
To My Family



CONCEPTUALIZING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE NON-STATE SECURITY ACTOR: AL QAEDA

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
July 2004

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ABSTRACT

CONCEPTUALIZING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE NON-STATE SECURITY ACTOR: AL QAEDA

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This thesis analyzes the nature of transnational terrorism and the actorness of transnational terrorists in order to answer the question of whether it is possible to give an effective international response to transnational terrorism. A dualistic approach of world politics has been developed in order to understand the 'international' nature of the response on the one hand, and the 'transnational' nature of the threat on the other hand. Accordingly, international nature of the response has been explained with the state-centric world image, while transnational nature of the threat has been explained with the multi-centric world image. Then, the term transnational terrorism has been conceptualized and the differences of the threat perceptions within the multi-centric world, of which transnational terrorism is a part, than those of the state-centric world have been analyzed. Thus, the rise of transnational terrorists as non-state security actors with the help of the multi-centric world and the actorness characteristics of these non-state security actors have been mentioned. The evolution and the characteristics of Al Qaeda transnational terrorist organization, which fits the non-state actorness criteria the best, has been evaluated in order to demonstrate the arguments made. In conclusion, it has been found out that the existing international response mechanisms cannot meet the challenge posed by transnational terrorism effectively. This is because while the response mechanisms are international and developed to meet the challenges posed by states, transnational terrorism is a transnational threat that is posed by non-state security actors, namely by transnational terrorists.

Keywords: Transnational Terrorism, Non-state Security Actor, Al Qaeda, Dualistic Image of World Politics, State-centric World, Multi-centric World

ÖZET

ULUSÖTESİ TERÖRİZMİN KAVRAMSALLAŞTIRILMASI VE DEVLET-DIŞI GÜVENLİK AKTÖRÜNÜN ORTAYA ÇIKIŞI: EL KAİDE

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Bu tez, ulusötesi terörizme etkili bir uluslararası karşılık verilebilir mi sorusunu cevaplayabilmek için, ulusötesi terörizmin doğasını ve ulusötesi teröristlerin aktörlüğünü incelemektedir. Bir yandan, verilmeye çalışılan karşılığın ‘uluslararası’ niteliğini, diğer yandan da karşı karşıya olunan tehdidin ‘ulusötesi’ niteliğini anlayabilmek için ikili bir dünya politikası anlayışı geliştirilmiştir. Buna göre, verilmeye çalışılan karşılığın uluslararası niteliği devlet-merkezli dünya anlayışı ile açıklanırken, karşı karşıya olunan tehdidin ulusötesi niteliği çok-merkezli dünya anlayışıyla açıklanmıştır. Daha sonra, ulusötesi terörizm terimi kavramsallaştırılmış ve ulusötesi terörizmin de parçası olduğu, çok-merkezli dünyadaki tehdit algılamalarının devlet-merkezli dünyadakilerden farklı incelenmiştir. Böylece, çok-merkezli dünyanın yardımıyla ulusötesi teröristlerin aktör olarak ortaya çıkışı ve devlet-dışı aktörlerin aktörlük özellikleri ortaya konmuştur. Yapılan argümanları somutlaştırmak için, bu aktörlük özelliklerini en iyi taşıyan ulusötesi terörist organizasyon El Kaide’nin evrimi ve özellikleri değerlendirilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, var olan uluslararası karşılık mekanizmalarının ulusötesi terörizm tehdidiyle etkili bir şekilde başa çıkmakta yetersiz olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunun sebebi, karşılık mekanizmaları uluslararası ve devletlerin oluşturduğu tehdidlere karşı geliştirilmişken, ulusötesi terörizm tehdidinin ulusötesi ve devlet-dışı aktörler, yani ulusötesi teröristler, tarafından oluşturulan bir tehdit oluşudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulusötesi Terörizm, Devlet-dışı Güvenlik Aktörü, El Kaide, İkili Dünya Politikası Anlayışı, Devlet-merkezli Dünya, Çok-merkezli Dünya

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On 11 September 2001, the World Trade Center and Pentagon of the United States were attacked by terrorists and severely damaged, to a degree that no other actor, including any state, was able to do before in US history. These attacks, first of all, demonstrated that even the world's only superpower, which had until now successfully protected its homeland from the attacks of other states, could be reached and hurt by attacks conducted by transnational terrorists. Another thing these attacks made clear is the changing nature of security threats in the post-Cold War era. Although states continue to pose security threats to each other, other threats, like transnational terrorism, have become security challenges in the system. As a result, states have begun to put terrorism on the forefront of their security agenda and the US has declared a 'war on terrorism'.

An important point here however, is that the measures being taken against transnational terrorism are the same as those that are used against the threats posed by other states. Even the word 'war,' that has been declared on terrorism in the aftermath of September 11, indicates that state-centric mechanisms are the tools that will be used against transnational terrorism. But transnational terrorism is not a security threat that arose from the state-centric world and it is not posed by states. It is a challenge posed by non-state security actors, namely by transnational terrorists. With the help of the processes of globalization, a multi-centric world with multiple actors and security threats rose in a nested manner with the traditional state-centric

world. Transnational terrorists have found a place to grow and become effective within this multi-centric world and started to pose security threats not only to states but also to the people within the state-centric world. Thus, the challenge here is 'transnational'; but the response issued to meet this challenge is 'international'.

Within this framework it is important to study transnational terrorism, which threatens all of us and to pose the question of whether it is possible to give an effective international response to transnational terrorism. In order to be able to answer this question, the differences between the threat perceptions¹ in the multi-centric world, which include transnational terrorism, and traditional threat perceptions, must be understood. To do so is important because the answer to the question lies in the rise of the transnational terrorists as non-state security actors, thus as threat posers, whose nature can be explained via the nature of the threats perceived in the multi-centric world. The response to the threats they pose must be formulated according to this fact. In other words, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing response mechanisms against a new threat and to find out what kind of a response should be given, we must first of all understand with what we are confronted. Suggestions in the literature, on how we should respond to transnational terrorism, that fail to clarify this problem, remain short of meeting the challenge. Therefore, this thesis will deal with the question of whether it is possible to give an effective response to transnational terrorism with the existing international response mechanisms, by clarifying the problem we face, i.e. the rise of transnational terrorism as the new threat of the era, and transnational terrorists as the non-state security actors that pose this threat. In doing this, how international terrorism has

¹ Throughout this thesis the word "perception" is not used to indicate that the threats in both the state-centric world and multi-centric world are not real. They are real and the threats in the multi-centric world threaten the state-centric world as well and vice versa. However, the issues perceived in the

been transformed into transnational terrorism and how transnational terrorism has become increasingly independent from the states and state-centric system will be explained. Moreover, how much the existing international response mechanisms meet the challenge posed by this transnational terrorism threat will be evaluated. It is important to discuss these issues both at the theoretical and practical levels. At the theoretical level this discussion will help us to understand the structure of the global system, and the nature of the challenges and actors that arise within it. At the practical level, this discussion will be useful to see the shortcomings of the existing counterterrorism policies and find better ways to meet this challenge that threatens the well-being and security of the people all around the world.

In discussing whether it is possible to give an effective response to transnational terrorism with the existing international response mechanisms, this research relies primarily on qualitative analysis of existing books, articles, and documents. Furthermore, from time to time, statistical data will be presented in order to strengthen the arguments. Furthermore, in order to operationalize the arguments made Al Qaeda, which is the best example in order to demonstrate the arguments in this thesis, has been studied as a case.

On the other hand, at the theoretical level, a toolbox methodology will be used. In other words, several different theoretical perspectives will be utilized depending on which one explains the issue at hand better. This methodology is adopted because a single theoretical perspective falls short of explaining all the aspects of the question posed. For example, a realist perspective fails to explain the emergence of non-state security actors within the system, an element that must be explained in order to understand the rise of transnational terrorists as non-state

multi-centric world as threats are not perceived as threats in the state-centric world. Therefore, "perceived threats" is used here to indicate that they are threats and are *accepted* as such.

security actors. On the other hand, a liberal perspective fails to explain why a strictly international and state-centric response is adapted against transnational terrorism. Therefore, a dualistic image of world politics, which is ideal for explaining each and every aspect of the question whether the existing international response mechanisms meet the challenge posed by transnational terrorism in an effective manner, has been developed. In order to understand why a strictly international response has been given, the state-centric world image has been adapted; while multi-centric world, image that co-exists and intersects with the state-centric one, is used to explain the rise of the transnational terrorists as non-state security actors and the emergence of issues like transnational terrorism as new security threats within the system.

Within this framework, in the following chapter, the theoretical bases of the thesis, namely the evolution of the dualistic image of world politics, will be explained. Firstly, the practical evolution of the state-centric and multi-centric worlds that constitute the dualistic image of world politics will be mentioned. Secondly, the theoretical roots of these two worlds in the area of international relations theories will be examined. In doing this, the reflections of the state-centric world in realism and of the multi-centric world in liberalism and the English School will be dealt with. The works of James N. Rosenau, who examined the state-centric world and multi-centric world concepts in his studies, will also be analyzed, as will the works of other authors who adopted a dualistic perspective without referring to it or to its theoretical foundations. Finally, my views on why the dualistic approach of world politics is the most suitable approach in trying to answer the research question of this thesis will be mentioned.

In the third chapter, the concept of transnational terrorism will be clarified. First of all, the problem of defining terrorism in general and transnational terrorism

in particular will be stated. Then how the term is used throughout this study will be mentioned. Later, the differences of transnational terrorism, as it is defined in this study, from other types of violence and terrorism will be explained by emphasizing the differences of transnational terrorism, which finds itself a place in the multi-centric world, from international terrorism, which is a part of the threat perceptions of the state-centric world.

In the fourth chapter, the threat perceptions, reference objects of security and security actors in the multi-centric world will be examined. But before these, the threat perceptions within the state-centric world and the primacy of the 'state' as the only important actor in the state-centric system will be briefly explained in order to state the differences of the threat perceptions within the multi-centric world from the threat perceptions of the state-centric world better. Then, the multiple threat perceptions in the multi-centric world, including socio-economic, cultural, environmental, and non-traditional military-political threats, will be explained. Thirdly, multiple reference objects of these multiple threats, including individuals, different kinds of groupings, societies, besides states, will be mentioned. Finally, non-state security actors in the multi-centric world, like individuals, groupings, MNCs/TNCs, NGOs and INGOs, transnational organized crime organizations, and transnational terrorist organizations, will be dealt with. These issues in the fourth chapter will be examined in order to show how the nature of the threats in the multi-centric world, including transnational terrorism, with multiple referent objects and security actors differ from that of the state-centric world. This is an important step for clarifying the problem we face, namely the rise of transnational terrorism as an important security threat in today's world.

In the fifth chapter, the actorness of transnational terrorists will be explained. In doing this, firstly, state support to terrorism -which made terrorism international in the Cold War era- will be mentioned. Secondly, the transnationalization of terrorism by freeing itself from the control of and dependency on states with the help of globalization in the post-Cold War era will be examined in order to explain the emergence of transnational terrorists as actors in the system. Thirdly, other characteristics that attribute actorness to transnational terrorists will be dealt with.

In the sixth chapter, Al Qaeda will be studied as a case study in order to demonstrate the actorness of transnational terrorists. Therefore, firstly, the historical evolution of Al Qaeda will be examined. Then, the actorness of Al Qaeda will be analyzed based on the criteria set in the fifth chapter.

In the conclusion part of the thesis, the research findings will be stated and the extent to which existing international response mechanisms are appropriate to meet the challenges posed by transnational terrorists as non-state security actors will be evaluated.

CHAPTER II

THE EVOLUTION OF THE DUALISTIC IMAGE OF WORLD POLITICS

Throughout this thesis the answer to the question whether it is possible to give an effective international response to transnational terrorism will be sought. In order to be able to answer this question the nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorism will be examined. A part of the nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorism is the non-state actorhood of transnational terrorists as perpetrators. One theoretical perspective alone cannot explain every aspect of these issues. In order to draw a clearer picture, the question posed above can be said to have roughly two major parts. The first part is the 'international' nature of the response mechanisms that are used to meet the challenges posed by transnational terrorism. This strictly 'internationalness' of the response can best be explained with the state-centric image of world politics and thus with the realist paradigm. The second part of the question is the transnational nature of the threat and its being posed by transnational non-state security actors. This part of the question can best be understood via the multi-centric image of world politics and liberal paradigm, and to a lesser extent by the English School. If we look from the other way around, the rise of the non-state security actors and transnational threats cannot be explained by the realist paradigm, while liberalism cannot explain the strictly international nature of the response. Therefore, a perspective that combines different aspects of these approaches is necessary. Such a combination must be developed based on which perspective explains the issue at hand better. Thus, a dualistic image of world politics will be developed here.

Accordingly, the strictly international nature of the response that is adopted against transnational terrorism will be explained by the state-centric world image, while transnational terrorism as the security threat and transnational terrorists as non-state security actors will be explained by the multi-centric world image. However, the most important aspect of the dualistic image of world politics is that it accepts and explains the existence of the state-centric and multi-centric worlds together in an interacting and intersecting manner. From the beginning onwards, it is worth to remind that this duality in world politics is not a visible matter but a conceptual one.

Throughout this chapter, the practical and theoretical evolution of the dualistic image of world politics will be explained. Firstly, the practical evolution of the state-centric and multi-centric worlds will be dealt with. Secondly, the theoretical roots of the state-centric world within the realist paradigm, and of the multi-centric world within liberalism and English School will be examined. Furthermore, also as a part of the theoretical evolution of the dualistic image of politics, the works of James N. Rosenau and those of some other authors will be analyzed. Finally, in the third section of this chapter, my views on why the dualistic approach of world politics is the most suitable approach in explaining today's events and for answering the main research question of this thesis, namely whether it is possible to give an effective international response to transnational terrorism, will be stated.

2. 1 The Practical Evolution of the Dualistic Image of World Politics

2. 1. 1 The Practical Evolution of the State-centric Image of World Politics

The roots of the state-centric world dates back to the Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648 after the Thirty Years' War conducted among the major powers of Europe. With this treaty 'state' had been put at the center of world politics and the

major principles of the state-centric world were determined. According to these principles, state has been recognized as sovereign both internally (the state is the sole supreme authority within its own territory and over its own population) and externally (no state has the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states and each state has the right to act independently in determining its domestic and foreign policies). Thus, terms like 'joint' or 'pooled' sovereignty were unthinkable.² Furthermore, although there may be physical differences among the states, each and every state was recognized as legal equals in the system. This means that there is no superior authority that controls the states in the system. Thus, having a demarcated territory with a loyal population, the sovereign rights over these territory and population, being legally equal and independent, and having been recognized by others in the system as such became the major characteristics of states that constitute the system as the sole actors within it.³

Of course, these states were not 'nation-states' from the beginning onwards. The states began to become nation-states from the 19th century onwards and that became the rule of the day in the 20th century.⁴ A strong and shared identity emerged among people who constituted the population of a state and who came to be referred

² Scholte, Jan Aart. 2001. "The Globalization of World Politics." In John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 20-21. Here, 'joint' sovereignty means the joint rule of two or more states over the same territory. For example, it is argued that in Taba Negotiations between Israel and Palestine joint sovereignty over holy sites had been proposed but no solutions were reached. For more detail about this issue see Lefkovits, Edgar, "Olmert: No International Control of 'Sacred Zone'", *Jerusalem Post*, January 24- 2001. Available online:

<<http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2001/01/24/News/News.20156.html>>. 'Pooled' sovereignty means voluntary subjection of states some of their sovereign rights to supranational institutions. For example, the members of the European Union agreed to subject themselves to supranational institutions like the European Court.

³ Teschke, Benno. 2002. "Theorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism", *European Journal of International Relations*, 8 (1):6. Hirst, Paul. 2001. *War and Power in the 21st Century*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 16.

⁴ Rothgeb, John M., Jr. 1993. *Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 24. For a more detailed information on the developments of nations and nationalism see Cobban, Alfred. 1969. *The Nation State and National Self-Determination*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.

as the 'nation'. In order to reinforce this sense of being a nation and the feelings of loyalty to the country, each state developed a distinctive flag of its own, "inspirational national anthems and oaths, and other rituals of citizenship and patriotism that are performed at public ceremonies."⁵ Therefore, the relations among the sovereign nation-states, the sole actors in the system, started to be called as 'international relations' and the rules accepted in the Peace of Westphalia had continued to be the major principles of the 'international' system. The Westphalian system and the rules it brought have been the roots of the international law that regulates the relations among these nation-states.

Within this system, composed of sovereign equals and no central international supreme authority, the states have to survive by their own means. They perceive threats from other states to their territorial integrity and independence. Therefore, they try to strengthen their military in order to secure themselves in the system. Military capabilities became an essential component in the foreign policy of all states in order to pursue national security and national goals. States continuously developed new military tactics and weapons systems⁶ in order to enhance their power. Hence, 'power' has been the main concern of states, and power was calculated in military terms and mostly in connection with the ability of states to conduct war.⁷ Thus, states conducted lots of wars including two major wars that were called world wars. At the end of the Second World War, a Cold War started to be fought between two blocs composed of states. These blocs used lots of tactics in order to defeat each other, and these tactics included the utilization of terrorist

⁵ Brown, Seyom. 1995. *New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics*. (Post-Cold War edition) New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 11.

⁶ Rothgeb, John M., Jr. 1993. *Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1.

⁷ Sprout, Herold and Margaret Sprout. 1971. *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth*. New York: D. Van Nostrand, 165.

groups. Hence, the major threat continued to be perceived from states and the object of these threats were also states as the sole actors in the system. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the Cold War ended, however states continued to perceive threats from other states, this time for example from the so-called 'rogue' states⁸, like Iraq and North Korea. Also the rise and strengthening of other states, like China and India, were perceived as threats to national security by some states, including the US.⁹ Therefore, the response mechanisms they developed to meet the perceived security challenges have always been state-centric and against other states that were perceived as enemies. This was a major result of the state-centricity of the world. Both threats and responses were state-centric because the only important actor that matter was states.

However, towards the end of the 20th century, by the help of the intensification of the processes of globalization, the situation concerning the world politics started to change. New security challenges with new and non-state security actors started to come to the forefront and threaten the well-being and life of the people as well as states. These issues can best be explained with the evolution of the multi-centric world in a nested manner with the state-centric one.

2. 1. 2 The Practical Evolution of the Multi-centric Image of World Politics

Towards the end of the 20th century new and non-state actors started to play important roles in the world politics besides the sovereign states. They challenged the sovereignty of the states by representing alternative power centers towards which the individual citizens of the states can shift their loyalties. Furthermore, individuals

⁸ The term "rogue states" was first used by the US for states that do not abide by international norms and laws.

⁹ Brown, Seyom. 1995. *New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics*. (Post-Cold War edition) New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 140-176.

themselves started to play significant roles in world politics as a result of the improvements in their skills by the help of the developments in communications and transportation technologies and improved education. The processes of globalization can be used in explaining the evolution of these developments. At the end a multi-centric world image with multiple actors and issue areas emerged and it intersects the state-centric world. In order to make further clear what we mean by multi-centric image of world politics it is worth first to state its characteristics; then, since globalization explains the development of these characteristics, in order to understand how this type of world image evolved, we should identify what we mean by globalization and what globalization means for the development of the characteristics of the multi-centric world.

2. 1. 2. 1 The Characteristics of the Multi-centric World

The multi-centric world¹⁰ can be said to have four major characteristics. The first one is that there are multiple actors within the multi-centric world. This means that states are not the only actors that matter in the system. There are other important and non-state actors that challenge the sovereignty of the states by providing alternative power centers for individual loyalties. Furthermore, these actors emerge as threat posers within the system, thus threats to the security of the state and its citizens come not only from other states but also from these non-state actors.

The second characteristic of the multi-centric world is the loyalty shifts of the individuals from states towards other transnational entities. This has two main

¹⁰ In some studies the term 'multi-centric world' is understood in the meaning of multipolarity, thus as the existence of multiple states in the international system as important actors. (for a comprehensive explanation of this issue see Wolfish, Daniel, and Gordon Smith. 2000. "Governance and Policy in a Multicentric World", *Canadian Public Policy – Analyse de Politiques*, 16(2): 51-72. However, throughout this study this term will not be used in that meaning. The way I use the term is explained within the text.

reasons. The first reason is, as stated above, the emergence of alternative power centers that meet the expectations of the individuals better than the state of which they are citizens. The second reason is the rise of global consciousness of the individuals and the improvements in their skills. These empower individuals and they associate themselves with transnational communities. As a result the sovereignty of the state is further challenged.

The third characteristic of the multi-centric world is the multiple threat perceptions. This means that issues like impoverishment, spread of infectious diseases, uncontrollable migration, identity crisis, and environmental problems that remain outside the borders of traditional military security problems are also perceived as threats in the multi-centric world. The decline in the importance of distances and borders, and increase in the speed of interactions with transnational and supraterritorial character, resulted in the spread of these threats all over the world. It is to say, the effects of these problems that seem to be effecting only the underdeveloped parts of the world can be felt all over the world including the developed countries as a result of the processes of globalization. The emergence of these multiple security threats itself is mostly a result of the shrinking distances and borders, faster interactions and the emergence of multiple actors that may be threat posers besides the states. These problems threaten not only the states, but also the individuals, groups, and societies. At the end, since individual states cannot cope with these threats that transcend individual state borders alone, their sovereignty is further challenged.

The fourth characteristic of the multi-centric world is actually the result of the three characteristics mentioned, i.e. the weakening of the sovereignty of the state in its Westphalian meaning. As stated above the sovereignty of the state is weakened as

a result of the emergence of other non-state actors as new power centers, empowerment of individuals and loyalty shifts of them from states towards these new entities, and the emergence of new security threats that transcend state borders. The role of globalization in the evolution of all these characteristics is crucial. To that role we now turn.

2. 1. 2. 2 The Concept of Globalization and its Impacts on the Development of the Characteristics of the Multi-centric World

Globalization as a concept can be and is defined in many different ways depending on one's perspective towards the world.¹¹ Globalization is used throughout this study with two meanings, namely as liberalization and deterritorialization, in explaining the evolution of the characteristics of the multi-centric world. The first conceptualization is based on the economic and technological aspects of globalization and the second one is mainly based on the political aspects of globalization. Thus, these two conceptualizations of globalization together provide a conceptual lens to understand the facilitating role of globalization for the rise of multiple security threat perceptions in the multi-centric world, non-state security actors and power centers, loyalty shifts of individuals towards these power centers and the challenge to state's sovereignty in its Westphalian sense.

Firstly, globalization as liberalization means the large-scale opening of state borders. This is a result of the removal of regulatory barriers to international trade, travel, financial transfers, and communications.¹² This type of globalization includes

¹¹ For example, internationalization, universalization, modernization, Westernization/Americanization are among the meanings attributed to globalization.

¹² Scholte, Jan Aart. 1997. "Global Capitalism and the State", *International Affairs*, 73(3): 431.
Hughes, Christopher W. 2002. "Reflections on Globalization, Security and 9/11", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 15(3): 423.

the improvements in technology that facilitated and sped up the worldwide travel, transportation and communication.

Secondly, globalization as deterritorialization, or supraterritoriality, means that there is an increase of trans-border relations, thus transcendence of borders. Borders mean here “the territorial demarcations of state jurisdictions, and associated issues of governance, economy, identity and community.”¹³ Thus global relations are less tied to territorial frameworks, in terms of both borders and distances. The world is becoming a single place. As a result of technological developments like telephones, computer networks, radio, television, or air travel, persons all over the world have easy and quick contact with each other. As an example of such global phenomena we can give the CNN broadcasts and Visa credit cards, which are virtually unrestricted by territorial places, distances, and borders.¹⁴ Another example is that telecommunications and electronic mass media move anywhere across the planet instantaneously.¹⁵ Furthermore, a global consciousness is emerging and people start to perceive the world as a single place and affiliate themselves with communities, be it religious, ethnic or otherwise, that transcend state’s territorial borders.¹⁶ Therefore, individual loyalties may shift from states to other global communities. This empowers individuals while decreasing state sovereignty. This does not mean of course, that states as territorial units and territorial geography have lost all their relevance. There are still many situations where territorial places, distances, and borders are important, as in the case of migration.¹⁷ Nevertheless,

¹³ Scholte, Jan Aart. 1997. “Global Capitalism and the State”, *International Affairs*, 73(3): 430.

¹⁴ Scholte, Jan Aart. 1999. “Global Civil Society: Changing the World?”, *CSGR Working Paper*, 31(99): 9.

¹⁵ Scholte, Jan Aart. 2002. “Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance,” *Global Governance*, 8: 286.

¹⁶ Scholte, Jan Aart. 1997. “Global Capitalism and the State,” *International Affairs*, 73(3): 431-432.

¹⁷ Scholte, Jan Aart. 1999. “Global Civil Society: Changing the World?”, *CSGR Working Paper*, 31(99): 9.

globalization as supraterritoriality is a new phenomenon. As stated by Jan Aart Scholte:

The world of 1950 knew few or no airline passengers, intercontinental missiles, satellite communications, global monies, offshore finance centers, computer networks, or ozone holes.¹⁸

However, today territorial spaces and global spaces coexist and interrelate with each other.

In sum, globalization as liberalization empowered non-state actors, including individuals, by making it easier for them to acquire the necessary means for being effective actors in world politics. Moreover, globalization as deterritorialization resulted in the increase of transborder relations, i.e. relations less tied to territory. This type of relations led to the emergence of a global awareness/consciousness among the individuals. Thus, they started to associate themselves with transnational communities, like religious and ethnic ones, that transcend state boundaries. These loyalty shifts weakened state sovereignty. Furthermore, globalization both as liberalization and deterritorialization resulted in the emergence of security threats other than military ones. These threats, like immigration and environmental problems, transcend state boundaries. They also threaten the well-being and existence of individuals and societies besides the states. Since these threats transcend the boundaries of one state, states cannot deal with them alone. This also contributes to the weakening of state sovereignty. Thus, globalization, as liberalization and deterritorialization, has affected the evolution of the characteristics of the multi-centric world.

¹⁸ Scholte, Jan Aart. 2002. "Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance," *Global Governance*, 8: 286.

2. 1. 3 The Dualistic Image of World Politics

The outcome of the evolution of the multi-centric world that interacts and intersects with the state-centric one is a dualistic image of world politics. It is worth reminding here that this duality is not a visible one but rather a conceptual image of world affairs. This dualistic image of world politics can be roughly pictured as in figure 1.




FIGURE 1: The Dualistic Image of World Politics

Besides its practical evolution, the reflections of this dualistic image of world politics can be seen in the field of international relations theories as well. Knowing the theoretical evolution of the dualistic image of world politics is also necessary to understand and explain the aspects of the question of whether it is possible to give an effective international response to transnational terrorism. This is because theories are developed to understand the practice easier and better. Therefore, the next section of this chapter is devoted to the explanation of the theoretical evolution of the dualistic image of world politics.

2. 2. The Theoretical Evolution of the Dualistic Image of World Politics

Actually in the field of International Relations dualistic thinking has always been commonplace although the dualities that are referred to vary. Scholars tend to think on the basis of external vs. internal, high politics vs. low politics, North vs. South, developed vs. underdeveloped, core vs. periphery, premodern vs. modern, zone of peace vs. zone of conflict, etc.. All of these dualities, some conceptual some geographical/territorial, exclude each other and are usually defined in an oppositional manner. However, the duality between state-centric and multi-centric worlds, as explained here, is a deterritorialized one and is different from the old types of dualities. The state-centric world and the multi-centric world do not exclude each other but they intersect. Those old types of dualities seemed to have remained within the state-centric world and are not part of the deterritorialized duality between the state-centric and multi-centric worlds.

The reflections of the emergence of a duality between the state-centric and multi-centric worlds can also be seen in theoretical studies. By looking at these studies we can observe the theoretical evolution of the dualistic image of world politics, mainly within the liberal paradigm and to some extent in the studies of English School scholars. Furthermore, there are scholars who used this dualistic approach of world politics without referring to its theoretical dimensions but by taking its existence as an assumption in their studies. These studies are useful to understand the theoretical evolution of the multi-centric world that intersects with the state-centric world. However, in order to understand the strictly international nature of the state-centric world and its acceptance of states as the sole important actors in the international system we should look at the realist paradigm. Since the newly emerging security problems and non-state actors cannot be placed within the realist

paradigm, developing another perspective to understand these issues became necessary. This situation contributed to the evolution of a dualistic image of world politics theoretically.

Within this framework, in this part of the thesis, first, in order to explain the reflections of the features of the state-centric world in international relations theory, the realist perspective will be briefly analyzed. Then, in order to explain the theoretical foundations of the multi-centric world that intersects with the state-centric world and the duality this situation creates, arguments in liberalism and to a lesser extent the English School will be examined. Also, as part of the theoretical evolution of the dualistic image of politics the works of James Rosenau, who dealt with state-centric and multi-centric worlds in his studies, and the works of some other scholars that utilize a dualistic perspective in their studies without openly referring to it, will be briefly evaluated.

2. 2. 1 The Theoretical Evolution of the State-centric World Image

As stated before, while explaining the characteristics of the state-centric world, in the state-centric world sovereign states are accepted as the only important actors. States are responsible for protecting their own territory, population, and the way of life of their citizens. Since there is no superior authority in the international arena that is above the individual collection of the sovereign states, states have to survive by their own means. For states, greater power means a better chance to survive. Here, power is defined narrowly in military strategic terms. Thus, states continuously try to improve and increase their military means and strength. However, this may be perceived as offensive by other states with the result that they will increase their military means and strengths as well. Therefore, while trying to

improve their own security, states threaten the security of other states. This is called as “security dilemma”. Therefore, more security for one means less for others. This is a “zero-sum game”. As a result international agreements and cooperation cannot last forever. Each state pursues its own national interests. Therefore, response to a common threat can only be strictly “international” and is limited within the borders drawn by the national interests of individual states. All these characteristics of the state-centric world are among the major assumptions and arguments of the theories in realist paradigm. Although there are differences among different versions of realism, the above mentioned assumptions and arguments are common in all of them. Thus, theories in the realist paradigm can be shown for the theoretical evolution of the state-centric image of world politics.¹⁹

2. 2. 2 The Theoretical Evolution of the Multi-Centric World Image

The theoretical foundations of the multi-centric world can be seen in the liberal paradigm and to a lesser extent in some arguments of the English School. These theoretical approaches can be said to accept the dual nature of world politics. For example, liberal theories accept the co-existence of states and non-state actors in the system. These theories also accept the importance of multiple issues besides the traditional security concerns. In order to explain the theoretical evolution of the

¹⁹ For a detailed textbook explanation of the theories in the realist paradigm see Jackson, Robert H. and Georg Sorensen. 2003. *Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baylis, John and Steve Smith. 2001. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press. For a textbook explanation and original texts see Viotti, Paul R. and Mark V. Kauppi. 1999. *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. For original works see Carr, E. H. 1939. *Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. London: Macmillan. Hobbes, T. 1946. *Leviathan*. Oxford: Blackwell. Machiavelli, N. 1961. *The Prince*. Trans. G. Bull. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Mearsheimer, J. 1995. “A Realist Reply,” *International Security*, 20(1): 82-93. Morgenthau, H. J. 1960. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 3rd edition. New York: Knopf. Thucydides. 1954. *History of Peloponnesian War*. Trans. R. Warner. London: Penguin. Waltz, K. 1959. 1959. *Man, the State, and War*. New York: Columbia University Press. Waltz, K. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley among others.

multi-centric world we will now analyze the arguments of liberal and English School theories.

2. 2. 2. 1 Liberal Paradigm and the Dualistic World Image

2. 2. 2. 1. i Pluralism

The first theoretical approach we should consider while analyzing the theoretical evolution of the multi-centric world image, which co-exists with the state-centric world, is pluralism. According to pluralism, alongside the states, non-state actors, like Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Multinational Companies (MNCs), international banks, international organizations, transnational civil society organizations, transnational groupings including criminal organizations and terrorists, are important entities in international relations as independent actors in their own rights. There are transnational relations between states and these non-state actors that operate across national borders.²⁰ Both governmental and private organizations may transcend state boundaries and form coalitions with their foreign counterparts.²¹ Furthermore, according to the transnationalism within the pluralist paradigm there are ties between societies that include much more than state-to-state relations.²² This increase in transnational ties and actors in the 20th century is largely a result of the increase in technology, communication, and economic ties. Thus, according to pluralists, the state-centric model of world politics is no longer enough

²⁰ Viotti, Paul R. And Mark V. Kauppi. 1999. *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 7-8.

²¹ Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye (eds.). 1971. *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1974. "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations," *World Politics*, 27(1): 39-62. Peterson, M. J. 1992. "Transnational Activity, International Society, and World Politics," *Millennium*, 21(3): 371-388. Risse-Kappen, Thomas (ed.). 1995. *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cronin, Bruce. 2002. "The Two Faces of the United Nations: The Tension between Intergovernmentalism and Transnationalism," *Global Governance*, 8(1): 53-71.

to grasp the nature of world affairs in the present century, and an alternative image of the world, which includes non-state actors and multiple issue agendas, is required.²³

2. 2. 2. 1. ii Functionalism, Neofunctionalism and Integration Theories

As a continuation of this pluralist school of thought, David Mitrany, mentioned the importance of transnational ties. According to him, collaborative responses from states are necessary in order to deal with the proliferation of common technical problems with which the individual states cannot cope alone. According to Mitrany, successful collaboration in one area would lead to further collaboration in related fields as a result of the benefits all states gain. Thus, states and societies will become increasingly integrated due to this expansion of collaboration in technical fields.²⁴ Although the functionalism of Mitrany was mainly concerning technical issues, Ernst Haas attributed a political dimension to this line of thought. According to the neofunctionalism of Ernst Haas, “political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states.”²⁵ Thus, he is explaining the loyalty shifts and the ‘pooling’ of sovereignty, which create supranational entities that at the end may lead to international integration. The European Communities, which later became the European Union, are the most common example for this. In general, the integration literature pays attention to economic, social, and technical transactions besides

²² Rosenau, James N.. 1980. *The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalisation of World Affairs*. New York: Nichols, 1.

²³ Viotti, Paul R. And Mark V. Kauppi. 1999. *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 211-212.

²⁴ Mitrany, D.. 1948. “The Functional Approach to World Organization”, *International Affairs*, 24(3): 350-363.

²⁵ Haas, Ernst B.. 1958. *The Uniting of Europe*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 16.

political and military ones and focuses on interest groups, transnational non-state actors and public opinion alongside the states.²⁶

2. 2. 2. 1. iii Regime Theories, Liberal Institutionalism and Interdependence Theories

Another theoretical perspective that contributed to the evolution of the dualistic image of world politics is the neo-liberal theories of regimes, which claim that international regimes can play an important role by helping states to realize their common interests. Non-state actors, along with states, are important according to this perspective as well. Sometimes non-state actors in combination with the states shape the international regimes along the line of which international politics are conducted. Also, they sometimes magnify and mitigate the effects of the regimes. Furthermore, non-state actors sometimes provide sources of information, channels for implementation, or other kinds of support to international institutions. These international institutions, in turn, provide access to the decision-making procedures for weaker states that might otherwise be excluded from the decision-making stages.²⁷ Also, liberal institutionalism attributes to non-state actors this kind of importance.²⁸ The complex interdependence theory of Keohane and Nye can be

²⁶ Haas, Ernst B. 1958. *The Uniting of Europe*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Haas, Ernst B. 1971. "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing." In Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., *Regional Integration: Theory and Research*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 30-31. Haas, Ernst B. 1976. "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration," *International Organization*, 30(2): 173-212. Keohane, Robert O. And Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1975. "International Interdependence and Integration." In Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*. (vol. 8) Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 363-414. Lindberg, Leon N. And Stuart A. Scheingold (eds.). 1971. *Regional Integration: Theory and Research*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Tsoukalis, Loukas. 1991. *The New European Economy: The Politics and Economics of Integration*. New York: Oxford University Press.

²⁷ Hocking, Brian and Micheal Smith. 1995. *World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. (2nd edition) London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 307.

²⁸ Keohane, R. (ed.). 1989. *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*. Boulder, Col.: Westview. Keohane, R. and L. Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security*, 20(1): 39-51. Haas, Ernst B. 1980. "Why Collaborate?"

mentioned here. According to them, there are transnational relations between individuals and groups outside of the state. Transnational actors, like NGOs and transnational corporations, will pursue their own separate goals free from the control of the state.²⁹ There are multiple channels of communication, which can be summarized as interstate relations, relations between states; transgovernmental relations, relations between the different segments of the governmental body of the states; and transnational relations, relations between the actors other than the states like NGOs, MNCs, etc.. Furthermore, there is no clear hierarchy among issues such as the claim that politics and military security are more important than economics or other issues. Also, force is not always an effective instrument of policy. For example, military force cannot be used in resolving economic conflicts among the members of an alliance. As the complexity of actors and issues in world politics increases, the utility of force declines. The manipulation of interdependence, international organizations and transnational actors become more useful instruments of policy under these conditions.³⁰

Keohane and Nye argue that both realism, which takes unitary states as the only prominent actors in international affairs, assumes an hierarchy among issues and pursuing the use of force as the most effective instrument of policy, and complex interdependence, are ideal types of thought. In practice most situations fall in *between these two*, and sometimes complex interdependence explains reality better than realism.³¹ Here, although the authors do not directly mention it, they assume a

Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics*, 32(3): 357-405. Rittberger, Volker (ed.). 1993. *Regime Theory and International Relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

²⁹ Jackson, Robert H. and Georg Sorensen. 2003. *Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 115.

³⁰ Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Jr.. 1977. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little, Brown, 3-37.

³¹ Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Jr.. 1977. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little, Brown, 3-37.

duality between a state-centric world represented by realism and a multi-centric world represented by complex interdependence.

2. 2. 2. 1. iv Sociological Liberalism

Along these same lines of thought, there is also sociological liberalism. According to this perspective international relations is not only about state-to-state relations but also it is about transnational relations, such as relations between people, groups, and organizations from different countries.³² According to many sociological liberals “transnational relations between people from different countries help create new forms of human society which exist alongside or even in competition with the nation-state.”³³ Relations between transnational actors are seen as being more cooperative than those between states. Also there may be overlapping memberships in such transnational groups that facilitate cooperation. Another thing that facilitate cooperation is the “simple act of communication”. Through communication people learn about others, their way of life, customs, practices and concerns. Thus, communication flows influence cultures and people’s sense of political identity. As a result, increased knowledge about people results in “mutual predictability of behaviour” and increases cooperation and even international political integration.³⁴ Actually, this relationship works reciprocally, i.e. transnational and international

³² Jackson, Robert H. and Georg Sorensen. 2003. *Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 109.

³³ Burton, J. 1972. *World Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also see Little, R. 1997. “The Growing Relevance of Pluralism?” In John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 66-86. Nicholls, D. 1974. *Three Varieties of Pluralism*. London: Macmillan.

³⁴ McMillan, Susan M. 1997. “Interdependence and Conflict,” *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41: 33-58. Deutsch, Karl W. 1953. *Nationalism and Social Communication*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Deutsch, Karl W. 1957. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press, 56-57.

organizations encourage habits of communication.³⁵ Even in the neofunctionalist literature discussed above, signs of sociological liberalism can be seen. For example, neofunctionalists' focus on transnational societal characteristics and transnational groups makes them important contributors to sociological liberalism. Furthermore, transnationalists, with their emphasis on the rise of non-state actors at the expense of states³⁶ can be said to contribute sociological liberal understanding.³⁷

2. 2. 2. 1. v The Importance of Individuals

According to liberal thinking, individuals are rational and they are self-interested and competitive up to a point. They share many interests and can engage in cooperative action when this serves their interests better. Moreover, liberal theorists believe in progress. Individuals learn in time and at the end this lead them to cooperate for realizing their interests.³⁸ This shows that in liberal thinking there is the belief that individuals can improve their skills through the processes of learning, and through cooperation with each other they become actors in the international system for their own rights which may differ from those of the states. This, in turn, contributes to the rise of the multi-centric world that intersects with the state-centric world.

³⁵ Deutsch, Karl W. 1957. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press, 189.

³⁶ Burton, John. 1972. *World Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 1971. *Transnational Relations and World Poltics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 1974. "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations," *World Politics*, 27: 39-62. Rosenau, James N. 1980. *The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalization of World affairs*. New York: Nichols. Taylor, Philip. 1984. *Nonstate Actors in International Politics*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview. Willets, Peter (ed.). 1982. *Pressure Groups in the Global System*. London: St. Martin's Press.

³⁷ Kegley, Charles W., Jr. 1995. *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 132-133.

³⁸ Jackson, Robert H. and Georg Sorensen. 2003. *Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 107. Smith, M. J. 1992. "Liberalism and International Reform." In T. Nardin and D. Mapel, eds., *Traditions of International Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 201-224. Rosenau, James N. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*.

2. 2. 2. 1. vi Theories of Globalization

Theorists of globalization also refer to the duality in world politics. For example according to Jan Aart Scholte:

The international realm is a patchwork of bordered countries, while the global sphere is a web of transborder networks. Whereas international links (for example, trade in cacao) require people to cross considerable distances in comparatively long time intervals, global connections (for example, satellite newscasts) are effectively distance-less and instantaneous.

Global phenomena can extend across the world at the same time and can move between places in no time; in this sense they have a supraterritorial and transworld character. ... International and global relations can coexist, of course, and indeed the contemporary world is at the same time both internationalized and globalizing.³⁹

So, globalization has not ended the importance of territorial geography but created a new supraterritorial space alongside and interrelated with it (territorial geography). But, since not every event in today's world is based on the geographical territory and since the sovereignty of a state is over a specified territorial domain, the sovereignty of the state is challenged to some extent. This, at the end, results in loyalty shifts from states towards other sovereignty-free entities with which individuals may associate themselves and this in turn further diminishes the state sovereignty.

2. 2. 2. 2 English School and the Dualistic Image of World Politics

Although the main theoretical roots of dualistic world image can be found in the liberal thinking, there are some arguments that reflect the features of this type of

New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Mingst, Karen. 1999. *Essentials of International Relations*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

world image in the International Society, or English School, as well. According to this perspective, although international society is a 'society of states', it is situated in between 'international system' of states and 'world society' of individuals, non-state actors and global population.⁴⁰ Furthermore, according to Barry Buzan, in order to develop, international society must be supported by the elements of "'world' culture at the mass level"⁴¹ on both subsystem and global scales. On the other hand, the state system is the only candidate, which can provide a stable political framework without which world society cannot emerge. Therefore, while international society provides the political framework of world society, world society provides the civilizational foundation for the development of the international society beyond a basic level.⁴²

Hence, although not to the extent of liberal theories, we can detect a kind of dualistic understanding of world affairs in English School as well. On the other hand, when we combine the arguments of the liberal theories explained above, we can draw a picture in which transnational actors and interactions co-exist with states and besides state-to-state relations. Moreover, there are different issue areas, like environmental degradation, that cannot be dealt with by individual states. This empowers some non-state actors that can deal with such issues better, at the expense of the states. All these points explain the co-existence of a multi-centric world and a state-centric world at the same time and in an intertwined manner. Moreover, the

³⁹ Scholte, Jan Aart. 2001. "The Globalization of World Politics." In John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 15.

⁴⁰ Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*. London: Macmillan. Bull, Hedley, and A. Watson. 1984. *The Expansion of International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Buzan, Barry. 1993. "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School", *International Organization*, 47(3): 340-351.

⁴¹ Buzan, Barry. 1993. "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School", *International Organization*, 47(3): 340.

⁴² Buzan, Barry. 1993. "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School", *International Organization*, 47(3): 340-351.

developments in the individual skills led individuals to emerge as important actors in world politics as well. This is best formulated in the works of James Rosenau.⁴³

2. 2. 2. 3 James N. Rosenau and the Dualistic Image of World Politics

According to Rosenau, the world of today is a turbulent one because in today's world the forces of integration and fragmentation coexist. Furthermore, there are non-state actors that play important roles in world politics besides the states. These non-state actors include individuals, which, as a result of the improvements in individual skills, themselves became important actors and bring different mentalities and perspectives to the issues of the day. Thus, Rosenau looks at the micro level besides the macro level and their relations in analyzing today's world politics. Within this framework, individual skills were improved, sovereignty-free transnational actors gained importance in world politics, the sovereignty of states diminished as the authorities were reallocated and loyalties shifted. Thus, a multi-centric world arose alongside the state-centric world and the former often challenges the later, for example by creating new security challenges that the latter is not ready to cope with, like transnational terrorism. In order to understand these phenomena better, we should look in more detail at Rosenau's explanation of skill revolution, authority reallocation, the diminishment in state sovereignty and the rise of the multi-centric world alongside the state-centric world in more detail.

⁴³ Some of these works are Rosenau, James N. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Rosenau, James N. 1997. *Along the Domestic- Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rosenau, James N. 2003. *Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rosenau, James N. 1995. "Security in a Turbulent World", *Current History*, 94(592): 193-200. Rosenau, James N. 2000. "The Challenges and Tensions of a Globalized World", *American Studies International*, 38(2): 8-22. Rosenau, James N. 1995. "Governance in the Twenty-first Century", *Global Governance*, 1: 13-43. Rosenau, James N. (in print). "Turbulence and Terrorism: Reframing or Readjusting the Model?" In E. Aydinli and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Paradigms in Transition: Globalization, Security, and the Nation State*. New York: SUNY Press.

At the micro level, as a result of a variety of sources like more education, travel, technological innovations like global television, internet, and fiber optic cables, individuals are undergoing skill revolution throughout which they gain greater analytical, emotional, and imaginative skills. Analytical skill means the ability to follow the events happening around the world and bring these into the agenda of their own countries and affect the national policies. Emotional skill means that individuals increasingly know what they want and what they support or are against. Improvement in the imaginative skills means the expansion of the imagination about the nature of other cultures and societies.⁴⁴ Thus, today “the skill revolution has expanded the learning capacity of individuals, enriched their cognitive maps, and elaborated the scenarios with which they anticipate the future”.⁴⁵ The skills of the individuals expand in the context of their own culture. Thus, as individuals’ awareness and capacity to affect the policies increases and as they start to define themselves with different concepts other than being a national of a state, they shift their loyalties towards other entities and they even emerge as actors in the system themselves. Therefore, the sovereignty of the state decreases both in quality and quantity. Moreover, the skills of actors like terrorists also expand in the context of their own culture and this increases their ability to conduct harmful terrorist acts all over the world, as well as serving to increase their devotion to their values and ideas.

At the micro-macro level, in both public and private settings, the sources of authority shifted from traditional criteria to performance criteria of legitimacy. As a result, a kind of reallocation of authority started to take place. This reallocation

⁴⁴ Rosenau, James N. (in print). “Turbulence and Terrorism: Reframing or Readjusting the Model?” In E. Aydinli and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Paradigms in Transition: Globalization, Security, and the Nation State*. New York: SUNY Press, 321.

⁴⁵ Rosenau, James N. 1995. “Security in a Turbulent World”, *Current History*, 94(592): 194.

happens ‘downward’ to subnational groups and ‘upwards’ towards supranational organizations, such as IGOs, NGOs, professional groups, MNCs, and inchoate international social movements. The emergence of interdependence issues like environmental pollution, currency crisis, flow of refugees, drug trade, and terrorism, all of which transcend national boundaries, necessitates cooperation among all actors which contributed to the loyalty shifts. This erosion of the ability of the state to address problems and loyalty shifts at the end results in the erosion of state sovereignty.⁴⁶

All these affected the transformation of macro variable. As Rosenau indicates:

Whereas the dominant structure for centuries prior to the present era was an anarchic state-centric system in which states, their organizations (intergovernmental organizations), and their interactions shaped the course of events, today another system, the multi-centric system consisting of diverse non-governmental collectivities (NGOs) [sovereignty-free actors], has evolved as a competing structure that often conflicts, sometimes cooperates, and endlessly interacts with the state-centric system.⁴⁷

Therefore, according to Rosenau the bifurcation between ‘multi-centric’ and ‘state-centric’ forms, which are in competition with each other, characterizes the world politics of today in a complex and turbulent period.

The September 11 attacks on the United States by Al- Qaeda demonstrates all these transformations in micro, micro-macro, and macro levels in a clear manner. The Al-Qaeda transnational terrorist organization emerged as a new actor in world politics as a result of increased organizational skills of terrorists, authority

⁴⁶ Rosenau, James N. 1995. “Security in a Turbulent World”, *Current History*, 94(592): 195-199.

disaggregation and loyalty shifts and challenges against the states. According to Rosenau, "The war between the world's hegemon and a diffuse, nongovernmental organization is a classic instance of the disaggregated and bifurcated global structures posited by the turbulence model."⁴⁸

2. 2. 2. 4 Practical Contributions to the Theoretical Evolution of the Dualistic Image of World Politics

Another area where we can detect a dualistic perception of world affairs is the studies of some scholars who utilize a dualistic perspective without referring to its theoretical foundations or without explicitly referring to it, but by adopting it as a de facto situation. In this type of studies, events around the world, like the September 11 attacks, are explained by referring to the features of the multi-centric world that intersects with the state-centric world. For example they refer to the emergence of global terrorist organizations as actors in the international arena besides the states, and improvements of the individual skills. Some of them also refer to the availability of unusual instruments for terrorist acts combined with the easy movement of people, money, weapons, and ideas around the world and revolution in information and communication technologies.⁴⁹ In the words of Stanley Hoffmann "the dominant

⁴⁷ Rosenau, James N. (in print). "Turbulence and Terrorism: Reframing or Readjusting the Model?" In E. Aydinli and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Paradigms in Transition: Globalization, Security, and the Nation State*. New York: SUNY Press, 321-322.

⁴⁸ Rosenau, James N. (in print). "Turbulence and Terrorism: Reframing or Readjusting the Model?" In E. Aydinli and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Paradigms in Transition: Globalization, Security, and the Nation State*. New York: SUNY Press, 325.

⁴⁹ LaFeber, Walter. 2002. "The post September 11 Debate over Empire, Globalization, and Fragmentation", *Political Science Quarterly*, 117(1): 1-17. Paul, T. V. (in print). "The National Security State and Global Terrorism: Why the State is not Prepared for the New Kind of War." In E. Aydinli and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Paradigms in Transition: Globalization, Security, and the Nation State*. New York: SUNY Press. Hoffmann, Stanley. 2002. "Clash of Globalizations", *Foreign Affairs*, 81(4): 104-116. Beeson, Mark, and Alex J. Bellamy. 2003. "Globalisation, Security and International Order After September 11", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 49(3): 339-354. Hughes, Christopher W. 2002. "Reflections on Globalisation, Security and 9/11", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 15(3): 421-433; Tehranian, Majid. 2002. "Global Terrorism: Searching for Appropriate Responses", *Pacifica Review*, 14(1): 57-65. Booth, Ken, and Tim Dunne. 2002. "Worlds

tension of the decade was the clash between the fragmentation of states (and the state system) and the progress of economic, cultural, and political integration – in other words, globalization.”⁵⁰ Before September 11, the idea in conventional international relations was that the war takes place among states, but September 11 showed that although poorly armed, individuals are now able to challenge and hurt the world’s hegemon/ only superpower. Thus, with the help of globalization, hopeless fanatics can easily access the means necessary to create an awful form of violence. This means that, individuals and groups are becoming global actors besides states and this results in the rise of insecurities and vulnerabilities. “Terrorism [has become] the bloody link between interstate relations and global society.”⁵¹

Others accept the rise of the multi-centric world, although they do not explicitly refer to it, as different from the state-centric world while explaining the transformation of the state as a result of the developments that emanate from the multi-centric world and by the help of globalization. For example, in terms of economics, national economies of individual states are becoming globalized in the sense that production chains across regional and global borders are organized by transnational corporations. Also a globally integrated financial market emerged. In terms of politics, “[g]overnance is changing from an activity conducted by national administrations over well-defined territorial realms to an international, transgovernmental, and transnational activity that includes not only governments and traditional international organizations, but also nongovernmental organizations and

in Collision.” In Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds., *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1-23 (although puts emphasis to the importance of state); etc.

⁵⁰ Hoffmann, Stanley. 2002. “Clash of Globalizations”, *Foreign Affairs*, 81(4): 104-105.

⁵¹ Hoffmann, Stanley. 2002. “Clash of Globalizations”, *Foreign Affairs*, 81(4): 108.

other nonstate actors.”⁵² It is argued that with the impact of globalization there is an upwards shift of sovereignty towards supranational authorities, and sideways shift of sovereignty towards transnational non-state actors.⁵³ In terms of nationhood, states are challenged by other power centers for the loyalty of their citizens since these centers may serve better in order to meet some needs of the people that individual states cannot provide alone. Moreover, in terms of the identity of the people, the creation of identity is becoming individualized and collective identities that transcend state boundaries are emerging. As a result of all these threat perceptions of the states on their security change as well.⁵⁴ Thus, the security problems become boundary-less, therefore, problems rising in one part of the world can easily and quickly be transmitted to the other parts of the world.⁵⁵ All these at the end equal to an acceptance of the co-existence of the intersecting state-centric and multi-centric worlds.

2. 2. 3 Why is the Dualistic Image of World Politics the most Suitable Approach?

When we consider all these explanations on the theoretical development and practical reflections of a dualistic perspective of world politics, I am convinced that it is the best approach in explaining the events of today’s world in general, and transnational terrorism and international attempts to fight against it in particular. Transnational terrorism gains most of its strength from the multi-centric world, but

⁵² Sorensen, G. (in print). “State Transformation and New Security Dilemmas.” In E. Aydinli and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Paradigms in Transition: Globalization, Security, and the Nation State*. New York: SUNY Press, 137-138.

⁵³ Strange, Susan. 1996. *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: n.p. Cutler, A. Clair, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter (eds.). 1999. *Private Authority in International Affairs*. New York: n.p.

⁵⁴ Sorensen, G. (in print). “State Transformation and New Security Dilemmas.” In E. Aydinli and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Paradigms in Transition: Globalization, Security, and the Nation State*. New York: SUNY Press, 138-139, 142.

⁵⁵ Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage.

the international response given to it so far remains within the state-centric world. To be more precise, so far the threat perceptions of the states in the system have been state-centric, i.e. other states have been perceived as the threatening actors. Therefore, the response mechanisms against these threats were also state-centric, like using conventional armies or building a balance of power mechanism against the enemy. Thus, the states know only the tools to fight with other states. This type of response is the one used by the US in its ‘war against terrorism’ launched in the aftermath of September 11. However, it must be questioned whether the threats posed by the transnational terrorism of today can be met by the mechanisms of the state-centric world, since this transnational terrorism is situated in a multi-centric world which intersects with the state-centric world. It is to say, transnational terrorist organizations can conduct all types of actions where the state-centric world and multi-centric world intersects but they can also escape from the borders of the state-centric world by hiding in the parts of the multi-centric world that remains outside the borders of the state-centric world. This situation can roughly be pictured as in the figure 2.




FIGURE 2: Duality in terms of Global Counter-terrorism

Therefore, although the US hit the Al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and replaced the Taliban regime that supported Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda is still able to conduct terrorist activities and is continuing to attack its targets all over the world. This is a result of the deterritorialized nature of the transnational Al-Qaeda network that emerged with the help of the rise of the multi-centric world.

It is worth recalling that the duality between the state-centric and multi-centric worlds explained here is a conceptual one, thus it is not territorial, i.e. there are no clear-cut demarcation lines between the state-centric world and the multi-centric world, rather this dualistic perception of world politics is related with the accepted characteristics of and perceptions about these conceptualized worlds.

In short, the non-state actors situated in the multi-centric world can pose security threats to states as well, and we must question whether the conventional mechanisms of the state-centric world are sufficient enough to confront these challenges. On the basis of these, in order to be able to understand and explain whether it is possible to give an effective international response to transnational terrorism, a dualistic perception of world politics seems to be the best approach. By the help of the dualistic perspective we can better understand the nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorism and the international nature of the response that is being offered against it. As stated at the beginning, in order to be able to evaluate whether the existing international response mechanisms fit to meet the challenge posed by transnational terrorism, we should first analyze what kind of a threat we are facing. But, even before that it must be clarified what we mean by the concept of transnational terrorism. Therefore, the next chapter will deal with this issue.

CHAPTER III

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

3. 1 Defining Terrorism

*There are, indeed, things that cannot be put
into words. They make themselves manifest.*

*Ludwig Wittgenstein*⁵⁶

Although there has been much discussion and many studies on the definition of terrorism, it is almost impossible to find a terrorism definition on which everyone agrees. This is because everyone tries to define the term in a way that fits to his/her own interests and point of view, still by looking at the issue from a state-centric perspective. Since those who utilize terrorism, those who suffer from it, and those who have not confronted a direct terrorist attack tend to define the term differently, one man's terrorist becomes another man's freedom fighter.⁵⁷ There is no consensus even on the criteria with which we should define terrorism. Some say that we should focus on the nature of the perpetrators. Others argue that we should focus on the characteristics/ nature⁵⁸ and results of the acts. Still others suggest focusing on the terrorist means and aims⁵⁹ or on

⁵⁶ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1961 (original work published in 1921). *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 151.

⁵⁷ Wieviopka, Michel. 1995. "Terrorism in the Context of Academic Research." In Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context*. Pennsylvania State University Press, 598.

⁵⁸ Cooper, H. H. A. 2001. "Terrorism: The Problem of Definition Revisited", *American Behavioral Scientist*, 44(6): 884.

⁵⁹ For example, Brian Jenkins is among them.

the targets.⁶⁰ When we attach another term to this already ambiguous concept, like ‘transnational’, the issue becomes further complicated. Therefore, it is not possible to find a concrete definition of terrorism in general, and transnational terrorism in particular, on which everyone agrees. On the basis of these complexities, my aim here is to conceptualize the term “terrorism” in general and “transnational terrorism” in particular in the way I use these terms throughout this thesis.

When we combine most of the factors that are included in the definition of terrorism by different analysts, such a definition emerges: Terrorism is the intentional use, or threat to use, violence against non-combatants or civilian targets, by states, sub-national groups or individuals, in order to attain political aims like changing the existing system, through intimidation of fear directed at a large audience. The motivation behind the political aim may be ideological, religious, social or something else and the sub-national groups or individuals conducting terrorism may have state sponsors as well.⁶¹

Terrorism is often referred to as the ‘asymmetric weapon of the weak’. It is a secret and unconventional way of fighting. Since terrorists are not capable of fighting with states through conventional ways, they utilize terrorism. They aim at creating fear among the societies of the targeted states or groups, so that these societies mobilize those who are in power to do something that serves to the terrorists’ interests. For example, one of the stated aims of Al Qaeda in conducting the September 11 attacks was to terrorize the American people and make them force their governments to call back their forces from the Middle Eastern region.

⁶⁰ For example, Walter Laqueur.

⁶¹ Ganor, Boaz. “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?”, 5, Available [online]: <<http://terror.host.net.kg/definingterr.htm>>. Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler 2002. “Patterns of Transnational Terrorism 1970-1999: Alternative Time Series Estimates”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 46(2): 150.

Furthermore, terrorists do not wear uniforms or other type of signs that may distinguish them from ordinary people. This contributes to the secrecy. They do not pay attention to moral or legal restraints. They use several different tactics, such as kidnapping, assassination, or bombing. All of these make terrorism relatively easy and cheap to conduct as a strategy, but expensive and hard to fight against.

Although this definition and the features stated above are very comprehensive and include lots of things into the concept of terrorism, they match to the way I use the term 'terrorism' throughout this study. The next crucial step is to clarify the transnational version of terrorism.

3. 2 Defining Transnational Terrorism

When a terrorist activity includes victims, perpetrators, or target audiences from two or more countries, and the organization of the terrorist group that is conducting the activity is spread across more than one country, then terrorism acquires a transnational character.⁶² For example, transnational terrorist activities may be planned in one place, the necessary training to perpetrators may be given in another place, and the actual incidents may be conducted in yet another place. Thus, the offices, headquarters, and training camps of transnational terrorist organizations may function in various countries. Also, transnational terrorist organizations may make attacks in different countries, the

⁶² Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler. 2002. "Patterns of Transnational Terrorism 1970-1999: Alternative Time Series Estimates", *International Studies Quarterly*, 46(2): 145-160.

members of these organizations may be from different countries,⁶³ and the victims of their attacks can be from different nationalities.⁶⁴

Conducting transnational terrorist activities became easier with the developments in the communication and transportation technologies, and with easier and faster movement of technology, finance, ideas, knowledge, information, and people across the globe. As a result of all these developments there is no longer any need for a large, fixed, physical presence in order to be able to conduct and control operations over long distances. Physical distances and national borders that once separated terrorists from their co-conspirators, their targets and their audience have disappeared in today's world of modern telecommunications and the internet.⁶⁵ Therefore, as in the case of September 11, terrorists may be trained in Germany, and get the necessary information for their operation through the internet. They communicate with the other cells of the organization, get financial resources from Saudi Arabia, and conduct operations in the US. For example, according to the US government Al Qaeda is operating in more than 60 countries.⁶⁶ Moreover, as a result of the world's shrinking, there remains no place, which cannot be reached. For example, although the US is situated between two oceans, it can still be reached. Thus, transnational terrorism arises as a threat in and from the multi-centric world.

⁶³ Jervis, Robert. 2002. "An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?", *Political Science Quarterly*, 117(1): 40.

⁶⁴ Ganor, Boaz. "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?", 11, Available [online]: <<http://terror.host.net.kg/definingterr.htm>>

⁶⁵ Hoo, Kevin Soo, Seymour Goodman, and Lawrence Greenberg. 1997. "Information Technology and the Terrorist Threat", *Survival*, 39(3): 138.

⁶⁶ Radu, Michael. 2002. "Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges", *Orbis*, Spring: 282.

Ferkiss, Victor. 2001. "Globalization and Terrorism: The Long Road Ahead," available [online]: <<http://www.wfs.org/mmferkiss.htm>>

However, this deterritoriality, multiple nationality and having an effect on more than one country is not enough to call terrorism 'transnational terrorism'. Another feature for terrorism to be transnational is that the terrorists involved not be under the control of or dependent on the support of any one state. They may receive direct and indirect assistance from different states, by some segments within some states, and from different ethnic and religious or ideological groups, and also from other terrorist organizations.⁶⁷ But the important point here is that as long as transnational terrorist organizations are not 'controlled' by any particular state, thus preserve their independence, and thus remain transnational. This has largely become possible as a result of the rise of the multi-centric world. Thus, especially in the aftermath of the Cold War, some of the international terrorism of the state-centric world that was under the control of some states or was dependent on them had been transformed into transnational terrorism of the multi-centric world.

At this point, it may be worth clarifying the differences of transnational terrorism from other types of violence and terrorism, as some of the features attributed to transnational terrorism here may be similar with other types of violence and terrorism. However there are important factors that differentiate transnational terrorism from these.

3. 3 Clarifying the Concept

3. 3. 1 Transnational Terrorism vs. Other Types of Violence

In the attempts to define terrorism and its transnational version there emerge controversies over whether we can count terrorism as a type of war, guerrilla warfare, or

⁶⁷ Ganor, Boaz. "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?", 11, Available [online]: <<http://terror.host.net/kg/definingterr.htm>>

ordinary crime. However, terrorism in general and transnational terrorism in particular are different from all these other types of violence. Therefore, in this section these differences will be examined from general (differences of terrorism with other types of violence) to specific (differences of transnational terrorism from other types of violence).

3.3.1.1 Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism vs. War

As a matter of definition, a 'war' can be fought between armies of independent states. It is defined as "an armed conflict between two or more states conducted by their armies in order to force the other party to accept ones' own will and it must be done on the basis of the rules determined by international law."⁶⁸ These rules were first proposed by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius and later in the 19th and 20th centuries codified in the Geneva and Hague Conventions of the 1860s, 1899, 1907, and 1949. These rules grant civilian non-combatants immunity from attack, prohibit taking civilians as hostages, state the inviolability of diplomats and other accredited representatives of states among other things.⁶⁹ If the parties violate these rules determined by the international law concerning the conduct of war, these acts are accepted as 'war crimes' and can be punished after the war.⁷⁰ Furthermore, in case of war, parties 'declare' war against each other so that each party knows the situation. Also the violence in war is one that is expected, continues and known.⁷¹ Thus, these characteristics of war and rules related to its conduct are mainly reflecting the features of the state-centric world. Therefore, it

⁶⁸ Sönmezoğlu, Faruk (derleyen). 2000. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Sözlüğü*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 606.

⁶⁹ Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 34.

⁷⁰ However, in practise, at the implementation level, most of the time these crimes remain unpunished and even the ones that are punished are only from the loser party.

⁷¹ Hilal Kılıç. 1996. *Terrorizm ve Mücadele Yöntemleri*. MA Thesis, Dicle Üniversitesi, 50.

would not be inappropriate to argue that war is a type of violence that can be situated in the state-centric world.

On the other hand, terrorists conduct their operations in secrecy, thus there is no declaration and it is not known when and how a terrorist act will occur. Terrorists do not obey to rules, legal or moral. Since their aim is to create fear and terrorize the public they mostly intend to kill civilians and non-combatants including the foreign representatives in countries. Moreover, and most importantly, terrorists are not states with armies, therefore, their activities and acts cannot be labelled as war.

In terms of comparing war with transnational terrorism, of course the differences between war and terrorism stated above are true for transnational terrorism as well. In addition, although both war and transnational terrorism affect the people of more than one country, armies that conduct war are composed of the citizens of a country while transnational terrorist organizations have members from the citizens of different countries. Even when coalitions are concerned, armies of different nations fight against the same enemy, but still each national army fights according to the rules determined by its own state and in accordance with its own national interests. Furthermore, as stated above, while war is conducted among armies of states, which are controlled by them, transnational terrorists are not under the control of any state and they do not fight for any state. Thus, when we look from the dualistic perspective, while the reflections of the characteristics of war can be seen in the state-centric world, the characteristics of transnational terrorism can be seen the multi-centric world.

3. 3. 1. 2 Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism vs. Guerrilla Warfare

Originally, guerrilla warfare is used to refer to military operations of irregular forces against the fear of an enemy, or of local inhabitants against an occupying force.⁷² The term “guerrilla” which means “little war” evolved from the Spanish resistance to the 1808 invasions of Napoleon.⁷³ The essence of guerrilla warfare is to establish liberated areas in the countryside. There, they set up military units and other types of institutions, conduct propaganda and other political activities. In this way they aim to gain strength, grow in number and quality, and fight against the government forces.⁷⁴ More or less the legal rules concerning war apply to guerrilla warfare as well. In guerrilla warfare civilians and non-combatants are not intentionally targeted. Guerrillas respect the rights of non-combatants and they exchange prisoners as in conventional war between states.⁷⁵ “Guerrilla war is a small war – subject to the same rules that apply to big wars, and on this it differs from terrorism.”⁷⁶ This shared adherence is mostly because they seek public support and do not want to provoke severe repressive governmental reaction.

On the other hand, terrorists usually operate in cities in a clandestine manner and in small units called cells.⁷⁷ Therefore, terrorism is not mass or collective violence, but it is conducted by a small group, although that group may have larger supporters that do not participate in the conduct of the activities.⁷⁸ Unlike guerrilla warfare, terrorism is

⁷² Anderson, Sean. 1995. *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism*. Metuchen, N. J.: Scarecrow Press, 92.

⁷³ Simonsen, Clifford E., and Jeremy R. Spindlove. 2000. *Terrorism Today: The Past, the Players, the Future*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 35.

⁷⁴ Laqueur, Walter. 1987. *The Age of Terrorism*. Boston- Toronto: Little Brown, 147.

⁷⁵ Wilkinson, Paul. 1986. *Terrorism and the Liberal State*. London: Macmillan, 54-55.

⁷⁶ Ehud Sprinzak, in a lecture at a workshop on “Israel and Terrorism” sponsored by the International Center for the Study of Contemporary Society, Jerusalem, 1985, cited in Ganor, Boaz. “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?”, 7, Available [online]: <<http://terror.host.net/kg/definingterr.htm>>.

⁷⁷ Laqueur, Walter. 1987. *The Age of Terrorism*. Boston- Toronto: Little Brown, 147.

⁷⁸ Crenshaw, Martha. 1995 *Terrorism in Context*. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 4.

directed against civilians and non-combatants. No rules, legal or moral, are taken into consideration by the terrorists.⁷⁹ Also, terrorists aim to provoke repressive governmental reactions in order to justify their terrorist acts by proving their claims concerning the repressiveness of the attacked entity. Thus, terrorists aim to create an overreaction on the part of the attacked party. By this way they aim to blame their enemy by being the real terrorists and by being worse than terrorists themselves are.⁸⁰

Again, these differences between terrorism and guerrilla warfare are also true for transnational terrorism and guerrilla warfare. In addition, while guerrilla warfare is conducted locally and aims to establish liberated areas in the countryside, transnational terrorism is conducted globally. This to say, guerrilla warfare is geographically based while transnational terrorism is deterritorial. Guerrillas establish bases in the liberated areas in the countryside, while transnational terrorists establish bases and training camps in different countries, and organize in small cells all around the world. Furthermore, those who participate in guerrilla warfare are usually local inhabitants who fight against an occupying force although they may receive some foreign help, but transnational terrorist organizations are composed of people from different nationalities. Again, from all these compared characteristics, we can situate guerrilla warfare in the state-centric world and transnational terrorism in the multi-centric world.

⁷⁹ Ganor, Boaz. "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?", 6-7, Available [online]: <<http://terror.host.net.kg/definingterr.htm>>

⁸⁰ Cooper, H. H. A. 2001. "Terrorism: The Problem of Definition Revisited", *American Behavioral Scientist*, 44(6): 891. An important point here that needs to be mentioned is that some guerilla groups also use terrorist tactics during their fight. Thus, when they use terrorist tactics they became terrorist and when they refrain from such tactics they remain as guerillas. Of course, this point further complicates the definition problem, since it is really difficult to find guerilla groups that solely use guerilla tactics.

3. 3. 1. 3 Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism vs. Ordinary Crime

The aim of an ordinary criminal is generally personal and material. Ordinary criminals do not aim to create acute fear in the society and give messages. The violence used by the ordinary criminals do not have the intention to create psychological repercussions beyond the act itself. Ordinary criminals, unlike terrorists, do not pretend a societal role for themselves, such as rescuing the society. They do not want to influence public opinion.⁸¹

On the other hand, terrorists' actions have organizational and psychological aims. They aim to give a political message by their actions⁸² and create an acute fear in the society in order to reach their aims. Terrorists aim to create fear not in the actual victims but in the audiences, by creating the sense that they might also become a victim.⁸³ Moreover the fundamental aim of the terrorists is to change the system, unlike ordinary criminals, who do not have the intension to alter the patterns of any political system. The terrorist believes that he is serving for a "good" cause and for a wider constituency.⁸⁴ These differences between terrorism and ordinary crime also apply to transnational terrorism. Furthermore, unlike transnational terrorism, ordinary crime is usually domestic in character and sometimes international.

3. 3. 2 Transnational Terrorism vs. Other Types of Terrorism

We can classify the types of terrorism based on several things, such as terrorist aims (e.g., revolutionary terrorism, or separatist terrorism), geography (e.g., Middle

⁸¹ Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 41-42.

⁸² Arıboğan, Deniz Ülke. 2003. *Tarihin Sonundan Barışın Sonuna*. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 116.

⁸³ Jenkins, Brian. 1990. "International Terrorism: The Other World War." In Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., *International Terrorism, Characteristics, Causes, Controls*. London: Macmillan Education Press, 35.

Hanle, Donald J. 1989. *Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare*. Washington: Pergamon Press, 112.

Eastern terrorism, Latin American terrorism, or Western terrorism), terrorist targets (e.g., domestic terrorism, or international terrorism), and perpetrators, thus according to the nature of terrorist groups and their organizations (e.g., state terrorism, or non-state terrorism). For the sake of my study and based on the definition I mentioned before, I am going to classify the types of terrorism based on the nature and organization of the terrorist groups/perpetrators and their targets.

On the basis of these, I will contrast transnational terrorism, which is a type of non-state terrorism, with domestic state terrorism, domestic non-state terrorism, and international state terrorism.

3. 3. 2. 1 Transnational Terrorism vs. Domestic State Terrorism

Domestic state terrorism is terrorism applied by a state/government (perpetrator) on its own citizens (target) within its own borders.⁸⁵ It is also referred to as “terrorism from above”.⁸⁶ In fact, the word “terrorism” is first used within this context to refer to the events that occurred after the 1789 French Revolution.⁸⁷ At that period, after the uprisings of 1789, terror was the tool the revolutionary government used against the counter-revolutionaries and other dissidents to re-establish order during the transition

⁸⁴ Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 42-43.

⁸⁵ Mullins, Wayman C. 1997. *A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism: An Analysis of Issues, Origins, Tactics, and Responses*. Springfield, Ill., C. C. Thomas, 37. Simonsen, Clifford E., and Jeremy R. Spinlove. 2000. *Terrorism Today: The Past, the Players, the Future*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 35.

⁸⁶ Hacker, Frederick. 1976. *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 3-34.

⁸⁷ Murphy, John Francis. 1989. *State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and Economic Dimensions*. London: Mansell Publications, 4.

period characterized by turmoil and upheaval. At that time terror had a positive connotation unlike today.⁸⁸

Later, terrorism acquired its negative meaning even in cases when it is utilized by a state, such as during the 1930s terror used by the German and Italian governments in their countries. In Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the governments established a system of fear and coercion through which they eliminated the so-called “enemies of the state”, like Jews and communists. Other examples include the 1970s right-wing military dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, and Greece; and the mid-1980s elected governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Columbia and Peru, which used terror against their own citizens.⁸⁹

Thus, the distinguishing characteristics of domestic state terrorism are, as its name implies, that it is conducted by the state through its official bodies, like its security forces and/or intelligence services, against its own citizens, within its own boundaries. On the other hand, transnational terrorism is conducted by non-state entities, although in some cases supported by some states or by some segments within some states, acting on their own behalf and not on the direction of any one state, against the nationals of several countries all around the world. Therefore, while transnational terrorism can be situated in the picture drawn by the multi-centric world image, domestic state terrorism can be placed within the state-centric world image.

⁸⁸ Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 15.

⁸⁹ Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 24-25.

3. 3. 2. 2 Transnational Terrorism vs. Domestic Non-state Terrorism

Domestic non-state terrorism is conducted by sub-national groups or individuals against the citizens of a nation, which have the same nationality with the members of the terrorist organization conducting the incidents.⁹⁰ This terrorism of private groups is also called “terrorism from below”.⁹¹ In this case, terrorist groups, victims, and the aimed audience are from the same country. As an example to this type of terrorism we can show the activities of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The origins of this organization date back to the days when all of Ireland was under British rule. Later in the 20th century, South Ireland acquired its independence under the name of the Irish Free State. Acceptance of this by some segments within the IRA caused a split in the organization, as hard-liners did not want to accept the British rule in Northern Ireland as well. Therefore, the hard-liners within the IRA continued to fight against the British Government in Northern Ireland.⁹² Since the activities of the IRA are directed against the citizens of one nation of which they are a part and conducted against civilians, their activities can be placed under the rubric of domestic non-state terrorism. The feature that attributes them a non-state character is that, although this type of organizations may receive support from foreign governments, they have their own existence, goals, and objectives distinct from these supporting states.⁹³

Although this last point is true also for transnational terrorism, in terms of targets, members, and the aimed audiences transnational terrorism is different from

⁹⁰ Mullins, Wayman C. 1997. *A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism: An Analysis of Issues, Origins, Tactics, and Responses*. Springfield, Ill., C. C. Thomas, 7.

⁹¹ Hacker, Frederick. 1976. *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 3-34.

⁹² Sönmezoğlu, Faruk (derleyen). 2000. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Sözlüğü*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 379-380.

⁹³ Weinberg, Leonard B., and Paul B. Davis. 1989. *Introduction to Political Terrorism*. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 12.

domestic non-state terrorism. The targets and aimed audiences of transnational terrorism are from multiple nations. Also, the members of transnational terrorist organizations have different nationalities unlike domestic non-state terrorist organizations. Furthermore, domestic non-state terrorism is geographical in aim and orientation, but transnational terrorism is deterritorial and global. Thus, the main difference between domestic non-state terrorism and transnational terrorism is that while the former is 'domestic' in character and aim, the latter is 'transnational' as their name implies. From a dualistic perspective, domestic non-state terrorism can be placed within the state-centric world image, while transnational terrorism is situated in the multi-centric world image.

3. 3. 2. 3 Transnational Terrorism vs. International State Terrorism

We can divide international state terrorism roughly into two categories. The first one is international terrorist operations conducted by the agencies of a state, like its intelligence services, in a covert manner. Since it is covert and secret by its nature, it is difficult to prove state involvement in such terrorist activities. The US and the USSR are suspected to have been involved in such activities during the Cold War era. For example, during the early 1970s the CIA participated in clandestine operations in Chile in order to remove Salvador Allende, the then Chilean President, from power. These operations include the assassination of the commander-in-chief of the Chilean army, Rene Schneider, who refused to participate in the plans to remove Allende.⁹⁴ In addition, in today's world, Iran, Iraq (before the US intervention), Libya, and Syria are said to be

⁹⁴ Combs, Cindy C. 2003. *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. (3rd edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., 82.

actively involved in terrorist activities. Therefore, terrorism became a covert warfare utilized by weak states against the stronger ones without facing the risk of retaliation.⁹⁵

The second category of international state terrorism is international terrorist activities conducted by terrorist groups or individuals controlled, supported and sponsored by the states in order to realize their aims without resorting to war. The states mentioned above, namely Iran, Iraq (before the US intervention), Libya, and Syria are suspected of supporting terrorists by providing them safe havens, training facilities, diplomatic immunity, weapons, and money among other things.⁹⁶

At this point, some scholars argue that if there is state sponsorship of terrorism, then this turns transnational terrorism into international terrorism.⁹⁷ Here the important point is that, in international terrorism states are the main actors whether applying terrorism by themselves or via supporting the sub-national groups in order to realize their own policies and weaken their enemies. However, in transnational terrorism the aims and ideologies of the sub-national groups are of primary importance. They are not seeking to expand or retract national power of a country and they do not represent any one country. Transnational terrorist organizations have their own aims, agendas, capabilities outside the control of the supporter states and they utilize the aid coming from states in order to realize their own aims and not the aims of the states unless these

⁹⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p.27; Jonathan R. White, p.14.

⁹⁶ Cindy C. Combs divides international state terrorism in two in a different manner, namely as state-sponsored terrorism and state-supported terrorism. According to her, there is more state involvement in the state-sponsored terrorism. Sometimes states are directly involved in the decision-making processes and control of the terrorist activities as far as state-sponsored terrorism is concerned. In state-supported terrorism, states only provide aids to existing terrorist groups that have varying degrees of independence. She has taken this approach from Schechter, Bernard, and Martin Slann (eds.). 1998. *Violence and Terrorism 98/99*. New York: Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, 42. (Combs, Cindy C. 2003. *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. (3rd edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., 81.) However, this type of division and clarification blurs the distinction between international terrorism and transnational terrorism therefore it is not applied in this study.

two converge. To clarify the point further, international terrorism is based on state control and support. It cannot exist without the support of a state. Transnational terrorism, on the other hand, is not under the control of a state and is not dependent on the support of any state. Transnational terrorists are themselves actors in the system. Thus, when we look from the dualistic perspective, international terrorism that is based and dependent on state support can be seen to reflect the features of the state-centric world while transnational terrorism reflects the features of the multi-centric world.

In sum, transnational terrorism is different from other types of violence; like war, guerrilla warfare, and ordinary crime; and from other types of terrorism like domestic state terrorism, domestic non-state terrorism, and international state terrorism. While all these other types of violence and terrorism can be evaluated with the state-centric world image perspective, transnational terrorism must be examined with the multi-centric world image perspective. Transnational terrorism is a type of non-state terrorism. Its targets, aimed audience, members, training facilities, operation fields as well as its whole organization is multi-national, meaning that it is not restricted to one country in terms of non of its components. Furthermore, even if transnational terrorist organizations receive aid from states, they nevertheless operate in an independent manner following their own aims and interests. Recently, with the rise of the multi-centric world, transnational terrorist organizations have become able to operate more effectively without the help of any state and became independent actors for their own sake. This point will be further explained in the fifth Chapter of this thesis. But before discussing the nature of threat posed by and actorship of transnational terrorism specifically, in

⁹⁷ See Guelke, Adrian. 1995. *The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System*. London: I. B. Tauris Publishers.

order to understand these issues better, we should first analyze the general context of which transnational terrorism is a part. Therefore, we now turn to analyze the nature of the threat perceptions, referent objects, and perpetrators of these threats in the multi-centric world.



CHAPTER IV

THREAT PERCEPTIONS, REFERENCE OBJECTS OF SECURITY, AND SECURITY ACTORS IN THE MULTI-CENTRIC WORLD

As it is stated, while conceptualizing the term, transnational terrorism carries the characteristics of the multi-centric world. Therefore, in order to be able to understand the nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorism, and thus argue on the instruments to fight against it, we should look at the threat perceptions, referent objects and security actors in the multi-centric world in general. In this way, we can analyze the nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorism better by a deductive manner, i.e. by applying the rules generated from the general to the specific.

Threat perceptions in the multi-centric world are multiple in terms of issues, reference objects, and perpetrators. In other words, different from the state-centric world, in the multi-centric world, issues other than military ones are perceived as threats. Among these issues are socio-economic, cultural, and environmental problems. These are threats to the security of individuals, societies, different kinds of groupings, organizations, and even to the international system besides the states.

Furthermore, these types of threats are posed not only by states and their military forces, but also by non-state actors; like individuals, groups, and transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. By the help of the multi-centric world, these non-state security actors can survive and operate without the support of states. In fact, the relationship between the non-state actors and the multi-centric

world is reciprocal. This means that, on the one hand, non-state actors rise as effective and strong actors with the help of the multi-centric world. On the other hand, the rise of non-state actors as power centers independent from the states led to the further development of the multi-centric world. This is because, the existence of non-state actors is among the major characteristics of the multi-centric world.

Related to this point, the threats perceived in the multi-centric world threaten the state-centric world as well. Actually some of the problems that are perceived as threats in the multi-centric world, like the revolution in military affairs, WMDs, and terrorism, are also perceived as threats in the state-centric world; but not as posed by non-state actors. In other words, states perceive these threats still as coming from other states or as supported by other states. They do not see that these threats are mostly rising from the multi-centric world, and in turn, strengthening it. Therefore, they miss the important differences of the nature of the threat that is posed by these issues.

In sum, it is important to understand the multiple issues that are perceived as threats in the multi-centric world; to whom these threats are directed at; and by whom these threats are posed. In doing this, the major emphasis must be put on the perpetrators since this is the point which creates the problem in countering the threats of the multi-centric world by the mechanisms of the state-centric world. It is to say, the multiple security threats of the multi-centric world have their own non-state security actors that at the end can even pose military threats to the states. However, the response mechanisms of the states are against the threats that are posed by other states. Therefore, the effectiveness of these international mechanisms to meet the challenges of these non-state security actors, like transnational terrorist organizations, must be questioned.

Within this context, in this part of the thesis I am going to explain these arguments by dealing with the issues that are perceived as threats in the multi-centric world, to whom these threats are directed at, and by whom they are posed. I will start by examining the threat perceptions, referent objects and security actors in the state-centric world so that the differences of these from that in the multi-centric world can be seen better.

4. 1 Threat Perceptions, Referent Objects and Security Actors in the State-centric World

Physical security, meaning the protection of territory and people of a state against the attacks of other states, and ensuring survival with fundamental values and institutions intact, have been at the core of the security concerns of the states.⁹⁸ Thus, national interest was centered on the protection and control of territory, people, and natural resources that can be done through military power. Military was absolutely important to the exercise of power.⁹⁹ On the bases of these, issues perceived as threats in the state-centric world are military in nature and both the referent object and the perpetrator of the threats are states.

4. 1. 1 Issues Perceived as Threats

The central security issues for states, which are the principal actors in the international system, are survival, protection of sovereignty and independence, territorial and institutional integrity.¹⁰⁰ Also, each state is responsible for ensuring the

⁹⁸ Jablonsky, David. 2002-03. "The State of the National Security State", *Parameters*, Winter: 4.

⁹⁹ Rothgeb, John M., Jr. 1993. *Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary international System*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 10.

¹⁰⁰ Holsti, Kal. 1967. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 83. Allison, Graham. 2000. "The Impact of Globalization on National and International

maintenance of the basic requirements of its citizens. That is, they should provide physical security of life and property for them¹⁰¹ and protect them from outside interference and security threats.¹⁰² Therefore, the threat, use and control of military force by other states¹⁰³ that can use these against a state itself, constitutes the major threat perception for that state in the state-centric world. Moreover, states threaten each other by other means, like utilizing terrorism in a covert manner, when open warfare is too risky. In sum, as far as the threat perceptions of the state-centric world are concerned there is a primacy of politico-military threats perceived as coming from other states. Thus, the threat perception was external and not internal.¹⁰⁴

4. 1. 1. 1 The National Interests of other States, Their Armed Forces, and the Possibility of War

The interests of other states, the strength of their armies and the possibility of war have always been central concerns of the states in the state-centric world. From the beginning of the state-centric system onwards states aimed to maximize their interests and at the same time protect their territorial integrity and independence. These two aims, namely maximizing ones interests while at the same time protecting territorial integrity and independence, clashed with each other and brought states into a confrontational conflict. Therefore, states conducted lots of wars throughout the history, some for maximizing interests and others for protecting their territorial

Security.” In Joseph Nye and J. D. Donahue, eds., *Governance in a Globalizing World*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 76.

¹⁰¹ Brown, Seyom. 1995. *New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics*. (Post-Cold War edition). New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 11.

¹⁰² McGrew, Anthony. 2000. “Power Shift: From National Government to Global Governance?” In David Held, ed., *A Globalizing World? Culture, Economics, Politics*. New York: Routledge, 133.

¹⁰³ The study of these issues has been the major topic of the security studies made by those that except the state-centric view of world politics and international relations. For a detailed analysis of this issue see Walt, Stephen M. 1991. “The Renaissance of Security Studies”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(2): 211-239.

integrity and independence from those that try to maximize their interests. The dictum coming from the times of the Roman Empire onwards states this situation well: *Si vis pacem, para bellum*, i.e. "If you want peace, prepare for war."¹⁰⁵ This situation of war forced states to develop weapons that are better than those of the enemy. As technology advanced also the quality and quantity of the weapons are improved. Even, some states acquired the capacity to destroy the enemy completely although they may be destroyed as well. Therefore, military capabilities of the states they utilized in trying to maximize their national interests, and the possibility of devastating war have always been the major threat perceptions in the state-centric world.

During the Cold War period, there were two rival blocs composed of states and headed by the US and the SU. The major threat perceptions were coming from the rival blocs. Even the loss of independence of friendly states became a national security concern in this era, especially for the superpowers as a matter of strategy. As, the then President of the US, Truman stated, "[t]he loss of independence by any nation adds directly to the insecurity of the United States and all free nations."¹⁰⁶ This understanding of national security was a reflection of the perceived necessity to develop the military establishment as a response to the military buildup of the SU. This understanding was further reinforced by the development of a nuclear device by the SU in the 1949. As a result, the US further increased its military budget and developed its military capabilities in a parallel manner with the SU. The major aim of the US at this period had been the containment of the SU on the Eurasian landmass

¹⁰⁴ Sorensen, Georg. 1997. "An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood: Consequences for Conflict and Cooperation", *Review of International Studies*, 23: 264.

¹⁰⁵ Jablonsky, David. 2002-03. "The State of the National Security State", *Parameters*, Winter: 5.

¹⁰⁶ May, Ernest R. 1992. "National Security in American History," In Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to a New World Order*. New York: W. W. Norton, 99.

in order to protect its national security interests.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, nuclear arsenals and the possibility of the mutually assured destruction had been the central concerns of the superpowers as well as the other states in the system during the Cold War period.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, states continued to perceive other states and their military capabilities as the major security concern and armed conflicts persist in the post-Cold War era as well.¹⁰⁸ For example, the US continued to associate the use of military forces overseas with its national security¹⁰⁹ and continued to intervene to the conflicts around the world, like in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Furthermore, with the disappearance of superpower rivalry and Cold War restraints, the struggles between former rivals reerupted, as is the case in Yugoslavia. Moreover, serious conflicts continue in the Middle East, Southeast and South Asia, Southern and Central Africa and in the Balkans.¹¹⁰ Also, the failed states¹¹¹ of the world were started to be seen as threat to the national security¹¹² as a result of their creating safe havens for those that threaten the US and other states, like terrorists. Here, the perspective is still state-centric and failed states are seen as the main problem instead of the terrorists that situate themselves in such countries.

Furthermore, even other issues like developments in the economy were evaluated in terms of their effects on the national security of states and their contribution to the enhancement of military capabilities and tactics. For example, with money states can buy weapons from abroad and economic strength may

¹⁰⁷ Jablonsky, David. 2002-03. "The State of the National Security State", *Parameters*, Winter: 5-6.

¹⁰⁸ Kolodziej, Edward A., and I. William Zartman. 1996. "Introduction: Coping with Conflict: A Global Approach." In Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet, eds., *Coping with Conflict after the Cold War*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 3.

¹⁰⁹ Jablonsky, David. 2002-03. "The State of the National Security State", *Parameters*, Winter: 11.

¹¹⁰ Kolodziej, Edward A., and I. William Zartman. 1996. "Introduction: Coping with Conflict: A Global Approach." In Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet, eds., *Coping with Conflict after the Cold War*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 3-4.

¹¹¹ A state in which the central government has little practical control over much of its territory and population is called a 'failed state'.

¹¹² Jablonsky, David. 2002-03. "The State of the National Security State", *Parameters*, Winter: 14.

increase productivity also in the military sector that result in the development of new and effective weapons.¹¹³

On the other hand, since the developments in technology assured mutual destruction, conducting war became too risky and less useful. Therefore, states sought other ways to protect and enhance their national interests, like utilizing terrorism. Also, weaker states that could not cope with their stronger enemies with their conventional military power, utilized ways like terrorism and guerilla warfare. Therefore, domestic and international terrorism, not for the sake of their nature, but as a tool for other states became another threat perception in the state-centric world. But still this threat is perceived as coming from other states, instead of coming from the terrorist organizations themselves.

4. 1. 1. 2 Domestic and International Terrorism as Tools for other States

As Thomas C. Schelling states, terrorism is a form of violent coercion that has the power to hurt and intimidate and therefore, it is a substitute for the use of overt military force.¹¹⁴ As war became too risky or costly states started to support terrorists in the enemy states that were fighting against the existing government (utilization of domestic non-state terrorism). As another way, states conducted clandestine operations with their own institutions, like the intelligence agencies. Sometimes they supported/sponsored terrorist groups or individuals which they controlled in conducting terrorist attacks against the enemy states (utilizing international state terrorism). Thus, terrorism had been used as an international,

¹¹³ Moller, Bjorn. 2000. "National, Societal and Human Security: A General Discussion with a Case Study from the Balkans", *Paper for the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions on "What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?"*, UNESCO, Paris, 27-28 November 2000, 13-14.

defense and foreign policy tool.¹¹⁵ Therefore, the utilization of both domestic non-state and international state terrorism as a response mechanism against the threats perceived from states is a two way sword, i.e. this was also another way of threat perceived by states from other states.

4. 1. 2 The Primacy of the State

Within this picture of the world, the principal actor is the state with its demarcated territory and population.¹¹⁶ Both the perpetrator and the referent object of the threats perceived is the state itself. Even if the lives and well-being of the citizens of a state is threatened, the state perceives the threat to its own integrity and well-being. Furthermore, terrorists or other actors, like MNCs, are not accepted as actors and threat posers themselves, but they are seen as tools of the states, which use these other entities while they pursue their national interests. However, these primacy attributed to the state is not the case as far as the multi-centric world is concerned. There are actors other than the states, multiple referent objects of the multiple threats posed by these multiple actors in the picture drawn by the multi-centric world image. To these we now turn.

4. 2 Multiple Threat Perceptions of the Multi-centric World

The developments that fostered the rise of the multi-centric world also affected the threat perceptions in that world by changing the nature and increasing the number of the threats perceived. Among these developments are the

¹¹⁴ Referred in Crenshaw, Martha. 1988. "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches." In David C. Rapoport, ed., *Inside Terrorist Organizations*. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 13.

¹¹⁵ "International Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and US Policy", *Congressional Digest*, November 2001, 258.

improvements in every type of technology, increase in the quantity and quality of the skills of the individuals, rise of alternative power centers, loyalty shifts of the people from their states towards these other entities, and challenges posed to the sovereignty of the states. Besides the traditional military-political threats perceived by the states in the state-centric world, socio-economic and cultural, environmental, and non-traditional military-political threats are perceived in the multi-centric world by individuals, groups, societies, organizations, as well as states.

4. 2. 1 Socio-economic Threat Perceptions in the Multi-centric World

First of all, in terms of socio-economic threats we can mention impoverishment and overpopulation, global economic dependencies and economic development problems, spread of infectious diseases, and uncontrollable migration.

4. 2. 1. 1 Impoverishment and Overpopulation

It may be worth starting by giving some numerical examples that demonstrate the scope of the threat posed by poverty in today's world. The estimated number of people died during the two world wars is about 30 million. On the other hand, people who currently die of hunger-related causes each year are 15 million.¹¹⁷ According to the UN statistics in the year 2000 more than 2.8 billion of 6 billion people of the world live in extreme poverty on an income of less than US \$2 a day. On the other hand, the assets of the world's three richest men are more than the combined gross domestic products (GDP) of the world's 48 poorest countries. Moreover, the top fifth (20 per cent) of the people in the world who live in the highest-income countries

¹¹⁶ Camilleri, Joseph A., and Jim Falk. 1992. *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*. Worcester: Billing and Sons Ltd., 3.

¹¹⁷ Thomas, Caroline. 2001. "Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links", *Third World Quarterly*, 22(2): 163.

have access to 86 per cent of the world's GDP, while the bottom fifth, in the poorest countries, has about 1 per cent.¹¹⁸ Therefore, billions of people are living in extreme poverty. These people are experiencing globalization that shaped the emergence of the multi-centric world not as an opportunity, but as a force of disruption and destruction, thus as an assault on their material standards of living.¹¹⁹ At the end, those people that do not see any other way in order to escape from their misery and poverty turn to fundamentalist and extremist ideologies. They also turn to terrorism as a weapon of the weak, which appears as the only possible way in their world-wide struggle against the strong.¹²⁰ The annual UN Human Development Reports from 1990 to the present systematically documented the gaps and their impact on the increasing antagonism between the poor and the rich. These reports show the linkage between global poverty and violence in numbers. The words of Luciano Benini, an Italian anti-globalist, states the situation very well. He says that:

why wonder that someone is trying to earn Heaven by the terrorist actions
when paradise on earth promised by neoliberal capitalism for more than four
fifths of humanity is a mirage which moves away.¹²¹

Deprivation and poverty becomes a source of tension between states and societies as well as a source of internal conflict.¹²² Poverty and inequality force people to choose between injustice and trying to get more shares from the existing scarce resources through violent means.¹²³ As the gap between the rich and poor widened, "[m]ass communication and the shrinking of distances, while making every country a

¹¹⁸ *The UN Millennium Report*, Briefing Papers for Students, 2001, p.208.

¹¹⁹ Kofi Annan's address to the UN General Assembly, New York, 21 September 1998, (SG/SM/6707) in *The UN Millennium Report*, Briefing Papers for Students, 2001, p.134.

¹²⁰ Tehranian, Majid. 2002. "Global Terrorism: Searching for Appropriate Responses", *Pacifica Review*, 14(1): 57.

¹²¹ Benini, Luciano. 2001. "Una Nuova Convivenza Mondiale". Available [online]: <<http://digilander.iol.it/giovaniemissione/strageusa5.htm>>

neighbour to every other, has tended to increase rather than decrease the physical and psychological sense of insecurity.”¹²⁴

If one of the reasons for the increasing poverty of the underdeveloped and developing worlds is the neoliberal capitalist policies of the developed world and globalized markets, one other reason is the rapidly increasing population. The growth of world population from 1 billion to 2 billion took 130 years, while it takes only a decade for its becoming 6 billion from 5 billion today. Moreover, more than 90 percent of the added billion is living in the underdeveloped and developing parts of the world.¹²⁵ Thus, more and more people are living in growing poverty. These threaten the well being of the societies and internal stability of the states by pushing people to fundamentalist and extremist ideologies including terrorism, as explained above. This in turn, creates instability in the international system and transcends the problem to the developed states and their societies as explained above.

Impoverishment and overpopulation are threats that are beyond the borders of traditional military-political threat perceptions. They are posed not by states directly and have their own security actors, mostly individuals. People loose their faith and loyalty on their governments since those governments cannot protect them from their misery. Therefore, they choose to shift their loyalties towards the representatives of extremist and fundamentalist ideologies, including terrorists. Thus, the effects of these threats can also be felt in the developed world by this way, i.e. through the terrorist attacks in the developed world or against the citizens of the developed countries. These threats are issues in the multi-centric world as their feature implies

¹²² Baylis, John. “International and Global Security in the Post-Cold War Era.” In John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 256.

¹²³ Smith, D. 1997. *The State of War and Peace Atlas*. London: Penguin, 15.

¹²⁴ The changing concepts of security in peace operations cd, p.44.

¹²⁵ Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. 1989. “Redefining Security”, *Foreign Affairs*, 68(2): 163-164.

although their negative reflections in the security arena can be felt in the state-centric world as well.

4. 2. 1. 2 Economic Dependencies and Development Problems

Economic dependencies and development problems have been another important socio-economic threat perception in the multi-centric world. Transnational firms and companies as well as states themselves face pressures from global market and economic shocks. This at the end create tensions between and within societies between those that benefit and that suffer.¹²⁶ Furthermore, economic crises in one state can rapidly affect other countries as a result of the interdependencies the global market creates.¹²⁷ Of course this problem is more acute for the developing countries and their societies since they have much less influence over global markets than the developed countries, but still even the developed countries cannot remain immune from the threats posed by the economic crises in the global market.¹²⁸

On the other hand, the widening gap between the developed and developing states and their societies contributes to the rise of extremist and radical groups in the developing world that at the end may return to the developed world as terrorism. This point will be explained in more detail later in this chapter.

4. 2. 1. 3 Spread of Infectious Diseases

As a result of the easy travel of human beings from one state to the other, infectious diseases have become a transnational security concern that concerns

¹²⁶ Derghoukassian, Khatchik. "After Renaissance: The Reformation of International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War", available [online]: <<http://www.isanet.org/portlandarchive/ghougassian.html>>, 11.

¹²⁷ Lord, Kristin M. 2000. "The Meaning and Challenges of Economic Security." In Jose V. Ciprut, ed., *Of Fears and Foes Security and Insecurity in an Evolving Global Political Economy*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 65.

¹²⁸ Lord, Kristin M. 2000. "The Meaning and Challenges of Economic Security." In Jose V. Ciprut, ed., *Of Fears and Foes Security and Insecurity in an Evolving Global Political Economy*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 74-75.

individuals and societies as well as states. For example, because of the black-market abuses of inoculation treatments and poverty, tuberculosis and malaria re-emerged as health hazards in the South and via human mobility these diseases spread to the developed North.¹²⁹ Also HIV/AIDS is one of the nightmares of today's world. Today HIV exists in virtually all countries of the world and it is in epidemic proportions in many of the countries¹³⁰, especially in Africa. The spread of these diseases throughout the world can occur in several ways, like war and conflict, global warming, changes in the social and behavioral patterns of the human beings, rapid and unsustainable urbanization, and possibly (biological) terrorism, besides the global movement of individuals. Of course the easiness and speed of travel in today's world much contributed to the spread of diseases since no part of the world remains inaccessible to human penetration. All these at the end result in the death of millions of people, economic hazards, psychological problems and even mass migration.¹³¹

4. 2. 1. 4 Uncontrollable Migration

The final socio-economic threat perception in the multi-centric world is uncontrollable migration. According to the data provided by UNHCR the approximate number of the refugees in the year 1951, when the UNHCR had been established, was 1.5 million while it reached 13.2 million in the year 1997. These numbers do not include those people that are displaced for reasons other than political, racial, ethnic or religious persecution (these reasons may include poverty, overpopulation, famine, natural disasters, environmental degradation and general

¹²⁹ Cha, Victor D. 2000. "Globalization and the Study of International Security", *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(3): 394.

¹³⁰ Chalk, Peter. 2000. *Non-military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Extremism, Violence and Chaos on National and International Security*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 96.

¹³¹ Chalk, Peter. 2000. *Non-military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Extremism, Violence and Chaos on National and International Security*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 103-114.

social breakdown) who are not accepted as refugees under international law. When we add these people, the number of immigrants around the world reach approximately 22.4 million for the year 1997-8.¹³²

From the multiplicity of the reasons we can say that there are several types of migration including migration as a result of political, religious, and/or ethnic pressures, i.e. forced migration; illegal migration; migration for employment; and environmental migration.¹³³ The end of the Cold War exacerbated ethnic conflicts and violent secessionist movements that create refugee flows. The dissolution of the empires and countries, like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, has created insecure minorities in the smaller units that are created. The persisting difference in income and employment opportunities among countries encouraged economic migrants. Environmental degradation, droughts, floods, famines, and civil conflicts push people to flee across international borders and “new global networks of communication and transportation provide individuals with information and opportunities for migration.”¹³⁴

Besides the plight and sufferings of the people that migrate, migration threatens both the receiving and sending states and the citizens of the receiving states in several ways. As far as states are concerned, migration can threaten the sending, receiving, and transitory route states by creating social, economic, and political

¹³² Chalk, Peter. 2000. *Non-military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Extremism, Violence and Chaos on National and International Security*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 115. Baylis, John. “International and Global Security in the Post-Cold War Era.” In John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 271. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). July 1998. *Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR*. Geneva: UNHCR Statistical Unit, section V.

¹³³ Choucrist, Nazli. 2002. “Migration and Security,” *Journal of International Affairs*, 56(1): 97-122.

¹³⁴ Weiner, Myron. 1995. “Security, Stability, and International Migration.” In Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 184-185.

instability and unrest.¹³⁵ Furthermore, migration threatens the states not only by creating internal problems but also by resulting in tensions between states. As examples to this we can mention the conflict between the United States and Great Britain over the forcible repatriation of refugees from Hong Kong; the US-Israeli controversy over the settlement of former Soviet Jews on the West Bank; the placement of Western migrants at the strategic locations by Iraq in order to prevent air strikes.¹³⁶

Migration may threaten the receiving societies in several ways by creating cultural, economic, and political problems. In terms of culture, immigrants may pose a threat to identities of the receiving societies based on common language, culture, association and in some cases religion.¹³⁷ Economically, they may result in the increase of unemployment rates as well as creating extra burden for the budget. Politically, they may create tensions between the refugee sending and receiving countries, spur racist movements in the receiving country, may increase the number of some components of the society that have ethnic affinity with the immigrants that at the end disrupt the balances in the society and create internal conflicts some of them may reach the degree of secessionism.¹³⁸

However, “migration regimes of nation-states (largely framed by the state-centric logic of the Cold War) are becoming problematic and ineffective as migration flows in a globalizing world are becoming multilayered and not easily controlled by

¹³⁵ İçduygu, Ahmet, and E. Fuat Keyman. 2000. “Globalization, Security, and Migration: The Case of Turkey”, *Global Governance*, 6(3): 384-385.

¹³⁶ Weiner, Myron. 1995. “Security, Stability, and International Migration.” In Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 183.

¹³⁷ Ibryamova, Nouray. 2002. “Migration from Central and Eastern Europe and Societal Security in the European Union”, *Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*, 1(2): 4.

¹³⁸ Chalk, Peter. 2000. *Non-military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Extremism, Violence and Chaos on National and International Security*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 127-128.

nation-states.”¹³⁹ Uncontrolled migration increasingly take its strength from the multi-centric world. As a result the rules created by the states in the state-centric world context cannot meet the challenge and the threat posed by migration flows.

Thus, besides threatening the states, migration of people results in the suffering of the people and threatens individuals that immigrate on the one hand, and it threatens the stability and well-being of the societies that face with the problems brought by the immigrants on the other hand.

4. 2. 2 Cultural Threat Perceptions in the Multi-centric World

Another category of threat perception in the multi-centric world is the cultural one. Within this category we can count identity crises, cultural misperceptions and misunderstandings, and the resulting human rights and freedoms violations.

4. 2. 2. 1 Identity Crises

The national identities are challenged by the influence of global language, style, goods, entertainment, and all types of information flows.¹⁴⁰ It becomes difficult to preserve the traditional patterns of language, culture, association and religion, thus preserve the national identity, unaffected. People start to associate themselves with groups that transcend state boundaries and this may result in the loyalty shifts from states towards other groupings, which threatens the states. This is to say, with the help of globalization identities have been de-territorialized, meaning that ethnic, religious or other types of groups display interactions that transcend territorial

¹³⁹ İçduygu, Ahmet, and E. Fuat Keyman. 2000. “Globalization, Security, and Migration: The Case of Turkey”, *Global Governance*, 6(3): 384.

¹⁴⁰ Barry Buzan. 1995. “Security, the State, the ‘New World Order,’ and Beyond.” In Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 187-209.

boundaries and also engage with other non-state identities.¹⁴¹ With the words of David Held there emerges a “gap” between the nation and the state.¹⁴² In other words, the emergence of “overlapping cultures, crosscurrents, and crosswalks ... gives rise to the crisis of national identity.”¹⁴³

4. 2. 2. 2 Cultural Misperceptions and Misunderstandings, Human Rights and Freedoms Violations

The resulting group identifications may reach the level of extremism, be it ethnic or religious, which may become a threat to the integrity of nation-states on the one hand, and to the security of the ‘other’ groups against which the extremists define themselves on the other hand. The most referred argument for this point is the “Clash of Civilizations” argument of Samuel Huntington.¹⁴⁴

Thus, national identities are challenged by subnational identities, like ethnic ones, from below and by transnational identities from above.¹⁴⁵ One other point here is the violation of human rights and freedoms of the individuals. This threatens the integrity and legitimacy of the states besides the threatened lives and well-beings of the individuals and stability of the societies.

4. 2. 3 Environmental Threat Perceptions in the Multi-centric World

A third group of threats perceived in the multi-centric world is the environmental threats. The depletion of natural resources including energy and water, global climate change and warming, desertification, ozone depletion,

¹⁴¹ Du Plessis, Anton. 2001. « “Exploring the Concept of Identity in World Politics”, in *Seminar Report 2001*, 11: 20. Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

¹⁴² Held, David. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

¹⁴³ İçduygu, Ahmet, and E. Fuat Keyman. 2000. “Globalization, Security, and Migration: The Case of Turkey”, *Global Governance*, 6(3): 386.

¹⁴⁴ Huntington, Samuel. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations”, *Foreign Affairs*, 72(3): 22-49.

radioactive contamination and acid rain, and loss of biodiversity are among these threats. These threaten the individuals, societies and states in a way that is beyond the dynamics and reach of the state-centric world.

4. 2. 3. 1 Depletion of Natural Resources

The depletion of natural resources, like energy and water, threaten the quality of the lives of the people and in the case of water scarcity it threatens the very survival of the people. It contributes to food shortages and the emergence and spread of diseases.

Besides the individuals and societies it also threatens the states. For example, one of the reasons of the Gulf War of 1991 was the control over oil.¹⁴⁵ Water resources create tensions between Turkey and Syria. Arab countries and Israel are another example. Also, by threatening the lives and well-being of the citizens of the states, environmental threats may undermine the sovereignty of the states and may prevent them from attaining economic growth and development.¹⁴⁶ The sovereignty of the states may be undermined, because states lose the confidence and loyalty of their citizens by failing to protect them from threats they are facing.

4. 2. 3. 2 Global Climate Change and some Other Threats

Global climate change and warming is another factor that helps the emergence and spread of diseases and food shortages, thus contribute to threat levels the individuals and societies face. It can also severely harm coastal nations,

¹⁴⁵ Du Plessis, Anton. 2001. « "Exploring the Concept of Identity in World Politics", in *Seminar Report 2001*, 11: 18-20. Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

¹⁴⁶ Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1994. "Environmental scarcities and violent conflict", *International Security*, 19(1): 18.

¹⁴⁷ Chalk, Peter. 2000. *Non-military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Extremism, Violence and Chaos on National and International Security*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 77-78.

particularly those that lack the necessary infrastructure and the capacity to rebuild or recover after such catastrophes.¹⁴⁸

Also, soil degradation, i.e. desertification, results in declining agricultural productivity thus contribute to the poverty and famine around the world,¹⁴⁹ but mostly in the underdeveloped parts of the world.

The chemicals that are used contaminates the air to the extend of resulting in ozone depletion. According to the UNDP report of 1997, each year 3 million people die from air pollution and more than 5 million people die per annum from diarrhoeal diseases caused by water contamination.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, radioactive centrals and waste cause radioactive active contamination and acid rain in some parts of the world. All these threaten the health of the people and the existence of the planet earth very severely.

Moreover, deforestation and extinction of species, thus biodiversity, threaten human security by resulting in the decrease in food supplies, materials for energy and construction, chemicals for pharmaceuticals and industry among many other consequences.¹⁵¹

Besides general health problems and threat to the existence and lives of people, environmental threats mostly, with some exceptions like water scarcity, have economic implications, which at the end cause human sufferings and societal unrest that are reflected in protests against governments. In extreme cases people migrate as a result of environmental hazards creating political instability around the world.¹⁵² Furthermore, since the developing world is and will be affected more from these

¹⁴⁸ Liotta, P. H. 2002. "Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security", *Security Dialogue*, 33(4): 483.

¹⁴⁹ Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. 1989. "Redefining Security", *Foreign Affairs*, 68(2): 165.

¹⁵⁰ UNDP *Human Development Report*. 1997. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 22.

¹⁵¹ Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. 1989. "Redefining Security", *Foreign Affairs*, 68(2): 165.

¹⁵² Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. 1989. "Redefining Security", *Foreign Affairs*, 68(2): 168.

hazards the gap between developing and developed world will be widened and this will create further tensions between these two.¹⁵³

4. 2. 4 Non-traditional Military/Political Threat Perceptions in the Multi-Centric World

As the final category, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), arms proliferation and weapon sales even to non-state entities, failed states and intrastate wars, ethnic and religious conflicts that have the potential to spillover instability and insecurity around the world and radicalization of ideologies and extremisms, transnational organized crime, and transnational terrorism even changed the traditional military perceptions in the multi-centric world and created non-traditional military/political threat perceptions.

4. 2. 4. 1 Weapons of Mass Destruction

It is admitted by the former US president Clinton and the former Russian president Yeltsin that the most serious and pressing danger at the threshold of the 21st century is the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical and other types of WMDs, the technologies for their production, and their means of delivery.¹⁵⁴ There is a threat that the WMD can fall into the hands of rough states, terrorists or other non-state actors that will not hesitate to use them. The use of sarin gas by Aum Shinrikyo terrorist group in the Tokyo subway in March 1995 and dispersal of anthrax through US mail in October 2001 show that it is possible for terrorists to use WMDs as soon as they acquire. It is known that the terrorists are seeking to access WMDs and using

¹⁵³ Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. 1989. "Redefining Security", *Foreign Affairs*, 68(2): 170.

¹⁵⁴ Clinton, William J., and Boris Yeltsin. 1998. "Joint Statement on Common Security Challenges at the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century", *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 05114187, 34(36), 09/07/1998. (They made the statement on 4 September 1998).

the globalization of information technology to their advantage.¹⁵⁵ If terrorists acquire WMDs, this will reinforce their actorness by placing them at the same table with the states. Even if they do not utilize these weapons, they will acquire the power of deterrence. It is to say, they will be able to make others do what they want by threatening them with using their WMDs. Furthermore, states won't be able to threaten to attack the supporters of the terrorists, with a fear of receiving a nuclear retaliation. Moreover, WMDs can be used against the military power of states. For example, biological bacteriums that are used to clean petroleum from the seas can be used to destroy the fuel reserves of a state.¹⁵⁶ In addition, the increase in the strength of the terrorist organizations that will have WMDs will make them more attractful power centers for some people to shift their loyalties. In turn, terrorist organizations will become further strengthened.

4. 2. 4. 2 The Revolution in Military Affairs

The developments in technology also affected the military sphere. These developments are generally referred as the 'Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)'. Thus, greater information technology and "smartness" of weapons, besides their greater firepower, were used to define advantage for the future warfare.¹⁵⁷ All these added to the destructive capacities of military assets. Moreover, the nation-states are no longer able to control the diffusion of information and technology.¹⁵⁸ Leading corporations in the private sector form strategic alliances. These are driven by competitive, cost-cutting, or cutting-edge innovative needs instead of techno-

¹⁵⁵ The Changing Concepts of Security, p.46.

¹⁵⁶ Kibaroglu, Mustafa. 2003. "Kitle İmha Silahlarının Gelişim Süreci, Yayılmasının Önlenmesine İlişkin Yapılan Çalışmalar ve Geleceğin Güvenlik Tehditleri", *Stradigma*, 1. available online: <<http://www.stradigma.com/turkce/subat2003/makale9.html>>

¹⁵⁷ Cha, Victor D. 2000. "Globalization and the Study of International Security", *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(3): 395.

nationalism. Consequently, the defense production becomes transnational and the control of the state over these activities is further reduced.¹⁵⁹ This feature of the RMAs made it a threat rising within the multi-centric world.

4. 2. 4. 3 Failed States and Intrastate Wars

Another important issue is that the typical conflicts of today have become intrastate instead of interstate, thus threatening the states, individuals and societies from within:

Internal conflicts broke out in various parts of the former Soviet Union; declarations of independence by the component parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia quickly led to fighting and ethnic cleansing; the disputes between warring factions in Liberia, Angola, Somalia and elsewhere in Africa became more intense and widespread; fierce and long-standing ethnic enmity led to genocide in Rwanda.¹⁶⁰

All these show that intrastate conflicts, rather than interstate ones, became one of the major destabilizing and insecurity creating threats of the day.

These types of conflicts rise as a result of state weakness. Besides creating instability, failed states provide safe heavens for the terrorists to operate and conduct their training. This, to some extent, meet the needs of transnational terrorist organizations for places to establish training camps. Such places were provided to terrorists by states supporting and using terrorism during the Cold War. However, now, failed states meet this need without being able to control the terrorists and terrorists are not dependent on these states. On the contrary, sometimes the regimes

¹⁵⁸ Simon, Denis Fred. 1997. *Techno-Security in an Age of Globalization*. New York: M. E. Sharpe.

¹⁵⁹ Cha, Victor D. 2000. "Globalization and the Study of International Security", *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(3): 395.

¹⁶⁰ The Changing Concepts of Security, p.39.

in the failed states need the support of the terrorist organization situated in their territories. This argument will be further explained in the next chapter of this thesis.

The monopoly of the state on using force had been disintegrated; private security forces, civilian militias and bandit gangs replaced the professional armies that had been broken apart. Since the rules and distinctions had disappeared, the vast majority of the casualties are civilians.¹⁶¹

The processes of globalization, which shaped the emergence of the multi-centric world, carries both integration and fragmentation tendencies with it. James Rosenau calls this phenomenon as “fragnegration”.¹⁶² On the one hand, the process of globalization has homogenizing effects that is combined with the “borderlessness” phenomenon. These homogenizing impulses include the diffusion of standardized consumer goods generally coming from the developed world, Western forms of capitalism and liberal democracy.¹⁶³ On the other hand, it spurs the ethnic and religious awareness among the groups that transcend nation-state boundaries and thus encourage fragmentation. “At the local level, the more functional the world becomes, the more people feel the need to identify with a particular community based on values rather than utility.”¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, “[t]he rejection of these globalizing tendencies in its purest forms is associated with and expressed by the resurgence of religious and ethnic politics in various extremist configurations.”¹⁶⁵ These characteristics demonstrate that the failed state and intrastate war threats are

¹⁶¹ Kaldor, Mary. 1999. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Great Britain: Polity Press, 2-3.

¹⁶² Rosenau, James N. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

¹⁶³ Cha, Victor D. 2000. “Globalization and the Study of International Security”, *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(3): 394-395.

¹⁶⁴ Guéhenno, Jean-Marie. 1998-99. “The Impact of Globalization on Strategy”, *Survival*, 40(4): 8.

¹⁶⁵ Falk, Richard. 1997. “State of Siege: Will Globalization Win Out?”, *International Affairs*, 73(1): 131-132.

rising within the multi-centric world, since they are reflections of the features of the this world.

4. 2. 4. 4 Transnational Organized Crime and Transnational Terrorism

Easy and speedy movement of goods, information and people combined with the improvements in communications and transportation technologies contributed to the rise of transnational organized crime. Especially drug-trafficking and increasing drug addiction creates severe problems for the societies. It even contributes to the spread of HIV/AIDS.¹⁶⁶ Besides, especially in terms of financial issues, it is known that transnational organized crime organizations and transnational terrorist organizations are cooperating.¹⁶⁷ Therefore, transnational organized crime threatens individuals and societies besides states not only through activities like drug-trafficking, smuggling, and money laundering but also by facilitating the terrorist activities.

With the rise of the multi-centric world terrorism also took a new shape. Before, as a traditional threat in the state-centric world, terrorist organizations could not operate fully without the support of a state, therefore it was easier for the states to control those terrorist organizations. However, in the multi-centric world with the help of globalization, terrorists acquired the ability to operate without the support of any state and therefore terrorist organizations run outside of the control of the states. Moreover, the multi-centric world provided a large space for the terrorists to hide by providing them the ability to organize and operate in a deterritorialized manner. (This topic will be further explored in the next chapter).

¹⁶⁶ Chalk, Peter. 2000. *Non-military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Extremism, Violence and Chaos on National and International Security*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 47-48.

¹⁶⁷ For a detailed explanation of this issue see *G8 Recommendations on Transnational Crime*, 2002. available online: <<http://www.g8j-i.ca/english/doc1.html>>

The development and spread of information and technology increased the lethality of the terrorist attacks.¹⁶⁸ The state collapse and the “privatisation” of its capabilities increase the possibility for terrorists to acquire the necessary capabilities to build or own WMDs.¹⁶⁹

Terrorists threaten individuals and societies by creating a sense of acute insecurity and panic thus result in a social-psychological damage and loss of underlying democratic identity, giving economic damage and in some cases causing contamination and vital infrastructural collapse.¹⁷⁰

One of the major characteristics of all these threat perceptions in the multi-centric world is their being transnational in nature rather than being national or local. Even those that seem to be local or affecting only one part of the world affect the rest of the world as a result of the interconnectedness and technological improvements. These improvements may be in transportation or communications technology. Furthermore, these threats are as important as the traditional military threats of the state-centric world. Since if the citizens of a state have no food, clothing, shelter, are threatened by infectious diseases, have no access to clean water and breathable air, and threatened by terrorists, the possibility of an external military attack by another state does not seem to be the sole or primary threat. The point here is that, the value of anything is determined by how much of it one has (the law of marginal utility). Therefore, “[i]n a world of scarce resources, the goal of military security is *always* in conflict with other goals, such as economic welfare, environmental protection, and

¹⁶⁸ Hoffman, Bruce. 1997. “Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses”, *Nonproliferation Review*, 4(3): 45-53.

¹⁶⁹ Guéhenno, Jean-Marie. 1998-99. “The Impact of Globalization on Strategy”, *Survival*, 40(4): 11.

¹⁷⁰ Chalk, Peter. 2000. *Non-military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Extremism, Violence and Chaos on National and International Security*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 32-33.

social welfare.”¹⁷¹ Besides, there is always the possibility that these other threats may result in military confrontations as well. There emerged a “survival dilemma” besides the traditional “security dilemma”.¹⁷²

After examining the multiple threat perceptions in the multi-centric world, we should also look at the multiple reference objects of these threats. Since, as different from the state-centric world, the threats in the multi-centric world not only threaten the state but have also other reference objects.

4. 3 Multiple Reference Objects of the Multiple Threat Perceptions

Whether socio-economic and cultural, environmental, or non-traditional military-political threat perception, the referent objects, i.e. those that are threatened, are multiple in the multi-centric world as well. In other words, threats are perceived not only by states but also by individuals, societies and groups. In the multi-centric world these types of threats to individuals, societies and groups are important in addition to the traditional military threats the states face. However, states must take these threats into consideration also because even the threats that seem to threaten individuals and societies, like HIV/AIDS, have effects on the security of states since they produce political and economic, and even sometimes military hardships for the states.

Therefore, both military and non-military threats to individuals (human security) and societies (societal security) including the groupings that transcend state boundaries constitute the threat perceptions and the referent objects in the multi-centric world.

¹⁷¹ Baldwin, David A. 1995. “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War”, *World Politics*, 48: 127-128. (emphasis in original).

¹⁷² Liotta, P. H. 2002. “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security”, *Security Dialogue*, 33(4): 480.

These non-traditional threats, be they linked to climate change, resource scarcity, declining productivity, or transnational crime and terrorism, are concerning the whole world, since the entire world is now confronted with human-centered vulnerabilities.¹⁷³ Human-centered vulnerabilities mean that the most important effects of the new threats are on the human-beings. The lives and well-being of the humans are threatened the most. The effects of these new threats on states are felt via their citizens. This is to say, as far as human-centered vulnerabilities are concerned, mostly, since the lives and well-being of their citizens are threatened, the well-being and integrity of the states are threatened too.

Human security was prioritized in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report. In this report the universality of concern for human security of all the people both rich and poor and the people-centered nature of human security concept were explained.¹⁷⁴

The shift in focus from states to individuals and societies opens up to scrutiny the state-society relations. The capacity and the legitimacy of the state and how it treats its citizens (especially in non-democratic countries, in terms of the provision of fundamental rights and freedoms) becomes important in elaborating threat perceptions. Therefore, states themselves may be a source of threat for their citizens¹⁷⁵ and this opens the way for the discussions of humanitarian interventionism.¹⁷⁶ Thus, not only states but also ethnic, religious and other types of

¹⁷³ Liotta, P. H. 2002. "Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security", *Security Dialogue*, 33(4): 473.

¹⁷⁴ *The UNDP Human Development Report*. 1994. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 22-23.

¹⁷⁵ Thomas, Caroline. 2001. "Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links", *Third World Quarterly*, 22(2): 164.

¹⁷⁶ Derghoukassian, Khatchik. "After Renaissance: The Reformation of International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War", available [online]: <<http://www.isanet.org/portlandarchive/ghougassian.html>>, 16.

groups become the reference object of security also when military issues are concerned.¹⁷⁷

Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde mentioned the reference objects of security in different sectors. According to them, as far as economic and societal sectors are concerned, the reference objects are states, individuals, groups within societies (e.g., tribes, clans, ethnic or religious units, classes, groups of individuals within national economy), societies, global markets, national economies, and civilizations. In the environmental sector the reference objects are the environment itself, human enterprise, societies, and again civilizations in the sense that there is a risk of losing the achieved level of civilization, and states. In terms of military and political sectors, states, societal groups (like tribes, minorities, and nations), transnational movements (including world religions), alliances (like NATO), emerging quasi-superstates (like the European Union), international regimes, and civilizations are the reference objects.¹⁷⁸

Therefore, as far as the threat perceptions of the multi-centric world are concerned, the centrality of the state and its sovereignty as the major and only reference object of security has changed.¹⁷⁹

4. 4 Non-state Security Actors of the Multi-centric World

When the threat perceptions in the multi-centric world are concerned, it is seen that the actors that perpetrate such threats are multiple. Not only the traditional perpetrators, i.e. states, but also individuals, groupings (ethnic, religious, or

¹⁷⁷ Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 52-55.

¹⁷⁸ Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 52-55, 75-79, 100-103, 123-124, 145-150.

otherwise; like national liberation movements), Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and/or Transnational Corporations (TNCs), Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and /or International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs), transnational organized crime organizations, and transnational terrorist organizations are emerging as threat perpetrators in the multi-centric world.¹⁸⁰ These sovereignty-free actors of the multi-centric world are able to escape from the constraints of states and pursue their own goals.¹⁸¹

4. 4. 1 Individuals as Non-state Security Actors

Individuals in the multi-centric world have experienced a “skill revolution”, with the help of globalization, and this has enhanced the capabilities of individual and group members of organized criminals, ethnic insurgents, and terrorists so that they can conduct their actions more effectively than ever before.¹⁸² Furthermore, in terms of harming the environment, individuals create threats to their own immediate environment and to the planet earth on which they live. Thus, individuals emerge as security actors in the multi-centric world.

¹⁷⁹ Derghoukassian, Khatchik. “After Renaissance: The Reformation of International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War”, available [online]: <<http://www.isanet.org/portlandarchive/ghougassian.html>>, 17.

¹⁸⁰ I do not refer to IGOs here as non-state actors, although they may be so. Although in most of the categorizations IGOs are accepted as non-state actors, I left them out because their members are states and not individuals or non-state groups. When I refer to non-state actors throughout this study I mean actors other than states and/or organizations of states. Furthermore, although there may be differences between MNCs and TNCs I use the terms as more or less referring to the same thing, namely as “huge firms that own and control plants and offices in at least more than one country and sell their goods and services around the world.”(Ataman, Muhittin. 2003. “The Impact of Non-state Actors on World Politics: A Challenge to Nation-states”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 2(1).).

¹⁸¹ Rosenau, James N. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 249.

¹⁸² Rosenau, James N. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Cha, Victor D. 2000. “Globalization and the Study of International Security”, *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(3): 394.

4. 4. 2 Subnational and Supranational Groupings as Non-State Security Actors

Especially after the Cold War, individuals began once again to give their loyalty to and identify themselves with ethno-national groups, which are composed of people that share common civilization, language, cultural tradition, and ties of kinship, in addition to showing loyalty to the nation-states.¹⁸³ This identification, in turn, has resulted in the increase in the importance of national liberation movements (NLMs) in world politics. “Since most states are multiethnic and many include at least one potentially threatening minority, the rising significance of ethnic groups reduces the relevance of nation-states in world politics.”¹⁸⁴ One of the most prominent examples of NLMs that play a significant role in international politics is the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that, since the late 1960s, has played a key role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In terms of groups as threat posers, there are also “stateless nations”, like the Palestinians, the Tibetans in China, the Basques and Catalonians in Spain, the Quebecois in Canada, the Muslims of Kashmir and Serbia, the Hindu Tamils in Sri Lanka, and the Kurds in the Middle East, who are effective actors in international politics.¹⁸⁵ They create instabilities and threaten the security of the individuals, societies and states.

4. 4. 3 TNCs/MNCs as Non-state Security Actors

TNCs have a powerful influence on the global economic agenda setting together with private consultancies and private bond-rating agencies. They work

¹⁸³ Kegley, C. W., and E. R. Wittkopf (eds.). 1995. *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives*. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 175.

¹⁸⁴ Ataman, Muhittin. 2003. “The Impact of Non-state Actors on World Politics: A Challenge to Nation-states”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 2(1).

¹⁸⁵ Brown, S. 1995. *New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics*. (Post-Cold War edition). New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 162-163.

together with private business interests.¹⁸⁶ These became security actors and threaten the well-being of individuals and societies through influencing, shaking and undermining the national economies of the states, resulting in loss of control by the states and preventing the development of domestic industries. As Caroline Thomas indicates:

The Asian Crises have also heightened awareness of the ability of a handful of relatively new private financial actors such as hedge funds to exert massive leverage. They can force currency devaluation at a breathtaking pace, undermine national economic policy, erode national development and throw literally millions below the poverty line.¹⁸⁷

Moreover, it is the private sector that has become the prime creator and distributor of new technologies in the last decades. MNCs transfer technology through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), joint ventures, international patenting, licencing, and knowhow agreements.¹⁸⁸ The activities of the MNCs are good evidence for showing the growing inability of the sovereign state to effectively control and regulate the economic activities of the private sector.¹⁸⁹ MNCs control a large amount of resources, thus they can easily move goods, money, personnel, and technology across national boundaries. This has strengthened them in terms of their bargaining power with governments.¹⁹⁰ All these factors at the end make it easier for non-state groups, like transnational terrorists, to acquire the necessary means and knowledge to conduct their activities and even open the way for them to acquire WMDs.

¹⁸⁶ Thomas, Caroline. 2001. "Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links", *Third World Quarterly*, 22(2): 169-170.

¹⁸⁷ Thomas, Caroline. 2001. "Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links", *Third World Quarterly*, 22(2): 173.

¹⁸⁸ Cha, Victor D. 2000. "Globalization and the Study of International Security", *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(3):395-396. Goldblatt, David, David Held, Anthony McGrew and Jonathan Perraton, "Economic Globalization and the Nation State: Shifting Balances of Power", *Alternatives*, 22(3): 277-279. (pp.269-285).

¹⁸⁹ Miller, L. H. 1994. *Global Order: Values and Power in International Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 67.

4. 4. 4 NGOs as Non-state Security Actors

Another type of non-state actors are the NGOs, like the International Red Cross, Doctors without Frontiers, Green Peace and Amnesty International (AI).¹⁹¹ For example, AI initiates worldwide campaigns against states that violate human rights and mobilizes international community against such states. This, while working mostly for the benefit of the individuals, may threaten the states by shaking their position in the international system via deteriorating their reputation and credibility.

4. 4. 5 Transnational Organized Crime Organizations as Non-state Security Actors

One other type of non-state actor that threatens the individuals and societies as well as states is the transnational organized crime organizations. With the help of globalization these organizations have found the opportunity to intensify their activities. Drug trafficking, smuggling, money laundering and all other activities of these organizations threaten individuals, societies and states in various ways ranging from harming the health of the individual, corrupting the societies, and shaking national economies.

Moreover, these groups work together with transnational terrorist organizations, thus contributing to the threat they pose. For example, transnational terrorists and transnational organized crime organizations cooperate in smuggling, money laundering, and drug trafficking activities for fund raising.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Bennett, A. L. 1991. *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 264.

¹⁹¹ Ataman, Muhittin. 2003. "The Impact of Non-state Actors on World Politics: A Challenge to Nation-states", *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 2(1).

¹⁹² Radu, Michael. 2002. "The New Protracted Conflict, Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges", *Orbis*, Spring.

4. 4. 6 Transnational Terrorist Organizations as Non-state Security Actors

Transnational terrorist organizations, which are the most important ones for the sake of this study, are the last type of non-state security actors of the multi-centric world that is to be listed here. Actually, this issue will be dealt in detail in the next chapter, but it may be worth to make a brief introduction here. Transnational terrorist organizations are composed of terrorists from various nationalities. Also, there is a collusion and cooperation between different terrorist groups that add these groups a transnational character. Thus, different terrorist organizations cooperate in terms of sharing training facilities, finance, information, expertise, etc., thus facilitating joint operations.¹⁹³ These terrorist organizations became important actors that threaten the whole world with the help of globalization.

Futhermore, transnationally organized terrorist groups are not only involved in violence but also “provide social services such as welfare, policing, education, employment, membership, identity and existential meaning to constituencies that are marginalized within the given political order.”¹⁹⁴ In other words, they appear as becoming full-fledged security actors with features of supplying and demanding security, as well as being a securiy challenger.

On the basis of these, September 11 events showed that non-state actors could seriously give harm even to a powerful state.¹⁹⁵ These attacks gave much harm to the US in its own territory than most of the attacks conducted by the nation-states throughout the history.

¹⁹³ Richardson, Louise. 2000. “Terrorists as Transnational Actors” in Max. Taylor and John Horgan eds., *The Future of Terrorism*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 216-218. (pp.209-219).

¹⁹⁴ Adamson, Fiona. “International Terrorism, Non-State Actors and the Logic of Transnational Mobilization: A Perspective from International Relations”, Memo for the conference “International Law, International Relations and Terrorism”, available [online]: <http://www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc/gsc_activities/adamson.page>, 7. (of 13 pages).

¹⁹⁵ Liotta, P. H. 2002. “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security”, *Security Dialogue*, 33(4): 473.

Therefore, in the more and more globalized world of today, non-state actors pose a significant threat to nation-states. For example, more and more individuals, private companies, and other non-state groups are becoming the producers, consumers, and merchants of the global arms market. Importantly, their being non-territorial, “enemies without an address” with the words of Bishara¹⁹⁶, capture the current dilemma of the state-centric world that is used to fight only with territorial state enemies unprepared. Thus these non-state actors such as mafia, narco-terrorists and transnational terrorists introduced a new struggle that is fought in an unconventional manner into the forefront of the international agenda.

For example, state-centric world is unprepared for suicidal terrorists with religiously motivated hatred who do not value international law and norms. At this point also the traditional modes of deterrence becomes irrelevant. Weaponized non-state and sub-state actors do not occupy sovereign territorial space, they operate as self-contained cells that render decapitating strikes at a central decision-making structure ineffective, thus they cannot be targeted.¹⁹⁷ Furthermore, how can one deter people that conduct suicide attacks?

Thus, transnational terrorists are non-military actors that also pose military challenges. However, the state-centric world still responds to these in traditional manner with traditional counter-response mechanisms, namely with military means as if the enemy is a state/ military actor. The old cliché “if all you have is a hammer,

¹⁹⁶ Bishara, M. 2001. “Adresi Belli Olmayan Düşman”, *Birikim*, 151: 75-78.

¹⁹⁷ Guéhenno, Jean-Marie. 1998-99. “The Impact of Globalization on Strategy”, *Survival*, 40(4): 12.
Cha, Victor D. 2000. “Globalization and the Study of International Security”, *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(3): 400.

then every problem begins to look like a nail”¹⁹⁸ summarizes the situation very well.¹⁹⁹

Therefore, states fail to meet the challenges posed by these non-state security actors. In order to be able to meet these challenges state-to-state counter-response mechanisms have to become state-to-non-state as well. Among the proposed solutions one is that the states should cooperate with other non-state actors like private sector and global civil society to undermine or at least not enable terrorist activity,²⁰⁰ besides cooperating with each other and utilizing international organizations.

From this point it may be worth switching to explain transnational terrorists as non-state security actors. In the light of the analysis made until here in thesis, we are already able to judge, to some extent, that the existing international response mechanisms are not enough to give an effective response to transnational terrorism. However, in order to see better why the existing counter-terrorism mechanisms are not enough to meet the challenges posed by transnational terrorism, we should look at the actorness of the transnational terrorists and to the nature of the threat they pose in more detail. In this chapter we analyzed the general framework of the perceived threats, referent objects, and security actors in the multi-centric world and their differences from the state-centric world. In the next chapter, we will analyze transnational terrorism in more detail, and apply the general features we examined

¹⁹⁸ Liotta, P. H. 2002. “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security”, *Security Dialogue*, 33(4): 482.

¹⁹⁹ Also the other threat perceptions in the multi-centric world; like poverty, overpopulation, economic development problems, migration, environmental degradation, etc.; cannot be eliminated through military means. The preoccupation of the state-centric world with the military statecraft limits its ability to address the problems that are not amenable to military solutions. (Baldwin, David A. 1995. “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War”, *World Politics*, 48: 32). one proposed solution is to build transnational coalitions among states, NGOs, and individuals specific to each problem. (Reinicke, Wolfgang. 1997. “Global Public Policy”, *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6): 134. (pp.127-138)).

here to that specific threat. This will be the last step to answer the question whether it is possible to give an effective international response to transnational terrorism, in a concrete manner.



²⁰⁰ Shambaugh, George E. 2002. "Statecraft and Non-state Actors in an Age of Globalization", prepared for the *International Studies Association Annual Conference New Orleans, LA, March 2002*, available [online]: <<http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/shambaugh.html>>, 1 (of 15).

CHAPTER V

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISTS AS NON-STATE SECURITY ACTORS

It is commonly argued that during the Cold War period states, especially the two superpowers, supported the terrorist organizations that were fighting against their rivals, or even engaged in covert terrorist activities themselves.²⁰¹ This was because terrorist activities seemed cheaper, easier, and less risky as long as state participation was kept covert. As a result, states that did not want to risk a nuclear war starting among themselves, which may result in nuclear holocaust, utilized terrorism.²⁰² Since it is difficult to prove the relationship between states and terrorist activities, the possibility of retaliation was greatly reduced. This situation resulted in the arguments that the “cold war” was superseded by a “camouflaged war”.²⁰³

On the other hand terrorist organizations were dependent on the support of states in order to be able to conduct their operations internationally in an effective manner. For example, states provided funds, weapons, training, diplomatic facilities, place to hide, technical and ideological support and other necessary logistical

²⁰¹ Actually state support and /or sponsorship of terrorism started very early in the history. The empires of Rome and Byzantium utilized terrorism. Since no empire could be able to live in continuous war with its neighbors, utilizing terrorism in order to cope with the enemies was the cheaper and easier way even at that time. Also, later in the history, but before the Cold War, Britain and France used terrorism against each other. For example, during the age of French Revolution the Irish rebels received help from Paris and Britain supplied help to the groups that were fighting against Napoleon in Spain and in other places. For more detail see Laqueur, Walter. 1999. *The New Terrorism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 156-158.

²⁰² For example Jenkins, Brian Michael. 1991. “Setting the Scene.” In Igor Beliaev and John Marks, eds., *Common Ground on Terrorism: Soviet-American Cooperation against the Politics of Terror*. New York: W. W. Norton, 35-38. Also see Stohl, Michael. 1988. “States, Terrorism and State Terrorism: The Role of the Superpowers.” In Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl, eds., *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 157.

²⁰³ Liddell-Hart, B. H. 1967. *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*. London: Faber, 375.

facilities for the international terrorists.²⁰⁴ All these strengthened them and increased their capabilities on the one hand, but enabled the states to control these terrorist organizations to a large extent on the other hand.²⁰⁵ This type of terrorism, to the extent that the states could control them²⁰⁶, remained within the framework of the threat perceptions of the state-centric world.

With the end of the Cold War and disappearance of the East-West rivalry, terrorist organizations mostly lost the support coming from the superpowers, therefore, state support to terrorism diminished and transformed. As a result of this development some terrorist organizations lost their effectiveness, however others found other ways to compensate for this loss of state/superpower support. This has mostly been accomplished through the opportunities created by the multi-centric world and the processes of globalization that fostered the emergence of the multi-centric world. Rapid developments in technology facilitated communication, transportation, acquiring information, and different kinds of weapons among other

²⁰⁴ Schlagheck, Donna M. 1990. "The Superpowers, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism." In Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 171.

²⁰⁵ Even at that time, especially from the 1970s onwards, there were transnational terrorist groups that cooperated with each other and did not need the support of the states to the extent that these states could control them. From that time onwards these organizations started to utilize the developments in technology. (for more detail see Russell, Charles A. 1976. "Transnational Terrorism", *Air University Review*, January-February, available [online]: <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1976/jan-feb/russell.html>). However, these transnational groups were not able to harm any superpower within its own territory, as Al Qaeda did in 11 September 2001. Also, an important point here is that, with their vast resources when compared to the terrorist groups, states had the greater capacity to make use of these technological developments than many individuals and terrorist groups. Therefore, even for making efficient use of the new technological developments state support could enhance their capabilities. (For more detail see Stohl, Michael. 1988. "States, Terrorism and State Terrorism: The Role of the Superpowers." In Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl, eds., *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*. London: The Macmillan Press, 196.) but the point here is that, some of the terrorist organizations transnationalized and became actors in the system gradually, thus as a result of a process. 1970s examples are examples to the stages within this process.

²⁰⁶ Of course this control was not absolute in each and every case. One reason of this is that some terrorist organizations had more than one state that support them and even if one state is discouraged to support them, another state could easily replace the support coming from the former state. Therefore, even at that time it was difficult to counter terrorism, but the state-centric measures like organizing military attacks to the supporter states could work to some extent, at least one could frighten those states that supported terrorism and diminish the state support of terrorism that in turn diminish the capacities of the terrorists to conduct effective international attacks.

things, without the help of any state. Furthermore, besides technology and information, people, capital, ideas, and knowledge started to move across borders easier and faster. As a result, to some extent, these facilitations of the multi-centric world took the place of superpower support for the terrorist organizations in the post-Cold War period.²⁰⁷ Also, other attributes of the multi-centric world, namely improvements in the individual skills and loyalty shifts among the people from states towards other entities including transnational terrorist organizations, contributed to this picture. All these at the end have transformed the transnational terrorists into non-state security actors in the new era and placed them outside of the threat perceptions of the state-centric world, despite their becoming one of the major problems that threaten the states.²⁰⁸

This chapter is devoted to explaining and demonstrating the above mentioned arguments. In order to do this, firstly, the dependency of international terrorists on the state support during the Cold War era will be explained. Secondly, how these terrorist organizations adapted to the diminished support of states and become more independent from the states in the aftermath of the Cold War and how this contributed to the emergence of these organizations as transnational actors will be mentioned. Thirdly, other functions of transnational terrorists, besides being able to operate without state support, that allows us to call them non-state security actors will be elaborated on.

²⁰⁷ Similar to this argument, Michael Radu argues in one of his articles that in the aftermath of the Cold War globalization took the place of Soviet support for the terrorist organizations operating against the West. (Radu, Michael. 2002. "The New Protracted Conflict, Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges", *Orbis*, Spring).

²⁰⁸ As explained before, the threats posed by transnational terrorism threaten the state-centric world as well, but states perceive these threats as coming from other states and thus as international instead of transnational. States do not perceive that the threats posed by transnational terrorism is coming from non-state security actors. Therefore, I argue that the threat posed by transnational terrorists as non-

5. 1 State Support and International Terrorism in the Cold War Era

5. 1. 1 International Terrorism as a Foreign Policy Tool

During the Cold War period superpowers utilized terrorism as a foreign policy tool. Instead of risking a total nuclear war among themselves, which would have meant the destruction of each and everyone, they preferred to utilize terrorism, either by their own institutions or by helping the emergence of sub-national terrorist groups or by supporting the already existing terrorist groups, in a covert manner.²⁰⁹ Therefore, terrorism became the continuation of politics by other means.²¹⁰

Of course, neither of the superpowers admitted that they were supporting the terrorists. Although the Soviet Union accepted that it was supporting the “revolutionary movements”, they strictly rejected to label them as terrorists. As a result of this, some Western scholars developed theories that blamed the SU for supporting the international terrorist organizations around the world and using them against the West. This argument stated that the SU had established an “international terrorist network” in order to spread its communist ideology throughout the world and defeat the West.²¹¹

On the other hand, some other scholars argued that the real terrorist network had been established by the US and also the other states of the First World. In

state security actors, remains out of the threat perceptions of the state-centric world, although it is a major threat the states are facing.

²⁰⁹ Stohl, Michael. 1988. “States, Terrorism, and State Terrorism: The Role of the Superpowers.” In Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl, eds., *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*. London: The Macmillan Press, 192. For a similar view see also Chalk, Peter. 1996. *Western European Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic*. Houndmills, England: Macmillan Press.

²¹⁰ This phrase is a mutant type of Clausewitz’ famous definition of “war” as the continuation of politics by other means done by Gary G. Sick. (Sick, Gary G. 1990. “The Political Underpinnings of Terrorism.” In Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 51.).

²¹¹ For example, Claire Sterling’s book *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* that attributes the existence of international terrorism to Soviet sponsorship, is among the most influential books concerning this issue. (Sterling, Claire. 1981. *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.). Among other supporters of this argument are Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander (1984) (see their book *Terrorism: The Soviet*

addition to the CIA's clandestine operations, the US supported the regimes that were ruling with terror as long as they were anti-communist and also supported groups that revolted against communist governments.²¹²

Other states like Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Cuba also supported terrorist organizations throughout the Cold War period. Although these states may have had other national considerations as well, even their support occurred within the context of Cold War rivalries, and these states received support from the superpowers for their support to terrorism in this context.²¹³ For example, Palestinians were supported by many states in the region in the course of their conflict with Israel. The major funds of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) came from the oil rich Arab countries. The SU supported these acts as a part of its policy to expand its influence in the Middle Eastern region.²¹⁴

Therefore, we can reach a conclusion which is that both of the superpowers contributed to international terrorism in the Cold War era and therefore they mostly had the capacity to control the international terrorist groups that they were supporting since these groups needed support from these states.

Hence, as far as the international terrorists of the era are concerned, most of the terrorist activities of the time were conducted by people with little power. These people required resources in order to conduct their activities in an effective

Connection. New York: Crane, Russak.), and Desmond McForan (1987) (see his book *The World Held Hostage: The War Waged by International Terrorism*. New York: St. Martin's Press.).

²¹² For example see Chomsky, Noam, and Edward S. Herman. 1979. *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

²¹³ Stohl, Michael. 1988. "States, Terrorism and State Terrorism: The Role of the Superpowers." In Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl, eds., *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*. London: The Macmillan Press, 192.

²¹⁴ Wilkinson, Paul. 1988. "Support Mechanisms in International Terrorism." In Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl, eds., *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 92-95.

manner,²¹⁵ and thus, international terrorism could be harmful and realize its aims at that time, only with the material and financial support of the powerful states. Ultimately, in the Cold War era, international terrorism became possible as a result of two factors, namely the existence of motivated and mobilized actors that were willing to conduct terrorism in order to pursue their political aims, and states willing to support them for their own interests. Hence, international terrorism could preserve its existence and effectiveness primarily as a result of the assistance provided by the states, since “many terrorist organizations could not survive in the absence of encouragement, financial and material backing, and political support supplied by states.”²¹⁶ According to Bruce Hoffman, a leading scholar on the issue of terrorism, state sponsorship enhanced the limited capabilities and operational capacity of international terrorists by “placing at their disposal the resources of an established nation-state’s entire diplomatic, military and intelligence apparatus and thus greatly facilitating planning and intelligence.”²¹⁷

5. 1. 2 How Did States Support International Terrorist Organizations

States supported international terrorists in several ways. The first way of such support was financial. States provided the necessary funds for the terrorists to acquire the necessary equipment for their operations and to organize and conduct their activities. Although it is not always easy to find direct relationship between funding states and the terrorists a detailed example for this is the confessions of Nezar Hindawi, who was charged for trying to explode an El Al jet at Heathrow and was

²¹⁵ Wilkinson, Paul. 1981. “Can a State Be ‘Terrorist’?”, *International Affairs*, 57(3): 467. Whine, Michael. 2002. “The New Terrorism”, available [online]: <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=427>

²¹⁶ Kegley, Jr., Charles W. 1990. “The Causes of Terrorism.” In Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 107-108. Also see the <http://www.milnet.com/milnet/ict/counter.htm> web site.

²¹⁷ Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 186.

put on trial in London in October 1986. He claimed that he was in contact with the Syrian Embassy in London and had received the necessary information on how to set the bomb on the plane from the Syrian Intelligence. Moreover, he reported having received US \$ 12 000 from Syria to conduct this attack.²¹⁸

The second way of state support was providing weapons and explosives to the terrorists, since it is easier for states to acquire these as legal entities that have defense departments and industries. This support includes the provision of high technology weapons, like rocket launchers and SAM-7s,²¹⁹ that were mostly under the control of states at that time instead of MNCs (as explained in the previous chapter). For example, radical Arab states acquired weapons from the Soviet Union and passed them on to the Palestinians. The conservative Arab States also provided weapons to the Palestinian terrorist organizations, but at that time they were purchasing these weapons from the US and other Western states.²²⁰

The third way of support was providing training facilities for the terrorists. This was done in several ways. One way was by providing the necessary training facilities in terms of assets and territory to conduct their training. For example, training centers were established in the US by Nicaraguan groups and the US turned a blind eye to this.²²¹ Another way was training the terrorists with one's security forces. These forces trained the terrorists on using different types of weapons and explosives (as the Hindawi example explained above demonstrates) including

²¹⁸ Wilkinson, Paul. 1988. "Support Mechanisms in International Terrorism." In Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl, eds., *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 94.

²¹⁹ Wilkinson, Paul. 1986. *Terrorism and the Liberal State*. (2nd edition). London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 278.

²²⁰ Stohl, Michael. 1988. "States, Terrorism and State Terrorism: The Role of the Superpowers." In Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl, eds., *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*. London: The Macmillan Press, 187.

²²¹ Stohl, Michael. 1988. "States, Terrorism and State Terrorism: The Role of the Superpowers." In Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl, eds., *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*. London: The Macmillan Press, 191.

sophisticated ones, giving them physical training, teaching them how to combat, conduct infiltration, make surveillance, use sophisticated communications equipments, and gather intelligence. The SU is suspected to have trained Palestinian terrorists in the camps in the SU as well as in the Middle East.²²² The SU hoped that their support to the Palestinians would enhance their position within the Arab world and erode the US position that was supporting Israel. Palestinian terrorists were able to learn terrorist tactics, like using Kalashnikov rifles and making bombs, in the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow.²²³ Also some members of the major PLO factions were trained at the Soviet foreign-military academy at Sanprobal on the Black Sea. Here these people were taught technical skills of terrorism, like blowing up vehicles and ammunition dumps and production of incendiary devices among other things.²²⁴

States also gave information, thus intelligence support, to the terrorist organizations besides teaching them the ways to gather intelligence. This was important for the terrorists because conducting a successful terrorist activity depends on accurate information on the target. Since states have a much wider and effective network for intelligence gathering, their intelligence support was essential for terrorists.

Another type of state support was logistical help. This included, in addition to the already mentioned weapon providing, the provision of transportation means. These include “the use of diplomatic pouches for the transport of weapons and

²²² Stohl, Michael. 1988. “States, Terrorism and State Terrorism: The Role of the Superpowers.” In Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl, eds., *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*. London: The Macmillan Press, 187.

²²³ Kushner, Harvey W. 1998. “The New Terrorism.” In Harvey W. Kushner, ed., *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium*. Thousand Oaks, Ca.: Sage Publications, Inc., 4-5.

²²⁴ Wilkinson, Paul. 1986. *Terrorism and the Liberal State*. (2nd edition). London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 189.

explosives”.²²⁵ Furthermore, states can provide safe havens, that is to say, places of sanctuary and protection for terrorists after they have conducted attacks elsewhere.²²⁶

Furthermore, states gave international terrorists diplomatic support. This included providing diplomatic immunity, passports, and other documents that are used to cover the real identities of the terrorists.²²⁷

Finally, states gave rhetorical support to terrorists. This was done by supporting the cause of the terrorists in their speeches and rejecting their being called as terrorists. Also, they supported them in the international arena, for example in the UN meetings.²²⁸

Thus, without the financial, material, logistical, tactical, diplomatic, and rhetorical support of the states it was nearly impossible for the terrorists to conduct effective and international terrorist activities. However, this situation changed in the aftermath of the Cold War era and terrorist organizations found other ways to compensate for the loss of state support of especially the superpowers, and at the end they became transnationalized. States had already strengthened the terrorists with their support in the Cold War era. This too has been a contributing factor to terrorists emerging as actors in the system. The earlier support greatly enhanced the terrorists’ capabilities and helped to transform them into more capable and powerful entities. This helped them to survive, and gave them time to find other ways to compensate the loss of state/superpower support in their transformation period in the aftermath of

²²⁵ Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 186.

²²⁶ Wilkinson, Paul. 1986. *Terrorism and the Liberal State*. (2nd edition). London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 278. Guelke, Adrian. 1995. *The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System*. London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 148.

²²⁷ Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 186.

²²⁸ Schlagheck, Donna M. 1990. “The Superpowers, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism.” In Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 173.

the Cold War. Ultimately making them able to operate without any support from the states.²²⁹

5. 2 Transnationalization of Terrorism in the Aftermath of the Cold War

With the end of the Cold War, terrorist organizations lost the umbrella provided by the superpowers and the state support they were getting was diminished and transformed in nature. On the other hand, the features provided by the globalization phenomenon replaced the support of the states in many ways.

5. 2. 1 Changed State-support of Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Period

As stated above, state support to terrorism has been diminished and transformed with the end of the Cold War. This happened in several ways. Firstly, the major support international terrorist organizations were receiving had been coming from the superpowers as explained in the previous part of this chapter. With the collapse of the SU the leftist oriented international organizations lost their major supporter. On the other hand, since its major enemy disappeared and since it remained as the only superpower in the international arena the US gave up its support to the terrorist organizations as well.

On the other hand, weak/or so-called 'rogue' states; like Syria, Libya and Sudan; continue to support terrorists on the basis of their aims. Since they cannot achieve their aims and cope with their stronger rivals through conventional means, they continue to utilize terrorism and give support to terrorists. However, unlike the Cold War period, these states do not have a guarantee from any superpower in their

²²⁹ Jenkins, Brian Michael. 1987. "The Future Course of International Terrorism", *The Futurist*, July-August 1987, available [online]: <<http://www.wfs.org/jenkins.htm>> at the web site of the World Future Society. Kushner, Harvey W. 1998. "The New Terrorism." In Harvey W. Kushner, ed., *The*

support to terrorism and they can face retaliation more easily, even when they are *suspected* to be supporting terrorism. Still, these states continue to provide safe havens and diplomatic support to terrorists when necessary.²³⁰ Another important point here is that these states are not able to control the terrorist organizations they are supporting. This means that, in order to fail to control the terrorists within its territory, a state does not necessarily have to be a failed state, its being weak is enough.

Finally, terrorists benefit from the situation of the so-called 'failed' states in the system. This type of states do not have control over their own territories. Therefore, terrorists can easily establish bases in these states without being disturbed. Furthermore, even though they do not have control over their own territories these entities are still called as 'states' and this enables them to benefit from the features of statehood. This is to say, they have the right of non-intervention in their domestic affairs within their own territory guaranteed by the international law. These provide terrorists very good safe havens in which they can organize their bases and training camps without any intervention, either from the host state or from other states. Also, diplomatic support can be acquired from these states (as well as from other weak states) when necessary. The governments of failed states can issue legitimate passports to terrorists and enable them to move around the world without decoding their real identities.²³¹ Moreover, terrorists sometimes even have control over the host states instead of vice versa and it looks like a terror group sponsoring a state. An example of this point was the relationship between the Taliban government in

Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc., 6.

²³⁰ Kushner, Harvey W. 1998. "The New Terrorism." In Harvey W. Kushner, ed., *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium*. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc., 6.

²³¹ Takeyh, Ray, and Nikolas Gvosdev. 2002. "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?", *The Washington Quarterly*, 25(3): 98-101.

Afghanistan and Al Qaeda before the US intervention.²³² Another important point here is that even if terrorist organizations lose a base in a failed country, like Al Qaeda's loss of its bases in Afghanistan after the US intervention, they can acquire bases in other failed states since there are lots of failed states in the system. For example, it is said that Al Qaeda seeks to establish new bases in other failed states, like Somalia, Chechnya, the mountains of Central Asia, Lebanon, or Kosovo.²³³ This is especially true because terrorists do not need to control the whole territory of a failed state. Control over a specific area is sufficient for their purposes. Besides establishing bases and training camps within these territories, terrorists also conduct fund raising activities. The weak or non-existent law enforcement capabilities of such failed states contribute to this function and terrorist organizations can easily engage in smuggling and drug-trafficking activities in these places.²³⁴ In sum, terrorists benefit from the sovereignty rights of the failed states as they remain beyond the reach of the sovereign state.²³⁵

The diminishing and transforming of state support of terrorism and the loss of control by the states over the terrorist organizations, contributed to the emergence of terrorist organizations as independent actors. As the quantitative analysis made by Walter Enders and Todd Sandler demonstrates, there has been a downward shift in the number of international terrorist incidents in the aftermath of the Cold War.²³⁶ This is a reflection of the decrease in state support of terrorists with the end of the

²³² Freedman, Lawrence. 2001. "The Third World War?", *Survival*, 43: 61-88. Fareed, Zakaria. 2004. "Terrorists Don't Need States", *Newsweek*, available [online]: <<http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4615876/>>

²³³ Takeyh, Ray, and Nikolas Gvosdev. 2002. "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?", *The Washington Quarterly*, 25(3): 98.

²³⁴ Takeyh, Ray, and Nikolas Gvosdev. 2002. "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?", *The Washington Quarterly*, 25(3): 98-99.

²³⁵ Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. "Globalization, Sovereignty and Terrorism", *Special Seminars in the Graduate School of International Studies and Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University*, 12/2/2003, 16.

²³⁶ Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler. 1999. "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era", *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(1): 145-167.

Cold War rivalry. As a result of this decrease it became more difficult to conduct effective trans-border attacks. However, the decrease in and transformation of state support also resulted in the loss of control over the terrorists as explained above. When these points are combined we reach a conclusion that without, or with less, state support the number of trans-border attacks decreased, however, since terrorists are now out of control, the lethality of these attacks dramatically increased. This increase in the number of deaths is an important feature of transformed terrorism of the post-Cold War era.²³⁷ During the Cold War era, the increase in casualties could increase the risk for both the terrorists by alienating the supporters and for the supporting state by increasing the possibility of retaliation. On the other hand, the independent terrorists of today do not care about alienating supporters since their main strength is coming from their ideology²³⁸ as will be explained later in this chapter.

5. 2. 2 Globalization and Transnationalization of Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era

The concept of globalization is a highly contested one. Its meaning, whether it is a project or a process, and if it is a process, when did it start, are the major debates. However, no matter how we answer these questions we feel its impacts in our lives. In particular, from the 1990s onwards we started to feel its impacts more intensively and it has become a very important dimension of our lives. Developments have occurred in technology, especially in communication and information technologies. Furthermore, technology, labor, capital, finance, ideas, knowledge, and information started to move across borders easier and faster. All these contributed to

²³⁷ Brent Ellis. 2003. "Countering Complexity: An Analytical Framework to Guide Counter-Terrorism Policy-Making", *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Spring/Summer: 2-3.

the rise of the multi-centric world next to the state-centric one as explained in the second chapter of this thesis. Globalization has been the process within this multi-centric world that shaped its major developments. Terrorist organizations, as well, started to make use of these benefits of globalization and found themselves a place in the multi-centric world. Therefore, to some extent, the multi-centric world that reflects the features of globalization took the place of superpower support for the terrorist organizations in the post-Cold War era.²³⁹ Money, weapons, assets for training, information and intelligence, and transportation facilities which could once only be provided by states became easy for entities other than states to acquire. These other entities include terrorist organizations. Thus, terrorist groups can create “networks of virtually connected, ideologically fused movements.”²⁴⁰ The rest of this part is devoted to explain these issues.

5. 2. 2. 1 Globalization as Facilitator of Transnational Terrorism

5. 2. 2. 1. i Facilitating Role of Globalization as Liberalization

The advances in technology and the expansion of networks of transportation and communication mean easier and faster movement of technology, finance, ideas, knowledge and information across the globe. But, what do these mean for terrorists who have the motivation to conduct terrorist incidents all over the world?

Firstly, by utilizing these developments, terrorist organizations are able to find financing for their operations. The easy flow of resources across borders gives

²³⁸ Morgan, Matthew J. 2004. “The Origins of the New Terrorism”, *Parameters*, Spring: 30-31.

²³⁹ For a similar argument see Radu, Michael. 2002. “The New Protracted Conflict, Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges”, *Orbis*, Spring. Shambaugh, George E. 2002. “Statecraft and Non-state Actors in an Age of Globalization”, prepared for the *International Studies Association Annual Conference New Orleans, LA, March 2002*, available [online]: <<http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/shambaugh.html>>, 3-4.

²⁴⁰ Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. “Globalization, Sovereignty and Terrorism”, *Special Seminars in the Graduate School of International Studies and Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University*, 12/2/2003, 1.

terrorist organizations, like Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah, the opportunity to find funds for their operations both in legal ways, like establishing legal trade companies or charities, and in illegal ways, like smuggling and drug trafficking.²⁴¹ Financial transactions of the terrorist organizations need not rely on high technology. On the contrary, terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda use simple methods. For example, they use informal money-changing methods like the hawala²⁴² system or direct currency transport, done through cash carried by individuals.²⁴³ Of course, this has become possible also by the easy movement of people and money across borders that has been a result of globalization as liberalization.

Secondly, as a result of globalization, it is now easier and cheaper for the terrorist organizations to acquire the necessary and diversified equipment for conducting their operations.²⁴⁴ Furthermore, they can also easily acquire necessary information to build and use different kinds of weapons. In the 1990s, the knowledge on how to make bombs became available to almost everyone in the world. Even information on chemical and biological materials, and how they can be used as weapons, became widely available on the internet.²⁴⁵ Although there are still some technical and otherwise difficulties, if terrorists acquire WMDs, they become strategically equal actors with states having the same destructive capabilities.²⁴⁶ Furthermore, terrorists are in a position to more easily use those weapons because

²⁴¹ Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. "Globalization, Sovereignty and Terrorism", *Special Seminars in the Graduate School of International Studies and Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University*, 12/2/2003, 9.

²⁴² The base of this system relies on 'trust'. It is a system of brokers linked together by personal relationships, including clan-based networks, of trust.

²⁴³ Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. "Globalization, Sovereignty and Terrorism", *Special Seminars in the Graduate School of International Studies and Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University*, 12/2/2003, 10.

²⁴⁴ Recep, Abdullah. 2002. "The Struggle with Global Terrorism and the Steps that Must Be Taken against It", *Insight Turkey*, 4(3): 15. Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 2002. "The Rise of Complex Terrorism", *Foreign Policy*, 128: 52-62.

²⁴⁵ Bremer III, L. Paul. 2001. "A New Strategy for the New Face of Terrorism", *The National Interest*, Thanksgiving: 24. Lloyd, Bruce. 2001. "Terrorism, Today and Tomorrow", available [online]: <<http://www.wfs.org/eslloyd.htm>>

they are not restricted by international law or moral rules or by their supporters, as states are restricted by their citizens. Moreover, they can apply a deterrence policy like states do. This means that they may apply a passive terror instead of active terror.²⁴⁷ The developments in technology also provide the terrorists the ability to convert non-weapon technologies to lethal weapons,²⁴⁸ as the use of commercial airlines in the September 11 attacks demonstrated.

The developments in information technologies also made it easier for terrorists to acquire the necessary and critical information to conduct their operations, besides the information for building and using weapons. For example, the terrorists that conducted the September 11 attacks could have found the detailed plans and design characteristics of the World Trade Organization buildings, and the information on how large buildings can be destroyed.²⁴⁹

Terrorist organizations also use the new technologies to be globally connected and to become more capable and effective.²⁵⁰ By this way they establish “globe-circling infrastructures” with “globetrotting individual members”.²⁵¹ These two concepts mean that terrorist organization disperse both their organizational structure and manpower all around the world.

Moreover, the developments in technology and liberal policies that made the movement of people across borders easier, has also increased the mobility of terrorists. By this way terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, Al Qaeda and others, could easily establish cells all around the world, including Europe and the US. These

²⁴⁶ Schelling, Thomas C. 1982. “Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism”, *International Security*, 6(4): 68.

²⁴⁷ Schelling, Thomas C. 1982. “Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism”, *International Security*, 6(4): 67.

²⁴⁸ Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 2002. “The Rise of Complex Terrorism”, *Foreign Policy*, 128: 56.

²⁴⁹ Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 2002. “The Rise of Complex Terrorism”, *Foreign Policy*, 128: 56-57.

²⁵⁰ Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. “Globalization, Sovereignty and Terrorism”, *Special Seminars in the Graduate School of International Studies and Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University*, 12/2/2003, 9.

²⁵¹ Pillar, Paul R. 2001. “Terrorism Goes Global: Extremist Groups Extend Their Reach”, *Brookings Review*, Fall: 34-35.

cells operate as sleeping cells in these places and are activated during times of operation only. This keeps them secret and uncoverable. Through their easy movement ability, terrorist organizations can collect intelligence in an easy manner. As one scholar indicates, in today's world, "[s]tates are more encumbered by territorially-based restrictions than are terrorist organizations."²⁵²

In addition, the developments in communications and travel technologies enable terrorists to operate in a decentralized manner. This means that terrorist organizations do not need a large, fixed physical presence that must be controlled by a centralized command structure in order to conduct and control operations over long distances.²⁵³ Instead, terrorists establish network like structures. These networks are composed of "loosely interconnected, semi-independent cells that have no single commanding hierarchy."²⁵⁴ In this way terrorist organizations have been able to further transnationalize and disperse around the world. This decentralized structure also enables terrorist groups to adapt more easily to the changing circumstances. Although their base in one country has been destroyed, the effectiveness of the terrorist organization does not disappear as a result of this decentralized organization.²⁵⁵ An example of this is Al Qaeda, which continues to conduct its operations all around the world despite its base in Afghanistan having been destroyed.

²⁵² Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. "Globalization, Sovereignty and Terrorism", *Special Seminars in the Graduate School of International Studies and Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University*, 12/2/2003, 9.

²⁵³ Hoo, Kevin Soo, Seymour Goodman, and Lawrence Greenberg. 1997. "Information Technology and the Terrorist Threat", *Survival*, 39(3): 138. Hoffman, Bruce. 2001. "Change and Continuity in Terrorism", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 24: 418.

²⁵⁴ Arquilla, John, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. 1999. "Networks, Netwar, and Information Age Terrorism." In Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, eds., *Countering the New Terrorism*. Santa Monica: RAND, 56.

²⁵⁵ Arquilla, John, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. 1999. "Networks, Netwar, and Information Age Terrorism." In Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, eds., *Countering the New Terrorism*. Santa Monica: RAND, 54. *Patterns of Global Terrorism* 1999, Introduction, 1-4.

Thus, this decentralization contributes to transnational terrorists' ability to conduct effective operations all around the world. For example, a cell of the organization can conduct an attack within the framework drawn by the organization, but without any coordination with other cells, even without the command of the head of the organization. This factor also strengthens transnational terrorist organizations to the extent that, even if the head of the organization is captured or killed, the organization can continue to conduct effective operations.²⁵⁶ At this point they are like states, since states too continue their existence under different heads of states. However, different from states, decentralization adds strength to transnational terrorists, while it weakens the states. This is mostly because while transnational terrorists are deterritorialized, states are territorial.

Another point is that the linkage between different terrorist organizations and between terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations has increased as well. In this way they can share information and expertise and find different ways of acquiring weapons and finance, for example through smuggling and drug-trafficking.²⁵⁷ For example, the Basque ETA is acquiring finance through drug money. Actually, the ETA terrorist group in Spain is a perfect example of a terrorist organization that blends organized crime and terrorism very well.²⁵⁸ The southern Italian mafia work with clans that are associated with terrorism, and trafficking of drugs and arms from Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia.²⁵⁹ Interpol

²⁵⁶ Shambaugh, George E. 2002. "Statecraft and Non-State Actors in an Age of Globalization." *Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Annual Conference, New Orleans, LA, March 2002*. Available [online]: <<http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/shambaugh.html>>, 2-3.

²⁵⁷ Radu, Michael. 2002. "Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges", *Orbis*, Spring 2002: 278.

²⁵⁸ The World Geopolitics of Drugs, *Annual Report 1998/1999*, P.96, available [online]: <<http://www.ogd.org/2000/en/99en.html>>

²⁵⁹ Radu, Michael. 2002. "Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges", *Orbis*, Spring 2002: 282.

Reports reveal these relationships between the transnational terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations.

Furthermore, the cooperation between different terrorist organizations has increased as well. Terrorist networks share their training facilities and tactics, support each other financially, share logistical assets, intelligence, and weapons. Sometimes they conduct joint operations.²⁶⁰ Transnational terrorists can cooperate even with organizations that have different ideologies than themselves, as long as they have a common enemy.²⁶¹ Similar to states, transnational terrorists try to acquire economic power and turn it into military and political advantage over their enemy. In order to do this, they cooperate with whomever it is necessary. Furthermore they sometimes cooperate with local groups, and thus act as a “franchise organization that employs local indigenous groups”.²⁶² These local groups conduct attacks that are connected with the bigger organization through inspiration, logistics, communications, training, or technique.²⁶³ In addition, there are terrorists that are only inspired from the activities of, for example Al Qaeda. They conduct attacks similar to those of Al Qaeda, although they have no connection with it. For example, after the September 11 attacks of Al Qaeda, the Basque ETA planned (but they were uncovered) to

²⁶⁰ Todd Sandler. 2003. “Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism”, *GEP Research Paper*, 03/13: 786-787. Combs, Cindy C. 2003. *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. (3rd edition). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 96-97.

²⁶¹ Audrey Kurth Cronin. 2003. “Globalization, Sovereignty and Terrorism”, *Special Seminars in the Graduate School of International Studies and Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University*, 12/2/2003. Richardson, Louise. 2000. “Terrorists as Transnational Actors.” In Max. Taylor and John Horgan, eds., *The Future of Terrorism*. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 216.

²⁶² Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. “Globalization, Sovereignty and Terrorism”, *Special Seminars in the Graduate School of International Studies and Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University*, 12/2/2003, 14.

²⁶³ Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. “Globalization, Sovereignty and Terrorism”, *Special Seminars in the Graduate School of International Studies and Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University*, 12/2/2003, 13-14.

explode the Picasso Tower in Madrid that resembles World Trade Center buildings.²⁶⁴

Thus, globalization as liberalization, when combined with the technological developments, plays the role of facilitator for transnational terrorist organizations in several ways.

5. 2. 2. 1. ii Facilitating Role of Globalization as Supraterritoriality

Another facilitating role of globalization on transnational terrorism comes to the forefront when globalization is perceived as supraterritoriality. As stated earlier, this type of conceptualization of globalization includes reference to developments in individual skills, loyalty shifts, and the decrease in state sovereignty as individuals and other non-state entities emerge as actors in the global system.

First of all the analytic, emotional, and imaginative skills of individuals, as explained with Rosenau's concept of "skill revolution" in the second chapter of this thesis, has been greatly improved as a result of a variety of sources. Among these sources are more education, travel, technological innovations like global television, the internet, and fiber optic cable. Of course, these skills of the individuals expand in the context of their own culture. These at the end have two main implications. The first one is that, as individuals' awareness and capacity to affect the policies increases and as they start to define themselves with different concepts other than being from a nation or a citizen of a state, they shift their loyalties towards other entities, like religious groups. Thus, the sovereignty of the state decreases both in quality and quantity. Secondly, the skills of the terrorists also expands in the context

²⁶⁴ Jenkins, Brian. 2001. "Terrorism Current and Long Term Threats", *Testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats*, November 15, 2001, published by RAND as CT-187, 4. Available [online]: <<http://www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT187/CT187.pdf>>

of their own culture and this increases their ability, as well as their devotion to their values and ideas.

One consequence of these is the authority crisis the states face.²⁶⁵ Since individuals start to define themselves with other communities or ideologies, like religion, their loyalties shift from state to those other entities.²⁶⁶ Among these entities there are also transnational terrorist organizations that have adapted ideologies or stances with which individuals may identify themselves. Also, having religion as the motivating ideology contributes to the deterritorialization of the terrorist groups by freeing them further, from being tied to a specific territory.²⁶⁷ This is because religions transcend the territorial borders of the states.

Another point here is that, globalization as deterritorialization (as well as liberalization)²⁶⁸ has helped the erosion of state sovereignty as explained before. As a result some states lose their sovereign control over their territory and people. This is explained with the failed state concept in the previous part. This facilitated terrorism, by providing terrorist organizations spaces for planning their activities almost free from interference. Moreover, in these areas, terrorists can build training camps.²⁶⁹ Thus, such states become safe havens for transnational criminal and terrorist networks. These safe havens are the places terrorists are engaging in smuggling and drug trafficking in order to raise funds for their operations. They can try to replace

²⁶⁵ Rosenau, James N. (in print). "Turbulence and Terrorism: Reframing or Readjusting the Model?" In E. Aydinli and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Paradigms in Transition: Globalization, Security, and the Nation State*. New York: SUNY Press, 322.

²⁶⁶ Rosenau, James N. 1995. "Security in a Turbulent World", *Current History*, 94(592): 195.

²⁶⁷ Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. "Globalization, Sovereignty and Terrorism", *Special Seminars in the Graduate School of International Studies and Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University*, 12/2/2003, 6.

²⁶⁸ Globalization as liberalization contributed to the growing gap between the rich and the poor. The poor people in poor countries get poorer as a result. This disrupted the already fragile social stability within underdeveloped and some developing countries and resulted in economic and political crisis. This at the end turned these states into failed states. (See Yıldızoğlu, Ergin. 2002. *Dinozorun Kuyruğu: 11 Eylül ve Yeni Roma*. İstanbul: Remzi.).

²⁶⁹ Hughes, Christopher W. 2002. "Reflections on Globalization, Security and 9/11", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 15(3): 431.

the state as the power center and acquire the loyalty of the citizens. This becomes possible because the state does not possess that loyalty any more as a result of its weakness. By this way terrorists can gain supporters.²⁷⁰ This loyalty shift and decrease in the credibility of the nation-state can even occur in developed and strong states. As states cannot protect their citizens from the threat posed by terrorism, it means that they cannot perform their main reason of existence from a Hobbesian perspective, namely protecting their citizens from threats to their existence. This, at the end, results in the loss of credibility on the part of the nation-state.²⁷¹

All these mean that, alongside the dominant structure of the prior centuries, composed of states and their institutions and the events shaped by their interactions, today a multi-centric system arises and this system includes actors other than the states, i.e. non-state collectivities.²⁷² Transnational terrorist organizations emerge as one of these non-state actors of the global era.²⁷³ The organization and structure of Al Qaeda is a good example of all these. It functions in more than 60 countries, thus spread all over the world. It is not dependent on any concrete territory or state, so it is a deterritorialized global actor.²⁷⁴ Indeed, the events of September 11 demonstrate to us that:

Besides the remarkable organizational skills reflected in their actions, what they did was another instance of the long-term process whereby authority is undergoing disaggregation, with new actors who clamber onto the world stage and exercise authority through horizontal networks rather than

²⁷⁰ Takeyh, Ray, and Nikolas Gvosdev. 2002. "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer: 99-100.

²⁷¹ Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2000. "Understanding the New Terrorism", *Current History*, April: 163.

²⁷² Rosenau, James N. (in print). "Turbulence and Terrorism: Reframing or Readjusting the Model?" In E. Aydinli and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Paradigms in Transition: Globalization, Security, and the Nation State*. New York: SUNY Press, 321-322.

²⁷³ Crelinsten, Ronald D. 2002. "Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in a Multi-Centric World: Challenges and Opportunities". *Paper presented at the Future Developments in Terrorism Conference at Cork*, 192.

²⁷⁴ Campbell, Kurt M. 2002. "Globalization's First War?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter: 8.

hierarchical chains of command and, in so doing, have the capacity to challenge states and generate widespread consequences.²⁷⁵

Thus, the September 11 attacks demonstrated that transnational terrorist organizations have risen as non-state security actors in the global arena and this has become possible, to a large extent, with the help of globalization²⁷⁶ and the rise of the multi-centric world.

In sum, terrorists have learned to acquire finance, weapons, and information, to cooperate with each other and other entities, to escape from the restraints of borders and become deterritorialized, and to acquire loyal supporters by benefiting from the developments that intensified in the aftermath of the Cold War. Within this framework, with the help of globalization and the rise of the multi-centric world as a result, international terrorism has escaped from state control and became transnationalized besides preserving and even extending its effectiveness and capabilities. This effectiveness and independence from the state control has resulted in the emergence of transnational terrorists as non-state security actors that can threaten even the sole superpower of the era, namely the US. Furthermore, the loyalty shifts of people from states to this type of organizations has contributed to

²⁷⁵ Rosenau, James N. (in print). "Turbulence and Terrorism: Reframing or Readjusting the Model?" In E. Aydinli and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Paradigms in Transition: Globalization, Security, and the Nation State*. New York: SUNY Press, 325.

²⁷⁶ Beeson, Mark, and Alex J. Bellamy. 2003. "Globalisation, Security, and International Order After 11 September", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 49(3): 342. Globalization as Westernization/Americanization may be a motivating factor for transnational terrorists that link a lot of people together. This is because globalization as Westernization or more specifically Americanization means that the Western values are spreading throughout the world and threatening to replace the local cultures and values. This is largely perceived by the rest of the world as cultural invasion of the West and US' desire to strengthen its hegemony and pursue its interests. Actually, globalization as Westernization includes the policies of the dominant states and international organizations, both financial and political, imposed on the developing world, like Western style economies, democracies, and values (Hughes, Christopher W. 2002. "Reflections on Globalization, Security and 9/11", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 15(3): 424), but at the end all these create the feeling that West is culturally invading the rest and undermining the local cultures (Beeson, Mark, and Alex J. Bellamy. 2003. "Globalisation, Security, and International Order After 11 September", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 49(3): 340). These create tensions and frustration which may contribute to the terrorist causes. Thus, perception of globalization as Westernization/Americanization may be a source of transnational terrorism.

their actorness. This is because these loyal people act as if they are citizens of transnational terrorist organizations. For example, they provide them money like they are paying tax to a state.

Besides the factors that are dealt with in the section, there are other factors that enable us to call transnational terrorists as important non-state actors that affect the stability and security in the system. These factors will be explained in the next section.

5.3 The Characteristics that Attribute Actorness to Transnational Terrorists

Some of the factors that demonstrate the actorness of the transnational terrorists are similar to the states while some others are different. Among the factors that attribute actorness to transnational terrorists are the ability to act in the global arena independent from the control of any state. Transnational terrorists are organized in a decentralized and deterritorialized manner. This, together with other factors like the developments in technology, enable them to conduct effective operations all around the world. They build alliances with each other and with other transnational entities. But, in addition to this some small organizations or even individuals are inspired from the activities of transnational terrorists and conduct activities in the name of the bigger organizations, sometimes without any participation by the role model organization. These three main characteristics of actorness have been explained in the previous section. But, there are also other factors that attribute actorness to transnational terrorists. For example, the ideologies that bring transnational terrorists together are more global, like religious fundamentalism. This enables them to acquire loyal supporters all around the world, which act like citizens of a state. Besides these, the capacity to apply a foreign policy

and the ability to affect the foreign and defense policies of the states in the international system, including those of the US, are factors that attribute actorness to transnational terrorists. In this section I will deal with these points.

5. 3. 1 Having a Global Ideology

The ideologies of the transnationalized terrorists of the post-Cold War era are based on religion, therefore it is more global in reach. It is possible to find persons from different religions in most, if not all, countries around the world. In this way terrorists can find supporters all around the world, solely based on religion.²⁷⁷ Therefore, a certain understanding of religion, like jihadism in Islam, becomes for transnational terrorists what nationalism is for nation-states. The loyal supporters acquired by this way act as if they are citizens of these transnational terrorist organizations. For example, they (e.g., Saudi millionaires, Egyptian radicals, Yemenite preachers as far as Al Qaeda is concerned) give money as if they are paying tax. Others participate in the operations as if they are conducting their military service. But unlike the citizenship of a state, supporters of a transnational terrorist organization do these things voluntarily. Thus terrorism becomes “society-sponsored” instead of state-sponsored.²⁷⁸

5. 3. 2 Challenging the State Sovereignty

In addition, transnational terrorist groups establish charitable organizations, schools, and even develop banking networks and credit agencies for the populace.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁷ This is not to say that all the people from the same religion support terrorists that claim to represent that religion. But the support of the fundamentalists all around the world is enough for the terrorists.

²⁷⁸ Fareed, Zakaria. 2004. “Terrorists Don’t Need States”, *Newsweek*, available [online]: <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4615876/>

²⁷⁹ Takeyh, Ray, and Nikolas Gvosdev. 2002. “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer: 101.

These increase the quantity and quality of the people that become supporters of these organizations. Thus, transnational terrorist organizations stand as an alternative to the state, and in doing so, they challenge the control of the states over their population and territory. Since the sovereignty of a state is based on the control over its own territory and population, as well as use of force, transnational terrorists undermine state sovereignty, by undermining a state's control.²⁸⁰

5. 3. 3 Ability to Conduct Foreign Policy

Another important factor that makes transnational terrorists actors is their ability to conduct foreign policy. This means that by their attacks and declarations they send messages to some states and ask to make deals with some others. For example, some Arab regimes allow the fund raising of some Islamic extremist terrorist groups within their own borders in return that they do not attack these regimes.²⁸¹ This point will become clearer during the discussion of the Al Qaeda case in the next chapter.

5. 3. 4 Ability to Affect the Domestic, Foreign, and Defense Policies of the States

As a continuation of this point, another factor of actorness is the ability to affect the domestic, foreign and defense policies of the states. As the citizens of a state lose their sense of security as a result of terrorist attacks, they may question the capability of the government of that state to protect them. This may become a factor that changes the election results. Therefore, states sometimes play a "double game", meaning that while in the international arena they act as an anti-terrorist, they at the

²⁸⁰ Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. "Globalization, Sovereignty and Terrorism", *Special Seminars in the Graduate School of International Studies and Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University*, 12/2/2003, 15.

²⁸¹ Friedman, Thomas L. 2001. "Hama Rules", *The New York Times*, September 21, 2001.

same time bargain with terrorists to prevent further destabilization.²⁸² Moreover, states cooperate with each other in order to defeat terrorism. While they are building alliances, they choose states that are not supporting terrorism and that are conducting policies to fight against it. They make plans to protect their homelands from terrorist attacks. Even the US, the only superpower of the contemporary world, determines its national security policy against a terrorist organization instead of other states, as the US National Security Report of 2002 demonstrates.²⁸³ Then, that terrorist organization can be said to be an actor in the system.

5. 4 The Convergence of these Characteristics of Transnational Terrorists with the Definition of Actorness

After stating the characteristics of transnational terrorists as actors, we can evaluate whether they meet the criteria set to define actors in world politics. There are several definitions used to describe an actor in world politics. The most general of these definitions is that “any entity which plays an identifiable role in international relations”.²⁸⁴ If we accept this definition it is clear that transnational terrorists are actors of world politics because they obviously have an “identifiable role in international relations”. A more specific definition of actor in world politics had been made by Oran Young as:

any organized entity that is composed, at least indirectly, of human beings,
is not wholly subordinate to any other actor in the world system in effective

²⁸² Takeyh, Ray, and Nikolas Gvosdev. 2002. “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer: 104.

²⁸³ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002. Available [online]: <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>>

²⁸⁴ Evans, G., and J. Newnham. 1990. *The Dictionary of World Politics*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 6.

terms, and participates in power relationships with other actors.²⁸⁵

Also, Brian Hocking and Michael Smith made a specific definition of actor in world politics. According to them, those entities that meet the criteria of having autonomy, representation and influence are actors in the system. Here autonomy means the ability of an actor to act independently while trying to achieve its objectives; representation means the type of constituencies an actor represents; and influence means the capacity of an actor to make a difference concerning an issue within a certain context.²⁸⁶ When we look to the features of transnational terrorists listed in the previous and this section, they fit to these criteria of actorness and include other features that go beyond these determined minimum criteria.

When we consider most of these features of actorness, Al Qaeda seems the only obvious example yet that carries all these features, therefore it is worth to study the emergence and features of Al Qaeda in order to better demonstrate the rise of a transnational terrorist organization as a non-state security actor. This is the topic of the next chapter.

²⁸⁵ Young, Oran R. 1972. "The Actors in World Politics." In James N. Rosenau and M. A. East, eds., *The Analysis of International Politics*. New York: The Free Press, 140.

²⁸⁶ Hocking, Brian, and Michael Smith. 1990. *World Politics*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 71.

CHAPTER VI

CASE STUDY: AL QAEDA

Al Qaeda is a network composed of different groups including Abu Sayyaf (from Philippines), Egypt's Islamic Group, Harakat ul-Mujahidin (from Pakistan), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Al-Jihan (from Egypt), and Osama bin Laden's own group.²⁸⁷ According to the information provided by the US government, Al Qaeda operates in more than 60 countries.²⁸⁸ It has cells and allies in these places and it sometimes cooperates with local organizations, thus it can conduct attacks all over the world. It has members from different countries, including Chechnya, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Somali, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen and also from Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and even the US.²⁸⁹ Its leadership staff is also composed of persons from different origins. Most importantly, it is not controlled by any state. It is financially independent, has a global goal and strategy, a global structure of cells, and an organizational structure that reflects the elements of an intelligence service, an army, and a multinational corporation.²⁹⁰ All these make Al Qaeda a 'transnational' organization and an actor in the world as the terms are defined throughout this study. Thus, in this chapter, the transnational terrorist

²⁸⁷ *Patterns of Terrorism 2001*, US Department of State, Washington DC.

²⁸⁸ Radu, Michael. 2002. "Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges", *Orbis*, Spring 2002: 282.

²⁸⁹ Jonny Walker was the American Al Qaeda member. Radu, Michael. 2002. "Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges", *Orbis*, Spring 2002: 282. Rohde, David. 2001. "On Paper Scraps, Talk of Judgement Day and Words to Friends at Home", *New York Times*, November 24, 2 David 001.

²⁹⁰ Bergen, Peter L. 2001. *Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*. New York: Free Press.

organization of Al Qaeda will be examined and how it reflects the characteristics of actorness, explained in the previous chapter, will be demonstrated. In doing this first of all the historical evolution of Al Qaeda will be explained and then the features of actorness that Al Qaeda carries will be evaluated one by one.

6. 1 Historical Evolution of Al Qaeda

From 1979, the time the seeds of Al Qaeda were planted, onwards, Al Qaeda has undergone two major transformations. The first of these happened with the end of the Cold War and the second major transformation occurred after the US intervention in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001. As a result of these transformations Al Qaeda has emerged as a prominent non-state security actor in the global system.

6. 1. 1 Al Qaeda in the Cold War

The nucleus of Al Qaeda was established in 1979 with the support of the US against the SU after the latter's invasion of Afghanistan.²⁹¹ It is argued that the CIA provided \$500 million-per-year to the militants in order to arm and train them. The US provided them weapons, including high tech ones like stringer anti-aircraft missiles.²⁹² Thus, it emerged as a proxy organization in conformity with the trends of the Cold War period. Therefore, it was dependent on the support coming from its state supporter at this period for training and other necessary facilities to conduct its operations. Still, the aim to rescue Afghanistan from Soviet invasion brought Muslims from different countries, like Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Southeast

²⁹¹ Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2002. "Countering Al Qaeda", Rand,3.

²⁹² "Al-Qa'ida: Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK – Service Office), International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders", available online:
<http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=74>

Asia, together. Here, besides fighting together they shared a powerful life experience²⁹³ and thus established a deep connection.

Osama bin Laden joined the anti-Soviet jihad in 1982 and he recognized that the infrastructure, especially for connecting people that come for jihad from different countries,²⁹⁴ and the necessary manpower to fight a protracted conflict were lacking in Afghanistan. In order to eliminate these difficulties, together with the leader of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood Abdallah Azzam, he established the Maktab al-Khidamat, a kind of services office. Together, they collected lots of young Muslims to fight in Afghanistan.²⁹⁵ This organization was funded by Osama bin Laden himself, together with donations from Islamic countries and the US government.²⁹⁶

In 1988 Osama bin Laden established the Al Qaeda in order to expand the jihad in Afghanistan into a global pan-Islamic resistance movement besides the establishment of other overlapping and interrelated organizations by other people.²⁹⁷

6. 1. 2 Al Qaeda in the Aftermath of the Cold War

With the end of the Cold War and loss of superpower support, Al Qaeda underwent its first transformation. As the SU left Afghanistan and later collapsed, Al Qaeda's reason for existence disappeared since its major aim was to throw the SU out of Afghanistan. Therefore, it changed its target and its former supporter, namely, the US became its new enemy.

At the same time the structure of the organization changed as well. After their struggle in Afghanistan against the SU ended, the mujahidens who fought there left

²⁹³ Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2002. "Countering Al Qaeda", Rand, 3.

²⁹⁴ Smith, Paul J. 2002. "Transnational Terrorism and the Al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities", *Parameters*, Summer: 35. (pp.33-46).

²⁹⁵ "Al-Qa'ida: Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK – Service Office), International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders", available online:
<http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=74>

²⁹⁶ "Al Qaeda", <http://encycloedia.thefreedictionary.com/Al%20Kaeda>

²⁹⁷ "Al Qaeda", <http://encycloedia.thefreedictionary.com/Al%20Kaeda>

Afghanistan. Some went back to their home countries and others went to fight for other Muslims around the world, like in Bosnia, Kashmir, and Chechnya. However, those that returned back home were often not welcomed in their homelands as a result of the fear that the regimes had for the mujahidens' religious fervor.²⁹⁸ These people that went home and were unwelcomed, together with the mujahidens that come back from Bosnia, as the Bosnian war ended, often chose to come to Sudan where Osama bin Laden, the head of Al Qaeda, was residing. Osama bin Laden was also among those who could not remain in his home country, since the Saudi government did not want him in Saudi Arabia as a result of his public activities and militant views that threatened the Saudi government. In Sudan Osama bin Laden, thus Al Qaeda, was able to build alliances with other terrorist groups from Egypt, Pakistan, Algeria, Tunisia, and Palestine. From this time onwards, Al Qaeda started its transnational operations. Not long thereafter however, in 1996, Osama bin Laden and his mujahidens were forced to leave Sudan as a result of US pressures on this country and they went back to Afghanistan, where a like-minded Taliban rule had gained victories. They cooperated with the Taliban and established themselves a safe haven²⁹⁹ there without being under the control of the Taliban regime. Thus, from this period onwards, Al Qaeda began to transform from being a proxy international organization controlled by a state to a transnational non-state mechanism outside the control of any state.

In the aftermath of the struggle in Afghanistan, in 1989 there emerged a split within the organization concerning the strategy that should be followed. Abdullah Azzam, who was one of the main organizers of the struggle in Afghanistan against the SU, and was a role model for Osama bin Laden in his role in Afghanistan,

²⁹⁸ Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2002. "Countering Al Qaeda", Rand, 3.

²⁹⁹ Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2002. "Countering Al Qaeda", Rand, 3-4. Erkmen, Serhat, Mazin Hasan, Soran Şükür. 2004. "11 Eylül'den Sonra El Kaide", *Stratejik Analiz*, Ocak 2004: 43.

suggested that the organization should remain regional. This means that instead of attacking the US as the new enemy, Al Qaeda should strengthen itself in Afghanistan, control Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula, and later Central Asia after saving Kashmir. On the other hand, Ayman al-Zawahiri, another leading figure, who comes second after Osama bin Laden in Al Qaeda nowadays, and a former key figure in Al Jihad, wanted Al Qaeda to be a global organization, acting in a global manner. Accordingly, he argued, the time had come to attack the US. The views of Zawahiri were also shared by Osama bin Laden. Azzam made the above mentioned arguments concerning remaining regional, but a few days later, he was murdered by a bombing assault. The suspect was Zawahiri according to some, and Osama bin Laden according to others. However, at the end, these developments resulted in the selection of acting globally as the strategy of the organization.³⁰⁰ The adaptation of a global strategy shifted Al Qaeda towards becoming a global actor. In 1998, Al Qaeda merged with Egyptian al Jihad and al Gamaa al Islamiya. With the support of other organizations from different countries the campaign came to be known as the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders.³⁰¹ Within this new framework Al Qaeda conducted several attacks all around the world including the bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998), the USS Cole (2000) and the September 11 (2001) attacks.

6. 1. 3 Al Qaeda in the post-September 11 Period

After the bombings of Afghanistan by the US in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Al Qaeda had to leave this country and restructure itself in a

³⁰⁰ Erkmen, Serhat, Mazin Hasan, Soran Şükür. 2004. "11 Eylül'den Sonra El Kaide", *Stratejik Analiz*, Ocak 2004: 50. Taheri, Amir. 2003. "Al Qaeda's New Course", *New York Post*, October 3, 2003.

³⁰¹ Smith, Paul J. 2002. "Transnational Terrorism and the Al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities", *Parameters*, Summer: 36.

new way. From this time onwards, Al Qaeda became a truly effective non-state security actor. It had become independent of any state in the aftermath of the Cold War and it became truly deterritorialized in the aftermath of the Afghanistan bombings by the US. This deterritorialization became the final stage in Al Qaeda's evolution into a transnational non-state security actor in the global arena. This does not mean that it is not benefiting from the uncontrolled parts of the globe for building bases, but it means that it is not dependent on any base in any country and it can continue its existence in an effective manner ,even if it loses a base in any country, as a result of its decentralized organization.

Although pushed out of Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, Al Qaeda continues to conduct operations all around the world, including in Singapore, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Macedonia, Bosnia, Italy, France, Spain, and Turkey. It is still able to "communicate, reconnoiter targets, plan operations, travel, meet clandestinely, and obtain finances".³⁰²

6. 2 Al Qaeda and Transnational Actorness

The features of transnational actorness has been listed as, first, the ability to organize in failed states and get support from states, especially rogue ones, while remaining out of their control. Second, the ability to find funds, weapons, information and other necessary means for their activities themselves by utilizing the developments in all kinds of technology and easy movement of people, capital, ideas, knowledge and information across borders. Third, having a decentralized and deterritorialized organizational structure so that having the capacity to conduct operations worldwide and the ability to continue its effective existence although its

³⁰² Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2002. "Countering Al Qaeda", Rand, 10.

leading figures are captured or killed. Fourth, having the ability to build alliances and be a source of inspiration for other terrorist organizations. Fifth, having an ideology with a global reach that provides loyal supporters to the organization all around the world. Sixth, having the capacity to challenge the sovereignty of the states not only by conducting attacks but also by establishing schools, charities, even banking systems as alternatives to those of states and contributing to loyalty shifts. Seventh, the ability to conduct foreign policy. And finally, the ability to affect the domestic, foreign and defense policies of the states including the sole superpower of the contemporary world. All these features are possessed by Al Qaeda as will be demonstrated.

6. 2. 1 Al Qaeda and Failed States

As explained above, Al Qaeda used the instability within Afghanistan and established itself a base there in the mid-1990s. With the US intervention in Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, Al Qaeda had to leave this country. However, there are lots of other places around the world, like Somali, Iraq, Chechenya, Kashmir, etc., where the state control is weak or non-existent. Al Qaeda has been able to establish bases in these places in a covert manner if not openly.³⁰³

In particular the situation in Iraq can provide Al Qaeda very good opportunities for establishing a new base. Those people that are coming to Iraq in order to fight against the US forces are religiously motivated Arab volunteers. The struggle in Iraq can have the same dynamics and consequences as the SU experienced in Afghanistan. “The world series of jihad” may now go on in Iraq.³⁰⁴

³⁰³ Hoffman, in *Symposium: Diagnosing Al Qaeda*. August, 18, 2003. Available online: <http://www.rand.org/newslinks/fp.html>.

³⁰⁴ Bowers, Faye, and Ilene R. Prusher. 2003. “Al Qaeda’s Reach Grows, with Help from Web”, *Christian Science Monitor*, 95(249): 2.

Therefore, Al Qaeda can gain from this struggle further members, reinforce its doctrine, and find new sources besides finding a new base to reorganize.³⁰⁵

In Afghanistan, Al Qaeda was independent from the control of the Taliban, while it benefited from the opportunities provided by the legal 'sovereignty' of this state. In fact, instead of being controlled by the Taliban regime Al Qaeda controlled that regime to an extent and helped its staying in power by eliminating its major internal enemies. By this way Al Qaeda possesses the feature of actorness that necessitates being independent from the control of any state while it continues to benefit from the weaknesses of the state-system.

6. 2. 2 Al Qaeda and Utilization of Globalization

It is well known that Al Qaeda benefits from the opportunities provided by globalization and the easy and quick access to all kinds of technology and easy movements of people, capital, ideas, knowledge, and information. Al Qaeda utilizes all kinds of technology including the internet, fax machines, air travel, and even satellite technology to acquire funds, weapons, information, and the other necessary means to conduct its operations around the world besides disseminating its ideology all over the world via these technological devices including its own web sites on the internet.

Osama bin Laden disseminates his speeches and fatwas through video- and audiotapes, CD-ROMs and DVDs as well as by satellite TV and the internet. For example, the 13 volume "Encyclopedia of Jihad" and 1 volume "Jihad Manual" can be reached from the world wide web and e-mailed to jihadists and would-be jihadists

³⁰⁵ "Al Qaeda is regenerated by Iraq War", *International Herald Tribune*, November 21, 2003.

by Al Qaeda. These documents can also be found in CD format.³⁰⁶ All of the speeches and fatwas of leading Al Qaeda leaders including those of Osama bin Laden can be found from the internet in addition to being announced from satellite TV that can be watched from all around the world. Moreover, Al Qaeda publishes an internet magazine, called Al-Battar Training Camp, providing people the opportunity to be trained as mujahidens from their own home. It is stated in the magazine that “oh Mujahid brother, in order to join the great training camps you don’t have to travel to other lands. Alone, in your home or with a group of your brothers, you can begin to execute the training program.”³⁰⁷

Benefiting from the low inspection possibilities on the flow of commercial cargo Al Qaeda is able to move every type of equipment including weapons around the world.³⁰⁸ “Taking advantage of lax asylum laws and immigration procedures, and the low level of scrutiny given to religious and charitable organizations, Al Qaeda has dispatched operatives and sleepers into Western countries, creating a network of safe houses and acquiring vehicles as well as equipment.”³⁰⁹

In 2001, Dahmane Abd al-Sattar, a member of a Tunisian-dominated Al Qaeda cell based in Belgium, was activated by the Al Qaeda leadership in order to assassinate Ahmed Shah Massoud, then leader of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. He travelled, with another fellow, as European-based Moroccan journalists, through the UK and Pakistan with Belgian passports and Pakistani visas to Afghanistan. They committed a suicide attack while interviewing Massauds and

³⁰⁶ Hoffman, Bruce. 2003. “Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An Assessment”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 26: 436. (pp.429-442).

³⁰⁷ Cited in “Al-Qaida offers do-it-yourself terror training”, *World Net Daily*, January 5, 2004. Available online: http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=36459

³⁰⁸ Smith, Paul J. 2002. “Transnational Terrorism and the Al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities”, *Parameters*, Summer: 42.

³⁰⁹ Takeyh, Ray, and Nikolas Gvosdev. 2002. “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 25(3): 101. For similar arguments see Orbach, Benjamin. 2001. “Usama bin Ladin and Al-Qa’ida: Origins and Doctrines”, *MERIA Journal*, 5(4).

both of the terrorists died besides Massaud.³¹⁰ This story demonstrates very well how Al Qaeda makes use of all of the benefits of globalization and acquires all the necessary means for its operations itself without any need for states. This is the second feature that demonstrates Al Qaeda's actorness.

6. 2. 3 Al Qaeda as a Decentralized and Deterritorialized, yet Institutionalized Body

The structure of Al Qaeda is a complex one. It conducts operations all around the world by using several ways since it has the ability to function in multiple operational levels. Firstly, it uses cells directly linked to Al Qaeda's command and control nucleus especially for major attacks like in the case of September 11. Secondly, Al Qaeda uses affiliated or associated groups it has trained, armed or inspired in some other ways. Al Qaeda has lots of sleeper cells dispersed all around the world. Some of these act on their own and conduct attacks in the name of Al Qaeda. "Most of the proposals for terrorist operations appear to come from the operatives in the field, rather than from the center."³¹¹ Thirdly, there are local terrorists that do not have previous connections with Al Qaeda but are inspired by its tactics, motivations, speeches made by Osama bin Laden or by Al Qaeda as a whole. All these features of a decentralized structure enable Al Qaeda to operate all over the world without being seriously encountered. It is too difficult for states to cope with such a dispersed organization. As Hoffman states "[b]ecause Al Qaeda is neither monolithic nor leaves a single, identifiable 'footprint', nor has one set modus

³¹⁰ Smith, Paul J. 2002. "Transnational Terrorism and the Al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities", *Parameters*, Summer: 38-39.

³¹¹ Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2002. "Countering Al Qaeda", Rand, 5.

operandi, the movement itself is all the more formidable and resilient.”³¹² Especially after it was forced out of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda benefited from its decentralized organization structure very much. After they lost their base in Afghanistan the terrorist cells further spread out.³¹³ Furthermore, collapsing one small group does not have the same effect with taking down a major central organization. In order to create the same effect states have to cripple most if not all of these small groups.³¹⁴

According to information provided by the CIA, since the September 11 attacks, 2/3 of the people that were in the leadership position within Al Qaeda have been captured.³¹⁵ Among these people there were leading figures. Such as Mohammed Atef (who was the first rank military commander of Al Qaeda), Zeynel Abidin Mohammed Husseyin (who was third in the ranking among the leaders of Al Qaeda and was responsible from the overseas operations of the organization), Mohammed Mustafa Ahmed Havsavi (who was among the leading figures of the organization that was responsible for the financial issues), Mohammed Hamdi Al-Ahdal (who was suspected to be among those who were responsible for the attacks on the USS Cole and French ship Limburg), and many others.³¹⁶ A lot of banking accounts and financial assets of Al Qaeda have been frozen.³¹⁷ Despite all of this progress, when we look at the number and intensity of attacks made by Al Qaeda after September 11, we see that there is no decrease. On the contrary, according to some arguments, Al Qaeda was conducting approximately one operation every 2

³¹² Hoffman in *Symposium: Diagnosing Al Qaeda*. August, 18, 2003. Available online: <http://www.rand.org/newslinks/fp.html>.

³¹³ “Al Qaeda considered as dangerous as before 9/11”, *USA Today*, November 1, 2002.

³¹⁴ Farah, Douglas, and Peter Finn. 2003. “Terrorism Inc.”, *Washington Post*, November 21, 2003.

³¹⁵ Diamond, John, Dave Moniz, Barbara Slavin, Peronet Despeignes, “6 Fronts of the War on Terrorism”, *USA Today*, September 11, 2003.

³¹⁶ For a more complete list see Erkmen, Serhat, Mazin Hasan, Soran Şükür. 2004. “11 Eylül’den Sonra El Kaide”, *Stratejik Analiz*, Ocak 2004: 45-46.

³¹⁷ It is said that bank accounts reaching \$200 million have been frozen and 315 people that were providing funds to terrorism were taken under custody. For more detail see Diamond, John, Dave Moniz, Barbara Slavin, Peronet Despeignes, “6 Fronts of the War on Terrorism”, *USA Today*, September 11, 2003.

years before September 11, but this number has increased to two operations each year after September 11, and the battlefield has expanded.³¹⁸ This is to say that Al Qaeda has preserved its capabilities to conduct attacks even in the Western world and the captured leaders have been replaced by others from the organization.³¹⁹ Among the most important of these new leaders is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who is said to be responsible for Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey on behalf of Al Qaeda. Also, he is said to be an expert on chemical weapons and is said to have established good relations with the Ansar al-Islam organization operating in Iraq.³²⁰ At this point, Al Qaeda acts as if it is a state, i.e. the state as an entity continues its existence as their leaders change and so does Al Qaeda. Therefore, although the leading figures change, it seems that there has emerged an institutional continuity within the Al Qaeda structure, that enables it to preserve its effectiveness and existence.

6. 2. 4 Al Qaeda and Alliance Building

Al Qaeda has strong relations with other terrorist organizations operating around the world. The peak of these relations was reached in 1998 when several organizations came together and established the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders. Besides Al Qaeda there were organizations from Egypt, Algeria, Pakistan, Chechnya, Philippines and Bangladesh within this establishment.³²¹

³¹⁸ "Despite war on terrorism, al-Qaeda is not slowing down", *USA Today*, November 21, 2003.

³¹⁹ "Al Qaeda considered as dangerous as before 9/11", *USA Today*, November 1, 2002. Erkmen, Serhat, Mazin Hasan, Soran Şükür. 2004. "11 Eylül'den Sonra El Kaide", *Stratejik Analiz*, Ocak 2004: 44-45.

³²⁰ Levitt, Matthew. 2003. "Placing Iraq and Zarqawi in the Terror Web", *Policy Watch*, February 13, 2003. Levitt, Matthew. 2003. "The Zarqawi Node in the Terror Matrix", *National Interest*, February 6, 2003.

³²¹ Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. "Al Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict", *Congressional Research Service*, May 23, 2003, 4.

As the intelligence sources and the court testimony from the 1998 Embassy bombers demonstrate there is also an alliance between Al Qaeda and Hezbollah. It is argued that Al Qaeda learned to conduct two-tiered simultaneous attacks from Hezbollah. Through this relationship Al Qaeda may aim to pull Hezbollah and other radical Palestinian movements into the global jihad it has been conducting.³²²

Al Qaeda also acts as an umbrella organization for the local terrorist groups, in a sense it is franchising terrorism. It provides them with the necessary means to conduct activities. They can share the expertise and establish contacts with other groups via Al Qaeda, get logistical and financial support and advice on weapons and other issues.³²³ Also some of these organizations sometimes conduct attacks in the name of Al Qaeda. For example, it is said that the hotel bombings in Bali were conducted by the Jemmah Islamiya organization in the name of Al Qaeda.³²⁴

Another important point here is that there are organizations around the world that are inspired by Al Qaeda. For example, the assaults on 6 May 2003 in Casablanca are known to have been conducted by a local terrorist organization named Selefite Jihad Organization. However, the way the assaults are conducted, the organization of the militants and the ideological discourses were similar to that of Al Qaeda. Investigations demonstrated that the members of these organization were listening to the speeches of Abu Qatada (whose actual name is Omar Mahmud Omar and who was among the important ideologists of Al Qaeda and was captured in the

³²² Bowers, Faye. 2002. "Attacks in Kenya signal Al Qaeda's expanding war", *Christian Science Monitor*, 95(5), December 2, 2002.

³²³ Erkmen, Serhat, Mazin Hasan, Soran Şükür. 2004. "11 Eylül'den Sonra El Kaide", *Stratejik Analiz*, Ocak 2004: 44. "Al Qaeda seen shifting to 'terror Consultant' role", *The New Zealand Herald*, April 20, 2004. Available online: www.nzherald.co.nz/storyprint.cfm?storyID=3535957. Farah, Douglas, and Peter Finn. 2003. "Terrorism Inc.", *Washington Post*, November 21, 2003.

³²⁴ Shahr, Yael. 2002. "Al Qaida's Asian Web", October 15, 2002, available [online]: <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articleDet.cfm?articleid=449>

aftermath of September 11), and using the books Al Qaeda used in the training camps in Afghanistan.³²⁵

All these demonstrate that Al Qaeda has another feature of actorness, namely the ability to establish alliances in order to survive better in world politics and to be an example for other similar entities.

6. 2. 5 The Ideology of Al Qaeda: 'Jihadism'

Al Qaeda members are from different ethnic and national origins but they are connected by their fundamentalist version of Islam. Also "dozens of local groups across the world [are] connected by [that] global ideology."³²⁶

Al Qaeda backs the traditional anti-imperialist feelings within the Middle East with religious motives and puts the concept of 'jihad'³²⁷ at the core.³²⁸ The continuation of jihad in the various parts of the world has enabled Al Qaeda to protect its dynamism and brought it the possibility to reorganize and disperse within such regions.³²⁹ As a result of the globalness of the ideology of Al Qaeda, its goals and tactics spread to terrorist cells not directly tied to Al Qaeda, and, as former CIA

³²⁵ Kelley, Kevin J. 2003. "How Al Qaeda Carried Out Paradise Hotel Bombing", *All Africa Global Media*, November 10, 2003.

³²⁶ Fareed, Zakaria. 2004. "Terrorists Don't Need States", *Newsweek*, available [online]: <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4615876/>

³²⁷ 'Jihad' is a religious duty of the Muslims to spread Islam by waging war. Jihad can be made in four ways, namely by heart (in ones of heart against ones inducements to evil), tongue, hand, and sword. Only the final version is done by waging a physical war against infidels (The Encyclopedia Britanica, vol. 6). Only in under emergency, when the Muslim world is under threat, all the Muslims must participate in Jihad. (Knapp, Michael G. 2003. "The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam", *Parameters*, Spring: 83). Osama bin Laden and his organization use jihad in this sense and argue that since the Muslim World is under threat each and every Muslim must participate in Jihad in return of an honored place in paradise. Osama bin Laden declared jihad twice, one on 26 August 1996 and the other on 23 February 1998. For a more detailed explanation of jihad and Al Qaeda's use of jihad also see Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2001. "The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad", *Middle East Policy*, 8(4): 18-42. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, and John Kaltner. 2003. "Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11", *Middle East Policy*, 10(2): 76-92. The Peace Encyclopedia's web site on <http://www.yahoodi.com/peace/jihad.html>. Kepel, Gilles. 2000. "Islamism Reconsidered", *Harvard International Review*, 22(2): 22-27.

³²⁸ Lesch, Ann M. 2002. "Osama Bin Laden: Embedded in the Middle East Crisis", *Middle East Policy*, 9(2): 82.

³²⁹ Erkmén, Serhat, Mazin Hasan, Soran Şükür. 2004. "11 Eylül'den Sonra El Kaide", *Stratejik Analiz*, Ocak 2004: 51.

Director George Tenet states, this “ensures that a serious threat will remain for the foreseeable future, with or without Al Qaeda in the picture.”³³⁰ Therefore, even if the identity of the actor that represents the jihadist ideology changes, as long as people are adhered to jihadism, a potential for actorness will always exist. The representation of the religious fundamentalist and jihadist ideology by Al Qaeda, has brought the organization to the level of being an ideology itself.³³¹

6. 2. 6 Al Qaeda as a Challenge to State Sovereignty Competing with the State

Besides its legal aspects, in de facto, state sovereignty is based on the ability of states to control their territories, people and the use of force within their territories and in the name of their citizens. States are responsible for protecting their people from internal and external threats. Al Qaeda challenges all of these.

In failed states Al Qaeda challenges state sovereignty in terms of controlling the territory as explained before. But Al Qaeda challenges the sovereignty of states not only in failed states but also in others. Al Qaeda uses its funds coming from the own investments of Osama bin Laden and from other wealthy supporters not only for terrorist attacks, but also for supporting religious schools, business enterprises in which they have interests, training camps, salaried agent network, and allies.³³² All these at the end make Al Qaeda a competitor of the state for the loyalty of the people and weaken state sovereignty. This is because people that share similar ideologies with Al Qaeda prefer to submit their loyalty to Al Qaeda, which provides the services

³³⁰ Cited in Diamond, John, and Tony Locy, “Al Qaeda may be showing a new face”, *Usa Today*, March 16, 2004.

³³¹ For similar arguments see Farah, Douglas, and Peter Finn. 2003. “Terrorism Inc.”, *Washington Post*, November 21, 2003. Hoffman and Jenkins and W. Rosenau in *Symposium: Diagnosing Al Qaeda*. August, 18, 2003. Available online: <http://www.rand.org/newslinks/fp.html>.

³³² Jenkins, Brian M. 2001. “The Organization Men: Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack.” In James F. Hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose, eds., *How Did This Happen?: Terrorism and the New War*. New York:Public Affairs, 12.

normally states provide. Therefore, states lose control over their citizens and lose their loyalty.

Al Qaeda attacks all over the world challenge the monopoly of the state to use force and also the ability of the states to protect their citizens from threats coming both from inside and outside. Furthermore, it is known from documents found in Al Qaeda camps that the organization has the aspiration to acquire WMDs, even if it lacks these capabilities so far.³³³ If they acquire such weapons they will further challenge state sovereignty and become a strategic equal to nuclear powers though even more threatening because of their being unrestricted by any kind of rule be it legal or moral.

All these demonstrate that being able to challenge the major actors of the state-centric world, namely the states, Al Qaeda emerges as an important non-state security actor in the system.

6. 2. 7 Al Qaeda's Foreign Policy

Al Qaeda has objectives and conducts certain foreign policy moves via video-types of the speeches and fatwas of the leading figures and via its operations/attacks all around the world. For example, Osama bin Laden suggested a truce with Europe in return for its alienation from the US and for pulling their soldiers back from the Middle East.³³⁴ In doing so, he tried to divide the enemy, like the ancient policies of the empires, 'divide and conquer'. Furthermore, he shows new targets to attack in his speeches. Moreover, every time President Bush gives a speech calling a space, like Iraq, safe, Al Qaeda makes attacks there, thus, in a sense, conducting international relations. For example, the timing of the truce offer to Europe by Osama bin Laden

³³³ Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2002. "Countering Al Qaeda", Rand, 6-7.

³³⁴ "'Bin Laden' offers Europe truce", *BBC News*, April 15, 2004. Available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/3627775.stm

came shortly after a conference given by George W. Bush in which he defended US policies in Iraq and met with Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister. According to the diplomatic correspondent of the BBC, Bridget Kendall, this move of Osama bin Laden can be considered a propaganda attempt to counter what Bush said about the situation in Iraq and the Middle East in general.³³⁵ Al Qaeda seems to be a non-state actor that operates within the state system as if it is a state.

Instead of giving official diplomatic notes, Al Qaeda gives messages through its attacks all around the world. For example, in a video left near a mosque in Madrid after the train bombings of March 11 2004, Al Qaeda claimed responsibility and said that this was a punishment for Spain because of its collaboration with the US and its allies, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq.³³⁶ Therefore, Al Qaeda perfectly utilizes terror as a diplomatic initiative and move.

Moreover, the investigations made after the September 11 attacks demonstrate that Al Qaeda has the capacity to organize several operations at the same time, like a state has multiple foreign policies for many different states and situations simultaneously. For example the training for conducting the September 11 attacks started more than a year before the attacks were made. The plans for these attacks were made still earlier. It is learned from the testimonies of the people accused of the bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, that Al Qaeda started to move assets into place for these attacks from 1994 onwards. In 1995 a key associate of Osama bin Laden came to the US in order to check the status and reliability of the local cells. All these means that Al Qaeda materialized the Embassy bombings of 1998 and the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 among other attacks at

³³⁵ “‘Bin Laden’ offers Europe truce”, *BBC News*, April 15, 2004. Available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/3627775.stm

³³⁶ Cariboni, Diana. 2004. “Spain: Terrorism, Lies and Elections”, *Inter Press Service*, March 15, 2004. Available online: <<http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/warOnTerror/SpainElections.asp>> and also <<http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=22857>>

the same time with its preparation for September 11 attacks. All these demonstrate that Al Qaeda has the capacity to prepare several major operations at the same time.³³⁷

Therefore, its capacity to conduct foreign policy, although via different means, is another sign of the actorness of Al Qaeda.

6. 2. 8 Al Qaeda's Impact on the Domestic, Foreign, and Defense Policies of the States

If the opinion polls conducted in Spain just before the terrorist attacks on trains that killed and injured lots of people are analyzed, one can see that the governing center right Popular Party would likely not have suffered a defeat in the elections made a few days after these terrorist attacks, had the terrorists attacks not been conducted. These attacks and the way the government handled the issue in the immediate aftermath of the incident angered the people and resulted in a change in the election results, perhaps with the help of other factors. Later on, it was discovered that there was an Al Qaeda connection in these bombings. One of the pieces of evidence was a video left near a mosque in Madrid. In this video Abu Dujan Al Afgani, who claims to be a military spokesman for Al Qaeda in Europe, took responsibility for the attacks. This example illustrates the ability of Al Qaeda to affect the domestic policies of a state.³³⁸ Officials across Europe and in the US are afraid of such attacks that can be conducted by Al Qaeda or other terrorists inspired

³³⁷ Jenkins, Brian M. 2001. "The Organization Men: Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack." In James F. Hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose, eds., *How Did This Happen?: Terrorism and the New War*. New York:Public Affairs, 9.

³³⁸ Cariboni, Diana. 2004. "Spain: Terrorism, Lies and Elections", *Inter Press Service*, March 15, 2004. Available online: <<http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/warOnTerror/SpainElections.asp>> and also <<http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=22857>>

by the success of the Spanish case, with the aim of affecting the election results, in these other countries.³³⁹

Al Qaeda has also had several impacts on the making of foreign and defense policies of states in the aftermath of September 11. Firstly, the threat perceptions have changed and threats have started to be perceived as coming from non-state entities conducting transnational terrorism in addition to the conventional threats perceived from other states. This has brought terrorism to the forefront of states' agendas in their relations with each other. For example, while building alliances states evaluate each other in accordance with their stance vis-à-vis terrorism. An example of this is that the US and its allies support President Pervez Musharraf, who took the office via a coup d'état, in order that Pakistan will continue to support them in destroying the Al Qaeda cells and supporters in this country and prevent Al Qaeda militants from escaping or hiding in Pakistan.³⁴⁰ Such support is actually not new. It was given by the US to authoritative regimes who were anti-communist during the Cold War era. But it is for the first time that such cooperation is made against a non-state entity, which confirms the actorness of this entity. Also, EU law enforcement specialists decided to meet in Madrid just after the terrorist attacks on 11 March 2004, in order to discuss the ways to fight terrorism.³⁴¹ This is another example of how Al Qaeda determines the agenda of the relations between states.

Another point here is that the US has started to build its foreign and defense policy according to the fight against terrorism. The major discussions on security in the US just before the September 11 attacks were whether to build a national missile defense shield in order to protect the country from the missiles that could be used

³³⁹ Diamond, John, and Tony Locy, "Al Qaeda may be showing a new face", *Usa Today*, March 16, 2004.

³⁴⁰ Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2002. "Countering Al Qaeda", Rand, 19-20.

³⁴¹ Diamond, John, and Tony Locy, "Al Qaeda may be showing a new face", *Usa Today*, March 16, 2004.

mostly by the rogue states. However, now, like the threat perceived from the SU during the Cold War, the destructive threat of terrorism for the US and world security in the post-Cold War period has become the major determinant of US foreign and defense policy.³⁴² This in turn necessitates all states in the system to redefine their positions in the system according to the position of the sole superpower on terrorism. Also, the pattern of conflict has changed from large-scale conventional wars between states to an asymmetric low intensity conflict in which one party is a non-state entity. However, in its declared 'war on terrorism' the US continues to act as if it is fighting with a state enemy and this causes it hardships.

All the examples and explanations above demonstrate the emergence of Al Qaeda as a non-state security actor in world politics. Its actorness has similarities with that of states as well as differences, because Al Qaeda is an actor of the multi-centric world instead of the state-centric world. However, as the state-centric and multi-centric worlds coexist and intersect, so do the states and Al Qaeda as a non-state security actor. Therefore, in their war on terrorism, states must recognize these fact, stop acting as if they are facing a state enemy from the state-centric world and as if the state-centric world is constituting the whole of the world system.

Having stated the features and nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorism and the actorness of transnational terrorists, and having demonstrated them on the Al Qaeda case, it is now possible to properly evaluate whether an effective international response to transnational terrorism, can be given.

³⁴² Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2002. "Countering Al Qaeda", Rand, ix.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

7. 1 Research Findings

Throughout this thesis the nature of transnational terrorism and the actorness of transnational terrorists have been analyzed. This has been done in order to be able to answer the question of whether it is possible to give an effective international response to transnational terrorism. In other words, in order to be able to evaluate what kind of a response is necessary to meet a challenge, we should first know with what we are confronted. Therefore, first, a dualistic approach of world politics has been developed. In this way, the international nature of the response that is tried to be given to transnational terrorism has been explained with the state-centric image of world politics. On the other hand, the transnational nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorism has been explained with the multi-centric world image. Furthermore, a dualistic image of world politics is used to explain how these two worlds intersect and thus show how the threats posed by transnational terrorism can also threaten the state-centric world.

Transnational terrorism is among the threat perceptions of the multi-centric world. Therefore, in order to understand its nature, first the general nature of the threat perceptions in the multi-centric world has been analyzed. Then, these features have been evaluated, specifically, within the framework of transnational terrorism. In order to better understand the differences in the nature of the threat perceptions in the multi-centric world, the features of the threat perceptions in the state-centric world

have been briefly analyzed as well. Accordingly, it is found out that, the only important actor in the state-centric world is the sovereign state. Therefore, both the referent object and perpetrator of the threats in the state-centric world are sovereign states. These sovereign states are legal equals and there is no superior authority in the system that can guarantee the safety and well-being of the states. Therefore, states have to protect their own. The only way to do this is to enhance one's powers, and power is measured in military terms. Through this military power, states pursue their national interests. As a result, the national interests of other states, their armed forces, and the increase in improvements of the weapons of other states are the major threat perceptions in the state-centric world. Also, domestic and international terrorism as tools of other states are accepted as threats. In sum, the threat perceptions in the state-centric world are military in nature and posed by states against other states.

On the other hand, threat perceptions in the multi-centric world are multiple in terms of issues, referent objects, and perpetrators. Socio-economic issues (like impoverishment and overpopulation), cultural issues (like identity crisis), environmental issues (like depletion of natural resources), and non-traditional military-political issues (like transnational terrorism) are among the threat perceptions in the multi-centric world. These issues became threats that threaten all the world by the help of the features of the multi-centric world. These threats are posed not only by states, but also by non-state actors whose referent object are not only states but also individuals, societies, and groups. The processes of globalization that shaped the multi-centric world, affected the emergence and spread of these threats. Among the impacts of globalization there are first the developments in communication, travel and transportation technologies. Second, easy and fast movement of individuals, information and all kinds of goods across borders. Third,

the decrease in the importance of distances and borders, and the increase in the speed of transnational and supraterritorial interactions. Fourth, improvements in the skills of individuals and loyalty shifts away from states to other power centers. Fifth, as a result of the above, the weakening of state sovereignty. These features, at the same time, differentiate the threat perceptions in the multi-centric from the traditional threat perceptions in the state-centric world.

In short, four main features can be stated that differentiate the threat perceptions in the multi-centric world from those of the state-centric world. First, the threats in the multi-centric world are multiple, thus not restricted with traditional security concerns. Second, the referent objects of these threats are multiple as well. This means that individuals, societies, and groups are threatened besides the states. Third, among the perpetrators of these threats, the major share is possessed by non-state actors. This is to say, these threats are mostly posed by non-state actors. Fourth, these threats have been developed and spread with the help of the processes of globalization. These general features can be applied to transnational terrorism that is among the threat perceptions of the multi-centric world.

Transnational terrorists are non-state security actors. They can act independent from states and in an effective manner, meaning that they can conduct harmful attacks all over the world. They can find finance, equipment, and intelligence through the facilities of globalization. Furthermore, globalization helps transnational terrorists acquire an increasing mobility and establish cells all around the world. Thus, they have a decentralized and deterritorialized organization. As a result, even if their heads are captured or killed, they can continue their effective existence. Transnational terrorists establish alliances with other transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. They have a global ideology and loyal

supporters. As a result of the development of a global consciousness among the people led by the developments in their skills, some people shifted their loyalties towards other power centers, including transnational terrorist organizations. Therefore, transnational terrorists challenge the sovereignty of states. Transnational terrorist organizations have the ability to conduct their own foreign policies. They also have the ability to affect the domestic, foreign, and defense policies of the states as actors in the system. All these features are demonstrated with the analysis of the Al Qaeda case.

In fact, another important research finding is that there is a mutual relationship between the multiple issues and actors, and the multi-centric world. The multi-centric world is reinforced and further developed as a result of the emergence of these issues as threats and by the rise of the non-state actors as independent from states.

The threats perceived in the multi-centric world threaten the state-centric world as well, however, these issues remain out of the traditional threat perceptions in the state-centric world. But, some of them, like WMDs, RMAs and terrorism, are perceived as threats in the state-centric world as well, but not as posed by non-state actors. States perceive these threats still as coming from other states. Thus, the nature of these threats are misperceived. Therefore, the response mechanisms used to meet these threats are developed in accordance with this misperception.

On the basis of these research findings, we can now look at the existing international response mechanisms and evaluate whether they can meet the challenge posed by transnational terrorism.

7. 2 Response Mechanisms of the State-centric World and Their Ability to Meet the Challenge Posed by Transnational Terrorism

In this section, the response mechanisms, in general, and counter-terrorism mechanisms, in particular, developed by states to meet the threats they perceive, will be analyzed. Then, whether they can be utilized to effectively meet the challenge posed by transnational terrorism will be evaluated.

7. 2. 1 Armies and Military Methods

In order to meet the major challenges to their security, which have traditionally been military threats coming from enemy states, states built up strong and capable military forces. They developed their military capabilities continuously by benefiting from the developments in technology. This reached to the point that states even used the developments in physics to create nuclear weapons. All these weapons at the end became major tools for states in order to counter the threats they perceive from the other states and their armies.

In terms of countering terrorism, specialist military units have been developed. These units are used to rescue hostages, dispose of bombs, protect key points, dismantle terrorist organizations and capture terrorists, assassinate terrorist leaders, attack the bases and training camps of the terrorists in, for example, retaliatory strikes following a terrorist attack.³⁴³

However, these measures are only partially useful as far as transnational terrorism is concerned. Armies and weapons can be utilized against an enemy that is situated in a territorially demarcated area. This is to say, as long as you do not know where your enemies are situated, you cannot bomb or attack them, no matter how

³⁴³ Pillar, Paul R. 2001. *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy*. Washington, dc: Brookings Institution Press, 97.

developed an army you have. Transnational terrorists have a decentralized and deterritorial organization. They have secret cells all around the world. Therefore, states cannot fight with them through traditional armies and weapons. The only use of the armies and weapons can be in punishing the states who support the terrorists. However, this does not stop transnational terrorists, because they are not dependent on any state supporter and can preserve their effectiveness as independent actors.

Moreover, in order to use specialized military units to rescue hostages, dispose of bombs, capture terrorists, and dismantle terrorist organizations, very good intelligence about the activities and personnel of the terrorists is necessary. However, the decentralized and dispersed nature of transnational terrorists make acquiring effective intelligence more difficult than ever.

7. 2. 2 Alliances and International Cooperation

As another response mechanism, states establish alliances with other states in order to augment their security.³⁴⁴ States had to possess the necessary means, including the physical resources, in order to be able to protect their territory and national interests. However, since the states have unequal military power and physical resources, they establish alliances with other states in order to balance the power of a common and stronger enemy.³⁴⁵ Even stronger states establish alliances in order to cope with another strong state. Alliances enhance the international perception of great power influence.³⁴⁶ Alliances can also be built in order to achieve collective security. Each member in an alliance expects that their alliance will protect

³⁴⁴ Rothgeb, John M., Jr. 1993. *Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary international System*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 195.

³⁴⁵ Brown, Seyom. 1995. *New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics*. (Post-Cold War edition). New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 13. Also see Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Menlo Park: Addison-Wesley.

them from potential hostile attacks either by deterring the enemy/s or by the use of collective hard power, should deterrence fail.³⁴⁷

States also cooperate against terrorism. International cooperation against terrorism has several components, namely legal and practical cooperation, including issuing conventions, declarations and resolutions to fight terrorism, cooperating in law enforcement, and disrupting terrorist finances.

International organizations like the UN pass resolutions for fighting against different aspects of terrorism in order to foster greater political action and cooperation among the member states. There are lots of narrowly focused conventions on terrorism-related issues. Among these are the Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), the Hague Convention for the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (1973), the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979), the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation (1988), the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for Purposes of Detection (1991), International Convention for the Suppression of Explosives (1997), and the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2000).³⁴⁸ Of course not all of these are signed and ratified by all the states, but at least these are attempts to cooperate against terrorism.

There are also UN Security Council Resolutions (S/RES) that are binding for the members of the UN. Among these are S/RES/635 (1989) on the marking of

³⁴⁶ Midlarsky, Manus I. 2003. "The Impact of External Threat on States and Domestic Societies", *International Studies Review*, 5 (4):17.

³⁴⁷ Shen, Dingli. 2004. "Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats?", *The Washington Quarterly*, 27(2):165.

³⁴⁸ Pillar, Paul R. 2001. *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy*. Washington, dc: Brookings Institution Press, 79.

plastic or sheet explosives for the purpose of detection, S/RES/731 (1992) on the destruction of Pan American flight 103 and Union des transports aériens flights 772, S/RES/748 (1992) on sanctions against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, S/RES/1189 (1998) concerning the terrorist bomb attacks on 7 August 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania, S/RES/1214 (1998) on the situation in Afghanistan, S/RES/1267 (1999) on measures against Taliban, S/RES/1269 (1999) on international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, S/RES/1333 (2000) on measures against Taliban, S/RES/1363 (2001) on the establishment of a mechanism to monitor the implementation of measures imposed by resolutions 1267 and 1333, S/RES/1368 (2001) condemning the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, S/RES/1373 and S/RES/1377 (2001) on the threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.³⁴⁹ There are also UN General Assembly Resolutions on measures to eliminate international terrorism and regional conventions on terrorism issued by regional organizations like the League of Arab States, Organization on Islamic Conference, Council of Europe, OAS, and OAU.

In addition to international legal measures, in order to combat international terrorism, also the military and police forces of states must ally and each states' forces must operate within their own national borders and ensure the enforcement of law relating to issues from tracking bank accounts to information sharing.³⁵⁰ As an example of this type of cooperation, the US helps fellow states to improve their judicial and law enforcement capabilities through training them under the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance Program. This helps to develop

³⁴⁹ *UN Security Council Resolutions on Terrorism*, available online, <<http://www.un.org/terrorism/sc.htm>>

³⁵⁰ Jablonsky, David. 2002-03. "The State of the National Security State", *Parameters*, Winter: 13.

working relationships between the US and other states in their fight against terrorism.³⁵¹

Furthermore, states are cooperating in order to block the finance of terrorist organizations and each state is responsible from preventing terrorists to raise, transfer and launder money within its own borders. Also, international organizations have issued a series of measures to fight terrorist finance. Among these are UN Security Council Resolution 1373, the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Finance, and important initiatives by the G-8 and EU countries. Besides these, individual states in America, Asia, Middle East and Europe have passed resolutions to impede the passage of funds to terrorists.³⁵²

However, as far as terrorism (not only transnational but any type of it) is concerned, international cooperation is problematic. This is because, as a result of the pursuance of national interests by every state, they cannot accept a clear-cut, universally acceptable definition of terrorism. Each state wants that the activities of the groups with which they have friendly relations should be left out of the definition of terrorism. Therefore, without agreeing on what is terrorism, states cannot cooperate against it effectively. This problem arises because states still act strictly according to their national interests and with a state-centric world image.³⁵³

As far as transnational terrorism is concerned, disrupting terrorist finance is a difficult task as well. Firstly, within the multi-centric world, with the help of the processes of globalization, it is difficult to control the flow of capital and financial transactions all around the world. Only, the assets of transnational terrorists that can

³⁵¹ Pope, Laurence. 1993. "Department's Efforts to Combat International Terrorism", *US Department of State Dispatch*, 4(17), April, 26, 1993, 299-301.

³⁵² Winer, Jonathan M., and Triffin J. Roule. 2002. "Fighting Terrorist Finance", *Survival*, 44(3): 88.

³⁵³ The lack of consensus on what terrorism is prevents the working of counterterrorism measures effectively within the state-centric world and against international terrorism, let alone their success against the transnational terrorism of the multi-centric world.

be detected can be frozen by states within their own borders. Secondly, transnational terrorists sometimes use techniques that cannot be followed. For example, Al Qaeda use the technique of hawala to transfer money, as explained before. In this technique individuals carry the money from a place to other, instead of using banks. It is almost impossible to follow such kind of transfers. Thirdly, transnational terrorists get money from charities and people that are loyal supporters. This practice becomes important as transnational terrorists become independent power centers and as individuals shift their loyalties away from their states towards these power centers. For example, some people in Saudi Arabia are not happy with the governments' positive attitudes towards the US and therefore support Al Qaeda. Thus, transnational terrorists' being non-state actors that represent an attractive ideology, make it difficult to disrupt their finance with traditional response mechanisms.

7. 2. 3 Deterrence

Deterrence is a strategy used to prevent enemies from initiating unacceptable and threatening behavior. With deterrence, a state aims to prevent the enemy from engaging in a harmful behavior, either by creating a fear that it will be punished too severely, or by making it believe that it cannot successfully achieve its aims. In order for a deterrence policy to work, a state must have the necessary weapons, successfully communicate its message to the enemy, and the enemy must have a determined territorial existence and a fear of losing something.³⁵⁴

In particular, in the Cold War period, with the help of the nuclear mutually assured destruction possibility, deterrence worked very well as a countering policy of the perceived threats. The framework of deterrence helped to stabilize the relations

³⁵⁴ Rothgeb, John M., Jr. 1993. *Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary international System*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 182-183.

among the major nuclear powers for decades to a great extent.³⁵⁵ This was also because there was a clear-cut rival; i.e. the enemy was a territorial state whose location was easily detected. The powerful states, especially the US, continued to use the deterrence policy in order to prevent nuclear and conventional wars in the post-Cold War period.

In terms of countering transnational terrorism, deterrence cannot be used against transnational terrorists directly. This is because, transnational terrorists do not have determined territorial existence. They are decentralized and deterritorialized. Furthermore, transnational terrorists do not have much to fear. How can you deter people that conduct suicide attacks?

On the other hand, deterrence may be used against state sponsors of terrorism, by the threat of retaliation, to increase the price of their support to terrorists.³⁵⁶ For example a raid conducted against Libya by the US on 14 April 1986 was made as a response to Libya's responsibility for several terrorist incidents. Among these incidents, there was the bombing of a nightclub in West Berlin on 4 April 1986, in which US citizens died and were wounded. This raid by the US, considered to be a way of sending a message to other state sponsors of terrorism, and aimed at deterring them.³⁵⁷ However, transnational terrorists are not dependent on the support of states. They can provide their needs by their own means, with the help of the processes of globalization. Furthermore, they can establish bases and training camps in failed states and since there are lots of such places around the world, they can easily shift their facilities from one place to the other. Therefore, as a result of

³⁵⁵ Scoblic, J. Peter, and Nina Tannenwald. 2001. "Should Traditional Nuclear Deterrence Be Abandoned?", *Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs*, Spring 2001.

³⁵⁶ Crenshaw, Martha. 1988. "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches." In David C. Rapoport, ed., *Inside Terrorist Organizations*. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 18.

the actorness of transnational terrorists, their decentralized and deterritorialized character, and by the help of the multi-centric world, deterrence does not work against transnational terrorists efficiently.

7. 2. 4 Diplomacy

In order to deal with the threats states perceive from other states, they may use non-military means like diplomacy as well. Representation, reporting and negotiation are the three activities of diplomacy. Representation enables governments to convey their policy concerns and objectives to other states. But it is also used to mis- and disinform a state against ones enemies.³⁵⁸ For example, during the Cold War the SU sent a letter, as if it were coming from the US Undersecretary of State, to the Ambassador in Greece, claiming that the US was willing to support a military coup in Greece. In this way the SU aimed at creating an anti-American reaction in this country.³⁵⁹

Reporting means the gathering of information and intelligence by the diplomats about the country where their missions are. Much of this information is openly available but some of them are gathered clandestinely.³⁶⁰

Finally, negotiation is the third diplomatic activity and it aims to reach agreement with other countries over issues on which the parties have partly overlapping and partly competing interests.³⁶¹

³⁵⁷ Prunckun, Henry W., Jr., and Philip B. Mohr. 1997. "Military Deterrence of International Terrorism: An Evaluation of Operation El Dorado Canyon", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 20(3): 267-280.

³⁵⁸ Hughes, Barry B. 2000. *Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives*. (4th edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2000, 79-80.

³⁵⁹ Holsti, Kal J. 1988. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 211-212.

³⁶⁰ Hughes, Barry B. 2000. *Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives*. (4th edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2000, 80.

³⁶¹ Hughes, Barry B. 2000. *Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives*. (4th edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2000, 81.

Since the weaker powers must usually make concessions at the negotiation table as a result of the pressures by the stronger powers, the relationship between diplomacy and force has resulted in the emergence of a term called “coercive diplomacy”.³⁶² Thus, diplomacy may be used as an alternative to military force by states in their search for enhancing their national security and interests.

In terms of counterterrorism, diplomacy may be used to persuade foreign governments not to support terrorists and to conduct extradition agreements.³⁶³ However, diplomacy remains as a tool that can be used in state-to-state relations only. It cannot be used to deal with transnational terrorists, because this will mean recognizing terrorists as actors. This is impossible for states and for the state-centric perspective.

7. 2. 5 Sanctions

Another response mechanism against the perceived threats is issuing sanctions. Sanctions can be diplomatic, political, cultural, technological and economic besides military. Diplomatic and political sanctions may include public protest, censure, condemnation, cutting off or severance of diplomatic relations, withholding recognition, voting against the will of the enemy in international organizations.³⁶⁴

³⁶² George, Alexander L. 1991. *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

³⁶³ Pillar, Paul R. 2001. *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy*. Washington, dc: Brookings Institution Press, 73-75.

³⁶⁴ Doxey, Margaret P. 1996. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*. (2nd edition). New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 13-14.

Cultural and technological sanctions may include cancellation of cultural exchanges and scientific cooperation, restriction or cancellation of telephone, cabal and postal links among other things.³⁶⁵

Economic sanctions may be among the most important sanctions and they are used in order to secure international political or military objectives like forcing a government out of a territory it invaded or destabilizing a government.³⁶⁶ These sanctions may be in the form of boycotts (restriction of imports from a country), various kinds of embargoes (the prohibition of exports to a country) including arms embargoes,³⁶⁷ foreign assistance reductions and cut-offs, and export and import limitations.³⁶⁸ These sanctions may reduce the military capabilities of the targeted state.³⁶⁹

As a matter of their nature, sanctions can only be adapted against states, and not against non-state actors. Therefore, only, the states that utilize, sponsor and support terrorism may be sanctioned by other states. The knowledge that a state is supporting terrorism provides states with a visible foe with territorially demarcated area, therefore states can impose military, political, or economic sanctions.³⁷⁰ For example, the US prohibited the states that are identified as supporting terrorism by the Department of State from receiving US economic and military assistance.³⁷¹ Also

³⁶⁵ See the table in Doxey, Margaret P. 1996. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*. (2nd edition). New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 14 for a more detailed explanation of all types of non-violent sanctions.

³⁶⁶ Rothgeb, John M., Jr. 1993. *Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary international System*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 173-174.

³⁶⁷ Hughes, Barry B. 2000. *Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives*. (4th edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2000, 82.

³⁶⁸ Haass, Richard N. 1998. "Introduction." In Richard N. Haass, ed., *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy*. New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1998, 2.

³⁶⁹ Les Aspin. 1991. *The Aspin Papers: Sanctions, Diplomacy, and War in the Persian Gulf*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic International Studies, 13(2): 7.

³⁷⁰ Prunckun, Henry W., Jr., and Philip B. Mohr. 1997. "Military Deterrence of International Terrorism: An Evaluation of Operation El Dorado Canyon", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 20(3): 267-280.

³⁷¹ "International Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and US Policy", *Congressional Digest*, November 2001, 258.

the UN mandated sanctions against Libya in order to punish it for its responsibility in the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombings.³⁷² However, again, since transnational terrorists are not dependent on the support of any state, such sanction will not mean much to them.

7. 2. 6 Using Intelligence Services

States use their intelligence services to collect information on the weaknesses and strengths of their enemies. Most of the experts argue that the most effective way to fight terrorism is to gather as much and as efficient intelligence as possible. In this way the terrorist organizations and their plans can be disrupted before they conduct their attacks. Moreover, a better multinational cooperation can be established against terrorists and their state sponsors and supporters.³⁷³ Intelligence also enables states to apply effective antiterrorism policies meaning that defending ones territories and citizens effectively by protecting the possible targets.³⁷⁴ It is true that terrorists have to be lucky only ones in order to conduct an effective attack, therefore, gathering intelligence is essential to frustrating the works of the terrorists³⁷⁵ and also for reducing their capabilities.³⁷⁶ However, as far as transnational terrorists are concerned, it is difficult to collect intelligence. Transnational terrorists have a decentralized organization. It is difficult to detect all the terrorist cells dispersed in different parts of the world. Thus, transnational terrorists utilize the benefits provided by the multi-centric world and can hide within it successfully.

³⁷² "International Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and US Policy", *Congressional Digest*, November 2001, 259.

³⁷³ "International Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and US Policy", *Congressional Digest*, November 2001, 259.

³⁷⁴ Crenshaw, Martha. 1988. "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches." In David C. Rapoport, ed., *Inside Terrorist Organizations*. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 16.

³⁷⁵ Wirth, Timothy E. 1993. "Meeting the Challenge of International Terrorism", *US Department of State Dispatch*, 4(29), July 19, 1993, 516-519.

7.3 The US “War on Terrorism”

In the aftermath of September 11, the US declared a “war” against terrorism. In this regard, it utilized all the mechanisms mentioned above in its effort to fight with terrorism. The US used its own intelligent agencies and also cooperated with those of other states in order to collect effective information especially on Al Qaeda and its major figures. It worked for the issuance of resolutions by international organizations, especially by the UN, related with fight against terrorism. It tried to establish a worldwide coalition against terrorism. It continues to apply sanctions against the states that are suspected as supporting terrorism. It conducted military assaults on the Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban regime that supported Al Qaeda, and later on, toppled the leadership in Iraq, which it accused of supporting terrorism. As a result, many leading figures of Al Qaeda were captured or killed, an important amount of its financial assets were frozen, and its major base situated in Afghanistan was destroyed and the states that were supporting Al Qaeda were frightened. However, Al Qaeda is still able to conduct effective terrorist activities in the aftermath of all these and actually the number of the activities it conducted increased in the aftermath of the Afghanistan operation of the US and its allies. This is a result of US attempts to deal with Al Qaeda as if it were an international terrorist organization that is able to operate only with the support of some states. However, this is not the case. Al Qaeda is a transnational terrorist organization that evolved with the help of the rise of the multi-centric world that co-exists and collides with the state-centric world. Therefore, the counter-terrorism mechanisms of the state-centric world fall short of meeting the challenges posed by transnational terrorism and thus can be effective only to a limited extent. The use of

³⁷⁶ Pillar, Paul R. 2001. *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy*. Washington, dc: Brookings Institution Press, 33.

the word “war” creates the impression that the enemy is clearly identifiable and has clear demarcated territorial existence, as if it is a state, so that it can be defeated with military means, but of course this is not the case.

As the analysis on the existing international response mechanisms and their limits to meet the challenge posed by transnational terrorism demonstrates, international response mechanisms of the state-centric world can only work against the threats posed by states and to some extent against international terrorism which is a tool of the states. But, these response mechanisms cannot meet the challenges posed by transnational terrorists that are non-state security actors. This is to say, existing international response mechanisms can meet the challenges of transnational terrorism only to a limited degree. Only the challenges of transnational terrorism that remain within the state-centric world can be met with these response mechanisms. For example, state supporters of transnational terrorists can be attacked, or the failed states in which the transnational terrorists are situated can be destroyed. However, the challenges of transnational terrorism that remain within the multi-centric world cannot be met with these response mechanisms. What are the practical and theoretical outputs of these?

7. 4 Practical and Theoretical Outputs

Since the challenges of transnational terrorism that remain within the multi-centric world cannot be met by the state-centric response mechanisms, in order to be able to cope with transnational terrorism, these two worlds must further converge and cover each other. A part of the answer on how this can happen can be the transformation of the state and the state-centric world politics. This is to say, states

must learn to accept that there are important non-state security actors in the system. These non-state actors pose multiple threats that are beyond the traditional military threats perceived by the states. These multiple threats are threatening the individuals, societies, and groups besides the states themselves. Also, states must learn to push their national concerns back, as far as global interests are concerned. This is because global interests are important for everyone and without them national interests are difficult to pursue. If states cannot cope with transnational terrorism, they cannot protect their citizens and territory and thus lose their reason of existence. Therefore, the transformation of the state and state-centric view in this way, may result in more convergence between the state-centric and multi-centric worlds. Thus, these two worlds should cover each other better, and less or no place should remain outside their individual borders. These arguments can be roughly pictured as in figure 3.




FIGURE 3: The Stages of Convergence between the State-centric and Multi-centric Worlds

In terms of theoretical outputs, the dualistic understanding of world politics must be further developed. Especially, the features and nature of the multi-centric world and the rise of the non-state security actors must be further studied. Only in this way can we better understand transnational terrorism as a threat in the multi-

centric world. Thus, only after understanding the problem we face, can we find ways to cope with it. Therefore, further research can be made on the rise of non-state security actors and the multi-centric world at the theoretical level, and on the possible counter-terrorism mechanisms to confront transnational terrorism at the practical level.



³⁷⁷ 's.c.w.' stands for 'state-centric world' and 'm.c.w.' stands for 'multi-centric world'.

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