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REGIONAL DIRECTIONS OF NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS:
TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY IN ITS NEIGHBORHOOD

Bilkent University 2017

REGIONAL DIRECTIONS OF NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS:
TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY IN ITS NEIGHBORHOOD

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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Ankara
May 2017

To Çağla



REGIONAL DIRECTIONS OF NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS:
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The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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
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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILISOPHY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

May 2017

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

REGIONAL DIRECTIONS OF NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS: TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY IN ITS NEIGHBORHOOD

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May 2017

This study analyzes Turkey’s foreign policy (TFP) through utilizing two foreign policy analysis (FPA) tools: Role Theory and Event Data. Role theory claims that foreign policy conduct is an attempt to perform the role conceptions that decision-makers formulate. The literature mainly focuses on the sources of role conceptions. However, most of the existing studies do not comprehensively incorporate foreign policy practices in their analyses. This study argues that such a stance hinders the explanatory power of role theory and creates a need to develop a systematic focus on states’ foreign policy practices. Therefore, it utilizes event data analysis, which reviews international news reports to collect data on the actual foreign policy practices of states. Combining event data and role theory, this study observes and measures the parallelism between TFP words and deeds. It collects data by utilizing two methods: hand-coded content analysis and computer-assisted event data analysis. By doing so, it builds the Turkey’s Foreign Policy Roles and Events Dataset (TFPRED) which analyzes TFP in five regions: Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Euro-Atlantic. This dataset makes it possible to observe the relationship between decision-makers’ vision and the country’s foreign policy practices. It presents proofs on the validity of its two main claims: 1) There are

region-specific differences in Turkey's national role conceptions towards its neighborhood and 2) All role conceptions (words) do not turn into practice (deeds) in foreign policy.

Keywords: Event Data Analysis, Foreign Policy Analysis, JDP Era (2002-2014), Role Theory, Turkey



ÖZET

ULUSAL ROL TASAVVURLARININ BÖLGESEL YÖNELİMLERİ: TÜRKİYE’NİN KOMŞU BÖLGELERDEKİ DİŞ POLİTİKASI

Sula, İsmail Erkam

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. İbrahim Özgür Özdamar

Mayıs 2017

Bu çalışma Türkiye dış politikasını (TDP) iki dış politika analizi (DPA) aracını kullanarak incelemektedir: Rol Kuramı ve Olay Verisi Analizi. Rol kuramı, dış politika davranışının karar alıcıların rol tasavvurlarını icra etme girişimi olduğunu iddia eder. Bu konudaki yazın çoğunlukla rol tasavvurlarına odaklanmaktadır. Ancak, mevcut çalışmaların büyük çoğunluğu yaptıkları incelemelere dış politika eylemlerini kapsamlı bir biçimde dâhil etmemektedir. Bu çalışma, böyle bir yaklaşımın rol kuramının açıklama gücünü aksattığını ve devletlerin dış politika eylemlerine odaklanan düzenli bir yaklaşım geliştirilmesi ihtiyacı doğurduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu nedenle devletlerin gerçek dış politika icraatlarına dair veri toplamak üzere uluslararası haber raporlarını inceleyen olay verisi inceleme yöntemini kullanmaktadır. Olay verisi inceleme yöntemini rol kuramı ile birleştiren bu çalışma TDP söylem ve eylemleri arasındaki koşutluğu gözlemlemekte ve ölçmektedir. İki yöntem kullanarak veri toplamaktadır: el ile kodlanan içerik analizi ve bilgisayar destekli olay verisi analizi. Böylece, Türkiye’nin 5 bölgeye yönelik dış politikasını inceleyen Türkiye’nin Dış Politika Roller ve Olayları Verisi’ni (TDPROV) inşa etmektedir: Balkanlar, Kafkaslar, Ortadoğu, Sahra altı Afrika ve Avrupa-Atlantik. Bu veriseti karar alıcıların tasavvurları ile ülkenin dış politika eylemleri arasındaki ilişkiyi gözlemlemeyi mümkün kılmaktadır. Çalışmanın iki temel iddiasının

geçerliliğine dair kanıtlar sunmaktadır: 1) Türkiye'nin komşu bölgelere yönelik ulusal rol tasavvurlarında bölgeye özgü farklılıklar vardır ve 2) dış politikada söylem ile inşa edilen tüm rol tasavvurları eyleme dönüşmemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ak Parti Dönemi (2002-2014), Dış Politika Analizi, Olay Verisi Analizi, Rol Kuramı, Türkiye



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is written with the help and support of the kind people around me, to only some of whom it is possible to give particular mention here.

Above all, I am deeply grateful to my wife Çağla for her great patience, academic and personal support at all times. She listened to my ideas over and over again, read my dissertation and gave feedback throughout the whole process. I greatly admire her thought-provoking ideas, working style and wisdom in understanding the ways of life. The remainder of my family has given me their unequivocal support throughout, as always, for which my mere expression of thanks likewise does not suffice.

I am heartily thankful to professor Özgür Özdamar whose support and guidance enabled me to develop a unique understanding of the topic. Our research on the project “112K163: Turkey’s foreign Policy Roles: An Empirical Approach” that is supported by TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council Of Turkey) has inspired me in developing the main idea of this dissertation. To this end, I am also grateful for the support provided by TÜBİTAK 1001- Scientific And Technological Research Support Program.

I am deeply grateful to the members of my thesis supervision committee: Esra Çuhadar, Özgür Özdamar and Ersel Aydınli. I am also grateful to the excellent professors of the Department of International Relations. Particularly, it has been an honor for me to become a student of Professor Ersel Aydınli who provided me with the academic spirit of being ‘courageous’, Professor Pınar Bilgin, who taught me to think theoretically, Professor Nil Şatana who taught me to study methodologically, and Professor Serdar Güner who taught me to discipline my mind. I am thankful to

Dr. Gonca Biltekin for her support and guidance through my event data endeavours. Her research on Turkish Foreign Affairs Events Dataset (TFAED) stands as a great example for those who are interested in event data analysis.

I owe my deepest gratitude to Uluç Karakaş. During my stay at Bilkent dorms, I knocked his door almost every day and kept interrupting him with my innovative ideas. I am thankful to him for his friendly support and patience in listening me during my academic development.

I am grateful to my postgraduate colleagues in the Department of International Relations. I am also thankful to Toygar Haliştoprak, Cihan Dizdaroğlu, Sercan Canbolat, Buğra & Özge Sarı, Rana & Yunus Türkmen, and Başar Baysal without whose support and friendship this thesis could not have been finalized. The effort made by Can Mutlu, Neslihan Dikmen Alsancak, Minenur Küçük, Anastassia Buğday, Murat Demirel in promoting a stimulating and welcoming academic and social environment will stand as an example to those that succeed them.

I would like to acknowledge the financial, academic and technical support of Bilkent University and its staff. In particular, the library facilities have been indispensable. I would also like to acknowledge the academic support of Bilkent Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, the International Studies Association, and to the International Relations Council (UİK) of Turkey.

I would like to thank the IR department secretary Fatma Toga Yılmaz and Doğa Erkasar for their kindness, friendship, and support, together with the other administrative staff of the Faculty of Economics Administrative and Social Sciences.

Last, but not the least, I offer my regards to my colleagues at the department of International Relations and the Institute of International Relations and Strategic Research of Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The vast number of studies in the International Relations (IR) discipline and in the foreign policy analysis (FPA) field suggests that although similar motivations might be observed, all states do not behave the same way (Hudson & Vore, 1995; Hudson, 2008; 2005; Neack, 2008). That is why a researcher encounters a variety of studies in the field of FPA, each stressing specific variables from different levels of analysis. Some studies focus on finding the similarities in state behavior whereas others focus on the differences. This study acknowledges that there is no single way of analyzing state behavior in the international system and no single study can cover all aspects of it. Therefore, this research starts with making a diagnosis of the complexity in the FPA literature and then develops around a broadly applied theoretical tool within the field: role theory.

Studies that utilize role theory have so far argued that state behavior depends on the roles that they (states/leaders) try to fulfill through the conduct of foreign policy (see Holsti 1970; Walker, 1987; Wish, 1980; Barnett 1993; Tewes 1998; Thies 2009; Bartal & Antebi 1992; Hirshberg 1993; Chafetz 1996-1997; Ghose & James 2005; Catalinac 2007; Rikard & Elgström 2012 among others). They claim that the study of state behavior should explain where these roles come from -sources of the roles- and how they are performed -state foreign policy practices-. Such explanation is expected to help the observer make sense of and –if possible- make predictions on state behavior. Building on these claims, this dissertation utilizes the FPA literature in

general and role theory in particular to make sense of Turkey's foreign policy (TFP) behavior in the AKP (Justice and Development Party - *AK Parti* or *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) era.

Turkey's foreign policy has been a popular topic both in contemporary academic studies and in policy circles. Especially, the country's shifting foreign policy orientations under AKP (The Justice and Development Party) governments have been studied in a variety of ways. There are many studies that focus on mere historical description, on comparisons of recent years with previous decades, and on the application of different FPA methods and theories (See Çelik 1999; Hale 2000; Makovsky and Sayari 2000; Kut 2001; Rubin 2001; Aras 2002; Aras & Görener 2010; Robins 2003; Larrabee & Lesser 2003; Martin & Keridis 2003; Gözen 2006; Murinson 2006; Tank 2006; Kirişçi 2009; Öniş, 2009; Öniş & Yılmaz 2009; Yanık 2009, 2011; Benes 2010 among others). The TFP literature is abundant of descriptive and historical analysis of AKP's foreign policy orientation whereas applications of FPA theories remain limited. This research is based on the argument that TFP in the AKP era can be understood with reference to the roles that are attributed to the country by its leaders. Applying role theory as a tool of analysis provides a comprehensive and structured framework to consider material as well as non-material variables that affect the foreign policy orientation(s) of the country. Role theory is a viable tool to understand the main motivations of the AKP decision-makers in conducting foreign policy.

The temporal domain of the dissertation starts from November 2002 and ends in August 2014. In this period the AKP established four governments (58th, 58th, 60th and 61st) and ruled Turkey for twelve years. The dissertation compares the words and deeds of the latter three governments¹ and makes two main claims

First, there is a need to analyze both the discourse of the decision-makers' (TFP words) and the actual practices of the country (TFP deeds). Turkey's foreign policy decision-makers have certain role conceptions that they expect their country to

¹ All four governments are included in the scope of the dissertation. However, as the 'speech selection' section of the Methodology chapter explains only the speeches of three governments (59th, 60th and 61st) were available for analysis. Event data analysis covers all four governments, yet the comparisons are only made for 59th, 60th and 61st governments.

perform. However, all role conceptions are not performed in the country's foreign policy practices. That is to say, Turkey performs only some of the role conceptions while not performing the others. In order to analyze both words and deeds of TFP the dissertation is divided into two data collection phases: Data collection phase I – Content Analysis, and data collection phase II: Event Data.

Second, the dissertation claims that Turkey's relationship with one region is different from the other. The analysis of the AKP decision-makers' speeches indicates that some role conceptions have certain regional directions. Therefore, there is a need to categorize roles in terms of their regional direction. Building on this need, the dissertation proposes a new categorization for role conceptions: region-specific (Rg) roles and general/overarching (Ge) roles. Rg roles are divided into three sub-types. (1) R_{Type1} roles are those that are directed to a single region. (2) R_{Type2} roles are those that refer to multiple regions. (3) R_{Type3} roles are those that refer to all regions. Finally, (4) Ge roles are those that have no specific regional direction.

Utilizing this new role typology the dissertation provides a comparative analysis of both TFP words and deeds in five regions: Balkans/Eastern Europe (Rg1), Black sea/Southern Caucasus/Central Asia (Rg2), MENA/Eastern Mediterranean (Rg3), Sub-Saharan Africa (Rg4) and the Euro-Atlantic region (Rg5). The dissertation argues that Turkey does not follow the same foreign policy practices in all regions and the decision-makers do not direct the same role conceptions towards all regions. Turkey has different sets of relationship with each of these regions. Most of the national role conceptions that are uttered by the decision-makers have regional directions.

The two above-mentioned data collection phases have resulted in the construction of Turkish Foreign Policy Roles and Events Dataset (TFPRED). TFPRED is a large dataset that I constructed in four years and consists of a combination of two separate datasets: (1) TFP Content Analysis Dataset and (2) TFP Events Dataset. The first dataset contains information on each role reference that is identified in the relevant speeches of the prime minister and foreign ministers (Gül, Babacan, Davutoğlu and Erdoğan) of the three AKP governments. The dataset builds on a total number of 87 speeches that make approximately 239.000 words. Each speech is analyzed word by

word and every identified role reference is coded separately. The dataset contains information on (1) the demographic details of each speech (speech title, date, and word count) (2) the frequency of each role appearance, (3) the type of each role (Rg or Ge), (4) the regional direction of each role (Rg1, Rg2, Rg3, Rg4, or Rg5), and (5) if available the country or regional international organization that each role reference is directed to. On the other hand, the second dataset (TFP Events Dataset) contains data processed out of 36,509 *Agence France Presse* (AFP) news reports. The processing of these news reports resulted in a total number of 16,069 events from November 2002 to August 2014. Each news report is coded separately through the use of TABARI (Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions – Version 0.8.4b2) software. It contains information on the (1) date, (2) source and target, (3) verb code, (4) scale (CAMEO Conflict/Cooperation score), (5) event type (Verbal/Material Conflict/Cooperation), and (6) Regional Direction (Rg1, Rg2, Rg3, Rg4, or Rg5) of each event.

TFPRED combines the two separate datasets in order to compare TFP words and deeds. The dissertation proposes that if the frequency of words that refer to a specific role is parallel to the frequency of deeds that refer to the same role then the role is performed. In order to observe the parallelism, the dissertation proposes a novel approach. The TFP Events Dataset contains 208 different event codes that refer to specific types of events. The dissertation matches each event code with the relevant role conception². Thereby, I turn the event frequencies into role practice frequencies. Then, I compare the role reference frequencies with role practice frequencies and observe role performance.

The dissertation observes 22 role conceptions in TFP under the three AKP governments. Some of these role conceptions are only uttered by the decision-makers but not performed in the actual foreign policy practices of the country. In addition, some of these roles are region-specific and some are general. In each relevant section, the dissertation makes detailed leader-based, government-based, region-based and role-specific analysis. In order to avoid possible confusions, the dissertation builds its argument in a step-by-step format. It is divided into four main

² See the Event-Role Matching table in Chapter III. Section 3.4 gives the details of this approach. Appendix D gives the type of event that each of these 208 codes refer to.

bodies: (1) theory (Chapter II), (2) methodology (Chapter III), (3) empirical analysis (Chapters IV-V) and (4) synthesis (Chapters VI-VII).

Chapter II is the theory chapter. It presents the main theoretical framework of the study. It starts with a comprehensive analysis of FPA and role theory studies. It gives a detailed review of the FPA literature (2.1) and focuses on locating role theory in this broader literature. The second section (2.2) gives information on the theoretical developments in role theory and its empirical applications. Then, continues with the existing studies that utilize the theory to explain TFP. On this ground, the last section (2.3) of Chapter II explains the theoretical framework and main propositions of the dissertation. The section also lists the theoretical contributions of the dissertation and presents a *sui generis* framework to understand the impact of the AKP decision-makers' role conceptions on Turkey's foreign policy practices.

Chapter III is the methodology chapter. It explains the methodological framework of the dissertation. The first section (3.1) describes the research procedures. It clarifies the main question, dependent/independent variables, selected regions, and temporal domain of the dissertation. The second section (3.2) explains the speech selection procedures and coding scheme of the TFP Content Analysis Dataset. The third section (3.3) introduces event data, summarizes the utilized literature and explains the coding scheme of the TFP Events Dataset. The last section explains the procedures of synthesizing words and deeds. It constructs the Event Code and Role Conception Matching Table (Table 13).

Chapter IV is the first empirical chapter. It presents the empirical findings of the Data Collection Phase I: Content Analysis. The first section (4.1) presents relevant portions of the content analysis data with tables and charts that comprehensively explain the observations on TFP words. The analyses in this section go from general to the specific. It starts from general findings and summarizes TFP role conceptions in total. Then, it explains leader-specific and government-specific observations. The second section (4.2) makes the case for a new role typology. It provides a detailed region-specific analysis of the role conceptions. It presents the regional directions of each role conception, analyzes Rg and Ge role conceptions and distributes the roles along the new role typology. The last section (4.3) observes the changes and

continuities in AKP decision-makers' foreign policy role conceptions and summarizes the chapter.

Chapter V is the second empirical chapter. It presents the findings of the Data Collection Phase II: Event data. The first section (5.1) presents relevant portions of TFP Events Dataset, filters and aggregates data in order to analyze the frequency, nature and category of Turkey's relationship with the world. This section also observes the government-based changing and continuing patterns of TFP practice. The second section (5.2) filters and aggregates the relevant portions of the dataset in order to observe region-specific frequency, nature, and category of TFP events. The third section (5.3) gives a comprehensive chapter summary of the overall observations.

Chapter VI is the synthesis chapter. It combines the findings of the previous two empirical chapters in order to check the propositions given in the theoretical framework chapter. The chapter observes the parallelism between the words and deeds according to the Role Conception/Event Code Matching Table (Table 13). The first section (6.1) observes the government-specific and region-specific parallelism of TFP words and deeds. The second section (6.2) makes a role-by-role observation and role performance tables for each TFP role. The third section (6.3) gives a chapter summary while observing the general patterns of Turkey's role performance and making a list of performed and non-performed roles.

Finally, the conclusion chapter summarizes all findings of the dissertation. It acknowledges the theoretical and methodological limitations of the research and shows possible directions for further studies.

CHAPTER II

THE FRAMEWORK: FPA AND ROLE THEORY

The FPA literature has provided researchers with many tools since the emergence of the field in early 1950s. Currently, the field is both theoretically and empirically advanced with its actor-specific focus as an overall approach that broadens our understanding of state behavior in particular and IR in general. As Drury et al. (2010: 187 - 189) points out, in their “attempt to look inside the ‘black box’ of state decision-making”, scholars in the field of FPA have focused on the agents, processes and outcomes of decision-making. Indeed, many aspects of state foreign policy behavior have been studied within the field of FPA. That is to say, with its ability to incorporate substantive questions about the foreign policy behaviors of states, the FPA literature has offered a lot to the discipline of IR and still has a lot to offer. As Hudson (2008: 27) suggests: “It is a wonderful time to become engaged in FPA, a time of new horizons.”

‘Foreign policy choices of a state’ is the general dependent variable of FPA studies. Taking this as a starting point, scholars have explained how and why decision-making agents have arrived to specific foreign policy choices. Focusing on the decision-making agent has led scholars borrow theoretical explanations from other disciplines such as political science, sociology and psychology (Stuart 2008: 576). This interdisciplinary nature brings with it the analytical question: how to establish a well-organized research design? Rosenau (2008: vii) points out that the analysis of foreign policy decisions “must focus on a wide range of phenomena – from

individuals and their orientations to the groups and institutions that form the bases of societies, economies and polities.” Hence, FPA has incorporated a complex set of variables across different levels of analysis (between the international and domestic) and different dimensions (ranging from military, strategy, economy, psychology, to culture). That is probably why Stuart (2008: 578) warns the foreign policy analyst that the field of study is “easy to get trapped in, and impossible to maneuver through.” In order to overcome this risk, one needs clear argumentation, testable propositions and observable variables that are presented under a well-organized research design. It is the aim of this chapter to provide such a research design.

However, one does not need to ‘reinvent the wheel’ while attempting to provide such a well-organized research design in applying role theory. In that quest, the abundance of studies that utilize role theory is quite helpful. The theory has been around for more than four decades since its introduction to the field by Holsti (1970). Borrowing from the sociology literature the theory claims that just like human beings in the social life, states acquire some roles in world politics and act accordingly. State behavior, in other words, depends on the roles that they try to fulfill through the conduct of foreign policy. Utilizing and contributing to Holsti’s framework a variety of studies have developed the theoretical, empirical and methodological underpinnings of role theory.

Accordingly, the first section of this chapter explains these developments and locates role theory within the larger body of the FPA literature. Then, the second section provides a comprehensive review of the role theory literature. The last section proposes a *sui-generis* theoretical framework to analyze TFP in the AKP period through a compound of existing methods utilized in the literature.

2.1 The FPA Literature

2.1.1 The Three Seminal Works

The emergence of the FPA field dates back to the end of WWII when the first systematic studies of state behavior and decision-making processes were conducted. Until then, state behavior was studied under International Relations (IR) theories,

which generally focused on inter-state relations and systemic factors affecting it. By the early 1950s, scholars started to focus below the nation-state level of analysis and on the decision-makers' impact on state foreign policies. These studies established the basis of FPA: Particularly the studies by Snyder, Bruck & Sapin (1954; 1963) Sprout & Sprout (1956; 1957; 1965), Rosenau 1966), are presented as the seminal works that set up the roots of this field (see Hudson 2008: 12; 2005: 5-7).

Snyder et al. (1954; 2002) argued that scholars should look below the nation-state in order to account for the continuities of and changes in specific state foreign-policy behavior. They claimed that the analysis should focus on the decision-making body (be it a group or an individual). They claimed that "those responsible for foreign policy choices" (2002: 5) make their decisions in line with their perception of the policy environment and their past experiences. In addition to the perception of the decision-makers, variables such as the structure of the decision making body, the process of decision-making (in group dynamics- individuals versus group), and the context of decision-making (the policy-making body should mediate the pressures between internal and external factors or between individuals) are to be listed and analyzed in detail in order to account for changes and continuities in foreign policy (2002: 6- 11). Early in the 1950s, Snyder et al. have provided the students of foreign policy with the initial steps of building a decision-making analysis framework and contributed to the emergence of the FPA sub-discipline.

Sprout & Sprout (1956) have argued that the environment in which the decision-makers are situated have a significant impact on state foreign policy. They argue that the impact of political environment has not been systematically studied until then. That is to say, the analyst should take the psychological, social and political context of decision-making into consideration. Hence, as Hudson (2005: 6; 2008: 14) argues, they invited the analyst "to look at what they termed the 'psycho-milieu' of the individuals and groups making the foreign policy decision."

Rosenau (1966: 30) while praising the then situation of the field of FPA observes a promising degree of methodological consciousness as the foreign policy analysts did not ignore the philosophy of science. In this way, they had become aware of the distinctions between "description and explanation, correlation and causation,

hypothesis and models, fact and value” (1966: 30). In addition, he argues, scholars had become aware of the impact of both domestic and external factors on foreign policy. However, he warns, identifying such factors does not mean that they are explained properly. “Sometimes policies are attributed to domestic factors and sometimes causation is ascribed to external sources, but the rationale for using one or other explanation is never made explicit and is rarely systematic” (Rosenau 1966: 34). Such rationale is to be found through the development of general testable hypotheses that explain, for instance, how the influence of leaders on foreign policy overcomes the influence of the domestic factors. The inability to develop such a general theory has limited the scope of FPA to historical analysis and single country oriented approaches (1966: 34-35). Hence, Rosenau claimed, “we have many histories of American foreign policy but very few theories of American foreign policy” (1966: 37). He invited the foreign policy analysts to develop testable generalizations of state behavior and provide multi-level and multi-causal analysis. Developing general theories of foreign policy depends on the “pre-theories” that clearly state the causal relationships between variables from different levels of analysis ranging from the individual level to the systemic level (see Table 2 in Rosenau 1966: 48).

2.1.2 A Brief Overview

Based on the above-mentioned roots, the field has grown into a large and complex scientific body and a subfield of IR (Hudson & Vore 1995: 212-215). Classical FPA has developed with a focus on the decision-making processes. Scholars have studied the actors and dynamics involved in the foreign policy making process. A large number of actor-specific studies were conducted which focused on foreign policy making actors, on small-group decision-making, and on organizational processes and bureaucratic politics. Allison (1969; 1971), in his groundbreaking study of ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ proposed that the foreign policy analyst produces conceptual models and filters the most significant factors that have consequences over specific foreign policy decisions. Citing Carl G. Hempel’s *Logic of Explanation*, Allison (1969: 690 [Emphasis Added]) claims that it “requires that the [researcher] single out the relevant, important determinants of the occurrence.” Most of the analysis, until then,

had utilized one conceptual model: Rational Actor Model (RAM- Model I). Allison observes that there are factors other than the rationality of the individual leader that have impact on the foreign policy decisions. That is to say, the foreign policy acts or decisions are also the outcome of organizational processes (Model II) and the internal politics of the government (Bureaucratic Politics Model III). Thus, he proposes two alternative conceptual models to the RAM and illustrates the three models with an analysis of Cuban Missile Crisis (1969: 691 -715). Following this research others also focused on bureaucratic politics and the decision making process (See Allison, 1971; Allison & Halperin, 1972, Halperin, 1974 cited in Hudson 2005: 8).

By the early 1970s cognitive and psychological factors were introduced to the field. Hermann (1974; 1977; 1980a; 1980b) and Ole Holsti (1977; 1989) have developed studies on the role of the decision-making styles and characters of individual leaders (e.g. leadership style, psychology, and perceptions) in foreign policy making (Hudson & Vore 1995: 212-220). Building on the studies that have been produced so far, Hermann established the initial steps of the famous research program 'Leadership Trait Analysis.' For instance, she claimed that four broad types of leader characteristics, which are "beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style," influence the style and the content of foreign policy (1980a: 8-10). She analyzes 45 leaders' foreign policy behavior and develops six characteristics that have an impact on their foreign policy decisions. The study has later on developed into a broader research program (see Hermann and Hermann 1989; and Hermann 2003 among others). It has been defined as one of the most significant research programs on the cognitive factors affecting foreign policy (Young and Schafer 1998; cited in Kesgin 2012: 31-32). The introduction of role theory also dates back to this period. Particularly, Kal Holsti (1970) studied national role conceptions and their impact on foreign policy which is regarded as the seminal work that set the ground for the theory.

By the end of the 1980s, Putnam's (1988) emphasis on the domestic and foreign policy relationship is accepted as a pivotal work in the field. In this study, he builds a game theoretical model that clarifies how domestic politics affects foreign policy decision making through his observations of international negotiations. Building on

the limitations of the previous research that had been proposed by Rosenau on the interrelationship between the domestic and the external, on Haas and Deutsch's studies on regional integration, and Allison's model of bureaucratic politics, he claims that his study explains the reciprocal relationship between domestic and international, an explanation that had not been produced until then (1988: 430-433). Then, he presents a unique game theoretical model on international negotiations what he calls the "two-level game." The argument is that the bargaining power of leaders (primary negotiators) in international negotiations (Level II) depends on their need for the final agreement (ratification) that is to be reached after those negotiations. Such need is determined with reference to domestic politics (Level I). The more the leader needs that agreement the less bargaining power he/she has. The 'win-sets' and preferences of leaders are determined according to this interaction between Level II and Level I. The model proposed by Putnam (1988), was a significant example of the game theoretical modeling of domestic-foreign policy interrelationship in its time. As Hudson (2005: 12) points out there have been many other important contributions to the study of domestic-foreign policy relationship after this article.

The 1980s represented a shift towards what had been called the 'scientific' study of IR. Indeed, the impact of the so-called behavioral revolution in political science has also been observable in FPA since its emergence. The roots of this impact were also observable in the three seminal works that the previous section explained. Finding generalizable patterns of nation-state behavior, acquiring cumulative knowledge through scientific methodology, producing parsimonious theories, and grand theories became an important aim in IR theoretical studies. McGowan and Shapiro (1977) provides a good example of such an approach when they, at the very first sentence of the introduction of their study, argue that "the goal of any discipline which claims the title of 'science' must be to develop a body of theoretically organized knowledge that is based on cumulative empirical research." The impact of the positivist understanding became more significant in the 1980s when FPA studies preferred specific methodological tools including "game theory, rational choice modeling, econometrics, large-N empirics" (Hudson, 2005: 14). This tendency, did not contribute to actor-specific theorizing since having more detailed and specific information about actors might necessitate disregarding generalizations and/or

theoretical parsimony at some cases. As Hudson (2005: 14) argues, “actor-specific theory is concrete, contextual, complex, and parsimony is not necessarily an attribute of good actor-specific theory.” Achieving generalizations seemingly becomes more difficult especially when studying cognitive aspects of decision-making processes, since it necessitates analyzing the psychology, discourse, traits, and behavior of specific decision-makers. However, one might still observe such attempts that establish generalizable patterns of actor behavior under certain conditions like Leadership Trait Analysis, Operational Code Analysis (see Walker 1990) or Kal Holsti’s role theory.

Since 1990s, FPA has developed on an actor-specific study perspective. The studies have used methods like “content analysis, in depth case study, process-tracing, agent-based computational models and simulations” (Hudson, 2005: 14). The main difference between IR theory and FPA stems from this actor-specific character of FPA. Most foreign policy analysts have claimed that a foreign policy decision cannot be explained just with reference to external factors. With the use of political psychology, scholars developed theoretical approaches on leader traits and psychological processes that affect decision-making (Hudson 2005: 14). In addition, as Hudson (2005: 15-21) points out, these studies have analyzed the non-quantifiable aspects foreign policy making. These aspects include group thinking, culture, role conceptions, and the influence of societal groups, leadership style and psychology, and the perceptions of human agents.

There are two general methodological choices that scholars usually prefer in the Field of FPA: the rationalist approach, and the cognitive approach. Rational approaches focus more on the outcomes whereas cognitive approaches generally study the decision making process (See George 1969; Neack, 2008: 43-45; Rosati, 2000). Rationalists generally study the preferences whereas cognitive approach focuses on beliefs and perception. “These beliefs and constructs necessarily simplify and structure the external world” (Rosati 2000, p. 57). Thereby cognitive mechanisms are affecting foreign policy decision-making more than cost-benefit calculations. “Whereas cognitive approaches study the impact of beliefs and the dynamics of the decision making process, Rational Actor Model deals with ‘preferences’ and the outcomes” (Sula 2011; Neack 2008: 43-45; Rosati 2000). Neack (2008: 43) claims

that rationalist and cognitive approaches are incompatible with each other. Yet, there are models like the Poliheuristic Theory (see Mintz 1993, 2004; DeRouen 2001, 2003; Sula 2011) that utilize the two approaches together.

Role theory fits in the cognitive approach since it argues that the role conceptions in leaders' mind affect how they observe the environment and what their foreign policy motivations are. The next section elaborates on the literature on role theory.

2.2 The Role Theory Literature

2.2.1 Role Theory: The Origins

Holsti's study on national role conceptions has been a seminal work that established the roots of the role theory (Holsti 1970). Being conducted in the Cold War era, the study provided a novel classification of states based on the national-role conceptions of state leaders. Leaders, as Holsti argues, have cognitive perceptions about the roles that their state can play in the international arena. Their observations of the international environment are filtered through these perceptions, and state foreign policy behavior is conducted accordingly. That is to say, state foreign policies are conducted with an attempt to fulfill the role conceptions that the foreign-policy makers formulate in their minds. Based on a content analysis of leaders' speeches from 1965 to 1967 he identifies seventeen foreign policy role conceptions for the leaders in the era.

Since role conceptions are argued to determine state foreign policy activities, identifying such role conceptions in leaders' speeches is proposed as a way of increasing our capability to predict possible future foreign policy behavior of specific states. On this framework, Walker (1987) adds that role conceptions are not just self-attributions of leaders but they are also based on the interaction of those leaders with the international environment. In other words, roles are not just determined by leaders themselves but they are also affected by the events that happen in the international relations of those specific states. Reviewing role theoretical studies, Thies (2009) similarly argued that although role conceptions can be analyzed through leaders' speeches, they could also be extracted through a study of the specific states' foreign policy actions. Accordingly it can be argued that a list of foreign policy role

conceptions can be determined both with reference to the ‘discourse’ (leaders’ speeches) and the ‘practice’ (foreign policy actions) of states. Then, the general foreign policy orientation of the specific country will be determined accordingly.

Having a list of different foreign policy role conceptions means that countries do not generally play single roles but in some cases they play multiple ones. In the same line of argumentation Holsti (1970: 276) had also argued that multiple roles could be determined and played by states. However, the existence of multiple roles might lead to role conflict in some cases. For instance, Barnett (1993) in his analysis of the Arab state-system finds out that there is a conflict between roles emphasizing state-sovereignty and the ones emphasizing pan-Arabism. Similarly, Tewes (1998) identifies a role conflict between Germany’s stances on the issue of the EU enlargement and integration. Role conflict in such cases might either lead to a choice between conflicting roles or to a re-interpretation of specific role conceptions (Barnett 1993: 288).

Recently, role theory has been proposed as a bridge between general IR theoretical studies and FPA studies. For instance, Thies & Breuning (2012) have argued that IR theory and FPA both focus on the agent-structure debate. Whereas the former studies the impact of the structure on state the latter has a more actor-specific focus. Studies on role theory are presented as a merging point between the two since it focuses on both ways. The contributors at the same special issue of *FPA Journal* presented similar arguments.

Role theory has been fruitfully utilized as a practical tool in FPA. A rich literature on the foreign policies of specific states has been produced since Holsti (1970). Granatstein (1992) focused on Canadian role conception that motivates the country for “doing some good” and initiating peacekeeping activities. Hedetoft (1993) provides a role theoretical analysis of the UK, Denmark and Germany. He emphasizes the relationship between the self-images of these states, their war mentalities, and their foreign policy behavior. He establishes a relationship between Denmark’s foreign policy isolationism with the Danish national self-image of not being “heroic people” or not having “a glorious history” (Hedetoft 1993: 291). Breuning (1995) studies the discourse and practice of UK, Germany and Netherlands

with regard to the issue of foreign aid. Netherlands, assuming an “activist state role,” contributes more than the others in foreign aid missions. Chafetz et al. (1996) analyze Belarus and Ukraine’s foreign policy with role theory. They argue that both countries’ policies over the nonproliferation regime are conducted according to their role conceptions. Baehr (2000) also focuses on Netherlands’ role conceptions. He argues that the country has assumed to be at the center of international law and its foreign policy is conducted accordingly. The role theory literature is rich of such country studies (see Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992; Hirshberg 1993; Chafetz 1996-1997; Ghose & James 2005; Catalinac 2007; Rikard & Elgström 2012 among others). The theory has also been applied to the Turkish case in a number of studies, which the next section elaborates on.

2.2.2 Role Theory and Turkey

A short review of TFP discourse reveals many references to Turkey’s cultural/historical ties to specific regions and countries, as well as the material benefits of following an active foreign policy in those regions. These references have led to the emergence of a rich literature on Turkey’s foreign policy. A vast number of studies exist especially on describing different variables affecting the foreign policy activism of Turkey in the post-Cold War era and on comparisons between the 1990s with the AKP period (Çelik 1999; Hale 2000; Makovsky & Sayari 2000; Kut 2001; Rubin 2001; Aras 2002; Aras & Görener 2010; Robins 2003; Larrabee & Lesser 2003; Martin & Keridis 2003; Gözen 2006; Murinson 2006; Tank 2006; Kirişçi 2009; Öniş, 2009; Öniş & Yılmaz 2009; Yanık 2009, 2011; Benes 2010).

Only a limited number of the above-mentioned studies have explicitly referred to role theory. But still some possible roles are identified for Turkey both in the literature and in the speeches of the country’s leaders. There are references to specific roles such as a ‘bridge across continents,’ a ‘bridge across civilizations,’ a ‘trading state’ or a ‘model/example country’ (see Aras 2002; Aras & Görener 2010; Tank 2006; Yanık 2009, 2011; Kirişçi 2009 among others). Aras (2002) argues that Turkey has attempted to utilize the emergent power vacuum in Central Asia and Caucasus after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The country assumed the bridge role in order to establish political/economic ties in these regions and to solve ethnic

conflicts. Yanık (2009) argues that the bridge metaphor has become a discursive strategy for TFP makers in the aftermath of the Cold War. It was a justification for Turkey's foreign policy goals as well as a way to re-construct Turkey's identity and international role in that period. The country's Western linkages, its secular political system and economic structure were presented as a model for the East. The country was portrayed as a connection between the West and the East. The use of bridge metaphor, however, has changed in the AKP era. Following the impact of 9/11 on world politics, the AKP leaders have shifted the geographical emphasis of the bridge metaphor into an ideational one. From an emphasis on a bridge across continents, the AKP leaders have shifted the emphasis into a bridge across civilizations (Yanık 2009:533). In another study, Yanık (2011) mentions that the AKP leaders have established an exceptionalist position for Turkey. The country as being part of both the East and the West is argued to have a special position to play a mediator/peacemaker role in world politics. The Ottoman background of the country has been utilized in establishing this position. However, Yanık argues that this emphasis on Ottoman background in the AKP era might clash with the traditional Kemalist foreign policy vision of the country.

Tank (2006) argues that it was Mustafa Kemal himself who first established the aim to become a western state for Turkey. Turkish leaders have followed such aim for a long time in their foreign policies. The Muslim heritage, as argued by Tank, has been denied since it was seen as an obstacle for this aim. However after 9/11 attacks the Muslim identity of Turkey had become a "marketable attribute." This shift has led to a reconstruction of Turkey's identity from a Western identity into a "progressive, democratic, Muslim" one (Tank 2006: 464). The country was presented as a model for the Muslim countries.

Kirişçi (2009) provides an alternative role for Turkey in his analysis of the economic considerations in the formulation of AKP's foreign policy. Powerful domestic business circles have affected the regional activism of Turkey. As argued by Kirişçi, opening up new trading markets and finding new economic opportunities have been major determinants of Turkey's activism in its surrounding regions. He refers to Turkey as a "trading state."

Aras & Görener have provided a role theoretical analysis of Turkey's foreign policy. The authors argue that a country might have a number of identities. The decision-makers' perception of their country's national role is based on these different identities. Building on Holsti (1970), the authors observe seven different role conceptions in their analysis of Erdoğan and Gül's speeches: "regional leader, regional protector, regional subsystem collaborator, global subsystem collaborator, example and bridge" (Aras & Görener, 2010: 81). Additionally, while the AKP leaders' self-identification with the "regional leader," "regional protector," and "global subsystem collaborator" role conceptions have increased; the bridge role has lost its significance in the recent era. The activism in the Middle East, as argued by the authors, has been a result of this shift in the AKP leaders' self-identification.

Reviewing from the literature, it is possible to observe a number of different roles that are mentioned for Turkey. The country has been argued to be a bridge across continents, bridge across civilizations, a model/example country, a trading state, a global system collaborator, a regional subsystem collaborator, a mediator/peacemaker, a regional leader, and a regional protector. This list can be further extended by a review of Davutoğlu's speeches who calls Turkey as a central/pivotal country and a good/peaceful neighbor, of İsmail Cem's speeches who calls Turkey a world state, or of Erdoğan's speeches who, especially after the Arab Uprisings in the Middle East have called Turkey a protector of the oppressed.³ This research aims to produce a comprehensive list of all national role conceptions that are uttered by the AKP decision-makers and compare their performance in five different regions surrounding Turkey: (1) The Balkans and Eastern Europe; (2) The Caucasus, Central and South Asia; (3) Middle East and North Africa; (4) Sub-Saharan Africa; and (5) Euro-Atlantic.

³ A list of different national role conceptions for Turkey since late 1990s has been produced by a TÜBİTAK funded project, which is conducted by Prof. Özdamar at Bilkent University IR department. The project is called "Turkey's Foreign Policy Roles: an Empirical Approach" and conducted by a research team since November, 2012. I have been a member of this research team since the beginning of the research project and this dissertation and the research design has been inspired from but gets a step beyond the scope of the TÜBİTAK project.

2.3 Building the Theoretical Framework

2.3.1 Why Role Theory?

The formulation and conduct of foreign policy in Turkey is highly affected by the decision-makers' vision. Not only the prime minister but also his advisors and the ministers are influential in this process. Although Erdoğan is a predominant leader and most of the activities depend on his approval, the dissertation claims that analysis of the conduct of foreign policy, require us to look at more than his leadership style. In addition, the literature review shows that foreign policy contains more than the decisions given in specific crisis, the political-psychology of the leaders, or mere analysis of leader's foreign policy statements. The dissertation argues that, role theory provides us with a more powerful and comprehensive tool to analyze foreign policy in general, and the interrelationship between the decision-makers' foreign policy vision and the actual foreign policy conduct in particular.

As noted above, Rosenau observes that “we have many histories of American foreign policy but very few theories of American foreign policy” (1966:37). Nearly five decades have passed since he made this argument but it still holds, at least for the state of the literature in Turkey. We have many histories of TFP but very few theories of it. Indeed, even the application of existing FPA tools to TFP still remain limited both in number and in quality. This dissertation does not attempt to provide a unique theory of TFP. However, it aims to provide a set of falsifiable arguments, with clearly framed details of its methodological approach, data sources and results. In that sense, the dissertation provides a methodological approach that is able to observe generalizable patterns of foreign policy behavior in Turkey. It clarifies some dynamics of the relationship between leaders' vision and the actual conduct of foreign policy. Clarifying such dynamics provides insights on how the foreign policy machinery works in Turkey, in order to possibly contribute to the emergence of a theory of TFP in the future. The main aim of the dissertation is to build a *sui generis* methodological model with a compound of existing methods in the FPA and TFP literature. The dissertation shows that, role theory has a high potential to provide us with the initial steps to create a generic model of TFP analysis.

Holsti (1970: 298) acknowledges that not all role conceptions that are actually stated by the leaders turn into foreign policy practice:

A major assumption of this analysis has been that foreign policy attitudes, decisions, and actions will be congruent with policymakers' national role conceptions. If this assumption is valid, we could predict with reasonable accuracy typical foreign policy decisions and actions on the basis of our knowledge of the pattern of role conceptions for a particular country (...) There are, however, some circumstances where knowledge of national role conceptions would not allow the investigator to predict typical or modal types of foreign policy decisions and actions, that is, where there would be no true role performance. (Holsti 1970: 298)

Then, the dissertation claims that any analysis that utilizes role theory should focus on clarifying the performance of those role conceptions in the actual practices of state foreign policy.

Finding appropriate tools to observe the above-mentioned foreign policy practices of Turkey under a systematic methodological framework has not been an easy task. However, the FPA literature includes studies that utilize 'Event Data' for such purpose. Thus, the dissertation builds up a TFP Roles and Events Dataset (TFPRED). The methodology chapter (Chapter III) explains the details of TFPRED.

2.3.2 Performed and non-Performed National Roles

The role conceptions that are not observed in the actual practices of the government are vague conceptions. The researcher cannot utilize vague conceptions as a starting point for predicting future policy decisions and actions of the state. In Holsti's words: "situations where a knowledge of national role conceptions might not serve adequately as a basis for predicting typical attitudes and decisions is where those conceptions are rapidly changing, weak, or vague" (Holsti 1970:299). However, role conceptions that are observed are very likely to affect the future decisions of the same decision-makers because state resources are invested on performed role conceptions. States are not likely to make these investments without future purposes. Therefore, the dissertation analyzes the foreign policy practices of Turkey to examine whether decision-makers' role conceptions do have an impact on the foreign policy actions of Turkey.

So far, the study has two variables: (1) role conceptions that are detected in the foreign policy statements of the leaders, (2) role performance that are observed through event data. The relationship between these two variables will result in a list of performed and non-performed national role conceptions of Turkey. Indeed, national roles of a country consist of both the statements of the decision-makers and the foreign policy practices of the country. If role conceptions and role performance are in line with each other I categorize them as performed national roles. If they are not in line, let us say, if they are only stated by the decision-makers but not observed in the practices, I categorize them as non-performed national roles. Hence, the dissertation makes a list of performed and non-performed national roles of Turkey in the AKP era.

2.3.3 A New Role Typology

The dissertation suggests a new component to the role conceptions: role direction. It makes distinction between region-specific (Rg) role conceptions and general (Ge) role conceptions. For instance, in the Turkish case a ‘developer’ role conception is more frequently observed in Sub-Saharan Africa than others. Similarly the ‘regional leader’ or ‘protector of the oppressed’ role conceptions are more frequently used with regard to the MENA region. The dissertation makes a comparative analysis of region-specific role conceptions while distinguishing them from ‘general’ ones.

There are four types of roles in Turkey’s foreign policy: (1) Type 1 roles are those that refer to a single region. (2) Type2 roles are those that refer to multiple regions. (3) Type3 roles are those that refer to all regions. Finally, (4) Type4 roles are those that have no specific regional direction. This typology clarifies the distinction between overarching and general TFP roles from region-specific ones. The dissertation provides a comparative analysis of TFP role conceptions in five regions: Balkans (Rg1), Black sea/Southern Caucasus/Central Asia (Rg2), MENA/Eastern Mediterranean (Rg3), Sub-Saharan Africa (Rg4) and the Euro-Atlantic region (Rg5). Turkey has different sets of relationship with each of these regions. Hence, the decision-makers do not direct the same role conceptions at all regions.

The following table summarizes the main argument, questions and major findings of the dissertation.

Table 1 The Summary of Main Proposition, and Research Questions

MAIN ARGUMENT - [discourse (Role conceptions) ↔ practice (Role Performance)] ↔ [performed and non-performed national roles]

MAIN QUESTION - To what extent do the practices of TFP reflect the role conceptions of the country's decision-makers?

ARGUMENT 1: National Roles are not constructed only through speeches but also with foreign policy practices.

(1) *Foreign policy is formulated in decision-makers' mind.*

(2) *Foreign policy statements of leaders reflect the foreign policy vision of the leaders*

(3) *Foreign policy is constituted by both words (speeches) and the deeds (TFP practices – event data)*

QUESTION 1: Are TFP practices parallel to the role conceptions that are detected in the decision-makers' speeches?

(1) *If yes, then performed national roles*

(2) *If no, then non-performed national roles*

ARGUMENT 2: Turkey has different sets of relationships with different regions.

(1) Decision-makers' role conceptions have regional directions

(2) All role conceptions are not directed at all regions

QUESTION 2: Is there a difference in TFP roles between various regions?

(1) *If yes, then we need a new role classification*

(2) *If no, then no need to add a 'Rg direction' component*

MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS

(1) A generic model to combine observed role conceptions (words) with observed event data (deeds)

(2) A large open-source dataset on observed role conceptions and foreign policy events.

(3) A structured, comprehensive, and falsifiable explanation of TFP in the AKP period based on observable and replicable data. Thereby, I propose a generic method, applicable to other cases and other periods in TFP.

(4) A new role conceptualization: performed, underperformed and over-performed role conceptions.

(5) A new role typology: region-specific and general/overarching roles

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The previous chapter observes that most of the studies that apply role theory have neglected a systematic focus on the practices (deeds) of the states but rather have focused on the role conceptions (words) of the leaders. Almost all of the above mentioned studies that analyze states' foreign policy role conceptions have carefully applied systematic methods (mostly content analysis) in analyzing different leaders' speeches, under a variety of conditions. However, the practices that are affected by such role conceptions have not been observed systematically. I argue that such a stance hinders the explanatory power of role theory because while focusing on the 'independent variable' (role conceptions) of the theory's argument, it neglects the 'dependent variable' (foreign policy practices).

Let us remember one of the foundational claims of role theory: State foreign policies are conducted with an attempt to fulfill the role conceptions that the foreign-policy makers (and sometimes the public) formulate in their minds. According to this basis, I argue that focusing on the sources of such role conceptions and explaining them in detail is only a partial application of role theory and does not fulfill the theory's promise. Together with an analysis of role conceptions, a clearly explained, consistent, logical and systematic focus on the foreign policy conduct (practices) of states would bring significant contributions to the explanatory power of role theory. Utilizing a combination of role theory and event data, this chapter aims to make that

contribution to the analysis of TFP. It fulfills this objective through constructing the TFP Roles and Events Dataset (TFPRED). The main aim of this chapter is to clearly explain the methodological framework and the research procedures that are applied in the dissertation.

The dissertation proposes to analyze the connection between the ‘words’ and ‘deeds’ of TFP. Accordingly, the research is based on two phases of data collection: Phase I: Content Analysis and Phase II: Event Data. The first section provides a step-by-step description of the research procedures including (1) the temporal domain of the analysis, (2) the selected regions: country/region matching, (3) the causal relationship, and (4) the relevance of data to the argument. The second section explains the data collection phase I: content analysis. It outlines the selected leaders, speech selection procedures; speech lists for each leader, and the coding scheme. The third section explains data collection phase II: ‘Event Data’. After providing a short summary of event data literature it explains the operationalization of event-role matching in the dissertation.

3.1 Research Procedures

3.1.1 The Literature and Research Questions

The last section of Chapter II reviews the literature and summarizes the main argument of the dissertation. In this section I explain how the main question and proposition is formulated. When I analyzed the literature I realized that most applications of role theory have focused on the national role conceptions but neglected role performance. However, the foundational claim of role theory the relationship between the two. Utilizing the contributions of role theory the dissertation claims that the foreign policy practices of Turkey are affected (if not, determined) by the foreign policy visions of the country’s foreign policy decision-makers. Following such argument the main question of the dissertation is the following:

RQ - “To what extent do the practices of TFP reflect the role conceptions of the country’s decision-makers?”

The first step in answering the question is to determine the variables in this relationship. The question here is formulated in a way to reflect the causal mechanism between two variables. I assume that foreign policy is first formulated in decision-makers' mind. Then, state resources are invested in order to fulfill such formulation. In line with such assumption the main variables of this study becomes:

IV – Decision-makers' National Role Conceptions

DV – Foreign Policy Practices of Turkey

Analyzing the relationship between the two variables requires one to look at the discourse of the leaders (to identify the IV) and the actual events that take place in world politics (to identify the DV). We need to find a way to analyze not only the statements/speeches but also foreign policy practices. For the former, I have decided to apply content analysis (Data Collection Phase 1) and for the latter I will utilize 'event data' (Data Collection Phase II). Once the relationship is determined, I become able to generate a list of 'performed and non-performed national roles' of Turkey. That is to say, National roles are not constructed only through speeches but also with foreign policy practices; hence, both need to be analyzed. The main proposition and other arguments are all extracted from this claim (explained in the previous chapter).

3.1.2 Step 2: Determining the Temporal Domain of the Study

Temporal domain determines the limits and possible contributions of the study. AKP has established its fourth single party government in 2014. Abdullah Gül established the 58th government in November 2002. It remained in power for approximately four months until Gül resigned and Erdoğan established the 59th government in March 2003. Erdoğan established the 60th Government in July 2007; Erdoğan again established the 61st government in July 2011. Davutoğlu established the 62nd government in August 2014 when Erdoğan was elected as the president of the Turkish Republic. I have decided to take the three (59, 60, 61) last (longest) governments as the temporal domain of this study. The first AKP government (58th) remained in power for a very short period to determine a specific foreign policy for

the country. The same, argument also holds for the most recent three (62nd, 63rd, 64th) AKP governments.

Taking three periods (11 years) increases the research load of the dissertation but it increases the explanatory power of the argument as well. Once the national roles of the three governments are listed, it gives me a possibility to compare the three governments' foreign policy orientations and the possibility to detect and explain the reasons behind specific changes that occur between the three periods. For this reason, the 'opportunity cost' of selecting one term (only the 61st government, for instance) instead of three terms was too high. Hence, the temporal domain of the study is as follows:

59th AKP Government (March 14th, 2003 – August 29th, 2007)

60th AKP Government (August 29th 2007 – July 6th 2011)

61st AKP Government (July 6th 2011 – August 29th 2014)

3.1.3 Step 3: Operationalization of the Variables

Operationalizing the variables is of significant importance in making theoretical and scientific explanations. The causal relationship in the dissertation has two main variables. As outlined above, the study aims to find the performed and non-performed national roles through analyzing the relationship between the leaders' national role conceptions (IV) and the foreign policy practices (DV) of the country.

For the Independent variable, I establish a content analysis data set of TFP decision makers for the temporal domain outlined above. So, I need to systematically analyze the most frequently referred foreign policy role conceptions in decision-makers' foreign policy statements. I took the Prime Minister and Foreign Ministers of the three AKP governments as the foreign policy decision-makers of Turkey:

59th Government (March 14th, 2003 – August 29th, 2007)

Prime Minister: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

MoFA : Abdullah Gül (March 14th 2003 – August 28th 2007)

60th Government (August 29th 2007 – July 6th 2011)

Prime Minister : Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

MoFA : Ali Babacan (August 29th 2007 – May 1st, 2009)

: Ahmet Davutoğlu (May 1st, 2009 – July 6th, 2011)

61st Government (July 6th 2011 – August 29th 2014)

Prime Minister: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (July 6th 2011 – August 28th 2014)

MoFA : Ahmet Davutoğlu (July 6th 2011 – August 28th 2014)

I have decided on a speech selection rule and tried to select at least 15 speeches (if possible) per leader that are available through official sources. This step is further explained in the next section of this chapter.

The argument that there is a relationship between the discourse and practice of foreign policy seems to be a simple one, and it is generally taken for granted argument. Determining the method for the dependent variable was more difficult, since I could not be able to find a clear definition of “what constitutes a foreign policy practice” in the FPA literature. So, I needed a way to operationalize most of (if not all) the foreign policy actions that are taken by Turkey. At this stage, I realized why the applications of role theory have generally focused on the national role conceptions of the leaders but neglected the systematic analysis of the foreign policy practice. In this quest I decided to use event data analysis. Basically, event data analyses global news agencies’ news reports and determines the foreign policy ‘events’ that take place in a specific time period. In more than six decades foreign policy analysts have generated a vast number of studies that focus on computer assisted counts of foreign policy events that take place in world politics. However, since it is developed in the field of ‘conflict studies’ the use of event data for the foreign policy purposes of this dissertation needed some modifications. The ‘Data Collection Phase II’ section explains all details of event data analysis and the modifications that I have made for the purposes of the dissertation. Suffice it to say here that I have decided to establish a ‘TFP Events Dataset’ for the analysis of TFP practices in the three periods mentioned above.

Until now, I have found no other studies that combine Content analysis of leaders' speeches and event data of foreign policy practices under a Role Theoretical framework. This combination builds into a *sui generis* methodology that is developed specifically for TFP analysis. My expectation is that it could be developed into a generic model of TFP analysis so as to possibly establish a 'Theory of TFP' in the future.






Figure 1 Operationalization of Turkey's National Roles

3.1.4 Step 4: Selected Regions: Country/Region Matching

One of the arguments that I generated from the main proposition was that National Roles could be categorized under specific role types. Hence one of the sub-questions of the research is as follows:” *Is there a difference in TFP roles towards the surrounding regions*” The claim is that one can classify these roles under four types:

- (1) R_{Type1} : roles are those that refer to a single region.
- (2) R_{Type2} : roles that refer to multiple regions.
- (3) R_{Type3} roles that refer to all regions.
- (4) R_{Type4} roles are those that have no specific regional direction.

A significant aspect of the dissertation is to determine which regions that the research is going to focus on. In determining the regions I have analyzed a combination of the activity reports of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA, *Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı*), The Department of Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB, *Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı*), the Yunus Emre Institute (*Yunus Emre Enstitüsü*) and the categorization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The geographical domain of TFP is defined inclusively and widely combining the information provided by the above-mentioned institutions. I have defined four regions according to a combination of country lists in the website of the MoFA.⁴ As a result, I have determined four major regions and put countries in as follows:

⁴ The Region lists of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are accessible from the following website: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?e55ad6a5-1b09-4788-a51c-2c1cae96fd0d>, Accessed: 03.01.2015.

Table 2 Region/Country Matching⁵

The Balkans And Eastern Europe	The Caucasus, Black sea and Central Asia	The Middle East, North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean	Sub-Saharan Africa
Albania	Armenia	Algeria	Angola
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Afghanistan	Bahrain	Benin
Montenegro	Azerbaijan	Egypt	Botswana
Bulgaria	Bangladesh	Iraq	Burkina Faso
Croatia	Bhutan	Israel	Burundi
Greece	Cambodia	Jordan	Cameroon
Kosovo	Georgia	Kuwait	Cape Verde
Macedonia	India	Lebanon	Central African Republic
Moldova	Iran	Libya	Comoros
Romania	Kazakhstan	Morocco	Côte d'Ivoire
Poland	Kyrgyzstan	Oman	Democratic Republic of Congo
Serbia	Laos	Palestine	Djibouti
Slovenia	Maldives	Qatar	Eritrea
Ukraine	Mongolia	Saudi Arabia	Equatorial Guinea
Other Countries	Myanmar	Syria	Ethiopia
	Nepal	Tunisia	Gabon
	Pakistan	United Arab Emirates	Ghana
	Sri Lanka	Other Countries	Gambia
	Tajikistan		Guinea
	Turkmenistan		Guinea Bissau
	Uzbekistan		Kenya
	Other Countries		Lesotho
			Liberia
			Madagascar
			Other Countries

⁵ The list of countries and division of regions are adopted from TİKA Activity Report 2014. The list is expanded to include the classification of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It might be further expanded as research continues and if necessary. A fifth region (Euro-Atlantic Region) was included in this table as I was coding the speeches. This table might be updated in the TFPRED codebooks. For the latest version please send an email: ismailerkam@gmail.com.

3.2 Data Collection Phase I: Content Analysis

3.2.1 Speech Selection: the Selection Criteria and Selected Speeches

I applied two general rules for speech selection. After listing all available speeches I have made a random selection of 5 speeches per year for each leader through utilizing a web based “Research Randomizer”.⁶ Then I applied a systematic selection rule on the randomly selected sample. The systematic selection rule has three criteria. First, each speech should be on general foreign policy (Criterion 2a). That is to say, the speeches should not be region-specific or case-specific but on general foreign policy orientation of the country. Second, each speech should be at least 1000 words in length (criterion 2b). Third, each speech should include at least three role references (criterion 2c). If the first five randomly selected speeches do not fulfill the systematic selection criteria, then I applied another random selection until reaching a list of 5 speeches per year for each leader.

It is important to note here that, I had to apply a specific speech selection rule for Erdoğan. Since Erdoğan has been the prime minister of the three governments, his speeches include a combination of domestic and foreign policy issues. Therefore, reaching general foreign policy speeches of Erdoğan has not been easy. Besides, Erdoğan’s speeches are not listed in the websites of the Prime Ministry or another official website. In order to reach Erdoğan’s speeches I have contacted the AKP Library and they provided me with a list of speeches delivered by Erdoğan between 2002 and 2007. Post-2007 speeches of Erdoğan are not categorized by AKP (or for some unknown reason they did not give me the speeches). Therefore I analyzed the official website of AKP and the Prime Ministry Directorate-General of Press and Information (*Başbakanlık, Basın Yayın Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü*). In the following sections, I give a detailed explanation on the speech selection steps and speech lists for each leader.

⁶ The Research Randomizer can be accessed from: <http://www.randomizer.org/form.htm>, Accessed: 14.10.2015

3.2.1.1 Speech Selection and Speech List for Abdullah Gül

Abdullah Gül served as the foreign minister between March 2003 and August 2007. The MoFA has published a book that includes a selection of speeches given by Gül (see Gül 2007)⁷. The first 221 pages of the book is a selection of 27 speeches on general TFP, given by Gül at different times (between 2003 and 2007) and occasions. The remaining sections of the book include issue/case specific speeches, which do not fulfill the systematic speech selection criteria. I have listed and enumerated all the 27 speeches (Full list given at the appendix) and made the selection according to the speech selection criteria. As a result, I selected 21 speeches for Abdullah Gül. The following table lists these selected speeches⁸:



⁷ The book entitled as “Horizons of TFP in the New Century” can be reached from the website of the foreign ministry at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/BAKANLAR/AbdullahGul_kitap.pdf. Accessed 23.12.2014.

⁸ Please refer to the relevant section of Appendix C for a step-by-step explanation of the procedures that I applied to select speeches.

Table 3 Selected Speeches for Abdullah Gül (2003-2007)

Date (DD.MM.YYYY)	Speech #	Speech Title and Page Number
03.07.2003	1 (2 In Appendix)	Royal Institute Of International Affairs’de Yapılan Konuşma Londra, 3 Temmuz 2003 p. 28
25.07.2003	2 (3 In Appendix)	Washington Institute For Near East Policy Tarafından Düzenlenen Toplantıda Yapılan Konuşma Washington, 25 Temmuz 2003 p. 35
24.09.2003	3. (4. In Appendix)	2003 Avrasya Zirvesi’nde Yapılan Konuşma New York, 24 Eylül 2003 p.43
26.09.2003	4. (5. In Appendix)	BM 58. Genel Kurulu’nda Yapılan Konuşma New York, 26 Eylül 2003 p.48
23.12.2003	5. (6. In Appendix)	Dışişleri Bakanlığı Bütçesinin Tbm Genel Kurulu’nda Görüşülmesi Vesilesiyle Yapılan Konuşma Ankara, 22 Aralık 2003 p. 53
17.01.2004	6. (8. In Appendix)	Avrasya-Bir Vakfinin Düzenlediği Toplantıda Yapılan Konuşma İstanbul, 17 Ocak 2004 p. 67
26.02.2004	7. (9 In Appendix)	Rusya Federasyonu Dışişleri Bakanlığı Diplomasi Akademisi’nde Yapılan Konuşma Moskova, 26 Şubat 2004 p. 76
22.05.2004	8. (10 In Appendix)	Boğaziçi Yöneticiler Vakfının Düzenlediği Toplantıda Yapılan Konuşma İstanbul, 22 Mayıs 2004 p. 83
23.09.2004	9. (12 In Appendix)	BM 59. Genel Kurulu’nda Yapılan Konuşma New York, 23 Eylül 2004 p. 100

Table 3 Cont'd

24.12.2004	10 (13 In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanlığı Bütçesinin TBMM Genel Kurulu'nda Görüşülmesi Vesilesiyle Yapılan Konuşma Ankara, 24 Aralık 2004 p. 106
11.01.2005	11 (14 In Appendix)	14. AK Parti Meclis Grubu'nda Yapılan Konuşma Ankara, 11 Ocak 2005
14.03.2005	12 (16 In Appendix)	İngiltere'de İşadamlarına Hitaben Yapılan Konuşma Londra (Bloomberg), 14 Mart 2005 p.129
07.06.2005	13 (17 in Appendix)	American Turkish Council Tarafından Düzenlenen Toplantıda Yapılan Konuşma Washington, 7 Haziran 2005 p. 138
21.09.2005	14 (18 In Appendix)	BM 60. Genel Kurulu'nda Yapılan Konuşma New York, 21 Eylül 2005 p. 144
21.12.2005	15 (20In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanlığı Bütçesinin Tbmm Genel Kurulu'nda Görüşülmesi Vesilesiyle Yapılan Konuşma Ankara, 21 Aralık 2005 p. 153
22.09.2006	16 (21 In Appendix)	BM 61. Genel Kurulu'nda Yapılan Konuşma New York, 22 Eylül 2006 p. 165
21.12.2006	17 (9 in Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanlığı Bütçesinin Tbmm Genel Kurulu'nda Görüşülmesi Vesilesiyle Yapılan Konuşma Ankara, 21 Aralık 2006 p. 172
13.01.2007	18 (24 in Appendix)	Ak Parti İstanbul İl Teşkilatı'nın Düzenlediği "Dış Politika, Ab Ve Dış Türkler" Konulu Toplantıda Yapılan Konuşma İstanbul, 13 Ocak 2007 p. 190

Table 3 Cont'd

18.01.2007	19 (25 In appendix)	TBMM 'de Gensoru Açılmasına İlişkin Önerenin Görüşülmesi Vesilesiyle Yapılan Konuşma Ankara, 18 Ocak 2007 p. 205
08.02.2007	20 (26 In appendix)	The German Marshall Fund Tarafından Düzenlenen Toplantıda Yapılan Konuşma Washington, 8 Şubat 2007 p. 216
01.06.2007	21 (27 in Appendix)	Ülkemizi Ziyaret Eden Yabancı Devlet Adamlarına Hitaben Yapılan Konuşma İstanbul, 1 Haziran 2007 p. 221

3.2.1.2 Speech Selection and Speech List for Ali Babacan

Ali Babacan's speeches are selected out of a list of speeches that are accessible through the website of MoFA⁹. The MoFA provides 50 speeches from year 2007 to 2009, the period in which Babacan served as the Foreign Minister (see Appendix for the full list of speeches). I have enumerated all speeches from 1 to 50 and randomly selected 5 speeches for each year through a web-based "Research Randomizer" that generates random numbers within a range defined by the researcher.

Accordingly, starting from the year 2007 until 2009, only ten speeches have fulfilled the speech selection criteria. After selecting all relevant speeches according to the above-mentioned criteria, the speeches are put into a date order and enumerated accordingly. The full list of Babacan's speeches is provided in the following table.¹⁰

⁹ Speeches can be accessed from: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.tr.mfa?0088246a-6e1d-47c2-9639-c358ffa03a06>

¹⁰ Please refer to the relevant section of Appendix C for a step-by-step explanation of the procedures that I applied to select speeches.

Table 4 Selected Speeches for Ali Babacan (2007-2009)

Date	Speech #	Speech Title
November 1 st , 2007	1 (49. In Appendix)	Sayın Bakanımızın Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma, 1 Kasım 2007
November 14 th , 2007	2 (48. In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanlığı ve Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği'nin 2008 Mali Yılı Bütçe Tasarılarının TBMM Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu'na Sunulması Vesilesiyle Dışışleri Bakanı Ali Babacan Tarafından Yapılan Sunuş, 14 Kasım 2007
December 10 th , 2007	3. (43. In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanlığı ve Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği 2008 Mali Yılı Bütçe Tasarılarının TBMM Genel Kurulu'nda Görüşülmesi Vesilesiyle Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan Tarafından Yapılan Sunuş, 10 Aralık 2007
April 21 st ., 2008	4. (33. In Appendix)	Sayın Bakanımızın “Avusturya ve Türkiye Komşuluk Çalıştayı”nın Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma, Ankara Palas, 21 Nisan 2008
May 4 th , 2008	5. (30. In Appendix)	Sayın Bakanımızın “Dünya Türk Girişimcileri Konseyi” Gala Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma, 4 Mayıs 2008
July 15 th , 2008	6. (26. In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Ali Babacan'ın Büyükelçiler Konferansı Açılış Konuşması, 15 Temmuz 2008, Bilkent Otel ve Konferans Merkezi
November 21 st 2008	7. (18 In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın 2009 Mali Yılı Bütçe Tasarısı Konuşması, 21 Kasım 2008
December 23 rd , 2008	8. (13. In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanlığı Ve Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği Bütçesinin TBMM Genel Kurulu'nda Görüşülmesi Vesilesiyle Sayın Bakanın Yaptığı Konuşma, 23 Aralık 2008
February 25 th , 2009	9. (8 In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın DEİK/TAİK Tarafından Düzenlenen Öğle Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma Ve Yöneltilen Sorulara Cevapları, İstanbul, 25 Şubat 2009
March 10 th , 2009	10 (7 In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın NTV'ye Verdiği Mülakat, Ankara, 10 Mart 2009

3.2.1.3 Speech Selection and Speech List for Ahmet Davutoğlu

Ahmet Davutoğlu served as the Foreign Minister of two governments. Similar to Babacan, Davutoğlu's speeches are also selected out of a list of speeches that are accessible through the website of MoFA¹¹. The MoFA provides 119 speeches from year 2009 to 2014, the period in which Davutoğlu, as the successor of Babacan, served as the Foreign Minister of Turkey (see Appendix for the full list of speeches).

24 speeches that fulfill the speech selection rules are selected out of the speeches that are provided by the MoFA. After selecting all relevant speeches according to the above-mentioned criteria, the speeches are put into a date order and enumerated accordingly. The list of Davutoğlu's speeches is provided in the following table¹²:

¹¹ Speeches can be accessed from: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.tr.mfa?52e904f9-78af-49b3-89b5-5b4bdb38d51f>

¹² Please refer to the relevant section of Appendix C for a step-by-step explanation of the procedures that I applied to select speeches.

Table 5 Selected Speeches for Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009-2014)

Date	Speech #	Speech Title
02.05.2009	1 (119. In Appendix)	Devlet Bakanı ve Başbakan Yardımcısı Sayın Ali Babacan ile Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Devir Teslim Vesilesiyle Yaptıkları Konuşmalar (2 Mayıs 2009)
09.09.2009	2 (116. In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Davutoğlu'nun 132. Arap Ligi Olağan Dışışleri Bakanları Konseyi Toplantısı'nın Açılış Oturumunda Yaptığı Konuşma, 09 Eylül 2009, Kahire
04.01.2010	3. (113. In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun İkinci Büyükelçiler Konferansı Açılış Oturumunda Yaptığı Konuşma, 4 Ocak 2010, Ankara
31.05.2010	4. (96. In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Davutoğlu'nun Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nde Yaptığı Konuşma (31 Mayıs 2010)
04.05.2010	5. (80. In Appendix)	Sayın Bakanımızın Afganistan Bölgesel Ekonomik İşbirliği Dördüncü Konferansı (Recca IV) Çerçevesinde Düzenlenen İş Forumu'nda Yaptıkları Konuşma, 3 Kasım 2010, İstanbul
03.01.2011	6. (71. In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun 3. Büyükelçiler Konferansı'nın açılışında yaptığı konuşma, 03 Ocak 2011
26.03.2011	7. (65 In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Türk Ocakları'nın Kuruluşunun 100. Yılı'nı Kutlama Etkinlikleri Kapsamında Düzenlenen “Büyük Türkiye'ye Doğru” Sempozyumunda Yaptığı Konuşma, 26 Mart 2011, İstanbul
23.12.2011	8. (64. In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Blackseaför'un 10. yıldönümü vesilesiyle Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı'nda yapmış oldukları konuşma, İstanbul, 08 Nisan 2011
25.02.2011	9. (54 In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sn. Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun IV. Büyükelçiler Konferansı Açılış Konuşması, 23 Aralık 2011
04.06.2012	10 (43 In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Ekonomi Müşavirleri Konferansı'nda Yaptığı Konuşma, 4 Haziran 2012, Ankara

Table 5 Cont'd

07.09.2012	11 (35 In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun "Arap Uyanışı ve Ortadoğu'da Barış: Müslüman ve Hristiyan Perspektifler" Konferansı Kapsamında Yaptıkları Konuşma, 7 Eylül 2012, İstanbul
28.09.2012	12 (34 in Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Birleşmiş Milletler 67. Genel Kurulu'na Hitabı, 28 Eylül 2012, New York
06.11.2012	13 (33 in Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun TBMM Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonunda Yaptığı Konuşma, 6 Kasım 2012, Ankara
27.12. 2012	14 (29 in Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Stratejik Düşünce Araştırma Vakfı'nın "2012'de Türk Dış Politikası ve Gelecek Ufku" Konferansında Yaptığı Konuşma, 27 Aralık 2012, Ankara
02.01.2013	15 (28 In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun V. Büyükelçiler Konferansında Yaptığı Konuşma, 2 Ocak 2013, Ankara
02.01.2013	16 (26 In Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Beşinci Büyükelçiler Konferansı Kapsamında Verilen Akşam Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma, 2 Ocak 2013, Ankara
06.01.2013	17 (23 in Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Beşinci Büyükelçiler Konferansı Kapsamında Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu Tarafından Düzenlenen Toplantıda Yaptıkları Konuşma, 6 Ocak 2013, İzmir
09.03.2013	18 (22 in Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu Tarafından Düzenlenen Toplantıda Yaptıkları Konuşma, 9 Mart 2013, İstanbul
15.03.2013	19 (20 in Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Diyarbakır Dicle Üniversitesinde Verdiği "Büyük Restorasyon: Kadim'den Küreselleşmeye Yeni Siyaset Anlayışımız" Konulu Konferans, 15 Mart 2013, Diyarbakır
13.01.2014	20 (12 in Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun VI. Büyükelçiler Konferansının Açılış Oturumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma, 13 Ocak 2014, Ankara

Table 5 Cont'd

18.01.2014	21 (10 in Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Altıncı Büyükelçiler Konferansı Kapsamında Adana'da Yaptıkları Konuşma, 18 Ocak 2014, Adana
18.01.2014	22 (9 in Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Altıncı Büyükelçiler Konferansı'nın Mersin Bölümünde Yaptıkları Konuşma, 18 Ocak 2014, Mersin
04.06.2014	23 (6 in Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler İşbirliği Konseyi IV. Zirvesi Kapsamında Gerçekleştirilen Dışışleri Bakanları Konseyi Toplantısında Yaptığı Konuşma, 4 Haziran 2014, Bodrum
28.08.2014	24 (1 in Appendix)	Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Veda Konuşması, 28 Ağustos 2014, Ankara

3.2.1.4 Speech Selection and Speech List for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been the prime minister of the three governments. Since he has not been the foreign minister, most of Erdoğan's speeches are primarily on domestic political developments rather than general foreign policy. Therefore, only speeches that are reachable and that have general foreign policy sections longer than 1000 words are selected for analysis (please look at the systematic selection criteria provided above). His speeches are only partly reachable through the Library at the AKP Headquarters. The AKP library only provided me the soft copies of three collections of Erdoğan's speeches limited to the year between 2002 and 2007. These collections are: 1) Erdoğan's speeches across the country (*Ülke Konuşmaları 2002-2007*), 2) Erdoğan's Parliamentary AKP Group Meetings speeches (*Ak Parti Grup Konuşmaları 2002-2007*), and 3) Erdoğan's addresses to the Nation (*Ulusa Sesleniş Konuşmaları 2002-2007*).

In addition to the collections provided by the AKP Library, I searched for Erdoğan's speeches in the official websites of AKP, the Press Center of the Prime Ministry (*Başbakanlık Basın Merkezi*), and the online archives of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The party website is not very helpful in this search. With the following keywords: "Erdoğan", "Konuşmasının", "Tam Metni" (searched exclusively) the AKP Website comes up with a maximum of 11 results that seem to be partly useful (only two passed the systematic speech selection criteria). The press center of prime ministry has a specific section for Erdoğan's speeches entitled as "On Route to Serve the Nation (Millete Hizmet Yolunda)" which are the renamed versions (after 2012) of Erdoğan's "Address to the Nation" speeches. These speeches are limited to the time period between November 2012 and May 2014. Only one out of fifteen speeches passed the systematic speech selection criteria. Finally, the archives of the National Assembly provided me with the Government Program speeches delivered by Erdoğan.

The three sets of collections that are provided by the AKP Library for the year between 2002 and 2007 have a total number of 417 speeches delivered in different

occasions.¹³ For the rest of the temporal period (2007-2014) I reached at approximately 50 speeches from the websites explained above. I carefully analyzed all these speeches and selected those that have foreign policy sections longer than 1000 words. For the purposes of this dissertation, only the foreign policy sections of each selected speech is included in the final word count. As a result, there are a total number of 32 speeches. The systematically selected speeches for Erdoğan are as follows:



¹³ A total of 417 speeches are provided by the AKP Library, that are mostly on domestic politics but some include foreign policy issues as well. These speeches are organized under the above-mentioned three groups. Under these groups there are 110 Parliamentary Group speeches: 24 for the year 2003, 20 for the year 2004, 23 for 2005, 27 for 2006 and 16 for the year 2007. There are 52 “Address to the Nation” speeches: 9 for the year 2003, 12 for 2004, 12 for 2005, 12 for 2006 and 7 for 2007. There are 255 speeches under the title “Speeches delivered Across the Country”: 41 in 2003, 33 in 2004, 56 in 2005, 52 in 2006 and 73 in 2007.

Table 6 Selected Speeches for Tayyip Erdoğan (2003-2014)

Date	Speech #	Speech Title
30. 01. 2003	1	Erdoğan – “Harvard –Kennedy School of Government Prepared Remarks” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/erdogan-%20harvard%20prepared%20remarks.pdf
18. 03. 2003	2	“59. Hükümet Programı” http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/HP59.htm
15. 11. 2003	3	“Ak Parti Türkiye İçin Neler Yaptı ” (Özellikle “2. Aktif Dış Politika Kısımı” 231-238) Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Ülke Konuşmaları 1 (2003 - 2004): 218-248.
30.01.2004	4	Ocak 2004“Ulusa Sesleniş Konuşması” Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ulusa sesleniş konuşmaları (2003-2007): 101-110
30. 06. 2004	5	Haziran 2004 “Ulusa sesleniş Konuşması” Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ulusa sesleniş konuşmaları (2003-2007): 131 -139.
23.02.2005	6	Erdoğan’ın 23 Şubat 2005 Tarihli Grup Konuşmasının Tam Metni Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ak Parti Grup Konuşması
27.02.2005	7	Şubat 2005, “Ulusa sesleniş Konuşması” Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ulusa sesleniş konuşmaları (2003-2007): 209- 217
26.04.2005	8	“Avrupa Birliği Yolunda Türkiye: The ‘Economist’ Konferansı” Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Ülke Konuşmaları 2 (2005): 114 -122.
03.05.2005	9	Erdoğan’ın 03 Mayıs 2005 Tarihli Grup Konuşmasının Tam Metni Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ak Parti Grup Konuşmaları
21.02.2006	10	Erdoğan’ın 21 Şubat 2006 Tarihli Grup Konuşmasının Tam Metni Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ak Parti Grup Konuşmaları
30.05.2006	11	Erdoğan’ın 30 Mayıs 2006 Tarihli Grup Konuşmasının Tam Metni Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ak Parti Grup Konuşmaları

Table 6 Cont'd

30.07.2006	12	Temmuz 2006, “Ulusa sesleniş Konuşması” Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ulusa sesleniş konuşmaları (2003-2007):
30.08.2006	13	Ağustos 2006, “Ulusa sesleniş Konuşması” Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ulusa sesleniş konuşmaları (2003-2007):
27.09.2006	14	“Ekonomist Konferanslar Dizisi 27 Eylül Tarihli Toplantısı” Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Ülke Konuşmaları 3 (2006): 221 – 227.
28.11.2006	15	Erdoğan’ın 28 Kasım 2006 Tarihli Grup Konuşmasının Tam Metni Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ak Parti Grup Konuşmaları
05.12.2006	16	Erdoğan’ın 05 Aralık 2006 Tarihli Grup Konuşmasının Tam Metni Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ak Parti Grup Konuşmaları
09.01.2007	17	Erdoğan’ın 09 Ocak 2007 Tarihli Grup Konuşmasının Tam Metni Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ak Parti Grup Konuşmaları
06.02.2007	18	Erdoğan’ın 06 Şubat 2007 Tarihli Grup Konuşmasının Tam Metni Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ak Parti Grup Konuşmaları
27.03.2007	19	Erdoğan’ın 27 Mart 2007 Tarihli Grup Konuşmasının Tam Metni Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ak Parti Grup Konuşmaları
31.08.2007	20	“60.Hükümet programı” http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP60.htm
30.12.2007	21	Aralık 2007, “Ulusa Sesleniş konuşması” Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ulusa sesleniş konuşmaları (2003-2007): 517-525
24.09.2009	22	BM 64. Genel Kurul’ a hitap http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/UluslararasıKuruluslar/BM/bm_genel_kurulu_hitap_konusmasi.pdf

Table 6 Cont'd

29.04.2010	23	Erdoğan “Der Spiegel “ Interview: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-turkey-s-prime-minister-there-can-be-no-talk-of-genocide-a-686131-2.html
01.06.2010	24	Erdoğan’ın 01 Haziran 2010 Tarihli Grup Konuşmasının Tam Metni Ak Parti Kütüphanesi, Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Ak Parti Grup Konuşmaları Grup Konuşması
08.07.2011	25	“61. HÜKÜMET PROGRAMI” http://www.bbm.gov.tr/Forms/pgNewsDetail.aspx?Type=5&Id=1821
23.09.2011	26	“ADDRESS TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY”: http://www.bbm.gov.tr/Forms/pgNewsDetail.aspx?Type=5&Id=2111
30.09.2012	27	4.Büyük olağan Kongre Konuşması” http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-ak-parti-4.-olagan-buyuk-kongresi-konusmasinin-tam-metni/31771
03.11. 2012	28	“19.İstisare ve değerlendirme toplantısı açılış konuşması” http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-19-istisare-ve-degerlendirme-toplantisi-konusmasinin-ta/33142
11.12.2012	29	“TBMM Bütçe konuşması”: http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-butce-konusmasinin-tam-metni/34904
31.08.2013	30	Erdoğan’ın 31.08.2013 Tarihli “Millete Hizmet Yolunda” Konuşmasının Tam Metni: http://www.bbm.gov.tr/Forms/pgNewsDetail.aspx?Type=4&Id=7917
11.12.2013	31	2014 Bütçe Görüşmeleri Konuşmasının Tam Metni
28.01.2014	32	Erdoğan’ın 28.01.2014 Tarihli Grup Konuşmasının Tam Metni, Ak Parti Web Sayfasından alınmıştır.

3.2.2 The Coding Scheme

3.2.2.1 Content Analysis: How it is applied – Coding Sheet and Sample Data Set

The dissertation assumes that decision-makers' role conceptions have an impact on the foreign policy practices of Turkey. In order to explain the relationship first I needed to identify the role conceptions that leaders have in their mind. For that purpose, as it is also noted previously, I am utilizing a content analysis of leaders' speeches that are selected with the above-mentioned criteria. As a result of this analysis the following questions are answered: "What are the most frequently referred foreign policy role conceptions in the selected speeches?" In order to answer this question, I established a data set that includes answers to a list of five sub-questions: 1) How many different roles are uttered and how do they differ from one government period to another? 2) Do Leaders' role preferences differ from one another or is there a consistency between them? 3) Which roles are most/least preferred by each leader? 4) Do role conceptions have regional-orientation or general-orientation? (See the next section) 5) which regions/countries are the role conceptions directed to? While answering these questions the following scheme is utilized in content analysis.

(1) Sampling: The study uses systematic sampling method (Johnson 2005: 223). As it is also explained above, before including a speech in the sample, it confirms that the speech is related to the subject matter of the study. Towards the purpose of making a comprehensive and deterministic analysis of speeches, I use a purposive sample selection strategy. The purposive sampling includes speeches of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Prime Ministers.

(2) Unit of analysis: One foreign policy speech is the unit of analysis of the research.

(3) Coded variables: Words, Contexts and paragraphs referring to foreign policy roles are coded.

(4) The measurement strategy: The system of enumeration includes four categories:

(4a) *Frequency*: Simply counts whether a foreign policy role occurs and how often it is referred to. I observe the percentage shares of each role as well.

(4b) *Space*: This category discovers how long the role is stated. For instance, in how many different contexts and paragraphs the role is elaborated? How many sentences or words refer to the role?

(4c) *Orientation*: Is the role directed towards a specific region (Rg) or does it have general orientation (Ge)?

(4d) *Country or Organization*: If the role is region-specific, does the leader refer to a specific country or organization?

3.2.2.2 TFP Role Conceptions

As noted previously the content analysis section of dissertation builds on a previous research project funded by TÜBİTAK and conducted at Bilkent University. In that research project (Ozdamar 2014) as a three membered research team¹⁴ we have found 25 role conceptions for Turkey for the period between 1997 and 2013 (Ozdamar 2014: 23-30). Combining the TFP literature with the speech analysis of the leaders of the period, the following roles have been determined by the research team:

¹⁴ Özgür Ozdamar, Burak Toygar Halistoprak and İsmail Erkam SULA

Table 7 Role List from Ozdamar's 112K163 TUBİTAK Project¹⁵

Code	Role	Code	Role
R1	Global System Collaborator	R14	Mediator
R2	Defender of peace and Stability	R15	Peace-maker/Problem-solver
R3	Regional Subsystem collaborator	R16	Independent
R4	Faithful Ally	R17	Active Independent
R5	Trading State	R18	Regional Protector
R6	Model Country	R19	Rising Power
R7	Developer	R20	Isolate
R8	Energy Transporting Country	R21	World State
R9	Protector of the Oppressed	R22	Eurasian Country
R10	Central/Pivotal Country	R23	Good Neighbor
R11	Western Country	R24	Regional Leader
R12	Eastern Country	R25	Regional Power
R13	Bridge		

From the content analysis of the selected leaders we observed that the following three R20 (Isolate), R21 (World State) and R22 (Eurasian Country) roles have never been uttered/conceptualized by Davutoğlu, Babacan, Gül and Erdoğan in the AKP period¹⁶. Therefore these three roles are excluded from the role list of this dissertation.

In this dissertation, while benefiting from the role list of the TUBİTAK project (Ozdamar 2014) I have made some additions to further clarify the definitions. The TFPRED contains 22 role conceptions.

¹⁵ Table Taken from the “Elite Interview Codebook” (Ozdamar 2014, emphasis added)

¹⁶ That is probably so because the World State and Eurasian Country roles were conceptualized and uttered by Foreign Minister İsmail Cem and disregarded or changed by the AKP administration.

R1- Global System Collaborator

The Global System Collaborator role is defined by Aras & Görener (2010: 84) to include “references to supporting the global order.” However, they have included Turkey’s both “global and regional” arrangements as indicators of this role (Aras & Görener, 2010: 84). In Ozdamar (2014: 23) the regional arrangements of Turkey are excluded from this role conception. Accordingly, it is defined to only include references to Turkey’s support to “global law and custom generating mechanisms such as UNSC” (Ozdamar 2014: 23). Turkish decision-makers’ references on the requirements to follow global law, the norms of the international society, and most of Turkey’s activities to support the UN decisions/policies are counted as references to this role conception. Hence, while fulfilling (or referring to) this role, Turkey is supporting (or calling for support to) the global system.

R2- Defender of Peace and Stability

This role is based on Holsti’s ‘Defender of Peace’ role conception, which he defines as to “indicate a universal commitment to defend against any aggression or threat to peace, no matter what the locale (Holsti 1970: 272).” Ozdamar (2014: 23) makes an addition to the definition of this role to include ‘defender of stability’ as well. Hence, this role refers to “a country that assumes a special responsibility to defend the peace and stability in the world.” Decision-makers’ references to Turkey’s support for global peace/stability, peaceful resolution of disputes or Turkey’s criticism of aggressive actions of other countries are all counted as references to this role conception.

R3- Trading State

This role conception is inspired from Kirişçi (2009) who argues that economic considerations and especially trade relationships play an important role in Turkey’s foreign policy. Özdamar (2014: 24) mentions that “this role refers to a conception of the leaders that foreign policy is conducted mainly with generally economic considerations and particularly with an aim to diversify trade relationship.” Here, the main reference is to increasing economic partnerships and trade with any country or region in the world. Turkish decision-makers’ references to Turkey’s support for

global/regional economic arrangements, Turkey's close economic relationships with other countries, the establishment of new trade relationships, and the increasing trade rates of the country with specific regions/countries are taken as references to this role.

R4- Protector of the Oppressed

We have found this role conception especially in our studies of Turkey's role in the post-Arab uprising period. Ozdamar et al. (2014: 105) argues that "Erdoğan and Davutoğlu have consistently framed Turkey as a 'protector of the oppressed' (...) this role mainly refers to a mission that Turkey supports people who live under oppressive governments." Hence, any references of Turkish Decision-makers to Turkey's responsibility to protect people against oppressive regimes, Turkey's support to protestors against oppressions are regarded as indicators of this role.

R5- Central Country

This role conception is taken from Davutoğlu who in many occasions have argued that Turkey is not a bridge but a central country. Ozdamar (2014: 25) has defined this role as to assume "a 'globally' central-status and a very special geographical and ideational condition that sees Turkey as a 'hub' between different regions, cultures, alliances and economic relations." Decision-makers' references to Turkey's special 'hub' position, Turkey's central position in the world and its surrounding regions, Turkey's increasingly important role in global politics and Turkey's rejection of a passive bridge role in the region are counted as references to this role conception.

R6- Mediator

This role conception is inspired from Holsti's definition of a 'mediator-integrator' role. Holsti (1970: 265) mentions that "the themes for this national role conception indicate perceptions of a continuing task to help adversaries reconcile their difference." Any reference of decision-makers' to Turkey's engagement in mediating conflicts among countries, resolving differences of conflicting sides, providing forums for discussions and resolutions of conflicts are counted as references to this role conception.

R7- Problem-solver/Peace-maker

This role conception, although it seems to be similar to ‘defender of peace/stability’ and ‘mediator’ role conceptions differs from them in essence. As Ozdamar (2014: 27) defines “Different from the persuasion or mediation between the conflicting parties, in this role the country assumes both the responsibility and ability (power) to enforce, or pressure the conflicting parties to achieve peace among each other”. This role assumes a more active involvement for Turkey in crisis and the decision-makers’ references to Turkey’s responsibility to bring/establish peace, solve problems in specific crisis will be regarded as indicators of this role.

R8- Independent

This role conception is originally defined by Holsti (1970: 268) with reference to the non-aligned countries. He argues that this role conception refers to states that conduct foreign policy “according to the state's own interests rather than in support of the objectives of other states” (Holsti 1970: 268; quoted in Ozdamar 2014:28). The same definition will be utilized here and any reference of Turkish decision-makers’ to Turkey’s ‘own interest’ in contrast to those of external actors will be regarded as indicators of this role.

R9- Active Independent

This role conception is originally defined by Holsti (1970: 262) who argues that it refers to more than mere self-determination. As Holsti (1970:262) defines “the role conception emphasizes at once independence, self-determination, possible mediation functions, and active programs to extend diplomatic and commercial relations to diverse areas of the world.” Ozdamar (2014:28) defines this role as to refer to a country “that seeks more than mere self-determination but actively engages in cooperative efforts, trade relationships, and diplomatic relationships to bolster its independence.” In this sense it is similar to what Davutoğlu generally calls ‘Rhythmic-Diplomacy.’

R10- Rising Power

Ozdamar (2014: 28) defines this role as “it indicates the leaders’ aspirations to become more powerful globally in the near future.” Any references of Turkish decision-makers’ to Turkey’s increasing political influence, economic capabilities, or military power in any part of the world are counted as references to this role conception.

R11- Regional Subsystem collaborator

Holsti (1970: 265) defines this role as indicating “far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities.” In addition to such definition, Aras & Görener (2010: 83) have mentioned that this role refers to “increasing dialogue with all political actors, various mediation initiatives, and undertaking facilitator and promoter roles among the states in surrounding regions.” Building on these definitions, Ozdamar (2014: 24) took Turkey’s attempts to initiate and/or take active part in regional institutions and cooperation efforts as indicators of this role conception. Any references of Turkish decision-makers’ to Turkey’s participation in regional cooperation efforts and organizations (such as Organization of the Islamic Conference - OIC or Black Sea Economic Cooperation - BSEC) or Turkey’s call for increasing cooperation are counted as references to this role conception.

R12- Western Country

This role conception is inspired from Aydın (2004) who argues that the western direction has been an unchanging and central aspect of TFP since the establishment of the republic. As it is defined in Ozdamar (2014: 26) “references to Turkey’s aim to become part of the Western (Euro-Atlantic) international community separate from other regions will be regarded as indicators of ‘Western Country’ role.” Accordingly, in this dissertation any references of Turkish decision-makers’ to Turkey’s participation in and membership to the EU, European Council, NATO will be counted as the indicators of this role.

R13- Eastern Country

In our analysis at the TUBİTAK project we decided to include the Eastern Country role as the opposite of western country. What we expected to observe is explained in Özdamar (2014: 27) as:

“Given the location of the country and its Muslim population we also find it necessary to define an Eastern and Muslim country role for Turkey... Though we do not argue that post-Cold war foreign policy is necessarily conducted to become a part of the Muslim world we try to find out how much reference is made to it. However, given the political background of AKP we deem it necessary to observe if such a role conception exists or not.”

What is observed in the TUBİTAK project was that Abdullah Gül only uttered the Eastern country role conception and it is referred to only five times throughout his speeches. The other leaders have not referred to such role conception in their speeches. However, since this dissertation will also look at the foreign policy ‘practices’ of the country, rather than excluding it from the role conceptions, I decided to re-check if such role is referred to in speeches of Turkish decision-makers and especially look if it is practiced in actual foreign policy. Hence, any references of Turkish decision-makers’ to Turkey’s Muslim identity, its historical ties with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries will be counted as indicators of Eastern country role.

R14- Bridge across Continents (Geographical - between East and West)

In the Turkish context the Bridge role has been referred to in two different ways. Geographical Bridge across continents (Material – Geopolitical) is the first one. Many references have been made to Turkey as a bridge with regard to the country’s geographical location between Asia and Europe. In Holsti’s (Holsti 1970: 267) original conceptualization the Bridge role refers to “acting as a ‘translator’ or conveyor of messages and information between peoples of different culture”. The ‘Bridge across Continents’ role is mainly referring to geopolitics (Bilgin 2006; Tank 2006 and in this sense it is different from what we refer as ‘Bridge across Civilizations’ which is differently conceptualized by Yanık (2009; 2011).

R15- Bridge across Civilizations (Ideational - between Islamic Civilization and Others)

‘The Bridge across Civilizations’ role rather than emphasizing the country’s strategic geographical location attributes ideational responsibilities to the country. As it is argued in different sources, especially in the AKP Period, Turkey has achieved a role to be a bridge between Muslim and Christian Civilizations (Yanık 2009; 2011). Following Ozdamar et al. (2014: 103) “references to the Civilizational Dialogue or to Turkey becoming the voice of the Muslim world in the West will be regarded as indicators of this role”.

R16- Faithful Ally

This role is taken from Holsti (1970: 267) who defines it as a government that “makes a specific commitment to support the policies of another government.” Turkey for a long time has made alliances with the western countries and is currently a member of NATO. Ozdamar (2014: 24) mentions that “especially Turkey’s support for US or other European foreign policies would be counted as indicators of faithful ally role. An important point here is that the role refers specifically to NATO and NATO allied member states”. Following such definition, in this dissertation any references of Turkish decision-makers’ to Turkey’s commitment to its NATO alliance, or Turkey’s support to the foreign policies of European countries and the US will be counted as indicators of the Faithful Ally Role.

R17- Model Country

The Model Country role is inspired from what Holsti (1970: 267) refers to as ‘Example’ who claims that it “emphasizes the importance of promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by pursuing certain domestic policies.” In Ozdamar (2014) we applied this role to the Turkish context. As it is mentioned in Ozdamar (2014: 24): “Turkey is generally identified as a ‘progressive’, ‘democratic’, and ‘secular’ country with a majority of Muslim population.” Regarding these characteristics of Turkey some authors have claimed that Turkey assumes the responsibility to serve as an example or model for the countries in its surrounding regions (see Tank 2006). In this dissertation any references of Turkish decision-

makers' to Turkey as a role model in the region with its characteristics as a Muslim democracy with a secular regime are counted as indicators of this role conception.

R18- Developer

This role is clearly defined by and therefore directly taken from Holsti (1970: 266): “This national role conception indicate a special duty or obligation to assist underdeveloped countries.” The leader assumes that the country is both able and willing to bring development to some regions and countries around the world. This role conception is especially evident in AKP foreign policies with regard to Turkey’s relationship with the Balkans, with Central Asia, Caucasus and the sub-Saharan Africa (take Turkey’s so-called recent “African Initiative” for instance).

R19- Energy Transporter

This role conception is found during the speech analysis of Ozdamar (2014). Due to Turkey’s geographical location, Turkish leaders have referred to the country as a hub or route for transporting Middle Eastern and Caspian energy resources such as oil and gas towards Europe. Hence, this role conception is counted at this dissertation as well.

R20- Good Neighbor

As Ozdamar (2014: 29) has conceptualized it, this role conception refers to “Turkey’s peaceful bilateral relationship with its neighbors”. Following this definition any references to the so-called ‘zero-problems with neighbors’ policy and to solving the existing conflicts with neighboring countries are counted as references to this role conception.

R21- Regional Leader

The Regional leader role conception is also utilized in Ozdamar (2014) and taken from Holsti (1970: 261) who argues that “the themes for this national role conception refer to duties or special responsibilities that a government perceives for it in its relation to states in a particular region (...).” This role is also identified by Aras & Görener (2010: 82) who argue that “the majority of the AKP leaders’ statements are

couched in language that indicates a strong self-identification as a regional leader.” Any references of Turkish decision-makers’ to Turkey’s Political/economic/ military leadership in any region are counted as references to this role conception.

R22- Regional Power

In this role conception, Turkey is not a leader in its region neither it is a protector, but it is one of the significant actors. In the leaders' discourse, references to Turkey's significance within its surrounding regions without assumptions of leadership will be regarded as indicators of this role.

3.2.2.3 The New Classification of Role Conceptions and Role Codes

The Role conceptions of this dissertation are inspired from the TUBİTAK Project (Ozdamar 2014). However they are not taken directly but instead redefined and reclassified in this dissertation. The previous section gave the redefined role conceptions that are analyzed in the dissertation. This section classifies these roles into two broad categories.

The main proposition of this dissertation (see Chapter II, p.25) puts forward a new role typology: that there are ‘region specific’ and ‘general’ role conceptions. According to that claim I classified role conceptions with ‘general orientation’ (not region specific) and ‘Regional orientation.’ Roles such as regional leader, regional power, regional subsystem collaborator, and good neighbor are generally uttered with reference to single or multiple regions. On the other hand defender of peace and stability, Pivotal Country, rising power, independent country and the like are role conceptions that are not region specific but instead general role conceptions. The following table gives the role classification and role codes that are utilized in this dissertation.

Table 8 TFPRED Role Conceptions

Code	Role	Code	Role
R1	Global System Collaborator	R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator
R2	Defender of peace and Stability	R13	Western Country
R3	Trading State	R14	Eastern Country
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	R15	Bridge across Continents (Geo.)
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	R16	Faithful Ally
R6	Mediator	R17	Model Country
R7	Peace-maker/Prob. solver	R18	Developer
R8	Independent	R19	Energy Transporting Country
R9	Active Independent	R20	Good Neighbor
R10	Rising Power	R21	Regional Leader
R11	Bridge across Civilizations (Ideational)	R22	Regional Power

3.3 Data Collection Phase II: Event Data

3.3.1 Event Data: Utilized Literature and the Coding System

In the FPA literature human decision-makers' are taken as primarily responsible for state foreign policy behavior. Accordingly, the dissertation argues that analysis of state behavior has to begin with the impact of decision-makers' vision. However, in order to have a complete analysis of state behavior, one need to focus on what states actually do as well; that is the foreign policy practices of states. This has possibly been one of the major incentives for the scholars that develop large-scale events data sets that focus on state foreign policy behavior. Such data sets have been dominant throughout the 1970s, and are still used in the field of FPA. As improvements in computer technology increased so did the efforts of event data analysts. Employing machine coding of events, the event data analysts have continued to develop new event data sets through generations (Bruening 2007: 169). This section introduces the existing studies and explains the event data analysis that is utilized in this dissertation.

FPA has developed upon “a search for empirically grounded indicators of foreign policy” (Neack 1995:253). Such development has opened up the way for FPA scholars to attract US federal funding opportunities. Utilizing such funds, the field has pretty much been affected by the overall positivist turn in social sciences in the 1960s. The positivist turn, for instance, has produced attempts to link ideal nation types with certain foreign policy behavior. The development of event data has also been a product of such understanding (Neack 2005: 6). Since then, event data has become “one of the most commonly used measurement techniques of foreign policy behavior” (Schrodt 1995:146). In a general sense, event data supports scholars in developing certain patterns of foreign policy through providing empirically grounded observations of the actual foreign policy behavior of states.

“Event data are generated by examining thousands of newspaper reports on the day-to-day interactions of nation-states and assigning each reported interaction a numerical score or a categorical code” (Schrodt 1995:146). McClelland’s (1976) World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) and Azar’s (1980) Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) initiated the first two events data-sets. In both datasets the interactions between states in world politics are coded according to a specific coding scheme. For example, “the COPDAB data set codes a general ‘issue area’-whether an action is primarily military, economic, diplomatic, or one of five other types of relationship. WEIS, in contrast, codes for specific ‘issue arenas’ such as the Vietnam War, Arab-Israeli conflict, and SALT negotiations” (Schrodt 1995: 149). Each data set has a specific coding scheme, which they explain in their respective Event Data Codebooks. WEIS and COPDAB is of significant importance since most of the subsequent event datasets have utilized the coding scheme developed by these early datasets. The coding scheme examples are provided below

3.3.1.1 WEIS Codebook (McClelland¹⁷ 1978 3rd Edition)

Being among the first event datasets the WEIS dataset codes public events reported daily in the press. It identifies the flow of action and response between countries. The assumption is that in the international political system, “nations act consistently enough so that their past behavior is a source for the prediction of their present and

¹⁷ Seen as the “father of the events data movement” (Azar, 1979: 111).

future actions” (McClelland 1978: 1). Through analyzing the past actions of the states the WEIS dataset attempts to produce patterns of interactions between countries. McClellands analyzes if these patterns are observable in international relations. An ‘Event’ is taken as the unit of analysis and it is described as “Each event/ interaction is a daily report of an international event.” 5 variables are coded in the data set: time, actor, target, arena, and event classification¹⁸. The dataset utilized New York Times as the data source. It has 22 event categories, which are divided into multiple sub-categories. The WEIS codebook codes for 63 categories in total.

Table 9 WEIS Event Categories and Their Codes

Event Code	Event Category	Event Code	Event Category
01	Yield	13	Protest
02	Comment	14	Deny
03	Consult	15	Demand
04	approve	16	Warn
05	Promise	17	threaten
06	Grant	18	Demonstrate
07	Reward	19	Reduce Relations(sanctions)
08	Agree	20	Expel
09	Request	21	Seize
10	Propose	22	Force
11	Reject		
12	Accuse		

Each event is coded based on an issue area such as Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967 war, Cyprus issue, and Vietnam conflict (among other 23 other issue areas). All countries in the world and some non-governmental actors are included in the dataset (see McClelland 1978: Appendix A)

3.3.1.2 COPDAB (Conflict and Peace Databank) Codebook (Aznar 1993 first in 1982)¹⁹

COPDAB is a computer-assisted dataset of the international and domestic events that happen between 135 countries from 1948 to 1978. “COPDAB holds about 500,000 event records systematically coded from about 70 international sources, covering the

¹⁸ They have 63 categories for this classification with textual definitions of each category

¹⁹ Later incorporated in Global Event-Data System (GEDS) Project produced under the coordination of John L. Davies at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM)

period between January 1, 1948 and December 31, 1978” (Azar 1993: 6). He explains an event as follows (Azar 1993:6):

International events are occurrences between nation-states which are distinct enough from the constant flow of transactions," (e.g., trade, mail flow) to stand out against this background as "reportable," or "newsworthy." Thus, to qualify as a descriptive event, an occurrence has to be actually reported in a reputable and available public source. For example, the conclusion of a trade agreement would qualify as a descriptive event in COPDAB's but the subsequent routine trade flows conducted under its terms would not.

In COPDAB, event statements are collected from public sources and transformed into ‘descriptive events’ (who said or did what to whom and when). Nation-states are taken as actors that act towards their domestic and world targets. Each event is aggregated by time periods, and the changes in the relations of states are interpreted statistically. Once event statements are transformed into ‘descriptive events’, each descriptive event contains information on the date, actor, target, source (where/the public source that the event statement is gathered), issue type (military, economic, etc.), Scale (Azar’s scale on Conflictiveness and cooperativeness of the event), and the issue area. Similar to WEIS, COPDAB also categorizes events. However it builds different categories:

Table 10 COPDAB Issue Types and their Codes

Code	Issue Type
1	symbolic political relations
2	economic relations
3	military and strategic relations;
4	cultural and scientific relations;
5	relations regarding the physical environment and natural resources
6	relations about human/demographic/ethnic issues;
7	political order and law/organization relations;
9	Other or residual relations

Each country, public source, event type and the scale of each event has a specific code explained in the codebook. So an event statement like: “May 23, 1968-- Egypt loans Syria \$750,000 for Economic Development” will be coded as the following: “680520365165202LOAN 2004\$750,000 ECONOMIC AID FOR DEVELOPMENT”. Some example events are provided in the following table:

Table 11 COPDAB- Coded Events (Some Examples)

Descriptive Event : May 23, 1968-- Egypt loans Syria \$750,000 for Economic Development.						
COPDAB Codes (with additional info) : 680520365165202LOAN 2004\$750,000 ECONOMIC AID FOR DEVELOPMENT						
680523	651	652	02	LOAN	20	04
(YYMMDD)	(Actor- Egypt)	(Target: Syria)	(Source: News Agency)	(Activity: Descriptive Verb)	Issue type: (Economic Relations)	Scale value (Conflict. / Coop.)
Descriptive Event : On September 14, 1956, Britain threatens to invade Egypt if the latter nationalizes the Suez Canal						
COPDAB Codes (with no additional info) : 56091420065102THREATEN TO INVADE IF SUEZ CANAL IS NATIONALIZED						
560914	200	651	02	THREATEN		
(YYMMDD)	(Actor- Britain)	(Target: Egypt)	(Source: News Agency)		(Activity: Descriptive Verb)	

The 15-point cooperation/conflict scale, each issue/actor/event code and some possible limitations of the data are clearly explained in COPDAB Codebook, which serves as a users' manual to read the dataset (See Azar 1993).²⁰

3.3.1.3 CASCON (Computer-Aided System to Handle Information on Local Conflicts) (Bloomfield & Beattie 1999; First in 1969)

CASCON analyzes crisis events under a case/phase categorization. It aims to collect information for developing conflicts around the world. The data set has information on fifty-three local conflicts around the world, which started and ended between 1945 and 1969. Each conflict case is then categorized into three phases (The dispute phase, the conflict phase and the hostilities phase).²¹

²⁰ The findings of COPDAB event data are mostly published in numerous issues of the *International Interactions* Journal. The Data Set can be accessed from the ICPSR Website:

<http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/07767>

²¹ The CASCON Data and Codebook can be accessed through the ICPSR Web Site:

<https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/5301?keyword=international+conflict&permit%5B0%5D=AVAILABLE>

3.3.1.4 CREON Codebook (Hermann et al. 1977)

CREON was formed in 1969 by a group of researchers (Hermann et al. 1977) as an attempt to observe behaviors of international actors and internal governmental processes. They have recorded events, which they define as “any action resulting from a decision by political authorities of a state that has the power to commit the resources of the national government,” (Hermann et al. 1977: i). 36 nations were selected (see (Hermann et al. 1977: Appendix A) and the dataset recorded approximately 12,000 events within a 30 months period between 1959 and 1968 utilizing “deadline data on world affairs.” Codebook Appendix D gives a list of sources utilized by Deadline data. The dataset is established in machine-readable format (OSIRIS). Each variable in the dataset is coded in detail including: the actor, year, month, day, event number, revised version of WEIS codes for events divided into verbal actions (words) and non-verbal actions (deeds). The events are categorized under a conflict/cooperation spectrum. In addition to WEIS coding the CREON Dataset also coded events according to resource area/skill which categorizes the action based on the resource area or skill that the actor uses in taking the action (economic, military, diplomatic, political, cultural, and ideological), Number of nations participating in action²², name of alliance, setting for multilateral collaboration, method through which the action is announced, official position of the announcer of the action, and a 150 other variables. 167 variables are coded in total that builds into a large dataset.

²² “Although, by definition, every event has only one actor, we recognize that nations often act jointly – in conferences, alliances, and the like...” (Hermann et al. 1977: 5).

Table 12 CREON Four Major Subdivisions (Revised WEIS Event Codes)²³

1. Evaluative categories (perceptions of past and current action by the self and the target)		2. Desire categories (desire for future action by the self or target)		3. Intent Categories (regarding actor's possible future action vis-a-vis the target)		4. Nonverbal Categories (Deeds)	
Conflict(1) Deny	Cooperation(2) Positive Comment	Conflict(3) Demand	Cooperation(4) Positive request	Conflict(5) Threaten	Cooperation(6) Positive intention	Conflict(7) Force	Cooperation(8) Yield
Accuse	Approve	Protest	Positive propose	Warn	Offer	Demonstrate	Grant
Negative comment	Consult	Negative propose	Negotiate	Reject	Promise	Aid opponent	Decrease Military capability
		Negative request		Negative Intention	Agree	Reduce Relationship	Carry out agreement
						Seize	Reward
						Expel	Increase relationship
						Subvert	
						Increase military capability	

²³ The revised version of WEIS event codes by CREON. See Hermann et al. 1977: 2 -5

3.3.1.5 The SHERFACS (Shermann 1994)²⁴

Sherman (1994) builds data on international conflicts based on a crisis/phase scale. In SHERFACS, each event is coded under a six-phase categorization: Dispute Phase (Phase 1), Conflict Phase (Phase 2), Hostilities phase (Phase 3), Post-hostilities conflict phase (Phase 4), Post-hostilities dispute phase (Phase 5), and Settlement Phase (Phase 6). The actors, actions, and results of each conflict are coded with an aim to contribute the resolution and management of international conflicts.

3.3.1.6 KEDS Kansas Event Data System (Schrodt 1998; Schrodt et al. 1994)²⁵

Utilizing the WEIS categorization another research project by Schrodt et al. (1998) developed at Kansas State University - KEDS (the Kansas Event Data System) provides a machine-coding system for generating event data. The data set has used the Reuters news leads on Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians and Syria). The program that was initially developed at Kansas State University recognizes the actors, verbs and phrases (according to the dictionaries written by the authors/programmers) in the Reuters NEWS leads and generates a codebook based on the standard “who | did what | to whom | and when” event data format.²⁶ The KEDS program had later on moved to Pennsylvania State University (2010-2013). In Pen State University the authors have developed the TABARI (Text Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions) Program that replaced the KEDS System.²⁷ The KEDS System also collaborated with PANDA (Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action) developed by Bond et al. (2003) at

²⁴ The Sherfacs Codebook can be reached from: <http://www.usc.edu/dept/ancntr/Paris-in-LA/Database/sherfacs.html>. Accessed: 04.01.2015. Full Reference: Sherman, Frank L. 1994 “SHERFACS: A Cross-Paradigm, Hierarchical and Contextually Sensitive Conflict Management Data Set.” *International Interactions*, 20 (1-2): pp. 79-100

²⁵ The KEDS Codebook can be accessed from: <http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/keds.dir/kedsmanual.pdf>. Full Reference: Schrodt, Philip A., Shannon G. Davis and Judith L. Weddle. 1994. “Political Science: KEDS-A Program for the Machine Coding of Event Data.” *Social Science Computer Review* 12,3: 561-588. Can be accessed from: <http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/papers.dir/outside.html>. Accessed: 04.01.2015

²⁶ The authors claim that machine coding is less costly and faster and that it produces results quite similar to human coding. As Schrodt et al. (1998:4) argue: “with Reuters lead sentences and the WEIS coding scheme, KEDS’s will assign the same code as a single human coder in about 80% to 90% of the cases.” The program is currently known as “The Computational Event Data System (CEDS).”

²⁷ Currently both the program and dataset is hosted by ‘Parus Analytical Systems’. For further details see: <http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/>. On details about TABARI see: <http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/software.dir/tabari.html> Accessed: 07.12.2014.

Harvard. The vocabulary list and coding software was shared between KEDS and PANDA. The Panda system codes for a “a superset of the WEIS categories (160 categories versus the 63 categories in WEIS) that provide far more detail on nonviolent events, sub-state actors and internal interactions such as strikes and protests” (Schrodt 1998: 3). New verb categories are developed in collaboration with the variety of event datasets utilizing the KEDS system. These categories are then built into two major event data systems - the IDEA (Integrated Data for Events Analysis) and CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Event Observations).

3.3.1.7 CAMEO (Schrodt 2012)²⁸ and IDEA (Bond et al. 2003)

CAMEO is based on the previous coding systems developed through the KEDS system. Updating the WEIS and COPDAB coding scheme the CAMEO system have produced novel codes for events and actors. The project is intended to be utilized in conflict studies as an effort to contribute to the mediation of crisis. Observing the role of non-state actors in conflicts around the world, Schrodt (2012) developed a combination of PANDA and KEDS system in order to code events for non-state actors as well.²⁹ Another version of the most recent event data-coding scheme is IDEA developed by Bond et al. (2003).³⁰

The development of computer assisted coding systems has contributed a lot on event data production.³¹ Previously, datasets like WEIS and COPDAB relied on human analysts, basically collecting news reports and hand-coding each event in the dataset. However, later versions of event data such as KEDS and CAMEO utilize a software program called “Text Analysis by Augmenting Replacement Instructions

²⁸ See <http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.html>). The codebook is still under construction. The latest update is made in the CAMEO codebook version 1.1b3 available from: <http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/cameo.dir/CAMEO.Manual.1.1b3.pdf> Accessed: 07.12.2015

²⁹ The CAMEO Project develops a huge ‘event data’ set and is updated regularly. However, the data generated by CAMEO, utilizes a wider actor dictionary, includes non-state actors, and better fits into the field of Conflict Studies and does not serve the purposes of this study. For further details on CAMEO, please see Schrodt 2012.

³⁰ Currently hosted by Virtual Research Associates, Inc. (VRA), see <http://vranet.com/IDEA.aspx>. Full reference for the IDEA codebook - Bond et al. 2003. "Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA): An Event Typology for Automated Events Data Development," *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 40. No3, 2003. Accessed:04.01.2015.

³¹ For the current state of event data generation see the massive Global Dataset of Events, Location, and Tone (GDELT) data accessible from: <http://gdeltproject.org/>. Accessed:04.01.2015.

(TABARI)”³² which is developed specifically for the purpose of event data generation.

3.3.1.8 TFAED - Turkish Foreign Affairs Event Dataset (Tüzüner & Biltekin: 2013)

Tüzüner & Biltekin (2013) have initiated a study on TFP between 1990 -2013. It is based on a concern also shared by this study that is producing comparable and quantitative data-based analysis on ideological and/or physical changes in TFP orientations.³³ “The TFAED project employs event data analysis to build up a 23-year dataset (1991-2012) of Turkish foreign affairs.” (Tüzüner & Biltekin 2013: 47). The study is based on international wire news of *Agence France Presse* (AFP) and generated event data using Schrodts’ free-access TABARI software.³⁴

To sum up, event data is based upon recognizing patterns of state behavior. Through a step-by-step process, researchers collect stories, code data, and find generalizable patterns through quantitative analysis in order to obtain predictive capacity on the possible future behavior. As Schrodts & Yonamine (2013:7) point out “event data as a specific data type is a set of records, each reflecting a specific event and containing codes indicating who | did what | to whom | when | [and sometimes] where|”.

Recently, Schrodts & Yonamine (2013) and Tüzüner & Biltekin (2013) gave a step-by-step explanation of developing event datasets. Those steps are benefited in developing the TFP Roles and Events Dataset (TFPRED) for the purposes of this dissertation. Each step and decision is clearly explained in the next section.

³² See the TABARI Manual from: <http://eventdata.psu.edu/tabari.dir/tabari.manual.0.8.4b1.pdf>. Accessed 04.01.2015.

³³ The authors warned the reader that the study is still in progress so the data set has not been finalized yet. However, their step-by-step explanation of the data generation process is of significant help to the development of this study.

³⁴ This dissertation will utilize the footprints of TFAED and make some adjustments to build an independent dataset for the purposes of this research. Utilizing Tüzüner & Biltekin’s (2013) wisdom the data set that is produced in this study will be named TFP Roles and Events Dataset (TFPRED).

3.3.2 Coding Scheme

Event data coding techniques are abundant. However, the utility and accessibility of each technique is determined by the capabilities of the researcher. First, the software programs are not like user-friendly Apple Apps, or Microsoft software programs. Each coding software program works in the basic Terminal (MacOS) or Command Prompt (Microsoft) environment. Understanding and utilizing these coding programs takes time and requires knowledge of basic Linux/Unix/MsDos commands and programming capability. In some instances, one needs to modify the software program codes in order to make proper use of them. So, a researcher needs to learn (at least) moderate programming language in order to generate machine-coded event data for his/her research. It is easy to reach these software programs from the websites of the above-mentioned datasets. However, the news sources where the raw (original/not coded) material is downloaded are not always found free of charge. So, the coding scheme greatly depends on at least two conditions: first, the financial resources of the researcher and second, the computer programming capabilities.

3.3.2.1 Step 1: Deciding on the Relevant Software and Finding the Machine-Readable Source Text to be coded:

The first step in coding event data is to find the relevant data source and choose the coding software. There are a couple of ways of finding the source but the options are limited due to the institutional and financial capabilities of the researcher. Once the sources are found, then comes the limitations of the version of the software program that the analyst is using in the coding process. For instance, the most recently developed program by event data analysts PETRARCH (Python Engine for Text Resolution and Related Coding Hierarchy) reads events from .XML files. However, I have not been able to find a free newswire source that provides downloadable .XML files.³⁵ Bilkent University provides access to LexisNexis Academics, a web source

³⁵ The PETRARCH “Read.Me” file is somehow not so clear on how and where to find and to download the input files. There is some guidance towards using something called a “Pipeline program” but the information on how to use those programs and reach the sources remains very limited. As far as I have understood, the analysts that utilize the PETRARCH program have utilized RSS services and Gigawords web site to download the .XML files and generate event data but these services are not free to use and currently Bilkent University does not provide access to these sources. By March 2016, a Bilkent University Phd student is not able to use the PETRARCH program unless

that provides downloadable files only with the .HTML .TXT .PDF file formats. Following a similar method utilized by Tüzüner and Biltekin (2013: 52) I decided to utilize the latest version of the previous event data software TABARI (Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions – Version 0.8.4b2), which is able to read .TXT files.

Once the original raw source files are acquired, then the researcher needs to use (at least) three sets of software programs to generate and interpret event data. First, filtering software is needed to convert the original TXT file into a TABARI-readable .TXT file. This software filters the unnecessary details in the newswire document, keeps the date and the ‘lead’ sentences of each news story and sorts them according to the release date.³⁶ Then, the filtered files are processed through the TABARI software, which generates event data in the “Who, Did what, to Whom, When” structure. Remember here that the resulting output.TXT file of the TABARI software will have about hundreds of thousands of lines of events in “Who (Target), did what (event), to whom (target), and when (date)” format, which makes thousands of pages in a single TXT file waiting to be analyzed and interpreted. This analysis and interpretation is done through utilizing the basic aggregation functions of some statistics software programs. There are a couple of ways of making these interpretations. In this dissertation, I will utilize a combination of the Rstudio to make data aggregations and Ms. Excel to generate figures.³⁷

3.3.2.2 Step 2: Keywords and Searching the LexisNexis Database:

For the purposes of this study, I have decided to utilize the free event data generating

he/she has adequate funding to utilize the news sources that provide .XML files. The LexisNexis website provides download options with .txt, .html, .Pdf formats and converting these into a PETRARCH-readable .XML file is a whole different story and seems not possible for a person who is not an expert on computer programming and file conversion techniques.

³⁶ For further details on the use of the filtering software please see the section 2.1. of the TABARI Manual (0.8.4): <http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/tabari.dir/TABARI.0.8.4b3.manual.pdf>. Accessed 01.03.2016.

³⁷ After spending a couple of months to understand and learn how to use PETRARCH, I realized that I could not use the program due to insufficient funds and computer programming capabilities. The lesson that I took from this experience is that the easiest way to generate event data is emulating the “best practices” of studies that have previously utilized some of these software programs for similar purposes. After this experience, while choosing the software programs to generate event data in the dissertation, I decided to utilize the wisdom of Tüzüner & Biltekin (2013). Here, my special thanks should go to Dr. Biltekin who encouraged me in my quest to utilize the most recent developments in event data and to have this thought-provoking experience.

software programs of the Computational Event Data System (CEDS), TABARI (Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions), which is provided for by the Parus Analytical Systems (<http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/index.html>). The programs work with two major online databases called LexisNexis (for AFP Newswire) and Factiva (for Reuters) as news sources. I decided to utilize the LexisNexis database (<https://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>).³⁸ Downloading the online sources requires the researcher to decide on the exact keywords, and source type. At this step I used a modified version of the method utilized by Tüzüner and Biltekin (2013: 52):

“After several trials, we determined the following search line to be the most efficient: ‘Turkey OR Turkish OR Turk OR Istanbul OR Ankara OR Izmir.’ (...) we chose Advanced Search and selected Agence France Presse as the news source. We did not determine a section search to ensure that every report that included the search terms would be returned. LexisNexis does not show full results for queries that bring more than 3,000 news reports. To restrict the results to fewer than 3,000 for each query, we entered date specifications consisting of three- to six-month periods from January 1, 1990 to December 31, 2012. LexisNexis allows for 500 news reports at most in a single document for download (...) we downloaded the news reports found through search terms in text format and full document view.”

Tüzüner and Biltekin’s (2013) TFEAD Dataset searched for all types of events between a larger range of actors than the study that I was planning to conduct in this dissertation. For the purposes of this study, I am specifically looking for the events, conducted one-way by Turkish government actors, towards international actors. So, the keywords needed to be determined accordingly. The keywords that I used for my search are “LEAD (Turkey OR Turkish OR Turk OR ANKARA).”³⁹

³⁸ For some reason unknown to me, I was unable to utilize Factiva since the website asked subscription even when I connected from the Bilkent servers. A note for future users: beware of your university’s online database access services.

³⁹ Different from Tüzüner & Biltekin’s study I decided to search for news reports that have “Turkey OR Turkish OR Turk OR ANKARA” in the lead sentences. Because the filtering program chops out most of the later paragraphs and keeps the leads of each news report. Tüzüner & Biltekin (2013: 54) have found approximately 91500 news reports but they have reported: “Almost half of these reshaped records do not contain actors from Turkey because the mentions of Turkey are in later paragraphs, which were cut out in the filtering process.” So I decided that there was no need to search for news reports that have information on Turkey in the latter paragraphs. Besides, rather than trying to find each and every event in the online sources, a representative sample of the whole events would be

After deciding on the keywords, I have entered these keywords at the advanced search option, tried to search for the whole temporal domain of this study (between November 18th, 2002 and August 29th 2014) and realized that for some unknown reason the LexisNexis database only shows the first 1000 of news reports if the search results are expected to come up with more than 3000 reports. So, I had to divide each year into six months in order to make sure that the results come up with less than 3000 results. Then, another surprising result of the great wisdom of the LexisNexis Database engineers was that a researcher could only download 500 news reports in a single TXT file. After finishing the LexisNexis journey, conducting approximately 23 separate “search-find” and 73 “download .TXT file” sessions, I have downloaded 73 separate .TXT files each containing 500 news reports and saved them as raw material on the desktop. The search ended up with approximately 36.000 news reports from November 2002 to August 2014, making hundreds of thousands of pages saved in 73 separate TXT files. These files are formatted, divided into paragraphs and made ready for TABARI by the filtering programs explained in the next section.

3.3.2.3 Step 3: Filtering and Reformatting Raw Material

The 68 separate .TXT files downloaded from the LexisNexis website need to be merged, filtered, and sequentially sorted in order to create a single input file for TABARI. This is done with the use of three programs downloadable from the Parus Analytics website.⁴⁰ First, the “NewNexisFormat.pl” program runs through the news stories and re-writes their lead sentences into separate .TXT files. Then, the “nexisreverse.pl” program merges those separate files into a single TABARI readable .TXT file. Third, the “seqsort.pl” program does a date sort on the records if they are out of order.⁴¹ After the use of these three programs, the NEWS reports that are downloaded from LexisNexis turn into a single TABARI readable text file

enough to decide if the Turkish government fulfills the role conceptions or not.

⁴⁰ To download the filtering program visit the:

<http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/software.dir/filters.html> website and download the zip file entitled “NewNexisFormat.pl (Perl)”. The zip file contains a folder with three software programs and a readme file describing how to use them. For further details on the use of the filtering software please see the section 2.1. Of the TABARI Manual (0.8.4) downloadable from

<http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/tabari.dir/TABARI.0.8.4b3.manual.pdf> . Accessed 01.03.2016.

⁴¹ This step might seem confusing, but once you read the “Readme.txt” file downloaded from Parusanalytics (look at the previous footnote) the details become clarified. Both the readme file and the TABARI Manual explain the filtering process clearly.

containing the lead sentences of each report. The filtering process is quite important to generate event data. Otherwise, TABARI will not be able to read the news. The newly created and filtered single .TXT file becomes the input file for TABARI. The input file that I have created for TFPRED dataset is named “TFPRED160523.text” containing approximately 150.000 lines of news reports (only lead sentences) from November, 2002 to August, 2014.

3.3.2.4 Step 4: Utilizing the TABARI Software and Coded events

For multiple reasons explained above I use TABARI (Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions – Version 0.8.4b2) program to code events.⁴² The TABARI program folder is downloaded from the Parus Analytics website. The folder contains most of the files that are necessary to run TABARI (the program file, options file, project file, and the actors and verbs dictionaries).

The TFPRED files are developed upon modifications of the GDELT dictionaries and options files provided by the Computational Event Data System Project. The GDELT dictionaries are downloaded from the Parus Analytics website. In order to modify the dictionaries, first, a dry-run is made with the “Globalnet.131001” actors and verbs dictionaries. Then events that are related to Turkey are analyzed and modifications made accordingly. In the dry-run the filtered “TFPRED160523.text” file ended up with 14204 events. Then the ministers of each government from 2002 to 2014, some city names from Turkey, and the Turkish version of the ministers’ and cites’ names (e.g. *Gül, Erdoğan, Bağış, İstanbul, İzmir etc.*) are added to the dictionaries. After modifications, a second run is made ending up with 22687 events. After further dictionary modifications another run is made resulting again with the same number 22687 events. The output file containing all 22687 events is named “TFPRED160528”. This file contains events as follows:

“021118	TUR	ISR	090	Investigate
021118	IRQ	USAGOV	195	Employ aerial weapons

⁴² As it is also explained above once you have come up to this step, it is assumed that you have already downloaded and filtered the news reports and have a single raw input file for the program to work on. Once ready, you might download the TABARI program bundle from the following link: <http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/software.dir/tabari.html>. Accessed 01.03.2016.

021118	IRQ	IGOUNO	128	Defy norms, law
...				
140827	EUR	IRN	036	Express intent to meet o
140828	TUR	TURGOV	112	Accuse
140828	TUR	TURGOV	112	Accuse”

Once the events output file is created, then one can start working on event aggregation. Currently the “Events” package of the Rstudio (CranR) is the easiest and a highly useful way to work on event data (Yonamine, 2012).⁴³ When the events are loaded into Rstudio the “events” package makes some additional tweaking of the data and removes duplicate events and sorts each event according to the dates.⁴⁴ The Rstudio-events package filtered data ended up with 20187 events after the removal of mostly irrelevant (duplicate events and sports events) events. However at this point the newly sorted and filtered data clarified that the TABARI software additionally codes phrases like “actor X said that it will do Y the next year” as if the promise has been made in the previous year. So, an event that took place in 14 March 2003 (Date: 030314) is coded as a promise that has been made the previous year (Date: 020314). 18 such instances are manually removed from the data set in order to fine-tune the events. As a result, data ended up with 20165 events between November 2002 and August 2016.

3.3.2.5 A short note on Rstudio “Events” package

After working on the event data software (Text filtering, TABARI, PETRARCH) for approximately a year, the TFPRED data had finally become ready to aggregate and analyze. I have run the TABARI software for a couple of times in order to reach the

⁴³ The aggregation choices are explained in detail by James, E. Yonamine in an unpublished manuscript which can be downloaded from website. James E. Yonamine, “Working with Event Data: A Guide to Aggregation Choices”, (unpublished paper), accessed 01.04.2015, <http://jayyonamine.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Working-with-Event-Data-A-Guide-to-Aggregation-Choices.pdf>.

⁴⁴ For those who are not familiar with CranR, there are video tutorials in the web explaining what CranR is, how Rstudio works and how the packages are to be downloaded. If you are interested in utilizing Rstudio (it is very useful for event data) a short google search for Rstudio tutorials might be quite helpful. Once the events package for R studio is downloaded the package contains a detailed explanation on how to use the commands. For further questions you might reach me via email: iesula@ybu.edu.tr.

above-mentioned final document. Only some of the details are written here in the dissertation. However, I have prepared a long readme.txt file in the dataset and will put it in the TFPRED section of my website. Please note that, in the dissertation I only provide a necessary summary of what I did to prepare Rstudio.⁴⁵ The document has details on how R studio "events" package is used in filtering and aggregating the data to be utilized in the TFPRED data set.

Each step in building a data set requires a decision and each decision has certain consequences. Currently, I decided to utilize two programs - "R studio" and "Ms. Excel" and this is a result of many trials and failures. So the information in the document is based on my personal experience for the specific purpose of building the TFPRED data set. The document assumes that the reader has basic knowledge of R studio. If not, I still provide as much detail as possible but a best suggestion to those who would like to generate event data and aggregate with Rstudio might be a quote from Samuel Barclay Beckett: "Ever tried, ever failed, no matter, try again, fail again, fail better."

3.4 Matching the Events with Role Conceptions

The dissertation is looking for the parallelism between the discourse and the practice of foreign policy in Turkey. I analyzed the discourse via content analysis and explained the details in section 3.2 of this chapter. The TFPRED Content Analysis Dataset shows data on the frequency and regional direction of 22 role conceptions shown in Table 16 (p.84).⁴⁶ Further details on TFP role conceptions and the findings of the content analysis are presented in Chapter IV.

Once the TFP discourse - that is the frequency of appearance and regional direction of TFP role conceptions- is observed then I look for the foreign policy practice of Turkey. Event data is utilized to observe the TFP practice and the events dataset is

⁴⁵ The readme file is quite technical and provides a long and step-by-step explanation of what I did in Rstudio. I explained each step as clearly as I was able to. Please see the codebook. The works of Phillip Schrodtt and other event data scholars have been very helpful for me in understanding how to work with event data. Now, I would very much like to do the same and help others. For any questions, please do not hesitate to reach me via email: jesula@ybu.edu.tr.

⁴⁶ The TFPRED Content Analysis Dataset can be reached via email: ismailerkam@gmail.com

established accordingly. The data on the date, source and target of the TFP practices are coded via TABARI and each step is explained in the previous section (3.3). The program codes 20165 events in total. After working on these events via Rstudio and cleaning up irrelevant data, the dataset ends up with 16069 events November 18, 2002 to August 29, 2014. The TFPRED Event dataset observes and summarizes TFP practices via presenting data on the frequency (# of appearance), nature (conflict/cooperation continuum) and direction (regional orientation) of the events.⁴⁷ Chapter V explains the findings of TFPRED event dataset.

After presenting TFP discourse and practice separately, then the thesis proposes a novel approach in observing the parallelism between the two. As shown in Appendix D 208 different events are coded in the dataset. In order to observe the parallelism, the dissertation matches each of these events with relevant role conceptions. This Event-Role Matching Table (Table 13) is presented below:

⁴⁷ The TFPRED Event dataset can be reached via email: ismailerkam@gmail.com

Table 13 Role Conception/Event Code Matching Table

Code	Role	Event Codes
R1	GSC	Number of cooperative events (both verbal and material cooperation) From TR (source) to global IGO's (targets).
R2	DoP	0256, 026, 027, 028, 0356, 036, 037, 038, 039, 045, 087, 0871, 0872, 0873, 0874, 1123, 1124
R3	Trade. S.	0211, 0311, 061, 1011
R4	Protector	0233, 033, 0331, 0332, 0334, 036, 070, 071, 072, 073, 074, 075, 1054, 112, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1124, 162, 1621, 1622
R5	Central C.	This role is a verbal construction - Non-observable through event data
R6	Mediator	028, 039, 045
R7	Peace-maker	037, 1056, 107
R8	Independent	016, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 1241, 1246, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 139, 160, 161, 162, 1621, 1622, 163, 164
R9	Active Indep.	Foreign policy activity (total number of events towards different regions)
R10	Rising Power	This role refers to a rise in economic and military power. Non-observable through event data.
R11	Bridge (Civ)	This role is a verbal construction - Non-observable through event data
R12	RSC	021, 0211, 0212, 0213, 0214, 022, 30, 031, 0311, 0312, 032, 050, 060, 061, 062, 063, 064, 101, 1011, 1014, 102
R13	Western C.	Events to Rg5
R14	Eastern C.	Events to Rg3
R15	Bridge (Geo)	This role is a verbal construction - Non-observable through event data
R16	Faithful Ally	Rg5 (013, 019, 021, 0211, 0212, 0213, 0214, 022, 030, 031, 0311, 0312, 032, 033, 0331, 0332, 0334, 050, 051, 052, 053, 057, 060, 061, 062, 063, 064, 100, 101)
R17	Model C.	This role is a verbal construction - Non-observable through event data
R18	Developer	033, 0331, 0332, 0334, 070, 071, 072, 073, 074, 075, 1122, 1123, 1124
R19	Energy T.	This role is currently non-observable through event data
R20	Good N.	021, 0211, 0212, 0213, 0214, 022, 030, 031, 0311, 0312, 032, 037, 055
R21	Rg. Leader	014, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 130, 131, 1311, 1312, 1313, 132, 134, 136, 138, 1382, 1383, 1384, 139
R22	Rg. Power	010, 012, 013, 017, 020, 040, 041, 042, 043, 044, 045, 046, 050, 051, 052, 053, 054, 055, 056, 057, 110, 111, 112, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1124

The table above presents the Event-Role Matching that is utilized in this dissertation. Since event data has been developed for conflict studies, some of the 208 event codes that appear in the TFPRED dataset were not relevant to foreign policy. Some codes referred to domestic political conflicts, or actions of non-state actors such as “terrorist attacks”, or events by sub-state actors like “use of police force”, “torture”, and “confiscate property”. The information on observed events, eliminated event codes, and full details on the Event-Role matching are shown in “Events Info – Worksheet” of the TFPRED Dataset. The matching will show if the role conceptions in leaders’ speeches are observable in Turkey’s foreign policy practice. This will clarify the parallelism of Turkey’s foreign policy role conceptions and actual foreign policy practice. These results are presented in Chapter VI.



CHAPTER IV

EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS: TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY ROLE CONCEPTIONS (WORDS)

This chapter presents the findings of the “Data Collection Phase I: Content Analysis” the details of which are explained in the previous chapter (Section 3.2). I analyzed a total number of 87 systematically selected speeches (composed of 238285 words in total) delivered by four AKP leaders (Erdoğan, Gül, Babacan, and Davutoğlu) between March 2003 and August 2014 according to the coding scheme. The frequency, space, and direction of each role reference are coded separately in the dataset. As part of the content analysis, the generated TFPRED dataset contains: (1) the demographic details of each speech (speech title, date, and word count) (2) the frequency of each role appearance, (3) the type of each role (Regional or General), (4) the regional direction of each role (Rg1, Rg2, Rg3, Rg4, or Rg5), and (5) if available the country or regional international organization that each role utterance is directed to. Hence, the dataset provides with necessary ingredients to make comparisons between leader-based role utterance frequency, government-based role utterance frequency and the patterns of year-by-year and government-by-government increasing and decreasing role utterance frequencies.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ In line with the main propositions of the dissertation, only the necessary (and therefore limited) portion of the data will be provided in this dissertation. If you would like to see the whole dataset please email the author from ismailerkam@gmail.com.

Utilizing this dataset, the subsequent chapters answer three questions: (1) what are the most frequently referred TFP role conceptions? (Frequency), (2) how do the orientations of TFP role conceptions change from one region to the other? (Role types), (3) is it possible to observe any pattern of change in Turkey's foreign policy vision in its surrounding regions?

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section presents leader-based, government-based and overall/combined data on the frequency of TFP role conceptions' appearance in leaders' speeches. Then, the second section generates a list of typology-based TFP roles⁴⁹. Finally, the third section provides a chapter summary where I list the most significant observations of the content analysis and the patterns of change in TFP role conceptions

4.1 TFPRED Content Analysis: Role conceptions in the AKP era

This section presents the findings of the content analysis dataset in three sets. The first sub-section gives information on the total word count of the selected speeches and presents general findings of the content analysis. The first sub-section gives data on the total frequencies without making leader-specific and government-specific distinctions. The second sub-section presents the leader-by-leader data in a comparative manner in order to identify the continuity and change between AKP decision-makers' foreign policy vision. Third, government-by-government data is presented to compare the foreign policy orientations of Turkey in the three governments (59th, 60th, 61st governments). Then, in the next section (4.2) I assert the claim for a new role typology.

4.1.1 General Findings: TFP role conceptions in Total (2003-2014)

The temporal domain of the dissertations starts from November 2002 and ends in August 2014. In this period the AKP established four governments (58th, 58th, 60th and 61st) and ruled the country for twelve years. The dissertation analyzes the latter three governments.⁵⁰ I analyzed the speeches of four leaders (Gül, Babacan,

⁴⁹ Please see the typology presented in the Theory Chapter (Section 2.3.3).

⁵⁰ As explained in the 'speech selection' section of the Methodology chapter, only the speeches of three governments (59th, 60th and 61st) were available for analysis.

Davutoğlu and Erdoğan) in the dataset. The following table presents a summary of the selected governments and leaders:

Table 14 The Three AKP Governments and Leaders (2003 – 2014)

59th Government (March 14th, 2003 – August 29th, 2007)	
Prime Minister	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
MoFA	Abdullah Gül
60th Government (August 29th 2007 – July 6th 2011)	
Prime Minister	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
MoFA	Ali Babacan (August 29 th , 2007 – May 1 st , 2009) Ahmet Davutoğlu (May 1 st , 2009 – July 6 th , 2011)
61st Government (July 6th 2011 – August 29th 2014)	
Prime Minister	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
MoFA	Ahmet Davutoğlu

A total number of 87 speeches (Erdoğan, Gül, Babacan and Davutoğlu) composed of approximately 239.000 words are analyzed word by word and every role reference is coded in the TFPRED dataset. I took the following two tables originally from the dataset. The tables show the list of these speeches (Table 15) and present the combined data for the observed role references in total 2003-2014 (Table 16).

Table 15 TFPRED: Coded Speeches (Codes, Dates, and Word Count)

R.T. Erdoğan(ER)						A. Gül(AG)			A. Babacan(AB)			A. Davutoğlu(AD)			
Code	Date	Words	#	Date	Words	Code	Date	Words	Code	Date	Words	Code	Date	Words	
Er1	30.01.03	3900	ER TOTAL	Er25	08.07.11	2500	AG1	03.07.03	3000	AB1	01.11.07	3000	AD1	02.05.09	1000
Er2	18.03.03	9000		Er26	23.09.11	3400	AG2	25.07.03	3400	AB2	14.11.07	5000	AD2	09.09.09	1500
Er3	15.11.03	2500		Er27	30.09.12	2200	AG3	24.09.03	2000	AB3	10.12.07	2500	AD3	04.01.10	3500
Er4	30.01.04	1600		Er28	03.11.12	1400	AG4	26.09.03	1750	AB4	21.04.08	2000	AD4	31.05.10	1000
Er5	30.06.04	2000		Er29	11.12.12	1050	AG5	23.12.03	2000	AB5	04.05.08	2000	AD5	03.10.10	1000
Er6	23.02.05	3000		Er30	31.08.13	1300	AG6	17.01.04	3500	AB6	15.07.08	4000	AD6	03.01.11	3000
Er7	27.02.05	3500		Er31	11.12.13	1000	AG7	26.02.04	2000	AB7	21.11.08	4200	AD7	26.03.11	2000
Er8	26.04.05	2000		Er32	28.01.14	1200	AG8	22.05.04	1800	AB8	23.12.08	2000	AD8	08.04.11	1200
Er9	03.05.05	3500		76435	AG9	23.09.04	1800	AB9	25.02.09	2000	AD9	23.12.11	3500		
Er10	21.02.06	1500			AG10	24.12.04	3000	AB10	10.03.09	4500	AD10	04.06.12	2000		
Er11	30.05.06	2500			AG11	11.01.05	1800	AB TOTAL	31200	AD11	07.09.12	1000			
Er12	30.07.06	2500			AG12	14.03.05	1500			AD12	28.09.12	1000			
Er13	30.08.06	2300			AG13	07.06.05	1500			AD13	06.11.12	4000			
Er14	27.09.06	1500			AG14	21.09.05	1800			AD14	27.12.12	8000			
Er15	28.11.06	3500			AG15	21.12.05	3500			AD15	02.01.13	7000			
Er16	05.12.06	3000			AG16	22.09.06	2400	AD16	02.01.13	4000					
Er17	09.01.07	3500			AG17	21.12.06	3200	AD17	06.01.13	1500					
Er18	06.02.07	1200			AG18	13.01.07	4500	AD18	09.03.13	7500					
Er19	27.03.07	2000			AG19	18.01.07	3000	AD19	15.03.13	5000					
Er20	31.08.07	2000			AG20	08.02.07	1500	AD20	13.01.14	9000					
Er21	30.12.07	1500			AG21	01.06.07	1500	AD21	18.01.14	6000					
Er22	24.09.09	1200			AG TOTAL	50450	AD22	18.01.14	3700						
Er23	29.04.10	1185					AD23	04.06.14	1400						
Er24	01.06.10	2000					AD24	28.08.14	1400						
									AD TOTAL		80200				
TOTAL Number of Speeches = 87 Speeches						Total Word Count = 238285									

Table 16 TFPRED: Observed Role References in Total 2003-2014

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]	Rg (1/0)	Rg#	Ge (1/0)	Ge#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
R1	Global System Collaborator	58	169	148	167	0	0	58	169	0	0	0	0	0
R2	Defender of peace & Stability	75	378	316	353	61	242	60	136	29	45	156	8	4
R3	Trading State	49	146	118	128	30	84	33	62	4	30	22	17	7
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	42	159	115	139	41	126	12	33	5	7	106	7	0
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	45	114	100	113	1	1	45	113	0	0	1	0	0
R6	Mediator	28	55	49	51	26	48	7	7	0	16	30	2	0
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	55	148	132	137	50	114	17	34	12	19	80	3	1
R8	Independent	24	44	42	44	3	3	22	41	0	0	3	0	0
R9	Active Independent	71	241	215	235	30	49	66	192	3	4	23	18	1
R10	Rising Power	30	55	49	54	0	0	30	55	0	0	0	0	0
R11	Bridge across Civilizations	36	54	50	54	0	0	37	54	0	0	0	0	0
R12	Regional Subs.collaborator	68	249	199	215	60	197	32	52	23	71	87	7	4
R13	Western Country	55	123	97	121	55	123	0	0	0	0	0	0	123
R14	Eastern Country	12	15	14	14	12	15	0	0	0	0	15	0	0
R15	Bridge across Continents	4	8	5	5	3	7	2	1	2	3	2	0	0
R16	Faithful Ally	36	82	62	80	35	81	1	1	0	0	0	0	81
R17	Model Country	11	14	14	14	10	13	1	1	0	0	12	0	0
R18	Developer	51	165	102	124	47	137	17	28	21	41	41	28	0
R19	Energy Transporting Country	27	42	35	42	9	13	26	29	2	9	1	0	3
R20	Good Neighbor	58	146	113	125	41	107	29	39	24	32	51	0	0
R21	Regional Leader	15	26	21	21	13	21	7	5	4	2	16	0	0
R22	Regional Power	42	97	64	65	39	93	10	4	19	27	40	8	3
	TOTAL	892	2530	2060	2301	566	1474	512	1056	148	306	686	98	227

As the table illustrates I identified 2530 role references in the 87 speeches of Turkey's decision-makers. 1474 of these references are region specific and the remaining 1056 references are general (no region is specified). Two roles have appeared in almost all of the speeches: DoP and AI (please look at column Y/N). Three roles have very limited appearance: Eastern Country, Model Country and Bridge across continents. The most frequently referred role is the DoP. Five roles have almost no region-specific appearance (look at column RG): Global System Collaborator (GSC), Central Country (CC), Rising Power (Rise), Bridge across Civilizations (Civbrid) and independent country. Three roles have almost always referred to a region (Look at column Ge (1/0)): Western Country, Eastern Country, Faithful Ally, and Model Country. The following table presents a frequency-based list of these role references:

Table 17 TFPRED: Total Frequency Based List

CODE	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]
R2	Defender of peace and Stability	75	378	316	353
R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator	68	249	199	215
R9	Active Independent	71	241	215	235
R1	Global System Collaborator	58	169	148	167
R18	Developer	51	165	102	124
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	42	159	115	139
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	55	148	132	137
R3	Trading State	49	146	118	128
R20	Good Neighbor	58	146	113	125
R13	Western Country	55	123	97	121
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	45	114	100	113
R22	Regional Power	42	97	64	65
R16	Faithful Ally	36	82	62	80
R6	Mediator	28	55	49	51
R10	Rising Power	30	55	49	54
R11	Bridge across Civilizations (Ideational)	36	54	50	54
R8	Independent	24	44	42	44
R19	Energy Transporting Country	27	42	35	42
R21	Regional Leader	15	26	21	21
R14	Eastern Country	12	15	14	14
R17	Model Country	11	14	14	14
R15	Bridge across Continents (Geographical)	4	8	5	5
TOTAL		892	2530	2060	2301

According to Table 17 the most frequently referred role conception in the 60th government is the Defender of Peace (DoP) role conception with 378# references. Second, although the role does not appear in all speeches (it appeared in 68 speeches), Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC) has been more frequently referred to, than the Active Independent (AI appears in 71 speeches out of 87) role conception. The fourth role conception is the Global System Collaborator (GSC) role and Developer role conception ranks the fifth. The next figure better illustrates significance of these roles and compares the frequency percentages:




Figure 2 TFPRED: Ranked Total Frequency Percentages

This figure illustrates that the first 6 roles are more frequently referred to (almost 60 percent) than the combined references of the remaining 16 roles. When % 6 is taken as the minimum limit, we can claim that most frequently referred roles in TFP between 2003 and 2014 are:

- (1) Defender of peace and Stability, (2) Regional Subsystem collaborator, (3) Active Independent, (4) Global System Collaborator, (5) Developer, (6) Protector

of the Oppressed, (7) Peace-maker/Problem-solver, (8) Trading State, and (9) Good Neighbor.

These roles indicate a peace-oriented, active and cooperative foreign policy vision in Turkey's decision-makers' speeches. The roles are mostly region-specific and indicate that Turkey's decision-makers deal more with the immediate neighborhood of the country. The following table shows the Rg-Ge distribution of the role conceptions and presents a better illustration of this finding:

Table 18 TFPRED: Role References Rg-Ge Distribution

CODE	ROLE	F#	Rg#	Ge#
R2	Defender of peace and Stability	378	242	136
R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator	249	197	52
R9	Active Independent	241	49	192
R1	Global System Collaborator	169	0	169
R18	Developer	165	137	28
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	159	126	33
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	148	114	34
R3	Trading State	146	84	62
R20	Good Neighbor	146	107	39
R13	Western Country	123	123	0
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	114	1	113
R22	Regional Power	97	93	4
R16	Faithful Ally	82	81	1
R6	Mediator	55	48	7
R10	Rising Power	55	0	55
R11	Bridge across Civilizations (Ideational)	54	0	54
R8	Independent	44	3	41
R19	Energy Transporting Country	42	13	29
R21	Regional Leader	26	21	5
R14	Eastern Country	15	15	0
R17	Model Country	14	13	1
R15	Bridge across Continents (Geographical)	8	7	1
		2530	1474	1056

The following chart shows the percentage distribution of these roles:




Figure 3 TFPRED: Comparison of the Rg-Ge direction of Role References

As figure (4.2) indicates, the first nine most frequently referred role conceptions (except AI and GSC) are those that refer to specific regions. The next chart illustrates the direction of TFP decision-makers' role references:




Figure 4 TFPRED: Total Role References Rg-Ge Comparison Chart

As the chart illustrates 58% of the total role references are directed towards a region (%42 have no specific regional direction). The following table gives data on the distribution of these roles towards specific regions:

Table 19 TFPRED: Regional Role References – Regional Distribution

	ROLE	Rg#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
R2	Defender of P & S	242	29	45	156	8	4
R12	Regional Subs. Col.	197	23	71	87	7	4
R18	Developer	137	21	41	41	28	0
R4	Protector of the Opp.	126	5	7	106	7	0
R13	Western Country	123	0	0	0	0	123
R7	PeaceM&ProblemS	114	12	19	80	3	1
R20	Good Neighbor	107	24	32	51	0	0
R22	Regional Power	93	19	27	40	8	3
R3	Trading State	84	4	30	22	17	7
R16	Faithful Ally	81	0	0	0	0	81
R9	Active Independent	49	3	4	23	18	1
R6	Mediator	48	0	16	30	2	0
R21	Regional Leader	21	4	2	16	0	0
R14	Eastern Country	15	0	0	15	0	0
R19	Energy Transporting C.	13	2	9	1	0	3
R17	Model Country	13	0	0	12	0	0
R15	Bridge Geo.	7	2	3	2	0	0
R8	Independent	3	0	0	3	0	0
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	1	0	0	1	0	0
R1	Global System Col.	0	0	0	0	0	0
R10	Rising Power	0	0	0	0	0	0
R11	Bridge across Civ.	0	0	0	0	0	0

The table above shows the regional direction of each role in a ranked order. The next chart better illustrates the regional distribution of all region-specific TFP role conceptions:




Figure 5 TFPRED: Total Role References Rg Distribution Chart

The regional distribution chart (Figure 5) shows that, most of the regional references of the Turkey's decision-makers are directed towards Rg3 (47% - MENA/Eastern Mediterranean). The second most frequently referred region is Rg2 (21% - Caucasus/Central Asia/Black Sea). The third region is Rg5 (15% Euro-Atlantic – US + EU except Rg1). The fourth region is Rg1 (10% Balkans and Eastern Europe). The least referred region is Rg4 (7% sub-Saharan Africa).

The figure illustrates how the MENA region dominates the foreign policy discourse of Turkey's decision-makers. Let us see this more specifically in the following role-by-role bar chart:



TFPRED: Total Role References Regional Distribution




Figure 6 TFPRED: Total Role References Regional Distribution Chart

The figure above indicates the dominance of Rg3 (MENA/Eastern Mediterranean)) in Turkey's decision-makers' role references. The most frequently referred roles towards the region are: (1) DoP, (2) Protector of the Oppressed, (3) Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC), and (4) Peace Maker/Problem Solver (PM). Second region is Rg2 (Caucasus/Central Asia/Black Sea). The most frequent roles towards Rg2 are: RSC, DoP, Dev, and GoodN, and Trading State. The third region is Rg5 (Euro Atlantic/EU except Rg1) and the two dominant roles towards this region are: Western Country and Faithful Ally. The fourth most frequently referred region is Rg1 and the most frequent roles towards this region are: DoP, Regional Power (RP), RSC, GoodN, and Developer. The least frequently referred region is Rg4 (Sub-Saharan Africa) and we see three dominant roles towards this region: Developer, Trading State and Active independent. The following figure summarizes the regional distribution of the most frequently referred fifteen role conceptions.




Figure 7 TFPRED: The Rg dist. of the most frequently referred 15 roles

The figure above illustrates the most frequently referred fifteen regional role conceptions in a ranked order (from left to right). These figures clarify the distinction between roles that refer to a single region (Rtype1), Roles that refer to multiple regions (Rtype2), and roles that are seen in all regions (Rtype3). For instance, one can clearly observe that when Turkey's decision-makers use the Eastern Country and Model country role conceptions they have referred to Rg3 and when they use the Faithful ally or Western Country roles they have referred to Rg5. Peace and economic cooperation related roles including Trading State (TS), Active independent (AI), RSC, DoP have been observed in all regions.

Looking at roles directed towards the immediate surrounding of Turkey (Rg1, Rg2, Rg3), the most significant ones are Regional Subsystem Collaborator, Good Neighbor, Regional Leader, Developer and Regional Power. An interesting finding here is that Turkey plays for both regional leadership and good neighborly relations in its neighborhood at the same time.

In sub-Saharan Africa (Rg4) Turkey's leaders have most significantly referred to Active Independent (AI), Developer, Trading State (TS) and Regional Power (RP). Regarding these findings, it can be argued that AKP's attempt to become part of the African region is mainly motivated by economic considerations.

The most significant roles towards the west are: Faithful Ally, Trading State and Western Country. These findings indicate the same old story while re-establishing the main determinants of traditional TFP understanding of the West: a region of economic and military cooperation.

The following table (Table 20) summarizes the regional distribution, and percentages of TFPRED role conceptions.

Table 20 TFPRED: Regional Role Ranking (F # and % Distribution Table)

Rank	RG3	F#	%	Rg2	F#	%	RG5	F#	%	Rg1	F#	%	Rg4	F#	%
1	DoP	156	64	RSC	71	37	West	123	100	DoP	29	12	Developer	28	22
2	Protector	106	85	DoP	45	19	FA	81	100	GoodN	24	22	AI	18	37
3	RSC	87	45	Developer	41	31	TS	7	9	RSC	23	12	TS	17	21
4	PM	80	70	GoodN	32	30	RSC	4	2	Developer	21	16	DoP	8	3
5	GoodN	51	48	TS	30	37	DoP	4	2	RP	19	20	RP	8	8
6	Developer	41	31	RP	27	28	RP	3	3	PM	12	10	RSC	7	4
7	RP	40	41	PM	19	16	ETC	3	20	Protector	5	4	Protector	7	6
8	Mediator	30	63	Mediator	16	33				TS	4	5	PM	3	3
9	AI	23	47	ETC	9	60				RL	4	18	Mediator	2	4
10	TS	22	28	Protector	7	5				AI	3	6			

Typology Summary :

All regions : DoP, RSC, RP, TS

Multiple Regions : 4 Regions - Protector, Developer, PM, ETC / 3 Regions- GoodN, Mediator, AI, RL

Single Region : Western Country, Faithful Ally

The table above presents the first 10 regional roles (if available) towards each region. The regions are ranked from left to right according to the total role reference frequencies. The regional roles are ranked from top to bottom according to the Frequency (F# Column). This information is then combined with the percentages (% Column) data. The % column shows the percentage of each role's direction. For instance, the DoP role conception has ranked first in Rg3. The role is uttered 242 times in total and 156 times (see F# Column) towards Rg3. The percentage column indicates that 64% of the total regional DoP role references are directed towards Rg3.

The findings indicate that most of the regional role references are directed towards the country's immediate surrounding. The roles mainly indicate a peace oriented, active and cooperative foreign policy vision in Turkey's decision-makers' speeches. However, it is important to note here that these references represent an abstract version of the whole period from 2003 to 2014. There are significant fluctuations in different periods of AKP governments. The following sections analyze and compare the leader and government-specific role references.

4.1.2 Role Conceptions of AKP Decision-makers

4.1.2.1 Abdullah Gül's Role Conceptions

Abdullah Gül served as the foreign minister between March 2003 and August 2007. The MoFA has published a book that includes a selection of Gül's speeches (see Gül 2007). The first 221 pages of the book is a selection of 27 speeches on general TFP delivered at different times and occasions between 2003 and 2007. 21 speeches have been selected that fulfill the selection criteria.⁵¹ The speeches are composed of approximately 50450 words. The following table summarizes the speech codes, dates, and the word count:

⁵¹ See the Appendix C for the full lists of speeches.

Table 21 Abdullah Gül's Speech Codes, Dates and Word Count⁵²

Speech Code#	Speech Date (DD. MM. YYYY)	Word Count (Approx.)
AG1	03.07.2003	3000
AG2	25.07.2003	3400
AG3	24.09.2003	2000
AG4	26.09.2003	1750
AG5	23.12.2003	2000
AG6	17.01.2004	3500
AG7	26.02.2004	2000
AG8	22.05.2004	1800
AG9	23.09.2004	1800
AG10	24.12.2004	3000
AG11	11.01.2005	1800
AG12	14.03.2005	1500
AG13	07.06.2005	1500
AG14	21.09.2005	1800
AG15	21.12.2005	3500
AG16	22.09.2006	2400
AG17	21.12.2006	3200
AG18	13.01.2007	4500
AG19	18.01.2007	3000
AG20	08.02.2007	1500
AG21	01.06.2007	1500
Total Word Count		50450

I coded each speech separately, and each role utterance in a specific code sheet. The following figure shows a sample code sheet for speech “AG17”:

⁵² For the speech titles and selection please refer to Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.1)

Speech Code : **AG17**
 Coded By : **Etem**

Coding Date: **20.10.2015**

FINAL CODING HERE – SAME AS TFPRED EXCELL DATASET																			
TFP ROLES		Y/N (1/0)	F#	S-C	S-P	OR				R/C									
#	ROLE					RG (1/0)	RG#	GE (1/0)	GE#	RG1		RG2		RG3		RG4		RG5	
										#	C	#	C	#	C	#	C	#	C
R1	Global System Collaborator	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R2	Defender of peace and Stability	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1528	-	-	-	-
R3	Trading State	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R6	Mediator	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R8	Independent	1	3	3	3	1	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	1000	-	-	-	-
R9	Active Independent	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R10	Rising Power	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R11	Bridge across Civilizations (Ide)	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R12	Regional Subsystem Collaborator	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	-	-	1	1000	-	-	-	-	-	-
R13	Western Country	1	3	3	3	1	3	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	300
R14	Eastern Country	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R15	Bridge across Continents (Geo)	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R16	Faithful Ally	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R17	Model Country	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R18	Developer	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R19	Energy Transporting Country	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R20	Good Neighbor	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1528	-	-	-	-
R21	Regional Leader	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R22	Regional Power	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	-	-	-	-	1	1528	-	-	-	-

Figure 8 Gül: A Sample Code Sheet (Original Version of AG17)

Table 22 Abdullah Gül (Ag 1-21) Combined Data

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]	Rg (1/0)	Rg#	Ge (1/0)	Ge#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
R2	Defender of Peace and Stab.	20	108	86	99	18	74	16	34	11	20	41	1	1
R12	Regional Subsystem col.	20	70	58	63	19	55	10	15	9	21	22	1	2
R20	Good Neighbor	20	65	41	49	17	52	9	13	13	14	25	0	0
R1	Global System Collaborator	15	55	45	53	0	0	15	55	0	0	0	0	0
R9	Active Independent	16	51	42	49	9	17	15	34	2	2	10	2	1
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	16	48	41	41	15	39	5	9	5	10	24	0	0
R13	Western Country	16	34	27	34	16	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	34
R16	Faithful Ally	13	32	21	30	13	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	32
R18	Developer	14	31	24	27	12	26	5	5	2	8	11	5	0
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	13	27	23	27	0	0	13	27	0	0	0	0	0
R22	Regional Power	11	24	21	21	9	21	6	3	6	7	6	2	0
R3	Trading State	9	16	15	16	5	8	5	8	0	4	1	1	2
R11	Bridge across Civ.	12	14	13	14	0	0	12	14	0	0	0	0	0
R10	Rising Power	7	12	8	12	0	0	7	12	0	0	0	0	0
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	6	9	9	9	6	9	0	0	0	0	9	0	0
R6	Mediator	7	9	7	9	7	9	0	0	0	0	9	0	0
R8	Independent	5	9	9	9	2	2	4	7	0	0	2	0	0
R19	Energy Transporting Country	6	9	8	9	2	3	6	6	0	3	0	0	0
R14	Eastern Country	5	7	6	6	5	7	0	0	0	0	7	0	0
R17	Model Country	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
R21	Regional Leader	2	3	3	3	1	1	3	2	0	0	1	0	0
R15	Bridge across Cont.	1	2	1	1	1	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
	Total Frequency		638	511	584		394		244	49	90	171	12	72

As shown in the previous table (4.3) Abdullah Gül made 638 role references in 21 speeches.⁵³ 394 of these references are region-specific and 244 of them are roles with general orientation (no region is specified in the utterance). Among the 394 regional roles: 49 refer to Rg1 (Balkans/CE Europe), 90 refer to Rg2 (Caucasus, Black sea and Central Asia), 171 refer to Rg3 (MENA and Eastern Mediterranean) and 72 refer to Rg5 (EU and US). Column Y/N indicates the appearance of each role in the total number speeches. Three roles appear in almost all speeches of Gül: Defender of Peace and Stability (DoP- appears in 20 Speeches), Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC- appears in 20 Speeches) and Good Neighbor (GoodN - appears in 20 Speeches). However, some roles including Bridge across Continents (Geobrid), Model Country and Regional Leader (RL) have almost no appearance. The following table provides a frequency-based list for Gül's role references:

Table 23 Abdullah Gül Frequency Based Role List

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]
R2	Defender of Peace and Stability	20	108	86	99
R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator	20	70	58	63
R20	Good Neighbor	20	65	41	49
R1	Global System Collaborator	15	55	45	53
R9	Active Independent	16	51	42	49
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	16	48	41	41
R13	Western Country	16	34	27	34
R16	Faithful Ally	13	32	21	30
R18	Developer	14	31	24	27
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	13	27	23	27
R22	Regional Power	11	24	21	21
R3	Trading State	9	16	15	16
R11	Bridge across Civ.	12	14	13	14
R10	Rising Power	7	12	8	12
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	6	9	9	9
R6	Mediator	7	9	7	9
R8	Independent	5	9	9	9
R19	Energy Transporting Country	6	9	8	9
R14	Eastern Country	5	7	6	6
R17	Model Country	3	3	3	3
R21	Regional Leader	2	3	3	3
R15	Bridge across Cont.	1	2	1	1
	Total Frequency		638	511	584

⁵³ Each speech is hand-coded in a separate code sheet as shown in Figure 8. Then the data is entered into an Ms. Excel Codebook, combined and counted. For information on the “F, S-C, S-p, Rg, and Ge” codes please consult to the TFPRED Codebook (Appendix)

As one might observe in the table above (4.4), Gül's most frequently referred role conceptions⁵⁴ have three commonalities. First, they are peace-related roles; second, they are cooperation related roles; and third, the roles require Turkey to take active part in their fulfillment. The three least uttered roles have the opposite connotations. For instance, regional leader is not a peaceful role, and bridge country and model country are either passive or prescribed roles. Indeed, Abdullah Gül has an active, cooperative and peaceful foreign policy vision for Turkey.

The following chart shows the frequency-based list of Gül's role conceptions.




Figure 9 Gül's Most Frequent Roles (F# Chart)

Since the number of available speeches change from one leader to the other, scaling the overall percentage of these role references is regarded as a more proper way of leader-by-leader comparison. When the percentages of Gül's role references is

⁵⁴ When listing the role utterances one might use different indicators like speech appearance (Y/N) or size (S-C-the number of contexts and S-p – the number of paragraphs). Although these indicators do not dramatically change the role rankings, one might still observe slight changes. In Gül's case the most frequently referred three roles do not change depending on any of these indicators (Y/N, S-c or S-p). In the coding process F# is the smallest unit of a role reference, meaning that any kind of role reference in the speech (be it a phrase or a sentence) is counted as "1" in the hand-coding process. Please take note that while making the interpretations and comments Role Utterance Frequency (F#) is generally taken as the major indicator in this dissertation. For further information please consult to the TFPRED Codebook.

scaled, DoP gets 17%, RSC gets 11%, and GoodN gets 10% of the total references. The following chart shows the frequency percentages of Gül's role references.




Figure 10 Gül's Most Frequent Roles (Percentages Chart)

In the AG Combined Data Table (4.3) one may observe two columns entitled as Rg and Ge.⁵⁵ These columns show the number of region-specific and general foreign policy roles.⁵⁶ The following table shows the Rg-Ge comparison list for Abdullah Gül:

⁵⁵ While coding the speeches, if a role is referred to a specific region by the leader then the role is coded as Rg (Region-specific), if no region is indicated in or inferred from the utterance then the role reference is coded as Ge (General/Non regional Orientation). For further information see the TFPRED Codebook.

⁵⁶ Coding this information is deemed important for three main reasons. First, one of the major claims of the dissertation is that role references cannot be counted to be the same for all regions. States have different sets of relationships with each specific region so leaders' role conceptions change from one region to another. Second, states do not engage in foreign policy related activities with the same activism in all surrounding regions. Coding the region specific roles would be an indicator of the importance of different regions with respect to each other. Finally, this data will enable the establishment of a new Role Typology (see Section 4.2) in the dissertation.

Table 24 Abdullah Gül Role Utterance RG-GE Comparisons

CODE	ROLE	F#	Rg#	Ge#
TOTAL	Total Frequency	638	394	244
R2	DoP	108	74	34
R12	RSC	70	55	15
R20	Good	65	52	13
R1	GSC	55	0	55
R9	A.I	51	17	34
R7	PM	48	39	9
R13	West	34	34	0
R16	FA	32	32	0
R18	Dev	31	26	5
R5	CC	27	0	27
R22	RP	24	21	3
R3	TS	16	8	8
R11	Civbrid	14	0	14
R10	Rise	12	0	12
R4	Prot.	9	9	0
R8	IDP	9	2	7
R19	ETC	9	3	6
R6	Med	9	9	0
R14	East	7	7	0
R17	Model	3	3	0
R21	RL	3	1	2
R15	Geobrid	2	2	0

The table shows that almost 60% of Gül's role references are region-specific. The following chart illustrates the Regional-General role reference percentages for each role:




Figure 11 Gül's Rg-Ge Role Reference Comparison

When I analyze the Table 24 and Figure 11 together, I observe that the most frequently referred role conceptions (except the Global System Collaborator- GSC and Active Independent- AI) are those that refer to specific regions. So this can be taken as an indicator that Gül has a mainly regional foreign policy vision for Turkey.

Looking back at the original table (4.3) one might observe that the coded data table has additional information on the regional reference frequencies in five different regions (Rg1, Rg2, Rg3, Rg4, and Rg5). The following table ranks the most frequently referred regional roles and shows the regional distribution of each:

Table 25 Abdullah Gül's most frequently referred Regional Roles

	ROLE	Rg#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
R2	Defender of P. and Stab.	74	11	20	41	1	1
R12	Regional Subs. Col.	55	9	21	22	1	2
R20	Good Neighbor	52	13	14	25	0	0
R7	Peace-M./Problem-solver	39	5	10	24	0	0
R13	Western Country	34	0	0	0	0	34
R16	Faithful Ally	32	0	0	0	0	32
R18	Developer	26	2	8	11	5	0
R22	Regional Power	21	6	7	6	2	0
R9	Active Independent	17	2	2	10	2	1
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	9	0	0	9	0	0
R6	Mediator	9	0	0	9	0	0
R3	Trading State	8	0	4	1	1	2
R14	Eastern Country	7	0	0	7	0	0
R19	Energy Transp. Country	3	0	3	0	0	0
R17	Model Country	3	0	0	3	0	0
R8	Independent	2	0	0	2	0	0
R15	Bridge across Cont.	2	1	1	0	0	0
R21	Regional Leader	1	0	0	1	0	0
R1	Global System Col.	0	0	0	0	0	0
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	0	0	0	0	0	0
R11	Bridge across Civ.	0	0	0	0	0	0
R10	Rising Power	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total Frequency	394	49	90	171	12	72

This table shows that Abdullah Gül's regional role references are mostly directed towards Rg3 (MENA/Eastern Mediterranean- Almost 50%), then Rg2 (Southern Caucasus, Black sea and Central Asia), then Rg5 (EU and US), then Rg1 (Balkans), and finally Rg4 (Sub-Saharan Africa). The following chart illustrates the frequency percentages of Gül's role references:




Figure 12 Gül - Regional Role Distribution Percentages

The chart above shows the regional distribution percentages of Gül's role references. Rg3 stands as the most frequently referred region. The main five regional roles towards Rg3 are DoP, GoodN, PM, RSC, and Dev. (see table 25 above). These findings indicate that Gül's foreign policy vision towards the region is directed by motivations including peace and cooperation. The second region is Rg2 and the roles directed at the region are RSC, DoP, GoodN, PM, and Dev. (Table 25). Although the ranking of roles differ, the same motivations hold for this region as well. RG5 ranks the third among all regions. Here I observe two significant roles Western Country (West) and Faithful Ally (FA), which makes sense that the 59th government was highly committed to Europeanization. Rg1 (Balkans and CE Europe) ranks the fourth in Gül's speeches where similar roles including GoodN, DoP, RSC, RP, PM, that are directed towards other regions hold. Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa) becomes the least referred region. Here, the most significant role is the Developer role. These results are better illustrated in the following figure.




Figure 13 Gül's Regional Role References - Regional Distribution

According to these regional references, it is possible to argue that Gül sees Turkey as a Developer in Sub-Saharan Africa (Rg4), a cooperative, peaceful and active actor in Balkans (Rg1), Caucasus (Rg2) and MENA (Rg3) and a member and an ally of the Western World (Rg5). The last section combines this observation with Erdoğan's role conceptions in order to explain the 59th Government's foreign policy vision.

4.1.2.2 Ali Babacan's Role Conceptions

Ali Babacan's served as the foreign minister for two years between August 2007 and May 2009. The MOFA provides 50 speeches for Babacan in the website. 10 of these speeches fulfilled the speech selection criteria (see Section 3.2.1.2). The speeches consist of approximately 31200 words in total. The following table summarizes the speech codes, dates and word count:

Table 26 Ali Babacan's Speech Codes, Dates and Word Count⁵⁷

Speech Code#	Speech Date (DD. MM. YYYY)	Word Count (Approx.)
AB1	01.11.2007	3000
AB2	14.11.2007	5000
AB3	10.12.2007	2500
AB4	21.04.2008	2000
AB5	04.05.2008	2000
AB6	15.07.2008	4000
AB7	21.11.2008	4200
AB8	23.12.2008	2000
AB9	25.02.2009	2000
AB10	10.03.2009	4500
Total Word Count		31200

Each speech is hand-coded in a separate code sheet as shown in Figure 8. Then the data is entered into a Ms. Excel dataset, combined and counted. The following table shows the combined data for Babacan:

⁵⁷ For the speech titles and selection please refer to Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.1)

Table 27 Ali Babacan (AB 1-10) Combined Data

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]	Rg (1/0)	Rg#	Ge1/0	Ge#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
R1	Global Sys. Col.	8	27	25	27	0	0	8	27	0	0	0	0	0
R2	Defender of P.& S.	10	73	58	68	9	55	8	18	11	14	27	4	2
R3	Trading State	7	18	16	16	7	14	2	4	1	9	0	1	3
R4	Protector of the Opp.	4	8	8	8	4	8	0	0	3	0	5	0	0
R5	Central/Pivotal C.	5	8	8	8	0	0	5	8	0	0	0	0	0
R6	Mediator	7	25	23	23	7	23	2	2	0	13	10	0	0
R7	Peace-M/Problem-S	6	17	17	17	6	14	2	3	2	2	12	0	0
R8	Independent	2	4	4	4	1	1	1	3	0	0	1	0	0
R9	Active Independent	8	24	22	24	4	5	8	19	0	0	1	4	0
R10	Rising Power	4	9	9	9	0	0	4	9	0	0	0	0	0
R11	Bridge across Civ.	5	11	9	11	0	0	5	11	0	0	0	0	0
R12	Regional Subs. Col.	8	39	34	36	8	38	1	1	5	15	14	3	1
R13	Western Country	7	15	12	15	7	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	15
R14	Eastern Country	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R15	Bridge across Cont.	1	3	1	1	1	3	0	0	1	2	0	0	0
R16	Faithful Ally	7	21	15	21	7	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	21
R17	Model Country	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
R18	Developer	8	28	24	25	7	22	4	6	1	9	10	0	0
R19	Energy Transp. C.	7	10	9	10	3	3	6	7	0	2	0	0	1
R20	Good Neighbor	9	28	24	27	8	27	1	1	5	12	10	0	0
R21	Regional Leader	2	3	3	3	2	3	0	0	1	0	3	0	0
R22	Regional Power	9	23	15	15	9	23	0	0	8	8	10	1	0
	Total Frequency		395	337	369		276		119	38	86	104	13	43

Table⁵⁸ (4.8) indicates that Babacan has made 395 role utterances in the total number of 10 speeches. 276 of these utterances are region-specific and 119 of them are roles with general orientation (no region is specified in the utterance). Among the 276 regional roles: 38 refer to Rg1 (Balkans/CE Europe), 86 refer to Rg2 (Caucasus, Black sea and Central Asia), 104 refer to Rg3 (MENA and Eastern Mediterranean), 13 Refers to Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa) and 43 refer to Rg5 (EU and US).

The Y/N column indicates the appearance of each role in the total number speeches. Three roles appear in almost all speeches Defender of Peace and Stability (DoP - appears in all speeches); Regional Power (RP- appear in 9 speeches) and Good Neighbor (GoodN- appears in 9 speeches). However, some roles including Bridge across Continents (Geobrid), Model Country, eastern country (EC) and Regional Leader (RL) have almost no appearance. The following frequency-based ranked list better explains Babacan's role references:

Table 28 Ali Babacan Frequency Based Role List

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]
	Total Frequency		395	337	369
R2	Defender of Peace and Stability	10	73	58	68
R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator	8	39	34	36
R18	Developer	8	28	24	25
R20	Good Neighbor	9	28	24	27
R1	Global System Collaborator	8	27	25	27
R6	Mediator	7	25	23	23
R9	Active Independent	8	24	22	24
R22	Regional Power	9	23	15	15
R16	Faithful Ally	7	21	15	21
R3	Trading State	7	18	16	16
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	6	17	17	17
R13	Western Country	7	15	12	15
R11	Bridge across Civ.	5	11	9	11
R19	Energy Transporting Country	7	10	9	10
R10	Rising Power	4	9	9	9
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	4	8	8	8
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	5	8	8	8
R8	Independent	2	4	4	4
R15	Bridge across Cont.	1	3	1	1
R21	Regional Leader	2	3	3	3
R17	Model Country	1	1	1	1
R14	Eastern Country	0	0	0	0

⁵⁸ Table taken from the TFPRED Dataset. For information on the "F, S-C, S-p, Rg, and Ge" codes please consult the Appendices

The table (28) indicates that, similar to the role conceptions of Gül, Babacan's role conceptions are again peace and cooperation oriented. We see a clear dominance of DoP role conception. There is an increase in the rank of roles like developer and regional power whereas a clear decrease in the rank of Western country. Additionally, Eastern Country role has no appearance in Babacan's speeches. These findings are most probably the result of hampering Turkey-EU relations and an increase in Turkey's activity in its surrounding regions. But Turkey is definitely not seen as an Eastern country. The findings of the following sections will further justify this claim. The next figure illustrates the rankings




Figure 14 Ali Babacan's Most Frequent Roles (F# Chart)

The regional relations are based on economy rather than cultural and/or historical belonging to the eastern/Muslim world. The slight increase in the rank of Trading State (TS) role is an indicator of this claim. For now, it is important to keep an eye on the Trading State role since AKP utilizes economic cooperation as a significant strategy in its foreign policy engagements towards surrounding regions. As a general observation for Babacan's role references we might argue that peace related roles are still dominant like those of Gül; the importance of the relations with the West has

started to decrease, whereas regional engagement and economy related policies have come forward.

The number of available speeches changes from one leader to the other, therefore scaling the overall percentage of these role references might be a better way to make the leader-by-leader comparison. When the percentages of Babacan's role references are scaled, DoP gets 16%, RSC gets 10%, and GoodN gets 7% of the total references. The following chart shows the frequency percentages of Babacan's role utterances.




Figure 15 Babacan's Most Frequent Roles (Percentages Chart)

The first three roles get almost the same percentages with those of Gül. However, I observe three clear changes in Babacan's foreign policy role conceptions from those of Gül. First, the rank of Active Independent (AI) has decreased and switched places with the Developer role conception. Second, the rank of Peace Maker (PM) role has

decreased and switched places with the Mediator role. Third, the Western Country (West) role has decreased and switched places with Regional Power. The AI and PM role conceptions are comparatively more assertive (or aggressive) than Developer and Mediator role conceptions. Hence, according to these shifts the Babacan era seems to be representing a shift of foreign policy vision towards a less assertive, less western and more regionally balanced than the Gül era. Now, in order to observe the essence of Babacan's regional foreign policy let us look at the Rg-Ge comparison of his utterances from the following table:

Table 29 Babacan's Role References: RG-GE Comparison

CODE	ROLE	F#	Rg#	Ge#
TOTAL	Total Frequency	395	276	119
R2	DoP	73	55	18
R12	RSC	39	38	1
R20	Good	28	27	1
R18	Dev.	28	22	6
R1	GSC	27	0	27
R6	Med	25	23	2
R9	A.I	24	5	19
R22	RP	23	23	0
R16	FA	21	21	0
R3	TS	18	14	4
R7	PM	17	14	3
R13	West	15	15	0
R11	Civbrid	11	0	11
R19	ETC	10	3	7
R10	Rise	9	0	9
R4	Prot.	8	8	0
R5	CC	8	0	8
R8	IDP	4	1	3
R21	RL	3	3	0
R15	Geobrid	3	3	0
R17	Model	1	1	0
R14	East	0	0	0

As it is observed in the table above 70% of Babacan's role references are region-specific (note that it was 60% in Gül). The Regional-General role reference percentages can be analyzed from the following chart:




Figure 16 Babacan's Rg-Ge Role Reference Comparison

When table 25 and Figure 16 are analyzed together it is observed that the most frequently referred role conceptions (except the Global System Collaborator- GSC and Active Independent- AI) are those that refer to specific regions. Compared to Gül we see an increase in regional reference in Babacan's speeches. The following table ranks the most frequently referred regional roles and shows the regional distribution of each:

Table 30 Babacan's most frequently referred Regional Roles

	ROLE	Rg#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
	Total Frequency	276	38	86	104	13	43
R2	Defender of P. & S.	55	11	14	27	4	2
R12	Regional Subs. Col	38	5	15	14	3	1
R20	Good Neighbor	27	5	12	10	0	0
R6	Mediator	23	0	13	10	0	0
R22	Regional Power	23	8	8	10	1	0
R18	Developer	22	1	9	10	0	0
R16	Faithful Ally	21	0	0	0	0	21
R13	Western Country	15	0	0	0	0	15
R3	Trading State	14	1	9	0	1	3
R7	PeaceM./ProblemS.	14	2	2	12	0	0
R4	Protector of the Opp.	8	3	0	5	0	0
R9	Active Independent	5	0	0	1	4	0
R15	Bridge across Cont.	3	1	2	0	0	0
R19	Energy Transp. C.	3	0	2	0	0	1
R21	Regional Leader	3	1	0	3	0	0
R8	Independent	1	0	0	1	0	0
R17	Model Country	1	0	0	1	0	0
R1	Global Sys. Col.	0	0	0	0	0	0
R5	Central/Pivotal C.	0	0	0	0	0	0
R10	Rising Power	0	0	0	0	0	0
R11	Bridge across Civ.	0	0	0	0	0	0
R14	Eastern Country	0	0	0	0	0	0

Compared to Gül's regional references we see a more balanced regional foreign policy vision in Babacan's speeches. This is better illustrated in the following chart:




Figure 17 Babacan Regional Role Distribution Percentages

There are no changes in the region rankings at Babacan's speeches. However, the share of each region in the total has shifted significantly. As it is observed in this table, Babacan's regional role references are still mostly directed towards Rg3 (MENA/Eastern Mediterranean), but the percentages are decreased from 47% to 37%. The second region is Rg2 (Southern Caucasus, Black sea and Central Asia) and its percentage increased from 23% to 30%. Then Rg5 (EU and US), which decreased from 18 % to 15%. Then, Rg1 (Balkans) where we see no change, and finally Rg4 (Sub-Saharan Africa) where we see a slight increase from 3%to 5%. The domination of MENA region is balanced by the increasing references towards other regions. Let us see which roles are mostly directed towards these regions.




Figure 18 Babacan's Regional Role References - Regional Distribution

The main five regional roles towards Rg3 are DoP, RSC, PM, GoodN, RP. These findings indicate that similar to those of Gül, Babacan's foreign policy vision towards the region is directed by motivations including peace and cooperation. The second region is Rg2 and here the roles are RSC, DoP, Med, Good, and Developer. The only shift here is Babacan's shift from Peacemaker to Mediator role in the region. This shift is most probably due to Turkey's mediation efforts in the Abkhazia crisis between Georgia and Russia. Another interesting role is the developer role. In the speech analysis this developer role is generally referring to Afghanistan and Turkic states in Rg2. RG5 ranks the third among all regions. Here we again observe two significant roles Western Country (West) and Faithful Ally (FA). Rg1 (Balkans and CE Europe) ranks the fourth in Babacan's speeches where similar roles including DoP, RP, RSC, GoodN, and Protector are observed. Interestingly, after referring to peace as usual, Babacan stresses that Turkey is a regional power (not a leader, but a regionally significant power) in the Balkans. Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa) becomes the least referred region. Different from Gül we see three main roles here. Gül was seeing Turkey as a developer in Africa whereas Babacan sees Turkey as a DoP, A.I, and RSC in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, compared to the other regions references to the sub-Saharan Region still remains limited.

According to these regional references, it is possible to argue that Babacan has a peace oriented but relatively less assertive foreign policy vision for Turkey that follows a more regionally balanced foreign policy. He regards Turkey as a regional power rather than belonging to the West or the East. He stresses Cooperative and economy oriented roles frequently in almost all regions. These observations will be further clarified when combined with Erdoğan's role conceptions (in the same era) in the last section, where I establish the 60th Government's foreign policy vision.

4.1.2.3 Ahmet Davutoğlu's Role Conceptions

Ahmet Davutoğlu served as the foreign minister for 5 years between May 2009 and August 2014. The MoFA provides 119 speeches from year 2009 to 2014, the period in which Davutoğlu, as the successor of Babacan, served as the Foreign Minister of Turkey (see Appendix for the full list of speeches). 24 of these speeches fulfilled the

speech selection criteria (see Section 3.2.1.3). The speeches make approximately 80200 words in Total. The following table summarizes the speech codes, dates and word count:

Table 31 Ahmet Davutoğlu’s Speech Codes, Dates and Word Count

Speech Code#	Speech Date (DD. MM. YYYY)	Word Count (Approx.)
AD1	02.05.2009	1000
AD2	09.09.2009	1500
AD3	04.01.2010	3500
AD4	31.05.2010	1000
AD5	03.10.2010	1000
AD6	03.01.2011	3000
AD7	26.03.2011	2000
AD8	08.04.2011	1200
AD9	23.12.2011	3500
AD10	04.06.2012	2000
AD11	07.09.2012	1000
AD12	28.09.2012	1000
AD13	06.11.2012	4000
AD14	27.12.2012	8000
AD15	02.01.2013	7000
AD16	02.01.2013	4000
AD17	06.01.2013	1500
AD18	09.03.2013	7500
AD19	15.03.2013	5000
AD20	13.01.2014	9000
AD21	18.01.2014	6000
AD22	18.01.2014	3700
AD23	04.06.2014	1400
AD24	28.08.2014	1400
Total Word Count		80200

Each speech is hand-coded in a separate code sheet as previously shown in Figure 8 above. Then the data is entered into a Ms. Excel dataset, combined and counted. The following table shows combined data for Davutoğlu:

Table 32 Ahmet Davutoğlu (AD 1-24) Combined Data

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]	Rg (1/0)	Rg#	Ge (1/0)	Ge#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
R1	Global System Col.	14	25	24	25	0	0	14	25	0	0	0	0	0
R2	Defender of P. & S.	16	43	37	37	9	23	12	20	2	3	18	1	0
R3	Trading State	13	57	41	43	10	38	9	19	3	13	9	12	1
R4	Protector of the Opp.	12	77	50	59	11	55	6	22	2	3	46	4	0
R5	Central/Pivotal C.	11	26	24	25	0	0	11	26	0	0	0	0	0
R6	Mediator	6	10	10	10	4	5	5	5	0	1	2	2	0
R7	Peace-M/Problem-S	13	23	23	23	10	13	4	10	1	1	9	2	0
R8	Independent	3	4	4	4	0	0	3	4	0	0	0	0	0
R9	Active Independent	20	61	58	59	11	15	17	46	1	1	2	11	0
R10	Rising Power	7	8	8	8	0	0	7	8	0	0	0	0	0
R11	Bridge across Civ.	7	7	7	7	0	0	7	7	0	0	0	0	0
R12	Regional Subs. col.	16	73	52	52	14	56	10	17	5	22	28	1	0
R13	Western Country	11	21	19	20	11	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	21
R14	Eastern Country	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R15	Bridge across Cont.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R16	Faithful Ally	4	4	4	4	3	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	3
R17	Model Country	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
R18	Developer	13	29	20	21	13	28	1	1	5	5	8	10	0
R19	Energy Transp. C.	6	8	8	8	1	1	6	7	0	1	0	0	0
R20	Good Neighbor	12	19	15	15	2	6	12	13	3	3	1	0	0
R21	Regional Leader	5	14	9	9	5	12	2	2	2	2	8	0	0
R22	Regional Power	13	37	15	16	13	37	0	0	4	12	16	2	3
	TOTAL	203	547	429	446	118	314	127	233	28	67	148	45	28

As shown in the previous table⁵⁹(4.8) Davutoğlu has made 547 role utterances in the total number of 24 speeches. 314 of these utterances are region-specific and 233 of them are roles with general orientation (no region is specified in the utterance). Among the 314 regional roles: 28 refer to Rg1 (Balkans/CE Europe), 67 refer to Rg2 (Caucasus, Black sea and Central Asia), 148 refer to Rg3 (MENA and Eastern Mediterranean), 45 Refers to Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa) and 28 refer to Rg5 (EU and US). Column Y/N indicates the appearance of each role in the total number speeches. Three roles appear in most of the speeches: Active Independent (AI -appears in 20); Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC- Appears in 16 speeches) and Defender of Peace and Stability (DoP- Appears in 16 speeches). However, some roles including Bridge across Continents (Geobrid), Model Country (MC), Eastern Country (EC), Faithful Ally (FA), and Independent Country (IC) have very little or no appearance. This is better illustrated in the following frequency based list for Davutoğlu's role references:

Table 33 Ahmet Davutoğlu Frequency Based Role List

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]
	TOTAL		547	429	446
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	12	77	50	59
R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator	16	73	52	52
R9	Active Independent	20	61	58	59
R3	Trading State	13	57	41	43
R2	Defender of Peace and Stability	16	43	37	37
R22	Regional Power	13	37	15	16
R18	Developer	13	29	20	21
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	11	26	24	25
R1	Global System Collaborator	14	25	24	25
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	13	23	23	23
R13	Western Country	11	21	19	20
R20	Good Neighbor	12	19	15	15
R21	Regional Leader	5	14	9	9
R6	Mediator	6	10	10	10
R10	Rising Power	7	8	8	8
R19	Energy Transporting Country	6	8	8	8
R11	Bridge across Civ.	7	7	7	7
R8	Independent	3	4	4	4
R16	Faithful Ally	4	4	4	4
R17	Model Country	1	1	1	1
R14	Eastern Country	0	0	0	0
R15	Bridge across Cont.	0	0	0	0

⁵⁹ For information on the “F, S-C, S-p, Rg, and Ge” codes please consult to the TFPRED Codebook (Appendices)

As one might observe in the table above (Table 33), we see clear shifts from the role conceptions of the previous leaders. Most significant shift is that the Defender of Peace role has dramatically decreased in the frequency ranking. Instead, Protector and Active Independent roles have increased # of references. Another significant change is the increased reference towards the Trading State role. A relative increase in Western Country is observed. A surprising change here is that there is a significant decrease in the Faithful Ally role.⁶⁰ Similar with previous leaders, The Model Country, Eastern Country, and Bridge across Continents roles have no appearance. The next figure illustrates these role frequency rankings




Figure 19 Davutoğlu’s Most Frequent Roles (F# Chart)

Indeed, the Protector of the Oppressed role has not been a surprise since this role did mainly emerge after the Arab Uprisings and Turkey’s responsibility to protect people against oppressive regimes, Turkey’s support to protestors against oppressions are regarded as indicators of this role.⁶¹ In addition, as will be demonstrated in the following pages, the Trading State and Active Independent role conceptions has most probably been a result of Turkey’s “African Opening” initiative. Similar to the previous pattern, we see an increase in economy-based roles like RSC and TS.

⁶⁰ The Faithful Ally role is generally uttered with reference to Turkey’s alliance with the US. If further evidence is found this might be argued to be an indicator of the impact of the hampering Israeli-Turkish relations over Turkey-US alliance.

⁶¹ This finding verifies our argument in a previous paper published in *International Relations* journal (See Özdamar et al. 2014)

Scaling the overall percentage of these role references might be a better way to make this leader-by-leader comparison. When the percentages of Davutoğlu's role references are scaled, Protector gets 14%, RSC gets 13%, AI gets 11%, and TS gets 10% of the total references. The following chart shows the frequency percentages of Davutoğlu's role utterances.




Figure 20 Davutoğlu's Most Frequent Roles (Percentages Chart)

Three important shifts are observed in the Davutoğlu era. First, the DoP role has been replaced by Protector of the Oppressed role conception. Second, GoodN and Faithful Ally role conceptions have clearly lost significance. Third, protector of the Oppressed (from 2 to 14%), Trading State (increased from 5 to 10 %) and Active independent (from 6 to 11%) role conceptions receives dramatically higher ranking. Other roles seem to remain in the same place. For instance, the Mediator, Regional Power and Regional subsystem collaborator hold their places. According to these observations we might claim that Davutoğlu's foreign policy vision is more assertive and interest oriented, while peaceful policy is not necessarily a part of this vision.

Now, let us see the Rg-Ge comparison of Davutoğlu's utterances from the following table:

Table 34 Davutoğlu Role Utterance RG-GE Comparison

CODE	ROLE	F#	Rg#	Ge#
	Total Frequency	547	314	233
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	77	55	22
R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator	73	56	17
R9	Active Independent	61	15	46
R3	Trading State	57	38	19
R2	Defender of Peace and Stability	43	23	20
R22	Regional Power	37	37	0
R18	Developer	29	28	1
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	26	0	26
R1	Global System Collaborator	25	0	25
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	23	13	10
R13	Western Country	21	21	0
R20	Good Neighbor	19	6	13
R21	Regional Leader	14	12	2
R6	Mediator	10	5	5
R10	Rising Power	8	0	8
R19	Energy Transporting Country	8	1	7
R11	Bridge across Civ.	7	0	7
R16	Independent	4	0	4
R8	Faithful Ally	4	3	1
R17	Model Country	1	1	0
R14	Eastern Country	0	0	0
R15	Bridge across Cont.	0	0	0

57% of Davutoğlu's role references are region-specific (note that it was 60% in Gül and 70% in Babacan). The Regional-General role reference percentages for each role can be analyzed from the following chart:




Figure 21 Davutoğlu's Rg-Ge Role Reference Comparison

When Table 34 and Figure 21 are analyzed together it is observed that the most frequently referred role conceptions (except the Active Independent- AI) are those that refer to specific regions. Compared to Babacan, we see a decrease in region-specific role reference in Davutoğlu's speeches. The following table ranks the most frequently referred regional roles (listed according to Rg#) and shows the regional distribution of each:

Table 35 Davutoğlu's most frequently referred Regional Roles

	ROLE	Rg#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
R1	Global System Col.	0	0	0	0	0	0
R2	Defender of P. & S.	23	2	3	18	1	0
R3	Trading State	38	3	13	9	12	1
R4	Protector of the Opp.	55	2	3	46	4	0
R5	Central/Pivotal C.	0	0	0	0	0	0
R6	Mediator	5	0	1	2	2	0
R7	Peace-M/Problem-S	13	1	1	9	2	0
R8	Independent	0	0	0	0	0	0
R9	Active Independent	15	1	1	2	11	0
R10	Rising Power	0	0	0	0	0	0
R11	Bridge across Civ.	0	0	0	0	0	0
R12	Regional Subs. col.	56	5	22	28	1	0
R13	Western Country	21	0	0	0	0	21
R14	Eastern Country	0	0	0	0	0	0
R15	Bridge across Cont.	0	0	0	0	0	0
R16	Faithful Ally	3	0	0	0	0	3
R17	Model Country	1	0	0	1	0	0
R18	Developer	28	5	5	8	10	0
R19	Energy Transp. C.	1	0	1	0	0	0
R20	Good Neighbor	6	3	3	1	0	0
R21	Regional Leader	12	2	2	8	0	0
R22	Regional Power	37	4	12	16	2	3
	TOTAL	314	28	67	148	45	28

Compared to the previous period we see that Rg3 still is the dominant region in the foreign policy vision. However, in Davutoğlu's references Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa) gets more reference than Rg1 and Rg5. This is better illustrated in the following chart:




Figure 22 Davutoğlu Regional Role Distribution Percentages

There are clear changes in the region rankings at Davutoğlu's speeches. Together with the ranking, the share of each region in the total has shifted significantly. As it is observed in the chart above, Davutoğlu's regional role references are still mostly directed towards Rg3 (MENA/Eastern Mediterranean), and the percentages is increased from 37% to 47% (interestingly same with that of Gül). The second region is Rg2 (Southern Caucasus, Black sea and Central Asia) and its percentage decreased from 30% to 23%. Then, in Rg4 (Sub-Saharan Africa) we see a dramatic increase from 5% to 14%. Rg1 (Balkans) and Rg5 (EU and US) become the least referred regions and their percentages decreased to 9 %. The MENA region dominates by getting almost the half of all regional references. This is parallel with the Protector of the Oppressed role conception that mainly rose after the Arab uprisings. Let us see which roles are directed towards which regions from the following figure.




Figure 23 Davutoğlu's Regional Role References - Regional Distribution

The main regional roles towards Rg3 are: Protect, RSC, DoP, RP, and TS. These findings indicate that different from previous period, although it is still important “peace” is not the major motivation behind Turkey’s roles towards the region. This is most probably due to Turkey’s policy in the Arab Uprisings, where the country sided with the domestic opposition groups rather than state regimes in the conflict ridden regional countries. The second region is Rg2 and here the primary three roles are RSC, TS, and RP. Trading state and Regional Power has increased reference towards the region. Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa) is the third region in Davutoğlu’s references. The three major roles in this region is Trading state, Active Independent, and Developer. This indicates that Turkey’s “African Opening” has a clear economic interest component in itself. The other two regions Rg5 and Rg1 are less referred regions in Davutoğlu’s speeches where the roles mostly remain the same as those of Babacan.

According to these regional references, two important characteristics of Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision can be stressed. First, Davutoğlu’s foreign policy roles are clearly more assertive than those of Babacan. The impact of Arab Uprisings and the so-called “African Opening” initiative are clearly seen in Davutoğlu’s foreign policy role conceptions. And second Economic interests have increased significance in Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision. Turkey has increasingly been regarded as a Trading State in multiple regions. In sum, Davutoğlu has an assertive and economic interest oriented foreign policy vision for Turkey and “peace” is not necessarily referred to in this process.

4.1.2.4 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Role Conceptions

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been the prime minister of the three government periods at hand. He served as the Prime Minister for 11 years between 2003 and 2014. 32 of speeches that fulfilled the speech selection criteria are selected (see Section 3.2.1.4). The speeches make approximately 76435 words in Total. The following table summarizes the speech codes, dates and word count:

Table 36 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Speech Codes, Dates and Word Count

Speech Code#	Speech Date (DD. MM. YYYY)	Word Count (Approx.)
Er1	30.01.2003	3900
Er2	18.03.2003	9000
Er3	15.11.2003	2500
Er4	30.01.2004	1600
Er5	30.06.2004	2000
Er6	23.02.2005	3000
Er7	27.02.2005	3500
Er8	26.04.2005	2000
Er9	03.05.2005	3500
Er10	21.02.2006	1500
Er11	30.05.2006	2500
Er12	30.07.2006	2500
Er13	30.08.2006	2300
Er14	27.09.2006	1500
Er15	28.11.2006	3500
Er16	05.12.2006	3000
Er17	09.01.2007	3500
Er18	06.02.2007	1200
Er19	27.03.2007	2000
Er20	31.08.2007	2000
Er21	30.12.2007	1500
Er22	24.09.2009	1200
Er23	29.04.2010	1185
Er24	01.06.2010	2000
Er25	08.07.2011	2500
Er26	23.09.2011	3400
Er27	30.09.2012	2200
Er28	03.11.2012	1400
Er29	11.12.2012	1050
Er30	31.08.2013	1300
Er31	11.12.2013	1000
Er32	28.01.2014	1200
Total Word Count		76435

Each speech is hand-coded in a separate code sheet as previously shown in Figure 8 above. The following table shows combined data for Erdoğan:

Table 37 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Er 1-32) Combined Data

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]	Rg (1/0)	Rg#	Ge (1/0)	Ge#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
R1	Global Sys. Col.	21	62	54	62	0	0	21	62	0	0	0	0	0
R2	Defender of P. &S	29	154	135	149	25	90	24	64	5	8	70	2	1
R3	Trading State	20	55	46	53	8	24	17	31	0	4	12	3	1
R4	Protector of the Opp.	20	65	48	63	20	54	6	11	0	4	46	3	0
R5	Central/Pivotal C.	16	53	45	53	1	1	16	52	0	0	1	0	0
R6	Mediator	8	11	9	9	8	11	0	0	0	2	9	0	0
R7	Peace-M/Problem-S	20	60	51	56	19	48	6	12	4	6	35	1	1
R8	Independent	14	27	25	27	0	0	14	27	0	0	0	0	0
R9	Active Independent	27	105	93	103	6	12	26	93	0	1	10	1	0
R10	Rising Power	12	26	24	25	0	0	12	26	0	0	0	0	0
R11	Bridge across Civ.	12	22	21	22	0	0	13	22	0	0	0	0	0
R12	Regional Subs. Col.	24	67	55	64	19	48	11	19	4	13	23	2	1
R13	Western Country	21	53	39	52	21	53	0	0	0	0	0	0	53
R14	Eastern Country	7	8	8	8	7	8	0	0	0	0	8	0	0
R15	Bridge across Cont.	2	3	3	3	1	2	2	1	0	0	2	0	0
R16	Faithful Ally	12	25	22	25	12	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	25
R17	Model Country	6	9	9	9	5	8	1	1	0	0	7	0	0
R18	Developer	16	77	34	51	15	61	7	16	13	19	12	13	0
R19	Energy Transp. C.	8	15	10	15	3	6	8	9	2	3	1	0	2
R20	Good Neighbor	17	34	33	34	14	22	7	12	3	3	15	0	0
R21	Regional Leader	6	6	6	6	5	5	2	1	1	0	4	0	0
R22	Regional Power	9	13	13	13	8	12	4	1	1	0	8	3	0
	TOTAL	327	950	783	902	197	490	197	460	33	63	263	28	84

As shown in the previous table (4.18) Erdoğan has made 950 role utterances in the total number of 32 speeches. 490 of these utterances are region-specific and 460 of them are roles with general orientation (no region is specified in the utterance). Among the 490 regional roles: 33 refer to Rg1 (Balkans/CE Europe), 63 refer to Rg2 (Caucasus, Black sea and Central Asia), 263 refer to Rg3 (MENA and Eastern Mediterranean), 28 Refers to Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa) and 84 refer to Rg5 (EU and US).

Looking at column Y/N that indicates the appearance of each role in the total number speeches, two roles appear in almost all of the speeches: Defender of Peace and Stability (DoP- Appears in 29 speeches) and Active Independent (AI -appears in 27). Similar to other leaders, in Erdoğan's speeches the Geobrid role has almost no appearance. The most frequently referred roles are better illustrated in the following list:

Table 38 Erdoğan Frequency Based Role List

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]
	TOTAL	327	950	783	902
R2	Defender of P. & S.	29	154	135	149
R9	Active Independent	27	105	93	103
R18	Developer	16	77	34	51
R12	Regional Subs. Col.	24	67	55	64
R4	Protector of the Opp.	20	65	48	63
R1	Global Sys. Col.	21	62	54	62
R7	Peace-M/Problem-S.	20	60	51	56
R3	Trading State	20	55	46	53
R5	Central/Pivotal C.	16	53	45	53
R13	Western Country	21	53	39	52
R20	Good Neighbor	17	34	33	34
R8	Independent	14	27	25	27
R10	Rising Power	12	26	24	25
R16	Faithful Ally	12	25	22	25
R11	Bridge across Civ.	12	22	21	22
R19	Energy Transp. C.	8	15	10	15
R22	Regional Power	9	13	13	13
R6	Mediator	8	11	9	9
R17	Model Country	6	9	9	9
R14	Eastern Country	7	8	8	8
R21	Regional Leader	6	6	6	6
R15	Bridge across Cont.	2	3	3	3

As one might observe in the table above (4.19), Erdoğan's role references represent a summary of all other leaders' role references. Defender of Peace role conception is the mostly referred role. The second role is the Active independent role. These two roles have been among the highest in other leaders as well. However, we see that the Developer role is dramatically increased in Erdoğan's speeches. RSC, Protector, GSC, and Peacemaker rank the third. It seems like the Regional subsystem collaborator and Active Independent have shifted their ranks in Erdoğan's references. The next figure better illustrates these role frequency rankings.




Figure 24 Erdoğan's Most Frequent Roles (F# Chart)

The DoP role conception seems to dominate in Erdoğan's overall foreign policy vision. However, this might be subject to change when the references are compared between to different terms of the government⁶². The active independent role still remains among the most referred roles. The high number of references to two roles - "Developer" and "Protector of the Oppressed" - indicates that Erdoğan sees Turkey as a powerful actor in foreign policy. However, his references are less assertive than

⁶² This is why a government-by-government comparison is deemed necessary. 11 years is deemed to be a very long period in for a foreign policy vision to remain static. A government-by-government comparison would better capture the impact of several events including Arab uprisings, Mavi Marmara Incident, the Abkhazia Crisis, or the African Opening. As we observe from the previous leaders Turkey's foreign policy vision has changed from one term to the other.

those of Davutoğlu.⁶³ The following chart shows the frequency percentages of Erdoğan's role utterances.




Figure 25 Erdoğan's Most Frequent Roles (Percentages Chart)

The most significant difference between Erdoğan and other leaders is that, Erdoğan has the highest number of references to the Developer role. Similar to Davutoğlu the Western country and Faithful ally roles remain in the lower ranks. The AI and RSC roles are shared among all leaders. An interesting finding here is that the GoodN role is left among the least referred role conceptions. Now, let us see the Rg-Ge comparison of Erdoğan's utterances from the following table:

⁶³ This comparison might be better made in the government-based analysis below.

Table 39 Erdoğan's Role Utterance RG-GE Comparison

	ROLE	F#	Rg#	Ge#
	TOTAL	950	490	460
R2	Defender of Peace and Stability	154	90	64
R9	Active Independent	105	12	93
R18	Developer	77	61	16
R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator	67	48	19
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	65	54	11
R1	Global System Collaborator	62	0	62
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	60	48	12
R3	Trading State	55	24	31
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	53	1	52
R13	Western Country	53	53	0
R20	Good Neighbor	34	22	12
R8	Independent	27	0	27
R10	Rising Power	26	0	26
R16	Faithful Ally	25	25	0
R11	Bridge across Civ.	22	0	22
R19	Energy Transporting Country	15	6	9
R22	Regional Power	13	12	1
R6	Mediator	11	11	0
R17	Model Country	9	8	1
R14	Eastern Country	8	8	0
R21	Regional Leader	6	5	1
R15	Bridge across Cont.	3	2	1

Around 50% of Erdoğan's role references are region-specific (note that it was 60% in Gül, and 70% in Babacan, and 57% in Davutoğlu). The Regional-General role reference percentages for each role can be analyzed from the following chart:




Figure 26 Erdoğan's Rg-Ge Role Reference Comparison

When table 39 and Figure 26 are analyzed together it is observed that the most frequently referred role conceptions (except the Active Independent- AI and GSC) are those that refer to specific regions. Compared to other leaders we see a decrease in region-specific role reference in Erdoğan's speeches. The following table ranks the most frequently referred regional roles (listed according to Rg#) and shows the regional distribution of each:

Table 40 Erdoğan's most frequently referred Regional Roles

	ROLE	Rg#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
	TOTAL	490	33	63	263	28	84
R2	Defender of P. & S.	90	5	8	70	2	1
R18	Developer	61	13	19	12	13	0
R4	Protector of the Opp.	54	0	4	46	3	0
R13	Western Country	53	0	0	0	0	53
R7	Peace-M/Problem-S	48	4	6	35	1	1
R12	Regional Subs. Col.	48	4	13	23	2	1
R16	Faithful Ally	25	0	0	0	0	25
R3	Trading State	24	0	4	12	3	1
R20	Good Neighbor	22	3	3	15	0	0
R9	Active Independent	12	0	1	10	1	0
R22	Regional Power	12	1	0	8	3	0
R6	Mediator	11	0	2	9	0	0
R14	Eastern Country	8	0	0	8	0	0
R17	Model Country	8	0	0	7	0	0
R19	Energy Transp. C.	6	2	3	1	0	2
R21	Regional Leader	5	1	0	4	0	0
R15	Bridge across Cont.	2	0	0	2	0	0
R5	Central/Pivotal C.	1	0	0	1	0	0
R1	Global Sys. Col.	0	0	0	0	0	0
R8	Independent	0	0	0	0	0	0
R10	Rising Power	0	0	0	0	0	0
R11	Bridge across Civ.	0	0	0	0	0	0

Similar to the previous leaders we see that Rg3 still is the most dominant region in Erdoğan's foreign policy speeches. Rg5 becomes the second most referred region and Rg2 is the third. This is better illustrated in the following chart:




Figure 27 Erdoğan's Regional Role Distribution Percentages

A significant finding is that Erdoğan refers to MENA region more than the previous leaders (reference increased to 57% compared to 43% of Gül, 37% of Babacan, and 47% of Davutoğlu). The second most referred region is Rg5 %16. The third region is Rg2 (Southern Caucasus, Black sea and Central Asia) the Fourth region is Rg1 (Balkans) and Rg4 remains as the least referred region in Erdoğan's overall role references. Let us see which roles are mostly seen in these regions from the following chart:




Figure 28 Erdoğan's Regional Role References - Regional Distribution

From the chart above, we observe that Erdoğan sees Turkey as a developer in the Balkans; a Defender of Peace, Protector of the Oppressed, a Peacemaker and Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC) in the Middle East; a Developer and RSC in the Caucasus and Central Asia; a Developer and Regional Power in the sub-Saharan Africa; and Faithful Ally and a member of the Euro Atlantic area. The overall findings indicate that Erdoğan's wants to see a peace oriented, active, and cooperative but powerful Turkey in its foreign policy. However, 11 years is a very long period for a foreign policy vision to remain static. A government-by-government comparison would better capture the impact of several events including Arab uprisings, Mavi Marmara Incident, the Abkhazia Crisis, or the African Opening on the leaders' foreign policy vision. As we observe from the previous leaders Turkey's foreign policy vision has changed from one term to the other. The next section provides the government-by-government comparison.

4.1.3 Role Conceptions of Governments (59th, 60th, 61st Govts.)

The previous section has made a leader-by-leader presentation of the findings. This section combines the relevant leaders' speeches and presents the government-by-government analysis of the findings. This is deemed important since making a government-based analysis will let us trace the shifting foreign policy orientations of Turkey in different periods and accordingly observe the patterns of change and continuity. Besides, this approach will partly neutralize the overemphasis on a single leader in FPA. The following sections combine the Prime Minister Erdoğan's relevant speeches with those of the Foreign ministers Gül, Babacan, and Davutoğlu and observe the most frequently referred foreign policy role conceptions of the respective governments.

4.1.3.1 Role Conceptions of the 59th Government (2003-2007)

The 59th Government remained in rule for 4 years between 2003 and 2007. A selective combination of Erdoğan and Gül's relevant speeches is utilized in the analysis of 59th government. A total number of 40 speeches (Er 1-19 and AG all)

composed of 104950 words analyzed for the 59th government. The following table lists the speech details:

Table 41 Er (1-19) and AG (All) Combined

Speech Code#	Speech Date (DD. MM. YYYY)	Word Count (Approx.)	Speech Code#	Speech Date (DD. MM. YYYY)	Word Count (Approx.)
Er1	30.01.2003	3900	AG1	03.07.2003	3000
Er2	18.03.2003	9000	AG2	25.07.2003	3400
Er3	15.11.2003	2500	AG3	24.09.2003	2000
Er4	30.01.2004	1600	AG4	26.09.2003	1750
Er5	30.06.2004	2000	AG5	23.12.2003	2000
Er6	23.02.2005	3000	AG6	17.01.2004	3500
Er7	27.02.2005	3500	AG7	26.02.2004	2000
Er8	26.04.2005	2000	AG8	22.05.2004	1800
Er9	03.05.2005	3500	AG9	23.09.2004	1800
Er10	21.02.2006	1500	AG10	24.12.2004	3000
Er11	30.05.2006	2500	AG11	11.01.2005	1800
Er12	30.07.2006	2500	AG12	14.03.2005	1500
Er13	30.08.2006	2300	AG13	07.06.2005	1500
Er14	27.09.2006	1500	AG14	21.09.2005	1800
Er15	28.11.2006	3500	AG15	21.12.2005	3500
Er16	05.12.2006	3000	AG16	22.09.2006	2400
Er17	09.01.2007	3500	AG17	21.12.2006	3200
Er18	06.02.2007	1200	AG18	13.01.2007	4500
Er19	27.03.2007	2000	AG19	18.01.2007	3000
	TOTAL	54500	AG20	08.02.2007	1500
			AG21	01.06.2007	1500
			Total		50450
TOTAL # OF SPEECHES: 40			TOTAL WORD COUNT: 104950		

Each speech is analyzed separately and every role reference is coded in the TFPRED dataset. The following table shows the combined data for the 59th Government, which is taken originally from the dataset.

Table 42 Combined References of the 59th Gov. (Er1-19 + AGall)

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]	Rg (1/0)	Rg#	Ge (1/0)	Ge#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
R2	Defender of P & S.	38	203	171	190	34	130	30	73	14	20	90	1	2
R9	Active Independent	31	118	101	114	13	27	29	91	2	3	19	2	1
R12	Regional Subs. Col.	37	116	95	106	34	92	15	24	12	29	40	2	3
R7	Peace-M/Problem-S	30	91	77	80	28	72	10	19	9	14	46	1	1
R1	Global Sys. Col.	28	82	71	80	0	0	28	82	0	0	0	0	0
R20	Good Neighbor	30	82	58	66	25	62	13	20	15	15	32	0	0
R13	Western Country	29	75	55	74	29	75	0	0	0	0	0	0	75
R5	Central/Pivotal C.	23	56	47	56	1	1	23	55	0	0	1	0	0
R3	Trading State	23	51	46	49	11	26	17	25	0	7	11	1	3
R16	Faithful Ally	21	51	38	49	21	51	0	0	0	0	0	0	51
R18	Developer	21	50	35	42	19	45	5	5	5	9	16	7	0
R22	Regional Power	18	35	32	32	16	32	9	3	7	7	13	5	0
R8	Independent	14	30	28	30	2	2	13	28	0	0	2	0	0
R11	Bridge across Civ.	19	29	28	29	0	0	20	29	0	0	0	0	0
R10	Rising Power	12	28	23	27	0	0	12	28	0	0	0	0	0
R4	Protector of the Op.	16	26	25	26	16	25	1	1	0	1	22	2	0
R6	Mediator	12	14	12	14	12	14	0	0	0	1	13	0	0
R19	Energy Transp. C.	10	14	12	14	3	4	10	10	0	4	0	0	0
R14	Eastern Country	10	12	11	11	10	12	0	0	0	0	12	0	0
R17	Model Country	8	11	11	11	7	10	1	1	0	0	9	0	0
R21	Regional Leader	7	8	8	8	5	5	5	3	0	0	5	0	0
R15	Bridge across Cont.	3	5	4	4	2	4	2	1	1	1	2	0	0
	TOTAL	440	1187	988	1112	288	689	243	498	65	111	333	21	136

As the table illustrates 1187 role references are identified in the 40 speeches delivered by Erdoğan and Gül. 689 of these references are region specific and the remaining 498 are general (No region is specified). Two roles have appeared in almost all speeches (DoP and RSC – Look at column Y/N). One role has a very limited appearance: Bridge across Continents (Geobrid). The most frequently referred role is the DoP. Three roles have no region specific appearance (look at column RG (1/0)): Global System Collaborator (GSC), Rising Power (Rise), Bridge across Civilizations (Civbrid) and four roles have always referred to a region (Look at column Ge (1/0)): Mediator, Western Country, Eastern Country, and Faithful Ally. The following table presents a frequency-based list of these role references:

Table 43 59th Government Frequency Based List

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]
	TOTAL	440	1187	988	1112
R2	Defender of peace and Stability	38	203	171	190
R9	Active Independent	31	118	101	114
R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator	37	116	95	106
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	30	91	77	80
R1	Global System Collaborator	28	82	71	80
R20	Good Neighbor	30	82	58	66
R13	Western Country	29	75	55	74
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	23	56	47	56
R3	Trading State	23	51	46	49
R16	Faithful Ally	21	51	38	49
R18	Developer	21	50	35	42
R22	Regional Power	18	35	32	32
R8	Independent	14	30	28	30
R11	Bridge across Civilizations (Ideational)	19	29	28	29
R10	Rising Power	12	28	23	27
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	16	26	25	26
R6	Mediator	12	14	12	14
R19	Energy Transporting Country	10	14	12	14
R14	Eastern Country	10	12	11	11
R17	Model Country	8	11	11	11
R21	Regional Leader	7	8	8	8
R15	Bridge across Continents (Geographical)	3	5	4	4

According to the Table 43 the most frequently referred role conception in the 59th government is the Defender of Peace (DoP) role conception with 203# references.

Second, although the role does not appear in all speeches (it appeared in 31 speeches), Active Independent (AI) has been a little more frequently referred to than the Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC appears in 37 speeches out of 40) role conception. The fourth Role conception is the Peace maker- problem Solver (PM) role. And the fifth place is shared by Good Neighbor (GoodN) and GSC role conceptions. The next figure shows the frequency percentages of these role references:




Figure 29 59th Government-Ranked Frequency Percentages

This figure better illustrates the significance of the above-mentioned first 6 roles, which are more frequently referred to (almost 60 percent) than the total frequency of the remaining 16 roles. Regarding the most frequently referred five roles one can claim that these roles resemble a foreign policy that is peace and cooperation oriented followed by a country that actively seeks to achieve its national interests. These roles are not assertive or conflictual and resemble a pragmatic middle power strategy. Passive roles (Model country, Bridge Country) or assertive/conflictual roles (for instance Regional Leader, Protector of the Oppressed) are in the lower ranks. Next table shows the Rg-Ge distribution of these roles:

Table 44 59th Government Rg-Ge Distribution

	ROLE	F#	Rg#	Ge#
	TOTAL	1187	689	498
R2	Defender of peace and Stability	203	130	73
R9	Active Independent	118	27	91
R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator	116	92	24
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	91	72	19
R1	Global System Collaborator	82	0	82
R20	Good Neighbor	82	62	20
R13	Western Country	75	75	0
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	56	1	55
R3	Trading State	51	26	25
R16	Faithful Ally	51	51	0
R18	Developer	50	45	5
R22	Regional Power	35	32	3
R8	Independent	30	2	28
R11	Bridge across Civilizations (Ideational)	29	0	29
R10	Rising Power	28	0	28
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	26	25	1
R6	Mediator	14	14	0
R19	Energy Transporting Country	14	4	10
R14	Eastern Country	12	12	0
R17	Model Country	11	10	1
R21	Regional Leader	8	5	3
R15	Bridge across Continents (Geographical)	5	4	1

As it is observed in this table there is a RG –GE balance among the most frequently referred role conceptions. DoP, RSC and PM are region-specific whereas AI and GSC are general roles. The next figure illustrates the distribution:




Figure 30 59th Government Rg-Ge Comparison

As the above-mentioned figure illustrates 59th government's role conceptions are slightly more region specific.




Figure 31 59th Government Rg-Ge comparisons (% Chart)

The figure above shows that 58% of all role references are region-specific. Now, let us see the regional percentages of 59th Government's role references:




Figure 32 59th Gov. Rg Distribution (% chart)

The regional distribution chart (Figure 39) shows that when Ge roles like GSC and AI are excluded from the list, most of the regional references of the 59th Government go to Rg3 (MENA/ and Eastern Mediterranean). The second most referred region is Rg5 (Euro-Atlantic – US + EU except Rg1). The third region is Rg2 (Caucasus/Central Asia/Black sea) and fourth region is Rg1 (Balkans and Eastern Europe). The least referred region is Rg4 (Sub Saharan Africa). This makes better sense when we look at which roles are mostly directed towards these regions. Let us see the following figure:




Figure 33 59th Gov. Regional Role Reference Distributions (F# chart)

The figures above illustrate the dominance of Rg 3 (Total Ref: 333-50%, MENA/Eastern Mediterranean) over other regions. The most frequently referred role conceptions towards the region are DoP, PM, RSC and GoodN. The second most referred region is Rg5 (Total Ref: 136-20%, EU except Rg1 and US). Two roles are referred to the region: Western Country and Faithful Ally. Third region is Rg2 (Total Ref: 111-17%, Caucasus/Black sea) and the most frequent role towards the region is RSC. This role is followed by DoP, PM and GoodN role conceptions. Fourth ranking region is Rg1 (Balkans/CE Europe) and the most frequent role towards the region is GoodN. Then, the roles are followed by the DoP, RSC, PM, RP role conceptions. The least referred region by the 59th Government is Rg4 (Total Ref: 21-3%, sub-Saharan Africa) and we observe two main roles towards the region: Developer and Regional Power.

Table 45 59th Government Rg Role Ranking (F # and % Distribution)

Rank	RG3 Roles	F#	%	RG5 Roles	F#	%	Rg2 Roles	F#	%	Rg1 Roles	F#	%	Rg4 Roles	F#	%
1	DoP	90	72	West	75	100	RSC	29	34	GoodN	15	24	Dev.	7	19
2	PM	46	65	FA	51	100	DoP	20	16	DoP	14	11	RP	5	16
3	RSC	40	47	RSC	3	3	GoodN	15	24	RSC	12	14	RSC	2	2
4	GoodN	32	52	TS	3	14	PM	14	20	PM	9	13	AI	2	7
5	Protect	22	88	DoP	2	1	Dev.	9	24	RP	7	22	Protect	2	8
6	AI	19	70	PM	1	1	RP	7	22	Dev.	5	14	DoP	1	1
7	Dev.	16	43	AI	1	4	TS	7	32	AI	2	8	PM	1	1
8	RP	13	40				ETC	4	100	Geobrid	1	25	TS	1	4
9	Med.	13	93				AI	3	11						
10	EC	12	100				Protect	1	4						

Roles in All regions : DoP, PM, RSC, AI (All Regions)

Multiple Regions : Developer, Regional Power (4 Regions) -

Single Region : Western Country, Faithful Ally (Rg5) - Mediator, Eastern Country (Rg3)

The table above presents the first 10 regional roles (if available) towards each region. The regions are ranked from left to right according to the total role reference frequencies. The regional roles are ranked from top to bottom according to the Frequency (F# Column). This information is then combined with the percentages (% Column) data. The % column shows the percentage of a role's reference towards each region. For instance, the DoP role conception has ranked first in Rg3. In total, the role has been uttered 127 times in total and 90 times (see F# Column) towards Rg3. The percentage column indicates that 72% of the total DoP role references have been directed towards the region. This percentage information will be utilized in the government-based comparisons at the following sections.

4.1.3.2 Role Conceptions of the 60th Government (2007 – 2011)

The 60th government remained in rule for 4 years between August 2007 and July 2011. A combination of Erdoğan, Babacan and Davutoğlu's relevant speeches is utilized in the analysis of 60th Government role conceptions. A total number of 23 speeches (Er 20-24, AB all and Davutoğlu 1-8) composed of 53285 words analyzed for the 60th government. Each speech is analyzed separately and every role reference is coded in the TFPRED dataset. The following two tables show the lists the speeches (Table 46) and present the combined data (Table 47) for the 60th Government, which is taken originally from the dataset.

Table 46 60th Gov. Speeches Er (20-24), AB (All) and AD (1-8)

Speech Code#	Speech Date (DD. MM. YYYY)	Word Count (Approx.)	Speech Code#	Speech Date (DD. MM. YYYY)	Word Count (Approx.)	Speech Code#	Speech Date (DD. MM. YYYY)	Word Count (Approx.)
Er20	31.08.2007	2000	AB1	01.11.2007	3000	AD1	02.05.2009	1000
Er21	30.12.2007	1500	AB2	14.11.2007	5000	AD2	09.09.2009	1500
Er22	24.09.2009	1200	AB3	10.12.2007	2500	AD3	04.01.2010	3500
Er23	29.04.2010	1185	AB4	21.04.2008	2000	AD4	31.05.2010	1000
Er24	01.06.2010	2000	AB5	04.05.2008	2000	AD5	03.10.2010	1000
TOTAL		7885	AB6	15.07.2008	4000	AD6	03.01.2011	3000
			AB7	21.11.2008	4200	AD7	26.03.2011	2000
			AB8	23.12.2008	2000	AD8	08.04.2011	1200
			AB9	25.02.2009	2000	TOTAL		14200
			AB10	10.03.2009	4500			
			TOTAL		31200			
TOTAL # OF SPEECHES: 23					TOTAL WORD COUNT: 53285			

Table 47 Combined References of the 60th Gov. (Er20-24+ABall+AD1-8)

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]	Rg (1/0)	Rg#	Ge (1/0)	Ge#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
R2	Defender of P & S.	19	115	95	108	15	80	15	35	12	22	43	4	2
R12	Regional Subs. Col.	17	81	65	67	15	66	10	15	8	25	29	3	1
R9	Active Independent	19	67	60	66	6	8	19	59	0	0	2	6	0
R1	Global Sys. Col.	16	54	48	54	0	0	16	54	0	0	0	0	0
R22	Regional Power	14	47	22	23	14	47	0	0	11	16	21	1	2
R18	Developer	14	40	33	37	13	31	6	9	4	15	13	1	0
R20	Good Neighbor	16	39	34	38	11	33	6	6	6	13	14	0	0
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	13	36	34	36	0	0	13	36	0	0	0	0	0
R7	Peace-M/Problem-S	13	35	35	35	11	23	5	12	2	2	21	0	0
R6	Mediator	10	32	28	28	10	30	2	2	0	13	17	0	0
R13	Western Country	14	27	23	26	14	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	27
R3	Trading State	13	26	24	24	10	19	5	7	1	12	2	1	3
R16	Faithful Ally	10	26	19	26	9	25	1	1	0	0	0	0	25
R19	Energy Transp. C.	11	20	15	20	5	8	11	12	2	4	1	0	3
R11	Bridge across Civ.	11	19	16	19	0	0	11	19	0	0	0	0	0
R4	Protector of the Opp.	8	18	14	18	8	18	0	0	3	0	15	0	0
R10	Rising Power	9	15	14	15	0	0	9	15	0	0	0	0	0
R21	Regional Leader	5	13	8	8	5	11	2	2	3	2	7	0	0
R8	Independent	6	9	9	9	1	1	5	8	0	0	1	0	0
R15	Bridge across Cont.	1	3	1	1	1	3	0	0	1	2	0	0	0
R17	Model Country	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
R14	Eastern Country	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL	240	723	598	659	149	431	136	292	53	126	187	16	63

As the table illustrates 723 role references are identified in the 23 speeches delivered by Erdoğan and Gül. 431 of these references are region specific and the remaining 291 are general (No region is specified). Two roles have appeared in almost all speeches (DoP and AI – Look at column Y/N). One role has no appearance: Eastern Country. Two roles have a very limited appearance: Bridge across Continents (Geobrid) and Model Country. The most frequently referred role is the DoP. Four roles have no region-specific appearance (look at column RG): Global System Collaborator (GSC), Central Country (CC), Rising Power (Rise), Bridge across Civilizations (Civbrid). Five roles have always referred to a region (Look at column Ge (1/0)): Protector of the Oppressed, Western Country, and Bridge across Continents, Model Country and Regional Power. The following table presents a frequency-based list of these role references:

Table 48 60th Government Frequency Based List

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]
R2	Defender of peace and Stability	19	115	95	108
R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator	17	81	65	67
R9	Active Independent	19	67	60	66
R1	Global System Collaborator	16	54	48	54
R22	Regional Power	14	47	22	23
R18	Developer	14	40	33	37
R20	Good Neighbor	16	39	34	38
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	13	36	34	36
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	13	35	35	35
R6	Mediator	10	32	28	28
R13	Western Country	14	27	23	26
R3	Trading State	13	26	24	24
R16	Faithful Ally	10	26	19	26
R19	Energy Transporting Country	11	20	15	20
R11	Bridge across Civilizations (Ideational)	11	19	16	19
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	8	18	14	18
R10	Rising Power	9	15	14	15
R21	Regional Leader	5	13	8	8
R8	Independent	6	9	9	9
R15	Bridge across Continents (Geographical)	1	3	1	1
R17	Model Country	1	1	1	1
R14	Eastern Country	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL	240	723	598	659

According to the Table 48 the most frequently referred role conception in the 60th government is the Defender of Peace (DoP) role conception with 115# references. Second, although the role does not appear in all speeches (it appeared in 17 speeches), Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC) has been more frequently referred to than the Active Independent (AI appears in 19 speeches out of 23) role conception. The fourth role conception is the Global System Collaborator (GSC) role and Regional Power ranks the fifth. The next figure shows the frequency percentages of these role references:




Figure 34 59th Government - Ranked Frequency Percentages

This figure illustrates the significance of the first 6 roles. Similar to those of 59th government, the first 6 roles are more frequently referred to (almost 60 percent) than the total frequency of the remaining 16 roles. The most frequently referred roles are similar to those of the 59th Government, however their rankings have changed. First, there is a change between the ranks of Active Independent and Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC) role conceptions. The RSC role ranks the second (was third previously). Second, we see an increase in the percentages of some of the role

conceptions. The most significant increase is seen in the Regional Power role conception, which rose from 3% to 7%. Then, we see a rise in the Developer role conception from 4 to 6%. Third, we see a decrease in the reference percentages of some roles. The most significant decrease is in the Peacemaker role conception from %8 to %4, which is replaced by Regional Power. Then, we see a decrease in the Western Country role conception (from 6% to 4%). Although the roles are similar to those of the 59th government, an increase in the percentages of region specific roles is observed in the 60th government. The roles are still peace oriented, active and cooperative roles. When the decrease in the western country role and increase in the regional power role conceptions are analyzed together we might argue that 60th government foreign policy deals more with the immediate neighborhood of the country. In other words, Turkey seems to be less Western but more regional in this period. Then, let us see Rg-Ge distribution of the role conceptions of the 60th government at the following table:

Table 49 60th Gov. Rg-Ge Distributions

	ROLE	F#	Rg#	Ge#
R2	Defender of peace and Stability	115	80	35
R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator	81	66	15
R9	Active Independent	67	8	59
R1	Global System Collaborator	54	0	54
R22	Regional Power	47	47	0
R18	Developer	40	31	9
R20	Good Neighbor	39	33	6
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	36	0	36
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	35	23	12
R6	Mediator	32	30	2
R13	Western Country	27	27	0
R3	Trading State	26	19	7
R16	Faithful Ally	26	25	1
R19	Energy Transporting Country	20	8	12
R11	Bridge across Civilizations (Ideational)	19	0	19
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	18	18	0
R10	Rising Power	15	0	15
R21	Regional Leader	13	11	2
R8	Independent	9	1	8
R15	Bridge across Continents (Geographical)	3	3	0
R17	Model Country	1	1	0
R14	Eastern Country	0	0	0
	TOTAL	723	431	292

The percentages of this distribution are shown in the following chart:




Figure 35 60th Government (Rg-Ge Comparison)

As it is observed in the Table 49 above the most frequently referred role conceptions (except AI and GSC) are those that refer to specific regions the Rg frequency is 60% of the total role utterances. The following chart illustrates this finding:




Figure 36 60th Government Rg-Ge Comparison Chart

The following chart illustrates the regional distribution of these roles:




Figure 37 60th Government Rg Distribution Chart

The regional distribution chart (Figure 37) shows that, similar to those of the 59th government, most of the regional references of the 60th Government go to Rg3 (42% - MENA/ and Eastern Mediterranean). The second most referred region is Rg2 (28% - Caucasus/Central Asia/Black Sea). Third region is Rg5 (Euro-Atlantic – US + EU except Rg1). The fourth region is Rg1 (Balkans and Eastern Europe). The least referred region is Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa).

We see a decrease in the role reference percentages towards Rg3 (from 50 to 42%) and Rg5 (from 20 to 14%), and increase in Rg2 (from 17 to 28%) and Rg1 (from 10 to 12%). This makes better sense when we look at which roles are mostly directed towards these regions. Let us see the following figure:






Figure 38 60th Government Regional Role Distributions Chart

The figure above indicates the dominance of Rg3 (MENA/Eastern Mediterranean)) in 60th government's role references. The most frequently referred roles towards the region are: DoP, RSC, RP, and Peace Maker (PM), Mediator, protector and Regional Leader. Second region is Rg2 (Caucasus/Central Asia/Black Sea). We see a dramatic increase in the references towards this region. The most frequent roles towards Rg2 are: RSC, DoP, RP, Dev, GoodN, Mediator and trading State Role conceptions. The third region is Rg5 (Euro Atlantic/EU except Rg1) and the two dominant roles towards this region are: Western Country and Faithful Ally. The fourth most frequently referred region is Rg1 and the most frequent roles towards this region are: DoP, Regional Power (RP), RSC, GoodN, Developer and Protector. The least frequently referred region is Rg4 (Sub-Saharan Africa) and we see three dominate roles towards this region: Active Independent (AI), DoP, and RSC. The following table summarizes these findings:

Table 50 60th Government Rg Role Ranking (F # and % Distribution)

Rank	RG3 Roles	F#	%	RG2 Roles	F#	%	Rg5 Roles	F#	%	Rg1 Roles	F#	%	Rg4 Roles	F#	%
1	DoP	43	52	RSC	25	38	West	27	100	DoP	12	14	AI	6	75
2	RSC	29	44	DoP	22	27	FA	25	100	RP	11	22	DoP	4	5
3	RP	21	41	RP	16	31	TS	3	11	RSC	8	12	RSC	3	5
4	PM	21	84	Dev	15	46	ETC	3	30	GoodN	6	18	RP	1	2
5	Med	17	57	Med	13	43	DoP	2	2	Dev	4	12	Dev	1	3
6	Prot.	15	83	GoodN	13	39	RP	2	4	RL	3	25	TS	1	5
7	GoodN	14	43	TS	12	63	RSC	1	1	Prot.	3	17			
8	Dev	13	39	ETC	4	40				ETC	2	20			
9	RL	7	58	PM	2	8				PM	2	8			
10	AI	2	25	RL	2	17				TS	1	5			

All regions : DoP, RSC, Regional Power, Trading State (All Regions)

Multiple Regions : Developer (4 Regions)

Single Region : Western Country, Faithful Ally (Rg5) - ~~Eastern Country~~ (Rg3)

The table above presents the first 10 regional roles (if available) towards each region. The regions are ranked from left to right according to the total role reference frequencies. The regional roles are ranked from top to bottom according to the Frequency (F# Column). This information is then combined with the percentages (% Column) data. The % column shows the percentage of each role's reference towards each region. For instance, the DoP role conception has ranked first in Rg3. The role has been uttered 115 times in total and 43 times (see F# Column) towards Rg3. The percentage column indicates that 52% of the total regional DoP role references have been directed towards Rg3. Compared to the 59th government's role conceptions we observe that the regional references have been further diversified in the 60th government. For instance the DoP reference percentage towards Rg3 decreased from 72% to 52% whereas this decrease showed itself as an increase in Rg2 (from 16% to 27%) and Rg1 (from 11 to 14%). A similar trend is observed in GoodN, Developer, and Mediator role conceptions. Another difference from the 59th government is that we see a dramatic increase in role references towards Rg2 (Caucasus/Black Sea/C.A). We see an increase in Mediator and Defender of Peace role conceptions towards this region. This might be slightly affected from the Abkhazia Crisis between Georgia and Russia in this period. Another important increase is the references towards the Trading state role conception towards this region (from 32 to 63 percent). Another important finding is that Turkey has become an active independent in Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa). This increase is most probably a reflection of the so-called African Opening policy of the AKP government, which started at around 2005. Last but not the least a significant shift is that we see an increase in the overall appearance of Regional power Role conception. References towards this role have increased in almost all surrounding regions.

The findings indicate that Turkey is less western in the 60th government compared to the previous government. There is an increase in the references towards the surrounding regions. In this period Turkey becomes a less western country that follows a more regionally diversified foreign policy, and actively seek for peace, cooperation and trade in its immediate surroundings. These findings will be further compared in the last section of the chapter.

4.1.3.3 Role Conceptions of the 61st Government (2011-2014)

The 61st Government remained in rule for 3 years between July 2011 and August 2014. A combination of Erdoğan and Davutoğlu's relevant speeches is utilized in the analysis of 61th Government role conceptions. A total number of 24 speeches (Er 25-32 and Davutoğlu 9-24) composed of approximately 80050 words are analyzed for the 61st government. Each speech is analyzed separately and every role reference is coded in the TFPRED dataset. The following two tables show the lists the speeches (Table 51) and present the combined data (Table 52) for the 61st Government, which is taken originally from the dataset.

Table 51 61st Government Speeches Er (25-32) and AD (9-24) Combined

Speech Code#	Speech Date	Word Count (Approx.)	Speech Code#	Speech Date	Word Count (Approx.)
Er25	08.07.2011	2500	AD9	23.12.2011	3500
Er26	23.09.2011	3400	AD10	04.06.2012	2000
Er27	30.09.2012	2200	AD11	07.09.2012	1000
Er28	03.11.2012	1400	AD12	28.09.2012	1000
Er29	11.12.2012	1050	AD13	06.11.2012	4000
Er30	31.08.2013	1300	AD14	27.12.2012	8000
Er31	11.12.2013	1000	AD15	02.01.2013	7000
Er32	28.01.2014	1200	AD16	02.01.2013	4000
	TOTAL	14050	AD17	06.01.2013	1500
			AD18	09.03.2013	7500
			AD19	15.03.2013	5000
			AD20	13.01.2014	9000
			AD21	18.01.2014	6000
			AD22	18.01.2014	3700
			AD23	04.06.2014	1400
			AD24	28.08.2014	1400
			Total		66000
TOTAL # OF SPEECHES: 24			TOTAL WORD COUNT: 80850		

Table 52 Combined References for the 61st Gov. (Er 25-32 + AD 9-24)

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]	Rg (1/0)	Rg#	Ge (1/0)	Ge#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
R4	Protector of the Opp.	18	115	76	95	17	83	11	32	2	6	69	5	0
R18	Developer	16	75	34	45	15	61	6	14	12	17	12	20	0
R3	Trading State	13	69	48	55	9	39	11	30	3	11	9	15	1
R2	Defender of P & S	18	60	50	55	12	32	15	28	3	3	23	3	0
R9	Active Independent	21	56	54	55	11	14	18	42	1	1	2	10	0
R12	Regional Subs. Col	14	52	39	42	11	39	7	13	3	17	18	2	0
R1	Global System Col.	14	33	29	33	0	0	14	33	0	0	0	0	0
R20	Good Neighbor	12	25	21	21	5	12	10	13	3	4	5	0	0
R7	Peace-M/Problem-S	12	22	20	22	11	19	2	3	1	3	13	2	0
R5	Central/Pivotal C.	9	22	19	21	0	0	9	22	0	0	0	0	0
R13	Western Country	12	21	19	21	12	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	21
R22	Regional Power	10	15	10	10	9	14	1	1	1	4	6	2	1
R10	Rising Power	9	12	12	12	0	0	9	12	0	0	0	0	0
R6	Mediator	6	9	9	9	4	4	5	5	0	2	0	2	0
R19	Energy Transp. C.	6	8	8	8	1	1	5	7	0	1	0	0	0
R11	Bridge across Civ.	6	6	6	6	0	0	6	6	0	0	0	0	0
R8	Independent	4	5	5	5	0	0	4	5	0	0	0	0	0
R16	Faithful Ally	5	5	5	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
R21	Regional Leader	3	5	5	5	3	5	0	0	1	0	4	0	0
R14	Eastern Country	2	3	3	3	2	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
R17	Model Country	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
R15	Bridge across Cont.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL	212	620	474	530	129	354	133	266	30	69	166	61	28

As the table illustrates 620 role references are identified in the 24 speeches delivered by Erdoğan and Davutoğlu. 354 of these references are region specific and the remaining 266 are general (No region is specified). One role has appeared in almost all speeches (AI – Look at column Y/N). One role has no appearance: Bridge across Continents (Geobrid). Three roles have a very limited appearance: Regional leader, Eastern Country, and Model Country. The most frequently referred role is the Protector of the Oppressed role. Five roles have no region-specific appearance (look at column RG): Global System Collaborator (GSC), Central Country (CC), Independent Country (IC), Rising Power (Rise), Bridge across Civilizations (Civbrid). Six roles have almost always referred to a region (Look at column Ge (1/0)): Western Country, Eastern Country, Faithful Ally, Model Country, Regional Power, and Regional Leader. The following table presents a frequency-based list of these role references:

Table 53 61st Government Frequency Based List

	ROLE	Y/N	F#	[S-c]	[S-p]
	TOTAL	212	620	474	530
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	18	115	76	95
R18	Developer	16	75	34	45
R3	Trading State	13	69	48	55
R2	Defender of peace and Stability	18	60	50	55
R9	Active Independent	21	56	54	55
R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator	14	52	39	42
R1	Global System Collaborator	14	33	29	33
R20	Good Neighbor	12	25	21	21
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	12	22	20	22
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	9	22	19	21
R13	Western Country	12	21	19	21
R22	Regional Power	10	15	10	10
R10	Rising Power	9	12	12	12
R6	Mediator	6	9	9	9
R19	Energy Transporting Country	6	8	8	8
R11	Bridge across Civilizations (Ideational)	6	6	6	6
R8	Independent	4	5	5	5
R16	Faithful Ally	5	5	5	5
R21	Regional Leader	3	5	5	5
R14	Eastern Country	2	3	3	3
R17	Model Country	2	2	2	2
R15	Bridge across Continents (Geographical)	0	0	0	0

According to the Table 53 the most frequently referred role conception in the 61st government is the Protector of the Oppressed (Protector) role conception with 115# references. Second, although the role does not appear in all speeches (it appeared in 16 speeches), the Developer role conception has been referred to 75 times. The third most frequently referred role conception is trading state. Fourth, role conception is the Defender of Peace role conception. Then, although it appeared in almost all speeches the Active Independent (AI appears in 21 speeches out of 24) role conception ranks the fifth. The next figure shows the frequency percentages of these role references:




Figure 39 61st Government - Ranked Frequency Percentages

This figure illustrates the significance of the first 6 roles. Similar to those of the previous governments, the first 6 roles are more frequently referred to (almost 60 percent) than the total frequency of the remaining 16 roles. There are a couple of significant shifts in the 61st government’s role conception frequencies. The “Protector of the Oppressed” role conception ranks the first with 19% (It was 2% in the previous government). Second, we see another significant increase in the rank of Developer role conception (Increased from 6%-6th to 12 %-2nd). The third shift is in

the rank of Trading State (TS), which ranked 3rd in the 61st government (was 4%-12th in the previous government). The most frequently referred three roles of the 60th government (DoP, RSC and AI) were replaced by Protector, TS, and developer role conceptions. For instance, the Protector of the Oppressed replaced the Defender of Peace role conception. These shifts are the results of two significant foreign policy events that happened in TFP this era: the African Opening Initiative and the Arab Uprisings in Turkey's neighboring countries. As will be shown in the following figures, there is a significant increase in the role references towards these two regions. Another interpretation could be that there is a shift towards a more conflictual, risk taker foreign policy orientation. Because protecting the oppressed people might necessitate Turkey to enter into a conflict with countries that are regarded to have oppressive regimes. Remember the definition, Ozdamar et al.(2014: 105): "Erdoğan and Davutoğlu have consistently framed Turkey as a 'protector of the oppressed' (...) this role mainly refers to a mission that Turkey supports people who live under oppressive governments." Table 54 shows Rg distributions.

Table 54 61th Gov. Rg-Ge Distribution

	ROLE	F#	Rg#	Ge#
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	115	83	32
R18	Developer	75	61	14
R3	Trading State	69	39	30
R2	Defender of peace and Stability	60	32	28
R9	Active Independent	56	14	42
R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator	52	39	13
R1	Global System Collaborator	33	0	33
R20	Good Neighbor	25	12	13
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	22	19	3
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	22	0	22
R13	Western Country	21	21	0
R22	Regional Power	15	14	1
R10	Rising Power	12	0	12
R6	Mediator	9	4	5
R19	Energy Transporting Country	8	1	7
R11	Bridge across Civilizations (Ideational)	6	0	6
R8	Independent	5	0	5
R16	Faithful Ally	5	5	0
R21	Regional Leader	5	5	0
R14	Eastern Country	3	3	0
R17	Model Country	2	2	0
R15	Bridge across Continents (Geographical)	0	0	0
	TOTAL	620	354	266

The following figure, which shows the percentages of this distribution:




Figure 40 61st Government (Rg-Ge Comparison %)

As it is observed in the table and figure above the most frequently referred role conceptions (except AI) are those that refer to specific regions. The Rg reference frequency gets 57% of the total role utterances. The following chart illustrates this finding:




Figure 41 61st Government Rg-Ge Comparison Chart

The following chart indicates the regional distribution of these roles:




Figure 42 61st Government Rg Distribution Chart

The regional distribution chart (Figure 42) shows that, similar to those of the 59th and 60th governments, most of the regional references of the 61st Government go to Rg3 (47% - MENA/ and Eastern Mediterranean). This percentage was 50% in the 59th Government, and 42% in the 60th Government.

Although Rg2 (20% - Caucasus/Central Asia/Black Sea) is still the second most referred region we see a significant decline in the percentages. This decline was captured by the rising percentage of references towards Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa), which takes the third place with a very significant increase. The region has acquired 17% of the total role references in the 61st government, which had been 3% in the 59th Government and 4% in the 60th government.

While taking 8% of the total references Rg5 (Euro-Atlantic – US + EU except Rg1) and Rg1 (Balkans and Eastern Europe) have been the least referred regions in the 61st government. Rg5 had 20% in 59th government and 14% in the 60th. Rg1 had 10% in the 59th government and 12% in the 60th. The most significant finding here is that we see a very clear increase in role references towards Rg4. Now let us see which roles are mostly observed in all these regions in the following figure:

61st. Government Rg Role Distributions




Figure 43 61st Gov. Rg Role Distributions (Ge Roles Excluded)

The figure above shows that the dominance of Rg3 (MENA/Eastern Mediterranean)) in 61st government's role references largely depend on the protector of the oppressed role conception. In addition, the dominance of the protector of the oppressed role conception shows the impact of the Arab uprisings on TFP.

With 166 role references in total, Rg3 ranks first among the other regions. The most frequently referred roles towards this region are Protector (69#), Defender of Peace (23#), Regional Subsystem Collaborator (18#), Peacemaker (13#) and Developer (12#). 61st government's roles towards this region seem to be national interest oriented, active, and cooperative. However, the existence and dominance of the Protector of the Oppressed role conception indicates a potentially conflictual and risk taking foreign policy orientation.

Rg2 (Caucasus) ranks second and have 69 total role references. Most frequently referred roles towards this region are Developer (17#), RSC (17#), and Trading State (11#). This shows that 61st government's relations with this region are mainly cooperative and economy oriented.

Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa) has 61 total references and ranks the third with a very slight difference than Rg2. Most frequently referred roles towards this region are Developer (20#), Trading State (15#), and Active Independent (10#). This regions significance has largely increased at the 61st government. This change is most probably due to the African opening initiative of the Turkish government. The dominance of the three roles explains the essence of the African Opening. Turkey while opening new embassies in the region significantly emphasizes its role as a Developer (Donor Country) together with an increase in Trading State: The decision-makers of the country seem to emphasize trade relations together with the aid they provide towards the region.

Rg1 (Balkans) ranks fourth with 30 references. The most significant role conception towards this region is the Developer (12 #), which is followed by Trading State (3#), RSC (3#), GoodN (3#) and DoP (3#). The decision-makers of the 61st government regard Turkey as a Developer in the region. Most of the findings are related to the restoration of the buildings and Ottoman heritage in the region.

Rg5 (Euro Atlantic) is the least referred region with 28 total references. The two main roles in this region are Western Country (21#) and Faithful Ally (5#). The significance of this region has clearly decreased from 59th government to 61st and AKP decision-makers' foreign policy role references have shifted towards other regions. Rg5 ranked 2nd in the 59th government, 3rd in the 60th government and 5th in the 61st government. This might be an indicator of the “axis-shift” debates that started in TFP literature around 2005.



Table 55 61st Gov. Regional Role Ranking (F # and % Distribution Table)

Rank	RG3 Roles	F#	%	RG2 Roles	F#	%	Rg4 Roles	F#	%	Rg1 Roles	F#	%	Rg5 Roles	F#	%
1	Protect	69	84	RSC	17	43	Dev	20	33	Dev	12	19	West	21	100
2	DoP	23	72	Dev	17	28	TS	15	38	TS	3	8	FA	5	100
3	RSC	18	45	TS	11	28	AI	10	72	RSC	3	7	TS	1	3
4	PM	13	68	Protect	6	7	Protect	5	6	GoodN	3	33	RegP	1	7
5	Dev	12	20	RegP	4	29	DoP	3	9	DoP	3	9			
6	TS	9	23	GoodN	4	25	RSC	2	5	Protect	2	2			
7	RegP	6	43	DoP	3	9	RegP	2	14	RegP	1	7			
8	GoodN	5	42	PM	3	16	PM	2	11	PM	1	5			
9	RL	4	80	Mediate	2	50	Mediate	2	50	AI	1	7			
10	East	3	100	AI	1	7				RL	1	20			

All regions : ~~DoP, PM, RSC, AI~~, TS, Regional Power (All Regions)

Multiple Regions : ~~Developer~~, Protector, DoP, RSC, PM, and Dev (4 Regions)

Single Region : Western Country, Faithful Ally (Rg5) - ~~Mediator~~, Eastern Country (Rg3)

The table above presents the first 10 regional roles (if available) towards each region. The regions are ranked from left to right according to the total role reference frequencies. The regional roles are ranked from top to bottom according to the Frequency (F# Column). This information is then combined with the percentages (% Column) data. The % column shows the percentage of each role's reference towards each region. The Protector of Oppressed role conception has ranked first in Rg3. The role has been uttered 83 times in total and 68 times (see F# Column) towards Rg3. The percentage column indicates that 84% of the total regional Protector Role references have been directed towards Rg3.

An important finding is that we see a diversification of Turkey's Rg4 role conceptions. Turkey's decision-makers have referred to the active independent in Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa). This has probably been so, due to the opening of new embassies in the region. In the 61st government, we see that Turkish leaders have referred to the Donor country (Developer) status of the country in the region. Then, we see that Turkey's decision-makers have emphasized the establishment of new economic ties with the region.

The findings indicate that Turkey is less western in the 61st government compared to the previous governments. There is an increase in the references towards not only the surrounding regions but also towards Africa. Here, we should take note that, although the role did not rank first in any of the regions, Trading State role conception is observed in all regions. This is a point that we should elaborate on the next section.

Last but not the least, in this period, similar to the shift that we observe in the previous government, we see that Turkey becomes a relatively less Western Country that follows an even more regionally diversified foreign policy, actively seeks for the establishment of new economic ties in these regions. Additionally, the emphasis on national interest and active foreign policy has overcome the country's emphasis on peace and stability. These findings will be further compared in the last section of the chapter.

4.2 A new Typology? General, Type1, Type2 and Type3 roles

As previously explained in the methodology Chapter (Chapter II – Section 2.3.3) the dissertation makes a distinction between roles with regional orientation and roles with general (no regional) orientation. The argument is that roles are determined according to specific set of relationships of Turkey with specific regions. The regional direction of role conceptions is an important aspect, which is often ignored by role theory scholars. TFPRED dataset proves that role directions differ and that every role is not observed in all regions. Since the direction of each role conception differs from one region to the other, the dissertation offers a new Role Typology.

The claim is that there are roles with regional orientation and roles with no regional orientation. So the first distinction that is coded in the dataset is the Regional (Rg roles) and General (Ge roles) distinction. It is not possible to observe differing role conceptions from one region to another without distinguishing between regional (Rg) and general (Ge) roles.⁶⁴ With the typology that is proposed here one can be able to observe the direction of each role conception. The direction matters because a country might follow a more assertive and conflictual foreign policy in one region whereas a less assertive and cooperative foreign policy in the other. The TFPRED dataset contains significant data to prove this claim for the Turkish case.

As shown in the previous sections, the TFPRED Dataset provides with important data on the regional distribution of Turkey's decision-makers' foreign policy role references. Three types of regional roles are found in Turkey's foreign policy: R_{Type1}, R_{Type2}, and R_{Type3}. Type 1 roles are those that refer only to a single region. Type2 roles are those that refer to multiple regions. Type3 are the roles that refer to all regions. This section summarizes and compares the role typologies of the three governments.

First, the following table comparatively summarizes the RG and GE distinction:

⁶⁴ I argue that this is a significant gap in the Role Theory literature. Currently, Role Theory scholars code each role reference as a Ge role, without necessarily taking the regional differences in consideration.

Table 56 TFPRED Role Typology: Comparative Sum. of the RG-GE roles

CODE	ROLE	Combined			59th Government			60th Government			61st Government		
		F#	Rg#	Ge#	F#	Rg#	Ge#	F#	Rg#	Ge#	F#	Rg#	Ge#
R1	GSC	169	0	169	82	0	82	54	0	54	33	0	33
R2	DoP	378	242	136	203	130	73	115	80	35	60	32	28
R3	TS	146	84	62	51	26	25	26	19	7	69	39	30
R4	Protector	159	126	33	26	25	1	18	18	0	115	83	32
R5	CC	114	1	113	56	1	55	36	0	36	22	0	22
R6	Mediate	55	48	7	14	14	0	32	30	2	9	4	5
R7	PM	148	114	34	91	72	19	35	23	12	22	19	3
R8	Independent	44	3	41	30	2	28	9	1	8	5	0	5
R9	AI	241	49	192	118	27	91	67	8	59	56	14	42
R10	Rise	55	0	55	28	0	28	15	0	15	12	0	12
R11	Civbrid	54	0	54	29	0	29	19	0	19	6	0	6
R12	RSC	249	197	52	116	92	24	81	66	15	52	39	13
R13	West	123	123	0	75	75	0	27	27	0	21	21	0
R14	East	15	15	0	12	12	0	0	0	0	3	3	0
R15	Geobrid	8	7	1	5	4	1	3	3	0	0	0	0
R16	FA	82	81	1	51	51	0	26	25	1	5	5	0
R17	Model	14	13	1	11	10	1	1	1	0	2	2	0
R18	Developer	165	137	28	50	45	5	40	31	9	75	61	14
R19	ETC	42	13	29	14	4	10	20	8	12	8	1	7
R20	GoodN	146	107	39	82	62	20	39	33	6	25	12	13
R21	RL	26	21	5	8	5	3	13	11	2	5	5	0
R22	RP	97	93	4	35	32	3	47	47	0	15	14	1

The table above indicates that five role conceptions have almost never (less than 10% of the total references) been directed towards a specific region. These roles are:

- Global System Collaborator
- Central Country
- Independent Country
- Rising Power
- Civilizational Bridge

The rest will be analyzed as regional roles. So, as the TFPRED dataset indicates 17 role conceptions have at least one regional direction. Now let us take a closer look at these 17 regional roles from the following chart:

Table 57 Role Typology: TFPRED Regional Role Directions (17 Roles)

CODE	ROLE	Rg#	Rg1#	Rg2#	Rg3#	Rg4#	Rg5#
R2	DoP	242	29	45	156	8	4
R12	RSC	197	23	71	87	7	4
R18	Developer	137	21	41	41	28	0
R4	Protector	126	5	7	106	7	0
R13	West	123	0	0	0	0	123
R7	PM	114	12	19	80	3	0
R20	GoodN	107	24	32	51	0	0
R22	RP	93	19	27	40	8	3
R3	TS	84	4	30	22	17	7
R16	FA	81	0	0	0	0	81
R9	AI	49	3	4	23	18	1
R6	Mediate	48	0	16	30	2	0
R21	RL	21	4	2	16	0	0
R14	East	15	0	0	15	0	0
R17	Model	13	0	0	12	0	0
R19	ETC	13	2	9	1	0	3
R15	Geobrid	7	2	3	2	0	0

The table presents the 17 regional references in ranked order (from the highest to the lowest). As the table presents four roles have only been directed to a single region. These are:

- Type 1 Roles: R13- Western Country; R16 – Faithful Ally; R14 –Eastern Country, R17- Model Country

Apart from single region roles there are Type2 roles, which refer to multiple regions. Among these roles Protector, Developer, Peacemaker, and Energy Transporting Country have directed towards four regions whereas Good Neighbor, Mediator, Active independent, Regional leader and geographical Bridge are directed towards three regions. The list is as follows:

- Type2 Roles:
 - Roles toward four regions: R18 - Developer; R4 - Protector; R7 - Peace-Maker; and R19 - Energy Transporting Country
 - Roles toward three regions: R20 - Good Neighbor, R6 – Mediator, R9 Active Independent, R21 Regional Leader, and R15 – Geographical Bridge

The remaining four regional roles are Defender of Peace and Stability, Regional Subsystem Collaborator, Regional Power, and Trading State, which, as the dataset show have been observed in all regions. These are argued as type three roles and listed below

- Type 3 Roles: R2 – Defender of Peace and Stability; R12 Regional Subsystem Collaborator; R22 – Regional Power and R3 – Trading State

All these findings are illustrated in the next table:

Table 58 Role Typology: Illustration of Regional Directions

CODE	ROLE	Type	Rg1	Rg2	Rg3	Rg4	Rg5
R2	Defender of P & S.	Type3					
R3	Trading State	Type3					
R12	Regional Subs. col.	Type3					
R22	Regional Power	Type3					
R19	Energy Transp. C.	Type2					
R4	Protector of the Opp.	Type2					
R7	Peace-M/Problem-S	Type2					
R9	Active Independent	Type2					
R18	Developer	Type2					
R15	Bridge across Cont.	Type2					
R20	Good Neighbor	Type2					
R21	Regional Leader	Type2					
R6	Mediator	Type2					
R14	Eastern Country	Type1					
R17	Model Country	Type1					
R13	Western Country	Type1					
R16	Faithful Ally	Type1					

The table illustrates how Turkey's decision-makers have asserted different role conceptions when the roles are directed towards different regions. This illustration will be further discussed in the next section.

4.3 Chapter Summary: Changes and Continuities in Role Conceptions

This section summarizes the observed patterns in Turkey's decision-makers' and AKP governments' foreign policy visions. The section is organized in a manner that goes from general to specific findings. The following table presents the most frequently referred 10 roles of each leader and government and summarizes the observed patterns in the TFPRED dataset.

Table 59 TFPRED Content Analysis Role Conceptions Summary

Rank	Erdoğan	Gül	Babacan	Davutoğlu	59th Gov.	60th Gov.	61st Gov.
1	DoP	DoP	DoP	Prot.	DoP	DoP	Protector
2	A.I	RSC	RSC	RSC	AI	RSC	Developer
3	Dev	Good	Good	A.I	RSC	AI	TS
4	RSC	GSC	Dev	TS	PM	GSC	DoP
5	Prot.	A.I	GSC	DoP	GSC	RP	AI
6	GSC	PM	Med	RP	GoodN	Developer	RSC
7	PM	West	A.I	Dev	West	GoodN	GSC
8	TS	FA	RP	CC	CC	CC	GoodN
9	CC	Dev	FA	GSC	TS	PM	PM
10	West	CC	TS	PM	FA	Mediator	CC
Leader based observations:					Government-based Observations:		
1. DoP role conception is uttered by all leaders although Davutoğlu puts it in the lower ranks.					1. A decrease in the peace-oriented roles (DoP, PM, GoodN) is observed		
2. Only Erdoğan and Davutoğlu refer to the Protector role conception					2. A decrease in relations with the West (FA, West) is observed.		
3. Only Gül and Babacan refer to the GoodN role conception					3. A significant increase in the Protector, developer and Trading State roles is observed. Probably a result of the Arab Uprisings, and African Opening.		
4. Gül and Babacan's role conceptions are more cooperative than those of Erdoğan and Davutoğlu					4. The 60 th Government is more cooperative than the 59 th government.		
5. The most assertive and possibly conflictual foreign policy vision is that of Davutoğlu, then Erdoğan, then Gül and Babacan.					However, with the 61 st government there is a significant decrease in cooperative roles (RSC, GSC).		

Starting from the decision-makers, the findings in section 4.1.2 indicate that there are significant differences in decision-makers' role references. Starting with Gül's role references, this section underlines and compares the most significant patterns and changes in the four AKP decision-makers' role references.

Abdullah Gül has made 638 role references in 21 speeches. 394 of these references have a specific regional direction and 244 of them have no regional orientation. The most frequently referred region is RG3 (MENA region) and his role conceptions have three commonalities. First, they are peace-related roles; second, they are cooperation related roles; and third, the roles require Turkey to take active part in their fulfillment. On the other hand the three least referred roles have the opposite connotations. For instance, regional leader is not a peaceful role, and bridge country and model country are either passive or prescribed roles. According to his regional references, Gül sees Turkey as a Developer in Sub-Saharan Africa (Rg4), a cooperative, peaceful and active actor in Balkans (Rg1), Caucasus (Rg2) and MENA (Rg3) and a member and an ally of the Western World (Rg5). TFPRED content analysis indicates that Abdullah Gül constructs an active, cooperative and peaceful foreign policy vision for TFP.

Babacan's most frequently referred role conceptions are again peace and cooperation oriented. We see a clear dominance of the DoP (Defender of Peace) role conception. There is an increase in the rank of developer and regional power role conceptions whereas a clear decrease in the rank of Western country. EC (Eastern Country) role conception has no appearance in Babacan's speeches. These findings can be regarded as the result of hampering Turkey-EU relations, and therefore an increase in Turkey's activity in its surrounding regions. But Turkey is definitely not seen as an Eastern country. The findings indicate that Babacan's regional relations are based on economy rather than cultural and/or historical belonging to the eastern/Muslim world. The slight increase in the rank of TS (Trading State) role is an indicator of this claim. The dataset indicates three clear changes in Babacan's foreign policy role conceptions from those of Gül. First, the rank of Active Independent (AI) has decreased and switched places with the Developer role conception; Second, the rank of Peace Maker (PM) role has decreased and switched places with the Mediator role;

and third, the Western Country (West) role has decreased and switched places with Regional Power role conception. The AI and PM role conceptions are comparatively more assertive (or aggressive) than Developer and Mediator role conceptions. Hence, according to these shifts the Babacan era seems to be representing a shift of foreign policy vision towards a less assertive, less western and more regionally balanced than the Gül era. TFPRED content analysis dataset indicates that Babacan also constructs a peace-oriented foreign policy vision for Turkey. However, compared to Gül's references, there is a more balanced regional foreign policy vision in Babacan's speeches. The importance of the relations with the West has decreased in Babacan's speeches, whereas regional engagement and economy related policies have increased. Cooperative and economy based roles are stressed frequently in almost all regions.

Davutoğlu's speeches represent clear shifts from the role conceptions of the previous leaders. Three important shifts are observed in the Davutoğlu era. First, the DoP role has been replaced by Protector of the Oppressed role conception. Second, GoodN and Faithful Ally role conceptions have clearly lost significance. Third, protector of the Oppressed (from 2 to 14%), Trading State (increased from 5 to 10 %) and Active independent (from 6 to 11%) role conceptions receives dramatically higher ranking. Similar with previous leaders, The Model Country, Eastern Country, and Bridge across Continents roles have no appearance. There are clear changes in the region rankings as well. Together with the ranking, the share of each region in the total has shifted significantly. The MENA region dominates by getting almost the half of all regional references. This is parallel with the Protector of the oppressed role conception that mainly rose after the Arab uprisings. Two important characteristics of Davutoğlu's foreign policy vision can be stressed. First, Davutoğlu's foreign policy roles are more assertive than those of Gül and Babacan. The impact of Arab Uprisings and the so-called "African Opening" initiative are seen in Davutoğlu's foreign policy role conceptions. And second Economic interests have increased significance in Davutoğlu's foreign policy vision. Turkey has increasingly been regarded as a Trading State in multiple regions. In sum, TFPRED dataset indicates that Davutoğlu's constructs a more assertive and economic interest oriented vision for TFP and peaceful policy is not necessarily a part of this vision.

In Erdoğan's speeches the DoP role conception receives the highest number of references. The active independent role still remains among the most referred roles. The high number of references to two roles - "Developer" and "Protector of the Oppressed"- indicates that Erdoğan sees Turkey as a powerful actor in foreign policy. However, his references are less assertive than those of Davutoğlu. The most significant difference between Erdoğan and other leaders is that, Erdoğan has the highest number of references to the Developer role. Similar to Davutoğlu the Western country and Faithful ally roles remain in the lower ranks. The AI and RSC roles are shared among all leaders. An interesting finding is that the GoodN role is left among the least referred role conceptions. A significant finding is that Erdoğan refers to MENA region more than the previous leaders (reference increased to 57% compared to 43% of Gül, 37% of Babacan, and 47% of Davutoğlu). The TFPRED dataset indicates that Erdoğan sees Turkey as a developer in the Balkans; a Defender of Peace, Protector of the Oppressed, a Peacemaker and Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC) in the Middle East; a Developer and RSC in the Caucasus and Central Asia; a Developer and Regional Power in the sub-Saharan Africa; and Faithful Ally and a member of the Euro Atlantic area. The overall findings indicate that Erdoğan constructs a peace-oriented, active, and cooperative but powerful country vision for TFP.

The shifting foreign policy visions of the leaders are parallel to those of the governments and there are also significant changes in the foreign policies of the three governments, which are explained in Section 4.1.3.

The most frequently referred six role conceptions of the 59th government are the Defender of Peace (DoP), Active Independent (AI) and Regional Subsystem Collaborator, Peace maker (PM), Good Neighbor (GoodN) and Global System Collaborator (GSC) role conceptions. These six roles have been more frequently referred to (almost 60 percent) than the total frequency of the remaining 16 roles. These roles resemble a foreign policy that is peace and cooperation oriented followed by a country that actively seeks to achieve its national interests. These roles are not assertive or conflictual and resemble a pragmatic middle power strategy. Passive roles (Model country, Bridge Country) or assertive/conflictual roles (for instance Regional Leader, Protector of the Oppressed) are in the lower ranks. Most of the

regional references of the 59th Government go to Rg3. The second most referred region is Rg5. The third region is Rg2 and fourth region is Rg1. The least referred region is Rg4. A typology-based regional role list is as follows:

- **Rtype3** : DoP, PM, RSC, AI,
- **Rtype2** : Developer , Regional Power
- **Rtype1** :Western Country, Faithful Ally (Rg5) - Mediator, Eastern Country (Rg3)

In the 60th government, the most frequently observed five role conceptions are the DoP, RSC, AI, GSC, and RP. Similar to those of 59th government, the first 6 roles are more frequently referred to (almost 60 percent) than the total frequency of the remaining 16 roles. The most frequently referred roles are similar to those of the 59th Government, however their rankings have changed. First, there is a change between the ranks of Active Independent and Regional Subsystem Collaborator role conceptions. The RSC role ranks the second (was third previously). Second, we see an increase in the percentages of Regional Power, Developer roles whereas a decrease in the reference percentages of Peace Maker and Western Country role conceptions. Compared to the 59th government, an increase in the percentages of region specific roles is observed in the 60th government. The roles still remain peace-oriented, active and cooperative in nature. However, the 60th government's foreign policy deals more with the immediate neighborhood of the country. In other words, TFP decision maker's vision of Turkey seems to be less Western but more regional in this period. Compared to the 59th government's role conceptions we observe that the regional references have been further diversified in the 60th government. There is a dramatic increase in role references towards Rg2 (Caucasus/Black Sea/C.A). We see an increase in Mediator and Defender of Peace role conceptions towards this region. This might be slightly affected from the Abkhazia Crisis between Georgia and Russia in this period. Another important increase is the references towards the Trading state role conception towards this region (from 32 to 63 percent). One important finding is that references towards the AI role conception increased in sub-Saharan Africa. This increase is most probably a reflection of the so-called African Opening policy of the AKP government, which started at around 2005. Last but not the least a significant shift is that we see an

increase in the overall appearance of Regional Power role conception. References towards this role have increased in almost all surrounding regions. TFPRED findings indicate that, in this period Turkey becomes a less western country that follows a more regionally diversified foreign policy, and actively seeks for peace, cooperation and trade in its immediate surroundings. A typology-based regional role list is as follows:

- **Rtype3** : DoP, RSC, Regional Power, Trading State (All Regions)
- **Rtype2** : Developer
- **Rtype1** : Western Country, Faithful Ally (Rg5) - Eastern Country (Rg3)

In the 61st Government era, the most frequently referred five role conceptions are Protector, Developer, Trading State, Defender of Peace, Active Independent role conceptions. There are a couple of significant shifts in the 61st government's role conception frequencies. The most frequently referred three roles of the 60th government (DoP, RSC and AI) were replaced by Protector, TS, and Developer role conceptions. These shifts are most probably the results of two significant foreign policy events that happened in TFP this era: the African Opening Initiative and the Arab Uprisings in Turkey's neighboring countries. The findings indicate that there is a shift towards a more conflictual, risk-taker foreign policy orientation.⁶⁵ Another important finding is that we see a diversification of Turkey's Rg4 role conceptions. Turkey's decision-makers have referred to the active independent in Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa). This has probably been so, due to the opening of new embassies in the region. The findings indicate that Turkey is less western in the 61st government compared to the previous governments. There is an increase in the references towards not only the surrounding regions but also towards sub-Saharan Africa. Last but not the least, similar to the shift that we observe in the previous government, we see that Turkey becomes a relatively less Western Country that follows an even more regionally diversified foreign policy, actively seeks for the establishment of new economic ties in these regions. The emphasis on national interest and active foreign

⁶⁵ Because protecting the oppressed people might necessitate Turkey to enter into a conflict with countries that are regarded to have oppressive regimes. Remember our definition, Ozdamar et al. (2014: 105) argue that "Erdoğan and Davutoğlu have consistently framed Turkey as a 'protector of the oppressed' (...) this role mainly refers to a mission that Turkey supports people who live under oppressive governments."

policy has overcome the country's emphasis on peace and stability. A typology-based regional role list is as follows:

- **Rtype3** : ~~DoP, PM, RSC, AI~~, TS, Regional Power
- **Rtype2** : ~~Developer~~, Protector, DoP, RSC, PM, Dev (4 Regions) -
- **Rtype1** : Western Country, Faithful Ally (Rg5) - ~~Mediator~~, Eastern Country (Rg3)

The above-mentioned three governments have put different emphasis on the regional direction of their foreign policy role conceptions as well. As it is presented above, starting from the 59th government AKP governments have increasingly become more interested in the country's surrounding regions. The regional emphasis has become more diversified as the respective governments engaged more with regions other than the West. The following figures illustrate the comparative regional distribution of the three AKP governments.




Figure 44 TFPRED: Percentage Distribution of Regional Role References




Figure 45 TFPRED: Regional Distribution of TFP Role Conceptions

As the figures above illustrate, the following patterns are observed in TFP regional role references:

- 1) Most of the regional role references in the AKP governments are directed towards Rg3. Remember that the most frequently referred role conceptions toward the region are DoP, AI, and RSC until the 61st government when the Protector Role conception ranks first.
- 2) There is a significant pattern of decrease in role references towards Rg5 (Euro-Atlantic area). Most frequently referred roles toward this region are Western Country and Faithful Ally
- 3) An increase in role references toward Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa) is observed. Especially in the 61st government it rose from 4% to 17%. Remember that the most frequently roles directed towards this region are Active independent, Developer, Trading state and Regional Power.
- 4) The percentages of AKP's regional role references are increasingly diversified and balanced as the governments change.

In conclusion, it should be kept in mind that the findings that are presented in this chapter are based on the analysis of the AKP decision-makers' speeches. However, as the dissertation argues, observing the foreign policy speeches of the leaders only partly explain a country's foreign policy. One also needs to look at how the country actually behaves in its foreign relations. While clarifying the foreign policy vision of AKP decision-makers', this section has only observed the words of TFP. The deeds will be observed in the next chapter through event data analysis.

CHAPTER V

EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS: TFP EVENTS (DEEDS)

This chapter presents the findings of the “Data Collection Phase II: Event data”. Approximately 36.000 news reports from November 2002 to August 2014 are analyzed according to the coding scheme (see Section 3.3). The resulting TFPRED event dataset contains 16069 events from November 2002 to August 2014, which are coded separately through the use of TABARI (Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions – Version 0.8.4b2) Software.

The dataset contains information on: (1) the date, (2) source and target, (3) event code, (4) scale (Cameo Conflict/Cooperation value), (5) event type (Verbal/Material Conflict/Cooperation), and (6) the Regional Direction (Rg1, Rg2, Rg3, Rg4, or Rg5) of each event. The data is used to analyze Turkey’s foreign relations with each region and observe the actual foreign policy behavior of the country.

The following three sections analyze TFP events in a deductive manner. The first section starts with general findings. It presents data on Turkey’s foreign relations with the world in general and five regions in particular. Then, the section presents a government-based interpretation of Turkey’s relations with the five regions. The second section evaluates TFP role performance, which is evaluated with the “Role/Event matching” presented in section 3.4 of the Methodology chapter. The final section gives a chapter summary and lists the observed patterns in TFP role performance.

5.1 General Findings: TFP events in Total (2002-2014)

After collecting the raw material from online sources that are explained in section 3.3, one can use the TABARI software to generate events. TABARI generates a text file (.TXT), which is then imported to Rstudio. While importing the data the event package in Rstudio checks for duplicate events and eliminates irrelevant data. After, some further checking of the dates and fine-tuning of the data the dataset will be ready to aggregate and interpret.⁶⁶ For instance The TABARI output file includes 20165 events that are coded from the news sources downloaded from LexisNexis database. Some of these events are duplicates, and some do not contain Turkey either as a source or a target. Some events on the other hand contain turkey as both source and target. These events are filtered and excluded from the dataset. The remaining dataset includes 16069 events from November 2002 to August 2014.

Some additional filtering is needed for the purposes of the dissertation. The TFPRED dataset is only interested with events between state actors in Rg1, Rg2, Rg3, Rg4 and Rg5. Therefore, non-state actors such as terrorist organizations or civil society organizations and state actors from irrelevant regions (Latin America and East Asia) are filtered eliminated from dataset. The remaining data contains 11429 events in Total.⁶⁷ The following table gives information on the number and direction of these events.

Table 60 TFPRED: Events Summary (November 2002 - August 2014)

TRSource	# of events	TRTarget	# of events	TOTAL
TRtoRg1	388	Rg1toTR	469	857
TRtoRg2	898	Rg2toTR	776	1674
TRtoRg3	2631	Rg3toTR	1927	4558
TRtoRg4	56	Rg4toTR	48	104
TRtoRg5	1835	Rg5toTR	2147	3982
TRtoOther ⁶⁸	161	OthertoTR	156	317
TRtoWorld(Sum)	5969	WorldtoTR(Sum)	5523	11492

The following chart illustrates quarterly data on Turkey's foreign policy activity.

⁶⁶ The TFPRED codebook contains step-by-step and detailed explanation of how Rstudio is used to create TFPRED. Please see the appendices or send an email to the author: ismailerkam@gmail.com to see the TFPRED Codebook.

⁶⁷ Every single event is coded separately and each region is included in the TFPRED dataset as separate Ms. Excel worksheet. If you are interested in seeing the Dataset, it will be publicly available after the dissertation is approved

⁶⁸ "Other" includes actors from East Asia and Latin America




Figure 46 TFPRED: Number of Coded Events

The average number of Turkey's foreign policy actions from TR to World is 124. The figure indicates that the number of TFP events fell below average in some quarters and there are fluctuations in Turkey's foreign policy activity towards the world. The first peak in the number of observed foreign policy events corresponds with 2003 general elections in Turkey and the US-led coalition war on Iraq. Then, Turkey's foreign policy activity fell down, until it made a second peak in late 2007 just after the elections July 2007. Then, it fell below average until it made another peak in mid- 2010 (Mavi Marmara incident). Then, it fell below average in late 2010 until it made another peak in late 2011 and early 2012, which is the initial period of Arab Uprisings. The figure indicates that Turkey's foreign policy activity fell below average in mid-2013 when Turkey started to deal with domestic political events like the Terrorist bombing in Reyhanlı, the Gezi Protests and 17/25 December Investigations.

The figure above illustrates data for four governments. The initial peak of foreign policy events in early 2003 corresponds with TFP under the 58th government (from November 2002 to March 2003). The most significant foreign policy decision of that period was the Turkish Parliament's denial of the government bill on Turkey's military participation in the US led coalition war in Iraq on March 1st, 2003. The increase in the foreign policy activity of that era was most probably related to the war on Iraq. There is a pattern of decline in foreign policy activity of the 59th government (2003-2007) and it fell below average (124 events in a quarter) in late 2006. The fall continued until the government elections in July 2007. The instant collapse of foreign policy events in early 2007 corresponds with the presidential elections in Turkey. The elections caused significant turmoil in the Turkish parliament (the controversy over a quorum of 367 members') and public (the Republic Protests- *Cumhuriyet Mitingleri*). Following this turmoil the Turkish Armed Forces issued an e-memorandum on April 27th, 2007. There is a peak in the number of foreign policy events in early 2008 just after the elections when AKP established its third government in July 2007 (60th Gov.). The foreign policy activity immediately fell below average in early 2008, which corresponds with the party closure case in the Turkish constitutional court against AKP. Foreign policy activity remained below average between early 2008 and late 2010. TFP activity makes another peak after the

Mavi Marmara incident, and then fell below average just before the start of Arab uprisings in late 2010. Another fall is observed just before June 2011 general elections when AKP established its fourth government (61st Gov.). The new government came into power facing the impact of Arab Uprisings in the MENA region. Foreign policy activity has generally remained above average until mid-2013 when it fell below average again and started to decline. The post-2013 era represents serious domestic political crisis, which has apparently affected Turkey's foreign policy activism negatively. There are important observations that we can make from the changing numbers of foreign policy events. First, the number of observed foreign policy events increase when significant real life foreign policy crisis (like Iraq War, Mavi Marmara, Arab Uprisings) emerge in the country's surrounding regions. This finding is important since it verifies the analyst's expectations on the ability of event data analysis to capture the impact of real life foreign policy events.⁶⁹ Second, the figure indicates that there is a correlation (if not causality) between domestic political crisis and foreign policy activity. As the significance of domestic political crisis increase, foreign policy activity of the country declines. Last but not the least, although there are some fluctuations, one can observe a pattern of decline in Turkey's overall foreign policy activity under the three AKP governments. The average number of foreign policy events in a quarter is 152 in the 59th government, 111 in the 60th government, and 96 in the 61st government era.

A second way of analyzing foreign policy events is to scale them under a conflict-cooperation spectrum. These events are scaled according to the CAMEO Conflict/Cooperation Scores (Goldstein 1992; Yonamine 2012)⁷⁰. This provides the analyst with a way to observe the Conflictual (+10) and Cooperative (-10) nature of each event. The following figure illustrates the quarterly mean scores of Turkey's foreign relations.

⁶⁹ A country would be more active when it faces serious challenges in its foreign policy environment. If event data is able to represent the real foreign policy practices of a country, then an analyst would expect that the number of observed events (through TABARI software) will increase during times of significant foreign policy crisis. This expectation is verified with the Figure 46 above.

⁷⁰ In order to see the scores of each event, please visit the following link:
<http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/cameo.dir/CAMEO.SCALE.txt> . Accessed 17.17.2016




Figure 47 TFPRED: Turkey's Foreign Relations (Quarterly – Mean Scores)

The following figure shows the monthly distribution of these scores




Figure 48 TFPRED: Turkey's Foreign Relations (Monthly – Mean Scores)

The figures above illustrate the fluctuations in the cooperative and conflictual nature of Turkey's foreign relations with the world. As Figure 47 illustrates, TFP had been mainly cooperative until mid-2007. It fell below 0 and turned conflictual between mid-2007 and late-2008. Then an increase is observed until late 2011. After late-2011 we see a conflictual foreign policy from TR to the World. As the figure indicates, the 59th Government (March 2003- July 2007) seems to have followed a cooperative foreign policy.⁷¹ The figure indicates that the initial foreign policy activism of AKP has been mainly cooperative activism. Then, with the establishment of the 60th government (July 2007- June 2011) the foreign policy activity of Turkey has turned to be a mixture of conflict and cooperation. The initial period from July 2007 to December 2008 represents a conflictual foreign policy. Then foreign policy turned toward cooperation until it makes a peak in the last quarter of 2009. Then there is an instant decline in July 2010 and incline in October 2010. TFP remained cooperative until April 2011 and then turned towards conflict. These fluctuations indicate that 60th government follows a mixed foreign policy in terms of conflict and cooperation.⁷² The foreign policy of the 61st government (June 2011 - August 2014) is conflictual according to the figure. The nature of TFP turned towards conflict in this era and sees the bottom in the third quarter of 2013 (From

⁷¹ This period corresponds with the so-called "golden age of Europeanization in Turkey" and the establishment of "zero-problems with neighbors" policy. The direction of activism in this era might most probably be a result of Turkey's relations with the West. This will be further observed below while observing the regional direction of these foreign policy events.

⁷² This is most probably due to the impact of significant foreign policy events

July to November). This period is the most conflictual foreign policy period in TFP under AKP. Then we see an instant incline in early 2014 followed by a decline afterwards. The fluctuations in the cooperative and conflictual nature of TFP events would be better understood below, when regional direction of these events are analyzed. However, it should be noted here that there is a significant pattern of decline in the average cooperation scores of the three AKP governments. The average score of 59th Government is +1.04, the 60th Government is +0, 45, and 61st Government is -0, 69.

A third way of aggregating and analyzing events is to distribute and count Verbal/Material, and cooperative/conflictual events. This distribution is made by Duval and Thompson (1980; quoted in Yonamine 2012: 8) who establish four categories for all events. These four categories are explained by Yonamine (2012:8, emphasis added):

“Verbal Cooperation: The occurrence of dialogue-based meetings (e.g. negotiations, peace talks), statements that express a desire to cooperate or appeal for assistance (other than material aid) from other actors.

Material Cooperation: Physical acts of collaboration or assistance, including receiving or sending aid, reducing bans and sentencing, etc.

Verbal Conflict: A spoken criticism, threat, or accusation, often related to past or future potential acts of material conflict.

Material Conflict: Physical acts of a conflictual nature, including armed attacks, destruction of property, assassination, etc.”

This categorization is applied to TFPRED events and the following figure illustrates the result of the event counts:




Figure 49 TFPRED: Turkey's Foreign Relations (event categories)

The figure above (5.4) illustrates that verbal events are more frequently observed than material events in TFP. Verbal cooperation is mostly dominant over other events throughout the AKP era. However, the gap between cooperation and conflict closes as the number of cooperative events decrease in time. This is better illustrated in the following figure:




Figure 50 TFPRED: Conflict-Cooperation event counts

The figure compares the sum of verbal and material cooperation with the sum of verbal and material conflict. It illustrates the closing gap between cooperation and conflict in TFP. Cooperative events have generally seen more frequently than conflictual events except a short period in 2013 (third quarter) when conflict passes cooperation.

A significant finding here is that, with each new AKP government, cooperative events decrease whereas conflictual events increase. The following figure shows the government based distribution of these event types.




Figure 51 TFPRED: Gov-based event counts (Verbal/material Conf. /Coop.)

The figures illustrate that 67% of the total foreign policy events are cooperative. A comparison of governments indicates that there is a pattern of decrease in the share of cooperative events from one AKP government to the other. The percentage of cooperative events is 71% in 58th and 59th governments, 67% in the 60th government, and 58% in the 61st government. A similar pattern is observed in the share of verbal

cooperation from one government to the other. An important finding here is that there is a significant pattern of increase in the share of material conflict, which has been 5% in 58th government, 8% in 59th government, 12% in 60th government, and 15% in 61st government.

5.2 TFP events in Surrounding Regions

The TFPRED event dataset contains information on the regional direction of each event. 285 actors appear wither as a source or as a target in the TABARI-coded initial text file. These actors are manually grouped under relevant categories and then the events are aggregated under regions. The following table presents the regional distribution of events in which Turkey is a source:

Table 61 TFPRED Events (2002-2014): Regional direction

Rg Direct.	#total	#coop.	# Conf	conf.mat	conf.verb.	coop.mat.	coope verb.
TRtoRg1	388	281	107	20	87	35	246
TRtoRg2	898	613	285	114	171	88	525
TRtoRg3	2631	1691	940	354	586	279	1412
TRtoRg4	56	38	18	14	4	9	29
TRtoRg5	1835	1276	559	107	452	165	1111
TOTAL	5808	3899	1909	609	1300	576	3323

The table shows the total numbers of event observed in the dataset. In each of these events Turkey is the source and an actor from one of the regions is the target. The table indicates that the highest number of events is observed in Rg3 (MENA). 2631 events make almost half of the total number of events in the dataset. In general verbal events are more frequently observed than material events and cooperative events are more frequent than conflictual events. The most frequently observed event type is verbal cooperation, which is followed by verbal conflict, then material conflict and finally material cooperation. This pattern only changes in Rg1 (Balkans) and Rg5 (Euro Atlantic) where material cooperation is more frequent than material conflict. The following figure illustrates the regional percentage distribution of events:




Figure 52 TFPRED Events: Regional Distribution Percentages

This figure indicates the regions that Turkey is more involved in. The figure illustrates that most of the observed foreign policy events are directed to Rg3 (%45), which is followed by Rg5 (%32), then Rg2 (%15), then Rg1 (%7) and finally Rg4 (%1). A closer look to the scale and type of these events will clarify the nature of Turkey's relationship with these regions.

5.2.1 TFP events in Rg1 (The Balkans and Eastern Europe)

As the methodology section indicates, Rg1 refers to the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The content analysis chapter of this dissertation looked at the most frequently referred regions in AKP leaders' speeches and Rg1 ranked 4th among other regions (Please see Figure 5 of the previous chapter). The findings of TFPRED events dataset indicate that the same ranking is also observed in the regional direction of

events. So, Rg1 ranks as the 4th both in the words and in the deeds of AKP decision-makers. 388 events are directed towards this region, which makes 7% of the total number of events. The date, type, code, direction and score (CAMEO Scale) of each event is coded separately in the TFPRED dataset and placed in a separate worksheet in the TFPRED Excel Workbook. Then, these events are aggregated and counted.⁷³ The figures in this section illustrate the number, the conflict/cooperation scores, and Verbal/Material event counts of these events. To start with, the following figure illustrates the fluctuations in the number of these events in each quarter from 2002 to 2014.



⁷³ Please note that, this section presents only part of the data in the TFPRED Dataset, which are relevant to the argument of the dissertation. The dataset includes many information, and if you would like to take a look please send an email to the autho: ismailerkam@gmail.com




Figure 53 Rg1: Number of observed events (Quarterly)

The figure above illustrates the fluctuations in Turkey's relations with Rg1. The average number of events from Turkey towards the region in a quarter is 12. As the linear trend line illustrates Turkey's activity towards the region follows a pattern of decline. Especially after the second quarter of 2005, events toward the region fell and remained below average. There are five significant periods when the number of events towards the region make peak. The first peak is in mid-2003. This peak corresponds with the March 2003 elections and AKP's foundation of the 59th government. As the previous section indicates as well, Turkey's foreign policy activity falls below average before the elections and make peak in the immediate afterwards. The second peak is in the first two quarters of 2004. This period corresponds with the both EU's and NATO's enlargement towards this region.⁷⁴ The third peak is observed in the first and second quarter of 2005. This peak corresponds with the post Annan plan referendum and the start of Turkey's EU accession process. Most of the events in this period are between TR and Greece either related to the Cyprus issue or to Turkey-EU accession negotiations. The fourth peak is observed in early 2008. This corresponds both with the immediate aftermath of general elections in Turkey and the declaration of independence in Kosovo. And the final peak is observed in the second quarter of 2010. The period corresponds with Turkey's mediation attempts at the political crisis in the region and the trilateral summit between Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. This period is the last period in which Turkey's activism towards the region gets above average. Parallel to the pattern in other regions Turkey's regional activism continues to decrease after late-2010. A government-based observation of the number of events illustrates that Turkey's activity in the region decreases significantly from one government to the other. The average number of events in the region during the 59th government (March 2003 – July 2007) is 223, the 60th government (July 2007 – June 2011) is 121, and the 61st government (June 2011 – August 2014) is 31. After observing the fluctuations in the number of events towards in the previous figure, the cooperation (+10) and conflict (-10) scale is applied to see the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region. The next figure illustrates the quarterly average scores of this relationship.

⁷⁴ This increase is most probably related with Turkey's diplomatic support towards these enlargements. As will be presented in the following figures, especially Turkey's verbal cooperation towards this region makes peak in this period.




Figure 54 Rg1: The nature of Turkey's relations (Quarterly Mean Scores)

The figure above, illustrates the quarterly mean scores of Turkey's relations with the region. The following figure shows the monthly averages.




Figure 55 Rg1: Monthly Conflict-Cooperation Mean Scores

The monthly scores in the figure above better illustrates the intensity of Turkey's relations with Rg1. Turkey is mostly active and cooperative in the period between November 2002 and February 2007. One of the significant foreign policy events in this period is the Cyprus problem and Annan Plan referendum in April 2004. Since Greece is included among the actors of Rg1, the mid-2004 decline at the figure represents the conflictual (most probably verbal conflict) Turkey-Greece relations over the Cyprus referendum. The late 2006 incline in the figure corresponds with the declaration of independence after a referendum in Montenegro. Turkey has been mostly supportive of Montenegrin independence and become among the first countries that recognized the independence of the Republic of Montenegro. Then, then there are almost no events in 2007. There is a cooperative peak in late 2008 which corresponds with the immediate aftermath of the declaration of independence in Kosovo. As the figure illustrates Turkey's events towards the region re-intensified between 2009 and 2011. This period is mostly cooperative due to the trilateral meetings between Serbia, Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina. After 2011, Turkey becomes less interested in the region.

A government-based interpretation of the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region indicates that Turkey has been mostly cooperative towards the region in the 58th government with the average quarterly score of 2, 08. Then, there is a decline in

the 59th government with the average quarterly score is 1, 45. Turkey's relations with the region get more cooperative in the 60th government (1, 71). However, with the 61st government Turkey becomes less interested with the region and there is a significant decline in cooperation in the 61st government (0, 81).

After looking at the 'frequency' and 'nature' of Turkey's relationship with the region, a third way of aggregating events is to count the 'category' of events. The following figure illustrates the count of the categorized events from Turkey to Rg1:






Figure 56 Rg1: Turkey's Foreign Relations (event categories)

The figure above illustrates that most of the events from turkey towards the region are categorized under Verbal Cooperation. Only around mid-2004, mid-2009, and mid-2011 verbal conflict passes the count of verbal cooperation. However, in these periods there is very limited foreign policy activity (the highest number of events is 6 in a quarter). The following figure better illustrates the total cooperative (verbal + material) and conflictual event counts.




Figure 57 TR to Rg1: Conflict-Cooperation event counts

A government-based observation of the event counts in the figure above follows the pattern that we observe in the scaled events. Turkey's relations with the region are mostly cooperative. However, as new governments are founded by AKP both the number of events and the cooperative nature of relationship decreases. The following table better summarizes these numbers:

Table 62 Rg1: Events Summary (November 2002 - August 2014)

	TRtoRG1								
	EVENT SCALE	EVENT FREQUENCY				EVENT CATEGORY			
	CAMEO Score (Average)	# of Events (Avg.)	# of events	# of Coop.	# of Conf.	conf. mat	conf. verb	coop. mat	coop. verb
58th Gov	2,08	12	24	19	5	0	5	2	17
59th Gov	1,45	13	223	165	58	9	49	17	148
60th Gov	1,71	6	121	88	33	7	26	14	74
61st Gov	0,81	2	31	20	11	2	9	3	17
Overall	1,28	8	388	281	107	20	87	35	246

The Event Scale column gives the quarterly average scores of Turkey's events toward Rg1. The score does not fall below 0 under any government. The average score of all events towards the region is 1, 28. This means that Turkey's relations with the Rg1 are cooperative. The event frequency column shows the average and total number of events towards the region. The first column shows the quarterly average number of events. This column is interpreted in order to compare the Turkey's activism towards the region under each AKP government. As the figure illustrates the TFP under the 59th government is the most active period in Turkey-Rg1 relations. This activism is in decline under the subsequent governments. The remaining columns in the table give the category-based event counts. Most of Turkey's activity towards the region is under the verbal cooperation category. These numbers are illustrated and compared in the figures below.




Figure 58 TR to Rg1: Gov-based event counts

The figures illustrate the percentage share of each event type and compare one government with the other. The share of cooperative events remains relatively constant until the 61st government when there is a slight increase in the share of conflictual events. However, it is observed that Turkey's relations with Rg1 are still mostly cooperative.

Finally, the following table summarizes Turkey's relations with the Rg1



Table 63 TR to Rg1 events summary

TFPRED: TRtoRG1 Summary				
	Regional Activism (Quarterly Avrg. #)	Nature of Relationship (Average CAMEO score)	Event Category (Percentage Share)	Major foreign policy events in the region (Possible impact)
58th Gov	Active (12)	Most cooperative (2,08)	Verbal Cooperation (71%)	No significant regional event found
59th Gov	Active (13)	less cooperative (1,45)	Verbal Cooperation (66%)	1) The referendum of Annan Plan in Cyprus (conflict in Turkish Greek Relations, increase in number of events), 2) Independence of Montenegro (Increase in regional activism, Increase in cooperative events) 3) EU- NATO enlargement in the region (increase in number of events)
60th Gov	mixed (6)	more cooperative (1,71)	Verbal Cooperation (61%)	1) Independence of Kosovo (Increase in number of events, increase in cooperation) 2) Turkey's mediation efforts in the region Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina (Increase in cooperation, Increase in number of events)
61st Gov	Very limited (2)	least cooperative (0,81)	Verbal Cooperation (55%)	No significant regional event found
Pattern	Decreasing regional Activism	mostly cooperative (1,28)	Decrease in verbal cooperation (77% to 55%) Increase in verbal conflict (21% to 29%)	
General Observation: Turkey follows a cooperative foreign policy towards the region; however, its regional activism is in decrease.				

5.2.2 TFP events in Rg2 (The Black sea, Caucasus and C. Asia)

As the methodology chapter indicates, Rg2 refers to the surrounding region starting from Ukraine in the north, to Iran in the east of Turkey. Countries in the Black sea, Caucasus and Central Asia are included in this region. According to the findings of the content analysis of the previous chapter, Rg2 received 21% of the total role references and has been 2nd most frequently referred region (Please see Figure 5 of the previous chapter). The findings of TFPRED events indicate a different ranking. 15% of the total events are directed towards the countries in this region, which makes Rg2 the 3rd among others. 898 events are directed towards this region. The date, type, code, direction and score (CAMEO Scale) of each event is coded separately in the TFPRED dataset and placed in a separate worksheet in the TFPRED Excel Workbook. The following figure illustrates the fluctuations in the number of events in each quarter from 2002 to 2014.




Figure 59 Rg2: Number of observed events (Quarterly)

The figure above illustrates the fluctuations in Turkey's relations with Rg2. The average number of events from Turkey towards the region in a quarter is 18. As the linear trend line illustrates Turkey's activity towards the region follows a pattern of slight decline. Until 2007, the number of events fluctuates around the average. Between 2007 and 2010, the number of events is above average. There is a pattern of decline after 2010. Especially, after the second quarter of 2012 events toward the region fell and remained below average. These patterns indicate that Turkey has been actively involved with the region; the most active engagement with Rg2 took place between 2007 and 2010.

There are six significant periods when the number of events towards the region make peak. The first peak is in mid-2003. This peak corresponds with the March 2003 elections and AKP's foundation of the 59th government. As the previous section explains as well Turkey's foreign policy activity falls below average before the elections and make peak in the immediate afterwards.⁷⁵ The second peak is in mid-2005. This period corresponds with the tulip revolution in Kirghizstan. The third peak is observed in 2007. This peak corresponds with the trilateral summit between Pakistan Afghanistan, and Turkey. The fourth peak is observed in late 2008, which is the immediate aftermath of the Abkhazia Crisis, and the Georgia Russian war. The fifth peak is observed between late 2009 and early 2010. Three major foreign policy events took place in this period. First, the institutionalization of the Turkish-Speaking Countries Summit; second, the protocol with Armenia on re-establishing diplomatic relations, and the Armenian president's visit to Turkey; and third is the Black sea economic cooperation summit in Azerbaijan. The period also corresponds with Turkish-Russian energy cooperation attempts and the resulting high level visits. The sixth and final peak is observed in late 2011 and early 2012. This period is the last period in which Turkey's activism towards the region gets above average. Most of the events in this era are high level visits between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan, to Iran, Georgia, and Turkmenistan. There are also two meetings in this era. The first meeting is the High-level Cooperation Council meeting with Russia and the second meeting is the Turkey- Iran and Azerbaijan trilateral summit in Istanbul. Parallel to

⁷⁵ Especially for the March 2003 elections, this patter is observed in almost all regions.

the pattern observed in other regions Turkey's regional activism continues to decrease after late-2010.

A government-based observation of these events shows that Turkey's activity in the region fluctuates from one government to the other. The quarterly average number of events in the region during the 59th government (March 2003 – July 2007) is 18, the 60th government (July 2007 – June 2011) is 23, and the 61st government (June 2011 – August 2014) is 13. This shows that the period in which Turkey most actively engaged with the region is the 59th government.

After observing the fluctuations in the number of events towards in the previous figure, the cooperation (+10) and conflict (-10) scale is applied to see the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region. The next figure illustrates the quarterly average scores of this relationship.




Figure 60 Rg2: The nature of Turkey's relations (Quarterly Mean Scores)

The figure above, illustrates the quarterly mean scores of Turkey's relations with the region. The following figure shows the monthly averages.




Figure 61 Rg2: Monthly Conflict–Cooperation Mean Scores

The monthly scores in the figure above better illustrates the intensity of Turkey's relations with Rg2. Turkey has an event with the region in almost every month from 2003 to 2014. The scores in the figure indicate that Turkey's relations with the region have been cooperative until 2005 and then we see a pattern of decline towards conflict between 2005 and mid-2008. The period between mid-2008 and late 2011 is the most cooperative period. This period is also the most active period in Turkey's relations with the region. Then the country enters in a period of mixed relationship. A government-based interpretation of the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region indicates that Turkey has been mostly cooperative towards the region in the 58th government with the average quarterly score of 1, 45. Then, there is a decline in the 59th government with the average quarterly score is 0, 15. Turkey's relations with the region get more cooperative in the 60th government (0, 63). Under the rule of the 61st government Turkey's relations with the region turns from cooperation to moderate conflict (-0, 05). After looking at the 'frequency' and 'nature' of Turkey's relationship with the region, a third way of aggregating events is to count the 'category' of events. The following figure illustrates the count of the categorized events from Turkey to Rg2:




Figure 62 Rg2: Turkey's foreign relations (event counts)

The figure above illustrates that most of the events from Turkey towards the region are categorized under Verbal Cooperation. There is only one short period between 2007 and 2008, when verbal conflict and material cooperation passes verbal cooperation. The following figure better illustrates the total cooperative (verbal + material) and conflictual event (verbal + material) counts.




Figure 63 TR to Rg2: Conflict-Cooperation event counts

The figure indicates that Turkey's relations with the region are mostly cooperative. Indeed, the event type counts follow a similar pattern to the event scores that are interpreted previously. Turkey's relations with the region are cooperative until 2005. Then there is a mixed relationship between 2005 and 2008. Then a period of cooperation follows until 2012. After 2012 the number of cooperative events decreases. The following table summarizes the government-based numbers:

Table 64 Rg2: Events Summary (November 2002 - August 2014)

TRtoRG2									
	EVENT SCALE	EVENT FREQUENCY				EVENT CATEGORY			
	CAMEO Score (Avrg)	# of Events	Avrg.	# of events	# of Coop	# of Cone	Conf mat	Conf verb	coop mat verb
58th Gov	1,45	10		20	17	3	1	2	2 15
59th Gov	0,15	19		326	214	112	49	63	21 193
60th Gov	0,63	24		381	272	109	44	65	39 233
61st Gov	-0,05	13		171	110	61	20	41	26 84
Total	0,31	19		898	613	285	114	171	88 525

The Event Scale column gives the quarterly average scores of Turkey's events toward Rg2. The score does only very slightly fall below 0 under the 61st government. The average score of all events towards the region is 0, 31. This means that Turkey's relations with the R2 are cooperative in general.

The four columns under event frequency category show the average and total number of events towards the region. The first column shows the quarterly average number of events. This column is interpreted in order to compare the Turkey's activism towards the region under each AKP government. As the figure illustrates the TFP under the 60th government is the most active period in Turkey-Rg2 relations. This activism is in decline under other governments. The remaining columns in the table give the category-based event counts. Most of Turkey's activity towards the region is under the verbal cooperation category. This high number of cooperative events towards the region is again observed under the 60th government. These numbers are illustrated and compared in the figures below.




Figure 64 Rg2: Gov-based event counts (event categories)

The figures illustrate the percentage share of each event type and compare one government with the other. The share of cooperative events fluctuates from one government to the other. The 61st government is the least cooperative government towards the region. However, it is observed that Turkey's relations with Rg2 are still mostly cooperative.

Finally, the following table summarizes Turkey's relations with the Rg2



Table 65 TFPRED: Rg2 events summary

TFPRED: TRtoRG2 Summary				
	Regional Activism (Quarterly Avrg. #)	Nature of Relationship (Average CAMEO score)	Event Category (Percentage Share)	Major foreign policy events in the region (Possible impact)
58th Gov	Limited(10)	Most cooperative (1,45)	Verbal Cooperation (75%)	Immediate aftermath of AKP's single party government (Increase in foreign policy activism and cooperation)
59th Gov	Active(19)	less cooperative (0,15)	Verbal Cooperation (59%)	The Tulip revolution in Kirghizstan (increase in foreign policy activism) The trilateral summit between Pakistan Afghanistan, and Turkey
60th Gov	Active(24)	more cooperative (0,63)	Verbal Cooperation (61%)	The Abkhazia Crisis – Georgia/Russian war The institutionalization of the Turkish-Speaking Countries Summit The protocol with Armenia on re-establishing diplomatic relations Turkish-Russian energy cooperation (Overall increase in cooperation and activism)
61st Gov	Limited (13)	least cooperative (-0.05)	Verbal Cooperation (49%)	An overall decline in Turkey's foreign policy activity in all regions (probably due to domestic political crisis in the country and the Arab Uprisings in Rg3)
Pattern	Regional Activism fluctuates	mostly cooperative (0,31)	Decrease in cooperation (85% to 64%) Increase in conflict (15% to 36%)	
General Observation: Turkey follows a mostly cooperative foreign policy towards the region; however, both the cooperative nature and the regional activism are in decrease.				

5.2.3 TFP events in Rg3 (The MENA and Eastern Mediterranean)

Rg3 refers to the Southeast and South of Turkey. Countries from the Middle East, North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean are included in this region. According to the findings of the content analysis of the previous chapter, Rg3 received almost half of the total role references (%47) and has been 1st most frequently referred region (Please see Figure 5 of the previous chapter). The findings of TFPRED events also indicate the same ranking. 45% of the total events are directed towards the countries in this region, which makes Rg3 the 1st region in Turkey's foreign policy. 2631 events are directed towards this region. The date, type, code, direction and score (CAMEO Scale) of each event is coded separately in the TFPRED dataset and placed in a separate worksheet in the TFPRED Excel Workbook. The following figure illustrates the fluctuations in the number of events in each quarter from 2002 to 2014.




Figure 65 Rg3: Number of observed events (Quarterly)

The figure above illustrates the number of events from Turkey to Rg3. Despite the fluctuations in Turkey's relations with Rg3, Turkey has always been active in the region. 14 events occurred at the point where Turkey is least active in the region (see the second quarter of 2014). The average number of events from Turkey towards the region in a quarter is 55. The number of events toward the region stays around and above the average until 2005, when a decline in activism is observed. Between 2005 and late-2010, the number of events have generally stayed below average with some peaks and bottoms. Contrary to other regions we see a pattern of incline after 2010. This incline might be an indicator that the balance of Turkey's regional foreign policy direction has turned from other regions to RG3. After the mid 2013 events toward the region fell and remained below average. These patterns indicate that Turkey has been actively involved with the region; the most active engagement with Rg3 took place in early 2003, late 2007 and between 2010 and mid-2013. These periods also correspond with three significant peaks in TFP activity to Rg3. The first peak is in early-2003. This peak corresponds with the March 2003 elections and AKP's foundation of the 59th government. The most significant event of the era was the US-led coalition war in Iraq and Turkey's parliamentary decision on declining the government Bill in March 1st, 2003. The third and fourth peaks are observed after 2011, an era that corresponds with the Arab Uprisings period in the region. Parallel to the pattern in other regions Turkey's regional activism continues to decrease after late-2010. This decline is most probably related with rising terror and political instability in Turkey's domestic politics. An interesting finding here is that despite the peaks in different periods, a government-based observation of the number of events shows that Turkey's activity in the region has remained similar from one government to the other. The quarterly average number of events in the region during the 59th government (March 2003 – July 2007) is 51, the 60th government (July 2007 – June 2011) is 50, and the 61st government (June 2011 – August 2014) is 55. The findings indicate that there is a slight increase in event frequency after the Arab-uprisings. After observing the fluctuations in the number of events towards Rg3 in the previous figure, the cooperation (+10) and conflict (-10) scale is applied to see the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region. The next figure illustrates the quarterly average scores of this relationship.




Figure 66 Rg3: The nature of Turkey's relations (Quarterly Mean Scores)

The figure above, illustrates the quarterly mean scores of Turkey's relations with the region. The following figure shows the monthly averages.




Figure 67 Rg3: Monthly Conflict–Cooperation Mean Scores

The monthly scores in the figure above better illustrates the fluctuations in Turkey's cooperative and Conflictual nature of relationship with the region. Turkey is cooperative toward Rg3 until mid-2007, when we see a turn towards conflict. Turkey remained conflictual until 2009. A second period of cooperation is observed between 2009 mid-2010. Then there is a fluctuating and gradual decline towards conflict.

A government-based interpretation of the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region indicates that Turkey has been mostly cooperative towards the region in the 58th government with the average quarterly score of 0, 32. Then, there is an incline in the 59th government with the average quarterly score 1, 23. This period is the most cooperative period in Turkey's foreign policy towards the region. Then, in the 60th government the relations turn towards conflict with the average score of -0, 20. The declining pattern continues in the 61st government with the score of -1, 01.

After looking at the 'frequency' and 'nature' of Turkey's relationship with the region, a third way of aggregating events is to count the 'category' of events. The following figure illustrates the count of the categorized events from Turkey to Rg3:




Figure 68 Rg3: Turkey's foreign relations (Event categories)

The figure above illustrates that most of the events from turkey towards the region are categorized under Verbal Cooperation. Verbal Conflict is the second most observed category. Material cooperation and material conflict seem in relative balance. The following figure better illustrates the total cooperative (verbal + material) and conflictual event (verbal + material) counts.




Figure 69 TR to Rg3: Conflict-Cooperation event counts

A government-based observation of the event counts in the figure above follows the pattern that we observe in the scaled events. Turkey's relations with the region are mostly cooperative. However, the gap between cooperation and conflict closes and conflict passes cooperation. There are three such periods: late-2007, late-2010, and late-2012. The following table better summarizes these numbers:

Table 66 Rg3: Events Summary (November 2002 - August 2014)

TRtoRG3									
	EVENT SCALE	EVENT FREQUENCY				EVENT CATEGORY			
	CAMEO Score (Average)	# of Events (Avg.)	# of events	# of Coop.	# of Conf.	conf. mat	conf. verb	coop. mat	coop. verb
58th Gov	0,32	124	249	163	86	20	66	33	130
59th Gov	1,23	51	869	631	238	61	177	121	510
60th Gov	-0,20	50	803	498	305	142	163	68	430
61st Gov	-1,01	55	710	399	311	131	180	57	342
Overall	0,11	55	2631	1691	940	354	586	279	1412

The Event Scale column gives the quarterly average scores of Turkey's events toward Rg3. The average score of all events towards the region is 0, 11. This means that Turkey's relations with the Rg3 are slightly cooperative. The first two governments of AKP have followed a more cooperative relationship with the region whereas the latter two turned towards conflict. The event frequency column shows the average and total number of events towards the region. The first column shows the quarterly average number of events. This column is interpreted in order to compare the Turkey's activism towards the region under each AKP government. As the table illustrates TFP under the 58th government is the most active period in Turkey-Rg3 relations. This period corresponds with the declaration of the US-led coalition war in Iraq. This activism has declined under the subsequent governments and remained around 50 events per quarter. The remaining columns in the table give the category-based event counts. Most of Turkey's activity towards the region is under the verbal cooperation category. These numbers are illustrated and compared in the figures below.




Figure 70 Rg3: Gov-based event counts (Event categories)

The figures illustrate the percentage share of each event type and compare one government with the other. The share of cooperative events increased from the 58th government to the 59th. However, the share is in decline in the latter two governments. As the figures illustrate, the most cooperative government is the 59th government whereas the least cooperative one is the 61st government. All findings indicate that two major events have affected Turkey's relations with the region. The first one is the 2003 Iraq War, which increased turkey's foreign policy activism in the region. The post-War era represents Turkey's cooperative attempts towards the region. The second event is the Arab Uprisings, which again increased Turkey's activism in the region. But the post-Arab Uprisings period represents a turn towards Conflict in Turkey-Rg3 relations. This pattern is not only observed in TFP practice but was also observed in Turkey's foreign policy discourse towards the region.


Finally, the following table summarizes Turkey's relations with the Rg3

Table 67 TFPRED: Rg3 events summary

TFPRED: TRtoRG3 Summary				
	Regional Activism (Quarterly Avrg. #)	Nature of Relationship (Average CAMEO score)	Event Category (Percentage Share)	Major foreign policy events in the region (Possible impact)
58th Gov	The most active (124)	Less cooperative (0,32)	Verbal Cooperation (52%)	US-led Coalition War in Iraq Turkish government bill (March 1st, 2003)
59th Gov	Active (51)	The most cooperative (1,23)	Verbal Cooperation (59%)	Post-war reconstruction. Turkey's attempts for regional cooperation.
60th Gov	Active (50)	conflictual (-0,20)	Verbal Cooperation (54%)	Late 2010 Arab Uprisings (The initial period)
61st Gov	More active (54)	The most conflictual (-1,01)	Verbal Cooperation (48%)	The post-Arab Uprisings period
Pattern	Relatively constant regional activism	Mixed (0,20)	Decrease in verbal cooperation (59% to 48%) Increase in verbal conflict (20% to 25%)	
General Observation: The nature of Turkey's foreign relations with the region is mixed and regional activism remains relatively constant.				

5.2.4 TFP events in Rg4 (The Sub-Saharan Africa)

Countries from the African continent are included in this region. According to the findings of the content analysis of the previous chapter, Rg4 received 7% of the total role references and has been the least frequently referred region (Please see Figure 5 of the previous chapter). The findings of TFPRED events also indicate the same ranking. The region receives a very limited reference that corresponds to only 1% of the total foreign policy events and ranks 5th among others. 54 events are directed towards this region. The date, type, code, direction and score (CAMEO Scale) of each event is coded separately in the TFPRED dataset and placed in a separate worksheet in the TFPRED Excel Workbook. The following figure illustrates the fluctuations in the number of events in each quarter from 2002 to 2014.






Figure 71 Rg4: Number of observed events (Quarterly)

The figure above illustrates the fluctuations in Turkey's relations with Rg4. The average number of events from Turkey towards the region in a quarter is 2. As the linear trend line illustrates Turkey's activity towards the region follows a pattern of slight increase. Until 2007, there is very limited activity toward the region. Most of the events toward the region are observed between 2007 and 2010, there is a pattern of decline after 2010. After a one-year stalemate we see another period of increase in Turkey's activity in the region. These patterns indicate that Turkey has not been actively involved with the region; the most active engagement with Rg4 took place between 2007 and 2010. Different from the pattern in other regions Turkey's regional activism in Rg4 remains relatively constant after 2007 late-2010. A government-based observation of the number of events shows that Turkey's activity in the region fluctuates from one government to the other. However, Turkish governments' foreign policy activity in the region is very limited. The quarterly average number of events in the region during the 58th and 59th government (March 2003 – July 2007) is 0, 5, the 60th government (July 2007 – June 2011) is 1, 50, and the 61st government (June 2011 – August 2014) is 1, 69.

After observing the fluctuations in the number of events towards in the previous figure, the cooperation (+10) and conflict (-10) scale is applied to see the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region. The next figure illustrates the quarterly average scores of this relationship.




Figure 72 Rg4: the nature of Turkey's foreign relations (Quarterly means)

The figure above, illustrates the quarterly mean scores of Turkey's relations with the region. The previous figures indicated limited activity in the region. This figure indicates that this limited activity in the region is almost always cooperative. The increasing activity in the post 2007 era is probably the result of the African opening initiative of Turkey.

A government-based interpretation of the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region indicates a similar nature.⁷⁶ The 59th government is less cooperative than others with the average quarterly score of 0, 49. Then there is an increase in cooperation with the 60th government which scores 2, 30. This period also corresponds with the so-called African Opening initiative of Turkey. Different from other regions, Turkey's cooperative attitude towards RG 4 also continued to increase in the 61st government era with the score of 1, 39.

After looking at the 'frequency' and 'nature' of Turkey's relationship with the region, a third way of aggregating events is to count the 'category' of events. The following figure illustrates the count of the categorized events from Turkey to Rg4:

⁷⁶ The score of the 58th Government is +4,00. However there is only one event in the two quarters (6 months between) November 2002 and March 2003. So this will be excluded from the government comparisons.




Figure 73 Rg4: Turkey's foreign relations (event categories)

The figure above illustrates that most of the events from turkey towards the region are categorized under Verbal Cooperation. The following figure better illustrates the total cooperative (verbal + material) and conflictual event (verbal + material) counts.




Figure 74 TR to Rg4: Conflict-Cooperation event counts

A government-based observation of the event counts in the figure above follows the pattern that we observe in the scaled events. Turkey's relations with the region are mostly cooperative. The most cooperative era in Turkey-RG4 relations corresponds with the 60th government. The following table summarizes these findings:

Table 68 Rg4: Events Summary (November 2002 - August 2014)

TRtoRG4									
	EVENT SCALE	EVENT FREQUENCY				EVENT CATEGORY			
	CAMEO Score (Average)	# of Events (Avrg.)	# of events	# of Coop.	# of Conf.	conf. mat	conf. verb	coop. mat	coop. verb
58th Gov	4,00	0,50	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
59th Gov	0,49	0,35	6	5	1	0	1	1	4
60th Gov	2,30	1,25	21	18	3	2	1	4	14
61st Gov	1,39	1,23	16	14	2	0	2	4	10
Overall	1,48	0,90	43	38	6	2	4	9	29

The Event Scale column gives the quarterly average scores of Turkey's events towards Rg4. The score does not fall below 0 under any government. The average score of all events towards the region is 1, 48. This means that Turkey's relations

with the Rg4 are cooperative. The event frequency column shows the average and total number of events towards the region. The first column shows the quarterly average number of events. This column is interpreted in order to compare the Turkey's activism towards the region under each AKP government. The average number shows that Turkey's activity in the region is very limited. However, as the figure illustrates the TFP under the 60th government is the most active period in Turkey-Rg4 relations. The remaining columns in the table give the category-based event counts. Most of Turkey's activity towards the region is under the verbal cooperation category. These numbers are illustrated and compared in the figures below.






Figure 75 Rg4: Gov-based event counts (event categories)

The figures illustrate the percentage share of each event type and compare one government with the other. The percentage shares of cooperative events increase from one government to the other. However, it is observed that Turkey's relations with Rg4 are still mostly cooperative. Finally, the following table summarizes Turkey's relations with the Rg4

Table 69 TFPRED: Rg4 events summary

TFPRED: TRtoRG4 Summary				
	Regional Activism (Quarterly Avrg. #)	Nature of Relationship (Average CAMEO score)	Event Category (Percentage Share)	Major foreign policy events in the region (Possible impact)
58th Gov	Very limited (0,50)	Most cooperative (4,00)	Verbal Cooperation (100% - only 1 event – excluded from comparison)	No significant event found
59th Gov	Very limited- Least Active (0,35)	least cooperative (0,49)	Verbal Cooperation (67%)	No significant event found
60th Gov	Limited (1,25)	more cooperative (2,30)	Verbal Cooperation (67%)	The African Opening Period.
61st Gov	Limited (1,23)	less cooperative (1,39)	Verbal Cooperation (63%)	Post-African Opening period
Pattern	Slightly increasing regional activism	Cooperative (1,48)	Increase in verbal and material cooperation (84% to 88%)	
General Observation: Turkey follows a cooperative foreign policy towards the region; Its regional activism is increasing.				

5.2.5 TFP events in Rg5 (The Euro-Atlantic Region)

Rg5 refers to the EU member countries and US – namely the Developed West. The US and the Western countries that are not in the immediate surrounding of Turkey (The Balkans or the Black sea) are included in this region. According to the findings of the content analysis of the previous chapter, Rg5 received 15% of the total role references and has been the 3rd most frequently referred region (Please see Figure 5 of the previous chapter). However, the findings of TFPRED events indicate a different ranking. The region received 32% of the total events, which makes Rg5 the 2nd among others. 1835 events are directed towards this region. The date, type, code, direction and score (CAMEO Scale) of each event is coded separately in the TFPRED dataset and placed in a separate worksheet in the TFPRED Excel Workbook. The following figure illustrates the fluctuations in the number of events in each quarter from 2002 to 2014.




Figure 76 Rg5: Number of observed events (Quarterly)

The figure above illustrates the fluctuations in Turkey's relations with Rg5. The average number of events from Turkey towards the region in a quarter is 38. As the linear trend line illustrates Turkey's activity towards the region follows a clear pattern of decline. Until 2007, the number of events fluctuates around and above the average. However, after late 2007 the number of events is generally below average. Indeed, this pattern is in parallel with the arguments in the literature that Turkey- EU relations have been in decline and that there is a shift of axis from the West towards other regions. As illustrated in the previous sections, especially after 2007 Turkey's relations with other regions was also in decline except the MENA region (Rg3) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Rg4), where a rise is observed.

The figure above illustrates that Turkey's regional activism continues to decrease after late-2010. A government-based observation of the number of events shows that Turkey's activity in the region declines from one government to the other. The quarterly average number of events in the region during the 58th government is 90, the 59th government (March 2003 – July 2007) is 56, the 60th government (July 2007 – June 2011) is 26, and the 61st government (June 2011 – August 2014) is 21.

After observing the fluctuations in the number of events towards Rg5 in the previous figure, the cooperation (+10) and conflict (-10) scale is applied to see the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region. The next figure illustrates the quarterly average scores of this relationship.




Figure 77 Rg5: The nature of Turkey's relations (Quarterly Mean Scores)

The figure above, illustrates the quarterly mean scores of Turkey's relations with the region. The following figure shows the monthly averages.




Figure 78 Rg5: Monthly Conflict–Cooperation Mean Scores

The figures above illustrate that the relations of the AKP governments' with the West starts from a positive and cooperative point of view. The first two government periods are generally regarded as the so-called Golden "Age of Europeanization". This observation is also indicated in the figure where AKP's relations with the EU are generally positive. However, despite the decline in the activism between Turkey and EU relations this declining activism does not show itself in the nature of the relationship. In other words, although Turkey's foreign policy activity towards the West declines the relations are still cooperative between the two sides (Please see the 2007-2012 period in the figure). Only after Turkey turns its attention towards Rg3 in the post Arab-uprisings era, the relations slightly turn from cooperation towards a neutral standpoint. A government-based interpretation of the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region also indicates that Turkey has been mostly cooperative towards the region. However this cooperative nature is gradually turning towards conflict as time passes. In the 58th government the average quarterly score of 2,10. Then, there is a decline in the 59th government with the average quarterly score of 1,06. Turkey's relations with the region became less cooperative in the 60th government with the score of 0,91. Under the 61st government, Turkey's relations with the region approaches to neutral with the score of 0,35. Now, let us look at the count of the 'category' of these events from Turkey to Rg5:




Figure 79 Rg5: Turkey's foreign relations (Event categories)

The figure above illustrates that most of the events from turkey towards the region are categorized under Verbal Cooperation. The following figure better illustrates the total cooperative (verbal + material) and conflictual event (verbal + material) counts.




Figure 80 TR to Rg5: Conflict-Cooperation event counts

The figure above illustrates how the gap between cooperation and conflict closes as new governments are founded. A government-based observation of the event counts in the figure above follows the pattern that we observe in the scaled events. Turkey's relations with the region are mostly cooperative. However, as new governments are founded by AKP both the number of events and the cooperative nature of relationship decreases. The following table summarizes these numbers:

Table 70 Rg5: Events Summary (November 2002 - August 2014)

TRtoRg5									
	EVENT SCALE	EVENT FREQUENCY				EVENT CATEGORY			
	CAMEO Score (Average)	# of Events (Avrg.)	# of events	# of Coop.	# of Conf.	conf. mat	conf. verb	coop. mat	coop. verb
58th Gov	2,10	90	181	138	43	0	43	15	123
59th Gov	1,06	56	959	679	280	58	222	93	586
60th Gov	0,91	26	422	286	136	30	106	25	261
61st Gov	0,35	21	273	173	100	19	81	32	141
Overall	0,86	38	1835	1276	559	107	452	165	1111

The Event Scale column gives the quarterly average scores of Turkey's events toward Rg1. The score does not fall below 0 under any government. The average score of all events towards the region is 0,86. This means that Turkey's relations with the Rg5 are cooperative. However, looking at where it started from in the 58th Government era (2,10) this cooperation is in a gradual decline (0,35). The event frequency column shows the average and total number of events towards the region. The first column shows the quarterly average number of events. This column is interpreted in order to compare the Turkey's activism towards the region under each AKP government. As the figure illustrates the TFP under the 58th government is the most active period in Turkey-Rg5 relations. This activism is in decline under the subsequent governments. The remaining columns in the table give the category-based event counts. Most of Turkey's activity towards the region is under the verbal cooperation category. The second most frequent event type is verbal conflict. And the gap between the two event types closes in time. These numbers are illustrated and compared in the figures below.




Figure 81 Rg2: Gov-based event count (Event categories)

The figures above illustrate the percentage share of each event type and compare one government with the other. Parallel to the previous findings, the share of cooperative events is in decline from one government to the other. However, it is observed that Turkey's relations with Rg5 are still mostly cooperative. The figures again indicate that verbal cooperation declines as verbal conflict increases.

Finally, the following table summarizes Turkey's relations with the Rg5

Table 71 TFPRED: Rg5 events summary

TFPRED: TRtoRG5 Summary				
	Regional Activism (Quarterly Avrg. #)	Nature of Relationship (Average CAMEO score)	Event Category (Percentage Share)	Major foreign policy events in the region (Possible impact)
58th Gov	The most active (90)	The most cooperative (2,10)	Verbal Cooperation (68%)	Flourishing EU-Turkey relations
59th Gov	More active (56)	More cooperative (1,06)	Verbal Cooperation (61%)	Flourishing EU-Turkey relations
60th Gov	Less active (26)	Less cooperative (0,91)	Verbal Cooperation (62%)	Stalemate in Turkey's relations with the EU
61st Gov	The least active (21)	The least cooperative (0,35)	Verbal Cooperation (51%)	
Pattern	Decreasing regional	mostly cooperative	Decrease in verbal cooperation (68% to	

Activism	(0,86)	51%)
Increase in verbal conflict (24% to 30%)		
General Observation: Turkey follows a cooperative foreign policy towards the region; however, both the cooperative nature and the regional activism are in decline.		

5.3 Chapter Summary: Findings on Turkey's Role performance

This section summarizes the observations of the TFPRED events dataset, which will serve as a transition to the synthesis of the next chapter. As utilized in the sections above, in its current state of development, event data analysis provides the researcher with at least three main ways to observe foreign policy.

The first way is to count the number of observed events. The rising or declining number of events in certain historical periods is used as indicators of the foreign policy activism of Turkey. The second way of analyzing event data is to scale the events along the cooperation (+10) and conflict (-10) continuum. There are alternative scales that can be applied to events. However, the most frequently used and widely accepted version in event data analysis is the Goldstein Scale, which is also utilized in this dissertation. In this type of analysis, each event is assigned a certain score between +10 and -10 and these scores are calculated (quarterly or monthly) in order to observe the conflictual/cooperative nature of the country's foreign policy relationship. Finally, the third way is to categorize events along different types: Verbal Cooperation, Material Cooperation, Verbal Conflict and Material Conflict. After categorizing each event one can count the number of cooperative and conflictual events. This categorization is utilized to compare the nature of foreign policy activism from one government to the other.

There are four main observations on the foreign policy activism (number of events) of Turkey. First, foreign policy activity decreases before the general elections and

makes a peak just after the elections in the country. Second, the number of observed foreign policy events increase when significant real life foreign policy crisis (like revolutions, wars, political/military conflicts) emerge in the country's surrounding regions. Third, there is a correlation (if not causality) between domestic political crisis and foreign policy activity. As the significance of domestic political crisis increase, foreign policy activity of the country decreases. In other words Turkey's foreign policy activity falls below average when the country tries to deal with domestic political turmoil like the e-Memorandum, Republican Meetings, constitutional disagreements, terrorist bombing in Reyhanlı, the Gezi protests and the 17/25 December Investigations. Last but not the least, Turkey's foreign policy activism follows a pattern of decline from one government to the other between 2002 and 2014.

On the other hand, the conflict and cooperation scores indicate three main observations about the nature of Turkey's foreign relations. First, the initial AKP governments (58th and 59th) have followed a cooperative foreign policy towards the world. This period corresponds with the so-called "golden age" of Europeanization and the establishment of "zero-problems" policy. As the scores illustrate, the initial activism in AKP's foreign policy has been a cooperative one. Second, with the establishment of the 60th government (July 2007- June 2011) the foreign policy activity of Turkey has turned into a mixture of conflict and cooperation. Third, the nature of TFP turned towards conflict after 2010 and there is a significant pattern of decline in the average cooperation scores of the three AKP governments.

A similar pattern is also observed in the categorized event counts. Here, the main finding is that there is a closing gap between the number cooperative events and conflictual events. With each new AKP government, the number of cooperative events decreases whereas the number of conflictual events increases. The percentage of cooperative events is 71% in 58th and 59th governments, 67% in the 60th government, and 58% in the 61st government. A similar pattern is observed in the share of verbal cooperation from one government to the other. An important finding is that there is a significant pattern of increase in the share of material conflict, which has been 5% in 58th government, 8% in 59th government, 12% in 60th government, and 15% in the 61st government.

After analyzing the whole dataset, the chapter focused on region-specific data. The observations of TFP events in Rg1 can be summarized in three sets of findings: foreign policy activism, nature of relationship, and the count of event categories. First, Turkey's foreign policy activism in the region follows a pattern of decline. The average number of events in the region during the 59th government (March 2003 – July 2007) is 223, the 60th government (July 2007 – June 2011) is 121, and the 61st government (June 2011 – August 2014) is 31. Second, the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region is mostly cooperative. Turkey has been mostly cooperative towards the region in the 58th government with the average quarterly score of 2,08. Then, there is a decline in the 59th government with the average quarterly score of 1,45. Turkey's relations with the region get more cooperative in the 60th government (1,71). However, with the 61st government Turkey becomes less interested with the region and there is a significant decline in cooperation in the 61st government (0,81). Third, and final finding is that the count of event categories follows a similar pattern. Turkey's relations with the region are mostly cooperative. However, as new governments are founded by AKP both the number of events and the cooperative nature of relationship decreases. Most of Turkey's activity towards the region is under the verbal cooperation category.

A similar summary can be made for TFP events in Rg2 as well. First, Turkey's foreign policy activism in the region follows a fluctuating pattern. Turkey has been actively involved with the region in specific periods. The most active engagement with Rg2 took place between 2007 and 2010, which corresponds with the Abkhazia Crisis, the bolstering Turkish-Armenian relations and the institutionalization of the Turkish-Speaking Countries Summit. A government-based observation of the events shows that Turkey's activity in the region fluctuates from one government to the other. The quarterly average number of events in the region during the 59th government (March 2003 – July 2007) is 18, the 60th government (July 2007 – June 2011) is 23, and the 61st government (June 2011 – August 2014) is 13. This shows that Turkey has most actively engaged with the region during the 59th government period. Second, the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region has been cooperative until 2005 and then we see a pattern of decline towards conflict between 2005 and mid-2008. Then, the period between mid-2008 and late 2011 is the most

cooperative one. A government-based interpretation of the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region indicates that Turkey has been mostly cooperative towards the region in the 58th government with the average quarterly score of 1,45. Then, there is a sharp decline in the 59th government with the average quarterly score is 0,15. Turkey's relations with the region get more cooperative in the 60th government (0,63). And, with the 61st government Turkey's relations with the region turns towards moderate conflict (-0,05). Third, and final finding is that the count of event categories follows a similar pattern. Turkey's relations with the region are mostly cooperative. The findings indicate that most of the events from Turkey towards the region are categorized under Verbal Cooperation.

In Rg3; first, despite fluctuations, Turkey has always been active in the region. Here, a significant finding is that, contrary to other regions we see a pattern of incline after 2010. This incline is also an indicator that the balance of Turkey's regional foreign policy direction has shifted from other regions to RG3. Turkey has been actively involved with the region; the most active engagement with Rg3 took place in 2003 (Iraq War) and between 2010 and mid-2013 (the Arab Uprisings). A government-based observation of the number of events shows that Turkey's activity in the region has remained similar from one government to the other. The quarterly average number of events in the region during the 59th government (March 2003 – July 2007) is 51, the 60th government (July 2007 – June 2011) is 50, and the 61st government (June 2011 – August 2014) is 55. The findings indicate that there is a slight increase in event frequency after the Arab-uprisings. Second, the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region has been cooperative until mid-2007, when we see a turn towards conflict. Turkey remained conflictual until 2009. A second period of cooperation is observed between 2009 mid-2010. Then there is a gradual decline towards conflict. A government-based interpretation of the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region indicates that Turkey has been mostly cooperative towards the region in the 58th government with the average quarterly score of 0,32. Then, there is an incline in the 59th government with the average quarterly score 1,23. This period is the most cooperative period in Turkey's foreign policy towards the region. Then, in the 60th government the relations turn towards conflict with the score of -0,20. The declining pattern continues in the 61st government with the score

of -1,01. Finally, the count of event categories indicates that Turkey's relations with the region are mostly cooperative. However, the gap between cooperation and conflict closes and conflict passes cooperation in certain periods. There are three such periods: late-2007, late-2010, and late-2012. Most of Turkey's activity towards the region is under the verbal cooperation category. The share of cooperative events increased from the 58th government to the 59th. However, this share is in decline in the latter two governments, where we see an increase in the share of conflict-type events.

In Rg4; first, the average number of events from Turkey towards the region in a quarter is 2. The findings indicate that Turkey has not been actively involved with the region; the most active engagement with Rg4 took place between 2007 and 2010. The activity towards the region follows a pattern of slight increase. The increasing activity in the post 2007 era is most probably the result of the African opening initiative of Turkey. Different from the pattern in other regions Turkey's regional activism in Rg4 remains relatively constant after late-2010. A government-based observation of the number of events shows that Turkey's activity in the region fluctuates from one government to the other. The quarterly average number of events in the region during the 58th and 59th government (March 2003 – July 2007) is 0,5, the 60th government (July 2007 – June 2011) is 1,50, and the 61st government (June 2011 – August 2014) is 1,69. Second, the nature of Turkey's limited relationship with the region has been almost always been cooperative. The 59th government is less cooperative than others with the average quarterly score of 0,49. Then there is an increase in cooperation with the 60th government with the score of 2,30. Turkey's cooperative attitude towards RG 4 also continues in the 61st government era with the score of 1,39. Finally, the count of event categories indicates that Turkey's relations with the region are mostly cooperative. The most cooperative era in Turkey-RG4 relations corresponds with the 60th government. Most of Turkey's activity towards the region is under the verbal cooperation category. The percentage share of cooperative events increases from one government to the other.

In Rg5; first Turkey's activity towards the region follows a clear pattern of decline. Until 2007, the number of events fluctuates around and above the average. However, after late 2007 the number of events is generally below average. Indeed, this pattern

is in parallel with the arguments in the literature that Turkey- EU relations have been in decline and that there is a shift of axis from the West towards other regions. A government-based observation of the number of events shows that Turkey's activity in the region declines from one government to the other. The quarterly average number of events in the region during the 58th government is 90, the 59th government (March 2003 – July 2007) is 56, the 60th government (July 2007 – June 2011) is 26, and the 61st government (June 2011 – August 2014) is 21. Second, in parallel with the so-called Golden Age of Europeanization, the nature of the first two AKP governments' relations with the West starts with a very positive and cooperative stance. A government-based interpretation of the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region indicates that the cooperative nature is gradually turning towards conflict as time passes. In the 58th government the average quarterly score of 2,10. Then, there is a decline in the 59th government with the average quarterly score of 1,06. Turkey's relations with the region became less cooperative in the 60th government with the score of 0,91. Under the 61st government, Turkey's relations with the region approaches to neutral with the score of 0,35. Finally, the count of event categories indicates that the gap between the quantity of cooperative events and conflictual events closes as new governments are founded. A government-based observation of the event counts indicate that most of Turkey's activity towards the region is under the verbal cooperation category. The second most frequent event type is verbal conflict. And the gap between the two event types closes in time; verbal cooperation declines as verbal conflict increases.

To sum up, this chapter presents and summarizes the findings of the event data analysis of the TFPRED. TFP practices (deeds) are generally parallel to the discourse (words) of TFP decision-makers. However, there are also points of departure between the words and deeds of TFP. This parallelism is observed in the next chapter, through a synthesis of the findings in the two empirical chapters (Chapter IV and V).

CHAPTER VI

SYNTHESIS: TFP WORDS AND DEEDS

This chapter combines the findings of the previous two empirical chapters in order to check the propositions given in the theoretical framework chapter (II). The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section gives government-based and region-based parallelism of words and deeds. The section compares the frequencies of AKP decision-makers' role conceptions and the frequency of their appearance in TFP deeds. As the following lines illustrate, the chapter develops a novel approach to observe the parallelism.

The second section presents a role-by-role observation of TFP role performance. The section develops a new classification for role performance. Findings indicate that all role conceptions are not observed in TFP deeds. There are (1) non-observable, (2) non-performed, (3) underperformed, (4) performed and (5) over-performed role conceptions in TFP.

The dissertation finds 22 main role conceptions in AKP decision-makers' foreign policy speeches. As the findings of the content analysis chapter indicate some of these roles appear more frequently than others depending on the government period and the region that the role is directed to. The codes and list of these roles are presented in the following table.

Table 72 TFPRED Role list and codes

CODE	ROLE	CODE	ROLE
R1	Global System Collaborator	R12	Regional Subsystem collaborator
R2	Defender of peace and Stability	R13	Western Country
R3	Trading State	R14	Eastern Country
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	R15	Bridge across Continents (Geographical)
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	R16	Faithful Ally
R6	Mediator	R17	Model Country
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	R18	Developer
R8	Independent	R19	Energy Transporting Country
R9	Active Independent	R20	Good Neighbor
R10	Rising Power	R21	Regional Leader
R11	Bridge across Civilizations	R22	Regional Power

The dissertation argues that some of these role conceptions are only uttered by the decision-makers but not performed in the actual foreign policy practices of the country. Hence, the dissertation proposes that with some modifications event data analysis can be utilized as a tool to observe the parallelism between the words and deeds. For the specific purposes of this dissertation I developed a Role – Event Matching table:⁷⁷

⁷⁷ The details on this table are presented in chapter III above. Please see “Events Info – Worksheet” of the TFPRED Dataset for more details. To see the definitions of each event please refer to the TFPRED Codebook.

Table 73 TFPRED: Role –Event Code matching table

Code	Role	Event Codes
R1	GSC	Number of cooperative events (both verbal and material cooperation) From TR (source) to global IGO's (targets).
R2	DoP	0256, 026, 027, 028, 0356, 036, 037, 038, 039, 045, 087, 0871, 0872, 0873, 0874, 1123, 1124
R3	Trade. S.	0211, 0311, 061, 1011
R4	Protector	0233, 033, 0331, 0332, 0334, 070, 071, 072, 073, 074, 075, 1054, 1122, 1123, 1124
R5	Central C.	This role is a verbal construction - Non-observable through event data
R6	Mediator	028, 039, 045
R7	Peace-maker	037, 1056, 107
R8	Independent	016, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 1241, 1246, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 139, 160, 161, 162, 1621, 1622, 163, 164
R9	Active Indep.	Foreign policy activity (total number of events towards different regions)
R10	Rising Power	This role refers to a rise in economic and military power. Non-observable through event data.
R11	Bridge (Civ)	This role is a verbal construction - Non-observable through event data
R12	RSC	021, 0211, 0212, 0213, 0214, 022, 30, 031, 0311, 0312, 032, 050, 060, 061, 062, 063, 064, 101, 1011, 1014, 102
R13	Western C.	Events to Rg5
R14	Eastern C.	Events to Rg3
R15	Bridge (Geo)	This role is a verbal construction - Non-observable through event data
R16	Faithful Ally	Rg5 (013, 019, 021, 0211, 0212, 0213, 0214, 022, 030, 031, 0311, 0312, 032, 033, 0331, 0332, 0334, 050, 051, 052, 053, 057, 060, 061, 062, 063, 064, 100, 101)
R17	Model C.	This role is a verbal construction - Non-observable through event data
R18	Developer	033, 0331, 0332, 0334, 070, 071, 072, 073, 074, 075, 1122, 1123, 1124
R19	Energy T.	This role is currently non-observable through event data
R20	Good N.	021, 0211, 0212, 0213, 0214, 022, 030, 031, 0311, 0312, 032, 037, 055
R21	Rg. Leader	014, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 130, 131, 1311, 1312, 1313, 132, 134, 136, 138, 1382, 1383, 1384, 139
R22	Rg. Power	Rg Roles (010, 012, 013, 017, 020, 040, 041, 042, 043, 044, 045, 046, 050, 051, 052, 053, 054, 055, 056, 057, 110, 111, 112, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1124)

The table above makes it possible to observe most of the TFP roles with event data. Following this table, I have built a combined comparison dataset through counting the events with the relevant codes. The new data-set compares the findings of the content analysis (words) with the findings of the events dataset (deeds) in terms of frequency. Then, I filtered and aggregated this data to build government-based, and region-based comparison tables. The next table shows the unfiltered government-based portion of the comparison dataset:

Table 74 Gov-based words (W) and deeds (D) data table (Unfiltered)

CODE	ROLE	TOTAL GOVERNMENTS							
		Total - W	Total - D	G59W	G59D	G60W	G60D	G61W	G61D
R1	GSC	169	119	82	69	54	29	33	21
R2	DoP	378	128	203	52	115	48	60	28
R3	TS	146	38	51	20	26	9	69	9
R4	Protect	159	142	26	74	18	24	115	44
R5	CC	114	NA	56	NA	36	NA	22	NA
R6	Mediate	55	33	14	7	32	22	9	4
R7	PM	148	14	91	11	35	2	22	1
R8	Indep.	44	359	30	155	9	103	5	101
R9	AI	241	5492	118	2468	67	1779	56	1245
R10	Rise	55	NA	28	NA	15	NA	12	NA
R11	Geobrid.	54	NA	29	NA	19	NA	6	NA
R12	RSC	249	443	116	233	81	149	52	61
R13	West	123	1654	75	959	27	422	21	273
R14	East	15	2382	12	869	0	803	3	710
R15	Civbrid..	8	NA	5	NA	3	NA	0	NA
R16	FA	82	256	51	159	26	68	5	29
R17	Model	14	NA	11	NA	1	NA	2	NA
R18	Develop.	165	137	50	73	40	31	75	33
R19	ETC	42	NA	14	NA	20	NA	8	NA
R20	GoodN	146	154	82	71	39	57	25	26
R21	RL	26	154	8	51	13	57	5	46
R22	RP	97	2697	35	1254	47	874	15	569

The table above presents the government-based data. The first two columns show the code and title of each role conception. The uncolored cells in the first two columns of

the table indicate the roles that are excluded from the overall comparisons. The CC, AI, Rise, GeoBrid., CivBrid., Model, and ETC are unobservable with event data (see Table 73 above).⁷⁸ The 3rd and 4th columns give the total number of words and total number of deeds. The remaining columns give the government based frequencies. When the non-observable and non-comparable roles are excluded, the new table filtered for comparison becomes the following:

Table 75 Gov-based words (W) / deeds (D) comparison table (Filtered)

CODE	ROLE	TOTAL		GOVERNMENTS					
		Total - W	Total - D	G59W	G59D	G60W	G60D	G61W	G61D
R1	GSC	169	119	82	69	54	29	33	21
R2	DoP	378	128	203	52	115	48	60	28
R3	TS	146	38	51	20	26	9	69	9
R4	Protect	159	142	26	74	18	24	115	44
R6	Mediate	55	33	14	7	32	22	9	4
R7	PM	148	14	91	11	35	2	22	1
R8	Indep.	44	359	30	155	9	103	5	101
R12	RSC	249	443	116	233	81	149	52	61
R16	FA	82	256	51	159	26	68	5	29
R18	Develop.	165	137	50	73	40	31	75	33
R20	GoodN	146	154	82	71	39	57	25	26
R21	RL	26	154	8	51	13	57	5	46
TOTAL		1767	1977	804	975	488	599	475	403

Once this table is generated, I developed frequency percentage charts of each role conception and compared the percentage shares in order to observe the parallelism and points of departure in TFP words and deeds. The total frequency charts of TFP words and deeds are as the following:

⁷⁸ The remaining West, East, RP and AI role conceptions are excluded from general comparisons but included in role specific comparisons in the next section. For instance the AI role conception refers to Turkey's foreign policy activism in the world. Hence, it counts every event from TR to the others. In order to have a more proper comparison this kind of roles, which require us to count every event towards a single direction are excluded from overall comparisons. These roles are excluded from overall comparisons but included in role specific comparisons in the next section. A similar logic holds for Western country role conception, which counts every single event from TR to Rg5 and then compared with the Eastern country role conception, which counts every event towards Rg3. For role specific comparisons please refer to the next section.




Figure 82 TOTAL: TFP words (W) / deeds (D) frequency percentages

The charts illustrate four significant points of departure in the words and deeds of TFP. First, the DoP role conception is the most frequently referred role conception in TFP makers' words (21%); however, such frequency is not observed in the deeds of Turkey (6%). Similar to this finding, a second point of departure between words and deeds are in the PM (Peacemaker) role, which took 8% of the total role references but only 1% of the foreign policy events. If the references to the three peace-related roles (Mediator, PM and DoP) are summed-up one can observe that these roles have received 32% of the AKP decision-makers' total role references. However, a similar calculation indicates a significant gap with the deeds, where the same three roles receive only 8% out total. If these findings are put together one can claim that although Turkey's decision-makers' express a peace-oriented foreign policy in their speeches, the practices indicate that it might not be regarded as a peaceful country in the foreign policy environment.

A third point of departure in words and deeds is on the "Independent" role conception. The role received 3% of the decision-makers' words; however, it became the second most frequently performed role conception in the deeds (18%). A third point of departure is on the Faithful Ally (FA) role. Although the decision-makers gave relatively limited references to this role conception (5%) it is the third most frequently performed role according to the deeds (13%). As illustrated in chapter IV this role refers to Rg5 (Euro-Atlantic region). Then, this observation indicates that

the country's practices are more in line with its Euro-Atlantic allies than the leaders' refer to in their speeches.

On the other hand, there are similarities between words and deeds as well. As the total frequency charts indicate the second most frequently referred role conception is RSC. This role has a unique and interesting position. As the charts indicate the RSC role conception is more frequently observed in deeds (22%) than words(14%); however, it ranks very similar in both words and deeds (2nd in words with 14%, 1st in deeds 22%). So despite the gap between the percentages of words and deeds there is a relative parallelism in rank.

Another parallelism is observed in the third (GSC), fourth (Developer) and fifth (Protect.) role conceptions, which receive very close percentages both in words and deeds. Another interesting finding here is that the GoodN role conception received exactly the same percentages in both the words and deeds of TFP (8%).

6.1 Government-specific and Region-specific Observations

After making the general observations, one can have a look into more specific government-specific charts. The following chart indicates the words and deeds of the 59th Government:




Figure 83 59th Government: words (W) / deeds (D) frequency percentages

The figures of the 59th governments' words and deeds indicate very similar gaps to those of the previously presented "Total- W" and "Total- D" figures. There is a gap between words and deeds in DoP (25% in Words / 5% in deeds), PM (11% in Words / 1% in deeds), Indep.(4% in Words / 16% in deeds), FA (6% in Words / 16% in deeds) and RSC (17% in Words- and 25% in deeds) role conceptions. On the other hand there is a parallelism of words and deeds in the GSC, Developer, Protector and GoodN role conceptions. The figures of the 60th government are presented below:




Figure 84 60th Government: words (W) / deeds (D) frequency percentages

The figure illustrates that similar to those of 59th government the most significant gap is in peace-related roles DoP and PM. Most of the roles hold their rank in the words and deeds of the two governments. A significant increase in the 60th government is in the deeds that indicate regional leadership. The share of RL role conception increased from 5% to 10% in the 60th government foreign policy practices. This increase indicates a relatively more conflictual stance in the country's foreign policy. On the other hand, similar to the 59th government a parallelism can still be observed in Protector and GoodN role conceptions. A general observation is that the gap, and therefore inconsistency between TFP words/deeds further increased this era.




Figure 85 61st Government: words (W) / deeds (D) frequency percentages

The figures of the 61st government indicate a significant shift in the frequency percentages and ranks of TFP roles especially in the words of AKP decision-makers. For instance the Developer role conception rose to the first rank in the words with 24%, which rose from 4% in the 59th government. The same role receives 11 % in 61st government's deeds, which rose from 4% of the 60th government. This indicates that the significance of the developer role increased simultaneously both in the deeds and word of 61st government compared to the previous periods. A similar case is also observed in the Protector role. Compared to the previous governments' the words/deeds inconsistency in DoP and RSC has decreased to a certain extent. On the other hand, the gap widened and words/deeds inconsistency increased in RL, Independent and TS role conceptions increased.

Once the Total and government-based data observations are completed, I have added region-specific data to the table. The region-specific data portion of the dataset is given in the following table:

Table 76 Region-specific words (W) / deeds (D) comparison

Regions Data (All)		TOTAL		REGIONS									
CODE	ROLE	Total W	Total D	Rg 1W	Rg 1D	Rg 2W	Rg 2D	Rg 3W	Rg 3D	Rg 4W	Rg 4D	Rg 5W	Rg 5D
R1	GSC	169	119	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
R2	DoP	378	128	29	8	45	20	156	76	8	2	4	23
R3	TS	146	38	4	2	30	14	22	14	17	0	7	8
R4	Protect	159	142	5	5	7	14	106	95	7	3	0	0
R6	Mediate	55	33	0	0	16	6	30	21	2	0	0	0
R7	PM	148	14	12	4	19	5	80	2	3	0	1	0
R8	Indep.	44	359	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
R12	RSC	249	443	23	39	71	86	87	168	7	5	4	145
R16	FA	82	256	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	81	256
R18	Develop.	165	137	21	4	41	14	41	92	28	3	0	0
R20	GoodN	146	154	24	23	32	43	51	88	0	0	0	0
R21	RL	26	154	4	11	2	28	16	114	0	0	0	0
Total		---	---	122	96	263	230	589	670	72	13	97	432

As the table illustrates, two of the roles that are included in the W/D comparison are Ge roles, which do not have any regional direction. Therefore, the GSC and Independent role conceptions are excluded from regional distribution comparisons. The following charts illustrate the regional distribution percentages of TFP words and deeds generated from this table.




Figure 86 TOTAL: TFP words (W) / deeds (D) regional distribution

As also noted in the previous chapters the data significantly indicates the dominance of Rg3 (MENA) in TFP. The figures above also illustrate this finding. In addition, except Rg5, other regions receive similar references in both words and deeds of TFP. Rg5 ranks as the fourth most frequently referred region in words but second in the deeds. This indicates that, although AKP decision-makers do not refer to the region that frequently, a significant portion of the country's foreign policy events is directed to the region. Then, Turkey is more part of the Rg5 (West) than the decision-makers of the country signal in their speeches.

After observing the parallelism in the regional distribution of the words and deeds I aggregated government-specific data for each region and developed five new region-specific tables. While deciding on the regional direction of each role I utilized the following table⁷⁹, which illustrates the type and regional direction of each role conception.

Table 77 Role Typology: Illustration of Rg Directions (Emphasis added)

CODE	Role	RType	Rg1	Rg2	Rg3	Rg4	Rg5
R2	DoP	Type3					
R3	TS	Type3					
R12	RSC	Type3					
R22	RP	Type3					
R19	ETC	Type2					
R4	Protect	Type2					
R7	PM	Type2					
R9	AI	Type2					
R18	Develop	Type2					
R15	Geobrid.	Type2					
R20	GoodN	Type2					
R21	RL	Type2					
R6	Mediate	Type2					
R14	East	Type1					
R17	Model	Type1					
R13	West	Type1					
R16	FA	Type1					
R1	GSC	Ge					
R5	CC	Ge					
R8	Indep.	Ge					
R10	Rise	Ge					
R11	CivBrid.	Ge					

⁷⁹ The table was previously generated in Chapter IV, section 4.2 (Emphasis added).

The first two columns of the table above indicate the code and title of each role conception. The uncolored cells in the first two columns indicate the role conceptions that are excluded from W/D comparison⁸⁰. The third column indicates the type of each role conception. The “Ge” type roles are excluded from regional comparison since these roles do not have any regional direction. The remaining five columns indicate the direction of each role. The colored cells in these columns indicate that the role is observed in that region. If the cell is empty then the role is not observed in the region. Accordingly, once the unobservable roles are excluded from the list, Rg1 roles are DoP, TS, RSC, Protect, PM, Develop, GoodN, RL. The following table illustrates the aggregated words and deeds data for Rg1.

Table 78 Rg1: TFP words (W) / deeds (D) comparison

Rg1-DATA		Rg1 TOTAL		Rg1GOVERNMENTS					
	ROLE	Total - W	Total - D	G59 W	G59D	G60 W	G60D	G61 W	G61D
R2	Dop	29	8	14	7	12	1	3	0
R3	TS	4	2	0	0	1	2	3	0
R4	Protect	5	5	0	1	3	3	2	1
R7	PM	12	4	9	4	2	0	1	0
R12	RSC	23	39	12	26	8	8	3	5
R18	Develop	21	4	5	1	4	2	12	1
R20	GoodN	24	23	15	18	6	3	3	2
R21	RL	4	11	0	4	3	4	1	3
TOTAL		122	96	55	61	39	23	28	12

The first column of the table indicates that 122 total role references are made towards the region by AKP decision-makers and 96 role practices are observed in the events. The percentage shares of these roles are presented in the charts below:

⁸⁰ These are included in the role-specific comparisons but excluded from overall comparison. For the reasons please see the role-specific explanations in the next section below.




Figure 87 Rg1 Roles W/D Percentage Shares

The charts illustrate that the most frequently referred five roles are mostly parallel in both words and deeds. A significant gap is observed in RL and RSC, which are less frequently uttered but more frequently practiced. Conversely the Developer and DoP role conceptions are more frequently uttered than practiced. So according to the actual foreign policy practices of the country, Turkey aims at establishing good ties with the region. Except the RL role conception other roles are mostly cooperative.

In Rg2, the roles that are included in the comparison are: DoP, TS, Protect, Mediate, PM, RSC, Develop, GoodN, RL. The following table illustrates the aggregated words and deeds data for Rg2.

Table 79 Rg2: TFP words (W) / deeds (D) comparison

Rg2-DATA		Rg2TOTAL		Rg2GOVERNMENTS					
CODE	ROLE	Total - W	Total - D	G59 W	G59 D	G60 W	G60 D	G61 W	G61 D
R2	Dop	45	20	20	8	22	10	3	2
R3	TS	30	14	7	4	12	4	11	6
R4	Protect	7	14	1	6	0	6	6	2
R6	Mediate	16	6	1	1	13	5	2	0
R7	PM	19	5	14	3	2	1	3	1
R12	RSC	71	86	29	29	25	45	17	12
R18	Develop	41	14	9	6	2	6	17	2
R20	GoodN	32	43	15	17	13	20	4	6
R21	RL	2	28	0	7	2	16	0	5
TOTAL		263	230	96	81	91	113	63	36

The first column of the table indicates that 263 total role references are made towards the region by AKP decision-makers and 230 role practices are observed in the events. The percentage shares of these roles are presented in the charts below:




Figure 88 Rg2 Roles W/D Percentage Shares

As illustrated in the charts above RSC and GoodN role conceptions are parallel to each other in terms of words and deeds. The developer, trading state and defender of peace role conceptions are more frequently uttered than performed. Except the regional leader role conception, most of Turkey's roles towards the region are cooperative but not necessarily peaceful. Parallel to the roles of Rg1, peace related roles are less frequently performed than uttered.

In Rg3 the roles that are observed include: DoP, TS, Protect, Mediate, PM, RSC, Developer, GoodN, RL. The following table illustrates the aggregated words and deeds data for Rg3.

Table 80 Rg3: TFP words (W) / deeds (D) comparison

Rg3-DATA		Rg3TOTAL		Rg3GOVERNMENTS					
CODE	ROLE	Total - W	Total - D	G59 W	G59 D	G60 W	G60 D	G61 W	G61 D
R2	Dop	156	76	90	22	43	31	23	23
R3	TS	22	14	11	9	2	2	9	3
R4	Protect	106	95	22	52	15	9	69	34
R6	Mediate	30	21	13	4	17	13	0	4
R7	PM	80	2	46	1	21	1	13	0
R12	RSC	87	168	40	78	29	58	18	32
R18	Develop	41	92	16	51	13	18	12	23
R20	GoodN	51	88	32	36	14	34	5	18
R21	RL	16	114	5	40	7	36	4	38
TOTAL		589	670	275	293	161	202	153	175

The table indicates that 589 total role references are made towards the region by AKP decision-makers and 670 role practices are observed in the events. The percentage shares of these roles are presented in the charts below:




Figure 89 Rg3 Roles W/D Percentage Shares

The figures indicate that both role references in both words and deeds are distributed relatively more evenly in Rg3. Most significant gaps are observed in peace related roles and the regional leader role. The RL, developer and RSC role conceptions are more frequently practiced than uttered. The Protector, GoodN Mediator and Trading state role conceptions are parallel in both words and deeds. Similar to other regions turkey's relations with Rg3 are cooperative but not necessarily peaceful. Indeed, the leaders envision a peaceful foreign policy in their speeches. However, regarding the relatively limited share of DoP, PM and Mediate and high share of RL, Protector Role conceptions in TFP events it would not be unrealistic to argue that Turkey's relations with the region are conflictual.

In Rg4 the roles that are observed include: DoP, TS, Protect, Mediate, PM, RSC and Developer. The following table illustrates the aggregated words and deeds data for Rg4.

Table 81 Rg4: TFP words (W) / deeds (D) comparison

Rg4-DATA		Rg4TOTAL		Rg4GOVERNMENTS					
ROLE		Total - W	Total - D	G59 W	G59 D	G60 W	G60 D	G61 W	G61 D
R2	Dop	8	2	1	1	4	1	3	0
R3	TS	17	0	1	0	1	0	15	0
R4	Protect	7	3	2	1	0	0	5	2
R6	Mediate	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
R7	PM	3	0	1	0	0	0	2	0
R12	RSC	7	5	2	1	3	4	2	0
R18	Develop	28	3	7	1	1	0	20	2
TOTAL		72	13	14	4	9	5	49	4

The table indicates that 72 total role references are made towards the region by AKP decision-makers and 13 role practices are observed in the events. The percentage shares of these roles are presented in the charts below:




Figure 90 Rg4 Roles W/D Percentage Shares


TFP events towards this region are very limited in number. As the deeds charts indicate PM, Mediator, TS are not observed in TFP practice towards the region. The observed practices indicate that Turkey has a peaceful and cooperative approach towards the region.

In Rg5, the observed roles are: DoP, TS, RSC and FA. The following table illustrates the aggregated words and deeds data for Rg5.

Table 82 Rg5: TFP words (W) / deeds (D) comparison

Rg5-DATA		Rg5TOTAL		Rg5GOVERNMENTS					
ROLE		Total - W	Total - D	G59 W	G59 D	G60 W	G60 D	G61 W	G61 D
R2	Dop	4	23	2	15	2	5	0	3
R3	TS	7	8	3	7	3	1	1	0
R12	RSC	4	145	3	99	1	34	0	12
R16	FA	81	256	51	159	25	68	5	29
TOTAL		96	432	59	280	31	108	6	44

The table indicates that 96 total role references are made towards the region by AKP decision-makers and 432 role practices are observed in the events. The percentage shares of these roles are presented in the charts below

**Figure 91 Rg5 Roles W/D Percentage Shares**

The FA role conception is a region specific role conception and it dominates Turkey's approach to Rg5. As the figures illustrate, there is a significant gap between words and deeds that refer to the RSC role conception. This indicates that although AKP decision-makers do not necessarily refer to the countries of the region as a collaboration partner, the actual practices indicate a different result. TFP events clearly indicate that Turkey cooperates with Rg5.

An overall analysis of the government-specific and region specific figures above indicates a number of findings. Twenty-two role conceptions are observed in TFPRED: five 'Ge' and seventeen 'Rg' roles. Three of the Ge role conceptions are not observable via event data: R5-Central Country (CC), R10 – Rising Power (Rise),

and R11- Bridge across Civilizations (Civbrid.). Among the remaining ‘Ge’ roles, the frequency percentage shares of the Global System Collaborator (GSC) role conception are parallel in words and deeds. The role is both uttered and performed in TFP. On the other hand, a significant gap exists between the percentage shares of the Independent Country (Indep.) role conception. That is to say, the role is more frequently performed than uttered. Among the remaining seventeen Rg roles, three are not observable with event data: R15- Bridge across civilizations (GeoBrid.), R17- Model and R19 – Energy Transporting Country (ETC). Three of these roles are observed in all five regions (Rtype1): Defender of Peace (DoP), Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC), and Trading State (TS). Seven of the Rg roles are observed in multiple regions (RType2): Protect, PM, AI, Develop, GoodN, RL, and Mediate. Finally, Eastern Country (East), Western Country (West) and Faithfull Ally (FA) are only observed in a single region (RType3). For a detailed in-depth analysis, let us look at role-by-role observations in order to make a list of performed and non-performed role conceptions

6.2 Role-Specific Observations

R1- Global System Collaborator (GSC)

In the methodology chapter above, this role is defined to include references of Turkey’s support to “global law and custom-generating mechanisms such as UNSC” (Ozdamar 2014: 23). Turkish decision-makers’ references on the responsibility to follow global law, the norms of the international society, and Turkey’s activities to support the UN decisions/policies are counted as references to this role conception.

Chapter IV provides detailed information on how many times the decision-makers referred to this role conception. According to the content analysis data the GSC role conception received 169 references in total, which amounts to 7% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 4th most frequently referred role conception. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 82 times, which amounts to 7% of the government’s total references. During the 59th government the role ranks 5th among others. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 54 times, which again amounts to 7% of the government’s total references. During the 60th

government the role ranks 4th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 33 times, which amounts to 5% of the total references. The role is ranked as the 7th. According to these findings there is a pattern of slight decline in AKP leaders' references to Turkey's supportive role towards international custom generating mechanisms. Leaders' references to the role remained constant until the 61st government. However, with the last government references towards this role declined. Let us compare this pattern with the foreign policy events.

As the Table 73 demonstrates, the GSC Role Conception will be considered as fulfilled depending on the number of cooperative events (both verbal and material cooperation) From TR (source) to global IGO's (targets). The following table shows and compares the findings. In order to observe the parallelism of the words and deeds, I filtered and aggregated the relevant portion of the Event dataset. The following table observes the frequency, scale (CAMEO scale) and category (Verbal/Material Cooperation) of TFP events towards global IGOs.

83 R1- GSC Words and Deeds Comparison

GSC (TRtoIGO Cooperative events)

EVENT DATA

MOD	ROLE PERFORMANCE	(DEEDS)			ANALYSIS (WORDS)			
		FREQUENCY		SCALE	CATEGORY		# OF REFERENCES	
		TOTAL# of Coop.	% Share	Avrg. CAMEO score	Verbal Coop.	Material Coop.	TOTAL#	% Share
Gov.	NA	14	NA	3,51	13	1	NA	NA
Gov.	Performed	69	7%	3,86	62	7	82	10%
Gov.	Underperformed	29	5%	3,00	27	2	54	11%
Gov.	Performed	21	5%	0,75	17	4	33	7%
Gov.	Performed	133	6%	2,68	119	14	169	10%

Observation:

utterance (words) and performance (deeds) are parallel to each other in terms of both frequency and content. The frequency of decision-makers' role references and TFP events follow a similar pattern. The significance of the role and the cooperative nature of Turkey's relationship with the global IGO's are in decline.

The table above gives aggregated comparison data on TFP words and deeds that refer to GSC. The first column gives information on the government period over which the data is aggregated. The second column provides information on role performance. I use the data on the “% share” columns while deciding on role performance. First, I look at the % share column of the Content Analysis (Words). Then, I look at the percentage share column of the Event Data (deeds). A role is considered as performed if the % share difference between the words and deeds is between -5 (when the percentage share of deeds is %5 lower) to +5 (when the percentage share of deeds is %5 higher). The scale⁸¹ is as follows:

- If difference is more than + 15% the role is **highly over-performed**
- If difference is between +6 % to +14 the role is **over-performed**
- If difference is between -5% to +5% **performed**
- if difference is between -6% to -14% **underperformed**
- if difference is more than - 15% **highly underperformed**

As the table indicates the percentage share of TFP words that refer to GSC is 10% in 59th Gov., 11% in 60th Gov., 7% in 61st Gov. On the other hand, the percentage shares of GSC in TFP events 7% in 59th Government, 5% in 60th Gov. and 5 % in the 61st government. The role is only underperformed during the 60th government. The third column gives data on the total number of cooperative events from TR to IGOs. One might observe that the number of cooperative events declines from one government to the other. When this decline is compared with the decision-makers’ total number of references (8th column in the table) to the role conception a parallelism is observed. A similar parallelism is also observed in the 4th column, which gives the average cameo score of Turkey’s relationship with IGOs. The score declines from 3,86 in the 59th Gov. to 0.75 in the 61st. Hence, the significance of GSC role conception is in decline both in words and deeds. Then, an overall observation for GSC is that, although the significance of the role is in decline from

⁸¹ An important point to note here is that this scale is only applied to the roles that are included in the Total, Government-based and region-based comparisons of the previous section. If a role is not included in the comparison, then another comparison is applied. For specific information on roles, please see the relevant role-specific explanation below.

one government to the other the role is performed in parallel with the words of the AKP decision-makers.

R2- Defender of Peace and Stability (DoP)

This role refers to a supportive position for the peace and stability in the world. As defined in the methodology section decision-makers' references to Turkey's support for global peace/stability, peaceful resolution of disputes or Turkey's criticism of aggressive actions are counted as references to this role conception.

According to the content analysis data the DoP role conception received 378 references in total, which amounts to 15% of the total role references. The role is ranked as the 1st most frequently referred role conception among others. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 203 times, which amounts to 17% of total references. During the 59th government the role is ranked 1st among others. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 115 times, which amounts to 16% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role is also ranked 1st. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 60 times, which amounts to 10% of the total references. However, the role is ranked 4th in this period. According to these findings the DoP Role is the most frequently referred role in total. However, there is a pattern of decline in references towards this role. This decline is especially significant during the rule of 61st government, when the percentage share declined from 16% to 10%. Let us compare this pattern with the findings on the foreign policy events of Turkey.

As the Table 73 demonstrates events with the codes of 0256, 026, 027, 028, 0356, 036, 037, 038, 039, 045, 087, 0871, 0872, 0873, 0874, 1123, 1124 will be counted as references to this role conception. These codes refer to foreign policy events in which Turkey declared its responsibility, support, and actions towards peace and stability in significant parts of the world. In order to observe the parallelism of the words and deeds, I filtered and aggregated events with the above-mentioned codes. As it is also explained in the government-based observations of the previous section, a significant gap is observed in the words and deeds that refer to the DoP role. The following table summarizes the frequency, percentage share and regional direction of all words and deeds related to the DoP role.

Table 84 R2- DoP Words and Deeds Comparison

R2 – DoP - 0256, 026, 027, 028, 0356, 037, 038, 039, 045, 087, 0871, 0872, 0873, 0874, 1123, 1124															
Period	Role Performance	Event Data(Deeds)							Content Analysis (Words)						
		Total # events	% Share (All)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#	Total # (Ge + Rg)	% Share (Ge+Rg)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#
58th Gov.	NA	5	NA	0	0	3	0	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
59th Gov.	Highly underperformed	52	5%	7	8	22	0	15	203	25%	14	2	90	1	2
60th Gov.	Highly underperformed	48	5%	1	10	31	1	5	115	24%	12	22	43	4	2
61st Gov.	Underperformed	28	7%	0	2	23	0	3	60	13%	3	3	23	3	0
TOTAL	Highly underperformed	133	6%	8	20	79	1	25	378	21%	29	27	156	8	4
Observation:															
The role is highly underperformed. A significant gap is observed between the words and deeds of TFP that refer to this role conception. The significance of the role conception is in decline and the gap between words and deeds is closing from one government to the other.															

The table illustrates that the role is highly underperformed. Although the decision-makers' of AKP very frequently refer to their country as the defender of peace and stability the foreign policy events do not indicate the same frequency. On the other hand, the regional direction of the words and deeds are mostly parallel and the role is most frequently directed to and observed in Rg3 (MENA). The gap and therefore inconsistency between words and deeds is in decline from one government to the other. The significance of the role conception is also in decline from one AKP government to the other especially with regard to the words of AKP decision-makers.

R3- Trading State (TS)

This role refers to a foreign policy is conducted with economic considerations and particularly to establish trade relationships. Here, the main reference is to increasing economic partnerships and trade with any country or region in the world.

According to the content analysis data the TS role conception received 76 references in total, which amounts to 6% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 8th among others. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 51 times, which amounts to 4% of total references. During the 59th government the role ranks 8th among others. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 26 times, which amounts to 4% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role ranks 9th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 69 times, which amounts to 11% of the total references. The role ranked as the 3rd. According to these findings there is a pattern of increase in references towards this role. This increase is especially significant under the 61st governments rule when the percentage share of the role rose from 4% to 11%. Let us compare this pattern with the findings on the foreign policy events of Turkey.

As the Table 73 demonstrates, events with the 0211, 0311, 061, 1011 codes are counted as references to this role conception. These codes mainly refer to foreign policy actions on economic cooperation and establishment of new trade relationships. In order to observe the parallelism of the words and deeds, I filtered and aggregated events with the above-mentioned codes. The following table summarizes the frequency, percentage share and regional direction of all words and deeds that are observed in the TFPRED dataset and related to the TS role.

Table 85 R3- TS Words and Deeds Comparison

R3 - Trading State - 0211, 0311, 061, 101															
Period	Role Performance	Event Data(Deeds)					Content Analysis (Words)								
		TOTAL# events	% Share (All)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#	TOTAL# (Ge + Rg)	% Share (Ge+Rg)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#
58th Gov.	NA	2	NA	0	1	1	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
59th Gov.	Performed	20	2%	0	4	9	0	7	51	7%	0	7	11	1	3
60th Gov.	Performed	9	1%	2	4	2	0	1	26	5%	1	12	2	1	3
61st Gov.	Underperformed	9	2%	0	6	3	0	0	69	14%	3	11	9	15	1
TOTAL	Underperformed	40	2%	2	15	15	0	8	146	8%	4	30	22	17	7
Observation:															
The role is performed parallel to the words but is not very significant in the 59th and 60th governments in terms of % shares. The significance of the role increases in the words of the 61st government but this pattern is not in parallel with the deeds. The role is underperformed according to the total words and deeds.															

As the table summarizes the role is categorized as underperformed. In terms of % shares, the role is not very significant but there is a parallelism between the words and deeds of Turkey that refer to this role in the 59th and 60th governments. The significance of the role increases sharply in the words of 61st government, however, this pattern is not observed in the deeds and the role is categorized as underperformed since the difference between the percentage shares of the role is minus (-) 12%. The difference in the percentage share of total words and deeds is minus (-) 6%, which also indicate that the role is underperformed.

R4- Protector of the Oppressed (Protect)

This role is defined especially with regard to the post-Arab spring period. However, during the speech analysis it is observed that this role also refers to Turkey's protection of Turkic Cypriots against Greece and Palestinians against Israel. Hence any references of Turkish decision-makers to Turkey's responsibility to protect people against other countries, oppressive regimes, and Turkey's support to protestors against oppressions are regarded as indicators of this role.

According to the content analysis data the Protector role conception received 159 references in total, which amounts to 6% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 6th among other role conceptions. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 26 times, which amounts to 2% of total references. During the 59th government the role ranks 16th among others. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 18 times, which amounts to 2% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role ranks 16th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 115 times, which amounts to 19% of the total references. The role ranked as the 1st. According to these findings, references towards this role remained stable until the 61st government. Then, the references increased significantly from 2% to 19% and the role ranked first among others. This is especially the impact of the Arab uprisings in the MENA region, after which Turkish decision-makers attributed a protector of the oppressed role conception to Turkey. Let us compare this pattern with the findings on the foreign policy events of Turkey.

As the Table 73 demonstrates, events with the 0233, 033, 0331, 0332, 0334, 070, 071, 072, 073, 074, 075, 1054, 1122, 1123, 1124 codes are regarded as indicators of this role's performance. These codes mostly refer to Turkey's events on appealing to aid or demanding the removal of embargo in the surrounding regions. I filtered and aggregated events with the above-mentioned codes. The following table summarizes the frequency, percentage share and regional direction of all words and deeds that are observed in the TFPRED dataset and related to the Protector role.



86 R4- Protector Words and Deeds Comparison					
Protector: 0233, 033, 0331, 0332, 0334, 070, 071, 072, 073, 074, 075, 1					
IOD	ROLE PERFORMANCE	EVENT DATA(DEEDS)			
		TOTAL#	% Share	Rg	Rg

		events	(All)	1#	2#	3#	4#	5#	(Ge + Rg)	(Ge+Rg)	1#	2#	3#	4#	5#
Gov.	NA	6	NA	0	0	2	0	4	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Gov.	Performed	74	8%	1	6	52	1	14	26	3%	0	1	22	2	0
Gov.	Performed	24	4%	3	6	9	0	6	18	4%	3	0	15	0	0
Gov.	Underperformed	44	11%	1	2	34	2	5	115	24%	2	6	69	5	0
AL	Performed	148	7%	5	14	97	3	29	159	9%	5	7	106	7	0
Observation:															
The role is mostly performed in parallel with the words of AKP decision-makers. The significance of this role conception increases sharply during the 61st government.															

As the table-above illustrates, TFP words and deeds that indicate the Protector role are mostly in parallel with each other. There is a sharp increase in both words and deeds towards this role during the 61st government, which corresponds with the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings in the MENA region. The role is overwhelmingly directed towards the Rg3 (MENA region). The total data indicates that this role is performed.

R5- Central Country (CC)

As defined in the methodology section, decision-makers' references to Turkey's special 'hub' position, Turkey's central position in the world and its surrounding regions, Turkey's increasingly important role in global politics and Turkey's rejection of a passive bridge role in the region are counted as references to this role conception.

According to the content analysis data the CC role conception received 114 references in total, which amounts to 5% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 11th among other role conceptions. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 56 times, which amounts to 5% of total references. During the 59th government the role ranks 8th among others. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 36 times, which amounts to 5% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role ranks 8th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 22 times, which amounts to 4% of the total references. The role ranked as the 10th. According to these findings references towards this role remained relatively constant. The role stands as a vague discursive construction of AKP decision-makers, which does not acquire a very significant position in AKP leaders discourse. When we look at TFP practices, as the Table 73 demonstrates, this role is mainly a verbal construction of AKP decision-makers and currently non-observable through event data.

R6- Mediator

This role refers to Turkey's engagement in mediating conflicts among countries, resolving differences of conflicting sides, providing forums for discussions and resolutions of conflicts. The role is observed in AKP decision-makers' discourse however, it is not very significant.

According to the content analysis data the Mediator role conception received 55 references in total, which amounts to 2% of all role references. The role is ranked as 14th among other role conceptions. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 14 times, which amounts to 1% of total references. During the 59th government the role ranks 17th among others. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 32 times, which amounts to 4% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role ranks 10th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 9 times, which amounts to 1% of the total references. The role is ranked as 14th. According to these findings except the 60th government the role does not receive any significance in AKP decision-makers' discourse. Let us look at the findings of the event data and see the parallelism.

As the Table 73 demonstrates, events with the 028, 039, 045 codes are regarded as indicators that this role is performed. These codes mainly refer to events that indicate Turkey's appeal to engage in or accept mediation and expressions of intent to mediate. I filtered and aggregated events with these codes. The following table summarizes the frequency, percentage share and regional direction of all words and deeds that are observed in the TFPRED dataset and are related to the Mediator role.

Table 87 R6- Mediator Words and Deeds Comparison

R6: Mediator: 028, 039, 045															
Period	Role Performance	Event Data(Deeds)					Content Analysis (Words)								
		TOTAL# events	% Share (All)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#	TOTAL# (Ge + Rg)	% Share (Ge+Rg)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#
58th Gov.	NA	0	NA	0	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
59th Gov.	Performed	7	1%	1	1	4	0	1	14	2%	0	1	13	0	0
60th Gov.	Performed	22	4%	3	5	13	0	1	32	6%	0	13	17	0	0
61st Gov.	Performed	4	1%	0	0	4	0	0	9	2%	0	2	0	2	0
TOTAL	Performed	33	2%	4	6	21	0	2	55	3%	0	16	30	2	0
Observation:															
The role is not very significant both in words and deeds. However, role performance is parallel to the decision-makers’ discourse. The role is performed.															

As the table illustrates, the role is performed but insignificant both in TFP words and deed. However, it is a performed role conception and most significantly visible in the Rg3 (MENA) and Rg2 (Caucasus) regions.

R7- Peace-maker/ Problem-solver (PM)

This role assumes an active involvement and capability for Turkey in resolving the crisis. As it is defined in the methodology section, the decision-makers' references to Turkey's responsibility to bring/establish peace, solve problems in specific crisis will be regarded as indicators of this role.

According to the content analysis data the PS role conception received 148 references in total, which amounts to 6% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 7th among other role conceptions. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 91 times, which amounts to 8% of total references. During the 59th government the role ranks 4th among others. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 35 times, which amounts to 5% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role ranks 4th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 22 times, which amounts to 4% of the total references. The role is ranked as the 9th. According to these findings the role has been mostly significant under the rule of 59th government. Then, one can observe a pattern of decline in AKP decision-makers' references to the role conception from 8% share to 4%. Let us look at the findings of the event data and see the parallelism.

As the Table 73 demonstrates, the events with 037, 1056, 107 codes are regarded as indicators that this role is performed. These codes refer to (037) express intent to settle dispute, (1056) Demand de-escalation of military engagement and (107) Demand settling of dispute. I filtered and aggregated events with these codes. The following table summarizes the frequency, percentage share and regional direction of all words and deeds that are observed in the TFPRED dataset and are related to the Peacemaker role.

R7- Peace-maker/Problem-solver: 037, 1056, 107

R7- Peace-maker/Problem-solver: 037, 1056, 107															
Period	Role Performance	Event Data(Deeds)					Content Analysis (Words)								
		TOTAL#	% Share	Rg	Rg	Rg	Rg	Rg	TOTAL#	% Share	Rg	Rg	Rg	Rg	Rg
		events	(All)	1#	2#	3#	4#	5#	(Ge + Rg)	(Ge+Rg)	1#	2#	3#	4#	5#
58th Gov.	NA	0	NA	0	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
59th Gov.	Underperformed	11	1%	4	3	1	0	3	91	11%	9	14	46	1	0
60th Gov.	Not Performed	2	0%	0	1	1	0	0	35	7%	2	2	21	0	0
61st Gov.	Not Performed	1	0%	0	1	0	0	0	22	5%	1	3	13	2	0
TOTAL	Underperformed	14	1%	4	5	2	0	3	148	8%	12	19	80	3	0
Observation: This role is most frequently uttered during the 59 th government. Its significance declines from one government to the other. The role is underperformed in the events of Turkey.															

As the table illustrates the significance of the PM role is in decline from one government to the other. The role is not performed in 60th and 61st government and underperformed according to the total data. Hence, a significant gap exists between the words and deeds that refer to this role.

R8- Independent

Turkish decision-makers' references to Turkey's 'own interest' in contrast to those of external actors are regarded as indicators of this role.

According to the content analysis data the Independent role conception received 44 references in total, which amounts to 2% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 17th among other role conceptions. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 30 times, which amounts to 3% of total references. During the 59th government the role ranks 13th among others. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 9 times, which amounts to 1% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role ranks 19th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 5 times, which amounts to 1% of the total references. The role is ranked 17th. According to these findings the role did not receive significant reference except the 59th government period. Let us look at the findings of the event data and see the parallelism.

As the Table 73 demonstrates, the events with 016, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 1241, 1246, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 139, 160, 161, 162, 1621, 1622, 163, 164 codes are regarded as indicators that this role is performed. This role is a reactive and composes of refusing to yield and rejecting any intervention on foreign affairs. I filtered and aggregated events with these codes. The following table summarizes the frequency, percentage share and regional direction of all words and deeds that are observed in the TFPRED dataset and are related to the Peacemaker role.

89 R8- Independent Words and Deeds Comparison					
Independent: 016, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 1241, 1246, 127, 129, 130,					
IOD	ROLE PERFORMANCE	EVENT DATA(DEEDS)			
		TOTAL#	% Share	Rg	Rg

		events	(All)	1#	2#	3#
Gov.	NA	29	NA	NA	NA	NA
Gov.	Over-performed	155	16%	NA	NA	NA
Gov.	Highly over-performed	103	17%	NA	NA	NA
Gov.	Highly over-performed	101	25%	NA	NA	NA
AL	Highly over-performed	388	18%	14	50	18

Observation:

role is highly over-performed. Its significance decreases in the AKP decision-m

Since it is a "Ge" role, this role does not have any regional direction. As the table demonstrates this role is highly over-performed by Turkey. There is a significant gap between the words and deeds that refer to this Independent role conception. This might be a methodological limitation of event data, a point further illustrated in the limitations section of the conclusion chapter.

R9- Active Independent (AI)

This role conception refers to a country that actively engages in cooperative efforts, trade relationships, and diplomatic relationships to bolster its independence.

According to the content analysis data the AI role conception received 241 references in total, which amounts to 10% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 3rd among other role conceptions. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 118 times, which amounts to 10% of total references. During the 59th government the role ranks 2nd among others. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 81 times, which amounts to 9% of the government's total references. During the 60th government the role ranks 3rd. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 56 times, which amounts to 9% of the total references. The role is ranked as the 5th. According to these findings references to this role conception remained relatively constant. Let us look at the findings of the event data and see the parallelism.

This role is not included in the general and government based comparisons of the previous section because as the Table 73 demonstrates the increasing and decreasing foreign policy activism of Turkey is regarded as the indicator that role is performed. Hence, the role necessitates us to count every event from TR to world in order to observe the increasing and decreasing foreign policy activity. Here, I use the observations that are made in the event data chapter (Chapter V- Section 5.1) in order to understand the decreasing and increasing foreign policy activism. The data indicated that although some fluctuations are observable, there is a pattern of decline in Turkey's overall foreign policy activity under the three AKP governments. The average number of foreign policy events in a quarter is 152 in the 59th government, 111 in the 60th government, and 96 in the 61st government era.

AKP decision-makers' in all governments constantly refer to the role. So its significance stands relatively constant from one government to the other. However, in the practices we see a decline in foreign policy activism. Hence, the role is a performed role; however, the performance is in decline.

R10- Rising Power (Rise)

As it is also defined in the methodology section this role refers to Turkey's increasing political influence, economic capabilities, or military power in any part of the world.

According to the content analysis data the Rise role conception received 55 references in total, which amounts to 2% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 15th among other role conceptions. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 28 times, which amounts to 2% of total references. During the 59th government the role ranks 15th among others. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 15 times, which amounts to 2% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role ranks 17th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 12 times, which amounts to 2% of the total references, and the role ranks 13th. According to these findings despite the increase in the rank of the role conception, the amount of references to this role remained constant throughout the three governments with 2%. The percentage share indicates that AKP decision-makers occasionally refer to Turkey as a rising power in the world. However, the role is not very significant in the overall discourse of TFP. The role refers to a rise in economic and military power, which necessitates finding other indicators. Hence, as Table 73 also demonstrates, the role is non-observable with event data and therefore not included into comparison here. This point is further discussed in the limitations section of the conclusion chapter.

R11- Bridge across Civilizations (Civbrid.- Islamic Civilization and West)

The Bridge across Civilizations role conception attributes ideational responsibilities to the country to bridge the Muslim and Christian Civilizations. "References to the Civilizational Dialogue or to Turkey as the voice of the Muslim world in the West is regarded as indicators of this role" (Özdamar et al., 2014: 27).

According to the content analysis data the CivBrid role conception received 54 references in total, which amounts to 2% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 16th among other role conceptions. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 29 times, which amounts to 2% of total references. During the 59th government the role ranks 14th among others. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 19 times, which amounts to 3% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government, the role is ranked as the 15th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 6 times, which amounts to 1% of the total references. The role is ranked as the 16th. According to these findings references to this role conception remained relatively constant until the 61st government, when the role lost its significance. This role has remained as a discursive construction especially in the initial period of the AKP governments in Turkey. As the Table 73 demonstrates it is verbal construction and non-observable through event data; therefore, not included in the words/deeds comparison.

R12- Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC)

This role refers to Turkey's participation in regional organizations, the country's engagement in cooperation efforts, or Turkey's call for increasing cooperation among regional actors.

According to the content analysis data the RSC role conception is the 2nd most frequently referred role conception and received 249 references in total, which amounts to 10% of all role references. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 116 times, which amounts to 10% of total references. During the 59th government the role is ranked as the 3rd. During the 60th government, the role is uttered 81 times, which amounts to 11% of the governments' total references and the role is ranked as the 2nd. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 52 times, which amounts to 8% of the total references. The role is ranked as the 6th. According to these findings, references towards this role have remained relatively constant until the 61st government. In this period, there is a decline in AKP leaders' references to the role from 11% to 8%. Let us see if the findings of the event data analysis are parallel to this pattern.

As the Table 73 demonstrates, the events with 021, 0211, 0212, 0213, 0214, 022, 30, 031, 0311, 0312, 032, 050, 060, 061, 062, 063, 064, 101, 1011, 1014, 102 codes are regarded as indicators that this role is performed. These codes refer to Turkey's demand, appeal for, or engagement in material, economic, diplomatic and military cooperation. I filtered and aggregated events with the above-mentioned codes. The following table summarizes the frequency, percentage share and regional direction of all words and deeds that are observed in the TFPRED dataset and are related to the Peacemaker role.



R12 - Regional Subsystem Collaborator: 021, 0211, 0212, 0213, 0214, 022, 30, 031, 0311, 0312, 032, 050, 060, 061, 062, 063, 064, 101, 1011, 1014, 102

Observation:

The role is over-performed in the 59th and 60th government. Its significance is in decline from one government to the other and in this regard the words and deeds are in parallel with each other. The gap between words and deeds closes as new governments are established by AKP.

According to the event dataset, RSC is the most frequently performed role conception. In TFP words it is ranked as the 2nd. As the table indicates the significance of this role conception is in decline from one AKP government to the other and this pattern is parallel in words and deeds. According to the total data the role is over-performed but the gap and therefore inconsistency between TFP words and deeds closes during the 61st government. According to the total data the role is categorized as over-performed.

R13- Western Country (West)

This role refers to Turkey as a part of the developed West. Turkish decision-makers' references to Turkey as part of Europe and western world, the country's participation in and membership to the EU, European Council are counted as the indicators of this role.

According to the content analysis data the Western Country role conception received 123 references in total, which amounts to 5% of all role references. The West role conception is ranked as the 10th most frequently referred role. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 75 times, which amounts to 6% of total references. During the 59th government the role ranks 7th among others. During the 60th government, the role is uttered 27 times, which amounts to 4% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role ranks 11th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 21 times, which amounts to 3% of the total references. The role is ranked as the 11th. According to these findings there is a pattern of decline in AKP governments' references to this role conception from 6% to 3%. Let us see if the events follow a similar pattern.

This role is not included in the general and government-based comparisons of the previous section because it looks at the increasing and decreasing region specific activity. As demonstrated in As the Table 73, this role requires us to count all events from TR to Rg5. Here I use the event data, which is previously given in Chapter V (Section 5.2.5).

Event data indicates that there are 1538 events towards this region, which makes it the second region in TFP events. This rank is different from the content analysis

data, in which the region ranked 3rd (please see Figure 5 in chapter IV). So the country is in more active relationship with the region according to the events, compared to the words of the AKP decision-makers. On the other hand, the quarterly average number of events from TR to Rg5 during the 59th government (March 2003 – July 2007) is 56, the 60th government (July 2007 – June 2011) is 26, and the 61st government (June 2011 – August 2014) is 21. Turkey's engagement with the region is in decline and this is parallel to the content analysis information given above. Hence, I observe that the role is over-performed but its significance is in decrease and the gap between words/deeds closes as new governments are established by AKP. The references in speeches and the events towards this region follow a parallel pattern of decline from one AKP government to the other.

R14- Eastern Country (East)

In the content analysis of the TFPRED any references of Turkish decision-makers' to Turkey's Muslim identity, its historical ties with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries are counted as indicators of Eastern country role.

According to the content analysis data the Eastern Country role conception received 15 references in total, which amounts to 1% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 20th among other role conceptions. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 12 times, which amounts to 1% of total references. During the 59th government the role ranks 19th. During the 60th government, the role did not receive any references. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 3 times which is not significant (0%). According to these findings only the leaders of the 59th government referred to this role. Then, the role has lost its significance in the AKP decision-makers' discourse. Let us see if this pattern is followed in TFP event frequencies.

As the Table 73 demonstrates the increase and decrease of events from TR to Rg3 are regarded as indicators of this role. This increase and decrease can also be analyzed comparatively with the Western Country role in order to see if there really is a shift of axis in TFP. As demonstrated in the Table 73, this role requires counting all events from TR to Rg3. Here I use the event data, which is previously given in Chapter V (Section 5.2.3)

Event data indicates that there are 2631 events towards this region, which makes it the first region in TFP events. A government-based observation of the number of events shows that Turkey's activity in the region has remained similar from one government to the other. The quarterly average number of events in the region during the 59th government (March 2003 – July 2007) is 51, the 60th government (July 2007 – June 2011) is 50, and the 61st government (June 2011 – August 2014) is 55. The findings indicate that there is a slight increase in event frequency after the Arab-uprisings.

Indeed, both in terms of role references and foreign policy events, RG3 is the most frequently referred region. Despite the decrease in the references and events towards other regions, Turkey's activity in RG3 slightly increased from one government to the other. When compared to the Western country role conceptions, this observation proves that there is a slight axis-shift towards Rg3 from one AKP government to the other. Yet, the increasing regional activism according to event data does not inform us about Turkey's belonging to the Muslim Identity. In the current state of the TFPRED dataset I cannot talk about Turkey's Muslim identity and suffice it to say here that my data indicates that Turkey belongs more to Rg3 than Rg5. This is a point further discussed in the directions for further research.

R15- Bridge across Continents (Geobrid. - between the East and the West)

As it is also understood from its name this role refers to Turkey's geographical location and references to this location is regarded as indicators of this role conception. According to the content analysis data the Geobrid role conception received only 8 references in total, which is not significant (0%) when compared to other role conception. Five of these references are given during the 59th government and 3 are given during the 60th government. The role did not receive any references during the 61st government. According to these findings the role has no significance in leaders' discourse. On the other hand, as Table 73 demonstrates, this role is a verbal construction and is not observable with event data.

R16- Faithful Ally (FA)

As defined in the methodology section any references to Turkey's commitment to its NATO alliance or Turkey's support to the foreign policies of European countries and the US are counted as indicators of this role.

According to the content analysis data the FA role conception received 82 references in total, which amounts to 3% of all role references. The role is ranked 13th among others. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 51 times, which amounts to 4% of total references. During the 59th government the role is ranked 10th. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 26 times, which amounts to 4% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role is ranked as the 13th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 5 times, which amounts to 1% of the total references. The role ranked as the 18th. According to these findings, there is a pattern of decline in AKP decision-makers' references towards this role conception. Let us look at the findings of the event data and see the parallelism.

This role is by definition directed towards Rg5 and observed in the speeches of the decision-makers as such. As the Table 73 demonstrates, the events from TR to Rg 5 with the codes of 013, 019, 021, 0211, 0212, 0213, 0214, 022, 030, 031, 0311, 0312, 032, 033, 0331, 0332, 0334, 050, 051, 052, 053, 057, 060, 061, 062, 063, 064, 100, 101 are regarded as indicators that this role is performed. These codes mostly refer to Turkey's political and diplomatic support to the countries of the region. I filtered and aggregated events with the above-mentioned codes. The following table summarizes the frequency, percentage share and regional direction of all words and deeds that are observed in the TFPRED dataset and are related to the Faithful Ally role.

91 R16- FA Words and Deeds Comparison

R16- Faithful Ally: Events to Rg5 (013, 019, 021, 0211, 0212, 0213, 0214, 022, 030, 031, 0311, 0312, 032, 033, 0331, 0332, 0334, 050, 051, 052, 053, 057, 060, 061, 062, 063, 064, 100, 101)															
Period	Role Performance	Event Data(Deeds)							Content Analysis (Words)						
		TOTAL# events	% Share (All)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#	TOTAL# (Ge + Rg)	% Share (Ge+Rg)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#
58th Gov.	NA	23	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	23	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
59th Gov.	Over-performed	159	16%	NA	NA	NA	NA	159	51	6%	0	0	0	0	51
60th Gov.	Over-performed	68	11%	NA	NA	NA	NA	68	26	5%	0	0	0	0	25
61st Gov.	Over-performed	29	7%	NA	NA	NA	NA	29	5	1%	0	0	0	0	5
TOTAL	Over-performed	279	13%	NA	NA	NA	NA	279	82	5%	0	0	0	0	81
Observation:															
The role is over-performed in TFP deeds. The frequency of reference decreases parallel in both words and deeds of TFP. The role loses significance from one government to the other.															

As the table-above demonstrates the FA role is over-performed in TFP practice. Although the leaders do not indicate Turkey's support to its traditional allies very significantly, the practices demonstrate that Turkey still acts in line with its FA role. As the data indicates, the gap closes and therefore inconsistency between the words and deeds decreases from one government to the other. The significance of the role decreases from one government to the other.

R17- Model Country

In the TFPRED content analysis dataset references to Turkey as a role model in the region with its characteristics as a Muslim democracy with secular regime are counted as references to this role conception. However, as Table 73 demonstrates this role is a verbal construction and is non-observable through event data.

According to the content analysis data the Model Country role conception received 14 references in total, which amounts to 1% of all role references. 11 of these references are given during the 59th government. Then the role has lost its significance in AKP decision-makers' discourse. According to these findings the role has no significance in leaders' discourse. In addition, as Table 73 demonstrates, this role is a verbal construction and is not currently observable with event data.

R18- Developer

This role is clearly defined by and directly taken from Holsti (1970: 266): "This national role conception indicate a special duty or obligation to assist underdeveloped countries." The decision-makers assume that the country is both able and willing to bring development to some regions and countries around the world.

According to the content analysis data the Developer role conception received 165 references in total, which amounts to 7% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 5th most frequently referred role conception. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 50 times, which amounts to 4% of total references. During the 59th government the role is ranked as the 11th. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 40 times, which amounts to 6% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role is ranked as the 6th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 75 times, which amounts to 12% of

the total references. The role ranked as the 2nd most frequently referred role. According to these findings there is a clear pattern of increase in the frequency of references towards this role (from 4% to 12%). Let us see if a similar pattern is also observed in TFP events.

As the Table 73 demonstrates, the events with 033, 0331, 0332, 0334, 070, 071, 072, 073, 074, 075, 1122, 1123, 1124 codes are regarded as indicators that this role is performed. These codes mainly refer to events that represent Turkey's economic and humanitarian aid towards the countries of the respective regions. I aggregated events with the above-mentioned codes. The following table summarizes the frequency, percentage share and regional direction of all words and deeds that are observed in the TFPRED dataset and are related to the Developer role.

92 R18- Developer Words and Deeds Comparison					
- Developer: 033, 0331, 0332, 0334, 070, 071, 072 ,073, 074, 075, 112					
IOD	ROLE PERFORMANCE	EVENT DATA(DEEDS)			
		TOTAL#	% Share	Rg	Rg

		events	(All)	1#	2#	3#	4#	5#	(Ge + Rg)	(Ge+Rg)	1#	2#	3#	4#	5#
Gov.	NA	2	NA	0	0	2	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Gov.	Performed	59	8%	1	6	51	1	NA	50	6%	5	9	16	7	0
Gov.	Performed	26	5%	2	6	18	0	NA	40	8%	4	2	13	1	0
Gov.	Underperformed	28	8%	1	2	23	2	NA	75	16%	12	17	12	20	0
AL	Performed	115	7%	4	14	94	3	NA	165	9%	21	28	41	28	0

ervation

ferences towards this role remained relatively constant until the 61st government. A sharp increase in the references towards the role is
erved in the 61st government. The role is underperformed due to that sharp decline. However, the total data indicates that the words and
s are mostly parallel and that the role is performed.

As the table demonstrates, the developer role conception has been directed towards multiple surrounding regions of Turkey until the 61st government. During the 61st government the decision-makers' references towards this role increased sharply. This increase in reference is mainly directed towards Rg4 sub-Saharan Africa region, which is most probably one of the long-term results of Turkey's African opening initiative. However, this African opening did not reflect itself in the deeds of the country, which resulted in role underperformance during the 61st government. In general the role is performed, but the direction is generally towards Rg3. However, beside the regional direction, the total results indicate that the role is performed and that there is a parallelism in words and deeds that refer to this role conception.

R19- Energy Transporting Country (ETC)

Turkish leaders have frequently referred to the country as a hub or route for transporting Middle Eastern and Caspian energy resources such as oil and gas towards Europe. Hence, this role conception is counted at this dissertation as well.

According to the content analysis data the ETC role conception received 42 references in total, which amounts to 2% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 18th most frequently referred role conception. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 14 times, which amounts to 1% of total references. During the 59th government the role is ranked 18th. With the 60th government, the role is uttered 20 times, which amounts to 3% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role is ranked as the 14th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 8 times, which amounts to 1% of the total references. The role is ranked as the 15th. According to these findings references to this role conception have remained limited and relatively constant throughout AKP governments. As the Table 73 demonstrates none of the event codes correspond with this role and therefore is currently not observable with event data. This limitation will be further discussed in the conclusion chapter.

R20- Good Neighbor (GoodN)

This role conception refers to Turkish decision-makers' intention to solve the existing conflicts with neighboring countries and to establish better ties with its neighbors.

According to the content analysis data the GoodN role conception received 146 references in total, which amounts to 6% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 9th most frequently referred role conception. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 82 times, which amounts to 7% of the total references. During the 59th government the role is ranked as the 6th. During the 60th government, the role is uttered 39 times, which amounts to 5% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role is ranked as the 7th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 25 times, which amounts to 4% of the total references. The role is ranked as the 8th most frequently referred role conception. According to these findings there is a pattern of slight decline in references toward this role conception (from 7% to 4%). Let us see if the TFP events indicate a similar pattern.

This role is included in the general, government-specific and region-specific comparisons of the previous section. But in the comparisons events towards Rg4 and Rg5 are excluded from data since these regions are not neighboring regions of Turkey and no references were directed to these regions in TFP decision-makers' speeches. As the Table 73 demonstrates, the events with 021, 0211, 0212, 0213, 0214, 022, 030, 031, 0311, 0312, 032, 037, 055 codes are regarded as indicators that this role is performed. These codes mainly refer to events that indicate Turkey's appeal, demand or action to ease, reduce or resolve conflicts in the respective regions.

Table 93 R20 - GoodN Words and Deeds Comparison

R20 - GoodN: 021, 0211, 0212, 0213, 0214, 022, 030, 031, 0311, 0312, 032, 037, 055															
Period	Role Performance	Event Data (Deeds)					Content Analysis (Words)								
		TOTAL# events	% Share (All)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#	TOTAL# (Ge + Rg)	% Share (Ge+Rg)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#
58th Gov.	NA	56	NA	4	3	16	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
59th Gov.	Performed	104	7%	18	17	36	NA	NA	82	10%	15	15	32	0	0
60th Gov.	Performed	90	10%	3	20	34	NA	NA	39	8%	6	13	14	0	0
61st Gov.	Performed	59	7%	2	6	18	NA	NA	25	5%	3	4	5	0	0
TOTAL	Performed	212	8%	27	46	106	NA	NA	146	8%	24	32	51	0	0
Observation:															
The words and deeds of TFP are in parallel with each other both in terms of regional direction and in terms of percentage share. The role is performed.															

R21- Regional Leader (RL)

While generating the content analysis dataset, any references of Turkish decision-makers' to Turkey's Political/economic/ military leadership in the surrounding regions were counted as references to this role conception.

According to the content analysis data the RL role conception received 26 references in total, which amounts to 1% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 19th most frequently referred role conception. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 8 times, which amounts to 1% of the total references. During the 59th government the role is ranked as the 21st. During the 60th government, the role is uttered 13 times, which amounts to 2% of the governments' total references. During the 60th government the role is ranked as the 18th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 5 times, which amounts to 1% of the total references. The role is ranked as the 19th. According to these findings references towards this role remained limited and relatively constant throughout the three AKP governments.

As the Table 73 demonstrates, the events with 014, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 130, 131, 1311, 1312, 1313, 132, 134, 136, 138, 1382, 1383, 1384, 139 codes are regarded as indicators that this role is performed. The codes refer to events that indicate Turkey's dominance with verbs such as demand and threaten. I aggregated events with the above-mentioned codes. The following table summarizes the frequency, percentage share and regional direction of all words and deeds that are observed in the TFPRED dataset and are related to the Regional Leader role.

R21- Regional Leader: 014, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 130, 131, 1311, 1312, 1313, 132, 134,136, 138, 1382, 1383, 1384, 139

R21- Regional Leader: 014, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 130, 131, 1311, 1312, 1313, 132, 134,136, 138, 1382, 1383, 1384, 139															
Period	Role Performance	Event Data (Deeds)							Content Analysis (Words)						
		TOTAL# events	% Share (All)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#	TOTAL# (Ge + Rg)	% Share (Ge+Rg)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#
58th Gov.	NA	17	NA	1	1	8	0	7	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
59th Gov.	Performed	95	5%	4	7	40	0	44	8	1%	0	0	5	0	0
60th Gov.	Over-performed	68	10%	4	16	36	1	11	13	3%	3	2	7	0	0
61st Gov.	Over-performed	54	12%	3	5	38	0	8	5	1%	1	0	4	0	0
TOTAL	Over-performed	234	8%	12	29	122	1	70	26	2%	4	2	16	0	0
Observation:															
The role is mostly over-performed. The words and deeds are not in parallel with each other and the gap increases with the establishment of new AKP governments.															

The table above demonstrates that the role is not very significant in AKP decision-makers' speeches. However, the foreign policy events indicate an opposite finding. The significance of the RL role conception increases in the deeds of Turkey from one government to the other. This increase Turkey's actions for regional leadership might also be taken as an indicator of a turn towards conflict in Turkey's foreign relations.

R22- Regional Power (RP)

As defined in the methodology section, in this role conception, Turkey is not a leader in its region neither it is a protector, but the country is one of the significant actors. In the leaders' discourse, references to Turkey's significance within its surrounding regions without assumptions of leadership will be regarded as indicators of this role.

According to the content analysis data the RP role conception received 97 references in total, which amounts to 4% of all role references. The role is ranked as the 4th most frequently referred role conception. The decision-makers of the 59th government have referred to this role 35 times, which amounts to 3% of the total role references. During the 59th government the role is ranked as the 12th. During the 60th government, the role is uttered 47 times, which amounts to 7% of the government's total references. During the 60th government the role is ranked as the 5th. Finally, under the 61st government the role is referred to 15 times, which amounts to 2% of the total references. The role is ranked as the 12th. According to these findings, references towards this role fluctuate. Let us see if this pattern is also observed in the TFP events.

This role is not included in the general and government-specific comparisons. The event codes taken into consideration for this role refer to almost every event that indicates Turkey's active engagement with the region. As the Table 73 demonstrates, the events with 010, 012, 013, 017, 020, 040, 041, 042, 043, 044, 045, 046, 050, 051, 052, 053, 054, 055, 056, 057, 110, 111, 112, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1124 codes are regarded as indicators that this role is performed. The following table summarizes the frequency, percentage share and regional direction of all words and deeds that are observed in the TFPRED dataset and are related to the Regional Leader role.

95 R22- RP Words and Deeds Comparison

R22- Regional Power: RG-specific events (010, 012, 013, 017, 020, 040, 041, 042, 043, 044, 045, 046, 050, 051, 052, 053, 054, 055, 056, 057, 110, 111, 112, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1124)															
Period	Role Performance	Event Data(Deeds)							Content Analysis (Words)						
		Total # events	% Share (All)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#	Total# (Ge + Rg)	% Share (Ge+Rg)	Rg 1#	Rg 2#	Rg 3#	Rg 4#	Rg 5#
58th Gov.	NA	180	NA	10	7	80	1	82	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
59th Gov.	NA	1254	NA	123	153	436	3	539	35	NA	7	7	13	5	0
60th Gov.	NA	874	NA	61	189	391	13	220	47	NA	11	16	21	1	2
61st Gov.	NA	569	NA	18	79	314	6	152	15	NA	1	4	6	2	1
TOTAL	NA	2877	NA	212	428	1221	23	993	97	NA	19	27	40	8	3
Observation:															
The role is performed in all regions but the frequency of words and deeds are not parallel with each other in Rg5.															

This role is the last role that is observed in this dissertation. The table above demonstrates that the role is performed in all regions. However, in Rg5 there is a very significant gap in words and deeds. The region is the least referred region in words; however, the events indicate that the region is the second region that foreign policy deeds are directed to. Except Rg5, the role is performed in parallel with the regional direction frequency of words.

6.3 Chapter Summary

The AKP decision-makers refer to peace-related roles more frequently than observed in the country's practices. In government-specific, region-specific and role-specific observations, tables and figures indicate a number of general findings. First, the main argument of the dissertation was that all roles that are uttered by decision-makers' are not observed in the foreign policy actions of the country. This argument is proved by the observations of this chapter. Second, the propositions that are put forward in Chapter II presented two categories for role performance (performed/structured and non-performed/vague roles). However, it is clarified here that a new categorization is needed for role performance. Some roles are performed in parallel with the words of TFP, some roles are performed more than they are uttered (over-performed), and some roles are performed less than they are uttered (underperformed). Third, the regional direction of TFP words and deeds are mostly in parallel to each other except for Rg4 and Rg5. For Rg4, foreign policy events of Turkey are very limited. This is either a result of Turkey's inactivity in the region, or it might be a methodological limitation; a point, which is further discussed in the conclusion chapter. On the other hand, in Rg5 TFP leaders only refer to significant roles such as FA, and Western Country. The observations on roles such as RSC, TS, and RP indicate that the role is performed more than AKP decision-makers refer to it. Indeed, in Rg5, most of the roles are over-performed. Fourth, there is a significant gap between the frequency of words and deeds that refer to peace-related three roles: DoP, PM, and Mediator. Indeed, the actual practices of the country are not as peaceful as the decision-makers frame in their speeches. Last but not the least, the observations of words and deeds in a government-by-government manner indicates that the foreign policy activism of the country is in decline and there is a turn towards conflict from the 59th government to the 61st.

Finally, in line with all of observations above, the next chapter summarizes the propositions, data observations and words/deeds comparisons; discusses the methodological and role-specific limitations; and presents possible directions for further research.



CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Studies that utilize role theory have so far argued that state behavior depends on the roles that they (states/leaders) try to fulfill through the conduct of foreign policy. Hence, they argue that the study of state behavior should focus on explaining where these roles come from and how they are performed. Such explanation helps the observer make sense of and –if possible- make predictions on state behavior. As the previous chapters indicate, this study utilizes the FPA literature in general and role theory in particular to make sense of Turkey's foreign policy behavior in the AKP era.

As Chapter II outlines, most of the studies that apply role theory have mainly focused on the role conceptions (words) of the leaders. These studies have applied systematic methods (mostly content analysis) to analyze different leaders' foreign policy speeches. However, most of these studies do not systematically observe how much these role conceptions affect states' foreign policy practices. Focusing on the sources of role conceptions and explaining them in detail only provides a partial application of role theory and does not fulfill the theory's promise. I argue that such a stance hinders the explanatory power of role theory. While developing a well-structured focus on the independent variable (role conceptions) of the theory, the existing literature has neglected a systematic focus on the dependent variable (foreign policy practices). Together with an analysis of role conceptions, there is a need for a clearly explained, consistent, logical and systematic focus on the foreign policy practices of

states. This focus bears a potential to bring significant contributions to the explanatory power of role theory and fill a significant gap in the literature.

With this dissertation, I aim to offer a generic methodological model to observe the parallelism between the decision-makers' foreign policy vision and the country's actual foreign policy practices. In order to observe this parallelism in TFP, I utilize role theory. The claim is that decision-makers' role-conceptions reflect their foreign policy vision. Therefore, the dissertation first identifies the role-conceptions of the decision-makers in their speeches (words). Then, it looks at the foreign policy practices of the country (deeds).

In building the generic model, I utilized a combination of content analysis and event data analysis. With this combination, I propose a significant contribution to the analysis of TFP. The research is based on data that is collected in two phases. In the first phase, I identified 22 role conceptions in the AKP decision-makers' foreign policy speeches. The dataset contains the reference frequency and regional direction of each role conception. In the second phase, I observed TFP practices with event data analysis. Hence, the dataset contains information on the code, nature, category and regional direction of each observed foreign policy event. Then, I made a synthesis of the two separate data in order to observe the parallelism between TFP words and deeds through matching the observed foreign policy event codes with the observed role conceptions. As a result of this effort, I have built a new dataset: TFP Roles and Events Dataset (TFPRED).

The dissertation interprets the findings of each data collection phase separately in chapter IV and V. Chapter IV gives leader-based, government-based and region-based observations of TFP words. As Section 4.1.2 explains, Abdullah Gül's role references indicate that he has an active, cooperative and peaceful foreign policy vision for TFP. Gül most frequently refers to peace and cooperation related roles, which require Turkey to take active part in their fulfillment. Babacan also constructs a peace-oriented foreign policy vision for Turkey. However, compared to Gül's role references, significance of the relations with the West has decreased in Babacan's speeches and there is a more balanced regional foreign policy vision. The findings indicate an increase in regional engagement and economy related policies.

Compared to other decision-makers Davutoğlu's foreign policy vision represents clear differences. In Davutoğlu's role conceptions, there is a significant impact of Arab Uprisings and the so-called "African Opening" initiative. He constructs a more assertive and economic interest oriented vision for TFP and peaceful policy is not necessarily a part of it. Erdoğan's references are less assertive than those of Davutoğlu. The most significant difference between Erdoğan and other leaders is that Erdoğan has the highest number of references to the Developer role. In his speeches Erdoğan constructs a peace-oriented, active, and cooperative, yet powerful country vision for TFP.

Section 4.1.3 combines relevant portions of these four decision-makers and makes a government-specific comparison. The section makes four general observations of the three AKP governments' (59th, 60th, and 61st) role references. (1) There is a decrease in the significance of peace-oriented roles (DoP, PM, GoodN) from one-government to the other. (2) There is a significant decrease in role references that indicate good relations with the West (FA, West). (3) There is a significant increase in the Protector, Developer and Trading State role conceptions. Finally, (4) the role references of 60th Government indicate a more cooperative vision than those of the 59th government. However, with the 61st government there is a significant decrease in references to cooperation oriented role conceptions (RSC, GSC). The section also makes an observation of region-specific role conceptions. Most of the regional role references in the AKP governments are directed at Rg3 (MENA). The most frequently referred role conceptions toward this region are DoP, AI, and RSC until the 61st government, when the Protector role conception ranks first. There is a significant pattern of decrease in role references towards Rg5 (Euro-Atlantic area). There is a gradual increase in role references toward Rg4 (sub-Saharan Africa). The percentages of AKP's regional role references are increasingly diversified and balanced as the governments change. Role references towards Rg2 significantly increased under the 60th government, and then decreased under the 61st Government. Finally, references to Rg1 (Balkans/Eastern Europe) have remained relatively constant from one government to the other.

Chapter V observes TFP events with three indicators: (1) frequency (number of events), (2) nature (event scale), and (3) category (event types). The chapter uses

event frequency as an indicator of TFP activism. There are four general findings on Turkey's foreign policy activism. First, foreign policy activity of the country decreases before the general elections and makes a peak just after the elections in Turkey. Second, activism increases when significant real life foreign policy crisis (like revolutions, wars, political/military conflicts) emerge in the country's surrounding regions. Third, there is a correlation (if not causality) between domestic political crisis and foreign policy activity. Foreign policy activism decreases in times of domestic crisis. TFP activism follows a pattern of decline from one government to the other between 2002 and 2014. The chapter utilizes event scale to observe the conflictual and cooperative nature of Turkey's foreign relations. It observes that the initial AKP governments (58th and 59th) have followed a cooperative foreign policy towards the world. The nature of TFP turned towards conflict especially after 2010 and there is a significant pattern of decline in the average cooperation scores from one AKP government to the other. Finally, the chapter observes event categories, which indicate a similar government-based pattern. With each new AKP government, the number of cooperative events decreases whereas the number of conflictual events increases. Similarly, the share of verbal cooperation decreases from one government to the other. There is a pattern of increase in the % share of material conflict.

Section 5.2 focuses on region-specific data. Data indicates that TFP activism in Rg1 (Balkans) declines from one government to the other. The nature of Turkey's relationship with the region is mostly cooperative. Most of Turkey's activity towards the region is under the verbal cooperation category. In Rg2 (Caucasus), TFP activism follows a fluctuating pattern. The most active engagement with Rg2 took place between 2007 and 2010, which corresponds with the Abkhazia Crisis, the bolstering Turkish-Armenian relations and the institutionalization of the Turkish-Speaking Countries Summit. Turkey's relations with the region are mostly cooperative. A government-based pattern indicates a decrease in the cooperative nature of TFP towards the region. Yet, most of the events in the region are under the Verbal Cooperation category. In Rg3 (MENA), government-based TFP activism remains constantly high. Contrary to other regions, event data indicates a pattern of increase in TFP activism towards this region after 2010. The most active engagement with

Rg3 took place in 2003 (Iraq War) and between 2010 and mid-2013 (the Arab Uprisings). The government-based pattern of the nature of Turkey's relationship with the region indicates cooperative relationship under the 58th and 59th governments, and a conflictual relationship under 60th and 61st governments. The category counts indicate that the gap between the frequency of cooperation-type events and conflict-type events gradually closes. There are certain periods when the number of conflict-type event passes the cooperation-type events. In Rg4 (Sub-Saharan Africa), the findings indicate that Turkey has not been actively involved with the region; the most active engagement with Rg4 took place between 2007 and 2010. TFP activity towards the region follows a pattern of slight increase. The nature of Turkey's limited relations with the region has almost always been cooperative. In terms of category, the percentage share of cooperative events (both material and verbal) increases from one government to the other. Finally, in Rg5 (Euro-Atlantic), government-based TFP activism follows a clear pattern of decline. The relations of the first two AKP governments' with Rg5 indicate a very cooperative nature. However, this cooperative nature turns towards a more neutral one under the 60th and 61st governments. The categories of TFP events in this region indicate that verbal cooperation declines as verbal conflict increases from one government to the other.

Chapter VI synthesizes the words and deeds of TFP and observes the parallelism. The analysis proves the argument of the dissertation that (1) all role conceptions are not observed in TFP deeds. There are non-observable, non-performed, underperformed, performed and over-performed role conceptions in TFP. (2) The regional direction of TFP words and deeds are mostly in parallel to each other except for Rg4 and Rg5. In Rg4, foreign policy events are very limited. In Rg5, most of the roles are over-performed. (3) There is a significant gap between the frequency of words and deeds that refer to peace-related three roles: Defender of Peace, Peace Maker, and Mediator. Turkey's decision-makers refer to peace related roles very frequently. However, the foreign policy deeds of Turkey do not indicate a stance as peaceful as the decision-makers frame in their words. (4) Both role conceptions and role performance indicate that foreign policy activism has declined in TFP. The foreign relations of Turkey have turned towards conflict from one government to the other. Finally, (5) approximately 50% of both words and deeds are constantly

directed towards Rg3, which indicates that relations with the MENA region have dominated Turkey's foreign policy.

Data on TFP words and deeds are collected and categorized in TFPRED. In its current state, the dataset contains year-by-year data on Turkey's foreign policy from November 2002 to August 2014. The collected data is categorized and aggregated in order to make leader-specific, region-specific and government-specific observations on TFP. Utilizing TFPRED, the dissertation makes five significant contributions (1) it builds up a theoretical model to combine observed role conceptions (words) with observed event data (deeds) (2) it builds a large open-source dataset on observed role conceptions and foreign policy events.⁸² (3) It provides a structured, comprehensive, and falsifiable explanation of TFP in the AKP period based on observable and replicable data. Thereby, I propose a generic method, applicable to other cases and other periods in TFP. (4) The dissertation establishes a new role conceptualization: performed, underperformed and over-performed role conceptions. (5) The dissertation proposes a new role typology to cover the regional direction of role conceptions: GE (R_{type4}) roles, roles observed in all regions (R_{type3}), roles observed in multiple-Regions (R_{type2}), and roles observed in a single region (R_{type1}).

The following table summarizes the findings and lists the performed and non-performed roles in of the dissertation.

⁸² Dataset will be made publicly available after the dissertation is approved. The relevant portions of the data are given in each chapter above. Please see the methodology chapter and Appendices for further information. Please email the author for additional information.

Table 96 PhD Dissertation Sum.: Performed and non-performed TFP roles

ROLE CONCEPTION				ROLE PERFORMANCE			
ROLE	Rank	%	Type	Total	59th Gov	60th Gov	61st Gov
	Total	Share					
R1-GSC	4 th	7%	Ge	Performed	Performed	Underperformed	Performed
R2-Dop	1 st	15%	Type3	Highly underperformed	Highly underperformed	Highly underperformed	Underperformed
R3-TS	8 th	6%	Type3	Underperformed	Performed	Performed	Underperformed
R4-Protect	6 th	6%	Type2	Performed	Performed	Performed	Underperformed
R5-CC	11 th	5%	Ge	Non-observable	Non-observable	Non-observable	Non-observable
R6-Mediate	14 th	2%	Type2	Performed	Performed	Performed	Performed
R7-PM	7 th	6%	Type2	Underperformed	Underperformed	Not performed	Not performed
R8-Indep.	17 th	2%	Ge	Highly over-performed	Over-performed	Highly over-performed	Highly over-performed
R9-AI	3 rd	10%	Type2	Performed	Performed	Performed	Performed
R10-Rise	15 th	2%	Ge	Non-observable	Non-observable	Non-observable	Non-observable
R11-CivBrid..	22 nd	2%	Ge	Non-observable	Non-observable	Non-observable	Non-observable
R12-RSC	2 nd	10%	Type3	Over-performed	Over-performed	Over-performed	Performed
R13-West	10 th	5%	Type1	Over-performed	D more than W	D more than W	D more than W
R14-East	20 th	1%	Type1	Performed	W/D parallel	W/D parallel	W/D parallel
R15-GeoBrid.	16 th	0%	Type2	Non-observable	Non-observable	Non-observable	Non-observable
R16-FA	13 th	3%	Type1	Over-performed	Over-performed	Over-performed	Over-performed
R17-Model	21 st	1%	Type1	Non-observable	Non-observable	Non-observable	Non-observable
R18-Develop.	5 th	7%	Type2	Performed	Performed	Underperformed	Performed
R19-ETC	18 th	2%	Type2	Non-observable	Non-observable	Non-observable	Non-observable
R20-GoodN	9 th	6%	Type2	Performed	Performed	Performed	Performed
R21-RL	19 th	1%	Type2	Over-performed	Performed	Over-performed	Over-performed
R22-RP	12 th	4%	Type3	Underperformed	W/D not parallel Rg5	W/D not parallel Rg5	W/D not parallel Rg5

The table above illustrates that 11 roles are performed, 5 roles are underperformed and the parallelism of 6 roles could not be observed in TFPRED. The role-specific observations section of Chapter VI (Section 6.2) provides detailed explanations and interpretations on how I came up with these results for each role. Yet, there is a need to discuss the theoretical, methodological and role specific limitations in order to explain why the performance of the 6 roles is listed as non-observable. This discussion is important to shed light on possible future research directions as well.

The theoretical limitation emerges out of a gap in the role theory literature. I observed that FPA studies, which apply role theory, have mostly focused on the sources of roles but I have been unable to find any clear definition of what constitutes foreign policy practice. Indeed, there are studies that deliver definitions for role performance and some, very few, acknowledge that some role conceptions are only uttered but not performed. Yet, these studies do not give or develop any scale for measuring performance. The state of the current literature indicates that proponents of role theory mostly focus on the sources of the roles and will continue to attempt bringing new sociological or psychological explanations on how the decision-makers of the world come up with such role conceptions. While not underestimating the contributions of these studies, I argue that the relationship between decision-makers' vision and the conduct of foreign policy is not automatic. Therefore, studies that explain the sources of countries' foreign policy role conceptions only explain the processes, or motivations of foreign policy that might/ or might not turn into foreign policy practices. I argue that analyzing foreign policy requires a systematic focus on the actual practices. Role theoretical explanations of foreign policy will continue to remain incomplete without having a scale to measure performance. The procedures that I apply in building the TFPRED dataset and in making the words/deeds comparison in this dissertation aim at developing such a scale. However, the existence of "non-observable" roles in the above-mentioned list indicates that the scale can still be further developed in future studies. These roles could not be observed due to the methodological limitations of this research.

The methodological limitations stem from the use of event data analysis. As I have summarized in section (3.3.1), there are studies that use event data in FPA. Yet, most

of these studies utilize event data for conflict analysis. These studies do not only analyze foreign policy events but also analyze domestic events. Some of the event verb codes are only related to domestic conflict. The coding software TABARI or PETRARCH are continuously developed with an aim to observe domestic or international conflicts around the world. The coded data includes data on actors other than states and issue areas other than foreign policy. The current state of the literature indicates that event data analysis will continue to develop in the ‘conflict analysis’ path and will increasingly part from the FPA field. While building the TFPRED, I filtered relevant actors and excluded irrelevant verbs from the data. The filtering, excluding, and aggregating relevant data approach that I apply in this dissertation will still be applicable in the future. Yet, a better approach at the issue would be to further update event data software, and increase its capacity to observe a larger set of foreign policy events with more foreign policy related verb codes. To achieve this aim, the theoretical and methodological approach of this dissertation might be proposed as a good starting point.

Role-specific limitations stem from the definitions of specific roles. The performance of six roles could not be measured with event data. Yet, alternative ways might be developed to observe these role conceptions. For instance, the performance of Rising Power requires having a detailed look at economic, and military figures indicating the increasing power of Turkey. A Model country necessitates fieldwork in the regions that the role is directed at. In addition, the performance of ETC requires taking a look at Turkey’s energy agreements with the countries of the regions that the role is directed at. All these methods are currently beyond the methodological scope of this dissertation. Yet, these can be proposed as another proper direction for future research.

Despite above-mentioned limitations, the findings of this dissertation provide great avenues for further research. For instance, producing the above mentioned list creates three questions: (1) Why are some role conceptions performed whereas others not? (2) Why do leaders utter role conceptions that are not performed? (3) If non-performed role conceptions are not to be taken as determinants of future foreign policy actions then why do we find them? I claim that ‘role conceptions’ are reflections of leaders’ foreign policy vision. However, every vision cannot be

materialized in the actual conduct of foreign policy. Then, understanding and explaining leaders' foreign policy visions are still important for at least two reasons. First, even if they are not applied, they exist in rhetoric and still bear the possibility to turn into practice. Second, explaining why some roles are uttered but are not (or could not be) performed opens significant directions for further research.

In some cases, countries' capabilities and the existence of international actors may limit the materialization of decision-makers' visions. Holsti (1970: 245) points at two directions: 1) the impact of the national position and power status of the states and 2) the impact of role prescriptions. National status or the power status of the state in the international structure is related with the capabilities of the country. For Turkey, the country is generally referred to as a middle power, or regional great power. Such status potentially affects the country's role performance in the five neighboring regions (Balkans, MENA, Southern Caucasus/Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Euro-Atlantic). In addition to status, role prescriptions are those that are ascribed to the ego (the agent- in IR the state) by the 'alter' (other actors within the society- In IR the countries/allies and/or other international actors). For instance, Turkey has been prescribed a bridge role between democratic/Christian West and authoritarian/Muslim Middle East. For a long time, Turkish leaders have been eager to perform such a role. But the understanding of bridge has been slightly changed in the AKP period at least in rhetoric. For instance, AKP decision-makers, especially in their first term of government have referred to a mediator role in establishing an alliance between civilizations. However, it is hardly possible to claim that together with Spain the two countries have been able to materialize such a role, except for routine meetings between the heads of the two states. Was this role beyond Turkey's capabilities? Or is it due to Davutoğlu's vision of becoming a central country, which clashed with the bridge role that is prescribed by the Western allies of Turkey? This example clarifies that with each performed and non-performed national role one can come up with a direction for new researches.

Collecting data on and combining words and deeds of foreign policy creates a very productive research agenda. This dissertation presents empirical evidence on the validity of its two main claims: 1) There are region-specific differences in Turkey's national role conceptions and 2) All role conceptions (words) do not turn into

practice (deeds) in foreign policy. With each performed and non-performed role conception one can come up with new research questions. In its current state, beside its contributions to the academic literature, the dissertation stands as a ‘research questions generator.’ Yet, suffice it to say that there are at least three major fields where one can conduct further research.

First, one can study more on the FPA implications of the dissertation’s findings. This dissertation provides a novel approach to analyze the ‘impact’ of role conceptions. It looks at the foreign policy vision of the decision-makers as the source of role conceptions. However, as indicated in Chapter II, the literature suggests that there might be sources other than the vision of decision-makers that affect the formulation of national role conceptions. Therefore, a more comprehensive approach towards the sources of role conceptions might further develop the model that I propose. For instance, one can collect and analyze data on the role conceptions that domestic political actors (public, civil society, political groups ...etc.) formulate. Then combine this data with event data analysis to discuss the impact of specific domestic political actors on the foreign policy practices of the country. One can also look at the international ‘sources’ of role conceptions to understand which international actors influence the foreign policy of the country at hand. On the other hand the definitions of role conceptions might be further developed, or the validity of the methods might be increased if a similar research is done with a team of scholars. Or the study might be applied to other countries in order to increase its reliability. Once more sophisticated versions content analysis and event data analysis methods developed, one can apply this methodology to other countries and probably find generalizable patterns of foreign policy making and develop new theoretical models. This direction of research will open up new research venues to discuss the impact of domestic and international politics on the foreign policy conduct of certain states. The research directions in the FPA field are not only limited to the sources and impact of role conceptions. Another way might be to work on developing further country-specific analysis with the use of words and deeds parallelism. For instance, with the methodological model that I propose in this dissertation one can extract some patterns about the vision, activity, direction, and nature of a specific state’s foreign policy. In the TFP case I observed that there has been a decrease in foreign

policy activity from one government to the other. I also observed a pattern that turned towards more assertive role conceptions that is followed by conflictual foreign policy events. If this dissertation had been finished in late-2014, I would have predicted that Turkey was turning towards a less active yet more conflictual foreign policy in the future. In this sense, the methodology can be utilized as an early-warning system about the shifts in the foreign policy of the specific state under consideration. The shifts in both foreign policy visions of countries' leaders and in the foreign policy practices can also be observed.

Second, the list of performed and non-performed role conceptions might be utilized as a good starting point for general International Relations Theory discussions. For instance, an international structure based approach might look at how systemic factors limit states' capability to perform the decision makers' role conceptions. This approach can use non-performed role conceptions to observe the impact of material capabilities and the international or regional balances of power. More specifically, a realist approach would most probably stress how material capabilities and power status of states determine the limits of foreign policy behavior. A constructivist approach might stress the processes on how decision makers' perceptions about their countries are constructed. Then focus on the impact of their perceptions on foreign policy behavior. This opens up new venues to discuss the role of the agent or the structure on foreign policy behavior. As discussed in the literature review chapter (Section 2.2.1) role theory scholars have already started focusing on the theory's possible contributions to the agent/structure debate.

Last but not the least, the methodology and findings that I provide in this dissertation have significant contributions to the study of TFP. As indicated above, one of the aims of this dissertation is to incorporate existing FPA tools to the study of TFP. The dissertation establishes a formal and structured model based on replicable data of Turkey. Studies of this kind remain to be rare in the TFP literature. The leader-specific, government-specific and region-specific analysis at each respective section above opens up new venues for future studies that utilize contemporary developments in the FPA literature.

To sum up, this study started four years ago on Rosenau's (1966) urge to develop a theory of foreign policy. The dissertation aimed at building a data-based generalizable explanation of TFP and developing a *sui generis* framework to observe the parallelism in foreign policy words and deeds. This scheme is currently in a state of development and there is long way to go in this quest. After four years of work, I still agree with Hudson (2008: 27): "It is a wonderful time to become engaged in FPA, a time of new horizons."



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APPENDICES

A. CODING SHEET SAMPLES

The codes in each column of the coding sheet refer to the following

Y/N : if the role is observed at least once in the speech, then I code “1”, if not “0”

F : How many times did I observe the role in the speech?

S-c : S(Space) –C(Context) in how many different contexts is the role referred to?

S-p : S(Space) –P(Paragraph) in how many paragraphs is the role referred to?

OR : The orientation (Rg or Ge) of the role

Rg (1/0): If any of the references to the role is directed at a region I code 1 if not 0

Rg# : How many times is the role directed at a region?

Ge (1/0): If any of the references does not have a regional direction I code 1 If not 0

Ge# : How many times is the role uttered with no Rg direction?

R/C : R (Region) – C (Country)

Rg1 : The Balkans and Eastern Europe

Rg2 : The Caucasus, Central Asia, South Asia

Rg3 : MENA and Eastern Mediterranean

Rg4 : Sub-Saharan Africa

Rg5 : Euro-Atlantic

: Number of references

C : Which country did the role refer to? If no C is found then code NA.

Sample Coding Sheet

Speech Code :

Coded By :

Coding Date:

[illegible]

ROLES		FREQUENCY (# of role reference)	SPACE (# of Contexts)	SPACE (# of Paragraph s)	ORIENTATIONS (Regional)	
DE	ROLE				R G	R G
	Regional					

[illegible]

Sample coding sheet cont.

[illegible]

A Sample Coded version of AG17

Speech Code : AG17
Coded By : Ekam

Coding Date: 20.10.2015

FINAL CODING HERE – SAME AS TFPRED EXCELL DATASET																			
TFP ROLES		Y/N (1/0)	F#	S-C	S-P	OR				R/C									
#	ROLE					RG (1/0)	RG#	GE (1/0)	GE#	RG1		RG2		RG3		RG4		RG5	
										#	C	#	C	#	C	#	C	#	C
R1	Global System Collaborator	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R2	Defender of peace and Stability	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1.5es	-	-	-	-
R3	Trading State	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R4	Protector of the Oppressed	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R5	Central/Pivotal Country	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R6	Mediator	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R7	Peace-maker/Problem-solver	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R8	Independent	1	3	3	3	1	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	1.0p	-	-	-	-
R9	Active Independent	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R10	Rising Power	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R11	Bridge across Civilizations (Ide)	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R12	Regional Subsystem Collaborator	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	-	-	1	1.0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
R13	Western Country	1	3	3	3	1	3	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3.0.4	-
R14	Eastern Country	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R15	Bridge across Continents (Geo)	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R16	Faithful Ally	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R17	Model Country	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R18	Developer	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R19	Energy Transporting Country	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R20	Good Neighbor	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1.5es	-	-	-	-
R21	Regional Leader	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
R22	Regional Power	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	-	-	-	-	1	1.5es	-	-	-	-

B. REGION/COUNTRY MATCHING TABLE

The latest version of the Region/Country Matching table is presented below.

Region 1 (RG1)	Region2 (RG2)	Region3 (Rg3)	Region4 (Rg4)	Region5 (Rg5)
The Balkans And Eastern Europe	The Black Sea/Caucasus/ Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Euro- Atlantic
Albania	Armenia	Algeria	Angola	EU (Except Rg1)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Afghanistan	Bahrain	Benin	NATO
Montenegro	Azerbaijan	Egypt	Botswana	US
Bulgaria	Bangladesh	Iraq	Burkina Faso	
Croatia	Bhutan	Israel	Burundi	
Greece	Cambodia	Jordan	Cameroon	
Kosovo	Georgia	Kuwait	Cape Verde	
Macedonia	India	Lebanon	Central African Republic	
Moldova	Iran	Libya	Comoros	
Romania	Kazakhstan	Morocco	Côte d'Ivoire	
Poland	Kyrgyzstan	Oman	Democratic Republic of Congo	
Serbia	Laos	Palestine	Djibouti	
Slovenia	Maldives	Qatar	Eritrea	
Other Countries	Mongolia	Saudi Arabia	Equatorial Guinea	
	Myanmar	Syria	Ethiopia	
	Nepal	Tunisia	Gabon	
	Pakistan	United Arab Emirates	Ghana	
	Sri Lanka	Cyprus	Gambia	
	Tajikistan	Other Countries	Guinea	
	Turkmenistan		Guinea Bissau	
	Uzbekistan		Kenya	
	Other Countries		Lesotho	
			Liberia	
			Madagascar	
			Other Countries	

C. FULL SPEECH LISTS AND SPEECH SELECTION

1. Full Speech List and Speech Selection for Abdullah Gül

The list of all speeches can be found from the book at the following link:

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/BAKANLAR/AbdullahGul_kitap.pdf

The first 221 pages of the book is a selection of 27 speeches on general TFP, given by Gül at different times (between 2003 and 2007) and occasions. I have listed and enumerated all the 27 speeches and made the selection according to the speech selection criteria. From the 27 speeches 6 are given in 2003 (Speech #1 - #6), 7 are given in 2004 (Speech #7 - #13), 7 are given in 2005 (Speech #14 - #20), 2 in 2006 (Speech #21 - #22), and 5 in 2007 (Speech #23 - #27).

For the year 2003, when the randomizer is asked to provide 5 random numbers (from 1 to 6) it generates: 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. then, the selected speeches for 2003 are:

#2. *Royal Institute of International Affairs”de Yapılan Konuşma* Londra, 3 Temmuz 2003 p. 28

#3. *Washington Institute For Near East Policy Tarafından Düzenlenen Toplantıda Yapılan Konuşma* Washington, 25 Temmuz 2003 p. 35

#4. *2003 Avrasya Zirvesi ’nde Yapılan Konuşma* New York, 24 Eylül 2003 p.43

#5. *BM 58. Genel Kurulu ’nda Yapılan Konuşma* New York, 26 Eylül 2003 p.48

#6. *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Bütçesinin TBMM Genel Kurulu ’nda Görüşülmesi Vesilesiyle Yapılan Konuşma* Ankara, 22 Aralık 2003 p. 53

For the year 2004, when the randomizer is asked to provide 5 random numbers (from 7 to 13) it generates: 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13. So the selected speeches for 2004 are:

#8. *Avrasya-Bir Vakfının Düzenlediği Toplantıda Yapılan Konuşma*, 17 Ocak 2004 p. 67

#9. *Rusya Federasyonu Dışışleri Bakanlığı Diplomasi Akademisi 'nde Yapılan Konuşma* Moskova, 26 Şubat 2004 p. 76

#10. *Boğaziçi Yöneticiler Vakfının Düzenlediği Toplantıda Yapılan Konuşma* İstanbul, 22 Mayıs 2004 p. 83

#12. *BM 59. Genel Kurulu 'nda Yapılan Konuşma* New York, 23 Eylül 2004 p. 100

#13. *Dışışleri Bakanlığı Bütçesinin TBMM Genel Kurulu 'nda Görüşülmesi Vesilesiyle Yapılan Konuşma* Ankara, 24 Aralık 2004 p. 106

For the year 2005, when the randomizer is asked to provide 5 random numbers (from 14 to 20) it generates: 16, 17, 18, ~~19~~, and 20. Since #19 does not fulfill the systematic selection criterion 2b (Foreign policy section should be longer than 1000 Words), Speech #14 is selected from the list. So the selected speeches for 2005 are: 14, 16, 17, 18, and 20.

#14. *AK Parti Meclis Grubu 'nda Yapılan Konuşma* Ankara, 11 Ocak 2005

#16. *İngiltere 'de İşadamlarına Hitaben Yapılan Konuşma* Londra (Bloomberg), 14 Mart 2005 129

#17. *American Turkish Council Tarafından Düzenlenen Toplantıda Yapılan Konuşma* Washington, 7 Haziran 2005 138

#18. *BM 60. Genel Kurulu 'nda Yapılan Konuşma* New York, 21 Eylül 2005 144

#20. *Dışışleri Bakanlığı Bütçesinin Tbm Genel Kurulu 'nda Görüşülmesi Vesilesiyle Yapılan Konuşma* Ankara, 21 Aralık 2005 153

For the year 2006, there are only two speeches in the book. So the two are selected:

#21. *BM 61. Genel Kurulu'nda Yapılan Konuşma* New York, 22 Eylül 2006 165

#22. *Dişışleri Bakanlığı Bütçesinin Tbm Genel Kurulu'nda Görüşülmesi Vesilesiyle Yapılan Konuşma* Ankara, 21 Aralık 2006 172

For the year 2007, there are five speeches: 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27. However, speech 23 does not fulfill criterion 2a (speech should be on general foreign policy) and it is therefore eliminated. Accordingly the selected speeches for 2007 are as follows:

#24. *Ak Parti İstanbul İl Teşkilatı'nın Düzenlediği “Diş Politika, Ab Ve Diş Türkler” Konulu Toplantıda Yapılan Konuşma* İstanbul, 13 Ocak 2007 190

#25. *TBMM' de Gensoru Açılmasına İlişkin Önerenin Görüşülmesi Vesilesiyle Yapılan Konuşma* Ankara, 18 Ocak 2007 205

#26. *The German Marshall Fund Tarafından Düzenlenen Toplantıda Yapılan Konuşma* Washington, 8 Şubat 2007 216

#27. *Ülkemizi Ziyaret Eden Yabancı Devlet Adamlarına Hitaben Yapılan Konuşma* İstanbul, 1 Haziran 2007 221

As a result of these steps I selected 21 speeches for Abdullah Gül. Please go back to section 3.2.1.1 for a list of selected speeches.

2. Full Speech List and Speech Selection for Ali Babacan:

For the list of all speeches please see the following link:

(<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.tr.mfa?0088246a-6e1d-47c2-9639-c358ffa03a06>)

(Accessed: December 14th 2014)

There are 50 speeches in the link above. I have enumerated all speeches from 1 to 50 and randomly selected 5 speeches for each year through a web-based “Research Randomizer” that generates random numbers within a range defined by the researcher. For each year, the randomizer is asked to generate 5 random numbers.

For the year 2009, there are 12 speeches in the MoFA Website. When the randomizer is asked to generate 5 numbers from 1 and 12, it gave the following numbers: 1, 6, 8, 10, and 12.

1. Devlet Bakanı ve Başbakan Yardımcısı Sayın Ali Babacan ile Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Devir Teslim Vesilesiyle Yaptıkları Konuşmalar, 2 Mayıs 2009 (Eliminated on criterion 2b)

6. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın 18 Mart Şehitler Günü Münasebetiyle Düzenlenen Törende Yaptıkları Konuşma, 18 Mart 2009 (Eliminated on criterion 2a)

8. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın DEİK/TAİK Tarafından Düzenlenen Öğle Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma Ve Yöneltilen Sorulara Cevapları, İstanbul, 25 Şubat 2009 (SELECTED)

10. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın AB Başmüzakerecilik Görevinin Devir-Teslimi Vesilesiyle Düzenlenen Basın Toplantısında Yaptığı Konuşma, Ankara, 11 Ocak 2009 (Eliminated on criterion 2a)

12. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın BM Güvenlik Konseyi Toplantısında Yaptığı Konuşma, New York, 6 Ocak 2009 (Eliminated on criterion 2b)

When the systematic speech selection rule is applied only Speech #8 passed the systematic selection criteria.⁸³ The speeches that do not fulfill the criteria are eliminated from the list. Then, another random sample of 4 speeches is selected out of a list of the remaining 7 speeches (the list is re-numerated from 1 to 7). When the randomizer is asked to generate four numbers out of seven, it gave 3, 5, 6, and 7.

These speeches are:

3. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın, Medeniyetler İttifakı İkinci Forumu Çerçevesinde Yüksek Temsilci Sampaio ve İttifakın Eş sunucusu İspanyol Dışışleri Bakanı Miguel Moratinos ile Birlikte Düzenlediği Ortak Basın Toplantısındaki İfadeleri, İstanbul, 7 Nisan 2009 (Eliminated on criteria 2a)

⁸³ Speeches #1 and #12 fail criterion 2b – 1000 Words Length, speech #6 and #10 fail criterion 2a – Case Specific.

5. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın NTV'ye Verdiği Mülakat, Ankara, 10 Mart 2009 (SELECTED)

6. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın Kosova Meclisi Genel Kurulu'nda Yaptığı Konuşma, Priştine, 13 Ocak 2009 (Eliminated on criteria 2a)

7. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nde Gazze'deki Duruma İlişkin 1860 Sayılı Karar'ın Kabulünden Sonra Yaptığı Açıklama, New York, 8 Ocak 2009 (Eliminated on criteria 2a)

Until now I could select only two speeches out of the first two random selection steps. 7 speeches failed the systematic selection criterion 2. Only three speeches remain in the original 12 speeches list for the year 2009. These are:

2. Bakanlığımızın 89. Kuruluş Yıldönümü Vesilesiyle Sayın Bakanımızın Tüm Teşkilata Mesajı, 2 Mayıs 2009 (Eliminated on criterion 2b)

3. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın TBMM Genel Kurulunda Yaptıkları Konuşma (29 Nisan 2009) (Eliminated on criterion 2a)

5. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın Özel Sektör ve Ekonomik Kalkınma Enstitüsü'nün Açılışı Vesilesiyle Yaptıkları Konuşma, Ankara, 2 Nisan 2009 (Eliminated on Criterion 2a)

Only two speeches have passed the random sampling and systematic selection criteria steps. Although the initial attempt was to elect five speeches for each year, for year 2009, I ended up with the following two speeches, since only these two have passed the criteria:

7. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın NTV'ye Verdiği Mülakat, Ankara, 10 Mart 2009

8. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın DEİK/TAİK Tarafından Düzenlenen Öğle Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma Ve Yöneltilen Sorulara Cevapları, İstanbul, 25 Şubat 2009

The same steps are applied for year 2008. There are 29 speeches for the year 2008 in the original list (starting from #13 to #41, see Appendix). When the randomizer is asked to provide 5 random numbers from 13 to 41, it gave: 16, 18, 19, 36, and 38.

16. Afganistan İslam Cumhuriyeti, Pakistan İslam Cumhuriyeti Ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanları Arasında Gerçekleştirilen İkinci Üçlü Zirve Sonucunda Kabul Edilen Ortak Açıklama, İstanbul, 5 Aralık 2008 (Eliminated on criterion 2a)
18. Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan'ın 2009 Mali Yılı Bütçe Tasarısı Konuşması, 21 Kasım 2008 (SELECTED)

19. Sayın Bakanın Türk-İtalyan Forumu'nda Yaptığı Konuşma, Roma, 5 Kasım 2008 (Eliminated on criterion 2a)

36. Sayın Bakanımızın Çevre Faslı Başlığında Uygulama ve Farkındalık Yaratma Projesi Kapanış Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma, TOBB - ETÜ TEPAV Binası, 8 Nisan 2008 (Eliminated on criterion 2a)

38. Sayın Bakanımızın Türkiye'nin Kosova'yı Tanıdığına Dair Açıklaması, 18 Şubat 2008 (Eliminated on criterion 2a)

One speech is selected and four more speeches to go. Another sample of four random numbers is: 17, 28, 30, and 39.

17. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ve Pakistan İslam Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanları Arasında Gerçekleştirilen Görüşmenin Ardından Yapılan Ortak Açıklama, İstanbul, 5 Aralık 2008 (Eliminated on criterion 2a)

28. Sayın Bakanımızın GDAÜ Zirvesi için Pomorie'ye Hareketinden Önce Havaalanında Yaptıkları Basın Açıklaması, 20 Mayıs 2008 (Eliminated on criterion 2a)

30. Sayın Bakanımızın “Dünya Türk Girişimcileri Konseyi” Gala Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma, 4 Mayıs 2008 (SELECTED)

39. Dışişleri Bakanı ve Başmüzakereci Sayın Ali Babacan'ın Eğitim Derneği 80. Yıl Uluslararası Eğitim Forumu vesilesiyle “AB Katılım Sürecimizde Eğitimin Yeri” konulu Açılış Konuşması, 30 Ocak 2008, Ankara (Eliminated on criterion 2a)

One more speech is selected. Next, the three random numbers generated by Randomizer are: 13, 31, and 35.

13. Dışışleri Bakanlıđı Ve Avrupa Birliđi Genel Sekreterliđi Bütçesinin TBMM Genel Kurulu’nda Görüşölmesi Vesilesiyle Sayın Bakanın Yaptıđı Konuşma, 23 Aralık 2008 (SELECTED)

31. Sayın Bakanımızın 9 Mayıs Avrupa Günü Vesilesiyle AB Üye ve Aday Ülkelerin Büyükelçilerine Verdiđi Kahvaltıdaki Konuşması, 9 Mayıs 2008, Swissotel (Eliminated on criterion 2a)

35. Sayın Bakanımızın Pasifik Ada Devletleri Dışışleri Bakanları Onuruna Sait Halim Paşa Yalısında Verdikleri Akşam Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma, İstanbul, 9 Nisan 2008 (Eliminated on criterion 2b)

Next two random numbers are: 32 and 40, which are both eliminated on criteria 2a. The other two numbers are: 20 and 33. Speech #20 is eliminated on criterion 2b, speech #33 is selected. The last random speech that fulfills the criteria was #26. Hence for year 2008 we end up with the following list of five speeches:

13. Dışışleri Bakanlıđı Ve Avrupa Birliđi Genel Sekreterliđi Bütçesinin TBMM Genel Kurulu’nda Görüşölmesi Vesilesiyle Sayın Bakanın Yaptıđı Konuşma, 23 Aralık 2008

18. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan’ın 2009 Mali Yılı Bütçe Tasarısı Konuşması, 21 Kasım 2008

26. Dışışleri Bakanı Ali Babacan’ın Büyükelçiler Konferansı Açılış Konuşması, 15 Temmuz 2008, Bilkent Otel ve Konferans Merkezi

30. Sayın Bakanımızın “Dünya Türk Girişimcileri Konseyi” Gala Yemeğinde Yaptıkları Konuşma, 4 Mayıs 2008

33. Sayın Bakanımızın “Avusturya ve Türkiye Komşuluk Çalıştayı”nın Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma, Ankara Palas, 21 Nisan 2008

In the full list of Babacan's speeches provided by the MoFA, there are 10 speeches for the year 2007 and only the following three speeches fulfill the speech selection criteria. (Other seven speeches are eliminated by the systematic selection criteria):

43. Dışışleri Bakanlığı ve Avrupa Birliğı Genel Sekreterliğı 2008 Mali Yılı Bütçe Tasarılarının TBMM Genel Kurulu'nda Görüşülmesi Vesilesiyle Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ali Babacan Tarafından Yapılan Sunuş, 10 Aralık 2007

48. Dışışleri Bakanlığı ve Avrupa Birliğı Genel Sekreterliğı'nin 2008 Mali Yılı Bütçe Tasarılarının TBMM Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu'na Sunulması Vesilesiyle Dışışleri Bakanı Ali Babacan Tarafından Yapılan Sunuş, 14 Kasım 2007

49. Sayın Bakanımızın Basın Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma, 1 Kasım 2007
Accordingly, starting from the year 2007 until 2009, only ten speeches have fulfilled the speech selection criteria. After selecting all relevant speeches according to the above-mentioned criteria, the speeches are put into a date order and enumerated accordingly. As a result of these steps I selected 10 speeches Ali Babacan. Please go back to section 3.2.1.2 for a list of selected speeches.

3. Full Speech List and Speech Selection for Ahmet Davutoğlu

For the list of all speeches please see the following link:

(<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.tr.mfa?52e904f9-78af-49b3-89b5-5b4bdb38d51f>)

I have enumerated all speeches from 1 to 119 and randomly selected 5 speeches for each year through a web-based "Research Randomizer" that generates random numbers within a range defined by the researcher. The same systematic selection rule is applied to the random sample.

For the year 2014 the MoFA provides 12 speeches (#1 to #12). When the randomizer is asked to generate five numbers out of the 12 it gave: 10, 9, 12, 5, and 1:

10. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Altıncı Büyükelçiler Konferansı Kapsamında Adana'da Yaptıkları Konuşma, 18 Ocak 2014, Adana (SELECTED)

9. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Altıncı Büyükelçiler Konferansı'nın Mersin Bölümünde Yaptıkları Konuşma, 18 Ocak 2014, Mersin (SELECTED)

12. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun VI. Büyükelçiler Konferansı'nın Açılış Oturumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma, 13 Ocak 2014, Ankara (SELECTED)

5. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Pasifik'teki Gelişmekte Olan Küçük Ada Devletleri Dışışleri Bakanları Toplantısı'nda Yaptığı Konuşma, 7 Haziran 2014, İstanbul (Eliminated on Criterion 2a)

1. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Veda Konuşması, 28 Ağustos 2014, Ankara (SELECTED)

After four speeches are selected, the randomizer is asked to give a random number: #4 (eliminated on Criterion 2a), #3 (eliminated on Criterion 2a), and finally #6 is selected: 1, 6, 9, 10, and 12

6. Dışışleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler İşbirliği Konseyi IV. Zirvesi Kapsamında Gerçekleştirilen Dışışleri Bakanları Konseyi Toplantısında Yaptığı Konuşma, 4 Haziran 2014, Bodrum

For the year 2013 the MoFA provides 16 speeches (#12 to #28). When the randomizer is asked to generate five numbers between 12 and 28, it gave: “23 (SELECTED), 17(eliminated on Criterion 2a), and 21(Eliminated on Criterion 2a), 25 (Eliminated on Criterion 2a), 28 (SELECTED)”. After selecting two speeches the randomizer is asked to generate 3 numbers. It gave: 15 (Eliminated on criterion 2a), 22 (SELECTED), and 20 (SELECTED). Among the remaining speeches only speech #26 fulfill the systematic selection rule. As a result the following speeches are selected for the year 2013: “20, 22. 23, 26, and 28”.

For the year 2012, the MoFA provides 22 speeches (#29 to #50). When the randomizer is asked to generate five numbers between 28 and 50 it gave: “35 (SELECTED), 44 (Eliminated on Criterion 2a-2b), 33 (SELECTED), 32 (Eliminated on Criterion 2b), 31 (Eliminated on Criterion 2a)”. After selecting two speeches the randomizer is asked to generate 3 numbers: 38, 39, and 48 all eliminated on systematic selection criteria. Another three numbers are: 34 (SELECTED), 46

(Eliminated on criterion 2a), and 36 (Eliminated on criterion 2a). Next two random numbers are: 45, 40 both eliminated. The next two numbers are: 29, 43 both selected. As a result the following speeches are selected for the year 2012: “29, 33, 34, 35, and 43”

For the year 2011, the MoFA provides 21 speeches (#51 to #71). When the randomizer is asked to generate five numbers from 51 to 71 it gave: “51 (Eliminated on Criterion 2a), 71 (SELECTED), 64 (Eliminated on Criterion 2a), 56 (Eliminated on Criterion 2a), 54 (SELECTED)”. The next three random numbers are: 53, 59, and 60 all eliminated on the systematic selection rule. The next three are: “59, 67, and 70” all eliminated on the systematic selection rule. The next three are: 57 (Eliminated on Criterion 2a), 64 (SELECTED), and 65 (SELECTED). None of the remaining speeches fulfill the systematic selection rule. Hence, the following four speeches are selected for the year 2011: “71, 54, 64, and 65”.

For the year 2010, the MoFA provides 42 speeches (#72 to #113). When the randomizer is asked to generate five numbers between 72 and 113, it gave: “113 (SELECTED), 106 (Eliminated on criterion 2a), 104 (Not Accessible), 77 (Only Video/No written Record), 75 (Eliminated on Criterion 2a)”. Next, the four numbers that are generated are the following: 92 (No Written Record), 78 (Eliminated on Criterion 2a), 85 (No Written Record), and 80 (SELECTED). The next three numbers are: 81, 79, and 82 all eliminated. The next three numbers are: 110 (No Written Record), 99 (No Written Record), and 96 (SELECTED). The MoFA does not give the written records of other speeches. Hence for the year 2012, I could only select the following three speeches: 80, 96, 113.

For the year 2009, the MoFA website provides 6 speeches (#114 to #119). Only two speeches fulfill the systematic selection criteria: 116 and 119.

As a result, 24 speeches that fulfill the speech selection rules are selected out of the speeches that are provided by the MoFA. After selecting all relevant speeches according to the above-mentioned criteria, the speeches are put into a date order and enumerated accordingly. Please go back to section 3.2.1.3 for a list of selected speeches.

D. EVENT DATA CODES

In the initial output file TABARI coded 21622 events involving 244 sources and 260 targets from Mon Nov 18, 2002 to Fri Aug 29, 2014 Containing 287 Different Actors 208 different events.

Event codes

TABARI Observed 208 total event codes in the dataset

"010" "011" "012" "013" "014" "015" "016" "017" "018" "019" "020" "021"
"0211", "0212" "0213" "0214" "022" "023" "0231" "0232" "0233" "0234" "024"
"0241" "0242" "0243" "025" "0253" "0256" "026" "027" "028" "030" "031"
"0311" "0312" "032" "033" "0331" "0332" "0334" "034" "0341" "0344" "035"
"0351" "0353" "0355" "0356" "036" "037" "038" "039" "040" "041" "042"
"043" "044" "045" "046" "050" "051" "052" "053" "054" "055" "056" "057"
"060" "061" "062" "063" "064" "070" "071" "072" "073" "074" "075" "080"
"081" "082" "083" "0831" "0833" "0834" "084" "0841" "0842" "085"
"086""0861" "0862" "087" "0871" "0872" "0873" "0874" "090" "092" "093"
"100" "101" "1011" "1014" "102" "104" "1042" "1043" "1044" "105" "1053"
"1054" "1056" "106" "107" "110" "111" "112" "1121" "1122" "1123" "1124"
"113" "114" "115" "120" "121" "1213" "122" "123" "1231" "1233" "1234"
"124" "1241" "1243" "1246" "125" "127" "128" "129" "130" "131" "1311"
"1312" "1313" "132" "133" "134" "136" "138" "1382" "1383" "1384" "139"
"140" "141" "1411" "1412" "142" "143" "145" "150" "151" "152" "153" "154"
"160" "161" "162" "1621" "1622" "163" "164" "166" "1662" "170" "171"
"1711" "1712" "172" "1721" "1722" "1723" "173" "174" "175" "180" "181"

"182" "1821" "1822" "1823" "183" "1831" "1832" "185" "186" "190" "191"
"192" "193" "194" "195" "196" "202" "203"

Descriptions of event codes

These Descriptions are taken from the CAMEO Codebook. Please see Section 3.3.1.7 for further details.

PUBLIC STATEMENT: 10 (statement) 11 (decline to comment) 12 (pessimistic comment) 13 (optimistic comment) 14 (consider policy option) 15 (admit error, claim responsibility) 16 (reject accusation) 17 (engage in symbolic act) 18 (empathetic comment) 19 (express accord/common understanding)

APPEAL: 20 (appeal/request) 21 (request Cooperation) 211 (economic) 212 (Military) 22 (Diplomatic Cooperation/policy support) 23 (material aid/assistance) 231 (economic assistance) 232 (appeal for military aid) 233 (Appeal for humanitarian aid) 234 (Appeal for military protection or peacekeeping) 24 (Appeal for political reform), 241 (Appeal for leadership change) 242 (Appeal for policy change) 243 (Appeal for rights) 25 (Appeal to yield) 253 (Appeal for release of persons or property) 256 (Appeal for target to de-escalation of military engagement) 26 (appeal to others - meet negotiate) 27 (Appeal to others - to settle dispute)

INTENT TO COOPERATE: 30 (express intent to cooperate) 31 (Express intent to engage in material cooperation) 311 (Express intent to cooperate economically) 312 (Express intent to cooperate militarily) 32 (Express intent to engage in diplomatic cooperation) 33 (Express intent to provide material aid) 331 (Express intent to provide economic aid) 332 (Express intent to provide military aid) 333 (Express intent to provide humanitarian aid) 334 (Express intent to provide military protection or peacekeeping) 34 (Express intent to institute political reform) 341 (Express intent to change leadership) 344 (Express intent to change policy) 35 (Express intent to yield) 351 (Express intent to ease administrative sanctions) 353 (Express intent to release persons) 356 (Express intent to de-escalate military engagement) 36 (Express intent to meet or negotiate) 37 (Express intent to settle dispute) 38 (Express intent to accept mediation) 39 (Express intent to mediate)

CONSULT: 40 (consultations and meetings) 41 (Discuss by telephone) 42 (Make a visit) 43 (Host a visit) 44 (Meet at a 'third' location) 45 (Engage in mediation) 46 (Engage in negotiation/bargaining)

ENGAGE DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION: 50 (Engage in diplomatic cooperation) 51 (Praise or endorse: Express support for, commend, approve policy, action) 52 (Defend verbally: justify policy, action or actor) 53 (Call on other parties to support the target) 54 (Grant diplomatic recognition) 55 (apologize: Express regret or remorse for an action or situation) 56 (Forgive: Express forgiveness, pardon.) 57 (Sign formal agreement)

ENGAGE in MATERIAL COOPERATION: 60 (Engage in material cooperation) 61 (Cooperate economically) 62 (Cooperate militarily) 63 (Engage in judicial cooperation) 64 (Share intelligence or information)

PROVIDE AID: 70 (Provide aid) 71 (Provide economic aid) 72 (Provide military aid) 73 (Provide humanitarian aid) 74 (Provide military protection or peacekeeping) 75 (Grant asylum)

YIELD/Concession: 80 (All yielding, concessions not otherwise specified) 81 (Ease administrative sanctions) 812 (Ease ban on political parties or politicians) 82 (Cancel, suspend, or postpone any (non-war) activity that constitutes political dissent.) 83 (Accede to requests or demands for political reform) 831 (Accede to demands for change in leadership) 833 (Accede to demands for rights) 834 (Accede to demands for change in institutions, regime) 84 (Return, release people, prisoner, hostages) 841 (return, release persons) 842 (Return, release property) 85 (Ease economic sanction, boycott, or embargo) 86 (Allow international involvement) 861 (Receive deployment of peacekeepers) 87 (De-escalate military engagement) 871 (Declare truce, ceasefire) 872 (Ease military blockade) 873 (Demobilize armed forces) 874 (Retreat or surrender militarily)

INVESTIGATE: 90 (All non-covert investigations not otherwise specified) 91 (Investigate crime, corruption) 92 (Investigate human rights abuses) 93 (Investigate military action)

DEMAND: 100 (All demands and orders not otherwise specified) 101 (Demand material cooperation) 1014 (Demand intelligence cooperation) 1041 (Demand leadership change) 1042 (Demand policy change) 1043 (Demand rights) 1044 (Demand change in institutions, regime) 105 (Demand that target yield) 1053 (Demand release of persons or property) 1054 (Demand easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo) 107 (Demand settling of dispute)

DISAPPROVE: 110 (Express disapprovals, objections, and complaints not otherwise specified) 111 (Criticize or denounce) 112 (Accuse, not specified below)

REJECT: 120 (Reject) 121 (Reject material cooperation) 122 (Reject request or demand for material aid) 123 (Reject request or demand for political reform) 1233 (Reject request for rights) 1234 (Reject request for change in institutions) 124 (Refuse to yield) 1241 (Refuse to ease administrative sanctions) 1246 (Refuse to de-escalate military engagement) 125 (Reject proposal to meet, discuss, negotiate) 127 (Reject plan, agreement to settle dispute) 128 (Defy norms, law) 129 (Veto)

THREATEN: 130 (Threaten) 131 (Threaten non-force) 1311 (Threaten to reduce or stop aid) 1312 (Threaten to boycott, embargo, or sanction) 1313 (Threaten to reduce or break relations) 133 (Threaten political dissent) 134 (Threaten to halt negotiations) 136 (Threaten to halt international involvement (non-mediation)) 138 (Threaten with military force, not specified below) 1382 (Threaten occupation) 1383 (Threaten unconventional attack) 1384 (Threaten conventional attack) 139 (Give ultimatum)

PROTEST: 140 (Engage in political dissent) 141 (Demonstrate or rally) 1411 (Demonstrate or rally for leadership change) 1412 (Demonstrate or rally for policy change) 142 (Conduct hunger strike) 143 (Conduct strike or boycott) 145 (Protest violently, riot)

EXHIBIT MILITARY POSTURE: 150 (Exhibit military or police power) 151 (Increase police alert status) 152 (Increase military alert status) 153 (Mobilize or increase police power) 154 (Mobilize or increase armed forces)

REDUCE RELATIONS: 160 (Reduce relations) 161 (Reduce or break diplomatic relations) 162 (Reduce or stop material aid) 1621 (Reduce or stop economic

assistance) 1622 (Reduce or stop military assistance) 163 (Impose embargo, boycott, or sanctions) 164 (Halt negotiations) 166 (Expel or withdraw) 1662 (Expel or withdraw inspectors, observers)

COERCE: 170 (Repression, violence against civilians) 171 (Seize or damage property) 1711 (Confiscate property) 1712 (Destroy property) 172 (Impose administrative sanctions) 1721 (Impose restrictions on political freedoms) 1722 (Ban political parties or politicians) 1723 (Impose curfew) 173 (Arrest, detain) 174 (Expel or deport individuals) 175 (Use repression)

ASSAULT: 180 (Use unconventional violence) 181 (Abduct, hijack, take hostage) 182 (Physically assault, not specified below) 1821 (Sexually assault) 1822 (Torture) 1823 (Kill by physical assault) 183 (Conduct suicide, car, or other non-military bombing, not specified below) 1831 (Carry out suicide bombing) 1832 (Carry out vehicular bombing) 185 (Attempt to assassinate) 186 (Assassinate)

FIGHT: 190 (Use conventional military force) 191 (Impose blockade, restrict movement) 192 (Occupy territory) 193 (Fight with small arms and light weapons) 194 (Fight with artillery and tanks) 195 (Employ aerial weapons) 196 (Violate ceasefire)

UNCONVENTIONAL MASS VIOLENCE: 202 (Engage in mass killings) 203 (Engage in ethnic cleansing)

Actors: Manually Grouped and Aggregated

285 Actors in the dataset

tur: "TURGOV", "TURGOVBUS", "TURGOVDEF", "TURGOVENR", "TURGOVENV", "TURGOVEU", "TURGOVJUD", "TURGOVLAB"

Rg1: "ALB", "BGR", "BGRGOV", "CZE", "CZEGOV", "EST", "GRC", "GRCGOV", "GRCGOVMIL", "HRV", "HUN", "ROU", "ROUGOV", "SVK", "SVKGOV", "MDA", "MKD"

Rg2: "AFG", "AFGELI", "AFGGOV", "ARM", "AZE", "AZEELI", "AZEGOV",
"GEOELI", "GEOGOV", "INDGOV~030101 ~ 040531", "IRN", "IRNGOV",
"IRNGOV~030101 ~ 050231", "IRNGOVBUS", "IRNMED", "KAZ", "KAZGOV",
"KGZ", "KGZGOV", "PAK", "PAKELI", "PAKGOV", "RUS", "RUSGOV", "TJK",
"TKM", "TKMGOV", "UKR", "UKRGOV", "UZB", "UZBGOV"

Rg3: "ARE", "BHR", "CYP", "CYPGOV", "DZA", "DZAGOV", "EGY",
"EGYGOV", "IRQ", "IRQELI", "IRQGOV", "IRQGOVMIL", "ISR", "ISRGOV",
"ISRGOVBUS", "ISRGOVMIL", "JOR", "JORELI", "JORGGOV", "KWT", "LBN",
"LBY", "MAR", "OMN", "PSE", "PSEELI", "PSEREB", "QAT", "QATMED",
"SAU", "SAUELI", "SAUGOV", "SYR", "SYRGOV", "TUN",
"YEM", "IGOMEAARL", "IGOMOS", "IGOPGSGCC"

Rg4: "aar", "afa", "AFR", "CAF", "CIV", "COD", "CPV", "DJI", "GHA", "KEN",
"LBR", "NGA", "SOM", "ZAF", "SDN", "SDNGOV~030101 ~ 051031", "MLI",
"MWI", "RWA", "TZA"

Rg5: "AUT", "AUTELI", "AUTGOV", "AUTGOV~030101 ~ 050131",
"AUTGOV~030101 ~ 070131", "AUTGOVBUS", "BEL", "BELGOV", "CAN",
"CANGOV", "CANGOV~030101 ~ 031231", "CHE", "CHEELI", "DEU",
"DEUELI", "DEUGOV", "DEUGOV~030101 ~ 051131", "DEUGOVMIL~030101
~ 051131", "DNK", "DNKGOV", "ESP", "ESPGOV", "EST", "EUR", "FIN",
"FRA", "FRAELI", "FRAGOV", "FRAGOVBUS", "GBR", "GBRGOV", "IRL",
"ISL", "ITA", "ITAEELI", "ITAGOV", "LIE", "LTU", "LUX", "LUXGOV", "LVA",
"LVAGOV", "MLT", "NLD", "NLDGOV", "NLDGOVJUD", "NLDJUD", "NOR",
"POL", "PRT", "PRTEELI", "SWE", "SWEGOV", "SWEGOV~030101 ~ 031031",
"USA", "USAELI", "USAGOV", "USAGOVBUS", "USAGOVMIL", "USAMED",
"USAMIL", "VAT", "IGOEURDEVEBR", "IGOEUREEC", "IGOEURSCE",
"IGOWSTBUS", "IGOWSTNAT"

East Asia: "CHN", "CHNGOV", "IDN", "JPN", "JPNGOV", "KHM", "KOR",
"KORGGOV", "LKA", "MDV", "MDV", "MMR", "MYS", "PRK", "THA",
"THAGOV", "TWN", "VNM"

Oceania/Southeast Asia: "AUS", "BGD", "PHL", "NZL", "NZLELI",
"SGP", "IDN", "MYS", "PNG"

Latin: "ARG", "BRA", "BRAGOV", "CUB", "PAN", "PRY", "MEX", "BHS",
"CHL", "HTI", "KNAGOV", "PER", "VEN"

NGO/MNC: "MNC", "MNCBEL", "MNCDEU", "MNCFRAHLH",
"MNCGBRMED", "MNCGRC", "MNCKWTMED", "MNCNLD", "MNCUSA",
"MNCUSAMED", "NGO", "NGOBUSWEF", "NGOENV", "NGOHLHIRC",
"NGOHRI", "NGOHRIAMN", "NGOHRIHRW", "NGOHRIMED", "NGOMED"

IGO: "IGO", "IGOASADEVADB", "IGOBUSGOE", "IGOBUSGOS",
"IGOBUSIMF", "IGOBUSOPC", "IGOBUSWTO", "IGOCOPITP",
"IGOEURCOE", "IGOEURDEVEBR", "IGOEUREEC", "IGOEURSCE",
"IGOJUDICC", "IGOMEAARL", "IGOMOS", "IGOPGSGCC", "IGOUNO",
"IGOUNODEVWBK", "IGOUNOIAE", "IGOUNOKID", "IGOUNOWFP",
"IGOWSTBUS", "IGOWSTNAT"

IGO (Except Regional ones): "IGO", "IGOASADEVADB", "IGOBUSGOE",
"IGOBUSGOS", "IGOBUSIMF", "IGOBUSOPC", "IGOBUSWTO",
"IGOCOPITP", "IGOEURCOE", "IGOJUDICC", "IGOUNO",
"IGOUNODEVWBK", "IGOUNOIAE", "IGOUNOKID", "IGOUNOWFP"

Religious actors/groups: "ABR010", "BUDMAH223", "CHR", "CHRCTH",
"CHRDOX", "CHRPRO", "JEW", "MOS", "MOSALE", "MOSSHI", "MOSSUN"

Uncategorized: "AFGINSTAL", "asy", "che", "chm", "ELI", "IMGMOALQ",
"INT", "kur", "mao", "SAS", "SCGSRB", "tat", "TURSEP", "UNKNOWN", "UIS",
"uig", "USASPY", "znd", "GME", "per", "SEA", "tms"

E. TFPRED: A GUIDE TO THE INEXPERIENCED READER

This document has details on how R studio "events" package is used in filtering and aggregating the data to be utilized in the TFPRED data-set.

Note to the reader: Each step in building a data-set requires a decision and each decision has certain consequences. Currently, I decided to utilize two software programs: "R studio" and "Ms. Excel". This choice is a result of many trials and failures. So the following information is based on my personal experience for the specific purpose of building the TFPRED data-set. This document assumes that the reader has basic knowledge of R studio. If not, I still provide as much detail as possible but a best suggestion to those who would like to generate event data and aggregate with R studio might be a quote from Samuel Barclay Beckett: "Ever tried, ever failed, no matter, try again, fail again, fail better". The steps are explained below

1. Preparing the environment

First, create a folder, put necessary files in it and set it as the working directory for R studio. As you might see below, the working directory of TFPRED is a folder named as "Rstudio_TFPRED" and it includes four main files:

- **TABARI OUTPUT FILE:** "TFPRED160528" - This is a tab delimited file that is generated by TABARI. This file includes coded events that are to be loaded to the R studio program (I load the data to Rstudio below)

- CAMEOCODES: "CAMEOgoldstein.txt" - This is a tab delimited text file, a modified version of the original CAMEO Scale developed by Schrodtt (further details can be reached from: <http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/cameo.dir/CAMEO.SCALE.txt>). The CranR "events" package has its own CAMEO scale already built in the package. However, this scaling does not work with the TABARI output file that I generated for TFPRED. This is probably due to the reason that I use an updated version of the TABARI software (Version 8b2) which generates event codes in three digits. For instance: if the event code is "20", TABARI 8b2 writes the code as "020" and if it is "200" TABARI8b2 codes it as "200". Basically, this means that "020" and "200" are codes of different events. The CAMEO scaling that is built in the CranR Events package reads "20" in two digits but not in three digits "020". That is why I needed to make a new scale with the "make_scale" function of the events package and for this purpose generated a "tab delimited text" file that is readable by R studio.
- WORKSPACE: "TFPRED_Workspace.Rdata" - This file is the R studio workspace file. It is the save file in which your modifications of data (filtering, scaling, aggregations...etc.) are saved and loaded each time you start the R Studio Software.
- CODEBOOK: "Codebook(TFPRED).txt" is this codebook. If you are reading this codebook you are most probably reading the master file that I put in the TFPRED folder that we are talking about here. Or less probably you are reading the appendix of my dissertation (well! thank you for your patience). The "CodeBook (TFPRED).txt" - A codebook that includes the list of actor codes, event codes, event scales, Role/Event Matching, and Region/Country Code Matching. It includes every code that you might see in the TFPRED Rstudio Workspace.

After making all these files ready, you need to load the events package (assuming that you have installed it before) from the packages tab on the lower right corner of Rstudio. After loading the events package you can command Rstudio to read the

events from the TABARI output file that you placed in the folder (in my case it is "TFPRED160528" file).

- **The command:** `TFPREDraw <- read_keds("TFPRED160528")`

This command creates a raw and non-filtered version of the TABARI output file as an object in the upper-right corner of Rstudio window named as TFPREDraw

- Then, I filtered the data for the temporal period required for TFPRED – from the 58th Gov. to the end of 61st gov. (2002-11-18 to 2014-08-29):

The Command: `TFPRED <- filter_time(TFPREDraw, start="2002-11-18", end="2014-08-29")`

- Now the TFPRED object that is created in the upper right corner is the event data that I would be further filtering, aggregating and summarizing. You might see a summary of the event data with the following command: `summary(TFPRED)`. The summary is as follows: "21622 events involving 244 sources and 260 targets from Mon Nov 18, 2002 to Fri Aug 29, 2014"
- I may now see the total number of actors (both as source and target) with the following command: `actors(TFPRED)`

2. Actor grouping

- In the resulting list the following actors are related to TURKEY:

"TURGOV", "TURGOVBUS", "TURGOVDEF", "TURGOVENR",
"TURGOVENV", "TURGOVEU", "TURGOVJUD", "TURGOVLAB"

In order to be able to make dyads in the future I aggregate them under a single name "tur" with the following command:

```
actor.agg <- list (tur=c("TURGOV", "TURGOVBUS", "TURGOVDEF",  
"TURGOVENR", "TURGOVENV", "TURGOVEU", "TURGOVJUD",  
"TURGOVLAB"))
```

Then I create lists of these countries according to regions (see section 3.1.4) with the following commands

- `actor.agg1 <- list (Rg1=c("ALB", "BGR", "BGRGOV", "CZE", "CZEGOV", "EST", "GRC", "GRCGOV", "GRCGOVMIL", "HRV", "HUN", "ROU", "ROUGOV", "SVK", "SVKGOV", "MDA", "MKD"))`
- `actor.agg2 <- list (Rg2=c("AFG", "AFGELI", "AFGGOV", "ARM", "AZE", "AZEELI", "AZEGOV", "GEOELI", "GEOGOV", "IND", "INDGOV~030101 ~ 040531", "IRN", "IRNGOV", "IRNGOV~030101 ~ 050231", "IRNGOVBUS", "IRNMED", "KAZ", "KAZGOV", "KGZ", "KGZGOV", "PAK", "PAKELI", "PAKGOV", "RUS", "RUSGOV", "TJK", "TKM", "TKMGOV", "UKR", "UKRGOV", "UZB", "UZBGOV"))`
- `actor.agg3 <- list (Rg3=c("ARE", "BHR", "CYP", "CYPGOV", "DZA", "DZAGOV", "EGY", "EGYGOV", "IRQ", "IRQELI", "IRQGOV", "IRQGOVMIL", "ISR", "ISRGOV", "ISRGOVBUS", "ISRGOVMIL", "JOR", "JORELI", "JORGGOV", "KWT", "LBN", "LBY", "MAR", "OMN", "PSE", "PSEELI", "PSEREB", "QAT", "QATMED", "SAU", "SAUELI", "SAUGOV", "SYR", "SYRGOV", "TUN", "YEM", "IGOMEAARL", "IGOMOS", "IGOPGSGCC"))`
- `actor.agg4 <- list (Rg4=c("aar", "afa", "AFR", "CAF", "CIV", "COD", "CPV", "DJI", "GHA", "KEN", "LBR", "NGA", "SOM", "ZAF", "SDN", "SDNGOV~030101 ~ 051031", "MLI", "MWI", "RWA", "TZA"))`
- `actor.agg5 <- list (Rg5=c("AUT", "AUTELI", "AUTGOV", "AUTGOV~030101 ~ 050131", "AUTGOV~030101 ~ 070131", "AUTGOVBUS", "BEL", "BELGOV", "CAN", "CANGOV", "CANGOV~030101 ~ 031231", "CHE", "CHEELI", "DEU", "DEUELI", "DEUGOV", "DEUGOV~030101 ~ 051131", "DEUGOVMIL~030101 ~ 051131", "DNK", "DNKGOV", "ESP", "ESPGOV", "EST", "EUR", "FIN", "FRA", "FRAELI", "FRAGOV", "FRAGOVBUS", "GBR", "GBRGOV", "IRL", "ISL", "ITA", "ITAELI", "ITAGOV", "LIE", "LTU", "LUX", "LUXGOV", "LVA", "LVAGOV", "MLT", "NLD", "NLDGOV", "NLDGOVJUD", "NLDJUD", "NOR", "POL", "PRT", "PRTELI",`

```
"SWE", "SWEGOV", "SWEGOV~030101 ~ 031031", "USA", "USAELI",
"USAGOV", "USAGOVBUS", "USAGOV MIL", "USAMED", "USAMIL",
"VAT", "IGOEURDEVEBR", "IGOEUREEC", "IGOEURSCE",
"IGOWSTBUS", "IGOWSTNAT"))
```

- actor.aggAsia <- list (Asia=c("CHN", "CHNGOV", "IDN", "JPN", "JPNGOV", "KHM", "KOR", "KORGOV", "LKA", "MDV", "MDV", "MMR", "MYS", "PRK", "THA", "THAGOV", "TWN", "VNM"))
- actor.aggSEA <- list (SEA=c("AUS", "BGD", "PHL", "NZL", "NZLELI", "SGP", "IDN", "MYS", "PNG"))
- actor.aggLatin <- list (Latin=c("ARG", "BRA", "BRAGOV", "CUB", "PAN", "PRY", "MEX", "BHS", "CHL", "HTI", "KNAGOV", "PER", "VEN"))
- actor.aggNGO <- list (NGO=c("MNC", "MNCBEL", "MNCDEU", "MNCFRAHLH", "MNCGBRMED", "MNCGRC", "MNCKWTMED", "MNCNLD", "MNCUSA", "MNCUSAMED", "NGO", "NGOBUSWEF", "NGOENV", "NGOHLHIRC", "NGOHRI", "NGOHRIAMN", "NGOHRIHRW", "NGOHRIMED", "NGOMED"))
- actor.aggIGO <- list (IGO=c("IGO", "IGOASADEVADB", "IGOBUSGOE", "IGOBUSGOS", "IGOBUSIMF", "IGOBUSOPC", "IGOBUSWTO", "IGOCOPITP", "IGOEURCOE", "IGOJUDICC", "IGOUNO", "IGOUNODEVWBK", "IGOUNOIAE", "IGOUNOKID", "IGOUNOWFP"))
- actor.aggRel <- list(REL= c("ABR010", "BUDMAH223", "CHR", "CHRCTH", "CHRDOX", "CHRPRO", "JEW", "MOS", "MOSALE", "MOSSHI", "MOSSUN"))
- actor.aggUnC <- list(UnC= c("AFGINSTAL", "asy", "che", "chm", "ELI", "IMGMOALQ", "INT", "kur", "mao", "SAS", "SCGSRB", "tat", "TURSEP", "UNKNOWN", "UIS", "uig", "USASPY", "znd", "GME", "per", "SEA", "tms"))

Then I group them under separate objects.

- `TFPREDtur <- map_actors(TFPRED, fun=actor.agg)`
- `TFPREDRg1 <- map_actors(TFPREDtur, fun=actor.agg1)`
- `TFPREDRg2 <- map_actors(TFPREDRg1, fun=actor.agg2)`
- `TFPREDRg3 <- map_actors(TFPREDRg2, fun=actor.agg3)`
- `TFPREDRg4 <- map_actors(TFPREDRg3, fun=actor.agg4)`
- `TFPREDRg5 <- map_actors(TFPREDRg4, fun=actor.agg5)`
- `TFPREDAsia <- map_actors(TFPREDRg5, fun=actor.aggAsia)`
- `TFPREDSEA <- map_actors(TFPREDAsia, fun=actor.aggSEA)`
- `TFPREDLatin <- map_actors(TFPREDSEA, fun=actor.aggLatin)`
- `TFPREDNGO <- map_actors(TFPREDLatin, fun=actor.aggNGO)`
- `TFPREDIGO <- map_actors(TFPREDNGO, fun=actor.aggIGO)`
- `TFPREDRel <- map_actors(TFPREDIGO, fun=actor.aggRel)`
- `TFPREDGrouped <- map_actors(TFPREDRel, fun=actor.aggUnC)`

For the purpose of TFPRED I will use the TFPREDGrouped object so I deleted all other objects from the environment to make things easier. (Note: This is optional) All the above mentioned functions (Step 6) can be done with the following two commands (NOTE: You need to build this command by yourself. I did so for TFPRED):

- `actor.agg <- list (tur=c("TUR", "TURELI", "TURGOV", "TURGOVBUS", "TURGOVDEF", "TURGOVENR", "TURGOVENV", "TURGOVEU", "TURGOVJUD", "TURGOVLAB"), Rg1=c("ALB", "BGR", "BGRGOV", "CZE", "CZEGOV", "EST", "GRC", "GRCGOV", "GRCGOVMIL", "HRV", "HUN", "ROU", "ROUGOV", "SVK", "SVKGOV", "MDA", "MKD"), Rg2=c("AFG", "AFGELI", "AFGGOV", "ARM", "AZE", "AZEELI",`

"AZEGOV", "GEOELI", "GEOGOV", "IND", "INDGOV~030101 ~ 040531",
 "IRN", "IRNGOV", "IRNGOV~030101 ~ 050231", "IRNGOVBUS",
 "IRNMED", "KAZ", "KAZGOV", "KGZ", "KGZGOV", "PAK", "PAKELI",
 "PAKGOV", "RUS", "RUSGOV", "TJK", "TKM", "TKMGOV", "UKR",
 "UKRGOV", "UZB", "UZBGOV"), Rg3=c("ARE", "BHR", "CYP",
 "CYPGOV", "DZA", "DZAGOV", "EGY", "EGYGOV", "IRQ", "IRQELI",
 "IRQGOV", "IRQGOVMIL", "ISR", "ISRGOV", "ISRGOVBUS",
 "ISRGOVMIL", "JOR", "JORELI", "JORGGOV", "KWT", "LBN", "LBY",
 "MAR", "OMN", "PSE", "PSEELI", "PSEREB", "QAT", "QATMED", "SAU",
 "SAUELI", "SAUGOV", "SYR", "SYRGOV", "TUN",
 "YEM", "IGOMEAARL", "IGOMOS", "IGOPGSGCC"), Rg4=c("aar", "afa",
 "AFR", "CAF", "CIV", "COD", "CPV", "DJI", "GHA", "KEN", "LBR", "NGA",
 "SOM", "ZAF", "SDN", "SDNGOV~030101 ~ 051031", "MLI", "MWI",
 "RWA", "TZA"), Rg5=c("AUT", "AUTELI", "AUTGOV", "AUTGOV~030101
 ~ 050131", "AUTGOV~030101 ~ 070131", "AUTGOVBUS", "BEL",
 "BELGOV", "CAN", "CANGOV", "CANGOV~030101 ~ 031231", "CHE",
 "CHEELI", "DEU", "DEUELI", "DEUGOV", "DEUGOV~030101 ~ 051131",
 "DEUGOVMIL~030101 ~ 051131", "DNK", "DNKGOV", "ESP", "ESPGOV",
 "EST", "EUR", "FIN", "FRA", "FRAELI", "FRAGOV", "FRAGOVBUS",
 "GBR", "GBRGOV", "IRL", "ISL", "ITA", "ITAELI", "ITAGOV", "LIE",
 "LTU", "LUX", "LUXGOV", "LVA", "LVAGOV", "MLT", "NLD",
 "NLDGOV", "NLDGOVJUD", "NLDJUD", "NOR", "POL", "PRT", "PRTELI",
 "SWE", "SWEGOV", "SWEGOV~030101 ~ 031031", "USA", "USAELI",
 "USAGOV", "USAGOVBUS", "USAGOVMIL", "USAMED", "USAMIL",
 "VAT", "IGOEURDEVEBR", "IGOEUREEC", "IGOEURSCE",
 "IGOWSTBUS", "IGOWSTNAT"), Asia=c("CHN", "CHNGOV", "IDN",
 "JPN", "JPNGOV", "KHM", "KOR", "KORGGOV", "LKA", "MDV", "MDV",
 "MMR", "MYS", "PRK", "THA", "THAGOV", "TWN", "VNM"),
 SEA=c("AUS", "BGD", "PHL", "NZL", "NZLELI", "SGP", "IDN", "MYS",
 "PNG"), Latin=c("ARG", "BRA", "BRAGOV", "CUB", "PAN", "PRY",
 "MEX", "BHS", "CHL", "HTI", "KNAGOV", "PER", "VEN"), NGO=c("MNC",
 "MNCBEL", "MNCDEU", "MNCFRAHLH", "MNCGBRMED", "MNCGRC",
 "MNCKWTMED", "MNCNLD", "MNCUSA", "MNCUSAMED", "NGO",


```
"NGOBUSWEF", "NGOENV", "NGOHLHIRC", "NGOHRI",
"NGOHRIAMN", "NGOHRIHRW", "NGOHRIMED", "NGOMED"),
IGO=c("IGO", "IGOASADEVADB", "IGOBUSGOE", "IGOBUSGOS",
"IGOBUSIMF", "IGOBUSOPC", "IGOBUSWTO", "IGOCOPITP",
"IGOEURCOE", "IGOJUDICC", "IGOUNO", "IGOUNODEVWBK",
"IGOUNOIAE", "IGOUNOKID", "IGOUNOWFP"), REL= c("ABR010",
"BUDMAH223", "CHR", "CHRCTH", "CHRDOX", "CHRPRO", "JEW",
"MOS", "MOSALE", "MOSSHI", "MOSSUN"), UnC= c("AFGINSTAL",
"asy", "che", "chm", "ELI", "IMGMOSALQ", "INT", "kur", "mao", "SAS",
"SCGSRB", "tat", "TURSEP", "UNKNOWN", "UIS", "uig", "USASPY",
"znd", "GME", "per", "SEA", "tms"))
```

- `TFPREDGrouped <- map_actors(TFPRED, fun=actor.agg)`

3. Cleaning irrelevant data

After grouping all actors I look if I have left any actors out. The command:

- `"actors(TFPREDGrouped)"` return with: [1] "Asia" "IGO" "Latin" "NGO" "REL" "Rg1" "Rg2" "Rg3" "Rg4" "Rg5" "SEA" "tur" "UnC".

This means that all actors are grouped the way I wanted them to be. Now I can further filter the relevant actors. The Uncategorized actors (UnC), Religious groups (Rel), NGOs and IGOs are not relevant to my research so I need to further clean my data from them. The following command will do the work:

- `TFPREDfilt <- filter_actors(TFPREDgrouped, fun=spotter("Asia", "Latin", "Rg1", "Rg2", "Rg3", "Rg4", "Rg5", "SEA", "tur"))`
- Summary: 16069 events involving 9 sources and 9 targets from Mon. Nov. 18, 2002 to Fri. Aug. 29, 2014

4. Dyadic grouping:

Remember that the CranR - Events package (in its current state) can generate plot diagrams of dyadic relationships, which means that the dataset I create and work on should have only 2 actors. So I created the following datasets

- TRtoWorld: First I group all actors except "tur" under one category:
`actor.aggWorld <- list(world= c("Asia", "Latin", "Rg1", "Rg2", "Rg3", "Rg4", "Rg5", "SEA"))`. Then I create the object `TRtoWORLD <- map_actors(TFPREDfilt, fun=actor.aggWorld)` Summary: 16069 events involving 2 sources and 2 targets from Mon Nov 18, 2002 to Fri Aug 29, 2014.
- TRtoRg1: I basically filter two actors "tur" and "Rg1" with the following command: `TRtoRg1 <- filter_actors(TFPREDgrouped, fun=spotter("tur", "Rg1"))`
- TRtoRg2: I basically filter two actors "tur" and "Rg2" with the following command: `TRtoRg2 <- filter_actors(TFPREDgrouped, fun=spotter("tur", "Rg2"))`
- TRtoRg3: I basically filter two actors "tur" and "Rg3" with the following command: `TRtoRg3 <- filter_actors(TFPREDgrouped, fun=spotter("tur", "Rg3"))`
- TRtoRg4: I basically filter two actors "tur" and "Rg3" with the following command: `TRtoRg4 <- filter_actors(TFPREDgrouped, fun=spotter("tur", "Rg4"))`
- TRtoRg5: I basically filter two actors "tur" and "Rg3" with the following command: `TRtoRg5 <- filter_actors(TFPREDgrouped, fun=spotter("tur", "Rg5"))`
- TRtoNGO: I basically filter two actors "tur" and "NGO" with the following command: `TRtoNGO <- filter_actors(TFPREDgrouped, fun=spotter("tur", "NGO"))`
- TRtoIGO: I basically filter two actors "tur" and "NGO" with the following command: `TRtoIGO <- filter_actors(TFPREDgrouped, fun=spotter("tur", "IGO"))`
- TRtoLATIN: I basically filter two actors "tur" and "Latin" with the following command: `TRtoLATIN <- filter_actors(TFPREDgrouped, fun=spotter("tur", "Latin"))`
- TRtoASIA: I basically filter two actors "tur" and "Asia" with the following command: `TRtoASIA <- filter_actors(TFPREDgrouped, fun=spotter("tur", "Asia"))`

- TRtoSEA: I basically filter two actors "tur" and "Asia" with the following command: `TRtoSEA <- filter_actors(TFPREDgrouped, fun=spotter("tur", "SEA"))`
- TRtoREL: I basically filter two actors "tur" and "REL" with the following command: `TRtoREL <- filter_actors(TFPREDgrouped, fun=spotter("tur", "REL"))`
- TRtoUnC: I basically filter two actors "tur" and "UnC" with the following command: `TRtoUnC <- filter_actors(TFPREDgrouped, fun=spotter("tur", "UnC"))`

5. Scaling the dyadic groups

I have 12 Dyadic Group upon which I will apply the CAMEO Scale from the file that I put in the home folder: "Rstudio_TFPRED". So I command Rstudio to make the scale: `CAMEO <- make_scale("CAMEO", file="CAMEOgoldstein.txt", sep = "\t")`. Then, the scale is applied to the respective dyadic groups.

- TRtoWorldCameo: `TRtoWORLDCAMEO <- add_eventscale(TRtoWORLD, CAMEO)`
- TRtoRg1CAMEO: `TRtoRg1CAMEO <- add_eventscale(TRtoRg1, CAMEO)`
- TRtoRg2CAMEO: `TRtoRg2CAMEO <- add_eventscale(TRtoRg2, CAMEO)`
- TRtoRg3CAMEO: `TRtoRg3CAMEO <- add_eventscale(TRtoRg3, CAMEO)`
- TRtoRg4CAMEO: `TRtoRg4CAMEO <- add_eventscale(TRtoRg4, CAMEO)`
- TRtoRg5CAMEO: `TRtoRg5CAMEO <- add_eventscale(TRtoRg5, CAMEO)`
- TRtoNGOCAMEO: `TRtoNGOCAMEO <- add_eventscale(TRtoNGO, CAMEO)`
- TRtoIGOCAMEO: `TRtoIGOCAMEO <- add_eventscale(TRtoIGO, CAMEO)`
- TRtoLATINCAMEO: `TRtoLATINCAMEO <- add_eventscale(TRtoLATIN, CAMEO)`

- `TRtoASIACAMEO: TRtoASIACAMEO <- add_eventscale(TRtoASIA, CAMEO)`
- `TRtoSEACAMEO: TRtoSEACAMEO <- add_eventscale(TRtoSEA, CAMEO)`
- `TRtoRELCAMEO: TRtoRELCAMEO <- add_eventscale(TRtoREL, CAMEO)`
- `TRtoUnCCAMEO: TRtoUnCCAMEO <- add_eventscale(TRtoUnC, CAMEO)`

6. Score aggregation/plot diagrams:

- I have created two-actor objects and scaled according to the CAMEOgoldstein scale along the conflict(-10)/cooperation(+10) continuum. Now I can command Rstudio to aggregate the scores in order to create plot diagrams. The scores can be aggregated in different ways (see the Pdf documentation of the Events package). NOTE: You will choose the best way after a few trials. I have decided to take the means(you can also take the sum- there are different choices see Yonamine's guide) of quarterly scores on each dyadic relationship. So here are the commands:
- `TR and the World: dyadsTRtoWORLD <- make_dyads(TRtoWORLD, CAMEO, scale="CAMEO", unit="quarter", monday=TRUE, fun=mean, missing.data=0)`
- Then, you can EITHER create a plot diagram with the following command:
`with(dyadsTRtoWORLD$tr.world, plot(CAMEO ~ date, type="l", lwd=2))` OR
you can export the dyadic table in "csv(comma separated File)" format and make your table in another program with the following command:
`write.csv(dyadsTRtoWORLD, "Tr-World dyad")` . The command creates a file in the working directory. I imported the data to Excel and made my diagrams there.

7. Event counts

Another way of aggregating event data is to count verbal and material conflicts rather than scaling them. For that purpose, I need to change event codes in the previously created objects into Verbal/material + Conflict/cooperation categories. Following the PDF guide of the events package I use the following command:

- `event.agg <- list(coop.verb=grep("02.|03.|04.|05.|08.|09.|10.", evts, value=TRUE),
coop.mat=grep("01.|06.|07.", evts, value=TRUE),
conf.verb=grep("11.|12.|13.|14.|15.|16.|17.", evts, value=TRUE),
conf.mat=grep("18.|19.|20.|21.|22.", evts, value=TRUE))`

Then I apply this category to each object that I created before and create new categorized versions of those:

- `TRtoWORLDCAMEOCounts <- map_codes(TRtoWORLDCAMEO, fun=event.agg)`
- `TRtoRg1CAMEOCounts <- map_codes(TRtoRg1CAMEO, fun=event.agg)`
- `TRtoRg2CAMEOCounts <- map_codes(TRtoRg2CAMEO, fun=event.agg)`
- `TRtoRg3CAMEOCounts <- map_codes(TRtoRg3CAMEO, fun=event.agg)`
- `TRtoRg4CAMEOCounts <- map_codes(TRtoRg4CAMEO, fun=event.agg)`
- `TRtoRg5CAMEOCounts <- map_codes(TRtoRg5CAMEO, fun=event.agg)`

The new objects are now categorized in verbal/material + Conflict/cooperation categories. Then I command R Studio to create dyadic lists of each object. These lists will be necessary to export and visualize categorized event counts data. The commands are as follows:

- `dyad.countsTRtoWORLD <- make_dyads(TRtoWORLDCAMEOCounts, scale=NULL, unit="quarter", monday=TRUE, fun=sum, missing.data=0)`
- `dyad.countsTRtoRg1 <- make_dyads(TRtoRg1CAMEOCounts, scale=NULL, unit="quarter", monday=TRUE, fun=sum, missing.data=0)`
- `dyad.countsTRtoRg2 <- make_dyads(TRtoRg2CAMEOCounts, scale=NULL, unit="quarter", monday=TRUE, fun=sum, missing.data=0)`
- `dyad.countsTRtoRg3 <- make_dyads(TRtoRg3CAMEOCounts, scale=NULL, unit="quarter", monday=TRUE, fun=sum, missing.data=0)`
- `dyad.countsTRtoRg4 <- make_dyads(TRtoRg4CAMEOCounts, scale=NULL, unit="quarter", monday=TRUE, fun=sum, missing.data=0)`

- `dyad.countsTRtoRg5 <- make_dyads(TRtoRg5CAMEOCounts, scale=NULL, unit="quarter", monday=TRUE, fun=sum, missing.data=0)`

At this step you might either write csv files of these newly created lists or command Rstudio to create plot diagrams. Here I decided to use Excel so I export each list into a separate csv file and then import data to my Excel TFPRED Dataset. To export these lists I use the following commands

- `write.csv2(dyad.countsTRtoWORLD, "dyadcountsTRtoWorld.csv")`
- `write.csv2(dyad.countsTRtoRg1, "dyadcountsTRtoRg1.csv")`
- `write.csv2(dyad.countsTRtoRg2, "dyadcountsTRtoRg2.csv")`
- `write.csv2(dyad.countsTRtoRg3, "dyadcountsTRtoRg3.csv")`
- `write.csv2(dyad.countsTRtoRg4, "dyadcountsTRtoRg4.csv")`
- `write.csv2(dyad.countsTRtoRg5, "dyadcountsTRtoRg5.csv")`

8. Final note

You can still use Rstudio to create diagrams and graphs. I preferred to use MS. Excel for this purpose and after exporting the above-mentioned CSV files, I imported the data to an Excel Dataset (See TFPRED Events Dataset). If you have come this far, it means that you have practiced enough and became familiar with event data.⁸⁴

The summary of the coded events is as following:

- 16069 events from Mon Nov 18, 2002 to Fri, Aug 29, 2014
 - TRtoWorld : 5969 events
 - WorldtoTR : 5523 events
 - TRtoTR : 686 events
 - WorldtoWorld : 389 events
 - TOTAL : 16069 events

⁸⁴ If you are in need of further assistance and believe that I can help you with that, then you can email me from: ismaierkam@gmail.com.