

UNTOLD STORY OF INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY: The Case of Germany,

Italy, and Austria

by

Gizem Çetin

A Dissertation Submitted to the
Graduate School of Social Science and Humanities
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the degree of

Master of Arts

in

International Relations



**KOÇ
ÜNİVERSİTESİ**

June 25, 2021

UNTOLD STORY OF INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY: The Case of Germany,

Italy, and Austria

Koç University

Graduate School of Social Science and Humanities

This is to certify that I have examined this copy of a master's thesis by

Gizem Çetin

and have found that it is complete and satisfactory in all respects,

and that any and all revisions required by the final

examining committee has been made.

Committee Members:

Prof. Ali Çarkoğlu (Advisor)

Prof. Murat Somer

Assist. Prof. Meral Uğur Çınar

Date: 06.25.2021



To my dear family and friends, thank you for all your support along the way.

Abstract

UNTOLD STORY OF INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY: The Case of Germany, Italy, and Austria

Gizem Çetin

Master of Arts in International Relations

June 25, 2021

This research investigates the intra-party democracies of 19 countries. Based on the classical method of Most Similar Systems Design, Germany, Italy, and Austria are the cases to seek the nature and reasons of differences in intra-party democracies. These cases show how different states that share a common historical and political heritage have different levels of intra-party democracy. The thesis will answer why Germany, Italy, and Austria have different levels of intra-party democracy despite their similarities. The thesis will show that legal provisions and political party ideologies influence the degree of intra-party democracy. Party systems and party types can provide an alternative explanation to legal provisions. The level of democracy, GDP, and Governance levels of the countries are weak and insufficient to explain the different levels of intra-party democracy as these three countries have similar values. To examine the effects of legal provisions and political party ideologies on intra-party politics, this paper uses the Political Party Database Project index as a measure of intra-party democracy and an index constructed in this project to measure the related legal provisions for intra-party democracy. There are two main findings of this research. First, Germany, Italy, and Austria have different levels of intra-party democracy, which can be attributed to the presence of legal provisions regulating intra-party democracy. Second, political party ideologies show that left-wing or environmentalist parties are accepted as acting more democratically than right-wing parties without legal provisions, as in Italy and Austria. Finally, right-wing political parties can follow democratic principles for their internal action with well-established legal provisions, such as Germany.

Keywords: Germany, Italy, Austria, Intra-party Democracy, Legal Regulations, Political Parties' Ideologies

ÖZET

Parti-içi Demokrasinin Anlatılmamış Hikayesi: Almanya, İtalya ve Avusturya

Gizem Çetin

Uluslararası İlişkiler, Yüksek Lisans

25 Haziran, 2021

Bu tez, 19 ülkenin parti içi demokrasilerindeki farklılıkların kapsamını ve doğasını incelemektedir. En Benzer Sistemler Tasarımı metodunu kullanarak Almanya, İtalya ve Avusturya karşılaştırmalı bir bakış açısıyla incelemektedir. Tez çalışması, benzer tarihsel ve siyasi mirası paylaşan devletlerin nasıl farklı düzeylerde parti içi demokrasiye sahip olduğunu göstermektedir. Tez, Almanya, İtalya ve Avusturya'nın sahip olduğu benzerliklere rağmen neden farklı parti içi demokrasi düzeylerine sahip olduğu sorusuna cevap vermektedir. Tez, farklı parti içi demokrasi düzeylerini açıklamak için yasal hükümleri ve siyasi partilerin ideolojilerini kullanacaktır. Parti sistemleri ve parti tipleri önerilen hipotezlere alternatif bir açıklama olması için kullanılabilir. Üç ülkenin demokrasi düzeyi, GSYİH ve Yönetişim düzeyi, benzer puanlara sahip olduğu için, parti içi demokrasilerindeki farklılıkları açıklamak için zayıf ve yetersiz kalmaktadır. Yasal düzenlemelerin ve siyasi partilerin ideolojilerinin parti içi siyaset üzerindeki etkilerini incelemek adına bu tez, parti içi demokrasi ölçümünde Siyasi Parti Veri Tabanı Projesi endeksini ve ilgili yasal hükümleri ölçmek için bu projede oluşturulan bir endeksi kullanılacaktır. Bu araştırmada iki sonuç elde edilmiştir. İlk olarak, Almanya, İtalya ve Avusturya, parti içi demokrasiyi düzenleyen yasal hükümlerin varlığından kaynaklanan farklı bir parti içi demokrasi seviyesine sahiptir. İkinci olarak, siyasi partilerin ideolojileri göz önüne alındığında, İtalya ve Avusturya da olduğu gibi yasal hükümlerin yokluğunda sol veya çevreci partilerin sağ partilere göre daha demokratik davrandıkları görülmektedir. Son olarak, Almanya'nın belirlemiş olduğu yasal hükümler sayesinde, sağ siyasi partiler kendi parti içi eylemlerinde demokratik ilkeleri takip ettikleri gözlemlenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Almanya, İtalya, Avusturya, Parti İçi Demokrasi, Yasal Hükümler, Siyasal Parti İdeolojileri*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis advisor Ali arkoėlu for his guidance and my committee members Murat Somer and Meral Uėur ınar for their feedbacks and time.



TABLE OF CONTENT

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Research Aim and Question.....	2
1.2 Methodology	4
Chapter 2: Literature Review.....	6
2.1 The place of political parties in politics	8
2.2 Party Types	9
2.3 Intra-party Democracy	12
2.3.1 For intra-party democracy	17
2.3.2 Against intra-party democracy	19
2.4 Legal Provisions.....	20
2.5 Political Parties' Ideologies	23
Chapter 3: Research Design	29
3.1 The Cases	29
3.1.1 Case Selection Criteria.....	30
3.2 Theoretical Perspective	35
3.3 Key Variables.....	37
3.3.1 Intra-party Democracy	37
3.3.2 Legal Provisions	41
3.3.3 Political parties' Ideologies	43
3.3.4 Party System and Party Type.....	44
3.3.5 Democracy Level: Polity IV	45
3.3.6 GDP: World Bank.....	46

3.3.7 Governance: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project	46
Chapter 4: Findings & Analysis	48
4.1 Intra-Party Democracy	48
4.2 Legal Provisions.....	50
4.3 Political Parties’ Ideologies	56
4.4 Democracy	59
4.5 GDP.....	60
4.6 Governance	61
4.7 Discussion	62
Chapter 5: Cases in Comparative Perspective.....	66
5.1 Germany	67
5.1.1 Historical Context	67
5.1.2 Political parties and Intra-party democracy	68
5.1.3 Legal Regulations	69
5.1.4 Political parties Ideologies.....	70
5.1.5 Democracy, GDP, and Governance	72
5.2 Italy	74
5.2.1 Historical context	74
5.2.2 Political parties and Intra-party democracy	75
5.2.3 Legal Regulations	76
5.2.4 Political parties Ideologies.....	77
5.2.5 Democracy, GDP, and Governance	78
5.3 Austria.....	79
5.3.1 Historical context	79
5.3.2 Political parties and Intra-party democracy	80
5.3.3 Legal Regulations	81

5.3.4 Political parties Ideologies.....	82
5.3.5 Democracy, GDP, and Governance.....	83
5.4 Discussion.....	84
Chapter 6: Conclusion.....	88
6.1 Limitations	90
6.2 Policy Implications	90
6.3 Future Research Agenda	91
REFERENCES	93
APPENDIX A.....	103



LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 2.1: CHRONOLOGY OF POST-WAR LEGISLATION ON POLITICAL PARTIES.	22
TABLE 3.1: INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY AND ITS COMPONENTS.	39
TABLE 4.1: MEAN OF INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY.	49
TABLE 4.2:LEGAL PROVISION INDEX.....	52
TABLE 5.1:GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES’ INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & IDEOLOGIES.	71
TABLE 5.2: ITALIAN POLITICAL PARTIES’ INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY& IDEOLOGIES.	77
TABLE 5.3:AUSTRIAN POLITICAL PARTIES’ INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & IDEOLOGIES.	82
TABLE 5.4:CASE SELECTION.	84
TABLE 5.5:POLITICAL PARTIES’ INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY SCORES.....	85

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 3.1:DEMOCRACY OF 19 COUNTRIES.....	31
FIGURE 3.2: INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & GDP.....	32
FIGURE 3.3: LEGAL PROVISIONS OF 19 COUNTRIES.....	33
FIGURE 4.1:INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY SCORE OF 19 COUNTRIES.	50
FIGURE 4.2: LEGAL PROVISIONS.	51
FIGURE 4.3:INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & LEGAL PROVISIONS.....	55
FIGURE 4.4: LEFT-RIGHT SCALE OF 19 COUNTRIES.....	57
FIGURE 4.5: INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & LEFT-RIGHT POSITION.	59
FIGURE 4.6:INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & DEMOCRACY.....	60
FIGURE 4.7: INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE.....	62
FIGURE 5.1: GDP PER CAPITA (CURRENT US\$).....	72
FIGURE 5.2:GOVERNANCE INDICATOR (RULE OF LAW).....	73

Chapter 1:

INTRODUCTION

Scholars of comparative politics have been interested in party politics, especially in democratic systems, since the 1940s (Almond & Powell, 1966; Bäck, Debus & W Müller, 2011; Crotty, 1970; Down, 1957; Duverger, 1954; Kitschelt, 2019; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Ostrogorski, 1982; Scarrow, 1998; Schattschneider, 1942;). In many democracies, political parties act as gatekeepers, providing a link between voters and elected officials. Thus, political parties are the cornerstones of democracies. However, since political party organizations do not have a unified structure, internal party politics' studies did not hold until the 1990s. Although scholars (Cross & Katz, 2013; Scarrow et al., 2017; von dem Berge et al., 2013) have developed different perspectives and definitions of intra-party politics, it is still challenging to find a universal definition and measurement method for intra-party democracy. Moreover, the structure of intra-party politics is more controversial than the definition of the concept, as scholars have different opinions on whether democratic rules are a necessity in the political party. However, after decades, it has become possible to define and measure intra-party democracy.

Another fuzzy area for politics is the legal regulations in the case of intra-party politics. The issue is whether there are regulations that govern intra-party action. There is diversity in the degree of legal regulation in a country. In addition, the nature of regulation is also an important point to consider. Laws do not always serve democracy and are made to secure it. Some scholars (Mersel, 2006; Meyer, 2010; Sjoebloom, 1968) believe that so many laws and restrictions to protect democracy could be dangerous for democracy. On the other hand, others (Allern & Pedersen, 2007, 1970) believe that regulations are prerequisites for building a stable democratic order for rulers and citizens.

Moreover, despite regulated norms and laws, their effect is questionable. Even if there are regulations on a particular issue, the rules are not followed and obeyed when implemented. Therefore, only looking at the existence of laws cannot give a complete picture and cannot tell the whole story of the case. Therefore, this study focuses on the

absence of legal provisions and the observable results of these provisions on intra-party democracy.

Moreover, this thesis will show that political party ideologies have an essential role in intra-party democracy (IPD) without legal regulation. Countries with more left-wing parties have higher scores on intra-party democracy than countries with a less left-wing political party. Italy and Austria will be used to prove the ideology argument. The extent of intra-party democracy may differ from country to country and even from party to party in the same country. Therefore, the environment that triggers these differences should be elaborated. I suggest that the differences between democratic countries stem from the different levels of legislation associated with political parties and the different ideologies of political parties. In addition, the level of democracy, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the level of governance in that country may impact the issue. Finally, to support my arguments and make a more robust comparison, the party types and party systems of Germany, Italy, and Austria will be examined. However, the results will show that Germany, Italy, and Austria have the same party systems. Furthermore, the party types will not open a new window. However, they will only serve to support the ideological arguments of the political parties, as the party types and the ideologies of the political parties are interrelated.

1.1 Research Aim and Question

This thesis's central question is: What are the reasons for differences in the level of intra-party democracy in 19 countries? This thesis examines the two possible reasons: legal provisions and ideologies of political parties in 19 countries. However, 19 countries have different features such as democracy level, party systems, or GDP that can affect intra-party democracy. Therefore, to avoid other factors' influence and only focus on legal provisions and ideologies, three countries will be selected based on Mill's method's most similar system design. Germany, Italy, and Austria. The search for the reasons for the different levels of intra-party democracy in Germany, Italy, and Austria is the main objective of this research. The study is primarily aimed at the influence of legal provisions on intra-party democracy. The ideologies of political parties are used as a secondary reason for different levels of intra-party democracy across countries. To the best of my knowledge, no index has been created based on legal provisions to measure intra-party

democracy, although several statements are on the relationship between legal regulation and intra-party democracy in the Political party database project. In addition, the influence of political ideologies on intra-party democracy has been studied in the past. Some political ideologies directly affect the level of intra-party democracy even in the absence of legal regulation. For example, left-wing or environmentalist political parties tend to be internally democratic compared to right-wing political parties (Scarrow et al., 2017). However, there is no research showing the relationship between ideologies and legal regulations.

Moreover, the level of democracy and the level of governance of countries are weak and insufficient factors to explain different levels of intra-party democracy as they have similar values. Finally, the political party system and political party type (mass, cadre, catch-all, etc.) can be considered factors are influencing intra-party democracy. For example, on the one hand, elite and cadre parties may be more authoritarian. On the other hand, mass or catch-all parties are more democratic within the party (Sartori, 2005). These three countries have a multi-party system that allows for diversity and opportunity for political parties.

In addition, the political parties in these countries have had similar experiences and formation processes. Therefore, political parties and party systems are the only control variables that support the hypotheses for this thesis. In addition, institutional or political actors' compliance with rules, the period in which the law was implemented, and the culture of the rule of law in that country are some factors that may make legal rules a less effective variable. However, these factors are not a problem in these countries because Germany, Italy, and Austria have well-established legal rules and institutions that adhere to order. These countries have a long history of democracy, and with that comes traditional long-lived political parties. Long historical heritage means that legal rules can play a crucial role in determining the level of intra-party democracy. The ideologies of political parties can influence the internal actions of political parties and the way they govern.

1.2 Methodology

This thesis will use the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) method to find an answer for different levels of intra-party democracy. The quantitative and contextual evidence is available in the literature in the case of measuring intra-party democracy from scholars Scarrow, Webb, and Poguntke from Political Party Database Project (IPD-Indices-Detailed Explanation of Construction Part I: Selection of PPDB-Items for the IPD-Indices PPDB- Answer-Option IPD-Value Effect on IPD, 2017). This database comprises 19 countries' intra-party democracy scores. For intra-party democracy score, this thesis will use the Political Party Database Project. It will use the same database to assess the scores of political parties individually. In addition, this research will also measure the number of legal provisions that regulate intra-party democracy for 19 countries. There is no available data for legal provisions. Therefore, legal provision data will be collected in this research. The legal provisions index will be counted as a primary contribution of the literature for this thesis. The relationship between these variables will be done by comparing Germany, Italy, and Austria. In addition, for the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, data will be derived from World Bank scores (World Bank Open Data | Data, 2015). Furthermore, the Polity IV index is used to measure the countries' level of democracy. Finally, governance scores are taken from the World Bank Governance Index (Worldwide Governance Indicators | DataBank, 2015).

This thesis is organized in the following structure: Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature related to political parties, internal party politics, legal provisions, political parties' ideologies, and its relations with intra-party democracy. Therefore, in Chapter 2, this research elaborates different arguments related to the key variables. Chapter 3 explains in detail which methods will be used in this research. In Chapter 4, the findings of this research will be reported. Firstly, it traces the relationship between Intra-party democracy and legal regulations for 19 countries that Political Party Database Project has. The results will show that for 19 countries, it is hard to find a correlation because of country-specific factors. Therefore, the thesis will focus on the cases to show the linkage between intra-party democracy and legislation concerning political parties' ideologies. This chapter will show that legal regulations impact Germany, Italy, and Austria's intra-

party democracy. Lastly, Chapter 5 is the conclusion part that discusses the findings, addresses limitations to this research, and offers potential areas for further research.



Chapter 2:

Literature Review

With modern democracy, political parties enter political life (Cross & Katz, 2013). They play an intermediary role between citizens and states. Therefore, they are considered an indispensable part of democracy and a prerequisite for consolidated democracy. Intra-party democracy is the essential piece of the puzzle of this research. Therefore, defining and understanding intra-party democracy is crucial. However, like democracy itself, intra-party democracy is hard to define and conceptualize. The concept opens an interpretation due to the broadness of the field. Different political parties applied different principles based on their goals in the case of intra-party democracy. For example, populist political parties have a different understanding of intra-party democracy from parties like Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, scholars have different criteria and conceptualization of intra-party democracy, explained in detail below. Firstly, a political party's internal and external actions are two separate areas that can be acted independently from each other. Meanwhile, a political party can be externally democratic, and its policies can be stem from democratic principles while it is internally undemocratic and authoritarian. Alternatively, a political party like Green parties can be both outwardly and inwardly democratic. However, generally outwardly undemocratic political parties have authoritarian party structure and undemocratic rules inside parties such as far-right religious parties. Therefore, there is no one rigid standard of intra-party democracy. However, from time to time, the external actions of political parties are undemocratic and pose a threat to democracy. Especially after the Second World War, many extremists political parties (e.g., communist, far-right, political wings of terrorist groups) were established (Bourne, 2020). These extremist political parties created a dilemma for democracies: banning or restricting these political parties may help protect democracy, but it will damage the essence of liberal democratic principles such as freedom of speech and representation. Therefore, states responded differently to this challenge (Bourne, 2020; Bourne & Casal, 2014). For instance, some states intervene to regulate the external actions of political parties to prevent a possible threat to democracy. Several states made excessive use of their power in dissolving extremist political parties, and their decisions

were re-evaluated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (Mersel, 2006). The Council of Europe declared its adverse reaction to extremist and non-democratic political parties (Mersel, 2006). On the other hand, some states took more reasonable precautions, such as legal regulations that follow democratic principles. As a result, the state did not initially regulate the internal actions of political parties but also intervened in the external actions of political parties. Over time, some states also interfered with the internal actions of political parties and forced them to be internally democratic. In this case, there are severe counterarguments to whether political parties should be internally democratic or not and whether the state should intervene or not.

As mentioned above, there is a debate for intra-party democracy whether political parties are internally democratic or not. However, it will not be debated in this thesis. Every political party has internal democracy to some degree; however, there is a difference in the levels of internal party democracy in countries. So, what is the reason for these different levels of intra-party democracy? Legal regulations imposed by the state can influence internal party democracy. On the other hand, political party ideology, independent of other factors, can be a determinant of intra-party democracy. This thesis examines the factors that influence intra-party democracy for Germany, Italy, and Austria.

This chapter reviews the existing literature on the relationship between intra-party democracy, legal provisions, and political party ideologies. It begins with an overview of political parties and intra-party democracy. Next, it traces competing arguments regarding the internal structure of political parties, whether political parties are intra-party democratic. From there, it reviews Micheal's iron laws of oligarchy, historical institutionalization, and the Life-Cycle approach. He then addresses the impact of legal provisions (state laws) on intra-party democracy. Finally, he concludes with an overview of political party ideologies and their relationship to the level of intra-party democracy.

2.1 The place of political parties in politics

“Political parties are micropolitical systems.”

(Ignazi, 2014, pp. 162)

The term political parties refer to “... associations with various structures, institutions, memberships, and rules, which are distinct from such features as activities, programs, and declaration (Mersel, 2006). According to Scarrow, in the 19th century, there was a rise of party politics to respond to the transformation to democracy in Europe and North America (2005). Political parties were the key point in the representative process. Many scholars agree that political parties cannot exist without democracy. Max Weber said that “political parties are the children of the democracy, of a mass franchise, of the necessity to woo and organize the masses” (Weissenbach & Weber, n.d.). According to James Bryce, “Political parties are inevitable: no free country has been without them, and no one has shown how representative government work without them” (2002). In E. E. Schattschneider’s famous formulation, “Political parties created modern democracy, and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties.” (1942, pp. 1).

It does not mean that political parties always serve democracy. for example, Leninist or ultranationalist political parties concentrated power into a leader and created autocracies rather than democracies (Mersel, 2006). Although from time to time, political parties were challenged in the case of their place and necessity in the system, during the 1900s, scholars still defended political parties as to the “heart of the political system” (Webb, 2005). Political parties are able citizens to reach information easily. These institutions are a cheaper way to mobilize people and fulfill the monitoring function in the system easily compared to individuals in direct democracies. Furthermore, political parties educate people to choose policies that are advantageous to them. Therefore, political parties are the fundamental institutions of democracy since they ensure democratic accountability and government responsiveness, giving citizens multiple policy choices and building a link between citizens and government to deliver their preferences (Dalton et al., 2011, pp. 3-27). Although these institutions are an essential part of democracy, their action can be

non-democratic externally and internally (Musil, 2011, pp. 1-30). Therefore, political parties could be a threat to democracy, and thus they were dissolved or banned many times during history. Like the nineteenth century's France and Spain cases that mentioned above due to their external non-democratic actions, 'Nazi Opposition Party' and 'the Communist Party during the Weimar Republic, or the 'Communist party' in Italy in the 1950 and 1960s were banned (Smith, 1989; Paterson and Webber & Pridham qt. in Mersel, 2006). Germany, Turkey, Poland, Spain, and Italy are the countries that open a party ban if the parties' ideology is a threat to the democracy's fundamental values.

On the other hand, some countries like the US and UK are not welcomed to ban a party by the state because they do not see them as a threat in the first place (Mersel, 2006). Generally, during history, external activities of a party evaluated by the state whether this action is a threat to the democracy. Internal activities of parties were not considered as a general risk for the democracy. Nevertheless, the internal actions of a political party give a clue for its tendency and general attitude toward democracy. Meanwhile, internal actions are the reflections of external behaviors.

In the light of all these explanations mentioned above, political parties have been an indispensable part of the democratic history of a country. However, the structure and function of political parties are debatable and show fluctuation over time.

2.2 Party Types

Political scientists have proposed various typologies and models to explain the features of political parties for nearly a century. Therefore, the literature full of various categories of party types accepted as the basis of the party types and used for decades (Duverger, 1954; Kirchheimer, 1966; Neumann, 1950). However, according to some scholars, classic typologies of political parties do not capture the features of modern political parties (Gunther & Diamond, 2003).

The typology of the political parties started with Max Weber at the beginning of the 20th century (Simon & núm, 2003). Weber seeks to answer the question of "What is the political party representing" (Simon & núm, 2003). He studied parties into two types: *the party of elites* and the *party of masses*. In the elite type of parties, power figures come from the persons who are lawyers, doctors, businessmen, leading officials. Their power

stems from their position in society and their financial positions. However, political activity is a secondary activity for these people. Therefore, in this type of party, members accidentally collect votes for elections. The organization is less organized and structured. The inner life of the political party works not with the number of votes but is based on trust and social hierarchy. However, with the expansion of the right to vote, mass party types appeared—this type of political parties run by professional politics who dedicated their lives to this.

Furthermore, mass parties have an organized and structured organizational structure that targets votes compared to elite parties. In addition, Weber multiple his typologies and added a new perspective for grouping political parties. According to him, the aims of the political party leader are another criterion for categorization. Based on this understanding, the patronage party, the class party, and the ideology party appeared. In the patronage party, the main aim is to determine the leader's power and decision-making for its clientele and its leadership. In the class party, the focus is on the ideas and interests of a particular class. Lastly, the ideological party functioned based on theoretical principles.

Duverger made his systematic classification of political party types in the fifties (Duverger, 1954). His classification is based on two criteria: the organizational setting and the relation of the membership. He examines the organization into four categories: party cell, party militia, caucus, and branch. The cell and militia were considered half-military organizations like the 20s and 30s political parties (Duverger, 1954). Bolshevik-type communist organizations are accepted as cell-type organizations. Both aimed to turn the system into a military dictatorship instead of democracy. Caucus types have similarities with Weber's elite party, and branch type is similar to the mass party type targeted to increase membership (Simon & núm, 2003). In the party membership classification, he separated parties into two as *mass parties* and *cadre parties*. In the caucus and branch parties, the distinguishing feature is the number of members. A cadre party (elite party, caucus type party) consists of a selected limited number of people.

On the other hand, collecting more members who are part of the working class is the main aim of mass parties (Gunther, 2003). In the cadre party, links between the leader and members are weak compared to the mass party. On the other hand, there is a more significant number of members and financial resources to finance their agendas in the mass parties. Therefore, mass parties need to be an organized and robust link between leaders and members. In addition, in the mass parties, votes matter; therefore, these parties

are more democratic than the cadre or elite parties in that decisions are made by a small number of people and based on their status in society.

Nevertheless, the systematization of the Duverger as caucus/cadre party and branch/mass party are not different from each other. Some principles of the Duverger are still used today, such as organizational and membership-based classification. However, caucus and cadre parties lived only in the 20th century (Simon & núm, 2003). Political parties transformed over the years, and new parties emerged, so scholars came up with new classifications to explain changes in political parties. However, the principles of the former classification did not change drastically (Sartori, 2005).

According to Weber, political parties are the means of attaining power; however, Neumann took attention to the mediator role of political parties between the organization and its members. Weber makes separation as an individual representative and integrative social parties. Also, he made a sub-category as a democratic integrative part and totalitarian integrative party. The fundamental distinction between these two is the degree of exclusion. In democratic integration, there is less exclusion than a totalitarian one. This classification is targeted to address modern political parties. In the individual representative parties, Weber repeated his category of an elite category. In this group of political parties, there is low political mobilization and participation. Neumann's contributed to the analyses of integrative political parties. In the integrative parties, there is a strong commitment with members. According to Weber, this commitment could be seen only in the party finance, such as membership fees; however, Neumann claimed that it is limited to the finance, but evidence can also be seen in the daily life in the parties' activities. Integrative political parties focus on the specific social groups of society, such as young people, women, or trade unionists, that they bring together under the party and express their interest with their involvement. The aim of the parties takes the attention of everyone and makes a member of the party. Neumann claimed that social-democrat parties and religious parties are examples of democratic integrative parties, and the Bolshevik and the fascist parties are totalitarian integrative parties (Neumann, 1950). In 1966 Kirchheimer proposed a new type of party based on changing characteristics of Western European Parties after WWII. According to him, the space between traditional classes became less important, so political parties changed their ideological ties and more focused on the masses. Conservative, liberal, and social democrat parties were equally affected and turned into a more pragmatic agenda (Kirchheimer, 1966). In the catch-all

parties, ideological features became less important; the executive branch of the party aim to gain more power, more plurality of interests, and support groups. According to him, catch-all parties could reach roader groups in the society and had a chance to be more successful.

To sum up, Duverger, Neumann, and Kirchheimer believed in categorizing political parties based on some characteristics. However, they also believed that these political parties were more visible in some periods of history. For example, in the 19th century, there was a time for elite parties which powered concrete of a small number of people and came from a small number of people. Between the 1880s and 1960s, mass parties dominated politics, which targeted more people than elite parties. Finally, during the 1970s, there was a rise of cartel parties in which party leaders see politics as an occupation and income resource. According to Katz and Mair, cartel parties mainly targeted the seat in parliament because it represented their power, so they blocked new emerging and small parties from the competition (Katz & Mair, 1995).

Therefore, the authors presented the various type of political parties during history based on their characteristics. In the 21st century, some of the parties carry the features of the old type of parties, some of the new. However, new political parties did not cancel old ones. Political parties simultaneously exist and emerge into politics.

2.3 Intra-party Democracy

“If state-level democracy cannot flourish save for parties, the questions inevitably arise of whether the parties themselves must be, should be, and are internally democratic with respect to their own decision-making practices and distributions of authority or influence.”

(Cross & Katz, 2013, pp. 1)

Political parties are cornerstones of political societies. They work for the interest of citizens, transform interests into policies, and provide an alternative. In addition, they train politicians and leaders and build a mechanism to control government institutions. Political parties are organizational bases to form a government if they are the majority; on the other hand, they form an opposition when they are in the minority. Briefly, political parties guarantee that voters and their interests will be represented in the parliament.

Therefore, there is no doubt that political parties are an essential part of the political system. While they play an essential role in voters' representation, the question is how they decide the process of decision-making and implementation. To what extent political parties act internally democratic to promote democracy in the society at large. Therefore, their internal and external actions are essential. In the 1950s, the debate did not relate to the intra-party structure or intra-party democracy. Much research is related to party politics because the literature focuses on party systems and inter-party competition.

Meanwhile, the differences between the single-party system and the two-party systems or multi-party systems and the competition relation among them started to become a most studied topic in party politics by scholars. However, there was no adequate scale for measuring inter-party competition and the stability mechanisms of the party system yet. In the 1960s, there was still no clear definition of intra-party democracy; however, the term started to be used in the articles, and in a sense, they started to study intra-party structure. For example, Lester G. Seligman (1961) wrote on the candidate selection process of the different ideological parties in the different levels of the competitive environment. He builds his article based on the different institutional settings of recruiting political candidates, such as the convention system and the primary system (Seligman, 1961).

Nevertheless, works were still very far away from today's understanding of the intra-party structure because there was no mention of the intra-party democracy, its definition, and its importance. In the 1970s- and 1980s-Party competition was a hot topic but not in the internal sphere of the party but outside of the party. Therefore, measuring the party competition had the priority for many scholars. For example, David J. Elkins build his hypothesis based on the measurement of the party competition in the "The Measurement of Party Competition" article (1974). He mentioned the dynamics of the intra-party structure and its influence in the inter-party competition, especially in the USA primary election case. However, he did not go further to just mention (Elkins, 1974). Instead of explaining the intra-party structure, he used political campaigns, mass media, and the one-party system to measure inter-party competition (Elkins, 1974).

Party politics has significant importance in the literature since the 1950s. However, internal party politics was not able to take attention up until the 1990s. Even scholars came up with various perspectives, theories, and definitions of intra-party politics; it is hard to find a universal definition and way of measuring or defining intra-party

democracy. Political parties are the fundamental actors for political accountability, bring voters' interests together and turn these preferences into policies. Political parties perform their actions according to the institutionalized agenda that citizens informed and evaluate the results of policies. In modern democracies, individuals have an essential influence on politics with organized collective action. This collective action can be throughout political parties or unrests. Without political parties, there would be no legitimate sources for evaluating the government's performance. Therefore, it will cause dissatisfaction and social unrest (Mersel, 2006; Musil, 2011, pp. 53-90). Therefore, political parties provide a platform to easily influence politics and access information without taking more risks or costs.

Intra-party democracy is a broad term that includes deliberation and the decision-making process. According to Mimpen, there is no universal definition of intra-party politics; however, scholars agree on the basic principles of the concept, such as accountability, transparency, inclusivity, participation, and representation (2007). Internal party democracy can be understood by looking into party organization (Mimpen, 2007). Political parties have party organizations. Some of them are very informal, but others are very professional and constitutionalized. Intra-party democracy has different faces, and practices differ in the party organizations. Young and Cross mentioned different versions of intra-party democracy in their articles (Young & Cross, 2002). However, according to the democratic theory, two fundamentally distinct modes of democratic decision-making are applied for intra-party democracy. Decision-making can be followed in direct (plebiscitary) or representative (assembly-based) decision-making (Kriesi, 2005, pp. 19-42). In assembly-based decision-making, decisions are made collectively with discussion, exchange, and negotiation over ideas in assembly or forum. On the contrary, there is no debate, exchange of ideas, or negotiation for ideas in plebiscitary decision-making. The main differences are to propose an alternative. In the plebiscitary, the only maneuver for the decision-making process is saying either/or. From the political parties' perspective, some political parties open decisions to citizens who claim to be party supporters, such as US primaries. There is no universal definition of intra-party democracy because the discussion above shows two different faces of intra-party democracy. According to Cross and Katz, intra-party democracy cannot be measured scientifically (2013). However, there is well-known democracy indicators that implemented state-level to measure democracy. Therefore, these indicators can be applied

to the political parties. Most of the studies accepted some of the basic principles of intra-party democracy: accountability, transparency, inclusivity, participation, and representation. With the valid common denominator, intra-party democracy can be conceptualized and measured (Scarrow et al., 2017). Cross and Katz summarized intra-party democracy's central points in the following quote:

“Like democracy itself, the definition of intra-party democracy is essentially contestable. (a) Is it primarily about participation, inclusiveness, centralization, accountability, or something else altogether? (b) Should the emphasis be on outcomes or the process? For example, if inclusiveness is a critical consideration in terms of candidate selection, is the concern about the inclusiveness of the selectorate (those who choose the candidates), or is it about the diversity of the group of candidates ultimately selected? (c) Moreover, who is either group meant to be inclusive of -party members, party supporters in the electorate, the electorate generally?” (2013).

In the literature, intra-party democracy is generally conceptualized as summarized by Cross & Katz. Therefore, in this thesis, the exact measurement and defining factors of intra-party democracy will be applied. Generally, participation is the primary focal point for intra-party democracy. Therefore, the conceptualization of intra-party democracy starts with inclusiveness, according to Scarrow, von dem Berge, and Poguntke. In inclusiveness, a wide circle of party decision-makers is the key. In inclusive parties, central issues are decided by many party members.

On the other hand, in the exclusive parties, decisions such as candidate selection, leadership selections, manifesto decisions are decided by a small number of people (single leader or a few leaders). From this perspective, inclusiveness is accepted as a most important indicator for determining intra-party democracy (see, e.g., Cross & Katz, 2013; Gauja, 2013, pp. 11-32; von dem Berge et al., 2013, pp.1-15). For this definition of inclusiveness, *participation*, *centralization*, and *accountability* are the fundamental aspects. The degree of inclusiveness in the decision-making process, such as manifesto, leadership selection, or candidate selection, is directly related to *participation*. *Centralization* is also related to inclusiveness (directly intra-party democracy). In centralized parties' decisions are made by a small number of members, and in decentralized parties' decisions are made by many members (Scarrow, 2005). State-level centralization can be applied at the party level (Bille, 2001). In comparison, decentralized parties' decisions can be influenced by different layers. Even a political party is highly

decentralized, and it can be undemocratic (exclusive) internally; moreover, a party can be centralized and internally democratic (inclusive).

However, there is a crucial factor that differentiates centralized and decentralized parties. In the decentralized inclusive (democratic) political parties, decisions are made by different party layers, while in the centralized exclusive (undemocratic) parties, decisions are made by a single power. Therefore, more actors are involved in the decision-making process than a centralized party in the decentralized party. From this perspective, decentralized political parties are somehow accepted as more democratic (inclusiveness), according to von dem Berge and Poguntke (2017). Therefore, decentralization is accepted as one aspect of intra-party democracy (von dem Berge, 2017). Lastly, the conceptualization of the intra-party democracy includes accountability, which means the party leader has responsibility for the party congress. Therefore, decision-making processes are more crowded; they directly control the leader with their decision-making power. On the other hand, members' decisions cannot be controlled by members in the exclusive parties because members are not involved in the decision-making process (Scarrow et al., 2017).

To sum up, intra-party democracy equals to inclusiveness level of the political parties in the following terms: a high number of members in the decision-making process, composition of party organs and more open elections, more shared power among party leaders, more inclusive party actors, the more inclusive a party is -therefore the more *democratic*.

The second point of the Cross and Katz definition is whether the highlight should be on the *process* or *outcomes* (Cross & Katz, 2013). Their definition answers that the process is more important than the outcomes. In intra-party democracy, the selectorate (process) inclusiveness is more critical than the selected (outcomes) inclusiveness for candidate selection. The decision-making process in the party is a more crucial and determinant factor because the primary concern is the conceptualization and measuring of intra-party democracy. Even though the process is democratic and inclusive, the outcome can be undemocratic and negatively influenced, but it is not the point for the debate. The question is not whether political parties should be democratic or not for the sake of the state. Lastly, Cross and Katz mentioned *the demos* in their conceptualization of intra-party democracy (Cross & Katz, 2013). Should party members, party supporters, or the entire electorate of the country be accounted for in the inclusiveness of a party? According to von dem Berge

and Poguntke's conceptualization of the intra-party democracy, the focus should be party members because outsiders should not be deciding the future of the internal actions of the party (Indriðason & Kristinsson, 2012). However, with the changing conditions of today, von dem Berge and Poguntke consider open primaries for exceptional cases in the conceptualization of intra-party democracy.

The literature contains significant debate on having internal party democracy. In the next section, there are counterarguments for intra-party democracy.

2.3.1 *For intra-party democracy*

“Intra-party democracy contributes to the stability and legitimacy of the democracies in which these parties compete for power.”

(Scarrow, 2005, pp. 3)

Scholars (Sjöblom, 1968; Mersel, 2006; Meyer, 2010; Rahat & Shapira, 2017) believe that parties should both externally and internally democratic for the well-being of political parties and countries. As a first reason, democracy supposed to provide equality and liberty, so why could party members not practice these rights in the party? In modern democracies, individuals have freedom and the right to equality, so they should have these rights and freedom in the political parties responsible for democracy (Meyer, 2010). Experiencing similar patterns and the tendency within the political parties with the country provide a political party more acceptance and protection by individuals. Secondly, the excessive power of the party leader would damage democracy. In a non-democratic political party, the party leader may close the party to new members and opinions. Therefore, parties may depend on one man and tie with existed rules without any changes (Rahat & Shapira, 2017).

In some cases, party leaders act as a protector of intra-party democracy (Sjöblom, 1968). According to Sjöblom, the parties' main target is to establish coherence in the party. To set coherence, democracy is the most effective way. With the democratic order, coherent may be ensured. For example, Green Parties are established for environmentalist purposes and safe-guarding democratic order in the parties hindering centralized structure (Harmel & Janda, 1994; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997, pp. 1-40). Roberto Micheals mentioned the fear of excessive power of the party leadership in his Iron Law of Oligarchy thesis.

According to him, political parties represent society. Also, as a part of its sociological characteristic, political parties concreate power and influence society. In the absence of internal democracy, the party leader is willing to collect more and more power on himself, which weakens the members' power. This tendency will be reflected in society, and society will be oppressed and controlled by individuals (Mersel, 2006). Thirdly, internal actions will resemble the external scope (Mersel, 2006).

Meanwhile, non-democratic parties may practice undemocratic party rule when they are elected. With the internally democratic party structure, there will be no room for the idea of undemocratic actions externally. It is debatable that internally undemocratic political parties cannot act externally democratic. However, internal policies and predispositions may affect the long run's political parties' external activities (Mersel, 2006). Furthermore, visa verse may also: an internally democratic political party may perform undemocratic behaviors when elected, such as Trump's case. These are unexpected outcomes that cannot be predicted because, in the democratically elected political party, the leader should represent the party members' ideas. Also, one should know there will be a punishment and reward mechanism if he acts against the general will of the party, such as re-election or not. Suppose he or she can preserve power without concerning re-election. In that case, it means that the internal democracy of the party was broken and would shift its position into a more authoritarian way. However, these cases are rare because, in the democratic internal party structure, decisions are made by the members, not only one person, so the undemocratic actions should come from the many members. Political parties have similar stories and working mechanisms in countries. A country leader can be elected with democratic elections and may act as an authoritarian after the election. This transition in the administration may also damage countries' democracy.

Meanwhile, democratic principles may create undemocratic leaders, but it does not mean that democratic principles are dangerous for democracy. Lastly, parties are formed to represent society's ideas. However, if the party is not democratic, it will not represent the whole only act according to the leader or a small number of the people in the party. Moreover, the mere existence of intra-party democracy will give an extra controlling and monitoring maneuver to citizens for elected officials. Therefore, concerning counterarguments, internal party democracy is necessary and needed to serve and protect democracy.

2.3.2 *Against intra-party democracy*

“Democracy on a large scale is not the sum of many little democracies.”

(Sartori, 1965, pp. 124).

Some scholars believe that if democracy is implemented correctly, undemocratic political parties will not damage the state-level democracy (Dahl, 1970; Sartori, 1987). Moreover, having a fully democratic intra-party structure may cause severe problems. For example, with the more inclusive member selection process, candidates would serve non-party mediators instead of the party itself, such as mass media, campaign professionals, donors, and some special interests. Their individualistic actions would harm the pluralist image of the political parties. Their motivation may be centered on their interest in taking an interest in media on themselves. Too much dependence on non-party actors may create more problems for a fair environment because dependency on donors may cause corruption. This situation turns into insufficient coverage in media because of the over-focus on the special interests of members. Therefore, negative media coverage damages the political party's public image and creates a legitimacy problem.

Furthermore, political parties may fail to accomplish their national goals (Rahat & Shapira, 2017). In addition, scholars (Allern & Pedersen, 2007) believe that a completely democratic intra-party structure will damage the party discipline and parties' ideology. For example, some parties could have fundamentalist religious ideology, which means men are superior to the women in the position. In addition, they could be ultranationalists, where party leaders are the spiritual leaders of the party (Mersel, 2006). Furthermore, the imposition of an intra-party democracy will damage the pluralist idea of democracy (Allern & Pedersen, 2007). Therefore, some scholars believe that there should be no legal provisions that regulate the intra-party structure for these reasons.

Although scholars have opposite sides for intra-party democracy, there is no doubt that intra-party democracy matters for political parties and states. However, many countries prefer not to force any rule for intra-party democracy and regulate the internal actions of democratic parties. Therefore, a variety in the level of intra-party democracy between political parties is expected for scholars. This variety justifies developing a systematic tool and criteria for intra-party democracy in general (Rahat & Shapira, 2017).

2.4 Legal Provisions

As previously mentioned, political parties both have internally democratic and undemocratic party structures. Different factors affect the intra-party structure and determine whether a political party internally democratic or not. According to some scholars, one of the essential factors is legal regulations and the legitimacy of the political parties. Political parties' internal actions can be regulated by an external authority such as constitution or legislation or internal authority party by law (*parti iç tüzüğü*). In this research, the focus is the external forces such as legislation and constitution (the law that is regulated and enforced by the outside of the party) that “standardize the forms of internal organization and political behavior that are acceptable for political parties” (Musil & Vašenda, 2020). According to some scholars, state intervention is problematic and further unacceptable (Issacharoff, 2006; Mersel, 2006; Sartori, 1965). Particularly in European systems, political parties are accepted as private and voluntary organizations (van Biezen & Piccio, 2013). Therefore, political parties are legally independent entities (Anderson, 1990 qt. in Mimpfen). Therefore, there is an ongoing debate among scholars whether an outside authority can regulate political parties' internal decision-making process and their internal actions or not. The concern is about protecting political parties' autonomy from the state since political parties are independent institutions from the state and have a right to fulfill self-determining features by themselves. To intervene in their internal actions, it might be problematic to turn them into semi-state agencies and public utilities (Katz & Mair, 1995; van Biezen, 2004).

Furthermore, state laws for internal and external actions of political parties change the leading figure of accountability from internal organs of parties to external institutions. Hence, state laws carry the risk of state centralization and control of political participation and public life. Furthermore, state laws leave the power of ultimate decision-making and legitimacy to the non-elected body of judges instead of elected representatives of the political parties (Bartolini & Mair, 1990a). For this reason, for many years, political party regulations are not including in state regulations. In addition, countries like the UK, the US, and Australia have been reluctant to impose external regulations into party politics because of their liberal tradition (Mersel, 2006).

On the other hand, according to Biezen and Piccio, in the last 20 years, the state intervenes in political parties' internal and external actions by defining their activities, behaviors, and organizational structure in public law or the constitution (2013). Currently, political parties experience a somewhat legitimacy crisis, and the general tendency is more democracy to fix this problem. The motto is that "the only cure for democracy is more democracy" (van Biezen & Piccio, 2013). Therefore, rules became widespread across Europe, but these rules regulate public funding or access in media mainly. Finally, the European Union and the Council of Europe intervene in political parties by proposing a set of '*good practices*' and '*common principles*' on party regulations (Piccio, 2015). Hence, more examples are observable in Europe now. Party law is defined as 'the total body of law that affects political parties' (Müller & Sieberer, 2006). Part law consists of public laws (including laws on political parties, finance, electoral law, and campaign law). According to Janda, because of the fundamental principles of liberal democracies, constitutions are not mentioned as political parties, so these do not source for party law (Janda, 2005). However, after the post-war period, with the trend of constitutionalization, political parties found a place in the constitution (van Biezen & Molenaar, 2012). Therefore, constitutions became sources for party law for some countries.

TABLE 2.1: CHRONOLOGY OF POST-WAR LEGISLATION ON POLITICAL PARTIES.

Country Name	Party Constitutionalization	Party Law
Australia	n/a	n/a
Austria	1945	1975
Belgium	–	–
Canada	n/a	n/a
Czech Republic	1992	1993
Denmark	–	–
France	1958	–
Germany	1949	1967
Hungary	1989	1989
Ireland	–	–
Israel	n/a	n/a
Italy	1947	–
Netherlands	–	–
Norway	1984	2005
Poland	1990	1992
Portugal	1976	1974
Spain	1978	1978
Sweden	1974	–
United Kingdom	n/a	1998

Source: van Biezen, I., & Piccio, D. R. (2013). *Shaping Intra-Party Democracy: On the Legal Regulation of Internal Party Organizations*. In Ra. Katz & W. Cross (Eds.), *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy* (pp. 27–48). Oxford University Press. www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl.

Table 2.1 provides data of 33 countries for legal regulations of political parties in the constitution and party laws. 28 European democracies gave a place for political parties in their constitution. However, most of them only mentioned political parties' definitions and roles very broadly. In addition, 21 countries have specific party laws. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands did not even mention political parties in their constitutions. These countries defend the independence of political parties and reluctant to regulate political parties with any external law. Moreover, generally, old democracies do not have any specific party law, such as Switzerland, Sweden, France, United Kingdom, and Denmark. Lastly, Germany, Italy, and Austria gave a place in the constitutions in the early years of their democracies.

The existence of a legal framework regulates the internal actions of the party and affects the level of democracy for parties (von dem Berge, 2017). Furthermore, according to van Biezen and Piccio, nearly 50 percent of the regulations related to the parties are about internal party democracy (2013). In addition, they believe that regulations favor democracy and contribute to developing the level of democracy (van Biezen & Piccio, 2013). Party laws determine the basis of the internal party democracy by regulating the candidate selection, party finance, decision-making process, activities, and behaviors of the political parties. When the outside enforces laws, a checking mechanism is directly involved. The democratic process is monitored and penalized when the outside authority violates the rules. Therefore, any state law to restore democracy in the political parties is a tool for having a higher standard of democracy in the political parties. State laws target the protection of democracy. Judicial control over political parties' behaviors would prevent any disruption to democracy. Especially in the new democracies or re-established democracies, strict laws on internal and external party actions are implemented to prevent return in strict time and forget to past experiences. According to Gauja, Germany is an excellent example of regulating legal provision because of the internal pressure that stems from the fascist history of Germany and their wish to change their image in the international arena (Gauja, 2006). Germany called as a 'heartland of party law' (Müller & Sieberer, 2006). Sundberg claims that Germany has regulations about candidate selection and leadership elections today (1997). Finland has similar kinds of regulations that regulate internal party politics (Sundberg, 1997). Spain, Venezuela, Portugal, and Nepal have some intra-party democracy regulations such as nominations, leadership, and decision-making (Gauja, 2006).

Therefore, the debate is ongoing whether the state should regulate the internal actions of political parties or not. The evidence is that except for Germany, the general tendency in Europe does not have a state law for political parties. Furthermore, this thesis will show that political parties can still be internally democratic with state law despite their ideological tendencies.

2.5 Political Parties' Ideologies

Not all thinkers and scholars have accepted ideas and ideologies as significant political concepts (Heywood, 2017, pp. 1-24). However, counterarguments have also

been put. For example, the economist Keynes discusses that the ideas of economists and political philosophers ruled the world. He wrote it in the closing pages of his *General Theory*:

“Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.” (Keynes, 1937)

According to this understanding, ideas and theories provide a path for human action. In this thesis, this basic understanding will show that the political parties’ ideas and beliefs lead their actions as democratic or undemocratic. Ideologies and beliefs impact political life in several ways. Firstly, it determines the perspective and gives a direction to interpret the world like a “lens.” Secondly, based on the ideologies and ideas, actions and political systems are shaped. For instance, western democracies stem from liberal-democratic values and the belief in representative, constitutional government.

On the other hand, absolute monarchies fare founded established norms such as divine rights of the king and religious beliefs. Lastly, ideologies and ideas are accepted as a form of a social contract. These provide a platform for social groups that can share similar ideas. Therefore, social groups are marked with specific ideologies such as a middle class with liberalism and working class with socialism. In this example, ideas represent the shared experiences, interests, and aims of social groups. However, ideas and ideologies bring together a different group of people also. For example, in a Muslim country, religion establishes rules and values for different beliefs. Due to the complexity and vagueness of the concept of ideology, it is hard to end with one definition or understanding. McLellan said, “Ideology is the most elusive concept in the whole of social sciences.” (1995). Therefore, in this thesis, the focus point is not the nature of ideology but the study of political ideologies. “Ideologies” are different from “ideology.” The study of ideologies focuses on the content of the political thought, ideas, and theories (Heywood, 2017, pp. 1-24). For example, the study of ideology asks the question of is ideology true or not? The study of ideologies asks what can socialism tell us equality? Since the French Revolution (1796), ideology was used in different meanings and purposes. For example, it is called ideas of the ruling class, political belief system, worldview of a social class, weapon for controlling oppressed and exploited ones, etc. Therefore, the term was explained differently during history by both Marxist and non-Marxist scholars.

Marx used the term “ideology” in his early work: *The German Ideology*, which he wrote with Engels (1970). It describes Marx’s concept of ideology: the ruling class’s ideas are the ruling ideas in every age, i.e., the ruling class can also control the intellectual forces. The class, which has the means of production, dominates the spiritual means of production (Marx and Engels, 1970). Marx’s concept of ideology has several critical features. First, he defined ideology as deception and mystification: it prolongs a misunderstood interpretation of the world. Engels later called his explanation a “false consciousness.” According to him, ideology has a critical role in exploring the structure of society. Second, there is a relationship between ideology and the class system. he believed that ideology reflects the interests and beliefs of a ruling class only. Therefore, according to him, this one-sided representation cause distortion in ideology. Third, ideology is an expression of power. He believed that ideology was used to hide class divisions in society and serve to explosion proletariats. Ideology represents the “ruling” ideas of the age. Finally, Marx considered ideology as a temporary phenomenon that depends on the class system and its aims. Later scholars of Marxists showed more interest in ideology than Marx himself. They believed that ideology represents characteristic ideas of a social class. Ideology was called Marxism which is a form of proletarian ideology. Gramsci contributed significantly to the Marxist theory of ideology (Vincent, 2009, pp. 1-23). Gramsci (1971) believed that the class system is maintained with the “hegemony” of ruling class ideas and theories. According to Marxist ideology, hegemony represents ideological domination in every aspect of life, such as media, politics, art, and literature. Later, the Frankfurt school accepted Marxist understanding of ideology.

On the other hand, Mannheim undertook the non-Marxist understand of the ideology. Like Marx, he accepted that their social status and circumstances shape ideas and ideologies (Ball, Dagger, & O’Neill, 2016, pp. 1-50). However, contrary to Marx, Mannheim did not focus on the negative implications of ideology. In his book, *Ideology, and Utopia* (1960), he defines ideologies as a thought system that help to maintain social order and represent the ruling class’s ideas. On the other hand, Utopias are portrayed as a hopeful future targeted to change in social order and represent the interests of the oppressed ones (Mannheim, 2013, pp. 49-97). He made a distinction between the particular and total ideologies. Ideologies represent one part of society.

On the other hand, total ideologies represent the worldview of a society. In this sense, Marxism, socialism, and conservatism can be accepted as total ideologies. However,

Mannheim believed that all ideologies, including total ideologies, are distorted because of their self-interested nature (Heywood, 2017, pp.1-24).

As mentioned above, ideology is a broad term with various definitions. For many years philosophers, economists, and political scientists came up with explanations and definitions of ideology. However, in this thesis, ideology will not refer to Marxist or non-Marxist understanding. Heywood explained ideology:

“An ideology is a more or less rational set of ideas that provides the basis for organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power.” (Heywood, 2017, pp. 37-38)

This definition is a social-scientific usage term (Heywood, 2017, pp. 38-39). Furthermore, it includes both normative and descriptive thoughts. Ideologies are descriptive and normative that help people understand how the world and their society generally work. Also, ideologies are accepted as paradigms that propose principles, beliefs, and values for people. In that sense, people identified their places in society. Lastly, ideologies are a fusion of thoughts and actions. In addition to its descriptive side, ideologies also help people transfer these thoughts into actions. Ideologies show how to plan the future, a good society, how states, societies, and the future can and should be. Party manifestos, government agendas are examples of practicing ideologies (Heywood, 2017 pp. 27-53). Each ideology contains certain beliefs on the best form of government (autocracy or democracy) and the best economic system, such as socialism or capitalism. Political ideologies will only be identified with the political spectrum (left, right or center) in this thesis. The terms left and suitable were firstly used in French revolution time for the sitting arrangements of radicals and aristocrats (Heywood, 2017, pp. 27-53). Generally, it is the separation between revolutionists and reactionists. The left side of the spectrum represents freedom, equality, rights, progress, and reforms, while the right-wing represents hierarchy, order, tradition, duty. Political scientists broaden the list of traditional ideologies by adding anarchists, communists, socialists, democratic socialists, social democrats, left-libertarians, progressives, and social liberals to the left side. Furthermore, right-libertarians, neoconservatives, imperialists, fascists, traditionalists, conservatives were added to the right side. Green movements are generally considered a left movement (Ball, Dagger, & O'Neill, 2016, pp. 257-307).

The left-right position of the voters is generally based on the economic classes (Bartolini & Mair, 1990b, pp. 97-102). Contrary to the general tendency, economic classes' influence on the ideological spectrum has declined. Nearly 50 years ago, Daniel Bell (1960) and some social scientists claimed that political ideologies lost their determinant roles in politics. However, voter-level investigations showed that voters still have attachment for the position of the left-right continuum. The only change was on the determinant factors of ideologies such as economic classes. Inglehart claimed that new norms gain importance to find a place in the spectrum, such as gender, religion, environments, human rights, or the EU (Inglehart, 1971, 1988, 2008).

Traditionally, political parties are also located into the spectrum and called left-wing or right-wing political parties. Like people, political parties identified with the position in the political spectrum. Party manifesto, party policy choice, party name, party family, elites' tendencies, voters' beliefs are the determinant factors for a political parties' ideologies. Social scientists used these various indicators to measure political parties' tendency toward the right or left side of the spectrum. Nevertheless, the single indicator is not enough to determine the ideology of a political party. Therefore, generally, scientists used composite indicators to measure. The simplest way is using party names to classify party positions. According to Klaus Beyme, party names express parties' families and beliefs (1984). However, this way is too simple and sometimes problematic because of changing names, not related names with any ideology, etc. Surveys for supporters are another effective way to understand a party's ideology. Supporters of that party should have the same ideology as the party itself.

Furthermore, elites of that party represent parties' ideologies because manifestos and agendas are written by these elites (Jäckle, 2009). Policies are the cues for political ideologies because leftist and rightist approaches have specific preferences for policies. Therefore, it is easier to measure the distance to the left or right side with some questions, such as the economy, same-sex marriage, weak laws, place of immigrants, women issue, globalization (Carroll & Kubo, 2019). Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) used multiple criteria for computing party position on a left-right scale (Franzmann, 2010). In this research, the party manifesto project will measure the place of political parties on the left-right scale.

With similar logic, it is easier to identify political parties' internal level of democracy by looking at their political ideology preferences. There is a causal

relationship between political parties' ideologies and intra-party democracies. Right-wing political parties tend to have a less democratic internal party structure compared to left-wing political parties. For example, social democratic or green parties tend to act internally democratic because they were formed to believe in rights, equality, and progress. On the other hand, conservative and fascist parties are tended to be undemocratic internally since they believe in authority, discipline, and traditions. In this research, some evidence shows that political ideologies have a role in intra-party democracy without legal provisions. Countries with more left-side parties have higher intra-party democracy scores compared to countries with fewer left-side political parties. For example, in the Czech Republic, the influence of left-wing political parties is stronger than right-wing political parties. Therefore, Czech Republic has internally democratic political parties according to its average IPD score. On the other hand, Italy has a low level of intra-party democracy on average because of the hegemony of the right-wing parties even though left-wing parties tend to act democratically in internal party politics and score intra-party democracy by themselves.

Chapter 3:

Research Design

As mentioned earlier, first, there is no consensus in the current literature on the effects of legal provisions and internal democracy of political parties in countries. Second, different types of ideologies have different effects on the internal actions of political parties. These differences can be observed in some cases and other cases. However, they do not significantly impact the actions of political parties. The purpose of this chapter is to propose a research design that sheds light on this relationship. First, it will present cases and justify them with explanations and analysis. Then, it will propose a theory based on the literature and empirical results based on the data. Then, the variables used in the research will be explained and operationalized, and a meaningful conclusion regarding the research question will justify the analysis. Based on the literature presented earlier, this research will analyze how legal regulations and political parties' ideologies influence internal party structure in three European countries, Germany, Italy, and Austria, using the research design described below. The focus will be on how legal regulations or political party ideologies can increase intra-party democracy.

3.1 The Cases

This research will use small-N analysis due to the limited amount of data on intra-party democracy. The first step of the research will examine the legal provisions of 19 countries, the relationship between the legal provisions and intra-party democracy, and the ideologies of political parties. Other necessary data are collected from the literature, such as countries' party systems, party types, geographical characteristics, GDP, democracy level, and governance quality. The combination of small-n analysis and many variables is called the comparative method (Ljiphart, 1971). Generally, the comparative method is studied in two ways: Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) and Most Similar System Design (MSSD). These two different comparison methods stem from Mill's difference and method of agreement (Godden, 2014). For this research, the MSSD

method, which aims to choose objects that are as similar as possible, with many of the same variables except one that affects the outcome, is the most appropriate. After evaluating 19 countries of the Political Party Database Project, this research will use Germany, Italy, and Austria. There are several reasons to use these countries to analyze the legal provisions, ideologies of political parties, and their relationships with intra-party democracy. Germany, Italy, and Austria have very similar control variables (democracy, governance, GDP, party system, party types, and geography). These three cases help find a reason for their different levels of intra-party democracy with their similarities and differences.

3.1.1 Case Selection Criteria

As mentioned in the previous section, this research was started with 19 countries from the Political Party Database Project (Scarrow et al., 2017). The data on legal provisions collected in this research for 19 countries is used to find a suitable case for further elaboration. The selection of criteria for case selection is challenging as the cases play a role in representing the cases outside the scope of the research (Seanwright & Gerring, 2008). However, there are some standard criteria, such as the size of the country. This general criterion applies to this thesis as all 19 countries are developed European countries with an acceptable level of democracy. Therefore, the criteria for case selection in this thesis are: 1) the state should have the same level of democracy according to the Polity IV index, 2) the states should have the same types of regimes, 3) the states with a similar range of GDP, 4) the states should have similar electoral systems, and there should be multiple parties in politics, 5) the states should have a certain level of legal regulation to study them adequately.

The first criterion is the level of democracy. The levels of democracy of the countries are significant because, without a high level of democracy, it is problematic to discuss democracy at the micro-level, which employs intra-party democracy. For example, 18 out of 19 countries received high scores (0.8, 0.9, 1.00) from the Polity IV Index (see Figure 3.1). According to Figure 3.1, Israel has 0.6 points. Therefore, Israel should be eliminated. Moreover, even France, Czech Republic, and Belgium have an acceptable level of democracy, and the most similar system designs require finding the

most similar variables. Therefore, these three countries were eliminated because their scores differ from the majority.




FIGURE 3.1: DEMOCRACY OF 19 COUNTRIES.

The second criterion to be considered is regime types. Regime types affect the constitutional tradition, which is directly related to legal regimes. For example, despite its high level of democracy, Denmark has a monarch that carries Scandinavian political values and should be removed from the list. The Netherlands and Spain also have a monarch, so they were removed from the list because of their constitutional monarchy.

The third criterion is GDP which is for provides similar economic conditions for political actors. Political parties could be accused of acting undemocratically with economic concerns. Therefore, only intra-party democracy should be focused on, other negative factors should be eliminated, and the environment should be suitable for democracy. Therefore, of the 13 countries that have left, 4 have a lower level of democracy than others. In addition, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Portugal have lower GDP than others, so they were eliminated (see Figure 3.2). Moreover, Figure 3.2 shows that Norway has a relatively high value for GDP compared to the other countries. Therefore, Norway should also be eliminated because of its outlier value.




FIGURE 3.2: INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & GDP.

The fourth criterion is electoral systems, which influence the institutional structure and actions of political parties. There is a relationship between electoral systems and party systems (Fujimura, 2012). In general, proportional representation systems provide multi-party systems where small parties can find a place in politics. In plurality systems, politics is controlled by two main parties that do not leave room for small parties. Therefore, multi-party systems provide a better environment for politicians to act democratically internally and externally based on their preferences. In general, 19 countries have proportional representation systems (Courtney, 1999). However, the UK, Canada, and Australia have plurality/majority systems (example of First Past the Post system) (Lundberg, 2007). Therefore, the UK, Canada, and Australia were no longer included in the list.

The fifth criterion relates to legal regulations. Based on the legal regulations index constructed in this research, three countries received "0" points out of "10". Therefore, these countries can be considered as outliers (see Figure 3.3). Sweden, Belgium, and Ireland were no longer on the list.




FIGURE 3.3: LEGAL PROVISIONS OF 19 COUNTRIES.

Finally, three countries remain Germany, Italy, and Austria, which meet all criteria. Germany has a high score for intra-party democracy of 0.71, while Italy (0.49) and Austria (0.46) have low levels of intra-party democracy.

Therefore, this study is based on Germany, Italy, and Austria in history, democracy, GDP, electoral and multi-party systems. However, the different outcomes of these countries for intra-party democracy will focus on searching for these different outcomes. These were each established democracies. Germany, Italy, and Austria are European countries with stable democracy after World War II and innovations after Cold War. They have had stable multi-party systems for over 50 years. These countries have well-established and robust party systems. All have traditional, solid political parties until the 1980s. In the 1980s, these countries experienced new emergence parties in their political party systems. Germany has had a party-based democracy since 1949 with the establishment of German Basic Law. Germany has old political parties; however, after the 1980s, it experienced the emergence of new parties in political life. Italy was a party government for over forty years. It has ten national parties with three old traditional parties and new emerging other parties. Austria also has a multiparty system.

Despite its small size, Austria has a comparable number of members in political parties. Especially after the Cold War, Austria has successfully practiced party politics (Katz & Mair, 1995). Therefore, all three countries have old and young, left or right, secular or Christian, significant and minor political parties in their systems. Most importantly, there are observable differences among political parties in these countries regarding the degree of individual intra-party democracy. This is important to observe and test the second hypothesis for this thesis. The governance and working institutions of these countries are well established and functioning. Germany and Italy are similar in size.

On the other hand, Austria is smaller than the other two countries. However, this difference in size is not problematic for the study. Furthermore, Germany and Austria are Central European countries, and Italy is an Eastern European country, which helps move the argument beyond one part of the region.

Also, their economies are close to each other. Germany's scores for internal party politics are above the mean, which means it has internally democratic political parties among 19 countries. However, Italy's and Austria's scores are below the mean. This difference caught my attention and made me question these values' reasons for whether these values are due to legal provisions. The values for legal provisions make Germany, Italy, and Austria better candidates for this study than a less democratic country like Israel or Sweden with high intra-party democracy without legal provisions.

Since political party ideologies and legal provisions are key in determining intra-party democracy, it seems important to examine established democracies and countries with different ideologies in political party systems. European countries are the pioneers of democratic values and a multiparty system with diversified ideologies. Germany, Italy, and Austria are not the exceptions for these regional phenomena. Moreover, this research shows that other countries in Europe can also experience similar results as Germany, Italy, and Austria. Therefore, Germany, Italy, and Austria seem to be reasonable cases to study the effects of legal regulations and ideologies on intra-party democracy.

Since intra-party democracy is of primary importance, this study highlights the score of each case based on the index of intra-party democracy. According to this index, Germany has 0.71 points, Italy has 0.49 points, and Austria has 0.46 points. This index covers the years between 2011-2014, so other variables such as GDP, democracy score, and governance score belong to the same period. However, legal regulations related to

internal party politics, political party systems, and political party ideologies do not have a particular focused period, as these are cumulative variables that require a more general overview of countries' democratic histories. Legal regulations that relate to intra-party politics are another critical concern. This study will focus on the laws and constitutions of each case. The operationalization of the legal regulations will be explained in detail in the following subheading.

This study will begin with the assessments of intra-party democracy of 19 countries to paint a broader picture and show the general trend in Europe. Then, the scope of the study is narrowed down to three cases - Germany, Italy, and Austria. Their scores are examined in detail, and it is explained how they arrived at their scores. Finally, this research will engage in a detailed examination of Germany, Italy, and Austria, focusing on legal regulations, political parties' ideologies, quality of the governance, GDP leading to significant changes in each case's level of democracy in the political parties. Ideally, what will occur from this case study is a clearer image of the impacts that legal regulations and political parties' ideologies have on internal party politics in three established European countries.

3.2 Theoretical Perspective

This study will use the life-cycle approach, Michels's "Iron Law of oligarchy" and Historical Institutionalism (HI) theoretical perspectives (McGovern, 2010). According to the life-cycle approach, party formation and adaptation are endogenous processes that shape the party during the "evolution" (Obert & von dem Berge, 2015). Therefore, this approach makes ideological effects reasonable. However, it does not cover the environment and exogenous factors that can influence party politics. Furthermore, from a Historical Institutionalism perspective, agents (political parties) may develop different responses in the same structural environment (Hellmann, 2011). Again, this perspective supports the argument that every political party may develop its unique structure. In addition, this perspective will help to explain the difference between political parties within the same country. Lastly, in Michels's "Iron Law of oligarchy," all political parties are bounded by the historical heritage that makes them more oligarchic (Inglehart, 1988).

Theoretically, political parties are autonomous organizations from the state. Their formation process is affected by their founding principles and decided by the inside actors of the political party in particular periods of a party's lifetime. According to Michels's perspective, all parties are oligarchic and far from internally democratic. In this thesis, time is an essential determinant because he believed that oligarchy became more visible and more substantial that hindered democracy. Therefore, he claimed that old parties are tended to be less democratic because they are a victim of iron laws of oligarchy.

On the contrary, according to the life-cycle approach, old parties are tended to be more democratic because they are more institutionalized than young ones. To have this, they must have a democratic experience over time (Obert & von dem Berge, 2015). This strong separation between these two approaches will be used to support the second hypothesis of this thesis. The aim is to show that age is not an important factor, the primary determinant for a political parties' internal democracy. The vital point is the ideology of this party. Finally, the historical institutionalist approach will help to rupture the link between the legal provisions and intra-party democracy. This approach makes it reasonable to have a different intra-party democracy within the same country. Unfortunately, literature suffers from the lack of general theory on political parties (Shapiro, 2018). Therefore, this research will use several theoretical frameworks such as the Life-cycle approach, Michels's "Iron Law of oligarchy," and the Historical Institutional perspective to analyze the influence of political parties' ideologies and legal regulations. Unfortunately, these approaches show that these are not cover all indicators and factors of the intra-party democracy and the structure of the political parties. Therefore, this thesis will use various theoretical frameworks and examine what sense Germany, Italy, and Austria fit the theoretical approaches. Regarding intra-party democracy, this research will adhere to the conceptual framework of Scarrow, Webb, and Poguntke (2017), who developed measures of intra-party democracies based on several criteria.

Based on key concepts in the literature, the critical question to be analyzed is:

What are the main factors that shape intra-party democracy?

The following hypotheses are considered to investigate this question:

H1: An increase in the number of legal regulations related to intra-party democracy positively affects intra-party democracy.

H2: An increase in the number of right-wing parties in countries negatively affect intra-party democracy score.

As previously explained, after the case selection, the criteria show that Germany, Italy, and Austria have a similar pattern for party system and party type and a similar level of democracy, governance, and GDP. Therefore, their intra-party democracy scores should stem from the differences in the legal provisions and political parties' ideologies. This argument was formulated with these hypotheses. Key concepts such as legal regulations, political parties' ideologies, and intra-party democracy need to be operationalized to test these hypotheses,

3.3 Key Variables

3.3.1 Intra-party Democracy


This research is concerned with how legal provisions and political parties' ideologies affect the degree of intra-party democracy. However, intra-party democracy was not measured before the Political Party Database Project. (*Political Party Database Project*, n.d.) Therefore, the dependent variable's data of this research derived from the Political Party Database Project. The Political Party Database Project is a cross-national initiative to establish and update an online public database as a source for crucial information about political party organizations.

This database provides standard coded variables describing party resources, party decision processes, and the outcome of decision-making procedures for parties in many representative democracies (*IPD-Indices-Detailed Explanation of Construction Part I: Selection of PPDB-Items for the IPD-Indices PPDB-Answer-Option IPD-Value Effect on IPD*, n.d.). Intra-party democracy has been a fundamental phenomenon for party politics during the centuries. Despite the extended study of the subject, researchers generally focused on normative studies, so there is a gap in the comparative empirical study. Moreover, it is challenging to study with the political parties because not every party publishes their detailed annual reports. Some parties are not willing to open their promises to the public. Even the archives are reachable; there is a problem with language.

Meanwhile, this research requires time and linguistic skills because you must apply a survey for every election for different countries to answer the economic outcomes, cabinet appointments, or legislative behaviors. Therefore, finding reliable cross-national data on formal party organization and practices are challenging. Hence, Political Party Database Project was created as a response to this gap. The study conducted with 19 countries and 122 parties, and for the second round, 41 countries with 250 parties, focusing on the period from 2011 and 2014 (Scarrow et al., 2017). In the project, researchers focused on the differences among the party organizations in the decision-making process or mobilized their supporters. They generally investigate representation, participation, and power. Some of them focus on how parties organize within the party, citizens, and other parties. In addition, others investigated the impact of the party organization from a financial perspective. Finally, some of them primarily focus on the internal level of party democracy.

This thesis will focus specifically on intra-party democracy. Democracy within parties can have different forms and be accomplished differently in the different party settings. To measure intra-party democracy, researchers of the Political Party Database Project need to identify the dimensions of the intra-party democracy because it has no universal definition, which allows researchers to make a scientific study. We cannot directly say that party A is democratic, and Party B is not, just as we cannot say that country A is democratic and country B is not. So, to make a clear judgment, the researchers created a common denominator for every country (Scarrow et al., 2017). As mentioned previously, the conceptualization of the intra-party democracy was needed and created based on inclusiveness since they believed that other components are the sub-categories of inclusiveness, such as accountability, centralization, and participation in the decision-making (see Table 3.1).

TABLE 3.1: INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY AND ITS COMPONENTS.



- 1- Decision-Making: Programme is an essential part of the intra-party democracy because it links the party and the citizens. Party manifestos, policies, and implementations are examined under this category, so who decides these processes in the party? Can party members express their ideas or not? These questions are used to measure the level of the internal party democracy (Scarrow et al., 2017).
- 2- Decision-Making: Personnel is the most crucial function of the intra-party democracy. This step consists of two-component which are party leader selection and candidate selection. Electoral and organizational activities of the party are guided by the party leader, who is the most important figure. In addition, this individual generally has the role of the leader of the country's executive body. Therefore, the inclusiveness of these election processes is measured as an indicator for intra-party democracy (Scarrow et al., 2017).
- 3- Organizational Structure is the last component for intra-party democracy, which includes the role of the party congress structure. Who can vote in the congress (local delegates, regional delegates, or all-party members)? How often is a congress held? These questions are the basis for determining whether the party's organizational structures democratic or not (Scarrow et al., 2017)?

Measuring Intra-party Democracy

As mentioned, there are two different ways of decision-making: plebiscites and assemblies. These two different logic results in theoretically distinct dimensions of intra-party democracy: *The assembly-based intra-party democracy index (AIPD) and the plebiscitary intra-party democracy (IPD) index (PIPD)*.

1) *The assembly based IPD index (AIPD)*: AIPD index measures the inclusiveness of the decision-making over the program, personnel selection, and organizational structure. The index investigates the process of decision-making in the assembly and examines how the process of decision-making is inclusive or not. Discussions and exchanges of the arguments are the determinant factors for deciding the level of inclusiveness of decision-making.

2) *The plebiscitary IPD index (PIPD)*: This index measures the program's decision-making and candidate selection process based on the plebiscitary logic of one member one vote system. This system eliminates the process of deliberation and to have a compromise. Although votes are coming from the party members, this process is only about either/or option. Therefore, it gives more power to leaders than members because of its dichotomous nature of politics (Katz & Mair, 1995).

All parties in the Political Party Database Project have an AIPD index even if they prefer plebiscites for personnel or program decisions. However, many parties do not have plebiscitary provisions. Therefore, in this thesis AIPD index will be used for the measurement score of intra-party democracy.

Based on these concepts, intra-party democracy indexes were created for the 19 countries and 122 parties. The intra-party democracy index covers 'official story' and 'real story' items. The official story is examined items that focus on party statues, and the real story is captured by items that focus on the real-life party event process. They include both because some process is not included in the party statues. Therefore, the real story should be accounted for. This data measures my first variable (Level of the internal party democracy as a dependent variable). The critical point is that they measure intra-party democracy based on these concepts because they define the party's level of democracy. It is crucial to this research because based on these specific components that define intra-party democracy, legal provisions data will be collected for the second variable (legal

provisions as an independent variable). The exact definition and measurement criteria for democracy will be used because the common definition and measurement factors eliminate the risk of any weakness which might arise from the different definition of democracy. This research claims that political parties tend to be non-democratic or democratic concerning their ideologies. These legal regulations force them to be democratic, leadership style, or the democracy level of the country. However, this research will show that external factors such as GDP, governance quality, or democracy have not significant effect on internal party politics. Thus, this research will mainly focus on one external factor- legal provisions and one internal factor- political parties' ideologies to show that those are effective on intra-party democracy or not.

3.3.2 Legal Provisions

The primary independent variable of this research is the legal provisions. There is no collected data based on the identified criteria about the legal provisions that regulate the intra-party democracy in a country. Therefore, this study will collect required data for 19 countries in the Political Party Database Project. On the political Party Database Project website, to create an index based on legal regulations on intra-party democracy, the Party Law in Modern Europe Database (Casal-Bértoa et al., 2012) will be used. The main point is defining the rules that will be looked for. Therefore, this research should only focus on the laws about the intra-party democracy components detailed below to prevent possible mistakes. The definition of intra-party democracy is not universal; therefore, the conceptualization of internal party politics is vital for the measurement. In this perspective, this study identified laws that make political parties internally democratic:

- ❖ The process of the decision-making at the program level?
 - Q1-Do the majority of the members of the party have a vote on the manifesto?
 - Yes (If party congress says YES) - 1.00.
 - No (If party legislators, executive committee, party leader say NO) -0.00

- Q2-Are there any intra-party policy ballots in which the majority of the party members vote on policy issues?
 - Yes - 1.00
 - No-0.00
- ❖ The process of decision-making at the personnel level.
 - Q3-Do the majority of the party members have a vote in the party leader selection process?
 - Yes- 1.00
 - No-0.00
 - Q4-Do the majority of the party members have the final vote in the candidate selection process?
 - Yes- 1.00
 - No-0.00
 - Q5-Is there any quota that separated the minorities and women's representation?
 - Yes (One of them is enough to say YES) - 1.00
 - No (Say No if there is none of them) -0.00
- ❖ The organizational structure of the party
 - Q6-Who is eligible to vote at the party congress?
 - Party members, delegates etc-1.00
 - Party leader- 0.00
 - Q7-How frequently must a party congress be held?
 - Q8-Is there any mention of obeying general democratic principles?
 - Yes 1.00
 - NO- 0.00
 - Q9-Is there any accountability of the party leader?
 - Yes - 1.00
 - No-0.00

➤ Q10-Are there any privileges of the party leader?

- Yes - 0.00
- No-1.00

In total, there are ten questions, and each question will get 1.00 and 0.00 values according to the answers. Hence, in the end, every country has its numerical value out of ten (10.00).

Finally, every country will get 0.00 to 10.00 points for their legal provision scores. These values will be divided into ten converted values between 0.00- 1.00 to have the same scope as the intra-party democracy index (see Table 4.2).

3.3.3 *Political parties' Ideologies*

This research will use political parties' ideologies as a second independent variable with the potential to influence the level of internal party democracy. According to the oligarchy thesis, political parties' ideologies may affect intra-party democracy (Michels, 1962). According to him, the development of oligarchies takes time, and time helps parties become institutionalized. Also, old-traditional parties represent their ideologies and act based on their ideological tendencies. However, new parties such as Green and new left-wing parties commonly established in the 1970s might have an institutionalized structure and shape their behavior based on their ideologies. In addition, generally, they have higher intra-party democracy than other traditional political parties, such as many far right-wing parties.

Furthermore, according to Mudde, left-wing parties, including social democratic ones, tend to be more internally democratic. In addition, Green and new-left-wing parties have a high level of intra-party democracy in contrast to right-wing parties because of their very centralized party organization (Mudde, 2015). Therefore, scholars and researchers show that political parties' ideologies are stronger determinants for intra-party democracy. The Manifesto Project (MARPOR)¹ will be used for the determination of

¹ Volkens, Andrea / Lehmann, Pola / Matthieß, Theres / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Weßels, Bernhard, The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2017a. (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2017).
<https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpps.2017a>

political parties' ideologies. MARPOR reports the collection and content analyses of parties' manifestos with different coders from 50 different countries. Germany, Italy, and Austria are the three of these countries. This project covers 1000 parties' policy preferences from 1945 to today. One of the indicators of MARPOR is the left-right position of the parties; therefore, it is a credible source for political parties' ideological variable (Budge & McDonald, 2012). In addition, to examine the relationship between political parties' ideologies and intra-party democracy, individual intra-party democracy scores of each political party are needed. Political Party Database Project will also offer individual scores of each party for every country in addition to average scores of countries. Therefore, this data will also use it for this study.

3.3.4 Party System and Party Type

The Party system and party type of Germany, Italy, and Austria will be examined in this thesis. To compare political parties and propose an explanation for the different German Italian, and Austrian intra-party democracy levels, party systems, and Party types should be analyzed. As previously mentioned, there are several types of party systems such as one-party system, two-party dominated system, or multi-party system. These party systems are directly related to the number of political parties involved in politics. In this thesis, the numbers of the political parties are more critical since comparing political parties' ideologies and observing differences among them require multiple political parties in the system.

Furthermore, having the same political party system in the countries will provide a more convincing case study. Therefore, in this thesis, Germany, Italy, and Austria should provide the same environmental features with their multi-party systems for political parties to eliminate the effect of the party system on the intra-party democracy. Therefore, the party system will be examined.

Secondly, the type of political parties is another control variable for this study. Political party types may directly influence political parties' behaviors both inside and outside of the party. Therefore, political parties, such as elite, mass, and catch-all parties, may offer an alternative explanation for the different levels of intra-party democracy in Italy and Austria. This research will show that political parties may act democratically

and undemocratically even in the same country, such as Italian and Austrian political parties, without legal regulations. Therefore, the differences in the political parties in a specific country will be explained with the political parties' ideologies; however, it might be explained with the party types. Despite party types might propose an alternative explanation for a different level of intra-party democracy because of the lack of quantitative data and index for all political parties in this research, party-type variables will not be evaluated. As mentioned in the previous section, party types change during history, and their categorization is not separated from each other with complete lines. Therefore, there is no common denominator and system for categorization. Lastly, some scholars do not accept the former party type for modern political parties. Therefore, the classification of traditional methods might not be applied to modern political parties and not provide a general outcome accepted by others.

3.3.5 Democracy Level: Polity IV

Democracy level is another variable that will be examined in this study. Theoretically, undemocratic countries are not the appropriate environment for internally democratic political parties. Basically, within an undemocratic or not fully democratic environment, political parties will not act democratically and internally because rules are not let it happen. They will suffer from the undemocratic tradition of the country. According to Harmel and Janda, political parties adopt the environment they exist in (Harmel & Janda, 1994). Therefore, they will be imitated the democratic level of the country. It is reasonable to see the parallelism between the democracy level of the country and intra-party democracy. This variable will be quantified through the use of the Polity IV index. This index covers 167 countries from 1800 to 2018. Each country has a polity score for each year from -10 to +10. -10 represents hereditary monarchy, and +10 represents consolidated democracy. Scores are divided into three categories based on main regime types. Scores from +6 to +10 are categorized as “*democracies*.” scores from -5 to +5 are categorized as “*anocracies*.” Lastly, from -10 to -6 represent “*autocracies*.” According to many scholars (Casper & Tufis, 2003; Högström, 2013; Schmidt, 2015), polity offers a relatively high quality of measurement criteria and well enough with its definition of democracy. In the literature, it is one of the most used parameters for

measuring democracy. Therefore, the Polity IV index will be used for this research to measure the democracy scores of the countries.

3.3.6 GDP: World Bank

Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is another variable of this research. Data will be drawn based on the World Bank (*World Bank Open Data | Data*, 2015) scores. World Bank uses simple measurement for measuring the economic level of the countries, which captures the rising income of the average member of the population. According to Inglehart and Welzel, a high standard of living may be another factor that promotes democratic internal party politics (2005). There might be no direct relationship between these two variables, but to see whether such associations exist at all. For this research, the average scores of 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 will be used.

3.3.7 Governance: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project

Thirdly, the governance indicator will show how a country has a well-functioned rule of law. World Bank Data will be used to observe the relation between the variables. “Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” (World Bank). It includes government selection, monitoring, and replacement process, the government's success to implement policies effectively, and regard of citizens and state institutions that control the economic and social interaction. The project consists of over 215 countries from 1996 to 2018 in six dimensions of governance: the voice of accountability, the rule of law, regulatory quality, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, and control of corruption. For this research, the most critical dimension is the rule of law² because it might affect legal regulations.

This chapter has suggested a research design based on theory originated from the existing literature. The next chapter will look in detail into the legal regulations and

² Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence
(<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents>)

ideologies of the political parties of Germany, Italy, and Austria. Its aim to explain how internal party democracy affected the number of legal regulations and ideologies of the political parties in these three countries. The goal is to show a causal mechanism regarding legal regulations and ideologies and these effects on intra-party democracy.



Chapter 4:

Findings & Analysis

The following chapter will investigate possible reasons for different levels of intra-party democracy. First, 19 countries will be analyzed and compared by looking at legal provisions, levels of democracy and governance, and GDP. Secondly, this thesis will focus on the cases of Germany, Italy, and Austria. Finally, it will scrutinize the impact of the legal provisions that regulate intra-party politics and the political ideologies of political parties on intra-party democracy in Germany, Italy, and Austria. This chapter aims to shed light on the relationship between intra-party democracy, legal provisions, political party ideologies, party systems, party types, GDP, and governance effectiveness. In this regard, it will attempt to answer whether an increase in the number of legal regulations related to intra-party democracy contributes to an increase in intra-party democracy in three established European countries. This research focuses mainly on the years between 2011-2014, as the index of intra-party democracy is only available for these years.

4.1 Intra-Party Democracy

As previously stated, Political Party Database Project was used to determine intra-party democracy levels of countries (IPD-Indices-Detailed Explanation of Construction Part I: Selection of PPDB-Items for the IPD-Indices PPDB-Answer-Option IPD-Value Effect on IPD, 2017). Unfortunately, Political Party Database Project covers only 19 countries and 122 parties of those countries so far; also, research has been conducted for 2011 and 2014. In the Political Party Database Project, a different number of political parties was examined. The average of the individual scores of these political parties constitutes countries' final scores of intra-party democracy. In Table 4.2, all countries' scores are listed. Party Change Theory suggested that political parties are affected by the environment and respond to it (Harmel & Janda, 1994). Therefore, the general tendency at the national level toward democracy should also be observed at the party level. As a

result, the political Party Database Project's countries have a high level of democracy (see Figure 3.1).

On the contrary, the results show no intra-party democracy and democracy for all European countries in the research. The countries have diversified scores despite their similarities in democratic history, political systems, and economies. Political parties have different procedures for decision-making and different tendencies to mobilize the masses despite their similar experience with democracy and political institutions (Scarrow et al., 2017). According to the mean of the intra-party democracy for 19 countries, intra-party democracy means 0.6 (scale is between 0.00 and 1.00) (see Table 4.1).

TABLE 4.1: MEAN OF INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
totalaipd	19	.6089474	.1274491	.39	.78
legalprovis	19	.4052632	.2895853	0	.9
democracy	19	.9578947	.1017393	.6	1
gdp	19	39221.56	10373.17	19167.78	65069.75
governance	18	6.893889	.9510744	5.32	8.54

Therefore, the scores below the mean (0.6) are labeled as a low level of intra-party democracy. To illustrate that Austria has 0.46 points, Spain has 0.39 points, and Italy has 0.49 points that are surprisingly low compared to expected regarding their democratic and governance scores (see Figure 4.1). On the other hand, Germany has 0.71, Canada has 0.68, and the UK has 0.78, high scores. Therefore, this research targeted the reasons for the variance in the countries' intra-party democracy levels.




FIGURE 4.1: INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY SCORE OF 19 COUNTRIES.

To sum up, the intra-party democracy index shows that in the 19 countries, there is not possible to observe a pattern and similar trend. Therefore, this research work with the small-N analysis to see any uncovered pattern with a more in-depth comparison. However, most similar system designs show differences in intra-party democracy in these countries despite their similarities. Legal provisions and political parties' ideologies are the possible reason for this variance in these three countries. In the next section, legal provisions are going to be explained in detail.

4.2 Legal Provisions

Legal provisions for intra-party democracy influence the format and the function of the party system by targeting the nature of the competition and competitors (van Biezen & Rashkova, 2011). As mentioned in chapters 2 and chapter 3, legal provisions are a controversial area for political science. Some scholars (van Biezen & Piccio, 2013; Müller & Sieberer, 2006) defend that to ensure democracy in the political parties, state

intervention with the legal provisions is acceptable since it only favors democracy. On the other hand, some of them (Issacharoff, 2006; Mersel, 2006; Sartori, 1965) believe that the state should not force democracy because force is against the nature of the democracy with limiting the free will of the political institutions. However, I defend that *a game with no rules is no game at all* motto. Rules emerge from society's need to respond to their demands, so the rulers do not enforce rules. Therefore, in this research, the aim is to prove that rules serve to increase democracy in the political parties. However, the conceptualization of the legal provisions is the crucial point since rules do not always serve in favor of democracy. Hence, defining which rules provide more democracy and which rules damage democracy is the starting point for measuring legal provisions for this research. Unfortunately, there is no collected data to measure which country has legal provision for intra-party democracy, and which has not. Therefore, data were collected for this research for 19 countries of the Political Party Database Project. The Party Law in Modern Europe Database and countries' government websites were used to collect data (Casal-Bértoa et al., 2012). Laws were collected based on specific criteria explained in chapter 3. According to the results, again, there is no similar trend across 19 countries of the research. Some countries have a high number of legal provisions, such as Germany (0.9), Spain (0.9), and Portugal (0.8) in contrast to Italy (0.2), Austria (0.3), and France (0.2) (see Figure 4.2)




FIGURE 4.2: LEGAL PROVISIONS.

TABLE 4.2:LEGAL PROVISION INDEX.

	Country Name	Q1- Vote on the manifesto	Q2-vote on policy issues	Q3-the party leader selection process	Q4-the candidate selection process	Q5-minorities and women's representation	Q6-eligible to vote at the party congress	Q7-party congress be held	Q8-Regulation for obeying general democratic principles	Q9-accountability of the party leader-Party members	Q10-privileges of the party leader	Total
1	Australia	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	6
2	Austria	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3
3	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	Canada	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	6
5	Czech Republic	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	5
6	Denmark	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3
7	France	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
8	Germany	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	9
9	Hungary	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	6
10	Ireland	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
11	Israel	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	3
12	Italy	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
13	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
14	Norway	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	6
15	Poland	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
16	Portugal	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	8
17	Spain	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	9
18	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	United Kingdom	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	5

The legal provision index (see Table 4.2) was created based on the defined criteria in the methodology chapter. There are ten fundamental criteria to measure legal provisions related to intra-party democracy. The results showed that countries have various legal provisions; there is no general tendency across Europe. However, according to the index, countries generally regulate similar areas for intra-party democracy. To illustrate those 13 countries out of 19 have a rule for obeying the general principle of democracy (Q8³). These are several examples of how Q8 mentioned laws across Europe:

“Political parties are a component of the free democratic basic order required under the Constitution. Due to their free and continuous participation in the formation of the political will of the people, they perform a public function which is incumbent on them under the Basic Law and which they undertake to fulfill to the best of their ability” (Germany Party Law 2004, Article 1).

“The organization and operation of political parties must adhere to democratic principles” (Spain Party Law 1978, Article 4). “...The internal structure and operation of political parties must be democratic” (Spain Party Law 2002, Article 7).

“The statute must comply with the democratic principles of internal life, in particular regarding the selection of candidates, the rights of minorities and the rights of members” (Italy The Law no. 96 2012, Article 5)

“Political parties shall be governed by the principles of democratic organization and management and of participation by all their members. ... Every member of a political party shall possess equal rights under its statute” (Portugal Party Law 2003, Article 5).

Even in countries with a low level of legal provisions, such as Italy, democratic principles were regulated. Furthermore, 12 countries out of 19 countries gave a place for Question 2, which is related to voting. These are several examples for question 2’s answers:

“Members of general party committees and similar institutions endowed pursuant to the statutes with extensive powers for deliberating or deciding on questions of party policy and organization may also be elected by subordinate regional branches” (Germany Party Law 2004, Article 12)

³ Is there any mentioned for obeying general democratic principles?
Yes-1.00, No-0.00

“...3. The management bodies of political parties will be established in the statutes and must be filled by means of a free and secret vote. ...4. The statutes or its internal enabling regulations must establish a sufficient notice period of meetings to give the collegiate bodies enough time to prepare the issues to be addressed; the number of members required to include issues in the agenda, rules of deliberation which allow room for contrasting ideas; and the majority required to adopt agreements. As a general rule, the latter will be a simple majority of those present or represented” (Spain Party Law 2002, Article 7).

Lastly, 11 countries have a rule for regulating minorities and women quota in the party (Q5⁴). Most of the 19 countries is a member of the EU. EU gives importance to minority rights and women, so it may be the reason for having more regulation on this issue in 11 countries. Searching criteria for the legal provisions were separated into three categories like Political Party Database Project’s criteria for measuring the intra-party democracy (Political Party Database Project, 2017)

These are:

- 1) The process of the decision-making at the program level (Q1-Q2)
- 2) The process of the decision making at the personnel level (Q3-Q4-Q5)
- 3) The organizational structure of the party (Q6-Q7-Q8-Q9-Q10)

According to results, generally, countries regulate decision-making at the program level. According to Political Party Database Project, it is the most critical part of the intra-party democracy because it serves the founding principle of the political parties at first. Political parties are the bridges between the state and society. Therefore questions 1 and question 2 related to understanding regulations for party manifesto, policies implementation process, and the environment in the political party in the decision-making process. Secondly, decision-making at the personnel level relates to the leader and candidate selection process. Question 2, question 3, question 3, are related questions for these criteria. For the 19 countries, this part is the second place that is regulated by law.

To sum up, generally, countries prefer to force rule for the decision-making process of the political parties, which are the most crucial part of building a link between the society

⁴ Is there any quota that separated for the minorities and women’s representation?
Yes (One of them is enough for say YES) - 1.00
No (Say No if there is none of them) -0.00

and state. In these steps, citizens are visible and part of the process. Lastly, countries generally did not prefer to regulate the organizational structure of the political parties. Oppositions to legal provisions defend that any state intervention and outside regulation would be dangerous for the independence and autonomy of the political parties from the state. In some countries, constitutions-related regulations have been made. For example, “...*Their activities shall not be subject to any restrictions by particular provisions of the law*” (*Austria Constitution 2010, Party Law/Article 1*). However, I believe that these results show that countries are more cautious about intervening in the internal affairs of the political parties and more willingly intervene in the decision-making process, which puts citizens at the center of the mechanism.

For the result for hypothesis 1, linear regression analyses were run for 19 countries, but results were not significant because of the limited number of the data (see Figure 4.3).




FIGURE 4.3:INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & LEGAL PROVISIONS.

$R^2 = 0.0079$, which means that the independent variable legal provisions cannot explain intra-party democracy in population. With these results, the regression model is statistically not significant, and except for outliers, the line will be horizontal, which means there is no relationship between variables. Therefore, we have not enough evidence

to accept H_1 ($H1$: An increase in the number of legal regulations related to intra-party democracy positively affects intra-party democracy.).

There are several reasons for this insignificant result. Obedience of rules by institutions or political actors, the period when the law was implemented, and the culture of the rule of law in that country are reasons for insignificant results of legal provisions for 19 countries. As a result, this research used Mill's Most Similar System Design of qualitative research methods to narrow down the scope of focus. Germany, Italy, and Austria are selected countries based on the selection criteria proved H_1 ⁵ and H_2 hypothesis is correct for these three countries.

4.3 Political Parties' Ideologies

According to Lipset and Rokkan, political parties emerged from the cleavages into society, and cleavages stem from the ideological differences (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, pp. 1-65). In the literature, political parties' positions have been an exciting area from time to time. For example, Teorell measured the intra-party democracy of Swedish political parties to test their success in getting into government (Teorell, 1999). His criteria were like Political Party Database Project. The opportunity to influence decision-makers, accountability, and decision-making was the focal point of his measurement. With this research, he observed that it was possible to locate political parties in the left-right spectrum by looking at their intra-party democracy scores. There is no doubt that the left and the right spectrum have identified features that separate them. For example, social democratic or green parties tend to act internally democratic because they were formed to believe in rights, equality, and progress.

On the other hand, conservative and fascist parties are tended to be undemocratic internally since they believe in authority, discipline, and traditions. Therefore, locating political parties into the political spectrum less open area for debate than other political science areas such as intra-party democracy. In this research, the party manifesto project

⁵ $H1$: An increase in the number of legal regulations related to intra-party democracy positively affects intra-party democracy.

$H2$: An increase in the number of right-wing parties in countries negatively affect intra-party democracy score.

was used to label parties with a particular ideology and measure their distance into the left-right scale. Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) used multiple criteria for computing party position on a left-right scale (Franzmann, 2010). This thesis examined the relationship between ideologies and internal party democracy of 122 political parties from 19 countries. The expected results are to find a significant relationship between ideologies and intra-party democracy based on the literature. Left-wing political parties should increase intra-party democracy, and right-wing political parties affect intra-party democracy negatively.




FIGURE 4.4: LEFT-RIGHT SCALE OF 19 COUNTRIES.

As previously mentioned, there are 122 political parties and 19 countries in this research. Therefore, all variables are examined for 19 countries. However, there is no data for countries' left-right tendency in general in political parties' ideologies. Therefore, firstly, each political parties' scores categorized as left and right. Then, the averages of each side comprise the left score of the country and the right score of the country (see **Figure 4.4**). The results showed that some countries have significantly high scores on

the right side and others left. For example, Israel has 52.92 points that refer country dominated by the right political parties. Therefore, according to my second hypothesis⁶, Israel should have a low level of IPD due to right-wing party domination. Therefore, Israel has a 0.56 point for intra-party democracy below the mean and makes Israel's political parties internally undemocratic.

Furthermore, Sweden (6.39), Ireland (2.91), United Kingdom (0), Czech Republic (6.38) has low scores for right-wing political party domination. Since these countries have left-wing party domination and scarcity of right-wing political parties, their intra-party scores should be above the mean (0.6). These countries also prove that the second hypothesis is correct because Sweden has 0.62, Ireland has 0.72, the UK has 0.78, and the Czech Republic has 0.64 points for intra-party democracy, which makes its political parties internally democratic.

Figure 4.5 does not include all countries and political parties because to observe the effect of the ideologies on the intra-party democracy, the countries with legal provisions should be eliminated. Legal provisions force political parties to obey rules; therefore, political parties act under legal regulation, not their ideologies. Thus, in this figure, there are 10 countries out of 19 and 71 political parties out of 122. Table 4.1 shows that the mean of the legal provisions is 0.4. Therefore, the countries with a higher than 0.4 legal provision score can experience legal provisions, so these countries were eliminated from the list. The results show a significant relation between the MARPOR score (ideologies) and intra-party democracy. Left parties located on the left side of the left-right scale increase intra-party democracy and vice versa (see **Figure 4.5**).

⁶ H2: An increase in the number of right-wing parties in countries negatively affect intra-party democracy score.




FIGURE 4.5: INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & LEFT-RIGHT POSITION.

In the following chapter German, Italian, and Austrian political parties' ideologies will be analyzed.

4.4 Democracy

As previously mentioned, the democracy level of the countries is a control variable for this research. Democracy is an important variable that enables to have political parties in the political system. In addition, without fully democratic institutions and a democratic system, it may be hard to build an intra-party democracy. Therefore, the democracy scores of the countries were controlled for this research. Polity IV score is used to measure the democracy level of the countries. As explained in the methodology chapter, each country has a polity score for each year from -10 to +10. -10 represents hereditary monarchy, and +10 represents consolidated democracy. Scores are divided into three categories based on main regime types. Scores from +6 to +10 are categorized as “*democracies*.” scores from -5 to +5 are categorized as “*anocracies*.” Lastly, from -10 to -6 represent “*autocracies*.” According to many scholars, polity offers a relatively high quality of measurement criteria and well enough with its definition of democracy. In the

literature, it is one of the most used parameters for measuring democracy. This research only focuses on the year between 2011 and 2014. Generally, all the 19 countries have high scores for these years; however, some have lower scores than others, such as Israel (+6).




FIGURE 4.6:INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & DEMOCRACY.

Regression analyses run to observe any relation between the intra-party democracy and democracy for the 19 countries. The results showed no significant relationship between these countries' intra-party democracy and democracy levels (See Figure 4.6). R2 is 0.0048. It means that none of the values fit the regression model. Meanwhile, %0 of the dependent variable (intra-party democracy) is explained by the independent variable (democracy). The most important reason for this result is that almost all countries are democratic according to the Polity IV index. Therefore, there is not any observable variance among these countries.

4.5 GDP

Economic conditions and the social effects of these may be another significant factor affecting intra-party democracy in countries. In the absence of economic prosperity, equality, and human development, establishing a well-functioning democratic

order and a competitive environment is impossible (Heo & Tan, 2001). Freedom House 2015 review showed that in the more democratic states, economic climates are better than autocratic states. According to the Freedom House, between 1988 and 2005, there was a decrease in not-free countries by nearly 14 points (from 37 to 23 percent), while free countries rose (from 36 to 46 percent). Therefore, the economic and social capacity of the countries needed to be checked for this research. According to their economies, the World Bank categorizes countries into four groups: low-middle, upper-middle, and high-income. This classification is updated each year. The 19 countries show that even they have different levels of GDP, there is no significant relationship between intra-party democracy and GDP (see, Figure 3.2)

4.6 Governance

For reasons previously stated, a governance indicator was used as another control variable for this research. World Bank Data will be used to observe the relation between the variables. “Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” (World Bank, n.d.). In the indicator, there are six dimensions; however, only one dimension (the rule of law) was examined for this research. Results showed that countries have a well-functioned rule of law. The rule of law may influence the legal provision implementation process. If the country does not have a rule of law tradition, there would be no meaning to mention any legal regulation that possibly affects the intra-party democracy. Therefore, this variable is linked with the legal regulations’ hypothesis. Results show a positive relationship between governance and intra-party democracy; however, results are not significant (see Figure 4.7). With the large-N data, results might be significant.

Furthermore, Germany, Italy, and Austria have similar scores of governance. It means that there is no problem with implementing rules in these countries. Therefore, Germany’s legal provisions can be used as a model for Austria and Italy.




FIGURE 4.7: INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE.

To sum up, in this section, intra-party democracy, legal regulations, democracy and governance level, and GDP were examined for 19 countries. Tables and regression analyses show that there is no significant relationship among the variables. 19 observations are a limited number to run a regression analysis, but because the intra-party democracy index data only contains 19 countries, I had to work with these amounts of data. Moreover, another problem is examining the country-specific factors such as political parties' ideologies for 19 countries and adopt these into regression analyses in a limited time and resources. However, the results show that 19 countries have a different level of intra-party democracy, and these differences should be studied. In this thesis, the reasons for the different levels of intra-party democracy will be scrutinized for three countries: Germany, Italy, and Austria.

4.7 Discussion

In this research, the internal actions of political parties were be evaluated regardless of their external agenda and actions. To sum up, Scarrow defines intra-party democracy as "...a wide range of methods for including party members in intra-party deliberation and decision-making (2005). Based on this definition in this research intra-party democracy conceptually categorized under three categories: inclusiveness,

centralization, and institutionalization. Details of the definition were explained in the previous section. However, these three categories were providing a better understanding of the intra-party democracy for this research. First, inclusiveness is one of the fundamental angles of intra-party democracy that everyone accepts. Inclusiveness means the inclusiveness of the leadership election, membership elections, and policy determination process. Generally, at minimum, political parties should be open for all rank-and-file members to influence candidates, leaders, and decision-making processes. However, some believe that this process also is eligible for party affiliations such as youth, women, and local branches.

Furthermore, others believe that political parties' broader bases should be included in the decision-making process, such as social, economic, cultural organizations. Therefore, the degree of inclusiveness is changeable for political parties like the definition of intra-party democracy. I believe that degree of inclusiveness is debatable, but it does not influence the democracy of a political party. This debate is like the debate between direct and indirect democracy on which one is more democratic? Therefore, if decisions are open for debate and collectively with the participating members, it is enough to consider a party internally democratic for the inclusiveness criteria. The second fundamental criterion that I accepted as a basis of intra-party democracy is decentralization. According to Scarrow, some argued that decentralization causes confusion inside the party and damages the power and cohesion of the party. However, I believe that decentralization brings more opportunities for democracy. It will provide a better system for checks and balances. In addition, decisions can be given with the bottom-up approach in the decentralized political parties with the participation of various party layers. In the centralized parties, party organizations tend to turn into an oligarchy. One of the most crucial features of internal party democracy is candidate selection. In centralized political parties, leaders may tend to appoint their candidates instead of selected ones.

Lastly, institutionalization can be accepted as a supporter feature for the first two criteria. In the lack of institutionalization first two criteria can be changed quickly and abused. These final criteria provide autonomy for actors from each other and the development of internal organizations. With high institutionalism, a political party may enjoy a high level of intra-party democracy because of the formal rules and established procedures. However, a high level of institutionalization does not always automatically lead to high intra-party democracy, such as in SAP in Sweden and LPD in Japan. These political

parties have a high level of corporatism which both have strong ties with the interest groups and state structure because of their long-ruling years. Therefore, both political parties rely on the decisions of a small number of people instead of the party, leading undemocratic intra-party structure. Therefore, inclusiveness and decentralization, and institutionalization is a packet deal which they mutually coexist.

Even the concept of intra-party democracy is open for discussion and suffers from the generally excepted definition, in this research inclusiveness, centralization, and institutionalization are accepted as fundamental components of intra-party democracy and were used to define and conceptualize the concept. Furthermore, still there is a hardness of acceptance of intra-party democracy whether it is good or always better for all types of political parties. Firstly, this thesis defends that intra-party democracy is beneficial for both countries and political parties. With the legal provisions, intra-party democracy can be forced to political parties. Therefore, legal provisions can be seen as a punishment mechanism to have intra-party democracy. However, in addition to the punishment side of the story, intra-party democracy is also beneficial for political parties. So, there is a rewarding side of them also. First, in the undemocratic intra-party setting, political party leaders abuse power and can reflect this power to party members, other political parties, and citizens. In the case of the elected undemocratic political party, there is no guarantee that that political party/leader would close or control other political parties. Therefore, to protect their existence in the system, political parties should accept some level of intra-party democracy and rules provide security for political parties from each other. Secondly, the main aim of the political parties is to get votes and be elected. With the intra-party democracy, ties between voters and parties will become stronger because in the internal democratic party setting voters and members can involve every process of politics. Therefore, political parties can get more support if they give priority to voters' opinions and wishes. These to factor reward side of the having intra-party democracy.

Is It for Every Political Party?

As previously mentioned, there is difficult to conceptually define intra-party democracy and accept the applicable basis for each party. In this research intra-party

democracy is about the relationship among three branches- the public, party institutions, and party representatives in government. In the ideal modern democracies, political parties responsible for providing a link between the public and leadership. However, what the public represents is changeable from party to party. At the state level, the public represents the whole, however, at the party level, the understanding of the public is more varied. Generally, understanding of party *demos* stems from the mass party model that accepts its more inclusive way. However, other party types consider the public differently, for example, catch-all parties consider citizens regardless of their ideologies and cartel parties see the public as a provider of resources. Therefore, every party has a different understanding of the public. Therefore, different perceptions of intra-party democracy. Intra-party democracy requires inclusiveness however, in the religious-political parties' participation in women would be not accepted. For example, in Israel, there is a high level of variance among Israel's political parties. Religiosity is one of the determinant factors that create variance among Israeli political parties. More religious political parties have a low level of intra-party democracy. Firstly, in religious-political parties' party members do not have power over candidate selection or leader of policy because they believe in religious leader and power. Also, women's representation in religious political parties is lower than in other political parties because of their patriarchal political culture. Therefore, it means that in the eyes of religious political parties, not everyone is equal and accepted as public so they should not have an equal chance to be part of the process and party. Therefore, these types of political parties have a low level of intra-party democracy and intra-party democracy may damage their founding ideals and principles.

Therefore, these examples show that conceptualization of intra-party democracy is hard and debatable for many aspects. Moreover, setting the basis for intra-party democracy and forcing it with legal regulations have a danger to weaken political parties' characteristics. However, still I believe that several bases for intra-party democracy should be determined and implemented for every party in countries to prevent experience what Germany faced during the Hitler era. Moderate level of authoritarian is acceptable political parties but the extremist level of it would be harmful to democracy at state-level. Women's voice in the religious political party would be weak and not enough to influence party agenda or decisions. However, exclude the entire one group to systems would give more damage to state level-democracy and the balance among other political parties.

Chapter 5:

Cases in Comparative Perspective

Three countries have been selected based on the case selection criteria explained previously (see chapter 3). Each case will be evaluated with respect to two main explanatory factors of different levels of intra-party democracy: legal provisions and political parties' ideologies. Furthermore, party systems and party types will also be analyzed for three countries instead of these two factors. Lastly, the democracy level, Governance, and GDP will be studied to show that these variables do not affect intra-party democracy.

Germany is accepted as a “heartland of the laws” (Katz & Mair, 2012). Germany has the highest number of legal regulations that regulate intra-party democracy among 19 countries. Also, have the highest score of intra-party democracy. However, due to the existence of legal regulations impact of the political parties' ideologies became ambiguous. Besides the fact that Italy has similar scores with Germany in GDP, democracy, and governance, Italy has a low score of intra-party democracy. Despite the low score of intra-party democracy, political parties in Italy have various scores in intra-party democracy. Some of them have a low score, some of them have a high score. The differences within the country stem from the difference in ideologies. Austria has similar scores and stories with Italy; she has a low score of intra-party democracy and a low score of legal provisions, although her high democracy, GDP, and governance scores.

5.1 Germany

Germany has a consolidated democracy with a multi-party system with various ideologies. Therefore, Germany experienced different phases in its political party politics. In addition, Germany has one of the higher scores of intra-party democracy in Europe. Furthermore, they have many regulations and legal laws to regulate intra-party democracy. Lastly, there is no essential difference between the political parties' scores of intra-party democracy, which stem from the political parties' ideologies. Therefore, in this thesis, Germany will show the effect of legal provisions on the intra-party democracy with its high legal provisions and intra-party democracy score compared to Italy and Austria's low scores.

5.1.1 Historical Context

German politics have different faces and experience changes during the history of the world wars and unification process. Economic policies, welfare policies, and laws have been affected by these changes.

In democratic regimes, political parties are necessities that maintain the system and are accepted as a requirement of a constitutional setting (Pollock, 1929). Germany adopted this understanding into its political system (Pollock, 1929). Because of the past unfortunate experiences of the Hitler era and the world war, Germany regulates every area of the political life and political parties' internal actions to prevent return into undemocratic politics. After WWII, the party system was highly polarized and fragmented. German politics experienced both horizontal and vertical fragmentation because of external conditions. However, German political parties accepted moderate pluralism with low ideological distance (Sartori, 1976, pp. 64-115). Because of the extensive legal regulations for political parties, political parties adopted a similar organization and decision-making mechanism structure. German political parties generally adopt a similar territorial and administrative structure with the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, The Liberals, Social Democrats, and the Greens have a unitary party structure in contrast to Christian parties' multiple channels (Weissenbach & Weber, n.d.)

Party systems did not change drastically after the unification of western and eastern Germany. The East adopted the West German model except for the Greens. In the Western side of Germany, there are four political parties (Christian Democrats (CDU), Social Democrats (SPD), the Liberals, and the Greens). The eastern side has three parties in the system, which are CDU, SPD, and socialist PDS (successor of the former governing party of the German Democratic Republic). Therefore, these varieties among the two sides of the country being changes in the systems. Generally, all political parties accepted and responded to the needs of the unifications (Picot, 2014). The Greens are the only party that changed entirely after the unification. After the unification, the East and the West Green allies went under the change in two-stage of transformation. Two political parties have different party organizations and party settings. Therefore, they combined two settings and agreed on one form instead of directly accept the West model. However, Germany still did not experience a drastic change in its political party system due to unification. On the contrary, Germany experienced several changes parallel with the other European countries, such as emerging new political parties such as Greens or more left-right polarization (Weissenbach & Weber, n.d.)

5.1.2 Political parties and Intra-party democracy

Germany has one of the most well-functioning and organized parties. America and England have a reputation for their solid and organized party systems. However, the German political party system is more permanent than American or English party systems (Katz & Mair, 1994). Germany has a multi-party system with nine political parties enjoy into the system. A multi-party system provides various ideologies for citizens and a competitive environment for political parties. Also, Germany has the highest score of intra-party democracy among 19 countries (See Figure 4.1).

There is an interrelated relationship between political parties and the state. German political parties represent their countries' roots. In this sense, like other well-developed democracies, this country an appropriate example of Rokkan's freezing hypothesis (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, pp. 1-65). German political parties affected and shaped several essential features of their culture. The German state is called a living organism that responds to society and organizations' needs (Debus & Brauninger, 2009).

Therefore, their political party system emerges from an accommodation of their needs. It may be why even there are various parties in the system, the organizational structure of the political parties and party programs are not too much different from each other. All political parties are formed with a bottom-up approach and have a democratic structure (Poguntke, 1994). Political party organizations have three parts: party assemblies, party executive committees, and party committees. Germany has a powerful and effective party discipline, which works as a mechanical engineer. In Germany, every party has various committees and publishes regular magazines (Saalfeld, 2002).

To sum up, Germany successfully built internally democratic political parties in the unified and stable political party system with merging differences.

5.1.3 Legal Regulations

Germany is called a motherland of the laws. With the help of the legal provisions, Germany has a high intra-party democracy and a stable political party system compared to other European countries. Fundamental law binds political parties with constitutional parameters. In the Basic Law, the role of political parties is mentioned in article 21, which demands political parties internally democratic (Katz & Mair, 2012). Regulations identify responsibilities and the limits of the individuals' intra-party positions, party leaders, or party congress. The constitutional environment cannot be changed by the political parties (Picot, 2014). German political parties are binding by the constitution. The effect of the laws is beyond the influence, and political parties must stick to some boundaries. The similarities between the German political parties' organizations stem from the legal provisions that regulate political parties. All these organizations are tied to each other with invisible rules that keep them in contact. Therefore, the whole country connects like a part of the machinery that works smoothly (Saalfeld, 2002). The constitutional framework directly influences the flow of public money, the electoral law, and the party law of the political parties. However, it does not mean that political party members act freely and influence society. Basic Law also gives political parties power to autonomously control their organizations and influence society (Article 38, Basic Law). Therefore, despite the legal regulations of political parties, German political parties have independent and powerful organizations (Katz & Mair, 2011). Although political parties

stick in the exact constitutional boundaries, they have different organizational settings (Debus, 2009; Poguntke, 1994). As mentioned previously, social democrats and the Liberals tend to have a unitary party structure, unlike the Christian Democrats' affiliated organization structure (Picot, 2014). On the other hand, the Greens, do not have sub-organizations until the 1990s.

Germany has the highest score on Legal Provision Index with 0.9 (see Table 4.2). There are ten criteria for getting 10 out of 10 points, and Germany has 9 of them except for Q10⁷ related to party leader privilege. Thus, the examples given above show that Germany regulated intra-party democracy detailed with legal provisions except for the party's leader rights and privileges.

5.1.4 *Political parties Ideologies*

There is a multi-party system in Germany, Italy, and Austria with major political parties such as Conservationists, Social Democrats, and Liberals. In addition, several new emerging Green parties were added to the list (See Appendix A). Therefore, we can observe different political positions for the German, Italian, and Austrian political party systems to investigate differences in intra-party democracy levels among these political parties. In general, German political parties are representing the class or economic cleavages into society.

As mentioned previously, there is a debate on intra-party democracy, which gained momentum during the late 1960s and early 1970s with the emergence of new left-wing parties and continued with the new Green Parties. These new parties focus all attention on intra-party democracy for saving democracy at the macro-level (Poguntke, 1987; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997, pp. 159-240, 257-275). Lastly, new right-wing populist parties discovered defeating old traditional parties by helping them erase their elitist image. Thus, it is an intra-party democracy. The German Alternative for Germany (AfD) follows this path with the combination of Greens' organizational features such as dual leadership, open party congress for all members, and so on (Scarrow et al., 2017).

⁷ Are there any privileges of the party leader? (Yes=0.00, No=1.00)

Moreover, according to Political Party Database Project's results, as expected, Greens and Social Democrats have the highest score of intra-party democracy. Far Rights have the lowest score of intra-party democracy. Liberals, Christian Democrats/Conservatives, and Left Socialists come before the Far Rights. However, not all Far-right or Left Socialist parties have the lowest score. There is an observable difference between the party families; however, in some cases, ideologies disappeared. For example, in Norway, Germany, Spain, and Canada, the variance between the political parties is very low.

In the German case, we can observe that there is no significant variance between political parties. The logical reason for this might be the legal provisions that all political parties should obey regardless of their political ideology (See Table 5.1).

TABLE 5.1: GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES' INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & IDEOLOGIES.

Country Name	Party Name	IPD Index	TOTAL IPD index	Party Ideology
Germany	The Left	0.84	0.71	-34.547
Germany	Alliance '90/The Greens	0.84	0.71	-19.595
Germany	Free Democratic Party	0.81	0.71	14.036
Germany	Social Democratic Party	0.78	0.71	-23.568
Germany	Pirate Party	0.6	0.71	-12.653
Germany	Christian Social Union	0.58	0.71	2.564
Germany	Christian Democratic Union	0.54	0.71	2.564

There are seven political parties in German in the Political Party Database Project (see Table 5.1). As previously mentioned, to locate political parties into the spectrum, MARPOR was used. According to MARPOR, left-wing parties have negative scores, and right-wing parties have positive scores. Their distance from the zero points measures the strength of ideologies (see Appendix A). Four of them are on the left side of the spectrum (The Left, Alliance, Alliance '90/The Greens, Social Democratic Party, Pirate Party), and 3 of them are on the right side of the spectrum (Free Democratic Party, Christian Democratic Union, and Christian Social Union) (See Table 5.1). However, Free Democratic Party has a high score of intra-party democracy (0.81) in contrast to expected. In addition, the variance between German Political Parties is 0.017, which is very low. It shows that even some political parties (Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social

Union) are below the mean (0.62), which means they are undemocratic. Their scores are close to the mean with 0.58 and 0.54. Furthermore, the proper party of the Free Democratic Party has an internally democratic party organization with 0.81 points.

Therefore, with the legal provisions, political ideologies lost their importance in determining the structure of political party organization. As a result, it is possible to establish a democratic environment in countries for every political party regardless of their ideology, even for right-wing political parties. To sum up, these results show that the second hypothesis⁸ of this thesis is correct in the light of enough evidence.

5.1.5 Democracy, GDP, and Governance

The democracy, GDP, and Governance scores of Germany are very high. However, Italy and Austria also have high scores.




FIGURE 5.1: GDP PER CAPITA (CURRENT US\$).

Therefore, these variables are not significant for explaining the different levels of intra-party democracy of Germany, Italy, and Austria. For democracy, the results showed that Germany got a +10 score out of 10 since the 1990s. Thus, Germany has consolidated democracy for 30 years.

⁸ H₂: An increase in the number of right-wing parties in countries negatively affect intra-party democracy score.

In the case of GDP scores, Germany, Italy, and Austria are in the high-income countries' category (UN,2014). Their average GDP per capita scores of 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 are close. Therefore, economic conditions are not a determinant factor for the differences in Germany, Italy, and Austria's intra-party democracy scores (see Figure 5.2)




FIGURE 5.2: GOVERNANCE INDICATOR (RULE OF LAW).

According to the result, all three countries have an acceptable score in the rule of law according to World Bank Governance Indicator in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2013. Germany has 7.23, which means that the authorities successfully implement laws. Merely existence of law is not enough to judge the effectiveness of laws because, in some countries, laws are not implemented even they exist. However, in Germany, it is not the case. Also, Italy and Austria will have no problem implementing rules if the German model would be applied in those countries. However, Austria has a higher score than Italy. It means that trust for rules and the power of rules are more visible in Austria. Thus, Austria may show better results in obeying rules. Therefore, there is no doubt about the effect of the legal regulations on the intra-party democracy in Germany.

5.2 Italy

Italy has a consolidated democracy with a multi-party system with various ideologies. Therefore, Italy experienced different phases in its political party politics. However, Italy has one of the lowest scores of intra-party democracy in Europe. Furthermore, they have a limited number of regulations and legal laws to regulate intra-party democracy. Lastly, there is an essential difference between the political parties' scores of intra-party democracy, which stem from the political parties' ideologies. Therefore, in this thesis, Italy will show the causes of the lack of legal provisions on the intra-party democracy with its low level of legal provisions and influence of political parties' ideologies on intra-party democracy.

5.2.1 Historical context

Italy has a deep contention to its roots and history. Political parties and society feed this heritage. Italy has a long history of fascism, Catholic subculture, and the fear of anti-democratic Communism (Bardi & Morlino, 1994). Christian Democracy had strong ties with the various organizations and the Vatican. During the 1960s, secularization and de-ideologization affected the relationship between the parties and the organization. Italy completed its consolidated democracy in the 1960s (Bardi & Morlino, 1994).

During the 1980 and early 1990s, Italy faced political parties, political classes, institutions, and the state. After the collapse of the USSR and the Berlin Wall, Italy experienced several changes post-war (D'Alimonte & Bartolini, 1997). Thus, During the 1990s, Italian political parties went under the transformation process. Old traditional political parties changed their organizational and ideological structure; new political parties were also emerged (Giannetti & Laver, 2009). To illustrate, the Communist Party (PCI) dissolved and formed the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS); the referendum was conducted against the traditional parties' positions; new political parties joined in the system. On the other side, illegal party finance was a problem for Italian party politics; after the transformation with the help of new regulations, all institutions and the political actors increase their effectiveness and status in the system (Giannetti & Laver, 2009). However, all political parties experienced difficulties during the transformation process,

but they adopted them into the new system. The electoral law system, old center political parties, too polarized political system, multiplicity in the political system were the new features of the Italian political life (Picot, 2014).

During the 1990s, as previously mentioned Italian political system was undergoing a change from polarized pluralism to moderate pluralism. The success and the degree of the change were debatable. The most problematic side of the old Italian political party is that system is lacking competition (Tarrow, 1977). Because the extremist excluded from politics, major political parties formed a government without any legitimate opposition. After the transformation system was still carrying the old characteristics; however, it became more competitive with the involvements of new political parties into the spectrum and legitimation of the ideological parties. At the end of this period, one big party, such as DC, stopped controlling the center (Tarrow, 1977). Therefore, the system turned unilateral.

5.2.2 Political parties and Intra-party democracy

Giovanni Sartori explained the Italian political system with the term ‘polarized pluralism’ in the 1960s (Sartori, 1976, pp. 1-35). Then he used this term as a part of a more general classification of party systems in his party system typology. Multiple political parties in the system are located on two opposite sides of the left-right spectrum in polarized pluralism and try to enlarge themselves. In contrast to polarized pluralism, Sartori's party system type is moderate pluralism with different features (Sartori, 1976, pp. 1-35). This system has the opposite understanding in the number of political parties in the system, ideological distances between them, and bipolar logic.

Italy experienced multiple changes in its political party system. The Italian system was not healthy for democracy inside and outside the political party because of the lack of competition among counters. However, after the 1990s, Italian political parties moved into a more moderate system like Germany. It makes the system more stable and friendly for democracy. The more political party entered politics and extremists were no longer alienated from the competition. However, Italy does not have an established, stable, and one mutual standard for political parties because of the lack of legal provisions. Furthermore, despite its similarities with Germany in Economic, Governance Level,

political party system, and Democracy score, Italy has a very low-level intra-party democracy compared to Germany.

Italy has different models of the party organization in the system. Due to the different types of models' Italian political party system is complex, and more need to build a stable link between the society and the state (Picot, 2014). For example, DC, PCI, and PSI had a more developed organizational structure. And a high number of members. Unlike them, the Communists minimal organizational network system at the local.

Furthermore, the Democratic left has a light party structure in contrast to the right. Italian party organization has an along-lasting history, so have unique and separated types of organizational setting. These different settings made it hard to build a stable and parallel system (Bale & Krouwel, 2013). Because of the limited number of general regulations that regulate political parties, all parties may act according to their preferences. Political parties are generally seen from the perspective of 'partisan politics' in comparative research. Parties represent the needs of their main constituents and seek to adopt policies when they are in power (Huber & Stephens, 2003; Korpi, 1983, pp. 53-83). The existence of other parties is in conventional partisan philosophy, not applicable to the actions of a specific party. Other parties are essential only to the extent that the total distribution of power is concerned. The main goal is to influence other parties' ability to implement its policies rather than their policies. This model of party politics has recently been questioned by some scholars, pointing out that the presence of other parties and the structure of the party system affect each party's activities (Huber & Stephens, 2003; Korpi, 1983, pp. 83-110).

5.2.3 Legal Regulations

Italy has a limited number of legal regulations that regulate internal party politics (see Table 4.2). The differences with Germany are legal regulations in the case of intra-party democracy for Italy. Therefore, Italy's low level of intra-party democracy can be explained with the legal regulations with the comparison of Germany. Throughout history, Italy gradually implemented electoral rules. These rules provided the basis for electoral mobility and party realignment. However, these rules did not target the internal actions of the political parties.

5.2.4 Political parties Ideologies

During this period of polarized pluralism, the Italian political system was highly polarized between the right and left poles. There is a sizeable ideological distance between the two poles. The political party system consists of multiple political parties that were ideologically polarized. In addition, there was party fragmentation, controlled center by a solid median voter of a strong party, multipolar distribution of political parties. Lastly, extremist political parties were excluded from the system because of their democratically unreliable reputation. In this system, there is a bilateral opposition.

In the Italian case, results showed that there is more variance (0.035) compared to Germany. Thus, the democratic political environment for political parties is more volatile contrasted to Germany. There are five political parties in Political Party Database Project. These are the Democratic Party, Italy of Values, Union of the Centre, The People of Freedom, Northern League. Two of them (Democratic Party, Italy of Values) have internally democratic party politics (see Table 5.2).

TABLE 5.2: ITALIAN POLITICAL PARTIES' INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & IDEOLOGIES.

Country Name	Party Name	IPD Index	TOTAL IPD index	Party Ideology
Italy	Democratic Party	0.71	0.49	-6.863
Italy	Italy Of Values	0.66	0.49	N/A
Italy	Union of the Centre	0.47	0.49	33.652
Italy	The People of Freedom	0.38	0.49	3.81
Italy	Northern League	0.26	0.49	3.81

The democratic party has 0.71, and Italy of the Values Party has 0.66 points above the mean (0.62) of 19 countries. The other three of them are not democratic internally. Union of the Centre (0.47), The People of Freedom (0.38), Northern League (0.26)' scores are below the mean (see Table 5.2). According to MARPOR, only one of them is the left-wing party (Democratic Party). Three of them are right-wing political parties (Union of the Centre, The People of Freedom, Northern League) (see Table 5.2). There is one missing value according to MARPOR. However, Italy of the Values political party is named a center populist party according to multiple resources (Giannetti et al., 2016;

Zulianello, 2020). Therefore, it will not damage the results due to their expected average score of intra-party democracy (0.66) parallel to their centrist ideology. Results proved that political parties act following their political ideologies' tendency in internal party democracy without legal provisions.

Furthermore, Italy has a low level of legal provision (0.2). Therefore, Italy has a low intra-party democracy (0.49) because of Italy's relatively high proper party hegemony. Therefore, Italy has a significant difference between political parties (Scarrow et al., 2017).

5.2.5 Democracy, GDP, and Governance

Italy has a +10 score in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. However, past experiences of these countries with democracy were also examined because democracy is a process that all countries gradually adapted. Italy got 10 points since 1948. Therefore, Italy has well-established democratic institutions and ruled based on democratic principles according to the Polity IV index for many years. Moreover, the Italian consolidated democracy is older than Germany. To conclude, democracy is not the identifier factor that explains the different intra-party democracies of these countries.

Italy is in the high-income countries' category (UN,2014). Italy's GDP per capita scores of 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 are close to Germany and Austria. Therefore, economic conditions are not a determinant factor for the differences in Germany, Italy, and Austria's intra-party democracy scores.

Italy has 5.84 in the governance index (See Figure 5.2). Thus, even though Italy has a relatively low governance score compared to others, it has still above the average. It means the rule of law is not why that causes a difference in the countries' intra-party democracy score. Furthermore, it shows that Italy and Austria have the potential and similar tendency with Germany in the rule of law. Meanwhile, implementing the legal regulations for intra-party democracy might be ended with the same results as Germany for Austria and Italy.

5.3 Austria

Austria has a consolidated democracy with a multi-party system with various ideologies. Austria has dominant two-party parties of the center-right and center-left with other more minor but influential political parties of the populists and environmentalists. However, Austria has one of the lowest scores of intra-party democracy in Europe. Furthermore, they have a limited number of regulations and legal laws to regulate intra-party democracy. Lastly, there is an essential difference between the political parties' scores of intra-party democracy, which stem from the political parties' ideologies. Therefore, in this thesis, Austria will show the causes of the lack of legal provisions on the intra-party democracy with its low level of legal provisions and influence of political parties' ideologies on intra-party democracy.

5.3.1 Historical context

Austria has a stable political system in Europe with several changes and continuations for decades. After experiencing Nazi rule for seven years and an authoritarian regime during the 1930s, the balance between left and right was built (Luther, 1989). However, today this balance is disrupted, and Austrian democracy has become more open for innovations. Since 1945 the Social Democrats and People's Party dominated party politics in Austria (Berger, 1950). However, they became less effective in the case of mobilizing masses (Luther, 1989). Since the 1980s, four political parties in the Austrian parliament: The Social Democrats, the People's Party, the Freedom Party, and the Greens. There were three other political parties in the system. However, they have a slightly small number of votes compared other four of them. However, since the 1980s, the voting tendency has shifted in Austria. The Party system and the results of the elections were no longer that predictable. There is no doubt that new political parties that emerged during this period, like all of Europe, can be a reason for this. Austrian political party system most of the time dominated by the two major political parties. Austrian People's Party represents the center-right (OVP) as a successor of the former Christian Social Party founded in the 1890s.

On the other hand, the center-left is represented by the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPO), the successor of the former Socialist Party (Helms, 1997). On the contrary to the former Socialist Party, SPO moved its image to a less ideological and Marxist, more progressive approach (Helms, 1997). Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) represents the populist ide in the country. They are sometimes referred to as a Liberal Party. FPO target every segment of the society including the immigrant and Muslims. The environmentalist bloc of the country launched under the name of Greens and took seats in the parliament in 1986. Lastly, the Communist Party of Austria (KPO) has not been represented in the parliament since 1959.

SPÖ and ÖVP had a clear class basis during the inter-war and post-war periods (Haerpfer & Gehmacher, 1984). SPÖ consisted of manual workers and low-ranking white-collar employees. On the other hand, ÖVP represented all peoples; however, generally, they targeted farmers and the self-employed class of the society (Haerpfer & Gehmacher, 1984). In time societal bases of the political parties have changed significantly. They became more like catch-all parties. Between 1945 and 1986, the People's Party and the Socialist Party shared the power, and 1979 with 90.2 percent of the votes (Luther, 1989). After the 1970s, significant changes in party politics have been experienced in Austrian politics. The number of political parties, targeted groups of the political parties changed since that time. Until 1983 there was a three-party in the parliament except for the time between 1949 and 1959. However, in the 1990s elections, Freedom Party took some power from the People's Party with 17 percent of the vote. In the 1999 elections, Freedom Party made a coalition government. In recent years, the Greens, the Liberal Forum, was launched and led by women. These two new parties had a different discourse for gender issues compared to the other three traditional parties. Social Democratic Party and People's Party renewed their organizational setting (Müller, 1994, pp. 51-80).

5.3.2 Political parties and Intra-party democracy

Austrian political parties' organization has one of the most prominent member populations in Europe despite the country's small number of populations. After the war, Austria successfully conducted party politics in the interaction between civil society (Müller, 1994, pp. 51-80). Instead of a low level of intra-party democracy in general, there are several differences between political parties. Some of them have a high level of

intra-party democracy by themselves. The Greens were established in a completely different organizational setting (Muller & Ulram, 1995; Müller, 1994, pp. 51-80). The Greens have a more transparent party organization, more balance among genders, and equality is more ensured than traditional two political parties.

Since the post-war period, there have been three major political parties in the system. However, party politics experience gradual changes and reforms both in the system and the parties' internal structure. Major political parties have many members, and they are able to maintain their size. Moreover, the internal party structure of the Austrian political parties is generally undemocratic. In Austria, political party leaders have more power than the party members since the post-war period (Müller, 1994, pp. 51-80). Political party leader enjoys the power and autonomy from their rank and file. Therefore, most party leaders control intra-party democracy. However, in time internal party structure changed and adapted more democracy into a party with the newly emerging political parties. Austria's and the German political party system have very similar features. Both have dominant two-party parties of the center-right and center-left, with other smaller but effective political parties of the populists and environmentalists. In the Austrian system, small communist political parties and several other fringe political parties are existing. Therefore, Austria has a multi-party system like other countries: Germany and Italy. Unfortunately, in general, Austria still has a low level of intra-party democracy. Compared to Germany, their party system is like each other. However, Germany has a high number of intra-party democracies.

5.3.3 Legal Regulations

Party Law was implemented in 1975 as a liberal law. Laws generously gave space for political parties to act freely in their actions. However, this freedom causes the hegemony of the two political parties, developing a high level of patronage, a hostile environment for new political parties, and competition (Müller, 1994, pp. 51-80). Austrian political parties have a different and complex organizational setting that stems from the territory and hierarchical levels in the state structure. The system has local, district, Land, and national organizations. This complex system required more regulations to create a basis and check all the layers in the system. However, despite the system's

needs, they have a minimal number of legal regulations that regulate party politics and the internal actions of the political parties. The lack of laws causes a low level of intra-party democracy for Austria.

5.3.4 Political parties Ideologies

Austria performed quite similar results to Italy. In Austria, five political parties have been placed in the Political Party Database Project. These political parties are Social Democratic Party, The Greens, Freedom Party, Alliance for the Future, and People's Party.

TABLE 5.3: AUSTRIAN POLITICAL PARTIES' INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY & IDEOLOGIES.

Country Name	Party Name	IPD	Total IPD	Party Ideology
Austria	Social Democratic Party	0.74	0.46	-38.48
Austria	The Greens	0.44	0.46	-13.94
Austria	Freedom Party	0.41	0.46	12.17
Austria	Alliance for The Future	0.37	0.46	-3.58
Austria	People's Party	0.34	0.46	-5.51

Only one of them is internally democratic in these parties (see Table 5.3). Social Democratic Party has 0.74 points which are above the mean (0.62). On the other hand, four of them are undemocratic internally. The Greens (0.44), Freedom Party (0.41), Alliance for the Future (0.37), and People's Party (0.34)'s scores are very low, which means they have a very undemocratic internal party structure. In addition, only 3 of them are located on the left side of the spectrum, and 2 of them are right-wing political parties (see Table 5.3). There is no data for Alliance for the Future Party in the MARPOR index; however, multiple resources labeled this party as a right-wing party (Bodlos & Plescia, 2018; Mefferta, Huberb, Gschwendc, & Pappi, 2011). Therefore, this party was accepted

as a right-wing political party for this research. Like the Italian case, Austrian political parties follow a similar tendency for their intra-party democracy and ideologies. Left-wing parties tend to have a more democratic internal party setting than right-wing political parties and undemocratic party settings. In the absence of legal provisions, political parties tend to act in accordance with their ideological heritage. In this case, the appropriate parties acted undemocratically internally, and the left political parties act democratically internally. Therefore, it causes an undemocratic environment for party politics in those countries such as Italy and Austria.

Therefore, Germany, Italy, and Austria are suitable examples to observe and compare the political parties' differences.

5.3.5 *Democracy, GDP, and Governance*

Austria has a +10 score in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 like Germany and Italy. However, past experiences with democracy were also examined because democracy is a process that all countries gradually adapted. Lastly, Austria has 10 points since 1946. Therefore, all these countries have well-established democratic institutions and ruled based on democratic principles according to Polity IV's index for many years. Therefore, democracy is not the significant factor that explains these countries' different levels of intra-party democracy.

In GDP scores, Austria is in the high-income countries' category (UN,2014). Austria's GDP per capita scores of 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 are close to Germany and Italy, at least not far away that make a difference. Therefore, economic conditions are not a determinant factor for the differences in Germany, Italy, and Austria's intra-party democracy scores (See **Figure 5.1**)

For the governance variable, Austria has 6.81 points (See **Figure 5.2**). It shows that Italy and Austria have the potential and similar tendency with Germany in the rule of law. Meanwhile, implementing the legal regulations for intra-party democracy might be ended with the same results as Germany for Austria and Italy.

5.4 Discussion

According to the selection criteria explained in the previous chapter, Germany, Italy, and Austria were selected to scrutinize the reasons behind the difference in intra-party democracy scores intensely. Thus, the only difference among these countries is legal provisions that would affect intra-party democracy (see Table 5.4).

TABLE 5.4: CASE SELECTION.

Country Name	IPD	LEGAL Provisions	Democracy	GDP	Governance
Germany	0.71	0.9	1	44476.5006	7.23
Austria	0.46	0.3	1	46924.2692	6.81
Italy	0.49	0.2	1	36112.2121	5.84

The literature review and the data analyses showed that these three countries have a common historical heritage, political party system, economic and social prosperity, and functioning governance. However, despite the similar features, these countries have a different level of intra-party democracy. The possible reason might be the legal provisions that regulate intra-party democracy. In contrast to Italy and Austria, Germany has a high level of legal provisions and, as a result, a high level of intra-party democracy. Secondly, political parties tend to act based on their ideological preferences in the absence of legal provisions.

Meanwhile, as previously explained, right political parties have a more traditional and authoritarian structure that hinders intra-party democracy. On the contrary, Green parties and left-sided political parties might be more democratic internally because they represent ideas of equality, rights, and freedom. This historical phenomenon shows its appearance in the case of Italy and Austria. Thus, despite the lack of legal regulations and force, some political parties prefer internally democratic, not based on their ideological preferences. Of course, not all the left-wing parties are more democratic than the right-wing parties, but it is only a general tendency in those countries.

In contrast, German political parties do not represent their ideological features in intra-party democracy since they bind with legal provisions. Political parties' ideologies are still valid and influence the intra-party democracy; however, these ideological features can be controlled with legal provisions like Germany. Furthermore, further investigation showed that there is a pattern in these three countries. In Italy and Austria, political parties have high and low intra-party democracy (see Table 5.5). Some parties in both countries have a high score of intra-party democracy, and some of them have a low score of intra-party democracy. The ones who have a high score of intra-party democracy have similar ideological tendencies.

TABLE 5.5: POLITICAL PARTIES' INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY SCORES.

Political Party	Country Name	Party Name	Intra-party Democracy Index	TOTAL intra-party democracy index
P2 ₁	Austria	Social Democratic Party	0.74	0.46
P2 ₂	Austria	The Greens	0.44	0.46
P2 ₃	Austria	Freedom Party	0.41	0.46
P2 ₄	Austria	Alliance for The Future	0.37	0.46
P2 ₅	Austria	People's Party	0.34	0.46
P8 ₁	Germany	The Left	0.84	0.71
P8 ₂	Germany	Alliance '90/The Greens	0.84	0.71
P8 ₃	Germany	Free Democratic Party	0.81	0.71
P8 ₄	Germany	Social Democratic Party	0.78	0.71
P8 ₅	Germany	Pirate Party	0.6	0.71
P8 ₆	Germany	Christian Social Union	0.58	0.71
P8 ₇	Germany	Christian Democratic Union	0.54	0.71
P12 ₁	Italy	Democratic Party	0.71	0.49
P12 ₂	Italy	Italy Of Values	0.66	0.49
P12 ₃	Italy	Union of the Centre	0.47	0.49
P12 ₄	Italy	The People of Freedom	0.38	0.49
P12 ₅	Italy	Northern League	0.26	0.49

On the contrary, Italy has one of the lowest scores, with 0.2, and Austria's score is 0.3. Italy regulated only the minority quota and democratic principle-related issues with the legal provisions. Austria regulated the voting right on party member election and party manifesto and minority quota. Therefore, Germany has a high level of intra-party democracy compared to Italy's and Austria's low score of intra-party democracy.

Historical Heritage, Party systems and Party types

Germany, Italy, and Austria have similar historical heritage, party systems, and party types with some differences as explained above. Each country faced World War I and fascism during the 1900s. After fascism countries started to implement national measures and developed the same type of political institutions. After fascism, both Germany and Italy adopted constitutions with many checks and balances. The most observable differences could be federalism in Germany and the unitary state structure in Italy. Furthermore, in the case of party systems, the Italian party system included many political parties that were highly polarized compared to Austria and Germany. Austria and Germany have fewer political systems with moderate distance to each other. This ideological difference was observed in this thesis. Political parties' ideologies show that Italy still has a highly polarized political party structure compared to the other two countries. Despite the Italian transition period from polarized pluralism to moderate pluralism, results showed that Italian political parties still have an ideological distance from each other, and it caused a political unstable in the country. According to this thesis, the main difference between the German more stable political system and the Italian more volatile political system is lacking legal provisions.

In the case of party types of every country experienced different party types in the process. For example, in Italy, for the League, the party consists of different features such as charismatic party, cadre party, protest party, and governmental party after the 1990s. On the other hand Italian system has opinion political parties such as Republicans, Liberals, or Social Democrats. Furthermore, the system has mass parties such as PCI. Like Italy, Germany and Austria have similar political party formation processes.

Despite their common heritage: world war and fascism, the responses of the countries were different. Italy did not give too much attention to erase signs of fascism and protect system extremists far compared to Germany. Although Germany and Austria suffered from the same man and ideology (Hitler), Austria followed different steps from Germany. They tried to avoid any similarity with Germany. Their policy was initiating all problems and blame to Germany and showed to the world their differences with Germany. Therefore, even they have shared historical heritage, political party systems, and their responses to it completely different. Germany preferred rule-based protection for political

stability. On the other hand, Italy did not have that much concern to erase signs of fascism. Furthermore, Austria wished to stay far away from German's way. To sum up, their transformation process has differences from each other. Italy still has polarized pluralism despite Germany and Austria's moderate pluralism. However, these differences in the policy cause different outcomes in the intra-party democracy levels of countries. this thesis showed that Germany is successful to provide intra-party democracy for every country with a high number of legal regulations despite Austria and Italy's low level of intra-party democracy and legal provisions. Lastly, I believe that because of the common political party systems and common historical heritage Italy and Austria would be successfully applied the German model of political party law to have more intra-party democracy.

To sum up, this chapter presented qualitative data and descriptive analyses for each situation in Germany, Italy, and Austria to answer whether legal provisions increase the level of intra-party democracy in established democracies. It showed that there is significant evidence to prove this hypothesis. The direct effect of legal provisions on intra-party democracy is apparent for Germany, Italy, and Austria. Surprising other significant finding was what appears to be a causal relationship between political parties' ideologies and the level of intra-party democracy. Therefore, it is likely that the type of ideology has a more significant effect on equitable increase. However, it can be controlled with legal regulations like in the German case. The following chapter is the concluding chapter that will discuss limitations and areas for further research.

Chapter 6:

Conclusion

This thesis attempted to contribute to the existing literature on legal regulations, political parties' ideologies, and intra-party democracy by looking at Germany, Italy, and Austria as established democracies. The main aim is to investigate the reason behind the different scores of Germany, Italy, and Austria's intra-party democracy scores. This aim compared several dynamic indices, including the Political Parties Database Project index, Polity IV, MARPOR, GDP, and Governance Indicator. It also used data of Legal Provisions Index that was created in this research based on Party Law in Modern Europe Database and countries' official websites. The purpose was to assess whether legal provisions or ideologies influence the degree of intra-party democracy in these three countries. In the end, this researchable to find proof to confirm that legal provisions provide more democracy for political parties' internal actions. However, findings suggest that intra-party democracy is affected by political parties' ideologies without legal regulations.

The first pair of hypotheses concerned the influence of an increase in the number of legal regulations-as measured in this research- on intra-party Germany, Italy, and Austria. This thesis found significant evidence to accept the hypothesis that an increase in the number of legal provisions positively impacts intra-party democracy in Germany. However, the data of intra-party democracy is only covered the years between 2011-2014 and updated every so it might be affecting the results of the research. There is no chance to compare the past with today's circumstances. Although this research focuses on the short period because of the availability of intra-party democracy, it is better to eliminate other factors' changes during the time, such as democracy or these countries' economies.

The second pair of these hypotheses pertained to the influence of political parties' ideologies- measured by MARPOR and Political Party Database Project -on internal party politics. This research validates the effect of political parties' ideologies. This research shows that (see Appendix A) change in ideologies leads to change in the level of democracy inside of the parties. Right-wing political parties tend to act more authoritarian manner inside of the parties. Therefore, this thesis confirms the hypothesis that political

parties' ideologies have been a causal factor in the intra-party democracy of Germany, Italy, and Austria.

Furthermore, these two hypotheses should also be examined together because their outcomes are related to each other. As a result of the first hypothesis, this thesis claimed that legal regulations (institutions) are matter and affect the behaviors of the political parties (organizations). However, in the absence of legal regulations, political parties follow their ideological principles and organize their behaviors. It is the outcome of the second hypothesis. Therefore, from the theoretical perspective, results should be evaluated from the perspective of idealism and institutionalism. Throughout history, institutions have been paying attention (Loewenstein, 1953). It was neglected from time to time; however, it has gained popularity again with the "*new institutionalism*" (Sauerland, 2015). In the new institutionalism, both ideas and institutions are matter. It focuses on both formal and informal rules that regulate and influence individuals' actions. This thesis shows that new institutionalism can explain the relationship between intra-party democracy, legal regulations, and ideologies. Institutions and ideologies have some common points, such as both targeted to reduce uncertainty in daily life. Therefore, both influence individuals' behaviors with rules and principles. The significant difference between them is that one of them (institutions) is formally another one informally regulates behaviors. Institutions identified the rules for the organizations and individuals. Similarly, ideologies can be defined as a set of rules that come from historical experiences. Scholars accepted that these two approaches have some common points (Sauerland, 2015). However, in this thesis, results show that ideologies disappeared like the Right-wing party in Germany in rules. Hence, this thesis does not prove that institutionalism is overcome idealism because ideologies still matter. In the Italian and Austrian cases, ideologies prove their impact on behaviors.

In sum, this study proposes that in Germany, Italy, and Austria, political parties' ideologies are a strong determinant of the level of intra-party democracy about the related legal provisions. Therefore, the primary purpose of this research to find a reason for the difference in Germany, Italy, and Austria's intra-party democracy scores. Therefore, this research finds an answer to this question. Furthermore, to the extent that ideologies are important to shape actions and policies within or out of the political parties for all democracies, it is important to try to find a way to improve the internal party dynamics and balances.

6.1 Limitations

There are several limitations of this research. The first has to do with the measure of intra-party democracy. As mentioned above, Political Party Database Project is only focused on a short period. Therefore, it makes it impossible to observe any change in time and compare that manner. Furthermore, not all parties of the countries were included in this index. However, the index consists of most political parties, so it is not creating a problem for making a general judgment for this countries' tendencies. Nevertheless, more diversity for this index would be better, especially for other countries in the index, because few political parties are in the index.

The second significant limitation of this research was controlling the real impact of the legal regulations for the other two countries (Italy and Austria). Merely having a legal regulation is not confronted with the impact of daily life. Implementing laws or checking systems are the other factors that should be controlled. However, in Germany, Italy, and Austria, there is a very high level of governance and trust in law and institutions; similar outcomes with Germany should be accepted for Italy and Austria.

Thirdly, the problematic conceptualization of intra-party democracy. Intra-party democracy is hard to define, and both have pros and cons as previously mentioned. Therefore, it is one of the limitations that research cannot offer concrete policy recommendations and facts that can be acceptable for everyone. However, still, whether defend intra-party democracy or not, this thesis showed that there is a variance among 19 countries' intra-party democracy scores, this variance cannot be explained with legal provisions however political parties' ideologies have a significant impact on the level of intra-party democracy.

6.2 Policy Implications

In this research, Germany has a high level of intra-party democracy compared to the other 19 countries. The high level of intra-party democracy stems from its high legal provisions regulating internal party democracy and forcing political parties to obey democratic principles. In addition, even Germany has right-wing and traditional political

parties; they do not act undemocratically. It shows that legal regulations able to provide democracy for every political party without damaging political parties' personalistic features. Therefore, the German model can be implemented in other countries to have more democracy in the political parties. In addition, countries that do not have any regulations related to the decision-making process may make some laws to regulate in those areas even they do not prefer to intervene in political parties' internal affairs. Because these are the most crucial part of building a link between society and the state. In these steps, citizens can be visible and part of the process. Results show that even countries are against implementing legal regulations most of them still have implementations to regulate these areas. Furthermore, today Traditional political parties started to lose their power and impact on citizens. Therefore, new emerging political parties started to rise (Ignazi, 1996). Furthermore, political participation and engagement in politics started to decrease. Less participation and involvement in politics will damage democracy. This trend stems from the weakening ties between citizens and political parties. In the democratic intra-party structure, citizens have a chance to be part of the process and say what they believe. Therefore, restoration of the tie can be ensured with the intra-party democracy. Legal provisions are the one way to establish intra-party democracy. As I said before decision-making at the program level is the most crucial part for intra-party democracy and citizens. Therefore, at least several laws should be done to secure these categories and democracy. This research showed that Germany, Italy, and Austria shared similar historical heritage, have similar economies, democracies, and governance. Therefore, it means that there is no other factor that would prevent Italy and Austria from becoming German in internal party politics.

6.3 Future Research Agenda

This research has revealed some areas for further research on the relationship between legal provisions, political parties' ideologies, and intra-party democracy. Firstly, as mentioned previously, traditional political parties started to lose their power and impact on citizens. Therefore, new emerging political parties started to rise (Ignazi, 1996). These new parties do not carry traditional left or right-wing party ideologies. Therefore, as this thesis concluded in the absence of legal regulations, political parties' ideologies stem in and influence internal politics. However, with the weakening of the ideologies, what will

be the determining factor for political party ideologies. This question should be eliminated with the updated data and in the light of new environmental factors.

Another possible research is for this research would be studying with large-N data. Political Party Database Project consists of 19 countries. The first hypothesis of this research was tested on the relationship between legal provisions and intra-party democracy. The results were the same with Germany, Italy, and Austria. However, to have a broader perspective and make a generalization, a second hypothesis would be tested for 19 countries. A large-N empirical analysis would either strengthen or disprove the results of this research, which suggest the legal regulations and type of political parties' ideologies affects intra-party politics. In addition, results show that there is a significant effect between parties' position and intra-party democracy. With the large-N data, the effect of the right-left position can be more visible and more robust.

Lastly, this research is a time restriction that stems from the limited data of the Political Party Database Project. The intra-party democracy index should be improved and consist of updated data to provide a broader perspective to users. With the wide range of historical data, it will become possible to compare the country for different times. In that way, it is there any differences? The differences may answer how intra-party democracy can be improved or why intra-party democracy is weak/strong in time?

REFERENCES

- Allern, E. H., & Pedersen, K. (2007). The impact of party organisational changes on democracy. *West European Politics*, 30(1), 68-92.
- Almond, G. A., & Powell, C. P. (1966). A developmental approach.
- Ayan Musil, P., & Vašenda, J. (2020). Party regulation in Turkey: a comparison with modern Europe. *Turkish Studies*, 21(1), 83-107.
- Bäck, H., Debus, M., & Müller, W. C. (2011). The Ideological Cohesion of Political Parties. In *Workshop «Cohesion, Dissent and Partisan Politics in European Legislatures»*, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops.
- Bale, T., & Krouwel, A. (2013). Down but not out: a comparison of Germany's CDU/CSU with Christian Democratic parties in Austria, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. *German Politics*, 22(1-2), 16-45.
- Ball, T., Dagger, R., & O'Neill, D. I. (2016). *Political ideologies and the democratic ideal*. Taylor & Francis.
- Bartolini, S., & Mair, P. (1990). Policy competition, spatial distance and electoral instability. *West European Politics*, 13(4), 1-16.
- Bartolini, S., & Mair, P. (2007). *Identity, competition and electoral availability: the stabilisation of European electorates 1885-1985*. ECPR Press.
- Bartolini, S., Mair, P., Identity, C., & Availability, E. (1990). The Stabilization of the European Electorates, 1885-1985.
- Bell, D. (1960). *The end of ideology: On the exhaustion of political ideas in the fifties*. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press.
- Berger, P. (1950). Elections and Parties in Austria. *The Journal of Politics*, 12(3), 511-529.
- Bille, L. (2001). Democratizing a democratic procedure: Myth or reality? Candidate selection in Western European parties, 1960-1990. *Party politics*, 7(3), 363-380.

- Bourne, A. K. (2018). *Democratic dilemmas: Why democracies ban political parties*. Routledge.
- Bourne, A. K., & Bértoa, F. C. (2014). Prescribing democracy? Party proscription, militant democracy and party system institutionalization. *ECPR joint sessions, Salamanca, April, 10-15*.
- Bryce, J. (2002). Party Organizations, 1891. In *Perspectives on Political Parties* (pp. 233-238). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Budge, I., & McDonald, M. D. (2012). Conceptualising and measuring 'centrism' correctly on the Left–Right scale (RILE)-without systematic bias. A general response by MARPOR. *Electoral Studies, 31*(3), 609-612.
- Carroll, R., & Kubo, H. (2019). Measuring and comparing party ideology and heterogeneity. *Party Politics, 25*(2), 245-256.
- Casal-Bértoa, F., Piccio, D. R., & Rashkova, E. R. (2012). Party law in comparative perspective. *Regulating Political Parties: European Democracies in Comparative Perspective, 119-148*.
- Casper, G., & Tufis, C. (2003). Correlation versus interchangeability: The limited robustness of empirical findings on democracy using highly correlated data sets. *Political Analysis, 196-203*.
- Courtney, J. C. (1999). Plurality-Majority electoral systems: A review. *Electoral Insight, 1*(1), 7-11.
- Cross, W. P., & Katz, R. S. (Eds.). (2013). *The challenges of intra-party democracy*. OUP Oxford.
- Crotty, W. J. (1970). A perspective for the comparative analysis of political parties. *Comparative Political Studies, 3*(3), 267-296.
- Dahl, R. A., & Sartori, G. (1970). The Formal Structure Of Government. In *Understanding Society* (pp. 424-439). Palgrave, London.
- D'alimonte, R., & Bartolini, S. (1997). 'Electoral transition' and party system change in Italy. *West European Politics, 20*(1), 110-134.
- Dalton, R. J., Farrell, D. M., & McAllister, I. (2011). *Political parties and democratic linkage: How parties organize democracy*. Oxford University Press.

- Debus, M. (2009). Analysing party politics in Germany with new approaches for estimating policy preferences of political actors. *German Politics*, 18(3), 281-300.
- Debus, M., & Bräuninger, T. (2008). Intra-party factions and coalition bargaining in Germany. *Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments*, 121-145.
- Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. *Journal of political economy*, 65(2), 135-150.
- Duverger, M. (1954). *Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in The modern State*. Methuen & Company.
- Duverger, Maurice. (1954). *Political parties : their organization and activity in the modern state*. London : New York: Methuen; J. Wiley
- Eatwell, R., & Wright, A. (Eds.). (1999). *Contemporary political ideologies*. A&C Black.
- Elkins, D. J. (1974). The measurement of party competition. *The American Political Science Review*, 68(2), 682-700.
- Franzmann, S. (2009). The Change of Ideology: How the Left-Right Cleavage transforms into Issue Competition. *An Analysis of Party Systems using Party Manifesto Data*.
- Fujimura, N. (2012). Electoral incentives, party discipline, and legislative organization: manipulating legislative committees to win elections and maintain party unity. *European Political Science Review: EPSR*, 4(2), 147.
- Gauja, A. (2006). From Hogan to Hanson: The regulation and changing legal status of Australian political parties. *Public Law Review*, 17(4), 282-299.
- Gauja, A. (2013). *The politics of party policy: from members to legislators*. Springer.
- Giannetti, D., & Laver, M. (2008). Party cohesion, party discipline and party factions in Italy. In *Intra-party politics and coalition governments* (pp. 162-184). Routledge.
- Giannetti, D., Pinto, L., & Pedrazzani, A. (2016). Setting parliamentary calendars: How parties allocate time for plenary debates on bills. *Political Studies*, 64(4), 1016-1035.
- Gramsci, Antonio (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. International Publishers.

- Gunther, R., & Diamond, L. (2003). Species of political parties: A new typology. *Party Politics*, 9(2), 167–199.
- Haerpfer, C., & Gehmacher, E. (1984). Social structure and voting in the Austrian party system. *Electoral Studies*, 3(1), 25-46.
- Hellmann, O. (2011). A historical institutionalist approach to political party organization: The case of South Korea. *Government and Opposition*, 46(4), 464-484.
- Helms, L. (1997). Right-wing populist parties in Austria and Switzerland: A comparative analysis of electoral support and conditions of success. *West European Politics*, 20(2), 37-52.
- Heywood, A. (2017). *Political ideologies: An introduction*. Macmillan International Higher Education.
- Högström, J. (2013). Does the choice of democracy measure matter? Comparisons between the two leading democracy indices, Freedom House and Polity IV. *Government and Opposition*, 48(2), 201-221.
- Huber, E., & Stephens, J. (2003). Development and crisis of the welfare state: Parties and policies in global markets (vol 32, pg 131, 2003). *JOURNAL OF SOCIAL POLICY*, 32, 313-313.
- Ignazi, P. (1996). The crisis of parties and the rise of new political parties. *Party Politics*, 2(4), 549-566.
- Ignazi, P. (2014). Power and the (il) legitimacy of political parties: An unavoidable paradox of contemporary democracy?. *Party Politics*, 20(2), 160-169.
- Indriðason, I. H., & Kristinsson, G. H. (2015). Primary consequences: The effects of candidate selection through party primaries in Iceland. *Party Politics*, 21(4), 565-576.
- Inglehart, R. (1971). The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies. *American Political Science Review*, 65(4), 991–1017.
- Inglehart, R. (1988). The renaissance of political culture. *The American Political Science Review*, 1203-1230.

- Inglehart, R. F. (2008). Changing values among western publics from 1970 to 2006. *West european politics*, 31(1-2), 130-146.
- IPD-Indices-Detailed Explanation of Construction Part I: Selection of PPDB-items for the IPD-Indices PPDB-answer-option IPD-Value Effect on IPD*. (n.d.).
- Issacharoff, S. (2006). Fragile democracies. *Harv. L. Rev.*, 120, 1405.
- Jäckle, S. (2009, July). Measuring Political Party Ideologies—Combining Expert Scale and Text Based Approaches. In *IPSA World Conference, Santiago de Chile*.
- Janda, K. (2005). Adopting party law. *Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives*, 81-134.
- Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing models of party organization and party democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party. *Party Politics*, 1(1).
- Keynes, J. M. (1937). The general theory of employment. *The quarterly journal of economics*, 51(2), 209-223.
- Kirchheimer, O. (2015). 6. The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems. In *Political Parties and Political Development.(SPD-6)* (pp. 177-200). Princeton University Press.
- Kitschelt, H. (2019). *The logics of party formation: Ecological politics in Belgium and West Germany*. Cornell University Press.
- Kitschelt, H., & McGann, A. J. (1997). *The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis*. University of Michigan Press.
- Korpi, W. (2018). *The democratic class struggle* (Vol. 22). Routledge.
- Kriesi, H. (2005). *Direct democratic choice: The Swiss experience*. Lexington Books.
- Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). *How democracies die*. Broadway Books.
- Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction. In S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (Eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.
- Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (Eds.). (1967). *Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives* (Vol. 7). Free press.

- Loewenstein, K. (1953). Political Systems, Ideologies, and Institutions: The Problem of Their Circulation. *Western Political Quarterly*, 6(4), 689-706.
- Lundberg, T. C. (2007). Electoral system reviews in New Zealand, Britain, and Canada: a critical comparison. *Government and Opposition*, 42(4), 471-490.
- Luther, K. R. (1989). Dimensions of party system change: the case of Austria. *West European Politics*, 12(4), 3-27.
- Mannheim, K. (2013). *Ideology and utopia*. Routledge.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1970). *The german ideology* (Vol. 1). International Publishers Co.
- McGovern, P. (2010). The young Lipset on the iron law of oligarchy: a taste of things to come 1. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 61, 29-42.
- McLellan, D. (1995). *The thought of Karl Marx: an introduction*. Pan Books Limited.
- Mersel, Y. (2006). The dissolution of political parties: The problem of internal democracy. *International journal of constitutional law*, 4(1), 84-113.
- Meyer, T. M. (2010). Party competition over time: How voters and intra-party structure constrain party policy shifts.
- Mimpen, J. (2007). Intra-party democracy and its discontents. *Democratization in a Volatile Political Landscape*.
- Morlino, L., & Bardi, L. (1994). Italy: tracing the roots of the great transformation, 242-277.
- Mudde, C. (2015). Populist radical right parties in Europe today. *Transformations of populism in Europe and the Americas: History and recent tendencies*, 295-307.
- Müller, W. C. (1994). The development of Austrian party organizations in the post-war period. *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*, 51-79.
- Müller, W. C., & U. Sieberer. (2006). Party Law. In Richard S. Katz & William Crotty (Eds.), *In Handbook of Party Politics* (pp. 435–445). SAGE.
- Müller, W. C., & Ulram, P. A. (1995). The Social and Demographic Structure of Austrian Parties, 1945-93. *Party Politics*, 1(1), 145-160.

- Musil, P. (2011). *Authoritarian party structures and democratic political setting in Turkey*. Springer.
- Neumann, F. L. (1950). Approaches to the study of political power. *Political Science Quarterly*, 65(2), 161-180.
- Obert, P., & von dem Berge, B. (2015). Intra-party democracy in post-communist Europe: explaining change and stability. In *ECPR General Conference* (pp. 26-29).
- Ostrogorski, M. (1982). *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, 2 vols, Seymour M. Lipset, ed., New Brunswick: Transaction Books.
- Pech, L. (2011). The Rule of Law as a Guiding Principle of European Union's External Action. Available at SSRN 1944865.
- Piccio, D. (2015). Party regulation as a self-legitimizing system. *Partecipazione e conflitto*, 8(1), 118-139.
- Picot, G. (2014). Party systems and social policy: A historical comparison of Italy and Germany. *West European Politics*, 37(1), 138-158.
- Poguntke, T. (1994). Parties in a legalistic culture: The case of Germany. *How Parties Organize. Change and Adaption in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*. London, 185-215.
- Political Party Database Project. (n.d.). Retrieved December 10, 2020, from <https://www.politicalpartydb.org/about/>
- Pollock, J. K. (1929). The German Party System. *The American Political Science Review*, 23(4), 859-891.
- Rahat, G., & Shapira, A. (2017). An intra-party democracy index: theory, design and a demonstration. *Parliamentary affairs*, 70(1), 84-110.
- Robert, H., & Kenneth, J. (1994). An integrated theory of party goals and party change. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 6(3), 259-287.
- Saalfeld, T. (2002). The German party system: Continuity and change. *German Politics*, 11(3), 99-130.
- Sartori, G. (1965). *Democratic Theory*. Wayne University Press.
- Sartori, G. (1976). *Parties and Party Systems: Volume 1: A Framework for Analysis* (Vol. 1). Cambridge: CUP Archive.

- Sartori, G. (1987). The Contemporary Debate. In *The Theory of Democracy*. Chatham House Publishers.
- Sartori, G. (2005). Party types, organisation and functions. *West European Politics*, 28(1), 5-32.
- Sauerland, D. (2015). Ideologies, Institutions, and the New Institutionalism. In *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences: Second Edition*, 561–572.
- Scarrow, S. E. (1998). *Party Decline at the Grassroots?: A Comparative Analysis* (Vol. 2). Center for German and European Studies, University of California.
- Scarrow, S. E. (2005). *Political parties and democracy in theoretical and practical perspectives: Implementing intra-party democracy*. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.
- Scarrow, S. E., Webb, P. D., & Poguntke, T. (Eds.). (2017). *Organizing political parties: Representation, participation, and power*. Oxford University Press.
- Schattschneider, E. E. (1942). *Party government*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). *Party government...* Transaction Publishers.
- Schmidt, M. G. (2015). Measuring democracy and autocracy. *Institut für Politische Wissenschaft Universität Heidelberg*.
- Seanwright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case selection techniques in case study research. *Polit Res Quart*, 61, 294-308.
- Seligman, L. (1961). Party structure and political recruitment. *American Political Science Review*, 55(1), 77-86.
- Shapiro, Y. (2018). Political Parties: Organizations and Power. *European Sociological Review*, 316–318.
- Simon, J. (2003). The Change of function of political parties at the turn of Millenium.
- Sjöblom, G. (1968). The study of party propaganda. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 3(A3), 15-46.
- Smith, G. (1989). A system perspective on party system change. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1(3), 349-363.

- Sundberg, J. (1997). Compulsory party democracy: Finland as a deviant case in Scandinavia. *Party Politics*, 3(1), 97-117.
- Tarrow, S. (1977). The Italian party system between crisis and transition. *American Journal of Political Science*, 193-224.
- Teorell, J. (1999). A deliberative defence of intra-party democracy. *Party politics*, 5(3), 363-382.
- Van Biezen, I. (2004). Political parties as public utilities. *Party politics*, 10(6), 701-722.
- Van Biezen, I., & Molenaar, F. (2012). The Europeanisation of party politics? Competing regulatory paradigms at the supranational level. *West European Politics*, 35(3), 632-656.
- Van Biezen, I., & Piccio, D. R. (2013). Shaping intra-party democracy: On the legal regulation of internal party organizations. *The challenges of intra-party democracy*, 27-48.
- Vincent, A. (2009). *Modern political ideologies*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Volkens, Andrea & Burst, Tobias & Krause, Werner & Lehmann, Pola & Matthieß Theres & Merz, Nicolas & Regel, Sven & Weßels, Bernhard & Zehnter, Lisa (2020): The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2020b.
- Von Beyme, K. (1984). Do parties matter? The impact of parties on the key decisions in the political system. *Government and Opposition*, 5-29.
- Von dem Berge, B. (2017). Europarty Eastern enlargement: an empirical analysis of Europarty influence on Central and Eastern European parties and party systems. *East European Politics*, 33(4), 472-495.
- Von dem Berge, B., Poguntke, T., Obert, P., & Tipei, D. (2013). *Measuring Intra-Party Democracy*. Heidelberg: Springer.
- Webb, P. (2005). Political parties and democracy: The ambiguous crisis. *Democratisation*, 12(5), 633-650.
- Weissenbach, K. Promoting Internal Party Democracy Party Assistance of the German political Foundations in Sub-Saharan Africa. *NRW School of Governance, Universitat Duisburg Essen*.

World Bank Open Data | *Data*. (2015). <https://data.worldbank.org/>

Worldwide Governance Indicators | *DataBank*. (2015).

<https://databank.worldbank.org/source/worldwide-governance-indicators>

Young, L., & Cross, W. (2002). Incentives to Membership in Canadian Political Parties. *Political Research Quarterly*, 55(3), 547–569.

Zulianello, M. (2020). Varieties of populist parties and party systems in Europe: From state-of-the-art to the application of a novel classification scheme to 66 parties in 33 countries. *Government and Opposition*, 55(2), 327-347.



APPENDIX A

Country Name	Party Name	Intra-party Democracy Index	TOTAL Intra-party Democracy Index	MARPOR
Australia	The Greens	0.71	0.64	-33.98
Australia	Liberal Party	0.63	0.64	22.98
Australia	Labor Party	0.61	0.64	-17.11
Australia	National Party	0.61	0.64	-3.96
Austria	Social Democratic Party	0.74	0.46	-38.48
Austria	The Greens	0.44	0.46	-13.94
Austria	Freedom Party	0.41	0.46	12.17
Austria	Alliance for The Future	0.37	0.46	-3.58
Austria	People's Party	0.34	0.46	-5.51
Belgium	Open Flemish Liberal and Democratic	0.94	0.71	-3.86
Belgium	Socialist Party	0.92	0.71	-34.79
Belgium	Ecolo	0.84	0.71	-31.30
Belgium	Democrat Humanist Centre	0.76	0.71	-24.56
Belgium	Flemish Interest	0.7	0.71	17.30
Belgium	Socialist Party Alternative	0.69	0.71	-15.50
Belgium	Christian-Democrat and Flemish	0.67	0.71	-0.10

Belgium	Green	0.67	0.71	-18.06
Belgium	New Flemish Alliance	0.59	0.71	8.58
Belgium	Fedaralist, Democrats, Francophone	0.57	0.71	-26.69
Belgium	Reform Movement	0.56	0.71	-0.20
Belgium	Libertarian, Direct, Democratic	0.55	0.71	
Canada	Conservative Party	0.71	0.68	26.27
Canada	Liberal Party	0.69	0.68	-7.79
Canada	New Democratic Party	0.69	0.68	-27.91
Canada	Green Party	0.67	0.68	-23.86
Canada	Bloc Quebecois	0.64	0.68	6.77
Czech Republic	Social Democratic Party	0.77	0.64	-26.28
Czech Republic	Communist Party	0.73	0.64	-34.96
Czech Republic	Civic Democratic Party	0.67	0.64	6.38
Czech Republic	Top 09	0.56	0.64	-11.37
Czech Republic	Christian Democratic Union	0.48	0.64	-23.05

Denmark	Red-Green Alliance	0.78	0.57	-41.78
Denmark	Socialist People's Party	0.72	0.57	-45.42
Denmark	Conservatives	0.71	0.57	47.89
Denmark	Liberals	0.62	0.57	-13.72
Denmark	Danish People's Party	0.52	0.57	30.93
Denmark	Social Liberal Party	0.44	0.57	-0.79
Denmark	Liberal Alliance	0.44	0.57	51.72
Denmark	Social Democrats	0.3	0.57	-6.51
France	Socialist Party	0.5	0.41	-32.71
France	Union for a Popular Movement	0.31	0.41	-2.33
Germany	The Left	0.84	0.71	-34.55
Germany	Alliance '90/The Greens	0.84	0.71	-19.60
Germany	Free Democratic Party	0.81	0.71	14.04
Germany	Social Democratic Party	0.78	0.71	-23.57
Germany	Pirate Party	0.6	0.71	-12.65
Germany	Christian Social Union	0.58	0.71	2.56
Germany	Christian Democratic Union	0.54	0.71	2.56

Hungary	Socialist Party	0.78	0.68	-12.89
Hungary	Jobbik	0.77	0.68	
Hungary	Fidesz- Hungarian Civic Alliance	0.69	0.68	
Hungary	Politics Can Be Different	0.51	0.68	-10.71
Ireland	Green Party	0.91	0.72	-14.88
Ireland	Labor Party	0.81	0.72	-10.59
Ireland	Fine Gael	0.68	0.72	-30.93
Ireland	Sinn Fein	0.6	0.72	-13.61
Ireland	Fianna Fail	0.59	0.72	2.91
Israel	Likud	0.88	0.56	
Israel	Labor Party	0.88	0.56	-15.71
Israel	Kadima	0.63	0.56	-12.24
Israel	Meretz	0.62	0.56	-21.42
Israel	National Religious Party	0.59	0.56	
Israel	Balad	0.44	0.56	
Israel	Agudat Yisrael	0.42	0.56	
Israel	Yisrael Beiteinu	0.42	0.56	46.07
Israel	Shas	0.38	0.56	59.77
Israel	Hadash	0.38	0.56	-26.79
Italy	Democratic Party	0.71	0.49	-6.86
Italy	Italy Of Values	0.66	0.49	
Italy	Union of the Centre	0.47	0.49	33.65

Italy	The People of Freedom	0.38	0.49	3.81
Italy	Northern League	0.26	0.49	3.81
Netherlands	Party for the Animals	0.97	0.77	-6.47
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal	0.89	0.77	17.70
Netherlands	Christian Union	0.82	0.77	10.20
Netherlands	Labor Party	0.79	0.77	-6.56
Netherlands	Democrats 66	0.78	0.77	-0.78
Netherlands	Green Left	0.78	0.77	-9.58
Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	0.78	0.77	22.63
Netherlands	50PLUS	0.72	0.77	-6.31
Netherlands	Socialist Party	0.66	0.77	-20.93
Netherlands	Reformed Political Party	0.56	0.77	26.60
Norway	Progress Party	0.78	0.75	-1.95
Norway	Conservative Party	0.77	0.75	-9.01
Norway	Liberal Party	0.77	0.75	-15.50
Norway	Labor Party	0.76	0.75	-17.99
Norway	Socialist Left Party	0.74	0.75	-28.27
Norway	Centre Party	0.73	0.75	-17.52

Norway	Christian Democratic Party	0.73	0.75	
Poland	Palikot's Movement	0.57	0.48	6.12
Poland	Civic Platform	0.54	0.48	-4.41
Poland	Democratic Left Alliance	0.54	0.48	-0.90
Poland	Law and Justice	0.45	0.48	17.47
Poland	Polish People's Party	0.42	0.48	18.30
Poland	United Poland	0.4	0.48	
Portugal	Socialist Party	0.48	0.44	0.24
Portugal	People's Party	0.48	0.44	
Portugal	Social Democratic Party	0.47	0.44	12.81
Portugal	Left Bloc	0.47	0.44	-35.82
Portugal	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	0.39	0.44	-14.17
Portugal	Communist Party	0.37	0.44	-15.00
Spain	United Left	0.44	0.39	-36.86
Spain	People's Party	0.4	0.39	-3.45
Spain	Basque Nationalist Party	0.39	0.39	-11.11
Spain	Socialist Party	0.39	0.39	-27.23

Spain	Democratic Convergence of Catalonia	0.36	0.39	-10.86
Sweden	Green Party	0.79	0.62	-26.16
Sweden	Centre Party	0.63	0.62	7.90
Sweden	Left Party	0.62	0.62	-33.89
Sweden	Christian Democrats	0.6	0.62	4.88
Sweden	Moderate Party	0.6	0.62	-16.75
Sweden	Liberal People's Party	0.59	0.62	-2.52
Sweden	Social Democrats	0.57	0.62	
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	0.54	0.62	-6.65
United Kingdom	Green Party	0.96	0.78	-29.08
United Kingdom	Plaid Cymru	0.91	0.78	-26.42
United Kingdom	Liberal Democrats	0.88	0.78	-16.07
United Kingdom	Conservative Party	0.75	0.78	-1.57
United Kingdom	Labor Party	0.72	0.78	-18.14
United Kingdom	Scottish National Party	0.64	0.78	-24.66
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party	0.63	0.78	-7.79

Source: Volkens, Andrea & Burst, Tobias & Krause, Werner & Lehmann, Pola & Matthieß Theres & Merz, Nicolas & Regel, Sven & Weßels, Bernhard & Zehnter, Lisa (2020): The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2020b.