

RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY
THROUGH THE CITY

A Master's Thesis

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To the memory of my grandfather

RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY
THROUGH THE CITY

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by
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ABSTRACT

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Although territorial physical borders are still relevant, other forms of bordering take place daily that are not in line with the imagination of the international as a space of territorially demarcated sovereign states. Urban space is a part of this identity making and spatializing process of (re)mapping the international. Engaging with practices and understandings of security reveals different experiences of urban, hence different imaginations of the city and the international. In this light, questioning the interaction between city, security and the international, this thesis asks how the bordering of cities plays in the construction of the international and its subjects through practices and understandings of (urban) security and insecurity. Firstly, different bordering practices within cities and their associated imagination of the international is examined. Then, informed by and informing such

imaginations, how authorities and professionals reborder the city and how the city is made 'safe' against those parts of the city that are deemed as dangerous is discussed. While this gives an understanding of how the everyday is shaped by security, final part questions how urban dwellers in their daily lives shape security understandings. This thesis argues that existing politics of the international that generates insecurities and inequalities work through bordering of cities and this is depoliticized through the existing politics of security both in the 'developed' and 'developing' world. The aim of the thesis is to reach a less state-centric and a more bottom-up approach in understanding and rethinking the relationship between city, security and the international.

Keywords: the international, urban space, borders, security, the everyday, global city, globalization, urbanization

ÖZET

‘ULUSLARARASI’NI VE GÜVENLİĞİ KENT ÜZERİNDEN YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK

Karacan, Sezgi

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Devletlerin fiziksel duvarlarla ördüğü toprak sınırları önemini koruyor olsa da, ‘uluslararası’ni devlet sınırları ile bölünmüş bir alan olarak tahayyül etmek, gündelik hayatta da tecrübe edilen farklı sınır pratikleri ile gittikçe zorlaşmaktadır. Kent mekanı, bu sınırların oluşturulduğu ve böylece uluslararası alanın yeniden düzenlendiği ve farklı kimliklerin kurulduğu bir alan olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu sınırların oluşturulmasında ve korunmasında güvenlik anlayışları ve politikaları rol oynamaktadır. Farklı güvenlik anlayış ve pratiklerine odaklanmak, farklı kent deneyimleri ve bu sayede de kentin ve ‘uluslararası’nın farklı tahayyül olanaklarını ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bu tez, kent, güvenlik ve ‘uluslararası’nın ilişkiselliğini tartışırken, şu soruyu sormayı amaçlamaktadır: kent güvenliği ve güvensizliği anlayış ve pratikleri yoluyla, kentler üzerinden oluşturulan sınırlar

‘uluslararası’ını ve ‘uluslararası’ının öznelerini nasıl kurar? Bu soruyu cevaplamak için öncelikle uluslararası ilişkilerde sınır anlayışı sorunsallaştırılmakta ve kentler üzerinden kurulan sınırlar ile bunların uluslararası tahayyülü açısından ne ifade ettiği tartışılmaktadır. İkinci olarak, hakim güvenlik anlayışlarının ve pratiklerinin kentteki gündelik hayatı nasıl şekillendirdiği sorgulanmakta ve son olarak kent gündelik hayatının güvenlik siyasetindeki olası rolü araştırılmaktadır. Tez, hakim güvenlik anlayışlarının küreselleşme, neoliberal politikalar ve kentleşme gibi süreçlerin eşitsizlikleri ve çeşitli güvensizlikleri yeniden üreten bir şekilde, kentler üzerinden devamlılığını sağladığını tartışırken, devlet-merkezci yaklaşımları eleştirmeyi hedeflemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: uluslararası, kent mekanı, sınırlar, güvenlik, gündelik hayat, küresel şehir, küreselleşme, kentleşme

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2: RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL	11
2.1. Borders of the International as State Territorial Boundaries	13
2.2. Borders of the International as Practice	21
2.3. Borders of the International and the City	27
2.4. Conclusion	42
CHAPTER 3: RETHINKING SECURITY	44
3.1. Security Studies	45
3.2. Security and Bordering the City	56
3.3. Conclusion	82
CHAPTER 4: RETHINKING THE EVERYDAY	85
4.1. Local, the Everyday and Resistance	87
4.2. Social Movements	92
4.3. The Everyday and Security within the City	98
4.4. Conclusion	117
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION	118
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	126

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Borders have been central both for the discipline of International Relations and its subject matter, the international. The way in which world was imagined and analysed as a space demarcated by state territorial borders provided IR with its field of inquiry: international relations (more precisely inter-state relations). This literal and figurative ‘mapping’ of the international by IR brought forward insecurities of which the sources were inter-state relations and territorial borders. In this sense, the state is not only taken as the centre of analysis of international relations, but it is presented as the most appropriate agent of the international and security. At the same time, the borders separating the ordered inside from the chaotic international have been assumed to be fixed, pre-given and linear by state-centred analysis of international relations that focused on inter-state relations and assumed the international as a distinct anarchical realm ‘outside’ of the state.

The problematic of this thesis is primarily based on this mapping, this approach to borders and the understanding of security brought forward by these assumptions. Moreover, it is based on the role of understandings and politics of security in mapping and bordering the international. To inquire about this problematic, this thesis directs its attention towards the urban context. The problem of the thesis is the interaction between borders of the international and the city, and the role of security in this interaction especially after 1980s and the end of the Cold War. For that matter, it asks: How do the bordering of cities play in the construction of the international and its subjects through practices and understandings of (urban) security and insecurity?

It is often claimed that more than half of the world's population lives in urban areas, and that this will be 60% of the world's population within the next two decades due to the speed of growth. The speed of the contemporary urbanization and urban population growth are agglomerating higher than ever before and this growth is faster in the 'developing' parts of the world (Abrahamsen et al., 2009; Wood, 2010). It is argued that what we witness is urbanization of the planet, thus urbanization is a "planetary condition" and we are entering the urban century (Brenner, 2009: 206). In addition to an unprecedented pace of growth, urban areas are witnessing severe insecurities and violence (Abrahamsen et al., 2009: 363).

However, rather than pointing to a world divided between urban and non-urban, this urban growth is significant in terms of the processes involved

such as reorganization of urban space, globalization, neoliberalism and urbanization. The numbers may show that more and more people are affected by these processes. Yet, it is not the numbers that is crucial but the questions related to the urban space that comes to one's mind: where the city begins and ends, who is included in the city and who is not, how one is not included, through which practices.

Traditional mapping of the international that is based on the binaries of sovereignty/anarchy and inside/outside started to be questioned in 1980s (Ashley, 1988; Walker, 1993; Campbell, 1998). These criticisms were complemented by Critical Geopolitics studies which argued that borders are not fixed and pre-determined, but they are practices that constitute space and identities (Agnew, 1994). Later, critical approaches to borders decentred borders beyond state and pointed at different forms of bordering practices (Newman, 2001; Salter, 2004; Walters, 2006; Rumford, 2011; Amoore, 2011).

After the end of the Cold War, with the acceleration of neoliberal globalization, internationalization of capital and free movement of money and labour indicated a transformation towards a borderless world for neoliberal approaches to IR. The imagination of the international with rigid territorial walls disagrees with this imagination of a borderless world. Building on the literature that approaches borders critically, this thesis attempts to go beyond this two-sided discussion and point towards the multiplicity and diffused character of borders through focusing on cities.

Firstly, by decentring borders beyond the state and including security professionals, bureaucrats, and experts as agents of bordering, these approaches make possible to look at cities as sites where borders of the international perform. Urban space has become a site of practices and part of the discourses through which the international and security are constructed. Urban in/security intertwined with other discourses of security – whether human, national, international and global security – is increasingly used by states, international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and MNCs. This happens mostly in a manner that has a tremendous cost upon some, while advantaging some others.

Secondly, by decentring borders to include people as agents and the everyday as a site of bordering, these approaches make visible alternative imaginations of the international, hence an alternative politics of the international. This suggests that urban space is not just the site of the above mentioned discourses and practices, but also involve challenges to them. The alternatives can be found in the everyday lives of urban dwellers. This as well suggests the possibility of different understandings of security, hence an alternative politics of security.

Making other bordering practices visible can bring other sources of insecurity experienced by urban dwellers to the forefront in the international politics of security and prioritize these insecurities over other sources of insecurity that are directed against states. In other words, decentring borders

can help decentring security through making visible other borders both as sources of insecurity and sources of resistance at the everyday. To put it more clearly, focusing on bordering practices other than the inter-state relations – such as between those who participate in the global economy through production and consumption and those who cannot – bring forward security practices within the city which protect and supply these borders. This argument suggests that the existing politics of security is a politics of bordering the city to ensure the sustainability of the global political economy. Security practices associated with planning, urbanization and urban warfare both in the so-called developed and developing parts of the world work for sustaining the conditions of global neoliberalism. In 1980s, in the developed world, end of Keynesianism and welfare policies brought to the eye the symptoms of already existing problems of socio-economic inequalities.

In the developing world, this happened through structural adjustment programs, privatization, economic liberalization, and integration to the global economy. As the symptoms – the problems generated by the global politics of security and economy such as unemployment, homelessness, extreme poverty, increased crime rates and even terrorism – became more visible, these symptoms were treated as the source of the problems (or as the source of insecurities) and the solutions were directed against the symptoms rather than structural sources. With 9/11 and war on terror, this was strengthened rather than questioned. Moreover, politics of security became even more exclusionary

and violent, became legitimized by the threat of terrorism and came to be more and more a politics of bordering to sustain the global political economy in the face of such a symptom of its problematic nature.

In this sense, decentring borders and focusing on borders within the city is not just essential in terms of representing security practices as (immediate) sources of insecurity, but it is essential because it brings forward the way these borders through security practices make possible the reproduction and survival of the existing global politics that generates insecurities.

City's significance for this analysis comes from its place in the global political economy. In most aspects, global political economy works through cities by means of urbanization, privatization and reorganization of urban space. City is where one can look for the agency of globalization. Then, city is where costs and consequences of these processes are most visible although these costs and consequences are generally treated as what causes insecurity rather than considered as insecurities themselves generated by wider processes. Through urban security practices inequalities become depoliticized and reproduced between and within cities both of the developed and developing world. Furthermore, politics of security work in a way that destroys any capacity for resistance and challenge to this reproduction and depoliticization. The city is where one's everyday life interacts most with the international. This is more the case in a city that is integrated in the global economy and involved in globalization more.

However, city is as well a site where oppositions, challenges and resistance to these processes take place. As people in their everyday lives experience insecurities stemming from the politics of the international in the urban space, they are as well involved in these processes through challenging, resisting, negotiating, altering or reproducing. When one thinks in terms of borders of the international both as sources of insecurity and sources of resistance, it even seems strange that cities did not attract more attention from IR studies.

In general terms, studying the city helps us to understand better the borders of the international, the relationship between ‘here’ and ‘there’, and the relationship between globalization and security. In doing this, by way of focusing on the everyday, this thesis aims to have a bottom-up approach to understand the relationship between city, security and the international. As the names of the chapters suggest, the thesis aims at rethinking the international as not just inter-state relations or as a space ‘outside’ the state, but as embedded within cities, rethinking security not as security of the city, of the nation-state, or of the international that is inclusionary but as securing the status quo, the international, the inequalities that the international is built upon through bordering cities so that the symptoms are targeted as sources of insecurity and the structural causes are depoliticized; rethinking the everyday urban life of people not as determined by the international but as actively being involved in the politics of security and the international.

For this end, Chapter 2 problematizes the state-centred and statist assumptions of IR and aims to decentre the borders of the international beyond the state. It asks how the borders of the international are constituted and secured through bordering cities. It argues that looking at the city – with its multiplicity of bordering practices and experiences of time and space – reveals the artificiality of binaries of global and local as well as the international and the everyday. Chapter 3 will analyse the existing politics of security of the city and how it operates through borders of the international while at the same time drawing those borders. In line with this, it will problematize the existing politics of security, whose security it is, and who borders the city. As globalizing processes, urban warfare, urban planning and design, and urbanization is taking place in cities everywhere, the argument is not limited to a certain part of the world (as developed or developing albeit with different experiences), but concerns cities that are integrated in the global political economy more. Chapter 3 as well illustrates how different cities are interconnected through their techniques of security. Several cities are discussed in terms of their practices and discourses of security and what brings them together is that with neoliberal globalization, hence privatization and liberalization, urban security practices become one of bordering the city to secure the existing relations of domination, colonialism, and inequality.

Although it has a decentred understanding of borders, Chapter 3 is limited to the ways in which the everyday is shaped by security understandings

and practices of security professionals. This critique is a first step towards inquiring into the ways in which the everyday shapes security understandings and the possibility of a transformation towards a more inclusionary politics of (urban) security.

In Chapter 4, then, the everyday is taken as an active site that inhabits the agents that do not only reproduce security logics that professionals of unease practice daily. It asks how these practices are experienced by urban dwellers and worked upon through their everyday life. It will question the extent to which everyday understandings and practices of security of the urban dwellers have a potentiality of transforming the existing politics of security towards more inclusionary lines based on co-existence, and that does not result in producing more insecurities, but that is rights and needs based. ‘The right to the city’ will be questioned as a basis upon which to build this alternative politics of security: ‘security within the city’.

Looking at the local and the everyday of the urban dweller reveals different urban experiences, thus different imaginations of the city and helps questioning ‘whose city’, who gets to define and (re)border the city, and how. In turn, focusing on the everyday and experiences of non-professionals with different bordering practices makes possible a different imagination and politics of the international that goes beyond the binaries of global/local, national/international, inside/outside. As this thesis argues that globalization is not an outside force that determines everything else or simply ‘inside’, but

works through the inside. City is one site where the agency of globalization is centred. Thus, the everyday of the urban dweller can bring possibilities of resistance and alternatives to politics of security and the international to the forefront of International Relations.

CHAPTER 2

RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL

The answer to the question of “what is the international?” given by the discipline of IR has been about territorially divided lines of sovereign states and the relations between them. Sovereign states have been central in the imagination of identity and space in the study of international relations. Through taking territorial space as the only order that diffuses identities and loyalties, i.e. as the only possible political space, international space has been imagined as the space of territorially divided sovereign states, falling into the “territorial trap” (Agnew, 1994). Thus, what influences most our answers to the questions of “what political life is and where it occurs” have been states (Walker, 1990: 6). For this understanding of the international, states being the natural and necessary actors, the problems that arose were never related to a problem with the state *per se*, but this or that state. Against this traditional understanding of international relations, there have been others who argued

“politics doesn’t fit into the neat boxes of sovereignty that the invocations of political space imply” (Dalby, 2005). The imagination of the global life provided by the traditional lens – mainly the realist lens – is criticized as being a narrow one as it assumes an anarchical world of black boxes of states inherently prone to war constantly.

Acknowledging that the study of international relations is “a moral mapping of spaces and identities” (George, 1996), this chapter questions this mapping that traditional international relations has been providing, and looks into cities to inquire other identity construction and spatializing processes that create a “different and nonstatic planetary map” (Shapiro, 1996: 3). It is argued that understanding the city and how the borders of cities are constructed is crucial in reproducing ‘the international’ and its alternatives.

The first part of the chapter asks what kind of a mapping traditional IR provides in which cities are “awkward” objects for studying international relations. This imagination of the international demarcated by the territorial state borders is problematized through arguments provided by critical approaches to IR. Building on this problematization and based on literatures such as Critical Geopolitics, Critical Border Studies and International Political Sociology, the second part of the chapter reconceptualises and de-centres borders as practices. This reconceptualization is necessary for an analysis of the mapping of the international through bordering of cities which is the task of the final part.

2.1. Borders of the International as State Territorial Boundaries

‘Border’ as a concept has a specific role in IR. Between the two World Wars, when the first IR chair was found and when IR was separated from Political Science as a discipline, its main objective was to understand and inquire the ways to prevent inter-state war (Burchill and Linklater, 2013). The way two disciplines were separated pointed towards a separation of an inside and outside of the state and assumed the borders of the international as interstate borders. Political theory was to deal with state as the only site of politics leaving IR to deal with the occasions – diplomatic, military and strategic – between those states.

This differentiation between inside state and outside inter-state relations as an anarchical realm can be found with most clarity in Martin Wight. He (1966) argued that international theory cannot use the “language” of political theory because that language is for political life, “normal relationships and calculable results”, and “good life” whereas international theory is about “survival” (1966: 33) seeking a “speculation about relations between states” (1966: 17) that consist of “recurrence and repetition” (1966: 26). Based on this differentiation between what is within states and between states, the international realm appears as a realm void of historical progress. Thus, for Wight, international theory “or what there is of it, is scattered, unsystematic

and mostly inaccessible to layman” (1966: 20). This understanding of international relations as an anarchical realm dominated the mainstream IR.

Starting with the 1980s and with the end of the Cold War, the domination of the understanding that the international consisted of territorial state borders was shattered and critical voices could no longer be disregarded (to some extent). First criticisms were based on this spatial separation of inside and outside complemented with a hierarchization in terms of sovereignty and anarchy. Ashley (1988: 252) problematizes this anarchy problematique that lies at the heart of the discourse of international relations: construing inside as a “prior” realm against outside as an anarchical realm (1988: 252).

For the sovereignty/anarchy dichotomy to work the differences within sovereign states should be repressed and converted to differences between sovereign states. Furthermore, for it to work, the domestic realm should be valorised as there lays the legitimate warrantor of identity, homogeneity and order, whereas the anarchical realm should be de-valorised as the realm of disorder, threat and heterogeneity. This hierarchical valorisation points towards representation of the sovereign entity as a ‘singular presence’, the domestic realm as stable and homogenous, and the realm beyond sovereignty as dangerous. As long as the representation of the inside – the sovereign identity – as a singular presence and as an homogenous space is naturalised and internalised, the dichotomy can survive (Ashley, 1988). Thus, the

dichotomy of sovereignty/anarchy both creates an inside, and orders, disciplines, silences and contains that inside.

Walker, in a similar manner, problematized inside/outside dichotomy that not only points towards a “spatial ontology” of inside and outside but also a “temporal dualism” of history and progress within and “recurrence and repetition” beyond (1993). He argues that the spatial and temporal divide between inside and outside that can be seen in Wight’s articulation of international theory shapes our understandings of political space, thus here and there, and “what political community can be”, thus its “nature and location” (Walker, 1993: 62). Based on this dichotomy here lies politics, the possibility of progress and universality; there exists mere relations, particularity, strangeness and threats (Walker, 1990: 11-2; 1991: 456-7). What is not considered to be ‘of state’ is considered to be out of politics whether ‘inside’ or ‘outside’. Walker (1995a: 30) criticizes Wight’s understanding for rendering local politics “irrelevant” at the same time claiming that world politics cannot exist. State appears as the sole mediator between inside and outside. The “nature and location of political community” is answered through same divide prioritizing citizenship over any other alternative political community (Walker, 1993: 62). In this analysis, cities or city politics are irrelevant as they are part of local politics. Their study becomes less important for international relations compared to study of inter-state relations (Magnusson, 2011: 17).

This form of analysis of the international as the ‘outside’ of state borders, and international relations as interstate relations is interpenetrated with an imagination and mapping of the international as a territorially divided space. Not surprisingly, the main actor of this analysis and imagination becomes the state. As will be discussed in the following chapter, such an analysis can only realize insecurities that are inter-state, but disregard other sources of insecurities as unimportant or less urgent (Bilgin, 2010).

States are not only taken as the main actor of the international, they are also given the primacy of being the most appropriate actor. The former, which is called state-centrism, is a “methodological choice” (Bilgin, 2008: 94). It is an “empirical justification” through the assumption that the states are the main actors of the international, and that is why they are the central figure of international relations theory (Wyn Jones, 1996: 199). The latter, which is called statism, is a “normative choice” (Bilgin, 2008: 94). The normative justification for state-centrism, hence the justification for statism, is that state represents the ideal way of articulating political space and identities, the only space where power and authority are exercised, an ideal agent which provides security for its citizens. State-centrism and statism reinforce each other. Through the empirical assumptions that take the state as fixed, trans-historical and homogenous, state-centrism is justified normatively representing state as the ideal agent of international relations and the ideal centre of power. In this line of thought, then, the discussion revolves around a unitary, autonomous

centre of power that governs almost all relationships (Campbell, 1996: 18). Moreover, the spatial mode of analysis provided by the dichotomy of inside/outside implies a level of analysis of sub-state and supra-state levels (Campbell, 1996: 9).

As mainstream approaches faced with criticisms after the Cold War, they seemingly renewed their assumptions. Other levels of analysis were added after the end of the Cold War (Campbell, 1996) and non-state actors were acknowledged though only as unitary actors and black boxes (Bilgin, 2008a: 95). Campbell is critical of the ways in which the problem of agency and actors is tried to be figured out by adding more levels of analysis such as local and global, or “something-national” (1996: 11). The levels are analysed as if separate, “autonomous practices” with little consideration of the relations between them and their conditions of possibility (Bigo and Walker, 2007: 728). Actors – be it state or non-state – are seen as prior to the relationships they are involved (Campbell, 1996: 11). Both for neo-realist and neo-liberal analysis, state remained to be the primary actor of world politics.

However, the imagination of the international as territorially divided units with impervious borders was disrupted by flows. Especially after the Cold War, it is argued, state has less and less control over the flows whether across borders or within them (Alker, 1996: x). Those flows – whether peoples,

identity, or capital – are challenges to the mapping of the world based on states and the codes that are created as a result such as the First and the Third World, or Occident and Orient (Ferguson, 1996: 169). Thus, refugees, migrants, indigenous peoples, and the flows of ideas and images are considered to be challenges to the territorially demarcated imagination of the international that is state-centric (Shapiro, 1996; Soguk, 1996; Xenos, 1996). Their interconnections suggest a “spatial continuity” challenging “spatial fragmentation” (Soguk, 1996: 87-8) and state’s ordering of political space and identity (Xenos, 1996). Falk (1990) calls these flows nonterritorial ‘evasions’ that are across, within, and beyond boundaries. They are argued to be creating new loyalties and communities. Therefore, loyalties are not always in line with the territorial borders of the state but transcend them (Alker, 1996: x). Although principle of state sovereignty have dominated our political identities and understandings of ‘who we are’ prioritizing citizenship over any other alternative identity or loyalty including humanity (Linklater, 1982; Walker, 1990: 12), this is under increasing challenge.

Nevertheless, it is crucial to be wary of taking state territorial borders as its containers, as the only way in which state power is displayed (Shah, 2012). For instance, neo-liberal approaches to international relations argue that the world is becoming a borderless space as flows of capital, people and cultures move freely between states more and more. What is disregarded by this approach is other – perhaps more invisible – bordering practices. Since

physical walls and territorial borders are not the only spatialising practices of states, their being undermined by flows does not necessarily mean fading state power or sovereignty. There are other ways of maintaining sovereignty claims and reasserting control (Shapiro, 1996; Brown, 2010). Spatial dividing lines are the most visible form of sovereignty practices of the state rendering the Other as “alien and dangerous” (Soguk, 1996: 286). Through strengthening territorial walls and other boundary practices whether physical, technological or “imaginative” (Soguk, 1996: 286), state continues its quest for hindrance of the challenges to its sovereignty, its domination over ways of living, thinking, and identity and space making. These practices reveal the contradictions with the neoliberal assumption of a borderless world. The eagerness of states for building walls go against the desire for “a world without borders” shared by almost all political tendencies (Brown, 2010). One example is norms of “human rights and cosmopolitanism” spread across Western democracies on the one hand, and “the closed nationalism and rise of institutional racism” on the other (Bigo, 2003: 112). This is a contradiction seen in the EU’s migration policies as well between its “fatalist externalization policies” and “commitment to uphold the global protection regime” (Bilgiç, 2013: 123).

The traditional understanding of borders suggests a role for borders as stopping the threat to trespass ‘inside’. However, if one considers transnational non-state threats, these borders seem impractical (Brown, 2010: 21). For instance, as many studies on migration show, harsher border policies and

stronger and taller walls do not result in decreased number of immigrants, but increased number of immigrants who are labelled as illegal, a more difficult and dangerous transit including death and getting cheated by the smugglers (Brown, 2010: 91; Soguk, 1996: 302). Then, why states seem to be so eager to build taller and stronger walls? Brown's (2010: 91) answer is that walls seem to be "nothing more than spectacularly expensive political gestures, sops to certain constituencies, signs of what distresses but cannot be contained". By building walls and strengthening their borders, states almost create an effigy of themselves which resonates a "theatrical play" with the state as the 'leading role' making a spectacle of its power (Brown, 2010). This quest is a reaction to the contestation of state's sovereignty over borders and display state's desire for holding onto its powers over guarding, containment, and 'fortifying'. In a similar manner, Soguk (1996: 300) wrote:

In many ways, the border is an embellished, enhanced spectacle that serves to undergird existing myths as to impervious and homogeneous "culture/nation gardens" or to create new ones.

As long as IR continues to take borders as pre-given and as the fixed territorial limits of the sovereign power, it can be thought as a "particular though powerful discourse of identity politics" which always puts state at the centre of its analysis as the sole claimer of organizing identity even at times of a challenge against this dominance (Campbell, 1996: 19). This in turn constitutes a particular way of imagining the international. In order to

challenge this particular imagination it is essential to problematize boundaries whether disciplinary, physical or of identity. This necessitates problematizing the way we think about borders. A critique of the way in which the international is imagined as a world that is territorially demarcated by borders does not necessarily mean a dismissal of the borders and arguing for a borderless world. Both ways, it becomes an “essentialisation”: “an essentialisation of a world divided among nation-states” or “an essentialisation of a world in which the international has been erased by” (Bigo and Walker, 2007: 730). It turns to a discussion of presence or absence: “Boundaries are either here or they are not. State sovereignty is either here or it is being replaced by something vaguely global, or cosmopolitan” (2007: 730). As presented below, analysis of borders and the international is much more complex than this ‘here or not’ discussion provides. A different understanding of the border as a concept is necessary for an analysis of borders of the international within the city.

2.2. Borders of the International as Practice

After the end of the Cold War, building upon the primary criticisms towards traditional approaches, disciplines of Political Science and International Relations started to question their geographical assumptions that led them into

a ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994). Those assumptions can be summarized as: “reification of state territorial spaces as fixed units of secure sovereign space”, “division of the domestic from the foreign”, and taking “territorial state as existing prior to and as a container of society” (Agnew, 1994: 77). Questioning the relationship between state, territory, space and power, and how we think of them, critical geopolitics problematize – whether explicit or implicit – geographical assumptions that are taken as facts and natural (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Dalby, 1991; Ó Tuathail, 1996; Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992; Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998; Ó Tuathail et al., 2006). A critical geopolitical analysis decentres our understandings of power and spatiality beyond the state and territory. It does not take spatiality as fixed and natural and takes space-making as a practice that goes beyond the state territory and beyond the state as well. Subjectivity and identity construction becomes decentred as well since identity-making and subjectivity-constructing practices beyond the state are made visible.

It is argued that the fixed and stable physical borders of states are an outcome of its search for “*fixing* political problems in a carceral landscape where everything and every person has *their* place” (Dalby, 2005: 432) and “freezing” flows and cultures in ‘settled’ spaces with settled borders (Ferguson, 1996: 170). However, these problems move without stopping at the borders. As an example of the invalidity of the fixed problems and politics confined in fixed boundaries, Dalby points to the increased immigration to the

urban areas for having a chance to take part in the global economy. Effects of this are not restricted with where the migration occurs. Failing to stop them at the physical borders, new borders are drawn. Mapping practices are not limited to the physical borders, but there is a “plurality of boundaries” (Bigo, 2003: 97). Although flows such as migration signal the weakness of the physical territorial state borders, other practices of inclusion and exclusion – such as ‘safe third country’ agreements – perform their role (Nyers, 2003: 1070). This is particularly the case with the EU and its border control mechanisms of externalization (Bilgiç, 2013: 111-126).

Being scattered across spaces, the (re)mapping practices take place on an everyday basis and signal the blurred lines between inside and outside, police and military, criminal and enemy (Bigo, 2003; Ingram and Dodds, 2009). Those practices are justified as a means for security of “a particular vision of the homeland” (Ingram and Dodds, 2009: 10) or “liberal globalization” (2). Brown (2010: 19-20) gives several examples to the practices of inclusion and exclusion other than the state borders: the increasing number of gated communities in the cities of US near Mexican border, walls within Jerusalem with the walls around its Museum of Tolerance, Via Anelli Wall built in the city of Padua to demarcate the city between citizens and immigrants and walls built by US in Iraq such as the Baghdad Wall.

A focal point of analysis for critical geopolitics is geographical assumptions behind binaries of East/West, North/South, and

developed/underdeveloped. The traditional understanding that borders and foreign policy represent a pre-existing state identity has been turned upside down. Foreign policy practices are boundary making practices that construe the dichotomies of inside/outside and the state identity (Campbell, 1998). In this understanding then, neither borders nor state (identity) is taken as fixed or pre-given. Thus, the state which is constructed through practices of statecraft is scrutinized as well. Bordering practices within cities can only become visible through such a radical change in the way borders are understood: as constructs rather than fixed territorial walls.

Critical border studies and International Political Sociology directed their attention to borders which are considered as practices that form subjectivities and identities. What is crucial with bordering is its multiplicity. On the one hand, bordering practices can be “social, spatial and political constructs” (Newman, 2001: 139). They are not only at the territorial limits of the sovereign state, but can be in the form of planning, architecture, technologies of surveillance, discursive barriers and identity fences. Then, borders are not simple lines. They are increasingly “non-geographical”, “non-territorial”, and “non-linear” (Walters, 2006: 145). Moreover, borders do not have singular meanings for different people or groups. This unequal character of borders means that a point of transit may mean barrier for others (Balibar, 2002). It may be explicitly political for some, such as those that are marginalized, whereas depoliticized for others such as the “kinetic elite”

(Salter, 2008: 377). It may be “invisible to the majority” while highly visible for others (Rumford, 2011: 68). This unequal character of borders points towards the functions of bordering. Bordering practices do not inherently mean stopping or blocking. Rather they “produce and distribute both mobility and immobility”. Bordering functions as a way of governing “conducted in and through movement itself” (Amoore, 2011: 64). This is reflected in some cases in the attempts of making borders “smart” not “impassable” (Salter, 2004).

Nevertheless, it is important to underscore that bordering practices transcend the state. This means that (re)bordering practices – a term used by Andreas (2000) – are diffused and scattered across space, performed by different actors such as security professionals in their daily practices. For an understanding of the borders that is not state-centred, Rumford (2011: 68) argues that one should “see like a border”, recognize the ubiquity of borders in everyday life, be aware of the invisibility of some borders for the majority, and acknowledge bordering practices other than the frontiers of nation-state. It is, after all, not just the authorities or professionals that do bordering. Citizens, non-citizens, NGOs, groups, and individuals engage in bordering practices as well (Rumford, 2011: 67). For some activist groups, such as ‘No one is illegal’ network, borders are constitutive of a part of their identity (Rumford, 2006: 165). Different people or groups’ “struggle for life-space” in the city consist of

different bordering practices (Öncü and Weyland, 1997: 11). In “The Time of the City”, Shapiro (2010: 10-11) wrote:

Within the urban milieu, there are (among others) two politically charged dynamics at play in the city’s partitioning: separations/barriers continually maintained by policing agents and events of repartitioning enacted by counter-agents – individuals and groups involved in financial schemes, survival strategies, politicization and subjectification.

Most common words used for cities such as ‘milieu’, ‘contact zones’, and ‘city as crossroads’ imply endless practices of bordering by different actors. For example, urban planning as a form of bordering practice has long been assumed to be the work of officials and urban planners working in tandem with governments. However, ordinary people are also engaged in urban planning. They transform their environment; change the very usage and meaning of urban infrastructure. Since it is assumed that the place that is not occupied by the state is an empty or vacant space, those who engage in such acts are considered “informal actors” with their “informal actions” (Calhoun et al., 2013: 197). These actions, however, do not have to be in direct opposition to the officials. At times, those practices that (re)make the city take place through “negotiation and dialogue” (Mack, 2013: 157). There are also those who find their own way of protecting their neighbourhood from outsiders with their own devices such as those ‘illegal’ residents of Maputo in Mozambique who have developed their own surveillance system monitoring the neighbourhood (Krause, 2013: 237).

Bordering practices of actors other than the state is made visible through this different understanding of borders discussed in this section. Bordering practiced daily by security professionals is interlinked with a certain understanding of security and forms a certain politics of security as will be discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, bordering practices at the everyday life-space beyond the state and official authorities are made visible as well. This makes possible to inquire the potential of a different understanding of security, hence a different politics of security (which will be the aim of Chapter 4).

This discussion of a different understanding of borders as practices or as constructs that constitutes and shapes identities, loyalties, belongingness, friends and enemies reveal borders other than the territorial walls. The next part focuses on the city as a border space that demarcates an inside from an outside (cutting across territorial state borders) and questions the ways in which bordering the city interacts with the international.

2.3. Borders of the International and the City

Thus far the discussion has revolved around rethinking the international beyond its imagination in terms of territorially demarcated state borders, reconceptualising and de-centring borders in terms of practices and processes. This makes possible to question the role of bordering of cities in the

imagination and mapping of the international. In fact, cities have long been a part of the political imaginary – long before the states – whether in terms of public space, city-republic or urban environment representing “a social and symbolic structure, a place of security or insecurity, of freedom or violence” (Abrahamsen et al., 2011: 365). The organization of cities has changed in the long duration. Medieval city as a fortress was “a policy of defense by its very existence” (Shapiro and Neubauer, 1990: 109).

For Shapiro and Neubauer (1990), modern city is a policy as well, but this time a policy of sustaining the global economy. Thus, according to them “what is modern to the city is its placement within the global economy” (1990: 109). However, this does not mean a division of labour in terms of security and economy between state and city. Although cities are not fortified in the way they used to be, protecting those inside from outside, other ‘walls’ perform within and across cities (Shapiro, 2009). Thus, the main assumption may be that states have the monopoly over security and violence leaving the role of sustaining global economy to cities. However, the two areas cannot be separated neatly as this assumption suggests.

Curtis (2011) makes an analogy between the international system and global networked cities arguing that issues such as inequality, disparity, forms of centrality and periphery that are existent in the international system are now existent in the global cities through “global networked forms”. The implications of this, he argues, can be both violence and authoritarianism, or

tolerance and cosmopolitan sensibility. He argues that if IR wants to understand how the international system is changing, where it needs to direct its attention is global cities and the relationship between cities and states. The relationship between cities and states, and the role of cities in the global economy does not suggest the decline of state; on the contrary it suggests that cities are crucial for states' existence in the global political economy. However, at the same time, global cities are said to "become key sites of political contestation, amplifying both systemic contradictions and historical possibilities" (Curtis, 2011: 1945). More importantly, cities are sites of conflicts, borderings, fragmentations, zones of contemporary wars, colonial practices, etc. as will be discussed in the next chapter. Borders of the international are constituted through such practices.

The dominant politics of the international works through both a temporal and spatial form of bordering. In other words, the international is constituted through not just spatial boundaries or spatializing, but through temporal boundaries or temporalizing as well. In addition to the spatial binary of traditional international relations, Walker (2006a, 2006b) adds a temporal one between the modern international and its other: "The international expresses a theory of temporality and history ('modernization') before it expresses a theory of spatiality and territoriality ('anarchy')" (2006b: 78). Demarcation in this sense is not just a spatial one between friend and foe, inside and outside, but a temporal one distinguishing between the modern

system of states and the non-modern, uncivilized, barbaric others outside of the international. Between friend and foe the consequences of anarchical system can be tackled through diplomatic relations, but the outside of the modern international (state system) does not even qualify for this mediation. This demarcation thus constitutes both the boundaries of the state and the state system/international order (2006a; 2006b). This double demarcation is called 'double outside' by Walker (2006a). He (2006a: 59) wrote:

Yet it is important to keep in mind that the limits of modern political life are articulated not only at the territorial boundaries of the modern state, as almost all modern critical political analysis has tended to assume, but at the boundaries of the modern international, even though it is far from clear where, or when, these boundaries are supposed to be.

With this double demarcation comes the question what/who is excluded from the international, constituted as not being brought into modernity or modern subjectivity. Walker (2006a: 68) gives the example of the relations between 'East' and 'West' during the Cold War as a spatial demarcation between friend and foe, and the relations between 'North' and 'South' as a temporal demarcation between civilized and barbarian. First set of relations constitute the international, whereas the second is between the modern international and the non-modern/immature. Along these lines international relations cannot be synonymous with world politics or humanity as a whole and to claim the contrary has become more difficult. Moreover, these borderings – spatial and temporal – are becoming indistinguishable and inseparable; territorial borders

do not overlap with them most of the time. They transgress territorial borders, and this thesis argues, urban spaces: cities are home to millions of who are constituted outside the modern international.

Bauman (2004) draws an analogy between industrial waste and waste as human lives. He talks about this category of ‘wasted humans’ in terms of outsiders and the unwanted ‘within’. Urban ghettos are sites where this ‘redundant’ population is left. Ghettos used to give a feeling of home to those belonged to them, a chance of social inclusion. It was inhabitants’ practice of bordering as well and not just those who ‘separated’ them. This was especially the case in the American black ghettos. Now, however, ghetto space has become a “dumping site” and a site for locking-down of the poor (Bauman, 2004: 80-1). Compared to the American ones, ghettos in Europe are not ethnically homogenous sites. There, waste is not produced within but “imported” (Bauman, 2004). They are inhabited by immigrants mostly. It is argued that this makes European ghettos even more subject to bordering through exclusionary security practices.

Therefore, those unwanted in the city may be outsiders that crossed the borders and came from somewhere else – as in the case of immigrants in general. At the same time, they might be already ‘inside’. Those created as ‘waste’ might not be moving to somewhere else and become migrants, but may become outsiders within.

What 'waste' signifies is not just an inability of sustaining one's life in economic terms, but a social exclusion, an inability of biological and social survival at once (Bauman, 2004). Urban masses become superfluous and unwanted as they are not part of global economy in terms of production, and more importantly, in terms consumption. In this way, their experiences and understandings of security become irrelevant as will be discussed in the following chapters.

Then, relationship of the city to the global economy is significant in bordering the city. Although both 'global city' and neoliberal approaches are centred on globalization of world economy, global city approaches, which focus on the place of cities in the global economy, challenge the borderless world imaginary provided by neoliberal approaches to international relations. Whereas the latter argue that globalization erases the borders of the international, the former reveals different borders created because of the specific place of cities in the global economy. Two of the pioneer texts of global city literature, Friedmann and Wolff (1982) and Friedmann (1986) suggest that several core cities have a crucial role in shaping the global economy of which they are a part of. Some cities with sectors that control the global economy have an upper hand in the hierarchy of world cities.

However, Sassen (1991) argues, global cities are not simply in competition with each other, but they are part of a system of global economy through a division of labour among cities. This division of labour signifies a

change within cities. Whereas the former industrial cities become post-industrial cities with development of sectors of services and finance, their centres become gentrified thus made attractive to the business circles. This results in verticalized central business districts. The international elites of these global cities form a bordered space different than the national borders. This new bordered space necessitates developing the information and communication infrastructure that connects these parts of global cities whereas “the immediate environment” can be left without “upgrading” (Sassen, 2007: 230-1).

Castells (1996) focuses on a different spatial imagination that comes through “space of flows”. For him, infrastructure and social ties that a network of global cities indicates result in loyalties different than those to the nation state. This creates transnational identities. Plus, in a network society time does not move sequentially, but it is dissolved. He calls this “timeless time” of which the structure is simultaneity.

Drawing on Castells’ work, Taylor (2003) attempts to categorize world city networks by measuring certain aspects of their producer services. Taylor does not assume city networks as bounded entities and analyses the relationship between globalization and cities – ‘globalizing cities’ – rather than a fixed category of the global city. However, he looks primarily and solely on economic factors and economic relations between cities as determiners of urban conditions. Taylor and his colleagues (Richard G. Smith

and Jon Beaverstock) from Loughborough University formed the Globalization and World Cities Research Network (GaWC) in 1998 where they issued bulletins measuring and categorizing global cities “based upon their level of advanced producer services” (GaWC Research Bulletin 5, 1999). Although not based on solely economic criteria as the GaWC, many other indexes and surveys were formed and issued later in the second half of 2000s. Some examples are Global Cities Index, Global Economic Power Index, Global Power City Index, the Wealth Report, and Global City Competitiveness Index. They measure, compare and categorize cities’ quality of life, capacities for interaction and relations with other cities, for influencing global decisions, and attracting investment. In a way, these indexes compare and categorize cities’ ‘global-ness’ or ‘world city-ness’.

The processes these studies highlight in the formation of global cities are urban crises of late 1960s, economic restructuring of 1970s, development of MNCs, deindustrialization and the revolutions in communication and information technologies in the 1990s. These processes signalled increasing privatization of public services and spaces, liberalization, de-industrialization of formerly industrial cities and their economic transition towards service sectors rather than manufacturing. These processes cause polarization of the city, increasing inequalities within and between cities, and gaps of access to digital technology between groups of people in the city which are mostly taken as corporate elite and low-paid labour. Global cities or world cities are taken as

a new urban form and posited as the backbone of globalization which is understood mostly in economic terms. Thus, the city once again – as it was in the past – has an important place in the political imaginary and the imagination of the international.

David Harvey as well posits central role for cities in the ongoing globalization of economy. He argues that with the latest stage of capitalism we see “annihilation of space by time” which is a new spatiotemporal experience called “the condition of postmodernity” (1989). Cities are *places* where *space* is annihilated by *time* through neoliberalism with the advent of information and communication technologies. In other words, this “time-space compression” is a result of technological innovation which is itself required by global capitalism. Harvey gives a temporal account of globalization by placing it in a later stage of capitalism that intensifies through time (Oke, 2009: 313). It is in this later stage that time and space is compressed. Capitalism moves to this stage by its inner logic. It necessitates to get rid of spatial barriers while keeping place differences (Oke, 2009: 314). Thus, Harvey posits capitalism with a singular logic and with a capacity of determining space and time. This means taking urban regions as bounded entities with a singular inherent logic (Painter, 2008: 350-351). He posits global and local as two separate and distinct realms that are in competitive relationship. Local is either determined by the global (economic superstructure) or it exists when resisting to the

global, but it can never be constituting it. In this binary, local is where the culture and identity politics exist (Smith, 2001).

The role of city in this process is a tool for this shaping, site of the workings of the global – read as the global economy – in which space is fixed in this postmodern age. Urban politics is then about these policies of global capitalism, a tool for the continuation and survival of capitalist logic. Role of the local in this process is being global's other. It is where one turns her/his face in an escape from the global. For Harvey local consists our roots (Smith, 2001: 27) and our differences, as opposed to borderless global where “space is annihilated by time” thus making space inessential. It is the site of identity politics, a fixed site existing as a reaction to the global. Agency of social change is attributed to capitalism which is not taken as a context but as an historical agent (Smith, 2001). Cities are where the acts of this agent are concentrated spatially. Neither cities nor its inhabitants are assumed to have agency other than reactionary. They are not subjects but objects of this capitalist postmodern world, conditioned by it. Plus, the state is also an object or a lesser an agent in the sense that it only struggles without autonomy in globalized economy. In light of these arguments, it is argued that Harvey places a specific experience of time and space as universal since it is determined by a singular logic of capitalism in its latest stage. Others' experiences or others' role in this particular experience of time-space compression are invisible in Harvey's account.

This dualistic understanding of global and local is evident in the above mentioned studies of the global city. Global is assumed to be a dynamic developed *space* driven by capitalism's logic that exists for and by itself, whereas local is assumed to be as a static and underdeveloped *place* that either gets shaped by the global or reacts to it (Smith, 2001; Oke, 2009). As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, this is what traditional IR is criticized for as well in terms of adding other levels or scales without questioning their interrelationships and conditions of possibility and keeping a state-centred lens to understand phenomena.

This form of analysis informs a mapping of the international based on a bounded understanding of space as divided between the global space of global cities and Others (including the local). It forces a dichotomy of inside as global city space and outside as everything else. What is left on the outside seems to be a blank canvas in this narrative (Öncü and Weyland, 1997) and other cities do not exist in this mapping.

For this dualistic understanding, actors that belong to the global – transnational capitalist class, high-waged professionals and firms – are products of global capitalism, whereas actors that belong to the local – class movements, subaltern class, immigrants, disadvantaged and low-wage unskilled labour, and grassroots – exist as reactionary to the global economy. Then, agency belongs to the global (economy) acting upon the inactive realm of the local (Smith, 2001). State's role in the relationship between these two

realms is a transformed one, a negotiated one that leaves state with less autonomy than before (Sassen, 2008). This “denationalization” occurred due to globalization and the insufficiency of state in the face of such globalization of economy (Sassen, 2008). Sassen takes spatial change in the logic of economic activities as the condition of possibility of this denationalization (Oke, 2013: 320). This rescaling means a new relationship between city and state in which the cities or city-regions are the bedrock of the organization of global economy.

However, imagination of the global, hence local, is still a territorially informed one ordered in relation to state. Challenging state territorial borders is assumed to be a decrease in state power. As long as challenging borders is directly associated with decline of state power, territory becomes reified as ordering worlds, “as the presumed framework of political order” (Shah, 2012: 58). For Shah (2012) this makes most of the studies on globalization fall into territorial trap. In this sense, global is assumed as a space above state whereas local is assumed as a place below state.

Moreover, in spatial terms, the global tends to be taken as the Western space that acts upon the Rest. Temporally, global cities tend to be defined in terms of their global-ness, modern-ness and postmodern-ness measured in terms of a temporal trajectory of globalization that is of the Western experience. This mapping informed by the global city concept, then, disregards and erases the ways modernity – albeit appearing as if global and

universal – is constituted through both spatial differentiation and temporal development (King, 1995: 113-114). To put it more clearly, whereas *now* is modern compared to a past, it is *here* that is modern but not there as well. *Here* read as the West, non-West in this relationship belongs to a past and only exist through its reaction to the West (Oke, 2009: 323). Through this temporalization and spatialization, a later stage gets to be categorized as postmodern, and in terms of cities this becomes an association of emergence of global cities with the postmodern era (King, 1995: 117). Agency of the non-West is negated and made invisible, whereas an understanding of modernity is reified as universal.

One example of this temporal and spatial Eurocentrism is the way cities are measured according to a set of criteria set by taking a city as global (King, 1997; Ong, 2011). However, if one used different criteria, those cities that are considered as non-modern could be more modern than those considered as modern (King, 1997). What is more to the point is that, contrary to the criteria against which regions and cities are measured, there are cities that have their own experiences and ways of being ‘global’ as a process and art rather than “established criteria of city achievements” (Ong, 2011: 3). Looking at several Asian cities, Ong (2011) finds different ways of being global, namely “modeling”, “inter-referencing” and “new solidarities”, which are experienced and experimented by those cities. These different “styles of being global” suggest going beyond binary mappings of “rich/poor,

metropolitan/postcolonial”, but recognize interconnections and diversity of the actors and practices involved (2011: 9).

In conclusion, the mapping that is provided by the concept of global city which focuses on global economy and cities is not so different than the traditional mapping provided by IR. Their actors and dichotomous levels are ordered in relation to the state which appears as the mediatory between their similar binaries of global-local and international-everyday, hence ‘here’ and ‘there’. Plus, these binaries are related to another binary of West and the Rest through which the former is made into the main agent of history. Through this binary, what is overlooked is “the mutual constitution and interaction” (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Rumelili, 2009: 45), “centuries of give and take between the two” (Bilgin 2009: 339) and “chains of elective affinities” (Pasha, 2006). In this manner, being highly dependent upon the experiences of a particular part of the world – the West – and a particular group of people – elite men – traditional understanding of international relations worked for some, while silencing others (Bilgin, 2010a; 2010b). However, this is not a matter of overlooking or disregarding other experiences which can be solved by adding them to the literature, but a matter of constituting “both the discipline and of subjects and objects of security in different parts of the world” through “silencing” them (Bilgin, 2010b: 616).

One of way of overcoming this silencing is to look into the time and space of the city: the “now time(s) of the city” as called by Shapiro (2010).

Adopting Mbembe's arguments on *time as lived* (2001) and Lefebvre's arguments on *abstract* and *concrete space* (1991), Shapiro argues that looking at the everyday, the multiplicity of time and space of the urban dweller makes possible a more critical agency. The (now) time(s) of the city reveal time and space's multiplicity. It is the time that is "lived experience", time of "existence" and "entanglement" as opposed to the abstract "unified World Historical time" that is chronological (Mbembe, 2001: 8, 16; Shapiro, 2010: 28, 39). It is the space that is concrete, experienced and "created by the productive activities of people in their everyday lives" that is open to encounters and resistance as opposed to abstract (official) space that is intolerant to heterogeneity and counter-practices of production of space (Shapiro, 2010: 38).

The now time(s) of the city brings the possibility of political resistance and negotiation into the forefront of the imagination and mapping of the international that is based on the reorganization of urban space. As opposed to taking globalization as an outside factor affecting the 'inside', such an analysis points towards the interaction between different practices of bordering within and across cities through processes of urbanization, neoliberalism and colonialism which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter in their relation to politics of security. This is a first step towards situating the possibility of a different imagination and mapping of the international through a different politics of security which will be the subject of Chapter 4.

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter dealt with the question of in what ways we can rethink the international through looking at the city. Firstly, the contradictions and basic assumptions of traditional IR were laid down. In this sense, these sets of questions were at the background of the first part: what makes the state most appropriate actor? Is the territorially demarcated, sovereignty-oriented international relations theory the best way to understand the international? Is the state the only identity-making actor, or only mediator between “global” and “local”, here and there?

In the second part, problematization of borders was moved further through discussions provided by critical approaches that take border as a practice. It is argued that it is not only professionals that engage in bordering practices. It is essential to look at people, alongside the authorities and intellectuals; popular alongside the formal and practical; alternatives and challenges alongside the official and scholarly discourses. As borders cannot be analysed through a simple ‘here or not’ question, at the background of this part was the questions of ‘where the borders are’, ‘who does the bordering’, and ‘what borders do’.

In the final part, these questions are diverted to the city space. Borders of the international cut across cities through urbanization, globalization, neoliberalism, colonialism, de-territorialization and re-territorialization. In this

sense, city is a border area. By way of acknowledging that this border area is a site of social struggle, different experiences of the city reveals different imaginations of it, and alternative politics of bordering. These processes that border the city work through practices of security. Chapter 3 now will question the interlinkage between the existing politics of security and bordering of the city.

However, the answer to why we need to rethink the international in the first place, especially through the city, is not limited with making sense of the international. What is more is the possibility of alternatives, the possibility of change. In this sense, looking at the everyday of the city dweller is crucial for questions of agency and opening a space for resistance. This is, however, the subject of Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 3

RETHINKING SECURITY

The previous chapter discussed what border means for the international and how borders of the international are drawn – or practiced – in and through the city space. This chapter aims to analyse the relationship of these practices of bordering to politics of security. It asks how the existing policies of security border the city, and questions what ‘security of the city’ is. Security of the city is problematized through a critique of the existing security understandings and policies of professionals and experts of security and urban planning both in the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ world.

The first part of the chapter deals with how security studies engage with the concept of security. The questions asked by these approaches are essential to answer what security is. The second part focuses on security practices which are bordering the city. Several themes are city’s role in warfare, destruction of

city space as a form of destruction of resistance and difference, urban planning as a form of securitization of the urban space, a politics of security that culminates in a war on the poor, and development as a form of exclusion. It is argued that these practices and understandings border the city, and – through leaving some outside of the city – exclude them from the political community.

These practices are examined through the questions that are provided by security studies. My main questions for this aim are what security of the city is, what security of the city does and how security of the city is done. While giving these answers, this chapter focuses on professionals of security and their practices. However, as the general objective of the thesis is to explore a potential for change, the discussion continues in the following chapter to pluralize the answers given to these questions of security.

3.1. Security Studies

This chapter does not aim to broaden the security agenda to include issues of urban security into the area of security. Rather the aim is to direct attention towards a change in the security agenda with different priorities: more specifically, a change towards taking the human (or the urban dweller) and their experiences at the centre of the security agenda. This move is based on a critique of the traditional approaches to security; and its primary and basic

assumption is based on an understanding of security provided by critical approaches: security is not an objective truth but issues are constructed as security issues.

Traditional approaches to security took security as an objective truth that is out there whether it is acknowledged by actors or not. It is important to note that pluralization of insecurities is acknowledged by these approaches as well. However, what differentiates them from more critical approaches is that the object to which those threats are directed is still the state for the traditional ones. Although it is acknowledged that security threats of this era is multiplied, broadened to include issues such as terror, migration, human-trafficking, drug-trafficking, transnational crimes, environmental degradation and epidemics, the referent object of security remains the same (Bilgin, 2004). Plus, with more security threats, it is still the state that has the monopoly of dealing with insecurities. Therefore, statism and state-centrism that is a big part of the discipline of International Relations is evident in security studies as well. State has been accorded the role of being the main provider of security and the sole legitimate perpetrator of violence. This consequently makes state's place both in Security Studies and IR a primary one.

However, both capability and practices of states in terms of these responsibilities have been questioned. It is argued that states fail to provide security for their citizens, and at the same time, become the source of insecurity themselves for their own citizens to whom they claim to be

responsible for providing security (Alker, 1996: x; Wyn Jones, 1996: 203). Others – non-citizens – who are not included in state's responsibility, or even worse, who are represented as threats face other insecurities. With the end of the Cold War, or even as early as late 1970s and early 1980s, this traditional understanding of statist and military oriented international security started to be criticized heavily (Booth, 1997: 85; Bilgin, Booth & Wyn Jones, 1998).

The primary objection to the traditional approaches was the understanding of security as constituted rather than being an objective truth. Buzan et al. (1998) and Waever (1998) brought the idea of securitization in 1990s. They argued that security is not pre-given, and an issue becomes a security issue when it is claimed to be so by state elites. This process of making an issue a security issue through speech act is called securitization. It is argued that security logic has become evident in other sectors such as society, environment and economy, though not as the result of an objective process but through speech acts. This is as well evident in the securitization of urban space where mobility is securitized and the space itself is constituted as a site that needs to be protected against various threats. For instance, the discourse of war on terror ties urban security to national security. On the other hand, others (Huysmans, 2006; Bigo, 2000; 2002) included daily practices of security professionals and experts into the process of securitization and showed how everyday life can be securitized through not just speech acts at exceptional moments but daily practices of security professionals and experts, i.e. “ongoing

processes of technocratic, bureaucratic and market-driven routinization and normalization” (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 466). The politics of security which securitizes the everyday is called politics of unease: governing the everyday and the society through unease and risk. Security or securitization, in this sense, is “a mode of governmentality”, a technique (Bigo, 2002; 2008; C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 457). Governmentality of unease works through creating a risk society by putting many phenomena into the same basket. At times, poor communities in cities are included in this. Bigo and Tsoukala (2008: 7) wrote:

Politics of unease is linked with the situation in a risk society and the development of many diverse mechanisms of surveillance, with global capitalism and unemployment, with urbanism and a planet of slums, with the conditions of late modern society and the roots of uncertainty of life.

The questions that are fundamental to this approach are: “Who is doing an (in)securitization move, under what conditions, towards whom, and with what consequences?” (Bigo, 2008: 125). In this sense, what ‘power games’ of security professionals – their truth claims over danger, threat, risk or unease – do is a point of concern for these scholars (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 457). What is crucial is that security logic is reproduced at the everyday by people.

Yet, this approach has been criticized for its “security professionalism” (Bilgiç, 2013: 7; 2014) by way of focusing on experiences of security professionals or state officials as the legitimate actors of security and by not

being interested in the “professionals of nothing” (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 459). Not taking their stories into account can actually lead to “reinforce the power geometries and hierarchies they seek to disrupt” (Ingram and Dodds, 2009: 11). Plus, security in this form of analysis tends to be “exclusion, totalization and even violence” (Nunes, 2012: 349).

Studies on the politics of resistance focusing particularly on experiences of immigrants, refugees, and minorities (Mueller, 2004; Huysmans, 2006; Nyers, 2006) are exceptions to the disinterest in the everyday experiences of non-professionals that participate in the politics of protection, i.e. that ‘do’ security or resist its doing. Rather than dealing only with the *effects* of ‘power games’, this interest into politics of resistance is accompanied by the inquiry into the *process* of these ‘power games’, the capacity of representation, the agency:

Who are the significant security agencies that modulate the meaning of protection and insecurity in the contest of competing security claims and practices and how is their transformative capacity structured and articulated? (Huysmans, 2006: 5)

With these studies, the everyday is analysed as a site where the practices and discourses of professionals are not taken as they are, but challenged or negotiated (Huysmans, 2009). Similarly, but more explicitly, emancipatory approaches to security have an understanding of the everyday that is not passive. Rather than taking the everyday as a site that reproduces security

logics, these approaches aim to include the everyday with its agents that ‘do’ security into the politics of security.

In this respect, for emancipatory approaches, security is a derivative concept determined by one’s philosophical and political stance (Booth, 1991). In the analysis of security, then, this approach starts from the experiences of insecurity of ‘real people in real places’ – that are ‘realities of security’ (Booth, 2004). This approach made visible agents other than the state or professionals that ‘do’ security or that challenge the existing security understandings, besides the agents that already ‘securitize’ issues due to the insecurities they experience (Booth, 1997). Consequentially, issues considered as sources of insecurity become broadened with this deepening move that broadens those who define what security is. Broadening does not only naturally come after deepening, but also should come after it (Booth, 2007: 149-181). Moreover, for this approach, the claim for a broadening of the issues and referents is tied to the claims for non-state, non-military agency, non-violent and non-zero-sum practices (Bilgin, 1999; 2002).

Therefore, this approach looks at how everyday insecurities can and do shape security understandings and security agenda. It is important to point that the everyday does not have to be analysed in one of two ways: as a reactionary site or as a passive site. As Richmond (2010; 2011a; 2011b) and Mac Ginty (2008; 2011) showed, the everyday is a site where the official and non-official, formal and informal negotiate, clash or collaborate. Politics of security may be

a combination dominated by the former (official and formal), but it can also be directed towards the latter (unofficial and informal). This chapter focuses on the former, whereas the next chapter questions the possibility of the latter in the context of the urban space and the contemporary forms of security and insecurity.

To distinguish between the two, urban security will be analysed through a differentiation between ‘security of the city’ and ‘security within the city’. This echoes Wood’s differentiation, albeit different in meaning. Wood (2010), in his chapter in *Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies*, distinguishes between insecurity of the city and insecurity in the city. Insecurity of the city refers to threats to the city that is taken as a whole unit. It is related to the city’s place in warfare and global political economy. Insecurity in the city refers to the ‘inside’ of the city. It is related to the city’s role as a policing, ordering, “repression and control” mechanism subjected on those within (Wood, 2010: 201). However, the two are inseparable as acknowledged by Wood. His differentiation is “heuristic rather than categorical” (Wood, 2010: 197). Inseparability of security of the city and in the city points to the blurred lines between an inside and outside; city is not a bounded unit. An analysis of contemporary urban insecurity clearly reveals this. One illustration of this is natural disasters.

Even though the city is claimed to be secured against natural disasters, it is not the whole city. Although the earthquake in Bam in 2013 showed that

resilience to disasters in cities such as that of Iran is not equal to that of a city in the North (that is part of global networks and immersed in the global economy), the damage of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2004 showed that vulnerability to natural disasters is not a natural occurrence. It is directly related to marginality, and to being included or excluded from the city or whatever that is claimed to be secured. Other examples of “insecurity generated by marginality in the new global economy” include the earthquake Hanshin that destroyed Kobe’s poorer neighbourhoods in Japan, and the landslide in Manila that crushed homes and livelihoods of people in Payatas - “the city’s garbage dump” (Wood, 2010: 203).

Elsewhere, Wood (2013) talks about ‘(in)security of the city’ and ‘(in)security in the city’ in a slightly different manner. There, the distinction comes from different analyses of urban (in)security rather than a heuristic one. (In)security of the city refers to security knowledges that circulate through global city networks. It is considered to be a top-down approach whereas (in)security in the city is taken to be a more bottom-up approach, because the latter analysis of urban (in)security takes into its analysis the local concerns, knowledges and their interactions with other knowledges. An analysis as such reveals the multiplicity of referents and the struggles over whose security it is the urban security. He examines (in)security in Rio de Janeiro and come up with different sources of urban security knowledge existing within the city. Here, however, his analysis of the interaction of local and circulating

knowledges is dominated by a focus on the interaction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security professionals.

In this thesis, unlike Wood’s (2010), the differentiation is not a heuristic one. It is rather a division in terms of ‘who securitizes’, ‘whose security’, and ‘what is security’. Security of the city refers to discourses and practices of urban security which result in more insecurity. This chapter aims at a critique of security of the city as a technique that ‘does things’ coupled with the question ‘whose security (gets to be involved in the security agenda)’. Although security of the city implies the whole city as its referent, some are pushed to the outside of this city. However, rather than taking security inherently as a negative or positive concept, this thesis aims to politicize urban security. After questioning the existing politics of security in this chapter, the possibility of a more positive form of security will be inquired in the following chapter.

Arguing for such a change towards a different politics of security in terms of the city indicates an ethico-political choice that is in line with the emancipatory approach. This approach asks ‘what security should be’ with an explicit commitment to emancipatory project (Booth, 1997: 109). As Booth’s (1991: 319) much quoted words suggest:

Security means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together

with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security.

Ethico-political dimension of politicization of security argues for a change in who gets to 'define' security and whose insecurities gets to be involved in the security agenda. These highly matter whether security can be "conceived globally and practised locally" and whether the people's insecurities that are disregarded can be included in the security agenda (Bilgin, 2008: 99-100). Similarly, this thesis aims to bring humans/urban dwellers into the centre of politics of urban security. The first step towards this change is "problematization of the existing relations and structures in order to reveal how they hinder the realization of human freedoms" (Bilgiç, 2013: 57) and how they are based on elitist, statist, and militarist understandings in terms of both agency and referent (Bilgin, 2008a: 98-9). Then, "transformation" can be possible through "already existing, albeit marginalized, ideas and practices" (Bilgiç, 2013: 57). It is the immanent potential and the "pluralism of the politics of security" that are the focal points of this approach in its aspiration for change (Booth, 2005: 259-279; Bilgiç, 2013: 1-15). Therefore, the change that theory aspires can be possible only because it is already there as a potential. This indicates an understanding of theory and practice that are interwoven within each other, rather than being separate realms.

In terms of transformation, for emancipatory approaches, “the appropriate referent object” and agents change depending on the context (Wyn Jones, 1999: 116). The means and ends of security are not fixed. They are constituted and never ‘finished’ (Bilgin, 1999: 32). These choices depend upon “concrete analysis of particular issues and areas” (Wyn Jones, 1999: 121) and “historical contexting” (Alker, 2005: 189). Thus, the appropriate move – whether taking issues from the realm of security to the normal politics, i.e. ‘desecuritization’ or ‘politicizing security’ – depend on the context (Alker, 2005; Bilgin, 2008a: 100). Plus, meaning of emancipation cannot be fixed but is “localized and unfinished process” (Nunes, 2012: 353) and context-based. Thus, emancipation is not Emancipation, not a blueprint (Booth, 2007). That is what ‘false emancipation’ is: ‘timeless’, totalizing ‘wisdom’ disadvantaging others while advantaging some (Booth, 2007: 113).

This chapter provides a critique of security of the city as a first step towards situating the possibility of security within the city, in other words, a change in the politics of urban security. For this aim, the discussion in this chapter is limited to the ways in which the city is ‘secured’ – through bordering – by state officials, security professionals and people that reproduce these borders. The following section focuses on these practices and asks what security (of the city) is, and what security (of the city) does in terms of the everyday.

3.2. Security and Bordering the City

In the *Special Issue on Urban Insecurities*, Abrahamsen and others (2009) present the city as a challenge to Security Studies and IR. Because an analysis of the city reveal the complicated lines between inside and outside, private and public, global and local, police and military. It is also a challenge because of the security discourses that invade the city on the one hand, and the urban experiences that are considered as sources of insecurity on the other. The previous chapter focused on different bordering practices of the international other than the territorial state borders. This reveals both different practices and discourses of security, and different experiences of insecurity compared to a focus limited to state's territorial borders.

The relationship between security and the city is manifold. It includes issues such as war-making, war on terror, war on gangs, war on crime, and urbanization as a destructive process. The city is *secured* through bordering it, through managing circulation and inhibiting the *bad* mobility, through segregating space into safe and danger zones, through dividing behaviour into acceptable/desirable and abnormal/unacceptable, through laws that become part of these borders, and at times through suspending the law. The city is secured against disorder, organized and petty-crime, terrorist threat and anti-social behaviour with wars on crime, drugs, gangs, poverty and so forth with old and new enemies of dissent, political activist, immigrant, poor, drug dealer, terrorist, and insurgent. The security of the city intertwines with other

discourses of national security, regional security, human security, international security, personal safety and safety of property.

State assumes the role of the provider of security not in a broader sense of the term, but in terms of controlling, ordering and containing the borders that separate the ‘good’/‘wanted’ from the ‘bad’/‘unwanted’. Security in this sense means order and control, rather than being free from constraints. This results in security policies that are obsessed with surveillance, data-gathering, monitoring people, hence locking-down or ‘sealing off’ of the poor and unwanted (Bauman, 2004: 85). Spatialization is one way in which sovereign power works to designate those “who matter” and “what life counts as life to be fostered” along with “who is disposable” and “what can be allowed to die” or “expose[d] to death” (Foucault, 1975-76 [2003]; 1977-78 [2007]; Mbembe, 2003). Thus, abandonment becomes a way of governing (see Selmeczi, 2010). This aspect of governing points at the ways power works through domination, destruction and marginalization.

City’s relation to security and bordering will be analysed in terms of three sets of practices. First set of practices is warfare as cities are highly involved in war making. Second set of practices is planning and design which border cities in the name of securing them. Third set of practices is related to urbanization which works through bordering the city.

Cities have been closely related to war making. With industrialization, the city of 19th and 20th century became targets in wars; and strategic bombing and area bombing emerged in World War II (Coward, 2009: 402-3). Either total destruction or damaging infrastructure that is vital for war-making capacities of the enemy was aimed (Graham, 2004; Coward, 2009). During Cold War, urban space as a space for warfare was not considered to be the ideal battlefield by the Western policy-makers. If seen necessary to take action in the urban space, the strategy would be mostly a “total war against cities” destroying the whole city (Graham, 2009: 396). However, in the post-Cold War period, urbanity has become the specific target of war making in the form of targeting the ‘critical’ or ‘networked’ infrastructure which is not just vital for a city but which makes a city (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Coward, 2009: 404). Infrastructure included those systems of information, communication, transportation, logistics, and energy circulation and storage. This implicates an interruption of the city as a process:

When our analytical focus centres on how the wires, ducts, tunnels, conduits, streets, highways and technical networks that interlace and infuse cities are constructed and used, modern urbanism emerges as an extraordinarily complex and dynamic sociotechnical process. (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 8)

Targeting urbanity through targeting cities has been the case in several terrorist attacks in cities such as New York, Madrid, London, Istanbul, Jakarta, Riyadh and Mumbai (Graham, 2004a: 5). In these attacks mostly infrastructure

is targeted because it disrupts urban network. Also, the number of people affected is maximized and certain values represented by that infrastructure becomes damaged (Coward, 2009: 408). Certainly, urbanization of warfare is not only about terrorist attacks. This form of violence is caused by both state and non-state actors. Especially by the US policy-makers, military theorists and planners, urban space as a battlefield started to be regarded as a necessary component of counterinsurgency. This is when terms such as Military Operations on Urban Terrain were created and Revolution in Military Affairs was to be reformed in order to adjust to the necessities of the urbanized warfare in the cities of the Global South (Graham, 2008: 34-42). In fact, the US considers the “Third World city” as the “key battlespace of the future” (Davis, 2004). Disrupting urbanity can mean “switching the city off” or “forced de-modernization of cities and urban societies” as in the case of ‘Shock and Awe’ bombing of Baghdad by the US (Graham, 2005; Coward, 2009: 404-406).

The second set of practices concerns planning, architecture and design of urban spaces. Among other issues, terror and crime as a security concern shapes cities via urban design and planning. Access to certain areas such as core commercial districts or international events is restricted through several measures of planning and design. Space in this sense is attempted to be made *defensible* through dividing it into controlled and fortified areas (Coaffee and Wood, 2006). Security measures are publicized to advertise those districts as ‘safe havens’ in order for them to become attractive for investment and to

become commercial and finance centres once again. Most prominent example is the measures taken in the name of war on terror that consists looking for enemies 'within' and taking defensive measures through defensible spaces. One response given to crime and terrorist attacks is constructing a 'ring of steel' which started to be used in 1970s in Belfast and later in 1990s in New York and London. 'Rings of steel' are sites protected and sealed by surveillance cameras, organizing traffic in a certain way and putting visible or invisible barriers in the form of other objects such as sculptures, sitting banks or plants (Coaffee, 2004).

However, 'rings of steel' targeted threats such as car bombs and came to be seen insufficient after 9/11. Emergency planning measures started to be replaced by more pre-emptive ones. This period is characterized by expansion and enhancement of surveillance infrastructure, gated communities, intensified security measures in sites such as airports and certain areas, and accelerated privatization of security (Coaffee and Wood, 2006). This shift towards pre-emptive measures is called resilience planning specifically in the UK in an attempt to create resilient cities in the face of such *risks* as terrorist threats. Mass data-gathering and assessing risk, creating risk profiles and diffusing the responsibility towards several institutions are some features of this planning. In the US, the term 'securescape' refers to the specific urban design developed in the aftermath of 9/11 (Shapiro, 2009: 446). Access of pedestrians to certain places is restricted and controlled in this form of planning. It is argued that, by

way of this, the pedestrian becomes constituted as a threat, a new threat to urban security (Shapiro, 2009: 446). Along with these types of long term planning and urban design, resilience planning can be temporary as well (Coaffee and Wood, 2006). Temporary resilience strategies are taken during hosting important international events such as Olympics, World Cup, G20, and so forth. Nevertheless, surveillance infrastructure that is deployed during such events mostly become permanent and stay after the events finish. Along with terrorist threat, they are legitimized through other risks of crime and trafficking of drugs and humans.

The third set of practices is related to urbanization and its associated processes of neoliberalism and globalization as discussed in the previous chapter. What was a solution to the symptoms of larger and structural problems have ended with the transformation from state-led to market-led development. Starting in the 1980s, neoliberalism became the dominant ‘strategy’ for development (Hettne, 2010). Infamous Washington Consensus started to be formed and the neoliberal logic of market-led development was pursued within ‘developed’ states. This marked the end of welfare state policies related to housing and unemployment.

As the consensus was presented as a “blueprint for development” for the Third World, end of the Cold War was an end to the former development strategy of state-led modernization in the cities of the South as well (Thomas and Williams, 2012: 301). Neoliberal policies such as structural adjustment

programs, privatization, and liberalization made sure nonmarket structures and public spheres were being “commodified and transferred to capital” (Robinson, 1999: 44). This caused the states that are ‘developing’ to favour some groups over others, and “external economic forces” over “domestic society” (Hettne, 2010: 43). As poor people and poor states were being presented as responsible for their own poverty, “the role of the state was redefined as the enabler of the private sector, facilitating privatization, liberalization and deregulation” (Thomas and Williams, 2012: 301). What marked the era of increasing neoliberal policies were urban wage reductions, transnationalized local elites, decline in public services and public sector, and speedy growth of informal sector (Robinson, 1999: 50-1). Cheap labour was seen as an opportunity for cities to have an advantageous position in the global economy in terms of lower production costs and foreign investment attraction.

The (re)constitution of poverty as at the heart of all the problems is not new. Underdevelopment has been directly linked with nesting threats – for the ‘north’, for the “system as a whole” or the “global-life itself” (Duffield, 2010: 68). It was the case in the communist ‘spread’ in the Third World in the 1950s, terrorism and high crime rates in urban areas in the 21st century. This appeared at the background of urban development projects that linked underdevelopment of certain parts of the city to security of the city in terms of order, and underdevelopment of the city in terms of the city’s place in the global economy.

Urbanization and neoliberalism as twin projects work with security discourses to reorganize and border the urban space through gentrification, destruction, eviction, displacement, demolition, and fundamentally through privatization. For instance, even if a regeneration project is carried out by the local government, it can use private security for matters such as the process of eviction and displacement of the people (see Rasmussen, 2007).

These sets of practices that are part of a politics of security operate in the everyday urban space in different ways. Firstly, everyday life is securitized as it becomes invaded by the understanding of urbanized warfare and security. City becomes a space of both peace and war as the two become inseparable. For instance, as part of war on terror, peace time and war time cannot be separated any more as it becomes an endless war fought in many fronts including the home front of the city (Graham, 2005). However, in most of the cities around the world, security understandings of states and professionals invaded urban spaces and fortified public spaces well before 9/11 even in New York (Mitchell, 2003). Enemies 'within' could and can be migrants, homeless, gangs, drug dealers or political activists. Related policies are sometimes gathered under the name of 'war on gangs', 'war on crime', 'war on drugs', development projects and so forth. These are presented as part of the same problem by linking petty crime, organized crime, anti-social behaviour, terrorism, migration, disorder, poverty and underdevelopment together. Feelings of insecurity and uncertainty are fuelled through these linkages.

Deploying military style equipment and personnel within cities can as well fuel sentiments of fear and insecurity among people (Graham, 2004a: 12). It becomes common sense to deploy military personnel and equipment within the public space of cities or to divide, fortify and barricade some parts of cities. Thus, urban space and the everyday becomes militarized (Coaffee and Wood, 2006; Graham, 2005; 2011). Then, it is not just policization of military that is taking place through a convergence and conflict in the traditional roles of police and military (Bigo, 2003: 111; 2004: 137), but military is also urbanized as its roles of security becomes more and more related to the urban space (Graham, 2004).

Moreover, the built environment can shape people's understandings and feelings of security and fear (Coaffee et al., 2009: 493). The appearance and visibility of security measures within cities whether in form of planning or not can raise the feelings of fear and risk. On the other hand, the visibility, appearance, and aesthetic aspects of design and measures of security have also become an issue of concern starting in mid-2000s (Dudley, 2007: 37). Since mobility or movement is one of the main tenets of cities, security design features should not exterminate and switch off this aspect of the city which makes a city. After all, some (good) mobility is needed for the survival and the continuation of the city (and global economy) while some (bad) mobility needs to be prevented. Urban security practices including urban design become a way of managing the mobility and circulation within the city to separate the

necessary and desirable from the unwanted and *dangerous* mobility (Weber and Lacy, 2011). As such, some of the daily practices of (in)securitization are hidden under the guise of “enhancing freedom of movement” (Bigo, 2008: 128; 2010: 36).

Secondly, as the everyday life and cities are securitized and militarized in response to fear of terror and crime, everyone potentially becomes a threat. What is crucial in terms of everyone becoming a potential threat and the securitization of urban life space is that they are accepted and more importantly reproduced by the society. Bigo (2002) calls this “governmentality of unease” in a risk society in which the feelings of unease and insecurity become a way of governing the society and governing the self. In terms of securitization of migration and linking migrants with crime, terror and unemployment, governmentality of unease serves for the sovereign power to keep on claiming the monopoly over providing security and protection while not really addressing and solving any problem. These practices result in understanding of the world and city as a risk-ridden and chaotic environment that necessitates the continuation of these practices. Through governmentality of unease, imagination of the world becomes “one of chaos and urban insecurity” (Bigo, 2002: 81). In this process, immigrant, protestor or the homeless becomes the embodiment of any problem facing the society and the state.

After 9/11, this aspect is visibly related to the measures taken as part of a war on terror. However, it is as well related to a war on the poor (Wacquant,

2003). Using the language of war and practices that resemble war and counterinsurgency, these campaigns work through policies such as increasing the number of police officers, prisons, new laws and harsher sentences. They sometimes work through “suspending the law” (Kyed, 2007: 151). The aims proclaimed in these campaigns are maintaining order, fighting with threats to this order and maintaining security of the wider community. Most policies taken under the name of these campaigns are overly publicized for providing security for the ‘community’. Contrary to their publicized claims they end up in criminalization of the poor, insecurity of certain communities and damage relationships between communities. These groups become potential threats and measures taken for securing the city against them become legitimized through this criminalization and securitization.

This has been the case in Central America where urban gangs were considered to be directly involved in urban violence and crime by local authorities. In 2005, they were marked by external actors and observers as “new urban insurgency” threatening the states of the region (Jütersonke et al., 2009: 377). With ambitious campaigns of war on gangs, those groups of gangs were represented as if constituting a transnational threat although they were involved in more local crimes (2009: 391).

In Cape Town too, with the increased crime rates, campaigns such as war on crime and war on gangs were deployed starting with 1990s and 2000s. The increased crime levels correspond with the period right before the end of

apartheid regime and after the transition. Although at first, welfare policies with a developmental logic were employed by the post-apartheid state, later there was a shift towards neoliberal oriented policies, increased growth of private security sector and increased concern for security as community safety rather than development (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; Jensen, 2010). Fear of crime became a priority and certain groups became criminalized. In a way “war on gangs is not just a war against gangsters but a campaign launched in the areas and spaces and populations in which and among whom the gangs exist” (Jensen, 2010: 91).

A war on the poor at the background of war on drugs, crime or gangs that criminalize and securitize certain groups is not limited to the cities of the Global South. End of the welfare state policies such as those related to unemployment and social housing in 1980s and 1990s prepared the ground for policies for a ‘war’ as such in some contexts. One policy as such was the implementation of a law on beggars and squeegeers named Safe Streets Act in 2000 in the province of Ontario. Policies that restricted the welfare programs such as social housing are seen as the cause of high rates of homelessness in Canada’s urban centres, especially in Toronto where it came to be represented as a national disaster in 1998 (Heroux, 2011: 111-112).

Begging, homelessness and taking care of basic needs – including sleeping – in public space were all condemned for threatening business, tourism and “quality of life” of those felt threatened (Heroux, 2011: 113). In

Toronto for example programs such as Project 35, Project 40, Community Action Planning and Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy were adopted throughout the 1990s and 2000s. With these programs, crime control became an important issue and a priority. Those who are targeted became public enemies; fighting crime meant *cleaning up* (Heroux, 2011: 123). The targets of this fight were declared to be drugs, prostitution and gangs. However squeegee kids, panhandlers and vandals were targeted at the same time. Moreover, petty-crime and anti-social behaviour became main targets as it was believed that fighting with these would prevent other crimes that are less visible. However, the promise of a ‘safer’ community provided by such programs – Project 35 and 40, CAP, and TAVIS – did not seem to work.

Overall, these programs’ main target is generally not the underlying causes of the problems faced by poorer communities. By targeting the symptoms of poverty such as homelessness, drugs, gangs, prostitution, and informal economy, these programs work to criminalize these symptoms, hence the poor. In that sense, they do not work for the *safety* of poorer communities or hindering violence. Moreover, they do not end up providing *safety* to the wider community as well. On the one hand, targeting only the symptoms results in either temporary prevention or moving those symptoms from one place to another. On the other hand, damaging relationships and trust within and between communities, and targeting certain groups excessively, do not serve for security or safety of the wider community as well. In Toronto case,

projects were blamed for further insecurity of the community through damaging trust between youth, police, racial segments, and other parts of the community. Raids led to interrogation of people who did not actually engage in criminal activities but who became criminalized for being poor. Moreover, mass evictions followed these raids showing how everyone was criminalized (Heroux, 2011: 130).

This has become a daily experience for those who face such programs and policies of a 'war on the poor'. This daily experience of some city-dwellers becomes a general condition during global events taking place in cities. Continuing with the example of Toronto where G20 summit took place in 2010, those policies used in the war on the poor were combined with measures of a war on terror. They were implemented towards everyone and not just protesters both before and during the event which ended up in mass arrests (Heroux, 2011: 132). Fortifications during urban summits or international events are "increasingly violent, temporary urban sieges". They protect those that are 'inside' from the protestors. This makes 'outside' "the other side of the street" (Graham, 2004a: 5).

Criminalization and securitization of the poor and 'underdeveloped' is as well embedded in the discourse of development/security (Duffield, 2005; 2010; DuBois, 1991; Chandler, 2007; Hettne, 2010; Stern and Öjendal, 2010). Several scholars discuss security-development in relation to cities and their inhabitants (see Buur et al., 2007; Jensen, 2010; Orjuela, 2010). For instance,

urban violence is considered as a hindrance against development while underdevelopment is seen as a threat to security. Linking poverty directly with urban violence criminalizes and securitizes the poor. Hence, the answer to whose security/development does not get to be those “underdeveloped” or perpetrators and victims of violence, but the “developed” and worthy of securing. Securing the city, the nation, or the region may result in insecurities for some who find themselves “at the margins of this nation”, this city, or this region (Orjuela, 2010) and who find themselves as threats to this security. This division between who constitutes the community, the city – or another referent that is claimed to be “secured” – and who is not part of it becomes a division between “law-abiding, tax paying and decent” city-dwellers and “illegal, criminal and non-paying” urban poor (Rasmussen, 2007: 176; see also Jensen, 2010: 83) who find themselves outside of “righteous forms of citizenship” (Kyed, 2007). This can be through explicit and visible but also invisible practices of criminalization and securitization aiming at elimination of these to be outsiders, can be through containment and repression or it can be simply through abandonment, being ignored and categorized as useless (Buur, Jensen and Stepputat, 2007).

Security of the city is never the security of the ‘waste’ as Bauman’s analogy of ‘wasted humans’ discussed in the previous chapter reminds us (2004). Those superfluous lives might find themselves at the front line of a ‘war’ – war on terror, crime, drugs, gangs, etc. – that is fought in the name of

the city, the country, the state, the global, the international and the community that they apparently are not considered to be a part of.

Security practices are employed in order to strengthen the bordering between two worlds, to stop the other world from being visible or trespass to the world it does not belong. Those practitioners and agents of security are likened to “rubbish collectors” by Bauman. They work for bordering, dividing “the inside and the outside of the human universe”, and “separating order from chaos” (Bauman, 2004: 28). This division needs to be practiced continuously so that the border continues to exist.

(Re)production of this separation (and deeming of some people as unwanted) works to *protect* the way of living that is deemed worthy as opposed to those unworthy. Thus, what goes unnoticed is that the unworthy is used for this protection and sustaining this way of life. Bauman especially considers immigrants as those who find themselves on the ‘unwanted’ side of the border though they are used for the continuity and sustainability of the way of life that is desirable and worthy. All in all waste is obviously invisible – if not appear as the enemy – in the narrative of the city or its success story.

Thirdly, as security becomes commodified, exclusionary practices of security become even more scattered with gated communities, private security personnel and companies. Security becomes a responsibility of all since, firstly, threats are ever more *personal* concerning daily lives and secondly everyone

can *achieve* security as it becomes something to be achieved through commodification. In other words, security that becomes *personal* security, at the same time becomes everyone's *responsibility* (Coaffee and Wood, 2006: 514). This creates a responsible citizen that sees the world and his/her immediate environment as chaotic and full of risks directly related to his/her personal life. Hence, a citizen that conducts him/herself with this awareness and acceptance (Bhandar, 2004).

Responsibilization can work along with criminalization. For instance, after the end of the apartheid regime in Cape Town, participation of the community in security policies was encouraged for the purposes of accountability. However, in 1990s and 2000s, this was replaced by responsibilization of community members where gangs existed and crime rates were high (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; Jensen, 2010). This made all community members suspects of either being a gang member or helping gangs (Jensen, 2010: 91).

Fourthly, the everyday is colonized through these practices that result in urbicide (Lefebvre, 1991; Gregory, 1994; Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007). Urbicide is the act of targeting a city with the aim of disrupting its urbanity (Coward, 2004; 2007; Shaw, 2004; Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007; Graham, 2004). Both attacking cities and urbanization as a destructive process can aim to disrupt urbanity. Urbicide was first used as a term in 1960s to criticize the urban development projects in the US for unintentionally ruining the city life.

Later it was considered to be intentional and “as a strategic objective in its own right” (Campbell, Graham and Monk, 2007: 6). For example, the 1992-5 Bosnian War reveals that destruction of built environments did not just coincide with the violent acts of ethnic cleansing, but were deliberate acts targeting urbanity that represented heterogeneity and plurality (Coward, 2004). Apart from targeting diversity, targeting critical and networked infrastructure as urbicide can mean destroying urbanity that represents resistance, challenge, and independence (Gregory, 2004; Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007). Results of such urbicide can be a decreased capacity of resistance and independence. In Zimbabwe for instance, the state campaign for cleaning some parts of cities from informal economy in 2005 – the Operation Restore Order – included eviction, displacement, demolition, torture and imprisonment. However, it was a form of state building because it actually aimed at eliminating the opposition to the ruling party (Hammar, 2007).

These exclusionary and violent practices of urban security are moves towards pacifying the everyday as well. Neocleous (2011) talks about how security is used as a technique for pacification and for securing the capitalist accumulation and colonization starting from the colonization of the Americas by the Spaniards in 16th century. Pacification and security are mechanisms of power that is not just repressive but productive or “constitutive” as well, in the sense that it produces subjects (2011: 26). To put it more precisely, pacification which works through the technologies of security acts upon everyday life and

serves for constituting subjects that are proper for capitalism. In other words, “ideal citizen-subjects” are created in this process of pacification through security (2011: 35). The processes of pacification outside and inside help each other. Neocleous calls the latter one ‘internal pacification’ noting that colonial or internal pacification should not be considered separately as they are part of “the logic of security as a whole” (2011: 41), a logic that works not just for repression or defeating resistance or enemy, but also for producing proper subjects with proper behaviours:

[S]ubsumed under the new language of military intervention is nothing less than the pacification of domestic as well as imperial resistance, the ‘enemy within’ as well as the ‘enemy without’, as security moves back and forth between the national and international, as the urban crisis gets redefined as a national security crisis and vice versa. (Neocleous, 2011: 52)

Security of the city then operates through an understanding of security that pacifies and produces relations of exclusion, violence and exploitation. These sets of practices related to urbicide form colonial relations and colonize the everyday life through forming domination, destroying resistance and independence, and separating urban space into valuable and de-valorized parts in terms of centre and periphery. Urbicide is part of colonial relations. It is outward as can be seen in forms of exploitation and the attacks under the name of ‘war on terror’. Complementing this process is inward colonial relations as can be seen with urbanization. Urbanization here means the urban destruction and reorganization that takes place ‘inside’ the colonizers’ cities:

'Urbicide' is one, violently coercive means towards such a territorial reorganization of centre-periphery relations. One may apply the concept not only to the military planning exercises in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine but also to the more confined and selective cases of destroying, gentrifying and privatizing ghettoized spaces (public housing districts, racialized social spaces) in metropolitan urban centres. (Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007: 51)

What is crucial is that segregated spaces of centre and periphery do not only exist between cities but within cities – whether considered as a 'metropolitan urban centre' or a peripheral city.

Fifthly, these practices within the city become depoliticized as they become more and more part of a technology of security, a 'science', an expertise, and an issue of planning. The decisions that result in certain understandings and practices of (urban) security do not get to be questioned as if they are part of a technical process (of technology and design) (see Bigo, 2008; Dudley 2007; Weber and Lacy, 2011) or a part of the 'global patterns of urbanization' that one cannot 'escape'.

Through linking these sets of practices to national security, regional security, international security, personal safety, and development, the insecurities they cause have been made invisible. Sources of insecurity are masked through presenting those who experience insecurities as the root of all problems they face.

Last but not least, these sets of practices and their above mentioned repercussions reveal the interconnectedness of the everyday 'here' and 'there',

hence a different form of mapping of the international which was inquired in the previous chapter. The home-city and other-city are linked through security industry in a less apparent way. As the militarized and policing techniques are deployed by the Western states and private companies in the urban spaces of the Global South, they are also deployed and imitated in the cities of the West “through the securitization of Western urban life” (Graham, 2011: XVII). Graham explains this by adopting Foucault’s term ‘boomerang effects’ to the war on terror:

At the end of the sixteenth century we have, then, if not the first, at least an early example of the sort of boomerang effect colonial practice can have on the juridico-political structures of the West. It should never be forgotten that while colonization, with its techniques and its political and juridical weapons, obviously transported European models to other continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatus, institutions, and techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West, and the result was that the West could practice something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism on itself. (Foucault, 1975-76 [2003]: 103)

It is argued that this internal colonialism has been taking place through the importation of certain practices of security such as non-lethal weapons and security zones (Graham, 2011: XVIII). The security industry links the cities of the South and the North. This growing economy of technologies of security links the colonized cities of South as test grounds with cities of North where those technologies that are tested can be sold. For example, the CCTV technology used in the early 1990s in London was imported from the first Gulf

War (Coaffee and Wood, 2006: 506). Military style equipment and technology used in the cities of the home front mostly come from other fronts in Other cities. With its “multinational capital”, privatized “surveillant economy” is a very profitable market (Graham, 2011: XXIII). Urban destruction on the other hand might be profitable for those construction companies such as Halliburton that was “granted no-bid contracts in Iraq and Louisiana to rebuild cities devastated by Bush Administration policies” (Dudley, 2007).

Consequently, the cities of ‘North/South’, ‘West/non-West’, or ‘homeland/colonial frontier’ are very much alike in their techniques of policing and controlling and in their fortifications within cities. But most importantly, it shows their interconnectedness or “umbilical” (Graham, 2011: XXVII) relationship although imagined as distinct spaces of inside-outside. Graham (2004c: 331) wrote:

The destruction and violence wrought by terror and war often mimic, and accentuate, the wider processes of destruction and creation forged through acts of planning, modernization, civil reconstruction, tides of hyperactive speculation, urban investment (and disinvestment), innovation, and technological development that characterize capitalist urban change.

In terms of political imagination, internal colonialism and its practices of security reproduce the imagination of civilized-barbaric dichotomy within the cities of the home front. Within cities, some parts are taken to be separate,

underdeveloped, dangerous and threatening similar to the way the Other cities of the war on terror are imagined (Graham, 2011: XIX).

Imagination of the city can rest on a differentiation between the civilized and barbaric, developed and underdeveloped that is space-bound. War on terror, for example, invokes this imagination of here and there in terms of civilization and barbarism, and Good and Evil (Gregory, 2004). The construction of space through the binary of civilized self and the barbaric other continues to be (re)produced through war on terror with binaries such as US city-‘homeland’ and Arab city-‘terrorist nest’ (Graham, 2006). ‘Imaginative geographies’ as Said (1979: 54) puts it, (re)produce and are (re)produced by the violent practices of military urbanism. In the case of ‘war on terror’, US cities are reimagined as homeland cities in which borders are drawn everywhere for the sake of national security, to find out who and what is a threat. Arab cities are reimagined as underdeveloped, “asocial”, “mere battlespace” with bodies as mere “targets” (Graham, 2006: 258-267). Therefore, cities are imagined on a hierarchical line, hence the urban subjects living within them. The lives that are affected by the measures taken under the name of war on terror – lives of Iraqis and Afghanis for example – become “collateral damage” (Graham, 2006: 263).

On the other hand, practices under the name of war on terror shatter the traditional imagination of ‘here’ (“homeland”, city, or country) as a separate entity from ‘there’ (“colonial frontiers”) (Graham, 2006). In spite of the

imagination of separateness, the ‘two’ domains of ‘homeland’ and ‘colonial frontiers’ are interlinked. This is especially evident in security discourses that conceive the latter as a threat to the security of the former. They are “treated as a single, and increasingly integrated, urbanizing ‘battlespace’” (Graham, 2006: 258). In this sense, the city space of the Global North as “home front” becomes the new front of the war on terror (Coaffee and Wood, 2006; Coaffee et al., 2009).

Another link between ‘here’ and ‘there’ appears when some countries receive international assistance in their ‘fight’ or ‘war’ against crime, gangs and drugs. The main objective of this assistance is to prevent organized crime that is considered as a threat to other (Western) countries. An example of this latter concern is the war on drugs campaign that is deployed in Colombia and funded by the US. Although concerns over drug-trafficking might be involved, the campaign did not achieve any results in terms of this concern. Rather what happens is an attempt of “crushing political opposition movements, disciplining subjects and justifying to the public new forms of warfare and the new technologies by which this warfare is to be conducted” (Neocleous, 2011: 44).

The US intervention in Colombia is not limited to the war on drugs. US funding and assistance started during the Cold War and continues after 9/11. It took the form of and used the language of war on communism, war on drugs and lately war on terror (Monbiot, 2003; Neocleous, 2011: 44). The US

involvement and funding empowers certain groups over others as the Colombian army assists certain groups. The groups that work with the Colombian army – mainly right-wing paramilitaries – engage in violent practices such as mutilation, castration, kidnap, massacres and “the killing of homeless people, drug addicts and petty criminals” which can be called “social cleansing” (Monbiot, 2003). Apart from keeping stability that serves the US interests, the objectives of such a war is to “secure those parts of the country which are rich in natural resources for Colombian landowners and foreign multinationals” (Monbiot, 2003).

Another explicit interconnectedness comes with privatization of security which results in transnationalization of security sector with transnational corporations being involved as it was in Cape Town (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). Privatization of security was supported by international organizations as well. UNDP, for instance, supported this process through Urban Management Programme. War on gangs and crime –with the shift in security understanding towards community safety – correspond to this period of foreign assistance and private security sector growth (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011: 185).

Clearly, it would be a mistake to reduce securitized urban space to a post-9/11 or war on terror period. What seems more apparent, visible and legitimized with war on terror has been the case long before 9/11. The security practices within cities to ‘secure’ the city are not reducible to war on terror,

cautions against accelerated mobility of people, or fight against increased crime rates in all the cities around the world. Fortification of public space, militarization and securitization of urban space, and fragmented urban zones dates back long before fear of terror; and in different cities, different groups are made into enemies or threats.

Wood (2013) argues that understandings of security circulate through cities all around the world. This is not to say that these are immediately accepted, adopted and reproduced within those cities. In fact, he emphasizes the ways in which local discourses and practices work with the circulating security knowledge. He identifies several “sources of global urban security knowledge” in the context of Rio de Janeiro. These include militarized security practices such as that of Haiti, planning and more inclusionary practices such as education programs in Colombia, New York’s ‘Zero Tolerance’ policy against crime, Israeli community policing, and surveillance technologies. These policies are mostly imported from other cities without taking into consideration the specific contexts. Exchange of advisors between cities and professional traineeships in other cities are common in this circulation of security knowledge. Furthermore, security knowledge circulates through international events. As cities host international events such as sports mega-events security becomes a priority to promote the city and protect its place in the global economy (Wood, 2013: 198).

Both local and global issues interpenetrate in securitization of urban space. In Japan for example, use of massive surveillance technologies and policies, gated towns and walled spaces cannot be separated from understandings and discourses shaped by the US occupation in 1946, gas attack on Tokyo in 1995, terrorist attacks in other cities all around the world, war on terror, international airport security requirements, immigration, hosting World Cup in 2002 and traditional 'internal enemies' such as Japanese mafia and anti-governmental groups of students, communists, and nationalists that were active after 1970s (Wood et al., 2007).

However, apart from these circulating security knowledges and local (but official) discourses and practices, there is also the everyday as an active site that has a play in the politics of security. Its role may be weak or may be invisible through such an analysis. The next chapter aims to bring the agency of the everyday to the forefront in an analysis of politics of (urban) security.

3.3. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to explore how practices of security border the city, and problematize the existing dominant understandings and policies of security. It is argued that securing the city works through exclusion, abandonment, exploitation, destruction or containment. In answering the questions of what

security does, how security is done, what ‘security of the city’ is, and ‘whose security is the security of the city’, the existing (urban) security policies and agendas are questioned based on a critique of security as a technique that governs, disciplines, contains, excludes, divides and pacifies. It is argued that urbanization and warfare through cities (as well as measures of urban planning and design) securitize the everyday, criminalize certain groups, and depoliticize security. Moreover, as practices of colonialism, they hierarchize space and fragment it into centre-and-periphery-like units within and between cities. In light of these findings, this chapter showed, it is not the ‘city’ that is secured through bordering, or any other object that is claimed to be secured through securing the city. But it is the preservation of these (exclusionary and exploitative) relations and the desirable, the acceptable and the normal. Security of the city is security of these relations that is resulting in many insecurities both ‘inside’ (within the city’s immediate environment) and ‘outside’ (other cities or other places).

However, these are not the only answers that can be given to ‘how security is done’, understood, and practiced. Rethinking security also entails including others in the struggle over what security is. In the context of the city, this can be through engaging with how the urban dwellers themselves and not security professionals solely, consider certain issues as sources of insecurity and do security themselves. It is not always the case that individuals play into the practices of securitization through being in accordance with the feelings of

insecurity and fear. The everyday of the urban dweller is an active site not just in terms of reproducing the sentiments of uncertainty but also in terms of acting upon, negotiating, resisting, and doing security. Moreover, it is a site in which the boundaries of political community are redrawn. This makes possible a different understanding of security within the city that is more inclusionary and 'right to the city' based.

This possibility of security within the city refers to broadened referents through different understandings of security. It does not only aim to make visible several insecurities experienced by those excluded, and how others 'do' security, but also aims to evoke an understanding of security as co-existence (within the city) based on the right to the city approach. For this aim, instead of a total dismissal of the concept of security, the analysis will focus on the different ways in which it is understood, practiced and experienced by different groups and individuals. This task will be taken up in the following chapter where agency and resistance in terms of the everyday will be discussed in the context of the city space. Security understandings and practices, in fact, circulate through cities all around the world. However, this does not necessarily mean that traveling security logics are adopted everywhere. Rather, security is contested, constructed, reconstructed, negotiated and worked upon by a myriad of actors including those who might not be acknowledged as actors. In Chapter 4, how different groups 'do' security and what this means and can mean for security within the city will be discussed.

CHAPTER 4

RETHINKING THE EVERYDAY

The everyday can be approached both as passive and as existing in reaction to an ‘outside’ dominant force. However, as discussed in the first chapter, the local and the everyday neither simply exist in reaction to the ‘outside’, nor they are passive sites that are shaped by the official, the international or the global.

The borders of the international can be constructed and secured not just at exceptional moments but through daily practices of professionals – for instance within and through cities as the previous chapter showed. However, at the everyday, these practices are not accepted as they are. They are not just reproduced at the everyday. The previous chapter dealt with securing and constituting the borders of the international through the city with politics of security of the city. It showed how security can be exclusionary, violent and produce more insecurity at the everyday.

However, these security understandings that travel across cities are not the only ones that shape the answer to what security is. The everyday urban space is a site of struggle in which contending security understandings emerge. Thus, dominant and the official security understandings do not naturally shape what security is for the urban dweller. When others are included to the answer, different insecurities and different strategies of security employed to confront these insecurities get into the picture. More importantly, though, a potentiality of security (within the city) as co-existence that is right (to the city) and needs based comes into view.

What this chapter proposes – rethinking the everyday and the local in terms of agency and resistance they inhabit – is that (re)mapping practices of the international are not under the monopoly of the official formal actors but people in everyday life engage in these practices. One possible and valuable focal point for International Relations and Security Studies is the urban space with its state actors, private security personnel and non-expert agents which are the subjects of this chapter: the non-professionals, non-officials and mostly those that are not considered as ‘proper’ agents by the lens of the state-centred analysis of traditional and some critical approaches to security.

This chapter directs attention to the everyday in order to analyse the agency of the urban dweller both in terms of the international and security. For this aim, firstly, what a rethinking of the local and the everyday in terms of agency and resistance entails will be discussed. Then, social movements will

be picked up as mobilized resistance that take place locally within the urban space but transcend the state boundaries. Finally, through an understanding of the everyday in terms of ‘critical agency’ that is transformative and resistant (Richmond, 2011), the possibility of security as co-existence within the city – that is rights and needs based – will be inquired.

4.1. Local, the Everyday and Resistance

‘Local’ can be used in a variety of ways including social, political or territorial space (Walker, 1988: 84). ‘Local’ here is not used as another level of analysis in positivist terms, i.e. a territorial space in a binary relationship with the state or global. Instead, it refers to “the venue for everyday life” (Magnusson, 1990: 45), a site where everyday practices take place, a social and political space. Moreover, it is a site where interconnections between people’s everyday lives and global structures are most visible. Then, everyday should also not be understood as yet another level of analysis in a positivist sense “to which we can turn for the truth” (Campbell, 1996: 23). The everyday and local are seen as sites of constant interactions and global interconnections, resistances, formation of alternative loyalties and identities. In Campbell’s (1996: 23) words:

Everyday life is thus a *transversal* site of contestations rather than a fixed level of analysis. ... [It] is transversal because the conflicts

manifested there not only transverse all boundaries; *they are about those boundaries*, their erasure or inscription, and the identity formations to which they give rise.

Boundaries of political community are drawn in the local and the everyday. Locality, everyday life and social movements are sites for challenging the state's claimed dominance over deciding the limits of political community (Magnusson, 1990). However, those are made invisible or "disappear except constructs of state and the market" (Magnusson, 1990: 48). An act of enclosing of political community is considered to be necessary by the state through deciding who gets to be included in the political community and who does not. Other community making boundary practices of "localities, cities, districts, regions, and international communities" (Magnusson, 1990: 49) are made invisible as 'nations' are made the primary and sole source of political community. The localities or everyday life do not have fixed boundaries; they transverse, go beyond the artificial boundaries of political community and the boundaries of neighbourhood, of the block, of the city, of the state (Magnusson, 1990).

Locality in terms of its own boundary-making processes and resistance can be thought of in two ways: social movements and the everyday. A theory of resistance is said to be what is lacking in IR, an IR that becomes disciplinary in terms of the power relations that it has already been a part of while emerging as a discipline (Richmond, 2011a). Resistance or critical agency emerges in IR as a 'reactive' force, but not as itself constitutive of

wider political structures and itself having a form of legitimacy on its own. It is as well not taken as constituting a part of transformation or change. Even when transformation is aspired, the possibility of change is searched outside the actors' capacities – the actors that the transformation seems to be most necessary for and demanded by. Only the resistance that is directed through formal channels are considered to be legitimate, or, to be resistant agency itself. This excludes other forms of critical agency that is mostly local and that happen at the everyday (Richmond, 2011a).

Then, if resistance is due to have a place in the study of the international, IR needs to turn its gaze towards the everyday (Richmond, 2011a: 430). That way it can escape its empirical unhelpfulness and being a normative justification of the status quo. He (2011a: 432) wrote:

Resistance and critical agency can be seen as a local and international conversation about the impact of hegemony, colonial praxis, the global economy and the reconstitution of rights, needs and identity. This conversation is carried along transversal, transnational networks and merges both the liberal and the local, the global north and south.

For Richmond the question is not about the existence of such an impact of the everyday on the international. It is not a 'yes/no' question, but a 'how' question: "how do the 'powerless' engage in politics and international relations?", "how are they facilitated, blocked and co-opted, and how do they maintain legitimacy, integrity and autonomy where they can?" (2011a: 434).

This thesis tries to answer these questions through cities and through abovementioned everyday bordering practices of city dwellers.

Boundary practices within the city (physical or not) may constitute binary relationships of internal/external, domestic/foreign, modern/non-modern. In this sense, the everyday becomes where the ‘international’ takes place. Understanding the international by understanding these boundaries necessitates looking at the everyday practices of people whether they reproduce, negotiate or challenge them. The international and its subjects are constituted through these practices in and across the city. Öncü and Weyland’s inquiry is very relevant in this sense: “how the ‘global’ is translated by different groups of urban actors into practices which transform the physical as well as social and cultural spaces of the city” (1997: 2). Looking only at the official (state officials, security professionals, etc) and making everyday lives of people invisible (re)produces a top-down approach, a “god’s eye view” (Walker, 1988: 7). On the contrary, realizing the latter as inherent to the international opens up the possibility of recognizing critical agency and “forms of hidden, everyday forms of resistance” although not visible in traditional IR (Richmond, 2011a: 423). Taking into account the latter enables any possibility of alternatives from below. Moreover, looking at the city and the everyday lives of people makes visible the interconnections between here and there, local and global showing that state is not the only mediatory in these relationships. Looking at the everyday directly challenges any

imagination based upon a “simple reading in such binary oppositions as traditional/modern, indigenous/foreign or local/global” (Öncü and Weyland, 1997: 10) rather highlighting the interconnections, interactions and blurred lines between those categories.

There are mainly two ways the local is emphasized as a site of resistance. One is more institutionalized. It takes the local as its space and derives from the everyday, but as it is institutionalized by mobilization it becomes no longer part of the everyday. Critical social movements are one example of this (Richmond, 2008; Walker, 1988). In relation to the processes of the urban and the international, the next part of this chapter looks at social movements for an understanding of the active local that is not limited to the state borders.

A second way of looking at the local as a site of resistance is focusing on the everyday. The everyday can be a site of reproducing existing power relations or resisting them. However the two processes are not easily separated. It is not that the everyday exists as a reactionary site to a ‘totalizing’ international. Rather, the two mutually interact as the everyday is a site itself that plays a constitutive role. This suggests overcoming the international-everyday binary as well as the global-local binary discussed in Chapter 2.

The everyday does not naturally and necessarily mean critical agency. It may have a role in reproducing disciplinary and exclusionary practices and

understandings more than challenging them. This is the case in relation to the security practices of the urban space which was the subject of the previous chapter. However in the everyday these practices are not taken as they are, plus the everyday can be more active or challenging.

In line with this separation, firstly, the institutionalized and more recognized mode of resistance is discussed. Later the everyday as a less recognized form of resistance and agency is analysed in terms of the security within the city.

4.2. Social Movements

A way of looking at the local as a site of resistance and non-state agency is to examine social movements (Walker, 1988; Magnusson, 1990; Ruiz, 1990; Bilgin, 2002; 2003; Wyn Jones, 1995). Conventional studies of international relations did not have much interest in social movements as they did not in everyday life or ordinary people. Even when their existence is recognized by IR, they have been rendered as social problems (Shapiro, 1996: xv), insignificant or impotent (Walker, 1988: 8), “outside of politics” or tried to be incorporated into the “state-centric political categories” through containing and institutionalizing (Magnusson, 1990: 51). These, however, are of growing interest to many scholars that are critical of the traditional state-centred IR. In

most studies they are seen as hopes for challenging the dominance of state, considered as a challenge to the dominant discourse of IR and as “part of a transformative assault on our inherited notions of authority, legitimacy, and power” (Walker, 1988: 8) because they allow people to understand the constructedness of those notions and how come their constructedness becomes possible. Once this is understood, it is claimed, there comes the possibility of changing “the realities derived from them” (George, 1996: 69). Without exaggerating their power in the present, for Walker (1988), they are hopes for future for two reasons. Firstly, they are expressive of “alternative ways of knowing and acting” (1988: 30), and rethinking the meanings of security and development. Secondly, they attempt at presenting new ways of realizing those new alternatives. What makes these movements even more important is that they form part of daily lives of people, and by this, they are a big part of the processes in which people give meaning to their lives and the world and imagine the international. Hence, they are a chance for surpassing “the dominant ways of thinking, speaking, and acting in modernist political society” from the bottom-up (Walker, 1988: 8). This is against what realist tradition has been arguing - that change “can only come from above, from the rational action of the major powers following rational self-interest” (George, 1996: 52).

Critical social movements are also associated with asserting alternative representations that are based on the experiences of people everywhere. They

reveal that categories such as First and Third World, East and West, North and South are not distinct places but interpenetrated ones (Walker, 1988: 19-21). They represent “new sites of collective political identification” (Connolly, 1996: 153) and newly “emerging forms of human solidarity” (Walker, 1988: 8). They are practices of boundary making in terms of redefining the boundaries of civil society (Camilleri, 1990: 35). In addition to multiple sources of identity-making, critical social movements point to “the multiple sources of insecurity” (Walker, 1988: 122).

Yet, one must approach the issue of social movements with caution and avoid idealizing them (George, 1996: 68). Acknowledging their potential for challenging the dominant discourse and changing it does not mean fixing them as a homogenous unit. On the contrary, it is necessary to recognize that “although they are part of a global struggle in one (interdependent) world, they represent also a politics of difference” (George, 1996: 67).

Focusing on the human agency in the Middle Eastern context, Bilgin (2002) argues for a critical assessment of the social movements case by case as some of them can be statist as well or engage in zero-sum and violent practices. The examples of “the Nestlé Boycott, the anti-apartheid campaign for South Africa and the campaign against nuclear missile deployments in Europe” (2002: 111), women’s movements during the Intifada, and the 1980s peace movements are given as examples of social movements that form a part of the struggle against statist, zero-sum and violent practices. On the other

hand, although providing security and services to some people, Islamist movements such as the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and Hamas are not considered as movements that challenge statism since they aim at seizing the state power adopting violent and zero-sum practices. At this point, the role of the intellectual – in not just assessing these movements, but also serving as guides for them in a reciprocal relationship – becomes crucial (Bilgin, 2002: 112-3; Wyn Jones, 1995).

Walker (1988: 26-32) distinguishes between critical social movements and other movements on the basis of their relation with the dominant discourse and the state power. The others – including old social movements of nationalism and socialism – do not constitute challenges to the dominant discourse; on the contrary they recreate that discourse by attempting at obtaining the state power. The new movements are not homogeneous as well, many of them are “deeply reactionary and parochial”, “act as a mere safety valve, as tame critics co-opting or deflecting the energy available for fundamental change” (Walker, 1988: 30). Critical social movements on the other hand view power as having a say on their own everyday lives, i.e. “control over the way they live” (Walker, 1988: 151) or having a control over their security (Bilgin, 2002: 111). Based on Walker’s *One World Many Worlds* (1988), Magnusson (1990: 52-3) enumerates several features of social movements that are democratic: plurality in the sense that there are multiple movements and one can be part of how many s/he wants; impermanency in the

sense that how long a movement lasts depends on its members' enthusiasm; inchoateness in the sense that there is no authoritative relations, no complete or fixed membership and everyone is involved in the decision-making process and in the activities; inclusiveness so that "anyone can be part of a movement"; and finally unboundedness i.e. not being enclosures with fixed boundaries. This is called "movement-democracy" by Magnusson (1990: 53).

One possible site for critical social movements is the urban space. Starting in 2011, urban space has once again become the point of attention due to social movements that either have urban issues at their core or make their voice through occupying public spaces. In the case of Turkey, the urban project of transforming one of the last parks in Taksim Square into a shopping mall coupled with the violent response given to the protesters is almost a caricature of the regime's neoliberal authoritarianism reflected in speedy privatization of public space and public sectors, urban renewal projects, gentrification, role of construction sector in Turkey, authoritarian responses to any criticism or any protestation, assault on liberties, and police brutality. In this sense, the protests are not only a claim towards right to the city but also right to politics that is not limited to the urban space.

Writing on the context of Arab Spring, Sassen (2013) argues that streets and squares that are mobilized are not public spaces in terms of the traditional European understanding of it, but they are public spaces as Global Street. Even if politicization of public space as Global Street and mobilization

do not result in empowerment of masses directly, it results in their gaining voice, at least making their powerlessness to be heard and made visible. This way they become powerless and not “invisible or impotent” (Sassen, 2013: 24). She includes the Indignados movement in Spain, Occupy Wall Street in the US, the piqueteros in Latin America, and protests in the UK, China and Tel Aviv into examples of public space as Global Street (Sassen, 2011). For Sassen, both politics and history can be (re)made through making their presence heard and seen which is a claim to “rights to the city”, hence “to the country” (2013: 24). For Soguk (2013) the effects of these protests have the potential of going beyond their streets, cities, countries, even regions. Those movements that take place in the parts of the world that are deemed as ‘non-modern’ or ‘not yet modern’ can make those who find themselves on the modern part of this binary question their assumptions. Although the inclination is towards assessing these movements in terms of certain criteria of modernity and not towards assessing modernity itself, there is a possibility that the “moderns” will question modernity itself and not just the binary of modern/non-modern.

If these movements that take place in cities or make a claim towards urban space go beyond their streets, their capacities to (re)make the political and history can go beyond ‘their’ own history (Sassen, 2013). Even in the case that they do not result in concrete change in their own contexts, there is another possibility of change which is (re)making the political and history that

of the way West sees and writes it. These movements might have the potential for the West to acknowledge its interconnectedness (Soguk, 2013).

4.3. The Everyday and Security within the City

Considering the meagre interest in social movements in traditional IR, the everyday attracts even less attention. Understanding the international through everyday life means looking at the international as experienced, constituted, represented and imagined in and through the everyday lives of people. The everyday reveals multiplicities rather than a singular idea of history, time and space.

Looking at popular discourse is one way of looking at the everyday in terms of the international. Salter (2011: 455) wrote, “the everyday is a crucial part of the construction and reification of an ‘international’” in his article where he emphasizes video games as part of everyday among other things. Especially after 9/11, militarization of everyday urban life and popular culture are some themes that are studied focusing for instance on videogames and car-culture (Graham, 2011). Shapiro (2009; 2010) on the other hand looks at literature and cinema that present a discursive mapping of cities.

Approaches that are using Foucaultian insights as well are interested in the everyday as a site where power relations are most visible. It is argued that

power operates through the everyday at the margins making it the site where power shows itself most. Foucault (1980: 39) wrote:

In thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary forms of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies, and inserts itself into their very actions and attitudes, their discourse, learning processes, and everyday lives.

However, the everyday in this sense has a dimension of resistance as well since “where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1980: 95).

In IR, feminist slogan of “personal is political” has been influential as well in terms of the attention given to the everyday as a site where power is perhaps not so visible due to the current analysis of it but where it is “deeply at work” (Enloe, 1997; 2011: 447; Tickner, 2001; Sylvester, 1994; 2002). Enloe (1989: 196) took the statement further and added “international is personal”. Moreover, the everyday consists of the possibility of resistance to these power relations more than it is realized.

Those studies looking at the everyday in terms of resistance start with a warning against idealization and romanticizing (Guillaume, 2011; Richmond, 2011a; Mac Ginty, 2008; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). Outlining how the international studies look at the everyday, in “Resistance and the International”, Guillaume (2011) distinguishes between an idealized view of everyday and a more ‘realistic’ one that is aware of the “incidental” form of resistance. In a romanticized manner, the everyday is directly linked to global

resistance whether in the form of a global civil society mobilized for a global or local cause, or in the form of a resistance at the locality without “global networks of mobilization” struggling against the impacts of globalization (2011: 460). This is discussed above in relation to social movements and the risk of romanticising them. However, Guillaume adds, there is a third strand that approaches the everyday resistance through distinguishing between organized activities which are purposeful and intentional, and “incidental” activities. The incidental form of resistance consists of tactics – a term used by De Certeau – employed by agents who cannot escape the power relations they are part of. In this form of resistance, agency is assumed to be a moment of transformation rather than a complete appropriation of power relations. Michel De Certeau (1984) has been an influential scholar writing on the everyday that comprises the practices through which ordinary people operate. Adopting Foucault’s writings on resistance and De Certeau’s writings on the everyday, Richmond (2011a) makes a similar point to Guillaume in terms of resistance and critical agency not being only about direct opposition: “the point of resistance is to elude power rather than to confront it head on” (2011a: 422). This form of resistance is not revolutionary or mobilized but more of “a conglomeration or aggregation of fragmented and hidden everyday forms of resistance and agencies” that has a capacity of transforming in more “subtle” ways (Richmond, 2011a: 433).

Richmond and Mac Ginty, who write mostly on peacebuilding, place more critical agency on the everyday and local forms of agency. The everyday and local Richmond (2010; 2011b) and Mac Ginty (2011) talk about is not necessarily the ‘official’ local such as local elites and civil society which actually do not represent the everyday. In mainstream IR, resistance is recognized when it occurs through certain ways such as mobilization and civil society that are liberal institutions (Richmond, 2010; 2011b: 17). Moreover, these studies either romanticize the local or focus on violent local practices (Richmond, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2011: 210). However, resistance can be less visible but more “hidden and fragmented” (Richmond, 2011b: 17); it can lead to betterment of conditions or can be negative and seeking to maximize power (Mac Ginty, 2008; 2011: 211-2). Or it can be “simply people getting on with their lives, opting out of the formal structures and norms offered by the liberal peace, and creating their own solutions to local issues” (Mac Ginty, 2011: 212). The everyday is already active and play a role in producing the international through reproducing, resisting or negotiating. As Richmond (2010: 682) stated:

[T]he everyday represents the rebalancing and re-occupation of IR by real and lived experiences rather than merely as the empty and virtual residual space specific to powerful states and elites. It offers an opportunity for empathetic relations to emerge between the international and the everyday.

If one thinks in security terms, looking at the everyday and ordinary people's experiences become ever more important. This weakens the presumed monopoly of state over security – the *raison d'être* of state (Darby, 2006). Bringing to the fore the alternative security practices enables loosening the grip of state over being the sole security agent. Shifting the focus to the everyday practices of ordinary people makes visible “neighbourhood and more-dispersed practices of self-securing, the shaping and use of public space to provide meeting places, and on the role of dissent as a form of community building” (2006: 460). Darby's suggestion is that rethinking security should involve looking at social suffering since the studies on social suffering are based on everyday life and case studies. This, he wrote “is a vital corrective to the faceless, placeless narratives so characteristic of security texts” (2006: 467). Based on experiences of people, literature on social suffering can help bring the accounts of violence and insecurity, which is constructive of those people's worlds, into the security discourse. Writing on the resistance and the everyday, Darby (2006: 469) argues:

I read the discourse on social suffering as above all directed toward understanding how some individuals and communities can resist the downward spiral of violence – how they can work for renewal in the aftermath of violence. This after all, is why scholars in the field look to the everyday. It is where they have placed their hope.

As security as a concept has been questioned and altered in the direction of including issues that are relevant to the everyday life, critical

approaches to security – whether starting from ‘security practices’ or ‘realities of insecurity’ in their answer to what security is – have an emphasis on the everyday in their own ways. Analyses that look at security practices and discourses take the everyday as a site that is shaped by these practices and that is dominated by security ‘logic’. The everyday has a role in reproducing the dominant security understandings. However, there is a dimension of the everyday that is related to resistance as well. Huysmans (2009) specifically talks about the everyday as a site where security practices and understandings are not received as they are, but “negotiated”, “worked”, “appropriated”, “interacted”. This implies a site that is active rather than “passive, habitual and routinized” (Huysmans, 2009: 205). An analysis that takes the everyday as such requires looking at the process of negotiation and contestation of security practices in their application. It will not suffice to focus on security practices alone (2009: 205).

Emancipatory approaches that take ‘realities of insecurity’ as their starting point take the everyday as a site of struggle in which security understandings are shaped. This means that the answer to ‘what is security’ is designated in the everyday as well and not just through top-down practices. These approaches brought non-state and non-professional actors to the forefront in the politics of security through asking whose definition of security gets to shape the security agenda and who provides security. Moreover, with the aim of deepening and broadening security, thus multiplying agents and

referents of security, these approaches open the possibility for recognizing the non-official agency in the everyday in terms of urban security. This further makes possible an alternative politics of security.

On the other hand, Rowley and Weldes (2012: 515) argue that international security studies have not been paying enough attention to the everyday as a site in which “identities and in/securities are constantly theorized, negotiated and contested”. For the centre of attention of international security studies, they opt for a direction from academia and policy makers towards the everyday security practitioners – the ‘non-experts’ – as both theorists and practitioners of security who “whether explicitly aware of this or not” theorize in/security, prioritize some over others, negotiate or contest them (2012: 521). Thus, what Rowley and Weldes advocate is a shift in the audience and the speakers of the international security studies, speakers being the everyday practitioners of security.

In this sense, looking at the security and the city from this perspective would reveal the agents of security within the city other than the official ones. Local authorities are not just those that are ‘official’ emanating or taking their authority from the state. Political authorities within cities are various; and they do not necessarily claim to be political or have a hierarchized body (Magnusson, 2011).

Including the everyday, the urban-dweller, and the non-professional into the struggle over what security is necessitates an analysis that focuses on their experiences and understandings. It is argued that more than the security literature, the literature that deals with development and its linkages to security is more engaged with this form of study through participatory methods and ethnographic studies (Lemanski, 2012: 63). For instance, Moser and McIlwaine's research (2006) focuses on the urban dwellers, especially the urban poor, who lead a life of routinized violence and experience insecurity on a daily basis in Latin America. Trying to reach for a holistic approach, the authors argue that the "perceptions of the poor people themselves" should be included in researches. According to the writers, through this more participatory approach, those who face insecurities as an everyday experience have a voice in the researches that in the end are examined by policy makers for violence-reduction policies. Most studies that focus on urban dwellers' own experiences and expressions of their everyday lives in mostly segregated communities find out that security issues related to crime, violence, threat of eviction, displacement, demolition of houses, exclusion and marginalization are expressed as dominating their everyday lives and practices (Lemanski, 2012). Urban poverty is regarded as one of the most important issues related to urban security. As a setback on the MDGs it is shown that "improving the lives of a growing number of urban poor remains a monumental challenge" (UN 2011: 4-5 cited in Thomas and Williams, 2012: 303). It is argued that poverty

stricken urban areas experience normalization of violence as a daily occurrence. Gun culture mostly among the unemployed male youth in major cities such as “Lagos, Rio de Janeiro and Nairobi” is one example among many (Thomas and Williams, 2012).

Looking at urban violence as a poverty issue risks linking poor communities directly to violence. This is especially the case when the poorer urban dwellers are represented as the perpetrators of violence and crime, whereas they are more victims than perpetrators. Moreover, urban violence is represented as a threat to the security of the city and the region in some cases. However, associating violence directly with poverty – hence with a group of people – negates their agency (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006: 97). Nevertheless, as a result of vertical and horizontal inequalities, exclusion and marginalization, violence is more likely to exist in poor communities as poverty can accelerate violence (Thomas and Williams, 2012; Moser and McIlwaine, 2006). With the effects of neo-Marxist and Dependency arguments in the 1970s and 1980s, the literature turned towards structural causes rather than criminal pathology for a better understanding of urban violence. With this shift, urban violence escaped from being understood as an individual issue mostly related to urbanization and migration portraying the migrant as the marginal other; it also became a development concern (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006: 90).

Acknowledging the structural factors that link poverty and violence should not necessarily mean disregarding how those people cope with these issues on a daily basis and how they engage in the practices of security. After all, “victimhood and agency are intertwined” (Orjuela, 2010: 105). It is not only the wealthier that resorts to private security for the provision of security. The poorer and excluded communities as well find ways of providing security for themselves through community groups such as gangs, mobs and vigilante groups or in simpler ways such as “dogs, window grilles and high fences” (Lemanski, 2004: 106). Both practices, while producing feelings of security and order for those communities, can produce feelings of insecurity, disorder, exclusion, segregation and violence at the same time.

Thus in their everyday life, people already engage in these practices sometimes in cooperation with officials and at times through opposition. Some urban dwellers find their own systems of securing their neighbourhoods through surveillance (Krause, 2013: 237), while some people engage in ‘planning’ that is not long term but that occurs through temporary moments of appropriation of space that eventually transform the urban space (Mack, 2013: 157).

Urban planning and security through design is a related aspect of these practices that are exemplified above. These examples show that cities are a result of a combination of the everyday or informal actions and the formal processes of design and planning (Calhoun et al., 2013). However, resembling

what Richmond (2010: 689) and Mac Ginty (2011) discuss in the context of “hybrid peace” which is a combination of the liberal form of peace and the everyday-local, this ‘hybrid’ form of planning of urban space can be a more negative one that reflects disciplinary and exclusionary politics, while at the same time it can be a more positive one that reflects the agency of the everyday.

As discussed in the previous chapter, urban planning is an important aspect of security practices in the city. One example of a negative combination is the measures taken against homeless and young people in cities to prevent them from sleeping in public areas, sitting, loitering, and skate-boarding (for example see Moving Sound Technologies, 2014). In London for example, spikes and studs situated outside by a real estate agent to prevent sleeping and sitting has been met with controversy and ended up in people protesting and cementing over the spikes or some establishments removing them (Taylor, 11 June 2014). On the other hand, it is possible to go in the other direction as it was the case when a charity organization raised awareness of homelessness through placing benches that make shelter and sleeping easier in Vancouver public space (Whitnall, 26 June 2014). It is possible to have an inclusionary type of planning and design that can be provided by different agents and that addresses other insecurities. Weber and Lacy (2011) inquires the ways for redesigning security through including others who will bring alternative practices. As technology shapes our understandings of security and insecurity

and of ourselves as well, including others into the process of planning and technology will result in questioning ethico-politically the existing understanding of the relationship between security, design, technology and human beings; hence it will result in changing security politics. One example of this form of ‘critical design’ is Casa Segura which is situated in Arizona desert providing shelter, food and water to those migrants crossing the border illegally (Weber and Lacy, 2011: 1032-1034; Casa Segura, 2014). Moreover, it provides access to internet so that those who are passing can communicate through a website that was created for that purpose.

The combination of informality and formality is as well reflected in the search for security at the everyday through community-based security groups. Although informal groups are depicted as “new urban insurgency”, criminals and at times terrorists, their relationship to the formal authorities is complex. For instance, informal urbanization may be a way of giving up state’s responsibilities of providing security for those informal settlers in the face of urban growth such as formal housing, access to water, sewerage and sanitation. In Cairo starting from the late 1960s, overlooking and even encouraging informal urbanization by the state provided the grounds for a lack of resistance against elite urbanization. Gated communities and elite formal housing hindered possibilities for alternative shelters for the informal settlers while at the same time they were attempts of protection from disordered informal urbanity. Egyptian state prioritized elite housing and did not pay much

attention to overall urbanization of its capital Cairo except for the times when international assistance and funding was provided from Western institutions such as USAID (Dorman, 2009).

Therefore, informality in the city of Cairo both resulted from authoritarian, exclusionary and elitist Egyptian top-down policies and ensured the continuation of these policies at the same time. The government only symbolically acted against informal urbanization through securitizing those zones, and this only happened when the government was concerned being conceived as not being able to control its capital city especially in the eyes of the international community. Through securitization and criminalization of these informal areas, the government showed itself as not tolerating informality. Furthermore, any form of resistance in these areas such as that of Islamist militants was depoliticized. The exclusion of these people from politics was grounded on their informal actions (Dorman, 2009: 436). Most importantly though, prioritization of elite housing over non-elite housing and neglect of informal areas went unnoticed and were not problematized while at the same time attention was paid to the informal areas as the root of all the problems that the city was facing (Dorman, 2009: 436). The case of informal Cairo complicates the picture that informality is a form of direct opposition or a result of power vacuum that state tries to fill. At times it is encouraged by formal institutions unwilling to take the responsibility by preventing and reversing informal urbanization.

Informality and state's neglect of it in Cairo were a result of a combination of factors none of which explained the situation on its own: state's underdevelopment and inability for urban development, liberalization and economic austerity starting in the 1970s, international funding, and authoritarian and exclusionary politics of the state.

Other factors that affect these practices of urban exclusion, displacement and urban renewal include human security discourse reflected in the concerns about the security of residents in ruined buildings and as victims of crimes (Rasmussen, 2007; Jensen, 2010). It as well includes regional security (Jütersonke et al., 2009) and security of the city reflected in the concerns about the zones of danger, crime and violence in the city (Rasmussen, 2007; Jütersonke et al., 2009) and the competitiveness and integration of the city in the global economy (Rasmussen, 2007; Ismail, 2009). At other times, exclusionary practices can be linked to national security, terrorism and global war on terror (Orjuela, 2010) and can be presented as the only way of eliminating the obstacles in front of development, modernization, reconstruction (Orjuela, 2010), and democratization (Jensen, 2010).

As a result several insecurities arise for those that are presented as threats or subjects of security and development. Physical insecurity, exclusion, loss of rights as citizens and loss of rights to the (inner) city, eviction, hence loss of shelter, jobs, belongingness are some of the everyday insecurities experienced by these urban dwellers (Rasmussen, 2007; Jensen, 2010; Orjuela,

2010; Lemanski, 2012). Police forces generally are another source of insecurity due to corruption or inefficiency (Orjuela, 2010; Lemanski, 2012).

These practices that involve both national and international actors reveal the common understanding that those spaces of authority or “security spaces” are unoccupied as they are left empty by the state and their re-appropriation should come easily and naturally (Ismail, 2009). However, albeit informal, partly legitimate actors appropriate those spaces competing and at times collaborating with formal authorities. Urban dwellers find and learn new ways of going on in their everyday lives.

Some of the factors that prepare the ground for these authorities to emerge are long periods of armed conflicts, access to small arms, authoritarianism, indifference of state, migration, deportation, social exclusion, inequality, limited access to formal economy and formal housing opportunities, search for survival in the streets and a place for belonging, structural adjustment programs, privatization and liberalization of urban space (Hammar, 2007; Rasmussen, 2007; Dorman, 2009; Jütersonke et al., 2009; Ismail, 2009; Jensen, 2010; Orjuela, 2010; Lemanski, 2012). These informal authorities take responsibility over securing the neighbourhood, supplying surveillance for preventing crimes and ensuring order, provide education and moral guidance, and provide and engage in alternative money making opportunities (Wood et al., 2007; Dorman, 2009; Ismail, 2009; Lemanski, 2012).

It is possible to argue that, if made visible, urban dwellers and (despite their violent, exclusionary and disciplining action) informal authorities that experience and deal with everyday urban insecurities present a potential for more inclusionary and rights-based understanding of security through their claims and struggles over “urban inclusion, housing and labor” (Jensen, 2010), over democratic rights in terms of formal housing and over right to the (inner) city (Rasmussen, 2007; Ismail, 2009).

It is argued that it is the practices at the bottom that make possible cities to exist rather than sovereign decisions (Magnusson, 2011). Urban space is a specific site that works through a certain way of life. In that, cities hold the potential of peaceful co-existence of different groups. The everyday practices of self-government and self-regulation of people in the urban space make this possible when certain regulations and practices are internalized by its inhabitants and continue to be reproduced. In this sense, cities are “self-organizing” and the potential for peaceful coexistence is already there in the way cities are ‘built’ or come to be organized. At the same time, the city is a site of social struggle where a plurality of politics of security operates. These struggles over the politics of securing and bordering the city can be analysed through ‘the right to the city’ concept.

One of the scholars who wrote and elaborated extensively on the issue of “the right to the city” is David Harvey, according to whom:

The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights. (Harvey, 2008: 24)

The right to the city for Harvey is crucial in the struggle of everyday people for having an equal saying in the process of urbanization which is directly linked to the way capitalism works, hence linked to neoliberalism. He posits right to the city the utmost importance in terms of resistance against urbanization not least because it is the twin process of neoliberalism. Consequently his concluding remarks in his essay on “the right to the city” are “Lefebvre was right to insist that the revolution has to be urban, in the broadest sense of that term, or nothing at all” (2008: 40).

The term originally belongs to Lefebvre who used it in terms of struggles over (re)making of urban space. Similar to the way Harvey adopted it, Lefebvre does not use it in the limited sense of urban environment as a bounded entity or in the sense of a territorial claim to the city, but uses in a more general sense related to urbanization of the planet and blurring of the line between urban and non-urban (Lefebvre, 1970 [2003]). Thus, right to the city signifies as well a claim to a share in the decision-making and (re)making of how the things work, to “a just access to resources” and “a claim upon society” (Gilbert and Dikeç, 2008: 254); it signifies “struggles over the conditions and

inequalities of globalization and urban life” (253). Rather than a territorial, separated and bounded category of urban, the right to the city puts forward and forces an understanding of the urban “as the (re)producer of social relations of power, and the right to participation in it” (254).

But whose right is the right to the city exactly? Lefebvre includes non-citizens in his approach linking the right to the city to “the right to difference”. The right to difference is about resisting and struggling against marginalization, being divided as categories, “discrimination and repression”, “exclusion, segregation, and criminalization” (Gilbert and Dikeç, 2008). Very relevant to the question whose right it is the right to the city, Erensu (2014) questions whether the ‘guests’ in the case of Syrian refugees coming to Turkey have this right as well. What influences the people’s ideas and imaginations living in those cities before ‘guests’ have arrived cannot be separated from their ideas on the nation-state, imaginations of the global, local and urban. She lists some of these interdependent factors as urban policies and foreign policy of the current government especially in terms of Syria, constituting everything that is foreign as a threat including the global asylum regime, and the imagination of the space of urban as a fixed and territorial unit. Then she questions whether it is possible to have a “right to the ‘transit’ city”. In fact, Lefebvre (1989 [2014]) points out that since movement has become the essence of the city, it is impossible to make a separation between those who move and those who do not. Moreover, he points at how the flows of ideas,

peoples, and knowledge make the relations in the city more international. Thus, he claims it is better to talk of the *city dweller* rather than the *citizen*, and *urban citizenship* rather than *national citizenship* in terms of the right to the city since the former terms are more inclusive (Gilbert and Dikeç, 2008). One example of this inclusiveness in terms of the right to the city that forms a potential for security as co-existence is the City of Sanctuary movement that started in the US in the 1980s and in the UK in 2005. Sanctuary cities welcome asylum seekers and refugees who arrive to those cities where a mutual interaction occurs between the newcomers and receivers (Bilgiç, 2014).

For security (within the city) to be security as co-existence, the dominant understanding of security needs to be questioned. As the previous chapter showed, the official discourse of security tends to be exclusionary, violent and produce wider insecurities. To realize this, it is necessary to shift the referents to others than the official agents that define security such as the state and professionals. Urban dwellers' own understandings and everyday practices reveal other insecurities and other ways of 'doing' security. Their struggles in and through the urban space can be a first step of the shift towards an alternative politics of security that is inclusionary and that is responsive to insecurities of the wider community.

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to rethink the everyday and the local as an active site of struggle over the definitions and practices of security and the politics of the international. As the everyday in the city provides a ground for an alternative politics of security, it as well challenges and constitutes alternative borders of the international.

The urban space is taken as a site where global and local, or the international and the everyday are interpenetrated. Thus the categories of the international, the city, the everyday, the global and the local are not really taken as categories or binaries but considered in a relational understanding. In this relationship, the everyday is taken as a site of struggle in which there is the potentiality of highlighting the existing politics of security as exclusionary practices of securing and bordering the city. More importantly, through this struggle between multiple understandings and practices of security that includes informal and formal, non-professional and official, local and international understandings and practices of security, the everyday as the site of these struggles has the potentiality of an alternative politics of security (within the city).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to question the interaction between borders of the international and the city. The main problematic in this relationship was how different interactions resulted in – and in turn shaped by – different understandings and politics of security. In line with this aim, Chapter 2 problematized the traditional imagination of the international that consisted of borders as territorial state walls. It aimed to go beyond a two-sided discussion of a ‘borderless world’ and a world with impervious and rigid state frontiers. To go beyond this discussion, the concept of border was decentred beyond the state, and it was reconceptualised as a practice that constitutes and shapes while demarcating. Through this reconceptualization, different agents of bordering were revealed such as security professionals, urban planners, social movements and ordinary people. Thus, bordering was argued to be a daily

practice rather than a practice only exercised at exceptional moments by the state.

The city as a border area and a site of social struggle with its multiplicity of experiences of time and space was introduced in Chapter 2 to question the borders of the international and the relationship between ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that is increasingly formed within and across cities. It is argued that the relationship of cities to the globalizing economy is crucial for the borders of the international. However, the literature that focuses on this relationship tends to reproduce the binary imagination of global and local similar to the dichotomous imagination produced by IR in terms of the everyday and the international. It is argued that looking at multiple experiences of time and space within cities is a way of overcoming this binary imagination. This is related to two points.

First, it necessitates taking globalization and the processes that are associated with it (neoliberalism, urbanization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization) as occurrences happening ‘in-here’ in relation to ‘out-there’, rather than inherently outside processes with a singular logic. This was discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to the politics of security of the city. It showed how these processes worked through ‘securing’ and bordering the city combined with discourses of human security, national security, global security and international security.

Second, it necessitates taking the everyday as an active site that has a role in these processes through negotiating, challenging, resisting, or working upon. This was discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to the possibility of an alternative politics of security through questioning the potentials of an understanding of security within the city that is inclusionary, right and needs based and based on co-existence. Whereas Chapter 3 focused on the ways in which dominant, exclusionary, and violent security practices shaped the everyday, Chapter 4 inquired the ways in which the everyday shapes and can shape the politics of urban security.

Chapter 3 focused on three sets of practices as bordering the city: warfare, planning and practices related to urbanization such as urban regeneration projects. It is argued that these practices – that are not so independent from each other – securitize the everyday, militarize the urban space, make everyone a potential threat, criminalize certain groups, make everyone responsible for their own and their neighbourhood's security, colonize the everyday and segregate space into centre and periphery-like units such as ghettos, destroy capabilities for resistance, challenge and independence while at the same time depoliticizing these practices through making those issues part of an expertise, technology, planning and development. Moreover, these practices reveal the interconnectedness between 'inside' and 'outside', 'here' and 'there' as security knowledges, practices and techniques circulate and security becomes privatized. The critique of the

existing politics of security that prioritizes certain groups or spaces under the name of security of the city combined with other discourses of security is a first step towards a more bottom-up understanding of security and the borders of the international.

This task is taken up in Chapter 4 where the everyday and local are discussed in relation to agency and resistance. The everyday is not taken as a level of analysis but as a site that transcends boundaries created by binaries of inside-outside. To analyse the potential of resistance, the local is examined in two ways without idealization and romanticization: social movements and the everyday. Through focusing on different voices and experiences within the city, the role of the everyday in the politics of (urban) security is analysed. It is argued that a combination of informal and formal, unofficial and official understandings and practices operate at the everyday urban space constituting the politics of (urban) security. Thus, it is never a simple picture where state officials and security professionals act and others accept or react to those practices of security. Plus, the space where official and formal actors do not act, i.e. space vacated by the state, is never an empty space. Other actors – be it informal, unofficial or ordinary people – are engaged in ‘doing’ security in those spaces in order to provide security or order for themselves.

Starting with such an analysis Chapter 4 inquires the possibility of a politics of security that is oriented towards inclusionary practices of security based on the right to the city approach. This analysis as well provides a

different imagination of the international based on borders cutting across cities, and attempts to bring forward a potential for an imagination that realizes the interconnectedness of the international and the everyday, global and local, making visible both different sources of insecurity and different agents that ‘do’ security in the context of the city.

This thesis had two central arguments. First, it is argued that the way the international exists is interwoven into the everyday life of cities. Cities are centres of global economy, global flows and international decision making processes. This argument that the international exists or works through cities suggests searching the agency of this process in the urban context. This thesis argues, especially after 1980s and the end of the Cold War with neoliberal globalization and urbanization, one way in which the existing politics of the international is sustained is through the politics of security in the urban context. The international and the insecurities stemming from the politics of the international are maintained through bordering, hence (re)organizing the urban space.

The existing security understandings and practices of urban warfare, planning, design, and urban development and regeneration projects are some examples of how politics of security prioritizes order and risk avoidance over other insecurities stemming from socio-economic inequalities. What is more to the point is that the latter insecurities are taken as sources of insecurity for the former ones. This is evident in the way organized and petty-crime, anti-social

behaviour, drugs, community-based security groups are prioritized, and underdevelopment, poverty, and migration is securitized. By way of this, existing politics of security makes unnoticed how these are symptoms of insecurities generated by socio-economic inequalities for different groups of urban dwellers. Existing practices and understandings of security do not only reproduce and depoliticize these insecurities, but produce new ones through bordering cities, by (re)organization of urban space, and produce 'responsible' and 'proper' subjects for the existing politics of security and the international.

By showing the way international is constituted through cities and the way its politics is maintained through politics of security within cities, this thesis highlighted the need for rethinking the international and security. In this sense, rethinking the international is about realizing how it is 'here' rather than 'outside' of state borders. The international is 'here', for instance, in and across cities. Borders of the international, an inside and an outside are located within and across cities. These are constituted, maintained and protected through politics of security. Then, rethinking security is about problematizing the taken for granted understanding of security and realizing the way it becomes an instrument for securing the status quo whether or not the status quo means insecurities for different referents. As different discourses of security with different referents such as city, public, state, region, and international are employed within cities, rethinking security and politicizing security entails

questioning whose security it is and the way boundaries of the political community are drawn through these practices.

The city as a site that witnesses bordering practices of the international is the focal point of this thesis in rethinking the international and security. The everyday life within cities, however, is not passive. Bordering is not only a source of insecurity. It is as well a source of resistance. Urban dwellers daily engage in bordering in cities. This leads to the second central argument of the thesis. This thesis argued that city's significance for the international does not only come from its place in its workings, but more importantly comes from its being the site where potentiality of change lies. It is where people engage, interact with and experience the international daily. Thereby, it is where change can come from. In this light, this thesis highlighted the need for rethinking the everyday to make visible urban dweller's agency and possibility for resistance and transformation as they daily negotiate, consider, and work out, resist and challenge the politics of the international, security and the city. They resist and challenge as well. This thesis argued that a change in who defines what security is and what the sources of insecurity are can be possible within the urban context through urban dweller's claim of right to be involved in the (re)organization of urban space, of 'right to the city' and to difference, hence politics of the international.

Cities have become part of the spatial vocabulary of the international. Through reorganization of urban space, this thesis argued that borders of the

international are practiced and through the existing politics of security these borders are secured. Moreover, the thesis highlighted the city not just in terms of a site where inequalities are reproduced, maintained and depoliticized through politics of urban security that prioritizes order and stability, but as a site where urban dwellers interact with and at times counteract the international and security. This thesis illustrated the city as a site to focus in inquiring the agency of the international and searching potentialities for change.

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