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**REGIONALISM AS A FAILURE OF NATIONAL
INTEGRATION
A CASE STUDY OF ITALY**

**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University**

by

AYLİN AVCI (GÜNEY)

**In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**


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**THE DEPARTMENT OF
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BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA**

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
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I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.



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
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ABSTRACT

REGIONALISM AS A FAILURE OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION A CASE STUDY OF ITALY

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December 1998

This thesis analyzes Italian regionalism in a historical context. The evolution of regionalism as a result of the failure of national integration in Italy will be discussed in different time spans that are deemed critical in Italian political life. The thesis will elaborate on the historical and structural factors such as the localist culture, the presence of the Church, the North-South divide that acted as an obstacle on the way to a successful national integration. Finally, the interplay of these forces during the unification, the fascist and post-fascist periods will be analyzed with regard to the national integration process. The thesis will aim to address the following questions: (1) Given that neo-regionalism in Italy is not a new phenomena, what are the reasons or the structural factors that had caused the persistence of regionalism in Italy despite the attempts to create a unified country? (2) How did the Italian state try to make the Italians? What kind of integration model was used to provide the integration and to what extent was it able to overcome the duality between the North and the South? (3) What is the nature of the neo-regionalism in Italy, is it a result of the failure of 'making Italians?' and to what extent does it pose a threat to the national unity of the country? It is concluded that the rise of neo-regionalism in Italy can not be explained only by the old and more recent theories on regionalism without taking into consideration the sui generis historical background of the problem of regionalism in that country.

Keywords: Regionalism, National Integration, Neo-Regionalism, Federalism

ÖZET

ULUSAL ENTEGRASYONUN İFLASI OLARAK BÖLGESELCİLİK İTALYA ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA

Aylin Avcı (Güney)

Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Aralık 1998

Bu çalışma, İtalyan bölgeselciliğini tarihsel bir çerçeve içinde incelemiştir. Bölgeselciliğin gelişimi, İtalyan ulusal entegrasyonunun iflasının bir sonucu olarak, İtalya tarihinde önemli görülen zaman dilimlerinde ele alınmıştır. Çalışma, öncelikle başarılı bir ulusal entegrasyona engel teşkil eden unsurlar olarak yerel kültürü, Kilisenin varlığını, Kuzey-Güney farklılığını vurgulamış, daha sonra, bu faktörlerin İtalyan Birliği, Faşist, Faşist dönem sonrası zaman dilimlerindeki etkileşimlerini incelemiştir. Çalışma başlıca şu soruları yanıtlamaya çalışmıştır: (1) İtalya'daki yeni-bölgeselciliğin yeni bir oluşum olmadığı göz önüne alınırsa, ulusal birliği sağlama çabalarına karşın bu ülkedeki bölgeselciliğin süregelmesinin sebepleri ve bunda etkili olan yapısal faktörler nelerdir? (2) İtalyan devleti ne şekilde bir İtalyan milleti yaratmaya çalışmıştır? Bu amaç doğrultusunda ne gibi bütünleşme modelleri uygulanmıştır ve bu çabalar Kuzey-Güney farklılığının ne derece üstesinden gelebilmiştir? (3) İtalya'daki yeni-bölgeselciliğin karakteri nedir? Bu bir İtalyan milleti oluşturma çabasının başarısızlığının bir sonucu mudur ve ülkenin bütünlüğünü ne derece tehlikeye sokmaktadır? Çalışmanın sonunda, İtalya'da ortaya çıkan yeni bölgeselciliğin literatürdeki eski ve yeni bölgeselcilik paradigmalarıyla açıklanamayacağı, ve bu sorunun ancak İtalya'ya özgü bir takım tarihsel ve yapısal faktörlerin yardımıyla açıklanabileceği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bölgeselcilik, Ulusal Entegrasyon, Yeni-Bölgeselcilik, Federalizm

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To my Beloved Grandparents



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
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MAP OF ITALY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Aim of the Study

The rebirth of territorial politics¹ in Italy along with the rise of a regionally-based political party in the 1990s has given a new vigor to the debate on regionalism and national integrity in that country². In many respects, it has been surprising for many students of Italian politics that in a country that was united comparatively recently, political tensions based on territorial conflict between the North and the South have erupted so early and intensely, and that regionally-based parties demanding secessionism have come to play an important role in Italian politics. So far, with the exception of some

¹ This new concept of “territorial politics” was defined by Bulpitt as: “that arena of political activity concerned with the relations between central political organizations and governmental bodies outside the central institutional complex but within the accepted boundaries of the state, which possess, or are commonly perceived to possess, a significant geographical or local/regional character.” See J. G. Bulpitt, *Territory and Power in the United Kingdom* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), chapters 1 and 2.

² The best example of this was revealed by scholars such as Gian Enrico Rusconi, *Se Cessiamo di Essere una Nazione: Tra etnodemocrazia regionali e cittadinanza europea* [If we are ceding to be a nation: Between regional ethnodemocracy and European citizenship], (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993); Giorgio Bocca, *La disunita d'Italia* [The Non-unity of Italy], (Milan: Garzanti, 1991); Ernesto Galli della Loggia, *La Morte della Patria. La Crisi dell'Idea di nazione tra Resistenza, antifascismo e Repubblica*. [The Death of The Nation. The Crisis of The Idea of Nation between Resistance, Antifascism and The Republic], (Bari: Laterza, 1998); Mark Gilbert, *The Italian Revolution. The End of Politics, Italian Style?* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995).

insignificant parts of the periphery, there have been few influential parties or movements with territorial demands of autonomy or more decentralization, let alone regionally based parties promoting the break-up of the Italian state.

With the crisis of the state (*crisi dello stato*) that was characterized by the breakdown of the national party system and the disappearance of the two powerful center parties of the Cold War years, the Italian Communist Party-*Partita Comunista Italiana (PCI)* and the Christian Democratic Party-*Democrazia Christiana (DC)*, there was an increase in the votes of the parties defending regional and territorial interests. Particularly important here is one regionally-based party, the Northern League -*Lega Nord*³ led by Umberto Bossi. For the first time in Italian politics, in the 1992 general elections, this political party defended the view that the present political system in Italy is no longer capable of functioning: Northern Italy, economically the locomotive of Italy, has been discriminated against by the state in Rome; Southern Italy does not function as efficiently and productively as the North and lives on the resources channeled from the North to the South. The solution to this problem according to the *Lega Nord* is the division of Italy into three macro

³ The Northern League will be referred to as Lega Nord throughout this study.

regions, the adoption of a federal system, instead of the present unitary one and the independence of the North within this scheme.⁴

The bottomline of the argument of the *Lega Nord* had been its somehow covert reaction, in fact, rebellion, towards southern Italy, which has been culturally, economically and socially more backward than the North. This party's rise to power in a coalition government after the 1992 general elections, gave rise to an intense debate in Italy as to whether there was now a replacement of the 'Southern question' by a 'Northern question' that poses a serious threat to the national political unity and whether a reform of the state (*riforma dello stato*) could overcome the evolving crisis of the nation-state in Italy.

Here it is important to note that even though the Northern question was brought into the forefront with the rise of Lega Nord, regionalism is not a new phenomenon in Italian politics and that one can not attribute it to only the rise of the Lega Nord. For a long time, the North-South divide⁵ and duality has had historical, cultural, sociological and economical roots, and it has always played an important role at different periods of the Italian history. However, the recent studies, while attempting to explain the rise of the Lega Nord, have paid attention neither to the historical roots of this problem, which harks so far back to the period of the Roman Empire and the pre-

⁴ For the map of the Lega Nord's proposal, see Appendix A.

⁵ For the classical division between the North and South of Italy, that will be referred throughout the thesis, see Appendix B.

unification period, nor to the recent developments that have taken place in Italy. Rather, the rise of regionalism in Italy characterized mainly by the rise of Lega Nord has tried to be explained by earlier and more recent theories on regionalism.

The earlier theories of regionalism mainly focused on the integration aspect of the nation-building process. Only a few paid attention to such factors as ethnicity, economic deprivation and internal colonialism. The focus of these theories was the peripheral, underdeveloped regions and as such, they failed to account for the regionalist movements in the developed regions of the nation-states. The more recent theories of regionalism link its rise to the crisis of the nation-state, that is, the pressures which are posed by globalism and the overloaded nature of the modern nation-state. These theories generally take issue with the centralized structure of the nation-state and as such, they are considered as post-modernist. These theories explain the present causes of the rise of regionalism but give short shrift to its historical roots.

Although it is important to utilize both sets of theories to come to grips with the general nature of regionalism in the Italian case, it is still not sufficient. The Italian case can not be explained by either sets of theories without taking into account such structural factors peculiar to Italy as the Napoleonic heritage, the persistence of the local cultures and the lack of a national feeling, the North-South divide and the presence of the Church which makes

Italy a *sui generis* case. These factors are not dealt with in either sets of theories. This study, with a focus on these factors, aims to explain the Italian case as one that is a consequence of a failed national integration or the failure of the unitary system of government. However, first it is necessary to discuss the earlier and more recent theories of regionalism.

Theories of Regionalism

The Old Paradigms of Regionalism

1. Theories of Integration

Since the French Revolution in 1789 the nation-state has been considered the most important unit through which the interests of nations are being articulated. Since the emergence of the modern nationalist movements during the fifteenth century, the “nation” has acquired a mythical value. Whereas Europeans’ primary identity used to derive from membership in a feudal fiefdom or in the universalist Roman Catholic Church, the “nation” became the object of faith and emotional appeal. Like the Church, it was regarded as eternal and transcendental.⁶ Nation-building was mostly regarded as the task of the modern state involving a form of government that brought about the consolidation of territory in Western Europe.⁷ This process was often

⁶ Charles F. Andrain and David E. Apter, *Political Protest and Social Change. Analyzing Politics* (London and New York: University Press, 1995), 94.

⁷ Ronan Paddison, *The Fragmented State: The Political Geography of Power* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 57. On the formation of the modern state, see also Joseph Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the*

referred to as national integration. However, the most important problem concerning the processes of national integration was that the territories of a 'nation-state' often did not correspond to only one nation exclusively. To this date, even though most present nation-states are not composed of exclusively one nation, nevertheless nation-statism has been a commonly sought goal. The state, through social engineering and political mobilization aims to "standardize" the population to the point where it is sufficiently assimilated to be described as a nation-state.⁸ Thus regionalism has been a concept with negative connotations; it aimed at the recognition of a separate identity and alternative administration to the nation-state. Regionalism was regarded as a fragmentary force upon the state. As the main issue was to attain a nation-state, regionalism was something that could not be tolerated by states.

Modernization Theories

Especially, with the rise of the modernization school during the 1960s, the nation-state gained an even more important role. Karl Deutsch wrote: "Nation-preserving, nation-building and nationalism...these still remain a major and even a still growing force in politics which statesmen of good will would ignore at their peril."⁹ It was followed by works of Reinhard Bendix

Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1978), Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975).

⁸ Paddison, *The Fragmented State: The Political Geography of Power*, 61.

on nation-building¹⁰, Leonard Binder on national integration and political development¹¹, and Rupert Emerson on nationalism and political development¹². The literature on nationalism usually interpreted development as an incremental or anachronous process of change and growth. According to these views, nationalism provided an ideological impetus for all sorts of development-political, economic, social, cultural and psychological. Thus the basic assumption of these studies was the following: the stronger the nationalism, the greater the probability that new demands and actions will arise for involvement in national life; these demands and actions may lead to change and development.¹³

The process of national integration, through which identities and loyalties become transferred from a pre-existing group such as the tribe or smaller ethnic division to a larger and culturally different entity is often associated with the more all-encompassing set of social processes known as

⁹ Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality*. (New York: Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley and Sons, 1953.), 4.

¹⁰ Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order*, (New York: Doubleday, 1969).

¹¹ Leonard Binder, "National Integration and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVIII, September 1964, 622-631.

¹² Rupert Emerson, "Nationalism and Political Development," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. XXII, February 1960, 137-149.

“modernization”. Modernization is associated with industrialization, urbanization, migration, increasing levels of literacy, and communications, and the emergence of new modes of social interaction. With the consequent loosening of ties with the smaller social units, the vacuum was to be filled by the development of ties with a larger and different group that is the *nation*.¹⁴

The basic building blocks of the modernization perspective are parallel to tradition-modernity ideal types of social organization and value systems. These have been borrowed from nineteenth century sociology. The traditional society is variously understood as having a predominance of ascriptive, particularistic, diffuse and affective patterns of action, an extended kinship structure with a multiplicity of functions, little spatial and social mobility, a deferential stratification system in mostly primary economic activities, a tendency towards autarchy of social units, an undifferentiated political structure, with traditionalist elitist and hierarchical sources of authority. By contrast, the modern society is characterized by a predominance of achievement; universalistic, specific and neutral orientations and patterns of

¹³ For a detailed overview of the literature on nationalism and modernization see Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981).

¹⁴ My emphasis. Paddison, *The Fragmented State: The Political Geography of Power*, 63-64. The main proponents of nationalism in the modernization discourse are Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1983).

action; a nuclear family structure serving limited functions; a complex and highly differentiated occupational system; high rates of spatial and social mobility; a predominance of secondary economic activities and production for exchange; the institutionalization of change and self-sustained growth; highly differentiated political structures with legal rational sources of authority and so on.¹⁵

Stein Rokkan's Center-Periphery Model

One of the most important models for explaining the national integration process and the formation of national states in Western Europe has been the model developed by **Stein Rokkan**. Rokkan uses a paradigm of political integration within a center-periphery framework. He utilizes Talcott Parsons' typology¹⁶ of economic, religious, military and judicial factors as the channels linking the 'subject periphery' to the 'central establishment.' The center was able to control its hinterland by virtue of its military superiority, which enabled it to extract necessary resources, and by a mix of the economic (trading), cultural-symbolic (religious) and legal links that brought the *center* and *periphery* into contact.

¹⁵ See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Modernization and Conditions of Sustained Growth," *World Politics*, 16, July 1964, 576-594. See also Samuel Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965); Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press, 1963); Lucien Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation-Building* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963).

Rokkan also referred to the Parsons-Hirschman model where the four time phases were located: two center-generated policies, the first military-economic, the second cultural; two phases of internal restructuring opening up opportunities for the periphery, the first symbolic-cultural, the second economic.¹⁷ Phase I in this model was the *state-building process* and covered the period from the High Middle Ages to the French Revolution in Western Europe. This period was characterized by political, economic and cultural unification at the elite level during which a series of bargains were struck and a variety of cultural bonds were established across networks of local power-holders. In addition, a number of institutions were built up for the extraction of resources for common defense, for the maintenance of international order and the adjudication of disputes, for the protection of established rights and privileges and for the elementary infrastructure requirements of the economy and the polity.¹⁸

Phase II brought in larger sectors of the masses into the system: the conscript armies, compulsory schools and emerging mass media. According to Rokkan, they all created channels for direct contact between the central elite and parochial populations of the peripheries and generated widespread feelings

¹⁶ Talcott Parsons, *Societies, Evolutionary and Contemporary Perspectives*, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

¹⁷ Parsons-Hirshman model is cited in Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe," in Tilly, *The Formation of National State*, 570.

of identity with the total political system. Frequently, but not necessarily, they culminated in prolonged conflict with already established identities such as those built up through churches or sects or peripheral linguistic elites.¹⁹

Phase III brought the subject masses into active participation in the workings of the territorial political system typically through the establishment of privileges of opposition, the extension of the electorates for organs of representation, the formation of organized parties for the mobilization of support and the articulation and aggregation of demands.²⁰

Finally, Phase IV represented the next series in the expansion of the administrative apparatus of the territorial state; the growth of agencies of redistribution, the building of public welfare services, the development of nationwide policies for the equalization of economic conditions, negatively through progressive taxation, positively through transfers from the better-off strata to the poorer, from the richer to the backward regions.²¹

Rokkan argued that the analytical history of center formation and periphery incorporation in Western Europe must start out from six 'givens': first, the

¹⁸ Ibid., 572.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

heritage of the Roman Empire, the supremacy of the Emperor, the systematization of legal rules, the idea of citizenship; second, the supraterritorial, cross-ethnic organizations of the Catholic Church and its central role in the channelling of elite communications during the millenium after the fall of Western Empire; third, the Germanic kingdoms and the traditions of legislative-judicial assemblies of free heads of families; fourth, the extraordinary revival of trade between the Orient, the Mediterranean, and the North Sea after the defeat of the Muslims and the consequent growth of a network of independent cities across Western Europe; fifth, the development and consolidation of feudal and manorial agrarian structures and the consequent concentrations of landholdings in important areas of the West; and finally, the emergence of literatures in vernacular languages and the gradual decline of the dominant medium of cross-ethnic communication, Latin, quite particularly after the invention of printing.

In different places, these 'givens' combined to produce a variety of strikingly different configurations during the crucial state-building period from around the eleventh to the eighteenth century.²² According to Rokkan, the most crucial factor in the European development was that the fragmented center belt was made up of territories at an advanced level of culture, technologically as well as organizationally characterized by, first, a well-developed agricultural economy, second, a remarkable network of highly

autonomous cities, institutionally distinct from the surrounding agricultural lands, third, the linking of the cities as well as the rural areas culturally through a common religion, and one dominant language, Latin; and fourth the transactions across these varied autonomous territories being regulated by the Roman law.²³ These points will be elaborated in the next chapter, with specific reference to Italy.

For a long time, within the center-periphery model, the dominant theory of the formation and consolidation of states was the concept of “diffusionism”. In essence, it holds that societies and states are formed around central points which assimilate the peripheries to their own values. Consequently, a common social, economic and political system emerges. The values are those of elites in politics, economics, education and other public spheres, which legitimate the distribution of roles and rewards in society. Rulers seek to extend the dominant value system throughout society. And, by bringing more of the population into contact with one another, the development of unified economic systems, political democracy, urbanization and education will create greater acceptance for it. The process may not be always smooth. Indeed, in the initial stages of contact, the contrast between peripheral and central values may be a source of conflict and even, in the case of territorial

²² Ibid., 575.

²³ Ibid.

peripheries, secession is possible. But, at least in territorially compact societies, integration is the norm.²⁴

The diffusionist model was criticized because of its deterministic approach. The main criticism was that the ideology of nationalism is not merely the product of cultural diffusion from the core and the assimilation of the peripheral territories into a common value system. The ideology of nationalism may be consciously used by political elites to create a common value system, using mechanisms of communication, education and administration. The political act of creating the state may come first and the sense of national identity would be created later by public policies and partisan activity. John Breuilly, for instance, has regarded nationalism as a special and successful form of modern politics to capture state power in opposition to ruling classes. In his view, nationalism serves as a vital political discourse able to mobilize different strata, uniting divergent social interests and legitimizing their political aspirations. In other words, nationalism is a form of politics, principally opposition politics.²⁵ He states that the roots of modern nationalism are to be found in the territorial and monarchical states of Western Europe in the early modern period. As these states extended their authority over their subjects and diminished that of other institutions, such as churches, estates and guilds, and as they came into increasing and more

²⁴ Ibid.

intensive conflict with one another, they took on the character of nation-states. Thus opposition to increasingly powerful monarchical states in various forms laid the ground for nationalism.²⁶ Thus nation-building is an activity suiting the interests of key groups at various historical moments and it can not be seen apart from this essentially political function.

Lipset and Rokkan Model

Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, while using the center-periphery model, stated that the process of modernization might give rise to territorial and cultural conflicts that persist into industrial society. However they consider territorial resistance to incorporation as the result of an incomplete modernization and therefore the continuing isolation of the periphery from the center. Thus territorial politics may develop where there is a heavy concentration of a distinct culture in the periphery; where there are few ties of communication, alliance and bargaining experience toward the national center and more toward external centers of cultural and economic influence; and where there is minimal economic dependence on the metropolis. In other words, where the process of modernization has been incomplete and the periphery has remained isolated, a distinctive territorial politics may persist.²⁷

²⁵ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 8.

²⁶ Ibid., 75.

Ronan Paddison Model

Ronan Paddison distinguishes three types of integrative factors, measuring cultural, economic and political variables in the process of national integration. The interplay of these factors are important in assessing especially the reasons for fragmentation in national states. The first, cultural integration, is deemed important by Paddison, since one of the tests of national integration is the extent to which a shared national identity is commonly subscribed. Thus culturally based differences that give rise to their own internal sets of loyalties are potentially divisive. Chief among these factors are those associated with religion or language or some other basis that helps support an ethnic group, membership of which gives the individual a value system that he will use to orientate himself to the wider national society.²⁸

The second integrative factor is economic integration. National economic integration is achieved once there are substantially comparable levels of social and economic development in all the regions of the state. According to Paddison, at one level, it assumes that as the developed economy brings in regional specialization, each region interacts with others and becomes increasingly interdependent with them. But it also assumes that each

²⁷ Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments: an introduction," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967), 12.

²⁸ Paddison, *The Fragmented State*, 69.

individual region enjoys roughly similar benefits from membership of the national economy, measurably through indices as per capita income, the consumption of goods and services, mortality rates, the incidence of unemployment and the proportion to employment in 'declining industries'. Paddison adds that the implications of this have been linked to the development of nationalism.²⁹ The third, political integration is linked with the extent to which social class is the basis of political conflict.³⁰ Even though other factors such as religion, ethnicity are cleavage-forming in a successful political integration, the distribution of wealth between classes is superseded.³¹ Paddison also argues that the existence of regional political parties provides the most overt evidence of an unsuccessful national political integration. Such parties are by definition tied to a territory embracing only a part of the state, their objectives are usually to mobilize support across class lines and to win concessions, including autonomy or the right to secede, from the state.³²

Anthony Birch Model

According to Birch, modern nations are an amalgam of historical communities which possessed a fairly clear sense of separate identity in the

²⁹ Ibid., 70.

³⁰ Ibid., 71.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., 74.

past but have been brought together by various economic, social and political developments. The process by which they are brought together is known as *political integration*.³³ Thus the term refers to the process by which smaller communities are consolidated into territorially larger units of government. Loyalties to local political institutions typically become secondary to the allegiance and support enjoyed by the larger unit.³⁴ When political integration takes place at the national level, it is described as *national integration*.³⁵

Birch underlines two main phases in the process of national integration. The first phase is characterized by the attempt to reach the natural borders or physical boundaries that would provide the state with military defensibility and a sense of integrity and completeness.³⁶ It is usually called *state-building* or *penetration*, which involves military pacification of the territory and the build-up of a network of field administration services insuring that the center is able to meet the basic needs of government, for instance the establishment of law and order and means to collect taxes.³⁷ This phase can also be

³³ Anthony H. Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 8.

³⁴ Paddison, *The Fragmented State: The Political Geography of Power*, 58.

³⁵ Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration*, 8.

³⁶ Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*, 90.

characterized with the assertion of sovereignty, which in early modern Europe represented the rejection of the universal claims of the Catholic Church and the residue of the Holy Roman Empire and the claim that ultimate power resided within the boundaries of the state. After the French Revolution the process of destruction of particularistic institutions continued even more effectively by the republican and Napoleonic regimes.³⁸

The second phase is *nation-building*, during which the process of mass social fusion takes place, giving the political unit a common identity. This identity is "nationality",³⁹ by which a state would claim that populations currently subject of its own or a neighboring state were "nationally" the same as the claimant's own population and hence should join the latter in a single system of rule.⁴⁰ According to Rokkan's center-periphery model, this phase is associated with center-initiated policies aimed at cultural standardization, notably a common language and education system.⁴¹

³⁷ Paddison, *The Fragmented State*, 61-62. See also Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration*, 8.

³⁸ Michael Keating, *Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland* (Great Britain: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996), 16.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁴⁰ Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*, 90.

⁴¹ Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of state-formation and nation-building: a possible paradigm for research on variations within Europe," in Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States*, 562-600.

Birch enumerates the essential steps in this process as the creation of symbols of national identity (such as a head of state, a flag and a national anthem), the establishment of national political institutions that bring all the citizens under the same law, the creation of an educational system which gives children a sense of national identity, teaching them about their common history and inculcating patriotism, and the development of national pride.⁴² As the result of a successful national integration, "the citizens must feel that it is their government whom they are obeying, their country for which they are making sacrifices."⁴³

2. Theories of Fragmentation

The national integration process from time to time was reversed and, in fact, culminated in fragmentation. One of the biggest surprises of the 1960s and 1970s were the revival of ethnic-regional-micronational consciousness within some of the oldest, and most advanced national societies. This situation ran contrary to the theories of the modernization school, which until then claimed that modernization would bring with itself national integration, and in turn, the cleavages between the constituent units of a nation-state would wither away. The rise of especially ethnic separatist movements within the

⁴² Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration*, 9-10.

⁴³ Ibid., 8-9. Birch states that the main obstacle to the development of national integration is the existence of ethnic or cultural minorities within the state who resist integrative tendencies. The steps in integration of such minorities

seemingly established nation-states in the 1970s proved this theory wrong. The re-emergence of regional nationalism not only upset many of the textbook theories of politics in western nations, but it also proved an uncomfortable experience for scholars who are brought up within 'national' traditions which took for granted the existing state order, and regarded regional nationalism either as a pathological condition, that is a malfunction of the modern state or as an archaic throwback, a temporary regression in political development.⁴⁴

Michael Hechter's Model of Internal Colonialism

The model of *internal colonialism* seeks to explain the causes of new regional nationalism in the early 1960s as a response to economic deprivation.⁴⁵ Hechter aims to explain resurgent minority nationalism by specifically arguing that this was a reactive mechanism to cultural and economic domination by a core group. The basic argument is that a cultural system of stratification overlies the more characteristic economic configuration of classes. Cultural domination arises, because in the process of modernization, certain areas and groups become more advanced and are able to use this to establish their economic and political superiority. Efforts by the core group to

is first, social mobilization, and second, official national language for instruction in schools. Ibid., 10.

⁴⁴ Michael Keating, *State and Regional Nationalism*, 1-2.

⁴⁵ Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).

maintain their status will lead them to subordinate minority groups within a cultural division of labor. The outcome will be apparent not only in the overall economic structure of the peripheral ethnic areas but also, more specifically in the occupations of the minority group members as in their general wellbeing. In other words, the economic differences between center and periphery can be causally linked to the cultural differences between core and periphery groups.⁴⁶

T. R. Gurr's "Relative Deprivation" Model

T. R. Gurr has developed a general model of conflict in which he argues that right or wrong perceptions of relative deprivation leads to frustration, which in turn fuels discontent and results in violence in the peripheral areas. In some extreme cases it may even lead to secession of the "relatively deprived" part of the country. This is only likely where the feeling of relative deprivation is widely felt among a territorially distinct population. These territorial differences, combined with beliefs that central control has been relatively disadvantageous to the region's prosperity help explain national fragmentation in the forms of increased demands for autonomy.⁴⁷

Most of the above-mentioned theories are based on the idea that groups in the periphery perceive themselves to be deprived, usually economically, but, in

⁴⁶ Paddison, *The Fragmented State*, 82.

some versions, culturally or politically, relative to those in the center. However, there is a poor relationship between relative economic deprivation and peripheral nationalism. Nor does a resurgence of territorial identity always coincide with a relative downturn in the regional economy. On the contrary, some regional movements have often been associated with a relative economic improvement. The best examples here are the cases of Catalonia or the Basque region and also the Northern League movement in Italy, where regional nationalism has emerged in the economically advanced regions.

The New Paradigms of Regionalism

In the 1990s tendencies towards fragmentation continued in various regions of Europe. Most interestingly, established nation-states faced difficulties vis-a-vis these fragmenting tendencies, such as the Scottish in Britain, Basque in Spain and the Lombards in Italy. However, with the end of the Cold War between the two blocs and the collapse of communism, the explanations for these new regional movements differed from the previous ones. Thus the 1990s witnessed a neo-regionalist school which can be regarded as also being post-modernist. Post-modern society, like all antithesis, brings to the extremes some of the trends of the preceding one, and in part, represents a reaction to it. Cultural pluralism, polycentrism, and localism belong to the post-modern view. It is also marked by the rejection of the value of uniformity, equality and homogeneity, which characterizes the modernist

⁴⁷ T. R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

thinking which is shaped by the requirements of the rule of law, of bureaucracy, and of mass production. Post-modernist thoughts defend the value of diversity and multiplicity.

Thus in the post-modernist and neo-regionalist perspective, unlike the old paradigms of regionalism that were regarded as having negative connotations, the term regionalism acquired positive connotations. As a neo-regionalist, Thomas Hueglin has pointed out there is considerable dissent as to whether regionalist movements are backward-oriented, traditional reactions against modernity and its defects. On the one hand, regionalism is described as the “resurgence of tribal sentiments” and as part of a “backlash” politics; on the other hand, it is identified as a leftist strategy linked to the new social movements and arising from peripheral forms of anticapitalist struggle.⁴⁸ According to Hueglin the paradigmatic change on the left culminated in the rediscovery of province as a new basis of emancipation. Ever since the French Revolution, regionalism had been regarded as provincialism and as a feudal relic impeding the democratic goals of equality and participation. But when the demerits of the centralized bourgeois intervention and welfare state became more obvious, the political left, or

⁴⁸ Thomas O. Hueglin, “Regionalism in Western Europe. Conceptual Problems of a New Political Perspective,” *Comparative Politics*, 18, (July 1986), 447.

rather the non-Fabian faction rediscovered the province as a new basis of emancipation.⁴⁹

According to neo-regionalists, there are several reasons as to why regionalism had not been paid much attention to, but had rather developed as a subsidiary or side-topic. For instance, as Thomas Hueglin argues, “it is due to a centralist Weltanschauung and both political scientists and politicians have been slow to recognize it as a dominant trend. As a result they had failed to anticipate the impact of regional movements on politics in Western Europe.”⁵⁰ Perry Anderson provided a historical account of why the term “region” was so much neglected. As he explained, the term “region” was never central in the political vocabulary of the early modern state. There were several administrative terms to denote territorial subdivisions within the framework of absolutist or semi-constitutionalist rule. In common discourse, however, the word “province” was more or less universal usage. Even though this term was used in the interwar period, in the post-war world, it faded away, ceasing to form part of acceptable discourse. From the beginning, the term also had a secondary connotation which was related to its Roman origins: provinces existed not just as a division of a realm, but also in its opposition to its capital.⁵¹ Thus, in time, the usage of ‘province’ fell out of favor, as

⁴⁹ Ibid., 448.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 439-440. My emphasis.

compromised by a pejorative cultural undertone, leaving the field free for 'region' as a neutral term. However, when the term 'region' first acquired a political ring, in the late nineteenth century, there was also opposition against it. If 'regionalism' was accepted in the literature as a minor but harmless sub-genre, regionalism in politics was condemned by most contemporaries as a regressive recalcitrance against the unity of the nation.⁵²

Another reason why region was not popular had to do with the *ideological contradictions of liberalism*. As a doctrine of liberation, liberalism sets individuals free from the constraints of the traditional institutions and communities such as religion, ethnicity and region. This was not only wishful thinking but a blatant disregard of the contradictions on which liberal democracy and the welfare state were based. Postulating a general decline of the older group and conflict patterns in the age of consensus and affluence,

⁵¹ Perry Anderson, *The Invention of the Region 1945-1990*. (Badia Fiesolana: European University Institute, 1994), 7. According to Anderson, "the source of this contrast was French. Pejorative reference to 'provincial' culture and manners can be found as early as Montaigne, and is a commonplace by the time of Madame de Sevigne. Bourbon centralization in the time of Louis XIV gave it virtually canonical force. From France, the associated meaning spread throughout Europe. By the early 18th century Samuel Johnson's dictionary in England treats 'provincial' as more or less a synonym of bucolic. By the 19th century when the earlier antithesis between court and country-onto which the opposition between capital and provinces had been mapped- had ceased to be active, scorn for provincialism if anything intensified, becoming a standard topos of mid-century French literature- Gautier, Sand, Flaubert, in particular. It is thus clear enough why the term province should have lost credit in the polite vocabulary of politics, once universal suffrage became a 20th century norm."

⁵² Ibid., 10.

the proponents of liberalism overlooked the fact that it itself depended on stable patterns of local, ethnic, religious, or class relationships.⁵³ As a result, regionalism was always regarded as a backward-oriented reaction against modernization and centralization and as a fragmenting force and a threat against the unity and integrity of the modern nation-state.

According to Anderson, there were three significant forces that contributed to the rise of the region as a point of political identification across Western Europe. The first of these was the uneven economic development of postwar capitalism. One came across the phenomenon of the 'depressed region' already in the inter-war period. But amidst the general hardships of the Slump and the War, it did not acquire prominence. During the post-war period, on the other hand, the fate of those areas which did not share in the median rise of the living standards within each nation, whether because they were zones of declining industry, or of uncompetitive agriculture, stood out as socially more combustible. Pressure for measures to redress the handicaps of relative disadvantage inevitably built up, giving a meaning to regions-economic interest supplying bonds even where prior cultural identity was weak.⁵⁴

⁵³ Hueglin, "Regionalism in Western Europe," 440. My emphasis.

⁵⁴ Anderson, *The Invention of the Region 1945-1990*, 10.

A second force was quite different in its impact and even opposite in direction. At a somewhat later stage of development, modernization and concentration of the means of mass communication started to create conditions of hitherto unprecedented cultural homogeneity within each nation-state of Western Europe. Television notoriously played the prime role in this process. Predictably, centralization of this kind in due course provoked local reactions. Other things being equal, most people wanted both material conditions similar to and cultural distinctions setting them off from, those within existentially comparative range from themselves. Uneven economic development gave one impulse to regional identification, and too even cultural development gave another.⁵⁵

The most profound change has been the advent of the European Community (now the European Union) itself. The emergence of a supra-national administration, more distant from immediate experience than any previous public authority has put an understandable premium on sub-national administration, as a compensating mechanism. The European institutions, in particular the Commission and the Parliament have been trying to by-pass national authorities, in pursuit of closer union and they express their interest in promoting regional institutions as lower-level partners, as it is expressed clearly in their Charter of Regionalization.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 10-11. My emphasis. This point was further elaborated by the writers on nationalism in the modernization discourse mentioned above.

To these three factors, Anderson adds one alteration which is in line with Hueglin's. He states that until 1945, the dominant ideological value in every Western European society was the nation. That is, the supreme legitimating discourse of public action was advance or defense of national interest or identity. This held good for both liberal-democratic and fascist-authoritarian regimes. After 1945 this has changed. One reason was the mutual destruction brought by the Second World War itself that left every West European power, including the winners, destroyed. Ideally, democracy became the prime internal justification of the existing social order, counterposed to its dictatorial opposite in Eastern Europe. It was above all, this permutation which released dynamics of the region. It weakened the principal modern barrier to the growth of regional autonomy. In Western Europe territorial claims by one state against another effectively disappeared, neutralizing one factor that had often made local autonomy suspect to central authority. The nation was now at once secured as a space and relativized as a code, the region could stir more freely within it. This was a negative condition--lifting of the restraints.⁵⁶

On the other hand, the elevation of democracy into supreme legitimation of the social order offered a positive opening to regional affirmation. Parliamentary systems based on universal suffrage and civil rights afforded a

⁵⁶ Ibid., 13.

compelling model of self-government. The question that now arose was: why should representative institutions be confined to the national level, necessarily distant from local life? Could they not be extended to the 'regional' level, so that they could 'fill out' the bare structures of decision-making at the center? Nothing inherent in the doctrines of liberal democracy appeared to rule out such a *dedoublement*. At worst, regional authorities might be supererogatory but they could not easily be viewed as incompatible with national assemblies.⁵⁷

Nevertheless, whatever the possible mediations between them, there had always been an undeniable tension between nation and region. Between democracy and region, by contrast, the relation might seem more like one of completion.⁵⁸ In this way, the term region gained a positive connotation. What is very important regarding this new political perspective was the linkage between globalism and localism. According to this view, "the growth of globalism does not correlate with a corresponding decline of localism; on the contrary, many new forms of localism are cropping up. 'New localism' seems an emergent feature of 'postmodern society'.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Raimondo Strossoldo, "Globalism and Localism: Theoretical Reflections and some evidence," in Zdravko Mlinar (ed.) *Globalization and Territorial Identities*, (England: Avebury, 1992), 35. Also see, Zdravko Mlinar, "Individuation and Globalization: the Transformation of Territorial Social Organization," in Mlinar, ed., *Globalization and Territorial Identities*, 1-34.

As noted, students of territorial politics called these regionalisms *neo-regionalism*; also because the concept connoted the reaction to modernist explanations, or old paradigms of regionalism. The first paradigm that the neo-regionalists reject for explaining and analyzing the rise of regionalism has been the center-periphery disparity. Hueglin argues that “peripherality is by no means synonymous with underdevelopment. Rokkan and Urwin define peripherality as “distance, difference and dependence”. Peripheries depend on one or more centers with regard to “political decision-making” “cultural standardization” and “economic life”. Thus peripherality includes both a horizontal dimension of spatial asymmetry and a vertical dimension of socioeconomic and political interaction characterized by central control. From this perspective regionalism appears as a protest movement against political-administrative and socioeconomic centrality. It is not so important whether its goals are sociocultural autonomy, political federalism, or outright separatism, whether its driving force is a small intellectual elite or politically organized party, nor whether its motives are predominantly cultural, economic, or political. The common characteristic of all peripheral regions is their position with regard to the overarching system of centrality.

The modernist explanations of regionalism are unsatisfactory for the most part, because they fail to explain what exactly set these peripheral predicaments in motion. Ethnicity and language can hardly explain why

regional identities would become salient exactly at a moment when ethnic minorities had almost ceased to differ from their majoritarian mass culture surroundings. These ends are now commonly explained in socioeconomic terms. But while the “unevenness” of the “tidal wave of modernization” goes a long way in explaining particular regionalist reactions against centralist national policy-making, there is also counter-evidence. A study of the correlation of regionalism and industrial development in 1975 showed that regionalism and anti-centralism in the then European Economic Community were most pronounced in those areas that had already attained some degree of modernization, whereas the poorest and predominantly agrarian regions sided with the industrialized centers, showing considerable faith in centralist national problem-solving. Hence, the mere factor of unevenness does not explain regionalist mobilization sufficiently. Regional mobilization is a “question of inconsistency between economic strength/potential and cultural status. Generally speaking, the phenomenon of uneven development in the process of modernization does not seem to correlate very well with the epochal rise of regionalism. Further explanation must be found in causal factors which are more specifically linked to the socioeconomic turbulences of that epoch.

The neo-regionalists provide some alternative explanations for the rise of regionalism that can be grouped under two main headings:

(a) Endogenous reasons: According to those scholars who adopt this approach, the rise of regionalism was mainly due to the **modern** concept and nature of the state itself and the way it was integrated and functioned. The main attribute of the modern state has been its highly centralized structure. As a result, the nation-state has become overloaded and is losing the capability to provide basic services and perform its traditional function.

As “the nation-state became too big to run everyday life and too small to manage international affairs,”⁶⁰ the regions or the sub-national units constituting the nation-state came to have influence and authority. The consequence of this development is that the national cultures and identities are squeezed between a much wider, more global culture and local or regional cultures and identities.⁶¹ As a result, national identities may not necessarily disappear but they may be overshadowed by regional or local identities. The next step is alienation from the state, questioning its legitimacy regarding fulfilling the needs of the specific regional/local entity, followed by demands and sometimes struggles for more autonomy. Thus tension between the nation-state and its constituent units regarding the issue of more devolution of power from the center to the regions once more came to the

⁶⁰ John Newhouse, “Europe’s Rising Regionalism,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No: 1, January-February 1997, 67.

⁶¹ Ibid.

surface. This has been particularly evident in European countries where regions occupy an important place in political life.

(b) Exogenous reasons: According to some other proponents of the “crisis of the nation-state” argument, the crisis stems from the pressures that **globalism** poses. Changes in the structure of international economy, technological advance and the end of the Cold War together are forcing a realignment of relations among states, citizens and the international economy.⁶² Thus the already weakened structure of the nation-state is further weakened by increasing globalism.

The best example of the global impact upon nation-states and their constituent regions is revealed by the process of European integration. The process of European integration added further complications to the already problematic relationship between state and nation. While trying to integrate with the global market, nation-states witnessed the resurgence of regionalism.⁶³ With the process of integration, regions gained further importance since this meant for them to jump state frontiers and apply for funding and appeal directly to the EU when they had problems. Even though integration did not aim to discard the nation-state from the scene, it has

⁶² Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, *After the Nation-State. Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder* (Great Britain: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994), ix.

provided a ground to justify the assertion of the activities and identities within the nation-states in Europe. This policy was further strengthened by the creation of the Committee of the Regions and by allowing the regions to open up representative offices in Brussels to articulate their own interests and lobby the Commission.

The European Union does not consider these developments as infringing upon the integrity of the nation-states. For instance, the European Parliament had repeated frequently that “the autonomy of the Regions of the European Community and the creation of a Europe politically more united constitute two complimentary and converging aspects of the same political evolution.”⁶⁴ Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that more or less uniform policies of the European Union had important implications upon each individual state, which were shaped to a great extent by the *sui generis* history, political structure, political culture and economic conditions of that country. As a result of these two factors-endogenous and exogenous- the nation-state faces a twin crisis which in turn, paves the way for the rise of regionalism.

A Note on the Methodological Approach

⁶³ Newhouse, “Europe’s Rising Regionalism,” 68.

⁶⁴ Santiago Petschen, *La Europa de las Regiones*. [The Europe of Regions]. (Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Autònomic, 1992), 326.

Most students of territorial politics criticized the neglect of the territorial aspects of politics.⁶⁵ For instance Jim Sharpe stated:

Until fairly recently the concept of territoriality did not usually attract much interest in political science...Territorial, spatial or even scale effects were usually left to geographers. The reasons seem to be partly because the dominant modes of analysis were usually sociologically inclined and were thus cast in non-spatial horizontal categories such as class or social strata; or in vertical, sectoral categories related to the division of labor. Alternatively the emphasis has been on the underlying primordality of the economy, but an economy rarely defined territorially...The other unit of analysis has been individual. But again the impact of territoriality on behavior except for nationality has not been prominent.⁶⁶

The concept of "territorial politics" methodologically brought in some novel approaches. The most important point made by those who study "territorial politics" was their criticism about the theory of intergovernmental relations. Of all the approaches encompassed by the term center-periphery relations, the intergovernmental theory was seen as the most restricted because it used to focus only on institutional relationships. Thus the key difference between the study of territorial politics and of intergovernmental relations lies not only in the latter's concern with institutions but in the former's recognition that there is a need to *return to history*.⁶⁷ A focus on territorial politics, therefore, fuses the intergovernmental theory with history.

⁶⁵ J. L. Sharpe, "The West European State: The Territoriality Dimension," in *Tensions in the Territorial Politics of Western Europe*, eds., R.A.W. Rhodes and Vincent Wright 147-167, (Great Britain: Frank Cass, 1987).

⁶⁶ Ibid., 148.

Rhodes and Wright suggest two possible ways in which historical analysis can be incorporated into the study of territorial politics: (a) synoptic, synthetic surveys (spans decades, even centuries, identifying general trends and providing an interpretative backcloth for current events) and (b) the analysis of critical junctures (focuses on either particular events or years deemed to be turning points in the development of territorial politics, documenting the events of concern and demonstrating their continuing impact).⁶⁸

This study will attempt to emphasize the territorial dimension of the regional problem in Italy that was neglected so far. The main approach will be the analysis of critical junctures of Italian history regarding the emergence and evolution of the regional problem in relation to the national integration process that started with the Unification of Italy. In this respect, the study will elaborate on the main events at critical junctures of Italian history with regard to the national integration process.

Terminological Clarification

In order to explain what regionalism means, first it is necessary to define the term "region". "Region" has several meanings. It can refer to a plurality of

⁶⁸ R.A.W. Rhodes and Vincent Wright, "Introduction," in *ibid.*, 1. Rhodes and Wright argue that the focus on history is necessary because contemporary events have to be located historically if cause and effect continuities and discontinuities are to be accurately distinguished.

states, such as “European region”, “Baltic region”, and some territories where specific supranational organizations are formed, such as “European Union”, “Arab League” and the like.⁶⁹ “Region” also refers to the parts of a state. This usage of the term is quite wide-spread. As such, it is defined in the constitutions of many European countries, such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, and England. In this respect, the “region” is defined as “the largest territorial articulation within a state.” In other words, “the region is the area where a series of rules correspond to an institutional asset marked by the democratic organs that represent the corresponding collectivity, administrative, and in many cases, also legislative power and autonomy under the guarantee of the organs of the same state.”⁷⁰ According to Peter Wagstaff, region may be a territory which is given the status of a region for administrative purposes; it is a unit occupying an intermediate position between central and local government. Region may also be a territory with claims to a cultural and political individuality of its own, marked out by ethnic, historical, linguistic features, moulded by shared myths and traditions. A region, may, of course, have the last two sets of characteristics.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁹ Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 108.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ “Introduction,” in *Regionalism in Europe*, ed., Peter Wagstaff (Great Britain: Cromwell Press, 1994), 4.

According to Perry Anderson, the term 'region' is an old word in all European languages with a major Latin word-stock, one typically that came into use in the fourteenth century. Its meaning was twofold: the demarcation of a geographical territory, vaguely associated with the sense of 'rule' (*regere*) and a portion of sub-division of any wider referent. However, from the very beginning, the term was highly indeterminate and was never central in the political vocabulary of the early modern state. In common discourse, there came to be one word of more or less universal currency; 'province'.⁷² So it was rather the term 'province' in general usage than the term 'region' but they more or less meant the same thing.

Anderson defines "regionalism" as the tendency of the inhabitants of a specific region to obtain major privileges, due to anthropological, historical, or cultural reasons. In other words, regionalism means the aspirations and activism of the concerned inhabitants of a region, and denotes the pursuit of the specific interests of such a unit.⁷³ Hueglin defines regionalism as "the

⁷² Anderson further argues that the most celebrated use of the term in its own way makes the point. The principle of *cuius regio, eius religio*, which came into use on the Peace of Augsburg, ...conceded to each ruler the right to determine the doctrine professed within the whole, not part of their territory: the sense is that of 'realm'. See Anderson, *The Invention of the Region 1945-1990*, 6.

⁷³ Ibid.

persistence of subnational and transnational differences, identities and commitments.⁷⁴

There are different categories of regionalism. Massart-Pierard categorizes five types of regionalisms: (a) *political regionalism*: a regional community exists which aims to obtain the participation of this group to the decision-making process in accordance with certain autonomy, such as Scottish regionalism, (b) *Neo-regionalism*: all forms of regionalism lying behind the “modern” concept of the region. It emerges because of the economic, social, administrative and spatial disequilibriums stemming from the modern industrial society, (c) *ethnic regionalism*: retrospective regionalism which proposes the division of linguistic zones or sub-cultural sectors, such as the Basque or Catalan regionalism, (d) *instrumental regionalism*: regions seen as a means to obtain some objectives, (e) *functional regionalism*: found not on historical or sentimental considerations but on objective consideration, such as administrative regionalism.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Hueglin, “Regionalism in Western Europe,” 439. He also cites Rokkan and Urwin who define the main characteristics and its perception of regionalism in the context of the modern centralized nation-state as geopolitical distance, sociocultural difference and socioeconomic dependence. See Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, *Economy Territory Identity* (London: Sage, 1983), 2-6.

⁷⁵ Françoise Massart-Pierard, *Pour une Doctrine de la Région en Europe. Régionalization e Régionalisme* [A doctrine for the regions in Europe. Regionalization and Regionalism], (Louvain: Vander, 1974), 147-148.

Throughout the present study , the term regionalism will be used as a term that will refer to the regionalist movements up until the end of the Cold War period. Whereas neo-regionalism, bearing also some post-modernist connotations, will be used to refer to the regionalism in the post-Cold War era that became even more obvious with the rise of the regionalist party, Lega Nord.

Italian Regionalism in Context

It is important to make a further distinction regarding the usage of the term “regionalism”. It bears two different meanings in the Italian context. The first meaning refers to the regions in the micro sense. The examples are Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna, Umbria, Sicilia. The second meaning refers to the regions in the macro, that is geographical sense. There are three macroregions in Italy. One is Northern Italy, which is also referred to as *Padania* in the rhetoric of the Lega Nord. Northern Italy is composed of such microregions as Piedmonte, Lombardia, Veneto, and Emilia-Romagna. The second macroregion is Central Italy, which is also referred to as *Tuscia*, being composed of such microregions as Toscana, Marche, Umbria, Abruzzi, Molise, and Lazio. The third macroregion is Southern Italy, often referred to as *Mediterraneo*, being composed of such microregions as Campania, Calabria, Puglia, and Basilicata. In addition to these are five special statute regions which have a higher degree of autonomy. These are the border regions in the

North, namely Valle d'Aosta, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige, and the two islands in the south, namely, Sicilia and Sardegna.

As noted above, the general objective of this study is to analyze the emergence of neo-regionalism in Italy in the early 1990s by tracing its historical, social, cultural and economic origins through a study of critical junctures in Italian history regarding national integration. This task might seem ambitious since it will cover an extensive time span. Another difficulty stems from the highly regional character of Italy itself. As one student of Italian politics had mentioned, 'there is not only one history in Italy, but many histories'. In analyzing the national integration process in Italy, the present study will focus on the "Northern question", that is deemed as the most critical regional problem in Italy and which is the source of today's crisis of 'neo-regionalism' in this country. The process of national integration in Italy in different time periods will be examined by adopting the three most important integrative criteria- political, cultural and economic, that are borrowed from Rokkan and Urwin's model.⁷⁶ By pointing out the

⁷⁶ The same analytical tools were used by Michael Keating in his comparative study *State and Regional Nationalism*, where four countries were examined. However, Keating uses the terminology somehow differently. He borrows the terms 'national revolution' referring to the efforts of central elites, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to establish common institutions based on consistent values within four states; 'industrial revolution' referring to the spread of industrialization, capitalism and market relationships in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the new classes which they spawned and the effects of this on the territorial balance. To these two terms he adds the term 'cultural revolution', referring to the efforts to unify state territories

importance of the structural factors and the historical heritage inherited by the modern state and by analyzing the *sui generis* operation of the three important integrative factors during the national integration process in Italy, this study will attempt to trace the origins of neo-regionalism beyond the “crisis of the modern state” argument and will attempt to bridge the gap in theories about explaining the rise of neo-regionalism.

Plan of Study

Before dealing with the different time periods and historical events that have affected the pace and nature of the formation of nationalism, some structural factors and historical heritages peculiar to Italy that the modern Italian state had inherited will be delineated in Chapter 2. In this Chapter, firstly, the peculiar geography of Italy - its being a long peninsula, its north being closer to Europe and its south being closer to the Mediterranean and Africa will be discussed. The importance of geography stems from the fact that it plays a crucial role in the development of the ‘Southern question’ and regionalism which is the most prominent character of Italy compared to the other European states. Secondly, the highly regional/local character of Italy will be mentioned. Here, a brief historical background of the local culture will be elaborated, which is important to understand how the forces for fragmentation operated throughout history, especially during the Roman

linguistically and culturally, seen much more as a strategy of political elites at the center than as a process of natural osmosis resulting from contacts

Empire. The main focus will be the historical, sociological, cultural and economic differences that had evolved between the North and the South throughout history. As an example of this, the separate developments of the city-states in the North and the South, the development of civic consciousness and impact of the church in the two parts of the country during the pre-unification period will be taken up. Thirdly, the impact of French Revolution and the Napoleonic regime in Italy will be examined. It is an important period that has formed the genesis of the Italian nationalism. This is because Italy, too, was affected by dissemination of French revolutionary ideas. Indeed, the presence of the French both as an occupying power as well as an exporter of revolutionary ideas and new forms of the state administration left a deep imprint in the later developments regarding state-building and nation-building in Italy. Thus, these three factors are deemed as critical heritages that the founders of the Italian state inherited, and they continued to be important factors concerning the national integration process.

In the following chapters of the study, regionalism and neo-regionalism will be examined as regards their links with the national integration process in Italy since its unification (*Risorgimento*). In other words, regionalism will be regarded as a fragmentary force since it aims to assert itself at the expense of the nation-state. Each chapter will focus on different time periods and historical events which are deemed as crucial in determining-by contributing

between center and periphery. See Michael Keating, *State and Regional*

to or impeding- the evolution of the national integration process in Italy. These periods will be the Unification period (1848-1870), the Fascist period (1914-1945) , the post-Fascist (1945-1990) and post-cold war (1990-today) periods. In each period, ideologies and policies of the state towards the problem of national integration will be analyzed. The ideological debate between the unitarists and the federalists during the unification period, the ultra-centralist policies of the Fascist state and the decentralist trends in the Cold War years were considered as critical for understanding the attempts for national integration in Italy. In sum, the general trend of policies intended for a successful national integration- centralism, decentralization and a possible federalism - will be analyzed since they are deemed as important in the national integration process of Italy.

Thus, Chapter 3 will elaborate on the unification period (*Risorgimento*). Here the emphasis will be on the ideological debate about the form of the newly-founded state and the 'Southern question' between the unitarists and the federalists. The reason why the unitary solution was preferred and its implications for the creation of the nation state and the 'Southern question' will be elaborated.

Before delineating briefly the reasons for the rise of fascism in Italy, Chapter 4 will provide two different but essential historical accounts of the making of

the Italian nation-state and its impact on the rise of Fascism in Italy. The first one is the Gramscian-leftist approach and the second is the Crocean-rightist approach. Then, the chapter will deal with the fascist vision of nationalism and regionalism and their impact on Mussolini's policies in trying to "make Italians". The main emphasis will be on the effects of the fascist period upon the process of national integration in Italy.

Regarding the 'Southern question', dealt within the framework of transition to democracy in aftermath of the Second World War in Italy, Chapter 5 will first elaborate on three main policies of the dominant actors in Italian politics towards the solution of the 'Southern question' and the consequences of these policies. More specifically, the 1948 Constitution, that envisaged a great deal of autonomy for regions like Sicilia or Sardegna will be elaborated. Secondly, the impact of the party politics (*partitocrazia*) upon the (non-) solution of the question will be examined with specific reference to the clientelistic policies of the right of center party, *Democrazia Christiana* (DC) and the decentralist policies of such leftist parties as *Partita Comunista Italiana* (PCI). The implications of party politics upon the Southern question and thus upon national integration are important not only because main deficiencies in the political system stemmed from this period, to which the criticism of the Lega Nord are directed. The policies of the DC to co-opt the Southern political elite into the system had some important consequences which culminated in increased corruption and clientelism. Besides, most of the policies pursued in

this period by DC for the economic development of the South proved futile. Thus, this period is an important period; it was during this period that the seeds of fragmentation and tension were planted. Regionalism, in this period, became an important issue, yet it remained under the shadow of party politics. Thirdly, the implications of European integration are deemed important for the rise of a supranational identity in Italy. Here, more specifically the study will elaborate on some regional policies of the European Community and evaluate the success of these policies in trying to bridge the gap between Northern and Southern Italy.

In Chapter 6, the neo-regionalist debates in Italy in the post-Cold war era will be taken up. The reasons behind the rise of the regionalist party- Lega Nord , its rhetoric and practice are the main issues addressed in this Chapter. This Chapter will also try to assess the rise of neo-regionalism in Italy within the context of the rise of regionalism and federalism in Europe in general. However, the Lega Nord is not the only medium through which the federalist proposals and schemes for state reform were being disseminated. In addition to Lega, the Fondazione Agnelli-a leading industrial sector representative, the Diocesana Ambrosiana-that is regarded as the voice of the Church and some other leading academic figures as experts of the issue have elaborated on this issue and proposed different solutions to the present crisis. Thus this Chapter will analyze these different segments of Italian society with the aim to address the following question: To what extent does the intense debate in

Italy regarding the issue of neo-regionalism pose a threat to the national integrity of the Italian nation state and can it be considered as a failure of national integration in Italy?



CHAPTER II

THE HERITAGE OF ITALY BEFORE UNIFICATION

The formation of an Italian nation was not an easy task for its founding fathers since Italy had a unique historical heritage which did not exactly coincide with the nationalistic feelings that were to flourish. This difficulty was best revealed in Massimo d'Azeglio's famous phrase (*Fatta l'Italia, dobbiamo fare gli Italiani*-Now that Italy is made, we must make the Italians). Since Italians as a people had little sense of loyalty to that state or to each other, Italy's unification was achieved quite late in 1870 compared to the other nation-states of Europe. This chapter, analyzes the main factors that played a crucial role in Italy's late unification and the problems which followed that had to be faced in order to build the nation.

The first factor was the highly local character, indeed the mosaic-like structure of the peninsula, where intense local allegiances have always been an important feature of the population. The strength of local culture was the main obstacle for the founders of the Italian state who aimed at the national integration of Italy. Especially in regions like northern Italy, where many prosperous commercial cities existed, and none of which was clearly

dominant over the rest, it was even more difficult to achieve integration, since such polycephalous areas are notoriously hard to unify.¹ The most important aspect of local culture was revealed by the cities or rather the city-states which in time turned into regional states. These states played a crucial role in the national integration process of Italy.

The second factor which had played a crucial role in Italy's late unification and difficult national integration were the Papal States in central Italy that had always viewed any effort to construct a united Italy as a threat to its own interests and to those of the Church. The Church was one of the forces that promoted fragmentation rather than integration between the individual city-states and regional states of the Italian peninsula. The location of the Papal States right in the center of the peninsula rendered difficult the integration of the north and the south of Italy.

The third factor was the dual structure in Italy, usually referred to as 'Two Italies', which was characterized by the profound difference between the historical traditions of northern Italy which had been under Germanic domination and those of the continent and, the insular southern part which had experienced Byzantine, Moorish, Norman and Spanish rule.² It was a

¹ Raphael Zariski, "Italy: The Distributive State and the Consequences of Late Unification, in Mark O. Rousseau and Raphael Zariski eds., *Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1987), 92.

² Ibid.

difficult task for the founders of the Italian state to make these 'two Italies' one, since the 'Southern question' always posed an obstacle for them. This duality of the country has always been a vivid issue in the political life of Italy since the relationship between the two parts were mostly tense, and this tension was recently revitalized by the emergence of the Lega Nord.

A Brief Note on the Territory and People of Italy

Continental Italy is a peninsula which extends from Central Europe like a long boot towards North Africa. It is surrounded by the Alps in the north, the Ligurian and Tyrrhenian Seas in the west, the Adriatic and Ionian Seas in the east, and the Messina Straits and the Mediterranean in the south. The two islands of Sicily and Sardinia were annexed in 241 and 238 B.C., respectively, as a result of the First Punic War with Carthage (264-242 B.C.) during the Roman Republic. It was then that what is known today as "Italy" took its actual form.³

The majority of Italians who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries never heard the word 'Italy'. It was a country which lived only in the minds of the literate. There were three main sources of the idea of Italy. First, the study of classical literature implied the idea of the old Roman province, praises of *Italia* from the Latin poets, and a belief that the peninsula formed

a territory with natural boundaries. Second, the native people's hatred of non-Italians as peoples whose language could not be understood and whose soldiers devastated native fields and towns for the claims of overlordship fed the idea of 'Italy'. Third, the merchants and exiles who were able to make a comparison between Italy and other countries played a role. For instance, an exiled writer, Brunetto Latini, on his return to his native city expressed his new consciousness of 'nationality' by saying: 'Italy is a better country than France.'⁴

Even though the peninsula was divided among Italic tribes and Greek emigrants, there was a tendency to regard it as a whole unit, as revealed by the works of such writers as Plato and Archimedes. Roman historians such as Livy, Virgil and Tacitus also approached the area as a unit and the heartland of the Roman Empire. Dante Alighieri (1251-1321) located and depicted its regions, stressing its natural frontiers. In his *Divina Commedia* [Divine Comedy] (1321), he spoke of "beautiful Italy", as the "garden" of the Medieval Empire.⁵

³ Ronald S. Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism. From its Origins to World War II* (Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger, 1990), 3.

⁴ John Larner, *Italy in the Age of Dante and Petrarch 1216-1380* (London and New York: Longman, 1980), 1-2.

⁵ Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism: From its Origins to World War II*, 3.

As regards the people, no precise origins can be claimed. The main influx was of the Indo-Europeans, whose habitat was between Scandinavia and the Russian steppes. The Indo-Europeans, who spoke a language from which Greek, Latin and German were derived, participated about 2500 B.C. in a massive migration, with one branch penetrating into Italy, several dispersing into other areas of Central and Western Europe and another reaching India. The Greeks and Etruscans were later arrivals, the former crossing the Adriatic and the Ionia between 750-550 B.C. while the latter infiltrated the region between the Arno and Tiber rivers in 600-510 B.C. Many anthropologists agree that another racial component may have filtered through North Africa. The North African immigrants first mingled with the indigenous population to form the Italian people, then were divided into Italic tribes and formed the ancestors of the Italians living in the regions of the peninsula; Romans, Tuscans, Ligurians, Piedmontese, Venetians, Lombardians, Umbrians , Neapolitans, Sicilians and others.

The Historical Roots of Localism and Microregionalism in Italy

As noted, one of the most important peculiarities of Italy that can be considered as an impediment to its national integration, has been the highly fragmented and mosaic structure of the country. Even though Italy is often considered as a geographically compact country and a unitary state, it is not a homogenous unit when one looks at its political and cultural structure. Italy's

history is that of a nation in the making.⁶ The geographically defined regional entities, politically independent, economically differentiated and generally dominated by a strong city have been prominent in Italian history for more than a millenium.⁷ For a long time, 'Italy' was nothing more than a sentiment and a literary idea. Throughout history, it has always been a collection of regions, and each region has been a collection of smaller units dominated by particularistic sentiments and local interests. Some of these regions are very ancient and have kept their identity and loyalties even under strong governments, such as the Roman Empire and the fascist Italy. Thus the most important structural factor in understanding Italian politics, state-society relations and economic development is this strong sense of localism, or rather regionalism. It is always important to keep in mind that an Italian is Milanese or Neapolitan before he is Italian, or very often he identifies being Italian with being Milanese or Neapolitan.⁸

This had some important implications upon Italian national historiography, because as one writer mentioned, 'there was not one but many histories in Italy'. If English history was made meaningful and given form by the story of

⁶ Rita Moore, "Historical Setting," in *Italy: A Country Study*, ed. Rinn S. Shinn (Washington, D. C.: American University, 1985), 3.

⁷ Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti. *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 18.

⁸ Chris Wickham, *Early Medieval Italy: Central Power and Local Society 400-1000*. (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1981), 1.

its parliament and the history of France by its monarchy, what characterized Italian history was precisely its lack of any coherence.⁹ The historical studies reflected the particularistic character of the peninsula, since the main theme in these studies were individual cities or regions.¹⁰ It is quite recent that national unification in Italian historiography was achieved.

The Cities, Communes and Regional States

The collapse of the Roman Empire in 476 was a critical milestone in Italian history. The Roman Empire had a vast range of territories extending from Ireland in the northwest to the Indus River in the southeast, the Danube in the north and the coastal area of Africa in the south. It contained about 75.000.000 people of different nationalities and levels of culture. Following the collapse of the western axis of the empire in 476 A. D., four major states or empires emerged, each advertising itself as the sole custodian of Roman universality.¹¹ These were the Eastern Roman Empire, Charlemagne's Frankish Kingdom, the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation and the

⁹ Larner, *Italy in the Age of Dante and Petrarch*, 7.

¹⁰ Julius Kirshner has argued that in Italy, the genre of political history focusing of particular individuals, acts and events, though battered, was never choked out by exotic species of historiography. This inherent character of established political history is also partly due to the 'intractable localism and geographic diversity that is not easily reduced to holistic paradigms. See Julius Kirshner, "Introduction: The State is Back In," in *The Origins of the State in Italy 1300-1600*, ed. Julius Kirshner (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 3.

Roman Catholic Church. Italy became the battleground of the conflicting ambitions of these four actors. However, the local or regional identities did not fade away under these empires since none of them was able to centralize or unify the peninsula. On the contrary, the localities took advantage of the conflicting policies and ambitions of these four actors and strengthened their identities and allegiances.

The City-States

The main local entities forming an obstacle to national allegiance for the Italians were the **city-states**. Before nationalism could germinate and flourish, strong public sentiment had to be transferred from the previous allegiances as the Roman Imperium, Roman Catholic universalism, and Renaissance transnational humanism based on allegiance to the city-state republics.¹² Nation-state building in Europe along ethnic-political lines had started long before the Italians began to think in similar terms.

As mentioned above, the Italian cities predated the Roman Empire. They were places where basic public consciousness and responsibility in the Empire were maintained. They retained these features right through the Middle Ages. The Roman Empire had maintained the cellular structure even though it had been strong and centralized. But when the empire began to

¹¹ Lerner, *Italy in the Age of Dante and Petrarch*, 9.

¹² Ibid.

collapse in the tenth century, its cellular structure became a disadvantage, for the interests of each city were no longer totally tied to that of the central government. Thus, Italy remained as an agglomeration of localities where local interests mostly crystallized around individual cities. There was already in existence a viable network of city-states long before the centralized state departed from the Italian political scene. Thus with the collapse of the Empire these small cellular structures became active on their own.

These localities which were under the pressure of conflicting and clashing interests of the four actors mentioned above exploited the situation to their interests and increased their room for maneuver economically and politically. Like small islands in the sea, they turned inward to the web of relationships being worked out between the major city and the countryside. The countryside was slowly assimilated by the metropolitan area and the degree of this assimilation was best revealed by a type of localism, called *campanilismo*.¹³ The concept meant that one's sole political allegiance was to one's city, whose *piazza* (public square) was conveniently accessible, and whose main cathedral and bell were visible and audible to all the citizenry.¹⁴ In other words the tower and the cathedral became the symbols of city-identity.

¹³ The first example of *campanilismo* was in Florence with the building of a *campanile-torre* (belfry-tower) in the city.

¹⁴ Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism*, 10.

Allegiance to the city-states were utmost and the city-identity was very strong. However, the sentiment of sharing a common citizenship within a city-state was not solely the result of having a common residence. When Waley quotes Pia dei Tolomai in Dante's *Purgatorio* – 'Siena made me' (*Siena mi fe*), she is more than announcing her place of birth: she is saying that by providing the physical, social and political environment in which she grew up, the city-state of Siena shaped her outlook and personality.¹⁵ In Count Carlo Sforza's words:

The Polis, the city-state, constituted the sole base of every political and social organism. One might say the same of Etruria between where the Arno and the Tiber was, until the Roman conquests, just a federation of twelve cities, a federation with extremely strict religious ties, but with a wide autonomy for each city....When dominion of Rome was extended all over Italy, things changed but little morally and socially; the *civitas* continued to be the base and the key to the life of all Italians. There is no other nation whose traditions, legends and popular epic are compelled so constantly to look to the city for their origin.¹⁶

Civic patriotism cannot be explained solely in terms of government and administration. A man will become fully aware of his allegiance to his own state only if he knows of other states to which he has no allegiance. His loyalty will be sharpened all the more if it becomes engaged in opposition to

¹⁵ Daniel Waley, *The Italian City-Republics* (London and New York: Longman: 1969, 1978), xiv.

¹⁶ Count Carlo Sforza, *Italy and the Italians* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985), 1.

other states. The Italian city-republics were highly capable of eliciting such loyalty, since a man had every chance of knowing neighboring cities and the important differences in geographical site, in architecture, in economic life, in political constitutions and traditions between other cities and his own. Traditions of enmity for rival cities were in fact an invariable ingredient in fully developed civic patriotism.¹⁷

The city was the focus for autonomous activity after the fall of state power. City-identity in both the Empire and the early Middle Ages was defined administratively: the presence of a city council, a duke, a count, a bishop and the presence of walls alone sometimes seems to have underlain the juridical definition of a city.¹⁸ Among thousands of centers of population in Italy, some hundreds were designated as cities (*citta*) and of these, some eventually acquired enough independence to deserve to be called city-states. The jurist Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1313-1357) offers an illuminating definition of the city. A wall was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, according to

¹⁷ Waley, *The Italian City-Republics*, 88. It has been suggested above that fully-grown civic patriotism was the product of enmity and warfare between cities. This patriotism did not merely expand by "natural" growth in these circumstances, but was consciously nurtured. An instance of this process is the communes' use of the *carroccio*, a special wagon to bear the standard in battle. ...By the later twelfth century a number of cities had adopted the use of *carroccio*, sometimes giving it a special name (Parma's *carroccio* was called 'Blancardus', Cremona's 'Bertha' and always appointing a body-guard to accompany it into battle.... The Milanese did not retain the *carroccio* without making modifications. In the later twelfth century St Ambrose, the city's patron saint, was portrayed where Archbishop Heribert had preferred a crucifix. For the symbols of the civic patriotism, see *Ibid*, 101.

Bartolus, to qualify as a 'city.' A fortress (*castrum*), though provided with walls or a moat, usually lacked common law jurisdiction and so it was like a village; although it might possess magistrates, they were placed there by the city to which it was subject.¹⁹ Bartolus adds that the place had been a city, however, before it acquired its bishop. The distinguishing mark of a city is the possession of jurisdiction, and jurisdiction not only over those within its walls, but over subject towns, villages and fortresses. Such cities might have been empty shells, or tiny settlements of peasants. In southern and southern-central Italy they often were. But there was perhaps four times the density of cities in some parts of the South as in the Po plain, in a far poorer landscape. Such a restricted territorial base often meant that such cities were only villages, with just a cathedral as their focus. They had a much weaker resistance to wars and invasions. Less than half of the Roman cities of the South survived the sixth and seventh centuries even as bishoprics. The geographical persistence of the northern cities contrasts clearly with this. In the North, there was a true urban society functioning in the cities such as Ravenna, Lucca and Milan. This assumes a clear economic definition of the city.²⁰

The ideological pre-eminence of urban life in Italian city-states throughout the early Middle Ages is clear. The survival of the institutions of the state

¹⁹ Girffiths, "The Italian City-State," 76.

²⁰ Ibid, 80.

and church in the cities contributed to a definite solidity of urban economic activity, too, even if it was less firmly based than under the Empire. When the Italian state decayed in the North, some of the great aristocratic families ruralized themselves. That was the lowpoint for the political dominance of Italian cities. But this in itself shows the persistence of the city as an administrative center for the state up to at least the tenth century. As the rise of the *communes* shows, even in the eleventh century, the balance lay with the cities.²¹

Cities had been acting as collectivities, at least informally since the late seventh century. For instance, the citizens of Milan had an assembly place in front of their cathedral as early as 879 A. D. For several centuries the bishop acted as the focus of city politics.²² It is clear that on one level the surrender of city government to bishops was a logical step in urban political development. But it was not all to the bishop's advantage. Cities were not collectivities that could easily be controlled; particularly the most important urban families, who were also for the most part major rural landowners, too, kept their autonomy. Even the most seigneurialised of northern Italian cities maintained their autonomies, as they were too complex to control by any other means. The germ of the *commune* (municipality) lay in these institutions

²¹ Ibid, 87-88.

²² Chris Wickham, *Early Medieval Italy: Central Power and Local Society 400-1000* (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1981), 181.

which were administered by the professionals who ran them as judges and notaries. Together with the urban landed aristocracy, the judges and notaries formed the *cives*. The city uprisings of the eleventh century show that ordinary people were prepared to fight for their cities and were not unpracticed at it. In the urban context, fighting had not become restricted to an elite, and in the pursuit of civic identity the poor were mostly prepared to follow the rich.

As mentioned above, both under the Roman Empire and the following Lombard Kingdom, the comparative uniformity of the central government and of the city administration totally broke down at the local level and was not replaced later. The collapse of the Roman Empire created a great power vacuum on the part of the central state and the localities took advantage of this situation. The basic unit for the Lombard state was essentially the *city* and its territory, making a cellular structure for the kingdom, mostly as the continuation of the traditional social and geographical framework of Italy.²³ Even though the Lombards tried hard to centralize these regional units, they could not manage it due to their disorganized invasion and their scattered settlements that were mostly confined to the northern part of Italy, most heavily around Milan, Pavia, Brescia, Verona, and in Friuli; less heavily in Western Emilia and around Lucca; hardly at all further south.

Another significant development in this post-Roman Empire period was that regional distinctions, which are not directly related to the Lombards, began to appear. From 700 A. D. onwards every zone of Italy has its own local customs and peculiarities in social hierarchy, legal formulae, weights and measures. This may be the separate development of different localities after 568 A. D., or quite probably the first clear evidence of deep local differences that the Romans could not have eradicated. It also shows that systematic reorganization of society by the Lombards was unlikely. Most of the peasantry, the bulk of the society was and remained Roman (*romani*). The Lombard settlement therefore did not produce a radical change in social structure.²⁴

The Lombards created a kingdom in Northern Italy and established themselves along the ridge of the Appenines , which stretch the whole length of the Italian peninsula, but were unable to take Rome or the coastal cities. The latter retained their ties to the imperial capital in Constantinople. But the Emperor could no longer guarantee the security of Rome, much less provide the forces necessary to drive the Lombards back. In this situation, the bishop

²³ Ibid, 42. See also Cristina La Rocca, "Public Buildings and Urban Change in northern Italy in the early Medieval Period, in *The City in Late Antiquity*, ed., John Rich (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 161-180.

²⁴ Ibid., 71. For a more detailed account of the impact of the Church see Gordon Griffiths, "The Italian City-State," in *The City-State in Five Cultures*, eds., Robert Grieffeth and Carol G. Thomas (California and England: ABC-Clio, 1981), 71-73.

of Rome began to exercise an increasingly important political role. To counter the Lombards, he called on the Franks , who defeated the Lombards and made the Lombard or 'Italic' kingdom part of the larger empire whose center was north of the Alps. As for the lands which the Pope had undertaken to administer and to defend, these were not returned to the possession of the eastern emperor, but became 'States of the Church,' stretching from sea to sea across the middle of the Italian peninsula and separating the north from the south. Upon the king of the Franks, the pope conferred the crown of a new Roman Empire of the West (Frankish Roman Empire) in 800 A. D., but the rulers of this 'Holy Roman Empire' were not Romans but Germans as of 919 A. D. and they were never able to obtain control of the whole peninsula.²⁵

Communes

Increased confidence motivated cities to become more bold and capitalize more fully on the animosities between the Empire and the papacy for the liberty and autonomy associated with the Era of Communes (1000-1250).²⁶

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism*, 11. For the transformation to the communes, see Waley, *The Italian City-Republics*, 32-34. He argues: The process involved three essential elements. In the first place the role of the 'law-worthy' men, the *boni homines*, had to be transformed by the setting up of a regularly instituted and permanent body among them as an executive for the citizens. The second element in the process was the gradual replacement of episcopal and other authority by the commune as the most important jurisdictional power within the city. The third element in the formation of a republican city-state was the acquisition of rights outside the city and the development of relations with other communes. This process, which gave momentum to the others,

The *commune* was an association of men bound together by an oath and common interests. They swore to aid and defend one another; they pooled their prestige and minute jurisdictions that they invested in their consuls.²⁷ Uprisings were not a necessary or immediate prelude to the *commune*, but they show clearly the force that civic identity began to take on once communes became autonomous political centers. That the principal heir to political power in the town was the bishop was a sign of the weakening of central authority in the early middle ages and of the discontinuity in institutions. From the ninth century onward, in the period of feudal particularism following the fission of the Carolingian dynasty, some bishops enjoyed this position by virtue of a royal grant of comital powers, though these were normally held by landed families, while some other bishops

involved the formation of new institutions -- administrative, military and diplomatic-- and conferred on the city an awareness of its individuality. Patriotism was above all the product of conflict. This third strand in the making of the commune as a state was interwoven with the second and was contemporaneous with it. Just as the judicial take-over from the bishop was a gradual process, so too was the winning of autonomy by the commune in its relations with the subject territory. 'the early 'submissions' by feudatories and rural or village communes were often made to the bishop as the recognized civic authority. Then there often followed a phase during which submissions were received jointly by the bishop and consuls. Ultimately the bishop was eliminated and the consuls acted on their own.

By that time the word *commune* was no longer merely an attributive, as in 'common counsel' or in deliberations 'in common', but a substantive in its own right, signifying the citizens or their assembly. This was the situation described by outside observers such as Otto of Freising and Benjamin of Tudela soon after the middle of the twelfth century. Both of these noted that the north Italian towns, under their consuls, were autonomous. 'The entire land is divided among the cities.'

²⁷ Lauro Martines, *Power and Imagination. City-States in Renaissance Italy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, 1988), 27.

exercised similar de facto rights in the absence of any other effective local authority. The authority of the bishop, however, was comparable with the sporadic survival of skeletal civic institutions. Certain arrangements of local importance had to be made wherever an urban community of any significance existed. These included the organization of defenses and in particular the allocation of the burden of keeping the town walls in adequate repair as well as other public works, and making of agreements affecting the local market. Certain ecclesiastical matters also called for discussion and settlement, among them sometimes the choice of the bishop himself as well as the more routine festivities and processions.²⁸

After the mid-tenth century civic consciousness and uprisings became more common. All the citizens of Verona came together to oppose Bishop Rather in 968 A. D. In 983, the Milanese expelled Archbishop Landulf II from the city and he had to make many concessions to the civic aristocracy to return.²⁹ There were other similar revolts such as those in Parma, Milan and Pavia and Ravenna. All of them were, at least in part, risings against what remained of imperial authority. They were local oppositions to the hegemony of the state. The strength of the Italian state had once been derived from its network of cities, but by Conrad II's reign the cities were the standard-bearers of local autonomy, more opposed to him than any other force in Italy. It is at this

²⁸ Waley, *The Italian City-Republics*, 1-2.

point that urban aristocracy detached itself most firmly from the state office-holding traditions of the rural aristocracy and began to direct its concerns exclusively to urban life. When it did so, the force of episcopal hegemony inside the city could not resist it for long; the combined landed power of the urban aristocracy was far greater than that of the bishop. Civic ideology in particular became entirely localized which formed the seeds of the communes.³⁰

One other occasion to exploit this schism between the Empire and the papacy came when Frederick Barbarossa (1152-1190) tried to restore imperial power, but his plan of installing an imperial governor (*podesta*) in each city provoked revolt in Lombard towns, led by the self-governing city of Milan (1160-1162). Milan was razed to the ground, but by 1167, a Lombard League, including a reconstructed Milan, had been formed with the support of Pope Alexander III. The Milanese and their allies defeated Frederick at Legnano in 1176 and forced him to sign a truce which became definitive in the Peace of Constance (25 June 1183). The Peace of Constance gave communes the right to nominate their own magistrates, to raise taxes, to make their own laws, and to try their subjects under their own laws but with the right of appeal to an imperial tribunal. In return, citizens were to swear loyalty to the emperor, and consular magistrates were to receive their investiture from him or from his

²⁹ Wickham, *Early Medieval Italy*, 190.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 191.

representative. By this peace, Italian communes which had been growing for a century in *de facto* political power, acquired *de jure* recognition.³¹ However, Legnano can be considered a victory for inter-Italian cooperation only in a limited sense. Although the battle cry of the Lombard League was “the Fatherland and Liberty”, what was understood by fatherland was the individual city-commune and by liberty its right to be independent and free from any form of coercion.³²

These examples of autonomy, in *castelli* and cities, by nobles, peasants, bishops and citizens were important features of Italian history in the late tenth-eleventh centuries. Italy was and is localised. Every different locality had its own history and individual dynamic. Wider forces like states, at least initially, were imposed on each of these localities from the outside. For each of the autonomous forces of the eleventh century, there was a long historical tradition. But the solidarity and cohesion of their ideologies were the product of the fall of the state, not its cause. In fact, apart from the times of their wars in Germany, the emperors of the eleventh century were plagued by four problems in Italy: (1) the rebelliousness of cities and mighty vassals, (2) a blazing reform movement directed against simonist clergy, (3) the resolute violence of papal factions and a riotous baronage in Rome, and (4) the

³¹ See Martines, *Power and Imagination*, 26; Griffiths, “The Italian City-State,” 79-80.

³² Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism*, 11.

menacing pressure in southern Italy of Byzantine and especially Norman armies.³³

The conception of a single people and a single state, the gens Langobardorum of Paul the Deacon, the regnum Italicum of Liutprand of Cremona, lasted as long as the state did. It is only after the state fell that they were replaced, in the minds of the Italian ruling classes, by the explicit affirmation of local loyalties. In another sense, though, it is at least not surprising that the Carolingian states fell before these new local forces. The Lombard and Carolingian states were monuments to the force of the ideology of the Roman Empire, for the four centuries after it vanished in the mid-sixth century.³⁴

The strongest force that allowed the kings to keep control of their kingdom was simply the consent of their aristocracies to the public ideal of the Roman state that their rulers nourished, and as a result of this consent, the landowning classes structured their political action around the state. The state patronage network was after all, extremely profitable to them. The fact that the state survived only through the consent of the upper classes was mirrored, too, in the equally important fact that the state barely ever made its presence felt among the different strata of the peasantry, the vast majority of society, except as a distant coercive force.

³³ Martines, *Power and Imagination*, 8.

The political settlement of the Lombard-Carolingian state was restricted to the aristocracy, and was largely irrelevant to everyone else. The most one could say would be that state control was more effective in northern Italy and Tuscany than in the South, or elsewhere in Europe, largely thanks to the complexity of north Italian cities and of the landownership around them, which enabled the state to exploit local rivalries and make interventions, and which lessened the possibility of any one family from gaining local control and seceding from the state. But local intervention required the use of politics of landowning, and this was not public, but private. The state exploited private links of dependence, but in doing so, it strengthened these links. At the crisis point, at the beginning of the tenth century, these links, based firmly on landholding proved themselves stronger than the public ideology of the state. In this sense, the tenth century saw a victory of localities over the state, for the private bonds of society, personal dependence, community and the coercion of the peasantry, were local ones. Even public institutions became localized now, in cities and *castelli*.³⁵ The ideology of the integrated state was replaced by the real force of local society. Italy was torn apart. The localities

³⁴ Wickham, *Early Medieval Italy*, 192.

³⁵ Woolf argues that "the triumph of the merchant-capitalists over the *popolo minuto* carried with it the destruction of the communes. Internally, the history of the communes is one: of perennial instability. The endemic struggles of guilds, factions and families had blocked the development of the bureaucratic and financial instruments of government and the transformation of the cities into states through the establishment of uniform administrations.", see Stuart

went their separate ways, fortified by a growing sense of their own separate identities.³⁶

Regional States and Gian Galeazzo of Milan

There were some attempts to create territorial states. The territorial state in northern Italy was, except in the case of the Venetian Republic, the creation of *signorie* (governments controlled by single families). The largest and the most enduring was established by the Visconti of Milan in the fourteenth century.³⁷

Gian Galeazzo Visconti (1378-1402) embarked upon a course of aggrandizement that came close to creating an Italian kingdom. However, Galeazzo could not pursue a centralistic course due to resistance. The Ordinances of Galeazzo issued in 1400 make clear that Galeazzo and his advisors were interested in the principles that should govern the relations between the central and local government. This comes out clearly in the following Ordinance: '*In matters concerning the Commune and the City, and not the State, (the lieutenant) shall let the citizens do as they wish in accordance with their own ordinances and customs.*' The explicit distinction between the State (*stato*) and the city seems to justify Burkhardt's famous assertion that something new in history had made its appearance: the State as a calculated

Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860. The Social Constraints of Political Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 17-18.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Griffiths, "The Italian City-State," 101.

conscious creation, as a work of art. The conception is restricted to the central government and the same restriction applies to the rest of Galeazzo's dominions, old and new. They were a collection of cities rather than a State in the modern sense. The only thing they shared was Gian Galeazzo himself. Each of the original 14 (eventually 20) cities under his dominion proclaimed him its Dominus (Signore). Each, like Siena, agreed in its contract with him that he might be represented by a lieutenant.

Gian Galeazzo did not attempt, as had rulers of Florence and Venice, to broaden the base of the central government at the expense of the cities. On the contrary, he sought to exercise power indirectly over the countryside through the cities. He did have a ducal chancery, and he did establish certain councils with competence over more than one city. However, such administrative institutions did not necessarily qualify even as embryonic elements of the modern centralized territorial state. To see Gian Galeazzo as the precursor of Napoleon is to overlook the work of the French Revolution. Galeazzo began the building of the cathedral of Milan which Napoleon carried to the completion, but Galeazzo never contemplated conferring common citizenship upon his various subjects, nor did he dream of giving his collection of cities a common legal code. To find his legislation, indeed, one must consult each city's collection of statutes. To have effect in all his dominions, an act of Galeazzo had to be enacted and registered among the statutes of each city separately.

As a result, the regime of signorie could not alter the basic parameters of the deadlock in Italian political development that had set in after the defeat of the project of a unitary imperial monarchy in the Hohenstaufen epoch.³⁸ The *communes* were structurally incapable of achieving the unification of the peninsula, because of the aptitude of their urban-commercial development. The *signorie* represented a political reassertion of the rural and seigneurial circumambiance within which they had always been invested. But no real social victory of the countryside over the towns was ever possible in Northern and Central Italy: the attractive strength of the cities was much too great, while the local landowning class never formed a cohesive feudal nobility with an ancestral tradition or *esprit de corps*. The lords who usurped power in the republics were frequently mercenaries, upstarts or adventurers, while others were elevated bankers or merchants. The sovereignty of *signorie* was consequently always in a deep sense illegitimate: it rested on recent force and personal fraud, without any collective social sanction in aristocratic hierarchy or duty behind it. The new princedoms had extinguished the civic vitality of the republican towns; but they could not rely on the loyalty or discipline of a seigneurialized countryside. The new princes were usually called city tyrants. Thus, despite their modernity of means and techniques, their famous inauguration of pure 'power politics' as such, the signorie were

³⁸ Hohenstaufen were the ruling family of Germany during 1138-1208 and of Sicily during 1194-1268.

in fact, inherently unable to generate the characteristic State form of the early modern epoch, a unitary Royal Absolutism.³⁹

Anderson sees the basic reason for the absence of any ascendant power in Italy to unify the peninsula in the premature development of mercantile capital in the North Italian cities, which prevented the emergence of a powerful reorganized feudal State at the national level. It was the wealth and vitality of the Lombard and Tuscan Communes which defeated the most serious effort to establish a unified feudal monarchy which could have provided the basis for a later Absolutism. The basic reason for the failure of the Hohenstaufen drive to unify the peninsula lay elsewhere- in the decisive economic and social superiority of Northern Italy, which had twice the population of the South and the overwhelming majority of the productive urban centers of trade and manufacture.⁴⁰ The Lombard and Tuscan towns proved strong enough to stifle any territorial regroupment on a rural-feudal basis. On the other hand, they were inherently incapable of achieving any peninsular unification themselves: merchant capital had no possibility of dominating a social formation of national dimensions at this date. Thus while

³⁹ Ibid, 162.

⁴⁰ Ibid. "It was the thriving Communes of Lombardy, Liguria and Tuscany which imported grain because of their advanced division of labor and demographic structure while the surpluses of the Mezzogiorno were conversely the sign of a thinly settled countryside."

the Lombard League could victoriously defend the North against imperial invasions, it was not itself capable of conquering the feudal South.⁴¹

This strong sense of localism has, of course, had important implications for the national integration process since it was a difficult task for the founders of the Italian nation-state to divert allegiances from these localities to the idea of the 'nation.' Both in the state-building and nation-building stages of national integration, this was the most difficult task to overcome. As a result, it has been a crucial factor in Italy's late unification as a modern nation-state in 1870, since it is very hard to talk about an Italian nationalism as compared to French nationalism. The idea of 'nation' was alien to the population that was strongly linked to the regional or local level of identification.

The Impact of the Church

In addition to the persistence of the local-regional culture and allegiances, a second and equally important factor has been the role of the Church in the Italian peninsula. Macchiavelli thought the national ills had all been caused solely by the Church and stated:

No province was ever united and prosperous unless it was under the sway of one republic or one monarch, as in the case of France and Spain. And the reason why Italy is not in this condition is none other than the Church, for the Church has never had the vigor to extend its sway over the whole

⁴¹ Ibid., 147.

country....The Church has kept us under slundry lords and princes. These have caused so much discord and debility that Italy has become the prey not only of powerful barbarians, but also of every assailant.⁴²

Perry Anderson agrees with this view stating that, "the universalist medieval institutions of the Papacy and the Empire acted to check the development of an orthodox territorial monarchy in both Italy and Germany. In Italy, the Papacy resisted any attempt at a territorial unification of the peninsula."⁴³

However, in the beginning of Lombard rule, that is, before the establishment of permanent boundaries between Lombard and Byzantine Italy, the political power of the bishops was rather weak. The Lombards, as well as the East Romans, primarily attacked the towns, and, as a consequence, bishops suffered from this. This was particularly true of central and southern Italy, where the bishops were faithful to the Pope. Furthermore, as local Roman leaders against the victorious Lombards, the bishops in central and southern Italy had large military and political responsibilities. Since the Lombards regarded these bishops as their military enemies, the episcopal organization suffered considerably in the south. In the north, where bishops accepted the Lombards, cooperated with the new kings and opposed the Pope, there were comparatively few episcopal vacancies. The basis for strong ecclesiastical organizations in the south was further weakened by new settlement patterns,

⁴² Luigi Barzini, *The Italians* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1964), 334.

⁴³ Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, (Great Britain: Verso, 1974), 143.

the evolution of hilltop villages, the abandonment and reconstruction of towns, the general regionalization of the economy, a hypothetical demographical decline and the fact that the episcopal towns in the south had often been merely large villages even before the Lombard attack. Gradually, as the Lombards underwent the process of territorialization and developed new social ties and new beliefs-particularly through the conversion to Christianity, which was mostly finished at the end of the seventh century -, the bishops regained much of their ideological importance. However, they were not institutionally attached to the kingdom.⁴⁴

During the Middle Ages Italy was divided into a great number of independent political entities that eventually coalesced into five major states-Naples, Florence, Rome, Venice and Milan-and several minor ones although none of them developed enough strength to conquer and unify the entire peninsula. Peculiar to Italy and marking its entire history was the Papal state, which the Popes considered essential to ensure their independence from secular rulers anxious to dominate the church. For centuries, the Popes battled the German-based Holy Roman Empire, which claimed Italy and the authority to intervene in Church affairs. The struggle between papacy and empire enabled the Italian states to remain independent.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Dick Harrison, *The Early State and the Towns: Forms of Integration in Lombard Italy AD 568-774* (Sweden: Lund University Press, 1993), 172-173.

The animosity between the Kings and the Popes in the eighth century was real, but it has been overemphasized. The kings were never religious enemies of the Popes. On the contrary, the Lombards seem to have supported the Popes, like Gregory II, against the Iconoclastic Byzantines. The problem was purely political: the kings rapidly conquered the remaining Byzantine territories, and, sooner or later, they would have to attack Rome. The Popes were against integration in the Italo-Lombard kingdom and tried in every way to oppose the king- by alliances with the emperors in Constantinople, the exarchs of Ravenna and the dukes of Naples, the dukes in Spoleto and Benevento, and kings of the Franks.⁴⁶

The bishops were not as powerful as they had been before the Lombard invasion and as they were to become. Their influence resulted from their ideological and social strength as Christian leaders and as the true representatives and incarnations of their towns. In southern and central Italy, many episcopal seats were vacant, but in the eighth century, several of them had been reoccupied, as in the duchy of Spoleto. The bishops had no functions as royal officials- there was no national church comparable to the one in Visigothic Spain -, but they did influence legislation. They were used as judges in certain courts, and at least some of them served in the army

⁴⁵ Spencer di Scala, *Italy: From Revolution to Republic, 1700 to the Present* (Boulder, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995), xix.

(although this was probably due to the bishop's own status as a free Lombard nobleman). The Pope was relatively weak, both ideologically and politically, although his influence was definitely growing. His hypothetical influence should have been greatest in his own metropolitan province of Tuscany as well as in central and southern Italy.⁴⁷

The Church claimed title to Rome and States of the Church that cut the peninsula in two. The Papacy opposed the German emperor's hegemonic ambitions and it fought any initiative in Italy which might lead to a national state. For instance, even though the Papacy encouraged the cities of Lombardy to organize the Lombard League against the invasions of Frederick Barbarossa, after victory, it maneuvered against its perpetuation out of fear that the League might become an agency for transpeninsula cooperation, which would jeopardize the Church's dominant position and temporal power.

The period 875-1024 witnessed political and institutional change in northern Italy. As the Carolingian Empire started to decline, some practices were introduced that would change the local-center relations. King Berengar, for the first time in Italy, needed to give systematic gifts in order to gain and maintain support from the notables of the kingdom. The great bulk of them

⁴⁶ Harrison, *The Early State and the Towns*, 209.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 222.

(*incastellamento* charters) were to the Church, above all to the bishops. This fits the Carolingian practice of balancing the power of counts and bishops, for counts controlled the military clienteles over which Berengar had lost authority. Bishops, however, were themselves by now not politically weak; they had their own followings of tenants and vassals and their vast lands. Berengar's concessions and those of his successors tipped the balance decisively and permanently in favor of bishops. This was most visible in cities. Bishops began to be conceded full comital powers in their cities, restricting counts to the countryside.⁴⁸

By the end of the century, the bishops were dominant in most of the cities of Emilia and the Veneto and in many cities of Lombardy. Only those of Piedmont and Tuscany remained predominantly lay. In time, the whole structure of comital power in northern Italy ceded away. Cities were in the

⁴⁸"Bishops intruded into the discussion either because the Roman Church limited the use of the term *city* to those places that were the seats of bishops, or because Bartolus recognized that the city magistrates of his day were the heirs of a jurisdiction that had once belonged to bishops. Bishops originally established their headquarters in the cities (*civitates*) of the Roman Empire. When civil government broke down during the Lombard or Frankish period, bishops undertook its responsibilities, often receiving or assuming the authority of a secular count. This meant that spiritual administration of the diocese was combined with secular administration of the county (*contado*). The boundaries of the two jurisdictions tended to coincide, and both were administered from the city which was the capital of both. In the eleventh century, however, this dual administration came to an end. The bishop was deprived of his secular administration, his place was taken by the *commune*, under magistrates called *consuls*. These new officials did not confine their activity to business within the city walls but assumed jurisdiction over the *contado* as well." Griffiths, "The Italian City-State." 77.

hands of the bishops. Even in the countryside, comital authority was undermined by immunities for Church lands and increasingly for *castelli*, which were becoming autonomous bases for completely new concentrations of authority and lordship.⁴⁹

The consequences of this transfer of authority were complex and in the long run, dangerous for the state, because society became more localized. The tenth-century kings were doubtless aware of this but regarded the risk worth taking. By making concessions, they could attach loyalties of the new local powers to their own persons. Berengar and his successors certainly prevented one development: that of the hemorrhage of public power into the hands of the secular aristocracy, as occurred in France. Cities and *castelli* were the independent foci of public authority, though in *castelli* this authority was becoming privatized in the hands of lay owners. Power in the countryside was thus too fragmented to offer an alternative to that of the bishop in the cities.⁵⁰ Kings, having granted this power to bishops, were often asked to confirm it in successive reigns; their authority was still recognized. Berengar may not have been able to prevent the collapse of the state, but at least he could, through his grants, determine, into whose hands his authority was

⁴⁹ Wickham, *Early Medieval Italy*, 175.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 174.

devolved. Bishops in this respect, were undoubtedly more reliable than the counts.⁵¹

Cities were the best centers for the survival of the public relationships of free society. Bishops were not able, for the most part, to maintain a private hegemony over urban society in the North; it was too socio-economically complex and the sources of power there were too strong. It is doubtful that a reasonably prosperous city (as nearly all the cities in the North were) could ever have passively become the private possession of a lay family as they did in the South, even if the counts had kept control of their cities. In 1014, the citizens of Mantua obtained a diploma from Henry II recognizing their public rights and properties and giving them immunity against all lay officials and bishops. Mantua was not a city that had ever received an episcopal immunity, and its counts were the members of the house of Canossa, the most influential family in the kingdom, who used the city as a major base. Nevertheless, its citizens had retained enough sense of their coherence to resist the Canossa and obtain this text, and they were even sufficiently aware of their public position to call themselves *arimanni*. The granting of rights to bishops elsewhere may have created the problem of the political separation of the countryside from the city; for the first time in Italy the restriction of counts to

⁵¹ Ibid, 176.

the countryside and the fragmentation of rural authority created a strong rural aristocracy with judicial rights.⁵²

The Church was particularly successful in Italy because of the broad identification of its vision of society with that of the ruling groups. If, at the political level, it had been forced to accept its role as a separate, albeit autonomous, organization from the secular polity, it remained intimately linked by multiple ties to the various nobilities and oligarchies of Italy. The Jesuits had replaced the humanists in the education of the noble young. The ecclesiastical hierarchy continued to be recruited from patrician families. Granting of benefices, lay control of nomination of priests to churches and the appointment of administrators of charitable institutions, were instances of the continuous, close links between ecclesiastical authorities and secular oligarchies. However separate as an organization, the Church confirmed and reinforced the aristocratic ideology of society, from its affirmation of the sovereign as the earthly manifestation of divine majesty and its hierarchical

⁵² Ibid. "The tendency of the Italian city to extend its authority to the borders of its *contado* has been seen as a typically Italian phenomenon to be contrasted with the government of the countryside in Europe north of Alps. There, despite the developing towns, control of the countryside generally remained in the hands of a rural and feudal nobility or fell under the control of a territorial prince or national monarch. The same might be said of the duchy of Savoy or the kingdom of Naples. But whereas in northern and central Italy, the claims of a higher authority were eventually reduced to a nullity by the contention between empire and papacy, the city gained sovereignty over the countryside."

structuring of religious ceremonies and processions to its homilies to the humble on the duties of respect, obedience and resignation.⁵³

Possession of land and exemption from taxes or fiscal privilege thus formed the basis of noble and ecclesiastical wealth. It was augmented by the exaction of seigniorial and ecclesiastical rights. The structure of Italy's feudal past survived in countless forms, from the emperor's claim to suzerainty over northern and central Italy and the pope's similar claims over the kingdom of Naples, to the survival of minute independent fiefs which constellated every area of Italy and impeded attempts to impose centralized, uniform administrative structures. These feudal legacies sometimes offered protection to the peasants, in the form of commonlands or grazing rights, or fixed dues paid for virtually perpetual leases received by ancestors in previous centuries.⁵⁴

The Church was thus open to attack. However, its influence and penetration of Italian society remained profound. The very number of clerics bears witness to its attraction: there were over 20.000 priests in Piedmont in the mid-eighteenth century, 40.000 in Venetia, over 10.000 in the duchy of Modena, 11.000 in the kingdom of Naples, perhaps a majority of the 160.000

⁵³ Stuart Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860. The Social Constraints of Political Change*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 22.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 47.

inhabitants of the city of Rome. The Church offered security, the possibility of a career, at least the advantage of a benefice.⁵⁵

By far the greatest juridical problem facing the communes was that of their relationship with ecclesiastical power. The rivalry of Church and State is of course a major historical theme throughout western Europe since the eleventh century, when the Church, under papal leadership, first stated and pressed its claim for separateness and independence. The same drama which involved the Emperor Henry and Gregory VII, Henry II of England and Thomas Becket, Philip Augustus and Innocent III, was played out with no less spirit on the myriad stages of communal Italy.

Since the commune was in some respects the legatee of Episcopal authority in the cities, the relations of the twin powers were from the beginning inevitably difficult, involving several juridical precedents and boundary problems. As the commune's reach extended into the countryside, where the bishop always held considerable lands and seigniorial rights, clashes were bound to become more serious and frequent.

The situation of the communes vis-a-vis the Church was the same as that of contemporary monarchies and the *casus belli* were similar. One ground for dispute was Episcopal and monastic lordship in the *contado* and the

commune's claim to exact military service and taxation from the bishop's or abbot's men. Particularly sensitive was the status of newly acquired rights; some communes legislated to prevent more land and men from passing into ecclesiastical hands. A city might also attempt to assert its control by ordering a monastic house to acquire property within its walls as a pledge; this was the origin of a bitter quarrel in the twelfth century between Lodi and the papacy. The whole question of the rival jurisdiction of ecclesiastical law courts and those of the commune was supremely fruitful in disputes. The principal points at issue were jurisdiction in suits involving clerics as well as laymen and such controversial matters as usury, which might concern important secular interests as well as ecclesiastical law. There was less argument in cases involving indisputable clerics or such undeniably ecclesiastical matters as testamentary or marital law, yet a rich crop of controversial circumstances survived around the dubious claimant to clerical privilege or the question of appeals from the spiritual to the secular courts, not to mention the bishop's seigniorial jurisdiction.⁵⁶

The Papal style of government did little to foster a common sense of citizenship among its constituent communities, as Pius VII recognized frankly in the Preamble to his administrative reforms of 1816: "Our state still lacked that uniformity which is so useful to public and private interests, since,

⁵⁵ Ibid., 49.

⁵⁶ Waley, *The Italian City-Republics*, 55-57.

formed by the successive reunion of different dominions, it presented an aggregate of naturally diverse usages, laws, and privileges."⁵⁷

What seems certain is that the attitude of the Church was critical in determining the extent and nature of regional sentiment. The strength and direction of regionalism was largely the outcome of the triangular relationship between the Church, the government and the landowning and urban elites.⁵⁸ It is important to note that the ecclesiastical organization was not something imposed forcefully and alien to the Italian society. Some historians ironically argue that the Church was an important actor in the formation of the modern state in Italy, because it laid the basic infrastructure that was important for the birth of the modern state.⁵⁹

North-South Duality: The "Two Italies"

Historical reasons

Perhaps the most important obstacle that the founders of the Italian state had to tackle was the deeply-imbedded duality between the historical and

⁵⁷ Adrian Lyttelton, "Shifting Identities: Nation, Region and City," in Carl Levy ed., *Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics* (Oxford and Washington D.C.: Berg, 1996), 35.

⁵⁸ Lyttelton, "Shifting Identities," 37.

⁵⁹ See Pierangelo Schiera, "Legitimacy, Discipline and Institutions: Three Necessary Conditions for the Birth of the Modern State," in *The Origins of the Italian State*, ed., Julius Kirshner, 13; Roberto Bizzochi, "Church, Religion and State in the Early Modern Period," in *The Origins of the Italian State*, 154.

cultural traditions of the northern and southern parts of Italy. One explanation for this duality has been the geographical peculiarity of Italy, which caused two different histories and cultures to flourish in the same peninsula.

In several studies on medieval history, it is very common to speculate on the assumed fundamental difference between Romans and “barbarians”. The main issues of consideration were whether the Romans were completely subordinated to the invaders, or whether the invaders allowed the Romans to keep their laws, or how this tension between these two groups was perceived. Even today this difference between these two groups are of major interest to students of Italy.

According to this line of reasoning, the Italo-Lombard Kingdom was based upon the Langobardorum, the Germanic Lombard tribe, that had conquered Italy and kept it under its dominance partly by stressing their tribal identity as such. Ethnicity was, in other words, an integrating force. The importance of ethnicity, as well as its function in society, has been evaluated in different ways. Delogu regards ethnicity as one of the main reasons why the kingdom eventually disappeared. According to Delogu, traditional Lombard ethnicity was, also after conversion to Christianity, structurally opposed to many elements of Italian life: Christianity (and official Catholicism in particular),

romanization, new values and the like. This resulted in internal tensions (such as rebellions) and a general lack of political cohesion.⁶⁰

Tabacco also regards ethnicity as a determining factor in Italo-Lombard history. According to Tabacco, even in the eighth century Lombard society was firmly based on the military sphere and thus on soldiers. The soldiers were mainly descendants of the original Lombards (although some Romans had been assimilated with the invaders). There was no contradiction between the new socio-economic groups and the old tribal structure, since the landowning stratum identified itself as constituting the Lombard tribe. Tabacco does not perceive this system as detrimental to state and society; at least, he does not emphasize the tensions in the same way as Delogu does.⁶¹

Similar ideas are found in works by Gasparri, according to whom specific Lombard ethnicity constituted the backbone of, as well as the reason for, the Italo-Lombard kingdom until the end of the seventh century, when the conversion to Christianity and the economic differentiation made the landowners (*possessores*) the new basis of society. The explicit difference between Lombards and Romans was followed by the difference between rich and poor. However, several old traditions remained intact, although within a

⁶⁰ Cited in Dick Harrison, *The Early State and the Towns: Forms of Integration in Lombard Italy AD 568-774* (Sweden: Lund University Press, 1993).

⁶¹ Ibid.

Christian framework, and the social differences of the eighth century were interpreted in ethnic terms.⁶²

The historical basis of the duality we are concerned with can be identified as the Lombard-Roman tension. When the Roman Empire was dismantled the northern part of Italy was controlled by the Lombards. Thus being a Roman was something very different from being a Lombard, or Langobard.⁶³ The Lombard identity was strong even in the ancient times and a good example of it was revealed in the memoirs of the bishop of Cremona, Liutprand. Liutprand explains that when he served as deacon and ambassador, on one occasion, the Byzantine Emperor Nicephorus, angered by something, called Liutprand, "not a Roman but a Langobard". The bishop countered this by pointing out how the story of Roman origins was one of fratricide, homicide, corruption and evil and that the worst possible insult, would, in fact, was to be called a Roman.⁶⁴ Thus what emerges in the tenth and eleventh centuries is a centering of interest in the north and a distrust of Rome and the South.

The Lombard League was the most prominent of a series of provincial or regional units, based around established and quasi-independent urban

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ The historical usage of the word Lombard is Langobard.

centers. To a larger degree, however, these urban leagues hark back to the Roman administrative organization of Italy and mark a resurgence of regional identity rather than of ethnic or other cultural roots. In effect, the emergence of the Lombard League had nothing to do with Langobard ethnicity. Indeed, the terms “league” and “regional state” are misnomers, since their internal cohesion was weak, and allegiance was primarily to one or more dominant city or noble family such as the Visconti of Milan.⁶⁵ Thus it is probably fair to argue that by the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the term Lombardia was merely a memorial to the last Langobard state. Its people, its culture and its architecture could trace links back to the former Germanic nation, but by the time of Frederick, the terms Lombard and Langobard must be seen as totally different labels.

However, Harrison rejects ethnicity as an integrating force in the way it was interpreted by others and argues that ethnicity of the early Middle Ages was not perceived in an objective way since the peoples of that time were rather heterogenous units grouped around a core of nobility, which defined the tribe and carried its tradition. Moreover, he argues, even though some scholars argue that the Lombards lived separately from the Romans, there are

⁶⁴ Liutprand, *Relatio*, ch. 12, in MGH, SS Rer. Ger., ed. J. Becker (Hanover and Leipzig, 1915, 182-93. Cited in Neil Christie, *The Lombards: The Ancient Langobards* (Oxford, U.K. and Cambridge, U.S.A: Blackwell, 1995), 225.

⁶⁵ W. F. Butler, *The Lombard Communes: A History of the Republics of North Italy* (London: 1906), 127-158; Tabacco, *The Struggle for Power in Medieval Italy*, 295-320, cited in *The Lombard Communes*, 225.

no actual traces of distinct ethnic quarters in towns or distinct Lombard areas of rural habitation.⁶⁶

Robert Putnam traces back the roots of civic traditions in both parts of Italy and tries to explain the reasons for this duality.⁶⁷ He argues that two strikingly distinctive political regimes, both innovative and both destined to have far-reaching social, economic and political consequences, appeared around 1100 in separate parts of the peninsula. In the south, after the breakdown of the Byzantine government, a powerful Norman kingdom built upon Byzantine and Arab foundations emerged. In the north, on the other hand, the attempts to revive the imperial power proved futile and local particularisms triumphed all over again. Here the communes became city-states and this area was ultimately called communal Italy.⁶⁸

Even though economically, the southern towns such as Palermo, Bari, Amalfi, Naples, Messina were well-off like their northern counterparts, in its social and political arrangements, the South was strictly autocratic. This pattern of authority was imposed by Frederick II's reforms. The highly centralized character of the kingdom prevented effective self-government by cities. Thus,

⁶⁶ Harrison, *The Early State*, 43, 48.

⁶⁷ Putnam et al., *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).

even though the Southern towns showed some signs of desire for self-government, they were soon incorporated by a network of central and local officials responsible only to the king. The barons and the townsmen were controlled by the royal administration and the civic lives of artisans and merchants were regulated from the center. Therefore, any glimmerings of communal autonomy was extinguished from the very beginning.⁶⁹ The regime remained a feudal monarchy even under the successive Spanish and French rules.

In the north, there was a completely different evolution. The anarchy that was endemic to all Europe was also prevalent in the north as well as in the south. However, the reaction was somehow different in the North. The remedy was sought less on vertical hierarchy, but more on the horizontal collaboration.⁷⁰ As a result, communes were formed through voluntary associations, groups of neighbors and the like, which had no connection with the public institutions of the old regime. Soon, these groups, with strong civic patriotism already mentioned, began to press for broader political reform which would secure order in their respective cities.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 121-122, J. K. Hyde, *Society and Politics in Medieval Italy: The Evolution of Civil Life 1000-1350* (London: Macmillan, 1973), 38.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 123.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 124.

The civic consciousness in the north was revealed by the organization of the Lombard League founded between Verona, Vicenza, Padua and Treviso in Northern Italy. Three years later this coalition was strengthened by the adherence of another league comprising Brescia, Bergamo, Mantua and Cremona, once the Emperor's closest Lombard ally. Other cities, including Milan, Ferrara and the main communes of Emilia (Parma, Modena and Bologna) joined at the same time.

The Lombard League's military successes forced the Emperor to modify his aims in northern Italy. After the Treaty of Constance (1183) Frederick resigned himself to a policy of compromise with the Lombard cities and the terms of an agreement reached with Milan in 1185 read in many respects like a settlement between equal powers. Mutual engagements were made, the Emperor promising that 'we shall maintain the city of Milan and aid . . . the Milanese to maintain all their possessions and rights' and that 'we shall make no alliance with any city, place or person of Lombardy, the March (of Treviso) or Romagna except with the consent of the Milanese'. The effect of the military struggle was naturally to sharpen the citizens' awareness of their constitutional singularity. Something of this enters into the reported speeches of the City representatives at Ferrara in 1177, of which we may accept the purport if not the exact words. These orators spoke of imperial 'persecution', of 'the Emperor's oppression of Italy and the freedom of the Church'. The aim of the cities was 'never to relinquish that liberty which [they] inherited

from [their] fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers': '[they] would rather meet a glorious death with liberty, than live a wretched life in servitude'.⁷¹

Economic Reasons

By the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the cities of northern and central Italy, as much as the countryside, had already acquired that characteristic physiognomy of towers and civic buildings, of markets and an economic battle which amazed all foreign visitors and distinguished Italy from the rest of Europe. In a feudal world, with their universalistic ideals of Church and Empire and the supremacy of their merchants in their respective communes, independent city states in northern Italy imposed themselves on Europe because of an undeniable economic hegemony, soon accompanied by a cultural superiority.⁷² Intimately associated with civic republicanism was a rapid growth in commerce. As civil order was established, the northern merchants expanded their trading networks, first in the regions around each city-state and then gradually further. The prosperity produced by trade helped, in turn, to shape and sustain the civic institutions of the city-republics.

⁷¹ Ibid., 92-23.

⁷² Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 14-15.

Unlike the wealth of the Sicilian kingdom, based on land, the growing prosperity of the northern Italian city-states was rooted in finance and commerce.⁷³ Contractual arrangements and the extension of credits were prominent features of the commercial activity in towns of north and central Italy in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

Thus by the beginning of the fourteenth century, there were two patterns of governance in the same peninsula with their associated cultural features- the Norman feudal aristocracy in the South and communal republicanism in the North.⁷⁴ In the south, *Pax* was to be secured by the preservation of the kingdom from those changes and tensions which were tearing northern and central Italy apart. Thus the independent commune was seen as the principal enemy. Against the danger to the existing order posed by the towns the monarchy looked to traditional allies, first to the Sicilian Church and second and above all, to the nobility.

In the North, feudal bonds of personal dependence were weakened; in the South they were strengthened. In the North, people were citizens, in the South they were subjects, Legitimate authority in the North was only delegated by the community to public officials, who remained responsible to those with whose affairs they were entrusted. Legitimate authority in the

⁷³ Lerner, *Italy in the Age of Dante and Petrarch*, 187.

South was monopolized by the king, who although he might delegate administrative tasks to officials and might confirm the nobles in their privileges, was responsible only to God. In the North, while religious sentiments remained profound, the Church was also a powerful and wealthy proprietor in the feudal order. In the North, the crucial social, political and even religious allegiances and alliances were horizontal, while those in the South were vertical. Collaboration, mutual assistance, civic obligation and even trust were the distinguishing features in the North. The chief virtue, in the south, by contrast, was the imposition of hierarchy and order on latent anarchy."⁷⁵

As a result two different societies and ways of life faced each other in the same peninsula. "The one, authoritative, romantic, employing all the learning of the present to preserve the venerable practices of the past; the other individualistic, violent, often squalid, creating the world of the future."⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 130.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 130.

⁷⁶ Larner, *Italy in the Age of Dante and Petrarch*, 29.

CHAPTER III

THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN NATIONALISM IN ITALY

Despite the background factors that acted as potential obstacles in the way of forming a modern nation-state, Italy, nevertheless, did not remain unaffected from the revolutionary wave that swept away the whole of Europe after the French Revolution in 1789. As a result of the impact of the revolution, Italy took its place among the other European states as a unified, centralized, and modern nation-state in 1870, a process that, as noted, is referred to as *Risorgimento* (Resurrection or Revival)¹. It was a critical period when important transformations had taken place in Italy-the collapse of the ancien regime, the development of a parliamentary system, the breakdown of the traditional rural society and the birth of a modern urban life, the transition from a feudal to a capitalist economy and the replacement of local or regional

¹ Edgar Holt defines *Risorgimento* as "the process by which Italians belatedly conquered freedom from foreign domination, unity under one law and one government, relative liberty for the people, and a cautious parliamentary regime." Edgar Holt, *The Making of Italy 1815-1870* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 2.

identities by a single national culture.² Thus with Risorgimento a modern state was to be established in all respects.³

The Napoleonic Prelude to Unification (1789-1848): The Rise of Nationalist Tendencies

Italian nationalism did not exist as a political reality before 1796. The Italian Jacobins were the first to talk of the creation of a united Italy as a concrete political project and their concept of the nation was derived from the French Revolution. For the French revolutionaries, the nation was not a given; it had to be created. The historical heritage was irrelevant, even dangerous. In the Italian case, the crisis of the ancien regime was associated with conflicts over reforms, the attempts to raise revenue through increased taxation and the

² Lucy Riall, *The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society and National Unification* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 1.

³ Other works on Italian Risorgimento include J. A. Davis ed., *Gramsci and Italy's Passive Revolution*, (London, 1979), Denis Mack Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860: A Study in Political Conflict*, (Cambridge, 2nd ed., 1985), A. W. Salomone ed., *Italy from Risorgimento to Fascism. An Inquiry into the Origins of the Totalitarian State*, (New York, 1970), P. Bevilacqua, *Breve Storia dell'Italia Meridionale dall'ottocento a oggi* [The History of Southern Italy from 1800 to today], (Rome, 1993), D. Beales, *The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy*, (London, 2nd edn. 1981), J. A. Davis and Paul Ginsborg (eds.), *Society and Politics in the Age of the Risorgimento. Essays in Honour of Denis Mack Smith*, (Cambridge, 1991), C. Cingari, *Mezzogiorno e Risorgimento. La Restaurazione a Napoli dal 1821 al 1830* [The South and Risorgimento (Resurrection). The Restoration in Naples from 1821 to 1830], (Bari, 1970).

Church and nobility which resented the attack on their special privileges and position in the political hierarchy.⁴

Thus the outbreak of the revolution in France was greeted in many parts of the Italian peninsula with enthusiasm and keen anticipation. The Revolution and its aftermath accelerated Italian thinking on liberation and unification. The impact of the French revolution and the Napoleonic era upon the evolution of Italian nationalism can be analyzed in two phases. In the first phase, the impact was positive for the flourishing of nationalist ideas, in the second phase it was negative, since it nourished reaction.

French nationalism was suitable for transplantation into Italy, where the historical basis for a political concept of nationality was lacking. The adoption of this concept was also facilitated by a shift in the meaning of the word *patria* (motherland) and its derivatives. Originally used in a neutral sense to refer to a person's place of birth, or, at most, the state of which one was a subject, it became charged with a new political significance. The *patria* could only be an association of free citizens, and a patriot was someone who worked for the cause of freedom against despotism. Paradoxically, it was the universality of the new idea of patriotism which prepared the ground for a new idea of the

⁴ Riall, *The Italian Risorgimento*, 11.

nation, because it implied a refusal of the legitimacy of the existing absolutist states.⁵

Not only did the French bring something positive to Italy, but in time the high taxes which they imposed and which Napoleon's wars made necessary, generated a strong opposition which took place in the development of national consciousness whereas the reformers of the eighteenth century had worked happily in the context of enlightened despotism, this generation and the next were open to much more radical aspirations of political liberty; and a causal chain was to lead from ideas of popular sovereignty to those of Italian patriotism. Filippo Buonarroti, a Tuscan radical who in the 1790s became a Frenchman by adoption, belonged to those who talked this new language of popular sovereignty. He and the more progressive among Italian Jacobins were able to glimpse at some possibility of a unified peninsula, and the detached position of exiles sometimes enabled them to see more clearly the relation between their own home provinces and the Italian nation at large.⁶

The propaganda for the new ideas of the French Revolution was effective because the victories of Bonaparte's armies demonstrated the weakness and

⁵ Adrian Lyttelton, "The National Question in Italy," in *The National Question in Europe*, eds., Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 63.

vulnerability of the old states and created a political vacuum. Austria was expelled from Lombardy, and it soon became clear that the other states of northern and central Italy retained their independence only on French sufferance. One response to the crisis of the old states was the resurgence of old municipal aspirations to 'liberty'. But this, curiously, created a base for unitarianism: the call for a united Italy found its greatest response in provincial cities like Brescia and Reggio Emilia, where it was seen as a way of challenging the hegemony of the old capitals (Venice and Modena).

The most important discussion of the national question took place in the context of a literary competition organized under the supervision of the French as the occupying power in Lombardy. The famous *concorso* announced in September 1796 offered a prize for the best essay on the question *Quale dei governi liberi meglio convenga alla felicità dell'Italia* (Which form of free government is best adapted to the happiness of Italy).⁷ The winner of the competition, Melchiorre Gioia rejected federalism and took the 1795 French

⁶ Denis Mack Smith, *The Making of Italy 1796-1866* (Hong Kong: MacMillan, 1968), 6.

⁷ "In 1796, after Napoleon's successful invasion of Piedmont and Lombardy, the French-dominated administration at Milan offered a prize for an essay on what type of government would best suit Italy. The circumstances of the competition dictated that their general tone would be solidly pro-French and anti-Austrian, pro-republican and anti-monarchic. Some contributors interpreted 'Italy' as meaning just what they called "the Lombard nation", other, even when they included the whole peninsula, left Sicily out

Constitution as his model. However, he rejected violent revolution as a method. Unity should only be achieved gradually, through the spontaneous imitation of the positive example set by the republic in the liberated territories. This program did not preclude the possibility of compromise with the existing Italian states, and it did not arouse fears of the Directory that the adoption of a radical program in Italy might favor the revival of Jacobin extremism in France itself. Gioia, who became one of Italy's leading economists, can be seen as a link between the native Enlightenment tradition of practical, modernizing reform and the new Jacobin patriotism. Gioia rejected federalism, because it would merely perpetuate those local differences which would weaken the Republic. It was the task of the legislator to destroy harmful and obsolete local prejudices by a uniform system of laws, and thereby create the new customs which would give a moral basis to the new state.⁸ Another reason why Gioia rejected federalism was that federalism would provide insufficient guarantees for national security. The example of Switzerland, invoked by federalists, was misleading because Italy lacked the protection given by the former's mountainous terrain. Exposed to the constant threat of invasion by more powerful neighbors, Italy needed a political system capable of reacting with more

etc...Nevertheless, there was a clear assumption that some kind of Italian nation existed, or ought to exist." See Smith, *The Making of Italy*, 13.

⁸ Lyttelton, "The National Question in Italy," 65.

rapidity and decision.⁹ Thus the idea of a united and single state was the most important contribution of the Napoleonic period in Italy.

Although new ideas had taken root throughout the peninsula, they flourished most in these provinces that composed a single state, under the name of the Kingdom of Italy. Bonaparte had decided to make several million Italians into Frenchmen. First the Piedmontese, then the Genoese, then the Tuscans and finally the Romans. An artificial line now separated populations who intended by their topographical position, by their language and common origin, by nature itself to form a single nation. Bonaparte imagined he could level the Alps, or rather transport them to his arbitrary line of demarcation by

⁹ Ibid. Smith quotes Gioia on the possibility of a federal solution: "Anyone who has analyzed political communities and knows how avid they are for esteem, how sensitive to contempt, how ready to take alarm, how difficult to reconcile, how fertile in ruses, obstinate in their scheming yet limited in aims, will readily conclude that a confederation of various political bodies with separate existences, laws of their own and local interests, is inevitably slow when it comes to planning, slower still when it comes to carrying plans out, and only too ready for disagreement. Each member of the confederation will consult its own interests only, will put aside thoughts for the future, will exalt its own contribution regardless of that of the others, will shut its eyes to the general good, and hence will inevitably oppose decisions lacking immediate advantage to itself...If Italy were divided into a number of federal republics, the seaboard cities would have already fallen to an invader before the general Italian congress had decided what to do." In addition to these remarks, Gioia also argues that Italy has almost always been invaded by foreign powers which have "violated their rights...and made themselves as the masters of their estate. Thus in her opinion, "...it is therefore best to provide her (Italy) with the sort of government capable of opposing the maximum of resistance to invasion. That government is beyond question a unitary republic: vis unita fortior. Smith, *The Making of Italy* 14.

a single decree. This led to an entirely novel phenomenon. Beside the same river, in the same country, the national language was encouraged on one bank and proscribed on the other. To speak of the independence of Italy was a crime in Parma, a virtue in Modena. The whole of French Italy was full of people who were French employees, from the prefect to the lowliest tax collector. Italian conscripts were used to fill up the ranks of the French regiments.¹⁰

The Kingdom of Italy that was made up by Napoleon, meanwhile was governed in an entirely different way. Bonaparte preserved its language, created a national army and a military spirit, appointed people of the country to all official posts, and indeed left no foreigner there except the Viceroy. Men of great ability found themselves at the head of affairs, and this lent great impetus to the national spirit. They directed education and guided the growing generation. Young men learned the use of arms, the arts were encouraged, monuments worthy of ancient Romans were erected and the national language and literature were cultivated with enthusiasm.

The inhabitants of different provinces, separated hitherto not by distance but by their customs, by the old cleavage between themselves, and the

government, began to know one another better and perceive one another as members of the same nation. From year to year, from day to day, this union became more intimate, these feelings grew in strength, these hopes became more general. Forced to obey the ruling power, which at that time seemed irresistible, they preferred to submit to the French ruler than to the French nation. Forced to fight for a foreign cause, they consoled themselves with the thought that they were practicing for the day when they would be fighting for their own independence... These were the ideas prevailing in Italy when in 1812, Bonaparte's star began to pale.¹¹

However, the real intentions of France were different and the Directorate saw the uses of Italian patriotism as purely instrumental. Prior to 1796, they did not recognize an Italian question, only an Austrian question and even after Bonaparte's conquests they valued the acquisition of Italian territory above all as a means of bringing pressure on Austria to make peace and concede the Rhine frontier. Therefore, Italian unity would be an inconvenient obstacle to this policy. Realists argued that it was in any case in France's long-term interest to keep Italy weak, divided and dependent. At first, it suited Bonaparte to give a greater degree of encouragement to the cause of Italian liberty and independence, as part of a personal policy designed to free

¹⁰ Smith, *The Making of Italy*, 21.

himself from the restrictions which the Directorate would have liked to impose on his sphere of action. But for him too the Italian patriots were a tool which should not be allowed to interfere with the requirements of realpolitik, or his own personal ambition. This became obvious with the Treaty of Campoformio (18 October 1797) which surrendered Venice to Austria.¹² This can be regarded as the turning point when Italian enthusiasm for the French turned from positive to negative.

The discordance between the French propaganda and French policy created a paradoxical situation. The first had encouraged the ideal of a free and united nation; the second was an obstacle to its realization. Italian patriots were forced either to redefine their aims or to contest their patrons. Thus patriots were torn between admiration for French models and the need to assert Italian autonomy and independence. For a long time, the terms of the national question in Italy were to be essentially defined by this dilemma. The easiest way out was through a reaffirmation of Jacobin ideals.¹³ Smith argues:

Italians were perhaps the first people of Europe to realize the falsity of the revolutionary doctrines and repudiate them, while trying to derive some benefit from the great upheaval. There were many men in Italy, cultured, judicious and high-minded, who had desired change only in the hope of liberating their

¹¹ Ibid., 21.

¹² Lyttelton, "The National Question in Italy," 66.

¹³ Ibid, 66.

country and saving it from being eternally the theater of war between other nations. These men were soon disgusted by the excesses of the revolutionaries; relinquishing their democratic dreams and false ideas of exaggerated liberty, they decided to make use of prevailing conditions to wipe out old divisions and awaken a sense of patriotism.¹⁴

At the same time, disappointment opened the door for Italy's most articulate writers and inspired poets who continued the tradition of intellectuals' commitment to the national cause. They were singularly responsible for the growth of cultural nationalism and its escalation into political nationalism.¹⁵

In sharp contrast with the liberal ideas that he defended, there was no place for national self-determination in Napoleon's imperial vision. The Kingdom of Italy was allowed to annex new territory, in the Veneto, the Tyrol and the Marche; but the smaller independent states were absorbed piecemeal into the French Empire. They were governed directly from Paris by French prefects.¹⁶ Napoleon was a unifier by temperament and conviction. This was apparent in the program he had sketched out for the Republic of Italy when he became its president: "You have only particular laws and you need general laws. Your people has only local customs and it is necessary that you acquire

¹⁴ Smith, *The Making of Italy*, 21.

¹⁵ Ronald S. Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism. From its Origins to World War II* (Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger, 1990), 46.

¹⁶ Lyttelton, , "The National Question in Italy," 70.

national habits.”¹⁷ In fact, not just the Kingdom of Italy, but all the territories directly or indirectly controlled by Napoleon came to share a broadly similar system of administration. The Napoleonic legal codes were extended to Italy and Naples with little modification, and the same was true of the prefectoral system. Taxation and public debt were reformed and simplified. Napoleonic reforms consolidated the new elite of bureaucrats, magistrates, legal and financial experts and statisticians which had already begun to form during the Enlightenment. In the end, the Napoleonic system emerged as the dominant model for the construction of a modern and unified national state.

Some Conclusions About the Impact of the Napoleonic Period upon Nationalism in Italy

Undoubtedly, Napoleon was remarkably successful in controlling and manipulating Italian national sentiment. Nevertheless, the Napoleonic regime may have actually encouraged the growth of a feeling of Italian national identity. The Napoleonic legacy in this way contributed to the solution of the national question in political and administrative terms; the Napoleonic period formed the foundations for that ‘unconditional unitarianism’ and uniformity of response to diverse local conditions which has often been seen as the besetting sin of the new Italian state. However, even the centralized system of

¹⁷ Ibid., 71.

government and the 'General laws' did not necessarily produce 'national habits', and in their absence the former's significance might be distorted.¹⁸

Both the positive attempts to win consensus by appealing to 'national' symbols, and the realities of French supremacy combined to work in this direction. In reaction to Napoleon's identification with Imperial Rome, Italian writers could only express their opposition by repudiating the Roman heritage. The later revival of the 'idea of Rome' obscures the fact that in its origins the Risorgimento was predominantly anti-Roman. After 1815, the interest in primitive Italic antiquity was largely superseded by the new attention paid to the free communes of the Middle Ages as the true nursery of Italian nationality. Both in the pre-Roman and post-Roman periods the origin of the Italian nation was divorced from Rome as a reaction against French imperialism.¹⁹ In the years after 1814, the poetry of Ugo Foscolo became a common bond for Italians who emigrated from every part of the country to serve Napoleon's regime in Milan. Nevertheless, the idea of Italy remained mainly as a literary idea and nothing more. "Occasionally we hear the word Italy," wrote one contemporary writer, Pietro Giordani, in 1816, "but it finds no echo in people's hearts." Mainly because the local forces were so weak, foreign help and ideas and models were needed to bring Italians together in a

¹⁸ Lyttelton, "The National Question in Italy," 71.

single nation. However, the varied contribution made by other countries is an example of different kinds of motive and process which went toward the formation of Italy. Inside the country, too, there were many separate currents of opinion and action which were to lead toward this one goal, some of which in retrospect may seem almost contradictory. The growth of national consciousness, namely the quarrels and rivalries between different groups of Italians.²⁰

The French Revolution, followed by the Napoleonic invasion of Italy had important effects on the growth of Italian nationalism. Not only did the French bring something positive to Italy, but in time the high taxes which they imposed and which Napoleon's wars made necessary, generated a strong opposition which took place in the development of national consciousness. Whereas the reformers of the eighteenth century had worked happily in a context of enlightened despotism, this generation and the next were open to much more radical aspirations of political liberty; and a causal chain was to lead from ideas of popular sovereignty to those of Italian patriotism. Filippo Buonarroti, a Tuscan radical who in the 1790s became a Frenchman by adoption, belonged to those who spoke this new language of popular sovereignty. The more progressive among Italian Jacobins and he

¹⁹ Ibid., 74.

²⁰ Smith, *The Making of Italy*, 8.

were able to glimpse some possibility of a more unified peninsula, and the detached position of exiles sometimes enabled them to see more clearly the relation between their own home provinces and the Italian nation at large.²¹

Ideological Precursors of Risorgimento

From the second half of the eighteenth century, the whole Italian political movement revolved around two basic principles which were the two poles of Italian political life; the Roman Idea (*l'idea Romana*) and the Municipal Idea (*l'idea municipale*). The former defended the idea of political unity and thus the victory of the monarchy. The latter defended the idea of maintaining the glorious tradition of the communes and unite them in a single state. The principle of municipality, thus, led to a search for a new order (*novus ordo*) where regional autonomy, administrative autonomy and decentralization gained prominence.²²

The Roman idea and the Municipal idea were two contradictory forces. The Roman idea identified itself with Italy during the Roman Republic and Empire, with complete sovereignty, absolute unitarism, based on the

²¹ Ibid., 6.

²² Antonio Monti, *L'Idea Federalistica Italiana e I Progetti di Federazione Europea*. [The Italian Idea of Federalism and The Projects of an European Federation] (Bari: Laterza, 1922) 19.

principle of “*Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento*” and “*Civis romanus sum*”. The second idea on the other hand, referred to the age of communes and the Signorie.²³ Thus these contrasting ideas persisted for ages even up until now in Italy. They can be regarded as the precursors of the unitarist and federalist ideas that constituted the main cleavage among the ideologues and the politicians of Italian political life.

Unitarianism of Giuseppe Mazzini²⁴

French Jacobin Influence on Mazzini

Mazzini's unitarianism owed much to the Jacobin tradition. The young Giuseppe Mazzini, like the aged Filippo Buonarroti, owed much of his initial influence to his ties with French republican leaders.²⁵ He insisted that the popular sovereignty of the nation must be indivisible, and viewed all forms of federalism as devices for prolonging the hegemony of local ruling classes.²⁶

²³ Ibid., 20.

²⁴ On Mazzini, see also Franco della Peruta, *Mazzini e i Rivoluzionari Italiani. Il Partito d'Azione. 1830-1845* [Mazzini and The Italian Revolutionaries. The Action Party. 1830-1845], (Milan: n. p., 1974).

²⁵ Stuart Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860. The Social Constraints of Political Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 303.

²⁶ Lyttelton, “The National Question in Italy,” 82.

Mazzini saw 'European' literature as the expression of the progress of modern civilization and the alliance of peoples employing a widespread romantic motif of these years. He looked to the "genius", perhaps with echoes of Napoleon, as a figure capable of interpreting the future destinies of peoples and humanity through his superior qualities and intuition. Until the revolutions of 1830-1, Mazzini combined his practical conspiratorial activities with an open cultural campaign in local Ligurian newspapers in which his romantic faith in progress and in the function of the writer as the expression of public opinion was accompanied by his affirmation of the existence of God and his exaltation of patriotic martyrdom.²⁷

But during those intense, creative months of June-July 1831, Mazzini remained close to the sectarian world of Orleanist France, making contact with republican groups at Marseilles and democratic leaders in Lyon and Paris. The future structure of Young Italy (*Giovane Italia*) was already outlined- membership restricted to ages under 40, a central congregation with provincial congregations in Italy and a reduction of the complex, macabre sectarian rituals to simple secret passwords. But, most significantly, members

²⁷ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 304-305.

of Young Italy were obliged to belong to other sects in order to direct them towards the aims of the new association.²⁸

Saint-Simonianism of Mazzini in the 'Making of the Italian People'

The entire philosophy of natural rights was tacitly rejected and replaced by Mazzini's ethical-religious vision of God revealing himself through the indefinite, continuous progress of humanity, which was effected by the creation of nations : "Where God has wished there be a nation, the necessary forces exist to create it" . Mazzini believed that the progressive series of European changes inevitably guided European societies towards forming themselves into vast unitary masses. Mazzini's program and method, in fact, were outlined in explicit polemic against the lack of principles and the gradualism and federalism of the old sects in Italy. Italy was to be republican because sovereignty resided in the nation and because Italy's past was wholly republican; it was to be unitarian because federalism weakened the nation.²⁹

Between the initial insurrection and the subsequent determination after Italy's liberation; he was prepared to recognize the need for a small dictatorial group in the first stage, although subsequently a 'National Council' would be the source of all power. Strongly influenced by Saint-Simonian ideas, Mazzini

²⁸ Ibid., 305.

elaborated on the duality of the “critical” age of individualism and skepticism and the coming dawn of the new “organic” age of the people, which would be characterized by “association”, a universal principle which marked the progress of humanity.

But the central theme which linked this ethical-religious philosophy of history to the practical realization of the Italian revolution, was Mazzini's analysis of the role of the people. Deeply conscious of the absence of the “multitudes” in the past Italian revolutions and at their present strength in France and England, Mazzini sought for the means to arouse their support. Defining the people in Saint-Simonian terms, as ‘the most numerous and poorest class’³⁰, Mazzini recognized that their support could only be won by painting the material benefits they would gain: “The people had been corrupted by centuries of servitude, they were unaware of the new transitional age in which they lived.....No revolution could succeed without the masses: But, equally, these ‘multitudes’ could not achieve the revolution without proper leadership.”³¹ For Mazzini the initiative had to come from the

²⁹ Ibid., 306.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

"intellects", the "middle class", the educated young.³² Thus for Mazzini, the solution to unite divided Italy laid in the doctrines of Saint-Simon and their followers and their ideal of a civic faith which would overcome in a new synthesis the sterile eighteenth century antithesis between reason and orthodox belief.³³ It was also in Saint-Simonianism that he found the specific idea of the end of the era of individualism and the beginning of a new era of collective behavior.

Man's central and great duty, Mazzini insisted, is to all mankind. And in order to enable man to fulfill his duty to mankind, nationalities and national states exist. "The nation is the God-appointed instrument for the welfare of the human race, and in this alone its moral essence lies. . . . Fatherlands are but workshops of humanity".³⁴ Each nation, according to Mazzini, has two important functions to perform. First, it must educate and train its members in the light of the moral law: Secondly, it must arrange and direct its activities on behalf of humanity at large. "Nationalism," he declared "is what God has prescribed to each people in the work of humanity," and he laid down a "law of nationality" in relation to humanity and duty: Making its pace with the march of humanity; having for its starting point the people; for its stepping

³² Ibid., 307.

³³ Lyttelton, "The National Question in Italy," 82.

stones, the consequences of its principle logically deduced and vigorously applied; for its driving force, the strength of all; for its purpose, the amelioration of all and, "the greatest good of the greatest number; and for its goal, the accomplishment of the task which God has assigned it in the world. There is Nationality."³⁵

Thus for Mazzini, moral values and politics, are inseparable. Ethnographical and anthropological elements are not sufficient by themselves, without the ethic factor (*fattore etico*). The nation is not just a political concept, but a political principle and thus what forms the nation and which is the fruit of liberty and independence is the moral and civil consciousness of the citizens.³⁶

Mazzini against Class Divisions and Conflicts

Inevitably, Mazzini was hostile to all class conflict because of its divisive and diversive effects. It was on this issue, perhaps more than on any other, that he was to part company definitively with Buonarroti. Although Mazzini was ready to admit that the history of the progressive development of the popular element through eighteen centuries of events and wars was the history of "the

³⁴ Carlton J. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), 155.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 155-156.

³⁶ Monti, *L'Idea Federalistica Italiana*, 77-78.

war between individuals and the universal, between the fractionizing and the unitary system, between "privilege" and the "people", he nevertheless concluded dogmatically: "We abhor fraternal bloodshed. We do not want terror erected into a system, we do not want the subversion of legitimately acquired rights, nor agrarian laws, nor useless violations of individual faculties, nor usurpation of property"³⁷. In fact, "if you convert a revolution into a war of classes, you will come to ruin, or you will not survive without unheard-of violence, without acquiring the reputation of usurpers, without accusations of a new tyranny."³⁸

Preoccupied with the danger of alienating the crucial support of the middle classes, Mazzini was also convinced that there was no justification for class warfare in Italy. Although at moments he recognized the abject poverty of the peasantry, which rendered it "disposed towards the most desperate attempts, merely if it is comforted and guided."³⁹, his propaganda was directed exclusively towards the urban poor. He himself recognized the difficulties of penetrating a world of illiteracy by his method of written propaganda. 'the one Mazzinian attempt to write popular dialogues - that of his follower

³⁷ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 308.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

Gustavo Modena -soon collapsed. As Mazzini admitted to Niccolo Tommaseo in a letter in 1834: "As for speaking to the people, you are right - and I would speak : but the paths are lacking, and we wander around in a circle without breaking out of it. The people cannot read." ⁴⁰

Breaking Away from the French Revolutionary Ideas

Mazzini's immediate reaction - the creation of the association of "Young Europe" - was a deliberate attempt to challenge French primacy and destroy the influence of the Buonarrotian *Carboneria*; and by 1835 he could proudly claim to have caused its disintegration. By the time the 77-year-old Buonarrotti died (1837), Mazzini's own movement was undergoing a crisis. *Giovane Italia* had spread rapidly in northern and central Italy and by 1833 Mazzinian ideas even inspired isolated groups in Neapolitan provinces. But Piedmont was the state where Mazzini counted most support particularly in Genoa, Alessandria and Turin, among the young officers and soldiers.⁴¹

According to Mazzini, it was necessary to free European democracy of the myth of the French Revolution:

The past kills us. I state with conviction: the French revolution crushes us. It weighs on the party, like a nightmare, and hinders its growth. It dazzles us with the luster of its gigantic

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., 311.

struggles. It hypnotizes us with its victories. - We go down on our knees before it. We ask everything of it, men and things. . . . Now, our fathers did not ape anyone. They drew their inspiration: from contemporary sources, the needs of the masses and the nature of the elements that surrounded them. They belonged to their time.⁴²

Within this vision of individual national initiatives, sometimes interpreted as the mission of guiding nations within great ethnic agglomerates (Slav, Germanic, Greek-Latin), Italy possessed a unique place in the regeneration of Europe because of the universal function of Rome: "The call for modern unity can start for the third time from Rome alone, because the absolute destruction of the old unity can begin from Rome alone."⁴³ The "third Rome" became the symbol not only of Italian independence and unity, but of the overthrow of the old Europe and consolidation of the new social epoch: Mazzini successfully appropriated for the democrats the age-old Catholic, universalist image of the Holy City, and offered an alternative to the negative judgement of Rome as the major obstacle to Italian unity, enshrined in the lay intellectual tradition since Machiavelli and Guicciardini.⁴⁴ Thus the completion of Italian unity entailed the destruction not only of the Papacy's temporal authority but of its spiritual authority as well. "It would bring about a secular millenium in which superstition would be finally banished from the earth and the

⁴² Ibid., 313.

⁴³ Ibid.

'regenerated' nations would rise again from the dead, united in harmony by the common cult of Humanity.⁴⁵

Mazzini's nationalism was essentially democratic. He rejected both the elitism of the moderates and the belief in revolutionary dictatorship of the Jacobin tradition. He added universal suffrage as a fourth prerequisite to the triad of Union, Independence and Liberty. The nation must be co-terminous with the people, and without democracy national unity would be an empty formula. National consciousness could only be formed through active popular participation in the struggle for independence. This could be realized, according to him, through a guerrilla warfare. However, at this point, Mazzini came across a great obstacle that would stand in the way: guerrilla warfare would not succeed without the support of the peasants. On the other hand, the backing of the clergy had been indispensable for winning the peasants to the national cause. The Italian republicans were never successful in overcoming the cultural gap between town and country. The populist urge to rediscover rural life and folk culture, which was so strong a

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Lyttelton, "The National Question in Europe," 83.

component of many nineteenth-century nationalisms was largely lacking in Italy.⁴⁶

The Federalism of Carlo Cattaneo

The federal idea in Italy mainly derived from the *l'idea municipale*, even though it may be thought that the federal idea is a political and the municipal idea is a social idea. But they are two complementary ideas and the underlying idea of both is the principle of individualism (*principio di individualita*).⁴⁷ The northern moderates' optimism about the beneficial consequences of economic progress owed much to a writer who consciously avoided their facile political deductions and always opposed the romantic patriotism of their historical vision and the conservatism of their social attitudes. That man was Carlo Cattaneo (1801-69). In contrast to Mazzinian attempts to create a unitarian party, the development of liberal ideas remained fundamentally regional.

According to Cattaneo, the progress and liberty of societies were thus dependent upon conflict and variety. Cattaneo was inevitably opposed to the reconciliatory aspirations of the moderates' politics and philosophy as he

⁴⁶ Ibid, 84.

⁴⁷ Monti, *L'Idea Federalistica Italiana*, 21-22. The municipal idea can be traced back to the times of the Etruscans, who had divided Italy into three regions.

was to the uniformity implied in Mazzini's program. He thought that if the decadence of eastern societies stemmed from their uniformity and traditionalism, western civilization had progressed because of the constant friction of rival ideas and institutions, stimulated by the innovatory effects of experimental sciences and application of the scientific method. The cradle of experimental sciences were the Italian communes; here were to be found the origins of modern civilization, the transformation from "feudal barbarism" to the process of *incivilimento* (civilizing)⁴⁸

Patriotic nationalism was irrelevant in the face of these truths and symptomatic of inadequately trained minds:

We are convinced... that Italy above all must keep in unison with Europe, and not cherish any other national sentiment than that of retaining a worthy place in the scientific association of Europe and the World. Peoples should act as a permanent mirror to each other, because the interests of civilization are mutually dependent and common ; because science is one, art is one, glory is one. The nation of scholarly men is one . . . it is the nation of the intellectuals, which inhabits all climates and speaks all languages. Beneath this nation there is a multitude divided into a thousand discordant patrias, castes, dialects into greedy, bloodthirsty factions, which revel in superstition, egoism, ignorance, which sometimes even love and defend ignorance as if it were the principle of life and the basis of customs and society.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Ibid., 334.

⁴⁹ Monti, *L'Idea Federalistica Italiana* , 337

Thus the unitary solution was the only solution in the mind of Mazzini.

Federalism of Vincenzo Gioberti

By the early 1840s moderate writers had won the support of sectors of educated public opinion for their cultural patriotism and their social and economic proposals for gradual, peaceful change. But their strength derived as much from dissatisfaction with the plots and attempted insurrections of the democrats as from their own initiatives. These moderates comprised loosely-linked, regionally based groups, not a political party with a national political program, as Mazzini had tried to create. It was Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-52) who gave them such a programme, around which they rapidly built the rudimentary structure of a party offering a concrete alternative to Mazzini and the democrats. Gioberti presented his program with spectacular success in his book *Of the Moral and Civil Primacy of Italians* published in 1843.

According to Gioberti, in Catholic regions, reluctance to accept either the ecclesiastical hierarchy as a subordination to the secular authorities or the Papacy's determined identification with the Restoration lay behind both the romantic search for a deeper individual religious morality and the explicit appeals for Catholicism to accept the legacies of the Revolution - liberalism and nationalism. The years of the Restoration had witnessed a total separation between the reconstruction of the official Church and Catholic

religious life. The liberal Catholics, in their attempts to achieve freedom from the Church and a more genuine religious consciousness, were ultimately dependent upon the pope.⁵⁰

The conclusion he deduced from the failure of liberal revolutions and Mazzinian plots was that no reliance could be placed on the people or on insurrections, and that in consequence the only hope lay in reconciling the various groups of patriots in support of the princes : "The princes are weak, cowardly, egoistic, soft, ignorant, contemptuous of virtue and glory; but at least they exist; whereas the Italian people is nothing but a voice, an abstraction."⁵¹ There was little that was new in this reversion to the *carbonaro* mentality of the revolutions of 1820-1 and 1831, except the appeal to the pope which during the pontificate of Gregory XVI could only represent a pious illusion, a myth, as Gioberti himself soon called it. His manner of welding Christianity to patriotism reduced religion to a purely utilitarian weapon for political ends : "Who cannot see how useful and effective would be this spring [of religion], if only there were people who knew how to utilize it to arouse the oppressed peoples and establish liberty, instead of relegating it and tampering with it, as did the philosophers of the last century, so leaving

⁵⁰ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 339.

⁵¹ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 342.

the field free far the superstitious, the Jesuits, the tyrants to adopt it for their own benefit.⁵²

The publication of the *Primato* (Primacy of Italians) in 1843 by Vincenzo Gioberti was undoubtedly a major success. The first 1500 copies were rapidly followed by reprints and Vieusseux proposed a popular edition of 5000 copies. The *Primato* had been written explicitly with the intent of attracting moderate and clerical support. Hence its omissions, as well as its propositions. Nothing was said about the problem of Austrian rule nor about the reform of the administration of the Papal States. Gioberti's proposals were carefully formulated to assuage Catholic and moderate worries, offering a program of national reconciliation to oppose the national revolutionary aims of the democrats. Reason and moderation were fused with a rhetorical idealization of Catholicism, practical political calculations with a vision of the redemption of Italy's mythical primacy. Unity was rejected as unhistorical: "To suppose that Italy, divided for centuries, can peacefully be brought under the power of a single state is madness."⁵³ Only a federal union fitted Italy's traditions and development, as both the moderates and Cattaneo maintained. Municipal self-government was asserted against administrative centralization, following the arguments in defense of individual rights of

⁵² Ibid.

French and Italian liberals and progressive Catholics since the 1820s. But power was to be retained in the hands of princes, aided but not restricted by “elective aristocracies”, an open class based on intelligence and experience.

But all these suggestions pale before Gioberti’s main proposal: the assertion of Italian primacy, the freeing of the peninsula from French tutelage through the creation of an Italic confederation under its natural leader, the pope, aided by the military force of Piedmont. Rome and Piedmont were the particular house of Italian charity and strength. In as much as the union of Italy must be consecrated by religion as idea and protected by patriotic arms as fact, so it seemed that it must start where faith and militia are mainly nursed, that is in the holy city and the warrior province.⁵⁴

The Risorgimento Period (1860-1914) “Making Italy”

The reasons for the adoption of a centralized unitary model and the rejection of even a relatively modest variety of regional decentralization are various. A few people called for the establishment of autonomous regional governments within the new state. Fearing the reactionary tendencies of the Church and the peasants, as well as the backwardness of the South, however, the majority

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 343-344.

of the makers of modern Italy insisted that decentralization was incompatible with prosperity and political progress.

The centralizers quickly won the debate. Top local officials were appointed by the national government in Rome. Local political deadlock (or even local dissent from national policy) could lead to years of rule by a commissioner appointed by the national government. Strong prefects, modeled on the French system, controlled the personnel and policies of local governments, approving all local ordinances, budgets and contracts, often in the minutest detail. Most areas of public policy, from agriculture to education to urban planning, were administered by field offices of the Roman bureaucracy.”⁵⁵

According to Zariski, first of all, the mutual distrust and antagonism that divided the rulers of the various Italian states during the early years of the Risorgimento seemed to rule out a federal bargain. Second, many feared that the decentralized system would eventually end up breaking the system apart. Third, some powerful domestic motivations played an important role. For example, the backwardness of the south and the hostility of the clergy and the peasantry at the grass roots aroused the suspicion that decentralization might lead either to a complete breakdown of law and order or to a reactionary

⁵⁵ Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti. *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 18.

legitimist revival, either of which would threaten the existence of the new state.⁵⁶

Political Integration in "making Italy"

The real nature of the Italian unification is revealed in the following words of Domenico Farini, the President of the Senate, who wrote in his diary: "Italy was united by the army (i. e. the material strength of the Italian people, her volunteers and soldiers) and by the plebiscite; and she can only be kept intact by the army and by parliament. From parliament must come the means needed to govern her, to strengthen, where necessary, the activities of the government."⁵⁷

Despite the French inheritance, the politicians of monarchical Italy never succeeded in building a modern state machine on Jacobin lines. Prefects were appointed, uniform local government instituted, and laws and the administration unified. The education system and military service were used to spread national consciousness, and as illiteracy declined, the standard Italian language spread. The social basis of the regime, however, prevented

⁵⁶ Raphael Zariski, "Italy: The Distributive State and the Consequences of Late Unification." In *Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Marc O. Rousseau and Raphael Zariski (New York: Praeger, 1987), 95.

⁵⁷ Domenico Farini, *Diario fi Fine Secolo*, [An End of Century Diary] (Rome: n. p., 1961), 1302 (entry for 5 June 1898) In *Modern Italy 1871-1982*, Martin Clark, (London and New York: Longman, 1984), 44.

the construction of a modern, efficient state. The great weakness of the regime was its somehow detached character from the people. The people needed material benefits, such as jobs, favors and recommendations, instead they were offered patriotism and impartiality. This was an unimpressive and hypocritical mixture to those born outside Piedmont. Thus the most evident tensions were between local government and parliament. The centralizing patriotic establishment tried to impose its authority on both, but with limited success.⁵⁸ The distrust of the ruling elites towards not only the regional governments but also the municipal and provincial governments had its roots in this period. And it is also in that period that the importance of controlling the local government increased.

One important aspect that revealed the incomplete political integration had been the limited suffrage. The electorate at parliamentary elections consisted of just over 500.000 men in 1870, rising to 622.000 by 1880.⁵⁹ Restricted suffrage meant in Sonnino's words "the vast majority of the people, more than 90 percent of them, feel estranged from our institutions; they see themselves as subjects of the State, constrained to serve it with blood and money, but they do not feel that they form an organic, living part of it, nor do

⁵⁸ Clark, *Modern Italy*, 57.

⁵⁹ This meant 2.2 percent of the total population or 8 percent of adult men). See *ibid.*, 64.

they take any interest in its existence and development.”⁶⁰ Thus the new Italian state did not enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. The traditional organs of the State were influential and the Italy’s ruling elite was really small, yet the State institutions never really penetrated into the heart of society. There always existed a gap between the ‘State’ and ‘Society’ even though the ‘State’ tried to intervene in ‘Society’ by using its Prefects, police, courts, tax-gatherers and conscription-sergeants. Clark argues that:

Rome was never a ‘dynamic Jacobin center of commerce or intellect, from which men could be ruled with a stern hand; she was a peaceful heaven, where sheep grazed in the Villa Borghese gardens, and where agricultural laborers were hired by the day in Piazza Montanara. Eternal Rome remained indolent, indifferent and sceptical: a city of bureaucrats where men took the broad, long-term view, and gossiped among themselves”.⁶¹

Thus, politics in Rome came to be characterized by a pattern of alliances known as *trasformismo*.

Trasformismo and the Incomplete Political Integration

Even before the first stage of Italian unification in 1860, economic and social relationships in southern Italy had been structured predominantly on the

⁶⁰ Sonnino’s speech to Chamber of Deputies 30 march 1881, in *Atti Parlamentari*, Cam. Dep., Sessione 1880-1, p. 4855, cited in Clark, *Modern Italy*, 64.

basis of patron-client ties. Southern Italy is not a unique case in this respect, but it was shown by some anthropological studies that it has been the characteristic of a wide range of traditional agrarian societies, particularly those in which economic resources are scarce and access to them concentrated in the hands of a restricted elite.⁶² What is particularly interesting about the Italian case is the politicization of the relationships of traditional deference that came about with the introduction of parliamentary institutions and local self-government after 1860, and the process by which such a style of political behaviour came to shape the working of the entire Italian political system in the decades that followed.

Thus *trasformismo* was the main characteristic of the regime. In its strictest sense, it refers to a parliamentary strategy, initiated by Agostino De Pretis in 1876, by which opposition deputies were induced to shift their votes to the government majority in exchange for personal benefits and, above all, access to state patronage.⁶³

⁶¹ Ibid., 67.

⁶² Judith Chubb, *Patronage, Power and Poverty in Southern Italy. A Tale of Two Cities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19.

⁶³ "Parliamentary *trasformismo* had its roots in an extremely restricted suffrage: less than 500.000 voters, or 1.9% of the population in 1861, increased to 2 million voters, 6.9% of the population in 1882 with universal male suffrage introduced only in 1913." Ibid., 19.

Trasformismo was a system of government in which potentially disruptive elements were absorbed into the governing coalition. So, while the interests of northern industrialists and southern landowners might seem in conflict, they were reconciled in an effective alliance to the exclusion of the northern industrial proletariat and the southern peasantry. The social and economic system of the south was left largely undisturbed apart from the incorporation of the layer of new bourgeois who had profited from unification by acquiring church and Bourbon state lands.⁶⁴

It was *trasformismo* where the seeds of the clientelistic system in Italy are found. By delivering a solid block of parliamentary votes to the government of the day which might change its complexion from time to time but was never supplanted, southern deputies were able to secure prominent positions in the government and were allowed control over patronage within their constituencies. The local government system, by placing impossible demands upon councils, reinforced centralization and consequently, the role of the deputy as the man who could get things done in Rome. At the same time, by reducing political questions to individuals' problems, the system inhibited the aggregation of demands on a territorial basis.⁶⁵ Once such a system

⁶⁴ Michael Keating, *State and Regional Nationalism. Territorial Politics in the European State* (New York: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1988), 54-55.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

became entrenched, “neither ideas nor practical programs were used as weapons in the fight for national power, but became the instruments of transactions, jobs and influence, elections and positions.”⁶⁶

The phenomenon of *trasformismo* was even more evident in the *Mezzogiorno* (South of Rome) and particularly in Sicily. Sicilian deputies, usually from the landlord class, including those who had enriched themselves with dispossessed church and state lands after unification, would rarely speak in Parliament but always vote with the government, meeting in private to concert their policy and protect Sicilian affairs from Parliamentary scrutiny.⁶⁷ Prefects who refused to go along with the local bosses could be removed, revenues were diverted into private pockets and corruption and intimidation were so rife that it was known for juries to protest at not being bribed. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Mafia, drawing on old Sicilian traditions but reinforced by American repatriates, was thriving, using the machinery of the state for its own ends and those of its landed allies but posing as heroic defenders of Sicily against the ‘foreigners’ of the north. So Sicily and south of Italy adapted to unification as they had adapted to changes of rulers over the centuries, with political and economic elites making an accommodation with the new regime. It does not mean that the south did not change, but rather the

⁶⁶ Chubb, *Patronage, Power*, 20.

mechanisms of accommodation of the sovereign power of the day remained in place, to be adapted and exploited by successive ruling elites. The Italian national revolution had not been achieved.⁶⁸ Unification, with its promise of a national revolution, was not accompanied by a social and economic revolution, an attack on the social and economic power of the landed classes in the south. By and large, these made their peace with the new order, realizing that the new regime was probably a more effective guarantor of their interests than the old.

The suppression of peasant disturbances in the 1860s amply confirmed this judgment. The old landowning aristocracy was joined by a rising middle class made rich on the purchase of disentailed church and state lands and together they provided the economic and social basis of *trasformismo* in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁶⁹

In a broader context, *trasformismo* may be seen as an attempt on the part of ruling elites, particularly after the widening of the suffrage in 1882, to forestall the spread of radicalism among northern workers. The economic, social and political dualism of Italian society provided successive

⁶⁷ Keating, *State and Regional Nationalism*, 55.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

governments with the means to achieve this end. Given the social and economic backwardness of the South and the consequent dominance of personal politics which facilitated governmental techniques of 'electoral management', the Mezzogiorno came to constitute a critical source of political stability for governments increasingly concerned with rising radical pressures in the North. Sustained by the unconditional parliamentary support of the mass of southern deputies, prime ministers like Giovanni Giolitti (1903-1914) achieved sufficient maneuverability to successfully manage class conflict- through either co-optation or isolation of the opposition- up until the outbreak of World War I. For the South this meant a substantial increase in its political weight, but at a very high price- renunciation of an active voice in national policy and forfeiture of a serious national effort aimed at the resolution of the Southern Question. This was so because it was the very backwardness of the South that made it such an important political asset for national leaders. Southern elites welcomed *trasformismo* as a guarantee of the local status quo; for the masses, instead, it meant resignation to economic stagnation and feudalistic class dominance.⁷⁰

The Birth of Mafia as a Symptom of Failed Political Integration

⁶⁹ Ibid., 62-63.

⁷⁰ Chubb, *Patronage, Power*, 21.

Given the limitation of the suffrage, the introduction of democratic institutions into the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, rather than promoting popular participation, had instead solidified and legitimized the absolute power of the landed aristocracy and the rising rural bourgeoisie.⁷¹ Judith Chubb cites Guido Dorso who argues that:

Having become the dominant social force, the rural bourgeoisie adapted all political activity to its particularistic mentality...All political struggle was organized around the municipal treasury. For this reason, southern politicians always tended to be 'ministerial'. Under these conditions, political organization of the South could not help but consist of a continual mediation between successive governments and passive southern masses which were excluded from formal institutions. This mediation was performed by deputies, who assured the government of the votes and the tranquility of the southern masses and received in return privileges and exemption for those under their protection.⁷²

In such a political system, the individual was compelled to seek the protection of a more powerful patron since to remain outside a clientelistic network meant total powerlessness.⁷³

The Economic and Social Integration

⁷¹ Ibid., 22.

⁷² Guido Dorso, *La Rivoluzione Meridionale*, [The Southern Revolution], (Turin: Mondadori, 1969), 153-154 cited in Chubb, 23.

⁷³ Chubb, *Patronage, Power*, 24.

The most important problem that faced the unifiers of the Italian state was the economic, social and cultural discrepancy between the North and the South of the country.⁷⁴ The Southern Question (*Questione Meridionale*) has remained the most serious impediment to national integration since those times and has not been easily overcome. The basis of the question lay in the contrast between a modern industrial society in the North and a traditional agrarian society in the South. Thus, after the unification the South found itself in a relatively disadvantaged economic position vis-a-vis the North, because of three important factors: (1) the harsh climate and topography and the objective resource poverty of the South, (2) its distance from Central European markets, (3) the survival under the Bourbon rulers of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies with a social and economic structure still organized on a predominantly feudal basis.⁷⁵

Some authors argue that the already existing underdevelopment of the South was accentuated by state policies which in the end created a symbiotic relationship between the north and the south. Although the social and economic structure of the South remained virtually unchanged, the impact of unification upon the southern economy was immediate and disastrous.

⁷⁴ For certain social characteristics of sections of Italy shortly after Unification, see Appendix C.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 15.

One of the first acts of the new government was to impose a uniform tax and tariff policy upon the entire country. In the South, it meant a sudden and drastic increase in taxes which, coupled with very limited public investment in the South, drained southern resources to finance northern industry. The elimination of high protective tariffs caught firms unprepared for the onslaught of northern competition, while opening southern markets to commercial penetration by the products of the northern industry. The economic situation of the South was further aggravated by the protectionist swing in Italian tariff policy throughout Western Europe. The imposition of high external tariffs struck the southern economy twice, the loss of traditional international export markets provoked a severe agricultural crisis, while at the same time, the South was compelled to pay higher prices for manufactured products purchased from the north, a process that was called by Sidney Tarrow "commercialization without industrialization."⁷⁶

With the progressive breakdown of the feudal system, then, southern society came to be characterized, in Antonio Gramsci's words, *una grande disaggregazione sociale* (an immense social disaggregation). Unlike the rest of Western Europe, the disintegration of feudalism in southern Italy failed to

⁷⁶ Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), 13-14.

produce an independent entrepreneurial middle class; instead, the social structure of the South remained polarized in two antagonistic blocs—the propertied elite and the mass of landless peasantry. With the division and sale of the communal lands following the abolition of feudalism and that of Church properties⁷⁷ after 1860 a bourgeois landholding class rapidly came into existence; rather than affirming itself as an autonomous and dynamic economic force, however, the nascent bourgeoisie focused its aspirations exclusively upon the land, and then primarily in terms of social prestige rather than productive investment.⁷⁸ The landed aristocracy rather than the industrial or commercial middle classes constituted its model of social values and behavior.⁷⁹

The acquisition of large amounts of land by rich landowners in the South was a great mistake on the part of the state. Because, future hopes for land reform

⁷⁷ In the South of Italy alone, 265,000 hectares of *demesne* (the land on sale) had been sold off by 1865, and a further 50,000 hectares were sold off between 1866 and 1881. See Clark, *Modern Italy*, 15.

⁷⁸ Clark cites Sonnino who found that “ecclesiastical property fell almost exclusively and with very rare exceptions into the hands of prosperous landowners, who were already rich landowners.” Sidney Sonnino, in L. Franchetti and S. Sonnino, *La Sicilia nel 1876*, (Florence: 1877), 286. The main reason for this was due to the policy that was pursued by the State Agency which sold off the land in public auctions, where the possibility of a poor peasant to acquire land was minimal compared to a rich landowner. See Clark, *Modern Italy*, 17.

⁷⁹ Chubb, *Patronage, Power*, 17.

would be impeded by those very people. The peasants who had got the chance of acquiring some sort of common land were forced to resell it to be able to pay taxes. Thus this implanted hatred among the peasantry towards the new system. Clark argues that 'even though the Southern Question was not created in those years, it was made more intractable.'⁸⁰

In the South, the modernizing processes of urbanization and commercialization were thus superimposed upon a traditional agrarian economic base. The failure to stimulate not only industrialization but even a modernization and rationalization of agriculture prevented the formation of stable and homogeneous social classes, for example, on the model of the independent peasant proprietor in France or of a capitalist landholding bourgeoisie as in the case of the English gentry. With the advent of mass communications and models of mass consumption, the South provided an ever-expanding market for the products of northern industry, such demand being sustained by the rapid expansion of the tertiary sector in the cities and by income maintenance in the form of transfer payments and migrants' remittances in the countryside. Once the South was integrated into the national economic system on these terms, market mechanisms perpetuated

⁸⁰ Clark, *Modern Italy*, 17.

and consolidated economic dualism, reinforcing the already substantial obstacles to autonomous industrialization of the South.⁸¹

Cultural Integration

Linguistic unification was achieved after 1860 through education, although there were non-Italian speaking minorities in the border areas and local dialects continued in daily use.⁸² Illiteracy was a serious problem.⁸³ A way of tackling educational problems was to set up schools. Before 1911, the lay State financed school-building on the Biblical principle: "to him that hath shall be given."⁸⁴ However, state policies aggravated the north-south disparity. Municipalities that were rich enough to pay for buildings received State subsidies or loans to cover part of their costs; the others received virtually nothing. So the poorest and most backward regions stayed backward.⁸⁵

⁸¹ Chubb, *Patronage, Power*, 18.

⁸² There were 80.000 French-speakers in Valle d'Aosta, 96.000 Albanian and 30.000 Greek speakers in the South, 30.000 Slav-speakers in Friuli and Molise, but in sum they constituted 1% of the population and did not constitute a real problem. See Clark, *Modern Italy*, 34-35.

⁸³ According to 1871 census, 68.8 percent of the Italian population aged six and over were illiterate which meant 61.9% of the men and 75.7% of the women. See *Ibid*, 35.

⁸⁴ Clark, *Modern Italy*, 170.

⁸⁵ Basilicata received 568.000 lire out of the whole spending of 100 million lire. Cosenza, a province of Calabria did not receive anything. In Reggio

Education in Italy was clearly split. An industrial bourgeoisie was growing up, with engineering and accounting skills; yet the country was also overproducing lawyers and classicists, who demanded more jobs in teaching and administration. Since few technical schools and institutes were in the South, this was tantamount to a North-South split. And it was worsened by the fact that the top bureaucracy was still firmly in Northern hands. But the pressure for jobs came mainly from the South, and in the long term the traditional Northern control of the State machinery was bound to be challenged.⁸⁶

The standard of living was so low in the south, in Sardinia and in remote rural areas elsewhere that, even when free elementary education was provided, the peasants could not utilize their rights since they needed their children's labor. The irony was that the peasants paid crushing taxes with which schools were built and teachers employed, but the peasants were too poor to benefit from the exercise.⁸⁷

Calabria not a single new school had been built by then; many of the schools were still the same temporary huts put up after the 1908 earthquake. See Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 171.

⁸⁷ Harry Hearder, *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento 1790-1870* (London and New York: Longman, 1983), 249-250.

As for the Mezzogiorno, a striking feature of nineteenth-century Italy was the presence of so many writers from the south combined with the absence of a real southern literature.⁸⁸ The great southern writers tended to be Italian figures, men of Risorgimento, and when they wrote about the south, it was to regret its failure to integrate with the north and realize the dream of Italian unity. Images of the Mezzogiorno projected in the region itself through myths and folk-tales and for those who could read through literature, were such as to discourage regional self-assertion.⁸⁹ Thus in the late nineteenth century, there was no realistic literary *genre* to present the condition of the south as a problem.

Some Concluding Remarks

After 1861, the State existed at last, as a set of unified institutions; this 'legal Italy' failed to secure the support of the Italian people. The rapid completion of the process of unification signified that the process of nation-building

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ "In Sicily the myth of Sicilian vespers was sometimes invoked as the foundation of an independent identity but the literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries portrayed a romanticised view of an unchanging land resistant to the successive 'foreign' invasions of the island. On the southern mainland, the notion of *meridionalita* conveyed the same idea. This was to the interest of the dominant classes, especially the new bourgeoisie who had made their accommodation with the new regime and wanted to resist social and economic change." Lampedusa's novel, the *Leopard*, and the works of Sciascia portray how the successive regime left the basis of the social structure intact, merely replacing one set of elites with another." See Keating, *State and Regional Nationalism*, 77.

would have to be completed by state policies. In this sense, the 'legal Italy' remained inherently diverse from 'real Italy' and the idea of 'nation' remained alien to many Italians even after the Unification. Thus, contrary to what d'Azeglio hoped for, the famous Risorgimento had made Italy but was not able to overcome the localist tendencies prevailing among the Italian people and thus was not successful in 'making Italians'.

The persistent Southern question was the example that best revealed this lack of integration. The main tool of integration was 'absorption' of the 'subversive' sections of the society into the state machinery (*trasformismo*). By this way, the State would get rid of opposition⁹⁰ and gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people by absorbing or reconciling each important group. However, as a result of the inefficiencies and insufficiencies of state policies, the huge cultural, political and economic gap between the north and the south persisted.

⁹⁰ The best examples of this process of 'absorption' were the absorption of the Catholics initially hostile to the new state, by 1913 Gentiloni Pact. This same process continued with Socialists and Communists in the twentieth century. See Clark, *Modern Italy*, 2.

CHAPTER IV

NATIONAL INTEGRATION DURING THE FASCIST INTERLUDE (1922-1943)

The Causes of the Rise of Fascism in Italy in Risorgimento

Historiography

The *Risorgimento* that created a unified and modern nation-state in 1870 was not a remedy for many ills of the country since the obstacles that were mentioned in Chapter 2 constituted major handicaps for the national integration process. The rise of fascism was regarded as the first crisis¹ that the Italian state faced and the reasons behind the rise of fascism was mostly directed at the failure of the Risorgimento period.

Two eminent Italian ideologues provided two conflicting accounts of Risorgimento after the experiences of Fascism and the First World War. The Risorgimento period was analyzed by both Liberal and Marxist thinkers and historians who arrived at different conclusions regarding the impact of unification upon Italy. The first is the Liberal approach of Benedetto Croce

¹ Massimo L. Salvadori, *Storia d'Italia e Crisi di Regime. Saggio sulla politica italiana 1861-1996*. [History of Italy and the Crisis of Regime. An Essay on Italian Politics 1861-1996], (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994), 65.

(Crocean approach) and the second is the Marxist approach of Antonio Gramsci (Gramscian approach). The common point in these two opposing currents of historical analysis was the "preoccupation with the apparent failure of Liberal Italy to live up to the aspirations and expectations of the Risorgimento."²

Crocean Account of Risorgimento

The idealist philosopher-historian Benedetto Croce presents a strongly favorable judgement of the Risorgimento.³ According to him, the leaders of the Historic Right (*Destra Storica*) and the architects of Italian unification in 1860 were men of a noble and self-sacrificing character.⁴ He argued that Liberal Italy's shortcomings could be attributed to decisions made by the *Destra Storica's* successors, and equally to the enormous problems that all Italy's leaders faced. Thus he claimed that Italy's leaders always kept their commitment to a liberal parliamentary system of government despite political, financial and diplomatic difficulties. He argued that:

It [the process of Italy's independence, liberty and unity] was called Risorgimento, just as men had spoken of a rebirth of Greece, recalling the glorious history that the same soil had witnessed; but it was in reality a birth, a *sorgimento*, and for the

² Lucy Riall, *The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society and National Unification* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 2.

³ Charles F. Delzell, ed., *The Unification of Italy 1859-1861. Cavour, Mazzini or Garibaldi?* (Huntington, New York: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1976), 92.

⁴ Federico Chabod, 'Croce Storico', *Rivista Storica Italiana*, 64, (1952), 473-530.

first time in the ages there was born an Italian state with all and with only its own people, and moulded by an ideal. Victor Emmanuel II was right when he said, in his speech from the throne on April 2, 1860, that Italy was no longer the Italy of the Romans but 'the Italy of Italians.'⁵

So in Croce's view, there was no causal link between Italian liberalism that the founders of the state adopted. He argued that there were significant barriers to political and economic progress in Risorgimento Italy. In fact, despite the dependence of Italy on foreign powers, its internal disunity, its reactionary rulers and its economic backwardness, he believes, the liberal regime could be regarded as successful. It was only the First World War that destroyed this political system and made the rise of fascism possible.⁶

Gramscian Account of Risorgimento

Antonio Gramsci, on the other hand, saw a series of links between fascism and liberalism.⁷ He addressed the difficulties that were posed by Risorgimento regarding the distinction between the Hegelian distinction of 'State' and 'Civil Society'. According to him, the first difficulty was the cultural and economic divisions that existed between the North and the undeveloped South, and the educated classes and the illiterate masses. The second difficulty stemmed from the first difficulty and it was the tension

⁵ Benedetto Croce, *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1933), 225.

⁶ Benedetto Croce, *A History of Italy 1871-1915* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1963); Riall, *The Italian Risorgimento*, 3.

⁷ Antonio Gramsci, *Il Risorgimento* (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1954).

between the 'legal Italy' that was the set of liberal institutions resulting from political unification, and the 'real Italy' that was the fragmented social reality of divergent regional traditions, economic attainment and polarized classes, i.e., "the Southern question".⁸

Gramsci further argued that the Piedmontese project of unifying the peninsula was a hegemonic act. This hegemony, in his view, was the "formative principle of nations."⁹ In the beginning, every national hegemony entails dictatorship in order to unite politically various components of the nation. Its legitimacy, however, is derived from the national-popular will. In his view, Piedmont's unification of the peninsula by force of arms alone and the imposition of Piedmontese institutions on the rest of the country was justified by the belief that its temporary domination would allow the development of an uncoerced moral unity stemming from the people's growing sense of a common nationality.¹⁰

He regards the Risorgimento as a "failed bourgeois revolution" since it lacked mass following behind it. According to him, "the bourgeoisie could

⁸ Richard Bellamy and Schecter, Darrow. *Gramsci and the Italian State* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), 137.

⁹ Gramsci defined "hegemony" as "that species of primacy, of supremacy, of majority, which is neither legal nor juridical,..., but consists in the moral efficacy, that amongst many similar provinces sharing the same language and nationality, one of them exercises over the others." *Ibid.*, 138.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

not lead a successful revolutionary struggle against the ancien regime. The Italian bourgeoisie was incapable of uniting, and this was the cause of its defeat and interruptions in its development. Thus Risorgimento lacked a mass following, and a following among the largest section of the Italian population-the peasantry. Therefore, Risorgimento was a 'passive revolution'. The bourgeoisie in Italy, unlike its counterparts elsewhere in Europe, had not been strong enough to overthrow the existing feudal order and instead sought a moderate compromise with it.¹¹

The Causes of Rise of Fascism

The Legitimacy Crisis of the Italian State

As explained in the previous chapter, between the interaction of nationalist sentiment among limited sections of the population, the influence and involvement of foreign powers, and the ambitions of one Italian state, Piedmont finally created a united Italian state in 1870. The Risorgimento, as the movement for and achievement of Italian nationhood, presented to Italy a complex legacy. First, it aroused amongst politically conscious Italians exaggerated expectations concerning Italy's immediate prospects of power and prosperity; second, in forging a new nation without involving or satisfying the mass of the population it created a socio-political system

¹¹ Riall, *The Italian Risorgimento*, 2-3.

permeable with potential weaknesses and created a crisis of legitimacy for the newly-founded Italian state.¹²

The new state, endowed with a limited monarchy, a liberal-parliamentary constitution and a highly centralized administration, was from the start resented by many as an agent of 'Piedmontization'. National consciousness was uneven and, throughout much of rural, provincial Italy, extremely low; loyalties to fallen dynasties and historic regions persisted, whilst for millions of peasants the only reality was the locality, any outside authority being regarded as an intruder and potential exploiter. Economic and cultural differences aggravated regionalism and localism: much of southern Italy was barren, impoverished and isolated from progressive developments. Metternich had once called Italy a mere 'geographical expression'; now it resembled a mere political expression.¹³ In other words, to the outside, it seemed that 'Italian-ness' did exist and that Italy was an identifiable entity; but in reality the conception of Italy never a shared or collective value.¹⁴

¹² Martin Blinkhorn, *Mussolini and Fascist Italy*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 3.

¹³ Ibid., 4-5.

¹⁴ William Brierley and Luca Giacometti, "Italian National Identity and the Failure of Regionalism," in *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe* Brian Jenkins and Spyros A. Sofos, ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 173.

The gulf between the new Italian state and so many of its people was reflected in and widened by its liberal policies. Late nineteenth-century liberalism was narrowly based; only around half a million male Italians out of a population of approximately 32 million were enfranchised between 1870 and the electoral reform of 1881, whilst between then and the next reform in 1912 the electorate grew from 2 million to 3 million. For three decades after 1870 political office was monopolized by the limited layer of mainly upper-middle-class Italians who had risen to power during the Risorgimento. Increasingly referred to by the revealing term 'political class', these men, divided less by differences of belief or class change than by regional loyalties and personal rivalries, treated Italy to a system of parliamentary politics lacking clear party boundaries. Instead, through the practice known as *trasformismo*, premiers and their parliamentary managers fashioned constantly shifting majorities by extending favors to deputies and their constituencies. Elections, both before and after the 1881 reform, were characterized by bribery, manipulation and outright coercion of voters by local power-cliques and political "bosses". Parliament in consequence represented the political class itself and those bound to its members by family, local and economic ties in networks now known as "clienteles". Parliament's unrepresentativeness was exacerbated by the attitude of Italian Catholics. The absorption of papal territories into the emergent Italian kingdom during 1860-1, and the final occupation of Rome in 1870, provoked

the papacy into adopting a hostile posture towards the new state; for the rest of the century most devout Catholics did not take part in politics.¹⁵

Thus 'Italy' had a weak hold on the imagination and consciousness of a people who were now forced to think of themselves as Italians. However, as mentioned above, Italy was culturally fragmented in 1860 and the deeply felt regional identities and loyalties that divided the inhabitants of the new nation-state persisted. Parochialism and provincialism were deep-rooted and reinforced by the living traditions of the Renaissance Communes.¹⁶ Thus the concept of a unified, democratic and liberal Italy had limited popular appeal and unification was regarded as a French rather than an Italian invention. The monarchy, a fundamental guardian of national tradition, was neither popular nor indigenous in Italy. The House of Savoy was French, and many Italians regarded it as foreign. Piedmont and its capital, Turin, where the first parliament of the new Italian state convened were culturally French. Cavour's first language was French and the father of Italy spoke Italian only when necessary and then with difficulty.¹⁷ As a result, Italy, in 1922, sixty years after unification remained a 'state without a nation'.¹⁸

¹⁵ Blinkhorn, *Mussolini and Fascist Italy*, 4.

¹⁶ Christopher Seton-Watson, *Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925* (London and New York: Methuen, 1967), 13.

¹⁷ Mabel Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self. The Political Culture of Interwar Italy* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 43.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 45.

National Frustration in the International Arena

Hopes that a united Italy would automatically prove internationally powerful were soon dashed. Susceptible Italians recognized and sometimes resented the important contribution made by other states, especially France and Prussia, to Italy's creation; from this stemmed the acute sensitivity displayed for decades by both politicians and intellectuals concerning Italy's standing as what has been termed 'the least of the great powers'. Although Italy might have done better to settle for the second-class status dictated by its deficient natural resources, its consequent economic backwardness, and the sheer demands of nation-building, the mood generated by the Risorgimento and the climate of intensifying international competitiveness after 1870 ensured that it should instead seek Great Power status accorded to its fellow 'young' nation', Germany. Patriotic Italians considered the Risorgimento incomplete while large numbers of Italian-speakers remained subject to Austrian rule in the regions of Trentino and Trieste.¹⁹ The acquisition of these *terre irredente* (unredeemed lands) was the dream of Italian irredentists up until 1918.

Italy had interest also in territories outside Europe. The presence of large Italian communities in Africa, specifically in Tunis and Alexandria, the activities of Italian traders and missionaries earlier in the century, and a

¹⁹ Blinkhorn, *Mussolini and Fascist Italy*, 5.

pride in the expansionist histories of Rome, Genoa and Venice had convinced men like Francesco Crispi (prime minister in 1887-1891 and in 1893-1896), that Italy must again play an imperial role. The reason for this 'imperial venture' was also economic. The imperialists believed that the colonies would generate wealth for Italy's own enrichment and its geo-political confinement. Expansion to overseas territories would offer millions of Italian emigrants an 'Italian' alternative to South America and the United States. However, during 1881-1882, Italian ambitions in North Africa suffered setbacks when France occupied Tunis and Britain established de facto control over Egypt. The only prospect left for the Italians was Tripolitania. Italy's loss in North Africa directed its expansionist aims towards Ethiopia, with the aim of establishing a protectorate over all or part of Ethiopia. However, the imperialist dreams of Crispi were destroyed when the Italian army was defeated by Ethiopian forces at Adowa, where 5000 Italians were killed and 2000 taken as prisoner of war. This was a major turning point in the eyes of many Italians since the defeat of Adowa not only discredited the imperial idea but the liberal regime who aimed to realize it lost credibility. The revenge of this defeat was one of the ideas behind the rise of fascism in Italy.²⁰

Economic Crisis and Social Unrest

²⁰ Ibid., 5-6.

Beginning in the 1890s, Italy underwent a belated but far-reaching agrarian and industrial transformation which was followed by a political and social one. In agriculture, the backwardness of which had greatly contributed to Italy's general economic retardation, the introduction of capitalist methods and modern machinery created in the fertile Po Valley a new breed of rich *agrari* (agrarians), a numerous class of rural laborers and a significant intermediate layer of estate managers and technicians; in other regions such as Tuscany the process worsened the lives of poor tenant farmers and sharecroppers (peasants who were contractually obliged to surrender to the landlord a proportion, often half, of their crop or their earnings). In the north-western region bound by Milan, Turin and Genoa, rapid industrialization occurred with the development of heavy industry and its offshoots: iron and steel, metallurgy and engineering, shipbuilding and automobiles, electricity and chemicals.

By 1914 there had emerged in the north a powerful class of bankers and industrialists, closely bound to each other and to a protective state. As well as this new modern and localized working class, another new urban class was also emerging which was eager to fill managerial, bureaucratic and white-collar positions and to keep its distance from the proletariat. The effect of these developments was to alter radically the relationships within northern and central Italian society, generating conflicts which in their turn were to contribute massively to the rise of fascism.

Economic development affected southern Italy much less than the north and the center. The 'southern problem' shirked by early liberal governments, became only more intractable as industrialization and agricultural modernization widened the gap between the north and south. For the vast and under-employed rural population of the south an escape was offered by emigration to the Americas or North Africa; by 1914, when Italy's population was 35 million, between five and six million Italians were living abroad. Much of the south nonetheless remained economically backward and both socially and politically inert.²¹

The Impact of the First World War

The First World War was a very important turning point in the culmination of the crisis between the liberal state the rise of a fascist regime. Italy had won the war but it was unable to shape the peace settlements. First of all, the Fiume question was an important episode that flamed national sentiment among the population.²² The second issue was the Italian state's failure to

²¹ Blinkhorn, *Mussolini and Fascist Italy*, 6-7.

²² Fiume (Rijeka) was a former Hungarian port on the Croatian coast. In the Versailles Conference that took place in the aftermath of the First World War, President Wilson refused to concede Fiume or Dalmatia to Italy. Two months later when the government fell, the Italian army occupied Istria and Northern Dalmatia, but its allies had failed in Fiume. Thus Fiume was lost and the government did not do anything. This aroused a nationalist sentiment among the Italians and the prime minister was called 'abject coward'. So, a military coup was organized by prominent nationalists, top army officers and one or two industrialists in Fiume led by Gabriele D'Annunzio, a nationalist poet. He stayed there for fifteen months, hurling defiance at 'abject coward'. Thus

cope with the transition to peacetime economy, which resulted in massive unemployment and labor militancy. This caused resentment on the part of the industrialists who were not content with the intervention of the government to factory occupations. Third, the land occupations especially in the South by the soldiers returning from war was a great source of social unrest. As a result of the social turmoil in Italy, big landowners and tenants were threatened. Fourth and perhaps the most important, no stable political framework could overcome these difficulties. The old ruling class had been bitterly divided by the war: 'interventionists' against 'neutralists'.²³

As a result, the First World War was used by fascists in an instrumental way to create the image of Italy as a great imperial power. Even though the masses did not follow this policy, nevertheless the War did catalyze a sort of national consciousness, but this was achieved at a sub-cultural level, as a result of the real trauma that the First World War created among the people.²⁴

The emergence of fascism in Italy was characterized by two processes of mobilization: First, the primary mobilization of large sectors of the lower classes, second the secondary mobilization of large sectors of the middle classes. Both processes had been originated by the consequences of the war as

Fiume became a symbol of patriotic fervor and youthful vitality. See Martin Clark, *Modern Italy. 1871-1982* (London and New York: Longman, 1984), 203-205.

²³ Ibid., 211.

²⁴ Brierley and Giacometti, "Italian National Identity," 174.

mentioned above.²⁵ However, these mobilized sectors represented the segments that were not well-integrated into the political system. Thus the fascist ideology best served their interests with its emphasis on order, discipline and hierarchy, and through the demobilization of the lower classes; it displaced frustrations from an individual or class level to a national level in terms of such issues as territorial claims and dreams of imperial power. All these factors account for the formation and growth of a mass movement with a high revolutionary potential and an extreme authoritarian nature.

In line with this argument, Juan Linz argued that "fascism was the novel response to the crisis-profound or temporary- of the pre-war social structure and party system and to the emergence of new institutional arrangements as a result of war and post-war dislocations. It would be particularly acute in nations such as Italy, which were divided about entry into the war and disappointed with the fruits of victory."²⁶ Similarly, Lyttelton has argued that Fascism was the product of the tensions which economic modernization brought in agriculture as well as industry. The slogan of 'the proletarian nation' expressed Italy's grievance as a latecoming great power at not being

²⁵ Gino Germani, *Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978), 225.

²⁶ Juan J. Linz, "Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective," in Walter Laqueur ed. *Fascism. A Reader's Guide* (Great Britain: Scholar Press, 1976), 7. For a detailed account of the rise of fascism in Italy, see also Adrian Lyttelton, "Italian Fascism," in Laqueur, *Fascism*, 125-150.

able to obtain a satisfactory share of the profits of imperialist exploitation.²⁷ Benedetto Croce, the famous historian of the fascist period, considered fascism to be symptomatic of a temporary moral decline within Italian liberalism. Since the turn of the century, he argued, the liberal sense of freedom had been debased by materialism, nationalism and a growing admiration for heroic figures. The new masses thrust onto the political stage during these years lacked liberal sensitivities and were easily manipulated by a minority of fascist hooligans, while the governing class was temporarily corrupt and incompetent. Fascism was thus an interruption in Italy's achievement of ever greater 'freedom'. So Croce perceived fascism as a cure to the illnesses of the liberal regime.²⁸

Rapid industrialization, urbanization, war, and demobilization, it is suggested, tore millions of Italians from their customary local, personal, socio-economic and cultural relationships. Powerless and without any direction, these abandoned souls fell prey to skillful demagogues and well-organized minorities who were able to use them to challenge the dominance of the ruling elites. In other words, fascism restored a sense of identity and community to countless individuals alienated from the state.

²⁷ Adrian Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power. Fascism in Italy 1919-1929*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), 437.

²⁸ Blinkhorn, *Mussolini and Fascist Italy*, 54-55.

Nationalism and Regionalism in Fascist Ideology

The ideology of Italian nationalism was developed originally by the philosopher Gabriele D'Annunzio.²⁹ It was an ideology bearing many marks, almost all of them foreign and completely alien to the Italian tradition of the Risorgimento and directly opposed to its traditional and humanitarian spirit. Italian nationalism consciously rejected that spirit, declaring that the only important thing regarding the Risorgimento was its formation of the territorial state. The ideals of nationalism were the destruction of liberalism, democracy and socialism, in favor of the despotic dominance of the state, a purely abstract and formal entity, but one which assumed the function of an idol. The state would be a resurrection of the ancient absolute state.³⁰

The other most important ideologues of the fascist regime had been the philosopher Gentile and historian Gioacchino Volpe. They succeeded in presenting fascism as a movement which had overcome the limitations of nationalism and reached a new synthesis. They both had hoped that fascism would create a truly united nation in Italy. But by 1919, it had to be recognized that the war had driven yet another wedge between the state and people. The political consciousness of the masses had indeed been awakened, but not in the way that they had hoped. Hence Gentile, Volpe and a number

²⁹ See Jared M. Becker, *Nationalism and Culture. Gabriele D'Annunzio and Italy after the Risorgimento* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1994).

³⁰ Luigi Salvatorelli, *The Risorgimento: Thought and Action* (New York, Evanston and London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970), 185-186.

of other intellectuals rallied to the Fascist slogan of the 'defense of victory'. The task of fascism in their eyes was to revive and fulfil the unrealized war aims of the nation, not only in foreign policy, but also at home. Gentile was obsessed with the "urgent necessity of conquering a position in the world for ourselves at all costs", and he believed that the failure of Italy to obtain its due was the consequence of deficiencies in political education and moral unity. These deficiencies were to be overcome by a stringent discipline, through which alone the masses could be brought to understand the reality and value of the State. For Gentile's idealist philosophy, the State was weak because its institutions remained for its masses either as mere names or else external and coercive forces. The moral life of the individual was not organized by the idea of collectivity.

The problem for Gentile was that of how the *higher* Italy of the cultured Italians could organize and activate the great mass of citizens and thus create a true national consciousness.³¹ This end, he felt, could never be achieved if the individualist and utilitarian view of the state as a mere night watchmen was allowed to prevail. The State must instead be ethical, a positive educational force inspired by a belief in its own mission.³²

³¹ My emphasis.

³² Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power*, 375.

Emilio Gentile examined the fascist regime's symbolic aspects under the category of sacralization of politics. He situates the origins of fascism's political style within the historical context of the nineteenth century Europe. In the wake of the French revolution and later, the church and monarchy, the traditional embodiment of the sacred were defeated, the myth of Christendom was greatly shattered and the hierarchical model of social relations had been virtually liquidated. Also, the modern, secular notion of politics, which was coexistent with parliamentary representation, became the target of critical appraisals about its ability to unify the polity around common goals, particularly in view of the new social groups and classes asserting their political voice. In Italy, the critique of parliament and democracy, from which fascism originated, was rooted in the historical reality of the post-Risorgimento. The unification of the state in 1870 had not been followed by a genuine integration of the country's diverse population, and over the years the liberal political class had failed to heal the division between state and society despite various attempts at forging a civil and national spirit. At the beginning of the twentieth century, disillusionment over the liberal system and its inability to create a national consciousness among Italians fostered the demands for new forms of political style and government. Organizational questions on how to control and channel the political participation of workers associations, socialist parties, and unions paralleled the search for novel values that would endow Italy with spiritual unity that it had been lacking.³³ The clamoring for new models of political

³³ Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle. The Aesthetics of Power in*

rule became more strident in Italy at the end of the First World War, the experience of the trenches and the collective mobilization of human and material resources seemed to have unified the Italians in their common sacrifice for the nation.³⁴

Over the years the regime rewrote the history of ancient Rome and made of it a myth, which it celebrated yearly. War, as potentially regenerative and also expressive of the virility of the country, became another cultural myth of fascism. In general, for the fascists violence signified rebirth and renewal; they mystified the March on Rome as a 'revolution'. The rituals of the fascist regime were supposed to shape the Italians into fascist men.³⁵ The Fascist regime was prepared to allow a degree of liberty in the pursuit of cultural activities whose political relevance was not immediate or obvious. But those circles in the universities, among artists and writers whose ideas were not favorable to the regime were isolated from the public by strict control established over the main channels of information. Of these, the Press was the object of by far the greatest attention.³⁶

Mussolini's Italy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 5.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., 6-7.

³⁶ Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power*, 394.

Prior to the advent of fascism, according to such ideologues as Panunzio, Curcio and Bottai, the Italian State had been a spiritual void. Fascism, however, had filled that void with its idealism, its demand for faith, its belief in the active will, which fired the imagination and hope of the populace, binding them to the State so that the State and society could become one and the same, namely the Nation. In order for this to be actualized it was necessary to politicize the masses so as to encourage them to become the protagonists of the 'permanent revolution' rather than becoming its unquestioning supporters and followers. Indeed, it was Panunzio's belief that 'a fragmented and disorganized people which expresses its consent and its adherence were succeeded by an 'organized people' which continuously and in every moment expresses its consent and its adherence.³⁷

The change from the concept of class to the concept of nation involves a major change in conceptual framework. In fascism the fundamental unit of analysis is the nation. Fascism deifies the nation.³⁸ Moreover, the nation is not simply the numerical summation of the individuals comprising it, but it possesses a history, a cohesiveness, and a destiny of its own. The nation is thus an entity that is both real and ideal; it can be physically defined in terms of national boundaries and size of population, but it is more than these two features. It has a past that differentiates it from other nations and a future potential that

³⁷ Doug Thompson, *State Control in Fascist Italy. Culture and Conformity, 1925-43* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1991), 98-99.

³⁸ Mark Neocleous, *Fascism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), 22.

may and may not be achieved. The nation is seen as a biological organism that lives, breaths, grows and dies while individuals are seen as cells that perform their function and achieve fulfillment only insofar as the entire organism is healthy. The individual simply does not exist without the nation. If the nation thus constitutes the highest ethical entity, the state becomes its political manifestation, the expression of its will and power.³⁹ This particular notion of the nation-state was gradually developed yet it dominated Italian political thinking for the following 30 years.

Mussolini in his *The Doctrine of Fascism*, published in 1932, appropriately emphasizes the notion of nation-state as follows:

Fascism is...opposed to that form of democracy which equates a nation to the majority, lowering it to the level of largest number; but it is the purest form of democracy if the nation be considered-as it should be-from the point of view of quality rather than quantity, as an idea, the mightiest because the most ethical, the most coherent, the truest, expressing itself in a people as the conscience and will of the few, if not, indeed, of one, and tending to express itself in the conscience and the will of the mass, of the whole group ethnically moulded by natural and historical conditions into a nation, advancing, as one conscience and one will, along the self-same line of development and spiritual formation. Not a race, nor a geographically defined region, but a people, historically perpetuating itself; a multitude unified by an idea and imbued with the will to live, the will to power, self-consciousness, personality.⁴⁰

³⁹ David F. Ingersoll and Richard K. Matthews, *The Philosophic Roots of Modern Ideology: Liberalism, Communism, Fascism* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1986), 231.

⁴⁰ Ingersoll and Matthews, *The Philosophic Roots of Modern Ideology*, 221.

On another occasion in the 'Naples Speech' three days before the 1922 March on Rome, Mussolini was claiming that "We have created our myth. The myth is a faith, a passion. It is not necessary for it to be a reality. It is a reality in the sense that it is a stimulus, is hope, is faith, is courage. Our myth is the nation, our myth is the greatness of the nation!...For us the nation is not just territory, but something spiritual... A nation is great when it translates into reality the force of its spirit."⁴¹ One of the problems that the emergent fascist movement faced in Italy was the absence of a genuine Italian national myth, despite the movement's own invocation of the myth of the nation. The reasons for this lie in Italy's failure to begin to become a nation-state until 1861, a major reason for which was the myth of Rome, embodied in the papacy, and its ubiquitous challenge to national liberation movements. Mussolini, reaffirming this view, had stated:

Through centuries of conquest at the greedy hands of Barbaric hordes, Italy has been, and remains the goal of reverent pilgrimage by the notable geniuses of the North... The Shines, the beacon of civilization. Irrespective of time and fortune, it has not been extinguished. Rome as it was in the times of Augustus, remains the city toward which men of all nations turn-and [he] who loves Rome, must love Italy. Italy is preparing a new epoch in the history of humanity.⁴²

⁴¹ Cited from Mussolini's 'Naples Speech' in *Fascism*, Mark Neocleous, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), 20.

⁴² Mussolini, *Un grande amico dell'Italia: Augusto von Platen*, "Opera", 2, 171ff, cited in *Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism*, A. James Gregor, (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1979), 74.

Neocleous quotes J. L. Talmon who argues that the myth of the unique and at the same time universal significance of Rome was so deeply-embedded in the Italian mind that the claim to secular, national self-determination seemed a poor, inadequate, indeed demeaning challenge in comparison with the myth of the universal church, the heir of the imperial myth.⁴³ In this context, he argues, the Italian fascists understood that the nation and state become crucial. First, the nation should be created, and the only force to create it was the state. Thus it is not the nation that creates the state, but it is the state that creates the nation.

The idea that the nation, whichever nation it happens to be, must be 'disciplined' is a central article of belief in the ideologies of the Right, hence their habitual claim to moral superiority. However, the 'nation' in this context invariably turns out to be the laboring classes while the traditional life style, wealth and privilege of the ruling classes are protected and guaranteed by much strengthened laws.⁴⁴

Once the violent revolutionary phase was over, the importance of the Party declined rapidly and the dominant characteristic of the State became its nationalism. The 'national interest' and 'national greatness' were the myths around which Fascism moulded the State and which it sought by every

⁴³ Neocleous, *Fascism*, 24.

⁴⁴ Thompson, *State Control in Fascist Italy*, ix.

available means to fix, as though it was a religion, in the hearts and minds of the Italian people.⁴⁵

For Mussolini and his supporters, the importance the state possessed can be appreciated in the light of Italian history. As noted, although the formal unification of Italy was completed in 1871, the country remained deeply divided. Unlike Germany Italy did not possess a unified culture nor even a common language. Regional dialects persisted and allegiances to local towns or provinces were not easily replaced by an affection for the newly created Italy. Most obviously, there was persistent antagonism between the industrialized North and the rural and the more backward South. In short there was an Italy but no Italians. As a nationalist, Mussolini wished to create a national consciousness, to forge an Italian nation, and the instrument through which he sought to achieve this objective was the Italian state. Mussolini's goal was to politicize the Italian people. In his words, 'the nation is created by the state, which gives to the people, unconscious of its own moral unity, a will and therefore an effective existence.'⁴⁶

Fascism inherited a tradition of chauvinistic and expansionist nationalism, which developed in the years before the First World War. Nations were regarded not as equal and interdependent, but as natural rivals in a struggle

⁴⁵ Ibid., xi.

⁴⁶ Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies. An Introduction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 181.

for dominance. Fascism sought to achieve more than mere patriotism, the love of one's country; it wished to establish an intense and militant sense of national identity, what has been called 'integral nationalism'. Fascism embodied a sense of messianic or fanatical mission: the prospect of national regeneration and the rebirth of national pride. Indeed, the popular appeal which fascism attracted was largely based upon the promise of national greatness. In practice, the notion of national regeneration led to the assertion of power over other nations through expansionism, war and imperialism. Through the invasion of Abyssinia in 1934, Italy sought to realize the grotesque dream of a "resurrection of the empire".⁴⁷

In many ways the nation served the same function for fascism as class did for Marxism. Fascism adopted from the nationalists the concept of Italy as a 'proletarian nation', oppressed by the richer, more highly developed capitalist nations.⁴⁸ Thus, according to official theory and propaganda, fascism was a 'totalitarian' system requiring not merely the passive conformity of all Italians but their sincere commitment to, and active participation in, a heroic enterprise of national regeneration.⁴⁹

Fascist Policies in Attempting to 'Make Italians'

⁴⁷ Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, 180; Salvatorelli, *The Risorgimento*, 195.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Blinkhorn, *Mussolini and Fascist Italy*, 37.

The year 1925 saw a revival and extension of the ideological and cultural ambitions of fascism. Mussolini and Gentile proclaimed the totalitarian character of fascism. The task was defined as that of creating a new national consciousness, a new mode of life, a new type of Italian. No field of national life was, in theory, to be exempt, it was the 'whole man' who must be remodeled.⁵⁰

The style in which Italian nineteenth century nation-state builders imagined Italy sharply differed from the style in which Italian citizens constructed their identities. Non-contingent Italian identities tended to be private and were tied to family, region and religion. The cultural communities of family, region and religion provided the schemata that were the sources of Italian self. The unification and the fascist project were attempts to supplant regional identities with national identities. Regionalism was a fact of Italian political and cultural life that no Italian regime has successfully overcome. Thus the cultural architects of the fascist project tried to transpose the rules of the Italian cultural game.⁵¹

The Fascist era was marked by a sharp swing in the direction of centralization. A series of laws culminating in the Provincial and Communal Law of 1934 abolished all elected local and provincial authorities and

⁵⁰ Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power*, 381.

⁵¹ Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self*, 48-49.

replaced them with state appointees. The elected mayor was replaced by an appointed *podesta* advised by an appointed council, *consulta*. The position of the prefect in local government was enormously strengthened although he was checked somewhat by the party bureaucracy and the police agencies. However, fascist centralization did not represent a sharp break with the liberal past; rather it simply accentuated the centralizing tendencies already present in the liberal constitutional monarchy of 1871-1922.⁵²

The law of 24 December 1925, which dealt with "The Powers and Prerogatives of the Head of Government", set Mussolini officially above all other ministries and effectively concentrated all executive powers in his hands, for it gave him the sole right to decide what should or should not be debated by either the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate.⁵³ Other important laws passed on 4 February 1926 were those which abolished the rights of communes of fewer than 5000 inhabitants to elect their municipal councils- a law which was later (3 September 1926) extended to include all communes of whatever size, and even provincial councils, substituting instead both mayors (*podesta*) and councils (*consulte*) appointed directly by the government; and finally that which greatly increased the powers and the status of the provincial prefects so as to make them undisputedly the most authoritative

⁵² Raphael Zariski, "Italy: The Distributive State and the Consequences of Late Unification," in *Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective*, eds., Marc. O. Rousseau and Raphael Zariski (New York: Praeger, 1987), 97.

⁵³ Thompson, *State Control in Fascist Italy*, 9.

State officials in the provinces (6 April 1926). By early September 1926, the State had greatly increased its authority at the expense of both the individual and collective freedoms of the Italian people, and had made it impossible for anyone not in sympathy with the aims and methods of the regime to express dissent in any effective way.⁵⁴

Another important fascist policy was the repression of ethnic minorities which had begun to raise their voices after the First World War. What Mussolini seems to have been concerned with primarily was the national dignity of the new, ideal *Homo Fascistus*, and in this sense the racial campaign was perhaps intended as just another aspect of the cultural engineering, the 'fascistization' of the nation, to compensate massively for a sense of racial inferiority in comparison with other Europeans.⁵⁵ From 1922 on, Volpe, the famous historian of the fascist regime edited the *Archivio storico per la Corsica*, upon Mussolini's desire, with the intention of furthering the idea of the island's *italianita* [italian-ness].⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Thompson, *State Control in Fascist Italy*, 10. For a detailed account of the fascist policies regarding over-centralization, see Sandro Fontana ed., *Il fascismo e le autonomie locali* [Fascism and the local autonomies], (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1973) and in particular, Ettore Rotelli, "Le trasformazioni dell'ordinamento comunale e provinciale durante il regime fascista," [The Transformation of the communal and provincial laws during the fascist regime] in *ibid.*, 73-156. See also Zariski, "Italy: The Distributive State," 97.

⁵⁵ Thompson, *State Control in Fascist Italy*, 142.

⁵⁶ Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power*, 413.

In the newly-acquired lands of Italy, substantial ethnic minorities existed. 228.000 Germans lived in the South Tyrol, 327.000 Slovenes and 98.000 Croats in Venezia-Giulia and they were determined to preserve their languages and customs. However, the Fascists were far too nationalistic to permit any such thing. They insisted upon the use of Italian in the primary schools, although hardly any of the local children could understand it. They also suppressed private teaching. Italian had to be the spoken language in public offices, courts and the like. As a result of this policy, some local officials lost their jobs. In addition, German and Slav names were Italianized. Even the inscriptions on the tombstones were changed. This was a real *Kulturkampf*, and it was not restricted to cultural symbols.⁵⁷ The jobs were at stake in teaching and administration and, Italians from other regions were encouraged to settle in North-East Italy. After 1934, a new industrial zone was set up in Bolzano, partly to speed on the "Italianization" process. By 1939, there were about 80.000 'Italians' in the South Tyrol, far more than in 1921.

With these draconian measures, the Fascist regime succeeded only in arousing resentment and increasing resistance especially in Val D'Aosta⁵⁸,

⁵⁷ Clark, *Modern Italy*, 252.

⁵⁸ For the autonomy movement and resistance in Val d'Aosta see E. Passerin d'Entreves, "La Lotta per l'autonomia e la difesa del francese in Valle

South Tyrol⁵⁹ and Sardinia⁶⁰. The process of “forced national integration” did not work. The local priests led the cultural resistance, continuing to preach and teach in German or Slovene, and organizing clandestine private schools. Church-State relations became more tense in these regions than anywhere else in Italy, and in 1936 Bishop Fogar of Trieste was even forced out of office. In South Tyrol, the Germans were isolated rather than assimilated. Deprived of schools and urban jobs, they remained defensive and desperate in their rural ghettos. In Venezia-Giulia even more severe forms of resistance appeared. Italian teachers were driven out of schools, bombs exploded in public buildings regularly and local terrorists assassinated police and militiamen. There were five Slavs out of the people condemned to death by the Fascist Tribunal before 1940. In these regions, anti-fascism became deeply ingrained and became synonymous with anti-Italianism.⁶¹

Another important aspect of Fascist propaganda to mention was the growing regimentation of leisure activities. It was in this field, where measures of social welfare and control went hand in hand, that the policy of Fascism made the greatest impact on large numbers of people. This was an area

d'Aosta,” in *Il fascismo e le autonomie locali* [Fascism and the local autonomies], ed., Sandro Fontana (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1973), 233-252.

⁵⁹ For the autonomist movement in South Tyrol, see G. Negri, “L'autonomismo nell'Alto Adige,” in *ibid.*, 205-232.

⁶⁰ On the Sardinian autonomist movement see S. Sechi, “L'autonomismo in Sardegna,” in *ibid.*, 301-327.

⁶¹ Clark, *Modern Italy*, 252-253.

where the party held an important function after 1926, working through its auxiliary organizations, the *Dopolavoro* (After-Work), the *Balilla*, the *Avanguardia*, and the *Fasci Femminili*.⁶² The *Dopolavoro* was the most effective instrument of the regime for penetrating the working class.⁶³

In 1928-1929 in schools, the curricula began to be revised so as to give a much larger place to direct political indoctrination. In the elementary schools, change was sweeping. On 24 February 1928, the Cabinet passed a decree ordering that all textbooks for history, geography, reading, economics and law used in the elementary schools and the 'supplementary courses' for the age group 11-14, should respond to the 'requirements' of the new period inaugurated by the March on Rome. A committee was set up to prepare a single State textbook whose use would be obligatory in all public elementary schools. In the new textbook, every subject was used for propaganda, even

⁶² "The creation of the new Fascist man was not left to schools only. The youth organizations of the fascist regime gained further importance after 1926. On 3 April 1926, they were united and given a legal status under the name of the *Balilla* for children aged 8-15, and *Avanguardie* (15-18), plus the *piccole Italiane* for the girls, soon became a powerful instrument for the totalitarian regimentation of youth. The cadres of *Balilla* were drawn from the schoolteachers, and those of *Avanguardie* from officers of the Militia." See *ibid.*, 408-409.

⁶³ In 1926, the *Dopolavoro* still had only 280.000 members over half of which were railwaymen and postmen. In 1927, however, it had 440.000, and in 1930, 1.400.000. In the South, the *Dopolavoro*, like the Fascist unions, was a real innovation since previously no associations had existed except the circles where notables played cards. *Dopolavoro* was the other important pillar of the Fascist regime. It was within *Dopolavoro* that an office for 'popular culture' was first created. See, Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power*, 401-402.

music and arithmetic: the children learned to sing Fascist hymns and their aggregate were illustrated by figures of the Balilla.⁶⁴

Another important project of the fascist regime were the public rituals that were aimed at creating a new fascist and Italian nation-state and identity.⁶⁵ The regime also expended a great deal of effort in reviving traditional holidays and fairs and putting a fascist stamp on them. The local events aimed at promoting links between the center and periphery were to reinforce the idea that fascist collectivity was the nation and the state.⁶⁶ Public rituals were important since they produced a feeling of solidarity-“we are all together”, “we must share something”. Thus, collective national selfhood could be enacted and collective memory produced.⁶⁷ The first of these public rituals was the invention of the events of 27-28 October 1922, as “the March on Rome”. Public events surrounding the first anniversary of the March on Rome established a ritual genre of commemoration that would be repeated every year until the regime fell in 1943.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Ibid., 410.

⁶⁵ Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self*, 66.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 99, 169.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 250.

⁶⁸ Salvatorelli argues, “after the March on Rome, the construction of Mussolini’s Fascist state was completed. National Fascism realized itself fully as anti-Risorgimento. It brought the suppression of all liberties, the discrediting and destruction of parliament, justice linked to political power, party privilege annulling equality among citizens, exploitation of the national

Consequences of the Fascist Regime

Fascism was essentially a military regime. So, too, was the Fascist economic and social policy. Fascist agriculture was a strategic resource designed to feed an army; Fascist demographic policy was supposed to breed one. The industrial sector became a vast 'military-industrial complex' geared to armaments and Empire. The regime could be assessed in military terms. All the efforts at mobilization and *italianita*, however, did not help to make Italians. By 1939 the regime had become more unpopular than ever before. Fascist Italy failed by its own criteria, and in failing, transformed the Italian economy and society once again.⁶⁹

Like the earlier Roman empires the Fascist regime crumbled first at the periphery. The Sicilians nursed their grievances and founded secret autonomous associations to struggle against the 'Continental'. In the South Tyrol, most of the inhabitants were 'Optanten' who had voted to leave Italian citizenship and who were regarded from 1940 onwards as German citizens subject to German law.

economy for the advantage of bands of profiteers, and the subjection and pollution of national culture through gross and inconsistent conceptions hostile to the humanistic principles fundamental to the new Italy. Salvatorelli, *The Risorgimento*, 191.

⁶⁹ Clark, *Modern Italy*, 278.

Even among the population at large, fascism's impact was uneven. Throughout much of rural, and especially southern Italy another fascist compromise allowed existing power structures to survive, either alongside, or actually disguised as those of the party. The village of Gagliano in the southern region of Lucania, immortalized by Carlo Levi's *Christ Stopped at Eboli*, exemplifies fascism's failure to impinge on everyday rural life. Urban Italians were to be exposed to fascist propaganda through school, press, radio, cinema, and the various organizations of the party, but such things barely penetrated southern countryside. With one southern power-group, however, the fascist regime refused to compromise. In Sicily, the Mafia whose ability to operate its own system of administration and 'justice', was plainly incompatible with 'totalitarianism'; it was resolutely pursued and apparently suppressed; however, the Mafia moved underground.⁷⁰

Although bureaucratic nationalization of the middle classes succeeded at least partially, that of the working class and peripheral Italy failed miserably. The reasons for this lie in working class alienation from the fascist regime and the appeal that the Soviet Revolution had in the working class imagination in the pre-fascist period, together with the persistence of the deep-rooted local cultural traditions. Thus the objective of creating a national identity was reduced to that of making the masses faithful and obedient to

⁷⁰ Blinkhorn, *Mussolini and Fascist Italy*, 38.

their fascist masters. In addition, the mobilization capacity of the Fascist Party was exhausted: 'fascist leaders and mere hangers-on subsided into a repetitive, tired routine, devoid of tension and creative impetus. To all of this must be added the Second World War which as well as military defeat, meant death, devastation, deportation, starvation and horror which shattered forever the fascist grandeur. The failure of the attempt to 'make Italians' did not lead, however, to the collapse of the idea of nation. In fact, sub-national and sub-cultural notions persisted, which taken together, still gave a sense, in many ways, of 'being Italian', though in a different manner.⁷¹

⁷¹ Brierley and Giacometti, "Italian National Identity," 175.

CHAPTER V

REGIONALISM AND REGIONALIZATION IN ITALY IN THE POST-FASCIST PERIOD

The post- World War II period which is also referred to in Italy as the Republican period is an important time in order to understand the causes of the present crisis that the Italian state has been going through regarding national integrity. During this period, the Italian state pursued policies that aimed at continuing the national integration process under the democratic premises that hopefully would erase the remnants of the Fascist interlude.

The Resistance Movement as a Fragmentary Force Between the North and the South

The Fascist period had a serious impact upon the process of national integration in Italy as mentioned in the previous chapter. The most revealing paradox in Mussolini's attempt to "make Italians" was that it did finally have the effect of launching a powerful movement of national solidarity which was aimed at destroying fascism forever.¹ The power of the Resistance

¹ "The armistice of September 1943 left Italy divided South of Rome between Allied and Nazi-controlled areas. Millions of Italians north of this line faced

movement provided a vital prerequisite for the country's rapid resurgence as a liberal democracy. It was the resurgence again in which 'the *paese reale* (real country) had risen heroically to free itself from dictatorship'.² Clark argues that the real effect of Resistance was political. It not only aborted Fascist attempts to restore 'national unity' but a new 'national unity' based on anti-Fascist terms was established. The peasants were involved in the national struggle to liberate their territories from Fascist rule.³ Post-Fascist Italy was to be a 'partyocracy' legitimized by the overriding ideology of anti-Fascism and national unity.

The most significant consequence of the Second World War was that in its last years it gave rise to a Resistance movement. Nevertheless, it was primarily a northern phenomenon that served to impede the growth of understanding between the North and the South⁴ and at the same time had some divisive effects upon Italian politics and society. The role played by the Communists in the Resistance movement was very important. In 1943-45, the PCI (*Partita*

stark choices: to fight alongside Nazis for the Salò Republic, to carry on with everyday life at the risk of being sent to German labor camps, or to join the Resistance.", See Roger Griffin, "Italy," in Roger Eatwell ed., *European Political Cultures: Conflict or Convergence?* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 144.

² Ibid.

³ Martin Clark, *Modern Italy 1871-1982* (London and New York: Longman, 1984), 315.

⁴ Joseph La Palombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), 55.

Comunista Italia) became a major force in the emerging anti-Fascist establishment, "of dedication to the State and to the interests of the nation rather than the Proletariat".⁵ Yet, the Resistance was restricted to Northern and Central Italy. There had been no popular insurrections in the South, apart from Naples in September 1943 before the Allies arrived. The old Southern political and economic system remained intact, and the Left parties were very weak there. Even in Rome itself there had been no insurrection against the Germans.⁶ As a result, when the 1946 referendum took place, all Northern and Central regions, except Latium, voted for the Republic whereas Rome and all the South voted monarchist, with a peak vote of 79 percent in Naples. The 1946 referendum revealed a very important turning point in the problem of national integration with a capacity to predict the forthcoming regional problems in the following decades: "the values of Resistance flourished only where the Resistance flourished. This had remained true ever since. The referendum highlighted the split between a conservative, monarchist South and a radical, Republican North and it proved an excellent guide to subsequent voting patterns."⁷

It is also important to note the incredible increase in the votes for the DC (*Democrazia Christiana*) in the aftermath of the Fascist interlude, a

⁵ Clark, *Modern Italy*, 313.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 316.

development which had a crucial impact on the future attempts and consequences of national integration in Italy. Taking advantage of the Cold War atmosphere and the threat of Communism, the DC had both the financial support of the United States and the Church behind it. The 1947 Christmas message from the Pope was very crucial in this respect. He warned that “he who gives his support, his services and his talents to those parties and forces that deny God is a deserter and a traitor.”⁸

The consequence of the 1946 referendum was the resentment and distancing between the Left-Wing Northerners and the DC supporters. The Left-wing Northerners resented the fact that the DC was relying on the old Roman institutions as the police, judiciary, prefects, and civil service, none of which was liberal. They felt that their revolution had been betrayed, their claims to rule had been ignored, the state they had created had been snatched from them. ‘They had defeated Fascism after years of hard fighting; they had founded the Republic. Yet, within two years, another ‘one-party regime’ had been established...Ever since 1947-48, radical Northerners have seen the

⁷ Ibid., 319.

⁸ The effect of this message was an enormous increase in the votes of the DC which would establish the party as the only party in the postwar period with a solid mass support. While the votes of the Popular Democratic Front of Socialists and Communists increased from 31 percent in 1946 to 39.8 percent in 1947, the votes of the DC increased from 35.2 percent in 1946 to 48.5 percent in 1947. See Ibid., 325.

Rome establishment as illegitimate; indeed as 'Fascist'; their resentment has proven a constant source of weakness to the Republic'.⁹

This resentment by the Northerners added another dimension to the already-existing gap between the Northerners and Southerners and played a negative role in the attempts to 'make Italians'. An important example revealing the degree of resentment by the Northerners towards the Southerners was revealed in the issue of civil service recruitment. Many of the recruits for the bureaucracy were reliable Southerners recommended by priest or bishop, or brought in by Allied administrators unwilling to rely on Left-wing partisans. The "wind from the North" may have blown a few Northerners into government in 1945, but the South wind proved stronger. The machinery of the state was *meridionalized* (Southernized) particularly at the upper echelons. Since 1948 over half of Italy's senior civil servants have been Southerners and the proportion shown up in surveys increased steadily: 54 percent in 1954, 63 percent in 1961, 76 percent in 1965. Thus the civil service, which in the pre-Fascist times had been small and Northern, became big and Southern. It further alienated Northerners, including many Christian Democrats, from the postwar State. Moreover, it created a gulf of mutual suspicion and hostility between the ruling politicians, who were predominantly Northerners

⁹ Ibid, 325. See also Raphael Zariski, *Italy. The Politics of Uneven Development* (Illinois, Hinsdale: The Dryden Press, 1972), 98. Zariski argues that "the Resistance experience which was shared only by the Northern Italians somewhat estranged the South."

appealing to anti-Fascist values, and the permanent administrators, who were predominantly Southerners with no experience of Resistance.¹⁰ Thus the developments after 1945 became effective in party formation in Italy and institutionalization of hostilities between the North and the South, thereby making the national integration process even harder.

The Italian State's Policies for National Integration in the Post-Fascist Period

The two major issues that the post-Fascist state in Italy dealt with had been **democratization**, that would eradicate the past remnants of the Fascist period and **development** together with **modernization** that was expected to overcome social and economic inequalities in the country. The most important indication of the desire for democratization was the recognition of the gap between the politicians and the people and thus the revival of the debate on centralization/decentralization. The fascist experience was thought to be the result of a too centralized state. It was recognized that some form of decentralization was necessary to keep the country intact and to close the gap between the state and citizens.

However, attempts at national integration were not very successful and produced some unexpected results which will be taken up in this chapter.

¹⁰ Clark, *Modern Italy*, 338.

Carlo Triglia argued that in Italy the most important difference compared to other cases is that ethnic identities did not play an important role as fragmentary forces, because these conditions did not exist in Italy. What existed instead was a particular relationship between the center and periphery-national government and provinces- based on weak national integration, a consequence of the process of national unification and the lack of a national myth.¹¹ Cassese and Torchia argue that the highly centralized state was an *aim* to pursue, unlike France where it was the starting condition.¹² The social, economic and political backwardness of southern Italy and some areas in the Center and North covering the Alpine and Appenine mountain ranges was considered to be the result of backward institutions. The regular and uniform application of the more advanced Piedmontese institutions¹³, it was assumed, would have led to the development of these areas.

The First Wave of Administrative Integration: The 1948 Constitution

¹¹Percy Allum, *State and Society in Western Europe* (Great Britain: Polity Press, 1995, 150.

¹² My emphasis. Sabino Cassese and Luisa Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," In *The Rise of the Meso Level in Europe*, ed., Jim L. Sharpe (London: Sage Publications, 1993), 92.

¹³ "Piedmontese" institutions were perceived as the state apparatus that a modern, unitary and centralized state would have. The region Piedmont, located in Northern Italy, even closer to the French border and under high French influence had the modern state structure that was inherited from the Napoleonic state administration.

This Napoleonic pattern of thought changed in the aftermath of the Fascist interlude that Italy went through even though the history of Italian political and administrative institutions during the last 120 years can be described in very general terms as a continual effort to reduce asymmetries and create uniform conditions throughout the country¹⁴ that would culminate in 'making Italians' as well as 'making Italy'. However, Ragioneri argued that this was a "creation of unity through administrative pressure as well as through the national government".¹⁵

The basic models characterized by centralization and uniformity to reach political and administrative unification were basically imported from France through the Napoleonic influence. However, there is a main difference between the French system and the Italian one regarding the functioning of the system which is attributable to two conditions peculiar to Italy: first, the conditions of unequal development within the country, which are particularly due to the social, economic and political backwardness of the south and some areas of the center and north, and second, the lack of the homogeneity of the ruling class. The coexistence of the northern industrialists and the southern landowners was an economic and political compromise,

¹⁴ Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 91.

¹⁵ Carlo Rosetti, "Constitutionalism and Clientelism in Italy," in *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*, eds., Luis Roniger and Ayse Günes-Ayata (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 92.

although both sides had different interests.¹⁶ As will be elaborated below, this latter factor in a way formed an obstacle to national integration.

Setting up the Italian regions was a complex and tortuous process requiring a long period of preparation from 1871 till 1970. The 'regional problem' has been a topic subjected to proposals and political contrasts right from the unification of the Italian state. The evolution of regionalism was merely in the realm of ideas and was not reflected on the institutions. One reason for this was that there were no 'regional communities' in Italy¹⁷, in the sense of a Basque or Catalan regional communities. Rather, the main territorial units that had legitimacy were the communes or municipalities, as also noted in Chapter 2. The boundaries of regions established in the Constitution are, in fact, the boundaries of the ancient 'statistical departments' set up almost a century earlier. The attempt to draw and establish new boundaries was rapidly ruled out by sharp disagreement on the constitutive elements of regional identity and by the bias against differentiation and particularism which has been an underlying institutional experience since unification in 1861. The fact of Italy as a 'late-comer' among nation state system explains, at least partly, why unity and uniformity have been so important and relevant

¹⁶ Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 92.

¹⁷ For more details see Adrian Lyttelton, "Shifting Identities: Nation, Region and City," in Carl Levy (ed.) *Italian Regionalism. History, Identity and Politics*, (Washington D. C.: Berg, 1996), 33-52. Also Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 93.

in political life. The country's localist and particularist heritage had to be converted into a unitarian nation-state. Otherwise, this particularism would render the state vulnerable to foreign attacks and conquests as happened in the past. Thus, it is understandable why uniformity was a main target to be achieved by the leaders of the state. It is also important to note that the different traditions of the pre-unification states were almost never allowed to survive, because they were often linked with domination by foreign powers. That is the main reason why pre-unification differentiation has never emerged as an important feature of sub-national politics in the modern Italian state.¹⁸

In 1947-1948, the principle of regionalism had been included in the Italian Constitution.¹⁹ Christian Democrats from Sturzo onwards were regionalists.

¹⁸ Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 114.

¹⁹ The literature on regionalism in Italy in the postwar period is vast. Some important works include, Gaspare Ambrosini, *L'Ordinamento Regionale. La Riforma Regionale nella Costituzione Italiana* [Regional Laws. Regional Reform in the Italian Constitution], (Bologna: Zanichelli Editore, 1957), Feliciano Benvenuti and Elio Caranti, *Le Regioni* [The Regions], (Roma: PAMOM, 1971), Ettore Rotelli, *L'Avvento della Regione in Italia* [The Advent of the Region in Italy], (Milano: Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, 1967), Enzo Santarelli, *Dossier sulle Regioni* [Dossier on the Regions], (Bari: De Donato Editore, 1970), Enzo Santarelli, *Il Regionalismo nell'Italia Unita* [Regionalism in United Italy. History of the Idea of Regionalism up to the Republic], (Firenze: Editore Bulgarini, 1973), Robert D. Putnam, R. Leonardi, R. Nanetti, *La Pianta e le Radici: Il Radicamento dell'Istituto Regionale nel Sistema Politico Italiano* [The Plant and the Roots: The Establishment of the Regional Institute in the Italian Political System], (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1985), Paola Bonora, *Regionalità: Il Concetto di Regione nell'Italia del Secondo Dopoguerra 1943-1970* [Regionalism: The Concept

Regionalism had to be introduced because of the collapse of the fascist state and the emerging serious threats of revolt or ethnic or linguistic differences from mainland Italy.²⁰ This was the case in Sicily and Sardinia, in French-speaking Val d'Aosta, in German-speaking South Tyrol and in Slav-speaking parts of Venezia-Giulia. Italian politicians had no choice but to grant autonomy to these regions to be able to keep the country intact. Centralization was considered to be a typical product of fascist authoritarianism, and the distribution of power, which regionalism would have brought about, appeared to be the most effective solution for safeguarding the democratic system. The Regions were regarded as multi-purpose entities. They were "for the reform of the state", "for the benefit of planning", "for greater participation", "as a political instrument to relieve social, political and other pressures on the center, by defusing tensions that were so typical of Italy".²¹ But perhaps the most important reason was to shrink the traditional administrative apparatus in Italy.

of Regions in Italy after The Second World War 1943-1970], (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1984).

²⁰ See Marco Walter Battachi, *Meridionali e Settentrionali nella Struttura del Pregiudizio Etnico in Italia* [The Southerners and Northerners in the Structure of Ethnic Prejudice in Italy], (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1959).

²¹ Ettore Rotelli, "Le Regioni dalla Partecipazione al Partito," ["The Regions from Participation to Party]. in *La Crisi Italiana* [In The Italian Crisis], L. Graziano and S. Tarrow, eds., (Turin: Einaudi, 1979) in Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 97.

Cassese and Torchia enumerate the three basic reasons for the regional clause in the Constituent Assembly as follows:

- (1) The need to distribute power in such a way so as to prevent a single party from taking over. It is for this reason that the Christian Democrats were in favor of the regions at the time, whereas the Communists were against them.
- (2) The need to bring rulers and ruled together. For example, the creation of points of access and consultation and bringing the institutions closer to citizens were the places of resistance of a certain wing of Italian regionalism, which was aware of the low level of representative, administrative and political institutions at the time. This theme of the gap between the institutions and the people is a recurring theme in post-war Italian politics.
- (3) The need to increase the rate of citizens' participation in public life to overcome the democratic deficit.

So, the four regions 'with special statutes' were created. They were allowed to elect their own assemblies, and were granted certain legislative and administrative powers.²² The local elites could preserve their own languages

²² Article 117 of the Constitution specified 17 headings under which the region may legislate: municipal boundaries, urban and rural police forces, fairs and markets, public charities, health and hospital assistance, vocational training and financial assistance to students; local museums and libraries, urban planning and tourism and the hotel industry, regional transport networks (excluding railways), regional roads, aqueducts and other public

and cultures, manage their own economies and welfare systems. This remedy worked and the regional agitations died down when the regions obtained the powers they demanded. The words of the President of the *Sudtiroler Volkspartei* to de Gasperi reflected this content. He said: "no one better than you, born in Trentino, can understand the desire for autonomous government rooted in our people for centuries. Autonomy is not a threat to national unity but the finest way of capturing the hearts of our people."²³

However, the powers allocated to regional and local government are not extensive by international standards. Italian regionalism is distinct from strong forms of federalism in various ways. Fewer powers are devolved, there are virtually no areas of 'exclusive' legislative powers attributed to the regions, financial autonomy is extremely limited and there is no formal representation of regional authorities in the legislature.²⁴ Another area of limitation is that in addition to the general powers allocated under Article 117, the Constitution adds an additional category of regional legislative power. However, it grants the central state the power to take back, as well as to delegate authority. Regional legislation is to be constrained 'within the

works, lake navigation and ports, mineral and spa waters, extractive industries, hunting and inland fisheries, agriculture and forestry and artisanship. See David Hine, *Governing Italy. The Politics of Bargained Pluralism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 266.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Hine, *Governing Italy*, 259.

limits of the fundamental principles decided by the State', and the region is free to legislate 'provided that such legislation is not against the interests of the Nation, or of other Regions'. Such a principle gives the center an important advantage in its relations with regional government, although the relationship is not entirely one-sided.²⁵ However, most articles in the 1948 Constitution were not applied properly and ended up with a shift towards centralism. The main reasons for the failure of the implementation of the regional clause in the Constitution were political. The DC was afraid that the creation of regions would increase the votes of Communists in some regions. In addition, even though the Fascist regime was overthrown, many bureaucrats with a centralized mentality remained in office; they strongly opposed the creation of regions. As a result, underdeveloped conditions of some parts of the country were used as an excuse to revert back to the centralized policies that were associated with the welfare state.²⁶

The Second Wave of Administrative Integration: The 1970 Regionalization

At the end of the 1960s, the economic growth and the emergence of a non-Fascist national identity especially among the newly-recruited ranks of the bureaucracy provided the necessary environment for regionalization to take place. In addition, by the late 1960s and the beginning of 1970s, the old centralized system started to break down further. It was unable to provide

²⁵ See Hine, *Governing Italy*, 267. Hine calls this type of administration as "centralized collegiate decision-making". Ibid., 270.

welfare services. Italian welfare state policies were expanding in three directions: larger amounts of financial resources were allocated to cover an increasing number of people, authority was ever more concentrated in the political center and the scope of public policies was broadened to cover new areas of need. At the same time, the economic recession of the early 1970s brought about a deeper crisis of trust-perception of an increasingly wide gap on the one hand between the social and economic expectations generated by the broad spectrum of political development, economic and social policies of the welfare state and, on the other hand, the actual outcomes. The result was increasing votes of protest in favor of the radical parties, demands for direct democracy and a call for institutions closer to people.²⁷

Nanetti argues that the combination of the economic, social and political crises of the late 1960s and 1970s led to the transition to a second phase of evolution in the welfare state system that can be referred to as "social capitalism", in which public policies are formulated for the creation, support and pervasive distribution of private wealth by sub-national governments.²⁸

²⁶ Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 96.

²⁷ Raffaella Nanetti, *Growth and Territorial Policies: The Italian Model of Social Capitalism* (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1988), 7. See also Sabino Cassese, "Italy: A System in Search of an Equilibrium," in *Regionalization in France, Italy and Spain*. Papers presented at a seminar on Nation-Region Conflicts in Economic Policy-making in France, Italy and Spain, 9-10 June 1983 at the International Center for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of University (London: Immediaprint Limited, 1984), 11-20.

²⁸ Nanetti, *Growth and Territorial Policies*, 8.

According to Nanetti social capitalism is a mass phenomenon. The society must have the ability to use the public resources for promoting broad, socially based rather than narrow, individual private gain, and there must be a sense of public interest well rooted among politicians and members of bureaucracy as well as society at large. Otherwise, public resources will be siphoned off for private corruption.²⁹

Indeed, debate about the creation of regions and devolution of power to them was very intense. Anna Bull cites J. Earle, who summed up the various reactions to the regional experiment at the beginning of the 1970s as follows: "At best, ...[devolutionary power] can inject new vigor and more direct democracy into the machinery of government, acting as a vehicle for progress and enrichment of life at all levels. At worst, it can insert a parasitic layer of maladministration...adding to the opportunity for clientelism, intrigue and corruption."³⁰ As a result, in addition to the already-existing five special statute regions, fifteen ordinary regions were created.³¹ However, the

²⁹ Ibid., 9.

³⁰ J. Earle, *Italy in the 1970s* (Newton Abbot and Vancouver, David and Charles, 1974), in Anna Bull, "Regionalism in Italy," in *Regionalism in Europe*, ed., Peter Wagstaff, (Oxford: Intellect Books, 1994), 72. Bull thinks that both forecasts turned out to be correct, Ibid., 72.

³¹ On the second phase of regionalization that took place in the 1970s, see also Percy A. Allum and G. Amyot, "Regionalism in Italy: Old wine in New Bottles?" *Parliamentary Affairs*, 24 (Winter 1970/1), 53-78; Sidney Tarrow, "Local Constraints on Regional Reform: A Comparison of Italy and France," *Comparative Politics*, 7 October 1974; J. L. Sharpe, "The European Meso: An

demand for the creation of regions did not come from below. The main drive for regionalization came from above, as in the case of 1948. In addition to the reason stated above by Nanetti, another explanation is provided by Cassese and Torchia. They argue that the regional reform was a “simultaneous cause and effect of the expansion process of the political class”.³² This is because the new institutions would generate an increase in the number of positions reserved for people through some form of election who are essentially appointed by political parties.³³ Thus the devolution of powers served in particular the interests of the DC and PCI. The Christian Democrats, whose party had been in power for twenty years and had permeated not only the center but all areas of political, social and economic life by means of a network of institutions under its control were seriously threatened by a Communist revolt that took them as the main target. As P. Farneti pointed out, devolution shifted the focus of social discontent away from the center, transferred responsibility for public services to newly created bodies and

Appraisal,” in *The Rise of Meso Government in Europe*, ed., L. J. Sharpe, 1-39 (London: Sage Publications, 1993). For the map of regionalization, see Appendix D.

³² Cassese and Torchia, “The Meso Level in Italy,” 113.

³³ “The main reason for expanding the number of posts available to political class has been the difficulties that politicians have had when they imposed their priorities and policies on the state bureaucracy and public agencies. The easiest and most painless way of overcoming the resistance of bureaucrats is to increase one’s own importance and maneuvering space by creating new political bodies providing additional offices.” Cassese and Torchia, “The Meso Level in Italy,” 113. See also Sabino Cassese, “Centro e Periferia. I grandi tornanti della loro storia,” [“The Center and The Periphery. The great moments in their history.”] *Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Pubblico*, 1.

obliged the left, especially the PCI, in managing the crisis in those areas that were affected worst by internal migration and industrialization and uncontrolled urbanization of the cities in the North.³⁴ Moreover, the DC, by turning over the administrations of a few regions to PCI, hoped to continue its national domination while siphoning off pressure from those groups permanently excluded from the exercise of power.

The PCI, on the other hand, saw in the regions the possibility of emerging from its political isolation, demonstrating its ability to govern, and increasing its legitimacy in the public mind by proving its political and administrative ability. When the PCI, seeking new political and social alliances, launched its historic compromise policy in September 1973 in order to recreate the climate and conditions which paved the way for the founding of the Republic and a democratic Constitution, the regions became the chosen ground for experiments attempted later at the central level.

The advocates of the regions thought that the creation of regions would compensate for the low degree of territorial representation and close the democratic deficit that stemmed from the highly centralized character of the Risorgimento state. Thus those newly-created bodies would be the medium

³⁴ Yves Meny, "The Political Dynamics of Regionalism: Italy, France and Spain," in *Regionalism in European Politics*, ed., Roger Morgan (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1986), 16-17.

through which 'civil society' could transmit their demands to the central authority.

The “Southern Problem” and State Policies for Economic and Social Integration

The most important problem of the Italian state with respect to national integration remained the Southern problem (*Problema del Mezzogiorno*).³⁵ The huge economic gap between the South and North of Italy was still there impeding the efforts at national integration. The Italian state undertook some projects to develop the South and achieve a successful integration of the country. The first phase of the postwar development policy (1950-57) had three main elements: land reform, foundation of the *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno* (Southern Development Fund) that was entrusted with the administration of funds for development purposes which were supposed to be normal investment procedure (extraordinary intervention), and fiscal and financial measures to encourage private investment in industrialization.³⁶ The main assumption behind the extraordinary intervention in the South rested on 'development theories' This approach was based on the dual belief that the

³⁵ Raffaele Brancati, *La Questione Regionale. Federalismo, Mezzogiorno e Sviluppo Economico* [The Regional Question. Federalism, The South and Economic Development], (Roma: Donzelli Editore, 1995), 14.

³⁶ For the Southern problem, see F. Roy Willis, *Italy Chooses Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 160-177.

disadvantage of the South in natural resources and location could be overcome by recent technological progress and that the shortcomings of the classical theorists of the South could be removed by treating the question as part of the new international issue of underdeveloped countries. For instance the Swiss economist Friedrich Vöchting suggested some solutions to the Southern problem. He argued that the South should begin a program of carefully chosen industrial projects suited to the resources and market in the area and protect them by imposing a regional tariff barrier against goods coming from the North.³⁷ This view was completely opposed to the ideals of integration, and found little support in Italy, except among Sicilian separatists. Instead the most favorable suggestion that enjoyed wide-spread popularity and acceptability was that of giving primacy to agricultural development accompanied by the creation of the infrastructure for development.³⁸ As a result, as the first stage of its official policy toward the South, the government aimed to create industrial infrastructure such as roads, bridges, schools and communications, and encouraged investment by private sector firms. The private firms who could invest in the South would enjoy the benefits of "external economies". However, by 1957, it was observed that this

³⁷ Friedrich Vöchting, *Die Italienisch Südfrage*, cited in *ibid.*, 163.

³⁸ The most important proponents of this view were Professors Giuseppe di Nardi, Francesco Vito, but especially Professor Pasquale Saraceno, vice president and one of the principal promoters of the very effective *Associazione per lo Sviluppo dell'Industria nel Mezzogiorno* (SVIMEZ) [Association for the Development of Industry in the South], a collaborator in the formulation of

incentive did not prove to be an effective stimulus for the private firms to invest in the South. Thus the state decided to give greater financial encouragement to firms to invest in the South and participate directly in the financing of industry in the South.

In the first phase of the intervention, the *Cassa* was really efficient. The investments used to aid the peasant farmers had increased productivity, absorbed labor in productive work, and brought marked social benefits to more than 100.000 families who had been settled in new homes. The transportation system of the South, both roads and railroads, had been improved. Water had been brought to several million people through the construction of water mains. A small beginning had been made in private industrial investment aided by credit institutions in which the *Cassa* participated.³⁹

However, the period of special intervention was not free from problems. The policies pursued by the *Cassa* were criticized to a great extent and interestingly enough, the criticisms revealed the ongoing difference between the North and the South. Some Northern critics argued that the program be dropped, in order to relieve the financial burden on the North at the moment when Italy's entry into the European Economic Community was going to

the Vanoni Plan, and vice chairman of the National Planning Commission. See *ibid.*

make it necessary for the Northern industrial complex to invest its available capital in more directly productive enterprises. The *Cassa's* reply to this demand was in the negative; they argued that there had been no alternative to spending 25 to 30 percent of the funds in the North, since the ongoing projects would be left on the way if it is done otherwise.⁴⁰

The second phase of the development policy (1957-1965) coincided with the formation of the European Economic Community. The law enacted on July 29, 1957 extended *Cassa's* activity until 1965 and ended the priority given to agricultural improvement and infrastructural investment. Instead the emphasis was placed on future investment for improving industrial production.⁴¹ According to the first laws (1957 and 1959) the development effort was to be concentrated in selected development areas (*poli di sviluppo*).

However, the second phase of the development policy, too, was not free from problems. The industrialization policy has not only been pursued through the incentives coming under the heading of extraordinary intervention. Industrial policy legislation enacted for the whole of the country

³⁹ 223 billion lire had been invested in private industrial projects in 1950-1956.

⁴⁰ Willis, *Italy Chooses Europe*, 167-168.

⁴¹ "Three methods of stimulating industrialization were to be coordinated: (a) the activity of the *Cassa* was reoriented to the creation of carefully delimited 'areas' and 'nuclei' of industrial development; (b) the state holding companies, especially IRI and ENI were required to make 40 percent of their

has generally contained clauses favoring enterprises located in the Mezzogiorno. In spite of these provisions, the North-Center (where more than 80 percent of the manufacture is located) has taken the major share of industrial incentives other than those specifically directed at the Mezzogiorno.⁴²

As a result, state policies aimed at integrating the South economically and socially were not very successful and were subject to severe criticisms. Graziano, for instance, stated that the programs of southern development have transformed the Mezzogiorno from a poor, self-sufficient region to one which is less poor but more strictly dependent on the rest of the country.⁴³ In the same vein, Carello argues that the Mezzogiorno's inferior position in the Italian and international economies has produced eight negative consequences: rural exodus, economic deserts, social disintegration, anomalous urbanization, anomalous consumerism, hypertertiarization,

investments in the South; (c) by further fiscal and financial benefits, private sector was encouraged to found industrial plants in the South." See Ibid., 169.

⁴² The most comprehensive account available of the activities of public agencies operating in the field shows a decline in the relative share of the South: from 60 percent in the 1971-79 period to 52 percent in the 1980-1987 period. See Commission of the European Communities. Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, *European Economy Reports and Studies. The Economic and Financial Situation in Italy*, No: 1 (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the EC, 1993), 128.

⁴³ Willis, *Italy Chooses Europe*, 191.

emigration and the entrepreneurial Mafia and the Mafia model of capitalist accumulation.⁴⁴

Perhaps the most important consequence of this unbridged gap⁴⁵ which has had a crucial impact on the rise of regionalist parties as Lega Nord in Northern Italy was the massive emigration from the South to the North as a result of state policies. Southern immigrants in the Northern cities aroused much resentment and even 'racial' hostility among the inhabitants. The immigrants were blamed for crime, illiteracy, sponging on welfare and overloading the available public services-transport, public housing, schools, and the like.

The Impact of European Integration upon National Integration in Italy

Supranational integration has added another dimension to the regional problem in Italy since the "the Southern Problem" has turned out to be a problem of the then European Community (now European Union). Since the beginning of the European integration, the Mezzogiorno became one of the

⁴⁴ Adrian Nicola Carello, *The Northern Question. Italy's Participation in the European Economic Community and the Mezzogiorno's Underdevelopment* (London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1989), 115.

⁴⁵ For differences between the productivity levels and distribution of RTD factors by Regions, and distribution of employment in intensity in high

less developed regions of Europe.⁴⁶ The Community has adopted policies to overcome these disparities between regions of the Community. But first, one should summarize how the EC perceived regionalism in general.

Part of the myth surrounding the creation and evolution of the European Union predicted a progressive weakening of central authority and state power and erosion of loyalties to central institutions and the transfer of authority and loyalty to new transnational centers of decision-making.⁴⁷ A related assumption, derived from the myth surrounding sub-national regional movements in Europe today, is that the unification of a continent requires its decentralization as well, with the natural and logical beneficiaries of such decentralization being the regions. A natural accompaniment to the emergence of united Europe is the emergence of a sub-national regional dimension.⁴⁸ Thus one can postulate a relationship between supranational

technology industries in Mezzogiorno and the remainder of Italy, see Appendices E, F, G respectively.

⁴⁶ In the Southern Italy, the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was less than 75 % of the Community average in 1988. On the issue of Italy and the European Community, see Antonio D'Atena, *Le Regioni Italiane e la Comunità Economica Europea* [The Italian Regions and The European Economic Community], (Milano: Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, 1981).

⁴⁷ Ernst Haas, *Beyond the Nation-state: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

⁴⁸ Lawrence Scheinman, "The Interfaces of Regionalism in Western Europe: Brussels and Peripheries," In *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*, ed., Milton Esman (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1977), 65.

integration and sub-national regionalism: national territory is redefined in regional terms in conjunction with the absorption of the state into European federal structures.⁴⁹

The increased emphasis on the regional level of integration and regional disparities were prevalent from the inception of the European integration and actually the problem of Mezzogiorno was recognized in the protocol attached to the Treaty of Rome. Article 2 of the Treaty referred to the objective of a "harmonious development of economic activities ... and a continuous and balanced expansion," while in the preamble the contracting parties stated their general desire "for reduction of the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favored regions". However, there were only a few provisions made in the treaty for the creation of instruments which could contribute towards this 'harmonious development' and the reduction of regional disparities. Thus the Rome Treaty had left the basic responsibility for dealing with the problem of regional disparities to the national authorities.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Ibid., 65-66.

⁵⁰ "Regional disparities were important but not of primary importance and was not considered as a major policy concern at the time of the signing of the treaty. In addition, large transfers of money across frontiers were considered as politically impossible." See Loukas Tsoukalis, *The New European Economy. The Politics and Economics of Integration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 209-210.

The accession of United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark into the Union in 1973 was the main reason lying behind setting up the **European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)** in 1975. With setting up of European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, the so-called **New Community Instrument (NCI)** was created in order to provide, through the European Investment Bank, subsidized loans to the less prosperous members, namely Ireland and Italy. The Community's interest in the problem of regional disparities became greater by the Second Enlargement Process and the entry of such relatively poor countries into the Community as Greece, Portugal and Spain. The Commission's 1985 White Paper which promoted the single market project expressed apprehension about huge regional disparities between and within the countries.⁵¹ Thus a new approach was adopted in 1985 with the **Integrated Mediterranean Programs (IMPs)** that was intended for the Mediterranean regions of France, Italy and the whole of Greece. The creation of IMPs was in recognition of the special development problems of these

⁵¹ "Economic integration, by increasing the possibilities for human, material and financial resources to move without obstacle towards the most economically attractive regions, could lead to an increase in regional disparities." *Commission of the EC, Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, CB-43-85-894-EN-C*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC, 1985, cited in Mark Wise and Richard Gibb, *Single Market to Social Europe: The European Community in the 1990s* (England: Longman, 1993), 201. On the impact of the Single Market upon regions, see Robert Leonardi, *Regions and the European Community: The Regional Response to the Single Market in the Underdeveloped Parts of the EC* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), Giuseppe Palmeri, "L'Atto Unico Europeo e le Competenze delle Regioni Italiane," ["The Single European Act and the

regions and the relative bias of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) against southern agricultural products.⁵²

The 1986 **Single European Act (SEA)** constituted an important turning point in the increased importance devoted to the regions.⁵³ The SEA created a fundamentally different environment for regional governments. Even though it reiterated the old aim of reducing the gap between well-developed regions or social groups and less favored ones, the main novelty was that an EC 'social dimension' was accepted as an 'indispensable corollary of the large market'.⁵⁴

The Commission's belief that an effective EC regional policy, formally referred to as "economic and social cohesion", was necessary for the

Responsibilities of the Italian Regions."] *Confronti*, Marzo-Aprile 1989, No: 2, 29-37.

⁵² Tsoukalis, *The New European Economy*, 215. On the implementation of IMPs in Italy, see also the report prepared by Robert Leonardi, *La Rivoluzione Regionalista in Europa: L'Atto Unico Europeo e Il Fondo Regionale* [The Regional Revolution in Europe: Single European Act and The Regional Fund], (Bologna: Nomisma, 1990).

⁵³ Sonia Mazey and James Mitchell, "Europe of Regions: Territorial Interests and European Integration: The Scottish Experience," in *Lobbying in the European Community*, eds., Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 95.

⁵⁴ Commission of the EC, *The New Structural Policies of the European Community*, European File, 7-8/90 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC, 1990).

successful functioning of the single European market, together with the increasing willingness and assertiveness of the regions led to the formation of the **Consultative Committee of the Regions** on June 24, 1988 (Article 198a of the Maastricht Treaty). The creation of a consultative body representing regional and local government contained the promise that lower levels would be more directly involved in decision-making processes which concerned them but from which they had so far been excluded.⁵⁵ This channel increased possibilities for the regions to represent themselves and lobby for their regional interests in Brussels. Indeed, since then, many regions have opened offices that primarily aim to influence the decision-making process in the Commission to their interests. The Commission encourages this process and the activities of European-wide organizations of local and regional authorities.⁵⁶

In addition, although the specific role of the ERDF was repeated in promoting regional development, the SEA also required the Commission to submit comprehensive proposals on the role of all three **Structural Funds** (ERDF, European Social Fund and the Guidance Section of EAGFF) in reducing socio-

⁵⁵ Thomas Christiansen, "Second Thoughts- The Committee of the Regions after its First Year" in *What Model for the Committee of the Regions? Past Experiences and Future Perspectives*, ed., Renaud Dehousse and Thomas Christiansen (Badia Fiesolana, Fiesole: The European University Institute, 1995), 36.

⁵⁶ Renaud Dehousse and Thomas Christiansen eds., *What Model for the Committee of Regions? Past Experiences and Future Perspectives* (Badia Fiesolana, Fiesole: The European University Institute, 1995).

economic disparities.⁵⁷ As a result the Council of Ministers adopted a reform package for doubling the Community Funds available for regional development and other social measures in real terms between 1988 and 1993 when the Single Market was due for completion. The new strategy for European integration therefore hoped to overcome the dominating role previously played by most of the national governments, by identifying the regions as primary subjects in the process of policy-making.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Wise and Gibb, *Single Market to Social Europe: The European Community in the 1990s*, 224. "The European Union's four structural funds are: 1. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF): aid to disadvantaged regions (infrastructure, productive investment, aid to small firms, local development, etc); 2. The European Social Fund (ESF): promotion of employment (vocational training, recruitment aid, etc.); 3. The Guidance Section of the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF): adjustment of agricultural structures and rural development; 4. The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG): adjustment of fisheries structures.", European Commission, Directorate General for Regional Policy and Cohesion, *Structural Funds 1996: Summary of the Annual Report*, Fact Sheet, 15.11.1997, 2.

⁵⁸ Piera Magnatti, "EU Structural Policies and Industrial Development: Application of the Subsidiarity Principle in the Italian Case," Paper presented at the Conference on "Competitiveness, Subsidiarity and Objectives: Issues for European Industrial Strategy. Crete, September 9-10, 1994, 6. "The Single Market program with its promise to open national frontiers to the four freedoms-the free movement of capital, services, goods and people-changed the basic assumptions about the operation of regional economies.⁵⁸ Furthermore, a number of crucial institutional and procedural reforms such as the enlargement of the community competences, the extension of majority voting in the Council and the systematic use of regulatory competition, demonstrated that a significant part of public policy-making was now moving outside the control of domestic actors.⁵⁸, see Christiansen, "Second Thoughts," 34.

In the period 1994-1999, the Structural Funds were to pursue six priority objectives.⁵⁹ Priority was given to 'Objective 1', designed to help those regions where income falls below 75 percent of the EU average, and which are characterized by a relatively high percentage of the labor force engaged in agriculture, thus lagging seriously behind in terms of overall economic development. Mezzogiorno was one such region. Thus two-thirds of the increased resources of the combined Structural Funds were allocated to this aim. Furthermore, this money was to be directed mainly at the poorest parts of the Union in a deliberate effort to define regional problems in a Union rather than a national context.⁶⁰

The Obstacles to the Implementation of Regional Policies of the EU in Italy

Center- Region Cleavage

⁵⁹ "Objective 1: structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind; Objective 2: economic conversion of declining industrial areas; Objective 3: combating long-term unemployment, integration into working life of young people and of persons exposed to exclusion from the labor market; Objective 4: adaptation of workers to industrial changes and to changes in production systems; Objective 5(a): adjustment of agricultural and fisheries structures; Objective 5(b): economic diversification of fragile rural areas; Objective 6 (Finland and Sweden): structural adjustment of regions with an extremely low population density." European Commission, *Structural Funds 1996: Summary of the Annual Report*, 2.

⁶⁰ Wise and Gibb, *Single Market to Social Europe: The European Community in the 1990s*, 224-225.

The process of European integration with its recent emphasis on the regions, of course, has had an important effect upon Italy where a huge regional disparity existed between the North and the South. However, policies of economic and social cohesion targeted to decrease the underdevelopment of the Mezzogiorno have met some obstacles, the most important of which is the **state-region cleavage** that has existed in Italy.

An example of the impact of the regional policies upon the regional problem in Italy was provided by Piera Magnatti's detailed study.⁶¹ Magnatti has questioned the failure of many EU regional interventions implemented in Italy and assessed the reasons for this. She has noted that in Southern Member States and Ireland, expenditure on regional incentives has increased and is now among the highest in the Community in relation to the GDP. Especially in Italy, regarding regional incentives, expenditure per head remained substantially ahead of the rest of the Community.⁶²

In Italy, some major policy changes took place in regional incentives policy since 1980. Before, the Mezzogiorno had been considered as a special intervention area since the post-war period and a central agency (*Cassa per il*

⁶¹ Magnatti, "EU Structural Policies and Industrial Development".

⁶² The regional incentive expenditure per head of population in assisted regions for Italy in ECU 1990 prices is 185.19 ECU in 1980, 238.72 ECU in 1985, 404.63 ECU in 1990.

Mezzogiorno) was created in order to manage all the interventions directly from the center. The main reason behind this initiative was that the local administrators were not considered to be capable of keeping up the industrialization process. In 1986, new legislation for the *Mezzogiorno* was introduced. Eligibility for aid was extended, three-year rolling programs were started, *Mezzogiorno* was divided into three grades of area, and discrimination in rate of support was introduced. Rates of maximum support was increased. In 1988, under Commission pressure, certain parts of north *Mezzogiorno* was re-designated as from 1990 and others from 1992. In 1990, discrimination on rates of support was increased. In 1992, "Special Intervention" for the *Mezzogiorno* was abolished from 1993 onwards.⁶³

As regards to the application of the EU regional policies in Italy, the most significant factor is that this new structural approach has not been implemented. In several cases, in particular in the case of the southern part of Italy, the Integrated Mediterranean Programs and the actions promoted under Objective 1 (i.e. cohesion at the Regional level), which require an active role from local authorities has not worked. Consequently, the Commission redirected part of IMP's grants from southern Italy to France. Even though some regions, such as the northern ones as well as Molise, Abruzzi and Puglia have succeeded in implementing their programs and,

⁶³ Ibid., 13.

therefore received Community subsidies, the least-favored areas have not been able to organize a local network of productive partnership and therefore, they missed the opportunity because prolonged dependency on the central government reduced their capacity to promote endogenous development.⁶⁴

In Italy another problem in the policy-making and implementation of the IMP's was that there was a "division of labor" rather than a collaboration between the national and regional levels. The national level has often refused to cooperate with the Regions that were considered to be antagonists rather than partners. Thus regarding the realization of Objective 1, the centralist approach which distinguished national intervention for the Mezzogiorno had been prevalent during the definition of the Development Plan. In contrast with, for example, France which has proposed five different Development Plans for each of the five regions, Italy has presented a single Development Plan for all the eight regions of the Mezzogiorno. Thus as a result, it was observed that since the favorite interlocutors for the Commission have been the bodies representing qualified reference points for their local economic systems, the presence of participants belonging to Objective 1 areas has been very scarce. This vacuum was filled by the **national** governments. In this perspective, the effects of the research and innovation policies on cohesion

⁶⁴ Ibid., 19.

have been very scarce.⁶⁵ Thus the first obstacle to successful implementation of the Community policies was the persistent centralized character of the Italian state despite the regionalization tendencies.

Institutional Weakness of the Regional Governments in the South

Another important obstacle to successful implementation of the regional policies of the EU has been the weakness of the institutional capacity and the lack of a strong regional government in the Mezzogiorno. Marc E. Smyrl has noted that the central purpose of the European Community Regional Policy (ECRP), that was adopted alongside the Integrated Mediterranean Programs (IMP), approved by the Council in 1985 and carried out in the 1980s, was to increase the discretionary authority of regional-level decision-makers.⁶⁶ In other words, the IMP aimed at direct involvement of sub-national authorities in planning and managing EC-funded economic development programs, by strengthening the regional leaders vis-a-vis the national center and an “empowerment” of the regions. By involving levels of government most directly concerned, the Commission’s economists hoped to encourage the creation of innovative responses to particular problems afflicting the Community’s various regions in line with the above-mentioned “economic

⁶⁵ Ibid., 21.

⁶⁶ Marc E. Smyrl, “ Building Institutional Capacity: Implementing European Community Regional Programs in Liguria and Tuscany,” *Italian Politics and Society*, Spring 1996, No. 45, 7-16.

and social cohesion through partnership" among the Community, national and sub-national levels of authority.⁶⁷

However, because of inter-regional differences, the effects of the ECRP differed from region to region as well.⁶⁸ The key to explaining this variation lies both in choices made by regional authorities themselves and in the nature of regional and infra-regional political society. First of all, the Italian regional governments were not as strong as they seemed to be, because they did not have taxation powers. Around 90 percent of the regional financial resources was made up of transfers from the national government. The regional authorities did not have the liberty to dispose of this money as they saw fit either. Second, regions have a relatively weak position in structures and networks of interest representation. The regional governments, as newcomers to the political scene, have found it difficult to aggregate and represent regional level interests, a role for which they seemed 'functionally' predestined. Instead, the deep-seated localism of Italian politics encouraged

⁶⁷ "Faced with the ongoing challenges of the Single market and the new challenges posed by economic and monetary unification, the Commission's medium-term budgetary proposals covering the period 1993 to 1999 (the Delors II package) have called for another significant increase in structural expenditure to promote economic and social cohesion. In consequence, the funds devoted to structural policies will increase by 41% from over 21 billion ECU in 1993 to 30 billion ECU in 1999, including the new Cohesion Fund. Structural funds in 1999, will, therefore, be three times their real value in 1989." Magnatti, "EU Structural Policies," 11.

⁶⁸ Smyrl, "Building Institutional Capacity," 7-16.

intra-regional groupings at the provincial level or below. At the same time, the vertical role of the political parties provided a direct link between locally-organized interests and the national level.⁶⁹

The IMPs revealed the wide variance in regional governments' experience in planning and efficiency, and required a consistent policy of regional planning by regional governments in order to spend allocated funds.⁷⁰ The implementation of the IMP's demonstrated a similar division of the regions' managerial capacities: regions such as Umbria, Emilia-Romania, Tuscany, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, the Marche, and Lazio which had had experience in regional planning and had no difficulty in implementing the IMPs whereas regions such as Calabria, Sicilia and Campania with little or no experience in planning and interregional cooperation, ran into several problems.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Ibid., 8.

⁷⁰ Carl Levy, "Introduction: Italian Regionalism in Context," in *Italian Regionalism. History, Identity and Politics*, ed., Carl Levy (Oxford and Washington D.C.: Berg, 1996), 18.

⁷¹ For the institutional performance of in the Italian regions and the relationship between "civicness" and the institutional performance of regional governments, see Appendix H.

Thus in Italy, coordination problems impeded structural programming and a significant proportion of allocated EU funds were never spent. Jurgen Grote observed that:

...relations between the European Union and the regions, for example during the implementation of the IMP and under the reformed structural funds, take place in an extra-legal space without any basis in constitutional or other legal provisions. Within this disarticulated context, structural programming appears to have been a pressure for reform and rationalization of regional-national relations in the direction of informal partnership.⁷²

A second implication for the political impact of the European integration, the recent developments within the EU form and shape new social and political movements and alliances. No longer able to rely on national diversionary policies, regional governments and movements have started to consider possibilities for indigenous development as well as ways to influence Community policies. In addition, EU provides a new context for older political demands. Autonomist and separatist movements, which in the past, often perceived the Community as one step more remote, and therefore more objectionable than national governments, have increasingly come to frame their demands in European terms.⁷³ For instance, the fact that regional or local authorities may open offices and lobby in Brussels have different

⁷² Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Channels of Subnational Representation in the European Union." In *What Model for the Committee of the Regions? Past Experiences and Future Perspectives*, ed., Renaud Dehousse and Thomas Christiansen (Badia Fiesolana, Fiesole: The European University Institute, 1995), 14.

repercussions in states with a federal or decentralized structure compared to those centralized structures.⁷⁴ For instance, in Italy, the only two offices opened in Brussels are from Lazio and the Mezzogiorno. While the Lazio office is funded by private firms rather than the regional government of Lazio, the Mezzogiorno office is funded by the Italian state and not by the regional governments.⁷⁵

Cultural Reasons

Another reason for the failure of the EU cohesion policies in the South can be attributed to **cultural** factors, even though this would assume a deterministic approach. Robert Putnam, in his well-known work, *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, has found that the civic engagement that is necessary for democratic experience was lacking in Southern Italy. The powerful communes of the North did not exist in the South. For long centuries the South was mainly under the rule of autocratic regimes which impeded the development of a communal culture, and instead led to clientelistic relations. The *mafiosi* power provided a kind of privatized

⁷³ Ibid., 7.

⁷⁴ For a detailed overview of the issue, see Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Channels of Subnational Representation in the European Union," 175-198.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 31-32.

Leviathan in the absence of effective state power.⁷⁶ Clientelism on the other hand, tended to preserve social fragmentation and disorganization in the South. So, in other words, collective action, let alone cooperation, was missing at the regional level. The clientele has been the only associations which actually showed real operative energy in a civil society which has been divided within itself for centuries.⁷⁷

These factors altogether impeded the development of strong regional governments in the South. Clientelism's origins are said to lie in the South. It belongs to a society that has remained a *Gemeinschaft*, a community that is regulated by vertical relationships and personal ties rather than by notions of citizenship and rights. Mc Carthy cites the example of the character Don Ciccio, in Tomasi di Lampedusa's famous novel, *Il Gattopardo* (The Leopard). Don Ciccio votes for the old monarchy because the King of Naples has sent him gifts of money so that he can study music. A more cynical version of the same explanation is that 'amoral familism' permits no social contracts other than those based on short-term advantage. The exchange vote in which the

⁷⁶ For a detailed account of Mafia and clientelism, see James Watson, *Mafia and Clientelism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), Paolo Pezzino, *Mafia: Industria della Violenza* [Industry of Violence], (Scandicci, Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1995).

⁷⁷ Robert D. Putnam et al., *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 144, 147.

elector barter his vote for a pension or a job serves as an example.⁷⁸ Percy Allum, on the other hand, points to a different aspect of clientelism and how it was internalized by the masses. He argued:

Clientelismo, as an integral part of Italian parliamentarism, has an ambiguous face as well; that is, in addition to its obviously corrupting aspects, there is a legitimating aspect, too. The southern 'notable' is simultaneously the protector of his 'clients' against the threats of the outside world, usually personified in his hostile state. Hence the patronage tie can assume a sacred aspect sanctioned by St. Augustine and confined in popular saying: *Senza santi non si va in paradiso* (without saints you can not go to heaven).⁷⁹

Clientelism is "the attainment and retention of power through the private expropriation of public resources and through the use of the state to expropriate public resources."⁸⁰ Rossetti argues that the formation of institutional centers, especially of cohesive and flexible constitutional centers, is of paramount importance in this connection. According to him, in complex societies, clientelism becomes the predominant form of political exchange if the integrity of the constitutional order is not protected by an autonomous constitutional review. However, a constellation of historical conditions has prevented the consolidation of an autonomous configuration of this kind in Italy. First, the nation-building elite was a political elite which created the new nation by executive orders and decrees. State institutions, the civil

⁷⁸ Patrick Mc Carthy, *The Crisis of the Italian State. From the Origins of the Cold War to the Fall of Berlusconi* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 62

⁷⁹ Allum, *State and Society in Western Europe*, 115.

⁸⁰ Mc Carthy, *The Crisis of the Italian State*, 62.

service and the judiciary were therefore a creation of the executive power. Secondly, the role played by political groupings and later by parties in shaping the modern Italian political system was affected by the territorial power of illegal associations over constituencies. The chief power instruments of the state fell into the hands of an elite dependent on the clientelistic, particularistic and illegal interests of their 'constituencies'.⁸¹ A good example of the clientelistic nature of region-center relations was revealed by Mc Carthy in his illustration of the Gava Family in Naples.⁸²

⁸¹ Rossetti, "Constitutionalism and Clientelism in Italy," 99. Mc Carthy argues that the Naples earthquake of 1980 unleashed a flood of government funds and contracts for clearance or rebuilding were distributed with no proper controls. Some 30 percent of \$40 billion went on to *Camorra* (Neapolitan Mafia) owned firms. McCarthy, *The Crisis of the Italian State*, 73.

⁸² In the early 1950s the Christian Democrat party (DC) gives Naples as a fief to the Monarchist, Achille Lauro, who in turn split his own party and became the mayor of Naples. While denouncing Christian Democrats locally, he helped them nationally. In 1957, Lauro developed delusions of grandeur and ran hard against the DC in the regional elections, raising the Monarchist vote to nine percent in Sardinia. Suddenly the Minister of Interior learned of corruption in the Naples town hall and suspended Lauro. His power passed to the DC proper, in the shape of Silvio Gava, but in fact to the Gava family proper. Silvio was a government minister in the mid-1950s, his son was president of the provincial government from 1961 to 1969 and his son-in-law held the Fiat franchise in Naples. Silvio extended his network to friends who were members of the Consortium for Industrial Development and leaders in the Chamber of Commerce. Since control of credit was vital, in 1959 the Gava family gained control of the *Istituto per lo Sviluppo e l'Industrializzazione del Meridione (Isveimer)*. [Institute for the Development and Industrialization of the South]. Six years later the publicly owned bank of Naples fell to them.

The significance of the family lies in the fact that their control over the local federation gave them power in both the city and regional government, which increased and was increased by their economic power. Their power base depended on their ability to appropriate the public money that flowed to the South. They were able to do so because of their positions in the national DC and in the government, which they obtained because they controlled the

Political Reasons

Valeria Fargion reveals the North-South gap in the application of social assistance policies; she analyzes the effects of regional decentralization on the development of social assistance policies in different parts of the country. While in most southern regions an archaic system of poverty relief is dominant, the center-north is characterized largely by a modern system of social services.⁸³ However, the differences in the performance of regional governments can not be fully explained by referring exclusively to historical legacy, but must also take into account the political variables.⁸⁴ Party politics and the party clientele play an important role in this context in Southern Italy.

According to Hine, the performance of all regions has been disappointing in so far as they have become an integral part of the Italian political system and are themselves entrenched in 'partyocracy'.⁸⁵ The parties act as channels through which regions and regional party leaders can bring pressures on the center.⁸⁶ Despite their limited financial autonomy, the regions operated large deficits in the 1980s in the knowledge that the center and the national

local DC. This meant the passage to systemic clientelism. Mc Carthy, *The Crisis of the Italian State*, 71-72.

⁸³ Valeria Fargion, "Social Assistance and the North-South Cleavage in Italy" *South European Society and Politics*, 1: 3, (Winter 1996), 135-154.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 135.

⁸⁵ For Northern and Southern public satisfaction with National, Regional and Local Governments, see Appendices I and J.

⁸⁶ Hine, *Governing Italy*, 271.

taxpayers would bail them out, which regularly happened. From this point of view, the pessimistic forecast that the regions would add another layer to the clientelistic Italian body politic can be deemed to have been correct. The recent Italian scandal known as *Tangentopoli* (from the word *tangente* meaning a cut paid by private and public companies to political parties in exchange for public contracts and favorable treatment) has involved many local and regional executives throughout Italy.⁸⁷ Thus the development of closer ties between the center and the periphery opened up new opportunities for the consolidation of covert and illegal power domains. Politicians have acquired a quasi monopolistic control of political markets that has allowed them a share in economic ventures under government patronage.⁸⁸

The South was the key region in the DC's bid to become an autonomous mass party.⁸⁹ Between the late 1940s and mid-1960s the percentage of its membership that lived in the North declined from nearly 50 percent to 28 percent whereas in the South the corresponding figures were 18 percent and 30 percent and in the islands 7 percent and 17 percent. The main reasons were

⁸⁷ Bull, "Regionalism in Italy," 73. See also Bruno Dente, "Centre-Local Relations in Italy: The Impact of Legal and Political Structures," in *Center-Periphery Relations in Western Europe*, eds., Yves Meny and Vincent Wright (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), 139, 146.

⁸⁸ Rossetti, "Constitutionalism and Clientelism in Italy," 95.

⁸⁹ For a detailed account of the clientelistic policies of the DC in the postwar period, see Simona Piattoni, "Clientelism Revisited. Clientelistic Politics and

northern irritation with inefficient public services and the battery of government agencies that allocated money to the South. The plans for state intervention drawn up by Saraceno, Morandi and their helpers were distorted and the *Cassa*, which was supposed to be used for special government intervention, became a discretionary fund for politicians. At first it provided infrastructure, and the alliance between the Christian Democrats and northern industrialists was evident in the way that the machines to build roads and the fertilizer for the pilot agriculture programs were made in the North. This pattern continued after the *Cassa* had expanded into setting up industrial plants. However the distribution of *Cassa* funds and the locating of public sector plants were fought over by the rival political clans in the South.⁹⁰

Failure of National Integration?

Although there were a lot of hopes placed in regionalization and creation of the meso level of government for better access to people and thus providing more democracy and modernity, the policies adopted by the state did not reach the targeted aim. Reasons for the failure were several:

1. The Problem of Legitimacy: Regional reform was a reform from above. It had a long period of gestation (1861-1970) but a rapid process of

Economic Development in Postwar Italy," *Italian Politics and Society*, 49, (Spring 1998), 44-62.

⁹⁰ Mc Carthy, *The Crisis of the Italian State*, 71.

implementation (1970-1977). Thus regions met a lot of problems as far as the legitimization and institutionalization of the new level of government were concerned.⁹¹ Although migration, improved transportation and communications have made the country more homogenous and territorially integrated, the diversity inherited from Italy's late unification was still marked. For many Italians, identification with the distinctiveness of the locality remained pronounced. Regions, cities and towns had their own traditions, culture and sense of identity.⁹²

2. The Problem of the Convergence of Competences: Dente argues that the overall effect of the transformations brought about by regionalization has increased the system's internal heterogeneity.⁹³ This in turn brought about a convergence of competences; with the creation of regions, "the regions turned increasingly towards the commune and province administrations, either by intervening in matters of local competence or by taking over representation of the lower levels of government. This shift in interest not only increased the heterogeneity of local government, but also provoked a strong reaction from the more powerful communes that were worried at losing their importance."⁹⁴ Thus in Dente's opinion, regional reforms

⁹¹ Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 91.

⁹² Hine, *Governing Italy*, 259-260.

⁹³ Dente, "Centre-Local Relations in Italy," 125.

increased fragmentation in the country since regional intervention in the implementation of the stage of state laws has introduced further elements of differentiation from one area of the country to another.⁹⁵

3. The Problem of Interest Representation: Regions had a relatively weak position in structures and networks of interest representation. Being a relative newcomer to the Italian political scene, regional governments found it difficult to aggregate and represent regional-level interests, a role for which they were functionally pre-destined. Instead, the deep-seated localism of Italian politics encouraged intra-regional groupings at the provincial level or below. At the same time, the vertical role of the parties provided a direct link between locally-organized interests and the national level.⁹⁶ In addition, regional constituencies did not coincide with electoral

⁹⁴ Ibid., 129-130. Cassese and Torchia argue that the attempts to render regions more effective also failed. The regions tried to set up some administrative units that are larger than municipalities, called *comprensori*. Because most of the municipalities were very small and unable to carry out administrative tasks and services that require the larger scale necessary for modern personal service delivery. However, again due to the resistance of the local government, the *comprensori* disappeared. Thus the resistance of the local government was a crucial factor in slowing down and weakening the evolution of any meso. Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 98.

⁹⁵ Dente, "Centre-Local Relations in Italy," 132. Dente also points out an apparent contradiction in the existing literature on Italian administrative system. The Italian system has been simultaneously described as highly centralized and highly fragmented. In fact, both explanations are true, since the former is true from a legal point of view and the latter is true from an administrative point of view. So, he argues, both levels are separate but should be taken into account simultaneously. Ibid., 127.

⁹⁶ Smyrl, "Building Institutional Capacity," 8.

constituencies. Thus the regions did not have a crucial political significance in the eyes of the political class. Having been created as a result of political considerations, the regions functioned primarily on the basis of strong ties with pressure groups and on the mediation of political parties rather than on the existence of strong and autonomous bureaucracies. Thus many regions, due to this fragility, found themselves politically decapitated when the number of elected members were found criminal in the *Tangentopoli* scandal.⁹⁷

4. The Problem of Limited Competences: A major weakness of the regions in regional reform was their lack of significant autonomous taxing powers. As of 1980, some 90 percent of their financial resources was made up of transfers from the national government. The regional authorities did not have the liberty to dispose of this money since the bulk of the regional income was passed on automatically to provincial and local governments in policy areas, such as health care.⁹⁸

As a result of the above factors, the Republican period faced serious difficulties in the national integration process. The state policies that aimed at integrating the peninsula in social, economic and cultural sense have partially

⁹⁷ Bruno Dente, "Sub-National Governments in the Long Italian Transition," *West European Politics*, 20:1, (January 1997), 180.

⁹⁸ Smyrl, "Building Institutional Capacity," 8.

failed due to the historical heritage of Italy that acted as a negative force concerning integration. Provincialism has proven to be a force that is unsurmountable and the “process of making Italians out of Piedmontese, Lombards, Tuscans, Sicilians and so forth, is far from complete.”⁹⁹ Zariski argues that the regional and local dialects have survived to the present day and have given way only slowly and grudgingly to the standard national tongue. Moreover, the sluggish rate of Italian urbanization, industrialization and economic growth did much to keep parochial loyalties alive.¹⁰⁰

Thus the new superstructure that was attempted to be based on a society that is deeply influenced by the historical heritage in question not only did not fit well, but also created further problems regarding national integration that culminated in the revived debate about the form of the state; a further decentralization, federalism or even secession of the North from the South that were brought into the agenda with the emergence of the regionally-based party, Lega Nord.

⁹⁹ Raphael Zariski, *Italy. The Politics of Uneven Development* (Illinois, Hinsdale: The Dryden Press, 1972), 97.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

NEO-REGIONALISM AND NATIONAL FRAGMENTATION

IN ITALY IN THE 1990s

By the beginning of the 1990s, the regional question once more gained prominence in Italian politics. This time, however, the problem was no longer the *Questione Meridionale* (Southern Question) characterized by its underdeveloped nature, but instead it was replaced by the *Questione Settentrionale* (Northern Question) which is characterized by the demands of independence of the North from the rest of Italy. With the 1992 elections that marked the beginning of a new era in Italian politics, a regionally-based party, *Lega Nord* (Northern League), brought into the political agenda for the first time the viability of the political and administrative system in Italy and proposed the separation of the Northern part from the rest of the Italy. This proposal was called a “bloodless revolution”¹ or a “conservative revolution”² since it questioned the “collapse of the First Republic”.³ This opened a new

¹ Spencer di Scala, *Italy: From Revolution to Republic. 1700 to the Present* (Boulder, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995), 326.

² Joseph Farrell and Carl Levy, “The Northern League: Conservative Revolution?,” in Carl Levy ed., *Italian Regionalism. History, Identity and Politics* (Oxford, Washington D.C.: Berg, 1996), 131.

debate on the national integrity and unity of the country, a phenomenon that the Italian state faced for the first time so seriously since the Unification in 1870.⁴

The Domestic and International Factors Behind the Emergence of the “Northern Question”

The rise of the northern question in the 1990s⁵ can not be understood without explaining the background factors. The 1990s were years in which the Italian system had undergone a major transformation. Gianfranco Pasquino argues that in fact 1990s can also be labelled as a period of ‘political transition’. The Italian political transition is marked by the disappearance of the old political alignments, the emergence of new political actors and coalitions in the political scene, heavy criticisms directed at the 1948 Constitution and the institutions and rules that it set, the approval of new electoral laws and perhaps most important, the increased sensitivity of the voters towards

³ Martin Clark, *Modern Italy 1871-1995. Second Edition* (London and New York: Longman, 1996), 397.

⁴ See Gian Enrico Rusconi, *Se cessiamo di essere una nazione. Tra etnodemocrazie regionali e cittadinanza Europea* [If we are ceding to be a nation: Between regional ethnodemocracy and European Citizenship], (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993); Aldo Schiavone, *Italiani senza Italia. Storia e Identità* [Italians without Italy. History and Identity], (Torino: Einaudi, 1998); Ernesto Galli della Loggia, *La Morte della Patria. La Crisi dell’Idea di nazione tra Resistenza, antifascismo e Repubblica* [The Death of The Nation. The Crisis of The Idea of Nation between Resistance, Antifascism and The Republic], (Bari: Laterza, 1998); Giorgio Bocca, *La disunita d’Italia* [The Non-unity of Italy], (Milan: Garzanti, 1991).

political parties and their programs so that they punished and rewarded the parties, office-holders, incumbents and challengers. All these factors together were indications of a major political transition in Italian politics.⁶

Domestic and international developments acted as interacting variables bringing about this political transition. The collapse of communism, the increased pace of European integration marked especially by the growing importance devoted to the project of "Europe of Regions" were the international variables, while the electoral referendums, Operation Clean Hands, and the legitimacy crisis of the state acted as domestic variables affecting political transition in Italy.

The Collapse of Communism and the End of the Cold War

The first reason behind the collapse of the old party system that is also referred to as *partitocrazia*, has been the collapse of communism and the dismantling of the Soviet Bloc. The most important impact of this international event upon Italian politics was the consequent collapse of the two major parties of the Italian party system, the PCI (*Partita Comunista Italiana*) and the DC (*Democrazia Christiana*). The party system in the postwar

⁶ Gianfranco Pasquino, "Shaping a Better Republic? The Italian Case in Comparative Perspective," Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Estudio, Working Paper 1994/62, November 1994, 1. For a detailed account of the crisis of the Italian state, see Paul Ginsborg, "Explaining Italy's Crisis," in Stephen Gundle and Simon Parker ed., *The New Italian Republic. From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 19-39.

era was shaped and structured by the cleavage between communism and anti-communism. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and a number of related transitions took place in Eastern Europe, the communist-anti-communist cleavage in Italy became obsolete. The change of the name of the party from the Italian Communist Party to Democratic Party of the Left and transforming the symbol from the classic hammer and sickle to an oak tree were important indications that the Communist threat ⁷ could no longer be revived. The sudden disappearance of the communist threat was a shock to the Christian Democrats as well, who used the anti-communist rhetoric to attract votes.⁸

The European Integration and "Europe of Regions"

The second international factor that played an indirect, yet an important role in the rise of the northern question in Italy has been the political developments taking place in the European Union, of which Italy was a member state. As noted in the previous chapter, the most important novelty in the process of European integration, especially after the Maastricht Treaty was the increased importance of the 'subsidiarity principle'. It revealed the

⁷ Italy had the largest Communist Party in Western Europe during the Cold War years.

⁸ For the crisis of these parties with the collapse of Communism, see also, Stephen Hellman, "Italian Communism in the First Republic," in Stephen Gundle and Simon Parker, ed., *The New Italian Republic*, 72-84; Patrick McCarthy, *The Crisis of the Italian State: From the Origins of the Cold War to the Fall of Berlusconi*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 123; Mark Gilbert, *The Italian Revolution. The End of Politics, Italian Style?*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 66-86.

fact that the regions have gained further responsibilities and would assume an active role in the European integration process. The creation of the Committee of Regions and the increased lobbying offices of the regions in Brussels were indicators of this role at the supranational level. Thus the region became a key level of political dialogue and action, where national, continental and global forces interacted.⁹

However, this direct interaction envisaged between the regional and supranational level have had an important political impact on the interaction between the regional and state level. Since Europe provided a new context for older political demands of the regions, autonomist and separatist movements have increasingly come to frame their demands in European terms.¹⁰ The integration also emphasized privatization, deregulation and a general retreat of the state. Thus the European integration and global market integration through GATT, MNCs, and capital mobility have forced the nation-states to revise their centralistic territorial management and thus devolve more power to the regional governments.

Electoral Reforms through Electoral Referendums

⁹ Michael Keating, "Europeanism and Regionalism," in Barry Jones and Michael Keating, eds., *The European Union and the Regions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

The first domestic development that had affected the rise of the Northern Question was electoral reforms through electoral referendums.¹¹ Between 1981 and 1990, fourteen national referenda had been held usually on issues unwelcome to the parties. In 1989-1990, a Christian Democrat from Sardinia, Mario Segni, founded a Committee for Electoral Reform and began collecting signatures to promote a reform from below by popular vote. Segni favored direct election of mayors, and single-member constituencies in parliament. The Constitutional Court amended the proposal by reducing the number of preference votes, which voters could give to particular candidates of their chosen party, from three or four to just one. This, according to Segni, could decrease factionalism within the parties.¹²

The electoral referendum took place on June 9, 1991. Behind the electoral referendum there was a political movement in the making-political, social and cultural mobilization against the fragmentary effect of proportional

¹¹ Referenda are the other important mechanism of checks in the Italian constitution. Since 1970, the enabling legislation activated the dormant constitutional provision permitting referenda, and this provided citizens with the opportunity to circumvent the Chamber and the Senate. However, a referendum can annul existing legislation but can not introduce legislation. Thus the referenda are only abrogating ballots. In addition, to call for a referenda, the promoters should obtain 500.000 valid signatures that would be approved by the Court of Cassation. Then the Constitutionality of the proposals of the referendum must be debated by the Constitutional Court. For more details, see Gilbert, *The Italian Revolution*, 98.

¹² Martin Clark, *Modern Italy 1871-1995*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Longman, 1996). See also Gilbert, *The Italian Revolution*, 93-97.

representation.¹³ The participation rate was 62.5 percent and more than 90 percent of the voters approved the electoral reform which paved the way for further mobilization.¹⁴ A greater number of citizens signed the popular request for two other electoral referendums. Hence, the Electoral Referendum Movement became a democratic attempt to challenge *partitocrazia* and reconstruct the entire political system, giving the message to the parties that they have to fix their ways. As a result, the 1992 elections, which marked a breakthrough in the political system of Italy was held under the new system proposed by Segni. The single preference made little difference in itself, but it was a huge symbolic blow to the old parties and their regime¹⁵, since it meant that the old political order established during the Cold War years would no longer be prevailing.

¹³ Pasquino, *Shaping A Better Republic?*, 8. On the question of proportion see Gilbert, *The Italian Revolution*, 89-93. Gilbert argues that the postwar electoral system that was used to choose the members of the Chamber of Deputies also worked to insure that all currents of political opinion were represented in strict proportion to the votes they garnered at the ballot box. Only parties that garnered less than 300,000 votes nationwide and which had failed to win a seat directly in a single electoral college could not obtain a place in parliament. However, in 1953, the system was in paralysis due to a high degree of fragmentation. In that year, the DC, taking advantage of the narrow absolute majority it had won in the 1948 elections passed, with the Republican, Social Democrat and Liberal support, an electoral law that seemed to have been designed to allow it to govern perpetually. This law gave two-thirds of the seats in parliament to any coalition that won 50 percent of the vote. This law was opposed bitterly especially by the left who called the law *legge truffa* (swindle law).

¹⁴ Patrick Mc Carthy, "The Referendum of 9 June," in Stephen Hellman and Gianfranco Pasquino eds., *Italian Politics. A Review. Volume 7* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), 11-28.

¹⁵ Clark, *Modern Italy*, 397.

The second domestic factor that triggered political transition in Italy and indirectly affected the rise of the Northern Question has been the changing nature of the magistrates¹⁶ and the *Mani Pulite* (Clean Hands) investigations that were aimed at putting a full-stop to clientelistic politics, corruption and organized crime that characterized especially the Cold War political system in Italy. None of the three problems were new in Italy. Indeed every decade from the forties to the eighties had been marked by some specific scandal that involved top politicians. Operation Clean Hands started in Milan in mid-February 1992 when Antonio Di Pietro arrested Mario Chiesa, the Socialist Manager of a Milanese charitable institution, in the act of taking a 7 million lire (\$4000) bribe from the owner of a cleaning company. This, however, was only the beginning of a huge web of systemic corruption in Milan, called *Tangentopoli* (Bribesville)¹⁷, meaning a cut paid by private and public companies to political parties in exchange for public contracts and favorable treatment.¹⁸

¹⁶ On the changing status and powers of the magistrates, see Mc Carthy, *The Crisis of the Italian State*, 63-80.

¹⁷ For a detailed analysis of the corruption scandals in Milan, see Donatella della Porta, "Milan: immoral capital," in Stephen Hellman and Gianfranco Pasquino eds., *Italian Politics*, 98-115; A. Carlucci, *Tangentomani. Storie, affari e tutti I documenti sui barbari che hanno saccheggiato Lo scambio occulto. Casi di corruzione politica in Italia Milano* [Tangentomania. The stories, affairs and all the documents on the barbarians who robbed the occult exchange. The cases of political corruption in Italy], (Milan: Baldini & Castoldi, 1992).

¹⁸ Anna Bull, "Regionalism in Italy," in Peter Wagstaff, ed., *Regionalism in Europe* (Oxford: Intellect Books, 1994), 73.

Soon the judges found out that Milan was only the tip of an iceberg of corruption. Investigations spread all over Italy. Prime Minister Craxi, himself indicted, resigned as Socialist leader; when his parliamentary immunity expired he fled to Tunisia. Other figures included names such as the Foreign Minister, De Michelis and the entire DC leadership in Naples. By 1993, prosecutors had requested the lifting of parliamentary immunities of 395 deputies and senators, (1/3 of the total); 18 percent of all local councillors were under investigation, and several top civil servants and businessmen, were put into prison or committed suicide. By 1994, the number of people arrested amounted to 3,000.¹⁹ The web of corruption brought to trial even the president, Giulio Andreotti, who was unanimously considered the most powerful politician of postwar Italy. He was put under investigation for alleged ties with the mafia, as well as for having ordered the killing of a journalist who specialized in uncovering political stories. The list of accusations has been extensive and broad to cover most of the areas investigated by the Italian judges. As noted, clientelism and patronage were at the core of the relationships established between several parliamentarians, mostly Christian Democrats and Socialists, and their voters, mostly, but not exclusively in the South.

Concerning the strength of the mafia and organized crime in Italy, the most important blow to the political regime was the assassination of Giovanni

¹⁹ Clark, *Modern Italy*, 7.

Falcone by the mafia. The appointment of the most prominent of the Palermo investigators, Falcone, by the Minister of Justice in 1991 to be Director of Penal Affairs at the Ministry of Rome was an indication of the revival of the anti-Mafia war. Falcone proposed important changes; new centralized police and judicial agencies were to be set up to combat organized crime. House arrest for convicted criminals awaiting appeal court verdicts was abolished. Above all, in January 1992, the Supreme Court of Cassation confirmed many of the maxi-trial convictions, to the surprise and dismay of the convicted. Retaliation of the mafia was the assassination of Falcone and his colleague Paolo Borsellino. This event showed that the mafia overreached itself.²⁰

The Italians were no longer prepared to put up with the scandals of *clientelismo*. Levels of corruption exceeded tolerance levels. Even though the magistrates took on the role of mediator of the will to change and began the task of dismantling the system, the renewal of the political system required more than just the work of the magistrates. A 'political answer', from new political forces was necessary. Since the political class was completely discredited, and the new social forces could not identify a political class ready or able to take the place of the old one, they took on the job themselves, giving direct expression to their anti-political, productivist, utilitarian culture

²⁰ Ibid., 399.

and background. This political transformation in the North culminated in the formation and the rise of the Leagues.²¹

The Crisis of Legitimacy

Thirdly, as a consequence of the collapse of communism, the pressures exerted by the process of European integration that brought with itself economic globalism and the unveiled corruption scandals, clientelism and organized crime, the parties of the Cold War period faced a crisis of legitimacy.²² This legitimacy crisis was best revealed in the 1992 elections when the DC and the reformed Communist Party, PDS obtained the worst results in the postwar period. (DC: 29.7 percent and PDS: 16.1 percent compared to DC: 38.7 percent and PCI: 34.4 percent in 1976). The most important novelty was the emergence of a regionally-based party, the Northern League (*Lega Nord*) which brought with itself the debate about the *riforma dello stato* (reform of the state). Related to the crisis of party legitimacy of the old order already mentioned, one factor specific to the rise of Lega

²¹ William Brierley and Luca Giacometti, "Italian National Identity and the Failure of Regionalism," in Brian Jenkins and Spyros A. Sofos, *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 180.

²² Bruce Haddock, "The Crisis of the Italian State," in Robert Bideleux and Richard Taylor eds., *European Integration and Disintegration* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 117; Clark, *Modern Italy*, ; Massimo L. Salvadori, *Storia d'Italia e Crisi di Regime. Saggio sulla politica italiana 1861-1996* [History of Italy and the Crisis of Regime. An Essay on Italian Politics 1861-1996], (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994).

Nord²³ was the 'crisis of the center-periphery integration in Italy'.²⁴ According to this view, the despondency of the modern nation-state has manifested itself more acutely in Italy than elsewhere in Europe. In Italy, the embodiment of local and regional identities into a centralized state dominated by political parties was only partially successful. Political parties succeeded in holding the fragile Italian nation-state together since they benefited from the freezing effect of the Cold War and their ability to insert themselves within relatively stable political and social subcultures. As a result, the Lega Nord, as a new type of social movement, attempted to constitute a new political identity in Italy by counterposing the crisis of the political center with the purported vitality and rationality of the periphery."²⁵

The Erosion and Decline of the Traditional Affiliations

A second reason for the rise of the Lega Nord, according to Mannheimer, is the erosion and decline of the importance of the subcultures and traditional affiliations (*appartenenza*), in addition to the disappearance of the importance

²³ On the rise of the Lega Nord, see Robert Leonardi and Monique Kovacs, "The Rise of a new catch-all party," in Stephen Hellman and Gianfranco Pasquino eds., *Italian Politics: A Review. Volume 8* (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1993), 50-65; Oliver Schmidtke, "The Populist Challenge to the Italian Nation-State: The Lega Lombarda/Nord," *Regional Politics and Policy*, vol. 3, 1993, 140-162; L. Costantini, *Dentro La Lega: Come nasce, come cresce, come comunica* [Inside the League: How it was born, how it grows, how it communicates], (Rome: Koine Edizioni, 1994).

²⁴ See Dwayne Woods, "The Crisis of the Center-Periphery Integration in Italy and the Rise of Regional Populism. The Lombard League," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 27, No: 2, January 1995, 187-203.

²⁵ Ibid., 189.

of the right-left division in politics.²⁶ Traditional affiliations to the parties were regarded as a subculture such as Communist or Catholic, characterized by well defined values. The cohesion of the subculture was reinforced by the definition of an 'enemy'. For instance, the 'enemy' in the case of the Communist subculture was communism and for the Catholic subculture the 'force of the capital and the 'patrons'.²⁷

The erosion of these subcultures can be explained by the gradual disappearance of these 'enemies' which in turn was due to the progressive secularization of the Italian society and the decadent experience of the communist regimes. The result was the erosion of the *raison d'être* of these identities. Lega Nord filled this vacuum by offering a new identity and by creating new 'enemies' such as the Roman *partitocrazia* or the Southerners or the immigrants.²⁸ Thus following the decline of the votes for the 'historical political forces'²⁹ and with the end of Cold War released DC voters turned to the Lega.³⁰

²⁶ See also Ilvo Diamanti, *La Lega. Geografia, Storia e Sociologia di un Soggetto Politico* [The League. Geography, history and sociology of a political subject], (Roma: Donzelli Editore, 1993), viii.

²⁷ Mannheimer, *La Lega Lombarda* [The Lombard League], 18-19.

²⁸ Ibid., 21. See also John Dickie, "Imagined Italies," in David Forgacs and Robert Lumley eds., *Italian Cultural Studies: An Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 29.

²⁹ Renato Mannheimer, "La Crisi del Consenso per I Partiti Tradizionali," [The Crisis of Consensus for The Traditional Parties"], in Renato Mannheimer

development of local systems of small firms- the industrial districts which specialized in the flexible production of consumer goods.³²

The strength of local traditions, that is focused personal and local trust has been an important factor that led to economic activity based on small firms, family businesses, and informal relationships with the employees. It is true that the co-existence of various social systems of production with different social bases has been responsible for the economic development of Italy, but it has also been an obstacle to the consolidation of such development. It has been a resource in the sense that institutional, socio-economic and political factors, historically rooted in some local societies, favored economic dynamism and compensated for the public disorder and inefficiencies with adjustments from below. This was seen first in the case of mass production, embedded in the institutional context of the Northwest and later in the case of the small-firm development embedded in the cultural and social framework of the 'Third Italy'. Both these areas with their leading role in economic development, helped to compensate for the backwardness of the South, where economic activities were largely dependent on political redistribution. On the other hand, the co-existence of economic systems with different territorial bases has hindered the consolidation of a strong national culture and institutions, and in this way impeded the development of more complex, innovative and long-term economic activities.

Two aspects are important in this respect. First, strong regional differences in culture and institutions made the aggregation and representation of interests at a national level more difficult, therefore blocking attempts at political reform and favoring distributive policies. Secondly, localism favored an economic dynamism based on small firms in many areas of the center-north, but paradoxically by sustaining economic growth and exports, it slowed down change in social and economic policies at the central level. Such policies, in turn, helped incomes and economic dynamism in the short run but in the long run they ended up seriously undermining this dynamism due to their inefficiency.³³

By the end of the 1980s, and the beginning of the 1990s, worsening public disorder ended up jeopardizing the old private dynamism that the small firms was based upon. Both small and large firms, exposed to international competition were increasingly penalized by the costs of the state not only in terms of high inflation and high interest rates, but also in terms of low efficiency of infrastructure and services and greater tax burden. In addition, Italian participation in the EMS supported by Banca d'Italia in order to stimulate a reorganization of public policy, ended up becoming a constraint on firms without being able to change government policies. In the end, the fragile development of the 1980s led to the crisis of 1992, with the devaluation

³² Carlo Trigilia, "Italy: The Political Economy of a Regionalized Capitalism," *Southern European Society and Politics*, Vol. 2, No: 3, (Winter 1997), 53-54.

of the lira, the exit from the EMS and first moves towards a policy of reduction in public deficit.³⁴ Thus as a result of the worsening economic situation, together with growing inefficiencies of state policies and increasing fiscal burden, a process of political mobilization started in the northern regions in Italy. It was no coincidence that the Lega Nord appeared especially in small firm areas.³⁵

Definition and Evolution of the Lega Nord

The Lega Nord which is the aggregation of different leagues under the leadership of Umberto Bossi, is a political formation that emerged in the 1980s in Northern Italy. It contested the ordinary status of the Northern regions of Italy which expressed antagonism towards the traditional party system³⁶ and aspired for territorial autonomy and even secession from the rest of the country. The Lega Nord was identified with the Barbaric hordes of the ancient times as well.³⁷ Thus the symbol of the party, that is a Lombard warrior, emphasized this ethnic character of the party from the beginning.³⁸

³³ Trigilia, "Italy: The Political Economy of a Regionalized Capitalism," 74-75.

³⁴ Ibid., 67.

³⁵ See also Renato Mannheimer, "La natura compositiva dell'elettorato leghista," ["The compact nature of League Voters"] in Giacomo Sani e Renato Mannheimer eds., *La Rivoluzione Elettorale: L'Italia tra la prima e seconda repubblica*, [The Electoral Revolution: Italy between the first and second republic](Milan: Anabasi, 1994), 119-48.

³⁶ Diamanti, *La Lega*, 6.

³⁷ A. Fusella, *Arrivano I Barbari. La Lega nel racconto di quotidiani e periodici* [The Barbarians have arrived. The League according to newspapers and

In order to come up with the profile of the typical Lega voter, a series of questions was asked to Northern Italians in 1992. The results of the interviews showed that in matters of taxation, they preferred that the taxes they paid would be spent for their own region. Regarding education, they said that they would prefer schoolteachers coming from the region where they taught. About the traditional parties, they stated that the traditional parties argue among themselves, but basically they are all the same. On the issue of the immigrants, their view was that the non-European immigrants do not integrate easily, since they are different from 'them'. Another question was about marriage. The answer was that it would be better if people married those from their own part of the country. Lastly, on the issue of regionalism, they said the North, the Center and the South are very different, thus it would be better if they had more autonomy from one another.³⁹

The evolution of the Lega Nord went through six phases.⁴⁰

periodicals], (Milan: Rizzoli, 1993); Franco Cardini, *La vera Storia della Lega Lombarda* [The Real Story of the Lombard League], (Milano: Oscar Mondadori, 1991).

³⁸ See Appendix L.

³⁹ See John Dicke, "Imagined Italies," 115.

⁴⁰ Diamanti., *La Lega*, 19-20. For the background information about Lega Nord, see also G. de Luna, ed., *Figli di un benessere minore: storia della Lega 1979-1983* [Children of a minor wealth: history of The League 1979-1983], (Milan: La Nuova Italia, 1994).

a. The first phase (1983-1987): This period witnessed the emergence of the Venetian League founded by Franco Rochetta in Northeast Italy. The League reflected the crisis of consensus on the solid Christian Democrat areas and the uncertainty that prevailed in the social structure of small enterprises. These enterprises were centers of development in the 1970s. In fact, Veneto, a region of strong Catholic traditions, was a leading economic area with these small enterprises and small family firms. However, the Church, as the guardian of universal values and identity, had managed to keep the Veneto society together. With the secularization process that had started in Italy in the 1960s, the role of the Christian Democrat party changed. It was no longer able to mediate between the national and local values and identities. No alternative identity or value system was proposed by the DC to replace the Catholic identity.

This 'identity vacuum' was filled with more of an ethnic sentiment that was revealed in the "Venetian nation." However, in time, the Liga Veneta lost the stage to a new movement in Lombardy. As a movement, the Lombard League was founded on 12 April 1984, although the first issue of its periodical, *Lombarda Autonomista*, containing the basic manifesto, had been published two years previously, on 1 March 1982. The manifesto was titled, "Lombardia to the Lombards, Padania to the Padans".⁴¹ The basic premises of the League read as follows: "Our fundamental common interest is the liberation of

⁴¹ The original title was "Lombardia ai Lombardi, Padania ai Padani,". For the complete version of the Manifesto, see Appendix M.

Lombardia from the suffocating hegemony of the centralist government in Rome, through Lombardian autonomy in the wider context of Padano-Alpina autonomy."⁴² In 1985 local elections, the candidates of the Lega Lombarda won representation in two councils, Varese and Gallarate.⁴³

- b. The Second Phase (1987-1990): The center of the autonomist movement slid towards the Northwest and the definition of "nation" was placed with more of a "regionalist" one which reflected the "community of interests." Lombardy becomes the territory where the "producer population" resided as opposed to the centralized state and the assisted South. At this phase the movement took the name, Lega Lombarda.

In the June 1987 general elections, the Lega Lombarda garnered 3.0 percent of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies and 2.5 percent for the Senate, which gave it a seat in each house. In the European Parliament elections in 1989, the Lega received 6.5 percent of the popular vote in Lombardy, and in the regional elections the following year its share of the vote increased to 16.4 percent.⁴⁴

⁴² "Lombardia ai Lombardi, Padania ai Padani," *Lombarda Autonomista*, Marzo 1982), cited in Umberto Bossi, *Il Mio Progetto* [My Project], (Milano: Sperling and Kupfer Editori, 1996), 7. For the complete version of the Manifesto and the Party Program, see the appendix.

⁴³ Farrell and Levy, "The Northern League," 135.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 135.

c. The Third Phase (1990-1992): On 4 December 1990, six of the leagues operating in Northern Italy-the *Liga Veneta*, *Piemont Autonomista*, the *Emilia-Romagnola*, the *Alleanza Toscana*, the *Unione Ligurie* and *Lega Lombarda*- signed a pact in Bergamo. The pact was subsequently formalized at a congress in Milan on 10 February 1991, giving birth to the Lega Nord. Bossi was nominated secretary and Rochetta was given the largely ceremonial office of president.⁴⁵ It is in this period that the Lega emerged with its rhetoric against the party system and traditional institutions. At the general elections of 1992, it had 8.7 percent of the national vote for the Chamber of Deputies and 8.2 for the Senate, but in Lombardy itself its vote reached 20.5 percent. It came to have 55 members of the Chamber of Deputies and 25 of the Senate. In the local government election in Mantua in 27 September 1992, its vote of 33.9 percent established it as the leading force in the region.

d. The Fourth Phase (1992-1994): The Lega moved from the regional level of politics to the national level. In the local elections of June 1993, it became the largest party in the Milan City Council; its candidate, Marco Formentini was elected mayor.

⁴⁵ Joseph Farrell and Carl Levy, "The Northern League: Conservative Revolution?" in Carl Levy ed. *Italian Regionalism. History, Identity and Politics* (Oxford, Washington D. C.: Berg, 1996), 135.

- e. The Fifth Phase (1994-1996): In the 1994 general elections, in just three months the percentage vote of Lega Nord dropped from 41 percent in the first ballot to 16 percent. The net result of the 1994 elections was concentration of Lega Nord's vote in the North. With the help of the winner-take-all system, the Lega returned 122 members to the Chamber. The strongholds of the Lega Nord vote were Veneto, Lombardy, Friuli and Piedmont, such provinces as Belluno, Treviso, Vicenza, Verona, Brescia, Bergamo, Como, Varese, and the hinterland of Milan and Cuneo. In these provinces the Lega Nord obtained more than 25.5 percent of the vote.⁴⁶
- f. The Sixth Phase (1996-today): The year 1996 was a turning point for the Lega Nord and its political strategy. The Lega definitively changed its character. It transformed itself from a versatile and heterogenous political actor into one with a project so specific and distinctive as to make any kind of political mediation difficult: "secession" and the creation of an independent state in northern Italy within a federal Italy.⁴⁷

The change in character during this sixth phase came about and was reinforced in two stages: The first stage coincided with the election of 21

⁴⁶ Ibid., 136.

⁴⁷ Ilvo Diamanti, "The Lega Nord: From Federalism to Secession," in Roberto D'Alimonte and David Nelken eds. *Italian Politics: The Center-Left in Power* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 65.

April, in which the Lega Nord scored an unexpected success. With nearly four million votes, more than 10 percent of the total, the Lega Nord was the largest party in the North and the fourth in Italy as a whole.

This result relaunched the Lega Nord in Italian politics after a period of relative decline. Above all it pushed the problems and demands which the Lega Nord articulated into the fore. The Lega put forward the proposal of forming a Liberation Committee for Padania (*CLN della Padania*) that would work for the independence of the North from the rest of the country.⁴⁸ Another target that was set by the Committee was to achieve recognition of Padania in Europe. Once it was formed, the Committee of Liberation stated that the provinces under Lega administration would not accept official visits of the representatives of the Italian state. These provinces were Varese, Brescia, Bergamo, Mantova and Pavia in the region of Lombardy, and Padova, Verona and Treviso in the region of Veneto. The Committee also stated that they would search for a way of certifying the birth of Padania on the part of the government, parliament, the political organizations of the foreign states, as it was done in the cases of Vatican and Slovenia before. The Committee also declared that its representatives would establish contacts with similar movements that sought independence from their mother

⁴⁸ *Corriere della Sera*, April 25, 1996.

countries. One example that they referred to was the Basques, under the leadership of Herri Batasuna.⁴⁹

The second stage started on September 15, 1996, when for the Lega, "secession" became a strategic objective rather than a tactical threat.⁵⁰ The leader, Umberto Bossi defined the aim of the Lega as independence of the North in a federal Italy.⁵¹ He very frequently started to mention "liberating Padania", "Padania as a promised land", "the end of the unitary state" and the like. He gave increasing importance to initiatives that marked the distancing of "Padania" from the Italian state. The so-called "Parliament of Mantua", in which the Lega's members and local administrators met periodically, was flanked by a series of organs which challenged legality and the Italian national identity in an increasingly open manner.⁵²

The Lega called demonstrations along the length of the River Po to coincide with its "proclamation of the Padanian nation". During the demonstrations, the "Green Shirts" (*Camicie Verde*) were presented as an autonomous militia for the Lega. The demonstrators proclaimed that the event's aim was the self-determination of the Padanian peoples. The rites were designed to promote a

⁴⁹ *Corriere della Sera*, June 5, 1996.

⁵⁰ Diamanti, "The Lega Nord: From Federalism to Secession," 75.

⁵¹ The increasing threat of secession was revealed in an antagonism towards Bossi and his party in the caricatures of the daily, *Corriere Della Sera* and in some other journals. For some examples, see Appendices N, O, P, and R.

sense of collective identity around territory, community and property. It was revealed with the slogan calling on the people to participate “for the freedom of *your* land, to be master in *your* house”.⁵³

The “secessionist” rhetoric, ironically, prevented most of the Lega supporters from participating in the demonstrations alongside the Po river. Diamanti argues that the media promotion was in part responsible for this. The dramatization of the event by the media, other political forces, state institutions and the magistracy, who started investigations of the “Green Shirts” and of the legality of threats to national unity were other reasons behind the failure of the demonstrations.⁵⁴

The Ideology of the Lega Nord

The crucial point in Lega Nord’s ideology is that it wants to unbind Italy and to restore government as far as possible to local political entities.⁵⁵ The aim of the Lega Nord is revealed in its manifesto: “...We have a fundamental common interest to which our division into parties of every political identity must be subordinated.... The fundamental interest of ours is the liberation of Lombardy from the insatiable and suffocating hegemony of the centralist

⁵² Ibid., 75-76.

⁵³ Ibid., 76.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 78.

⁵⁵ Bossi, *Il Mio Progetto*, 7-10.

government in Rome, via Lombard autonomy within the far wider context of northern Italian autonomy."⁵⁶

The declaration of principles in the Manifesto was accompanied by a fifteen-point program of specific political goals, which was later amended into a definitive twelve-point agenda in 1983. In this latter document the Lega Nord stated that it was for:

- self-government for Lombardy, and supercede the centralized state with a modern Federal State that respects all of the peoples which constitute it;
- precedence of Lombards in assigning jobs, houses, welfare and financial contributions;
- regional control and management of the fruits of the Lombards' labor and their taxes;
- a school system and public administration in the hands of Lombards, not 'denaturized' ones;
- construction of a Europe founded on autonomy, federalism, and mutual solidarity and respect between peoples, and thus between the Lombards and all peoples. In addition, the Lega emphasized its dislike of the "opportunistic mentality" of the parties in Rome. ⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Daniele Vimercati, *I Lombardi alla nuova crociata: la lega dall'esordio al trionfo: cronaca di un miracolo politico*. [The Lombards in a new crusade: the league from the beginning to the triumph: chronicle of a political miracle], (Milano: Mursia, 1990), 49.

The Components of the Lega Nord's Ideology

1. Neo-Federalism

The most important component of the ideology of the Lega Nord is the return to federalist ideas. The birth of the federalist pillar of the Lega dates back to the meeting of the present leader of the Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi, with the leader of the *Valdotaine Union*, Bruno Salvadori in 1980. Salvadori, having seen Bossi's interest in federalist thought, proposed the publishing of a small newspaper to him, *Nord-Ovest* (North-West), for diffusing in Lombardia the idea of autonomy. The same year, Bruno Salvadori died in a traffic accident and left the floor to Bossi for the birth of a new political organization, the *Lega Lombarda*. Bossi, in his autobiography explains the ideology of the party in those years as follows:

It was an intense and fascinating period of organizational work and cultural search. My effort, which I think, in the final analysis was successful, was to popularize the federalism thesis, an ideology that was rather refined but distant from the sensibility of the masses. For years the masses had been indoctrinated with the Marxist and Crocean ideologies. I was making up slogans such as 'Rome, the robber', 'Enough for the colonial school', 'Lombardia, the goose that lays the golden egg', 'No to the Southerners' excessive power'. We decided to spread anti-Southern feelings in Lombardia, and in other Northern regions, and, thus, attract the attention of the wider public and mass media.⁵⁸

He goes on:

We were suggesting more autonomy in Lombardia and other regions of Italy, the birth of a new federal state, the revision of the central fiscal system, the defense of the traditions and the

⁵⁸ Umberto Bossi and Daniele Vimercati, *Vento del Nord La mia Lega* [North Wind. My League My Life], (Milano: Sperling and Kupfer Editori, 1992), 42.

local cultures, the protection of the small industry and agriculture that created the richness of the region, the dismantling of the privileges to the Southerners in the public examinations in obtaining posts, accommodations, assistance and financial contributions.⁵⁹

According to Anna Bull, federalism of the Lega Nord, as put forward in the party's 1992 electoral program appears to have been crudely inspired by Bagnasco's 'three Italies' thesis. The Lega Nord advocated the creation of a Federal State made up of three macro-regions or Republics each considered as a homogenous unit from the socio-economic point of view.

The setting up of the three macro-regions or at least the Northern one was to be achieved in accordance with the existing legal and constitutional rules and procedures. Article 132 of the Italian Constitution stipulates that it is legitimate to provide for the fusion of existing Regions by Constitutional Law, on the condition that this is proposed by a number of Municipal Councils representing at least a third of the interested population, and that the proposal is approved in a referendum by a majority of the same population.⁶⁰

The crux of the ideology lay in the refutation of the Risorgimento values. Bossi explains this as follows: "We put the blame on the founding fathers of

⁵⁹ Ibid., 43.

⁶⁰ Bull, "Regionalism in Italy," 76.

the Risorgimento, from Mazzini to Cavour...We brought into the center of the debate the ideas of Cattaneo and Ferrari, as well as Jefferson, Hamilton and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who admired the ancient Greek *polis* and defended the thesis that 'the true democracy can be achieved only in relatively small communities.'" ⁶¹ According to Bossi, the unitary state formed by the Risorgimento was imposed from above and had never succeeded in erasing the etno-cultures that divide Italy. The only remedy to the problems of the "res publica" was to be solved by adopting the formula of "integral federalism" (*federalismo integrale*). As Bull has argued Lega Nord's federalism can be defined as "instrumental in descent" despite the Lega's claim that they are Cattaneo's natural heirs. Donzelli had pointed out that the federalist current of thought that can be traced back to the Italian Risorgimento tradition can be defined as "instrumental in ascent", i.e. federalism which identifies strong ethnic, linguistic, social and cultural differences within a territory seen as capable of achieving national unity. The federal system is seen in this context as a system, an instrument to bring about the harmonization and real unification of a state's regional components. ⁶²

2. Anti-Southern Stance

Another important pillar of the ideology of Lega Nord has been its anti-Southernism. The emergence of Lega Nord is a symptom of growing

⁶¹ Bossi and Vimercati, *Vento del nord*, 43.

⁶² Donzelli cited in Bull, "Regionalism in Italy," 75.

resentment in the richer Northern regions regarding the corruption and inefficiency of the state. The immense sums of money pumped into the *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno*, for instance, was seen as totally counter-productive, since they seriously distorted and restricted economic growth. All that happened in effect was that potential investment capital was channeled away from the North. Thus by propping up established clientele networks, including the mafia, state funds were seen as essentially perpetuating the status quo.⁶³

It was further asserted by the Lega that Rome thinks of Lombardy as a 'milch cow'. In the manifesto it states: "Lombardy is not an idiot who will pay other people's debts. Lombardy is not going to follow Rome passively into bankruptcy because it has no intention of sacrificing the rights of its citizens, the sweat of his sons, the diligence of its people and the personality of its people on the altar of Roman misgovernment."⁶⁴ In the eyes of the Lega Nord, the "Southernization" of the Italian state as evidenced by the

⁶³ Haddock, *The Crisis of the Italian State*, 116; Woods, "The Crisis of the Center-Periphery Integration," 198. The first split within the party, marked by the expulsion of the movement's second in command, Franco Castellazzi was also a good indicator of how serious Lega considered the corrupt practices of the parties of the old order. The conflict between Bossi and Castellazzi was more than a personality clash or a power struggle. Castellazzi represented the factions within the movement that wanted to adopt a more conciliatory position towards the Christian Democrats. In cities where the League had done well electorally but did not receive enough votes to form a government, Castellazzi wanted to enter into alliances with the Christian Democrats or the Socialist Party. However, Bossi disagreed on the ground that governing alliances would expose the movement into cooptation and corruption by the traditional parties.

⁶⁴ Vimercati, *I Lombardi alla nuova crociata*, 148-150.

emergence of a widespread corrupt and clientelistic system of government is a clear sign that the process of national integration, far from promoting homogenization of the country around 'Northern' laws, practices, institutions and economy, has succeeded only in imposing the South's deviant practices upon the whole of the country.⁶⁵

The appeal to Europe is also emphasized in relation to Lega Nord's anti-Southern stance. According to Lega, Northern Italy is already a fully European country and is ready to meet the requirements of European integration. Thus it will not tolerate the thought of missing the 'European Train' because of the inefficiency and backwardness of the Center-South. Indeed, this is the main argument for the "secession" hypothesis.⁶⁶

The anti-Southern stance has best been revealed in Bossi's words:

What is the meaning of having frontiers between Piedmont and Savoie, or South Tyrol and Austria? Their ethnicity is substantially identical, from a naturalistic point of view. From a socio-cultural point of view, ...nothing unites Trentino and Lombardy with Calabria and Campania. Therefore, I say: why not replace the fixed frontiers and the centralism by a plurality of institutional centers each with specific and limited responsibilities? Why not eliminate, in other words, the rigid frontiers between very similar realities, as for example Lombardy and Baviera, while introducing separate decision-making centers each with real autonomy, in different realities which were arbitrarily unified, such as the North and South of Italy?"⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Bull, "Regionalism in Italy," 75.

⁶⁶ Zdravko Mlinar ed., *Globalization and Territorial Identities* (Brookfield, Vt., U.S.A.: Avebury, 1992), 51.

After the victory in the 1992 elections, Bossi stated that the North had chosen federalism and Europe and the South had chosen Africa and Fascism.⁶⁸

Criticisms and Fragmentation within the Lega Nord

The radical change in Lega's ideology after the 1996 elections, marked by the emphasis on "secession" and "independence" made the Northern Question central to political debate. The state could no longer ignore the uneasiness in the North revealed by the continuing rise of the Lega Nord. Criticisms were intense. The Church, the media, the government and the opposition leaders stated that the unity and integrity of Italy is a *sine qua non* condition, thus they discarded the possibility of independence of the North. The Pope made a declaration upon Lega's previous proposal of creating a Northern Church⁶⁹ and declared that "the unity of the Italian state was indispensable", that "the cultural and ecclesiastical (patrimonial) unity of Italy is much older than its political unity", and that "the local autonomies should be given credit".⁷⁰ This view was further strengthened in the book published by Diocesi of Milano, which argued that the remedy to the present crisis of Italy would be

⁶⁷ Bossi and Vimercati, *Vento dal Nord*, 161-162. (with the translation of Anna Bull).

⁶⁸ *La Repubblica*, April 7, 1992.

⁶⁹ This proposal was made by the Torinese deputy of Lega Nord, Mario Borghezio who stated that "they, the Northerners, want a separate Church in the North. This Church would not be church of 'God of Money', but a Church of Religion." *Corriere della Sera*, November 26, 1995.

⁷⁰ *Corriere della Sera*, May 7, 1996; *Corriere della Sera*, May 10, 1996.

strengthening the regional autonomies and thus creating a “solidary federalism”.⁷¹

Even the United States declared its support for the “integrity and indivisibility” of the Italian state based on the premise that a secessionist movement in that specific geography of Europe would upset the strategic and political balances that the NATO and the European Union has been trying to maintain. Clinton further stated that Italy was regarded as a bridge to the Balkans and the Middle East and it can perform this role as long as it has domestic integrity and stability.⁷²

These criticisms towards the “secessionist” rhetoric of the Lega Nord were also accompanied by polarization and split within the party. The “reformists and federalists” formed the moderate pole, the “secessionists and the militants” formed the extremists, and “marginalized” were the territorial units, such as Veneto.

The first split in the party was the dismissal of Irene Pivetti. She said that she had left the party because the racist and independist rhetoric adopted by the party disturbed her. She further argued that the independence of the north was not compatible with the ideas of federalism, which the Lega was

⁷¹ Commissione Diocesana “Giustizia e Pace” [“Justice and Peace”], Diocesi di Milano, *Autonomie Regionali e Federalismo Solidale* [Regional Autonomy and Solidary Federalism], (Milano: Centro Ambrosiano, 1996).

cherishing before.⁷³ In time, another split occurred. The very ideologue of the Lega Nord, Professor Gianfranco Miglio, resigned and set up an alternative movement which claimed to protect the true aims of the League movement that had been betrayed by Bossi, Maroni and Formentini.⁷⁴ He basically put the blame on the character of Bossi. He has argued that Bossi was always a liar.⁷⁵ He claimed that from the cultural point of view, the level of Bossi is close to zero. He further stated: "I never managed to understand what he had studied. In his autobiography he talked about having read Pareto, Weber, Adorno, Marcuse, Cattaneo, Gioberti, Hamilton, and the like. But in many of the conversations that I had with him, I never saw even a hint about the ideas of these intellectuals."⁷⁶ Another defect in Bossi's personality, Miglio argued, was his jealousy for the other people in the party organization. That is why he blocked the entrance of many qualified people to the party. Miglio also stated in his memoirs that he was very disappointed by the fact that the federalist proposal was never put into action after the votes of the Lega started to increase.

⁷² *Corriere della Sera*, June 13, 1996.

⁷³ *Corriere della Sera*, November 26, 1995.

⁷⁴ Farrell and Levy, "The Northern League," 144.

⁷⁵ Gianfranco Miglio, *Io, Bossi e La Lega. Diario Segreto dei Miei Quattro Anni sul Carroccio* [Bossi, The League and I. The Secret Diary of my Four Years on the Bandwagon], (Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1994), 37.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

Other Federalist Proposals

Gianfranco Miglio's Federalism

Gianfranco Miglio is an important name in the federalist debate that has been taking place in Italy. For the last thirty years Miglio has been theorizing about the necessity of a federal Italy. The originality of the Miglio proposal is that it is the only proposal that combines the political culture and “juridical (or constitutional) engineering”.⁷⁷ Miglio referred to the Italian nation as a ‘myth’ constructed by a particular elite in order to press their own advantage and interest.⁷⁸ Far from the state in 1861 reflecting the Italian nation, Miglio argued that the Piedmontese propagandists effectively fabricated the idea of the nation as a means of legitimizing the dominant dynasty.⁷⁹

The bottomline of Miglio's thesis is that there are two diverse political cultures in Italy--the Northern/European and the Southern/Mediterranean. The former is characterized by activism, the latter by indolence. The former subscribes to pluralism and the market, the latter is interested in seizure of power. The cohabitation of these two different cultures can not be free from tensions. The only way of assuring an efficient cohabitation is through a

⁷⁷ See Gianfranco Pasquino, *Lo Stato Federale* [The Federal State], (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1996), 78.

⁷⁸ Gianfranco Miglio, “Le Leghe Regionali: Il mito della nazione,” [“The Regional Leagues: The myth of nations.”] in his *Il nerbo e le briglie del potere* [The whip and reins of power], (Milan: Edizioni del Sole 24 Ore, 1988), 303.

federal system where diverse political cultures are not in intense competition with each other.⁸⁰ Miglio sees the 'right of secession' as a 'natural right' essential for the preservation of cultural diversity.⁸¹

The federalist proposal of Miglio is implicitly based on the assumption that the Northern culture is superior to the Southern one. He argues that a strong and reliable center is necessary to govern. In the absence of such a strong center, the center cannot cope with the centrifugal tendencies of the periphery and in this case the outcome is the secession of the North. Thus it is up to the South to speak out and take on the challenge. The solution suggested by Miglio, is a referendum about the formation of macroregions: the Canton of Padania in the north consisting of Piemonte, Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, the Canton of Tuschia in the Center composed of Toscana, Marche, Umbria, Abruzzi, Molise, Lazio, and the Canton of the Mediterranean in the South composed of Campania, Calabria, Basilicata, Puglia. In addition there will be the five special-statute regions mentioned above. The governments of these regions will be elected by the people.⁸²

⁷⁹ Ibid., cited in Haddock, "The Crisis of the Italian state," 116.

⁸⁰ Gianfranco Miglio, *Come Cambiare. Le Mie Riforme* [How to Change. My Reforms], (Milano: Mondadori, 1992).

⁸¹ Miglio's preface to Gianfranco Morra, *Breve storia del pensiero federalista* [A Short History of the Federalist Thought], (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1993), 5-6, cited in Haddock, "The Crisis of the Italian State," 117.

⁸² Gianfranco Miglio, "Towards a Federal Italy," *Telos*, 90, Winter 1991-1992. On the federalist scheme, see also Marcello Staglieno ed., *Una Costituzione per*

Giovanni Agnelli Foundation's "Twelve-Region" Proposal

Another scheme for federalism has been suggested by the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, that proposes a consolidation into twelve large regions, instead of the present twenty.⁸³ This scheme, in fact, was made in 1864, by Pietro Maestri, even before the unification of the Italian state was achieved. The scheme envisages the merger of regions with similar characteristics. They are large enough to accept a balanced relationship between them and the State, but they are not large to encourage any secessionist tendencies. These regions would be able to compete with the regions of the other European states and would acquire financial autonomy.⁸⁴

In this scheme of the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, some regions would remain as they were such as Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna, Sicilia, Calabria and Sardegna. Whereas some other regions and also some large provinces would merge to form a macro region. These regions were grouped as follows: (Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Trentino-Alto-Adige), (Valle d'Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria), (Marche, Abruzzo, Molise), (Toscana, Umbria- the

prossima trent'anni: Intervista sulla terza repubblica [A Constitution for the next thirty years: Interviews on the third republic], (Roma: Laterza, 1990).

⁸³ See the map of twelve regions in Appendices S and T.

⁸⁴ Giuseppe Balistreri, "Federalismo o regionalismo? [Federalism or regionalism?], In Paul Ginsborg, ed., *Stato dell'Italia* [The Italian State], (Milano: Bruno Mondadori, 1994), 221.

province of Perugia), (Lazio, Umbria, Province of Terni), (Campagna, Basilicata, Province of Potenza), (Puglia, Basilicata, Province of Matera).⁸⁵

An Assessment of Neo-Regionalism in Italy in the 1990s

Despite all the ups and downs in Lega's votes and oscillations in its ideology from autonomy to federalism and from federalism to secession, the phenomenon of the Lega Nord is the most crucial factor in understanding the present crisis of neo-regionalism that rekindled the fragmentation between the North and South of Italy. The anti-Southern rhetoric, that was referred to as "neo-Orientalism"⁸⁶ was revived and brought into the political agenda by the Lega Nord.

The importance of the Lega Nord stems from the fact that it established a new basis of communication with the society attributing a lot of importance to individual leadership with new organizational models and new communications, transforming the dominant values or changing them into new forms.⁸⁷ Besides, the Lega Nord from 1980-1993 constitutes the principal factor of rupture and the innovation in the Italian political system. It has

⁸⁵ Pacini, Marco, ed., *Un Federalismo dei Valori. Percorsi e conclusioni di un programma della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1992-1996* [A Federalism with values. Directions and conclusions of the program of Giovanni Agnelli Foundation], (Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1996), 171.

⁸⁶ Jane Schneider, ed., *Italy's "Southern Question". Orientalism in One Country* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1998).

⁸⁷ Diamanti, *La Lega*. xi.

accelerated change in the process between the voters and parties, offering representation to the social and territorial sectors whose economic weight has increased more than the political weight and became a channel from which the demands for party changes and the traditional institutional changes spread out. Thus with the emergence of the phenomenon of Lega Nord, the Italian political system has passed to a stage of instability.⁸⁸

The sudden rise in the votes of the Lega Nord alarmed even the armed forces. Representatives of the armed forces proclaimed the goal stated as 'independence of the North from the rest of the country through secession' unconstitutional and indicated that they might intervene if the members of the party were awarded delicate political positions in the aftermath of the elections. This aspect of Lega's rise caused rumors of a coup in conjunction with the 1994 elections and contributed to the resignation of the army chief of staff in October 1993.⁸⁹

Most recently, in the beginning of 1998, the public prosecutor of Verona, Guido Papalia claimed that the leader of the Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi should be tried for attacking the integrity of the State, destroying the national sentiment, and forming military associations with a political scope. It was

⁸⁸ Ibid., viii, vii.

⁸⁹ Di Scala, *Italy: From Revolution to Republic*, 332.

also uncovered that Bossi's telephones were tapped.⁹⁰ This reveals the fact that the state no longer ignores the threat of "secession"; that can not be tolerated.

In this respect, the "Europe of Regions" scheme seems to be creating further tensions between the richer regions of Northern Italy that look more to Europe than the Southern regions that were perceived to drag down the efficiency of the North. This incompatible duality of Italy, according to the Northerners is what keeps Italy weaker politically and economically in the European Union. Thus, within the new framework of supranational integration that is introduced by the European Union, the failed task of "making Italians" reveals itself even more strikingly. Even though the Lega Nord may not be regarded as representing the entire population of Northern Italy, it can not be denied that it has an important weight in Italian politics that should be taken seriously. So far, the Lega has not been able to present its cause as successfully as its partners in Spain or England, however, if the present crisis in the Italian state is prolonged, it will gain further weight in the national, supranational and international political arena.

⁹⁰ *La Repubblica*, January 30, 1998; *La Stampa*, February 18, 1998.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

This study has been an attempt to contribute to the theories on national integration and fragmentation, by analyzing the past and present causes of the recent rise of regionalism in Italy. The rise of neo-regionalism in Italy in the 1990s, marked by the wide-spread debate that has been brought into the political agenda by the establishment of a regionally-based party for the first time led scholars to question the success of Risorgimento (the process through which the present Italian state was founded.) For the first time since the Risorgimento, norms upon which it has been based started to be questioned and in the process the national integrity of the country was put at stake.

The reason behind the rise of a debate that put the national integrity of the country at stake was the argument by the regionally-based party in northern Italy, the *Lega Nord*, that the present state system in Italy has collapsed and it has to be replaced with a federal-type of state in which Italy would be divided into three macro-regions-the North, the Center and the South. In this macro-regional scheme, the North of Italy would secede and establish a separate, independent state. Even though the Lega Nord was the most

prominent actor in this debate about the form of the state, it was not only the Lega who came up with this idea about federalism. Many sectors of the Italian society, too, started questioning the wisdom of the centralized state “imposed” from above in 1870. Among these sectors was even the highly respectable and influential Giovanni Agnelli Foundation that also stated that there was a need to reshape the Italian state by dividing it into twelve regions instead of the present twenty regions.

It is often assumed that the highly centralized Roman Empire and the highly decentralized city-states or communes had been the premises upon which present-day Italy has been founded. However, despite the existence of the Roman Empire, Italy had never been under an absolutist or centralized rule. There have always existed many different cultures and ethnic groups in Italy and it has always been hard to define who constitutes an Italian. Likewise, the strong affiliations to the city-states, such as Venice, Florence, Genoa and the like acted as a great obstacle for the creation of a sense of national identity. Moreover, the allegiances to these city-states and to even smaller localities persisted throughout all of Italy's history, making national identification problematic.

The Renaissance contributed to the promotion of a cultural unity in Italy through the attempts at creating an Italian language. However, because of the internal pressures and the external intervention in internal affairs the

Renaissance did not last long. The decline of the Renaissance led Italy to lose whatever cultural, economic and political unity was achieved during that period and, as a result, the peninsula was fragmented to hundreds of small principalities, dukedoms and the like. The lack of unifying capabilities on the part of these small political entities once more strengthened local allegiances that had continued to exist. From then on the “Italian national identity” faded even more and became something difficult to define. The conception of Italy was no longer shared or collective; in particular the long historical rift between the North and the South of the country became even more evident after the Renaissance.

The French revolution and the subsequent occupation of some parts of the Italian peninsula by Napoleon marked the most important turning point in Italian history. For the first time, there emerged in Italy a “nationalist” fervor. This fervor carried to Italy the notion of “one nation, one state”, that was nonexistent until then in that country. At the same time, the occupation far exceeded its intended aim and raised an anti-French, anti-revolutionary sentiment, that carried “nationalist” undertones as well.

The most important legacy that the Napoleonic regime left in Italy had been the acclaimed need for the “unification” of the peninsula around Italian nationhood. That was regarded as the sole remedy to the vulnerability of the country to foreign attacks. However, it was no easy task for the founders of

the state because of the mosaic-like structure of the peninsula. It was the little state of Piedmont under French influence that first took up the task of unification. The question of the "Italian nation" became central again with the Risorgimento, which marked the beginning of the unification process that culminated in the birth of the Italian state in 1870. With Risorgimento (Resurrection), the old, centralized, Roman state was aimed to be resurrected.

The Piedmontese aim was to unify the different states, principalities, cities and communes under the banner of a unitary Italian state, as did France. The main philosophical figure behind this view was Giuseppe Mazzini. However, a unitary state was not regarded as the best type of state by some other philosophers and ideologues. One such example was Carlo Cattaneo. The proponents of federalism argued that a unitary state would not last long since it would be difficult to maintain the unity of different localities and to divert allegiances of the people from their localities to the central, unitary state. However, the federalists were weak so the Piedmontese initiative prevailed. As a result, Unification came about as a result of the Piedmontese initiative which prevailed over the federalist proposals of various other thinkers and philosophers.

The creation of Italy was not free from problems. The two major issues at stake were the "Roman Question", and the "Southern Question". The Roman question was the problem of integration of the territories of the Papal States

that opposed the unification of the peninsula under the leadership of Piedmonte. The "Southern Question", likewise, had to do with the problematic nature of the integration of the Southern territories of Italy, including Sicily and the island of Sardinia, with the rest of the country. Both questions seemed to be solved primarily by force of arms and partially by diplomacy in 1870, a fact that further undermined the legitimacy of the newly-founded state of the Piedmontese.

Thus the Risorgimento, in fact, marked another important turning point in Italian history regarding the failure of national integration. The task of "making Italians" was even harder than "making Italy" since the Italian state lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the newly-integrated parts of the new state. The nationalist policies to prop up a weak nation were unable to create a "civic and democratic integration". The high level of illiteracy and the persistence of the local dialects, and allegiances to local entities and the low level of communications between different regions of the country could not be overcome by policies of the newly-founded Italian state.

The newly-founded Italian state applied a method of *trasformismo* (transformation) through which it aimed to co-opt the inhabitants of the newly-annexed territories and gain legitimacy in their eyes. It was also regarded as a method for national integration. However, this co-optation process remained very elitist since the alliance between the northern

industrialists and the southern landowners, called *blocco storico* (historical blockade), impeded the penetration of state policies to the grassroots. As a result, it was considered as a *revolution manquee* [incomplete revolution] since the pre-First World War liberal class failed to “make Italians”. The center and periphery gap as explained in various models of Stein and Rokkan could not be overcome. The state remained alien and distanced from the masses and, as noted, it lacked legitimacy in their eyes.

The ideal of creating the Italian nation, however, did not fade away with the failure of the liberal class that ruled Italy after Risorgimento. The lack of legitimacy of the liberal ruling class, increasing social unrest together with such frustrations in the international arena especially after the First World War created an appropriate atmosphere for the fascists who used nationalism as a tool of propaganda against the liberal class. Although the shared experience of war created a sense of national identity, it nevertheless, was not able by itself to “make Italians”. The ultimate goal of the fascist regime that came to power in the aftermath of the war was that of creating the “Italian man” as well as the *Homo Fascistus*.

The National Fascist Party, *Partita Nazionale Fascista (PNF)*, failed in its project to “nationalize” the Italians, because rather than attempting to construct a new national identity, it limited itself to mobilizing a variety of sectors behind the symbols of fascism. Through public rituals, commemorations,

public events and through offering everyone a status in society, fascism sought to incorporate the alienated sectors of the society into the state apparatus, thus closing the gap between the center and periphery. However, the exclusion of middle classes and ethnic minorities culminated in the decline of popularity of fascism in the eyes of the people. The decreasing legitimacy of the fascist regime together with the military defeat and destruction of the Second World War left Italy without Italians again. As a result, the task of “making Italians” was not accomplished by the fascists either.

The aftermath of the Second World War and the Resistance Movement against the fascist regime and Nazi presence rekindled the already existing ashes of the division of Italy. The North started to blame the South of not engaging in the Resistance Movement, whereas the Southerners still felt alienated from the regime and the state.

The cultural, economic and social gap between the North and South of Italy became a serious concern in the aftermath of the Second World War when reconstruction began. Against the fascist background, the 1948 Constitution envisaged the devolution of powers from the center to the periphery; twenty regions were created, four of which had special status and powers. This decentralization was regarded as a means of trying to increase the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the people as well as promoting the participation of

the citizens in political life through the regional institutions. However, the regional clause in the 1948 Constitution was put into effect only in the 1970s, after the eruption of social unrest in such peripheral ethnic regions as South Tyrol. It was assumed that the creation of the regional tiers of government, referred also as the meso-level, following the creation of similar institutions in some other European countries would to some extent ameliorate the unrest. However, setting up of regional governments, let alone increasing the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the people, further increased the tension by indirectly increasing the gap between the North and the South.

For in the South, the regional governments did not function effectively. On the contrary, they provided an institutional basis for corruption and clientelism, that was a common phenomena in the South due to the lack of a civic consciousness and commune mentality as it was revealed by Robert Putnam. Thus the state-allocated funds were channeled to improper destinations and little development took place. Whereas in the North, due to the historically inherited commune mentality, the performance of regional governments were far more successful. Thus state funds were utilized efficiently and the cultural, social and economic gap between the North and the South increased in real terms.

Another important factor that further exacerbated the North-South difference was the entry of Italy into the European Community. The underdeveloped

Mezzogiorno immediately became a major problem for the European Community since it was the least developed of all the regions in the Community. The Community allocated some funds as part of its regional policy framework for the development of the Mezzogiorno. However, these funds too were wasted to a great extent. In addition, European integration provided ground for the legitimacy of claims from the economically-developed Northern regions of Italy. The Northerners perceived themselves much closer to Europe than to Southern Italy, which further undermined efforts of national integration in Italy. Thus the European Community, while acting primarily with economic considerations indirectly led to increase the gap between the North and South.

The post-Second World War period also witnessed the institutionalization of clientelistic politics especially in the South and subsequent corruption scandals. The Christian Democrat party (DC) which came to power in the aftermath of the war, governed the country for a long period and was especially strong in the Southern parts of the country. However, the party basically functioned through patron-client relationships and in time, the South became the hotbed of the Mafia and corruption.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Italy went through a major transformation as a result of some international and domestic stimuli. Thanks to the judges' efforts, many corruption scandals that had been going on during the Cold

War years were uncovered. As a result of long investigations and arrests, it was found out that the political parties, but mostly the DC has been involved in the corruption, called *Tangentopoli*, including even the President of the Republic, Giulio Andreotti. This was a major shock to the voters, especially in the North, who meanwhile distanced themselves from the traditional parties, DC and the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The PCI lost votes also because communism had collapsed in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc had been dismantled. The electoral reforms, the pressures inserted towards more decentralization were other stimuli behind the political transformation in question, particularly in the North culminated in the emergence of the Leagues under the leadership of the Lega Nord.

The Leagues, the most important of which has been the Northern League, (*Lega Nord*), brought into the political agenda the old North-South conflict in a different manner. The party, led by Umberto Bossi, has argued that the Italian state could no longer function effectively because it is governed by a Southern mentality. The party questioned the Risorgimento, that is the unification and integrity of the country and advocated the view that Italy should no longer exist as a unitary country. The country should be divided into three macro-regions, according to cultural and economic lines, the North, the Center and the South. The party went even further and declared an independent Republic of Padania in the North. However, due to some tactical

mistakes the party lost its ideologue, Gianfranco Miglio and some of its support.

This study has also tried to show that the rise of the *Lega Nord* has been a very important case which runs contrary to national fragmentation theories. For instance, the well-known “internal colonialism” model of Michael Hechter could not explain the emerging fragmentary movement in the northern part of Italy, which is economically more developed than the southern part. Likewise, according to Ted Gurr’s “relative deprivation theory”, it should have been the South, the economically more backward part of Italy which should demand autonomy and secession. However, the case is the opposite. Thus both theories fail to explain the rise of neo-regionalism in Italy in the 1990s.

Even though the rise of neo-regionalism in Italy was regarded as a new phenomenon stemming from the rise of globalism, or from the crisis of the state, in the present study it is argued that the rise of the federalist debate in Italy was not a new phenomenon and was not related solely to globalism and the crisis of the Italian state. Thus even though the theories on globalism and crisis of state which try to explain the fragmentary movements are useful in explaining the Italian case, they are not sufficient. Instead, it has been argued that the neo-regionalism in Italy had long historical roots and that the historical roots of regionalism are vitally important for understanding the

present rise of neo-regionalism in Italy. It is for this reason that this study has focused mainly on the historical heritage of the Italian state before Unification was achieved and in this respect tried to shed light upon the peculiar features of Italy that had an important impact upon the rise of regionalism in Italy.

The second task of the present study has been that of explaining how the Italian state tried to deal with this historical heritage in its efforts to “make Italy” as well as “making Italians”. To this end, the study looked at state-building and nation-building processes in Italy since they are regarded as the two crucial phases of national integration. To do this, three historically-important time periods were chosen in Italian political development, namely the Risorgimento, the Fascist interlude and the Republican period. The success or the failure of the policies pursued in these periods were vitally important in the course of the national integration process. All along, thus the major question posed was whether or not the Italian state succeeded in creating Italians as well as Italy.

The study concluded that so far the process of national integration was not fulfilled in Italy and “Italians are still not made.” As Ronan Paddison argues, the existence of a regionally-based party demanding secession, has proven that political integration has failed. The failure of economic integration is best revealed by the ongoing gap between the North and South part of the Italy, which brought the country to the brink of fragmentation. This gap might get

even wider with inefficient implementation of the regional funds of the European Union in the South on the one hand and the increasing integration of the North with Europe as a result of the rapid process of globalization. The failure of cultural integration is revealed by the anti-Southern sentiments among people in the North and their “orientalist” look towards the Southern culture and people and the prevalent secessionist, neo-regionalist and federalist schemes that aim to find a solution to this “unsatisfactory cohabitation” of the Northerners and Southerners in the same country.

As a result, the study concludes that the rise of neo-regionalism in Italy in the 1990s can not be explained solely by the old and more recent theories on regionalism. Even though these theories contribute to our understanding of the Italian case, they, nevertheless, fall short of providing a historical background to the present problem of regionalism. With the aim of providing this lack in historical analysis through explaining the critical junctures in Italian political history, the present study tried to fill this gap in the old and more recent theories on regionalism. It is concluded that the rise of neo-regionalism in Italy was a consequence of the failed attempt of “making Italians”. In other words, Italy is made, but there is still time to “make Italians”.

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
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
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Appendix A : Lega Nord's Proposal of Federalism in Italy



Source : Giovanni Agnelli Foundation

Appendix B : A Two Way division of Italy



Source : David Forgacs and Robert Lumly ed. *Italian Cultural Studies : an introduction* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1996, p.116.)


Appendix C : Certain Social Characteristics of Section of Italy Shortly After National Unification

Certain social characteristics of sections of Italy shortly after national Unification

	North-West	North-East	Tuscany	East Central	South	Sicily	Sardinia	Italy
Density of population , average number of persons per square mile , 1871	280	315	231	191	218	228	68	234
Size of community , average in square miles , 1871	7	8	33	19	18	31	26	14
Reading ability , per cent of persons aged 6 and over able to read , 1871	55	42	32	25	17	15	14	31
Political preference , per cent of vote for Right party , 1871	70	70	77	69	33	14	53	54

Source : Lloyd Saville, *Regional Economic Development in Italy*
Edinburgh University Press , 1968, p.15.

Appendix D : Regions of Italy



Source : David Forgacs and Robert Lumly ed. *Italian Cultural Studies : an introduction* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1996, p.115.)

Appendix E : Italy , Productivity Levels , By Region

ITALY - PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS * , BY REGION

REGION		PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS
1	Piemonte	101
	Valle d'Aosta	
	Lombardia	114
	Trentino-Alto Adige	85
	Veneto	94
	Friuli-Venezia Giulia	93
	Liguria	114
	Emilia Romagna	96
2	Toscana	95
	Umbria	85
	Marche	77
	Lazio	98
3	Abruzzi	72
	Molise	56
	Campania	76
	Puglia	72
	Basilicata	61
	Calabria	66
	Sicilia	80
	Sardegna	87
TOTAL ITALY		93

* Value added per employee, all sectors 1974 (EEC=100)
Source : SECTORAL PRODUCTIVITY AND REGIONAL POLICY ,CEC Document


Appendix F : Italy - Distribution of RTD Factors by Region

ITALY - DISTRIBUTION OF RTD FACTORS BY REGION

	<i>GERD /</i>	<i>BERD /</i>	<i>S + T</i>	<i>EMPL.</i>	<i>RTD</i>
<i>REGION</i>	GDP (%) 1982	GVA (%) 1982	GRADUATE OUTPUT PER MILLION POPULATION 1982	IN HIGH TECH. INDUSTRY / EMPL. IN ALL INDUSTRY 1981 (%)	POTENTIAL INDEX (Z)
1					
Piemonte	1.93	1.94	409.67	18.98	1.79
Valle d'Aosta	0.43	0.45	-	6.04	-0.72
Lombardia	1.37	1.28	426.86	21.98	1.34
Trentino-Alto Adige	0.20	0.10	28.56	15.15	-0.57
Veneto	0.52	0.27	444.67	10.64	-0.04
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	0.60	0.42	213.06	13.71	-0.07
Liguria	1.21	0.96	489.18	18.72	1.04
Emilia Romagna	1.08	0.31	560.08	11.66	0.42
2					
Toscana	0.78	0.45	539.16	8.03	0.18
Umbria	0.56	0.21	678.66	9.58	0.18
Marche	0.26	0.07	212.78	8.30	-0.64
Lazio	1.97	0.78	520.57	16.68	1.25
3					
Abruzzi	0.35	0.20	286.78	16.06	-0.11
Molise	0.02	0.01	-	0.87	-1.36
Campania	0.75	0.31	495.10	10.51	0.14
Puglia	0.36	0.07	220.05	5.16	-0.72
Basilicata	0.61	0.22	-	8.82	-0.63
Calabria	0.21	0.01	180.53	2.69	-0.98
Sicilia	0.53	0.13	469.48	8.06	-0.19
Sardegna	0.48	0.07	292.31	11.08	-0.32
TOTAL ITALY	1.04	0.72	413.52	14.39	-



Source : U. del Canuto , IRI, Rome

Appendix G : Distribution of Employment Intensity in
High Technology Industries :
Mezzogiorno and Remainder of Italy




Source : CEC Regio Data Base

Appendix H : Industrial Performance in the Italian Regions ,
1978-1985 and The Civic Community in
the Italian Regions




Source : Robert Putnam et.al., *Making Democracy Work, Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* .
Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton Univ. Press, 1993

Appendix I : Northern and Southern Satisfaction with National, Regional and Local Government (1988)



Source : Robert Putnam et.al., *Making Democracy Work, Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*.
Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton Univ. Press, 1993

Appendix J : Public Satisfaction with Northern and Southern Regional Governments , 1977-1988



Source : Robert Putnam et.al., *Making Democracy Work, Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* .
Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton Univ. Press, 1993

Appendix K : The “ Three Italies ” of Arnaldo Bagnasco



Appendix L : The Symbol of the Lega Nord



Appendix M : The Manifesto of the Lega Nord

Lombardi!

Non importa che età avete, che lavoro fate, di che tendenza politica siete: quello che importa - che siete - e che siamo tutti lombardi. Questo è il fatto realmente importante, ed è giunto il momento di ricordarlo dandogli una concretezza politica.

E come lombardi, infatti, che abbiamo tutti un fondamentale interesse comune di fronte al quale devono cadere in sottordine i motivi della nostra divisione in partiti di ogni colore: partiti italiani che ci stñrntalizzano e distolgono il nostro impegno dalla difesa dei nostri interessi per servire interessi altrui (e il loro, prima di tutto!).

Questo nostro fondamentale interesse comune è la liberazione della Lombardia dalla vorace e soffocante egemonia del governo centralista di Roma, attraverso l'autonomia lombarda nel più vasto contesto dell'autonomia padano-alpina. È una questione di sopravvivenza lombarda nemica, culturale, economica - che investe il senso di l'esponsabilità morale, civile, politico, di tutti i lombardi, senza distinzioni di sorta.

È un'esigenza che il regime accentratore romano ha sempre cercato di farci dimenticare temendone iyna nostra responsabile presa di coscienza, ma che ora - di fronte a una situazione nazionale in irrimediabile deterioramento - si propone come problema concreto che dobbiamo portare al più presto alla ribalta della vita politica.

Il governo accentratore di Roma - con la complicità di tutti i partiti italiani (che sono contemporaneamente sostegno ed emanazione del regime centralista unitario) - chiacchiera di autonomie e di Europa, ma di fatto non vuole né autentiche autonomie né lo Stato Federale Europeo.

Abbiamo infatti un Parlamento Europeo fantasma perché creato apposta senza poteri, e strutture regionali che non sono governi autonomi, ma soltanto doppioni amministrativi del governo centrale, unico depositario di ogni potere: Ma non esiste effettiva autonomia senza il relativo potere politico. E oggi, la Lombardia non è più dei lombardi, l'Padania non è più della gente padana. È soltanto un'espressione geografica senza alcun valore politico, un territorio senza diritti di fronte all'invasione altrui. Il suo popolo è una massa di gente priva di un'identità politica, incorporata anonimamente in uno Stato nazionale in fallimento che ci trascina nella sua crisi senza sbocco e senza speranza.

Appendix N : The Caricature in Corriere Della Sera




The leader of the Lega Nord , Umberto Bossi says to the President Scalfaro :
"The 'Beautiful Country' is finished . There is only Padanian Chese"
Corriere Della Sera

Appendix O : The Caricature in Corriere Della Sera and La Repubblica




Source : La Repubblica , 14.9.1996




(The crayz Czechoslovakia)
Source : Corriere Della Sera, 6.5.1996

Appendix P : The Fantasy Map




Source : David Forgacs and Robert Lumly ed.
Italian Cultural Studies : an introduction
(New York : Oxford University Press, 1996, p.104)

Appendix R : The Fantasy Map



(Attention ! You are entering the area where they kill children)
Source : La Repubblica , 18.9.1990

Appendix S : The Financial Self - Sufficiency of the Regions
According to Giovanni Agnelli Foundation



Source : Giovanni Agnelli Foundation

T.C. YÜKSEKÖĞRETİM KURULU
DOKÜMANTASYON MERKEZİ

Appendix T : "Twelve Region" Proposal of the
Giovanni Agnelli Foundation



Source : Giovanni Agnelli Foundation