

Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy in the post-Wilsonian Era



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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ABSTRACT

Ideology, as a system of ideas characterizing that forms the basis of theories and policies, shapes the way in which citizens and politicians conceptualize foreign policy. In analyzing the determinants of American foreign policy in the post-Wilsonian era, this research considers realism and idealism to be the two opposing foundational ideologies upon which additional systems in political thought are founded. An analysis of ideologies, in this sense, from isolationism to neoliberalism and expansionism demonstrates that the core ideological roots found in American policy doctrines are formed as a result of constant symbiotic interplay of political realism and idealism. Approaching ideology on the basis of continuity and change, this research attempts to analyze the areas in which ideologies influenced American foreign policy in the post-Wilson period by analyzing the prominent social and political understandings since the birth of America as a nation and state.. The main purpose of this academic study, therefore, is to identify the role of ideology in influencing American politicians and state policies, in the formation of policies characterizing foreign affairs of the United States.

Keywords: American foreign policy; American political thought; conservatism; idealism; liberalism; realism

ÖZET

Teorilerin ve politikaların temelini oluşturan bir fikirler sistemi olarak ideoloji, vatandaş ve politikacıların dış politikayı algılama biçimini büyük ölçüde şekillendirir. Bu araştırma, Wilson sonrası dönemde Amerikan dış politikasının belirleyici faktörlerini analiz ederken, gerçekçilik ve idealizmi, siyasi düşüncede ek sistemlerin üzerine kurulduğu iki karşıt temel ideoloji olarak ele alır. Bu anlamda izolasyonizmden neoliberalizme ve yayılmacılığa ideolojilerin bir analizi, Amerikan politikası doktrinlerinin, bu temel ideolojik dayanaklar olan siyasi gerçekçilik ve idealizmin sürekli sembiyotik etkileşiminin yanı sıra bir sentezi de oluştuğunu gösterir. İdeolojiye süreklilik ve değişim temelinde yaklaşan bu araştırma, Amerika'nın bir millet ve devlet olarak doğmasından bu yana öne çıkan toplumsal ve politik anlayışları analiz ederek, ideolojilerin Wilson sonrası dönemde Amerikan dış politikasını etkilediği alanları incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bu akademik çalışmanın temel amacı, ideolojinin Amerikan politikacılarını ve devlet politikalarını etkilemedeki rolünü ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin dış politikasına yansımalarını saptamaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Amerikan dış politikası; Amerikan siyasi düşüncesi; idealizm; liberalizm; muhafazakârlık; realizm;

DEDICATION

To my family, undying sources of inspiration and the bright moonlight.



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INTRODUCTION

1.1 Preface

In this research paper, I have set out to investigate the determinants of policy making in foreign affairs, on the basis of the concept of ideology. States are the primary actors in international relations, and the politics of their governance requires policy choices, principles and strategies in the architecture of state behavior. My studies on interstate interactions at the graduate level stimulated my interest in the progression of international relations as a domain of political science. In an attempt to analyze actions taken by states, I seek to illustrate the correlation between the rationales and the implementation of policies in foreign affairs. These two aspects of foreign policy are tied together by ideology, which in turn plays a prominent role in making sense of governments' strategies. Articulating states' agendas in a multipolar setting of politics, ideologies are adopted to justify and reinforce nations' stance at home and abroad.

For the purpose of outlining the role of ideology in influencing state behavior within a given setting, I have focused on the United States as a case study. The United States of America, as a state, presents multifarious societal factors that have been conducive to the adoption of political ideologies which have had far-reaching implications for the world. From the outset, the American nation has embraced a self-image built on the uncommon founding ideals of governance and thus demonstrated state behavior characterized as American exceptionalism. My research on the rationales driving nations' foreign policy choices indicates that the ideologies adopted by American statesmen, as well as by the state at large, can be classified into two opposing camps that will be judged to be core ideologies. Political realism, a theory that explains state activity with reference to the politics of power, competition and conflict, characterizes accompanying ideologies such as expansionism that engender foreign policies based on pragmatic interests. Political idealism, on the other hand, typifies policies that involve values and beliefs in line with the nation's identity and normative aspirations in foreign affairs. The main thesis in this paper presents an examination of the nature and role of ideology in the conduct of foreign policy. Featured below are preliminary findings on characters and events in American history that have left behind legacies and pillars of foreign policy, evaluated in relation to political ideologies

1.2 Background

Ideologies are systems of ideas constituting any given practice, held at the individual as well as national level that serve to determine the conduct of American foreign policy. What distinguishes the ideologies adopted by American politicians, primarily, are the values based on idealism that make the nation not also exemplary or pioneering but also ‘superior to other nations’ and deserving of privileges over other national groups. (Mearsheimer, 2011, 8) The United States, like any other state, is subject to the competitive and conflictual aspects of political realism. Nonetheless, the foundations of Americans’ deeply rooted self-perception of exceptionalism arguably allow the United States to defy predominantly pragmatic interests in *realpolitik* in a way other nations cannot. American exceptionalism, accordingly, was born predominantly idealistic, although the symbiotic nature of realism and idealism necessitated in time that exceptional national features be built on realism as well. America has been identified as ‘the Kingdom of God on Earth,’ founded upon the European philosophical conception of the state, as ‘a sphere in which eternal truth and justice is or should be realized.’ (Tucker, 1978, 628) This self-image incites the American nation to place a relatively heavier emphasis on morals, values and idealism, relative to primarily pragmatic interests and the dictates of *realpolitik* or realism, in the making of ideologies that construct the foreign policy practice of the United States. The endeavor to investigate the nature and role of ideology in shaping American foreign policy necessitates a historical analysis of the nation’s political narratives and policy choices. This paper will examine the origins, function and evolution of foundational and accompanying state ideologies in the form of state behavior, presidential doctrines and political legacies, to provide a basis for the adoption of recurring as well as contrasting foreign policy practices of the United States.

Based on a number of scholars whose work I have examined in this research, I hold that the nature of ideologies adopted by states and individuals can be analyzed via a bipolar theoretical framework. Idealism and realism are therefore considered to be two opposing foundational ideologies that characterize American foreign policy, and tie to other accompanying ideological orientations influencing state behavior and individuals’ decision making in politics. These accompanying ideologies, evaluated within the dual realism/idealism paradigm, include liberalism, conservatism, isolationism, expansionism and more. Idealism, in this paper, is primarily

associated with inherent idiosyncratic values and the exemplary global role of the United States such as in promoting democracy, multilateral conduct, diplomacy and cooperation. Realism, on the other hand, correlates with the politics and maximization of power, competition, pragmatic interests and the enforcement role of the United States around the globe. On the nature of the function and coexistence of these two ideologies in governance, it will be argued that a society undeniably is built on common national interests, and yet it is values and beliefs that serve to strengthen it by conceiving a sense of community and identity.

Idealism is and has been remarkably prominent in American politics due to the unique intellectual and societal foundations of the republic, to be examined in this research. As such, American exceptionalism, an outlook that draws on national identity, self-image and mission, is assumed to have arisen initially based on idealism with an emphasis on values and beliefs. National ideology, defined as the sum of prevalent ideas and norms that guides the members of society in their behavior, can therefore be utilized in garnering popular support for administrations' policies. (Levi, 1970, 20) The values at the heart of ideology in statecraft carry vital significance in steering policy making processes and instructing 'what ought to be.' This process, with idealistic ideology at times directly engendering policy choices as well as being shaped by them, has historically been conspicuous in the foreign policy mechanism of the United States. American society came into being prior to the formation of the U.S. as an actor in the order of competitive states, and it possessed shared ideas other than blood or religion. This characteristic of the nation allowed its people to forego the competitive nationalism of the Old World and its restrictive geopolitical concerns in the making of the nation. Americans were virtually able to import political notions and ideologies of the enlightenment, such as individualism, republicanism, and federalism from Europe, to craft their identity. They had not needed, in other words, to make the mistakes other states had, for progress as a nation. As a mass society, Americans did not "grasp the politics, history, and social forces out of which foreign policy is typically made elsewhere," (Lepgold and McKeown, 1995, p 383) and thus American politics was 'exceptionally' conducive to idealism.

The opposing camp of ideology, realism, is presumed to offer the most accurate explanations for state behavior, as states are obligated by earthly concerns to prioritize survival to protect their existence, borders and national security at large. Although realists emphasize the

anarchic order in the international system, Mearsheimer, an offensive realist, acknowledges this is “not to say that the system is characterized by chaos or disorder.” (2011, 5) The United States is endowed with the qualifications to contribute to international order as an exemplary leader, as its conception as a state has been embellished with elements of what is known in the literature as American exceptionalism. Because exceptionalism depicts US global dominance via “representations of a destabilized world order in need of US power to maintain order,” (Pease, 2009, 20) American exceptionalism may carry elements of political realism based on dominance, in addition to idealism based on exemplary leadership. The founding fathers and early American leaders crafted an ideology that revolves around the elevated self-image of an uncommon nation born extraordinary. America was a nation born on a mission to be “a city upon a hill” as a product of “some divine plan,” (Engen, 2020) and a beacon of hope for the world. Therefore, American exceptionalism is a driving force in inspiring foreign policies, and explains the nation’s presumed capacity to avert the challenges urging other states to put interests before ideologies. The United States is and has been thought to be exceptional in its ability to defy, at times and when needed, external factors and the quest for material advantage, to play the game of states on its own terms. Americans view the instruments and objectives of realpolitik suspiciously (Lepgold and McKeown, 1995, 370) and this peculiarity allows the U.S. to bypass the boundaries of material interests, and justify conflict or cooperation with reference to an exceptional, morally superior position.

Other studies that concentrate on the tangible, practical objectives achievable through foreign policy reveal that it is an arduous task to determine at any given time whether the United States capitulates to pragmatic interests and political realism, or acts on idealist exceptionalism in the practice or making of foreign policy. In this paper, American exceptionalism will be associated primarily with political idealism, unless realism is noted to be especially influential in foreign policies. This ‘tendency’ of the function of exceptionalism is based on Mearsheimer’s view that “American elites, as well as the American public, tend to regard realism with hostility.” (Ruggie, 1995, 68) Historically, Americans have opted to equate diplomatic recognition of other states with political and moral approval, to a greater extent than what is typical of most nations. It has been a deeply-rooted norm in American foreign policy that diplomacy and alliance building hinge on moral and ideological conditions to be evaluated by the United States. The presence of such

morally-founded justifications in the history of U.S. presidential doctrines and policy making, as well as exceptions to this norm, prompt this inquiry into the determinants of foreign policy in the United States. Ever since the end of World War 2, America has enjoyed a position to set the rules in the system of international relations and adjusted its national narrative and ideologies accordingly. Today, the diversity of rivaling opinions held by U.S. policy makers and world leaders demonstrates the salience of political ideology in foreign affairs. (Gill, 2016, 138) Aiming to establish the foundations of recurring patterns and schools of thought in the American state apparatus and foreign policy, I intend to analyze major ideological pillars and utilize them in making sense of the rationales behind U.S.' actions in the post-Wilsonian era.

Taking into account the above findings, this study will require analysis of events and statesmen that have created a lasting memory in the American nation's political consciousness. Interpreting the ideological makeup of presidential doctrines up until the 20th century requires a relatively heavier review of domestic politics as a major source of state ideologies and policy making. As colonies, the thirteen settlements to found the United States had to coexist with other states and groups at a theater of global conflicts in the Americas. These settlements, as protectorates of the United Kingdom, interacted primarily through trade with the Kingdoms of France and Spain, in addition to Native American tribes stationed as buffer zones among these colonial powers. (Virginia's Early Relations with Native Americans, n.d.) The experience of fighting and cooperation with these actors were major elements constituting the identity of the United States as a nation. The American Revolution is arguably the most defining event in the inauguration of the United States as a distinguished actor whose foreign affairs portrayed endemic national characteristics, interests and ideology. Defined by concepts of independence and resistance against imperial powers, the American experiment gained global recognition as a flag bearer of egalitarianism and liberty. The nation's sympathy for the French Revolution was therefore based on the promotion of civil liberties and the rule of the people in the face of imperial tyranny. The United States' victory on the path to independence had arguably inspired the next great revolution in France 14 years later, which in turn reinforced the mission and perceived legitimacy of the United States around the globe.

Major figures in American statecraft, starting with George Washington, have been outstanding in establishing strategies and ideologies that in turn shape foreign policy choices. The first president's warning about 'entangling alliances' demonstrates caution with regard to foreign involvement by the nation's rulers and is an emphasis on power politics where the U.S. is not one of the most powerful actors. Political leaders such as Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton have left behind lasting legacies as representatives from a bipolar arrangement of rivaling political camps. Thomas Jefferson is a distinguished statesman in that his liberty-oriented political ideology was comparable to that of Woodrow Wilson, in asserting that the nation's conviction and destiny was to "lead the world from the old to the new" (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990, 137) as an example to other states in the principles of society. Because political parties mostly adopted opposing camps of ideological orientation, an analysis of political life and leaders is essential to understanding the factors that influenced foreign policy at the foundation of the United States. War, for example, was the ultimate nemesis in Jeffersonian thought, and its costs brought the many under the domination of the few, but practically this did not stop Jefferson from adopting some degree of expansionism and using threats of aggression. (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 140) The views of the ancestors of republican and democratic statesmen in America remain crucial in making sense of the adoption of preeminent state policies. In the 19th century, the United States had to formulate and adapt its political ideology as well as economic practices in a zero-sum game of mercantilism dominated by great powers.

In defining the conduct of American foreign policy, presidential doctrines are of utmost importance and will be a major source of analysis for this research. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 is renowned for its articulation of the scope of the state's influence. Just as ideology and the self-image of nations evolve over time, American administrations were to refer to Monroe's Doctrine in justifying the adoption of ever more expansionist policies in foreign affairs. Conquest of the American frontier and the expansion into the rest of the globe would be reinforced by moral superiority and divine justification granted by Manifest Destiny. It remains debatable the extent to which the U.S.' exceptional identity fueled the effort toward the Western frontier and the defeat of Native Americans. Arguably, material interests preceded the ideological feud within the nation in the Civil War of 1861, as the enslavement of African Americans provided considerable economic profit. The self-image and identity of the nation evolved in this era, as the war and the

abolition were monumental in establishing national unity, reinstituting federal territorial authority and promoting civil rights for freed slaves. Once these had been achieved, the state's resources could be directed once again to pursuing foreign policy objectives and expansionism. For this purpose, the use of hard power peaked during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt starting in 1901, as his 'Big Stick' ideology or 'Big Stick' diplomacy was a result of increasing U.S. power and unilateralism building upon the policies of threat or coercion via naval power.

The formation of foreign policy since the Wilsonian era, on the other hand, demonstrates a transition into a new period in which influence by and exposure to offshore developments, separate from interests based on power politics, had to be given more consideration. Woodrow Wilson's 'America First' policy was accompanied by his internationalism and "Fourteen Points," and mirrored the vacillating foreign policy trends of future administrations including isolationism, neoliberalism and interventionism. Drawing on the exceptional nature of the U.S.' foundation era, Wilson guaranteed that the objectives of foreign policy were the means to protect and promote individual freedom and well-being. In this endeavor, the United States was once again 'exceptional' in that a patriotic sentiment prevailed in the society, a national belief fueled primarily by idealism, that no other state possessed the means and exemplary leadership qualities of America. (Holsti, 2010, 381) The ideological orientation of the United States gained practical salience as presidents acted in anticipation of reactions from increasingly larger audiences, and were motivated to be responsive to the international system. The Wilsonian administration ushered in a new era in American foreign policy in that it translated various domestic progressive ideas into foreign policy, in the form of free trade, self-determination, democracy and open agreements. The US, a global power, reformulated the scope of its influence, its role among other nations and supplemented its military might with diplomacy and novel moral objectives. Ideologically, Woodrow Wilson did not shy from the 'entangling alliances' of Europe but sought to shape world politics based on moral grounds, progressivism and internationalism.

The aftermath of the Great Depression and the First World War engendered vacillating trends of idealism and isolationism as well as unilateralism, multilateralism and interventionism. The enhanced role and recognition of the United States in the post-Wilsonian era was followed by the need for novel narratives, doctrines, allies, adversaries, and ideological alignments. In foreign

policy, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan introduced notable foreign policy concepts such as the fight against communism, containment and the necessity to expand interventionism in transatlantic affairs. The United States was ready to invest in strengthening allies to oppose the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The presidents had to provide justifications for American interventionism and the use of military power. Still, diplomacy and unilateralist militarism had been harmonized within the newly-crafted image of the nation, as the American involvement in the Korean war (1950) and the Suez Crisis (1956) involved multilateral conduct in combat. Realism and idealism are competing theories/ideologies in understanding the rationale behind the making and implementation of American foreign policy.

The challenge that emerges in the effort to determine the nature and influence of ideology in foreign policy is the arduous endeavor to acquire practical insight into the process of foreign policy stages. The impact and the agency of values and idealism or interests and realism, demonstrated by scholarship focusing on the making and the implementation of foreign policies comparatively, are not mutually exclusive. Distinguishing the function of opposing ideologies, Levi argues that although idealism-driven ideology may play a minor role in deciding the state's objectives and plan to reach them, it plays the more important role in justifying the decision once it has been made. (1970, p. 5) This point reveals that statesmen's choices have to be accounted for through the information that the state has been and will be circulating. While tangible interests may ignite foreign policy process, the state's actions ought to be in line with the narrative that has been promulgated to the world. As responsibility became a greater concern for policy makers in the second half of the 20th century, a defining feature of American foreign policy in the post-Wilsonian era was the use of intelligence services and the CIA. Just as the CIA had toppled a democratically elected prime minister in Iran in 1953, it was involved in various overseas operations, undercover missions and orchestrated coups. The rationales behind the official proclamations regarding such activity include support for and control of Islamic movements and administrations in the face of communism. The ever-present ideology of expansionism and containment that had been dominant in the post-Wilson era was to be further enhanced under the Reagan administration, in consolidation of the Carter Doctrine's security framework.

Ideology, in the sub-form of interventionism, aligned the United States with diverse allies from different geographies, especially after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. This led the U.S. to station troops around the world in a way comparable to the world-wide military presence of the Roman Empire. It should be remembered, however, that the U.S. simultaneously adopted a neoliberal ideology in economics built upon free trade and the use of the dollar as a reserve global currency. This meant that unlike the foundation era in which America had to find a way to exist in a world system of mercantilism dominated by major global powers, the United States now had the means to dictate the norms and conduct of trade and global finance in much the same way it sought to become the only superpower by defeating the Soviet Union. America's economic policies mirrored, on the other hand, its foundational values of idealism-driven exceptionalism that purported to 'free trade' from its shackles. (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 141) As economics and politics are both fields of foreign policy, this dichotomy in the manifestations of state ideology remains a crucial area to be explored and examined on a case by case basis. In this period, the U.S.' reliance on diplomacy and economic cooperation was recurrently accompanied by aggression and unilateral action. The salience of ideology and interests remains a constant in U.S. foreign policy and explains America's stance on neoliberalism, democracy and institutionalism. The Eisenhower-planned and Kennedy-launched failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba proves doctrines are passed on through administrations. Elsewhere, the Middle East stood at the intersection of the nation's political, military and economic interests, which expedited the Carter administration's departure from a dialogue-based foreign policy in favor of hard power. Ideologically, President Carter had to adopt an aggressive anti-Soviet position and abandon the twin-pillar policy of the Nixon Doctrine's detached oversight on the Persian Gulf. This shift in foreign policy portrays pragmatism and interests may trump ideology, doctrines and legacies in foreign policy.

In analyzing ideology in the making of American foreign policy, the bipolar world of the Cold War era and the U.S. support for right-wing leaders around the world will be pivotal. The U.S. involvement in the Middle East that was arguably motivated primarily by the objective to reach oil, in the presence of the state's ideological position as a flag-bearer of democracy and freedom, induced the nation to side with states and non-state actors that diverged from the values it promoted. Access to oil, global economic crises and other regional conflicts were areas of concern the United States continued to be entangled with, as part of its aspiration to 'police the

world' in the American century. (Bokat-Lindell, 2021) The objective in American foreign policy in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union was to capitalize on the defeat of the adversary in various ways around the globe. The next era of confrontation in foreign affairs arrived after the September 11 attacks, as the perpetrator's base of operations was Afghanistan, where American support for a right wing regime had contributed to a hub for fundamentalism. The breakthroughs in American foreign policy in the post-Wilsonian era demonstrate that different eras present varying threats, opportunities and motivations impacting state behavior, and that ideological systems are likewise not static.

New information and interests can alter vital values and beliefs, and ideologies evolve and gain flexibility in relation to national interests. (Levi, 1970, 13) Today in the 21st century, vacillating trends in foreign policy are precedented as well as novel in the history of U.S. statecraft. The Bush administration's neoconservative ideology was led by foreign policy hawks seeking a revival of patriotism, militarism and expansionism. The otherization of America's enemies has resurged as a foreign policy tool, as did containment and phrases such as the 'axis of evil'. State ideology and presidential doctrines continued to adapt to shape Barack Obama's and Donald Trump's complex foreign policy choices in Libya, Venezuela, Ukraine and Syria. The trends of isolationism, multilateralism and expansionism are observed to be intertwined in foreign affairs, and the analysis of ideology in relation to realpolitik holds the most promise in interpreting the rationales behind the United States' worldwide policies.

In light of these explanations, this research attempts to design and implement a research framework investigating the ideological foundations of American foreign policy doctrines as well as politicians' individual decision-making. This study aims to demonstrate that a dual analysis of ideology, on the basis of realism and idealism as two polar opposites, can be employed to assess the vacillating foreign policy trends in the conduct of United States foreign policy that contrast or parallel pillars in American political thought.

1.3 Research Questions

The purpose of this research is to evaluate the function of ideology in shaping and being shaped by the conduct of American foreign policy. To that end, social, political and economic factors impacting this equation will be examined from theoretical and practical outlooks, with an extensive focus on the executive office of the president of the United States. This research will therefore put forward and seek to answer a wide range of issues connected to the making and conduct of American foreign policy, including:

- What factors influence the adoption of political realism or idealism as the main components of ideologies?
- What is the role of state ideologies in forming national identities and the values distinguishing one state from another?
- How significant is the foundation era of the United States in creating lasting legacies that impact later generations' foreign policy agendas?
- What are the determinants that lead American statesmen to resort to aggression, war or favor diplomacy and inter-state dialogue?
- To what extent are parallels observed between foreign policies driven by economics and those driven by politics and power in the United States?
- What, if any, is the impact of the bipolar system of American politics and political parties in administering foreign affairs via unilateralism, multilateralism, hard and soft power?
- How extensive have presidential doctrines been in shaping foreign policy before and after the Wilsonian era?
- What is the function of ideology in steering American foreign policy in the face of threats and nemeses?

In addition, this research will explore the changing global dynamics outside of the United States that have contributed to the adoption of ideological orientations and foreign policies in American politics. In light of these points and as a result of these issues being explored analytically, I will be able to articulate a center point that draws on and responds to many of these areas of concern. The formulation of a thesis and hypotheses, therefore, will necessitate a pivotal point of analysis that will recurrently address the events and characters of American foreign policy.

Propositional hypotheses based on the arguments and questions presented so far involve different approaches to arrive at a single hypothesis that ties state ideology to foreign policy from various aspects.

1. The geopolitical conditions surrounding the United States are observed to engender material conditions and interests that rival national values, norms and patterns of state activity in influencing foreign policy. These sources of influence necessitate a comparative examination based on realism, in relation to idealism, as a political ideology through which foreign policy strategies can be analyzed.
2. Within this context, idealism is observed to spring from and defy materialism in thought and in practice. The interaction between theoretical, value-based as well as practical and materialist determinants of policy making in foreign affairs can be tied to the adoption of multivarious American policies based on survival, coexistence, domination, as well as zero-sum and positive-sum outlooks in international relations.

At this point, the main thesis can be formulated as the proposition that ideology is a definitive element of foreign policy based on the intellectual formulation of political ideas and the agenda-setting found in the state's foreign policies. The nature of the predominant ideology deployed at any given time necessitates an investigation into the role of ideology in influencing U.S. foreign affairs, and into the global conjuncture in which American administrations are situated. The relationship between ideology and the conduct of foreign policy in the United States, it will be demonstrated, is tied to the fundamental approach in the adoption of rivaling priorities and objectives on the basis of intrinsic values or material interests.

The unique circumstances at the founding of the United States initially required amiable relations with stronger world powers and the means of war only when it was needed for survival. The next generations of statesmen, however, increasingly opted for expansionism, unilateralism, strengths of the nation and realism-driven power politics. The 20th century and President Woodrow Wilson's administration was remarkable in igniting a resurgence of exceptional values, identity and the special role of America to lead the world by promoting freedom, democracy, justice and neoliberalism. The synchronization and the balance of vacillating trends necessitates the analysis of the role of ideology to steer the narrative, making and implementation of American foreign policy.

1.4 Literature Review

Based on a number of scholars whose work I have examined in this research, I hold that the nature of political ideologies adopted by states and politicians can be analyzed via a bipolar theoretical framework. Idealism and realism are considered to be two opposing ideological foundations that characterize American foreign policy, and tie to other accompanying political strategies and philosophies influencing state behavior and individuals' decision making in politics. In the field of social sciences, there are many studies delving into the distinct features defining idealist and realist behavior. This research draws not only on the extant literature on the relevant First Great Debate in International Relations but also on an understanding of the two major theories of interstate politics that are liberalism and realism.

Idealism, in this paper, is primarily associated with inherent idiosyncratic values and the exemplary global role of the United States as a flag-bearer of liberty in promoting democracy, multilateral conduct, diplomacy and cooperation. Realism, on the other hand, correlates with the politics and maximization of power, competition, pragmatic interests and the enforcement role of the United States around the globe. On the nature of the function and coexistence of these two ideologies in governance, it will be argued that a society undeniably is built on common national interests, and yet it is values and beliefs that serve to strengthen it by conceiving a sense of community and identity.

Immanuel Wallerstein's World Systems Theory posits that multiple systems composed of different forms of order exist in the world, that serve to determine the economic and political systemic role of each state. As a leader of the core countries, the United States arguably demonstrates behavior that follows as well as enforces global order underlined by its hegemony in the economic, political and military spheres of influence among nations. Analyzing American foreign policy in line with this systemic framework facilitates an inquiry into the sources of cooperation and conflict in relation to the realist dictates of hegemony. Built upon the tenets of structural realism, such a world of systemic competition encourages power maximization and attempts to punish anarchy. Still, a constructivist approach to examining American foreign policy

clarifies that the identity of state, in and of itself, can engender behavior associated with liberalism, cooperation and enhanced institutionalism.

On the sources of conflict and cooperation, Kenneth Waltz identifies three images that influence foreign policy. The human nature of politicians, the sociopolitics and identity of each state, and the structure of global politics correspond to the three proposed sources or images of state behavior, and this research offers an account of all three aspects, primarily in reference to the second image. In the post-Wilsonian era, American exceptionalism is argued to demonstrate the tenets of political liberalism and idealism in line with the literature, like in the foundation era, unless realism is noted to be especially influential in foreign policies. Other studies that concentrate on the tangible, practical objectives achievable through foreign policy reveal that it is an arduous task to determine at any given time whether the United States capitulates to pragmatic interests and political realism, or acts on idealist exceptionalism in the practice or making of foreign policy.

This research portrays that exceptionalism is based on Mearsheimer's view that "American elites, as well as the American public, tend to regard realism with hostility." (Ruggie, 1995, 68) Historically, it has been a deeply-rooted norm in American foreign policy that diplomacy and alliance building hinge on moral and ideological conditions to be evaluated by the United States. The presence of such morally-founded justifications in the history of U.S. presidential doctrines and policy making, as well as exceptions to this norm, prompt this inquiry into the determinants and characteristics of foreign policy in the United States. Ever since the end of World War 2, it is found that America has enjoyed a position to set the rules in the system of international relations, intervene in the affairs of states deemed "deviant" and adjusted its national narrative and ideologies accordingly.

As mentioned, the structural turn of international relations, with world politics becoming a society in the post-Wilsonian era, has brought about concepts such as defensive offensive realism used to understand foreign policy behavior today. The variance of elements of idealism and realism in different U.S. presidential doctrines and policies indicate that new information and interests can alter vital values and beliefs, and ideologies evolve and gain flexibility in relation to national interests. (Levi, 1970, 13) Today in the 21st century, vacillating trends in foreign policy are preceded as well as novel in the history of U.S. statecraft. The Bush

administration's neoconservative ideology was led by foreign policy hawks seeking a revival of patriotism, militarism and expansionism. The otherization of America's enemies has resurged as a foreign policy tool, as did containment and phrases such as the 'axis of evil'. State ideology and presidential doctrines continued to adapt to shape Barack Obama's and Donald Trump's complex foreign policy choices in Libya, Venezuela, Ukraine and Syria. Today, the diversity of rivaling opinions held by U.S. policy makers and world leaders demonstrates the salience of political ideology in foreign affairs. (Gill, 2016, 138)

1.5 Research Methods

The subject of the research relates to the internal as well as external factors constituting the ideological foundations and national interests that influence foreign policy and presidential doctrines. The role of ideology will be examined in its lasting salience to shape public discourse and foreign affairs in the post-Wilson political era. The problem that is the basis of this research paper is the effort to shed light on the motivations for state behavior and foreign policy agendas. In this study, a qualitative method of research is to be utilized methodologically, in terms of data collection and interpretation. The case studies and periods of history necessitate a thorough contextual analysis throughout the research.

The purpose of the study is to evaluate the function of ideology in shaping and being shaped by the conduct of American foreign policy. To that end, social, political and economic factors impacting this equation will be examined from theoretical and practical outlooks, with an extensive focus on the executive office of the president of the United States and how state behavior may be situated within the theories of international relations. TAccordingly, this study draws upon the literature on realism and liberalism, structural realism and the further conceptual and systemic frameworks such as the World Systems Theory, to illustrate the binary symbiosis of elements of idealist and realist thought in the making and implementation of American foreign policy. The research refers to scholars who have depicted the United States from a constructivist approach, to highlight the salience of Kenneth Waltz's second image of the sources of cooperation and conflict, which is the socio-political, ideological setting in which foreign policies are constructed. Due to the lengthy time period through which American foreign policy is examined, an analysis of idealism and realism found in American presidents' policy choices entails in this study an evaluation of the progression of state behavior and international norms, in

line with the structural and institutional development in global politics that has arguably served to transform the interstate “system” into a society. Overall, a theoretically analytical and critical assessment of American foreign policy, based on the characteristics of specific political ideologies employed, will be attempted.



CHAPTER I

Chapter 1.1 On the analytical framework of inquiry: The Ideological Foundations of Statehood and Foreign Policy

Ideology is a term coined in 1796 by Antoine Destutt de Tracy while imprisoned during the Reign of Terror of the French Revolution. Tracy's 'science of ideas' linked morals to the field of politics based on experienced sensations from interactions with the material world and the consequent ideas formed as a result of experiences. (Antoine-Louis-Claude, n.d.) In the political realm of states and international relations, ideologies serve to lay out the moral and sociopolitical foundations of policies adopted by administrations. In this sense, an ideology is a system of ideas that explain reality from a collection of subjective understandings about the world. The term "American exceptionalism" is attributed to Alexis de Tocqueville, who noted "that the United States held a special place among nations, because it was as a country of immigrants and the first modern democracy" and that American foreign policy based on moral principles is "a consistent theme in the American discourse." (Thimm, 2007, 3)

Preferring the concept of 'ideological state apparatus,' French philosopher Louis Althusser distinguishes between individual ideologies and general ideology. Althusser asserts it is not beliefs and values that are ideological, but the discourses that engender collective beliefs and material institutions in which individuals participate without conscious examination and critical thinking. Louis Althusser's work conceptualized ideology as a universal element of society based upon its own materiality, individuals and their 'real conditions of existence'. (Dino, n.d.) Established beliefs in the context of societies, therefore, function to instruct especially the uninquisitive minds on how to behave in political arenas. It is worth noting that these minds may amount to the majority of populations at any given time.

Ronald Inglehart, a political scientist at the University of Michigan and the director of the World Values Survey, has mapped social attitudes in 100 countries covering 90% of the global population since 1980. His research tied beliefs and values to people's immediate surroundings, and elucidates the bond between ideology and interests that leads to the making of politics at large. People in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia have been found to be relatively inclined toward traditional beliefs and had little tolerance for liberal values. Liberal beliefs and secular values, on

the other hand, are adhered to in protestant Europe, and the United States stands out as an anomaly among high-income countries with its adoption of traditional beliefs and elements of Christianity. (*Findings and Insights - World Values Survey*, n.d.) To this day, the official motto of America, ‘In God we Trust’ is an aspect of the exceptional self-image and the perceived elevated mission of the nation on the world stage.

Ideologies pertaining to politics involve numerous elements of society and state activity including trade, military, the economy, education, patriotism, environment, social security, welfare and the religious establishment. Political ideologies, as they relate to state conduct, have two dimensions: the goals and ideas about how the society should work as well as the methods through which to obtain the ideal alignment of values. Ideologies are concerned with the allocation of power and the ends to which power should be used, as they originate from social attitudes and discourses that create shared beliefs and institutions exemplified by Althusser. Political parties differ in terms of ideological orientation and may follow a variety of analogous or disparate ideologies without strict commitment to any single one of them. Statesmen are among those individuals whose minds readily possess the evaluative values and beliefs that make up political ideologies. Political behavior at the individual level, as well as states’ policy making process, therefore, “may result directly from an ideological value” which demands action based on wants and needs. (Levi, 1970, 6)

Ideological state apparatuses have been present at any period in history, and major ideologies that follow realism and idealism such as religion, nationalism and communism guided politicians and states, with forms of ideology serving to “become the major component of culture in most societies.” (Rabie, 2022, 1) Furthermore, ideologies contained diverse conceptions of the ideal form of government in addition to the adoption of macro-strategies in foreign and domestic affairs. This can be observed in the chronological progress in adopting systems of governance, via a prevalent global trend away from absolutism in sovereignty toward enhanced representation and politics. Exceptions to this observation highlight states’ ideological choices based on idiosyncratic sociological and historical factors. Choices on theocracy, autocracy, parliamentarism and democracy, recently portraying an incremental preference in the direction of liberal thought in domestic affairs of states, are principal indicators of the prominence of ideology in state behavior. In light of this reality, it can be argued ideological state apparatuses, based on politicians’ choices, function to establish the structure and the “identity” of nations. The agendas and objectives of

states' foreign affairs and the implementation of foreign policies, therefore, draw on ideology in governments' everyday actions. In the case of the United States, the aforementioned idiosyncrasies present in the political and sociological life of the nation allows the nation to embrace and protect its own principles given the Founding Fathers and the American settlements familiarity with political concepts originating primarily from the European Enlightenment. As such, American leaders adopted, internalized and legislated the desired aspects of the state based firstly on constitutionalism. This was once again followed by further ideological and scientific inquiry into governance, and consequently federalism was chosen in addition to democracy and republicanism as globally-recognized progressive features of the American state.

In defense of republicanism as a progressive ideology of governance, Tucker and Hendrickson indicate that in Thomas Paine's view, the reason republics are not plunged into war, characterized by an emphasis on interests, is that "the nature of their government does not admit of an interest distinct from that of the nation." (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990, 137) For policy makers, the scope of government and the appropriate economic systems such as mercantilism, capitalism and socialism is of ideological concern in virtually any state. These camps of ideology will be addressed in this research in relation to their impact on and relationship with foreign policy agendas in the United States of America. Other uses of ideology have been suggested by contemporary scholars. Sally Haslanger asserts that the purpose of ideology, in contrast to its function in republicanism according to Paine, may be to "stabilize and perpetuate dominance", and it may in fact function to prevent societies "from knowing what and who matters". (Haslanger, 2017, 159)

Dominance is thus projected via narratives on identity, values and interests. Ideology is regularly instrumentalized by the state to install despotism, as Marxist thought holds that the state can function to be 'nothing but a machine for oppression of one class by another. (Tucker, 1978, 628)' The power of the state, however, can provide the conditions of progress for the nation as well, based on the make-up of state ideologies. The representation of societies has been a major responsibility of states that has gained salience in the late modern era. The growth of societies, agents and political organizations was followed by an extension of the scope of the state. While medieval 'governments' were preoccupied with relatively limited, traditional activities such as declarations of war and law-making to oversee the exercise of power over territoriality and commerce, the modern state has the additional burden of the generation of subjectivity in the

people it represents. The expanded scope of the state today is in accordance with internal as well as external factors. States operationalize elements of culture via undertakings of reform, development, incarceration, education, family planning, war and welfare. It is through this process which incorporates the notions of nationhood and representation that states generate and circulate information with regard to belonging, positively and negatively sanction prescriptive and proscriptive behaviors (about sexuality, gender, age, race, ethnicity) and build libraries, monuments, and museums to display particular interpretations of the nation. (Borneman, 2015, 348)

Just as states today overwhelmingly identify as democracies as members of a global community with common norms and regulations, governance has always involved the use of various devices of power and strategies of self-representation. Self-representation, a major component of states' foreign affairs, is constructed through a greater dependence on ideology, relative to political realism and interests. The need to create and follow a consistent narrative in the best interest of and in accordance with the interests of the nation results in the formation of domestic and foreign policies. Ideologies, arranged by national values and beliefs, impress upon governments' policies and are affected by national and international sources which significantly influence statesmen's choices. Though common, shared interests are likely to be the strongest foundation of a society, shared values and beliefs strengthen it by guiding the members of society in their behavior. Also, like all factors existing in common, they strengthen a sense of community and nationhood. Furthermore, appeals to common values and beliefs prevailing in a society can be useful in arousing the public to support policies. (Levi, 1970, 20) In the United States, ideology and self-image play a far greater role in influencing policy making, and endows the nation with its perceived exceptional qualities defying the predicaments of political realism in the form of material obligations and interests. In this sense, the U.S. arguably diverges from Karl Marx's view of the development of human history, in that it can behave relatively unbound by the 'immediate material means of subsistence' and *realpolitik*. (Tucker, 1978, 681)

It can be asserted that the political advancement of states is determined largely by war and trade, and in both fields ideology plays a vital role. The founding epochs of states are especially prevalent in forming national ideologies, and are generally inspired by outstanding individuals. Their deeds, in turn, establish doctrines and thoughts that stimulate exemplary patterns. State behavior and policy adoption necessitate the adoption of ideologies whose characteristics justify

states' actions with reference to these patterns, to secure legitimacy in the homeland. Recognition in the international arena is followed by the assumption of moral values and characteristics of identity that render the state distinguished or superior to others. Built upon interests based mainly on materialism as well as upon ideology as a product of values, beliefs and elements of identity, foreign policy 'expresses the needs and wants of the state' whose fulfillment is seen as beneficial for the state. The sum total of these needs and wants are the state's interests in the international society. (Levi, 1970, 3) The relative intensity of ideology and that of interests determines their influence on foreign policy. When, for example, the intensity of the value in question is low, this might induce foreign policy makers to ignore it for the fulfillment of the interest at stake. It is therefore probable that under varying conditions and information available, new interests 'can add or subtract from values and beliefs' and vice versa. (Levi, 1970, 13) This study examines the major factors assigning importance to ideology and interests, to analyze the determinants of foreign policy choices at the individual and state level.

In sum, an overview into the foundations of ideology in American society indicates that the political prevalence of ideology in the United States and consequently its foreign policy, are bound to be closely tied to the sociological and intellectual make-up of the nation. A practical and efficient exploration of ideology in governance, therefore, is possible through a thematic analysis-based framework that inspects Americans' evolving social attributes in relation to material factors. Such inspection, then, will aim to tie these findings to the overall political domain that engenders and determines the conduct of foreign policy.

1.2 The Making of the Political Sphere in the United States

For the United States of America, the process of ideology formation occurred in a most distinctive political setting. In search of identity in the New World, the thirteen settlements were to strip off their status as colonies, and had genuinely unique opportunities and advantages to do so. They were to build an exceptional legacy and achieve this in an extraordinary manner. In the United States, every president has invoked the theme of a unique America in some way or another. (Thimm, 2007, 7) Unlike most states that had to tolerate or succumb to their immediate socio-cultural and geopolitical circumstances, the newcomers of the New World in the late 18th century

were able to build their system of governance and foundational narrative not from scratch but on top of a relatively modern, well-crafted national identity. For these settlements, the road to independence was followed closely by ideological orientations drawing on the European concepts of freedom and liberty. To that end, the states of America had the chance to build their values, political structure and institutions free from established local traditions of the native land via imported principles from abroad. This ‘exceptional’ groundwork of national identity formation explains why the United States’ ideological beliefs have not progressed in parallel to those of other high-income countries of today. Not only the origins of state ideology in the U.S. were built upon post-Renaissance political thought, but the making of ‘America’ as a regional, continental and global power was to be characterized to a great extent by its interaction with European powers.

The thirteen colonies in the 18th century were governed by Great Britain as overseas dependencies, yet could be considered to be protectorates as they had their local governments with elections accessible to most free men. From the beginnings of the 17th century to the global conflict of the Seven Years War (1756-1763) between Britain, France and Spain, these European powers were instrumental in ruling over much of the Americas. The Spanish Empire had been well-established in most of the East Coast of South America, Central America and what is today Mexico since the mid-16th century. By 1760, the Spanish had extended their vast influence as the Kingdom of Portugal had subjugated most of the west coast of South America. At this time, the eastern half of the entirety of the North American continent including what is today Canada was divided up by the Kingdoms of Great Britain and France. The French Kingdom had sovereignty over a massive land area surrounding the Mississippi river in the midwest, the great lakes and all the way east to Labrador and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The British controlled the west and south of Hudson Bay in the North, Newfoundland and the city of St. Johns as a commercial trading outpost. Great Britain also ruled over much of the entire West Coast overlooking the Atlantic, stretching to the Spanish-held Pascua Florida, and it was in this territory the American colonies would seize independence.

Concurrently, Native American tribes such as the Abenaki, Miami, Shawnee, Cherokee and Creek were stationed as buffer zones among these colonial powers, at times interacting, fighting, and cooperating in trade with the European powers. The French and Indian War, (1754-1763) saw the British empire’s colonies clash with those of the French and was to incorporate the Seven Years War starting in 1756. The French and Indian War forced both these kingdoms to rely

heavily on indigenous tribes as well as the black population. (*French and Indian War, n.d.*) This was particularly needed for France, as its colonies only had around 60,000 settlers in comparison to the 2 million settlers of the British. 2 years into the fighting, Great Britain declared war on France. In the North American theater of this war, the fighting in Ohio resulted in victory for the British-American forces in 1758. The subsequent victory in the Montreal Campaign next year forced the French to cede Canada to Britain, as stipulated in the Treaty of Paris later in 1763.

In all of this turmoil, the American protectorates allied with the Imperial British as somewhat autonomous entities. War, as a commonplace instrument of foreign policy built on values and interests, required an effort for harmonious mobilization and cooperation by the American settlements. Accordingly, Benjamin Franklin, the deputy postmaster general for the British colonies since 1753, set up the first national communications network, and designed and distributed a political propaganda/cartoon to unite the American colonies. Created in 1754, the 'Join or Die' cartoon depicted a snake in 8 pieces and was designed to urge the colonies to fight the French and their native allies. This propaganda effort was also a message to the British Kingdom in seeking its support for a unified colonial government in America. (Kiger, 2018) The theme of unity against external forces that threaten the American settlements was significant in establishing a precedent that the colonies had to exist as a single body for survival. This idea was to be doctrinized later into the Great Seal of the nation in 1782, as shown by the first official motto 'E Pluribus Unum,' to be used on money starting in 1795, meaning roughly 'Out of Many, One.' The adoption of the theme of unity constituted a value with strong intensity, and was going to hold relevance forming national ideologies and impacting foreign policies of future administrations.

1.3 The War of Independence and the American Experiment in Democracy

It would take no less than a revolution for the colonies to gain full independence and become the United States, and April 1775 started the American Revolutionary War. Securing independence from Great Britain, the Thirteen States received help from their former adversary, the French Kingdom, as well as the Spanish Empire in conflicts in the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean. The Declaration of Independence in 1776 was a result of major developments taking place in the 1770s. The Boston Tea Party incident on December 16, 1773 was in protest of a tax on tea and the exacting trade monopoly held by the British East India Company. The American

Parliament had passed a Tea Act earlier in December with the aim to support the financially struggling East India Company through exemption from the export tax and operational privileges. The protest of about 60 Americans in Boston Harbor led to the razing of British merchandise, leading the parliament to retaliate against this protest and pass punitive measures to be known as Intolerable Acts. The behavior of the parliament in passing the Boston Port Hill and banning all commercial activity therein, was coupled with the British government's efforts in punishing the State of Massachusetts. The destruction of British merchandise bringing forth imperial punishment can be likened to the set of events that led to the start of the Opium Wars between Britain and China in 1839. In the American colonies in 1773, this status quo and the perception of injustice toward one of the states was a leading cause of the emergence of a revolutionary fervor for the American colonies. Their own government had been working for the benefit of the British at the expense of Americans, and the theme of unity found advocated in the 'Join or Die' propaganda/cartoon by Franklin in 1754 against the external power of the French Kingdom now targeted Great Britain. The offshore monopoly over trade urged the conservative merchants to ally with radicals such as Samuel Adams and his Sons of Liberty. The American revolution, therefore, emphasized the unity of states against external forces and the Declaration in 1776 cemented the victory for those in pursuit of liberty.

The great American experiment in democracy was applauded by many around the world and became an initial step in creating the state's exceptional national legacy, primarily through values and identity over political realism. Among those proponents was the English-born political theorist and revolutionary Thomas Paine, whose pamphlet 'Common Sense' (1776) advocated for an egalitarian government, American independence and resistance against imperial powers. The United States of America was to receive worldwide recognition as a flagbearer of liberty, and this quest was especially vital for the Patriots, a heterogeneous body also known as Revolutionaries or American Whigs, that had been instrumental in the Declaration of Independence and the Revolutionary War. Unlike the Loyalists who were in favor or tolerant of British rule, and driven by immediate material interests thereof, the opposing camp of the Patriots embraced classical republicanism and as were associated, as American Whigs after 1768, with the British Whig Party that adopted similar policies and became the new Liberal Party in the 1850s. The Loyalists adopted traditional conservatism as a political ideology, and it is worth noting that the Loyalists were often older and likely to resist innovation, seeing the British Crown as a source of morality and

legitimacy. This was a sign, the state ideology of America under the Loyalists' rule would be primarily based on realpolitik. The Patriots, however, felt a moral obligation for resistance as the British government had imposed significant economic grievances on Americans. Incidents such as the Boston Tea Party led the Patriots to reject taxes imposed by legislatures where taxpayers were not represented. This rejection based on the lack of representation was articulated in the slogan 'No taxation without representation.' After the Declaration of Independence, the revolutionary fervor of the Patriots was directed toward the American administration and the parliament. In western Pennsylvania, the Whiskey Rebellion took place in protest of government-imposed taxes on whiskey. The taxes, though aimed toward paying the national debt, attempted to raise awareness about the immorality of alcohol and were to remain ideologically relevant at least until the Prohibition Era, also known as the Dry Crusade. Ideology, between competing cadres of political views,

It can be observed that values and beliefs, at the national level, are significant determinants of policy making and may trump interests such as economic profit. The American nation's resolve toward autonomy led the Founding Fathers to adopt the Articles of Confederation in 1781 and opt for a confederation of sovereign states in the face of overwhelming British central authority. The treaty of Paris that formally ended the Revolutionary War had created the Northwest territory to the United States as the first organized incorporated territory. Although the articles rendered the Congress in charge of foreign affairs, military appointments, issuing bills of credit and borrowing money, the Congress had fallen short of enforcing requests to the states for troops or money, by 1786. The Constitution of the United States, as a result, was written in 1787 and ratified in 1788 to establish the structure and the duties of the federal government in relation to the states. In time, ideological divergence would flourish based on whether the Constitution was meant to be interpreted to adhere to the Founding Fathers' 'original intent' or adjust to differing circumstances. Next, the first ten amendments known as the Bill of Rights was proposed in 1787 and 1788 to address Anti-Federalist objections, and ratified in 1791 to form a basis of individual rights for Americans. It was made apparent that the state ideology adopted by the founders and the Congress of the United States would aim to guarantee civil liberties. The codification of these amendments built upon earlier worldwide precedents of progress in this area, such as King John of England's royal charter of Magna Carta of 1215, English Bill of Rights of 1689 and Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776.

That the United States was so invested in a revolution with far-reaching global consequences was a major factor harbingering that its national ideology would reflect a value-based, exceptional ideology relative to other states whose national development had to abide by immediate interests rooted in the politics of power. These developments show that the American Experiment had roots in the colonial period, and in the nation's self-perception that its exceptionalism is found in the American constitution and political institutions. In contrast to Europe's warlike and corrupt state, the American Creed promoted equality, individualism, constitutionalism and the rule of law. The underlying assumption, therefore, was that the United States was not only different, but superior (Holsti, 2010, 397) to other states, their institutions and social habits. This reality is a cornerstone of values and beliefs in America and thus enforces the salience of ideology, in relation to interests, in the minds of politicians that make policies. Because American principles are believed to benefit all mankind, it follows that the United States has a right to lead other nations, who should aspire to become like America. By 1787, the political landscape in the United States suggested it would be committed to the identification of the new nation's fate with that of freedom in the world. As shown by the references in the wording and codification of amendments, the American states were to draw on progressive ideas that had been emerging throughout the world. In 2 years, a new revolution would be haunting European powers, with inspiration from the Americans, and promulgating the motto 'liberte, egalite, fraternite.' These notions from the French Revolution functioned to reinforce the endeavor and perceived legitimacy of the United States.

1.4 The French Revolution and its Ideological Influence on the Politics of the Modern World

On July 14 of 1789, the French Revolution was ignited by the storming of the fortress and political prison in Paris, known as Bastille. Just as 'the shot heard around the world' that started the American Revolution, the French revolt served as a global call for liberal democracy and ushered in what came to be known as an age of "Atlantic Revolutions". It functioned to transform radical contemporary ideas into popular movements that demanded enhanced political representation and reform in France. The French nation had a recognizable, exceptional 'mission,'

much like America, to emancipate Europe through its universal values as seen in the Declaration of Rights of Man (of all mankind). The Revolution promised liberty by gaining freedom in the form of civil rights, popular sovereignty and Enlightenment values, all of which were found in the American experiment. In this sense, the ideological and constitutional makeup of America paralleled, and potentially inspired, the French experiment's fight for liberty and democracy. The French would found a republican state just like the United States, as an ally against monarchical and aristocratic powers such as Great Britain. In sharp contrast to the Old World's repressive rulers and its predominantly feudal structure, America identified itself with the New World in that it was made up of a politically open society and interacted with other states not through power and realpolitik but commercial and legal mechanisms. (Lepgold and McKeown, 1995, p 370) This reality explains the phenomenon that the self-image and ideology of America, to this day, often defies the dictates of pragmatic interests in foreign policy, and makes America exceptional.

It should be noted, however, it is highly regular that American politicians succumb to pragmatic interests in foreign policy. When the French Revolution had a destabilizing effect particularly on the French colony of Saint-Domingue in the Caribbean, the bureaucracy therein split into royalist and revolutionary factions as the masses demanded civil rights. As a result, the second independent country in the Americas was formed after a successful revolution of the slaves of Northern Saint-Domingue. At this point, President Washington, serving from 1789 to 1797, sided not with the revolutionaries but chose to support the slave-owning colonists by sending money, arms and provisions. This, as an example of realist thought, and demonstrates that values can succumb to pragmatic concerns in foreign policy and constitute ideological political choices that do not validate American exceptionalism. Similarly, the Washington administration was criticized by the likes of Thomas Jefferson by not showing enough of a commitment to resist the British Navy violating American neutral rights in trade and its impressing of American mariners. Diverging from an idealism-driven exceptional foreign policy, Washington dismissed Jefferson's strategy to force the British to accept an expansive definition of neutral rights. Likewise, the Republicans' proposals to discriminate against British commerce were not adopted by the Congress to avoid a conflict with Great Britain, in signing the less ambitious Jay Treaty in 1794. (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 148)

The aftermath and unforeseen ramifications of the French Revolution fueled contradicting ideological views in the United States. The Haitian slaves murdering French people and others contributed to fears in slave-owning America that a race war could be ignited. Still, it is assumed that most Americans at this time were in favor of the Revolution. The political debate over its nature served to aggravate the pre-existing divisions, as Thomas Jefferson, the first U.S. Secretary of State, headed the pro-French faction and its republican ideals. Alexander Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury, sought instead to maintain the commercial ties with the British monarchy. The French's declaration of war against the British in 1792 led the Jeffersonians to oppose Hamiltonian support for neutrality, denouncing the United States administration as friends of monarchists based on nonmoral ideological concerns. Jefferson and Hamilton, therefore, represented two camps of American political thought, upon which far-reaching political cleavages and competing national ideologies were to be built.

Thomas Jefferson was a vehement supporter and admirer of the French Revolution, as his nation had found an ally that prioritized the assumed values fuelling the American endeavor to lead the way toward the universal restoration of power to the governed. Those men that facilitated the French Revolution by appealing to the nation's exceptional character, akin to that of America, had done so by recognizing no external authority of any kind. They were radicals in building upon the 'inalienable rights of man' to proclaim that society, religion, natural science, and political institutions 'were subjected to the most unsparing criticism' by reason. (Tucker, 1978, 683) This is what constituted the French Republic as 'the kingdom of reason' best suited to supersede 'injustice, privilege, oppression' with 'eternal truth, eternal right, equality, based on nature and the inalienable rights of man. (Tucker, 1978, 684) Jefferson's standing ovation for the French Revolution originated from his alignment with 'virtuous' ideology rather than with political pragmatism. The Hamiltonians, on the other hand, pointed to the reign of terror that followed the Revolution to warn of destruction of order and 'crowd rule' akin to anarchy. Based on realpolitik, this was behavior motivated by the possibility of threats in an international system devoid of security guaranteed by necessary norms and a central authority. The popular support in America for 'liberty, equality and fraternity' and the willingness of a substantial portion of people to fight for the French cause contradicted President Washington's belief that the war-ridden United States was too weak to fight a war with a leading European power. In addition to resisting domestic

pressure favoring involvement in the fate of Europe, Washington prevented foreign diplomatic pressure as well. After the president's second inauguration, France sent the diplomat Edmont-Charles Genet to garner support for the Revolution in America, specifically to issue letters of marque and reprisal authorizing private individuals to attack and seize British merchant ships. Because such a letter would permit individuals to act on American territorial waters and even beyond international borders, Washington firmly opposed the French request and preserved his nation's foreign policy position. This example, compared to Jefferson's position, clarifies the point that values and interests are in constant conflict to trump one another to influence politicians' and states' ideologies, and therefore policies in foreign affairs.

1.5 Political Parties and Polarization in America

It has been demonstrated thus far that ideology and interests are competing forces endemic to the United States' political landscape. Political cleavages within American society were at the heart of ideological outlooks of statesmen who were to found political parties and vie for power. Before the emergence of these organizations, President George Washington had been known for his opposition to political parties on the grounds that they were antagonistic to the nature of republican government. The administration in 1789 was one in which Washington exercised nonpartisan leadership. In his farewell address, the first president warned of ill-founded jealousies, factional animosity, riots and insurrection as political party-based threats to the American republic. Washington's political ideology, as shown by his policy choices, prioritized realpolitik and relative isolationism in both domestic policy in a way that was tied to foreign policy, as "foreign entanglements" threatened democracy at home by upsetting the balance of power. (Gourevitch, 1978, 899) The aforementioned partisanship on ideological grounds, such as between the Patriots and the Loyalists, was to develop at this time primarily over foreign policy behavior and the fiscal policies of the secretary of treasury, Alexander Hamilton, who was supported by Washington. James Madison, a politician instrumental in the crafting of the constitution, and joined by Alexander Hamilton in writing the Federalist Papers, had emerged as a leader in the House of Representatives. The Federalist Papers of 1787 and 1788 had called on Americans to ratify the constitution, and in papers No. 10 and 14, Madison advocated for an extended

commercial republic as well as the ways in which rule by majority can be prevented. Accordingly, it was unsurprising that Madison opposed the centralization of power and economic program adopted by Hamilton. An outstanding figure censuring government policies and the style of leadership, Madison would join Thomas Jefferson in forming organizational resistance in the form of political parties.

The Federalist Party, the first political party of the United States, held a conservative ideology and under Alexander Hamilton, controlled the parliament from 1789 to 1801. It was founded by Alexander Hamilton, and proponents of strong central government to be known as Hamiltonians. The anti-federalists had initially curtailed their opposition in support of the George Washington administration, who had started his 8 year presidential term in 1789. Partisanship, once despised as a political concept by Washington, had solidified into political factions by the early 1790s. Founded in 1792 by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, the Democratic-Republican Party adopted the principles of republicanism, agrarianism and anti-federalism. The election of Thomas Jefferson in 1800 was pivotal in establishing the ideological principles of the Democratic-Republican Party. Arguably comparable to libertarianism in ideology, the Democratic-Republican thought possessed elements of both the conservative and the liberal camps of present-day America, and thus was a forerunner of these political ideologies. The Alien and Sedition Acts, enacted previously by the Federalist President John Adams in 1798 to restrict immigration and speech critical of the government, was in sharp contrast to the liberal and progressive agenda of Jeffersonianism to enhance civil liberties. Jefferson's Democratic-Republican Party repealed the whiskey tax imposed by the government, in an effort to reduce government overreach by the federal administration. Jeffersonians' ability to garner popular support through its well-supported policies caused the Federalists to be perceived as elitists, and their refusal to support the War of 1812 was to be a major blow to their party.

Political parties in America can be analyzed, to this day, based on their leaders' ideological orientation and in terms of whether they reinforce or weaken the exceptional nature of American statecraft. American exceptionalism, characterized by its uncommon promise to surpass the confines of realpolitik, has been called upon by Hamilton's Federalist Party and Jefferson's Democratic-Republican Party, as well as National Republican and Whig parties. The surviving

bipolar political system, with one of either the Republican and Democratic parties having won every presidential election since 1852, presents a political landscape suitable for the analysis of foreign policy choices and state ideologies founded upon either morality, values or pragmatic interests, wants, needs and competition. The inquiry into the ideological orientation of American administrations, due to the changing nature of political circumstances facing the nation, remains promising in illuminating the common and deviant rationales employed by statesmen in the making of foreign policies.

1.6 Personal Creeds and Political Legacies in Creating Vacillating Foreign Policies

Since the early 19th century, doctrines and cults of leaders have established state ideologies that would justify and endorse policies as part of U.S. statecraft. The bipolar arrangement of the political sphere in America arguably resulted in the formation of contrasting legacies by prominent politicians, arguably best represented by the personal ideologies of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Hamilton. Hamilton's vision involved a strong central government. He advocated for a powerful fiscal economic policy, strong national defense and reinforced the manufacturing industry. Hamilton was in charge of the funding of Revolutionary War debts by states and the founding of de facto central banks such as the Bank of North America and the First Bank of the United States. Alexander Hamilton's Federalist vision of American life and commercial policy influenced America's economic path for generations to come. Today, the complex of banks, markets and corporations, military foundations, the soaring debt and taxes, the status of state governments and federal jurisdiction arguably mirror the accomplishments of Hamilton's Federalist view based on the statist tradition of governance. He was in opposition to the commonly-held view that republics should have universal visions and aspirations, an opposition that defies the exceptional nature and identity of America as presented by the evidence so far. In contrast to such values, Andrew Hamilton was motivated by the politics of power and tangible interests in that he maintained the implied powers of the Constitution provided the legal authority to assume states' debts, fund the national debt via tariffs on imports and taxes, such as those on whiskey and tea. Contrary to Hamiltonians, the Jeffersonian appeal to the nation stemmed from its ability to evoke the essence

of the American experiment in self-government. Under Jefferson's presidency, the nation was to set off to serve as an example to the rest of the world with the principles of society it entertained at home, and policies it followed abroad. Thomas Jefferson, in his inaugural addresses, emphasized the inseparable nature of the nation's moral duties. He held that republicanism is a quintessential part of America's identity as a state, and its nature stipulated, as did the revolution in France, that any interest taken into account in policy-making cannot be distinct from the popular will of the nation. Doctrines are thus deep-rooted components of national progress, as Friedrich Engels asserts states are 'a product of society at a certain stage of development.' (Tucker, 1978, 752) It is evident that individual differences of opinion among outstanding politicians in American society have been vital in steering the nation's development in the face of perceived threats and opportunities.

Foreign policy, as a state mechanism in the United States, is characterized by policymakers' actions based on the values and interests pertaining to themselves and to the nation. Jefferson's presidential term from 1801 to 1809 displayed a commitment to the guarantee of global and perpetual peace in an arena of republics, and to the identification of the nation's fate with the fate of freedom in the world. In this sense, Jeffersonianism asserted that the well-being and security of the United States were integral to the prospects of free government elsewhere. Defying the convention of full supremacy of foreign policy over domestic policy-making, the Jeffersonian thought held that the conduct of foreign policy existed so as to ensure the protection of the objectives of domestic policy. The emphasis on and the empowerment of the vox populi in governance contradicted European governments' heavy reliance upon executive power, excessive taxation and military establishments. Jefferson viewed these aspects of governance as tyranny, and the causes of corruption of the state in Europe. To Jefferson, statecraft in Europe resulted in the destruction of property, labor and the lives of the people. He thought that the unending rivalries and battles in the European continent offered a minute chance of developing truly free institutions. To him, war, in theory, was the ultimate nemesis, and its costs brought the many under the domination of the few. (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 140) It was believed by Jeffersonians that Americans saw conflict and war as unnatural, and like Jefferson, they viewed 'the instruments and objectives of realpolitik suspiciously.' Motivated by ideology, as in values, Americans preferred "principles in foreign affairs, especially moralistic and legal ones, to a context-dependent approach." (Lepgold and McKeown, 1995, p 370) These aspects of the Jeffersonian thought

created a legacy and pillars of American foreign policy that were to be reignited by future presidents, such as Woodrow Wilson.

In Jeffersonian thought, the very foundations, values and institutions of public liberty were deemed incompatible with the instrument of war. For Jefferson, war was the ultimate nemesis, and its costs brought the many under the domination of the few. (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 140) Jeffersonian foreign policy was therefore ideologically-oriented with an emphasis on emancipating the state in international activity. It aimed to free trade from the boundaries of mercantilism, and to preserve freedom of commerce even in war. The U.S. administration, therefore, prioritized ameliorating challenges imposed on neutral states by war conditions and the objective that America should remain beyond the reach of European wars and despotism. Although Jefferson threatened war against Spain, his approach was never dominated by sheer force, and employed what was contemporarily known as 'New Diplomacy.' The strategy employed by Jefferson via the embargo of 1807-1809 was one of defensive isolationism coupled with assertive foreign policy principles to protect American commerce. As such, The Jeffersonian policy of peace became virtually impossible to sustain when the War Hawks got stronger during the Napoleonic Wars. The interest America had in preserving a neutral stance in this way was the viability of the international order it sought to defend. The nation's conflict with England over impassement and neutral rights proved that the U.S. presidents had to formulate their own national agendas for security and progress in a world of mercantilism-dominated global economy led by empires. The well-being of the American republic thus necessitated an open trading system. Jeffersonian ideology sought to safeguard trade through frequent interventions against those other nations that benefited from keeping the system closed.

Although Jefferson threatened war against Spain, his approach was arguably not dominated by sheer force, and employed what was contemporarily known as 'New Diplomacy.' Still, the use of the threat of war by a president who had defended idealism as part of his understanding of American exceptionalism, demonstrated "the supple pacifism of the principled but slippery Jefferson" (Mead, 1999, 6) The nation's conflict with England over impassement and neutral rights proved that the U.S. presidents had to formulate their own national agendas for security and progress in a world of mercantilism-dominated global economy led by stronger

powers. In foreign policy. Despite its aversion to the instrument of war, Jeffersonian ideology sought to safeguard an open trading system through frequent interventions against those other nations that benefited from keeping the system closed. The balance of America's security and its commitment to freedom in the world has 'given to American statecraft a dimension above and beyond a conventional reason of state', (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 138) and Jefferson elegantly articulated it to create a lasting legacy. It can be argued, on the other hand, that Jefferson succumbed to political realism, rather than a primarily idealistically exceptional ideology, in utilizing the threat of war through the American Navy and reaping the benefits of an interest-oriented foreign policy. He justified this behavior on the grounds that 'a naval force can never endanger our liberties nor occasion bloodshed; a land force would do both', as the army's officer corps was seen as an "aristocratic cast.' (Lepgold and McKeown, 1995, p 372) This justification, reflecting the exceptional values driving Jeffersonian ideology, represents a divergence from the dictates of Machiavellian pragmatism. A political realist, John Mearshaimar, holds that land armies are vital to control territory as 'the most important asset in a world of territorial states.' (Toft, 2005, 384)

The state ideology adopted by the United States in relation to war and the army, in many instances, represented the 'exceptionalism' of Americans in their ability to choose morality over realpolitik. As such, a significant portion of Americans generally disapproved of 'power politics and old-fashioned diplomacy', mistrusted powerful standing armies and entangling commitments because they made 'moralistic judgments about other people's domestic systems,' and believed liberal values transferred readily to foreign affairs. (Lepgold and McKeown, 1995, p 369) The Jeffersonian policy of peace, however, became virtually impossible to sustain when the War Hawks got stronger during the Napoleonic Wars. The interest America had in preserving a neutral stance in this way was the viability of the international order it sought to defend. Still, neutrality arguably constituted an interest-based foreign policy choice by Jefferson, given his ideological alignment with and previous applause for the French Revolution. This supposed contradiction can be explained by a change in the values held by the President. Such a drastic change in ideology, from morality-based support for the French to neutrality, originated from the aftermath of Napoleon's coming to power in France in 1799. The European war had now lost its moral significance to Jefferson, because the oppressive instrument of the centralized government, army,

political police and bureaucracy Napoleon had created in 1789 had been ‘taken over by every new government’ and wielded to subdue opponents. (Tucker, 1978, 627) The French cause and the subsequent wars had become ‘a mere struggle for power between the tyrant on land and tyrant of the ocean’ (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 148)

Morality and values were a significant determinant of foreign policy choices for statesmen from both camps of the bipolar political landscape of the United States. In the Federalist Papers published in 1788, Alexander Hamilton had argued that a federal army can be ‘unfriendly’ to the liberties of the people, that the citizens were not inferior to army men in discipline and the use of arms. (*Alexander Hamilton warns of the danger to civil society and Liberty from a standing army since, n.d.*) In this sense, Hamilton’s personal ideology was comparable to those of Jefferson’s, in viewing officials of land armies as aristocratic cadres. Based on a belief in public liberty, Alexander Hamilton applauded citizens ‘ready to defend their rights and those of fellow citizens.’ Interestingly, the right to arms, for Hamilton, created a substitute for a standing army, as well as the best possible security against it. Up until the present day, the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, ratified in 1791 along with nine articles from the Bill of Rights, has protected the right to keep and bear arms. It is open to debate whether this aspect of the constitution portrays an element of ‘exceptionalism’ based on values over pragmatic interests, but it is observed that the American experiment on liberty and exceptionalism fueled socio-political factors that consequently influenced federal authority. The Army that fought the Revolutionary War had allied with state militias for independence and the standing army had been recognized by the congress in 1789 under the Washington administration. By the mid-19th century, America had a military involved in many foreign geographies. The 1840s saw the American military power, geostrategic vision and territorial claims increase greatly, and the formation of U.S. foreign policy was to be characterized predominantly by military relations with and sovereignty over weaker nations. The military might of the nation would be a significant determinant of America’s conduct with other states in terms of cooperation and domination, and as extensions of political pragmatism as well as idealism.

Political ideologies of prominent leaders based on the wielding of military capabilities readily translated into ideologies in economics and trade throughout the 19th century. Mercantilism, the economic practice by which governments adopted economic policies to boost exports and lower imports for the accumulation of gold and silver (bullion) and at the expense of

other nations, had been the mainstream economic strategy of great powers for centuries. It promoted augmented state power in economic regulations and empowered governmental monopolies, followed by high tariffs on manufactured goods. Mercantilism was the equivalent of political absolutism, despite its expanded scope based on the view that colonial lands and subjugated nations should function as markets for exports and as providers of raw material to the mother country. It therefore restricted or forbade manufacturing by colonies, and allowed only for the monopoly of the mother country. Adam Smith, an 18th century philosopher and an economist widely known as the father of capitalism, coined the term ‘mercantile system’ where the domestic mercantile classes allied with governments that enacted laws protecting their business interests in foreign rivalry, as well as prohibiting the import of goods that competed with a select group of local manufacturers. This aspect of the imposition of superiority of the colonizer can be argued to have been the leading cause of the Boston Tea Party incident in 1773, when the United States was itself a colony. Mercantilism allowed governments to hinder the transfer of wealth to foreign powers, and accumulate financial power through its emphasis on state control on trade and business, the implementation of which was made possible through military superiority. Mercantilists, including Alexander Hamilton, overlooked the mutual advantages of trade to all parties involved in a macroeconomic zero-sum game of static global wealth, characterized by what Walter Mead calls the “commercial realism” of the Hamiltonians. (1999, 6)

Under Thomas Jefferson’s presidential term, ideology and policy choices in economics opposed mainstream mercantilism due to a perceived need for new trading routes to be made accessible on the basis of neutral shipping rights. Adopting the international principle of freedom of commerce, Jefferson’s foreign policy practices served as a foundation of the U.S.’ novel economic ideology geared toward enhanced activity in foreign markets. Thomas Jefferson, unlike mercantilists, was committed to opening markets for American exports, fighting piracy and other security threats to American as well as bilateral commerce. In pragmatic terms, the state was in need of an increase in the wealth of the people, and was responsible for guaranteeing the rights and security of neutral shipping. Jeffersonian foreign policy was therefore ideologically-oriented with an emphasis on emancipating the state in international activity. It aimed to free trade from the boundaries of mercantilism and to preserve freedom of commerce even in war. The U.S. administration, therefore, prioritized ameliorating challenges imposed on neutral states by war conditions and the objective that America should remain beyond the reach of European wars and

despotism. In this respect, Hamiltonians once again diverged from Jefferson's adherents in that Alexander Hamilton denounced the ideological position the 'genius of republics is pacific,' and thus objected to the equation of peace with the spirit of commerce. (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 138) Without necessarily adopting an warmongering strategy, Hamiltonian mercantilism embraced a Machiavellian, realist approach in economic foreign policy in its emphasis on the United States that deviated from the exceptional position of America which was meant to lead the world in liberalism. That Alexander Hamilton defended this view without insisting on the use of the military illustrated that he embraced 'other ways of exercising power' such as 'economic warfare.' (Toft, 2005, 384)

As demonstrated, the diversity of opinion between U.S. politicians that has functioned to establish long-standing political cleavages 'illustrates the salience of political ideology' (Gill, 2016, 138) in influencing foreign policy in the United States. Individual political ideologies based on either the 'exceptional' values and the perceived role of America as a flag-bearer of liberty, or on its pragmatic interests dictated by realpolitik and the politics of power, created vacillating trends in the policy choices of future administrations. Despite such fluctuation present in the bipolar political setting of the United States, expansionism, as a foreign policy ideology, remained a prominent principle driving economic as well as political policies, as settlers had been spreading westward across North America since 1780. It was under the idealist Jefferson administration that in 1803, the U.S. had gained massive lands in the midwest following the Louisiana Purchase from the French First Republic. The constant increase in the size and duration of armed conflicts against First Nation tribes had come to an end with the War of 1812, resulting in American victory over leading Indian coalitions in addition to Great Britain. Under James Madison's presidential term from 1809 to 1817, this was followed by fewer conflicts and the use of treaties in exchange of territories. The resort to diplomacy, it can be argued, was a result of Madison's adoption of liberalism in ideology and diplomacy in interstate relations. The president's promotion of the Bill of Rights and his role in drafting the Constitution that resulted in Madison being called the 'Father of the Constitution' arguably rendered him 'exceptional' because these were pivotal elements that set America apart from other contemporary nations. That the president's conduct in foreign affairs mirrored his outlook in American politics demonstrates, once again, the correlation between domestic and foreign policy based on politicians' ideologies.

CHAPTER II

2.1 Isolation, Expansion and the Monroe Doctrine

Expansionism in foreign policy, therefore, was to be characterized by individual deeds as well as by the adoption of notable outlooks and doctrines. At the Battle of New Orleans in 1815, Brevet Major General Andrew Jackson's victory against British forces was to make a national figure of the future president. Similarly, the earlier War of 1812 was an example of Jacksonian nationalist honor and political realism-driven sentiment, unlike Jeffersonian to moral idealism in "forcing a war out of resentment over continual national humiliations at the hand of Britain." (Mead, 1999, 21) The U.S.' annexation of Spanish West Florida in 1810 was followed by the invasion of East Florida in 1817, purportedly to protect itself in the face of the local Seminole Indian raids. It can be argued that expansionism was a natural result of the growing capabilities of the United States in a realism-driven world of states where the logic of anarchy is consistent with expansionist state behavior. (Toft, 2005, 403) 'Entangling alliances' in foreign affairs had long been cautioned against by George Washington, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. Under the geopolitical circumstances in the 19th century and the changing interests of the United States, however, the nation's foreign policy adjusted to the precepts of power politics. Military use and expansionism were generally justified with references to the nation's prosperity, dignity and defense. Washington had warned in the Fifth Annual Address to Congress in 1793 "If we deserve to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity; it must be known that we are at all times ready for war." (Loveman, 2016) Hamilton, similarly, had argued that security against invasions was tied to the acquisition of land such as the Floridas, Louisiana, and even South America. The Spanish Empire ceded Florida and other territories in the Gulf Coast in 1819, following a triumph of American diplomacy. Originating from the political instability and the rivalry between European super powers in North America, the foreign policy of the United States evolved to respond to novel needs. The concerns for security, nationalism and territorial expansion in the new world increasingly necessitated unilateralism and the recurrent use of military force in foreign policy. Since the early 19th century, the geopolitical circumstances of the United States necessitated a

compound of diplomacy and hard power, where the balance between the two would be determined by the administrative principles of the President as Commander in Chief.

Personal doctrines continued to shape state ideologies in foreign policy and in 1819, James Monroe, the 5th president, signed into law an act to protect American interests, commerce and punish the crime of piracy against security threats following disruption in the Spanish Empire. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 adopted defensive isolationism and unilateralism as a foreign policy ideology, within a period of prosperity known as the Era of Good Feelings (1815 to 1825). President James Monroe articulated administrative principles of non-intervention in European affairs as well as a firm stance against further European colonization or interference in the American hemisphere. The doctrine, a renowned American foreign policy agenda toward the Western Hemisphere, was articulated in an annual message delivered to Congress by President Monroe. The 'isolationist' aspect of the doctrine, however, was in accordance with political realism in that it was defensive primarily toward the great colonial powers and offensive, as will be demonstrated in Andrew Jackson's presidency, toward native Americans. The Monroe Doctrine's isolationism, built on the politics of power within cautionary defensive realism as a foreign policy ideology, cautioned the European states that America would not allow further colonization or puppet regimes in the Americas. The Doctrine, by referring to growing American interests in South and North America, 'declared the American continents beyond the reach of European war and despotism' -(Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 141)

What rendered the Monroe Doctrine exceptional, in terms of creating a lasting legacy future administrations kept referring to in justification of their policies, was that it went beyond a merely realistic interpretation of the nation's perceived power in the world, to assert a firm stand to keep 'entangling alliances' and intrusions of Europe at bay. Its novel articulation of America's 'sphere of influence' was based on political pragmatism and the current strength of the nation. The doctrine incorporated an idealist vision in establishing a commitment to confronting European superpowers that were arguably more powerful than the United States. The Monroe Doctrine would be a pillar of U.S. foreign policy throughout various administrations to come, and specifically the interpretation of the 'sphere of influence' would allow future statesmen to augment the state's mission based on this growing domain of perceived control. Such efforts, built on a necessity for expansion of the nation's foreign activity, were supplemented by value-based ideological statements regarding America's role to lead the world, as much as by realpolitik, as the

international system structure “generated incentives for power maximization.” (Toft, 2005, 401) This reality, consequently, had major implications for the U.S. Navy presence and trade. Monroe’s doctrine’s defensive realism oversaw the implementation of the No-Transfer legislation of 1811, which opposed the transfer of territories in the Western Hemisphere among European colonial powers, and empowered the President to acquire such land until further negotiations. The U.S. Policy toward the Spanish Borderlands gained ground toward Cuba and Latin America. In domestic policy, the Supreme Court decision in the *Gibbons v. Ogden* case of 1824 ruled that the Congress had a right to regulate interstate commerce, and states were forbidden to enact legislation that would interfere with its right to oversee commerce. As such, the federal government increasingly exercised authority over much of the nation’s economic life.

Examining the state ideology and presidential doctrines of the United States in the nineteenth century, it is not surprising that geopolitics stood at the heart of American foreign policy. At the first half of this century it was not commonplace that “every nation’s foreign policy should have an ideological component” and the principal objective of the nation was “to stay out of European politics, extend U.S. trade, and to keep the seas open for American ships.” (Manning, 1976, 274) Therefore, the primary motivation driving U.S. foreign policy, established by James Monroe, was pragmatism that placed interests above the idealistic pursuits such as exporting governmental forms or ideals. (Manning, 1976, 274) It should be noted that the exemplary aspect of American exceptionalism functioned instead in domestic politics, where the United States was a flag-bearer of individual liberty and representative democracy. Accordingly, another president who left behind a lasting political thought, Andrew Jackson created a powerful political tradition that represented political realism, albeit with noteworthy divergences from the Hamiltonian tradition.

2.2 Nationalism and Zero-Sum Foreign Policy

The 7th president of the United States from 1829 to 1837, Jackson had gained renown as a general in the United State Army and served in both houses of the U.S. Congress. In 1830, Jackson signed the Indian Removal Act to forcefully remove Native Americans living in the eastern lands of the country, to the west of the Mississippi River. The Jackson administration thus relocated approximately 50,000 Native Americans. The American President’s proclivity for violence and

slaveholding was accompanied by his image as a politician of the common man. His administration's policies aided Southern planters, and he enjoyed support among middle-class farmers. His followers, Jacksonians, utilized cultural nationalism and populism and their audience's belief in the sound political and moral instincts of the American people. (Mead, 1999, 16) Jacksonians were akin to civil libertarians in that they held "the simpler and more direct the process of government is, the better will be the results" (Mead, 1999, 16) The Jacksonian political thought was devoted to the constitution as well as to the Bill of Rights and to preserving the freedoms of common American citizens. Jacksonians had suspicion toward elites, as did Jeffersonians, and opted for empowered local governments and a loose federal structure. In a way comparable to today's republicans, the most significant expectation from the state in Jackson's school of thought was to promote the liberty and the rights of the individual and the political in the face of government overreach. Unlike the Jeffersonian vehement commitment to the First Amendment and freedom of speech, Jacksonians viewed the Second Amendment and the right to bear arms as pillars of liberty. (Mead, 1999, 8)

In foreign policy, the War of 1812 served as an example of Jacksonian pride instigating a war out of resentment due to repeated national humiliations by Britain. The strong sense of folk community, common values and destiny makes it a crucial tradition that is often evoked by American politicians in line with populism to fuel domestic and foreign policy. Jacksonian Americans were more alarmed about liberal politics and foreign aid hoaxes than massive military spendings. Empowered by Andrew Jackson's understanding of individualism, Jacksonians in the 19th century fought duels, long after the practice had been abandoned by aristocrats in Europe. Jacksonian thought could explain why Americans today are far more likely than Europeans to settle personal altercations with extreme and deadly violence, and are armed for defense of the home against robbers or usurpations by the federal government. Like Jeffersonians, Jacksonians preferred "a loose federal structure with as much power as possible retained by states and local governments" (Mead, 1999, 7) While Jeffersonians supported democracy in principle, they were still wary of the prospects of tyrannical majorities that can suppress minorities. The popular sway of the Jacksonian political ideology resulted from the president's attempts to restrain the Federal Government's ties with the capitalists. The power derived from moneyed interest and the control of paper currency, as well as corporations with exclusive privileges and government sponsorship

of banks and financial interests, was employed for the benefit of the wealthy urban businessmen against the common American.

The American nation's ideological orientations, as demonstrated, were not only built on but also characterized by significant divergences from the ideologies of foundational figures such as Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson and Alexander Hamilton, in a bipolar political system. Political cleavages to be formed in the United States had arguably grown from ideological disagreements in the political landscape. As a proponent of slavery and of the exalted status of white Americans as opposed to Native Americans or black people (today known as Afro-Americans), Andrew Jackson's conservatism and political realism-driven foreign policy allowed Jacksonian America to target the enemy's will by any means, including attacking "civilian lives, establishments and property." (Mead, 1999, 23) Systematic violence and destruction had become "an acknowledged warfighting strategy" (Mead, 1999, 23) exemplified by the earlier Colonial Wars, the Revolution and the Indian Wars. In opposition to Andrew Jackson's violent radical stand against those not considered 'American' such as native Americans and black people, William Lloyd Garrison, a journalist, reformer and suffragist, started publishing in 1831 a weekly paper that advocated the complete abolition of slavery. Only 2 years after the presidential term of Andrew Jackson, a slave-holding President who brought a large household of slave domestics to the President's House from Tennessee, the origins of the Abolitionist Movement had appeared. It is apparent that political ideologies followed a vacillating historic path in the U.S. statecraft. From the Democratic Socialist aspects of Jacksonian federal policy to the enduring themes of liberty as well as expansionism, varying political and economic ideologies steered American administrations' policy making. The early political history of the United States demonstrates that ideologies have a pivotal role in shaping foreign policy conduct. Doctrines, however, adapt to changing circumstances through interpretation. Despite contending ideologies in domestic politics, the vision provided by the Monroe Doctrine had become a bipartisan tenet of overly patriotic jingoism, and by the 1840s, the cornerstone of American foreign policy. It was time for the U.S. to create an even greater image and legacy of America to reflect on the popular sentiment.

Beyond the defense of the nation's boundaries, a mix of political realism as well as the idealism-driven 'exceptional' perceived role of the U.S. augmented Monroe's view of the nation's sphere of influence, and called for the use of heightening military might. For that purpose, Manifest

Destiny provided the impetus. In 1845, the term ‘Manifest Destiny’ appeared for the first time in John L. Sullivan’s magazine article. Manifest Destiny, ideologically linked to politics of identity, status and nationalism, was a cultural belief formulated upon perceived existing characteristics of the nation and driven by the political necessity for the popular justification of an America that had a paramount role at home and in the league of states. It promulgated the belief that the U.S. was destined to expand across the continent, held by many white Americans. The articulation of a divine justification of the American people in fighting and conquering other tribes and peoples was a significant landmark in the history of ‘otherization’ of America’s opponents in foreign policy. Manifest Destiny was comparable to Great Britain’s colonialism in India, in that it endorsed the “breaking up the native communities, by uprooting the native industry, and by leveling all that was great and elevated in the native society.” (Tucker, 1978, 659) Ideologically, Manifest Destiny utilized political idealism by promoting a divine and expanded duty of the nation, toward the politics of power. It built on the exceptional foundations of the United States to advocate for an extended use of executive powers and the Federal Army. Accordingly, the popularization of Manifest Destiny was a result of the historic development of the military duties of the nation and the expansionist ideology in foreign policy.

2.3 Manifest Destiny, Race and Identity Politics and the Civil War

The United States, at this time, was neighbored in North America only by the United Kingdom to the north, horizontally covering the entire continent, as well as Texas Republic and Mexico to the southeast. The Navy functioned as a backbone of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, as this would lead to the ‘Big Stick’ militaristic diplomacy under Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency at the beginning of the next century. In North America, the Pacific Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic, the United States had ample opportunities and markets to make use of. Toward that end, John L. Sullivan’s magazine article in 1845 articulated the right to “overspread and possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us.” (Manifest Destiny, n.d.) In conjunction with the material objectives of U.S. foreign policy, Manifest Destiny not only justified expansionism as linked to American liberty, but also was deliberately opaque in defining its

territory limits. Political, geographical as well as racial boundaries of inclusion soon gave way to racist nationalism in the incorporation of ‘unsettled’ and ‘empty’ lands. These lands belonged to peoples and communities that contrasted to the image, status and exceptional qualities of the American.

Manifest Destiny, therefore, served to justify the conquest of lands from Native Americans, the annexation of Texas in 1845, the invasion of nearly half of Mexico between 1846 and 1848, as well as its territorial annexation that ended with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. Expansionism inspired interventionist policies and expeditions to Central America and Cuba. Throughout generations of U.S. administrations, ideological elements of the doctrines of American Exceptionalism, Manifest Destiny and cults of personality were to determine the perceived status of the United States in relation to other actors that were often either inferior or underdeveloped and in need of American assistance, intervention and trade. This ideological component of American foreign policy could be called ‘oriental despotism,’ where it was the fate of inferior societies that differed from the exceptional image of Americans to go the way of bourgeois development as seen in Europe (Tucker, 1978, 653) through American intervention and imperialism. In addition to Mexico, Cuba and Central America, annexationist expeditions spread to Hawaii in the Pacific. President John Tyler (serving from 1841 to 1845), had extended the Monroe Doctrine and the No Transfer Resolution to the areas of expansion. Based on the Monroe Doctrine’s No Transfer Resolution that had expressed official opposition to the capture of lands in the Western Hemisphere by European powers and the repositioning of European influence therein, U.S. naval units exercised supremacy over Hawaii and regularly patrolled in the Caribbean as well as off the coasts of Hispaniola in the 1850s.

In the years leading up to the American Civil War (1861-1865), a great many socio-political disputes were to arise from ideological as well as practical concerns over the citizenship, rights and the administration of subjects of slavery. Public opinion was divided over who was considered American, with different races and ethnicities and in the 1850 Census, where color was among the data collected. In 1787, the three-fifths compromise had been instituted by the U.S. Constitutional Convention, establishing the counting of three-fifths of ‘other persons’ (slaves) in determining a state’s total population. (The "Three-fifths compromise" in America, 2021)

Similarly, the Constitution contained a fugitive slave clause (1787 to 1992) enabling slave masters to recapture escaped slaves anywhere in the country. On the interstate level of federal governance, this meant slaves could not break free from slavery even if they moved to a state where slavery was outlawed, and brought about confrontations regarding the legal authority of states. From an economic outlook, slavery was crucial in providing the labor force for the plantation-based agricultural economy of much of the south. In 1860, the election of Abraham Lincoln, who opposed the extension and then the practice of slavery, was followed by the secession of 7 southern 'slave states' that in 1861 formed the Confederacy under President Jefferson Davis to defy the Union. Through its technological superiority in railroad use, steamships and the ironclad warship, the Union seized Petersburg in March 1865 after a ten month siege, which eventually led to the surrenders of many Confederate Generals as well as of Robert Lee, the commander of the Confederate States. As a result of the war, four million enslaved people were initially freed. After the War, the United States brought the former states of the Confederacy back into the Union. Through federal policy regulation on interstate commerce, emerging industries and infrastructure throughout the nation in the Reconstruction Era prosperity and technological progress in the homeland would rebuild the nation,

The American Civil War and Abolitionism were inward reflections of such ideological adoptions of American society and politicians. The nation's self-image and identity were principal elements around which heavy clashes were to occur. Ideologically, political realism dictated that the pragmatic interests and economic profit provided by the practice of slavery should maintain the first modern democracy of the world to remain a slave-owning. The opposing ideological camp, political idealism, however, engendered differing stances. One position, represented by Jacksonians, promoted exceptionalism based on the interpretation of the American nation in that the white American was superior to people of color and this superiority allowed America to provide benefits to the underprivileged populations working at plantations under enslavements. The other position, based on another interpretation of exceptionalism, engendered the view that Americans had a moral obligation to end the practice of slavery. From an ideological approach, the convoluted nature of the contending views was arguably what prolonged the resolution of the debate around slavery in the United States. It is argued, additionally, that the Northern states had held back their opposition to Abolition on the grounds that the rights to be granted to people of

color based on citizenship would tilt the balance of political representation and power in the U.S. Congress, as the southern states had a considerably greater number of African population who would be allowed to vote. This reality debatably points to political corruption in American politics that had justified and maintained slavery. Writing around this time, Karl Marx notes that it had become intolerable that each of the parties in the United States “is controlled by people who make a business of politics” who “make a living by carrying on agitation.” (Tucker, 1978, 627) No matter the cause of the prolonged quagmire of slavery in America, its abolishment following the bloody Civil War brought about a nation that was once again ready to carry out expansionism, supplemented with elements of exceptionalism, in foreign policy.

2.4 Return to Expansion and Power Politics in Foreign Policy

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, American statesmen’s increased focus on expansionism induced American foreign policies to portray the endemic characteristics of European colonialism and imperialism. This is significant, as both the American Revolution that proclaimed the exceptional nature of the American nation, and the Monroe Doctrine that solidified America’s stance in foreign policy, had demonstrated a strong-willed objection to colonialism at the hands of European powers. This is why, when America invaded the Philippines, President McKinley downplayed the nation’s inherent sentiment of anti-colonialism and manifested a novel principle in American statecraft. The Wounded Knee massacre in South Dakota, in December 1890 marked the climax of the Indian Wars, and the Census Bureau announced in 1890 that the West had been settled and the frontier was closed. The wild west had been tamed and the sovereignty of the Americans of the United States over the ‘others’ had been reinforced. The new notion wielded by politicians in foreign policy, based on American exceptionalism, was the United States’ humanitarian mission that was popularly reinforced in relation to the nation’s ‘fellow-men for whom Christ also died.’ Ideologically, this was crucial because it was the first time the ‘global mission’ of America was pronounced so strongly, where “the exceptionalist rhetoric of a ‘civilizing mission’ and ‘bringing the gifts of civilization to the natives’, conformed to the messianic dimension of exceptionalism.” (Holsti, 2010, 385) Additionally, Holsti clarifies that this exceptionalist rhetoric was inspired by the French and British Kingdoms’ imperial projects that

had gained ground since the 1880s, and thus was not unique to America as a foreign policy tool. (2010, 385) This ideological component in foreign policy was to assert the United States was a colonial power whose sphere of influence surpassed North America. Following the American-Spanish War of 1898, Spain ceded Cuba and the U.S. acquired Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines for \$20 million. The new transatlantic as well as pacific frontiers created new areas of military-led sovereignty and responsibilities for the Navy.

America's war on the Spanish in 1898 is arguably integral to the transformation of the state into an expansionist body that employs policies that can be called criminal and imperialistic. In reference to the opposition of the 'anti-imperialists' to aggression, intervention and war as a prominent foreign policy, Vladimir Lenin points to Abraham Lincoln's words that "When the white man governs himself, that is self-government; but when he governs himself and also governs others, it is no longer self-government; it is despotism." (quoted in Lenin, 1916, 83) Subsequently, the aforementioned 'Big Stick Diplomacy' of President Theodore Roosevelt, who served from 1901 to 1909, built on not only the power-driven realism of American foreign policy but also its political idealism in that Roosevelt's ideology utilized a mixture of extreme patriotism and reverence, "on behalf of a campaign by civilized and orderly powers to insist on the proper policing of the world." (Ruggie, 1995, 69) His renowned foreign policy proposition, known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine's sphere of influence, asserted in 1904 that the United States may be obligated by this doctrine to exercise an international police power in cases of impotence and wrongdoing in the Western Hemisphere and particularly in the domestic affairs of Latin American countries. The defense of American economic interests, just as it had obliged many presidents since Jefferson toward territorial expansion of U.S. authority, required military occupation and unilateral interventionism. At the beginning of the 20th century, the practice of the United States' foreign policy therefore involved the reorientation of sovereign states in Central and Latin America into economic and political protectorates. The expanding concept of national security endowed the U.S. foreign policymaking with further military involvement on foreign soil. Centralism as an ideology in U.S. economic policy making characterized the conduct of Roosevelt's foreign policy.

CHAPTER III

3.1 Woodrow Wilson as a Champion of Political Idealism, at Home and in the World

As American foreign policies continued to be shaped by presidents' ideological orientations upon existing historical characteristics, doctrines and political legacies of previous administrations, the question remained, for the Woodrow Wilson administration (1913 to 1921), as to what kind of global power and rising hegemon the United States was going to be. President Wilson opted for a primarily exemplary, rather than interventionist foreign policy in principle, and aspired to "build on America's aversion to entangling alliances a U.S. commitment to what he described as a universal alliance." (Ruggie, 1995, 69) Just as the founding fathers had laid the foundation for a nation that was, by conception, extraordinary and free from the sources of corruption found in Europe, this 'universal alliance' was one in which America could lead on the basis of a firm ideological commitment to moral principles such as representative democracy and civil liberties already found in the American society. This exemplary role differed from the interventionist, colonial ideology that had affected the foreign policies of the previous administrations. Instead, Wilsonian ideology introduced concepts such as civilization, the nation's mission, providential backing for the American experiment in democracy and the inherent assumption that other nations must become like the United States.

Wilson appealed to the nation's exceptional self-image based on idealism, in reference to what set the nation uncommon in the society of nations from, and in line with the founding fathers' and specifically the Jeffersonian school of thought. This idealism-driven foreign policy ideology was founded upon an inherent characteristic of Americans which led them to "view the instruments and objectives of Realpolitik suspiciously" and to "prefer general principles in foreign affairs, especially moralistic and legal ones, to a context-dependent approach." (Lepgold and McKeown, 1995, p 370) Contributing to Jeffersonian ideology, Woodrow Wilson reiterated that foreign policy objectives were a means toward advocating for the aims of domestic society such as personal liberties. In that, Wilsonianism built on Thomas Jefferson's ambitions to "escape the corruptions of Europe", which it "could not do if it succumbed to the blandishments of the power state". (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 139) In defying the primacy of foreign policy over domestic

politics, Woodrow Wilson adopted a progressive agenda at home, that saw in April 1913 the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution, allowing the popular election of senators instead of by state legislatures. He was also in charge of creating the Federal Reserve System, a federal income tax, aid to farmers, child-labor laws and the eight-hour work for railroad workers. These policies resulted in the regulation of competition in an economic system that provided protections of workers. As such, Woodrow Wilson's program acknowledged the social and economic foundations of a strong democratic society.

It should be recognized that Wilsonian ideology was well-received by republicans and democrats alike because of the president's promotion of American beliefs that had historically been bipartisan. In the previous century, federalists and anti-federalists alike had held that the ends of foreign policy were "not self-justifying but had to be seen as means to the ends of society, that is, the ends of individuals." (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990, 143) In foreign policy, Wilson's administrative agenda was monumental in that it translated various domestic progressive ideas into foreign policy, in the form of free trade, self-determination, democracy and open agreements. In August of 1918, the Nineteenth Amendment granted women the right to vote was ratified. The president's diplomatic presence appeared to be one in support of democracy worldwide and rejection of overthrowing governments using force or economic coercion. Woodrow Wilson stated his renowned Fourteen Points as principles of peace in January 1918, to be used in peace negotiations to end the World War. The principles were enunciated to the United States Congress, although in Europe, doubts were cast upon the applicability of Wilsonian idealism. This was arguably natural, because comparable to Jeffersonian school of thought, Wilsonianism was meant to avoid the corruption of Europe that was an extension of the "power state" therein. (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 139) Thomas Jefferson may have been the first American president that aimed to reform the international system, but he was not the last.

Based on his League of Nations vision, President Wilson offered a novel dimension to the civilizing mission rhetoric. This project was built on the democratic peace theory that asserted that non-democratic states were fundamentally aggressive as they acted primarily upon the interests of elites, therefore upon the dictates of political realism, and disregarded the needs of the broad population. A fundamental aspiration of the League of Nations, therefore, was to be an institution bringing together the world's democracies, as "peace would be guaranteed because only

democracies express mankind's peaceful hopes and meet their treaty obligations.” (Holsti, 2010, 386) In opposition to this view of the League of Nations founded upon an idealist aspect of American exceptionalism and American mission in the world, isolationists held that the League's membership would compromise America's sovereignty and freedom of action. They held that the nation would be weakened to respond to opportunities and threats present in the international system. On that note, it was not political but military isolationism that had been abandoned by Woodrow Wilson. Believing that America was a special society within God's plan for humanity, Wilson would inspire many future politicians such as Ronald Reagan, who enunciated that “American predominance in the world serves the interests of civilization and is part of God's plan for the world.” (Holsti, 2010, 398)

3.2 Exceptionalism wielded toward Idealism

The president's agenda based on what would later become known as neoliberalism and institutionalism put forward self-determination and multilateralism on the world stage. This policy choice, however, was contrasted by the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the first international conference of the League of Nations in that year. This foreign policy behavior by the United Nations, interestingly, can be illustrated by another dimension of American exceptionalism. As will be portrayed by the choices of future politicians, exceptionalism endowed America with the entitlement to pick and choose which multilateral treaties and institutions to commit to or renounce. Such behavior defied the ‘exemplary’ character of the United States as a flag-bearer of democracy, driven by its foundational exceptional values, and justified America's privileges over other national groups based on its inherent superiority and on a differing aspect of American exceptionalism. (Mearsheimer, 2011, 8) In the conduct of foreign affairs, therefore, exceptionalism was to remain a pillar that warrants “an American tendency to remain outside of multilateral regimes and to an unwillingness to abide by the norms of international law (Thimm, 2007, 2)

As demonstrated, the founding era and exceptionalism fueled varying stances of American statesmen in foreign policy, and the United States. The idealism-driven stance of American exceptionalism promoted the idea that America differed qualitatively from even the most advanced

states “because of its unique origins, national credo, historical evolution, and distinctive political and religious institutions.” (Thimm, 2007, 3) This dimension drove the Wilson administration and the American public to support global progressive agendas based on the emerging political ideal of internationalism. Still, the opposing ideological camp, political realism, continued to hold sway. A realist and pragmatism-oriented political legacy, Jacksonianism continued to fuel opposition to major currents in American society, as Jacksonians had “the least regard for international law and international institutions.” (Mead, 1999, 18) As such, the fact that the League of Nations primarily contained imperial and globally-influential powers as the four permanent members (Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) hindered opposition to cooperation in this novel ‘entangling alliance’ based on defensive realism and isolationism. The aforementioned privileges tied to the choice and level of American commitment to the norms of international law demonstrate that there exists a causal relationship between pragmatic exceptionalism and unilateralism. Exceptionalism, therefore, may place emphasis on the “double standard in American behavior,” and it can promote the idea that other nations “have to play by the (multilateral) rules, while the US can disregard them.” (Thimm, 2007, 5)

As much as Woodrow Wilson championed democracy, peace and civil liberties at home and in the world, most accounts of Wilson’s presidency nevertheless omit the reality that the president’s reinstitution of Jim Crow laws and unprecedented segregation within the federal office constituted reinforced racism at the federal level. This was observably in contrast to what Mead called “the crusading moralism of Wilsonian transcendentalists.” (Mead, 1999, 6) What is more, in 1914 Woodrow Wilson threw the civil rights leader William Trotter out of the oval office, who was there to discuss the surge of segregation in the nation. Just as Wilson’s otherwise liberal policies demonstrated aspects of early American presidents’ support for slavery and segregation, elements of idealism and realism are found mixed together in politicians’ as well as nations’ ideologies. Accordingly, the proclaimed visionary idealism of the Wilson administration was to be mixed with unilateralist realism in American foreign policy. The 1914 U.S. military intervention in Mexico during the Mexican Revolution (1910 to 1917) involved the invasion of the Veracruz city, followed by another expedition in 1916 and 1917. Wilson’s foreign policy in Latin America asserted that the region was in the sphere of influence of the U.S., as proposed in the Monroe Doctrine. These demonstrations of U.S. military might amid portrayals of America as

a promoter of diplomacy and dialogue, indicates that “the United States would be “a much weaker power” (Mead, 1999, 9) without Jacksonians’ militarism based on pragmatism.

Built upon the Monroe Doctrine’s politics of power that justified American interventionism in the Western hemisphere, the unilateral action taken in Mexico by the Wilson administration illustrated America was ready to resort to political realism to protect its perceived interests. Wilson claimed later on that the U.S. invasion resulted from the Mexican government's refusal to apologize for the 'Dolphin incident' in which American sailors were arrested in Tampico. This event showed once again that no matter the dominant ideologies characterizing administrations’ foreign policies, the U.S. could find material justifications for aggression in foreign affairs. On the intertwined nature of opposing ideologies alternating in this way, Mead suggests that unlike Wilsonians’ Lockean political aspirations manifested at home, Jacksonians believed it was inevitable that national politics “will work on different principles from international affairs.” (Mead, 1999/2000, 18) Comparable to Woodrow Wilson’s record vacillating from multilateralism to unilateralism, Thomas Jefferson’s progressive ideology in foreign policy had justified territorial expansion as a necessity. The fusing of competing ideologies, characterized by Wilsonian ideals for multilateralist progressivism as well as actions based on the nation’s pragmatic interests necessitating unilateralism, was once again a vital component of America’s involvement in World War 1.

Although the U.S. was initially neutral in the First World War (1914-1918), the American economy benefited immensely from supplying raw material, food, ammunition and guns to the Allies. The fact that the U.S. was in charge of massive provisions that were vital to the allies and lucrative to the American government calls into question the nature of the administration’s stated goal of neutrality. Ideologically, Wilsonian America invited and appealed to the nation’s “enthusiasm in World War I for making the world safe for democracy.” (Manning, 1976, 275) It was after the Germans’ submarine warfare and the sinking of the unarmed British ocean liner Lusitania in 1915, that the U.S was to abandon its neutrality in Europe to project its strength as a global superpower. Despite Wilson’s militaristic isolationism in Europe, it was the following sinking of American ships that America was convinced war was necessary, (Mead, 1999, 19). The nation’s resolve to safeguard democracy in the world, rooted in idealism-driven American exceptionalism, was therefore reinforced by the dictates of realpolitik based on survival. The

Founding Fathers had resorted frequently to the threats of war and alliance as traditional diplomatic means. (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 142) Woodrow Wilson, similarly, justified his nation's partial involvement in World War 1 as a necessity, just as his administration did not abstain from 'necessary' military interventionism in Mexico. Still, the political legacy left behind by Wilson was shaped primarily by his "Fourteen Points," to negotiate the end of the war via an emphasis on open diplomacy, equal trade conditions and principles of peace protecting weaker and the defeated states.

A prominent statesman that facilitated the world's transition into a new era, Woodrow Wilson was the architect of liberal internationalism that expanded to Europe. In a world of states and kingdoms as unitary actors, he championed democracy and self-determination rights, such as the right to vote and representation of peoples. Wilson argued for peoples such as the Hungarians and the Poles, who had been ruled under empires, to decide their own fate. This understanding paved the way for the international politics and law of the consequent decades that would extend the rights borne by states to those possessed by individuals. This paradigm shift, that was to result in international human rights and civil liberties, owed much to Wilson's exceptional ideology based on moral principles. America, therefore, identified itself with the New World based on its "politically open society and interacted with other states not through power and realpolitik but commercial and legal mechanisms." (Lepgold and McKeown, 1995, p 370) This demonstrated that Wilsonian America had opted primarily for idealism over realism as the nation's governing ideology. Woodrow Wilson's progressive ideology, advocating for military isolationism and exemplary foreign policy, approached the concept of power based on its unifying feature, as the "community of power." In this sense, the president, according to Mearsheimer, associated power in politics with "cognate phrases like international society and collective security." (2011, 12) It was therefore Wilson's liberty-based policies, akin to those of Jefferson, that helped the international community and institutions like the UN place emphasis, later in the 20th century, on the legitimacy of states based on the treatment of their people. Woodrow Wilson's pioneering legacy was comparable to Abraham Lincoln's role in the emancipation, albeit in domestic politics. Accordingly, citizens remember prominent politicians and invoke their legacies in contemporary political debates, (Fong et al, 2017, 31) just as Lincoln had enunciated to Congress in 1862 that his administration's fiery trial would light them down to the latest generation.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Wilsonian Administration corresponds to the formulation of what is known as ‘the First Great Debate’ in the discipline of International Relations. This debate was a dispute between idealists and realists that took place in the 1920s and 1930s, primarily about how to approach a number of foreign policy dilemmas such as how to deal with Nazi Germany. On this note, Kissinger expresses that in international relations idealism and realism are inextricably interwoven. (Thorpe, 2016, 2) The endeavor to determine the extent to which and circumstances under which to utilize idealism or realism would determine the course of the Post-Wilsonian international order.



CHAPTER IV

4.1 Post-Wilsonian Episode of Clash of Ideologies and Policy Orientations in Theoretical as well as Practical Terms: Ideology and WW2

The aftermath of World War 1 was characterized by economic prosperity in America. This period of growth, and expansionism in trade led the 30th president Calvin Coolidge to assert that “The chief business of the American people is business,” in 1925. (Ferguson, 2014) During the "Roaring Twenties" and the Jazz Age, peace and prosperity ensued. This era, remarkably, was accompanied by a Constitutional Law restraining business on ideological and religious grounds, known as the Prohibition period from 1920 to 1933. In the Prohibition era, the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages was officially outlawed one year after the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment in January 1919. The constitutional ban had gained additional political as well as pragmatic support during World War 1, as it would allow more resources to be spent toward the production of grain for use in the war effort. In an ideology-driven clash in American society, the lucrative brewing and alcohol industry and its consumer base encompassing the urban class was threatened by rural values and a conservative political outlook. In 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected president in the midst of the Great Depression, an era of economic deprivation following the stock market crash of October 1929. In the following years, at least one fourth of Americans were unemployed and some American citizens resorted to the sale of their most vital belongings, and even the sale of children took place. The Depression, therefore, put an end to nation-wide prosperity, leading to the worst global depression in history. (*Great depression: Black Thursday, Facts & Effects*, n.d.)

The four-term presidential service of FDR until 1945 made him the only U.S. president to serve more than two terms, as Roosevelt attempted to establish that Americans had nothing to fear. His ‘New Deal’, a federal program aimed toward reforms in industry, labor, housing and toward economic relief, was promulgated via informal radio addresses between 1933 and 1944. Known as ‘fireside chats’, these addresses contributed to the reorientation of the public’s morale during an era of crises such as the Depression and World War II. Roosevelt also aimed to prevent the crime instigated by the implementation of Prohibition, and the Twenty-First Amendment to the constitution, under Roosevelt’s administration in December 1933, repealed the federal alcohol ban.

In the public's consciousness, both Wilson and Roosevelt were heroes of the nation' primarily through their ability to convey their message successfully to the nation. Both leaders possessed 'soft legacies' made up of a governing vision and experiences such as the Fireside chats, as well as 'hard legacies' (Fong et al, 2017, 5) that were concrete policy changes that affect society, which could be exemplified by the abolishment of the Prohibition and by Roosevelt's record in foreign policy.

In 1940, Roosevelt declared neutrality in the approaching World War II and vetoed intervention. This was a remarkable moment in the presidential legacies of interventionism and military expansion, driven by domestic factors. Building upon Wilsonianism, FDR held that militarism was a threat to the United States in Asia and Europe. Instead, he opted to diplomatically support the UK, China as well as the Soviet Union. The U.S. coexisted amicably with the Soviet Union and even bolstered it against Japan until 1933, when Soviet policy was considered a threat to American interests. (Levi, 1970, 7) Into the war, the German advance through the Soviets, however, pushed the technically-neutral America to supply goods to the Soviets by sea, via the Trans-Iranian Railway in the Persian Corridor. This was federally made possible through the U.S.' Lend-Lease Act in March 1941. Lend-Lease aimed to provide the Allied nations with oil, food, weaponry, warplanes and warships until 1945, and asserted such support was essential to the defense of America. The act signaled the end of the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s, and undermined the non-militarist and non-interventionist foreign policy ideology previously held by Roosevelt. This instance demonstrates once again the realism-centered nature of ideologies. Just as Wilsonian idealism approved of the invasion of Mexico, Roosevelt abandoned his foreign policy principles, previously made into law, in favor of further extending the 'sphere of influence' of the U.S. It can therefore be argued that "Statesmen act in order to satisfy interests, not to make ideology function." (Levi, 1970, 7) as overwhelming evidence can be observed that suggests the initiative for political behavior on the international scene comes from needs and wants, sources outside ideology. American leaders' political choices arguably demonstrates a realism-driven ideology that are shaped in reaction to pragmatic realism/

During World War 2, President Roosevelt advanced his country's cooperation with the Allied leaders from Britain, the Soviets and China, overseeing the mobilization of U.S. industry to aid the Allies in the upcoming conflicts. By preserving the principles of self-determination of states, peace and dialogue, Roosevelt wanted to "make Wilsonianism practical" (Ruggie, 1995,

69) and utilize it as a ‘major power tool’. His Europe-first policy, accordingly, was another ideological and strategic amendment to the foreign policy doctrines and the ‘foundational’ position of America that rejected entanglement in the affairs of European super powers. The Pearl Harbor attack by the Japanese in December 1941, however, provided the U.S. with the justification to retaliate and participate, this time formally, in World War II. The Roosevelt administration supervised the construction of The Pentagon as well as the development of the first atomic bomb. The Tehran Conference of November 1943 between Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin and Roosevelt resulted in the launching of Operation Overlord, in which the Allies invaded German-held Western Europe starting June 1944, and the military operations continued until the Liberation of Paris on August 25.

With regard to the foreign policy ideology adopted by Franklin Delano Roosevelt during World War II, identity politics and the otherization of the enemy were prominent aspects of the United States’ World War II strategy. In this period, the United States incarcerated and forcibly relocated around 120,000 individuals of Japanese ancestry. (*Japanese American incarceration: The National WWII Museum: New Orleans* 2018) Concentration camps in the west of the country served to contain primarily those who lived on the Pacific Coast. It was President Roosevelt’s executive order that initiated a process akin to a witch-hunt, after the Pearl Harbor attack executed by Imperial Japan. Japanese Americans, as defined by California, were those with 1/16th or greater Japanese ancestry. For Colonel Karl Bendetsen, ‘one drop of Japanese blood’ qualified for the Japanese’ internment. In addition to local government, federal institutions such as the U.S. Census Bureau assisted with Japanese imprisonment via providing census data on Japanese Americans. (Minkel, 2007) The March 1942 poll by the American Institute of Public Opinion confirms that 93% of the nation was in favor of the relocation of the Japanese non-citizens from the Pacific Coast. Much later in 1980, President Jimmy Carter was to open an investigation to gauge if the government was justified in forcing Japanese Americans into imprisonment in concentration camps. The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, consequently, found in 1983 that negligible evidence of Japanese disloyalty had been present, and the internment was a result of racism. This practice, and the official apology and compensation extended by Ronald Reagan in 1988, demonstrates that elements of nationalism and racism were significant factors shaping foreign policy. Comparable to aforementioned domestic racism against Native Americans, the U.S. policy toward the Japanese during World War II signaled aspects of prejudice,

discrimination and orientalism based on the nationality and ancestry of the victims. The otherization of entire populations, therefore, was to continue to shape American foreign policy ideologies in the upcoming administrations.

4.2 Expansion and Diplomacy: The Limits of Bilateralism and Multilateralism

The war had demonstrated the vital need for fuel, and led Roosevelt to offer to make use of Saudi Arabia's immense oil fields. He met with the founder of the modern Saudi dynasty, King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud after the Allies' Yalta Conference in February 1945. Most scholars hold that the two leaders agreed to an alliance where American privileges in accessing Saudi oil were to require the protection of the House of Saud against domestic and foreign foes. Consequently, the Roosevelt Administration provided a defensive shield encompassing Saudi Arabia and its petroleum industry. Among these defensive measures were a permanent U.S. military base at Dhahran (established in 1946), the provision of advanced weapons to Saudi forces as well as the deployment of thousands of American military instructors and advisors in the kingdom. (Klare, 2007: 33) The earlier non-aggressive doctrine of Roosevelt was revised by the President itself to take an assertive stance in the formulation of America's role in the global world. Ideologically, this was not a surprise, as despite embracing liberal democracy in the way proposed by Woodrow Wilson, great powers continued to act as 'aggressive power maximizers' (Toft, 2005, 381) in Mrtfffearsheimer's phrasing. As such, Franklin Roosevelt had agreed to enter a comprehensive strategic and military alliance with Saudi Arabia and started working on a new 'world order,' and on the multilateral organization of post-war global politics. World War 2 had succeeded in defeating the Nazism and its Jaanese counterpart, and its finale gave America "a grand global vision grounded in traditional American liberal economics, free trade, anticolonialism and parliamentarism" in the making of novel vital institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the United Nations. (Manning, 1976, 271) Roosevelt's 'four policemen' plan proposed, as a guarantor of world peace, a security plan with regional actors that were the Allies of WW2; the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. This local control-based design was not going to be satisfactory around the globe, and Roosevelt adopted a hybrid design for the United Nations, where collective security was introduced as a key uniting concept based in a concert of power, "to be used by, but not

against, the permanent members of the Security Council.” as a mechanism for "joint action" by national forces.(Ruggie, 1995, 63)

It must be stated America’s support for European unification, ideologically, defied the realist maxim that “today's ally could be tomorrow's adversary” and thus “one's ally should not benefit from an alliance relationship so much that it could become a serious competitor another day.” The U.S. “promised to transform the traditional conduct of European international politics, not merely in economic, but also in security affairs.” (Ruggie, 1995, 66) In his long presidential service until his death in office in 1945, Roosevelt created a legacy of increasingly expansionist foreign policy based on realist competition, as well as idealism in the aspiration to build a new political order. Mearsheimer states that this institutionalism-driven ideology driving alliance-building was based heavily on liberalism where states “should act primarily as if they are an integral part of a larger community, not as self-interested actors maximizing their own utility.” (2011, 4) Succeeded by vice president Harry Truman, Franklin D. Roosevelt left behind a military tested in battle, a mobilized and war-oriented economy and the most advanced warfare options available to the President of the United States. At the outset of Harry S. Truman’s presidency, the war in Europe was over and the U.S. military was advancing on Japan. As demonstrated by the government-sanctioned incarceration of Japanese Americans in the homeland, the lives of the ‘other nations’ citizens were relatively expendable under U.S. policymaking, especially compared to those in Europe. This reality may account for President Truman’s unprecedented choice to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The victory in World War 2 was to mark the end of the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union, setting these powers as adversaries in the Cold War. The bipolar world, after this point, functioned to paint a picture of good and evil among rivaling states. As such, Americans held that “there was nothing wrong with bombing Germany and Japan or using nuclear weapons against Japanese civilians” because they were “the white hats and the victims were the black hats.” (Mearsheimer, 2005, 5) At this time, the Soviets’ post-war instability and the internal contradictions found in the communist system resulted in the insecurity of a mainly agricultural people, as Soviet citizens came to interact with the economically advanced West. In attempting to legitimize the Soviets’ expansionism and the suspicion of the capitalist world, Joseph Stalin and the cadres of the revolution relied on modern Marxism. (Merrill, 2006, 30)

4.3 The Truman Doctrine in a Bipolar World and the Policy of Containment in Ideological Warfare and Alliance Building

The presence of reciprocal foreign policy doctrines of expansion and competition between two of the greatest world powers created narratives of ‘otherization’ and the use of propaganda on both sides. It was in this polarized international politics that Harry Truman announced his renowned Truman Doctrine and the containment of Communism in 1947. For President Truman, the emancipation from totalitarianism was for the “whole world [to] adopt the American system.” (Pagden, 2005: 53) This understanding was once again reinforced by American exceptionalism and the idealist mission and destiny of the country on the world stage. Fighting communism, in and of itself, was a factor that created avenues of ideological propaganda for the United States. Opposition to the totalitarian rule of the Soviet regime had brought forth that “bringing democracy to countries that do not yet have it” was a prominent foreign policy objective of the Truman administration. (Ryn, 2003, 386) Once aligned with the global mission of the French Revolution, the United States adopted a neo-Jacobin ideology and “democratism,” or democracy promotion, to cast a sway over politics around the globe. In response to the Soviets’ imperial expansionism, the Truman Doctrine promised to aid free peoples and armed minorities resisting subjugation by external powers with “a latent propensity to go forth to save the world.” (Manning, 1976, 275) This exceptional mission and psychological resource, according to Manning, was in fact the only way to make sure the American public does not lose “interest in international affairs.” (1976, 275) The Doctrine was initially announced for the purpose of acquiring congressional support in favor of U.S. aid to Turkey and Greece, where the Soviet threat was alarming. The massive undertaking to defend states in need was to become a pillar of the U.S. Cold War foreign policy, created via the mobilization of state apparatuses such as the military and economy, to modernize regions of instability. The Truman Doctrine’s adoption of nation-building activities, its material support for regime change and its resort to warfare against insurgencies created a legacy that would resonate in the future of U.S. foreign policy, at least until the Bush Doctrine and its global fight against terrorism. In addition to the Truman administration’s concerns over the Soviet threat in political ideology and security, the free-market economy promised modernity and unmatched prosperity alongside the fear of a resurgence of the Depression era. Truman’s foreign policy surpassed in

scope the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary, that focused primarily on the Western Hemisphere. It was in this setting of heightened foreign policy conduct, diplomacy and global military engagement that the Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1947.

These developments put forward a significant ideological orientation of the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. After a long period and tradition of American isolationism, interventionism had flourished and the containment doctrine had reversed American strategy prior to 1945. Expansion and intervention, fueled by “numerous alliances and forward- based troops were put in place to convince the world that (American) separation did not imply aloofness,” (Lepgold and McKeown, 1995, p 382) unlike before. The Truman Doctrine, therefore, was a remarkable milestone in which America abandoned, more strongly than ever before, Washington’s political ideology stating “foreign entanglements threatened democracy at home by upset- ting the balance of power.” (Gourevitch, 1978, 899) In addition to aid to Greece and Turkey as stipulated in the Truman Doctrine, the \$12 billion Marshall Plan for European post-war reconstruction and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led to exceptional peacetime military buildup. The American army was firmly stationed in a massive geography from Cuba and Berlin to Afghanistan and Vietnam. This was countered by the spread of communism and its domino effect in Hungary, Italy, France and Austria. The Soviets intended to encircle Greece, Turkey and Germany through communist activity in Soviet-dominated countries. At the international conferences of Yalta and Potsdam, Joseph Stalin had articulated his desire for joint control of the Straits and the Dardanelles with Turkey. The Dardanelles linked the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, offering Russia a passage toward warm waters. Diplomacy failed to bear the results the Soviets hoped for, which led them to station troops along the north of the Turkish border. As Turkey consequently turned to the U.S. for help, mixing realpolitik with Wilsonian idealism appeared to be a viable choice for the United States. The Truman administration would offer economic assistance and modernization along capitalist lines to those nations threatened by communism. In Greece, the withdrawal of Nazi invaders in October 1944 led to British influence endorsing the right wing government in Greece and quenching armed insurrections by the Communist ELAS/EAM. The foreign involvement from communist neighbors such as Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania, coupled with Greek Communist Party KKP’s boycott of the elections in 1946 brought about a civil war that induced President Harry S. Truman to dispatch legation to organize the Greek economy in 1947.

The global ramifications of the crises in Turkey and Greece led the United States to view these countries as the last barriers to communist subjection in the Balkans. This meant that the east of the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and access to oil-rich geographies in the Middle east were under threat. It is therefore demonstrated that as the Cold War progressed, American foreign policy signaled a shift to more realist thinking based on concrete objectives, resources and logistic assets. One can argue that the ideological system of American administration, accordingly, "was not a "static thing" but that it was evolved over the years and that "the realities of Soviet politics have been the driving force behind this evolution." (Levi, 1970, 10) Strategic, economic and military concerns led to the Truman administration's proposals for \$100 million in economic and military aid to Turkey, and \$300 million to Greece. In his address to Congress on March 12, 1947, Truman's pragmatist interests led him to overlook the corruption and human rights violations in Greece, citing it as a free, democratic nation. This depiction was in line with the ideological principles of U.S. foreign policy. Similarly, the president noted that the Turks had appealed for economic aid for modernization and establishing their national integrity. Accordingly, the domestic aspects of Turkish and Greek rule were portrayed to place these nations within the progressive and modernized ideals of the U.S. state policy. Harry S. Truman built on the border violations and insurgencies instigated by militant minorities, to characterize the Cold War conflict in binary terms. He asserted that nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life, and the American-endorsed ideology advocated for individual liberty, free speech and religion, free institutions and elections and a representative government. The other way was marked by the forcibly-imposed will of a minority. The loss of Turkey and Greece, therefore, would equate to chaos and disorder spreading 'throughout the entire Middle East.' The Truman Doctrine and the president's address in March 1947 was crucial in international law as this was the first time the emotionally and politically charged noun 'terror' was used to illustrate the oppressor. With reference to that concept, Truman argued that America must support free peoples resisting subjugation by armed minorities and outside pressures. (Merrill, 2006, 30) These remarks have created a foreign policy legacy of binary portrayal of conflicts in which America is involved. Akin to the treatment of the civilian populations with Japanese ancestry in America during and after World War II, the United States would make excessive use of state propaganda to influence political and social subjectivity at home and abroad. Administrations' attempts to shape how

various peoples view America's adversaries would carry on into the next terms of presidential doctrines, such as the concept 'axis of evil' outlined in the Bush Doctrine in the next century.

It was arguably as a result of the state's propaganda efforts that pollsters found strong popular support for economic aid to Turkey and Greece. This support was diminished, remarkably, for military involvement, as the war-weary nation leaned toward assigning the responsibility to the United Nations. Truman's interventionist ideology, however, was not to bend to the public will when it comes to military interventions. In June 1950, President Truman sent American troops to battle without Congress approval, after the North Korean communists backed by the Chinese and Soviet armies invaded South Korea. Although East Asia was not a priority in foreign policy the way Europe had been, President Truman wanted to contain the Communist attack before disastrous events spread to initiate new global-scale war. The reality that the security of U.S.-ally Japan was crucial to American interests in a region marked by the newly-Communist China and the Soviets served to shape the President's foreign policy choices. In the anti-Communist war in Korea, the United States received military assistance in the form of manpower from United Nations forces made up of 22 countries. The Turkish brigade was the only unit permanently attached to American divisions in the fighting. The previous Truman aid to Turkey, as well as the prospects of NATO membership, incentivized the Turkish military efforts in Korea. The conflict between communist and non-communist forces would see Seoul captured four times, and the communists were pushed back each time by South Koreans and American allies. Pragmatic realism in American foreign policy ensured that "the United States has continued to employ devastating force against both civilian and military targets," as "an estimated 1 million North Korean civilians out of a pre-war population of 9.49 million are believed to have died as a result of U.S. actions" between 1950 and 1953. (Mead, 1999, 5) The war of attrition on both sides, as well as air-to-air combat between American and Soviet pilots made North Korea among the most heavily-bombed counties in history. The heavy fighting in Korea that left 3 million war fatalities and ended in July 1953 following the armistice foreshadowed the containment doctrine as a fundamental foreign policy principle of the United States and would be followed by further military entanglement in Vietnam.

Realist ideology, as well as populism, was influential in affecting policy makers' choices. For Jacksonian support in the administration's campaigns, America had to be convinced Moscow aimed for world domination and America and its allies were the world's only hope. The overstatement of the Soviets' capabilities and intentions induced the populist American public to

provide unwavering support for the administration's endeavors, depart from its isolationism and "make enormous financial and personal sacrifices if convinced that these are in the nation's vital interests. (Mead, 1999, 19) The foreign policy strategy of containment would lead to enhanced U.S. involvement in the global south and the third world. Military and economic assistance were supplemented by covert operations including coups and coup attempts in Iran, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Guatemala and Cuba. These undertakings saw heavy involvement by the CIA, founded under Truman's presidency. In response to Communist aggression and insurgencies in the Third World, the Truman administration mainly employed limited war. On the other hand, just as the interventionist ideological orientation of President Truman and the foreign policy agendas urged the administration to commit troops in Korea, similar concerns were present in Vietnam. In fact, it is argued that it was mainly because of the populist, Jacksonian American people that President Truman's efforts "to wage limited war in Korea cost him re-election in 1952" (Mead, 1999, 24), as the "the first Jacksonian rule of war is that wars must be fought with all available force" (Mead, 1999, 23) The Communist anticolonial revolution in French Indochina, similar to the triumph of Mao's Civil War and Communist Party in 1949 that drove the Kuomintang Party out of China and into Taiwan, led Harry Truman to authorize \$15 million in aid for the French to continue to control French Indochina. With the consequent support of China and the USSR for the left-wing revolutionary movement in the prolonged guerilla fighting, the conflict would once again divide Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia along ideological lines in the South and the North. President Dwight Eisenhower, in office from 1953 to 1961, was to be pressured into committing American troops in yet another foreign conflict, following the military withdrawal of the French from Indochina in 1954. South Vietnam had become yet another military protectorate of the United States, as part of its foreign policy strategy of containment of Communism. The protracted Vietnam War would test the limits of America's military power projection and involvement overseas, as the fighting, from its initial stages to the end, would encompass four terms of presidency in the United States between 1950 and 1975.

The Eisenhower administration was distinguished by domestic elements of identity and ideology that impacted and was impacted by foreign policy ideology. In May 1954, the Supreme Court decided *Brown v. Board of Education*, officially ending racial segregation in public schools. While social progress was arguably achieved among citizens at home, the outside threat that was

lurking in the U.S. created national suspicion and distrust. In the televised Army-McCarthy hearings from April to June 1954, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy accused army officials, public figures and media members of being pro-Communists. In 1956, the official motto of the United States was changed to 'In God We Trust' from 'E Pluribus Unum' that had been the de facto motto since the Great Seal of the United States. The law had initially been passed by a joint resolution of Congress in July 1955, after which President Dwight Eisenhower had approved it and established that the motto 'In God We Trust' was to appear on all currency. Just as American foreign policy was heavily influenced by domestic elements of governance in the foundation era and in the first half of the nineteenth century of American politics, the adoption of the new motto demonstrates a foreign policy-instigated U.S. effort to distinguish its identity from that of the Soviet Union. In contrast to state atheism and the implementation of antireligious legislation by Communists, the religious motto was to assert the exceptional nature of the American people in a way that can be observed by the outside world. In terms of warfare and in addition to technological progress and wealth, the United States had been a global superpower shaping international politics as well as conflicts via substantial support from organizations such as the U.N.

The global reach of the U.S. state apparatus was expressed as part of the foreign policy objectives of the Eisenhower administration at his inauguration ceremony. The range and tenacity of American foreign policy were to be vitally needed during the two-decade-long protracted war with Vietnam, from 1955 to 1975. Ideologically, America hoped to appeal to Jacksonian America's commitment to military service as a sacred duty. Unlike Jeffersonians, Hamiltonians and Wilsonians; Jacksonians' support for any campaign justified in relation to honor rendered them "ready to kill or to die for family and flag." (Mead, 1999, 14) According to Mearsheimer, the "domino theory" was a crucial factor convincing American policy makers to go to war in Vietnam, as it predicted that Vietnam's fall to communism would be followed by other countries in southeast Asia and in other regions, that "would jump on the Soviet bandwagon." (2005, 3) The shifting balance of global power in the second half of the twentieth century was further evidenced by the unfolding and ramifications of the Suez Crisis in 1956. In response to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, Israel, the United Kingdom and France invaded Egypt in late 1956. The Canal had previously been owned primarily by French and British shareholders. The coordination between the invaders made apparent that the invasion had been conspired by these powers, rather than provoked. As the canal was blocked by

the Egyptian forces, despite being defeated afterwards, the United Kingdom, France and Israel faced mounting pressure from the United States, The Soviets and the United Nations to end the invasion. President Eisenhower's threat to inflict severe damage to the British financial system by selling the American government's pound sterling bonds was especially effective in inducing the U.K. to withdraw alongside France and Israel. The crisis arguably marked the end of the British Kingdom's role as one of the major world powers, in comparison to the U.S. and the Soviets who had decided the fate of the crisis. From an American outlook, the country was able to order its former colonizer kingdom to abort its mission, from a position of strength and superiority

4.4 Interventionism: Korea, Vietnam and Cuba

Just as it was observed in the Suez Crisis, the Eisenhower administration arguably aimed to limit interventionism and military entanglement in American foreign policy. After the intense fighting in the Korean War, the U.S. involvement in the conflict in Vietnam would not surpass a thousand military personnel up until 1959. It must be remembered that the scope and reach of American foreign policy as the "policeman" of the world had created problems in significant decisions. A weakness of U.S. foreign policy in the Third World had been a failure to differentiate between situations, with a "tendency to see every conflict in the global context of the U.S.-Soviet competition and to fail to distinguish the degree of the threat" as the least important conflicts would "acquire the significance of the most important by invoking the domino theory or other such notions." (Johnson, 1988, 518) Diverging from the Monroe Doctrine that designated the country's now global scope of influence, to build on the Truman Doctrine and contain Soviet geopolitical expansion and authoritarianism, the Eisenhower administration resorted to covert means to seek the rollback of communism. The CIA, given birth under Truman, was instrumentalized to topple left-leaning and self-proclaimed anti-imperialist governments of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1954 and Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran in 1953. It should be noted that both Guzman and Mossadegh were democratically elected leaders, and their forcible elimination signals that a pragmatic and zero-sum strategy was prioritized above the ideological legitimacy of foreign policy undertakings. These efforts demonstrated that the profits of the American multinational corporation United Fruit Company in Guatemala, and the revenue from Iranian oil were more important to the U.S. than the ideal of spreading democracy around the globe. It was at this stage

in the history of U.S. foreign policy making that the Truman Doctrine's support for nations threatened by communism was interpreted to imply an expansionist foreign policy on the basis of capitalist enterprises linked to the U.S. government. Eisenhower's CIA also planned the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, launched by the Kennedy administration in 1961. Alliances, based on anti-communism or economic profits, led to American support to local dissidents in Brazil, Chile and British Guinea for regime change in the 1960s and 1970s.

By 1963, the Kennedy administration had deployed over 23000 military personnel in Vietnam. In the upcoming years, the United States was to be put to the test regarding to what extent it would utilize its technological superiority in the war effort. The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibiting the production and use of chemical weapons was not to be signed until 1993 and effective until 1997. Decades ago, it was up to those developed states whether or not to unleash the devastation of chemical warfare on enemy soldiers, as well as on civilians. One of the tactical use 'Rainbow Herbicides,' Agent Orange was a chemical defoliant and herbicide that was a part of the U.S. military's herbicidal warfare program called 'Operation Ranch Hand' from 1961 to 1971 in the Vietnam War. It is estimated that more than 20 million liters of Agent Orange were sprayed by the U.S. military over Vietnam between 1961 and 1971. (History.com Editors, 2011) Today, birth defects in Vietnam are over four times more common than elsewhere, and the Vietnamese government asserts up to three million people suffered Agent Orange-related illnesses. The Red Cross of Vietnam assesses that the disabilities or health problems of around a million people are due to exposure to Agent Orange. It was after the 1960s that Vietnamese physicians took note of a significant rise in birth defects and cancers, while the U.S. continues to pay compensation to its soldiers resulting from exposure to the chemical agent. Ultimately, chemical warfare, akin to nuclear warfare, was a means in foreign policy resorted to on the condition that the opponent is a foreign, publicly unfamiliar nation.

In January of 1961, the Kennedy administration severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, three months before the failed attempt known as the Bay of Pigs invasion by the U.S.-backed Cuban exiles to overthrow the Cuban government. Only a year later, President Kennedy denounced the Soviet Union for installing missile bases on Cuba, in what is known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. This led Kennedy to implement a naval blockade of Cuba, threatening to seize any weapons

that Soviet vessels may attempt to bring to Cuba. The two superpowers were therefore on the brink of nuclear war, although the communication between the U.S. president John F. Kennedy and the Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev helped end the confrontation in November, 1963 Khrushchev oversaw the removal of ballistic missiles from Cuba, as Kennedy promised to withdraw the nuclear-armed missiles that had been stationed in Turkey in previous years. A significant breakthrough was reached after this crisis, as a system of direct communication between the two superpowers, called the Moscow-Washington hotline was established. It was shown in this crisis and the Suez Crisis of 1956, that international politics had much to gain from increased bilateral dialogue and cooperation among major global powers.

Under the presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson, U.S. planes began bombing North Vietnam in 1965, and American forces invaded Cambodia five years later in 1970. The U.S. foreign policy demonstrated that it was prepared to take on any military duty when deemed necessary, in line with expansionism and the doctrine of containment. Before the war was over, President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972, just like the direct communication between world leaders in previous crises, was a crucial element resulting in a peaceful resolution, through the ceasefire agreement between representatives of North and South Vietnam signed in Paris in January 1973. The Vietnam War and the global political conjuncture at this point provided insight into the function of the two prominent and opposing ideologies worldwide. On the 'red' side of the Cold War's opposing actors, communism portrayed differing interpretations between China and the Soviet Union, based on the interests and capabilities of these two powers. Such internal dispute indicated that idealism and adherence to revolutionary methods had to be flexible and to adjust to pragmatic factors tied to realism. The necessity for flexible ideologies was common to both capitalist or communist governance, originating primarily from geopolitical and the national features. In East Asia, Mao's communist government, from 1949 to 1976, reigned over a communist state that differed to the Soviet Union in terms of geography and the fact that Mao's government served a single Chinese nation, whereas the Soviet Union was composed of 15 republics. Levi asserts that this major influence of interests and capabilities of nations result in the manipulation of ideologies that must "take into account the "historical realities" of the moment" (Levi, 1970, 19)

It is arguably evident, therefore, that ideologies evolve and are wielded by politicians in reference to specific needs, interests and capabilities of states around the globe. In American society, comparative political scholarship demonstrates that Americans “grow weary of foreign commitments” ... when “the ambiguities of an imperfect world” intrude and that Americans “show little tolerance for sustained, contingent strategic interaction.” (Lepgold and McKeown, 1995, p 371) This peculiarity of the American populace, therefore, may explain the sustained ‘heroic’ or oppositional characterization of the United States’ foreign affairs, especially in the aftermath of World War 2. For instance, Richard Nixon, a republican in an age of American economic hegemony, resorted to ‘idealistic interpretations’ in justifying his policies. Nixon’s practical idealism, consequently, built on to the Wilsonian ideas of multilateralism and dialogue, in introducing his flexible ‘detente’ diplomacy. This detente period drew on idealism and moral liberalism in international relations, as the late 1960s and 1970s saw a ‘thawing’ of the Cold War, when enhanced dialogue promoted diplomacy at the top level, and ignited discussions on security and arms control.

As to the function of ideologies in foreign policy statecraft, however, idealism cannot suffice as the predominant resource for superpowers and their objectives. Elements of political realism, such as competition, and consequently domination, would require that America continue to expand its ‘sphere of influence’ in search of oil as a resource linked to power. The 1970s therefore saw the U.S. attempt to monopolize the global petroleum market through the practice of petrodollars. In 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had argued that the Middle East stood at the intersection of ‘our political, military and economic interests’ and the Middle East was of vital importance to the West. Coined in the early 1970s during the oil crisis, petrodollar use obligated states in need of petroleum to buy U.S. dollars first. At this time, security of petroleum production had been a vital area of interest to the United States. The diminishing regional influence of Great Britain and the removal of British forces from the Middle East and the Gulf initially conferred responsibility for maintaining regional stability on the Shah of Iran. Iran was to remain a principal American ally well into Jimmy Carter’s presidency. President Carter’s meeting with the Israeli and Egyptian prime ministers, Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat respectively, for the signing of Camp David Accord in September 1978 was a crucial triumph of diplomacy as an international foreign policy tool, that ended the over three decade-long conflict between the two nations. The U.S. foreign policy under Carter's administration relied heavily on diplomacy,

bilateral as well as multilateral cooperation and dialogue. Following in the footsteps of former president Richard Nixon and his visit to China in 1972, President James Earl Carter Jr. (Jimmy Carter) established diplomatic relations with mainland China, for the first time after the Communist takeover in 1949. The resort to dialogue demonstrates once again the evolution of the nature of political ideologies as opposed to one another, based on mutual interests shared by two hegemonic states. America's increased adoption of multilateralism in foreign policy may be argued to originate primarily from Wilson's legacy in liberal internationalism that continued to resonate with Americans' understanding of the 'zeitgeist' of their time. There is, however, a realist pragmatism explanation elucidating such state behavior and a liberal/idealist ideology in foreign policy.

Multilateralism and enhanced diplomacy was a rational, rather than mainly ideologically optimistic or moral-based, foreign policy mechanism. Power politics based on political realism in international relations, it can be argued, dictates that state behavior of global powers fluctuates based on the chances of the attaining, maintaining and policing of nuclear and global hegemony. Based on Mearsheimer's concept of offensive realism in foreign affairs, global hegemony is unlike regional hegemony for great powers, and is "virtually impossible because projecting massive force across the world's oceans" is too difficult. (Toft, 2005, 384) Mearsheimer's reasoning follows that even nuclear hegemony, that may support a global hegemon, is "unlikely to happen" due to interstate rivalry and nuclear retaliatory reactions. (Toft, 2005, 384) It is observed, therefore, that the adoption of idealist bilateralism and diplomacy by presidents Nixon and Carter, two executives of opposing political ideologies and parties in the United States, interact with pragmatic and security-based interests to bring about an evolving repertoire of foreign policy approaches. As mentioned, the 'thaw' of the 1960s and 1970s accelerated super power diplomacy, negotiations and the adoption of a power politics-driven offshore balancer strategy by the United States. The offshore balancer strategy, through its extensive reliance on regional partners, was a significant element in U.S. foreign policy, exemplified within the context of oil trade since the rapprochement between President Roosevelt and the founder of the modern Saudi dynasty, King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud in the wake of the Second World, and likewise by the 'Twin Pillar policy' of the Nixon administration. With President Carter's aforementioned diplomatic achievements in the Middle East, domestic economic conjuncture and the "need to export capital" that arises from the inability

for American capital to “find a field for “profitable” investment,” (Lenin, 1916, 45), a novel economic ideology, neoliberalism, was to flourish in American statecraft.



CHAPTER V

5.1 Neoliberalism: Domestic and Global Foundations of the Political Economy of American Ideological Apparatus

The idealism-realism duality and the accompanying political and economic ideologies explained in this paper have been demonstrated to function in conjunction, and in response to the needs of the American populace and the state. The rise of neoliberalism as a domestic as well as an international foreign policy ideology, arguably, could be traced back to the principal moral philosophy of liberalism in the United States. Fundamentally, a parallel can be drawn between liberalism and idealism as political thoughts, as ‘liberty’ has been underlined to be a prominent pillar of American identity embedded in American history and constitution. Whereas political liberalism (and, therefore, liberty) has provided the American people with Lockean-based freedoms such as speech, property and the right to organize, economic liberalism was to bring about revolutionary changes in everyday business, the dynamics of free market and foreign policy agendas. Because neoliberalism necessitated a break from state control, intervention and regulation of the economy, it contradicted the very foundations of the New Deal Order’s statism that was based upon a strengthened welfare state, primarily progressive taxation and state-regulated industries such as banking, telecommunications, airlines, health, education, and natural resources. ‘Liberal,’ in the context of American politics, hitherto defined elements of social democracy (via the enhanced role of state in the domestic sphere) and was adopted by Republicans and Democrats alike up until the 1970s. Richard Nixon, with his family assistance plan (introduced in 1969) and welfare policies to combat social inequality, was arguably ‘the last liberal republican’ president of the United States of America. Adopting the economic ideology articulated by John Keynes, one of the most influential scholars of capitalist economics, Nixon commented ‘We are all Keynesians now.’ (Gerstle, 2017, 243) upon becoming president, and maintained his predecessors’ belief in the enhanced role of the state in the political economy. While this philosophy in statecraft has not been discussed in this paper in great detail due to its primarily domestic scope, ‘neoliberalism’ has significant implications for the conduct of foreign policy.

Albeit founded on the very basis of ‘liberty’ as a concept, political liberalism and neoliberalism have come to refer to vastly conflicting approaches and policies in the United States.

Within the context of America as a collection of settlements, its members, subject to a colonial jurisdiction, naturally conceived of liberty as “the right of private property, the right of self-interest” (Tucker, 1978, 42) as articulated by Tomas Jefferson. The transition from settlements to states in a ‘federalist’ structure, therefore facilitated an unusual case study where the role of the state/government (and the ‘Social Contract’) can be examined as post-state-of-nature in Lockean terms. Such disposition of the nation, on the basis of the understanding of liberty, allowed Americans to construct their image in contrast to the post-feudal society of the Old World. It followed, significantly, that American exceptionalism was to manifest itself as an economic national characteristic. Unlike the Old World Countries that related to one another through power, Americans were distinguished in that they “dealt with the world through commercial and legal mechanisms.” (Lepgold and McKeown, 1995, p 370)” The roots of neoliberalism in America were embedded in the very features that allowed the American nation to thrive as a capitalist society. Tucker, based on Friedrich Engels’ materialist conception of history, argues that “ the kingdom of free competition, of personal liberty, of the equality, before the law, of all commodity owners” (1978, 700) are vital elements of the capitalist mode of production.

It can be asserted, therefore, that the American nation has an “ideological stance” and a “preference for a relatively free-market economy,” and that it is vital that this economic choice of the nation was guarded by the “individualistic libertarian tenets set out in the Constitution in 1789.” (Manning, 1976, 274) This national preference did not result in an out-and-out free market philosophy in much of the 20th century, arguably because America’s transformation into a super power necessitated that the state oversee a number of industries toward the essential war effort, coupled with the Great Depression that called for further measures of state role in the economy. As such, the Keynesian, statist, mixed-command economy was reinforced by Roosevelt’s New Deal order in the 1930s, was “still recognizable in the 1970s” and finally gone by the 1980s and 1990s. (Gerstle, 2017, 245) In this period, neoliberalism established a new set of rules based on hierarchy as well as competition in the global economic realm, and this dual nature of a neoliberal world allowed America to once again resort to a mix of idealism and realism within the global political economy. Connecting world economies through global integration of which America was to be in charge, globalization gained ground, initially as a component of the U.S. containment of the Soviet Union, and was strengthened by “the aim of worldwide economic growth and extension of capitalist ways of production and consumption.” (Demuth, 2018, 63)

The emergence of a novel international division of labor, globalization, tied “the national economy into one interdependent whole”, and enabled the United States to “use the means of economic diplomacy and achieve most of its foreign policy objectives.” (Zirovcic, 2016,9) Diplomacy was now ever more connected to economic interests and created opportunities arguably for all states to participate in. It can be debated, however, the superior position of America based on the dollar as a reserve currency allowed the United States to take advantage of this system. The World Systems Theory, developed by Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970s, proclaimed it as a systemic necessity in the contemporary world order that nations be categorized into core, periphery, and semi-periphery states in the global economic system. Benefiting from such hierarchy in the world order of integrated free trade reflected a *realpolitik* and an ideology that debatably created an observable link between neoliberalism and imperialist agendas of superpowers. The vision of a neoliberal political economy of free markets around the globe, however, required that America continue to ‘police the world,’ this time in the economic realm. This mission to keep the trading system open, importantly, fortified expansionism and “entailed the need to intervene against those whose efforts were directed to keeping the system closed.” (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 155)

At the heart of neoliberal interventionism, accordingly, was the reality that finance capital was not only able to penetrate national economies in international relations, but also to subject “even states enjoying the fullest political independence” (Lenin, 1916, 61 & 62) to the norms of the new economic order. Just as American exceptionalism promoted a foreign policy of rewards and punishment via the gunboat diplomacy of President Theodore Roosevelt nearly a century ago, the United States once again utilized a mix of idealism backed up by the politics of power and realism through the mechanisms of neoliberal world order. These included the use of economic aid, sanctions and American influence on the policy-making process of Bretton Woods institutions that are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). This mission of the United States, according to President Nixon’s secretary of state and President Ford’s national security advisor Henry Kissinger, demonstrated that a “need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order.” The new international order, it followed, was “inconceivable without a significant American contribution.” (Thorpe, 2016, 7) This ideology of American statesmen built upon ‘normative realism’ in that it acknowledged partial anarchy in world politics despite

international organizations and multilateralism, argued for an ‘exceptional’ American duty to establish order.

Insofar as America adopted this role in the new order, it articulated the global promise of a neoliberal free market economy in idealistic terms. Wilsonian ideas of multilateralism and diplomacy accelerated the expansion of neoliberalism, especially thanks to the ‘thaw’, a period of easing of tensions between the Soviets and America that started under the administration of Nikita Khrushchev, Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964. Even before the gradual collapse of the Soviet Union that was observable in the 1980s, therefore, Kissinger held that the age of the superpowers was drawing to an end and the need for an American-led order stemmed from increased military bipolarity that “encouraged political multipolarity.” (Thorpe, 2016, 7) around the globe. This approach highlighted the inadequacy of political idealism, values and cooperation in sustaining order in international relations, and justified the resort to politics of power and the persisting need for the use of hard power. It is worth noting, however, that it was not the sole objective of America to abuse this international power vacuum for mere self-interest and pragmatism, as it could benefit from interstate order just like any other nation. This reality once again called for a balance in adopting an ideological mix of realism and idealism in foreign policy. The global mission of the United States to lead and police the world on the basis of the new world order of neoliberalism contained one major weakness that would engender opposition at home. According to Vladimir Lenin, neoliberalism called for the use of surplus capital in the American economy not for raising the standard of living in a given country, which would diminish profits for the capitalists (in the neoliberal order), but for increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward countries.” (1916, 45) Before this side effect led to severe political backlash in the United States, exporting capital abroad and importing precious natural resources needed for a sustainable functioning American economy and a full-fledged military.

5.2 The Neoliberal Order and Oil in the Middle East

The very nature of neoliberalism, an ideology global in scope and one that necessitates the forcible preservation of open markets integrated into a world system, (of which, the United States

was to be the unrelenting leader) not only built upon the early 19th century Jeffersonian ideal of free trade, but also gradually obliged varying levels of ‘dependency,’ as articulated in Immanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems theory. Neoliberalism, consequently, laid the foundations for an increased resort to primarily economics-driven interventionism that endorsed arguably imperial agendas and thus induced reactionary social attitudes in the form of Anti-Americanism. As such, President Carter’s foreign policy ideology of peace and dialogue was to be put to test by neoliberal economic interests based on an industrial dependence on the petroleum of the Gulf area. Jimmy Carter, a liberal democrat, adopted much of the Wilsonian principles, and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002, primarily for his leading role in major achievements of liberal, and in fact neoliberal-political institutionalism, such as the Camp David Accords, the Panama Canal Treaties, and the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between 1977 and 1979. The Panama Canal Treaties showcased the dialectical projection of power and ideals in American foreign policy, in that the bilateral treaty between Panama and the U.S. promised both that Panama would assume full control of canal operations and become primarily responsible for its defense starting from December 31, 1999. The treaties also guaranteed that the U.S. maintain the perpetual right to defend the canal from any threat that threatened its neutral service to ships of all nations. (*Terms of the treaties*, n.d.)

The dialectics portrayed by contradicting aspects of realist and idealist, emancipating and dominating, visions of United States foreign policy based on a neoliberal ideology sought to create American economic global hegemony via the interplay between multilateralism and the use of military might. Despite Carter’s monumental efforts in and commitment to strengthening peace and dialogue through the Camp David Accords and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the dictates of realpolitik unstoppably arose to influence the composite ideology of the president of the United States. The abating regional power of Great Britain in Iran, according to realist principles, contributed to the founding of the Islamic revolution and the overthrowing of the Shah in February, 1979. Another source of friction in Asia was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979. The invasion allowed the Soviet administration to exploit regional instabilities and was one that the U.S. could not prevent. The developments in Iran and Afghanistan threatened American foreign policy interests and demonstrated the failure of the twin-pillar policy designated as part of the Nixon doctrine. The twin-pillar policy that had become the backbone of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East had envisioned the empowerment of regional powers such as Iran and

Saudi Arabia. The Nixon Doctrine, therefore, was one that failed to create a lasting legacy in the history of U.S. foreign policy making. Following the Iranian Hostage Crisis of November 1979, President Carter was to articulate his own doctrine, to supersede the twin-pillar policy of the Nixon administration.

The colossal Hostage Crisis of November 1979, following the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Iran and the capturing of fifty two American diplomats and citizens by militarized Iranian college students, led to a diplomatic standoff between the U.S. and Iran. It is crucial that the neoconservative popular political ideology, that can be called neo-Jacksonian opinion, would have supported “a full-scale war with Iran over the 1980 hostage crisis” and an “equally hawkish stance toward any future threat to perceived U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf.” (Mead, 1999/2000, 19) Arguably, this is where the Carter Administration wobbled. Following in the steps of Wilsonian idealism in multilateral conduct, American diplomatic negotiations, led by the later-Nobel Peace Prize winner Jimmy Carter, did not deliver the release of the hostages until after the end of Carter’s presidential term, characterizing the presidential election between Ronald Reagan and the incumbent president. Although Carter ordered a rescue mission using U.S. naval power in the Gulf, Operation Eagle Claw, the failure of this attempt and the perceived lack of American power projection in the conflict arguably led to the defeat of Jimmy Carter in the presidential election of 1980. Although the approaching end of the Cold War would render communism-oriented presidential doctrines moot, President Carter’s consequent geopolitical vision based on the adoption of offensive realism and aggressive zero-sum competition in overseas interests, albeit hand in hand with a commitment to liberal institutionalism and interstate dialogue as epitomized by the earlier Camp David Accords and Panama Canal Treaties, remained intact in its ability to influence the foreign policy agendas of the United States for decades to come. The realism-idealism synthesis, the balance of two diverging ideologies in the practice of foreign affairs, once again demonstrates the evolution of the Wilsonian doctrine toward an enhanced reliance on proactive power politics.

The Carter Doctrine, as declared in the ‘state of the union’ address of 1980, informed the congress and the nation that access to the oil fields in the Persian Gulf was vital to the U.S. and any means to hinder that access would be deemed a direct attack on America’s interests to be countered with the appropriate response (military force). Despite the president’s personal commitment to diplomacy and dialogue, oil was to remain a top priority worth fighting for, (as an

extension of neoliberalism-dictated extraction of resources) in American foreign policy. As President Carter's ideological orientation based on multilateral conduct succumbed to pragmatic and utilitarian concerns, he signaled to the Soviets that the U.S. foreign policy had departed from its detached oversight on the Persian Gulf in the Gulf region. Still, the Carter administration utilized harsh diplomacy, not militarism, in 1980 to get the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, by threatening that American athletes would not attend the Summer Olympics in Moscow. The Olympic boycott was based on the confidence of U.S. leadership in multilateral undertakings. Despite occasional resort to a post-Wilsonian preference for diplomacy, however, the United States maintained full responsibility for regional security in the Middle East and sought to resort to increased hard power to deter threats aimed at oil resources. To implement this foreign policy agenda, President Carter oversaw the significant presence of the rapid deployment joint task force (RDJTF) and a permanent US naval presence in the Persian Gulf. Military expansionism in foreign policy resulted in Operation Cyclone, a CIA program to finance and arm mujahideen in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1992. Costing more than \$20 billion, the operation supported militant Islamic groups and jihadists in the defense of American interests. Throughout the next U.S. administrations, the Carter Doctrine remained relevant, as presidents succeeding Carter have continued to advocate for his 1980 doctrine, in efforts to enlarge the American capabilities in projecting military power into the Gulf area.

It was unsurprising, therefore, that the Reagan administration, from 1981 to 1989, intended to consolidate the Carter administration's foreign policy framework. In many ways, the Reagan Doctrine was to build upon Carter's, initially by upgrading the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to a comprehensive regional headquarters in January 1983 and charging the U.S. central command (CENTCOM) with providing the protection of oil from the Gulf to western markets. Business, as it undeniably had been since before the Wilson era, was closely linked to American power politics, and had been dialectically intertwined with the ascent of neoliberalism-driven foreign policy. The control of global markets, the most prominent being petroleum, had been a priority in American foreign policy exemplified by the inauguration of the American-made 'petrodollar industry' in 1973. This decision was supplemented by Reagan with the authorization of the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers with American banners, and protection by American naval forces. The U.S.' commitment to the oil business in the Gulf region had been complicated by the fall of the Shah and the Islamic revolution in 1979, as well as the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. As the Reagan

administration continued the Carter Doctrine's emphasis on geopolitical power projection in the Middle East, the United States developed ever closer relationships with the Saudi regime. This foreign policy choice President Reagan had initiated four months before he entered office demonstrated that the oil industry continued to constitute the United States' priorities and interests it was ready to fight for. Consequently, Saudi Arabia became more than a regional ally but the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf. Through the Reagan 'corollary' to Carter's foreign policy ideology, the United States declared that it would not allow Saudi Arabia to become Iran, to protect the vital oil trade. (Kuniholm, 1986, 345)

The increasing resort to realist power politics in American foreign policy, as an extension of Carter's late principles and based firstly on pragmatism in relation to the control of vital resources and markets, signaled that the United States strived toward 'global hegemony' in an imploding bipolar world order, a status Mearshemeimer held was impossible to sustain. In terms of the synthesis of idealism and realism that is characteristic of post-Wilsonian administrations, Reagan's neoliberal-founded ideology incorporated neo-conservatism in the form of aggressive realism, and was going to be supplemented by increasingly utilitarian, ruthlessly competitive and hostility-justifying ideals. The president's republican backing arguably encouraged him to make use of the world's largest military by geographical reach. His work with the congress to deploy more troops and bases further enlarged the 'sphere of influence' articulated in the Monroe Doctrine. Other than the administration's cooperation with and the transfer of weaponry to the Saudis, the Reagan administration saw to weaponry assistance to Iraq, among claims of the transfer of chemical weapons used by the Saddam regime. (*U.S. involvement in the 1980s Iran-Iraq War: America's haphazard extension of Gulf insecurity*, 2018) In doing so, the United States still arguably took a side in the conflict, in managing to prevent an Iraqi defeat via limited efforts to aid the Iraqi government. During the eight year war, the U.S. extended \$1.5 billion in credits to Iraq for importing American commercial and agricultural products. Elsewhere, the \$3.2-billion five-year economic and military assistance package to Pakistan incorporated the sale of F-15s, served to empower a weaker ally and facilitated further American support to its neighbor, Afghanistan. This support during the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979 to 1989 was to result in covert assistance adding up to \$250 million a year. (Kuniholm, 1986, 345)

Ronald Reagan followed a long list of American statesmen, from Hamilton and Jefferson to Truman and Kennedy, to make use of political idealism in promulgating the view that the United States defends liberty and consequently has a duty to support others struggling for freedom. The addition of Reagan's neoconservative realism, therefore, spawned a foreign policy doctrine affirming the principality of the so-called 'freedom fighters' in the global competition with communism, to move far from the 'Khrushchev thaw' of the 1950s and 1960s. In defining the purpose of supporting the Contras in Nicaragua in the 1980s, Ronald Reagan articulated that the United States had a duty to support them because they (the Contras) "are the moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers". (Mead, 1999, 23) The self-image of the nation, therefore, once again was instrumentalized in garnering support for debatably controversial foreign policies such as promoting regime change in 'ideologically'-contested geographies. Insofar as the Reagan Doctrine enunciated its ideals based on inherent American values such as freedom and democracy, its overarching ideology could be called 'Wilsonianism with teeth.' The use of foreign aid to insurgencies via intermediaries, such as through covert missions by the CIA, empowered local American allies and reduced the costs to American soldiers. Reagan's foreign policy ideology, accordingly, envisioned a world-wide enlargement of the counter-revolutionary tradition, a proactive and aggressive take on the containment doctrine in American foreign policy that endowed the U.S. with the know-how in mastering the practice of regime change toward anti-communist ideological victories.

In this respect, it can be argued that the expansionist-interventionist ideology in American foreign policy that had dominated the post-Wilson era, albeit sporadic use of idealist liberalism, was further enhanced under the Reagan administration as the U.S. continued to build upon the ideological foundations of the Carter Doctrine's security framework. Military facilities in Kenya, Somalia and Oman cost over \$463 million and military assistance to Turkey reached \$1 billion a year. Building upon the Truman Doctrine's support for a strong NATO ally, the Reagan administration agreed to co-produce 16 F-16s in cooperation with the Turkish Republic. The agreement included the modernization of Turkish airfields and building two new ones in the east of Turkey, in close proximity to the Middle Eastern neighbors such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Later into the Reagan presidency and the final stages of the cold war, the U.S. foreign policy doctrine of arming freedom fighters resisting authoritarianism and communism necessitated further military involvement and invasions. In October 1983, the U.S. invasion of Grenada allowed the U.S. to

project hard power near communist states in the Caribbeans such as Venezuela and Cuba. President Reagan, in doing so, may have been motivated to prevent a repeat of the Iranian hostage crisis. Although the containment of Iran had been a U.S. foreign policy principle following the hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war, it was revealed during the second presidential term of Ronald Reagan that his administration approved and implemented the sale of American weapons to Iran. The administration's agenda to fund a right wing rebel group in Nicaragua, typical of Reagan's Cold War foreign policy, was largely financed by the arms sale to Iran, despite an arms embargo put in place by the U.S. Congress. (Suri, 2021) In light of the administration's activity in foreign affairs, it can be argued the U.S. held a pragmatic ideology that served to justify the president's resort to secrecy and the de facto violation of American laws to further Cold War objectives. Based on policy choices in light of evolving geopolitical concerns, the ideological and sociological roots of the Reagan Doctrine are arguably "in common with other American foreign policy doctrines", in that it represented "both continuity and change." (Johnson, 1988, 510)

In attempting the architecture of a new global order via an emphasis on American exceptionalism's idealistic self-image, the Reagan Doctrine assumed the role to determine the priority goals and political legitimacy of other societies, and enforce such judgments through the use of realism via violence against illegitimate regimes. Within the rhetoric of foreign policy, the Reagan Doctrine was, in theory, based on the proposition that democracy promotes peace. The administration's claim is arguably well-founded in that democracies (liberal states) have been remarkably peaceful in their relations with each other, but as Michael Doyle demonstrates, it cannot be assumed that the peaceful behavior of democracies extends to their relations with non-democratic states. (Johnson, 1988, 513) Overall, the normative component of American idealism in Reagan's foreign policy was reinforced yet again by the emphasis on hard power and interventionism. As such, the global expansion of U.S. military bases, weapons and personnel would lead to ever enlarged American frontiers and to a commonwealth of the United States' army presence around the globe. The Reagan Doctrine and the ideological components founded in expansionist realism adopted by the U.S. administrations following the Truman Doctrine, can be thought to have laid the groundwork for the nearly 800 military bases in over 70 countries and territories today in 2022. (Haddad, 2021)

The gradual collapse of the Soviet Union toward the end of Ronald Reagan's term, therefore, had been precipitated by the ruthless pragmatism, competition and conflict sponsored by American neoliberal policies and revised proactive confrontationalism derived from the deeply-rooted containment policy. Neoliberalism, working in conjunction with interventionist neoconservatism, showcased a clear triumph over the planned economy of the Soviet Union. As internationally roaming American capital had built economic partnerships around the world, the Soviets failed to compete due to the lack of the intermediary of a transnational bourgeois class. The consequent implosive dissolution of the Soviets in 1991 had led many to expect that the US military endeavors would subside, and the first few years after the end of the Cold War saw the US close several military bases overseas. The US, however, has continued to engage in military aggression and went on to deploy ever more military members abroad. (Gill, 2016, 137) The Post-Cold War American objective, ideologically, was the Hamiltonian dream of "a fully integrated global economy, combined with the Wilsonian dream of global political order." (Mead, 1999, 19) The scope of this objective illustrated that America indeed was pursuing 'global hegemony,' but this was not merely military hegemony in the sense Mearsheimer envisioned. In this sense, a third dominion in the conceptualization of global hegemony, the sphere of politics, had arisen to complement economical and militaristic areas. The element of idealism found entrenched in the dual ideology of the American world order, significantly, was susceptible to falling short of garnering the support of the American nation in the absence of an 'ideological' adversary. Kissinger, consequently, inquires as to what will ensure the American involvement necessary to create and sustain a stable international security order, without the driving force of the Cold War? (Ruggie, 1995, 69)

5.3 Ideology at the End of History: Unipolar Dominion of Neoliberal Power and Foreign Policy in the new World Order

American political scientist Francis Fukuyama's work of political philosophy, *The End of History and the Last Man*, is a 1992 book that proposes that the triumph of Western liberal democracy represents a potential cure to world order and mankind's ideological evolution to the final form of human government. The triumph of liberal democracy could arguably be seen as an accomplishment in the idealist, liberal democratic progression of international relations. The novel "End of History" and its aftermath were to manifest familiar characteristics of normative American

presidential doctrines that reflect upon the globally ‘victorious’ exceptionalism presented by the American experiment. In 1991, James Baker, President George Herbert Walker Bush’s secretary of state, made use of ‘neo-Jacobinism’ in declaring that U.S. foreign policy should serve not only American interests but the “enlightenment ideals of universal applicability.” (Ryn, 2003, 391) This statement can be seen as an extension of the principles of American liberalism and political idealism, and was a key element of identity driving American politicians. American presidents had habitually had to bear in mind the differing priorities and expectations of the two political camps in the nation for popular support, in the process of foreign policy-making. At the ‘end of history,’ however, the United States had considerably more incentives to address a world in need of leadership and prospects of developments and peace. With the possibility of political and economic integration of those countries formerly detached from the American-led world order by the Iron Curtain, this new era of United States foreign policy presented an inviting picture of expansion and growth for American global influence.

The interdependent economic and political vision presented by globalization drew on idealistic neo-Jacobinism toward worldwide connectivity that could be steered toward enhanced American leadership. Globalization, a process that facilitates interactions between governments, people and companies, has had crucial influences on the conduct on foreign policy. It stipulated that a state’s behavior towards its citizens, and to some extent towards the global vox populi, was not an entirely internal matter, as “leaders’ behavior was now shaped by the various external factors like the persuasion of international and regional organizations, foreign donors and civil society organizations (Risse, quoted in Nanyonga, 2019, 149) Accordingly, The Bush Doctrine, set forth primarily in the National Security Strategy, commits the United States to a foreign policy emboldened by the post-cold war world’s opportunities. The publicly and formally stated U.S. goal, significantly, was articulated as establishing global supremacy, both de jure and de facto. The United States was to be an “arbiter of good and evil in the world and, if necessary, enforce its judgments unilaterally.” (Ryn, 2003, 395) It could be argued that global hegemony in a unipolar world now appeared achievable, arguably able to surpass Mearsheimer's relevant realism and objection based on the challenge of offshore military power projection. America, in addition to a dominant military power, now possessed a rare international monopolistic share in the institutional economic and political arenas of what is called global hegemony.

5.4 Neoliberalism and Post-Cold War Geopolitics: New Contractions

At the end of 1989, the newly elected George H. W. Bush administration decided to invade Panama, to capture General Noriega, who had been indicted on drug trafficking and racketeering charges in the U.S. As a result, the United Nations General Assembly and the Organization of American States condemned the invasion as a violation of international law. This example demonstrated that despite what kind of president or ideology shapes foreign policy, unilateralism in expansionist and interventionist tradition remained a constant in America's repertoire. It was perfectly viable for the U.S. to initiate a U.N.-orchestrated multilateral response in Panama based on international law and institutionalism. While that foreign policy option was neglected for the case of Panama, the United States opted to resort to multilateral intervention in the more challenging conflict that was to be called the Gulf War. Prior to 1990, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi government had been on good terms with and supported by the U.S. as part of its prioritization of oil production, as well as during the Iran-Iraq War. When Hussein ordered the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the White House evaluated the invasion to pose a clear threat to the Carter Doctrine and the geopolitical interests of the U.S. in the Gulf. This was a region, after all, in which America had made significant and costly investments in building up a security web, bases, intelligence units and allies. Of primary concern to the President and the Department of Defense was, as it had been before, the protection of Saudi oil fields. The concern for legitimacy of state behavior through institutionalism, in the case of the Gulf War intervention, was supplemented by the geographical remoteness of Kuwait (relative to Panama), and the common shared interests of the members of the Security Council of the UN in the petroleum industry were elements constituted the reasons American foreign policy turned 'multilateral' in Iraq.

The Gulf War of 1990-1991, accordingly, was a prime example of neoliberal concerns fuelling involvement and interventionism in the function of the American-led economic order. The war demonstrated that President Carter's assertion that America would fight for oil was not limited to fighting, directly or indirectly, the Soviet Union. Political realism in approaching world events, interventionism and economic sanctions would be adopted to oppose any adversary in the way of neoliberal expansion. The Gulf War was popular in Jacksonian circles because the defense of the nation's oil supply struck a chord with Jacksonian opinion based on neoconservative nationalism. That opinion, remembering the oil shortages and price hikes of Jimmy Carter's 1970s, regarded

stability of the oil supply as a vital national interest to be defended and fought for. On the other hand, idealistic and moralistic reasoning, based on the atrocity propaganda about alleged Iraqi barbarisms in Kuwait, did not inspire Jacksonians to war, and neither did legalistic arguments about U.S. obligations under the UN Charter to defend a member state from aggression. (Mead, 1999, 13) It was arguably the aforementioned neoconservatism and public sentiment (pertaining to the price of oil) that required unapologetic realism and power projection in this war and President Bush's "refusal to insist on an unconditional surrender in Iraq" that facilitated his defeat in the 1992 presidential election. (Mead, 1999, 24) The primacy of vital resources with respect to the integrity of the neoliberal order, therefore, is once again accentuated in American foreign policy.

To further the ideologically symbiotic (realism and idealism) American foreign policy tradition of neoliberal market expansion and the containment doctrine toward Iraq, President Bill Clinton (inaugurated in 1993) adopted further economic sanctions with the objective to trigger popular uprisings against Saddam Hussein. A firm stance and overwhelming military as well as political encirclement of Iraq based on America's mission in the region, continued to be the cornerstones of U.S. foreign policy. June 1993 saw President Clinton order a missile attack against Iraq to retaliate for a purported plan to assassinate former President Bush. From a realist perspective, Iraq was no match for the mighty American military. Furthermore, unlike the Cold-War era, the Clinton administration was able to manage foreign affairs in the absence of national fear, that had haunted the likes of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the Depression era and many others facing the nuclear-powered Soviet Union. The fact that opponents such as Iraq did not constitute an 'enemy to be feared, unlike in the Cold War era' demonstrates that idealism and liberal interstate cooperation was instituted and promoted by political realism based on the U.S.' status as a hegemon in world affairs. This reality, once again, highlights the function of the symbiotic relationship between idealism and realism in determining the conduct of American foreign policy.

The globalization-enforced neoliberal foundations of the new world order, with the weakening of fear in the minds of Americans, led the United States to approach rivals such as China via liberalism and coexistence in terms of political ideology. Based on cooperation rather than zero-sum competition, China was named a strategic partner at this time. Clinton was to push Congress to approve the trade agreement between the U.S. and China in 2000. As such, President Clinton aimed to align the Democratic Party with laissez-faire economic principles successfully

advertised by Ronald Reagan and facilitated his party's adoption of neoliberal imperatives, as the collapse of communism had "accelerated the globalization of capitalism and elevated neoliberalism's prestige." (Gerstle, 2017, 241) Under Bill Clinton's presidency in 1995, GATT was replaced by the WTO and international free-market economic policies, supported by prominent financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and the U.S. Department of the Treasury would be referred to as 'the Washington Consensus'. The epitome of President Bill Clinton's neoliberal agenda was arguably the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a trade agreement that practically turned all of North America into a single market.

Elements of Wilsonian idealism in American foreign policy found new forms of instrumentalization under the Clinton administration, specifically in the form of an emphasis on human rights and humanitarian aid. As it has been the case in earlier American administrations, elements of liberalism and conservatism went hand in hand in foreign affairs, specifically through the application of 'humanitarian interventions'. Since 1948, Yugoslavian unity had been vital to American interests especially, when it broke free from Soviet control. The lessening post-Cold War Western economic support for Yugoslavia, relative to states like Germany, had started to erode incentives for the unity and cooperation of Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and Slovenians. (The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990–1992, (n.d.)) Nationalist sentiment, utilized by Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia's President from 1989, was followed by declarations of sovereignty by Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990. Under these circumstances, a civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and displaced millions from their homes, as Europe witnessed the most horrific fighting on its territory since the end of World War II. These circumstances would put to test the importance of Yugoslavia in American foreign policy under President Bill Clinton.

The United States utilized diplomacy and Wilsonian liberal institutionalism to end the ethnically-oriented conflict in formerly-communist Yugoslav Republic. In brokering the Dayton Peace agreement among Bosnian muslims, Serbs and Croats in 1995, it can be argued that Bill Clinton initially opted for a peaceful resolution in line with his liberal idealism comparable to his overall approach to neoliberal globalization. In 1998–1999, violence erupted again in Kosovo, with the province's majority Albanian population calling for independence from Serbia. A U.S.-led NATO bombing campaign and a set of economic sanctions, then, forced the Milosevic regime to accept a NATO-led international peace keeping force. The province was consequently placed

under U.N. administrative mandate. (The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990–1992, (n.d.)) The recurring yet differing American involvement in the turbulent affairs of the Yugoslav Republic speaks to the fact that foreign control of regions continued to require occasional military commitment from America even under presidents that adopted Wilsonian liberalism and cooperation. Characterized by the institutional assistance of NATO and its members, the era of an unrivaled hegemon determining the fate of nations and of policy making of international organizations, at least in Europe, was in place.

The path for American foreign policy following the Cold War had been to go forward and capitalize on the defeat of its adversary around the globe. This period presented an opportunity for America's equipment, weaponry, and military presence to spread and yield lucrative as well as strategic results. Globalization and power politics, in the form of intergovernmental arms trade and military assistance, therefore, were interlinked within Clinton's firm commitment to promoting market democracies "in a context of wider liberal triumphalism." (Bridoux, 2013, 237) By 1997, the Caspian states had already begun receiving massive American military aid, in addition to regional joint military exercises with U.S. troops in lead. It is worth noting that President Clinton chose not to invoke the Carter Doctrine directly, albeit applying a similar understanding of national security that arguably connected oil industry-based American interests in the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf.

Meeting the president of Azerbaijan in a White House meeting in 1997, President Clinton asserted that his country cannot rely entirely on a single region for energy supplies. The facilitation of Azerbaijan's oil through exports, it was argued, helped this nation prosper and strengthened American security by diversifying its energy supply. As this was a far less contentious region, the military aid to the Caspian sea nations was relatively modest compared to that provided to Saudi Arabia. As a result of such expansion of the American state apparatus (diplomacy and military presence) and intervention in the affairs of foreign populations, America had acquired not only additional access to vital resources to sustain its economy and military, but also further responsibilities such as nation-building in war-torn nations like Kuwait. These enhanced responsibilities cemented the U.S. role of policing the world, which in turn created armed insurgencies and groups driven by anti-Americanist sentiment. Soon to be categorized as terrorists, these groups opposed American intervention and the presence of the American army in their societies. The rise of resistance fueled by anti-Americanism found in the Iraqi people and

administration, for example, led the Clinton administration, along with Britain, to launch air strikes against military sites and weaponry in Iraq, in December 1998. The Middle East, however, was only one of the areas controlled by American supervision in the world.

The historical trajectory of American administrations demonstrates that foreign policy better engages the American populace when there is opposition. In the absence of the aforementioned national fear that rallies support for foreign policy instruments from trade agreements to war, there was less consensus among Americans on foreign policy issues and ideological objectives in the post-Khrushchev Thaw era, compared to the period from 1940 between 1965. (Manning, 1976, 271) Consequently, this reality required the United States to settle upon a new consensus regarding global moral objectives. It is therefore understandable that an emphasis on the identity of the United States as an exceptional nation and the leader of the new world order leads American politicians to rank and view other nations accordingly. Even in the absence of clear-cut opposition from ‘enemies,’ the American-led world order maintained a zero-sum approach toward those nations that rejected or even did not participate in the predominantly neoliberal structure of the world in ‘need’ of ever enhanced globalization.

Creating a perceived moral hierarchy among states and their economic role in the world, US elites often constructed non-neoliberal nations as not only economically backward but led by ‘uncivil’ leaders. For instance, Venezuelan leaders such as former President Chávez were perceived to be in need of “US tutelage in order to correct their behavior” as they did “not properly understand how democracy works”. (Gill, 2016, 139) Gill argues that under such a civil/uncivil schema, “US elites often understand themselves as the bearers of civilization and the entity that must instruct the world in the ways of democracy, lest uncivil behavior persist.” (Gill, 2016, 139) The systemic structure and function of this hierarchical global order had been articulated by Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970s, as his ‘World Systems Theory’ illustrates a worldwide system in which the domestic economic structure, division of labor and function of peripheral and semi-peripheral states are determined based on the ‘needs’ of core states. The United States, as the leader of the system and a principal core state, had the perceived right to regulate the design of other nations’ economic roles in the overarching system, tied closely to the manipulation of the neoliberal order and ‘free trade’. While this was the aspect of the neoliberal order characterized by realism as well as a global economic pecking order, idealism provided a morally-founded

categorization of other states through which the perceived democratic or uncivil status of nations shaped the manner in which the United States chooses to deal with the world in foreign policy.

5.4 The War on Terror and the Resurgence of Neoconservative Realism

It was in this conjuncture of American-dominated international relations that the aforementioned reactions based on anti-Americanism can be thought to have produced the single most definitive event in the twenty first century American history. The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that took place on September 9, 2001 significantly transformed the conduct of the United States' foreign policy. George W. Bush, who took office earlier in 2001 for a two-term presidency, announced the next stage of American foreign policy ideology and his presidential doctrine to be defined by the 'global war on terror'. What is remarkable about this novel objective and state of affairs in the United States' strategy abroad, however, is how closely the war on terror tied to America's position regarding the oil business in rhetoric as well as in geographic scope. The expansion of the U.S. hard power in the Middle East region, based on aforementioned anti-American grievances, had constituted mass resentment that was radicalized by local communities to produce the shocking terrorist attack on September 11. As the Beirut attack of 1983 that killed 241 American military personnel had demonstrated before, significant muslim-majority groups and ethnicities were driven by extremist ideologies to perform anti-American (and indirectly anti-neoliberal) acts of violence and protest.

Osama Bin Laden was the leader of Al-Qaeda, the terrorist network that executed the suicide-attacks on September 11, and held and preached that American imperialism and foreign troops should be expelled from Muslim territories. Born into a wealthy family in Saudi Arabia, Laden joined Mujahideen forces in Pakistan to fight against another invading imperial power, the Soviet Union. Gaining popular support among Arabs for his offering of arms, money and manpower to the mujahideen, he founded Al Qaeda, officially Qaedat al-Jihad 'the Foundation of Jihad' in 1988. Laden believed that a U.S. led Christian-Jewish alliance was at war with and intended to destroy Islam. This belief, held by masses around the world, was put forward by American political scientist Samuel Huntington's colossal work 'The Clash of Civilizations' in

1996. Establishing a base in Afghanistan after 1996, Osama Bin Laden acquired the means to order the deadly U.S. Embassy bombings in 1998. 224 people, including 12 Americans, had been killed in 1998 as a result of simultaneous explosions at the American Embassies in Dar es Salaam of Tanzania and in Nairobi of Kenya. Targeting the U.S. directly, Osama bin Laden arguably created an anti-doctrine against the economic and military expansionism that characterized American foreign policy, and declared the September 11 attacks to be based on religious self-defense and jihad, the Islamic Holy War.

The 'War on Terror' transformed ideological approaches to American foreign policy and created an instant response based on the doctrinalization of the novel fight against terror and the threats it posed. It was less than five months after the 9/11 catastrophe and in his State of the Union address on January 29 of 2002 that President Bush introduced the phrase 'axis of evil' to refer to those states that allegedly supported terrorism and possessed or aimed to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Repeatedly articulating the notion of such an axis that originally referred to Iran, Iraq and North Korea, George Bush attempted to garner popular support for the War on Terror. The 'evil school,' therefore, was a concept in realist political thought, as the corrupt nature of man or of 'bad' states were thought to be the causes of contemporary international power struggles. (Toft, 2005, 389) It is worth noting that the 'axis of evil' was a reference to the Axis Powers of World War 2, which was made up of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and Fascist Italy. In terms of the ideological makeup of presidential doctrines and foreign policy making, the United States was once again in need of a way to differentiate, label and recognize the enemy, and this necessity can be understood in relation to America's ideological dependence on an morally inferior enemy, to garner maximum support for foreign policy activity from the American people.

This tradition of the use of language in the advertising, policy making and implementation in foreign affairs had persisted even after World War 2, exemplified by Ronald Reagan's labeling of the Soviet Union 'the Evil Empire' as the focus of evil in the contemporary world. The newly-developing Bush Doctrine, therefore, built upon Reagan's ideology and policy choices that characterized America's campaign as one between good and evil. The labeling, instead, of Iran, North Korea and Iraq ignites suspicion that the U.S. administration may have utilized and abused the war on terror to further its own foreign policy ideology that prioritizes the exceptional global leadership of America and geopolitical interests beyond the intent to end terrorism. Regardless,

President Bush's proclamation of the axis of evil resulted in the formation of what Iran named the 'Axis of Resistance' that comprised Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. These developments functioned to frame world politics, comparable to the emphasis of the Carter administration, around the question of U.S. presence, military objectives and further involvement in the Middle East region.

George Bush's America, while responding to the reality of terrorism, purported to be a nation on a mission. The ideological composition of the administration's policies demonstrated an extreme reliance on political realism, interventionism and the politics of power while maintaining the tradition of moral idealism. The Bush doctrine stressed the vitality of spreading democracy, specifically in the middle east. According to Mearsheimer, the war against Afghanistan, initiated less than a month after the 9/11 attacks on October 7 of 2001, was the initial step in this direction. (2005, 3) Triggered by 'interventionist acute democracy promotion', the first phase of the anti-terror reaction by America was the toppling of the Taliban that had reigned over Afghanistan and provided a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda. The American mission in this country would go beyond the two terms of the Bush administration, with the subsequent objectives to defeat Taliban militarily, politically and by initiating a counterinsurgency.

Starting with the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, America's foreign policy agenda, not constituting a paradigmatic shift in and of itself, claimed to portray a radical continuation of the "commitment to promote democracy globally" (Bridoux, 2013, 238) It should be noted that in the new century, idealism in American foreign policy found novel ways of adapting to the realities of the use of hard power. American politicians, at this time, adopted post-Wilsonianism in that their mission tied strictly to their fundamental belief in democratic peace that furthered the cause of freedom around the globe. In this sense, nearly a century after the Wilson administration, the neoconservative interventionist aspect of ideology adopted by the Bush doctrine could be compared to Ronald Reagan's doctrine that was referred to as 'Wilsonianism with teeth'. On that note, the doctrine remained moralistic and hawkish, where Wilsonianism provided the idealism, an emphasis on military power provided the teeth. According to John Mearsheimer, neoconservatives believed in big-stick diplomacy, just like Theodore Roosevelt did a century ago, as the Bush doctrine privileged military power over diplomacy and was 'exceptional' in that there

had never “been a state on earth that has as much relative military power as the United States has.” (2005, 1)

An ideology-based argument can be made that the Iraq War was part of a synthesis of a neoconservative as well as neoliberal agenda that aimed to maintain US imperial credibility and exploited idealistic moralism toward ‘ruthless’ pragmatic realism. George Bush, on the other hand, contended that the attack on Iraq was moralistically motivated, “not only by a desire to liberate the long-oppressed victims of Saddam Hussein’s tyranny, but also as a major step in the democratization of the Middle East”. (Holsti, 2010, 386) A mix of moral idealism and power projection, commonly adopted in American foreign policy tradition, served to legitimize the Iraq Invasion (March to May 2003) on the basis of international collective security. Alarming, no alleged weapons of mass destruction were to be found in Saddam’s Iraq after the Iraq invasion. In fact, Colin Powell, American Secretary of State at the time, uttered the words “‘weapons of mass destruction’ a total of 17 times in the United Nations Security Council to justify an intervention that would prevent evil from harming the Iraqi people and the neighboring states. (Mitchell, 2023) Among the extravagant claims of the United States representative was that America had ‘solid sources’ for its allegations, whose inauthenticity was later revealed to demonstrate the aforementioned ‘immoral’ pragmatism. The fact that the United States representatives manipulated world public opinion and the members of the Security Council in pointing to nonexistent weapons of mass destruction shows once again that rapacious neoconservatism based on pragmatic realism was more significant for the Bush administration than the institutionalist moralism found in Wilsonian idealism.

It should be noted that even offensive realists, who are usually in favor of power projection based on political realism, objected to America’s invasion of Iraq that was initiated in March of 2003 and lasted until December of 2011. The objection was on the grounds that even if Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, he would be easily deterred via “an offshore balancing strategy relying on Iran.” (Mearsheimer, quoted in Toft, 2005, 399) Moving away from the neoconservative realist depiction of events, the idealist ideology created was that the United States intended “eventually to transform the entire region into a sea of democracies.” (Mearsheimer, 2005, 3) Observably, this aspect based on a liberal ideology was similarly specious, as neighboring states did not benefit from such an egalitarian agenda following the invasion.

Political realists, according to Mearsheimer, predicted that “Iran and North Korea would not react to an attack on Iraq by abandoning their nuclear programmes, but would work harder than ever to acquire a nuclear deterrent so as to immunize themselves from American power”. (2005, 4) An analysis of the ideological political philosophies and the policy choices of the Bush administration, as well as on the element of oil reserves that had been an enduring U.S. interest since the Gulf War and still later in Iraq during the Clinton administration, indicates that ‘offensive neoliberalism’ may illustrate the credible reasons for the Iraq invasion owing to the resilience of America’s perceived hegemonic responsibility to control the global oil industry.

5.5 President Obama’s Strategic Absence to President Trump’s Neoliberal Absence

The continuing American military presence in Iraq, based on enduring policies, constituted George W. Bush’s ‘hard legacy’, which in turn was curtailed by the Obama administration’s (2008 to 2016) efforts to withdraw troops from the region. (Fong et al, 2017, 6) Barack Obama’s lessened reliance on political realism, hard power and military troop presence abroad was matched by an increased use of economic sanctions. This reality could be tied to a ‘democratic’ liberal tendency, comparable to the Wilsonian tradition of utilizing liberal institutionalism and soft power. As the United States continued to be the unrivaled hegemon in global politics and the neoliberal order, the use of economic pressure on states that did not comply with “the standards set and agreed by the international community” (Zirovcic, 2016, 7) promoted an ever-more normative American role within the U.S.-led world system. The emphasis on such compliance, accordingly, signals a continuation of the economic characteristics of neoliberal expansion and potentially the regulatory dictates of the hierarchical ‘world systems,’ while pointing to a departure from overly militaristic realism.

The president’s democratic anti-neoconservative ideology was a constitutive pillar of the Obama doctrine called ‘Strategic Absence’. ‘Obamaism’ therefore, drew on Jeffersonians’ minimalist realism under which American interests are defined as narrowly as possible and defended with an absolute minimum of force. (Mead, 1999, 17) This doctrine aimed to limit American interests, rearrange the responsibilities of international partners and local actors, and ultimately to minimize the offshore involvement of the American military via a ‘manpower-

minimizing' emphasis on utilizing unmanned aircraft systems known as drones. (Williams, 2016, 3) In the NATO-led intervention of Libya in 2011, the Obama administration articulated the strategy 'leading from behind' in an effort to coin its novel understanding of securing American interests. This effort entailed the reliance on multilateral institutions including the United Nations Security Council, the International Criminal Court and NATO, as well as reducing military involvement by refusing to commit troops on the ground to fight the forces of Muammar Gaddafi.

A critical analysis of the Obama administration, in terms of ideological commitment to foreign affairs, indicates Obamaism may portray as much continuity as change. While the American counterterrorism strategy tool has become the foundational element as a targeted killing program, a normative, idealistic and pacifistic outlook may suggest 'reductionism' matters insofar as it reduces the death toll of civilians due to American military involvement, and not of manpower. On that note, the 563 drone strikes (compared to Bush's 57) ordered during Obama's two terms in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, have resulted in the murder of between 384 and 807 civilians. (Purkiss & Serle, 2017) Similarly, Obama's resort to economic sanctions may be viewed as another way to perpetuate the hierarchical order upon which the United States is situated. This objective may be tied to the aforementioned opposition to the socioeconomic and governmental architecture of states including but not limited to Venezuela and Cuba, that are resultantly perceived to be uncivil, deviant and morally inferior. In fact, based on Muammar Gaddafi's commitment to de-dollarization and plans to introduce a gold dinar to support African currencies, (Isilow, 2021) the United States' involvement in the toppling of the Libyan leader may be categorized as 'interventionist neoliberalism' aimed at maintaining American economic interests in the Greater Middle East at all costs.

In rhetoric, however, Barack Obama was opposed to the neoconservative interventionism normally adopted by hawkish American administrations, and stood in contrast to the previous president who, even after his presidential term, refused to acknowledge any wrongdoing during the Iraq War. This dichotomy between a republican and democratic administration, among other domestic ideological frictions, had created polarization and dissonance in the Senate, hindering Barack Obama's ability to sign treaties as part of his doctrine of 'Strategic Absence.' As such, Obama's ideological political position led the president to complete considerably fewer treaties than previous American presidents, opting instead for executive agreements. This unusual reality,

however, may have damaged the international prestige of an administration that strived to embrace Wilsonianism in foreign affairs. Ratified treaties, as opposed to executive orders, are arguably much more credible in international relations, and U.S. treaty partners, due to such credibility in commitment, “prefer treaties to executive agreements.” (Milner, quoted in Peake, 2014, 33) Another element of reductionism found in the Obama Doctrine, a departure from the previous administrations of the Cold War era (particularly that of Ronald Reagan), was the waning of democracy promotion, a burdensome process, in American foreign policy. Arguably, the lack of such grand narrative reflected the state of the world, in that greater multipolarity and numerous challenges around the globe forced the Obama administration to abandon “the grand project of remaking the world in the United States’ image.” (Bridoux, 2013, 238) This reality demonstrates once again the limits of liberal Wilsonianism, as a result of the dictates of political realism.

Based on the ideological outlook of the Obama administration, the wider political conjuncture and rising powers in the world observably shaped the symbiotic antagonism found in the balance of idealism and realism in American foreign policy. In the post-Cold War era, the Russian Federation had vehemently objected to NATO's eastward expansion. Significantly, however, Russia had not attempted to resist the NATO military action against Yugoslavia in 1999; and U.S. action against Iraq in 2003 (Elhefnawy, 2022, 7) In Syria, Russia had deployed its own ground, air and naval power in 2015 to protect Bashar Assad’s regime, had declared war on Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea via a military intervention in Eastern Ukraine. (Elhefnawy, 2022, 7) The Obama administration’s foreign policy ideology displayed a dramatic departure from George W. Bush’s ‘War on Terror’ in that the ‘narrow’ approach to foreign policy of Strategic Absence led to the exclusion of local jihadi power struggles from the framework of ‘vital American interests.’ Obama’s America demonstrated a lessened reliance on radical ‘freedom fighters’ even in the face of threats to American interests. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Obama Doctrine “dramatically understated the threat posed by ISIS to the United States” (Williams, 2016, 8) in a principled effort to minimize American military involvement overseas. In Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine, Obama’s reductionist foreign policy ideology was a result of the challenge of determining “which group has the more legitimate right to rule”. (Johnson, 1988, 519) In a globalizing world of enhanced interaction, Obama’s caution against unilateral foreign interventions stood in stark contrast to the Reagan Doctrine’s (and consecutive neoconservatives’) emphasis on supporting

alliances with states and non-state actors that are antithetical to the United States' adversaries, easily perceived as legitimate, and worthy of American support.

A crucial aspect of Barack Obama's presidency that significantly affected the world was the 2008 financial crisis, which led to the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. Sustained economic distress, slow recovery and economic inequality between as well as within nations, had demonstrated democratic governments to be unsuccessful in response, while the Keynesian stimulus implemented by Barack Obama arguably yielded relatively more fruitful results. (Gary Gerstle, 2017, 262) The adoption of Keynesianism by the Obama administration demonstrated that neoliberalism, a pillar of American economic ideology, could be suspended in times of severe debacles. In doing so, Obama responded to a growing backlash at the tenets of neoliberalism such as deregulation, globalization, free trade and the unrestrained movement of people. Accordingly, it was precisely such resentment regarding the domestic neoliberal foundations of the American economy that the next American president Donald Trump would capitalize on.

In Trump's America, (2017 to 2021) the primary remedy to 'make America great again' and reverse the neoliberal disaster at home was to build walls and reverse globalization. (Gerstle, 2017, 263) The massive popular support for Donald Trump originated from the revival of Jacksonian, neorealist America in that when government perversion (as an extension of neoliberalism) became intolerable, Jacksonians looked for "a popular hero to restore government to its proper function." (Mead, 1999, 16) The election of Donald Trump, therefore, had been "a symptom of the crisis in the neoliberal order, not its cause." (Gerstle, 2017, 263) This crisis arguably had even more alarming consequences for other states, as the expansion of big monopolist associations gravitated the salience of organizations that Vladimir Lenin had predicted would lead to "the formation of international cartels" (1916, 50) in places like Mexico. Armed militias had been formed and the resultant 'New Wars' and 'failed states' led to populations becoming 'both victim and agent of violence' where state institutions lost their "monopoly of violence including the power to protect their citizens." (Demuth, 2018, 68)

In America, the Great Recession of 2008 that ruptured the nation's neoliberal order enabled the anti-Mexican, anti-immigrant "right-wing populism of Donald Trump and the left-wing populism of Bernie Sanders," (Gary Gerstle, 2017, 241) in the American political sphere. Under the Trump administration, (as it had been for a long time) political parties were characterized by

“partisan zealots, people who value ideology (and party) over the system.” (Fettweis, 667) The president’s ideology within the economic sphere, arguably, is partially comparable to Vladimir Lenin’s anti-capitalist views a century ago, that argued further development of capitalism (or today’s neoliberalism) necessitated that the export of capital (for cheap labor, resources and infrastructure elsewhere) arrested development in the capital-exporting countries. (Lenin, 1916,47) It is important to note that the adoption of anti-neoliberalism in economics led to limited economic neoconservatism. As such in criticism of heavy reliance on the function of markets, Donald Trump adopted isolationism as a political as well as economic ideology.

Debatably a reflection of hostile Cold War foreign policy at home, Trumpism followed a tradition of divisive political realism at home. It wasn’t unexpected, therefore, that the scarcity of Wilsonian liberalism unsettled not only citizens of Mexican origin or Afro-American identity, but arguably any social group that did not identify as conservative white American. The president’s ideological orientation, instead, was supplemented by the political philosophy of Andrew Jackson, in whose household were listed fourteen enslaved individuals, according to the 1830 census. (Hopkins, 2019) At home, Donald Trump embraced a “zero-sum, good-versus-evil affairs” ideology opposed to bargaining. (Fettweis, 667) The president’s policy choices abroad, on the other hand, undermined the link between economic and military expansionism in American foreign policy. This reality places Donald Trump’s record in contrast with the neoconservative ideology, commonly held by Jacksonian republicans. In line with the era of the Cold War, democratic and republican leaders more or less reacted to the images they held of other states, in comparison their own self image or to that of their nation. In that sense, Trump was once again an outlier. Trump’s ideology led American foreign policy to demand that countries which were historically aligned with or allies of the U.S. military, such as Japan, to pay their ‘fair share’ for the American protection provided and the American troops stationed. (Seligman & Gramer, 2019) In terms of realpolitik, Donald Trump had the potential to undermine the significant political-military gains that had been made to preserve the American global order.

The fact that Donald Trump adopted a deviant and ‘laissez-faire’ approach in leadership, which did not follow the tradition of foreign policy, allowed him to turn ‘unilateral’ in ordering the killing, through a drone attack, of Persian general Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. In the sense that this attack did not fit Trump’s foreign policy isolationism (in neoconservative as well

as neoliberal spheres) and costly military commitments, this ‘execution’ could be seen to be an exception or as ‘selective reductionism’ comparable to the Obama Doctrine. In that regard, the polarization at home allowed republicans to defend Donald Trump based on ‘whataboutism’. People on the right pointed to the Obama administration’s excessive use of unmanned aircraft in conflicts to defend the killing of Soleimani, or asked in relation to the perceived presidential overreach of President Trump, “what about Obama’s executive orders?” (Fettweis, 682) Adhering to political isolationism abroad by withdrawing from the Paris Agreement of 2016 (an international treaty on climate change) based on economic nationalism, Donald Trump preserved his military isolationism by not fully antagonizing the North Korea Chairman Kim Jong Un and instead by meeting him in person in 2018 to agree to formally end the Korean War and work toward a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

The way in which Donald Trump’s political ideology entailed an inward criticism of the nation’s foreign and domestic policies, rather than pointing exclusively at foreign threats with the exception of Iran, demonstrated once again a deviant president who capitalized on “the absence of a clearly defined threat to the national interest”. (Mead, 1999, 19) Facing economic ideological opposition or an absolute severe threat against U.S. interest that could be resolved via a minimal effort (the drone strike on Suleimani), Donald Trump did not abstain from conflict. The trade war with China that intensified during his reign demonstrated the president’s commitment to confront any country, to solve the ‘neoliberal problem,’ as a great deal of American capital was exported to China, ‘stealing’ American workers’ jobs. In terms of power politics in a newly emerging bipolar world, the realist school would command that (as proposed by Mearsheimer) the U.S. should “concentrate on slowing the rise of China rather than stimulating it through the hitherto accommodating economic policies” (Toft, 2005, 399) Overall, the presidential record of Donald Trump displayed a much less active and aggressive America in military commitment, opting instead to utilize power politics in confronting foreign economic adversaries and fighting neoliberalism at home.

The immense political impact of and societal backlash to Trumpism, based on the reactionary nature of core ideologies and characterized mainly by liberalism/idealism, provided a roadmap for Joseph Biden to start his tenure as president in 2021. In stark contrast to the economic, political and military isolationism of Donald Trump, President Biden argued Americans should

stop treating our opponents as enemies and signaled a return to liberal institutionalism initially via a return to the Paris environmental agreement. At home, this can be expected to be followed by civil Wilsonian policies until 2025. The president's ideological orientation, therefore, demands that the American people "recognize that disagreements need not lead to demonization." (Fettweis, 667) Even though it is early to evaluate the current American president Joe Biden's administrative choices in foreign policy, it can be argued that American foreign policy is facing one of the most dangerous international crises since the most severe instances of Cold War confrontations such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. (Elhefnawy, 2022, 8) The Russian invasion of Ukraine, initiated on 24 February 2022, constitutes the most significant conflict to threaten the security of Europe ever since the end of WW2, as well as endangering NATO's interests.

CONCLUSION

This research has thus far considered realism and idealism to be two core ideologies within a spectrum, upon which other ideological orientations are founded. An overall assessment of the progression of ideologies observed in the making and implementation of United States foreign policies demonstrates a correlation with the gradual proliferation of novel theoretical and methodical approaches based on political idealism in the world. In political rhetoric, trade and diplomacy, idealism has characterized significant reform outlined in detail in this research. Realism, in comparable as well as contrasting terms, has proven to be a relatively more stagnant yet recurring ideology that has served to either primarily characterize American foreign affairs or supplement the adoption of evolving administrative trends in line with the political conjuncture around the world. This research, based on close inquiry into some of the major policy choices by American statesmen, acknowledges the interrelationship that roughly ties realism to conservatism, and idealism to liberalism in American political thought. The synthetic coexistence of the two opposing camps that characterized the first great debate in international relations and were found extant in differing compositions in American foreign policy agendas establishes that an ideological examination of U.S. foreign policy is optimized by an approach that focuses on the ontological nature of idealism as well as realism. Instead of thoroughly associating realism with conservatives and idealism with liberals in American politics, this research concludes that each presidential administration conjures their own non-stagnant ideological orientations based on pragmatic as well as moral considerations.

Insofar as it is analyzed in this paper, the composite nature of ideologies that influence American foreign policy, despite divergences among leading Americans, has been crucial for the American politicians in the founding era, just as the presence of long-standing political cleavages today 'illustrates the salience of political ideology.' (Gill, 2016, 138) The nature of idealism in early American political thought, based on liberal-progressive ideas exported from post-Renaissance Europe via the works of exceptional thinkers such as John Locke and Thomas Paine, was congenitally visionary, egalitarian and arguably revolutionary. The amount of control by the United Kingdom and the restrictive law-making of the 'colonial' parliament over American trade and everyday life, therefore, contrasted the vision of to-be-American intellectuals who held progressive thoughts. Such discrepancy, by creating ever-growing discontent among Americans, demonstrated a situation in which the resort to violence, therefore to realism, was fueled by

idealism. Protesting and shouting ‘no taxation without representation,’ Americans depended on an egalitarian understanding of society and justice, to push for their political rights via the Parliament. Likewise, the Tea Act of 1773 that served to strengthen the monopoly of the British East India Company and eventually led to the Boston Tea Party incident, is another example whereby realism was instigated by idealistic thought. While the ‘pioneer role’ out of these two ideologies was to alternate in time, liberal thought becoming the driving force in the equation throughout the initial stages of American socio-political life engendered the belief that the concept American exceptionalism is fundamentally and ideologically about ideas, progress and idealism. The historical process and examples through which American exceptionalism was analyzed in this paper, however, manifests that realism not only accompanies idealism in American accomplishments but also often precedes it.

The fact that political realism went hand in hand with liberal thinking in American political thought is observed in the process leading up to the American Revolution. As a body of immigrants who had inherited martialism from a continent long infused with wars and such aspects of late medieval traditions as dueling, the assertion of power against a stronger Imperial power or competitor was a familiar concept in line with realist ideology. The opening shot of the battles of Lexington and Concord that initiated the Revolutionary War, however, was to be renowned as “the shot heard around the world’ as an idealistic proclamation of anti-imperial sentiment. Next, competition in the face of an imperial power, the United Kingdom, necessitated a balancing strategy, based on realism, to support the anti-imperial French republic following the French Revolution of 1789. Once again, this particular American policy of aligning with the new France, despite having fought the French Kingdom recently in the North American continent, was a result of pragmatic realism as much as it was of moral idealism. Republicanism, for a collection of settlements, was a move in the liberal direction. Despite leading to a major debate on the allocation or centralization of power and therefore another manifestation of the realism/idealism dichotomy, the Federalist-anti-Federalist debate itself can be considered to be a process primarily characterized by liberalism, as the outcome (constitutionalism) served to consolidate the tenets of United States democracy. It was during this era that the thoughts of colossally influential figures such as Hamilton, Madison and Jefferson created guiding pillars in American thought that were thoroughly examined in this research. Bearing in mind that the American experiment assumed the role of a flagbearer of liberty around the globe for years to come, the early stages of identity

formation for the American nation arguably owes more idiosyncratic features to idealism than realism.

The preeminence, or predominance of idealism over realism early in American history might be tied to the reality that Americans were a nation in the process of building a group identity, and needed unifying ideas that would set them apart from others. A comparative approach would indicate that even as a colony, American society avoided the bureaucratic-governmental predicaments of the feudal tradition that nations elsewhere had to struggle with. It was no surprise in this era, therefore, that a considerable portion of the American populace disapproved of high dependence on power politics and old-fashioned diplomacy, mistrusted powerful standing armies and entangling commitments such as alliances because Americans made “moralistic judgments about other people’s domestic systems,” and believed liberal values transferred readily to foreign affairs. (Lepgold and McKeown, 1995, p 369) In fact, the revolutionary fervor that was carried onto France might be considered to be the first American attempt at ‘globalization,’ albeit an ideological one on the basis of republicanism and liberties. The liberal/idealistic notion that the United States was a sacred ‘city upon a hill’ built upon exceptional ideas, therefore, provided a basis for the exportation of ideology around the world that America was to utilize time and time again in the 20th century.

As mentioned numerous times throughout this research, on the other hand, realism, characterized by conflict, pragmatic competition and rivalry, necessarily follows idealism in forming states’ ideologies. In this sense, realism ‘caught up’ with the United States, as the progress-promoting, liberty-loving nation went from a colony to colonizer in charge of the practice of settler colonialism, whose national narrative had to ‘catch up’ with the reality that America aimed to conquer land and manipulate the demographics of vast territories, primarily to the west. The invention of “Manifest Destiny”, as a concept, therefore, presented Americans with a divine right for expansion. Not only was it a much more conflict, power and realism-driven ‘experiment’ compared to the American experiment in liberty, but it also provided a framework for future foundational foreign policy agendas in that it was deliberately ambiguous in defining its territory limits. Once more, it is observed that in the American socio-political sphere, elements of realism and idealism determine the utility of accompanying ideologies such as religion and nationalism, which in turn “become the major component of culture in most societies.” (Rabie, 2022, 1)

Ideologies, via doctrinalization, build on one another and this is particularly conspicuous in the case of expansionism. The American Civil War and Abolitionism were arguably inward reflections of such ideological adoptions of American society and politicians. The moral idealistic aspect of the interstate civil war was the stance toward slavery, while the rural-urban economical distinction pointed to elements of competition and power politics. The reality that America had strong foundations built upon ideals, it can be debated, facilitated the emergence of leaders who united the nation on the basis of exceptional American idealism in times of crises. To that end, Abraham Lincoln's words that the white man's governing others equates to despotism (quoted in Lenin, 1916, 83) was a clear statement against the practice of slavery, and yet the same resolute idealism was not extended to Native Americans/Indians and Mexicans. Indian Wars officially concluded in 1890 with the western frontier being closed, and increasing realism/expansionism dictated, unsurprisingly, that the United States geared toward the control of Middle and South America, with a novel ideologically-composite invention called the "gunboat/big-stick diplomacy."

As a continental power on the rise, the late 19th and early 20th centuries portrayed a rising American power whose statesmen's ideological orientation in foreign policy was driven primarily by realist power politics that were in turn followed by the more subtle, complementary justifications of idealistic statements, unlike the foundation era. In contrast to the founding fathers, President James Monroe and the Monroe Doctrine left behind a legacy whose geographical focus was to make it flexible enough to suit the evolving pragmatic interests of the United States administrations. The Doctrine's declaration that the American continents were 'beyond the reach of European war and despotism,' (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 141) therefore, purported to point to an ideological adoption of defensive realism in that America claimed it did not have expansionist objectives in Europe. This interpretation is rather problematic, however, as a strategic reading of the United States' capabilities at the time indicated that expansion beyond America already surpassed the viable ambitions in American foreign policy. Therefore, switching the intent of the geographical focus of the Monroe Doctrine in terms of ideological orientation, American foreign policy adopted interventionist offensive realism in North and South America, doctrinalized by the big-stick diplomacy and ever-intensifying involvement in these regions. The 'aggressive' ideological shift in the United States' foreign policy, therefore, speaks to the reality, illuminated

by Levi, that states' interests in international relations are the sum total of needs and wants (1970, 3) which accordingly adjust based on material capabilities and political realism.

Unlike the progression of policies adopted by American statesmen in the 19th century, the post-Theodore Roosevelt world of 20th century America reflected the gradual 'globalization' of liberal thinking and ideologies that were primarily idealistic. The enhanced need for legitimacy in the eyes of an ever growing international public sphere spoke to the observation that varying conditions and available information, as well as interests, 'can add or subtract from values and beliefs' and vice versa. (Levi, 1970, 13) Based on the aforementioned reactionary nature of competing ideologies in American foreign policy and a return to the progressive thought of the Founding Fathers, president Woodrow Wilson altered the primarily pragmatic and aggressive exceptionalist mission of 'civilizing natives' by force to the similarly "messianic dimension of exceptionalism" (Holsti, 2010, 385) which was this time predominated by cooperation and idealism. The novel American experiment of liberty around the globe in the form of Wilsonianism contributed to invaluable progress in the conceptualization of international relations, as evidenced by what is known as the first great debate in international relations between idealism and realism that flourished during and in the immediate aftermath of the Wilsonian era. Woodrow Wilson contributed immensely to the development of Americans' ideological orientations in preferring principles in foreign policy, "especially moralistic and legal ones, to a context-dependent approach." (Lepgold and McKeown, 1995, p 370)

Wilsonian ideology held that a nation cannot claim to be a world power without reforms in diplomacy, communications, interstate dependence and credibility and trade. American administration., at this time, strived toward a change in tradition in the approach toward America's aversion to entangling alliances, via an emphasis on commitment to a "universal alliance." (Ruggie, 1995, 69) Comparable to Thomas Jefferson's ambitions to "escape the corruptions of Europe", this ideal required a stance against the power state" (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 139) and the politics of power. The globalization of ideas and the formation of a global community, explained in greater detail in this research, created a legacy that induced Americans to view realpolitik suspiciously. Still, these developments could not fundamentally alter the reactionary nature of competing ideologies in foreign policy. Just as the Wilson administration did not demonstrate an approach that fully deviates from realism, idealists in America around the globe, witnessing the advent of fascism and Nazism in Europe, had to concede realism and the resort to

power cannot be radically and entirely opposed in international relations. The 1914 U.S. military invasion of Mexico during the Mexican Revolution (1910 to 1917) based on unilateral power projection, demonstrated pragmatic competition and conflict were enduring features and saw limited potential for cooperation. In this sense, Wilson's structural realism reflected the 'flexible' pacifism of the "principled but slippery Jefferson" (Mead, 1999, 6) in the latter's reliance on the American Navy.

The symbiotic nature of opposing ideologies, characterized by reactionary forces was observed once again during the Great Depression, this time in domestic policy. Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal Order and statism, Keynesian economics and welfare state policies that were to last until the end of the Nixon administration was not only a reaction to America's traditional predominant adoption of free trade and its expansion, but also represented continuity as a return to Hamiltonian view of centralization of state power. Characterized state involvement in multiple aspects of the domestic economy comparable to Alexander Hamilton's understanding of 'infant industries' in need of state empowerment, the Keynesian model could be named Neo-Hamiltonism. The resurgence of fundamental ideological orientations deeply-rooted in American history and in the thought of the Founding Fathers, therefore, demonstrate that the United States benefit immensely from the American tradition and intellectual heritage, in the formation of novel ideologies and policies. Just as Hamiltonians diverged from the Jeffersonian idealistic view that the ideological position that the "genius of republics is pacific," (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 138) Roosevelt did not argue for economic expansion based on the advancement of free trade around the globe and thus mainly separated economics from foreign policy.

The next crisis in the world, World War 2, demonstrated considerable opportunity for both realism and idealism in American foreign policy. Harry Truman's presidential address in the aftermath of the war introduced the vital concept of the emotionally and politically charged noun 'terror' was used to illustrate the oppressor. Idealism was advanced with reference to that concept, as Truman argued America must support free peoples resisting subjugation by armed minorities and outside pressures. (Merrill, 2006, 30) A pillar of American foreign policy for decades to come, this novel understanding introduced strategies to further American hegemony around the globe, such as "offshore balancing" and alliance-building, and Richard Nixon's Twin Pillars policy. The novel foreign policy instrument of economic aid, initiated with support for Turkey and Greece,

once again combined American comparative economic power and realism with idealism that urged other nations' foreign policy preferences to align with American objectives in the world.

Realism, in the Cold War era, was observed on an individual basis in addition to as part of state policy. In June 1950, President Truman utilized de facto authority in sending American troops to battle without Congress approval, after the North Korean communists backed by the Chinese and Soviet armies invaded South Korea. Realism and liberal aspects were not only interrelated but interdependent, as Truman's economic aid to Turkey, as well as the prospects of NATO membership, incentivized the Turkish military efforts in Korea. American foreign policy in war resorted to a return to Jacksonian 'ruthless' pragmatism, as over 10 percent of North Korean civilians are believed to have died as a result of U.S. actions" between 1950 and 1953. (Mead, 1999, 5) Just as the Great Depression represented disruption and a crisis that necessitated the adoption of intense aggressive realism in foreign policy, ideological reliance on military expansion and power politics were established as prominent themes in American foreign policy. In this sense, the Truman and the Cold War Era arguably made it appear as if the Wilsonian administration was an exception in the gradual 'offensive' evolution of American foreign policy since the Monroe Doctrine's seemingly defensive isolationism.

Even before the end of the Cold War, America's dominant ideological stance in economics based on idealistic exceptionalism returned to replace the statism and social welfare policies of the New Deal Order. After the last Keynesian president, Richard Nixon, a national "preference for a relatively free-market economy," built on the tradition of liberty and guarded by the "individualistic libertarian tenets set out in the Constitution in 1789" (Manning, 1976, 274) served to characterize not only domestic but also foreign policy. This development, emphasis on economic liberalism without social welfare or state regulation, was a victory for conservative ideology among the republicans. Political liberalism, however, favored the democrats, who made considerable gains in the form of civil rights, and in terms of opposition to military interventionism in foreign policy, whose proponents would be called the 'New Left.' Once again, anti-interventionism had deep roots drawing on the ideological orientations of Jeffersonians and to some extent of Hamiltonians, as war, just like standing armies, were thought to be a threat and 'nemesis' (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1990: 140) by many early American intellectuals. Both of these ideologies, in economics and politics, were to be 'globalized' and spread around the world, a practice that was idealistic in and of itself and built on the American experiment.

Elements of ideological continuity and change in American foreign policy, as demonstrated, can be tied to the varying thoughts of the Founding Fathers. The return of free trade, and the emergence of globalization around the world before the end of the Cold War, was accompanied by what was called neoliberalism, an economic ideology that could be named neo-Jeffersonianism. Connecting world economies through global integration in which America was to be in charge, globalization gained ground as an extension of the U.S. containment of the Soviet Union, and was strengthened by the aim of the “extension of capitalist ways of production and consumption.” (Demuth, 2018, 63) This was followed by novel means of liberal institutionalism in the form of economic aid, sanctions and American influence on the policy-making process of Bretton Woods institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Economical reform based on liberalism/idealism, therefore, was to be followed by an increased emphasis on militarism in line with the expansionist-interventionist ideology in American foreign policy that had dominated the post-Wilson era.

Neoconservatism, a postmodern ideology that can be interpreted as neo-Jacksonianism, favored interventionism as a natural instrument of the United States military and was in line with structural realism as a theory of international relations. Neoconservatives defended the use of full, if not excessive power, of America, just as Systematic violence and destruction had become “an acknowledged warfighting strategy” (Mead, 1999, 23) during the presidential term of Andrew Jackson. Neoconservatism was adopted by President Carter and the Carter Doctrine’s security framework, and advanced under the Reagan administration as the U.S. embraced a hawkish stance in the face of any threat to “U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf.” (Mead, 1999/2000, 19) Neoconservatives’ aggressive offshore-balancing strategy, through heavy use of ‘freedom fighters’ demonstrated a reform in military realism. Johnson, therefore, reiterates that the Reagan Doctrine represented “both continuity and change.” (1988, 510) While the instrumentalization of freedom fighters had been introduced, albeit primarily as a concept, in the Truman era, the militaristic elements of both continuity and change in the wake of the Cold War were observed in that the U.S. deployed “ever more military members abroad”. (Gill, 2016, 137)

The interlinked nature of realism and idealism, as fundamental ideologies characterizing American foreign policy, is accentuated on the basis of expansionism, within the dynamic relationship between neoliberal globalization and neoconservative interventionism. The expansionist function of the economic, political as well as military domains of foreign policy were

instrumentalized as finance capital initially penetrates other states' national economies, to subject "even states enjoying the fullest political independence" (Lenin, 1916, 61 & 62) American military involvement in countries such as Libya and Iraq, as explained in this research, is arguably tied to economic concerns in relation to the 'global police' role of the United States within the neoliberal order. In this sense, it can be argued that America not only ranks other nations based on a moral perception of their democratic and civilizational development, but also seeks to punish the outliers of the American-led world order that do not 'obey' their systemic role as designated by the World Systems Theory.

In this world order characterized by neoliberalism as well as neoconservatism, therefore, the United States continues to act as an "arbiter of good and evil" (Ryn, 2003, 395) and act unilaterally as well as multilaterally based on its political power in global institutions such as the United Nations and its Security Council. The Post-Cold War American objective of the Hamiltonian vision of an integrated and arguably 'centralized' global economy, and liberal institutionalism and the political order of Woodrow Wilson (Mead, 1999, 19) are supplemented by Jacksonians' preference for hard power and interventionism. Just as the War on Terror served to perpetuate the justification of American military involvement in varying geographies, the containment of states of the 'evil school' today such as Iran and North Korea demonstrates areas of continuity in line with the politics of power combined with moral idealism. Elements of change, on the other hand, are observed in the variations in administrations' commitment to international agreements such as the Paris agreement, the ever-increasing resort to multilateralism and interstate diplomacy, drone warfare and troop commitment, as well as the selection of new geographies

Overall, this research establishes that within the evolution of both realism and idealism in American foreign policy, idealism and liberalism have been the more flexible one in its ability to introduce novel concepts and methods in international relations. Both of these ideological components of foreign policy display reactionary and complementary characteristics, although realism and conservatism are observed to engender particularly far-reaching consequences in times of major American and global crises. Just as Donald Trump's military isolationism did not stop the president from taking unilateral action in the assassination of Suleimani, the liberal/pacifist stance of Joseph Biden did not prevent him rallying behind Ukraine via economic and military equipment aid in the war against Russia. Despite fluctuation in policy choices based on the individual preferences of presidents and their doctrines, American foreign policy generally

demonstrates a commitment to realist interests for the maintaining of the nation's role in global economic and political order. Elements of continuity and change are expected to 'remain' in the foreign affairs of the United States, serving to balance out the adoption of ideological positions in relation to each other.



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