

ATTITUDES OF THE UNIVERSITY YOUTH TOWARDS AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY IN MAJOR UNIVERSITIES OF ANKARA AND
ISTANBUL.

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

ATTITUDES OF THE UNIVERSITY YOUTH TOWARDS AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN MAJOR UNIVERSITIES OF ANKARA AND ISTANBUL

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The basic question to be answered in this thesis is: To what extent the two characteristics of Turkish political culture- preference for strong political leaders and the exaltation of state- is prevalent among senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations Departments? Since the figures of political leaders and state are the symbols of the authority, the thesis in fact aims at revealing the attitudes of these students towards authority. Well functioning of a democracy is based on a certain relationship between the authority and the citizenry. Articulation of such a relationship with the state calls for an effective oppositional and critical political practice on the side of the citizenry. Contrary to the exaltation of state and political leaders, authority figures should be considered at certain distance for control and balancing purposes. These students' attitudes towards authority are significantly important since as the graduates of these departments, they will occupy

central positions for the country in various state and private institutions. To answer the thesis question, a survey was conducted of almost four hundred senior students studying in these departments of major universities in Ankara and Istanbul. The theoretical foundations are the studies of political culture, Turkish political culture, value change and political socialization. The survey findings are compared with the same survey conducted in 1994. Accordingly, we find that senior students of these departments exhibit these characteristics of Turkish political culture with an upward trend in preference for strong political leaders and a downward in exaltation of state traits.

Key words: University students, authoritarian attitudes, exaltation of state, preference for strong political leaders, Turkish political culture

ÖZET

ÜNİVERSİTE GENÇLİĞİNİN OTORİTEYE YÖNELİK TUTUMLARI: ANKARA VE İSTANBULUN ÖNDE GELEN ÜNİVERSİTELERİNDE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ÇALIŞMA

Kazak, Evrim Özgül
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü

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Bu tezde cevaplandırılmak istenen temel soru şudur: Türk siyasi kültürünün iki ögesi olan güçlü siyasi lider tercihi ve devletin kutsallaştırılması, son sınıf Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi ile Uluslar arası İlişkiler Bölümleri öğrencileri arasında ne kadar yaygındır? Siyasi lider ve devlet kavramları aynı zamanda otorite sembolleri olduğundan, bu tez esas olarak bu öğrencilerin otoriteye karşı olan tutumlarını açığa çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Demokrasinin iyi işleyişi belli bir otorite-vatandaş ilişkisine dayanmaktadır. Otoriteye itaat, otoritenin sorumluluğu ile öyle dengelendirilmelidir ki, otorite gücünü kötüye kullanmasın. Devlet ile bu çeşit bir ilişki kurulması etkili ve eleştirel bir siyasi pratiği gerektirir. Bu nedenle , devletin ve siyasi liderlerin yüceltilmesinden çok, kontrol ve dengeleme amaçlarına uygun olarak , otorite simgeleri belli bir mesafeden değerlendirilmelidir. Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi ile Uluslar arası İlişkiler Bölümleri son sınıf öğrencilerinin otoriteye yönelik tutumlarının özellikle önemli olmasının nedeni, bu bölümlerin mezun

öğrencileri olarak onların birçok devlet ve özel sektör kuruluşlarında ülkemiz için çok önemli mevkilerin sahipleri olacak olmalarıdır. Tez sorusunun cevaplandırılması amacıyla 2004 yılının Mayıs ve Haziran aylarında Ankara ve İstanbul'un önde gelen yedi üniversitesinde yaklaşık dört yüz son sınıf Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi ile Uluslar arası İlişkiler Bölümü öğrencileri üzerinde bir araştırma yapılmıştır. Teorisel temeller siyasi kültür, Türk siyasi kültürü, değer değişimi ve siyasal sosyalleşme çalışmalarıdır. Buna göre, bu bölümlerde okuyan son sınıf öğrencilerinin, güçlü siyasal lider özelliği artan oranlarda , devletin yüceltilmesi ise azalan oranlarda olmak üzere , Türk siyasal kültürünün bu iki özelliğini de gösterdiği saptanmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Üniversite öğrencileri, otoriter tutumlar, devletin yüceltilmesi, güçlü siyasi lider tercihi, Türk Siyasi kültürü

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INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Turkey was founded following the demise of the Ottoman rule. Despite manifest structural and socio-cultural changes under the Turkish Republic, the Ottoman system left its mark on the Turkish political culture. Turkish political culture has many attributes originating from the Ottoman social, economic and cultural structures. Thus, an understanding of contemporary dynamics of the Turkish political culture in many cases calls for an awareness of the main legacies of the Ottoman system.

One of the most basic and enduring patterns is the exaltation of state. The Ottoman state was largely autonomous from any kind of social, economic, or religious forces in the society. It had a meaning and interests by its own. Respect for the political authority, serving the state and experience in statecraft were highly exalted by the members of the ruling class. The Ottoman state developed a paternalistic character, which was supposed to exercise justice in order to realize public welfare. “Interestingly, not only the ruling class but also the subject masses seemed to share this belief in the paternalistic nature of the state, as evidenced by the popular expression of “father-state” (*devlet baba*)” (Özbudun, 1994: 190-191).

Another characteristic of the Ottoman rule, which seems to highly persist in Turkish politics, is the rule of persons. Although, to some extent, constrained by

Shari' a, traditions and norms, nevertheless, the Ottoman Sultans (emperors) were all powerful and sole rulers of the empire. "In the Republican period, as in the Ottoman period, personal rule characterized politics" (Heper, 2000:4). Political leaders dominated the party structures and their actions loomed large as a factor determining the political agenda. In addition to this, personal characteristics of the party leaders played significant role in decision-makings of the Turkish electorate in elections (Özbudun, 2000:86). Political leaders maintained their popularity among the masses not according to their performance on their party programs but according to their images drawn upon heroic conducts (Heper, 1992:156). As political authority figures, Turkish people have tended to prefer strong political leaders.

Since the establishment of the Republic, Turkey went through a series of fundamental and drastic changes in the social, political, economic and cultural structures. Kemalist reforms aimed at radical reforms, which included abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate; secularization of the state and educational system; and the adaptation of European codes of law. Many reforms were brought to turn Turkey's face toward a modernized, secularized and industrialized nation-state. Construction of a modern political organization was enhanced with the advent of multi-party politics in 1945. This process has included various struggles and transformations. Political and state elites' confrontations in the 1950s, the liberal atmosphere provided by the 1961 Constitution in the 1960s, extreme political polarization of the 1970s have all resulted in significant transformations in social and political structures of Turkey. With the policies of Özal government in 1980s, a drastic economic modification, which required the opening-up of the Turkish economy to the world, had also taken

place. The revival of Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic Kurds has been other noteworthy developments in Turkish politics in this era. Although interrupted three times by the military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980, Turkish political system seem to have survived. In contemporary times, Turkey has turned its face to become a member of European Union. For this purpose, various social, economical and political changes are being implemented. Consequently, since the termination of the war of independence, Turkey has changed a lot. In the course of these developments, Turkish youth, who has become not only strategically but also demographically important portion of the population, have also experienced this permanent process of alterations and adjustments. In the light of these developments, of major concern here is the question that: To what extent the youth of the Turkish population exhibit the two characteristics of Turkish political culture - preference for strong political leaders and the exaltation of state? The above question may well be a subject of a large- scale survey. As a part of this greater inquiry, this thesis focuses on the university students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments as a sample. Within the scope of this thesis, the aim is to determine the prevalence of two characteristics of Turkish political culture - preference for strong political leaders and the exaltation of state - among the senior (fourth year) students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations Departments of several universities in Turkey.

To determine the prevalence of preference for political leaders and the exaltation of state features of Turkish political culture among the senior students of the Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations

Departments, a survey was conducted in May and June 2004. The survey questionnaire is adopted from the original questionnaire of an international survey carried by Russell F. Farnen and Jos D. Meloen between 1991-1997.¹ The survey sample was composed of senior student studying in Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations Departments of major universities in Ankara and Istanbul.

The thesis is included four main chapters. Chapter one will summarize the major surveys, which were conducted to reveal the political attitudes and tendencies of university students in Turkey. University students constitute the most dynamic, active and educated part of the youth in particular and of the population in general. They are being trained in various fields to serve for the country according to their areas of specializations. Economic development cannot be realized without the contribution of qualified labor force of the university students. University students are also the candidates for key positions in various public institutions as prospective administrators who to take part in important policy-formulation and application processes for the future of the country. For the purposes of revealing political tendencies and attitudes of the university youth in Turkey, various surveys have been launched. These studies were mainly directed to ascertain attitudes and tendencies of the university youth towards religion, democracy and human rights related issues. They also wanted to learn how Turkish university students define themselves, Turkey and their and Turkey's major problems. Youths' attitudes and tendencies towards and perceptions of authority have not been extensively analyzed. Therefore, another

¹ Russell F. Farnen and Jos D. Meloen. 2000. *Democracy, Authoritarianism and Education*. Great Britain: Rowe Ltd.

purpose of this work is to make contributions for filling the gap in this area of research.

Chapter two centers on the theoretical context of the thesis. Explaining the commonness of these two characteristics of Turkish political culture among the students of these departments, in fact refers to the explanation of some attitudes, tendencies and the opinions of these students. The major approaches, which are concerned with the sources and ramifications of attitudes, tendencies and the values, are the studies on 'political socialization', 'value changes' and 'political culture'. Therefore, the thesis will introduce the theories of political socialization, political culture and a value change as a theoretical background. In the part, where the theoretical constructions of political culture will be presented, studies on Turkish political culture are also to be extensively discussed.

In chapter three, the methodology of the thesis will be presented. To answer the thesis question, a survey was conducted of senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments of major universities in Ankara and Istanbul. The first part will present general information about research instrument, application process and the goals of the survey. The second part will introduce the parts of the survey, which are relevant to our thesis question and hypotheses. The parts of the survey questionnaire which are to be utilized by this thesis are; personal information part about the respondents, self-rating part where the participants were asked to define themselves between some opposite defining elements and two statements from the part of opinion and attitudinal statements of the

survey questionnaire. The two statements will be used to test the prevalence of preference for strong political leaders and the exaltation of state characteristics among the sampled youth. These two statements are: ‘What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, are a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith’ and ‘Freedom of speech does not justify someone’s teaching foreign and disloyal ideas in our schools’ respectively. From the findings concerning these statements, the thesis aims to assess the perceptions of the senior students studying in Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments about strong political leaders and the exaltation of state respectively. By examining their tendencies towards political leaders and state, this thesis in fact wants to obtain an understanding of these students towards authority. Political leaders and state are the figures of authority. In this regard, their attitudes towards ‘strong’ political leaders and state would give us important clues concerning the nature of their tendencies towards authority.

The findings of the survey, which are to be elaborated within this scope of the thesis, will also be compared with the 1994 survey results. The 1994 survey was conducted in Turkey as the part of the International project mentioned above. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya was one of the local researchers at this international survey. For a comparative study, he redesigned the original questionnaire according to the factor analysis and inter- item correlations applied to the 1994 survey and we conducted it in 2004. That is, the present survey (the 2004survey)’s questionnaire was formed on the basis of the 1994 survey. Our aim in comparing these two survey results is to

determine that whether any change or continuation in the attitudes and tendencies of the youth about the issues concerned by the thesis exists or not.

Chapter four presents the survey findings, which are utilized by the thesis. In the first part, personal information and self-ratings parts of the 2004 and 1994 survey questionnaires will be introduced. In the second part, the findings of the two statements which are employed to test the dominance of preference for strong political leaders and the exaltation of state attributes of the Turkish political culture will be analyzed. The elaboration of the findings concerning these questions will also be done in comparison with the results of the same statements from the 1994 survey.



CHAPTER I

LITERATURE SURVEY ON SOME MAJOR AND LARGE- SCALE SURVEYS OF THE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN TURKEY

The youths who are university students constitute one of the strategic social groups in a society. University students studying in various departments from social sciences to engineering and technical sciences will be vital labor force of a country. They will serve to the country in various fields. Therefore, their political tendencies and attitudes are particularly important. Great efforts have been made to ascertain the political tendencies and attitudes of the Turkish university students. My purpose in the rest of this chapter is to introduce some of the significant and large-scale surveys. The selected surveys were conducted on mainly university students in order to discover their political attitudes and tendencies towards various issues. In this area of research, the surveys have generally aimed at obtaining an understanding of university students' thoughts and tendencies about religion, human rights and democracy. In fact, these concerns have been the most controversial issues of contemporary Turkish politics and thus these studies have attempted to discover the standpoint of the university students concerning these topics. In relation to this, surveys in this area have generally wanted to determine the terms with which the

university students define themselves such as Kemalist, Islamist or democratic. The aim behind these endeavors is to identify a profile for the university students in Turkey. For this purposes, the surveys have also investigated the socio-economic statuses of the university students on the basis of the place of origin and their parents' social class. Additionally, how university students define their and Turkey's problems is another major interest of these surveys. These investigations have also been designed to obtain a deeper understanding of the university students' expectations from the future.

These studies have rarely studied the Turkish youths' tendencies towards authority. Attributes and tendencies of the university youth with reference to the Turkish political culture have not been specifically analyzed by the surveys conducted of Turkish university students. The gap in this area of research has also persuaded us to pursue such a study. This thesis will specifically search for the existence of two characteristics of Turkish political culture –preference for strong political leaders and the exaltation of state-among the university students. In this study, the sample of university students were limited to the senior university students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments due to the limitations in time and financial resources.

How do Turkish university students define themselves and Turkey, as it prepares to join the European Union? Concerning this question, Caner Ocak (1999) utilizes the survey results of almost on ten thousand university students all over Turkey. Macro Presentation and Investigation Center conducted a survey in 1999. In

this survey, when asked to define themselves, 22.7 % of participating university students defined themselves as democratic, 22.5% as nationalist, 15.8% as secular, 13.4% as Islamic, 6% as Socialist-Marxist and 3% as liberal. From these findings, Ocak draws the conclusion that although there is a range of self-definitions, being democratic comes first as a defining element among Turkish youth. To the question of 'how should Turkey be identified in the future?', of the university students 27.0% answered as modern, 25.5% as democratic, 16.6% as Islamic, 14.3% as secular, 2.6% as antidemocratic and 1.2% as militarist. Ocak argues that these findings show the aspiration of Turkish university youth to a modern and democratic Turkey. The survey also revealed that 79.3% of the respondents are not members of any kind of foundation or civil society associations.

To examine religious beliefs among university students in Ankara, Kayhan Mutlu (1996) utilizes data collected in 1978 and 1991. The 1978 survey was based on responses from 536 university students and the 1991 survey included 563 university students' responses. The data was collected through questionnaires, which were designed in the form of agree/disagree responses to various statements concerning attitudes towards religion. On a religiosity scale composed of statements such as whether as God really exists, there is a Day of Resurrection, The Qur'an conveys the command of God; university students in 1991 seem to be more religiously oriented than those of 1978. Mutlu believes that religious socialization in accordance with the essential elements of Islamic beliefs is becoming more widespread among university students i.e., the prospective elites in Ankara. (Mutlu, 1996: 355) On the other hand, the set of statements supposed to measure democratic orientations revealed that

university students overwhelmingly reject religious discrimination and fundamentalism. 'Religious minorities in Turkey must be allowed to worship freely' was accepted by 81% of the subjects, 'In order to be a developed country, Turkey must emphasize science more than religion' was accepted by 59% of the subjects, 'Political decisions must be made in accordance with Islamic principles' was rejected by 62% of the subjects, and 'Secularism must be continued in Turkey' was accepted by 67% of the subjects in 1991. These findings made him propose that most university students accept individual freedom of conscience and that religious socialization in Turkey most likely takes place in a democratic manner.

Arif Payaslıoğlu and Ahmet İçduygu (1999) made a study of 1025 Turkish university students in 1997. The survey intended to measure the level of awareness of and support for human rights by using a questionnaire consisting of twenty items. Of these twenty items, ten came from the provisions of the current Turkish Constitution's 'General Principles' and 'Fundamental Rights and Duties' sections, three from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, two from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, another from the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. The others were formulated by the authors to see the reaction of students to some human rights-related issues. According to the authors, the ethnic revival of Kurds and the religious revival of Islamist are two particular forces that have made human rights a controversial topic in Turkey. However, the survey concentrated on secularism and paid relatively little attention to the discussion of human rights debates in relation to the Kurdish question. The survey revealed that among the university students in Turkey, there is

less awareness about the existence or nonexistence of human rights-related items in the Turkish legal regulations (the average percentage of awareness is 56%) than the level of support for the inclusion of these items in regulations (the average percentage of support is 78%). The questionnaire also included a set of questions about some individual factors of students to look for any relationship between these traits and the degree of awareness of and support for human rights. The study revealed that awareness of and support for human rights are in fact related with socio-economic factors as the place of origin, the kind of high school a student graduated from, and their university (metropolitan or peripheral), but not with individual factors as age or sex of the respondents. The level of support for human rights is highest among students from the southeastern region (82%). The graduates of prayer leader and preacher schools appear to be more liberal in their support for the item ‘the right to not to be forced to participate in religious ceremonies or blamed because of religious beliefs’. On the other hand, only 29% of them do not support the item of ‘prohibition of the attempts to base the fundamental, social, economic, political and legal order of the state on religion tenets’. According to the findings, the percentage of students who correctly identify the existence or nonexistence of human rights-related laws is higher in the universities of the metropolitan areas than of the peripheral areas. The study also reveals that both the support for and the awareness of human rights are highest among the social science students and lowest among the natural science students.

According to Savaş Büyükkaragöz (1995) what supports a democratic system is education for democracy. In democracies, youth should be introduced to the

principles, functions and values of democracy. Strongly supporting this claim, Büyükkaragöz conducted a field survey in 1995, which was published in his book named *Higher Education Programs and Democratic Attitudes*. This survey aimed to analyze the democratic behavior and attitudes of university students to understand the role of higher education programs in the education for democracy. The survey was applied on Gazi University (Ankara), Ankara University (Ankara) and Selçuk University (Konya) students. Randomly selected students (1672 in number) from these universities were asked to approve or disapprove of the various statements. The findings of the study can be summarized as follows: The majority of the students agree with the view that people should freely express what they think. Half of them agree with the statement that 'Every thought should be allowed to be politically organized'. Almost all of them agree with 'Everybody is born equal in terms of honor and rights'. Almost all of them agree with 'Each person is responsible for society'. The majority of the students agree with the statement that, 'No concession should be given regarding human rights'. The majority of the students agree that, 'In democracies, a multiparty system provides the basis for the organization of different views'. More than half of the students believe that 'In democracies, for the election of any administrators, referendum should be held'. The majority of the students agree that, 'The provision of cultural independence can only be possible with democratic understanding'. More than half of the students agree with 'the privatization of state enterprises'. The majority of the students believe that 'The media should be reconstructed according to the premises of democracy'. The majority of the students agree that 'In higher education programs, there should be education for democracy'. The majority of the students think that, 'In democracies, the right of the majority is

not unlimited'. The majority of the students think that, 'Democracy allows everybody to enjoy their lives and democracy is a lifestyle in which others should also be taken into account'. More than half of the students think that, 'Democracy is not just voting in elections but rather internalizing the responsibility of voting'.

From the findings of the survey, Büyükkaragöz observes that among the universities included Selçuk University students seemed to have more democratic attitudes than students of other universities and in different science groupings (Science and Health, Social Sciences, Directly and Indirectly Teacher Training, Engineering and Technical Sciences), those students who are from Social Sciences exhibit more democratic attitudes.

The Social Research Center of Istanbul Political Science Department's Foundation (İstanbul Mülkiyeliler Derneği) conducted a survey namely- 90's Youth in Turkey- of 1078 Turkish youth in January-February 1995. This survey was based on a very detailed form of interview and group discussions. The majority of sampled youth was university students (542 in number) while the rest were high school teachers (223 in number) and, employees and the unemployed (313 in number). The survey aimed to reveal various aspects of 90's youth. A majority of university students (52.5%) showed a reformist approach by agreeing to the statement that 'some corrections can be made, even if the course of events may not be changed in the world'. For the sampled youth, after inflation (40%) come education (30.4%) and freedom of thought (23.7%) as the foremost problems of Turkey. To the question of

whether Turkey should join the European Union or not, majority of them said 'yes'.
(The total of yes (32.3%) and definitely yes (21.0%))

With regard to the identity section of the survey, the author came up with four main identity groups: nationalists, Islamists, socialists and Kemalists. The survey revealed that although there appear to be antagonisms between nationalists and socialists; Islamists and Kemalists, there exist no clear-cut identity divisions among the youth. He draws this conclusion from the findings of the survey which revealed common, cross-cutting categories as liberal, moderate, Muslim and modern with which youth in the four main categories also tend to identify themselves. For the author, these crosscuttings in identities are due to the dynamics of modernism in Turkey. Turkish society is neither a traditional nor modern society and that structure has been bringing cross-cuttings in identities in Turkey (1995:53). He observes that in the survey, a large proportion of the sampled youth agreed with the statements, which are synthesizing the traits of being modern and traditional (1995: 54).

With regard to the nationalism, the survey asked the respondents to define nationalism in 'solidarity', 'aggressive' or 'nonfunctional' terms. 61.8% of the sampled youth defined nationalism as 'a necessary understanding for strengthening the idea of solidarity in societies'. As to find out what the youth mean by this solidarity, they were asked to list the elements that hold a society together. In this list being Muslim (31%), culture (30%) and Atatürk (23%) occupied the first three ranks. The author argues that the survey forces us see that 90s Turkish youth have not been successfully internalized the concept of 'citizenship'- a salience concept of

modernization (Türkiye’de 90’ların Gençliği: 57). According to the author, the sampled youth seem to be ‘democratic’ in their responses about some controversial religious issues (Türkiye’de 90’ların Gençliği: 58). (57.5% of them agreed with the statement that ‘Female students wearing a headscarf should be able to enter the universities’. 85.6% agreed with ‘It is up to a female whether to wear a headscarf or to fast’, 57.5% agreed, ‘A female student wearing a headscarf could be a nurse’.) These findings made him conclude that the sampled youth is tolerant towards ‘the other’ concerning religious affairs.

Vehbi Bayhan (2002) conducted a survey of 3223 students of İnönü University, Malatya, Turkey in 2001. The case study was based on a 110-item questionnaire. The questions were designated to interrogate social, demographical, economic, cultural and psychological conditions of the young people. Although Bayhan admits that the findings of the case study cannot be generalized for all university youth in Turkey, he still argues for the representativeness of the survey for two reasons. First, the participants in the survey come from different regions of Turkey. Second, the results of the survey display great similarities with other surveys of the same kind. Bayhan, therefore, maintains that the İnönü University case may offer a sociological profile for the endeavors of identifying youth identity in Turkey. Some of the survey findings may be summarized as follows: 57% of the participants of the survey are male and 43% are female. 79% of the participants are from middle-income groups while 17% are from low-income groups and 3% are from high-income groups. 47% of the participants support a fundamental modernization project in Turkey. The percentage of those saying that no beliefs, traditions, customs and practices should be changed is

20%. On the other hand, the percentage of those saying that all the traditions should be changed is 5%. 74% of the participants agreed with the statement that some of the traditions ought to be changed. To the question of ‘Should we use violence to impose any thought on others?’ 2% said yes, 14% said sometimes and 84% said no. 36% of the participants consider the attitudes of professors in the universities towards the students as authoritarian, 28% as indifferent, 20% as democratic and 8% as protective.

Regarding the religiosity, 75% of the participants defined themselves as moderately religious, 18% as not religious at all and 4% as highly religious. The ratio of those who agreed with the statement that ‘everybody should care about his/her own happiness instead of worrying about the country’s general problems’ and ‘it is good to earn a lot of money easily (kolay yoldan köşeyi dönmek iyidir)’ is highest among the ones who defined themselves as highly religious. Overall 20% of the respondents agreed with the statement that ‘everybody should care about his/her own happiness instead of worrying about country’s general problems’. 25% of the respondents would approve of their child’s marriage with a person of a different religious sect, 25% would reject it and 48% of the respondents said they would let the child decide whether to marry a person of different religious sect or not.

77% of the respondents think that the actual purpose of the politicians in Turkey is to be rich and famous. Only 11% of them think that politicians in Turkey aim to serve to the country. 82% of the respondents agreed with the statement that ‘it is nonsense to apply to an official office with any complaints since they do not pay

enough attention to the problems of public'. According to the participants, the biggest problems for Turkish youth are unemployment (38%), psychological problems (21%), societal repressions (16%), not being free enough (12%), and sexual problems (5%).

The most important things that the participants want from the future are finding a job (40%), health (18%), living in another country (13%), being rich (11%), possessing a car (3%) and possessing a house (1%). According to the participants, the most important problems in Turkey are inflation (34%), bribery (22%), unemployment (12%), education and health (7%), democratization (6%), mafias (3%), anarchy and terror (2%), the use of religion in politics (2%), religious fundamentalism (2%) and environment and traffic (0.2%). To the question of 'how do you see the future of Turkey?' 50% of the respondents said worse, 30% the same and 19% better. For the future of the world, 49% of the respondents think that it will be better, while 26% think it will remain the same and 23% worse.

According to Bayhan, the survey supports a 'pluralist identity model' for the university youth of Turkey. Although a conservative profile is dominant, the views of university youth also reflect the dynamisms of a modern culture. Therefore, he defines a university youth as a 'postmodern individual', combining modern and traditional cultures. He says:

Turkish youth are those who are mostly drinking Coca-Cola, eating local food but at the same time lahmacun, kebap, döner, hamburger and pizza; mostly listening to Turkish folk and pop music and simultaneously arabesk, original (özgün) music, Classical Turkish music, rock and jazz, mostly

wearing Mavi Jeans but also Levi's, mostly smoking Tekel 2000 and 2001 but at the same time Marlboro; mostly drinking tea, preferring Nescafe to Turkish café; mostly drinking beer, mostly playing Sayisal Loto, not preferring to go to traditional cafes but to internet cafes; mostly reading newspapers and watching TV, beside the poems of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and Mehmet Akif Ersoy, enjoying the poems of Orhan Veli Kanık and Nazım Hikmet; half of whom are defenders of modernism, 20% of whom are extreme conservatists - a postmodern youth (2002: 22).

Another survey, which aimed to identify the socio-cultural profile of Turkish university youth, is the 'Turkish university youth inquiry'. It was conducted on 37680 students of 58 universities in Turkey in 2002. The survey was based on a questionnaire consisting of a variety of questions from socio-economic status to leisure time activities of students. Below are some findings from the survey:

The majority of state university students are from middle classes while the majority of private university students are from middle-high classes. Female university students come from higher socio-economic classes than male students. A large majority of sampled Turkish youth believes in the importance of civil society associations for democratization in Turkey. However, active participation in these civil society associations among the youth is pretty low (5.6%). When compared with state university students, private university students are more active in the activities of civil society associations. For the sampled youth, starting from the most influential, the significant groups in Turkey are ranked as follows: media, soldiers, businessmen, politicians and men of religion. It is widely believed among the sampled youth that these groups are actually more powerful than they should be. A majority of the sampled students think that civil society associations, workers, civil

servants and peasants do not have the political and social influence that they deserve to have.

According to the sampled Turkish university youth, the education system (25.4 %), inflation (23.2%), unjust distribution of income (22.7%) and democracy and human rights (14%) occupy the first four ranks of Turkey's foremost problems that need to be solved. Concerning the determination of prices in the market, 80% of the sampled university youth favors an open economy but together with necessary state controls and interventions. Only 12% of the sampled youth defend a free market economy in Turkey. The proportion of those defending a state-regulated economy is 8%. For the sampled youth, in the 21st Century Turkey has to search for her future in integration with the European Union (42.3 %). Integration with the Turkish World/Eurasia was favored by 20%.

Of the sampled youth, three students out of four want to go to a foreign country to work and live. 17% of them do not even think about returning. While 67.5% of the sampled university youth defend the idea that Turkish should be used as the medium of instruction in universities, 30% of them favored English. Only 6.1% of the sampled youth think that they have freedom of expression in the universities. Of the sampled youth, while 28.4% consider their communication with academicians good, the rest find it either moderate (46.2%) or bad (25.4%)

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL CONTEXT

2.1 Political culture

During the past decade , there has been an increasing interest in the concept of culture as a crucial determining factor in political and economic life. In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba published 'The Civic Culture'- a path-breaking book that had a large impact on comparative political studies. The book presented the results of interviews conducted in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Mexico. The study aimed to determine variations in values and attitudes that might be correlated with the degree of political cohesiveness and progress toward democracy of each country. It revealed that Britain and the United States had the closest approximation to the 'civic culture'. The civic culture refers to a form of political culture, which is the most congruent with a stable, democratic system. The civic culture values a citizen behavior, which is well informed, rationalist and activist toward politics. Yet, at the same time, it includes various forms of citizen behavior. In it, many individuals are active in politics but there are also many who are not well informed, not deeply involved and not active. Nevertheless, in the civic culture, there is a kind of balance between active and passive orientations in such a way that it balances governmental power and governmental responsiveness. For Almond and Verba, attitudes supportive of participation within the political systems such as trust

in other people and social participation in general also have a central place in the civic culture. They believed that education, the democratization of authority systems in the family, the school, the workplace and the general trust among fellow citizens help to the development of attitudes favorable to a democratic political system and to transmit the civic culture from generation to generation. (Verba, 1980:399).

In 1993, Robert Putnam published a book entitled 'Making Democracy Work' which was also concerned with the question of what are the values and attitudes that make democracy work or work not? He highlighted the concept of 'social capital' as a crucial factor for the well functioning of democracy. By social capital, Putnam mainly meant the level of interpersonal trust in a society. For him, trust in modern complex settings can arise from 'the norms of reciprocity' and 'the network of civic engagement' (Putnam, 1993:171). Trust is not only born out of these factors but is also continuously recreated by them. It lubricates collaboration and that ability to communicate with each other and thereby helps to overcome the problem of collective action. Faced with a strong civil society, the state would be more responsive and effective. Thus according to Putnam 'Democratic government is strengthened not weakened when it faces a vigorous civil society' (Putnam, 1993: 181).

The renaissance of culture in political life has gained enormous attention partly as a result of Huntington's thesis of 'clash of civilizations'. According to Huntington, after the Cold War, since ideological differences disappeared it is more meaningful now to group countries not according to their political or economical systems but

according to their culture. In fact cultural differences are basic, real and less mutable and less easily compromised than political and economical differences. Concerning the cultural differences, Huntington draws the main fault line between the Western and other major civilizations (Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African). He argues that although Western culture seems to have permeated the rest of the world “Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, separation of church and state often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures”(1993:40). Instead, Western efforts to spread these ideas are now creating reactions to these ideas themselves and preparing the ground for the reaffirmation of indigenous values in other civilizations. Thus, he hypothesized that in this new world “the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural” (1993: 22).

The actual term ‘political culture’ was coined by Gabriel Almond in 1956. Almond’s article entitled ‘Comparative Political Systems’ was concerned with offering a way of classifying the political systems. In the article, he introduced a fourfold classification consisting of the Anglo-American (including some members of the Common Wealth), the Continental European (exclusive of the Scandinavian and Low countries which combine some of the features of the Continental European and the Anglo-American), the pre-industrial or partially industrial, political systems outside the European- American area and the totalitarian political systems. He described the essential differences and the properties of these four systems by employing four concepts: action, system, role and orientation to political action.

Concerning the concept of 'orientation to political action', he argued that "Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action"(Almond, 1956: 396) and he referred to orientation to political action as the 'political culture'. He stated that he introduced a new term-political culture- since the terms that were employed at that time such as 'ideology' or 'political party' did not cover what he meant by political culture. According to Almond, political culture is not the same thing as the general culture. It is rather a part of general culture. As a reason for that he argued that besides involving values of the general culture, orientation to political action includes some other factors. Informed from Parsons and Shils, Almond stated that any orientation to politics involves cognition; preference, involvement or affect (*cathevis*) and the evaluation or choice through the application of standards of values to the cognitive and affective components. Regarding the concept of political culture, he also points that political culture does not coincide with a given political system or society. It may extend beyond the boundaries of political systems. For instance, he argued that countries of continental Western Europe include several different political cultures, which extended beyond their borders.

In his fourfold classification of political systems, the Anglo-American political systems are embedded in a homogenous and secular political culture. It is a homogenous political culture in the sense that the great majority of political actors in the political system share a set of political ends and means. Although there are groups that emphasize one specific value at the expense of others, the values of freedom, mass welfare and security are never to be completely repressed. It is a secular political culture in the sense that "it is a rational- calculating, bargaining and

experimental political culture”(Almond, 1956: 398). The pre-industrial political systems have mixed political cultures. By a mixed political culture, Almond meant the mixture of traditional and Western political cultures. The mixture often arises as a result of the erosion of a traditional political culture under the influence of Western political cultures. Instability, unpredictability, anxieties over the violation of sacred customs and relationships, feelings of rootlessness and directionlessness because of the rejection of habitual routines are the typical characteristics of a mixed political culture. As to the totalitarian political culture, Almond argues that although it seems to be a homogenous political culture, in reality it is not. In totalitarian regimes political communication is controlled from the center and there exist no intermediary institutions. Therefore, it is less likely to be certain about the acceptance of the system among the people. Lastly, the Continental European political systems are characterized by the fragmentation of political culture. The Continental European systems have common roots and a heritage. However, their different historical development patterns have led to the creation of different political sub-cultures. In the Continental Europe major political sub-cultures occurred in the pre-industrial, primarily Catholic components; in the middle– class components and in the industrial components.

Being one of the most significant contributors to the political culture research, Larry Diamond defines political culture as “people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments and evaluations about the political system of its country and the role of the self in that system” (1994: 7). He recognizes that the interaction between the attitudes and the structure is reciprocal and thus political culture is both a

dependent and an independent variable. It constantly shapes and is shaped by the political and social system in which it exists. Political culture affects governmental structure and performance but it can change quite dramatically in response to governmental performance too. A number of factors such as a historical experience, deliberate actions of political leaders, economic changes and the impact of international environment interact in complex ways to shape political culture of a society. Such dynamic nature of political culture made the founder theorists of political culture-Gabriel Almond and Larry Diamond- reject a deterministic approach to political culture. Since they believe that political culture not only shapes a political system but is also reshaped by a variety of factors such as institutional change, political socialization and the functioning of the political system itself, they are strongly skeptical toward cultural determinism as it is the political culture that decides a political system (Diamond, 1994: 9).

Political culture is remarkably durable and persistent as well. It is deeply situated in national histories and in personalities of people. It is shaped through time and is gained to great extent, through early socialization. Diamond argues that “To a considerable extent, political culture is a legacy of historical past and elements of the political culture may be traced back in time” (1994:229). Political culture follows a cumulative process that new value orientations displace but not completely remove the existing ones. Therefore, it is much more difficult to change an element of political culture than other elements of a political system such as a provision of a constitution, a political leader or the regime type.

2.2 Ottoman legacy and the Turkish political culture

The Ottoman Empire was a highly centralized state with all its systems regulated towards the concentration of power in the hands of the 'Sultan' (the ruler). An Ottoman concept of the state was derived from ancient near east concepts (İnalçık, 1973: 67). The basic principles of the near eastern theory of state and its class system survived in the Ottoman Empire. Originating from the near eastern states, the Ottoman Empire was a bureaucratic state. Although Sultan (emperor) had an unlimited power, he was supposed to act in accordance with the rules of Shari'a, traditions and norms and the decisions of the 'Imperial Council'. The Imperial Council (Divan-I Hümayûn) was the council where the principal activities of government were discussed and formulated. In the council, a 'kadıasker' represented the judicial and a 'defterdar' represented the financial authority. 'Nişancı' had the responsibility to fix the 'tuğra'-the sultan's official monogram- to a document to confirm its legality. To preserve state's authority, to maintain external and internal security were the main tasks of a 'vezir' (vizier). In the service of viziers there were secretaries who worked according to the traditional near eastern principles of administration. In this sense, their main concerns were to maintain the independence and the centralization of political authority. As İnalçık noted, despite the opposition of the 'ulema' (the men of religion), it was they who initiated reforms in the periods of decline as the only way of preventing the state from disintegration (İnalçık, 1973: 102).

Under near eastern effects, old Turkish traditions had also been perpetuated. In this vein, “Kutadgu Bilig”, an influential oriental maxim written in 1069 for the Turkish ruler of the Karakhanids in Central Asia, gives important clues about the basic principles of Ottoman rule. Kutadgu Bilig advises that to control the state a ruler needs a huge army. Supporting a large army requires wealth. For wealth, people must be prosperous and for people to be prosperous laws must be just. Constructing a circular notion of ruling, this theory of the state considers the administration of justice as the most important function of the state. According to the Turkish traditions of Central Asia, the principle of justice referred to the impartial application of ‘törü’ or ‘yasa’ – a code of laws, which the founder of the state had established (İnalçık 1973: 66). So both near eastern concepts of the state and old Turkish traditions regard royal authority as the corner stone of the whole social structure. The conversion to Islam also contributed to this kind of Ottoman rule. The Ottoman Sultans considered their subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim, as ‘reaya’, which means flock. As the head of the Islamic community, the Sultan had the duty of leading the flock along the path of Shari’a.

Ottoman society was divided into two: first, the ruler: Sultan, the military class and the bureaucrats; second, the ruled, the flock. The flock was the essential producers and taxpayers. In a typical Ottoman province the ‘timar system’ was in force. The timar system refers to the practice of assigning state agricultural revenues to ‘sipahi’ (a fief holder) army. In return to a proportion of taxes from timar lands, a ‘sipahi’ was obliged to perform military service. He was also responsible for the enforcement of the state rule in that province. The system may seem to resemble

medieval feudalism, although it was quite different. In the Ottoman Empire, all rural agricultural land was 'miri'-belonging to the state. The peasant worked on the state's land and the timar-holding sipahi held the position of government official to enforce law and collect taxes in that province. Furthermore, a government can only implement such a system in areas where control is decisively established. Therefore, contrary to feudal states, The Ottoman Empire had to maintain a strong, centralized power over the provinces. In the Ottoman Empire, there was absolute control of the state over the rural economy. Due to financial crises the timar system was turned into a 'tax-farming system' where local notables collected taxes and paid the sum to the state in advance. This practice, which was employed in the eighteenth century, increased the power of 'ayans' (local notables) and led to the Bill of Union in 1807, a document where the Sultan formally recognized the ayans. For some time, ayans appeared as an opposition group against the totalizing conceptions of the Ottoman state. According to İnalcık:

It is also possible to see the ayans as representing a failed attempt towards the formation of a feudal-aristocratic class. Not only did they fulfill the material requirements to emerge as a class, but they also seemed to have had the subjective intention of sharing in political power....Had they had the time to carry out the logical extension of their political project, we might have witnessed the transformation of tax collecting rights into something akin to feudal property rights, with the historically given independence of the peasantry also threatened (İnalcık, 1973:16-17).

However, it did not take long for Mahmud II to discipline the ayans and get rid of this threat to the central authority. Similar to the ayans, neither could the mercantile bourgeoisie form a class to counter the state's power. The Ottoman state never encouraged the emergence of a powerful merchant class. The mercantile

activity was dominated by non-Muslim minorities. According to Özbudun, because of the Islamic nature of the Ottoman state, economic power of the non-Muslim minorities could not be converted into a significant political power (Özbudun 2001: 94). For İnalcık, a strong merchant class could not develop because a desired context for the development of mercantile activity was lacking in the Ottoman Empire (İnalcık 1973: 18-19). He argues that mercantile activity is not only buying and the selling. For the development of trade, peasants could have been forced to produce the desired goods for sale. Yet, this would have necessitated the growth of powerful landlords and dispossessed peasantry, which the Ottoman Empire did not allow to develop.

In short, there were no confronting groups at all against the state in the Ottoman Empire. There were no intermediary, autonomous social structures between the ruler and the ruled. The civil society remained weak. This furthered the degree of state autonomy. The 'state's interests' were not associated with any groups' but had a meaning of its own. As Özbudun states the Ottoman concept of the state played a tutelary and paternalistic role, which reflex itself in the popular expression '*devlet baba*' (father state) (Özbudun, 2001: 95). This expression refers both to the expectation from that state to be just and protective and to the fact that the ruled should not rebel against the ruler. These developments were quite different from those taking place in the West. As Mardin remarks,

The forces that shaped the state in the West seem to vary significantly from those that shaped the Ottoman state... The process of centralization that created the modern state included a series of confrontations leading to compromises with what may be called the forces of periphery: the feudal

nobility, the cities, the burghers and later industrial labor....Each time a compromise or even a one sided victory was obtained, some integration of the peripheral force into the center was achieved (Mardin 1973:170).

In the Ottoman Empire, however the only confrontation was the clash between the 'center' and the 'periphery' in Mardin terms. The center and the periphery were two worlds, which were only loosely related to each other. Ethnic, religious and regional particularities were tolerated and no action was taken in terms of integration as long as the ties of taxes worked. In time, these two worlds developed their own ways of life and thinking in terms of their norms, language and religious practices.

The gap between these two worlds had further increased by the modernization period during the nineteenth century. Because of the secularizing policies of the center in this modernization period, the religious institutions, which had stood between the center and periphery before, was increasingly identified with the periphery (Mardin 1973:172). At the same time, the center became increasingly familiar with Western culture and perceived themselves as far superior to the people. It is significant that the initiative for the reforms always came from the center and from the Great Powers. In this regard Heper notes that the policies of the center during the nineteenth century did not really deviate from the line with its traditional orientation towards the periphery (Heper, 1980:97). The equality of all citizens proclaimed in both the 'Tanzimat Charter' in 1839 and 'The Reform Edict' in 1856 or in the Ottoman Parliament of 1877 were all considered as practical means of the state to maintain its power. They were the products of foreign interference in Ottoman affairs.

Starting from the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire gradually lost its power. By the nineteenth century, the superiority of West in the fields from science to military and economics was evident. To revive the governmental structure of earlier centuries, the Ottomans tried to imitate their counterparts in Europe. The first two areas of reform were the military and the administration. Special secular schools were founded to supply the urgently needed civil servants. In these schools and in the military academies, a body of westernized officials was trained. And these two groups, the military and the bureaucracy have become significant figures in Turkish politics, as were they in Ottoman politics.

Since the establishment of the Republic the military have intervened in Turkish politics three times. All interventions were justified on the grounds that it was necessary to reestablish or safeguard democracy and the state. However, the military interventions did not result in long-term authoritarian rules. This was because the military elites regarded a military intervention as a means for putting things in order for the well functioning of democracy in Turkey (Özbudun, 1990:68). Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the military not only fought for independence but also transformed the Ottoman Empire into a modern nation state. As the first modernized factor in the Ottoman Empire, the military became a modernizing factor in the Republic of Turkey. According to military's point of view, it has the obligation to protect the values of Republic's modernization project against the short-term interests of politicians and particularistic demands of different interests groups.

During the Republican era, the military found an easy access to politics. This was mainly because of the military backgrounds of the top political figures of the time- Atatürk and İnönü. This position of the military in politics was further legitimized, I believe, by Atatürk who said “The Turkish nation has always looked to the military as the leader of movements to achieve lofty national ideals... When speaking of the army, I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country... The Turkish nation considers its army the guardian of its ideals”(Heper M. and Tachau F, 1983:20).

During the multi-party period, each intervention provided the military with exit guarantees. Following the 1960 intervention, a National Security Council was founded. Under the Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution, the council consisted of the chief of the General Staff, representatives of the army, navy and air forces and ministers to be determined by law. The council had the authority to submit its views about national security to the Council of Ministers to assist the council in making its decisions. By 1971 amendments, instead of representatives of the forces, force commanders themselves became the members of the council. Moreover, the National Security Council’s duty was no longer to ‘assist’ the council but to ‘recommend’ the basic views to the council concerning national security and ensuring coordination. The 1982 Constitution further enhanced the constitutional status of the National Security Council. It explicitly enumerated the civilian members and assured the numerical equality of civilian and non-civilian members of the council. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers was obliged to ‘give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures it deems necessary for the

preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of society'¹. The ambiguous references that the article had, has also helped the military to have more say in politics.

Like the military, state elites have remained as prominent figures in Turkish politics as were they in Ottoman politics. During the multi party period, they resisted the political elites who were accused of scarifying 'rational democracy' to 'popular democracy'. The state elites believed that elected governments were manipulating the public at the expense of ignoring general public interests. They argued that shall the masses could be educated, they would have rationally thought and thereby discovered the 'national interest' and would have refrained from particularistic or short-term interests. Özbudun criticizes the state elite's concept of 'national interest' on the grounds that regarding national interest as something that can only be understood through education seems to reflex not democratic but elitist tendencies of the state elite. (Özbudun, 1990: 66-67). For Özbudun, the intellectual-bureaucratic elite has not internalized the understanding of democracy that allows different interests to organize and compete peacefully. He argues that national interest is an interest, which is simply determined by the accommodation or the combination of divergent interests at one time. It is not a stable or unchanging concept.

Especially until the 1960 military coup, the tension between the political and bureaucratic elites did not soften. Believing in the basic truth of its position, the state

¹ The 1981 Constitution Article 118.

elite did not take any action to compromise with the political elite. As Heper noted “this zero-sum mode of thinking was typical of Ottoman politics”(Heper, 2000: 5). After the 1961 Constitution, the unity of official, military and civilian elites started to be broken. According to Özbudun (1) the more liberal atmosphere provided by the 1961 Constitution that made official, military and civilian elites open to different political ideologies, (2) the coalition governments of the mid and late 1970s which destroyed the professional competence of the state elites due to their patronage and nepotism were the two important factors that broke the elites unity (Özbudun, 1994: 203-204). In addition to these, after 1983, the Motherland Party attempted to reduce the influence of the state bureaucracy in Turkish politics. Simultaneously, the increasing emphasis on civil society institutions and liberal values were reducing the tendency of seeing the state bureaucracy as the sole guardian of the public interest. However, Özbudun argues that still the result was not a competent bureaucracy subservient to elected politicians. On the contrary, the developments after 1983 resulted in a decline in the quality and effectiveness of the state bureaucracy due to Özal’ rule which often disregarded rules and regulations (Özbudun, 1994: 207).

In the Republican period, personal rule characterized politics, as in the Ottoman period. İnönü, Menderes, Demirel, Ecevit, Özal were all virtually the sole spokespersons of their parties (Heper, 2000: 4). Changes in the top leadership through intra-party competition could be possible only when the leaders wanted to leave the office. Because of the absence of civil society inherited from the Ottoman times, politics has developed into ‘party-politics’ in the Republican era. That is, there have been mainly political parties that set the political agenda. And the political parties

have been dominated by the leaders of the parties. Therefore, Turkish politics, to a great extent, is characterized by the personalities. The dominance of personalities in parties and politics is referred by the term 'personalism' by Özbudun (Özbudun, 2000: 86). He defines personalism as one of the general characteristics of Turkish political parties and observes that, "In election campaigns, the trustworthiness and other personal qualities of party leaders loom much larger than the parties' positions on issues"(Özbudun, 2000: 86). Özbudun also argues that none of the three military interventions in Turkey were inevitable if not certain characteristics and actions of the leaders of political parties decreased the probability of the system survival (Özbudun, 2000: 43). To start with the 1960 military intervention, he finds both the public bureaucracy and the Democrat Party (DP) leaders guilty. Remained loyal to the Republican People's Party (RPP), the bureaucracy resisted the DP regarding it as their duty to protect the public interest against the DP's efforts to use state funds for political patronage purposes. The DP leaders, on the other hand, reacted harsh against opposition. According to Özbudun "The DP leaders- having been socialized into politics under RPP rule- had inherited many attitudes, norms and orientations that were more in harmony with single party rule than with a competitive party system"(Özbudun, 2000: 31). For the 1971 breakdown, Özbudun holds the deep-seated distrust of military officers towards the Justice Party (JP) government responsible beside the failure of JP government to cope with political terrorism. Lastly, for Özbudun, the 1980 intervention was also driven by the actions of Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel- the leaders of RPP and DP respectively. They polarized the situation and did not accommodate even though the country went through a bloody struggle between leftists and rightists.

While the leaders have attempted to strengthen their positions in the parties through strong party disciplines, little efforts have been made to establish close links with the electorate. Rather, Turkish political parties have utilized vertical clientalistic networks. They are not strongly rooted in the civil society. According to Özbudun, the loose link between the parties and the people can well be observed in the high volatility rates- sudden and significant changes in party votes from one election to the next- in Turkish elections (Özbudun, 2000: 78).

As one of the scholars of Turkish political culture studies, Kalaycıoğlu (1995) examined the dispersion of five values, which are commonly associated with a democratic regime: tolerance, interpersonal trust, confidence in social and political institutions, political efficacy and political interest. To analyze the distribution of these values within Turkish context, he utilized the World Values Survey findings of 1990-91

Tolerance: To measure the level of tolerance, respondents were asked to answer the question “What kind of people do you want not to be as your neighbors?”

UNDESIRE
NEIGHBOUR %

	ENGLAND	FRANCE	INDIA	ITALY	JAPAN	HOLLAND	NIGERIA	TURKEY
CRIMINALS	41,2	19,5	92,8	48	49,7	28,4	80,3	80,9
FROM OTHER RACE	8,2	9,4	34,9	12,1	10,6	7,4	31,2	34
EXREME LEFTISTS	33	23,5	74,2	29,2	77,4	46,7	48,4	70,3
ALCOHOLICS	48,9	49,7	90,7	51,1	58,3	59,7	72,2	87,1
EXTEME RIGHTIST	27	32,7	65	33,4	79	52,2	35,7	71,1
LARGE FAMILY	10,2	7,6	35,4	13	5,7	7,9	33,3	40,7
MUSLIM/CHRISTIAN	16,4	17,5	28,5	14,3	28,8	14,1	24,3	54,7
IND. INFECTED BY HIV	24,2	14,7	92,5	42,3	76,6	15,2	79	88,5
DRUG ADDICTS	64,1	43,9	92,6	59,9	90,8	72,7	76,5	92
HOMOSEXUALS	33,2	24,4	91,4	36,8	68,5	10,9	76,4	91,7
JEWS	6,7	6,7	52,5	12,3	28,1	3,3	35,3	59,4

This table suggests that Turkish society is one of the least tolerant societies whose people do not like others who are alien. Turkish people seem not to want to be in relation with those who have different religion or who are from another race. However, democracy certainly needs a ground where competition and opposition are seen as normal, in fact be welcomed. For this to be happen, there must be tolerance for differences in the society. Tolerance and the idea of living together in peace are among the essential elements of the philosophy of democracy.

Interpersonal trust: To measure this value, the question “Can people be trusted in general?” was asked. In 1990, only 9.8% of respondents in Turkey agreed with the statement (a combined total of yes and definitely yes).

Can people be trusted in general?

	Yes	%
ENGLAND:	43.7	
FRANCE:	21.4	
INDIA:	33.5	
HOLLAND:	50.7	
NIGERIA:	21.7	
TURKEY:	9.8	
ITALY :	33.8	
JAPAN :	37.6	
MEXICO :	30.2	

From these figures, it is clear that interpersonal trust is almost completely lacking in Turkey. However, low interpersonal trust inhibits the ability of citizens to cooperate with each other in their relations with the government. Therefore, their

ability to influence the government by creating intermediary institutions such as voluntary organizations, trade unions, and interest groups is limited.

Confidence in Social and Political Institutions: The below table introduces the confidence scores given for different political and social institutions. The findings given in comparison with some other countries show that confidence in social and political institutions in Turkey are not appreciably different from that of European countries. These findings indicate that there is mass commitment to the institutions of democracy in Turkey. Özbudun explains the unusually high confidence score for military by reference to its historically predominant role in Turkish modernization (Özbudun, 2001:91). He mentions that the military is still widely accepted as the ultimate guardian of a secular and a modern state.

Institution	Countries								
	England	France	India	Italy	Japan	Mexico	Holland	Nigeria	Turkey
Military	80.4	54.4	92.4	45.4	23.9	46,8	31,1	60,5	91,4
Education	48,3	63,7	72,6	46,8	45	76,2	64,4	83,4	66,8
Judicial									
System	51,8	55,6	62,8	31,7	61,3	53,2	62,5	63,9	63,4
Press	14,8	37,2	64,2	39,3	54,6	48,8	35,6	70,8	42,6
Trade									
Unions	26,7	30,1	50,5	33	25	38	51,4	65,6	42,2
Police	76,4	65,1	39,1	64,7	57,8	31,7	72,7	43,7	63,4
National									
Assembly	43,5	43,4	65	30,6	28,4	34,3	52,6	52,9	58,1
Religious									
Institutions	44.7	47.8	84.9	60.2	10,9	76.0	31.7	87.1	67.1

The sense of Political Efficacy: The below findings show that there exists a reasonable feeling of political efficacy in Turkish society.

I cannot do anything about a law which I think is unjust	Who governs the country?	
Yes %	Certain private interests %	Everybody
England 45,6		
France 67		
India 17	50,4	40,7
Italy 45,6		
Japan 33,9		
Mexico 32,6	75,2	17,5
Holland 41,3		
Nigeria 57	72,7	20,5
Turkey 48,3	48,1	42,6

Interest in Politics: Interest in politics in Turkey is found at reasonable levels for the smooth functioning of democracy. Yet, Kalaycıoğlu reminds that it should not be forgotten that the relation between an interest in politics and political participation is not so strong in Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995: 64).

Countries	Very interested %	Little	Total
England	12,8	34,3	47,1
France	7	30,3	37,3
India	12,7	33,2	45,9
Italy	5,7	22,5	28,2
Japan	10,9	49,3	60,2
Mexico	8	29,2	37,2
Holland	13,6	48,6	62,2
Nigeria	17,6	17	34,6
Turkey	10	37,7	47,7

Concerning the encouraging aspects of Turkish political culture that work in favor of the consolidation of democracy, Özbudun states that there is a strong elite and a mass commitment to democracy in Turkey (Özbudun, 1994: 68). To start with the bureaucratic-intellectual elite, Özbudun maintains that the bureaucratic-

intellectual elite has been loyal to the Kemalist reforms, which has the ideals of a modern and a democratic state. Therefore for the bureaucratic-intellectual elite one-party rule was not an end but a means for the realization and the consolidation of reforms. As to the military elite, Özbudun argues that the fact that no military intervention in Turkey has turned into a totalitarian regime shows military elites' commitment to democracy. For Özbudun, mass commitment is also evident from the fact that since the transition to multi-party politics, the majority of Turkish people has voted for democratic and moderate parties. He believes that as long as this consensual tendency is strengthened among the political elites, there is no need to be pessimistic about the future of Turkish democracy.

2.3 A theory of value change

In 1971, Ronald Inglehart proposed a theory of a value change predicting that value priorities of advanced industrial societies would tend to shift from 'materialist' concerns such as economic and physical security to 'postmaterialist' values as freedom, self-expression and material and non-material quality of life². He hypothesized that the post-war generation of Western Europe would have different value priorities from older generations who had experienced World War I., the Great Depression and World War II. His research was guided by two key hypotheses (Inglehart, 2000:220).

² His argument was first presented in 'The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post Industrial Societies' in *American Political Science Review* 4: 991-1017, 1971 and then published in the book entitled *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* Princeton, Princeton University Press 1977.

A scarcity hypothesis: An individual's priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment. An individual places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply.

A socialization hypothesis: The relationship between the socioeconomic environment and value priorities is not one of direct modification; a substantial time lag is needed for an individual's basic values to reflect the conditions that prevailed during that person's pre-adult years.

The scarcity hypothesis implies that economic development has significant consequences. From the Industrial Revolution to the second half of the twentieth century, Western industrial societies followed a process of modernization. Central to the modernization process were the erosion of the traditional – religious authority and rising rational and scientifically oriented belief systems that supported centralized bureaucratic states oriented towards economic growth. Inglehart argues that within the last twenty-five years, a major change from modernization toward postmodernization has taken place (Inglehart, 1995: 384). Both traditional and modern societies were shaped by scarcity. The growing economic security with which the industrialist states have been providing its citizens, has given rise to a cultural feedback that is having a major impact on the political systems of advanced industrial societies. Within this new value system, concerns like economic achievement, economic growth and the authority of government are being replaced with a focus on individual concerns: the quality of life and work experience and self-expression. As the economic needs of a population are increasingly fulfilled,

materialists die, they are replaced constantly by younger less materialists and this will gradually increase the proportion of postmaterialists (Inglehart, 2001: 232)

2.3.1 Measuring value change

Inglehart's thesis was first tested in surveys carried out in 1970 in Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. The people interviewed chose the goals they considered the most important among a set of items designed to indicate material and postmaterial concerns³. As hypothesized, large differences were found between the values of younger and older generations: younger generations tended to give more emphasis to the post-materialist values

³ Respondents were asked to select what they believe their country's two top goals should be among three sets of goals, each of which included four alternatives:

In the first set, respondents were asked to choose their top two goals among:

- 1) Maintaining a high level of economic growth
- 2) Making sure that this country has strong defense forces
- 3) Seeing that people have more say in how things are decided in their jobs and in their communities
- 4) Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful

In this set, (1) and (2) were designated to tap Materialist values, (3) and (4) were designated to tap postmodernist values.

In the second case, respondents were asked to choose their top two goals among:

- 1) Maintaining order in the nation
- 2) Giving people more say in important government decisions
- 3) Fighting rising prices
- 4) Protecting freedom of speech

In this set, (1) and (3) were designated to tap materialist values, (2) and (4) were designated to tap postmodernist values.

In the third set, they are asked to choose their top two goals among:

- 1) A stable economy
- 2) Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society
- 3) Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money
- 4) The fight against crime

In this set, (1) and (4) were designated to tap materialist values, (2) and (3) were designated to tap postmodernist values.

This twenty-item measure was later turned into a four-item measure and employed in later surveys. The widely used four-item measure of materialist/postmaterialist values is based upon a choice among maintaining order, giving people more say, fighting prices and freedom of speech. Respondents who select 'maintaining order' and 'fighting rising prices' are classified as materialists, while those who choose 'giving the people more say' and 'freedom of speech' are classified as postmaterialist. The remaining combinations are classified as mixed.


than older generations. This set of questions measuring the materialists/postmaterialists value dimension was enlarged by other sets of questions and was widely used in 65 countries under the name of 'World Values Survey'⁴. Evidence from the World Values Survey revealed that a value shift occurs in any society that has experienced sufficient economic growth in recent decades so that the pre-adult experiences of younger birth cohorts are significantly more secure than those of older cohorts. At this point, Inglehart is quick to remind us that the type of economic growth that is conducive to the emergence of postmodern values is the one, which occurs through the process of industrialization that produces a set of cultural and social structure changes as it did in Western Europe (Inglehart, 1997: 215).

The World Values Survey provided evidence from various countries that economic security contributes to the rise of postmaterialist values. When asked to choose among competing goals, there is rising prioritization of post materialist goals such as belonging and self-expression rather than materialist values such as maintaining order and fighting inflation. Inglehart argues that although there is an overall trend towards post materialist values, some short-term forces may prevent postmaterialism from rising (Inglehart, 1994: 341). More to the point, his theory predicts that economic and physical insecurity will tend to stimulate materialists concerns. Consistent with his scarcity thesis, some short-term variations may

⁴ World Values Survey is a worldwide study that aims to attain a comparative base for values, attitudes and norms concerning economic and political behavior, religion, family and environmental issues. It is based on a very detailed form of questionnaire. The study has been carried out in four waves of 1981-82, 1990-91, 1995-1998 and 1999-2001. For more detailed information about the survey, see www.worldvaluessurvey.com or wvs.isr.umich.edu

originate from changing levels of inflation and unemployment. Nevertheless, Inglehart argues that if the effects of various short-term fluctuations are controlled for, there remains significant trend toward postmaterialism in all the sampled countries (Inglehart, 1994: 345).

Figure 2: The Shift Toward Postmaterialist Values Among The Public of Nine Western Societies, 1970-1994



Source: European Community Surveys Feb.1970 and fall 1990 and US National Election Surveys from 1972 and 1992, taken from (Inglehart, 2000:222).

According to Inglehart's arguments, one might rightfully expect that in time there would occur a global culture in the world. However, Inglehart does not argue that the trend toward postmaterialism caused by economic development will produce a uniform global culture (Inglehart, 2001: 21). He is aware of the fact that

his theory holds true only in countries that have experienced the modernization process in the hypothesized way and in which economic growth had led to certain social and political transformations. In fact, he argues, “postmodernists reflect a world view that could only come after the successful attainment of modernity” (Inglehart, 1997: 379). In the light of the World Values Survey findings, he claims that certain cultural, economic and political variables are closely correlated. There is a causal relation between them and that causality is not linear but subject to feedback (Inglehart, 1995: 381). The process of economic-cultural-political change is bound to and conditioned by some specific historical and context-dependent variables. Knowing that the reciprocal relations between economic, cultural and political patterns make it difficult to assert which come first, Inglehart argues that the analyses of the World Values Survey suggest that industrial development leads to certain changes in the belief systems which in turn produce specific changes in the economic and political systems of these countries. He does not expect therefore that the same process would take place in countries of different economic, cultural and political patterns. He says “Economic development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than converging they seem to move along paths shaped by their cultural heritages. Therefore, we doubt that the forces of modernization will produce a homogenized world culture in the foreseeable future”(Inglehart, 2001: 20).

2.3.2 Postmodern values and democracy

Inglehart maintains that a shift away from materialist concerns toward postmodern values is conducive to democracy. Postmaterialists put greater emphasis on self-expression and political participation. Postmodernists are tolerant of other groups and even regard exotic things and cultural diversity as interesting (Inglehart, 2000: 223). Postmodernists give importance to individual, sexual gratification and individual self-expression. Growing acceptance of gay and lesbian lifestyles, questioning the role and position of women in the society, the declining acceptance of rigid religious norms and growing concerns for environmental issues are all indicators of this general value change toward postmodernism (Inglehart, 2000: 224). Inglehart suggests that high levels of subjective well-being, coupled with postmodern values including interpersonal trust and tolerance, helps with the functioning of democratic regimes (Inglehart 1995: 400).

His theory concerning the relationship between democracy and postmodern values has also been tested by James Gibson and Raymond Duch (1993). They carried out a survey in Russia consisted of selected questions from the World Values Survey. According to the findings of this survey, of the sampled Russians those who were categorized as postmaterialists tended to be more supportive of democratic values which were conceptualized by the authors as valuing liberty, support for democratic norms, rights consciousness, support for dissent and opposition, support for independent media, support for competitive elections and political tolerance (Gibson J. and Duch R., 1993: 21). They claim that

postmaterialist value orientations are affecting Soviet politics in the same way that they have affected Western politics in terms of being a facilitating element for the consolidation of democracy.

For Inglehart, another process that has been gradually transforming the values of Western publics in ways conducive to democracy is the movement in both established democracies and new democracies towards increasing elite-challenging political participation such as petitions, boycotts and other forms of direct action (Inglehart, 2002: 302). Whereas elite-directed hierarchical organizations such as labor unions and churches are losing members, membership of political parties is falling sharply and confidence in government is declining, the World Values Survey findings revealed that there is an upward tendency of protest politics as predicted by Barnes and Kaase (1974) under the name of the spread of 'unconventional political participation'⁵.

⁵Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase conducted a 'Political Action' survey in 1974. They developed a set of scales to measure both conventional political action such as voting and writing to one's representative in parliament and unconventional forms of political action as demonstrations, boycotts and occupation of buildings. Considering the findings, they argued that potential for protest would be a lasting characteristic of democratic mass publics in *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Societies* 1979 California: Sage.

Figure 3: Rising elite-challenging participation in 50 societies.

COUNTRY	1981	1990	1995	2000	Shift Ratio*	COUNTRY	1981	1990	1995	2000	Shift Ratio*
Belgium	24	47		71	2.96	Nigeria		7	7	7	1.0
Czech			26	56	2.15	Brazil		50	47		.94
Ireland	29	42		59	2.03	Portugal		28		26	.93
Mexico	10	35	30	19	1.90	Ukraine			13	12	.92
Netherlands	35	51		61	1.74	Philippines			12	11	.92
Norceland	35	60		87	1.63	E Germany		69	57	60	.87
Slovakia			35	57	1.63	Croatia	43		43	36	.84
Sweden	54	72	72	87	1.61	Hungary		18	25	25	.83
Ireland	30	41	39	48	1.60	Chile		23	17	19	.83
Serbia			19	29	1.53	Argentina	39	22	31	23	.68
Poland		14	20	21	1.50	Puerto Rico			28	19	.68
Finland	45	51		67	1.49	Venezuela			23	15	.65
Iceland	37	47		52	1.41	Bangladesh			25	14	.56
S. Africa	20	34	19	27	1.35	Romania			17	9	.53
Japan	48	62	55	63	1.31	Estonia		39	14	19	.49
USA	64	72	71	81	1.27	Bulgaria		22	7	10	.45
Ireland	63	75		79	1.25	Lithuania		58	31	25	.43
Denmark	44	51		55	1.25	Russia	30	11	11		.37
Italy	42	48		52	1.24	Belarus		27	18	8	.30
S. Korea		42	40	52	1.24	Latvia		65	31	18	.28
West Germany	47	57		56	1.19						
Canada	62	77		74	1.19						
Norway	56	61	65		1.16						
India		25	27	29	1.16						
Austria		48		55	1.15						
Australia	70		79		1.13						
Slovenia		28	19	31	1.11						
Spain	24	31	22	26	1.08						
Switzerland		63	68		1.08						
Turkey		14	20	15	1.07						

Source: 1981-2000 World Values Survey. Quoted from Inglehart, 2003: 308.

Rising rates of elite-challenging political behavior are closely associated with the rising levels of education and the spread of postmodern values. But the pattern, Inglehart maintains, is not universal. This shift in political behavior is seen as a component of a cultural shift from survival values to self-expression values and thus much more likely to be found in rich democracies (Inglehart, 2002: 306). Inglehart conceptualizes the significant decline in political action observed in the ex-communist world and developing democracies as a period effect. He argues that the decline reflects a 'post-honeymoon effect'. This post-honeymoon effect refers to the situation of declining levels of mass participation in cases where the transition to democracy has brought severe disillusionment (Inglehart, 2002:304). It is anticipated that as these countries attain economic growth, they will also experience the gradually rising levels of elite-challenging political action (2002:314).

2.3.3 Changing attitudes towards authority

The Word Values Survey has a large variety of questions considering attitudes towards authority. In this domain, it has questions to measure trust in government, political interest, voter turnout, interpersonal trust, political activism and respect for authority. With respect to these questions, the study revealed two divergent trends. On the one hand, there is the erosion of institutional authority, evidenced by declining trust in government, decreasing voting and party membership and diminishing respect for authority. On the other hand, there is growing political activism observed in the rise of individually motivated forms of participation and political interest. According to Inglehart, the rise of postmodern values plays a significant role in these trends that are indicating the rise of citizens interventions in politics. Being more articulate and politically more active, the postmodernists, he argues, evaluate politics according to more demanding standards and put less emphasis on respect for authority (Inglehart, 1997:297). In this vein, the trend toward postmodernism would necessarily refer to the trend toward less emphasis on the respect for authority.

The Word Values Survey findings on attitudes toward authority were also investigated by Neil Nevitte and Mebs Kanji (1994). To examine whether it is possible to find a general trend for the changing patterns towards authority, they utilized the findings of the survey data collected from 12 industrialized countries at the time points of 1981 and 1990, on attitudes toward authority in the polity, the workplace and the family. In their study, they used both the individual items

designated for the operationalization of public attitudes towards authority in the polity, the workplace and the family and the very general indicator of deference to authority.

Figure 4: Support for the General Principle of Deference by Country (1981-1990)

Country	1981	1990	% Change
Average (12 countries)	65.3%	57.6 %	-7.7%
France	52.5%	55.0 %	+2.5%
Britain	69.7%	73.2%	+3.5%
West Germany	38.8%	29.4%	+9.4%
Italy	61.9%	47.0%	+14.9%
Netherlands	54.0%	52.1%	-1.9%
Denmark	35.1%	33.7%	-1.4%
Belgium	57.2%	48.8%	-8.4%
Spain	75.0%	67.0%	-8.0%
Ireland	84.1%	82.4%	-1.7%
Northern Ireland	86.2%	81.6%	- 4.6%
U.S.	84.3%	76.2%	-8.1%
Canada	75.0%	63.8%	-11.2%

Note: The above results represent respondents saying that greater respect for authority in the future would be a good thing.

Source: 1981 & 1990 World Values Surveys, taken from Nevitte N. and Kanji M., 1999: 9

Through their evaluation of attitudes towards authority in the polity, the workplace and the family domains, Nevitte and Kanji maintained that the shifts occurring in attitudes towards authority are generalizable from one domain to others.

They conclude that in advanced industrial states, authority relations indicate a trend from authoritarian modes to equalitarian ones (Nevitte N. and Kanji M., 1999: 23).

According to Inglehart, declining emphasis on all kinds of authority is one of the major aspects of the general postmodern shift. The postmodern shift includes a shift away from both religious and bureaucratic authority. Deference to authority calls for the subordination of personal goals to those of a broader entity. But living under conditions of security and prosperity, the postmaterialists are much more interested in individual concerns, and the quality of the physical and social environment. Conversely, conditions of insecurity would increase people's commitment to authority. Inglehart points that under the threat of invasion, internal disorder or severe insecurity, people generally prefer strong authority figures to protect them from threatening forces. He calls this situation 'authoritarian reflex' and believes that this authoritarian reflex may bring fundamentalist, xenophobic reactions or uncritical admiration of strong leaders in times of severe insecurity (Inglehart, 1997: 296).

2.4 Political socialization

Political socialization is a part of the general socialization. It is concerned with understanding the process in which a child gains and develops political opinions, attitudes and tendencies. Political socialization research wants to obtain an answer to the question that: "When, how and as a result of what do which people acquire what political knowledge and which political opinions, attitudes, skills, behavioral

intentions and behavioral patterns and what is the relationship of the cognitions, opinions, attitudes, skills, behavioral intentions and patterns with what political system?”(Hekker, 1991: 18).

Systematic research and theory developments in political socialization had started in the late 1950s. The first methodical investigation on political socialization was made by Herbert Hyman in *Political Socialization* (1959). In his work, he pointed to “the absence of any attention to the childhood experiences that produce such political patterns” in the socialization literature, which was dominated by the studies concerning the socialization process in adult life (Hyman, 1959: 25). He reviewed the literature relevant to general formulation of political behavior as a product of socialization.

Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt were also among the earliest scholars who have systematically studied political socialization. According to Dawson and Prewitt “Political socialization is the name given to the process through which a citizen acquires his own view of the political world” (Dawson, R. and Prewitt, K., 1969:6). It is the route in which an individual gains beliefs and information related to the political world around him /her. This process operates at both individual and community level (1969:13). At the community level, it refers to the transformation of established patterns of thought and action to new generations. In other words, it indicates the transmission of a nation’s political standards from one generation to another. At the individual level, political socialization operates into the ways in which the individual acquires his/her political views. It investigates the process and the

agencies through which the individual forms his/her 'political self'. Dawson and Prewitt maintain that political socialization brings about a political self. More to the point, through political socialization process an infant become aware of political object, acquire and develop varied political orientations (Dawson R and Prewitt K., 1969:19). They offer a developmental cycle for the progress of the political self (Dawson R and Prewitt K., 1969:20). In the first place, recognition of rules, authority and loyalty takes place. The child starts to develop attachments to some political symbols and acquires basic loyalties and identifications with them. These basic orientations have in fact become the most strongest and durable perceptions of an individual that play highly important role in shaping the later tendencies of a person. In the early youth, the child starts to gain precise knowledge and information about various properties of the political world. For Dawson and Prewitt, the process for the development of a political self is unending. As people face with new political confirmations and events, they develop new forms of political orientations towards them and thus the process of political socialization continues.

The theory of political socialization is concerned with a general formulation. Hyman stated that this simplification is desirable because of the fact that the infinite variations in human beings and their experiences may lead to endless numbers of different political socialization processes (Hyman, 1959:155). The process of socialization is not the same for all individuals. It differs from person to person depending on the characteristics of the individual being socialized and the environment in which he/ she lives.

2.4.1 Agencies of political socialization

The most influential agencies of political socialization are considered as the family, school and the mass media.

2.4.1.1 Family

Family is both a major and a primary agency of political socialization. It is considered as the most important agent of socialization. As a reason for that Sharma argues that every human has four basic needs and all these are fulfilled in the family (Sharma, 1985:40). Family is the source of food, safety from harm, love and affection and establishing identity. By satisfying all these basic needs of an infant, the family gains a central place in the shaping the thought and actions of the child.

The political socialization process in the family varies depending on the nature of the family such as extended family, nuclear family, one-parent family and remarried family. Relationships within the families can also differ drastically and thus affect the socialization process differently. For instance, it is argued that the more a young person have the chance to participate in the family affairs, the more she or he participates in the political decision making process (Alkan, 1982:9).

Through intentional and unintentional ways, family trains the individual for various situations. It plays a significant role in making individuals' personality. Furthermore, family is also highly influential in shaping the basic orientations of

offsprings. In this regard, there found relatively high degree of correspondence between parents' and children's party affiliations, warmth and hostility toward specific political objects and religious beliefs (Jennings, K. and Niemi, R. 1968:172-180)

2.4.1.2 School

School has also been considered as an important agent of political socialization. It is a formalized institution of socialization and therefore an important variable for shaping the political behavior of an individual. In schools, children are introduced with the skills and knowledge by a special person and a specific agenda. By the employment of formal curriculum, school is the agent of conscious manipulation and planning. In addition to curricular environment, school can inculcate insights, attitudes and behavioral patterns through 'hidden curriculum' as well. During class hours, children gain many cultural values, which may have political consequences such as conformity, showing respect, the acceptance of sex-role determined behavior (Dekker, 1991:34).

2.4.1.3 The media

Mass media is also important agent of political socialization. It includes radio, television, newspapers, magazines and the Internet. Mass media is capable of reaching very large number of people at lower costs. People receive much of the information about politics and foreign affairs by the use of mass media. Therefore,

the media is accepted as a primary source of political influence for both pre-adults and adults (Paletz, D. and Boiney, J. 1990:238). It affects the political attitudes and opinions of people. In the childhood, mass media is also one of the prime determinants of political behavior. Children are open to political influences exerted by the mass media over which the family and the school, which are the crucial political socialization agents in the childhood, have relatively little control. The influence of media varies from person to person. Its influence on the individual differs in relation with the socio-economic status, age, sex, education, employment and beliefs of the person being socialized.



CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

3.1 The research instrument

The research used a questionnaire. The questionnaire was adopted from an international survey, which was conducted in 1991-1997. The conductors of the international survey – Jos Meloen and Russell Farnen - collected data from 44 countries with 9713 respondents. Participants were asked to answer a questionnaire of 77 questions on democratic attitudes, authoritarianism, multiculturalism, liberal and nationalist tendencies in education, support for well-known dictators and reformers, political self ratings and background questions. The aim of the survey was to evaluate such opinions, ratings and attitudes in the light of the international tendency for democratization during the 1990s (Farnen R. & Meloen J.D, 2000:183). This international project on democracy, authoritarianism, multiculturalism and education was also included Turkey. In Turkey, it was carried out in 1994. The data were collected from 315 senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations Departments of eight major universities in Ankara and Istanbul (Ankara University, Bilkent University, Middle East Technical University, Hacettepe University, Gazi University, Bogaziçi University, Istanbul University and Marmara University). Ömer Faruk Gençkaya was one of the local conductors of this project. For a comparative study, he redesigned the original questionnaire and we

conducted it in major universities in Ankara and Istanbul in 2004. The present survey questionnaire (2004 survey) was refined and redesigned according to the results of statistical factor analysis and inter-item correlations applied to the 1994 Turkey survey. Accordingly, the most working questions for Turkish respondents were chosen and some of the original survey questions were excluded.

The present survey included twenty-four opinion and attitudinal statements regarding the issues of democracy, authority and equity. Respondents were asked to evaluate these statements on 7-point scale ranging from 'I agree completely' to 'I disagree completely' (1=agree completely; 2= agree; 3= agree somewhat; 4=undecided, no opinion; 5= disagree somewhat 6= disagree; 7= disagree completely). These statements aim to ascertain the tendencies of the interviewed youth regarding democracy, authority and equality. The thesis draws upon the findings of statements concerning to reveal the tendencies of the sample towards authority. Specifically, these statements are: 'What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, are a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith' and 'Freedom of speech does not justify someone's teaching foreign or disloyal ideas in our schools'. The following nine items constitute a set of questions about a few personal traits of the students. These are the questions about the age, sex, residential background, parents' educational backgrounds and social class, the means through which the sampled youth keep up with social events most, membership of an intermediary institution and any job being performed. Each of the other eleven items introduces a 7-point scale on which interviewees are asked to place himself/herself between some opposite/contrary

defining elements (1= left characteristics applies best; 4= undecided, no opinion, both apply; 7= right characteristics applies best). In this self-ratings part of the questionnaire, the aim is to determine how the respondents rate themselves on being political versus apolitical, liberal versus conservative, rightist versus leftist, anti-authoritarian versus authoritarian, religious versus secular, internationalist versus isolationist, aggressive versus peaceful, equalitarian versus elitist, anti-nationalist versus nationalist, universalist versus local and European versus Asian/Middle Eastern.

3.2 Application

The questionnaires were applied on May and June 2004 in Ankara and Istanbul, Turkey. The sample included 385 respondents. The survey intended to cover all major universities in Ankara and Istanbul. It included students studying in the Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations Departments of Ankara University, Bilkent University, Middle East Technical University, Hacettepe University, Gazi University, Boğaziçi University and Fatih University. For technical problems, the survey could not be conducted in Marmara and Istanbul Universities. Some other universities were excluded due to time and financial limitations. The number of universities was also restricted for the purposes of selecting established universities for the application of survey. Therefore, some universities, whose life spans are short, were similarly excluded from the survey. The data was collected in a group-administered manner in the classes under the

supervision of instructors. In all cases, students were informed about the research project and thus were free to participate or not to participate in the survey.

The survey was applied on the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments. The departments of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations train manpower for the cadres of administration in public and private sectors. The graduates of these departments work as middle and top managers in various public institutions as well as numerous local and municipal government positions. In addition to that, public and private finance institutions; banks and media continue to be an important source of employment. Universities also need increasing number of specialists in political science, public administration and international relations areas. In sum, the graduates of these departments are the candidates for key positions in various important institutions of the country. Since they will be the persons who are to formulate, apply and direct policies that will shape the future of these organizations in particular and the future of the society in general, their attitudes and tendencies towards authority are of particular importance. This work by searching for the dominance of preference for strong political leaders and the exaltation of the state traits of the Turkish political culture in fact aims at revealing the tendencies of the senior (fourth year) students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations Departments towards authority. Their attitudes towards authority are significantly important since well functioning of a democracy is based on a certain relationship between the authority and the citizenry. Obedience to authority should be balanced with the responsibility of the authority in such a way that authority cannot abuse its power.

Articulation of such a relationship with the state calls for an effective oppositional and critical political practice on the side of the citizenry. Contrary to the exaltation of state and political leaders, authority figures should be considered at certain distance for control and balancing purposes.

The reason behind choosing 'senior' students of these departments is that senior students of these departments are assumed to have more in-depth and settled ideas and attitudes regarding democracy, authority and equality. It is assumed that they took more courses than lower classes' students, which enable them to gain more knowledge, broader perspectives and different points of views. In this vein, they can be regarded as the best representatives of the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations Departments.

3.3 Hypotheses of the survey

Although accepted as secondary to the patterns of class, education and religion, patterns of gender also have roles to play in determining the political behavior. The fact that males and females experience the life differently and have different roles to play affects their viewpoints and thereby their political tendencies. Kışlalı maintains that females are much more affected from emotional conditions and they try to take shelter behind the stronger for the purposes of attaining determination and guarantee (Kışlalı, 1976:125). Kışlalı together with Abadan-Urat and Ergil conducted a survey of 787 voters in 1975. The study revealed that among the factors that lead female electorate to vote for a particular party, the characteristics of a party leader is much

more influential for women (28.7%) than for men (20.8%). Additionally, the party programs loom much larger as a persuading factor to vote for a party for men (50.9%) than for women (23.3%). According to Kışlalı, the findings of a survey question - 'What is the political system that will solve Turkey's problems in the best way?' - clearly put forwards the fact that females seek reliance (Kışlalı, 1976:129). Regarding this question, more women preferred disciplined one party rule (33.6%) to two-party (22.5%) and multi-party systems (21.0%). Preference for disciplined one party rule was higher among the females than males (25.4%). Males tended to prefer multi-party (36.6%) and two-party (36.0%) systems more than females.

By following the Kışlalı's striking point about gender preferences, we can assume that female may more incline to the need for a strong leader. In this regard, this thesis hypothesizes that the ratio of those who agreed with the statement that 'What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, are a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith' will be higher among the female respondents than male respondents in both 1994 and 2004 surveys.

The statement 'Freedom of speech does not justify someone's teaching foreign and disloyal ideas in our schools', which the thesis will utilize is in fact designed to ascertain the tendencies of the sampled youth towards authority particularly towards the state. Hostility towards what is regarded as foreign and disloyal ideas derives from the strong commitment to existing order and its values that are to be protected by the state. By this way, the power and authority of the state are exalted and

respected. Along the lines this statement indicates the exaltation of state is provided by prohibitions of the different views and actions. A liberal person rather than emphasizing the respect for authority is expected to value personal autonomy. In this respect, we can argue that the more liberal is a person in his/ her beliefs and attitudes, the less support does she/ he give for prohibitions and strong state. This may consequently lead to a more society-oriented environment compared to the superiority of the state over everything. Therefore, this work hypothesizes that the percentage of those who agreed with the statement that 'Freedom of speech does not justify someone's teaching foreign and disloyal ideas in our schools' will be less among those who defined themselves as liberal in the liberal versus conservative scale of the self-ratings part of the 1994 and 2004 survey questionnaire.

CHAPTER IV

THE FINDINGS

To measure the findings, we rely primarily on descriptive statistics and crosstabulations. The survey was conducted of 385 university students. 47.9% of the respondents' ages ranged from 20 to 22. The rest were between 22-24 (41.7%) and above 25 (8.9%) years old. While 51% of the participants of the survey are female, 47.7% are male. Thus, there is nearly equal distribution of sex among the participants. Regarding their residential backgrounds, 2.3% of participants are from villages, 1.3% are from rural towns, 8.9% are from suburbs, 30.5% are from cities and 56% are from large cities. The great majority of the participants (69%) stated their parents' social class as upper middle. The remaining students are from lower middle (12%), upper (7.6%) and lower classes (1%). Considering their fathers' educational background, 59.9% of the participants' fathers are the graduates of a university, 22.2% of the participants' fathers are the graduates of a high school and 14.8% of the participants' fathers are the graduates of a primary school. When their mothers' educational background is concerned while 38.3% of the students have mothers with university education, 33.1% have mothers with high school education and 22.6% have mothers with primary school education. The means through which the sampled youth keep up with the social events most run as television (60.2%), newspaper (18.8%), radio (15.4%), Internet (2.9%) and journals (0.5%). 0.8% of the

participant students indicated that he/she get information by the word of mouth. Of the participant youth, 28% are the members of a social institution while 68.2% are not. The participants are not working in somewhere.

In 1994 survey, males were more represented than females. While 64% of the participants were male, only 36% were female. Considering their parents' social class, the majority of the participants were from upper middle class families (57.6%). Rest of the participants stated their parents' social class as upper (8.7%), lower middle (19.1%) and lower (10.4%). Of the respondents, 38.9% have fathers with university education, 26.4% with high school and 31.5% with primary school education. Regarding their residential background, 4.8% of the participant students are from villages, 4.2% are from rural towns, 15% are from suburbs, 28.4% are from cities and 47.6% are from large-cities.

The questionnaires of both 1994 and 2004 surveys have a part in which the participants are asked to describe themselves. In this part of self-ratings, respondents were asked to use 7-point scales to circle the appropriate number. The scale runs from one to seven where the mid point-point four is designed for those who have no opinion or are undecided. While the first three points were considered as indicators of the item on the left, the last three points were evaluated to be a sign of the item on the right. Figured in such a way, the findings of the self-ratings part of the questionnaire revealed that while the sampled youth display homogeneity concerning some of the items, they seem to constitute a much more heterogeneous group regarding some other items. Some items were commonly preferred by the sampled

youth. In other words, there appears to be a consensus among the participants on some defining items. Accordingly, the great majority of the sampled youth defined themselves as peaceful (78.1%) as opposed to aggressive (9.9%), internationalist (73.3%) as opposed to isolationist (11.7%) and equalitarian (72.4%) as opposed to elitist (17.7%). In addition to this, a meaningful majority of the sampled youth rate themselves as secular (69.8%) as opposed to religious (13%), universalist (69.5%) as opposed to local (17%), political (68.5%) as opposed to apolitical (16.1%), liberal (60.9%) as opposed to conservative (16.7%) and leftist (51.3%) as opposed to rightist (26.6%). From these findings we may say that the defining elements of the sampled youth appears to be being internationalist, universalist, peaceful, equalitarian, political, liberal, secular and leftist. Among these traits, being political, liberal secular and leftist seem to be much more noteworthy than the other characteristics. These four traits are related to contemporary points of discussions in the Turkish political agenda compared to the other four traits. They refer to highly distinguishable properties in the political conjuncture of Turkey.

Concerning the rest of items, the sampled youth display varied traits. While 42% defined themselves as anti-authoritarian 33.8% defined themselves as authoritarian; while 46.7% defined themselves as nationalist, 35.7% defined themselves as anti-nationalist; and while 48.8% defined themselves as European, 24.3% as Asian / Middle Eastern. Neither percentage of these traits is above 50% and the difference between the two opposite traits are not so striking. In addition to these, the percentage of those who declared that they had no idea/were not sure about how to define themselves in these scales are also at considerable levels which may easily

change the end results in some cases. In anti-authoritarian-authoritarian scale the ratio of those who stated that they had no idea / were not sure about defining themselves in this scale was 21.4%, this ratio was 12 % in the anti-nationalist- nationalist scale and 23.4% in the scale of European-Asian /Middle Eastern. Therefore, regarding these items, it is difficult to determine the definite stand of the sampled youth from the finding of the survey. Nevertheless, the sampled youth tended to be more anti-authoritarian than authoritarian, more nationalist than anti-nationalist and more European than Asian/ Middle Eastern.

Similar to the 2004 sampled youth, university students sampled in 1994 survey displayed homogeneity on some items and heterogeneity on some other items. The large majority of the sampled youth defined themselves as peaceful (79.1%) as opposed to aggressive (6.7%), internationalist (78.1%) as opposed to isolationist (10.2%), universalist (77.4%) as opposed to local (9.4%) and equalitarian (72.4%) as opposed to elitist (14.3%). Additionally, an important majority of the sampled university students scored themselves as political (69.8%) as opposed to apolitical (15.5%), secular (61.2%) as opposed to religious (20.9%), liberal (59.4%) as opposed to conservative (19.7%) and anti-authoritarian (50.1%) as opposed to authoritarian (24.8%). Consequently, the defining elements of the 1994 sampled youth appears to be as being peaceful, internationalist, universalist, equalitarian, political, secular, liberal and anti-authoritarian. Interestingly, these traits, which were found as dominant among the 1994 sampled youth, are so similar with the defining elements of the 2004 sampled university students.

Regarding nationalist- anti-nationalist item, 1994 surveyed youth appeared to be a mixed group. The findings of the 1994 survey revealed that like that of the 2004 youth, 1994 surveyed university students tended to define themselves as nationalist (47.3%). Yet, it should also be noted that the ratio of those who saw themselves as anti-nationalists was 34.3% and the ratio of those who declared that they had no idea/ were not sure about defining themselves in this scale was 14.3%. Therefore, in both surveys of 1994 and 2004, we are not able to categorize being nationalist as a defining characteristics of the senior students studying in the Political Science and Public Administration and, International Relations Departments although in both years the percentage of those who defined themselves as nationalist was higher than those who defined themselves as anti-nationalist in the nationalist-antinationalist scales (Figure 1-Figure 2).

Figure 1: The percentages of those who defined themselves as nationalist or antinationalist in the nationalist-antinationalist scale of self-ratings part of the 1994 survey.





Figure 2: The percentages of those who defined themselves as nationalist or antinationalist in the nationalist-antinationalist scale of self-ratings part of the 2004 survey.



Since the 1994 survey did not have European- Asian/Middle Eastern scale, we are not able to make comparisons between the findings of the both survey on this scale.

In the light of both 1994 and 2004 findings, the only noteworthy differences occurred in the scales of anti-authoritarian- authoritarian and leftist-rightist. In the 1994 survey, the majority of the participants defined themselves as anti-authoritarian

(50.1%). In 2004, the percentage of anti-authoritarians was similarly higher than authoritarians. However, when we compared the findings with that of the previous study, in 2004 survey the ratio of anti-authoritarians dropped to 43.9% from 50.1% while the ratio of authoritarians increased to 34% from 24.8%(Figure 3-Figure 4). From the findings of both surveys, we may detect a tendency among the senior students studying in Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments from being anti-authoritarian to being authoritarian.

Figure 3: The percentages of those who defined themselves as authoritarian or antiauthoritarian in the authoritarian –antiauthoritarian scale of self-ratings part of the 1994 survey.





Figure 4: The percentages of those who defined themselves as authoritarian or antiauthoritarian in the authoritarian –antiauthoritarian scale of self-ratings part of the 2004 survey.



Another change between the surveys occurred in the leftist-rightist scales. In 1994 survey, While 36.1% of the participants defined themselves as leftists, 32.5% defined themselves as rightists. The ratio of those who had no idea/were not sure about defining themselves in this scale is significantly high (24.4%). While being leftist appeared as one of the defining characteristics of the 2004 youth, the 1994 sampled youth was slightly more leftist than rightist. In other words, between the two surveys these seems to exist a trend towards being more leftist among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments (Figure 5-Figure 6).

Figure 5: The percentages of those who defined themselves as leftist or rightist in the leftist-rightist scale of self-ratings part of the 1994 survey.





Figure 6: The percentages of those who defined themselves as leftist or rightist in the leftist-rightist scale of self-ratings part of the 2004 survey.



This thesis utilizes the findings from the opinion and attitudinal statements part of the survey for the purposes of analyzing the existence of some characteristics of Turkish political culture among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations Departments. The characteristics, which will be examined in this thesis, are: the preference for strong political leaders and the exaltation of state among the masses. To this end, two opinion and attitudinal statements of the survey selected: ‘What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, are a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith’ and ‘Freedom of speech does not justify someone’s teaching foreign and disloyal ideas in our schools’. The findings of these statements will be used to test the commonness of the two traits of Turkish political culture among the sampled university youth.

4.1 Testing ‘the preference for strong political leaders’ among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations Departments

One of the characteristics of the Turkish political culture outlined in chapter two is the dominance of leaders in politics. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, Turkish nation won its independence. Mustafa Kemal did not remain just as a hero soldier, he was also a statesman. “Atatürk used his natural charisma to promote a state ideology –Kemalism” (Heper, 1992: 155). He initiated ‘Kemalist reforms’ in almost all fundamental aspects of social and political life. After his death, İsmet İnönü was the ‘National Chief’ who to protect Republican reforms. The transition to

multi-party politics had been realized under his leadership. However, multiparty politics did not put an end to inordinate power of the political leaders in Turkish politics. Political leaders have projected themselves as rulers who are personally responsible for the people's welfare. The leaders of multi-party period, to a great extent, drew upon the images of rulers who would become panacea for the woes of the country. They exercised extensive control over party organizations. The distribution of power within a party is mostly determined by the nature of nominating procedure and in this vein it is significant that, nominating candidates in Turkish parties is prepared through central executive committees, which are strongly controlled party leaders (Özbudun, 2000: 83-84). In addition to nominating procedure, political leaders exercised different conducts to establish and retain their control over the party members (Heper, 2002: 224). Accordingly, Menderes, Demirel and Çiller relied on political patronage and nepotism. Ecevit tightly controlled the entrance process to the party. Türkeş developed a centralized party composed of party members who were indoctrinated according to his points of views and Özal created a core group of relatives and protégés in the party (Heper, 2002:224-225).


Since political leaders personally dominated the Turkish politics, “ Turkish democracy with its success and failures has been virtually the handiwork of political leaders” (Heper, 2002: 217). More than the social, economic and historical forces, political leaders' ability to negotiate, compromise and accommodate became the primary reasons of military interventions (Özbudun, 2000: 43), (Heper, 2002:222). Almost all of them were too sure of their judgements that they remained inflexible and aggressive towards oppositionary views without considering the demands of

changing conditions and the ways for reconciliation. Therefore, more than the party programs, the leaders' personal characteristics and their statecraft have given direction to Turkish politics. More importantly, voters tended to give their votes to leaders rather than political parties. In other words, personalities have dominated Turkish politics and the Turkish people have voted for the persons (Özbudun, 2000: 86).

If the above line of argument about a feature Turkish political culture - preference for strong political leaders among the masses - is also correct for the senior students studying in the Political Science and Public Administration and, International Relations Departments, we should also detect commitment to political leaders from the findings of the survey. Since it is assumed that Turkish people tend to vote for personal qualities of party leaders, we should be able to observe that the sampled youth prefer strong, determined political leaders if that trait is also prevalent among the senior students studying in the Political Science and Public Administration and, International Relations Departments. Aiming to reveal the tendencies of the sampled youth towards authority figures, the survey has the statement that 'What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, are a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith'. While 63.5 % of the participants agreed with this statement, only 27.9% showed their disapproval of the statement and 7.8% stated that they had no idea about it. These findings demonstrate that there is a tendency among the senior students studying in the Political Science and Public Administration and, International Relations Departments to prefer powerful political leaders to laws and political programs.

In 1994 survey, again the majority of the respondents agreed with this statement (50.2%). The percentages of those who reject the statement was 44.4% and it was 5.4% of the participants who stated that they had no idea / were not sure about the statement. Similar to 2004 findings, the results of 1994 survey also manifest the prevalence of preference for strong political leaders among the senior students studying in the Political Science and Public Administration and, International Relations Departments. In both survey the majority of the respondents preferred strong, determined and faithful political leaders to political programs and laws. In fact, the percentage of those who agreed with this statement showed an increase between the 1994 and 2004 surveys from 50.2% to 63.5%. That is, the belief in the need for a strong leader for the country has increased in the last ten years among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration and, International Relations Departments (Figure 7).

Figure 7: The percentages of the participants' answers to the statement that 'What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, are a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith' in the 1994 and 2004 surveys.



4.2 Testing 'the exaltation of the state' among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations Departments

As already stressed, the Ottoman Empire was a highly centralized and bureaucratic state. The state dominated the society without being restrained by any source of independent power. The only source of politics and power was the state itself. According to Heper, the main reason behind the strong state characteristics of the Ottoman Empire is the nature of the Empire's goals (Heper, 1992: 148). The Ottoman rulers were mainly concerned with political goals of conquest and territorial expansion. The goals of economic strength and growth were ignored. "The de-

emphasis of economic goals which obviated the need to mobilize the social groups enabled the Ottoman rulers to avoid granting these groups political or constitutional rights” (Heper, 1992: 149). So by emphasizing purely political goals, the Ottoman rulers maintained autonomy from the social groups. Rulers’ main area of interest became the central government. Under these circumstances, the society remained subordinate to the state. On the other hand, Frey explains the superior position of the Ottoman state by reference to its Islamic nature (Frey, 1975:47). The Ottoman Sultans were also the caliphs who were responsible for leading the flock along the rules of Shari’ a. For Frey “The merging of state and faith, together with the absence of well developed, independent commercial and social interests, funneled almost all significant talent and attention into politics and onto the state (regime and government)” (Frey, 1975: 48). The union of state and faith indicated the fact that loyalty to the state did not only refer to loyalty to a temporal authority but also to a spiritual authority. Loyalty to a spiritual authority both in direct and indirect ways increased the loyalty and the exaltation of political authority among the flock.

Being autonomous from society, the Ottoman state was valued in its own right. State interests were formulated independently from peripheral forces. The masses, on the other hand, saw the state not as a threat but as a protective father figure. According to Özbudun, state’s paternalistic image among the masses may well be observed in the popular expression ‘*devlet baba*’ (father state) and the popular saying ‘*Allah Devlete, Millete zeval vermesin*’ (May God preserve the state and the Nation) (Özbudun, 2001:95-96). Özbudun stated that the expression ‘*devlet baba*’ shows two tendencies of the masses at the same time (Özbudun, 1990:64). First, the state should


be just and protector. Second, people should not and cannot rebel against state's authority." The exaltation of the state has been fostered consistently through the educational system and the military" (Özbudun, 2001:96). Turkish civilians, to a large extent, have internalized the 'omnipresent' and 'omnipotent' state around their lives (Heper, 1992: 147). Heper introduces the explanation of the chairman of the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen who was asked why employers did not articulate their demands straightforwardly in 1970s as an example for such an attitude among Turkish civilians: " In this country, our philosophy has always been that of taking the 'Papa State' as paramount, refraining from challenging it and of pursuing an economic policy, not in spite of, but with the 'Papa State'.." (Heper, 1992: 147).

If the exaltation of the state among the masses- one of the features of the Turkish political culture- is also relevant for the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations Departments, we should be able to observe a meaningful majority among the sampled youth who agreed with the statement of the survey that 'Freedom of speech does not justify someone's teaching foreign and disloyal ideas in our schools'. The very idea this statement put forward is that the status quo should be protected. Foreign and disloyal ideas have the potential to damage the existing order and therefore their diffusion should be prevented. The statement refers to dislike and intolerance towards different ideas. If there are foreign and disloyal ideas, there must also be domestic and loyal ideas. In this vein, the statement implicitly recognizes the existence of a lofty state whose interests are defined by the state apparatus itself. It conveys the message that foreign and disloyal

ideas should not be taught in our schools and we must be loyal to the existing authorities. Therefore, this statement may well be accepted as an indicator for the exaltation of state trait of the Turkish political culture.

Of the sampled youth in the 2004 survey, while 51% agreed with the statement only 39.9% disagreed with it and 8.6% stated that they had no idea/ were not sure about the statement. These findings reveal that there is exaltation of state among the sampled youth. The survey participants have a tendency to preserve the existing order and protect the state's lofty ideals from foreign and disloyal ideas. However, in democracies state interests develop alongside the social groups. State does not refer to a distinct body above from the society. The ideas, interests and policies of a state are determined simply by the peaceful compromise of different groups and interests in a period of time. In 1994 survey, the same statement was also defended by a meaningful majority of the sample (61%). The percentage of those who disagreed with the statement was 34.5% and it was 4.4% of the participants who stated that they had no idea or was not sure about the statement. From these findings we may argue that similar to the 2004 surveyed students, participants of the 1994 survey tended to exalt the state and thus exhibit the exaltation of state trait of Turkish political culture. By comparing the findings of the 1994 and 2004 surveys, we observe a trend towards less exaltation of state among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations Departments. While the ratio of those who agreed with the statement was 61% in the 1994 survey, it has decreased to 51% in the 2004 survey (Figure 8).

Figure 8: The percentages of the participants' answers to the statement that 'Freedom of speech does not justify someone's teaching foreign and disloyal ideas in our schools' in the 1994 and 2004 surveys.



The present survey statements, as already mentioned, were selected from an international research project on democracy, authoritarianism, multiculturalism and education. In the international survey of 1991-1997, factor analyses showed six factors that were named as psychological authoritarianism, political repression, militarism, multiculturalism, democratic attitudes and attitudes about a democratic political system. The two statements that were examined above are among the items in the scale that reflect authoritarian tendencies, namely 'psychological authoritarian' tendencies. Informed from Theodor W. Adorno's definitions of an authoritarian personality, the conductors of the international survey— Russell Farnen and Jos Meloen- argued that the variable, which they called psychological authoritarianism,

was composed of the statements that included most of the Adorno's items (Farnen R. and Meloen J.D, 2000:24). The two statements analyzed here are also the two statements of this psychological authoritarianism variable developed in the international survey. Along the lines Farnen and Meloen argued, present survey's findings of these two statements show that the sampled youth display authoritarian tendencies. In both surveys of 1994 and 2004, the great majority of the participant university students agreed with the statement that 'What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, are a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith'. They showed preference for strong leaders. Similarly, the majority of the sampled university students agreed with the statement that 'Freedom of speech does not justify someone's teaching foreign and disloyal ideas in our schools'. By agreeing with this statement, the participants indicated that they were against the diffusion of ideas, which they see as foreign and disloyal to the established system. From the findings of this statement, the sampled youth seem to be intolerant of different views and supportive of existing order without too much questioning. In sum, both statements were defended by the majority of the participants. That is, two statements of psychological authoritarianism variable of the international survey worked well among the sampled university students in Turkey and thus, the participants seem, at least to some extent, to display psychological authoritarian tendencies.

Being one of the scholars who examine the role of personality traits in the maintenance of different political systems, Alex Inkeles argues that personality patterns of a society should also be considered as an important element for the

development and maintenance of political system (Inkeles, 1961). He maintained that,

The formal or explicit “content” of one’s political orientation – left or right, conservative or radical, pro-or antilabor - may be determined mainly by more “extrinsic” characteristics such as education and social class; but the form or style of political expression - favoring force or persuasion, compromise or arbitrary dictation, being tolerant or narrowly prejudiced, flexible in policy or rigidly dogmatic - is apparently largely determined by personality (Inkeles, 1961:193).

Accordingly, he defined an ‘authoritarian personality syndrome’ supportive of political extremism. An authoritarian personality display “exaggerated faith in powerful leaders and insistence on absolute obedience to them; hatred of outsiders and deviates; excessive projection of guilt and hostility; extreme cynicism; a sense of powerlessness and ineffectiveness (alienation and anomie); suspicion and distrust of others; and dogmatism and rigidity” (Inkeles, 1961:193). Contrary to an authoritarian personality, he also projects a democratic personality,

(Who is) accepting of others rather than alienated and harshly rejecting; open to new experience, to ideas and impulses rather than excessively timid, fearful, or extremely conventional with regard to new ideas and ways of acting; able to be responsible with constituted authority even though always watchful, rather than blindly submissive to or hostilely rejecting of all authority; tolerant of differences and of ambiguity, rather than rigid and inflexible; able to recognize, control, and channel his emotions, rather than immaturely projecting hostility and other impulses on to others (Inkeles, 1961: 198).

From the points of Inkeles’ definitions, the findings of the two statements examined above seem to indicate that the sampled youth is much more close to authoritarian personality syndrome than a democratic personality if we consider an

authoritarian and democratic personalities to be at the both ends of a spectrum. Both statements, which are analyzed in this work, disclosed some tendencies of the sampled youth, which are stated among the characteristics of an authoritarian personality. When the findings of the first statement is considered, the sampled youth appear to prefer powerful leaders for the solution of the country's problems to laws and political programs. It seems that the participants can easily be submissive to a leader who they define as courageous, tireless, devoted and reliable. However, for Inkeles " At the core of a democratic personality lies a stress on personal autonomy and a certain distance from, if not distrust of, powerful authority, or, to put it negatively, an absence of the need to dominate or submit such as found in the authoritarian personality" (Inkeles, 1961: 196). Similar to the exaltation of powerful leaders, the sampled youth seem to praise the state more than a democratic personality in Inkeles terms actually do. The sampled youth appeared to be against those ideas that are described as foreign and disloyal. They seem not to have tolerance towards different ideas that they regard as having the potential to risk the existing functioning of the political order.

It should also be pointed here again that, contrary to the above analyses, which indicated authoritarian tendencies of the sampled youth, the sampled youth defined themselves as anti-authoritarian. In the self-ratings part of the 1994 and 2004 surveys majority of the respondents ranked themselves as anti-authoritarian as opposed to authoritarian. Today, liberal representative democracy has proved itself as the only viable alternative against authoritarian regime types. As a result, democracy discourse prevents many people from overtly defending authoritarian traits. The authoritarian

tendencies of the sampled youth as against their claims to be anti-authoritarian individuals could be articulated and explained within this framework. Furthermore, Turkey's efforts to become a part of the Western civilization and culture that started from the late 19th Century with the initialization of the Turkish modernization project has shaped today's Turkish youths' perceptions of politics. In this regard, Turkish nation's progress towards more western democratic values also affects new generation's political values and attitudes in addition to the prominence and effectiveness of the democracy discourse in general. Therefore, at least in verbal terms they define themselves as anti-authoritarian.

4.3 Testing the hypotheses

This thesis has two hypotheses. Firstly, in accordance with the Kışlalı's argument that females are apt to prefer strong political leaders more than males, this work sought evidence indicating such a trend among the female students in the 1994 and 2004 surveys. In order to test this hypothesis, we observed the responses of female participants to the statement that 'What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, are a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith'. The crosstabulations of females and those who agreed with this statement produced that while 49.5% of the females favored strong political leaders to party programs and laws, it was 49.7% of the male respondents who also preferred strong leaders for the country in the 1994 survey. It is evident that the data from the 1994 survey lent little support to the hypothesis. In 2004, the ratio of females indicating a need for a strong political leader appeared to be higher (68.3%)

than males (59%). Although we received some support from 2004 findings to our hypothesis, the lack of correspondence between the 1994 and 2004 survey results prevents us to argue for the existence of hypothesized relationship between being female and being more inclined to strong leaders. In this respect, the rise of the preference for strong leaders among the females can be evaluated within the framework of the general shift in the demand for a strong political leader from 1994 to 2004 survey.

Secondly, this thesis hypothesized that the ratio of those who agreed with the statement that 'Freedom of speech does not justify someone's teaching foreign and disloyal ideas in our schools' are to be less among those who defined themselves as liberal since liberals are expected to be more against prohibitions and less attached to the state. Contrary to our expectations, the analysis of crosstabulations between the statement and the liberals produced no confirmation to this hypothesis. In the 1994 survey, almost all the liberals (92.8%) accepted the statement. Although the ratio of defenders of this statement among the liberals has fallen in 2004, still half of the liberals in the 2004 survey (50%) positively evaluated the statement. Therefore, in neither surveys our hypothesis appeared to be accurate.

CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to answer the question of to what extent the two characteristics of Turkish political culture - preference for strong political leaders and the exaltation of state among the masses - are prevalent among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments? Among the features of Turkish political culture, these two traits are commonly studied as the factors detrimental to the well functioning of a democratic regime. It seems sensible that the reason behind the unfavorable effect of the prevalence for strong political leaders among the masses may originate from that the preference for strong political leaders among the masses prepares the ground for the legitimacy of inordinate power uses of political leaders in the eyes of the masses. Feeling supported by the people, political leaders tend to act as the only rulers of the country. They are inclined to personally rule and resist to any kind of oppositions. In this vein, the political arena may easily turn to a platform for personal struggles of the political leaders. Since projecting an image of strong and determined character is the most influential factor that makes them ascend to political power, they try to preserve this image at any cost. To stay in power, they do not feel obliged to be loyal to the system itself but rather feel obliged to preserve their 'father' image and manipulate the masses accordingly. For these purposes, they may easily act contrary to the basic premises of a democratic regime and thus hamper the regime stability.

The exaltation of state is similarly incompatible with a democratic regime. According to this tendency among the masses, the state as an autonomous entity above the society should be just and protector. In their turns, the people should obey the demands of the state. State interests are formulated by the state apparatus themselves in more like 'once and for all' format. In other words, they are treated as stable concepts, which cannot be changed easily. The exaltation of state tendency is unable to get along with idea of a coexistence of ideologies and the rivalry of different interests and ideas through multi-party system since the hostility towards some kind of views is taken for granted by this tendency. However, in democracies government policies and national interest are determined by the accommodation of different interests and views among different groups at a single point of time. The interests, the groups and the end result may change from time to time.

The departments of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations are the major sources of employment in various state and private institutions. The graduates of these departments work as middle and high level managers in the administrative cadres of these institutions. Additionally, they may work in finance and media sectors or choose to continue their careers with academic professionalism. Since they will be the candidates for central positions, especially for the administrative cadres in various key institutions of the country, their tendencies regarding these two characteristics of Turkish political culture are particularly significant. Therefore, the thesis attempted to investigate the popularity of these traits among the senior students of. 'Senior' students were chosen as a sample since it is assumed that they have more settled ideas, attitudes and

characteristics than the students of the lower classes. They took more courses than the departments provided them with than other students of the same departments, which increased their knowledge and broadened their viewpoints. In this regard, they may better represent the students of Public Administration, and International Relations departments than lower class' students.

Chapter one focused on the reviews of selected large-scale surveys conducted on university students in Turkey. The selected surveys were projected to reveal the political attitudes and tendencies of the university students regarding various issues. They are mainly concerned with the attitudes towards democracy, religion and human rights related issues. Indeed, other domains of political tendencies of the university students have been rarely explored systematically with respect to the question of university students' perceptions of authority. Thus, this thesis also aimed to make contributions in this area of research in Turkey.

In chapter two, theoretical context of the thesis was specified. In contrast to the students of politics who are mainly concerned with the structure of political systems, agencies, institutions and their effects on public policy, there is also a trend in political sciences that studies orientations, attitudes, values and their effects on political structure. Central to this trend are the theories of political culture, value change and political socialization.

The very idea political culture studies introduce is that when interpreting various political systems, it is necessary to understand the political orientations of the

individuals who constitute the political system in addition to the institutional and constitutional features of these systems. Political orientations of people are among the determining factors in political life and structure. 'A particular pattern of orientations to political action' is referred by the concept of 'political culture' (Almond, 1956:396). This pattern is different in different political systems and this difference reflects itself in the political systems. However, there is not a one-way relation between political culture and political structure as political culture determines the political structure. Rather they are dynamically interacting and interconnected. That is, a political culture not only directs a political system but is also directed by that system.

In Turkish political culture, the heritage of Ottoman Empire has proven to be significantly evident. The Ottoman Empire was a highly centralized and a bureaucratic state in which all the power was possessed by the Sultans (emperors). No intermediary institutions stood between the state and the society, which may restrain the state's supremacy. Instead, the centralized and autonomous power structures bred a political culture, which exalted the state and service to the state. The paternalistic nature of the state remained significant in Turkish Republic as well. During the revolutionary years of Kemalist period, power stayed centralized and any kind of social divisions were suppressed. Transition to multi-party politics to a large extent came along with a political instability mostly engendered by the antagonisms between the political and state elites; the political and military elites and between the political leaders themselves. State elites believed that political elites were irresponsible for the necessities of the rationalist democracy. On the other hand,

political elites accused the state elites of preventing the realization of the will of the people. From the 1960s, only the military preserved its unity of outlook while intellectual-bureaucratic elite have become fragmented. As a key element of the modernizing coalition, the military viewed it as its duty to intervene in politics when necessary to protect the democracy and fundamental characteristics of the state. Thus, no military interventions resulted in a regime breakdown. In Turkish politics, the antagonisms between the political leaders themselves have also resulted in shortcomings of Turkey's experience with democratic politics. When a political opposition came to power, at that time they failed to tolerate oppositions. Political competition, therefore, easily turned into unrestricted warfare between the political leaders. Clash of personalities not of ideas dominated the Turkish politics. Political leaders have gained popularity by their heroic deeds and people have tended to vote for their personal qualifications not for their ways to pursue and implement policies.

Values can also be seen as motivations or orientations, which direct certain attitudes and opinions and which in turn, guide human action. At least to some extent, a political behavior can be explained from his/her general values. One's general value orientations shape his or her political values. The theory of a value change recognizes the importance of values for the existence and the maintenance of political systems. It attempts to explain causes and effects of value changes on political systems. The theory of value change, which is also referred as Inglehart's postmodernism theory, argues that value priorities in advanced industrial societies tend to shift away from materialist concerns such as economy and security towards greater emphasis on postmodern concerns such as freedom, self-expression and the quality of life. This

shift resulted from intergenerational population replacement. As material orientations such as respect, obedience, discipline and order are losing ground, postmodern orientations such as creativity, personal freedom and emancipation have gained importance among the younger generations. This hypothesis was first tested in a survey of six West European societies conducted in 1970. Accordingly, when asked to select what they believe their country's top goals, older respondents tended to choose materialist concerns such as maintaining order and fighting inflation, while younger generations chose postmaterialist concerns such as self-expression. The World Values Survey carried out in 1981-1983 and 1990-1991 provided further evidence for the investigation of value shifts. The findings demonstrated that this value shift occurs in any society that has experienced enough economic growth in recent decades so that younger birth cohorts have experienced greater economic security in their formative years. But Inglehart also notes that economic development conducive to the existence of postmodern values should follow the process of industrialization and related social and cultural structure changes.

Political socialization research wants to obtain an understanding of when and how do individuals acquire what political knowledge, opinions, skills and attitudes. It aims at defining a process through which an individual gain political orientations and knowledge. For this purposes, it examines the political socialization agents such as family, educational system and media, correlations between political socialization and the characteristics such as age, sex and socio-economic status of the individual, effects of political socialization and the relationship between political socialization and political systems.

Chapter three introduced the methodology of the thesis. For the purposes of answering the thesis question, a survey was conducted of senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments of seven major universities in Ankara and Istanbul. The survey questionnaire was adopted from an international survey carried by Jos Meloen and Russell Farnen. The international project was also conducted in Turkey in 1994 including senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments of eight major universities in Ankara and Istanbul. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya was one of the local researchers in this international project. For a comparative study, he purposively refined the original questionnaire according to the factor analysis and inter-item correlations applied to the 1994 survey and we conducted it in 2004. This thesis introduced the findings of some parts of both surveys (personal information parts, self-ratings parts and the two statements from the opinion and attitudinal statements parts) to do a comparative analysis. The thesis question was also answered on the basis of the comparison between 1994 and 2004 surveys' findings.

Chapter four presented the results of 1994 and 2004 surveys. The comparison between surveys revealed some similarities and differences. To start with the similarities, in surveys, being peaceful, internationalist, equalitarian, universalist, political, liberal and secular appeared as the dominant characteristics of the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments. There seems to be a settled consensus on these defining items among the 1994 and 2004 sampled youths. Another similarity in both surveys occurred in the

nationalist-anti-nationalist scales. This scale did not bring about a defining characteristic for the both surveys' sampled youth. Although, both survey students appeared to be more nationalist than anti-nationalist, the ratio of those who defined themselves as anti-nationalist and undecided were also significantly high. Therefore, we could not conceptualize being nationalist as a defining element of both surveyed university students.

The remarkable changes between both surveys occurred in the scales of anti-authoritarian- authoritarian and leftist-rightist. While being anti-authoritarian was among the dominant characteristics of the 1994 youth, after ten years, it became one of the weak defining elements of the 2004 sampled youth. Although still the ratio of those who defined themselves as anti-authoritarian was higher than those of authoritarians in 2004 survey, the ratio of authoritarians increased such that being anti-authoritarian could not be regarded as a dominant element of the 2004 surveyed youth. In other words, there is a trend towards being more authoritarian among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments. The scale of leftist-rightist also brought about important difference between both surveys. In 1994, the sample was dominated by slightly more leftists than rightists and being leftist did not appear as a dominant characteristic of the 1994 youth due to the fact that the ratio of who defined themselves as rightists and undecided were also considerably high. However, in 2004 being leftist has become one of the defining elements for the sampled youth. The majority of the 2004 survey participants defined themselves as leftist. From 1994 to 2004, the percentage of those who defined themselves as rightists decreased, the percentage of those who

defined themselves as undecided and leftist increased. Under the light of these findings, we observe a trend among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments towards being more leftists. Consequently, the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments seem to becoming more authoritarian and more leftist. In fact, these two trends toward being more authoritarian and leftist do not converge as we expect to find leftists to be more anti-authoritarian than the rightists.

For the examination of prevalence of preference for strong political leaders and the exaltation of state traits of Turkish political culture among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments, we have selected two specific statements from the survey. The findings of the statement that ‘What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, are a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith’ were used to test the commonness of the preference for strong political leaders characteristic among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments. According to the findings of 2004 survey, this statement was supported by 63.5% of the respondents while only 27.9% did not support it and 7.8% declared that they had no idea/were not sure about the statement. In 1994 survey, this statement was also positively evaluated by 50.2% of the respondent students. It was 44.4% of the surveyed youth who disagreed with the statement and 5.4% of the participants who declared that they did not have any idea or were not sure.

The findings of the statement that ‘Freedom of speech does not justify someone’s teaching foreign and disloyal ideas in our schools’ were utilized to determine the dominance of the exaltation of state trait among these students. A derivative implication of the statement is that the diffusion of the foreign and disloyal ideas should be prevented. If there is foreign and disloyal ideas there should also be domestic and loyal ideas to the existing order. The existing order should be protected from the diffuse of foreign and disloyal ideas that have the potential to damage the order. According to this statement the preservation of the status quo is provided by the prohibitions on ideas. Consequently, the state, which is to determine these prohibitions and secure the existing order, should be obeyed and respected. In this regard, this statement indicates loyalty and attachment to state. In the 2004 survey it was defended by the majority of the respondents (51%). The ratio of those who disagreed with it was 39.9% and the ratio of those who declared that they had no idea/ were not sure about the statement is 8.6%. According to the 1994 survey findings, this statement was defended by 61% of the participants while 34.55 disagreed with it and 4.4% of the respondents declared that they did not have any idea or were not sure.

Our study findings with a meaningful majority of the both 1994 and 2004 survey participants positively evaluating the selected statements suggested that the sampled university students exhibit these characteristics of Turkish political culture. The data from our study provided us a clue for the prevalence for strong political leaders and the exaltation of state traits of Turkish political culture among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations

departments. As mentioned earlier, these two statements were chosen to reveal the attitudes of the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments towards authority. The examination of these statements would also enable us to look at authority orientations of the sampled youth. Figures of political leaders and state are indeed the symbols of authority and therefore the orientations towards them would highly imply the sampled youths' tendencies and orientations towards authority. Turning to the data, the research finds evidence for the authoritarian tendencies of the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments. Large number of factors might account for the authoritarian tendencies of these students. A reason behind the authoritarian tendencies of the sampled youth may lie in their perceptions of economic and political life. As revealed in the various surveys conducted on Turkish youth, university students worry about their futures. They see unemployment and inflation as the most important problems of themselves and Turkey. In this regard, an instable and conflict ridden political arena furthers their doubts concerning the economic fluctuations in the country. The lack of dialog and communication in Turkish political agenda affects their confidence in institutional authority in a negative way. The constant disharmony between the various institutions of the state might have made them believe that the problems of Turkey can only be solved through a strong political leader who could effectively resist this discord rather than party programs and laws. In this vein, the sampled university students seem to be ready to submit their personal goals to the desires of 'strong' political leaders. It may also be understood from their approval of the statement 'Freedom of speech does not justify someone's teaching foreign and disloyal ideas in our schools' that they are

against and hostile to any kind of ideas which may cause instability in the existing order. It seems sensible that they seek determination and guarantee. Their commitment to the preservation of the status quo leads to the deference to the state who to protect it.

The comparison of the findings between 1994 and 2004 surveys regarding these two characteristics reveals that while there is an upward trend in the preference for strong political leaders, the exaltation of state is decreasing. The percentage of those who preferred strong political leaders in 2004 (63.%) is higher than those of 1994 participants (50.2%). In other words, in ten years between both surveys, more students come to believe in the need for a strong leader for the country. In contrast, the statement, which was referred to as the exaltation of state, was less supported in 2004 (51%) than in 1994 (61%). After ten years, the students seem to be more open to different views and less inclined to the deference to the state. It is beyond the task of this paper to unravel thoroughly these findings. The explanation of the decrease in the exaltation of state and the increase in the preference for strong political leaders among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments might call for the examination of various factors as economic, political and social. A missing point in one of these domains might mislead the points of discussions. Therefore, the studies on these issues require more in-depth and large-scale systematic and contextual analyses. Possible questions for further investigations might be the followings. What are the reasons behind the increase in the preference for strong political leaders among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments?

What are the reasons behind the decrease in the exaltation of state among the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments? Why the senior students of Political Science and Public Administration, and International Relations departments exhibit the traits of the preference for strong political leaders and the exaltation of state traits of Turkish political culture? What might be the consequences of the authoritarian tendencies of the university students for Turkish political culture and Turkish political life?



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