



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
INSTITUTE FOR AREA STUDIES**

**THE WITHSTANDING DIFFERENCE: SOCIAL EFFECTS OF
MODERNIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION IN CHINA AND TAIWAN**

Master's Thesis

Hasan Basri Biberoğlu

Master of Arts in Asian Studies

August 2021



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ABSTRACT

Literature has shown that economic development increases liberal democratic and emancipative values at the societal level. Intercultural interaction and global media exposure have been linked with increased cosmopolitan values, and internet usage with distrust towards authoritarian regimes. This study investigated how modernization and globalization affect social values and political legitimacy perceptions in China. The Patriotic Education Campaign and internet control mechanisms of the government were conceptualized as countermeasures against unwanted social effects. To identify the unique effect of China's sociopolitical context, the difference-in-differences approach was applied, taking Taiwan as a reference. The results implied that even at fixed levels of controls, a slower rate of intergenerational social change is expected in China compared to Taiwan. In later analyses, national identification was found positively related with legitimacy perceptions independently from controls. The findings were interpreted as signifying the effectiveness of countermeasures in slowing down social change and maintaining legitimacy.

ÖZET

Literatür, ekonomik gelişimin toplum düzeyinde özgürlükçü ve liberal demokratik değerleri arttırdığını göstermiştir. Kültürlerarası etkileşim ve küresel medya tüketiminin kozmopolit değerleri arttırdığı, internet kullanımının otoriter rejimlere güveni azalttığı göstermiştir. Bu çalışma küreselleşme ve modernleşmenin Çin'de toplumsal değerleri ve siyasal meşruiyet algısını nasıl etkilediğini incelemiştir. Hükümetin vatansever eğitim kampanyası ve internet kontrol mekanizmaları, istenmeyen toplumsal sonuçlara karşı önlemler olarak ele alınmıştır. Çin'de sosyopolitik bağlamın toplumsal değişim üzerindeki özgün etkisini saptamak için Tayvan referans alınarak farklar arasındaki fark yaklaşımı uygulanmıştır. Sonuçlar, kontroller sabit tutulduğunda dahi Çin'de Tayvan'a göre daha yavaş bir kuşaklararası toplumsal değişim bekleneceğine işaret etmiştir. Sonraki analizlerde, milli aidiyetin kontrollerden bağımsız olarak meşruiyet algısıyla pozitif ilişkili olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Sonuçlar, alınan karşı önlemlerin toplumsal değişimi yavaşlatmakta ve meşruiyeti sürdürmekte etkili olduğu yönünde yorumlanmıştır.

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INTRODUCTION

In recent history, globalization and modernization have amplified the difference between the socialization experiences of successive generations. Their implications on social change are considerable. Literature has pointed to increased expressions of cosmopolitan attitudes linked with globalization through the mechanisms of intergroup contact and intercultural exposure. Modernization and internet usage on the other hand have been strongly linked with the emergence of democratic and emancipative values around the world, attributed to cognitive empowerment and human development. Yet the unique sociopolitical context of a society shapes how these processes take place. China is rapidly globalizing and modernizing. The Chinese Communist Party has been leading this process and welcoming its material outcomes. On the other hand, commonly considered social and political outcomes of modernization and globalization may not serve the party's interests. The CCP wants to maintain allegiance to its ideological line and preserve national identification among Chinese. In this study, internet control and patriotic discourse were conceptualized as countermeasures devised by the government against the undesired effects of modernization and globalization – erosion of national attachment and weakened legitimacy perceptions. Quantitative analyses attempted to assess the effectiveness of countermeasures and substantiate theoretical discussions, using World Values Survey data with simple and mixed regression models. Inspired by the difference-in-differences approach, Taiwan was used as a reference point (Dinas & Stoker, 2014). The models included indicators of internet usage and socioeconomic development as control variables, equalizing their effects across Taiwan and China. The intergenerational change was visualized, with the difference that could be explained by control variables removed. The resulting trends were compared, and remaining differences were observed. The goal of this procedure was to isolate the unique effect of the Chinese sociopolitical context in impeding the social effects of globalization and modernization.

The literature review covered the concepts that provided the theoretical foundation for the study. These included political socialization, generation, and social change

theories. The history of legitimation strategies in China, leading up to the 21st century was discussed, with emphasis on the century of humiliation discourse and the Patriotic Education Campaign. Cosmopolitan theory and empirical studies on cosmopolitan identity expression were deliberated. The Chinese path of modernization and the Asian exceptionalism debate were detailed. Literature on the effects of modernization, internet usage and cognitive empowerment on regime legitimacy perceptions and human development were reviewed. In the methodology section, methods used for data imputation and analyses, research questions, research design, variables and hypotheses were disclosed. The political and economic histories of China and Taiwan, as well as their present status, were contrasted to validate their comparison. The data collection and operationalization processes were explained. In the analyses section, the regression techniques used in addressing each hypothesis were detailed. Visualizations of the results were shared and findings were discussed. The conclusion section entailed theoretical discussions motivated by the covered literature and findings from the conducted analyses. Shortcomings of the study were reiterated and areas requiring further research were proposed. The study concluded with a discussion on future implications of recent state rhetoric and a closing statement.

1. CHAPTER 1 LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1. POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION & GENERATIONS

Hyman described socialization as an individual's "learning of social patterns corresponding to his societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society" (1959, p. 25). He defined political socialization as "regularities in the political behavior of adult individuals and stable differences between groups of adults". More comprehensively, political socialization denotes "the whole of the processes by, and the structures under the influence of which individuals acquire and develop their political orientations and behaviours" (Dekker et al., 2020, p. 56). It was maintained that the study of political socialization lacked a coherent and commonly applied paradigm (Wasburn & Adkins Covert, 2017). This has partly been due to the difficulty of conducting comprehensive longitudinal studies that could generate conclusive answers. Some frequently referenced aspects of political socialization have been its content variety, system relevance, agents, learning process, its diverse manifestations throughout life-cycles, across generations, cultures, subgroups, subcultures and individuals (Dennis, 1968, p. 88).

1.1.1. Content, Agents & System Relevance of Political Socialization

The content of political socialization regards the information that members of the system are meant to receive and internalize. These may include attitudes, values, norms and beliefs about the regime. System relevance considers the role of political socialization in generating "diffuse support" or perceived regime legitimacy (Dennis, 1968, p. 89). Diffuse support is the end-goal of institutionalized political socialization led by political elites, designed to generate conformity with the regime in populations by instilling desired norms through public education (Easton et al., 1969). This function of political socialization presents a theoretical link between the individual and the macro-level political system.

The learning process of political socialization considers the implicit and explicit agents that may shape individual attitudes (Dennis, 1968). Individuals may develop political attitudes by internalizing transmissions from socialization agents, inferring from available information or through direct experience (Dekker et al., 2020). Often referenced

agents of political socialization have been family, peers, school, mass media (TV, newspapers, social media and the internet) and the political environment, represented by political leaders, speeches, campaigns, elections and propaganda (Dekker et al., 2020; Neundorf & Smets, 2017). Some have considered family to be the primary agent of political socialization. However, if it were the only determining factor, political attitudes of populations would remain static as the same views would be transmitted from one generation to the next in families (Hyman, 1959). It has been shown that family influence diminishes relative to other socialization agents as individuals grow into adolescence (Merelman, 1972). Possibly because individuals encounter a wider variety of sources as they age and tend to process information more critically (Hyman, 1959).

One agent may complement or contradict another during political socialization. It has been shown that individuals consume media selectively, seeking those which reinforce their existing values and beliefs. Being exposed to complementary information from various agents may enhance the influence of political socialization (Dekker et al., 2020). However, encountering conflicting perspectives may lead them to reassess their understanding of social reality and politics (Wasburn & Adkins Covert, 2017).

1.1.2. Generational Imprinting, Impressionable Years & Diversity of Political Socialization

Generational variance considers the broad reflection of changes in political environments upon members of a generation. The level of disparity between the experiences of subsequent, differentially socialized generations was considered to determine the level of divergence in their political behavior (Dennis, 1968). Mannheim (1952) argued that each generation experiences a unique sociopolitical moment in history. The conditions individuals socialize in “imprint” their psychology, forming generations or cohorts with persistent characteristics. Upcoming generations gradually replace older ones as new participants of social systems are born and former participants die. This continuous process of replacement may gradually alter the composition of aggregate values and political attitudes of a population, creating social change (Ryder, 1965).

The life-cycle aspect examines the beginning, development and consolidation of political socialization throughout the stages of life. Scholars have attempted to specify a stage of individual development, characterized by an increased propensity to internalize

political socialization when certain values are crystallized. This life stage was proposed to have an enduring impact over political attitudes expressed later in life. A common conception has been that earlier experiences shape political attitudes more strongly and enduringly because human psychology is more flexible prior to adulthood, and susceptible to outside influence (Neundorf & Smets, 2017). Initial research on political socialization regarded childhood as the most crucial stage in determining lifelong political attitudes (Easton et al., 1969). It was thought that information received later in life was mediated by early acquired norms, exerting continuous influence (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995). Then the emphasis shifted towards the period of transition from adolescence to adulthood, roughly between ages seventeen and twenty five, often referred to as the “critical period” or “impressionable years” (Flanagan & Sherrod, 2010; Hyman, 1959; Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Searing et al., 1973, 1976). Recently, it has been widely acknowledged that political socialization begins earlier than previously thought and continues to varying degrees throughout the lifetime depending on the context (Dekker et al., 2020; Neundorf & Smets, 2017). In this view, the endurance of early acquired attitudes is considered reliant on the absence of further socialization that disrupts previously held beliefs.

The cross-cultural aspect of political socialization is related to the variance of political systems across nations, and its expected reflection in societies (Dennis, 1968). It has been suggested that the significance of the early adulthood period in individual development is largely cultural and confined to societies where entry into adulthood takes place later in life (Arnett, 2000). Individuals in industrialized societies generally spend longer years in education, start working and marry later than those in rural societies, giving them a prolonged period of exploration. Arnett (2000) argued that this cultural difference was starkly observable in developing economies such as China, where youth in urban and rural areas typically take on adult responsibilities at different ages. This signifies that political socialization is affected by the internal diversity present in societies. The broad sociopolitical context determines what is transmitted by major socialization agents during a particular period. However, individuals receive and process these transmissions diversely, depending on their personal attributes and social locations. As such generations are not monolithic social units. Demographic subgroups within national populations, distinguished by gender, class or ethnicity are expected to respond

diversely to socialization. Mannheim (1952, p. 304) defined “actual generations” as including all individuals who coexist in temporal locations. He referred to “generational units” as subgroups within generations who coexist in proximal temporal as well as social locations and develop social attitudes of greater similarity.

1.2. AGE-PERIOD-COHORT RESEARCH

Generations socialize in distinct conditions and develop identities and attitudes related with their unique experiences. Theoretically, subsequent generations should exhibit attitudes that differ in accordance with the historical progression of sociopolitical life in their society. Thus, it should be possible to observe social change by analyzing intergenerational trajectories (Ryder, 1965).

Scholars have generally relied on survey data to empirically measure social change and distinguish enduring generational attributes from other variables. Because several factors may influence political socialization and values in unique ways, their effects need to be separated. The expression of similar political attitudes by generations due to their socialization in similar historical contexts is often referred to as the cohort effect. On the other hand, some political attitudes may be associated with certain life-stages given that individuals accumulate life experience, physiologically age and have differing social roles throughout their lifetimes. This points to a potential age effect that is independent from other factors. And the sociopolitical reality of a given moment in history may sway individuals’ political attitudes independently from their age or cohort, denoting an independent period effect. The “Age-Period-Cohort” (APC) theoretical framework follows these assumptions and has been widely applied in the research of social change (Bartels & Jackman, 2014; Bell & Jones, 2018; Dinas & Stoker, 2014; Down & Wilson, 2013; Grasso et al., 2019; Neundorf & Niemi, 2014; Stegmueller, 2014; Y. Yang & Land, 2006).

Age has usually been operationalized as individuals’ age at the time of survey, period as the year of response and cohort as year of birth. However, it has been methodologically challenging to distinguish the individual effects of these variables due to their collinearity (Grasso, 2014; Ho et al., 2015; Smets & Neundorf, 2014; Y. Yang & Land, 2006, 2008). When two of them are included in a model, the third is their function, thus automatically known. For example, the sum of age and birthyear will always equal

year of response. It is statistically impossible to hold any two of these variables constant and let the third randomly vary in a regression analysis. This has been commonly referred to as the “identification problem”.

1.2.1. Solutions to the Identification Problem

Researchers have proposed various solutions to the “identification problem”. Yang and Land (2006, 2008) proposed using mixed multi-level regression models with repeated cross-sectional survey data, supplemented by cross-classified random effects to assess in-cohort homogeneity. Their hierarchical model utilized data at the individual and macro levels to overcome the identification problem, with individuals nested within cohort and time period groups. One strategy to address the identification problem has been to group cohorts under five-year periods in order to break collinearity. Grasso (2014), concerned that arbitrarily delineating the continuum of birth years could produce errors, applied generalized additive and generalized mixed additive models to the data to validate her five-year categorization. She conducted comparative multi-level regression analysis nesting cohorts within countries and used random coefficients to model variables at the lower level. This generated a smooth curve reflecting age effects and validated the preemptive categorization of the sample. Pop-Eleches and Tucker’s (2014) study also included multiple countries and addressed the identification problem by devising country-level and supranational cohort categories derived from literature. Instead of separating cohorts by year of birth, they measured the number of years lived under each cohort, allowing for overlaps, and observed variance at the two levels. Smets and Neundorff’s (2014) study also used hierarchical modeling where groups with closer sociopolitical experiences were nested within the general cohorts. Macro level variables were allowed to vary randomly, whereas age was taken as fixed. The variance assisted the interpretation of the relationship between variables and allowed observing in-cohort heterogeneity. Stegmueller (2014) similarly allowed random effects to be time-structured in a multilevel cross-classified analysis, based on the assumption that social change occurred gradually.

However, Bell and Jones (2018) contested the wide application of hierarchical models in APC research. They maintained that the identification problem stemmed from the inherently inseparable structure of survey datasets. Consequently, they argued, most of the proposed statistical methods provided no real solution to the problem. The authors

proposed future research to either focus on non-linear effects or to explicitly apply theory driven constraints on the model. The common operationalization of period effects presupposes them to resemble steady progressions, when in reality they often come as time-constrained events (Bell & Jones, 2018). Hence it was suggested that future researchers consider excluding period effects from models, given that this assumption is theoretically applicable and explicitly articulated. Alternatively, cohort and period effects may be discretely coded based on theory in order to overcome the identification problem. Dinas and Stoker (2014) proposed the usage of control groups derived from historically “untreated” samples to identify cohort effects. They posited that the traditional method of analyzing intergenerational change could be supplemented by incorporating untreated samples as reference points to the focal “treated” samples. For the most reliable assessment of cohort effects, the control and treatment samples would be as similar as possible and only differ in terms of being subject to the socialization conditions being researched. This difference-in-differences approach was suggested to eliminate the confounding of closely related variables.

1.2.2. Evidence for Cohort Effects & The Critical Period

In earlier analyses of social change, there had been limited empirical evidence confirming the assumption that sociopolitical conditions experienced during formative life stages solidly determine lifelong political attitudes and behavior as suggested by the “generational imprinting” concept (Marsh, 1971; Niemi & Hepburn, 1995). More recently, many researchers have provided empirical evidence for this assumption. Schuman and Corning (2012, 2000) have demonstrated a strong correlation between generational historical awareness and future political behavior across various populations. Bartels and Jackman (2014) have shown that the sociohistorical context at adolescence carried significant weight in shaping political attitudes expressed later in life, pointing to a real “generational imprinting” effect. Models produced by Ghitza and Gelman (2014) could substantially explain adult attitudes inferring from early political socialization, evidencing the existence of coherent generations. Jeannet and Dražanová (2019) have presented similar evidence of cohort effects, emphasizing that major, discrete shocks were not necessary to observe change in political generations and that implicit political colorings of the socialization environment could be reflected in gradual intergenerational change.

However, there has not been clear agreement upon a precise developmental period of exceptional significance for political socialization. Some have pointed to the importance of childhood in formulating lasting political views (Rekker et al., 2017; van Deth et al., 2011), agreeing that value orientations crystallized in childhood mediate later political attitudes. Other studies have found the period between ages fourteen and twenty four (Ghitza & Gelman, 2014), six and seventeen (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2014) and between seven and seventeen (Bartels & Jackman, 2014) to be more influential over political socialization. It has also been proposed that there is lifetime openness to political socialization with a fluctuating influence, while acknowledging that the period of adolescence and early adulthood marks a distinct openness (Bartels & Jackman, 2014; Dekker et al., 2020; Neundorf & Smets, 2017).

Ghitza and Gelman (2014) conceptualized socialization as a cumulative learning process and investigated the proportional weight of sociopolitical context in determining lifelong political attitudes. From the findings, they estimated the most sensitive period to be between the ages fourteen and twenty-four, as preferences considerably stabilized and became resistant to novel influence thereafter. In Pop-Eleches and Tucker's (2014) analysis, the effects of exposure between the ages six and seventeen were significantly more pronounced compared to exposure in adulthood. Bartels and Jackman (2014) used a mathematical approach with large-scale and longitudinal survey data and presented evidence of fluctuating sensitivity to political environment throughout the lifetime. The period between ages seven to seventeen was found to carry the largest impact in shaping individuals' lifelong political behavior, which was significantly earlier than generally assumed in literature. Furthermore, it was found that those in their twenties had been significantly less responsive to external stimuli, speculated to be resulting from the increased preoccupation with personal life around the time (Bartels & Jackman, 2014; Neundorf & Smets, 2017). This period of indifference was followed by another peak in interest from ages thirty-three to forty-three and diminished further on. Grasso et al. (2014; 2019) have found the "formative years" following age twenty to be the most influential. This was attributed the congruence of intellectual maturation and cognitive plasticity at this developmental stage, resulting in the first politically conscious encounter with one's social reality without rigid preconceptions (Grasso et al., 2019). Numerous other studies of birth cohort effects have considered the prevalent sociopolitical context

to be most influential on socialization at the time individuals turn eighteen and provided empirical support for their approach. A common way to operationalize this effect has been to assign individuals with the macro-level data, such as gross domestic product per capita, corresponding to the year they turned 18 (Bartels & Jackman, 2014; Jeannet & Dražanová, 2019; Rekker, 2018; Rekker et al., 2015).

1.3. NATIONALISM & CONCEPTUALIZING IDENTITY

1.3.1. Explanations of Nationalism

Nationalism as a coherent political ideology emerged in the 18th century and has since transformed the global political structure, envisioning the world as divided into ethnically distinct autonomous political units (Anderson, 2006; de Rougemont, 1965; Gellner, 2006; Kedourie, 1960). Gellner defined nationalism as a principle that one's nation and its corresponding political unit should be consistent. In other words, nationalism derives legitimacy out of the alignment of ethnic and political boundaries. Nationalist sentiment arises from the disturbance of this principle as national sovereignty is perceptually violated.

There are various theories used to explain nationalism in literature. They are commonly categorized under functionalist, primordialist/culturalist and constructivist perspectives. Generally, primordialism has held that social identity has organic components, denoted by a universal proclivity for ethnocentrism. It has been hypothesized that ethnic belonging, assumed kinship, collective memories and shared territorial associations have facilitated forms of social organization throughout history. Modern identities descended from early versions of tribal kinship which were beneficial for group survival. These “primordial” social units gradually gained complexity and breadth in response to the competitive pressure posed by rival groups. Since their origination, various forms of social organization have emerged, evolved, prevailed, and fell. And in recent history, ethnic and civic national types of identity have largely superseded other forms (Hastings, 1997; A. D. Smith, 1992, 1996, 2007; Van den Berghe, 1978). Further articulations of primordialism referred to evolutionary psychology and sociology. Certain cognitive mechanisms may have been evolutionarily selected for their benefits to group survival, which may explain the prevalence and persistence of ethnic identification into the present day. It has been suggested that humans are inclined to

observe others for visual and social cues of proximity. They favor those who appear genetically and culturally proximal and prefer to associate and cooperate with them (Bayar, 2009; Horowitz, 2003). Primordialists have argued that psychological dispositions incline humans to maintain their naturally acquired identity which severely limits the effectiveness of external attempts to instill constructed identity. Thus, group identity is considered to be largely fixed once it is acquired during early socialization (Bayar, 2017).

The primordialist view suggested that nations emerged naturally through a historical process where forms of social organization and group identification grew increasingly more complex and inclusive. Human evolution accompanied this process as cognitive predispositions to adopt cultural norms and social identities were selected for strategic benefits. Thus, nationalism could be considered as expressing intrinsic human qualities. The functionalist approach on the other hand proposed that nationalism emerged in response to certain historical conditions. Before industrialization, large populations under a single political authority remained highly diverse in terms of language and ethnicity. It was suggested that as economic growth became the primary goal of industrializing states, enhancing internal homogeneity and standardized communication became a strategic goal to improve the efficiency of economic activity. This led political elites to construct standardized languages and national identities and assimilate previously diverse populations through mass media and public education (Gellner, 2006).

Finally, the constructivist explanation of nationalism proposed that national consciousness emerged as mass print media became widely available. Before the birth of nation-states, group identification relied on assumed common origins. With mass print media, large numbers of individuals gained access to identical content. Anderson used the term “simultaneity” to explain the collective experience of temporal coexistence that mass media induced (Anderson, 2006, pp. 24–27). Consumption of identical media, such as newspapers and novels, propagated awareness of simultaneous presence and a sense of compatriotism among previously disconnected members of society. Thereafter, larger groups of people were able to imagine themselves in collective terms, not necessarily under the assumption of shared ancestry. Mass print media also facilitated the consolidation of national standardized languages. Unlike primordialism, constructivism

asserted that identity construction is open to external influence, which has allowed political elites to reconstruct and disseminate national identity discourses according to their interests (Anderson, 2006, pp. 44–46).

The rise of multilateral organizations during the Cold War and the establishment of the USSR led some scholars to believe that nationalism would lose relevance into the future. Hobsbawm (1992) argued that nationalism had passed its peak and would cease to be the prevalent model of political organization as supranational structures took over. It was assumed that as communication technology rapidly accelerates, so would a process of economic and cultural homogenization (Cooper, 1997). Globalization and transnational phenomena would erode nation-states and nationalities thus global identification would prevail (Appadurai, 1999). This notion was weakened with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent wave of national independence struggles (Leoussi, 2016). The idea that nationalism had already experienced its peak was reconsidered by scholars (Popper, 1997). Gellner (1997) interpreted this to be a natural reaction to the centralized artificial nation building practice of the Soviet rule. Shils (1997) related these moments in history to an innate human desire to assume territorial and ancestral belonging. The strength and prevalence of nationalist ideology all around the world as well as its numerous political victories in recent history, showcased the persistence of nationalism (Anderson, 2006; Leoussi, 2016; Young et al., 2011).

1.3.2. Conceptualizing National Identification

Scholars have noted the disarray over conceptualization and operationalization in the study of nationalism and its lack of empirical substance (Dekker et al., 2003; Gries, Crowson, et al., 2011; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Sinkkonen, 2013). The terms patriotism and nationalism were used interchangeably in some contexts whereas others distinguished them, signifying a lack of agreement over the distinction between national identification, national pride and nationalism. Some have attempted to identify different modes and intensities of national identification and construct consistent conceptual frameworks. Schatz et al. (1999) conceptualized blind patriotism as uncritical support of one's country and constructive patriotism as aspiration for the country's progress. It was demonstrated that these were empirically distinct, and both positively correlated with national identification. Dekker et al. (2003) proposed a cumulative hierarchy model of

nationalist identity where each stage necessitated the fulfilment of the one it followed. These were national feeling, national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority and finally nationalism characterized by a strong attachment to one's nation, a strong desire to protect its independence, unity and in some cases ethnic purity. It was hypothesized that individuals are motivated to move up the nationalist attitudinal hierarchy for psychological benefits, progressively adopting more positive national beliefs while ignoring, rationalizing or rejecting the negative.

Kosterman & Feshbach (1989) proposed distinguishing national identity expressions based on their orientations. They defined patriotism as love or attachment towards one's country and nationalism as belief in national superiority, the key difference being the external orientation of superiority. They found the two concepts to be empirically distinct, noting the major distinction emerging from feelings of superiority and the emergent sense of normative obligation to serve the nation's interests. Additionally, nationalism is distinct from patriotism in that superiority insinuates entitlement to dominate the inferior and rationalizes military aggression and expansionism (Johnston, 2017).

1.4. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY & HISTORY OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

1.4.1. Political Legitimacy & The CCP

Easton (1965) argued that since the material and symbolic resources governments are tasked with allocating are scarce, they will inevitably fail to satisfy some segments of society and lose their favor. Part of their solution has been homogenization, meant to reduce the cultural diversity and disparity within a population through centralized education and mass media in order to prevent intergroup conflict. Another solution has been to generate "diffuse support", meaning mass emotional attachment to the political system, in order to soften the opposition coming from those feeling disadvantaged (Easton, 1965, pp. 278–280). Diffuse support most often relates to a sense of legitimacy of the regime to rule and the accompanying moral imperative to uphold its authority and follow its instructions. Through legitimation, individuals may be socialized into norms around compliance with authority in the name of common interests, feelings of membership in historical greatness and shared future objectives of a political community. Any system lacking diffuse support would suffer from a temperamental political

environment susceptible to severe instability in the event of poor performance bringing about the need to use coercion to maintain authority (Easton, 1965; Easton et al., 1969). Through the practice of legitimation, authoritarian rules strive to maintain and strengthen their legitimacy, maximize support, minimize resistance and eliminate the need to use force to stay in power (Downs & Saunders, 1998; Zhong, 1996).

Political legitimacy has been defined as “the belief that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just” (Tyler, 2005, p. 376). Throughout its history, The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has used various strategies to build up its political legitimacy. From 1949 when its rule began until 1970s, its strongest emphasis was on ideology. Leninist, Marxist, Maoist thought and their promise of socialist emancipation, anti-imperialist nationalism and the political charisma of founding leader Mao bolstered the party’s legitimacy claims (Zhong, 1996). During early decades of CCP rule, China experienced large scale famines and several violent social unrests (D. Zhao, 2004). In mid-1970s, the death of Mao and other high-profile officials, a failed economy and the loss of ideological credence shattered the belief in the party’s legitimacy. At which point, the party undertook a reassessment of its sources of legitimacy and diverted its emphasis away from ideology. The new agenda prioritized modernization, political and economic rationalization and made a strong commitment to economic development. The 1980s brought increased interaction with the outside world and witnessed the collapse of socialist Soviet Union which further weakened the belief in CCP’s legitimacy (D. Zhao, 2004). Communist ideology had lost support and promises of political and economic rationalization were unsatisfied. The reality of a socialist state pursuing capitalist development posed an internal contradiction. At the end of the decade, dispersed, smaller protests culminated into a nationwide movement widely known as The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 (S. Zhao, 1998; Zhong, 1996). Some have maintained that the common portrayal of the events as a student movement centered on democratic political reform has been mistaken. The protests may have primarily featured students at their inception. Ultimately, however, proponents emerged from various social groups – predominantly workers and ordinary citizens (Wasserstrom, 2013, pp. 83–84). The movement was diverse, even including proponents positioned in official legal and academic institutions, as well as public intellectuals some of which were exiled following the events (Hui, 1998). Their motivations included personal freedoms and political

reform. Although, the more probable impetus behind this broad coalescence was the growing sense of frustration with the regime over systemic corruption, inflation, and the asymmetrical impact of economic growth.

Many scholars interpreted the movement as signifying the depletion of CCP's regime legitimacy (Chen, 1995; Hoffmann & Larner, 2013; Xiaolin, 2017; S. Zhao, 1998; Zhong, 1996). In the absence of ideological or democratic institutional sources of legitimacy, the party was experiencing a "legitimacy crisis". The urgent need to improve the party's image and substantiate its claims to authority had become apparent. The party in turn, forcefully suppressed the movement, reestablished authority and took steps towards relegitimation. The CCP began referring to patriotism, defined as love for the state, more frequently. This was distinguished from nationalism which the party refrained from officially endorsing (Fairbrother, 2008). In fact, former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin (1990) clarified the party's position early into post-Tiananmen relegitimation, stating; "The patriotism we advocate is by no means a parochial nationalism". Nonetheless, many scholars maintained that nationalist undertones gained prominence in official rhetoric following the Tiananmen events (A. Carlson, 2009; Downs & Saunders, 1998; Fairbrother, 2008; Sinkkonen, 2013; W. Tang & Darr, 2012; Xiaolin, 2017; S. Zhao, 1998, 2000).

Nationalist rhetoric is often used by political actors to gain and maintain power. It may enable governments to blame external agents for internal failures, keeping the public opinion on their side. It can be used to legitimate and garner support for aggressive international policy (Dekker et al., 2003; Zheng Wang, 2008). Nationalist rhetoric can also provide the upper hand against political competitors (Downs & Saunders, 1998). In the absence of interparty competition, the CCP has used nationalism mostly to maintain and consolidate its authority. The official discourse highlighted the CCP's heroic achievements and leadership in China's anti-imperialist struggle, emancipation and modernization as well as its role in restoring national pride. It conditioned the future of China's economic growth on the maintenance of social order, both dependent on CCP's continued rule (Downs & Saunders, 1998; Zhong, 1996). The rhetoric was intended to synchronize public opinion with the regime's policies by framing CCP as the protector and champion of common national interests (Woods & Dickson, 2017). Intertwining the

Chinese nation and the CCP was meant to paint political dissent as unpatriotic (A. Carlson, 2009; Zheng Wang, 2008; S. Zhao, 1998). In summary, nationalism was used to relay a common national history and a common future. Stressing the CCP's role in the past, it promised the economic performance and social stability necessary to attain a better future, asking for obedience in return.

1.4.2. Patriotic Education Campaign

Several incidents of large-scale anti-foreign protests triggered by international confrontations took place since the 1990s in China. Scholars have interpreted the increased frequency of such incidents as reflecting a surge in nationalist sentiment throughout Chinese society. This was attributed to the nationalist propaganda seen in state-controlled mass media and public education, namely the “Patriotic Education Campaign” (He, 2007; Hoffmann & Larner, 2013; Johnston, 2017; Qian et al., 2016; W. Tang & Darr, 2012; Zheng Wang, 2008; Woods & Dickson, 2017; S. Zhao, 1998, 2005; Zhou & Wang, 2017). The patriotic education campaign was an extraordinarily comprehensive, nationwide initiative that was launched by the CCP Central Propaganda Department in 1991. The campaign was concentrated on youth, from kindergarteners to university students. Its operation intensified with the 1994 Action Plan, entailing movie screenings in schools, TV broadcasts, a reformed education curriculum and visits to historical sites. Museums, buildings and monuments were declared designated patriotic education bases and hosted students of all ages as well as soldiers, officers, workers and farmers. Extensive collections of patriotic media material were nationally distributed. The official guidelines listed the central topics of patriotic education as; Chinese history and tradition with a focus on CCP and the modern period, CCP's heroic figures and stories of revolution, its core values and policies, its prominent role in China's modernization and rapid economic development, China's peculiarities, its socialist democracy and conception of rule of law vis-à-vis the West, external threats to China's national security and the restoration of its historical unity. These topics were intended to instill an awareness of China's strengths and weaknesses, a sense of unity based on shared history and future objectives, all strongly linked with CCP leadership. This was a significant shift away from CCP's prevailing ideology-driven, revolutionist narrative, towards a renewed reference to historical continuity (S. Zhao, 1998). After the 1990s characterized by patriotic propaganda, the CCP in the 2000s began supplementing their legitimization by

emphasizing individual rights and the rule of law. Directives during the decade called for the promotion of legal education and individual rights and responsibilities (Fairbrother, 2008). A review and textual analysis of past and current curriculum showed that history textbooks were revised greatly in 2003 to feature notably less war-related content and ideological tones (Qian et al., 2016).

1.4.3. The Century of Humiliation

The patriotic curriculum and mass media content have strongly featured the “century of humiliation” narrative in order to maintain its awareness in upcoming generations (Gries & Sanders, 2016; Qian et al., 2016; Rosen, 2004, 2009; Zheng Wang, 2008). This referred to a period of aggression and invasion China suffered at the hands of imperial powers. At the time, with developments in industrialization and modernization, Western powers were increasingly outrivaling the Chinese empire. The Opium War, beginning in 1839, signified the beginning of the century of humiliation (Tanner, 2010, pp. 72–79). Chinese society was experiencing an epidemic of opium addiction, exported by British merchants. The Qing rule decided to ban its trade. Britain attacked to preserve its lucrative market and defeated the Chinese army. In order to conclude hostilities and prevent the invasion of the capital, the dynastic rule signed The Treaty of Nanjing in 1842. The settlement entailed weighty capitulations. Notably the establishment of designated commercial districts in major port cities controlled by various foreign actors, incapacitated domestic control over Chinese territory, economy, and society. In the following years, China endured consecutive defeats. The Sino-Japanese war over control of Korea began in 1894 and resulted in defeat for China in 1895 (Tanner, 2010, p. 90). In 1899, groups of young men grew hostile towards Christian influences in China. The events widely known as the Boxer Rebellion were characterized by widespread violence around the empire mostly targeting Chinese Christians and foreigners. The insurgents were suppressed by an international military alliance in 1901. With the Boxer Protocol, Qing rule agreed to pay sizable compensations for the loss of foreign lives and property. In modern China, the period has been commemorated as the “Invasion of the Eight Allied Armies” where revenge killings and lootings by foreign soldiers took place (Wasserstrom, 2013, pp. 35–37). Japan’s expansionist activity in the East Asian region accelerated in the following decades, increasingly undermining Chinese territorial control. At one point, a significant portion of the Chinese population lived in areas occupied by Japanese forces

(Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp. 310–312). The presence of Japanese military was accompanied by domestic political rivalry between the nationalist government of the time, Kuomintang (KMT) and the CCP in the aftermath of the empire's disintegration. The two camps ceased internal conflict and formed a united front against the Japanese forces, eventually repelling them and regaining former Chinese territories in 1945. Thereafter, Civil War between the rival powers broke out and lasted until 1949 with victory for the CCP (Tanner, 2010, pp. 184–188). The nationalist government of Kuomintang relocated to Taiwan, which had been under Japanese rule since 1895, and reestablished the Republic of China. Meanwhile The People's Republic of China was founded on the mainland by the CCP.

1.4.4. Taiwan

The legal status of Taiwan has been a contested issue. Taiwan has been considered domestically sovereign in practice (Lin & Roy, 2011). However, international recognition of its independence is limited to a few states. China and Taiwan have expressed the necessity of maintaining the status quo for peace, although their interpretations of what this entailed have differed. The policy of the PRC on the topic, commonly referred to as the “One China” principle, stated that Mainland China and Taiwan were united and that Taiwan was under China's sovereignty (Cabestan, 2011). Different political movements within Taiwan have advocated for unification as well as independence. China's increasing military capability, U.S. involvement in the issue and the emergence of a distinct Taiwanese identity have complicated the topic further. Surveys with Taiwanese citizens show a rapid trend of growing identification as Taiwanese and waning support for unification with Mainland China (Muyard, 2012). Some have dated a distinct Taiwanese identity back to 1920s when the island was under Japanese colonial rule (Gates, 1981; Liao & Wang, 2006; Muyard, 2012). Although it is generally considered that it became apparent with KMT's relocation to the island in 1945 and following events (Corcuff, 2002; Lynch, 2002). With the relocation, over one and a half million Mainlanders migrated to the island. Locals felt institutionally marginalized and disempowered by the new regime. Growing social tensions led to a popular uprising which was violently suppressed by the military. Beginning in 1949, the island was administered under martial law by the authoritarian KMT rule for thirty-eight years.

The social and political disenfranchisement of the Taiwanese and the asymmetrical allocation of resources may have caused a growing sense of self-categorization by Taiwanese as distinct from Mainlanders. In the following decades, significant numbers of students were sent overseas to study, mainly to the US. These students began returning to the island to take key positions in education, business, local administration and media with alternative ideas adopted abroad. They mobilized around the project of establishing a democratic nation inspired by liberal Western norms and models of sociopolitical organization (Lynch, 2002). The KMT government faced mounting pressure to make reforms. Its holding severely weakened following multiple blows to its legitimacy, culminated in Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations in the 1970s, followed by the recognition of the People's Republic of China by the UN and the US (Cabestan, 2011). The internal and external pressures for democratization was recognized by the regime in the 1980s. Chairman Chiang Ching-kuo moved to end martial law and the process of democratization was officially launched in 1987, involving liberal institutional reforms as well as rights to freedom of expression and political participation (Lynch, 2002; Muyard, 2012). The island experienced a gradual transition into democratic rule, with increasing momentum from the 1980's onwards when multi-party elections were first held. The 1990s were marked by a relatively liberated political atmosphere. Constitutional reforms consolidated democratic institutions and the first full parliamentary and direct presidential elections were realized, reinforcing Taiwan's designation as a liberal democracy (Fell, 2018, pp. 36–40; T. Huang et al., 1998).

Taiwanese intellectuals and the political elite deliberately distinguished themselves from mainland Chinese in their nation building process. They were also heavily influenced by the advanced industrial economies of the West and values of global culture, aspiring for integration into the global system. Taiwanese national identity and nationalism have been described as multicultural and civic political as opposed to being ethnoculturally constructed. While most Taiwanese recognized a common ethnic background with the mainland, they maintained a distinct identity (Lynch, 2002). It has also been revealed that several waves of Mainland migrants and their descendants, which constitute a significant portion of Taiwan's population, have been gradually integrating Taiwan's political culture into their identity.

Considering the entire duration of Japanese occupation and martial law from 1895 to 1987, Taiwan's rule was characterized by authoritarianism for most of the 20th century (Fell, 2018, p. 11). Presently, Taiwan is not only democratic, but also considered one of the healthiest democracies in the world. Its status was changed from a "flawed democracy" to a "full democracy" in the 2020 Democracy Index report published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2021), showing the largest improvement from the previous year. Taiwan scored exceedingly in measurements of political culture and participation, civil liberties, electoral process, and pluralism, attaining the 11th highest average out of 167 societies in total. China was ranked 151st in the same list, with its regime type described as "authoritarian".

1.5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

1.5.1. Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism

Some have argued that Chinese nationalism originated in reaction to the century of humiliation (S. Zhao, 2000). During the chaotic period, nationalism provided new parameters of self-defense, a place within the established world order and a claim for the international recognition of China's independent sovereignty. Many politicians in modern Chinese history have reflected on this past and expressed their motivation to restore China's pride and greatness (S. Zhao, 2005). The CCP has nourished Chinese nationalism by reiterating this historical narrative, especially since the 1990s (Woods & Dickson, 2017). A quantitative content analysis of Chinese sources directed at domestic and international audiences reflected the determination to portray China as a continuous victim of imperial efforts to keep it powerless and incorporate the humiliation narrative into Chinese national identity (H. Wang, 2003).

One aspect of relegitimation has been the portrayal of incidents in contemporary international relations as in continuity with China's history of national humiliation (S. Zhao, 1998). China's present-day foreign relations often entail confrontations with foreign powers over trade law, human rights and territorial disputes. When officials and the public associate these incidents with the century of humiliation, they may be interpreted as renewed attempts to contain China's success and infiltrate its sovereignty. Several scholars considered Chinese public perceptions of international disputes to be primed by memories of humiliation (Johnston & Stockmann, 2018; H. Wang, 2003; S.

Zhao, 2005, 2013). It has been noted that outside criticisms of the CCP and attempts to promote democracy and human rights in China were easily related to the century of humiliation and perceived as obstructing Chinese sovereignty, thus heightened nationalism and support towards the regime (W. Tang & Darr, 2012).

In light of China's rapidly growing economic and military capabilities, analysts have extensively debated the implications of surging Chinese nationalism over regional and global stability (Downs & Saunders, 1998; He, 2007; Johnston, 2017; Sinkkonen, 2013; S. Zhao, 2005). It was feared that an inflamed nationalist public may grow to demand more assertive foreign policy from the government and in the absence of alternative sources of legitimacy, decision makers could be cornered into complying. Gries (2004) referred to several incidents where nationalist movements defected from CCP hegemony, at times questioning the party's legitimacy and commitment to protecting national interests. Some international disputes where China displayed aggressive behavior were interpreted as confirming these assumptions (Xiaolin, 2017). Still, many scholars have questioned the empirical basis for the argument that nationalism is surging in China (Johnston & Stockmann, 2018; Qian et al., 2016; Sinkkonen, 2013) and producing aggressive foreign policy (A. Carlson, 2009; Woods & Dickson, 2017; S. Zhao, 2000).

Many maintained that the regime was aware of the limitations and dangers of excessive nationalism, in that a hostile nationalist public has the potential to derail China from its path of economic growth by damaging diplomatic ties needed for international economic cooperation. The party has also recognized that mounting opposition from extreme nationalists could disturb political stability and that widespread Chinese nationalism could provoke ethnic minorities, inciting separatism. Hence it has been argued, decisionmakers have employed nationalism pragmatically and rationally, refraining from instigating it beyond control or letting it affect foreign policy decisions (Downs & Saunders, 1998; He, 2007; Reilly, 2011; Weiss, 2008; S. Zhao, 2005). Suisheng Zhao (2005) suggested that Beijing had been making efforts to reduce nationalism rather than promoting it, in order to be able to conduct a rational foreign policy without sacrificing political legitimacy. Weiss (2008) argued that the regime selectively allowed civil mobilization for diplomatic bargaining leverage. On several

occasions, Chinese nationalists were permitted to express frustration about international disputes so that negotiators could play up the potential of instability at home and appear to have little room for compromise. Although the state had learned from experience to prevent the evolution of nationalist protests into broader political mobilization, they were still tolerated and assisted. Yet, on different occasions they decided to suppress the protests early on because their balance of potential costs and benefits were less appealing. This indicated that decision-makers consciously took domestic risks to pursue diplomatic interests. Reilly (2011) similarly illustrated Chinese people's growing capability to deliberate policy demands and the government's increasing responsiveness to public opinion. The study investigated anti-Japanese nationalist mobilization and how it affected the party's Japan policy, and how the movement was repressed and silenced when it escalated too far. The state adaptively used the media to readjust rhetoric and reorient public opinion. This successfully alleviated political dissidence and was anticipated to be beneficial in averting major challenges to the regime in the future.

1.5.2. The Angry Nationalist Youth Assumption

Analysts have asserted that there is greater need to understand the demographic dynamics of Chinese nationalism and its trajectory considering the transformation of Chinese society expedited by urbanization, globalization, improving economic conditions and better access to education (Hoffmann & Larner, 2013). General convention has held that those who have been subject to the patriotic education campaign beginning in the 1990s have become more nationalistic than their predecessors (Zheng Wang, 2008; S. Zhao, 1998). The increased frequency of nationalist demonstrations served the basis for the assumption that Chinese youth have internalized the prevalent nationalist discourse and patriotic education to become staunch nationalists. Others have argued that this surge has often been presumed without sufficient evidence (A. Carlson, 2009; Johnston, 2017). It was maintained that a valid assessment of nationalist trends in China required consistent and measurable indicators of nationalism, a metric for evaluating upwards or downwards trends and a specific timeframe.

One study testing the assumption found younger generations to express lower levels of nationalism (W. Tang & Darr, 2012). The authors interpreted this as indication that the observation of a distinctly nationalist Chinese youth emanated from an atypical

yet loud segment of society. They expected the trend to continue in the long term, suggesting nationalism in China will recede as better educated, urban and affluent generations replace their predecessors. Similarly, another study showed that younger and university educated Chinese respondents felt significantly warmer towards advanced economies (Woods & Dickson, 2017). Another study used political generation as a key variable when assessing anti-Americanism among Chinese (Johnston & Stockmann, 2018). They found that, for the most part, those who were more affluent, better educated, younger, more interested in international news and well-travelled were less inclined to express anti-Americanism and felt less culturally distant to the US. Although the findings demonstrated pervasive distrust towards the US, no significant relationship between being subject to patriotic education and level of anti-Americanism was found, also challenging widely held assumptions. Analyses with original time-series data from surveys in Beijing investigated the rising Chinese nationalism rhetoric and revealed no sustained increase in nationalist sentiment among Chinese respondents (Johnston, 2017). To the contrary, in some measures the curve had flattened or dropped since 2009. Also, there was no evidence indicating that younger Chinese were more nationalistic than previous generations. In some measures, those born in the 90s were significantly less nationalistic than those born in the 80s, indicating growing skepticism. Thus, other factors had likely been influential in their identity construction besides the conventionally emphasized centralized education and media. Whereas these studies were mostly concerned with identity and patriotism, another study looked at foreign policy preferences and provided some evidence for the “angry youth” assumption (Weiss, 2019). Younger Chinese were more likely to favor aggressive international behavior and felt more threatened by US military presence in the region.

1.5.3. Effectiveness of the Patriotic Education Campaign

Some studies have evaluated the patriotic education campaign’s effectiveness in preserving and promoting patriotism among younger generations. A recent quantitative analysis employed data from cross-sectional surveys with 1458 elite Beijing university students. Researchers presented empirical evidence of a strong positive relationship between exposure to patriotic content – TV, movies and textbooks in particular – and nationalist sentiment. At the same time, engagement with diverse information sources somewhat reduced this effect (Zhou & Wang, 2017). Another survey analysis found

longer years in education to be associated with greater distrust of foreign countries among urban Chinese (Gries & Sanders, 2016). Some studies conveyed that Chinese students filtered state indoctrination through critical thinking as opposed to passively adopting what was taught. It was argued that political messages were mediated through individual critical thinking, resulting in awareness of and resistance to the establishment of state hegemony (Fairbrother, 2003a, 2003b, 2008). Surveys with Chinese students in 1999 and 2000 showed that half of them considered in-school education as indoctrination, and these attitudes were positively correlated with critical thinking attributes such as skepticism and negatively correlated with patriotism and nationalism (Fairbrother, 2003b). Through further surveys in 2000 and 2005, it was found that students were increasingly more influenced by media and friends relative to state education. Students surveyed in 2005 were significantly less patriotic and nationalistic. This was speculated to be related to changes in education content. The incorporation of individual rights and legal education elements into the curriculum resulted in less resistance to state hegemony from students interviewed in 2005, in contrast to previous heavily patriotic content which triggered stronger skepticism and resistance. While students' patriotism and nationalism decreased, the perception of state legitimacy increased (Fairbrother, 2008). In one study, when the respondents were split based on whether they were subject to patriotic education, the older generation showed consistently higher levels of nationalism in surveys between 2007 and 2015 (Johnston, 2017). Another study revealed a limited relationship between education and patriotism, in-class education having been particularly inconsequential (Qian et al., 2016). Low-quality informative experiences triggered skepticism and motivated students to look for alternative objective resources. Whereas experiences of higher quality such as visits to memorial sites or watching engaging historical dramatizations, while still limited, were relatively better at invoking an emotional response and impacting identity. It was concluded that substantial changes to the format and content of textbooks, their usage and external information channels such as the internet had weakened the impact of patriotic education and strengthened students' cognitive and emotional agency.

1.5.4. Attitudinal Correlates

Given the patriotic education campaign's content on the history of national humiliation and its main target being youth, correlations between historical awareness and Chinese nationalism, its expression among youth and its impact on attitudes towards

foreign countries have been areas of interest in literature. Many analyses have demonstrated a strong relationship between historical consciousness and the intensity of nationalism among Chinese respondents (Fairbrother, 2008; Gries, Zhang, et al., 2011; Sinkkonen, 2013). In one study higher degrees of nationalism were found to be significantly correlated with greater conformity with the regime, less support for democracy, civil disobedience, market economy and lower social and political tolerance (W. Tang & Darr, 2012). This, according to the study, showcased the effectiveness of the CCP's usage of nationalist discourse for regime legitimization. Surveys with a nationally representative sample of Chinese subjects revealed a strong correlation between historical knowledge and national identity (H. Huang & Liu, 2018). A great majority of subjects overestimated China's historical achievements, which corresponded with greater expression of nationalism. It was argued that the overstatement of China's historical greatness in the national discourse had shaped public opinion. In another study, nationalist orientation among Chinese university students was significantly correlated with negative views towards the US & Japan (Zhou, 2018). Another survey on international attitudes revealed that urban Chinese generally distrusted foreign countries (Gries & Sanders, 2016). It was also demonstrated that those who expressed stronger interest in foreign affairs were more likely to hold negative views toward foreign countries. This could be due to the nationalist nature of the content most likely to be available to individuals interested in the topic.

Studies employing different methodological approaches reached differing conclusions. One study (Woods & Dickson, 2017) operationalized feelings of attachment to the state and belief in superiority as patriotism while considering victimization and anti-foreign orientations as additional dimensions of Chinese nationalism, in order to disaggregate its different expressions. The study used original data obtained from nationwide surveys in urban China. Individuals most concerned with stability and conforming to authority were the strongest believers in the victim narrative and the most patriotic. It was also found that knowledge of the century of humiliation had no significant relationship with views toward foreign nations, only exception being Japan. The authors concluded that Chinese national identification was a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Expressions of national pride could not be equated to resentment towards foreign powers. Instead, the two forms of nationalism described; patriotism and externally oriented

nationalism, had differing sources and outcomes, constituting conceptually and empirically distinct identities and behaviors.

1.5.5. Demographic Correlates

Analyses of nationalism in Chinese society have examined its correlations with the variables; age, gender, residence, socioeconomic background and status, ethnic background, CCP membership and education (Gries, Zhang, et al., 2011; Gries & Sanders, 2016; Hoffmann & Larner, 2013; Sinkkonen, 2013; W. Tang & Darr, 2012; Zhou, 2018; Zhou & Wang, 2017). No definitive answers could be drawn about the implications of these variables since findings have been mostly inconsistent. In most analyses gender showed no significant effect (Gries & Sanders, 2016; Sinkkonen, 2013; W. Tang & Darr, 2012) while some found women to be more nationalistic (Hoffmann and Larner 2013) and in others women viewed foreign countries more positively than men (Zhou, 2018). In some studies younger age significantly predicted lower levels of nationalism (Hoffmann & Larner, 2013; Johnston, 2017; W. Tang & Darr, 2012; Woods & Dickson, 2017) and weaker anti-foreign sentiment (Johnston & Stockmann, 2018) while others presented no significant correlation (Gries & Sanders, 2016). Most studies found individuals with rural backgrounds to express higher levels of nationalism relative to those from urban backgrounds (Hoffmann & Larner, 2013; Sinkkonen, 2013; W. Tang & Darr, 2012). Yet others found no significant correlation (Rosen, 2004). One study found that those with lower and higher income were more nationalistic than middle income individuals (W. Tang & Darr, 2012). In another, higher-income individuals were found to be more nationalistic (Hoffmann & Larner, 2013). Yet some showed affluence to be associated with more positive views towards foreign countries (Johnston & Stockmann, 2018; Zhou, 2018). Most studies reported no significant influence of ethnic background (Gries & Sanders, 2016; Sinkkonen, 2013; W. Tang & Darr, 2012; Woods & Dickson, 2017). Some studies showed a negative correlation between level of education and anti-foreign sentiment (Johnston & Stockmann, 2018). Some found no correlation between education and nationalism (Woods & Dickson, 2017) while some showed longer years in education to be associated with greater nationalism (Hoffmann & Larner, 2013). In another study with similar findings, it was noted that individuals who stay in education longer may performatively appear in agreement with the official narrative for employment concerns (Gries & Sanders, 2016).

1.6. GLOBALIZATION & COSMOPOLITANISM

1.6.1. Philosophical Background

Three broad conceptions of cosmopolitanism have been identified in literature with each highlighting its institutional, political or cultural meanings (Woodward et al., 2008). Institutionally, cosmopolitanism has referred to global governance mechanisms through which nation-states would yield to the interests of humanity. Politically, cosmopolitanism has referred to multiculturalism and inclusivity. Culturally, cosmopolitanism has entailed tolerance of foreign experiences and cultures, linked with the increased movement of people and goods across borders.

The idea of cosmopolitanism was first introduced in Ancient Greek philosophy, gaining further prominence under the multicultural conditions of the Greco-Roman Empire (Kleingeld & Brown, 2019). For much of the later period, Western philosophy was preoccupied with Christianity. During the Enlightenment, Erasmus reintroduced classical cosmopolitanism and called for the abandonment of particularistic notions of identity in the name of universal peace. With the Renaissance, many geographically distant intellectuals felt more connected to each other than people from their own societies. Waves of European excursions fostered a sense of globalization and advanced debates around human rights and cosmopolitanism. At this point “cosmopolitan” generally referred to a person free from the constraints of their local values and modes of thinking. Immanuel Kant introduced a cosmopolitan vision in which a universal political system would compel governments to maintain global justice and equality and establish perpetual peace. He criticized expansionist military campaigns, arguing that they impeded human happiness by depleting resources that could be reallocated into education and welfare (Taylor, 2010). Marx and Engels claimed that global capitalism driven by boundless consumerism would erode national boundaries (Marx & Engels, 1977). They predicted that working classes around the world would grow to resent their arbitrary separation, revolt against their local bourgeoisie and establish global unity. Later Austro-Marxist thinkers maintained that further globalization and fragmentation would diminish national loyalties and flourish cosmopolitanism (Linklater, 2005, p. 119). The nationalist revival in Europe that resulted in the first World War contradicted these assumptions. Lenin and Bukharin considered imperialism to be the reason and proposed that the devastation of war would awaken the international proletariat to their exploitation, which

would lead them to abandon national loyalties and pursue a cosmopolitan community (Bottomore & Goode, 1978). Contemporary philosophers elaborated on cosmopolitanism. Gilroy (2005) suggested that decolonization, environmentalism and anti-war movements signified the emergence of a revisionist, postmodern cosmopolitan culture. This was linked with the changing perception of scale that humanity had begun to experience. Technological advancements and particularly space exploration had induced a sense of global coexistence and interdependence into human consciousness.

1.6.2. Beck's Contribution

Ulrich Beck has been influential in advancing cosmopolitan thinking in social sciences and has made contributions to discussions around globalization, cosmopolitanism and modernity (Beck, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2016). Beck defined globalization as “a non-linear, dialectic process in which the global and the local do not exist as cultural polarities but as combined and mutually implicating principles. These processes involve not only interconnections across boundaries but transform the quality of the social and the political inside nation-state societies” (2002, 1). In his view, globalization had compressed the experience of space and time and blurred the lines demarcating the local and the global as they become intertwined and mutually constitutive. This process has been an innate consequence of capitalism exemplified in various phenomena that have been propelling it for centuries, from colonization to mass migrations. What makes the modern condition unique have been the historically unparalleled prevalence and self-consciousness of globalization facilitated by the growth of global market economy, transnational social movements and advancements made in communication and transportation technologies. Modernity has also amplified the experience and awareness of various global and transnational risks, such as climate change, environmental degradation and disaster, transnational terrorism, pandemics, financial crises and war crimes. These risks permeate national borders, undermine nation-states' sovereign competence, breed global normative consciousness and legitimize global norms and institutions.

Beck introduced the concept of “cosmopolitanization” as denoting the societal reaction to these ontological changes. Cosmopolitanization referred to the internalization of globalization and the increasing receptivity to information from outside the nation-

state. Cosmopolitan individuals are defined by their awareness of coexisting cultures and rationalities and their ability to transcend these contradictions through “dialogic imagination”. Dialogic imagination includes the otherness of the other; otherness of nature, alternative modernities and future generations. It enables questioning the legitimacy of established hierarchies, moralities of spatial and temporal exclusion and their rationale. It urges the renegotiation of dominant definitions of power and modes of its organization by revealing their insufficiencies and obsolescence. Cosmopolitan subjectivity arises from new normative horizons implicated by global risks and begets the imperative to reflect on a shared future, rather than shared national histories. Beck noted; at their inception, nation-states were received as artificial and superficial constructs by many of their subjects. Through repetitive exposure to national symbols and rituals, national belonging became naturalized. According to Beck, a similar process of gradual internalization of globalization could naturalize cosmopolitan political organization in the future.

1.6.3. Methodological Cosmopolitanism

Beck and Sznaider (2010) critiqued the implicit centrality of nation-states in social sciences and humanities and compelled scholarship to acknowledge the ontological transformations that have been taking place in the globalizing modernity. They disapproved the implicit employment of “methodological nationalism” in social sciences. By centering social analysis around nations and nation-states, this perspective has reinforced the primacy of these institutions. Methodological nationalism has resulted in misconstrued commitments to outmoded dualisms, such as national-international, domestic-foreign and global-local. In the cosmopolitan age, concepts previously imagined in binary oppositions at all levels of social reality have become increasingly interwoven in ways which necessitate analytical and theoretical reconsideration. Cosmopolitan methodology differed from normative cosmopolitan philosophy in that it addressed the unintended, spontaneous and readily extant consequences of globalization. In this view, rising global interconnectedness produces reflexive cosmopolitanization. For some individuals, this translates into global identification and aspirations for cosmopolitan political organization.

Beck and Sznaider did not reject nation as a relevant research entity but pointed out that it was not an essential or perpetual feature of social organization. Rather, it has been an ongoing practice that is becoming increasingly more compromised. Thus, strict binary dynamics fail to adequately explain the globalizing social life. Instead, processes of change and intertwinement need to be prioritized (Beck, 2002). Methodological cosmopolitanism did not encourage reductive universalism either. To the contrary, it prescribed the acknowledgment of the coexistence and entanglement of conflicting universalisms and modernities in distinct contexts. It presented a multi-perspectival and deterritorialized approach that understands the nation-state and national society as horizontally and vertically interrelated with various structures and processes. Accordingly, it proposed the adoption of new units of analysis that conceptualize the present social reality more accurately, such as “transnational regimes of politics” and “transnational spaces and cultures of memory”, informed by theory or historical, functional, social and institutional criteria (Beck & Grande, 2010; Beck & Sznaider, 2010).

1.7. CONTENT & CONSTRUCTIONS OF COSMOPOLITAN ORIENTATION

1.7.1. Correlates & Expressions of Cosmopolitan Orientation

Scholars have attempted to capture the expression of cosmopolitan orientation in individuals, its subdimensions and associations. There has been notable congruence in literature regarding the content and correlates of cosmopolitan orientation. In one study, two waves of research using data from a worldwide representative sample found evidence of metric invariance between three factors of cosmopolitan orientation: cultural openness, global prosociality and respect for cultural diversity (Liu et al., 2020). Many scholars have similarly shown that cosmopolitan orientation and its correlates extend to other areas of value expression, evidencing strong positive associations with favorable attitudes towards globalization and immigration, pro-environmentalism and feelings of moral responsibility to promote human rights (Hamer et al., 2019, 2020; Leung et al., 2015; J. H. Liu et al., 2020; McFarland et al., 2019; Rekker, 2018; Woodward et al., 2008). Some studies have shown that global prosociality in particular, has significant independent predictive value for individuals’ support for the United Nations (Liu et al., 2020) and unique, incremental influence in predicting pro-environmental behavior (Leung et al.,

2015). Psychological traits of openness to new experiences, extraversion, agreeableness, empathy and universal tolerance have been empirically linked with cosmopolitan orientation. On the other hand, negative correlations were found with general prejudice, ethnocentrism, social dominance, authoritarianism, isolationism, blind patriotism. No significant correlation with constructive patriotism was observed (Hamer et al., 2019, 2020; J. H. Liu et al., 2020).

1.7.2. Psychometric Constructions of Cosmopolitan Orientation

Scholars have come up with several psychometric measurement constructions of global identification and cosmopolitan orientation. McFarland et al. (2012) developed a psychological scale of identification with all humanity (IWAH) and tested its empirical validity. IWAH expression in individuals was found to be longitudinally consistent and showed significant correlations with empathy, general morality, prioritizing human rights over national interests and lower ethnocentrism. Hamer et al. (2020) confirmed the replicability and measurement invariance of the IWAH scale in integrative cross-national applications. Another study analyzed the relative utility of various constructs measuring global human identification (McFarland & Hornsby, 2015). It was revealed that the constructs significantly overlapped, and world citizenship measures strongly correlated with two widely used measures; Identification With All Humanity (McFarland et al., 2012) and Psychological Sense of Global Community (Malsch, 2005). It has been shown that attitudes towards aspects of globalization are consistent enough to be modelled under a single dimension owing to their strong bivariate relationships. Multiculturalism, attitudes towards immigration and ethnic outgroups are all strongly related with each other and attitudes towards globalization (Rekker, 2018). Some studies have used the single World Values Survey item “I see myself as a world citizen,” for measuring cosmopolitan orientation (McFarland & Hornsby, 2015; W. C. Smith et al., 2017). This item was shown to be strongly correlated with several other constructions of global human identification and citizenship however weakly predicted global humanitarian concern relative to other more comprehensive constructs (McFarland & Hornsby, 2015). Others have questioned the validity of using single-item measures for social identification (Reysen et al., 2013). Multiple analyses confirmed the convergent, divergent, external and predictive validity of employing single-item scales, as in statements similar to “I

strongly identify with [insert in-group]” for reliable assessments of psychological connection to social groups and related behavior.

1.8. ANTECEDENTS OF COSMOPOLITAN ORIENTATION

1.8.1. Exposure & Contact Hypotheses

The “mere exposure hypothesis” holds that the frequent availability of an object to individuals’ perception results in the development of positive attitudes towards the object. Psychological experiments have supported this idea, showing that individuals developed preference through the simple repetition of stimuli (Zajonc, 1968). A related concept has been the “contact hypothesis”, which conveys that intergroup interaction among individuals reduces the level of outgroup prejudice (Allport, 1954). A meta-analysis investigated empirical evidence for this idea in related literature and came across a significant and negative relationship between intergroup contact and outgroup prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Moreover, the findings showed that the reduction in prejudice did not only apply to the specific groups that subjects had contact with but extended to a broad range of outgroups in various contexts.

In addition to physical interpersonal contact, its virtual and imagined forms have been considered. A meta-analysis of imagined intergroup contact research concluded that studies designed in various ways and involving diverse social groups presented meaningful evidence of prejudice reduction effects of imagined contact, extending beyond specific contexts and combinations (Miles & Crisp, 2014). In one study with three analyses, metanalytical evidence suggested that both interpersonal contact and exposure to foreign cultural elements uniquely contribute to lower outgroup prejudice, greater global identification and concern for global human rights in individuals (Sparkman & Eidelman, 2018). In another study, students who engaged with a virtual foreign student through a web-based chat interface in international contact simulations scored significantly higher in terms of global identification than a control group (Römpke et al., 2019). A subsequent experiment with an extended longitudinal design replicated the results with real foreign students. The evidence confirmed that virtual international contact developed global identification and indirectly fostered feelings of global responsibility. The authors concluded that modern communication technology held

immense potential for encouraging collective action to address global issues by enabling global interpersonal contact.

Others have considered the effect of practical internet usage on cosmopolitan values. It has been found that online news consumption promotes the development of self-transcendent values related to common welfare, justice and ecology among adolescents (Ekström et al., 2014). Another study assessed the positive effects of social media usage, appreciation of technology and academic performance on global identification, prosocial values and behavior in university students (Lee et al., 2017). These variables were significant predictors of increased global identification. They were also linked with greater self-ascribed feelings of interconnectedness and global knowledge.

1.8.2. Normative Understanding & Cosmopolitan Values

In explaining the link between intercultural contact, exposure to foreign cultural elements and cosmopolitan values, researchers have pointed to individuals' conception of normativity. Perceived boundaries of personal responsibility may broaden in response to growing awareness of the other and to accommodate perceptions of social expectation. Grimalda, Buchan and Brewer (2018) hypothesized that participation in global networks expanded individuals' conception of their in-group. Findings confirmed their hypothesis, showing an increased likelihood in globalized individuals to express cosmopolitan identification which in turn increased motivation to cooperate with others at the global level. Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2017) found that Bulgarian media covered global stories more frequently and neutrally, whereas the US media was more inclined to frame global stories with local references. They theorized that the news coverage in Bulgaria created a normative environment perceived as prescribing global identification. As expected, consumption of news media was positively correlated with global identification among Bulgarians, and this association was mediated by the perceived normative environment.

1.8.3. Globalization, Socialization & Social Context

Beck (2002) considered that generations socialized in the age of globalization had a distinct familiarity with change. Adding that they expressed greater awareness of the

self-destructive potential of the world and have witnessed the deficiencies of nation-based institutional structures in addressing transboundary threats. Beck expected these generations to develop distinctive normative frameworks and ambitions for political mobilization. Scholars have highlighted the renewed importance of political socialization research in light of globalization, referring to the increasingly global context in which individuals around the world grow up (Chiu et al., 2011; Flanagan & Sherrod, 2010; Rekker, 2018; van Deth et al., 2011; D. Yang et al., 2011).

Globalization increases opportunities of intercultural contact and exposure. Gilroy (2005) argued that being exposed to the suffering of others would curb xenophobia. He called for promoting multicultural engagement and diversity to foster global ethical norms. On the other hand, Woodward et al. maintained, “It is incorrect – both historically and empirically – to see globalization as a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of cosmopolitanism” (2008, p. 210). Findings have signified that reactions to globalization depend on local social contextual factors such as political discourse and economic development. For some, exposure to the suffering of others triggers empathy and promotes altruism. For others, perceived erosion of cultural homogeneity triggers hostility and hatred. Both emotions stem from the weakened perception of boundaries according to Beck (2002).

An analysis of the empirical correspondence of cosmopolitan philosophy in individuals concluded that cosmopolitan orientation is not universally consistent but expressed in different ways depending on particular modes of cultural engagement, socioeconomic location and sociopolitical context (Woodward et al., 2008). It has been shown that people may showcase integrative as well as exclusionary reactions when exposed to elements of foreign culture (Chiu et al., 2011). Transnational experiences may encourage openness to new experiences, global moral consciousness, and cosmopolitan orientation. But they may also bolster cultural protectionism and defensive nationalism (Roudometof, 2005; Türken & Rudmin, 2013).

In their large-scale analysis, Liu et al. (2020) found weaker associations between socioeconomic development and cosmopolitan values than theoretically expected. The authors interpreted this as a reflection of the socializing effects of anti-globalization rhetoric recently seen in many advanced economies. Others have examined the effects of

societal global integration and individual level of education in fostering global identification (W. C. Smith et al., 2017). The results showed a significant negative correlation between all macro-level variables; economic development, social integration, economic integration, and the dependent variable; global identification. On the other hand, level of education had a significantly positive association with global identification regardless of gender or age. The authors hypothesized that experiences with globalization may have triggered defensive reactions in less educated individuals.

Nevertheless, it has been acknowledged that experiences with foreign people and places – real or virtual – are conditions most conducive to cosmopolitan values (Szerszynski & Urry, 2006; Szerszynski and Urry, 2002; Woodward et al., 2008). McFarland et al. (2019) concluded based on reviewed literature that experiences in childhood and adolescence that promote global awareness, intergroup empathy and emotionally compelling intercultural interactions increased global identification. In several studies, Rekker et al. have shown that those who came of age at a time when their society was experiencing globalization more intensely were significantly more likely to hold positive views on multiculturalism, immigration, EU integration and globalization (Rekker, 2018; Rekker et al., 2015, 2017).

1.9. SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE INTERNET & POLITICAL ATTITUDES

1.9.1. Modernization, China & Asian Exceptionalism

Modernization commonly refers to a social transformation involving secularization, urbanization and industrialization, of formerly traditional, rural and agrarian societies, generally linked with major economic growth (Kumar, 2020). Modern societies may be differentiated from premodern societies generally by improved living standards. Berman (1988, p. 16) described modernity as a “maelstrom” induced by scientific and technological advancements and industrial production changing the relationship we have with our environment as well as changes brought about by novel social phenomena such as mass migration, urbanization, mass communication and the ascendancy of a global capitalist market. This view of modernity most accurately reflected the modernization experience in Western societies, displaying its progressive as well as destructive aspects.

Scholars have questioned the validity of relying on primarily Western notions of modernity to interpret the Chinese experience. According to Wang Hui, outside scholars tend to rely on Western modernization theory in explaining China, highlighting material advancements in technology, military, economy and bureaucracy. This view presents a specific future condition that arose spontaneously in the West as a historical goal for underdeveloped societies (1998, p. 13). In contrast, Chinese modernity emerged with an agency and sensibility afforded by the opportunity to premeditate on these observations. This alternative or “antimodern” modernism was a product of China’s historical situation as a largely preindustrial society, remotely observing the repercussions of capitalist modernization outside. In this sense, Chinese modernism attempted to avoid the adverse outcomes of capitalist modernity, in recognition of its internal contradictions between progress and destruction. Contemporary Chinese intellectuals and officials leading China’s modernization saw modernization as a means to the material ends of power and prosperity. They problematized the position of Chinese society and culture vis-à-vis the West in order to identify why China’s modernization was incomplete and flawed. Yet, they were also keen on avoiding the inherent flaws of Western capitalist modernity, exemplified in colonial imperialist expansion and severe socioeconomic inequality. Mao’s Chinese Marxism provided a coherent articulation of this attempt, aspiring for a modern yet egalitarian society (Dirlik, 2005, pp. 108, 116–117; Hui, 1998). For this ideal, economic development would need to accompany the redistribution of wealth. These ideas produced practical applications intended to broaden public ownership, coordinate national mobilization, and generate immense growth to the benefit of all through a highly centralized economy. The antimodern modernization paradigm, prevalent up until the late 1970s, largely failed to deliver the intended results. An economic model based on public ownership and egalitarianism with limited competitiveness turned out to be inefficient. The strictly centralized political atmosphere fueled social tension. In the 1980s, an unorthodox intellectual movement emerged, with growing objection towards the status quo and a reform agenda inspired by theories from the French Enlightenment and Anglo-American Liberalism. Their aspirations included intellectual, political, economic, legal, cultural and individual liberalization and participation in the global capital market as steps towards successful modernization. They critiqued existing structures formulated under Maoist socialism as feudal and traditional. These ideas proved influential in the following

decades, as Chinese economy became increasingly privatized, competitive and globally integrated (Hui, 1998).

Through these developments, China has come to resemble modern capitalist economies more closely. Although, the sociopolitical impact of modernization implied by Western theory has been rather inconspicuous in Chinese society. Western articulations of modernization have commonly portrayed a confounding of the processes of economic development and democratization. Some have drawn the conclusion that even if the establishment of democratic regimes did not necessarily depend on economic welfare, their survival did, to a great extent (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Welzel, 2007). Healthy democratic regimes have been associated with economic modernization throughout the world. Still, some have regarded hypotheses of a universal link as hyperbole. In fact, China has been considered illustrative of how rapid modernization can ensue without breeding democratic norms (Welzel, 2011). China and other East Asian societies, as parts of the larger “Confucianist” cultural sphere, have been considered to intrinsically contradict certain norms typically ascribed to modern Western societies such as individualism, democracy, liberty, equality, human rights, secularism, and freedom of expression (Bomhoff & Gu, 2012; Fukuyama, 1997; Huntington, 1993; Pye, 1988; Zakaria & Yew, 1994). Huntington considered manifestations of these values and related institutions outside the West to be artificially instated by external agents, and not necessarily indicating their true internalization. He held that the value sets of non-Western civilizations were fundamentally irreconcilable with those of the West and that most Asian societies remained predominantly particularistic, rendering the actualization of a “universal civilization” founded on shared norms unlikely (1993, pp. 40–41).

Similar assumptions have come to be referred to as the Asian Values thesis – or Asian exceptionalism. Proponents have pointed to certain features considered to be common in Asian cultures when substantiating their arguments. These entailed the idea that a stronger sense of collective belonging is present in Asian cultures and that indiscipline, individualism at the expense of social harmony and challenges to power hierarchies are looked down upon (Jayasuriya, 1998). Being antithetical to values associated with Western modernity, the perpetuity of these values has been referenced in explaining the persistence of non-democratic regimes in Asia despite rapid economic

modernization. However, others have criticized Asian exceptionalism for being reductionist, essentialist and oversimplistic. Several scholars have pointed to the utility of the discourse for political elites as an instrument to legitimize authoritarianism, and to dismiss criticism on their treatment of human rights as foreign imposition (Jayasuriya, 1998; Li, 1999; Robison, 1996; Sen, 1997; Thompson, 2001, 2004; Welzel, 2011). Fukuyama (1995) asserted that Confucian values are in fact compatible with liberal democracy, and democratization could be expected to follow sustained economic modernization in Asian societies.

Welzel (2011) argued that the Asian Values thesis carried significant implication over a central debate on modernity, in that it discredited a universally applicable understanding of modernization, stressing cultural relativism. To investigate its validity, he conducted empirical analyses using data from 87 countries throughout the world. To address the Asian-Western dichotomy implied by the thesis, societies were grouped into 10 cultural zones, including Taiwan and China within the East Asia group. Findings presented evidence of variation in the expression of emancipative values within Asian societies, resembling the internal distribution found in Western countries. Furthermore, it was found that the cross-national variation in Asia was akin to the variation between Western societies. The study concluded that distinct cultural qualities have not provided immunity against the emergence of democratic and emancipative values in response to modernization in Asia. Welzel (2012) opposed the portrayal of democratic and emancipative values as specific to Western cultures, interpreting this as a consequence of their circumstantial origination in the Western Enlightenment. While acknowledging the influence of culture, he argued that certain individual-level mechanisms were universally pertinent, as illustrated in the human development thesis.

1.9.2. The Human Development Theory

Initiated by Professor Ronald Inglehart, The World Values Survey (WVS) is a repeated cross-sectional representative survey conducted in more than 120 societies around the world since 1981. The data is made publicly available by the WVS international scientific research program. The project's objective is to observe and compare the expression of social, economic, religious, cultural and political values in

populations throughout time and across geographies (World Values Survey Association, 2020).

A body of research using WVS data have identified a consistent link between the prevalent values in societies and their socioeconomic conditions (Ronald Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Ronald Inglehart & Welzel, 2001; Welzel et al., 2003; Welzel & Inglehart, 2010). The theory of Human Development was introduced to explain this phenomenon. Referring to human psychology, it was suggested that the adoption of value systems is generally driven by material scarcity or abundance. Agents in scarce, hostile conditions prioritize existential security and sustenance, leading them to adopt “materialist” or “survival” values. These entail deference to authority and preference for social conservatism and homogeneity. Abundant conditions on the other hand induce a strengthened sense of agency and encourage “post-materialist” or “emancipative” values involving freedom of choice, diversity and expressiveness. In the human development sequence, the strategic value of obedience to authority for protection diminishes as the environmentally induced threat perception decreases. At the same time, emancipation from authority in search of greater agency and self-expression becomes preferable (Welzel & Inglehart, 2010).

An implication of the human development theory was that socioeconomic development accompanied intergenerational social change (J. D. Carlson, 2010; Ronald Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Welzel et al., 2003; Welzel & Inglehart, 2010). As socioeconomic conditions drastically improve in a society, the proportion of individuals who primarily adhere to survivalist, authoritarian and conservative values is expected to shrink over time through generational population replacement. Subsequently, emancipative, self-expressive and secular values are expected to gain prevalence.

Analyses have illustrated that intergenerational value change is an evident, global phenomenon that cannot be solely attributed to life cycle or period effects. The principles of the human development theory have been applied consistently across all studied populations. Furthermore, pronounced social change was not observed in economically stagnant societies, reaffirming that socioeconomic development, and not the dissemination of Western values through globalization, has been driving the proliferation

of emancipative and post-materialist values (J. D. Carlson, 2010; Ronald Inglehart & Welzel, 2001; Welzel, 2011).

1.9.3. Cognitive Empowerment, The Internet & Regime Legitimacy

Beyond social change, human development theory carries political implications. It was shown that prevalently emancipative populations were more motivated to mobilize to attain or maintain democratic regimes (Welzel, 2007). The stability and survival of a democratic regime initiated by external powers was strongly implicated by the prevalence of emancipative values in the local population. Individuals in socioeconomically developed societies enjoy easier access to education and knowledge. This accessibility promotes cognitive empowerment, which constitutes the universal link between socioeconomic development and the desire to pursue emancipation (Welzel, 2011). In authoritarian societies, higher levels of education were linked with lower government support, related to an increased awareness of false propaganda and media censorship (Guriev & Treisman, 2019).

It can be inferred from literature that the internet's effect on political culture has similarities with that of socioeconomic development. Analyses have pointed to the role of the internet in fostering skepticism in users, resulting in changed perceptions of political institutions and demand for democracy. A longitudinal empirical study investigating the internet as an agent of political socialization found that deeper engagement with online news spaces resulted in a consistent increase in political awareness and participation among adolescents (Ekström et al., 2014). One comparative study used cross-sectional survey data to examine the relationship between national internet penetration, internet usage and demand for democracy. Individual internet usage and preference for democracy were found to be significantly correlated, whereas national internet penetration had no effect. Furthermore, it was revealed that the effect was more pronounced in less democratic countries and those with better internet infrastructure (Nisbet et al., 2012). Another analysis using World Values Survey data similarly found that internet usage in authoritarian regimes generated distrust towards political institutions among citizens (You & Wang, 2020). It has been hypothesized that internet usage may weaken regime trust indirectly, by providing alternative information sources, virtual spaces for critical discussion and opinion exchange (M. Tang & Huhe, 2020).

Findings have supported this idea, showing a consistent negative relationship between internet usage and government performance evaluation which in turn lowered regime support.

1.10. GLOBALIZATION, MODERNIZATION & POLITICAL CULTURE IN CHINA

1.10.1. Changing Demographics

Those born after 1980, sometimes referred to as the post-reform generation, have been subject to patriotic education as well as the effects of globalization from a young age. In the near future, the post-reform generations will become predominant in China according to population projections. Scholars have generally referred to four generations of Chinese based on the political atmosphere that prevailed during their adolescence (Gries, 2004). The first generation referred to those who experienced the foreign invasions and civil conflicts of the 1930s and 1940s. The second generation's adolescence was defined by the Great Leap Forward and severe political oppression in the 1950s. The third generation was marked by the Cultural Revolution and major social upheavals in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, the fourth generation experienced the opening up of Chinese society and rapid economic development in the 1980s and 1990s. According to official estimates based on a national sample survey, over fifty-one percent of the population were age thirty-nine or younger in 2018, meaning the majority of Chinese citizens today were born after 1979 (NBS, 2018). United Nations population projections estimated that by 2030, those born after 1980 will make up over sixty percent of the Mainland Chinese population while those born after 1990 will make up forty-five percent (UN, 2019). Consequently, researchers have shown interest in the attributes of post-reform generations (Zhengxu Wang, 2010).

1.10.2. New Forces of Socialization in China

The landscape of Chinese society has gone through major changes in recent history, attracting speculation among scholars. The transformative implications of socioeconomic modernization, globalization and the internet, especially after the 1980s, have been debated extensively. Hui (1998) maintained that only by accounting for the globalization context can China's modernization be adequately investigated. Ong (1997) theorized that globalization has been driving the emergence of a transnational Chinese

identity since the 1980s. Ong applied Anderson's concepts of simultaneity and imagined communities beyond nation-states, justified by the changes that globalization had brought about. She extrapolated that global capitalism, transnational travel, migration, trade and mass media allowed for a broader experience of simultaneity and loosened the territoriality of the imaginaries of culture and modernity. National identification in China was standardized through mass media in the early 20th century. Entrance into the global market economy in the 1980s and 1990s ushered in a second shift in national consciousness. As mass media and popular culture consumption began integrating dislocated Chinese populations, individuals were able to adopt alternative forms of Chinese subjectivities and transnational identities. Fong's (2004) qualitative work illustrated the coexistence of national and cosmopolitan identities among the post-reform generations. Fong posited that the post-reform generations enjoyed more material comfort and better access to education, due in part to the regime's long applied policy of one-child per family. This has brought them closer to living a life akin to those in wealthier countries. They had greater awareness of the outside world through studying abroad and enjoyed easier access to global information, thus grew to identify with a globally imagined community. Fong explained Chinese teenagers' relationship with the state through the lens of "filial duty", resembling the traditional Chinese family organization characterized by children's unconditional obedience to their parents. This filial form of nationalism involved feeling strong devotion and affection towards China. Yet this was accompanied by a recognition of its disadvantages and inferior qualities. It also entailed idealizing advanced economies and a motivation to assist China's modernization and participation in an imagined community of wealthy societies. Therefore, filial nationalism served to reconcile national and cosmopolitan identification in Chinese youth. Others have assessed the political implications of modernization and globalization. Carlson (2009, 2011) considered forces of globalization to have diversified agents of socialization and altered their hierarchy in China. Therefore, he postulated that the CCP would increasingly lose its monopoly over identity reproduction. Wang and You (2016) hypothesized that levels of political trust would diminish among Chinese over time as the values, expectations and critical thinking habits of individuals change as a byproduct of socioeconomic modernization.

The internet's introduction into China, and its rapid expansion throughout society has compelled analysts. Commercial internet access began in 1994 in China (CNNIC, 2012). According to official records, as of March 2020 there were 904 million internet users in China, up from 457 million in 2010 (CNNIC, 2018, 2020). Furthermore, each year from 2015 to 2020, more than 80 percent of internet users in China accessed online news spaces. It was suggested that the comprehensive control mechanisms overseeing traditional media in China could not be replicated when establishing control over online activity. This implied that the internet's introduction would be revolutionary for Chinese society. The inherently decentralized, interactive and democratic structure of the internet carried an unprecedented potential to empower Chinese civil society (Lagerkvist, 2005).

1.10.3. Countermeasures Against Exposure & Contact

It has been shown that authoritarian governments spend more on public education and invest more in media ownership, conversely to increase their capacity to domineer public opinion through indoctrination (Lott, Jr., 1999). Guriev and Treisman (2019) argued that contemporary authoritarian regimes have increasingly been relying on sophisticated information manipulation methods to overstate their performance and boost popular support. This change was attributed in part to the expansion of modern communication technologies. The use of force and violent oppression have become more costly as global audiences emerged. The CCP has been aware of the implications of globalization, modernization and the internet over its regime legitimacy. The comprehensive and sophisticated countermeasures employed by the regime have signified its determination to withstand the unwanted byproducts of the increasingly modern, global and interconnected context of socialization in China.

The CCP devised the patriotic education campaign with the goal to strengthen national identification while antagonizing foreign values as incompatible with the unique conditions of China (S. Zhao, 2005). Patriotism was promoted as a virtuous value entailing loyal attachment to the nation and the regime. At the same time, pragmatic, selective engagement with the outside world to access technical and scientific information was encouraged to assist the modernization of China (Hughes, 2006). Past party leader Jiang Zemin expressed the CCP's dedication to preserve Chinese national pride, particularly among youth, against foreign influence and to prevent admiration of the West

(Jiang, 1991). Patriotic education was explicitly prescribed against the loss of national attachment and potential disobedience to the party among youth due to increased contact with the outside world (Gries & Sanders, 2016; Johnston, 2017; S. Zhao, 2000). It has been argued that the regime would attempt to counteract its weakened control over public discourse caused by the proliferation of non-state media and internet usage by relying on nationalism into the future (Xiaolin, 2017).

The regime so far has been successful in mitigating the negative political consequences of the internet with highly sophisticated surveillance and regulation measures (Song & Miao, 2014). The government addressed the issues of cybersecurity and information regulation first in 1995, initiating an extensive online administration structure involving many state agencies. More recently, China has been named the world's most comprehensive country in terms of domestic surveillance and national cyber defense (Voo et al., 2020). Ideological control has mainly been administered through domestic content censorship and access restrictions to unsanctioned foreign websites (Taneja & Wu, 2014). In addition, online content and interpersonal communication has been monitored and restricted using various unofficial methods (Song & Miao, 2014). The party has maintained a tight grip over online activity, stringently suppressing the deliberation and dissemination of unorthodox opinions and prosecuting even private expressions of dissidence (Lagerkvist, 2005). The discourse in online media outlets have been closely supervised. In order to guide public discussion in desired ways, affiliated institutions have been distributing reports on sensitive topics swiftly, censoring unwanted content and issuing follow-ups designed to assuage negative opinions (Xiaolin, 2017).

1.10.4. Consequences of Globalization, Modernization & The Internet

Socialization effects of modernization, globalization and the internet have been empirically observed in the Chinese society. Quantitative analyses revealed that Chinese youth and particularly those in coastal urban areas were more in tune with global trends and internationally oriented relative to previous generations (Rosen, 2004, 2009). Surveys with 629 history students from thirty-three Chinese universities in 2007 showed that over 94% of students considered themselves to be influenced by Western culture, more than 51% identified with American cultural concepts and more than 61% identified with liberalism. It was found that the perception of regime legitimacy in the post-reform

generation was weaker (Zhengxu Wang, 2010). They expressed significantly less trust towards the government and the regime. Another study showcased that trust in political institutions diminished in younger generations, independently from government performance, linked with improved socioeconomic conditions and increasing popularity of liberal and democratic values (Zhengxu Wang & You, 2016).

Some analyses asserted that surveillance and censorship may have influenced the effects of the internet on Chinese society. It was found that the internet enhanced the flow of information and access to alternative sources, provided space for public opinion deliberation and strengthened civil society in China. Although its potential for collective action was foreshadowed by state-society confrontation (Zheng & Wu, 2005). Another study evaluated the internet's potential for inducing societal value change in China. It directly influenced the evaluation of government performance, and indirectly lowered regime support by increasing democratic values. However, the direct effects were mediated by government's surveillance and censorship measures, leading the authors to maintain that despite the gradual culmination of liberal democratic values facilitated by the internet, its immediate political effects were highly contingent on the broader sociopolitical context (Huhe et al., 2018).

In addition to state efforts, user habits have contained the effects of the internet, contradicting expectations. The idea that if given the opportunity, most users' internet consumption patterns would be globally oriented has been discredited. Studies have shown that the organization of the web as well as patterns of production and consumption of online content have largely reflected national borders (Soffer, 2013). It was observed that users were predominantly geared towards consuming geographically, culturally, and linguistically proximal content. The online activity of the Chinese people was determined by their cultural preferences to a higher degree than freedom of access (Taneja & Wu, 2014). Online content is diverse and interactive whereas traditional media has been a top-down channel of communication. Still, patterns of online content consumption have been largely characterized by internalized national assumptions. Thus, it has been argued that rather than eroding local modes of identification, the internet may have further facilitated simultaneous national consciousness.

The comprehensive study by Cunningham et al. (2020) has challenged the idea that the diversification of information channels would erode regime legitimacy in China. The authors investigated government perceptions through eight waves of surveys conducted between 2003 and 2016 with nationally representative samples. Their analyses demonstrated sizable increases in satisfaction with the government, nearly on all dimensions considered. Notably, rural respondents representing the majority of the population, showed no significant discrepancies with more affluent segments of society. These findings undermined the notion that waning legitimacy perceptions would inevitably spark a state-society confrontation in China. On the contrary, the findings showed that legitimacy perceptions have greatly improved. However, this improvement was largely tied to government performance, insinuating dependence on maintained success for future regime legitimacy.

2. CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY

2.1. ADDRESSING MISSING DATA

In research, missing data is usually addressed through omission or imputation (Fernstad, 2019). The first refers to the deletion of cases with missing values. This method may distort the data structure greatly depending on the size and mechanism of missingness, especially with time-series cross sectional data (Honaker & King, 2010; King et al., 2001). The leading alternative to case deletion has been imputation. Imputation entails replacing missing values with estimations obtained through various methods from available data.

Multiple imputation is an imputation approach that involves generating multiple complete datasets where missing values are estimated by algorithms. These algorithms take variable correlations, uncertainty and similar available observations into account when generating replacement values. Around ten iterations are usually considered adequate for robust results (Blankers et al., 2010). Conventionally, imputed datasets produced by each iteration are analyzed as intended with the original data. Then statistical analysis results are combined following rules described by Rubin (1987). A more simplistic approach has been to take the average of the values from every iteration to fill empty cells and create a single complete dataset for analysis (Burns et al., 2011). This method is not expected to be as robust as the concurrent analysis approach however it may be preferred for requiring less computing power and memory.

Multiple imputation methods are successful when dealing with complex missingness patterns involving multiple variables (Burns et al., 2011; Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011). They have been shown to be effective for imputing variables with over 50% missingness. These methods are also relatively easy to apply and accessible to researchers without comprehensive knowledge in advanced mathematical procedures used for statistical prediction. However, multiple imputation may also produce biased results when missingness follows non-random missingness patterns (Cranmer & Gill, 2013). Simulations have shown varying imputation accuracy performances across different missingness patterns and variable correlations with the best outcomes produced in data with higher correlations and completely random missingness (F. Tang & Ishwaran, 2017). There are three types of patterns often used to describe

missingness in data. The data is either missing at random (MAR), missing completely at random (MCAR) or missing not at random (MNAR) (Shah et al., 2014). The classification considers how the probability of a missing value is related to observed and missing values. If there is no relation, the data is MCAR. If the probability is related only to observed values, the data is MAR. If both missing and observed values influence the probability of missingness, the data is MNAR (X. Liu, 2016a). There isn't any widely accepted missingness pattern identification strategy.

Amelia II is a multiple imputation algorithm tailored to address missingness in time-series cross-sectional data, using expectation-maximization with bootstrapping (Blankers et al., 2010). The process involves bootstrapping samples from available data, establishing population parameters based on these draws, and replacing missing values based on this information. The algorithm is applicable to continuous, dichotomous as well as ordinal type data (Honaker et al., 2011). Another multiple imputation method relies on the Random Forest machine learning algorithm (D. J. Stekhoven & Buhlmann, 2012; Daniel J. Stekhoven, 2013). Random Forest involves prediction through independent sampling in an iterative process. The algorithm avoids overfitting through large numbers of bootstrap samples while preserving the error, randomness and correlation in the data through training (Breiman, 2001). Random forest algorithms are suited for handling data entailing multidimensional, mixed typed variables with non-linear interactions. The method does not require data to fit the assumption of normality or other prespecified parameters (Hong & Lynn, 2020; Shah et al., 2014; D. J. Stekhoven & Buhlmann, 2012; F. Tang & Ishwaran, 2017). The present study employed Amelia II imputation for missing years in macro level variables and Random Forest imputation for missing survey responses (Varga & Westergaard, 2020). Both operations were performed separately for China and Taiwan data.

2.2. RESEARCH QUESTION

Political socialization enduringly shapes individuals' values, comprising generations with shared characteristics. Family, state education and mass media have been generally considered the most influential socialization agents, but modern communication technology and globalization have diversified these forces. Theoretically, socioeconomic modernization and globalization promote the adoption of emancipative

and cosmopolitan values. Thus, increasing modernization and globalization experienced at the societal level is expected to result in increased emancipative and cosmopolitan values expressed by successive cohorts through generational imprinting. In other words, these macro-level variables are expected to drive social change towards more emancipative and cosmopolitan societies everywhere. It would be expected that generational value change across populations would be different to the extent that their globalization and modernization trajectories differ. If the macro-level factors were held constant across two societies, their respective rates of social change would be similar. Unless, there are context-specific factors influencing the socializing effects of macro-level variables on individuals and cohorts.

Recently, new agents have disseminated into Chinese society, becoming increasingly more prevalent in the socialization process of successive generations. The CCP has acknowledged that increased contact with the outside world could alienate Chinese youth from their national identity and undermine loyalty to the regime. As the CCP has feared and literature has shown, individuals may develop cosmopolitan and democratic values and their perception of CCP's legitimacy may be compromised as a result of socioeconomic modernization and globalization. Hence, the intergenerational replacement that will take place as stated in population projections may carry significant implications for the CCP's perceived legitimacy. The government has taken several countermeasures to address these concerns including the patriotic education campaign as well as highly sophisticated methods of internet surveillance, censorship, media control and propaganda. The main aim of the present study was to assess whether these countermeasures have successfully hindered intergenerational value change in China. For this purpose, cohort analysis inspired by the control group method introduced by Dinas and Stoker (2014) was used, taking the population of Taiwan as the reference point.

Taiwan has close historical, ethnic and linguistic interlinkages with Mainland China. From the perspective of methodological cosmopolitanism, although they have been politically separated, Taiwanese and Mainlanders have coexisted under a broader transnational Chinese space. Yet, their domestic political institutions have prepared vastly different sociopolitical contexts with socializing agents of differing influences. Additionally, following their political separation, Taiwan and Mainland China have had

fundamentally distinctive histories of economic structuring and development. Conversely, the intergenerational discrepancy in the expression of cosmopolitan and emancipative values in Taiwanese society should be more pronounced than mainland China simply because of the difference in the intensities and trajectories of socioeconomic modernization and globalization. Accounting for this disparity was imperative in identifying the distinct effects of sociopolitical context to the greatest extent.

Economic policy in Taiwan during early Kuomintang rule was largely guided by the state, entailing land reforms aimed to increase agricultural production, local industrialization, and inflation control. Financial and military aid from the United States remedied the island's deficiency in resources and production capacity between 1949 and 1958 (Rabushka, 2019, p. 109). Beginning in the late 1950s, US economic aid was gradually withdrawn. In the meantime, Taiwanese government began steering production towards exportable goods using various incentives. Comprehensive reforms led to the emergence of a competition-based market economy with a growing private sector. By 1971, the series of reforms had flourished economic output, eradicating unemployment on the island (Rabushka, 2019, pp. 125–127). Investments in infrastructure, variety in industrial production, market liberalization and further global integration predominated economic policy in the following decades. The exponential growth sustained by foreign trade led to a dramatic improvement in living standards (Rabushka, 2019, p. 138). The early economic structure of the People's Republic of China was heavily centralized, regulated and collectivized, with production focused on agriculture and heavy industry. Agricultural production was gradually decentralized in the 1960s and consumer goods production gained prominence. A series of reforms implemented in the 1970s and 1980s were meant to address economic stagnation and poverty. The reforms introduced ideas from capitalism, gradually increasing market freedom, the share of light industry and autonomy in production. Failures in banking and finance management in 1984 led to a sharp increase in inflation, regressing the progress made towards deregulation (Rabushka, 2019, pp. 47–49, 71–72, 78–80, 95). Mainland China's accumulated international reserves were about a quarter that of Taiwan's at the end of 1986 (Rabushka, 2019, p. 194).

Some recent figures show the continued discrepancy between the two societies in terms of economic development and global integration. In 1980, gross domestic product per capita, expressed in local currencies converted to current US dollars, was around 307 dollars in China and 2,367 dollars in Taiwan, according to data from the World Economic Outlook Database (International Monetary Fund, 2021). In 2018, the value was around 9,920 US dollars for China and 25,826 US dollars for Taiwan. Taiwan's HDI score was 0.683 for 1990 and 0.880 for 2018 in the Subnational HDI database (Smits & Permanyer, 2019). These figures denoted "medium" and "very high" human development stages respectively, under the classification of the United Nations Development Programme (2020, p. 4). The national averages for China were 0.502 and 0.757 for the same years, indicating "low" and "high" human development. The DHL Connectedness Index assesses levels of societal global integration based on data that captures the inflow and outflow of trade, capital, information and people (Altman & Bastian, 2020). The result is a composite score ranging from 0 to 100 with greater values representing increasing globalization. The earliest data point available was for 2001 and the most recent for 2019. China's scores for these years were calculated as 44 and 53 respectively whereas Taiwan's scores were 65 and 72.

From similar stages of underdevelopment, both societies have shown tremendous progress. However, Taiwan has evidently outpaced Mainland China to rank among the world's most advanced societies. Their different development histories readily imply different social outcomes. The major point of interest in this study was whether there would remain a stark difference in the intergenerational value trajectories of China and Taiwan when conventional indicators of globalization and socioeconomic modernization were controlled for. This would reveal the influence of sociopolitical context in mediating the effects of modernization and globalization. It would also signify the effectiveness of the countermeasures taken by the CCP. The final goal of the study was to observe perceptions of the regime across Chinese social subgroups distinguished by their level of national identification. Analyses of state-led Chinese nationalist discourse have portrayed it as formulated against global integration and the emergence of liberal democratic values. On the other hand, literature has shown the erosive effects of socioeconomic development, education and internet usage on legitimacy perceptions in authoritarian regimes. It is naturally expected that those with greater national identification will

perceive a regime that promotes patriotism more positively. The question here was whether fixing the effects of socioeconomic modernization, education and internet usage would remove meaningful variance across groups with different levels of national identification.

2.3. RESEARCH DESIGN

Several researchers have shown that social change typically results from cohort effects and generational replacement rather than period or age effects (Bartels & Jackman, 2014; Down & Wilson, 2013; Ghitza & Gelman, 2014; Grasso, 2014; Grasso et al., 2019; Jeannet & Dražanová, 2019; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2014; Schuman & Corning, 2012). It has been suggested that confounding variables be avoided as long as it is appropriate for the analysis (Bell & Jones, 2018). Therefore, period effects were excluded as a variable. Using the difference-in-differences approach, age effects were assumed to be identical in the two groups. The variable age was included or excluded from models depending on statistical significance and its contribution to the explanatory power of each model. Since globalization and socioeconomic modernization are gradual processes and not clearly defined, their cohort effects could not be conceptualized as time constrained events. Their effects are expected to be reflected in the trajectory of intergenerational value change. It has been suggested that cohorts be defined as annual birth years in such cases (Dinas & Stoker, 2014; Jeannet & Dražanová, 2019).

Dinas and Stoker (2014) proposed the usage of control groups for identifying the effects of certain agents or sociopolitical contexts on cohorts, referring to an untreated group that is otherwise highly similar to the analyzed group. With the control group or “difference-in-differences” approach, analyses of inter-cohort differences are supplemented by within-cohort differences. The difference-in-differences approach was adopted to identify the effect of the sociopolitical context of China over the development of cosmopolitan and emancipative values in response to societal socioeconomic modernization and globalization. From a methodological cosmopolitanism framework, Taiwan was considered a suitable reference point to China. The populations of Taiwan and China have been subject to distinct sociopolitical environments. Nevertheless, given their geographic, historical, cultural and linguistic proximity, the two societies could be

expected to respond similarly to the phenomena of modernization and globalization. Remaining differences could largely be attributed to contextual factors.

The analyses progressed as follows. First, separate simple and generalized linear regression models were fit with each dependent variable and region and cohort as independent factor variables. This was meant to confirm the primary assumption of the study which stated that the intergenerational value trajectories should differ across China and Taiwan simply due to their different trajectories of modernization and globalization. The next analysis involved linear and generalized linear mixed-effect models for each dependent variable. Control variables were added as fixed effects whereas the effects of cohorts nested in regions were allowed to vary. The goal was to identify the difference in intergenerational value trajectories caused by unexplained factors while the effects of control variables were held constant across China and Taiwan. The final analysis only used data from China. Mixed models with random effects of categories of national identification and fixed effects of control variables were fit. The assumption was that greater national identification would be associated with lower emancipative values and more favorable regime perceptions even when control variables were held constant.

All models were visualized with figures. For the first two analyses, predictions were generated for unique region-cohort combinations and fixed control variable values when relevant. The cohorts with the birthyear 1942 were the oldest remaining in data for both regions. They were considered reference cohorts (Dinas & Stoker, 2014). The difference between the estimated value for each cohort and the reference cohort was calculated separately for China and Taiwan. Finally, the absolute differences between the intercohort differences in China and Taiwan were calculated. For example, the cross-regional difference-in-differences for emancipative values for the 2000 cohort corresponded to the absolute difference between the 2000-1942 intercohort differences of Taiwan and China. For the third hypothesis, each dependent variable was estimated for each level of national identification. The variance in the predicted values across groups were visualized through plots.

First two steps of analysis could be described as multi-leveled, using individual level data aggregated into subgroups within two societies. The focus was on intergenerational trends produced by intercohort differences and their comparison across

Taiwan and China. Both cohort-specific, and region-specific information were discussed. Since the data consisted of three cross-sectional surveys, said trends were not longitudinal. Although, they were considered to indirectly reflect longitudinal changes in sociopolitical contexts. The final set of analyses only involved social subgroups within China. Here, the comparison of subgroups determined by their levels of national identification was the point of interest. All individual level data was obtained from three separate repetitions of a cross-sectional survey. However, the implied period effects were ignored. It was assumed that period effects would largely be parallel across the compared groups.

2.4. VARIABLES & OPERATIONALIZATION

2.4.1. Independent Variables

The independent variables in the first two analyses were cohort operationalized as year of birth and region. For brevity, the usage of China referred to Mainland China throughout the study. The analyses included 59 cohorts born between 1942 and 2000 from China and Taiwan. The last analysis included level of national identification as an independent variable. This was a composite measure created using two items related to national identity and national pride throughout the waves. The Cronbach's alpha score of the two items was 0.43 and their Spearman's rank correlation score was about 0.30 ($p < .001$) in the combined data, denoting a large effect size according to Funder and Ozer's (2019) criteria. The resulting variable national identification ranged from 1 to 7 corresponding to increasing intensities of national identification.

2.4.2. Control Variables

Education, self-reported income level, interest in politics, national identity, age and sex were varyingly included in models as individual level control variables. These were obtained from the WVS data. The remaining individual level control variables were constructed during data processing to achieve consistency across survey rounds. Items associated with alternative sources related to online activity and peer interaction. Items associated with traditional media across different waves were averaged and transformed to correspond to a consistent scale between 0 and 1, after correlation tests and factor analyses were used to confirm their latent relationships. Others have operationalized traditional media as an agent of political learning by calculating the average usage

frequency of newspapers, print magazines, television news and radio news to represent the intensity of individual traditional media exposure (You & Wang, 2020).

Human Development Index and gross domestic product per capita are values commonly used in literature as indicators of socioeconomic development and globalization. The KOF Globalization index provides a more direct measure of societal globalization, however it was not available for Taiwan. Therefore, it was only used for the imputation of macro-level China data and not included in analyses. Individuals were assigned their societal-level HDI and GDP per capita values at the year they turned 18 (Bartels & Jackman, 2014; Jeannet & Dražanová, 2019; Rekker, 2015, 2018; Rekker et al., 2017). The GDP variable was log-transformed for better scaling with the rest of the data (Honaker et al., 2011; Keene, 1995).

2.4.3. Dependent Variables

The dependent variables in the cross-region analyses were emancipative values, global identity, prioritization of environment versus economy, and outgroup prejudice. The dependent variables in the final analysis involving only China were emancipative values, confidence in government and perceived level of democracy.

Emancipative values was readily available in the WVS data as a composite index consisting of four sub-indices (Welzel et al., 2003). These included independence, imagination or obedience as preferred kid qualities for the autonomy sub-index, gender equality in labor, politics, and education for the equality sub-index, views on homosexuality, abortion, and divorce for the choice sub-index and personal and national priorities in terms of self-expression versus order for the voice sub-index. Oblique-rotated hierarchical factor analyses were used to confirm the assumption of high correlation between the items. The index score was built in a two-step procedure where first the related items, and then the resulting subindices were normalized and averaged. This created a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1, increasing towards maximum support for self-expression (Welzel, 2010). Cases where more than 1 sub-index were unavailable were coded as missing. Global identity was operationalized as a continuous variable denoting the intensity of the response given to items asking respondents how close they felt to the world or whether they considered themselves to be world citizens. For the environmentalism variable, the responses to the item asking respondents whether the

government should prioritize protecting the environment or economic growth were recoded. The variable was dichotomous with pro-environmental responses coded as 1 and pro-economy and fill-in responses coded as 0.

The outgroup prejudice variable was a composite of 9 items. The items asked respondents whether they would dislike having people from various outgroups (drug addicts, people of a different race, people with AIDS, immigrants or foreign workers, homosexuals, people of a different religion, heavy drinkers, unmarried couples living together and people who speak a different language) as neighbors. The variable was calculated as the total number of mentioned groups not wanted as neighbors. Others have processed WVS data in similar ways for their analyses. These included treating data as numeric after linear transformations and taking arithmetic means or sums of correlated variables (Welzel, 2010; Welzel & Inglehart, 2010; You & Wang, 2020). The Cronbach's alpha was used to supplement the reliability of the construct.

The Cronbach's alpha is a widely used measure of construct reliability and internal consistency (Cronbach, 1951; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1967; Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). The measure denotes the interrelatedness and unidimensionality of a set of variables, based on response correlations. Its value ranges from 0 to 1, with increasing values representing greater reliability. The test is useful for confirming whether a set of items in a survey correspond to a single latent trait. The Cronbach's alpha scores (rounded to two digits) for the items used to construct dependent variable outgroup prejudice was 0.79 before ineligible responses were recoded as missing. The value was 0.69 after recoding and 0.7 after the imputation. Generally, a Cronbach's alpha score of 0.7 has been considered the acceptable minimum (Hair et al., 2010; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1967; Tavakol & Dennick, 2011).

Confidence in government and level of democracy were added as dependent variables in the analyses for the final hypothesis. Both were obtained from the WVS. Variables were transformed so that greater values represented greater confidence in the regime and greater perceived levels of democracy. Other variables not included in the analyses were Autonomy at the individual level and KOF globalization index scores at the societal level. These were utilized to improve imputation accuracy.

2.5. DATA COLLECTION & IMPUTATION

2.5.1. Software Utilization

Data processing, analyses and visualizations in this study relied solely on the R statistical language and the RStudio integrated development environment (R Core Team, 2021; RStudio Team, 2021). The R package “dplyr” provides a convenient approach to data handling (Wickham et al., 2021). Various functions from the package were heavily utilized throughout the study. Most model visualizations were generated using the R package “ggplot2” (Wickham, 2016). Others employed the built-in R package “graphics”. To enhance reproducibility, the entire process of data transformation, processing, imputation and analysis was recorded in an R markdown file (Allaire et al., 2021; Xie et al., 2018, 2020). The html output of the file was rendered using R package “knitr” (Xie, 2014, 2015, 2021). The complete document with coding is open to public access via Rpubs¹.

Linear and generalized linear mixed models were fit using the R package “lme4” (Bates et al., 2015). The model parameters were estimated using restricted maximum likelihood estimation. The built-in prediction function did not include an option for standard error and confidence interval estimation, due to the difficulty of including the uncertainty in the variance parameters. Bootstrapping methods were recommended by package creators. However, calculating confidence intervals for mixed models with bootstrapping can be computationally taxing, especially with larger sample sizes. The “merTools” package for R addressed these problems with a method of approximation through sampling distributions (Frederick & Knowles, 2020). The method was advantageous for requiring less time and computational power when generating predictions and confidence intervals from mixed effect models. However, the estimations did not account for uncertainty in covariance parameters. The combination of control variables for each model were selected through backwards elimination with assistance from R package “lmerTest” (Kuznetsova et al., 2017).

¹ <https://rpubs.com/hasanbasri53/dataprocessing>

2.5.2. Data Sources

Individual level data was obtained from the official World Values Survey Association website (R. Inglehart et al., 2018; Ronald Inglehart et al., 2018, 2020). The analyses used data from survey rounds 5, 6 and 7 in China and Taiwan. The survey rounds were conducted in 2007, 2013 and 2018 in China; and 2006, 2012 and 2019 in Taiwan. Initially, there were 7327 cases from China and 3688 cases from Taiwan in total. Final analyses involved 10488 cases after deletions, of which 7133 were from China and 3355 from Taiwan. Yearly de facto time-series KOF Globalisation Index data was only available for China and was obtained from the official KOF Swiss Economic Institute website (Dreher, 2006; Gygli et al., 2019). The GDP per capita data, gross domestic product in current U.S. dollars divided by mid-year population, for China, was obtained from the World Bank database and does not include Taiwan (World Bank, 2021a). GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars data for Taiwan was obtained from the Macro Database of the National Statistics Bureau of Taiwan (National Statistics, 2021). The Human Development Index (HDI) data, for China and Taiwan were obtained from the Subnational Human Development Index (SHDI) provided by the Global Data Lab which covers 161 countries (Global Data Lab, 2020; Smits & Permanyer, 2019). The index is a composite measure of human development, calculated as the average of three subdimensions: education, health and living standards. Missing values in the data are replaced through interpolation and extrapolation methods. The SHDI index used data from the Taiwanese Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics for Taiwan data. For China, data from the Human Development Report Office of the United Nations Development Program and National Bureau of Statistics of China were used. It should be noted that the national HDI data for China included Taiwan and Hong Kong as sub-national provinces, in addition to mainland Chinese territories. However, national level data corresponded to the population-weighted average of sub-national data, meaning provinces with smaller populations had smaller effects. The mid-year population of Taiwan was 23,582,179 in 2020 (National Statistics, 2020). The estimated mid-year population of mainland China was around 1,402,112,000 for 2020 (World Bank, 2021b). Taiwan constituted about 0.02% of the combined population estimates, implying a very small effect.

2.5.3. Missing Response Imputation

Generally, case deletion is considered appropriate for variables with a missingness ratio of 5% or less (Little & Rubin, 2002). In the WVS data, responses that did not necessarily contribute information about the item were coded as negative values. For example, items V211, V209 and Q254 in Waves 5, 6 and 7 respectively, asked respondents how proud they were of their nationality. Possible responses ranged from “Very proud” to “Not at all proud”, coded in a scale from 1 to 4. Additionally, respondents could choose “I am not [nationality]”, “Don’t know”, “No answer”, “Not asked” and “Missing; Not available” coded as 5, -1, -2, -4 and -5 respectively. For the purposes of the analysis, “ineligible” responses to all items were recoded as missing.

After the ineligible responses in the WVS data were recoded, of the 26 variables, 22 in China and 14 in Taiwan had missingness. There were five variables with missingness above 5% in China and two in Taiwan. For China, the key variables “Global Identity”, “Level of Democracy” and “Environment vs. Economy” had missingness ratios of 16.7%, 12.8% and 11.1% respectively. In Taiwan data, the key variable “Global Identity” was completely missing from Wave 5, as it was not asked. Its missingness ratio in the combined data was 35.8%. The other variables with missingness above 5% were “Income” and “National Identity” in China with 9.3% and 8.1% missingness respectively. “National Identity” was also not asked in Taiwan Wave 5, with 34.4% missingness. All other variables had missingness ratios below 5%.

The number of variables with missingness above 5%, and their importance for the analyses made imputation preferable over their removal. Case-wise deletion was not viable because the missingness was not concentrated in some of the cases. The ratio of cases with one or more missing responses to the total number of cases in the WVS data was around 36% in China and 40% in Taiwan. Furthermore, the data was mixed, entailing dichotomous, continuous, and ordered categorical variables. Therefore, Random Forest multiple imputation was the chosen method, utilizing the R package “missForest” (D. J. Stekhoven & Buhlmann, 2012; Daniel J. Stekhoven, 2013). Random Forest imputation does not necessitate assumptions of normality or linearity, and is suitable to work with mixed type data with complex relationships (Hong & Lynn, 2020; Shah et al., 2014; D. J. Stekhoven & Buhlmann, 2012; F. Tang & Ishwaran, 2017). Nine cases were deleted

from Taiwan WVS data prior to imputation for missing age and birthyear information. Three cases were deleted from Taiwan and China who responded with “I am not [nationality]” to the item about national pride.

The imputation took place in an iterative process. The built-in stopping criterion was that when both the differences between categorical and continuous parts of successive imputed data matrices become larger, the imputation process is stopped. The matrix before the last one is returned, as it usually has higher accuracy. The maximum number of iterations was set to 20 for both datasets. The stopping criterion was met after 11 iterations for China and 9 iterations for Taiwan, and imputations were completed. The built-in diagnostic calculations entail out-of-bag (OOB) imputation error estimates of normalized root mean square error (NRMSE) for continuous variables and the proportion of falsely classified (PFC) for categorical variables (Stekhoven & Buhlmann, 2012). These values range from 0 to 1, with lower values representing higher accuracy. The returned NRMSE was 0.002 for both Taiwan and China. The returned PFC was 0.249 for China and 0.16 for Taiwan. The estimated errors were comparable to those achieved in studies with simulated missing data (Stekhoven & Buhlmann, 2012). Further diagnostic operations involved comparisons of correlations between 325 variable pairs within original and imputed datasets. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the distribution of differences between the Spearman’s rank correlation scores of variable pairs which had statistically significant correlations in both original and imputed data for China and Taiwan.




Figure 2.1 Distribution of differences in variable correlations (China)




Figure 2.2 Distribution of differences in variable correlations (Taiwan)

Both distributions were heavily skewed towards zero which denoted no difference. Significant changes involved the correlations between Global Identity, National Identity and Year of Survey across original and imputed Taiwan data.

2.5.4. Missing Year Imputation

The variables HDI and GDP were used in analyses as macro level indicators of socio-economic modernization and globalization. Individual cases were assigned the societal-level indicator value coinciding with the year they turned 18. The range of years with available values differed across variables and across China and Taiwan. In order to cover the maximum range of cohorts consistently across China and Taiwan, Amelia II imputation was performed. GDP per capita data were available between years 1960 and 2019 for China and between 1951 and 2020 for Taiwan. The Subnational Human Development Index scores were available between 1990 and 2018 for China and Taiwan. KOF Globalization Index scores were only available for China between 1970 and 2018 and were included to improve imputation accuracy. Years past 2018 were removed since the youngest cases in the WVS turned 18 in the year 2018. The three constructs are theoretically and structurally interrelated. This was confirmed with Pearson's product moment correlation tests which produced significant and large correlations for each pair. The Amelia II imputations were performed separately for China and Taiwan, with 10 iterations each. Available HDI and GDP values for Taiwan; available HDI, GDP and KOF values for China were used for the imputation of missing years. For each missing cell, the average of all the imputed values from the 10 iterations were pulled and a complete dataset was created (Burns et al., 2011). Figure 2.3 shows the original and imputed yearly HDI values for China.




Figure 2.3 Original & imputed yearly HDI (China)

The earliest GDP value for China was from 1960, which corresponded to the cohort 1942. All three country level variables for China were unavailable prior to this point. Those born before 1942 made up about 0.026% of all cases in China and 0.087% of all cases in Taiwan. For consistency, the cases were removed from both China and Taiwan WVS data. The remaining cases were assigned the GDP and HDI values coinciding with the year they turned 18. Out of the remaining cases, 3975 of 7133 in




Figure 2.4 Original & imputed yearly HDI (Taiwan)

China, and 1868 of 3355 in Taiwan were assigned imputed HDI values. Figure 2.4 shows the original and imputed yearly HDI values for Taiwan.

2.6. HYPOTHESES

Extrapolating from the theories of human development, cosmopolitanization, intercultural exposure and intergroup contact, the following hypothesis was devised.

H₁: Successive cohorts will be increasingly more emancipative and cosmopolitan in China and Taiwan. The trend will be stronger in Taiwan.

The literature on political legitimacy, diffuse support, Chinese nationalism, political socialization agents and generational imprinting motivated the second and third hypotheses.

H₂: The trend of intergenerational value change will still be more pronounced in Taiwan compared to China when macro level variables are held fixed.

H₃: Those in China with greater national identification will perceive their country as more democratic, feel greater confidence in government and express lower emancipative values when control variables are held fixed.

3. CHAPTER 3 ANALYSES

3.1. COEFFICIENT OF DETERMINATION

Statistical significance conveys the probability of achieving a test statistic as extreme as was achieved, out of chance. Effect size on the other hand, quantifies the strength of the association between predictors and outcomes in a statistical model. Coefficient of determination, notated as R^2 , is a measure of effect size denoting the explained variance in a model, calculated by subtracting the residual variance from 1 (Falk & Miller, 1992). Conversely, a very large effect size may be statistically insignificant and similarly a statistically significant effect may be extremely small. Falk and Miller (1992) proposed that R^2 values above 10% be considered adequate for inference from linear regression models. Cohen (2013) listed the explained variance proportions below 2% as very weak, between 2-13% as weak, 13-26% as moderate and above 26% as substantial. However, he discouraged the generalized application of this rule, stating that considerations should be made regarding the field of study at hand. The rules introduced by Cohen to help with the interpretation of effect sizes have been commonly applied in social research. Some scholars have criticized the reliance on Cohen's guidelines and proposed updated guidelines for interpreting effect sizes (Funder & Ozer, 2019; Richard et al., 2003). The emerging convention has been that comparisons be made in-between models and with other relevant findings when interpreting effect size. Sample size may also be implicative when assessing effect sizes. It has been suggested that large samples may permit smaller effect sizes to be considered meaningful (Funder and Ozer 2019). Larger sample sizes are considered more likely to result in reliable statistical estimations. Based on simulations, researchers have found that sample sizes approaching 250 were generally sufficient for producing reliable results (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013).

For linear mixed and generalized linear mixed models, R^2 values cannot be calculated as with simple linear models. Nakagawa and Schielzeth (2013) have developed an approach that ameliorates this problem. The GLMM coefficient of determination denotes the explained variance similarly to simple linear regression models. However, the authors noted that the interpretation of this value should be supplemented with

additional assessments. The R^2 value for mixed models were automatically extracted with the R package “effectsize” (Ben-Shachar et al., 2020).

3.2. HYPOTHESIS I

The first set of models attempted to test the assumption that there is an intergenerational trend of social change in both Taiwan and China, and that it is more pronounced in Taiwan. The social change dimensions of interest were emancipative values, outgroup prejudice, global identification, and pro-environmentalism. The covered theoretical and empirical literature indicated significant associations between these values and the level of cognitive empowerment permitted by socioeconomic development as well as the intercultural contact and global media exposure facilitated by globalization and modern communication technologies. Given these associations, a steeper trend of intergenerational value change was expected in the population of Taiwan, which has experienced socioeconomic development and globalization more intensely and rapidly. This was observed in Figure 3.1, where the aggregate mean responses of unique cohort-region groups were plotted for an exploratory visualization. It should be noted that the sample sizes greatly varied by group.




Figure 3.1 Response means of cohort aggregates, compared

One generalized linear and three simple linear regression models were fit with region-cohort combinations and their interactions as independent variables predicting the four dependent variables measuring emancipative values, outgroup prejudice, global identification and pro-environmentalism. For continuous response variables, linear regression models were fit with ordinary least squares estimation. For the binary response variable environment vs. economy, a binomial generalized linear model with maximum likelihood estimation was fit. All models had statistically significant intercepts and their explanatory powers varied between very weak at 4% and moderate at 15% (Cohen, 2013). Using the “predict” function from R base package “stats”, estimated dependent variable values for each region-cohort combination and 95% confidence intervals were extracted from the models (R Core Team, 2021). The estimations accounted for the effects of cohort, region and their interactions. Then, the difference between the estimated values for successive cohorts and the respective oldest cohorts were calculated for China and Taiwan. The oldest cohorts, born in 1942, served as references for assessing intergenerational trends. Finally, the pairwise absolute differences between the predicted intercohort differences of China and Taiwan were calculated. This corresponded to the difference-in-differences (Dinas & Stoker, 2014). The presence of notable patterns in the absolute difference between the intercohort differences of treated and untreated groups may hint at the effect of contextual factors.

Three plots visualizing the mentioned aspects of each dependent variable were created. Firstly, the estimated responses for successive cohorts were plotted as two separate lines for Taiwan and China on the y axis. Response predictions were in the order of birthyear, situated on the x axis. Shaded regions around the lines represented the 95% confidence intervals for predictions. The second graphs had two lines for Taiwan and China denoting intercohort differences, calculated as the estimated value for the respective reference cohort subtracted from the estimated value for the cohort on the x axis. The final plots featured a single line visualizing the absolute differences between pairwise intercohort differences.

3.3. HYPOTHESIS II

The goal with the second set of models was to assess how much of the difference in intergenerational trends initially observed could be attributed to a monotonous reaction

to socioeconomic modernization and globalization and how much of it was left unexplained. The models utilized mixed effect regression to stabilize the effect of certain variables across Chinese and Taiwanese cohorts and observe the residual difference in intergenerational trajectories. Conversely, the sociopolitical context in China has been restrictive, seeking to contain the undesired outcomes of modernization and globalization. Political institutions have actively combatted social change through countermeasures such as patriotic education and censorship. On the other hand, the sociopolitical environment in Taiwan has been neutral, conversely even welcoming, to new agents of socialization with an eagerness to join the global society. These contextual peculiarities may have altered the linear social effects of modernization and globalization. Consequently, it was hypothesized that the intergenerational trajectory of social change would still be stronger in Taiwan when related variables were held fixed.

The four dependent variables from the first set of analyses were assessed through linear and generalized linear mixed effect models where the effects of control variables, most notably HDI as an indicator of socioeconomic modernization and globalization, were held fixed across Taiwan and China. Restricted maximum likelihood for continuous dependent variables and maximum likelihood estimation for the binary pro-environmentalism variable were used. The models included cohorts and being from China or Taiwan as simple random effects. The model structures were hierarchical where cohorts were nested within regions. This meant that intercepts varied across China and Taiwan, and among cohorts within them (Bates et al., 2015). It should be noted that while advantageous for the purposes of prediction in this study, difficulties arise with mixed models when assessing robustness and confidence intervals, which were addressed in previous sections. Nonetheless, explanatory power calculations were considerably better in the second set of models with conditional R^2 values between 14% and 28%. Explanatory power generally increases when a greater number of variables are included in a model. However, the mixed effect models were optimized for parsimony and explanatory power using backwards elimination with the “step” function from R package “lmerTest” (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). All included control variables had statistically significant effects at 95% level of confidence in each model. Predictions and visualizations for the second set of models progressed similarly to the first. The first plot showed the estimated value of each dependent variable for every unique region-cohort

combination and for control variables fixed at their mean or median value in the used data, except for variable sex set to female. The values were arbitrarily assigned to control variables since the differences between predictions and not the actual values were of interest. The shaded regions around the lines represented 80% confidence intervals with residual variances excluded. Later plots similarly showed the intercohort differences of estimated values within China and Taiwan, and the absolute pairwise intercohort differences between China and Taiwan.

3.4. HYPOTHESIS III

The CCP's emphasis on patriotism and preserving national loyalty among youth has featured the depiction of the regime as interwoven with the Chinese nation. This has been interpreted as an attempt to promote diffuse support and maintain legitimacy. Scholars have argued that by formulating a national identity which features itself as an integral element, the CCP has attempted to delegitimize political dissent. It is also possible that the CCP attempted to create an emotional link between the regime and the citizen that would precede rational criticism, even evoking emotional defensiveness against skeptics. In each case, many analysts have agreed that patriotic discourse has been a leading legitimization strategy for the CCP.

Internet usage, socioeconomic development and education may lower perceived legitimacy. Literature has found that socioeconomic development and education lowered government performance evaluation and trust while increasing liberal democratic values through cognitive empowerment. Similarly, internet usage has been positively linked with political engagement, liberal democratic values and demand for democracy and negatively linked with government support, government performance evaluation and trust in government. Some of these findings were stronger in or exclusive to authoritarian regimes. It could be contemplated from these findings that cognitive empowerment and internet usage similarly elicit skepticism towards and disillusionment from government propaganda in individuals. However, it has also been found that government interventions, as in surveillance and censorship, have lessened these effects in China.

Thus, both patriotic discourse and internet control served as brakes against the erosion of perceived legitimacy and emergence of unorthodoxy undesired by the regime. It should be reasonable to assume greater levels of national identification to be associated

with greater perceptions of regime legitimacy if said regime ideologically aligns with a nationalist paradigm. The motivation behind the last part of analyses was to assess whether greater national identification truly obstructed the evidenced effects of socioeconomic modernization and internet usage in fostering government criticism and demand for democracy. Will levels of national identification still influence emancipative values, confidence in government and perceived level of democracy when the effects of socioeconomic modernization and internet usage are held constant? This could mean that national identification has at least partially suppressed the expected effects of said factors, as intended.

The final set of models investigated these questions with data only from China. Linear mixed models with restricted maximum likelihood criterion were used. The grouping factor was the constructed variable national identification. All three models included levels of national identification as random effects. The dependent variables were confidence in government, perceived level of democracy and emancipative values, all operationalized as continuous. Models were optimized for parsimony and explanatory power with a combination of control variables, assisted by backwards variable elimination (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). The final models only included control variables with statistically significant effects at 95% level of confidence. Predictions for seven levels of national identification were generated with fixed values for the remaining variables, at their mean or median value in the used data except for variable sex set to female. Plots showed the mean estimated value for the dependent variable for each level of national identification. Lines crossing the points denoted the upper and lower limits of 80% confidence intervals of predictions, excluding residual variances.

3.5. RESULTS & DISCUSSION

The following sections described the model fits and individual variables in greater detail, featured visualizations of generated predictions and interpreted the results for all dependent variables in each set of analyses. All estimation and intercohort difference plots featured a dotted blue line for Taiwan and a solid yellow line for China.

3.5.1. Extant Trends

3.5.1.1. Emancipative Values

The first model for dependent variable emancipative values had a statistically significant and moderate explanatory power with an adjusted R^2 at 15%. The model's intercept, corresponding to the 1942 cohort in China was statistically significant at 0.37 ($p < 0.001$, 95% CI). The values for the variable ranged from 0 to 1, with increasing values denoting greater expression of emancipative values. The visualization of emancipative values in Figure 3.2 showed a pattern of increase in both China and Taiwan. However, in line with expectations, the trend was steeper in Taiwan.




Figure 3.2 Estimated emancipative values across cohorts in China and Taiwan

Figure 3.3 plotted the estimated referential intercohort differences in China and Taiwan as two separate lines. Each point in the line for China corresponded to the difference between the estimated value for the oldest Chinese cohort in the model, born in 1942, and the cohort on the horizontal axis (Dinas & Stoker, 2014). The same applied to Taiwan. This was meant to isolate and magnify the aspect of intergenerational change in each society. The increase in the most recent Taiwanese cohorts from their reference cohort approached 30%. Whereas their Chinese contemporaries were estimated to be about 10% more emancipative than their reference.




Figure 3.3 Intercohort differences in estimated emancipative values in China and Taiwan (Cohort – 1942)

By isolating and magnifying the intercohort differences and the differences in intercohort differences, the estimated difference in the rate of social change could be observed in Figure 3.4. The difference was likely related to the different histories of socioeconomic development that have taken place in China and Taiwan. The results




Figure 3.4 Absolute differences-in-differences in emancipative values between China and Taiwan

supported the first hypothesis showing that there is a stronger trend of increasing emancipative values across cohorts in Taiwan compared to China.

3.5.1.2. Outgroup Prejudice

The first model for dependent variable outgroup prejudice had a statistically significant and weak explanatory power with an adjusted R^2 of 7%. The model's intercept, corresponding to the 1942 cohort in China was statistically significant at 3.92 ($p < 0.001$, 95% CI). The values for the variable ranged from 0 to 9, denoting the total number of outgroups not wanted as neighbors.




Figure 3.5 Estimated outgroup prejudice scores across cohorts in China and Taiwan

In Figure 3.5, a notable difference in trends was already visible. Namely, estimations for the oldest Taiwanese cohorts indicated greater outgroup prejudice than the Chinese. However, more recent Taiwanese cohorts were increasingly less prejudiced whereas the predicted responses for successive Chinese cohorts remained relatively stagnant.




Figure 3.6 Intercohort differences in estimated outgroup prejudice in China and Taiwan (Cohort – 1942)

The estimated change in China hovered around zero. Whereas in Taiwan, successive cohorts were consistently less prejudiced than the reference cohort and increasingly more so, with estimates approaching a three-point reduction in the most recent cohorts.




Figure 3.7 Absolute differences-in-differences in outgroup prejudice scores between China and Taiwan

Figure 3.7 showed the absolute difference between the intercohort differences across successive pairs of Chinese and Taiwanese cohorts. As could be inferred from the previous graphs, there was a consistent increase in the pairwise intercohort differences. Results from the outgroup prejudice model also supported the hypothesis that intergenerational social change was more pronounced in Taiwan.

3.5.1.3. Global Identity

The first model for dependent variable global identity had a statistically significant and weak explanatory power with an adjusted R^2 of 7%. The model's intercept, corresponding to the 1942 cohort in China was statistically significant at 2.68 ($p < 0.001$, 95% CI). The values for the variable ranged from 1 to 4, denoting the intensity of global identification. The model's explanatory power improved by 1% with the inclusion of control variable interest in politics. Its effect on global identity was statistically significant and positive ($\beta = 0.10$, 95% CI [0.08, 0.11], $p < .001$). As seen in Figure 3.8, estimations for Chinese cohorts were consistently higher than those in Taiwan up until most recent cohorts where the two lines seemed to converge.




Figure 3.8 Estimated global identification across cohorts in China and Taiwan

In Figure 3.9, there was a relatively more noticeable trend of decreasing global identification across successive Chinese cohorts. It couldn't be confidently said that Taiwanese cohorts contrasted this with an increasing trend.




Figure 3.9 Intercohort differences in estimated global identification in China and Taiwan (Cohort – 1942)




Figure 3.10 Absolute differences-in-differences between global identity values in China and Taiwan

Even though intercohort differences weren't noticeably oriented in either direction, the difference-in-differences showed an increasing pattern. The intercohort difference was mostly in the positive direction for Taiwan, and negative direction for China. There was some indication of differently oriented intergenerational change in global identification across the two societies. However, the trends were not as stable as in previous models where the disparity between intergenerational trends increased more cumulatively. This could be related to the operationalization of the variable as continuous despite its low granularity.

3.5.1.4. Pro-Environmentalism

The first model for dependent variable environment versus economy had a statistically significant and weak explanatory power with a Nagelkerke's R^2 of 4%. Adjusted for generalized linear models, Nagelkerke's R^2 (1991) value is an approximation of the proportion of variance in the outcome probabilities of the dependent variable, explained by the predictors. The model's intercept, corresponding to the 1942 cohort in China was at 0.53 ($p = 0.001$, 95% CI). The estimations corresponded to the likelihood of responding in favor of the environment. In Figure 3.11, the confidence intervals overlapped for the majority of the two trends. However, the reference cohorts were





Figure 3.11 Estimated probability of pro-environmental response across cohorts in China and Taiwan

confidently distinct, with a lower probability of pro-environmental response in the Taiwanese cohort. Consequently, successive Taiwanese cohorts showed increasingly higher change, consistently in the positive direction. Most recent Taiwanese cohorts were about twice as likely to respond in favor of environment compared to their reference.

The estimated probabilities for successive Chinese cohorts mostly remained close to their reference. The last graph indicated disparate trends of intergenerational environmental attitudes across China and Taiwan. A slight increase in estimated probabilities in most recent Chinese cohorts somewhat lessened the pairwise difference.



3.12 Intercohort differences in probability of pro-environmental response in China and Taiwan (Cohort – 1942)

The results were in support of the hypothesis showing a growing intergenerational discrepancy in pro-environmentalism within Taiwan and relative stagnancy in China.

However, the explanatory power of the model was weak. Furthermore, confidence intervals were not clearly distinguished between the lines for most predictions.




figure 3.13 Absolute differences-in-differences between probabilities of pro-environmental response in China and

The results generally reinforced the initial assumptions about trend differences from the first hypothesis. Some dependent variables supported the hypothesis more strongly while some produced ambiguous findings. More recent Taiwanese cohorts showed notable and increasing discrepancies from their predecessors in the expected directions in emancipative values and outgroup prejudice. Visualizations for global identification and pro-environmentalism were not as conclusive. This, along with the relatively modest explanatory powers could be attributed to the possibly implicative variables not included in these models as well as shortcomings in operationalization. Nonetheless no signs of parallelism between intergenerational trends in Taiwan and China were observed.

3.5.2. The Withstanding Difference

3.5.2.1. Emancipative Values with Controls

The second model for dependent variable emancipative values had a moderate explanatory power with a conditional R^2 of 19% (Cohen, 2013). Conditional R^2 denotes the combined variance explained by random and fixed parts in a linear mixed model

(Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013). The model was hierarchically structured with cohorts nested within regions, producing unique intercepts for all combinations. Regions and cohorts within regions constituted random effect components in the model. Other variables were included as controls with fixed effects. Of these, the effects of HDI, education, income, alternative sources, and being female had statistically significant and positive effects on emancipative values, and traditional media consumption had a negative effect. The largest effect was of HDI (beta = 0.18, 95% CI [0.16, 0.21], $p < .001$). Confidence intervals and significance values were computed with Wald approximation (Ben-Shachar et al., 2020; X. Liu, 2016b; Makowski et al., 2020; Ward & Ahlquist, 2018). Estimated emancipative values were generated for unique cohort-region combinations with control variables arbitrarily fixed at mean or median values in the used data, apart from variable sex set to female. Then the differences between every cohort from each region and their respective 1942 cohorts were calculated. Finally, the absolute differences between the estimated intercohort differences of parallel Chinese and Taiwanese cohorts were calculated. Figure 3.14 showed the estimated values as a dashed blue line for Taiwan and a solid yellow line for China. The trends were not noticeably distinguished, however overall increase in Taiwan and decrease in China could be observed.




Figure 3.14 Emancipative values across cohorts in China and Taiwan estimated with fixed controls

Figure 3.15 showed the intercohort differences between cohorts on the x axis and the reference cohorts. Change from the reference cohort in the predicted response was exclusively in the negative direction for successive Chinese cohorts, and almost exclusively in the positive direction for Taiwanese cohorts. More recent cohorts showed increasingly larger differences from the reference in Taiwan. This resulted in a partially




Figure 3.15 Intercohort differences in E.V., est. with fixed controls (Cohort – 1942)




Figure 3.16 Absolute differences-in-differences of E.V. trends, est. with fixed controls

cumulative increase in pairwise intercohort differences. The intergenerational expression of emancipative values had divergent trends even when control variables were held fixed,

with successive cohorts in Taiwan increasingly more emancipative than their reference compared to China.

As expected, the effect of HDI was positive and large. Notably, traditional media had a negative effect. The results were in support of the second hypothesis. Successive Taiwanese cohorts were estimated increasingly more emancipative than successive Chinese cohorts with the same level of education, income, internet and peer socialization, traditional media consumption, gender and the same level of HDI at age 18. Factors beyond those mentioned may have influenced intergenerational social change within China and Taiwan. It is also possible that the control variables had varying influences across China and Taiwan.

3.5.2.2. Outgroup Prejudice with Controls

The model for dependent variable outgroup prejudice had moderate explanatory power, with conditional R^2 calculated at 24%. The control variables included in the model had statistically significant effects. Variables HDI, age and being female had positive effects on outgroup prejudice whereas the effects of education, income and alternative sources were negative. The largest positive and negative effects were from HDI (beta = 4.04, 95% CI [3.13, 4.95], $p < .001$) and alternative sources (beta = -0.24, 95% CI [-0.38,




Figure 3.17 Outgroup prejudice across cohorts in China and Taiwan, estimated with fixed controls

-0.10], $p < .001$). The estimated values for outgroup prejudice were consistently higher in China. The lines were not markedly oriented in either direction in figure 3.17, although a moderate increase in China and decrease in Taiwan were observed.

However, when the intercohort differences were isolated, a notable contrast was apparent where successive cohorts were almost exclusively more prejudiced than the oldest cohort in China, and almost exclusively less prejudiced in Taiwan. Both differences approached half a point in opposite directions in more recent cohorts.




Figure 3.18 Intercohort differences in O.P., est. with fixed controls (Cohort – 1942)




Figure 3.19 Absolute differences-in-differences of O.P. trends, est. with fixed controls

The difference-in-differences showed a pronounced increase. Estimations showed that successive Taiwanese cohorts were increasingly less prejudiced towards outgroups. On the other hand, Chinese cohorts were increasingly more prejudiced, resulting in a widening gap between the intergenerational trends in two societies. The results were in support of the second hypothesis, signaling that factors beyond socioeconomic development, sex, age, income, education, and alternative socialization may have influenced the intergenerational change in outgroup perceptions across China and Taiwan.

3.5.2.3. Global Identity with Controls

The conditional R^2 of the model with dependent variable global identity was substantial at 27%. Control variables had statistically significant effects. HDI had a large and negative effect ($\beta = -3.85$, 95% CI [-4.22, -3.49], $p < .001$). Age had a smaller negative effect ($\beta = -0.46$, 95% CI [-0.50, -0.42], $p < .001$). Interest in politics had a small positive effect ($\beta = 0.09$, 95% CI [0.08, 0.11], $p < .001$). In Figure 3.20, differently from the first model, estimated values were consistently higher in Taiwan. However, neither trend was prominently oriented in a single direction.




Figure 3.20 Global identity across cohorts in China and Taiwan, estimated with fixed controls

Nevertheless, when the isolated intercohort differences were visualized in Figure 3.21, it was revealed that global identification in most cohorts was greater than the reference in Taiwan, and smaller in China. However, the differences were very small, only surpassing 0.2 towards either direction within a 3-point range between 1 and 4.




Figure 3.21 Intercohort differences in G.I., est. with fixed controls (Cohort – 1942)

This resulted in a relatively unsteady trend of difference-in-differences. The absolute pairwise difference increased with more recent cohorts, but the trend was less linear. Also as mentioned, the largest difference was only 0.4.




Figure 3.22 Absolute differences-in-differences of G.I. trends, est. with fixed controls

Estimated global identification for Taiwanese cohorts were consistently larger than Chinese cohorts with the same age, interest in politics and societal HDI at age 18. However, the difference was neither large nor consistent. The results from this model did not provide confident support to the second hypothesis.

3.5.2.4. Pro-Environmentalism with Controls

The conditional R^2 of the model for dependent variable environment vs. economy was moderate at 14%. The variable was dichotomous, predicted using mixed effects binomial probit regression and maximum likelihood estimation. The control variables for the model were HDI, education, income, age, and interest in politics, all with statistically significant and positive effects, HDI being the largest (beta = 1.74, 95% CI [1.11, 2.38], $p < .001$). Contrary to the hypothesis, the estimated probability of a pro-environmental response was consistently higher for China, with differences occasionally exceeding 20%.




Figure 3.23 Probability of pro-environmental response, est. with fixed controls

Although in the expected directions, the intercohort differences were infinitesimal. The largest intercohort difference in probabilities was a reduction slightly above 5% in a Chinese cohort.




Figure 3.24 Intercohort differences in Pro-Env. (Cohort – 1942), est. with fixed controls

A notable or linear difference was not observed in the intergenerational trends of estimated probabilities of pro-environmental response across China and Taiwan. The




Figure 3.25 Absolute differences-in-differences of Pro-Env. trends, est. with fixed controls

trend of difference-in-differences was highly unstable with dips near zero at several points and the largest peak nearing 10%.

Estimated probabilities of a response in favor of the environment were consistently about 20% higher in China. Intercohort differences were small overall, mostly near zero or in the negative direction in China and mostly near zero or in the positive direction in Taiwan. However, the results did not indicate markedly disparate intergenerational social change regarding environmental attitudes at fixed levels of income, education, age, interest in politics and societal level of HDI at age 18.

The results of the second set of models generally indicated that there are differences in intergenerational social trends across China and Taiwan that socioeconomic development and globalization, at least to the extent covered by the employed control variables, cannot sufficiently explain.

3.5.3. Effects of National Identification

3.5.3.1. Emancipative Values & National Identification

The data used in the final set of models was only from China. The first of these models was with dependent variable emancipative values. The model's explanatory power was weak with conditional R^2 at 12%. The grouping factor was national identification. Levels of national identification were included as random effects. Intercepts were allowed to randomly vary between groups whereas control variable effects were held fixed. These included HDI, education, income and alternative sources with statistically significant positive effects and interest in politics with a very small but statistically significant negative effect (beta = -0.004, 95% CI [-0.007, -0.001], $p = 0.006$). The largest effect was of variable HDI (beta = 0.12, 95% CI [0.10, 0.15], $p < .001$).

Estimated emancipative values were generated for each category of national identification. Control variables were arbitrarily fixed at their mean or median values in the data, apart from variable sex which was set to female. The points in the plot corresponded to the estimated values for different levels of national identification. Lines above and below the points denoted 80% confidence intervals for the predictions with residual variances removed. The sample sizes for the two lowest categories were very small, reflected in the wider confidence intervals. However, remaining categories showed

a prominent negative relationship between expressed emancipative values and national identification.




Figure 3.26 Emancipative values & levels of national id. in China, est. with controls

The plot showed that those who express greater national identification are less emancipative than those who express lower national identification with the same level of education, income, alternative socialization, interest in politics, and societal level of HDI at age 18. Control variables education, HDI and alternative sources had positive effects as was suggested by literature. However, there was visible disparity between groups even when their effects were held constant. Furthermore, the remaining difference resulted in a meaningful trend, with emancipative values decreasing as national identification increased.

3.5.3.2. Confidence in Government & National Identification

The second in the last set of models was with dependent variable confidence in government. The model explained a moderate proportion of variance with a conditional R^2 of 17%. The fixed parts of the model included control variables HDI, age and interest in politics with statistically significant and positive effects, and education and alternative sources with statistically significant and negative effects. The largest positive effect was from HDI (beta = 1.56, 95% CI [1.20, 1.92], $p < .001$) and the largest negative effect was from alternative sources (beta = -0.10, 95% CI [-0.16, -0.05], $p < .001$). There was a clear

trend across levels of national identification and increasing confidence in government estimated with fixed control values.




Figure 3.27 Confidence in gov. & levels of national id. in China, est. with controls

Interestingly, the effect of HDI on confidence in government was positive whereas education and alternative sources had negative effects as expected. Once again, after their effects were equalized across levels, a noticeable trend was apparent. The predicted value was linearly correlated with the intensity of national identification. This implied that national identification influenced perceptions of government beyond socioeconomic modernization, globalization and internet usage.

3.5.3.3. Level of Democracy & National Identification

The final model in the analyses was with dependent variable level of democracy. The model had substantial explanatory power with a conditional R^2 of 28%. Included control variables were HDI, income, age, and interest in politics with statistically significant positive effects, and education and alternative sources with statistically significant negative effects. In addition, being female had a statistically significant and positive effect. The overall largest effect was of HDI (beta = 6.21, 95% CI [5.05, 7.38], $p < .001$) while the largest negative effect was from alternative sources (beta = -0.40, 95%

CI [-0.58, -0.22], $p < .001$). In the visualization, a steep pattern of increase in perceived level of democracy was observed across levels 2 to 7.




Figure 3.28 Perceived L.O.D. & levels of national id. in China, est. with controls

As with the previous model, HDI had a very large and positive effect, while alternative sources and education had negative effects as expected. Yet, a pattern indicating a linear relationship between intensity of national identification and perceived level of democracy was still present when control variables were held constant. The results were in support of the final hypothesis.

The third set of models generally pointed to variation in dependent variables inadequately explained by control variables, that is linearly related to the intensity of national identification in the expected directions. In all three models, education, and alternative socialization – denoting internet usage and peer interaction – had effects in the expected directions. Contrary to expectation, HDI had positive effects on government confidence and perceived levels of democracy. It was mentioned that a positive relationship between national identification and government perception is sensible if the government frequently appeases patriotic values. The visualizations hinted that this relationship has at least partially persisted the social effects of socioeconomic modernization, increased access to education and internet usage, all of which have been shown to lower legitimacy perceptions in literature. Of course, their effects were only captured to the extent permitted by the used data.

4. CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION

In beginning to conclude the study, I would like to acknowledge the sensitive nature of discussed topics. The only motivation here was to advance scientific discussion around said topics and contribute novel perspectives. I would also like to disclose my reasoning behind the research questions. The foundation of this study was the assumption that otherwise similar social units will respond similarly to the same societal influence in the absence of additional factors particular to their respective conditions. This assumption was supplemented by theoretical and empirical literature that vividly illustrate universal patterns in various unfolding social phenomena. The human development body of research has supplied compelling evidence of an almost mechanical relationship between material conditions and social change. Analyses of cosmopolitan orientation, intercultural contact and exposure have established globally consistent value adoption and expression mechanisms. Of course, it could still be counted upon that all such patterns manifest diversely in connection to subtleties in various settings. As elaborated by Ulrich Beck, modern social reality consists of horizontally and vertically interlinked processes taking place along layers coinciding with, but not limited to, the individual, society and the world.

The departure point of this study was to evaluate why and how may local agents arbitrate the processes of modernization and globalization. The admitted reason for the CCP was preventing loss of national attachment and admiration of the West among youth. Inferences by analysts largely pointed to the value of legitimation for an authoritarian regime. By ensuring a patriotic youth, CCP could consolidate its future support base. Furthermore, social homogeneity meant less social conflict, allowing rapid economic development. Extrapolating from this, if we were to anthropomorphize the Chinese Communist Party, it could be thought of as someone with survival/materialist values. As explained in the covered literature, these values relate to deference to authority, social conservatism, and preference for a homogeneous society. In contrast with emancipative values, survival/materialist values prioritize sustenance over self-expression and freedom. A patriotic nationalist paradigm aligns with this value orientation. From a materialistic perspective, patriotic propaganda is beneficial to the welfare of the citizens. A patriotic base ensures the drive of a development-oriented government. Furthermore, this rhetoric

establishes a place in the historical continuity of the Chinese nation. The future of the nation is portrayed as tied with the CCP's rule. When listing the main content of patriotic education with the 1994 Action Plan, particular importance was placed to the understanding of "the great spirit and accomplishments of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)" and "how it led all the people of the entire nation in the fight to establish a new China" ("Action Plan for Patriotic Education," 2006, p. 9). This relates to the regime legitimacy aspect of patriotic education by emphasizing the CCP's role in establishing modern China.

A social movement will express discontent more freely and act more organized when a critical point is reached such that the perception of popularity reinforces the attainability of change (Christiansen, 2009; Hopper, 1950). This is one way the Tiananmen Square events have been interpreted. Another very prominent characterization of the events has been as a legitimacy crisis, signifying demand for democracy and self-expression. The patriotic education campaign was devised soon after the events. The campaign and other countermeasures may have been designed directly against the depletion of legitimacy and a looming burst of emancipative, self-expressive and liberal democratic values. President Jiang Zemin in a letter to his comrades, criticized the idea that democracy would bring immediate prosperity to China and denounced the idealization of advanced economies, referring to their exploitative histories and ongoing global inequalities (Jiang, 1991). This possibly signified the interpretation of the events in relation to globalization, as an infiltration of Chinese society by imperialist ideology, rather than a genuine demand for change as a byproduct of socioeconomic modernization. With these considerations, the campaign presents more strongly as a corrective measure against emancipative, self-expressive, liberal democratic and cosmopolitan values.

The CCP was concerned with the implications of increased interaction with the outside world when devising the patriotic education campaign. But the internet was not nearly as accessible in 1991 as it has recently become. The sophisticated machinery of internet control in China is a defensive correspondence of the patriotic education campaign. Rather than generate support, censorship is meant to prevent the development of dissidence. The internet presents a platform for the spread and organization of unorthodoxy. With the internet, scattered individuals with nonconformist opinions may

easily find each other and instantly communicate from any distance. Analysts have extensively demonstrated the utilization of the internet as a device to address and dissuade public opinion in China. In this sense, the internet provides the CCP a means to depressurize social tension far before it reaches a boiling point. However, it is a matter of question how far the party is willing to stretch to accommodate bottom-up pressure. At which point, censorship and propaganda come into the picture. As mentioned, the impression of feasible success insinuated by popular opinion drives social tension to its later stages. Censorship is highly capable of distorting this impression and discouraging dissidence. As such, like the patriotic education campaign, internet control could be considered a provision against the culmination of weakened legitimacy perceptions into an outburst of discontent.

The CCP has adamantly expressed the party's commitment to development. The rapid socioeconomic modernization of China has been a frequently referenced source of legitimacy for the regime. On the other hand, literature has shown that authoritarian regimes encounter increasing criticism from a cognitively empowered base. The CCP's rhetoric did not necessarily indicate that this relationship was acknowledged. Rather it seemed, the blame was largely placed on global integration. Nevertheless, the countermeasures targeted the outcomes and not the process itself, exemplified in China's remarkable global integration in the 21st century. And although the process of modernization was certainly not targeted, its outcomes were indirectly affected. Another direct target was the youth, indicating an awareness of the generational aspect of social change.

To summarize, similarities can be drawn between internet control and patriotic education in what they are meant to accomplish. In two different ways, they both counter the proliferation of unorthodox opinions. They are both meant to maintain the ideological alignment of the majority with the party and boost regime legitimacy. Coincidentally, they counter emancipative, self-expressive, liberal democratic and cosmopolitan values as these present challenges to the regime. This study attempted to identify the effectiveness of these countermeasures. The society of Taiwan was taken as a reference point. With a difference-in-differences approach, the idea was that the countermeasures and the wider sociopolitical context of Mainland China presents an intervention or

“treatment” effect over the evidenced social effects of socioeconomic modernization and globalization. Reiterating the foundational assumption of the study, the two populations were expected to react similarly to the same societal influences, in the absence of additional factors endemic to their respective environments. The societal influences of socioeconomic modernization and globalization have been evidenced in intergenerational social change throughout the world. The countermeasures of the CCP present context specific factors absent in Taiwan. Therefore, it should be possible to observe the residual effects of the countermeasures in the difference that remains after the societal influences of modernization and globalization are equalized across the two societies. In short, the withstanding difference would demonstrate how similar processes manifest divergently due to context-specific factors.

Findings largely provided support for the hypotheses, showing discrepant trajectories of social change across Taiwan and China in various value expressions, before and after the influences of modernization and globalization were equalized. As was suspected, on most dimensions, the difference between the intergenerational trends observed in the two societies could not be sufficiently explained by socioeconomic modernization, globalization, and internet usage. Beyond these influences, the general difference was relative stagnancy of social change towards increasing emancipative and cosmopolitan values in China compared to Taiwan. It should be iterated that these trends did not denote a longitudinal development, rather the reflection of longitudinal developments on successive generations who temporally coexist. In Taiwan, the more recent cohorts showed greater discrepancies with their respective oldest cohort compared to Chinese contemporaries with fixed levels of socioeconomic development at age 18, internet usage, education etc. So, what constituted this withstanding difference?

As previously conveyed, the assumptions of this study asserted that remaining differences could largely be attributed to context specific factors. In this case, local factors most pertinent to the expression of emancipative and cosmopolitan value orientations were the countermeasures in the Chinese context. As discussed in detail above, patriotic education and internet control have strong implications over the intergenerational expression of emancipative and cosmopolitan values. However, their most established goal, is the maintenance of regime legitimacy. Conversely, the countermeasures work in

two different ways when slowing down social change by interacting with the processes of modernization and globalization. Internet control and censorship dilute their influences before they can be internalized by the society. They intervene with ongoing processes of information exchange and opinion deliberation, altering the transmissions that society receives. On the other hand, patriotic education metaphorically provides immunization against their influences. By conditioning individuals to strongly identify with the nation, and to equate the regime with the nation, patriotic rhetoric reduces the receptivity to influences that drive social change and undermine legitimacy.

The last portion of analyses contemplated the effectiveness of the countermeasures, specifically patriotic rhetoric, from a different angle. Here, the unit of analysis was groups within China, delineated by the intensity of their national identification. The assumption was that greater levels of national identification would predict greater legitimacy perceptions and lower expressions of emancipative values. The variables employed to gauge the perceptions of regime legitimacy were the expressed confidence in government and perceived levels of democracy. The first corresponded to a subjective evaluation of the government somewhat more directly. Nonetheless, perceived level of democracy was also considered a meaningful indicator of regime legitimacy perception in China. One could argue that public opinion on the quality of democracy holds little substance in an authoritarian regime. However, the CCP considers China a democracy and promotes socialist democratic values. In this sense, a lower evaluation contradicts state rhetoric and signals discontent with the form of democracy offered. Therefore, both confidence in government and level of democracy relate to regime legitimacy perceptions. Emancipative values, as argued before, pose a contrast to the materialist/survival values which align more closely with the regime's interests. The visualizations showed a persistent relationship between national identification, confidence in government, perceived level of democracy and emancipative values that withstood the influences of socioeconomic development, education and internet usage. The greatest perceived level of democracy, greatest confidence in government and lowest expression of emancipative values were estimated for the group with the highest intensity of national identification. The remaining groups showed mostly linear relationships with the variables in the expected directions. Significantly, the results implied that there was

an effect of national identification that surpassed the evidenced legitimacy eroding effects of the control variables.

Overall, the findings have supported the assumption that social effects of modernization and globalization play out differently in China and Taiwan, as reflected in intergenerational trends. In addition, the effects of modernization, education and internet usage on emancipative values and legitimacy perceptions differ across levels of national identification in China, in the expected directions. Together, results imply that the countermeasures against social change have at least partially produced the desired results in China. However, it couldn't be ruled out that the differences in intergenerational trajectories have partially resulted from the sociopolitical context in Taiwan. The distinct societal openness to globalization may have artificially increased the social impact of modernization and globalization beyond what would have ordinarily taken place. This may have enlarged the discrepancy in trends; however, it is unlikely that it was the sole reason, given the implications of the countermeasures discussed and the demonstrated effects of national identification on value expressions in China.

The analytical progression of this study concludes by theorizing based on findings and considerations that the slower rate of intergenerational social change in China could at least partially be explained as a consequence of government measures. Namely, the patriotic education campaign and internet control, have effectively inhibited the social effects of socioeconomic modernization, globalization, and internet usage from manifesting their fullest potential.

4.1. SHORTCOMINGS & FURTHER RESEARCH

Throughout the previous sections, I have tried to communicate the various shortcomings of this study transparently. As mentioned earlier, considerable proportions of cases were ultimately assigned with imputed values for various variables. Furthermore, the scope of birthyears for which societal-level variables were available differed across the regions. This was ultimately addressed with the omission of a small portion of cases prior to analyses. A very small number of additional cases were omitted due to ineligibility. Variance in group sample sizes were not properly addressed in analyses, which may have influenced some results. Especially in the final set of models, categories with the lowest levels of national identification had sample sizes far too small to make

reliable statistical inferences. Fortunately, other categories were much larger and produced estimates with greater confidence.

Certain variables were inconsistently operationalized across the waves. These were transformed to fit within consistent scales in various cases. Some conventionally ordinal variables were operationalized as continuous. Several variables were constructed using various items to improve granularity. The individual items used were conceptually related and their construct validities were statistically tested. However, the extent and merit of these tests could be assessed varyingly according to different benchmarks.

It was assumed, as explained by Dinas and Stoker (2014) that the parallel design inherently resolved some major problems in social change analysis. Dinas and Stoker's guidelines to the difference-in-differences approach advised the iterative modeling of age and period effects to support robustness of findings. This study followed that period effects were difficult to model and not as relevant considering the gradual progression of the influences of interest, socioeconomic development, and globalization. On the other hand, age effects were included in certain models after backwards elimination confirmed their contribution to explaining the dependent variable (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). Age effects were mostly small. Explanatory powers in several models were considered weak. This was not of great concern with the first set of models since their goal was to observe extant trends and magnify trend differences in the observed data in an exploratory manner. Coefficient of determination scores for mixed-effect models generally fell between acceptable ranges. It was mentioned several times that confidence intervals in the visualizations for mixed models did not include residual variances. Residual variance refers to the variance left unexplained by the model fit which is expectedly large in social sciences (Cohen, 2013; Funder & Ozer, 2019; Gignac & Szodorai, 2016; Richard et al., 2003). Inclusion of residual variances in most models greatly enlarged confidence intervals and completely flattened trends in some cases. Schielzeth et al. (2020) have explained residual variance in mixed models as a cascade effect where random variation that is unmodelled trickle down throughout the nest hierarchy. Consequently, unmodelled effects in the higher-levels accumulate in the lower-levels, and unmodelled lower-level and cross-level variances are reflected in residual variance. However, their analyses showed that mixed effect models are considerably robust even when distribution

assumptions are heavily violated. Furthermore, the emphasis of the study was comparison of estimations rather than estimations for specific values, alleviating some of the concerns related with estimation reliability. Nevertheless, the imperfect analysis design and data collection did not permit making conclusive statements based on the findings.

Further research may hopefully produce more robust conclusions. A significant improvement would be to collect original data designed specifically to address the research questions, entailing continuous variables with high granularity. This study relied on composite constructs and suboptimal operationalization for certain variables, which may have influenced results. Further research may also examine broader scopes of value orientations, societal influences and geographies. Another research design could feature different categories of treated and untreated groups corresponding to nationality, ethnicity gender and more. Further research may pay closer attention to the specific mechanisms of internet control and whether there is a direct connection between the degree of control and the development of critical perceptions and democratic values. Novel approaches could also identify additional variables with significant influence on social change as well as additional variables strongly influenced by societal factors. Finally, in-depth comprehensive analyses could potentially determine the actual extent of social change inhibition caused by contextual factors with statistical confidence.

4.2. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS & CLOSING STATEMENT

This study mainly discussed China's sociopolitical environment leading up to the 21st century. The literature on social change and cohort effects point to age 18 as a significant moment for political socialization, making the experience of today's adolescents the prime interest of analysis. The effects of the early 21st century sociopolitical environment of China will only be fully understood in the future. Still, the recent direction signals renewed approaches to legitimation which compel contemplation (Johnson, 2021). As discussed, many were concerned with the increasing nationalist tones in official rhetoric of the post-1989 Chinese landscape. More recent assessments demonstrate a sustained emphasis on patriotism among other things. Jinping's speech (Xinhua, 2021) at the ceremony marking the centenary of the CCP, thoroughly captures the legitimation strategy that the party intends to pursue into the future.

In beginning his address, Jinping declared the fulfillment of the party's centenary goal: eradication of absolute poverty in China. This accomplishment was credited to the efforts of the party and the entire Chinese nation. China's humiliation history was detailed, with references to the unequal treaties and capitulations, which tied into the CCP's leadership in leading the people towards national rejuvenation, the party's greatest mission and aspiration. The Chinese course of modernization was referenced several times as a model for human advancement. It was stated that the party has continuously developed socialism with Chinese characteristics, exemplified in successive reforms and China's opening up. Thanks to these advancements, the once isolated and underdeveloped Chinese economy was now a globally integrated socialist market economy, and the second largest economy in the world. While other cultures were welcomed to share constructive criticism, "preaching" was resolutely rejected, adding that China would not allow interference in its progress. This was followed by a call for an accelerated modernization of China's national defense and armed forces. Jinping also stressed China's past and future commitment to peace and disgrace for hegemony and expressed its interest in technical and economic cooperation in the name of mutual benefit and peaceful development. It was maintained that China would advocate the universal values such as peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy and freedom, while also expressing renewed commitment to the One China principle and complete reunification with Taiwan, calling compatriots on both sides of the strait to come together against "Taiwan independence". It was reiterated that China's commitment to national sovereignty and territorial integrity was not to be questioned. The party's remarkable adaptability was frequently underlined, expressing its commitment to serving the interests of all people, and not any special group. Efforts to keep corruption at bay through continuous party building were highlighted, entailing intraparty regulation, self-reform, self-governance and self-supervision. State officials were called on for moral integrity and vigilance against corruption.

The speech explicitly stated that the CCP's authority must be upheld, as China's future depends on it. It was pointed out that China's ongoing national rejuvenation would not have been possible if not for the party's leadership. Jinping invited everyone to consider the big-picture and stressed the importance of political homogeneity and alignment with the party's ideology. It was cautioned that attempts to divide the party

from the people would be resolutely countered. Chinese people, at home and abroad, were called to unite in patriotism. Adding that young people in particular, should partake in China's national rejuvenation and confidently, proudly, and assuredly identify as Chinese to fulfill the expectations of the party and the nation.

The intensified "Chinese Dream" narrative, was meant to reconcile emerging political differences with the party's rule (Hizi, 2019). As Chinese society is exposed to global influence, individualist norms meet increasing resonance. Through public media and education, state institutions have deliberated a narrative in which the pursuit of individual self-realization is intertwined with patriotic devotion to socialist modernization. Along with the Chinese Dream, the regime has increasingly based its legitimacy on its outstanding performance in phasing out wide-spread poverty and corruption. In addition, the national humiliation history has been perpetuated to mobilize regime support against external threats posed to Chinese autonomy, and display dissidence as traitorous (Darr, 2011; Han, 2021; Kim & Cao, 2021; J. Wang, 2017).

Under this formulation, political dissidence undermines the collective benefit of the people and cannot be tolerated. Allegiance to the party and the nation, serves the interests of all, including the self. The oppression and suffering imposed by foreign powers in the past, reinforce the urgency of these responsibilities for Chinese patriots of all ages around the world. These sentiments powerfully echo the spirit of the Patriotic Education Campaign. Generations of Chinese are coming of age in a sociopolitical context marked by these narratives, and an increasingly interconnected and modernized society. It will be revealed in the future to what degree ongoing political socialization is being effectively internalized by young citizens, and what this will mean for China and the regime. Many analyses, including the present study, have concluded that the CCP's legitimation strategies in recent history have been successful. Provided that economic growth is sustained, and the CCP continues to deliver on its promises, an emboldened patriotic discourse may continue to be a valuable component of the multifaceted legitimation strategy of the CCP. Although, even with increasing sophistication, efforts to contain social change may be overwhelmed by the growing intensity of modernization and globalization in China.

As a closing statement, I would like to share an excerpt from the 1994 Action Plan for Patriotic Education, translated by Ming Qiang and Gregory P. Fairbrother (2006). The 4th essential principle of patriotic education states:

Patriotic education must adhere to the principle of opening to the world. Patriotism is definitely not narrow nationalism. We must not only carry on and develop China's excellent achievements; we must also learn from and absorb all the civilized achievements of each of the world's nations, including developed capitalist nations. Only in this way can the people of China become able to contribute to promoting world peace and world progress.



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