

“WILSON VS. LENIN” REVISITED:
THE CONTENDING IDEAS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
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İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

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The Great War brought destruction and death when it got unleashed with the bullet of an assassin in 1914. Yet, this was also the beginning of a New Order as much as being the end of the Old Order. The forerunners of this New Era came from two distinct corners of the world, namely America and Russia when Thomas Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Ilyich “Lenin” Ulyanov proposed their peace formulae with the Fourteen Points of January 1918 and the Soviet Peace Decree of October 1917.

This study provides an analysis of the differences and parallels between these formulae. In order to meet this objective, the individual biographies of Wilson and Lenin, and the histories of the United States and Russia are examined in detail as it is argued that the given features of these declarations were the consequences of the different personal experiences and cultural backgrounds of these two leaders as well as the domestic issues and histories of their countries.

The study is structured around the main argument that Wilson and Lenin recognized the Great War as the ultimate crisis of the Old World with their parallel arguments. They saw the end of the Imperial Era, and in this matter, they offered new military, diplomatic and economic norms of the New World. Nevertheless, Wilson and Lenin had very different reasons, methods and designs for the New Order. These different discourses were the origins of both order and disorder of the New Era.

Keywords: First World War, Lenin, Progressivism, Socialism, Woodrow Wilson

ÖZET

“WILSON, LENİN'E KARŞI” YENİ BİR YORUM:

YENİ BİR DÜNYA DÜZENİNİN ÇATIŞAN FİKİRLERİ

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1914'te bir suikastçının kurşunuyla patlak verdiğinde Cihan Harbi yıkım ve ölüm getirmişti. Fakat bu aynı zamanda bir Yeni Düzenin başlangıcı anlamına gelirken bir o kadar da Eski Düzenin sonu anlamına gelmekteydi. Thomas Woodrow Wilson ve Vladimir İlyich “Lenin” Ulyanov, Ocak 1918'de On Dört Madde ve Ekim 1917'de Sovyet Barış Kararnamesi ile barışın sağlanması için çözümlerini duyurduklarında bu Yeni Çağın liderleri dünyanın iki uç köşesinden, yani Amerika ve Rusya'dan çıka gelmişlerdi.

Bu çalışma, barış için ortaya atılan bu çözüm önerileri arasındaki farklılıklara ve paralelliklere dair bir inceleme sunar. Bu amaçla, bu önerilere ait mevzu bahis niteliklerin iki liderin farklı kişisel tecrübelerinin ve kültürel geçmişlerinin olduğu kadar ülkelerinin iç sorunlarının ve geçmişlerinin bir sonucu olduğu savunulmaktadır. Bu nedenle, Wilson ve Lenin'in kişisel biyografileri ve Birleşik Devletler ile Rusya'nın geçmişleri detaylı bir şekilde incelenmektedirler.

Çalışma, Wilson ve Lenin'in birbirlerine paralel argümanlarla, Cihan Harbi'ni Eski Dünya'nın nihai krizi olarak nitelendirdikleri ana savının çevresinde yapılanmaktadır. Emperyal Çağ'ın sonunun geldiğini görmüşler ve bu bağlamda Yeni Dünya'nın yeni askeri, diplomatik ve ekonomik ilkelerini öne sürmüşlerdir. Ancak Wilson ve Lenin, bu Yeni Düzen için çok farklı sebepler, yöntemler ve tasarımlara sahiptiler. Bu farklı söylemler, Yeni Çağ'ın düzen ve düzensizliklerinin tamamının kökenleri olmuşlardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Birinci Dünya Savaşı, İlerlemecilik, Lenin, Sosyalizm, Woodrow Wilson

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This is probably the most difficult part of the study for me to write, not only because I have never been good at such things, but I have also been one of the luckiest people ever alive as I have had many people around me to support me and make me who I am, so I have a long list of people, to be grateful. However, I will try my best to write it and keep it related to the academic environment, in which this study was made, yet it does not and never will mean that I forget those who were not directly in that sphere but always with me in my mind and heart.

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CHAPTER I

ORIGINS OF EXTREMES¹

1.1. The Progressive Era

The nineteenth century was the era of revolutions, as it was displayed in a wide range of instances, in which the Napoleonic Wars, the revolts of 1848, the changing means of production with the second industrial revolution, the rise of industrial cities in the modern states and many others were included. Consequently, the Progressive Era itself was a reaction to these rapid changes. These changes were not limited to only economy and politics, but they also changed the entire visage of Western civilization and represented the mid-point of a series of events. Having accelerated with the Renaissance, they continued with the Reformation, and then entrenched with the Cartesian manner of thinking in the Enlightenment Era, and the foundations of the progress toward the modern world continued throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The nineteenth century was born out of the Age of Reason and Rationalism, and it became the Age of Industrialism and Progressivism. At the end, world did not even look

¹ The title was inspired by Eric Hobsbawm's *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century: 1914-1991*. As the author emphasized the unexpected and unprecedented changes in the 20th Century, covering the ones that happened in almost every aspect of life including society, technology, economy and military, this study's Chapter I examines the changes that took place in these aspects in the second half of the 19th Century and examines the extreme conditions that they caused as the origins of the extremes that Hobsbawm diagnosed. Also, in general, this study argues that these events of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries constituted the foundations of the events, studied by Hobsbawm among many authors, in the 20th Century. See Eric Hobsbawm's *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century: 1914-1991* (London: Abacus, 1995).

similar to what it had been in the past with its grand metropolises, gigantic market economies, and colossal military organizations, and to organize all of them, the time had come for the birth of the modern state and it was equally important to establish the new norms for the interactions of these states.

In the middle of these rapid changes, the empires of Europe were experimenting with reformation and reconstruction policies both in domestic and foreign politics in order to conserve their positions and outmaneuver their rivals. This process constituted the road to the First World War, and for many scholars this very process itself was one of the major reasons for the war; Christopher Clark argues how “short-range, contingent realignments” created an entirely “opaque and unpredictable” system, “feeding a pervasive mood of mutual distrust, even within the respective alliances,”² and together with the domestic instability of the countries, the fear of invasion from outside or revolution within, this system led to the great outbreak in 1914.

This was the story of the downfall of the Old World and the traumatic birth of the new one. Ironically, the war of the empires ended up with their own downfall and the establishment of the nation-states and international organizations, the war meant the end of this old-world system – or at least corresponded to the greatest attempt to end it.

In 1917, after the bloodshed of three years, the war gained a new meaning and turned into a final war between “the Forces of Order” and “the Forces of Movement”. Arno J. Mayer’s definition with his references to various scholars, including John Stuart Mill’s *Essay on Liberty*, is that the Forces of Movement were referred to be the political groups

² Christopher Clark. *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 557. Also, see Christopher Clark’s interpretation of the path to the Great War between pages 555-62.

which were against the status quo, and mainly they were grouped around Socialist and Progressive organizations, while the Forces of Order, as it can be understood from the name, were fighting for conserving the antebellum system of non-democratic or partially democratic/constitutional monarchies and militarist governments.

By this means, the diplomatic tools of the New Order were also being redefined through the rejection of the old one by the Forces of Movement. It possessed a great significance as it meant defining the rules of the international interactions between the units of the New World as these rules at times constituted the only difference between peace and war.

In order to state the differences between the Old and New Diplomacies, Kenneth Weisbrode referred to Wilson's contrast between these two definitions.³ For Wilson, the New Diplomacy was new because it did not only refuse to accept the "secret treaties, aristocratic salons, palace intrigue, balance of power", but it also "came as a gift of the New World". At this point, Wilson had a mistake; the New World was not represented by the United States only despite an American leader's tendency to claim his country's exceptionalism, but Russia was also in the middle of a transformation, in which it refused almost all of the traditions of its imperialist past, including the means and definition of diplomacy.

On November 22, 1917, Trotsky reminded that the Bolsheviks had refused the secret treaties by stating that these were the means of "a propertied minority" and "imperialism", serving to their pursuits of "conquest" and "robbery"; therefore, "the

³ Kenneth Weisbrode. *Old Diplomacy Revisited: A Study in the Modern History of Diplomatic Transformations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 4

abolition of secret diplomacy was the primary condition for an honest, popular, truly democratic foreign policy.”⁴ However, there was one thing certain that both of these leaders of the Forces of Movement denounced the Old Diplomacy by defining it as a means of imperialist designs of the Old Order and advocated the New Diplomacy by defining it as a necessity of democracy and popular sovereignty.

In terms of the dialect of Old vs. New Diplomacy, the Forces of Order advocated the conservation of the old traditions in diplomatic affairs, while their opponents, the Forces of Movement, advocated that it was time for the mankind to establish new axioms in the diplomatic efforts of the upcoming century. Both Wilson and Lenin were among the pioneers – and most vocal representatives – of this reformist group.⁵

One side, therefore, tried everything it had in its hand to conserve the old system of emperors and aristocracy due to its Hobbesian fear of anarchy. However, the opposite group, the men of a new generation, believed in a sort of Rousseauian idealism and the possibility of abolishing the old system and establish a new world order, in which liberty, equality and justice could grow within nation-states, which would act in harmony under a guiding supra-national body, and the world could be freed from the ambitions of those, who ruled the people without the consent of the people under the scepter of their militarist governments; thus, the Great War could be “the war to end all wars” in H. G. Wells’ words. Therefore, with the Great War, the Age of Rationalism and Industrialism did not only lead to fundamental changes in every notion of life, but it also destroyed the world itself, in

⁴ Leon Trotsky. “Statement on the Publication of the Secret Treaties,” *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed July 7, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1918/commissar/gov.htm>.

⁵ Arno J. Mayer. *Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy 1917-18* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1959), 4-5.

which they had been hatched and developed. This was the story of the downfall of the old-world and the traumatic birth of the new one.

This study briefly discusses the beginning of second half of the 19th-century before reaching its focus on the political and social changes in the United States and Russia from 1870 until the Great War, in Chapter I. It agrees with Arno Mayer's argument that 1917 was the year when "the simultaneous emergence of Washington and Petrograd as two rival centers of power" occurred,⁶ yet unlike his focus on the domestic issues of the European countries before and during the Great War, the underlying questions of this study are how much the domestic politics, the Progressive Era as a response to the Gilded Age, and the Bolshevik Movement as a response to the imperial past, of the United States and Russia, respectively, affected Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow Wilson and how this political milieu was formed in the late 19th century. The second layer of this question leads to another one: how these two leaders happened to develop two parallel discourses, especially around the issue of New Diplomacy, and how their respective environments contributed to the occurrence of these discourses, particularly the Lenin's arguments that led to the Petrograd Formula of 1917 and the Wilson's arguments, declared to the world with the Fourteen Points Speech in 1918.

This study advocates that the explanations behind the motives, ideas and decisions that Wilson and Lenin took in their own political pursuits can be explained by examining their own biographies and the individual histories of the United States and Russia, in contrast to the concentration of Mayer's book on the politics of Europe during the Great War. Furthermore, this study intends to avoid the mistake of reforming Wilson and Lenin

⁶ Mayer, 34.

into the figures of the Cold War leaders that the authors of the mid-20th Century did for many times.

Instead, it studies them as two distinct individuals, with different experiences and perspectives but confronting the same problem, the ultimate crisis of the Old Order, the Great War, and the necessity of establishing the New Order. This study, in other words, does not aim at redefining Wilson, Lenin and the political movements that they represented in a manner that they are forced to fit into the certain definition of an era, namely the Cold War Era, made retrospectively by the historian. It aims at providing a portrayal of the historical events, ideas and individuals independent from any contemporary ideologies in order to redefine the World War Era, not the individuals and facts, from a different perspective.

This is the reason why this study follows a different chronological path than Mayer's analysis. It seeks for understanding the political and social environment before the Great War as well as Wilson and Lenin's formations as individuals and reactions to that milieu, thus it begins with the crises preceded before the Great War. The Revolutions of 1848, the American Civil War and the Crimean War are just some of these crises that took place in the course of a progress in which such concepts as industrialism, Capitalism, Socialism and Imperialism were standing for the driving forces behind the events.

1.2. The Second Industrial Revolution

As one of the greatest historians, studying this period, Hobsbawm explains the great transition by discussing the origins of the era before 1848. He defines how everything, not only the production, changed, from the means of illuminating indoors, to the means of

transportation and construction, toward the second industrial revolution.⁷ The birth-rates increased multiple times with medical developments and urban areas increased in size with the new factory-based production systems, and population multiplied and concentrated in specific places like Moscow, New York, London and many others.

However, these new urban areas were far from being paradises on Earth. They were full of pollution and poverty. People, migrating in masses to these areas with the hope of better future, faced difficult and dangerous working conditions, meager – if not completely absent – labor laws, insufficient infrastructure and eventually poverty and unemployment. Increasing crime rate was on the top of this list as a by-product of it.

The primary beneficiaries of this New World were not the poor, certainly. These problems, accompanied by the rational-realist moods of thinking, which was becoming more and more popular around the educated spheres particularly in this era, created men of different ideas and solutions. Progressive Liberalism and Socialism slowly appeared as the thoughts of these men in this period as the ideals for how to regulate and govern the new, mainly industrial, world.⁸

In this sense, Daniel T. Rodgers argues that the Progressive ideologies were born in Europe out of the municipal and social concerns.⁹ These early examples for the Forces of Movement in France, Germany and Russia were concerned about “the concentrated powers of the monarchical state” as an obstacle before constitutional rights, yet there were also those who recognized the necessity of reforms up to the bottom of the social strata.

⁷ Eric Hobsbawm. *The Age of Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), 298.

⁸ Hobsbawm, 298-9.

⁹ Daniel T. Rodgers. *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998), 52.

Hence, some exceptional thinkers like Max Weber, William James, Henry Sidgwick, Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx had already begun to realize at different times that these masses of urban-workers needed better conditions and rights, also that their problems were material and could be solved with rational actions, taken by those carrying the scepter of the government; furthermore, the question of whether these masses were legitimated to take this scepter by force, if necessary, became more and more important in their thoughts.

However, their emphasis on rationalism should not be mistaken for crude materialism, which has the connotation of someone's being insensitive to social and humanitarian concerns, and it should be remembered these authors questioned ethics, morality, liberty, and others. An ideal leader was under a gradual process of redefinition when they began to argue that military or economic success was not enough within itself and ethnic concern, meaning respect to civic liberties, equality and justice, had to be adopted together with it. James T. Kloppenberg identifies this group of thinkers as *via media* toward the Progressive Era and provides an explanation for them with such words:

This generation matured prior to the second industrial revolution, and a certain poignancy pervades their reflections on the sociopolitical world that dawned near the end of the nineteenth century. Aware that new circumstances made nonsense of prevailing political ideas, the philosophers of the *via media* groped toward unorthodox positions on reform strategy and toward altered ideals of liberty, equality, and justice consistent with their theories of knowledge and responsibility.¹⁰

This was the beginning of the trend, which started with these changes in the living environment and conditions and continued with the realization of the fact that the old

¹⁰ James T. Kloppenberg. *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 4-5.

political institutions and systems were obsolete to meet the demands and needs of the citizens. This process provided the roots of the Liberal Progressivism and Socialism of the Progressive Era, both in terms of their common aspects and the points on which they began quarreling.

This was the road from industrialization to either revolution or reformation, and eventually the schism between the Liberals, who advocated gradual reformation of the system, and Maximalists, supporting the overthrow of the monarchies and aristocrats overnight. It should be stated at this point that the same conflict between reformists and revolutionaries was also one of the primary reasons of the clash between Lenin and Wilson's formulae to end the war, but this will be discussed in Chapter IV in a detailed manner. Nonetheless, at this point, it is required to remark that the states and empires either had to find a way to deal with these upheavals or faced the threat of being overthrown by the masses.

As the result of the chronic poverty and disappointment as its by-product, the demand of the masses for representation and rights broke out as a series of revolutions and reforms throughout the 1830s and 1840s. The Revolution of 1848 was a major outbreak among them, even though it ended up as a failure since it could not overthrow any of the monarchs throughout Europe – except for France, where the House of Orléans was overthrown, yet the elected President, Napoleon III, abolished the parliamentary system and reestablished the monarchy, three years later. In these decades, “the moderate liberal

middle-class institutions", in Hobsbawm's words, gained power and recognition with their anti-aristocratic discourse.¹¹

It is not a coincidence that this was the period of the social movements that included the French one at the time of the Revolutions of 1848. Britain, having ceased suffrage from being a question of ethnic origin or religion in 1829 with the Roman Catholic Relief Act, abolished slavery in 1833, as well. The United States, under President Andrew Jackson, enlarged suffrage to almost all white men, which was a small one as it did not recognize the rights of other ethnic groups and women, yet still an improvement. This was the beginning of the end for the political system, which was based on the suffrage of land-owner aristocrats, and even "the most backward empire" of Europe was on the road to abolishing serfdom toward 1861.

Nevertheless, toward the end of the nineteenth century, it was seen that the reduction of the power of monarchies and their loyalist institutions, namely the forces of order, and compelling these forces to share their power with their subjects to a certain extent, as women and ethnic minorities were still kept out of state-level politics, were not enough to solve the chronic problems of the masses, such as poverty, inequality and deprivation from fundamental rights of humanity. There was a strong need for fundamental reforms in every aspect of society, from women, children and minorities' rights, to state's responsibilities, to municipal services, and to workers' rights as well as many other aspects of life.

¹¹ Hobsbawm, 301-2.

Consequently, the following decades, meaning the 1870s and 1880s, witnessed William Gladstone, Woodrow Wilson's alleged role model, getting involved in "the agenda of liberal politics", which covered democratization, free trade, and freedom to ethnic and religious minorities. This approach created the pillars of the liberal-progressive politics in Britain at that time.

This period witnessed the tension between the Forces of Order and the people, demanding more representation and particularly broader constitutional rights. Rodgers refers to Gladstone's efforts as attempts to solve the Irish question and reduce the tension between Irish workers and English absentee landlords, in order to preserve the status quo.¹²

Although these years would have been seen as the golden age of Capitalism and the British labor seemed to moderate its discourse by absorbing a more reformist stance under liberal influence, in contrast to the revolutionary ideals of the Radical Socialists, the radical intellectuals like Sidney Webb and his Fabians experienced that their voices were heard by more people with every passing day toward the last decade of the century.¹³

Similarly, Bismarck's social policies, driven by "Junker dominated 'feudal' elite" also aimed at the preservation of their system by partially compromising to the masses.¹⁴ The central one of these social reforms from above was the German social insurance program, which had to be accepted by Bismarck, despite his detestation of "state interference" in private sector for the favor of the workers. This undesired interference was

¹² Rodgers, 54.

¹³ Kloppenberg, 199-202.

¹⁴ Rodgers, 22.

intended to provide the disarmament of "outlawed socialists and rewedding the loyalties of the German working class to the state and emperor".

These policies were also continued under the rule of Wilhelm II, with the monarchical intervention in the labor strikes and even organization of labor standards in the 1890s.¹⁵ These policies had a great impact on the rural areas of the respective countries, too, and this was one of the major reasons of how the West seemed to have taken a different road than Russia toward the end of the century, which will be discussed under the section spared for Russia in this chapter.

In parallel with the changing policies, the change in the environment could not be underestimated or simply neglected and must be regarded in correlation with the politics. In this era, the edifices like Eiffel Tower, the Crystal Palace, and Central Park appeared in the middle of three great metropolises. As Rodgers states that Eiffel Tower "was an advertisement for the tradition-shattering, revolutionary possibilities of industrial technology."¹⁶

He also remarks how some conservative Parisians petitioned against it to have it demolished; this was just one of many examples of the forces of order, in action. The Crystal Palace perplexed the minds with its revolutionary structure and symbolized the new era of architecture and building. Beyond that, these structures became the focal points of the oncoming new age. Central Park represented the peak of man-made solutions to the needs of the urban masses and symbolized these masses' yearning for more habitable cities. And Eiffel Tower was standing as the symbol of the new industrial era *en fer et en acier*,

¹⁵ Rodgers, 54-5.

¹⁶ Rodgers, 8.

and under its shadow, some Parisians were disgusted by its lack of elegance, while others were amazed by its magnificence.

Even these buildings, hence, became the objects of the discussions between the Forces of Order and the Forces of Movement, between those who wanted the conservation of the old methods by the fear of an unknown future and those who argued that humanity could be taken to a higher level and life could be made better by the virtue of social and industrial progress.

This contrast between two distinct worldviews reflected in parliamentary discussions, public petitions and even in the writings of authors, ranging from Dickens' observations of London, to the allegedly distant corners of the Western societies with Samuel Clemens's American South and Chernyshevsky's Petersburg. These social changes, which were intended to be broadly mentioned in order to provide an introductory basis for the major discussion of this study, were the ideological, political and social origins of the Progressive Era, starting in the 1870s and continuing until the Great War.

As Rodgers remarks it, this was the period when "on both sides of the Atlantic, politicians rode the new issues to power and popularity".¹⁷ These persons were also the actors of the Great War and they were taking their places on the stage at that moment. The second half of the nineteenth century was the period of time, which shaped the worldview of these individuals with its rapid changes under the impact of the Second Industrial Revolution, in which they lived their childhood; in which they got involved in business,

¹⁷ Rodgers, 56.

academic studies, politics and military adventures; and in which they identified themselves and met their own societies.

The importance of this generation is emphasized by Hobsbawm in his *Age of Empire: 1875-1914*, as well. He draws his readers' attention to the members of this generation, among them he includes Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, "Lenin", who was forty-four in 1914, Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, "Stalin", thirty-five, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, thirty, Winston Churchill, forty.¹⁸ Nevertheless, for the sake of the coherence of this study, another man has to be added into this list; Woodrow Wilson was fifty-eight, in 1914. This was the club of gentlemen, who recreated their own worlds from its roots to the branches, yet they had another common attribute; they were all influenced by the developments of the Progressive Era.

1.3. The Progressive Era in the United States

*I meet an American sailor and I ask him why his countries' vessels are built to last a short time, and he replies to me without hesitation that the art of navigation makes such rapid progress daily that the most beautiful would soon become almost useless if its existence were prolonged beyond a few years. In these words, pronounced at random by a coarse man concerning a particular fact I perceive the general and systematic idea according to which a great people conduct all things. Aristocratic nations are naturally brought to contract the limits of human perfectibility too much, and democratic nations sometimes extend them beyond measure.*¹⁹

Alexis de Tocqueville – *Democracy in America*

In the United States, the years after the Civil War witnessed demands for the improvement of life standards and labor conditions, as well. The United States had already been founded as the result of a constitutional struggle for representation and equal rights,

¹⁸ Eric Hobsbawm. *Age of Empire: 1875-1914* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 3. Some of the names, counted by Hobsbawm are excluded from the integrity of the narration, here.

¹⁹ Alexis de Tocqueville. *Democracy in America* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 422.

and this was given against a monarchical power. The United States was an experiment, and, by nature, it tended to side with the Forces of Movement. The country had various moments in its history, in which the conflict between the dualities ruptured – Old and New, Monarchy and Republic, Equality and Submission and so on so forth. All of these were the momentary breakouts of the ambivalence about the past and future of this experiment. The Progressive Era was no less turbulent than any other era.

The Civil War of 1861-65 was the biggest of them and this moment can be interpreted as another episode of the struggle for the constitutional rights and equality. These years provided the origins of the Progressive Era. Eric Foner refers to the Whig Party's ideological slogan and also the title of his book: "free soil, free labor, free men." He refers to Carl Schurz's words, quoted from his *For the Great Empire of Liberty, Forward!* and defines how the idea of free labor provided the ground for these Republicans to come together in the antebellum years.²⁰

Furthermore, Foner, throughout his study, explains how "free soil, free labor and free men" were blended by these politicians in their ideology. He finds an example for this argument among Lincoln's words about a hypothetical black woman: "In some respects she is not my equal, but in her natural right to eat the bread she earns with her own hands without asking leave of anyone else, she is my equal, and the equal of others."²¹

In this sense, Lincoln is depicted by Foner, while putting this ideology into words by saying that "I want every man to have the chance—and I believe a black man is entitled

²⁰ Eric Foner. *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), Page 33.

²¹ Foner, 296.

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²¹ Foner, 296.

to it—in which he *can* better his condition . . .”²² Therefore, in the light of these points, it is impossible to refuse the universality of labor in the Whig-Republican ideology on the eve of the Progressive Era.

When they were speaking for the rights of the black, the concept of labor, which was uttered between the lines of their argumentations, was not specific for this given social-ethnic group, yet it was a universal value, which was supposed to be shared and rewarded equally among human beings. Above all, moral concerns were becoming a part of politics as nothing similar had been seen throughout the modern history. The Civil War Era was the cradle of Progressive ideas. As a member of this generation, young Thomas Woodrow Wilson witnessed the wounded soldiers and Yankee prisoners in Augusta, Georgia and he saw the “charred remains” of Columbia, South Carolina, brought into ruins by Sherman in the Civil War; Wilson learned why to hate the war.²³ Yet, he also learned the importance of equality and cohesion in society.

Although the following decades after the Civil War ironically witnessed the cumulation of vast amount of wealth into monopolistic corporations (for instance, the Standard Oil and Southern Pacific Railroad) and disappointed those fighting for the constitutional rights as there were still a set of racially discriminative laws, namely the Jim Crow Laws, this process eventually led to the revival of Progressive policies in the United States. A new generation of politicians began to take place on the stage of history with their own ideas and social sensitivities.

²² Foner, 299.

²³ Arthur S. Link. *Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography* (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1963), 16.

Whereas the 1880s were the years of strikes and the rise of private corporations, which enjoyed overwhelming influence on the government as it can be seen in the role of banker Jay Gould in the election of Cleveland and in the pro-corporation decision of the Supreme Court in *Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad*, after the 1890s, the progressive movements began to turn the winds for their own benefit and their political influence and used the legislative force of the state to have many laws approved and enforced.

They began to group up at seminars and reactionary organizations. However, it is problematic to think about the Progressive Movement as a centralized movement with objectives and agendas determined by a certain number of motives, instead, Daniel Rodgers defines this movement with these words: "an era of shifting, ideologically fluid, issue-focused coalitions, all competing for the reshaping of American society."²⁴ Therefore, a student of this era must be ready to see "coalitions" of people from different backgrounds and approaches.

The Ocala Platform was one of the most striking examples of these coalitions. As it was organized by the populist – and almost socialist – Southern Farmers' Alliance, the Ocala Demands of December 1890 display how Progressive expectations are embedded in the populist discourse of the farmers. These demands were to provide the political material for the Progressives to criticize and finish the Gilded Age. They were conspicuously written over the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian traditions. The demand for the abolition of banks, nationalization of railroads and foreign investments, the establishment of equality

²⁴ Daniel T. Rodgers. "In Search of Progressivism," *Reviews in American History* 10, no. 4, (1982): 114.

were the reinterpretation of these traditions on the eve of the 20th century.²⁵ Nevertheless, these demands carried another unique characteristic of Americans as well as the Progressive Movement. They requested the enforcement and endorsement of these reforms by the hand of the federal government. This demonstrates one of the key points of American Progressivism: the role of institutions.

The connection between rural populism and progressivism in America is embodied in William Jennings Bryan, who ran for Presidency in 1896 by enjoying a great support by these populist movements, and who served as the Secretary of State in Woodrow Wilson's cabinet after the election of 1912. As much as the support of the rural working class, Bryan was surprisingly supported by some of the thinkers like William James.²⁶ This was an example of American Progressive Movement's appeal to the working class along with the elite of their society, and an example of the fluidity theory of Rodgers.²⁷

On the other hand, Progressive institutionalism required that any institutions, including the state itself, as long as it is either cooperative or directly under control, was meant to be a tool to enact and realize their ideals and objectives by the Progressivists. This condition added another layer to the crude demand for the institutionalization of collective action as it meant that an ideal state was the one which was treating its citizens responsibly and responding to their demands. It was the point where institutionalism gave birth to the new ideal state of the Progressive Era.

²⁵ John D. Hicks. *The Populist Revolt, A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party* (Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, 1955), 430-1.

²⁶ Kloppenberg, 169.

²⁷ Kloppenberg, 298.

Although Bryan's loss to McKinley with the landslide victory for the latter brought a brief disappointment in these early moments of the Progressivist Movement, it was just a matter of time before they reached the most glorious moment of their history. And even if McKinley was also supported by the bankers and industrialists just like Cleveland, he did not have any luxury to ignore the demands, summarized with the Ocala Demands, of the workers and farmers, let alone the politicians, profiting from these events.

However, the tranquility before the storm was not because the workers and farmers were satisfied with their demands, but because of the changes in the international sphere. The Spanish-American War, the Philippines, and Cuba were not the only ruptures in an ongoing story, yet they were the very moments which led to another transition in the Progressive Thinking: internationalism and expansion. These American adventures in foreign lands created their own hero, Theodore Roosevelt. He started his autobiographic account on his *Rough Riders* by summarizing his zeal with these words:

During the year preceding the outbreak of the Spanish War, I was Assistant Secretary of the Navy. While my party was in opposition, I had preached, with all the fervor and zeal I possessed our duty to intervene in Cuba and to take this opportunity of driving the Spaniard from the Western World. Now that my party had come to power, I felt it incumbent on me, by word and deed, to do all I could to secure the carrying out of the policy in which I so heartily believed; and from the beginning I had determined that, if war came, somehow or other, I was going to the front.²⁸

This was the mindset that "Teddy" had when he was looking for volunteers to follow him on his ride to the war. In her book, *Rough Rider in the White House*, Sarah Watts recounts John Hay's commentary words on Roosevelt's eagerness to fight, "wilder

²⁸ Theodore Roosevelt. *The Rough Riders* (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1899), 5.

werweger" – an adventurous savage – and the author rightfully argues how this act of aggression served to the portrayal of "romantic, imperialist adventurism",²⁹ as though Roosevelt had been a political Huckleberry. On this romanticism, Roosevelt created his ideal army of volunteers by saying "in all the world there could be no better material for soldiers than that afforded by these grim hunters of mountains, these wild rough riders of plains."³⁰ This was the romanticism which led him to Cuba on May 29, 1898, in order to fight foreign imperialism with local imperialism. The United States, dreamt by Roosevelt, was a great power on Earth, which had a say in international affairs.

Upon the assassination of McKinley, on September 1, 1901, Theodore Roosevelt became the President of the United States thirteen days later. What marked Theodore Roosevelt's Presidency was his declaration of war against the monopolies. Daniel Rodgers defines this period by referring to William A. White's words "it is funny how we have all found the octopus" in order to define how the newborn middle-class of the urbanizing country got introduced to almost a century-long concept of antimonopoly, when Jackson's attempts to keep the business elite under control and prevent centralization and Jeffersonian agrarian Republicanism with his criticism of the same group are taken into consideration.³¹

In this matter, Daniel Rodgers refers to the fact that the Bureau of Labor was established in the US in 1885 and "soon emerged as the key social investigative agency in Washington."³² It compared the living and labor conditions of the people with the statistics

²⁹ Sarah Watts. *Rough Rider in the White House: Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of Desire* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 75.

³⁰ Roosevelt, 18

³¹ Rodgers, 123.

³² Daniel T. Rodgers. *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998), 62.

gathered from other countries. Although it was claimed that the US was decades behind of the development of European countries,³³ dozens of developments took place. They included the legislation on anti-trust policies and labor rights, such as the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, against monopolies; the Erdman Act of 1898, aiming at preventing discrimination against rail-road worker unions; the Pure and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act of 1906, enacted in order to regulate the medical and food products that were distributed to public; the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, intended to regulate the communication services. In the same period, social organizations, among which the National Child Labor Committee, established in 1904, and the aforementioned Bureau of Labor were just two examples, were founded and aimed at regulating the relationship between state, market and society in favor of democracy, equality and civil rights, as the culmination of a century-long suspicion and hatred of the business elite.

To understand the broader meaning behind all of these laws and organizations, the final two of Rodgers' three features of the Progressive politics, named by him "the emphasis on the social bonds" and "the rhetoric of social efficiency", must be referenced. These two were the very results of American society's recognizing the new industrial-urbanized world and attempts at adaptation. Rodgers explains how academia questioned once again the meaning of "society" and Smith, Locke and Mill's liberal concepts of "autonomous economic man, the autonomous possessor of property rights, the autonomous man of character" began to be criticized and replaced by "a rhetoric of social cohesion."³⁴ Institutionalism was the tool of the pursued cohesion in the society. This desire to use

³³ Rodgers, 72. See pages 74-5, as this perception was also shared by the American Progressives and they proclaimed that it is one of the objectives of American Progressivism to catch up with their European counterparts.

³⁴ Daniel T. Rodgers. "In Search of Progressivism," *Reviews in American History* 10, no. 4, (1982): 124-7.

institutions to reshape society in a Progressivist model was not going to be limited within the borders of the United States, when Woodrow Wilson declared his desire to establish a supra-national institution to regulate the nations of the world.

Nevertheless, Wilson's internationalism did not come out of nowhere, either, because in addition to Rodgers' three points, there is another one which can be seen in Theodore Roosevelt's policies. Roosevelt's zeal in domestic policy was accompanied by his internationalist concerns, which he seemed to have inherited from his "Rough Rider" years. His enthusiasm and concern about international affairs had not disappeared, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 brought about an opportunity for them to erupt. Watts argues how this search for peace was in contrast with Roosevelt's self-depiction as a masculine warrior-cowboy, which was created around his conceptualization of the Rough Rider. Roosevelt's answer to this paradox did not only reflect the character of his discourse, yet also summarized some crucial aspects of the Progressive internationalism, when he said "the strong man with sword girt on thigh who preaches peace. . . not from fear of distrust of his own powers, but from a deep sense of moral obligation."³⁵ In contrast to his war-oriented mind and criticism of Wilson's pacifism on the eve of America's involvement in the Great War,³⁶ Roosevelt's rhetoric, desire for action, and hatred of fear and passivity granted a new dimension to the Progressive mind. From now on, the US was not seeking for an answer to the question of "what or how the American society was", but also of "what the position of the American state was in the world."

³⁵ Watts, 217-9.

³⁶ Watts, 220.

Roosevelt's Republican successor William Howard Taft was no less internationalist and progressivist than his predecessor as it will be seen in Chapter II; he was just more cautious. When Roosevelt got bored of Taft's timidity and claimed that his successor was also under the control of bosses, he decided to adopt Herbert Croly's "the new nationalism" and his "formula for achieving Hamiltonian ends through Jeffersonian means" to find the balance between "the independent individual and the democratic community"³⁷ and ran for the presidency in 1912 for the third term with a third party, at the cost of dividing the Republican votes. Taft admitted his confusion and past-loyalty to Roosevelt's policies, which was the reality especially in Taft's domestic policies, with these words "what I attempted to do in my administration was to carry out Mr. Roosevelt's policies. . ."³⁸ Therefore, it is not possible to claim that there was a discontinuity under Taft's presidency, and his internationalism will be remarked when Wilson's policies will be discussed in Chapter II of this paper.

Besides, these schisms, inner-party conflicts and intricate alliances were not rare occasions in the Progressive Era as it was just what happened on the opposite bench of the election of 1912, during the Democratic Convention, which opened the path to the White House for Wilson. The Convention started on June 25th with Bryan's demand to be given the Temporary Chairmanship and making the Convention a Progressive platform; in this matter, he clearly received Wilson's support.³⁹ Back then, Governor Wilson of New Jersey was a strong candidate, who had leaned toward the Progressive Movement during his

³⁷ Kloppenberg, 313-4.

³⁸ "Taft Draws Inferences from Colonel's Remarks About Prosecution of Trusts," *The Chicago Tribune* (Chicago, IL), May 5, 1912.

³⁹ "Will Offer Himself as Temporary Chairman to Defeat Parker," *The New York Times* (New York City, NY), June 25, 1912.

administration in Jersey, before he had clearly declared his commitment to this cause on September 30.⁴⁰

Through Bryan's words, this Progressive front within the Democratic Party declared its desire to turn the Convention into a crusade against the Wall Street bosses, especially when Bryan proclaimed "I am here to fight for Progressive Democracy and against the predatory interests. . . ." This early sign of the Bryan-Wilson Alliance of Christian Progressives was just another example of the Progressive Era coalitions, mentioned by Rodgers, as much as the schism in the Republican Convention. Nevertheless, Bryan-Wilson alliance was met with a bitter response in the early ballots of the Convention, when Champ Clark, Wilson's Wall Street supported archrival, had almost half of the votes and Bryan lost the Temporary Chairmanship to Alton B. Parker,⁴¹ despite Bryan's passionate opening speech, in which he underlined "The country has not forgotten . . . the Wall Street threw the party down . . ."⁴² However, the Nebraskan did not surrender and his support had such a grand impact that he was the one who was attacked more than Wilson by the supporters of Wall Street during the Convention,⁴³ whereas again he was the one who got congratulated at first when Wilson won the nomination.⁴⁴ Hence, together with Bryan's switching support from Clark to Wilson on the fourteenth ballot and the unshaken

⁴⁰ Link, 42-45.

⁴¹ "Convention Beats Bryan 579 to 510; Parker, Chairman, Urges Harmony," *The New York Times* (New York City, NY), June 26, 1912.

⁴² *Official Report of Proceedings of the Democratic Convention, held in Baltimore, Maryland, June 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and July 1 and 2, 1912*, ed. Urey Woodson and Milton W Blumenberg (Chicago: The Peterson Linotyping Co., 1912).

⁴³ "Bryan Finds Profit in Political Game," *The New York Times* (New York City, NY), June 30, 1912. This article, particularly, represents Bryan as an aristocratic-soldier figure and creates resemblances between him and Theodore Roosevelt, when it is implying how Bryan is a professional politician, doing this as a job to profit and get clout, all of which was, for sure, in contrast with the image of "commoner" that Bryan tried to impress his supporters with.

⁴⁴ "All is Now Harmony with the Democrats," *The New York Times* (New York City, NY), July 3, 1912.

backing of "the Wilson-men" granted the nomination to the Governor.⁴⁵ Aside from the Bryan-Wilson Alliance's success, the Convention was a clear-cut picture of the fragmented society in the turmoil of this era and this was not unique to the United States.

Nonetheless, unlike the Republican tragedy, the Democrats managed to come out from a very turbulent convention with unity, and even Charles Frances Murphy, a New York boss and generally the target of Bryan's salvos against "interests" as being a major supporter for Clark's nomination, declared his support for Wilson for the oncoming presidential campaign.⁴⁶ On July 3, 1912, the newspapers of New York celebrated Wilson's nomination with a combination of pure cheerleading, cautious celebration and hostile criticism, again the divided structure of this era was reflected on this issue, as well.

The New York Times compiled the newspaper reports related to Wilson's candidacy on July 3, 1912 and wrote "*The World* cheered with the title 'A New Birth of Freedom'" and remarked "the Democratic Party, at last, has broken its shackles" and continued: "Woodrow Wilson will be the next President of the United States. But he will be more than that. He will be the first President of the United States in a generation to go into office owing favors to nobody except the American people, and under obligations to nothing except the general welfare."⁴⁷

The Tribune wrote "Gov. Wilson's nomination at Baltimore yesterday was, on the surface at least, a decisive victory for the radical element in the Democratic Party. It was even a greater triumph for Mr. Bryan than it was for Mr. Wilson."

⁴⁵ Link, 55.

⁴⁶ "All is Now Harmony with the Democrats," *The New York Times* (New York City, NY), July 3, 1912.

⁴⁷ "Newspaper Views of Wilson's Choice," *The New York Times* (New York City, NY), July 3, 1912.

The Sun cheered under the title of "A Choice of the Majority" and continued: "No candidate of any party since politics began ever won in convention his nomination more fairly and honorably than Gov. Woodrow Wilson", but also criticized his "overeagerness to please", "willingness to recant", "his swift sacrifice not only of personal obligations but also of well-grounded convictions to present advantage", "his chronic neglect of official duties in his own State for the cultivation of votes elsewhere" and concluded its report with praising Taft.

The Herald celebrated "the New Jersey Governor has won and won handsomely. When it is analyzed it is a personal triumph", but it also concluded its report with praising Taft by saying "the Republican Party is badly damaged, but it is a great organization, and it has as its candidate, whatever his other defects may be, one who stands firmly for the business interests and the principle of protection."

The Press did not celebrate, at all and in fact, it was quite hostile with these words: "To Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic nominee for President of the United States, the opposing party has sent, for his campaign, the most powerful suit of armor he could wear. It is Republican factionalism. If there is one weak spot which can be penetrated behind that borrowed coat of mail it is the tariff flesh of the Democratic candidate" and its report was titled "Wilson, the Free Trader." The newspaper reports were like a panorama of the US politics of the era.

At the end of this phase, when Wilson found what he was looking for in Louis D. Brandeis' program of "the restoration of competition and unleashing of economic energies by the regulation of competition itself", which was given a name by Wilson when he said "the New Freedom for 'the man who is knocking and fighting at the closed doors of

opportunity", the race to the White House began and became the stage for one of the most educative debates in the history of the United States as it could be comparable with the debate between Lincoln and Douglas in 1861, in Arthur S. Link's interpretation.⁴⁸ This debate will be examined together with Wilson's first term at the office in Chapter II so as to analyze Wilson's New Freedom before the Great War broke out.

What has been discussed so far is that despite their different agendas, the Progressives shared some common attributes, three of which were listed by Daniel Rodgers, out of a necessity to state what these seemingly muddled active groups had in common in order to define the features of the era. These were "the language of anti-monopolism", "the emphasis on the social bonds", and "the rhetoric of social efficiency".⁴⁹ What is added in this study is the idealization of the United States' role as an international Great Power, which became much more obvious under Roosevelt's administration before Woodrow Wilson's involvement in the world politics due to the Great War. One must ask what Roosevelt had in his mind, before accusing Wilson of being a dreamer.

Therefore, it should not be mistaken that the sense of internationalism had existed only in the American politics, as discussed by Rodgers in another work of his, which makes the subject even more interesting, but what he examined was the convergence between the Atlantic countries' domestic policies in his book, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age*, in terms of how they influenced each other, along with their parallels and contrasts.

⁴⁸ Link, 58-9.

⁴⁹ Daniel T. Rodgers. "In Search of Progressivism," *Reviews in American History* 10, no. 4, (1982): 123.

This study focuses on the internationalism, in the sense that the United States, by its Progressive leaders, was desired to become an international Great Power, which required getting involved in the war, as much as the peace, and articulation and implementation of doctrines about peace-making, trade and other general affairs between nations. This process started a decade before the Great War and it was the self-manifested Progressive creed, which was pursued by these leaders to turn the United States into a great power and reform the world, according to their own ideology.

By this reason, when Mayer's Wilson was concerned about the internal politics – mainly European Socialists' ideas – of Europe before declaring the Fourteen Points, he was not representing any discontinuity in the foreign policy of former Progressive Presidents, but his involvement in the war displayed one of the four features of the Progressive Era – internationalism – at the cost of negating his own promise for staying out of the Great War, which will be discussed in Chapter II, in more detail. Nonetheless, it should be stated here that the Progressive leaders of America had already developed internationalist concerns long before the Great War.

However, the United States was not the only country, as it was emphasized by Rodgers already, that went through a series of traumas in varying sizes – such as the accumulation of wealth in the hand of the few, rapid urbanization, difficult living conditions and strong need for a modern state to govern all of these issues – and in this matter, this study will also ask the question of *what about Russia and Lenin?*

1.4. The Progressive Sufferings of Russia

Pauperism and proletariat are the suppurating ulcers which have sprung from the organism of the modern states. Can they be healed? The communist doctors propose the complete destruction and annihilation of the existing organism. . . One thing is certain, if

*these men gain the power to act, there will be not a political but a social revolution, a war against all property, a complete anarchy. Would this, in turn, give way to new national states, and on what moral and social foundations? Who shall lift the veil of the future? And what part will be played by Russia? 'I sit on the shore and wait for the wind,' says an old Russian proverb.*⁵⁰

August von Haxthausen - *Studies on the Interior of Russia*

Referring to the twentieth century, Robert Service remarks "Russia has had an extraordinary century" by swinging from monarchy to Communism and from an agricultural economy to urban industrialism, and he adds, for Winston Churchill, Russia was "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."⁵¹ The reason behind this was the fact that Russia went through a different experience, compared to its Western counterparts. The Age of Progressivism was the Age of Resistance for many Russians. Especially after the Crimean War, Russia did not find itself in the golden age of *laissez-faire*, instead it was faced with serious economic and governmental problems,⁵² while its society was going through the same changes with the Western societies.

Being aware of the fact that the armies, having chased Napoleon back to Paris less than half a century before, were defeated by the Western powers, with the defeat in the Crimean War, Tsar Alexander II became aware of the necessity for a reform in his country, so he had his court enact the Emancipation Edict of 1861, which abolished serfdom and granted the title of "the Liberator" to Alexander II. The edict was just a single step in a set of reforms, and it was followed by the establishment of *zemstvo*, local elective

⁵⁰ August von Haxthausen. *Studies on the Interior of Russia* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1972.), 156-6. Original quotation belongs to Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), 297.

⁵¹ Robert Service. *A History of Twentieth-Century Russia* (London: Penguin Books, 1998), xxxiii.

⁵² Richard Pipes. *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London and England: Harvard University Press, 1997), 1-8.

administrations; of local courts as well as the improvements in the local education. Additionally, the term of military service was decreased from twenty-five years to a maximum of six years.⁵³

All of these changes aimed at reforming the administration of rural Russia, which constituted most of the country. Russia, as an extremely centralized country, was trying to perform its own Progressive reforms by the hand of the Tsar. However, Service specifies that these changes were far from being successful as they put the former-serf population into a more difficult situation as they turned into tenant farmers, who had to pay to the gentry to be able to plant the land, and with the addition of the primitive penalties – such as corporal punishment for misdemeanors – made them “remain a class apart”.⁵⁴

Pipes defines Russian villagers’ living conditions with these words: “a harsh climate and a government that treated him exclusively as an object of exploitation”, when it was mixed with the patriarchal traditions and autocratic households, the peasants had many things, forcing them to give in, and these same things made them revolt.⁵⁵

These years also witnessed the quadruplication of both rural and urban working-class populations, as well as the production output of the country. However, they were all under constant surveillance due to the Tsar’s fear of revolts. Above all, the working conditions were extremely difficult and based on manual labor even at the mechanized factories.⁵⁶ Therefore, it can be argued that the working class of Russia was also

⁵³ Service, 6-7.

⁵⁴ Service, 7.

⁵⁵ Richard Pipes. *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 4-10.

⁵⁶ Service, 8.

experiencing problems with the gentry and bosses, similar to the Western European countries and the United States.

In these years, the Russian intelligentsia began to be stirred up with the question of *What is to be Done?* This generation provided most of the greatest intellectuals of the century. Some of them were rather skeptical about the industrial era and the oncoming profound changes in the social and political spheres, like Dostoyevsky, while others criticized the Nihilism of the youth of these years, like Turgenev, but a group of them, like Chernyshevsky, were already sure that the old, as a term within itself, was something to be done away with, and this meant fundamental changes down to the roots of society. Although Pipes blames the members of this third group, by naming them the radical intellectuals, for exploiting "the concrete complaints" of the peasantry and working class "into an all-consuming destructive force",⁵⁷ this study does not agree with this interpretation, and in Chapter III, it is preferred to read these intellectuals as a group of people who were trying to make sense of what was going on around them and to provide a possible solution for their people.

To be able to explain this study's approach to these intellectuals, it should be mentioned that there were two great differences between Russia and the West in the second half of the nineteenth century. The first one was, in Hosking's narration, the disappointment across the country due to the failure of Alexander II's reforms.⁵⁸ The intellectuals of Russia began convincing themselves that they were the only hope of their country. The second one was the oppression of the police-state, experienced as a strong

⁵⁷ Pipes, xv.

⁵⁸ Geoffrey Hosking. *Russia: People and Empire 1552-1917* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 345.

censorship and arrests.⁵⁹ Despite the slight improvement during the 1850s and 1860s, the police force of the Tsar kept a strong grip on these groups of students and intellectuals who were gradually getting more marginalized due to these policies and diverging into various kinds of radical activities, ranging from dedicating their lives to serve the peasants as doctors and teachers, to getting involved in terrorist activities.⁶⁰

Regarding these two points, it is quite normal that the intellectuals of Russia became *the intelligentsia*,⁶¹ and began to see the monarchy and its apparatuses as a set of obstacles before the emancipation of the people. The aforementioned state structure did not leave many options to the socially concerned spheres of Russia. Before 1905, some of them reflected their discontent by resorting to violent actions like *Narodnaya Volya*, which was born from the university students' uprisings in the 1870s and which had direct effects on the lives of both the Romanovs and the Ulyanovs,⁶² whereas Plekhanov, one of the first Socialists in Russia to adopt Marxist theories, was claiming that violence was not a solution and the establishment of Capitalism was necessary for Russia to have a successful proletarian revolution as a strict reading of the Marxist theory.

Meanwhile, the Social-Democratic Party (the SDs), from which the Bolsheviks separated in 1903, still advocated a constitutional reform in a Western style and then exploiting these changes to establish the proletariat.⁶³ The Socialist-Revolutionary Party

⁵⁹ Hosking, 348 and 355.

⁶⁰ Hosking, 356.

⁶¹ See Pipes' comparison of the terms "intellectual" and "intelligentsia" on pages 21 and 22.

⁶² This organization was behind the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, and Lenin's elder brother Alexander was executed with the accusation of being a member of a radical student group, modeling itself after the same organization, in 1887. In this case, the series of coincidences follow one another in an endless trail.

⁶³ Pipes, 27.

(the SRs) was also conducting its propaganda in the rural areas as well as embracing a certain level of terrorism, inherited from the *Narodniki*, according to Pipes.⁶⁴

At the other end of the spectrum, the Liberals of Russia were grouping under the Constitutional-Democratic Party (the Kadets), their ranks consisted of educated urban middle-class – “academics, lawyers, physicians” et cetera – along with some reformists aristocrats.⁶⁵ They were all looking for a way out with their own methods and understandings. The amount of their diversity shows that Rodgers’ observation about the differences between the factions of the American Progressive Era was not unique for the United States, and it can be argued that this was a characteristic of a global Progressive Era.

In this way or another, Nicholas II forcibly persuaded almost all of these factions that his government was rotten, when his forces, in a country which had already suffered from long years of social disorder, opened fire on peaceful demonstrators on January 9, 1905, the Bloody Sunday of Russia.⁶⁶ This was the road to the Revolution of 1905, the rehearsal for 1917,⁶⁷ in which all of our actors, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Chernov, Martov, Plekhanov, and others, were practicing their roles. In this milieu, Lenin’s first works, in which he began to articulate what is called Leninism today, were published.

⁶⁴ Pipes, 28.

⁶⁵ Pipes, 29.

⁶⁶ Service, 13.

⁶⁷ Leon Trotsky. *My Life: An Attempted Autobiography* (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1970), 186. Trotsky defines the Revolution of 1905 with these words: “In Russian life, the revolution of 1905 was the dress rehearsal for the revolution of 1917. That was its significance in my personal life as well. I took part in the events of 1917 with absolute resolution and confidence, because they were merely a continuation and development of the revolutionary activity, which had been interrupted by the arrest of the St. Petersburg Soviet on December 3, 1905.”

Meanwhile, in addition to all of these events, when the Russian Fleet was defeated by the Japanese navy in the Strait of Tsushima and Nicholas II desperately needed Theodore Roosevelt's mediation for a peace treaty with the Japanese,⁶⁸ he ran out of all materials that he could advertise to his subjects. His country was running from one political crisis to another in the midst of chronic social unrest, and now, he was a defeated commander. What followed this period was Nicholas II's efforts to keep his boat afloat by giving concessions, in an unsuccessful manner.

Forced to listen to the demands of his subjects under these circumstances, the Tsar permitted the meeting of the First State Duma in 1906. When this duma requested that the land should be distributed to the peasantry from the gentry, the Tsar dissolved it at the expense of losing the Constitutional Democratic Party's cooperation.⁶⁹ After the Second Duma, assembled in 1907, met the fate of its first sister. Nicholas II decided to change the rules of the game by ordering his Minister of Internal Affairs, Petr Stolypin, to rewrite the electoral rules and to establish the Third Duma.⁷⁰ Pipes specifies Stolypin's ultimate goal as such:

[He] wanted to cooperate with the Duma by forming a bloc of loyal supporters and thus isolating the left. But beyond parliamentary maneuvering, he also envisaged bringing into existence a conservative, landowning yeomanry to perform the same stabilizing function that it performed in France and some other Continental countries.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Pipes, 39.

⁶⁹ Service, 15.

⁷⁰ Service, 16.

⁷¹ Pipes, 47.

Therefore, Stolypin tried to imitate the result of the French Revolution of 1848, in Russia, by compromising with the gentry and crushing the Socialists.⁷² This led him to pursue a series of reforms and measurements. The first one was the establishment of field courts-martial to suppress the protesting civilians.⁷³

Then he continued with loosening the travel restrictions on the peasantry and providing them an opportunity to leave their communes and establish their own farms. However, this reform also failed at the end, as only 10 percent of the farmer population could access their own lots.⁷⁴

Stolypin also supported the request of the Duma to be given authority over naval expenditure, which was normally the responsibility of the Tsar's Court. According to Figes, this was a sign of Stolypin's Western approach to the task of the government.⁷⁵ In his view, the government was a neutral entity to protect the interests of the country. This was a shift from the old traditionalist approach to the state as the property of the monarch, whose interests had the utmost priority.

He also intended to reform the provincial governments, the *zemstvo*, into more democratic and popular organizations, which was confronted by the reaction of the rural aristocracy and exploited to damage the prestige of Stolypin before the Court even further.⁷⁶ Eventually, Stolypin's attempts to reform the country in a Western style drove a

⁷² Orlando Figes. *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924* (London: Pimlico, 1996), 223.

⁷³ Pipes, 49 and Figes, 224.

⁷⁴ Pipes, 49-50.

⁷⁵ Figes, 226.

⁷⁶ Figes, 228.

wedge between him and the Tsar, who was outraged by perceiving it as his own subject, in this case it is specifically Stolypin, wrestling with him for power.

Nevertheless, his project of establishing a parliament, containing a mixture of Liberals and Constitutionalists under the parties of Kadets, Octobrists, and Socialists, seemed to work as it was the only one which could complete its full term of five years,⁷⁷ until Nicholas II proved his incompetence once again and considered his lifeline, namely Stolypin, dispensable and expendable.⁷⁸ When he was praising the men like Rasputin, while suspecting Stolypin and punishing Lenin, the Tsar was unconsciously trying his best to be the last of the Romanovs.

Richard Pipes provides a well-studied account of the events in Russia on the eve of the Great War, he argues that the old system could survive in Russia, regarding the industrial and economic statistics, and he claims that the increase in industrial strikes did not mean there had to be a revolution as the same was occurring in Great Britain and the United States.

He neglects two things. The first one is the rate of the turmoil that existed in the United States until Roosevelt's reforms and it was likely that the social unrest could spread even and gain a radical tone even in the US as the Ocala Demands provided an example for this issue. The second one is the fact that the United States Constitution and Congress existed, and by nature, they gave people the prospect of legislative reforms to improve their conditions and granted an opportunity for peaceful reforms, despite the one-man rule of

⁷⁷ Pipes, 51.

⁷⁸ Pipes, 53.

Russia under an autocrat, who tried everything to prevent any reforms, regardless of their scopes.

Pipes himself points out three differences of Russia from its Western counterparts and every single of them was a reason to revolt for the people and the *intelligentsia* provided them the tools and methods, only. Everything would have been very different if a policeman had not arrested young Lenin, and he could have just found a love story in Chernyshevsky's novel. Sometimes, people see the world how the world makes them see it. Few years before the bloodiest war of the history up to that moment, Woodrow Wilson was celebrated by his compatriots and he enjoyed the opportunity to realize his New Freedom, whereas Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov was in exile, desperately trying to find a way to save his country from the yoke of an autocrat. In fact, they both were preparing to fulfill the prophecy:

There are two great peoples on the earth today who, starting from different points, seem to advance toward the same goal: these are the Russians and the Anglo-Americans.

Both have grown larger in obscurity; and while men's regards were occupied elsewhere, they have suddenly taken their place in the first rank of nations, and the world has learned of their birth and of their greatness almost at the same time.

All other peoples appear to have nearly reached the limits that nature has drawn and to have nothing more to do than preserve themselves; but these are growing: all the others have halted or advance only with a thousand efforts; these alone march ahead at an easy and rapid pace on a course whose bounds the eye cannot yet perceive.

The American struggles against the obstacles that nature opposes to him; the Russian grapples with men. The one combats the wilderness and barbarism, the other, civilization vested with all its arms: thus the conquests of the American are made with plowshare of the laborer, those of the Russian, with the sword of the soldier.

To attain his goal, the first relies on personal interests and allows the force and the reason for individuals to act, without directing them.

The second in a way concentrates all the power of society in one man.

The one has freedom for his principal means of actions; the other servitude.

Their point of departure is different, their ways are divers; nonetheless, each of them seems called by a secret design of Providence to hold the destinies of half the world in its hands one day.⁷⁹

Alexis de Tocqueville – *Democracy in America*

⁷⁹ Tocqueville, 389-90.

CHAPTER II

WILSON BEFORE THE GREAT WAR

The Great War has always attracted enormous interest both from the general audience of historical studies and academia. For some of the scholars like Norman Stone, the war was perceived to be the cause of many problems of the twentieth century, ranging from the origins of the Second World War, to the regional conflicts in the Far East as much as the Middle East and Africa, and even the Cold War itself was identified to be a result of the conflicts between the Great Powers, having taken place from 1914 until the bombs were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima.⁸⁰ And some of the scholars like Akira Iriye even argued that there were not completely separated clashes, yet a grand, century-long power struggle between these powers.⁸¹

As the result of this process, the United States and the USSR came out as global supreme powers, superior to any force that had ever existed on the planet before them. As this study is about the ideological origins of these changes, at the beginning of the 20th century, this chapter discusses how the presidency of Woodrow Wilson was shaped both by his own characteristics and the realities of his term at the office.

⁸⁰ Norman Stone. *World War One: A Short History* (London and New York: Penguin, 2007), 153-5.

⁸¹ Akira Iriye. *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Volume III: The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 215-6

In this study, it is argued that Wilson was more than a realist or a simple idealist, the latter of which is generally attributed to him. It is advocated that Wilson carried the features of both of them as he realistically articulated policies, yet he assigned idealistic objectives to them, to such extent that they were perceived impossible to be achieved. Furthermore, Wilson was not alone in this matter as it is seen when Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft's arguments and efforts on the policy-making at peace and war are taken into consideration.

As E. H. Carr stated, both idealism – "utopianism" in Carr's lexicon – and realism were the products of the differences in the nature of free will and determination, the former focuses on "creative spontaneity" while the latter focuses on "causality". Carr also emphasized the necessity of balance between these two forces with these words:

The complete realist, unconditionally accepting the causal sequence of events, deprives himself of the possibility of changing reality. The complete utopian, by rejecting the causal sequence, deprives himself of the possibility of understanding either the reality which he is seeking to change or the processes by which it can be changed. The characteristic of the utopian is naivety; of the realist, sterility.⁸²

In Carr's equation, Wilson was neither a suffering from the sterility of the realists, in Carr's wording, nor a naïve utopian to launch a futile crusade in pursuit of his ideals; instead, he acted rationally both when he was articulating policies and pursuing his objectives. It is true that he was an idealist in defining his objectives, yet he was also a realist in the articulation and implementation of his policies. In fact, his characteristics were a part of the new trend of his era's policy-making process, the Progressive Internationalism.

⁸² E. H. Carr. *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981), 11.

In order to cast light on how Wilsonian realism and idealism – the combination of which made Wilson deserve the title of a strategist of “higher realism” – Arthur S. Link defines a realist as someone who “faces life and its situations without illusions, in short, one who can see realities or truth through the fog of delusion that normally shrouds the earthbound individual” and he adds “if *they* were realists, then President Wilson was a realist of a different sort.” Thereupon, he gives this sort a name, “higher realism”, by defining it as “higher because more perceptive, more in accord with ultimate reality, more likely to win the long-run moral approval of societies professing allegiance to the common Western, humane, Christian traditions.”⁸³

Hence, Wilson did not only perceive the things as they were, like a proper realist, but he added to them moral goals.⁸⁴ What Link diagnosed was the characteristic of a Progressive politician, who paid attention to material affairs and pursued a rational explanation-understanding what was going on around him, yet he was also the one who yearned for moral and ethical purposes, which were mainly remarked with a Christian discourse, in his actions and decisions. Wilson was neither alone in this approach, nor he was a simple-minded individual in the dialectic between realism and utopianism; he was both of them and was much greater than being packed into simplified definitions as any human being and as one of the leaders of the Progressive Era.

⁸³ Arthur S. Link. “The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson,” *The Journal of Presbyterian History*, Vol. 76, No. 2 (1998): 153. Emphasis belongs to the cited source.

⁸⁴ See Patricia O’Toole’s recent study on Wilson’s moralism in *The Moralist: Woodrow Wilson and the World He Made* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018).

2.1. Whigs and Priests

Thomas Woodrow Wilson was born to Joseph Ruggles and Jessie Woodrow Wilson in on December 28, 1856 in Staunton, Virginia. His mother's family was known with scholars and Presbyterian ministers among its members, and his father was a Scotch-Irish Presbyterian minister.⁸⁵ Wilson's paternal grandfather was a Whig, which referred a group of politicians who were bothered by the inequality and deficiencies in the constitution and who advocated that the solution would lie in reforming the United States in the model of a modern and industrial democracy, based on wage-labor and equal treatment of citizens before authorities.⁸⁶ It should be also noted that the Whig Party accommodated the Northern Whigs, who refused slavery on moral grounds and conflicted with the Southern Whigs within the party, so the reformist spirit of the Republican Party originated from the turmoil inside the Whig Party, mainly.

Together with the political aspect of his background, his family also possessed Presbyterian idealism, feeding into Whig non-partisanship and devotion for the public good. Henceforth, the mixture of the Christian messianic zeal with the scholarly approach to worldly affairs was in the blood of the President. Young Thomas was a child with ambitious ideals even when he was at his sixteen. Wilson was depicted by showing the portrait of British Prime Minister William E. Gladstone to his cousin and identifying him as his role model and adding that one day he "intends to be a statesman, too."⁸⁷ Not many

⁸⁵ Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George. *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (New York: The John Day Company, 1956), 3-4. Also, see Arthur S. Link. *Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography* (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1963), 16-18.

⁸⁶ David Steigerwald. *Wilsonian Idealism in America* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994), 19.

⁸⁷ Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, 3.

children in the Old South were inspired by the leader of British Liberals, let alone seeing him as a model for his future.

Probably, he was not aware at this age, but this occasion reveals that Wilson was not only a dreaming young man but like his generation, he was adapting to the new industrial society, which was becoming technocratic at a rapid pace.⁸⁸ These were the years when the children of the rural middle-class – of reverends, doctors, teachers, lawyers etc. – were encouraged to follow academic careers and excel in this course in order to meet the increasing need for skilled workers and experts in the thriving cities of the late nineteenth-century United States. The visionary ones among them in the old rural America had already understood that the new era was to be an urbanized one and it had its own rules; thus they were preparing their children accordingly.

Particularly in Wilson's story, this brand-new world taught him that old religious traditions and piety could not provide an answer to the questions of the urban society – otherwise, William Jennings Bryan could be thriving with his rhetoric of Christian-Progressivism – so one had to be appealing to rational and realist thoughts as much. This setting was shaping a new type of statesman, who was as much a realist as a college educated expert and as much an idealist as a missionary, who desired to shape the world to make the people gather around the "Common Good".

This social environment shaped how Wilson interpreted the world for the rest of his life. David Steigerwald states that every work about Wilson's life must refer to these social changes and his life to understanding what shaped and created his ideas.⁸⁹ These

⁸⁸ Steigerwald, 18.

⁸⁹ Steigerwald: 20.

details do not lead to a narration of Wilson that portrays him as though he had been isolated from his generation; instead, his lifetime experiences as a child of a politically concerned religious family provided the personal background for his own rhetoric, which was displayed before the entire nation especially during the Elections of 1912, when he confronted "the old lion".

2.2. On the Pinnacle of Progressive Politics

In 1910, two years before the secession of the National Progressive Party from the Republican Party and the elections of 1912, Theodore Roosevelt declared the refinements in his "Square Deal" by naming it "New Nationalism"; more or less reflecting all of the characteristics of the Progressive Era. He exclaimed in his own fiery style "property shall be the servant and not the master of the commonwealth". Moreover, he discussed how the private interests must be banned from funding politicians and parties in order to keep their influence limited on politics. He came up with new proposals, as well, varying greatly from preventing tariffs from becoming a political issue that could be exploited by the big enterprises, to levying an income tax on these gigantic corporations in proportion to their sizes, to providing a stronger monetary policy, and to ensuring the use of natural resources for the public good rather than monopolistic interests. Above all of these ambitious objectives, he underlined the importance of public control over private interests and the role of the Federal Bureau of Corporations, in this regard.⁹⁰ Therefore, Roosevelt realigned the two pillars of the Progressive Politics in his new doctrine: anti-monopolism and social efficiency.

⁹⁰ Theodore Roosevelt. *An Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Wayne Andrews (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 329-33.

However, the third pillar was coming, when La Follette, the champion of the Republican Progressives for the coming election, was defeated in the Republican Convention. By leaving the Republican Party, by accusing it of becoming a party of interest, Theodore Roosevelt found the opportunity to turn his new agenda into a campaign program for the election under a new party, the Progressive Party.

On March 20, 1912, at Carnegie Hall, New York, he warned his audience by referring to the events before the French Revolution and claimed that the feudal lords' rejection of Turgot's proposals gave an opportunity for the birth of Robespierre's Reign of Terror. After this, he simplified and glorified the objective of his party by saying: "Friends, our task as Americans is to strive for social and industrial justice, achieved through the genuine rule of the people. . . We stand against all tyranny, by the few or by the many."⁹¹

Finally, three months later and at Carnegie Hall again, he granted a religious and national meaning to this task with these words: "I wish you to realize deep in your hearts that you are not merely facing a crisis in the history of a party. You are facing a crisis in the history of a nation. . ." Hence, the crisis of the Republican Progressives became a national crisis for Roosevelt and his followers, and he ended this speech with this statement: "We fight in honorable fashion for the good of mankind; fearless of the future; unheeding of our individual fates; with unflinching hearts and undimmed eyes; we stand at Armageddon, and we battle for the Lord."⁹² Therefore, the third one, social bonds came with a Christian zeal and universalization of the party objectives to the entire nation.

⁹¹ Roosevelt, 338.

⁹² Roosevelt, 337-45.

However, when the Democratic Convention chose its own candidate, Roosevelt did not face with either Robespierre or Bryan, or Clark of the bosses, but Woodrow Wilson, a Progressive scholar. The Presidential Campaigns of 1912 became a clash between two intellectually developed Progressive politicians. Wilson accepted his nomination with a speech on August 7, 1912, at Sea Girt, New Jersey. Being well-aware of the defeats of the Democratic Party for many years before, Wilson claimed that he was addressing not to "partisans" but "an awakened nation", which was "awakened to a sense of neglected ideals and neglected duties" and to the fact that inequality between the privileged few and the masses reached a non-negligible point.⁹³ Like Roosevelt, Wilson also covered a variety of issues, which he organized under two groups and summarized as such:

There are two great things to do. One is to set up the rule of justice and of right in such matters as the tariff, the regulation of the trusts, and the prevention of monopoly, the adaptation of our banking and currency laws to the various uses to which our people must put them, the treatment of those who do the daily labor in our factories and mines and throughout all our great industrial and commercial undertakings, and the political life of the people of the Philippines, for whom we hold governmental power in trust, for their service not our own. The other, the additional duty, is the great task of protecting our people and our resources and of keeping open to the whole people the doors of opportunity through which they must, generation by generation, pass if they are to make conquest of their fortunes in health, in freedom, in peace and in contentment.⁹⁴

Woodrow Wilson, hence, discussed almost the same issues that Roosevelt referred to at his speech at Carnegie Hall; however, there were important differences between them. First of all, Wilson did not share Roosevelt's masculine and aggressive tone and style in leadership; on the contrary, he spoke in a scholarly, almost clerical manner. Secondly,

⁹³ Woodrow Wilson. "Speech of Acceptance," *A Crossroads of Freedom: The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Woodrow Wilson* ed. John Wells Davidson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), 18.

⁹⁴ Wilson, 20.

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⁹³ Woodrow Wilson. "Speech of Acceptance," *A Crossroads of Freedom: The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Woodrow Wilson* ed. John Wells Davidson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), 18.

⁹⁴ Wilson, 20.

Wilson was quite skeptical about the overarching, paternalistic central authority of Roosevelt's ideals; instead he advocated a more democratic society, in which individuals possessed the necessary common sense to protect and respect others' interests, while being led by a wise and strong leader, elected by the majority of these ideal individual citizens.⁹⁵ At this point, it should be remembered that Wilson was a Virginian, even if he became pro-Union and praised the United States as a nation. Roosevelt's ideal of an extremely strong central government was, nevertheless, unacceptable for him, although he also advocated state intervention in business. Due to these views, Wilson gained a furious response from Roosevelt.⁹⁶ Consequently, these debates gained a characteristic as being between a Virginian Progressive and a New Yorker Progressive; Wilson and Roosevelt took on the thrones of Jefferson and Hamilton in the eternal subject of debate of the American politics.

Nevertheless, one of Wilson's subjects, which did not concern Roosevelt as much as the legislation on trusts and tariffs – and it is very likely that it did not concern Wilson as much, either – was his statements about the Philippines. In the midst of the rumble of arguments on trust-busting and social cohesion, Wilson remarked, in the very same speech:

We are not the owners of the Philippine Islands. We hold them in trust for the people who live in them. . . It is our duty, as trustees, to make whatever arrangement of government will be most serviceable to their freedom and development. Here again, we are to set up the rule of justice and of right.⁹⁷

Here were the ideas of self-determination, no annexation, and even the guardianship system buried. The rest of this part of his speech was embellished with the expressions such as

⁹⁵ John Milton Cooper, Jr. *The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow and Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1983), 173-4.

⁹⁶ Roosevelt, 345-8.

⁹⁷ Wilson, 31-2.

"universal partnership", "purity of politics and its aim and spirit", "the great tasks of protection and conservation and development", meaning the Christian-Progressive zeal to remodel the world. The affairs between the United States and the Philippines were not a relation between the conqueror and the conquered, and Wilson interpreted it as a means to provide the development of and cooperation with the Philippines. Moreover, for him, the motive behind this attitude was his perception of politics in terms of purity and ethics; this was where Wilson's Presbyterian background came to light.

Nonetheless it is important to emphasize that Wilson did not diverge from the Progressive politics as much as he seemed to at first glance, and if Roosevelt is taken into account, like Freidenberg did, as a ruthless realist, who talked with "the rhetoric of militant decency" and modeled himself as a masculine figure, carrying a "Big Stick" around as the sheriff in the town, and if his emphasis on the importance of national power, based on the material strength of the country, and his supportive attitude toward the role of military interventions, seen in his policy on the Panama Canal,⁹⁸ are taken into account, alone, it can lead one to the great fallacy of defining Roosevelt as a single-minded autocrat.

In fact, Roosevelt was also well aware of the fact that the United States could not afford to fluctuate between pacifist and expansionist policies, and it needed to justify its actions in moral terms while standing firm and moving decisively. In this regard, J. Lee Thompson underlines the parallel between Roosevelt's statements in his "Nobel Address of 1910" and Wilson's later-Fourteen Points.⁹⁹ It cannot be known by us whether he lost

⁹⁸ Robert V. Friedenberg. *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rhetoric of Militant Decency* (New York, Westport, Connecticut, and London: Greenwood Press, 1990), 19-20.

⁹⁹ J. Lee Thompson. *Theodore Roosevelt Abroad: Nature, Empire, and the Journey of an American President* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 174-5. Also see John Milton Cooper, Jr. *The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow and Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1983), 280.

himself in the magic of the moment when he was addressing an audience of over two thousand people at the National Theatre in Oslo, but Roosevelt really uttered these words:

Our words must be judged by our deeds; and in striving for a lofty ideal we must use practical methods; and if we cannot attain all at one leap, we must advance towards it step by step, reasonably content so long as we do actually make some progress in the right direction.¹⁰⁰

Therefore, Theodore Roosevelt granted a new aspect to his discourse by supporting realist policies, as striving for high ideals, which can be named as Roosevelt's interpretation of "high-realism". However, he did not cease his oration with the aforementioned words on "striving for a lofty ideal" together with a realist approach, and he also called for arbitration treaties between "civilized nations" – of course, in his imperialist style he noted that such treaties could not be signed with "backward" states until "some kind of international police action" is established and he also left an open door to apocalypse by saying these agreements can provide peace "aside from the very rare cases where the nation's honor is vitally concerned".

Roosevelt, however, included two more points into his speech. In the second point, he reminded his audience about the developments at the Hague Conferences by associating its first session with a sublime task of "framing a Magna Carta for the nations". Then, he remarked his expectation of the foundation of a Court of Arbitral Justice to serve between nations. Furthermore, he pointed out the American Constitution and Federal Courts as good examples for what such a document should achieve.

¹⁰⁰ Theodore Roosevelt. "International Peace," *Nobel Lectures* ed. Frederick W. Haberman (Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1972). This speech was accessed at nobelprize.org.

Finally, but probably the most importantly, he remarked that it could be a "masterstroke. . . if those great powers honestly bent on peace would form a League of Peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent [the war], by force if necessary." After saying this, he defined the objective of such an organization by saying that there was a need for an international enforcement body to protect peace and order. Thus, in contrast to what Arno Mayer argued, the roots of the policy that Wilson pursued after the neutrality period of the United States in the Great War were in the essence of the Progressive politics of his country, not somewhere else, and obviously, J. Lee Thompson was right that the fundamental ideas behind the League of Nations and Collective Security of Wilson were shared by Roosevelt, too.

Nonetheless, it should not be taken for granted that Roosevelt had become a dove by receiving the Nobel Prize as the Commander of the Rough Riders. After accepting the price, he found it necessary to remind Carl Schurz that the military power of a nation was the strongest insurance of its safety and keeping peace cost "a greater number of lives . . . than in any European war since the days of Napoleon." Therefore, he remarked "until people get it firmly fixed in their minds that peace is valuable chiefly as a means to righteousness, and that it can only be considered as an end when it also coincides with righteousness, we can do only a limited amount to advance its coming on this earth. . ."¹⁰¹ Roosevelt's pessimistic interpretation of the current situation of the world in its progress to international peace and his emphasis on the necessity of military preparedness were the

¹⁰¹ Theodore Roosevelt. *An Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Wayne Andrews (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 296-7.

major aspects of his discourse, which were going provide the background for his criticism of Wilson's policies during the years of the Great War.

Furthermore, the realization of this parallel between Wilson and Roosevelt's foreign policies reveals what can be missed by identifying one of these two men as an absolute idealist and the other as an absolute realist. In contrast to this monochromatic interpretation, they had more in common, and they possessed some of the features of both ideologies. John Milton Cooper, Jr. addresses the "ironic" parallels between the foreign policy conducts of "the Warrior and the Priest", rather than the superficially contrasting aspects, until what happened in Mexico, where Wilson learned the limitations of the military power without moral justification, in a difficult way.¹⁰²

However, before concluding this part of the study, it is the fact that in 1912 both Wilson and Roosevelt were primarily concerned with domestic issues, and even in his famous speech, "Conquest of a New Freedom" on October 3, in Indianapolis, Wilson underlined that "there will be no greater burden in our generation than to organize the forces of liberty in our time, in order to make conquest of a new freedom for America",¹⁰³ so by this means, it was approved that the main focus of these debates was domestic politics. Therefore, when Woodrow Wilson became the 28th President of the United States on March 4, 1913, his motivation, which fueled his wishes, was "to create a Renaissance in America - political, artistic and social"¹⁰⁴ with the promise of "restoration" in the United States.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Cooper, 266-8.

¹⁰³ Wilson, 325.

¹⁰⁴ Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, 133.

¹⁰⁵ Woodrow Wilson: "Inaugural Address, March 4, 1913," *The American Presidency Project*, accessed May 14, 2018, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25831>.

Therefore, the Philippines was also considered a domestic problem by Wilson, rather than an international issue, and he was articulating his ideas with the luxury of a man who was not expected and obligated to implement them in a successful manner to protect the interests of his country or the international system. His trial by fire was not to come from the Philippines, but somewhere else, closer to home.

2.3. The Lessons of the Priest

At the time when Woodrow Wilson began to his first term at the office, the United States' southern neighbor Mexico was in the grasp of a civil war for years, which broke out after the decades of resistance to Porfirio Diaz, who ruled the country as a dictator from 1876 until 1911. After the resistance forces brought Francisco Madero to power in 1911, he could not meet his promises to transform the country into a constitutional democracy and began to lose his former supporters, whereas his feeble efforts were already enough to provoke the conservatives, so he began to lose the popular support totally and found himself between a rock and a hard place.

In February 1913, Victoriano Huerta, an officer who served under Diaz but then pledged his loyalty to Madero when he came to power, was called to suppress the revolt in Mexico City, which was led by Felix Diaz, dictator Porfirio Diaz's nephew who had escaped from the prison shortly before the revolt. However, Huerta turned this incident into a *coup d'état* and ordered Madero's assassination together with the vice-president of the country; this was the end of the incidents, named *Ten Tragic Days*, today.

Disregarding the United States Government's clear orders to its mission in Mexico to keep the government and American citizens out of the chaos, Henry Lane Wilson, the US Ambassador to Mexico at that time, claimed that the interests of the US were under

threat and got involved in these incidents. As he tried to deceive Madero into resigning by the fear of an American intervention, he also declared his open support to Diaz, who claimed to be Pro-American in those days, and turned the US into one of the parties of the domestic conflict of Mexico.¹⁰⁶

Despite having signed an armistice at the US Embassy, Huerta changed his mind and did not hold elections shortly later. With his clumsiness, the Ambassador of the US to Mexico, thus, participated in the creation of a totally anti-democratic military junta. In face of this unexpected result, the Taft administration postponed recognizing Huerta's junta as the legitimate government of Mexico in order to use it as a leverage to conclude the border disputes between the US and Mexico around the Rio Grande, by the time when Taft's term in the office ended.¹⁰⁷ Eventually, when Wilson became the President in March 1913, he inherited a southern border, which was in a completely chaotic situation.

Wilson, initially, considered granting recognition to Mexico, believing that the constitutional regime could be restored with the elections that Huerta had promised.¹⁰⁸ However, when Huerta refused to meet the expectations, Wilson declared his position as "watchful waiting" in an address to the Congress on August 27.¹⁰⁹

Therefore, it can be seen that Wilson prioritized democratic and moral values over self-interests.¹¹⁰ He could support granting recognition to Huerta and benefit from the

¹⁰⁶ Cole Blasier. "The United States and Madero," *The Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1972): 209-22.

¹⁰⁷ Paul V. N. Henderson. "Woodrow Wilson, Victoriano Huerta, and the Recognition Issue in Mexico," *The Americas* Vol. 41, No. 2 (1984): 162-3.

¹⁰⁸ Henderson, 166-8.

¹⁰⁹ Henderson, 173.

¹¹⁰ Kendrick A. Clements. "Woodrow Wilson's Mexican Policy, 1913-15," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1980): 115.

amicable attitude that he showed to Great Britain, which recognized his government, despite the objection of the US. Consequently, Britain revoked it after the protests of the Wilson administration. Wilson's attitude toward Huerta also represented what he expected from a nation-state. He expected it to have a constitutional government, elected by the people, and to meet its responsibilities in the international sphere, such as cooperating with its neighbors and participating in free-trade, while not getting degraded to colonial status.¹¹¹

For the sake of these ideals, he considered intervening in Mexico, even as early as 1913, whereas he tended to support the Constitutionalist forces, providing that they were committed to the reconstruction of democracy in Mexico.¹¹² Wilson seemed to be the victim of his idealism, and his oscillation between intervention and non-intervention was interpreted to be the sign of his confusion by Cooper.¹¹³ Hence, his "watchful waiting" was actually a kind of paralysis of a giant in confusion.

Nevertheless, on April 9, 1914, when American sailors got arrested in Tampico, Wilson decided that the time had come to make a decision between intervention and support. Although the arrested citizens of the US got released with apologies directly from Huerta himself, Admiral Henry T. Mayo demanded the Mexican army to give an official salutation to the United States flag, which got rejected by Huerta.

¹¹¹ See Lloyd E. Ambrosius. "Woodrow Wilson and the Culture of Wilsonianism," *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 27-8. Ambrosius successfully draws a parallel between Wilson's interpretation of the historical development of democracy and nationhood in the United States and his interpretation of the norms that are necessary to constitute a nation-state.

¹¹² Clements, 117-21.

¹¹³ Cooper, 268.

On April 20, 1914, Wilson addressed Congress to get the permission for intervention, although he was warned not to do that by both his own Secretary of State Bryan and the Mexican rebel, Carranza.¹¹⁴ His justification for demanding this permission was that Mexico was under the rule of a military junta, which was unconstitutional and was preventing its citizens from participating in the government of their own country. Furthermore, he defined the objective of the United States in a possible conflict as "to restore to the people of the distracted Republic the opportunity to set up again their own laws and their own government."¹¹⁵

Actually, Wilson seemed to have become the victim of his biases toward other races and younger nation-states just like Mexico.¹¹⁶ In the last part of his speech, he added a second, but certainly not secondary, objective by saying that "I, therefore, come to ask your approval . . . to obtain from General Huerta and his adherents . . . the full recognition of the rights of dignity of the United States. . ." Henceforth, Wilson decreed that what was not recognized in these series of events was the rights of the United States, not the legitimacy of Huerta's government.

This speech, which was the milestone before American Navy's assault on Veracruz and the conflict between Mexican and American forces, caused casualties on both sides, displayed Wilson's approach to other nations and specifically revolutions and civil wars, which would become important again when he faced the Russian Revolution of 1917. Nevertheless, it is not a coincidence that Wilson felt an urge to make this demand from the

¹¹⁴ Clements, 124.

¹¹⁵ Woodrow Wilson. "On the 'Flag Incident' in Mexico," *Speeches of Woodrow Wilson: Notable Public Addresses and Messages to Congress by the President* (New York: Brooklyn Daily Page, 1915), 17.

¹¹⁶ Ambrosius, 21-5.

Congress after the crew of a civilian trade boat experienced the violation of their rights in a foreign harbor. For Wilson, this was not only harmful to the prestige of the United States, yet it was also an attack to the ideal of free-trade.

In terms of his views about revolutions, he considered them legitimate only if they were pursued in order to establish constitutional democracies against foreign imperialist powers or domestic tyrants like Huerta. When it came to the role of the United States in this picture, he saw it as an insurance for weaker nations to protect their democratic governments against domestic and foreign threats until they could gain their independence. This attitude was developed by the Progressive presidents from the Monroe Doctrine, to conserve order and security in the regions where the American interests lie since the scope of the United States' area of influence was much wider than how it had been in Monroe's era and the world had changed a lot by then.

As discussed above Roosevelt supported the utilization of military power in order to support the diplomatic aims of the country and defined himself as preaching peace while carrying a sword. Taft acknowledged the importance of diplomacy and introduced the idea of using economic sanctions as an option before resorting to military methods.¹¹⁷ He also supported the necessity for the foundation of international institutions to protect stability and safety in the continent.¹¹⁸ In addition to these, Wilson introduced the importance of ideological coherence between the United States and its counterparts by advocating that constitutional democracies were less likely to fall into war against their democratic neighbors. This was the primary reason behind Wilson's concerns about Mexico and the

¹¹⁷ David H. Burton, *Taft Wilson and World Order* (London: Associated University Presses, 2003), 43.

¹¹⁸ Burton, 61-2.

motive of his foreign policy in that country. A revolution, which led to the reign of an autocrat like Huerta, was the least desired possibility.

As though it were meant to confirm Wilson's concerns, just a day after Wilson's address to the Congress, a German merchant vessel was found to be carrying weapons to a dock in Veracruz. The weapons were going to Huerta. Wilson gave the order to occupy the port, which led to the death of 126 Mexicans and 19 Americans. What made the things worse was that even the rebels like Carranza criticized this action of the United States and this almost created a common ground for the rebels and Huerta to reconcile against the US.¹¹⁹

At the final episode of Wilson's policy in Mexico, on May 11, 1914, he addressed at the Brooklyn Navy Yard to commemorate those who lost their lives in Veracruz. He assigned idealism to war, in his own rhetoric:

... the friends and relatives of these lads shall mourn them, though with a touch of pride. . . We have gone down to Mexico to serve mankind if we can find out the way. We do not want to fight the Mexicans. We want to serve the Mexicans if we can, because we know how we would like to be free, and how we would like to be served if there were friends standing by in such case ready to serve us. A war of aggression is not a war in which it is a proud thing to die, but a war of service is a thing in which it is a proud thing to die.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Clements, 123-4. Also see John Milton Cooper, Jr. *The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow and Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1983), 268-9. Cooper argues this failure was the reason behind Wilson's insistence on non-intervention and his statement of "being too proud to fight" in the first years of the Great War. He also claims that the reaction of both rebels and Huerta shaped Wilson's policy against the Bolsheviks in 1917.

¹²⁰ Woodrow Wilson. "Services in Memory of those who Lost Their Lives at Veracruz, Mexico," *Speeches of Woodrow Wilson: Notable Public Addresses and Messages to Congress by the President* (New York: Brooklyn Daily Page, 1915), 18.

Therefore, Wilson turned this incident into a rhetoric of just war, given to "serve mankind" by liberating it, and even aggression became something to be proud about if it is "a war of service"; it seemed like Wilson inherited Roosevelt's skill in manipulating events through idealism, along with his "Big Stick". However, Wilson was not aware of the fact that the greatest war of the history of mankind was on its way, and he had just happened to make his own definition of war.

The Mexican Revolution, nevertheless, was the first event where Wilson had to face the limits of the use of the military power, and what followed this should not be read as Wilson simply accepted his defeat. It is true that he avoided further involvement in Mexico either by sending soldiers or supporting the activities of any of the sides, although it was getting more and more difficult in 1915 and impossible in 1916.¹²¹ He had learned the importance of respecting the principle of self-determination, especially when a country's people, even if they were openly fighting with one another, had some sort of negative consensus on any foreign intervention.

Regarding the developments, following the one in Veracruz, it is seen Wilson duly respected the principle as long as he could. According to Cooper, Wilson learned his lesson not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries without extreme caution and good planning.¹²² This was the lesson which created the Wilson that Arno Mayer found as he was closely watching domestic policies of the belligerent forces during the Great War before becoming a part of the conflict. Besides, Wilson the Idealist was learning how to be more realistic in foreign affairs, this was the birth of the Wilson that Arthur Link observed.

¹²¹ Clements, 125-33.

¹²² Cooper, 269.

Above all, even though the Mexican Revolution provided a stage to demonstrate Wilson's ideals – ranging from his conceptualization of an ideal nation-state to the importance of constitutional government and democracy, to the role of the United States in foreign affairs and interventions, the focus of Washington was about to be diverted to another continent, when someone shoots an archduke and heir to the throne in the cause of another revolution, on June 28, 1914.

2.4. Before Intervention 1914-1917

*[Earth] become at once too big a world and too little a world to submit destinies to the hostile rivalries and ambitions now of this and again of that member of the great family of men. . . . An inevitable partnership of interests has been thrust upon the nations. They are neighbors and must accommodate their interests to one another.*¹²³

Woodrow Wilson

The period between June 1914 and April 1917 has to be studied closely in order to comprehend the development of the US foreign policy during the Great War. This part of the study focuses on four points in order to establish a bridge to Chapter IV, alongside with bringing Chapter II to a conclusion, in which Woodrow Wilson's statements and policies before the entry of the United States to the First World War are discussed in order to examine the development of the US foreign policy before intervention under his administration.

These points constitute the details of Wilson's understanding of the ideal role of the US in the world and of the necessary reaction to crises, such as the Great War. The first one is that Wilson had never been ignorant of the situation nor supported his country's

¹²³ Original quotation belongs to David Steigerwald. *Wilsonian Idealism in America* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994), 35.

involvement in this war, until he was left without any other choice. On the contrary, he gathered as much data as he could and analyzed them like a scholar to find if there was any other option rather than involvement.

The second point is that Wilson was not a simple dreamer, and especially in terms of the League of Nations, he was not the first one who brought up the issue especially in this period of time. Former presidents Roosevelt and Taft also shared his opinion as well as other public figures that are mentioned in this study. Therefore, the League of Nations was not the outcome of a naïve utopian's efforts, but the American response to the changes in the international affairs taking place before the dawn of the New World Order.

In relation to this second point, the third one is that Wilson was not romanticizing without any grounds; instead, he was ordering his officers to analyze and observe European politics, especially the belligerent parties. For this purpose, he assigned his officers like Colonel House, Herbert Hoover, Elihu Root and William Jennings Bryan to keep an eye on what was going on in Europe. They tried to grant Wilson the information that he needed to understand the current situation, the belligerent powers and their leaders. While some of them, such as Hoover and House, were successful in portraying what the US faced to the President, it is seen in this Chapter and Chapter IV that others could not be as much successful; for instance, Elihu Root could not provide a comprehensive portrait of Russia after the revolution.

As the fourth and the last point, Wilson's radical breakthrough was not something unexpected, if the features that he possessed as a Progressive himself, as well as his former statements and interpretations about the Philippines and Mexico are taken into consideration. Furthermore, this final point ironically brought Wilson to such a position

that he found himself fighting for almost the same cause as Lenin for completely different reasons.

Starting with the first point, it is well known that neutrality came with a cost for the United States. As Kendrick A. Clements states, the North American economy, which was already under tension, began to give an alarm, in 1915, when Germans launched a U-boat campaign in the Atlantic. Clements tells how US diplomat and Wilson's counselor Colonel Edward M. House even complained about Wilson's neglect of the conflict in Europe and said that he did not seem to understand the gravity of the situation.¹²⁴

In fact, Wilson had responded to the bad news from Europe, immediately. Through a press release, on August 4, 1914, Wilson declared to the European leaders that the United States would "welcome an opportunity to act in the interest of European peace".¹²⁵ In those days, he was aware of the potential political and economic consequences of the war, and relevantly, he remarked to a delegation of businessmen that "we shall remember that America knew how to handle herself in such a way as not to help herself, but also to serve the rest of the world."¹²⁶ Therefore, the first task that Wilson undertook was to define the stance of the United States inside the country before the early incidents of the Great War.

Meanwhile, in the domestic politics, even before the German submarine campaign of 1915 started, Wilson was repeating his call to businessmen in order not to let them forget about their responsibilities to the society, with the perspective of a Progressive, but this

¹²⁴ Kendrick A. Clements. *Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999), 152.

¹²⁵ Woodrow Wilson. "Press release about a message to the European leaders on August 4, 1914," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed May 12, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/WILS-01-30-02-0359>.

¹²⁶ Woodrow Wilson. "Remarks at the White House to a delegation of businessmen," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed May 12, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/WILS-01-30-02-0411>.

time he increased the borders of his rhetoric, literally. He was preparing business for the worst-case scenario. Despite his optimistic tone in his reply to Senator William Joel Stone, a member of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee, a day before his remarks to the delegation of the businessmen, in which he stated his prediction for the peace treaties to be discussed in a short time,¹²⁷ and he asked his opinion on the Senate's attitude toward ratification of such treaties, Wilson did not share his optimism with everyone; instead, he followed a realistic approach in his affairs with the navy and business.

Almost a couple of weeks later, on August 18, 1914, Wilson addressed his countrymen by reflecting this discrete attitude, hidden under his moralism. He warned the citizens to be prudent and to conserve their neutral stance before what was happening in Europe. Wilson also added that America was "a nation. . . which keeps herself fit and free to do what is necessary and disinterested and truly serviceable for the world."¹²⁸ Henceforth, Wilson counseled the same both to the bosses and the citizens to stay out of the conflict in Europe so as to conserve their moral stance and to be ready to serve mankind. In these words, Wilson did not only define the war as a phenomenon which stains morality of the people, but he also articulated his own policy, even if he had not come up with a well-structured doctrine, yet. Even though he was displaying an optimist attitude, he was enacting his policy of staying as a neutral country, on the basis of moral values, without

¹²⁷ Woodrow Wilson. "Letter to Senator William Joel Stone on August 13, 1914," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed May 12, 2018. <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/WILS-01-30-02-0409>.

¹²⁸ Woodrow Wilson. "An Appeal to the American People for Neutrality on August 18, 1914," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed May 12, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/WILS-01-30-02-0427>.

underestimating the scope of the war's potential consequences, unless the peace could be restored, immediately.

In this matter, he was flirting with unconventional methods to keep the people out of the harm's way by using the legislative means. He and Bryan agreed on a policy to prevent the United States banks from providing credits to the belligerent forces, especially Germany, as it could damage the neutrality of the country, while they were also trying to avoid an economic crisis with these precautions. These measures also included Bryan's note to Britain to respect the Declaration of London, consigned in 1909 to recognize the rights of the neutral countries in terms of a wide-scale conflict, but when it turns into a matter of controversy as the British did not want to give any concessions, the Wilson administration decided to respect Britain's decision to not respect the Declaration. Wilson and Bryan did not repeat the mistakes of Jefferson and Madison in the Napoleonic Wars.¹²⁹

In terms of diplomatic affairs, Wilson was aware of the United States' limits as a world power. On September 16, 1914, he remarked to the Belgian Commissioners, appealed to the Wilson administration on the matters concerning German aggression and Belgium's position:

. . .it would be unwise, it would be premature, for a single government, however fortunately separated from the present struggle, it would even be inconsistent with the neutral position of any nation which like this has no part in the contest, to form or express a final judgment.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Clements, 152-5.

¹³⁰ Woodrow Wilson. "Remarks to the Belgian Commissioners on September 16, 1914," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed May 12, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/WILS-01-31-02-0042>.

As Belgium was invaded by Germany on August 5, 1914, and from that point on, it became a party of the given conflict, it is obvious that the country of "the neutral position" was the United States, and Wilson clearly stated how he was aware of the limitations that his country had in terms of imposing an armistice, much less a peace treaty, on the belligerent forces, at that time. Furthermore, it is arguable that Wilson's optimism in August did not exist anymore in September, as he could not tell the Belgian that he was predicting a peace treaty, soon, like he did to Senator Stone.

However, this awareness did not lead him to reclusion, but instead he started to follow the events in Europe closer than ever, especially after the Invasion of Belgium. Wilson drew a line between Belgium and the United States as the former was a neutral country, whose rights of neutrality were violated, in his point of view. William Jennings Bryan kept informing the President about the feasibility of an American investigation of the events developing in Belgium without trespassing the borders of neutrality, along with his analysis on the international law and the German conduct of warfare.¹³¹ Meanwhile, Colonel House shared with the President his observations of the leaders of the belligerent countries and established connections with some of them like Sir Edward Grey, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Britain. He informed the President about the anger of the British officials before German aggression, together with lots of other remarks, including Kaiser Wilhelm II's despising the high-cost of American military organization, while claiming that the Prussian Army was the most efficient in the world, despite being cheaper to

¹³¹ William Jennings Bryan. "Two Letters from William Jennings Bryan on August 29, 1914," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed June 13, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-30-02-0508%20WILS-print-01-30-02-0509#WILS-01-30-02-0508-fn-0002>.

maintain.¹³² Additionally, Secretary of State Robert Lansing was brainstorming with the US Senators about what to do in case that the Allies did not recognize the neutrality rights of the US.¹³³

Steigerwald argues that Wilson considered the belligerent imperialist European countries similar to business trusts, just like how the latter were seen to disturb democracy and social cohesion in the domestic politics, Wilson perceived the former ones as they did the same thing in the international dimension.¹³⁴ He hoped that the United States government could imitate the role of the arbitrator that he played in the domestic politics, in the international affairs, as well, in order to help the establishment of “the new age” of democracy and order. In other words, Wilson, as a Progressive, was seeking for restoring the social cohesion and bonds between nations under the protection of a stabilizing institutional entity or entities.

However, the year of 1915 witnessed enough grief that could bring darkness over the remaining hope in Wilson’s heart. On February 4, 1915, Germany declared that any neutral vessel around the British Isles was going to be sunk by the submarines.¹³⁵ If Wilson and his countrymen thought nothing could be worse, probably they had never been that much mistaken before. On April 25, 1915, the Washington Post published a compilation

¹³² Edward M. House. “From the Diary of Colonel House,” *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed June 13, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-30-02-0508%20WILS-print-01-30-02-0509#WILS-01-30-02-0508-fn-0002>.

¹³³ Robert Lansing, “From Robert Lansing on August 26, 1916,” *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed June 13, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-38-02-0113%20WILS-print-01-38-02-0115%20WILS-print-01-38-02-0116%20WILS-print-01-38-02-0117%20WILS-print-01-38-02-0118#WILS-01-38-02-pb-0084>.

¹³⁴ Steigerwald, 31.

¹³⁵ Clements, 156.

of news reports from the belligerent countries of Europe, among which it was reported the French war department shared with the public that "Thick yellow smoke emitted from the German trenches and driven by northerly winds produced an effect of complete asphyxiation among our troops, which was felt even in our second line positions."¹³⁶ On April 29, 1915, *The New York Times* reported British official statement, which said "... the Germans again made use of asphyxiating gasses and of shells manufactured in contravention of the Hague Convention."¹³⁷ At the moment, when Wilson was on the edge of losing his last hope on arbitrating for a peace treaty to save mankind and reconstruction of international society's cohesion, Germany was about to perform its greatest attempt in violating the laws of both peace and war – it already required a serious effort to trespass such a vague set of rules as they were set up in the Hague Conferences. For this purpose, a U-Boat torpedoed British liner *Lusitania* on May 7, 1915, which cost 124 American citizens' lives.¹³⁸

Under these circumstances, Wilson's plans had to be remade, accordingly. Walter Hines Page, the US Ambassador to Britain, reported to the President, how British leaders became resolute on the issue that Germany's actions meant "the complete abandonment of war regulations and humanity" and they refused any mediation or participation of the United States in the treaty-making process at the end of the war if it did not declare war against Germany.¹³⁹ Therefore, the new condition for Wilson to pursue his objectives to

¹³⁶ "Battle Bulletins from Firing Lines," *The Washington Post* (Washington D. C.), April 25, 1915.

¹³⁷ "Germans Halted; French Reports," *The New York Times* (New York City, NY), April 29, 1915.

¹³⁸ Arthur S. Link. *Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography* (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1963), 94.

¹³⁹ Walter Hines Page. "From Walter Hines Page to Woodrow Wilson," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed May 12, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/WILS-01-33-02-0107>.

become the leader of the antebellum reconciliation processes was the United States' entry to war. On February 22, 1916, the so-called House-Grey Memorandum also confirmed the possibility of an American involvement in the war, providing that Germany refused an offer for a peace conference.¹⁴⁰ Wilson realized that the circle was tightening around him, and it was becoming more and more difficult to stay as a moralistic neutral force while everyone around him was shooting at each other. Nonetheless, these developments were not enough to intimidate Wilson to become a war leader on their own, especially when the elections were coming in 1916. On May 10, 1915, Wilson remarked his historic statement of "so proud to fight."¹⁴¹

This apparent pacifism, however, was the surface of Wilson's policies before the US' intervention at war. He had two major paths, which could open to new ones. These were how the institutionalist aspect of Progressive policies was introduced to the international affairs during the Great War. For the first one, William Howard Taft, in 1915, grabbed the flag of internationalism, which Roosevelt had declared in his Nobel Lecture Speech in 1910, and he accepted the invitation to join the League to Enforce Peace together with a group of scholars and politicians, on June 17, 1915, at Independence Hall of Philadelphia.¹⁴² One of the Executive Members of this organization, Hamilton Holt, an

¹⁴⁰ Clements, 160.

¹⁴¹ Woodrow Wilson. "An Address in Philadelphia to Newly Naturalized Citizens," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed May 13, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/WILS-01-33-02-0131>.

¹⁴² Hamilton Holt. "The League to Enforce Peace," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1917): 65. In this review, dated July 1917, Hamilton Holt, stated that "It may be that the little group of men who met there on that hot June day started a movement that will eventually lead to the *united nations*, just as their forefathers in the same place started a movement which led to the formation of the United States." The emphasis belongs to my own. Holt also referred to Andrew Carnegie, American businessman, and industrialist, as he was the first one who used the term of "League of Peace" in 1905, and Holt also added other names to Carnegie, such as Richard Bartholdt in 1906, Senor Ordonez at the Second Hague Conference, and Theodore Roosevelt in 1910.

internationalist scholar, journalist, and politician, was going to say, retrospectively in 1917, that "... our best hope is to make the idea of the league universal, not against some other league, but against the common enemy of mankind, which is war."¹⁴³ Holt also summarized how this organization contacted with the foreign governments of England, France, and even Germany.¹⁴⁴

Back in 1916, Taft made a speech, in which he stated the four provisions that they expected the League to provide, and even more interestingly he explained how the name of "League of Nations" was suggested by the British and the people of Oregon, as the former asked to remove "Peace" and the latter "Enforce".¹⁴⁵ By the means of these provisions, this league provided the details for Theodore Roosevelt's proposed organization and made its own contribution. As keeping on detailing and elaborating the ideas on the operations of the league, Taft made two remarks toward the conclusion, one of them was extremely brilliant and the other one was the summary of Wilson's situation in 1916. In the first one, he referred to the Non-Entanglement Doctrine of Washington and said that "... when Washington spoke. . . He was five times as far from Europe as we are to-day, if you can judge by the speed of transportation, and twenty-five times in matter of communication."¹⁴⁶ In the second one, he remarked that neutrality policies brought the United States closer to the war, and he implied that this situation showed them the war was

¹⁴³ Holt, 66.

¹⁴⁴ Holt, 67.

¹⁴⁵ William H. Taft, "The Proposal for a League to Enforce Peace: Affirmative," *Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository*, accessed May 14, 2018, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3939. The points that Taft mentioned in 1916 were also affirmed by Holt in 1917. The first one of them required the establishment of an international Court of Justice; the second one required bringing any disputes between members to a Commission; the third one required the protection of any member against an aggressor one, which violates the rules; the fourth one required the establishment of an International Congress, consisted of the representatives of all member nations. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4944&context=fss_papers.

¹⁴⁶ Taft, 18.

probably inevitable unless they themselves got involved in it and stopped this “disaster to human progress”.¹⁴⁷

In his opposition, there was Theodore Roosevelt and he was quite angry about the administration of the country. He was shouting for preparedness by defining “unwise peace treaties” as the ones, “which cannot be kept”.¹⁴⁸ In this matter, he referred to Germany and Japan’s violations of the neutral states’ rights, and he insisted that the United States had a responsibility to mankind and it had to be “an international police force” to enforce these treaties.¹⁴⁹ He also dictated that military preparedness was a must and it served to two purposes; firstly, it was “a partial insurance against war” – so our bull-moose reinvented the concept of deterrence; and secondly, it protected the nation against “dishonor” and “material loss.”¹⁵⁰ Particularly in terms of preparedness, he was very critical of the Wilson administration and all “ultrapacifists” because of their being “futile and impotent in working for peace” and of their “crime against morality of failing to uphold righteousness”. Finally, he declared in his rhetoric: “‘blessed are the peacemakers,’ not merely the peace lovers.”¹⁵¹

In fact, Wilson followed a third path, higher-realism, by following both of these paths. On December 7, 1915, he suggested founding a regular army of 400,000 soldiers, by disbanding the state militia and National Guard and naming this force “the Continental Army.”¹⁵² Probably being aware of this proposal was going to mean the violation of the

¹⁴⁷ Taft, 20.

¹⁴⁸ Theodore Roosevelt. *America and the World War* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915), 44.

¹⁴⁹ Roosevelt, 59.

¹⁵⁰ Roosevelt, 174.

¹⁵¹ Roosevelt, 244.

¹⁵² Woodrow Wilson. “An Annual Message to the State of the Union,” *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed May 13, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/WILS-01-35-02-0331>.

American traditions of state-rights and his own political attitude toward over-centralization, he remarked in this very same speech "All the governments of America stand, so far as we are concerned, upon a footing of genuine equality and unquestioned independence." However, even his reference to the Virginian Bill of Rights in this speech could not save him from the harsh criticism of "progressives, Socialists, and agrarians" and even "the House Military Affairs Committee" and he gave in, eventually.¹⁵³ Therefore, Wilson was not Roosevelt's man, if he had been looking for someone to blame for unpreparedness. Wilson the Realist tried to follow his path and prepare for the war.

Six months later on May 27, 1916, he attended the First Annual Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace and talked about the "American Principles."¹⁵⁴ In his speech, Wilson stated that the world was going through dire times and "we are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also." He created the echoes of the New Diplomacy with these words: "And the lesson which the shock of being taken by surprise in a matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the world has made poignantly clear is, that the peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy."

Subsequently, Wilson accepted the four points of the League to Enforce Peace and added three more, for him all of these were in concordance with the moral duty of the nations.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, Wilson the Idealist joined his fellow utopians and began to articulate

¹⁵³ Link, 97.

¹⁵⁴ Woodrow Wilson. "Address Delivered at the First Annual Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace: 'American Principles'," *The American Presidency Project*, accessed May 14, 2018, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65391>.

¹⁵⁵ At this point, Wilson introduced the concept of self-determination to the four points of the League, by stating that "We believe these fundamental things: First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. Like other nations, we have ourselves no doubt once and again offended against that principle when for a little while controlled by selfish passion, as our franker historians

their expectations from the postbellum world; this was the second path. Nonetheless, it should be stated that Wilson's idealism was two-edged as he expected both American citizens and other countries' leaders to support the proposal of the United States to restore order and found a new system by the virtue of abandoning their pursuit of imperialist wars; he could not be more wrong.

2.5. Conclusion

This was the story of Wilson before the revolutions of 1917 and 1918 in the world of diplomatic affairs. His faith in Christianity and Democracy gave him his optimism and Progressivism, while his scholarship taught him the importance of rationalism. This is how he approached issues. He categorized them in a moral spectrum, and then he believed he needed to correct the wrong in order to meet the creed of America on Earth.

He saw an evil man in Huerta and desired to save Mexicans from his grasps, even if they did not want it. He was sure of himself as he was sure of doing the work of God and Democracy. He defied the findings of the scholarly methods and the warnings of his officers. This led him to his first defeat in Veracruz. He might have left the battlefield victorious, yet he knew he was beaten as he lost the moral superiority. It happened because this was the moment he refused to merge idealism with rationalism. He did not repeat the same mistake again within the borders of Mexico.

have been honorable enough to admit; but it has become more and more our rule of life and action. Second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon. And, third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations." However, it should be taken into consideration with regard to these points and Wilson's approach to Huerta's junta that the preliminary condition for the nations to claim their right of self-determination is that they should be able to hold democratic elections under the protection of their constitutions.

When the Great War broke out, he did not forget what he had learned. As the rule of the scholarly approach, he first observed and analyzed through the proxy of his officers, and he listened to advices. Although he devoted himself to stay out of this immoral war in Europe, he studied what the United States needed. He prayed for it to end as fast as possible without doing any harm to the United States. He concluded that it was not going to happen, regarding his findings in the first year of the war. Then, he asked what the United States needed and decided it needed preparation in all major fields, including economy and military, as well as a creed to fight for. He also loathed the empires and their *ancien regimes* for threatening the United States and hurting its citizens with their immoral wars. He recognized that the world was on the eve of getting shaken to its foundations with the greatest war that had ever come. The New Era could not afford being led by emperors, aristocrats and chauvinists. This second reasoning was going to bring him to share his objectives with a man, who had a completely different world view than Wilson and fought for the same objectives with completely different purposes and reasons.

CHAPTER III

LENIN BEFORE THE GREAT WAR

Cold War history has been studied and scrutinized deeply for more than fifty years. It was an immensely popular field, not only in academia but also in every aspect of the quotidian life, even at the very first moment after the Iron Curtain speech of Churchill, on March 5th, 1946. When the war escalated, it ironically led Western scholars to get involved in the attempts to understand their rival, they began to study the Soviets and their doctrine, even before the 1960s.

Joining the literature that already existed before the Second World War, such as the analysis of Maurice Dobb and the autobiographical works of Trotsky and others, who witnessed and participated in the events between 1905 and 1917 – and even later, the literature of Cold War studies widened and begun to cover almost one hundred years, from George Kennan's analysis to Adam Ulam's comprehensive study and the Post-Cold War studies of such scholars as Richard Pipes, Robert Service, and Orlando Figes.

In terms of this study's approach, unlike the orthodox interpretation of Cold War – which puts it into a period of almost fifty years between 1946 and 1991 – this study goes back to the roots of the Bolshevik movement, and Lenin as its leader must be understood in a detailed manner; to be able to understand the origins and the unexpected developments in this early phase of the rise of the New World Order and its means of diplomacy.

With this purpose, starting from the 1850s and 1860s of Russia, with the crisis following the Crimean War, until 1917, this study will focus on the attitude of the intellectuals of the first phase of this periodization. In this matter, the works of Chernyshevsky, Dostoyevsky, and Turgenev, along with references to a few other related intellectuals like Dobrolyubov, are discussed with regard to their reaction to their milieu and their ideas on what to do. The importance that these authors possess is granted by their impact on the generation of their readers, including Lenin. Various studies, including the studies of the scholars like Richard Freeborn, Jane Barstow, G. Zekulin and N. G. O. Pereira's works, are discussed in order to merge the different views on the issue.

In this frame, Lenin's early life and thoughts on the Bolshevik movement will be the second phase of the discussion. The characteristics which he acquired from the members of the Russian intelligentsia, including the aforementioned authors, and the turning points of his life as a revolutionary – such as his brother Alexander's execution; his meeting with Plekhanov at the meetings of the Party of Marxist Emancipation of Labor; and the split of the Socialist movement in 1903 – will provide the background for the main study. The major purpose of this examination is to comprehend how Lenin perceived the developments, taking place around him, and how he reacted to them and more importantly what his ideal form of the reaction was; marked with the question "What is to be done?"

Finally, the reflections of the Leninist Bolshevik doctrine on the foreign policy will be studied in the last phase with regard to Lenin's idealistic expectation of revolutions in other European powers and what he thought when the Petrograd Formula of October 1917 was declared, in Chapter IV. At this point, the discussion will focus on how Lenin met

Socialism as a son of a nobleman and what he understood from it. Then, his own thesis for the future of the Socialist movement in Russia will be examined before studying how he perceived and interpreted the international events during the Great War.

3.1. Russia after the Crimean War and Lenin as its Child

Adam B. Ulam remarks in the preface of his work, titled and devoted to *The Bolsheviks*, "the history of the Bolsheviks and of the Russian Revolution has to be focused around the life of one man: Vladimir Ulyanov-Lenin. . . [he] imparted to Bolshevism and communism not only ideology and tactics but also many of his personal characteristics".¹⁵⁶ Figes writes, in this matter, to define the difference between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks: "Lenin's personality was the crucial issue."¹⁵⁷ Hence, to understand the Bolshevik movement, one has to comprehend its leaders – and especially Lenin – and the milieu, which shaped their lives. In this matter, studying the literature of this era can give an idea.

The resolution and will of Lenin and his Bolsheviks, which from time to time resulted in brutal actions like the execution of hundreds of people and a bloody civil war in Russia, cannot be comprehended without understanding their generation's past. In other words, to understand "What is to be done?", according to Lenin, one has to understand "What is to be done?", according to Chernyshevsky.

After the failure of the Socialist movements in France and Germany in the Revolutions of 1848, European Liberalism and the *ancien regime* concluded a pact and set

¹⁵⁶ Adam B. Ulam. *The Bolsheviks: the Intellectual and Political History of the Triumph of Communism in Russia* (New York: Collier Books, 1968), vii.

¹⁵⁷ Orlando Figes. *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924* (London: Pimlico, 1996), 153.

in a so-called golden-era of Liberalism by 1850. It was the peak of *laissez-faire* policies of Europe, and continued until the 1870s, according to Hobsbawm.¹⁵⁸ However, for Russia, this period was much shorter, as Hobsbawm himself also refers to it between the lines. Losing the Crimean War in 1856, Russia had to face its acute problems of poverty and inequality as the new generation of intellectuals like Chernyshevsky began to question Russia's old traditions and institutions, including the Monarchy, itself.¹⁵⁹

Especially, Chernyshevsky was respected to such extent that he was perceived as though he was the deity of the Socialist cause.¹⁶⁰ Nonetheless, his ideas about the future of Russia were not shared by everyone. Other intellectuals like Turgenev and Dostoyevsky depicted their characters in the middle of pessimism and depression, caused by their nihilism. These characters could not make sense of their past as they totally rejected traditions and the origins of their environment and themselves, which led them to be alienated from their present.

In brief, there were two approaches among the intellectuals of this era. The former argued society had to go through reformations in parallel with the developments, occurring around them in many aspects of life with the advancements in technology and economy and this could mean the end of the old traditions, if they were standing on the way of these changes. Nevertheless, the latter argued that these changes meant the domination of materialism in the country's social life, and they were afraid that people could lose their

¹⁵⁸ Eric Hobsbawm. *Age of Capital: 1848-1875* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 88-90

¹⁵⁹ N. G. O. Pereira. "N. G. Chernyshevsky Architect of Anti-Liberalism in Russia," *The Russian Review* 32, no. 3 (1973): 265-9.

¹⁶⁰ Geoffrey Hosking. *Russia: People and Empire 1552-1917* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 347.

ties with the old values, through which they identified themselves and their society. For this reason, they could fall into meaninglessness and depression. However, it should be noted here that the former group of intellectuals, in which Chernyshevsky was included, embraced the loss of old traditions and bindings and considered it to be a necessity to launch the social reformation, starting with the individual itself.

In reference to Turgenev's approach, it should be noted that he was deeply inspired by the thoughts of English scientist and historian H. T. Buckle. To understand this relation, Richard Freeborn refers to these words of Buckle in his article on Turgenev: "the hall of science is the temple of democracy."¹⁶¹ Turgenev was a believer in rationalism, just like Chernyshevsky, yet he did not share his optimistic thoughts about forsaking the traditions. His poor Bazarov, one of the main characters, and perhaps the protagonist, of *Fathers and Sons*, is a brilliant young man, as he was a man of science, a student of the medical school in Petersburg, believing that rationalism and the Cartesian way of thinking could bring humanity to a better future. On the other hand, he is depicted to be deeply skeptical and critical of the old traditions of Russia, to such extent that he falls into conflict with another character Pavel, who is an old soldier and represented the dogmatic traditional values of Russian aristocracy.

Nevertheless, Turgenev does not portray his revolutionary model as a part of a happy picture; instead, Bazarov is depicted to be an "outsider", who cannot confront his "inferiority complex" and directs his anger to whatever is around him and this makes him lose the meaning of everything, of love, of family and of life.¹⁶² In Turgenev's perspective,

¹⁶¹ Richard Freeborn. "Bazarov as a Doomed Revolutionary," *New Zealand Slavonic Journal*, (1983): 72.

¹⁶² Freeborn, 77-8.

Bazarov is an egoist, not a man of altruism. He is more of an anti-hero in the setting of conservative and traditional Russia of the 19th century. Furthermore, Bazarov is suspicious about his own thoughts too, and this makes him hesitate from taking any action and when he can finally take an action it is not to serve society but to ease his emptiness and desire to find a meaning.

While discussing Turgenev's pessimistic portrayal of a revolutionary, it is beneficial to mention Dostoyevsky, who not only shared the pessimistic worldview of Turgenev but criticized the optimism of Chernyshevsky to a greater extent. For Dostoyevsky, the *Crystal Palace* – a common symbol among these intellectuals, which originated from the building of the London Exhibition of 1851 and which had bad connotations as being the symbol of extreme materialism and the fragility of its products – was so-to-say a prison for the mankind.¹⁶³ The Crystal Palace and Eiffel Tower, mentioned in Chapter I, had become the objects of the same anxiety, shared by two different societies. Just like the Parisians, who petitioned to get the tower demolished, Dostoyevsky was irked by the view of a glass and steel structure as a symbol of extreme materialism and aesthetic vulgarism of the era that was to come.

In this respect, in his *Notes from Underground*, published in 1864, Dostoyevsky creates a caricature of the rational man. The Underground Man is a surrealistically negative portrayal of the revolutionary model of Chernyshevsky.¹⁶⁴ He ridicules almost every single aspect of Chernyshevsky's Lopukhov. The Underground Man is not just nihilistic and lost

¹⁶³ Jane Barstow. "Dostoyevsky's 'Notes from underground' versus Chernyshevsky's 'What is to be Done?'," *College Literature* 5, no. 1 (1978): 24-8.

¹⁶⁴ Barstow, 25.

like Bazarov, but he is almost on the verge of insanity. His thoughts do not serve either society or himself. On the contrary, it leads him to deny everything and makes him incapable of any human contact as he cannot perceive what lies behind the material surface of both people and objects.¹⁶⁵

In the middle of this clash of ideas, Chernyshevsky's *What is to be Done?* was a reaction to the pessimistic thoughts, reflected by both Turgenev and Dostoyevsky among others. Andrew M. Drozd points out the similarities between the plot of *Uncle's Dream* by Dostoyevsky and *What is to be Done?*¹⁶⁶ Compared to the portrait of the man as a product, and actually the victim, of his fate and milieu, Chernyshevsky's characters define their own fates by the virtue of taking actions and refusing to be shaped by society; instead, they strive to shape society. What Chernyshevsky did was to plant revolutionary thoughts into the Russian literature.

Chernyshevsky recognized the potential of humanity to become good and pushes away Dostoyevsky's pessimistic determinism by the back of his hand.¹⁶⁷ He implied that man is cruel as the result of the corruption in society, which hurts and causes him to become evil. On this basis, Chernyshevsky believed that humanity could be saved, by ethical and idealist policies. This connection between secular morality-ethics and politics was an important point, which provided the origins for the thoughts of the Bolsheviks.

¹⁶⁵ Barstow, 28.

¹⁶⁶ Andrew M. Drozd. "'What is to be Done?' and Chernyshevsky's Response to Dostoyevsky's 'Uncle's Dream'," *South Atlantic Review* 67, no. 2 (2002), 11.

¹⁶⁷ Drozd, 17.

However, at this point, it is crucial that someone like Lopukhov, the protagonist of Chernyshevsky's book and the portrait of an idealist, must take a responsibility and altruistically act to lead society to its emancipation from the landlords and oligarchs. He stands as a catalyzer for the progress of the people. Chernyshevsky named this mentality "rational egoism" meaning the selfless actions of an individual is actually quite rational as his society benefits from it and the individual also enjoys the positive outcomes of this circumstance as a part of this society.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, ethics and moralism were suggested to become parts of an individual's behaviors.

Another character of Chernyshevsky's novel also provides "a model for a whole generation of revolutionaries (including Lenin)," in Figes' words.¹⁶⁹ This character is Rakhmetov, a minor character but he plays crucial roles in some events like Lopukhov's plot. Rakhmetov's experimenting with the limits of human body and mind in order to discipline himself to be able to serve the revolutionary cause perfectly is a metaphor for the necessity of discipline and dedication of an individual to realize his own reformation, at the first hand.

By Chernyshevsky, the new revolutionary was expected to be a man of rational altruism and to go through an initiation period to be ready. Perhaps, this initiation process was not supposed to consist of a physical training of a Buddhist monk, yet the intellectual training that a young person had to go through in order to achieve the necessary level of

¹⁶⁸ G. Zekulin. "Forerunner of Socialist Realism: The 'Novel What to do' by N. G. Chernyshevsky," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 41, no. 97 (1963): 473-4.

¹⁶⁹ Figes, 130-1.

development. It can be argued that Chernyshevsky foresaw Lenin's young years, along with many others of his generation.

Henceforth, Maurice Dobb remarks that 17-year-old Lenin inherited his beloved brother's books, after his execution due to the accusation of involvement in the activities of an anarchic organization, *Narodnaya Volya*.¹⁷⁰ These books contained the aforementioned ideas and arguments. The discussion, given place in this paper up to this point, has been not only about the conflicting opinions of a group of intellectuals, yet they were the elements which shaped young Lenin's world. Lopukhov was not only a literary figure but a role model for him as well as many others in his generation. In Ulam's words, referring to Chernyshevsky, "Lenin was to be indebted more than to any other thinker with the exception of Marx for his philosophy and his decision to become a revolutionary".¹⁷¹

Lying under all of these arguments was something, which had much more drastic effects. What was standing on the top of the traditions of Russia, which were questioned and rejected by Bazarov and Lopukhov, was the Monarchy itself as one of the two oldest institutions of the country together with the Church, and the Tsar was the head of both of them. Therefore, while Turgenev was skeptical about this attitude, Chernyshevsky accepted the necessity of change as the old system was crumbling into pieces due to the

¹⁷⁰ Maurice Dobb, "Lenin," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 19, no. 53/54 (1939-1940): 35. Also, see Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924* (London: Pimlico, 1996), 144-5. *Narodnaya Volya* translated to the English language as *the People's Freedom* was a radical organization which supported the use of violence for the revolutionary cause. The organization committing the assassination of Tsar Alexander II was *Narodnaya Volya*. Alexander Ulyanov became involved in a student group in 1887, one year after his father's death. This group was modeling itself after *Narodnaya Volya*, which was destroyed by the police forces of the Tsardom after the assassination. Alexander's group failed in their attempt to make a bomb attack on the sixth anniversary of Tsar Alexander II's assassination on March 1, 1887.

¹⁷¹ Ulam, 19.

incompetence of the central authority to implement the needed reforms and the resistance of the aristocracy to support the reforms that had any chance to be successful.

Dostoyevsky criticized their optimism and questioned rationalism's role as a solution, but the new generation, represented by the young revolutionary figures in the works of these authors, equipped with rationalism, critical-thinking and disciplined efforts to reach enlightenment as well as disobedience to corrupted and obsolete traditions. They praised social rights and egalitarianism by considering them as the requirements of ethical and moral values, they optimistically imagined a citizen-oriented state organization; in contrast to the older one, formed around the Tsar and his elites. These were the books that the revolutionaries of the future read, in their young years. Bazarov, Rakhmetov and Lopukhov were more than romantic figures in a story for them, rather the beacons for the new modes of thought of the new century.

Lenin's realism and rationalism were fed by the idealism in these works of literature.¹⁷² As a man is what he reads and thinks, the optimistic, social humanist, revolutionary and egalitarian ideals of Russian Socialists were directly reflected in Lenin's worldview. He dedicated himself to science and philosophy. He went to the university in Kazan shortly after his brother's execution.

Robert Service writes that the news about this grim incident was still fresh and Lenin found himself under the surveillance of the authorities.¹⁷³ Service also remarks the only protection between him and these authorities was ironically Fyodor Kerensky, a

¹⁷² Figes, 145.

¹⁷³ Robert Service. *Lenin: A Political Life Volume 1 The Strengths of Constitution* (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1985), 30.

neighbor, friend of Lenin's father, and the father of the future leader of SRs and Lenin's rival, Alexander Kerensky.

As a student with a critical-mind, dissenting from authority, Lenin found friends thinking alike, in the student association of Samara-Simbirsk as well as through his alignment with a group of revolutionaries.¹⁷⁴ These meetings were mainly seminar groups of students and middle-class citizens, rather than a party. However, they were far from being peaceful meetings. They organized a demonstration on December 4, which ended up with the arresting of hundreds of students, including Lenin himself.¹⁷⁵

In this event, Dobb reports a dialog between 21-year-old Lenin and a police officer, who arrested him for his political activism: "What's the use of rebelling, young man? You're knocking your head against a brick wall" asked the officer, "But it is a rotting wall, kick it hard and it will crumble", answered young Lenin.¹⁷⁶ The will and resolution of Lenin, fed by such optimistic works like Chernyshevsky's *What is to be Done?* was also becoming one of the characteristics of the future of the Soviets.

As the result of these events, Lenin got expelled from the school and was not permitted to travel abroad to continue his studies. Then, he returned to his own books, including those left by Alexander and continued his education on jurisprudence on his own, while adding new books to his list like *Das Kapital*.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ Service, 32.

¹⁷⁵ Service, 31-2.

¹⁷⁶ Dobb, 36.

¹⁷⁷ Service, 32-3.

However, these years did not mean Lenin secluded himself in their new house in Samara. In 1893, when he was 23 years old, he began to participate in the meetings of the Party of Marxist Emancipation of Labor, led by Plekhanov.¹⁷⁸ He became quite influential in Lenin's interpretation of the current situation of the politics in Russia by opposing the theories that the Capitalist development would lead to an agrarian-socialist government, and he advocated that Socialism could be established only through a bloody revolution, made against the bourgeois government.¹⁷⁹ Almost twenty years later, history was going to prove how accurate Plekhanov's reading of Russian politics was. These were the roots of Lenin's fierce opposition to the Liberals or Socialists who accepted collaboration with Capitalists and Imperialists.

The period of 1893-5 was also the timeline, in which Lenin's first exile years started as a part of his active involvement in these Socialist groups. In these years, Lenin's primary contribution was his novel interpretation of the history of the industrial era, as described by Dobb.¹⁸⁰ By strictly reading Marx's teachings, his predecessors had mainly argued that the capitalist methods of production were leading the path to the Socialist revolution. It meant that the revolution was going to occur in the industrially developed capitalist states, namely the countries of the North Atlantic like Great Britain, France, the United States and Germany.

¹⁷⁸ Dobb, 36.

¹⁷⁹ Service, 40-1.

¹⁸⁰ Dobb, 38-9.

In his first major work, titled "The Development of Capitalism in Russia", published in 1899 under the pseudonym of "V. Ilin",¹⁸¹ Lenin refused this interpretation and argued that the proletariat was ripe enough to start a revolutionary movement in a backward country like Russia, as well. He argued that the condition of the peasantry in Russia is not different than the condition of the industrial proletariat. He declared this notion with the words as such:

In spite of the theories [of the Narodnik economists, namely] that have been prevalent in Russia during the past half-century, the Russian commune peasantry is not the antagonists of capitalism, on the contrary, they are the deepest and most durable foundation of it.¹⁸²

Therefore, Lenin argued that the agrarian pre-industrial social groups, such as Russian peasantry, should not be idealized like how it was made by many thinkers of the West including Rousseau and Jefferson much less than some of the Socialists in Russia. He saw the connection between the accumulation of wealth and land in a few wealthy peasants, who hired other peasants as wage-workers for the amounts of payment that made it impossible for them to survive, while their employers were profiting; Russia had begun to develop its own bourgeois-class.

Besides, these wealthy farmers could afford new agricultural machinery and then stimulated the growth of large factories in urban zones to meet their demand, which led to the accumulation of wealth in few hands, namely the industrialists, this time in the urban

¹⁸¹ V. I. Lenin. "The Development of Capitalism in Russia," in *Essential Works of Lenin*, ed. Henry M. Christman (New York: Dover Publications, 1987), 11.

¹⁸² Lenin, 15.

areas.¹⁸³ Hence, Russian economy had been in the hands of a land and capital owner minority, who provided markets for one another, while denying rights of the masses of workers and exploiting their surplus value, under the protection of the Tsardom. To provide the basis of his argument, Lenin, himself, goes on with referring to Marx's definition of the capitalist systems' establishment by the means of "*the disintegration of the small producers*".¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, he defines how the system of "money rent" allowed landlords to usurp the earned income of the laborers without spending any energy or labor.¹⁸⁵ Again, referring to Marx's *Das Kapital*, Lenin explains how the peasantry, just like the industrial proletariat of the West, got turned into "propertyless day laborers". By this means, Lenin materialized the connection between the peasants and the industrial workers.

The peasantry was important in a state like Russia, seventy-five percent of whose population consisted of farmers until Stalin.¹⁸⁶ Nevertheless, Lenin also observed that the Russian industry was evolving from agricultural to industrial; he summarized this in the conclusion for one of the chapters of his analysis:

The rapid development of factory industry in Russia creates an enormous and continuously increasing market for means of production (building material, fuel, metals, etc.), it increases with particular rapidity the proportion of the population engaged in conducting articles to be used in production and not personal consumption. But the market for articles for personal use also grows rapidly owing to the growth of large-scale machine industry, which draws a growing proportion of the population away from agriculture into commercial and industrial occupations.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸³ Service, 65-7.

¹⁸⁴ Lenin, 16.

¹⁸⁵ Lenin, 17.

¹⁸⁶ Richard Pipes. "Weight of the Past: Russian Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective," *Harvard International Review* 19, no. 1 (1996/97): 8.

¹⁸⁷ Lenin, 46.

Russia was becoming more of a consumption society, while the laborers were alienated from the process of production; it was the orthodox reading of Marxism that Lenin accepted. The peasants were degraded to the level of daily wage workers, while rural bourgeois possessed huge amounts of land and together with their urban counterparts, this class of industrialists and landowners usurped the workers under the negligence of the state. These conditions were leading peasants to immigrate to cities to become industrial workers, in which they were turned into mere puppets of a complex chain of production. Day by day, the relationship between consumer and producer was disappearing. Before this picture, the main necessity, according to Lenin, was a new type of party to lead and perform the organization of the proletariat. As the result of this theorization process, Lenin published his ideas in 1902 under the title of "*What is to be done?: Burning Questions of Our Movement*" – apparently named after Chernyshevsky's work.

3.2. Lenin's "What is to be done?"

Having been the leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Victor Chernov depicts Lenin as an absolute realist, to the extent of "heartlessness".¹⁸⁸ In fact, Lenin was a man of higher realism. He saw and discerned the reality with the skill of a great observer; furthermore, he got into action in order to do what he found necessary to be done. For those like Chernov, Lenin was almost on the verge of insanity and he was so ruthless and resolute to achieve the goals that he could sacrifice even the proletariat itself if he thinks it is necessary for its goodness. It is a humorous coincidence that Lopukhov was also depicted

¹⁸⁸ Victor Chernov. "Lenin," *Foreign Affairs* 2, no. 3 (1924): 366.

to be too much idealistic and even crazy. Yet, in effect, Lenin had never lost his ties with reality and he always adapted his ideas to actuality. In the years of exile, he devoted almost his entire life to analyze and interpret the Marxist doctrine, and his *What is to be Done?* was the first major product of this process.

This unwavering resolution and willpower to execute the revolution were fed with optimism and rationalism, Lenin became a perfect model of revolutionary; he could be easily included into social realist novels, discussed at the beginning of this paper. In his work, Lenin displayed how his personality differed from other Socialists, in terms of his aggressive but carefully decisive manner based on rational thoughts yet fed by high ideals of Marxism, and this carved out the Bolshevik doctrine; this was the guide for him and his followers.¹⁸⁹

Lenin commences his analysis with an assault on the reformist-democratic Socialist interpretations through Bernstein and Millerand, even in the very first paragraph.¹⁹⁰ By conserving his views that he inherited from the Ex-Narodniks like Plekhanov, he clearly rejected the moderate interpretation of the Socialist movement and despised any tendency of cooperation between the bourgeois and so-called socialists. In the first part, Lenin forbade such moderates even from the right of "freedom"; by remarking that "'Freedom' is a grand word, but under the banner of free trade the most predatory wars were conducted." After this assault on the Western doctrine of free trade, he continued "under the banner of free labor, the toilers were robbed. The modern use of the term 'freedom of

¹⁸⁹ Ulam, 176.

¹⁹⁰ V. I. Lenin. "What is to be Done?" in *Essential Works of Lenin*, ed. Henry M. Christman (New York: Dover Publications, 1987), 55.

criticism' contains the same inherent falsehood".¹⁹¹ To clarify, he was blaming his opponents for attacking at him and his supporters, the future Bolsheviks, by hiding behind the right of the freedom of criticism. This would also provide the fundamental difference between American and Russian offers for peace during the First World War, discussed in detail in Chapter IV.

Before it comes to the question of organization, Lenin pointed out the ideological differences within *Iskra*, political newspaper of the Socialists, and accused those, who desired milder politics and cooperation with the Liberals in the events of 1901, of blocking the momentum of the Socialist demonstrations by hiding behind the freedom of criticism. Therefore, Lenin drew a clear line of "we" and "they", by stating how the people, thinking like him, called students and workers to resist in a political – yet non-violent – manner; exposed the "senseless dreams" and the "lying hypocrisy" of the Liberals; and propagated against the *Zemstvo*, the oligarchic local governments of the Tsar. It can be deduced from this argument that the correct resistance was supposed to be organized and prepared for this struggle, beforehand. Lenin was against the spontaneous breakouts, what he defended was a planned movement of revolutionary forces.

At this part, Lenin concluded his words on the problems that he saw in the economists. According to him, these economists were "yielding to liberalism" by demanding an "economic struggle against the employer and the government", and thus they were forsaking the Social-Democratic movement. He openly blamed the economists for "indirectly preparing the ground for converting the labor movement into an instrument

¹⁹¹ Lenin, 57.

of bourgeois democracy", by neglecting the threat that the "bourgeois democracy" possessed and by recommending cooperation with the Liberals.¹⁹² In contrast to their revisionism and moderation, Lenin perceived himself as "a humble disciple of Karl Marx" and a true Marxist.¹⁹³ It was, in fact, true that the Bolsheviks were going to be the most dedicated group to the revolution during the years of war to come.

After pointing at the economists as a negative example for the Socialist movement, Lenin listed the reasons of their failure in such a way that it provided a material to comprehend what is to be done, in his expectations. Then, he referred to the German Social-Democrats as an example to clearly state his ideas, and praises how they were "always found to be in advance of all others in its revolutionary estimation of every event and in its championship of every protest against tyranny."¹⁹⁴ Lenin referred back to his own group and lashed it for passivity and cooperation with the bourgeois, in contrast to the German Socialists. Hence, Lenin clarified what he expected from a successful Socialist party. It had to be a group of revolutionary partisans, who could progress and lead the proletariat by the means of propaganda and political activism, while rejecting the leadership of the Liberals, unconditionally.

In respect to the specific details of the revolutionary organization, Lenin argued it had been seen in the student movements and worker strikes that the masses were not ready to hold a considerable resistance against the trained troops and guards of the Tsar. Referring to this situation, Lenin did not blame them, but blamed the so-called socialist

¹⁹² Lenin, 123-5.

¹⁹³ Ulam, 179.

¹⁹⁴ Lenin, 126

revolutionaries, because they did not organize nor train the masses for the revolutionary cause.¹⁹⁵ He openly declared the necessity of the semi-secretly organized groups that were “professionally engaged in revolutionary activity”.¹⁹⁶ This was not going to simply pass by in the course of history, but to become one of the crucial subjects of the breaking between Lenin and Martov – and thus the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in 1903.¹⁹⁷ Therefore, the characteristic features of the Bolshevik Party were defined through Lenin’s stance. What he expected from a party was, according to Ulam, “to fight ‘spontaneity’ and ‘opportunism’” under a well-organized structure.¹⁹⁸

At this point, Lenin might seem to be overaggressive for some people, yet this was not a spontaneous outbreak of anger. Again in a confessional manner, Chernov states that his former rival had spent almost his entire life among the conflicts inside the party, this made Lenin a perfect “gladiator”, and as the politics were a disguised form of war for him, he executed his doctrines as though he were at war.¹⁹⁹ Even though Chernov says between these lines that Lenin was “dishonest” and “emotionless”, presumably as a reflection of his grudge from his SRs ultimate defeat before the Bolsheviks in 1918, his article conforms to other authors like Robert Service, who witnesses Lenin as an inexhaustible fighter of the class struggle with an “unfailing capacity to explicate reality almost before it had ensued”.²⁰⁰ And yet, according to Dobb, as well, it was the fact that Lenin was not a man of sentiments; at the moment when he learned the loss of his brother on a newspaper, what

¹⁹⁵ Lenin, 135.

¹⁹⁶ Lenin, 136-7.

¹⁹⁷ Dobb, 42.

¹⁹⁸ Ulam, 179.

¹⁹⁹ Chernov, 366-7.

²⁰⁰ Service, 192-4.

he remarked was the words: "No, we shall not go along that road."²⁰¹ Lenin was not a kind of person who could lose all of his senses before a tragic event, but instead, analyze it with cold rationality. One can argue that it was one of the features that created a strong gladiator who fought to save his people and to reconstruct his country to set a model of a socialist state for the rest of the world. The first step was to establish the necessary discipline and organization of the party because it was going to unify and lead the country. Lenin was dreaming of an army of Rakhmetovs.

As the second step, before the international struggle – which is going to be the summit of this study – Lenin argued, after the establishment of an organization, the goal was to carry the local agitation to the national, "all-Russian" level, and he demanded workers to be informed in parallel with this objective.²⁰² On this nation-wide stratum of his doctrine, Lenin was not rigidly stubborn, unlike his attitude toward the core party organization; instead, he argued cooperating with trade-unions and army officers just like the peasantry, who would be allies to the proletariat.

Briefly, he advised the proletariat not to be limited to the cities or the industrial zones and cooperate with other dissident social groups.²⁰³ For those, who blamed Lenin for abandoning the workers' movement especially in the international sphere after 1918, it was the detail that they missed. The Bolsheviks – like their leader – were resolute especially in the local resistance, yet they were not futilely stubborn, in contrast to the Narodniks, when they were convinced that they could be devastated in a direct conflict. After all, it was

²⁰¹ Dobb, 36.

²⁰² Lenin, 164.

²⁰³ Dobb, 44-5.

Lenin himself, who advised to join the Duma and focus on education as a means of spreading their ideology,²⁰⁴ at one point and who wanted to solve the Dual Power problem in a pacifist manner until losing his hope for transforming the Provisional Government and deciding that it was just another militarist-capitalist organization, at another moment. Therefore, inside Russia, they realistically reacted and positioned themselves before the developments like the unexpected events of February 1917 and the Kornilov Revolt, or the Great War, itself. This is one of the aspects of the Leninist Bolshevik doctrine; it was deterministically rationalist, realist, and materialist but also it was idealist, as much.²⁰⁵ This was also important in the international dimension of the Bolshevik doctrine.

3.3. Before Revolution, 1914-1917

The days before the Russian intervention in the war represented the high watermark of the Pan-Slavist sentiments in the court of Tsar Nicholas II. His high-ranking generals were dreaming of taking the control of Constantinople as well as the remaining Ottoman territories in the Balkans while saving other Slavic states from "the German yoke."²⁰⁶ This Pan-Slavist mentality, reflected in the form of propaganda campaigns in the Balkans, was one of the major causes of the ethnic conflicts in the Eastern regions of Austria-Hungary, along with the Pan-Germanist response to this, which got intensified in the last decade of the 19th Century particularly.

²⁰⁴ Dobb, 44.

²⁰⁵ Richard Gregor. "Lenin, Revolution, and Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 22, no. 4 (1967): 563.

²⁰⁶ Figes, 249.

Although the Russian Army was not expected to be ready before 1917 and the Tsar must have learned how the masses could threaten his throne like they had done in 1905,²⁰⁷ the assassination of Ferdinand and Austria-Hungary's declaration of war to Serbia did not leave many options to Nicholas II in 1914, except for preparing for the war as fast as possible.

Nevertheless, it was a fact that the war came earlier than he had probably calculated. Although Robert Service argues "Nicholas II leapt into the darkness of the Great War without anyone pushing him", the role that the Tsar had chosen for himself for years as the protector of Slavs required action and disabled any possibility for utilizing only diplomatic means when Austria-Hungary chose the option of declaring war immediately without leaving a door ajar for diplomatic negotiation.²⁰⁸ However, it is true Nicholas II decided his own fate by obeying the Pan-Slavists around him and created the disadvantageous environment for himself in the international sphere, as much as he did in the domestic sphere. What came after this incident was a series of war declarations between alliances, 1914 was the most tragic year in the history of Europe.

Before these developments, Lenin, still exiled in Switzerland, did not waste any time and declared "The Tasks of Revolutionary Social-Democracy in the European War" in August 1914.²⁰⁹ It was a kind of manifesto, in which he defined the war as a "bourgeois, imperialist and dynastic war" and then added that the French and German socialist parties had betrayed Socialism by giving their support to their governments. After stating with

²⁰⁷ Figes, 249.

²⁰⁸ Robert Service. *A History of Twentieth-Century Russia* (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 24-5.

²⁰⁹ Vladimir Lenin. "Tasks of Revolutionary Social-Democracy in the European War," *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed May 20, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/aug/x01.htm>.

reasons how both France and Germany were conducting wars of aggression, despite their claims of waging the war for the defence of their countries, he declared the "first and foremost task of Russian Social-Democrats" to fight against the chauvinism of the Tsar and the supporters of this policy, including "the Russian Liberals, Cadets, a section of the Narodniks, and other bourgeois parties." He identified the defeat of the Tsar's army, which was oppressing other nations, mainly Poland and Ukraine, as "the lesser evil", compared to the invasion of Russia by the armies of the Kaiser. Yet, for Lenin, any kind of imperialism was evil at heart, and accordingly, he remarked three objectives, none of which was well-articulated and detailed at that point, but the Peace Decree of October 1917 were created within the framework that these points shaped.

In these objectives, he came up with something very important for this study, after expectedly inviting people to make propaganda and use weapons not against other workers, but against their own bourgeois governments. For the second objective, he called for propaganda "for transforming of all the separate states of Europe into a republican United States of Europe." Furthermore, in the third objective, he called again for "liberation" and more importantly the "self-determination of nationalities oppressed by Russia" together with the "advocacy of a revolution in Russia."

Therefore, Lenin granted the revolution an internationalist cause of peace and unity. From now on, the revolution was not aimed at overthrowing the monarchies and their bourgeois collaborators but for reunion and peace in Europe. It is not certain whether Lenin realized he eventually aimed for the same thing as the Progressive leaders of America, who were bourgeois in his view, except for his revolutionary cause, in contrast to the

Americans' advocacy of gradual reforms. This difference, which may seem deceptively small at first look, was the root of the ideological polarization between Lenin and Wilson, although they both were anti-imperialist leaders demanding peace.

At this point, mentioning what Lenin understood and meant by self-determination is helpful before continuing to discuss the other aspects of his doctrine. Pipes defines Lenin's position by remarking how he was not the first to realize the existence of the nationalist struggles against Imperialism and the threat that they possessed, yet he was one of the first Socialists who realized that these movements could provide allies to the Socialists in their own efforts to overthrow the Capitalist-Imperialist regimes. He was also aware of the fact that this kind of an alliance could be only a temporary one, because the task of the Socialists was to unite the proletariats of all states in "a republican United States of Europe."

Therefore, as a revisionist approach to Marxism, which argued that encouragement of national movements could lead to isolated local revolts and divide the power of a united nation-wide revolution, Lenin was more flexible and accepted the possibility of cooperating with the nationalists, who were fighting against the same enemy, the Imperial regime. However, he did not support those – like Bauer – who advocated that full-autonomy must be given to ethnic groups, striving for their independence under the Empires, since this would mean the secession of these nations from the Socialist supra-national entity, which was intended to be established after the war.²¹⁰

²¹⁰ Richard Pipes. *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London and England: Harvard University Press, 1997), 34-49.

All of these mean two things. Firstly, Lenin recognized the national struggles – and thus the right of self-determination – as long as they pledged their allegiance to the postbellum supra-national body of Socialist states. Secondly, this also gives a hint about what kind of organization Lenin imagined for this body. It was an organization of Socialist states who were granted rights to speak their own language and establish their own local institutions but were bound by the central authority of the organization in the crucial matters, such as foreign affairs and constitutional laws.

In the following months, Lenin's doctrine became a party manifesto for the Bolsheviks, in November.²¹¹ In this manifesto, the necessity of the establishment of unity among the Socialists was promoted, and whoever did not abide by this demand was declared the enemy of the cause. In this regard, Lenin criticized the Social Democrats of Germany for their submission to the authorities and support for war, in December.²¹² In the same month, he harshly criticized – partly insulted – the Russian Socialists, who did not see the war as a phase of revolution, and he argued that the real defense of one's country could be achieved by means of preventing the country from oppressing others, in this matter he referred to these words of Marx: "No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations."²¹³ Briefly, Lenin was elaborating his declarations that were made in August by calling the Socialists to unite and oppose the war and aggressor monarchies by promoting

²¹¹ Vladimir Lenin. "The War and Russian Social-Democracy," *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed May 24, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/sep/28.htm>.

²¹² Vladimir Lenin. "Dead Chauvinism and Living Socialism: How the International Can Be Restored," *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed May 19, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/dec/12.htm>.

²¹³ Vladimir Lenin. "On the National Pride of the Great Russians," *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed May 19, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/dec/12a.htm>.

the revolutionary cause. Therefore, Lenin's policy was defined for the first year of the war.²¹⁴

Toward the end of 1915, something important happened: the Zimmerwald Conference of September 5-8. At this conference, European Socialists, including Lenin and Trotsky, met to declare a common manifesto.²¹⁵ Through this manifesto, all of the Socialist factions that participated at the conference agreed on three points. First of all, the war was a product of Imperialism and Capitalism.²¹⁶ Secondly, they denounced the belligerent countries for attempting to justify the war as a defensive war, made for "democracy, and the liberation of the oppressed nations". Finally, they warned the workers and proletariat against being exploited by their countries' aristocrats and bourgeois-classes and called them to unite and struggle with their oppressors for "a peace without annexations or war indemnities" and "the right of self-determination." As the Manifesto did not emphasize the revolution as a prerequisite of peace, at least not as strong and fierce as Lenin's argumentation, it is seen that almost at the same time with the League to Enforce Peace in the United States, the European Socialists manifested that they had more or less the same expectations from the end of the war. In these events, the ground for the alignment of the Forces of Movement was coming into existence. Progressivism and Socialism were finding a common enemy in the Imperialism of the Old World.

²¹⁴ Vladimir Lenin. "The 'Peace' Slogan Appraised," *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed May 20, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/jul/x01.htm>. Also, see Vladimir Lenin. "The Question of Peace," *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed May 20, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/jul/x02.htm>.

²¹⁵ Leon Trotsky. *My Life: An Attempted Autobiography* (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1970), 250-1.

²¹⁶ "Zimmerwald Manifesto," *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed May 20, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/zimmerwald/manifesto-1915.htm>.

Arno Mayer misses the details of this convergence between great rivals of the Cold War in these early years of the Great War by jumping so fast ahead to 1917 and only briefly mentioning the First Zimmerwald Conference.²¹⁷ This leads to depicting Lenin and Wilson as if they had been two absolute realists fighting over the control of Europe by calculating and measuring what they can use against one another, yet there was more than that.

The reasons behind their common points and major differences lie in this earlier time period, and it represents that the clash between Wilson and Lenin was not simply caused by their ambitions over spreading their ideologies to Europe but by the details of their discourses, shaped by their individual experiences and the past of their countries. Therefore, this alignment between two seemingly distinct schools of thoughts deserves more study and offers new perspectives to its students.

Nevertheless, in the first half of 1916, Lenin published his work, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. In the last chapter of this work, he discussed "The Place of Imperialism in History."²¹⁸ He remarked that "monopoly capitalism" was the "characteristic of the epoch", in which he lived and examined in his given study. This issue was examined under four points by him; the first one was how high-tariff and *laissez-faire* economy policies in the developed countries, Lenin names Germany, the United States and the Great Britain, led to the creation of the monopolies. Secondly, he pointed out how these monopolies exhausted the resources of these countries. Thirdly, the banks, the creditors of the monopolies, turned into "a financial oligarchy." Lastly, in the fourth point, he argued

²¹⁷ Arno J. Mayer. *Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy 1917-18* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1959), 192

²¹⁸ Vladimir Lenin. *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, accessed May 24, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ch10.htm>.

colonialism was connected with monopolies as these capitalists of the aforementioned countries began to "struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for spheres of influence" and this led to "the struggle for the division and the redivision of the world." In the following paragraphs, Lenin expanded the argumentation behind these points by underlining how the rapid growth of Capitalism under the encouraging policies of the states led to inequalities and culmination of wealth in a small percent of the population. Moreover, this rapid growth did not only take the control of huge resources for private use, but they turned masses into workers and consumers; in Lenin's view, this was "the socialization of production", which Marx foresaw to unite the masses as an exploited class of people before the downfall of Capitalism. Lenin defined this situation as the decay of Capitalism hidden under the "shell" of "private economic and private property relations" and declared it necessary to remove it.

Through this work, Lenin not only showed how Imperialism and the nineteenth century policies of the *laissez-faire* served as tools for the rise of monopolies – one can confirm his views by studying the history of railroad and oil corporations in the United States, he also successfully diagnosed how the occurrence of these structures threatened the social organization and equality in the very empires, in which they were established. Even more importantly, they threatened to cause the downfall of these countries. If the race for resources between the Western Empires during the second half of the nineteenth century until the Great War – as the main motive of colonialization efforts – are taken into consideration as one of the major causes of the tension between the major powers, and if it is remembered how the Great War caused the end of the monarchs and their empires – in 1919, there were no more Romanovs, Ottomans, Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns, it can be

understood how Lenin's reading of the circumstances was correct and realistic. The Old Order was on the edge of collapsing with all of its apparatus. By causing the rise of the monopolies, the Old Order had created its own patricidal child, and its efforts to lull this child by the colonial policies outside and the police-state inside, it created the final act of its tragedy: The Great War.

Nonetheless, besides the truth in the arguments of the Forces of Movement, which was vocalized through Lenin's aforementioned work for this time, they were far from being united as it is seen in Lenin's article "The Peace Programme", published on March 25, 1916.²¹⁹ In this article, written in reference to the upcoming Second Zimmerwald Conference, he once again attacked whoever advocated supporting peace because the independence and rights of nations were recognized, rather than insisting on the necessity of an international revolution. Against their peace program, Lenin declared his own program finally addressing to the issues, specifically. He clearly stated:

. . .the imperialist Powers and the imperialist bourgeoisie *cannot* grant a democratic peace. . . Such a peace *must* be sought and fought for, not in the *past*, not in a reactionary utopia of non-imperialist capitalism, nor in a league of equal nations *under* capitalism, but *in the future*, in the socialist revolution of the proletariat.

With these lines, Lenin openly remarked he was refusing the league idea of Wilson and others because it was coming from capitalists. For this reason, the convergence between Progressive and Socialist proposals gained a new characteristic and this relation created a new dimension of the conflict: the battle over the peace proposals. The seemingly

²¹⁹ Vladimir Lenin. "The Peace Programme," *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed May 20, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/mar/25.htm#fwV22E065>.

small difference led to a great distinction. A characteristic of the future Cold War was born many years before its time. At this point, Lenin's personality also played its role, as his obstinacy and obsession allowed him to keep his position, regardless of anything, positive or negative. The only true method, for Lenin, was the one which his rational thought calculated to be correct; this was Bazarov in foreign affairs.

Meanwhile, the fight continued in all fronts, fiercely. However, one man was coming to change the timid atmosphere in the Russian high-command: Aleksei Brusilov. In April 1916, he had just been appointed to the position of a front commander, but his determination to turn the tides of the war led him to initiate the most ambitious offensive of the Russian Army in the Eastern Front – the Brusilov Offensive was rightly named after its architect. Nonetheless, regardless of the military mastermind behind the offensive and the selfless efforts of the soldiers, the unbelievable incompetence of the Court of Nicholas II and his wife caused a failure out of this military victory.²²⁰ As it was certain that the offensive ended up as a failure by September, Brusilov was disappointed by the regime, which he was serving by risking his own life and spending millions of lives of his countrymen, and he was not alone among other soldiers; nor was the army the only part of the collapsing empire as the economy, transportation and bureaucratic structure were all on the eve of falling apart together with their minor branches.²²¹ The empire, which had gone to the edge of its downfall as the result of the demonstrations of workers and students, would have been believed to survive an incident that was as destructive as the Great War only by those who believed in miracles.

²²⁰ Figes, 279-282.

²²¹ Figes, 283.

In the final month of the year of 1916, a rational man analyzed how the Empires were bitterly seeking for an opportunity to restore the order and peace by the means of secret diplomatic negotiations.²²² He was well aware that the end of the war without revolution would mean that these Empires could get away with having exploited the labor and lives of people both at war and peace. However, this incident brought another dimension to the war-time doctrine of Lenin and his Bolsheviks, which was manifested to be extremely important at the final act of this story. Alongside with their former request for the unity of the Socialists and denunciation of the chauvinists and pacifists, they also requested from other Socialists to make the details of these secret negotiations of their states revealed, which was not only an ancient mode of conduct for the diplomatic processes, but it was also the very method that these Empires followed in their current negotiations. Henceforth, Lenin had not only set an internationalist objective to his comrades, but he also framed the new method for the conduct of the diplomatic affairs – the New Diplomacy, based on the approval of the citizens with its transparency and accountability.

3.4. Conclusion

As it was stated at the beginning of this study, for those who study Lenin's arguments on the foreign policy, there is a grand question, with the potential of causing confusion. It is because the Bolsheviks propagated "peace and bread" throughout the tumultuous year of 1917 against the Provisional Government and other opponents.²²³ How

²²² Vladimir Lenin. "Theses for an Appeal to the International Socialist Committee and All Socialist Parties," *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed May 24, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/dec/25.htm>.

²²³ Ulam, 387 and Dobb, 49.

did the Bolsheviks advocated the revolutionary war, while convincing people that they were standing for peace? The answer lies in understanding their milieu. In a country, struck by famine, poverty and fatally exhausted by the war of attrition since 1914, the Bolshevik slogan gave hope to Russia. However, on the opposite end, it was the same Bolsheviks who had been following the Marxist doctrine and arguing that it was needed to make a revolutionary war in order to achieve a utopian peace since the beginning of the war.

They advocated that if they overthrew the Tsar, and the Socialists of other countries also did the same and established their own dictatorial regimes of the proletariat in their countries, this peace could be provided. If these conditions were met there would not be any need for secret treaties, tedious diplomatic affairs or an armed confrontation, as Europe would turn into a continent of the Socialist regimes, so the New Diplomacy could be achieved.²²⁴ Yet, it meant a wave of revolutions throughout Europe, which would need to be supported by the Bolshevik Russia, directly. The Bolsheviks were actually offering a civil war to end the international war as Figes correctly observed.²²⁵ This was the position of the Bolsheviks and their dictator before the great outbreak of 1917.

²²⁴ Gregor, 563-5.

²²⁵ Figes, 294.

CHAPTER IV

THE PEACE DECREE AND THE FOURTEEN POINTS: 1917-1918

For many people, the First World War was the most important incident of the twentieth century; after it, nothing was the same. The map of Europe changed completely. The old regimes of Europe were either gone or on the edge of it. Their peoples were looking for new ways and means to restore their lives. Half of the world was on the fronts, while the other half was working for supplying them. In these long four years, 1917 was the breaking point. In this year, Wilsonian America got involved in the war and the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government, so the first episode was complete before the US and the USSR became the world powers and the opposite poles of two distinct ideologies. It was also the moment, in which the history witnessed the outbreak of the acute crisis of the modern era. This crisis was caused by the clash between the new modes of production, of cities, of healthcare, of working life, of education, of transportation, of everything and the old traditions.

However, these years also witnessed the birth of the New World Order. Maybe, not many realized what was happening when it took place, but it was certainly understood thirty years later. Joseph Stalin and Franklin Delano Roosevelt were among the officers of Wilson and Lenin and continued this process by leading the metamorphosis of the modern society. This final chapter discusses how their own ways of understanding politics and war influenced this New World.

Obviously, this study owes a lot to Arno Mayer, the author of *Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy 1917-1918*. However, it also owes equally to the studies of Arthur S. Link, Orlando Figes, and Robert Service, along with many other scholars. Therefore, this study diverges from Mayer's study, in terms of both methodology and content as it was briefly mentioned in the introduction, as well.

First of all, it does not share Mayer's Eurocentric approach and adopts America-centric and Russia-centric approaches, meaning the origins of Wilson and Lenin's discourses are traced back to their own past and milieu. Secondly, the time frame of this study is accordingly different as it starts examining its subjects much earlier, going back to the 1900s and 1910s and ends in January 1918.

Also, this study does not focus on the dual declarations of 1917-18 from a perspective that revolves around the last two years of the war, but it focuses on these declarations with regard to their backgrounds. It emphasizes that the period of time between these two years was the climax of the downfall of the old regime and, of course, their international system, which had taken decades until that moment, and what happened after this period until the Versailles and Brest-Litovsk were signed was the result of this breaking point.

Thirdly, in order to keep a research, which covers such a long span of time, on the track, this study is structured around certain themes. These were the Progressive Era in the United States and the Bolshevik Movement in Russia, alongside with the biographies of Lenin and Wilson as the protagonists of this story. In this regard, their criticisms and predictions about the situation of the economic and political system were examined,

together with the emphasis on their definitions of the New Order and nation-states, namely units of the New World and the dynamics of the international affairs between them.

Hence, this part of the study examines the final episode of the process, in which Lenin and Wilson articulated their own policies for one last time and declared them as full-fledged doctrines. It questions to what extent they resembled and differed from one another and the reasons for them. In the end, the study focuses on the individual texts of the Petrograd Formula of October 1917 and the Fourteen Points of January 1918, with regard to three major issues. The first one is the concept of "no-annexations" and the perception of the remaining empires of Europe and what to do with them to reestablish and conserve the peace. The second one is the question of "self-determination" and the future of the national ethnic groups under the empires and expected qualities of these new "nation-states". Finally, the third one is the foundation of a supra-national entity to govern these affairs. These three subjects were one of the shared issues between the Progressive and Bolshevik peace proposals, yet they were very different from each other under the shell.

4.1. Russia 1917

1917 was the most important year in the modern history of Russia, even if its importance in the international sphere is not taken into consideration. Stricken by the war, social unrest and hunger, Russia was on the edge of slipping out of the control of the Tsar. The intellectual and aristocratic classes of its society began to dissent the conduct of the country. Richard Pipes argues the major cause behind the downfall of the regime was this tension between the government and its privileged citizens. He points out the waves of rumors about the Court of Nicholas II, especially about his wife Tsarina Alexandra, with German origins, and other potential German traitors. Pipes claims that together with the

food and fuel shortages in the northern cities, the urban population of the Empire could not take it anymore and overthrew the regime. According to him, the ultimate goal of these groups was to conduct the war better, not to end the war, so he claimed that it was mistaken to point at the war exhaustion as the cause of the February Revolution.²²⁶

If one just looks at the reasons behind the initial revolt against the Tsar in February 1917, it is normal to think that the desire to peace was not a strong impulse behind the actions of the people, compared to their hatred of Germans and economic problems. However, the Russia of February 1917 went through not one, but two revolutions. As Robert Service described these events, Petrograd workers and garrison soldiers also revolted, mainly due to the worsening economic conditions as well as the suppression and exploitation of the Tsar as an acute problem of Russia.

Their expectation from the war was not to get themselves under more burdens to annex any foreign territories or carry on the imperialist wars of the old Russia but to defend the country and the rights, gained after overthrowing the Tsar. The power of the Petrograd Soviet of workers and soldiers, compelled the Provisional Government to recognize its strength and to cooperate with it.²²⁷ Maybe, the war sentiments were not totally pacifist yet, but it was certain that people started to stray away from the chauvinism of the early war years.

During this period until the October Revolution, Russia went through the "dual power" era, between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet. At the

²²⁶ Richard Pipes. *Three "Whys" of the Russian Revolution* (London: Pimlico, 1995), 26-30. Also, see Orlando Figes. *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924* (London: Pimlico, 1996), 284-5 and 352.

²²⁷ Robert Service. *A History of Twentieth-Century Russia* (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 34-6.

beginning, the Bolsheviks consisted of a minority in the Petrograd Soviet and some of their leaders, including Stalin, was positive about cooperating with the Mensheviks, who advocated the socialist revolution had to be preceded by a bourgeois revolution and even participated in the second cabinet of the Provisional Government together with the SRs, especially after July, when the government had to recognize the strength and seek for the support of the Socialists.²²⁸

However, Lenin returned on April 3 from his exile in Switzerland and published his *April Theses* on April 7.²²⁹ This declaration mainly consisted of ten points.²³⁰ He reiterated his call for a socialist revolution before peace and claimed that it was impossible to achieve the one without another. Furthermore, he accused the Provisional Government of carrying on the imperialist war of the Tsar, and he argued that it was the outcome of the connection between Capitalism and Imperialism. As a capitalist government, in his view, the Provisional Government could be supported only if it promised to hand over the power to the Bolsheviks, eventually.

Lenin was also aware of the minority position of the Bolsheviks at that point and suggested that the masses must be convinced by the means of “an *explanation* especially adapted to the practical needs of the masses.”²³¹ With this fourth point, he was going to establish the foundations of the “peace and bread” program. In the fifth and sixth points, he first called for the abolition of the bourgeois police power and bureaucracy, and in the sixth one, he demanded the “confiscation of all landed states.” The seventh point demanded

²²⁸ Service, 46-7.

²²⁹ Service, 47.

²³⁰ Vladimir Lenin. “The Task of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution [a.k.a. The April Theses],” *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed May 29, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/04.htm>.

²³¹ The emphasis belongs to the author.

the unification of all banks under "a single national bank." At the final and the tenth point, he called for "a new International. . . against the social-chauvinists and against the 'Centre'."

These points got accepted by the Seventh Party Conference at the end of the month.²³² At this moment, Lenin was enjoying the success of a small but well-organized revolutionary party. The February Revolution of the Soviets provided him and other *émigres* a platform to return to Russia and hope to implement his revolutionary ideas in the field. Although they did not have the majority, the Bolsheviks could reach a consensus so fast and easily that it seemed like one body and mind with their leader Lenin.²³³

Pipes argues that this dedication to Lenin of the Bolsheviks displayed that they did not have any adopted doctrine or policy, but they only followed one man, it should be noted that the situation of the other parties was not any brighter than the Bolsheviks in terms of following a well-articulated doctrine, even the Provisional Government was lost for its entire career of almost 8 months.²³⁴ Under these circumstances, the Bolsheviks and their leader were actually the group which had the most consistency in their policies and Lenin's domination allowed them to react and act rapidly, which was crucial in such a year as 1917.

²³² Service, 48.

²³³ Richard Pipes. *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 115.

²³⁴ Orlando Figes. *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924* (London: Pimlico, 1996). See pages 193 and 336, the leaders of the Provisional Government defined themselves as "the leaders of the people", but they were disconnected from the masses, except for Kerensky. Also, see page 293 for the indecisiveness of the Mensheviks. Also, see page 356 for the autocratic thoughts of Milyukov and Guchkov in contrast to moderatism of Kerensky and Lvov as an example for the lack of consensus in the First Provisional Government. Also see page 442; Kerensky, as the leader of the second cabinet after Lvov, began acting like a Tsar by being intoxicated by the power. He was gathering people like General Kornilov, a supporter of traditional military discipline and autocracy, around himself.

In the period between April and August 1917, two important things happened, both of which allowed Lenin to justify his arguments and convince the people that the Provisional Government was not very different from the monarchy. According to Figes, this entire process was actually "a political battle between those who saw the revolution as a means of bringing the war to an end and those who saw the war as a means of bringing the revolution to an end."²³⁵

Pavel Nikolaevich Milyukov was in this second group as the leader of the Kadets and a right-wing member of the Cabinet. One of the first things that he did was to propose the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Russia.²³⁶ He was not only deaf and blind to the practical needs of the masses, which caused him to misunderstand the incidents happening around him in these months but also, he supported expansionism,²³⁷ and the use of force to suppress the turmoil inside Russia.²³⁸ Nevertheless, he was selected for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the First Cabinet.

As one of the first acts of the Petrograd Soviet was to declare to all the proletariats of the world under the title of "Appeal to the Peoples of All the World" on March 14 that the Russian regime was overthrown and to call on them to do the same in their own countries and to inditimidate the peace negotiations. This was completely a kind of paraphrase of Lenin's arguments, since the beginning of the war he had repeated his call for peace as well as emphasizing the necessity of the international revolution of the proletariat as the basis of it.²³⁹

²³⁵ Figes, 380.

²³⁶ Service, 33.

²³⁷ Service, 45.

²³⁸ Figes, 356.

²³⁹ Figes, 380.

In contrast to the Soviet declaration, on April 18, the Milyukov Note pledged the Provisional Government's full support to its imperial allies, promised to meet the military obligations of the Imperial Russia and refused to denounce the secret treaties. On April 21, Lenin published an essay and pointed out this note as the greatest sign of the capitalist and imperialist nature of the Provisional Government;²⁴⁰ this was the first issue, from which the Bolsheviks could profit greatly in their pursuit of convincing the masses to demand a socialist regime. Consequently, on the same day, the Bolsheviks declared their modifications to their political program, in which the importance and objectives of propaganda to enlighten the masses about the warmongering of the Provisional Government were repeated, and the Bolsheviks again denounced the conformist factions of the Socialists as well as the government.²⁴¹

Arno Mayer argues that the Milyukov Note was given after the recognition of the new Russian Government by Wilson Administration and the President's remarks about war aims on April 2 for United States' declaration of war against Germany.²⁴² The problem lies in Mayer's understanding of Milyukov. He was not a democrat or anything close to that, Milyukov was a member of the Forces of Order. He was against the new open diplomatic means, affirmative to the secret treaties and above all he was an expansionist.

Even if Wilson's insistence on no-annexation, open diplomacy, free trade and democratic league of countries after the war is neglected completely, the lengthy address

²⁴⁰ Vladimir Lenin. "Honest Defencism Reveals Itself," *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed June 17, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/21b.htm>.

²⁴¹ "Resolution of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) Adopted April 21 (May 4), 1917," *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed June 17, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/21.htm>.

²⁴² Arno J. Mayer. *Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy 1917-18* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1959), 71-9.

of Wilson on April 2 was mainly concerned about Germany's atrocities and violations of laws and why the United States could not maintain its neutrality.²⁴³ In the same speech, Wilson briefly congratulates the government of Russia for getting rid of autocracy. Wilson does not mention whether the government was a Socialist or a bourgeois one – Lenin was the one who made these distinctions. Wilson's primary concern was about the empires, as he compared them to monopolies, which he already detested in the domestic politics as a Progressive, and about the deteriorating effect of the war on the United States' economy and the lives of its citizens. Above all, it is another matter of curiosity that how one could associate Wilson's no-annexation with Milyukov's desires on the territories, such as Anatolia, Poland and Persia. Wilson's stance is remarked under the American-specific part of this chapter regarding President Herbert Hoover's testimony.

At this point, in order to conserve the narrative integrity of the study, this issue should not be elaborated any more, yet it should be remembered that even after the Bolshevik *coup d'état* in October, Wilson was the one who sent his good wishes and regards to the Soviets even as late as March 1918, when the new Bolshevik regime was facing the threat of German invasion.²⁴⁴ Until November 1918, Washington was rather indecisive about what to do about what had happened in Russia.²⁴⁵

²⁴³ Woodrow Wilson. "An Address to a Joint Session of Congress," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed May 30, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-41-02-0571%20WILS-print-01-41-02-0572#WILS-01-41-02-pb-0519>.

²⁴⁴ Woodrow Wilson. "To the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviets," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed May 30, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-46-02-0642%20WILS-print-01-46-02-0643#WILS-01-46-02-pb-0598>.

²⁴⁵ Robert Lansing. "On the recognition of a Russian government," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed June 4, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-45-02-0533-0001%20WILS-print-01-45-02-0533-0002#WILS-01-45-02-pb-0563>.

The point is to avoid unnecessarily trying to fit Wilson and Lenin into the dichotomies of the most heated years of the Cold War Era. Mayer completed his book in 1959, and it is normal that he was reading the materials from a certain perspective, which was deeply divided into two camps, and he sought for the connections with the US-USSR confrontation, in every matter. Right now, in this study, this perspective is not accepted. This study has tried to note the contrasts and parallels between Wilson and Lenin's doctrines without forcing them to fit into certain patterns – and by examining them within a new pattern even, if possible. In other words, the aim of the study is not to impose the norms of the Cold War onto a different time period, namely the Great War Era, yet it is to contribute new perspectives to the Cold War, based on its origins in the relation between Wilson and Lenin in the early twentieth-century.

When it comes to the second incident, the Kornilov Revolt, the personality of General Lavr Kornilov and his ambitions must be mentioned, briefly. During the days after the February Revolution, he was the Commander of the Petrograd Garrison, so in a regime, whose police force had completely collapsed together with the downfall of its chief-of-staff. His attitude toward the demonstrating workers and soldiers was displayed in his reaction to the demonstrations of these groups due to the Milyukov Note. The only thing that prevented him from crushing these revolts by force was the cabinet's hesitation about using force against the people.²⁴⁶ Hearing that, the Soviet took the control of the garrison and made Kornilov resign.²⁴⁷ Therefore, together with Milyukov, Kornilov was also

²⁴⁶ Figes, 382.

²⁴⁷ Figes, 443. Also, see Richard Pipes. *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 119. Pipes narrates this event as though Kornilov himself had wanted to resign in protest to the government's decision against using force to suppress the demonstrations.

another member of the Forces of Order in Russia, who was greatly disturbed by the changes in their era.

When the Second Provisional Government failed in its offensive against the Germans, which was intended to bring unity inside the country by achieving a military success after the years of defeats of the Tsar's armies, the Commander of the Armies General Aleksei Brusilov was replaced with Kornilov in July 1917.²⁴⁸ Two important things that shaped Kornilov's stance was his counter-revolutionary thoughts, especially after the Soviet's relieving him from his duty at the garrison, and the other one was his confrontation of Kerensky and even flirting with the ideas of *coup d'état* against the Provisional Government.²⁴⁹

The Kornilov Drama was actually a sequel to the tragedies of the Tsardom. It had a self-appointed aristocrat, Vladimir Lvov, who had nothing but failure in his political career and possessed enough skills to bring destruction on others that he touched; this time he touched at first Kerensky, and then Kornilov. It also had a reckless politician, Kerensky, who was increasingly becoming more impatient with the social disorder and turning into a dictator. Finally, a soldier, Kornilov, who detested politics and could not understand how the politics could be more dangerous than the frontlines especially during such an epoch as the Russia of 1917.

In the first act, Lvov found an opportunity to contact Kornilov and mention his desire to establish a "strong government".²⁵⁰ Afterward, he found another opportunity to

²⁴⁸ Figes, 442.

²⁴⁹ Figes, 444-6.

²⁵⁰ Figes 449.

meet Kerensky and bring about the claim that the army command was plotting his assassination, which was taken seriously by Kerensky who had been already facing many warnings like this recently. Kerensky ordered Lvov to ask Kornilov's view on these matters. By this way, Lvov managed to create for himself the position of a liaison officer between Kornilov and Kerensky.

On August 24, Lvov, tactlessly, added other purposes to his mission by asking Kornilov's view on three matters, the first one of which was Kerensky's assumption of dictatorial powers, as if he had not done that yet; the second one was the establishment of a Directory with Kornilov as a member; and the last one, which caused the all of this mess, was Kornilov's declaration of his own dictatorship.²⁵¹ Kornilov took it as the beginning of a negotiation process for the transformation of the government into a more autocratic one, initiated by Kerensky through Lvov, who claimed to be an emissary of the Premier, and he said he would prefer the third option, which meant mutiny.

On August 26, Lvov met Kerensky and said Kornilov was "*demanding* dictatorial powers."²⁵² As the result of these affairs, Kerensky, the head of the Provisional Government, accused Kornilov of treason, which was a cause of great humiliation to a soldier like him and led him to revolt.²⁵³ According to Pipes, what happened was not Kornilov's betrayal, despite his open allegiance with the conservatives who demanded Kerensky to resign, but Kerensky had an imaginary threat of counter-revolution and by this reason made "grave mistakes". This incident was an example of the extent of the loose organization between the government and the army. These organizational failures, merged

²⁵¹ Pipes, 132.

²⁵² Figes, 450.

²⁵³ Pipes, 134.

with incompetent and opportunist remnants of the aristocracy, destined the Provisional Government to share the same end as the Court of Tsar.

All of these things helped one faction mainly: the Bolsheviks. Having been pushed out of the political arena after the July Days,²⁵⁴ they were returned to power by the hand of Kerensky, due to the Kornilov Revolt. As the Bolsheviks were capable of mobilizing soldiers and workers in case of any counter-revolutionary attempt, Kerensky did not only have their leaders released from the prisons, where they had been sent less than two months before for the convict of treason, but also he ordered them to be armed.²⁵⁵

On August 30, Lenin declared that they were fighting against Kornilov, yet they were not in defense of the government; instead, it was an opportunity for them to display Kerensky's weakness and convince people to support the Bolsheviks.²⁵⁶ Lenin was not wrong in his predictions. During this episode, soldiers began to join the Soviets in even higher numbers and the Bolsheviks occupied 49.5 percent of the seats in the Soviet of Moscow, for the first time. Before October 1917, there was almost nothing left before the Bolsheviks to take over the power.

Richard Pipes argues the revolution of October 1917 was mainly a typical *coup d'état*, plotted and performed by a highly militant and manipulative group – namely the Bolsheviks – and then he claims that this was what inspired Mussolini and the Fascists of

²⁵⁴ Figes, 421-33. These demonstrations of the soldiers and workers, the July Days, had turned into an uncontrolled revolt that caused the lives of hundreds and was desired by none of the factions, including the Bolsheviks, and arbitrarily ended up with the arrest of the Bolshevik leaders, including Trotsky, and the exile of Lenin to Finland.

²⁵⁵ Figes, 452.

²⁵⁶ Vladimir Lenin. "To the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.," *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed May 30, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/aug/30.htm>.

the Second World War.²⁵⁷ He also argues that the Bolsheviks did not represent any popular movement, but they were just a group of militant plotters, attempting to overthrow the regime, which is an exaggeration that can be understood by looking at the rumors and dissent against Kerensky, which took place before October and very unlikely to be directly related with the Bolsheviks.²⁵⁸

Pipes was correct about the militant organization of the Bolsheviks, which was used as a means to satisfy Lenin's "hunger for power" and their responsiveness to the international affairs.²⁵⁹ Nevertheless, it should be noted at this point that the Bolsheviks were not the primary or only cause of the autocracy and the state terror which had already existed for decades before the October Revolution and which actually created the hostile environment, in which the Bolsheviks and Lenin identified themselves and their doctrines in response to this violation and oppression, which was shared by the entire population of the Imperial Russia. Aside from that, Pipes accurately catches two important aspects of the Bolsheviks. The first one is Lenin's recognition of military power, led by the party of disciplined revolutionary professionals, as a necessary force to perform and protect the revolution. Eventually, it is the fact that the October Revolution could be achieved thanks to the military activities of the Bolsheviks.²⁶⁰

However, the second one of these aspects, meaning the internationalization of the revolution, is the main concern of this study, but the first one also had to be referred and studied under the concept of "the ideal party organization of Lenin" as they were both

²⁵⁷ Richard Pipes. *Three "Whys" of the Russian Revolution* (London: Pimlico, 1995), 60-2.

²⁵⁸ Figes, 478-9.

²⁵⁹ Pipes, 43.

²⁶⁰ Figes, 481.

related to understanding how the Bolsheviks came to power and did what they did in the international sphere.

In fact, both of these aspects had one common origin: Bolshevik Propaganda, in which they called for other countries' Socialists to become organized in order to agitate and overthrow their Imperialist regimes and their supporters, like they themselves had done, and they also promised to provide a peace formula to unite all these socialist regimes under a supra-national entity. This required the utilization of arms to make a *coup d'état* to take the first step and prepare a revolutionary army for the second step, the internationalization of the revolution.

As discussed above, Lenin called for the propagation of revolution and peace since the beginning of the war, and then added bread to their lexicon, especially after the February Revolution. This was the program for appealing to the practical needs of Russians, as Lenin had called it. Therefore, the peace propaganda had to be concluded with a declaration as soon as the first armed phase of the October Revolution became successful. The second step began with the declaration of the Peace Formula.

On October 26, the "Report on Peace" was issued by Lenin. In this decree, he called for no-annexation, open negotiations and denounced the secret treaties of the old regime. At the same time, he urged the Socialists of three great powers, Britain, Germany and France, to revolt and force their governments to accept this call for peace.²⁶¹ Therefore, Lenin repeated the peace terms that he had articulated as a Socialist leader, but this time he was talking as the leader of the only and first successful Socialist movement and the

²⁶¹ Vladimir Lenin. "Decree on Peace," *Marxist Internet Archive*, accessed June 01, 2018, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/oct/25-26/26b.htm>.

commander of the largest land forces of the world, even though they were in a miserable shape.

In the literature on the Soviet Decree on Peace of October 26, 1917, Lenin's foreign policy is depicted by some scholars, led by Kennan and Pipes, as an act of idealism on the part of Lenin, and it was claimed that the Decree was not approved by his fellow Bolsheviks either. It was also remarked that he was actually anti-Clauswitzian as he intended to use diplomacy as a means of war, not the opposite, and he intended to use the armistice with Germany to recover the Red Army and start a war of revolution across Europe.²⁶²

Although it is true that Lenin ordered Trotsky to delay the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk as long as he could, this should not be forgotten that they were the German representatives, who refused open diplomacy, no annexations and self-determination, briefly everything Lenin and Wilson agreed on. Hence, it is quite problematic to turn Lenin into a pure evil incarnate, who had exploited whatever he could find to depose his country's democratic government; to undermine the social order; and to spread his evilness to the other countries – one can read this sentence by assuming the word "evil" is a pseudonym of Communism, from the point of view of some Western scholars of the Cold War Era.

Even if it is true that Lenin foresaw the downfall of the Imperialists and Capitalists all over the world, this approach does not help to explain how both Wilson and Lenin had parallel expectations in terms of self-determination, open diplomacy and the end of Imperialism, while Wilson did not have any intention of destroying Capitalism. This approach also leads to assumptions on whether Wilson was deceived and misunderstood

²⁶² Richard Pipes. *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 166-7.

the world or whether he was just naïve or whether he was also evil and wanted to spread American Imperialism to Europe, so on so forth.

Another approach originates from focusing on the European political parties and their perception of Wilson and Lenin as "Wilson versus Lenin", which was expressed by Mayer in his quotation from Albert Thomas, a French Socialist and the war-time Minister of Armament:

Either Wilson, or Lenin. Either democracy based on the French Revolution, fortified by the struggles of an entire century, developed by the great American Republic, or the primitive, incoherent, brutal forms of Russian fanaticism. A choice must be made.²⁶³

This Eurocentric approach and the idea of coherence between Wilson and Lenin's views mutually fed the claim that Wilson and Lenin's views reinforced, each other.²⁶⁴ As much as the first view of Lenin the Evil was radical and biased, this approach is also so much European and tells more about the point of view of the European leaders like Thomas, including his contemporaries, ranging from Clemenceau to Lloyd and Scheidemann.

However, this approach possesses other problems. If Wilson is accepted to issue his declaration as a counter-manifesto to Lenin's Peace Decree, it does not explain the relationship between Wilson's peace formula, the arguments of the League to Enforce Peace, not much less than the arguments of Theodore Roosevelt's Nobel Address, and it undermines Wilson's own capacity of articulating an independent policy from its predecessors and implies that the Fourteen Points were nothing but an attempt to prevent the infusion of the Bolshevik propaganda especially into Germany and Eastern Europe.

²⁶³ Mayer, 386.

²⁶⁴ Mayer, 333.

The only solution is to focus on Wilson and Lenin's own stories in order to understand how Wilson and Lenin developed independent doctrines, whereas the parallels between them were caused by the undeniable truths of their era, such as the reality of the war and the disability of the Old Order to reproduce itself anymore; meanwhile, the separations occurred due to the distinct personalities, political contexts of these leaders as well as the characteristics of their own and their countries' histories.

4.2. The United States 1917

Herbert Hoover, future President of the United States of America, who was assigned in Europe to administer the US aid to Belgium, describes the shock that Americans had at the news of Germany's declaration of an unlimited submarine war, on February 1, 1917.²⁶⁵ Toward the end of that month, Hoover tells us how he strived to secure the neutrality rights of the United States before Germans. Nonetheless, his efforts were of no avail.

On February 24, President Wilson, on the other hand, received the message of Walter Hines Page, the Ambassador of the United States to Britain, which was including the decoding of the famous Zimmermann Telegram.²⁶⁶ In this telegram, German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann was informing the government of Mexico of the upcoming declaration of the unlimited submarine warfare in the Atlantic and was offering an alliance against the United States. On March 12, Hoover received the news of another German

²⁶⁵ Herbert Hoover. *The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958), 4-5.

²⁶⁶ Walter Hines Page to Robert Lansing. "Telegram from Ambassador Walter Page to Secretary of State Robert Lansing," *The National Archives Catalog*, accessed June 2, 2018, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/302022>.

attack, which sank twelve relief ships, including seven American and cost the lives of their crews.²⁶⁷

This was the last straw, and Wilson called the Congress for an extraordinary meeting, on March 21, 1917.²⁶⁸ On April 2, 1917, he declared "... armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable" before the German submarine attacks. Therefore, Wilson declared the objectives of the United States in this pursuit by these words:

Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles.

Before mentioning the Zimmerman Telegram, Wilson pointed out at Russia, which had just deposed the Tsar, and celebrated this activity along with defining the Provisional Government as "a fit partner for a League of Honor." While this remark is argued to have made Milyukov write his own note, Mayer argues that the Allied forces could only superficially talk about self-determination due to Russia's following annexation policies and Wilson had had suspicions about joining in an alliance with an imperialist power.²⁶⁹

Considering Milyukov's commitment to the expansionism of the Tsar, it is seen he did not only ignore the potential backlash in his own country but also, he misunderstood Wilson's address by declaring the Provisional Government's commitment to annexation policies and the secret treaties of the overthrown Emperor. However, if Wilson was

²⁶⁷ Hoover, 7.

²⁶⁸ Woodrow Wilson. "A Proclamation," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed June 3, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-41-02-0478%20WILS-print-01-41-02-0479-0001#WILS-01-41-02-pb-0446>.

²⁶⁹ Mayer, 164-7.

expecting to find a Russia committed to self-determination, no-annexation and an international concert of peoples, he was looking for it in the wrong place, because not the Provisional Government, but the Petrograd Soviet was advocating something similar to the American war-aims, but the Soviet had no intention to be a part of the military activities of the imperial powers, not much less than continuing to fight for the commitments of the Tsar.

Until June 1917, Wilson focused on mobilizing the country and explaining the reasons for war, so Russia was not his primary concern until he got reports from Senator Elihu Root, who was sent as the representative of the US to Russia, in April. He had a special mission, known as the Root Mission, named after the senator, to encourage the Provisional Government to establish democracy and continue to support the Allied Forces.²⁷⁰ However, it was made clear that the Root Mission was in no way meant to intervene in Russia's domestic affairs and was intended to establish friendly relations with the Socialists as well.²⁷¹

With a small flashforward, it should be noted here, even in July 1918, when Wilson agreed to participate in the Allies' Anti-Communist pursuits in Russia, he was clear that this intervention was going to be quite limited to save the Czecho-Slovak forces in Russia

²⁷⁰ Lloyd E. Ambrosius. "Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for Orderly Progress," *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 42-3. Also, see George Kennan. *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920 Volume I: Russia Leaves the War* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 19-20. Also, see Robert Lansing. "Robert Lansing's Message to the Government of Russia," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed June 4, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-42-02-0423-0001%20WILS-print-01-42-02-0423-0002%20WILS-print-01-42-02-0423-0003#WILS-01-42-02-pb-0368>.

²⁷¹ Elihu Root to Robert Lansing. "Telegram from Senator Elihu Root to Secretary of State Robert Lansing," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed June 4, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-search-1-3&expandNote=on#match1>.

and prevent the country from collapsing entirely before Germany, if possible. He specifically remarked that his position was similar to the one that he had taken in Mexico, and he desired to let Russians come up with their own solutions.²⁷² Although he did not grant any recognition to the Bolsheviks and showed his favor to the Whites, Wilson had taken his lesson in Veracruz and did not repeat the same mistakes, so he avoided becoming a party to the Russian Civil War.

However, back in mid-1917, it would be unfair to claim that Wilson expected the Bolsheviks to take the control, in any manner. Kennan argues that the Root Mission was a total disaster, and the reason behind this was Root and Wilson's incomprehension of the situation in Russia, inflicted by "demoralization" and "war-weariness".²⁷³ As a paraphrase of these words, Wilson did not understand the practical needs of Russians, unlike Lenin, and his words, "Practical questions can be settled only by practical means. Phrases will not accomplish the result", were nothing but pure irony. It is ironical because not only their arms but also their words had carried the Bolsheviks to power. Also, Wilson had nothing but words to use as the events came to a point, which was beyond the range of the weapons in 1917, and he actually realized in Mexico that weapons could only make things worse in an unstable country like the Russia of 1917.

Nevertheless, these "practical means", the nature of which was hinted at Root's statement of "no fight, no loans", achieved one thing, according to Kennan, and it was in hastening the downfall of Kerensky's government.²⁷⁴ Encouraged by the Allies and urged

²⁷² Ambrosius, 43.

²⁷³ George Kennan. *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920 Volume I: Russia Leaves the War* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 23.

²⁷⁴ Kennan, 23-5.

by Root, Kerensky ordered, as discussed above, Brusilov to launch the July Offensive, which ended up with total disaster and led to the replacement of Brusilov with Kornilov.

To understand the position of Wilson better, his greetings on July 5, 1917, to the newly appointed Russian Ambassador to the United States, Boris Aleksandrovich Bakhmetev, should be paid attention.²⁷⁵ In this message, Wilson's expectations from the Root Mission reflected on his own words as he repeated his desire for cooperation between the Provisional Government of Russia and the United States of America against Germany and ensuring the freedom and equality of its citizens. If Kennan's argument is taken into account, one can even conclude that the Root Mission caused what it was meant to prevent by opening the road to power for the Bolsheviks. However, it can be an underestimation of the other causes behind Kerensky's downfall and overestimation of the Mission's impact.

This way or another in November 1917 – due to the difference between the Russian and Western Calendars, the October Revolution took place in November for the West – the unexpected thing happened and the Bolsheviks came to power. Meanwhile, Wilson was busy with other matters as he was trying to define the nature of the relationship between the Allies and the United States as can be seen in his message to Herbert Hoover, asking to avoid using the word “ally” and to prefer “associates”.²⁷⁶ He was also occupied with the

²⁷⁵ Woodrow Wilson. “A Greeting to the New Russian Ambassador,” *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed June 4, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-43-02-0111%20WILS-print-01-43-02-0112#WILS-01-43-02-pb-0100>.

²⁷⁶ Hoover, 12.

mobilization of the country, which involved various tasks, ranging from motivating the National Army,²⁷⁷ to encouraging volunteers to the Red Cross.²⁷⁸

On December 4, 1917, Wilson addressed Congress for the Fifth Annual Message, which was the turning point of these events.²⁷⁹ Wilson turned this speech into an event to inform not only his compatriots but also the subjects of belligerent powers, by specifically naming the Austrian Empire and the citizens of Russia. While doing this, Wilson self-appointed himself as a spokesman for “the voices of humanity”, which demanded “no annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities” and practically a peace without victory, then. He also expressed his belief that Russians were deceived by “the masters of German intrigue”, and now, they were looking for a separate peace. Wilson claimed, by referring to the aggression of Germany, that the United States was commitment to the objective of protecting the aforementioned three principles in these words:

All these things have been true from the very beginning of this stupendous war; and I cannot help thinking that if they had been made plain at the very outset the sympathy and enthusiasm of the Russian people might have been once for all enlisted on the side of the Allies. . .

²⁷⁷ Woodrow Wilson. “A message to the soldiers of the National Army,” *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed June 4, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-44-02-0157%20WILS-print-01-44-02-0158#WILS-01-44-02-pb-0142>.

²⁷⁸ Woodrow Wilson. “An Appeal to the American People to Join the Red Cross,” *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed June 4, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-44-02-0676-0001%20WILS-print-01-44-02-0676-0002#WILS-01-44-02-pb-0555>. Also see Woodrow Wilson. “A Proposed Statement on the Progress of the War Effort (draft),” *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed June 4, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-44-02-0537%20WILS-print-01-44-02-0538#WILS-01-45-02-0446-0002-fn-0001>.

²⁷⁹ Woodrow Wilson. “Fifth Annual Message, December 4, 1917,” *The American Presidency Project*, accessed June 5, 2018, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25831>.

It is very likely that Wilson was mistaking his own voice for “the voice of humanity”, but apart from this idealism, there was one point in which he was, completely, mistaken. If he expected Lenin to follow the footsteps of Kerensky, it showed that Wilson did not know who the Bolsheviks were and what their leader had advocated since the beginning of the war, and above all, he did not know to what extent the army and people were exhausted in Russia.

If it is accepted as true that the Bolsheviks were manipulating the masses due to being under the control of Germany, these masses were responding to the Bolshevik propaganda even more than expected – remember Trotsky’s efforts to keep the revolting sailors away from violent acts and how he saved Chernov’s life during the July Days. Furthermore, the first claim does not explain how the Bolsheviks stood for the same principles years before the Great War, even if they were doing this for different reasons than Wilson.

Nevertheless, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, in accordance with the statements of his President, made a statement of his own that was meant to encourage the Bolsheviks to meet the treaties of the former governments of Russia, which meant undertaking the commitments of the Imperialist secret treaties of the Tsar, to establish a constitutional democracy, which meant the Bolsheviks had to hand over the power through elections, and to carry on the war against Germany, which would mean giving against their own “peace and bread” propaganda.²⁸⁰ Fortunately, neither Lenin nor Trotsky lacked the intelligence to follow such a path to join Nicholas II, Prince Lvov and Kerensky on Charon’s boat.

²⁸⁰ Robert Lansing. “A Statement by Robert Lansing,” *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed June 5, 2018,

After Wilson's address on December 14, 1917, Ambassador Bakhmetev, representative of the overthrown Provisional Government, began his lobbying activities and sent a lengthy memorandum to Washington.²⁸¹ In this memorandum, he admitted that Russia could not be recovered in a way that would allow it to be a part of the military activities of the Allies anymore. He also claimed that with the Bolshevik *coup d'état*, there was no chance left for democracy in Russia, so that Bakhmetev claimed there had been an opportunity under Nicholas II, Prince Lvov, Kerensky or Kornilov. After depicting a dark portrait of Russia, he concluded that US aid was needed to establish democracy and to save Russian provinces before being separated and preyed by Germany. Wilson might have misunderstood Russia, but Bakhmetev apparently understood the fears of Americans, very well. Thereupon, he shared three items of the solution for Russia, which were "propaganda", "economic organization" and "relief". Then, he explained that he meant "educational activities" to spread "the real aims and intentions of the world democracies", meaning the United States and the Allies.

Bakhmetev and Lansing represented two different factors that affected Wilson's thoughts about the Bolsheviks in this period. The former was a representative of the old Russia and disturbed by the popular movements in the country. People like him still believed that with an armed resistance and foreign support the events could be reversed in their country. In this matter, they used their propaganda machine ruthlessly against the Bolsheviks. The latter was a member of conservative Americans, who were equally

<http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-45-02-0208#WILS-01-45-02-pb-0205>

²⁸¹ Boris Aleksandrovich Bakhmetev. "Memoranda by Boris Aleksandrovich Bakhmet'ev on the conditions in Russia," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed June 5, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-52-02-0001>.

disturbed by the mobs of Russia and afraid of the occurrence of similar events in the countries of Europe and Americas. They were extremely critical of the Bolsheviks and their Anti-Capitalist doctrines.

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks were dealing with the threat of German invasion. The German-Bolshevik relations during the Great War already had a strange tone, and at some points, it led to ironical consequences. For instance, both Kennan and Gregor report that the German High Command secretly funded the Bolshevik movement during the events of 1917 as it was a strongly anti-war group among the factions existing at that time.²⁸² At the end, Lenin's peace propaganda evidently worked out and saved Germany from fighting in two fronts, which meant, according to Kennan's analysis, "a gift of about one million men" and perhaps even more importantly the encumbrances of the logistic support for such a large army on the eve of the offensive planned to be launched on the Western front in spring.

As can be deduced from this picture, the German High Command and the Bolshevik Party were not friends, yet instead two natural enemies, who had to sit around the negotiation table due to material necessities. For the Bolsheviks, a peace treaty without annexations and indemnities would not only provide fresh air to Russia, but it would also lead to a crack the so-called "capitalist front", in Lenin's own words as it was remarked by Gregor.²⁸³

²⁸² George F. Kennan. *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin*, (Little Brown & Co., June 1st, 1961), 42 and Richard Gregor. "Lenin, Revolution, and Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 22, no. 4 (1967): 568.

²⁸³ Gregor, 571.

However, the German High Command also had its own plans. This situation revealed itself as soon as the negotiations started, shortly after signing the armistice. Germans were not only demanding to annex the Baltic States and Russian Poland but also, they were negotiating with the Non-Communist Ukrainian separatists, as though they were an independent political entity.

Trotsky, however, confessed that his main objective in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations was to delay signing a treaty as long as possible,²⁸⁴ so the revolutionaries in Germany and Austria could have enough time to put pressure on their governments to accept the demands of open diplomacy, no annexations, no indemnities, and self-determination, all of which did not happen. The Bolshevik Commissar for Foreign Affairs found himself before a group of irreconcilable aristocrats from Prussia and Austria, while he was deprived of the support of the Socialists of these German countries. Therefore, the gamble of German leaders with the Bolshevik experiment ended up with disappointment for both sides, and the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk Treaty were blocked by its participants as soon as their start.

On January 8, 1917, Wilson began his famous speech with statements about these negotiations.²⁸⁵ He praised the Russian Delegates, led by Trotsky, for being "sincere", "earnest", for insisting on open diplomacy because of their being "very justly", "very wisely", "in the true spirit of democracy"; one would have expected the President to declare his membership to the Bolshevik Party, if he had continued with this.

²⁸⁴ Leon Trotsky. *My Life: An Attempted Autobiography* (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1970), 369.

²⁸⁵ Woodrow Wilson. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Conditions of Peace, January 4, 1918," *The American Presidency Project*, accessed June 5, 2018, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25831>.

Then, he stated “. . . we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace”, and added “The program of the world’s peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it. . .” so he began to count his Fourteen Points, which was the repetition of the principles of open diplomacy (Point I), self-determination (Point V), a supra-national organization of states (Point XIV), and he also added free navigation (Point II), free-trade (Point III) and disarmament (Point IV).

Among these points, four of them, namely the Points I, V, IV, and XIV, were the shared grounds between the Bolsheviks and the Progressives. The reason behind this was that these points were made against a common problem, which was the old imperial order with its wars of annexation and secret diplomatic treaties. These were the points of realism.

In contrast, the points of idealism, namely the Points II and III, were the characteristic parts of the Liberal-Progressive Formula. They were meant to appeal the request for the restoration of the international trade system, eliminated by the effects of the Great War. Wilson’s second group of idealistic points was corresponding to Lenin’s own points of idealism, related to the Soviets’ support and call for an international revolution and the destruction of the Capitalist system, in sense of their position between idealism and realism. To understand how Wilson and Lenin were the two contrasting parts of the New Order, the cause and effect of these points must be well understood.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

5.1. Points of Realism

These were the points which provided the material for the consensus between American and Russian Peace Offers. They demanded the elimination of wars of annexation, which had been considered legitimate in the feudal, and later imperial system. The territories of an empire were considered to be the property of the sovereign, and his rights on these lands could be transferred to another ruler, in case of a defeat at war. This system did not only lead to the death and dislocation of huge populations throughout history, but it was the excuse behind the Pan-Slavist and Pan-Germanist policies of the Russian and Austria-Hungarian Empires.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, this system was no longer applicable due to various reasons. The most important of them was the increasing awareness of the ethnic groups about their own identities, which had begun to increase starting with the French and American Revolutions. The subjects of the ancient empires began to demand their own sovereignties. This was the process which turned the Habsburg Empire into the Dual-Monarchy. These internal conflicts were pregnant with many more conflicts, and it happened to be so. The Austrian and Ottoman Empires were prone to be first victims of this wave of changes. Other empires began to plot for annexing the territories, splitting away from these dying giants.

On the other hand, the legitimization of annexations was the excuse for economic wars. When this type of war is mentioned, it should not be thought of the colonial wars in the peripherals, only. Although they were a part of this, it did not necessarily mean the wars that took place in distant colonies of the empires; instead, there were regions in Continental Europe, which were the spots of such incidents. Alsace-Lorraine, Ukraine, and the Dardanelles were just a few of the examples for these regions. For the rich mineral resources, fertile fields and important ports of these locations, empires mobilized massive armies and caused the slaughter of thousands.

With the increasing population and urbanization thanks to the Second Industrial Revolution, these conflicts had reached a point in which they could threaten the world system. Mass production led to the employment of huge numbers of laborers and this led to the foundation of massive business organizations. The petite-bourgeois of store and farm owners of the early nineteenth century left its place to the class of bourgeois, which was possessing massive wealth and power now. While this era witnessed production at an extreme level, it also experienced the extreme needs for resources to feed these industrial plants. The industrial race between empires turned into their own struggle for survival. They could either feed the monopolies that they themselves had created or they could be fed to them as happened in Russia, in February 1917.

The struggle to capture regions, carrying strategic importance for the industrial economies, also reached a massive scale. Everything had grown bigger and become faster in this process, the steam-engine allowed ships to sail faster and trains to carry massive loads of products and materials from one end to another. It is surprising that not many people thought these ships could also carry bigger guns and these trains could transport

troops just like their commercial cargoes. The industrial race was on the eve of turning into an arms race, shortly before the explosion of all of them. This explosion was nothing like anything that had happened before; it was so big that the distant corners of the world, Russia and America, were not so far away anymore, and they were no exceptions from the ideas, policies, products, armies and many other aspects of the world.

This was also the epoch when the industrial cities were emerging around the industrial zones, and human beings were also treated as a type of capital. As a resource this human capital had to be processed to be ready for use, thus national education systems became the primary subjects of the political agendas of the industrial empires. The educated middle-class of experts were born out of this process. Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky and most of the other heroes of this story were members of this new class.

Soon, this new educated elite began to question its own environment. It was just a matter of time before they began to find the faults of the international system, too. After diagnosing the problems, they brought their solutions to the political powerhouses of their countries and appealed to the citizens of their own country. And in fact, this brought success to them. Unlike their predecessors, they were more responsive to the problems of the urban masses. This is the reason why domestic reforms were occurring at the same time with the demands for reforms in the international sphere.

However, this optimistic picture could not be shared by Russian intellectuals. As soon as they were persuaded that much bigger reforms than those of Alexander II were needed and it could mean the change of even the entire regime, they were confronted by the violence and suppression of the Monarchy. These circumstances marginalized and

made them as much violent as the treatment that they faced. These were the roots of the different interpretations within the Forces of Movement.

However, this was also the cause of the coherent parts behind Roosevelt's Nobel Peace Address, the League to Enforce Peace, the Fourteen Points and the Peace Decree of the Bolsheviks. They were all aware that annexations could not be carried on in the New World System, in which wars could not be kept limited due to the extreme size and powers of the industrial countries and any conflict between them could threaten the entire world peace. The industries and bourgeois-class that had provided the last connection for the empires to stay alive could not survive such a war, either. Therefore, the Progressives of America aimed at preventing such a conflict and eliminating the causes of it, even if it meant the elimination of the entire old system, whereas the Bolsheviks of Russia embraced the conflict and aimed at using it as an opportunity to eliminate the old system completely. They both put their plans forward when the downfall of the old system came, and they both failed in achieving their goals after that; they were ahead of their time.

The principle of self-determination was the main pillar, if they could have secured no-annexations of any minor or major state. This principle was meant to be the keystone of the new system. First of all, it nullified the possibility of foreign intervention in case of an internal crisis of a country by recognizing the unquestionable sovereignty of the people on the affairs of their countries. Both Wilson and Lenin, as well as other aforementioned leaders, were aware of the fact that such crises were exploited as excuses by greater powers to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states for their own benefit.

Wilson compared these greater powers to monopolies, which were harming democracy and equality in the United States, and he advocated that such an accumulation

of power was something that had to be prevented as they did exactly what they did inside his country by securing their own hegemonies. Lenin was thinking on the problem of ethnicities under the Russian Empire as early as 1913. He was one of the first thinkers, who realized how the imperial powers violated the rights of minor states and waged wars to usurp their resources to feed their own industries. Colonialization did not only cause the usurpers to reach enormous sizes but also its legitimization was serving as an incentive for the wars between the colonizers. While crushing the proletariat inside to compel them to work under inhumane conditions and killing foreign populations to exploit the resources of their lands and even their labor as slaves, the emperors and their collaborators were leading soldiers to death and gambling with their rivals. This cycle of usurpation and war could be ended by recognizing and securing the rights of the minor powers.

Nonetheless, Wilson and Lenin were also aware that this new system could be quite unstable as it could not have five or six major decision makers yet dozens of new local powers, all of which would have their own expectations and competitions with their neighbors. Something was needed to stabilize this system.

Wilson believed that democracies would not fight unless it was for defensive reasons. On the contrary, Lenin reached the conclusion that in order to access more wealth and resources the rulers were manipulating the masses to fight against other countries' people, who were not in any better position in terms of their relations with their own rulers. By this means, the rulers were not only exploiting the labors of their populations, but they were also using them as tools to conduct their own wars. Therefore, he claimed that a Socialist world would not have any more wars as the exploited of every nation could have nothing to demand from their neighbors, except for their cooperation to coexist.

If one is asked to put these points on a scale by considering their closeness to pure utopianism or realism, the principle of a supra-national body to govern the New Order could be slightly falling on the utopian side of such a graphic. Hence, the major cracks, which eventually led to the ultimate break between Progressive and Socialist movements on the New World Order, originated from this part, when they began to stray away from realism.

It should not be understood that idealism created the conflicts and it was something to be blamed for. Instead, it was the element which allowed Wilson and Lenin to get out of the political and ideological unproductivity of the Forces of Order and get a move on to propose models for the New World.

However, they, of course, defined what they saw in their own unique styles as two different persons, with different life experiences and conditions. Nevertheless, in this matter, it was certain that the major evil was Imperialism, so both of them could see that clearly and suggested solutions. However, when the subject became the design of the new system, Wilson and Lenin put forth their own models, on the basis of their worldviews.

Consequently, Mayer was right when he aligned these two leaders in the Forces of Movement. However, neither did they perceive each other as the ultimate evil nor did they initially begin quarreling as soon as they were introduced to learn about the proposal of one another in 1917. In the beginning, Wilson and Lenin stood on the same side against Imperialism and the Old Order. Although they kept their distances from each other, the ultimate evils in this drama were Imperialism and social inequality, which were feeding and consuming each other like a dragon eating his own tail. Yet, one must be careful while

playing with an explosive material like ideologies. Even though they fought against a common enemy, Wilson and Lenin found rivals in each other on the points of idealism.

5.2. Points of Idealism

As soon as the leaders of the Forces of Movement saw the light at the end of the tunnel and gained full confidence that they were right about the end of the Old Era and they were destined to be the mediators of the new one, they declared their own ideals. Wilson wanted to see Russia as a country that adopted democracy with his ignorance of the seriousness of the social crisis that it was going through. He despised Lenin for not holding elections, while the oligarchs and generals of the *ancien régime* were demanding his head.

Lenin, on the other hand, despised Wilson for protecting the monetary elites of his country, by ignoring the fact that the President was nothing but an elected-official to preserve and enforce the Constitution of the United States and the American system was not providing an obstacle before people to gain their rights. Its amendable nature, in fact, provided an opportunity to reform the country without falling into the abyss of the civil war like the one that broke out in 1861, which was caused at the point when there was a constitutional crisis, actually.

In addition to their mutual contempt and distrust, they assumed the role of the world leader and declared the characteristics of the New World Order. They both brought their own countries' systems and imagined a new order in the model of their systems. Wilson, as a believer of American democracy, believed that a democratic order and liberal economic system could achieve the stability that was provided in the United States. Disarmament could follow the institutionalization of the international system in this model.

Therefore, these were the fundamental components of the Collective Security in Wilson's mind.

On the contrary, Lenin, having given up on establishing a constitutional democracy of the people after the failures of Russia that it went through under the old regime and its provisional extension, advocated the necessity of the total annihilation of the old system by the means of revolution. Whereas Wilson believed in gradual reforms to establish the new system, Lenin demanded international revolution.

While the supra-national body for organizing and harmonizing the New World Order was supposed to consist of democratic nation-states in Wilson's opinion, Lenin insisted that the fundamental unit of this system had to be socialist dictatorships, and until it was achieved, Lenin embraced the possibility of the rule of anarchy and revolutionary wars until the soil was ready for the plantation of the sprouts of the new system.

This was the origin of the schism within the Forces of Movement, which made it certain that no sooner than the empires' downfall they were apt to become the centers of two poles of the New Order. Hence, when the Cold War came thirty years later, the students of Russia like Kennan began to tell how it was corrupt and tyrannical by nature. However, they totally ignored how both the US and USSR got on the world stage as the champions of the same cause, which deprived these two powers of accepting each other's differences and of reconciling for almost a century.

Without understanding how these two powers were actors on the same front before they divided their common front into two halves, one cannot understand how they could once again meet in the years of the Second World War and separate again for one last time.

Even the Cold War did not stand for the decades of a permanent détente; on the contrary, it was a period of consecutive rapprochements and détentes, which continued until these two champions of the movement reached a consensus on ceasing fighting over the ideals and trying to find a common ground. This took them seventy-four years, from 1917 until 1991, and in effect, this process still continues, today.

Although Wilson and Lansing assigned William C. Bullitt to analyze the situation and negotiate with the Soviets for a possible armistice and peace in Russia in 1919, and later Bullitt reported how the Soviets were ready for a peace conference, providing that they were to be recognized and their security was to be guaranteed against the anti-Soviet forces of the Russian Civil War and the Allied Forces,²⁸⁶ these affairs could not reach any conclusion due to the pressure from the Conservatives. Georges Clemenceau, the Prime Minister of France, spoke for these conservative notions against recognizing and negotiating with the Bolsheviks due to the fear of the spread of Communism, and thus served to the Forces of Order.²⁸⁷

The biggest mistake of Wilson and Lenin was closing the doors of negotiation to each other after the failure of the Bullitt Mission and before having any chance to find a common ground of coexistence for their ideals in the international system. It is ironical considering the fact that they themselves were the advocates of open diplomatic negotiations. The coldness of the Cold War might be appreciated in military terms as it did not turn into a "hot war" between two sides, but on the plane of ideas, this coldness and

²⁸⁶ William Christian Bullitt. "From William Christian Bullitt on March 16, 1919," *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition*, ed. Arthur S. Link (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press: Rotunda), accessed July 15, 2018, <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-55-02-0391>.

²⁸⁷ William Christian Bullitt. *The Bullitt Mission to Russia: Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate of William Christian Bullitt* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1919) 20-4 and 32.

long years of détente, as its by-product, caused probably the biggest vicious cycle of the history of humanity. Thus, as soon as the damages, caused by the barrenness of the détente, was comprehended, the ices of cold began to melt and relations between the states warmed up.

By understanding how these years, especially after the Second World War, served the US and USSR as formative years, in which they reformed themselves as the Civil Rights and Labor Laws got adopted in the Western societies, while the East learnt how to trust and open itself to its Capitalist neighbors without demonizing them, so it began to experiment with the concepts of parliamentary democracy, private industry, and non-partisan social structure, one can understand how the Cold War could end peacefully when open dialogs were established between the parties.

Nonetheless, the twentieth-century was the Century of Wilsonianism and Leninism. Although they were casted aside with the end of the First World War, since both of them were defeated in the international affairs as the former's model got refused in the parliament of his own country, while the latter's call for revolution was not responded as much enthusiastically as he expected by the Socialists of Germany, Britain, and France. However, when the global system collapsed, what the leaders of the Second World War years did was returning to the doctrines of Wilson and Lenin. Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared the United States' commitment to democracy, open negotiations, free-trade and the Collective Security under a supra-national institution, and he found Stalin willing to cooperate.

They could leave this legacy thanks to the combination of realism and idealism. The realistic analysis of the events allowed both Wilson and Lenin to realize the corruption

of the Old World and to develop strategies so as to cope with the threats that they confronted, while the rulers of this Old World put up a final fight of survival. The idealism, however, granted them the vision for the coming New Era, along with the moral and intellectual superiority, which eventually turned into ideological models for their successors and granted them universality.

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APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY

1848-1912

<i>1848,</i>	<i>February 19, 1861,</i>
Revolutions of 1848	Alexander II's Emancipation Reform
<i>1850s-1870s,</i>	<i>12 April, 1861,</i>
Golden Age of <i>Laissez-Faire</i>	American Civil War
<i>May 1-October 15, 1851,</i>	<i>1863,</i>
Great Exhibition of London; Crystal Palace	Chernyshevsky's <i>What is to be Done?</i>
<i>October 4, 1853,</i>	<i>December 6, 1865,</i>
Crimean War	Thirteenth Amendment of US Constitution ratified
<i>March 20, 1854,</i>	<i>1863-77,</i>
Collapse of the Second Party System of the United States, Birth of the Republican Party	American Reconstruction Era
<i>December 28, 1856,</i>	<i>April 10, 1870,</i>
Wilson is born	Lenin is born

1877,

Failure of Reconstruction, Jim Crow
Laws

1879,

Narodnaya Volya founded

1870-98,

Gilded Age, Rise of Monopolies,
Worsening Labor Conditions

1873-1879

Long Depression, Panic of 1873

1880s,

American Labor Strikes and Pro-
Corporation Governments, Second
Industrial Revolution

March 1, 1881,

Assassination of Alexander II

March 14, 1883,

Death of Karl Marx

June 27, 1884,

Bureau of Labor Established in United
States

May 8, 1887,

Execution of Alexander Ulyanov

March 31, 1889,

Eiffel Tower

July 2, 1890,

Sherman Anti-Trust Laws, Ocala
Demands

1893,

Lenin joins Party of Marxist
Emancipation of Labor and meets
Plekhanov

March 1-3, 1898,

Congress of the Russian Social
Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP)

April 21, 1898,

Spanish-American War

September 27, 1898,

Theodore Roosevelt, Governor of New
York

1899,

Lenin published "The Development of
Capitalism in Russia"

December 1, 1900,

First issue of *Iskra*

September 6, 1901,

Assassination of McKinley

September 14, 1901,

President Theodore Roosevelt

1902,

Massive Labor Strikes in United States

1902,

Lenin's *What is to be Done? Burning
Questions of Our Movement*

July 17-August 10, 1903,

Second Congress of RSDLP, split
between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks
1904,

Roosevelt's Square Deal Policy and Anti-
Trust Policies

March 14, 1904,

United States v. Northern Securities Co.

February 8, 1904-September 5, 1905,

Russo-Japanese War

January 9, 1905,

"Bloody Sunday," St. Petersburg
Revolution of 1905

1906,

Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle*

June 29, 1906,

Hepburn Act

June 30, 1906,

Food and Drug Act,

Federal Meat Inspection Act

1907,

Lenin exiled again

4 March, 1909,

President William Howard Taft

August, 1910,

The Mann-Elkins Act

January 17, 1910,

Wilson, Governor of New Jersey

May 5, 1910,

Roosevelt's Nobel Address

November 20, 1910,

Mexican Civil War

1911,

United States v. Standard Oil and United
States v. U.S. Steel

1912,

Woodrow Wilson vs. Theodore
Roosevelt; New Freedom vs. New
Nationalism

1912-1918

April 8, 1913,

17th Amendment to Constitution against
corruption in Senate ratified

1913,

Federal Reserve Act to stabilize economy

April 21, 1914,

Veracruz Incident

June 28, 1914,

Great War begins

August 3-October 31, 1914,

Invasion of Belgium

May 7, 1915,

Lusitania sunk

June 1915,

League to Enforce Peace founded	<i>July 3-7, 1917,</i>
<i>February 22, 1916,</i>	July Days
House-Grey Memorandum, possibility of	<i>July 24, 1917,</i>
US involvement in war	Kerensky, Prime Minister of the
<i>June-September 1916,</i>	Provisional Government
Brusilov Offensive	<i>June 18-22, 1917,</i>
<i>February 23 - March 3, 1917,</i>	Kerensky Offensive
February Revolution	<i>June 1917,</i>
<i>March 1, 1917,</i>	Kornilov, Commander of the Armies
Zimmermann Telegram published	<i>August 1917,</i>
<i>June 1917,</i>	Kornilov Revolt
Root Mission	<i>October 1917,</i>
<i>April 4, 1917,</i>	Bolshevik Revolution
Lenin's April Theses	<i>December 1917,</i>
<i>April 6, 1917,</i>	Brest-Litovsk Negotiations
US declares war against Germany	<i>January 1918,</i>
<i>April 20, 1917,</i>	Fourteen Points
Milyukov Note	* All the dates concerning Russia are given in the Old-Style format.