

To Nil and Aras



YANKEE LEVANTINE: DAVID OFFLEY AND OTTOMAN – AMERICAN
RELATIONS IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

YANKEE LEVANTINE: DAVID OFFLEY AND OTTOMAN – AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

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This study focuses on the role of David Offley who settled in Smyrna and opened the first American trade house in 1811 which lead to the establishment of economic, diplomatic, social and cultural relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire. Through his own personal efforts, he made an arrangement with Ottoman office holders, which put Americans almost at the level of the most favored nations and established the groundwork for the first formal treaty between the United States and the Ottoman Empire, concluded and ratified in 1831. During this period a small American Levantine community was established in Smyrna, Turkey opium became an important trade item in American trade to China and diplomacy between the US and Ottoman State entered its infant stages.

Keywords: American Levantine, David Offley, Opium, Ottoman-American Relations, Treaty of Amity and Commerce.

ÖZET

YANKEE LEVANTEN: DAVID OFFLEY VE ONDOKUZUNCU YÜZYILIN İLK YARISINDA OSMANLI – AMERİKAN İLİŞKİLERİ

Avcı, Ayşegül

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Bu çalışma 1811 yılında İzmir’e yerleşen ve ilk Amerikan ticaret evini açan David Offley’nin Osmanlı Devleti ile Amerika arasında ekonomik, diplomatik, sosyal ve kültürel ilişkilerin kurulmasındaki rolünü ele almaktadır. Kişisel çabaları sonucu Osmanlı yetkilileriyle bir anlaşmaya varmış ve bu anlaşmaya göre Amerikalılar neredeyse en çok gözetilen ulus statüsündeki ülkeler ile aynı seviyeye erişmişlerdir. Bu sözlü anlaşma 1831 yılında yürürlüğüne girecek olan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile Osmanlı İmparatorluğu arasındaki ilk resmi anlaşmanın temelini oluşturmuştur. Bu tarihe kadar İzmir’de küçük çaplı bir Amerikan Levanten toplumu oluşmuş, Türkiye afyonu Amerika’nın Çin’e ticaretinde önemli bir ürün haline gelmiş ve her iki ülke birbiri hakkında diplomatik çerçevede bir algı oluşturmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Afyon, Amerikan Levanten, David Offley, Dostluk ve Ticaret Anlaşması, Osmanlı-Amerika İlişkileri.

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I dedicate this thesis to all of you and it is also dedicated to the memory of Ayşegül Keskin Çolak, who passed away during the course of this project, and to the memory of my grandfather İlhan Sözgen.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BFP	Barton Family Papers
BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
BSP	Benjamin Shreve Papers
C.HR.	Cevdet Hariciye
CFP	Chever Family Papers
DFP	Derby Family Papers
EIC	East India Company
HAT	Hatt-ı Hümayun
JDC	Jacques Downs Collection
JHAP	John Hancock Andrews Papers
M23	State Department Consular Despatches Algiers Series
M 28	Notes from Foreign Consuls in the United States to the Department of State, 1789-1906
M 43	Despatches from United States Ministers to Portugal
M 46	Despatches from United States Ministers to Turkey
M 77	Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801- 1906
M 125	Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy
M 179	Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State

M 687	Letters of Application and Recommendation during the Administrations of Martin Van Buren, William Henry Harrison, and John Tyler, 1837-1845
M 873	Letters of Application and Recommendation during the Administrations of James Polk, Zachary Taylor, and Millard Fillmore, 1845-1853
M 967	Letters of Application and Recommendation during the Administrations of Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan, 1853-1861
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
OFP	Offley Family Papers
PFP	Phillips Family Papers
RFP	Rodgers Family Papers
SGP	Stephen Girard Papers
T 194	Despatches from United States Consuls in Constantinople, 1820-1906
T 238	Despatches from United States Consuls in Smyrna, 1802-1906
TPP	Timothy Pickering Papers
WFP	Willings and Francis Papers
WLP	William Law Papers

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION



We had many old souvenirs of the Offleys here – colored photographs of the Offleys and Pauldings on mirrors and some miniatures also. We also had the permit (firman) the first Offley (**David Offley**) had to stay out here, all of parchment and signed in gold letters ... Among the old souvenirs we lost was a big gilt clock with a statuette of Washington standing on a pedestal and a gilt banner with tassels underneath and with the words “Washington, First in War, First in Peace, First in the hearts of his Countrymen” ... We also had a quaint sort of perpetual motion (machine) grandpa **Edward Stephen Offley** brought back from Trieste ... The big Offley house in the town of Izmir where grand-papa’s sisters lived had many portraits of the old Offleys and I remember well big old portraits in the dining room and hall where we use to go with mother and **Aunt Mary** to see **Aunt Louise**, grand-papa’s sister, but unfortunately, house and all were burned in the fire (in) 1922 ... you would have seen ... old Lahore shawls in splendid condition belonging to great-grandfather Offley and also my grandfather’s uniform which we kept wrapped in tissue paper, and his sword ... If I remember well, we had a small portrait of great-grandmother **Helena Curtovich**...¹

There was an organic bond between the activities of merchants and diplomatic relations, especially in the first years of the United States of America. Diplomatic missions followed the path opened by merchants, while the latter integrated into the daily, commercial and political life of the hosting country. In the case of the first

¹ From a letter written in 1946 by Mrs. Wilfred B. Wilkin, daughter of Helen Offley and David Gout, to a Mrs. McDonald Douglass in John Brockenbrough Offley, ed., *Diary of John Holmes Offley* (Williamsburg, Virginia: Privately Printed, 1993), 112-13.

Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed between the Sublime Porte and the United States, the American administration was slow to follow the merchants. The Ottoman government also abstained from concluding a treaty immediately. There are several reasons behind American inaction and Ottoman reluctance: disturbances in the Mediterranean and Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that diverted the attention of both countries; Anglophobia in the US and the Ottoman reluctance to provoke Britain; the American public interest in the Greek Revolution; and the costs of treaty which included the customary presents that the US had to give to Ottoman office holders, were all influential and openly expressed reasons for not concluding a treaty in the documents of both countries.² However, the most important reason was David Offley's personal arrangement with the Ottoman authorities, which gave the American merchants almost all the privileges that nations with a treaty had enjoyed. In the few years following his arrival at Smyrna, Offley negotiated with members of the *Divan* and procured essential privileges from the Porte, by spending out of his own pocket, without any government support. He obtained the right to trade in Smyrna on the basis of approximately 3 % duty, instead of 6 %, which put US merchants almost at the same level of the most favored nations. He also managed to free American vessels from having to maintain business under British protection, thus relieving them from consulage and dragomanage payments.

Offley's experience was also unusual in the Ottoman context. Foreign countries without a treaty had to seek protection from another country with a treaty, and thus negotiate with the Porte through the mediation of a friendly foreign power. Instead Offley travelled to Constantinople by himself, negotiated alone with the Ottoman

² Especially in the documents reserved in NARA, the attitude of the American government towards the Porte is revealed; and the Ottoman documents can be found in BOA. The detailed accounts will be given in the following chapters.

office holders, and successfully concluded an arrangement. Being in a state of conflict and weakness, the Ottoman authorities welcomed Offley's agility. Since Offley's arrangement was highly favorable to the American merchants, the American government itself did not need to push an official treaty with the Porte. The only concessions the Americans did not have were the right to sail in the Black Sea and the status of most favored nation, which would be the main items argued extensively during the negotiations in 1828 and in 1829. Therefore, while Offley's oral and temporary arrangement substituted and laid the groundwork for a formal treaty, the US government, however, could delay taking definitive steps towards signing a treaty with the Ottoman Empire, considering the state of European relations, the domestic conflicts of the Ottoman Empire and financial burden of the treaty for the US.

The second argument of this dissertation is that the Americans, in their approach to the Ottoman Empire, were so influenced from their experiences with Great Britain and the Barbary States that while their prejudices against the former led them to believe, without questioning, the alleged intrigues of the British to interrupt their negotiations with the Porte, their prejudices against the "Turk" prevented them from understanding the real motives behind the acts of Ottoman office holders. American representatives accused Ottoman authorities of pursuing their own interests, especially in the case of presents ignoring the centuries-old traditions, and they disregarded the Ottoman insistence of gaining financial advantages instead of strict reciprocity during the negotiations. These prejudices were also widespread in the American public, who formed a parallel between the troubles of American captives in the hands of Barbary "Turks" and the cruelty of Ottoman Turks over the Christian Greeks.

American representatives who came to the Ottoman Empire carried their prejudices with them. Although, Anglophobia remained stronger, prejudices against the Turks lessened during the process of diplomatic and personal encounters. However, it took many years until the American government realized the importance of training informed diplomats in Eastern languages, as well as on the traditions and functionings of Eastern governments. In a period when the actions of diplomatic and commercial characters were intermingled, the role of David Offley in the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations drew some important lines. His letters and his narratives of the events had an influence in shaping the US government's approach to the Porte. The other representatives sent by the US, and the Ottoman office holders who met them, were also important in the final negotiations and the ratification of the treaty. These rising commercial relations, especially concerning the trade of Turkey opium, included American merchants who maintained business of this article, into the process of establishing diplomatic relations. "Perhaps no other single agricultural product affected the relations between nations during the nineteenth century as drastically as did the opium poppy, *papaver somniferum*," which "planted the seed of commercial and diplomatic relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire."³ This dissertation shows these ties, starting from the first American encounters with the Barbary States until the ratification of the first Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and the Ottoman Empire, with an emphasis on David Offley.

David Offley was born in Philadelphia on September 8, 1779 to Daniel Offley and Judith Scull. Twenty years later he volunteered when the war with France was approaching and enrolled as a 1st Lieutenant and Regimental Quartermaster in the 10th

³ Turgay Üner, "The 19th-Century Golden Triangle: Chinese Consumption, Ottoman Production and the American Connection, II," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 3 (Winter 1984-85): 105.

U.S. Infantry. His wedding ceremony took place at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania on March 31st, 1800. Following his marriage to Mary Ann Greer, he resigned his commission on April 15th and began working as a merchant. One of his first voyages was to Smyrna on the ship *Glory* on February 23, 1806. Seeing the commercial advantages Smyrna offered, David Offley decided to settle there. In 1811 he set foot with a cargo of merchandise; he was the first and only American resident merchant in western Anatolia.⁴ He established the firm of Woodmass & Offley that same year, and being the only American trade house in Smyrna, in a few years, he quickly drummed up some business.⁵ What brought David Offley to Smyrna, however, goes back to the American Independence, which resulted in American merchants being left unguarded in the open seas, having lost the privileges of sailing under the protection of the British flag.

The first contact between the two countries was through the Barbary States. Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli were under the domain of the Ottoman Empire but they were powerful and distant enough to maintain a relatively autonomous administration. On the coast of North Africa, the Barbary States were terrorizing the Mediterranean trade by attacking and seizing merchant vessels. European countries either had to pay

⁴ He is referred as the “first and only” American resident merchant in Smyrna in several works and also by himself in his letters to the State Department and to his sister. However Pliny Fisk noted his visit to a Mr. Perkins in Smyrna in his diary under the date January 18, 1820. “There are two merchants here by this name, who are brothers, from Boston; one however had lived here about twenty years, and the other a longer time.” in Alvan Bond, ed., *Memoir of the Rev. Pliny Fisk, A.M.: Late Missionary to Palestine* (Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1828), 109. Thomas H. Perkins also mentioned Messrs. Perkins in Smyrna in one of his letters, but does not specify on how long they had been living in that city. Perkins to Capt. Sam. Connant, April 15, 1817, in James Elliot Cabot, ed., “Extracts from Letter Books of J & T. H. Perkins et al. 1786-1838,” (Unpublished Manuscript), 250-251. Samuel Elliot Morison wrote one of these two was William Lee Perkins who settled in Smyrna during the Revolution in “Forcing the Dardanelles in 1810: With Some Account of the Early Levant Trade of Massachusetts,” *The New England Quarterly*, 1 (April 1928): 209. On the other hand Timothy Roberts identified him as George Perkins in “Commercial Philanthropy: American Missionaries and the American Opium Trade in Izmir during the First Part of the Nineteenth Century,” *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 19 (2010): 373.

⁵ Brockenbrough Offley, *Diary*, 107; *Dictionary of American Biography*, s.v. “David Offley.”

ransoms for captives or pay tributes to the Barbary States in order to prevent attacks. Although great European powers that could defeat the pirates, England and France preferred to pay them tribute to keep the Mediterranean trade free from competition.⁶ When the American ships lost the protection of the British navy and the benefits of the commercial agreements, the Barbary nations realized the new flag paid no tribute to them and began to harass American ships. They captured and enslaved their vessels and crews in order to force the US to sign an agreement. The captivity narratives written by these crews hold a great place in American literature.⁷ In May 1784 Congress authorized John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson to deal with the Barbary powers and they commissioned representatives for each state. The American government signed treaties with Algiers in 1795, with Tripoli in 1796 and with Tunis in 1797.

During the negotiations, the Barbary States claimed that a treaty with the Ottoman Porte was required prior to signing treaties with these States. Upon this, the American government began to collect information from its representatives there and from the European countries that had experience with the Porte. The response of the American government to the information it gathered will be discussed in the next chapter, but it clear that the first perception of the American government about the Ottoman Empire was formed by these inquiries and through the American captives held in the Barbary States.

⁶ Eugene Schuyler, *American Diplomacy and the Furtherance of Commerce* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895), 194-95; Gardner W. Allen, *Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs* (New Jersey: The Scholar's Bookshelf, 2005), 26-27.

⁷ Cansu Özge Özmen, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika üzerine 19. Yüzyılda Yazılan Amerikan Seyahatnameleri," *Doğu Batı: Osmanlılar IV* 54 (Ağustos, Eylül, Ekim 2010): 193-94. This article includes a comprehensive bibliography of the American travel narratives related to Ottoman Empire.

Neither the Americans nor the Ottomans knew much about each other when the first American vessels began to visit the port at Smyrna in the late eighteenth century, nor when the Sultan first laid eyes on the American flag in Constantinople in 1801. In 1800 Captain William Bainbridge was ordered to proceed to Algiers with the annual tribute that the US was bound to pay according to its agreement with that power. After the arrival of Bainbridge, the Dey of Algiers wanted him to carry his ambassador and some presents to Constantinople. Arguing that there was no agreement with the Ottoman Porte and his government, Bainbridge refused to go but under the threat of harming commercial relations with Algiers, and losing his crew and ship, he had to sail on October 19. The arrival of the *George Washington* created a sense of excitement since it was the first time that the Ottomans met with the Stars and Stripes. During his stay in Constantinople, Bainbridge met with Capudan Pasha,⁸ Küçük Hüseyin Paşa, who stepped on board the *George Washington* and put the American frigate under his protection. On December 23, Bainbridge and Capudan Pasha met again and in that meeting the latter expressed the desire of the Porte to negotiate a treaty, although it would take another thirty years to actually accomplish that. While the American government had approached the Barbary States with the goal of securing commercial treaties at a very early date, it abstained from immediately concluding one with the Sublime Porte immediately.

The main motive of the American government in pursuing a treaty with the Sublime Porte was to secure and promote commerce, which especially increased after the termination of the War of 1812. David Offley was also an essential figure in this increase, since he encouraged American merchants by extending the privileges he

⁸ The American sources use Capudan Pacha for Kapudan-ı Derya, Chief Admiral of the Ottoman Navy; Reis Effendi for Reisü'l Küttab, Minister for Foreign Relations; and Seraisker Pacha for Serasker, Head of the Armed Forces. In this work, these terms are used as referred by the Americans.

obtained to all of his countrymen. After only ten years following his arrival at Smyrna, three new American trade houses were opened in the city.⁹ Even after these establishments, Offley played a major role as an experienced and trustworthy agent in conducting American business in Smyrna. He earned the respect of the Ottomans and by setting a good example for his countrymen, he also took the lead in the formation of a small American Levantine community in Smyrna, which enabled a branch of the Offley family to maintain their lives in the city throughout the twentieth century.

Smyrna, the main Anatolian port in the Ottoman Empire, was once home to Levantines from almost all parts of the European commercial world. Generally called “Frenk,” these foreign merchants played an active role in the economic, social and political development of Smyrna. In the sixteenth century it grew as an important mercantile center in the Ottoman Empire, connecting inner Anatolia to the Mediterranean and European trades by Dutch, English and French merchants who searched for a new port in the eastern Mediterranean. Cotton, silk and mohair were the main commodities that Europeans were willing to buy at the end of the seventeenth century in addition to soap, sultanas, raisins, olives, olive oil, sesame seeds, jam, walnuts and almonds.¹⁰ Its geographical position, its proximity to Constantinople and relatively safer countryside, its natural bay, its link with the silk caravan route and the imperial policy of the seventeenth century that aimed “to make Smyrna the only port in western Anatolia with the international market,” carried the city to the middle of the eighteenth century as “the largest exporting site in the

⁹ “In 1816 the Perkins brothers and in 1821 Langdon & Company, both of Boston, joined Offley’s Izmir branch; in the late 1820s Issaverdes, Stith & Co. also started consigning goods to American ships calling at Izmir.” Üner, “19th-Century Golden Triangle: II,” 120.

¹⁰ Elena Frangakis-Syret, *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820)* (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1992), 24.

Ottoman Empire.”¹¹ In the eighteenth century goat wool, cotton yarn, and wool were among the principal exports of Smyrna while the lesser exports were wheat, safflower, wax, boxwood, yellow berries, gallnuts, hare skins, wine, figs, sponges, white mastic, opium, scammony, dried fruits, carpets and some manufactured cloth in addition to the ones mentioned above. The most valuable import of Smyrna was cloth of all qualities besides the secondary imports like coffee and sugar, indigo and cochineal, spices, pepper, hardware, porcelain and glassware and a variety of woods.¹² Increasing demand from Western European industries for raw materials in the middle of the eighteenth century turned their attention to Smyrna, too.¹³ Particularly France became the Ottoman Empire’s most important trading partner in the eighteenth century, and starting from the 1820s Britain gained the first place. The nineteenth century witnessed the competition between these two countries over the Eastern Mediterranean trade and the shift of power from France to Britain.¹⁴ Beginning from 1754, Smyrna’s annual exportation to Europe surpassed all the other ports in the Ottoman Empire.

The dominance of the foreign merchants in Smyrna’s trade was the result of the Ottoman’s policy of capitulations. The Ottoman government’s main policy was to keep the products inside the country, therefore it encouraged the importation of

¹¹ Ibid., 25-27.

¹² Ibid., 34.

¹³ Reşat Kasaba, “İzmir,” in *Doğu Akdeniz’de Liman Kentleri 1800-1914*, ed. Çağlar Keyder (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), 7. Kasaba also mentioned other reasons for the growth of the city: British rule over India increased the importance of Ottoman lands in order to keep contact with Asia; American War of Independence pushed Britain towards Ottoman Empire for its cotton production; French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars hindered its trade in the Near East which revealed an opportunity for the local merchants to fill the gap.

¹⁴ Durmuş Akalın and Cemil Çelik, “XIX. Yüzyılda Doğu Akdeniz’de İngiliz-Fransız Rekabeti ve Osmanlı Devleti,” *International Periodical for the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic*, 7 (Summer 2012): 21-45.

certain products and only if there was surplus, then the products could be exported. On the other hand, Europe followed mercantilist policies, which encouraged exportation and discouraged importation. Moreover mercantilist countries stipulated that foreign trade was to be conducted via their own shipping. Thus at first, Ottoman officials granted privileges to foreign ships and merchants in order to support trade. Since the Ottoman Empire did not have a merchant marine to maintain trade with foreign countries, European mercantilist policies were also in favor of the Ottoman commercial system. However, these capitulations were given in order to gain political allies in the following years, and sometimes the Ottoman Porte was forced by European nations to grant expansive rights under the name of capitulations. These capitulations gave the right to travel and do business within the Empire, to hoist their own flags on the ships, establish their own courts, and pay lesser custom duties. The transformation of the contents of capitulations from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century is explained in detail by Halil İnalcık who argued that one of the negative effects of enlarging the extent of capitulations was that the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire in particular, began to be appointed as translators by foreign consuls, which created a problem in the later period of Ottoman history.¹⁵

The geographical position of the city was a great advantage but it was constantly under the threat of earthquakes and fires, moreover being a trade center, the inhabitants were frequently attacked by plagues. Reşat Kasaba, emphasizing the cosmopolitan structure of Smyrna between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries, found that the ability to recover from natural disasters (fires, earthquakes), illnesses (1812-14 plague) and attacks of bandits as one of the most amazing sides to the development of the city. He wrote Smyrna could recover from these calamities

¹⁵ Halil İnalcık, “İmtiyazat,” vol. 22 of *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 245-252.

because it was a growing city on its way to becoming the major trade center in Eastern Mediterranean. He tells the story of Smyrna's growth through political, social and commercial relations between the city and European countries as well as central authority and other parts in the Empire.¹⁶

Due to its position as a commercial port of the Ottoman Empire, Smyrna was home for both Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman subjects as well as European merchants and their families, all of whom maintained separate living quarters.¹⁷ Although in the mid-seventeenth century European merchants and Smyrniots used to have better social relations, by the end of the eighteenth century the social contact lessened to include only protocol visits. Despite the distance between the Levantines and the Turks in Smyrna, it is possible to say that the Non-Muslim, Christian Ottoman subjects, mainly Greeks and Armenians, who played a role in gathering the local products from other parts of Anatolia for the foreign merchants, were closer to them.¹⁸ Aside from business contacts, Levantines also had better relations with the Greek Ottomans on personal basis. It was a frequent occurrence among the foreign merchants to marry Greek women from the end of the seventeenth century.¹⁹ In this respect, unlike Muslim Smyrniots, Levantines were closer to the Christian Ottomans both as business associates and social acquaintances. Carrying this cosmopolitan and active economic community to the nineteenth century, Smyrna kept its position as the leading port in Ottoman Empire's commerce with Europe and the Mediterranean

¹⁶ Kasaba, "İzmir."

¹⁷ Frangakis-Syret, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 36.

¹⁸ Kasaba, "İzmir," 10.

¹⁹ Frangakis-Syret, *Commerce of Smyrna*, 37; Rauf Beyru, *19. Yüzyılda İzmir'de Yaşam* (İstanbul: Literatür Yayınları, 2000), 22.

world, with a new visitor from the recently founded country, the United States of America, also known as “*Yeni Dünya*.”

Commerce between the US and the Ottoman Empire goes back to colonial times, but due to British regulations colonial ships did not visit Ottoman ports but received Ottoman items from British ports or ships. Smyrna figs, raisins and nuts were already famous in New England. The commercial pages of the colonial newspapers advertised products of Turkey as ready to sell in their stores.²⁰ After the Revolution, American merchants began to visit the ports, which previously had been restricted by Great Britain, including Smyrna. The British Consul in Smyrna, Francis Werry, wrote to the American Minister to London, Rufus King “the American flag was first known here in the year 1797.”²¹ Since that date several American ships entered Smyrna port, and soon opium became the leading product in this business due to its link to the American trade to China.

There are many layers in this study: the connection between the Turkey opium trade to China and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire; the formation and adaptation of the American Levantine community in Smyrna; the first impression of the Americans towards the Turks and the evolution of this image; and the Ottoman approach to the Americans in terms of naval power. The role of David Offley, his life and career, is put at the center of this study as the primary element that connects these layers and their interactions.

²⁰ *Boston Evening Post*, October 13, 1735; *Pennsylvania Journal*, July 28, 1748; *New-York Gazette, or Weekly Post-Boy*, February 15, 1768.

²¹ Francis Werry to Rufus King, Smyrna, May 2, 1803, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

1.1. Literature Survey

Much has been written by historians on Ottoman-American relations in the first half of the nineteenth century. Regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations, Walter L. Wright's dissertation written in 1928, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831" is the most comprehensive work. Beginning from American adventures in the Barbary States, the incident of the *George Washington*, and the several attempts of the US to establish formal relations with the Ottoman Empire, Wright gives a diplomatic account up to the ratification of the treaty. Through the extensive use of American archival sources, and the Public Record Office to some extent, in addition to dispatches of Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople, Wright's study offers a detailed analysis of the period. His dissertation has been widely used in this study, as well as in other works on this subject. However, he limits his study to the diplomatic relations, without supplying the Ottoman Empire's approach to the American representatives and commissions. He also only gives limited information about the volume of trade between the Ottoman Empire and the US, and Offley's life in Smyrna.²²

More recent studies do not add much to the historiography since the establishment of diplomatic relations is a minor part in their works. One of the most prominent historians Leland James Gordon covers a centennial of Ottoman-American relations after 1830, with an emphasis upon the affairs between the commercial interests and "good-will investments," mainly schools, hospitals, missionary and relief efforts. Touching upon diplomatic relations only in the introduction, he gives a brief account

²² Walter Livingston Wright, Jr, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1928).

of the developments, but the rest of his work deserves attention for historians studying the Ottoman Empire and the United States of America in a comparative perspective.²³

Another important work is given by Charles Oscar Paullin, who evaluates the role of the naval officers in American diplomatic interests. The book covers a large geography from Japan, Korea and China to the Barbary States. In the fifth chapter titled “The First American Treaty with Turkey, 1784-1832” Paullin handles how the US government approached the Ottoman Empire through the naval officers, some of whom commanded the Mediterranean Squadron for the protection of American commercial interests in the region. An invaluable source for this dissertation, the author reveals the importance of naval officers in American diplomatic missions in the first years of its establishment. Another contribution of this book concerns American negotiations with the Barbary States, which also had an essential influence on American attitude towards the Ottoman Empire.²⁴ Thomas A. Bryson shares Paullin’s perspective in his study dealing with American diplomatic relations with Mediterranean countries, mainly the Barbary States, but he also includes the Ottoman Empire, especially the American navy’s role during the Greek Revolution and the subsequent negotiation process.²⁵ However, due to its scope, the book leaves out the role of civilians and merchants in concluding a treaty, the much-discussed influence of European interference, or the stance of Americans in the Ottoman Empire.

²³ Leland James Gordon, *American Relations with Turkey 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932). Another work by Gordon which focuses on Turkish-American relations is “Turkish-American Treaty Relations,” *The American Political Science Review*, 22 (1928): 711-721. In this work he points out some of the conflicts after the treaty, and the differences between the first and the second treaty, which was signed in 1862.

²⁴ Charles Oscar Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers 1778-1883* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1912).

²⁵ Thomas A. Bryson, *American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784-1975: A Survey* (New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1977); *Tars, Turks, and Tankers: The Role of the United States Navy in the Middle East, 1800-1979* (New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1980).

James A. Field approaches the subject from a different angle and studies the influence of American relations with the Mediterranean world on American foreign policy in general. He studies missionaries, the opportunities created by merchants, and the role of the American navy in the relations with the Barbary States, its role in protecting American commerce in the Mediterranean, and in negotiations with the Porte, etc. While bringing all of these aspects together, the author focuses on the intellectual background of American foreign policy.²⁶

Besides these prominent works, studies, which deal with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and the Ottoman Empire, only offer a shallow argument on whether it was the American government that pursued an agreement with the Ottomans or whether it was the Ottoman Empire, which itself desired a treaty. Furthermore, these works reflect primarily the Ottoman perspective in the negotiations and through a limited use of archival sources.²⁷

For the more comprehensive works written about the Ottoman-American relations, Çağrı Erhan is an important figure. He is one of the prominent names in Turkey in

²⁶ James A. Field, *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969). He offers a more compact analysis in his article where he argues American entanglement with the Mediterranean world was a result of foreign commerce. These commercial enterprises, however, introduced a new field of influence, which became more effective even after the commerce, which was thought so profitable, turned out to be limited and diminishing. This new field was, as Field himself wrote, the “public and private interest in the region” that created a contradictory approach to issues like the Greek War of Independence, the Armenian question, the establishment of the State of Israel, etc. See “Trade, Skills, and Sympathy: The First Century and a Half of Commerce with the Near East,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 401 (1972).

²⁷ Hamdi Atamer, “İlk Türk Amerikan Münasebetleri,” *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 2 (1967): 20-25; Çağrı Erhan, “1830 Osmanlı-Amerikan Antlaşması’nın Gizli Maddesi ve Sonuçları,” *Belleten* 62 (1998): 457-465; İhsan Ilgar, “169 Yıl Önce İstanbul’a Gelen İlk Amerikan Harp Gemisi,” *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası* 6 (1969): 4-8; İhsan Ilgar, “İlk Türk-Amerikan Ticaret Anlaşması,” *Hayat Tarih Mecmuası*, 9 (1969): 4-7; Orhan Koloğlu, “200 Yıllık İlişkilerin Resmi Olmayan Tarihi Türk’le Amerika’nın Tanışması,” *Tarih ve Toplum* 163 (1997): 17-25; Orhan F. Köprülü, “Tarihte Türk Amerikan Münasebetleri,” *Belleten* 51 (1987): 927-947; İsmail Köse, “Amerikan Arşiv Belgelerinde Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Başlaması, 1830 Tarihli Ticaret ve Seyrüsefayin Antlaşması,” *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 193 (2011): 145-188; Ercüment Kuran, “XIX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Türklerinin Amerika’ya Tanınması,” in *500. Yılında Amerika*, ed. Recep Ertürk et al. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları; 1994): 39-44; Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türk Amerikan Münasebetlerine Kısa Bir Bakış (1800- 1959)* (Ankara 1959).

this field and in his book *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri* he covers a large period time and issues.²⁸ He writes that three elements (missionaries, tradesmen, diplomats) fed one another. He deals with the first merchants who came to Ottoman Empire (first Barbary powers and then Anatolia), legal position of the Americans in Ottoman lands, the activities of the missionaries and their influence on the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, American diplomats and their efforts to increase the relations between the two countries, as well as European influence on these relations. In writing the book, Erhan uses British, American and Ottoman archives as well as published primary sources and a great deal of secondary sources. Being a detailed and comprehensive study his book should be read by anyone who aims to study Ottoman-American relations. However, Erhan analyzes the subject by focusing on their influence on the diplomatic relations only, putting aside the social and economic history.

A similar work is Nurdan Şafak's *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri*, which also deals with economic, diplomatic and philanthropic relations between the two countries.²⁹ Şafak only uses Ottoman sources in her work and sometimes her tone is critical towards American activities, especially the missionaries' in the Ottoman lands. In this work, the relations are also held from a diplomatic point of view. However, unlike Erhan, Şafak only makes an introduction to the subject.

David Offley opened an agency to regulate American merchants' business in Smyrna. As mentioned above, they traded many articles from Asia Minor, but opium held a different place when compared to other articles because of its connection to the China market. One of the most important names in this field is Charles Stelle who covers the

²⁸ Çağrı Erhan, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2001).

²⁹ Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri*, (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003).

period starting from the first adventures up to 1839 in two articles. By using the archival sources of many American merchant firms like Heard, Cushing, Perkins, William Law, etc., in addition to consular reports from Smyrna, Stelle draws a comprehensive record of American opium commerce to China with an emphasis upon Perkins' domination after 1820. His second article centers upon American relations with China and the influence of the Chinese government's regulations on the American merchants conducting opium trade.³⁰ Another name is Jacques M. Downs, who, like Stelle, covers the same period in his article. Written almost thirty years after Stelle, Downs uses his work extensively, and introduces new archival sources like Girard, Wilkocks and Willings & Francis, etc. In much the same way, Downs analyzes the growth of American trade and the changes in the smuggling system caused by the restrictions and procedures within China.³¹ Üner Turgay's articles in two parts are more ambitious when compared to Stelle's and Downs' works in terms of their scope. Turgay covers a lengthy period up to 1900s in dealing with American opium trade, including opium production in Asia Minor and transaction of the article into the hands of the American merchants. While his study is limited in terms of how American merchants did business in Smyrna, unlike Stelle and Downs, Turgay introduces the subject from a new perspective by using Turkish archival sources.³² While the works of these three esteemed historians are supplementary to each other

³⁰ Charles Stelle, "American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820," *Pacific Historical Review* 9 (1940); "American Trade in Opium to China, 1821-1839," *Pacific Historical Review* 10 (1941).

³¹ Jacques Downs, "American Merchants and the China Opium Trade, 1800-1840," *Business History Review* 42 (1968). Other works of Downs related to American opium trade are "Fair Game: Exploitative Role-Myths and the American Opium Trade," *Pacific Historical Review* 41 (1972); *The Golden Ghetto: The American Commercial Community at Canton and the Shaping of American China Policy, 1784-1844* (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1997).

³² A. Üner Turgay, "The 19th-Century Golden Triangle: Chinese Consumption, Ottoman Production and the American Connection, I," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 2 (1981-82); "19th-Century Golden Triangle: II," A similar work from Turgay is "Ottoman-American Trade During the Nineteenth Century," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları/Journal of Ottoman Studies* 3 (1982).

and make valuable contribution to this dissertation, they do not analyze the relationship between the trade and politics of the two countries and the social life in Smyrna.

Aside from works that directly deal with American opium trade, studies generally concerning the commerce of Smyrna also offer great contribution to the field as American commercial activities began to hold an essential place in the nineteenth century economic history of the city. A prominent name in this field is Elena Frangakis-Syrett, who determines the overall commercial development and changes in foreign dynamics, including the volume of materials brought by foreign merchants.³³ Also through his research of the Foreign Custom House records of Smyrna, Mesud Küçükkalay compares the volume of trade belonging to different countries and analyzes which commodities became a product of interest for these countries between the years 1818 and 1839. Unlike many historians who study the commercial identity of Smyrna, Küçükkalay includes the role of the American merchants in Smyrna's trade in his book.³⁴ Due to the years this book takes under examination, it is a valuable source for the scope of this dissertation in terms of specifically placing American trade within the overall trade in Smyrna. However, Küçükkalay limits his work to the import part of the trade process, excluding export relationships and as a consequence the opium networks in place in Smyrna.

Since opium was a very important product concerning American trade to China, historians analyzing American-Chinese trade relations often devote a substantial

³³ Elena Frangakis, "The Port of Smyrna in the Nineteenth Century," in *War and Society in the East Central Europe: Southeast European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies from the Mid-Eighteenth Century to 1914*, ed. Constantinos D. Svolopoulos et. al. (Colorado: Social Sciences Monographs, 1988); Frangakis-Syrett, *The Commerce of Smyrna*.

³⁴ A. Mesud Küçükkalay, *Osmanlı İthalatı: İzmir Gümrüğü 1818-1839* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007).

portion of their work to the opium trade. John Haddad, in a relatively recent study *America's First Adventure in China*, analyzes American trade to China as a space where American merchants benefitted from the experiences of the British merchants, yet ultimately followed a unique path on their own. More importantly, Haddad focuses on the company of Thomas Perkins and how he obtained dominance over the China trade. He also reveals the approach of Americans to opium smuggling by comparing those who opposed and those who supported smuggling. However, similar to other studies, which deal with the American opium trade to China, Haddad confines his study to China, and thus does not include the relations of American merchants with the Ottoman Empire, or the opium trade in Smyrna.³⁵

There are several works on the most famous American merchants like John Jacob Astor, Thomas Perkins and Stephen Girard who were engaged in opium trade with China, earning a great profit. Although these works cover a great range of subjects from their lives, families to business, a part of each study also focuses on the opium trade. While greatly detailed due to the specific nature of their topics, these studies do not contextualize their subject matters within the general scope of American commerce with Asia Minor or China. Rather they focus on the motives pushing these individuals into the Turkey market, their approaches to opium commerce and the commercial system these merchants and their firms constituted. By analyzing

³⁵ John R. Haddad, *America's First Adventure in China: Trade, Treaties, Opium, and Salvation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2013). Other sources that focus on the American commerce with China generally have the same approach. While important data can be gathered from these sources, they neglect the Ottoman field of the analysis. Especially several issues of *The American Neptune* contain valuable information on trade, as well as on the field of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Some of them are Rhys Richards ed., "United States Trade with China, 1784-1814," supplement, *The American Neptune* 54 (1994); E. Mowbray Tate, "American Merchant and Naval Contacts with China, 1784-1850," 31 (1971); George Green Shackelford, "George Wythe Randolph, Midshipman, United States Navy," 38 (1978); and James M. Merrill, "Midshipman DuPont and the Cruise of North Carolina, 1825-1827," 40 (1980).

individual motives and the mechanism in which they entered the general trade networks, from this perspective such works are invaluable.³⁶

Finally, David Finnie's *Pioneers East* is one of the most thorough analysis on the early American contact with the Middle East to date. Finnie gives the accounts of many, from travelers to missionaries, who spread throughout the entire Middle East. American negotiations with the Ottoman Empire and David Offley's role, and Henry Eckford's enterprise during the ratification of the treaty are well-written based on the National Archives, but Finnie's analysis is not limited to only telling the accounts of these pioneers. They were successful, Finnie argues, because they could adapt, they were able to combine their nationalistic character with the traditions and understanding of the area they chose as their new homes. Finnie chooses these pioneers as his subject matter because they were "essentially nonpolitical Americans;" missionaries, merchants, naval officers, tourists, etc... However, in a period when the line between political and commercial, missionary, exploratory activities were so thin, the author, inevitably, touched on the diplomatic relations.³⁷

The above-mentioned works all dealt with vital aspects of both diplomatic and commercial developments of the United States and the Middle East. This dissertation

³⁶ The response of Thomas H. Perkins to the discussions in America whether to assist the Greek revolutionaries officially is analyzed in relation to his opium business in Michael E. Chapman, "Pragmatic, ad hoc Foreign-Policy Making of the Early Republic: Thomas H. Perkins's Boston-Smyrna-Canton Opium Model and Congressional Rejection of Aid for Greek Independence," *The International History Review* 35 (2013); Carl Seaburg and Stanley Paterson, *Merchant Prince of Boston: Colonel Thomas H. Perkins, 1764-1854* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); John Denis Haeger, *John Jacob Astor: Business and Finance in the Early Republic* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991); Kenneth Wiggins Porter, *John Jacob Astor: Businessman* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966); Jonathan Goldstein, "Clash of civilizations in the Pearl River Delta: Stephen Girard's Trade with China 1787-1824," in *Americans and Macao: Trade, Smuggling, and Diplomacy on the South China Coast*, ed. Paul A. Van Dyke (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press; 2012); Jonathan Goldstein, *Stephen Girard's Trade with China 1787-1824: The Norms versus the Profits of Trade* (Portland, Maine: Merwin Asia, 2011).

³⁷ David H. Finnie, *Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967).

aims to fill the gaps left by these studies by focusing specifically on the development of American-Ottoman diplomatic and trade relations within the specific setting of Smyrna and David Offley. The introduction of Turkey opium to American merchants brought David Offley to Smyrna, and he immediately stepped into the diplomatic field. Offley himself deserves analysis as the embodiment of a nineteenth century American merchant, seeking his future in a foreign country. The examples of this kind are many, especially in China, where agents travelled there to run a business but whose goal was to return to their home countries wealthy. David Offley, too, wished the same when he first came arrived in Smyrna: to save up enough money for himself and his family, to be able to offer his sons a solid future. However, as the business flourished, he felt he could not entrust it to another person and as he built a family in Smyrna, he could not turn back and resume his former life in Philadelphia. He integrated into society in Smyrna, learned Ottoman traditions, became an American Consul assuming the mixed character of an American Smyrniot Levantine. In tandem with his personal experiences, David Offley assisted other American merchants not only through his agency, but also by extending the trade concessions he procured from the Ottoman government. By making Turkey trade more profitable to his countrymen, Offley increased his commission, but he also welcomed other Americans who followed his path, rather than forming a trade monopoly in Smyrna. Finally, Offley served the US government through his contacts in Ottoman government circles. He represented the American people respectfully and eased the way toward negotiations, and with the notes he took, he actually kept the record of American commercial activities in the early years, which would be incomplete without him and his efforts. This dissertation offers the most extensive analysis on David Offley to date. It uses personal letters written to his sister in Philadelphia alongside consular

reports, which are generally used in other secondary works. Moreover, while acknowledging his influence on the diplomatic, commercial, social and cultural grounds, this dissertation argues that Offley's arrangement with Ottoman authorities was a foundation or precursory act of the later formal treaty. Although Offley many time encouraged and advised for a formal treaty, his arrangement nevertheless allowed for the American government to postpone formal agreements with the Ottomans until a time when conditions became more favorable and suitable to pursue its own interests. As mentioned before, since American merchants were able to maintain commercial relations in Smyrna at a level relatively equal to those considered the most favored nations, the American government prioritized other matters rather than pursuing an official commercial treaty.

Furthermore, this study analyzes the travel of Turkey opium to China and the East Indies. There is much written concerning American trade with China as opium was one of its key products. As Indian opium was forbidden to American merchants, Turkey opium filled the vacuum left by this inaccessibility. Finally, many of these studies also analyze the effect of Chinese regulations on American smuggling operations. However, this dissertation will focus particularly on the Turkey opium network, which was not limited to Smyrna, but also connected several European and Mediterranean ports as well. By studying the individual archives of prominent American merchants who dealt with Turkey opium, this work aims to bring forward the breadth of this business. The opium trade network, was thus not only limited to the ports from which it was purchased but also to regions where it was sold, China and the East Indies. Generally, historians do not focus on American trade into the East Indies as it never reached to the same heights as trade with China, particularly since

the East Indies functioned as a supplementary market to China.³⁸ However, this dissertation will show that, at times the East Indies offered a much safer and more profitable, market than China, especially after 1820s when Thomas Handasyd Perkins dominated the Turkey opium trade to China.

Finally, this study goes back to the roots of the negative image of the “Turk.” The American experience in the Barbary States was traumatic. The resultant captivity narratives defined the population in the Barbary States under the general term of “Turk” or “Muslim,” both of which corresponded to each other. In this way, a prejudiced impression was created in the United States, not only in public but also in diplomatic and military fields. One of the most intense examples can be seen throughout the texts written during the Greek Revolution, condemning the Muslim Turks by giving the most brutal and bloody accounts of their acts. Outside of the Greek Revolution, however, Americans depicted a much different “Turk.” This dissertation examines the evaluation of this negative image by analyzing the travel narratives and letters written during the early nineteenth century. While Offley’s arrangement enabled the Americans to adjust to life in Smyrna, their contact with the native population increased. Authors either openly or subversively criticized themselves for their prejudices. Most important, however, what many of them had in common was that following their surprise, they developed a more objective approach to the Ottoman people, their traditions and office holders.

³⁸ The region referred as East Indies was the Dutch colony between the years 1800 and 1949, today’s Indonesia. Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, was named Batavia during the colonial period.

1.2. Outline

The following chapter examines the American experiences in the Barbary States right after the American Revolution and the initial creation of the “Turk.” The captivity narratives produced in this period, compose an essential aspect of how American readers created a negative image of both the British and the Turk. While the US government initially followed a passive policy and did not actively seek out to sign treaties with or pay tribute to the Barbary States, merchants continually lost valuable cargo in the meantime. The negotiations with the Barbary States, in fact, brought up the question of signing a treaty with the Ottoman Empire as these states were still formally under the rule of the Ottoman Sultan. Therefore, this chapter also introduces the first formal encounter of Ottoman office holders, including the Sultan, with Americans, as Captain Bainbridge was forced to travel to Constantinople by the Dey of Algiers.

While the American government was considering the necessity of signing an agreement with the Porte, American Minister to London, Rufus King, sent letters to the State Department encouraging his own government to approach the Porte, as he believed the Ottoman domains could offer great profit for American merchants. The US government made use of King’s suggestions and contacted Ottoman representatives in London. The US government considered sending William Loughton Smith to Constantinople to pursue a treaty but due to the unstable political climate in Europe, the government stepped back to wait a more opportune moment. Not long after, however, William Stewart was appointed as the first American Consul to Smyrna, yet without a formal treaty, the Porte refused to recognize him. While America’s first diplomatic attempts failed, commerce took a new turn, as American

merchants discovered Smyrna opium. The third chapter evaluates the first period of diplomatic and commercial contacts between the two countries, while also introducing the importance of opium for American trade with China.

The fourth chapter starts with the *Calumet* and *America* event, two American merchant vessels, which passed the Dardanelles without permits. Since these two vessels hoisted American flags, the Ottoman authorities in Constantinople became aware of the existence of American commerce under the British flag, and brought upon a new regulation to force them to pay a 6 % duty. However, the Americans thought that it was the British who pushed for this increase. In addition to examining the two differing opinions on the interference of the British, this chapter also introduces David Offley, who arrives on the scene only one year after the *Calumet* and *America* event. Considering it was dishonorable to pay the British and to use a British flag, Offley managed to obtain concessions from the Ottoman Porte which let American merchants trade under their own flag, pay much less than 6 % and only a small amount higher than those countries with formal treaties. Moreover, he was able to befriend high Ottoman authorities like the Capudan Pacha and the Governor of Smyrna. Thus, this chapter explains David Offley's role in the diplomatic field.

As the previous chapter ends with the Treaty of Ghent, the fifth chapter focuses on the development of the American opium trade with China and the East Indies between 1815 and 1830. As American merchants witnessed the profits gained by opium, more entered into the business after peace was established with Great Britain. Opium trade was not limited to Smyrna and American merchants built a wide web which included other Mediterranean ports, such as Gibraltar and Malta, as well as European ports, such as Amsterdam and London which allowed them to purchase as much opium as

they could obtain. However, in Asia Minor, the production of opium was limited, thus there was competition among the American merchants. This rivalry decreased due to the domination of Boston merchants who were able to turn the misfortunes and regulations in China into profit by increasing their role in the opium business. After 1820 Thomas Handasyd Perkins and Boston Group created a monopoly in Turkey opium trade to China, while trade to the East Indies kept its secondary place. The influence of merchants and increase in trade will be discussed in the following chapters. This chapter also reflects David Offley as the primary commercial agent in Smyrna, dealing with the opium business.

The focus of the sixth chapter is the American Levantine community in Smyrna. Although there are not many sources describing the daily lives of Americans in Smyrna, both travel accounts and David Offley's letters allow for a more comprehensive picture to emerge. In his letters to his sister, he is depicted as a family man concerned about the future of his children. Thus family values and anxieties can be reached through these previously unexamined sources. Furthermore, this chapter will also analyze these sources in order to understand American prejudice against the Turks, which reached a climax during the Greek Revolution in regards to its negativity. In a period when Turcophobia was common among the American public, Offley and other Americans who visited or lived in the Ottoman lands, drew a different image than what had been narrated since American encounters with the Barbary States in the late eighteenth century. However, the narratives of Americans who had experienced day-to-day life in the Ottoman domains, and had daily contact with Ottoman people, did not wipe out the settled prejudices against the "Turk." One of the goals of this study is to explain the differences between the two opposing images of the "Turk," and their development by focusing on the texts written in the

first half of the nineteenth century. This chapter will also analyze the influence of merchants over American foreign-policy makers, by exploring the discussions concerning whether to assist in the Greek uprising or not. This period also witnessed the first years of the activities of American missionaries, who had close relations with the Levantine society of Smyrna, and the American merchants who dealt there with opium.

The seventh chapter analyzes the diplomatic attempts of the American government starting from Luther Bradish's mission in 1820. Although Luther Bradish, who was sent as a secret agent to obtain information on the Ottoman disposition towards the US, and his mission were interrupted, it directly led to Commodore Rodger's mission. Since the Greek Revolution required the Mediterranean Squadron to convoy merchant vessels, following the information obtained by Bradish, the American government benefitted from the existence of naval officers in the Mediterranean to make contact with the Capudan Pacha to explore the means of concluding a treaty with the Porte. However these missions were not conclusive since the government did not authorize the representatives to sign a treaty. Only in 1827 did the American government furnish David Offley with full powers to negotiate with the Ottoman Porte, with specific instructions to place the US on the same footing as the other European nations and to obtain the right to sail in and out of the Black Sea. However, when the Ottoman authorities insisted upon reciprocity, the negotiations could not be finalized until another representative from the US was sent to Constantinople. Thus, Charles Rhind gave the Ottoman authorities what they had been seeking with a separate and secret article. Both the Ottomans and Americans had different views about reciprocity and while the Americans thought it should mean complete equality, the Ottomans believed it should give certain advantages to both countries. According to the secret

article, the Ottomans would be able to order sufficient quantity of timber to build war vessels, or order them to be built in US shipyards by American engineers and workers at the same price that would cost the US government, and at the same quality that would be built for the US government. The secret article was clearly advantageous to the Ottomans and shows how they believed reciprocity should function. This chapter focuses on the negotiation process by including the Ottoman perception, and the following discussions about the secret article, which was ultimately rejected by the Senate.

The final chapter offers an analytical approach to the people and events explained in the previous chapters. The role of David Offley as a commercial and diplomatic agent is examined in relation to the development of both commercial relations within the American economy and the general development of diplomatic relations. Finally, through the lens of David Offley, social life in Smyrna, including the interaction between the merchants and missionaries will also be discussed.

1.3. Sources

The primary sources gathered from American archives and libraries can be categorized as diplomatic, commercial and social although in most cases, they overlap most of the time. Therefore the sources are classified under the archives and libraries. Most of the official documents are collected from the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington DC and College Park, Maryland. “Captain’s Letters” within the Record Group 45 contains letters and reports from captains written to the Secretary of the Navy. These letters contain important data on the missions sent to the

Ottoman Empire in order to gather information or sign a treaty. They also include general information about both the internal and international relations of the Ottoman Empire. The process of signing an agreement between the US and the Ottoman Empire and the period of the Greek Revolution are of interest. The years covering the Greek Revolution are especially essential in terms of understanding the American public's attitude towards the "Turks." Although the letters from this period mention the harmful effects of Greek pirates on American commerce, both the public and the government were sympathetic to the Greek revolutionaries. The American public's support of the Greek cause created a minor conflict in Ottoman-American relations but officially, the government did not support the Greek War of Independence. American merchants who had business in Smyrna also abstained from supporting the rebellion.

The documents in "Letters of Application and Recommendation" in RG 59 deal with the consular appointments. Through these letters, it is possible to reflect the standing of David Offley among other American merchants as well as to form a view of the small American community in, and doing business with, Smyrna. The limited information on Joseph Langdon, another American resident merchant, agent of T. H. Perkins, was also gathered from this file.

All of the records collected from College Park are government documents. In general they include reports from the representatives of the US government in the Ottoman Empire and instructions from the US government to consuls, ministers and ambassadors, etc. They also include commercial information like which items were bought and sold, the amount and price of these items and the names of the merchants involved in Ottoman trade. The consular letters from Smyrna reveal the American

entrance into the Smyrna trade, the scope and volume of trade, as well as David Offley's role in American diplomatic relations and in Smyrna within the American community. Supplementary records from some European countries and Barbary States are also collected from NARA. These sources are essential in terms of understanding the domestic and international policies of the US, and its disposition towards the Ottoman Empire.

Besides being one of the first cities to be were involved in the Smyrna trade, Philadelphia is also important as it is the hometown of the Offley family. The Pennsylvania Historical Society library holds the John Holmes Offley Diary. He is David Offley's son from his first marriage. David Offley went to Smyrna in 1811 with his wife and after settling there he invited his sons to join him and established a business there. John Holmes first went to Smyrna in 1815 when he was 13. He returned to the US after a while, but went back to Smyrna with his wife, stayed there in the 1820s and founded another trade house with his brother Richard, Richard & John Holmes Offley Co., a firm dedicated to supplying the American Navy in the Mediterranean. In 1828, John Holmes entered into business with Stith & Co. in Trieste, while his brother Richard continued the business in his name where after some tome there, John Holmes was appointed American consul. He kept his diary beginning from the sea journey from America to Smyrna and then document his stay there. He gives hints about American social life, his family's business and the situation during the Greek Revolution. The diary was published as a part of a genealogy of the Offley Family, which includes information about the future generations of Offleys in Smyrna too.³⁹

³⁹ Brockenbrough Offley, *Diary*.

Other collections from Pennsylvania Historical Society give information on how the opium trade was started and conducted by the American merchants. The Willings & Francis collection enlightens the first years of the opium trade. This collection contains financial records, invoices of the articles and more importantly the letters and reports to and from William Read, who represented the firm and as supercargo.⁴⁰ The letters of William Read, who was one of the first to carry Turkey opium to China, give the accounts of the approach of his firm, the profits earned from the first adventures, and the hardships encountered in China.

The American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia contains one of the most comprehensive collections on the Philadelphia business circles in the nineteenth century, the Stephen Girard Papers. He was one of the first American merchants who realized the importance of Turkey opium in the China trade. The collection contains business papers, account books as well as correspondence between Girard and his agents in Smyrna, basically Van Lennep and after the foundation of Woodmas & Offley, with David Offley. It is also gathered from the records that Turkey opium was not bought only from Smyrna, but also from Amsterdam, London and Gibraltar. The net of the Turkey opium trade was more complicated and included many agents from different ports.

Salem also played a role in the beginnings of Smyrna trade. One of the more famous Salem merchants who entered into opium business in Turkey is contained in Derby Family Papers collection in Peabody Essex Museum Library. There are a few letters

⁴⁰ Supercargo was responsible of the cargo carried on the ship. Depending on the owners' instructions supercargo sold the cargo at specified prices at specified ports and in return purchased new products. During the early nineteenth century, supercargoes managed the shipment of the cargo to and from the ports, made the necessary arrangements with the resident merchants, paid the duties, but through the second half of the nineteenth century, the responsibilities of the supercargo began to be replaced by the permanent trade houses and resident merchants.

written from Smyrna and they give information about the condition and price of the opium. Also the Papers of William Law, agent to the New York Company Minturn & Champlin, are held in New York Public Library. Especially his letters from 1815 reveal Chinese regulations during that period which had a negative influence on Law and other small-scale merchants, but enabled Thomas H. Perkins to increase his investments in the opium trade and finally built a monopoly.

After 1820s Boston grew out as the major American port involved in Smyrna trade. Therefore, the sources gathered from the Boston libraries are of primary importance for this project. In terms of gathering information on opium trade the most valuable source was presented by the Massachusetts Historical Society. Besides the extensive collection of the library, the access to the website <http://www.cap.amdigital.co.uk/> allowed for continued and in-depth access. The web page “China, American and the Pacific” was started in order to explore the cultural and commercial ties in America, China and Pacific triangle between the 18th and 20th centuries. The website contains manuscript collections from American Philosophical Society, Boston Athenaeum, California Historical Society, Hagley Museum and Library, Hawaiian Historical Society, Massachusetts Historical Society, Nantucket Historical Association, Phillips Library, University of Alberta, University of British Columbia, University of California and Winterthur Museum. Some of these libraries do not contain opium related archival sources, and some of the sources in the mentioned libraries are not complete. However, in terms of the quality of the copies and as a starting point this website is invaluable. The manuscripts gathered from this website are: Barton Family Papers, Benjamin Shreve Papers, Chever Family Papers, Joseph Downs Collection, all of which contain information on the American opium commerce, in letter books,

logbooks, account books, diaries, etc. The website also contains a great number of secondary sources on China, trade with China or Americans in China.

The sources mentioned above are all valuable in gaining insight into how American merchants gained an interest in the trade with the Ottoman Empire and how they maintained this trade until 1820s. However, in 1821 the Chinese government began to increase its control over opium smuggling and most of the American merchants were pushed out of this trade. One firm, on the other hand, maintained its business and increased its participation to such an extent that it monopolized the Turkey opium trade and became a threat for the British merchants by creating a considerable demand in China for this article. Considered as lower quality, Turkey opium was cheaper than the Bengal opium carried by British merchants. However, the cheaper and lower quality meant a higher demand from the addicts in China and its bitter taste began to be preferred in the northern regions. The firms under the direction of Thomas Handasyd Perkins regulated the Turkey opium trade and the rest of the American merchants who were still in business after 1821 followed Perkins' steps in order to make a profit. The nature of sources in this collection, similar to the above mentioned ones, are logbooks, account books, letters, etc. What makes this collection essential for this dissertation is, however, the period and the period covered by the sources. After Britain opened the opium trade to Americans, merchants began to withhold from the Ottoman Empire. Trade between the two countries continued, but other articles began to move up front, and instead of purchasers, American merchants began to bring materials to Turkey. In this respect, the Perkins collection completes the time span of the Turkey opium trade. This website also includes some historical books about American and British trade with China.

Included in the commercial records, Massachusetts Historical Society also includes the Charles Folsom Papers. He was one of the agents sent by the American government to the Ottoman Empire in order to investigate the situation in the latter country and gather information about the procedure to be followed to sign an agreement. He contacted with David Offley and sent many reports back to the US. Some of the letters in this collection can also be found in NARA, but since these letters were preserved and in a better condition at the Historical Society, the researcher will benefit from Charles Folsom Papers in this library.

A two-page letter written by Joseph Langdon to T. H. Perkins in 1827 is particularly important because it shows the position taken by the American merchants in Smyrna during the Greek Revolution, and their attitude towards the Greek slaves captured by the Ottomans. This letter is about a young Greek liberated by him and sent to America. Both from here and in the John Holmes Diary, it is understood that it was common among the American residents in Smyrna to rescue Greek slaves and send them to the US.

The Timothy Pickering Papers give information about the political stance of the US in terms of conducting commercial ties with the Ottoman Empire. He was the Secretary of State under George Washington and John Adams. He supported the idea of signing a trade agreement with the Porte. His correspondence about this issue and the American relations with the Barbary nations can be found in this collection.

Another phase of diplomatic relations were conducted by Luther Bradish who visited Smyrna and İstanbul in 1819 as an American agent to gather information about the Ottoman Empire and the conditions necessary to sign an agreement. During his visit he negotiated with Ottoman authorities but they could not reach an agreement. His

letters describe this journey and the collection also includes graphical information about American ships at the Smyrna port before and during his visit. Similar to the Charles Folsom Papers, some of the Bradish reports and letters can be found in NARA, but are in better condition on New York Historical Society Library.

Library of Congress offers a great variety of collections and databases. Congressional Records contain the discussions and debates on the ratification of the treaty and the secret article. The Documents prepared for the 22nd Congress, 1st Session, Doc. No. 250 and 25th Congress, 3rd Session, Doc. No. 200 are compiled from the reports and letters in NARA. The former is related to the Treaty with the Sublime Porte, and the latter is about the commercial activities in Smyrna port. These typed versions of the originals provide the opportunity for reading the sources more easily, but they are not complete, particularly the parts related to European countries, which were deleted, therefore the researcher needs to complete the missing parts from the originals. The databases of newspaper collections extending to the eighteenth century are also valuable for this dissertation because while earlier newspapers show that Smyrna fruits already had a market in the US, the dates covering the Greek Revolution reveal American public opinion towards the war and Turks. Besides these databases, the manuscript collection includes Rodgers Papers LC, who was assigned to the Mediterranean Squadron. John Rodgers commanded *John Adams* in 1804 and the frigate *Congress* in 1805-06 and was Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean Squadron in 1824-27. While his first two duties mentioned here is about American relations with the Barbary nations, his latter duty coincided with the Greek Revolution and the attempts to sign an agreement between the US and the Ottoman Empire.

The Offley Family Papers in Earl Gregg Swem Library contain letters, diaries, paintings, etc. of several members of the Offley Family. For the purpose of this study only the first series, John H. Offley's, is of use. It includes correspondence between Catharine V.R.H. Offley, Mary Heaton, Deborah Heaton, and Richard Jones Offley and concerns their life in Smyrna, their relations with Turkish officials, the Greek War of Independence, etc. John Holmes Offley series is limited but it includes also the portraits of David Offley, John H. Offley and a painting of Smyrna.

In addition to archives and libraries in the United States, Ottoman archives provide sources which give insight and perspective in regards to the Ottoman authorities and their own attitudes towards the United States. Although in detail and in range the Ottoman documents are more limited when compared to the American documents, due to the scope of this dissertation, only the *Hatt-ı Hümayun*, and *Cevdet Hariciye in Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri* records were used. These documents include letters and reports written by Ottoman ambassadors in London, as well as by the Reis Effendi and other Ottoman office holders related to negotiations and meetings with American representatives.

Finally the website www.levantineheritage.com is one of the most important sources for the researchers who study the Levantine community of different origins. It includes letters of David Offley to his sister in Philadelphia about his life in İzmir, his perception of Islam/Muslims, his goals in settling in and his future plans for himself and his family, etc. While the diplomatic and commercial character of David Offley can be tracked down based on the sources from American libraries and archives, Levantine Heritage and Earl Gregg Swem Library offer distinguished information about his thoughts, understanding, family life and living conditions.

CHAPTER II

AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE BARBARY STATES AND FIRST CONTACT WITH THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

A Great number of Our Good Subjects peaceably following their Employments at Sea, have been taken by the Turkish Pirates of *Algiers*, *Salley*, *Barbary*, and other places on the Coast of *Africa*, and now remain Slaves, in Cruel and Inhumane Bondage, without any *Dayes of Rest*, either on the *Turkish Sabbath* or Ours, except Four Dayes in a Year; being kept to Extream *Labour*; from which, some endeavouring a little Rest, several of them were barbarously Murdered. Neither is their *Diet* any more tolerable then their *Labour*; Great Numbers being allow'd not other Food, than decay'd *Barley*, which stinketh so, that the Beasts refuse to eat it. And ofthen they are not permitted to go from their Labour, to fetch Water, which is their only Drink; and sometimes driven about by *Black-a-moors*, who are set over them as Task-masters; and some of them have been so severely Whipp'd, that they have dropp'd down Dead.⁴¹

Cotton Mather delivered the words of Queen Mary and King William to his congregation in March 1703, when explaining the hardships faced by Christian slaves

⁴¹ Cotton Mather includes the above statement of King William and Queen Mary in his sermon, in Cotton Mather, "The Glory of Goodness. The goodness of God, Celebrated; in Remarkable *Instances* and *Improvements* thereof; And more particularly in the REDEMPTION remarkably obtained for the English Captives, Which have been languishing under the Tragical, and the Terrible, and the most *Barbarous* Cruelties of BARBARY. The History of what the Goodness of God, has done for the captives, lately delivered out of Barbary," in *White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives*, ed. Paul Baepler (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 61-62.

taken captive in the Barbary States. Mather frequently brought up this issue in his sermons based on Joshua Gee's account. He was captured in 1680 and gave one of the first American Barbary captivity narratives. Although Gee's narrative was not printed until 1943, it is thought that Cotton Mather was among the many who heard the story, from Jonathan Gee himself, or his son who bore the same name. Having been directly familiar with the threat presented by the Barbary States since 1625, the colonists in New England maintained the stereotypical image of the "Turk" as inherited from Europe. The European captives, narrating the story of their experiences, beginning from the sixteenth century, gave the earliest examples of Barbary captivity narratives. For the British, the African Coast was the home of "petty states and tribal powers," populated by "a bewildering variety of peoples," and they "tended to lump these peoples together under the broad headings of 'Turk' or 'Moor,' portraying them as altogether given to tyranny, cruelty, lust, chicanery, immoderate passion, and superstition."⁴² While the tradition of using the word "Turk" in general for Muslim, Arab, Turk, Algerian, Moor, Black, etc. was maintained in America, Jacob Rama Berman drew attention to the necessity of forming "an American antebellum discourse on Arabs, one that distinguished the image of the Arab from the image of the Turk or Persian and from the conglomerate image of the Islamic oriental."⁴³

The common notions mentioned in the above excerpt were also repeated in almost all of the Barbary captivity narratives of the nineteenth century: hard labor without rest, torture and murder, poor and decayed food, dehydration and "black" masters.

⁴² Joe Snader, *Caught Between Worlds: British Captivity Narratives in Fact and Fiction* (Kentucky: The University press of Kentucky, 2000) 132-33.

⁴³ Jacob Rama Berman, "The Barbarous Voice of Democracy: American Captivity in Barbary and the Multicultural Specter," *American Literature*, 79 (2007): 3-4, accessed August 2015, doi: 10.1215/00029831-2006-069.

However the American approach to the “Turk” differed from European orientalism, particularly in terms of their role in establishing American identity. Whether searching for opportunities in the open seas, competing with European rivals, forcing a distinction from England, fighting with indigenous people, it was aimed in the US to “marginalize Barbary culture to one extreme or the other and to claim the vacated territory.”⁴⁴ Barbary captivity narratives were used “as a means to set themselves apart as a new people with superior morals not only to non-Europeans but even to Europeans.”⁴⁵ In other words, the representations of “Turk” in Barbary captivity narratives described what the Americans were not. This imagery, on the one hand, had evolved through time and influenced the American approach to the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, these narratives tried to draw a specific line between Europeans, mainly the British, and Americans. To do that, they showed the unvirtuous and dishonorable acts of the British who, in order to protect their material benefits, provoked the “Turks” against their former colonies. To defend its commerce and people from the attacks of the Barbary States and European powers (during the France-England wars), the US government chose to use naval force when the negotiations failed to solve the problems.

American encounters with the Barbary States at the beginning of the nineteenth century shaped many of the features that influenced the American approach towards the Ottoman Empire: such as the establishment and use of naval power as being among the most important factors in the conclusion of a treaty; the suspicion and distrust towards Great Britain, which had a lasting effect on the negotiations and the

⁴⁴ Berman, “Barbarous Voice of Democracy,” 5-6.

⁴⁵ Moulay Ali Bouânani, “Propaganda for empire: Barbary captivity literature in the US,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 7 (2009): 403.

approach of both countries towards each other; the inheritance of the term “Turk” from Europe and through its encounters with the Barbary States, it built on the term depending on its own experience. Moreover, the Americans got to see the Turks when the Dey of Algiers forced Captain Bainbridge to make a voyage to Constantinople while the Ottoman Porte met and began to form an opinion about the US. This chapter will lay out American relations with the Barbary States during the late 18th and 19th centuries and show the historical background of various factors that were influential during the first years of Ottoman-American relations.

2.1. Facing the Barbary States

Great Britain imposed commercial restrictions on the American colonies, and they fought for their freedom and gained independence. Expecting free trade, however, they stepped into a “tribute demanding world” when their merchant vessels began to sail in the Mediterranean.⁴⁶ Before the Revolution, colonies had considerable trade with the Barbary States,⁴⁷ and there are sources indicating that the Barbary States had been attacking American colonies and taking captives since the seventeenth century. Fighting with England, US commissioners tried to procure the protection of France against the Barbary with the 1778 agreement but the only concession they could get was the “good-offices” of the King of France.⁴⁸ The main problem began after that date, when the Barbary nations realized the presence of a new flag in the

⁴⁶ Frank Lambert, *The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005), 4.

⁴⁷ Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations*, 26-27.

⁴⁸ Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations*, 27, Allen, *Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs*, 25; Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, 195.

Mediterranean.⁴⁹ In 1784 the American brig *Betsy* was captured by Morocco and was released after six months by the emperor with the intention of forming friendly relations with the US. The schooner *Maria* of Boston and the ship *Dauphin* of Philadelphia were not as lucky since twenty-one people were captured in July 1785 by Algerian pirates and spent years under captivity. Many followed these instances in the first years of the republic.

Piracy constituted a major income for the Barbary nations. They seized the cargoes of ships, they enslaved captives to perform manual labor, or collected ransom for the captives, they took tributes and presents from nations regardless of any agreements.⁵⁰ Even the great powers were paying tribute to these states. However, the financial condition of the US would not permit it to pay high amounts of tribute like the great European powers because in the first decades of its foundation the US owed between fifty to seventy-five million dollars to creditors at home and abroad.⁵¹ The assault of the Barbary revealed the weakness and poverty of the US government.⁵² This weakness was not only in military or financial fields but more so in the domestic system. The Articles of Confederacy divided the power among the individual states, which, through sectional jealousies and different interests between the commercial and agricultural states, deprived Congress of the power to declare war and collect the

⁴⁹ Allen, *Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs*, 13.

⁵⁰ Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations*, 24-26.

⁵¹ Edward Channing, vol. 4 of *A History of the United States* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935), 60.

⁵² Lambert, *Barbary Wars*, 5.

taxes necessary for war. Only after the ratification of the Constitution in 1789, could a change in the attitude of the US towards the Barbary be observed.⁵³

The two choices available to the US are reflected in the differing policies of Adams and Jefferson. The former advocated peace by paying tribute because war would be expensive, while the latter waged war in the name of American honor, thus gaining respect in Europe.⁵⁴ The war with the Barbary States was “an extension of America’s War of Independence.” The enemy was the same; an imposing force against free trade and if the US wanted free trade, it had to fight for it.⁵⁵ At the end of 1790, Jefferson, then the Secretary of State, prepared reports advocating the use of naval force to protect the Mediterranean trade.⁵⁶ However, the Congress decided on February 22, 1792 that signing for peace and paying tribute would be more beneficial for the country.⁵⁷

The American decision to pay tribute was not a clear-cut solution to the problems faced in North Africa. Until 1815, the Barbary States broke their agreements several times and attacked American vessels in the Mediterranean. One of the events that was highly discussed in the US occurred in 1793, after the truce between Portugal and Algiers. The Portuguese blockade of Algiers had enabled American merchant vessels safe travel in the Mediterranean for a while, however when suddenly a truce was signed in 1793, Algiers resumed its attacks on American ships and captured more than ten vessels with more than a hundred seamen and voyagers. Congress passed an act

⁵³ Ibid., 8.

⁵⁴ Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, 198-99.

⁵⁵ Lambert, *Barbary Wars*, 6.

⁵⁶ Allen, *Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs*, 43.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 45.

for building six warships in answer to Algerian demand of \$ 2,435 for ransom, but at the same time Colonel David Humphries was appointed to negotiate peace in the amount of \$ 642,500 in cash, and annual tribute of \$ 21,600 in naval stores. An agreement was reached but when payment was delayed, Joel Barlow convinced the Dey to keep his patience by offering a thirty-six-gun US-built warship. “Eventually, the price of the treaty, annual tribute, frigate, and ‘presents’ ballooned to nearly a million dollars – about one-sixth of the annual \$5.7 million federal budget.”⁵⁸

2.2. The Influence of American Naval Forces in Relations with the Barbary States

The War of Independence left the US with an exhausted treasury and an enormous debt. Selling navy ships was found necessary but this decision left only three ships under command; the *Alliance*, *Deane*, *General Washington*, and navy officers sought employment in other fields. The lack of a naval force left American commerce open to threat in the Mediterranean and this threats led to the establishment of the navy.

The period between the Revolution and the end of the Barbary Wars witnessed the gradual development of the US naval forces, yet before 1815 the armed forces of the young republic was “tiny and weak,”⁵⁹ as neither the financial and industrial resources nor the governmental system let the government raise and equip military forces.

Localism was another primary preventative factor in the development of a steady

⁵⁸ Baepler ed., *White Slaves, African Masters*, 71-72.

⁵⁹ Wayne S. Cole, *An Interpretive History of American Foreign Relations* (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1974), 27.

military. One of the significant steps of the US government was taken after the truce of 1793 between Algiers and Portugal.

Directly after the truce, Algerian pirates increased their attacks on American ships. Not being able to stop the assault, Congress passed an act for the establishment of a navy in order to protect “the commerce of the United States against the Algerian forces”⁶⁰ on March 27, 1794, upon which six frigates were ordered. There was resistance in the US against this act. Some opposed it for economic reasons and some due to a traditional prejudice towards standing forces. Thus a concession was made; the construction would be stopped when a treaty with Algiers materialized. While the construction of ships was continuing, Algiers made peace with the US in 1795. After that, the construction of the three ships was terminated and only three of them were launched in 1797. The cost of peace, on the other hand, was more than the cost of a navy.⁶¹ Following the peace with Algiers, in November 1796 the US signed a treaty with Tripoli, and in 1797 negotiations with Tunis were concluded. Although the American government objected to some of the terms of the agreement, following long negotiations with the Bey of Tunis, the treaty was concluded almost completely on American terms, yet it cost \$ 107,000.⁶² Formally the US government had signed treaties with all of the Barbary States but these treaties did not bring satisfaction to any country.⁶³

⁶⁰ Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, 212.

⁶¹ Samuel Flag Bemis, *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1963), 595-96; Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations*, 30.

⁶² Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, 218.

⁶³ Paullin, *Diplomatic Negotiations*, 57.

In the meantime, another important decision for the improvement of the navy was taken due to the British-French Wars. French cruisers and privateers violated the neutrality of American waters by capturing British ships and seizing American merchant vessels. Similar offensive practices were also conducted by England. Congress passed a law for the purchase or construction of twelve vessels for \$ 950,000 on April 27, 1798. Three days later, the Secretary of the Navy was added to the President's Cabinet and a marine corps was established by the law of July 11, 1798.⁶⁴ Therefore, the new navy effectively protected American commerce during the British-French Wars.⁶⁵

With the elections of 1800, Thomas Jefferson entered office right after the Senate ratified the peace treaty with France. Being an ardent opponent to a permanent navy, Jefferson did not abolish the navy but reduced the number of vessels and officers. By 1800 the American government had treaties with all the Barbary States but the total cost of the agreements, tributes, presents, etc. amounted to, in 1802, "over two million dollars; enough [...] to have built and equipped twenty large frigates. Half of this, if spent on naval appropriations in the beginning, would have saved us the tribute of many years; for it would have procured peace with all these powers without payment or ransom."⁶⁶ Despite the expenses, the agreements did not terminate the problems. As William Eaton, former army officer and Consul to Tunis between the years 1797 and 1803, wrote "If the United States will have a free commerce in this sea, they must defend it. There is no alternative. The restless spirit of these marauders cannot be

⁶⁴ Edgar Stanton Maclay, vol. 1 of *History of the United States Navy from 1775 to 1902* (New York: Appleton, 1901-1902), 162.

⁶⁵ "The exports of the country under the protection of this marine force increased from \$57,000,000 in 1797, when not a single American cruiser was in commission, to \$78,665,528 in 1799, and the revenue in imports rose from \$6,000,000 in 1797 to \$9,080,932 in 1800." Ibid., 213.

⁶⁶ Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, 218.

restrained.”⁶⁷ In less than three years after the treaty, the problems with Tripoli required the intervention of the navy again.

As the remaining naval forces were protecting American commerce, the US sent the frigate *Crescent* to the Dey of Algiers in 1798. It carried valuable presents, while the frigate itself was also a present, a compensation for the delay of the yearly tribute that the US was to pay as a part of the treaty stipulation. However, other Barbary States realized the different amounts of tribute paid to each of them, by the US. Early in 1800 the Bashaw of Tripoli demanded more from the US because he felt offended at not being considered equal to the Dey of Algiers. When the latter did not fulfill the Bashaw’s demands, however, he declared war on May 14, 1801 and American consulate was closed immediately.

Jefferson’s presidency was contradictory with respect to the American navy. Not particularly interested in promoting merchant and shipper enterprises that required protection, Jefferson had reduced the size of the navy. When faced with trouble in the Barbary, the Jefferson administration decided to send a small squadron to blockade Tripoli, but later it was raised when Algiers and Tunis protested. Then, they began to convoy merchant vessels. As the war became more aggressive, American forces gained the upper hand with the support of the ex-Bashaw Hamet, who had been dethroned by his brother. In the end, co-operation with Hamet forced the ruler of Tripoli to make peace, while at the same time endangered the lives of Americans captives there.

On October 31, 1803 Captain Bainbridge in command of the frigate *Philadelphia*, was captured with 307 American sailors, making Tripoli the captor of more American

⁶⁷ Ibid., 219.

captives than Algiers. The Bashaw of Tripoli demanded \$ 1.69 million for ransom.

Jonathan Cowdery, one of the surgeons on the *Philadelphia*, kept a diary and published it following his return home. Cowdery had cured the Bashaw's son and thus was kept closer to the palace and had a relatively easier captivity experience. When he visited the Bashaw to request the removal of American officers into the American house for the betterment of their situation:

the Bashaw replied, that the war between him and my country at first was about money; but now it was whether him or his brother should be the Bashaw; and that the Americans had bound themselves to his brother in such a manner that it was not in their power to make peace with him. But that his brother and the Americans were determined to take Tripoli and take off his head. He swore by the prophet of Mecca, that if the Americans brought his brother against him, he would burn to death all American prisoners except me; that my life would be spared, because I saved the life of his child when very sick.⁶⁸

This was not an empty threat. Although "it was agreed to postpone this measure for that time," eight days after Cowdery's conversation with the Bashaw, he learned that in a council gathered upon the news that a Tripolitan force, under Hassan Bey, was taken in Derne by the Americans and his brother, the Bashaw "proposed to put all the American prisoners to death."⁶⁹ Their lives were spared for the moment, but their days became harsher. Twenty-five Americans were sent to the country for timber, and the conditions of the rest are described below in Cowdery's account:

The wind from the desert was very heavy and hot. The men almost perished in sand, which flew and drifted like a snow storm in our country. They stopped through fatigue, and asked the driver, who was a Turk, for liberty to drink at a well which was near them. The Turk replied, that they were *Romo kelps*, Christian dogs, and said they should have no water. He gave them all a severe beating with a large club, which he always carried with him to drive them with, and made them go on with the cart, which the poor fellows had to drag,

⁶⁸ Jonathan Cowdery, "American Captives in Tripoli; or Dr. Cowdery's Journal in Miniature. Kept during his late captivity in Tripoli," Baepler ed., *White Slaves, African Masters*, 181.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 182.

loaded wi[t]h timber, through the burning sand. They returned towards night almost perished.⁷⁰

Despite the hardships forced upon the captives and the danger to their lives, American policy began to acquire desired results as the Bashaw began to mention his desire to sign a peace with the US in order to stop the progress of his brother obtaining the throne. On May 24 Cowdery wrote “The Bashaw was so agitated at the news of the approach of his brother, that he this day declared, that if it was in his power now to make peace and give the American prisoners, he would gladly do it, without the consideration of money.”⁷¹

When a peace was reached with Tripoli for the payment of \$ 60,000 in return for the captives held in Tripoli, the American government left Hamet alone. As Eugene Schuyler commented on the event, “It may have been very unwise for us to have made the original agreement with Hamet to restore him to his throne; but certainly we showed bad policy and bad faith in not keeping our agreement.”⁷² For the next two years the US government gave a pension of two hundred dollars a month to Hamet.⁷³ The agreement with Tripoli was the result of American support of Hamet, not American naval power. As Cole put it: “Jefferson’s administration had made a minor effort with meager results.”⁷⁴ Strengthening naval forces when required and dismantling them when the emergency passed prevented the US from establishing stability in the region. Along with the ransom for American captives, each consul had to bring a present to the Bey of Tripoli. In 1807, Jefferson withdrew American naval

⁷⁰ Ibid., 182.

⁷¹ Ibid., 183.

⁷² Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, 220.

⁷³ Maclay, *History of the United States Navy*, 300.

⁷⁴ Cole, *An Interpretive History*, 66.

units from the Mediterranean and until 1815, the US did not maintain a steady presence in the region.

Small conflicts with the Barbary States continued to rise until 1812 when the Dey of Algiers demanded that the tributes had to be paid according to the Mohammedan calendar, not the Christian calendar. This meant that the US owed \$ 27,000. The American consul was ordered to pay the amount or to leave the country. American government prioritized its relations with Great Britain but right after the peace in 1815, the American squadron arrived at Algiers and captured the Algerian fleet. The three-years war with England improved American naval forces. Moreover, the American squadron proved its efficiency against Great Britain, the most powerful nation on the seas at the time. As the confidence of the officers increased, the American image within North Africa developed into a more advanced nation. The next day, following the arrival of the American squadron to port, Algiers proposed a treaty. American negotiators had one fundamental demand of the treaty: the US would never pay tribute. Demanding an immediate answer, the Dey was forced to agree to the terms on June 30, 1815. Tribute and presents were abolished and it was also agreed that prisoners of war would not be enslaved. Following peace with Algiers, Captain Decatur arrived at Tunis to demand indemnity in the amount of \$ 46,000 for two American ships, which had been seized by Britain during the war, with permission from Tunis. This act of Tunis was against the terms of the agreement with the US. American forces had proved their power in the War of 1812, forced Algiers to agree to their terms, now they were waiting for the Dey of Tunis to decide whether he would pay the indemnity demanded or fight. "The Dey looked at the fleet, laid down his telescope, sank back in his cushions, combed his beard with a small tortoise-shell comb set with diamonds, reflected a minute, and ordered the money to be paid

immediately.”⁷⁵ The Bashaw of Tripoli, too, agreed to pay \$ 25,000 in indemnities for the two American vessels that had been captured by England.

After a short while the Dey of Algiers denounced the treaty of 1815 and sent away the American consul. President Madison wrote to the Dey of Algiers in August 1816, “The United States, whilst they wish for a war with no nation, will buy no peace of none. It is a principle incorporated into the settled policy of America, that as peace is better than war, war is better than tribute.”⁷⁶ Considering the earlier negotiations of the US with the Barbary States, preferring tribute to war, this decisive action of the government was influential. Luckily for the US, Britain was also at war with Algiers at the time and bombing the Algerian port when the American squadron arrived there. Unable to defend itself against these two powers, the Dey agreed to declare peace on American terms. The treaty was renewed in December 1816. The US was the first among world powers to obtain a treaty from the Barbary States that abolished the enslavement of war prisoners, presents and tribute.

2.3. Anglophobia in the US during the Early Years

The American government and people accused Great Britain for their misfortunes on the coast of North Africa. The American captives in the Barbary States expressed how they held the British responsible in their narratives. American suspicion towards Britain goes back to the middle of the eighteenth century when the latter imposed the Sugar Act in 1763, the Stamp Act in 1765 and the Townshend Acts in 1767 all of

⁷⁵ Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, 224.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 231.

which were criticized in the colonies with a “focus on the illegality and immorality of Parliament’s policies.”⁷⁷ The War of Independence ended with the victory of the colonies, but increased the antagonism towards the British. On the question of whether the US government should be involved in the regulation of trade, there were two opposing arguments; one favoring and one rejecting, the merchants and the manufacturers. The former, blaming the British for the commercial crisis at the end of the war, wanted a legislation to keep the British merchant ships out.⁷⁸ However at the same time the recently-founded country expected to hold the commercial privileges entitled to British colonies. “The Americans,” as Thomas A. Bailey stated “were learning the disagreeable lesson that they could not eat their cake and have it too.”⁷⁹

Expecting to maintain trade in the Mediterranean, American ships were faced with captivity and smuggling due to the fact that Britain withdrew its protection from American merchant ships. What is more, Britain issued new passports and informed the Barbary States that the old passes in the hands of Americans were no longer valid.⁸⁰ Taken captive on July 25, 1785 in the *Maria* of Boston, James Leander Cathcart wrote that the British Consul, Charles Logie, arrived at Algiers after the War of Independence and immediately informed the authorities in Algiers that the American vessels were not protected by “his Master, and, that wherever the Cruisers of Algiers should fall in with the vessels of the United States of America, they were

⁷⁷ Joseph J. Ellis, *After the Revolution: Profiles of Early American Culture* (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1979), 18-19.

⁷⁸ Merrill Jensen, *The New Nation: A History of the United States during the Confederation 1781-1789* (New York: Alfred A Knopf), 287.

⁷⁹ Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), 55.

⁸⁰ Joshua E. London, *Victory in Tripoli: How America's War with the Barbary Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and Built into a Nation* (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 13-14.

good prizes and wished them success in their attempts to capture those who refused allegiance to his Master.”⁸¹ Holding Britain responsible for the attacks, Cathcart accused Logie for the indignities the British put the Americans through. According to Cathcart, as a man of the Western world and a Christian among Muslims, Logie’s attitude towards the Americans was depressing. Expecting him to forget the recent war between their countries and to remember the language and religion they shared, Cathcart expressed his disappointment with an example he witnessed on the second day of festival, the only time of the year when slaves were permitted to visit their friends. When they entered the British Consul’s garden:

we found Captain O’Brien with a hoe digging a hole to plant a tree in the Consul’s garden; Stephens, with the capote given him by the Regency tied around his middle with a straw rope, driving a mule loaded with manure for the root of the tree, and Coffin, who was consumptive, feeding the hogs and poultry. We could not refrain from tears at viewing their humiliating situation which affected us the more as they suffered this indignity from a person, [the British Consul], who ranked among Christians and gentlemen, was of the same religion and spoke the same language, and from whom a more humane treatment might naturally have been expected.⁸²

The European powers protected their shipping through tributary agreements and one of the criticisms towards them, and specifically towards England since it had a very powerful naval force, was that they preferred to pay tribute because it was an effective deterrent for small nations like the US that could emerge as possible commercial rivals.⁸³ Moreover, the US could find new markets besides England.⁸⁴ In defense of England, in the *Edinburgh Review* it was written that England did not encourage

⁸¹ James Leander Cathcart, “The Captives, Eleven Years a Prisoner in Algiers,” Baepler ed., *White Slaves, African Masters*, 107.

⁸² Ibid., 117.

⁸³ Allen, *Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs*, 26-27; Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, 195; John Spears, *The Story of the American Merchant Marine* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1915), 166; London, *Victory in Tripoli*, 13-14.

⁸⁴ Lambert, *Barbary Wars*, 6.

piracy to oppose the commerce of other nations, still it could have destroyed them much earlier.⁸⁵

In his letter to Jefferson, Richard O'Brien, who was kept under bondage in Algiers after he had been captured as the master of the *Dauphin* on July 30, 1785, touched upon this issue, arguing that European countries would create obstacles to prevent the US from pursuing peace with the Barbary nations. Considering the high insurance rates paid to British companies by American merchants, O'Brien wrote that the European powers encouraged piracy "whilst they reap such benefits in being the carriers of our commerce, particularly the English, French, & Spanish being jealous of us." Although O'Brien held all the great European countries responsible, he mainly accused the British of the lengthened captivity of American vessels and people. When Mr. Lamb arrived at Algiers with a limited amount of money for ransom, O'Brien wrote that the Dey rejected the payment because he was led to believe by the British Consul that the US would pay any amount he asked for. In response to Mr. Lamb's offer of \$ 10.000, the Dey asked for \$ 50.000.⁸⁶ The impression was that the British Consul aimed to discourage the Americans from the Mediterranean trade, and kept the insurance rates high when they insisted to maintain trade in the region. Peace between the two should be prevented.

American antagonism towards the British was strengthened when its role as a mediator in the truce between Portugal and Algiers was revealed. Right after the truce in 1793, ten American vessels were captured and the number of American captives

⁸⁵ Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, 226.

⁸⁶ Richard O'Brien to Thomas Jefferson, Algiers, June 8, 1786, M 23, Roll 1, NARA.

rose to 115.⁸⁷ The Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the American consul at Lisbon, Mr. Church that they were not expecting the truce. Portugal had expressed its desire for cooperation to England and Spain, in order to obtain a lasting peace with Algiers, upon which Charles Logie negotiated with the Dey but without authority from his government and without consulting the Portuguese government. Defining this act by Britain as a “hellish conspiracy,”⁸⁸ Mr. Church wrote to the Secretary of State, “The conduct of the British in this business leaves no room to doubt or mistake their object, which was evidently aimed at us, and proves that this envy, jealousy, and hatred will never be appeased, and that they will leave nothing unattempted to effect our ruin.”⁸⁹ While the strong enmity towards England is obvious in his words, when the American Minister at London, Thomas Pinckney, enquired about the issue, British Foreign Secretary Lord Grenville told him that it was not England’s intention to injure the US. ; Rather, it was an act of “friendship for a good ally required of them;” while British interference “was also particularly advantageous to themselves, as they wanted the co-operation of the Portuguese fleet to act against their common enemy, which it was at liberty to do when no longer employed in blocking up the Algerine fleet.”⁹⁰ At the time, the war between England and France benefited American merchants to maintain trade in the Mediterranean, over which English ships had dominated before the war. John Spears argued that behind Logie’s

⁸⁷ Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, 209; Baepler writes the number is 119 in *White Slaves African Masters*, 8.

⁸⁸ Spears, *Story of the American Merchant Marine*, 120.

⁸⁹ Schuyler, *American Diplomacy*, 210.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 211.

attempt there was a desire to administer and check the commerce “that the pirates were loosened upon the Atlantic.”⁹¹

Another blow to Anglo-American relations came with the French Revolutionary Wars. American merchants expanded carrying trade into the French West Indies, which was previously only run by French shippers. The US advocated that neutrals could trade with belligerents in non-contraband goods and that contraband should be defined narrowly. Britain, on the other side, rejected American claim to neutral shipping and defined contraband broadly. Since American carrying trade was beneficial to Britain’s enemy, carrying goods directly or indirectly between France and the French West Indies, Britain seized American ships and cargoes, and impressed American seamen.⁹² A continuation of the French Revolutionary Wars, during the Napoleonic Wars, the US had to deal with impressment, interference with neutral rights and carrying trade. Both of the belligerents were trying to blockade the commerce of the other.

The US was decisive in staying neutral during the wars between France and England, the two giants of Europe, but received attacks from both sides, which increased American dislike of European wars and politics. Napoleon’s Continental System prohibited trade with Britain and ordered the capture of all ships that entered British ports and its colonies. This system evolved into the seizure of all ships that allowed search or taxation by the British. Although Napoleon’s measures did not prevent American commerce with the British, it led to the loss of many American ships to the French.

⁹¹ Spears, *Story of the American Merchant Marine*, 122.

⁹² Cole, *An Interpretive History*, 52-53.

On the other hand, due to the greater size and power of British naval power, their interference with American commerce and shipping was more effective and thus irritated Americans and raised Anglophobia. British Orders-in-Council aimed to control all trade with France. Neutral ships en route to France had to stop in England and all the cargoes had to go through inspection. Only the non-contraband was allowed to reach France but it was subjected to British duty and licensing. The Rule of 1756 also forbade American ships to carry goods between the French West Indies and France. When American merchants tried to exempt themselves from the Rule by carrying the goods first to the US, then to France, Britain passed the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage to prevent such an indirect trade.

Impressment was another problem that American sailors had to deal with. As the Royal Navy required a major number of seamen and since there were a lot of British citizens who deserted the Royal Navy to work in American ships and obtained American citizenships, Britain rejected to recognize this naturalized citizenship and impressed men from American ships. Some of these men were American citizens. Impressment harmed American commerce and it damaged the pride and honor of the young republic. It also strengthened distrust towards the British. During the war between the US and Tripoli, an American frigate, the *Philadelphia*, was captured with all of its crew. One of the sailors, William Ray, wrote an account of the distrust and hatred of Britain when some English-born American seamen applied to the British Consul for their emancipation under the rights and privileges that British citizens benefitted from:

For this purpose they [seamen] went to him [British Consul] and registered a number of their names, promised to write his government, and, if possible, effectuate their release. They returned highly elated with the prospect of freedom. But a large majority of our patriotic tars, who had adopted America

as their country, laughed at their credulity and hissed at their project, positively declaring that they would not be released by a government which they detested, on account of its tolerating the impressment of seamen, and swearing that they would sooner remain under the Bashaw than George the third.⁹³

Drawing a parallel between the Bashaw of Tripoli and George III, Ray put an emphasis upon the tyrannical rule and hatred felt for Britain. In order to prevent foreign attacks American administration tried to put economic pressure on the belligerents. Although the US tried to maintain its neutrality with the Embargo Act of 1807, the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, and the Macon Bill No. 2 of 1810, they were unsuccessful attempts to end the harassment, and the conflicts during the Napoleonic Wars triggered the War of 1812. Although the merchant community of New England, who lost their ships and cargoes to the British, did not favor war even for the protection of their neutral rights, the War of 1812 was an important factor in building up American patriotism. The foundation of American nationalism was laid during the War of Independence and strengthened during the war of 1812. The spirit of nationalism “reenforced the ideological and emotional bases for both isolationism and expansionism. The belief in America’s moral superiority encouraged the conviction that little but harm could come from involvement with the corruption and tyranny of monarchical Europe.”⁹⁴

⁹³ William Ray, “Horrors of Slavery, or the American Tars in Tripoli,” Baepler ed., *White Slaves, African Masters*, 197.

⁹⁴ Cole, *An Interpretive History*, 26.

2.4. The “Terrible Turk” and the Unfortunate Christians

American relations with the Barbary States constitutes one of the most important periods in its history because it caused and witnessed the growth of the US from a whining victim of pirates into a power which proved itself against those pirates as well as against the European nations. Reflecting this transition is the literary genre called Barbary captivity narratives, written by Americans from the perspective of a people in the making. In this respect, how they interpreted the acts of the British as a jealous conspirator and competitor was given above. The other main villain of these narratives was the “Turk,” who represented all of the inhabitants of the mentioned region. The word “Turk” did not only refer to the ethnic and national background only, but was also used for “Muslim,” the common peculiarity of the Barbary States. The religious distinction between the East and West enabled the American community to draw a strict line between the Barbary States and themselves. America had claimed the West since the colonial period and the West acknowledged the US as one of its own. However, in its relations with the Eastern world, the US overemphasized the differences between them in order to be recognized as a strong and important Western power. As religious beliefs played an important role in how they defined both each other and themselves, the changing of one person’s religion was a great threat. Almost all of the Barbary captivity narratives include a story of how the captives or someone around them were urged to convert to Islam.⁹⁵ The hardships in the captives’ lives would have been eliminated and all their problems would have been solved if they had converted for if they accept Islam, they would be free. A very tempting offer in the face of hard labor, nutritional deficiency, physical

⁹⁵ Gordon M. Sayre, “Renegades from Barbary: The Transnational Turn in Captivity Studies,” *American Literary History* 22 (2010): 350.

and psychological torture, some Christians “turned Turk” while many considered it an indignity; their religious belief should have been maintained as part of their identities. In parallel, Christian captives were victimized while their Muslim captors’ inhumanity was emphasized in the Barbary captivity narratives.⁹⁶ Religious belief was a determinant in classifying them as “civilized” or “barbaric.” This distinction created a problem when the existence of *renegados*, or Christians who “turned Turk,” converted to Islam, is recalled.

The inherited and distorted understanding of Islam stood in opposition to many peculiarities that the United States wished to build its young republic upon. Islam meant “barbaric despotism,” created “immoderate sensuality,” “easy indolence” and “irrational fatalism,” while Americans pledged “Christian purity,” “enlightened democracy,” “public chastity,” “hard work” and “progressive reform.” “In its oppositional form, the Islamic world served as a distant mirror of foreign alterity that revealed and embodied anti-American models deployed to caution citizens about their excesses and remind them of the worldly importance of their enterprises.”⁹⁷

Americans drew a clear line between the two societies and defined themselves in reference to this opposition. Another factor in demonizing Muslims was the social condition of Americans as captives in the Barbary States. Despite the importance given to freedom and independence, the concepts that were aggrandized in America during and after the Revolutionary War, the impact of falling captive to a group of people whom they despised and already considered inferior was a heavy blow. The threat of the pirates, their attacks and a life of captivity were real. American seamen,

⁹⁶ Paul Michel Baepler, “The Barbary Captivity Narrative in American Culture,” *Early American Literature*, 39 (2004): 220.

⁹⁷ Timothy Marr, *The Cultural Roots of American Islamism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 10.

officers and travelers experienced this threat and through their narratives, the American people witnessed it at home.

Being captured by Algerians in 1785 aboard the *Maria*, James Leander Cathcart was forced to serve the Dey in the palace gardens. As he was in the presence of the Dey, he did not suffer from worn out cloths or decayed food, yet believed his labor to be particularly, if not the most, humiliating. “I was convinced,” wrote Cathcart, “that the honor of our country was connected with redemption.”⁹⁸ The expected redemption, however, would not materialize for another decade. Although he rejoiced when he was taken from the palace and given hard labor, a short while later, Cathcart realized his mistake and desperately hoped for his government’s aid. Living more than ten years under captivity, he experienced “every indignity that Barbarians could invent to render the life of a Christian miserable in the extreme.”⁹⁹ Worrying about national honor but pointing religious beliefs as the main characters who put them through this humiliation, Cathcart’s account, like the rest of the Barbary captivity narratives, drew a parallelism between how Americans perceived religion and nationality in unity in the early years of the republic.

How a nineteenth century historian interpreted the conflicts between the US and the Barbary States from a religious point of view may give a better understanding of the general opinion of Americans in regards to these Islamic states. E.S. Maclay wrote, as the Barbary “buccaneers were generally of the Mohammedan faith, their attack were directed against Christians.” Being ruled by Islamic law, the Barbary States freed the slaves who converted to Islam, thus it was the general practice to attack non-Muslim

⁹⁸ Cathcart, “Captives,” 121.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 119.

countries' vessels. The author's approach can be seen in the word choice he used in defining these states. "These pests" he wrote "frequently landed at night" implying insidiousness, and:

destroyed whole villages, carrying off the men to a horrible servitude to await ransom, while the women were sold in the slave marts of the East. Some of the greatest fortifications along the northern coast of Africa were constructed by Christian slaves in Mussulman bondage, the mole at Algiers representing the labor of thirty thousand Christians.¹⁰⁰

Religious belief and nationality were entangled in the nineteenth century. The word "Turk" was generally used to describe Muslims in the Barbary States and was therefore transmitted to the Ottoman Empire with the negative connotation embedded within it. This perception was pronounced in the writings of Americans who visited the Ottoman Empire in the following years but it would also show slight differences in regards to those experiences. The understanding of "Turk" in the Barbary States would evolve when the Americans came to the Ottoman Empire. While most of them approached the Ottoman people with prejudice, some would change their feelings and opinions once they established direct contact. One of these cases was Captain Bainbridge who visited Constantinople in 1800. He was acknowledged as the first American officer who visited Constantinople, had direct contact with Ottoman bureaucrats and sailed in the Black Sea.

¹⁰⁰ Maclay, *History of the United States Navy*, 218-19.

2.5. Captain Bainbridge and the *George Washington* in Constantinople

Late in June, Bainbridge received an order to carry tribute to Algiers and he was to command the *George Washington*. For Bainbridge, this trip to pay the protection money to pirates was a “blow to the honor of both his ship and his country.”¹⁰¹ Lord Teignmouth commented on the event as follows: “the circumstance of an American warship bearing the honored name of the First President being selected for so degrading a mission, [...] was an insult to the memory of that great man, sufficient to have caused him to turn in his grave.”¹⁰² Still, Bainbridge was eager to show his country’s naval power because at the time American prestige in the region was running low. For the US, the Barbary States were petty tyrants, but as Frank Lambert described it, the US was “petty” itself.¹⁰³ Sending the first American warship to the Mediterranean, the American government intended to show its strength and “hoped the sight of *George Washington* would help raise America’s standing in Barbary and go some way toward persuading the various deys, beys, and pashas who ruled this region that the United States of America would not be mistreated with impunity.”¹⁰⁴ However this show of force did not impress the Dey.

The Dey of Algiers, Mustapha, signed peace with France when the Ottoman Empire was at war with the latter country. In order to conciliate the Sultan in the face of this

¹⁰¹ London, *Victory in Tripoli*, 1.

¹⁰² Lord Teignmouth, “British Protection of American Shipping in the Mediterranean, 1784-1810,” in *The United States Service Magazine: with which are Incorporated the Army and Navy Magazine and Naval and Military Journal* (London: H. Colburn, 1829-1920), 172.

¹⁰³ Lambert, *Barbary Wars*, 5.

¹⁰⁴ London, *Victory in Tripoli*, 2.

move, the Dey forced Bainbridge to carry an ambassador with the corresponding gifts to Constantinople. Bringing tribute to Algiers was already an indignity for Bainbridge, being forced to go to Constantinople was even worse. According to the agreement between the US and Algiers, the Dey had a right to demand such performance from American ships for such duties, although Bainbridge and Consul-General Richard O'Brien argued, that this proviso was relevant only for merchant vessels. Bainbridge and O'Brien were thinking of the dangers that the vessel might face travelling in the Mediterranean and going to a port that the US had no formal relations with. However, what irritated them was the contemptuous attitude of the Dey. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Bainbridge transmitted the Dey's words showing the position of the Americans in Algiers: "You pay me tribute, by which you become my slaves."¹⁰⁵ As mentioned above, for the Americans, the relations with the Barbary States was harming their national honor. As they considered these States inferior, it was hard to digest such manners. In the log of *George Washington* it was written that "some tears fell at this Instance of national Humility" upon lowering the US pendent and hoisting the flag of Algiers instead, as the Dey ordered.¹⁰⁶ Bainbridge had been ordered to follow O'Brien's suggestions unless they were "degrading to yourself or the flag of the U: States,"¹⁰⁷ and although he acknowledged the degradation, Bainbridge complied with the Dey's demand, believing that the Dey

¹⁰⁵ Thomas Harris, *Life and Services of Commodore William Bainbridge, United States Navy* (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea & Blanchard, 1837), 45. David F. Long wrote this letter could only be found in the works of Harris and Dearborn, *Ready to Hazard: A Biography of Commodore William Bainbridge, 1774-1833* (New Hampshire, London: University Press of New England, 1981), 49; but David H. Finnie included an explanation about the letters saying that the letters dated December 22 and 26, 1800 could be found in Great Britain Public Records Office, Reference, F.O. 78/31 in *Pioneers East*, 303.

¹⁰⁶ Long, *Ready to Hazard*, 43.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 40.

would declare war and harm the “valuable commerce of those seas.”¹⁰⁸ Their resistance to the demand was useless and, the *George Washington* had to set sail on October 19, 1800.

All foreign vessels had to have an imperial decree from the Porte to pass through the Dardanelles but Bainbridge did not have one. To obtain it Bainbridge had to wait, but since the US had no representation in Constantinople, Bainbridge thought that “commercial jealousies” might trigger “a sinister influence” among the foreign embassies “on the subject of introducing the American flag into those waters.”¹⁰⁹ Instead, he ordered the firing of an eight-gun salute, waited for the fort to return the gesture and under smoke sailed quickly and arrived at Constantinople on November 9, a city “beautifully situated on the sides of 7 Hills gently ascending from the sea making a most beautiful appearance from the Sea.”¹¹⁰ A British traveler, Edward Daniel Clark, was in Constantinople when Bainbridge entered the port. Clark visited the Captain on the *George Washington*. In witnessing the acceptance of the American ship into the city he wrote, “*Turks* were altogether unable to comprehend where the country was situate whose flag they were to salute.” Only after the Turkish officer received an affirmative answer to “whether *America* were not otherwise called the *New World*” the nation of the ship made sense to the *Turks*.¹¹¹ The officer returned in a few hours with a lamb and flowers, a token of peace and welcome. Receiving an invitation from Ottoman Sultan Selim III, Bainbridge visited him at his palace. He

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 44; Harris, *Life and Services of Commodore William Bainbridge*, 45.

¹⁰⁹ James Fennimore Cooper, *Lives of Distinguished American Naval Officers* (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1846), 26.

¹¹⁰ London, *Victory in Tripoli*, 86.

¹¹¹ Edward Daniel Clarke, vol. 3 of *Travels in Various Countries of Europe Asia and Africa*, 4th ed. (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1817), 78.

showed a curiosity towards the US but he also revealed his ignorance of the New World. The Sultan, noticing the stars on the American flag pointed to its similarity with the Ottoman flag as an indication of a future friendship. He concluded that there must have been a similarity between the religion, laws and customs between the two countries. “To his mind, America was not a Christian nation, and thus was not like the nations of Europe.”¹¹²

Bainbridge’s visit to Constantinople was not only welcomed by the Porte, but the European ambassadors at Pera also showed great interest. They invited Bainbridge to their palaces and rendered their services to him.¹¹³ Since the US had no representative in Constantinople, Bainbridge applied to the British consulate for protection. British ambassador Thomas Bruce, Lord of Elgin, was already aware of American interest in establishing formal relations with the Ottoman Empire through his conversations with Rufus King, American Minister to London. He rendered his services to Bainbridge and offered advice about Reis Effendi who, according to Bainbridge, wished to get money from Bainbridge. While the Americans were accusing the British of conspiracy against their well-being and good relations in North Africa, they did not abstain from looking for friendly protection in a foreign land at the same time.

Starting this voyage reluctantly, Bainbridge gained the friendship of the Küçük Hüseyin Paşa. He was appointed as Capudan Pasha on March 10, 1792 and was married to Sultan Selim III’s cousin (his uncle’s daughter) Esma Sultan, by Selim

¹¹² London, *Victory in Tripoli*, 87.

¹¹³ Henry S. Dearborn, vol. 1 of *A Memoir of the Commerce and Navigation at the Black Sea and the Trade and Maritime Geography of Turkey and Egypt* (Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1819), xx.; Clarke, *Travels in Various Countries*, 79.

III's order.¹¹⁴ The Ottoman Sultan attended the wedding ceremony, which turned this event into a festival.¹¹⁵ In addition to his marriage, Capudan Pasha's accomplishments in the first months of his post increased his prestige before the Sultan.¹¹⁶ He was a close advisor and third in rank to the Sultan. Capudan Pasha's secretary Mr. Zacbe, was fluent in English and had met Benjamin Franklin in Paris, so he had information about the United States, which was both surprising and pleasing for Bainbridge. Mr. Zacbe's close attention commenced a friendship between the two and this friendship would continue for many years via correspondence. When Capudan Pasha offered his protection to Bainbridge in lieu of British protection, this was gladly accepted, and elated Bainbridge since it was considered "one of the most distinguished honors that can be conferred on the commander of a foreign vessel of war."¹¹⁷ Capudan Pasha invited Bainbridge to his palace and visited the *George Washington*. The "good conduct of American officers, the skill and subordination of the crew, the cleanliness and fine appearance of the ship" impressed the Pasha.¹¹⁸ Clark also noted that *George Washington's* "fine order" and "the healthy state of her crew, became topics of general conversation in *Pera*."¹¹⁹ In one of their conversations, Capudan Pasha informed Bainbridge that *George Washington* was the first foreign ship, which had passed the Dardanelles without a passport, and that the governor of the castle had been sentenced to death for letting it pass. Bainbridge explained how he had passed

¹¹⁴ Enver Ziya Karal, *Selim III.ün hattı-i humayunları* (Ankara, 1942), 164, qtd in Nejad Göyünç, "Kapudan-ı Derya Küçük Hüseyin Paşa," *Tarih Dergisi* 2 (1952), 36.

¹¹⁵ Nejad Göyünç, "Kapudan-ı Derya Küçük Hüseyin Paşa," *Tarih Dergisi* 2 (1952), 38.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 39.

¹¹⁷ Harris, *Life and Services of Commodore William Bainbridge*, 50.

¹¹⁸ Henry Alexander Scammell Dearborn, *The Life of Bainbridge, Esq. of the United States Navy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1931), 21.

¹¹⁹ Clarke, *Travels in Various Countries*, 79.

and advocated for the innocence of the governor, begging for his release. Accepting the explanation, Capudan Pacha was impressed by Bainbridge's honesty. He also gave him an edict to guarantee his ship respect and protection in all other Turkish ports.

Their conversations touched upon the subject of a treaty between their countries, and Bainbridge informed his government that Capudan Pacha had mentioned that a minister from the United States should visit Constantinople for that purpose.

Bainbridge informed the Pacha that William Smith, Ambassador to Lisbon, had already been commissioned and would come in a few months. Bainbridge wrote it was "a most favourable moment to negotiate a very advantageous treaty with this government. I have entered the channel and find it clear of difficulties, but, not having orders, cannot proceed."¹²⁰ Bainbridge received from Capudan Pacha a letter for William Smith. He enclosed that letter and in his own wrote of the friendly reception and attention he received from the Ottoman Pasha who "is very anxious that an Ambassador should be sent from the U.S. to negotiate a Treaty of Commerce with the Porte."¹²¹ Bainbridge thought that was a highly favorable moment because they obtained Capudan Pacha's support, being "nominally the third in the Government but in reality it is first, being nearly related to the Grand Seignior, & governs him as he pleases."¹²² Bainbridge's trust and conviction about the influence of Capudan Pasha arose from his ignorance of the Ottoman administrative system. Capudan Pasha's influence over the Sultan was exaggerated because he could not make the Sultan act

¹²⁰ Dearborn, *Memoir on the Commerce and Navigation*, *ibid.*, xxii; Harris also quoted this letter. The message given is the same although expressed in different words, *Life and Services of Commodore William Bainbridge*, 53.

¹²¹ William Bainbridge to William L. Smith, February 5, 1801 enclosed in William L. Smith to Secretary of State John Marshall, February 24, 1801, M 43, Roll 5, NARA.

¹²² *Ibid.*

as he pleased, he could only give advice and strongly recommend on behalf of the US, and depending on his power he could influence the Sultan, but could not give such a guarantee to the Americans.

Before Smith's departure for Constantinople, the President revoked his support for Mr. Smith's mission. However, extending his protection to both Bainbridge and American merchants trading with the Ottoman Porte, the office of Capudan Pacha would also play a role in the negotiation process in the future.¹²³ On the return voyage, as the *George Washington* passed the fortification at Tapaná, it was given a full salute. It was an honor granted to Capudan Pacha alone but being under the personal protection of the Pacha, the American ship received salute as the first foreign vessel of war. This occasion was interpreted as an exclusive compliment.¹²⁴

On his return to Algiers, Bainbridge informed Mustapha of the Ottoman Sultan's demands. The Dey had to liberate all the captives with British passports, remit to Turkey \$3,240,000 and declare war on France.¹²⁵ Immediately fulfilling these demands, the Dey wished the *George Washington* to return to Constantinople, but O'Brien rejected. The Dey's anger cooled off however, when Bainbridge presented the letter he obtained from the Capudan Pacha. It was a sign that the Ottoman Sultan indeed had influence over the rulers of the Barbary States.

¹²³ For details about the visit of Bainbridge to Constantinople see. Allen, *Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs*, 75-84; Dearborn, *Memoir on the Commerce and Navigation*, xviii-xxiii.

¹²⁴ London, *Victory in Tripoli*, 89; Harris, *Life and Services of Commodore William Bainbridge*, 53.

¹²⁵ Long, *Ready to Hazard*, 51.

2.6. Conclusion

The period of early American relations with the Barbary States led the American government to take definitive steps against piracy and establish a steady navy. Only after proving its naval power, did the US began to sign conclusive treaties with those States. It also became an effective force against Great Britain during the War of 1812. Another influence of the navy was the impression it created on the Ottomans. When Captain Bainbridge visited Constantinople, the American government had not yet built a navy and the *George Washington* was one of the remaining three war ships the American navy consisted of. However, it still reflected the technological advancement of the US and the good order of the crew. This first visit earned them the admiration and the friendship of the Capudan Pacha who would later be involved in the protection of American merchants in Ottoman dominions and in concluding a treaty. The contact between Bainbridge and the Capudan Pacha was the first direct meeting between the representatives of these two countries where they touched upon the subject of signing a treaty. Although Bainbridge was reluctant to go to Constantinople, and had no intention of reaching an agreement or an arrangement with the Porte to facilitate American commerce in the Mediterranean, his acquaintance with the Capudan Pacha opened a gate for future American attempts and David Offley's initiative.

The American encounter with the Barbary States was also important because it strengthened the Anglophobia common in the American public through the Barbary captivity narratives. These texts transferred the experiences of American captives who interpreted their misfortunes as being a result of British activities, which encouraged the Barbary rulers to attack American vessels and hold them under captivity until a

satisfactory ransom sum was paid. The treatment of the British towards the captives in those states also proved their enmity according to the Americans. Anglophobia would be an effective item in America's relations with the Ottoman Empire in the form of a constant suspicion about British intrigues, aimed at preventing American commercial and diplomatic activities.

Another result of the American experience in the Barbary States was the formation of a negative image about Turks. The word Turk covered many people living in a wide geography and the meaning was reduced to simply Muslim Eastern peoples. The horrors that American captives were put through defined the first impressions they formed about Ottoman peoples and lands. The influence of this negative impression will be explained further in Chapter 6 through comparison of the differences between the prejudices and experiences of American travelers visiting the Asia Minor.

The next chapter will analyze another influence of the Barbary States on the American approach to the Ottoman Porte, since during the negotiations the rulers of the Barbary States suggested the necessity of signing an agreement with the Porte prior to any arrangement with them. The first information about the Ottoman Empire and whether a treaty would be beneficial and/or necessary to the US was gathered by the Americans in the Barbary States and the Europeans who had previous experiences with that country. As this chapter presented the American experiences in the Barbary States, the next chapters will analyze the influence of these experiences until the US government formed direct and formal contact with the Ottoman Empire.

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST ATTEMPTS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH FORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE OPIUM TRADE

Bainbridge's forced visit to Constantinople was the first time the figures on the level of government came across but his suggestion of negotiating a treaty with the Ottoman Empire was not the first time that the US considered such an option. One of the priorities of the US was to form diplomatic relations and widen its commercial ties with the rest of the world through treaty agreements since it lost the privileges it had enjoyed during the colonial period. In 1784 the Continental Congress commissioned John Adams, Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin for this purpose. The Ottoman Empire was among the intended countries, but priority was given to Barbary States since they posed an immediate threat. When the representatives of these states brought up the necessity of signing an agreement with the Porte first, these three commissioners seriously considered the idea. In 1786 Tripolitan Ambassador to London, Abdurrahman, told Jefferson that their countries were at war since they had no formal relations and that in order to establish formal relations the US had to sign a

treaty with the Porte.¹²⁶ The commissioners instructed their agents to gather information on the Ottoman government and its relations with the Barbary States. In 1784, they did not approach the Porte due to insufficient funds to make a treaty, but after the negotiations began with the Barbary States, they re-handled the issue. Around the same time, Algiers also demanded an Ottoman-American treaty prior to an American-Algerian agreement.

Since the beginning Americans sought the advice and mediation of European countries to approach the Porte, which brought forward European perception concerning the Ottoman government, people and traditions. This pre-conceived understanding mingled with the American perception of the Turk inherited from the relations with the Barbary States and captivity narratives, which that prevented direct contact with the Ottoman Empire. It took more than twenty-five years for an American to finally take that step. A few years following David Offley's settlement in Smyrna, he was able to obtain privileges for American merchants from the Porte by removing European mediation.

The American government made several attempts in this period to develop formal relations with Constantinople, but these attempts could not be concluded. A conflict ridden Europe was the most important reason, American ignorance about the Ottoman Empire and the lack of any immediate necessity to push American government into entering into negotiations were also effective for the failure of concluding a treaty between the two countries in those years. However, although the premature attempts failed, they laid the foundation of the commercial relations between Smyrna and New England. This chapter will focus on the first period of Ottoman-American relations,

¹²⁶ Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 3.

particular American attempts to increase contact with the Porte and the approach of both countries towards each other. Another objective of this chapter is to explain the first years of the American opium trade to China, the infamous product of Anatolia that was introduced to the American government and possibly to the merchants after the first American consul appointed to Smyrna, William Stewart. Although the government's attempt to initiate diplomatic relations failed, it started the opium trade, which would develop into a very lucrative trade in the next decades for American merchants.

3.1. First Attempt: William Loughton Smith

When the Barbary States stipulated American agreement with the Porte, American commissioners began to gather information from experienced European diplomats who had been to Constantinople or who had previously negotiated with that power. They also questioned Americans with experience in the Barbary States about the necessity of signing an agreement with the Porte receiving opposing answers. In 1786, Jefferson had a conversation with Count de Vergennes,¹²⁷ who had resided in Constantinople for many years. Walter L. Wright emphasized the influence of Vergennes who advised to the contrary; the expense of the agreement would be great and it would not facilitate America's relations with the Barbary or provide them the

¹²⁷ Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes was "An aristocrat and career diplomat" who was also "the architect of French policy toward the American Revolution." He was the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during the Revolution and before that he was the French Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in 1755-1768. Jefferson trusted his judgment as well as his abilities in foreign relations. George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 17-18.

possibility of a cheaper agreement with the latter powers.¹²⁸ Richard O'Brien, a captive and later consul to Algiers agreed with Vergennes, that the Ottoman Sultan had no influence on the Barbary States.¹²⁹ On the other hand, Count D'Espilly, who was contacted upon O'Brien's advice, since he was negotiating a peace with Algiers at the time, urged the US government to start negotiations with the Grand Seignior.¹³⁰ The American representative at Madrid, William Carmichael, and John Lamb who was negotiating peace with the Dey of Algiers at the time, supported D'Espilly's opinion.¹³¹ Considering the opposing opinions, Adams favored the given by Vergennes, thinking that the cost of both a treaty and presents to the Ottoman court would be too expensive. The issue was dropped and the first step died before turning into an actual attempt. Although the rulers of the Barbary States claimed a treaty with the Porte was required, it is doubtful whether it would have an influence over the attitude of the Barbary States towards the US, as all the other European countries, which had treaties with the Porte, also had separate treaties with the Barbary States. If a treaty with the Porte was influential, those powers would not pay tribute to the Barbary States. Their allegiance to the Ottoman Empire did not affect their relations with the European powers, or in this case with the US. They acted like independent states in terms of their relations with the European countries and the US. Although the Porte sent warnings and *fermans* to the Barbary States when they attacked on the

¹²⁸ C.C. P. No. 87, Vol. 1, 367-370, qtd in Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 6.

¹²⁹ Richard O'Brien to ..., April 28, 1787, M 23, Roll 1, NARA.

¹³⁰ Richard O'Brien to ..., April 23, 1787, S.D.A, Dispatches, Algiers, Vol. 3, quoted in Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 6.

¹³¹ Richard O'Brien to Jefferson, June 8, 1786, SDA, Dispatches, Algiers, Vol. 3, and Carmichael to Jefferson, May 16, 1786, CCP, No. 84, vol. 5, quoted in Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 7.

vessels of foreign countries, which had treaties with the Porte, it is understood that the pirates occasionally violated the authority of the Porte.¹³²

Instead of thinking about developing commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire, the American government thought about paving the way for an easy negotiation process with the Barbary when it considered signing a treaty with the Grand Seignior. While the US faced the threat of piracy and captivity in North Africa, negotiating with Constantinople did not require immediate attention. American consul in Algiers, Joel Barlow, continued to emphasize this point in his letter to the State Department nearly ten years after this first step.¹³³ Moreover, the US was not aware of any commercial advantages it might gain with that power. One of the first hints was brought to its attention by the American consul in Tripoli, James L. Cathcart.¹³⁴ Although his suggestion went unnoticed, it was Rufus King, American minister in London, who was able to draw his government's attention onto the subject. King was an experienced diplomat, born in Massachusetts, and he knew the importance of foreign trade, but as he was not a merchant himself, he had never been in Ottoman lands and did not know anything about its commercial potential until Peter Abbott introduced it to him.

¹³² Gökür Akçadağ, "Akdeniz'de Türk-Amerikan Ticari İlişkilerinin Başlamasında Kaptan William Bainbridge'in İstanbul Seyahatinin Önemi," *Tarih Dergisi* 54 (2011), 125-126.

¹³³ Joel Barlow to the Secretary of State, April 18, 1796, M 23, Roll 2, NARA. In this letter Barlow induces on the necessity of signing a treaty with the Porte but his focus is that the Ottoman Sultan would be a deterrent for the Greek pirates in the Mediterranean and the caprices of the Barbary States more than the opportunities of the trade in the Levant. Actually he mentions that since the American business in the Levant could not support a consul there, it would be preferable to leave the consular duties to the care of the French consul.

¹³⁴ J. L. Cathcart to Pickering, April 15, 1799, SDA, Dispatches, Tripoli, I, quoted in Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 10.

Peter Abbott was born into an English family who had been living in Ottoman dominions for three generations. Being a merchant, he stated that American merchants would benefit from carrying colonial goods, such as coffee, indigo and spices to the Levant. Especially when the French Revolution and then the Napoleonic Wars disrupted the Mediterranean trade, neutral American ships would be in grand demand.¹³⁵ Abbott was very influential in convincing Rufus King to contact the Ottoman ambassador in London. After their conversation, King wrote “if *reliance can be placed on his opinion*” referring to the Ottoman ambassador, “there would *not be much difficulty in our concluding a valuable Treaty with that Power*.”¹³⁶ Abbott also insisted that the Porte would welcome such an offer from the US “whose interest could never be prejudicial to her own.”¹³⁷

The American government, on the other hand, was silent to King’s and Abbott’s suggestions. One of the reasons why King thought Abbott would make a preferable choice for concluding a treaty was his affiliation and familiarity with the Ottoman world. That is why when Abbott decided to set sail towards the US in order to pursue commercial interests and converse with the Secretary of State, King wrote a letter of introduction addressed to Pickering and followed by a second, in which he wrote “I have given no other encouragement to the voyage of Mr. Abbott” and that he was “wholly unacquainted with the sentiments of the American government” on this

¹³⁵ Peter Abbott to H. M. Bird, October 20, 1796, enclosed in Rufus King to the Secretary of State, January 24, 1797, SDA, Dispatches, Great Britain, Vol. 5, qtd in Wright, “American Relations with Turkey to 1831,” 11-12.

¹³⁶ Rufus King to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, January 24, 1797, vol. 2 of *The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, Charles R. King ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1895), 137.

¹³⁷ Peter Abbott to H. M. Bird, October 20, 1796, enclosed in Rufus King to the Secretary of State, January 24, 1797, SDA, Dispatches, Great Britain, Vol. 5, qtd in Wright, “American Relations with Turkey to 1831,” 11-12.

subject since he had received no answer.¹³⁸ However, as Wright expressed, King's confidence in Abbott was explicit because he entrusted the delivery of other important letters.¹³⁹ The French, however, captured his ship, and Abbott lost these important letters in the prisons of Verdun.¹⁴⁰

Despite the indifference of the American government, Rufus King was well convinced, and he dedicated himself to accomplishing a treaty with the Porte. He followed the events affecting the Ottoman government and thought that Napoleon's campaign on Egypt created an opportunity for the US to approach the Porte for a treaty. With the French attack on Egypt, the Ottoman Empire suffered from scarcity of rice and some other commodities originally supplied from Egypt. This scarcity "created a great demand and sudden rise in the price" of Egyptian goods, which King defined to "present a favorable moment not only for the extension of our trade in the Mediterranean, but for the conclusion of a commercial Treaty with the Porte."¹⁴¹

In this first phase of attempts of establishing commercial and diplomatic relations with the Porte, the US constantly searched for the mediation of a foreign and friendly power. King sought the aid of Britain and Russia. In his same letter to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, King stated that Foreign Secretary Lord Grenville offered Britain's "*good-offices and influence at Constantinople in any arrangement we may be inclined to make there*" and that the US could "with confidence *rely upon*" them.

¹³⁸ Rufus King to Secretary of State, November 12, 1787, SDA, Dispatches, Great Britain, Vol. 5, qtd in Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 12.

¹³⁹ Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 12

¹⁴⁰ Robert Walsh, vol. 2 of *A Residence at Constantinople, During a Period Including the Commencement, Progress and Termination of the Greek and Turkish Revolutions* (London: Frederick Westley and A. H. Davis), 342.

¹⁴¹ Rufus King to the Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, November 10, 1798, vol. 2 of *The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, 463.

Count Woronzow, Russian Ambassador to England, also informed King that “they stood well at this moment *with the Porte* [...] *and that he had no reason to doubt that the Emperor* would be inclined *not only to form a commercial Treaty with us*, but moreover *to afford us his Influence in concluding one with the Porte*.”¹⁴² The American government handled establishing relations with the Ottoman Empire in combination with the advantages of accessing the Russian market from the beginning, and thus sought Russian assistance several times. Another reason was that the American government was ignorant of Ottoman administrative traditions and culture which, depending on their experience with the Barbary States, they thought would require a mediatory power. Bainbridge, however, warned his government about foreign influence. The British could be reluctant considering “political reasons” and the Russians had “a very extensive trade in Turkish ports” but the Danish Charge d’Affaires and the Prussian Envoy could be better choices since they had no clashing commercial interest with the US.¹⁴³ Bainbridge also wrote that the US would gain much if Smith went there “in one of our best frigates” because “showing a fine frigate in that port will have a much greater effect that our Gov. can imagine, for the Captain Bashaw [...] has a passionate fondness for ships of war.”¹⁴⁴ Bainbridge referred here to Capudan Pasha’s visit on board the *George Washington* and his words of admiration about American shipbuilding advancements as mentioned in the first chapter.

¹⁴² Rufus King to Secretary of State, November 10, 1798, London, vol. 2 of *Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, 462.

¹⁴³ William Bainbridge to William L. Smith, February 5, 1801 enclosed in William L. Smith to Secretary of State John Marshall, February 24, 1801, M 43, Roll 5, NARA.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

The conflicted and constantly fluctuating affairs in Europe was one of the major factors that prevented American approach to the Ottoman Empire. Russia and England enjoyed great prestige at the time in the Porte, because they allied with that power against France. King was convinced that Britain would use this positive influence on their behalf, and emphasized this point several times in his letters. Pickering also shared King's sentiments towards the French. Wright thought the timing for such an approach was "propitious. The United States could at the same time gain commercial advantages in the Levant and align herself with the Great Powers of Europe in opposition to the spread of revolutionary disturbances. The Federalists would identify the New Republic with the solid and conservative nations of Europe."¹⁴⁵ As argued in the previous chapter, the American government drew a parallel between the Barbary States and the Ottoman Empire but it was also aware of the fact that these two entities were different to some extent. While the Americans marginalized the Barbary States as a threatening force, the Turks of the Ottoman Empire were considered with a milder perception. Establishing formal relations with the Barbary States was a necessity to end violence and protect American citizens and property, while with the Ottoman Empire, it was to elevate themselves to the level of European powers, while also gaining commercial advantages. That is why the American government always took European affairs into consideration before approaching the Porte.

Receiving King's reports, Pickering began to communicate with the Senators to gather support and obtain information about the cost of such an agreement. Pickering also contacted Robert Liston, British Minister in the US, who had spent three years in Constantinople at his former post. Liston prepared a detailed report for the costs

¹⁴⁵ Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 14.

including the travel expenses, accommodation, interpreter, servants, presents, expensive dresses for the occasions when he came into the presence of the Sultan and/or the Grand Vizier. The total estimated cost would be 6600 pounds.¹⁴⁶ Presenting the letters of King and Abbott, and Liston's reports to President John Adams, Pickering was able to obtain his approval and with the support of the Senate, William Loughton Smith, the American Charge d'Affaires at Lisbon at the time, was appointed as the first American Minister to Constantinople to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce. As Wright suggested the nomination of Smith to Constantinople placed the US in the anti-French block, which received reactions from statesmen like Jefferson.¹⁴⁷

On February 11, just before the Senate's approval, Pickering informed Smith of his appointment expressing that "this to be the fittest time to make the attempt" considering that the damaged trade of the Levant would push the Porte towards an agreement with the US, but more importantly because it received "voluntary offers" from Britain and Russia. Without trying to cloud his sympathies towards Britain, Pickering wrote "The success of the British in their own seas, in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and the good terms on which we stand with that power" plus the "friendly overtures on the part of Russia" would pave the way.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ "Conjectural Sketch of Expenses," February 6, 1799, M 179, Roll 17, NARA; 1 pound corresponded to 4.13 US dollars in 1799. For the years between 1799 and 1830, the exchange rate was \$ 3.62, the minimum and \$ 5.22 maximum, Lawrence H. Officer, "Dollar-Pound Exchange Rate From 1791," MeasuringWorth, 2016, accessed September 16, 2016, <http://www.measuringworth.com/exchange-pound/>; William Turner stated in his book that 1 Bill in London for the pound sterling was 17 piastres (Ottoman currency) in 1812, but rose to 30 piastres in 1816, in vol. 1 of *Journal of a Tour in the Levant* (London: J. Murray, 1820), xviii.

¹⁴⁷ Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 16.

¹⁴⁸ Timothy Pickering to William L. Smith, February 11, 1799.

The preparations had begun; King and Smith corresponded, a budget for the negotiations was spared, Smith was ready to go to London to converse with King and to travel to Constantinople.¹⁴⁹ However, while Pickering and King thought it would serve the best interest of the US to negotiate a treaty with the Ottoman Empire, President Adams, on the other hand, considered it unsuitable because it would mean taking a step against France. The US had to deal with the two warring countries at sea, which denied recognizing the neutrality of the US. Moreover, within the US, there were two blocks: the Federalists opposed French politics while the Jeffersonian Republicans supported French revolutionary ideas. Thus when, nine days after Smith's appointment, Adams nominated W. V. Murray as Minister Plenipotentiary to France to negotiate a treaty after the X.Y.Z. affair that led to the Quasi War, the members of his own party were surprised. Adams' step towards the betterment of American relations with France removed the function of Smith's mission. Pickering informed Smith of the developments and wrote King "After such a damning measure on the part of the United States, it is impossible that Russia and Great Britain can give us their aid in negotiating with the Porte: on the contrary, one word from them would send our minister back in disgrace."¹⁵⁰ Adams found the conflict with France more urgent than the "hypothetical" advantages of trade in the Levant, with the Ottoman Empire and Russia.¹⁵¹

Smith's mission was cancelled for the time being, but the news of his appointment reached him in early May, not through Pickering's letters but through a newspaper.

¹⁴⁹ Timothy Pickering to William L. Smith, February 13, 1799, M 28, Roll 5, NARA. Pickering informed Smith that his nomination was approved on 11th and that the budget was to be drawn by the Senate for presents and such. Pickering also advised Smith to travel to London to procure the presents.

¹⁵⁰ Timothy Pickering to Rufus King, February 19, 1799, TPP.

¹⁵¹ Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 21.

While Smith was on a tour with Pickering's son as his assistant in Portugal, he received a letter from King in which he wrote he had read Smith's appointment to Constantinople in a New York newspaper dated February 16.¹⁵² Diplomatic dispatches travelled very slowly in 1799.¹⁵³ Smith received Pickering's letters informing him of his appointment not soon enough.¹⁵⁴ In the meantime, King maintained his efforts to contact people who could facilitate the negotiation process with the Porte, one of whom was the Ottoman ambassador to London. King had a conversation with him about the advantages of a treaty and gave him a short memoir on the subject before he returned to his country. Whether the Ottoman government received this memoir is unknown since there are no records of it in the archives, but when the new ambassador İsmail Ferruh Efendi came, King also contacted him on the same issue.

King defined this new ambassador as "a more intelligent man" since he "*showed his exact knowledge* by saying, when I was first presented to him, that he was glad to see a man who came from the country of Diamonds and of Gold!!!!"¹⁵⁵ As it can be understood from four exclamation points, the Americans, who contacted Ottoman subjects with knowledge of the United States, were surprised and felt proud to some extent. A similar reaction was observed in Bainbridge's account when he realized Zacbe was familiar with the New World.¹⁵⁶ One of the reasons for this ignorance and

¹⁵² William L. Smith to Timothy Pickering, May 9, 1799, Reel 24, TPP.

¹⁵³ Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 21.

¹⁵⁴ William L. Smith to Timothy Pickering, June 12, 1799, M 43, Roll 5, NARA.

¹⁵⁵ Rufus King to William Smith, March 26, 1799, vol. 2 of *Life and Correspondence*, 590.

¹⁵⁶ Actually the first known book about the New World was written and reproduced in Constantinople in 1580s. Entitled as *Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi*, the book is one of the first examples of information transfer from West to East as it includes information about Columbus' discoveries. Although in the following years more books were published in the Ottoman Empire, in 1720s İbrahim Müteferrika reproduced

indifference towards the US was Ottoman commercial policy. Foreign trade of the Ottoman Empire was limited unlike the European countries and the US. The volume of foreign trade was no more than 2-3 per cent of the total production within the Empire at the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Interregional trade was more important than foreign trade.¹⁵⁷ In addition to interregional trade, the major part of supplies were provided from Russia and Egypt.¹⁵⁸ That is why French occupation of Egypt was seen as an important opportunity to start negotiations with the Porte.

After Smith got the news of his appointment, he began to consider his conveyance to Constantinople. For him the best option would be a new American frigate since it was the “most likely to produce a good effect on Turkish government.”¹⁵⁹ American representatives were aware of the interest of the Ottoman Empire in shipping, and their country was moving towards becoming one of the leading countries in this field. Smith’s suggestion would re-emerge in the long process of attempted negotiations between the two countries and the Americans made use of the advancements in shipbuilding to arouse the interest of the Ottoman government. Actually this would be one of the main reasons for Ottoman acceptance of a treaty with the US and one of the main conflicts after the agreement was signed, but this phase will be analyzed in the following chapters.

this book in five hundred copies but in the nineteenth century only one book was published about the American continent. It is clear that Ottoman Empire lost interest for the countries beyond Atlantic. Thomas D. Goodrich, “Osmanlı Amerika Araştırmaları: XVI. Yüzyıla ait *Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi* adlı Eserin Kaynakları ile İlgili bir Araştırma,” *Belleken* 49 (1985): 667-74.

¹⁵⁷ Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisinde Bağımlılık ve Büyüme 1820-1913*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), 16.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁵⁹ William Smith to Timothy Pickering, May 18, 1799, Reel 24, TPP.

King repeatedly mentioned the assurances given to him by Lord Grenville and he thought it was essential because “as I am informed is the custom in regard to Nations *with whom the porte has never treated*, must be made known at Constantinople by the minister of some nation with which the Porte is in friendship.”¹⁶⁰ When Smith’s appointment was written in the newspapers, King immediately went to see İsmail Ferruh Efendi to explain to him the conversation he had with his predecessor and Lord Grenville about the American intention to negotiate a treaty. İsmail Ferruh Efendi, in response, said that his predecessor communicated to him about their conversation, as well as to the Reis Effendi, “and added that if England approved, who was their *Great Ally* he thought it would be favorable.”¹⁶¹ It is understood from İsmail Ferruh Efendi’s words that his predecessor transmitted their conversation to his government and that England’s intervention would have a great influence at the Ottoman Court, if it could have been obtained.

More than two months after this conversation between King and İsmail Ferruh Efendi, the latter reported to the Reis Effendi the developments. At the beginning of June, King visited him again and told him about his instructions to inquire the appropriate way of approaching the Ottoman government and conveyance of Smith to Constantinople, and to seek his and Lord Grenville’s advice. In their conversation, Lord Grenville expressed his appreciation and stated that he would make contact with İsmail Ferruh Efendi, and even suggested that Smith could be sent with the British Ambassador at Constantinople. The following day Smith visited İsmail Ferruh Efendi, too, regarding the same issue. Although, depending on the Americans’ accounts, Lord

¹⁶⁰ Rufus King to Timothy Pickering, June 5, 1799, vol. 3 of *The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, Charles R. King ed. (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1896), 29.

¹⁶¹ Rufus King to William L. Smith, March 26, 1799, vol. 2 of *Life and Correspondence*, 591.

Grenville had given full support and offered assistance, when he invited the Ottoman ambassador to dinner they did not speak of it despite the long and extensive talk they had.¹⁶² Whether Britain learned of the developments regarding the nomination of Mr. Murray to France, although this does not seem probable, or it decided to take away the support to the US is not clear, but Lord Grenville did not assist the US in its first attempt towards the Porte.

On May 4, Pickering wrote explaining the decision he made about suspending Smith's mission to Constantinople, yet he did not mention Mr. Murray's appointment; instead he wrote the reason for suspension was:

The events of the war of France with Naples – the easy transition from the latter country to the Turkish Dominions in Europe – the feebleness of the Turkish Government – the torpidness of the European continental Powers, which opposing no effectual barrier for their own territories – will certainly not stop the march of the French to Constantinople and the very possible subversion of the Turkish Empire in Europe.¹⁶³

Pickering's frustration and disappointment concerning the suspension of the mission was partly due to the anticipated commercial advantages. As mentioned above, Pickering thought acting against the French advancement would place the US at the same level with the Great European Powers, but placing it in affiliation with France could disrupt its relations with England, towards which he felt admiration. Pickering's son was to join Smith in his assignment to the Porte but when it was cancelled, Pickering expressed his concern for his son and esteem towards Britain in his letter to Smith. Since it could be his only chance to visit Europe, Pickering desired his son to see England "of all countries in the world most worthy of an American's attention; the

¹⁶² İsmail Ferruh Efendi to Reis Efendi, 8 Muharrem 1214 / 12 June 1799, BOA, HAT 142/5898.

¹⁶³ Timothy Pickering to Rufus King, May 4, 1799, vol. 3 of *Life and Correspondence*, 12; Pickering wrote a similar letter to William L. Smith, May 5, 1799, Reel 11, TPP; and from same to President Adams, May 6, 1799, M 40, Roll 11, NARA.

birth place of his ancestors – glorious in arts and [arms?] – the most enlightened – and, his own excepted, the freest portion of the globe.”¹⁶⁴

The letter of May 5th reached Lisbon on June 18th, but as Pickering wrote, the main reason for the suspension was the French occupation of Naples, and since that situation was altered by the time he received the letter, Smith thought his mission would still continue. The situation became more favorable in order to obtain the right to trade in the Ottoman dominions, because “deprived of Egypt, depending on Russia for supplies from other parts, their policy would naturally point to America as a valuable resource; should they finally lose Egypt & be at war with Russia, our trade may soon save their Empire from ruin.”¹⁶⁵

The news of American attempts to establish friendlier relations with France spread to Russia and England. Although this move diminished the possibility of gaining their support at Constantinople, both Smith and King continued to discuss the issue with the representatives of both countries.¹⁶⁶ When both England and Russia withdrew their assurances, Pickering considered it best to put the whole mission aside, but President Adams disagreed. He denied seeking assistance from European countries in America’s negotiation with the Porte and gave instruction for the continuation of the mission. Wright, although admiring the independent and solid attitude of Adams,

¹⁶⁴ Timothy Pickering to William L. Smith, July 2, 1799, Reel 11, TPP.

¹⁶⁵ William L. Smith to Timothy Pickering, July 1st, 1799, Reel 25, TPP.

¹⁶⁶ Rufus King to Lord Elgin, August 10, 1799, vol. 3 of *Life and Correspondence*, 85; William L. Smith to Timothy Pickering, August 31, 1799, Reel 25, TPP, this letter includes an extract of a letter from Rufus King about his conversation with Count Worongow, Russian Minister in London. The latter told King frankly that under the circumstances his court would not find favorable of forming an alliance with the US and that “Russian minister at Constantinople, who possesses very great influence, would consistently with his duty oppose any negotiations your might engage in.”; William L. Smith to Timothy Pickering, September 21, 1799, M 43, Roll 5, NARA, transmitting his conversation with Lord Elgin in which he tried to convince the latter of how American intentions for forming friendlier relations with France were misunderstood.

supported Pickering, stating that “There can be no doubt that an American mission would not have prospered in the face of opposition from Turkey’s great Allied [*sic*]. Adam’s diagnosis was faulty.”¹⁶⁷ Although Pickering informed Smith of the President’s decision, when he did not answer Smith’s letter asking for further instructions,¹⁶⁸ America’s first attempt to establish formal relations with the Ottoman Empire could not be concluded with success.

3.2. Second Attempt: William Stewart & Early Trade

Although the first attempt could not be carried into effect, it nevertheless prepared the suitable conditions for the second one. Smith sent the letter of Bainbridge and Capudan Pasha to the State Department and although Smith’s role in establishing relations with the Porte ended there, Capudan Pasha’s close interest in the American mission revived another attempt. Particularly since because not long after Smith’s correspondence President Jefferson nominated William Stewart of Pennsylvania as the Consul of Smyrna, and the Senate approved the nomination immediately. On October 28, 1802, Stewart wrote the letter of acceptance to the Department of State expressing that he would write his next letter from Smyrna.¹⁶⁹

Before arriving at his post, Stewart decided to go first to Constantinople in order to introduce himself and acquire recognition from the Ottoman government, however, not having a treaty, he could not obtain presence. The American flag was the only

¹⁶⁷ Wright, “American Relations with Turkey to 1831,” 29.

¹⁶⁸ William L. Smith to Timothy Pickering, July 5, 1800, M 43, Roll 5, NARA.

¹⁶⁹ William Stewart to James Madison, October 28, 1802, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

one, which was not represented in the Ottoman Empire. He argued that if it was the wish of the US to extend its commerce to the Levant, an agreement was required and at least a Charge D’Affaires had to be present at Constantinople “to guard the national and commercial interests.” He added that, like King before him, the US needed a friendly power to prepare the Turkish ministry for an acceptance of American representative. He continued to explain the advantages of such an agreement, one of which “may appear strong to you in favor of their forming a treaty with the Porte, which is the influence, if not entire dominion which the Grand Seignior has over the Barbary States.” The American flag would be respected more in North Africa, which would enable the American merchants to have free and safe navigation, “and consequently saving the United States an immense expense, for the cost of a single frigate cruising in the Mediterranean one month would be more than adequate to the annual support of a representation at Constantinople.”¹⁷⁰ Until the US solved its problems with the Barbary States, the American authorities thought signing an agreement with the Ottoman Empire would ease their relations with those states. To what extent this point would have worked is however questionable since the Porte did not have a strong sanctioning power over the Barbary States.

The other point, which Stewart emphasized, was the commercial advantages. Being a merchant himself, he sent a detailed report back to the State Department on the Smyrna trade. “A Lucrative and advantageous trade may no doubt be established between these two countries” because Smyrna was the “general deposite of all the productions of Turkey and Egypt, as also of those of Europe, the Indies, and America, consumed in Turkey.” He observed that although there was a limited trade between the US and Ottoman Empire, with the encouragement of the government, American

¹⁷⁰ William Stewart to James Madison, April 25, 1803, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

merchants would raise their attention. He wrote that the American merchants already imported some of the most essential goods to Smyrna,¹⁷¹ except that Smyrna merchants purchased those articles in the Mediterranean ports of Europe. If the American merchants could have brought them directly to Smyrna, they would have profited greatly as they would have gotten rid of extra charges paid to the Europeans. Moreover, Carolina rice could also replace Egyptian rice in case of crop failure and codfish could have been sold if only it had arrived in October.¹⁷²

October was also the best time of the year to purchase Turkish products since the caravans arrived from all parts of the country and it was the harvest season. American merchants could obtain many products in Smyrna that could sell both in the US and/or in foreign markets.¹⁷³ He ended his letter by stating, “there is every reason to hope that this commerce, once established, would become very considerable.”¹⁷⁴ Actually two years before Stewart’s report, a letter was sent to Messrs. Derbys, West &

¹⁷¹ Among these articles are “East and West Indies sugars, Mocha, Java, and West Indies coffees, indigos of all sorts, dye woods, such as, Campeachy, Pernambuco, and Santa Martha, cochineal, pepper, pimento, cloves, cinnamon, nutmegs, and East India muslins.” William Stewart to James Madison, April 25, 1803, T 238, Roll 1, NARA; more readable version is included in House Document No. 200, 3rd Session, 25th Congress, 81. However House Document No. 200 focuses on the commercial relations between the US and Ottoman Empire, thus the full transcription is not included. For the complete letters see the original archival sources.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ “Red Sorat Copper, opium, and Russian iron in bars might be shipped to India with advantage. The latter comes from the Black sea, and is much cheaper here than in Baltic. Our hat manufacturers might make use of goats’ wool and romelia, and Natolia hare skins. Madder roots, alum, galls, yellow berries, and the gums of Turkey and Egypt might meet with a consumption in the few manufactories we have, and are already used for several different purposes in America. Our druggists are always in want of rhubarb, scammony, and myrrh, and the various drugs which abound here, and which are very cheap. The white soap of Candia is one-third cheaper, and equal in quality to that which we import from the Mediterranean. The same may be said of olive oil, which costs at least 20 per cent less than that of the same quality in France or Italy. The fruits of Smyrna are well known in the United States, particularly the figs and raisins. There are many wines which are of a good quality, particularly the red Archipelago and white Muscatel wines. There are also morocco leathers and manufactured silks in this country of a neat taste, and of different qualities, which might answer well our markets.” William Stewart to James Madison, April 25, 1803, NARA, T 238, Roll 1; Senate Document No. 200, 3rd Session, 25th Congress, 81-82.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 82.

Pickman of Salem from one of the most prominent trade houses in Smyrna, Lee & Sons, encouraging trade between the two countries. Offering fruits, which had already been “in great request” in the US, American vessels could bring all the colonial articles like American coffee, dyewoods, muslins, indigo, etc.¹⁷⁵ Trade became considerable in the next decades. This was not due to the American government’s encouragement but due to American merchants’ initiatives. It would be the merchants who pushed the government into action.

Until the end of the War of 1812, American merchants benefitted from the protection of the British consulate. The British consulate in Smyrna was taking care of the business of American merchants and there are several documents from the early nineteenth century written by the British Consul at Smyrna, Francis Werry to Rufus King about the disbursements of distressed American merchants who had received documental, medical and material aid.¹⁷⁶ In one of these letters Werry stated “The American flag was first known here in the year 1797.”¹⁷⁷ Although there are no formal records about hoisting the American flag earlier than that date, in one of his letters, Abbot mentioned the arrival of an American ship at Constantinople around 1786.¹⁷⁸ More regular reports from Smyrna about the arrival and cargoes of American ships began to come after 1797.¹⁷⁹ The first American captain that applied to Werry

¹⁷⁵ Lee & Sons to Messrs. Derbys, West & Pickman, January 25, 1801, Smyrna. Five years later, Lee & Sons were encouraging John Derby to bring those colonial goods to Smyrna, From Lee & Sons to John Derby, September 22, 1806, Smyrna, Box 2, File 5, DFP. The similarity also shows that Turkey had grown a regular appetite for the colonial goods, especially sugar and coffee, that the American merchants would have a buyer in that part of the world for those products.

¹⁷⁶ There are many letters in T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

¹⁷⁷ Francis Werry to Rufus King, May 2, 1803, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

¹⁷⁸ Peter Abbott to H. M. Brits, October 20, 1796, enclosure with King to Secretary of State, January 24, 1797, qtd in Wright, “American Relations with Turkey to 1831,” 44.

¹⁷⁹ “Account of the distressed seamen subjects of the United States of America, subsisted and taken care of by order of Francis Werry, Esquire British Consul in Smyrna known the year 1796 to 1803” T

for protection arrived with a cargo from Bengal and the latter informed that, depending on the rights provided by the capitulations between England and the Porte, he could extend protection to the American ship as the British were allowed to do so for the subjects and ships of nations that had no treaty with the Ottoman Empire. The protection included tax regulations. While British merchants paid a 3 % tax, American merchants would have to pay 6 % unless they applied to the British consulate. In return they paid consulage duty to the British which, when compared to the 6 %, was profitable. Until 1806, there are no letters or reports written to the State Department about the Levant trade or diplomatic relations between the two countries.

After spending around a year in Smyrna, William Stewart left for Philadelphia, without accomplishing anything, in November 1803. He appointed Consul for Denmark and Sweden, Robert Wilkinson as acting consul in his absence.¹⁸⁰ However, being a Philadelphia merchant, it is highly possible that he shared his observations on the advantages of the Levant trade with his merchant friends because not long after his return, James and Benjamin Wilcocks came to the Smyrna port from Philadelphia in 1804 on the *Pennsylvania*, which belonged to R.H. Wilcocks & Co., bringing

238, Roll 1, NARA. Francis Werry's reports are about the distressed seamen who received aid, so these reports do not give information about ships cargoes, but include the names of the seamen, where they board, with which ships they came and with which they were sent back, how long they stayed in Smyrna.

¹⁸⁰ Charles Folsom wrote a report about the historical background of the American trade in Smyrna in 1820 when he was sent as a secretary to William Bainbridge, to investigate the circumstances in the Ottoman Empire for a formal treaty. His report is based on the information gathered from David Offley, who although had not been in Smyrna yet, furnished Folsom with the information about the first years of trade. Folsom wrote that the amount of American trade should have attracted the interest of the government because in 1808 an American named Mr. Sloane of Baltimore was sent as American Consul, but could not obtain recognition from the Porte due to the lack of a formal treaty between the two countries. On his departure, Mr. Sloane left Robert Wilkinson to act in his place. This information was given only in Folsom's reports and depending on this the name Sloane was mentioned in several works. However, considering that the earliest date on Wilkinson's letters to the State Department, it is safe to claim the incorrectness of this information. Wilkinson was appointed by William Stewart in 1803. Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, Commander in Chief of the Naval Forces of the United States in the Mediterranean Sea, US Brig Spark, in Quarantine, Port Mahon, December, 18, 1820, Roll 68, NARA.

coffee, powder sugar, pepper, logwood and tea. James L. Wilcocks purchased 49 chests of opium for himself and Hugh McPherson, master of the ship, bought 1 chest of opium.¹⁸¹ This is the first written record of an American ship purchasing opium in Smyrna. Others followed and bought more opium in a few years. In the manifests prepared by Wilkinson for the schooner *Hazard* from Philadelphia, reported on August 24, 1805, a familiar name came up: Mr. E. Woodmas.¹⁸² Whether this Mr. Woodmas had a similar name with the one in Woodmass & Offley Co. or it is just a coincidence and/or a misspelling is not clear but around the same time, David Offley came to Smyrna for the first time as a supercargo of a Philadelphia ship, and after half a decade he opened the first American trade house in the city.

The first period of American trade in the Levant was not limited to relations between the US and Asia Minor, but instead spread to many countries. Little of the outward cargoes of the American ships leaving Smyrna reached the US, because most of the Turkey products were not consumed there. The markets in New England could not absorb all of the products, thus a major part of the figs, raisins, copper, lead, etc. were sent to European ports, such as in Italy, Malta, England, etc. American merchants profited from this carrying trade. The main product that earned them a great advantage was the opium that was sent to Chinese ports, either directly or indirectly from Smyrna.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Robert Wilkinson to James Madison, January 15, 1806, T 238, Roll 1, NARA; House Document No. 200, 83.

¹⁸² Robert Wilkinson to James Madison, January 15, 1806, T 238, Roll 1, NARA; House Document No. 200, 84. Mr. Woodmas sent coffee, rum, indigo, Havana sugars, pepper, muslins, tobacco, nankeens, ginger, logwood and muslins, and purchased safflower, goats' wool, sponges, wax, drugs, hare skins, muslins, tobacco, kid skins, goat skins, galls, cotton stuffs, madder roots, carpets, figs, currants, red raisins, Sultana raisins, all landed by Messrs. Lee & Sons; and John Williams purchased carpets, figs, red raisins, currants, Sultana raisins, honey, opium, saffron and gum copal.

¹⁸³ Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 55.

3.3. Opium: The link between Ottoman Empire and China Market

American merchants took a primary interest in opium among the other articles of Anatolia because it turned the China trade into a considerably profitable one. One of the first adventures of the American merchants after the Independence was towards China. In February 1784, the *Empress of China* cleared from New York, and arrived at Whampoa in August, as “the first American vessel to reach China” and before 1800, twenty to thirty American vessels engaged in the China trade annually.¹⁸⁴ The problem with the China trade however lay in the inability of Western merchants to supply China with any demanded articles, because it was a “most nearly self-sufficient” country. In 1793 Lord Macartney, an official British emissary, obtained the Chinese Emperor’s presence to stress the advantages of a commercial treaty, but his offer was declined since, as the Emperor replied “there is nothing we lack.”¹⁸⁵

Like other Western countries, US merchants had to rely on silver, in the form of Spanish dollars, to be able to buy tea and silk from China.¹⁸⁶ However, one article that was in demand and could not be grown in China was opium. The East India Company had the monopoly on opium trade but did not carry the crop on its own vessels, instead it gave license to private English and Indian vessels to carry the crop it produced.¹⁸⁷ The Chinese government declared opium contraband after 1729 and wanted to limit the trade of the article due to its harmful effects on people. While the opium dealers were held responsible and subject to imprisonment, banishment,

¹⁸⁴ Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820,” 425.

¹⁸⁵ Frederic Delano Grant, Jr., “A Fair, Honorable, and Legitimate Trade,” *American Heritage Magazine*, 37 (1986): 4.

¹⁸⁶ Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820,” 425.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 426.

confiscation of property and capital punishment, the smokers faced no penalty since the Chinese government found addiction was a self-punishment.¹⁸⁸ However these severe penalties were not enough to stop drug trafficking as it was maintained through smuggling.

Samuel Shaw was appointed Consul at Canton and after spending six months at the Macao port in China, he wrote his observations about the Chinese government, people and market. He stated that opium was definitely contraband and could not be legally admitted to Chinese ports; but Macao belonged to the Portuguese and by paying *douceur* or admitting the governor as partner in the business, it could be sold there if the prices were low in Canton “where it can always be smuggled with the utmost security.”¹⁸⁹ Another way was for the English merchants to keep a depository vessel among the neighboring islands with safe harbors. Chinese purchasers came to that ship, and smuggled the crop inside the country by paying twenty dollars to the mandarins a bribe for each chest.¹⁹⁰

It is understood from Shaw’s letters that the American government and merchants were aware of the profits they could make from the opium trade to China but “It is highly probable” wrote Stelle “that the decisive element in the inhibition of American entrance into the drug traffic was the disinclination of the East India Company to countenance the carriage of opium by American vessels from the Calcutta sales to the China market.”¹⁹¹ American vessels were banned by Jay’s Treaty to carry

¹⁸⁸ Turgay, “19th-Century Golden Triangle: II,” 106.

¹⁸⁹ Samuel Shaw, *The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, the First American Consul at Canton*, ed. Josiah Quincy (Boston: WM Crosby and H. P. Nichols, 1847), 238.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 238-239; he repeated the profitability of opium in the China market in 265.

¹⁹¹ Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820,” 427.

commodities between British territories in India to any port except the ones in America. Although American carrier traders participated in the trade between China and India to some extent, they were not permitted to carry opium. As early as June 1805, Thomas Handasyd Perkins asked his nephew John P. Cushing to obtain information about Turkey opium.¹⁹² He stated in a later letter that they could obtain opium from the Mediterranean at “\$ 2 pr. lb.” at which rate could earn them a great profit if the Turkey opium was “as much in repute in China as the opium of India.”¹⁹³ Another attempt was to instruct S. Burling to get “Turkey opium, but mostly Spanish Dollars, if they can be had” in return for the ship *Fortuna*’s cargo carrying white Havana sugars and nankins to Trieste the same year.¹⁹⁴ Perkins also directed Captain Charles Cabot “to the Mediterranean to procure Opium,” stating “their strong desire.”¹⁹⁵ Soon enough New England merchants, including Philadelphia, Boston, Salem, New York and Baltimore, engaged in the opium trade in the Levant, and increased their participation. There are two policies of the East India Company that enabled the American merchants to trade freely, without facing competition from the British merchants in this field. The first was that private British vessels were banned from trade between Europe and China, and the second that company vessels were banned from carrying opium.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹² T. H. Perkins to J. P. Cushing, June 19, 1805, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, *ibid.*, 116.

¹⁹³ T. H. Perkins to J. P. Cushing, September 23, 1805, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, *ibid.*, 122.

¹⁹⁴ T. H. Perkins to S. Burling, April 15, 1805, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, *ibid.*, 120.

¹⁹⁵ T. H. Perkins to Captain Charles G. Cabot, April 16, 1806, L. Vernon Briggs, vol. 1 of *History and Genealogy of the Cabot Family, 1475-1927* (Boston: Charles E. Goodspeed & Co., 1927), 405; Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, *ibid.*, 128.

¹⁹⁶ Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820,” 429.

After the brig the *Pennsylvania*, cleared for Batavia on March 6, 1805, five more vessels arrived at Smyrna in the year 1805.¹⁹⁷ The brig *Eutaw*, Christopher L. Gantt master, came from Baltimore and arrived on July 5, 1805 and left four months later, with a cargo of 46 chests and 51 boxes of opium, for Mr. John Worthington, and 2 boxes of opium for Christopher L. Gantt. This was the first American merchant vessel to engage in a direct opium trade between Smyrna and China. On July 17, 1805 the brig *Spartan* arrived at Smyrna from Baltimore and among many other products of Turkey, it purchased only 3 boxes of opium for Mr. Henry Messonia and 2 boxes of opium for Charles Chamberland, the master, and left on November 1, 1805. The schooner *Hazard* from Philadelphia arrived on August 24, 1805 from Philadelphia and purchased even less opium, 1 drum, for John Williams, the master and left on October 25, 1805. *Spartan* left for Trieste and Baltimore, and *Hazard* for Leghorn and Philadelphia. The next vessel after these two, arrived on September 30, 1805 from Philadelphia; the brig *Slyph*, Samuel Clarke master, and James S. Wilcocks supercargo. It left for Leghorn and Canton on November 26, 1805 with 33 cases of opium and 26,000 Spanish dollars besides other products of small amount. James Wilcocks turned back to Smyrna after his first visit while his brother stayed at Canton to regulate the business between these two ports. The last American vessel of 1805 arrived on October 18 from Philadelphia was the brig *Hibernia* and left on November 29, 1805 for Leghorn and Canton, but with no opium on its return cargo.

Five of the six vessels purchased opium, and while only *Eutaw* went directly to China, *Pennsylvania* and *Sylph* arrived at Canton after making a stop at other ports. The other

¹⁹⁷ Robert Wilkinson to the Secretary of State, January 15, 1806, T 238, Roll 1, NARA; the manifests of the ships arriving and leaving Smyrna can also be found in House Document No. 200, 83-85, but there are some mistakes in this typed version. For example, the departure date of *Pennsylvania* was written as March 6, 1806, although in the original document it is 1805.

two that purchased opium went to the US after making a stop in Trieste and Leghorn. Turkish opium also reached China “by the circuitous route of America” meaning that probably some or all of these vessels went to China with some or all of the opium in their cargoes after they stopped at New England. Charles Stelle came to the conclusion that *Eutaw* and *Slyph* were not the first American vessels carrying Turkish opium to Canton. In the season 1805-1806, 102 piculs¹⁹⁸ of Turkish opium were in the Canton market. Stelle wrote that the yearly calculations were arranged by season that usually ended on March 31. Thus, the opium brought by *Eutaw* and *Slyph* was not included in 1805-1806 season calculations since they arrived in June and July. As *Pennsylvania* was the only ship that purchased opium and left Smyrna earlier than that date, according to the consular reports, the first Turkish opium sold in China was carried to Canton by the said vessel.

The Supercargo of the ship *Bingham* informed the owners of the ship Willings & Francis, and Willing & Cuwen of Philadelphia about the sales of the *Pennsylvania*, which, at that moment, did not seem promising. The Turkey opium brought by the said ship did not sell at all.¹⁹⁹ William Read first travelled to Batavia, where he could not sell the opium on board due to the government regulations of the time in that port, and later went on Canton and made a sale there, though under the expected price.²⁰⁰ Willings and Francis was one of the American companies which dealt opium, but in the case of the *Bingham*, it is not known how it obtained the drug, because it was not specified in Smyrna consular reports, and it could not have obtained it from one of the

¹⁹⁸ “A picul/pecul was approximately 100 catties, or 133 ⅓ pounds, or 60 kg. Turkish opium was generally packed in chests which contained one picul of the drug.” Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820,” 432.

¹⁹⁹ William Read to Willings & Francis, and Willing & Cuwen, November 9, 1805, Canton, Box 1, Folder 3, WFP.

²⁰⁰ The letters from Read to the same about his dealing in Batavia can be found in Box 1, WFP.

above-mentioned vessels, as the earliest departure date was given October 25, 1805 for *Hazard*, but one of the first letters of Read is dated September 3, 1805 from Batavia. One possibility is that either *Bingham* or any other vessel belonging to Willings & Francis obtained opium from a Mediterranean or European port. This way of procuring opium from other ports was used by American merchants regularly. For example, John Derby tried to purchase opium from Leghorn, which was “the first opium market in Europe” and which was “in general very abundantly supplied with it.” However, in 1805, Derby received a letter from his agent there that they were unable to collect the amount Derby asked.²⁰¹

While the mystery remains to be solved, Read informed from Canton that “the quantity of Turkey opium brought here has exceeded what it has been for any former year,” probably referring to the amount brought by vessels from other countries. Two cargoes were brought before the *Pennsylvania* and they sold at \$ 800. The *Pennsylvania*, which brought the greatest supply, sold at the same price except 3 picul on hand, and finally the parcel brought by Read himself.²⁰² Considering the amount of Turkey opium, especially brought by the *Pennsylvania*, the price fell contrary to the owners’ expectations, but Read was able to make a profit; the net proceeds was \$ 11.127.84.²⁰³ Moreover there were four or five boxes of opium that were in bad quality and were adulterated with sand and mixed with old, dry and hard lumps, and thus were rejected by the purchaser and sent back to the owners, in order for them to

²⁰¹ (Legen, Purviance & Co. ?) to John Derby, August 15, 1805, Leghorn, Box 2, File 5, DFP.

²⁰² William Read to Willings & Francis, and Willing & Cuwen, November 27, 1805, Canton, Box 1, Folder 3. In another letter Read wrote almost half of the total amount of opium brought by *Pennsylvania* was sold at \$ 720, From same to Willings & Francis, January 9, 1806, Canton, Box 1, Folder 5, WFP.

²⁰³ William Read to Willings & Francis, January 9, 1806, Canton, Box 1, Folder 5, WFP.

recover their investments.²⁰⁴ Following the instructions of the owners, Read first went to Batavia, then to Canton, pleasing the owners by making “a sale of opium at a reasonable profit.”²⁰⁵ His letters also show that Turkey opium found its way to the East Indies, and other American merchants would sell the article there in the coming years.

Stephen Girard was also one of the American merchants who entered into the opium business at an early date, and who enquired about Turkey opium in other Mediterranean ports.²⁰⁶ In his letter, Girard wanted his agents and the captain of the ship to invest thirty thousand dollars, on the condition that the price would not exceed three and a half dollars, or, to invest fifty thousand dollars on condition that the price would not exceed two and a half dollars per pound English weight on good opium. He also instructed them, in case the desired amount could not be procured in Trieste, the *Rousseau* could go to other Mediterranean ports or “even” Smyrna. The reason for his reluctance to advocate going to Smyrna, the origin of Turkey opium, was the distance of that port at that could delay the departure of the ship. In this ten-page letter Girard wrote very detailed instructions on how to procure the article or how to store it, to how to act in Canton and discharge the article. One thing he emphasized was that the agent and the supercargo had to be discreet about their intention in buying the opium “in fear of rising its price.”²⁰⁷ Being aware of the recent American interest in the drug, Girard wanted them to be cautious in order to keep the price low but the price would not be the problem. His agent in Trieste informed Girard about the scarcity of the

²⁰⁴ William Read to Willings & Francis, December 10, 1805, Canton, Box 1, Folder 3, WFP.

²⁰⁵ Willings and Francis to William Read, April 14, 1806, Philadelphia, Box 1, Folder 5, WFP.

²⁰⁶ M. Hutchinson Jr., Myles M. Leveen to Stephen Girard, March 30, 1806, Roll 37, SGP.

²⁰⁷ Stephen Girard to Mr. Hutchinson & Capt. Myles McLeveen, January 2, 1805, Doc. No. 30.1-10, Letterbook 10, Roll 124, SGP.

article due to the great interest shown by American supercargoes who, “have shown such avidity to purchase opium, and have been acting so imprudently in that respect, that they have pushed the price up to piasters 21 which is extravagant.”²⁰⁸ Despite Girard’s detailed plans built upon opium, the *Rousseau* could not be loaded with the article because the amount of opium was only three or four boxes.²⁰⁹

The later letters of Robert Wilkinson are not as detailed as the ones he wrote in the year 1805. In his last letter, he stated the names, origins and destinations of the American merchant vessels but did not include their cargoes.²¹⁰ There is a significant gap in the information related to the American merchant vessels trading with Smyrna, and via Smyrna with China. To fill this gap the individual archives of the firms engaged in the Smyrna trade should be analyzed. Ottoman and East India Company sources are also essential to have a complete evaluation on this subject. Depending on the EIC archives, Morse stated that in the year 1806-1807, 180 piculs of opium brought to Canton market by the American vessels, 1807-1808, 150 piculs.²¹¹ The American opium trade to Canton was terminated in the year 1808 for a short term by the American Embargo Act. The coming years reflected the affect of the Act and due

²⁰⁸ “Extracts of Letters from Smyrna dated October 1805” within from M. Hutchinson Jr., Myles M. Leveen to Stephen Girard, March 30, 1806, Doc. No. 171.1-9, Roll 37, SGP.

²⁰⁹ M. Hutchinson Jr., Myles M. Leveen to Stephen Girard, March 30, 1806, Doc. No. 171.1-9, Roll 37, SGP.

²¹⁰ “The *Dolphin*, Benjamin Labree master, from Philadelphia and Leghorn, reported the 4th March and cleared out for Leghorn the 21st of March; the *Glory*, Thomas Moore master, arrived from Philadelphia on 27th instant, with divers merchandize.” in Robert Wilkinson to Secretary of State, April 29, 1806; “The brig *Phoebe*, Wood Abraham master, from Baltimore; the brig *Globe*, John Williams master, from Philadelphia” arrived at Smyrna with colonial produce, in same to same, June 26, 1806; the last letter of Wilkinson including details on the American vessel and cargo was about the brig (..) for Philadelphia which purchased 30 boxes of opium, and brig *Resolution*, Captain Samuel Rea, for Salem, without opium, same to same, September 22 1808. All these letters of Wilkinson are in T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

²¹¹ Hosea Ballou Morse, Vol. 4 of *The Chronicles of East India Company Trading to China, 1635-1834* (Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, 2007), 384.

to 1812 War, it was cut off for three years. Thus in the few years following the start of the American opium trade, it ended.

Stelle calculated that the value of the American opium trade in these first years was between fifty and one hundred thousand dollars, which corresponded to two to four per cent of the overall American trade to China, or five to ten per cent “if remittances of specie are left out of account.”²¹² Comparing it to the Indian opium brought by the English merchants, it was simply “insignificant.”²¹³ However it was enough to create concern among the company directors. The problem was not the amount brought by the Americans, it was the effect over the Bengal opium brought by the British, because the former “was used only to adulterate the more costly Bengal product.”²¹⁴ Their concerns were easily appeased by the company’s supercargoes who informed the directors that the amount of the opium brought by the Americans, either directly from Smyrna or via other ports, never reached the amount of the opium brought by the British and Turkish opium was considered to be of an inferior quality.²¹⁵

Moreover, as seen above, American merchants sometimes faced difficulties in selling the opium they brought. However, they found this trade profitable enough that they invested in this trade and continued after the conflicts created by the wars were solved. The small scale opium trade of the Americans in Canton would in a few decades reach a level that Russell & Company, the biggest American firm in Canton

²¹² Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820,” 433.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ David Edward Owen, *British Opium Policy in China and India* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1968), 68.

²¹⁵ Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820,” 433-34. However, Stelle wrote the information that Turkey opium was only used for adulterating the Bengal opium was probably incorrect. Since the Turkey opium was cheaper when compared to Bengal opium, it was considered as inferior, yet it was stronger than the Bengal and was preferred in the Northern regions instead of the Bengal opium.

dealing with opium, would also become the third largest firm in the Indian opium trade, British and American included, in 1840. The influence of Turkish opium over the British trade was limited, but the experience the American firms gained through the Turkey opium trade would soon begin a competition with the British firms in China.

3.4. Conclusion

Because the American government was unfamiliar with the Ottoman system, it looked for the mediation of a friendly power in its first attempts at formal diplomacy, which came from European representatives and Americans in the Barbary States. The gathered information was contradictory, while some advised for a treaty with the Porte, others opposed it. Only after Rufus King put the commercial advantages forward did the government decided to make a move under Pickering's initiative and appointed Smith. However, his mission was terminated before he travelled to Constantinople in consideration of the troubled relations with Europe. The commercial advantages claimed by King and Abbott were not just yet proven, and the US government chose to give priority to European relations. Another consideration of the American government was to obtain assistance from the Porte in its relations with the Barbary States.

The second attempt was to send Stewart, although he was able to reach Constantinople, he failed since the Porte did not recognize him. Although no direct contact was established, right after Stewart's mission, American merchants began to purchase Turkey opium and carry it to China. Following these first adventures,

American interest in the article grew so much that it consumed what was on the market and caused a rise in the prices. Another importance of Stewart's mission was the establishment of a direct accumulation of information from the Ottoman lands to the US government, thus he left Wilkinson as a representative of the American government. His letters to the State Department are an important source of information concerning the first phase of American commerce with Smyrna.

Both King and Stewart encouraged the US government to pursue a treaty with the Porte, considering the commercial advantages it offered to the American merchants. This point would be made by the Americans who would visit Smyrna in the following years as well as by David Offley, who, after learning about the lucrative business in Smyrna, decided to move to that port. The next chapter will evaluate Offley's role in the development of Ottoman–American relations, both on the commercial and diplomatic levels, through Offley's arrangement with Ottoman office holders.

CHAPTER IV

SULTAN'S GUESTS: THE ARRIVAL OF DAVID OFFLEY AND HIS ARRANGEMENT WITH THE OTTOMAN AUTHORITIES

There was no precedent whatever to follow and the success of Offley in what he now undertook must be credited to the native resourcefulness of a Yankee trader and the unexpectedness of his action.²¹⁶

In the first years of American trade with Asia Minor, the representatives of Great Britain and the Levant Company regulated the business. Due to the agreement between Britain and the Porte, the Ottoman authorities did not interfere with the arrangements between the US and Britain. American merchants did not encounter a problem in the Ottoman lands until 1810 with the *America* and *Calumet* event. Diplomatic attempts were made but failed, a small-scale opium trade was established, and the representatives of both countries began to form an understanding about each other. The most important reason for this unfamiliarity was the British protection. American vessels were using the British flag, except during 1807-1808 when they used their own flag instead while doing business in Smyrna, due to the war between

²¹⁶ Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 60.

Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire.²¹⁷ Another reason is that the American trade was mainly carried out in Smyrna port. As for the direct trade between the two countries, carrying trade was also profitable for American merchants who transported goods among several Mediterranean ports mainly Malta, Smyrna, and British ports.

Thirteen American vessels, six of them from Massachusetts, entered Smyrna from the United States between April 28 and December 1, 1809, and eleven more American vessels entered Smyrna from British ports or Malta, between March 15, 1809 and March 7, 1810. Ten American vessels cleared from Smyrna for the United States, and nine more for England or Malta, in about the same period.²¹⁸

On the other hand, American trade with other ports in the Ottoman lands was limited. The sources indicate that in September 1809, the *Telemachus* of John Crowninshield from Salem arrived at Constantinople with a cargo of Indian goods, spices, coffee, sugar, myrrh and frankincense and cleared for Malta with cordage, sail cloth and opium on board on November 21 of the same year.²¹⁹ Another vessel was the *Eleanor* of Baltimore with coffee that arrived in December.²²⁰ Neither of the vessels had any difficulty in Constantinople as they hoisted the British flag. The next year, however, two American ships caused a big problem that would negatively affect the attitude of the Levant Company towards American merchants.

In the final days of 1809, *Calumet* from Boston, E.T. Holmes master, and *America* from Salem, Joseph Ropes master, sailed for Constantinople, under the American

²¹⁷ Sir Robert Adair to Lord Wellesley, Pera, April 17, 1810, Sir Robert Adair, vol. 2 of *Negotiations for the Peace of the Dardanelles* (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1845), 30. In this respect S. E. Morison wrote that whether the American vessels used their own flag or sought the protection of another country was unknown, S. E. Morison, "Forcing the Dardanelles," 214.

²¹⁸ Morison, "Forcing the Dardanelles," 215. Morison acquired this information from the Public Record's Office, and SPFA, vol. 132, as the records of American consulate in Smyrna are scanty and inadequate in reflecting the true amount and value of the Smyrna trade.

²¹⁹ Morier's letter, January 10, 1810, SPFA, 132, qtd in Morison, "Forcing the Dardanelles," 215.

²²⁰ Morison, "Forcing the Dardanelles," 216.

flag. The *Calumet* and *America* event was the first time the Ottoman authorities interfered with American trade. The sight of these two ships in Constantinople with the American flag on the main mast and one of them painted as a war ship, triggered a change in this triangular British-American-Ottoman relations. Realizing American presence in the Anatolian trade, and thus the income that would be provided by custom duties from American cargoes, Ottoman authorities began to apply 6 % duty. The role of Britain in this arrangement, however, would cause conflict and draw reactions from the Americans, especially from David Offley who would openly accuse the British ambassadors for this increase, as he stated in his reports and letters to the State Department. Greatly influenced by Revolutionary feelings and American patriotism, Offley's approach to this settlement, and the use of British flag on American vessels in Ottoman waters and ports was firm. The atrocities before the War of 1812 were also effective in pushing Offley to take steps against British dominance over the American trade.

The arrival of Offley to Smyrna coincided with the problematic years between his country and England. The wars had a negative influence on the American trade in Smyrna as opium transactions to China stopped during the war. Offley was the first and only American merchant in Smyrna. After a short while others followed him, some even settled like Offley and some stayed temporarily, but none of them made a similar effort to change the situation for the betterment of American business in the Ottoman lands nor did any of them influence Ottoman-American relations. This chapter will focus on the first years of David Offley's arrival to Smyrna in relation to the expansion of diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries and the development of the opium trade.

4.1. Calumet and America

According to S.E. Morison, the captains chose to hoist American flag because some rival merchants at Malta warned the masters that a war was about to break out between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain. It would have been unwise to approach the well-protected capital with the enemy flag. *Calumet* brought Havana sugars, pepper, coffee, cotton, and logwood, and the latter, tea, gum Arabic, ginger, rhubarb, indigo, myrrh, and frankincense.²²¹ They arrived at Constantinople together on January 1, 1810.²²² On their arrival, British Consul-general Morier offered protection of the Levant Company, which was kindly but cautiously accepted by Charles W. Greene, supercargo of *Calumet*. Greene questioned Morier about the possibility of changing protectors in case a war broke out. To this Morier replied with sympathy and wrote he would still render his services “Subject to the approbation of the Ambassador, of whose kind and conciliating disposition you may also rest assured, from the instances he has already shewn upon every occasion.”²²³

Not long after, however, Ottoman authorities learned about the unauthorized entrance of American vessels into the capital. The main problem with the *America* was that it was painted like a frigate of twenty guns and it passed the “Dardanelles with a pennant flying at the main, and with all the parade of a ship of war” according to Sir Adair.²²⁴ He was successful in preventing the American ships and cargoes from being confiscated by Ottoman officers, but he could not convince them that the cargo was

²²¹ Ibid., 216.

²²² Ibid., 217.

²²³ Morier to Sir Adair, January 10, 1810, SPFA, 132, qtd. in Morison, “Forcing the Dardanelles,” 217-18.

²²⁴ Adair, vol. 1 of *Negotiations for the Peace*, 329.

consigned to British merchants, and thus eligible for a 3 % duty. Customs officials, on the other hand, argued that American citizens sold the goods and the duty was therefore collected from the seller. In this respect the agreement between the Porte and England did not cover the customs duty exemption for American sellers, since there was no agreement with that power, and thus, they had to pay 6 %.²²⁵ As these discussions were carried on, Greene obtained an edict permitting him to go to Odessa, with the aid of M. Palin, Swedish Charge d’Affaires. Due to the war between the Porte and Russia, the former needed a neutral ship to transfer wheat from the latter, and probably that was how M. Palin was able to obtain an edict. The embargo against the export of grain from Russia however prevented this transaction.²²⁶ Not being able to purchase wheat, the *Calumet* bought “*Moskof bezi*”²²⁷ and other products from Odessa and proceeded to return to Constantinople. Adair again argued that these products belonged to British merchants but failed to persuade Ottoman officers. This being the case, the American captains settled with Ottoman officers on 6 %.

After paying customs duty, American captains wanted to obtain *izn-i sefine emri*,²²⁸ which would let them to sail with an American flag. However, Ottoman rules did not allow foreign vessels to do business with their own flag unless there was a treaty. Officers demanded that the captains hoist the Ottoman flag instead. The captains

²²⁵ BOA, HAT 300/17797, 29 Zilhicce 1232 / 9 November 1817: the date on this document is 1817 when converted to the Gregorian Calendar, but the date of the arrival of *Calumet* and *America* was 1810. This seven-year difference could be caused by a mistake of the Ottoman clerk because the wars mentioned in the document were: Napoleonic Wars between France and England took place around fifteen years in 1800-1815; and the wars between the Ottoman Empire and Russia took place around six years in 1806-1812. However on the date of the document, 1817, the above-mentioned countries were at peace. Although the names *Calumet* and *America* are not stated in the document, the events were given in detail.

²²⁶ Morison, “Forcing the Dardanelles,” 218-19.

²²⁷ Moscovian cloth.

²²⁸ A legal permit for safe conduct.

doubted the officers' intention though, they believed that the Ottomans would confiscate and seize the ships if they sailed under the Ottoman flag. They and the crew thought about deserting the vessels if the Ottomans insisted on the hoisting of their own flag. The war between England and France damaged Mediterranean trade in addition to the war with Russia that harmed Black Sea trade. The lack of essential products was felt in the Empire. The American carrying trade was a relief in this atmosphere. Ottoman officers were also aware of the American vessels waiting in Malta to go to Smyrna, loaded with goods, but insistence on the use of Ottoman flag could deter the American captains in Malta from arriving at Ottoman ports. Considering the advantages, American vessels were permitted to travel with their own flags, but only during the night.²²⁹ After the *Calumet* and *America* event, Americans stood clear from Constantinople for a long while.

As mentioned above, the American ships maintained business in the Ottoman Empire under the British flag in order to benefit from custom duty reductions in return for consulage and dragomanage payments. The British consulate charged American merchants approximately one percent on the value of goods imported and exported on their ships for this service.²³⁰ This one percent made a total of 65,500 Spanish dollars for twelve years preceding the Porte's demand of a 6 % duty from American merchants.²³¹ It was true that American shipping did not exceed the Levant Company's trade in its first years. When compared, it was a minor nuisance to the British but it had sent the signals of a growing business. However, the consulage

²²⁹ BOA, HAT 300/17797, 29 Zilhicce 1232 / 9 Kasim 1817.

²³⁰ Morison, "Forcing the Dardanelles," 212.

²³¹ David Offley to Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, January 24, 1824, T 238, Roll 1, NARA; Morison, "Forcing the Dardanelles," 212.

payments were also important for the Levant Company to maintain the protection of American ships despite the growing rivalry. The consul-general of the Levant Company and His Britannic Majesty at Constantinople explained the advantages and disadvantages of protecting American merchants in a letter written to the British Ambassador in the same city, Robert Adair. He later forwarded that information in letter to Lord Wellesley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.²³²

To obtain more information on the volume of American trade with the Levant and whether it would pose a serious competition, Adair made contact with John Lee of Smyrna, who was a member of the famous Lee family, which was engaged in business with the Levantine community. In the same letter, he expressed his concern about Ottoman interference into the commercial arrangement between the US and Britain. The *Calumet* and *America* event attracted the attention of the Ottoman authorities and made them aware of a lucrative income channel provided by American merchants. Moreover, the peace agreement that ended the war did not abolish the conflicts between the Porte and Britain. Complaining about “the jealousy of the Turkish Government,” Adair asked about the volume of trade carried on by the British and American ships, the volume of colonial produce imported in Smyrna by British and American ships, and any other information related to British and American commerce in the Levant.²³³

Based on the information he gathered, Adair felt the need to inform Lord Wellesley and receive instructions concerning the attitude of the British government towards

²³² The original letter of Isaac Morier to Sir Robert Adair is dated Constantinople, December, 6, 1809, qtd in Morison, “Forcing the Dardanelles,” 213.

²³³ Sir Robert Adair to Mr. John Lee, Pera, Feb. 27, 1810, Adair, vol. 2 of *Negotiations for the Peace*, 287-88.

protecting American vessels, trading in the Ottoman ports, as the number of American vessels engaged in the Levant trade was increasing. Another reason was the changing attitude of the Ottoman authorities towards the British representatives and it was Adair's understanding that the difficulties would increase. He questioned whether he should continue to grant protection to the Americans and if yes, how far he should insist on this protection in case they faced a resistance from the Ottoman authorities. Mr. Lee's reply is not included in Adair's book but it is safe to suppose that he was not concerned about American rivalry because Adair found it advisable to maintain the protection. Although the number of American vessels increased, since they brought only colonial products mainly from the West Indies, they did not pose a threat to British manufactured goods. In this respect the advantages outweighed the possible drawbacks.

The American vessels' cargoes were mainly consigned to British merchants and members of the Levant Company living in Constantinople and Smyrna. The money gathered as consulage from all of the American merchants entering Ottoman ports, constituted an important item in the yearly income of the Levant Company. Since the chief staple products of Turkey had no consumption in the US, the vessels loaded with those articles stopped by Malta and England for sale of the products. The income of the American cargoes was generally remitted in bills for the payment of British manufactured goods. The only suggestion he had, based on Morier's letter, was to communicate to the American minister in London and obtain a letter addressed to the American captains and supercargoes arriving and leaving Ottoman ports, to give true manifests of their cargoes, whether consigned to British or foreign merchants and to

follow the regulations imposed by the Levant company bye-laws.²³⁴ While Britain tried to prevent American trade in the Mediterranean in the first years following American independence, by provoking the Barbary States against American merchants, it had solid benefits from American shipping to Smyrna. Both the direct financial income gained from consulage and dragomanage, and the materials they brought, served British interests. Thus the question of British protection over American vessels and seamen was put aside for a while, especially considering the fact that British protection was not the only option for American merchants. They could easily acquire a similar agreement with another country.²³⁵

The *Calumet* and *America* event disrupted the arrangement between US merchants and the British Levant Company, which had enabled the former to trade in Ottoman ports by paying a 3 % customs duty, like British subjects. It also put forward the question of British protection over the American merchants. Although the British government decided to maintain protection and keep receiving consulage, American merchants lost the privilege of a tax reduction. Adair did try to save American ships from being confiscated and to prevent them from paying the arbitrary duties imposed on the vessels of foreign nations without a treaty with the Porte. Still American captains ended up paying a 6 % duty. However, considering the whole situation, such as facing the possibility of losing all of their cargoes, it can be said that American vessels were saved by British interference.²³⁶

²³⁴ Robert Adair to Lord Wellesley, Pera, April 17th, 1810, Adair, vol. 2 of *Negotiations for the Peace*, 30-33.

²³⁵ Ibid., 31.

²³⁶ Morison, "Forcing the Dardanelles," 213. Depending on British sources, Morison argued that if it were not the Morier's and Sir Adair's interference, the American vessels would have paid an amount between ten and twenty percent.

Wilkinson described the *Calumet* and *America* event similar to Adair's narration in his letter to the Secretary of State. He held the Ottoman authorities responsible for demanding a 6 % duty. He also stated that the authorities had intended to seize both ships "all on a sudden." He wrote that the British minister in Constantinople was doing his best to assist the American captains, but it was the Reis Effendi who rejected Adair's interference; "he [Reis Effendi] declared that neither the British, nor any other European mission have any right to protect the American ships and their commerce."²³⁷ While Wilkinson reported the events, he neglected to write the main reason behind their action, that the captains used an American flag instead of a British one.

American interpretation of this event, however, was different. It is not clear why Wilkinson's letter or Adair's version was ignored but it is possible that the American narration preferred to draw attention to British intrigues and ill-will instead of admitting to its own mistakes and ignorance of Ottoman rules. Another possible reason was the memories of British intervention in American dealings with the Barbary States. They already had experienced British malice and intent of harming American commerce during its encounters with the Barbary States, thus questioning Britain's motives at this time was probably thought unnecessary by Americans such as Henry A. S. Dearborn, a prominent author of his time. He was one of the first who implied that British atrocity was the main reason behind the misfortunes faced by American captains. He held Adair responsible for preventing the *Calumet* and *America* from passing the Dardanelles and for exacting double the amount of duties. Moreover, when he learned of the sail of the *Calumet* to the Black Sea, Dearborn

²³⁷ Robert Wilkinson to Robert Smith, Secretary of State, Smyrna, September 15, 1810, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

argued that Adair pushed the Porte into sending a sloop of war to stop it. However, the *Calumet* was able to escape and reached Odessa where Mr. Greene met the governor, the Duke de Richelieu. The Americans were welcomed and the Duke expressed his will to open commercial relations between the US and Russian ports in the Black Sea. He gave Mr. Greene a letter for the Russian minister in the United States for this purpose, which was seized by Stratford Canning, successor of Adair as Charge d’Affaires. Due to British intrigues that caused “the disastrous results,” American merchants were discouraged in making another attempt at opening Black Sea commerce until 1828.²³⁸

In the coming years, David Offley also accused the British. Referring to the 6 % duty paid by American vessels, he wrote “when the English merchants found the exclusive management of American interests in this place was no longer to remain within their hands, and that if they could induce the Turks to refuse admittance to our vessels or place material obstacles in their way that they would then supply this country with colonial produce without a competitor.”²³⁹ Offley was convinced that the British (and sometimes another foreign country) were behind almost all of the troubles that the Americans encountered in the Levant. In opposition, Wright stated that the records did not support the argument that the British played a role in impairing American interests in the Levant. “It is probable that the Yankees, as newcomers in that region, took an attitude toward their rivals in trade,” wrote Wright to stress the enmity between the two countries as the main reason behind American distrust.²⁴⁰ British merchants did not compete with American merchants with colonial goods, and in the

²³⁸ Dearborn, vol. 1 of *Memoir on the Commerce and Navigation*, xxiii-xxv.

²³⁹ David Offley to John Quincy Adams, January 24, 1824, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

²⁴⁰ Wright, “American Relations with Turkey to 1831,” 52.

1810s American trade did not reach a point where it threatened British commerce in the Levant. When Offley came to Smyrna, Wilkinson was still acting consul of the US and thus it is highly probable that he learned about Wilkinson's letters, but although he did not witness the events himself, he chose to depend on his own perception. The American representatives who later visited the Ottoman Empire in order to collect information used Offley's account, as they met him in person while Wilkinson's letters were waiting among others in the State Department archives. This distorted version would affect American attitude towards both Britain and the Ottoman Empire, both preceding and during the agreement negotiations. Moreover, Offley's patriotic prejudice would become a strong motive for his efforts to improve the position of American merchants and increase American trade.

4.2. Offley's Arrangement and American Trade

Wilkinson continued to carry out his duties as American acting consul and he also encouraged the US government to initiate an agreement with the Porte in his letters to the State Department. Since the peace between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, American trade had increased, and it would be in the interest of the US government to pursue an agreement. However, he was advised by Danish Charge d'Affaires, that it would be wise for the American representatives to come as travelers in order to hide their intentions, for the purpose of keeping the European countries uninformed.²⁴¹

Soon after the *Calumet* and *America* event, Wilkinson received another letter regarding the duties to be applied on American vessels. The Ottoman government

²⁴¹ Robert Wilkinson to Robert Smith, Smyrna, September 15, 1810, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

determined to receive a 6 % duty from all American vessels arriving with inward and outward cargoes in the future.²⁴² How much this decision influenced American trade, however, is unclear. Even after the execution of this new rate American merchants carried their business under the British flag and benefitted from British protection. American merchants were content with the service they had been receiving from the British consulate and did not want to terminate it due to a 3 % increase. Actually the British consulate was taking care of almost all of the bureaucratic procedures of American merchants. Since the US had no treaty with the Ottoman Porte, American citizens had to seek protection from a European consul, instead of depending on the American acting consul who had no authority. The only function of the latter was to assist distressed American seamen in case of need and accept the applications of American merchants to swear their cargo certificates. Wilkinson expressed the attentive and conscientious care shown to the American merchants by the British consul in his letters as another disruption of the function of an American consulate in Smyrna.²⁴³ There is no indication that a change did take place in the attitude of the British consul towards American citizens after the *America* and *Calumet* event.

After the news reached Smyrna, Wilkinson stationed a watch boat in the gulf to warn the American vessels approaching the port. He advised them to hide their colors and use the British flag instead. This practice produced effective results since no American citizen was subjected to further investigation about the vessels' origin. Although Americans had complained and been disappointed about the ignorance of the Ottomans, this time their ignorance worked to the benefit of the Americans. As Wilkinson stated, the Ottoman authorities generally confused the Americans with the

²⁴² Robert Wilkinson to Robert Smith, Smyrna, October 20, 1810, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

²⁴³ Robert Wilkinson to James Madison, Smyrna, January 15, 1806, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

English due to their appearances and common language, culture and history and since the authorities took them as British citizens, they did not ask for their papers.

However, he warned, the circumstances could change any moment because “when several American vessels accumulate in their ports, [the Ottoman authorities may] take a similar sudden determination in stopping them, and demand ten to twenty per cent” because “no doubt some busy people will be intriguing.”²⁴⁴ It is unlikely that Wilkinson here pointed fingers to a British intrigue. More probably he was worried about the inconsistencies of the Ottoman authorities, because in his next letter he explained how this new arrangement worked smoothly with the British authorities:

All the American vessels that arrive hoist English colors, and no questions are asked about them by the Turks, and they are not subject to high dutys. The English agents in the Levant are authorized by the treaty with the Turks to protect vessels and property of any nation coming into the ports under British colors, and the property only liable to the same duties which the English pay.²⁴⁵

American merchants avoided new sanctions brought upon them by the Ottoman authorities with the help of the British consulate, however, this side arrangement did not last long. Adair’s concerns about protecting American citizens were discussed by the British and since they wanted to keep good relations with the Ottoman Empire, they refrained from interfering with the Ottoman authorities’ dealings with American citizens in the Levant. On the other hand, Anglo-American relations were deteriorating and American trade was growing in the region. Considering all of these factors, the Levant Company decided to end its arrangement with the American merchants. A few months after Wilkinson had sent the above letter, he was informed that the British consulate would prevent American vessels from using the British flag.

²⁴⁴ Robert Wilkinson to Robert Smith, Smyrna, October 20, 1810, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

²⁴⁵ Robert Wilkinson to Robert Smith, Smyrna, December 29, 1810, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

American citizens and cargoes would be protected, but the British consulate would not interfere with the double duty to be paid by American merchants, nor in any other way that might result in opposition for the Porte. These instructions were not limited to the Smyrna port as all the other British representatives would receive the same instructions.²⁴⁶ The Levant Company's resolution of August 30, 1811 clearly set the limits of taking this decision: "It is not consistent with the interest of the Company, nor with those of the Country at large, to endeavor to protect a trade carried on from British ports to the Ports of the Grand Seignior, upon foreign Bottoms, whilst those ports are open to British vessels."²⁴⁷ Wright argued that this decision was taken under the influence of British ship owners who were complainant of protecting American vessels as it harmed their business.²⁴⁸

In the coming years, Americans would accuse the British government and the Levant Company of being prejudiced against American commerce and of being jealous of America's new commercial independence, when in fact Britain was looking after its own merchants. Charles Folsom came to the Ottoman Empire in order to gather information, by the directives of the American government in 1820. He visited David Offley in Smyrna, "a highly respectable citizen of the U. States resident in Smyrna as a merchant, for politely aiding my inquiries and furnishing me with more full and authentic information than I could have derived from any other source." Through Charles Folsom, Offley's account of the events, his understanding and his prejudices were transferred to the State Department. Depending on Offley's narrative Folsom continued to report that the Levant Company began to lose profits in 1811 when

²⁴⁶ Robert Wilkinson to James Monroe, Smyrna, May 20, 1811, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

²⁴⁷ Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 55.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 56,

Woodmass & Offley was established and “a loud clamour was immediately raised against the growing importance of our trade.” The British government sent instructions to Smyrna consul not “to interfere between the citizens of the United States and the Turks, should the latter raise the duties on the cargoes of American vessels.” These instructions were very clear and sent not only to the Consul but also carried a message to the Ottoman authorities because “Little persuasion was now necessary to induce the Turks to demand higher duties, and they were accordingly raised to six per centum on all merchandize imported and exported in American vessels.”²⁴⁹

The British government and the Levant Company considered the question of supporting American trade in the Levant before the *Calumet* and *America* event, which fired the issue by revealing the problems between the Porte and England. The inquiries made at the time did not mark American commerce in the region as threatening to British commerce, on the contrary the latter benefitted from the former. However, Folsom’s report, which reflected Offley’s opinion, focused on British actions as the only determinant behind the Porte’s decision to raise duties, triggered by jealousy and ignoring the fact that the Ottoman authorities were responsible and that the British representative in Constantinople made an effort to save American vessels. The belief in British intrigues would be repeated again and again in the reports and letters of American agents, shaping the policy of the US government’s and the representatives’ approach towards the Ottoman government. They were misled by these reports and they were so consumed with their prejudices against Britain that they were unable to understand the Ottoman Empire.

²⁴⁹ Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, December 18, 1820. Bainbridge transmitted Folsom’s report to Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy enclosed in January 10, 1821, M125, Roll 70, NARA.

The new regulations again stirred up the necessity of signing an agreement with the Porte. American Charge d'Affaires in London, J. S. Smith, emphasized the "propriety of some Agency of the United States at Constantinople, as the protection which has been heretofore extended by the British Legations to Americans and their property is no longer permitted by the Ottoman Court."²⁵⁰ A later letter placed the British on the position of the accused since it suggested that American merchants were deprived of their advantages "depending on the interest, or jealousy or caprice of the accommodating power."²⁵¹ Although American representatives in Britain were again discussing the function of an agreement, their thoughts were not actualized due to the War of 1812. In the meantime, David Offley made a personal agreement with the Porte, which regulated American business in the Ottoman lands. The American government, however, did not approach the Porte while fighting a war with Great Britain.

In order to force American merchants to pay a 6 % duty, the authorities began to seize their cargoes. David Offley was also subject to the new regulations yet he thought that this new exaction was not authorized by the government and instead was applied only in Smyrna.²⁵² When he refused to pay the demanded amount, his property was seized. Taking this as an aggressive act of the British against American merchants and believing that explaining the conditions to the Ottoman authorities in person would change the regulations for the betterment of American trade, David Offley travelled to Constantinople. His aim was to arrange a direct meeting with Ottoman authorities

²⁵⁰ J. S. Smith to the Secretary of State, October 22, 1811, SDA Dispatches, Great Britain, qtd in Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 56.

²⁵¹ Jonathan Russel to the Secretary of State, March 30, 1812, SDA Dispatches, Great Britain, qtd in Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 57.

²⁵² Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, December 18, 1820. Bainbridge transmitted Folsom's report to Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy enclosed in January 10, 1821, M125, Roll 70, NARA.

without a mediator. He made a personal application to the government but spent three months in the capital during which, according to his own account, “every difficulty had been and was continued to be thrown in our way.”²⁵³ “Treating with a government like the Turkish” was already challenging, moreover, the opposition of the British Minister at Constantinople, Mr. Canning, obstructed Offley’s efforts. As Offley obtained the opportunity of addressing Ottoman high ministers, which was a favor granted to foreign ministers and not to individuals without title, the European inhabitants of Pera conjectured him as an official American agent there to negotiate an agreement. It is possible that Ottoman ministers were influenced by these speculations since they repeatedly expressed “their surprise and displeasure” about the US government’s negligence of sending an agent to Constantinople. Their insistence of maintaining a 6 % duty finally pushed Offley to take a final step against this regulation: he threatened the ministers of reaching out to the Sultan himself on his way to mosque on Friday.²⁵⁴ Tradition in the Ottoman Empire was that the Sultan accepted petitions from people on his way to mosque on a Friday. It was an important ceremony that enabled the people to reach the Sultan and made him aware of their problems, complaints and conditions. Generally the grand vizier was responsible for tracking and correcting these petitions, and the Sultan himself attached a great deal of importance to this duty. There are examples in the history of the Ottoman Empire when the Sultan scorned and reacted strongly to the grand vizier’s negligence.²⁵⁵ That is why Offley’s bold step had the desired effect on the Ottoman ministers, and he obtained a personal arrangement.

²⁵³ David Offley to John Quincy Adams, January 24, 1824, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

²⁵⁴ Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, December 18, 1820. Bainbridge transmitted Folsom’s report to Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy enclosed in January 10, 1821, M125, Roll 70, NARA.

²⁵⁵ Mehmet İpşirli, “Cuma Selamlığı,” Vol. 8 of *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: 1993), 90-92.

This incident was the first of Offley's accomplishments that would continue in the following years. However, it would be unjust to call it just a lucky or desperate effort on Offley's part. Instead by combining his experience in doing business with the Ottomans and his resourcefulness with insight, he managed to accomplish what he came for. As David Finnie stated;

The wisest of the Americans were those who adapted to its unfamiliar rhythm while maintaining their own identity. As long as their Government shunned all political involvement, the opportunities for effective influence by individual American were necessarily limited. Those who succeeded best were those who became the most acclimated: David Offley, Foster Rhodes, and William Thompson.²⁵⁶

Without the interference of his government, Offley, singlehandedly, obtained the first commercial advantages from the Ottoman government, no matter how insufficient he was in interpreting the meaning of this arrangement: "It was now evident that the new duties had not been levied by the authority of the sovereign."²⁵⁷ The Ottoman Sultan did not ratify each and every decision taken by the *Divan* members, but it did not devalue the validity of the edicts. Moreover this practice was quite common in the Ottoman bureaucratic and legal process. Ignorant of this, Offley was not able to capture the functioning of the Ottoman government system, yet he was still right to guess correctly that the ministers would not want this issue to reach the Sultan's ears. The ministers were stressed because once the Sultan heard about American business, he would personally question the issue and probably learn some of the other suspicious and inconvenient deeds of the ministers. It was commonly desired by the ministers to keep the Sultan away from diving into the state business, and Offley was

²⁵⁶ Finnie, *Pioneers East*, 272-273.

²⁵⁷ Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, December 18, 1820. Bainbridge transmitted Folsom's report to Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy enclosed in January 10, 1821, M125, Roll 70, NARA.

courageous and lucky enough to use that. As a result of his meetings with the Director of Customs and the Dragoman, the duties were fixed

on the value of the merchandize usually imported from the U. States which do not average 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ per centum. The duties fixed on exports, though more considerable, are yet not higher than those paid by the most favored nations, averaging 4 per centum, but on the principal articles exported to the U. States, not amounting to more than 3 per centum.²⁵⁸

This confirms that American merchants would pay the same amount as the most favored nations with a formal treaty. The only difference was in the amount of “ten per cent on the duties paid to the custom-house, rendered as a gratuity to its officers.” American vessels had to pay only 15 % and that was much less than the consulage paid to the British consulate.²⁵⁹

Taking courage from his success in the *Divan*, Offley took one step further to renounce the protection of a European nation while maintaining business in Ottoman lands. Upon his return to Smyrna, Offley shared this idea with his fellow countrymen, captains, supercargoes and masters, who were at that moment in the city in charge of property, but he could not find support. The reduction in duties granted by the Porte did not exempt American merchants from seeking the protection of a European country, and for this reason they were still paying consulage. Besides the financial burden, Offley thought it would be unwise to expect nothing but “jealousy and opposition which naturally spring from commercial rivalryship.” The other American merchants were either persuaded that a European shield was required or feared from drawing a “more open and determined hostility” of the Levant Company.²⁶⁰ Offley

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ George Bethune English to John Quincy Adams, December 27, 1823, House Doc. 250, 22nd Congress, 1st Session, 14; Wright, “American Relations with Turkey to 1831,” 61-62.

²⁶⁰ Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, December 18, 1820. Bainbridge transmitted Folsom’s report to Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy enclosed in January 10, 1821, M125, Roll 70, NARA.

put every effort to convince them but they were determined that paying consulage would be better for obtaining, what Offley called, “imaginary protection against imaginary dangers.”²⁶¹ As he was unable to persuade American merchants and attract the attention of the American government, Offley decided to terminate his business in Smyrna. Folsom wrote he did so because not being able to maintain business under his flag hurt his “national feelings,” especially after 1812 as it made “dependence [on the British flag] everyday more irksome.”²⁶² However it should also be noted that while Folsom prepared this report, he was highly influenced by Offley, as he assumed the accuracy of Offley’s account, without even considering that the American trade in the Levant completely stopped during the War of 1812. I had not been Offley’s decision, and it would be absurd to assume that, since he left his country to establish a business in the Levant, seeing the opportunities it offered to the American merchants.

4.3. 1815: Finally Free from British Protection

Offley wrote “It was until the year 1815 that I succeeded to save our nation from this degradation and its citizens from so great an expense, and it is with great pleasure I can assure Your Excellency that since that period no instance have occurred wherein an American citizen has been injured in either person or property.”²⁶³ American ships could not travel to the Levant under the British blockade and pass Gibraltar and Malta during the three-year war. The growing trade ended suddenly, but after the Treaty of

²⁶¹ David Offley to John Quincy Adams, January 24, 1824, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

²⁶² Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, December 18, 1820. Bainbridge transmitted Folsom’s report to Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy enclosed in January 10, 1821, M125, Roll 70, NARA.

²⁶³ David Offley to John Quincy Adams, January 24, 1824, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

Ghent, the obstacles before the American merchants had been removed. They restarted visiting the Smyrna port, this time without paying consulage. There were two reasons for this: England rejected to extend protection to American merchants and secondly, Offley managed to obtain concessions from the Ottoman authorities and to persuade other American merchants to follow his initiative.

Taking the time as a “favorable moment” for pursuing his goal, Offley obtained presence before the Governor of Smyrna, Katipzade Mehmet Bey, and shared his intention of renouncing British protection. During the War, Offley had cultivated the “good-will” of the Turkish authorities and it paid off when he expressed his intention to entrust his person and his property in the city to the Governor’s guardianship. This was again an unusual act; no other foreign merchant ever came with such a proposition. Addressing to the “pride” of the Governor, Offley received a favorable answer; “he could have chosen no protection more efficient or more generous than that of the Grand Seignior, who could not fail to be well-pleased with the preference thus bestowed on the Sublime Porte.” After obtaining the Governor’s approval, Offley immediately sent word to the two American vessels waiting at the harbor at that moment and processed their business and papers without foreign interference.²⁶⁴ Since then, May 1815, American merchants did not pay consulage and dragomanage to the British Levant Company, which would be approximately 55.839 \$ in eight years at the time he wrote to the State Department about the developments in the American commerce in the Levant since his arrival in Smyrna.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, December 18, 1820. Bainbridge transmitted Folsom’s report to Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy enclosed in January 10, 1821, M125, Roll 70, NARA.

²⁶⁵ David Offley to John Quincy Adams, January 24, 1824, T 238, Roll 1, NARA. The information that the arrangement with the Governor was made in May 1815 was taken from Charles Folsom to William

The importance of David Offley's accomplishments cannot be ignored. As the only American resident merchant in Smyrna, he realized that his advantages were in parallel with his country's, thus he made an effort to increase the prestige of the United States and obtain concessions from the Ottoman government that would facilitate American commerce in the Levant. Although the American government did not pursue the initial attempts to sign an agreement, American representatives and merchants in different parts of the world, including Offley, sent letters to the State Department emphasizing the advantages of the Levant trade. In Offley's arrangements, however, the American government did not have any influence.

In the early nineteenth century, the US signed treaties with many countries establishing and extending trade, and in almost all of these cases it was the work of the American merchants that led the government to take action. Offley's case was not unusual in this respect. Although he could be described as a typical American merchant, Offley's methods were unusual for the Ottoman authorities. He did not know much about the Ottoman government but he was informed, wise and careful enough not to offend the authorities. It is not known how much Offley himself was aware of American entanglements in the Barbary States, but the experiences gained there created a prejudiced perception concerning the Turks and also prepared the American government to deal with an Eastern bureaucracy. Despite the familiarity though, both Offley and other American representatives would express their surprise, displeasure and disapproval of the Ottoman way of doing business. The European countries were accustomed to their way and their representatives had already adapted themselves. Americans would also learn how to adjust to the Ottoman system during

Bainbridge, December 18, 1820. Bainbridge transmitted Folsom's report to Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy enclosed in January 10, 1821, M125, Roll 70, NARA.

their encounters with the bureaucrats. The first examples of which can be seen in Offley's attempt in Constantinople and his approach to the Governor. Offley took another impressive step in 1816.

In September Capudan Pacha Koca Hüsrev came to Smyrna to punish the Governor who had been accused of corruption. The Governor was arrested and immediately put to death. George Barrel's account, however, provides other reasons or rumors found floating through the city. A few months previous to his arrival, Capudan Pacha visited the Governor and brought "an elegant fowling-piece" as a gift. Requesting his company on the next day, Capudan Pacha left the Governor. Unsuspecting the Governor accompanied the Capudan Pacha to the shore and was then forcibly carried onto a frigate, where he was beheaded. Although the governor had been able to rule the city for around twenty years, the Grand Seignior ordered his removal several times and each time he was able to dodge the bullet. Many governors were appointed to displace him, but none dared to challenge Katipzade Mehmet Bey, or his janissaries. Through his spies, he learnt whenever the Sultan issued a *ferman* for his death and left the city, as he also did whenever a more powerful man arrived. This time, however, he placed his trust in his friendship with the Capudan Pacha. According to this American gentleman, the Governor was accused of "being excessively cruel to the subjects of the Empire – this is true- for whenever he took a fancy to the wife, sister, or daughter of a poor Greek, or Armenian, he would order her without any ceremony." He even punished the relatives of the women, if they complained. Another matter of accusation was his religious beliefs. Depending on his close relations with the Franks, and his fondness of alcoholic beverages, he was thought to be a Christian. "His death, which may be considered a *natural one* to great men in

Turkey, caused no disturbance in the city. The Franks regretted his decease – the residue of the inhabitants rejoiced at it.”²⁶⁶

After the incident, Capudan Pacha received a welcome from the Consuls and notable European citizens residing in the city as was custom. Having no US Consulate in Smyrna, David Offley sent a letter to Capudan Pacha, explaining the situation and expressing his desire to meet him, along with other American shipmasters and supercargoes who were in the city, at the time. An appointment was given for the next day and Capudan Pacha “treated [the Americans] with the distinction usually shown only to the Consuls of other nations, which, as great importance is attached to it in Smyrna, was peculiarly gratifying.” In the meeting Offley explained his personal arrangement with the deceased Governor. Since it was not written and official, he asked for Capudan Pacha’s view, who reassured him that the arrangement would continue as it was. Furthermore, he was honored by the utmost importance and confidence given to him by the Americans in choosing the protection of the Porte over some other European nation. On their departure, he asked for another interview with Offley, which took place the following day.²⁶⁷

Christopher L. Gantt, master and supercargo of the *Wabash*, belonging to Smith and Buchanan, attended the first meeting with Offley and had a conversation with the Capudan Pasha. Soon after he sent a letter to his brother including his opinions on the Smyrna trade. He stated, in that letter, that Americans paid more duties than other countries, referring to the extra 15% according to Offley’s arrangement and that a

²⁶⁶ George Barrell, *Letters from Asia, Written by a Gentleman of Boston to his Friend in that Place* (New York, A. T. Goodrich & Co., 1819), 16-17.

²⁶⁷ Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, December 18, 1820. Bainbridge transmitted Folsom’s report to Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy enclosed in January 10, 1821, M125, Roll 70, NARA.

representative from the American government was expected by the Capudan Pasha in order to eliminate the extra amount.²⁶⁸ He also sent a similar letter to Smith & Buchanan in which he explained the recent regulations obtained by Offley who

has well supported the American character here as also at Constantinople having had much trouble in bringing about all adjustment of the duties which I conceive he merits the thanks of our government as well as merchants trading here & I am convinced in the event of a treaty a more proper person could not be found to represent us as our Consul at this Port.²⁶⁹

General Samuel Smith of Baltimore forwarded Gantt's letters to Secretary of State James Monroe, in order to draw his attention towards signing an agreement with the Porte, and conversed with the President Madison. Smith started his career in a counting house, sailed as a supercargo when he was 20, fought in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, later served as a congressman, senator, Secretary of the Navy, and was also a merchant engaged in the Smyrna trade during the early nineteenth century. Without waiting for the President's decision, Smith sent M. J. Jaussaud, an American by naturalization, to the Ottoman Empire as, Wright called, a "secret agent" to gather information. Jaussaud could not obtain Offley's trust and was unable to get as much information on the subject as he intended. His reports back to Buchanan, thus, represented Offley as an inadequate representative and criticized Offley's arrangement, arguing that instead of making a separate arrangement, Americans could have benefitted more by seeking protection under France or Russia. In response to this argument, Wright wrote the affairs of Europe would cause trouble for American merchants, because, for example Russia was at war with the Porte at the time and associating American business with a current enemy of the Ottomans would

²⁶⁸ Christopher L. Gantt to his brother John, October 15, 1816, Smyrna, enclosed in Samuel Smith to James Monroe, January 12, 1817, M 179, Roll 36, NARA.

²⁶⁹ Christopher L. Gantt to Smith & Buchanan, October 14, 1816 Smyrna, enclosed in from Samuel Smith to James Monroe, January 12, 1817, M 179, Roll 36, NARA.

harm rather than protect business venture. Jaussaud later travelled to Constantinople, conversed with the French Ambassador, met the Dragoman of the Porte and sent all the information he gathered to Smith, who was unable to have the government to take action.²⁷⁰

In the meantime, Offley in Smyrna was still working to improve conditions for American merchants. In the second meeting between David Offley and Capudan Pasha, the focus was on the lack of a treaty between the two countries. Capudan Pasha expressed his surprise that the US government never sent a formal and fully authorized representative for this purpose. His familiarity with American sea power influenced his attitude towards Offley. He was especially eager for a treaty because he wanted to benefit from American advancements and competence in marine technology. He remarked that his department would principally handle the issue of a treaty when such an offer came from the US, and assured that the Americans would not experience any trouble in forming a treaty advantageous to both countries. Before he left the city, Capudan Pasha gave an edict to Offley addressed to the Governor of Smyrna, judges and authorities in the custom house “in which he styled Mr. Offley ‘his friend the Consul of the Americans,’ with an injunction that he should be respected as such in all affairs regarding his countrymen, and that kindness should be shown and assistance afforded to him on all occasions.” In another edict he appointed a dragoman under Offley’s service.²⁷¹

The Capudan Pasha’s close concern to Offley was based on Captain Bainbridge’s visit to Constantinople. Koca Hüsrev Paşa worked under Küçük Hüseyin Paşa (the

²⁷⁰ Wright, “American Relations with Turkey to 1831,” 78-81.

²⁷¹ Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, December 18, 1820. Bainbridge transmitted Folsom’s report to Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy enclosed in January 10, 1821, M125, Roll 70, NARA.

Capudan Pacha during Bainbridge's visit) as his sealer (*mühürdar*) and chamberlain (*kethüda*). He shared his mentor's views and supported Ottoman modernization under Selim III and Murad II, who would appoint him as Seraisker Pacha in the following years and sought his assistance in establishing the new army. Koca Hüsrev Paşa was appointed Capudan Pacha on January 12, 1811 for the first time and he maintained his duties until February 1818. His second appointment to the same position would be on December 9, 1822.²⁷² Behind his supportive attitude towards the Americans there was the idea of modernizing the Ottoman navy, which could benefit from American naval advancements and industry. He had a strong influence over the Sultan and could use this influence during the negotiations.

Another important point in the conversation that passed between the Capudan Pacha and Offley was the recognition of David Offley as the Consul of the United States. Robert Wilkinson was acting consul in those years, taking care of the business of American merchants and distressed seamen, when needed. However, he was not recognized officially by the Ottoman authorities, and there is no record of Wilkinson being present in the meeting that took place between the Americans and the Capudan Pacha. In this respect, the year 1816 was when David Offley was recognized as the person-in-charge in the Ottoman Empire, although it would take seven more years to be officially appointed as the American Consul in Smyrna by the American president.

²⁷² Halil İnalcık, "Hüsrev Paşa, Koca" Vol. 19 of *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 41-42.

4.4. American Trade between the Years 1809, Revocation of the Embargo Act and 1815, the Treaty of Ghent

A few days before Jefferson left office, the Embargo Act was revoked on March 1, 1809 and American trade in the Mediterranean resumed. However, it was again cut off due to the War of 1812. Therefore, although the mentioned period witnessed important developments for American diplomatic and commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire, the volume of actual trade remained limited. Until 1823, American consular reports give vague information on American vessels entering and leaving Ottoman ports. The most detailed report bearing information about American trade was prepared by Offley and transmitted to the State Department by Charles Folsom. EIC records are also limited at this point. Morse stated that Turkey opium trade to China conducted by American merchants worth \$ 21,664 for the period 1805-1810, within a total of \$ 5,744,600 in trade. During the next five-year period, American vessels did not import any opium to China.²⁷³ Considering the period that coincided with the War of 1812, the reason behind the termination of American trade in the Levant is understood. Still, until 1812 American merchants maintained their small-scale presence in the Levant trade.

During the short period between the revocation of the Embargo Act and the 1812 War, some American vessels arrived at Smyrna and loaded opium among the other products of Turkey. In 1810 Wilkinson wrote to the State Department about the particulars of two American vessels that departed for Philadelphia and Salem, the brig *Expectation*, with Captain Joseph L. Kay, and the brig *Resolution*, with Captain

²⁷³ Hosea Ballou Morse, vol. 1 of *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1910), 34.

Samuel Rea, respectively. While the former bought 30 boxes of opium, the latter was recorded to take 20 cases of drugs. The other products include skins, raisins, soap, oil, wine, etc.²⁷⁴ Morse stated that the American ship *Sylph* of Philadelphia reached Canton in 1811, carrying the opium it had purchased in Smyrna in 1806.²⁷⁵ The rest of Wilkinson's letters do not give specific data about inwards and outwards cargoes: the brig *Pennsylvania Packet*, Henry Harrison, Master of Philadelphia, arrived at Smyrna from Mocha with Mocha coffee and gums; the brig *Albion* of G.L. Carter, Master from Liverpool;²⁷⁶ the schooner *Valona* James Curtis, Master arrived on the 3rd of December from Baltimore with a cargo of sugars and coffee, and loaded 137 bales red cotton yarn and 11 sacks of madder roots; and the brig *Sylphe*, Thomas Arnold, Master of Philadelphia came on December 29, from Havana with a cargo of coffee and sugars;²⁷⁷ the brig *Expectation*, Joseph P. Kay, Master came from Philadelphia with various goods and returned with a cargo produce of Turkey;²⁷⁸ the American ship *Lewis*, Joseph Lawrence, Master arrived at Smyrna from Liverpool, with a few goods having landed the principal part of her cargo at Lisbon and Malta.²⁷⁹ None of these ships purchased Turkey opium according to the information given by Wilkinson, however, it should be kept in mind that while he gave detailed information about the diplomatic state of the Ottoman Empire in those letters, Wilkinson mentioned the American vessels in less detail, he might not have made note of the presence of opium in return cargoes. Another possibility is that some of the letters and

²⁷⁴ Robert Wilkinson to Robert Smith, September 15, 1810, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

²⁷⁵ Morse, Vol. 3 of *Chronicles*, 163.

²⁷⁶ Robert Wilkinson to Robert Smith, October 20, 1810, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

²⁷⁷ Robert Wilkinson to Robert Smith, December 29, 1810, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

²⁷⁸ Robert Wilkinson to Robert Smith, March 16, 1811, T 238, Roll 1, NARA; this same ship with same Master was in Smyrna a year before.

²⁷⁹ Robert Wilkinson to James Monroe, May 20, 1811, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

reports that included detailed information on the American vessels might not be preserved because the next letter from Wilkinson is dated 18 March 1818, and there is no indication that he stopped correspondence for seven years.

David Offley's chart is more detailed in this respect, but since he listed the vessels and their cargoes separately, it is not possible to track the individual cargoes of the ships. This chart, however, is invaluable because it fills the gap for the seven years during which no letters of Wilkinson can be found in the archives. During the year 1811 four of the American ships were from Philadelphia, the brig *Expectation*, schooner *Eclipse*, the brig *Mary*, and the schooner *Farmer*. Four were from Baltimore, the schooner *America*, the *Independence*, the brig *Eclipse*, and the *Herald*; and one from Salem, the brig *Mary*. The next year, four American ships came from Philadelphia, the brig *Hannah & Sally*, the ship *Dolphin*, the brig *Expectation*, and the *Eclipse*; two from Baltimore, the brig *Aid*, and the schooner *America*; one from Brazil, the schooner *Dash*; one from Havana, the brig *Amphitritie* (?); one from St. Barts, the brig *Grace Ann Green*; and three from Boston, the brig *Ship Ann*, the brig *Hannah*, and the ship *John Adams*. There were twenty-one ships listed in Offley's chart for the years 1811 and 1812. The value of inward cargoes was 4,313,010 piastres and the consulage duty paid to the British Levant Company was 35,795 piastres in total. Of these twenty-one ships, except for the ships from Boston, all of them were addressed to the Woodmass & Offley Company. The *Ann* and the *Hannah* were consigned to Van Lennep & Co., and the *John Adams* was to Lee & Sons, both of which had been in business for a long time in Smyrna and dealt with foreign shipments.²⁸⁰

²⁸⁰ Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, December 18, 1820, M125, Roll 68, NARA.

The blockade affected American shipping negatively but right after the repeal of the Embargo, merchants began to receive letters of introduction from agents in Smyrna, the most famous of them are James La Fontaine, Dutilh and Co, Lee & Sons. Examples of these kinds of letters can be found in almost all of the individual collections of the firms engaged in the Levant business. They give valuable information about the Levant market and prices, but in general the contents remain the same; encouraging merchants to bring colonial goods, mainly sugar, coffee, indigo, cochineal and peppers, and the amount and price of opium and fruits besides other Turkey goods.²⁸¹ Shipments of colonial goods from America rose to such a point that in his next letters, La Fontaine warned Girard to be cautious about sending more of those goods since they were abundant in Turkey and thus the prices were low, except Mocha coffee.²⁸² On their return cargoes, American vessels loaded opium, however the period between the repeal of the Embargo and the declaration of war in 1812 was so short that, some of the vessels in the Mediterranean were caught off guard and were confiscated by the British. Benjamin Shreve, who was instructed to first travel to Gibraltar, and then other Mediterranean ports if found necessary, in order to obtain advantageous cargo in 1811. Employed by Gideon Tucker and Joseph Peabody,

²⁸¹ James La Fontaine to Stephen Girard, March 15, 1809, Smyrna, Doc. No. 70.1-4, Roll 43, SGP. "Before the embargo American vessels brought a vast quantity of colonial produces [...] which have sold to great advantage, but at present this lucrative trade is entirely in the hands of the English, your embargo having left them no rivals in Turkey." After giving a more detailed information on what to import in what quantities, La Fontaine mentioned the exportable goods like "opium, carpets, goatwool, yellow wax, figs, red raisins, madder roots, galls, scamony & sundry other kinds of drugs." His focus on opium shows the increasing interest of the American merchants on this article: "opium, a considerable quantity has been bought up here of late years for your country where I understand it is reshipped for China, & some years ago one of your ships went there direct from whence with a cargo parcel of that drug & a good sum in Spanish dollars, the produce of a cargo of colonial goods she had brought here. Fresh opium begins to come here in august; some is to be found at market all through the year, but the greatest abundance is in September, October and November."

²⁸² James La Fontaine to Stephen Girard, December 21, 1809 and July 27, 1810, Smyrna, Doc. No. 484.1-4, Roll 43, SGP.

Shreve was to purchase opium if found at \$ 3.50.²⁸³ Travelling in company with a convoy in the Mediterranean, he was able to accomplish this task in Malta.²⁸⁴

However, before he could turn back to Salem, the British seized the brig *George*, upon declaration of war. He wrote to the owners “Fortune of war has thrown me into hands, from which I previously feared no molestation whatever.”²⁸⁵

4.5. Conclusion

The period handled in this chapter witnessed a transition of American commerce in Smyrna from British protection to Ottoman protection. The British authorities began to question American presence in the area before the *America* and *Calumet* event, and while it granted protection, they took a decision to first limit privileges to American merchants enabling them to pay a 3 % duty, and a short while later, completely stop protection due to the War of 1812. Although Offley’s interpretation of the *America* and *Calumet* event do not reflect reality, it was an important motive behind his approach to the Ottoman authorities. While he accused the British of interfering and causing an increase in the duty, Offley was able to gain concessions, which brought American merchants almost to the level of the most favored nations. Other Americans, however, did not support Offley and used his arrangement until the removal of British protection. In this respect Offley proved to be a prescient person who understood depending on a foreign power could and would influence American

²⁸³ Gideon Tucker to Benjamin Shreve, October 8, 1811, Salem, “Instructions, Invoices and Accounts of Second Voyage in Brig George,” BSP.

²⁸⁴ Benjamin Shreve to Joseph Peabody and Gideon Tucker, January 18, 1812, Malta, “Instructions, Invoices and Accounts of Second Voyage in Brig George,” BSP.

²⁸⁵ Benjamin Shreve to Joseph Peabody and Gideon Tucker, July 20, 1812, Liverpool, “Instructions, Invoices and Accounts of Second Voyage in Brig George,” BSP.

business with the Ottoman Empire. Hence the reason he kept writing to his government, encouraging for the formation of a formal treaty. The role of the Capudan Pacha should not be ignored in Offley's arrangement. Wanting to benefit from American naval power, he supported Offley's initiative, and expected this arrangement would increase commerce and thus bring about a treaty with the US. Recognizing Offley as the Consul of the Americans in Smyrna not only confirms his good intention towards the Americans, but also shows Offley was considered to be able and worthy of such a position.

Right after Offley opened the first American trade house in Smyrna, his company began to collect the American business under its roof. However, for the next three years American business completely stopped due to war with Britain, and the next ship listed in Offley's chart dated 1815. The war did not stop Offley from approaching the Ottoman authorities trying to improve the conditions for American merchants. His efforts bore fruit after the war when Britain completely withdrew its commercial privileges from American business. Commerce between the two countries increased after 1815 and more American commercial firms sent agents to Smyrna. The period after 1815 also witnessed the growth of the American opium business spreading more intensely to the other ports in the Mediterranean and to some European ports, thus creating a wide web of commercial ties including Asia, Europe, America, China and East Indies.

CHAPTER V

TURKEY OPIUM IN CHINA AND THE EAST INDIES

On its introduction, Turkey Opium met with the opposition, arising from prejudice, which all new things must encounter. The Chinese, who are the farmers of the Opium excise, could scarcely be induced to take a few chests in 1815. In their contract with merchants shortly afterwards, they consented to take one-fourth Turkey Opium. In 1817, they expressly stipulated for it to the amount of one-half they required, although the price had doubled, and Bengal Opium remained stationary. In 1818, they demanded that three-fourths should be of the Turkey article, and the price approximated to the Bengal drug, which considerably diminished in value.²⁸⁶

As the rumors indicating that the war was coming to an end became definite, American vessels began to visit Mediterranean ports once again. The sources do not specify the amounts of articles exported and imported by American vessels in the Smyrna port, however the contents of trade did not change much. Americans exported cochineal, coffee from the West Indies, cotton yarn, dye woods, indigo and muslins from East Indies, rum, skins, spices, sugars and tin, and imported box wood, figs,

²⁸⁶ "Opium" Extract from a letter, addressed to a gentleman in Philadelphia, by his friend, residing in Canton, dated, December, 1824, *Journal of the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy*, Nov, 1827; 110.

goat's wool, gums, gall nuts, hare skins, raisins, sponges and opium. The last article mentioned constituted a considerable part of the cargoes. It was brought to the homeports of the merchants and while a small part of it was kept in the United States, most of it was directed to China and secondly to the East Indies. It is also understood from the archival sources of merchant firms dealing opium that not the entire article was obtained from Smyrna but also from other Mediterranean and European ports. This chapter will focus on the American trade to China and the East Indies, the main two geographies where Turkey opium had a market.

During the War of 1812, American merchants were unable to enter the Smyrna port, but they continued sending vessels to China, risking an assault from the British frigates. At least ten American vessels visited China in 1814, some were small but fast, and some were larger in size and heavily armed and manned.²⁸⁷ In 1815 the number rose to 21, three of which had come in 1813 but remained in Whampoa for over two years and unlike the others, waited there until after the Treaty of Ghent. None of these American vessels carried opium or any other Levantine product to China. Their cargoes consisted of ginseng, sealskins, furs, specie and Dutch and Swedish dollars.²⁸⁸ After peace was established between the US and Britain, American vessels once again began to carry opium to China.

The Chinese were more willing to obtain opium and at the same time the quantity of Indian opium brought to China decreased; "The five-year annual average for the seasons 1809-1810 to 1813-1814 was 4,815 chests, while the average for the period

²⁸⁷ Morse, vol. 3 of *Chronicles*, 214.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 228.

from 1814-1815 to 1818-1819 was 3,873 chests.”²⁸⁹ This, combined with Offley’s arrangement facilitating their condition in Smyrna, paved the way for American merchants to increase their involvement in the Levant trade. On the other hand, the Chinese government increased control in the ports to stop drug trafficking around the same years. The Chinese government permitted importation of opium to the country for medicinal purposes, but it was forbidden in 1796, although with no practical effect as and opium continued to be imported. It was included into the tariff as an article of trade after that date in Canton, but it was received in Whampoa freely until 1820.²⁹⁰ The American merchants carrying opium to China faced problems from time to time in those years. While the Chinese regulations in 1815, 1817 and 1820 aimed to stop opium smuggling, they were not influential enough to end the opium trade, instead creating a change in the overall American opium trade to China. Especially after 1820, Thomas H. Perkins and the Boston Group dominated the Turkey opium commerce, which limited other merchant firms’ business.

5.1. 1815 Problems in China

In 1815 several Chinese opium dealers were arrested and the government conducted an investigation on the Chinese drug speculators in the following months. William Law, an agent of the New York Company, Minturn & Champlin experienced the disadvantage of this investigation. Minturn & Champlin instructed Law to dispose of

²⁸⁹ Downs, “American Merchants,” 425.

²⁹⁰ Robert Bennet Forbes, *Remarks on China and China Trade* (Boston: Samuel N. Dickinson), 44-45.

the opium in *Lion* “to the best advantage & for payment take our debts”²⁹¹ from Houqua. Contrary to his expectations, Houqua rejected to deal with American opium traders. The company knew that the importation of opium was forbidden in China and that is why they asked him and the captain of the ship to keep silent about the cargo.²⁹² However they did not know about the recent controls over the Hong merchants. Law wrote, on his arrival to Canton, he “found all the buyers of opium in difficulty and none could be found to purchase at any price. I have gained away 15 piculs at \$ 760 and the remainder I know not when and how it will sell.”²⁹³ Law could not sell his opium as quickly as he planned and when he finally managed to sell the opium through the offices of Philip Ammidon, another American merchant at Canton, it was for a very low price:

It was entirely unfortunate for us that just the time of our arrival, all the [dealers] in this article has been troubled by the Mandarins & were obliged to move away & not a man would talk of buying, before they have fairly made their [..?] so as to begin to carry on their business. Vessels began to drop in daily with this troublesome article & the price fell rapidly & it was with much difficulty that we would get rid of it.²⁹⁴

Although Law arrived at Canton before the other merchants carrying opium, due to the investigation, he had to wait and when he was able to sell the drug, it was for a very disadvantaged price.²⁹⁵

²⁹¹ Minturn & Champlin to William Law, New York, December 20, 1815, Box 1, Folder “Letters to William Law from Minturn & Champlin, Thomas C. Butler, and others, 1815-1816”, WLP.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ William Law to Thomas C. Butler, Canton July 19, 1816, Box 1, Folder “Letters of William Law, 1815-1816”, WLP.

²⁹⁴ William Law to Messr. Brynes and Harrison, Canton September 22, 1816, Box 1, Folder “Letters of William Law, 1815-1816”, WLP.

²⁹⁵ Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820,” 436-437.

Other American merchants who had opium on board around the same time also faced similar difficulties. One of them was John Richardson Latimer,²⁹⁶ whose first voyage to Canton was in 1815 as supercargo of the ship *Bengal*, owned by William Waln. Before his first visit, Latimer gathered as much information as he could about trade in Canton and he made a note concerning advice given to him by a more experienced merchant, John Gibson. He was informed he would be requested a return of the cargo bearing the information on the articles and the amount on board. If there were prohibited goods like opium, they needed to be withheld since they were to be smuggled at Whampoa, where, without difficulty, he would be able to discharge the vessel because the Whampoa mandarins carried out a regular smuggling system for a fixed price. He mostly purchased teas and silks in return, like the rest of the American merchants involved in the China trade.²⁹⁷

In his first voyage, Latimer carried ginseng of superior quality, Spanish dollars and Turkey opium of \$ 10.000 borrowed on respondentia from Phoenix Sons Co., consigned to B.C. & J. Wilcocks. Waln's advice was to sell the article if a good price was offered, and load the ship with teas as soon as possible for return, but his main expectation concerned the ginseng.²⁹⁸ Latimer gained \$ 1000 for transacting Waln's business in Canton.²⁹⁹ Besides being the owner and investor of the ship, Latimer was also responsible for taking care of the business of others who sent articles on board

²⁹⁶ John Latimer was born on December 10, 1793, and not having interest in the institutional education, after his graduation from Westtown, he entered his uncle's counting house in Philadelphia, and began to learn about the city's trade with the West Indies and Europe beginning in 1811. He was one of the American merchants who enthusiastically entered into China trade after the peace with England. He started as supercargo and continued this profession until 1823, after when he undertook the position of a resident agent in Canton. "Lecture by Charles Hummel about John Richarson Latimer," JDC.

²⁹⁷ "Lecture by Charles Hummel about John Richarson Latimer," JDC.

²⁹⁸ William Waln to B. C. and J. Wilcocks, May 8, 1815, Philadelphia, "Letterbook 1815-1819," JDC.

²⁹⁹ William Waln to John R. Latimer, May 8, 1815, Philadelphia, "Letterbook 1815-1819," JDC.

the *Bengal*. To give a few examples on Turkey opium; W. (Harnon?) and A. (Laussat?), residents in Philadelphia, sent opium worth \$ 11.845 which amounted to fifteen boxes to be sold in Canton and asked Latimer to purchase silks in return. Latimer's charge would be a 3 % commission, both on the sales of opium and on the return cargo.³⁰⁰ Another Philadelphian who sent fifteen cases in total of Turkey opium consigned to Latimer, worth \$ 16.805.50 with expenses, was John Hollingsworth.³⁰¹ William Evans consigned Latimer only one case of Turkey opium containing 135 pounds.³⁰² In addition to opium, Latimer also carried ginseng to Canton for the account of others, such as William Read,³⁰³ or carried Spanish dollars for Washington Stewart and Benjamin Rush, among others.³⁰⁴ This way, supercargoes like Latimer were able to make money by transacting the businesses of several people who sold and purchased goods.

Despite the hopes and expectations of the investors on opium, Latimer found a dull market in Canton when he arrived there on September 29. The price of Turkey opium was \$ 750 – 800 per picul and he could not sell any as of yet. As he explained to Hollingsworth "... it is an article which requires the greatest caution & secrecy in disposing of, and on account of several arrivals since the Bengal the dealers have held back until they [can?] ascertain their cargoes." Latimer, however, did not think the new arrivals would cause too much trouble because other than the *Bengal* the only

³⁰⁰ W. Harnon & A. Laussat to John R. Latimer, May 8, 1815, Philadelphia, "Letterbook 1815-1819," JDC.

³⁰¹ John Hollingsworth Jr. to John R. Latimer, May 6, 1815, Philadelphia, "Letterbook 1815-1819," JDC.

³⁰² William S. Evans to John R. Latimer, May 8, 1815, Philadelphia, "Letterbook 1815-1819," JDC.

³⁰³ William Read to John R. Latimer, May 8, 1815, Philadelphia, "Letterbook 1815-1819," JDC.

³⁰⁴ Washington Stewart to John R. Latimer, May 8, 1815, Philadelphia; Benjamin Rush to the same, May 6, 1815, Philadelphia, "Letterbook 1815-1819," JDC.

vessel carrying a significant amount of Turkey opium was the *Caledonia*, which would probably arrive late due to a monsoon and he believed he could sell the opium on board before its arrival.³⁰⁵ Upon advice from Wilcocks, Latimer decided to keep the drug off the depressed market instead of trying to sell it immediately at a lower price.³⁰⁶ Latimer also realized and reported back the disadvantaged position of Turkey opium compared to Bengal because the former was too strong and the Chinese were accustomed to the latter. This difference of quality was reflected in the price as Bengal opium was sold at \$ 1450, Turkey opium could only be sold at \$ 800.³⁰⁷ In his next letter, however, Latimer had to inform the merchants of having opium on board that he could not dispense of, having made no significant progress in terms of its removal. The period of the *Bengal*'s arrival to Canton coincided with the stricter control that began to be imposed upon opium smugglers by the government, and this intimidated the mandarins. Afterwards, he gave a list of American vessels, which had brought Turkey opium to Canton before his arrival, excluding the *Voltaire*, the amount and the price of opium:

Seneca	17 pecul	\$ 1150
Trader	1 ½	1000
Canton	12	830
Voltaire	10	about 800
Chasseur	2	800 ³⁰⁸

Considering the current situation, Wilcocks made an arrangement with a company ship, which would stay in Canton after *Bengal*'s departure to store the unsold opium,

³⁰⁵ John R. Latimer to John Hollingsworth Jr., October 25, 1815, Canton, "Letterbook 1815-1819," JDC.

³⁰⁶ John R. Latimer to W. Harnon & A. Laussat, October 25, 1815, Canton, "Letterbook 1815-1819," JDC. He sent a similar letter to the other investors of opium on the same date.

³⁰⁷ John R. Latimer to William Waln, October 29, 1815, Canton, "Letterbook 1815-1819," JDC.

³⁰⁸ John R. Latimer to John Hollingsworth Jr., November 14, 1815, Canton, "Letterbook 1815-1819," JDC. He sent a similar letter to the other investors of opium on the same date.

but Latimer was hopeful that such an arrangement would be unnecessary and that the mandarins would attempt to buy the opium when they heard the ship was ready for sail.³⁰⁹ Eventually, he was able to sell the opium but at a loss because a part of the total article was “false opium,” as called by the purchasers, meaning a very inferior quality - it sold at \$ 400 per picul.³¹⁰ William Waln, on his own account made a net total of \$ 15,061.74; Waln and Latimer on the joint account made \$ 4,348.03; William S. Evans made \$ 675.70; Hollingsworth, \$ 10,231.63; Harnon & Laussat, \$ 9,582.86. While the latter two accounts failed in their investment, due to mixed-in inferior opium, Waln and Evans made a profit with Latimer, who also took his commission.³¹¹ In his later voyages to China, Latimer continued to report the situation of Turkey opium (which sold at 450 to 500 & per picul in 1819), although as understood from his letters, the article did not make much of the total cargo anymore.³¹²

5.2. Stephen Girard’s Trade to the East Indies

Stephen Girard³¹³ was one of the first Philadelphia merchants who entered into the Turkey opium business at the beginning of the nineteenth century and he participated

³⁰⁹ John R. Latimer to William Waln, November 14, 1815, Canton, “Letterbook 1815-1819,” JDC.

³¹⁰ John R. Latimer to John Hollingsworth Jr., December 18, 1815, Canton, “Letterbook 1815-1819,” JDC. He sent a similar letter to W. Harnon & A. Laussat on the same date.

³¹¹ “Letterbook 1815-1819,” JDC.

³¹² John R. Latimer, September 7, 1819, “Letterbook 1819-1820,” JDC.

³¹³ Stephen Girard was born in Bordeaux, France in May 21, 1750. He entered into commerce as a cabin boy when he was ten or twelve, and sailed towards the West Indies, and then reached New York. In a short amount of time he settled in Philadelphia and opened a shop in 1769. After some misfortunes in his partnerships and the wars, he was able to expand his business to the level that he became one of the richest merchants of his time. He was among the leading figures of Philadelphia and invested in the city’s well-being by establishing the first Bank of the United States, a college and a center for the blind.

actively right after the peace. In fact, he was one of the first who sent a vessel to Canton with opium on board in 1815. Arthur Grelaud was the supercargo of the *Voltaire*. He arrived at Canton on September 23, 1815 and made an arrangement with an Armenian dealer for opium at \$ 800 per picul a few days after his arrival. However, he wrote to Girard “Two days after I had closed my sale an unfortunate circumstance took place which created delays which no one could have foreseen,” to which he referred to the capture of smugglers by the Chinese government. Not being able to find a dealer to take the opium, Grelaud had to wait for a month before he could obtain any opportunity to discharge the ship.³¹⁴ Moreover, Houqua’s refusal to secure the ships that had opium on board, forced Grelaud to land his small parcel of opium without making a sale.³¹⁵ While Girard suspended his drug business to Canton for a while, his attention slid to the East Indies, which had a long history of commerce with the Ottoman Empire and which already had a familiarity with Turkey opium. Trade between the Dutch and the Ottoman Empire began through the end of the sixteenth century, based in Smyrna port. They imported silver money, home-produced textiles and exported cotton, dried fruits and opium since the beginning of the trade. The Dutch dominated the inner-Asian trade in the second half of the seventeenth century, and opium was one of the main articles in this commerce. Batavia (today

He also took active part in one of the most disastrous epidemics in the city’s history in 1793 and in 1797-1798. It devastated an important rate of the city’s population, it created disorder among the ones who survived while above one third of the inhabitants left the city and the sick to the care of physicians in disagreement with each other and the African-Americans who were considered not liable to the infection. In this disorderly environment, Girard took care of the sick in the hospital, which was established one mile out of the city by a self-formed committee including himself and Daniel Offley, father of David Offley. Freeman Hunt, vol. 1 of *Lives of American Merchants* (New York: Office of Hunt’s Merchant’s Magazine, 1856), 227-234; Samuel (..?) Fisher, “A Letter to a Respected Friend, Philadelphia, 11th Month, 18th, 1793,” Roll 11, 1793, SGP.

³¹⁴ Arthur Grelaud to Stephen Girard, October 29, 1815, Doc. No. 691, Roll 57, SGP.

³¹⁵ John R. Latimer to William Waln, October 25, 1815, “Letterbook 1815-1819,” JDC.

Jakarta, capital of Indonesia) became a main port from where opium, which soon became the most profitable product, was sold to the other Asian countries. While Holland was the greatest exporter of Turkey opium from Smyrna in 1782, beginning with 1784 the amount of export declined enormously. They lost their hegemony to the British and the US. The first American vessel, the *Hope*, landed in Batavia in 1789, but Batavia became a staple port and opium trade was broken. By the nineteenth century, Dutch merchants in Smyrna mostly left due to the decreasing commerce between the two countries.³¹⁶ Of the few Dutch merchant family firms left in Smyrna, Van Lennep and Co., headed by Jacob van Lennep, was the largest and most widely preferred by the Americans who were doing opium business to the East Indies. Another agent present was James La Fontaine, who later entered into partnership with Edward Hayes and Dutilhs & Co. As the Dutch merchants left their businesses, Dutch agents in the Levant also became more entangled with American merchants. The first recorded American vessel carrying Turkey opium to Java was the *Pennsylvania* of Philadelphia.³¹⁷ It was also the first American vessel that purchased Turkey opium. 171 European and American ships arrived at Java in 1819, but only 43 of them were Dutch, and a major amount of the Turkey opium carried to the East Indies was transported in British and American vessels at the first half of the nineteenth century. While the Chinese preferred the softer Bengal opium, consumers in the Indies got used to the harsher taste of Turkey opium by the beginning of the nineteenth century.³¹⁸

³¹⁶ Jan Schmidt, *From Anatolia to Indonesia: Opium Trade and the Dutch Community of Izmir, 1820-1940* (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1998), 15-19.

³¹⁷ Ibid., 21.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

Carrying Turkey opium to China at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Stephen Girard withdrew temporarily after 1815, due to the increased control over the drug trade by the Chinese government, and gradually turned his attention to the East Indies. Upon receiving the news, Girard instructed Grelaud not to load and carry “opium or any other contraband or unpermitted article either on my account or on account of others on board of the ship *Voltaire* under any pretext whatever.”³¹⁹ Edward George informed Girard that opium was sold at \$ 1200 & 1300 per picul but he was “afraid to touch that article for fear that it would create difficulties with Houqua.”³²⁰ The attitude of Houqua, or Chinese officers in general, was not the only reason behind Girard’s reluctance. At the end of the same year, Grelaud informed Girard that the Canton market was so glutted that Turkey opium could only sell at \$ 450 per picul.³²¹ By 1818, Girard began to receive letters from Batavia agents giving information on the situation of Turkey opium, which was “of consequence for this market.” There were also other Americans engaged in this business, one of which had imported 130 boxes of Turkey opium the previous year and the market was ready to receive the article.³²² As the restrictions in China created trouble for the American opium business, Girard’s attention in the East Indies increased within time, which also affected Girard’s exports to China. Edward George wrote Girard that he was “very glad I did not bring any other articles from Europe for your account. I found quicksilver at \$ 70, lead at \$ 4¾ to \$ 5 [...] opium \$ 550. In fact the camlets were this

³¹⁹ Stephen Girard to Arthur Grelaud, March 2, 1816, Doc. No. 106, Roll 126, Letterbook 14, SGP.

³²⁰ Edward George to Stephen Girard, March 11/12, 1816, Doc. No. 187, Roll 58, SGP.

³²¹ Arthur Grelaud to Stephen Girard, October 20, 1816, Doc. No. 877, Roll 60, SGP.

³²² Van Reenen to Stephen Girard, September, 23 & 25, 1818, Batavia, Doc. No. 914, Roll 68, SGP.

year, the only article which had offered some profit.”³²³ Girard purchased teas in China and sold them to the European markets, mainly to Holland, and purchased opium and other Levant goods there and brought them to the East Indies.

The correspondence between Girard and his agent in Amsterdam, Daniel Crommelin shows that Girard sent instructions to obtain as much opium as Crommelin could find at a reasonable price not only in Amsterdam but also from other European ports like Rotterdam, Hamburg, London, etc.³²⁴ He did not restrict himself with these ports.

Gibraltar was also an important port to purchase opium for American merchants and Girard also received letters informing him about opium sales from that location. One reason American vessels did not want to go to Smyrna was the frequent plagues endangering the health of the crew, and thus they preferred the transfer of opium to another port from which American ships could load the article. If Girard could give “timely orders,” an agent in Gibraltar wrote, they could “send a small vessel [...] and have it purchased there by Woodmas & Offley, our correspondent who will send it to the Lazaretto at Malta, and thence to use to be kept here with one of your vessels may take it.” This method would save Girard the expense of sending the vessel directly to Smyrna, and as this method was regularly used, it was proven effective.³²⁵

Van Reenen’s letters encouraged Girard to invest in the Turkey opium trade in the East Indies, regularly stating the demand and the situation of the article:

³²³ Edward George to Stephen Girard, February 1, 1819, Canton, Doc. No. 921, Roll 68, SGP.

³²⁴ Daniel Crommelin to Stephen Girard, September 4, 1820, Doc. No. 496; From same to same, June 27, 1820, Doc. No. 501; from same to same July 10, 1820, Doc. No. 535; from same to same, July 18, 1820, Doc. No. 560, Roll 74, from Baring Brothers to same, December 27, 1820, London, Doc. No. 955, Roll 76, 1820, From Daniel Crommelin to same, January 23, 1821, Amsterdam, Doc. No. 62, Roll 76, 1821, SGP.

³²⁵ Henry & M’Call to Stephen Girard, November 21, 1820, Gibraltar, Doc. No. 742, Roll 75, SGP.

Said opium [Turkey opium] will always sell well as it is cheaper as the Bengal which price is now Spanish dollars 1500 to 1600 per chest of 40 balls, which are in general weighing 133 or 135 Dutch pounds, during Java was in the English hands it was not allowed to be imported, now it is using mixed with Bengal, as said, if we new you or Messieurs D. C. [Daniel Crommelin] & Sons would send none to us in commission we ourselves would have made remittances and ordered some.³²⁶

To compare the prices, Turkey opium sold at \$ 950 Spanish dollars in April 1819.³²⁷

The demand for the article remained constant, as Van Reenen stated, “opium is still and always will be wanted.”³²⁸ This increase in demand was reflected in the prices. In April 1820, Bengal opium sold at \$ 1500 to 1550 per chest, while Turkey opium sold \$ 1400 to 1450 per picul.³²⁹ In July this price rose to \$ 15-1600 per picul.³³⁰ Girard was not the only American in the East Indies market. A Baltimore ship *Brazilian* brought sixty-four piculs of Turkey opium in addition to six hundred barrels of flour.³³¹ As the amount of Turkey opium increased in Batavia, with the contribution of other American vessels’ stock into the market, the price decreased immensely in a few months and at the end of 1820, the article sold at \$ 850 to 900.³³²

Although the prices fluctuate greatly and sometimes dropped as low as \$ 850, it was still a lucrative business and offered a good profit. For this reason, Girard continued to carry Turkey opium to the East Indies and moreover tried to extend the net of opium procurement by enquiring about the prices and availability of the article in Gibraltar.

³²⁶ Van Reenen to Stephen Girard, January 16, 1819, Batavia, Doc. No. 39, Roll 69, SGP.

³²⁷ Van Reenen to Stephen Girard, April 26, 1819, Batavia, Doc. No. 319, Roll 70, SGP.

³²⁸ Van Reenen to Stephen Girard, July 1, 1819, Batavia, Doc. No. 514, Roll 70, SGP.

³²⁹ A. L. Forestier & Co. to Stephen Girard, April 28, 1820, Doc. No. 337, Roll 73, SGP.

³³⁰ Daniel Crommelin to Stephen Girard, July 18, 1820, Amsterdam, Doc. No. 560, Roll 74, SGP.

³³¹ A. L. Forestier & Co. to Stephen Girard, November 18, 1820, Doc. No. 508, Roll 74, SGP.

³³² A. L. Forestier & Co. to Stephen Girard, December 9, 1820, Doc. No. 917, Roll 76, SGP.

Contrary to expectations though, it was very scarce.³³³ The regular and intense shipment of Turkey opium to the East Indies filled the market eventually, but Girard's agents in Batavia suggested other ways to dispose of the drug. One of them was, as always an option, to send the surplus to Canton and find a buyer at may be a lower price and another was to stock the drug in Entrepot. The latter method was also employed when the holders of Turkey opium preferred to wait, in order to obtain better prices, as happened in February 1822. There was 300 piculs of Turkey opium ready to be sold in Batavia but the enormously high price of Bengal opium at the Calcutta deck encouraged the dealers in Batavia to hold on to their stock.³³⁴

Girard did not completely stop transporting Turkey opium to China, he sent several vessels to Canton and Whampoa directly or sometimes sent the surplus after selling a part in the East Indies. While the other American merchants continued to send small parcels of opium to both markets, another event in 1817 affected the future of American opium trade to Canton.

5.3. 1817 Wabash Affair and Opium to China

Joseph Peabody was also one of the most famous New England merchants who took part in the opium trade to China after the war. His entanglement with commerce began before the Revolutionary War, enlarged his business in the carrying trade and increased it due to government initiatives. He entered into partnership with Gideon

³³³ Henry & M. Call to Stephen Girard, March 7, 1821, Gibraltar, Doc. No. 209, Roll 77, SGP.

³³⁴ Forestier & Co. to Stephen Girard, February 10, 1822, Batavia, Doc. No. 123, Roll 79, 1822; John Shillaber to Stephen Girard, February 8, 1821, Batavia, Doc. No. 115, Roll 76, 1821, SGP. Shillaber also suggested that Turkey opium would definitely bring profit in Batavia and the surplus could be sent to China in case the market in Batavia was glutted.

Tucker and run his business from Salem, making the city the central base in his company's shipments. He owned a vast number of vessels that travelled in all the seas including Canton and Mediterranean ports.³³⁵ Like the other American merchants, Peabody purchased tea, silks and nankeens among other goods from China and relied on specie and opium for the payment of teas. One of his vessels was in Canton right before the Wabash affair. The vessel had Turkey opium on board and Peabody's correspondence with Benjamin Shreve, the Master of the ship *China*, gives a detailed account of the amount and the investors of the article. It can be taken as a standard American vessel engaged in the China trade at the time. The cargo contained English Vellum Setter papers, natolia wine, cordage, cordial, Sultana raisins in small amounts, specie dollars (\$ 80.000 on account of Joseph Peabody and Gideon Tucker, \$ 1700 on account of Peabody, and \$14.000 on account of the Benjamin Shreve) and opium worth of \$ 42.864.43 (on account of Joseph Peabody and Gideon Tucker) and of \$ 208.25 (on account of Joseph Peabody Junior). Others also sent merchandize in the same vessel consigned to Shreve, including opium, but in smaller amounts (Tucker Dalands, 1 case of opium worth of \$163.62; John Mansfield, 1 Drum of opium worth of \$ 46.75).³³⁶ All of the opium on board the *China* was sold to a Gregory Baboon at \$ 525 per picul of 133 ⅓ pounds. Shreve took note that Baboon would take the article from the vessel and pay all the expenses in thirty days. He would also pay Shreve \$ 50 of bargain money per picul.³³⁷

³³⁵ Hunt, vol. 1 of *Lives of American Merchants*, 367-389.

³³⁶ Joseph Peabody and Gideon Tucker, Tucker Dalands, John Mansfield to Benjamin Shreve, May 23, 1817, "Accountbooks, Letterbooks and Memorandum Books for the Schooner *China*," and for typed version of the letters "Ship Papers *China*," BSP.

³³⁷ Benjamin Shreve, September 16, 1817, "Notebook Belonging to Benjamin Shreve," BSP.

The *China* was in Canton right before the Wabash affair. The vessel *Wabash*, brought a cargo of specie and opium to China in May 1817, but it was captured by Chinese pirates who also killed some of the crew and plundered seven thousand dollars in specie and thirty-five cases of opium. Due to the charges brought by the American consul, Benjamin C. Wilcocks, who held back the information about the contents of the cargo, the authorities were able to intervene and managed to take back the ship. However, they also discovered the opium. American merchants who had invested in the vessel lost their property and the Hong merchants were penalized.³³⁸ They also sent a proclamation announcing that they would no longer secure American vessels whose masters refused to sign bonds stating that there was no opium on board.³³⁹

Foreign merchants were not permitted to go into the country and socialize with the Chinese, thus they built national houses called factories in Canton, and they were confined to do commerce only with Hong merchants, of which there were twelve or thirteen licensed merchants.³⁴⁰ As soon as a foreign vessel entered into the port, the supercargo had to call a Hong merchant who would secure his ship, meaning that the Hong merchant would receive the cargo into his warehouse and pay its duties to the government. This arrangement also included the principle that Hong merchant would buy the majority of the ship's cargo and sell it from his storage. They were the intermediary between the Chinese government and foreigners. The "Hoppo" or Collector of Customs who received his commission directly from the government supervised the Hong merchants. Hong merchants were also responsible for the foreign vessels and their crews. Thus when the Chinese government enforced stricter

³³⁸ Stelle, "American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820," 438.

³³⁹ Morse, vol. 3 of *Chronicles*, 318-320; Downs, "American Merchants," 426.

³⁴⁰ *The Chinese Security Merchants in Canton and Their Debts* (London: J. M. Richardson, 1838), 3.

regulations, triggered by incidents where foreigners broke rules or smuggled contraband, Hong merchants were also blamed and punished. One of the most known and trusted Hong merchants was Houqua, with whom American merchants did business intensively.³⁴¹ In fact Houqua's reputation was so good that teas bearing his stamp sold better, even at a more expensive price in the US. In return Houqua's commission was higher when compared to other Hong merchants but he established his business on the trust that he would provide the best of goods.³⁴² That is why when the Hong merchants sent a general proclamation, but more importantly Houqua ceased to secure specifically American vessels, the merchants felt a discouraging turn of the business. Peabody's and others' investments in the *China* was not influenced by this event. However, they were experienced enough to understand the difficulties that would emerge after these kinds of incidents. Peabody's investment in opium, considering the problems, did not continue steadily after this event since opium was a "troublesome article" as Benjamin Shreve wrote.³⁴³

These events were few and trivial considering the entirety American opium trade to China, however they had a devastating influence on the small-scale merchant. Charles Stelle analyzed the influence of the latest changes in Chinese regulation and the general process of opium trade on the smaller companies to show the advantages provided to the larger scale companies as:

The net effect of the sporadic Chinese attempts at interference with the drug trade was to encourage concentration of the American branch of the traffic in

³⁴¹ Forbes, *Remarks on China*, 11-15.

³⁴² WLP qtd in Tyler Dennet, *Americans in Eastern Asia; A Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with Reference to China, Japan and Korea in the 19th Century* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), 59.

³⁴³ Benjamin Shreve to Joseph Peabody and Gideon Tucker, September 23, 1817, Canton, "Ship's Papers – China," BSP.

the hands of the wealthier American houses. Opium was at best a speculative commodity, sold in a limited market and subject to extreme price fluctuations. Chinese interference with the traffic, however, slight or temporary, tended to dislocate the market or to delay sales of the drug. The added risks operated most strongly against small venturers in opium, who could not afford to wait too long for a return upon their investment or who did not control the movements of the vessels on which their drug was shipped; less importantly upon shippers who owned or controlled the vessels which carried their drug; and least of all upon the merchants who handled sufficient quantities of opium to enable them to keep one vessel at Whampoa for a lengthy enough period to dispose of all the drug which they might ship at various times in a single season. Of these facts the important speculators were fully cognizant.³⁴⁴

5.4. T. H. Perkins, Monopoly

Upon the *Wabash* affair and the fact it was made public that it had opium on board, T. H. Perkins³⁴⁵ informed his agent David Offley about the “severe edict” issued by the Chinese government and that there were now “severe penalties annexed to the introduction of” opium which, in consequence, “will be very dangerous to introduce it.” This situation, however, did not intimidate Perkins. On the contrary, he captured the advantage. He wrote: “We think the competition will be less next year at Smyrna, & that should we do anything in it we shall get it at the old price ... Should

³⁴⁴ Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820,” 438-439.

³⁴⁵ Thomas Handasyd Perkins was born in Boston, December 15, 1764. His mother wanted to give him college education but he was more enthusiastic about business life and it was decided that he would start working at a counting house. He worked for Messrs. Shattuck, who was among the most active merchants of Boston, until he was twenty-one, but it was his marriage to Miss Elliot in 1788 that drew the fate of his career. A relative to Mrs. Perkins, Captain James Magee had been in Canton and after they met, Perkins became more interested in the advantages of the China trade. As supercargo of *Astrea*, belonging to E. H. Derby of Salem, Perkins sailed from Boston in February 1789 first to Batavia and then to Canton under the command of Captain Magee. Soon he and his brother James formed a co-partnership under the name J. & T. H. Perkins until his brother's death in 1822, but the name of the firm changed when their sons were admitted into partnership in 1819. They shipped coffee and sugar to Europe, and traded with the West Indies but their major business was on the northwest coast and in China. Hunt, vol. 1 of *Lives of American Merchants*, 33-50; Thomas G. Cary, *Memoir of Thomas Handasyd Perkins*, (New York, Burt Franklin, 1971); Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 1-2.

circumstances favor it we may go very extensively into the business.”³⁴⁶ It was a great opportunity to increase his involvement and decrease the competition of smaller companies. As he explained to his agent at Leghorn, the new regulations would harm the smaller merchants, because Perkins could keep the opium “on board until an opportunity offers to sell it deliverable alongside.” However, “Persons with a limited time for their vessels to stay, will not adventure.”³⁴⁷ As mentioned above, Perkins boosted his participation in the opium trade to China after 1818, and soon he would become one of the major American companies in the business.

In 1803, Perkins started a house in China for the transaction of the company’s business. Mr. Ephraim Bumstead was considered for the managing position but his sudden illness forced him to return to the US, and he died on the way back. Mr. J. P. Cushing at the age of sixteen, Perkins’ nephew, who had accompanied Mr. Bumstead, then became the manager. He was made co-partner and he stayed in Canton until the dissolution of the house in 1827.³⁴⁸ Throughout the years he was able to make a fortune of \$ 7,000,000, “probably the largest in the New England of his generation.”³⁴⁹ A considerable amount of this fortune was made by means of the opium business.

His interest in the Turkey opium trade began early, and he instructed his agents and captains to obtain information about that article, although he did not enter into the

³⁴⁶ T. H. Perkins to Woodman & Offley, February 11, 1818, Smyrna, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 289; Briggs, vol. 2 of *Cabot Family*, 561.

³⁴⁷ T. H. Perkins to F. W. Paine, March 24, 1818, Leghorn, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 290; Briggs, vol. 2 of *Cabot Family*, 561; in another letter to the same, Perkins wrote “The article [opium] is a prohibited one, and transient adventurers cannot deal in it so advantageously as we can.” September 8, 1817, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 285.

³⁴⁸ Hunt, vol. 1 of *Lives of American Merchants*, 46; Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 4.

³⁴⁹ Briggs, vol. 1 of *Cabot Family*, 284.

opium business fully until 1818. However, this does not indicate his ignorance about the advantages of trading opium in China. Upon learning the worries of William F. Paine (who had been at the Island of Bourbon since he landed from a ship belonging to Perkins in 1797 bound from Canton to Boston), Perkins advised him to go back to Canton³⁵⁰ and convert “both y’r money & y’r coffee into some article saleable in China, as opium, cotton, or black-wood.”³⁵¹ On another occasion, Perkins advised J. W. Langdon, supercargo of the ship *John Adams* bound to Gibraltar for the shipment of nankins, to proceed to Malta and if he could not obtain his wishes to exchange them for opium or quicksilver to be sent to China.³⁵²

Trading opium was not his main object, but several times he acquired opium as a supplementary article. In 1815, he instructed John Harrod, supercargo of the brig *Monkey*, to invest in quicksilver and opium in Trieste, unless there were other more advantageous articles. He included that “Opium is generally plenty at Malta.”³⁵³ After 1815, Perkins, too, became more interested in the opium trade, following the advice of their agents in China and of Chinese merchants, namely Houqua, who “recommended in very strong terms the purchase of a large quantity of opium and quicksilver.” Perkins instructed F. W. Paine, who was at Gibraltar at that moment, to pay \$ 3, or a little more if the article is good quality, and asked him to inquire how to obtain opium at better terms in Smyrna.³⁵⁴ A few days later, he informed Paine that

³⁵⁰ Perkins to William Buchanan, May 15, 1811, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 184.

³⁵¹ Perkins to William F. Paine, May 6, 1811, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 184; Briggs, vol. 2 of *Cabot Family*, 540.

³⁵² Perkins to J. W. Langdon, November 15, 1811, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 203.

³⁵³ Perkins to John Harrod, August 23, 1815, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 236; Briggs, vol. 2 of *Cabot Family*, 552.

³⁵⁴ Perkins to F. W. Paine, March 15, 1817, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 248-49; Briggs, vol. 2 of *Cabot Family*, 556.

the price of opium in Smyrna was about \$ 2.66 per English pound.³⁵⁵ In another letter Perkins wrote to Captain Samuel Connant (or Conant) that Mr. Paine would inform Connant about an agent in Smyrna and directed him towards “Messrs. Perkins, Bros., our townsmen, are residents there.” Capt. Connant was to also look for cheap quicksilver, which could at times be found in Smyrna in addition to the opium. In order to reach Smyrna, the captain needed to hire a pilot and had to keep an open eye for pirates who sometimes attacked unarmed vessels but muskets were enough to keep the danger away. Perkins also instructed him to report quicksilver and provisions at Macao when he reached there, but not opium because it was ruled as contraband. Finally, he wanted the captain to keep the “Smyrna destination to himself” without further explanation.³⁵⁶ One reason for this secrecy was to postpone competition because an increase in demand would increase the price as he wrote “we are fearful that there will be so many in pursuit of opium that it will rise in price in Smyrna.” In the same letter, Perkins asked S. Williams to write to the Perkins Brothers in Smyrna and authorize them to “value on you for £ 10,000, to be invested in opium.” This opium however was not Turkey opium, but the Bengal opium sold in England, which, upon the advice of Houqua & Perkins & Co., was considered to be purchased at about 15,000 lb.³⁵⁷ It can also be deducted from this letter that the duties of the Smyrna agents was not just to purchase opium, or any other article, and store it for the companies. They were also responsible for transacting money to other agents around Europe because Smyrna was not the only port where American merchants purchased opium.

³⁵⁵ Perkins to F. W. Paine, March 21, 1817, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 284.

³⁵⁶ Perkins to Capt. Sam. Connant, April 15, 1817, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 250-51.

³⁵⁷ Perkins to S. Williams, March 21, 1817, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 284-85.

T. H. Perkins began to employ the Perkins Brothers as the company's agents, and soon would open an agency under Joseph Langdon but for the moment, he was still benefiting from the experience of Offley's firm. Offley followed the fur business, aside from fishers and otters as experiment for Smyrna market, but his main duty was to follow the instructions about opium.³⁵⁸ Gibraltar was one of the widely used ports for this purpose. By redirecting a part or the whole cargo of the *Ophelia*, Perkins wished to purchase a large quantity of quicksilver and opium for its return; 200 m lbs. of quicksilver at 40/100, and 20 m lbs. of Turkey opium at 2-3/4 or 3-1/4 per lb. The important thing had to be considered was the timing of the vessels because "the first arrivals will put the other on the scent."³⁵⁹ Another port was Leghorn and in 1818 Perkins wrote that the brig *Boras Tigris* obtained 40,000 lbs. of opium, along with 250,000 lbs. of quicksilver from Leghorn during its stay there in November 14-18, 1817.³⁶⁰ Yet another port was Trieste. When Perkins learned that the *Oliver* of Baltimore had sold opium there for \$ 4 ½ per lb., he instructed Paine to purchase all he could even at \$ 4.³⁶¹ At one point Perkins also inquired about Persian opium as a profitable article in the China market, and asked E. A. Newton to furnish Mr. Cushing with all the information he had on the mentioned article which, they thought, cost "a little more than \$ 1 a pound."³⁶² On this Persian opium business, Perkins benefitted from his rival's experiences as Astor had purchased a parcel of opium from the Gulf

³⁵⁸ Perkins to Woodman & Offley, December 12, 1817, Smyrna, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 287-88.

³⁵⁹ Perkins to Bernard Henry, February 7, 1817, Gibraltar, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 283.

³⁶⁰ Perkins to Wm. Lorman & Sons, January 16, 1818, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 262.

³⁶¹ Perkins to F. W. Paine, September 8, 1817, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 285; Briggs, vol. 2 of *Cabot Family*, 559.

³⁶² Perkins to E.A. Newton, September 8, 1817, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 285-86; Briggs, vol. 2 of *Cabot Family*, 559.

of Persia at around \$ 3 and sent it to China where it could not find a buyer and was returned.³⁶³

By 1818, Perkins had already begun to enlarge the web of trade in order to procure opium in the most advantageous price and at the same time to prevent the rivalry of the small-scale American firms and merchants. Chinese regulations, which had been brought upon around this period, served Perkins' aim because he had the means to force his competitors out of the opium business. He wrote to Paine "the last year's [1817's] produce of opium was only 150,000 lbs. of which the wants of Europe will demand at least 50,000, and leave for China 100,000." Thinking of purchasing the entire 100,000 lbs. he continued, "by keeping a vessel on the spot, even this large quantity might be disposed of to advantage." Small merchants and firms were easy to defeat, but Perkins feared big names like Astor. The other important rival was EIC whose jealousy, readiness and strength could have destroyed Perkins:

Should they think that extensive shipments of Turkey opium interfere with the Indian, they might reduce the price, under the idea of destroying private speculators. This they would undoubtedly do, if the article could be introduced openly, but being contraband they dare not meddle with it... We shall be glad to have as large a proportion of the crop as we can compass.³⁶⁴

While Chinese control over opium smuggling in 1817-18 forced small firms to abandon the opium trade to bigger firms like J & T. H. Perkins, the general position of the article as contraband protected these firms from the overwhelming power of the British East India Company. Perkins decided to "place a credit with W. & Offley, to the extent of £ 30,000 or upwards"³⁶⁵ as he was desirous to increase his participation

³⁶³ Perkins to F. W. Paine, March 24, 1818, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 290; Briggs, vol. 2 of *Cabot Family*, 561.

³⁶⁴ Perkins to F. W. Paine, March 24, 1818, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 289-291; Briggs, vol. 2 of *Cabot Family*, 561-62.

³⁶⁵ Perkins to F. W. Paine, March 24, 1818, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 290.

in the Turkey opium trade and monopolize it. In the early nineteenth century, Turkey opium was produced by small family farms, owned by mostly Turkish and Greek Ottoman subjects making the amount of cultivated opium small.³⁶⁶ As the amount was limited, the competition was great. Perkins instructed his agents in Smyrna to collect all the opium that was left from European purchases. As the article was contraband, Perkins kept a vessel in the storehouse. Although he could afford it, keeping a store vessel increased the expense. Though Smyrna opium was cheap compared to Indian opium, and Persian opium did not respond well previously when Astor tried to sell the article in China, Perkins kept trying to make a profit out of it and brought 80 m pounds to China, “which was principally sold at 25 per cent above the Turkey opium, and cost less.”³⁶⁷ The profitable account of Persian opium did not decrease the importance or purchases of Turkey opium, because the cultivation of Turkey opium was already in limited amount and American merchants tried to obtain more of the article. Actually there is no indication that Perkins continued to carry Persian opium to China.³⁶⁸ Instead, Perkins kept instructing their Smyrna agent Woodmass & Offley, to obtain Turkey opium.³⁶⁹

While the Chinese regulations in 1815 and 1817 mostly discouraged American merchants from bringing Turkey opium to China, or diverted attention mainly to the Batavia market, as in the case of Stephen Girard, T. H. Perkins courageously and carefully handled the business and established a monopoly on Turkey opium. His only

³⁶⁶ Turgay, “The Nineteenth-Century Golden Triangle,” 66.

³⁶⁷ Perkins to Woodman & Offley, June 16, 1819, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 297-98; Briggs, vol. 2 of *Cabot Family*, 563.

³⁶⁸ Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820,” 441.

³⁶⁹ Woodman & Offley was instructed to obtain 300 m lb. of opium by T. H. Perkins, From Perkins to F. W. Paine, October 31, 1819, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 303; Briggs, vol. 2 of *Cabot Family*, 565.

concern was, as mentioned above, John Jacob Astor, who also had a major establishment and the kind of experience that could compete with Perkins's.

Before the 1812 war, John Jacob Astor conducted a regular trade with China, exporting furs, specie, ginseng and sometimes camlets, cochineal, quicksilver, and rarely cotton, iron and blackwood and importing teas, silks, nankeens, chinaware, etc. to be sold both in the US and Europe.³⁷⁰ At the outbreak of the war, he focused on the fur trade and although the war completely halted the China trade, he expanded his business dramatically by taking new initiatives with Europe and China after the war. This expansion continued until 1819, when his grandson John Jacob Bentzon died, which had a devastating influence on Astor. Thus the year 1819 was a turning point in his business.³⁷¹ One of his initiatives was to open a permanent agency in Canton. Previously he dealt his business through his captains and supercargoes but this way of doing business did not answer the needs since the resident agents benefitted from lower prices throughout the year and stocked articles beforehand. From time to time Astor had used Perkins's agent in Canton on a commission charge but eventually he appointed Nicholas G. Ogden as his permanent agent there.³⁷²

Astors's vessels brought lead, quicksilver and opium from Europe to be transported to Canton in order to decrease the dependency on specie for Chinese teas and silks. The *Boxer* was the first ship of Astor that visited Smyrna and Gibraltar after the peace. It cleared on July 10, 1815 and returned on January 24, 1816 loaded with fruit, drug,

³⁷⁰ Porter, vol. 2 of *John Jacob Astor*, 589.

³⁷¹ Haeger, *John Jacob Astor*, 170.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, 173.

wool, etc.³⁷³ In the next month, the *Boxer* sailed again for Gibraltar and Smyrna, and returned on September 15, 1816. Astor bought another brig for the Mediterranean trade, and the *Alexander* that was sent right after its purchase. “As a result of these Mediterranean voyages” wrote Porter, “some of the cargoes of Astor’s ships at Canton for the season 1816-17 presented new elements” such as 40 piculs of opium and 133 piculs of quicksilver.³⁷⁴ In the following years, the brigs *Pedler* and *William and John* were among the Astor’s vessels that visited Mediterranean ports.³⁷⁵

Generally the vessels cleared from Canton for New York, where some of the cargo was sold at auction or in Astor’s shop, and some of it sent to other US ports, to the West Indies, and to European ports like Hamburg and Le Havre. Still some part of the Canton cargo was sent to Smyrna in return for Turkey opium or to Gibraltar in return for quicksilver, specie and lead. Then the vessels cleared for New York and some of the cargo from Gibraltar and Smyrna was sold in New York, but the majority was loaded on another Astor vessel to be sold in Canton, among other items.³⁷⁶

This route changed after a while. Astor began to employ vessels to sail from New York to Gibraltar and Smyrna, sometimes for both ports sometimes only for Gibraltar, loading the products of these ports and continue to Canton, without employing an intermediary vessel.³⁷⁷ “So we see that quicksilver and lead from Gibraltar and opium from Smyrna, [...] began in 1816 to take a conspicuous place in the list of Astor’s

³⁷³ Porter, vol. 2 of *John Jacob Astor*, 599.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 600.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 602.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 664-65.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 603.

imports into China.”³⁷⁸ However, Astor’s interest in the opium trade was temporary³⁷⁹ and “opium was a regular, although small part of Astor’s cargoes from 1815 to 1820.”³⁸⁰ Actually Astor did not pursue the opium trade after 1818. There are three reasons for his withdrawal from this article’s commerce: Turkey opium did not sell in large quantities in China and thus formed only a minor part of Astor’s trade, secondly being a contraband, opium smuggling required special arrangements which, for Astor, proved “more troublesome than profitable” and finally his failed attempt to sell Persian opium discouraged him.³⁸¹ Despite Perkins’s fears, Astor left the Turkey opium trade into the hands of T. H. Perkins and his company.

5.5. Turkey Opium in China and the East Indies after 1820

The year 1821 again brought important changes affecting American participation in the drug trade to China. EIC increased the amount of Bengal and Malwa opium in order to terminate the competition of Turkey opium introduced by the American merchants. This proved successful, and new regulations were introduced by the Chinese government to end the drug traffic completely. Although the Americans imported greater amounts of Turkey opium in the following years, their share in the overall importation decreased. Moreover, the vessels directed their routes to Lintin to be able to smuggle the article into China, which created an opportunity for American

³⁷⁸ Ibid., 601.

³⁷⁹ Ibid., 604.

³⁸⁰ Haeger, *John Jacob Astor*, 174.

³⁸¹ Porter, vol. 2 of *John Jacob Astor*, 605.

merchants to participate in the sales of the Indian drug.³⁸² However the scope of this work covers only the Turkey opium, thus does not mention the merchants and vessels that dealt with the Indian opium.

Due to the increased control on smuggling, Cushing put a distance between himself and the drug sales. All the opium brought by American vessels began to be handled by the new firm of James P. Sturgis & Company. Despite Cushing's announcement, he continued to participate in the opium sales, but he officially cleared himself from the Chinese government's abuses.³⁸³ This decision of Cushing's benefitted him, when, in 1821, the infamous Terranova incident took place. The Baltimore ship *Emily*, owned by John Donnell arrived at Canton in May 1821, after an unsuccessful venture to Batavia, where it was banned from selling the opium on board by the Dutch authorities. Supercargo of the ship Griffin Stith, Donnell's nephew, had spent four months in Whampoa, selling the cargo in small pieces, but on September 23, a Sicilian seaman named Francis Terranova threw a bottle overboard which accidentally killed a Chinese woman who was selling fruit on a nearby boat. When Captain William Cowpland refused to comply with American Consul Wilcock's advice to bribe her relatives, they applied to Chinese authorities. The Americans formed a committee and were able to convince the Chinese to hold the trial on board the *Emily*. The trial's impartiality did not satisfy the Americans though, so they rejected to surrender Terranova at first. When the Chinese government cut off the entire American trade, they could find no other option than to submit, considering the high amounts of money invested in them. Terranova was executed by strangling. Around the same time, a Chinese bribe-collector was arrested, who gave up the names of

³⁸² Stelle, "American Trade in Opium to China, 1821-1839," 57.

³⁸³ Downs, "American Merchants," 426-27.

people and vessels engaged in opium smuggling, among which was the *Emily*.³⁸⁴

The Terranova incident and the subsequent confession were enough for the Chinese officials to start another war on drug trafficking. While opium sales in Canton and Whampoa were suspended, the British found another way to smuggle opium into China through Lintin, seventy miles from Canton and eighteen from Macao. The vessels transferred the opium to the store ships kept in Lintin, while the buyers arranged everything at Canton with the resident merchant of the firm. “The dangerous and unpleasant part of the business – bribing officials, delivering the narcotics ashore, and retailing to addicts was handled by the Chinese dealers.” which enabled the Americans, who copied this system from the British, to conduct a much safer business in China.³⁸⁵ EIC ships were forbidden to store “foreign opium” referring to the Turkey opium, which freed the Americans from competition once again. The first American store ship stationed in Lintin was the *Cadet* of Perkins and Company.³⁸⁶ Although government control in Whampoa and Canton eased over time, both the British and the Americans found the Lintin system more easy and secure, and American trade in Turkey opium kept increasing until 1830. J. & T. H. Perkins in Boston and Perkins & Company in Canton, together with Bryant & Sturgis of Boston, known as the Boston group, dominated the Turkey opium trade in this period.³⁸⁷ The Boston group sold sixty per cent of the total stock of Turkey opium in China in the year 1825. The rate was not altered at the disadvantage of the Boston group in the following years. In

³⁸⁴ Downs, “American Merchants,” 427-28; Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, 1821-1839,” 57-58.

³⁸⁵ Downs, “American Merchants,” 429.

³⁸⁶ Downs, “American Merchants,” 429; Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, 1821-1839,” 60-62.

³⁸⁷ Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, 1821-1839,” 63.

1829, the Boston group probably furnished seventy per cent of the Turkey opium on the China market.³⁸⁸ Although the Boston group dominated the Turkey opium trade to China, these firms also had to deal with small-scale merchants. It was not the big merchants, like Peabody, who concerned them but the former group who were anxious to sell the article on board quickly, and thus caused a decline in prices. To cope with the small firms, the Boston group chose to force these firms to sell the article to them, by under selling them.³⁸⁹ American merchants continued to bring Turkey opium to China for many years to come but after the charter of EIC expired in 1834, they had easy access to Indian opium.

The Boston group benefitted from the new system built up in Lintin which depended on the presence of a store ship. However, some other American merchants found it too challenging to take the risk of endangering their investments. One of those concerned was Stephen Girard. By 1820, Jonathan Goldstein stated that Girard's vessels, mainly the *Rousseau* and *Sally*, followed a triple route. First they went to Europe to sell American raw materials in exchange for European products and Turkey opium. Then they sailed to China and purchased Asian goods in return for the ship's cargo. Finally they turned back to Europe, sold these products in return for Continental goods and brought the final cargo back to Philadelphia.³⁹⁰ Girard's opium trade was an important part of his business, and although his vessels frequently visited European ports instead of purchasing the article in Smyrna, he kept receiving letters from agents in Smyrna. One of them was Edward Hayes & La Fontaine, who wrote in

³⁸⁸ Ibid., 64-65.

³⁸⁹ Stelle, "American Trade in Opium to China, 1821-1839," 65.

³⁹⁰ Goldstein, *Stephen Girard*, 74.

1818 and later in 1821 trying to lure Girard's business into their house.³⁹¹ Goldstein did not focus on Girard's commerce with the East Indies but he stated that after the Terranova incident he stopped sending opium, and soon withdrew completely from commerce with China.³⁹² However, he sent vessels to the East Indies in the following years with opium on board as his agents there kept informing him about the opium market in Batavia. Some other American merchants also used Batavia as an alternative to China, as a letter informed him about a brig from Salem which proceeded to Lintin after making an unsuccessful attempt to sell the opium there.³⁹³ Especially after the dissolution of the opium farm monopoly in Batavia in 1823, Turkey opium began to get higher prices, which made it more profitable for American merchants to carry opium to the East Indies.³⁹⁴ American ventures in the East Indies attracted the attention of British merchants, too. A representative of a trade house in Smyrna shared the information he had about American trade in Smyrna and the East Indies. He found this trade so profitable that he wrote:

... we suppose it would be a desirable object to wrest so much of it out of their [Americans] hands as related to the articles of the produce of the East Indies, and the exportation hence of Turkey Opium. We once more call your particular attention to the subject, as we beg to repeat that we do not see why the British would not be able to derive the same advantages which it is very evident our transatlantic friends do.³⁹⁵

³⁹¹ Edward Hayes & La Fontaine to Stephen Girard, March 30, 1821, Smyrna, Doc. No. 265, Roll 77, SGP.

³⁹² Goldstein, *Stephen Girard*, 90.

³⁹³ Forrestier & Co to Stephen Girard, November 5, 1822, Smyrna, Doc. No. 922, Roll 82, SGP. There are other letters from Forrestier and Shillaber, stating other vessels going to China after making a stop in Batavia in the same collection.

³⁹⁴ Forrestier & Co to Stephen Girard, June 23, 1823, Smyrna, Doc. No. 496, Roll 84; from same to same, September 22, 1823, Doc. No. 762, Roll 85, SGP. There are other letters from Forrestier and Shillaber, stating prices were affected favorably following the new regulations in opium farms in Batavia in the same collection.

³⁹⁵ "Letter from Smyrna, June 16, 1821, to --, Calcutta" *The Calcutta Journal of Politics and General Literature*, April 20, 1822, 562.

Besides the parcel brought by the Boston group, the rest of the article was carried to China by individual merchants in small amounts. Like Girard, some of these merchants tried to sell the article in the East Indies first, and then transferred the surplus to China. The brig *Leander* visited the port of Smyrna regularly for the purpose of obtaining opium. In 1822, the brig carried the article for the account of Samuel Barton, a Salem shipping merchant who would later be appointed as the supercargo of the *George*, along with Captain Thomas M. Saunders in 1827, to be sold in Batavia.³⁹⁶ There is also information that a part of the opium from the same account was sold in Canton in October 1824.³⁹⁷

Some merchants were luckier in their venture to the East Indies and could sell the entire article without having the need to travel to China. In 1822, master and supercargo of the ship *Perseverance*, James W. Chever was instructed to sail to the coast of Sumatra and sell Turkey opium, of which 15/48 belonged to William Pede, 9/48 to Richard Wheatland, 9/48 to James Silver, 3/48 to Benjamin Dodge and 12/48 to James W. Chever. He sold the article as instructed in Sumatra.³⁹⁸ In 1828 Nathaniel Kinsman, master of the *Bengal*, sold eight cases of Turkey opium on account of Pickering Dodge in the East Indies.³⁹⁹ Some, on the other hand, had no luck at all due to the changing market conditions. John Hancock Andrew's investment in opium onboard the *Eliza* did not find a purchaser in the East Indies.⁴⁰⁰ Another unsuccessful venture was conducted by Captain Allen Putnam who purchased Turkey opium on

³⁹⁶ "Opium 1," BFP.

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

³⁹⁸ "James W. Chever Shipping Account Book: Ontario, Perseverance," CFP.

³⁹⁹ "Ship's Papers – Bengal," PFP.

⁴⁰⁰ (...?) Putnam to John H. Andrews, April 26, 1826, Batavia, Box 1, File: Ship's Papers – Brig *Eliza* 1823-1827, MSS 2: JHAP.

account of Stephen Phillips of Salem in 1824. Although the price of opium was promising for a high profit, the market in the East Indies was so bad that Captain Putnam could not sell any and had to leave his cargo unsold in the care of Shillaber & Co in Batavia in 1826, after travelling through other ports in the East Indies.⁴⁰¹

5.6. Opium Commerce in Smyrna

While the period between 1815 and 1820 witnessed important developments, which changed the structure and domination of American opium trade to China and the East Indies, there is a lack of sources concerning American engagements in the Smyrna port. American Consular reports do not cover the period until 1818 and the few letters written afterwards focus on the Empire's foreign relations with European countries without giving any details about the American merchants. Folsom's report, on the other hand, is the most intact source that deals with rates associated with the trade but it also does not provide specific information about the individual cargoes of the vessels, the amount and quality of foreign goods brought to Smyrna or of Levant goods purchased by the Americans.

Following the Treaty of Ghent, until the Greek Revolution, American merchants did not face many difficulties in the Ottoman Empire. Trade continued and rose smoothly. Between the final months of 1815 and 1821, according to Folsom's report which depended on the information he obtained from David Offley, fifty-eight American vessels visited the Smyrna port; four in 1815, eight in 1816, seventeen in 1817, seven

⁴⁰¹ Captain Allen Putnam to Stephen Phillips, "Ship's Papers – Elize, George", PFP. These papers cover the years 1824-1826 written from same to same from different ports in Europe and the East Indies.

in 1818, six in 1819 (the number of vessels dropped in these years due to the financial crisis) and fifteen in 1820 (one of the vessels, ship *Sally Ann* entered the port twice before heading back). Of these fifty-eight, thirty-six were addressed to Woodmass & Offley (one brig *Torpedo* was addressed to both Woodmass & Offley and Van Lennep & Co.), ten to Van Lennep and Co. (including the co-consigned *Torpedo*), eight to Perkins Brothers, and four to Lee & Sons. The distribution of the vessels according to their departure port cities were as follows; one from Salem (the brig *Coromandel* also made a stop in Mocha), one from Sumatra and Sabon, three from Havana, eight from Philadelphia, eleven from New York, thirteen from Baltimore (ship *Meridian* also made a stop in Naples, and ship *Emily* also made a stop in Mocha) and twenty from Boston (ship *Henry* also made a stop in Trieste). While the early years of trade seems to be under the dominance of Philadelphia, in the following years New York and Baltimore also entered the Levant trade. The dominance of Boston can be seen especially in the year 1820, as of fifteen ships that came, ten were from Boston. The total amount of the cargoes from May 1815 to November 1820 was 18,199,187 piastres. The monetary advantage provided by Offley's arrangement for American vessels that came between these dates was 180,000 piastres. This amount would have been paid as consulage and dragomanage to the British Levant Company.⁴⁰²

There is also contradictory information about American participation in the overall opium trade to China. It never reached the amount carried by the EIC vessels, but, the "Americans brought" in the seasons 1816, 1817 and 1818, according to Stelle's rather modest calculation, "approximately ten per cent of the total Chinese imports of opium in the first two seasons and twenty per cent of the total in the third season, while, by

⁴⁰² Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, December 18, 1820, M125, Roll 68, NARA.

the larger estimates, American carried to China in 1817 and 1818 over a third of the opium...”⁴⁰³ The following two seasons, on the other hand, witnessed a deceleration because the amount of Turkey and Persian opium brought into China was more than the demand. In 1820, American overall commerce with China dropped to almost half of what it had been in 1819. The rumors about increased production of Bengal opium were also influential in this decrease. American merchants successfully achieved an increase to their share of the opium trade to China, but they were limited to Smyrna opium, though, for a short period they tried Persian opium. They gave the signals of being in serious competition with the EIC, upon which, the latter increased the production and sale of Indian opium. This would change the course of trade for the American merchants in the following years.⁴⁰⁴

The dominance of the Boston group in China pushed the small-scale merchants who could not afford to keep a store ship in Lintin to the East Indies, but the market was limited for Turkey opium, which glutted when these merchants entered into business there. However, it took several years for American merchants to leave the Turkey opium business and some business continued even after the dissolution of EIC. Although a considerable amount of Turkey opium was obtained from other European ports, which were not included in the consular reports, David Offley kept a detailed chart of the American vessels that entered Smyrna beginning from 1823. Data for the years between 1820 and 1823, however, is fragmentary. In 1823, fifteen American vessels entered the Smyrna port; two of them, brig *Niger* and ship *Sally Anne* came twice within the year. While ten of them were from Boston, one was from Salem, one from Philadelphia, one from Duxbury and three from Baltimore. Next year, again

⁴⁰³ Stelle, “American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 1820,” 442.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., 443-44.

fifteen vessels came to Smyrna and two of them conducted two visits within the same year; brig *Clio* and brig *Cherub*. Two of these were from Baltimore, one from New York and the rest were from Boston. In 1825, sixteen vessels came to Smyrna, but this time six of them made double entrance to the port; brig *SUSn*, brig *Otter*, brig *Herald*, brig *Jew*, brig *Cherub*, and brig *Rambler*. Ten of these vessels came from Boston, two from New York, and one from Bristol, Duxbury, Baltimore and Kingston each. In 1826 thirteen vessels came, and five of them visited Smyrna twice; brig *Cherub*, brig *Romulus*, brig *Smirna*, brig *Sultana* and brig *Caspian*. Offley also stated where the vessels belonged to, but for the *Romulus* and *Smirna* he noted both Boston and Duxbury. Besides these two, one was a Baltimore vessel, one New York, one Gloucester, two were Duxbury and six were Boston vessels. Offley either did not keep a chart for the year 1827, or it did not survive. The next year, of the seventeen vessels that entered Smyrna port, one was from Salem, one from Gloucester, one from Baltimore, two from Duxbury, two from Plymouth and ten from Boston. While six of them entered the port twice (brig *Tenedos*, brig *Samos*, brig *Camilla*, brig *Corporal Trim*, brig *Cherub*, brig *Danube*), the schooner *Hayti* entered three times and the brig *Delos* entered four times within a year. Fourteen vessels entered Smyrna in 1829, the *Smirna* was again noted as belonging to both Duxbury and Boston, and the *John Laird* to Alexandria. Besides these two, the ship *Emerald* and the brig *Delos* made two entrances, the brig *Tenedos*, the brig *Cherub*, and the brig *Hope* made three. Two of the American vessels are from New York, three of them from Salem, and seven originated from Boston. Finally, in 1830 twenty-six vessels entered the port, six vessels entered twice within the year; brig *Cherub*, brig *Kingston*, brig *Smirna*, brig *Melville*, brig *Mermaid* and brig *Index*. Of these twenty-six, eleven were Boston

vessels, five New York, two Duxbury, two Baltimore, one New Haven, one Kingston, one Salem, one Marblehead and one was from Plymouth.⁴⁰⁵

Except 1827, 6,194 cases of opium were purchased in Smyrna by the above-mentioned American vessels in seven years. Of these 3390 cases, more than half, were carried by the Boston merchants. Salem followed Boston with 575 cases, Baltimore with 300 cases, Duxbury with 131 cases, New York with 109 cases, Kingston with 71 cases, Gloucester with 30 cases, New Haven with 25 cases and Plymouth with 13 cases. As mentioned before, American merchants obtained Turkey opium from other ports frequently, and David Offley did not give the amount of opium purchased by foreign or local vessels which carried that opium to other ports. The exception was the year 1829, when American houses in Smyrna shipped 1,320 cases of opium to England for the China market on the American account.⁴⁰⁶ The exact amount is much higher considering the opium purchased in other ports, but even the numbers in Smyrna show the dominance of Boston merchants. The pioneers of the Turkey opium business, from Philadelphia and Baltimore, however, were almost completely out of the picture by 1820. In one of his letters to his sister, David Offley wrote about the decrease in the number of Philadelphia vessels visiting the port of Smyrna as “It appears we are never more to have any vessels direct from Philadelphia; in fact, so many of our friends have failed, that we are almost strangers among the present class of merchants...”⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁵ This information was gathered from the yearly charts prepared by David Offley. These charts can be found in T 238, Roll 1, NARA; typed version of these charts is in House Doc. 200, 88-118.

⁴⁰⁶ In addition to these numbers, in the charts Offley mentioned *Charles* loaded 200 cases of opium and *Padang* 30 cases, but he did not note any other information. Charts can be accessed from T 238, Roll 1, NARA; typed version of these charts is in House Doc. 200, 88-118.

⁴⁰⁷ David Offley to Mary Offley, June 20, 1820, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage,” last modified 2015, www.levantineheritage.com.

5.7. Conclusion

After the Treaty of Ghent, American opium commerce to China and the East Indies became more regular, although there had been interruptions, especially during the first years of the Greek Revolution. Despite these interruptions, American opium trade spread through several Mediterranean and European ports. Although Smyrna was the origin port of the opium, through their agents, American merchants also procured the article from secondary ports. Due to the distance of Smyrna, this circuitous route provided an easier, and sometimes more profitable trade for Americans, as they could participate in the carrying trade among and sell China products to these secondary ports. Thus there was not a direct trade link from Smyrna to Canton and Batavia. While on the one hand it makes it difficult to detect the amount of Turkey opium purchased by Americans at each port, on the other hand it shows the breadth of the commercial networks of this article. Although it never reached high amounts, opium was an important part of the cargoes, and the merchants adapted themselves to the changing conditions both in China and the Ottoman Empire. While T. H. Perkins and the Boston Group began to dominate the Turkey opium commerce to China, merchants like Stephen Girard found new markets after the Chinese government's regulations, or withdrew from the business completely.

CHAPTER VI

PREJUDICE VS. REALITY: AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF THE “TURK” AND THE GREEK REVOLUTION

A long street extends beyond the bay, lined with the houses of the rich merchants of the town, and for the two hours before sunset, every family is to be seen sitting outside its door upon the public pavement, while beaux and belles stroll up and down in all the gayety of perpetual holyday. They are the most out-of-doors people, the Smyrniotes, that I have ever seen. And one reason perhaps is, that they have a beauty which has nothing to fear from the daylight. The rich, classic, glowing faces of the Greeks, the paler and livelier French, the serious and impassioned Italian, the blooming English, and the shrinking and fragile American, mingle together in this concourse of grace and elegance like the varied flowers in the garden. I would match Smyrna against the world for beauty. And then such sociability, such primitive cordiality of manners as you find among them! It is quite a Utopia.⁴⁰⁸

Smyrna had been one of the favorite spots for European travelers and although the name of the city was familiar to Americans enjoying the delicious fruits sold in their markets since the colonial period, American travelers began to visit Smyrna only in the first half of the nineteenth century. One of them, Nathaniel Parker Willis resided many years in Europe and travelled in Asia Minor. His letters written during these years were compiled into a book which both depicts the American traveler and the

⁴⁰⁸ Nathaniel Parker Willis, *Pencillings by the Way* (New York: Morris & Willis, 1844), 170.

people in the countries he visited. By 1820, there had been a small but considerable mercantile community, both resident and temporary, in Smyrna. The American Board of Foreign Missions sent the first missionaries in that year to the city and soon more followed and spread throughout the country. As the number of Americans grew, the contact with the native population increased. With this increase they gained a better view of the Ottoman government, its people, its functioning, the traditions of the country and daily life. Almost all of the tourists, and Americans were no exception, described the Turkish baths, cloths, manners, the differences between religious habits and ethnic groups. They also focused on the size of the streets, for they were considered too narrow, the coffee, *chubuk* and *sherbet* consumed in coffee houses or in their homes by the Turks as they sat on a cushion in a cross-legged position for hours. Their ability to do that alone, amazed the foreigners. These travel narratives provide valuable information about the important diplomatic and public events, the everyday life of, and authors' ideas about the Ottomans, as well as their change of heart regarding their prejudices, once they became acquainted with the native population. On the other hand, the Greek uprisings in the 1820s created a strong sensation in the United States, favoring aid to the Greeks while strengthening the prejudices towards Ottoman rule. The uprisings were closely followed in the US dubbed the war of the cross against the crescent. However, the American mercantile community engaged in business in Smyrna opposed government entanglement in the Revolution. By analyzing the differences between the government, public and mercantile community this chapter will elaborate on the American perception of the Ottomans in the first half of the nineteenth century in order to reveal the emerging character of the American merchant community in Smyrna, the opinion of Ottomans about David Offley and the Americans, and the American response to the Greek

Revolution by giving the differences among government, public and mercantile community.

6.1. American Social Life in Smyrna

Smyrna had been home to foreign merchants since the sixteenth century and there had been families living in the city for generations, whose descendants can still be found there today. The Levantines consisted of people from different countries, but in Smyrna, they had formed a unified community to some extent. In terms of life style, social relations, entertainment and religion they had found a common ground. However, this was a closed community, which required limited interaction with the Muslim and Turkish Ottoman subjects. Language was one of the most important challenges preventing this interaction, as the Levantines could not speak proper Turkish, and the Turks did not know foreign languages.⁴⁰⁹ Another challenge was the life style - a male centered society eliminated women from daily social interactions. So much so that “There are no people so jealous of their wives as the Turks. No man ever sees his wife until he becomes her husband.”⁴¹⁰ The relation between a *Frenk* and a Turkish woman would be dangerous for both, as an American gentleman noted:

The Frank, provided he gives no cause of jealousy to the Turks as regards their women, and show proper respect to their religion [...], may enjoy more liberty, and as much happiness, in Asia, as in any part of the world. [...] but should he be detected in an intrigue with any of their women, his life would be in danger, and that of the woman would certainly be sacrificed to their rage.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁹ Beyru, *19. Yüzyılda İzmir’de Yaşam*, 22-25; 111.

⁴¹⁰ Barrell, *Letters from Asia*, 30.

⁴¹¹ Ibid., 49-50.

Unfamiliar to and discontent with the gender-segregated communal life, the interaction between the Muslim community and the Levantines was limited to official meetings with the city and custom administrators. On the other hand, the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire had closer relations with the Levantines due to a common religion and culture, and the knowledge of foreign language. Foreign merchants benefitted from non-Muslim Ottoman subjects as the middlemen who made contact with Anatolian producers and marriages between Greek women and Levantine men were also common. Despite the commercial rivalry between Levantines of different countries, they had established a shared community in Smyrna. Thus when the Americans came to Smyrna at the beginning of the nineteenth century, they did not feel alienated in the streets of the city where foreign languages were commonly spoken than Turkish.

Foreign merchants lived on the Frank Street, which ran parallel to the shore in the northern part of the city. The houses were protected with strong gates at night and had a great view over the harbor from where they could see all the foreign vessels.⁴¹² Since all the foreigners lived in the same quarter, they had regular contact with each other. Thus when a visitor, traveler or a new merchant came to the city he was welcomed and hosted by not only his countrymen, but also the Levantines of other countries. John Lloyd Stephens noted that he spent most of his time with his countrymen in Smyrna, although Mr. Van Lennep, the Dutch Consul and one of the prominent agents of the city, who was also “the great friend of the missionaries in the Levant,” opened his home to him at all times.⁴¹³ Van Lennep’s hospitality towards

⁴¹² Ibid., 13.

⁴¹³ John Lloyd Stephens, *Incidents of Travel in Greece Turkey Russia and Poland* (Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers, 1839), 42.

American missionaries began with the assignment of Pliny Fisk and Levi Parsons, the first American missionaries sent to Smyrna. On January 18, 1820, Fisk wrote his father they found new friends as soon as they stepped in Smyrna, among whom was Messrs. Van Lennep who “received us very kindly, offered us every assistance in their power; told us they kept horses, which we could have to ride at any time.” Fisk also visited Mr. John Lee, Perkins Brothers and Mr. Langdon, the latter two were resident merchants from Boston. Mr. Langdon invited them to use his library and offered his influence to be “excited in our favor, and favor of our object.”⁴¹⁴

It is not clear exactly when Joseph Langdon settled in Smyrna, but he had been engaged in the opium business at least since 1811, as supercargo of the *John Adams* belonging to T. H. Perkins and it is possible that he came to Smyrna in late 1810s. Being a social and extroverted person, he quickly made a name for himself among the few Americans in Smyrna. He married an Ottoman Greek woman, Miss Gou,⁴¹⁵ started a business there and formed connections with American merchants. Both in 1838, after David Offley’s death and in 1846, after David Offley’s son David W. Offley’s death, Langdon applied for Smyrna consulship upon which a mass of recommendation letters flocked to the State Department in favor of Langdon. The letters, written by merchants, masters and supercargoes of vessels, insurance officers trading with him and missionaries who had been in Smyrna, praised Langdon’s character and his abilities. They argued that he would be the most effective and qualified person for the post as his honesty, hospitality, experience and mastership on the languages spoken in Smyrna, and laws and customs of the Porte and local

⁴¹⁴ Bond ed., *Memoir of the Rev. Pliny Fisk*, 108-109.

⁴¹⁵ George Leighton Ditson, *Circassia; or a Tour to the Caucasus* (New York: Stringer & Townsend, 1850), 316. This account is the only source, which gives the name of Langdon’s wife. Ditson also mentions Offleys of Philadelphia as the prominent Americans and his friends in Smyrna.

administration would benefit both the American government and the citizens engaged in Ottoman Empire in different fields.⁴¹⁶ Although Langdon lost the post to the Offleys both times, he kept extending his assistance and hospitality to visitors. In a newspaper article written during his application for Smyrna consulship after David W. Offley's death, the author depicted his stance among the Levantines as, "Every traveller knows Joseph Langdon – his noble and honest countenance, his unaffected and frank manners, his simple and perpetual welcome, rising up among the first memories of travel in the East."⁴¹⁷ Stephen C. Massett, who came to Smyrna in September 1843, was one of the many who received the Langdon family's cordiality, and spent a few days in their summer house in the neighboring Boujah; "I never can forget the kindness, hospitality, and attention received at the hands of this excellent family; and it affords me infinite pleasure in being thus able to record their kind-heartedness and liberality."⁴¹⁸

The Levantines of Smyrna kept a country house in Sediguey (Seydiköy, today's Gaziemir), Boujach (Buca) and Bournabat (Bornova) in order to escape the hot summers. "Among the most pleasant rides in the vicinity of Smyrna" as described by Walter Colton, who was hosted by David Offley in his country house in Bournabat, "leading through a succession of vineyards and olive-groves, with the tulip and ranunculus blooming around in wild profusion" gave him great excitement.⁴¹⁹ David Offley was very fond of his summerhouse and he stayed there unless an important

⁴¹⁶ These letters can be found in M687, Roll 19; M 873, Roll 873; M 967, Roll 25, NARA.

⁴¹⁷ "Brief Mention," *Home Journal*, March 29, 1851.

⁴¹⁸ Stephen C. Massett, *"Drifting About" or What "Jeems Pipes of Pipesville" Saw-and-Did* (New York: Carleton, 1863), 75.

⁴¹⁹ Walter Colton, *Ship and Shore: or Leaves from the Journal of a Cruise to the Levant* (New York: Leavitt, Lord & Co., 1835), 307.

event called him back to the city because, as his son expressed “There is a very sensible difference between the air of country and town – the first is so pure while the latter, pent up, is impregnated with all kinds of impurities. I wonder people don’t get sick – but they seem to thrive in it like muscles in the mud.”⁴²⁰ Although the weather of Smyrna was challenging to the Levantines, who had the chance to reside outside the city’s noise and dust, as it was situated between the gulf and the mountains, it also created a fertile climate for the growth of delicious fruits that amazed almost all of the Americans who tasted them:

Besides the figs, which every one knows are esteemed the finest in the world, the grapes, cherries, pomegranates, and melons, are extremely good. Grapes of the best quality, even the royal sultanas, which are so famous for their delicacy and having no seeds, may be had for a cent a pound. The cherries are large, of various kinds and different colours, and also excellent; and as for the melons they are not to be excelled by any others. Indeed, the kind called cassabar for size and flavour is unequalled, and has the reputation of being the best in that or any other country. The olive tree grows to great perfection in the plains, and its fruit is of the finest quality; but from not being properly preserved it is not as much liked as the olives of France and Spain, and its oil from not being made with care is commonly of inferior quality.⁴²¹

The favorable climate, however, sometimes let the residents down as happened in the winter of 1832-1833, when it was so severe that it destroyed many orange trees in the city, and left David Offley with none “instead of having a crop often the US had oranges.”⁴²²

Besides travelling between their residences, and dealing with their own businesses,

⁴²⁰ Richard Offley to Catharine Van Rensselaer Heaton Offley, June 19, 1830, Smyrna, OFP.

⁴²¹ Gustavus R. B. Horner, *Medical and Topographical Observations upon the Mediterranean; and upon Portugal, Spain, and Other Countries* (Philadelphia: Haswell, Barrington, and Hasswell, 1839), 194. Opium was the main article in American trade in Smyrna but Smyrna fruits also gained attention from the merchants, and it was not only the figs and grapes. Perkins instructed Paine to obtain various melon seeds because “cantaloupes and other melons are said to be better in Turkey than else where” Perkins to F. W. Paine, November 1, 1819, Cabot, *Extracts from Letter Books*, 301.

⁴²² Horner, *Medical and Topographical Observations*, 194.

the Levantine community passed time in the Casino, which was the main amusement center in Smyrna, as the city lacked operas, theatres, public squares, etc. to address the social needs of the Levantines. Almost all of the travel narratives mention the Casino since it had an important function in their travels and in the social lives of the Levantines. The Casino was

a large and handsome edifice, built and owned by a Greek. In the second story are a billiard-room, two parlours, and a spacious hall used commonly for a reading-room and exchange, but in winter also used for the balls, which are given throughout that season by the subscribers to the establishment. Any subscriber has the liberty of introducing into it as many strangers as he thinks proper, and once introduced they always retain the privilege of resorting there. Foreign officers belonging to the men-of-war in port are always invited to the balls, and if they wish it they can get otherwise introduced to the Casino without difficulty, where they are sure of being received politely, and becoming acquainted with the most respectable part of the Frank population.⁴²³

Nathaniel Parker Willis also described the Casino with admirable words:

The stranger, on his arrival, is immediately introduced to the *Casino* - a large palace, supported by the subscription of the residents, containing a reading-room, furnished with all the gazettes and reviews of Europe, a ball-room frequently used, a coffee-room whence the delicious mocha is brought to you whenever you enter, billiard-tables, card-rooms, etc., etc. The merchants are all members, and any member can introduce a stranger, and give him all the privileges of the place during his stay in the city. It is a courtesy that is not a little drawn upon. English, French, and American ships-of-war are almost always in the port, and the officers are privileged guests.⁴²⁴

The Levantines of Smyrna and the travelers gathered in the Casino, where they entertained themselves with dances, masquerades at nights, and sipping coffee and playing cards during day. They discussed the events happening in their countries or affecting the world, they organized meetings regarding their businesses, and hosted their visitors, tourists or officers of the foreign war vessels. Despite the central and

⁴²³ Ibid., 196.

⁴²⁴ Willis, *Pencillings by the Way*, 170.

colorful descriptions, the Casino had, at the same time, a base of class and nationality. It was an aristocratic establishment, which opened its doors only to the most prominent residents of the city.⁴²⁵ Smyrna's uniqueness in terms of the different ethnic and national groups living there was praised in the writings of foreigners. On his first day in Smyrna, John Lloyd Stephens noted the amazement he experienced turning a corner that led him to the main street as "It was gay, animated, striking, and beautiful, and entirely different from any thing I had ever seen in any European city. Franks, Jews, Greeks, Turks, and Armenians, in their various and striking costumes, were mingled together in agreeable confusion..."⁴²⁶ This colorfulness however was not a part of the Casino. Privileged enough to enter the Casino, Stephens was disappointed because

The company consisted only of the aristocracy or higher mercantile classes, the families of the gentlemen composing the club, and excluded the Greek and Smyrniote women, among whom is found a great portion of the beauty of the place. [...] The casino, by the way, is a very aristocratic institution, and sometimes knotty questions occur in its management. Captains of merchant vessels are not admitted. A man came out as owner of a vessel and cargo, and also master; *quere*, could he be admitted? His consignee said yes; but the majority, not being interested in the sales of his cargo, went for a strict construction, and excluded him.⁴²⁷

The establishment and administration of the Casino also shows the public structure within Smyrniot society, including the Levantines. Smyrna was a cosmopolitan city, but each ethnic and religious group had their own quarters and prayer buildings, and although they came together in the bazaars or in the streets, they did not share a common social ground that included all of them. Moreover, established in order to preserve and create a space for Western culture, the Casino, like Smyrna society,

⁴²⁵ *Le Spectateur Oriental*, January 12, 1826, qtd in Beyru, *19. Yüzyılda İzmir'de Yaşam*, 122.

⁴²⁶ Stephens, *Incidents of Travel*, 39.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, 42-43.

attached more importance to class, as in the second half of the nineteenth century particularly, upper class non-Muslim Ottoman subjects began to be accepted for membership.⁴²⁸

The social life in Smyrna was both inclusive and exclusive at the same time, and the Americans who resided there and stayed or visited for a short period of time integrated into the already established Levantine life. Americans like Langdon shone out through their hospitality and social abilities, whose house, as stated by an American traveler, became the meeting point for other Americans. In contrast, David Offley chose to lead a “dull life” as he described: “My family still consists of myself, servant & an old cat, so that when at evening I return home, it may be truly said I have retired.”⁴²⁹ This life style did not change over the years, and in another letter again written to his sister, he stated that “When I return to a house I may call elegant, furnished with everything which certain luxury ... to make life agreeable ... I feel shut up from the world as if I was the only creature in it.”⁴³⁰ The simple life of David Offley could be called domestic, though became more cheerful after his marriage to Helena Courtovich, of one of the most respectable Greek families in Smyrna. It had also previously one of the richest, but the family fortune was lost after her parents’ death.⁴³¹ Being brought up by her siblings and experiencing the wrath of fate at an early age, “she has had the advantage of a good standing in Society, at the same time has been taught the value of money.” He continued “She is silent, rather timid, patient, of great sensibility, little of which is shown in words, but in her actions; in

⁴²⁸ Beyru, *19. Yüzyılda İzmir’de Yaşam*, 121-124.

⁴²⁹ David Offley to Mary Offley, September 28, 1815, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

⁴³⁰ David Offley to Mary Offley, July 10, 1818, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

⁴³¹ The date of their marriage was given as May 4, 1819 in Brockenbrough Offley, *Diary of John Holmes Offley*, 107.

person, tall, slender, a pleasing countenance, and on the whole, what is called rather an elegant than pretty woman.” The couple married on May 4, 1819, and had their first child, Henry Daniel Offley, on March 26, 1820.⁴³²

David Offley gave priority to his business and family, which actually served the common ideal for him. He mentioned his longing for his sister and daughter several times in his letters. However, upon his sister’s insistence for his return, he wrote “I am not able to retire from business in justice to my children, and as a merchant, there is no place where my prospects would be so good as here.”⁴³³ His trade house was promising from the time it first opened, and as he strengthened his stance, it became more lucrative, but at the same time tied him to Smyrna: “My commercial establishment has become too valuable to be slightly abandoned by a father of three sons. This establishment promises an easy entrance for my children into the world.” By the time he wrote this letter, his three sons from his first marriage, Richard, Holmes and David had joined him and found jobs with the aid of their father.⁴³⁴ Richard and Holmes would start a partnership in the following years, and Holmes would later move to Trieste as an agent and would become Consul there. Richard would establish a business with Issaverdy and move to New York.⁴³⁵ David, on the other hand, would work in a Counting House in Constantinople⁴³⁶ and be appointed as Consul after his father’s death.

There is not much information on David Offley’s experiences in Philadelphia, and

⁴³² David Offley to Mary Offley, June 20, 1820, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

⁴³³ David Offley to Mary Offley, September 28, 1815, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

⁴³⁴ David Offley to Mary Offley, July 10, 1818, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

⁴³⁵ David Offley to Mary Offley, June 20, 1820, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

⁴³⁶ David Offley to Mary Offley Sharpless, May 27, 1831, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

what pushed him to leave his life there and move to a lesser-known part of the world, but in his letters it is indicated that he had a misfortune. His family had a high standing in Philadelphia society and was a regular member of Quakers, but he had a divorce, and it is possible that he had problems in his business life, which altogether, created a troublesome atmosphere and left bad memories. He wrote, “I have a few (very few indeed) friends who I wish to see. Was it not for them, what inducement have I to live in America. Certainly the recollections which Philadelphia must always present to my mind are not of the kind to add to my tranquility or happiness.”⁴³⁷

Whatever had passed in Philadelphia, it is certain that it left a mark on David Offley and kept him away from his country. In another letter he noted, “Much do I desire to see America, but still that rose would not be without its thorns. I am not happy even at this distance from the scene of my disgrace & unhappiness, the view of scenes which would ever moment recall recollections to make the blood boil in my veins, would conduce to nothing but more complete misery.”⁴³⁸ Although he did not have it in mind to stay forever in Smyrna, one of the reasons why he devoted himself to his business and endeavored to enhance the position of American merchants and the government in the Ottoman Empire was due to the difficulties he had endured in Philadelphia, which dampened his will to return. After his marriage and his well-operating business were established, it became more difficult to leave even for a limited period of time, as his “establishment here is too valuable to be lightly abandoned.”⁴³⁹ 1820s were when the American business in Smyrna boomed but it brought difficulties to Offley. He maintained his self-shouldered duties as a non-

⁴³⁷ David Offley to Mary Offley, September 28, 1815, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

⁴³⁸ David Offley to Mary Offley, July 10, 1818, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

⁴³⁹ David Offley to Mary Offley, June 20, 1820, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

official consul, while the other American merchants extended their business and established new agencies in the city to compete with Woodmass & Offley.

While the travel narratives and letters generally describe the lives of American men, there is an unfortunate there is a lack of sources depicting how it was for an American woman to lead a life in Smyrna in the first half of the nineteenth century. In this respect the few letters of Catharine Van Rensselaer Heaton Offley, John Holmes Offley's wife, to her sisters back home shed light on these issues. While the merchants ran their businesses, Catharine passed the time running the household, time consuming endeavour as she was unable to speak Greek or Turkish. Thus giving orders to her servants was a challenge itself, but she could understand a little Greek and knew Italian "perfectly well" and therefore was able to communicate to those who did not know English. In addition to chores, she was "making shirts, table cloths, napkins, curtain covers for Turkish sofas" kept her busy during the day.⁴⁴⁰ Not so much different than her life in the US.

She also visited her father-in-law's and her husband's acquaintances in Smyrna, including the Pacha of Smyrna. During these visits she paid attention to the smallest details from the food and drinks, to the embroidered coffee cups, to cloths and traditions. The Pacha of Smyrna invited his physician Mr. Clarke to his palace. Accompanying Mrs. Clarke, Catharine Offley had a chance to see inside a harem and give a detailed account of it to her sister. Before entering the harem, she was invited to join the other members of the group and sit with the Pacha and converse with him through his dragoman. Upon learning who she was, Pacha expressed his friendship with her husband. The women in the group, including the English Consules and Mrs.

⁴⁴⁰ Catharine Van Rensselaer Heaton Offley Mary Heaton, December, 1826, Smyrna, OFP.

Woodmas, were later invited into the women's apartments, the rooms reserved for the Pacha's relatives. Plain and pure decoration of the furniture, women's cloths, or their manner she wrote, "did not answer at all to our ideas of the Harams of the East."⁴⁴¹

The economics of maintaining life in Smyrna was another issue brought forward by Catharine Offley. Although missed America and her acquaintances there, she was content to led a more luxurious life on a much cheaper budget in Smyrna, with two servants, the one was paid \$ 18 and the other \$ 50 per annum, in a house larger than was needed. While they spent 20 to 26 dollars per month in Smyrna, they had been spending 14 dollars per week in the US. The difference was "a great consideration."⁴⁴² Catharine Offley spent most of her time in the Levantine community, limiting interaction with the Turks of the city. John Holmes indicated at the beginning of his diary that Catharine was already having a tough time "as she was leaving parents and relations to go to a foreign country and from general report to none of the most pleasant."⁴⁴³ Thus her experiences throughout her stay in Smyrna could not extend the boundaries of what she had already known or heard. The customs, characters, religion of Turks had some nice qualities but in the simplistic terms they were "strange."

⁴⁴¹ Catharine Van Rensselaer Heaton Offley to Deborah Heaton, March 26, 1827, Smyrna, OFP.

⁴⁴² Catharine Van Rensselaer Heaton Offley to Mary Heaton, November 9, 1827, Smyrna, OFP.

⁴⁴³ Brockenbrough Offley, *Diary of John Holmes Offley*, 1.

6.2. The Greek Revolution and the Americans

Influenced by the literary revivalism during the final decades of the nineteenth century, wrote Myrtle Cline, Greek patriotism gained strength gradually and in the spring of 1821 the Greeks revolted against Ottoman rule, a movement that would continue for almost a decade.⁴⁴⁴ It was a period of brutal and bloody massacres on both sides. The Ottomans did not wait long to respond to the rebels' atrocities in the Greek mainland and on many of the islands, and both Greeks in official positions and Greek subjects were attacked and executed under official orders and by individuals. Highly populated by non-Muslim subjects and inhabited by the Levantine community, Smyrna became the scene of such violence, and the events were described in almost all of the travel narratives, diaries or letters by people who witnessed the events themselves or through hearsay during and after the revolution.

David Offley wrote to his sister about the "state of the greatest possible alarm" because they "were entirely at the mercy of an armed mob" among whom were strangers who "do not know how to discriminate between them [Greeks] and other Christians." He expressed his astonishment about the fact that "not more than about 40 murders were committed" most of which had a history of previous disagreements, still he reserved a cabin for his family on a Russian ship at the harbor, like most of the Levant community and his partner Mr. Woodmass had already embarked and secured his family. David Offley, on the other hand, considering his two toddlers, and thinking his house was "so situated on the marine that it is easily defended, and from which I have at all times a secure retreat on ship board," decided to remain. The

⁴⁴⁴ Myrtle Cline, *American Attitude toward the Greek War of Independence, 1821-1828* (Atlanta, Georgia: Higgins – McArthur Company, 1930), 9-10.

atrocities that frightened both non-Muslims and the Levant community were mainly caused by people coming from other cities and by the loss of command by the governor and other authorities in the city. Once a Pacha arrived and took command of the city, however, the situation calmed considerably. He gave assurances to the residents and secured tranquility.⁴⁴⁵ Pliny Fisk's account was harsher. He gave the estimated number of the Greeks who had been killed within 24 hours in Smyrna as 50 to 200. He continued to write about attacks on Greek subjects in the streets, on Greeks and Levantines in Bournabat, but at the end of the June 18th entry, he stated that some of the reports were exaggerated.⁴⁴⁶

The violence in the city and throughout the Empire was a reaction to recent events in Chios (Scio / *Sakız Adası*). The Greek revolutionaries landed on Scio in March 1822 from the neighboring island Samos, and although some residents joined the cause, most of the islanders tried to maintain neutrality. However, many of the Turks living in Scio were attacked. By the end of the same month, Capudan Pacha Nasuhzade Ali arrived at the island and upon orders from the Porte initiated a mass assault on the Greek population. Most of the survivors were enslaved, brought to Smyrna and sold in slave bazaars. Relaying the words of one of the survivors who had been enslaved in Smyrna, English traveler George Keppel did not think the Turks were the sole reason for the events, but it was the Samos (*Sisam*) and Ipsara (İpsara) Greeks who caused it.⁴⁴⁷ Contrary to Keppel, John Lloyd Stephens' approach was more intense and denunciatory towards the Turks. Relying on witness accounts like Keppel, and after

⁴⁴⁵ David Offley to Mary Offley Sharpless, May 25, 1821, Smyrna, "Levantine Heritage."

⁴⁴⁶ Bond ed., *Memoir of the Rev. Pliny Fisk*, 150-54.

⁴⁴⁷ George Keppel, vol. 1 of *Narrative of a Journey Across the Balcan, by the Two Passes of Selimno and Pravadi; also of a Visit to Azani, and Other Newly Discovered Ruins in Asia Minor, in the Years 1829-1830* (London: Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1831), 173.

explaining the violence, murders and slavery, Stephens wrote, “My feeling were so wrought upon, that I felt my blood boil at the first Turks I met in the streets. I felt that I should like to sacrifice him to the shades of the murdered Greeks.”⁴⁴⁸ John Holmes Offley wrote his own experience in his diary. He was on a trip to Scio for business and he reached it right after the attack on the island. As he narrated what he had heard and seen, he wrote “One of the first and most heart rending sights we witnessed that horrible day was the body of a murdered female.” Their guide told the story of this young woman, who was suspected to have been no more than eighteen, was captured by two Turks, who could not decide over her ownership. As it was clear from her clothes, she was from a wealthy family and neither was willing to give her up. While the Turks were arguing with the yataghans in their hands, she captured a moment to run away. Realizing this, the two Turks shot and wounded her. The rest is given as John Holmes narrated the story:

They came near and discharged their pistols at her fallen body. Even this did not seem to allay their demoniacal fury, for they drew their yataghans and literally minced her into a hundred pieces, leaving the face alone untouched, the beauty of which seemed still retained in all its fullness, as if to draw from the passerby a tear of sympathy for her memory, and anathemas upon the heads of her cruel destroyers. The awful tragedy closed, said our guide, by the two Zebecks shaking hands and making their peace over her mutilated remains.⁴⁴⁹

Letters telling the events in Scio written by Greeks and sent to a Londoner found their way into American papers. One of the authors described the atrocities towards the islanders as “but what will you say of these innocent young children who have fallen victims to the most horrible death caused by the brutal conduct of those monsters into

⁴⁴⁸ Stephens, *Incidents of Travel*, 33-34.

⁴⁴⁹ Brockenbrough Offley, *Diary of John Holmes Offley*, 52.

whose possession they fell!”⁴⁵⁰ Another Greek wrote about the Turks after Scio
“These tigers, a thousand times more cruel than those of the forest, have vented that
hatred upon the dead which they bear to the living. They opened the tombs, and threw
into the streets the bones of our fathers, and the corpses of their own victims were
dragged by the feet through the brooks.”⁴⁵¹

The reaction of the travelers condemning the Turks and pitying the Greeks can be
understood since this event found strong publicity abroad and increased the pro-Greek
sentiment in the United States. Until 1825, the Greek Revolution was more or less
successful against the Ottoman forces, but it could not establish a stable government.
In that year, Sultan Mahmud II sought the help of the Pacha of Egypt who was able to
conduct a successful campaign against the Greeks. While the Greeks understood the
aid of a foreign power was required in order to achieve their goals, the American
public and the authorities followed the Greek cause closely throughout these years. As
early as 1822, philhellenic sentiment surfaced in a mass meeting in Albany. While the
origins of American democracy, culture and art was rooted in Greek history, a parallel
was established between the Greek Revolution against the despotism of the Ottoman
Empire and the American Revolution against the tyranny of Great Britain. The other
efficient support for the Greeks came from the religious perspective as it was
constructed as a war of Christianity against Islam, the oppressed Christian against his
Muslim rulers. All these points were expressed in Albany in order to collect aid for
the Greek cause. The following year, a group of women in New York attracted

⁴⁵⁰ “Copy of a letter written from Leghorn, by a Greek house, to one of his friends here,” *Daily National Intelligencer*, August 19, 1822; *Louisville Public Advertiser*, September 7, 1822.

⁴⁵¹ “Extract of a private letter from a Young Greek, Smyrna, May 15” *Daily National Intelligencer*, August 19, 1822; *Louisville Public Advertiser* September 7, 1822; *Religious Remembrancer*, Sept. 14, 1822.

attention to the Greek resurgence again, but it was when Edward Everett, professor of Greek literature at Harvard, advocated for the cause that an overall interest was aroused in the US. He wrote in newspapers, repeating the same arguments made in Albany. He triggered the people who wanted to do more for Greece and a volunteer committee was initiated to raise donations.⁴⁵² Committee members, statesmen favoring the Greek cause and articles in the newspapers, all emphasized the barbarity and violation of the Muslim Turk.

While the news of Greek victories was given under headings like “Glorious News from Greece!”⁴⁵³ or “Greek Skill and Heroism,”⁴⁵⁴ Ottoman victories were presented under titles like “Turkish Barbarities,” “Massacre of Greeks” or “Horrors of Greece.”⁴⁵⁵ Largely dependant on letters written by people who resided there or who visited the Mediterranean ports, these articles emphasized the “sufferings of Greeks” who “will all rather die than submit, whilst there is a ray of hope.”⁴⁵⁶ Attacks on Greeks found great publicity during the revolutionary years with such words that depicted the actions of Turks as “murders”, “massacres,” “destruction” or the people as “barbarians” and “inveterate masters.” On the other hand, the Greeks were known for their “bravery” but they were “defenceless,” “innocent,” “poor,” “victims.”⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵² Cline, *American Attitude*, 22-38.

⁴⁵³ *Aurora and Franklin Gazette*, June 12, 1826.

⁴⁵⁴ *Aurora and Franklin Gazette*, November 29, 1824.

⁴⁵⁵ The titles were followed by extract of letters in *Daily National Intelligencer*, August 19, 1822; *Louisville Public Advertiser*, September 7, 1822.

⁴⁵⁶ *Aurora and Franklin Gazette*, October 18, 1824.

⁴⁵⁷ Some of these exact words are quoted from the following papers: *Daily National Intelligencer*, February 14, 1822; *Louisville Public Advertiser*, March 22, 1826; *Maryland Gazette*, January 13, 1825; *Providence Patriot*, *Columbian Phoenix*, February 16, 1822; *The National Advocate, for the Country*, February 12, 1822; *Christian Watchman*, March 2, 1822.

These general USges aside, some extracts depicted the cruelty of the Turks in detail.

One of them, written by an American officer in the *Erie* is given below:

... I saw a sight one morning, as I was walking in one of them, which disgusted me more than any thing I had seen of the Turks. Close by a shop that I was passing, I came near to stumbling over a dead body; it was so much mangled that at first I did not perceive what it was. The people informed me that a Greek shopkeeper had been reported to the Bashaw, for having in his possession some bad money. Without any thing in the form of a trial, the Bashaw sent his executioner, who dragged the poor wretch right in front of his own door, and there, before his family and friends, but his head off and placed it on the other extremity of the body as the greatest insult he could add. No one dare to touch the body until the Bashaw was petitioned for permission to have it buried. I went away as soon as possible; but had not gone far when I saw another who had been treated in the same way, and for the same reason. Thus it is the poor Greeks are treated like dogs...⁴⁵⁸

He criticized the indifference of the Levantine community of Smyrna towards these kinds of actions. He held them similar to the Turks who actually committed those cruelties. Among all the Levantines, he found only two men who were deemed respectable and separate from the rest: David Offley and Joseph Langdon.⁴⁵⁹

While these kinds of letters condemning the Turks were widespread in American newspapers, there were also letters criticizing the Greeks. One of the very harsh examples was written by the *New York Commercial Advertiser* correspondent who, after visiting Napoli di Romania, observed that “There is as much enmity and bad feeling between the Greeks of different parts of the continent and islands, as between them and the Turks” and concluded that “They are totally incapable of anything like self government, and in fact, are just what their situation for centuries past, has tended to make them.”⁴⁶⁰ The belief in the final victory of the Greeks and their eventual

⁴⁵⁸ “Extract of a letter from an American officer in board the *Erie*, dated at Napoli di Romania, Sept. 18” *Christian Secretary*, December 12, 1825; *Christian Watchman*, Dec. 2, 1825.

⁴⁵⁹ “Ibid.

⁴⁶⁰ *Aurora and Franklin Gazette*, January 7, 1826.

formation of perfect self-government was weak, according to these letters, as described by an American in Smyrna: "I never expect to see the Greeks an independent nation. It is much more probable I shall live to see them Russian subjects, and assisting to destroy the liberties of others."⁴⁶¹

American "Greek fever" did not stop on the public level. Everett's enthusiasm pulled Daniel Webster to his side. He was encouraged by President Monroe's message esteeming Greek victory and submitted a motion to the House on December 8th, 1823 for the appointment of a commissioner to Greece. Coming right after the Monroe Doctrine, which denounced intervention into the businesses of the Old World, and John Quincy Adams' promotion for non-entanglement, Webster's motion was rejected.⁴⁶² Neither Webster, nor Everett pursued their goal to induce the American government to send aid to the Greek rebels. Chapman's explanation for their reluctance to maintain a strong public support for the Greek cause and the government's rejection of an official entanglement was the growing importance of Turkey opium trade in Thomas Handasyd Perkins' business and his investments in Boston influencing the general well-being of the city.⁴⁶³

In the middle of December 1823, Everett called on prominent Bostonians to take part in a committee to raise funds for the Greek cause and invited the esteemed "merchant prince" of Boston, T. H. Perkins to the meeting. Rejecting Everett's offer, Perkins replied with an article published in *Boston Daily Advertiser* anonymously, signed 'A Merchant.' In the article Perkins expressed sympathy towards the Greek cause, yet

⁴⁶¹ "Extract of a letter from an American gentleman in Smyrna, to his friend in Philadelphia, dated April 24th, 1824" *Daily National Intelligencer*, July 19, 1824; *Niles' Weekly Register*, July 24, 1824.

⁴⁶² Chapman, "Pragmatic," 450-51.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

opposed financing it in consideration of the reaction of the Ottoman Empire. The result could not only threaten the well-being of American citizens in that part of the world but also evoke the enmity of all the Mohammedan power it held, referring to the Barbary States.⁴⁶⁴ The night the article was published, Everett wrote a letter to Perkins seeking his aid for the relief of Greek sufferers. Realizing his article was not strong enough, Perkins wrote another letter, again signed 'A Merchant.' This time he emphasized the role of Turkey opium in American trade, and thus in the development of Boston. Moreover, he called for the necessity of establishing an embassy in Constantinople. There were many articles brought from Turkey to the US ports, but opium had a more important place due to its role in the commerce with China. "For the past three years, the opium crop had averaged 'one million dollars, and at least the one half of the last crop will have been exported from Turkey for *American account*.'" Perkins emphasized the importance of opium by stating that it decreased the amount of specie sent to China. Sacrificing this lucrative trade on behalf of the Christian sympathies would "hazard the liberty of our citizens."⁴⁶⁵ The importance of trade with the Ottoman Empire began to be discussed in the Senate's first session on January 20, 1824. The debate circled around whether it was valuable enough to be sacrificed for the Greek cause, continuing for a few days, with the US government eventually deciding on behalf of non-entanglement.

While defending non-entanglement, Perkins and the American community in Smyrna helped the Greeks individually. A letter from Joseph Langdon to T.H. Perkins revealed one example of his philanthropy in aiding those Greeks enslaved by the Turks. In one letter, he indicated that an amount of \$ 1800 was spent to free a slave

⁴⁶⁴ "A Merchant," *Boston Daily Advertiser*, 19 December 1823, qtd in Chapman, "Pragmatic," 456.

⁴⁶⁵ "A Merchant," *Boston Daily Advertiser*, 23 December 1823, qtd in Chapman, "Pragmatic," 457.

named Sappho who was later sent to the family of Governor James Winthrop of Massachusetts. Whether there were other examples is unknown but, Louise Langdon, the author of the second letter wrote, “He [Perkins] was much troubled by the effect of the War of Greek Independence on his business, of course, but did not let it influence his generosity.”⁴⁶⁶ David Offley took part in these philanthropist actions. He wrote the brutal story of a slave girl whom he freed by paying \$ 320. “This child” whom he took into his home “was in the hands of a particularly ferocious and bad Turk. He had her tied up and beaten to force her to renounce her religion, [...]. When I saw her, she gave me a look that I never shall forget. It was full of hope and despair.”⁴⁶⁷ Offley’s son John Holmes, also gave an account of his experience with a slave girl. While he and an unnamed American gentlemen were touring the bazaars, they came across two girls, one Sciot and one Isparid, held by “a barbarous looking Turk.” Since the Levantines were forbidden to purchase slaves, they had to use a Turkish mediator and through their porters they were able to purchase these two girls. John Holmes purchased the Sciot, Marigo and took her to his mother, referring to Elena, his father’s Greek wife. Marigo lived with them until she was sent to her mother who was later found in Syria. Whether John Holmes and David wrote about the same girl is not clear, but it is highly possible that the American gentleman John Holmes mentioned was Joseph Langdon, who after purchasing the Isparid, sent her to

⁴⁶⁶ The first letter is from Joseph Langdon to T. H. Perkins, August 6, 1827, Smyrna, the second letter is from Louise Langdon van Agt to Crosby Forbes, July 21, 1979, Maine, Call no. Ms. N-49.38, Massachusetts Historical Society. The second letter informs the receiver that the information about the future of Sappho was given in David Finnie’s *Pioneers East*. She also mentions another child, named Garafilia, who was sent to Charleston where Langdon’s parents resided, on Langdon’s account to be educated.

⁴⁶⁷ David Offley to Mary Offley Sharpless, October 14, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

his family near Boston to be educated.⁴⁶⁸ The effort to free Greek slaves was adopted by all of the Levantines living in Smyrna, and also some of the Ottoman subjects. The Greek Revolution and the murders, violence and enslavement of the Greeks re-animated the image of the barbarous Turks. Not only did the newspapers elaborate on this image in articles written by Americans who had never met a Turk before, but the residents of and visitors to Smyrna also repeatedly described and accused the Turks of atrocities. Remembering the attitude towards the Barbary nations, the Greek Revolution was one of the events, which drew a very negative image.

The Greek Revolution also damaged American commerce with Smyrna. David Offley complained about the scarcity of incoming vessels due to the embargo placed by the Porte in the event of the Greek Revolution. As business was “at a complete stand” Offley survived this period by “a handsome capital” he had saved. The only problem he thought he had, was his goal to leave his sons a considerable amount to help them to establish their own businesses, which would no longer be possible.⁴⁶⁹ Although the embargo was lifted in a short while, the conflicted affairs harmed the business so much so that on the face of his expenses and losses, his gains had been unimportant.⁴⁷⁰ The following years had been harsher on Offley, as he expressed to his sister “My losses by the Greek rebellion have been considerable. I have, however, just enough left to insure me a sufficient competency according to the economical manner I now live in these times.”⁴⁷¹ In addition to the Greek Revolution, the domination of the

⁴⁶⁸ Brockenbrough Offley, *Diary of John Holmes Offley*, 54-55. In a newspaper article, it was written that Langdon redeemed a Greek captive named Garafilia Mohalba and “sent to this country [the US] for education, adopting her as a daughter.” In “Brief Mention,” *Home Journal*, March 29, 1851.

⁴⁶⁹ David Offley to Mary Offley Sharpless, May 25, 1821, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

⁴⁷⁰ David Offley to Mary Offley, January 29, 1822, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

⁴⁷¹ David Offley to Mary Offley, August 11, 1823, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

Boston Group and the establishment of other agencies also put Offley's business at hazard. The lucrative business he had run for almost ten years, without any competition, began to fail. While he came with great hopes for his children's and his own well-being, he found himself with a larger family and a diminishing business.

Another negative effect of the Greek Revolution on American commerce in the Mediterranean was brought upon by pirates. Despite the support for the Greek cause, piracy was criticized severely in the US. The newspapers published the information they gathered from captains and seamen who had recently been in the Archipelago. The Greek pirates did not only plunder the cargoes but sometimes murdered the crew.

⁴⁷² The American merchants had been saved from the assaults so far, except the robbing of a brig belonging to Boston by a Greek privateer.⁴⁷³ The officers in *Ontario* and the other convoy ship *Erie* sent several letters to American newspapers, arguing that keeping war vessels was necessary because while the American trade was becoming more valuable, the piracy was increasing at the same rate and even the American flag was subject to attacks.⁴⁷⁴ The following years, Greek pirates increased their attacks on the American commerce. One of the most devastating examples was one of Smyrna's regulars, *Cherub* of Boston which was captured by the Greeks on its way to Smyrna and robbed of its cargo, and was captured again on its return voyage.⁴⁷⁵ Besides *Cherub*, *Phoebe Ann*, *Roy Roy* and *June* were among the other American vessels that were captured by the Greeks. The last one was carrying

⁴⁷² *Aurora and Franklin Gazette*, November 10, 1826.

⁴⁷³ John Rodgers to Bernard Henry, Gibraltar Bay, July 8, 1825, BOX 3 OV – 1: Letter book North Carolina, RFP, LC.

⁴⁷⁴ "Extract from letters received from officers of the *Ontario* and *Erie*, dated at Smyrna, 29th Oct. and 1st Sept. 1825" *Daily National Intelligencer*, November 16, 1825; *Maryland Gazette and State Register*, November 24, 1825.

⁴⁷⁵ David Offley to Henry Clay, November 26, 1827, Smyrna, T 238, Roll 1, NARA.

“provisions for the suffering Greeks” but was still plundered.⁴⁷⁶ While criticisms towards the Greeks were expressed in the papers, there were also defensive texts published in the same papers. One of them held not only the Turks but also the Christian powers responsible for the piracies, is given below:

The Greeks are on all sides accused of piracy. The government has done everything in its power to prevent it, and has even punished some fathers of families whom wretchedness had reduced to the necessity of becoming pirates. But what can be answered to a whole population who cry for bread that cannot be given to them? [...] Until the Greeks be massacred or succored, or conquerors, it will be impossible to prevent piracy, for the first law of nature is to exist, and the Greeks abandoned to their own means, can only exist by the aid of the beneficent, or by taking food where they can find it. They have no other resource than death or independence; for to return under Turkish or Egyptian dominion is death. They know they have no quarter to hope for on that side, and that treaties will ever be condemned by the followers of Mahomet. Let not then the powers complain of the piracy of famishing nations, or let them charge it upon themselves alone. All our vices and defects come from the Turks and the Christians; the former for having treated us as slaves for three centuries, and the latter for having riveted our fetters by favoring the Turks. If Christian powers will not succor us, let them at least openly aid the Turco Egyptians, and our agony will be shorter.⁴⁷⁷

Another strong argument came from Dr. Howe, who went to Greece during the Revolution. Holding the Turks responsible for oppressing the Greeks for centuries, which caused character failures and piracy, Howe responded these denunciations in a long article by trying to create sympathy in the American public:

Hence you will find the Greek merchant cunning and dishonorable; and those who have wandered about in Europe, as well as those living on the sea-coast, and in large towns, to be mean, jealous, intriguing and unprincipled. It is with these that the traveller, the transient visitor, such as sea-captains meet, as they generally speak French and Italian; they find them base, get cheated by them, and, without knowing any thing of the mass of the people, or one word of their language, pronounce a self-concelted and sweeping denunciation against them as a nation of rogues. This is almost universally the case ... Much has been said about their civil broils, and particularly about their piracies; but these are

⁴⁷⁶ “Extract of a letter from Smyrna, dated Nov. 12” *Daily National Intelligencer*, February 1, 1828.

⁴⁷⁷ “Extract of a letter from Constantine Jerostacha, addressed to M. Eynard, philohellenist at Florence and transmitted by the latter to the duke de Choiseul,” *Aurora and Franklin Gazette*, June 12, 1826.

not at all to be wondered at; and I appeal to the good sense of this audience, whether if fifty thousand American Sailors were thrown out of employ, and likely to starve, if there were no Government to rule, and no power or tribunal to punish them, would they not be worse than the Greeks?-would they be content, like them, to take property and spare life? [...] There is yet a spark left of the spirit of ancient Greece, which long ages of subjection, and four hundred years of horrible slavery, have not been able to put out – the same love of learning, liberty, and their native land.⁴⁷⁸

6.3. The General Perception of The Turks

The Greek Revolution was an important event that influenced not only the American business in Asia Minor, but also the general American perception of the Muslim Ottoman subjects. The accounts given in that period remind the readers of the American experience in the Barbary States in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the idea of the “Turk” as developed in those years settled in the minds of American public. The experiences of Americans who visited Ottoman lands constructed a different perception and sometimes uttered how different their experiences were when compared with the prejudices they had before coming. Some of these perceptions, as expressed by the authors, are given below in the frame of the character of the “Turk,” as the word itself cover the meaning of “Muslim.” A few years before the Greek Revolution, David Offley wrote to his sister how he “admired” Islam. It was a religion of love, in his own words:

To believe in God, that there is but one God, & that Mohamet is his prophet, is their whole creed. Their prayers might be cited as examples to Christians as most perfect...on the Goodness of God; that he never punishes but thro’ love, and as he knows what is best, that no attention may be paid to the longings of their hearts, which are so often after bad. A good Musleman will see himself bereft in one moment of wife, children & fortune, and bear it above what we

⁴⁷⁸ Dr. Howe, “Character of the Greeks,” *New-Hampshire Statesman and Concord Register*, May 10, 1828.

can suppose human nature capable. When he regards it as a punishment of God, he is then consoled in the assurance of his love.⁴⁷⁹

The religious belief was considered as one of the basic differences between the Turk and the Westerners in general, and as mentioned in the first chapter, these two, “Turk” and “Muslim,” were inseparable. Although Offley’s opinion about Islam came as a shock to his sister, actually these kind of positive approaches were not exceptional. There was a difference between the “Turk” of the Barbary States, and the “Turk” of the Ottoman Empire, but this difference was not embraced by the American public; although the accounts given by Americans who actually were in contact with the Turkish Muslim population reflected the virtuousness of these people, the barbarous image of the “Turk” has maintained. George Barrell expressed his opinion in his letters written during his visit to Asia Minor as; “Notwithstanding their religion differs from ours, still I cannot help respecting it! They worship the same God that we do, they esteem our Saviour as a great prophet and law-giver, their prayers are evidently offered with a sincere heart, and considering that it is the religion of their ancestors, how can we blame them for preferring it to ours?”⁴⁸⁰

Except the period of the Greek Revolution, both before and after, the Americans who came together with Turkish people gave positive accounts, especially emphasizing the morality of the Turks. Reverend Daniel Temple was an American missionary who resided in Smyrna between the years 1833 and 1844. Not long after he came to Ottoman Empire, a fire broke out in Smyrna, which forced Temple to leave his house until the danger had passed. Taking advantage of the fire, a group of Jews and Greeks tried to broke into Reverend’s house; “A Turk acted a most noble part, taking a stand

⁴⁷⁹ David Offley to Mary Offley, July 10, 1818, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.” The same letter can be found in OFP.

⁴⁸⁰ Barrell, *Letters from Asia*, 20.

in our storeroom with a large club in his hand, and laying it about him upon the pilfering Jews and Greeks, with a dignity and firmness that filled me with admiration, and them with fear. This brace fellow has not returned to ask any reward...⁴⁸¹

Among all of the characteristics, honesty of a Turk was emphasized by almost all of the Americans. During the assignment of *USS Constellation* to the Mediterranean until November 1834 the notes of Walter Colton, a naval chaplain of the ship, was published later under the title of *Ship and Shore*. In that book, comparing a Turkish seller to any other, Colton wrote:

I must not, however, be too severe on the Turk, as he atones in some measure for his want of gallantry in never recommending his articles for what they are not – and never in his change cheating his young customers. This is more than can be said generally of the Franks; they are all smiles and deception, politeness and imposition. So the Turk, though vastly less attractive and engaging, is the safer man to deal with; yet among the shopping ladies of my own country, he would not sell the value of five farthings a year; for he holds no chat, exchanges no smiles, no glances, and pays no compliments. He coolly presents the articles inquired for, - if you purchase, well, - if not, it is a matter of your concern, not his. Our ladies would undoubtedly call occasionally at his shop, but it would be to look at his beard, disturb the slumber of his goods, vex his indolence, and laugh at his self-complacent taciturnity. But though ever so silent and supercilious, there are at least two things in which you may trust a Turk all lengths – money and malice – in both he will be sure to render you your full due, be the consequences what they may to himself.⁴⁸²

In this colorful representation of a Turkish seller, while he qualified him as an uncorrupt and fair person, he nevertheless did not ignore the darker side of his character. Whether it is vengeance or violence, the Turk was criticized because of his understanding of justice and his way of securing justice. George Barrell gave an account of his visit to the governor's house where, he and his friend witnessed the process of confession of three Greeks who were accused of stealing from a Frank;

⁴⁸¹ Daniel H. Temple ed., *Life and Letters of Reverend Daniel Temple, for Twenty-Three Years a Missionary of the A.B.C.F.M. in Western Asia* (Boston: Congregational Board of Publication, 1855), 134.

⁴⁸² Colton, *Ship and Shore*, 290.

bastinado was the method they used. As the “dreadful” cries filled the air, the author expressed the pity he felt towards the accused, yet he continued as “Justice of some kind may always be obtained in this country” and if the thief had been found, it was certain that he “will meet his reward.”⁴⁸³

Of the few narratives, diaries and letters written in the first half of the nineteenth century by Americans about the Ottoman Empire, nearly all describe the honesty of Turks and their respect to the property, and this feature was described in parallel with the religious belief of the Turk. The porters, or couriers, who were assigned to carry a piece of property from one part of the country to another, were always Muslims, as the religion definitely forbade them from harming the property of another and the laws of the country made it certain that unless otherwise occurred, the responsible party would be punished severely.⁴⁸⁴

HONESTY, so often sought, and rarely found among the enlightened and religious communities of Europe and America, in this part of Asia, and in the Turkish dominions west of Hellespont, stands unrivalled.

Whether a sense of virtue, or moral obligations to each other contained in the pages of the Koran, is the cause, I am unable to say; but all travellers who have visited this country, and are divested of prejudice, will do them the justice to say, that theft is a crime almost unknown throughout the realms of the Grand Seignor.⁴⁸⁵

The texts praising the character of the Turks in comparison to non-Muslim Ottoman subjects and criticizing the prejudiced opinion were also expressed in papers. Written by an American who visited Smyrna wrote a letter to the editor of the *National Gazette* in such manner. “The unfavorable impression which is generally prevailing in America against the Turks, is very erroneous, for they are much more correct and

⁴⁸³ Barrell, *Letters from Asia*, 24-25.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., 50.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., 45.

honest than the Greeks, Jews, and any other nations in this part of the world.” In defense of the Turks, he continued “ A great deal has been said about the barbarity and oppression which the Turks exercise over the Christians; but I have found them an honest, obliging, and even generous people.”⁴⁸⁶

One of the reasons why the Americans focused on reliability of the Turks in terms of honesty was the prejudicial opinion they had which had been fed by their experienced in the Barbary States and the narratives of those who transferred those experiences to their countrymen. Keeping in mind the accounts given in the first chapter, the below quotation of George Barrell at the early pages revealed this approach. On his way from Grecian Islands to Smyrna he wrote, and it is one of the mostly quoted part:

The unhappy prejudices of the Christian world against the professors of Mahomet's creed, which had been instilled into my mind, led me to fear a thousand dangers where none existed. On the African shores - from Cape Spartel to the bay of Tunis, and in fact to the coast of Assyria - shipwreck would be attended by death of slavery; but when the seamen approaches that part of Asia inhabited by Turks, he may with safety bury all alarm, and rest satisfied, that although he is not near a Christian country, still he will find among the inhabitants, all the virtues possessed by Christians, with but few of their vices.⁴⁸⁷

Reminding David Offley's words about “imaginary dangers,” Barrell's, and the other Americans' narratives show, once again, that there was a keen difference between the opinions of Americans who entered into direct contact with the Muslim Turks and the ones who formed their opinions upon prejudices.

⁴⁸⁶ *Daily National Intelligencer*, July 13, 1830; *Indiana Journal*, July 28, 1830.

⁴⁸⁷ Barrell, *Letters from Asia*, 11.

6.4. The Perception of the Porte about Americans

After 1815, as foreign conflicts and wars came to an end which had disrupted American commerce American merchants increased their share in the opium business and became a part of the Levantine community of Smyrna. As the business was regularized, more Americans entered into Smyrna market. David Offley was considered both by the Americans and the Ottomans as the head of the American business and community in the city. While the merchants consigned their cargoes to him and benefitted from his experience, Ottomans contacted him when necessary. They also built up a positive perception about Americans through Offley's persona. In a correspondence to the Sultan, the manager of Smyrna Custom House wrote, there were a few Americans in Smyrna, the head of the merchants tried to regulate their business since there was not an American consulate in the Empire, and although the members of other countries, the British, French, Austrian and Russian, tried to put the Americans under their guard, the latter preferred Ottoman guardianship instead. In this respect Americans were auspicious for tariff revenue; moreover since they rejected to follow the treacherous habits of the other foreigners, they were honest, favorable and faithful. He concluded by saying that it would be beneficial for the Porte to protect American merchants.⁴⁸⁸ The confidence invested in Offley was not ungrounded. When he came to Smyrna, he was aware of the fact that he needed to establish a business on solid ground to satisfy not only American merchants' needs but also to build a relationship with the Ottoman government based on respect and justice. His goal was to expand business and earn a living both for himself and his children. It was not a short-term plan:

⁴⁸⁸ BOA, C.HR.51/2547, 25 Rebiülevvel 1234 / January 15, 1819.

I still remain in the same opinion that my destiny is to remain some years longer in this Country, for on every consideration, I know of no place where my interests would be more advanced than here. I wait most anxiously to hear from you an answer to my letters of December & January last, wherein I requested my dear sons, Richard & David, might be sent to me. Indeed, I begin almost to look for them with impatience... what a joyful moment it will be to me when they arrive. [...] when Richard shall be of an age suitable to leave here, that I may be able to furnish him a good Capital, and return home with the means of enjoying, if possible, some peace in my old days. This is my wish...⁴⁸⁹

The Ottoman approach to the Americans in their lands was hospitable in general.

Besides the commercial benefits provided by the taxes paid by Americans, Ottoman officials kept an eye on the general condition of the US in terms of its stance in international relations. It is possible to find in the Ottoman archives, reports written by Ottoman representatives in foreign countries about the War of 1812. What interested Ottoman officials more was the contribution and intermediacy of the European powers in this war. Competing with the British trade and being displeased with British naval power, the French supported the US.⁴⁹⁰ Ottoman officials closely watched the war and its outcomes because by the nineteenth century European powers were playing an important role in the Empire's relations. The US, on the other hand, was a recently established, potentially strong but geographically distant country. Therefore, while watching the developments beyond the Atlantic, the main interest of the Ottomans was focused on the European dynamics. It was anticipated that the US would become as efficient and resilient as the great European powers but whether it would be beneficial for the Ottomans was yet a question to be answered. The Porte

⁴⁸⁹ David Offley to Mary Offley, September 28, 1815, Smyrna, "Levantine Heritage."

⁴⁹⁰ BOA, HAT 1277/49536-Ç, 6 Safer 1230 / January 18, 1815. Written by Modovian Voivode İskerlet Bey, the report stated that the warring nations reached a settlement and signed peace; BOA, HAT 1274/49465, 29 Zilhicce 1230 / December 2, 1815, written by Ottoman (ambassador / charge d'affaires) in London Antonaki, the report gives information on one of the final battles of the War, and explains shortly how American troops defeated the British. While both parties were waiting for additional forces to continue, the news of peace negotiations arrived.

was also informed of the stipulations of Treaty of Ghent, through its representatives.⁴⁹¹

The year 1815 was an essential turning point in the history of the US as it consolidated and reasserted its independence from Great Britain and its strength to the world. Although the intention and willingness of the US to entangle with the European politics was uncertain, the Ottomans had already recognized the strength of the US on the seas as a major power to challenge the supremacy of the British to such extent that in one of the letters written by the Ottoman representative in London Antonaki stated that “the naval power of the US transcends the British.”⁴⁹² These kinds of remarks about the American advancements in naval industry would be repeated in the reports and letters of the Ottomans in the following years. As the contact increased between the people of two countries, their perceptions and thoughts about each other would show an alteration. The Ottomans were in the habit of comparing Americans to Europeans; likewise Americans compared themselves to Europeans, but while the former pursued a more favorable approach in this comparison towards the Americans by highlighting their positive characteristics, Americans tried to position themselves at the level of Europeans to gain legal and commercial advantages. This difference would become more visible during and after the negotiation process.

⁴⁹¹ BOA, HAT 1178/46516, 7 Rebiülahir 1230 / March 9, 1815, written by Ottoman (ambassador / charge d'affaires) in London Antonaki, the report gives information about the results of the peace treaty: both parties came to terms on their rights on open seas, the US would keep the permissions it gained three years ago but they will restore each other's property which they confiscated during war and restore their relations to status quo.

⁴⁹² BOA, HAT 1265/48979-D, 12 Ramazan 1831 / August 6, 1816.

6.5. Conclusion

Historians who study the period do not focus on the social life of the American Levantines in Smyrna but travel narratives, letters of missionaries, merchants and diplomatic and naval officers reveal that they became a part of the community quickly. Forming closer relations with the other Levantines and non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, Americans adapted themselves to the life in Smyrna, instead of creating a separate community. While the 1820s witnessed the arrival of first missionaries, Offley also started a family in those years and reunited with his sons from his first marriage, offering them a chance to establish their own business as he aimed to do when he first came.

This chapter also shows the difference between the prejudices of Americans and their experiences. Highly influenced by the Barbary captivity narratives they expected to see the cruel Turks living in a dangerous country. The accounts of the Greek Revolution that found great space in American newspapers strengthened the negative image of Turks. However, most the travelers changed their ideas after they visited the country, some of them even stated their admiration and emphasized especially the honesty of Turks.

While the Terranova incident caused a change in the smuggling system in China, Perkins, who began to monopolize Turkey opium trade, was able to use it to his advantage by putting a store ship and increased the share of the Boston Group in this trade. This also gave him the power of influencing the politics as happened in the discussions regarding the aid to Greek Revolutionaries. While he opposed American government's aid, he and American Levantines in Smyrna helped Greek slaves individually.

CHAPTER VII

THE FIRST TREATY OF COMMERCE AND AMITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

İşbu takririm ve tercüme-i mezkûre manzûr ve malûm-i hümayunum olmuştur. Frenklerin adetleri kendülerinin mukaddema söyledikleri sözden nükûl etmeğe asla utanmazlar. Hemen kendülerine menafii olacak maslahat her ne ise anı tevcihe bakarlar. Şu Devlet-i Aliyyemizin tanzimat-ı beriyye ve bahriyesine biavnihi tealâ hele bir kerre merkez lâyıkında rabîta verilsün de inşallahu tealâ bunların ilerüde hiçbirine hacet bırakılmayarak kendülerinden ol vakit Devlet-i Aliyyemiz tarafından hiçbir şey intenilmese bile yine kendüleri hizmet etmeğe talip olacaklarını rabbim gösterir inşallah.⁴⁹³

While the Ottoman authorities watched the US grow and contemplated its future role in Ottoman foreign relations, the American government was also aware of the

⁴⁹³ Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II's reaction to the rejection of the secret article: "This document and the translated narrative are read and considered by me [the Sultan refers himself]. It's a known fact that the Frenks are never ashamed of breaking their promises. They immediately try to direct the situation according to their own benefits. Once a considerable sum is given for the reformation of Ottoman land and naval forces, if God permits, we will never be in need of them; then, may god show us the day when these Frenks will serve again willingly to our state without asking for anything in return." BOA, HAT1212/47494, 29 Zilhicce 1246 / June 10, 1831.

growing trade with Smyrna. John Quincy Adams, US Minister to Russia for five years coinciding with the *Calumet* and *America* event, and a Massachusetts Senator in preceding years was already aware of the advantages offered by Anatolian and Black Sea trade. During his administration as Secretary of State between September 1817 and March 1825 under James Monroe, he assigned Luther Bradish, Charles Folsom and Commodore Rodgers separately to investigate the possibility and means of signing a treaty with the Sublime Porte, but these missions were limited with the object of getting information. Considering the public interest in the Greek Revolution, Monroe administration did not make a decisive step towards a treaty, while the agents advised for a direct approach instead of looking for a foreign mediation.

While Ottomans received these agents cordially, they also found it more suitable not to encourage an American attempt to negotiate a treaty considering the conflicts with the Greeks. Ottomans were informed of the growing power of the US and kept a record of the events affecting European – American relations. While they attached importance on the attitude of Britain about approaching the US, Ottomans also explored the possibility of using American suspicions about Britain for their own benefit, especially after Ottoman navy was destroyed by the combined forces of England, France and Russia in Navarino in 1827. Upon the initiation of the Porte, in 1828, the American government appointed commissioners to negotiate a treaty with full powers but it took three more years to finally exchange the ratifications. The reason behind the augmentation of the negotiation process was the different expectations of each country. While the American commissioners wanted to obtain a treaty based on a perfect reciprocity and limited with commercial stipulations, the Ottoman authorities saw no advantage in signing such a treaty and wished to obtain benefits in financial or naval fields. The final treaty included a secret article, which

enabled the Ottomans to have war vessels built in the US, while the main text of the article gave the Americans their wishes. However the rejection of the secret article by the Senate let down the Ottoman office holders, as well as the Sultan Mahmud II, who noted down the above excerpt revealing his disappointment and disapproval of the rejection. The Americans who were welcomed by Sultan Selim III, during Bainbridge's first visit to Constantinople, who were considered to be different than most of the Europeans, dissatisfied the Ottomans. The United States of America was another Western power, which aimed to secure its well-being. The expectations of the Ottoman authorities clashed with the American principles, and the former was unable to adapt itself to the fact that the US was not after gaining political concessions or to offer some to the Ottoman Porte. This chapter will describe the American missions in the first half of 1820, the negotiations in 1828 and 1829, and the exchange of ratifications that validated the first treaty between the two powers.

7.1. The Mission of 1820: Luther Bradish, Commodore Bainbridge, and Charles Folsom

When he took office in the State Department, Adams obtained the correspondence about the Ottoman Empire that had been sent to his predecessors and after serious consideration he decided to update the information on the advantages/disadvantages and the ways of signing a formal treaty with the Porte; he appointed Luther Bradish to conduct another investigation in Constantinople. In the spring of 1820, Adams issued two passports to Bradish, one presenting him as an individual traveler and the other as an "agent for collecting such information [...] in relation to the commerce of the

United States...”⁴⁹⁴ He was assigned to learn, first whether an agreement with the Porte would benefit the American commerce, to which he replied, although he was not in Constantinople long enough to gather adequate information to give a satisfactory answer, he thought the American government had already expected a positive outcome, otherwise he would not have been sent on this mission.

Secondly he was required to learn whether such treaty would be practicable, to which he gave a more detailed answer. The news of his arrival travelled faster than he did and the reports claimed that his mission was signing an agreement. With this information at hand, the Reis Effendi sent an invitation to Bradish to converse about the disposition of the US about a treaty of amity and commerce. As the step came from the Porte, Bradish concluded an affirmative answer to the second inquiry.

Finally he needed to learn the mode of approaching to the Porte in order to obtain a successful outcome regarding the treaty. These reports indicated that Bradish was seeking a Russian mediation, but depending on the advices he was given, an indirect approach would prove “more difficult, expensive and less successful. [...] Direct negotiation” on the other hand “is particularly suited to the character of the Turks. It implies a degree of confidence which is gratifying to their pride, and which they endeavor by their conduct to justify.” Referring to the neutral policy, which would be stated in a few years by Monroe, Bradish argued that a direct contact would reflect the American principle of having “friendly relations with all nations, entangling alliances with none.” This method would also address to the “generosity and magnanimity” of Turks. European assistance however was not encouraged because in case of any trouble that might arise between the Porte and the friendly power, to which the US

⁴⁹⁴ Both passports can be found in House Document 250, the former dated April 14, and the latter April 18, 1820, 3.

would apply, the Porte would consider the latter two in alliance and act accordingly. Another reason he suggested direct negotiation was the information he received “in confidence, from the Porte itself” that Great Britain formally protested against a negotiation between the Porte and the US, and threatened to break its relations and even declare war on the former. Austria, France and Holland also shared Great Britain’s attitude. Thus, the Porte suggested, a secret negotiation was necessary. About the expenses of such a treaty, Bradish concluded 350,000 piastres for presents and maintaining positive attitude of Reis Effendi, approximately amounting to \$ 45,000, would be enough, excluding the expenses of the salaries of American representatives.⁴⁹⁵

A strong anti-British sentiment existed in Bradish’s report. His perception towards Britain should have been so strong that there is no indication of doubting the Reis Effendi’s statements. Wright, however, found this “almost ridiculous. It is utterly preposterous to think that England would go to war with Turkey” if the latter started negotiations with the US. The more reasonable explanation was that the Reis Effendi tried to force the Americans, who showed their willingness for such a treaty, to offer more advantageous stipulations to the Ottomans by creating “imaginary opposition.” Wright also suggested that Nicholas Navoni, a Levantine of Neapolitan nationality, who served Bradish as the dragoman, exaggerated the Reis Effendi’s words.⁴⁹⁶

⁴⁹⁵ Luther Bradish to John Quincy Adams, December 20, 1820, Constantinople, M 77, Roll 162, NARA; House Document 250, 4-12. Some parts are omitted in the House Document. Although Bradish stated that first the Reis Effendi made a contact with him, in the Ottoman archives there is a translated letter directly from Bradish asking for a meeting with the Reis Effendi without a medium of a foreign nation. He stated the willingness of American government to sign a treaty and inquired about the disposition of the Porte. Whether Bradish submitted this letter before or after Reis Effendi’s invitation is not clear as the original letter could not be found in the archives. BOA, HAT 959/41183-C, 18 Teşrin-i Sani 1820 / November 18, 1820.

⁴⁹⁶ Wright, “American Relations with Turkey to 1831,” 89-90.

According to a detailed report prepared to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of such a treaty, the Porte seriously considered signing an agreement with the US, but if the US sought assistance from a foreign power, the Porte would be deprived of some benefits which could be obtained by a direct negotiation; if an agreement was reached between the two nations, the US would secure its vessels from the attacks of Barbary States, which would, as a result, strengthen American naval power and enabling this growth, the Porte would draw the wrath of European nations. As the Ottoman citizens were unable to travel to and from the American lands, such a treaty would benefit only the US. In this respect the Porte needed to include articles to benefit the treasury through duties and other incomes. As the treaty would enable the Americans gain more power through extended trade, they could easily increase their strength in the seas, and in case of a conflict they could enter into alliances with other countries and use this power against the Ottomans. Great Britain could react negatively into the prospect of a treaty with its rival, but as Great Britain responded positively when the US government signed agreements with several European countries, a conflict on the part of Great Britain was unlikely. Ottoman citizens would also benefit from a treaty of commerce and amity with the US as the latter's vessels could bring American products, mainly coffee and sugar directly to Constantinople and other Ottoman ports, Ottoman treasury would benefit from the increased trade through custom duties as well as by selling Ottoman products to American merchants. During wars with European countries, neutral American ships could bring the necessary goods through the Dardanelles. The US was a growing power; the population doubled in twenty years and it reached at a level to challenge Great Britain at seas. As the other European countries as well as Russia were trying to cultivate their friendship with the US, the Porte needed to do the same and a commercial treaty

would pave the way for such friendship. If successful, it could also save the Porte from depending on Great Britain. Considering all of these, wrote the author of the report, an answer to American representative should include the kindness and positive attitude shown to American merchants visiting Ottoman ports until then, and considering the commercial structure, benefiting the American merchants more than the Ottoman citizens who did not travelled to American ports, an unofficial representative would be welcomed by the Porte in order to negotiate a mutually beneficial agreement.⁴⁹⁷

The author of the report approached favorably to a treaty of amity and commerce. It also showed that, unlike Bradish's inferences, Great Britain was not a threat as the Reis Effendi had claimed. The Porte took into account British disposition towards an agreement between the two and would set aside the negotiations in case a slight protest had been given, but it seems that seeing the willingness of American government and being aware of the recent wars with Great Britain, the Reis Effendi wanted to use the latter as leverage in order to obtain advantageous stipulations. Unable to read into the Reis Effendi's bluff and to hide his enthusiasm for a treaty, Bradish misguided his government; in this respect it can be said that he was not the right person for the mission. Despite the positive report and the Reis Effendi's friendly approach, in the reply given to Bradish in 1821, the Porte stated due to the affairs in Europe and domestic conflicts, it did not have time to enquire about the advantages and disadvantages of signing an agreement with the US. The main reason for such reluctance, however, was given as the geographical distance and political

⁴⁹⁷ BOA, HAT 1236/48102, 29 Zilhicce 1235 / October 7, 1820.

isolation of the US.⁴⁹⁸ Later Navoni wrote that the Reis Effendi had told him personally, the reason of their denial was the signs of Greek insurrection. It would take all the attention of the Porte. Moreover, as the assistance of England would be sought, the Porte thought pending American business aside would “avoid the displeasure of England.”⁴⁹⁹ Once again, American attempt to establish formal relations fell of the agenda.

Besides Bradish, in the spring of 1820, recently appointed Commodore to the Mediterranean Squadron, Bainbridge received similar instructions from the Navy Department to obtain information about the states of Ottoman Empire and Russia since the government was considering to extend trade to Black Sea. He was also informed that he might receive an order to enter the Dardanelles and visit Constantinople on his ship *Columbus* and asked to enquire the effect of such a visit on the Porte.⁵⁰⁰ However he could not get the chance to find out since Baron Stroganoff, Russian ambassador in Constantinople, informed him that vessels of war of foreign countries were forbidden to enter the Dardanelles and the Porte would not give permission to Commodore Bainbridge.⁵⁰¹ While Bainbridge was cruising in the Mediterranean and Bradish was conducting his research in Constantinople, Charles Folsom, appointed as the former’s private secretary, was sent to Smyrna. His report completely focused on the history of Smyrna trade, of which content was given in the

⁴⁹⁸ BOA, HAT 1213/47510, 13 Rebiülahir 1236 / January 18, 1821. A very similar document is BOA, HAT 1213/47507 – F, 29 Zilhicce 1236 / September 27, 1821.

⁴⁹⁹ Nicholas Navoni, “Summary Narrative of Communications with the Sublime Porte,” House Document 250, 57.

⁵⁰⁰ Navy Department to Commodore Bainbridge, April 13, 1820, M 179, Roll 48, NARA.

⁵⁰¹ Baron Stroganoff to l’Amiral Bainbridge, September 11, 1820, Buyukdere, enclosed in Commodore Bainbridge to John Quincy Adams, December 18, 1820, Port Mahon, M 179, Roll 49, NARA.

previous chapters. In the final part of his report, however, he tried to attract the attention of the government to the necessity of signing an agreement:

At the present moment we have no cause of complaint. On the contrary we have reason for self-congratulation, when we see American citizens, whose enterprise leads them to a remote country, participating largely in an important trade with powerful rivals, and compensating for the want of their private characters and the respect they individually command. But the actual favorable state of things, as it is no doubt greatly owing to the public spirit and personal address of one man who has known how to turn the pride of the Turkish character to good account, must necessarily be of uncertain continuance. The frequent change of officers, for which the Turkish government is almost proverbial, must often place our commercial interests at the caprice of a new individual, and keep them even in a state of insecurity.⁵⁰²

Although Offley's arrangement was put to test several times, and had real benefits for the American merchants trading in Smyrna, Folsom's warning about its unreliability was valid, and in order to solidify, the US government needed to take action. While the Porte did not show interest to the mission of 1820, American government also chose not to pursue the agreement. John Quincy Adams noted in his memoirs on the 3rd of November, Mr. Lynch of New York, partner of a commercial house owning the steamship *Robert Fulton*, applied to the government in order to sell the ship and relieve his firm from its expense. According to Lynch's plan, the government would buy the ship and give it as a present to the Ottoman Sultan whose admiration would enable the US to secure a treaty on its own terms. Another option, Lynch suggested, was to send the ship to Constantinople on his own account and sell it in return of licenses to enter the Black Sea. A meeting was held the following day under the President, but the offer was rejected unanimously. The reason was, as Adams wrote:

It is believed that an opening to the trade of the Black Sea, and a commercial treaty with Turkey, would be of great public benefit; but that the time for undertaking to accomplish it is not yet mature. The commercial interest in the community desire it, but there are prejudices against it in other quarters, and

⁵⁰² Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, December 18, 1820, M 125, Roll 68, NARA.

great opposition to any movement of the Government to effect it must be expected.⁵⁰³

7.2. Commodore Rodger's Mission

While the Greek Revolution caused discussions in the US, the government and merchants maintained the idea that establishing formal relations would be beneficial. After G. Bethune English turned back to the US, he met with Adams and the President a few times to share his experiences and opinions about the contemplated treaty. During the meeting with the former that took place on May 6th, 1824, English enquired whether the government would follow Capudan Pasha's suggestion to send a naval officer to the Greek Archipelago. Adams, however, was not sure that it would be the best way to conduct a negotiation, because as English stated in his letters, the Reis Effendi was already suspicious and could hamper American mission.⁵⁰⁴ English did not stop his efforts over this reply and kept writing to the Secretary repeating the importance of a treaty and the convenience of Capudan Pasha's plan. What changed his mind, according to Wright, was either English's stubbornness or the eleven Boston merchants, including Thomas Handasyd Perkins, who called for the necessity of keeping war vessels in the Archipelago to protect the American citizens and property on shore and convoy American vessels like most of the European nations did.⁵⁰⁵

At the beginning of the year 1825, John Rodgers was appointed to the command of the Mediterranean Squadron to protect American commerce. He also received

⁵⁰³ John Quincy Adams, vol. 5 of *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams. Comprising Portions of His Diary From 1795 to 1848*, ed. Charles Francis Adams (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1875), 197-98.

⁵⁰⁴ Adams, vol. 6 of *Memoirs*, 320.

⁵⁰⁵ Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 106.

additional instructions to embark on *North Carolina* and if a chance presented itself, to meet Capudan Pacha and learn the manner of obtaining a treaty to open Black Sea to the American commercial enterprises, and “confidentially communicate” the information he obtained. He was supposed to give the Capudan Pacha suitable gifts for his rank and assure him that in the conclusion of a treaty, “his good offices will be duly estimated in the transaction.”⁵⁰⁶ It can be seen from these instructions that Adams studied the previous reports and letters that had been sent for the past forty years, since 1784 when the government first thought about signing a treaty with the Porte; the importance attached to the amount and price of presents by the Ottoman officials, to maintain the goodwill of high bureaucrats, and transacting all the business in complete secrecy. English’s insistence seems to have worked as he was appointed to serve Rodgers in this mission as his private interpreter.

Rodgers was unable to meet Capudan Pacha since he was running an operation in the Greek Islands, and finding it impolitic to approach him at the time, Rodgers decided to wait for a more suitable time and anchored at the harbor of Smyrna.⁵⁰⁷ During his stay in the harbor, a fire broke out in Smyrna in the night of August 26. Rodgers ordered his men, about 200 seamen, to land with the engines of the squadron and help to extinguish the fire, which they did in less than two hours.⁵⁰⁸

President elect of the United States in 1825, John Quincy Adams left the office in the State Department to Henry Clay who began to follow the developments regarding the

⁵⁰⁶ John Quincy Adams to Commodore John Rodgers, February 7, 1825, House Document 250, 19-20.

⁵⁰⁷ John Rodgers to Henry Clay, August 31, 1825, Smyrna, House Document 250, 41; M 77, Roll 162, NARA.

⁵⁰⁸ “Extract from letters received from officers of the Ontario and Erie, dated at Smyrna, 29th Oct. and 1st Sept. 1825” *Daily National Intelligencer*, November 16, 1825; *Maryland Gazette and State Register*, November 24, 1825.

treaty with the Porte. He informed Rodgers about what the American government wished to obtain from a treaty with the Porte: first, “to trade with all the ports of Turkey [...] on the footing of the most favored nation; secondly to obtain free ingress and egress through the Dardanelles to and from the Black sea; and thirdly to be allowed to appoint consuls to reside at such ports as the interests of our commerce may require.” Rodgers, however, was not sent to negotiate a treaty, but to learn if the Porte was open to sign such a treaty.⁵⁰⁹

Unable to locate Capudan Pacha, Rodgers left letters to Offley, “in whose secrecy and prudence I could confide,” for him to forward to the addressee. The rest of the letters contains Rodgers’ ideas about the present situation of the Capudan Pacha, who had been anticipated to gain victory over the Greeks since otherwise would lose him the favor of the Sultan. If, as expected, his campaign succeeded, Rodgers thought his assistance would benefit the Americans. In 1823, Koca Hüsrev Mehmed was appointed as the Capudan Pacha for the second time. This encouraged the Americans since he was known for the friendly approach to the Americans and support for signing a treaty with the US. Rodgers firmly argued that an attempt to sign such a treaty would be achieved as long as the squadron was kept at Tenedos during the negotiations, because “the apparent superiority of our ships over those of other nations which they [Ottomans] have been accustomed to see” wrote Rodgers, created a “favorable impression [...] on the minds of the people of Smyrna at its late visit here, from the bashaw [...] down to the meanest individual.”⁵¹⁰ In the letter he wrote to Capudan Pasha, Rodgers requested to meet him in order to discuss the possibility of signing a treaty. He mentioned the American belief that the Porte had abstained

⁵⁰⁹ Henry Clay to John Rodgers, September 6, 1825, House Document 250, 20-21.

⁵¹⁰ John Rodgers to Henry Clay, October 14, 1825, Gibraltar Bay, House Document 250, 41-42.

from establishing closer relations with the US because of “the opposition and jealousy of certain European diplomatists at Constantinople, friendlier to their own interests than to those of the Ottoman Empire.” The Americans could not imagine any other reason for the previous failures because while the Porte had treaties with the European nations, which had “so frequently shown themselves enemies to the Empire,” it was “indisposed towards a nation which has never been the enemies of the Ottomans, and which is far from bearing towards them any political or religious prejudices.”⁵¹¹

According to an extract of a letter quoted from *The New York Mercantile Advertiser* the Americans bore the hope that this attempt would bring promising results because Rodger’s visit created a very good impression, and “the Turks are well disposed towards a nation that wants nothing of them but a free trade.” The only problem could be introduced by “Some of the European Powers” which “may endeavor to lay obstacles in your way at the capital” but “From several conversations we have had with some of the most distinguished Ministers at Constantinople, we know that no difficulties will be made for a commercial Treaty with the United States.”⁵¹² In a later letter he wrote after the meeting with the Capudan Pacha, Rodgers repeated his belief that the intrigues of the “crooked policy of European ambassadors, and a host of other foreign agents (particularly of England and France)” were the main reasons, which prevented the Porte from accepting American attempts.⁵¹³

Rodgers’ letter indicated that despite the efforts of the American government, the Porte had declined meeting or negotiating with them, but the former had never sent an

⁵¹¹ John Rodgers to Capudan Pacha, September 20, 1825, House Document 250, 43.

⁵¹² “Extract of a letter from Smyrna, dated August 30, to a gentleman of that city” *New-Hampshire Statesman and Concord Register*, November 19, 1825.

⁵¹³ John Rodgers to Henry Clay, July 19, 1826, Vourla, M 77, Roll 162, NARA; House Document 250, 47.

official dressed with authorization to negotiate a treaty. Rodgers himself was not authorized either. Considering either the expenses, the situation in Europe, or in the final case the public opinion, the US government had abstained from taking definitive steps. The most important reason for this abstention was that the then current situation of the American merchants had been good enough. Except the Black Sea trade and the extra 15 %, the advantages that had been gained by Offley's personal efforts, American commerce had already been improved for a country without an official treaty with the Porte. The Ottoman Empire, on the other side, had shown contradictory interest; while several officials, like the Pasha of Smyrna and the Capudan Pacha, had several times mentioned their surprise for the American inaction, and their enthusiasm to accept an American representative in the capital, they had given negative answer to Bradish regarding the treaty in 1821,

While Rodgers relocated back to Gibraltar, it left *Ontario* to protect the American commerce in the Mediterranean due to the reports about the increased activity of the pirates. Through the end of the year, Offley informed Rodgers that Capudan Pacha sent word that he would be pleased to meet Rodgers. Offley expected a positive outcome and urged Rodgers to conduct another visit in the spring. With the assistance of Capudan Pacha, the US would be able to obtain a treaty on its own terms. The most difficult aspect of the negotiations, he thought, was the amount of the presents, as it would be the means to open the Black Sea to American vessels. He continued "The passage into the Black Sea is regarded a concession of great favor. It is, however, the only one worth either great pains or expense in obtaining, as our commerce to this country stands already on a tolerably fair footing." According to Offley, Black Sea trade would give "employment to more than a thousand vessels" each year and would bring riches to his country, and the American government should act to procure the

right of commerce there.⁵¹⁴ As Dearborn stated the importance of Black Sea trade more than a decade earlier, it was not unknown to the American government.⁵¹⁵ With the respect and admiration for Offley, Rodgers wrote he shared his ideas.⁵¹⁶

Capudan Pacha met Rodgers accompanied by Offley and English on July 6th. After hearing Rodgers, Capudan Pacha told them his government would not be able to confer on the subject due to the recent changes in the Ottoman military system, referring to the removal of the Janissaries, but he would inform the Sultan and they should expect an answer in three or four months. They decided to meet in ten days at Mytilene (*Midilli Adası*), on which occasion Capudan Pacha stepped on board *North Carolina*. After scrutinizing carefully, he did not, as Rodgers stated, hide his satisfaction and said “he had seen some of the best ships of England, France, and Russia, but that none of them would bear any comparison to the *North Carolina*.” Rodgers returned the visit the next day and on his leave, a flag bearing the seal of the Sultan was hoisted. The Capudan Pacha informed Rodgers that the flag was hoisted only when the Sultan got on board, and “so extra-ordinary an honor had never been conferred on the flag of any European power.” The dragoman of the Capudan Pacha brought presents to Rodgers and told the Capudan Pacha “would like to be possessed of correct representations of our naval battles, of the plans of our principal cities, a general map of the United States, and of draughts of such of our ships of war as we most approved of, particularly of this ship, of our new frigates, and of the class of 3 deckers.” Proud and satisfied, Rodgers was sure that Capudan Pacha would assist the

⁵¹⁴ Extract from a letter David Offley to John Rodgers, November 30, 1825, Smyrna enclosed in from John Rodgers to Henry Clay, December 25, 1825, House Document 250, 44-47.

⁵¹⁵ Dearborn, vol. 1 of *Memoir on the Commerce and Navigation*, *ibid.*, xxvi.

⁵¹⁶ John Rodgers to Henry Clay, December 25, 1825, House Document 250, 45.

Americans. Especially after his victory in Missolongi against the Greeks, his fame and Sultan's favor of him increased.⁵¹⁷ On contrary to his expectations, however, Rodgers did not receive a reply from Capudan Pacha. The reason, he thought, was the frigate *Hope*, which was reported by unfriendly European powers, of carrying arms to the Greeks to be used against the Ottoman army and navy with the knowledge and approval of the US government.⁵¹⁸

Rodgers' visit to the Ottoman Empire earned him the cordial friendship of Capudan Pacha, but considering the main goal of his mission, it ended with failure, as he was unable to receive a certain answer from Capudan Pacha bearing information about the disposition of the Porte. On professional interest, the Capudan Pacha inspected the American vessel under Rodgers' command and showed his curiosity by requesting more information on the American naval standing. Since *George Washington*, he contemplated on the means of benefiting from American naval industry, in parallel with Sultan Mahmud II's attempts to modernize Ottoman armed forces. However, he and the Porte had more urgent issues demanding their attendance, like the ongoing Greek uprisings and the conflicts with Russia. Ignoring this, Wright accused him of the failure and concluded that it was "a scheme of the avaricious old Turk, concocted for the benefit of his private pocket, and perhaps also for his own amusement. America was new at the devious game of Ottoman diplomacy, and the seriousness with which his suggestions were taken by the businesslike Yankees must have delighted the wily Khosrew [Hüsrev]."⁵¹⁹

⁵¹⁷ John Rodgers to Henry Clay, July 19, 1826, Vourla, House Document 250, 47-50.

⁵¹⁸ John Rodgers to Henry Clay, February 14, 1827, Malta, House Document 250, 50-51.

⁵¹⁹ Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 127.

Trade flourished, new American trade houses were and continued to be established in Smyrna, more Americans included Anatolia in their travel routes, American missionaries stepped on Anatolian soil, all of which were influential in increasing the government's interest, but the period coincided with the Greek Revolution. It harmed American trade, strengthened Turcophobia in American public, caused American government to be cautious towards the Porte, which directed its attention to its domestic politics and held American attempts pending until a more favorable time arrived.

7.3. Negotiations Part I: David Offley and William Crane

On November 11, Offley received a letter from the Seraisker Pacha (Capudan Pacha Koca Hüsrev was appointed as Seraisker Pacha in April 1827) inviting him to Constantinople “as the moment was favorable for the termination of a commercial treaty between the Porte and Govt. of the United States.”⁵²⁰ Twenty days before this letter, on October 20, the combined forces of Great Britain, France and Russia destroyed Ottoman navy at Navarino Bay. According to what Offley heard, the former Capudan, then current Seraisker Pacha had communicated to the Sultan about the American interest in signing a treaty, and the Porte thought a formal treaty would let them “to have war vessels built in the United States, so to replace those destroyed at Navarino.” Moreover, the Porte could now act on its own, without considering England's wishes: “... they [Ottomans] are particularly glad to be relieved” wrote Navoni, “from the *surveillance* which that power [England] has exercised over them

⁵²⁰ David Offley to Henry Clay, November 26, 1827, Smyrna, House Document 250, 53.

with regard to a proposed treaty with the United States of America.”⁵²¹ The Sultan gave orders to the Reis Effendi to conclude a treaty with the US.⁵²² The Reis Effendi sent a letter to Offley to be forwarded to the State Department, stating the desire of the Porte to welcome an American representative furnished with authority to negotiate a treaty. While “the delay, until now, must be attributed to destiny!” wrote Reis Effendi, “the present period is favorable for such a convention.”⁵²³

Since the very beginning of the Ottoman – American encounters, the Ottoman officials, for the first time, had felt that they could benefit from a treaty with the US. The former was aware of the latter’s technological development in the shipbuilding field not only through the American vessels which had visited Ottoman dominions, but also through reports sent to the government. Besides the ones already mentioned in the previous chapters, as early as the summer of 1805, two Ottoman citizens, *Kayserili Mehmet Dayı* and *Giridli Mustafa Dayı*, set sail from Tunis and spent three years in different parts of Europe and America. Spending one year in America, they wrote the Americans had around thirty war vessels and around thirteen thousand merchants vessels at the time and they had been building more since they had prosperous armories, ammunition, powder mills and shipyards.⁵²⁴ The amount of the recorded numbers is obviously exaggerated, but to the Ottomans, who had no chance

⁵²¹ Nicholas Navoni to Henry Clay, January 24, 1828, Pera, at Constantinople, House Document 250, 56. In the “Summary”, Navoni wrote that right before Navarino, through the end of September, “a person of influence in state affairs” communicated with him to learn the whereabouts of Luther Bradish, and whether there was any one in the Levant furnished with powers to negotiate a treaty with the Porte. After enquiries and meetings with the Reis Effendi, Navoni concluded that Offley would be the right person to be communicated, narrated in detail in the same document House Document 250, 57-60.

⁵²² David Offley to Henry Clay, February 17, 1828, Smyrna, House Document 250, 54.

⁵²³ “Translation of Turkish paper,” dated February 7, 1828, Constantinople, enclosed in from David Offley to Henry Clay, February 17, 1828, Smyrna, House Document 250, 55.

⁵²⁴ BOA, HAT 1417/57945, 20 Zilhicce 1223 / February 15, 1809.

of verifying the given information, the United States of America was a growing nation and had advanced in maritime.

It is understood from a report, written by the Austrian ambassador that the Porte had been contemplating the subject of signing an agreement with the US in 1827. The ambassador thought that such a treaty would bring advantages to the Porte in terms of commercial activities since it could purchase several articles from the US merchants while could export goods that would attract American public. It is also inferred from the report that the Ottoman office holders seriously considered the reaction of the European countries, especially of Great Britain. The ambassador wrote since the US had treaties with almost all of the European countries, including Great Britain, none of them could oppose such convergence. He noted that the only thing that could deter American government was the Greek Revolution.⁵²⁵

The Porte's attitude towards the US was highly favorable during the several months following Navarino. When the brig *Delos* requested permission to pass the Dardanelles and bring a cargo to Constantinople, the Ottoman officers granted permission because, although the two nations did not have an agreement entitling the American vessels a passage from the Dardanelles, due to the endearment and compassion felt towards that nation, the permission was granted.⁵²⁶ It was the first American vessel that attempted to go to Constantinople after *Calumet* and *America*.

⁵²⁵ BOA, HAT 1203/47262 – B, 10 Cemazielevvel 1243 / November 29, 1827.

⁵²⁶ BOA, C.HR. 133/6620, 3 Zilkade 1243 / May 17, 1828. The exact words used in the document were “*şime-i kerime-i garib-nevazi ve şefkat.*”; Offley also wrote the permission was “granted in the most obliging manner” in from David Offley to Henry Clay, April 22, 1828, Smyrna, House Document 250, 55; Charles MacFarlane mentioned the presence of *Delos* on the Golden Horn with the other merchant vessels hoisting the Sultan's “eastern crescent, on a level with, if not *above* the western stars” in vol. 2 of *Constantinople in 1828; A Residence of Sixteen Months in the Turkish Capital and Provinces: with an Account of the Present State of the Naval and Military Power, and of the Resources of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Saunders and Otley, 1829), 373.

The arrival of *Delos* at Constantinople was presented in American papers as the first merchant vessel carrying the American flag. Although the information was incorrect, it was expressed that the visit created “great excitement” and it “was immediately visited by many Turks of distinction, some of whom even carried away pieces of rope, as memorials of the event.”⁵²⁷ The reply of the US government to the Porte’s invitation was to appoint William M. Crane, commander of the Mediterranean Squadron, and David Offley as commissioners to negotiate and sign a treaty with the Porte.⁵²⁸ While the former American agents were sent to inquire whether the Porte was willing to sign a treaty with the US and to learn the best way of approaching to the Ottoman Empire, this was the first time the US government had appointed representatives with full power to sign a treaty.

According to Adams’ instructions, Offley proceeded to Constantinople alone. Crane waited to hear from Offley and would go to the capital only if a satisfactory treaty could be concluded. A credit of twenty thousand dollars was furnished to Crane for the expenses related to the treaty.⁵²⁹ Offley received a similar letter including the objects of the treaty as such; to establish the relations between the two nations “on a firm and permanent basis” on the level of the most favored nation, covering all the dominions and ports of the Ottoman Empire, and to obtain passage to and from the Dardanelles for navigation in the Black Sea. Adams stated his trust to Offley by writing;

It is not deemed necessary to give you instructions in further detail. Your long residence, and official station at Smyrna, having given you a full knowledge of

⁵²⁷ *Daily National Intelligencer*, July 19, 1828; *Saturday Evening Post*, July 19, 1828.

⁵²⁸ House Document 250, 63.

⁵²⁹ John Quincy Adams to William M. Crane, July 22, 1828, Washington, House Document 250, 64.

the commercial condition and regulations of the country, you will be careful to cause to be included in the treaty every article necessary to secure protection on the persons and property of citizens of the United States in the Turkish dominions.⁵³⁰

The only warning Adams made was about the limits of the treaty, which had to cover commerce and navigation, and “must, in no respect, interfere with the neutral obligations of the United States, or with any of their existing treaties with other nations.”⁵³¹ Considering the ongoing war with the Greek revolutionaries and the recent attack on the Ottoman navy at Navarino, Adams, depending on the letters he received from Offley and Navoni, knew the contemplations of the Ottoman officeholders to find support from the US government. However, Adams objected to intervention in any way in the affairs between the Ottoman Empire and the Greeks, which would hamper the American isolationist policy.⁵³²

Offley arrived at Constantinople on the first day of December, and paid a ceremonial visit to the Reis Effendi, Pertev Mehmed Said Paşa, or as generally called Pertev / Pirtev in the documents. He was appointed as Reis Effendi on March 24, 1827, and was removed from office on February 23, 1830, right after the establishment of Greek state. Defined as one of the most talented and honest office holders of his time, he was also known as “*İngiliz hizibi*” meaning, pro-English; he maintained regular communication with the British Ambassador through *Fenerliler*, the Greek Ottoman subjects in general, who provided secret communication between the Porte and foreign embassies.⁵³³ In this first meeting, Pertev Pacha told Offley he could see no

⁵³⁰ John Quincy Adams to David Offley, July 21, 1828, Washington, House Document 250, 65.

⁵³¹ Ibid., 66.

⁵³² Cline, *American Attitude*, 213.

⁵³³ Carter Vaughn Findley, “Pertev Mehmed Said Paşa (1785-1837),” vol. 34 of *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 234.

difficulties in front of concluding a successful treaty. This was a preliminary meeting, and they conducted a second meeting on the 15th. Upon Pertev Pacha's enquiry of the advantages offered by the US government, Offley explained the prospects of commercial expansion, which did not satisfy the former. Pertev Pacha expected to hear one or more ships of war to be given to his government as presents. Offley replied that American government would not "purchase the friendship of any nation." According to Pertev it was not a question of "selling or purchasing friendship, but one of obtaining advantages in exchange for those required."⁵³⁴ A treaty solely based on commercial principles would not serve the Porte, as it had no vessels and merchants doing business with a distant country like the US. On the other hand, American merchants would obtain the right to sail in and out of the Black Sea and pay decreased duties. As the negotiations were terminated temporarily, they agreed to meet soon to continue. Offley understood that Mr. Issaverdens was the one who made the promise of warships to the Porte, but the latter rejected, and claimed that it was the Reis Effendi who enquired about such possibility in return for a treaty. Offley demanded his passport to turn back to Smyrna, but upon the insistence of Seraskier Pacha, he accepted to stay longer in Constantinople, with the hope that they could overcome their disagreements on the issue of war vessels.

Offley stated his regret that he had to conduct negotiations with the Reis Effendi, and not with Seraisker Pacha or any other minister, and his opinions about the conflicts and "the great jealousy" existing in the *Divan*. He did not think a successful result could be obtained with the former, but Reis Effendi suggested to Offley's dragoman

⁵³⁴ David Offley to John Quincy Adams, January 31, 1829, Constantinople, House Document 250/2, 8-9. The House Document 250 was prepared in two parts; the first part ends in page 94, and the second part start from page 1, but there is no sign at the beginning of the second part. In order to prevent any confusion with page numbers, the references to the second part will be shown as House Document 250/2 from now on.

that if they could agree on some sort of concession on the part of the US, in the form of vessels or an equivalent, then they could sign a treaty without even including that concession in the treaty. Offley rejected this suggestion upon the grounds that he had no such authorization except to conclude a treaty on equal terms, and demanded his passport again. This time, however, a change of tone was obvious in Pertev Pacha requesting Offley to stay longer.⁵³⁵

Till the end of February, the two had exchanged notes on daily basis to reach an agreement. Offley was hopeful that they could agree on a treaty in accordance with his instructions. He constantly received letters from Seraskier Pacha or heard the favorable disposition of some of the Divan members, encouraging him to lengthen his stay. He also heard that Grand Vizier personally gave orders to the Reis Effendi to sign a treaty with the US.⁵³⁶

Pertev Pacha abandoned his demand of war vessels but the discussion continued on the rate of duties; he wanted to set the amount to 5 %, a higher rate than the amount agreed with other nations. The treaties between the Ottoman Empire and the European countries would expire in the following years, and the Porte would increase the amounts accordingly to set the rate even. For Offley, Pertev Pacha's insistence was understandable because Turkish coinage had lost value since the period it made treaties with European nations. Thus, although the amount was set at 3 % in 1816 with France, depending on the depreciations, it corresponded to a little over 1 % in 1829. Offley replied that Pertev Pacha could set whatever amount he wished, as long as it was on the same level with the other nations. Moreover Pertev Pacha asked

⁵³⁵ David Offley to John Quincy Adams, January 31, 1829, Constantinople, House Document /2 250, 10-13.

⁵³⁶ David Offley to William Crane, February 9, 1829, Constantinople, House Document/2 250, 24.

American vessels to pay 500 piastres, around \$ 37, on their passage to Black Sea. An article included in the treaty with Sweden but not with France or England. Although reasonable wishes, Offley rejected all of Pertev Pacha's suggestions as they were against his instructions. Their disagreement on this issue, too, led to the termination of negotiations.⁵³⁷ Crane shared Offley's feelings in this issue, that the treaty should put the US on the same footing with the other most favored nations.⁵³⁸

Pertev Pacha, however, saw this as a short break, not as termination, since he offered Offley to come back to the capital after the *Ramazan Bayram*. He also stated his desire of concluding a treaty with the US through Navoni.⁵³⁹ Offley was aware of the negotiations between the Porte and Russia, which required immediate attention of the Reis Effendi, and despite the several messages from him, did not find it a suitable time to go back to Constantinople. The return of a Russian ambassador to Constantinople would, Offley thought, stimulate the Porte to continue negotiations with the US, as it was the wish of Russia to open Black Sea to American merchants. In the meantime, American vessels had been visiting Constantinople, which gave Offley a positive impression on the future of their negotiations.⁵⁴⁰

The Ottoman government wished to renew its destroyed navy through the assistance of the US, partly in the form of presents, as made clear by the Pertev Pacha. Upon the

⁵³⁷ David Offley to John Quincy Adams, February 28, 1829, Constantinople, House Document 250/2, 13-14. Offley wrote, regarding Pertev Pacha's suggestion of receiving higher duties from the American merchants, "the real difference between us in reality is trifling; but I cannot agree that it shall appear evident that our treaty should be less favorable than that of any other nation." In David Offley to William Crane, February 27, 1829, Constantinople, House Document 250/2, 25.

⁵³⁸ William Crane to David Offley, February 23, 1829, Harbor of Smyrna, House Document 250/2, 20; William Crane to David Offley, March 5, 1829, Harbor of Smyrna House Document 250/2, 26.

⁵³⁹ David Offley to John Quincy Adams, March 21, 1829, Smyrna, House Document 250/2, 18.

⁵⁴⁰ David Offley to William Crane, July 28, 1829, Smyrna, House Document 250/2, 26-27.

orders from the Sultan, Reis Effendi discussed the conditions with Capudan Pacha, Qadi-askers and Shaykh al-Islam. In this meeting, they concluded that a treaty with the US would not provide profit to the Ottoman merchants and citizens, since only the American merchants and vessels were able to travel between the two countries. Moreover, signing a treaty with the US would displease Great Britain, as the two had an enmity. The rivalry between the Russians and the English would complicate the position of the Porte, since the latter was in favor of a treaty with the US. If Americans sought Russian assistance during the negotiations, the Ottomans would be caught between two Great Powers. Considering all of these points, Reis Effendi and the other members of Divan discussed the issue and found it advisable to give a round answer to the representative of the US, in a manner not to create dissatisfaction to the latter. Another important factor of not completely rejecting the Americans was its growing power. It was a colony of Great Britain not long ago, but now they choose their own rulers in every four years. It had a fleet composed of two hundred war vessels and a merchant fleet equal to the British fleet. It had been entangled in commerce with far distant countries like India and China and signed agreements with almost all of the European nations. Having fertile lands, they had abundant goods in their countries. All of these in addition to their patriotism drew many from Europe in search of a new home. With the consent of the Sultan who found no advantages in signing a commercial treaty, and with fear that it could create problems with both Great Britain and Russia, but being aware of the growing power of the US, it was decided to give an answer to the American representative containing the domestic entanglements as the reason of their rejection.⁵⁴¹

⁵⁴¹ BOA, HAT 1212/47492, 29 Zilhicce 1243 / July 12, 1828.

The reflection of this first round of negotiations in the American press was differential. First of all, it is understood that the American press heard about the developments from foreign press, basically from the English and French papers. According to those reports, David Offley endeavored to obtain free passage from the Dardanelles, which was correct. They also claimed that both Turkey and Russia were trying to gain the support of the American navy. The reaction to that, however, was very harsh: “Neither will get it. Its all stuff. King-ridden Europeans know little of the principles of our government – not event he inhabitants of the ‘fast anchored isle.’”⁵⁴² One month before this tough statement, the same paper argued that the negotiations “has excited the jealousy of the enemies of our commerce in that quarter, who pretend to view it as a pledge to assist the porte in its operation against Greece!”⁵⁴³ Another article however stated that David Offley’s insistence of free navigation on the Black Sea was rejected by the Reis Effendi, which was considered as an indication of Ottoman “disposition to gratify England; and infer from it the possibility of an agreement with that Power.”⁵⁴⁴

Despite the suspicions, how much the British were involved in negotiations is not clear. The Ottoman officeholders, however, put significant thought upon the British reaction, because it played an important role in Ottoman affairs in the nineteenth century. Through the end of this first phase of negotiations, Reis Effendi prepared a report for the Sultan, transmitting the wish of Offley to return to Smyrna and explained the course of negotiations. While he stated Offley’s reluctance to recognize the offers that came from others regarding war vessels and passage from the Black

⁵⁴² “United States and Turkey,” *Nile’s Weekly Register*, April 18, 1829.

⁵⁴³ “Russia and Turkey,” *Niles’ Weekly Register*, March 14, 1829.

⁵⁴⁴ *Christian Secretary*, March 28, 1829.

Sea, he accepted signing a treaty with the US would have advantages for commercial purposes. However, he emphasized the fact that before giving approval, they must learn the British attitude towards such a treaty. In this respect, the American representative Offley was occupied throughout the negotiations and the Reis Effendi abstained from giving a decisive answer. Until the Ottomans learned the British position, it was decided that Offley would return to Smyrna.⁵⁴⁵

The answer given to Offley did not exactly reject signing a treaty. Wright argued that Offley would have had more chance if he had been authorized to negotiate right after an invitation came from the capital, but the US government's tardiness and the slowness of communication prevented Offley from acting immediately.⁵⁴⁶ Although it cannot be said that the first round of negotiations ended with failure, it was not concluded successfully, either. Both parties revealed their priorities, wishes and expectations from each other. The Porte had to renew its relations with the great European countries whose representatives had left the capital after Navarino, and in the meantime kept the US on the side, not making any promises, but thinking a more advantageous agreement with them could be procured.

7.4. Negotiations Part II: David Offley, James Biddle and Charles

Rhind

When Offley's last letters reached Washington, Andrew Jackson had been president for three months and Martin Van Buren had been appointed as Secretary of State. The

⁵⁴⁵ BOA, HAT 1212/47488, 29 Zilhicce 1246 / June 10, 1831.

⁵⁴⁶ Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 159.

latter noted in this autobiography “The first negotiation we instituted was one with the Sublime Porte”⁵⁴⁷ After reading the letters and reports about the issue, David Offley, James Biddle, Commander of the Mediterranean Squadron and Charles Rhind, a New York merchant, were appointed commissioners to negotiate a treaty. The American government decided that a second attempt should be conducted, since “The trade between the United States and the Turkish dominions, though very limited in its range, and without the security derived from treaty stipulations, is, even under such adverse circumstances, very considerable.”⁵⁴⁸ The paranoia that European nations would hamper the negotiations was clear in Van Buren’s words; “Apprehensive that other powers might interfere to our prejudice I availed myself of Mr. Adams’ hint and kept all the papers at my private rooms while the matter was in progress.”⁵⁴⁹ The belief that other nations were responsible for the failure in concluding a treaty in their previous commission was repeated in Van Buren’s letter to the commissioners informing them of their new duty, and thus he emphasized the importance of secrecy.

The attitude of the American government this time was flexible. Pertev Pacha had insisted on the 5 % duty in the previous negotiations and it was presented as the main reason of disagreement. Van Buren informed the commissioners that it was a reasonable request and it was not “an insuperable obstacle” in front of reaching an agreement, meaning that the commissioners could accept the Porte’s stipulations on the issue. Van Buren was quick to explain right after this, that he did not think it was

⁵⁴⁷ Martin Van Buren, vol. 2 of *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1918: The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren*, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), 270.

⁵⁴⁸ Martin Van Buren to James Biddle, David Offley, and Charles Rhind, September 12, 1829, Washington, House Document 250, 69.

⁵⁴⁹ Van Buren, vol. 2 of *Autobiography*, 270.

David Offley's fault to insist on the equal footing as he acted in accordance with his instructions. He continued:

The President is the more desirous that there should be no misapprehension upon this point, from finding how much the trade between the United States and Turkey has been benefited by the zealous attention of Mr. Offley to the duties of his office, and frequently by efforts which, if they did not flow entirely from his own impulses, were required only by an enlarged and patriotic view of his official duties.⁵⁵⁰

It seems, finally, that the American government recognized the importance of Offley's previous actions. According to the instructions, Charles Rhind would proceed to Constantinople alone and only after they agreed on a satisfactory agreement, Offley and Biddle would follow him to finalize the treaty.⁵⁵¹ Twenty thousand dollars was spared for the expenses.⁵⁵²

As soon as Rhind received instructions, he set sail from New York and shared the mission only with his son. He delivered the letters and instructions to Biddle and the two proceeded to Smyrna, confident that their mission was successfully kept secret. "Your Excellency may judge of our mortification and surprise when Mr. Offley came on board, and informed us that it was perfectly well known in Smyrna that we were commissioners." Once again, the Americans failed in their efforts to keep their actions hidden. On February 8, he reached Constantinople where he made an acquaintance with Nicholas Navoni and after being persuaded that the latter deserved his confidence, Rhind revealed his mission. Two days later he sent Navoni to Pertev Pacha to request a meeting. Pertev Pacha made an appointment for February 18th.

⁵⁵⁰ Martin Van Buren to James Biddle, David Offley, and Charles Rhind, September 12, 1829, Washington, House Document 250, 70-71.

⁵⁵¹ Martin Van Buren to James Biddle, David Offley, and Charles Rhind, September 12, 1829, Washington, House Document 250, 72.

⁵⁵² Andrew Jackson to John Branch, September 12, 1829, Washington, House Document 250, 74.

On their first meeting, Pertev Pacha told if the US was ready to set the duties on 5 %, they could sign a treaty right away. Rhind's answer was affirmative as long as a separate or secret article was included stipulating that after the renewal of the treaties with other nations, the US would be put on the same footing with them. Pertev Pacha then suggested decreasing the amount to 4 % without any private or secret article, as he did not feel comfortable with a secret article. Rhind's answer to this was "he might make it 10 per cent, if he pleases, provided he put us in the footing of other nations." As to the secret article that it was commonly used by European powers as by the Porte itself. Upon Rhind's resistance, Pertev Pacha told he would inform the Sultan and would communicate to Rhind soon.

About the passage to and from Black Sea, Pertev Pacha expected Rhind to comply with the terms that had been offered to David Offley. Rhind, however, thought that the situation had changed since then, due to the recently signed Treaty of Adrianople, which ended the war of 1828-1829 between the Ottoman and Russian Empires.

According to that treaty, the commercial vessels belonging to nations in peace with the Porte could travel through the Dardanelles and sail in and out of the Black Sea. Without giving a reply, Pertev Pacha ended the meeting there, saying he had another appointment. Rhind's next step was to arrange a meeting with Count Alexey Fyodorovich Orlof (who signed the Treaty of Adrianople on behalf of Russian Empire) and narrated his meeting with Pertev Pacha. Count Orlof told Rhind "that *man*" referring to Pertev Pacha "was in the habit of making strange demands" and assured him that Pertev Pacha would, in the end, consent to sign a satisfactory agreement with the US. Before they had another chance for a meeting, though, Pertev

Pacha was removed from his office on February 23.⁵⁵³ Americans thought Pertev Pacha was pro-British and a stubborn man who kept raising difficulties on the way of signing an agreement.

In the meantime, Rhind met Alexandre de Ribeaupierre, the Russian Ambassador to Constantinople, who explained Pertev Pacha's interpretation to Rhind. The Treaty of Adrianople was valid for the countries that already had a treaty with the Porte, and the American government had to sign one in order to be able to benefit from that treaty.

After the appointment of Mehmed Hamid Bey as Reis Effendi, he immediately engaged himself with the government business, which delayed his meeting with Rhind despite the latter's insistence, but the former appointed Beylikci Effendi Mehmet Akif Pacha to conduct meetings with Rhind.⁵⁵⁴ Beylikci Effendi held an office under the Reis Effendi. He was the head of *Divan Kalemi*, an office where the edicts and *fermans* were written. Beylikci Effendi followed the foreign business of the Ottoman Empire from the first hand and especially in the nineteenth century, he was assigned to various diplomatic duties and he either accompanied the Reis Effendi or attended alone to the meetings held with foreign ambassadors and representatives.⁵⁵⁵

Navoni had an interview with Akif Pacha on March 6, where they discussed the previous missions. Navoni later informed Rhind that Akif Pacha had found David Offley partly responsible for termination of negotiations in 1828 since he rejected to recognize the offers made by other Americans, regarding the vessels of war and

⁵⁵³ Rhind wrote he was deposed in February 16, in Charles Rhind to Andrew Jackson, May 10, 1830, House Document 250, 77-82. All the information about Rhind's account was taken from this source. Findley, however stated it was February 23, in "Pertev Mehmed Said Paşa," 234.

⁵⁵⁴ Charles Rhind to Andrew Jackson, May 10, 1830, House Document 250, 83-84.

⁵⁵⁵ Mehmet İpşirli, "Beylikçi", vol 6 of *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 78-79.

Luther Bradish's mission failed due to the conflicts of the time and the influence of the British whom Porte tried to please. Navoni told him it was Pertev Pacha's narration, that Offley could not have recognized such offers, and it was Pertev Pacha who included the British into the affairs. The two arranged a meeting for March 9th, with the presence of Reis Effendi. Before the meeting took place, Rhind stated that the English legation in Constantinople was trying to reveal the real duty of Rhind, as "they knew I had diplomatic powers." They even tried to bribe Navoni who "proved faithful & immediately informed me of the fact."⁵⁵⁶ At this point the role of Navoni in increasing the suspicions of the Americans about the British interference should be considered. He was the interpreter since Bradish's mission and thus transmitted the words of the Porte, or as in this case the actions of British mission. The Porte had considered England's views but to what extent they were influential is uncertain. The argument was made to the American representatives several times that the foreign powers, especially Great Britain was reluctant, but Wright proved otherwise. Sir Robert Gordon, British Ambassador to Constantinople, wrote to the Foreign Secretary a conversation he had had with the previous Reis Effendi, Pertev Pacha who had informed the latter that the Americans were inclined to accept 5 % duty. Sir Gordon's reply was:

I desired my dragoman to express my acknowledgement for this friendly message at the same time to assure the Reis Effendi that I saw no objection whatever to his entering into the proposed convention with the Americans. Whatever was calculated to advance the wealth and prosperity of this Empire must be agreeable to the British Government, and we besides have no desire whatever that the American trade with Constantinople and the Black Sea should be prohibited or restricted. In regard to the propositions for laying a duty of 5 % upon the American trade, it also met with my approbation, grounded, as stated above, upon the advantage to be derived from it to Turkey.

⁵⁵⁶ Charles Rhind to Andrew Jackson, May 10, 1830, House Document 250, 84-85.

I even admitted the possibility of extending at a future period this increase of duty to all European nations.⁵⁵⁷

Through Sir Gordon's letter, the Ottoman office holders learned the disposition of Great Britain towards an Ottoman-American treaty. While the negotiations with Offley were broken in 1828 considering the British disposition, renewing negotiations in 1829 also indicates that the British did not oppose to such treaty. Still the Ottomans continued to claim British intervention and intrigue.

Although the Americans thought the Ottomans were ignorant of the US, it was not the case. Reports related to American Revolution, the War of 1812, American actions in the Barbary States exist in the Ottoman archives, thus the Porte was informed on not only the American relations with Britain and other countries, but also its domestic relations and technological advancements. Some of these reports were given above. Thus Ottoman office holders, like Pertev Pacha, used already present American suspicion towards Great Britain as leverage to obtain advantages. A commercial treaty based on perfect reciprocity would not give the Porte advantages, the amounts of duties were already low and the US representatives on several occasions made it clear that their government would not play any role in the European politics; it was only natural for the Ottomans to see if they could obtain war vessels or increase the duties. By claiming British reluctance, the Ottoman office holders tried to accelerate the process and convince the American commissioner to offer advantages, because if the negotiations were prolonged, the British would have intervened.

On March 9, Navoni visited Beylikci Effendi to learn the hour of their meeting that was supposed to take place on the same night. However, Beylikci Effendi brought up

⁵⁵⁷ Sir Robert Gordon to the Earl of Aberdeen, March 2, 1830, #22, PRO, F.O. 78,189 qtd in Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 185.

the issue of 5 % again and requested him to prepare a treaty on the basis of this rate, without any private article specifying other nations, since their treaties would expire in different times. He suggested stipulating that the 5 % would be paid at least for three years. Rhind, however, gave a strong reaction, and thinking that the Porte had been delaying the meeting, he demanded either signing a treaty on the footing of most favored nation, without an increase in the duties, or to end the negotiations completely. This created the expected impact; Beylikci Effendi stepped back and retrieved his offer, and they arranged a meeting with the Reis Effendi the following evening.

When they met on March 12, Rhind repeated his request for a treaty on reciprocity, on the 17, Reis Effendi informed Navoni that he had received orders from the Sultan to conclude a treaty as Rhind wished, and that he could call his colleagues to sign it. One final difficulty was put in the way by the British. On March 20, he learned that one of the English dragomans had been in contact with certain members of the *Divan* to push the Americans to pay 5 % duty. Learning these intrigues, Rhind applied to the Reis Effendi to obtain permission for his colleagues and the American frigate, which would bring them to the capital. Reis Effendi replied that they could travel through land, or if they insisted on coming on a frigate, it had to be masked. Rhind argued that war vessels of other nations had visited the capital on similar occasions and requested permission for the American frigate again. Reis Effendi informed him that he would ask the Sultan and would let him know.

In the meantime, Rhind received a note “from a friend (high in office)” urging him to sign the treaty immediately “for the English had interfered and were operating with several members of the Divan, particularly Perteve, who altho’ deposed is not (..?)

and has a seat still in the council.” He acted immediately and sent Navoni to the Reis Effendi informing him that Rhind was ready to sign the two articles as the base of a treaty right away, but Reis Effendi rejected this offer and suggested waiting for his colleagues. Rhind requested a meeting with the Seraisker Pacha who gave an appointment for March 31st. While waiting for Seraisker Pacha in his palace, “Mr. Chabert, the first Dragoman of England” entered the room. Rhind interpreted his action as his “determination to intrude himself at the interview I was to have with his excellency.” In order to prevent his intrusion, Rhind decided to leave the palace, but Seraisker Pacha sent his secretary to place the Americans into another chamber, “but we arrived too late, the [Dragoman] having entered the room we were in.” Rhind never questioned Mr. Chabert’s actions, or the British intrigues. Whether Mr. Chabert came uninvited or otherwise was unknown, it can be speculated that he was invited by the Seraisker Pacha who wanted to intimidate the Americans with the so-called existence of a British intrigue, but it was enough to convince Rhind and that was how he transacted the events to the President. When they finally could meet, Seraisker Pacha warned Rhind again and “begged me to let no trifling difficulties impede the conclusion.”

On the second day of April, Rhind learned that Pertev Pacha had given a written notice against the conclusion of a treaty based on 3 % duty. The next day, with the attendance of the Reis Effendi and the Beylikci Effendi, they discussed the inclusion of a secret article and set the duty at 5 %, which was rejected by Rhind on grounds that it was pushed by the English, and not by the Porte. Unable to reach an agreement they left but he learned later that the Sultan gave orders to conclude a treaty on Rhind’s terms. Finally on May 7th, the Reis Effendi and Rhind signed two copies of the treaty, written in French and in Turkish. Rhind, later sent a message to Offley and

Biddle inviting them to Constantinople.⁵⁵⁸ Wright concluded his chapter with the text below, revealing his suspicion towards the British intrigues, which all of the American representatives emphasized, and towards Rhind's self-claimed success:

Charles Rhind was jubilant. He had succeeded where others had failed and the treaty was made. His satisfaction was unalloyed by suspicions that some of the mountains of opposition which he had overthrown were perhaps purely imaginary. All that remained was for him to receive the congratulations of his colleagues and proceed to the United States and accept gratefully the gratitude of the President and people of the country which he felt himself to have served so well. His troubles with the Turks were over, but those with his colleagues were about to begin. His mission was well begun but by no means finished. He had told only part of the story and his omission was to find him out.⁵⁵⁹

7.5. Secret Article and the Ratification of the Treaty

David Offley had spent nineteen years in Ottoman lands, met and conversed with Ottoman office holders several times, even formed close relations with Koca Hüsrev Paşa, made an arrangement by himself for the benefit of all American shipping, but could not conclude a satisfactory treaty with the Porte because he had strict instructions and did not want to overreach. On the other hand, Rhind, who had been engaged in trade with the Ottoman Empire for several years, was able to conclude a treaty on the terms, which were rejected to Offley. At least that was what he proudly claimed. Rhind sent a copy of the treaty and a *ferman* inviting them to Constantinople; Biddle and Offley arrived on May 24th. Upon their arrival Rhind informed them that he had purchased nine snuffboxes and gave them as presents to different members of the *Divan*. After Navoni was sent to arrange a meeting with the

⁵⁵⁸ Charles Rhind to Andrew Jackson, May 10, 1830, House Document 250, 86-94. The text, however, omitted the parts about the foreign interference, which can be completed from the original in M 46, Roll 3, NARA.

⁵⁵⁹ Wright, "American Relations with Turkey to 1831," 190-191.

Reis Effendi in the morning of May 28th, Rhind told them the secret article, and not before although they had spent four days in the same house, conversing on the treaty. Upon learning this secret part of the treaty, they deferred their meeting with the Reis Effendi.⁵⁶⁰ The secret behind Rhind's success was this secret article:

...considering the abundance and strength of ship timber in the United States of America and the more suitable price thereof, and as a signal proof of the sincere friendship entertained by the aforesaid power towards the Sublime Porte, it has been agreed that whenever the Sublime Porte may wish to cause to be built in the United States any number whatever of ships of two decks, frigates, sloops, and brigs of war, the Department of the *Riasset* (Chancery of State and of Foreign Affairs) may apply to, and concert with, the Minister of said power near the Sublime Porte, respecting the manner of making a contract, which shall contain the conditions agreed upon in relation to the cost of construction, the space of time for the completion of the work, and the means of having it conveyed to Constantinople; in order that, by virtue of such contract, the ships which may be ordered to be built agreeably to the models which will be furnished by this Imperial Admiralty, may be built, in the United States, as strong and as solid as the ships of war of the United States [and that the costs of construction shall not be greater than the ordinary costs of ships of war of the United States]. In like manner, if the Sublime Porte should desire it, the Commissioners of the two powers will concert together, in order that instead of the vessels which may have been built sailing from the United States in ballast, there may be laden on board of each the necessary and sufficient quantity of timber for the construction of another vessel of the same form and dimensions, at the price which may have been fixed by the Government of said power to be paid for its own vessels, the timber to be cut and prepared on the spot according to the measures and dimensions given to whom it may belong.⁵⁶¹

Neither Offley nor Biddle approved this article. Offley even sent Navoni on May 29 to inform the Reis Effendi that they would not sign it. Unable to find the Reis Effendi, he transmitted the information to the Grand Vizier and Beylikci Effendi. Their answer revealed their dissatisfaction and disappointment; they told Navoni the negotiations would be considered as broken off, if the two commissioners refused to sign it. Moreover, they argued, the article let the Porte to have war vessels built in the US on

⁵⁶⁰ Charles Rhind to Martin Van Buren, May 31, 1830, Constantinople, M 46, Roll 3, NARA.

⁵⁶¹ Hunter Miller, ed., vol. 3 of *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America* (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1933), 578-79.

the former's account, the latter would merely offer assistance. In addition, Offley knew Rhind already had spent half of the amount reserved for their mission.⁵⁶² In the letter he wrote to Van Buren, Offley stated that he did not think the Porte would make use of this article because the Ottoman office holders had a wrong impression about the costs of shipbuilding in the US. It would cost them more to order a war vessel in the US than what it cost in their own dominions. Moreover, they thought that American government paid less for a vessel than the individuals, and wanted to secure the same privilege. He stated his opinion as "no contract ever be made which would be satisfactory to them. The secret article therefore remain without evil." Thus, resolved to sign the treaty and leave the final decision to American government.⁵⁶³

Biddle, when he first learned the existence and content of the article, thought that this article was so unacceptable that, he wrote, "Most certainly I should not have repaired to this city, if Mr. Rhind, when he transmitted the treaty itself to Smyrna, had transmitted also the secret article of it." According to Biddle, this article over extended their instructions and opposed the principle of the US, not to form any other relations with foreign countries, except commercial. David Offley shared his feelings but also thought that if they withheld their signatures, the Porte would feel offended and increase the duties levied on articles essential for American trade to the point that it might end completely. In consideration of these circumstances, Biddle and Offley signed the treaty with the secret article on May 30.⁵⁶⁴ Although both Biddle and Offley did not agree to the contents of the secret article, they decided to add their

⁵⁶² David Offley to James Biddle, May 29, 1830, Constantinople, M 46, Roll 3, NARA.

⁵⁶³ David Offley to Martin Van Buren, June 2, 1830, Constantinople, M 46, Roll 3, NARA.

⁵⁶⁴ Charles Rhind to Martin Van Buren, May 31, 1830, Constantinople, M 46, Roll 3, NARA.

signatures because once Rhind had made the agreement with it, they figured the treaty would go ahead.

They each sent separate letters containing their version of the occurrences to the American government. While Offley and Biddle accused Rhind for withholding information, the latter claimed that he had sent a letter including the secret article to Offley before their departure.⁵⁶⁵ Whether he sent a letter or not is doubtful since they had never talked about it during the four days they had spent together, and it is highly possible that Rhind, apprehending protests, withheld this information until the last minute. In either case, the secret article gave the Porte what it had pursued since the beginning of the negotiations; and the use of the so-called British threat worked for the benefit of the Ottomans. Rhind also accepted the fact that his success was the result of the secret article: “It was necessary to show the Sultan that *something* had been granted for the concessions he had made, and our Turkish friend [probably the Hüsrev Paşa] suggested the private article.” He defended himself by writing the secret article was “perfect nullity,” because it gave “only the privilege of consulting with our minister about the best mode of making a contract to procure ships or timber.”⁵⁶⁶ Nonetheless, Rhind’s mission was a success. He was able to obtain a treaty from the Porte, while others failed.

On December 7, 1830, President Andrew Jackson announced the conclusion of a treaty with the Porte. Upon this announcement, the issue was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations; Mr. Tazewell prepared a report regarding the subject and presented it in the Twenty-First Congress, Second Session. The Congress

⁵⁶⁵ Charles Rhind to James Biddle and David Offley, May 29, 1830, Pera, M 46, Roll 3, NARA.

⁵⁶⁶ Charles Rhind to Martin Van Buren, June 1, 1830, Constantinople, House Document 250, 95.

focused its attention on two issues; the first one was the 7th article, which stated “Merchant vessels of the United States, [...] go and come in the Black Sea [...] may be laden with the produce, manufactures and effects, of the Ottoman Empire, excepting such as are prohibited, as well as of their own country.”⁵⁶⁷ This article limited the cargo, which could be carried by the American vessels with the produce of the US or the Ottoman dominions, but considering the Black Sea would open the ports of Russian Empire to American merchants, the report stated that this article had to be amended in a way to permit the American vessels to sail into and out of the Black Sea loaded with any kind of cargo composed of articles of the United States, Ottoman Empire, or any other country.⁵⁶⁸

The second issue was, as expected, the secret article. On February 1, 1831, Mr. Livingston gave a motion to amend the secret article into a form that would only require American government’s advice and assistance in case the Ottoman government intended to enter into contracts with the citizens of the United States. Mr. Frelinghuysen gave a motion right after to be added to Louisiana Senator Edward Livingston’s amendment: “It being further understood that in no event shall the United States be under obligation to comply with the stipulations of this article when such compliance shall interfere with or endanger the neutral relations of the United States Government.” The main concern, as clear in these amendments, was forcing the US government to enter into a formal relationship with a foreign country, direct opposite of the isolationist principle. These amendments aimed to break this obligation, but were rejected 22 to 23. When the option of amending the secret article

⁵⁶⁷ Miller ed., vol. 3 of *Treaties*, 543.

⁵⁶⁸ Vol. 8 of *Compilation of Reports of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 1789-1901* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), 31.

was removed, the Senate rejected to ratify the secret article 27 to 18.⁵⁶⁹ The reason, as Tazewell stated in his report, was, in accordance with the laws and Constitution, “the Government thereof possesses no authority to compel their citizens to enter into any contract, either with their own Government or any foreign power whatever, or to prescribe the terms upon which such contract, when voluntarily entered into by the citizens of the United States...”⁵⁷⁰ The Senate ratified the first treaty between the United States of America and the Ottoman Empire with the exception of the secret article and with an amendment made on the 7th article on February 1, 1831, 42 to 1, the negative vote came from Mr. Noble.⁵⁷¹

7.6. Exchange of the Ratifications

The only thing that was left was the exchange of ratifications with the Ottoman government. The President appointed former US commodore, then consul general to the Barbary States David Porter as Charge d’Affaires to Constantinople. Van Buren explained the causes that had led the Senate to the rejection of the secret article to Porter, and instructed him to convince the Porte that it was not rejected because of a prejudice or ill-will felt by the American government towards the Porte, but because it was against the principles and laws of the US. However, if the Ottoman government wished to construct war vessels in the US, Porter, experienced and informed being a former naval officer himself, should be willing to offer his advice and counsel. Van

⁵⁶⁹ U.S. Congress. *Senate Exec. Journal*, 21st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1 February 1831, 148-49.

⁵⁷⁰ Vol. 8 of *Compilation of Reports of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 1789-1901*, 31. The reasons for rejection were also written, to be explained to the Porte, in from Martin Van Buren to David Porter, April 15, 1831, Washington, M 77, Roll 162, NARA.

⁵⁷¹ U.S. Congress. *Senate Exec. Journal*, 21st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1 February 1831, 149-50.

Buren was expecting a protest and discontent from the Porte, and instructed Porter to secure the ratification but without giving the impression that another treaty including the stipulation of the secret article had a chance to succeed.⁵⁷²

Porter arrived at Constantinople in August, and without waiting Navoni, who would give some information about the customs and traditions of the Ottoman Porte, he proceeded to the capital. Navoni, thus, went to see him on board after the vessel anchored opposite the Seven Towers. Porter wished Navoni to communicate to the Reis Effendi and arrange a meeting. Navoni, however, claimed it was not possible due to the rank of Porter. The Porte was expecting a Minister from the US, but Porter was Charge d’Affaires. Ignoring his advice, Porter insisted on his instructions. Before he left the ship, Mr. Hodgson, who was sent as Secretary of the Legation, informed Navoni that some changes should be expected in the officers.⁵⁷³ By saying this, Mr. Hodgson revealed his and the new ambassador’s suspicions about Navoni, and their intention to remove him from his post, which had been granted not by the American Government but by Bradish and Rhind before his departure.⁵⁷⁴

Navoni visited the Reis Effendi but he “burst out in laughter” when he heard Porter’s request for an interview. He told Navoni that Porter had to settle in a house in the city and that he would communicate to him in due time in accordance with the customs.

⁵⁷² Martin Van Buren to David Porter, April 15, 1831, Washington, M 77, Roll 162, NARA.

⁵⁷³ Nicholas Navoni to Edward Livingston, October 25, 1831, T 194, Roll 1, NARA.

⁵⁷⁴ Employing Levantines as dragomans was common in Foreign Legations and Consulates. These dragomans were expected to be impartial but they were also charged of “partisanship and falsity” as in the case of Porter who accused Navoni of transferring incorrect information. “Dragomans, and particularly those from the Levantine community were also not always trusted and did not have the best reputation among the foreign legations and local actors in Istanbul. [...] dragomans were not always highly regarded and often referred to as untrustworthy and self-serving, looking to line their own pockets.” Frank Castiglione, “The Interviewees,” interview by Craig Encer, June 2015, last modified 2015, www.levantineheritage.com. Besides the general prejudice against dragomans, whether Porter’s distrust of Navoni had had any foundation is not clear and a further research is required in the British archives in order to reach a conclusive interpretation.

According to Navoni, Porter's rank was the main reason why he was kept waiting until September 13, a month after Porter made his first request for presence from the Reis Effendi. Nevertheless, this issue was dropped quickly; the main discussion turned to the secret article. Porter explained the rejection was due to American laws; the Reis Effendi in return wanted to learn what he would offer in substitute; but Porter had nothing to offer.⁵⁷⁵ This long letter, which was written a month after Navoni was dismissed from American Legation by Porter, reflects Navoni's dissatisfaction and disapproval of Porter's and Hodgson's attitudes and their inability to decently communicate to the Porte according to that government's laws and traditions. He was most definitely biased towards these two Americans, but he was right on the point that neither Porter nor Hodgson, despite their experiences in the Barbary States, did not have enough information on how to approach the Porte or Ottoman office holders accordingly.

President Andrew Jackson wrote a letter to the Sultan Mahmud II, informing him the rejection of the secret article; in that letter he explained that according to the laws of the US, the President could not by himself pass a treaty and/or specific articles, but he expressed his wish to preserve the friendship which had been based on a formal foundation with this treaty.⁵⁷⁶ At the time discussions about ratification, New York shipbuilder and designer Henry Eckford arrived in Constantinople with the purpose of benefiting from the treaty by selling his recently built *United States* to the Porte. Henry Eckford built ships for American government and merchants, and was praised

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ Andrew Jackson to Sultan Mahmud II, April 15, 1831, both the English and the translated version were given in Akdes Nimet Kurat, "Türkiye ile ABD Arasındaki Münasebetlere Dair Arşiv Vesikaları," *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2 (1964): 336-38.

for his talent and genius in his profession.⁵⁷⁷ Before sailing from New York in the early summer of 1831, to present his vessel to the Sultan, he requested letters of information and reference from the President, who not only provided those, but also informed Porter of his venture. The arrival of Henry Eckford was therefore “highly favorable to this negotiation” and Porter expressed that he “shall not fail to make use of it.”⁵⁷⁸ The Ottoman authorities however thought that the vessel was brought as a present to the Sultan, as part of the customary presents given after the ratification of a treaty.⁵⁷⁹

The disputes regarding the secret article did not ease away quickly. The Reis Effendi argued that all the treaties of the Ottoman Empire depended on reciprocity, and the secret article provided this base. Without it, the treaty benefitted only the Americans. In this respect, Eckford’s venture was influential in convincing the Ottoman authorities to exchange the ratification. The secret article would enable the Porte to have built and purchase war vessels from the US. Although it was rejected in the Senate, the arrival of Eckford showed that the Ottomans could still benefit from American naval facilities without the secret article, and proved American guarantees were valid.

Porter wrote, “I find them [Ottoman authorities] however a reasonable people ready to fulfill their own engagements and only requiring others to fulfill theirs.”⁵⁸⁰ They prepared a new translation of the treaty, and Porter was able to abort all the

⁵⁷⁷ Phyllis DeKay Wheelock, “Henry Eckford (1775-1831), an American Shipbuilder,” *The American Neptune*, 7 (July 1947): 177-81.

⁵⁷⁸ David Porter to Edward Livingston, August 11, 1831, off Seraglio Point, M 46, Roll 4, NARA.

⁵⁷⁹ David Porter to Edward Livingston, August 17, 1831, Buyukdere, M 46, Roll 4, NARA.

⁵⁸⁰ David Porter to Edward Livingston, September 13, 1831, Buyukdere, M 46, Roll 4, NARA.

difficulties by “consenting that, in all disputes, the Turkish instrument shall be referred to, which they acknowledge to be, according to our understanding of it; that is to say, that it entitles us to all the privileges, without exception, of the most friendly nations.” Porter held Navoni responsible for aggravating the process of ratifications, and wrote, “since his suspension from duty which was on the 23rd, the day on which I began to correspond with the Porte without his intervention” he had made great progress and finalized the process.⁵⁸¹ His reception by the Sultan was written in American newspapers as a great event itself, since it was “perhaps unprecedented in the annals of the Turkish Empire. It has been the custom to admit no diplomatic agent under the rank of Ambassador to an audience of the Grand Seignior himself. In the case of the United States, this piece of etiquette appears to have been entirely waived.”⁵⁸² Porter accomplished this by offering his own services to the Porte:

Now, I David Porter, Charge d’affaires acting for, and in behalf of the United States near the Sublime Porte, do, in conformity with the orders of the President of the United States, and as an equivalent for the aforesaid rejected separate article, hold myself, at all times ready to give my friendly council and advice, to the Sublime Porte as to the best manner of obtaining ships of war, wood for their construction and timber of any description, from the United States, and to obtain all advantages contemplated by the said separate article, without violating the Laws of the United States, or conflicting with their engagements with other nations.

This concession is to be binding on the part of my successors.⁵⁸³

Porter, by following the President’s instructions, offered his services to the Porte. This text restored the privileges that had been given by the secret article, but did not require the ratification of the Senate.

⁵⁸¹ David Porter to Edward Livingston, September 26, 1831, Buyukdere, M 46, Roll 4, NARA.

⁵⁸² “Important from Smyrna,” *Atkinson’s Saturday Evening Post*, November 19, 1831.

⁵⁸³ Signed by David Porter, September 26, 1831, M 46, Roll 4, NARA.

7.7. Conclusion

Adams' secretaryship and presidency renewed American interest into the Ottoman Empire, and new agents were sent to enquire Ottoman disposition towards the US. The period coincided with the Greek Revolution, which affected American approach to the Ottoman Empire for treaty, as the administration considered the public opinion favoring Greek revolutionaries. When the Ottoman fleet was destroyed in Navarino in 1827, however, a change in the attitude of Ottomans was observed, as they were more willing to draw American naval support through signing a treaty. While Commodore Rodgers' visit two years before Navarino reminded Capudan Pacha the naval power of the US, object of the mission was again gathering information. Ottoman attention was distracted by the war and dissolution of the Ottoman Janissaries in 1826, but Navarino led the Ottomans to focus on American mission and a formal invitation was made. As the American administration decided favorable conditions were established for negotiating a treaty, a mission under the head of Offley was sent to Constantinople.

The Ottomans aimed to benefit from the naval industries in America, and considering its conflicted relations with the great nations of Europe, it seemed a favorable moment to approach the US. American administration was also ready for the negotiations after spending years in gathering information on the Ottoman diplomacy and commerce. David Offley was instructed to go to Constantinople for this purpose but he could not obtain an agreement due to the restricting instructions given to him. He could not accept to offer war vessels to the Ottoman Empire as a treaty stipulation.

Charles Rhind, however, approached the issue from a different angle. What he exactly thought was unknown since his letters to the State Department did not include the

discussions about the secret article, but he realized that in order to obtain a treaty, he had to give something to the Porte. The secret article did not bind the American government to the Porte diplomatically; it only let the Ottomans to build vessels of war in the US facilities, which they could do without the secret article. Although it was rejected in the Senate, the Porte accepted to ratify the main text of the article without the secret article on condition that the Turkish version of the treaty would be used instead of the English version in case of conflicts and upon Porter's personal guarantee for offering his services to the Ottomans if they chose to build war vessels in the US. Eckford's initiative was also timely for the Porte's decision.

Where Rhind accomplished to sign a treaty with the Porte, Offley failed to capture diplomatic maneuvers. However while Rhind lost favor in the American government, Offley maintained his duties as the American consul in Smyrna. He also sent several letters to the State Department accusing Rhind of signing a treaty which include articles beyond commercial relations, in order to show that Rhind accomplished to sign an agreement because he exceeded the instructions. Being away from the US for many years, Offley was extra-cautious not to offer anything that might even slightly face opposition. He could not let himself to applaud Rhind's success, although it put the Ottoman-American relations on a solid ground.

CHAPTER VIII

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

This dissertation studied the first encounters of the Americans with the Ottomans in the early nineteenth century. While a naval officer, Captain Bainbridge in 1801, made the first contact, his voyage to Constantinople was a result of American relations with the Barbary States. Beginning from that date, this study covered the period until the ratification of the first Treaty of Amity and Commerce and evaluated the establishment of diplomatic, commercial and social relations. While dealing with these different fields, it built them around the first American merchants who came to Smyrna and strengthened American opium commerce to China and the East Indies and established American Levantine community in Smyrna. Among them David Offley came forward who, although was not the first American merchants in Smyrna, was referred as the first and only American in many sources. His initiatives to free American commerce from the British protection and establish formal relations defined many aspects of American business until the treaty.

This chapter approaches the events in a more critical way and offers an analytical summation of the period in four parts; the first one focuses on the uniqueness and the

role of David Offley, the second one analyses the influence of opium trade on the US and world economy, the third one evaluates on the connection between the commercial activities and diplomatic relations, as well as the future diplomatic course they took, the final part concentrates on the cultural activities; the establishment of the American Levantines in Smyrna and the relationship between the merchants and missionaries.

8.1 What was unique about Offley and his Role?

Right after the independence, several American merchants went to foreign countries as resident merchants in order to regulate business, like the China agents and/or consuls Samuel Shaw, Benjamin Wilcocks, John P. Cushing. The aim was to earn money and save some of it to lead a comfortable life when they return to the US. David Offley had the same idea in his mind when he first travelled to Smyrna; moreover he wished to offer a decent future to his sons, which issue was brought up several times in his letters and mentioned in previous chapters. However, within years he adapted to the conditions in the Ottoman Empire, his environment in Smyrna, he built a running business that could not be delivered to someone else's hands. The resident merchants in China were forbidden to socialize and contact with the Chinese population except the Hong merchants and other mediums, and they had to live in factories, separate areas reserved for foreign merchants. Unlike them, Americans in Smyrna could socialize with Ottoman subjects, and Offley married Elena Curtovich, an Ottoman Greek and built a large family. In addition to these, his haunting past prevented him from going back to Philadelphia, where his sister and beloved daughter lived. None of these made him unique though. Although there is very limited

information on Joseph Langdon, who followed Offley's path to Smyrna, it is likely that he had similar experiences.

What made Offley unique was his ability to situate certain American characteristics on the Ottoman ground. The best example, and the central argument of this dissertation, is David Offley's personal arrangement with the Ottoman high-office holders. The details of this arrangement were given in Chapter IV. When he first came to Smyrna, the US was not represented on the official level, and the American merchants conducted business under the British flag, obtained required documents and even benefited from British Consulate in cases of troubles. Offley, however, highly influenced by the Anglophobia, common in the early nineteenth century America, chose to seek other ways to maintain business independent from any other European country. This step was not just taken against the dominance of Great Britain over the American merchants, but Offley advocated for the complete independence, and that is why he did not seek to replace British protection with another consulate but instead formed direct relations with the Ottoman office holders. In order to achieve this he went to Constantinople, spent there around three months, circumvented the bureaucratic procedures and spent a great deal of money. In his letters he emphasized his motive in terms of his patriotic feelings, that the US, after gaining its independence from the British Kingdom, should not continue to exist under its flag but should be able to use the Stars and Stripes. Using British protection would, in Offley's eyes, was dishonorable and disgraceful. As a resident merchant Offley definitely financially profited from the removal of these extra payments and could have tried to limit the concessions he obtained to his use only. Instead he wished all the merchants to take advantage.

While he endeavored to obtain Ottoman protection, the other merchants did not share his opinion and continued to benefit from British protection. Removing the consulage and dragomanage payments to the British consulate rendered a financial relief and it was not a minor amount when considered in total. On the individual basis, the merchants could afford to pay though. Instead of approaching this issue like Offley, they probably thought it was either easier or more secure to use British protection, because it was not more profitable financially. This brings up another point where Offley differed from his countrymen.

As explained in the second chapter, the American community had developed a negative idea about the “Turk” since the first encounters with the Barbary States. The differences between the policies of the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary States towards foreign commerce and merchants were unknown, and also ignored in the US. While piracy was an important income for the former, the latter entitled the merchants and the Levantine community extensive rights. As understood from the several travel narratives, the Americans expected to find a dangerous and threatening place when they came to the Ottoman lands, but there were no such dangers. The British consulate protected the merchants from a sudden change of policy by the Porte, which did not happen until the *America* and *Calumet* event in 1810, and even after then the Americans benefitted from the concessions given to the British. Thus, while they preferred to use British protection considering nonexistent dangers created by their prejudices, Offley approached the Ottoman Empire with an open mind. After the War of 1812 and Great Britain removed protection, the American merchants began to use Offley’s arrangement.

Without waiting for his government's initiative, Offley took the step to establish semi-official ties with the Porte. The American government followed the merchants to establish diplomatic ties with the foreign countries. The relations with the Ottoman Empire was formulated in the same way, but even after the reports claiming the existence of a favorable climate for a treaty, the American government did not take definitive steps to approach the Porte. Since Offley's arrangement let the American merchants to conduct trade under the conditions almost the same offered to the most favored nations, and the only place where the Americans were expelled was the Black Sea trade, the government did not pursue at this time a treaty considering international and domestic conditions, Offley's efforts and advocacy notwithstanding. Besides the European politics and the financial burden, which would come with the treaty, the established public opinion about the Turks was also an important factor that delayed American action.

Offley had become a representative of American character in the Ottoman Empire, by taking a bold step, not only in his dealings with the Ottoman office holders, but also by moving to a foreign and distant country alone. He was an adventurer, an entrepreneur. His individualism also gained many profits not only to himself but also to his countrymen and government. While he visited Constantinople, he was able to integrate these American values with the Ottoman traditions. Although at some events he misinterpreted Ottoman actions, he was quick to learn the functions of the Ottoman government. Forming and maintaining good relations with a high bureaucrat who had an influence over the Sultan was essential in Ottoman diplomacy. Offley gained the friendship of Hüsrev Paşa, whose interest into Americans began at Bainbridge's first visit to Constantinople. Offley cultivated this friendship and applied to it in cases of need. None of the other American merchants who did business in Smyrna, lived there

for a period of time or settled there achieved this. It probably was because of their motives. For Offley, the business in Smyrna was more than securing his own future. He desired to lead a comfortable life in his old age through his savings but he also wished to furnish his sons a good capital to enable them to establish their own businesses. In this respect it was not a temporary business. Although in the first years of his arrival he thought he would eventually turn back to the US, as early as 1815, he was so content with the business that he wrote to his sister “I know too well the uncertainty of this world to say this is the plan from which I shall not vary.”⁵⁸⁴ Especially after he got married in 1819 and realized he might never turn back, Offley strengthened his stance in Smyrna through his acquaintances.

Besides political motives, Offley gained the respect of fellow Americans, the Levantine community and the Ottomans. The Ottomans considered him as the representative and the head of the American community, treated him with respect and esteem. The Americans benefitted from his services, his hospitality and assistance, which he conducted even before he was officially appointed consul in 1824. These peculiarities were mentioned in their letters, travel narratives, or official reports. David Offley came to Smyrna thinking of the future he could give to his children, and although his business went very well until 1820, due to Greek Revolution, piracies, competition emerged after the establishment of new trade houses, the business slowed down. Moreover, he had now a new family to think about. Thus, although it was less than what he expected, Offley still could aid his sons financially to start a business on their own.

⁵⁸⁴ David Offley to Mary Offley, September 28, 1815, Smyrna, “Levantine Heritage.”

Moreover, he left his name as his legacy. After Offley's death in 1838, his son from his first marriage David W. Offley became Smyrna consul. He performed this duty for eight years and following his death in 1846, his son from his second marriage Edward S. Offley became consul. Not only in 1838 and 1846, but also during Edward S. Offley's consulate, the State Department received many letters from American community entangled in business in Smyrna recommending others for the post.⁵⁸⁵ Appointment of Edward S. Offley was especially criticized; he was accused of not being an American since his mother was a Greek Ottoman, of growing up in Smyrna not in America, not speaking English and of believing in Greek religion.⁵⁸⁶ This kind of criticisms was too burdensome that the State Department conducted a research about Edward's integrity, and only after gathering positive answers from William H. Stiles, American Minister to Vienna, and Dabney S. Carr, Minister resident in İstanbul, his appointment was approved. In the letters recommending Edward S. Offley, his father's efforts, achievements and his good memory were specifically emphasized.

8.2. What Contribution did the Smyrna Trade make to the US and world economy?

Right after the peace with Britain, commerce with China began and the first vessel was sent in 1784. In 1789 there were fifteen vessels, hoisted with the American flag in

⁵⁸⁵ These letters can be found in M 873, Roll 8, recommending Blackler Francis, Joseph Langdon; M 687, Roll 16 recommending Hooker Thomas; M 687, Roll 31 Stith Griffin applying for the position, NARA.

⁵⁸⁶ The letters both criticizing and favoring Edward S. Offley can be found in M 967, Roll 33; M 873, Roll 64, NARA.

Canton, “a greater number than from any other nation, except Great Britain.”⁵⁸⁷ The British had sixty-one vessels that year in Canton.⁵⁸⁸ American vessels not only carried goods between China and America, but also involved in carrying trade to European ports, especially during the long wars between France and England. The main imports from China were teas and silks. Americans depended on foreign articles to maintain China trade, specie constituted the greatest share. The merchants tried to replace specie with other goods, but until 1827, specie dominated the American commerce with China. Beginning from 1829, the opium carried by American vessels began to be effective and in 1831, specie was almost completely abandoned.⁵⁸⁹

American merchants began to purchase Turkey opium in the early nineteenth century. While the first ships carried small parcels, the amount of opium in their overall cargoes increased quickly since it brought great profit in China market. The British had the dominance on opium trade in China and the American trade had never reached the British. Downs stated that American opium trade “was probably about one-tenth” of the British opium trade in 1830s “though more sizeable in the dozen or so years following the War of 1812.”⁵⁹⁰ Opium trade was not legal, it carried into China through smuggling, it was purchased from different European and Mediterranean ports besides Smyrna, thus there is not yet definitive numbers on the overall size, but it was enough to at least disturb the British authorities.

⁵⁸⁷ Timothy Pitkin, *A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America: Including also an Account of Banks, Manufactures and Internal Trade and Improvements* (New Haven: Durrie & Peck, 1835), 246.

⁵⁸⁸ Morse, vol. 1 of *International Relations*, 81-82.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 83-84.

⁵⁹⁰ Downs, “American Merchants,” 418.

However, Turkey opium constituted neither the greater part of the overall opium shipments to China nor in the overall American shipments. Turkey opium began to be sold in China in the season 1805-1806, in the seasons 1808-1809, 1810-1811, 1813-1814, 1814-1815, 1820-1821, 1822-1823, 1825-1826 and 1827-1828 the records show no shipment of this article. Between the years 1805 and 1830, the total amount of Turkey opium shipped to China was 5728 chests. In total of 169.399 chests including Bengal and Malwa opium brought by the EIC, the amount of Turkey opium corresponds to approximately 3.5 %.⁵⁹¹ Total value of the American imports to China between 1805 and 1830 inclusive was \$ 104.627.118. Within the overall American imports to China, total value of opium for the same years was \$ 3.874.865, which corresponds to around 3.7 %.⁵⁹²

When the numbers are considered opium trade may not seem important because American involvement in the overall opium commerce was small. The reason is that they were expelled from carrying Indian opium to China and the opium grown in Turkey was limited. Still the merchants made profit from this business. Although the prices fluctuate constantly even during the same season, the prices for 1805 give an idea of how lucrative the business was. While opium could be purchased for 2-3 \$ per pound in Smyrna, it could be sold at 10 \$ in China.⁵⁹³ Considering the difference between the purchase and sale price, it can be concluded that many opium merchants made a profit although they could never exported as much opium as the British to China.

⁵⁹¹ These numbers are calculated according to the charts given by Morse, vol. 1 of *International Relations*, 209-10.

⁵⁹² These numbers are calculated according to the charts given by Morse, vol. 1 of *International Relations*, 34.

⁵⁹³ Roberts, "Commercial Philanthropy," 374.

The importance of this trade was its function in the commerce with China. As explained in previous chapters, China was a self-sustained country and thus did not need to import. Chinese teas and silk, however, were in demand both in the US and Europe. Like the British, American merchants used quicksilver and specie in their transactions. When the British discovered that opium could replace those items, they began to import large amounts. Although opium was declared contraband by the Chinese government, it was smuggled into the country and became an essential item long before the Americans entered into commerce with China.

When the American commerce with China began in 1784, the merchants used specie, which became a disturbance especially after the War of 1812. According to a report prepared and presented in the House of Representatives on January 16, 1819 by Mr. Lowndes, “there is no complaint more generally made than that of a want of specie in any shape.” One of the prominent reasons of this want was the American trade to China; as Lowndes stated “The whole amount of our current coin is not probably more than double of that which has been exported in a single year to India, including China in the general term.”⁵⁹⁴ Turkey opium was used in the China trade to replace specie. Tyler Dennett quoted from a Boston merchant whom he thought Thomas H. Perkins to explain the role of Turkey opium:

There has been a strong prejudice existing against the China trade in this country, under the idea that specie was necessarily exported to procure cargoes from China. So far is this from the fact, *in our case*, that, although our importations have averaged more than a million dollars annually for several years, in the products of China, of which silks and nankeens form a considerable portion, that we have not shipped a Spanish dollar for the past *three years* to China. Our funds arise from the export of opium from Turkey,

⁵⁹⁴ “Coins, Foreign and Domestic,” House Document 551, 15th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 11 of *American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive of the Congress of the United States* (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), 399.

British goods from Great Britain, lead and quick-silver from Gibraltar, and the same articles on a large scale from Trieste.⁵⁹⁵

One of the main reasons Thomas H. Perkins dominated the Turkey opium trade was to use that article in China market. The other merchants who could procure less Turkey opium had to depend on other articles and specie, but they also gained profit from it.

Opium was not the only Turkey product that the Americans had shown an interest; raisins, figs, oil of roses were among the many purchased. In return American vessels brought coffee and sugar mainly, which had almost all the time a ready market and were two of the most favored food products.⁵⁹⁶ Although Egyptian sugar was of a higher quality, Ottomans preferred white sugar brought by Americans, as it seemed better.⁵⁹⁷ The first American vessel that purchased Mocha coffee was the *Recovery* in 1798, soon after they began to carry it to Smyrna and entered into “a thriving commerce” between these two ports as it was used for the exchange of opium.⁵⁹⁸

Besides the direct contribution to the US economy, American entanglement with Turkey opium taught them the opium business in China. As the Chinese government took strict measures against the smuggling from time to time, the smuggling system changed and adapted to the new conditions. American merchants followed the British in most cases until they set their own system. The experiences they gained served

⁵⁹⁵ Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, 20. Although Dennett did not give a reference for this quotation, it was probably taken from the article T. H. Perkins wrote in the *Boston Daily Advertiser* in 23 December 1823.

⁵⁹⁶ Küçükkalay, *Osmanlı İthalatı*, 67.

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid., 134.

⁵⁹⁸ Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, 30.

them especially after the EIC's monopoly in India was dissolved. American merchants began to trade Indian opium after 1834.

Turkey opium became an essential import item in the East Indies, too. Although it did not attract the attention of the American merchants as much as China, the East Indies market offered the Americans a side door they could use in cases of strict control in China, or when the China market was slow or saturated. It was profitable enough to attract the attention of the British, who considered an investment in that market.

The American merchants who made fortunes from commerce with China reflected it to the society in American society. When Perkins dissolved the firm in 1838 he was among the wealthiest Americans in New England, and he made a good use of some of his wealth for philanthropic means.⁵⁹⁹ T. H. Perkins opened the Perkins School for the Blind, Stephen Girard started the first private Bank of the United States in order to encourage small businesses and merchants at the beginning of their careers, and left most of his fortune for the use of helping the poor and Girard College was established in accordance with his will, William Wagner, who began working as a counting house clerk for Girard in 1814, spent time and Money for philanthropic means, too, and also founded Wagner Free Institute of Science in Philadelphia.

⁵⁹⁹ Briggs, vol. 1 of *Cabot Family*, 441.

8.3. What contribution did the First Treaty of Amity and Commerce make to US diplomacy and US relations with the Ottoman Empire?

In his farewell address George Washington addressed to the public and diplomats about the role of the US in its future relations and urged neutrality. The European relations, he warned, would have a devastating effect over the US, and the relations should be kept at the level of commerce; the US government followed this isolationist policy, in terms of its relations with the European powers, and in this case with the Ottoman Empire, until the First World War. In its approach to the Porte, the American government emphasized this and warned the commissioners to retrieve from any kind of political entanglement. This was the main reason behind the rejection of Rhind's secret article; it bound the US government officially. Although the Senate rejected the secret article, in accordance with his instructions Porter guaranteed to offer his services and advice to the Porte in case the Ottomans decided to order war vessels to be built in the US. This was never put into use though, because after Henry Eckford brought his ship to Constantinople and sold it, he was employed by the Sultan to work in *Tersane-i Amire*.⁶⁰⁰ Eckford brought with him around eighty Americans and they were given a separate department for the purpose of building war vessels for the Ottoman navy. Although Eckford died in two years following his arrival, Foster Rhodes took over his job.

However, American isolationist policy did not meet the expectations of the Ottomans. During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire fought with all the Great Powers. Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798 and broke the long-term good relations with France; the Ottoman Empire fought with Great Britain in 1807-1809; but sought for the aid of

⁶⁰⁰ Ottoman shipbuilding yard.

these two powers against Russia in the wars in 1787-1792 and 1806-1812. The Ottomans also had to deal with its non-Muslims subjects who were influenced by the nationalistic ideology after the French Revolution. The insurrection of the Serbian subjects at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the Greeks subjects in the late 1810s occupied Ottomans, and the Great Powers were involved in these, and the following rebellions.

In this conflicted situation, the Ottomans considered luring American influence and using it in the balance politics that the European powers were conducting over the Ottoman Empire, but did not force it seeing the reluctance of the US government to play a role in European politics. This would work against the American enterprise in the Ottoman shipbuilding yards. Although the Americans were effectively building a new Ottoman navy, they were soon replaced by the British engineers and shipbuilders. One of the reasons was to guarantee British aid.

The Ottomans also considered the US government's stance as an advantage. Being geographically and politically distant, the US would not claim influence over the Ottoman lands, unlike the European powers. Thus Ottoman approach to American government was at least free from suspicions about the latter's plans for the future of the Empire. This issue would be brought up later during the Independence War, the possibility of the American mandate and later during the Second World War. Considering the American politics were safer when compared to European powers, the Turkish office holders benefitted from American isolationism during the war, using it as a tool for balancing the Great Powers.

The US government used the treaty with the Porte in a different manner. There were two conditions that the American commissioners insisted upon during the

negotiations; the first one was the right to trade in the Black Sea, and the second one was to obtain the most favored nation status. These two were interrelated. The European countries had the right to sail in and out of the Black Sea but the conditions of passing through depended on their agreements. For example, Sicily had to pay a passage fee, while England and France did not. During the negotiations, both Offley and Rhind rejected this clause, since it was against the treatment of the most favored nation status.

The second item of discussions was the rate of tax to be collected from the vessels. Both British and French merchants were paying 3 % duty. The Americans merchants also paid this amount during the early years of commerce benefitting from the British protection. During the negotiations, Ottoman office holders aimed to increase this amount to 4-5 %, arguing that this increase would benefit Ottoman treasury, especially considering the inflation and devaluation of the Ottoman currency. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire would not benefit from a treaty with the US otherwise; it was the American merchants who would conduct the commerce, and the only thing the Ottomans could benefit financially was through the customs duty collected from imports and exports. None of the commissioners objected to the reasonableness of this wish. The treaties between the Porte and the other European countries would expire in the following years, and the required changes could be inserted into their treaties based on the amount specified in the treaty with the US. Even putting a secret article was considered; it would state that after the renewal of treaties, the amount paid by the Americans and other European countries would be equal. Although the secret article issue was dropped, at least in terms of tax amount, the insistence of the commissioners on the most favored nation status is emphasized here. They made it clear that the main concern was not the amount, and the Ottoman

officers could increase the amount to obtain the most advantageous result, so long as it put the US at the same level with the other most favored nations.

After the independence, the American government began to develop very quickly. As a result of its relations with the Barbary States it obtained a powerful navy; powerful enough to win the War of 1812, convoy its merchants in the Mediterranean, attract the attention of the Porte. After the Act of Confederacy, it reorganized the political system and rearranged the jurisdiction of states, to accumulate more power to the federal government; its merchants travelled to the distant parts of the world and established a network of commerce. However, being absent from the international politics, the US had to prove its position in the international arena. The treaty with the Ottoman Empire gave the American government that opportunity.

Recognizing the American government among the most favored nations, the Ottoman Empire extended the same concessions given to Great Britain and France to the US. Although the American government managed to obtain a treaty on its terms, since it did not play a role in the international relations of the Porte, the most favored nation status was an item on paper. In terms of Americans' rights in the Ottoman lands, however, the treaty provided them with extensive rights.

One of the advantages of the relations with the Ottoman Empire can be seen in the diplomatic offices. None of the American representatives who had been in the Ottoman Empire during the first period knew the language. Thus they used non-Muslim Ottoman subjects as dragomans, like Nicolas Navoni. After Luther Bradish appointed him as dragoman, Navoni was involved in the communication process between the US and the Porte. Especially after Rhind's arrival to Constantinople, Navoni became a part of the negotiations. His role and the suspicions towards him

were explained in the previous chapter. Whether he used American negotiations or directed the parties for his own benefits is unknown, but the need of training educated diplomatic staff that knew the Eastern languages began to be felt by the Americans. One of the first trained staff was Hodgson, who also accompanied Porter to Constantinople and after Navoni's dismissal, he performed the duties of a translator.

8.4 How did they affect cultural perceptions? What was their legacy?

As much as commercial initiatives led to the establishment of diplomatic ties, the cultural interactions became more active in the Ottoman-American relations in the following years. Missionary activities were the most influential of all. After the establishment of American Board of Foreign Missions, the first missionaries were sent to British India, and soon after the interest of the administration was drawn into the Ottoman dominions and in 1820 Pliny Fisk and Levi Parsons arrived to Smyrna. Many followed these first missionaries and they spread through Asia Minor and Middle East. While Parsons went to Jerusalem at the end of that year, Fisk spent more time in Smyrna and the Greek Islands. Following the death of Parsons in 1822, Jonas King in 1823, Elnathan Gridley and Josiah Brewer in 1826 came to Smyrna.⁶⁰¹ In the previous chapters accounts from Fisk's letters were given to show the warm welcome offered by the merchant community in their arrival to Smyrna. Missionaries spent time in the merchants' houses, both in the city and country, used their libraries, they travelled to historical sights together. One of these visits was to Ephesus,

⁶⁰¹ Dilşen İnce Erdoğan, "Amerikalı Protestan Misyonerlerin Raporlarında İzmir İstasyonunun Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri (1820-1900)," *Karadeniz Araştırmaları* 33 (2012), 101.

accompanied by George Perkins, Thomas and Joseph Langdon, all of whom were Smyrna agents doing business with American commercial firms dealing opium.⁶⁰²

ABCFM chose Smyrna because it was the commercial center, and the missionaries could spread into the country from that point much easier. The other reason was that Smyrna would enable the missionaries to obtain the materials and means they needed. In his article analyzing the relationship between the American missionaries and the American merchants trading opium to China in the first part of the nineteenth century, Timothy Roberts emphasized the importance of Smyrna for the missionaries.⁶⁰³ “The active commerce [that] is carried on from the many islands and ports in the Levant ... furnish the means of conveying books and tracts to distant and populous regions.”⁶⁰⁴

Besides being a mercantile center port of Asia Minor, Smyrna was also an advantageous place to initiate the missionary activities due to its population. The city inhabited Levantine communities from different parts of the world, as well as non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, mainly Jews, Greeks and Armenians who were acting as the medium men between the Anatolian producers and foreign agents. While the missionaries targeted non-Protestant Christians, as well as Greeks and Turks at the beginning, their experiences would lead them to focus their energies on the Armenians in the following years. Yet they addressed the whole Christian population at their first arrival. Especially through the end of the Greek Revolution, increasing

⁶⁰² Roberts, “Commercial Philanthropy,” 378.

⁶⁰³ Ibid., 375.

⁶⁰⁴ *Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Boston, 1821), qtd. in Roberts, “Commercial Philanthropy,” 375.

poverty among the Greeks led the missionaries to focus on this group and they opened a school for poor and orphan Greek girls.⁶⁰⁵

Until the missionaries established their own institutions, they used the facilities of the American merchants. Besides Langdons and Perkinses, missionaries also had a close relationship with David Offley. While missionaries faced with trouble in the first years and drew reaction from the public, they were able to overcome these difficulties with the help of Offley.⁶⁰⁶ He helped not only as a consul but also opened his estate to the use of missionaries many times for religious services. “In a pattern that would be repeated elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, missionaries relied on the influence of traders to practice what became known as ‘Christian philanthropy’, the line between commerce and humanitarian benevolence blurring in the process.”⁶⁰⁷ After the treaty, the US government opened several consulates in different parts of the Ottoman lands and the missionaries went with them and used their facilities the same way they used Offley’s property. Offley was a Quaker but like the other merchants he offered service to the missionaries, not only as a merchant but also as the representative of the Americans in Smyrna.

While the missionaries tried to spread Protestantism and raised their voices for temperance movement, influenced by the Great Awakening, Roberts has pointed to the lack of criticism against opium commerce. Opium’s devastating effect on the Chinese people were known and made an issue in several American newspapers, especially by the missionaries who went to China. As the missionaries established

⁶⁰⁵ Erdoğan, “Amerikalı Protestan Misyonerler,” 102-3.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid., 103.

⁶⁰⁷ Roberts, “Commercial Philanthropy,” 379.

strong relations with opium merchants in Smyrna and benefitted from them, they kept their silence on this issue.

One other reason of this silence was that the missionaries in Smyrna did not witness the generally narrated negative effects of this article. Besides the medicinal purposes, few people smoked opium, and although how many of them were addicted to the article was unknown, the opium use in Ottoman lands was very low. The same was valid for the use of alcohol. The missionaries were surprised, wrote Roberts, when they realized that the Muslims in the Ottoman Empire did not consume alcoholic beverages and even used this fact as a rhetorical item in the temperance movement.⁶⁰⁸

The formation of a different opinion about Turks after the Americans visited Ottoman lands was discussed earlier. Although the Turks had never been considered as heathens since they believed in a monotheistic religion, they still had a negative image in the US. The missionaries expressed their opinions in the newspapers, the travelers stated their experiences in their narratives that were published and widely read in the US, the diplomats wrote positive accounts about the Porte, even during the Greek Revolution the actions of the Turks were defended from time to time. Although these affirmative accounts did not do much to change the general image of the Turks, by the 1850s a small but strong American community had been established in Ottoman lands. It was no longer limited with Smyrna; through merchants, missionaries and diplomats Americans spread to several cities, most importantly Constantinople.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., 382.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Anglophobia was high in America. Arriving in Smyrna right before the War of 1812, David Offley also shared enmity and suspicion towards the British government, thinking that it would try to impair American business in and diplomatic relations with foreign countries. The British attitude towards Americans in the Barbary States, the *Calumet* and *America* event, conflicts during the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812, and impressment of the American seamen all kept Anglophobia alive. Thus when Offley came to Smyrna, one of the first things he tried was freeing American shipping from the protection of the British consulate. He successfully obtained concessions from Ottoman office holders, without the interference of the American government. The other American merchants, who lost the protection of the British consulate after the War of 1812, followed his initiative.

The Capudan Pacha considered him as the American consul in Smyrna, even before the American government appointed him officially. His good conduct, success and

diligence earned him the respect not only of the American merchants doing business in with Smyrna, but also Ottoman office holders and the Levantine community. When other merchants or missionaries came to Smyrna, they found Offley's assistance at their service. The Americans blended into the local Levantine society and formed a small community that continues up to this day.

The growing American community also attracted American travelers into Ottoman lands, and almost all of them visited Constantinople and Smyrna, the first one the capital of the Empire, the second was the pearl of the East. The accounts of these travelers revealed the social life of the Levantines and also reflected the prejudiced approach of the Americans towards the Turks and the Ottoman lands, and how their opinions evolved and changed after their visit. The negative image of the Turks that was created as a result of American experiences in the Barbary States had changed but to what extent these new accounts reached and spread to the general public in America is a question in need of further study.

With this personal arrangement, Offley put American commerce almost at the level of the most favored nations. American commerce had already been thriving and Offley's arrangement enabled the merchants to conduct business under more beneficial conditions by paying a 3 % duty, instead of a 6 %. It enabled merchants to conduct business under the protection of the Ottoman government, which removed the necessity of paying dragomanage and consulage duties to the British consulate. Offley also worked as a resident merchant, regulating the business of American firms, purchasing the required products with better prices. One of the most profitable products was the Turkey opium because of its ties to the China market. It was one of the most demanded products in China that could be used in transactions instead of

specie. American merchants were barred from carrying Indian opium to China by the British EIC. After 1805, the first American vessel purchased Turkey opium in Smyrna and the number of vessels and amount of Turkey opium increased, except the years when the American commerce was interrupted due to the wars.

The growing business led to the domination of the trade by the company of Thomas Handasy Perkins, and after 1820, Boston companies increased their share in Turkey opium business. This left the Philadelphia and Baltimore companies, which initiated this trade, out of the competition, while some of the companies within the Boston group became among the largest companies in China.

Another market where Turkey opium was sold was the East Indies. Especially when China market was glutted or restricted due to the Chinese government's regulations, the East Indies offered a safe market for Turkey opium. Stephen Girard was one of the most famous Philadelphia merchants who conducted business in the East Indies, even after he retrieved from sending the article to China market. Many historians have studied American trade to China and the function of Turkey opium, but the East Indies market is still an untouched field that deserves the attention of researchers.

The Turkey opium network was not limited to Smyrna. It was the first port where the article reached and sold, but it travelled to other Mediterranean and European ports through resident agents and American merchants preferred to obtain the article from these secondary ports since it took more time to go to Smyrna.

Furthermore, sometimes it became a dangerous voyage, particularly during the Greek Revolution. The network spread through Malta, Trieste, Gibraltar, Amsterdam, and London. Resident merchants in Smyrna, like David Offley, were used to transfer the product from Smyrna to these secondary ports, too. This dissertation used the

documents of prominent American merchants who conducted their business in the Turkey opium trade, and revealed some of the ties between Smyrna and the secondary ports. Further research would enlighten the details of this business.

The tie between commerce and diplomatic relations is one of the major points of this dissertation. During the early nineteenth century, American merchants in foreign countries also acted officially, and sometimes unofficially like Offley, as consuls. While Offley's arrangement was mainly commercial, in terms of defining the status of Americans within Ottoman lands, it can be considered a diplomatic arrangement. Offley also encouraged the American government to sign a treaty with the Porte in order to formalize relations. The other merchants also shared Offley's opinion on this issue, and like the example of Perkins during the Greek Revolution, became involved in diplomatic decisions. After 1820, Turkey opium constituted an essential part of Perkins' business, thus the government's actions would affect him more than any other merchant entangled in the Smyrna business.

This dissertation focuses on Turkey opium, but American commerce in Smyrna was not limited to opium. Figs, raisins, oil of roses all constituted an important part of the cargoes, while Americans brought mainly coffee and white sugar, which were in high demand. American vessels were also involved in carrying trade among European and Mediterranean ports, especially after the second half of 1820 between Smyrna and Constantinople. Although American commerce with the Ottoman Empire was limited, it was a growing business and thus deserves the attention of historians. Further research can be conducted on the overall system of American trade in Smyrna or in a more general sense with the Ottoman Empire. The influence of American commerce

on Ottoman production and domestic trade is also another field, which the historians can focus on through the use of Ottoman archives.



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APPENDICES

US Vessels in Smyrna 1804-1822

Arrival Date	Departure Date	Where from	Where to	Name of ship	Captain / Master/Supercargo	Belong to	Consigned to	Value of Cargo
			Boston	Schooner William	Parsons (Captain)	Derby	Lee & Sons	⁶⁰⁹
				Brig Katy	Little/Cattle? (Captain)	Derby	Lee & Sons	⁶¹⁰
20 Dec. 1804	6 March 1805	Philadelphia	Batavia	Brig <i>Pennsylvania</i>	Hugh McPherson (Master)			⁶¹¹
5 July 1805	2 November 1805	Baltimore	Canton	Brig <i>Eutaw</i>	L. Gantt (Master)			⁶¹²
17 July 1805	5 November 1805	Baltimore	Trieste & Baltimore	Brig <i>Spartan</i>	Charles Chamberland (Master)			⁶¹³
24 August 1805	25 October 1805	Philadelphia	Leghorn & Philadelphia	Schooner <i>Hazard</i>	John Williams (Master)			⁶¹⁴
30	26	Phila	Legh	Brig	Samuel			⁶¹⁵

⁶⁰⁹ Letter date 25 Jan. 1801, Smyrna from Lee & Sons to Messrs. Derbys, West & Pickman

⁶¹⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹¹ Robert Wilkinson to Secretary of State first on 15 January 1806, then duplicate on 29 April 1806, T 238, NARA.

⁶¹² Ibid.

⁶¹³ Ibid.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid.

September 1805	November 1805	Philadelphia	Leghorn & Canton	<i>Sylph</i>	Clarke (Master)			
18 October 1805	29 November 1805	Philadelphia	Leghorn and Canton	Brig <i>Hibernia</i>	William Morrison (Master)			616
4 March 1806	21/25 March 1806	Philadelphia & Leghorn	Leghorn	<i>Dolphin</i>	Benjamin Larabee (?) (Master)			617
27/28 April 1806	4 November 1806	Philadelphia		Ship <i>Glory</i>	Thomas Moore (Master)			618
		Baltimore		Brig <i>Phoebe</i>	Wood Abraham (Master)			619
		Philadelphia		Brig <i>Globe</i>	John Williams (Master ?)			620
		Boston		Brig <i>Acorn</i>	Laben Folger (Master)			621
		Boston		Brig <i>Joseph</i>	Isaac (Elwill?) (Master)			622
	December 1806	Boston		Brig <i>Joseph</i>				623
			Phila	Brig	Joseph L.			624

⁶¹⁶ Ibid.

⁶¹⁷ Robert Wilkinson to State Department, Smyrna, 29 April 1806, T 238, NARA.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid.

⁶¹⁹ Robert Wilkinson to State Department, Smyrna, 26 June 1806, T 238, NARA.

⁶²⁰ Ibid.

⁶²¹ Robert Wilkinson to State Department, Smyrna, 22 September 1806, T 238, NARA.

⁶²² Robert Wilkinson to State Department, Smyrna, 22 October 1806. T 238, NARA.

⁶²³ Robert Wilkinson to State Department, Smyrna, T 238, NARA.

⁶²⁴ Robert Wilkinson to State Department, Smyrna, 15 September 1810, T 238, NARA.

			delphia	<i>Expectation</i>	Kay (Captain)			
			Salem	<i>Brig Resolution</i>	Samuel Rea (Captain & Master)			625
		Mocha		<i>Brig Pennsylvania Packet</i>	Henry Harrison (Master of Philadelphia)			626
		Liverpool		<i>Brig Albion</i>	G. L. Carter (Master)			627
3 december 1810		Baltimore		<i>Schooner Valona</i>	James Curtis (Master)			628
29 December 1810		Havana		<i>Brig Sylphe</i>	Thomas Arnold (Master)			629
August 1811		Philadelphia		<i>Brig Expectation</i>	Joseph P. Kay (Master)	Woodmas & Offley		404,597 piastr es (P) / 75 aspes ? (AS) 630
		Liverpool		Ship	Joseph			631

⁶²⁵ Robert Wilkinson to State Department, Smyrna, 15 September 1810, T 238, NARA, and from same to same, Smyrna, 20 October 1810, T 238, NARA.

⁶²⁶ Robert Wilkinson to State Department, Smyrna, 20 October 1810, T 238, NARA.

⁶²⁷ Ibid.

⁶²⁸ Robert Wilkinson to State Department, Smyrna, 29 December 1810, T 238, NARA.

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

⁶³⁰ Robert Wilkinson to State Department, Smyrna, 16 March 1811, T 238, NARA, and Charles Folsom to William Bainbridge, Commander in Chief of the Naval Forces of the United States in the Mediterranean Sea, US Brig Spark, in Quarantine, Port Mahon, 18 December, 1820. Bainbridge transmitted Folsom's report to Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy enclosed in US ship Columbus, Port Mahon, 10th January, 1821, M125, Roll 70, Doc. 16-5/16-7, NARA. It will be referred as Folsom's Report from now on.

⁶³¹ Robert Wilkinson to State Department, Smyrna, 20 May 1811, T 238, NARA.

		rpoo l (Bef ore Live rpoo l, went to Lisb on & Malt a)		<i>Lewis</i> (?)	Lawrence (Master)			
August 1811		Balti more		<i>Indepe ndence</i>			Wood mas & Offley	130, 012 P/ 07 AS ⁶³²
August 1811	19 Octob er 1811	Phila delp hia		Brig <i>Eclips e</i> of Baltim ore	Mills (Captain)		Wood mas & Offley	157,5 04 P / 75 AS; Same vessel s came back to Smyr na port the same mont h with 418,4 57 P / 16 AS ⁶³³
August 1811		Balti more		<i>Ameri ca</i>			Wood mas & Offley	263,7 21 P / 97 AS ⁶³⁴

⁶³² Folsom's Report.

⁶³³ Benjamin Shreve to Joseph Peabody and Gideon Tucker, November 18, 1811, "Instructions, Invoices and Accounts of Second Voyage in Brig *George*" BSP and Folsom's Report.

⁶³⁴ Folsom's Report.

September 1811		Philadelphia		<i>Mary</i>			Woodmas & Offley	356,644 P / 81 AS ⁶³⁵
15/16 October 1811		Salem		<i>Brig Resolution</i>	Samuel Rea (Captain)		Woodmas & Offley	166,253 P / 07 AS ⁶³⁶
October 1811		Baltimore		<i>Herald</i>			Woodmas & Offley	103,451 P / 36 AS ⁶³⁷
November 1811		Philadelphia		<i>Farmer</i>			Woodmas & Offley	52,607 P / 51 AS ⁶³⁸
February 1812		Baltimore		<i>Brig Aid</i>			Woodmas & Offley	39,979 P / 41 AS ⁶³⁹
February 1812		Baltimore		<i>America</i>			Woodmas & Offley	189,939 P / 45 AS ⁶⁴⁰
February 1812		Philadelphia		<i>Hannah & Sally</i>			Woodmas & Offley	226,440 P / 93 AS ⁶⁴¹
February 1812		Philadelphia		<i>Dolphin</i>			Woodmas & Offley	326,634 P / 50 AS ⁶⁴²
February 1812		Philadelphia		<i>Expectation</i>			Woodmas &	288,894 P /

⁶³⁵ Ibid.

⁶³⁶ Benjamin Shreve to Joseph Peabody and Gideon Tucker, November 18, 1811, "Instructions, Invoices and Accounts of Second Voyage in Brig *George*" BSP and Folsom's Report.

⁶³⁷ Folsom's Report.

⁶³⁸ Ibid.

⁶³⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid.

⁶⁴² Ibid.

		hia					Offley	30 AS ⁶⁴³
Februar y 1812		Phila delp hia		<i>Eclips e</i>			Wood mas & Offley	143, 853 P / 63 AS ⁶⁴⁴
Februar y 1812		Braz il		<i>Dosh</i>			Wood mas & Offley	129,9 55 P / 68 AS ⁶⁴⁵
April 1812		Hav anna h		<i>Amphi trite</i>			Wood mas & Offley	190,5 63 P / 13 AS ⁶⁴⁶
June 1812		St. Bart holo mew s		<i>Grace Ann Green</i>			Wood mas & Offley	93,49 9 P / 49 AS ⁶⁴⁷
June 1812		Bost on		<i>Ship Ann</i>			Van Lenne pp & Co	320,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁴⁸
June 1812		Bost on		<i>Brig Hanna h</i>			Van Lenne pp & Co	130,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁴⁹
June 1812		Bost on		<i>Ship John Adams</i>			Lee & sons	180,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁵⁰
May 1815		Phila delp		<i>Brig Agent</i>			Wood mas &	154,9 72 P /

⁶⁴³ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid.

		hia					Offley	18 AS ⁶⁵¹
August 1815		Salem & Mocha		Brig <i>Coromandels</i>			Van Lennep & Co	342,125 P / 20 AS ⁶⁵²
August 1815		Havannah		Schooner <i>Lawrence</i>			Van Lennep & Co	250,000 p ⁶⁵³
September 1815		New York		Brig <i>Boxer</i>			Woodmas & Offley	300,000 p ⁶⁵⁴
February 1816		Philadelphia		Brig <i>Only Son</i>			Woodmas & Offley	143,655 p ⁶⁵⁵
May 1816		Sumatra & Salem		Ship <i>Augustus</i>			Woodmas & Offley	301,051 p ⁶⁵⁶
June 1816		New York		Brig <i>Boxer</i>			Woodmas & Offley	321,694 p ⁶⁵⁷
August 1816		Baltimore		Ship <i>Wabash</i>			Woodmas & Offley	265,410 p ⁶⁵⁸
September 1816		Philadelphia		Brig <i>Only Son</i>			Woodmas & Offley	164,510 p ⁶⁵⁹
September 1816		Philadelphia		Brig <i>Eliza</i>			Woodmas & Offley	256,708 p ⁶⁶⁰

⁶⁵¹ Ibid.

⁶⁵² Ibid.

⁶⁵³ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid.

September 1816		New York		Brig <i>Alexander</i>			Van Lennep & Co	200,000 p ⁶⁶¹
November 1816		Boston		Schooner <i>Havre Packet</i>			Perkins Brothers	70,000 p ⁶⁶²
February 1817		Boston		Brig <i>Ocean</i>			Perkins Brothers	100,000 p ⁶⁶³
February 1817		Baltimore		Brig <i>Brazilian</i>			Van Lennep & Co	750,000 p ⁶⁶⁴
1817		Baltimore & Naples		Ship <i>Meridian</i>			Woodmas & Offley	350,000 p ⁶⁶⁵
1817		Havana		Schooner <i>Midas</i>			Van Lennep & Co	310,000 p ⁶⁶⁶
1817		Baltimore		Schooner <i>Revenge</i>			Woodmas & Offley	580,000 p ⁶⁶⁷
1817		Philadelphia		Brig <i>Maryanne</i>			Woodmas & Offley	145,651 p ⁶⁶⁸
1817		Boston		Brig <i>Bocca Tigris</i>			Woodmas & Offley	426,000 p ⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶⁶² Ibid.

⁶⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid.

1817		Phila delp hia		Brig <i>Levant</i>			Wood mas & Offley	317,6 80 P ⁶⁷⁰
1817		Balti more		Ship <i>Eduar do</i>			Wood mas & Offley	413,0 00 P ⁶⁷¹
1817		New York		Brig <i>Aid</i>			Wood mas & Offley	218,5 00 P ⁶⁷²
1817		New York		Brig <i>Alexan der</i>			Wood mas & Offley	317,0 00 P ⁶⁷³
1817		New York		Schoo ner <i>Vestal</i>			Wood mas & Offley	86,00 0 P ⁶⁷⁴
1817		Bost on		Brig <i>Ocean</i>			Wood mas & Offley	120,0 00 P ⁶⁷⁵
1817		Phila delp hia		Brig <i>Eclips e</i>			Wood mas & Offley	450,0 00 P ⁶⁷⁶
1817		Phila delp hia		<i>Eliza</i>			Wood mas & Offley	270,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁷⁷
1817		Hav anna h		<i>August us</i>			Lee & Sons	600,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁷⁸
1817		Bost on		(<i>Sally</i>)			Van Lenne p &	300,0 00 P / 00

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.

⁶⁷² Ibid.

⁶⁷³ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid.

							Co	AS
7 Februar y 1818	14 Febru ary 1818	New York & Gibr altar	Canto n	Brig <i>Peddle r</i>	Jonathan Eldredge (Master, of New York)	John Jaco b Asto r	Wood mas & Offley	168,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁷⁹
1818		Balti more		Ship <i>Excha nge</i>			Wood mas & Offley	397,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁸⁰
1818		New York		Brig <i>Boxer</i>			Wood mas & Offley	121,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁸¹
1818		Bost on		Brig <i>Ocean</i>			Wood mas & Offley	117,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁸²
1818		New York		Brig <i>Miner va</i>			Wood mas & Offley	220,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁸³
1818		Balti more		Brig <i>Homer</i>			Wood mas & Offley	530,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁸⁴
1818		Bost on		Brig <i>Rous</i>			Perkin s Brothe rs	200,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁸⁵
1819		New York		Brig <i>Miner va</i>			Wood mas & Offley	182,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁸⁶

⁶⁷⁹ Robert Wilkinson to State Department, Smyrna, 18 March 1818, T 238, NARA, and Folsom's Report.

⁶⁸⁰ Folsom's Report.

⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

⁶⁸² Ibid.

⁶⁸³ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid.

1819		Boston		Ship <i>Leopold</i>			Perkins Brothers	250,00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁸⁷
1819		Boston		<i>Charles & Ellen</i>			Perkins Brothers	200,00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁸⁸
1819		Boston & Tires te		Ship <i>Henry</i>			Van Lennep & Co	150,00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁸⁹
1819		Baltimore		Brig <i>Octavus</i>			Woodmas & Offley	310,374 P / 24 AS ⁶⁹⁰
1819		Baltimore & Mocha		Ship <i>Emily</i>			Woodmas & Offley	960,275 P / 55 AS ⁶⁹¹
1820		Boston		Brig <i>Messenger</i>			Woodmas & Offley	554,918 P / 00 AS ⁶⁹²
1820		Baltimore		<i>Midas</i>			Woodmas & Offley	317,546 P / 00 AS ⁶⁹³
1820		New York		Brig <i>Minerva</i>			Woodmas & Offley	11,000 P / 00 AS ⁶⁹⁴
1820		Baltimore		<i>Torpedo</i>			Woodmas &	342,00 P /

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid.

⁶⁹² Ibid.

⁶⁹³ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid.

							Offley & Van Lenne p & Co.	00 AS ⁶⁹⁵
1820		Balti more		Ship <i>Emily</i>			Van Lenne p & Co.	200,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁹⁶
1820		Balti more		<i>Midas</i>			Wood mas & Offley	320,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁹⁷
1820		Bost on		Brig <i>(Luill?)</i>			Wood mas & Offley	500,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁹⁸
1820		Bost on		Ship <i>Sally Anne</i> (Two Voyag es)			Van Lenne p & Co	450,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁶⁹⁹
1820		Bost on		Brig <i>Washi ngton</i>			Perkin s Brothe rs	200,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁷⁰⁰
1820		Bost on		?			Lee & Sons	450,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁷⁰¹
1820		Bost on		<i>Fawn</i>			Lee & Sons	250,0 00 P / 00 AS ⁷⁰²

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁰¹ Ibid.

⁷⁰² Ibid.

1820		Boston		<i>Aurora</i>			Lee & Sons	150,000 P / 00 AS ⁷⁰³
1820		Boston		Schooner <i>Philadelphia</i>			Perkins Brothers	180,000 P / 00 AS ⁷⁰⁴
1820		Boston		Brig <i>G. P. Stevenson</i>			Woodmas & Offley	732,118 P ⁷⁰⁵
1820		Boston		Brig <i>Charles & Ellen</i>			Perkins Brothers	200,000 P / 00 AS ⁷⁰⁶
				Schooner <i>Young Brutus</i>	John Samuel Smith (Captain)	Thomas Stewart in Baltimore		⁷⁰⁷
	1822 (February?)			Brig <i>Leander</i>	Samuel Rea (Captain?) / Samuel Barton (on account)		Lee & Sons	⁷⁰⁸
	1822 (June)		Batavia	Brig <i>Leander</i>	Charles Raundy (Master) / Samuel R. Putnam (supercargo) / Samuel Barton (account)			⁷⁰⁹

⁷⁰³ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁷ John de Jongh to State Department, Smyrna, 8 October 1822, T 238, NARA.

⁷⁰⁸ “Opium 1” BFP.

⁷⁰⁹ “Opium 1” BFP.

US Vessels in Smyrna 1823-1831

List of arrivals and departures of American vessels from the 1st of January to the 31st of December, 1823.

Date of arrival.	Description and name of vessel.	Register burden.	Captains' names.	Coming from.	Touched at.	Place belonging to.	Number of men.	Owners' names.	Date of departure.	Destination.
1823. Jan. 2	Brig Niger	Tons. 954bs. 335 02	Wright Luce	Boston	-	Boston	10	H. Hovey, F. Stanton, W. Luce, Weston G. Luckee, and J. Sizer	Feb. 4	Boston.
5	Brig Margarita	-	B. Carter	Baltimore	-	Baltimore	-	Register not deposited	-	Baltimore.
5	Ship Sally Anne	311 70	R. B. Edes	Boston	Malta	Boston	13	David Hinckley	-	Boston.
7	Brig Pacific	-	J. Hall	Boston	-	Boston	-	Register not deposited	-	Boston.
10	Brig Otter	-	Thos. Knox	Boston	-	Boston	-	Do.	-	Boston.
13	Brig Midas	-	B. Dickinson	Baltimore	-	Baltimore	-	Do.	-	Baltimore.
17	Brig Roque	-	F. Gibbs	Salem	-	Salem	-	Do.	-	Salem.
Feb. 1	Sch'r Margaret Meade	117 68	J. M. Butler	Gibraltar	-	Philadelp'a	8	Richard Wm. Meade	Feb. 22	Philadelp'a.
May 4	Brig Torpedo	206 40	J. V. Chandler	Baltimore	-	Baltimore	12	George Patterson and William Patterson	July 1	Baltimore.
June 2	Brig Sultana	187 15	E. E. Bradshaw	Boston	-	Boston	12	Ebenezer Breed	July 18	Boston.
July 1	Brig Niger	205 02	W. Luce	Boston	-	Boston	10	H. Hovey, F. Stanton, W. Luce, G. Luckee, and J. Sizer	Sept. 10	Boston.
7	Brig Cherub	173 70	H. J. Rich	Boston	-	Boston	9	John J. Putnam	Sept. 14	Boston.
Sept. 21	Brig Laurel	112 73	John Williams	Boston	-	Boston	8	Ebenezer Breed	Sept. 29	Boston.
Oct. 18	Brig Nile	193 50	W. Hutchings	Boston	-	Boston	11	J. Black and F. Stanton	Nov. 23	Boston.
Nov. 6	Brig James and Isabella	212 75	M. Powers	Boston	Leghorn	Boston	12	Henry Gray	Nov. 29	Boston.
Dec. 11	Brig Charles	230 46	J. Batchelder	Mocha	Leghorn	Boston	13	W. B. Swett, B. Swett, T. Swett, & S. Towne	In port.	In port.
23	Brig Herald	162 19	M. Watterman	Boston	-	Duxbury	8	Ezra Weston and M. Waterman	In port.	In port.
31	Ship Sally Anne	311 70	R. B. Edes	Boston	-	Boston	13	David Hinckley	In port.	In port.

Smyrna, December 31, 1823.

DAVID OFFLEY, Con. Com. Agent United States.

List of arrivals and departures of American vessels from January 1 to December 31, 1824.

Date of arrival.	Description and name of vessel.	Tons per registration.	Captains' names.	Coming from.	Touched at.	Place belonging to.	Owners' name or names.	Date of departure.	Destination.	No. of crew.
Feb. 17	Schooner Liberty	-	E. Graves	Boston	Gibraltar	Boston	William Gray	Feb. 28	Boston	8
20	Schooner Spy	-	E. Kendrick	Boston	-	Boston	H. H. Fiske, Y. Stanton, F. Nichols, G. Hallett, J. Nickerson, H. Shelding and Van Nordick	March 16	Boston	7
Mar. 11	Brig Rubicon	143 63	J. Woodberry	Boston	Malta	Boston	Israel Thorndike	May 21	Boston	11
18	Brig Clio	179 31	E. Bradshaw	Boston	Malta	Boston	H. H. Fiske & J. Stanton, F. Nichols, J. Blake, T. Bassett, A. Crocker, E. Bacon, W. Lewis	April 9	Boston	9
19	Schooner Rampart	107 16	W. Meldrum	New York	-	New York	W. Meldrum, R. J. Offley, and J. H. Offley	12	New York	7
27	Brig Cherub	173 70	H. Rich	Boston	Malta	Boston	J. G. Putnam, M. Pratt, and H. Rich	May 5	Boston	9
May 4	Brig Midas	265 53	C. Dickinson	Baltimore	Gibraltar & Marseilles	Baltimore	John Donnell	July 31	Baltimore	14
30	Brig Lapwing	176 59	O. King	Boston	-	Boston	J. Fisher, H. Hovey, F. Stanton, T. Dunbar, O. King, G. Luke, and J. Sizer	24	Boston	9
July 6	Brig James & Isabella	212 75	M. Powers	Boston	-	Boston	Henry Gray	Oct. 5	Boston	12
26	Schooner Yellat	178 68	J. Curtis	Baltimore	-	Baltimore	Isaac McKim	7	Baltimore	12
Aug. 18	Brig Herald	162 19	M. Waterman	Boston	-	Boston	E. Weston & M. Waterman	12	Boston	8
21	Brig Susan	159 55	J. Williams	Boston	-	Boston	Ebenezer Breed	1	Boston	11
28	Brig Charles and Ellen	182 03	S. R. Gerry	Boston	Gibraltar and Malta	Boston	Henry Gray	14	Boston	11
Sept. 25	Brig Clio	179 31	F. Goodwin	Boston	-	Boston	H. H. Fiske, F. Stanton, T. Nichols, J. Blake, T. Bassett, D. Crocker, E. Bacon, and W. Lewis	9	Boston	9
Nov. 1	Brig Cherub	173 70	H. Rich	Boston	Gibraltar and Malta	Boston	J. J. Putnam, Nahaniel Pratt, and H. Rich	Dec. 1	Boston	9
1	Ship Sally Anne	311 70	R. B. Edes	Boston	Malta	Boston	David Hinckley	31	Boston	13
11	Brig Jew	186 93	C. Chase	Boston	-	Boston	W. S. Bridge and B. Fiske	20	Boston	7

DAVID OFFLEY, Com. Com. Agent United States.

SMYRNA, December 31, 1824.

List of arrivals and departures of American vessels from 1st of January to 31st of December, 1825.

Date of arrival.	Description and name of vessel.	Tons per registration.	Captains' names.	Coming from.	Touched at.	Port belonging to.	Owners' names.	Date of departure.	Destination.	Number of crew.
1825.										
Feb. 26	Brig Susan -	159	J. Williams	Boston -	Boston -	Boston -	E. Breed	Mar. 14	Boston -	10
28	Brig Friendship -	172	J. Hopkins	Cuba -	Bristol -	Bristol -	G. De Wolfe	April 12	Boston -	11
Mar. 26	Brig Otter -	158	M. Powers	Boston -	Boston -	Boston -	Henry Gray	Dec. 8	Boston -	11
30	Brig Clio -	179	T. Goodwin	Boston -	Boston -	Boston -	Horatio Fiske & others	Dec. 7	Boston -	9
Apr 21	Brig American -	199	S. Lewis	N. York -	Boston -	New York -	Henry Eckford	May 21	New York -	10
23	Brig Romp -	127	J. C. Smith	Boston -	Leghorn -	Boston -	N. B. Lombard & others	May 25	Boston -	9
May 16	Brig Ranger -	164	W. Hodge	Boston -	Napoli -	Boston -	W. S. Bridge and B. Fiske	May 28	Boston -	8
19	Brig Herald -	162	Watterman	Boston -	Malta -	Duxbury -	Ezra Weston and M. Watterman	June 11	Boston -	8
23	Brig Jew -	186	E. Chase	Boston -	-	Boston -	Samuel Wheeler	June 11	Solonica -	7
23	Brig St. Thomas -	156	G. Lane	Boston -	-	Boston -	J. J. Putnam & others	June 11	Malta -	9
23	Brig Cherub -	173	H. Rich	Boston -	Malta -	Boston -	J. J. Putnam & Pratt	July 18	Enos -	11
July 6	Brig Jew -	186	E. Chase	Salonica -	-	Boston -	Samuel Wheeler	July 30	Boston -	7
12	Ship Sally Anne -	311	R. B. Edes	Boston -	Malta -	Boston -	David Hinckley	Oct. 15	Malta -	13
13	Schooner Yellott -	178	J. Curtis	Cuba -	-	Baltimore -	I. McKim	Sept. 27	Genoa -	12
Aug. 26	Brig Cherub -	173	H. Rich	Enos -	-	Boston -	J. J. Putnam and Pratt	Aug. 28	Boston -	11
28	Brig Rambler -	187	S. Corcy	Boston -	-	Kingsion -	P. Wilson and others	Sept. 27	Chesme -	9
Sept. 23	Brig Otter -	158	M. Powers	Boston -	-	Boston -	Henry Gray	Oct. 8	Boston -	11
25	Brig Sultana -	187	J. Williams	Boston -	-	Boston -	Ebenezer Breed	Oct. 11	Boston -	11
29	Schooner Lucinda -	107	B. Hiltner	N. York -	-	New York -	S. S. & G. G. Howland	Oct. 22	New York -	7
Oct. 14	Brig Rambler -	187	S. Corcy	Chesme -	-	Kingsion -	P. Winsor and others	Oct. 17	Boston -	9
Dec. 2	Brig Herald -	162	M. Watterman	Boston -	-	Duxbury -	E. Weston and M. Watterman	Dec. 19	Boston -	8
27	Brig Susan -	159	A. Pratt	Boston -	Trieste -	Boston -	E. Breed	In port	-	9

SMYRNA, December 31, 1825.

DAVID OFFLEY, Com. Com. Agent United States.

List of arrivals and departures of American vessels from 1st of January to 31st of December, 1826.

Date of arrival.	Description and name of vessel.	Tons per register.	Captain's names.	Coming from.	Touched at.	Place belonging to.	Owners' names.	Date of departure.	Destination.	Number of crew.
1826. Feb. 26	Brig Cherub	173	H. Rich	Boston	-	Boston	J. Putman, N. Pratt, and H. Rich	Mar. 22	Boston	11
Mar. 18	Brig Romulus	250	J. Allen	Boston	Malta	Duxbury	J. Allen and S. Sampson	April 5	Boston	11
18	Ship E. A.	241	A. Clarke	Batavia	Gibraltar	Baltimore	Isaac McKim	April 15	Genoa	13
19	Brig Smyrna	162	S. Sprague	Boston	Gibraltar	Duxbury	E. Weston	April 5	Boston	13
20	Brig Seaman	181	W. Dominick	N. York	Gibraltar	Gloucester	Benj. Fiske and W. S. Bridges	April 13	New York	8
Ap'l 8	Brig General Bolivar	196	S. Cobb	Boston	Mahon	Boston	Benj. Fiske and W. S. Bridges	June 30	Boston	10
26	Brig Sultana	187	J. Williams	Boston	Gibraltar*	Boston	Ebenezer Breed	May 19	Boston	9
May 24	Brig Caspian	194	A. Gifford	Boston	Gibraltar	Boston	J. Putman and N. Pratt	June 8	Enos	11
June 27	Brig Caspian	194	A. Gifford	Enos	Gibraltar†	Boston	J. Putman and N. Pratt	July 14	Boston	12
Sept. 3	Brig Clio	179	H. Foster	Boston	Gibraltar	Boston	H. Fiske, Stanton, Thaddeus, Nicholas, & others	Oct. 7	Boston	12
11	Brig Cherub	173	H. Rich	Boston	Malta	Boston	J. Putman, N. Pratt, and H. Rich	Oct. 7	Boston	9
9	Brig Susan	159	J. Gibson	Boston	Malta	Boston	Ebenezer Breed	Oct. 13	Boston	11
10	Brig Hiram	114	T. West	N. York	Gibraltar	New York	F. Wert, C. A. Davis, & Sidney Brockey	Oct. 23	New York	9
29	Brig Smyrna	163	S. Sprague	Boston	Gibraltar	Boston	Ezra Weston	Nov. 15	Boston	8
Nov. 18	Brig Sultana	187	J. Bradford	Boston	Malta†	Boston	Ebenezer Breed	Dec. 2	Boston	11
Dec. 1	Brig Romulus	250	J. Loring	Boston	Malta	Boston	John Allen & S. Sampson	Dec. 11	Boston	11
8	Brig Suffolk	267	Milmore	N. York	Trieste	Duxbury	Joshua Blake, Hallet, & others	In port	-	9
15	Brig Ganges	171	S. Soule, jr.	Boston	-	Duxbury	Ezra Weston	In port	-	8

SMYRNA, December 31, 1826.

* Samos.

† Candia.

‡ Tunis.

DAVID OFFLEY, Com. Com. Agent United States.

List of arrivals and departures of American vessels from 1st of January to 31st of December, 1828.

Description and name of vessel.	Captains' names.	Places touched at.	Coming from.	Belonging to.	Tonnage.	Date of arrival.	Number of crew.	Owners' names.	Destination.	Date of departure.
Brig Tenedos	A. Gifford	Malta	Boston	Boston	215	Jan. 9	12	J. J. Putnam & N. Pratt	Boston	Feb. 29
Brig Samos	John Parsons	Do.	Boston	Boston	243	Feb. 15	12	Wm. Fay & J. Parsons, Jr.	Boston	April 25
Brig Camilla	R. B. Edes	Do.	Boston	Boston	233	Feb. 15	12	David Ellis & R. B. Edes	Boston	April 25
Brig Corporal Trim	H. Foster	Do.	Boston	Gloucester	167	Mar. 21	10	Winthrop Sargent	Merrellin	May 5
Brig Cherub	H. Rich	Do.	Boston	Boston	173	Mar. 18	13	J. J. Putnam & N. Pratt	Boston	July 4
Ship Emily	W. S. Coupland	Do.	Havana	Baltimore	281	July 14	14	John Donnell	Gibraltar	9
Brig Delos	N. P. Smith	Do.	Boston	Boston	160	Mar. 21	12	J. J. Putnam, Fay, and N. Pratt	Constant'ple	April 1
Brig Danube	R. B. Forbes	Do.	N. York	Boston	210	May 5	14	S. Cabot, T. H. & J. Perkins, and J. P. Cushing	Boston	May 13
Brig Delos	N. P. Smith	Do.	Constant'ple	Boston	169	May 31	12	John J. Pratt, W. Fay, and N. Pratt	Enos	Aug. 9
Brig Corporal Trim	H. Foster	Do.	Metillin	Gloucester	167	May 31	10	Winthrop Sargent	Boston	June 10
Brig Smyrna	S. F. Sprague	Do.	Boston	Duxbury	162	Aug. 3	8	Ezra Weston	Boston	Sept. 13
Brig Wizard	J. Alexander	Do.	Boston	Boston	163	Aug. 10	10	J. Sargent & P. C. Brooks	Boston	Sept. 13
Brig Tenedos	H. R. Loring	Do.	Boston	Boston	215	Aug. 11	13	J. J. Putnam and Pratt	Boston	Sept. 9
Brig Delos	N. P. Smith	Do.	Enos	Boston	160	Aug. 18	12	J. J. Putnam and Pratt	Constant'ple	Sept. 20
Brig Sultana	J. Bradford	Do.	Boston	Boston	187	Aug. 18	11	Ebenezer Breed	Boston	Oct. 6
Brig Rhine	F. Robbins	Do.	Boston	Plymouth	174	Aug. 27	8	Ezra Weston	Boston	Sept. 27
Schooner Hayti	A. Pratt	Do.	Boston	Boston	74	Aug. 29	6	Ebenezer Breed	Constant'ple	Sept. 2
Brig Ceres	S. Soule	Do.	Boston	Duxbury	175	Oct. 12	8	A. Jackson & D. Jackson	Bost. & Malta	Nov. 1
Brig Delos	N. P. Smith	Do.	Constant'ple	Boston	169	Oct. 22	12	John J. Putnam, W. Fay, and N. Pratt	Boston	Nov. 8
Schooner Hayti	A. Pratt	Do.	Constant'ple	Boston	74	Oct. 22	6	Ebenezer Breed	Salonica	Nov. 5
Brig Camilla	R. B. Edes	Do.	Boston	Boston	233	Nov. 4	12	David Ellis & R. B. Edes	Boston	Nov. 18
Brig Palestine	A. Gifford	Do.	Boston	Boston	248	Nov. 4	6	N. Pratt & J. R. Putnam	Boston	Dec. 12
Brig Samos	J. Parsons	Do.	Boston	Boston	243	Dec. 4	12	Win. Fay & J. Parsons	In port.	Dec. 12
Brig Autumn	E. S. Turner	Do.	N. York	Plymouth	181	Dec. 4	9	A. Jackson, D. Jackson, and E. Cabot	In port.	
Brig Danube	C. Inglee	Do.	Boston	Boston	210	Dec. 9	14	S. Cabot, T. H. Perkins, J. Perkins, and Cushing	Constant'ple	Dec. 20
Schooner Hayti	A. Pratt	Do.	Salonica	Boston	74	Dec. 12	6	Ebenezer Breed	Enos	Dec. 30
Brig Cherub	J. Williams	Do.	Boston	Boston	173	Dec. 14	12	John J. Putnam & Pratt	In port.	
Ship Emerald	J. Webb	Do.	Boston	Salem	271	Dec. 31	15	J. Forrester & T. Forrester	In port.	

SMYRNA, December 31, 1828.

DAVID OFFLEY, Con. Agent United States.

List of arrivals and departures of American vessels from January 1 to December 31, 1829.

Description and name of vessel.	Captain's name.	Touched at.	Coming from.	Belonging to.	Registry.	Arrival.	Number of crew.	No. of register.	Number of Mediterranean passengers.	Destination.	Date of departure.	Owners' names.
Ship Emerald	J. Webb	Malta	Boston	Salem	Tons 545 371 33	January 11	15	27	182	Constantinople	February 3	J. Forrester & T. H. Forrester.
Brig Danube	C. Inglee	-	Boston	Boston	240 72	January 31	14	283	1,566	Boston	23	J. Cabot, T. H. Perkins, T. H. Perkins, Jr., S. Perkins, and J. P. Cushing.
Brig Tenedos	El. K. Loring	Malta	Boston	Boston	245 25	February 19	13	48	1,902	Metelin	April 12	J. J. Putnam, W. Fay, and N. Pratt.
Brig Cherub	J. Williams	-	Constantinople	Boston	173 70	23	12	70	1,996	Boston	March 25	J. J. Putnam and N. Pratt.
Ship Emerald	J. Webb	-	Constantinople	Salem	271 23	March 21	15	97	182	Gibraltar and Canton	April 4	J. Forrester & T. H. Forrester.
Brig Hope	J. Beckford	Malta	Salem	Salem	176	April 19	7	6	41	Constantinople	28	D. Abbott, D. Abbott, Jr., and J. Beckford.
Brig Delos	S. Sprague	Malta	Boston	Boston	160 50	29	9	25	2,060	Constantinople	May 8	J. J. Putnam, W. Fay, N. Pratt, and G. Stith.
Brig Tenedos	H. K. Loring	-	Metelin	Boston	245 25	May 29	13	48	1,902	Boston	June 10	J. J. Putnam, W. Fay, and N. Pratt.
Brig Hope	J. Beckford	-	Constantinople	Salem	176	June 15	7	6	41	Constantinople	July 20	D. Abbott, D. Abbott, Jr., and John Beckford.
Brig Smyrna	S. Sprague	Malta	Boston	Duxbury	162 72	19	8	18	1,772	Alexandria	August 12	J. J. Putnam and N. Pratt.
Brig Delos	N. P. Smith	-	Constantinople	Boston	160 50	July 31	9	25	2,060	New York and Boston	16	E. E. Brushshaw.
Brig William Henry	M. Wadleigh	-	Boston	Boston	183 91	August 18	8	114	2,093	Boston	Sept. 15	S. S. Howland and G. G. Howland.
Schooner Edgar	M. Wilson	Malta	St. Jago	New York	146 71	August 19	9	304	19	New York	15	J. J. Putnam and N. Pratt.
Brig Cherub	H. Rich	Marselles	Boston	Boston	173 70	26	11	70	1,936	Constantinople	1	Robert G. Shaw.
Brig Nile	C. Ellis	-	Boston	Boston	193 57	29	9	276	2,032	Boston	16	Robert G. Shaw.
Brig Smyrna	S. Sprague	Zant	Alexandria	Boston	162 72	30	8	18	1,772	Boston	October 11	Ezra Weston.
Brig Sultana	H. Foster	-	Boston	Boston	187 15	September 4	10	136	1,339	Boston	25	Elbenzer E. Breed.
Brig John Laird	G. Fletcher	-	Trieste	Alexandria	211 65	5	9	20	185	New York	23	J. C. Vowell, M. Miller, and W. H. Miller.
Brig Hope	J. Beckford	-	Constantinople	Salem	176	18	7	6	41	Boston	25	D. Abbott, D. Abbott, Jr., and John Beckford.
Brig Cherub	H. Rich	-	Constantinople	Boston	173 90	27	12	70	1,996	Boston	October 13	J. J. Putnam and N. Pratt.
Schooner Exact	S. Nichols	-	New York	New York	177 91	27	7	197	89	New York	13	S. Nichols, Philo Doane, and L. S. Sturges.
Brig Leander	J. Silser	Malta	Salem	Salem	223 30	November 3	13	40	153	In port	-	Joseph Peabody.
Brig Tenedos	J. Williams	Malta	Boston	Boston	245 25	December 31	13	48	1,902	In port	-	J. J. Putnam, W. Fay, and N. Pratt.

SMYRNA, December 31, 1839.

DAVID OFFLEY, United States Consul.

Arrivals and departures of American vessels from 1st January to 31st December, 1830.

Description and vessels names.	Captain's name.	Coming from.	Belonging to.	Register tonnage.	Date of arrival.	Number of crew.	Number of register.	Date of register.	Number of Mediterranean passport.	Date of Mediterranean passport.	Destination and date of departure.	Owners' name or names.
Brig Dove	K. Ripley	Boston	Boston	145	Feb. 4	7	131	June 23, 1825	1,729	July 5, 1825	Boston, March, 22	William W. Orthington.
Ship Circassian	E. Kingsbury	New York	New York	298	Feb. 4	12	96	April 15, 1829	53	April 16, 1829	Sou. Feb. 22 to a foreigner	Gardner G. Howland and Samuel S. Howland.
Brig Garland	A. Hilton	Boston	Boston	233	Feb. 26	11	64	Mar. 27, 1830	857	April 24, 1816	Malta, March 25	C. C. Parsons, T. Fursons, and C. Parsons.
Brig Wm. and Henry	W. Hinckley	Boston	Boston	185	Mar. 15	9	144	June 23, 1829	2,093	June 24, 1829	Boston, April 24	E. E. Bradshaw.
Brig Flora	W. Cole	New York	Boston	151	Mar. 10	9	8	Jan. 13, 1830	4	Jan. 14, 1830	New York, April 5	J. Clark, W. B. Reynolds, E. E. Bradshaw, and A. C. Reynolds.
Ship Don Quixote	C. Ingles	New York	New York	200	Mar. 26	14	274	Oct. 19, 1829	18	Feb. 10, 1830	Samos and N. York, Ap. 5	J. Suris and J. G. C. Perkins.
Brig Banyan	N. P. Smith	Boston	Boston	216	Mar. 26	10	10	Jan. 19, 1830	2,135	Jan. 19, 1830	Malta, April 14	W. Fay and N. P. Smith.
Brig Henry	S. J. Masters	New York	New Haven	185	Ap. 8	9	34	Dec. 10, 1829	131	Dec. 24, 1829	New York, May 11	H. N. Clark, J. W. Clark, and A. L. Kison.
Brig Chernob	H. K. Loring	Boston	Boston	173	Ap. 12	12	70	April 10, 1829	1,996	April 11, 1829	Boston, June 23	J. J. Putnam and N. Pratt.
Brig Kingston	G. Brewster	Boston	Kingston	115	May 6	7	33	Mar. 11, 1830	2,134	Mar. 11, 1830	Boston, June 18	Samuel S. Howland and Gardner G. Howland.
Brig Smyrna	S. F. Sprague	Boston	Duxbury	102	May 31	9	18	Oct. 27, 1825	1,772	Dec. 2, 1825	Constantinople, June 21	Ezra Weston.
Brig Teledes	S. Allen	Boston	Boston	245	Aug. 4	13	48	Mar. 5, 1827	1,902	Mar. 5, 1827	Boston, August 25	J. J. Putnam and W. Pratt.
Brig Phebe Ann	A. Besse	Boston	New York	244	Aug. 5	10	215	July 3, 1827	48	Mar. 23, 1826	New York, September 20	Abel Adams, John Stevens, and N. Whitton.
Brig Colon	W. Crocker	Boston	Boston	208	Aug. 8	12	30	Feb. 7, 1823	1,502	Feb. 7, 1823	Gibraltar, September 25	Israel Thorndike.
Brig Caro. Augusta	M. Duggan	Boston	Boston	222	Aug. 10	10	94	May 28, 1830	2,158	June 1, 1830	Boston, September 23	George D. Carter.
Brig Plover	J. Stevenson	Havana	Baltimore	135	Aug. 25	11	22	Mar. 14, 1829	5	Mar. 14, 1829	Baltimore, September 17	Thomas Tenen.
Schooner Fanfan	J. Richards	New York	New York	66	Sept. 5	6	166	June 19, 1830	66	June 19, 1830	New York, September 17	John A. Robinson, John Stevens, and P. Palmer.
Brig Leander	J. Silver	Salem	Salem	233	Sept. 10	13	40	Aug. 27, 1821	153	Aug. 28, 1821	Salem, November 13	Joseph Peabody.
Brig Paoung	H. G. Gray	Boston	Marblehead	175	Sept. 12	8	4	July 17, 1829	2,052	Jan. 2, 1829	Boston, October 18	William Reed.
Brig Melville	T. Baker	Baltimore	Baltimore	261	Sept. 15	14	108	Oct. 16, 1827	28	Oct. 16, 1827	Aframitti, October 26	J. Wilson, T. Wilson, D. S. Wilson, and T. Baker.
Brig Smyrna	S. J. Sprague	Trieste	Duxbury	102	Sept. 24	9	18	Oct. 27, 1825	1,772	Dec. 2, 1825	Boston, October 2	Ezra Weston.
Brig Mermaid	J. Williams	Boston	Boston	189	Sept. 30	9	148	Aug. 6, 1830	2,173	Aug. 6, 1830	Aframitti, October 11	E. E. Bradshaw, A. Mac-tier, and Peter Edes.
Brig Index	J. Hooper	New York	Duxbury	231	Oct. 1	10	219	Aug. 5, 1830	81	Aug. 5, 1830	Aframitti, October 6	J. Hooper, Jr., C. Drew, and S. Drew.
Brig Susan	J. Thing	Malta	Boston	159	Oct. 15	9	44	Mar. 19, 1830	2,170	July 22, 1830	Boston, October 36	J. Thing, N. Francis, and J. Balch, Jr.
Brig Banian	N. P. Smith	Boston	Boston	216	Oct. 15	10	10	Jan. 19, 1830	2,135	Jan. 19, 1830	Malta and Boston, Nov. 20	W. Fay and N. P. Smith.
Brig Potomac	C. W. Knapp	Trieste	New York	196	Oct. 31	11	145	June 4, 1830	73	June 3, 1830	In port	Edwin Post.
Brig Index	J. Hooper	Adramitti	Duxbury	231	Nov. 3	10	219	Aug. 5, 1830	84	Aug. 5, 1830	New York, November 6	J. Hooper, Jr., C. Drew, and S. Drew.
Brig Mermaid	J. Williams	Adramitti	Boston	189	Nov. 7	9	148	Aug. 6, 1830	2,173	Aug. 6, 1830	Boston, November 9	E. E. Bradshaw, A. Mac-tier, and P. Edes.
Brig Kingston	G. Brewster	Boston	Kingston	115	Nov. 29	7	33	Mar. 11, 1830	2,134	Mar. 11, 1830	In port	A. Adams, J. Sever, B. Delano, S. W. Sever, and M. Whitton.
Brig Melville	T. Baker	Adramitti	Baltimore	261	Dec. 3	14	108	Oct. 16, 1827	28	Oct. 16, 1827	In port	J. Wilson, T. Wilson, D. S. Wilson, and T. Baker.
Brig Cherub	H. H. Greene	Boston	Boston	173	Dec. 10	10	70	April 10, 1828	1,966	April 11, 1828	In port	J. J. Putnam and N. Pratt.
Brig Daniel Webster	F. W. Welch	Boston	Plymouth	135	Dec. 10	7	12	Oct. 2, 1828	1,948	Sept. 6, 1827	Constantinople, Dec. 19	T. Heide, T. L. Fledge, and J. Covington.

SATANA, December 31, 1830.

DAVID OFFLEY.
Com. Com. Agent of the United States.

List of American vessels arriving at, and sailing from, this port from the 31st of December, 1830, to the 31st of December, 1831.

Description and name vessel.	Captain's name.	Ports touched at.	Coming from.	Part belonging to.	Register tonnage.	Date of arrival.	Captain's appearance at the office.	Number of crew.	Number of regt.	Date of register.	No. of Med. pass- port.	Date of Mediterranean passport.
Brig Palestine	H. K. Loring	Boston	Constantinople	Boston	Tons. 95 lbs.	Jan.	9	14	158	Aug. 4, 1838	2,028	Aug. 5, 1838
Brig Daniel Webster	F. W. Welch	-	Constantinople	Plymouth	248 80	Jan.	18	19	12	Oct. 2, 1838	1,048	Sept. 6, 1837
Brig Tenedos	Samuel Allen	Malta	Boston	Boston	125 15	Mar.	13	13	48	March 5, 1837	1,002	March 5, 1837
Brig Tenedos	Samuel Allen	-	Constantinople	Boston	245 26	April 20	21	13	48	March 5, 1837	1,002	March 5, 1837
Brig Elizabeth	W. K. Merry	-	New York	New York	211 77	April 20	21	13	61	Feb. 28, 1831	53	April 2, 1835
Ship Clifford Wayne	G. W. Lewis	-	Porto Rico	Boston	301 88	May 13	13	13	249	Dec. 3, 1830	122	Oct. 24, 1838
Brig General Warren	Joseph Gorham	-	Constantinople	Fairhaven	187 91	May 13	13	10	7	Mar. 27, 1838	173	Aug. 6, 1830
Brig Mermaid	W. D. Phelps	Sira	Boston	Boston	189 44	May 13	13	9	148	Aug. 6, 1830	2,200	Mar. 26, 1831
Brig Fortune	John Williams	-	Boston	Boston	229 27	May 18	18	11	70	Mar. 27, 1838	19	Jan. 21, 1838
Schooner Edgar	M. Wilson	-	Trieste	New York	146 71	May 21	21	304	304	Oct. 1, 1837	2,135	Dec. 19, 1830
Brig Bauman	N. P. Smith	Malta & Tinos	Boston	Boston	216 54	May 30	30	13	10	Jan. 19, 1830	2,134	Mar. 11, 1830
Brig Kingston	George Brewster	-	Boston	Boston	115 16	May 30	30	7	33	Mar. 11, 1830	2,053	Jan. 2, 1829
Brig Padang	El G. Gray	-	Boston	Marblehead	173 21	May 31	31	8	4	July 17, 1829	132	Oct. 24, 1838
Brig General Warren	J. Gorham	-	Samos	Fair Haven	187 91	June 15	15	10	7	Mar. 27, 1838	2,174	Aug. 11, 1830
Brig Elizabeth	Richard Coombs	-	Boston	Boston	138 72	June 15	15	7	151	Aug. 10, 1830	2,200	Mar. 26, 1831
Brig Fortune	John Williams	-	Constantinople	Boston	229 27	June 19	19	11	70	Mar. 27, 1831	2,200	Mar. 26, 1831
Ship Clifford Wayne	G. W. Lewis	-	Constantinople	Boston	304 88	June 29	29	13	249	Dec. 3, 1830	52	April 2, 1835
Brig Elizabeth	Richard Coombs	In distress	Constantinople	Boston	128 72	July 11	11	7	151	Aug. 10, 1830	2,174	Aug. 11, 1830
Brig Bauman	N. P. Smith	-	Voula	Boston	216 54	July 18	18	13	10	Jan. 19, 1830	2,135	Jan. 19, 1830
Brig Mermaid	W. D. Phelps	-	Bengasi	Boston	189 44	July 23	23	9	148	Aug. 6, 1830	173	Aug. 6, 1830
Brig Kingston	George Brewster	-	Slagk	Boston	115 16	July 23	23	9	33	Mar. 11, 1830	2,134	Mar. 11, 1830
Ship Clifford Wayne	G. W. Lewis	-	Adramitta	Boston	301 88	Aug. 1	1	13	249	Dec. 3, 1830	52	April 2, 1835
Brig Hebe	Osborne Howes	-	Boston	Boston	171 86	Aug. 5	5	8	56	Mar. 15, 1831	2,222	June 2, 1831
Brig Ursula	George Powell	-	Boston	Boston	98 93	Sept. 13	13	9	191	July 9, 1831	2,241	July 19, 1831
Brig Chernob	H. E. Green	-	Boston	Boston	173 70	Sept. 15	15	10	70	April 10, 1838	1,996	April 11, 1838
Brig Pavilion	S. Devalcourt	-	Boston	Boston	150	Sept. 19	19	7	104	April 8, 1831	26	April 8, 1831
Ship Messenger	James Buffington	Enos	Constantinople	New York	277 40	Oct. 4	4	15	143	May 23, 1831	2,221	May 26, 1831
Brig Virginia	S. H. Davis	Malta	Havana	Boston	137	Oct. 5	5	15	15	June 23, 1831	15	May 22, 1838
Brig Cazenove	S. Corey	-	Constantinople	Gloucester	171 13	Oct. 5	5	8	208	Nov. 5, 1829	2,244	July 27, 1831
Brig Angelina	Francis Johnson	Malta	Boston	Boston	151 91	Oct. 5	5	8	118	July 8, 1831	1,712	June 2, 1835
Brig Cutler	Cornelius Ellis	Gibraltar & Malta	Boston	Boston	151 91	Oct. 6	6	9	366	Nov. 23, 1830	116	Nov. 24, 1830
Brig Henry	L. Russell	-	New York	New York	162 82	Oct. 26	26	8	131	June 1, 1831	2,248	Aug. 4, 1831
Brig Aurora	G. M. Weld	Malta	Boston	Boston	145 35	Nov. 6	6	7	43	Mar. 5, 1837	1,902	March 5, 1837
Brig Tenedos	Samuel Allen	-	Boston	Boston	145 35	Nov. 27	27	14	48	Mar. 5, 1837	1,902	March 5, 1837
Brig Tenedos	Samuel Allen	-	Chesmi	Boston	244 21	Dec. 10	10	9	228	Aug. 14, 1831	30	May 14, 1831
Brig Harp	M. Wilson	Trieste	Trieste	New York	277 49	Dec. 15	15	15	143	May 23, 1831	2,221	May 26, 1831
Ship Messenger	J. Buffington	-	Constantinople	Boston	277 49	Dec. 15	15	15	143	May 23, 1831	2,221	May 26, 1831

Cargoes of US Vessels

Manifests, inwards and outwards, of the brig Pennsylvania, Hugh McPherson master.

Inwards from Philadelphia, reported December 24, 1804.

By Messrs. R. H. Wilcocks & Co. to Mr. J. C. Wilcocks—
40 hhds. coffee, say powder sugar
38 hhds. coffee
135 bags pepper
38 tons 2 cwt. 2 qrs. logwood.

By Mr. Wm. Wala to Mr. J. C. Wilcocks—
120 bags pepper
9 hhds. powder sugars
15 hhds. powder sugars.

By Mr. J. Fiske to Mr. J. C. Wilcocks—
89 and 76 bags pepper.

By Mr. William Steward to N. B. Draylizza & Co.—
6 hhds. and 5 bbls. coffee.

By H. McPherson to himself—
6 small chests tea.

Outwards for Baltimore, cleared out March 6, 1806.

By J. L. Wilcocks to himself—
49 chests opium.
2 bbls., containing 8,200 Spanish dollars.

By H. McPherson to himself—
1 chest opium.

Manifests, inwards and outwards, of the brig Eutaw, Christopher L. Gant master.

Inwards from Baltimore, reported July 5, 1806.

By Mr. John Worthington to himself—
280 bbls. loaf sugar
49 cases Havana sugars
80 cases Havana sugars
539 bags coffee
211 bags pepper
13 tons logwood.

By Christopher L. Gant to himself—
1 ballat muslins.

Outwards for Canton in China, cleared out November 2, 1805.

By Mr. John Worthington to himself—
46 chests opium
51 boxes opium.

By Christopher L. Gant to himself—
2 boxes opium.

Manifests, inwards and outwards, of the brig Spartan, Charles Chamberland master.

Inwards from Baltimore, reported July 17, 1805.

By Mr. Felix Caune to Messrs. A. & E. Hayes & Co.—
200 cases Havana sugars
330 bags coffee
127 bags coffee
5½ tons logwood
7 tons Nicaragua wood.

By C. Chamberland to himself—
23 bags coffee
23 bags coffee
2 drums scammony
6 cases gum amoniac

Outwards for Trieste and Baltimore, cleared out the 1st of November, 1805.

For Trieste.

By Hain & Santo Levi to Tornis & Caris—
100 slabs copper.

By Raff & Garbich to Chiriaco & Brothers, Catraco—
12 bbls. and 1 keg of safflower.

By Stephen de Hagi Siffer to Hemspacher & Co.—
140 bbls. red raisins.

MANIFESTS—Continued.

Inwards from Baltimore, reported July 17, 1805.

By C. Chamberland to himself—*Continued.*

7 bags hazelnuts
12 boxes Cyprus wine
1 case safflower
5 bales sponges
23 demijohns orange-flower water
4 boxes, containing
1,600 Spanish and imperial dollars
167½ doubloons
610 imperial chequins.
By Mr. Felix Caune to himself—
1 bale carpets
74 drums figs
60 drums red raisins
2 cases pistache nuts
6 chests opium
1 canister saffron
1 box, containing
2,600 Spanish dollars, and
150 doubloons.

Outward for Trieste and Baltimore, cleared out the 1st of November, 1805.

For Baltimore.

By Mr. F. Caune to Mr. Henry Messonnia—
3 boxes Turkey oil-stone
20 slabs copper
6 bales carpets
18 bbls. senna
397 drums figs
383 drums red raisins
50 bbls. black raisins
60 kegs red raisins
6 boxes
4 cases opium
1 case gum draganth.
By Charles Chamberland to himself—
15 bbls. red raisins
30 drums red raisins
21 drums figs
2 boxes opium
1 canister saffron
1 bag, containing
1,150 Spanish and imperial dollars.

Manifests, inwards and outwards, of the schooner Hazard, John Williams master.

Inwards from Philadelphia, reported August 24, 1805.

By Mr. E. Woodmas to Messrs. Lee & Sons—

40 hhds. coffee
15 puncheons rum
8 boxes indigo
150 boxes Havana sugars
378 bags pepper
3 bales muslins
2 cases tobacco
15 bales nankeens
21 bags ginger
3 tons 6 cwt. 1 qr. 4 lbs. logwood
1 bale muslins.

Outwards for Leghorn and Philadelphia, cleared out October 25, 1805.

17 bales safflower
16 bales goats' wool
5 bales sponges
22 casks wax
12 cases drugs
4 drums do.
10 cases do.
4 bbls. do.
3 bales hare skins
1 bale muslins
2 cases tobacco
2 cases kid skins
1,776 goat skins
8 sacks galls
1 bale cotton stuffs
18 sacks madder roots
3 bales carpets
736 cases figs
50 drums figs
23 bbls. currants
75 drums red raisins
50 bbls. red raisins
58 drums Sultana raisins
22 cases drugs
35 drums and cases fruit, presents.
N. B.—All the foregoing goods landed by Messrs. Lee & Sons.
By John Williams to himself—
2 bales carpets
60 cases figs
54 drums figs
4 drums and 2 bbls. red raisins
52 drums currants
1 drum Sultana raisins
1 drum honey
1 drum opium
1 box saffron
1 box gum copal.

Manifests, inwards and outwards, of brig Slyph, Samuel Clarke master.

Inwards from Philadelphia, reported September 20, 1805.

By Mr. James S. Wilcocks to Messrs. Lee & Sons—

122 boxes Havana sugars
25 boxes do.
30 boxes do.
30 boxes block tin
3 bales muslins
5 tons 1 cwt. 1 qr. 26 lbs. logwood
500 bags pepper
30 hhds. coffee
50 hhds. do.
40 bags do.
10 boxes indigo
3 boxes do.
10 bags coffee.

Outwards for Leghorn and Canton, cleared out November 26, 1805.

By Mr. James S. Wilcocks to himself—

921 pigs lead.
2 cases merchandise
33 cases opium
18 bbls. quicksilver
150 sacks madder roots
64 bales cottons
100 pieces boxwood
13 cases, containing
26,000 Spanish dollars.

Manifests, inwards and outwards, of the brig Hibernia, William Morrison master.

Inwards from Philadelphia, reported October 18, 1805.

By Mr. Jacob Otto to Lee & Sons—

631 bags coffee
79 tierces do.
105 hhds. do.
358 boxes Havana sugars
12 bales nankeens
20 bags pimento
10 puncheons rum
3 tons block tin
3 tons logwood
3 bags cassia lignia
10 hhds. loaf sugar
85 bags pepper.

Outwards for Leghorn and Canton, cleared out November 29, 1805.

By Mr. Jacob Otto to himself—

134 hhds. and tierces coffee, reshipped
629 bags coffee, reshipped
12 bales nankeens
1,600 kils of salt
336 pigs lead
26 cases drugs
150 sacks madder roots
26 sacks galls
6 bbls. beeswax
10 boxes, containing
19,213 Spanish dollars.

This is to certify that the annexed manifests of six American vessels are true copies, extracted from the originals. Given under my hand this 15th day of January, in the year of our Lord 1806.

ROBERT WILKINSON, *Pro-consul.*

Importations by American vessels from the 1st day of July to the 31st of December, 1823.

Vessels' names.	Bags of coffee.	Hogsheds of coffee.	Barrels of coffee.	Cases of indigo.	Cases of sugar.	Packages of tea.	Packages of cloves.	Packages of cassia ligna.	Pieces of nankeen.	Hogsheds of rum.	Bales of East India pecegoods.	Packages of Canton sails.	Tons of dyewood.	Packages of cochineal.	Bags of pepper.	Packages of cotton yarn.	Packages of Waltham cotton.	Cases of China ware.	Hogsheds of tobacco.	Kegs of manufactured tobacco.	Bags of pimento.	Pipes of wine.	Barrels of beef.	Pigs of lead.	Boxes of tin plates.	Bales of Mocha coffee.	Barrels of biscuits.	
Niger	1,673	130	51	26	-	125	3	-	2,000	30	14	5	25	-	-	1	2	10	8	-	-	50	2 1/2	30	20	31	1,300	8
Cherub	513	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	50	-	-	12	-	150	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Laurel	892	33	-	19	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	23	-	252	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nile	1,872	21	-	-	63	10	-	60	-	21	-	7	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	50	2 1/2	30	20	31	1,300	8
James and Isabella	1,440	-	107	-	380	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Charles	-	-	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	50	-	8	32	2	150	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Herald	1,116	73	-	19	50	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	46	-	163	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sally Anne	816	53	24	-	130	-	3	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	8,322	310	182	64	549	155	660	2,000	171	14	22	188	2	715	1	12	10	28	27	50	2 1/2	30	20	31	1,300	8		

Exportations by American vessels from the 1st day of July to the 31st of December, 1823.

Vessels' names.	Cases of opium.	Bales of carpets.	Slabs of copper.	Cases of gums.	Kinials of boxwood.	Bales of wool.	Medicals—oil of roses.	Cases of soap.	Bales of sponges.	Drums of figs.	Cases of figs.	Casks of raisins.	Spanish dollars.	Hogsheds of hare skins.	Bales of goats' wool.	Cases of saffron.
Niger -	-	14	285	-	-	178	7,320	254	-	4,000	300	-	34,000	15	-	-
Cherub -	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,075	-	694	75,000	-	8	10
Laurel -	15	-	-	21	120	-	-	-	11	2,491	280	26	-	-	-	-
Nile -	166	-	-	-	-	59	608	-	8	3,826	532	-	-	-	-	-
James and Isabella -	45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	256	14	285	21	120	237	7,928	254	19	16,392	1,112	720	41,500	15	8	10

SMYRNA, December 31, 1823.

DAVID OFFLEY,
Consular Commercial Agent.

Exportations by American vessels from January 1 to December 31, 1824.

Vessels' names.	Cases of opium.	Bales of carpets.	Sets of copper.	Cases of gums.	Quintals of boxwood.	Bales of sheep's wool.	Cases of soap.	Bales of sponges.	Medicals—oil of roses.	Cases of raisins.	Cases of figs.	Drums of figs.	Hds. of hareskins.	Bales of goats' wool.	Spanish dollars.	Drums of scammony.	Bales of galls.	Okes of old copper.	Tons of oil-stones.	Hds. of terra ombr.	Cases of olive oil.	Kils. of salt.	Drums Suliana raisins.	Sacks of almonds.	Barrels cologuenticida.	Bales of senna.	Bales of madder roots.	Bales of yellow berries.
Herald -	125	-	-	64	-	-	-	-	3,500	901	844	2,060	-	8	4,987	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Liberty -	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	380	-	803	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sally Anne	98	5	-	13	-	-	135	6	2,500	1,800	-	2,300	-	12	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Spy -	30	-	140	7	-	-	-	-	5,000	385	-	115	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Clio -	48	-	-	-	-	-	344	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rampart	26	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cherub -	5	1	-	4	-	118	-	1	3,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	810	3	2	4	2,000	-	-	-	-	-
Rubicon	138	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	800	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,050	-	-	-	2,000	-	-	-	-	-
Lapwing	170	-	-	29	-	153	-	-	5,600	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,000	-	-	-	510	-	-	-	-	-
Midas	111	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,000	-	-	-	3,000	-	-	-	-	-
Charles -	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	432	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	250	-	-	-	-	-
Susan -	5	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	4,134	2	900	11,220	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,200	-	-	-	-	-
James & Isabella	34	-	-	-	110	-	-	-	600	327	900	3,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yellat -	45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	81	-	2,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Clio -	91	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,000	-	-	8,000	-	-	334	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Herald -	70	-	-	-	120	-	-	-	708	1,100	502	3,980	-	-	1,707	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	2	-	-	-
Charles and Ellen	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,000	300	600	1,200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	561	-	-	-	-	-
Cherub -	18	-	-	1	-	160	-	-	-	80	600	3,459	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,200	-	-	-	-	-
Jew -	326	-	-	27	200	92	-	-	4,000	500	633	826	-	-	-	2	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	1
Sally Anne	64	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	1,180	-	70	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1,651	740	109	530	523	479	740,842	7,036	4,569	40,055	350	32,309	6	19	9,866	3	2	4	7,753	3,211	20	220	1	1	-	-	-	-

SMYRNA, December 31, 1824.

DAVID OFFLEY, Com. Agent of the United States.

Importations by American vessels from January 1 to December 31, 1824.

Vessels' names.	Bags of coffee.	Hhds. of coffee.	Bbls. of coffee.	Cases of indigo.	Casks of sugar.	Packages of tea.	Packages of cloves.	Packages of cassia.	Packages of nankeens.	Hhds. of rum.	Packages Canton silks.	Tons of dyewood.	Packages of cochineal.	Fox skins.	Mink skins.	Slabs of tin.	Bags of pepper.	Packages cotton yarn.	Pack. manuf. cotton.	Hhds. of tobacco.	Kegs manuf. tobacco.	Bales Mocha coffee.	Bags of pimento.	Pigs of lead.	Boxes of tin plates.	Boxes of spermacell.	Cakes spelta.	Casks of hardware.	Bags of sugar.	Bbls. of sugar.	Bbls. of varnish.
Liberty -	260	41	-	-	121	-	-	-	-	-	10	5	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Spy -	960	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rubicon -	2,700	-	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Clio -	1,171	158	2	2	-	20	-	-	-	20	10	14	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rampart -	785	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	-	-	-	250	650	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	600	-	-	-	35	-	-	-	-
Cherub -	276	5	25	-	26	-	-	-	800	88	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	20	8	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Midas -	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lapwing -	1,056	50	32	5	30	-	-	-	-	90	-	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
James & Isabella -	338	140	-	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yellot -	1,107	-	134	-	-	-	-	-	-	47	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Herald -	1,655	-	6	19	100	-	-	38	-	31	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Susan -	1,620	-	-	-	50	-	-	500	-	45	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Charles and Ellen -	256	-	-	-	200	-	-	-	-	47	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Clio -	1,568	11	-	2	74	-	-	15	-	55	3	4	-	-	-	-	100	-	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cherub -	859	32	65	2	44	-	-	387	-	13	10	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	102	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sally Anne -	885	22	-	8	140	-	-	50	-	80	8	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jew -	1,508	-	5	15	100	20	-	50	-	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	200	-	-	-	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20
Total -	17,504	483	273	57	1,085	40	51	1,040	800	540	47	137	27	250	650	10	300	3	172	8	117	600	85	80	40	35	5	2	500	54	20

SMYRNA, December 31, 1824.

DAVID OFFLEY, Con. Com. Agent of the United States.

Exportation by American vessels from 1st of January to 31st of December, 1825.

Vessels' name.	Cases of opium.	Bales of carpets.	Slabs of copper.	Cases of gums.	Quintals of boxwood.	Bales of sheep's wool.	Cases of soap.	Bales of sponges.	Medicals—oil of roses.	Casks of raisins.	Cases of figs.	Drums of figs.	Hogsheds of hare skins.	Bales of goats' wool.	Cases of saffron.	Spanish dollars.	Drums of scammony.	Bales of galls.	Oks of old copper.	Tons of oil-stones.	Hds. of terra ombr.	Cases of olive oil.	Drums of Sultana raisins.	Sacks of almonds.	Barrels of colocquientida.	Bales of senna.	Bales of camels' hair.	Bales of sheep's skins.	
Susan-	61	-	-	17	-	-	4	-	3,000	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	120	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Clio -	-	-	-	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000	-	5	-	-	60	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Otter -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Friendship	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	3,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
American	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Romp-	24	-	-	-	-	90	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ranger	56	-	100	-	-	64	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Herald	-	-	-	16	-	143	61	-	4,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	172	-	-	-	-
St. Thomas*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jew -	6	-	-	27	-	203	-	-	1,500	-	-	1,200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cherub	20	-	-	-	-	300	-	-	-	-	1,200	4,605	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yellow-	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,500	-	1,200	10,000	-	-	-	-	10,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Otter -	14	-	-	-	350	-	-	-	-	300	500	5,000	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sultana	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	1,200	10,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sally Anne	36	-	-	-	-	120	-	-	-	2,000	500	5,000	-	10	-	-	-	4	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-
Rambler	65	-	-	-	300	72	80	-	9,000	1,014	3,030	910	-	-	-	-	-	46	-	3,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	-	-
Lucinda	-	-	-	10	-	126	-	-	-	435	293	293	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	-	-
Herald	80	-	-	-	247	194	-	-	15,000	-	1,230	925	-	13	-	-	-	3	1	4,800	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	403	6100	87	1,097	1,316	145	-	-	34,000	3,749	5,960	22,933	2	45	-	-	18,000	7144	10,890	-	-	-	180	-	265	6	67	3	3

* Sailed in ballast.

SMYRNA, December 31, 1825.

DAVID OFFLEY, Com. Com. Agent United States.

Importations by American vessels from January 1 to December 31, 1826.

Vessels' names.	Bags of coffee.	Hhds. of coffee.	Casks of indigo.	Cases of sugar.	Packages of tea.	Packages of cloves.	Packages of cassia.	Hhds. of rum.	Packages E. I. goods.	Packages Canton silks.	Tons of dyewood.	Packages of cochineal.	Packages of furs.	Bags of pepper.	Bales domestic goods.	Bales of Mocha coffee.	Bags of pimento.	Bags of sugar.	Cases of China ware.	Boxes sperm candles.	Boxes of tin plates.	Packages of mace.	Pigs of lead and iron.	Bhls. of flour.
Cherub	695	-	4	126	93	8	1,000	105	10	-	-	4	-	60	151	-	30	-	-	16	36	-	-	-
Romulus	-	-	-	35	-	-	40	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
Ea	2,077	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Smyrna	841	-	-	-	-	-	40	120	-	-	14	-	-	100	51	49	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Seaman	-	-	-	-	-	-	195	-	-	-	-	4	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
General Bolivar	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	-	-	-	-
Sultana	600	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	100	16	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	-	-
Caspian	1,607	25	20	208	106	12	-	85	-	-	-	-	-	100	75	-	-	100	20	-	-	-	-	-
Clio	1,650	-	13	70	25	30	-	60	-	-	-	1	-	100	110	-	-	80	22	-	-	-	-	20
Cherub	997	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	206	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Susan	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	27	-	-	-	-	5	200	17	-	-	300	20	-	-	-	-	-
Hiram	429	113	12	60	-	-	-	67	-	5	-	2	-	400	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Smyrna	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	47	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sultana	376	-	14	49	34	9	300	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Romulus	1,400	-	15	50	12	12	130	28	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suffolk	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ganges	700	-	20	150	-	6	-	30	-	-	5	3	-	-	47	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	150	-
Total	11,373	138	98	770	270	77	1,745	537	16	5	47	13	51,099	770	49	30	480	80	66	36	12	395	20	

Smyrna, December 31, 1826.

DAVID OFFLEY, Com. Com. Agent of the United States.

PROPERTY OF
UNITED STATES SENATE
LIBRARY.

Exports by American vessels from January 1 to December 31, 1826.

Vessels' names.	Cases of opium.	Bales of carpet.	Slabs of copper.	Cases of gums.	Quintals of boxwood.	Bales of Spanish wool.	Cases of soap.	Medicals—oil of roses.	Cases of raisins.	Cases of figs.	Drums of figs.	Hds. of hare skins.	Bales of goats' wool.	Drums of scammony.	Bales of galls.	Oks of old copper.	Tons of oil.	Drums Sultana raisins.	Sacks of nuts.	Bales of yellow berries.	Bales of sheep skins.	Bales of sponges.	Casks of currants.	Casks of prunes.	Packages of cow skins.	Goat skins in packages.
Susan	23					166	33	14,000	46				6	4		3,250	1		110	3	1	3	3536	2		
Cherub	30		6	6	144	281				550	101											5			67	
Romulus			148		60	344		1,500							40	6,250							78			
Smyrna	24	3			121	190			237				8													
Seaman																										
Es*																										
Sultana																										
General Bolivar	78					611																				
Caspian	24					491		1,500	307		3,908	2		4			2	50				3				
Cherub	21					152				1,700	4,350			6				100				13				
Clio	373	2			111	90				247	6,083			11				100				4				
Susan	1					30				405	8,311			3				10								
Hiram	22								8									82								
Smyrna	82							3,000	1,098		5,096							10								
Sultana	24								1,072		430								43							33
Romulus	103		191		200	58			4,000		150			8					16							
Total	805	7	345	6	793	2,413	33	20,000	7,368	2,902	28,429	2	14	36	40	9,500	133	502	190	3	4	36	965	2	121	1,273

* Went in ballast to Genoa and Leghorn.

SMYRNA, December 31, 1826.

DAVID OFFLEY, Con. Com. Agent of the United States.

Exportations by American vessels from the 1st of January to the 31st of December, 1828.

Vessels' names.	Cases of opium.	Bales of carpets.	Slabs of copper.	Quinals of boxwood.	Bales of sheep's wool.	Cases of gum.	Medicals of oil of roses.	Casks of raisins.	Cases of figs.	Drums of figs.	Bales of goats' wool.	Drums of scammony.	Oles of old copper.	Tons of oil, (olive.)	Kils. of salt.	Drums Sultana raisins.	Sacks of nuts.	Bales of yellow berries.	Bales of camels' hair.	Bales of sponges.	Casks of currents.	Packages of cowhides.	Packages goat and sheep skins.	Casks of wine.	Horns.
Leander	160	1	537	500	445	1	5,000	1	1	1	1	4	4,000	1	2,400	1	1	1	1	13	1	1	40	1	2,600
Tenedos	20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	400	1	1,950	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	30	1	2,600
Sultana	1	1	1	1	1	1	11,270	1	1	1	1	4	2,800	1	3,100	1	29	23	1	1	1	1	10	1	2,600
Delos	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	2,800	1	3,100	1	29	23	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Samos	32	3	1	400	420	1	4,500	1	1	1	1	11	1,500	1	4,500	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Camilla	26	5	1	200	150	1	20,000	1	1	1	1	3	3,500	1	2,500	1	84	1	1	1	1	1	20	1	2,600
Corporal Trim	30	1	1	200	260	1	3,000	1	1	1	1	3	1,200	1	2,500	1	100	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Cherub	1	1	284	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	18	1,200	1	2,500	1	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Hayti	12	1	1	1	434	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3,500	1	2,500	1	70	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Tenedos	16	1	1	1	183	1	5,000	1	1	1	1	1	1,000	1	2,500	1	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Wizard	15	1	1	1	100	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1,200	1	2,500	1	100	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Smyrna	13	1	1	250	80	24	6,000	300	1	13,000	1	1	2,000	1	2,500	1	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Rhine	25	1	1	1	20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,000	1	2,500	1	70	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Sultana	50	1	1	1	1	15	1	250	60	2,200	1	1	1	1	2,500	1	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Danube	105	1	1	150	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,500	1	70	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Emily	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,500	1	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Ceres	12	1	1	1	1	15	1	250	60	2,200	1	1	1	1	2,500	1	70	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Hayti	8	1	1	1	1	1	3,000	280	800	6,120	1	1	1	1	2,500	1	70	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,600
Delos	26	15	1	150	550	1	10,000	1	1	1	1	12	1,500	1	4,500	1	185	1	1	1	1	1	15	1	2,500
Danube	6	1	1	1	1	1	4,000	1	1	1	1	1	1,500	1	4,250	1	185	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,500
Camilla	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4,250	1	185	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,500
Palestine	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4,250	1	185	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2,500
	556	25	821	1,850	2,642	39	50,500	830	860	54,350	5	56	21,800	302	25,760	750	556	47	4	74	40	212	115	30	5,100

Smyrna, December 31, 1828.

DAVID OFFLEY, Con. Com. Agent United States.

Importations by American vessels from January 1 to December 31, 1829.

Vessels' names.	Bags of coffee.	Hbbs. of coffee.	Bbbs. of coffee.	Cases of indigo.	Cases of sugar.	Packages of tea.
Emerald	2,300	-	-	4	236	38
Danube*	1,150	297	-	-	198	-
Tenedos	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cherub*	-	-	-	-	-	-
Emerald*	-	-	-	-	30	-
Hope	60	-	-	-	150	-
Delos	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tenedos†	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hope†	-	-	-	-	-	-
Smyrna	1,781	-	-	-	-	-
Delos†	-	-	-	-	-	-
William and Henry	1,200	-	-	6	50	-
Edgar	1,000	7	-	-	60	-
Cherub	-	-	-	-	62	-
Nile	1,670	-	-	-	-	-
Smyrna‡	-	-	-	-	-	-
Suliana‡	-	-	-	-	-	-
John Laird¶	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hope**	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cherub**	450	-	-	45	400	40
Exact	2,500	-	-	-	195	20
Leander	900	-	24	-	-	-
Tenedos	-	-	-	-	-	-
	12,914	301	24	55	1,381	278

* A general cargo of the produce of the country for sundry merchants here, loaded at Constantinople.

† Brought a cargo of oil, about 250 tons, from Metelin, which she carried to the United States.

‡ A general cargo from Constantinople, the same as the vessel above.

Smyrna, December 31, 1829.

Pack. of cassia lignia.	Hbbs. of ruin.	Packages Canton silks.	Tons of dyewoods.	Packages of cochineal.	Bags of pepper.	Pack. domestic goods.	Kegs manuf. tobacco.	Bags of pimento.	Bags of sugar.	Boxes sperm candles.
-	60	-	10	-	-	-	16	-	-	30
-	170	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	300	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	86	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	50
-	62	-	-	-	-	52	-	-	200	40
-	160	-	-	-	-	-	30	-	500	-
-	290	-	5	3	-	54	80	-	-	60
1,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1,500	100	3	-	-	-	26	15	-	-	-
-	220	8	24	10	182	-	150	15	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3,000	1,448	11	74	13	182	132	291	-	700	180

§ In ballast, from Alexandria in Egypt.

‡ From Zante, with a few tons of currants, destined for the United States.

¶ In ballast, from Trieste.

** A general cargo, second time from Constantinople, as above.

DAVID OFFLEY, United States Consul.

Imports by American vessels from
1st January to 31st December, 1830.

Vessels' names.	Bags of coffee.	Hogsheads and barrels of coffee.	Cases of indigo.	Cases of sugar.	Packages of tea.	Packages of cassia.	Hogsheads of rum.	Packages of E. I. silks.	Tons of dyewood.	Packages of cochineal.	Packages of furs.	Bags of pepper.	Bales of domestic goods.	Bags of pimento.	Pipes of wine.	Bags of sugar.	Boxes of sperma candles.	Barrels of flour.	Manufactured tobacco.	Barrels of flour.
Dove	1,800	150	20	170	15	1,800	116	5				400	133	30			100			
Circassian	1,200						50							100			400			
Garland	1,150			100	70		74						80			1,000				
William and Henry	1,000			40	12		230							80						
Flora	1,800			65			140													
Don Quixote	350						8													
Banyan	300						40													
Henry	190			151			40													
Cherub	600		15				50													
Kingson	1,000			35	25	150	170													
Smyrna	1,200				90															
Tenetos	1,200		51		50															
Phebe Ann*	2,300		6	21			73													
Colon	2,000																			
Caroline Augusta	2,000																			
Fanfan	1,800																			
Lady's Return	720																			
Leander	1,500		50	456	70	700														
Padang	2,250		42			800														
Melville	2,000		60																	
Smyrna	2,000		16																	
Mermaid	1,300			100																
Index	1,050																			
Susan	1,150																			
Banyan	800																			
Potomac	1,700																			
Kingson	1,200																			
Cherub	120																			
Daniel Webster																				
	28,080	162	263	1,288	332	3,450	1,078	5	100	52	3	2,350	965	246	4	2,150	253	50	70	170

* In ballast. Landed her cargo, all but five bales domestic goods, at Trieste.

† In ballast from Trieste.

‡ In ballast from Trieste.

SMYRNA, December 31, 1830.

DAVID OFFLEY,
Com. Com. Agent of the United States.

Exportations by American vessels from 1st January to 31st December, 1830.

Vessels' names.	Cases of opium.	Bales of carpets.	Cases of gums.	Quintals of boxwood.	Bales of wool.	Medicals oil of roses.	Casks of raisins.	Drums of figs.	Drums of scammony.	Oks of old copper.	Casks of oil.	Kils. of salt.	Drums of raisins.	Sacks of nuts.	Bales of madder roots.	Bales of sponges.	Packages of currents.	Barrels of dates.	Oranges.	Lemons.	Salted hides.	Casks of wine.	
Leander	190	1	25	-	-	4,500	574	1,800	3	-	-	3,000	275	164	31	45	-	292	10,000	-	-	2,800	-
Tenedos	27	-	17	-	-	7,000	4,400	3,000	-	-	-	2,500	-	-	-	7	-	-	25,000	-	-	-	-
Dove	22	-	10	104	200	3,000	400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	25	-	-	-	3,200	500
Garland	-	2	30	-	-	-	2,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Flora	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Banyan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Don Quixote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
William and Henry	40	-	-	-	-	-	800	5,000	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,500
Henry	25	3	-	-	-	-	185	-	4	2,000	-	-	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	1,200	-
Kingsion	6	-	-	-	80	-	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	8,800	-
Cherub	44	-	100	200	260	-	-	-	-	3,000	-	-	60	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tenedos	-	4	-	-	400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	300	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fanfan	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,000	-	-	-	-	300	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lady's Return	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Phebe Ann	-	-	16	-	-	-	300	12,000	-	-	-	-	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,000	-
Caroline Augusta	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,000	14,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Colon	250	-	-	-	-	-	760	1,500	-	-	-	500	900	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Smyrna	-	-	-	-	38	-	2,500	16,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	-	-	10,000	30,000	-	-	-
Index	-	6	-	-	40	-	-	16,000	-	3,000	60	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mermaid	-	-	-	-	110	-	-	3,000	-	-	270	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Padang	30	-	2	-	-	-	301	24,000	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	400	-
Susan	-	-	-	-	75	-	286	12,560	-	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Leander	145	-	-	-	31	-	200	400	5	-	-	500	-	-	-	-	152	-	-	-	-	-	-
Banyan	-	-	-	-	187	-	1,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	782	16	200	304	1,421	14,500	11,705	121,460	14	13,000	130	6,500	2,335	164	31	139	152	317	45,000	30,000	31,400	2,000	-

SAVRINA, December 31, 1830.

DAVID OFFEEY, Con. Com. Agent of the United States.

List of American vessels, with their inward cargoes, arriving at this port from the 31st of December, 1830, to the 21st of December, 1831.

Vessel's names.	Bags of coffee.	Cases of indigo.	Cases of sugar.	Pack's of ca-sia lignia.	Hogsheads of rum.	Tons of dye-wood.	Packages of cochineal.	Bags of pepper.	Bales domestic goods.	Kegs of manuf. tobacco.	Bags of pimento.	Bales of mankeens.	Boxes of sperm candles.	Barrels of flour.	Cases of boots and shoes.
Palestine ^a	3,000	-	-	477	34	36	-	-	227	-	-	-	-	-	-
Daniel Webster ^b	-	-	227	-	116	35	-	-	110	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tenellos ^b	547	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Elizabeth ^c	1,332	-	192	-	135	45	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-
Clifford Wayne ^c	1,800	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
General Warren ^b	-	-	400	525	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mermaid	84	-	75	1,897	1	-	13	50	-	-	30	-	-	200	-
Fortune	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Edgar ^a	140	14	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bancian	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kingston ^c	200	24	191	-	-	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Padaug	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
General Warren ^f	1,103	-	95	-	2	8	-	230	-	-	-	397	44	12	6
Elizabeth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fortune ^b	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Clifford Wayne ^b	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Elizabeth ^g	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bancian ^b	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mermaid ^h	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kingston	700	-	-	-	33	25	-	-	-	-	32	-	-	-	-
Hebe	375	23	209	-	43	14	-	50	-	-	50	300	-	-	-
Ursula	544	-	-	-	40	-	-	100	-	-	142	-	-	-	-
Cherub	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pavilion ^b	909	13	1,000	-	131	q ^{ly}	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Messenger ^a	-	-	-	-	-	q ^{ly}	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Virginia	-	-	900	-	-	12	-	250	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cazenove ^j	89	-	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Angeline	878	4	161	-	98	20	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-
Curlew	463	-	21	1,040	64	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Henry	30	-	44	-	132	-	-	-	63	-	-	-	-	-	-
Aurora	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tenellos	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Harp ^d	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Messenger ^b	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	11,194	78	3,445	3,939	539	384	19,570	542	70	312	637	44	12	327	7

^a Landed mostly at Constantinople.
^b Constantinople.
^c Remainder cargo landed at Constantinople.
^d These.

^e Siagik.
^f Samos.
^g In distress.
^h Beangasi.

ⁱ Adramitti.
^j Landed at Constantinople.
^k Chesme.

DAVID OFFLEY.

SMYRNA, January 2, 1832.

List of outward cargoes of American vessels sailing from the

port from the 31st December, 1830, to the 31st December, 1831.

Vessels' names.	Cases of opium.	Cases of gums.	Bales of wool.	Cases of soap.	Bales of sponges.	Medicines—oil of roses.	Bottles, oil of roses.	Boxes of oil of roses.	Casks of raisins.	Boxes of raisins.	Drums of Sultana.	Cases of figs.	Drums of figs.	Barrels of goats' wool.	Drums of scammony.	Oks of old copper.	Casks of olive oil.	Sacks of almonds.	Barrels of yellow berries.	Barrels of camels' hair.	Ox and cow-hides.	Casks of old copper.	Bags of walnuts.	Kinials of filberts.	Sticks of boxwood.	Bags of galls.	Boxes of prunes.	Bags of senna.	Kils. of Turkey oil-stone.	Barrels of nut galls.	Sacks of madder root.	Kegs of currents.	Salt.		
Palestine	31	20	702	—	7	—	—	—	315	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Daniel Webster	54	—	30	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Tenedos <i>a</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Elizabeth <i>b</i>	—	—	450	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Clifford Wayne <i>c</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
General Warren <i>b</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Mermaid <i>d</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Fortune <i>a</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Edgar <i>b</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Banan <i>a</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Kingston <i>c</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Padaug	13	—	239	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	659	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
General Warren	—	—	200	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Elizabeth	—	—	129	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Fortune	—	—	69	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Clifford Wayne <i>a</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Elizabeth	—	—	435	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Banan	—	—	460	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Mermaid	—	—	150	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Kingston	—	—	300	302	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Clifford Wayne	22	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Hebe	5	—	51	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Isula	—	—	200	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Cherub	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Pavilion	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Messenger <i>a</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Virginia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Cazenove	3	—	305	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Angeline	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Curtew	—	—	167	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Henry	—	—	129	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Aurora	—	—	143	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Tenedos <i>f</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Tenedos <i>g</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Harb <i>b</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Messenger <i>g</i>	1	6	—	—	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Kingston	129	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Mallville	—	—	300	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Cherub	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
TOTAL	217	91	4,154	610	32	16,181	23	20	2,921	1,619	4,763	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

a Constantinople.
b Samos.

c Adramiti.
d Bengasi.

e Siagik.
f Chesmè.

g In port.

a Constantinople.
b Samos.

c Adramitti.
d Bengasi.

e Siagik.
f Chesne.

g In port.

Smyrna, January 2, 1832.

DAVID OFFLEY.

American Trade to China

Year ending March 31st.	Shipping.		IMPORTS.				EXPORTS. Merchandise.	Estimated Disbursements for Shipping.
	No.	Tons.	Opium. \$	Other Merchandise. \$	Treasure. \$	Total. \$		
1805	34	10,159	—	653,818	2,902,000	3,555,818	3,842,000	238,000
1810	37	12,512	21,664	999,936	4,723,000	5,744,600	5,715,000	259,000
1815	9	2,854	—	451,500	—	451,500	572,000	63,000
1816	30	10,208	54,160	551,340	1,922,000	2,527,500	4,220,000	210,000
1817	38	13,096	330,376	734,224	4,545,000	5,609,600	5,703,000	266,000
1818	39	14,325	303,296	1,172,532	5,601,000	7,076,828	6,777,000	273,000
1819	47	16,377	546,339	1,951,869	7,369,000	9,867,208	9,057,107	329,000
1820	43	15,145	121,860	1,804,640	6,259,300	8,185,800	8,173,000	301,000
1821	26	8,663	—	1,465,500	2,569,500	4,035,000	4,088,000	182,000
1822	45	15,597	259,291	2,815,450	5,125,000	8,199,741	7,058,741	315,000
1823	40	14,557	—	2,046,549	6,292,840	8,339,389	7,523,492	280,000
1824	34	13,069	94,780	2,124,317	4,096,000	6,315,127	5,677,149	238,000
1825	43	16,262	278,247	2,159,298	6,524,500	8,962,045	8,501,119	301,000
1826	42	16,431	—	2,051,101	5,725,200	7,776,301	8,752,562	294,000
1827	26	9,566	37,912	2,364,537	1,841,168	4,243,617	4,373,891	182,000
1828	29	12,090	—	2,754,597	2,640,300	5,394,897	6,576,696	203,000
1829	27	8,613	1,212,040	1,430,325	1,388,500	4,030,865	3,769,049	189,000
1830	34	11,670	614,900	2,572,738	1,123,644	4,311,282	4,211,611	238,000
1831	24	6,995	872,508	3,167,312	183,655	4,223,475	4,344,551	168,000
1832	34	11,357	326,424	2,057,261	667,252	3,050,937	5,999,732	238,000
1833	61	20,621	258,400	2,649,536	682,519	3,590,455	8,372,175	427,000
Total 16 yrs.	594	211,338	4,925,997	34,587,592	58,089,378	97,602,967	103,255,875	4,158,000
Average .	37	13,209	307,875	2,161,724	3,650,586	6,100,185	6,453,492	259,875

Source: Hosea Ballou Morse, *International Relations with the Chinese*, Vol. 1, 89.

TABLE D
OPIUM, 1800-1821

YEAR.	SHIPMENTS TO CHINA.				CONSUMPTION.	
	BENGAL (CALCUTTA).	MALWA.	TURKEY.	TOTAL.	QUANTITY.	VALUE.
	Chests.	Chests.	Chests.	Chests.	Chests.	\$
Average : 1795-1796 to 1796-1798 }	1,814					
1798-1799 to 1799-1800 }	1,793	2,320	—	4,113		
1800-1801 .	3,224	1,346	—	4,570		
1801-1802 .	1,744	2,203	—	3,947		
1802-1803 .	2,033	1,259	—	3,292		
1803-1804 .	2,116	724	—	2,840		
1804-1805 .	2,322	837	—	3,159		
1805-1806 .	2,131	1,705	102	3,938		
1806-1807 .	2,607	1,519	180	4,306		
1807-1808 .	3,084	1,124	150	4,358		
1808-1809 .	3,223	985	—	4,208		
1809-1810 .	3,074	1,487	32	4,593		
1810-1811 .	3,592	1,376	—	4,968		
Average 11 yrs.	2,650	1,324	42	4,016		
1811-1812 .	2,788	2,103	200	5,091		
1812-1813 .	3,328	1,638	100	5,066		
1813-1814 .	3,213	1,556	—	4,769		
1814-1815 .	2,999	674	—	3,673		
1815-1816 .	2,723	1,507	80	4,310		
1816-1817 .	3,376	1,242	488	5,106	3,698	4,084,000
1817-1818 .	2,911	781	448	4,140	4,128	4,178,500
1818-1819 .	2,575	977	807	4,359	5,387	4,745,000
1819-1820 .	1,741	2,265	180	4,186	4,780	5,795,000
1820-1821 .	2,591	1,653	—	4,244	4,770	8,400,800
Average 10 yrs.	2,824	1,440	230	4,494	4,553	5,440,700

Source: Hosea Ballou Morse, *International Relations with the Chinese*, Vol. 1, 209

TABLE E
OPIUM, 1821-1839

YEAR.	SHIPMENTS TO CHINA.					DELIVERIES FOR CONSUMPTION.		
	BENGAL (CALCUTTA).	MALWA.			TURKEY.	TOTAL.	QUANTITY.	VALUE.
		Bombay.	Damán.	Total.				
	Chests.	Chests.	Chests.	Chests.	Chests.	Chests.	Chests.	\$
1821-1822 . . .	3,298	1,600	678	2,278	383	5,959	5,011	8,822,000
1822-1823 . . .	3,918	1,600	2,255	3,855	—	7,773	5,822	7,989,000
1823-1824 . . .	3,360	1,500	1,535	5,535	140	9,035	7,222	8,644,603
1824-1825 . . .	5,960	1,500	2,063	6,063	411	12,434	9,066	7,927,500
1825-1826 . . .	3,810	2,500	1,563	5,563	—	9,373	9,621	7,608,200
1826-1827 . . .	6,570	2,500	2,605	5,605	56	12,231	10,025	9,662,800
1827-1828 . . .	6,650	2,980	1,524	4,504	—	11,154	9,525	10,425,190
Average 7 years . . .	4,795	2,026	1,746	4,772	141	9,708	8,043	8,725,600
1828-1829 . . .	4,903	2,820	3,889	7,709	1,256	13,868	14,388	13,749,000
1829-1830 . . .	7,443	3,502	4,597	8,099	715	16,257	14,715	12,673,500
1830-1831 . . .	5,672	3,720	9,136	12,856	1,428	19,956	20,188	13,744,000
1831-1832 . . .	6,815	4,700	4,633	9,333	402	16,550	16,225	13,150,000
1832-1833 . . .	7,598	11,000	3,007	14,007	380	21,985	21,659	14,222,300
1833-1834 . . .	7,808	—	—	11,715	963	20,486	19,362	12,878,200
1834-1835 . . .	10,207	8,985	2,693	11,678	?	21,885	?	?
Average 7 years . . .	7,207	5,788	4,659	10,899	857	18,712	17,756	13,403,000
1835-1836 . . .	14,851	—	—	15,351	?	30,202	—	—
1836-1837 . . .	12,606	—	—	21,427	743	34,776	—	—
1837-1838 . . .	19,600	—	—	14,773	?	34,373	28,307	19,814,800
1838-1839 . . .	18,212	—	—	21,988	?	40,200	—	—
Average 4 years . . .	16,317	—	—	18,385	743	35,445	—	—
Estimated quantity for China, 1835-39)	14,000	—	—	16,000	743	30,743	—	—

Source: Hosea Ballou Morse, *International Relations with the Chinese*, Vol. 1, 210.

David Offley Portrait



Source: Offley Family Papers