (Hale 2013, 100). Bernstein (1980, 97) assesses the crisis as a victory of Kennedy referring to it as *"seven days of wide-ranging deliberations and careful planning; and six days of the shrewd use of cautious threats, limited force,- and wise diplomacy to achieve victory"*.

1.5.2. The Results of the Cuban Missile Crisis

The US feared from the Soviet missiles in Cuba just as the USSR had reason to worry about developments in Turkey in 1947-1948. The difference was that in 1962 the US had the military means to stop the emergence of an offensive threat on its southern border. In 1947-1948 the Soviets had no such power (Leffler 1985, 825).

Following the Cuban missile Crises, when the growing threat of mutual destruction came to the top of the agenda, President Kennedy explained the necessity for reducing tension to avoid a war. In 1963, the *hot line*, a direct communication system was established between the White House and the Kremlin, and *Partial Test Ban Treaty* was signed²¹ (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 88).

²¹ The 1967 Glassboro Summit, the 1967 *Outer Space Treaty*, and the 1968 *Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty* followed. The superpowers also accepted the permanence of the European borders including that of the divided Germany tacitly. Thus, two Powers left the confrontational tactics and laid the ground for détente (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 88).

The Cuban failure demonstrated the gap in the Soviet nuclear strategy and the Soviet military weakness vis-à-vis the US to find a non-nuclear solution to a nuclear crisis. The change was an improvement of the Soviet strategic thinking which had been based on nuclear power and neglecting conventional forces on the sea and in the air (Golan 1990, 12-13). Therefore, Moscow adopted two strategies. In the diplomatic side, it resumed the quest for *peaceful coexistence* with the western bloc that had been initiated in the mid-fifties but had been interrupted by the Berlin and Cuba crisis during 1958-1962. Its purpose was to minimize the possibility of a nuclear confrontation which it was bound to lose. Therefore, at the military side, the USSR decided to accelerate “*a long-range program ... to transform Russia from a Eurasian land power into a global sea and air power*”²² *capable of defending its interest anywhere in the world. Its purpose was to achieve an approximate parity in nuclear and naval forces that would neutralize the American strategic deterrent and naval superiority*” (Keylor 2001, 319).

The last of the Jupiters were removed from Turkey on 24 April 1963 (Hale 2013, 100). The Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that “*the possession of strategic offensive weapons makes any country a primary target*” and that the US “*could and would act in its own best interest without consideration of or consultation with its allies*” (Aydın 2000, 123). Had Khrushchev not agreed to withdraw the Cuban missiles, the US could have decided to destroy them by air attack. The Turkish Jupiters would then have been the target of a Soviet nuclear counter-strike (Hale 1997, 259).

The Cuban missile crisis took place at a time when the US was engaged in efforts to replace the *Massive Retaliation Strategy* with the *Flexible Response Strategy*. Therefore, the uncertainties and suspicions concerning the proposed new NATO strategy occupied the first place in Turkey’s anxieties. This was also main reason of De Gaulle’s controversy with the US and eventual withdrawal of France from the integrated forces of NATO (Gönlübol 1975, 42). The *flexible response* strategy foresees first a direct conventional response to a conventional attack on one

²² The opening of the Soviet Naval Squadron in 1964 was a response to the deployment of US Polaris submarine in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the USSR sought not only shore facilities for its fleet but air bases for the protection and functioning of fleet with aircrafts (Golan 1990, 12-13).

of NATO member. Using of the tactical nuclear weapons will be the second stage if aggression cannot be defeated by conventional weapons. The next stage involves a strategical total nuclear war. This strategy turned the territories of the European members into zones of war while placing North America outside this zone (Gönlübol 1975, 43-44).

Turkey concluded that *“the USA might be willing to sacrifice Turkish interests for American ones, and that exclusive reliance on American support might be risky”*. This crisis reinforced trends towards the adoption of more flexible policies towards the superpowers which would be seen in the second half of the 1960s (Hale 2013, 101). The results of the Cuban Crisis in terms of the Turkish-American relations were the following:

- The US accelerated to give F-104 and F-100 fighter jets to Turkey in order to increase Turkey’s conventional power within the framework of passing from the *Massive Retaliation Strategy* to *Flexible Response Strategy*.
- The crisis explicitly demonstrated that the decisions taken in Washington could endanger Turkey’s security and even existence. The image that the US was an honest and loyal ally was damaged in Turkey. The crisis helped the strengthening of the anti-American movements in Turkey.
- Turkey understood the necessity of establishing contacts with other states and shaped the period of transition to multilateral foreign policy with the lesson taken from the Cuba crisis (Erhan 2015a, 684-685).

The removal of the Jupiters from Turkey paved the way for the development of Turkish-Soviet bilateral relations (Tellal 2015d, 775-778). The relaxation of relations after 1962 had significant effects on Turkey. As the focus of east-west conflicts shifted away from Europe towards Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East, *“Turkey’s perception of an imminent military threat from the USSR declined”*. Turkey now had *“more room for maneuver than it had done during the earlier phase of the Cold War”* and, therefore, *“it could take the risk of improving its relations with the USSR and the non-aligned nations without endangering its national security”* (Hale 2013, 104). Between 29 May and 14 June 1963, a Turkish parliamentary delegation headed by the president of Senate Ürgüplü visited the USSR and returned with Soviet

promises for friendship and economic aid (Karpas 1975b, 88). Khrushchev published an article in the newspaper Cumhuriyet in October and claimed that there were now “no serious reasons that could prevent the establishment of good neighborliness relations between our two countries” (Hale 2013, 101).

2. The Cyprus Conflict: The Turkish-American Alienation and the Turkish-Soviet Rapprochement (1964-1979)

The Soviet policy towards Cyprus was constructed on the basis to support every movement which could weaken the influence of the UK and the US in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Soviet attitude against *enosis* was shaped in this framework. It can be argued that the USSR saw the Cyprus issue as a tool to be used to weaken the south east wing of NATO following the joining of Turkey and Greece to this organization (Sönmezoğlu 2016, 151).

Soviet policy toward Cyprus has been influenced by strategic importance of Cyprus and east-west conflict considerations. The USSR consistently supported the nonaligned status of Cyprus and ruled out both *enosis* and partition of island between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots (Sezer 1985, 124). In the 1950s, the USSR and the Eastern bloc countries supported Greece’s efforts to internationalize the Cyprus question²³. The motives behind this tactic were to try “to hinder a NATO-inspired settlement of the problem which might have enhanced the influence of the Western camp in the region as well as to exploit and escalate possible tensions in it”. Therefore, the disputes arising among the Northern Tier countries were welcomed by the USSR to detach them from their alliances and extend “Soviet power and influence over the

²³ During the Lausanne negotiations, Turkey recognized the British annexation of Cyprus in 1914 (Hale 2013, 95-96). Greece demanded the annexation of Cyprus by sending a Note to Britain, France and the USSR in 1928 (Derman and Kurban 2016, 457). Until 1950s, the British rule was seen by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots as the best available alternative to union with Greece or *enosis* (Hale 2013, 95-96). In August 1954, Greece requested that the self-determination for the people of Cyprus should be put on the agenda of the UNGA despite preventive British reaction (Stergiou 2007, 87). In 1955, the UN Political Committee decided not to discuss the Greek requests. The decision was resulted largely from the opposition of the US to the Greek policy which would likely harm the southeastern flank of NATO. Thence, the Cypriot Greeks engaged in terrorist activities first in 1955 against the British administration and then in 1956 against the Turkish community (Bilge 1975, 138). In January 1955, Turkey expressed a clear preference for the continuation of British rule in the island. In 1956, Turkey pushed for the partition of the island among Turkish and Greek Cypriots which had originally been suggested by the British (Hale 2013, 95-96).

south-eastern Mediterranean area ... gaining access to the natural resources and airspace of countries in the region” (Stergiou 2007, 83-89).

The Zurich agreement reached by the prime ministers of Turkey and Greece on 5-11 February 1959 contained the principles of the internal regime and international status of Cyprus. The FMs of both countries obtained the British consent and officially adopted the principles previously agreed upon at the London Conference on 19 February 1959 (Bilge 1975, 150-151). A provisional government was set up in Cyprus and two commissions of mixed ethnic composition began the preliminary task of drawing up the international treaties and the Constitution in conformity with the principles adopted at London. The independent Republic of Cyprus²⁴ was proclaimed on 16 August 1960 (Bilge 1975, 153-154).

2.1. The 1963-1964 Cyprus Crisis and the Results of the American Involvement

On 30 November 1963, Cyprus president Makarios proposed constitutional changes, the adoption of which “*would have reduced the status of the Turkish community on the island from one of a community with equal rights to one of a minority subject to the mercy of the majority*”. On 6 December, Turkey rejected the proposals. The relations between the two Cypriot communities strained. The fighting started between the two communities following the murder of a Turkish woman by Greek security guards on 21 December. The casualties amounted to 24 dead and 40 wounded among Turks in three days. Despite the communal clashes, the Greek Cypriot leaders hoped to revise the existing constitutional arrangements with a *fait accompli* (Bilge 1975, 157-158).

On 24 December, Turkey, Greece, and Britain issued a *joint statement* asking the two communities to cease fire. On 25 December, Turkey ordered her military

²⁴ The Republic of Cyprus was based on the partnership of the two communities. The individual affairs of each community and the affairs common to all were regulated separately. The government was patterned after a presidential system. The president would be a Greek, and the vice president would be a Turk. The constitutional order was guaranteed by England, Greece and Turkey which ruled out both the union of the Republic with another state and its partition. The defense of the Republic was entrusted, within the framework of the Military Treaty of Alliance, to a joint force provided by Cyprus, Greece and Turkey (Bilge 1975, 152).

contingents on the island to take a defensive position. Turkish Air Forces undertook warning flights over the island. A joint force consisting of the English, Turkish and the Greek contingents on the island was formed to maintain the status quo (Bilge 1975, 158). Turkey wanted to pull the US into the Cyprus crisis. President Gürsel sent a message to President Johnson on 25 December 1963 and demanded from him “*to do all in his power in order that this bloodshed be stopped forthwith*”. Johnson’s reply, dated 26 December 1963, can be assumed the beginning of his famous letter dated 5 June 1964:

“Dear General Gürsel

I have received your telegram dated December 25 on the tragic events occurring in Cyprus. I, too, am deeply concerned, and have sent the following message to President Makarios and Vice President Küçük. This message, I assure you, represents my heartfelt feelings. You may be sure that I will continue to do everything I can to support any and all actions proposed by the three guarantor powers which offer any reasonable hope of assisting in a peaceful solution” (as quoted in Armaoğlu 1991, 263-264).

At the London conference started on 15 January 1964, while Turkey hoped to increase the constitutional safeguards, the Greeks hoped to eliminate all safeguards so as to facilitate *enosis*. Meanwhile, the US initiated negotiations to replace the tripartite force with a NATO force which would preserve order and security in Cyprus until a definitive settlement was found. The London conference broke up on 31 January 1964 (Bilge 1975, 158-159). Makarios rejected any NATO force in the island and “*insisted that any peace force should be sponsored by the UN*”. Coincidentally, “*Makarios repeatedly called for Soviet military involvement in the event of a Turkish intervention. This fueled the fears of US officials*” that Cyprus would be the *Mediterranean Cuba* (Stergiou 2007, 93).

Khrushchev, in his message dated 7 February 1964 sent to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, stated that the conflict between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots could not be used as a pretext to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Cyprus Republic. He stated that the proposals to send NATO troops to Cyprus meant the occupation of a non-aligned country (Bilge 1993b, 423).

The NATO allies “*ultimately agreed on UN involvement after a request by Makarios in March 1964*” due to the increasing violence in Cyprus. The USSR

strongly supported the request and enabled the UNSC to adopt (Stergiou 2007, 94) the resolution no:186, dated 4 March 1964, which recommended the establishment of a UN peace keeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and asked the parties involved in the conflict to refrain from acts which could further aggravate the conflict.

Turkey informed the USSR of the recent developments in Cyprus, explained her position on the issue, and communicated her expectation for the condemnation of the bloodshed caused by the Greeks. The USSR ignored the course of events and advised against outside interference in Cyprus. The USSR was concerned with the prospect of seeing the island turned into a NATO base. It was this attitude of her delayed the preplanned visit of FM Erkin to Moscow in March 1964 (Bilge 1975, 169-170). Originally, the USSR accepted the existence of a unitary government in Cyprus as a whole, without openly recognizing the existence of separate Turkish and Greek communities on the island (Karpas 1975b, 91).

The possibility that the conflict would evolve into a conflict between two members of the south flank of NATO created deep anxiety in the US (Bilge 1975, 162). President Johnson, in his famous Letter sent to Prime Minister İnönü dated 5 June 1964 threatened Turkey as the following:

“... [Y]our NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies. ... Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. ... [U]nless I can have your assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation ... must immediately ask for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security Council” (as quoted in Váli 1972, 309-313).

The letter quoted above indicated that the US envisaged no enemy for Turkey other than the Soviet Union and believed that Turkey's rights could only be violated by the USSR. For the US, the important problem in the whole Cyprus issue was prevention of war between the two allies of NATO. The US did not intend to invoke the NATO mechanism in favor of Turkey as long as no direct Soviet aggression occurred, even though the most vital Turkish interest were at stake (Gönlübol 1975, 18).

The reason why Turkey was heavily frustrated from the Johnson Letter was hidden in the meaning that Turkey loaded to her partnership with the US. According to the US, this partnership was a relationship based on self-interest, whereas this partnership carried ideological features as *loyalty to common values* and *union of destiny* for Turkey. One of the important consequences of the Johnson letter was the beginning of the process of Turkey's alienation from the US and its rapprochement with the USSR (Derman and Kurban 2016, 463-465). Prime Minister İnönü's reply letter, sent to President Lyndon B. Johnson, dated 14 June 1964, was reminding the following issues:

"If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist this member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning. ... We have, upon your request, postponed our decision to exercise our right of unilateral action in Cyprus conferred to us by the Treaty of Guarantee" (as quoted in Váli 1972, 313-324).

The US invited both Turkish Prime Minister İnönü and Greek Prime Minister Papandreu to Washington. The visit of İnönü on 22-23 June and Papandreu's visit immediately after that did not produce a tripartite meeting because of the reluctance of the Greek Prime Minister to attend. The talks originally planned on a tripartite basis turned out to be bilateral. The talks began on 9 July 1964 between Erim, Acheson and the UN mediator Tuomioja. The *Acheson Plan* envisaged originally the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey produced no results (Bilge 1975, 162-164).

The Turkish jets strafed the Greek positions on the island on 8 August 1964 (Sönmezoğlu 2016, 154). This sign of a crack in the NATO alliance prompted the USSR to alter its position (Golan 1990, 249-250). The USSR instead of a threat of war as in the past, sent a mild message to Ankara to stop the attacks which would increase the danger of war. The visit of Soviet Ambassador in Nicosia to vice-president Fazıl Küçük on 15 August was a clear indication that the Soviet position on Cyprus had changed (Karpat 1975b, 91-92). Cyprus crisis was a case of exploiting a conflict in order to further SU's own interests as in the case of Arab-Israeli conflict which was exploited to move into the southern tier. In the Cyprus case, the USSR was able to

exploit the disaffection of the US ally. The SU was not directly involved in the 1964 Cyprus crisis. The SU's position also was not consistent throughout the crisis (Golan 1990, 249).

Cyprus was not the only source of tension between Turkey and the US since it was exacerbated by other problems such as legal immunity of US military personnel in Turkey (Hale 2013, 107). The Cyprus crisis became "*the catalyst which forced Turkey to re-examine its foreign policy in the light of a rapidly changing world system*" which had left Turkey isolated in the international community. During the Cyprus crisis, the NATO members and especially the US were reluctant to enter into a local discord between the two members of the alliance. Since by the 1964, both countries were less strained by the Cold war it was not easy for the US to use leverage on both countries for fear of alienating either of them (Aydın 2000, 119-120).

The crisis demonstrated that Turkey's assumption of having identical interests with her allies pushed her into an isolated position in the international field (Turan and Barlas 1994, 437). Turkey tried to move away from exclusive reliance on NATO and to adopt a more independent and multi-faceted foreign policy. This aimed at improving her relations with the USSR and its satellites and trying to develop new links with the Arab countries and the Third World. However, this shift was fairly limited and hesitant. The *détente* between the superpowers also played its part in this process. The reduce in the risk of direct aggression by the USSR, probably enhanced a Turkish perception that she could take the risk of clashes with the US (Hale 1997, 259-260). Thus, a new mood became apparent in Turkey. Ankara started to reappraise the various facets of the alliance despite it remained committed to close ties with Washington²⁵ (Harris 1975, 51). The Turkish foreign policy after 1964 aimed first at gathering international support for her Cyprus policy (Karpas 1975a, 9). NATO's contribution to Turkey's security and Turkey's NATO membership began to be discussed in the Turkish public opinion. Turkey started to interrogate whether the American initiatives

²⁵ Between 1948 and 1964, American actual military assistance to Turkey totaled \$2,271 m, plus \$32.8 m deliveries of surplus equipment. In addition, between 1950-1962, Turkey received around \$1,380 m program and project economic aid (Hale 1997, 257). The American economic assistance to Turkey gradually dwindled after 1968 due to her experiencing an unfavorable trend in its balance of trade among other factors (Harris 1975, 66-67).

in international arena were in line with Turkey's foreign policy objectives and principles. Turkey reviewed bilateral agreements with the US. Turkey approached to new military structuring in NATO under the US leadership with caution. Turkey, taking into account that the vast majority of the weapons used by the Turkish army were American origin, sought to develop her own defense industry and proliferate the countries that she could procure weapons (Erhan 2015a, 690).

Turkish-US discontent led to a rapprochement with the USSR which had been demanded by the USSR for some time but hitherto rejected by Turkey. The perceived reduction in the Soviet threat combined with the Soviet support for the Greek Cypriots seriously weakened Turkey's position on the Cyprus question. As the possibility of a conflict with the USSR over Cyprus made Turkey vulnerable to US pressure, Turkey sought to reduce this threat (Hale 2013, 108). Turkey's beginning to improve relations with the Soviet Union was not a result of Turkey's intention to pit one superpower to another but it was the emergence of a reality that was the loss of confidence to the US during the Johnson letter crisis. This crisis also demonstrated the inexpediency of a continuous tension with a superpower and the benefit of the holding relations on a soft ground. The most important factor of Turkish-Soviet relations beginning from 1964 became the principle of reciprocity, although its application demonstrated special situations since the basis of Turkey's foreign policy was western alliance (Armaoğlu 1988, 828-829). Soviet policy towards Turkey beginning from 1964 until 1982 was based on the strategy of exploitation of contradictions between the developing countries and the West (Hale 2013, 121). Ülman and Dekmejian (as cited in Aydın 2000, 124) underscores *“three factors, related to Cyprus, that forced Turkey to consider a rapprochement with the Soviet Union”*:

- *“A Turkish-Soviet rapprochement would pressure the United States and NATO into inducing the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to accept a solution favorable to Turkey”.*
- *“Turkey hoped to win positive Soviet support for its position on Cyprus” and that of the eastern bloc in the UN.*
- *“The least Turkey could expect was a neutral Soviet position, thereby denying support for the Greek position”.*

This new assessment inevitably called for a reconsideration of the relations with the USSR (Bilge 1975, 170). The real thaw in Turco-Soviet relations started with the visit of FM Erkin to Moscow between 30 October and 6 November 1964. The toppling of Khrushchev on 15 October, did not hamper this visit. Erkin states in his memoirs that the rapprochement began because the Soviet threat to Turkey decreased due to the NATO alliance, the rise of China, her domestic economic difficulties and demands for autonomy by the USSR's allies in Eastern Europe. On the day of departure of Erkin to Moscow, Greece agreed finally to hold bilateral talks with Turkey to solve the Cyprus dispute. This was an unsuccessful move to thwart Turco-Soviet agreement on Cyprus. The *Joint Communiqué* issued at the end of Erkin's visit, called for the strengthening of good neighborly relations based on mutual respect for territorial integrity and independence, and emphasized the need for increased commercial relations. The USSR endorsed a peaceful solution for the Cyprus dispute which would allow for the peaceful coexistence of two national communities and recognize the legal rights of the two national communities within the framework of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus (Karpas 1975b, 90-93). Following the visit, the USSR changed her attitude towards Cyprus partially. This visit also marked the beginning of a series of state visits between the two countries (Bilge 1975, 170). This visit was a clear indication of the change in Turkey's policy in response to US desertion over the Cyprus issue (Golan 1990, 249-250).

During the visit of Soviet parliamentary delegation to Turkey between 4-13 January 1965, Turkey announced that she would not join the MLF due to financial reasons and did not allow the visit of American nuclear-equipped warship *Savannah* to Istanbul. Nikolay Podgorny stated the following in his speech at the TGNA on 5 January 1965:

“... from the WWII until today dark clouds were circulating over the Turkish-Russian relations. I have to confess that the speeches of some of the Soviet statesmen in the past played an important role in this. Such expressions have been now left behind. The Cyprus issue should be resolved through peaceful means without foreign military intervention” (Derman and Kurban 2016, 465; my translation).

FM Gromyko stated in *Izvestia* on 21 January 1965 that the Cyprus conflict could be solved by taking into consideration the legitimate rights of the Turkish and

Greek communities and by respecting the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. He also added that a federal form of government could be a possible way for settlement. The political significance of this statement was stemmed from the recognition extended to the Turkish Cypriot community. This statement was a blow to the Greek Cypriots and Greece (Bilge 1975, 170). The Turco-Soviet trade doubled the amount of 1964 in 1965 reaching to an amount of 20 million dollars. The USSR proposed to build ten cement factories, electric energy center, and other industrial projects such as glass factory and a steel mill (Karpas 1975b, 96-97).

On 8 March 1965, the principle of *peaceful coexistence*, propagated by Khrushchev as a pillar of foreign policy already in 1956, began to be extensively discussed in Turkey and led to the reevaluation of the Turco-Soviet relations and Turkey's closer economic ties with East European countries (Gönlübol 1975, 16-17). Following a short interval caused by Czechoslovak arms shipments to Cyprus, the exchange of mutual visits resumed. Between 17-22 May 1965, Soviet FM Gromyko visited Ankara (Karpas 1975b, 94). During the visit of Gromyko, Turkey rejected the Soviet proposal to renew the Treaty of Paris (Tellal 2015d, 776). On 3 July 1965, Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin expressed the following:

“There is not any dispute exists between our two countries. The Soviet Union wishes the signing of a new agreement within the framework of the guidelines and principles of the 1925 Treaty, taking into account the current new elements and not being against a third-state” (Derman and Kurban 2016, 465; my translation).

It would be misleading to assess the normalization of Turkish-Soviet relations due to the change in the Soviet attitude over Cyprus. General trends in international relations of the time was also important. Yet, the Cyprus issue acted as catalyst in the general reassessment of the Turkish foreign policy and the normalization of the relations between Turkey and the SU (Bilge 1975, 170-171).

Prime Minister Ürgüplü visited Moscow on 7 August 1965 (Karpas 1975b, 94). In the fall of 1965, the Cyprus conflict was brought by Greece and Turkey to the UNGA once again. The Greek Cypriots, counting on the votes of the non-aligned countries, intended to obtain a resolution which would abrogate the treaties supposedly limiting the independence of Cyprus, and would forbid Turkey from undertaking an

action in Cyprus. Turkey sought resolution which would recommend negotiations between parties. A novelty in the discussion was the USSR's explaining the possibility of a form of settlement based on the existence and rights of two communities in Cyprus (Bilge 1975, 167-168).

The UNGA recommendation A/RES/2077(XX), sponsored by thirty-two mostly nonaligned and African countries, was adopted by a vote of 47 for, 6 against²⁶, and 51 abstention on 18 December 1965 (Gönlübol 1975, 32). The abstention of the eastern bloc countries demonstrated Turkey's recent rapprochement with the USSR (Aydın 2000, 138). The UNGA decided that the Republic of Cyprus is "*entitled to enjoy, and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference*", and, called upon all states "*to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from any intervention directed against it*". Turkey made it formally known that she would not accept this recommendation (Bilge 1975, 168). Makarios insisted that the international treaties and agreements about Cyprus were abrogated but he could not enforce his claim (Bilge 1975, 172).

The American negative vote was an attempt to calm to some extent the reaction aroused by President Johnson's Letter. The abstention votes belonged to all of the Eastern bloc countries and the rest of the NATO members. These votes reflected the new tendency of Turkey to better her relations between Turkey and the USSR and other members of the Eastern bloc. Thus, the Cyprus question brought to light the fact that Turkey had been isolated in the international scene (Gönlübol 1975, 31). Thus, Turkey sought to follow a new complex relationship including the establishment of more friendly relations with the USSR²⁷ and her allies ending her isolation (Váli 1971,

²⁶ The six negative votes belonged to two CENTO allies Iran and Pakistan, to Libya, United States and Albania, apart from Turkey (Gönlübol 1975, 31).

²⁷ Bilateral visits began after the Cuba crisis and intensified after the Johnson Letter. These visits occurred between 1963-1972 are listed as follows:

- Visit of Turkish parliamentary delegation chaired by speaker Suat Hayri Ürgüplü between 29 May-14 June 1963.
- Visit of FM Feridun Cemal Erkin to Moscow between 30 October-6 November 1964.
- Visit of Soviet parliamentary delegation to Turkey between 4-13 January 1965.
- Visit of FM Gromyko to Turkey between 17-22 May 1965 (first after Litvinov's in 1931).
- Visit of Prime Minister Ürgüplü to the USSR between 9-16 August 1965.

133). The UNGA resolution also influenced Turkey's foreign policy towards the Arab and African countries. The disagreement between the Arab states among themselves and the differences of view regarding the source of foreign threat faced by Turkey and the Arab countries had prevented the desired level in the relations. The détente between the blocs encouraged Turkey to attempt to make better her relations with the Arab countries (Bilge 1975, 172).

The US vote against the draft proposal at the UNGA in favor of Turkey was insufficient to undo the unfavorable impression created by the Johnson Letter (Bilge 1975, 171). The alteration in the Turkish foreign policy was observable in the restriction of the freedom of American activity in Turkey. After a reconnaissance aircraft crashed in international waters in the Black Sea in 1966, such flights ceased and were never subsequently resumed. Turkey also ceased to be a base for active surveillance of the USSR by U-2 aircrafts (Harris 1975, 64). The agreements signed between Turkey and the US within and out of the framework of NATO on military, economic and financial matters became the subject of discussion in Turkey for the first time after President Johnson's Letter. The agreement mentioned in the Letter was about the conditions set by the US to extend aid to Turkey in the framework of the Truman Doctrine (Gönlübol 1975, 33). The treaty had been concluded at a time of an acute Soviet threat in 1947 when no ties of alliance existed between Turkey and the US (Gönlübol 1975, 34). Until 1964, Turkey and the US concluded fifty-five agreements relating to the presence of the US on Turkish soil, and most of them have never been submitted to parliament for approval (Váli 1971, 139). Turkey and the US concluded nearly a hundred of agreements²⁸ a majority of which remained secret, either with reference to Article 3 of the Treaty or with reference to the NATO *Status of Forces Agreement* dated 19 June 1951 to which Turkey became a party on 10 March

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- Visit of Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin to Turkey between 20-27 December 1966 (first Soviet prime minister).
 - Visit of Prime Minister Demirel to the USSR between 19-29 September 1967.
 - Visit of FM Çağlayangil to the USSR between 8-12 July 1968.
 - Visit of President Sunay to the USSR between 12-21 November 1969.
 - Visit of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Podgorny between 11-17 April 1972 (Tellal 2015d, 775-778).

²⁸ For the detailed account of Turco-American bilateral agreements within the framework of NATO, see, Gönlübol (1975, 33-41).

1954 (Gönlübol 1975, 35). Following a proposal put forth by Turkey on 7 April 1966 and accepted by the US on 8 April 1966, two countries entered into negotiations to combine all the bilateral agreements into a single basic agreement. Finally, Turkey and the US concluded an agreement relating to the basic principle of the collective measures to be taken by the two Governments pursuant to Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty of which only basic principles were made public (Gönlübol 1975, 38).

During the visit of Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin to Turkey between 20-27 December 1966, Turkey rejected oil import proposal from the USSR (Tellal 2015d, 778). In 1967, Turkey started to accept Soviet credits and economic assistance. On 25 March 1967, *Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Equipment and Materials to be Delivered to Turkey by the USSR for the Establishment of Some Industrial Plants, and the Technical Services to be Provided and Conditions of Payment thereof* was signed in Moscow. Turkey was obtaining economic resources for the establishment of seven factories, namely, Aliğa Petroleum Refinery, Seydişehir Aluminium Factory, Bandırma Sulphuric Acid Plant, Artvin Timber Factory and İskenderun Iron and Steel Plant (Tellal 2015d, 782).

During the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Turkey declared that the use of bases in Turkey against Arabs would be out of the question. Turkey, by supporting the non-aligned draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of Israel to the prewar frontiers, preferred an attitude out of the NATO line for the first time (Turan and Barlas 1994, 437). Turkey had taken into account the importance of the 13 potential Arab votes and Communist bloc support for its position on Cyprus in the UN. However, Turkey abstained on the Soviet resolution that labelled Israel an aggressor (Aydın 2000, 126).

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, 40 to 60 Soviet ships entered the Mediterranean. The purpose of this massive increase was psychological rather than strategical. It would act as a visible counterweight to the American sixth fleet in order to enhance Moscow's prestige among the Arabs. Brezhnev demanded the withdrawal of the US fleet from the Mediterranean. The Soviet argument regarding the Mediterranean was along the following lines: "*Our state, which is, as is known, a Black Sea and consequently also a Mediterranean power, could not remain indifferent*

to the intrigues of those fond of military ventures organized directly adjacent to the borders of the USSR ...” (Váli 1971, 214-215). The growth of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean caused growing apprehension in Turkey. The Soviet claim that the Mediterranean was an extension of the Black Sea rather than the other way round directly concerned the status of the Straits (Karpát 1975b, 99). Turkey’s allowing the Soviets to move a complete fleet into the Mediterranean through the Straits in 1967 was a significant shift in Turkey’s foreign policy (Stergiou 2007, 95). The USSR began to seek bases and alliances in apparent contradiction to the encouragement of non-alignment which was the result of the rise in importance of the SU’s military-strategic interests in the Mediterranean (Golan 1990, 11-12).

2.2. The 1967 Cyprus Crisis and the Turkish-Soviet Relations

On 14 November 1967, the Greek police, entering into the Turkish section of Boğaziçi (Agios Theodoros) with armored trucks in a show of force, caused fighting the next day. Twenty-nine Turkish Cypriots were killed, and the homes of the Turks were destroyed. Occupation of the Turkish villages continued in the following days. On 17 November 1967, the TGNA authorized the government to use armed force in Cyprus. In a Note, submitted on 18 November, Turkey asked Greece to withdraw Grivas and the Greek forces from Cyprus. Turkey threatened to dispatch an equal number of forces to the island, if the request were not fulfilled. Turkey also asked for the reparation of the damage caused to the Turkish Cypriots during the attacks (Bilge 1975, 174-175). The SU protested stiffly the bombings of the Greek positions by the Turkish jets (Karpát 1975b, 97). Upon the mediation of US, England and Canada, Turkey chose the diplomatic channels while maintaining military preparedness. In the end, Greece agreed to withdraw her forces from the island which was the most essential Turkish demand (Bilge 1975, 175-176).

The *Harmel Report*²⁹ of NATO dated 13-14 December 1967 stated that each ally could decide its policy and addressed the allies to seek improved relations with the USSR and the Eastern European countries which dispelled Turkey’s apprehensions

²⁹ For the full text of the *Future Tasks of the Alliance - Report of the Council (Harmel Report)*, see, United States Department of State (1967).

that its changing relations with the eastern bloc could jeopardize its position in NATO (Aydın 2000, 116). On 28 December 1967, the Turkish Cypriots announced the creation of the *Provisional Turkish Administration* to conduct the affairs of their community (Bilge 1975, 177).

Four sets of foreign policy objectives shaped the Soviet foreign policy following Brezhnev's consolidation its power by 1968. The first objective was to stabilize the arms race to cover anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) without hampering the Soviet advantage in strategic delivery systems. The recognition of the status of East Germany and Eastern Europe by the West was the second objective. These two objectives formed the main lines of Soviet concept of détente. The third objective was the continuation of the ideological struggle outside Europe. The fourth was to establish a *cordon sanitaire* around Peoples republic of China (Barston as cited in Wozniuk 1990, 166).

The *détente* process³⁰ and the consequent loosening of the bipolar balance initiated important changes in international relations and greatly affected Turkey's

³⁰ There are various approaches in the periodization of détente. It is often referred to the "*Cuban missile crisis of 1962 as the beginning of the process and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979*" as the beginning of the Second Cold War. Some scholars date it as death of Stalin (1953), "*others fix its inception with the Nixon/Kissinger overtures to China in 1972. ... [M]ost agree that it refers to a structural change in post-war superpower relations and ... a number of significant points of dialogue between them including the Helsinki Accords (1975) and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)*" started in 1969 (Evans and Newnham 1998, 125-126). The Nixon administration officially coined the term *détente* in 1969. The Soviets also adopted this term to define their relations with the US. Two powers moved from confrontation to cooperation. The Nixon administration invented a *linkage strategy* which depended on mutually rewarding exchanges. The main trajectory of the détente was arms control (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 89).

The US policy of détente in 1971–72 emerged from an assessment of American military, economic, and political power strained by the Vietnam War. Since the USSR "*was about to obtain parity with the United States in strategic weapons, ... détente was essentially a realist strategy to cope with the challenge of Soviet power in an era of American relative decline*". The USSR "*shared the goals of stabilizing the nuclear arms race, avoiding dangerous disputes over regional conflicts, and expanding economic contacts between East and West, but they did so for different reasons*". The USSR felt that nuclear arms control would help to fix a rough strategic balance with the US. The USSR also hoped that "*increased access to Western goods, credits, and technologies would help to fill immediate gaps in Soviet production, thereby satisfying growing consumer demand in the USSR and improving Soviet industrial performance*" (Njølstad 2010, 137-138).

R. Craig Nation (as cited in Roberts 1999, 68) states the following as "*specific reasons and incentives for the Soviets to embrace détente in the 1970s*":

"To stabilize the arms race once approximate strategic parity with the United States was achieved. ... To win international acceptance of the postwar security order in Europe. ... To create a more propitious climate for east-west trade and technology transfer. ... To neutralize

international position. The rise of France and China against bipolarity turned the bipolar structure of post-war years to be a multipolar one. Increasing role of the secondary states caused a loosening of the bipolar balance despite international relations continued to be under the influence of two strong poles. The *Group of 77* and the *Group of non-aligned Countries* represented the Third World countries in economic and political stages (Aydın 2000, 115-116).

The “*Prague Spring*” of 20 August 1968 resulted in the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops and the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine which recognized a limited sovereignty to socialist states (Wozniuk 1990, 163-165). The Brezhnev Doctrine claiming the right of intervention to uphold the socialist regimes were a reminder to Turkey that the USSR had not renounced force where its interests were concerned. Turkey’s immediate reaction to Czechoslovakian crisis was to co-operate in the MLF to be created in the Mediterranean under the NATO³¹ auspices (Aydın 2000, 125).

Military and technological developments also created issues with regards to the implementation of the Montreux Convention. In December 1968, two American warships *Dyess* and *Turner* entered the Black Sea through the Straits and remained there for five days. Since both warship were below the determined aggregate tonnage of 15.000 tons, there were no inconvenience. However, since *Dyess* was equipped with 8 anti-submarine missiles (ASROC) with a caliber of 305 mm exceeding the condition of 203 mm stated in the Convention, the Soviet and Bulgarian ambassadors protested the situation. Turkey replied that the newly developed weapons of defensive purposes which were not stated in the Convention did not violate the Convention. The problem

the threat of US-Chinese collusion by giving the West a greater stake in positive relations with USSR”.

³¹ During 1966-1968, a debate developed in Turkey whether she should remain in NATO. Haluk Ulman urged that Turkey should opt for neutrality arguing that the western powers would still come to Turkey’s aid in case of a Soviet aggression even if it were not in NATO. On the other side, supporters of NATO membership, such as retired admiral Sezai Orkunt and then foreign minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil argued that Turkey still needed NATO as the most secure deterrent against aggression (Hale 1997, 260). İnönü said soon after the invasion of Czechoslovakia that “*we have examined the NATO agreement and announced our stand. The recent Czech events have shown that how correct this stand was*” (Hale 1997, 266). Regarding the debates whether Turkey should leave NATO, see, Váli (1971, 157-164).

was that annex II of the Convention was not adapted to the developing arms technology (Özersay 2015, 184).

The US had begun pulling personnel out of facilities and major installations on the Black Sea coast Starting in 1968 (Harris 1975, 65). As a result of the discussions made for three years, *Turkish-American Defense Cooperation Agreement*³² was signed on 13 July 1969. Main principles of the agreements were:

- Joint defense installations were recognized as being the property of Turkey.
- Turkey began to exercise full control over these installations.
- The non-Turkish personnel would be subject to the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement of 19 June 1951.
- Turkish authorities would be duly informed of movements of the American personnel stationed at these installations (Váli 1971, 140).

Turkey ensured that all joint defense activities were conducted within the limits of NATO commitments (Hale 2013, 107). However, Turkey continued to look the US as the major source of military equipment³³.

By the early 1970s, projection of Soviet naval power in all of the strategically important regions of the world narrowed the strategic gap between the two superpowers and paved the way for the first successful arms control negotiations since beginning of the Cold war³⁴ (Keylor 2001, 322). By the end of 1960's Turkey became one of the largest Third World recipients of Soviet economic aid with over 1000 Soviet economic advisers in Turkey. Progress in the political sphere was more limited. In 1970, Turkey permitted to the transfer of Soviet arms to Syria and Iraq via Turkey (Golan 1990, 250-251).

In 1970, two Lithuanians hi-jacked a Soviet aircraft to Turkey. When Turkey gave the hi-jackers sanctuary, the USSR retaliated by shooting down a US military

³² For the Turkish texts of the “*Turkish-American Defense Cooperation Agreement*” dated 3 July 1969 and dated 26 March 1976; “*Turkish-American Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement*” dated 29 March 1980, and the renewed “*Turkish-American Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement*” dated 21 February 1988, see Armaoğlu (1991, 277-371).

³³ In August 1972, Turkey committed its own resources to buy 40 Phantom jet fighter-bombers (F-4) after Greece concluded similar agreements (Harris 1975, 66).

³⁴ For the information regarding arms control and strategic parity between the US and the USSR, see, Keylor (2001, 318-325).

plane which overflowed the Soviet border with both American and Turkish officers aboard. Despite this, both sides avoided major crisis (Golan 1990, 251).

During Makarios' visit to Moscow in 1971, the USSR back-tracked from its earlier tilt towards Turkey. The USSR joined Makarios in condemning all outside interference and called for a solution to be reached by the peoples of Cyprus themselves and the removal of all foreign troops. The existence and rights of two distinct communities were ignored. Any role for Turkey was implicitly ruled out (Golan 1990, 251).

The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), intended to restrain the arms race in strategic ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons, was signed in Moscow on 26 May 1972 between Brezhnev and Nixon (Sönmezoğlu 2016, 230-231). N.V. Podgorny, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, visited Turkey between 11 and 17 April 1972. The visit was an important step for the development of Turkish-Soviet relations. Podgorny proposed the renewal of the 1925 treaty but Turkish president Sunay rejected that offer on the ground that leftist anarchism still prevailed in the country but they agreed to maintain negotiations on renewal of the agreement (Kurban 2017, 160-161). On 17 April 1972, a *Declaration of Principles on Good Neighborliness Relations*³⁵ was signed between Turkey and the USSR. The contents of the Declaration were determined in line with the negotiated provisions of the *Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* to be signed on 20 May 1972³⁶ and of the CSCE (Tellal 2015d, 779). Some of the principles of the Declaration were the following:

- Improvement of friendship and good neighborly relations initiated by Atatürk and Lenin.
- Mutual rights for sovereignty and equality.
- Mutual respect for territorial integrity.
- Non-interference in the internal affairs of the other party.

³⁵ For the full text of the *Declaration on the Principles on Good Neighbourliness Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, dated 17 April 1972, see, Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, 655-657).

³⁶ For the full text of the *Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, dated 29 May 1972, see, Office of the Historian (2020).

- Respect for political, social, economic and cultural system of one another.
- Not allowing use of their boundaries for attacks against other states.
- Resolution of international problems through peaceful means.

The parties conditioned the Declaration on Turkey's not to allow her bases for use of hostile purposes and on Moscow's not to support communist movements in Turkey (Kurban 2017, 161). During the visit of Podgorny, the USSR corrected issues claiming that there had been no change in the Soviet position regarding her Cyprus policy. The Soviet President returned to the earlier formula of two communities as preferred by Turkey and refrained from any mention of foreign involvement. The *communique* issued at the end of the visit explicitly ruled out the idea of Cypriot union with Greece (Golan 1990, 251-252).

On 17 April 1973, *the Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Determination of the Maritime Border Line between the Turkish and Soviet Territorial Waters in the Black Sea* was signed in Ankara. During the Yom Kippur war between 6-24 October 1973, Turkey closed an eye to the time requirements for prior notification of the passage of Soviet warships. Turkey also permitted Soviet overflights of equipment to the Arabs (Golan 1990, 250-254). Turkey also refused to facilitate American support for Israel in the two Arab-Israeli conflicts (Stergiou 2007, 95-96). On 29 December 1973, several Protocols pertaining to the State Border between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics were signed in Ankara.

2.3. Turkey's 1974 Cyprus Intervention and the USSR

In November 1973, Makarios began to show interest in closer ties with the USSR to use it to counterbalance Turkey and the Greek Junta and increase his own freedom of action to the detriment of the UK and the US. This was a turning point in the relations between the Greek Cypriots and Greece because this would have deprived Greece of her influence in Cyprus and her power ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean (Karpas 1975c, 194). Following the request demanding arms for the

protection of prominent statesmen and the politicians against terrorist attacks, the USSR delivered 100 Walter branded pistols and 2500 bullets to Greek Cypriots secretly (Hasanlı 2011, 471).

Before 15 July 1974, Makarios asked Junta to pull out from Cyprus the officers from the mainland commanding the National Guard. Makarios made also public the existence of a plan devised by Junta to assassinate him and give the presidency to their own man (Karpas 1975c, 195-196). On 15 July 1974, the Greek Cypriot National Guards supported by the Greek Junta ousted Makarios with a *coup d'état* (Derman and Kurban 2016, 470). Nikos Sampson was made president with the obvious purpose of declaring *enosis* (Karpas 1975c, 186). Turkey declared that she would not accept a *fait accompli* and would enforce the existing international agreements in order to maintain the independence of Cyprus. Greece labeled the events in Cyprus an internal affair and warned Turkey not to interfere or intervene (Karpas 1975c, 197).

The US refrained from explaining not to recognize new Sampson government despite it condemned the situation (Derman and Kurban 2016, 470). The US seemed ready to accept the situation in Cyprus and concentrated her efforts mainly on preventing an armed confrontation between Greece and Turkey. The US apparently wanted to prevent Soviet interference in the affairs of Cyprus. The Nixon administration seemed to back Sampson rather than Makarios. The US found itself in a situation being the only supporter of the Greek Junta. It was also clear that Makarios could not be brought back to the presidency without outside intervention. To charge the UN with intervention would have involved the USSR in the Cyprus affair that the US struggled to avoid for years. To prevent Turkey from intervening under treaty rights would turn Turks against the US and NATO. A slight move by Turkey towards the Soviet bloc would have drastically altered the balance of power in the Mediterranean and would have enhanced greatly the Arab position towards Israel. As a consequence of all these calculations, the US began to adopt a neutral attitude towards the Cyprus crisis although still intent on preventing a Turkish-Greek war (Karpas 1975c, 197-198).

The UK issued a strong statement in favor of Makarios still recognizing him as the legitimate president of Cyprus and asked for the removal of Greek officers from

Cyprus and restoration of the status quo. The USSR began to attack to NATO as preventing the UN from intervening in Cyprus and seemed ready to support Turkey if she wished to use her treaty rights and intervene to restore the pre-coup constitutional order in Cyprus (Karpas 1975c, 197).

The annexation of Cyprus would allow Greece to control the southern coast of Turkey, including the important export outlet ports of Mersin and İskenderun. It would also permit Greece to play an important role in the politics of the Middle East as a whole (Karpas 1975c, 186-187). On 20 July 1974, Turkish paratroopers and marines started to land in Cyprus. Greece decreed general mobilization with the intention of forcing Turkey to withdraw her troops from Cyprus. The UNSC called for a cease-fire with its resolution no:353 on 20 July 1974. Sampson resigned and was replaced by Glafcos Clerides, the head of the Greek Cypriot community (Karpas 1975c, 199-200). The UNSC decided with its resolution no 353 dated 20 July 1973, “*to restore the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus*”, in other words, the re-functioning of the Makarios administration (Sönmezoğlu 2016, 402).

The USSR was remarkably self-restrained “*despite declarations of willingness to protect the Republic of Cyprus*”. Moscow undertook no action to stop Turkish intervention. The Soviets obviously signaled non-opposition to intervention. Thus, the US had no leverage to convince Turkey of a potential war on Turkey, as Johnson did in June 1964. “*While making strong statements and accusations against Western imperialism and NATO ... [for intending] to dismember Cyprus and create a NATO stronghold in the Eastern Mediterranean, ... Moscow ... carefully avoided condemnation of the Turkish operation*” (Stergiou 2007, 98). Stergiou (2007, 98) interprets this Soviet inaction as follows:

“Soviet inaction has been interpreted by some researchers in the context of the Soviet-American détente and the tacit acceptance that each superpower had a sphere of vital interests. The Soviets were not ready to undermine détente over an incident in a grey area of primary American interest. Other researchers argue that Soviet policy was dictated by the consideration that a military clash between Greece and Turkey would blow up the south-eastern flank of NATO There is strong evidence that Turkey had informed Moscow of its invasion plans, maintaining that this operation would aim at restoring the independence of Cyprus. And independent state, with whatever limitations, was preferable for the Soviets to its being united to a NATO member state.”

On 25 July, peace talks between Turkey, Greece and Britain opened in Geneva. The parties signed a *joint declaration* on 30 July which confirmed the establishment of buffer zone between two sides and linked the withdrawal of Turkish forces to the achievement of a just and lasting solution. The declaration also noted the existence in practice of two autonomous administrations in the island which meant an implicit recognition that the former unitary republic could not be restored. When Clerides asked the Soviet observer for a limited Russian military presence in Cyprus, he was responded whether this had been cleared with the Americans since there may have been a US-Soviet understanding that neither superpower would intervene unilaterally (Hale 2013, 114). The USSR sent an observer to the talks in Geneva between Britain, Turkey and Greece seeking to play a small role in the determination of the future of the island (Golan 1990, 252). On 10 August, some sort of federal solution was favored by both the US and Britain (Hale 2013, 114). Greece was willing to accept a federation based on a system of cantons (Turkish enclaves spread on the island), a solution which she had rejected in the past. Turkey demanded a geographical federation for two autonomous communal units – the Greek Cypriots at the south and the Turkish Cypriots at the north of the island (Karpas 1975c, 200-201).

Turkey's second military advance began on 14 August, the day after Turkish FM considered Clerides' demand for 36 hours to assess the Turkish proposals as a device to gain time (Karpas 1975c, 201). The second advance drew reactions from the world public opinion. Greece got out of the military flank of NATO on 14 August 1974 stating that the US did not prevent the Turkish military operation (Derman and Kurban 2016, 470).

Soviet attitude towards Turkey underwent quick change. Primarily, the USSR supported the Turkish operation in Cyprus because it definitely prevented Enosis and preserved the status of Cyprus as an independent state which could maintain relations with the USSR as in the past. However, the USSR reacted negatively to Turkish further military advance and proposed an international conference with the participation of UNSC members and the relevant parties to settle the issue. Greece accepted the offer whereas the US and Turkey rejected because it would render the Cyprus dispute more complex and unsolvable (Karpas 1975c, 202). The USSR demanded expulsion of all

foreign forces from the island. Turkey remained under the pressure of both superpowers. Although Turkish-Soviet relations were affected by the Cyprus issue, the problem did not play a determining role in their relations. Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus moved Turkish-Soviet relations in a new direction. The USSR sought to make Turkey a nonaligned state, closer to the Socialist Bloc (Kurban 2017, 168-169).

The UNGA passed a resolution no:3212 (XXIX) dated 1 November 1974 which was accepted also by Turkey, calling on all parties to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, to withdraw all foreign armed forces and to allow for the return of refugees to their homes (Karpas 1975c, 203). Makarios returned back to Cyprus on 7 December and assumed the administration from Clerides (Derman and Kurban 2016, 472).

On 30 December 1974, the US Congress passed a resolution banning military sales and aid to Turkey until the substantial progress made in the settlement of the Cyprus problem which came to effect on 5 February 1975 (Hale 2013, 116). According to the Act SEC.22, amending the Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by adding the following new subsection:

“All military assistance, all sales of defense articles and services (whether for cash or by credit, guaranty, or any other means), and all licenses with respect to the transportation of arms, ammunitions, and implements of war (including technical data relating thereto) to the Government of Turkey, shall be suspended on the date of enactment of this subsection unless and until the President determines and certifies to the Congress that the Government of Turkey is in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and any agreement entered into under such Acts, and that substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus: Provided, that the President is authorized to suspend the provisions of this section and such Acts if he determines that such suspension will further negotiations for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus conflict. Any such suspension shall be effective only until February 5, 1975, and only if, during that time, Turkey shall observe the ceasefire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any United States supplied implements of war” (United States Government Publishing Office (GPO) 2019b).

The immediate Turkish response was the establishment of *Turkish Federated State of Cyprus* on 13 February 1975 (Armaoğlu 1991, 287). The Soviet representative at the UNSC stated that the USSR recognized the Makarios government as the only legal government of Cyprus and supported the independence, sovereignty and

territorial integrity of Cyprus, and demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces in the island and return of the refugees to their homes (Sönmezoğlu 2016, 403). On 26 July 1975, Turkey suspended the *Defense Cooperation Agreement* of 1969 and ended all the US operations in Turkey other than those purely functioning under NATO (Hale 2013, 116). In the post-Cyprus period, Turkey did not look as regularly to Washington to solve her problems as in the earlier era. Turkey was no longer so willing to say yes automatically to military requests that carried risks of embroiling Turkey with the USSR or her other neighbors (Harris 2004, 72).

On 1 August 1975, *Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*^{37,38} was signed among 33 European countries (all but Albania), the US and Canada (Keylor 2001, 339). Among others, the Act formally recognized the existing political frontiers of Europe and provided for an increase in economic and cultural relations between the two blocs. The major concession made by Moscow in exchange for the West's acknowledgment of political frontiers in Europe was the guarantee for respect for human rights and political freedoms (Keylor 2001, 339-340). The Helsinki Conference brought the end of the Cold War in Europe and the US recognized the permanence of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe (Keylor 2001, 382-383). The Helsinki Final Act was perceived as a *two-sided coin*. While some criticized that it was the selling of Eastern Europe by recognizing the territorial status quo, the others argued that its provisions regarding human rights encouraged dissidents and led to increasing instability after 1975 (Wozniuk 1990, 163-165).

³⁷ For the full text of the *Helsinki Final Act*, dated 1 August 1975, see, OSCE (2019c).

³⁸ Since the mid-fifties Moscow issued periodic proposals for the convocation of a European Security Conference to break the political impasse in Europe. Western countries consistently rebuffed the Soviet overtures on the ground that political agreements were meaningless unless accompanied by a mutual reduction of military forces in Europe. However, by the early 1970s, two developments in the global balance of power forced both sides to reconsider their positions. The defeat of the US in Vietnam and ensuing reduction in American military personnel increased Western Europe's enthusiasm for an agreement to reduce the size of the military forces in Europe. The increasing tension between the USSR and China over the territorial disputes and a likely improvement in Sino-American relations at the expense of the USSR following the visit of Nixon's national security adviser Kissinger to China in July 1971 forced the USSR to recognize the advantages of détente and stability on its European flank. Brezhnev agreed "to participate in a conference on *Mutual and Balanced Forced Reductions (MBFR)* in exchange for the western nations' endorsement of the Soviet proposal for a *European Security Conference (CSCE)*". Thus, two parallel conferences, the CSCE had begun in Helsinki on 15 January 1973, and the MBFR in Vienna on 30 October 1973 (Keylor 2001, 337-338).

The circumstances in 1974 were different from 1964 and 1967 and the Turkish-US relations had undergone a transition. Therefore, the US had no longer leverages on Turkey that it had in 1964 and 1967 (Aydın 2000, 129). In October 1975, the Congress agreed under strong pressure of the administration to a partial lifting of the embargo by limiting it to supplies covered by grants and deferred credit sales (Hale 2013, 116). During the visit of Kosygin to Ankara at the end of 1975 a *Joint Declaration* was issued in which the following regarding the Cyprus issue was stated:

“The Cyprus issue needs to be solved by peaceful means through negotiation, without prejudice towards the principles of ... Cyprus’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and nonalignment, [and taking into account] the legitimate rights and interests of Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the island so as to enable them to live in peace and full security” (as quoted in Kurban 2017, 170-171).

The signature of a non-aggression pact proposed by Kosygin was rejected by Prime Minister Demirel (Sönmezoğlu 2016, 398-399). A *Joint Soviet-Turkish Communique on Economic and Technical Cooperation*³⁹ was issued at the end of the visit (Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 658-662). As of 1976, development of bilateral relations between Turkey and the USSR extended into the military arenas. Turkish military experts were invited to Caucasus military exercise in Georgia and Armenia between 25 January – 6 February 1976 (Tellal 2015d, 779-780).

On 26 March 1976, a new DCA⁴⁰ was signed between Turkey and the US (Armaoğlu 1991, 288). The warship categories defined in the Montreux Convention also became a source of conflict. The category of a warship was important since the Montreux Convention allowed their passage through the Straits according to their categories. On 18 July 1976, the Soviet warship *Kiev* passed through the Straits from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. The USSR defined *Kiev* as an anti-submarine cruiser. However, the deck of the warship had the capacity to keep 25-30 Yak-36 aircraft and 25-30 anti-submarine helicopter. This led to a discussion whether the warship was a carrier or a cruiser. Despite the passage was not denounced by any country, the problematic about the meaning of some of the provisions of the

³⁹ For the full text of the *Joint Soviet-Turkish Communique on Economic and Technical Cooperation*, dated 30 December 1975, see, Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, 658-662).

⁴⁰ For the Turkish text of the DCA, dated 26 March 1976, see, Armaoğlu (1991, 288-296).

Convention with respect to international law came to the agenda (Özersay 2015, 184-185). Turkey allowed the passage of the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev by accepting the Soviet classification of it as an anti-submarine vessel to circumvent the absence of clauses in the Montreux Convention (Golan 1990, 253-254).

There were two conditions for the new DCA to take effect: Ratification by the US Congress and the abolition of embargo. When the US Congress rejected to ratify the agreement in January 1977, the agreement became *null and void* before taking effect (Erhan 2015a, 709).

The deterioration of Turkish-US relations paved the way for the greatest Soviet return on the Cyprus conflict. One of the major objectives of the SU – the removal of NATO facilities from Turkey to the south of its border was achieved with little effort at least temporarily. The position of the USSR in the Cyprus crisis and the Turkish rift with the US led to an improvement in the Turkish-Soviet relations ⁴¹. The Cyprus crisis was not an entirely easy one for the USSR despite its implicit backing Turkey. Shortly after the outbreak of the crisis, the generals in Athens were replaced by anti-American and an anti-NATO civilian government which were clearly of interest to USSR. The USSR hoped to exploit both the US opposition to Turkish move and new anti-Americanism in Athens and sought to focus the issue on NATO rather than Turkey versus Greece. Too strong a Soviet involvement carried the risk to push either Turkey or Greece to the US. Although the Soviet demand for withdrawal of all foreign troops directed against the British, it implicitly included Turkey and complicated matters. The USSR was not too pleased with the de facto partition of the island which seemed to be emerging. The USSR was not particularly concerned about the resolution of the Cyprus issue. The continued conflict as a thorn in NATO may have been more promising. The USSR interested in the conflict only to a limited degree since a conflict always ran the risk of precipitating the US involvement which could create instability regarding the Turkish straits (Golan 1990, 252-253). During the visit of FM

⁴¹ Economic and technical cooperation between Turkey and the USSR was implemented on the project basis until 1976 when an *Intergovernmental Joint Commission* was established (Tellal 2015d, 783). A Soviet credit for \$700 million for existing and new projects was given to Turkey. In 1977 a ten year economic agreement was concluded for the sum of \$1.3 billion and in 1979 a \$3.8 billion agreement was signed for energy projects (Golan 1990, 253).

Çağlayangil to Moscow between 13-18 March 1977, Ankara avoided from arms procurement from the USSR (Tellal 2015d, 780). A *Joint Soviet-Turkish Communiqué Exchanging Views on Current International Situation*⁴² was issued at the end of the visit (Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 663-665).

Turkish flexibility regarding the Straits was entirely dependent upon the goodwill of the Turkish government at any time acting according to its own interests. Turkey reversed its leniency of 1973 and refused the Soviet overflight rights for the transfer of military aid to Ethiopia during the Ogaden war (July 1977-March 1978). Turkey not only turned down Soviet offers of arms but also rejected the Soviet demand for the use of Turkish facilities for the Soviet fleet. Turkey declared its interests in balanced policy. The Turkish-Soviet border in the Black Sea was amicably delineated between the two countries in 1978 (Golan 1990, 253-255).

The visit of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR, in April 1978 was the first of its kind since the 1920s. Ogarkov announced that the USSR could make military assistance to Turkey. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit visited Moscow between 21-25 June 1978 (Tellal 2015d, 780). On 23 June 1978, Turkey and the USSR signed a *Political Document on the Principles of Good Neighborly and Friendly Cooperation*^{43, 44}. The document was approval of the 1972 *Declaration of Principles* and 1975 *Final Act* at the bilateral level (Tellal 2015d, 780). The document was far less than the non-aggression pact that the USSR had been working for. Prime Minister Ecevit announced in Moscow that Turkey would reduce its cooperation with the US and NATO on the grounds that the USSR no longer constituted a threat to Turkey (Hale 2013, 117). The political document was a break-through for Soviet relations with a NATO country. The Document banned the use of each country's territory for the perpetration of aggression or subversion against other country. From the Soviet point of view, this was meant to prevent NATO activity or facilities in

⁴² For the full text of the *Joint Soviet-Turkish Communiqué Exchanging Views on Current International Situation*, dated 18 March 1977, see, Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, 663-665).

⁴³ For the full text of the *Political Document on the Principles of Good Neighbourly and Friendly Cooperation between Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, see, Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, 666-670).

⁴⁴ The Document provoked various reactions in Turkey from the nationalists and anti-communists (Kurban 2017, 174).

Turkey, although Turkey had a more limited interpretation. Although it proved to have little practical value, the document was a political achievement from the Soviet point of view (Golan 1990, 254). The *Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Black Sea between the Republic of Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* was also signed in Moscow on 23 June 1978. In the joint declaration issued at the end of the visit, the USSR for the first time accepted the resolution of the Cyprus dispute between the parties (Sönmezoğlu 2016, 403). Joint Soviet-Turkish Communique on Closer Economic Cooperation⁴⁵ was issued on 26 June 1978 (Dmytryshyn and Cox 1987, 671-678).

As the relations between Turkey and the USSR was developing, the US Congress passed a law concerning Turkey and Cyprus on 26 September 1978. Section 13 of the Act No: 95-384 pertaining to the *United States Policy Regarding the Eastern Mediterranean* was not only lifting the embargo but also determining the Eastern Mediterranean policy of the US in general, and Cyprus, Turkey and Greece policy in particular (Armaoğlu 1991, 296):

“Section 620 (x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall be of no further force and effect upon the President’s determination and certification to the Congress that the resumption of full military cooperation with Turkey is in the national interest of the United States and in the interest of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and that the Government of Turkey is acting in good faith to achieve a just and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem...

(2) a just settlement on Cyprus must include the withdrawal of Turkish military forces from Cyprus; ...

(4) The United States will furnish security assistance for Greece and Turkey only when furnishing that assistance is intended solely for defensive purposes, including when necessary to enable the recipient country to fulfill its responsibilities as a member of the North Atlantic Organization...” (United States Government Publishing Office (GPO) 2019c).

Turkey agreed to the reopening of the US bases in view of the fact that the latter had lifted embargo on arms sales just two months after the signing of the Political Document. This was a serious blow to the Soviet goals in Turkey. It also demonstrated the problematic of the relationship. Turkey assured the USSR that Turkey’s membership in NATO would never be used in a way to create insecurity for its

⁴⁵ For the full text of the *Joint Soviet-Turkish Communique on Closer Economic Cooperation*, dated 26 June 1978, see, Dmytryshyn and Cox (1987, 671-678).

neighbor. The opening of the US bases restarted surveillance and monitoring of Soviet testing and troop movements and it also meant the rebuilding of the US air and naval facilities. Thus, the US defeated the Soviet effort to disengage Turkey from NATO (Golan 1990, 254). The USSR stated that the abolition of arms embargo to Turkey was a threat to peace by creating imbalances in the Aegean and the Mediterranean (Armaoğlu 1988, 831-832). Despite all these, the Turkish-Soviet economic cooperation reached to its peak with the agreement signed on 5 June 1979. The agreement was envisaging the establishment of a nuclear power plant in Turkey and economic assistance/credit amounted to \$8 billion (Tellal 2015d, 783).

On 18 June 1979, Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna. SALT II limited each side to have 2250 delivery vehicles of which no more than 1320 could be MIRVed vehicles (Keylor 2001, 385).

3. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Impact of Repaired Turkish-American Ties on Turkish-Soviet Relations (1979-1986)

With the Carter administration (1977-1981), the role of human rights and Islam gained importance in the formulation of American foreign policy (Uzgel 2015c, 34-37). In December 1979, the USSR dispatched troops to Afghanistan⁴⁶ to quell an Islamic resurrection covertly supported by the US, China and Pakistan against the pro-Soviet government in Kabul (Keylor 2001, 389). This invasion proclaimed the death of Détente (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 89). Carter reacted to the Soviet action harshly, and *“increased the 1981 defense budget by 5 per cent in real terms, imposed an embargo on grain deliveries to the Soviet Union in excess of the minimum quantities specified in the 1975 agreement, restricted Soviet access to American fishing waters and high technology exports, and organized a boycott of the Olympic Games held in*

⁴⁶ Afghanistan, like Iran, was the source of rivalry between the tsarist Russia and Great Britain before the WWI and was formally recognized as a neutral buffer between Russia and British India in 1907. Afghanistan maintained its neutral status between the Soviet Union and the Western ally Pakistan during the Cold War. While Iran was brought into the American-dominated security system after 1946, Afghanistan approached to the Soviets during the 1950s, renewed non-aggression pact and received substantial Soviet economic aid (Keylor 2001, 389).

Moscow in July 1980” (Keylor 2001, 390). Carter withdrew the SALT II⁴⁷ treaty due to the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR (Sönmezoğlu 2016, 230-231). On 12 December 1979, NATO decided to deploy a new generation of intermediate-range Pershing II missiles in Western Europe to offset the Soviet SS-20s which were MIRVed and mobile replacing the obsolete SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate-range missiles (Keylor 2001, 386). Fearing of a Soviet attempt to profit from the American expulsion from Iran for a future offensive toward the oil resources of the Persian Gulf and warm waters of the Indian Ocean, President Carter announced on 23 January 1980 at his *State of Union Message* that the US considered the Gulf vital to its national interest (Keylor 2001, 390):

“... the Soviet Union has taken a radical and an aggressive new step. ... The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world’s exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world’s oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force” (Jimmy Carter Library 2020).

During the first half of the 1980s, the previous tension in Turkish-American relations abated markedly and old suspicion and hostility returned to Turkish-Soviet relations due to the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the invasion of Afghanistan (Hale 2013, 118). For Turkey, uncertainties in relations with the US created a determination to manufacture her own weapons. Despite the resistance of the US for extensive technology transfer, Turkey’s demands regarding the establishment of a defense industry became codified in the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1980 (Harris 2004, 73). *The Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy (DECA)*⁴⁸ was signed on 29 March 1980 which may have allayed the Turkish doubts

⁴⁷ The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) to begin in Geneva on 29 June 1982 signifies a break with the SALT II Treaty (Keylor 2001, 387).

⁴⁸ For the full Turkish text of the *Agreement for Cooperation on Defence and Economy between the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Turkey in Accordance with Articles II and III of the North Atlantic Treaty (DECA)*, and Additional Protocols, dated 29 March 1980, see, Armaoğlu (1991, 300-363).

about the US commitment and a new US economic aid package renewed Turkey's allegiance to the West (Golan 1990, 255-256). Turkey returned to a distinctly more pro-western orientation (Hale 1997, 267). This was a further setback for Soviet policy and led to sharp attacks on Turkey in the Soviet press. A Soviet military build-up in the Caucasus in the early 1980s increased suspicions in Turkey. The Soviet aid to Turkey dried up at the same time⁴⁹ (Hale 2013, 120-121). In this period, the USSR was also disturbed from the American policies to increase nuclear capacity in Turkey (Sönmezoğlu 2016, 522) and for allowing the American *Rapid Deployment Force* (Golan 1990, 256).

In November 1981, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks between the US and the USSR started in Geneva (Keylor 2001, 386). Reagan defined the USSR as an *evil* in his address to the British Parliament on 8 June 1982:

“... [W]e see totalitarian forces in the world who seek subversion and conflict around the globe to further their barbarous assault on the human spirit. What, then, is our course? Must civilization perish in a hail of fiery atoms? Must freedom wither in a quiet, deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil? ... The British people know that, given strong leadership, time and a little bit of hope, the forces of good ultimately rally and triumph over evil” (Reagan Library 2020).

The F-16 project beginning in 1983 constituted the biggest and most important pillar of the Turkish defense industry. The purpose of the project was to equip Turkish Air Forces with new F-16 fighter jets and found aeronautics industry in Turkey (Uzgel 2015c, 79). The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was proclaimed on 15 November 1983. The SU condemned what it called illegal creation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Golan 1990, 256).

During the 1980s, the USSR sought to maintain if not improve its relations with Turkey despite the Turkish-US rapprochement and the Cold War atmosphere (Golan 1990, 256). Golan (1990, 257) argues that the mainstay of Soviet policy was economic assistance while striving to prove to Turkey that a stable relationship with the USSR would provide greater security for Turkey than the military aid or presence of the US. The Soviets chose a cautious even cooperative rather than confrontational

⁴⁹ According to CIA estimates, Turkey received a total of around \$3.4 bn Soviet aid between the 1960s and the 1980s more than any non-communist state, except for India and Afghanistan (Hale 1997, 266).

approach to Turkey. The success of this approach was dependent more on fluctuations in Turkish-US relations (Golan 1990, 257).

An Intergovernmental Natural Gas Agreement signed on 18 September 1984 was a turning point in Turkish-Soviet bilateral relations (Golan 1990, 256-257). Turkey's gas import from the opponent bloc as early as 1984 was an important political development. The implementation of a similar project by the Federal Germany was also influential in the emergence of this project. This project paved the way of the Turkish construction services for the first time. This project also helped the diversification of Turkish export goods and encouraged the third parties to invest in Turkey (Tellal 2015e, 163-164). A *Long-Term Program for the Development of Economic, Commercial and Scientific-Technical Cooperation Between the USSR and the Turkish Republic*⁵⁰ was signed on 26 December 1984. The natural gas agreement began to be implemented with the *25-year Natural Gas Purchase-Sale Agreement* which was signed between BOTAS and Soyuz Gaz Export on 14 February 1986 in Ankara. Turkey's natural gas imports started in the second half of 1987 (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 2020). 70% of the Soviet gas revenue would be used for the payment of goods to be bought from Turkey and half of the 70% would be construction ventures of the Turkish companies in the USSR. Remaining 30% would be used for the payment of trade credits (Tellal 2015e, 163-164).

The Afghan and Polish situation provided the Reagan administration sufficient political material to embark on an unprecedented arms build-up⁵¹ against the USSR. Therefore, the Soviet gains obtained from détente now seemed in jeopardy⁵². The period between 1982 and 1985, under the leadership of Andropov and Chernenko, was the lowest point in the relations since the 1960s (Wozniuk 1990, 227-229).

⁵⁰ For the full text of the *A Long-Term Program for the Development of Economic, Commercial and Scientific-Technical Cooperation Between the USSR and the Turkish Republic*, dated 26 December 1984, see, Dmytryshyn & Cox (1987, 682-689).

⁵¹ For the categories of American military build-up during the Reagan administration and an account of the US-SU disarmament talks, see, Keylor (2001, 452-453).

⁵² The Soviet economy slowed down beginning from the late 1970s and continued through the end of the 1980s. This had eroded the living standards of the people. The costly and bloody intervention to Afghanistan had not produce any clear victory by November 1982. The Polish affairs of 1980 and 1981 had paved the way for the rollback of gains (Wozniuk 1990, 227-229).

Reagan, at his State of Union Message (Reagan Doctrine) on 6 February 1985 announced the US pledge for support of anti-Communist insurgents in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 89-90). The US started to use green as an antidote of the red danger. The US sought to infiltrate Turkic republics of the USSR and press leftist movements in the countries like Turkey through Islam. The rise of Islam would provide legality to the conservative regimes in Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich conservative regimes of which stability carried importance for the US. However, the US was seeing radical Islam and especially Iran as a big threat to itself. The policy of the US was to support moderate Islam, to use it against the USSR and to transform and moderate or isolate radical Islam (Uzgel 2015c, 37).

4. The Process of the Dissolution of the USSR (1986-1991)

On 11 March 1985, following Andropov's death, a representative of the young generation of Soviet leaders Mikhail S. Gorbachev was appointed as General Secretary of the CPSU (Wozniuk 1990, 252-253). Deterioration of the Soviet economic system which imperiled its capability to exercise power and influence in the world and ever-increasing technological advantage of the US *vis-à-vis* the SU which ensured that the US would prevail in the bilateral arms race were the realities that Gorbachev inherited. Therefore, Gorbachev started a series of reform projects "*including decentralization of decision making and self-management in industry, the encouragement of private initiative, and the introduction of a modified market economy in order to boost productivity*" (Keylor 2001, 451). He openly declared that a new *détente* was the *sine qua non* for such reforms. A relaxation in the relations with the West would cut excessive defense spending and bring the economy to life. The keys to second revolution were *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) as Gorbachev told. A "*frontal assault on the heavily bureaucratized system of social management that Stalin had created...*" started (Wozniuk 1990, 252-253).

Gorbachev added the principle of *mutual dependency and international cooperation* to the *coexistence* of Khrushchev and rejected the *two-camp* theory of Stalin (Tellal 2015e, 160). The Soviet rulers sought to introduce this as a long run respite (Передышка). The new thinking (новое мышление) started as of 1986 was the international dimension of *perestroika* and *glasnost*: Withdrawal from Afghanistan

and Africa, to bring the disarmament to the foreground, removing ideology from the international relations and the ending of two-economy/two-world market (Tellal 2015e, 160-161). Gorbachev desperately sought to negotiate an end to a military competition seeing his country's meager technological assets and economic difficulties. Thus, the stalled arms control negotiations were resumed in 1985 (Keylor 2001, 452). On 8 April 1985, the USSR declared moratorium regarding the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe until November 1985 (Kurban 2017, 198).

Moscow “explicitly condemned the founding of the ‘TRNC’, describing it as ‘the direct result of imperialist interference in Cyprus domestic affairs’. In January 1986 Gorbachev reiterated the old Soviet proposal for an international conference and demilitarization of the island” and released the document internationally (Stergiou 2007, 100). The Soviet proposal⁵³ for the resolution of the Cyprus issue presented to the UNGS on 21 January 1986 was in line with the general Soviet policy of defending the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, united and non-alignment status of the Cyprus Republic. The resolution of the dispute should have to provide demilitarization of the island, including the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the elimination of all foreign military bases and sites. The international guarantees should have to rule out any future outside interference.

The *Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles* (The Washington Treaty)⁵⁴ (INF Treaty) was signed on 8 December 1987 (Wozniuk 1990, 253).

Bulgaria followed an oppression policy towards Turks in the country. Turkish prime minister Özal visited Moscow between 28 July-3 August 1986 who became the first prime minister that could not see the Soviet leader during an official visit since Gorbachev was on a five-day trip (Kurban 2017, 199). Protocol between the Republic

⁵³ The Soviet proposal dated 21 January 1986 has been recorded in the UN system with the number: A/41/96, S 17752.

⁵⁴ For the full text of the *Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles*, dated 8 December 1987, see, U.S. Department of State (2019c).

of Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Flight Information Region (FIR) was signed on 24 March 1988 (Tellal 2015e, 164).

During the 1980s economic relations between Turkey and the USSR grew dramatically. Bilateral trade nearly quadrupled between 1987 and 1990, from \$476 m. to \$1.8 bn. The supply of natural gas from Russia to Turkey through Romania and Bulgaria with a pipeline was most influential in this increase (Hale 1997, 269). During the second half of the 1980s, for the first time since 1930s, Turkey was able to develop better relationship with both the Soviet Union and the western powers simultaneously (Hale 2013, 122).

In 1988, occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region by Armenians gave rise to military and political issues between the two Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The creation of national fronts in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia for the purpose of organizing demonstrations in favor of perestroika were transformed into independence movements. Similar demonstrations took place in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (Kurban 2017, 208). In November 1988, Estonia declared itself a sovereign state within the Soviet Union with its own flag, own passports, and right to veto legislation passed by the Soviet parliament. In February 1989, last Soviet soldier retreated from Afghanistan regardless of the fate of its Soviet-installed puppet regime (Keylor 2001, 457-458).

The US announced that it would withdraw troops from the western Europe and demanded to precipitate reduction in the conventional arms during the NATO Summit meeting in Brussels held between 29-30 May 1989 (Uzgel 2015e, 305). At the NATO Defense Planning Meeting held at the end of 1989 the term *risk* replaced the term *threat* for eastern Europe (Uzgel 2015e, 305). Gorbachev stated at the end of his talks with President Bush held between 2-3 December 1989 in Malta that the Cold War ended and a period of lasting peace started (Sönmezoğlu 2016, 427).

Border and coastal trade agreement between Turkey and the USSR was signed on 6 July 1989. In 1989, Turkey became a source of credit to USSR rather than the other way round. The Turkish Export-Import Bank extended two \$150 m. credits for

the purchase of consumer goods to be followed by another credit of \$350 m. in 1990 (Hale 1997, 269).

On 19-20 January 1990, the Soviet army entered Baku and killed 147 people. The Soviet policy of breaking up the nationalist movements further accelerated national movements for independence (Kurban 2017, 208). Turkey's policies regarding the recent developments in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan-Nakhchivan events were determined as the following:

- If Armenia attacks Nakhichevan, Turkey will wait for the USSR to act first and will use her treaty rights.
- If life hazard occurs in Nakhichevan, the Turkish border would be opened for asylum seekers.
- If the Soviet army intervenes in Nakhichevan, Ankara will not intervene (Kurban 2017, 209).

Lithuanian declared its independence on 11 March 1990 (Çulha 2016, 287). On 12 June 1990, the first Congress of the People's Deputies of the RSFSR adopted the *Declaration of State Sovereignty*. The Russian government decided to work on a new agreement which would provide soviet republics with extensive rights (Kurban 2017, 210). With the *Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance (The London Declaration)* issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in London held between 5-6 July 1990, it was declared that NATO and the Warsaw Pact were no more adversaries:

"The member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the CSCE Final Act. ...

NATO will prepare a new Allied military strategy moving away from "forward defense" where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying "flexible response" to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In that connection NATO will elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe" (NATO 2019d).

On 23 August 1990, the *Declaration of State Sovereignty of Armenia*⁵⁵ was signed by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, president of Armenia, and Ara Sahakian, Secretary of the Supreme Council of Armenia, in Yerevan. Article 11 of the Declaration stated that “the Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia”⁵⁶ (Oran 2017a, 163).

The Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)⁵⁷ was signed on 19 November 1990 between the *group of States Parties* that signed the *Treaty of Warsaw*⁵⁸ of 1955 or the group of States Parties that signed or acceded to the *Treaty of Brussels* of 1948 or the *Treaty of Washington* of 1949 (OSCE 2019d), as result of the negotiations which had started in March 1989 “under the aegis of the thirty-five state Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)” (Keylor 2001, 453-454).

The *CFE Treaty* was signed at the CSCE conference where also the *Paris Charter* was signed. The CFE was the most technical and comprehensive disarmament treaty signed until then. The arms reduction covered the area extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains in five category of weapons. In every bloc, there would be reciprocally 20.000 battle tanks, 20.000 pieces of artillery, 30.000 armored combat vehicles, 6800 combat aircraft, and 2000 attack helicopters. Sub-regional and national ceilings were determined to prevent accumulation of weapons in a certain area. The countries exceeding the national ceiling would destroy or transfer the weapons to the countries not exceeding the ceiling. A control mechanism was established. Turkey took the advantage of cascading by taking the over-ceiling arms

⁵⁵ For the full text of the *Declaration of State Sovereignty of Armenia*, dated 23 August 1990, see, The Government of the Republic of Armenia (2019).

⁵⁶ The meaning of the *Western Armenia* in the Armenian political terminology is the historical Armenian territories taken by the Ottoman Empire in accordance with the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin (Treaty of Zuhab) signed with the Safavid Iran in 1639. Roughly, the area corresponds to today’s eastern Anatolia. Whereas the *Ottoman Turkey* means the Ottoman territories which remained out of the western Armenia and especially where a great number of Armenians lived such as Cilicia and western Anatolia etc., which became the theatre of *tehcir* (deportation). It must be distinguished from the *Declaration of the Independence of Armenia* dated 23 September 1991 which made a general reference to the previous (Oran 2017a, 163).

⁵⁷ For the full text of the *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, dated 19 November 1990, see, OSCE (2019d).

⁵⁸ Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, Romania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

of her allies as a grant (Oran 2015d, 207). Turkey did not undertake any obligation regarding her territory in the southeast due to the existence of her forces in this region to meet any threat originated from unstable Middle East (Ayman and Ateşoğlu Güney 1994, 153). The areas of Turkey and the USSR covered by the Treaty were as follows:

“In the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the area of application includes all territory lying west of the Ural River and the Caspian Sea. In the case of the Republic of Turkey, the area of application includes the territory of the Republic of Turkey north and west of a line extending from the point of intersection of the Turkish border with the 39th parallel to Muradiye, Patnos, Karayazı, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, Doğan kent, Gözne and thence to the sea” (OSCE 2019d).

Article V of the Treaty regarding the regional limitations within the CFE stipulated the following:

“to ensure that the security of each State Party is not affected adversely at any stage [within the wing areas] consisting of the ... Republic of Bulgaria, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway, Romania, the part of the Republic of Turkey within the area of application and that part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics comprising the Leningrad, Odessa, Transcaucasus and North Caucasus Military Districts, ... 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty ... the group of States Parties ... do not exceed 4,700 battle tanks, 5,900 armored combat vehicles, and 6,000 pieces of artillery” (OSCE 2019d).

The *Final Act* accepted at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki in 1975 had referred mainly to the security (first basket) issues. The *Paris Charter* which was accepted at the CSCE Summit on 21 November 1990 completely referred to the human rights issues (third basket). According to the Paris Charter, the states were required to create necessary conditions for the strengthening of the identity of the national minorities. This meant that human rights would become the superstructure of the West following its infrastructure (international capitalism). With the adoption of the CFE, the political victory of the globalization was also proclaimed in the military field. The USSR consented to the extent that any superpower could not make, and became obliged to compromise her great military superiority in the conventional weapons to the political architecture of the world (Uzgel 2015e, 206-207).

The first Gulf War took place following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 (Hale 2013, 159). Following the occupation, Özal visited Washington in September 1990. Turkey demanded the abolition of limitations put on the textile

import, support for military modernization and the alleviation of foreign debts. Bush responded to these demands with an assistance in the amount of \$82 million emergency aid in January 1991. Besides, the US added \$282 million to the aid for the year 1991 (Uzgel 2015e, 257-258). After separatist developments in Latvia (11-13 January 1991), Gorbachev intervened in the Baltic states by force with the Soviet military thinking that political disintegration of the Soviet system had gone far enough (Keylor 2001, 458).

During the Gulf War, Turkey departed from her traditional policy of non-involvement in regional conflicts and participated in the US-led Allied Coalition that repelled the invading Iraqi forces from Kuwait (Sayarı 2003, 31). On 17 January 1991, at the last minute, the TGNA permitted for the coalition air forces to use İncirlik and other bases for attacks on Iraq (Hale 2013, 160). Turkey's participation in the Gulf War largely stemmed from a desire to reassert its role and importance in the Post-Cold War era (Sayarı 2000, 171). This marked an important turning point in which Turkey abandoned its non-interventionist policies in the Middle East acting as a regional power for the first time since the demise of the Baghdad Pact (Hale 2013, 162). The US became the final and determiner power in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The US, which have never been powerful in the region since the end of 1940s when she entered the region politically, benefitted from the cooperation established with Turkey to a great extent (Uzgel 2015e, 254).

The US rejected Turkey's *strategic cooperation* proposal stated by President Özal during his visit to Washington between 22-23 March 1991 in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Turkey's demand for an assistance in the amount of \$1 billion to compensate her damage emanated from the Gulf War was also rejected (Uzgel 2015e, 252-253). Turkey exposed to great loses both economically and politically during the Gulf War. A *Turkish Defense Fund* in the amount of \$4,2 billion was formed with the contributions of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, the US and Kuwait. Egypt bought Turkish F-16s. However, a part of this fund returned later to the US as it was used in the finance of the second round F-16 jets. Despite all these, Turkey's loss would reach to the amount of \$100 billion in the following ten years due to the embargo applied to Iraq (Uzgel 2015e, 257-258).

The overall impact of the Gulf War was to heighten Turkish-American discord. Turkey felt that it had not been sufficiently compensated for the economic losses it had incurred as a result of its support for the US. Turkey viewed the “*U.S. support for the Kurdish entity in northern Iraq as part of a conscious plan to support the emergence of an independent Kurdish state on Turkey’s southern border*” and regarded this “*as an existential threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish state*” (Larrabee 2010, 8-9).

Turkey’s proposal to create safe heavens in the north of Iraq for the Kurds who sought shelter in Turkey following the brutal suppression of Iraqi forces was accepted by the US and the UK. Under a UNSC resolution, all the refugees turned to Iraq as part of what was called “*Operation Provide Comfort*” in March 1991. This left western policy dependent on Turkish cooperation and consent since permission to use Incirlik base for non-NATO operations required the permission of TGNA at six month intervals (Hale 2013, 161). The *Operation Provide Comfort*⁵⁹ created some anxieties in Turkey rested on the fear that establishment of an independent Kurdish state would have serious implications for the future of Turkey (Hale 2013, 162).

The visit of president Özal to the USSR between 11-16 March 1991 was the second at this level after the visit of President Cevdet Sunay in 1969 (Karpas 1975b, 98). On 12 March 1991, *Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation between Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* was signed in Moscow (Hale 2013, 207). The agreement was approving the principles of the Paris Charter at the bilateral level. The agreement was also bringing the following undertakings for the parties:

- Respect for the territorial integrity and political independence.
- Consultation over the regional issues.
- Dialogue over the military issues.
- Cooperation on economic, cultural, and other topics.
- Joint action against terrorism (Tellal 2015f, 540).

⁵⁹ Turkey managed to extract some cosmetic changes and the name of the operation was changed to “*Northern Watch*” as from the beginning of 1997 (Hale 2013, 163).

In accordance with Art.16, the parties agreed that the development of relations between Turkey and the USSR Union republics would contribute content and scope to the bilateral relations. Bilateral relations among Turkey and Ukraine, Kazakh and Azerbaijan SSRs was also started with the signing of various agreements in the aftermath of the Moscow visit (Tellal 2015f, 540-541). On 12 March, two other agreements between Turkey and the USSR were also signed⁶⁰.

One of the American attempts during and in the aftermath of the Gulf War was to establish a Kurdish state in the Middle East to increase its control over the regional countries and to relieve Israel. The latest American attempts⁶¹ of 1991 had some peculiarities differed from the previous ones. This new attempt was long-term, insistent, and comprehensive attempt while the previous ones were tests and enquiry in certain crisis periods. This time, the US itself paved the way for this development in northern Iraq with the *Operation Provide Comfort*. This time, the American attempt found support at the president level (Özal) from the interior of Turkey. The biggest and most influential barrier in front of the realization of these scenarios was the Turkish Armed Forces (Uzgel 2015a, 259).

The *Operation Provide Comfort* started with the establishment of a *safe zone* in the thereabouts of Zaho in April 1991 to protect the Iraqi Kurds with the participation of the US, British and French forces. Turkey allowed the deployment of these forces in Turkey on 12 July 1991. Thus, Turkey accepted the use of NATO bases in İncirlik and Batman for *out of area* operations. Besides, the UN Resolution number 688 dated on 5 April 1991 was only calling the member states for a humanitarian aid to Iraqi Kurds (Uzgel 2015e, 261).

The referendum held for the preservation of the USSR on 15 March 1991 was boycotted by six Soviet republics (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova). At Russia's first presidential election held on 12 June 1991, Boris Yeltsin

⁶⁰ *Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Commercial, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, and, Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Avoidance of Double Taxation.*

⁶¹ The USS brought forth, firstly after the 27 May 1960 coup d'état and secondly in 1965, the proposal of the establishment of a Kurdish federated state which would include the Kurds of Iran, Iraq and Turkey, under a federal Turkey. A similar scenario was repeated at the end of 1986 but failed due to the objections of Turkish General Staff (Uzgel 2015a, 259).

was elected the first president. A new union treaty was drafted in July 1991 by Gorbachev and the leaders of nine republics which projected to transform the USSR into a confederation of sovereign states. The treaty was scheduled to be signed on 20 August 1991 (Kurban 2017, 210). Meanwhile, Comecon was abolished on 28 June 1991 and the Warsaw Pact dissolved on 1 July 1991 (Keylor 2001, 456).

On 19 August 1991, the defenders of the old order, with a conspiracy involving the KGB, the army, and hard-liners within Gorbachev's own entourage, detained Gorbachev in Crimea and formed an interim government under his conservative vice president, Gennady Yanaev (Keylor 2001, 459). Eight hardline leaders from the Soviet government established a State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP) and declared that Gorbachev was discharged from the office. The Russian government regarded the actions of GKChP as a coup attempt and declared them illegal. President Bush demanded the return of Gorbachev to office. The western countries decided to apply embargo on the USSR and Turkey announced that she would join. On 21 August Gorbachev was saved from isolation and returned to Moscow. On the same day the members of GKChP were arrested (Kurban 2017, 211-212).

The coup attempt of 19 August 1991 became the turning point in Turkey's relations with the Caucasian and Central Asian Republics (CCAR). The failed coup attempt persuaded even the hesitant leaders of the Central Asian countries that the end of the USSR was soon (Aydın 2015b, 374). On 30 August 1991, Azerbaijan declared its independence⁶² (Hale 2013, 212). Following Azerbaijan's announcing her independence, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan declared their independence on 31 August 1991. On 31 August Turkey announced that she cared not to damage her relations with Moscow while developing her relations with the CCAR. Turkey's caution emanated from her giving priority in her relations with Moscow because the Ankara-Moscow relations were more important than Ankara-CCAR relations (Aydın 2015b, 375). On

⁶² "The Karabakh conflict started on 20 February 1988 ... with the local authorities in Karabakh voting for the unification (miyatsum) of the region with neighboring Soviet Armenia. ... The conflict developed from political conflict to ethnic violence, and finally into low-intensity war" between 1988 and 1991 (Cheterian 2012, 704). Karabakh proclaimed itself a separate republic on 2 September 1991. Armenia proclaimed her independence on 21 September. On 26 November 1991, the Azeri parliament withdrew the autonomous status of Nagorno- Karabakh which was granted under the Soviet constitution (Hale 2013, 212).

3 September 1991, Turkey announced that she welcomed three Baltic republics' regaining their independence and would establish diplomatic relations once again. The detail was that Turkey had established diplomatic relations with the three republics during the 1930s and had not recognize their annexation by the USSR in 1940. Thus, Turkey did not need to recognize the independence of these three states (Aydın 2015b, 376).

Gorbachev's attempt to seize the government encountered resistance from the leaders of the Soviet republics. Yeltsin saw himself as the ruler in Moscow. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR declared its dissolution on 5 September 1991 and transferred all its duties and responsibilities to the State Council of the USSR (Kurban 2017, 212-213). In September, Turkey sent two delegations to these republics. The first one went to Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics and the second went to Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia (Aydın 2015b, 376).

The process of NATO transformation which had started with the London NAC Meeting was substantiated in the meeting of NAC in Rome on 8 November 1991 (Kavuncu 2013, 308). The *Declaration on Peace and Cooperation (The Rome Declaration)* called for a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) meeting among others:

"... The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other. ...

Our new strategic concept reaffirms NATO's core functions and allows us, within the radically changed situation in Europe, to realize in full our broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects, along with the indispensable defense dimension. ...

The development of a European security identity and defense role, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. ...

The Alliance's new Strategic Concept, being an agreed conceptual basis for the forces of all Allies, should facilitate the necessary complementarity between the Alliance and the emerging defense component of the European integration process. ...

We have consistently encouraged the development of democracy in the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We therefore applaud the commitment of these countries to political and economic reform following the rejection of totalitarian communist rule by their peoples. We salute the newly recovered independence of the Baltic States. We

will support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and will give practical assistance to help them succeed in this difficult transition. ...

Therefore, as the next step, we intend to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues. ... In particular, we propose ... annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level in what might be called a North Atlantic Cooperation Council” (NATO 2019e).

Turkey recognized Azerbaijan on 9 November 1991, may be, not to remain at Iran’s back (Aydın 2015b, 378). On 8 December, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus announced that the *Treaty of Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* dated 30 December 1922 had been terminated and the USSR was dissolved (Kurban 2017, 212-213). The four agreements so called *Belovezhskii Agreements* marked the transition from the USSR to the *Commonwealth of Independent States* (CIS). The *Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States*^{63, 64} was signed among Belarus, Ukraine, and Russian Federation, in Minsk on 8 December 1991.

Turkey’s cautious and Moscow-centered foreign policy was also seen in her rejection of recognizing the independence of Turkmenistan during the visit of president Niyazov to Ankara on 2 December (Aydın 2015b, 378). On 16 December, Turkey recognized all the newly independent countries including Armenia and became the first country which recognized all the CCAR countries (Aydın 2015b, 379). On the same day at early hours, Turkey had not organized a presidential ceremony for the visiting Uzbek president Kerimov. During the welcome ceremony, besides Turkish and Uzbek flags, the Soviet flag had also been raised and the Soviet ambassador Chernyshov had also accompanied Kerimov. However, the situation changed in the afternoon. With the recognition of the independence of Uzbekistan, the Soviet flag, the Soviet national anthem and also the Soviet ambassador himself were bypassed. On

⁶³ For the full text of the *Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States*, dated 8 December 1991, see, Melville and Shackleina (2005, 3-6).

⁶⁴ *Protocol to the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, signed on December 8, 1991 in the city of Minsk, by the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation (RSFSR) and Ukraine* was signed in Alma-Ata, on 21 December 1991. With this Protocol, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan joined the Commonwealth of Independent States. Three former Soviet republics, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia did not join the CIS. Georgia joined the CIS in December 1993. For the full text of the *Protocol to the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, signed on December 8, 1991 in the city of Minsk, by the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation (RSFSR) and Ukraine*, dated 21 December 1991, see, Melville and Shackleina (2005, 7).

18 December, Turkey decided first to establish consulates in the CCAR except Armenia and then turn them into embassies. Until the implementation of the decision, Turkey's relations with the CCAR would be maintained under the coordination of Turkey's Moscow Embassy (Aydın 2015b, 379).

The leaders of the Central Asian states were influenced from the sentiment of Turkishness forgotten for a long time and reflected this to Turkey at least at the beginning. By the end of 1991, Turkey started to develop active relation with the post-Soviet states leaving aside Moscow-centered policies. According to PM Demirel, Turkey, located exactly at the center of the newly forming political and economic structure with her distinct cultural, geographical, and historical characteristics, could not avoid from implementing the requirements of her newly increased regional and international responsibilities. The western states supported pro-western Muslim but laic Turkey fearing from Iran-supported political Islam's filling the vacuum emerged with the dissolution of the USSR in the region. Turkey was a sample proving that Islam, democracy, human rights, and market economy could live concomitantly. A similar tolerance also existed in the Russian attitude (Aydın 2006, 8-10).

Certain western circles and especially Russia feared that Turkey's north-eastern policy had pan-Turkist purposes. Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan assessed the chance of success of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism in the region as the following:

"Pan-Turkism may become political trend only against the Soviet administration and 70 years of neglect in this region of the world. I am against to place people in strict frames by adopting objectives like pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. They do not have any chance of success. What we witness today is a Turkic rapprochement because it is easier to share common values among Turkic speaking peoples. But this cannot reach to a dangerous chauvinism (Sander 1994, 422; my translation).

On 20 December 1991, NATO established *North Atlantic Cooperation Council* (NACC) and called the central and eastern former socialist countries for dialogue, partnership and cooperation to prevent the reentry of these countries under Russian influence and to integrate them in the western system (Uzgel 2015b, 309). NATO rebuffed the Czech, Hungarian and Polish bids for prompt admission not to offend Russia (Keylor 2001, 473).

On 25 December 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned the presidency of a vanished political entity (Keylor 2001, 460). On 31 December 1991, the USSR ceased its presence and Russia appeared as the most effective and largest successor of the USSR (Kurban 2017, 215). With the implosion of the USSR, fifteen Newly Independent States (NIS) emerged (Berryman 2010, 229). In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the number of political, economic, military actors multiplied, geopolitical realignments occurred, and Russia's influence around the Black Sea diminished (Aydın 2007, 104).

Conclusion

The hegemonic unipolarity of the BSS underwent a variation due to Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. Turkey's NATO accession should be considered as a relational variable which shaped the pattern of relations between Turkey and the USSR. This accession signified the final rupture between Ankara and Moscow. A certain patron-client type of relation between Turkey and the alliance leader US and occasional fluctuations in this relationship shaped the framework of the great power balancing in the BSS and by extension the dynamics of relations between Turkey and the USSR. Increasing military activities of the US in Turkey targeting the USSR adumbrated the occurrence of centrally produced and managed conflicts between Turkey and the USSR.

The first hypothesis is supported by the evidence. Due to this *alliance-based threat complex* under the hegemonic unipolarity, the Turkish-Soviet sibtex fully dominated the dynamics of the Turkish-Soviet conflicts until 1991. Most of the conflicts occurred in the Turkish-Soviet relations in this period were having system related dynamics and were product of centrally produced and managed conflicts.

The Turkish-Soviet conflicts of this period, such as, the Jupiter missiles, U-2 and balloon flights, the Syria crisis of 1957 fully supports the second hypothesis that the dynamics of the Turkish-Russian conflicts are mostly the extension of the great power balancing in the subsystem. The best example demonstrating Turkey's overt hostile attitude against the USSR was the Syria crisis of 1957 triggered by the US influence on Turkey through utilizing the domestic economic concerns of Turkey.

This evidence supports also the third hypothesis. Turkey's alliance ties led it to adopt more assertive foreign policy aiming to undermine Soviet influence. Turkey's attitude towards Syria crisis in 1957 and its reactions against the coup d'état in Iraq were examples of this attitude. The conflict emanated from the US-backed Turkish assertive foreign policy against the USSR was also centrally managed. It is generally accepted that Turkey's hostile foreign policy in Syria in 1957 was emanated from Turkey's seeking to obtain American economic assistance by exaggerating the Soviet threat.

A crack in Turkey's alliance ties may have reconciliatory effect on Turkish-Soviet relations. Turkey's disillusionment due to the Jupiter missile crisis and the Cyprus conflict with her alliance partners exerted transformer influence on Turkish-Soviet relations. This emerged in the form of rapprochement in Turkish-Soviet relations and Turkey's facilitating the transit of the Soviet navy through the Straits during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is also supported by the evidence.

PART FOUR
THE NON-HEGEMONIC UNIPOLAR 2.0 BSS
(1992-2015)



CHAPTER SEVEN
DISSOLUTION OF THE USSR
AND THE CHANGING PATTERN OF THE GREAT POWER
IMPACT ON THE DYNAMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF THE
TURKISH-RUSSIAN CONFLICTS
(1992-2015)

Introduction

This chapter covers the period between the dissolution of the USSR on 31 December 1991 and the shooting down of a Russian SU-24 jet by Turkey in Syria on 24 November 2015. The dissolution of the USSR changed the membership composition of the BSS and paved the way for the transition to non-hegemonic unipolarity with the emergence of independent national entities in the BSS and in the contiguous subsystems. The proliferation of the actors proliferated the dynamics of the conflicts and facilitated the involvement of the TPGPs into various BSS affairs. The simplicity of the pattern of interactions of the hegemonic unipolarity was replaced with the complex web of relations due to redistribution of the geographical assets among the new actors in addition to the local ethnic and religious conflicts.

The stages of this chapter were dated according to certain events which do not determine the course of developments but more or less help to give meanings to the forthcoming developments with the combination of other factors. The first stage refers to period beginning with the dissolution of the USSR, covering the announcement of the Near Abroad Doctrine on 23 April 1993, and ending with the Military Doctrine on 2 November 1993. This period signifies Turkey assertive policy in the CCAR backed by the US and RF's seeking to integrate into the international organizations, such as, IMF and World Bank.

The second stage covers the events until the signature of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on 27 May 1997. In this stage, the western intrusion into the former Soviet geography occurred in the form of the PfP program. The Caucasus issues, BTC

and Baku-Novorossiysk projects, Turkey's maritime traffic regulations through the Straits and the terrorist activities in Turkey and Chechnya were the main issues.

The third stage covers the events between the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO Washington Summit held between 24-25 April 1999. Main developments of the third stage were the invitation and accession of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the NATO, EU's closing the doors to Turkey in the Luxembourg Summit, the ESDI and *out of area* decision at the Washington Summit of NATO. In this period, disillusioned from their individual relations with the West, Turkey and Russia were pushed to a more balanced relationship.

The fourth stage covers the events between the NATO Washington Summit and NATO at 20 Formula on 28 May 2002 at the Rome Summit. This period reflects Russia's concerns from unilateral Western moves and Turkey's feelings threatened from the US in the same vein. Thus, Turkish-Russian rapprochement emerged in this stage in the form of BLACKSEAFOR and Joint Action Plan in Eurasia.

The fifth Stage covers the events between the NATO Rome Summit and the expansion of EU by incorporating Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007. In this stage, the western activities emerged in the form of Iraqi war and the second round NATO enlargement were responded with the Operation Black Sea Harmony and the Turkish-Russian Joint Declaration on the Deepening of Friendship.

In the aftermath of the EU expansion in 2007, the Russian endeavor is observed to stop the western intrusion into the former Soviet geography, to prevent American unilateralism and to re-claim her great power status. The US formulated various tactics not only to halt Turkish-Russian rapprochement emanated from the perceived common threat from American unilateralism but also sow the seeds of hostility between them during this period.

The disclosure of the Russian discomfort about the US unilateralism was observed at the Munich Conference in February 2007. The 2008 began with the independence of Kosovo and the invitation of Ukraine and Georgia by NATO. The new European security architecture proposal of the RF did not receive positive response. The Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 formed the first military reaction

of the RF against the Western intrusion into her priority area. Turkey's unilateral steps independently from her allies created apprehension in the western circles. The Russian assertiveness continued with the renovation plans of the Tartus port in Syria as a permanent facility for the Russian navy in September 2008 which alarmed both Israel and the US. The EU's eastern partnership initiative towards former Soviet geography in May 2009 was also met with strong criticism of Russia. The American Missile shield system was a new source of tension including both Turkey and the RF. The western counter move as a reaction to Russian revival was to seek to topple pro-Moscow government in Syria which led Turkey and RF to launch a proxy war against each other.

In the period after 2007, almost all the dynamics of the conflicts involving both Turkey and the RF were direct consequences of Russia's relationships with the West, such as, the South Ossetia-Georgia war, the Missile Shield Project, the Crimean crisis, the Syrian crisis, the debates regarding the Montreux Convention, and the US assertiveness to deploy naval power in the Black Sea.

1. The Impact of the Dissolution of the USSR on the Black Sea Subsystem

1.1. The New Member Complex of the Black Sea Subsystem: New States and Contiguous Subsystems

Following the dissolution of the USSR, Russian Federation, as the successor of the USSR and other 14 new states joined the international system. The population of Russia was more than the half of the former USSR. The most important part of the natural resources remained in Russia (90% of oil, 80% of natural gas, 70% of gold, 62% of electricity production) (Tellal 2015f, 542).

The southern Caucasus reemerged following the dissolution of the USSR. The Caucasus was situated between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea in an area the length of which is km 110 and, the width is km 160 around the Caucasus Mountains. South of the Caucasus mountain range is called Transcaucasia. The area has a strategic importance since it is situated at the crossroads between Black Sea and Central Asia,

and between Russia and Iran (Berber 2006, 244-245). The independence of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan “*undermined Russia’s position to the east of the Black Sea, throughout the Caucasus region, and in parts of Central Asia*” and “*reduced Russia’s position in the Black Sea region to that of a medium power with nuclear capability*” (Sezer 1997, 3).

Georgia was the only country among the south Caucasian states that has exit to open seas but it does not have either a strong lobby abroad as Armenia nor rich natural resources as Azerbaijan (Akpınar 2013, 608). Important oil and gas pipelines and railways were traversing the Georgian territory. Azerbaijan and Armenia were relying on Georgia for transportation (Kelkitli 2012, 90-91). The Caucasus provided Turkey an important transit corridor to the Caspian and Central Asia (Kuchins and Mankoff 2013, 12).

The Black Sea, which had been the scene of East-West strategic competition throughout the Cold War by providing some strained stability (Aydın 2009, 271), transformed itself from a static border region to an active and central one connecting East and West (Çelikpala 2010a, 287).

With regards to system dynamics, the concept of equilibrium for the lesser states ended, and the western bloc remained unrivalled. Thus, the countries safeguarding their autonomy by benefitting from this equilibrium stepped in a harder world (Oran 2015d, 209).

1.2. The New Turkish-Russian Subsystemic Bilateral Threat Complex

The bipolar world ended with the dissolution of the USSR on 31 December 1991 (Kalaycıoğlu 2012, 101). Davutoğlu (1994, 110) underlines the following instabilities as the characteristics of the new period:

- the end of strategic stability.
- geopolitical and geo-economic vacuum of power.
- the emergence of authentic identities.

- Intra-civilizational and intra-systemic competition.

A number of “*deep-seated historical animosities, border disputes and ‘frozen conflicts’*” which came into the light included “*the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Transnistria dispute in Moldova, and the separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia*” (Larrabee 2009, 303). The frozen conflicts connected regional rivalries within and between states with the larger great-power competition (Blank 2008, 23).

Since the Caspian/Black Sea region was an important source of energy containing “*approximately 2-3 % of the world’s oil resources, as well as large deposits of natural gas*” (Larrabee 2009, 301), “*various former Soviet states along the north and east of the Black Sea (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) became strategically important to the US for securing the east-west energy corridor linking Europe with the Caspian resources*” (Aydın 2009, 273).

The advantages and disadvantages of proximity of Turkey to the world’s biggest oil and gas reserves were referred in geopolitical/geostrategic assessments. Energy title became the main element of competition and cooperation between Turkey and Russia. The issue of the construction of the energy pipelines excluding Russia beginning of the 1990s put Turkey to the center of the discussions and projects due to her geographical situation (Çelikpala 2017c, 208-210).

As Murinson argued (as cited in Sözen 2010, 109) the great *geographical depth* of Turkey emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union. Contrary to the Cold War period, Turkey found herself surrounded by small, unstable, newly independent states, instead of a superpower and her loyal allies, which made her a regional power. Many states feeling language, culture and history loyalty to Turkey emerged in the Caucasus and the Central Asia. The leaders of these countries started to evaluate Turkey as a bridge in the way to modernization in the first years of their independence. Some of the Balkan states seeking to establish a new balance of power in the conflictual environment started to see Turkey a potential ally by using religious affinity to a certain extent. In this environment, Turkey started to point out her regional interests above her alliance interests (Sander 1994, 419-420). Turkey’s efforts to chart its course

in the new dynamics were described as a policy of *new activism* by the observers due to her activities in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Central Asia (Sayarı 2000, 169).

Russia's economy depended "to a substantial degree on the economic and political stability of the CIS states. The Soviet-designed and built network of oil and gas pipelines has enabled Russia to create an oil monopoly and ensure the dependence of the Central Asian and South Caucasus states on Russia". Therefore, Russia pursued policies "aimed at weakening ... and keeping them more dependent on Russia". This included continuous opposition to any export routes or the construction of new pipelines that avoided Russian territory (Kanet and Homarac 2007, 175-176).

Since Russia had enduring strategic interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the involvement of outside powers was often a source of tension with Russia (Mankoff 2013, 23). Russia exploited the ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet area to maintain a high profile security presence (Winrow 2007, 122). It exerted control on new parastates (Abkhazia, Transnistria, Southern Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh) by using ethnic conflicts as a leverage. Russian military bases (Belarus, Armenia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and Tajikistan) in post-Soviet countries became a party to the ethnic secessionism (Balcer 2009, 79-80). Russia often intervened in the Caucasus conflicts in such a way as to promote their escalation and/or continuation instead of resolution (Hill 2003, 62-63). Russia sought to hold the region in Socor's term under a kind of *controlled instability* to prevent regional countries' claim to real independence (Ereker and Özer 2013, 192).

New geostrategic landscape more or less forced Turkey and Russia to engage in a reassessment of the threat (Sezer 2008, 115). There were many other factors contributing to shifting threat perception:

- The dissolution of the USSR refurbished the world's geostrategic balances in favor of the West in which Turkey was part of it.
- The Russian outlook to the world has changed from confrontation about the essential features of the international system to an accommodation due to her being in the grips of political and social transition (Sezer 2008, 118).

Sezer (1997, 18) argues that “*Russian perception of Turkey as a threat to Russian interests in Central Asia, and more acutely in the southern Caucasus, generally falls into three categories: Turkey as a challenger in Russia’s backyard; Turkey as a provocateur of Turkic/Islamic secessionism; and Turkey as a military threat in collusion with the West*”.

1.3. The New Turkish-Russian Systemic Bilateral Threat Complex

Turkey was the only member of the Trans-Atlantic system directly tied to northern Black Sea, Caucasus, and Central Asia. Thus, the scope of the Turkish-Russian relations was broader than the term bilateral would routinely suggest. Although many of the issues had bilateral content, they have been influenced by the core issues dominated the agenda of Transatlantic and Eurasian interaction (Sezer 2000b, 60). Therefore, Turkey hardly welcomed the end of the Cold War since the end of the threat discourse was fundamentally damaging her western security connection and her military and economic benefits derived from it (Aydın 2003, 140).

During the Cold War geopolitics had been dominant. The US contained the USSR with air bases and surveillance stations. However, application of the geopolitics relatively declined and new geo-economic rules were redetermined in 1991. The US decreased the number of the bases surrounding Russia. The new American strategy emerged in the form to spin a network of democratic countries connected to each other through free market economy (Köni 2015, 245).

However, during the first decade of the post-Cold War era, the US maintained a rather low profile¹ foreign policy regarding the Black Sea issues (Çelikpala 2010a, 291). According to Uzgel (2015e, 278-279), the American interests in the region were the following points:

- the region’s being the center of new world power struggle,

¹ While the US was supporting the independence of the Baltic republics, it preferred to see the events in the South Caucasus concerning Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia as the domestic issue of the USSR in early 1990s. The policy of the US was based on the fact that the USSR had annexed the Baltic republics after the US recognized her officially in 1933, whereas the Caucasian republics were part of the USSR before the date of recognition (Öztürk 2009, 10).

- the region was close to the Middle East,
- The existence of large oil reserves in Azerbaijan and the Caspian region,
- The US rivalry with China to establish influence over Afghanistan and Iran,
- the US interest to prevent the reentry of the regional countries under Russian control,
- To provide transition to democracy and free market economy (Uzgel 2015e, 278-279).

The principal source of bilateral cooperation between Turkey and the US during the Cold War was the basic symmetry in their security perceptions against the USSR which enabled both countries to develop close military and political ties (Sayarı 2003, 28). The end of the Cold War eliminated this original impetus for the American-Turkish security partnership. Turkey's strategic importance to the United States began to lie *"not in deterring a threat from Russia but rather in its capacity to provide a bridge to the Muslim world and serve as a stabilizing force in the Middle East and the Caucasus/Central Asia- as two areas of increasing strategic importance to the United States"* (Larrabee 2010, 4).

For this reason, the US needed Turkey's cooperation to establish her influence in Eurasia. The authors linked with US administration, such as, Graham Fuller, Ian Lesser and Paul Henze pointed out that Turkey ought to assume new roles in a geography extending from Yugoslavia to the west of China. These authors were suggesting in a book titled *Turkey's New Geopolitics* issued by RAND in 1993 that Turkey ought to display activity by putting forward her Muslim identity in the Balkans and her Turkic identity in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Henze argued that Turkey ought to redefine Ottomanism to ensure this activity and put forward the concept of neo-Ottomanism. Brzezinski stated that Turkey ought to play a pivotal role in the Eurasia that the US saw as the prize of the Cold War (Uzgel 2015e, 251-252).

New cooperation areas in Europe/Balkans, Caucasus-Central Asia, and the Middle East emerged between the US and Turkey. Turkey sought to reach her foreign policy objectives by coming closer to the US. Since the American influence over the countries surrounding Turkey including Russia increased, Turkey's possibility to make new openings as in the 1960s and 1970s decreased. Thus, Turkey's openings to

the Balkans and Central Asia became attempts emerged with the American support (Uzgel 2015e, 243-244).

Öniş (2003, 1) argues that the European and American conceptions of Turkey's importance for the western security differed to a great extent. From a European perspective, Turkey appeared to be more of a security liability than an asset in the 1990s. Turkey continued to have a more important role for the US in a highly unstable region extending from the Middle East to the former Soviet Central Asia. Nevertheless, Turkey's geopolitical role was not comparable to the Cold War era.

2. The US-Backed Turkish Intrusion into the NIS and the Russian Efforts to Consolidate Power in its Near Abroad (Ближнее Зарубежье) (1992-1993)

The dissolution of the USSR transformed Turkey's geostrategic engagement and presented Turkey with both unprecedented opportunities and risks (Blank 1993, 55). The most active period of Turkey in Central Asia was between 1991-1993 (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 138). In this period, Turkey followed a policy disregarding Moscow and even directed to break its influence and embarked on a challenge for influence without any plan and program with Turkist and Islamist discourse (Aydın 2015b, 371).

Turkey's allies pushed it to seek a special part in the development of the NIS. This policy was mainly driven by the rapid Islamization of the region by Iranian fundamentalism. Turkey was promoted as a Western countermodel for Central Asia. Ankara eagerly seized this opportunity to reestablish its strategic importance for the West and aimed at turning the region into a sphere of special Turkish influence (Kramer 2000, 97). The US itself proposed an *enhanced partnership* to Turkey during the visit of PM Demirel to Washington between 10-12 February 1992. The US announced that it saw Turkey as both partner and a model for the NIS in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Uzgel 2015e, 252-253). In February 1992, Manfred Verner, General Secretary of NATO, stated that the protection of the interests of NATO in Central Asia and to combat fundamentalism in the regional countries were assigned to Turkey. Russia did not react to this statement (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 136).

Turkey attempted to take the advantage of the power vacuum created by the Russian retrenchment by expanding the parameters of its political, economic and cultural relations in the region (Sezer 1997, 2) and pursued an assertive foreign policy with a Pan-Turkic discourse “*from Adriatic to the Great Wall of China*”² (Aktürk 2014, 14). Demirel’s this proclamation that the establishment of a Turkic World was underway caused widespread accusations that Turkey was after an empire again (Aydın 2006, 12).

The new issue between Turkey and Russia was adaptation to the new geopolitical reality: “*Playing up its democratic regime, secularism, market economy, and Western connections, Turkey offered economic, cultural, and military assistance and presented itself as a role model for the Turkic NIS.*” Russia resented these Turkish overtures. Russia’s primary method for keeping Turkey outside was indirect, through greater emphasis on integration within the CIS (Sezer 1997, 13). Russian Federation sought to turn CIS into a tool for reintegration among former Soviet republics. Turkish policies “*were designed to serve two mutually reinforcing functions*”: To facilitate the integration of the new republics into the international community, and “*to weave special bonds among Turkey, Azerbaijan and the Turkic republics on the basis of common ethnic, linguistic and cultural roots*” (Sezer 2001, 4).

Turkey attempted to contact with Armenia and persuade Azerbaijan to restore the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, by February 1992, full scale fighting erupted between the Armenians and Azeris. On 28 February 1992, the CSCE, upon Turkey’s proposal, condemned the alteration of the frontier by force and confirmed that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan (Hale 2013, 212). In March 1992, CSCE was entrusted to mediate in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict (Cheterian 2012, 706).

During the Bosnian war started in April 1992, Turkey supported Bosnians whereas Russia supported the Serbs (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 140). Following the proclamation of Bosnian Serb Republic on 27 March 1992, the fighting between the Muslims and Serbs³ erupted in Bosnia Herzegovina in April 1992. Turkey

² The slogan “*the Turkic world from Adriatic to the Great Wall of China*” was first pronounced by PM Demirel in February 1992 (Tellal 2015f, 543).

³ It had become impossible to hold Yugoslavia together following the Slovenian and the Croatian proclamation of independence, and their recognition by the European Union on 15 January 1992.

stressed the need to sustain the independence and territorial integrity of the Bosnian state and advocated multilateral intervention in various forums, such as, the CSCE, NATO, OIC, and the UN in order to put pressure on Bosnian Serbs to stop the war. In early stages of the hostilities, in accordance with its pro-Western foreign policy orientation, Moscow followed a similar stance with the US and the EU and did not veto the sanctions imposed on Serbia. However, Russia also opposed the lifting of the arms embargo in favor of the Bosnian Muslims (Kelkitli 2012, 124-125).

Turkey exaggerated the extent of her capacity to influence the socio-politic and economic transformation of the Central Asia. During his visit to Central Asia between 27 April – 3 May 1992, PM Demirel promised import credits and assistance amounted to \$1,1 billion forcing the capacity of Turkey and told these states that it would be better for them to leave the *Ruble Zone* (Aydın 2006, 10-11).

Diplomatic relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation were established on 3 April 1992 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia). One month later, Armenia attacked on Nakhichevan on 3 May 1992. The Armenian attack on Nakhichevan raised critical questions for Turkey. This would have been a clear violation of the Treaty of 1921 which stipulated that Nakhichevan was part of Azerbaijan and could not be handed over to any other state (Hale 2013, 212). PM Çiller, moving from the argument that the Treaty of Kars gave Turkey a guarantor title, announced that she would request authorization for intervention in case of Armenia's invasion of Nakhichevan (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 143). Shaposhnikov, Commander of the CIS forces, announced that Turkey's intervention would lead to the third world war (Kasım 2011, 33,96). By 11 May 1992, the Armenians captured whole of Nagorno-Karabakh and opened up a corridor between the enclave and Armenia (Hale 2013, 212). Turkey announced that the issue of the status of the Nagorno Karabakh could be resolved within the framework of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 144). At this time, Turkey was maintaining commercial relations with Armenia

Turkey recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia collectively on 06 February 1992. The Bosnian Serbs, who had carved out autonomous regions in October 1991 and formed a separate parliament in January 1992, declared the Bosnian Serb Republic on 27 March 1992 (Kelkitli 2012, 124).

(Oran 2017a, 168-169). Turkey's direct approach to Russia resulted with the declaration condemning the fighting on the border between Armenia and Nakhichevan which induced the Armenians to break off their attacks two days later. This outcome reduced the tension between Turkey and Russia (Hale 2013, 213).

2.1. The Collective Security Treaty (15 May 1992)

The *Collective Security Treaty*⁴ (CST), adopted under the framework of CIS, was signed in Tashkent on 15 May 1992 among Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Kasım 2011, 124-125). The following articles of the Treaty was demonstrating the nature and scope of the CST proving the increasing control of Russia on the former Soviet zone:

“1. The participant states shall not accede to military alliances, or participate in any groups of states, or in actions directed against any other participant state. ...

2.... In the event of the emergence of a threat to the security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of one or several participant states, or a threat to international peace and security, the participant states will, without delay, bring into action the mechanism of joint consultations with the purpose of coordinating their positions and undertaking measures to eliminate the emergent threat.

4.In the event of one participant state being subjected to aggression on the part of another state or group of states, this will be regarded as aggression against all the participant states of the present Treaty. ...

7.The deployment and operation of the facilities of the collective security system in the territory of the participant states shall be regulated by special agreements. ...” (as quoted in Melville and Shackleina 2005, 9-12).

2.2. Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation (25 May 1992)

The next treaty regulating Russia's relations in the new environment was signed with Turkey. Turkey and Russia signed the *Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation*⁵ on 25 May 1992 in Moscow. Some of the provisions of the Treaty enumerating the principles of relations were the following:

⁴ The CST was later joined by Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia in 1993. The treaty entered into force upon completion of the national ratification procedures on 20 April 1994 (CSTO).

⁵ For the Turkish version full text of the *Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation*, dated 25 May 1992, see, Resmi Gazete (03/03/1994).

“Recording that an era of freedom, peace, security, democracy, and cooperation has been opened in interstate relations, Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation agreed on the following subjects:

- 1.The Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation accept each other as a friendly state.
2. The parties undertake not to use force or threat of use of force in their mutual relations and not to allow the use of their territories for the purpose of aggression or destructive and separatist activities against each other.
- 4.The parties declare that, in case of one of them is exposed to direct or indirect aggression of a third-party state or states, they will not deliver support to the aggressor or aggressors in any way, and to exert effort for the cessation of this aggression and elimination of all the results in line with the arrangements of the Organization of the United Nations and other relevant international organizations;
- 6.The parties shall make consultations for the purpose of ensuring regular development of relations and exchanging views regarding international and regional issues.
- 10.The parties, believing in the importance of increasing bilateral military contacts, agreed about the realization of high level contacts between military authorities.
- 11.The parties agree for the development of their mutual cooperation in the fields of economy, commerce, science, technology, and ecology comprehensively and with a long run perspective.
- 19.The parties affirmed their resolute belief that they are against all kinds of terrorist actions committed for whatever purposes and whatever reason, and that terrorism cannot be justified under any conditions” (Resmi Gazete 03/03/1994, my translation).

The content of this Treaty was same with the content of the Treaty of March 1991. There were only two differences. The statement “... *aiming to contribute to the peace and stability in the region where the continents of Europe and Asia converged, and Turkey and Russia located as neighbors ...*” was added to the preamble of 1992 Treaty. This phrase meant that Turkey and the Russia were the only Eurasian states and they had similar problems. It was needed to settle these problems through cooperation. The second difference referred to a change which was made in the article 16 of the 1991 Treaty. The statement that “... *development of relations between Turkey and the Union republics ...*” was replaced with the statement “... *contacts and cooperation with the regions, cities, local organs, and administrations ...*” in the 1992 Treaty. The Treaties of 1991 and 1992 were different from the Declaration of 1972 and Document of 1978 with respect to content and substance:

- The 1991 and 1992 treaties were binding. They were agreements, not a document or declaration.
- The parties denoted each other as *friend* for the first time after the 1925 Treaty.
- There was a solidarity against any attack to the parties.

- The parties agreed for consultations in international and regional issues.
- The parties decided to encourage contacts and cooperation among the parliaments, political parties, media organizations, unions, education institutions and local administrations (Tellal 2015f, 547).

The number of NACC members reached to 38 in June 1992 with the participation of Albania and Georgia (Uzgel 2015b, 309). The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which was proposed by Turkey in 1989 to promote private sector activity and stimulate the free movement of goods and services among members (Larrabee 2009, 303), was officially launched with the signing of the *Summit Declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Bosphorus Statement*⁶ by eleven countries⁷ on 25 June 1992.

Russia planned to gain membership in Western international organizations rapidly to soon bring Russia to the front-rank status of advanced European countries and the US. Like Gorbachev, the new Russian leaders were hoping to receive adequate recognition and resources from the West in response to their commitment to their new vision. Russia quickly joined the IMF [1 June 1992] and World Bank [16 June 1992] and announced its intention to acquire memberships in G-7, NATO, and the EU. Russia also loyally supported the Western international security agenda by accepting sanctions against Libya [March 1992], Yugoslavia [April 1992] and Iraq (Tsygankov 2010, 222-223).

Turkey considered cooperation with Azerbaijan in the military field vital and signed military training and cooperation agreement with Azerbaijan on 11 August 1992 (Çelikpala 2010b, 102). Right after, *the Treaty between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation on the Status and Operating Conditions of the Border Troops of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Republic of Armenia* was signed on 30 September 1992, and Russia started to safeguard the state borders of

6 For the full text of the Bosphorus Statement, dated 25 June 1992, see, <http://www.bsec-organization.org/UploadedDocuments/BsecAtAGlance/1992%20Bosphorus.pdf>

7 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.

Armenia with Iran and Turkey jointly with Armenia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia).

A Turkic Summit consisted of Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan was held in Ankara between 30-31 October 1992. Tajikistan could not take part due to the continuing civil war in the country. During the meeting, President Özal's proposing a *Turkic Common Market* and a *Turkic Development and Investment Bank* scared all the leaders except Elchibey, and his efforts to obtain guarantees regarding the construction of oil and gas pipe-lines from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan disturbed them (Aydın 2006, 12). It was not possible to get their support for the above-mentioned projects. While Uzbek President Karimov was announcing his objection to the establishment of a supra-national organization to coordinate the activities of the Turkic world, Nazarbayev who was aware of the existence of important Russian population in his country, stated that he would veto any statement referring to the establishment of any organization which would be built on ethnic or religious basis. Furthermore, the Central Asian leaders did not allow the inclusion of a reference to the Karabakh conflict not to offend Russia despite the pressure of Turkey and Azerbaijan. A press statement was not issued at the end of the meeting due to Nazarbayev's rejecting to sign it implying the recognition of TRNC as an independent state (Aydın 2006, 13). Thus, the Turkic states summit hurriedly met without necessary preparation failed (Aydın 2006, 14).

The US Congress, under the pressure of the Armenian lobby, adopted Section 907 of the *Freedom Support Act 228* on 24 October 1992 and banned any kind of direct US aid to the Azerbaijani government until it lifted the blockade against Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia (Kelkitli 2012, 88). The *Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States*⁸ was signed in Minsk on 22 January 1993. The CIS would be based on sovereign equality of its members and it would not be a state or a supranational. The purposes of the CIS would be cooperation in political, economic, ecologic, humanitarian, and other spheres; to ensure world peace and security, mutual legal assistance and pacific settlement of disputes and conflicts among its members.

⁸ For the full text of *the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States*, dated 22 January 1993, see, United Nations (1994).

On 9 March 1993, an outline agreement was signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan in Ankara to construct the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC Project) oil pipeline (Hale 2013, 213). With the *Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan Main Export Crude Oil Pipeline*, it was aimed to transport the crude oil produced in the Caspian Region, especially in Azerbaijan, to Ceyhan Marine Terminal through Georgia via pipeline system and onwards to world markets from Ceyhan Marine Terminal via tankers (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources). Turkey closed the border with Armenia on 3 April 1993 upon the occupation of seven Azeri districts (rayon) by the Armenians and abolished the electricity agreement (Oran 2017a, 168-169). Turkey declared an economic blockade on Armenia following a UNSC resolution of 6 April 1993 calling for the withdrawal of Armenian forces (Hale 2013, 214).

2.3. The Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation (23 April 1993)

In the spring of 1993, Russia formally asked the UN to “*recognize Russia’s special responsibility for keeping the peace in the multiple ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union, because it had stopped and then ‘frozen’ these conflicts through interventions of the Russian army*” (Trenin 2009, 8). This was the demand for recognition as the sole guarantor of security in the former Soviet Union, a policy which was labelled as the *Russian Monrovisky Doctrine*. The international community did not object to the near monopoly that Russia enjoyed as a peacekeeper in the former Soviet space without granting such a mandate (Sezer 2000a, 98).

Russia adopted its first foreign policy concept on 23 April 1993. According to the Foreign Policy Conception, the most important foreign policy tasks requiring consistent efforts were “*... eradicating armed clashes, settling conflicts around Russia and preventing them from spilling over into our territory, and ensuring strict observance of individual human rights and minority rights in the countries of the near abroad, particularly the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations*”. Russia envisaged that the global situation would be largely characterized by “*dissipation of the global bipolar structure*”, “*multitrack international politics as a result of the dissolution of the global bipolar structure*” and “*the emergence of*

regionally centered power relations". One of this regionally centred power relations was the *Near Abroad* of the Russian Federation:

"The Russian Federation believes that the best way of creating a belt of security ... along its borders is to have comprehensive stabilization in the geopolitical space around Russia, and a zone of constructive regional cooperation. ... [W]e must combine full-fledged development of bilateral ties with ... diverse multilateral forms of interaction ... seek transformation of the Commonwealth into an effective interstate formation of sovereign entities of international relations. ... [O]ur partners must realize ... if any near-abroad states commit actions that infringe Russia's interests, or fail to fulfill the obligations they undertake, Russia will seek ways to protect its interests, of course in compliance with the norms of international law, using the capacities of the UN, CSCE and other international organizations, and—if need be—resorting to countermeasures of its own" (as quoted in Melville and Shackleina 2005, 27-64).

The aim of the Near Abroad Doctrine was to take political, economic, and military control over the bordering states in the former Soviet space, to provide the use of the natural resources of the neighboring countries in line with the Russian interests and to protect the rights of the Russian people living in the neighboring countries (Akpınar 2013, 595). Russia would implement the Near Abroad policy through bilateral agreements instead of multilateral arrangements on a wide range of issues that reflect each country's specific needs and aspirations (Aydın 2013, 49).

The Foreign Policy Conception referred to Turkey under the *western European Affairs* title in the form of "*Enhancement of ties with the countries that command significant economic and technical potentials (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, and others) and boast levers of influence over the situation in the regions vital for us*", and also under the *South and West Asia* title:

"Relations with the Islamic countries in South and West Asia cannot be developed without taking into consideration their policy towards those CIS states and Russian regions that are populated by Muslims; nor can the rivalry among these countries for influence in the states of the near abroad be ignored. Given this, it is especially important for Russia to seek ways of interacting and cooperating in different ways with the various individual countries of the region in order to prevent the spread of fundamentalist Islamic tendencies and establish the idea of secularism in our Muslim near abroad. In this respect, Turkey is a priority for Russia, for it is more susceptible to western values, particularly due to its membership in NATO. Friendly relations with Turkey are important for us, both since there is every prospect that they will become mutually advantageous in terms of trade and the economy, and because of the possible positive impact they might have on Russia's southern neighbors within the Commonwealth as they develop their civil societies" (as quoted in Melville and Shackleina 2005, 27-64).

Russia was against the formation of a buffer zone in eastern Europe:

“Eastern Europe does not merely retain its significance for Russia as a historically predetermined sphere of interest. The importance of maintaining good relations with the countries of the region became incomparably greater when the belt of sovereign states was formed”. ... “Our strategic task at present is to prevent the transformation of Eastern Europe into a sort of buffer belt that would isolate us from the West. On the other hand, we must not allow the impending displacement of Russia from the East European region by western powers. This is a task that can be carried out, especially in view of the fact that—despite the way they have of late noticeably and rather ostentatiously distanced themselves politically from Russia—the Eastern European states remain economically, and, to a considerable extent, also culturally, oriented towards Russia and the other CIS states” (as quoted in Melville and Shakleina 2005, 27-64).

Russia also needed to assume an active foreign policy in the Middle East:

“Russia’s attitude to the region is determined above all by the region’s geostrategic and geopolitical significance, by the role that the local oil reserves play for the global energy balance, by the presence of considerable financial resources, and by its territorial proximity to the frontiers of Russia and the CIS, which carries with it the danger that the destabilizing developments of the region may have a direct effect on the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia’s long-term interests in the region consist in safeguarding its national security on its southern frontiers, preventing the negative effects that the conflict situations that are persisting and emerging in the region may have on interethnic and inter-confessional relations within the CIS, creating the conditions necessary for the development of mutually profitable trade and economic exchanges, and using the regional states’ potential to support Russia’s economic revival. These are the reasons why Russia needs to assume an active foreign policy stance in the Middle East. The costs associated with these policies are incomparably lower than the political and economic losses that may ensue if we distance ourselves unduly from the region’s problems and assume the posture of an onlooker” (as quoted in Melville and Shakleina 2005, 27-64).

Participation of Russia in international organizations was also important. Russia’s foreign policy resources were then and this situation increased the importance of the country’s participation in international organizations (Akpınar 2013, 595). The military relations between Russia and Turkey had begun with the signing of the *Memorandum of Understanding* by the Ministries of Defense of the two countries on 11 May 1993 (Kelkitli 2012, 147). In June 1993, Turkey joined the Minsk Group set up by the CSCE to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict (Hale 2013, 213). On 17 September 1993, Russia informed the parties to the CFE that it could not apply the relevant reduction provisions of the CFE Treaty in the Northern Caucasus due to the change in the conditions (Tellal 2015f, 544). Turkey announced that it fully objected to any amendment in the Treaty (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 161).

Turkish PM Çiller, during her visit to Moscow in September 1993, expressed that Turkey would look at the world with the Russians through the same window. Kırca

and Çandar (as cited in Çelikpala 2015, 125) assessed the visit of Çiller as the end of the *active and competitive approach* and the *bankruptcy* of Turkey's foreign policy. Çiller's meeting with Haydar Aliyev, who recently came to power in Azerbaijan, for the first time in Moscow meant Turkey's symbolic acceptance of the Russian superiority (Çelikpala 2015, 125). The Turkish economic blockade on Armenia had virtually no effect since by September 1993 Armenian forces captured all the territory between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to the land south of the enclave as far as Iranian border displacing 100.000 Azeri and occupying about 20% of the total land area of Azerbaijan (Hale 2013, 214).

The Agreement on Turkey's purchase of military equipment from Russia was signed on 31 October 1993. Turkey purchased nineteen general purpose Mi-17 (NATO reporting name Hip H) helicopters, seventy BTR-80 armored transporter and other weapons worth a total of \$114 million (Kelkitli 2012, 147). This arms contract was the first of its kind for a NATO country obtained arms and military equipment from Russia. The deal came at a time when Turkey's Western allies refused to sell military hardware to Turkey on the grounds of violation of the human rights by Turkish Armed Forces in their struggle against PKK (Kelkitli 2012, 148).

2.4. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2 November 1993)

Russia had indicated that it wanted to join NATO in the long-term and it did not principally object to NATO membership of the Central and Eastern European countries. Russia had envisioned the transformation of NATO into a pan-European security alliance in which Russia played an equal role (Thorun 2009, 53). However, in the fall of 1993, Moscow's benign attitude changed abruptly towards the West and the eastern European countries since "*not only had NATO rejected Russia's fast-track accession and not dissolved itself, but it was now proceeding to pick up the pieces from the former Soviet strategic glacis and turn it into a forward position vis-à-vis a post-communist Russia*" (Trenin 2009, 8). The *Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, dated 2 November 1993, constituted a document of the transitional period, the period of establishing Russian statehood and shaping a new

system of international relations. The Military Doctrine mentioned the following as the existing and potential sources of external military danger for Russia:

“[T]he possibility of strategic stability being undermined as a result of the violation of international accords in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction and of the qualitative and quantitative buildup of armaments by other countries; ... the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation's military security; ... International terrorism; and the existing and potential local wars and armed conflicts, particularly those in the immediate vicinity of the Russian borders... (as quoted in Federation of American Scientists 2019a).

The Russian Federation would use its nuclear weapons in case of the following:

“[A]n armed attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces, other troops, or its allies by any state which is connected by an alliance agreement with a state that does possess nuclear weapons; ... joint actions by such a state with a state possessing nuclear weapons in the carrying out or in support of any invasion or armed attack upon the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces, other troops, or its allies” (as quoted in Federation of American Scientists 2019a).

Russia's stress on the role of nuclear weapons to deter regional wars and defend allies was partially motivated by its desire to deter Turkey from playing a more assertive role in the Caucasus (Sezer 1997, 13-14). The following factors would help transform a military danger into an immediate military threat to Russia:

“[T]he buildup of groupings of troops (forces) on the borders of the Russian Federation to the point where they disrupt the prevailing correlation of forces; the introduction of foreign troops in the territory of neighboring states of the Russian Federation (if this is not connected with measures to restore or maintain peace in accordance with a decision of the UN Security Council or a regional organ of collective security with the agreement of the Russian Federation)” (as quoted in Federation of American Scientists 2019a).

Among the basic principles of Russian Policy in the military security was “*the maintenance of stability in regions adjoining the borders of the Russian Federation, neighboring countries, and the world as a whole*” (as quoted in Federation of American Scientists 2019a). In sum, the material aspects of the Near Abroad Policy and the Military Doctrine were the following:

- The economy which was split among the former Soviet republics would be re-used.
- The Russian diaspora of 25 million would be protected.

- The domination in the less developed region having important energy resources ought not to be lost to great powers (Tellal 2015j, 542).

Two aspects of the military doctrine raised anxiety both in Turkey and in the West. The first was Russia's renunciation of the no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge adopted in the Soviet era. Second, Russia no longer viewed nuclear weapons as weapons of deterrence but as weapons to fight a war to compensate for the weakness in Russia's post-Soviet conventional deterrence (Sezer 2008, 122). Russia's *"stress on the role of nuclear weapons to deter regional wars and defend allies is at least partially motivated by its desire to deter Turkey from playing a more assertive role in the southern Caucasus"*. Russia also considered coalition-building *"as a long-term strategy, with Greece, Armenia, and Iran viewed as potential partners in a future anti-Turkish coalition"* (Sezer 1997, 13-14). In the aftermath of the Near Abroad Doctrine, Turkey considered that she ought to be more receptive regarding the interests of Russia in the region in order to avoid from situations which could lead to an armed conflict (Aydın 2006, 22). However, during the 1990s, Russia progressively abandoned the notion of a joint CIS armed force, the ruble zone, common economic space, common external borders, and dual citizenship. It managed to preserve ownership of the Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, SU's permanent seat on the UNSC and the Soviet property abroad including embassies and the Soviet debts (Trenin 2009, 7).

3. Between the Near Abroad (1993) and the NATO-Russia Founding Act (27 May 1997)

In December 1993, Azerbaijan transferred 10% of its shares in the exploitation of the Chirag and Güneşli oil fields to the Russian oil company, Lukoil, to be able to solve the Karabakh problem with the Russian support. Similarly, Turkey's share of 1.75% later rose to 6.75 for the same end (Tanrısever 2003, 126).

Following the cease-fire on 12 May 1994, Turkey advocated for the deployment of a multinational force in Karabakh under the OSCE supervision against Russian peace keepers as suggested by Russia (Aydın 2003, 147). The Karabakh conflict enabled *Russia to "influence a large number of issues such as military presence, Turkey's potential political and military intrusion, and Caspian energy*

development and pipeline roots” (Abushov 2009, 195). The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has vital economic and strategic dimensions for Turkey. Turkey could not afford to give much more than economic support to Azerbaijan for fear of provoking a direct military conflict with Armenia which might broaden into a Turkish-Russian war. The CSTO Treaty allowed Russia to station troops in Armenia, so that if Turkey had been involved in direct hostilities with Armenia it would also have fought Russia (Hale 2013, 211). Viewing Turkey and Azerbaijan as security threats, Armenia, looked to Russia as its primary guarantor of security (Sezer 2000b, 71). Thus, Russia became in the foreground in Armenia’s foreign policy and Armenia also became the basis of Russia’s South Caucasus policy and the most important strategic partner in the region (Demirağ 2013, 267-268).

The western powers refrained from taking active part in the armed conflicts in the Caucasus and assumed the role to alleviate the intensity of the clashes and propose mediatory policies when possible. The reason of this was the concern from likely grave retaliation of Russia which was under the influence of a severe trauma emanated from the dissolution of the USSR. Thus, western powers were more receptive in their relations with Russia with respect to the Caucasus. However, the developments in the Balkans demonstrated that a common understanding would not be possible in this region (Kibaroglu 2001, 97).

Georgia requested military assistance from Russia to suppress the uprising in Abkhazia despite Russia’s previous accusations of occupation there. In return, Russia’s demands were Georgia’s accession to the CIS and signing of the *Agreement on the Status of the Russian Forces in South Caucasia*⁹. This agreement gave right to Russia to obtain four military base (Vaziani, Batum, Gudauta and Akhalkalaki), Russian border guards and the deployment of Russian peace forces in South Ossetia. This was perceived shadow to the independence of Georgia, and this pushed Georgia to the western states in the areas of foreign policy and defense (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 152). Georgia also signed the *Agreement on Friendship and Good*

⁹ An agreement was done in March 1995 extending the period of use of the bases for 25 years (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 152).

Neighborliness between Russia and Georgia during the visit of Yeltsin to Tbilisi on 3 February 1994 (Demirağ 2013, 254).

Russia had explicitly put her objection for Turkic summits after the first summit. The second Turkic summit was to be held in Baku in January 1994. The summit was postponed upon the proposals of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan only two days before the date of the summit. Yeltsin had persuaded Kerimov during the CIS summit held in December 1993 to prevent the realization of this summit. It was once more understood that the Turkic solidarity was so weak in the face of Russian pressure (Aydın 2006, 17).

The eastward expansion of NATO emerged with the German desire to form a wall composed of Poland and Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary against Russia (Kibaroglu 2001, 97). Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic were also aspiring NATO membership whereas Russia was objecting to NATO enlargement. Russia increasingly opposed NATO enlargement threatening that NATO enlargement played into the hands of communist and nationalist forces whose rise would foster an anti-Western foreign policy (Thorun 2009, 53). Yeltsin issued dire warnings for NATO enlargement and proposed instead an all-inclusive Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to replace the Atlantic Alliance (Keylor 2001, 473). Despite this, NATO accepted enlargement principally at the Brussels Summit on 10 January 1994. In order to persuade Russia, NATO guaranteed that nuclear weapons and new troops would not be deployed in the territories of new members. NATO also launched the *Partnership for Peace* (PfP) program at the Brussels Summit not to provoke Russia and not to disappoint NATO-aspirant countries (Uzgel 2015b, 309). At the Brussels Summit, all NACC partner countries and CSCE states were invited to participate in the PfP program. The *PfP Framework Document* was published (NATO 2019b). With the invention of the PfP program, the principles of *dialogue* and *cooperation* adopted in the Rome Summit were put into effect (Kavuncu 2013, 308). Russia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1994 (McNamara 2010, 6). Despite her objections to the PfP program, the requirement for the credits of IMF and WB was influential in Russia's reconciliation with NATO in this issue (Tellal 2015j, 542).

The concept of *Combined Joint Task Forces* and other measures to support the development of a *European Security and Defense Identity* (ESDI) was also endorsed at the Brussels Summit. NATO reaffirmed its readiness to carry out air strikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and other UN-declared safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina (NATO 2019b). This decision signaled that NATO would not operate in its own classical responsibility area (Kavuncu 2013, 310).

By the middle of 1994, the US military presence in Turkey was drastically reduced. The US closed or handed over to Turkish forces the eight of the twelve US military bases in Turkey as part of its global policy. The US military aid to Turkey was also scaled down substantially (Hale 2013, 159). However, on the contrary, the US started to attach importance to the Black Sea in 1994. At its inception, US policy regarding the Black Sea was basically an energy policy driven with a hidden power politics dimension (Tsantoulis 2009, 249).

On 20 April 1994, *Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Areas of Military Technical Issues and Defense Industry* was signed. On 20 September 1994, *the Agreement on the Joint Development and Production Sharing for the Azeri and Chirag Fields and the Deep Water Portion of the Gunashli Field in the Azerbaijan Sector of the Caspian Sea* (Gulistan Agreement) was signed in Baku among eleven¹⁰ oil companies. Due to its political, economic, and strategic importance, the agreement was dubbed the *Contract of the Century*. Azerbaijan International Operation Consortium (AIOC) became the coordinator of the project (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 174). The competition over the transportation route of the Caspian oil to international markets was the basis of Turkish-Russian conflict. Russia wanted to carry the oil from Baku to Novorossiysk through pipeline and transfer it to the world markets through the Straits. Turkey planned to transport the oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 175).

¹⁰ Eleven international oil companies (AMOCO, BP, McDermott, UNOCAL, SOCAR, Lukoil, Statoil, TPAO, Pennzoil, Aramco, Delta) were representing seven countries (Azerbaijan, USA, UK, Russia, Turkey, Norway, and Saudi Arabia) as contractor parties.

Turkey spent serious efforts to hold the second Turkic summit in Istanbul in October 1994. Contrary to the first summit, the expectations were held lower and the final statement was circulated to the parties to get their views in advance (Aydın 2006, 17).

Since the early 1990s, mutual suspicions between Turkey and Russia have been brewing also due to the Chechen and Kurdish separatist movements which intensified their operations in the tolerant international climate of the post-Cold-War years (Sezer 2008, 128). Turkey's alleged support for the separatists of Turkic origin from Tatarstan and Bashkortostan or Muslim peoples such as Chechnya¹¹ combined with the apprehension that the country would be divided along the Volga, caused serious Russian reactions and culminated with the playing of the Kurdish card (Aydın 2006, 21).

BTC and Baku-Novorossiysk routes were passing through hot points where PKK and Chechen separatists¹² were active. Russia preferred the resolution of the issue by military means and waged the first Chechen war between 11 December 1994 and 31 August 1996 (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 218). Olson (1998, 209) argues that the Kurdish and Chechen issues were linked more closely than generally realized. Russia used the Kurdish card effectively to reduce Turkey's ability to influence its policy toward Chechnya¹³. The first Chechen war had repercussions on the Turkish-Russian relations. During the war, although Turkey followed a policy supporting the territorial integrity of Russia (Kasım 2011, 137-139), Russia accused Turkey of supporting Chechens since Chechen solidarity groups in Turkey raised money,

¹¹ The Chechen issue emerged for the first time with Chechnya's proclamation of her independence from Russia on 2 November 1991 (Tellal 2015f, 544-545).

¹² For the detailed account of the PKK versus Chechen Card, see, Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay (2006, 218-265).

¹³ An analogy can be drawn between Russia's approach to the PKK issue and Turkey's approach to the Chechen issue. The mutual approaches at the level of governments were cautious. However, upon the initiative of Duma, a conference titled *History of Kurdistan* was organized in Moscow on 22 February 1994. On 25 January 1995, a *Kurdish Home* was opened in Yaroslavl. The Russian officials visiting Ankara in February 1995, demanded from Turkey to withdraw its support from Chechnya, to prevent arms and volunteer transport to Chechnya, to close the Caucasus-Chechen solidarity associations. Turkey was reluctant to implement these demands. Upon this, the *Kurdish Parliament in Exile* made its third meeting in Moscow between 30 October – 1 November 1995 (Tellal 2015f, 546).

provided equipment, and dispatched volunteers to fight in Chechnya (Winrow 2007, 127).

Turkey's position as a member of NATO, the West's encouragement of Turkey to act as a role model for the NIS, and Turkey's military capability created in Russia an image of a country which was a military threat to Russia both on its own and on behalf of the West. Former President Gorbachev claimed in October 1995 that, "*the West, especially the United States, decided to take advantage of Russia's temporary weakness and started a new geopolitical game whose aim was to alter Russia's status as a world power... An attempt was made to play the Turkish card*". This perception appeared as the basis of Russian policy maintaining a regular military presence in Georgia and Armenia (Sezer 1997, 21).

Despite accepting the Turkish influence as equilibrating the danger of the expansion of Iran-supported Islamism during 1989-1991, Russia, seeing that Turkey was replacing the Russian influence in the region more active than Iran between 1991-1993, moved away from this view and did not refrain from expressing her reaction by 1995 (Aydın 2006, 21). In conformity with the *Protocol on Cooperation against terrorism and Organized Crime* signed in Moscow on 24 January 1995, two parties would abstain reciprocally from involvement in either the Kurdish or Chechen conflicts (Hale 2013, 210). In August 1995, Cernisev, Russian ambassador to Ankara, stated that "*We must understand each other. Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones to others' houses*" (as quoted in Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 229).

After 1995, Turkey followed a more realistic and balanced policy not disregarding Russia in the region (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 138). Following the first steps of Turkey to establish influence in the Central Asia, the events, the issues encountered, the disappointments experienced in five years, demonstrated that Turkey did not have enough economic power and political experience to play her game in the region. Turkey started to reassess her policy towards the region and put it in a more realist framework. The possibility of turning into a hot conflict of Turkey's economic, political, ideological and religious competition with Russia and Iran also emerged as elements to be paid attention while determining the

policies towards the region (Aydın 2006, 19). Causes of tensions between Turkey and Russia were beyond the confines of bilateral relations except separatist movements in one other's country. The causes of tension were interacting with regional and international developments (Sezer 2000a, 94). Uzgel (2006, 236) argues that the course of development during the 1990s demonstrated that the contents of Turkey's *big state* and *regional power* concepts, which were a bit self-proclaimed and a bit instigated by the US, were empty.

The US, a non-regional power, proclaimed the Black Sea region as its *sphere of vital interest* since the second half of 1990s. Primary interest of the US was to prevent the region to become an exclusionary sphere of influence by a rival power (Ereker and Özer 2013, 188). As of 1995, the US began to support the BTC project. The political support of the US was important because international oil transportation and finance institutions were not finding this route economic (Uzgel 2015e, 281). Georgia became the center of Turkey's Caucasian policies due to the Armenia-centered developments and the BTC (Çelikpala 2010b, 99-100). The pipelines issue formed the strategic part of the American Eurasia policy beyond the transportation of oil to the international markets through the shortest route. The US formed her policy on the long-term strategic views. The US sought to realize the following:

- To tie opposing regional countries to each other politically.
- To transport the oil of the region through more than one pipeline.
- To break the monopoly of Russia over the energy pipelines.
- To reduce the dependency of the regional countries to Russia over energy pipelines.
- To disable Iran regarding pipelines (Uzgel 2015e, 280-281).

Thus, "*Russia would have eventually lost its leverage in the region*". The regional actors would be, aside from the regional rivalries, part of a global power struggle. "*The importance of the Black Sea region from a global power balance perspective made the US involvement in the region inevitable*" (Çelikpala 2010a, 291).

Turkish-Russian relations were severely strained through most of the 1990s over the risks to the environment of increased tanker traffic carrying petroleum from

the newly accessible Caspian Sea basin through the Turkish Straits for delivery to world markets (Sezer 2008, 128). Turkey felt that the lack of environmental awareness more than fifty years ago cannot be used to justify irresponsible use of the Straits (Sezer 1997, 20). When it appeared that the early production oil would be carried from the Novorossiysk Port through the Straits, Turkey called attention to the danger of this intense tanker traffic through the Straits (Tellal 2015f, 544). While Turkey was pressing for the transportation of Caspian crude oil through Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, it also sought to block the Baku-Novorossiysk option by questioning the safety of the oil shipment through the Turkish Straits (Tanrısever 2003, 127).

The *Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits and the Marmara Region*¹⁴ which was issued on 11 January 1994 entered into force on 1 July 1994. Russia viewed “*the Turkish move as a deliberate attempt to undermine the Russian project to ship Caspian oil from Novorossiysk through the Straits to world markets*” and “*entered into negotiations with Bulgaria and Greece for alternative pipelines that would bypass the Straits*” (Sezer 1997, 20). Russia argued in its Letter sent to the UNSG on 13 November 1995 accused Turkey regarding the Maritime Traffic regulations as the following:

“[G]o beyond the solution of technical problems related to ensuring safe navigation and do not conform to the provisions of the Convention regarding the regime of the Straits. ... In practice, Turkey’s attempt to amend, on a unilateral basis, the regime of navigation in the Straits has already resulted in considerable economic loss as a consequence of the unjustified detention of vessels prior to their entry into the Straits, first and foremost for countries of the Black Sea littoral. ... Turkey’s attempt to introduce unilaterally its own rules for transit through the Straits can create an extremely dangerous precedent for international shipping in other geographical regions” (United Nations 14/11/1995).

Turkey responded with its Letter sent to the UNSG on 7 December 1995 in which it stated the following:

“Owing to many physical constraints, the Straits already present a bottleneck for maritime traffic. The risks and dangers associated with tanker navigation, maritime accidents and environmental catastrophes are further aggravated by the increase in density of traffic, tanker size and cargo capacity, as well as the nature of the cargo. ... The Montreux Convention, which affirms the freedom of navigation through the Turkish Straits, at the same time highlights Turkey’s full sovereignty over the Straits area. The purpose of the new regulations is to ensure, to the extent possible, the safety of navigation while providing security to the inhabitants in

14 For the full text of the *Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits and the Marmara Region*, dated 11 January 1994, see, United Nations (2019).

and around the Straits area as well as the environment at the current dense level of maritime traffic. Turkey, fully cognizant of its responsibilities, has submitted traffic separation schemes (TSS) in the Turkish Straits to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The relevant bodies of IMO, the Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation and the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), have fully discussed and adopted the TSS and a set of associated special rules and recommendations having relevance to the safe navigation of large vessels in the straits of Istanbul and Çanakkale, for the purposes of the TSS. On the other hand, the Regulations, which fall within national jurisdiction and therefore were not submitted to IMO, are comprehensive in scope and contain detailed provisions covering all aspects of traffic management in the whole area of the Straits, as well as rules to be applied to all vessels irrespective of their size. ... In our times, it is not possible to consider, in the international law of the sea, the notion of "freedom of passage" independently from the notion of "safe navigation". ... As for the issue of delays, the safe passage of a large vessel could be ensured by temporarily suspending the TSS and two-way traffic and instituting one-way traffic arrangements. This could only be accomplished by requiring waiting periods at the entrance to the Straits. In many instances, the vessels of the complaining States had to await the safe passage of vessels flying their own flag. ...

From the very beginning, the Russian side has attributed ill intentions to the Turkish side. These attributions are totally unfounded, all the more so in the light of the record of implementation. The Russian side appears, in words, to have a certain consideration for Turkey's concerns on issues of safety, yet acts with well-known political and economic motives, in total disregard of these legitimate concerns... The letter presents a totally distorted view of the Maritime Traffic Regulations introduced by Turkey on 1 July 1994. By using very condensed and vague language, it intends to mislead those who are not very familiar with the issues involved. ... Turkey is and has always been receptive to suggestions for bilateral review of any complaints concerning the implementation of the Regulations. However, Turkey would be rather reluctant to enter into a debate with parties that choose to adopt confrontational approaches on this issue in international forums" (United Nations 08/12/1995).

Russia in its Letter sent to the UNSG on 9 January 1996 stated the following:

"The Turkish document, ... does not reflect the true state of affairs. Article 2 of the Montreux Convention provides that "... merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, under any flag and with any kind of cargo". ... The Russian side wishes to emphasize once again that, in drawing the attention of the United Nations to this issue, it is guided solely by the desire to prevent a situation arising which could lead to tension in the region. We have no doubt that Turkey, like the Russian Federation and the other countries of the region, endeavors to build its relations on a basis of good neighborliness and cooperation. However, the difficulties that have arisen can be overcome not by unilateral action, but through constructive dialogue, for which the Russian side is always ready. ... The Russian side notes Turkey's reluctance to acknowledge the fact that the problem which has arisen in connection with the regime for navigation through the Black Sea Straits has its origin not in a "purely technical issue", as is stated in paragraph 39 of document A/50/809, but in a point of principle relating to the discharge by a State of its obligations under international treaties. In this context, the Russian Federation considers that the General Assembly is an entirely appropriate forum for dealing with this issue" (United Nations 15/01/1996).

Both countries made four inconclusive meetings regarding the traffic regulations in the Straits between 1994 and 1996. Russia carried the topic to the IMO. Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania also supported Russia from time to time (Kolobov,

Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 171). Turkey insistently argued that there was no linkage between the regulation and the BTC pipeline (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 179).

Nearly a week after Russia's letter about the Straits, nine people with Caucasian origin sought to hijack a Turkish ferryboat named *Avrasya* from Trabzon to Sochi on 16 January 1996 to support the Chechen resistance against Moscow. The Russian FSB accused MIT of supporting the Chechens through clandestine activities (Tanrısever 2003, 128). The perpetrators were judged in Turkey by not kidnapping the ferryboat but by changing the course of the ferryboat. Sooner the convicts escaped from the prison. A park in Istanbul was given the name of Dudayev Park and a square in Ankara was given the name Dudayev Square (Tellal 2015f, 545).

Russia argued that the CFE treaty was a product of the Cold War, and, the limitation of the forces damaged her sovereignty and instability in the Caucasus and increased her security concerns (Kasım 2011, 121). Moscow demanded changes in the flank limits due to the changed political and military circumstances. The first war in Chechnya (11 December 1994 – 31 August 1996) seemed to give credence to Moscow's arguments.

“Russia was in breach of the treaty on November 17, 1995, the deadline for the completion of the mandated reductions. At the First Review Conference held in Vienna in May 1996, a compromise was reached, effectively allowing Russia another three years, until May 31, 1999, to comply with the numerical limitations. In addition, the size of the flank area in the Northern Caucasus was reduced, allowing Russia to concentrate the same amount of force in a much smaller area” (Sezer 1997, 22).

Turkey had resisted such concessions since 1993 but finally accepted under American pressure. Turkey believed that the revise of the treaty was a US concession to Russia to soften the latter's stand on NATO expansion (Sezer 1997, 22).

*Memorandum between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Russian Federation regarding Cooperation in the Field of Combatting Terrorism*¹⁵ was signed in Moscow on 18 December 1996. The parties agreed on the following issues in the field of combatting terrorism among others:

¹⁵ For the Turkish version of the full text of the *Memorandum between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Russian Federation regarding Cooperation in the Field of Combatting Terrorism*, dated 18 December 1996, see, Resmi Gazete (23/05/1997).

- The parties shall exchange information regarding terrorist groups which are taking malicious actions against the interests of the parties and relations of the terrorists groups with each other located in their countries.
- The parties shall exchange information regarding possible terrorist actions directed at their countries and citizens.
- The parties shall exchange information regarding drugs and arms trafficking which play important role in the finance of terrorist organizations (Resmi Gazete 23/05/1997).

The year 1997 has become the year of decreasing power and influence of Russia in the Caucasus (Demirağ 2013, 263). On 6 May 1997, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed the *Declaration on the Development of Strategic Partnership* in which it was stated that a priority was given to the BTC project (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 182).

The *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (NATO-Russia Founding Act) was signed on 27 May 1997 in Paris. According to the Act, the parties would consult and cooperate over the issues of common interest related to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area among other provisions:

“NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries; ... NATO and Russia will help to strengthen the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including developing further its role as a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation, as well as in enhancing its operational capabilities to carry out these tasks;

... [T]he shared objective of strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the benefit of all countries requires a response to new risks and challenges, such as aggressive nationalism, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, persistent abuse of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, and unresolved territorial disputes, which pose a threat to common peace, prosperity and stability;

To carry out the activities and aims provided for by this Act, and to develop common approaches to European security and to political problems, NATO and Russia will create the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council. The central objective of this Permanent Joint Council will be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia. ... Russia will establish a Mission to NATO headed by a representative at the rank of Ambassador” (as quoted in Melville and Shackleina 2005, 75-84).

4. Between the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) and the NATO Washington Summit (23-25 April 1999)

At the NATO Madrid Summit held between 8-9 July 1997, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were invited to begin accession talks (Kavuncu 2013, 311). Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) replacing NACC and NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) were established (Kavuncu 2013, 313). Russia's joining the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and signing the NATO–Russia Founding Act contradicted Russia's hostile tone. As Kubicek argues, “[t]he Russian side was basically forced to back down. ... NATO's will was determined, and various Russian efforts to sabotage expansion or water down NATO were rejected. A military response clearly was out of the question”. Thus, “Russia behaved as if it was a rational power-maximizing actor. It cooperated with the West since it lacked a reasonable alternative choice due to the determined will of the Western states and Russia's weak relative power position” (Thorun 2009, 54).

Russian influence in the post-Soviet regions steadily declined so that new international political and economic arrangements, such as GUAM¹⁶, were formed against Russian Federation (Hill 2003, 62). GUAM was established on 10 October 1997 during the Summit of Council of Europe in Strasbourg, among Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. GUAM provided a forum where pro-western former Soviet countries could gather around and exchange experiences (Aydın 2009, 273). Russia saw GUAM as a tool of containment by the US and NATO (Ereker and Özer 2013, 189).

By the end of 1997, Ankara and Moscow recognized that their rivalry was not likely to produce a clear victory to any of the parties, whereas this could undermine their national security and their relations with the western powers. It was the limitations in their capacities that pushed both countries to a more balanced relationship (Tanrıseven 2003, 129). Under the difficult conditions of the post-Cold War, Turkey and Russia needed each other to survive. Economic cooperation would

¹⁶ GUAM turned into GUUAM with the joining of Uzbekistan during the NATO Summit in Washington held between 23-25 April 1999 (Demirağ 2013, 263).

likely to moderate the geopolitical rivalry between the two states with certain limits due to their rapprochement without settling their rivalries over the CCAR (Tanrısever 2003, 135).

At the Luxemburg Summit of the EU held between 12-13 December 1997, the EU did not grant Turkey candidate country status despite some of the former Warsaw Pact members were granted. Turkey felt isolated and marginalized, thus, she refused to cooperate with the EU in almost all policy domains including foreign and security policy (Üstün 2010, 229).

The visit of PM Chernomyrdin to Ankara held between 16-17 December 1997 which was the first in 25 years by a Russian head of government was occurred in the aftermath of EU's closing the door to Turkey at the Luxembourg Summit on 12 December. Russia was claimed alternative foreign policy direction but the enormous significance of the visit was insufficient to surmount mutual suspicions regarding the CCAR (Sezer 2000a, 96). During the visit of Chernomyrdin, Turkey and Russia agreed to abstain from actions likely to harm the other's economic interests or threaten their territorial integrity. Russia also would not interfere in the construction of Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and in return Turkey promised to hire Russian companies to help building of the pipeline (Tanrısever 2003, 131). The focus of the visit was to sign the Blue Stream agreement which would bring Russian gas to Turkey through an underwater pipeline in the Black Sea. On 15 December 1997, 25-year *Natural Gas Purchase-Sale Agreement*¹⁷ was signed between BOTAŞ and Gazexport to transport natural gas from Russia through a transit line under the Black Sea to Turkey. The financing and construction of the part of the natural gas pipeline in the Russian Federation and under the Black Sea would be carried out by the GAZPROM Company and the financing and construction of the Turkish section by BOTAŞ. The Turkish part of the Blue Stream Project would start from Samsun and reach to Ankara via Amasya, Çorum and Kırıkkale (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources). There were objections towards the Blue Stream project since the natural gas could be brought much cheaper from Turkmenistan. The project would damage Turkey's relations with Turkmenistan

¹⁷ The pipeline was taken into operation on 20 February 2003 and the official opening ceremony was held on 17 November 2005 (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources).

and create a big dependence on Russia (Tellal 2015i, 548). Meanwhile, bilateral relations between Turkey and the US were started to be dealt under five agenda item during the visit of PM Mesut Yılmaz to Washington on 17 December 1997: regional cooperation, economy and commerce, energy, Cyprus, defense and security cooperation (Uzgel 2015e, 253).

4.1. The National Security Concept of Russia (17 December 1997)

Russia's perceived most important threat was the NATO expansion (Ereker and Özer 2013, 194). The *National Security Concept of the Russian Federation* of 17 December 1997 identified bloc politics as attempts to isolate Russia (Kropatcheva 2012, 33):

“The prospect of NATO expansion to the East is unacceptable to Russia since it represents a threat to its national security.

The Russian Federation's national interests in the international sphere require the implementation of an active foreign policy course aimed at consolidating Russia's positions as a great power: one of the influential centers of the developing multi-polar world. The main components of this course are the development of equal partnership with the other great powers; and the strengthening of those mechanisms of collective management of world political and economic processes in which Russia plays an important role.

Threats to the Russian Federation's national security in the international sphere are manifested via the attempts of other states to counter Russia's consolidation as an influential centre of the multi-polar world that is taking shape. This is reflected in actions aimed at destroying the Russian Federation's territorial integrity, including actions involving the use of inter-ethnic, religious, and other internal contradictions, and also in territorial claims involving allusions in individual cases to the lack of the precise registration of state borders in treaties. ... As a whole this could lead to the limitation of Russia's influence, the infringement of its most important national interests, and the weakening of its positions in Europe, the Near East, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia. ...

The conservation or creation by major powers (and their coalitions) of powerful groupings of armed forces in regions adjacent to Russia's territory remains a threat to Russia's national security in the defense sphere. Even when there are no aggressive intentions with regard to Russia, these groupings present a potential military danger” (as quoted in Federation of American Scientists 2019b).

4.2. The Crisis of the S-300 Missile Deployment in Southern Cyprus (January 1997-1998)

Following the news about the Greek Cypriot purchase of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles (SA-10C) leaked to media on 3 January 1997 (Federation of

American Scientists 2016), Greek Cypriot government announced on 5 January 1997 that it had acquired Russian S-300 missile system. While Greek Cypriot government argued that it had legitimate right to enhance its defence capabilities, Turkey announced that this would undermine peace in the region (Kambas 2016). The Russian arms export organization, Росвооружение (*Rasvooruzheniye*), informed that the sale of S-300 missile system would not adversely affect the balance of power in the region as the weapons were purely defensive (Shukshin 2016). The range of the missiles were 150 km which could hit Turkish air space from just 70 km away Cyprus.

For Turkey, the issue was not limited to the changing balance in Cyprus. Turkey pointed out that her territories became vulnerable to attacks from Cyprus. This would lead to a breakdown in Turkish-Greek military balance (Firat 2015, 471). Another reason of Turkey's severe reaction was the *Agreement on Joint Defense Policy and Joint Defense Area between Greece and Greek Cypriot Administration* signed in 1993. The deployment of Greek Jets in a base near Paphos would turn S-300 into an attack weapon. It was also argued that Russia planned to prevent NATO's eastward expansion by pitting Turkey and Greece to each other (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 164-166).

Turkey started to use *Brinkmanship Policy* which may be defined as to coerce adversary power consciously and deteriorate the relations in order to confront it with choices to change policy or prefer to wage war. When Turkey's decision to launch pre-emptive strike to prevent the deployment of the missiles in the island became clear, the situation was escalated by the decision of Greece to send F-16 fighter jets to Cyprus. In September 1997, Turkey began to surveil all the ships suspected to carry the S-300 missiles passing through the Straits and intercepted all the ships carrying military cargo under the pretext that it carried S-300 missiles. The Russian ambassador in Ankara stated that any attack to a ship carrying S-300 missiles to Cyprus would be considered as *casus belli* (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 163-165).

The US government, concerning from the operation of Russian military personnel in Cyprus in the framework of sale contract and the tracking of NATO aircraft movements by S-300 missile system, launched a diplomatic campaign to settle the Cyprus question if the Greek Cypriots did not take the delivery of the missile

system. The NATO officials warned that Turkey would probably carry out its threat against missile installations. Meanwhile, deployment of the missile system in the Greek island of Crete emerged as the most pleasant option. NATO governments urged Greece to find a face-saving way to avoid bringing the weapons to Cyprus (Fitchett 2016). Under the American pressure, the Greek Cypriot government announced that the S-300 missile system would be deployed in the Greek island of Crete. Although the delicate situation was diverted to the Aegean Sea, this did not ease the heavy concerns of Turkey. Greece proclaimed that it would not activate the missiles and they were there for storage. Although this proclamation kept the balance of power intact, Turkey was forced to improve the radar system and reconsider its defence priorities in the region (Aksu 2001, 17).

The country most profited from this crisis was Russia. She both sold weapons and caused the emergence of conflicts among NATO members (Fırat 2015, 472). The factor making the S-300 crisis important with respect to Turkish-Russian relations was its influence on the re-formation of mutual images in Turkish-Russian relations which underwent fundamental change in the aftermath of the Cold War. The crisis carried clues demonstrating that which type of patterns of behavior would come to foreground in the future Turkish-Russian relations. The factors which may be underlined that the crisis revealed were to avoid from actions which would destroy current ground of relations having common benefits besides competition (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 166-167).

Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and Republic of Armenia was signed on 29 August 1997. Turkey and Azerbaijan criticized this military agreement strongly arguing that this agreement constituted a serious intervention of Russia to the balance of power in the Southern Caucasus. Russia and Armenia stated that the agreement did not target any third country (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 146). The Founding Members¹⁸ of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation established the *Organization of the Black Sea*

¹⁸ The Republic of Albania, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Bulgaria, Georgia, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey, and Ukraine.

Economic Cooperation (BSEC), by signing the *Charter of BSEC* on 5 June 1998 in Yalta. The area of cooperation was defined in the article four of the Charter as the following:

“... [T]rade and economic development; banking and finance; communications; energy; transport; agriculture and agro-industry; health care and pharmaceuticals; environmental protection; tourism; science and technology; exchange of statistical data and economic information; collaboration between customs and other border authorities; human contacts; combating organized crime, illicit trafficking of drugs, weapons and radioactive materials, all acts of terrorism and illegal migration, or in any other related area, following a decision of the Council” (BSEC).

Triantaphyllou (as cited in Tsantoulis 2009, 247) suggests that BSEC was created rather to pursue Turkey’s own interests, to expand its influence and create some sort of international support and legitimacy for its policies. However, Turkey’s BSEC strategy was hard to achieve in practice since the complex contests between almost all the members (Greece and Turkey, Russia and Ukraine and Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) proved too obdurate. Three of the BSEC members became members of the more powerful EU alliance (Hale 2013, 209-210). Akgün (as cited in Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 159) qualified the BSEC as a stillborn organization. The BSEC began to lose its importance due to the following reasons:

- Other cooperation and integration efforts of the member states decelerated the in-depth development of the organization.
- Inclusion of the Balkan and Caucasian states in the BSEC complicated the formation of common political orientation.
- Many members of the BSEC had bilateral or regional conflicts.

Meanwhile, the US military aid to Turkey came to an end in 1998 despite Turkey continued to depend on the US as its principal source of new weapon systems and military technology. The US Congress began to restrict arms transfers to Turkey to pressure Ankara to improve its human rights records and to modify its position in the Turkish-Greek disputes. The withholding of military equipment sometimes paid by Turkey bitterly resented Turkey (Sayarı 2003, 35).

The penetration of the Caspian region by western oil companies and the US support to construct multiple pipelines to end Russia’s monopoly on Caspian oil transit

expanded the traditional military focus on geopolitics to include geo-economics (Trenin 2009, 9). The US increased her efforts and attempts in 1998 for the realization of the BTC project. The *Trans-Caspian Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe Gas Pipeline Agreement (TCP¹⁹)* was initialized between Turkey and Turkmenistan on 20 October 1998. The *Ankara Declaration* accepting the Baku-Ceyhan line as the main transportation line of the Caspian oil to the world market was signed among Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on 29 October 1998 at a ceremony to which the American Secretary of Energy also took part (Uzgel 2015e, 281). The BTC created a platform for deeper political and military cooperation among Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey that insulated Georgia from Russian pressure and facilitated its cooperation with NATO (Kuchins and Mankoff 2013, 16).

As a result of Turkey's threatening Syria over its support for the PKK, the Syrian government forced Öcalan, the leader of PKK, to leave the country but did not turn him over to the Turkish authorities. Öcalan arrived at Moscow before he received answer from Russian intelligence services on 9 October 1998. On 20 October, Turkish PM Yılmaz announced that Öcalan was in Russia. The Turkish government circles stated that the trade volume between Turkey and Russia was \$5 billion, Turkey and Russia recently signed Blue Stream agreement and expressed the belief that Russia would not stand up for the deterioration of the relations. On 27 October, Turkey officially demanded from Russia the extradition of Öcalan to Turkey. Russia responded that anybody named Öcalan did not come to Russia and they were still continuing to search him. On 4 November, Yeltsin rejected the request of Duma to grant asylum to Öcalan. With this negative response²⁰, Russia approached to Turkey one step and the Caspian oil share was put into practice. As a next step of the bargaining, Russia would not object to the construction of the BTC pipeline. Turkey, in return, would not limit the passage of the supertankers carrying Kazakh Tengiz oil

¹⁹ However, TCP was gradually receded into background. A coolness appeared between Turkey and Turkmenistan between 1999-2000 which echoed on economic relations in 2000. Turkmenistan, which owned the 35% of world gas reserves, argued that Turkey did not use her strategic preference in favour of it (Aydın 2006, 26-29).

²⁰ Russia's refusal to grant PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan asylum in November 1998 marked a turning point (Winrow 2007, 127). Öcalan left Moscow on the night of 12-13 November 1998 for Rome. Öcalan came to Russia on 15 January 1999 for the second time to leave on 29 January (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 241-245).

from Novorossiysk to the world markets through the Straits (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 241-245).

The Turkish *Maritime Traffic Regulations*²¹ was issued on 06 November 1998. The provisions of the new Regulations demonstrated that Turkey paid attention to the objections of her neighbors. There are substantial changes in the new regulation compared to the previous one. Many references to international agreements were made in the new regulation. Many rules retarding or complicating the passage of the vessels have been annulled. Art.49 of the Regulation removed Russia's concerns by exempting warships from the rules of the regulation. At the stage of the preparation of the document a close cooperation between Ankara and Moscow was held (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 171,186).

Öcalan was captured in Nairobi with the assistance of the US in February 1999. Thereafter, the PKK terrorist actions stopped dead. This was an important development for the transportation of oil through the Turkish territories (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 185).

4.3. The Kosovo Crisis (1998-1999)

Turkey and Russia had different views during the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999. However, the competition experienced between Turkey and Russia in the Balkans never reached to the level of competition experienced in the Caucasus (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 141). The US-led NATO military action in Kosovo undermined the post-Cold War framework of security, which allegedly was to be based on an enhanced role for the UN and OSCE, and strict compliance with the UN Charter and international law. The framework was also based on the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, partnership between Russia and NATO, joint peacekeeping operations, and comprehensive arms control and disarmament measures (Arbatov 2003, 27). For Russia, NATO's operation in Kosovo, which was performed without a UN mandate, was an act of aggression against a sovereign state and meant the breach of the international law (Kelkitli 2012, 211).

²¹ For the full text of the *Turkish Maritime Regulations*, in Turkish, see, Resmi Gazete (06/11/1998).

4.4. The First Round NATO Enlargement (12 March 1999)

On 12 March 1999, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined to NATO. NATO's military action against Yugoslavia began on 24 March 1999 was perceived as a slap in the face for Russia which demonstrated more than ever before the West's intention to overlook Russian interests. It was a particularly painful humiliation for Moscow since President Yeltsin had guaranteed Yugoslavia's security. NATO's offensive against Yugoslavia appeared to be a clear demonstration of a genuine transformation of that alliance. Its new strategic concept, adopted at the April 1999 summit, claimed a much greater mission in the post-Cold-War world. This implied the self-proclaimed right to act independently, without UN or OSCE authorization (Arbatov 2003, 28).

The reaction of Russia was to suspend its participation to the *Founding Act* and *PfP*, withdraw its military mission from Brussels, expel NATO representatives from Moscow, and remove Russian troops from the NATO operational command in Bosnia. As a result, Russia was not allowed to have its own military sector in Kosovo. The Russian military contingent was deployed in the US, German and French sectors (Kelkitli 2012, 217).

4.5. The NATO Washington Summit: Out of Area and the Enlargement Decision (23-25 April 1999)

The NATO Washington Summit was held between 23-25 April 1999. In the *Washington Summit Communique* issued on 24 April, it was stated among others that, for the NATO of the 21st century started at that day, the parties concluded the following topics:

“[A]pproved an updated Strategic Concept; reaffirmed our commitment to the enlargement process of the Alliance and approved a Membership Action Plan for countries wishing to join; completed the work on key elements of the Berlin Decisions on building the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance and decided to further enhance its effectiveness; [and] launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative” (NATO 2019g).

At the Summit, NATO removed the *out of area* discussions and accepted that it could intervene to the crises even a direct attack to any member did not exist and decided to launch the *Defence Capabilities Initiative* to develop troops having rapid

movement capability to organize operations out of the territories of the member states (Uzgel 2015e, 306-307):

“Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind” (NATO 2019g).

Turkey made a reservation²² to the phrase that the *European Security and Defense Identity* (ESDI) would readily access to the collective assets and capabilities of NATO concerning from being by-passed with a decision taken by the WEU. Turkey’s objections resulted with the amendment of the article 30 of the *New Strategic Concept* (Kavuncu 2013, 315):

“... the European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union. It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities;... and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose” (NATO 2019a).

Oran (2015d, 238-242) argues that Turkey is an equilibrist pro-status quo state (dengeci statükocu) and she can force the status quo only for defensive purposes and in the forms that international law deems legal. However, he argues that it became impossible to maintain this policy in a unipolar world dominated by western globalism in the economic and political fields. The chain of humanitarian intervention institutionalized in the Washington Summit of NATO in 1999 became a model, and Turkey indexed her foreign policy to the US. This carried the risk to reduce the alliance relationship to the level of a satellite position. This threat is more serious for a country

²² Turkey used her veto for the first time in the history of NATO to prevent the allocation of NATO’s capabilities to the EU without her consent (Kalaycıoğlu 2012, 126).

whose economic foreign dependency raised to a great extent. Under these conditions, Turkey might be forced to do something that she never wanted.

5. Between the NATO Washington Summit in 1999 and NATO at 20 (28 May 2002)

The US *Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999* dated 11 May 1999 authorized assistance in the humanitarian, economic, migration and refugee, development, border control, and democracy areas to the Caucasian and Central Asian countries in order to promote their independence, assist in the resolution of regional conflicts, promote economic cooperation and market-oriented principles, support US business interests and investments. The Act prohibited assistance to the governments of the South Caucasus and Central Asia if they violate human rights, transfer controlled missiles or missile technology to another country including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and support acts of international terrorism. The Act also amended the *Freedom Support Act* to waive the restriction on assistance to Azerbaijan if such restriction would not be in the national interest of the US (Congress 11/05/1999).

With a resolution taken by the support of the US, UK, Germany, France, Holland and Japan in the IMO in May 1999, the Turkish Straits issue was taken off the agenda on the condition that Turkey ought to establish Vessel Traffic System (VTS) and take other necessary measures in the Straits. The US support could not be explained independently from the US preference regarding the BTC oil pipeline (Özersay 2017, 819).

The Turkish-American relations was defined as *strategic partnership* during the visit of PM Ecevit to Washington in September 1999 (Uzgel 2015e, 253). Thereafter, PM Ecevit visited Moscow on 4-6 November 1999. It was argued that main purpose of the visit was to remove Russian objections and impedition towards the BTC project. Russia insisted on the realization of the Blue Stream project in return. At the end of the visit of Ecevit to Moscow, while the Second Chechen war was continuing, Turkey and Russia issued a *Joint Declaration between the Government of the Republic Turkey and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation*

to *Combat Terrorism*²³. With this joint declaration, both parties denounced terrorism and pledged joint efforts to fight it. Ecevit's move demonstrated the priority to upgrade relations with Russia at the risk of alienating Turkey's 5-6 million citizens of Caucasus origin (Sezer 2008, 129). Ecevit could not meet with President Yeltsin but met with PM Putin during his visit to Moscow (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 249).

At the OSCE Summit, on 18 November 1999, the *Intergovernmental Agreement* was signed between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey for the construction of BTC oil pipeline. Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ) became the Turnkey Contractor for the part of BTC pipeline in Turkey. BOTAŞ International Limited (BIL) became the operator of the part of BTC pipeline (Figure 7.1) in Turkey (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources).




Figure 8.1. Oil Pipelines

Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. 2018. "Oil Pipelines." accessed September 19. <https://www.enerji.gov.tr/en-US/Pages/Oil-Pipelines>.

²³ Russia closed down the Kurdish Home in Yaroslavl on 20 September 2000 (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 255-256).

The Agreement²⁴ was signed with the testimony of the US President Bill Clinton. The US Secretary of State announced that this was a political victory which would develop the strategic interests of the US (Uzgel 2015e, 281). The BTC project which became the centerpiece of Turkish foreign policy in the Transcaucasia significantly reduced Russia's leverage over the Caspian states (Hale 2013, 213). The energy sector within the context of transferring Caspian resources to the western markets was a leading sector in Turkey's seeking to strengthen her relations with the West. The BTC was launched within the framework of regional balances and global relations and formed the basis in shaping Turkey's relations with her allies and regional policies (Çelikpala 2010b, 96).

Since Russia exceeded the limitations of the CFE in the northern Caucasus one more time in the fall of 1999 when the second Chechnya war intensified (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 162), the *Agreement on Adaptation of The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*²⁵ was signed on 19 November 1999 at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul (Oran 2015d, 208). This was a concession given to Russia which objected to the eastward expansion of NATO (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 162). The adapted treaty eliminated the zones and set territorial ceilings for each state in order to guard against weapons accumulations. Twenty countries set their territorial ceilings equal to their national ceilings. This required “*a country's own TLE holdings on its territory to be lower than its national ceilings if the country wants foreign forces stationed within its borders*”. The adapted treaty allowed countries to host temporary foreign deployments in certain limitations (Boese).

The *Final Act* ^[26] “*generally reinforced the adapted treaty's aim of keeping armament levels low in regions of historical conflict*” and attempted to alleviate Russia's unease with NATO expansion. Moscow reciprocated by pledging that “*in the present politico-military situation it has no reasons, plans or intentions to station*

²⁴ The *Host Government Agreement* that is appendix of the Intergovernmental Agreement was signed between the Republic of Turkey and Main Export Pipeline Participants on 19 October 2000 (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources).

²⁵ For the full text of the *Agreement on Adaptation of The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, signed on 19 November 1999, see, OSCE (2019a).

²⁶ For the full text of the *Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, dated 19 November 1999, see, OSCE (2019b).

substantial additional combat forces” in the Kaliningrad and Pskov oblasts on a permanent basis. “*In its southern flank, Russia pledged to reduce its TLE holdings in Georgia to a level equalling a basic temporary deployment by the end of next year- to which Georgia consented.*” The parties pledged to review the status of all the pledges in the next review conference scheduled for May 2001 (Boese). The US and NATO allies have conditioned their ratification of the treaty on Russia’s fulfilling its Final Act pledges (Lomagin 2010, 196).

President Demirel proposed a *Caucasus Stability Pact* (CSP) during his visit to Georgia in January 2000 based on OSCE norms and values. The proposed revised CSP would be in a 3+3+2 framework, which would cover three Caucasian states together with Turkey, Iran, and Russia. It would also receive technical support and financial assistance from the EU and the US (Winrow 2007, 128). Georgia and Azerbaijan welcomed the proposal (Sezer 2008, 134). This would provide security and stability and contribute to the economic development of the regional countries. A pact, including Azerbaijan, Russia, Armenia and Turkey and when the circumstances allow with the participation of Iran, US, EU²⁷, and OSCE, would reduce the influence of Russia in the region and increase that of Turkey, create the opportunity for the involvement of the US and western countries in the region (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 153-154).

Although Russia announced that it conceded to the foundation of a pact, disclosed its dissatisfaction with a diplomatic language. According to Russian experts, this pact was carrying the purpose to weaken the position of Iran in the Southern Caucasus. In 2001, Georgian president Shevardnadze declared that Georgia should be the northern forward outpost of the Turkey-centered security axis rather than being the southern belt of the Russia security zone (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 154).

²⁷ The EU 2000 *Regular Report* asked Turkey to materialize the Caucasus Stability Pact. However, the idea was stillborn due to the inhospitable international environment (Üstün 2010, 230).

5.1. Official Documents Reflecting Russia's Reaction to US-led Western Unilateralism

The new versions of the Russian national security concept and Military Doctrine clearly reflected Moscow's reaction to the Balkan war. Therefore, the Kosovo war triggered a major revision of the Russian national security concept, defense doctrine and military policy (Arbatov 2003, 27-29).

"The question often raised in Moscow [was] whether Kosovo and Chechnya [were] links in a chain of steps toward the creation of a one-dimensional, NATO-centered world (Blank 2000, 24). Kosovo was the last straw uniting many of the most feared military and political elements of threat. NATO's new Strategic Concept "expanded the alliance's mission to include non-NATO Europe as a potential area for further NATO use of force". It was also argued that "NATO's Kosovo operation represented the template of future NATO operations against Russia or its vital interests in the 'near abroad' as outlined in NATO's April 1999 Strategy Concept". NATO's designs of enlargement and unilateral out-of-area operations on both the Balkans and the Caucasus were perceived threat to Russian national security interests (Blank 2000, 3-5). Seen through the Russia perspective, it can be argued that these documents were prepared to prevent the developments which could make Russia experience one more dissolution process (Kibaroglu 2001, 103).

5.1.1. National Security Conception of the Russian Federation (10 January 2000)

The *National Security Conception of the Russian Federation* was issued on 10 January 2000. According to the Security Conception, the domination of the US-led western nations was providing unilateral solutions to the key problems of global politics. However, Russia's national interests was consisted of *"enhancement of Russia's position as a great power and one of the influential centers in a multipolar world"*. NATO's practice of the use of force *"beyond the alliance's area of responsibility and without the sanction of the UN Security Council [might] destabilize the strategic situation in the world"*. Russia's military presence in some strategically important regions of the world, the deployment of limited military bases or naval

forces in such regions in compliance with agreements would “*ensure Russia’s ability to fulfill its obligations, facilitate the creation of a stable military-strategic balance of forces in these regions, enable Russia to react to crisis situations in their initial stage, and facilitate the achievement of the state’s foreign policy goals*” (Melville and Shackleina 2005, 129-146).

The existing conflict resolution and peacekeeping instruments such as the UN, OSCE and NATO and the security and confidence building arrangements like the CFE Treaty were not totally successful in dealing with the territorial, nationalistic, ethnic and religious disputes (Aydin 2007, 104). Threats to the national security of Russia could be seen in other states’ attempts to undermine its position in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region. The main threats directed at Russia according to the National Security Conception were being conditioned by the following:

“[T]he devalue the role of the existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all those of the UN and the OSCE; the eastward enlargement of NATO; possible emergence of foreign military bases and large military contingents in direct proximity to the Russian borders; decline of the integration processes within the Commonwealth of Independent States; and emergence and escalation of conflicts in proximity to the state borders of the Russian Federation and external borders of member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States” (as quoted in Melville and Shackleina 2005, 129-146).

5.1.2. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (21 April 2000)

When Putin became president on 26 March 2000, Russia’s relations with her neighbors and her near abroad were shaped by the following basic factors: to bring energy resources to the fore, to give priority to the commercial relations, to try to determine regional balances by using ethnic conflicts and clashes, and to combat terrorism. Putin aimed to create a new Russia keeping feet on the ground by using her resources effectively. His basic objective was to create a Russia having a voice in global developments (Çelikpala 2017b, 532-533). The multipolar international system which began to be discussed since the second half of the 1990s was turned into a main foreign policy objective of Russia. In this direction, Russia approached to Britain, France and Germany, and began to pursue a comprehensive policy towards CIS

countries, China and India (Demirağ 2013, 264). As Nation and Trenin suggest (as cited in Tsantoulis 2009, 252) Russia's resurgent strategic thinking resembled to the pre-WWI environment of ruthless strategic competition among major powers rather than returning to Cold War mentality.

"Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" was issued on 21 April 2000. The Military Doctrine was a document for a transitional period marked by *"the period of the formation of democratic statehood and a mixed economy, the transformation of the state's military organization, and the dynamic transformation of the system of international relations"*. The Military Doctrine elaborated the main provisions for the Military Doctrine of 1993 and specified the guidelines of the National Security Concept of Russia (Melville and Shackleina 2005, 105). According to the military doctrine, the following factors were exerting a destabilizing effect on the military-political situation:

"[A]ttempts to diminish (ignore) the existing mechanisms for ensuring international security (particularly the UN and OSCE); the use of military action by way of "humanitarian intervention" without the sanction of the UN Security Council; the violation by certain states of international treaties and agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament; [and] the operation of extremist nationalist, religious, separatist, and terrorist movements, organizations, and structures" (as quoted in Melville and Shackleina 2005, 107).

Some of the main external threats were enumerated as the following in the military doctrine:

"[A]ttempts to ignore (violate) the interests of the Russian Federation in resolving international security problems, and to oppose its strengthening as an influential center in a multipolar world; the existence of seats of armed conflict, particularly close to the state border of the Russian Federation and the borders of its allies; the formation (buildup) of groups of troops (forces), leading to the violation of the existing balance of forces, close to the Russian Federation's state border and the borders of its allies, or on the seas adjoining their territories; the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the military security of the Russian Federation; [and] the entry of foreign troops, in contravention of the UN Charter, onto the territory of friendly states adjoining the Russian Federation" (as quoted in Melville and Shackleina 2005, 107).

5.1.3. Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation (28 June 2000)

The Putin approach was envisaging a downsized global outlook reflecting the calculation that Russia's limited economic means needed to be deployed rationally for

the country. Foreign Minister Ivanov described the realist aspect of the Foreign Policy Concept by saying that “*Our foreign policy priorities are now more closely linked than before to the long-term tasks of internal development and are more in keeping with Russia’s real possibilities and resources*” (Sezer 2008, 124). The *Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation* issued on 28 June 2000 was revealing the new Russian foreign policy as the following:

“... [T]he main efforts should be directed ... to form a belt of good-neighborliness along the perimeter of Russia’s borders, to promote the elimination of existing hotbeds of tension and conflict, and prevent the emergence of anymore, in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation...

Russia will promote a multipolar system of international relations that will genuinely reflect the diversity of the contemporary world and its great variety of interests.

The global order of the 21st century must be based on mechanisms for the collective resolution of key problems, and on the precedence of law and broad democratization of international affairs.

Proceeding from the principle of multi-speed and multi-level integration within the CIS framework, Russia will regulate the characteristics and nature of its interaction with CIS member states both within the CIS as a whole, and within smaller associations, primarily the Customs Union and the Collective Security Treaty. A priority task is to strengthen the Union of Belarus and Russia.

... “The Russian Federation regards the EU as one of its main political and economic partners, and will strive to develop with it an intensive, stable and longterm cooperation that is not susceptible to fluctuations governed by expediency.

... NATO’s new strategic concept, which do not rule out operations employing force beyond the zone of the application of the Washington Treaty and without the sanction of the UN Security Council,...” [runs counter to Russia’s interests] (as quoted in Melville and Shackleina 2005, 89-103).

On 26 September 2000, Russia and Armenia signed the *Declaration on Allied Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia Directed towards the Twenty-first Century* in Moscow. According to the Treaty,

“The Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia will coordinate their foreign policy activities with a view to carrying out joint or agreed actions aimed at strengthening security in the Caucasus region. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia believe that the basis for strengthening security and developing cooperation in the Caucasus is interaction between all the countries of the region and they attach special importance to the constructive role of the “Caucasus Four”²⁸ (Art.5).

²⁸ Russia seeks to institutionalize its influence in the Caucasus through military presence and regional security mechanisms within a *Caucasus-Four* format of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia under the Russian leadership.

The Republic of Armenia notes with satisfaction the constructive role of the Russian Federation in the settlement of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict (Art.6).

The Parties will cooperate actively to ensure joint defence within the framework of common military strategic goals on the basis of the Treaty on Collective Security of 15 May 1992” (Art.7); ...” (United Nations 02/10/2000).

Declaration on the Enlargement of EU which was issued at the Nice Summit held between 7-8 December 2000 stated that the number of the EU members in the future would be 27 and Turkey²⁹ was not one of them (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 286). On 12 March 2001, *Turkey-Azerbaijan Intergovernmental Agreement* about the construction of the *Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum* (BTE) natural gas pipeline which aimed to supply natural gas produced from the Shah Deniz field of Azerbaijan to Turkey was signed. BOTAŞ and SOCAR signed a 15-year Natural Gas Purchase-Sale Agreement for the transportation of 6.6 billion m³ of Azerbaijan natural gas to Turkey annually (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources).

5.2. The BLACKSEAFOR: Turkey’s Move to Prevent American Military Presence in the Black Sea (2 April 2001)

One of the important aspect of Turkey’s policy towards the Black Sea region was to prevent direct conflict between Russia and the western powers which brought Turkey into a degree of alignment with Russia (Hale 2013, 210). Both Turkey and Russia shared common strategy to prevent western military, naval and political interference into the Black Sea (Minchev 2006, 10). When the global asymmetric risks and threats in the Black Sea were brought to the agenda by the America-centric attempts for the justification of the US presence in the region, Turkey decided to launch a series of cooperation mechanisms³⁰ with the Black Sea littoral countries to avert this process. Among these, there was an idea to establish a naval task group among the Black Sea littoral states (Aydın 2017b, 527). Russia suspected that Turkey wished to include the US into this force and therefore did not join for a while. When

²⁹ At the Helsinki Summit of EU held between 10-11 December 1999, Turkey had been granted candidate country status (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 286).

³⁰ Among these mechanisms, there were *Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Black Sea Maritime Area* signed on 25 April 2002, *Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center*, and *Black Sea Provide Comfort* started by Turkey as her own national operation on 1 March 2004 (Aydın 2017b, 527).

the US could not join the force, she wanted to make Greece involve in this scheme building its reason on the membership of Greece in the BSEC. However, only Black Sea littoral countries could join this task force (İşyar 2013, 115). The BLACKSEAFOR (*The Black Sea Naval Co-Operation Task Group*) agreement was signed by the Black Sea littoral countries in Istanbul on 2 April 2001 among Turkey, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. The Task Group would be a multinational force, and contribute to search and rescue, minesweeping, environmental protection, and security-building measures. The Task Force at the beginning would be activated³¹ when needed or for training purposes (Uzgel 2015d, 522-523).

5.3. The Impact of the 9/11 on the Turkish-Russian Relations (2001-2007)

The 9/11 attacks were a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks with four passenger airliners hijacked by 19 al-Qaeda terrorists in the US on 11 September 2001. Two of the planes were crashed into the north and south towers of the World Trade Center. A third plane was crashed into the Pentagon. The fourth plane crashed into a field in Pennsylvania after its passengers thwarted the hijackers. This attack resulted in the beginning of American war on terror. The US waged war on Al-Qaeda and its protector Taliban regime in Afghanistan by establishing a chain of alliance (Kalaycioğlu 2012, 103-104).

The 11 September attacks placed the discourse of *global war on terrorism* to the center of the American foreign policy. At the first stage, the US invaded Afghanistan and toppled Taliban rule in October 2001 (Uzgel 2017b, 249). The US launched a NATO initiative within the context to combat terrorism in eastern Mediterranean in October 2001, so called, *Operation Active Endeavour* (OAE). The OAE would be patrolling in eastern Mediterranean to prevent any terrorist attempt to threat safe navigation of the vessels and to prevent the movement of terrorists or weapons of mass destruction. Thus, commercial naval traffic in the eastern

³¹ The BLACKSEAFOR was first activated between 27 September-16 October 2001 under the Turkish command. The second activation was under the Ukrainian command in August 2002; the third activation was under the Bulgarian command between 3-31 August 2003 (Bozkurt 2011, 5). The BLACKSEAFOR functions on the basis of six months of rotations under the command of a determined country after 2004 (Aydn 2017b, 527-528).

Mediterranean was taken under control by NATO (Özersay 2017, 819). During the American invasion of Afghanistan, Turkey opened her bases to the American jets and gave logistical support since Turkey was dependent on the US in the political/military fields besides economic field (Oran 2017a, 144).

In the aftermath of the intervention in Afghanistan ensuing the 9/11 event, definition of the Black Sea region by the US as a kind of *power vacuum* placed it in the center of the western security policies (Ereker and Özer 2013, 169). The US reassessed its geostrategic interest in the region and added a military dimension to its strategy by enhancing the role of NATO. The priorities of the US towards the region entailed geopolitical, security, economic, commercial and humanitarian aspects (Çelikpala 2010a, 292).

The US-Russian tension demonstrated sign of amelioration for a while following Russia's support extended to the West in the aftermath of 9/11 (Kasım 2011, 124). Putin supported the US military intervention against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan by facilitating the US access to air bases in Central Asia (Kanet 2010, 212). Despite this, Russia made clear that it viewed the US presence as temporary and tied directly to the war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda (Kanet and Homarac 2007, 187). Russia's support reinforced the image of a cooperative Russia on several vital international security issues (Sezer 2008, 125). Putin sought for a strategic partnership with the US. While Yeltsin had sought integration into the West, Putin aimed at integration with the West. Russia would accept a pro-Western orientation in eastern and southern Europe, allow the Baltic States' future entry into NATO and the EU, withdraw itself from the Balkans and even tolerate temporarily US military bases in Central Asia and a US military assistance to Georgia in return for the recognition of Moscow's primacy in the CIS. However, the US did not want to bind herself by making agreements with lesser partners (Trenin 2009, 10).

The US had brought the *Strategic Defense Initiative* (SDI) (nicknamed as Star Wars) of 1983 to the agenda under the *National Missile Defense* (NMD) name towards the end of 1990s. The reason was the threat emanated from the missiles owned by countries such as Northern Korea, Iran and Iraq which were defined by the US as *rogue states*. Since these missiles did not have sufficient range to reach the US, main aim of

the US was to obtain an assurance against the ICBMs and other missiles of China and Russia, to expand its area of movement by strengthening its superpower position through becoming a completely invulnerable state and to maintain its civilian and military superiority in the aftermath of the Cold War. Therefore, the US launched this project by violating the ABM Treaty of 1972 (Uzgel 2015e, 311). Turkey gave the impression that it leaned towards the project while Russia and China were objecting, and other NATO members were abstaining. The US proclaimed that Turkey was surrounded by four (Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria) of the five dangerous rogue states. There was the possibility that the project could negatively affect Turkey's relations with her neighbors (Uzgel 2015e, 311). The US announced on 13 December 2001 that it would withdraw from the ABM Treaty as of 13 June 2002. On the following day, Russia responded that it would no longer be bound by the START II. This was an indicator of the changing atmosphere formed after 9/11 (Kasım 2011, 198).

Minchev (2006, 4) argues that the US contemplated the Black Sea as “*a strategic corridor, serving three basic and interrelated strategic causes*”: The Black Sea was connecting Europe with Central Asia through the Caucasus. Central Asia was the seat of geo-strategic balance between China and the West in the 21st century. The level of control in Central Asia would determine to a large extent the preconditions for the global contest between the US and China. Controlling the agenda of the Black Sea and the Caucasus would provide the US to fully integrate Turkey and Russia into the western alliance. In case of the failure of the US, Turkey and Russia would dominate the region with their powerful resources for autonomous strategic games. The Black Sea was also an important commercial route and energy corridor. Thus, it could provide Europe with alternative oil and gas resources reducing its energy dependence on the Middle East and Russia (Minchev 2006, 4). The US announced that her three sets of long-term interests in the CCAR were “*preventing the spread of terrorism, ... assisting the Central Asian states with economic and political reform and the establishment of the rule of law, and ... ensuring the security and transparent development of Caspian energy resources*” (Kanet and Homarac 2007, 175). Within this framework, Oktay (as cited in Tsantoulis 2009, 250) points out that the US deployed a twofold strategy in the Caucasus in the aftermath of 9/11: conciliation and

alignment with regional countries like Turkey Georgia and Azerbaijan, and containment and isolation of Iran and Russia.

However, basic western interests in the Black Sea region was differed between the US and the major powers of the EU. They both pursued strategies for change and transformation of the Black Sea region motivated by different only partially coinciding agendas. While the US perceived Russia as an opponent, Germany and France accepted Russia's legitimate right to keep its own sphere of influence around its borders (Minchev 2006, 3-6). While the US was after "*security matters and the primacy of NATO, the EU emphasised joint projects in the region, which could establish a sense of mutual security and guaranteed long-term collaboration*". This was demonstrating that the EU was more of a soft power than the US (Çelikpala 2010a, 294).

Following these developments in the Caucasus, two different axis emerged in the region: Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan axis, and Russia-Armenia-Iran Axis. The first one was west-east axis and the second one was north-south axis. Besides, Greece and Syria could be added to the second axis, and the US could be added to the first axis. There were three triangles in the region containing the other. These were the Baku-Tbilisi-Yerevan triangle, Tehran-Ankara-Moscow triangle, and the US-EU-Far East triangle. In one sense, bipolar system was continuing in the Caucasus (Kolobov, Kornilov, and Özbay 2006, 156).

5.3.1. Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia between Russia and Turkey (From Bilateral Cooperation to Multidimensional Partnership (16 November 2001))

The 9/11 created new awareness in Turkey and Russia to take anti-terrorism cooperation more seriously. True cooperation in the challenging geopolitical terrain of Eurasia would be mutually more beneficial. In this spirit, Ismail Cem and Igor Ivanov signed the *Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia between Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey (From Bilateral Cooperation to Multidimensional*

Partnership)³² at the UN Headquarters in New York on 16 November 2001 (Sezer 2008, 136). The Eurasia Action Plan was the concrete result of the visit of Kasyanov to Ankara in October 2000, during which to develop relations by taking economic and commercial relations to the center and leaving conflictual political issues aside was decided. The Eurasia Action Plan paved the way for the opening of cooperation in political and economic fields in the Moscow-Ankara-Central Asia triangle which was qualified as *Strategic Triangle* (Çelikpala 2017c, 206). The Eurasian Action Plan provided a freedom of movement in the Eurasian geography particularly in the Caucasus bringing forth the economic cooperation discourse (Çelikpala 2010b, 106).

The geographical and thematic scope of the partnership was ambitious, ranging from political matters with regard to the sub-regions of Eurasia, cooperation in international organizations and European security to economic matters and anti-terrorism (Sezer 2008, 137). The parties would develop their relations within the framework of multipolar international system. They would contribute to the strengthening of the organization of the UN and consolidating its central role in world issues. BLACKSEAFOR would be another indicator of the intention of two countries to cooperate. The parties would contribute to the development of the export and transit potential of the Black Sea-Caspian area. Russia and Turkey considered that the energy topics constituted the important part of their bilateral relations and their regional cooperation which would create strong mutual benefit. The Blue Stream Project was one of the main elements of the further development of constructive partnership between them. The parties were determined to carry their existing good relations, political consultations, and experiences in economic cooperation to the Eurasian dimension and thus reach a new and high level in their bilateral relations. To this end, the parties instructed the Joint Working Group to prepare concrete proposals regarding the basic principles and orientations of the cooperation aiming multidimensional partnership. The Areas of Consultation and Cooperation in the political field would be the Balkans, South Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Cyprus, Middle East Iraq, Black Sea region, Mediterranean topics, Cooperation initiatives in the South Caucasus

³² For the full text of the *Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia between Russian Federation and Turkey (From bilateral Cooperation to Multidimensional Partnership)* dated 16 November 2001, in Turkish, see, Kelkitli (2012, 404-405).

and Central Asia, Cooperation in the Eurasian topics in international organizations, Comprehensive European Security Architecture topic. The parties would also develop bilateral consultations regarding international terrorism.

Lebedev, Russian ambassador to Ankara, was summarizing the logic of the *Action Plan* as the following (Çelikpala 2017b, 536; my translation):

“This document has a very deep political meaning. The concept of Eurasia is of concern for the first time. The meaning of this is to pass from competition to cooperation. We do not use the term strategic partnership in this document. Because this kind of partnership requires cooperation to move together in an organization such as NATO. Advanced partnership is very important for two countries to renounce the competition in the past”.

5.3.2. Naval Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the Black Sea (25 April 2002)

In March 2002, General Tuncer Kılınç, Secretary General of the National Security Council of Turkey, told that Turkey should seek out alternative alliances with Russian Federation or Iran underscoring the occurrence of “*seismic shifts*” in Eurasian geopolitics which have been gradually pushing Turkey and Russian Federation together (Hill 2003, 61). Because, the idea that the US can be considered as both an ally and a potential security threat had had a tremendous impact on Turkey’s national security interests (Oğuzlu 2008, 3).

The Agreement on *Naval Confidence Building Measures* (CBMs) in the Black Sea was signed on 25 April 2002 among six Black Sea littoral states-Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and Turkey. Bilateral exchange of military information, monitoring of the implementation of the agreement, risk reduction through cooperation as regards unusual military activities, notification of naval activities, observation in the naval bases of each participating states, voluntary cooperation and contacts in the naval field were among the measures to be implemented (Lachowski 2004, 144).

5.4. The NATO at 20 Formula

NATO and Russia, meeting at the Rome Summit on 28 May 2002 in the 19+1 format, adopted a *Declaration*³³ on the new quality of the relations. At the Summit, NATO member states and Russia founded the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) based on *NATO at 20* formula, replacing the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council [PJC]. The NRC would “*focus on all areas of mutual interest identified in Section III of the Founding Act*”. The Russia–NATO Council would “*provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action ... on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region*”. Initially the parties agreed to pursue efforts to cooperate in the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, nonproliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, civil emergencies and new threats and challenges (Melville and Shackleina 2005, 187-190). The upgrading of NATO-Russia relations under the *NATO at 20* formula was an act to reward Putin for his determined efforts to build bridges with the Trans-Atlantic Community in the aftermath of 9/11 (Sezer 2008, 125).

6. Between NATO at 20 and the EU Expansion (1 January 2007)

According to US National Security Strategy (Bush Doctrine) presented by George Bush in September 2002, the US considered “*the Black Sea and Caspian region as a vitally important not only from the strategic oil supply and ... as a bridgehead of further access to the perspective markets of Pakistan, India and South-Eastern Asia*” (Goncharenko 2005, 24). According to this Strategy, the American foreign policy would be rested on three main pillars: a doctrine of unrivaled military supremacy, the concept of preemptive or preventive war, and a willingness to act unilaterally if multilateral cooperation cannot be achieved (Canadian Centres for Teaching Peace). The *preventive strike* was a disputed concept in international law. The *pre-emptive strike* had not any legal legitimacy. Because this meant that the US had the right to intervene even if any country *think* to attack the US. After the

³³ For the full text of the *Declaration by Heads of State and Government of the Russian Federation and NATO Member States*, dated 28 May 2002, see, Melville and Shackleina (2005, 187-190).

proclamation of this Doctrine, the US attacked Iraq arguing that the latter constituted a threat to itself and its allies (Uzgel 2017b, 252).

On 7 October 2002, the *Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization*³⁴ (CSTO) was signed by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Russia, and Tajikistan-the remaining member states of the *Collective Security Treaty*, which was signed in Tashkent, on 15 May 1992. In December 2003, the CSTO Charter was registered with the UN. In accordance with Article 3 of the Charter, the objectives of the Organization were “*the strengthening of peace, international and regional security and stability, the protection on a collective basis of the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Member States*” (CSTO).

At the Prague Summit of NATO held between 20-22 November 2002, NATO invited Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria to begin accession talks. Russia indicated that it would not oppose the second round of NATO enlargement and sought to establish a new basis for NATO-Russia relations (Thorun 2009, 54). However, inclusion of Ukraine and Georgia to the NATO expansion at the Prague Summit, proved very disturbing for Russia’s interests in the region. For this reason, preventing NATO expansion in the region became an important topic of her agenda (Ereker and Özer 2013, 188-189). Russia criticized the third round of NATO enlargement that could encompass the Ukraine and Georgia and put pressure on both Ukraine and Georgia not to foster accession (Thorun 2009, 54). Turkey was also reluctant to support the idea of the NATO membership of for Ukraine and Georgia (Hale 2013, 210).

Putin, recognizing Russia’s weak international position, initially “*sought to avoid picking fights Russia could only lose- be it over the establishment of American bases in Central Asia, Washington’s unilateral abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, or the decision of the 2002 NATO Prague Summit to proceed to the second stage of NATO’s enlargement*” (Berryman 2010, 230-231). The US started to deploy troops in Central Asia and enforce NATO’s role in the region following NATO Prague

³⁴ For the full text of the *Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization*, dated 7 October 2002, see, CSTO (2019a).

Summit. Georgia and Azerbaijan were among the first to offer extensive assistance to the US (Tsantoulis 2009, 250).

6.1. The Iraqi War

On 3 December 2002, the US wanted Turkey to allow US forces to use Turkish territory to open a northern front against Iraq. The landing of US forces in Turkey was rejected by the TGNA on 1 March 2003. The decision of TGNA was a severe shock to the US and triggered the most serious crisis in Turkish-American relations since the Johnson letter of 1964 (Hale 2013, 166-168). According to Turkey, *“a regime change in Iraq would jeopardize Iraqi territorial integrity, possibly paving the way for an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. ... The denial not only damaged the long-standing partnership between Ankara and Washington but it signaled to Moscow that Ankara was a credible ally”* (Demiryol 2015, 74-75). However, another TGNA resolution dated 19 March 2003 allowed the US jets to use Turkish airspace (Uzgel 2017b, 277). The American occupation of Iraq without the authorization of the UNSC on 20 March 2003 caused a new momentum in the development of relations between Turkey and Russia. A certain cooling period started in Turkish-American relations while strengthening PKK existence in the region became the main agenda article between Turkey and the US (Erşen 2017, 150). The US could not find the WMDs in Iraq. The American public started to ask what their soldiers looked for in Iraq. President Bush argued that his basic target was to bring democracy and peace to the Middle East beginning from Iraq (Kalaycıoğlu 2012, 106). On 4 July 2003, the US forces raided the liaison office of the Turkish Special Forces stationed in Sulaymaniyah in Iraq, arrested them, and led away with hoods on their heads. The Turkish soldiers were released 55 hours later. While anti-American feelings increased in Turkey upon this event, the Turkish government preferred not to dramatize the event despite the occurrence of deep and sudden crisis in Turkey (Uzgel 2017b, 277).

By 2003, the greatest threat to the Russian and Turkish interests, was the growing military and political presence of the US in the Middle East and Black Sea region. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the catalyst for both Russia and Turkey that the US military presence constituted the immediate threat to regional stability (Demiryol 2015, 74). Turkey's problematic relations with the US following the

invasion of Iraq and growing tensions between Russia and, EU and NATO led Turkey to follow a cautious policy regarding the Black Sea developments (Aydın 2013, 53). *“Russia was a strong opponent of the US-led action that toppled Saddam Hussein, because, ... it had maintained close economic relations with Baghdad for years”* and *“military action was not sanctioned by the UN Security Council”* (Rukavishnikov 2007, 58). Russia evacuated its forces from both Bosnia and Kosovo while the US was invading Iraq. In November 2003, draft peace agreement was cancelled by Moldova at the last minute on advice from the West as it allowed for continued Russian military presence in the country (Trenin 2009, 11).

The US also took the place of Turkey in Central Asia after 2001 and the Turkish-Russian-Iranian competition left its place to the American-Russian competition (Aydın 2006, 30-31). Turkey entered to the 2000s as having renounced from influence competition in the Caucasus and Central Asia, having started to normalize relations with Russia, and having focused rather to the Caucasus for energy projects (Aydın 2017b, 463).

Turkey *“gradually developed a separate set of policies towards Russia. The changing security environment after 11 September 2001, Turkey’s disagreements with the USA over Iraq and growing tensions between Russia and NATO, all led to Turkey’s pursuit of a policy of ‘caution’ with regard to the Black Sea region”* (Çelikpala 2010a, 296). The Russian Black Sea security policy was basically to be a reactionary policy to the strategies of the western countries. This reactionary policy could be explained by Russia’s disability to develop an extensive alternative strategy to the changing international dynamics (Bozkurt 2011, 2). Kınıklıoğlu linked the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia beginning in early 2000s to their alienation from the West and argued that their relations with the West determined the course of bilateral relations (Çelikpala 2015, 129).

In the early 2000s, a pluralist international existence emerged around the Black Sea for the first time since the Antiquity (Aydın 2007, 105). The Black Sea region became the focal point for three regional projects produced by the great powers:

- Near Abroad Policy (NAP) of the RF.

- European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) of the EU.
- Broader Middle East-North Africa Initiative (BMENA) of the US (Aydın 2013, 49-50)

The region situated at the intersection of the NAP, the BMENA and the ENP was called as the *Wider Black Sea Region* consisting of the Caucasus, the Black Sea and Eastern Europe. Since these regionalization concepts in the economic, political and security spheres are not mutually exclusive, their dynamics placed the countries across these groupings under a considerable stress (Aydın 2009, 276).

The *Wider-Europe-Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors* which was issued on 3 November 2003 drew the framework of EU's relations with its neighbors without presenting a membership perspective (Erbaş 2010, 152). On 12-13 December 2003, the European Council adopted the *European Security Strategy* (ESS) entitled *A Secure Europe in a Better World* which became the first official document to state that the South Caucasus required further attention (Çelikpala 2010a, 294) (Üstün 2010, 230-231). The ESS spoke of tackling threats such as unresolved regional conflicts, and the proliferation of WMD by creating a “ring of well-governed countries” around Europe's borders (Winrow 2007, 122).

Following the accession of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia (A10 countries) to EU on 1 May 2004, the Black Sea became Europe's periphery (Larrabee 2009, 302). The *European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper* issued on 12 May 2004 included Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. EU offered these countries “a privileged relationship in return for a commitment to common values, democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles, and sustainable development” (Aydın 2013, 50).

The ENP was an instrument developed for support and assistance of neighbouring nations outside the institutional process of EU accession negotiations. EU provided resources, technical assistance, market access and institutional support (Minchev 2006, 9). The ENP was a foreign relations instrument of the EU. The borders

of the ENP was the most clearly defined concept among the three concepts. The ENP was originally intended to include the immediate neighbors of the EU: Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. It was later extended to include the Southern Caucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Aydın 2009, 276).

The US's enhanced threat perception induced the emergence of understanding that many of the threats were emanating from the wider Middle East area which led to the *Broader Middle East-North Africa Initiative* (BMENA) (Aydın 2013, 50). The US suggested the BMENA officially at the Summit of G-8 held in Sea Island between 8-10 June 2004. The priorities of BMENA was entailing improvements in the social, political, economic, democratization and human rights spheres. The main problem was that the Muslim communities of the Middle East were holding the West responsible from all their troubles. The political movements such as the *Society of the Muslim Brothers* ought to be organized in legal political parties and thus be moderated rather than going of the dissatisfied large masses to the underground. For this, reforms ought to be made in the one man regimes (Uzgel 2017a, 267). The US defined BMENA as including the Arab states, Israel, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (Aydın 2009, 275). The main objective of the BMENA was to open the region to the western economy and its superstructure within the framework of the rules put by the US. Application of the project would be done by using Turkey as a pivotal and model country and excluding Syria and especially Iran from the equation (Oran 2017b, 31).

Even though the US and EU share certain policies towards the region, the two had slightly different approaches. While the US developed a political/security perspective for the region under the banner of the Wider Black Sea region, the EU preferred an economic and commercial type of relationship based on cooperation³⁵ (Çelikpala 2010a, 291).

³⁵ The EU would launch the *Black Sea Synergy* in 2008 and *Eastern Partnership* (EaP) on 7 May 2009 (Çelikpala 2010a, 291).

6.2. The Operation Black Sea Harmony: Turkey's Reaction to US Black Sea Objectives (1 March 2004)

Turkey's objection to long-term US presence in the Black Sea became apparent with its opposition to the US suggestion to expand the activities of OAE to the Black Sea. Turkey's concern was to preserve the Montreux regime and the political and military balances that emerged in the Black Sea region since the end of the Cold War (Aydın 2013, 54). The expansion of NATO's OAE to the Black Sea to combat terrorism, prevent the proliferation of the WMDs and combat all kinds of smuggling to the Black Sea region was first proposed by the US in NATO in 2003. It was also argued that permanent control of security and stability environment in the Black Sea was not possible due to the fact that the BLACKSEAFOR was an on-call force. A decision could not be taken due to the requirement of consensus (Aydın 2017b, 528). According to Turkey, there was no need for a stronger NATO presence in the Black Sea and Caucasus region as the existing security structures were adequate to maintain the order. Turkey and Russia also insisted that the BLACKSEAFOR rendered a stronger NATO presence in the region unnecessary. Turkey and Russia were not in pursuit of a revisionist strategy but balancing against perceived threats (Demiryol 2015, 75). Meanwhile, with a decision taken upon the initiative of Turkey in 2004, the BLACKSEAFOR gained operational capability to combat asymmetric threats notably terror and WMDs trafficking (Aydın 2017b, 528).

On 1 March 2004, Turkey initiated *Operation Black Sea Harmony* (OBSH) in accordance with the UNSC resolutions 1373, 1540 and 1566, the aim of which was same as NATO's OAE in the Mediterranean: to deter terrorism and asymmetric threats (Aydın 2013, 55). The OBSH was originally an exclusive Turkish air and naval operation³⁶ to monitor and intercept suspicious vessels in the Black Sea which were approaching the Bosphorus (Winrow 2007, 129).

Both Turkey and Russia argued that "*BLACKSEAFOR and Operation Black Sea Harmony were capable of intercepting suspicious shipping in the Black Sea*".

³⁶ On Turkey's invitation, Russia joined in the Black Sea Harmony on 27 December 2006, Ukraine on 17 January 2007, and Romania on 31 March 2009 (Aydın 2013, 55).

Turkey also argued that “NATO was already active in the Black Sea through the presence of Turkish, Bulgarian and Romanian navies”. In this regard, there have been “accusations that Turkey and Russia appear to be striving to establish a ‘naval condominium’ in the Black Sea” (Winrow 2007, 130-131). The regional countries did not show interest in the OBSH at the beginning. Turkey insistently continued to OBSH and objected to the starting of any other activity within the framework of NATO. Upon the renouncement of the US to send naval forces to the region, other littoral countries started to contribute to the OBSH (Aydın 2017b, 528).

6.3. The Second Round NATO Enlargement (29 March 2004)

On 29 March 2004, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic joined NATO (Berryman 2010, 231). The enlargement of NATO was interpreted in Russia that the latter was a loser in the Cold War at least geopolitically since NATO expansion removed Russia’s hope of a neutral buffer between Russia and the West (Trenin 2009, 8). The *Istanbul Summit Communiqué* issued by the members of the NAC on 28 June 2004 was disturbing for Russia for referring the CFE, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Ukraine:

“17. We reiterate our commitment to the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security, and reaffirm our attachment to the early entry into force of the Adapted Treaty. We recall that fulfilment of the remaining Istanbul commitments on the Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova will create the conditions for Allies and other States Parties to move forward on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. We note the progress that was made in 2003 on withdrawal of Russian military forces from the Republic of Moldova. We regret that this progress has not continued in 2004 and that the extended 31 December 2003 completion date, agreed in the framework of the OSCE, was not met. It is essential that efforts be intensified to complete the withdrawal as soon as possible. We will continue, via the OSCE, to monitor and assist in this process. We urge a swift resolution of the outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia as set out in their Istanbul Joint Statement of 17 November 1999, and to this end, call upon the parties to resume negotiations at an appropriately senior level. ...

31. In enhancing the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, we will put special focus on engaging with our Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia. ... We welcome the decision by Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan to develop Individual Partnership Action Plans with NATO.

37. We have today also decided to offer cooperation to the broader Middle East region by launching our “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative”. This initiative is offered by NATO to interested countries in the region, starting with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to foster mutually beneficial bilateral relationships and thus enhance security and stability. ...

40. We encourage Ukraine to accelerate the implementation of the objectives outlined in the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, particularly regarding the conduct of free and fair elections, the guaranteeing of media freedoms, and implementation of the results of the Defence Review.

We are determined to support Ukraine in these efforts, while noting that a further strengthening of our relationship will require stronger evidence of Ukraine's commitment to comprehensive reform. ..." (NATO 2019f).

Russia's relations with Greece and the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus were the most important barriers in front of her developing relations with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Russia, by using her veto for the SC resolution aiming to alleviate the security concerns of the Greek Cypriots prior the Annan referendum, influenced the referendum in Cyprus which held on 24 April 2004. Russia also used her veto in the SC during the approval of the Annan Report criticizing the attitudes of the Greek Cypriot administration (Çelikpala 2017b, 556). The Security Council draft resolution calling for ending the isolation of the Cypriot Turks was also vetoed by Russia (Çelikpala 2017b, 557).

6.4. Joint Declaration on the Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership between Turkey and Russia (6 December 2004)

Turkey's alienation from the US "*started in early 2000s, with two major transformations in America's global strategy*". The 9/11 events and the US strategy for war on terror affected Turkey's vision of national security in the Middle East. The second transformation was the growing importance of the Black Sea after integrating the CEE countries as full members of NATO although Turkey supported NATO enlargement. Although Turkey supported NATO enlargement, it hesitated to see the Black Sea fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. For Turkey, the US and Europe were welcomed "*to care about the strategic identity of the Black Sea- but only through partnership and mediation of the hegemonic powers of the region*" (Minchev 2006, 16).

The *rose revolution* in Georgia in November 2003 and the *orange revolution* in Ukraine between November 2004 and January 2005 changed the threat perception of Russia and Turkey. For both Russia and Turkey, the US was behind these so-called color revolutions (Demiryol 2015, 74-75). Russia saw color revolutions as part of a US-conceived and led conspiracy rather than popular anger against corrupt authorities. These activities had aimed at reducing Russia's influence in its neighborhood and

expanding that of the US (Trenin 2009, 12). Russia was worried that since the Orange, Rose and Tulip revolutions were successful elsewhere, the West could attempt to encourage one in Russia. This fear showed itself in Russia's regional strategic policies (Ellison 2011, 345). After the coloured revolutions, Russia began developing proactive policies to enhance its sphere of influence in the region (Çelikpala 2010a, 295). Russia, assisted by high oil prices, no longer viewed the old methods of preserving stability and security as sufficient (Tsygankov 2009, 51-62).

Ifantis and Tsakiris (2007, 97) argue that the *prima facie* reason of the deterioration of the post-9/11 US-Russian rapprochement was the US aid for the revolutionary overthrow of the Georgian and Ukrainian governments rather than NATO's second round expansion, the unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty and the Iraqi debacle (Ifantis and Tsakiris 2007, 98). Essentially, the NATO membership had become the most important foreign policy of the new Saakashvili administration in Georgia to reach to the goal of controlling South Ossetia and Abkhazia which had strong ties with Russia. These political moves and openings, supported by the US and EU, replaced the quiescence experienced relatively since 1992 with an increasing tension, confrontation and instability (Öztürk 2009, 7). *"The aspirations of the new governments in Georgia and Ukraine to establish closer ties with the EU and NATO also made Ankara nervous. Ankara considered Georgia and Ukraine's NATO membership a precursor to EU membership ... which coupled with the slow progress in Turkey's accession efforts, led to a perception of further exclusion and encirclement in Ankara"* (Demiryol 2015, 74-75).

The rapprochement between Turkey and Russia in the 2000s lead to the emergence of issues between Turkey and her traditional allies, Europe and particularly the US. Turkey's basic approach was to shape her regional policies by realist steps considering the regional activism of Russia. Turkey was defending the necessity that Russia ought to be included in any process that the Euro-Atlantic world launch in the region. Turkey's this attitude often influenced her relations with her allies especially due to the negative attitudes of NATO and EU's old Warsaw Pact members (Çelikpala 2017b, 555). The basic causes preventing the Turkish-Russian relations to turn into a strategic dimension were Turkey's NATO membership, Turkey's wish to maintain her

position in the western world and Russia's wish to hold her relations with Turkey in the economic framework rather than carry to the strategic dimension (Çelikpala 2017b, 558).

Putin's visit to Ankara in December 2004 was a first official visit held in the level of president after a 32 years interval (Erşen 2017, 150-151). During the visit, Turkey and Russia signed six agreements and protocols (Kurban 2017, 225-226). Turkey and Russia signed the *Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on the Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership*³⁷ on 06 December 2004 in Ankara to upgrade their relations to the level of an enhanced multi-dimensional partnership. In the Declaration, the parties noted with pleasure that their basic approaches to many international and regional issues are similar or close to each other. The parties explained their belief in the supremacy of the provisions of the UN Charter and other norms of the international law and mechanisms referring to the joint and multilateral approaches for the settlement of main issues in international relations. The parties reaffirmed the positive effect of multi-dimensional, comprehensive, and stable commercial and economic relations on the whole of the bilateral relations. The parties, underlining the importance of their cooperation in the energy sector as the important element strengthening mutual ties and interests, stated the importance of the development and diversification of the cooperation in the energy sector. The parties agreed to support the development of bilateral cooperation in the military, technical and defense industry fields. The parties, which had special interests in the Eurasian region, expressed their pleasure for the activities of the High Level Joint Working Group which had been established in the framework of the Joint Action Plan in Eurasia. The parties, reaffirming the importance of the safety of life, commodity, environment, and navigation in the Straits, agreed to maintain consultations for the further development of maritime relations between the two countries.

³⁷ For the full text of the *Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on the Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership* dated 06 December 2004, in Turkish, see, Kelkitli (2012, 406-409).

The years of 2004-2005 was a period of *annus mirabilis* as coined by Kınıklıoğlu due to experiencing a different spring atmosphere, getting the result of the framework drawn with the agreements, meetings of the leaders so often unseen in the history, and changing of the threat atmosphere which can be counted rapidly (Çelikpala 2015, 134). Richard Holbrooke said in February 2005 that “Now [Russia] is engaged in a little-noticed charm offensive to woo our all-important ... ally Turkey into a new special relationship that would extend Russia’s influence in that volatile region” (Demiryol 2015, 75).

As is the case with Iran, Turkey’s closer ties to Syria created tension with the US. The tension was particularly visible in the spring of 2005, when US officials sought to persuade President Ahmet Necdet Sezer to cancel his visit to Damascus. However, Sezer insisted on making the visit, causing considerable dismay in Washington (Larrabee 2010, 39).

In the second half of the 2000s, Turkey, together with Russia, found itself objecting to the policies of Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania, and her allies. The *Community of Democratic Choice* established on 2 December 2005 in Kiev emerged as the restructured aspect of GUUAM, and the *Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue* led by Romania inaugurated on 4-6 June 2006 emerged against Russia. Turkey did not lean towards these formations supported by the US on the grounds that they could damage the delicate balance established in the aftermath of the Cold War with difficulty. The Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue was pursuing a goal to bring the US into the Black Sea, to exclude Russia, and to break the influence of Turkey in the region. Especially, with a discourse emanated from Romania and Bulgaria, it was argued that Turkey and Russia formed a *condominium* in the Black Sea. Romania and Bulgaria, supported by Ukraine and Georgia in the background from time to time, argued that Turkish-Russian *condominium* wanted to close the Black Sea to foreign forces and this ought to be prevented by the Transatlantic powers (Aydın 2017b, 525-526).

Russia cut off the flow of natural gas during the Ukraine-Russia gas price dispute on 1 January 2006. This crisis had important ramifications on Turkish-Russian relations. The important part of the pipelines transferring Russian gas to Europe,

including the western pipeline transferring Russia gas to Turkey, was passing through Ukraine. This event caused the meeting of Turkey and the EU in a common ground. The NABUCCO gas pipeline project was aiming to transfer the Caspian and Middle Eastern gas to Austria, through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. In the face of this development, Russia sought to exclude Ukraine with a project named *Southern-Stream* which would carry gas to Europe through Black Sea, Bulgaria and Italy (Erşen 2017, 151).

The tendency of improvement in the Turkish-American relations became evident in 2006. The FMs of the two countries accepted the *Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership Document* in April 2006. This unsigned document did not have a legal binding upon the parties. It had been formed to provide a general framework to the relations (Uzgel 2017b, 262).

The American *Silk Road Strategy Act of 2006* dated 4 May 2006 updated the *Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999* due to the significant changes occurred to the political, economic, and security conditions in Central Asia and the South Caucasus since 11 September 2001 and due to the need for security cooperation between the US and the countries of CCAR was grown. The Act enumerated many projects necessary to implement in the CCAR. In the Act, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, which contributed to US military deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, were counted as key US partners enhancing and contributing to US energy and security interests. According to the US, “the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan” resulted in the ouster of corrupt and ineffective regimes. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were counted among the countries engaged in gross violations of human rights. Turkey was recognized “as a crucial energy transit and consumer country, vital for the successful development of large-scale energy infrastructure and cross-border projects”. The development of the Trans-Caspian Oil and Gas Pipelines was supported. The rail link which was already partially supported by the EU within the *Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia* (TRACECA) initiative was also supported (Congress 04/05/2006).

The BTC oil pipeline became operational on 4 June 2006. Besides the Azeri oil, Turkmen and Kazakh oil were also transported depending on the production (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources). With the completion of the BTC and Tengiz-Novorossiysk oil pipelines, the energy competition between Turkey and Russia fell off the agenda (Aydın 2017b, 463).

Russian aspirations over Crimea have been long apparent. In late 2006, Putin offered Ukraine security guarantees in return for permanently stationing the Black Sea Fleet on its territory. This was unnecessary since Russia already maintained Ukraine's security through the Tashkent Treaty of 1992 and the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 signed with Ukraine, the UK, and the US (Blank 2014, 43-44). Although the EU had decided in October 2005 to start Turkey's accession negotiations, many negotiation titles were suspended in December 2006 due to the Cyprus issue (Erşen 2017, 150). In December 2006, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov proposed to reinforce international security by developing a cooperation mechanism between NATO and CSTO followed by a clear division of spheres of responsibility (Blank 2008, 32).

Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on 1 January 2007. Before the EU became a Black Sea power, the EU and the Black Sea region were linked together by accession countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) and special relations with Ukraine and Russia (Aydın 2004, 3).

7. THE CAUSES OF RUSSIAN ASSERTIVENESS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE EU EXPANSION

Russia had obliged to swallow the Balkan wars, two rounds of NATO expansion, the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty, US military presence in Central Asia, the invasion of Iraq and plans to deploy nuclear missile defense in Eastern Europe during the recent years (Tsygankov 2009, 51-62). Besides, the EU enlargement in 2007 drew new borders between the EU and non-EU Europe permanently (Aydın 2004, 5).

NATO and EU expansions were viewed by Russia as expanding West's geopolitical dominance in Europe and directly undermining Russia's role and its long-term security. According to the predominant Russian interpretation, the US and Europe

attempted to take advantage of Russia's weakness during the 1990s to push eastward to contain the revival of Russian influence. "*Russia's reactions to Western incursions into legitimate Russian spheres of influence*" were illustrated in the form of "*the so-called cyber-war conducted against Estonia in 2007, ... military intervention in August 2008, ... and the gas war with Ukraine in January 2009*" (Kanet 2010, 214-215).

At a time, the US exerted military and political pressure in the Black Sea via NATO enlargement, and bilateral defense agreements, Putin expressed his discomfort about the US intrusion into the Black Sea (Aydın 2013, 48) and US unilateralism in the world affairs at the *Munich Conference on Security Policy*³⁸ on 10 February 2007. Putin's speech was soon followed by Moscow's threat to withdraw from the *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty* (INF) should NATO continue with deploying its military equipment closer to Russian borders. Russia also sought to strengthen its control over the former Soviet region by "*building pipelines in all geographic directions, raising energy prices ..., moving to control transportation networks in the former USSR, and coordinating its activities with other energy-producers*". In May 2007, Putin secured commitments from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to increase exports of Central Asian energy via Russia's pipelines (Tsygankov 2009, 51-62).

As the EU constructed a *Mediterranean Policy* after the membership of Spain and Portugal, and the *Northern Dimension* after the northern enlargement, it established the *Black Sea dimension* after the Bulgarian and Romanian membership. The EU Commission adopted the Black Sea Synergy Paper entitled "*A Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative*" in April 2007, "*focusing on main areas of cooperation such as democracy and good governance, immigration, promoting confidence-building measures, energy security, support for regional transport cooperation, environment, trade, fisheries, maritime policy, research and education, science and technology, employment and social affairs and regional development*" (Üstün 2010, 235). The significance of the Black Sea Synergy was twofold. First, it pinpointed the key areas where it might be possible to promote

³⁸ For the full text of Putin's speech at the at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, on 10 February 2007, see, Kremlin (2019f).

regional cooperation. Secondly, it attempted to stimulate reform in various policy areas to support stability, foster growth and finally to create an atmosphere conducive to the resolution of the ongoing conflicts (Çelikpala 2010a, 294). The EU, thus, could also be able to drag regional countries further away from Moscow (İşeri and Dilek 2011, 46).

On 14 July 2007, Putin signed a decree *On Suspending the Russian Federation's Participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Related International Agreements*³⁹. The operation of the Treaty would be suspended in 150 days as of the date of Russia's notifying the depositary and other member states of its decision unless the conditions necessary for restoring the viability of the CFE Treaty were not be implemented (Kremlin 2019c).

In July 2007, “Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to transport 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Iranian and Turkmen natural gas to Europe”. The deal envisaged “the construction of two separate pipelines to ship gas from Iranian and Turkmen gas fields”. The US strongly criticized the deal. “Besides opposing foreign investments in the Iranian gas sector, the United States ... also [concerned] that the deal could undercut U.S.-Turkish cooperation to develop Caspian gas resources and construct a pipeline”. However, Turkey needed to “diversify its sources of supply in order to avoid becoming too dependent on one supplier”. The deal had broader geostrategic benefits. It gave Turkmenistan a non-Russian option. It also kept alive “the EU-sponsored Nabucco pipeline project ... [as] an alternative to the Russian effort to expand its market share of Europe's energy supply”. It also gave Turkey a chance to become a transit corridor which was outside the control of the Russian Gazprom (Larrabee 2010, 35-36).

In August 2007, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Masorin, announced Russia's plans to return to the Mediterranean. Since permanent Russian naval bases could only be opened in Syria, this caused serious alarm in Israel. The Israelis thought that the Syrian ports would turn into major centers of electronic surveillance and air defense centers which would threat Israel's national

39 For the causes of Russia's suspending the CFE Treaty and her conditions necessary for restoring the Treaty outlined at the extraordinary meeting of parties to the CFE Treaty, held in Vienna on 12–15 June 2007, see, Kremlin (2019c).

security (Alexandrova-Arbatova 2008, 301). On 12 December 2007, Russia formally suspended the CFE Treaty (Çelikpala 2017b, 539).

The increased US political and military support for Turkey's struggle against the PKK since late 2007 resulted in an improvement in Turkish-American relations (Larrabee 2010, 20). However, after 2007, Turkey had a clear tendency to act independently of the Western alliance, especially in relation to major regional and international conflicts although it continued to commit to a western orientation and EU membership rhetoric. Turkey attempted to play a more active regional and global role. Turkish foreign policy was more active in the Middle East but less active in the Balkans and Central Asia where the scope of regional leadership was more limited and would be contested by powerful rivals. The Middle East and North Africa became a focal point in Turkish foreign policy efforts suggesting that there was a strong identity dimension implicit in the new Turkish foreign policy (Öniş 2011, 50-51).

Meanwhile, the 17 February 2008 *Kosovo Declaration of Independence* taken by the Kosovo Assembly introduced a new practice in the recognition of the sovereignty of sub-units of federative states. Before that only federative units of former states such as Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union were recognized as sovereign states by the international community (Cheterian 2012, 703). Turkey recognized Kosovo on 18 February 2008 (Kelkitli 2012, 354). Russia criticized the decisions taken without taking into account her objections (Çelikpala 2017b, 539). Russia desperately sought to prevent Kosovo's independence arguing that the Kosovo precedent would give a green light to secessionist movements and trigger a chain reaction in the post-Soviet space (Alexandrova-Arbatova 2008, 312).

At the NATO Bucharest Summit held between 2-4 April 2008, Ukraine and Georgia were invited to apply for MAP:

"NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries' applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign

Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia” (NATO 2019c).

Whereas Russia viewed NATO’s potential enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia as an intrusion on its traditional sphere of influence (McNamara 2010, 1). On 5 June 2008, Medvedev delivered a major foreign policy speech⁴⁰ in Berlin in which he called for a new *European Security Architecture* (ESA) based on the principle of indivisible security as a legal obligation. His *Berlin Doctrine* was containing several principles. According to the Doctrine, every Euro-Atlantic state ought to have a voice and all relevant international organization should have to be included in the architecture. The treaty ought to be based on new rules binding on all and “*deal with a wide range of trans-regional security threats in the wider Eurasian space*” (Lomagin 2010, 185). Medvedev called for a European summit to discuss a new treaty to “*reestablish an indivisible security sphere reaching from Vancouver to Vladivostok*”. He stated that Russia had been marginalized by “*West’s military-bloc mentality and that European security is now divisible*” (McNamara 2010, 2). Trenin (2009, 14) argues that Russia’s view of ESA would be something like a NATO-CSTO committee with the inclusion of permanent neutral states, such as Ukraine.

The Medvedev Doctrine was interpreted as a tactic to pull Europe apart from its strategic alignment in the United States (Lomagin 2010, 181-182). Sestanovich (as cited in Kasım 2011, 219) compares Medvedev’s call for a new European Security Architecture to the expectations of Brezhnev from the CSCE. While Brezhnev wanted the recognition of the division of Europe, Medvedev demanded the recognition of CIS and CSTO forming the tie between Russia and the NIS. Russia was demonstrating with this policy her return to sphere of influence and competition strategy in the geography which she defined as Near Abroad (Kasım 2011, 219).

Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation dated 12 July 2008 defined CIS as a priority area of Russia’s foreign policy and a tool for Russia to assert its global power and to become more equal with the West (Kropatcheva 2012, 33). Russia would “*promote in every possible way the CSTO as a key instrument to maintain stability and*

40 For the full text of the Medvedev’s *Berlin Doctrine*, dated 5 June 2008, see, Kremlin (2019g).

ensure security in the CIS area focusing on adapting the CSTO as a multifunctional integration body to the changing environment". According to the Foreign Policy Concept, Russia would focus on the global processes to ensure formation of a just and democratic world order: *"the unilateral action strategy leads to destabilization of international situation, provokes tensions and arms race, exacerbates interstate differences, stirs up ethnic and religious strife, endangers security of other States and fuels tensions in intercivilizational relations"*. Russian view concerning the Eurasian security and the future NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine was as the following:

"The main objective of the Russian foreign policy on the European track is to create a truly open, democratic system of regional collective security and cooperation ensuring the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, in such a way as not to allow its new fragmentation and reproduction of bloc-based approaches which still persist in the European architecture that took shape during the Cold War period. This is precisely the essence of the initiative aimed at concluding a European security treaty, the elaboration of which could be launched at a pan-European summit. ... Russia maintains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders on the whole, which violates the principle of equal security, leads to new dividing lines in Europe and runs counter to the tasks of increasing the effectiveness of joint work in search for responses to real challenges of our time" (Kremlin 2019b).

8. The Russo-Georgian War (7-12 August 2008) and its Impact on the Turkish-Russian Relations

The explanation of the causes and results of the Georgia war requires dealing with both the regional dynamics and foreign involvement (Öztürk 2009, 9). The Russo-Georgian war of 7-12 August 2008 grew out of Georgia's pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration and Moscow's efforts to limit the expansion of Western influence in the Caucasus (Kuchins and Mankoff 2013, 13) and (Berryman 2010, 233). A series of events had contributed to the breakout of the five-day war. In January 2008, Georgia had voted to join NATO⁴¹ in a plebiscite. In February, Russia had reiterated its claim that Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia would serve as a precedent for

⁴¹ Georgia applied for NATO membership at the November 2002 NATO Summit in Prague and it was accepted as a NATO aspirant in March 2003. At the Istanbul NATO summit in June 2004, Georgia was invited to develop Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO, and in November the Georgian IPAP was approved (Nygren 2010, 108).

both Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence from Georgia. On 6 March, Russia had withdrawn from a CIS sanctions treaty that had limited independent trade relations with Abkhazia. On 16 April, Russia had started direct relations with Georgian separatist regions which feared Georgia that Russia would annex the two regions (Ellison 2011, 351-353).

Lately, Medvedev and Saakashvili met in St. Petersburg on 6 June 2008. Before the meeting, Saakashvili reiterated Georgia's demands at a press meeting in Batum for the withdrawal of additional Russian peace forces in Abkhazia and railway forces in South Ossetia, and abolition of the decisions establishing direct link between Russia and, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He also demanded the deployment of international peace forces instead of the Russian peace forces (Kasim 2011, 212). In July, days after the beginning of *Immediate Response 2008* joint military exercise in Georgia with the participation of 1000 American special forces troops, Russian yearly *Kavkaz* exercise took place in North Ossetia near the Georgian border (Ellison 2011, 351-353).

Blank (2014, 50) argues that Putin had preplanned the Russo-Georgian war since 2006 with the deliberate use of separatists. According to him, the Western absence from conflict resolution opened the way to Russia to interfere with the South Caucasian states by exploiting its monopoly over the conflict resolution process to strengthen its neo-imperial drive (Blank 2014, 52). Ellison (2011, 343-344) mentions two theories relating the discussion of Russia's role in the war. The first one is about her historical hegemony in a regional sphere as seen by instilling her historical but lost dominance over a small state. This theory establishes a linkage between Kosovo and NATO enlargement and Russia's justification for the war. The second theory is about Russia's using power "*to punish Georgia for choosing to lean west-seen particularly in Tbilisi's desire to join in NATO. This theory presupposes that if NATO had not attempted to offer Georgia the Membership Action Plan (MAP), Russia would not have pursued a preventive war as a 'deterrent'*". Both theories commonly assert that the war was more about Russia's relationships with the West and the protection of its sphere of interest.

According to Ellison (2011, 346-347), long-term strategic objectives of Russia in Georgia were to "*communicate to Georgia and the West that Russia will not tolerate*

the encirclement caused by NATO enlargement”, “communicate to other countries, particularly CIS states, that Russia will not accept regional challenges that compromise its perceived sphere of influence”, “force specific EU countries to make a decision between further NATO expansion and natural gas sales from Russia”, and “force a western reassessment of the southern corridor energy strategy”, besides halting NATO enlargement.

On 7 August 2008, following firings at five South Ossetian villages from inside the Russian border, Georgian forces responded by firing upon civilians in Tskhinvali. Russia maintained that it responded to Georgian attack on Tskhinvali from Vladikavkaz in North Ossetia and then deployed reinforcement forces into Georgia (Ellison 2011, 353). The official justification of Russia was to protect her 70.000 South Ossetia citizens that she issued passports (Demirağ 2013, 259).

During the war, Russian troops rapidly reached at the point where the BTC line passed and stopped there, and they did not damage the pipeline while they were bombing its surroundings (Aydın 2017b, 479). The BTC became unusable and the BTE gas pipeline was halted due to the security reasons. The tense ground between Russia and Georgia was carrying the potential to destroy Turkey’s Black Sea-centered policies, economic and political projects such as regional security initiatives as BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony, BTC/BTE pipelines and BTK railway (Çelikpala 2010b, 108). At the end of the war, Moscow actually took control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Wieclawski 2011, 14).

8.1. The Repercussion of the Russo-Georgian War

The war illustrated that the interplay of regional and global forces would continue to dominate future political and military issues in the region (Çelikpala 2010a, 290). The war allowed Russia to check NATO expansion in the Caucasus (Kuchins and Mankoff 2013, 14) and reversed the tendency that Russia’s losing influence on the area of the CIS together with diversification of political, economic and military contacts of the countries in the region (Wieclawski 2011, 13). It can be said that the game field of the West in the Caucasus was constrained in the aftermath of the Georgian war (Öztürk 2009, 23).

The Russian military intervention caused anxiety and cautiousness among the CIS members by strengthening Moscow's position there in the short term (Wieclawski 2011, 16). Immediate Georgian response was to announce Georgia's withdrawal from the CIS, which occurred formally in August 2009. While Putin personally required that the CIS states take a stand on the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, CIS members silently disobeyed (Nygren 2010, 109). The Western powers lost a lot of their credibility in the eyes of the CIS states. Despite the fears none of the countries in the privileged area decided to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Wieclawski 2011, 13).

The US failed to respond to Russia and its position as the security guarantor for Georgia has been called into question (Çelikpala 2010a, 293). The US issued new reminders of its guarantees to the Baltic states and support for Ukraine (Blank 2009, 35). *"Effectiveness of the Western political pressure on Russia has been limited. Moscow has quickly dismissed the European threats of freezing the EU's cooperation with Russia as well as the US warnings of ruling Russia out of the G-8 and some other forums of international dialogue"* (Wieclawski 2011, 17). Harsh explanations of the US were not supported equally in the EU especially by France and Germany which constituted an impediment for the West's development of a common strategy against Russia. Germany's cooperation with Russia on energy prevented her adopting a harsher policy (Kasım 2011, 221-222).

The Montreux regime had limited the ability of the Soviet navy to move its forces to the Mediterranean Sea in a short time. Changing security dynamics and the admission of Bulgaria and Romania to NATO and the EU had brought forth the possibility of relaxing the provisions of the Montreux regime in order to favor a large US Navy presence in the Black Sea. Turkey opposed these ideas which might induce Russia to retaliate ending the maritime force equilibrium achieved in the Black Sea for the first time since the collapse of the Ottoman State. Following the August 2008 crisis, Romania, Ukraine and Bulgaria renewed the idea to enlarge NATO presence in the Black Sea (Aydın 2013, 54). These developments transformed Turkey from most devoted Euro-Atlantic partner in the Cold War to a status quo power in the Black Sea region (Minchev 2006, 14).

The Georgia war brought forth many issues to the forefront of the agenda for Turkey. These were Turkey's position between Russia and the West; Georgia's territorial integrity and the status of Abkhazia; the possibility of the resume of the armed conflicts in Karabakh; BSCE, BLACKSEFOR, Black Sea Harmony; BTC and BTE pipelines; economic and political projects like Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Project; Montreux Convention in the context of sending humanitarian aid to Georgia; the possibility of being a sample of the separatist Abkhazia to the Turkey Kurds (Aydın 2017b, 479). Russia and Turkey began to diverge due to the disrupted transportation, energy, and other infrastructure networks in the region, adversely affecting the interests of Turkey (Kim and Blank 2012a, 1). With the pressure of these developments, new sets of steps were taken influencing Turkey's Caucasus policy that it was established in last 15 years (Çelikipala 2010b, 108).

Russian intervention in Georgia and weakening position of the US in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia activated to some extent other regional powers having interests on the area, such as, Turkey (Wieclawski 2011, 14). However, the crisis demonstrated the weakness and limitations of Turkey with regard to regional problems (Aydın 2013, 55). Despite Turkey had serious interests in Georgia it could not do anything much more than watching during the war (Hale 2013, 219).

On 13 August, Turkey, priorly negotiating with Russia, put forward the establishment of the *Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact* (CSCP)⁴² which differed from the previous for its giving the US and the EU only observer status in the platform (Aydın 2017a, 477). Turkey's aim in establishing the Pact were as the following:

“restructuring of the Caucasian Republics’ economies, ensuring development and cooperation, boosting economic cooperation with the world, fostering free trade, supporting the private sector, ensuring environmental protection, putting the existing and future energy and transportation lines extending from the east to the west to use, regulating the

⁴² The first meeting of the Pact was organized at the meeting of the Council of Ministers of OSCE on 4-5 December 2008 with the participation of its five members: Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia (Üstün 2010, 237). Despite the launching of the meetings at the technical level, mutual distrust and the conflictual environment prevented the finalization of the CSCP. However, the future rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia would be the product of the talks maintained within the framework of this initiative (Aydın 2017a, 477).

administrative structures, ensuring administrative transparency, tackling refugee issues and ensuring the relevant countries' integration” (Çelikpala 2013, 125).

Turkey's proposal was met with suspect and even reaction by her western allies, particularly the US due to Turkey's taking unilateral step independently from her allies while a common response was sought to be developed against Russia under the umbrella of EU and NATO. Main reasons of this suspect was the ambiguous content of the proposal, the reservation created by the emphasis made on regionalism and the distrust created by Turkey's negotiating the proposal firstly with Russia. The basis of Russia's positive approach was the exclusion of non-regional actors particularly the US. Azerbaijan and Armenia did not react positively or negatively to the proposal while Georgia was alienated since the proposal excluded the EU and did not meet Georgia's security need against Russia (Çelikpala 2010b, 110-111).

On 20 August 2008, *Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Poland Concerning the Deployment of Ground-Based Ballistic Missile Defense Interceptors in the Territory of the Republic of Poland* was signed. According to the agreement, the US would extend direct assistance to Poland before NATO assistance in case of an attack and the US forces would be stationed in Poland for such a guarantee (Blank 2009, 35,39). Moscow recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia on 26 August as sovereign states, formulating arguments similar to those given by Western states in the justification of their recognition of Kosovo (Cheterian 2012, 703).

The war in Georgia led Russia to get the chance to further promote its political and military power, global position, relative gains and prestige in both regional and international levels (Özkan 2012, 60). The Western criticism following the war did not weaken Russian assertiveness regarding its role on the international scene. On the contrary, Russia intensified its contacts in Latin American countries, such as Venezuela and Cuba, “*promising them the Russian economic and political support as well as military cooperation. One of the aims of this demonstration has been to warn Washington that any American intervention in the Russian sphere of 'privileged interests' on the area of the CIS may be reciprocated*” with countries close to the US borders and reluctant to the US hegemony (Wieclawski 2011, 13).

Russia and Syria had opened up a new chapter in their post-Cold War relations with Bashar al-Assad's visit to Moscow in January 2005. Russia and Syria had signed many agreements in economic and military fields between 2005 and 2008. In September 2008, Russia announced that it had begun renovation procedures on the Syrian port of Tartus, with the objective of setting up a permanent facility for the Russian navy that would secure it a major military foothold in the Mediterranean (Kelkitli 2012, 321-323).

The Five-Day War sent shock waves to both Azerbaijan and Armenia. They both realized that they should do something to enhance their security. The US demands for support for the Nabucco project during the visit of Vice President Cheney on 4 September 2008 seem too have received no positive answer from Azerbaijan (Cheterian 2012, 709). Baku, acting prudently during the war, redirected some of its energy flows from the BTC route to Russian installations (Blank 2009, 40-41). The *Joint Declaration of the CSTO*, issued in Moscow on 5 September 2008, endorsed Russia's reaction to Georgia in the war over South Ossetia and accused Georgia of breaking the peace (Özkan 2012, 47).

8.2. The Regime of the Straits with Reference to the Russo-Georgian War

The development getting Turkey closer to Russia in early 2000s was the assessment of the US that the Black Sea basin was a security vacuum. What the US wanted was to deploy American troops in the region as it did in other regions of the world. This approach got the support of Romania and Georgia and led to a confrontation among the Black Sea states. These developments unified Turkey and Russia in the defense of the current status quo of the Black Sea and the Montreux Convention (Çelikpala 2017b, 556). The US had demanded the establishment of a force similar to the OAE in the Black Sea and agreed with Romania to establish a naval base in Constanta in 2005. However, the movement area of the US in the Black Sea was limited due to the provisions of the Montreux Convention. In a period, debates regarding this American policy, still taking place, the Russo-Georgian war had broken out. The US efforts to send aid to Georgia through the Straits led to crisis. The US

wanted to dispatch two hospital ships named *Mercy* and *Comfort*, the standard displacement tonnage of each singly was 70.000 tons. If they passed, that would be the violation of the Montreux Convention (Özersay 2017, 821).

Some of the American think tanks brought into agenda that Turkey did not do her part as a good ally in the past by referring to the 1 March 2003 resolution following Turkey's determined attitude not to make compromise over the Montreux Convention (Özersay 2017, 822). The original US effort to send the aid via the USS *Comfort* and the USNS *Mercy* were assessed by some as an attempt by the US to press for a revision of the Montreux Convention. However, the US issued a firm denial that it desired any change in the status of the Montreux Convention (Larrabee 2009, 314).

A part of the focus of the debates in this period was the notification that should be given to Turkey preceding to the transit of the vessels of war. Turkey discussed whether the US obtained permission at least 8 days before (this duration is 15 days for non-Black Sea Powers) (Özersay 2017, 822). Some argued that the US did not obey the notification rule required for the normal transits of the vessels of war. However, Russia's not arguing any violation of the Montreux Convention demonstrated that these assessments were not true because the party receiving the notification had to inform other parties immediately. When the hospital ships issue could not be resolved, the US expressed on 20 August that it would send humanitarian assistance with a destroyer of approximately 9000 tons and a coast guard boat of 3000 tons. According to the Montreux Convention (18/1-d), the naval forces to be sent to Black Sea for humanitarian purposes ought not to exceed 8000 tons altogether. This tonnage demonstrated that the transit of these vessels would not be counted in the humanitarian transit category. Otherwise, the Convention would have been violated. In this period, Russian deputy chief of General Staff expressed that Russia was satisfied from Turkey's applying the provisions of the Montreux Convention (Özersay 2017, 822-823).

Eventually, the US sent the aid aboard the USS destroyer *McFaul*, the USCGC *Dallas* and the USS *Mount Whitney*, all of which were well below the tonnage limits allowed under the Montreux Convention (Larrabee 2009, 314). Russia did not believe that humanitarian aid equipment existed in the US vessels. However, the Montreux

Convention was not giving right to Turkey to control the cargos of the vessels of war at times of peace. Therefore, Russia refrained from accusing Turkey regarding the cargos of the vessels despite her dissatisfaction from the transits of these vessels. The US terminated the transit of these vessels of war sent for humanitarian assistance to Georgia in the middle of September. In this period, the US rotated her war vessels in the Black Sea due to the limitation that “*vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea Powers shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the object of their presence there*” (Özersay 2017, 823).

Despite Russia’s appreciation for Turkey’s diplomatic effort, it led to some serious tensions in Turkey’s relations with the US (Hale 2013, 219). The entering and exit of the *USS McFaul* through the Straits three times to overcome the 21-days of limitation of the Montreux Convention was interpreted in Turkey as a new US plan to remain in the Black Sea permanently (Aydın 2017b, 477).

9. Between Russo-Georgian War and the Syria Crisis

9.1. Russian Privileged Interests and the Proposed New European Security Architecture (31 August 2008-29 November 2009)

Following the South Ossetia War Medvedev spoke about Russia’s spheres of privileged interests which sounded as if Moscow was reclaiming the Soviet geopolitical legacy of Russia’s spheres of influence (Trenin 2009, 3). On 31 August 2008, Medvedev set out *Five-point Foreign Policy Principles*⁴³ of the new world order, the last of which emphasized that there were regions in which Russia had *privileged interests* (Berryman 2010, 228). Medvedev declared that “*a key point of all Russian foreign policy would be the establishment of such a sphere of influence wherein Russia has ‘privileged relations’ with member countries of the CIS and other, unspecified states*” (Blank 2009, 40-41). According to the principles, Russia would defend its citizens and its business community from any aggressive acts abroad. This doctrine targeted many of the CIS members and also Estonia and Latvia but so many CIS

43 For the full text of Medvedev’s Five-point Foreign Policy Principles, dated 31 August 2008, see, Kremlin (2019d).

countries chose not to comment (Nygren 2010, 110). Medvedev stressed that “*Russia’s interests in the world were in no way confined to the post-Soviet area as many important investment sources, vital markets, and critical technologies were to be found outside of Russia’s borders. In such a context, the talk of spheres of ‘privileged interests’ appeared perfectly natural and thoroughly nonexclusive*” (Trenin 2009, 4). Trenin (2009, 13) contends that that *influence* tends to be both all-inclusive and exclusive whereas *interests* are more specific and identifiable.

Following the Five-Day War, Ankara and Moscow realized that they needed to revise their policies for different reasons. Turkey discovered that her South Caucasus policy was heavily Azerbaijan-centric and completely ignored Armenia. It attempted to establish normal relations with Yerevan and play a positive role in solving the Karabakh conflict. Russia also launched an intensive mediation to find a solution to the Karabakh conflict. On 2 November 2008 Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents signed the *Declaration on Regulating the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (Moscow Declaration)*⁴⁴ which was the first document that both parties signed after the cease-fire agreement of 1994 (Cheterian 2012, 710).

The EU had failed to produce concrete measures against Russia. The only step taken by the EU had been the postponement of the negotiation meetings of the partnership agreement with Russia. However, at the Nice Summit on 14 November, the EU decided to resume negotiations despite the fact that “*Moscow did not fulfil the EU’s condition of the complete withdrawal of Russian troops to their pre-war positions*” (Özkan 2012, 42-43). At the end of 2008, the European Commission published a Communication on *Eastern Partnership (EaP)*⁴⁵ towards Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine laying out guiding principles in fostering stability and prosperity, trade relations leading to the establishment of a network of free-trade areas (FTA), deeper cooperation in energy security among others. Although

⁴⁴ However, the succeeding trilateral meetings beginning at St. Petersburg in June 2009 until Sochi in January 2012 were too far away from bringing any concrete development toward the resolution of the conflict (Kelkitli 2012, 304). Arman Melikyan (as cited in Blank 2014, 53) claims that “*in the mediation Russia ostensibly ‘brokered’ in 2011 on Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow was to arrange for the surrender of liberated territories, thereby ensuring its military presence in return and establishing a network of military bases in Azerbaijan to prevent any further cooperation between Azerbaijan and NATO*”. While Armenia accepted this plan, Baku refused to do so.

⁴⁵ The EU launched the EaP in March 2009 (Çelikpala 2010a, 294).

Turkey was satisfied with EU's efforts in the region after the publication of the Black Sea Synergy stressing the importance of the EU's existence as a neutral actor in the solutions of the regional conflicts, the exclusion of Turkey and Russia from both bilateral and multilateral initiatives with the publication of Communication on Eastern Partnership created disillusionment. This new initiative was said to be strengthening the divisions among the regional states (Üstün 2010, 235-236).

NATO rejected to grant Ukraine and Georgia MAP at the Brussels meeting held between 2-3 December 2008 (Blank 2009, 35). OSCE's mission in Georgia expired on 31 December 2008 and Russia's veto of its extension prevented Western presence in Georgia giving Moscow more exclusive control there. Russia insisted that the OSCE and its member states recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a precondition of any formal peace conference (Blank 2009, 32-38).

In January 2009, the new gas conflict appeared to be a Russia's policy to disgrace the Orange Revolution and punish Yushchenko for his support of Georgia in the August war. *"The price disagreement between Ukrainian and Russian governments stopped the flow of gas from Russia to Europe via Ukraine for nearly three weeks"*. During that time, *"a number of Eastern and Western countries ... had to bear the cold winter and shut down some factories working with natural gas"*. The US, EU and Turkey intensified their efforts to realize the Nabucco gas pipeline. Russia considered *"Nabucco as a project motivated by western geopolitical concerns but not by its economic necessity"*. Putin went further and warned the supporters of Nabucco by asking them where they would find gas resources to fill it. Russia did not rule out the use of force in the competition over the energy resources in the near abroad (Özkan 2012, 56-57).

The US and Georgia had negotiated a framework agreement for a strategic partnership during the Bush administration but when the Obama administration (2009-2016) moved to repair relations with Russia, Georgia was only assured that *"the US support for Georgia would not be sacrificed for better ties with Russia"* (Ziegler 2010, 169). The US and Georgia signed a strategic cooperation agreement in January 2009 (Kasım 2011, 220-221). In February 2009, Vice President Joe Biden met with Saakashvili in Munich and *"rejected the concept of spheres of influence and defended*

the right of countries to belong to international alliances of their choice” (Ziegler 2010, 169). Obama, after elected as president of the US, visited Turkey on 6 April 2009 and defined Turkey as *model partner* during his speech at the TGNA (Uzgel 2017b, 263).

On 20 April 2009, Medvedev called for the conclusion of a treaty of European security as a kind of *Helsinki Plus* (Lomagin 2010, 186). The *National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020*⁴⁶, dated 12 May 2009, noted that “*Russia has overcome the consequences of the systemic crisis at the end of the 20th century. All in all, the prerequisites have been established for the transformation of the RF into one of the leading great powers*” (Kropatcheva 2012, 32).

Having seen Russia's unbending behavior both in the war and aftermath, the EU felt obliged to announce its *Eastern Partnership* initiative towards six NIS of Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in May 2009. However, Russia opposed to this project more than ever before because it considered that EU tried to create its sphere of influence in the near abroad at the cost of Russia's (Özkan 2012, 43). The *Corfu Process*, to discuss Medvedev's proposal on a European security architecture, was launched in June 2009 within the OSCE and was formalized in Athens in December 2009.

Triggered with different motivations, Euroscepticism alienated Turkey and Russia from the EU and associated the two countries within the framework of alternative search under the influence of the conjunctural developments. The deadlocks emerged during Turkey's membership process and EU's pursuit of expansion at Russia's backyard coincidently with the NATO expansion, the pressure of Neighborhood and Eastern Partnership policies on Russian foreign policy became the elements feeding Euroscepticism in Turkish and Russian politics (Akgül-Açıkmeşe and Hisarlıoğlu 2017, 257). Çelikpala (as cited in Akgül-Açıkmeşe and Hisarlıoğlu 2017, 259) argues that these developments, while alienating both parties ideationally from the western world which was seen as a partner to cooperate in priority, created

46 For the full text of the *National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020*, dated 12 May 2009, see, Rustrans (2019).

an idea that they could enter into a kind of close cooperation in political, economic and commercial areas.

Russia tried to prevent the realization of the Nabucco project by offering to buy all of Azerbaijan's but the latter refused this offer because it would undermine Azerbaijan's energy partnership with the West and severely curtail its own national independence (Larrabee 2009, 304). However, Azerbaijan reacted to a possible Turkish–Armenian rapprochement by shifting closer towards Moscow. In June 2009, Azerbaijan undertook to supply Russia with 500 million cubic meters of gas annually. Azerbaijan also reportedly acknowledged Gazprom as a “*priority buyer*” for Stage 2 of the Shah Deniz gas field without which the EU-supported Nabucco would not be viable (Ziegler 2010, 171). The Nabucco agreement was signed among Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria on 13 July 2009 (Çelikpala 2017b, 521).

The most important change in the Turkish foreign policy caused by the Georgian war was the starting of a process called *Armenia opening* which made the ongoing covered talks between Turkey and Armenia since early 1990s visible with an increasing momentum (Çelikpala 2010b, 111). Ankara's *CSCS platform* was part of an overall revitalization of her foreign policy with Armenia. At the end of negotiations, Turkey and Armenia issued two protocols on 31 August 2009 (Cheterian 2012, 711). The protocols were signed in Zurich on 10 October 2009 by the FM's of Turkey and Armenia in the presence of US, Swiss, Russian, and French FM's and the EU's foreign policy chief. Hakobyan (as cited in Cheterian 2012, 712) argues that, “*the expectations of the various sides were based on wrong calculations*”. Armenia was wrong to assume that “*it was possible to change the status quo on Armenian-Turkish relations without changing the status quo on the Karabakh issue*”. Turkey was wrong that “*dialogue with Armenia would lead to Armenian concessions on Karabakh*”. Turkey overestimated its own capacity to resist pressure from Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan threatened Turkey to raise the price of gas and looked Russia for future pipeline projects to deliver the energy resources of Caspian to Europe. It was already clear that Turkey's attempts to create a new diplomatic space in the Caucasus had failed at the time of the signing of the protocols.

On 29 November 2009, Russia published a draft of a *European Security Treaty* (EST)⁴⁷ comprising fourteen points:

“Many of the basic tenets of the Medvedev proposal, ..., are standard principles of European security doctrine: respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, rejection of the use or threat of use of force, the indivisibility of European security, and the advancement of comprehensive arms control ... found in existing European security agreements, including the Charter of Paris (1990), the NATO–Russia Founding Act (1997), and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1990). ... [T]he treaty would prevent NATO from acting independently of Moscow” (McNamara 2010, 3).

Jensen (as cited in McNamara 2010, 4) argues that Medvedev’s proposed EST had four primary goals: to “*legitimize Moscow’s sphere-of-privileged-interest policy, reduce American influence in Europe and undermine existing treaties, eradicate the indivisibility of transatlantic security, and project greater Russian influence internationally*”. EST would also raise the profile and standing of the CSTO and the CSTO would be given formal recognition in Europe (McNamara 2010, 4). In the November 2009 text, “*the EST would effectively give Moscow a veto over further NATO expansion and would de facto recognize Moscow’s self-proclaimed sphere of privileged interests*” (McNamara 2010, 2).

Medvedev’s initiative received a lukewarm reaction from both the US and NATO. In December 2009, NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen said that there was no need for a new security treaty. In February 2010, US Secretary of State Clinton rejected Russia’s call, saying that Europe’s security would be strengthened by a closer cooperation between Russia and NATO (Lomagin 2010, 195). Lomagin (2010, 195) argues that Russia’s aim was “*to change the terms of the debate on the future of security in Europe away from NATO towards a new body that includes Russia as a founding member*”.

The *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*⁴⁸, dated 5 February 2010, criticized “*attempts to empower NATO with global functions and to move NATO infrastructures close to the borders of the RF by means of enlargement*” and

47 For the full text of the *Draft of the European Security Treaty*, dated 29 November 2009, see, Kremlin (2019a).

48 For the full text of the *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, dated 5 February 2010, see, Carnegie (2019).

emphasized “*Russia’s right to use nuclear weapons, if it or its allies are attacked*”. In both the 1993 and the 2010 documents it was not NATO, but rather its enlargement was identified as a danger (Kropatcheva 2012, 33).

9.2. The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Reactor (12 May 2010)

On 11 May 2010, Russian-Syrian summit talks were held in Damascus. Russia-Syria talks had also deep political meaning. Moscow was conducting policy of coming back to the Middle East (Kolobov and Kornilov 2011, 31).

During the visit of President Medvedev to Turkey between 11-12 May 2010, High Level Cooperation Council was established. Under the Council headed by two co-chairmen, there would be Joint Strategic Planning Group, Mixed Economic Commission and Turkey-Russia Social Forum. A memorandum of understanding concerning the transportation of the crude oil in the Black Sea region by taking the priority of the Samsun-Ceyhan line was signed during the visit (Çelikpala 2017b, 541). *The Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on cooperation in the area of construction and operation of the nuclear power plant at Akkuyu site in the Republic of Turkey* was signed on 12 May 2010 (Çelikpala 2017b, 550). This project came to realize with the government to government formula without going out to tender. Russia would construct the plant in accordance with *build-own-operate* business model. This was a first example that Russia would produce nuclear energy outside her own territory and would sell this energy to third parties by via Turkey. Russia also attempted to construct similar plants with the credits extended partially or totally by the Russian treasure in Ukraine, Belarus, India and China since early 2010 (Çelikpala 2017c, 212).

The signing of Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual assistance between Turkey and Azerbaijan in August 2010 was coincided with a Russian-Armenian agreement under which Russia prolonged its lease of a military and air base in Armenia for 34 years. These two commitments raised the threat that Turkey and Russia might be involved in a military collision arising from a Caucasian conflict over which they lacked direct control (Hale 2013, 216).

9.3. The Natural Gas of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Turkish-Russian Relations (2010-2011)

The enormous gas discoveries of the south Cyprus and Israel in eastern Mediterranean in 2010-2011 created a new source of tension between Turkey and Cyprus. In late 2011, “*Noble Energy, the firm contracted by Cyprus to explore its waters for gas, announced a discovery estimated at 5-8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas there*”. The US Geological Survey estimated that Eastern Mediterranean may hold 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. These discoveries “*heightened tensions between the TRNC and the Greek-led Republic of Cyprus*”. The TRNC “*reacted coolly to the gas discovery, and Turkey ... sent an exploration ship accompanied by warships and fighter jets to the area after Noble started drilling*”. Russia publicly backed Cyprus’ right to develop its Mediterranean gas. Russia also dispatched an aircraft carrier and submarine to Cyprus as a show of support (Kim and Blank 2012a, 9-10).

Russia, which sees itself as Europe’s main gas supplier, would not simply let Israel and Cyprus cut into its sales with such massive impact and compete with it at no cost. This meant that Russia would exert substantial pressure on Cyprus to be able to enter into the gas business from their recent discoveries and make harder for Turkey to coerce Cyprus. The Russian involvement in the Cyprus gas would enhance its leverage vis-à-vis Turkey in their bilateral energy dealings. Russia’s seeking permanent anchorages and bases in south Cyprus challenged Turkey’s security and NATO planning. The Cyprus energy conflict served as a reminder that energy politics are inseparable from larger security considerations (Kim and Blank 2012a, 9-11).

9.4. The American Missile Shield System Project

The American *Missile Shield System* had also become an element of tension between Russia and the West during the 2000s. The Missile Shield system was in the agenda of the US since 1980s under different names. When Reagan first put forward the project as *Strategic Defense Initiative* (which was also coined Star Wars) he was aiming to consolidate the effectiveness of the American power in the new international system since the USSR was on the verge of dissolution. The project almost completely fell of the agenda during the 1990s. The Bush administration aimed to end Russian-

Iranian cooperation by pressing both countries via stationing missile shield in Europe during the 2000s (Gözen 2011, 35-36). The purpose of the missiles was to shoot the missiles of the states proclaimed as *rogue* by the US, such as, Northern Korea, Iran and Iraq (Uzgel 2017b, 317).

Russia's nuclear deterrence was the most important basis of her defense policy against the US. However, a country's having nuclear arms does not bring together the nuclear deterrence. One cannot be told about the deterrence of Russia if a missile shield established around Russia annihilate the missiles launched from Russia while they are in space. Therefore, Russia considered the American air defense system to be established in Europe as attack-intended. Nicholai Patrushev, Russian Security Council Chairman, stated that the NATO missile defense system could make Russian intercontinental ballistic missile power ineffective and this situation may lead to a nuclear imbalance and strategic instability (İşyar 2013, 108-109). Gözen (2011, 34) argues that the Missile Shield System was *"rather than being a military capacity having a purpose of pure defense or attack, ... is used on the purpose of affecting, changing both general and regional balances or creating new political balances in the international system"*.

The Bush administration speeded up *"concluding the treaties for the establishment of the Missile Defense System (MDS) with Poland and Czech Republic, evidently partly, to punish Russia for its actions in Georgia"*. Russia announced that *"it would deploy its short-range Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad in order to neutralize the perceived security threat from the United States and/or NATO"*. May be this strong Russian reaction played *"an important role for the US government to scrap the plan of instalment of MDS in Poland and the Czech Republic in 2009 and to concentrate such alternative allies as Turkey, over which Russia would express less or no opposition"* (Özkan 2012, 42).

The Obama administration declared that it would turn the American project into a NATO project in September 2009. The US announced that the purpose of the project was to protect Europe and the US forces in Europe and form a defense wall against the developing missile capacity of Iran. The Missile Shield system was assessed as a test of Turkey's existence in the western system due to her negative vote

against the sanction on Iran at the UN Security Council on 9 June 2010 (Resolution No:1929). Turkey did not owe a missile defense system and therefore was approaching positively to the project. Due to her close relations with Iran, Turkey demanded that any country ought not to be stated in the NATO Declaration. The Missile Shield decision⁴⁹ was taken at the NATO Lisbon Summit meeting held between 19-20 November 2010. At the Summit Russia was invited to the project, any country was not stated as a threat, and Turkey approved the project (Uzgel 2017b, 317-318). Russian frustrations were mainly directed towards the US as the architect of the project, rather than Turkey, which Russia perceived as a much less influential US partner (Öniş and Yılmaz 2015, 13). Ian O. Lesser (as cited in Hale 2013, 173) suggested in June 2010 that *“the new Turkish-Western relationship will be à la carte and driven by convergent national interests rather than amorphous notion of geopolitics and identity”*. On 23 November 2011, Medvedev announced the following decision (Kim and Blank 2012a, 6-7):

“First, I am instructing the Defence Ministry to immediately put the missile attack early warning radar station in Kaliningrad on combat alert. Second, protective cover of Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons will be reinforced as a priority measure under the program to develop our air and space defenses. Third, the new strategic ballistic missiles commissioned by the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy will be equipped with advanced missile defense penetration systems and new highly effective warheads. Fourth, I have instructed the Armed Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defense system data and guidance systems if need be. These measures will be adequate, effective, and low-cost. Fifth, if the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy modern offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe. One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad Region. Other measures to counter the European missile defense system will be drawn up and implemented as necessary. Furthermore, if the situation continues to develop not to Russia’s favor, we reserve the right to discontinue further disarmament and arms control measures. Besides, given the intrinsic link between strategic offensive and defensive arms, conditions for our withdrawal from the New START Treaty could also arise, and this option is enshrined in the treaty”.

NATO and the US tried to appease Russia arguing that the missile system did not target Russia and it was established against Iran and North Korea. When Russia’s demand for a written guarantee stipulating that the system would not be used against Russia refused, Russia announced on 5 February 2012 that she would establish her

49 A radar site in Kürecik, Malatya in eastern Turkey was activated in May 2012 (Öniş and Yılmaz 2015, 13).

own defense system. Among the precautionary measures that Russia would take, as Nikolay Makarov, Russian Chief of Staff, announced on 10 May 2012 the following measures that Russia would implement:

- To deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.
- To establish defense systems in Russia's south and northwest regions and equip these regions with new assault weapons.
- To destruct the missile system infrastructure in case of tense relations (İşyar 2013, 109-110).

The last of these precautionary measures concerned Turkey. From the elements of the missile defense system, that Russia explained that she would launch preemptive attack, the radar would be deployed in Malatya/Kürecik, preventive missiles would be deployed in Romania and Poland, and the command center would be established in Germany (İşyar 2013, 110).

10. The Syria Crisis and Turkish-Russian Relations (2011-2014)

10.1. The Inception of the Syrian Crisis

Between 2003 and 2011 Russia and Turkey had behaved as status quo powers whose interests dictated extensive policy coordination to maintain regional order against the projections of the US and NATO. During this period, trade and energy cooperation were the primary instruments of rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow. Relations between Moscow and Ankara declined after 2011. The primary reason for the Russian–Turkish divergence was the shifting threat perceptions (Demiryol 2015, 82). Turkey, anxious to take advantage of the Arab Upheavals, opted to topple the Assad regime whereas Russia continued to support the existing regime (Demiryol 2015, 83).

The Turkish-Syrian relations had entered into a process of reconciliation after Syria's expulsion of Abdullah Öcalan and the closure of PKK training camps in Syria. Associated to the mounting political and security ties, the two states had also improved the economic and commercial facet of their relationship. Remarkable moves in this

direction were the foundation of the *Syrian-Turkish High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council* on 16 September 2009 and the abolition of visa requirements between the two states on 13 October 2009. Turkey and Syria, along with Jordan and Lebanon, declared the establishment of *Quadripartite High Level Cooperation Council* on 10 June 2010 to create a zone of free movement of goods and persons among themselves. This elevating and promising relationship received a heavy blow in the summer of 2011 (Kelkitli 2012, 345-346).

The initial perception of the situation in Syria was heavily influenced by the events unfolding in Libya. According to Russia, Russia's abstention on UNSC resolution No:1973, dated 17 March 2011, "*authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya was grossly misinterpreted and abused by Western countries to oust Gaddafi and change Libya's regime*". Russia saw Western moves to condemn Assad's actions in the UN "*as an attempt to implement the Libyan scenario in Syria and was determined not to allow it*" (Bagdonas 2012, 57).

Russia's naval facility in Syria was one of the main reasons why Russia so adamantly protected Assad's regime. The Syrian port of Tartus which was established in 1971 to provide for the activities of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron hosted Russia's naval supply and maintenance station. Since 1991, after the squadron was disbanded, was used to resupply occasional warships (Bagdonas 2012, 61). Russia's strategic interests were the important factors in explaining her support for the Syrian regime. Russia was "*interested in reestablishing itself as a global actor, a great power whose concerns and interests have to be accommodated or at least taken into account*" and expanding or at least preserving its influence in the Middle East. What was potentially at stake in Syria was the "*elimination of Russia's last remaining footholds in this geopolitically vital region. In addition to this, Russia is concerned about its security because instability and sectarian politics could not only limit its influence in the Middle East but also spread closer to home*" (Bagdonas 2012, 67).

Altunışık (2013, 177) argues that "*the nature of regional constellations ultimately explain ... [the] transformations in Syrian-Turkish relations*" between 1998 and 2011, and after 2011. Turkey used Arab spring to improve its relations with the US, and the cooperation and dialogue between the two countries intensified (Altunışık

2013, 190). Altunışık (2013, 190) also argues that the Turkish-Syrian relations fit the following description of Buzan and Weaver:

“The pattern of amity and enmity is normally best understood by starting the analysis from the regional level and extending it towards inclusion of the global actors on the one side and domestic factors on the other. The specific pattern of who fears or likes whom is generally not imported from the system level but generated internally in the region by a mixture of history, politics, and material conditions”.

The protests, began as part of the Arab upheaval in Syria in March 2011, escalated to a country-wide violent clashes in April 2011. At the beginning, Turkey tried to convince Assad to respond the protests with necessary reforms. Turkey’s policy gradually shifted to the support of the opposition as Assad continued to brutally suppress the uprising (Altunışık 2013, 189). Turkey sought to base her calculations⁵⁰ on toppling Assad regime in Syria until then which were close friends. Turkey supported the opponent conferences organized in Turkey by the aid of the Ikhwan as of April 2011. Turkey played an important role in the foundation of the opposition *Free Syrian Army* (FSA) on 29 July 2011 (Oran 2017a, 158-159). The Free Syrian Army, composed of the defectors from Syrian Armed Forces, had its main base in Turkey (Altunışık 2013, 189). Turkey pioneered the establishment of *Syrian National Council* on 23 August 2011 (Oran 2017a, 158-159).

The political divergence occurred between Turkey and Russia under the conditions of expanding trade and continued economic interdependence (Demiryol 2015, 75). In spite of growing economic interdependence, bilateral relations continued to be characterized by significant elements of conflict (Öniş and Yılmaz 2015, 2). While Turkey became the main state working for the downfall of legal president Assad, Russia tried to keep Assad in his place (Aktürk 2013, 4). Aktürk (2014, 19) argues that the Syrian war became a “*proxy war*” between Russia and Turkey. Both Russia and Turkey helped the respective sides of the war logistically and militarily (İşyar 2013, 117).

⁵⁰ For the construction of the JDP’s Syria policy in the Turkish media, see, Batmazoğlu (2014). This article refers to the opposing views in the Turkish media which are in favor of or opposing to Turkey’s leaving its traditional pro-status quo stance under the US influence.

Russia's diplomatic activities beginning from March 2011 served more to shield Assad's regime from international pressure, rather than contributed to any kind of resolution of the conflict (Bagdonas 2012, 60). By the end of 2011, Turkey began to play a key role in CIA-MI6 operations which were providing the delivery of arms and ammunitions seized in Libya to Syria with aircrafts of which NATO signs were erased (Özcan 2017, 270).

10.2. The NABUCCO and TANAP (2011-2012)

Turkey and Russia have an evolving mutual dependence in the oil and gas spheres. This dependency created subtle competition among both parties. During the years 2009-2010, the acute geopolitical rivalries between Nabucco and South Stream⁵¹ have suddenly reversed between two competing and mutually exclusive energy supply routes. The Nabucco would serve Western Europe's interest in reducing its dependency on Russian gas, while South Stream would help Russia strengthen its position as the main energy producer for Europe and Turkey (Kim and Blank 2012b, 1).

On 1 October 2011, Turkey announced that it would terminate the purchase of Russian gas delivered through the Western Balkan pipeline. The reason on the surface was the high price of Russian gas whereas the reality was different. Upon Russia's refusal of price cut, Turkey signed a major gas deal with Azerbaijan on 25 October 2011 to buy 6 bcm of gas annually from Shah Deniz-II field until 2043 recovering the lost from the western pipe-line. Turkey would also transfer for another 10 bcm annual supply of gas to Europe through spare capacities in its pipelines. The agreement envisaged for the building of *Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline* (TANAP) for the transfer of Azeri gas to Turkey. Russia would lose significant revenue and political leverage with this agreement. These accords also opened the way for the transfer of

⁵¹ The Southern Stream came to the agenda in 2007 in the aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of 2006 which also influenced whole of the Europe. The agreement on the construction of a pipeline was signed between Russian Gazprom and Italian ENI companies on 23 June 2007. Finally, the South Stream Agreement on the construction of the Natural Gas Pipeline among Russia, Italy, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece was signed on 15 May 2009. Turkey involved in this process after this date (Çelikpala 2017a, 548). The Protocol concerning the passage of the South Stream pipeline through Turkey's exclusive economic zone was signed between Turkey and Russia on 6 August 2009 (Çelikpala 2017a, 548).

Turkmen and Kazakh gas bypassing Russia and strike a decisive blow to Russia's power over Europe (Kim and Blank 2012b, 4-5).

TANAP greatly enhanced Turkey's role as a transit hub and represented the only pipeline to realize the Nabucco project. Building the trans-Caspian pipeline would reduce the risk on Azerbaijan being the sole Caspian gas producer bypassing Russia (Blank 2014, 63-64). Although Nabucco fell off the agenda due to the decreasing energy demand of Europe, with the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Turkey and Azerbaijan on 27 December 2011 regarding the construction of TANAP⁵², Nabucco had had been put into practice with a different perspective (Çelikpala 2017c, 211). Because of its limited scope, TANAP did not receive the fierce opposition that Nabucco triggered from Russia. As a balancing act to appease Moscow, only two days after the signing of the memorandum of understanding for TANAP, Turkey and Russia signed an agreement on 29 December 2011 for the utilization of the Turkish exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea for the South Stream (Öniş and Yılmaz 2015, 15). It was argued that Turkey actually commanded two different horses running in the very same race with the hopes of agitating neither Russia nor the US (İşeri and Dilek 2011, 48).

10.3. Increasing Tension between Turkey and Russia over Syria

The attempts to get the approval of the UNSC to topple the Syrian regime with an international intervention as in Libya became inconclusive due to the vetoes of Russia and China on 4 February 2012 (Özcan 2017, 270). The natural gas flow to Turkey from Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan interrupted coincidentally in early February 2012. Russian and Iranian gas almost came to a halt whereas Azerbaijani gas totally stopped. Some analysts observed that these interruptions occurred coincidentally with the emergence of hearsays that Turkey would intervene in Syria jointly with the US

⁵² The Intergovernmental Agreement concerning TANAP between Turkey and Azerbaijan was signed on 26 June 2012. With TANAP Project, an 1,850 km long pipeline with the initial capacity of 16 billion m³ and the maximum capacity of 32 billion m³ per year was planned to reach the Greece border from Georgia. In order to bring Azeri gas to Turkey and through Turkey to Europe, final investment decision of the Shah Deniz Phase II development, the Southern Caucasus Pipeline Expansion (SCPX) Project, TANAP and the *Trans-Adriatic Pipeline* (TAP) were taken in Baku in December 2013 (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 2020).

(İşyar 2013, 94-95). On March 20, 2012, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov told the Defense Board the following:

“... [N]ew centers of power with claims to regional leadership and sources of military-political tension for Russia have emerged. A tendency toward an escalation of tensions along the perimeters of our borders is increasing the risk of Russia being dragged into different military conflicts . . . The deployment of the global missile defense shield is seriously disturbing the established status quo and strategic stability in general” (Blank 2012, 187).

While the West saw the Syria crisis as a “*growing armed reaction to crimes against humanity perpetrated by a brutal regime*”, Russia emphasized that “*the protesters shared equal responsibility for the violence, since October 2011*”, and began branding the armed opposition as terrorists. In June 2012, it was argued that the majority of armed resistance to Assad’s regime consisted of foreign fighters. Russia was still refusing to discuss the issue in the UNSC since the situation did not present a threat to international peace and security (Bagdonas 2012, 58).

The shooting down of the Turkish RF-4E reconnaissance jet⁵³, on 22 June 2012, few days after the announcement of the G-20 that a military intervention choice was suspended, was meaningful. In this context, it was interpreted that Turkey was given a lesson due to her warmongering despite the G-20 explanation (İşyar 2013, 127). Turkey’s tough Syrian policy escalated after the crash of her jet. Meanwhile, the *Democratic Union Party* (PYD) composed of the pro-PKK Kurds sought to dominate Syrian Kurds until then divided into many parts. The Iraqi Kurds armed by Barzani were also started to be sent to Syria (Oran 2017a, 159-160). Security cooperation between Syria and Turkey against the PKK disappeared. The possibility of Syria’s supporting the PKK and regionalization of the Kurdish issue emerged (Altunışık 2013, 189).

Turkey became a party to the conflict in Syria and focused on toppling Assad even much more than the US (Oran 2017a, 161). Oran (2017a, 162) links Turkey’s tough policy towards Syria to the following three matters:

⁵³ Wreck of the aircraft was found at 8,6 miles off the Syrian shore (Syria has 12 miles width of territorial waters). Following the clash of views about how the jet crashed, the Turkish General Staff announced in September 2012 that the jet crashed under the blast effect of an exploding missile nearby (Oran 2017a, 159-160).

- The disillusionment of the nonrealization of the expectations of the Turkish government that the new Syrian regime would be an Ikhwan regime.
- Turkey started to concern from the influence of the Syrian Kurds' gaining autonomy on Turkey Kurds.
- The influence of the Turkish government's constructing Turkey's policy towards Syria on a basic wish that "*Turkey is a global power*".

Dugin (as cited in İşyar 2013, 134-135) stated on 15 August 2012 that Turkey did not have a share in the new Middle Eastern map of the US, on the contrary, Great Kurdistan and Great Armenia formations had been placed in the Turkish territories. According to him, Turkey's seemingly shifting from the Atlantic-centered western alliance to Eurasian axis had lost its meaning with her Syrian policy. According to Pankratenko (as cited in İşyar 2013, 140-141) the Turkish foreign policy in 2012 was reflecting the following situation: Turkey-Al-Qaeda meeting had been realized. Western countries and Saudi Arabia were using Turkey explicitly. Turkey had been pushed into the Syrian crisis by the US and the Arab countries. Turkey was not successful in the establishment of special relations with Iran. The Kurdish issue had accelerated in Turkey. Davutoğlu's isolationist discourse regarding Russia had faced Turkey with serious issues. Turkey was gradually approaching to Russia's enemies. Pankratenko reminded that Turkey ought to get off the anti-Syria train immediately to rescue from this adventure with minimum damage. According to Russia, toppling the Damascus administration is a project which could be realized by the usage of the Al-Qaeda militants, financial support of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and Turkey's strategic support. Ankara had assumed the role of technical administrator and the coordinator (İşyar 2013, 141).

When it became clear that Turkey could not succeed to make a regime change in Syria with her own power, providing more effective American involvement in Syria became one of the most important elements of Turkey's Syrian policy in 2012. However, the murder of the American ambassador in Benghazi on 11 September 2012 by Al-Nusra Front that she armed and supported together with Turkey, changed the American policy in Syria. Including Al-Nusra to the list of terrorist organizations, the US began to behave skeptically regarding her relations with the armed groups that she

supported in Syria. Therefore, the Benghazi event can be seen as the beginning of divergence between Turkey and the US about which groups should be supported (Özcan 2017, 270-271).

TGNA authorized the Turkish Armed Forces on 4 October 2012 for a one year to launch military operations in the Syrian territory. On 10 October 2012, a Syrian passenger aircraft flying from Moscow to Syria was forcefully landed to Ankara Esenboğa airport upon the received American intelligence that the aircraft was carrying military equipment, rocket, and arms. There have not any rocket or arms in the aircraft as the US argued. Moscow announced that the electronic parts found in the aircraft belonged to a radar installation and that radar installation was an export product that could also be used for civilian purposes (İşyar 2013, 136-137). Turkey argued that military communication devices were found on the Syrian plane. In the aftermath of the aircraft crisis, the High-Level Cooperation Council which was to be held in October 2012 was postponed due to the Putin's health issues which some people linked to the aircraft crisis (Kurban 2017, 234-235). Just after the aircraft event, Putin was said to say that "*if only one Turkish soldier enters Syria, we treat him as he entered Moscow*" (İşyar 2013, 137).

The US initiated to establish a new formation of the Syrian opposition since the *Syrian National Council* had been composed of extremist Islamists and had not represented all the Syrian opposition, namely, the Alevites, Christians, and the Kurds. In the meeting held in Doha in November 2012, the *National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces* (commonly named *the Syrian National Coalition*) replaced the Syrian National Council (Oran 2017a, 158-159).

Turkey twice consulted the NATO and secured only in December 2012 the deployment of Patriot missiles from Netherlands, Germany and the US (Alterman and Barnett 2013, 6). Following the process of deploying Patriot missiles on Turkey's territories bordering Syria started, Russia stated that these missiles was a preparation for a military intervention in Syria. According to Putin, Syria was not in a position to threat Turkey and attack in this disorder. Valeri Gerasimov, Russian Chief of General Staff, stated that the Patriots could not be used to establish a no-fly zone in Syria (İşyar 2013, 143-151).

Turkey's cooperation with the radical groups in Syria paved the way the emergence of a problematic area in her relations with the US. Beginning from 2013, the US started to accuse Turkey in supporting organizations derivative of Al-Qaeda (Özcan 2017, 270-271). Following a massacre with chemical weapons in Ghouta on 21 August 2013, Turkey claimed that enough conditions were provided for an international intervention in Syria relying on the explanation of the US that use of chemical weapons would be a reason for intervention. However, the US renounced from its decision to intervene when Syria explained that she would transfer her chemical stockpiles to the *Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons* upon diplomatic attempts of Russia (Özcan 2017, 271). Upon these developments, while Turkey insisted for the formation of safe zones to change the regime in Syria, the US, concerning that the refugees might be exposed a massacre like Srebrenica, demonstrated a gradually increasing negligence (Özcan 2017, 272).

The emergence of the *"Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also referred as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), has further complicated the situation for both Turkey and Russia."* Russia was quite critical of Turkey's relatively lenient attitude towards ISIS. *"Setbacks in Turkey's cooperation with the USA over ISIL, its support for the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the region, its strong anti-Israel rhetoric and its flirtation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have raised concerns that the country is drifting away from its Western allies"*. The Syrian crisis *"clearly illustrated the structural limits of Turkey's ability to act independently of the USA and the EU in the face of a major regional crisis"* (Öniş and Yılmaz 2015, 12).

In September 2013, Moscow forced Armenia to renounce to sign a Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU and instead join the *EurAsEc* (Blank 2014, 53).

11. Russia's Annexation of Crimea and the Turkish-Russian Relations (February-March 2014)

The pro-EU and pro-NATO protests, began in Kiev in November 2013 as a reaction to President Yanukovych's suspending the *DCFTA*, established between the

EU, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, as a result of the Russian pressure, continued until Yanukovych's run to Russia on 21-22 February 2014. The new pro-Western government in Kiev maintained its rule over eastern and southern Ukraine where pro-Russian parties were voted mostly (Aktürk 2017, 140-141). On 23 February pro-Russian demonstrations began in Sevastopol and on 27 February masked Russian troops seized the Crimean Supreme Council. On 16 March, Crimea's independence was declared following a referendum. On 18 March, Russia and Crimea signed the accession treaty. On 26 March, all Ukrainian military facilities in Crimea were captured by the Russian troops.

The signatories of the 1993 Budapest Memorandum, particularly the US and the UK, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine in return for submitting all her nuclear stockpiles to Russia, could not take risk to enter in direct confrontation with Russia (Aktürk 2017, 142). Blank (2014, 42) argues that if the classic purpose of the US force deployments in Europe and Asia was to deter and reassure allies, it became a stunning strategic failure after the *de facto* acquiesce in the annexation of Crimea. The assessment of Gvosdev (as cited in Blank 2014, 50) was as follows:

“Ukraine and Georgia have never been very high on the list of US priorities and probably never will be. They will always fall within the ambit of broader regional policies, whether these are directed toward Greater Eastern Europe or the Wider Black Sea area (WBSA), or even the more vaguely defined Eurasia. Contrary to some expectations, the WBSA, or the so-called Black-Caspian Sea region, has not become a priority for the United States. There has been no clear vision of US interests in the region ...”.

Turkey warned against the possible domino effects of the Ukraine crisis, cautioning that the crisis might reawaken several frozen conflicts in the region (Demiryol 2015, 78). Turkey advocated Ukraine's territorial integrity, did not accept the annexation of Crimea and also refrained from an outright criticism of Moscow's actions. However, Turkey's direct and powerful financial relations and energy dependency to Russia obstructed Turkey to continue the opposite posture against Russian intervention in this process. Turkey offered Ukraine a \$50 million loan and called for the protection of Crimean Tatars. For Turkey, Ukraine would be a good partner but not enough to alienate Russia (Aydın 2016, 454).

The EU, in addition to the US, not only criticized Russia for aggravating conflicts in Crimea and eastern Ukraine but applied diplomatic and economic sanctions on Russia on the ground of illegal annexation of Crimea. However, Turkey's Russia policy included serious questions marks regarding her adjustment to EU's *Common Foreign and Security Policy* (CFSP). Underlining the respect to the territorial integrity of Ukraine and non-recognition of the results of the independence referendum, Turkey did not join EU's sanctions against Russia. Turkey's foreign policy practice regarding Russia was discussed in the EU Commission's 2015 Turkey Progress Report and the importance of the necessity of Turkey's concerted action with the EU Council resolutions as a candidate country was reminded (Akgül-Açıkmeşe and Hisarlıoğlu 2017, 263).

Blank (2014, 45-46) argues that Putin's proposal that Russia keep Crimea, Moscow and Washington jointly federalize Ukraine, and Ukraine promise to be both Finland and Switzerland, meant an attempt to destruct Ukraine's sovereignty and the creation of a permanent leverage in a weak state that Moscow can forever manipulate.

12. The Turkish-Russian Military Confrontation in Syria (2015-2016)

12.1. The Formation of Coalition Forces to Combat ISIL and the Russian Military Involvement in Syria on 30 September 2015

ISIL's taking control of wide areas in Iraq and Syria in 2014 changed almost fully the American view of the Syrian crisis and her relations with all the parties to the crisis, particularly Turkey (Özcan 2017, 272). On 11 September 2014, Turkey demonstrated that she pursued different priorities from the US by not signing the Joint Declaration of the meeting of the *Friends Group* in Jeddah where the Friends Group transformed into an international coalition to combat terrorism. Turkey postponed the American request to use İncirlik air base against ISIL by linking it to the formation of a safe zone. Meanwhile, the US took the lead for the establishment of a safe zone in Kobane by PYD by supporting its resistance against ISIL. The success of the resistance

in Kobane demonstrated that the events developed contrary to the expectations of Turkey (Özcan 2017, 272).

During the visit of Putin to Ankara on 1 December 2014, he explained that the South-Stream gas pipeline project was totally cancelled and put forward a new pipeline project called *Turkish Stream* which would run parallel to the Blue-stream to Greece through Turkey (Erşen 2017, 156). The Turkish Stream Project came to the agenda within the framework of Russia's seeking for alternative in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea (Çelikpala 2017c, 206-207).

Considering that the US followed an irresolute policy regarding Iran and Syria, the Saudi government agreed with Turkey to establish an umbrella organization so called Jaish Al-Fatah (Army of Conquest) to unite opposition organizations on 2 March 2015. Turkey hosted the meetings of the components of Jaish Al-Fatah. Jaish Al-Fatah conquered many areas by advancing from north and south in Syria. In April 2015, the visit of the commander of Jaish Al-Fatah, Zahran Alloush, was linked with the preparation works of intervention that Turkey would execute together with Qatar and Saudi Arabia (Özcan 2017, 273). At the beginning of May 2015, the withdrawal of the forces of the Assad administration after losing critical areas led to the predictions that Assad would lose the war. Meanwhile, expansion of the Kurdish safe zone towards the northwest Syria increased the importance of the line between Afrin and Jarabulus for Turkey which was controlled by ISIL and the opposition half and half (Özcan 2017, 274). Taking into account the inconveniency of a unilateral intervention, the possibility of the establishment of a buffer zone by the opposition elements supported by Turkey came to forefront to prevent the expansion of the Kurds (Özcan 2017, 275).

Meanwhile, Turkey examined the examples of intervention which were implemented without obtaining the UNSC authorization. Examining NATO's intervention in Kosovo without the authorization of the UNSC, it was understood that the possibility of creating a legal basis to establish safe zone in Syria was possible within the framework of *Responsible to Protect* (R2P). It was a reasonable possibility that Turkey's Kosovo-like designs, if not a coincidence, were influential in Russia's taking a decision for intervention in Syria at the beginning of 2015 summer. Two developments of 2015 summer strengthened this possibility: Turkey's organizing

Turkmans for the control of Aleppo-Lattakia axis and opening of the Incirlik Air Base to the coalition aircrafts by signing the Incirlik agreement (Özcan 2017, 276). The agreement aiming to create a free-ISIL zone in Syria by the coalition powers was signed on 7-8 July 2015 (Özcan 2017, 279). Thus, Turkish-Russian relations entered under the influence of the Syrian crisis. One of the first signals was Putin's preferring to attend the 100th anniversary of the genocide in Armenia on 24 April and making a speech criticizing the official position of Turkey regarding the genocide despite his invitation to join the 100th anniversary of the Gallipoli war (Özcan 2017, 283).

The opening of the Incirlik airbase to the Coalition Forces deepened the Turkish-Russian conflicts. Following the meeting of the FMs of Turkey and Russia in Sochi on 17 September, Lavrov stated that the coalition which was formed to combat the ISIL was the violation of the international law. Putin called for support for the Kurdish militia fighting against terrorist in his two different speeches in September 2015 (Özcan 2017, 283). Making a speech at the UNGA on 28 September, Putin indicated the following:

“... [W]e think it's a big mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian authorities and government forces who valiantly fight terrorists on the ground. We should finally admit that President Assad's government forces and the Kurdish militia are the only forces really fighting terrorists in Syria” (Kremlin 2019e).

Russian army directly intervened in Syria on 30 September 2015, only several days after Erdoğan attended the opening of the biggest mosque of Europe in Moscow as a guest of Putin (Aktürk 2017, 142). Özcan (2017, 270) argues that at least a part of the causes provoking the Russian intervention in Syria crisis⁵⁴ were related to Turkey's attempts in Syria in the first half of 2015. On 30 September, Russian jets that took off from the Khmeimim Airbase initiated air strikes targeted terrorist groups in Homs and Hama in Syria (Kurban 2017, 250).

⁵⁴ For a detailed account of the Turkish-Russian Syrian crisis, see, Özcan (2017).

12.2. The Shooting Down of the Russian SU-24 by a Turkish Jet (24 November 2015)

To prevent western designs seeking to establish no-fly zone in Syria was stated as one of the causes directing Russia to the intervention. Beginning from the first days, the Russian intervention targeted groups which were supported and equipped by the US and Turkey, such as Tajammu al-Izza. In the coming weeks, the Russia bombardments targeted Turkmen villages in the Aleppo-Lattakia axis. On 3 October 2015, Turkey activated NATO following the violation of the Turkish air space by Russian jet around Hatay. Denouncing the violations of Turkish airspace, NATO demanded the immediate termination of the violations (Özcan 2017, 283-286).

On 20 October 2015, Russia and the US signed a memorandum of understanding to prevent the engagement of their military units with each other in Syria (Kurban 2017, 251). At the beginning of November 2015, Russia began negotiations with Armenia for the establishment of a common air defense system (Kurban 2017, 245). NATO's most concrete reaction for the airspace violations was the deployment of 12 fighter/interceptor jets in the Incirlik Air Base in the first half of November 2015. During the G-20 Summit which took place in Antalya between 15-16 November 2015, Turkey could not persuade even her own allies for the establishment of a safe zone. On 20 November, a draft resolution prepared by France authorizing the fight ISIL was accepted unanimously in the UNSC (Özcan 2017, 283-286).

On 24 November 2015, at 09:20 o'clock, Turkish jets shot down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 attack aircraft in the south of Hatay. The downing of a Russian fighter aircraft by a NATO member since 1953 caused the escalation of a tension unprecedented in the history of both countries. Turkey requested support from her NATO allies. Putin called the incident a stab in the back by the terrorists' accomplices (Özcan 2017, 287-288). On the same day, Putin said that *"instead of immediately establishing contacts with us, as far as we know, Turkey turned to its NATO partners to discuss this incident - as if we had hit their plane and not the other way around"* (Aljazeera 2019).

Official Turkish explanations accused Russian jets violating Turkish airspace for a long time. The US pointed out Turkey's right to protect her airspace (Özcan 2017, 288-289). The US withdrew her F-15 jets from Incirlik which had been deployed there in accordance with the 23 July agreement. The decision of withdrawal may be seen as a precaution towards a possibility that Turkey may escalate the crisis and leave the alliance in the face of a *fait accompli*. The US and NATO did not extend a decisive support to Turkey, besides explanations for the sake of appearances. The shooting down of aircraft dragged Turkish-Russian relations into an unprecedented crisis in the years following the WWI. Reciprocal harsh explanations heightened the tension. Russia took harsh measures against Turkey when her expectations for excuse and compensation were not met. In the aftermath of the shooting down, Russia intensively covered the areas controlled by the armed opponents supported by Turkey with fire and provided for the seizure of these areas by the regime forces (Özcan 2017, 269).

The possibility of the engagement of Turkish Air Forces in the Syria airspace was disappeared due to the lock-on of Russian radars and Syrian air defense systems to the Turkish jets approaching to Syrian border. Thus, Turkey became a mere spectator to the goings-on in Syria. After 24 November, Turkey lost the possibility of cooperation with her allies while an understanding between the US and Russia for a joint-work in Syria developed (Özcan 2017, 291-292).

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Meshkov expressed that Turkey should pay damages and assume responsibility for what had happened and apologize to Russia (Kurban 2017, 264) and rapidly reacted in the form of sanctions composed of six articles which could hurt Turkey's economic and commercial structure as of January 2016 similar to those EU put into effect following the annexation of Crimea (Çelikpala 2017c, 216). Russia argued that Turkey downed the Russian jet to protect oil trade with ISIS. On 28 November 2015, Putin signed the "*Executive Order on Measures to Ensure the National Security of the Russian Federation and Protection of Citizens of the Russian Federation against Criminal and Other Illegal Acts and on the Application of Special Economic Measures against the Republic of Turkey*". The provisions of the Order were the following:

- The Turkish organizations were banned from security-related services in Russia.
- Turkish citizens were prohibited from being employed in Russia as of 1 January 2016, except those who had a contract with their employers before 31 December 2016.
- Certain goods originating from Turkey would be banned from entering Russia.
- Charter flights between the two countries were banned.
- Visa-free travel between Russia and Turkey was suspended as of 1 January 2016.
- Controls over the activities of Turkish trucking companies was enhanced. Russian travel agents were to suspend products for Turkey (Kurban 2017, 257-258).

At the beginning of February 2016, Turkish PM Davutoğlu stated that the life corridor between Aleppo and Turkey was interrupted. Russia increased her support of PKK when her demands for compensation and excuse were not met. Russia allowed the PYD to open an office in Moscow. On 13 May 2016, a Turkish Cobra helicopter flying around Dağlıca was shot down with a Russian 9K38 Igla Surface-to-Air Missile which signaled that if not prevented, the tension would expand to other areas (Özcan 2017, 291-292).

The downing of the Russian jet executing an air operation in Syria by a Turkish jet demonstrated that Turkish-Russian relations were depending on regional dynamics (Akgül-Açıkmeşe and Hisarlıoğlu 2017, 264). Downing of the Russian jet also demonstrated that the parties could not establish a mechanism to prevent the crisis despite the existence of routine talks within the framework of High-Level Cooperation Council establishing institutional structure at the highest level. In this, the role of disregarding the differences in the foreign policy and security fields by focusing on economic and commercial relations including energy was great. Present situation terminated focusing on the continuity of bilateral political, economic and social relations leaving aside differences in interest and position faced during the crisis regarding regional issues particularly. Remaining silent over the resolution of political

and security issues and maintaining old habits of focusing only on economic and commercial relations would not be enough to heighten the level of bilateral relations. The effect of remaining in different camps regarding the political and security issues was also decisive (Çelikpala 2017c, 221).

Conclusion

Many independent states emerged following the dissolution of the USSR. The Russian unipolarity continued within a non-hegemonic pattern in the Black Sea Subsystem. The change in the subsystem member complex (sumex) also changed the subsystem bilateral threat complex (subtex) with enlarged geographic area of confrontation involving many smaller states and proliferated dynamics of the conflicts. This change had repercussions on many facets of the tripartite relation in the BSS. Firstly, the Turkish-Russian subtex with its geographic area, number of actors, and multitude of dynamics of the conflicts expanded. Secondly, the Turkish-Russian sibtex gained a local character. Thirdly, the sibtex' gaining local character eventually weakened Turkey's alliance ties. Fourthly, weakened alliance ties increased the likelihood of the decentralized management of Turkish-Russian conflicts. Fifthly, the expanded subtex and weakened alliance ties required cooperation between Russia and Turkey against the US of which potential threat character gained more visible aspect in the new subtex. The alliance-based threat complex gained a different pattern of relations under NHUS. Thus, the findings narrated in this chapter confirms the first hypothesis.

To pursue foreign policy objectives incompatible with the relative power of a state in the system is coined here as anomaly. This anomalous foreign policy behavior emerges due to the nationalist and religious domestic considerations and may be triggered by a third-party state encouragement. Turkey's assumption of a role in the in the CCAR casted by the US has been emanated from the discourse of the "*Turkic World from Adriatic to the Great Wall of China*", however, Turkey then has become obliged to retreat from this assertive foreign policy due to the lack of sufficient capability. The foundation of Turkey's *zoning policy* was laid also in this period. Turkey's objection against Ukraine and Georgia's accession to NATO and the military

existence of the US in the Black Sea demonstrate Turkey's pursuing a distinct policy in the Black Sea region.

The second hypothesis is supported considering the discourse of the "*Turkic World from Adriatic to the Great Wall of China*" backed by Turkey's allies. However, changing sumex gradually weakened Turkey's western connection due to the emergence of many divergent interest areas.

Turkey mostly managed her conflicts with Russia by coordinating with the US. The S-300 missile crisis, the BTC pipeline conflict, the Ocalan crisis were resolved with the help of the US. Turkey always sought to include the US in the conflicts with the RF as it is seen in the proposal of the Caucasus Stability Pact. When Turkey felt threatened from the activities of the US it often pursued to solve the conflicts with Russia bilaterally by excluding the US, such as, BLACKSEAFOR and OBSH. These findings support the third hypothesis.

The fourth hypothesis is supported with the signature of the consecutive joint action plans in Eurasia in 2001 and 2004 due to the necessity forcing the parties that cooperation should replace competition in the face of common perceived threats from the Western states in the form of exclusionary western re-structuring and expansion.

Following the second round NATO expansion, the colored revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty by the US, the prospective missile shield system, and the establishment of the EU on the shores of the Black Sea with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania led Russia to develop proactive foreign policies in the BSS and neighboring subsystems. The invitation of Georgia and Ukraine to apply for MAP in April 2008 became the precursor of Russia's counter moves to assert itself in her privileged area and in eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, Turkish-Russian relations after 2007 were shaped under the influence of Russia's tense relations with the western powers.

After 2007, while the Black Sea issues brought Turkey and the RF together as pro-status quo powers, the eastern Mediterranean issues become the cause of divergence between them. In other words, while Turkey acted as if ally of the RF against the US in the Black Sea, it maintained its allies ties with the US against the RF

in eastern Mediterranean. While the BLACKSEAFOR, the Black Sea Harmony, the CSCP, the Turkish-Russian pro-Montreux views demonstrate Turkish-Russian cooperation in the Black Sea; the Syria crisis, at least for the term of the chapter, demonstrates Turkish-American cooperation against Russia in the Mediterranean. This policy is coined in the dissertation as *zoning policy*.

The TPGP involvement in Turkish-Russian relations occurred through the local dynamics in the form of sometimes reconciliatory and sometimes alienating effect between Turkey and the RF. As far as the events of this period, such as, the MAP invitation for Georgia and Ukraine, the color revolutions, the Ukraine and Syria crisis, the missile shield project, Black Sea Harmony, and Montreux Convention debates are concerned, the first sentence of the second hypothesis is supported with many findings with a nuance. While Turkey was a contributor to the conflicts in HUS, she became obliged to face conflicts emanated from her alliance ties in the NHUS. The second sentence of the second hypothesis is also supported as far as the Syria crisis is concerned.

The developments confirm the third hypothesis that the sign of a crack in Turkey's relations with her alliance partners leads to the decentralized management of the conflicts with the RF. Turkey's CSCP proposal by excluding the US is an example of decentralized management of conflict.

The US potential threat became more visible in the NHUS 2.0 as far as the latter's destabilizing intentions are concerned. The exclusionary attitude of Turkey and the RF towards the US during the formation of the Black Sea Harmony emanates from Turkey and the RF's perceiving threat from the likely presence of the US navy in the Black Sea. This led both parties to adopt similar policies regarding the Montreux Convention. Both parties also pursued an exclusionary foreign policy towards the US regarding the CSCP. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is also supported by these findings.

THE DISSERTATION CONCLUSION AND THE RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this research is to assess the impact of third-party states on the dynamics and management of Turkish-Russian conflicts between 1917 and 2015. The objectives of the research, as stated earlier, is to investigate the influence of the third-party states on the formulation of the foreign policy objectives of Turkey and Russia concerning each other, to identify various patterns of interactions regarding the third-party state involvement in Turkish-Russian relations, and to compare the conditions of centralized and decentralized management of the Turkish-Russian conflicts.

The new subsystemic perspective of the dissertation required a new model and new concepts. The new model was based on the following determinants:

- Turkish-Russian relations evolve within the framework of a subsystemic interactions in which the TPGPs are inherent part of the subsystem.
- While Russia is the constant great power of the subsystem, other great powers balancing Russia in the Black Sea subsystem varies according to the systemic power configuration.
- Turkey, exposed to the effects of a constant great power balancing in the subsystem, seeks to *equilibrate the threats* posed from either of them.

The most feasible theory to assess the hypotheses regarding this tri-partite interaction is the Balance of Threat Theory- a variant of Neorealism. According to the theory, states balance threats rather than power imbalances. The theory has been modified to make it applicable to a tri-partite interaction in a subsystem. The two of the conditions of the threat assessment which require balancing are the *geographic proximity* and the *offensive intentions* of a state. With respect to a lesser power, the local great power was defined as the *imminent threat* and the non-local great power was defined as the *potential threat*.

In a relationship in some kind of alignment, the divergence between interests in the partnership may be perceived by the lesser power as its partner has *destabilizing intentions* which may not be defined as offensive intentions. This differentiation in the

form and type of the threat perception will help to explain the policy outputs of the lesser power during the process of *equilibrating the imminent and potential threats*.

The *equilibrium policy*, as explained in the research design part of the dissertation, needs to be reviewed here briefly. The *policy of threat equilibrium* corresponds to the “*balance policy*” which means equilibrating either of the threatening great power with one another. The *policy of interest equilibrium* corresponds to what is often known as “*active neutrality*” - to develop positive relations with both parties to be at the side of the winning party at the end of the game. In sum, the strategy of the lesser power seeking to equilibrate imminent and potential threats ranges between alignment and alliance. While establishing an alliance with the potential threat is the ultimate choice to equilibrate the threat posed by the imminent threat, the policy of alignment is the ultimate choice in order to equilibrate the threat posed by the potential threat. Because a relationship exceeding some sort of political rapprochement with the imminent threat state would mean to bandwagon the subsystemic great power.

In this dissertation, the membership of the subsystem was assumed as forming a pattern of interaction (with the proviso that structural modifiers and relationship variables cause different variants of a pattern), since a change in the membership composition of the subsystem changes the dynamics and the management of the conflicts. The membership composition of the BSS changed three times in 1917, 1922 and 1991 demonstrating two different compositions for the period of examination. These compositions are coined here as *hegemonic unipolarity* and *non-hegemonic unipolarity*. Before delving into the characteristics of both patterns, we need to delve into the relevant concepts.

The constant membership composition of a subsystem is coined *subsystem member complex (sumex)*. *Internal transformation* of the sumex refers to change in the number of its members. As said before, the Black Sea sumex changed three times during the period subject to the examination in 1917, 1922 and 1991. *External transformation* of the subsystem is related to the formation of regimes or military occupation of any of the members by the non-subsystem powers which modify the structure of the subsystem.

The sum of any foreign policy objectives of two states in a subsystem which may be considered as threat by either party is defined as *subsystemic bilateral threat complex (subtex)*. The subtex changes when sumex changes. The mapping of distribution of power and distribution of geographical assets in a subsystem reveals most of the likely dynamics of the conflicts among the members of the subsystem. The dynamics of the conflicts emanated from the acts of the great powers balancing in the subsystem is called *systemic bilateral threat complex (sibtex)*. The weight of subtex and sibtex change in different subsystem member complexes.

Now then, we can return back to the characteristics of the hegemonic and non-hegemonic unipolarity. Hegemonic unipolarity is defined as the disappearance of lesser and smaller powers from the international system under the rule of a subsystemic great power. Since local dynamics are mostly erased from the international system, the sibtex dynamics prevail in the subsystem.

The non-hegemonic unipolarity refers to a sumex in which many smaller or lesser powers gained independence from the hegemonic great power. This pattern represents complexity of relations due to the multiplicity of actors, proliferated dynamics of the conflicts, and increased involvement of the TPGPs in the subsystem. While the sibtex dynamics prevail under hegemonic unipolarity, the subtex shapes the extent of sibtex in non-hegemonic unipolarity. In sum, great power balancing dynamics shape the subtex in HUS, whereas subtex dynamics shape the great power balancing in the NHUS.

In the dissertation, centralized management of the conflicts means management of the conflicts with strong coordination in an alliance with the pursuit of group-based interests. Decentralized conflict management means individualistic self-help with the pursuit of self-interest.

As said before, the Black Sea sumex changed three times between 1917 and 2015. The October revolution in 1917 led to a change in the sumex with the emergence of independent entities in the former Tsarist geography. A variant of this pattern emerged soon after, due to the signature of the Armistice of Mudros in October 1918 which served as a kind of regime change for the Straits and modified the structure of

the BSS. Due to this new code of conduct, the Entente powers gained capability to transit their war ships through the Straits. This period between 1917-1922 is named as the Non-Hegemonic Unipolarity 1.0.

The creation of the USSR on 30 December 1922 changed the Black Sea sumex. Small and lesser powers of the Black Sea and other contiguous subsystems were included in the USSR. This new hegemonic unipolarity almost coincidentally began with the signature of the Lausanne Convention related to the Regime of the Straits in July 1923. The new regime delegated the main dynamic of the conflict between Turkey and the USSR to an international authority due to the establishment of an International Straits Commission which is responsible for the administration of the passage through the Straits, the demilitarization of the Straits zone, and the joint guarantee extended by the great powers for the security of the straits zone. The Lausanne Convention related to the Straits constituted the linchpin of the Treaty of Paris of 1925, forming the context of behavior in the BSS as a relational variable, which formed the framework of Turkish-Soviet relations in some form of alignment. Thus, the variance of this stage in the HUS was coined as *alignment-based threat complex*.

The signature of the Montreux Convention in July 1936 modified the structure of the BSS. However, the real importance of Montreux emanates from its annihilating the basis of the Treaty of Paris and bringing back the main dynamic of the conflict into the Turkish-Soviet relations due to the abolition of the provisions related to the International Straits Commission, the demilitarized zone and the joined guarantee of the great powers provided for the security of the Straits. Since the Treaty of Paris became a dead contract already in 1936, the second variant of this stage in the HUS was coined as *non-alignment-based threat complex*.

Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty added a relational variable to the Turkish-Soviet relations. This membership created the situational context for behavior through which the effects of the modified BSS structure was transmitted to the behaviors of both Turkey and the USSR. The third variance of this stage in the HUS was coined as *alliance-based threat complex*.

The dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of many independent states changed the Black Sea sumex in December 1991. The pattern of non-hegemonic unipolarity emerged for the second time. The modified structure of the BSS with the Montreux Convention and the relational variable of Turkey's NATO membership continued in this non-hegemonic unipolarity. This period is coined as non-hegemonic unipolarity 2.0.

The dissertation has produced patterns of interaction by periodizing the Turkish-Russian relations in line with the following three variables:

- The membership composition of the Black Sea Subsystem determines the likely dynamics of the future conflicts between Turkey and Russia.
- The regimes as structural modifiers lay the basis of conflict or cooperation between Turkey and Russia.
- The non-alignment/alignment/alliance as relational variables create the situational context of the third-party state impact on Turkish-Russian conflicts.

The membership compositions of the BSS (*subsystem member complex*, sumex) changed three times so toughly that two types of compositions emerged which were coined as:

- Non-hegemonic unipolarity 1.0 (NHUS) (1917-1922)
- Hegemonic unipolarity (HUS) (1923-1991)
- Non-hegemonic unipolarity 2.0 (NHUS) (1992-2015)

The general characteristics of the NHUS represents a complex web of relations due to the multitude of state actors, proliferated conflict dynamics, expanded geographical engagement areas, and involvement of many TPGPs in various conflict dynamics. The general characteristics of the HUS represents simple relationship web composed of bilateral issues due to the disappearance of most of the subsystemic conflict dynamics under the hegemonic rule of the great power. The HUS is characterized with simplicity of relations due to prevalence of the dynamics of the system level balancing acts of the great powers in the subsystem (sibtex). The NHUS

is characterized with the complexity and uncertainty of relations due to the coming to the fore of the subsystemic dynamics in the great power balancing.

The patterns of HUS and NHUS become more explanatory when the structural modifiers and relationship variables are included. The structural modifiers lay the basis of conflict or cooperation, and the relationship variables shapes the functioning of these dynamics of conflict or cooperation in the subsystem. Conflict or cooperation is more obdurate in the HUS whereas they intermingle with respect to geography, actors, and issues in the NHUS. It can be argued that the dynamics of the HUS allow far fewer counterproductive responses in the alliance relationship. Whereas, in the NHUS it is usual to pursue policies contrary to the interests of the big alliance partner. While collective interests and centralized management of conflicts are much widely implemented in the HUS, the pursuance of self-interest and decentralized management is more widespread in the NHUS. The limit of cooperation between Turkey and Russia in the NHUS against commonly perceived threats is much more wider than the HUS.

The dynamics of the conflicts between Turkey and Russia are distinguished into the *systemic bilateral threat complex* (sibtex) and *subsystemic bilateral threat complex* (subtex) in order to notice the dynamics of the great power balancing in the subsystem in different subsystem member complexes. The *subsystemic bilateral threat complex* (subtex) dynamics shape the great power balancing in the subsystem by local means and by extension Turkish-Russian conflicts in the NHUS. The *systemic bilateral threat complex* (sibtex) represents the dynamics as the extension of systemic great power balancing into the Turkish-Russian conflict dynamics in the HUS. In sum, subtex represents the subsystem dynamics of conflicts whereas sibtex represents the dynamics emanating from the great power balancing in the system. The sibtex gains local character in the NHUS.

This model which was revealed in the periodization with its patterns and their variants support the first hypothesis with the proviso that regime formations and non-alignment / alignment / alliance dynamics as process variables provide a more determinate, coherent, and predictable course of third-party state involvement in Turkish-Russian relations and counter Turkish response in each type of the sumex:

- NHUS 1.0 (1917-1922): The October Revolution provided transition to the new sumex in the BSS.
 - The alliance dynamics between the Ottoman State and Germany shaped the course of relations between the Ottoman State and the RSFSR during the pre-Mudros stage of NHUS 1.0 (1917-1918).
 - The Armistice of Mudros which was served as a regime formation and modified the structure of the BSS laid the basis of emerging common threat perception of Ankara and Moscow during the second stage of NHUS 1.0 (1918-1922).
- HUS (1923-1991): The creation of the USSR provided transition to the new sumex in the BSS.
 - The Lausanne Convention as structural modifier delegated the main Turkish-Soviet conflict dynamics to an international authority and paved the way for future rapprochement between them.
 - The Treaty of Paris as relational variable created the situational context in the form of *alignment-based threat complex* between Turkey and the USSR and translated the sibtex dynamics to their bilateral relations (1925-1936).
 - The Montreux Convention as structural modifier annihilated the basis of the Treaty of Paris already in 1936 and the sibtex was translated to the bilateral relations of Turkey and the USSR through the dynamics created by Turkey's *de facto non-aligned status* which eventually led to their total alienation in 1952 (1936-1952).
 - Turkey's NATO membership as relational variable completed the superstructure of Montreux and the new *alliance-based threat complex* dynamics dominated the Turkish-Soviet sibtex (1952-1991).
- NHUS 2.0 (1992-2015): The dissolution of the USSR provided transition to the new sumex in the BSS.
 - The dynamics of the Montreux Convention and Turkey's alliance membership mutated in the new sibtex. The proliferated dynamics

of the conflicts and the expanded engagement area inevitably led Turkey and Russia to enter into a kind of alignment relationship in some issue areas while Turkey maintaining its alliance ties albeit weakened to some extent.

Before delving into an analysis of the variants of interaction patterns, general findings related to the first hypothesis were summed up. The first hypotheses that “*different Black Sea membership compositions demonstrate different patterns of interaction*” is confirmed with the proviso that structural modifiers and relationship variables give a more consistent framework of relations.

The findings of the dissertation instantiate the above mentioned arguments. The general characteristics of the NHUS are intermingling of many actors around the subsystemic issues, counterproductive policies of bigger allied partners, and the prevalence of uncoordinated and self-help management of the conflicts. The NHUS 1.0 displays two variants. During the pre-Mudros stage, the Ottoman State’s policy of establishing an Islamic State in the Caucasus as a buffer zone had not been coordinated with Germany. Furthermore, this self-professed attempt of the Ottoman State met also with the resistance of Germany. This situation supports the arguments that the dynamics of the NHUS weakens alliance ties of the lesser power. The armistice of Mudros, as a structural modifier, laid the basis of gradual rapprochement between Turkey and the RSFSR. The relations between Ankara and Moscow were actually the extension of the dynamics of the post-Mudros stage. The UK’s projection to establish a Caucasus barrier meant sibtex’s gaining subsystemic character due to the proliferated local actors and dynamics of the conflicts.

The findings also confirm the general characteristics of the HUS pattern with the proviso that structural modifiers and relationship variables provides the stability of the pattern with a pre-shaped future relations. The simplicity of relations and prevalence of great power system level balancing dynamics in the subsystem constitute the general characteristic of the NUS. These general characteristics gained direction and stability with the Lausanne Convention related to regime of the Straits, the Treaty of Paris of 1925, the Montreux Convention and Turkey’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1952. The Lausanne Convention laid the basis and the Treaty of Paris

laid the superstructure of the alignment between Turkey and the USSR. The great power balancing in Europe were translated to the behaviors of Turkey and the USSR through this prism. The Montreux annihilated this alignment. Turkey's seeking to accommodate the UK/France on one side and the USSR on the other was emanated from Turkey's non-aligned status. The period of Turkey's non-aligned status was a period of transition to an alliance relationship as the superstructure of the Montreux Convention.

The findings also confirm the general characteristics of the NHUS 2.0. Turkey's alliance ties weakened due to divergence of interests over the enlarged geography and proliferated dynamics of the conflicts in the aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR. The US unilateralism perceived as threat to regional stability led Turkey to implement geographically differentiated foreign policy between the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. By the early 2000s, Turkey began to act in coordination with Russia against the US in the Black Sea, and in coordination with the US against Russia in the eastern Mediterranean.

Once patterns established and the first hypotheses confirmed, a general discussion was made regarding the three hypotheses. The first phrase of the second hypothesis refers to whether the majority of the Turkish-Russian conflicts emanates from the acts of the great powers balancing each other or from their bilateral clash of interests. Despite the dynamics of conflicts vary between HUS and NHUS, the findings support that the majority of the Turkish-Russian dynamics of the conflicts are produced under the influence of the great powers. The restoration of the Ottoman border at the Caucasus to the 1877-1878 border and the ensuing Ottoman advance to establish an Islamic state in the Caucasus as a buffer state against the RSFSR in 1918 was the consequence of her alliance partnership with Germany. The Montreux Convention could not be in question unless the prior support of the UK. It can be argued that alienating Turkey and the USSR would become possible with the revival of the traditional Turkish-Soviet conflict over the Straits. The failure of the Turkish-Soviet mutual assistance negotiations and ensuing emergence of tension between the parties were emanated from the failure of the Anglo/French-Soviet negotiations for a mutual assistance pact and the USSR's seeking to divert the German threat. It is

strongly likely that the Soviet-Turkish tension during the 1945-1946 period emanated from the UK and US' preliminary policy of giving green light to the USSR for the review of the Montreux Convention and the US' seeing the realignment of the Caucasus border as bilateral in nature at the beginning. Majority of the Turkish-Soviet conflicts during the Cold War were emanated from the US moves in Turkey, such as, naval visits, establishment of bases, U-2 intelligence flights, intelligence gathering with balloons, deployment of Jupiter missiles in Turkey, and the US' encouraging Turkey to pursue an assertive policy in Syria in 1957. Following the dissolution of the USSR, Turkish assertive foreign policy in the CCAR was encouraged by her NATO allies. The South Ossetia-Georgia war, Ukraine and the Syria crisis, the missile shield project were all emanated from the US' seeking to balance the RF in the BSS which had negative repercussions on Turkish-Russian relations.

The findings demonstrate that Russia takes decisions likely to produce conflict with Turkey in case of the neutrality or support of any other great power(s) or as a reaction to the policies of Turkey's allies. Whereas Turkey's assertive foreign policy against Russian interests emanates from Turkey's coordinated decisions with other great powers unless Turkey's vital interests are in question.

In the context of the third hypothesis, Turkey's centralized type of management of conflicts emanates from her alliance ties as seen in the restoration of the Ottoman-Soviet border to the 1877-1878 line at Brest-Litovsk and in the crisis of Syria in 1957. The implementation of decentralized management of the conflicts demonstrate variances between different sumex. While a crack in the alliance ties in the HUS produce rapprochement between Turkey and the USSR, a crack in the NHUS may produce counterproductive responses. For example, considering the US project to extend the OAE into the Black Sea, Turkey started to equilibrate the American threats with the RF by seeking cooperation in this issue. The exclusionary attitude of Turkey and the RF towards the US during the formation of the Black Sea Harmony represents management of the American-sourced conflict. While Turkey's CSCP proposal by excluding the US is an example of decentralized management of conflict, Turkey's some actions during the Syria crisis, for example, immediate call for NATO assistance after the shooting of the Russian SU-24 constitutes an example of centralized

management of the conflict. The above-mentioned findings also support the existence of the *zoning policy*.

In the context of the fourth hypothesis, during the negotiations of the Treaty of Moscow of 1921, the signs of the reconciliation between Moscow and Ankara begins following the emergence of hearsays that Ankara would soften her relations with the Entente Powers through the intermediary of the Istanbul government in return for some territories in the Caucasus and modification of the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres. Moscow ought to be more receptive to the demands of the Ankara government not to push it to the Entente side. Despite the demands of Moscow over Van, Bitlis and Muş, Ankara also refrained from portraying the RSFSR as a threat. The findings demonstrate that common threat perceptions lead to a reconciliatory approach on the Turkish-Russian dynamics, such as, the Black Sea Harmony, the CSCP, the pro-Montreux attitude of Turkey and the RF during and after the Georgia war.

The second, third and fourth hypotheses were tested in each variant of the patterns as seen in (Table Conclusion.1) and the following results were found:

- The post-Mudros and alignment periods did not produce conflict as the extension of the great power balancing dynamics. The alliance and non-aligned periods produced conflicts as the extension of the great power balancing dynamics.
- Turkey pursued threat-producing objectives under the influence of the TPGPs only when she was a member of an alliance. Moscow pursued threat producing objectives under the influence of TPGPs when Turkey was a non-aligned state. Both parties did not pursue threat-producing objectives under the influence of the TPGPs towards each other when they did not have mutually important conflict dynamic and they were in some form of alignment relationship.
- The centralized or decentralized type of the management of the Turkish-Russian conflicts is in question when Turkey have an alliance ties. The type of management is shaped in line with Turkey's perceiving threat from her alliance partner. Decentralized management transforms into an alliance-weakening form in the NHUS.

- The peaceful and cautious management of conflicts between Turkey and the USSR was not on the carpet when Turkey was a non-aligned state. Turkey's alliance membership provides dialogue over the current or likely conflicts.

Two clarifications are needed for the (*) and (**) mentioned in the Hypothesis Comparison Table. The (*) was used to explain that, while Turkey contributes to the dynamics of the conflicts in the alliance variant of the HUS, it is more exposed to the dynamics of conflicts emanated from her alliance relationship in the NHUS. The (**) was used to explain that the unilateral US support after 1946 does not mean coordinated management.

Table Conclusion.1. Hypothesis Comparison Table

	NHUS 1.0		HUS			NHUS 2.0
	Alliance Threat Complex (1917-1918)	Non-alignment Threat Complex (1918-1922)	Alignment Threat Complex (1925-1936)	Non-alignment Threat Complex (1936-1952)	Alliance Threat Complex (1952-1991)	Alliance Threat Complex (1992-2015)
H2	Supported ----- Supported with respect to the Ottoman State	No data ----- No data	No data ----- No data	Supported ----- Supported with respect to the USSR	Supported ----- Supported with respect to Turkey	Supported with variance* ----- Supported
H3	Supported	No Data	No Data	No Data**	Supported	Supported
H4	No data	Supported	Supported	No data	Supported	Supported

The variants of the HUS seen in (Table Conclusion.2) reads as follows: Despite the Turkish-Soviet dynamics of conflicts are the extension of the great power balancing in the subsystem, this impact varies when Turkey has or has not alliance ties. The conflict-producing objective is likely with respect to the USSR when Turkey

is non-aligned, whereas it is likely with respect to Turkey when it is a member of an alliance.

Centralized Management of the conflicts is seen when Turkey has alliance connections. However, any likely threat to perceived from alliance partners leads Turkey to pursue decentralized management of conflicts, the limits of which varies between sumex types. Decentralized management is likely when the USSR perceives threat when Turkey is non-aligned. When Turkey is non-aligned, centralized management may be in question in the form of a unilateral decision the conditions of which were dictated to Turkey. In the NHUS Turkey becomes more challenging against her partners.

Turkey and Russia's bilateral conflict resolution ability varies between Turkey's non-aligned status and her alliance membership. While it is up to the USSSR's threat perception in the former, it is up to the common threat perception in the latter.

Table Conclusion.2. Variants of the HUS

	HUS/1 Alignment-based Threat Complex (1925-1936)	HUS/2 Non-alignment-based Threat Complex (1936-1952)	HUS/3 Alliance-based Threat Complex (1952-1991)
H.2	Not Likely ----- Not likely with respect to Turkey.	Likely ----- Likely with respect to the USSR.	Turkey contributes to the emergence of conflicts. ----- Likely with respect to Turkey.
H.3	CM is not likely. DM is the most likely.	CM is a weak probability. DM is likely when the USSR perceives threat.	CM is the most likely. DM is likely when Turkey perceives threat from her alliance partner.
H.4	The most likely.	Likely when the USSR perceives threat.	Likely when both parties perceive threat despite Turkey has limited leverage against her alliance partner.

The alliance-based threat complex¹ as seen in (Table Conclusion.3) reads as follows: Types of *subsystem member complex* are influential in Turkey's being

¹ Comparison of the NHUS 1.0 and NHUS 2.0 is included here because only the pre-Mudros stage of the NHUS 1.0 can be compared to the NHUS 2.0 due to the variable of alignment.

contributory to the dynamics of conflicts with Russia or its being exposed to the effects of already produced conflicts. The types of sumex are influential also in the extent of decentralized management of the conflicts. Turkey becomes more challenging against her alliance partner in the NHUS.

Table Conclusion.3. Alliance-based threat complexes

	NHUS 1.0 Alliance-based Threat Complex (1917-1918)	HUS/3 Alliance-based Threat Complex (1952-1991)	NHUS 2.0 Alliance-based Threat Complex (1991-2015)
H.2	The Ottoman State contributes to the emergence of conflicts. ----- Likely.	Turkey contributes to the emergence of conflicts. ----- Likely with respect to Turkey.	Turkey is mostly exposed to the dynamics of conflicts. ----- Likely.
H.3	DM is likely.	CM is the most likely. DM is likely when Turkey perceives threat from her alliance partner.	DM is most likely.
H.4	No data.	Likely when both parties perceive threat despite Turkey has limited leverage against her alliance partner.	Very likely due to likely diverging interests in Turkey's alliance. Turkey is increasingly likely to challenge her bigger partner.

The USSR, as a great power, maintains its privilege on conflict-producing, conflict management, and bilateral resolution of conflicts when Turkey is a non-aligned state (Table Conclusion.4). In the non-alignment-based threat complexes, the lesser power is exposed to the leverages of both imminent and potential threat states. Two non-alignment periods indicate that non-alignment status of Turkey does not demonstrate stable course of relations and they exhibit proclivity of Turkey to seek alignment against the threatening party.

Table Conclusion.4. Non-alignment-based threat complexes

	NHUS 1.0 Non-alignment-based Threat Complex (1918-1922)	HUS/2 Non-alignment-based Threat Complex (1936-1952)
H.2	No data except few trivial cases.	Likely

		----- Likely with respect to the USSR.
H.3	No Data.	CM is a weak probability. DM is likely when the USSR perceives threat.
H.4	No data.	Likely when the USSR perceives threat.

The patterns of interaction of the Turkish-Russian relations are fully visible and distinguishable from each other. Thus, TPGPs involving in Turkish-Russian relations operate in different patterns with regards to the following:

- Constraints and opportunities.
- Balancing dynamics between the great powers.

The TPGPs have wide space of maneuverability in the HUS and have increased possibility of using sticks and carrots due to the limited likely rapprochement between Turkey and the USSR unless dynamics of conflicts disappeared and some form of alignment established between them due to the their common their perception from the TPGPs. The balancing dynamics is quite noticeable between different types of the sumex. While the HUS highly demonstrates the system-based great power balancing in the BSS, the NHUS heavily demonstrates the subsystem-based great power balancing. The NHUS 1.0 and the NHUS 2.0 demonstrate similarity regarding the TPGP penetration since the small states of the Caucasus exhibit the characteristic of being an arena of great power clash for sphere of influence in both period.

This dissertation covered a long period of Turkish-Russian relations. This may have prevented the thorough analysis of the foreign policies of the relevant parties. Using this methodology, future research covering shorter periods will provide more detailed insight to the field.

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APPENDIX

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2002/09/17. The National Security Strategy of the United States (Bush Doctrine).

2002/10/07. Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Kishinev.

2003/07/17. Economic Cooperation Organization Free Trade Agreement (ECOTA). Islamabad.

2004/12/06. Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on the Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership. Ankara.

2006/04/. Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership Document.

2007/02/10. Putin's Speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy.

2008/04/2-4. NATO Bucharest Summit Inviting Ukraine and Georgia to Apply for MAP.

2008/06/05. Medvedev's Berlin Doctrine.

2008/07/12. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.

2008/08/20. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Poland Concerning the Deployment of Ground-Based Ballistic Missile Defense Interceptors in the Territory of the Republic of Poland.

2008/08/31. Medvedev's Five-point Foreign Policy Principles.

2009/02/13. Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership. Moscow.

2009/05/12. National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020.

2009/10/10a. Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey. Zurich.

2009/10/10b. Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey. Zurich.

2009/11/29. The Draft of the European Security Treaty.

2010/02/05. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

2010/05/12. Cooperation Agreement on the Construction and Management of Nuclear Power Reactor in Akkuyu.

2010/08/16. The Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Baku.

2013/02/12. The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.

2014/12/26. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

2015/11/24. A Turkish Air Force F-16 fighter jet shot down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24M attack aircraft near the Syria–Turkey border

2015/12/31. The Russian Federation's National Security Strategy.

2016/11/30. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.



CURRICULUM VITAE

EDUCATION

2016-2020	Istanbul University / Istanbul PhD Candidate in Political Science and International Relations
2014-2015	Leeds Beckett University / UK Erasmus Intern Research Assistant
2013-2014	Leeds Metropolitan University / UK Erasmus Exchange Student
2012-2016	Fatih University / Istanbul PhD Candidate in Political Science and International Relations
1996-2000	Middle East Technical University (Institute of Social Sciences) M.A. Thesis: Great Powers` Rivalry and the Greek Independence (A Research on Diplomatic History)
1987-1995	Bilkent University Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences B.A. at the Department of International Relations
1978-1986	Gaziantep Anatolian High School

PUBLICATIONS

Academic Article:

“Comparative Discourse Analysis of the Turkish Media on the Foreign Policy of the Justice and Development Party in the Context of the Arab Uprisings.”
Turkish Journal of Politics Vol.5 No.1 Summer 2014: 21-38.

Conference Paper:

“Environmental Threats Originating from Oil Transportation in the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits.” Paper presented at the Eurasia Environment Conference, Istanbul, Turkey, 14-16, 1997.

CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION

The 14th PIIC Beijing Seminar on International Security: Strategic Stability and Cooperation, Hangzhou, China, October 19-22, 2014.

EXPERIENCE

2001-2004	Second Secretary at the Turkish Embassy in Ljubljana
1999-2001	Third Secretary at the Turkish Embassy in Kishinev

1997 Attaché at the Turkish Embassy in Tirana
1996-1999 Attaché at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey
 Department of Multilateral Economic Relations

LANGUAGES

Turkish (Mother Tongue), French (intermediate), Italian (intermediate)
Russian (Intermediate)

Italian	Diploma at University of Ankara - TÖMER
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French	Certificate at University of Ankara - TÖMER

