

FRAMING OF THE ANNAN PLAN IN PRINT MEDIA:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation presents a comparative analysis of headline articles, op-eds, and cartoons on the Annan Plan that appeared in Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek newspapers in the month preceding the twin referenda held on 24 April 2004. Relying on two theoretical pillars, the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the Mediterranean Model of Hallin and Mancini (2004), the dissertation includes 12 newspapers central to the issue: *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, *Vatan*, *Charavgi*, *Fileleftheros*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Yeni Şafak*, *Rizospastis*, *Ta Nea*, and *Kathimerini*. The research primarily investigates the patterns of similarity and difference in the use of “win-win”, “win-lose”, “lose-lose”, “there is no alternative”, and “risky gambling” frames in print media. Second, it seeks to clarify whether the coverage of analyzed newspapers displays the characteristics of the Mediterranean Media Model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), such as press-political party parallelism.

By employing content analysis, the collected data from 12 newspapers across three main themes (articles, op-eds, and cartoons) are coded through a detailed codebook. The findings of the study indicate that the game theoretical frames were used not only to present the “yes” or “no” choices by pro-yes and pro-no newspapers, but newspapers with a critical stance refuted the game theoretical logic when questioning the legitimacy of the referendum itself. In this sense, the logic of game theory and prospect theory appears at the backbone of the referendum and how it was framed by print media. Findings also show that this logic originates from policymakers and then finds its place in the print media. Finally, this dissertation sheds light on the complexity of a multiparty conflict where primary and secondary parties adhere to the Mediterranean Media Model.

The research combines several disciplines such as political science, media studies, social psychology, and conflict analysis and resolution, drawing from the related literature. Last but not the least, the comparative content analysis offers an important tool for further research in this domain that could be applied in other cases.

Key words: *Referendum, Annan Peace Plan, frames, content analysis, headline articles, op-eds, print media, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus*

ÖZET

Bu tez, Annan Planı konusunda Kıbrıs Türk kesimi, Kıbrıs Rum kesimi, Türk ve Yunan gazetelerinde 24 Nisan 2004’te yapılan çifte referandumdan önceki bir ayda yer alan manşet haber, makale ve karikatürlerin karşılaştırmalı analizini sunmaktadır. Teorik anlamda Kahneman ve Tversky’nin (1979) Beklenti Teorisi ve Hallin ve Mancini’nin (2004) Akdeniz Medya Modeli (2004) olmak üzere iki temele dayanan bu tez konu için merkezi 12 gazete incelemesini içermektedir: *Afrika, Kıbrıs, Vatan, Charavgi, Fileleftheros, Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Yeni Şafak, Rizospastis, Ta Nea ve Kathimerini*. Bu araştırma öncelikli olarak yazılı basında kullanılan “kazan-kazan”, “kazan-kaybet”, “kaybet-kaybet”, “başka bir alternatif yok” ve “riskli şans oyunları” çerçevelerini incelemektedir. İkinci olarak, analiz edilen gazete içeriklerinin Akdeniz Medya Modeli’nin (Hallin ve Mancini, 2004) basın siyasal parti paralelliği gibi özelliklerini taşıyıp taşımadığına açıklık getirmeyi hedefler.

İçerik analizi uygulanarak, 12 gazetenin manşet haber, makale ve karikatürlerinden toplanan veri detaylı bir kod kitapçığı ile kodlanmıştır. Çalışmanın sonuçları oyun teorisine dayanan çerçevelerin sadece evet ve hayır yanlısı gazetelerin görüşlerini iletmekle kalmayıp, eleştirel gazetelerin referandumun meşruiyetini sorgularken oyun teorisi mantığını da ret ettiklerini ortaya koymuştur. Bu bağlamda, oyun teorisi ve beklenti teorisi referandumun ve yazılı basında sunulduğu çerçevenin bel kemiğini oluşturmaktadır. Bulgular ayrıca bu mantığın politika belirleyicileri tarafından oluşturulup, sonradan yazılı medyada karşılık bulduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Sonuç olarak bu tez, birincil ve ikincil tarafları Akdeniz Medya Modeline uyan çok taraflı bir anlaşmazlığın dinamiklerine ışık tutmaktadır.

Bu araştırma siyaset bilimi, medya çalışmaları, sosyal psikoloji, uyumsuzluk analizi ve çözümü gibi birçok disiplini bir araya getirip, ilgili literatürlerden referans sunmaktadır. Sonuç olarak karşılaştırmalı içerik analizi kullanan bu tez bu alanda devam edecek çalışmalara ve başka vakalara uygulanabilecek bir araç sunmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: *Referandum, Annan Planı, çerçeveler, söylem analizi,manşet haberler, köşe yazıları, karikatürler, yazılı basın, Türkiye, Yunanistan, Kıbrıs*



DEDICATION

To the memory of Fikret Ahsen-Böre,

Who supported me at every stage of writing this dissertation, with his in-depth knowledge of history, politics, and experience in diplomacy— and more important, his trust in me—from Helsinki, Finland.



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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 General Motivation

This dissertation's title "Framing of the Annan Plan in Print Media: A Comparative Analysis" indicates that the study is about how the Annan Plan has been framed in different national newspapers. Indeed, the study looks at how Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Greek newspapers from the left, center and right of the political spectrum framed plan in the month before the referenda. First of all, the Cyprus conflict has been selected, because it is a very good example on linkage politics, operating on five interrelated levels. The levels identified by Michael (2001) are the local, the national, the subregional, the regional and international. The local level refers to the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, the national level refers to Cyprus as a whole, the subregional level refers to the Cyprus, Turkey and Greece triangle, the regional level refers to the EU, Southern European and Middle Eastern countries, and the international level refers to all the international actors such as the United Nations and the US. The presence of five interrelated levels, provides an opportunity in the study of frames, to trace the patterns of similarity and difference, as well as interaction.

Secondly, the dynamics between the conflicting parties also makes the nature of the conflict unique. Michael (2001) underlines a double minority syndrome in relation to Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, where Turkish Cypriots have identified themselves as a minority in the island, and the Greek Cypriots as a minority within its subregional context. Also, in the wider context, the two "motherlands" Turkey and Greece are the only two nations in the world that have won their independence against each other. The second question is why the Annan Referendum. The Annan

Referendum was selected because it is a point in the conflict, where the parties came closest to a resolution.

The Referendum was the single main news story Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Greek newspapers for a month. Naturally this resulted in an immense amount of debate on the subject in the public space, i.e., newspapers. The newspapers became a forum in which the Annan Plan and Cyprus conflict were discussed. Some newspapers supported the plan, whereas others opposed it, yet a very dynamic discussion took place. The pursuit of this study was to look at the discussions metaphorically speaking under a magnifying glass, seeking to understand not only the relationship between media frames and voters' choices, but also how parties relate to oneself, the other and third parties. In other words, the pursuit of this study has been to understand the mental map of the conflict in the minds conflicting parties. The search has been for the frames, or patterns of thought in the Turkish Cypriot, and Turkish news "meydan"¹, likewise Greek Cypriot and Greek news "πλατεία"²

1.2 Purpose of the study

One definition of conflict is a process characterized by stages of initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, de-escalation, and termination either as settlement or conflict resolution (Sandole, 2003). To better understand a conflict, conflict resolution theory separates the process of conflict into parts such as parties, issues, objectives, means, conflict-handling orientations, and conflict environments. Also, theory provides general explanations on how every conflict proceeds; yet the pattern of every conflict has a unique development and resolution that depends on many things including history, culture, and perceptions. To speak metaphorically, a conflict

¹ Turkish word for square

² Greek word for square

is like a river, and every river takes its own course. The course the Cyprus conflict has taken has been very complex and continues to be as such. Why is this so? First of all, Cyprus is a Mediterranean island of strategic importance, with a colonial history. Second, it is a multi-issue, multi-party conflict. Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are the primary parties of the conflict, Turkey and Greece are secondary parties, and the UN, the EU, and the US are third parties. Issues range from guarantorship, territory, military presence, displaced persons, properties, to settlers and immigrants.

The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), deployed since 1964, is the UN's longest-serving peacekeeping mission. So far, concepts such as parties and issues have been reviewed, yet all gain meaning through perception. Only when coupled with perception can the issues in a conflict gain significance. Self-perception and the perception of the other make society's parties, or adversaries, in a conflict, and it is the media that shapes perceptions. This study focuses on the Cyprus conflict, at a time when it came closest to resolution, in the month prior to the April 24 Annan Referendum. It explores the coverage of the Annan Plan in the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek media and seeks to understand the frames within which the plan was presented by the parties. Conflict is never static. Rather it is dynamic, with constant changes, developments, adaptations, and reactions. The newspaper coverages on the conflict provides researchers the opportunity to understand how this process occurs, or rather, how it is given meaning.

This study offers an examination of the above-mentioned process by presenting a comparative content analysis of headline articles, op-eds, and cartoons that appeared in the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek newspapers about the Annan Plan during the April 2004, when the referendum took place. The analysis covers 12 newspapers: *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, *Vatan*, *Charavgi*, *Fileleftheros*, *Machi*,

Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Yeni Şafak, Rizospastis, Ta Nea, and Kathimerini. The research questions are as follows:

RQ 1: What are the patterns of similarity and difference in the use of win-lose, win-win, lose-lose, there is no alternative, and risky gambling frames in the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Greek newspapers analyzed?

“Win-win,” “win-lose,” and “lose-lose” are game theory terms that describe the outcomes of a particular negotiation. They also have been adapted to the field of conflict resolution. A “win-win” outcome occurs when each party perceives that it has won. Usually, this outcome is reached after an integrative bargaining process. “Win-lose” outcomes take place when one party perceives that it has won and the other that it has lost. In most cases, this outcome is reached after a distributive bargaining process. “Lose-lose” outcomes are when all parties are worse off than at the beginning of the negotiation (Spangler, 2003). The “there is no alternative frame” builds on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory that postulates that gains and losses are valued differently. According to prospect theory, which is also known as loss-aversion theory, more weight is put on perceived gains. The risky gambling framework is a schema of understanding developed by this study to refer to the association of voting affirmatively or negatively during the Annan Referendum to games of chance and risk-taking.

RQ 2: Does the coverage of the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek newspapers of the Annan Plan demonstrate characteristics of the Mediterranean Media Model such as press-political party parallelism? What additions to the Mediterranean Media Model can the findings of this content analysis make?

RQ 2 focuses on to what extent the content analysis findings confirm that the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek coverage of the Annan Referendum fit Hallin and Mancini's (2004) Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralistic Media Model. After their study of media in western democracies, Hallin and Mancini suggested that there are three media models: the Mediterranean or polarized pluralist model; the North, Central European or Democratic corporatist model; and the North Atlantic or Liberal model. Accordingly, five countries constitute examples to this model: Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France.

The main characteristics of the media in these Southern European countries, all of which have experienced periods of authoritarian rule, are a low level of newspaper circulation, press political-party parallelism, weaker professionalization, and a high level of state intervention. Papathassopoulos (2007) extended Hallin and Mancini's initial list, suggesting that also Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta can be given as examples of the Mediterranean Media Model. This study focuses on patterns of press political-party parallelism, internal pluralism, and commentary-oriented journalism in the newspapers selected. The study examines how the two primary parties in the conflict, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, and two secondary parties, namely Turkey and Greece, all of which can be said to have the Mediterranean-type media, covered the Annan Plan.

1.3 Methodology

This study carries out a content analysis of headline articles, op-eds, and cartoons about the Annan plan published between October 2002 and May 2004 in 12 newspapers. A newspaper representing the left, a newspaper representing the center, and a newspaper representing the right of the political spectrum have been selected

from each primary and secondary party to the conflict. The Turkish Cypriot newspapers selected for the analysis are *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, and *Vatan*; the Greek Cypriot newspapers are *Charavgi*, *Fileleftheros*, and *Machi*; the Turkish newspapers are *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Yeni Şafak*; and the Greek newspapers are *Rizospastis*, *Ta Nea*, and *Kathimerini*. The content analysis covers three data sets, each consisting of one unit of analysis. The findings of each dataset are discussed in one analysis chapter. The first dataset (D1) consists of 332 headline articles, the second dataset (D2) of 1237 op-eds, and the third dataset (D3) of 347 cartoons, making the sum total of the data 1916. The coding of the datasets was done by one Turkish native speaker and one Greek native speaker, both from the field of political science and international relations. The “Depiction of the 2004 Referendum on the Annan Plan” codebook was used for the coding.

1.4 Overview of Chapters

In this chapter, the purpose of study was discussed. Chapter Two provides background information on the subject matter. Chapter Three presents the theoretical basis of the two research questions. First, it discusses the Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), provides an overview of key communication theory concepts such as agenda setting, priming and framing, and reviews applications of Prospect Theory in the fields of international relations and political science. Second, it discusses the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Media Model introduced by Hallin and Mancini (2004), and provides an overview of the concept of Press-Political Party Parallelism developed by Seymour-Ure (1974).

Chapter Four presents the research methodology of the study. It introduces the research questions and units of analysis and then explains the data selection, coding,

and analysis processes. Third, it introduces the codebook used for analysis in with an overview of its sections.

Chapters Five, Six, and Seven provide analysis and discussion of the findings from the headline articles, op-eds, and cartoons, respectively. Each chapter has a section on comparative frequency, press political party parallelism, and support to the Annan Plan, findings from Turkish Cypriot newspapers, Greek Cypriot newspapers, Turkish newspapers and Greek newspapers. The chapters provide a comparative analysis, focusing on patterns of similarity and difference in the analyzed headlines, op-eds and cartoons.

The final chapter of the study, Chapter Eight, presents the conclusion. It reviews the outcomes of the analysis and elaborates on the significance of the outcomes in relation to Prospect Theory and the Mediterranean Media Model. It presents an overview of the current situation of the Cyprus conflict, with a short discussion on future prospects. Finally, it discusses the contributions and shortcomings of this study, and opens a window for further research.

CHAPTER 2

OVERVIEW OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the parties to the Cyprus conflict, the history of the Cyprus conflict, an overview of the Annan Plan, and a discussion on constitution-making and conflict transformation.

2.2 Parties to the Cyprus Conflict and national contexts during the Annan Plan

Paul Wehr's (1979) conflict map distinguishes between primary parties, secondary parties, and third parties. Primary parties are defined as parties who oppose one another, use fighting behavior, and have a direct stake in the outcome of the conflict. Following this definition, the primary parties in the Cyprus conflict are Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Secondary parties are defined as those who have indirect stakes in the outcome. They are not direct adversaries but are often allies or sympathizers with primary parties. Thus, we can say that in the Cyprus conflict, Turkey and Greece are the secondary parties. Third parties are defined as actors such as mediators and peacekeeping forces which can intervene to facilitate conflict resolution. In the case of Cyprus, the UN, US, and the EU are the principal third parties.

To understand the Cyprus conflict, we first need to understand the issues the primary parties prioritize. The Turkish Cypriots sought to secure the post-1974

conditions by preserving their basic administrative structures (Michael, 2007).

Autonomy and self-determination appear as key issues for Turkish Cypriots both inside and outside the negotiation process (Ertegun, 1984). They showed a preference for a confederation or loose federation.

On the other hand, the events of 1974 constitute the main reference point for the Greek Cypriots, causing a general sense of insecurity. The Greek Cypriots have reservations about a federal or transitional government and emphasize the demilitarization of the island. Thus, the current situation appears to them as more desirable than any federal solution that does not include a strong central authority and withdrawal of Turkish troops. Interestingly, Michael (2007) points out a double insecurity dilemma experienced by both communities and their motherlands. From the Greek Cypriot side, there is suspicion of Turkish Cypriot secessionist objectives and fear of Turkish occupation. The Turkish Cypriots for their part, feel insecurity in relation to a possible return to the pre-1974 situation as a minority in the island.

Another key to understanding the mindsets of the parties is familiarity with each national context. Let us begin with the political context of Southern Cyprus. A significant development in the Turkish Cypriot political scene was the development of a strong opposition. Left-wing opposition parties such as the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and the Communal Liberation Party (TKP) advocated coexistence with Greek Cypriots, and also less dependence on Turkey (Michael, 2007). On 14 December 2003, national elections took place in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) during which the CTP received 35.17 % of the votes. On 11 January 2004, the leader of CTP, Mehmet Ali Talat, formed a government in coalition with *Demokrat Parti* (DP), traditionally more rationalist. Thus, during the referendum, Rauf Denktash was president, Mehmet Ali Talat was prime minister, and Serdar

Denktash was minister of foreign affairs (Dodd, 2003). Inevitably, having a pro-Annan Plan government in office was influential in assuring a “yes” vote in Northern Cyprus.

The parliamentary elections of 14 December 2003 in Northern Cyprus as well as the presidential elections of 16 February 2003 in Southern Cyprus were dominated by the Annan Referendum. On the Turkish Cypriot side, a CTP-DP coalition led by pro-settlement prime minister Mehmet Ali Talat, came out of the ballots. On the other hand, in the South of the island, the leader of the Democrat Party (DIKO), Thasos Papadopoulos, who had reservations about the Annan Plan, won the elections with 51% of the vote (Samaras, 2005), and became president following the ten-year presidency of Glafkos Clerides, who had been favorable to the Annan Plan. Katsis (2002) points out that the rejectionist/concessionist polarization had replaced the former left/right political divide in the political landscape of the South before the referendum. In the parliamentary elections that took place on 27 May 2001, the Communist Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) won 34.7% of the votes, the liberal conservative Democratic Rally (DISY) founded by Glafkos Clerides received 34.0% and DIKO 15.8%.

In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the parliamentary elections of 2 November 2002 with a landslide victory, leading to the formation of a stable, single-party government under the premiership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Phillips, 2004). In 2004, the year in which the twin referenda on the Annan Plan took place, the Turkish government consisted of both secular and Islamic components. In other words, the hegemony of Islamist politics had not materialized fully. Secular politician Ahmet Necdet Sezer was president of the Republic led by the government of Prime Minister Erdoğan. The military still had its traditional presence in Turkish

politics, apparent in the National Security Council. Yet, Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök made it clear on several occasions that he was cooperating with the Erdoğan government.

After assuming office, Erdoğan supported the Annan Plan and made an important shift in Turkish foreign policy by distancing his government from the hawkish Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktash (Phillips, 2004). The main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), was critical of the plan. In regards to Turkey-EU relations in the period, Turkey was given the prospect of EU accession at the 1999 Helsinki Summit. In the Copenhagen Summit of 2002, the EU declared that it would open accession negotiations with Turkey once it fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria (Aydın-Düzgüt & Çarkoğlu, 2009). Yet the commencement of accession negotiations was put under conditionality, where the EU made clear that Turkey could not block Cypriot accession to the EU, by refraining from contributing to the resolution of the conflict.

In Greece, the parliamentary elections took place on 7 March 2004 and the leader of the center-right New Democracy, Kostas Karamanlis, formed his government after receiving the vote of confidence on March 23. Former prime minister Kostas Simitis, leader of the left-wing PASOK expressed its support of the Annan Plan. In contrast, in his discourse, Karamanlis underlined that the decision belonged to the Greek Cypriots (Marrogordatos, 2005). Thus, the overview of the national contexts of the primary and secondary parties indicates that the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments were supportive of the Annan Plan, the Greek Cypriot government was against it, and the Greek government was neutral. The frames present in the newspapers analyzed cannot be thought of independently from the political contexts in the primary and secondary

parties, especially given that some of the newspapers analyzed present a high degree of press-political party parallelism.

2.3 Overview of the Cyprus Conflict

Undoubtedly, the Cyprus conflict is one of the most complex conflicts in history. The multiparty nature of the conflict can be stated as one of the reasons for its complexity. The principal parties to the conflict were the Greek Cypriot community, the Turkish Cypriot community, Greece, and Turkey (Tocci, 2004). The third parties were mainly the EU, the US, and the UN. This study divides into three the periods from the island's independence until its EU accession: 1960-1974, an independent Cyprus; 1974-1993, Cyprus divided in two; and 1993 onwards, the Europeanization of the conflict. The post-accession period will be evaluated in the conclusion chapter of this study.

1960-1974: An Independent Cyprus

The period of independence began in 1960 and corresponds to the escalation of conflict, with two peaks, one during the 1964 crisis and the second during the Turkish interventions of 1974. In 1960, Cyprus became an independent Republic with a constitution based on power-sharing principles. The constitution granted a national legislature as well as two communal chambers. Makarios became president and Küçük vice-president of the newly independent Republic. The constitution also allowed sovereign British military bases and the stationing of small Greek and Turkish contingents. Britain, Turkey, and Greece were constitutionally granted the right to carry out military operations to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the government (Fischer, 2001; Oran, 2001).

On 30 November 1963, Makarios proposed 13 constitutional amendments that breached the power-sharing nature of the 1960 constitution. Accordingly, the Turkish Cypriots' veto powers, the requirement for separate majorities in parliament, and the ratio were to be annulled. On 6 December, Küçük rejected the proposal, as did Turkey. This instigated a Greek Cypriot military assault on the Turkish areas of the island (Bölükbaşı, 1996; Oran, 2001). In January 1964, Turkish Cypriots who had been subject to violence abandoned their homes and fled to Turkish enclaves, which constituted less than 5% of the island's territory.

The London Conference convened on 15 December to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The proposal to install NATO contingents on the island was rejected by Makarios, who favored a UN presence on the island. Thus, the issue was brought to the attention of the UN and in March 1964, based on resolution 186, the Security Council sent a peace-keeping mission to the island. The peace-keeping mission, however, failed to prevent the further escalation of the conflict. During the 1964 crisis, İsmet İnönü was the prime minister of Turkey. The İnönü government notified Britain and the US that it could intervene in the island militarily should the grave conditions continue. The Johnson administration responded with a document known as the Johnson Letter, which is often interpreted as a turning point in Turkish-American relations. The letter stated that NATO members had not made up their minds on whether they were obligated to protect Turkey if Turkey were to take a step that resulted in a Soviet intervention. This meant that if Turkey were to invade the island, it would no longer be under NATO protection. The letter also made clear that Turkey could not use US-supplied weapons in an invasion of Cyprus. It is not known whether Johnson's letter prevented the landing of Turkish troops on the island. Bölükbaşı suggests that the Turkish army, which lacked landing craft, would not have

been able to carry out a military operation. Oran (2001) states that the letter provided an official excuse not to carry out a military assault and prompted the İnönü government to follow the diplomatic route.

The Geneva Conference convened in July to discuss former US Secretary of State Acheson's plan. The US pressured Turkey and Greece into an agreement; however, the conference did not yield any desirable outcomes since the Cypriot government had refused to participate. Cypriot government forces imposed a blockade on the Turkish Cypriots in the northern Erenköy region. Ankara responded to the Greek Cypriot assault with an air strike in August 1964. A British-US-supported UN initiative achieved a cease-fire.

On 16 December 1965, the Cyprus issue once again was brought to the attention of the UN. The General Assembly objected to a third-party intervention on the basis that Cyprus was an independent state with full sovereignty.

In Greece, a military junta seized power in Athens in April 1967, and the "Régime of the Colonels" governed the country until 1974. The years following the advent of military rule in Greece should be analyzed in this light. Grivas, the commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, attacked the Turkish Cypriot villages of Geçitkale and Boğaziçi and seized control on 15 November. The same night, Demirel, the Turkish prime minister at the time, convened his council of ministers. The decision to launch an intervention on the island was announced, yet a military operation was not possible because of insufficient naval capacity (Bölükbaşı, 1996; Oran, 2001).

An agreement was reached as a result of the mediation efforts of Cyrus Vance, the envoy of US President Johnson. The military rule in Greece accepted the recall of

its forces, but Makarios refused to disband the National Guard. Nevertheless, on 3 December 1967, both countries agreed to withdraw all illegal foreign troops from Cyprus. Following the 1967 crisis, a provisional Turkish administration that controlled Turkish enclaves covering 250 square kilometers was established and inter-communal talks commenced. In 1968, Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktaş commenced inter-communal talks on a new constitution, but the talks broke down in 1973 without an agreement since Makarios rejected a solution without Enosis³ (Hale, 2000).

What were the conditions that led to the Turkish intervention on the island? For reasons explained above, twice before 1974, Turkey had come close to landing troops on the island, once during the premiership of İnönü and second during that of Demirel. On 15 July of that year, the military junta of Greece organized a coup d'état against Makarios. Nikos Sampson, known for his killings in the EOKA campaign during the 1950s, was made president of Cyprus (Hale, 2000). In Turkey, Ecevit was the prime minister of a coalition government. He first approached Britain to explore the possibilities of joint intervention. Then, on 20 July, Turkey launched its first military operation, using its right provided by Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. On 22 July, Turkey agreed to a cease-fire and decided to participate in the Geneva Conference. A result of the first Turkish intervention was the establishment of a civilian government in Athens on 23 July, under the premiership of Constantine Karamanlis, ending the Régime of the Colonels. The next day, Clerides became head of the provisional Greek Cypriot government.

A conference was convened in Geneva on 25 July with the participation of Clerides, Denktaş, and British, Greek, and Turkish delegations. First, Denktaş

³ Unification with Greece

requested a federation in which 34% of the territory would be given to Turkish Cypriots. Minister of Foreign Affairs Doğan Güneş presented Clerides a "cantonal" plan that envisaged six cantons to be given to Turkish Cypriots. Clerides and his foreign minister asked for 36 hours to decide. The Turkish side was not satisfied with this reply.

The Turkish armed forces launched their second operation on the morning of 14 August. The second intervention led to Turkish control of 36% of the territory and the displacement of 150,000 Greek Cypriots. Ecevit had counted on using the intervention to pressure the Greeks at the negotiation table, but things did not turn out as expected. With the second intervention, Turkey lost its legitimacy and the international support it had gained during the first intervention. Oran (2001) states that the second intervention was viewed as illegitimate mainly because Greece was no longer led by a military junta and Turkey had carried out the operation before the Geneva Conference had ended. The UN General Assembly Resolution 3212 of 1 November 1974 asked for the removal of all foreign military forces from Cyprus.

1974-1993: Cyprus Divided into Two

The period from 1974 to 1990 corresponds to a stalemate in negotiations. As of 1974, Cyprus was de facto divided in two, with the north of the island governed by Turkish Cypriots and the south governed by Greek Cypriots. Around 40,000 Turks from Turkey were settled in the Turkish regions to compensate the workforce deficit (Oran, 2001). The Greek Cypriots resented this decision. For Turkey, the gravest consequence of its intervention on the island was the US embargo. As of 5 January, 1975, Washington implemented a congressionally-approved arms embargo that was to

last for three years. Turkey retaliated by closing the military bases in Turkey to American use.

On 7 December 1974, just a few months after the Turkish interventions, Makarios returned to the island, replacing Glafkos Clerides. On 13 January 1975, the Cypriot Turkish Federative State was declared (Birand, 1985).

The UN played an active role in bringing the parties together. In accordance with Security Council Resolution no. 367, Denktas and Makarios held meetings in Vienna, under the auspices of UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, from 28 April 1975 to 21 February 1976 (Oran, 2003). During the meetings, the leaders made an agreement on population exchange. Partly due to Turkish isolation in the international community, in 1976, the Demirel government decided to take an initiative on the Cyprus issue, prompting Denktas to propose a meeting to Makarios. On 12 February 1977, the leaders agreed on four main issues to be discussed: Cyprus was to be an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federation. However, in the August of the same year, Makarios died and the negotiations broke down once more.

The following year, the US, Britain, and Canada proposed the ABC Plan, which envisaged a bicomunal federation of two constituent parts. Unfortunately, the plan was rejected by the new Greek Cypriot leader, Spyros Kyprianou. UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim then brought Kyprianou and Denktas together on 18-19 May 1979 and the leaders made an agreement on ten principles based on Security Council Resolutions on Cyprus and the Denktas-Makarios agreement of 1977. The leaders agreed to discuss territorial and constitutional issues, the demilitarization of the island, the opening of Maraş (Varosha) for settlement under UN administration, and assurances against division and unification with another country (Oran, 2003).

The main developments regarding the Cyprus issue in the 1980s were the 1980-1983 intercommunal talks, the establishment of the TRNC in 1983, and the 1984-86 proximity talks. The background factors that influenced the intercommunal talks were, first, the 12 September 1980 coup d'état in Turkey and ensuing military control for the following three years. When the coup d'état took place, the intercommunal talks had already started. On 2 January 1984, Denktaş proposed a set of ideas on a possible settlement to the UN secretary general, including steps to be taken in regard to Maras, the opening of Lefkoşa international airport, and the creation of a committee on lost people. Following Denktaş's set of ideas, the secretary general proposed a plan on the issue of Maraş to both parties; however, the plan was rejected by Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianou (Fisher, 2001; Heraclides, 2011; Oran 2001). Thus, the intercommunal talks ended without a settlement.

Following the 6 November 1983 elections in Turkey, the military rule ended, and a civilian, Turgut Özal, became prime minister. The Özal government declared the solution of the Cyprus problem a priority. The proximity talks between Denktaş and Kyprianou had already started in New York. An agreement on a draft that carried the principles of an independent, bizonal, bicomunal federation with two official languages was reached. The first direct meeting between the leaders for years took place in New York on 17 November 1985 to discuss the draft settlement. However, since Greek Prime Minister Papandreu had not authorized Kyprianou to sign the draft agreement, the meeting ended without an agreed settlement.

On 15 November 1983, the TRNC was declared, creating two de facto states on the island. The declaration, however, was only recognized by Turkey. Oran (2003) underlines that the declaration of the TRNC was a departure from the principle of

federation and meant that the new basis of the status quo, and thus a solution, had become two states instead of two communities.

On 21 January 1988, George Vassiliou became president of Cyprus. Vassiliou and Denktaş held two summit meetings in Geneva and New York. On 2 July 1989, Cuellar proposed a settlement to the leaders, but the proposal was rejected by Denktaş, who then submitted his views on the application of the principle of self-determination for both communities. This was refused by Vassiliou. The stalemate continued.

1993-2004: Europeanization of the Conflict

The most crucial change concerning the Cyprus issue in the 1990s was the Europeanization of the conflict, which began with the Greek Cypriot government's application for EU membership (Fisher, 2001; Oran, 2003). On 30 June 1993, the European Commission welcomed the application. The Greek Cypriot government's application to the EU did not take a separate course from Turkish-Greek and Turkish-EU relations. Therefore, the process can be better understood by examining how the linkage of issues took place.

As stated above, the EU commission welcomed the Greek Cypriot application in 1993. Two years later, under the premiership of Tansu Çiller in Turkey, a customs union agreement between Turkey and the EU was signed. Thus, the development in Turkish-EU relations led Turkey to tolerate the Greek Cypriot application. A crisis took place following the 12 December 1997 Luxembourg Summit, during which Cyprus, together with Central and Eastern European countries, was given candidate status, but Turkey was not. The accession negotiations with Cyprus started on 31 March 1998 (Fisher, 2001; Oran, 2003). Turkey reacted immediately, by forming an

association agreement that sought economic and military integration with the TRNC (Fisher, 2001).

The EU presented Turkey a route to accession, in conditionality with the Cyprus issue. Turkey was given candidate status finally at the December 1999 Helsinki summit. As a result of the rapprochement between the two countries that had occurred earlier in the same year, Greece lifted its veto (Heraclides, 2011). Turkish-Greek relations reached a nadir after the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in the Greek embassy in Kenya.

The new foreign minister of the Simitis government, Yorgo Papandreu, and İsmail Cem, the foreign minister of the Ecevit government, carried out bilateral meetings, engineering a rapprochement between their countries. This first-track diplomacy was complimented with second-track diplomacy when Greek rescue teams participated in the search and rescue efforts following the catastrophic 17 August 1999 earthquake in İzmit, Turkey. Following the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, Turkey was given candidate status. However, the clauses attached to the Helsinki decision clarified that Cyprus would be admitted to the EU irrespective of a resolution to the conflict (Fisher, 2001; Oran, 2003; Heraclides, 2011). Thus, the Helsinki summit decisions, although cheered in Turkey, led to the disappointment of the Turkish Cypriot negotiation team that had been engaged with the Greek Cypriots in talks in New York since the beginning of December.

The Europeanization of the Cyprus issue also was witnessed in the legal realm with the Loizidou case, which set a precedent for later legal cases. In July 1998, the European Court of Human Rights found the Republic of Turkey guilty of denying Ms.

Titiana Loizidou access to her property in Northern Cyprus. According to the judgement, Turkey had to pay Ms. Loizidou CYP 320,000 in compensation.

The UN-led conflict resolution efforts went side by side with the process of Europeanization. The new Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Gali prepared a roadmap for negotiations known as “the Gali set of ideas on an overall framework agreement on Cyprus.” The Gali set of ideas foresaw a ratio of 50 to 50 in the upper house and a ratio of 70 to 30 in the lower house. Following the report of Gali, the Security Council passed Resolution 750 in April 1992, giving itself the right to be involved in negotiations.

The proximity talks between Denktaş and Clerides were held from 18 June to 14 August 1994 in New York. The main subject areas of discussion were to be territory, displaced people, and the constitution. Boutros-Gali proposed a map that necessitated Turkish withdrawal from Maraş and Güzelyurt. Maraş (Varosha) was to be re-opened for settlement. The Boutros-Gali set of ideas also foresaw the UN-administered Lefkoşa (Nicosia) international airport open to civilian and cargo traffic. The map reduced Turkish Cypriot territory to 28.20% of the overall territory. Denktaş, whose bottom line was 29%, refused to negotiate over the map. Also, the use of Cyprus Turkish Airlines of the airport and the status of the road linking Maraş to the Greek Cypriot zone emerged as problematic issues (Bölükbaşı, 1993, 1994; Oran, 2003).

The Greek Cypriot government made an agreement with Russia on the installation of S-300 missiles on the island. This was unacceptable to Turkey. The crisis was resolved by the decision to install the missiles on Crete instead of Cyprus. Another crisis during the 1990s happened following the confrontation of nationalists

of both communities in the buffer zone called the “Green Line,” established by the UN to divide Lefkoşe (Nicosia). A Greek Cypriot was beaten and later died in hospital. The crisis was aggravated by the shooting of a Greek Cypriot trying to pass the Green Line following the funeral of the deceased (Oran, 2003).

The period of Europeanization (1990-2002) corresponds to a second stage of stalemate and failed conflict resolution attempts. The importance of the legal realm highlighted by the Lozidou case is another characteristic of this period. Cyprus’s EU membership following the twin referenda on the Annan Plan on 1 May 2004 created an odd situation for the northern part of the island. De Waal (2018) explains that although the TRNC is de facto closer to Turkey, de jure it remains part of the EU. Yet, despite being formally part of the EU, the *acquis communautaire* has been suspended until the unification of the island (de Waal, 2018).

2.4 The Overview of the Annan Plan

The Annan Plan is referred to as the most comprehensive attempt to find a solution to the Cyprus conflict. The plan, developed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, was first introduced in January 2002. The document was revised five times to find a common ground between the two sides. The final version is known as Annan V. Finally, on 24 April 2004, the twin referenda on the Annan Plan that envisaged a unification of the island was approved by the Turkish Cypriots with 64.91% and rejected by the Greek Cypriots by 75.83% votes. Following the referenda, the Greek Cypriot government joined the European Union without a solution to the conflict (Ulusoy and Verney, 2009; Varnava and Faustman, 2009). This study examines the general features of the Annan Plan and the UN peace plan that intertwined with the

Turkish and Cypriot accession processes to the EU. It seeks to explain why the Turkish Cypriots voted “yes” and Greek Cypriots voted “no.”

The plan covered the seven major issues of the conflict: the political system, guarantorship, three freedoms, territorial adjustment, military buildup, displaced persons and properties, settlers and immigrants, and EU membership (Sözen and Özersay, 2007). In regard to the political system, the plan envisaged the formation of two constituent states and one federal common state (Oran, 2013; Sözen and Özersay, 2007). The status and relationship between the component states and federal state were inspired by the Swiss example, while the EU and foreign policy-related matters were inspired by the Belgian example. The legislative was to be based on a bicameral parliament composed of a senate and a chamber of deputies. Half of the senators and at least a quarter of the deputies were to be Turkish Cypriots. The plan also proposed the establishment of a supreme court, consisting of Cypriot and non-Cypriot members.

On the issue of guarantorship, the plan foresaw that the 1960 treaty of guarantee would remain in force. As to the three freedoms, no restrictions were put on the freedom of movement; however, the freedom of settlement and freedom of property had some restrictions. The rights of return provided for the return of refugees in large numbers, although Greek Cypriots residing in the North made up 18% of the population in the next 19 years (Asmussen 2004; Sözen and Özersay, 2007). Additionally, land and property claims were to be dealt with by a property board. Concerning territorial adjustment, the amount of Turkish Cypriot territory was to be reduced to 29%. On military buildup, the plan envisaged a timetable for foreign troop withdrawal, according to which 650 Turkish and 950 Greek military personnel would

remain on the island. The plan foresaw a lightly armed, separate police force for each state, and a police force for the federal state.

The plan introduced a complex formula in relation to displaced persons and properties. The remaining displaced persons not settled within the framework of territorial adjustment either would be reinstated to their former properties or compensated financially. As for settlers and immigrants, the plan allowed 45,000 immigrants and settlers on both sides. The settlers and immigrants to remain were to be selected based on criteria such as marriage, period of employment, and residency. Finally, in regard to EU membership, the plan stated that the arrangements for the agreement would be incorporated into the *acquis communautaire*. However, given that Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004 without a solution, this last point became void.

2.5 Constitution making and conflict transformation

In recent literature on political science, there is a linkage between constitution-making and conflict transformation. Questions such as how constitution making can be helpful in conflict transformation, and a review of successful and unsuccessful examples may be helpful to understand the linkage. First, it is essential to grasp the different dynamics of traditional constitution-making and new school constitution making. Traditional constitution-making in the sense of liberal western constitutionalism is mainly about the exercise of power, creation of institutions, setting limitations, and providing guarantees (Hart, 2001). The traditional constitution-making experience is the result of elite or intergovernmental negotiations. They represent a top-down approach. On the other hand, new constitution-making is

singled out as a process rather than a completed event. Secondly, it deals with groups, identities, individuals and rights. It is not top-down, but rather bottom-up. It can be characterized as a forum for negotiation in deeply divided societies. What have passed experiences around the world shown us and what can we say about the Cyprus conflict and constitution-making?

The 1998 Belfast Agreement of Northern Ireland and the 1996 constitution of South Africa can be cited as successful examples of constitution-making. Until the 1998 Belfast Agreement, constitution-making in Northern Ireland was concerned with procedures, assemblies, electoral systems, law and order. Issues such as equality between the citizens of Northern Ireland were omitted. The Belfast Agreement was a success, precisely because it addressed the guarantees of equality. If we look at the South African constitution of 1993, and the final constitution of 1996, equality between citizens and between the citizens and the state were crucial, and therefore these constitutions are cited as successful examples in the history of constitution making. As to why treaties or constitutions fail to reach the people, the Danish vote against the European Union Maastricht treaty can be shown as an example. The failure often has been attributed to top-down processes imposed by strong provincial or member state government (Hart, 2001)

What place does constitution-making play in the Cyprus issue? Mendez and Triga (2009) underline that the 1960 constitution was the foundational constitutional act of the republic. They underline that the 1960 constitution turned out to be an unstable compromise, and was the result of elite agreement, thus constituting and example to top-down rather than bottom-up constitution-making. Furthermore the authors draw a parallel between the 1960 constitution and the constitutional order envisaged by in 2004 by the Annan Plan (Mendes and Triga, 2009). First, both

processes are characterized as elite negotiations in which external actors had the lead. In 1960, it was the guarantor powers, namely Great Britain, Turkey, and Greece, and in 2004, the UN, with the backing of the guarantor powers. Finally, the operational features of constitution making include the mode of representation, the mode of communicative interaction, and the mode of legitimation. In relation to the mode of representation, either the leaders of social groups or citizens of a certain constituency select their representatives. The mode of interaction presents a distinction between a “bargaining” and “deliberative” type of communication, where the prior comes close to a win/lose logic whereas the latter is more the result of open/ sharing understanding. In the mode of legitimation, either the constitution making process is ratified by the political elite, or alternatively by popular vote.

If we look at the mode of representation, the mode of communicative interaction, and the mode of legitimation in the Annan Plan, we can see hints to why it unfolded as it did. As to the mode of representation, both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots were represented by their governments, so it can be argued that representationally the process was sufficient. However, the mode of interaction falls more in the category of bargaining than deliberative. Even, the use of the “there is no alternative” frame that constitutes the subject of this study is proof of the use of the bargaining logic. The twin referenda held in both North and South of the island indicate the pattern of legitimization of the constitution. This short review demonstrates that the deficit was mainly in the interaction part of the constitution-making.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the parties, issues, and history of the conflict. Also, it summarized the Annan Plan, and elaborated on the relation of constitution-making and conflict transformation. The conflict map that this chapter presented will serve as a key to understanding the newspaper coverages of the conflict that is the subject of this study.



CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

3.1 Introduction

This study stands on two theoretical pillars: The prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the Mediterranean media model of Hallin and Mancini (2004). The chapter begins with an overview of decision-making theories with an emphasis on prospect theory and then explains central concepts in the study of communication such as agenda-setting and framing. Furthermore, it reviews the applications of prospect theory in the fields of international relations and political science. Finally, it discusses the Mediterranean media model and key concepts of this model such as press-political party parallelism.

3.2 Prospect Theory

Many researchers use the logic of strategic games to develop a theory on decision-making and economic behavior. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced the expected-utility theory in their book, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*. The theory states that under conditions of risk and uncertainty, individuals seek to maximize their gains by ranking the expected utilities of alternative actions. Thus, the rational behavior of decision-makers is at the core of expected utility theory. Expected utility is calculated by multiplying the value of each possible outcome with the probability of that outcome occurring.

Since the late 1970s, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have challenged the rationality principle of expected utility theory and developed prospect theory as an

alternative model to understand decision-making under risk. Prospect theory explains how alternative descriptions of the same outcome led to shifts of preferences.

Kahneman and Tversky (1979) conducted an experiment on students at Stanford University and the University of British Columbia to prove how framing an outcome affects choices. They told the first groups of students to assume that there was an outbreak of an unusual Asian disease in which a loss of 600 people was expected. They were asked to choose between two alternative programs to combat the disease. In the first problem, program A stated that 200 people would be saved, and program B stated that there was a $1/3$ probability that 600 people would be saved and a $2/3$ probability that nobody would be saved. Seventy-two percent of the 152 students chose program A, while 28% chose program B. The same public health case was worded differently to a second group of students in the second problem. Program C stated that 400 people would die and program D stated that there was a $1/3$ probability that nobody would die, and a $2/3$ probability that 600 people would die. This time 22% of the 155 students chose C, while 78% chose D. Kahneman and Tversky (1981) concluded that the preferences in the first and second problems illustrate that choices involving gains are often risk-averse and choices involving losses are often risk-taking. This is called the certainty effect. In other words, people tend to engage in more risk to avoid losses viewed as certain. Levy (1998) refers to alternative A as the survival frame and alternative C as the loss frame.

Problem 1: There is an outbreak of an unusual Asian disease which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been formed (N=152).

Table 1*Outbreak of Asian Disease*

Scenario	Percentage
A: 200	72
B: 1/3 chance 600 will be saved, 2/3 chance all die	28

Table 2*Test of Student Perceptions of Risk*

Scenario	Proposed outcomes	Percentage of students for each option
A	people will be saved (survival frame)	72
B	1/3 chance 600 will be saved, 2/3 chance all die	28

Problem 2: There is an outbreak of an unusual Asian disease which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been formed (N=155)

Table 3*Test with Mortality Frame*

Scenario	Percentage
C: 400 people will die (mortality frame)	22
D: 1/3 chance that nobody will die, 2/3 chance that all will die	78

Interestingly, the writing of this dissertation coincided with the Covid 19 pandemic, which followed a similar path with the disease scenario that Kahneman and Tversky used in their experiment. Thus, one can say that a similar experiment on

prospect theory can be repeated by framing the Covid 19 pandemic to see whether people chose to take more risk when losses were viewed as a given.

Quattrone and Tversky (2004) start their discussion on risk aversion by stating that “a significant feature of the value function is that losses loom larger than gains” (p. 330). How can we interpret the “losses loom larger than gains principle” of prospect theory? The loss aversion property of prospect theory explained by Quattrone and Tversky develops around the idea that displeasure associated with loss is more significant than pleasure associated with gain. Levy (1992) elaborates on this very principle by stating that more weight is given to losses than comparable gains. For example, the Equal Rights Amendment is framed in two different ways. In the first frame, it is presented as an attempt to eliminate discrimination, and in the second as legislation designed to improve women’s status in society. When the same question was posed to Stanford University students in the two different frames, the support was 9% more in the eliminating discrimination frame.

Another concept of prospect theory related to the “losses loom larger than gains” theme is the endowment effect. The endowment effect can be explained as the value given to what one has as opposed to comparable things that one does not have.

Reference points and how they are determined are key for comprehending prospect theory (Levy and Thompson, 2010). In their discussion about the causes of war, Levy and Thompson state that gains and losses are measured in terms of deviations from a reference point. “Preference reversal” happens when the preference changes as a result of a change in the reference point. Levy and Thompson underline that framing in a choice problem involves the identification of a reference point. Moreover, they state that the status quo is the most common reference point. Yet, this

is not always the case. Alternatively, one can also think of deviations from an aspirational level (Levy, 1992).

Another key concept of prospect theory is the decision frame (Breuning, 2007). Breuning defines the decision frame as the decision-maker's conceptions of the act's outcomes. The calculation of the probability of the desired outcomes of a particular action becomes essential. There are many examples of how the decision frame works in foreign policy. Although the main premise of realism asserts that a state tries to maximize its gains, political psychology points to a different side of the story, where perceptions influence decisions, and in turn frames influence perceptions. Prospect theory has two phases, the editing and evaluating phase (Levy, 1992; Mintz and Derouen, 2006). The first phase, or the editing phase, consists of the preliminary analysis of the choice problem, in which the available options and outcomes are identified. Framing holds an important place in this phase. In the second phase, or the evaluation phase, the preferred prospect is selected. In summary, the two phases demonstrate that prospect theory offers a complex analysis of decision making, looking at all dynamics involved, compared to expected utility theory, which takes a rather simplistic approach.

3.3 Key Communication Theory Concepts: Agenda Setting, Priming, and Framing

The discipline of psychology sheds light to decision making by leaders, especially in contexts of peace and war. Drawing on the canonic work of Jervis(1976) "Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics" and Stoessinger's (2008) "Why Nations Go to War?", Erişen (2012) discusses effects of misperception in the decision of going to war. These misperceptions are primarily

driven by leaders' opinion about themselves, their opinion about their adversaries, their opinion about the intention of their adversaries, and finally their opinion about the capacity of their adversaries. For example, in the Korean War, General MacArthur had miscalculated China's capacity of intervention. Similarly, Hitler's did not expect such a long duration war when he attacked the Soviet Union, or Saddam Hussein did not for see the Iran-Iraq war to continue for years.

Psychology also plays an important role, when we think about how leaders' characters shape conflicts, either escalating it, or deescalating it. Factors such as leaders' personal qualities, images that they use and have, and belief systems have an undeniable effect on conflict escalation (Erişen and Keskin, 2012). In Turkish Foreign Policy, for example, we cannot truly comprehend the pattern of escalation of the Kardak/Imia crisis⁴ which nearly brought the two nations to war in 1995, if we do not include Prime Minister Tansu Çiller's personal qualities in the equation.

The first study that looked at the role of the press in the formation of public opinion is Lippmann's *Public Opinion* (1922). This study suggests that the press provides the raw materials from which public opinion is formed. Lipmann argues that "pictures inside people's heads do not automatically correspond with the world outside" (Lipmann, 1997: 19)⁵ Thus, it can be said that the press act as facilitators for us to give meaning to the outside world. They connect the world outside with the pictures in our heads. They mediate meanings. Many studies following Lipmann's pioneer work have given attention to the role of the press in public opinion formation.

⁴ The Imia/Kardak crisis was a crisis between Turkey and Greece following a Turkish ship getting stuck in the islets. After the leaking of official correspondence Turkish and Greek journalists got into a race of owning the island by flying their flags respectively. President Demirel to a calmer approach to the rising tension, as opposed to Prime Minister Çiller, and the crisis was resolved with the intervention of President Clinton and UN Secretary General Xavier Solana.

⁵ *Public Opinion* was first published by MacMillan in 1922. A second edition was published by Free Press Paperbacks in 1997. This study uses the second edition.

Terms such as “agenda-setting” and “priming” have been developed to better conceptualize and understand the relationship between the press and public opinion.

During the 1968 U.S. presidential campaign, in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, McCombs and Shaw tested their agenda-setting hypothesis by comparing the 100 undecided voters’ perceptions of issue salience with the amount of coverage of these issues (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). The main finding of the study is that prominent public affairs aspects in the news become prominent in the public (McCombs, 2005). The term “priming” is also related to media influence. The hypothesis is that some issues are made more salient by others by media and that this influences the references by which candidates of public office are judged (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). In a study on priming effects, Iyengar and Simon (1993) determined that foreign policy issues made salient through news coverage of the Gulf War were more important than other issues when evaluating presidential performance.

Researchers working on framing theory in the fields of psychology, communication, and political science have developed various definitions in the understanding of framing. Research areas include topics such as the production of frames, framing effects, and categories of frames. Case studies on these topics have been mainly conducted in the US and Europe.

What is framing? Entman defines it as “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993: 52). Salience appears as an important concept in Entman’s definition of framing and answers the question of how framing takes place. According to Entman (1993), frames highlight certain aspects of information and

make that aspect of the information more visible. This is achieved by placement, repetition, and association with familiar symbols. Entman's (2004) cascade model sheds light on the production of frames. In the cascade model, he presents five levels of systems: 1) the administration, White House, and state defense; 2) other elites, congress members, former officials, experts, and foreign leaders; 3) media, journalists, and news organizations; 4) news frames and framing images; and 5) public, polls, and other indicators. Although the model supposes that frames are constructed at level 1, especially in matters concerning foreign policy, it suggests that the flow of influence links each level of the system. Chong and Druckman (2007) extend the model by underlining how the public reaction to the initial frame reflects on the elites, and this, in turn, influences the administration. Thus, it can be said that the production of frames works in two directions, where the influence is reciprocal. Once produced, frames affect public opinion. The selective acceptance or rejection of frames leads to public opinion formation (Chong and Druckman, 2007)

According to Gitlin, "media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation of selection, emphasis and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual (Gitlin, 1980: 7). In one of the founding texts of framing theory, *The Whole World is Watching: The Making and Unmaking of the new Left*, Gitlin looks at how the mainstream media framed the 1968 Chicago anti-Vietnam war demonstrations to devalue the movement. Gitlin's research focuses on the selection of people and events and how they are covered

Druckman and Nelson focus on the effects of framing. They state that "a framing effect occurs when individuals arrive at different positions on the issue, depending on the priority given to various considerations" (Druckman and Nelson,

2007: 730). Their research has focused on the effect of democratic competition on the power of elites to frame public opinion (Druckman and Nelson, 2007). They argue that framing effects depend on the qualities of frames than on frequency and dissemination. Interestingly, they situate framing in the democratic process, where citizens go to ballots regularly and cast their votes. The frames produced by the elites thus effect the decisions of the voters

De Vreese (2004) describes framing as a communicative process, which he calls the “integrated process model of framing” (51). De Vreese’s integrated process model of framing has two stages, the frame building stage, which deals with how the frame emerges, and frame setting, which deals with the interplay between media frames and audience dispositions.

Gamson and Modigliani (1980), who have studied media discourses on nuclear power since 1945, conceive media discourse as interpretive packages that give meaning to an issue. The frame is at the core of the interpretive package as a central organizing idea. However, a package includes a range of positions on an issue rather than a single position, opening room for controversy. They introduce five framing devices and three reasoning devices. Framing devices consist of metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images. Reasoning devices consist of roots, consequences, and appeals to principle. Gamson and Modigliani (1980) also emphasize that interpretive packages are not static and that they construct meaning over time.

Researchers also have established categories for frames. Entman (2004) states that frames report political events, issues, and actors. De Vreese (2005) distinguishes between issue-specific and generic frames. Issue-specific frames are used to interpret

specific topics and events whereas generic frames are used for all topics (De Vreese, 2002). The five frames identified by Semetko and Volkenburg (2000), “Conflict,” “human interest,” “attribution of responsibility,” “morality,” and “economic consequences” can be given as examples of generic news frames. Goffman (1986) suggests that individuals make sense of the world through “primary frameworks,” which consist of natural frameworks that identify events as physical occurrences and social frameworks that interpret events to be driven socially.

As mentioned earlier, cases to illustrate concepts related to framing theory come mainly from the U.S. and Europe. One common aspect of the cases studied is that all look at how salient issues are covered by print media, TV, and more recently, the internet. In the U.S., a great deal of research has been carried out on foreign and domestic policy. Gamson and Modigliani have studied framing affirmative action (1987) and nuclear power (1989). Chong and Druckman (2007) have analyzed social security frames in the *New York Times* from 1997 to 2000. Finally, Dimitrova (2005) has focused on news framing of the second Gulf War on the web. Election coverage also appears as a central theme for U.S.-based studies on framing. McCombs and Shaw (1972) have analyzed the framing in the 1968 presidential campaign and Weaver et al (1981) have looked at the agenda-setting of the television and press during the 1980 presidential election.

In Europe, there is parallelism between the process of European integration and framing studies. Research has been conducted on framing common foreign and security policy in the media of the EU member states (Kandyla and de Vreese, 2011) European parliamentary elections (Van der Brug and de Vreese, 2016), and public support for national referendums on European integration (Schuck and de Vreese, 2015) across member countries. Furthermore, issues concerning framing EU

enlargement vis-a-vis Turkish membership, immigration, and populist communication have been studied.

3.4 Applications of Prospect Theory in the Fields of International Relations and Political Science

In the field of political science, prospect theory has been used mainly to analyze the decisions of military action, ending a war, and cooperation between states. In the field of political science, prospect theory has been applied to creating public support for a peace agreement referendum through use of frames that convey a certain loss in the condition of a no vote.

Levy (1998) states that if a state sees itself in decline, it will be willing to take risky actions. He points to perceived external decline and internal insecurity as the conditions that created the domain of loss in which the decisions of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan were made. He extends his argument by illustrating cases where the mutual perceptions of losses occurred, such as the situation for France and Germany in 1870, the U.S. and Japan in 1941, and the U.S. and Iraq in 1991. Haas (2001) has analyzed the decisions of Kennedy and Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis. His study demonstrates that both leaders' decisions during the crisis were consistent with the predictions of prospect theory. Haas (2001) gives three examples of Kennedy and Khrushchev's excessive risk-taking behavior, when in the domain of losses: Khrushchev's decision to send missiles to Cuba, Kennedy's decision to continue to threaten the Soviets once the blockade had been established, and finally Khrushchev's decision to bluff Kennedy from October 22 to October 28 in order to get a better deal before the missiles were removed. Berejikian (2002) also has applied prospect theory to his

analysis of foreign policy decisions. The author argues that military deterrence can be explained by prospect theory. Britain's decision to use military action following Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal and the U.S. president Carter's attempt to use military force in April 1980 during the U.S. hostage crisis with Iran reflect that the leaders chose to take big risks. The risk-taking policies in both cases were tied to the "loss frame" that the leaders faced at home.

Although the use of prospect theory to explain the decision to start a war or take military action is more common, there is also literature that analyzes war termination with prospect theory. Mintz and Geva (1998) look at cases where gains and losses were defined in terms of the increase or decrease of public support. Taking the crisis of 1991-1992 as an example, they point out that President Bush selected the risk-averse alternative of stopping the war and refused the risk-taking alternative of ousting Saddam from power. Thus, they illustrate that in a domain of gains, leaders do make risk-taking decisions

The application of prospect theory to the decision of interstate cooperation counters the realist paradigm by its premise that in a domain of losses, governments will risk cooperation, even in conditions where the expected value of noncooperation is greater. (Berejikian, 2002). The U.S. acceptance of the structural impediments initiative with Japan and the Israeli cooperation with the U.S during the Gulf War are given as examples that demonstrate the risk-taking aspect of cooperation. Berejikian evaluates his own work as "grounding political theory in cognitive psychology" (Berejikian 2002)

In the field of political science, prospect theory has been applied to referendums. Referendum campaigns have made use of prospect theory by framing

preferred choices in referendum campaigns as being less risky than the alternative (Hancock, Weiss, and Durr, 2010). Reaching a “yes” in a referendum on a peace proposal is achieved by focusing on the risks of failure and the possible negative outcomes of a “no” vote, rather than the positive outcomes of a “yes” vote (Hancock, 2011). Getting a “yes” from referendums on peace agreements has been partly explained by the use of frames emphasizing the risks of voting “no.” For example, Hancock (2011) has studied the framing of the Good Friday agreement in the Northern Ireland referendum of 1998. His analysis indicates that the “yes” campaign in Northern Ireland made use of prospect theory (2011) by focusing on the risks of failure rather than the benefits of success. Hancock identified eleven themes used in the campaign. Especially two of the themes, “the agreement is a unique opportunity that will not come again” and “there is no alternative” emphasize the risk of failure. To compare the Good Friday agreement with a case that did not yield a positive result, Hancock, also has looked at the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. He concludes that Oslo Accords failed because the peace agreement was communicated by emphasizing the rewards of success instead of the costs of failure.

The report on communicating peace agreements (Haider, 2016) starts by asking the question of what lessons can be learned from past experiences. The report focuses on the following cases: the 1992 referendum in South Africa, the 1993 Oslo Accords, the 1998 referendum for the Good Friday agreement, the 1999 Guatemala referendum, and the 2005 twin referenda on the Annan Plan. The cases of North Ireland and South Africa are singled out as successful examples. The report concludes that in both cases, the “yes” vote was related to the fear of negative consequences in the condition of a “no” vote (Haider, 2016). For example, the report highlights that in

the case of Ireland, there was fear of renewed violence, and in the case of South Africa, there was fear of international sanctions and economic turmoil.

The report includes a brief discussion on Turkish and Greek Cypriot coverage of the Annan plan; however, the Annan referendum is not analyzed with reference to prospect theory except for Loizides's (2016) point that fears similar to those in the case of South Africa such as international sanctions and economic turmoil were not present in the case of Greek Cypriots. Adding to Loizides's point on the Greek Cypriot case, one can argue that contrary to Greek Cypriots, fear of the continuation of international sanctions and economic turmoil was present in the Turkish Cypriot case. Taking the argument one step further, the "yes" result of the referendum in Northern Cyprus can be linked to the use of the "no alternative" frame in the campaign itself and media coverage. Similarly, the "no" result of the referendum in Southern Cyprus can be linked to the absence of the use of the "no alternative" frame.

The analysis of the use of the "no alternative" frame also can be understood in contrast to the conflict analysis and resolution concept of the Better Alternative to Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). From a prospect theory viewpoint, BATNA can be regarded as a gain. Yet, in the logic of prospect theory, "losses loom larger than gains," thus making the "there is no alternative" frame more relevant than BATNA. This is also related to the conditions of the primary parties in the conflict. The EU promise that Cyprus would join the Union, with or without a resolution to the conflict following the referendum, gave Greek Cypriots an alternative to saying "yes" in the referendum. Whereas the logic of the Turkish Cypriot, that there was no alternative concept, was related to the perception that Turkish Cypriots could be part of the EU member states and have the same rights and opportunities as Greek Cypriots only if they said "yes" to the referendum. The content analysis of Turkish Cypriot, Greek

Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek newspapers provide an extension to referendum-based framing studies. As mentioned above, referendum-based framing studies already have applied prospect theory to their analyses. The current study provides a unique example as it carries out a content analysis of the coverage of the primary and secondary parties in the conflict.

Table 4

Primary Parties' expectations of gain and loss

Parties	Gain	Loss
Turkish Cypriots	Confederation or loose federation	Territorial concession
Greek Cypriots	Strong federation and demilitarization of the island	Joint federal or transitional government

3.5 The Polarized Pluralist or the Mediterranean Media Model

After studying the relationship between media and politics in 18 western European countries, Canada and the U.S., Hallin and Mancini (2004) introduced three media models: the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, the North/Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model, and the North Atlantic Liberal Model. France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain were given as examples of the Mediterranean Model; Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland of the North/Central European Model; and Britain, Ireland, the U.S., and Canada, of the North Atlantic Model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Hallin and Mancini used four criteria to compare Western European and North American media systems: the development of media markets, press-political party parallelism, journalistic professionalism, and the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system.

An understanding of the concept press-political party parallelism is a prerequisite to following how Hallin and Mancini developed their categories. The notion of press-political party parallelism was first developed by Seymour-Ure (1974). Seymour-Ure's notion of press-party parallelism is based on three aspects: (1) the party ownership and/or management of mass media by political parties, (2) the partisan bias in the editorial choices of media organizations, and (3) the party affiliations of readers (Çarkoğlu, 2010).

Regarding the first of the four criteria, Hallin and Mancini have identified that France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have low newspaper circulation and an elite politically-oriented press. As to the second criteria, countries that represent the Polarized Pluralist model display high political parallelism, external pluralism, and commentary-oriented journalism. As to the third criteria, Southern European countries have weaker professionalization and instrumentalization. Finally, in relation to the fourth criteria, these countries have strong state intervention (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Hallin and Mancini explain the reasons behind their findings with the similar historical backgrounds of southern European countries, underlining that Greece, Spain, and Portugal overthrew authoritarian regimes and experienced transitions to democracy in 1974 and 1975. The late transition to democracy set the tone of the relationship between media and politics in these countries. The mass media became accustomed to taking a position in conflicts and were regarded as a means of ideological expression and political mobilization (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

Papathanassopoulos (2007) extended Hallin and Mancini's Mediterranean media model by adding three more countries to the list: Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta. Papathanassopoulos argues that all eight countries share late transition to democracy, pointing out that democratic consolidation took place in Greece, Spain, and Portugal

between 1975 and 1985, and that Turkey experienced military coups, in 1960, 1971, and 1980 (Papathanassopoulos, 2007). The main characteristics of the Mediterranean Model introduced by Hallin and Mancini also are applicable to Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. The state news agencies such as Agence France Presse in France, the Italian Agency AGI in Italy, EFE in Spain, ANA in Greece, and Anadolu Ajansı in Turkey are given as examples of state intervention in the media (Papathanassopoulos, 2007).

Studies on press-political party parallelism have been done in Turkey and Northern Cyprus. For example, a study done by Çarkoğlu (2010) indicates that in both the 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections, 60% of *Cumhuriyet* readers voted for the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP). The study evaluates the press-party parallelism of conservative newspapers as a whole. Accordingly, 80% of *Vakit*, *Akit*, *Yeni Şafak*, and *Türkiye* readers voted for the Justice and Development Party (JDP) during the 2007 elections.

Kalkan, Şafaklı, and Günalp (2015), studying the press-party parallelism of Turkish Cypriot newspapers, identify *Güneş*, *Ortam*, *Demokrat Bakış*, and *Yeni Düzen* display press-party parallelism. *Yeni Düzen* exhibits parallelism with the Republican Turkish Party (RTP), and the National Unity Party (NUP). *Africa* and *Vatan* are identified as newspapers that openly show their ideology, whereas *Kıbrıs* is described as a newspaper that positions itself in the center and adapts according to the context (Kalkan, Şafaklı and Günalp, 2015). Among 15 newspapers published in Northern Cyprus, *Kıbrıs* ranks the highest, *Yeni Düzen* fourth, *Afrika* sixth, *Vatan* seventh, and *Güneş* ranks tenth in terms of readership.

Another concept closely related to press-political party parallelism is pluralism. There are two types of pluralism, internal and external. Internal pluralism is

the existence of different opinions within each media organization and external pluralism is the presence of multiple opinions in the media as a whole (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). However, in the more recent understanding, the distinction between internal and external pluralism is not that clear. Rather, media pluralism is used as one concept, mostly as a criterion for evaluating the level of democracy in a country. For example, the EU has conducted studies of media pluralism in member countries. In this form, media pluralism refers to the plurality/diversity of media suppliers, freedom and affordability of access, content pluralism and diversity of ideas, diversity of news sources, independent and not concentrated editorial practices, diversity and transparency of media ownership, and cultural and social diversity in media programs and ideas (Perusko, 2010).

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented an overview of the two main theoretical foundations of this study, Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory and Hallin and Mancini's (2004) Polarized Pluralist Media or Mediterranean Media Model. These theoretical foundations serve as the macro and micro backbones of this study. Prospect theory is used as a tool to analyze the logic used in the frames to cover the Annan Plan in Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek newspapers, with reference to referendum-framing studies. Thus, it is concerned with the analysis at the detail level. Hallin and Mancini's Polarized Pluralist Media or Mediterranean Media Model is used as a blueprint to understand the larger picture presented by the selected newspapers. Concurrently, key communications theory concepts such as agenda-setting, priming, framing, press-political party parallelism, and internal and external pluralism are reviewed, some in relation to their significance to prospect theory and others in relation to their significance to the Mediterranean Model. For example,

framing is essential in prospect theory and press political party parallelism is essential in the Mediterranean Media Model.

This study provides an application of prospect theory to an important international case. An evaluation of the existing literature shows that the analysis of the Annan Plan in the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek press will provide another case study that applies prospect theory to peace referendum framing. So far, themes that convey the certain loss in the case of a “no” vote have been identified in relation to the case of Northern Ireland. The absence of the loss theme has been discussed in relation to the “no” vote of Southern Cyprus, yet the presence of the loss theme has not been discussed in relation to the “yes” vote of Northern Cyprus. Once again, “losses loom larger than gains” when citizens are going to the ballots to accept or refuse a peace referendum. Former studies have linked an unsuccessful peace referendum result to the absence of highlighting losses. Then, the question remains how a “yes” and a “no” can be situated in the twin referenda that took place on the Mediterranean island of Cyprus? Identifying the themes used to “sell” the Annan Plan to the Turkish Cypriots will expand the scope of research in the field. Also, the current study will allow researchers to see how the specific dynamics of the Mediterranean Media Model were manifested in the two conflicting parties on the Mediterranean island of Cyprus when covering the Annan Plan and the secondary parties to the conflict, Turkey, and Greece.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

Content Analysis is a method of analysis used in a variety of social science disciplines including media studies, political science, and communication studies. The subject matter of content analysis is also large in spectrum, ranging from newspaper articles to presidential speeches, from TV series to school books. First, content analysis is systematic (Wimmer and Dominick, 2010), meaning that the researchers have certain rules to follow. Second, it is scientific, meaning that it aims to make valid and replicable inferences of the analyzed content. Third, it is objective, meaning that research cannot include personal biases of the researcher.

The method has different types among which are quantitative content analysis and descriptive content analysis. Quantitative content analysis relies on statistics to make its inferences whereas descriptive content analysis is more qualitative in nature. This dissertation employs descriptive content analysis. According to Erişen et al. (2013), qualitative content analysis “focuses more on what certain words, groups of words or symbols mean and their implications” (p. 23). Given that newspapers from four different countries, in two different languages are analyzed, it would not be incorrect to describe the method as comparative qualitative content analysis. This chapter presents the research design of the study and discusses possible strengths and weaknesses that the study might have related to the research design.

The use of content analysis, often used in in the US and Europe, was first applied in the US during World War II to analyze the meaning behind newspaper articles in Europe. Since the entry of content analysis as a method of scientific

research to the field of social sciences in the US, many studies have been done on how the media effect the choices of voters in presidential elections. Units of analysis range from TV news to print media articles, op/eds, and cartoons. For example, Zübriggen and Sherman (2010) carried out a content analysis of editorial cartoons about the candidates of the 2008 US presidential elections. They examined cartoons that featured the candidates Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, examining patterns of race and gender. The study found that racial stereotypes were less salient than those for gender.

The content analysis of media during presidential elections is an American tradition of communications/social science research, developed by researchers such as Mccombs and Shaw, who focused on the concept of agenda-setting in the 1968 presidential elections, and Weaver et al., who analyzed agenda-setting in the 1980 presidential elections. Other salient content analysis examples from the US include Chong and Druckman's (2007) analysis of social security reform frames from 1997 to 2000 in *The New York Times*, Gamson and Modigliani's (1989) analysis of nuclear power, Dimitrova et al.'s (2005) analysis of support for war, and Brewer and Sigelman's (2002) analysis of cynicism toward government. Gamson and Modigliani's (1989) study on nuclear power relied on four units of analysis, television news coverage, news magazine accounts, editorial cartoons, and opinion column.

Content Analysis in Europe has been an important research tool in understanding European integration. The primary characteristic of European content analysis examples is that they are cross country and comparative in nature. For example, de Vreese and Semetko (2001) analyzed how national media reacted to the introduction of the Euro in the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, and the UK, using as its source the main evening television news programs in these countries.

Boomgaarden et al. (2013) analyzed cross-national and over-time variation in news media coverage of EU affairs. They carried out a large-scale media content analysis of newspaper and television news about European Parliament elections in 1999, 2004, and 2009. Textbooks of content analysis have provided roadmaps on how to carry out content analysis by providing detailed descriptions of each step to be taken (Neuendorf 2002; Wimmer and Dominic, 2010). This study follows Neuendorf's (2002) Typical Process of Content Analysis Research Flowchart.

4.2 Research Design


The research design of the study follows the nine steps of Neuendorf's (2002) Typical Process of Content Analysis Research flowchart. The nine steps of the flowchart include 1) Theory and Rationale 2) Conceptualizations, 3) Operationalizations, 4) Coding Schemes, 5) Sampling, 6) Training and Pilot Reliability, 7) Coding, 8) Final Reliability, and 9) Tabulation and Reporting. The first step of the flowchart, Theory and Rationale, lays down the research questions and hypothesis. The second step, Conceptualizations, focuses on the variables to be used in the study and how they are conceptually defined. The third step, Operationalizations, looks at issues such as internal validity, unit of data collection, and whether the variables are well measured. The fourth step, Coding Schemes, has two sections, one manual coding, and the other computer coding. This step, either manual or computer coding, introduces the prerequisites for coding, the codebook, and coding form.

The fifth step of the flowchart, Sampling, looks at how a subset of content will be sampled. The sixth step, Training and Pilot Reliability, is about the training of coders and reliability tests performed. The seventh step, Coding, again has two

versions, human coding and computer coding. Human coding emphasizes the concept of intercoder reliability, and computer coding emphasizes the concept of dictionaries. The eighth step, Final Reliability, is about calculating a reliability figure as percent of agreement. Finally, the ninth step, Tabulation and Reporting, looks at how findings are presented.

Figure 1

Typical Process of Content Analysis Research Flowchart



As mentioned earlier, the data consists of Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish newspaper headline articles, op-eds, and cartoons. The data were coded by two coders, the first a native Turkish speaker, and the second a native Greek speaker. Thus, it can be said that both the data in itself and the coding process are highly complex. The only way to carry out an efficient content analysis of such complex data was by following a well-structured road map that did not leave anything out. Also, the presence of two coders made the issue of inter-coder reliability

highly important. Neuendorf's (2002) Typical Process of Content Analysis Research flowchart provides a step-by-step roadmap that met the specific needs of this study. Importantly, the sixth step of the flowchart, Training and Pilot Reliability, was very relevant for this study.

The first step of Neuendorf's (2002) flowchart concerns Theory and Rationale. It consists of the theoretical background of the study and the research questions or hypothesis of the study. The theoretical background was explained in the previous chapter. As to the research questions, the study has two: the first about media frames, and the second about media models.

RQ 1: How are the win-lose, win-win, lose-lose, there is no alternative, and risky gambling frames used in reporting the Annan Plan prior to the referendum in the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Greek newspapers analyzed?

RQ 2: Does the coverage of the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek newspapers of the Annan Plan demonstrate characteristics of the Mediterranean Media Model such as press political party parallelism? What additions to the Mediterranean Media Model can the findings of this content analysis make?

4.2.1 Conceptualization

The second step in Neuendorf's (2002), Conceptualization, deals with what variable or variables are used in the study and how they are defined conceptually. The main variable of this study is the 2004 referendum in the Annan Plan. This study is concerned with how newspapers with different political orientations of the primary and secondary parties to the conflict view the plan, whether they were for or against

it, and the news frames within which they understood it and presented it. In the codebook prepared for the content analysis, specific categories, or variables, which will be introduced later in the chapter. The specific categories are used as criteria of comparison in the content analysis were established.

4.2.2 Operationalization and Measures

The third step in Neuendorf's (2002) flowchart, Operationalization and Measures, looks at the units of analysis used in the data collection process. This study takes three units of analysis: banner headline articles, op-eds, and cartoons. *The Collins Dictionary* defines a banner headline as "a large headline in a newspaper that across the front page." *The Cambridge Dictionary* defines op-ed as "writing that expresses a personal opinion and is usually printed in a newspaper opposite the page on which the editorial is printed." The same dictionary defines a cartoon as "a drawing, especially in a newspaper or magazine, that tells a joke or makes a humorous political criticism."

4.2.3 Coding Schemes

The fourth step in Neuendorf's flowchart focuses coding schemes. Neuendorf distinguishes between human coding and computer coding. Human coding is preferred in this study. The codebook and the coding form are the two materials necessary to conduct a content analysis. All variable measures need to be fully explained in the codebook and the categories established need to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive (Neuendorf, 2012).

In this study, first the codebook was prepared, by using an already existing codebook as a sample. The "Depiction of the 2014 Election in Turkey" codebook,

developed for the International Political Science Association (IPSA) meeting held at the Middle Eastern Technical University (METU) summer school 2014, served as a sample to develop the codebook used for this study. Adaptions were made in the codebook so that it could be used for this study. A priori coding was used, meaning that categories were established prior to the analysis.

The “Depiction of the 2004 Referendum on the Annan Peace Plan in Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Greek Press” codebook was updated nine times throughout the study, as new categories emerged. Previous coding was updated after each new version of the codebook. Codebook IX consists of six main categories: The first is formal categories, which consist of subcategories such as Coder ID, newspaper ID, data type, data rank, day, month, and year. The first category is not actually a variable that is analyzed. The variables are introduced as of the second category.

The second category focuses on the points of view on the Annan Plan and its proposal regarding the political system, guarantorship issues, three freedoms, territorial adjustment, military built up, displaced persons and properties, and settlers and immigrants.

The third category is about references to primary, secondary and third parties of the conflict. Subcategories include Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot institutions, political parties, leaders and civil society, Turkish and Greek institutions, political parties, leaders and civil society, the UN, the EU, the US, the Russian Federation, and Great Britain.

The fourth category focuses on other references and it consists of subsections such as historical references, references to international politics, legal references, literary references, and game theoretical references. The game theoretical references

subsection is essential for the purpose of this study as it covers the variable which the first research question concerns. The game theoretical references sub category covers the use of “win-win,” “win-lose,” “lose-lose,” “risky gambling” and “there is no alternative” frames.

The fifth category, depiction patterns and discrimination, which is used merely for the analysis of cartoon, has subcategories such as the depiction of parties as an animal, sexual references, and gender and race-based discrimination.

The sixth and seventh categories, positive and negative consequences of a “yes” vote and positive and negative consequences of a “no” vote looks at consequences of both “yes” and “no” for Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, Turkey, and Greece.

Finally, the eight category “various” consists of additions to the codebook after the process of coding started, due to the recognition of need during coding. Entries belonging to the other main categories were placed under various, simply for practical reasons. For example, although France belongs to the third category, it was placed under “various,” because when preparing the initial codebook, the country was not included in the category of third parties. Thus, mostly entries that were missed during the preparation of the codebook, we added later, under the category of various. This category was extended by a few entries in each new version of the codebook, resulting in a consecutive increase of the category in the final version of the codebook.

Overall, in the updated versions of the codebook, 20 entries were added, bringing the number of entries of the final codebook to 153. Entries added to the updated versions of the codebook include entries such as the constitutional court and

referendum bill, Taiwanization, Hellenization, and the “*ver kurtul*”⁶(give and save yourself) frame. Adding a category was not the only type of change in the codebooks. Since the content analysis of cartoons was carried out first, the category of ‘depiction patterns and discrimination,’ relevant for this specific analysis, was taken out in the following codebooks.

It should be noted that the same codebook was used to code the three units of analysis by the coders. The codebook remained the same, yet the coders coded each unit of analysis in a separate codesheet. The data of each unit of analysis had four code sheets, two Turkish language code sheets, two Greek language code sheets. During the coding of the Headline articles, Coder 1, the Turkish language coder, worked with code sheet A: Turkish Cypriot articles, and code sheet B: Turkish articles, while Coder 2, the Greek language coder worked with the code sheet A: Greek Cypriot articles, and code sheet B: Greek articles. During the coding of Op-Eds Coder 1, worked with the code sheet C: Turkish Cypriot Op-Eds, and code sheet D: Turkish Op-Eds, while Coder 2, worked with code sheet C: Greek Cypriot Op-Eds, and code sheet D: Greek Op-Eds. During the coding of cartoons Coder 1, worked with E: Turkish Cypriot Cartoons, and F: Turkish Cartoons, and Coder 2, worked with E: Greek Cypriot Cartoons and F: Greek Cartoons.

⁶ The “*ver kurtul*” frame refers to abandonment, letting go of the Cyprus issue as the national cause.

Table 5*Code Sheets Used by Coders 1 and 2 for the Content Analysis*

	Coder 1	Coder 2
Headline articles	• Codesheet A: Turkish Cypriot headline articles • Codesheet B: Turkish headline articles	• Codesheet A: Greek Cypriot headline articles • Codesheet B: Greek headline articles
Op-Eds	• Codesheet C: Greek Cypriot Op-Eds • Codesheet D: Greek Op-Eds	• Codesheet C: Greek Cypriot Op-Eds • Codesheet D: Greek Op-Eds
Cartoons	• Codesheet E: Turkish Cypriot Cartoons • Codesheet F: Turkish Cartoons	• Codesheet E: Greek Cypriot cartoons • Codesheet F: Greek cartoons


4.2.4 Sampling

The fifth step in Neuendorf's flowchart involves sampling. This study uses relevance sampling, which "aims at selecting all textual units that contribute to answering given research questions" (Krippendorf, 2013: 119). Thus, following this rationale, the sample of the research includes *all* headline articles, op-eds and cartoons on the 2004 referendum on the Annan Peace Plan in the selected newspapers and time period.

The data were collected from the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek newspapers from the left, center and right of the political spectrum. The Turkish Cypriot newspapers selected are *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, and *Vatan*. The Greek Cypriot newspapers selected are *Charavgi*, *Fileleftheros*, and *Machi*. The Turkish newspapers selected are *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Yeni Şafak*. The Greek newspapers selected are *Rizospastis*, *Ta Nea* and *Kathimerini*. This study takes the dates between 1-25 April 2004 as its time frame

Figure 2

The selected newspapers across the political spectrum




The selection of newspapers follows a slightly adapted version of the of the data collection method Vreese and Semetko (2004) used in their study on framing the referendum on the Euro in Denmark that took place on the 28 September 2000. De Vreese and Semetko carried out a detailed content analysis of five dailies printed in September 2000. The five newspapers were chosen according to their circulation rates. Then, their front pages were screened for news about the referendum and the Euro.

Another study that was taken as an example is Alioğlu-Çakmak and Türkeş-Kılıç's (2016) comparative study of Turkish and Greek newspapers on whether the human rights or national interest dimension prevailed when discussing the 18 March 2016 Turkey EU cooperation agreement to stop irregular immigration from Turkey to

the EU states via Greece. Alioğlu-Çakmak and Türkeş-Kılıç used two criteria in the selection of newspapers, the level of circulation, and representation of main political parties. The Turkish newspapers analyzed include *Sabah*, *Posta*, *Habertürk*, *Sözcü* and *Cumhuriyet*, and the Greek newspapers include *Ta Nea*, *Ethnos*, *Eleftheros Typos*, *Dimokratia*, *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, *Kathimerini* and *Avgi*. The study selected newspapers printed in the weekend in Greece, as well as newspapers printed during the weekend, daily and nightly newspapers. This study has three newspapers in common with Alioğlu-Çakmak and Türkeş-Kılıç's study: *Cumhuriyet*, *Ta Nea* and *Kathimerini*. *Cumhuriyet* was chosen for the study on the discussion about the Turkey EU agreement, because it represents a prevalent political view, despite its rank as 19th in terms of national readership. Studies done in 2002 and 2007 indicate that 60% of *Cumhuriyet* readers have voted for CHP (Çarkoğlu and Yavuz, 2010). Similar to Alioğlu-Çakmak and Türkeş-Kılış the Turkish and Greek newspapers have been selected *Cumhuriyet* and *Rizospastis*, due to their pivotal positions in the national debates.

In regard to sample size according to the units of analysis, there is a total of 332 headline articles, of which 149 are from Turkish Cypriot, 75 from Greek Cypriot, 45 from Turkish, and 63 from Greek newspapers. Of the 1237 op-eds, of 496 are from Turkish Cypriot, 226 from Greek Cypriot, 221 from Turkish, and 294 from Greek newspaper. Of the 347 cartoons, 40 are from Turkish Cypriot, 109 from Greek Cypriot, 40 from Turkish, and 158 from Greek newspapers.

Figure 3*Sample for Each Coding Category⁷*

Note. Series 1 stands for headline articles, Series 2 stands for op-eds, Series 3 stands for cartoons.

4.2.5 Training and Pilot Reliability

The sixth step in Neuendorf's flowchart relates to training and pilot reliability. The research team for this study consists of four members, two principal coders, and four researchers. The two principal coders also conducted the research. The data collection process for this study took place in two stages. In the first stage data from Turkish and Greek newspapers were collected from newspapers archives in Istanbul, Turkey, and Thessaloniki, Greece. The first stage of data collected, which took six months, was carried out by the two principal coders, Coder 1, responsible for coding data in Turkish, and Coder 2, in Greek. A meeting between the two principal coders was held in Thessaloniki to form a common understanding of the examined variables.

⁷ Headline articles are represented by the color blue, op-eds are represented by the color brown, and cartoons are represented by the color grey.

However, no independent coding test, to assess the inter-coder reliability on each variable was performed.

With the onset of the Covid 19 pandemic, the data collected from Turkish newspapers was completed online. This had a slight effect on the nature of the research. In the beginning the preference of the Turkish newspaper from the center was *Hürriyet*, but after the pandemic the newspaper *Milliyet* was selected due to the existence this newspaper's online archive. The second stage of data collection, which also took around six months, was carried out by two researchers, Researcher 1, responsible for researching the data from Turkish Cypriot newspapers, and Researcher 2, responsible for researching the data from Greek Cypriot newspapers. The data from Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspapers was collected in the Turkish and Greek parts of Nicosia. Both researchers were trained by the principal coders via Zoom meetings. Thus, in about a year, all of the data were collected.

4.2.6 Coding

The seventh step in Neuendorf's flowchart concerns coding. Although pilot reliability tests were not performed, the two main coders followed the same coding schedule and held monthly meetings to discuss their results. The coders did continuous corrections and updates, and the final data list was established based on the same codebook, with harmonious work between the coders. Initially, separate datasets were prepared by the coders, and then the Turkish language datasets and Greek language datasets were combined into one final dataset. A researcher assisted each coder in establishing the datasets. Researchers in the Turkish and Greek sides of Nicosia, collected the data and sent them to the responsible coder, who in turn added the data to their list. Despite the fact that one coder was based in Istanbul and the

other was based in Thessaloniki, the coding proceeded smoothly, yielding comparative results.

Finally, the research assistants did not carry out any coding. All coding was done by the two coders. To avoid any misunderstanding, one text was not coded by two coders. Rather a text was coded according to its language by the person responsible for the data in that language. However, the coders conferred with each other when question marks about the data arose.

Coder qualifications are also an important consideration when selecting coders (Krippendorff, 2004). Since both Coders 1 and 2 were graduate students in departments of Political Science and International Relations at Yeditepe University and Aristotle University Thessaloniki, respectively, finding common ground was not difficult, despite the difference of countries. Krippendorff (2004) states that the coding procedure follows two phases, the first being designing the coding procedure, and the second applying it. The coding procedure was designed by Coder 1, and then shared with Coder 2 through training sessions via Zoom meetings.

4.2.7 Final Reliability

The eighth step in Neuendorf's flowchart is about final reliability. He suggests calculating a reliability figure, let's say a percent agreement, such as Scott's Pi, Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (ρ), or Pearson's correlation coefficient (r) for each variable. Given that the analysis does not have a quantitative base, and there weren't two coders for each dataset, a final reliability figure was not calculated. Krippendorff's alpha coefficient also could have been used for assessing inter-coder reliability; however inter-coder reliability tests were not conducted because one text was coded by one coder, since the texts to be coded were divided according to the

language, and the Turkish language texts were undertaken by Coder 1, and Greek language texts by Coder 2. Also, determining reliability figures is a part of quantitative content analysis, whereas this study presents a qualitative content analysis. Alternatively, reliability was sought by the simultaneous work of the coders, followed by zoom discussions.

4.2.8 Tabulation and Reporting

The ninth and final step in Neuendorf's flowchart, about tabulation and reporting, is about how findings are presented. As mentioned above, this study presents a qualitative or descriptive content analysis. The discussions in which findings from Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek newspapers are compared are accompanied by tables that compare the frequencies of the analyzed variables. Each analysis chapter begins with a discussion followed by tables. Thus, the tables are used as complimentary to the discussion. Krippendorff (2004) mentions tables of absolute frequencies, relative frequencies, and cross-tabulation. This study uses mostly descriptive tables.

4.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Research Design

Krippendorff (2004) defines content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (p. 18). According to the definition of Erişen et al. (2013), content analysis is “the systematic replicable method used in many social science disciplines for inferring meaning from data sources into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding” (p. 23). Erişen et al. (2013) stress that the reliability of the classification procedure, consistency, and objectivity are necessary for inferences to be valid. They also emphasize the significance of inter-coder

reliability as a means to assessing the internal validity of the conclusions. Where does this work stand in the light of the above-mentioned definition and points?

Like every scholarly work, this study has its strengths, and weaknesses. Let us start with the strengths. The main strength of this work lies in the richness of the data. The data consists of twelve datasets: headline articles, op-eds, and cartoons from Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek newspapers. The international nature of the research team consisting of Turkish, Greek, Turkish and Cypriot members also contribute to the value of the study. The presence of Turks, Greeks, and Cypriots on the research team, renders the inferences objective. According to Erişen et al. (2013), the consistency and objectivity of the classification procedure are what makes inferences valid. Thus, it would not be wrong to state that the content analysis carried out has valid inferences.

In addition, the data collection and coding processes were done in a consistent and systemic manner, adding to the validity of the study. Thus, it can be rightfully said that the inferences of the study are theoretically and empirically valid. Krippendorff (2013) stresses that research techniques should result in findings that are replicable. Reliability is measured by the replicability of a study. The current study is about how the press of primary and secondary parties to the Cyprus conflict viewed the referendum on the Annan Plan, yet the research design could be applied to any other international conflict involving a peace referendum. The codebook prepared for this study, can also be useful also for other studies that involve conflicting parties, and secondary parties. Thus, it can be argued that another strength of this study is that it has reliability.

As to the weaknesses of this study, the methodology lacks a solid quantitative element. The application of statistics and other quantitative work would have added

value to the findings. A mixed methodology combining qualitative and quantitative characteristics would have yielded the best results, yet the application of a quantitative methodology requires a mastery of statistics, etc., which does not match the specializations of the research team members. A quantitative touch is provided in this study in the use of tables, which makes the comparison possible in terms of numbers and frequencies.

Another weakness of the study is that computer programs were not used in any part of the coding process; thus, human coding was carried out from the beginning to the end. However, it can be argued that given the scope of this study, human coding is an asset rather than a weakness. Having one Turkish and one Greek coder do the coding also added to the objectivity of the results and reduced the possible bias. Rather than simply record how many times a word occurs, which can easily be done by a word count in a word processor, the study seeks to understand why the word is used.

Finally, the integrative model of content analysis introduced by Neuendorf (2002) compliments the content analysis carried out by other methods such as readership surveys, public opinion polls, and experimental research. A readership survey or opinion poll would have been convenient to measure how the frames used in the newspapers effected the readers. Thus, with Neuendorf's integrative model of content analysis, the cause-and-effect relationship could have been better measured. However, given the time allocated and complexity of carrying out a comparative content analysis of newspapers in four different countries, adding an opinion poll or readership survey to the methodology would have complicated research further.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the research design of the study, developed with the guidance of Neuendorf's (2002) content analysis flowchart and discussed the reasons for choosing the flowchart as a roadmap. The chapter reviewed the phases of content analysis carried out in this study, preparation for the analysis, the actual analysis, and reporting.

Regarding the preparation for analysis, first it provided an explanation of the research sample by tracing how the final data set was compiled. Second, it introduced the research team that carried out the study, consisting of two coders and two researchers. The change of data collection method due to the emergence of the Covid 19 pandemic during the research was emphasized. Third, it reviewed the process for developing the codebook, from the establishment of the initial codebook to the following revisions. The different categories covered in the codebook also were explained in the chapter.

Regarding the actual analysis, it reviewed the process of coding, with an emphasis on issues such as inter-coder reliability. The advantages of having one Turkish language coder and one Greek language coder in terms of objectivity were discussed. Also, how the coders overcame the challenge of not having a pilot reliability test, by face-to-face and Zoom meetings, was discussed. As to final reliability, the absence of correlation calculation has been brought up as a possible weakness of the study. Nevertheless, the frequent meetings of the coders, indicate a correlation of around 75%. Regarding the reporting of the findings, the use of discussions and descriptive tables to compare the data was explained. Finally, this chapter elaborated on the main strengths of the methodology.

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS FROM HEADLINE ARTICLES ON THE ANNAN PLAN

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the content analysis findings from headline articles of Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Greek newspapers. Four objectives are kept in consideration when discussing the findings. First, drawing on McCombs and Shaw's (1972) agenda setting theory, it compares the frequency of news on the Annan Plan making the headlines. Second, in the light of Hallin and Mancini's (2004) Mediterranean Media Model, it evaluates the dataset with a particular emphasis on Seymoure Ure's (1974) concept of press political party parallelism. Third, it compares the use of "win-win," "win-lose," "lose-lose there is "no" alternative, and "risky gambling" frames. Fourth, it traces the development of the "solution frame" used by pro-"yes" newspapers, and "continuation of the status quo frame" used by pro-"no" newspapers.

5.2 The Comparative Frequency of Headline Articles on the Referendum

The frequency of headline articles on the referendum shed light on how often the Annan plan was covered in the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek print media. Why, then is this important? The relevance of frequency of the Annan Plan making it to the headlines can be explained by the mass communication theory of agenda setting. Introduced by McCombs and Shaw (1972), the theory demonstrates that people prioritize issues presented to them as important by the media. After surveying North Carolina voters during the 1968 US presidential elections, Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw reached this conclusion. In this

study, the frequency of topics related to the Annan Plan making it to the headlines during April 2004 in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, and *Vatan*; Greek Cypriot newspapers *Charavgi*, *Fileleftheros*, and *Machi*; Turkish newspapers *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Yeni Şafak*; and Greek newspapers *Rizospastis*, *Ta Nea* and *Kathimerini* have been calculated. The results are significant as they demonstrate the agenda-setting process in both the primary parties of the conflict, namely Northern Cyprus, Southern Cyprus, and secondary parties to the conflict Turkey and Greece.

As to the print media of primary parties to the conflict, in the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspapers analyzed, all 25 of the headline articles are on the Annan Plan, thus making the frequency percentage 100%.

Let's continue the discussion with the frequencies of headline articles in the print media of the secondary parties to the conflict, namely Turkish and Greek newspapers. First, it should be noted that the frequency of headline articles in the Turkish press and Greek press is nearly identical. Sixteen of the 25 headline articles in the Turkish newspapers *Cumhuriyet* and *Yeni Şafak* are on the referendum, which amounts to 64%. The same percentage is seen in *Kathimerini*. The median of the percentage frequency is 64. To be more precise, the issue is slightly more prioritized in Greece than Turkey; however, the difference is not significant. Interestingly, all the Greek Cypriot newspaper headlines analyzed are against the Annan Plan; the only variation occurs among the percentages. The leftist *Charavgi* has the highest percentage of headline articles against the plan.

To sum up, the findings on the frequency in Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspapers are identical, as all the island newspapers headlines in the April of 2004, both Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot, were about the Annan Plan. Second,

the frequency percentages in the Turkish and Greek newspapers are similar, with the Greek newspapers having a slightly higher percentage

5.3 Press-political party parallelism and support of the Annan Plan

Initially, Hallin and Mancini (2004) who proposed the Mediterranean Media Model, suggested that four countries fit the model: Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Accordingly, the media landscape of these four countries had common characteristics such as late transition to democracy and political parallelism. Papathanasopoulos (2007) revisited Hallin and Mancini's Mediterranean Media Model and added Malta, Turkey, and Cyprus to the initial list of countries.

According to Hallin and Mancini (2004), one of the key characteristics of this model is press-political party parallelism. They assert that media in southern European countries are strongly politicized, and that political parallelism is high. The concept of press-political party parallelism (PPP) introduced by Seymour-Ure (1974) has three features: ownership of the mass media by political parties, the editorial choice of the news organizations, and the party affiliation of the readers. Research on Turkish and Greek media landscapes reveals the prominence of press-political party parallelism (Çarkoğlu, 2010; Papathodorou and Manchin, 2003).

How do the findings on headline articles on the Annan Plan in Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish newspapers relate to the findings of Çarkoğlu, Papathodorou, and Manchin (2010, 2003)? The findings of this study also indicate press-political party parallelism in relation to Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek media. Press-political party parallelism is, for example, highly visible in the Greek newspaper *Rizospastis*, owned by the Greek Communist Party. This newspaper advocates a "no" on the referendum, displaying political parallelism

with the Greek Communist Party. It should be noted that this newspaper also serves as an example of Seymour Ure's second feature of press-political party parallelism.

Similarly, the position taken by the two Turkish newspapers *Cumhuriyet* and *Yeni Şafak* in relation to the referendum is related closely to the position of the political party with which they show parallelism. In parallel with the JDP (Justice and Development Party), *Yeni Şafak* takes a pro "yes" position. To the contrary *Cumhuriyet*, in parallel with CHP (Republican Peoples Party) takes a pro "no" position. The Greek Cypriot *Charavgi* displays press-political party parallelism with Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People), and the Turkish Cypriot *Vatan* displays press-political party parallelism with the UBP (National Unity Party). Both newspapers take a pro-"no" stance in parallel with the AKEL and UBP.

The support of the Annan Plan is the highest, with a 64, in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Afrika*. Press-political party parallelism in the analysis of headline articles can be understood by the percentages of leaders quoted in them.⁸ The CTP (Republican Turkish Party) leader Mehmet Ali Talat is quoted in 36% of the headline articles of *Afrika*. The support for the plan is 41% in the *Kıbrıs*. However, the rate of quotes from a single political leader fall under 10% in this newspaper. In contrast with the Turkish Cypriot newspapers *Afrika* and *Kıbrıs*, *Vatan* is against the Annan Plan. The percentage of opposition to the plan in this newspaper is 24%, and President Denktaş is quoted in 47% of the headline articles.

In the Turkish newspapers, *Milliyet* and *Yeni Şafak* support the plan. On the other hand, *Cumhuriyet* opposes it. The percentage of headline articles against the plan in

⁸ It is important to note that the unit of analysis for the following analyses is the published headline in the particular newspaper. The tables report each newspaper separately and thus the percentages are calculated in reference to the number of observations (i.e., *n*) of that particular newspaper.

Cumhuriyet is 25. The percentage of headline articles that support the plan in *Milliyet* is 54, with seven articles out of 13. The percentage of headline articles that support the plan in *Yeni Şafak* is 56, our nine articles out of 16.

The analysis of the Greek Cypriot newspaper headline articles demonstrates that 3 out of 27 headlines from *Charavgi* are against the plan, which is equivalent to 11%. As to the headline articles from the newspaper *Fileleftheros*, 8 out of 22 headline articles are neutral to the plan, giving a percentage of 36. In *Machi*, 13 out of 26 headlines articles are against the plan, making 50%.

The percentage of headlines against the plan is comparatively high in the analyzed Greek newspapers. Twenty-five out 27 headline articles of the newspaper *Rizospastis* oppose the plan, which amounts to a 93%. Five out of 20 headline articles of the newspaper *Ta Nea* are neutral to the plan, making 25%. In *Kathimerini* 4 out of 16 articles support the plan, which is equivalent to 25%.

5.4 Findings from Turkish Cypriot headline articles

First, two of the three Turkish Cypriot newspapers analyzed took a pro “yes” position on the Annan Plan. Regarding the use of the “win-win,” “win-lose,” “lose-lose,” “no” alternative,” and “risky gambling” frames, only a single headline article was found that used the “no” alternative frame in the newspaper *Kıbrıs*. This single article is highly relevant because the exact content of the frame is given in the wording “There is “no” plan B in Cyprus, it will not be better (*Kıbrıs'ta B planı yok daha iyisi olmayacak*).”⁹ Finally, the newspapers *Kıbrıs* and *Vatan* do not use any of the five above-mentioned frames.

⁹ *Kıbrıs* April 15, 2004.

Among the three analyzed Turkish Cypriot newspapers, the pro “yes” *Afrika* and *Kıbrıs* use a “solution frame.” To the contrary, the pro-“no” newspaper *Vatan* uses a “continuation of the status quo” frame. This raises the questions of what constitutes the building blocks of these frames and whether they follow a particular pattern? In *Afrika*, one headline article appears daily accompanied by a sentence in direct dialog with the reader that is presented before the headline. For example, one such sentence reads “Denktaş says that if they say “yes” and we say “yes,” we are in trouble. Someone will be in trouble, but who that will be is already known.”¹⁰ Also, these sentences present short questions such as “We are entering the last week with one “yes,” and one know. Let’s see where we will be next Sunday, still in this inn, or in Europe?”¹¹ These short remarks also include quotations and sarcasm. One reads, “Talat says if the Greek side enters the EU, they will do so like a child with a runny nose. Since our mother is going to wipe our nose, we are going to be clean.”¹² They serve as a short opinion presented with the headline article, and they function in constructing the “solution” frame. In parallel to these short comments, the “solution frame” also is developed in the headline articles, through the use of quotations and statistics. Hallin and Mancini (2004), and Hallin and Papathassopoulos (2000) underline the tradition of advocacy reporting in the Mediterranean model. *Afrika* serves as a very good example of advocacy reporting, advocating strongly a “yes” in the referendum.

In the newspaper *Kıbrıs*, we see quotes from the leaders of primary parties of the conflict, i.e., Turkish Cypriot politicians, and from leaders of the secondary parties

¹⁰ *Afrika*, April 18, 2004.

¹¹ *Afrika*, April 19, 2004.

¹² *Afrika*, April 2004.

of the conflict, i.e., Turkish politicians and from officials of third part institutions such as the UN.

Prime Minister Talat is quoted in 5% of *Kıbrıs* headline articles. Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan is quoted in 6% of the headline articles of the same newspaper. Also Turkish Cypriot president Denktaş, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül, Under Secretary of the UN de Soto, US special envoy for Cyprus Weston, and President of Azerbaijan Aliyev are quoted in the headline of at least one of the newspapers. Rather than press-political party parallelism, the quotation pattern in this newspaper is related to the “solution” frame the newspaper adopts in relation to the Cyprus conflict. Thus, the editorial choice of the newspaper is to quote the speeches of leaders supporting a solution.

The solution theme also demonstrates itself in this newspaper by “call for action” headline articles. These headline articles are either in question form or use the imperative mood such as “Come on to the Rally,”¹³ “Where are the police?”¹⁴ “Do not miss the historical opportunity,”¹⁵ and “Hear our voice, Akuste Mas.”¹⁶ The use of Greek in one of the above-mentioned headlines is highly interesting since it shows that the newspaper also targets the Greek Cypriots with its headline. Similar to *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs* also engages in advocacy reporting, strongly advocating a “yes” in the referendum.

In *Vatan*, instead of the solution frame, we see the application of the continuing the status quo frame. This frame develops around three pillars. The first pillar is quotes, the second pillar is statistics, and the third is the negative

¹³ *Kıbrıs*, April 14, 2004.

¹⁴ *Kıbrıs*, April 21, 2004.

¹⁵ *Kıbrıs* April 21, 2004.

¹⁶ *Kıbrıs* April 15, 2004.

consequences of a “yes” vote, to Turkish Cypriots and Turks. The quotation pattern in the *Vatan* newspaper is as follows: Regarding quotations from Turkish Cypriot leaders in descending order, President Denktaş is quoted in 16% of the headline articles, leader of UBP Derviş Eroğlu is quoted in 5%, and Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat is quoted in 2%. As mentioned above, these quotes serve to strengthen the newspaper’s continuation of the status quo frame. For the example, the headlines “Eroğlu: Traps that will put the future of our people in danger and deficits still exist in the new plan,”¹⁷ “Do not give up your state,”¹⁸ and “I will call on every individual to unite under the flag of ‘no’”¹⁹ quote UDP leader Derviş Eroğlu and President Denktaş for this very purpose. Quotes from Turkish Cypriot and Turkish non-governmental organizations to support the continuation of the “status quo” or “no” vote also appear.

The headline article “We do not want to be Iraq; we do not want to be left without a state or be Palestine either” constitutes an example of the use of quotes from Turkish Cypriot civil society.²⁰ The headline articles “The mothers of martyrs are in Cyprus”²¹ and “National conscience and Cyprus in Malatya”²² constitute examples of quotes from Turkish civil society in support of a “no” vote. Thus, quotes from primary parties of the conflict, secondary parties are used instrumentally for the same purpose by *Vatan*; however, the newspaper uses quotes from third parties in a more informative manner. In regard to quotations from third parties to the conflict, vice Secretary General de Soto is quoted in the headline article “De Soto has returned to the island,”²³ a quote that is informative rather than instrumental. From here, we can draw the conclusion that two different types of quotes are used in the *Vatan* headline

¹⁷ *Vatan* April 1, 2004.

¹⁸ *Vatan* April 9, 2004.

¹⁹ *Vatan*, April 19, 2004.

²⁰ *Vatan*, April 17, 2004.

²¹ *Vatan*, April 20, 2004.

²² *Vatan*, April 5, 2004.

²³ *Vatan*, April 7, 2004.

articles on the referendum, instrumental, and informative. However, the number of instrumental quotes is higher.

A second finding of the content analysis demonstrates that the frame of constitutional court and referendum law is highly significant in the headline articles of the selected newspapers. This frame is used in relation to the approval of the referendum law by the Cypriot constitutional court as to make it valid. The use of this frame can be better understood from the perspective of Putnam's two-level games. In Putnam's two-level games, bargaining between the negotiators is referred to as level I, and separate discussions within each group of constituents on whether to ratify the agreement is referred to as level II (Putnam, 1988). Five of the headline articles of *Afrika* and three of *Kıbrıs*'s use the constitutional court/referendum law frame. This amounts to 5% of the *Kıbrıs* headline articles, and 20% of those of *Afrika*.

5.5 Findings from Greek Cypriot Headline Articles

First, it should be noted that all Greek Cypriot newspapers analyzed take a pro "no" position, whether left or center of right of the political spectrum. The newspapers use the "continuation of the status quo" frame like the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* and Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Vatan*. The Greek Cypriot headlines frame the Annan Plan as a "continuation of 1974." "The continuation of the 1974" frame draws a parallel between the Turkish intervention to the Island and the Annan Plan. However, this frame is more prominent in the Greek headlines. Another interesting parallel is between the headline articles of Turkish Cypriot nationalist newspaper *Vatan* and those of the Greek Cypriot nationalist newspaper *Machi*. In contrast to the analyzed Turkish Cypriot newspapers, the Greek Cypriot newspapers

make use of win-lose or lose-lose frames. In the leftist *Charavgi*. Three out of 27 headlines use the win-lose variant, amounting to a 11 %.

On the right *Machi*, 1 of 26 headlines, amounting to a 4%, use the win-lose frame. The “risky gambling” frame also is present in the Greek Cypriot newspapers. For example, the *Fileleftheros* headline articles “Papadopoulos puts first his cards on the table”²⁴ and “the last card is on the 12th”²⁵ use the “risky gambling” frame in their narrative. The *Charavgi* headline articles “The people have the floor (Ο λαός έχει το λόγο),”²⁶ “Tassos’ answer is “no” (Όχι απαντά ο Τάσος),”²⁷ “Tassos Papadopoulos: “We insist on a intercommunal bi-zonal federation (Τάσος Παπαδόπουλος: Επιμένουμε σε δικοινοτική διζωνική ομοσπονδία),”²⁸ and the *Machi* “no” agreed solution was reached (Δεν επετεύχθη συμφωνημένη λύση),”²⁹ constitute examples to the use of “win-lose” frame.

The Greek Cypriot newspapers *Charavgi*, *Fileleftheros*, and *Machi* use the same “continuation of the status quo” frame present as the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* and Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Vatan*. Very interestingly, the Greek Cypriot nationalist *Machi* constructs its continuation of the “status quo” frame, using the same building blocks as the Turkish Cypriot nationalist *Vatan*. Like *Vatan*, *Machi* first justifies a “no” to the referendum, by giving reference to Greek Cypriot civil society. The *Machi* headline articles “Thousands of members (7000) of DISY opted in favor of no,”³⁰ “The youth is rising against. The gimmickry of Anastasiadis embarrass

²⁴ *Fileleftheros*, April 4, 2004.

²⁵ *Fileleftheros*, April 13, 2004.

²⁶ *Charavgi*, April 1, 2004.

²⁷ *Charavgi*, April 8, 2004.

²⁸ *Charavgi*, April 23, 2004.

²⁹ *Machi*, April 1, 2004.

³⁰ *Machi*, April 22, 2004.

Cyprus internationally,”³¹ and “Overwhelming ‘no’.” “The people have spoken. Members of DISY demand the people’s decision to be respected,”³² trace the use of the civil society pillar of the continuation of the “status quo” frame.

Also, in Greek Cypriot newspapers the Annan Plan is framed as the continuation of 1974. It should be noted that this frame is more prominent in the Greek newspapers than the Greek Cypriot newspapers. 16% of *Charavgi* headline articles present the Annan Plan as a continuity of 1974. The percentage of framing the Annan Plan as a continuity of 1974 is lower in *Fileleftheros* and *Machi*, with 5% in the former and 7% in the latter.

5.6 Findings from Turkish Headline Articles

The “risky gambling” and “win-win” frames are present in the Turkish newspapers. The “risky gambling” frame is used in four of *Cumhuriyet*’s headline articles, which is equivalent to 25%. The ““win-win” and “risky gambling” frames are used in *Yeni Şafak*. The “win-win” frame is used in one article, amounting to 6%, and the “risky gambling” frame is used in two articles, adding up to 13%.

A significant finding of the Turkish headline articles content analysis is that the “no alternative” frame is used as part of the solution frame by newspapers that support a “yes” to the plan, whereas the risk gambling frame is used regardless of the position of the newspaper in relation to the plan.

Even though the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* and the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Yeni Şafak* are from the opposite ends of the political spectrum, both newspapers use the “continuation of the status quo” frame and support it similar fashion. *Cumhuriyet*, which is against the plan, builds its frame, parallel to *Vatan*, by

³¹ *Machi*, April 23, 2004.

³² *Machi*, April 25, 2004.

the use of quotes. Turkish, Turkish Cypriot statesmen and officials and representatives of the EU are quoted for this purpose. President of the Republic of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Chief of Staff General Özkök, Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül, EU commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen is quoted once (see Table9), which is equivalent to 6%. CHP deputy head Öymen and Turkish Cypriot President Denktaş are quoted twice (13%). One headline article is particularly indicative in how the quotations are used instrumentally in building the frame. For example, in the article “Gül: The pros of the Annan Plan are more. Öymen: Even the ones who signed Sévres knew what they signed. There will be problems.”³³ both opinions are presented in the headline, however the second quotation is emphasized by giving it more space in the headline.

An interesting finding about the *Cumhuriyet* headlines is that the newspaper goes beyond advocating a “no” in the Annan referendum, questioning its legitimacy. For example, the headline “Two peoples that are going to the ballots under threat and pressure will vote on the Annan plan without knowing the content.”³⁴ This article, printed on the day of the referendum, questions its legitimacy through the central ideas that the referendum is being carried out under threat and pressure and people will vote without knowledge on the content of the referendum.

In the Turkish newspaper headlines, legal references have a prominent presence. To be more specific, concepts related to European law such as primary law, secondary law, and the derogation issue are present. These references cannot be understood with prior knowledge of the concepts. First, what is primary law? Treaties of the European Union are considered as primary law, whereas law that is derived

³³ *Cumhuriyet*, April 7, 2004.

³⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, April 24, 2004.

from principles and objectives of treaties is considered secondary law. Secondary law includes regulations, decisions, directives, recommendations, and opinions. In relation to the Annan Plan, it requires the approval member state parliaments to gain the status of primary law. However, the concern is that even if the plan becomes primary law, cases about displaced persons and properties can still be brought to European Court of Human Rights and European Court of Justice.

“Derogations” refer to provisions in an EU legislative measure which allows part of the measure to be applied differently. In the context of the Annan Plan, the Turkish Cypriot side has advocated permanent derogations from the EU acquis concerning the right to buy property and the right to reside (IKV report). Thus, the Annan Plan introduced temporary derogations that limited the rights of Greek Cypriots to reside and buy property in the North for 15 years. Presented in Table 7, two of the *Cumhuriyet* articles (13%) give reference to primary law, and of the *Cumhuriyet* articles give reference (6%) to the derogation issue. One of the *Yeni Şafak* articles gives reference to primary law (6%).

The *Milliyet* headline articles in majority support the Annan Plan, yet the none of the five game theoretical frames are used in these newspapers headline articles. A particularity about the *Milliyet* stands out in the analysis: the priority it gives to the international community. Based on personal experience, as reporter in the foreign news desk in the late 1990s, I can argue that this is related to the newspapers large number of foreign correspondents and the tradition of foreign news leverage in the newspaper’s daily news meetings, compared to other newspapers. Five of 13 headline articles, which amount to 38%, include references to the international community; three references to the European Union, including three quotations from the European Union commissioner for enlargement Verheugen; and two references to the US

administration, including one quote from US Secretary of State Collin Powell.

Milliyet uses the “pro solution” frame, and develops this frame with references to the international community, either as informative articles or quotations from representatives of the international community such as the EU or US administration. The newspaper also places itself within this solution frame as seen in the article “Powell gave his message to Cyprus through *Milliyet*: “saying no will not be intelligent.”³⁵

Finally, there are common headline articles in the examined Turkish newspapers. As shown in Table 9 *Cumhuriyet* headline “EU commissioner Verheugen: The Greek Cypriots have fooled us”³⁶ and the *Milliyet* article “Historical confession about Greek Cypriots from Verheugen: I have been deceived” share the same content and present it from the same perspective. Thus, it can be said that the articles are practically the same. Also, at times, the exact content is given in a different perspective. The *Cumhuriyet* article “Reservations put forward in extraordinary Cyprus meeting. Power resides in government. The National Security Council has not assumed responsibility”³⁷ the *Milliyet* article “NSC: The judgement belongs to government,”³⁸ and the *Yeni Şafak* article “NSC: Yes, to the plan, caution to the application” constitute an example of the latter.

We also see the use of the “solution” frame in the newspaper *Yeni Şafak*. This newspaper also uses quotations from Turkish and Turkish Cypriot politicians as well as EU officials as part of the “solution” frame. Prime Minister Erdoğan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül are quoted in two of 16 articles, accounting to 13%.

³⁵ *Milliyet*, April 17, 2004.

³⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, April 22, 2004.

³⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, April 6, 2004.

³⁸ *Milliyet*, April 6, 2004.

Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat and EU commissioner for enlargement Verheugen and are quoted in one of 16 articles accounting to 6%.

5.7 Findings from Greek Headline Articles

In the Greek newspapers, presented in Table 9, the “win-lose” frame is prominent. One out of 27 *Rizospastis* headline articles, one demonstrates the use of the “win-lose” game theoretical frame, meaning an equivalent of 4%. Also, in the same newspaper there is one article that uses the “lose/lose” frame. The *Rizospastis* article, “Solidarity with the Cypriot people,”³⁹ can be given as an example to the use of the “lose-lose” frame by the newspaper and the “Resounding no to the Annan Plan”⁴⁰ can be given as an example of the use of the “win-lose” frame.

Rizospastis shares the same “continuation of the status quo” frame with *Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, *Charavgi*, *Fileleftheros*, and *Machi*, yet with one significant difference: the strongest “no” to the plan comes from this newspaper. How *Rizospastis* develops its “no” frame is of particular interest. First, the newspaper presents the Annan plan as a continuation of 1974. This frame is also used in the Greek Cypriot newspaper *Charavgi*’s headline articles; however, it is more prominent in *Rizospastis*.

Secondly, it presents the plan as an imperialist plot orchestrated by Britain/the US, the UN, and the EU. *Rizospastis* headline articles against the UN and representatives are 4 out of 27, equivalent to 15%. The same newspapers headline articles against the EU and representatives are 20 of 27, equivalent to 74%, and the headlines against the US and officials appear in 20 of 27, equivalent to 74 %. The headline articles against Britain and officials of is 11 of 27, equivalent to 41 %. The

³⁹ *Rizospastis*, April 2, 2004.

⁴⁰ *Rizospastis*, April 8, 2004.

headline “No to the imperialist Atilla”⁴¹ is an example to this pattern in the newspaper. The headline articles “Europoisan against Cyprus,”⁴² “The Europeans were dripping with Eurovenom,”⁴³ “Plans of blackmail by USA EU, escalation of pressure by the American-British,”⁴⁴ “Pressure and disinformation binge on behalf of USA-EU”⁴⁵ are examples of framing the plan as an imperialist plot. Thus, *Rizospastis* uses the narrative of conspiracy theories in framing the plan.

Interestingly, the main adversary for *Rizospastis* appears as third parties, rather than the primary parties and secondary parties to the conflict. In fact, references to Turkish Cypriots are positive as visible in the following articles “Bidding of clash with the imperialist planning, firm solidarity with Turkish and Greek Cypriots”⁴⁶ and “Plan-Trap for the people of the region.”⁴⁷ The strong opposition to the plan by *Rizospastis* can be explained by the newspaper’s ownership. Among the newspapers analyzed this newspaper is the only one that is owned by a political party, the Communist Party of Greece.

The headline articles of the two other Greek newspapers *Ta Nea* and *Kathimerini* also oppose the plan; however, their interpretation of the Annan Plan as a continuation of 1974 and as an imperialist plot orchestrated by the Britain/US/EU is not as strong as in the headlines of *Rizospastis*. *Ta Nea* has only one article that refers to the Annan Plan as the continuation of 1974. The language that *Kathimerini* employs for third parties to the conflict is more neutral when compared that of

⁴¹ *Rizospastis*, April 18, 2004.

⁴² *Rizospastis*, April 22, 2004.

⁴³ *Rizospastis*, April 22, 2004.

⁴⁴ *Rizospastis*, April 17, 2004.

⁴⁵ *Rizospastis*, April 20, 2004.

⁴⁶ *Rizospastis*, April 14, 2004.

⁴⁷ *Rizospastis*, April 15, 2004.

Rizospastis, as seen in the article “The international actors are advocating for yes.”⁴⁸

While *Ta Nea* is also critical of third parties in relation to the Annan Plan, it does not frame the plan as an imperialist plot. The following can be shown as an example to the newspaper’s presentation of third parties. “Vote ‘yes’ or forget us: Ultimatum from Europe, the USA, the UN.”⁴⁹ Another interesting point is that the Annan Plan becomes instrumental in *Rizospastis*’s criticism of the Karamanlis government, which was in power during the Annan Referendum period. *Rizospastis* is highly critical of prime minister Karamanlis and his government’s policies in regard to the Annan Plan. One headline articles out of 27, an equivalent of 4%, are critical of Prime Minister Karamanlis.

In its coverage of the Annan Plan, *Kathimerini* emphasizes the disagreement about the referendum between the Greek government, headed by prime minister Karamanlis, and the Greek Cypriot government, headed by President Papadopoulos. The newspaper underlines Karamanlis’s effort in the direction of obtaining a “yes” from the referendum, in contrast to Papadopoulos’s “no.” Four out of 16 *Kathimerini* headline articles support Prime Minister Karamanlis, which makes 25%.

Also, *Ta Nea*’s coverage underlines the disagreement between the Greek and Greek Cypriot governments in relation to the plan. The newspaper takes a critical stance against the government of Karamanlis as demonstrated in the article “‘Yes’ silently and humbly by Karamanlis.”⁵⁰ *Ta Nea* bases its criticism on the Karamanlis government by the use of numerical data. “Booming ‘no’ but takes sides” and “71%

⁴⁸ *Kathimerini*, April 2, 2004.

⁴⁹ *Ta Nea*, April 2, 2004.

⁵⁰ *Ta Nea* April 16, 2004.

have stated that the Greek government must openly declare its intentions.”⁵¹ are two articles that make use of numeric data.



⁵¹ Ibid.

5.8 Conclusion

The analysis of the headline articles dataset yields five sets of conclusions. The first set relates to the positions the headline articles have taken for the plan. Among the 12 newspapers analyzed, *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, *Milliyet*, and *Yeni Şafak* are in the “yes” camp of the referendum, whereas *Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, *Charavgi*, *Fileleftheros*, *Machi*, *Rizospastis*, *Ta Nea* and *Kathimerini* are in the “no” camp. The highest percentage of support for the plan among the newspapers in the “yes” camp is given by the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Afrika*, whereas the highest percentage of opposition in the “no” camp is given by the Greek newspaper *Rizospastis*.

The second set relates to the “no alternative” and other frames. The first significant outcome is that the “no alternative” frame is used in newspapers that support the Annan Plan. However, the “risky gambling” frame is used in both pro “yes” and pro “no” newspapers. Pro “no” newspapers also prefer to use the theme of negative consequences of a “no” vote in the referendum. Secondly, one of the sources of the “there is no alternative” frame is the US state department, as demonstrated in Secretary of State Collin Powell’s speech stating that there is no alternative to the referendum.

The second set of conclusions is related to the solution frame used by pro “yes” newspapers and continuation of the status quo frame used by pro “no” newspapers. The analysis demonstrates that continuation of the “status quo” frame has the same building blocks. This parallel is particularly visible between the Turkish Cypriot nationalist *Vatan* and the Greek Cypriot nationalist *Machi*.

The third set of conclusions are related to press political party parallelism and patterns of similarity. Despite the expectation that there would be similarity in how


newspapers of similar political leaning covered the Annan Plan, in Turkish and Turkish Cypriot newspapers, the outcome demonstrates the opposite. For example, the leftist Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* shows more similarity with the Turkish Cypriot conservative daily *Vatan*. Both newspapers take an actively pro “no” position and use the frame of “continuation of the status quo.” This can be explained by press political party parallelism.

In the Turkish media context, since the Annan plan was supported by the AKP government, newspapers in opposition to the government such as *Cumhuriyet*, took a pro-“no” position, whereas newspapers that aligned with the government, such as *Yeni Şafak*, took a pro-“yes” position. *Milliyet*’s stance on the plan cannot be explained by press political party parallelism, since at that time the newspaper did not show parallelism with a political party although it can be regarded as central left. A significant pattern of parallelism can also be seen in how the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* instrumentalizes the Annan Plan to criticize the Erdoğan government, and how the Greek newspaper *Rizospastis* does the same to criticize the Karamanlis government. Thus, both *Cumhuriyet* and *Rizospastis* do not agree with the pro-“yes” position of the Turkish and Greek governments and criticize their policies on the Annan Plan. Also, it should be noted that all three of the analyzed Greek newspapers are critical of the Karamanlis governments policies vis-a-vis the Annan Plan; whereas in the Turkish context, a significant degree of criticism is only present in *Cumhuriyet*.

The fourth set of conclusions is related to the frames particular to this dataset, specifically to the headline articles of the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Greek newspapers. The “constitutional court and referendum law” theme has a significant presence in Turkish Cypriot newspapers, creating a moment of flashback

to Putnam's two-level games. In Turkish newspapers, concepts related to European Law such as primary law, secondary law, and the derogation issue have a high degree of visibility.

Finally, each data set brings a new angle to the research, offering a distinguishing result. To follow this logic, what then is the contribution of the dataset on headline articles of the selected newspapers to the study, holistically speaking? The newspaper landscape in all the studied countries reflects Putnam type-two level games. For the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspaper landscape, the first level is Cyprus, and the second level is Turkey and Greece. From the perspective of the Turkish and Greek newspaper landscape, Turkey and Greece are the first level, and Cyprus is the second. The toolkit of these two-level games are the remarks of the politicians on the issue, often given in quotations. It would be better to say three-level games, if we take the international organizations such as the UN and the EU, plus other countries with stakes, such as the USA, Britain as the third level.

Figure 4*Comparative Frequency of Headline articles*

Note. The newspapers in Series 1 are *Afrika*, *Charavgi*, *Cumhuriyet*, and *Rizospastis*; the newspapers in Series 2 are *Kıbrıs*, *Fileleftheros*, *Milliyet*, and *Ta Nea*; and the newspapers in Series 3 are *Vatan*, *Mahki*, *Yeni Şafak* and *Kathimerini*.

Table 6*Leaders Quoted in Headlines*

News.	Leaders	Quote Freq	Quote (%)
Afrika (N=25)	M.A. Talat	9	36
Kıbrıs (N=66)	Various		
Vatan (N=58)	Denktaş	27	47
Charavgi (N=27)			
Fileleftheros (N=22)			
Machi (N=26)	Papadopoulos	10	38
Cumhuriyet (N=16)			
Milliyet (N=13)			
Yeni Şafak (N=16)	Erdoğan Abdullah Gül	4	25
Rizospastis (N=27)			
Ta Nea (N=20)			
Katimerini (N=16)			

Table 7*Support given to Annan Plan in headlines*

News.	Support Freq.	Support (%)	Against Freq.	against (%)	Neutral Freq.	Neutral (%)	Not ment. Freq.	Not ment. (%)
Afrika (N=25)	16	64					9	36
Kıbrıs (N=66)	27	41					39	59
Vatan (N=58)			14	24	2	3	5	9
Charavgi (N=27)	2	7	3	11	17	63	5	19
Fileleftheros (N=22)					8	36	14	64
Machi (N=26)	1	4	13	50	4	15	8	31
Cumhuriyet (N=16)			4	25	1	6	11	69
Milliyet (N=13)	7	54					6	46
Yeni Şafak (N=16)	9	56					7	44
Rizospastis (N=27)			25	93			2	7
Ta Nea (N=20)	2	10	1	5	5	25	12	60
Katimerini (N=16)	4	25			2	31	10	44

Table 8

Frequency of “win-win,” “win-lose,” “lose-lose,” “no alternative,” and “risky gambling” frames in headlines

[illegible]

Table 9*References to Third Party Intervention in headlines⁵²*

Newspaper	UN, Kofi Annan		EU, Günther Verheugen		USA, President Bush, Secretary of State Powell, Special envoy for Cyprus Weston		Great Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair		Russia, President Putin	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
<i>Afrika</i> (N=25)	3	12	2	8	3	12			1	4
<i>Kıbrıs</i> (N=66)	2(+)	3 (+)	1(+)	2(+)	1(+)	2(+)				
	1	2	1	2	3	5				
<i>Vatan</i> (N=58)	5	9								
<i>Charavgi</i> (N=27)	2(-)	7 (-)	2(-)	7(-)	1(-)	4(-)	1(-)	4(-)	1(+)	4(+)
	23	85	15	56	1(+)	4(+)	3	11	3	11
					10	37				
<i>Fileleftheros</i> (N=22)	16	73	10	45	14	64	5	23	3	14
<i>Machi</i> (N=26)	10	38	1(-) 4	4(-) 15	4(-)	15(-)	4(-)	15(-)	1(+)	4(+)
<i>Cumhuriyet</i> (N=16)	2	13	2(-)	13(-)	2(-)	13(-)	1	6	1(-)	6
	2(-)	13(-)	2	13	1	6			1	6(-)
<i>Milliyet</i> (N=13)			1(+)	7(+)	1(+)	7(+)				
			2	15	1	7				
<i>Yeni Şafak</i> (N=16)	5(+)	31(+)	1	6	2(+)	13(+)			1(+)	6 (+)
<i>Rizospastis</i> (N= 27)	4(-)	15(-)	20(-)	74(-)	20 (-)	74(-)	11(-)	41(-)	1(-)	4(-)
	12	44	1(+)	4(+)	1	4	1	4	5	19
			1	4						
<i>Ta Nea</i> (N=20)	1(-)	4(-)	1(-)	4(-)	5(-)	25(-)	2	8	1	4
	12	60	14	70	12	60				
<i>Kathimerini</i> (N=16)	1(-)	6(-)	2(-)	13(-)	13	81	5	31	4	25
	11	69	11	69						

⁵² Positive references have been indicated with a "+" sign, while negative references have been indicated with a "-" sign, and neutral references have been combined with quotes.

CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS FROM OP-EDS ON THE ANNAN PLAN

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the content analysis findings of op-eds from the Turkish Cypriot newspapers *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, and *Vatan*; the Greek Cypriot newspapers *Charavgi*, *Fileleftheros*, and *Machi*; the Turkish newspapers *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Yeni Şafak*; and the Greek newspapers *Rizospastis*, *Ta Nea*, and *Kathimerini*. It first compares the number of op-eds published in the newspapers subject to analysis. Next, it focuses on support for the Annan Plan and relates the findings to concepts such as press-political party parallelism and internal pluralism. Last, it looks at the findings of the op-ed content analysis from primary and secondary parties to the conflict, with an emphasis on the presence or absence of frames such as "win-win," "win-lose," "lose-lose," "there is no alternative," and "risky gambling."

6.2 Quantitative analysis of op-eds published in the newspapers

According to Hallin and Mancini (2004) one of the main characteristics of the Mediterranean Media model is the prominence of commentary, or advocacy, journalism. What is the prominence of the commentary in the newspapers analyzed? If we look at the number of op-eds that appear in Turkish Cypriot newspapers, presented in Figure 5, *Afrika* has 341, *Kıbrıs* 75, and *Vatan* 80. As for the Greek Cypriot newspapers *Charavgi* has 42, *Fileleftheros* 94, and *Machi* 90. In regards to the Turkish newspapers, *Cumhuriyet* has 80, *Milliyet* 105, and *Yeni Şafak* 36. Of the Greek newspapers, *Rizospastis* has 95, *Ta Nea* 131, and *Kathimerini* has 68.

Among the analyzed newspapers, the newspapers that most closely fit the criteria of Hallin and Mancini's advocacy journalism are the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Afrika*, followed by the Greek *Ta Nea*, and the Turkish *Milliyet*. The two newspapers that least fit the advocacy journalism criteria are the Turkish *Yeni Şafak* and the Greek Cypriot *Charavgi*. The median for the analyzed sample is 105, with three newspapers being equal to or higher than the median. Finally, in terms of advocacy reporting and the prominence of the commentary, a high level of discrepancy is evidenced between the number of commentaries published in the Turkish Cypriot *Afrika* and the Greek Cypriot *Charavgi*; whereas that of the commentaries in Turkish *Cumhuriyet* and Greek *Rizospastis* is very close. As for center newspapers, a discrepancy is found between the number of commentaries published in *Kıbrıs* and *Fileleftheros*, as well as *Milliyet* and *Ta Nea*. However, it should be noted that the number of commentaries in both *Milliyet* and *Ta Nea* is equal to, or above the median. Finally, the number of commentaries published in *Vatan* and *Machi* is very close, in contrast to *Yeni Şafak* and *Kathimerini*, where the discrepancy is high.

6.3 Press-Political Party Parallelism, Internal Pluralism, and Support for the Annan Plan

Presented in Tables 10 and 11, regarding the issue of internal pluralism in the newspaper *Afrika*, it is possible to read op-eds that support the Anna Plan as well ones that express doubt. Out of the 341 *Afrika* op-eds analyzed, 200 (59%) are supportive of the Annan Plan and 5 (1%) are against it.⁵³

⁵³ It is important to note that the unit of analysis for the following analyses is the particular op-ed published in the newspaper. The tables report each newspaper separately and thus the percentages are calculated in reference to the number of observations (i.e., *n*) of that particular newspaper.

Thirty-four of the 75 *Kıbrıs* op-eds support the plan, amounting to a 45 %. On the other hand, two (3%) of the 75 op-eds are against the plan. The op-eds published in the newspaper *Kıbrıs*, also voice criticism of Turkish Cypriot President Denktaş. Eighteen out of 75 (24%) op-eds are critical, and 4(5%) make critical statements about Greek Cypriot president Papadopoulos.

Pro-"no" op-eds in *Vatan* make up 46 out of 80, a rate of 58%. In regard to patterns of political parallelism on the national scene, 8 references and quotes appear about President Denktaş, amounting to 10 %.

Shown in Table 11, As for the issue of internal pluralism, the left *Charavgi* has op-eds neutral to the plan, favoring it, and against it. The majority of *Charavgi* op-eds are neutral, with 24 out of the 42 evidencing no position on the plan, equivalent to 57%. Seven (17%) op-eds are against the plan, and three (7%) are supportive. In relation to national politics, 6 (14 %) of the 42 op-eds refer to the Papadopoulos positively, and he is quoted in the same number of op-eds. Thirteen (31 %) of the op-eds mention AKEL positively.

The central *Fileleftheros* also has internal pluralism, with the presence of op-eds supporting the plan, against the plan, as well as neutral ones in its pages. Thirty-three (35%) of the op-eds are against the plan, 16 (17%) are supportive, 30 (32%) are neutral. As for national politics Papadopoulos, fifty-eight refer to him positively, representing 62%; and six refer to him negatively, representing 6%. Finally, the far-right *Machi* opposes the Annan Plan, printing 81 out of 90 op-eds against it, equivalent to 90%. On the national level, 14 out of 90 *Machi* op-eds refer to Southern Cypriot president Papadopoulos positively, amounting to 16 %.

Cumhuriyet takes a strong position against the Annan Plan, with 96% of the op-eds analyzed against it. The *Milliyet* op-eds analyzed have a high degree of internal pluralism. Out of 105 op-eds in the data list, 40 were pro-"yes," and nine were pro-"no," amount to 38% pro-"yes" articles, and 9% pro-"no" articles. Columnists such as Hasan Cemal, Sami Kohen, Mehmet Y. Yılmaz, Güneri Cıvaoğlu, and Çetin Altan support the Plan, while Fikret Bila, Hasan Pulur, and Melih Aşık argue against it.

The *Yeni Şafak* op-eds take a pro-"yes" position on the Annan Plan referendum, with 56% supporting the plan. As such, the newspaper advocates a "yes" to the Annan plan. There is no internal pluralism among *Rizospastis* op-eds. Out of 95, 64 (67%) are against the Annan Plan. Regarding national politics, given the newspapers organic link with the Communist Party of Greece, there are many op-eds that support this party or quote a member of it. Twenty-three (24%) demonstrate support to the party, and there are six (6%) quotes from party members. Twenty-four (25%) op-eds are critical of New Democracy and its members, 38 (40%) are critical of PASOK and its member, 22 (23%) are critical of the leader of PASOK, Andreas Papandreou, and 37 (39%) are critical of SYRIZA.

In contrast to *Rizospastis*, the center-right *Kathimerini* has a relatively high degree of internal pluralism. 18 (26%) of the 68 *Kathimerini* op-eds are against the plan, 11 (16%) are for the plan, and 13 (19%) evidence a neutral stance. On the national level, 23 (34%) op-eds are supportive of Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis's Cyprus policies, and 5 (7%) are critical of Karamanlis.

Similar to *Kathimerini*, *Ta Nea* also has a high degree of internal pluralism. Out of 131 op-eds 34 (26%) are supportive of the Annan Plan, 15 (11%) are against the Plan, and 14 (11%) are neutral. On the national level *Ta Nea* also is highly critical

of the Karamanlis government, with 47 (36%) of its op-eds critical of Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis. On the other, 11 op-eds support Karamanlis (8%).

A main indicator of press-political party parallelism in a print institution is the presence of opinion pieces by political party members. The Greek Cypriot newspaper *Charavgi* displays press-political party parallelism with AKEL. Does the newspaper have op-eds written by AKEL members in its pages? The answer to this question is yes. An op-ed titled “Crunch Time,” written by Nikos Katsouridis, member of the Politburo of AKEL,⁵⁴ and an op-ed titled “Historical Responsibility,” by Neoklis Sylikiotis, member of the Central Committee of AKEL⁵⁵ are given space. Yet, alternatively, newspapers also may act as an open forum for discussion, creating the opportunity for writers as well as to politicians express their views. Southern Cypriot President Nikos Papadopoulos, for example, wrote an op-ed for the widely-read *Fileleftheros*, titled “Thirty Pieces of Silver.”⁵⁶

6.4 Findings from Turkish Cypriot Op-Eds

The *Afrika* op-eds analyzed are as follows: “Lololo” (*Lololo*), by Erdoğan Baybars; “Periodic” (*Periodik*) by Ali Osman; “Clearly” (*Dobra Dobra*), by Turgut Afşaroğlu; “Events and Facts” (*Olaylar ve Gerçekler*), by Arif Hasan Tahsin; “Angle” (*Açı*), by Şener Levent; “Awakening” (*Uyanış*), by Leyla Kıralp; “Sound of Silence” (*Sessizliğin Sesi*), by Mehmet Levent; “Letter From Africa” (*Afrika’dan Mektup*) and “London Letter” (*Londra Mektubu*), by Serhat İncirli; “Writings without an Address” (*Adressiz Yazılar*), by Faize Özdemircioğlu; “Letter from Australia” (*Avustralya Mektubu*), by Niyazi Öktem; “Comment” (*Yorum*), by Damla Özkan; “Stopper” (*Tıkaç*), by Ahmet Karaman; “Gappellari Uncle Fuad from Ağdana” (*Ağdanadan*

⁵⁴ N. Katsouridis, “Crunch Time,” *Charavgi*, April 4, 2004.

⁵⁵ N. Sylikiotis, “Historical Responsibility,” *Charavgi*, April 8, 2004.

⁵⁶ N. Papadopoulos, “Reparations: Thirty Pieces of Silver,” *Fileleftheros*, April 8, 2004.

Gappellari Fuad Dayı), by Hüseyin Çakmak; “Germany Letter” (*Almanya Mektubu*), by Yaşar Altay; “Tarantula,” by Ulaş Barış; and “Point of View” (*Bakış*), by Özger Ülker.

It was stated above that every newspaper defines “us” on three levels: ideological, national, and cultural. Their self-definition based on these three criteria determines the frames used by the newspapers. From the ideological viewpoint the newspaper *Afrika* stands on the radical left, and thus prioritizes issues such as human rights and equality and takes a strong position against chauvinist violence that erupted in Northern Cyprus after the arrival of ultra-nationalists from Turkey at the end of April to campaign for a “no” in the referendum. Eighteen out of the 341 op-eds are about ultranationalist terror in *Afrika* (5%).

They are “idealists” (*ülküçü*)!

Their only ideal, for now, is shedding the blood of Turkish Cypriots that want a solution and peace! For this reason, they have gathered around Denktaş who says that “There is a good thing in no” ... and at the same time with Denktaş’s “the priests are going to come to drink Turkish blood” words, the ultra-nationalists were busy drinking the blood of our youth who wants a solution and peace! Thus, who is thirsty for the blood of the Cypriot Turk, and who has attempted this bloody barbarism has been shown to the world one more time⁵⁷

Also, the op-eds critical of Britain, the USA, the EU, and the UN can be interpreted with the newspaper's anti-imperialist stance due to its leftist ideology. In regard to the second level, *Afrika* is a strong advocate of an independent Cypriot

⁵⁷ Mehmet Levent, “They Have Killed, They Have Spilled Blood, We Have an Objection,” *Afrika*, April 22, 2003.

identity. Six, or 2%, of its 341 op-eds support an independent Cypriot identity. The newspaper prioritizes a common Cypriot identity, over a Turkish or Greek identity, and advocates that Cyprus need to be independent vis-a-vis Turkey and Greece. The newspaper's stance towards Turkey and Greece is similar to its stance towards Britain and the US. It sees all four as foreign powers.

Who has an eye on Cyprus today?

1. Turkey
2. Greece
3. Britain
4. America

In that case, the precautions that the Cypriot need to take should have these points in consideration. Haven't we closed senate membership to foreigners by stating that 24 Cypriot Turks and 24 Cypriot Greeks? Can those who come from Turkey and Greece be understood from this statement? Well, they should be.⁵⁸

Thus, the only salvation for Cyprus is the formation of the Republic of Cyprus after a double "yes" to the Annan Plan in the referendum. Another op-ed reads, "Yet it must not be forgotten that our struggle should not be to open the way for the motherland (Turkey), but should be to open the way for Cyprus, because above everything else we are Cypriots"⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Tahsin, Arif Hasan "Events and Realities: To be or not be," *Afrika*, April 4, 2004.

⁵⁹ Tasin Çelebioğlu, "We are Cypriots above Everything," *Afrika*, April 1, 2004.

It is very interesting when compared to the logic present in op-eds of Turkish newspapers, that “Turkey has already done enough for Turkish Cypriots, and now it is the turn of Turkish Cypriots to do us a favor.” Thus, duality exists not only between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, but also between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, and Greek Cypriots and Greece.

The Cypriot identity is also emphasized in *Afrika* op-eds in columns that use a Cypriot villager dialect. This dialect, which can be also called the “Cypriot villager” frame, is present in the entire “*Ağnadan Gappelları Fuad Dayı*” series by Hüseyin Çakmak, and some of “Events and Realities” op-eds by Arif Hasan Tahsin. Twelve (12%) out of the 341 op-eds (4%) in the paper use this frame. The following quote demonstrates that the theme of Cypriot sovereignty and independence is also embedded in some of the op-eds written in the Cypriot Turkish villager dialect:

There is no easy way out from now on! The Americans will understand this as well. And they have. Whatever they want, they will want from the owner. If they want our petroleum, they will want from us...If they want military bases, they will want from us. What Becerikli has said, are we not the owner... We will give whatever we want, petroleum, fish or bases. Nobody can interfere anymore, it is us who will do the referendum...and if we want, we will say “yes”, if we want, we will say “no.”⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Tahsin, Arif Hasan “Events and Realities. Dut artık bizi dutabilersen” Afrika April 16, 2004. Quote given in original to show the dialect used. *Ama artık yağma yok! Amerikalılar da anlayacaklar bunu. Anladılar da...Ne isterlerse malın sahibinden isteyecekler. Petrolümüzü mu isterler. Bizden isteyecekler....Üs mü isterler? Bizden isteyecekler... Direk... Bizden... Sahibinden... Becerikli'nin dediğinden, mal bizim değil mi? İster önden veririk, ister arkadan....İster petrol veririk, ister balık, ister üs...Kimse bize garişamaz artık. Referandum'u da biz yapacaık...Ve istersek “evet” deyceyik, istersek “hayır” deyceyik...*

In relation to the use of game theoretical frames, the “there is no alternative” frame and the “risky gambling” frame are used in *Afrika*. In this newspaper, the “there is no alternative frame” is not only used to influence readers to vote “yes” but also to analyze why Turkish Cypriots will vote yes as opposed to Greek Cypriots. The “risky gambling frame” is used in one op-ed and the “there is no alternative frame” is used in three op-eds

On the Cypriot Turkish side, the situation is just the opposite.... The majority will say “yes.” Why? Because the native, the settled knows that this is the last opportunity...If this last train is also missed...The hold on to Cyprus will no longer be possible. Yet he is afraid. He is afraid to lose what he has.⁶¹

The *Kıbrıs* op-eds analyzed are as follows: “Backstage” (*Kulis*), by Başaran Düzgün; “Perspective on the News” (*Habere Bakış*), by Hasan Hastürer; “Vision” (*Vizyon*), by Necdet Ergün; “The World Affairs” (*Dünya Hali*), by Osman Kalfaoğlu; “Marking” (*Markaj*), by Ali Baturay; and columns by Ahmet Tolgay, Hasan Ali Bıçak, and Martti Ahtisaari

Kıbrıs op-eds campaign for a “yes” in the referendum through the use of the “probability,” “call for appeal,” “win-win,” and “there is no alternative” game theoretical frames. The newspaper features also op-eds on possible referendum scenarios such “yes-yes,”⁶² “no-no,”⁶³ and “yes-no.”⁶⁴ Interestingly, the newspaper does not have an op-ed on the “no-yes” scenario. The op-ed on the “yes-yes” scenario underlines the positive consequences of a “yes” for Turkish Cypriots such as EU

⁶¹ Turgut, Afşaroğlu, “Outright, Yes, or No?” *Kıbrıs*, April 5, 2004.

⁶² The scenario in which both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots say “yes.”

⁶³ The scenario in which both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriots say “no.”

⁶⁴ The scenario in which Turkish Cypriots say yes, and Greek Cypriots say “no.”

membership and an end to lawlessness in the North and at the same time positive consequences for Turkey such as the commencement of accession negotiations with the EU.

The “yes-no” scenario, on the other hand, is presented as the better of the worst scenarios. The logic follows: the best scenario is a double “yes,” but still if the Greek Cypriots vote “no” the Turkish Cypriots will be better off having voted “yes” than “no,” since also in this option they will receive benefits. The only op-ed that uses the win-win frame, which also underlines the Pareto optimal nature of the agreement made, says, “The Annan Plan has reached the “optimum” level. The Fifth Annan Plan guarantees the establishment of a globally recognized Turkish Cypriot state, a Turkish Cypriot identity and our existence in the EU.”⁶⁵

Also, the newspaper *Kıbrıs* has two one op-ed that uses the “there is no alternative frame.” Third, the op-eds of *Kıbrıs* plead of the cause of “yes” by making an emotional appeal to both Turkish and Greek Cypriots.. The op-ed “Hear our Voice” (*Sesimizi duy*), which uses both Turkish and Greek language titles, for example, is addressed directly to the Greek Cypriots: “Now we are again addressing the Greek Cypriots. Please hear our voice. Let us establish together perpetual peace in Cyprus and turn our island into an island of peace. Let our entire island belong to all of us.”⁶⁶

In another op-ed, the newspaper makes an emotional appeal to Turkish Cypriots who were asked to participate in a meeting urging “yes” that took place in

⁶⁵ Mehmet Özey, “Why We Should Say Yes,” *Kıbrıs* April 13, 2004.

⁶⁶ “Hear Our Voice,” *Kıbrıs*, April 15, 2004.

the South: “Turkish Cypriots should also participate in that meeting, and should call out with one-word “*nai/evet*” (yes) to the world.”⁶⁷

Another method the newspaper uses to convince its readership to vote “yes” in the referendum is by printing op-eds written by key international figures. For example, former president of Finland Martti Ahtisaari and former Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gareth Evans wrote an op-ed for *Kıbrıs* that carries the title “Cypriots have to make use of this opportunity.”⁶⁸ Also, Javier Solana, High Commissioner for EU Common Foreign and Security Policies wrote an op-ed for the paper titled “The European Solution for Cyprus.”⁶⁹

The *Vatan* op-eds analyzed are as follows: “Daylight” (*Gün ışıktı*), by Lütfi Özler; “Justice” (*Adalet*), by Ali Murat Yılmaz; “From the Day” (*Günün İçinden*), by Ali Tekman; “MIH,” “The Square of Ideas” (*Fikir Meydanı*), and “Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow” (*Dün, Bugün, Yarın*) by Ahmet. G. Gazioğlu; and columns by Erdoğan Naim, Ahmet M. Kerim, and Kemal Akıncı.

Vatan op-eds are highly critical of the UN, EU, and the US, which they view as imperialist powers, and Greece and the Greek Cypriots, the ruling Erdogan government in Turkey, the Talat government in Northern Cyprus that all had a pro-“yes” stance. The newspaper is also critical of the Democrat Party (DP), which is a coalition partner with the Republican Turkish Party (CTP). Twelve (15%) of the op-eds are critical of Northern Cypriot Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat and the CTP and 15 (19%) of Prime Minister Erdogan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Gul, and the AKP government. Three op-eds (4%) are against the UN, Secretary-General Kofi

⁶⁷ Hasan Hastürer, “Denktaş Fooled Himself, Misguided Others,” *Kıbrıs*, April 21, 2004.

⁶⁸ Martti Ahtisaari and Gareth Evans, “Cypriots Need to Make Use of This Opportunity,” *Kıbrıs*, April 21, 2004.

⁶⁹ Javier Solana, “European Solution for Cyprus,” *Vatan*, April 20, 2004.

Annan, and undersecretary de Soto; five op-eds (6%) are against the EU and European Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen; and four (5%) are against the US.

Reminiscent of *Cumhuriyet*'s reconstruction of game theoretical frames, *Vatan* questions the application of the game theoretical logic to the referendum. "Yet, there is also an evaluation outside of a mathematical equation, one from a medical perspective: "You can have as many pluses as you want; however, if the result is ex, will the number of pluses still have significance?"⁷⁰

The newspaper states that the game theoretical logic is part of a discourse to promote a "yes" in the referendum.

The target of equation-based propaganda is evident. Citizens are made to believe and conditioned that they have the chance of winning when they say yes. The traditional lottery advertisement is based on the 'what if' promise.

The state lottery however turns the logic upside down and places the 'what if it does not' in the foreground.⁷¹

The newspapers also stress that the "there is no alternative" frame is purposefully constructed in order to promote a yes in the referendum: "Those who say this is the last opportunity and there is no alternative are lying. You will see, those who are currently saying the last opportunity, the last alternative, will create themselves new opportunities and alternatives."⁷²

⁷⁰ Ahmet Kerim, "MIH. Pluses, Minuses, and Exes," *Vatan*, April 14, 2004.

⁷¹ Ahmet Kerim, "MIH. The Annan Lottery," *Vatan*, April 16, 2004.

⁷² Kemal Akinci, "The Square of Ideas. The Shirt from Fire," *Vatan*, April 13, 2004.

Yet, the newspaper uses its own “there is no alternative” frame to campaign for a “no.” In the op-ed on April 6, Tekman states that the referendum on the Annan Plan is not only a question of “to be or not to be” for Cypriot Turks, but also for the Turks of Anatolia.⁷³ Two *Vatan* op-eds use the “there is no alternative” frame, one that uses the “risky gambling” frame, and two that use the “win-win” frame, making the total use of game theoretical frames five.

The outlook of the three Turkish Cypriot newspapers on national identity is quite different. *Afrika* adheres to a Cypriot national identity; *Kıbrıs* reflects a dual identification, simultaneously identifying to a Turkish and Cypriot identity; whereas *Vatan* adheres to a solely Turkish identity, denouncing a Cypriot identity. For example, an April 22, 2004 op-ed reads, “There are no Cypriots, there are either Turks of Greeks, yesterday, today, tomorrow.”⁷⁴

Similar to how pro-” yes” newspapers underline the positive consequences of a “yes” vote for Northern Cyprus and Turkey, *Vatan* underlines the negative consequences of a “yes” vote. “The bloody peace” frame is repeated, signaling that the agreement will not bring peace, but to the contrary, disrupt peace. Three op-eds highlight the negative consequences of a “no” vote. *Vatan* also is highly doubtful of the way the Annan Plan deals with certain issues. Two of the op-eds voice concern about the handling of the guarantorship issue, three about the handling of the territorial adjustment, and three about the plan’s proposal on military build-up. The newspaper is highly doubtful about the Turkish military withdrawing from the island and being replaced by UN peacekeepers. Especially, in regard to UN peacekeepers

⁷³ Ali Tekman, “They Should also Have a Referendum,” *Vatan*, April 6, 2004.

⁷⁴ “There are no Cypriots, there are either Turks or Greeks,” *Vatan*, April 22, 2004.

there is a reference to the peace mission's having been unable to prevent the bloodshed in Bosnia.

6.5 Findings from Greek Cypriot op-eds

The Charavgi op-eds analyzed are as follows: "Editorial," "Topic of the Day" (Θέμα της Ημέρας), and "One, Every Day" (Ένα κάθε μέρα), by Kostas Milikouris; "Half-seriously" (Μεταξύ σοβαρού και αστείου), by A. Panatos; "Aggressively" (Επι-θετικά), Discreetly (Διακριτικά), and "Uncommitted Views on Annan Plan" (Μη δεσμευμένες απόψεις για το σχέδιο Ανάν) by Stelios Thedolou; "Independent views on the Annan Plan" (Ανεξάρτητες απόψεις αναφορικά με το Σχέδιο Ανάν), "The News Writer" (Ο συντάκτης); and columns written by Kypros Kourtellaris, Dinos Michailidis, Giorgos Christodoulidis, Mikis Theodorakis, Nikos Katsouridis (member of the Politburo of AKEL), and Andreas Maragkos.

The *Fileleftheros* op-eds analyzed are as follows: "Fragments" (Αποκόμματα), by Christos Arvanitis; "Editorial," and "In the Pulse" (Στον παλμό), by Michalis Piasardis; "Seven Days Opinions" (7 Μέρες Απόψεις), by Andreas Panatos; "Ephemerally" (Εφήμερα), by Chrystalla Chatzidimitriou; "Yes," (Ναι μεν, αλλά), by Giannis Mammidis; "Imprints" (Αποτυπώματα), by Antigoni Solomonidou-Drousiotou; "Free Tribune" (Ελεύθερο Βήμα) by Pnagiootis K. Mavros; and columns by Anthos Lykavgis, Kosta Mavridis, Alekos Makridis, Christos Kliridis, Christoforos Christoforou, Kosta Sophokleous, Marios Lukas, and Anthos Lykavgis.

The *Machi* op-eds analyzed are as follows: "Editorial," "Controversials" (Επίμαχα), and columns by Ouranios M. Ioannidis, N. Lygeros, Γ. Tryfonas, Petros Stylianou, Mikis Ks. Ioannou, Giota Christodolou, Giorgos Koutsogiannis, A. Frydas, Panikos S. Cheimonas, Andreas Maragkos, Andreas Theofanous, Prodromos G.

Prodromou, Stelios M. Stylianou, John Charalambous, Sofoklis Mousoulos, Christodoulos Elisaïos, and Makis Georgiou.

On the international level, eleven *Charavgi* (26%) op-eds are critical of the US, President Bush, Secretary of State Powell, and special envoy for Cyprus Weston. Only one (2%) of the op-eds are critical of the UN, and Secretary General Kofi Annan. As for the EU and commissioner Verheugen, nine, or 21%, out of 42 op-eds are critical.

In regard to the use of game theoretical frames (shown in Table 12), the only game theoretical frame used in the *Charavgi* op-eds is "win-lose", in three out of 42 op-eds, a rate of 7%. An interesting point to make in regard to *Charavgi* op-eds is that this newspaper printed the same Mikis Theodorakis column, titled "They Shall Let the Cypriot People Be Undistracted" as the Greek newspaper *Ta Nea*.⁷⁵

On the international level, *Fileleftheros* is also critical of the US, similar to the positions taken by *Charavgi* and *Machi*. Of the 94 op-eds printed in the *Fileleftheros*, 29 are against the US and the Bush administration, representing 31%; nine are critical of the EU and commissioner Verheugen, which equals 10%; six are favorable, representing 6 %. Thirteen of the op-eds are critical of the UN (14%), and Secretary General Kofi Annan

In relation to the use of game theoretical frames, *Fileleftheros* also employs the "win-lose" frame. The frame appears in three *Fileleftheros* op-eds, representing 3% of the total. On the international level, 51 of the *Machi* op-eds are critical of the US and the administration, amounting to 57%. Eleven op-eds are critical of the EU,

⁷⁵ Mikis Theodorakis, "They Shall let the Cypriot People be Undistracted," *Charavgi*, April 6, 2004.

equivalent to 12%; and two are supportive, making 2%. Criticism of UN and Secretary General Kofi Annan is visible in 23 op-eds, reaching a 26 percent.

As for the use of game theoretical frames, five op-eds use the "win-lose" frame, amounting to 6%. The "risky gambling" frame is also present. An op-ed written by Christodoulos Elisaïos, for example, likens the referendum on the Annan Plan to Russian roulette.⁷⁶ An interesting point of comparison would be between the newspapers *Vatan* and *Machi*. Parallel to how *Vatan* underlines a Turkish identity, as opposed to a Cypriot identity, *Machi* refers to Cypriot Hellenism.⁷⁷ In his column, I. Siekersavva urges the Greek Cypriots not to depart from the route of Cypriot Hellenism.⁷⁸

6.6 Findings from the Turkish Op-eds

The *Cumhuriyet* columns analyzed are as follows: "Agenda" (Gündem), by Mustafa Balbay; "Angle" (Açı), by Mümtaz Soysal; "Knife Edge" (Bıçak Sırtı), by Erol Manisalı; "Current" (Güncel), by Cüneyt Arcayürek; "Window" (Pencere), by İlhan Selçuk; "From the World of the Worker" (*İşçinin evreninden*), by Şükran Soner; "Prose" (*Düz Yazı*), by Orhan Birgit; "Frankly" (*Açıkça*), by Şükrü Sina Gürel; "From Past to Future" (*Geçmişten Geleceğe*), by Orhan Erinç; and "Wide Angle" (*Geniş Açı*) by Hikmet Bila.

The *Milliyet* op-eds analyzed are as follows: "Comment" by Sami Kohen (Yorum), "Direction" (*Yön*), by Fikret Bila; "What The Devil Wants Us to See" (*Şeytan'ın Gör Dediği*), by Çetin Altan; "Inside the Events" by Güngör Uras (*Olayların İçinde*); "Lens" (*Objektif*); by Taha Akyol "Events and People" (*Olaylar*

⁷⁶ Christodoulos Elisaïos, "Russian Roulette," *Machi*, April 14, 2004.

⁷⁷ Pertros Stylianos, "Spit the Hellenism so as to not be Hoodooed," *Machi*, April 10, 2004.

⁷⁸ Siekersavva, I "Do Not Abandon Again the Cypriot Hellenism," *Machi*, April 10, 2004.

ve *İnsanlar*), by Hasan Pulur; “Politics Diary” (*Siyaset Günlüğü*), by Derya Sazak; “Today” (*Bugün*), by Güneri Civoğlu; “Open Window” (Açık Pencere), by Melih Aşık; “Stars, Lines and Beyond” (Yıldızlar, Çizgiler ve Ötesi), by Yasemin Çongar; “The Island” (*Ada*), by Can Dündar; "For the Reader" (Okur İçin), by Meliha Okur; “Eco Agenda” (*Eko Gündem*), by Meral Tamer; and “Macro- Outlook” (*Makro-Bakış*) by Osman Ulugay. Other op-eds analyzed in *Milliyet* include columns by Hasan Cemal, Mehmet Y. Yılmaz, and Yaman Toruner.

In *Yeni Şafak* columns by the following authors are analyzed: Fehmi Kuru, Nazif Gürdoğan, Hayrettin Karaman, Yalçın Akdoğan, Taha Kıvanç, Mustafa Karaalioğlu, Koray Düzgören, Yalçın Akdoğan, Ali Bayramoğlu, Kürşat Bümin, Akif Emre, Davut Dursun, Mehmet Ocaktan, Ahmet Taşgetiren, Sami Hocaoglu, Mehmet Şeker, and Resul Tosun.

Cumhuriyet's columns mainly direct their criticism to the Turkish Cypriot government, the Turkish government, the US, the EU, and the media. Interestingly, Greek Cypriot political parties and their leaders, such as AKEL and its leader Christofias, for example, are praised for taking a position against the plan. Also, Greek Cypriot president Papadopoulos and Greek prime minister Karamanlis are mentioned favorably in the newspaper commentaries. In regards to the newspaper's position on the North Cypriot government, it supports President Denktaş, and is against Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat. Twelve of *Cumhuriyet* op-eds mention Denktaş positively (15%), and twelve mention Talat negatively (15%)

As to the position of the commentaries on the Turkish government, they support president Ahmet Necdet Sezer and are against Prime Minister Erdogan. In four of the *Cumhuriyet* op-eds (5%), President Ahmet Necdet Sezer is mentioned

positively, and in 24 op-eds (13%), Prime Minister Erdoğan is mentioned negatively. Also, Chief of staff General Ozkök is mentioned favorably in five op-eds (6%). As for the Greek Cypriot political leaders, there is praise for Greek Cypriot president Papadopoulos and Greek President Karamanlis. The support given to Papadopoulos appears in 6% of the *Cumhuriyet* commentaries. Karamanlis is mentioned positively in two of the op-eds (3%) and negatively also in two (3%). In four of (5%) of the newspaper's op-eds, AKEL is mentioned positively, and in two it is mentioned negatively (3%) (shown in Table 13).

With a strong anti-imperialist tradition, the newspaper is highly skeptical of western powers such as the US and UK, and international organizations such as the UN and EU. Interestingly, the newspaper commentaries mention Russia favorably, because of the country's veto in the UN Security Council of the US and British proposal aimed at revising the plan based on the Greek Cypriot objections. Nine op-eds in *Cumhuriyet* (11%) display a position against the UN, or Secretary General of the organization Kofi Annan; fifteen of the op-eds (19%) are against the USA, President George Bush, Secretary of State Collin Powell and special envoy for Cyprus Weston; and eighteen op-eds (23%) are against the EU and the Commissioner for Enlargement, Günther Verheugen. Six (8%) of the newspaper's op-eds take a favorable stance towards the Russian Federation, and six (8%) take a critical stance against Great Britain.

To answer the primary research question, the presence of the game theoretical frames and their usage were analyzed. Among the identified five game theoretical frames: "win-win," "win-lose," "lose-lose," "risky gambling," and "there is no alternative frame," Six (8%) of the *Cumhuriyet* op-eds use the "win-win" frame, and

one (1%) uses the "there is no alternative frame." The remaining three frames are not used.

The “win-win” fame takes a very interesting twist in the columns of *Cumhuriyet*. By a play of words, the columns refer to two different versions of the frame, the “scratch and win” version (*kazı-kazan*) referring to card lotteries where you are sometimes awarded something when you scratch a card, and “scratch, win and rip-off” version (*kazı, kazan, kazık*) referring the idea when you are not winning something but actually being ripped off. “The scratch and win” version underline the use of the "risky choice" frame.

In his column “Crossroads: The Island of Cyprus is on the way” Özgen Acar writes, "However, under the administration of Annan the application has transformed from “win-win” to “scratch-win.” Both Turkish and Greek Cypriots have scratched and won...They scratched; however, the cards were empty."⁷⁹ This illustrates that the “the scratch and win” version of the "win-win" frame actually is close to the "risky choice" frame. Also, the quote underlines that neither of the groups are winning, by referring to both parties having empty cards.

In his column titled “Angle: Win, Scratch, and Rip Off,” Mümtaz Soysal states, “the win-win gain belongs to those who govern the Turkey and US, and the rip-off to the Kemalist Republic.”⁸⁰ This quote illustrates the use of the "win-lose" frame where the US and Turkish governments are seen as winners, whereas the Republic of Turkey is seen as the loser. Also, the dichotomy between the AKP government and the Turkish state is underlined.

⁷⁹ Özgen Acar “Crossroads: The Cyprus Island is on the Way,” *Cumhuriyet*, April 6, 2004.

⁸⁰ Mümtaz Soysal, “Angle. Scratch, Win, Ripp-off,” *Cumhuriyet*, April 5, 2004.

The newspaper columns also redefine the "win-win" frame by underlining that the frame actuality serves to disguise the concessions given. In his column titled "Current: Accountability is in this World," Cüneyt Arcayürek states, "if they had not followed a 'give it in order to save yourself' (*ver kurtul*) policy disguised by the lie of "win-win," the Cyprus problem could have long been solved."⁸¹

Milliyet's pro-"yes" op-eds evidence three news frames: the advantages of the Annan Plan to Turkey, to Turkish Cypriots, and the "there is no alternative frame." The pro-"no" op-eds, on the other hand, are highly critical of the government and international organizations such as the EU, US and UN. Accession to the EU, or the prospect of being given a date for the commencement of official accession negotiations, is mentioned as the main positive consequence of a "yes" from the Annan referendum for Turkey. Five (5%) of the *Milliyet* op-eds use the "there is no alternative" frame and three (3%) use the "risky gambling" frame. The analysis of the op-eds also indicates that the "there is no alternative frame" was developed by the US state department.

Powell specifically emphasizes the "there is no Plan B" argument. Thus, at the same time the Cypriot Turks are reminded that "Your path to enter the EU together with the Greek Cypriots passes from saying yes," and more importantly, the message "Do not think that when you enter the EU that you will have a more advantageous agreement than the one reached with the guidance of Annan, do not think that you will find the necessary international support" are given to the Greek Cypriots.⁸²

⁸¹ Cüneyt Arcayürek, "Current: Accountability is in This World" *Cumhuriyet*, April 13, 2004.

⁸² Yasemin Çongar, "Towards the Referendum," *Milliyet*, April 19, 2004.

Three other issues are salient in the op-eds: the issue of derogation, the comparison of the Annan Plan to the Lausanne Treaty, and the theme of universal change. . Some columnists underline the legal validity of the exceptions to the Annan Plan sought by the Turkish side, as a challenge that needs to be met, whereas others suggest that it does not constitute a problem. For example, Hasan Cemal states that the derogations will be made a part of European Union law with the act of adaptation.⁸³ In his op-ed “Will Derogations be Cancelled?”⁸⁴ Taha Akyol underlines that if the exceptions brought to the plan to support the Turkish Cypriots are cancelled by the European Court of Human Rights, the balances that come about with the Annan Plan will be disrupted. There is also linkage of the Annan Plan to the Lausanne Treaty. The linkage of the Annan Plan with the Lausanne Treaty is that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü made a compromise at the Lausanne Treaty, yet the treaty became the act of foundation of the Republic of Turkey.

If Atatürk had found a fault with everything, would he have managed to make the Lausanne Agreement? If he had taken only enmity and hostility out of recent history, would he have been able to make peace with Greece and other occupant states? Would he have been able to get together with his comrades, especially İsmet İnönü, and materialize the Lausanne Agreement which brought the Republic of Turkey to the scene of history?⁸⁵

The third salient issue, universal change, appears repetitively in the “What the Devil Wants us to See” column of Çetin Altan. . In his op-eds, Altan stresses the theme that Turkey will not be able to resist universal change and that the mentality

⁸³ Hasan Cemal, “Yes Message from Ankara,” *Milliyet*, April 1, 2004.

⁸⁴ Taha Akyol, “Will Derogations be Cancelled,” *Milliyet*, April 8, 2004.

⁸⁵ Hasan Cemal, “Atatürk, Thessaloniki, İzmir,” *Milliyet*, April 14, 2003.

closed to new perspectives will be affected inevitably by this transformation. In other words, Altan views the pro- “yes” stance of Turkey from the dimension of universal change. Interestingly, he also combines the theme of universal change with the "risky gambling" frame.

I wonder how much fun those watching local and universal politics marathons as watching horse races are having. For example, on the 24th of April, there is a referendum in the North and South of Cyprus. Most probably both sides are going to say “yes” because this is what President Bush wants. Is President Bush powerful enough to unite the different sui generis politics rivers of the Mediterranean island whose population does not exceed one million, in a dam that he set up before? On the 24th of April, we will all together see how powerful or powerless he is...Just a horse race.⁸⁶

In contrast with *Cumhuriyet*, *Yeni Şafak* supports the Annan Plan, and does this mainly by the use of three frames, “there is no alternative,” “positive consequences for Turks,” and “positive consequences for Turkish Cypriots.” The “there is no alternative” frame is used in three (8%) of the *Yeni Şafak* op-eds; however, the newspaper also introduces an emphasized version of this frame that can be called the “there is no alternative plus” frame.

If those who impose their small agendas on a sensitive issue such as Cyprus are listened to without a test sincerity, we will face a situation more horrific than what is feared when things calm down.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Altan, Çetin “The taste of universal transformation’s troublesome situations,” April 8, 2004

⁸⁷ Fehmi Kuru, “Worse than What is Feared,” *Yeni Şafak*, April 6, 2004.

The “more horrific than what is feared” emphasis in the quote above constitutes an example of the “there is no alternative plus” frame. The newspaper highlights positive consequences for Turkey. The most salient theme of this frame is Turkey’s EU membership prospect. The op-eds underline that a solution to the Cyprus problem is a prerequisite for Turkey’s membership.

The “positive consequences for Turkish Cypriots” frame is used in three of the op-eds analyzed. In Turkish pro- “yes” newspapers, the number of op-eds that underline positive consequences for Turkey is higher understandably than op-eds that emphasize positive consequences for Turkish Cypriots, and vice versa in Turkish Cypriot pro-“yes” newspapers. *Yeni Şafak* makes use of numbers in the “positive consequences for Turkish Cypriots.

The percentage of the number of people that believe that life will be better than today should a United Cyprus join the EU after the approval of the Annan Plan in the Turkish and Greek parts of Cyprus is 66.3%, and the percentage of the number of people that think life will be worse is 21%.⁸⁸

In contrast with the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, *Yeni Şafak* is supportive of the government. The newspaper is highly critical of Cypriot president Denktaş, with nine (25%) op-eds analyzed critical of him. A significant divergence between *Cumhuriyet* and *Yeni Şafak*, is that *Cumhuriyet* views the government as a different entity than the state, and uses this understanding to say that the government supports the plan whereas the state does not. In juxtaposition with *Cumhuriyet*, in its narrative, *Yeni Şafak* underlines the uniformity between state and government. From another

⁸⁸ Ali Bayramoğlu, “The Last Situation in Cyprus,” *Yeni Şafak*, April 22, 2004.

viewpoint, it presents the Cyprus policy of the government as part of the *raison d'état*. Ali Bayramoğlu writes, "From the beginning of the Cyprus negotiations the Turkish state has shown willpower in favor of a solution... There is a state decision given with the interest of the government."⁸⁹

The understanding reflected in *Yeni Şafak* op-eds on the National Security Council Meeting is also highly different from that expressed in *Cumhuriyet*. The newspaper presents the announcement of the national security council as supportive of the government and welcomes the military's non-engagement in governmental affairs.

Finally, *Yeni Şafak* op-eds take a favorable approach to third parties such as the EU, UN, France, and the US. Again in sharp contrast with *Cumhuriyet*, *Yeni Şafak* emphasizes that the words of the French Foreign minister on Turkey's prospective EU membership have been misunderstood.⁹⁰

6.7 Findings from the Greek Op-eds

The op-eds analyzed in *Rizospastis* include titles such as "Our Opinion" (*Η άποψή μας*), "Imerodromos" (*Ημεροδρόμος*), by Nikos Mbogiopoulos; "Discreetly" (*Διακριτικά*), by Periklis Kourmoulis; "By the Press" (*Δια του Τύπου*), by Thanasis Lekatis; "Eponymously" (*Επωνύμως*), by Nikos Mbogiopoulos; "From Day to Day" (*Από μέρα σε μέρα*); and "Patridognomonio" (*Πατριδογνωμόνιο*), by Liana Kanelli; "The Other Dimension" (*Η άλλη διάσταση*), by Nikos Andonakos; and "Self-evident" (*Τα αυτονόητα*), by Giorgos Kakoulidis. Columns appear by Iordanis Pavlosoglou, Pavlos Kladis, Iordanis A. Prousanidis, Thanasi Lekatis, Michail Dekleris, Stephanos Linaios, Yannis E. Diakogiannis, Themis Ch. Stoforopoulos, Pavlos Rizargiotis,

⁸⁹ Mustafa Karalioglu, "The Meaning of Denktas's Speech in Parliament," *Yeni Şafak*, April 14, 2004.

⁹⁰ Mustafa Karalioglu, "The Wind is Blowing again from Turkey's Side," *Yeni Şafak*, April 21, 2004.

Nikos Mbogiopoulos, Thanasis Mbalodimas, Thanasis Kanaris, Kostas Kazakos, and Vasilis Ambelogiannis,

The op-eds analyzed in *Ta Nea* include “The Imprint of the Day” (*Το στίγμα της ημέρας*) by Voula Kechagia, “Cutting Edges” (*Αιχμές*) by Panagis Galiatsasos, “Opinion” (*Γνώμη*), “Pillar of Salt” (*Στήλη Αλατος*) by Dimitris Danikas “Hagiography” by Dimitris Mitropulos (*Αγιολογία*), “Spotlights” by P.K Ioakeimidis (*Προβολείς*), “Gusts” (*Πιπές*), “Opinion” (*Γνώμη*), Mikropolitikos (*Μικροπολιτικός*), “Analysis” by Ilias Nikolakopoulos, and columns by Andreas Theophanous, Mikis Theodorakis, Evangelos Venizelos, Staphanos Tzanakos, Andreas Andrianopoulos, and Kostas Simitis

The op-eds analyzed in *Kathimerini* include “Editorial,” “Comment” (*Σχόλιο*), and “Endoskopos” by K. I. Aggelolopoulos (*Ενδοσκόπος*); “Windsock” (*Ανεμοδείκτης*) by Thanos Oikonomopoulos; “Every Day” (*Κάθε Μέρα*) by Andonis Karkagiannis, “Opinion” (*Αποψη*) by Kostas Iordanidis; “Third Opinion” (*Τρίτη Γνώμη*) by Thanos Veremis; “Off-Topic” (*Εκτός Θέματος*) by Dimitris Kastriotis; “Attitudes” (*Στάσεις*), by Pantelis Mboukalas; “Responses” (*Αντίλογοι*) by Georgios P. Malouchos; “Notebook” (*Σημειωματάριο*), by Eleni Bistika; “Imprints” (*Αποτυπώματα*), by Marianna Tziantzi; “A Gaze” (*Ένα βλέμμα*) by Nikos G. Xydakis; and “Essay” (*Επιφυλλίδα*) by Christos Giannaras.

In relation to the use of game theoretical frames, none of the *Rizospastis* op-eds analyzed use the "there is no alternative frame." Similarly, the "risky gambling" and "loss-loss" frames are also not present. One of the 95 *Rizospastis* op-eds uses the "win-loss" frame, and no op-eds uses the "win-win" frame. Thus, all in all, it can be stated that *Rizopastis* op-eds do not present the Annan Plan from any of the game theoretical frames.

Shown in Table 13, the 95 op-eds published in *Rizospastis* are highly critical of third parties to the conflict, namely the UN, the EU, the US, and Britain. Twenty op-eds in the newspaper are critical of the UN and Kofi Annan (23%) and four (4%) are supportive. Fifty-nine (62%) are critical of the EU and European Commissioner for Enlargement Günther Verheugen. Ninety-two (97%) are critical of the US, President George Bush, Secretary of State Collin Powell and Special envoy for Cyprus Weston. Finally, 36 (38%) are critical of Great Britain and Prime Minister Tony Blair.

At the international level, 14 of *Kathimerini*'s op-eds are critical of the UN (21%). There are 22 op-eds critical of the EU (32%). Thirty-three op-eds are critical of US policies (49%). In relation to the use of the game theoretical frames, two out of the 68 (3%) op-eds use the "win-lose" frame.

In *Ta Nea*, 29 op-eds are critical of the US government, equivalent to 22%. There are ten op-eds critical of the UN and Secretary General Kofi Annan (8%). The EU and its officials are quoted in 60 *Ta Nea* op-eds (46%). There are no game theoretical frames used in *Ta Nea*.

Both in the Turkish and Greek newspapers analyzed a parallel is drawn between the stances taken by Denktaş and Papadopoulos. An op-ed written by Andreas Andrianopoulos points to the similarity of opinion between the two leaders.⁹¹ The Greek newspapers also serve as a forum for intellectuals and politicians to voice their opinions. For example, *Ta Nea* features an op-ed written by Mikis Theodorakis, a politically active composer who took an active part in the Turco-Greek rapprochement.⁹²

⁹¹ A. Andrianopoulos, "Cutting Edges: Papadopoulos Agrees with Denktaş and the Generals," *Ta Nea* April 14, 2004.

⁹² M. Theodorakis, "The Greek Cypriots Must be Let to Take a Decision Undistractedly," *Ta Nea* April 9, 2004.

6.8 Conclusion

The findings of the analyzed op-eds offer seven important conclusions. The first is that three of the analyzed newspapers come close to the advocacy journalism described in Hallin and Mancini's Mediterranean Media Model, the Turkish Cypriot *Afrika*, the Turkish *Milliyet*, and the Greek *Ta Nea*. Second, the op-eds pages of the newspapers, for the most part, again in line with the Mediterranean Media Model, act as forums where different opinions are discussed. Among the newspapers analyzed *Milliyet*, *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, *Fileleftheros*, *Charavgi*, *Kathimerini*, and *Ta Nea* show characteristics of internal pluralism, giving room to op-eds both for and against the plan.

Third, the op-eds serve as an indicator of press-political party parallelism. Especially, the printing of op-eds written by AKEL members in the Greek Cypriot leftist newspaper *Charavgi* demonstrates a parallelism between the political party and the newspapers.


Fourth, a strong anti-imperialist discourse is present in the Turkish Cypriot *Afrika*, the Greek Cypriot *Charavgi*, Turkish *Cumhuriyet*, somewhat in *Milliyet*, and the Greek newspaper *Rizospastis*. Of particular interest here is that the pattern here is that an anti-Annan Plan position comes together with an anti-imperialist mindset, meaning that for *Cumhuriyet* and *Rizospastis* to oppose the plan does not come as a surprise; however, a very peculiar discourse is developed by the Turkish Cypriot *Afrika* in its strong anti-imperialist stance, with its equally strong pro-“yes” position, as evidenced by its “yes be annem” phrase. The op-eds of this newspaper make it the exception, in the sense that it questions the main pillars of the Cypriot equation, from

the Turkish foreign policy perspective, demanding the independence of Turkish Cypriots, vis-a-vis Turkey.

Fifth, the research questions about the use of game theoretical frames have pointed to a very interesting pattern. The content analysis carried out importantly documented how Turkish language newspapers against the Annan Plan, either deconstructed a specific game theoretical frame, such as *Cumhuriyet*'s deconstruction of the "win-win" frame, or took one step further such as *Vatan* and questioned the entire game theoretical logic on which the frames were built. This similarity between the newspapers *Cumhuriyet* and *Vatan* is highly interesting. Sixth the analysis carried out that among the game theoretical frames, the Greek language newspapers preferred the use of "win-lose" frame. And finally, seventh, the main pillar of the "yes" campaign, the "there is no alternative" frame in the pro "yes" press, was also used by *Vatan* to back the "no" campaign through persuading the readership that there is no alternative.

Figure 5

Frequency of op-eds on the Annan Plan in the analyzed newspapers



Note. The newspapers in Series 1 are *Afrika*, *Charavgi*, *Cumhuriyet*, and *Rizospastis*; the newspapers in Series 2 are *Kıbrıs*, *Fileleftheros*, *Milliyet*, and *Ta Nea*; and the newspapers in Series 3 are *Vatan*, *Mahki*, *Yeni Şafak* and *Kathimerini*.

Table 10*Positions Vis-A-Vis Political Parties in Op-Eds*

Newspaper	Support to Politician/ Political Party (Freq)	Support to Politician/ Political Party (%)	Critical of Politician/ Political Party (Freq)	Critical of Politician/ Political Party (%)
<i>Afrika</i> (N=341)			Denktaş =18	Denktaş =5
<i>Kıbrıs</i> (N=75)			Denktaş =18 Papadopoulos= 4	Denktaş =24 Papadopoulos=5
<i>Vatan</i> (N=80)	Denktaş =8	Denktaş =10		
<i>Charavgi</i> (N=42)	Papadopoulos =6 AKEL= 13	Papadopoulos = 14 AKEL= 31		
<i>Fileleftheros</i> (N=94)	Papadopoulos=58	Papadopoulos =62	Papadopoulos =6	Papadopoulos=6
<i>Machi</i> (N=90)	Papadopoulos =14	Papadopoulos =16		
<i>Cumhuriyet</i> (N=80)			Erdoğan=24	Erdoğan=13
<i>Milliyet</i> (N=105)				
<i>Yeni Şafak</i> (N=36)			Denktaş=9	Denktaş=25
<i>Rizospastis</i> (N=95)			Karamanlis =11	Karamanlis =12
<i>Ta Nea</i> (N=131)	Karamanlis =11	Karamanlis =8	Karamanlis=47	Karamanlis = 36
<i>Kathimerini</i> (N=68)	Karamanlis =23	Karamanlis =34	Karamanlis= 5	Karamanlis = 7

Table 11*Support Given to the Plan in Op-Eds*

Newspaper	Pro (Freq.)	Pro (%)	Against (Freq)	Against (%)	Neut. (Freq)	Neut. (%)	Not ment. (Freq)	Not ment. (%)
<i>Afrika</i> (N=341)	200	59	5	1			136	40
<i>Kıbrıs</i> (N=75)	34	45	2	3			39	52
<i>Vatan</i> (N=80)			46	58			34	42
<i>Charavgi</i> (N=42)	3	7	7	17	24	57	8	17
<i>Fileleftheros</i> (N=94)	16	17	33	35	30	32	15	16
<i>Machi</i> (N=90)	1	1	81	90	4	4	4	
<i>Cumhuriyet</i> (N=80)			77	96			3	4
<i>Milliyet</i> (N=105)	40	38	9	9	1	1	55	52
<i>Yeni Şafak</i> (N=36)	20	56					16	44
<i>Rizospastis</i> (N=95)			64	67			31	33
<i>Ta Nea</i> (N=131)	34	26	15	11	14	11	68	52
<i>Kathimerini</i> (N=68)	11	16	18	26	13	19	26	38

Table 12*Game Theoretical Frames in the Op-Eds*

Newspaper	Win-win	Win-win	Win-Lose	Win-Lose	Lose-lose	Lose-lose	Risky gambling	Risky gambling	“no” alternative	“no” alternative
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
<i>Afrika</i> (N=341)							1	0.30	3	1
<i>Kıbrıs</i> (N=75)	1	1							1	1
<i>Vatan</i> (N=80)	2	3					1	1	2	3
<i>Charavgi</i> (N=42)			3	7						
<i>Fileleftheros</i> (N=94)	3	3	3	3						
<i>Machi</i> (N=90)	1	1	5	6						
<i>Cumhuriyet</i> (N=80)	6	8							1	1
<i>Milliyet</i> (N=105)							3	3	5	5
<i>Yeni Şafak</i> (N=36)									3	8
<i>Rizospastis</i> (N=95)			1	1						
<i>Ta Nea</i> (N=131)										
<i>Kathimerini</i> (N=68)			2	3						

Table 13*References to Third Party Intervention in Op-Eds.*

Newspaper	UN, Kofi Annan		EU, Günther Verheugen		USA, President Bush, Secretary of State Powell, Special envoy for Cyprus Weston		Great Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair		Russia, President Putin, Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
<i>Afrika</i> (N=341)			7	2	14	4	7	2		
<i>Kıbrıs</i> (N=75)	2(+)	7(+)	1(+) 8	1(+) 11	1(+)	1(+)				
<i>Vatan</i> (N=80)	3(-)	4(-)	5(-)	6(-)	4(-)	5(-)				
<i>Charavgi</i> (N=42)	1(-) 11	2(-) 26	9(-) 15	21(-) 36	11(-) 4	26(-) 10	1(-) 1	2(-) 2	1	2
<i>Fileleftheros</i> (N=94)	13(-) 1(+) 21	14(-) 1(+) 22	9(-) 6(+) 21	10(-) 6(+) 22	29(-) 7	31(-) 7	12 (-) 2	13(-) 2	1(-)	1(-)
<i>Machi</i> (N=90)	23 (-) 24	26(-) 27	11(-) 2(+) 40	12(-) 2(+) 44	51(-) 7	57(-) 8	38(-) 2	42(-) 2	2(+)	2(+)
<i>Cumhuriyet</i> (N=80)	9 (-) 1	11(-) 1	18(-)	23(-)	15(-)	19(-)	6(-)	8(-)	6(+)	8(+)
<i>Milliyet</i> (N=105)	3(-) 1(+) 2	3(-) 1(+) 2	15(-) 4	14(-) 4	3(+) 3	3(+) 3				
<i>Yeni Şafak</i> (N=36)	1(+)	3(+)	3(+) 1	8(+) 3	1(+)	3(+)				
<i>Rizospastis</i> (N=95)	22(-) 4(+) 22	23(-) 4(+) 23	59(-) 7	62(-) 7	92(-) 5	97(-) 5	36(-) 2	38(-) 2		
<i>Ta Nea</i> (N=131)	10(-) 44	8(-) 34	10(-) 1(+) 60	8(-) 1(+) 46	29(-) 23	22(-) 16	12(-) 5	9(-) 4		
<i>Kathimerini</i> (N=68)	14(-) 17	21(-) 25	22(-) 28	32(-) 41	33(-) 20	49(-) 29	16(-) 5	24(-) 7	4	6

Note. Positive references have been indicated with a “+” sign, while negative references have been indicated with a “-” sign, and neutral references have been combined with quotes.

CHAPTER 7

FINDINGS FROM CARTOONS ON THE ANNAN PLAN

7.1 Introduction

This chapter covers the content analysis findings of cartoons on the Annan Plan in the selected Turkish and Greek Cypriot and Turkish and Greek newspapers, in the selected time frame. To begin with, in regard to the research questions, the study has identified five game theoretical news frames: 1) the “win-win” frame 2) the “win-lose” frame 3) the “lose-lose” frame 4) the “no alternative” frame and 5) the “risky gambling” frame.

The first news frame emphasizes the mutual gain of both parties, the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in this case. The second news frame emphasizes the gain of one party and the loss of the other, i.e., the gain of the Greek Cypriots and loss of Turkish Cypriots, or vice versa. The third news frame emphasizes the mutual loss of both parties. The fourth frame uses the logic that there is no alternative to a “yes” vote. This frame equates the “yes” vote to a “to be or not be” rational, whereas a no vote becomes synonymous with “not to be.” Also, the conflict analysis and resolution concept of a Better Alternative to Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is valid in this frame, precisely because the absence of a BATNA is underlined. However, this frame uses a logic slightly different than that of BATNA. The absence of an alternative, rather than a better alternative, constitutes the central theme of this frame. The fifth news frame compares the referendum on the Annan Plan to gambling, in which there is a risk. According to this news frame, the probability of a “yes” vote coming out of the ballot is the same as the probability of a “no” vote. Thus, this frame carries an element of unpredictability.

Secondly, this study identifies certain patterns in relation to the prominence of cartoons. The first prominence pattern is country based, meaning that the frequency of cartoons varies according to the country. In regard to variance according to country, the number of cartoons about the Annan Plan during April of 2004 are highest in the Greek newspapers, followed by the Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, and Turkish newspapers.

Figure 10 demonstrates that the use of cartoons was more prominent among Greek-language newspapers than Turkish-language newspapers. The number of cartoons about the Annan plan is roughly the same number in Turkish Cypriot and Turkish newspapers, whereas that in the Greek newspapers is significantly higher when compared to the Greek Cypriot newspapers.

The second prominence pattern is ideology-based. The culture of printing cartoons in newspapers and voicing criticism through humor seems to be a part of a journalism tradition belonging to the left. This is especially so for the Turkish-language newspapers. In the Turkish Cypriot media, we see 61% of the cartoons about the Annan plan are from *Afrika*, 37% are from *Kıbrıs*, and 2% are from *Vatan*. In the Turkish media, we see that 55% of the cartoons are from *Cumhuriyet*, 40% from *Milliyet*, and 5% from *Yeni Şafak*. Thus, we can say that cartoons are a part of the leftist newspaper tradition in the Turkish-language media, be it Turkish or Turkish Cypriot newspapers. In contrast, this clear-cut ideological division is not that pronounced in the Greek-language media. Cartoons about the Annan plan are common across the political spectrum in the Greek and Greek Cypriot media.

7.2 Press-Political Party Parallelism and Support for the Annan Plan

Hallin and Mancini (2004) theorize that the Mediterranean media model reflects press-political party parallelism. According to Papathanassopoulos (2008), Spain, Italy, France, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus constitute examples of this model. Thus, all the newspapers that fall into the scope of this study are part of national media systems that display the Mediterranean model. This raises the question of which of the analyzed newspapers display press political party parallelism and whether this has any effect on the newspaper's position on the Annan Plan.

Presented in Table 14, In Northern Cyprus, the radical left *Afrika* is aligned with the Turkish Cypriot Democratic Party (TDP) and the conservative *Vatan* newspaper is aligned with National Unity Party (UBP), whereas the center *Kıbrıs* does not display press-political party parallelism.⁹³

Table 15 demonstrates that the percentage of support for the Annan Plan in cartoons is approximately equal in the newspapers *Afrika* and *Kıbrıs*. Similarly, the percentage of neutral cartoons is similar. There is one cartoon in *Kıbrıs* that takes a position against the plan, whereas all cartoons in *Afrika* are either supportive of the plan or neutral. In the conservative *Vatan*, there is a single cartoon about the Annan Plan, and it takes a position against it.

The content analysis of the dataset from *Kıbrıs* shows that cartoons about the plan are similar to those found in *Afrika*. Firstly, the cartoons in *Kıbrıs* also take a pro-yes position. Secondly, they are also critical of Denktaş, the DP and AKEL. Interestingly, a word game that emphasizes the similarity between the words “*kel*”

⁹³ It is important to note that the unit of analysis for the following analyses is the particular cartoon published in the newspaper. The tables report each newspaper separately and thus the percentages are calculated in reference to the number of observations (i.e., *n*) of that particular newspaper.

(bald) and “AKEL” is used in a cartoon that criticizes AKEL for the position the party takes. The content analysis of the dataset from *Vatan* is based on the analysis of a single cartoon taken from *Milliyet*. Based on the study of this single cartoon, we can conclude that the cartoon has a pro-no position. Table 15 indicates that there are no cartoons in favor of the Annan plan in the analyzed dataset.

In Southern Cyprus, the left *Charavgi* newspaper shows parallelism with the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL), the center *Fileleftheros* does not display political parallelism, and the conservative *Mahki* displays press political party parallelism to the Democratic Rally (DISY). *Charavgi* (left) has the highest percentage of cartoons against the Annan plan, with 49. The percentage of the cartoons against the Annan Plan is 29 % in *Fileleftheros* (center) and 40 % in *Machi* (right).

If we look at the press political party parallelism in the Turkish media, *Cumhuriyet* displays parallelism with the CHP and *Yeni Şafak* with the AKP. In contrast to these newspapers, the center-left *Milliyet* does not show any press-party parallelism. *Cumhuriyet* has the highest percentage of cartoons against the plan, with 59%, and *Yeni Şafak* has the highest percentage of cartoons supporting the plan, with 100%. Interestingly, 50% of the cartoons in *Milliyet* are neutral.

If we look at the press political party parallelism in the Greek media, *Rizospastis* displays parallelism with the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), *Ta Nea* with the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and *Kathimerini* with the New Democracy Party. Table 15 indicates that similar to the Greek Cypriot newspaper dataset, there are no cartoons published in favor of the Annan Plan in the Greek

newspapers. *Rizospastis* (left) has the highest percentage of cartoons against with 66%, followed by *Kathimerini* (center-right) with 23%.

7.3 Findings from Turkish Cypriot Newspaper Cartoons

The aim of this study is to ascertain whether a game theoretical frame is used in the coverage of the Annan Plan. Table 16 shows that two of the five game theoretical frames introduced is used in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers, the “win-lose” frame and the “risky gambling” frame. Does the ideology of the newspaper matter in the use of the game theoretical frames? The content analysis carried out indicates that ideology is a significant factor. The game theoretical frame is seen most frequently in *Afrika*. The percentage for “risky gambling” frames at *Afrika* 17 %. The center newspaper *Kıbrıs* preferred to use the “risky gambling” frame, with a percentage of 7 %. As for *Vatan*, it did not use any of the five game theoretical frames.

Interestingly, the cartoons also give us a key to the conceptualization of Cyprus. Cyprus is often portrayed as a whole without differentiating between the North and South. On the other hand, when there is a juxtaposition between the two sides, one side is portrayed as winning, while the other side is portrayed as losing. Many of the cartoons display sexual or racial discrimination. In regards to sexual discrimination, *Afrika*'s cartoon of April 20 depicts Cyprus as a woman in her underwear. Sexual references and sexual discrimination are also present in *Kıbrıs*. For example, the cartoon dated April 16 in this newspaper depicts a woman lying naked in bed with a “yes” banner while the man sitting on the edge of the bed is holding a “no” banner.

An element of racism appears in cartoons critical of the UN and Annan. For example, in the cartoon below published in Afrika, the racial features of the figure representing Annan (including color, shape of nose) are exaggerated. In the cartoon, Annan says "I hope that people who are against my plan do not see any good deed." The cartoon plays on the two meanings of the word "hayır" in the Turkish language, "no" and "good deed." This cartoon, displays two different aspects, the presence of racial discrimination and word games. The presence of an element of racism in a newspaper that goes by the name "Afrika" to draw a parallel between itself and the discriminated continent is highly ironic.

7.4 Findings from Greek Cypriot Newspaper Cartoons

First, the cartoons in the Greek Cypriot newspapers employ two game theoretical frames: the "win-lose" frame and the "lose-lose" frame. The leftist *Charavgi* only uses the "win-lose" frame, whereas *Fileleftheros* has used both the "win-lose" and "lose-lose" frames. Similar to the Turkish Cypriot newspaper findings, those from the Greek Cypriot newspapers yield a similar outcome about the relationship of ideology and the use of game theoretical frames. Also in the Greek Cypriot newspapers, the game theoretical frames are used mostly by the leftist *Charavgi*, followed by the center *Fileleftheros*. The game theoretical frame is absent, in any of its forms in the conservative *Charavgi*, as in the conservative *Vatan*.

Secondly, the cartoons in the Greek Cypriot newspapers display a strong position against third parties in the conflict. For example, 8% of the cartoons that the leftist newspaper *Charavgi* published prior the referendum on the Annan Plan are critical of the EU and commissioner Günther Verheugen, 46% of the US, President Bush and Secretary of State Powell, and 14 % of the UN and Secretary-General Kofi Annan. (Table 17). The anti-American, anti-EU and anti-UN position of the Greek Cypriot newspapers could be comprehended more thoroughly by keeping the island's colonial past and its conflict-driven road to independence in mind.

Finally, the Greek Cypriot newspapers have the same sexist sense of humor as seen in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers. The 18 April *Fileleftheros* cartoon depicts two men having a conversation, with “yes” used in a sexual context in the background. The sexist element is found across the political spectrum in Greek Cypriot newspapers. The nationalist/conservative *Mahki* cartoon, also published on 18 April, depicts Cyprus as a woman running to the “EU” castle while the UN, the US, and Great Britain are chasing to rape her (Figure 6).



Figure 6

Machi, April 18, 2004



7.5 Findings from Turkish Newspaper Cartoons

The content analysis of the Turkish newspaper cartoons indicates the presence of two of the game theoretical frames, the “no alternative” frame and the “win-lose” frame. *Cumhuriyet* uses the “no alternative” frame in 5% (Table 16). In parallel with Cypriot newspaper cartoons, both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot, the presence of the game theoretical frame in also Turkish newspapers is related to the ideology of the newspaper. The absence of any of the five game theoretical frames in the conservative *Yeni Şafak* can be understood in this light.

Secondly, a significant position against third-party intervention is also apparent in Turkish newspapers (Table 17) Among the newspapers analyzed, *Cumhuriyet* is the most critical of third-party intervention, with 18% of the analyzed cartoons against the UN and Annan and 9 % against the EU and Verheugen. The percentage of cartoons against the US, however, remains rather low, at 9%. There aren't any cartoons critical of the USA or its leaders in *Milliyet*. As for *Yeni Şafak* cartoons, there is no reference to third-party intervention.

Thirdly, Turkish newspaper cartoons display the same sexist sense of humor as that of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot cartoons.. For example, in a *Cumhuriyet* cartoon dated April 8, a prostitute is shown saying “we gave it, but we could not save ourselves.” This cartoon can not be interpreted independently of the Turkish political discourse, which refers to the conciliatory stance on the Cyprus issue by the phrase “*ver kurtul* (give it, save yourself).” The sexist element, more pronounced in this cartoon, is also present in the wider Turkish discourse. A comparison of Cartoon 2 from *Machi* and Cartoon 3 from *Cumhuriyet* displays a striking similarity (Figure 7),

Figure 7

Cumhuriyet, April 18, 2004.



which in turn is a strong indication that the understanding of the Cyprus issue in the Turkish/Greek Cypriot psyche is not independent of a sexist framework.

Also, it should be noted that Cyprus is referred to as a whole in 25% of *Milliyet* cartoons and 14% of *Cumhuriyet* cartoons. *Milliyet* gives 25% neutral reference to Turkish Cypriots, and 25% neutral reference to Greek Cypriots. *Cumhuriyet* gives 19% positive reference to Turkish Cypriots and 9% positive reference to Greek Cypriots. Also, in the Turkish newspaper cartoons we see the depiction of Cyprus as a bird. In *Cumhuriyet*, Cyprus is depicted as a stork bringing a baby, and in *Milliyet*, the TRNC is depicted as a featherless chicken being fed by the UN from an EU feeding bag.⁹⁴

The politicians depicted most often in the Turkish newspaper cartoons are Denktaş and Papadopoulos. The percentage of cartoons that support Denktaş is 14% in *Cumhuriyet*. In contrast to *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet* and *Yeni Şafak* are critical of Denktaş. The percentage of critical cartoons about Denktaş is 25 in *Milliyet*, and 100 in *Yeni Şafak*. As for Papadopoulos, 13% of *Milliyet* and 50% of *Yeni Şafak* cartoons reflect criticism.

The length of the plan appears as a reoccurring theme worth mentioning, present in both *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet* cartoons. 14% of *Cumhuriyet* cartoons are critical about the length of the plan, while this percentage is 6 in *Milliyet*. The length of the plan is not addressed in *Yeni Şafak* cartoons.

⁹⁴ The same cartoon also appears in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Vatan*.

7.6 Findings from the Greek Newspaper Cartoons

The content analysis first indicates that Greek newspaper cartoons use two particular frames as expected: "win-lose" and "lose-lose." The "win-lose" frame is used most frequently by communist *Rizospastis*, and least used by conservative *Kathimerini*. Although the Greek newspaper cartoon findings follow the same pattern concerning the ideology/game theoretical frame link with Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot and Turkish newspapers, slight differences can be seen. *Kathimerini* features one cartoon with a game theoretical frame, whereas this frame is absent in all five versions in the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot and Turkish media. This absence can be explained by the fact that *Yeni Şafak* (conservative) and *Machi* (nationalist) are more on the right of the political spectrum than *Kathimerini*.

Second, the analysis of Greek newspapers indicates a strong level of criticism against third parties to the conflict such as the UN, EU, and US. The highest level of criticism among these third parties is directed toward the US, President Bush and Secretary of State Powell, in all newspapers, with a range of 15 to 40%. After the US, the most criticized third party is the UN and its Secretary General, Kofi Annan (Table 17).

Similar to the cartoons in Turkish and Cypriot (both Turkish and Greek) newspapers about Annan, emphasis is given to skin color, which may be accepted as a racist element in the sense of humor specific to the region.

Criticism of the UN and Secretary General Annan in Greek cartoons is also blended with an element of racism. For example, in the cartoon below, similar to the cartoon in the Turkish newspapers, racial features of Annan such as color are

emphasized. In the cartoon, Annan is trying to persuade Greek Cypriots by mentioning that singer Anna Vissi has received a music award.

As for national political parties and politicians, *Rizospastis* cartoons are critical of New Democracy and Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis, PASOK and its leader George Papandreou, Syriza and Konstantopoulos.

Figure 8

Afrika, April 10, 2004




Figure 9

Kathimerini, April 20, 2004



7.7 Comparison of the Findings

The analysis indicates that most of the Turkish newspaper cartoons are in favor of the Annan plan, whereas most of the Greek newspaper cartoons are against it. First of all, game theoretical frames appear prominently in both the left of Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Greek newspaper cartoons, whereas the same prominence is not visible in those on the right. Secondly, the newspaper cartoons of primary parties to the conflict, as well as secondary parties to the conflict, carry elements of racism and sexism. Surprisingly some of the cartoons printed in the

newspapers of different parties, display the exactly same logic. Language, the use of Turkish/Greek and English is also an important dynamic within the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sense of humor. The presence of the English language in Cypriot cartoons can be interpreted in light of the island's colonial past.


The Turkish left, Greek Cypriot and Greek cartoons display a strong position against third-party intervention. Going back to the point of Papathanassopoulos (2008) that Spain, Italy, France, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus constitute an example of Hallin and Mancini's (2004) Mediterranean model, this study brings the argument one step further. Yes, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus all constitute examples to the Mediterranean model with a high degree of press-political party parallelism; but furthermore, we can theorize that Mediterranean nations that are primary and secondary parties to, i.e., the Cyprus conflict, relate to this conflict using the same news frames. Thus, their understanding of the conflict is different, yet the tools they use to understand it are not.

Finally, we can talk about a particular Cypriot sense of humor that reflects the island's colonial history.

What stance do Turkish and Greek Cypriot newspaper cartoons take to the Annan Plan? In parallel to the stance taken by the newspapers of the primary parties to the conflict, the newspapers of the secondary parties of the conflict, namely Turkey and Greece, follow the same pattern: Turkish newspaper cartoons mostly support the plan, whereas Greek newspaper cartoons mostly oppose it. Since the "no alternative" frame is used as a justification for voting yes in the referendum on the Annan plan, it is present in the Turkish newspaper cartoons. The logic of the frame is "Turkish Cypriots have to vote yes because they have no alternative." On the other hand, game

theory as a more general theme is present in both the Turkish and Greek newspaper cartoons. The newspapers of the secondary parties to the conflict have the same aspect of racism and sexism present in the cartoons of primary party newspapers. In the case of the Turkish newspapers, we can say that the widespread “*ver kurtul*” frame, used to express making concessions on the Cyprus conflict, also is present in the cartoons. Finally, Turkish and Greek cartoons of newspapers from the left also are critical of third-party intervention.

A pattern of important difference is visible when contrasting the Turkish Cypriot and the Turkish left. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper from the left of the political spectrum, *Afrika*, is pro-yes, yet it takes a position against third-party intervention, whereas the Turkish newspaper with a similar political leaning, *Cumhuriyet*, is pro-no, and at the same time takes a position against third-party intervention. It can be said that anti-third-party intervention serves as a general common ground, and each leftist newspaper takes its own position in regard to the Annan Plan.

Figure 10*Distribution of cartoons*⁹⁵

⁹⁵. The newspapers in Series 1 are *Afrika*, *Charavgi*, *Cumhuriyet*, and *Rizospastis*; the newspapers in Series 2 are *Kıbrıs*, *Fileleftheros*, *Milliyet*, and *Ta Nea*; and the newspapers in Series 3 are *Vatan*, *Mahki*, *Yeni Şafak* and *Kathimerini*.

Table 14*Press-political parallelism in cartoons*

News	PP.
Afrika	TDP
Kıbrıs	Center
Vatan	UDP
Charavgi	AKEL
Fileleftheros	Center
Machi	
Cumhuriyet	CHP
Milliyet	Center
Yeni Şafak	AKP
Rizospastis	KKE
Ta Nea	PASOK
Kathimerini	NDP

Table 15*Support given to the Annan Plan in the cartoons*

News	Support (Freq)	%	Against (Freq)		Neut. (Freq)	%	Not Ment. (Freq.)	%
Afrika (N=24)	18	75			6	25		
Kıbrıs (N=15)	11	73	1	7	3	20		
Vatan (N=1)			1	100				
Rizospastis (N=65)			43	66	5	8	17	26
Ta Nea (N=80)			18	23			62	77
Kathimerini (N=13)			3	23	1	8	9	69
Cumhuriyet (N=22)			13	59	3	14	6	27
Milliyet (N=16)	1	6			8	50	7	44
Yeni Şafak (N=2)	2	100						
Charavgi (N=37)			18	49			19	51
Fileleftheros (N=42)			12	29			30	71
Machi (N=30)			12	40			18	60

Table 16*Frequency of game theoretical frames in cartoons*

N.	Win/win frame		Win/lose frame		Lose/lose Frame		No alternative frame		Risky gambling frame	
	F.	%	F.	%	F.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Afrika (N=24)									4	17
Kıbrıs (N=15)									1	7
Vatan (N=1)										
Rizospastis (N=65)			16	25						
Ta Nea (N=80)			2	3						
Kathimerini (N=13)			2	15						
Cumhuriyet (N=22)							1	5		
Milliyet (N=16)										
Yeni Şafak (N=2)										
Charavargi (N=37)			1	3	2	5				
Fileleftheros (N=42)					2	5				
Machi (N=30)			1	3						

Table 17*References to Third Party Intervention in cartoons*

Newspaper	UN, Kofi Annan		EU, Günther Verheugen		USA, President Bush, Secretary of State Powell, Special envoy for Cyprus Weston		Great Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair		Russia, President Putin, Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Afrika (N=24)	4 (-)	17(-)	1(-)	4(-)	1(-)	4(-)			1(-)	4(-)
Kıbrıs (N=15)	1 (+)	7(+)								
Vatan (N=1)	1 (-)	100(-)	1(-)	100(-)						
Rizospastis (N=65)	22 (-)	34(-)	29(-)	45(-)	26(-)	40(-)	5(-)	8(-)		
Ta Nea (N=80)	11 (-)	14(-)	3 (-)	4(-)	23(-)	29(-)	4(-)	5(5)		
	1	1			2	3				
Kathi(N=13)	1	8			2(-) 1	15(-) 8				
Cumhuriyet (N=22)	4 (-)	18(-)	2(-)	9(-)	2(-)	9(-)	1(-)	5(-)		
					1	5				
Milliyet (N=16)										
Yeni Şafak (N=2)	1	50								
Charavgi (N=37)	5(-)	14(-)	3(-)	8(-)	17(-)	46(-)	3(-)	8(-)		
Fileleftheros (N=42)	11 (-)	26(-)	2(-)	5(-)	14(-)	33	6(-)	14(-)		
Machi (N=30)	6 (-)	20(-)			6(-)	20(-)	3(-)	10(-)		
	1	3								

Note. Positive references have been indicated with a “+” sign, while negative references have been indicated with a “-” sign, and neutral references have been combined with quotes.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

The conclusion chapter of this dissertation will present the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot press frameboxes and news event covered, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot press frameboxes and news events covered, and findings from the analyzed headline articles, op-eds, and cartoons. Furthermore, it will discuss what has been achieved by this study, and what further research can be done.

8.2 The Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Press Frameboxes and News Events Covered

The Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot press utilized both separate Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot frameboxes as well as a common Cypriot framebox to present the issues around the Annan Plan to their readership. Each party was concerned with news events in its own national context, the other side of the divided island, Turkey, Greece, and on the international level.

8.2.1 Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Frameboxes

The comparative content analysis conducted has demonstrated the use of different frame boxes by the Turkish Cypriot newspapers when covering the Annan Plan, in their headline articles, op-eds, and cartoons

Let us start with the mental maps of the two primary parties to the Cyprus conflict, the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot frameboxes. In the Turkish Cypriot framebox used by the Turkish Cypriot press, first, there is the identity issue. The Cypriot left, center, and right represented by the newspapers *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, and *Vatan*

each have a different outlook on Cypriot identity. The left is for full Cypriot independence, also vis-a-vis Turkey. It is against the “*anavatan/ yavru vatan*” (motherland/ babyland) duality. It emphasizes above all, the Cypriot identity. The center manages to find a compromise, or harmony, between the Cypriot and Turkish identities. In other words, for the center, the Cypriot and Turkish identities coexist. *Kıbrıs* does not underline the conflict between these two identities but rather reinforces the harmony.

The Cypriot right, as seen in the newspaper *Vatan*, refuses the existence of a Cypriot identity upfront, and opts for a Turkish identity. Second comes the level of national politics, where we find national political actors such as President Denktaş, Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat, Minister of Foreign Affairs Serdar Denktaş, and Northern Cypriot political parties such as the RTP, UBP, and DP. The civil society and the pro-"yes" rallies in Nicosia were also important in the Turkish Cypriot framebox. Finally, the Turkish Cypriot newspapers used game theoretical frames, such as "there is no alternative," and "risky gambling" frames to understand the Annan Plan and present it to their readership. How the Turkish Cypriot right questioned the application of the entire game theoretical logic to the referendum is highly interesting.

In the Greek Cypriot mental map as well, identity plays an important role. Reminiscent to the Turkish Cypriot identity formation, the left represented by *Charavgi* prioritizes a Cypriot identity, the center combines a Greek and Cypriot identity as in *Fileleftheros* and Cypriot Hellenism is dominant in the right, as seen in the *Machi*. At the national level of the Greek Cypriot framebox, we see political actors such as Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos, political parties such as AKEL and DISY, and the leader of AKEL Hristofyas. As to the use of game theoretical

frames, Greek Cypriot newspapers use game theoretical frames less when compared with Turkish Cypriot newspapers, yet when they do, the "win-lose" frame is preferred. The Greek Orthodox religion is also more visible on the right of the political spectrum. For example, the *Machi* has more religious references than the *Charavgi*.

Yet, an important finding of this research is that there is a common Cypriot framebox, as well as separate Turkish Cypriot and Greek frameboxes. This might be explained by the distinct history of the island, which includes a colonial period. In the common Cypriot framebox, there is a strong anti-imperialist pillar that becomes visible in critical approaches to the US, the EU and the UN from both the North and South of the island. Not only are both communities critical of third parties involved in the conflict, but in the sense of humor they employ to demonstrate this criticism is also parallel. The Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sense of humor features a strong blend of sexism and racism.

8.2.2 Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot News Events

The newspapers developed their frames on the Annan Plan with the use of their frameboxes, and in the context of the event line of April 2004, preceding the referendum of April 24. First, Turkish Cypriot newspapers. All three of the newspapers analyzed, *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, and *Vatan* covered events about the referendum in the primary parties of the conflict that is, of course, first Northern Cyprus, and then Southern Cyprus. Second, the newspapers covered events on secondary parties of the conflict, namely Turkey and Greece, and finally, they covered events at the international level. All three newspapers covered the Bürgenstock meeting on the Annan Plan finalized on March 29. As to key events that took place in Northern Cyprus, *Afrika* emphasized the “yes” meetings in Nicosia in its coverage, as well as

ultranationalist terror against the supporters of “yes.” *Kıbrıs* also underlined the “yes” meeting, with the “yes *be annem*” frame. *Vatan*, on the other hand, gave the views of non-governmental organizations, and elements of civil society that opposed the plan. As to key events that took place in Southern Cyprus, all three newspapers emphasized AKEL’s committee meeting and Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat’s visit to Southern Cyprus to speak with AKEL and DISI leaders. *Afrika* and *Kıbrıs* supported Mehmet Ali Talat’s visit, whereas *Vatan* opposed it.

Regarding events that took place in Turkey, *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, and *Vatan* followed the National Security Council Meeting in Ankara, and the declaration of the council following the meeting. *Afrika* and *Kıbrıs* interpreted the declaration as proof of non-involvement of the military in the government’s Cyprus policy, whereas *Vatan* took it as a critical stance taken by the military establishment of the country against the Annan Plan. Also, the Turkish Cypriot newspapers followed the speech given by President Denktaş at the Turkish Parliament. *Vatan* backed Denktaş and was critical of the Turkish government for betraying the national cause, whereas *Afrika* and *Kıbrıs* were critical of Denktaş.

The Greek Cypriot newspapers followed the news events in Southern Cyprus, the other part of the island, Greece, Turkey, and the international community. All three of the Greek Cypriot newspapers, *Charavgi*, *Fileleftheros*, and *Machi* covered the announcement of President Papadopoulos regarding the referendum. AKEL and DISY’s decision-making processes, that is, their internal meetings on the issue, were covered again by all three newspapers. Given its closeness to AKEL, the viewpoint of the party was more underlined in *Charavgi*, as compared to the other two newspapers. Meeting for “yes” and “no” in Nicosia were also covered, however in a very different manner. Out of the three newspapers, *Machi* was hostile to the “yes” meeting at which

there were participants also from Northern Cyprus, calling it a political anti-rally. As to the news events that took place in the North of the island, the newspapers were concerned with Denktaş's position, the policy of the RTP, and Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat. The Greek Cypriot newspapers were interested in the difference of opinion between Ankara and Denktaş.

As to events in Turkey and Greece, the Greek Cypriot newspapers followed the speech of Denktaş in the Turkish Parliament, Erdogan's reaction to the speech, and the declaration of the National Security Council. Finally, regarding events in Greece, the Cyprus policy of Karamanlis was followed very carefully. *Charavgi* took a doubtful position as to Karamanlis's remarks, whereas *Fileleftheros* was more neutral. At the international level, the newspapers were first concerned with the Bürgenstock meeting, and then with the UN Security Council Meeting on the guarantees to be given to Cyprus.

8.3 Turkish and Greek Press Frameboxes and News Events Covered

8.3.1 Turkish and Greek Press Frameboxes

Having discussed the frameboxes of the primary parties to the Cyprus conflict, we can move on to discussing the frameboxes of the secondary parties to the Cyprus conflict, namely Turkey and Greece. To understand the Turkish framebox, it is first necessary to understand the context of the first decade of the 21st century in Turkish politics. With the coming to power of the AKP in 2002, the political polarization in Turkey shifted from left/right to secular/Islamic. Thus, the secular elements of society that opposed the AKP also opposed its policies such as its Cyprus policy, and

conservative elements of society embraced its policies, regardless of the meaning behind the policy.

At the national level, the different parts of the political establishment of Turkey of the time period consisted of President of the Republic of Turkey Necdet Sezer, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül, the National Security Council consisting of civil and military members such as the Chief of Staff General Hilmi Özkök, and political parties such as the AKP and the CHP. Once again, it should be underlined here that the Turkish press constitutes an example of Hallin and Mancini's Mediterranean Model by displaying press-political party parallelism. *Cumhuriyet* showed parallelism with the main opposition party CHP, whereas *Yeni Şafak* showed parallelism with the ruling AKP. As opposed to *Cumhuriyet* and *Yeni Şafak*, *Milliyet* showed no one-to-one parallelism with either political party. The positions that the newspapers take on the Annan Plan also should be understood in this light. *Yeni Şafak*, in parallel with the AKP, supported the plan, whereas *Cumhuriyet* in parallel with CHP was against the plan.

Turkey's start of the accession negotiations with the European Union, or rather being part of Europe, is another frame in the Turkish press framebox. This is especially so for the newspaper *Milliyet*, which had many correspondents in European capitals. However, it should be noted that the European vocation or frame is rather a new one in the case of the newspaper *Yeni Şafak*. In other words, the *Milliyet* had a true European vocation coming from the tradition of its editor-in-Chief, Abdi İpekçi, who was assassinated by Mehmet Ali Ağca in 1979, and represented by many Europhile columnists such as Sami Kohen. *Yeni Şafak* used the European frame instrumentally to support the AKP.

The Turkish framebox also presents the theme that “Turkey” should come before Cyprus. Although this is not said outright at all times, there is a reference to Turkish Cypriots owing a favor to Turkey in some of the op-eds. Interestingly, the Cyprus issue is framed as a national cause, but at the same time, a Turkey-first position also coexists with the national cause frame. The conciliatory stance on the Cyprus issue, a pro-solution position, is slammed by the national discourse as a “*ver kurtul*” (leave it and survive) frame. The mirror image of the “Turkey first” frame is also present in the Turkish Cypriot press. Especially *Afrika* says it loud and clear on many occasions, that Cyprus should not carry the burden of Turkey. The newspapers take a stance against the Turks from Turkey that have populated the island.

To understand the Greek framebox, we need to have a look at the political context of the country in the April of 2004, the month preceding the referendum. On March 8, 2004, a month before the studied period, general elections took place in Greece, giving a victory to Costas Karamanlis’s New Democracy Party. So, when Karamanlis took office as head of the country, there were negotiations with Turkey on the Annan Plan in his lap. The Greek Communist Party and the small left coalition also were represented in parliament. Similar to the Turkish press, the Greek press displays press-political party parallelism, again providing an example of Hallin and Mancini’s Mediterranean Media Model. *Rizospastis*, is the official news organization of the Greek Communist Party. *Kathimerini* shows press-political party parallelism with *New Democracy*, and *Ta Nea* is at the center resembling *Milliyet*. The themes of the Greek framebox include political parties such as PASOK and its leader Papandreou.

It should be noted that Greece and Turkey are the only two countries in the world that have won their independence from each other, thus the national identities of both countries have developed in opposition to one another. 2004 comes after the

Turkish Greek rapprochement initiated by foreign ministers Andreas Papandreou, and Ismail Cem, thus the anti-Turkish feeling, as well as the anti-Greek feeling is not that prominent, yet still, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus is seen as a “Turkish invasion” in Greece, and the country does not accept the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, for its part, Turkey sees the Cypriot issue as its national cause

Despite their differences, there is also a common Greek-Turkish framebox, influenced by shared history and culture. Similar to the case of the common Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sense of humor, there is also a common Turkish and Greek sense of humor, evident again, in the racist and sexist elements of the cartoons printed in the Turkish and Greek press. Also, both the Turkish and Greek press have a strong anti-imperialist tradition, especially visible in the newspapers *Cumhuriyet* and *Rizospastis*. *Cumhuriyet* and *Rizospastis* speak from a common ground, viewing the Annan Plan as a scheme of the British and Americans, a plot against Turkey in the case of *Cumhuriyet*, and a plot against Greece in the case of *Rizospastis*. The Greek framebox is also prone to conspiracy theories such as the Turkish framebox.

Similar to the mutual skepticism seen in some of the elements of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot press against each other, there is also doubt towards each other in the Greek Cypriot press and Greek press. For example, the Greek Cypriot newspaper *Charavgi* underlines that Karamanlis stands indirectly for "yes." The underlying point here is that the national interests of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are not necessarily the same as those of Turkey and Greece, respectively.

The Greek newspapers also make use of the game theoretical framebox. In parallel to Greek Cypriot newspapers, they make more use of the "win-win" frame. The “there is no alternative frame” was not that prominent in Greek language media,

more specifically the Greek Cypriot press and the Greek Press, precisely because “having no alternative” was not the case for Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots were promised entry into the European Union on May 1, following the referendum, irrespective of whether a "yes" or "no" emerged from the ballots, thus they had an alternative. Yet we can make a distinction in the Greek language press, between europhiles and euroskeptics. It can be argued that Europhile and Euroskeptic frames are both present in the Greek language press. For example, the Greek Cypriot newspaper *Fileleftheros* can be given as an example of a newspaper that uses a Europhile frame, since it opens its pages to politicians from EU countries such as Finland’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Maarti Ahtisaari.

8.3.2 Turkish and Greek News Events

As for news events covered by Greek newspapers, all three newspapers are interested in the Karamanlis government’s position on the plan. Also, the Greek press shows interest in the position of other political parties such as PASOK, and leader Papandreou’s position on the Annan Plan. As for Turkey, the Greek press is interested in the Erdogan government’s position on the Annan Plan, and also the Greek newspapers follow Turkish-EU relations closely. Regarding Southern Cyprus, they emphasize the “no” of Papadopoulos, and regarding Northern Cyprus, they underline the position of Denktas, and also Mehmet Ali Talat and his party CTP. At the international level, the Greek press covers the Bürgenstock summit and the UN Security Council Meeting. Also, Verheugen’s remarks constitute a news event.

8.4 Findings from Headline Articles, Op-Eds, and Cartoons

The analysis of the headline articles dataset yields five sets of conclusions. The first set of conclusions is related to the positions the headline articles have taken towards the plan. Among the 12 newspapers analyzed, *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, *Milliyet*, and *Yeni Şafak* are in the “yes” camp of the referendum, whereas *Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, *Charavgi*, *Fileleftheros*, *Machi*, *Rizospastis*, *Ta Nea*, and *Kathimerini* are in the “no” camp. The highest percentage of support for the plan among the newspapers in the “yes” camp is given by the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Afrika*. Whereas the highest percentage of opposition in the “no” camp is given by the Greek newspaper *Rizospastis*.

The second set of conclusions is related to the game theoretical frame. The first significant outcome is that the “no alternative” variant of the game theoretical frame is used in newspapers that support the Annan Plan. However, the “risky gambling” variant is used in both pro-“yes” and pro-“no” newspapers. Pro-“no” newspapers also prefer to use the theme of the negative consequences of a no vote in the referendum. Second, one of the sources of the “there is no alternative” frame is the US state department, as demonstrated in Secretary of State Collin Powell’s speech saying there is no alternative to the referendum

The second set of conclusions is related to the solution frame used by pro-“yes” newspapers and the “continuation of the status quo” frame used by pro-“no” newspapers. The analysis demonstrates that the continuation of the status quo frame has the same building blocks. This parallel is particularly visible between the Turkish Cypriot nationalist *Vatan* and the Greek Cypriot nationalist *Machi*.

The third set of conclusions is related to press-political party parallelism and patterns of similarity. Despite the expectation that there would be similarity in how newspapers of similar political leaning cover the Annan Plan, in the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot newspapers, the outcome demonstrates the opposite. For example, the leftist Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* shows more similarity to the Turkish Cypriot conservative daily *Vatan*. Both newspapers take an actively pro-"no" position, and use the frame of "continuation of the status quo." This can be explained by press-political party parallelism. In the Turkish media context, since the Annan plan was supported by the AKP government, newspapers in opposition to the government such as *Cumhuriyet* took a pro-"no" position, whereas newspapers that aligned with the government such as *Yeni Şafak* took a pro-"yes" position. *Milliyet*'s stance on the plan cannot be explained by press-political party parallelism, since at that time the newspaper did not show parallelism with a political party although regarded as central left.

There is also a significant pattern of parallelism in how the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* instrumentalizes the Annan Plan to criticize the Erdoğan government, and how the Greek newspaper *Rizospastis* instrumentalizes the plan to criticize the Karamanlis government. Thus, both *Cumhuriyet* and *Rizospastis* do not agree with the pro-"yes" position of the Turkish and Greek governments and criticize their policies on the Annan Plan. Also, it should be noted that all three of the analyzed Greek newspapers are critical of the Karamanlis governments policies vis-a-vis the Annan Plan, whereas in the Turkish context, a significant degree of criticism is only present in *Cumhuriyet*.

The fourth set of conclusions is related to the frames particular to this dataset, specifically to the headline articles of the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, and

Turkish and Greek newspapers. The “constitutional court and referendum law” theme has a significant presence in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers, creating a moment of flashback to Putnam’s two-level games. In the Turkish newspapers, concepts related to European law, such as primary law, secondary law, and the derogation issue have a high degree of visibility.

Finally, each data set brings a new angle to the research or has a distinguishing result. To follow this logic, what then is the contribution of the dataset on headline articles of the selected newspapers to the study, holistically speaking? The newspaper landscape in all the studied countries reflects a Putnam type-two level games. For the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspaper landscape, the first level is Cyprus, and Turkey and Greece are the second level. From the perspective of the Turkish and Greek newspaper landscape, Turkey and Greece are the first level, and Cyprus is the second level. The toolkit of these two-level games is the remarks of the politicians on the issue, often given in quotations. Actually, it would be better to say three-level games, if we take international organizations such as the UN and the EU, plus other countries with stakes such as the US and the UK as the third level.

The findings of the analyzed op-eds bring us to seven important conclusions. The first is that three of the analyzed newspapers come close to the advocacy journalism described in Hallin and Mancini’s Mediterranean Media Model: The Turkish Cypriot *Afrika*, the Turkish *Milliyet*, and the Greek *Ta Nea*.

Second, the op-eds pages of the newspapers for the most part, again in line with the Mediterranean Media Model, acted as forums where different opinions were discussed. Among the newspapers analyzed, *Milliyet*, *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, *Fileleftheros*,

Charavgi, *Kathimerini* and *Ta Nea* showed characteristics of internal pluralism, giving room to op-eds both for and against the plan.

Third, the op-eds also served as an indicator of press-political party parallelism. Especially, the printing of op-eds written by AKEL members in the Greek Cypriot leftist *Charavgi* demonstrated a parallelism between the political party and the newspapers.

Fourth, a strong anti-imperialist discourse was present in the Turkish Cypriot *Afrika*, Greek Cypriot *Charavgi*, Turkish *Cumhuriyet*, somewhat *Milliyet*, and Greek *Rizospastis*. What I find of particular interest is that the pattern here is that an anti-Annan Plan position comes together with an anti-imperialist mindset, meaning that for *Cumhuriyet* and *Rizospastis* to oppose the plan does not come as a surprise; however, a very peculiar discourse is developed by the Turkish Cypriot *Afrika*'s strong anti-imperialist stance, with its equally strong pro-“yes” position that it states with the “yes *be annem*” phrase. The op-eds of this newspaper singled out, in the sense that it questioned, the main pillars of the Cypriot equation, from the Turkish foreign policy perspective, demanding the independence of Turkish Cypriots, vis-a-vis Turkey.

Fifth, the research questions about the use of game theoretical frames have revealed a very interesting pattern. The content analysis carried out importantly documented how Turkish language newspapers against the Annan Plan either deconstructed a specific game theoretical frame, such as *Cumhuriyet*'s deconstruction of the "win-win" frame or took one step further such as *Vatan* and questioned the entire game theoretical logic on which the frames were built. This similarity between the newspapers *Cumhuriyet* and *Vatan* is highly interesting. Sixth, the analysis carried

out that among the game theoretical frames, the Greek language newspapers preferred the use of "win-lose" frame. Last, the main pillar of the "yes" campaign, the "there is no alternative" frame in the pro-"yes" press, was also used by *Vatan* to back the "no" campaign through persuading the readership that there was no alternative but saying "no."

The analysis indicates that most of the Turkish newspaper cartoons are in favor of the Annan plan, whereas most of the Greek newspaper cartoons are against it. First of all, game theoretical frames are prominent in both the left of Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Greek newspaper cartoons, whereas the same prominence is not visible in those of the right. Second, the newspaper cartoons of the primary parties to the conflict, as well as the secondary parties, carry elements of racism and sexism. Surprisingly, some of the cartoons printed in the newspapers of different parties display the exactly same logic. Language, the use of Turkish/Greek and English is also an important dynamic within the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sense of humor. The presence of English language in Cypriot cartoons can be interpreted in light of the island's colonial past.

Finally, the Turkish left, Greek Cypriot, and Greek cartoons display a strong position against third-party intervention. Going back to the point of Papathanassapoulos (2008) that Spain, Italy, France, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus constitute examples of Hallin and Mancini's (2004) Mediterranean Model, this study brings the argument one step further. Yes, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus all constitute examples of the Mediterranean Model with a high degree of press-political party parallelism, but furthermore, we can theorize that Mediterranean nations that are primary and secondary parties, i.e., the Cyprus, relate to this conflict using the same news frames. Thus, their understanding of the conflict is different, yet

the tools they use to understand it are not. Also, we can talk about a particular Cypriot sense of humor that embodies traces of the island's colonial history.

What stance do Turkish and Greek Cypriot newspaper cartoons take on the Annan Plan? In parallel to the stance taken by the newspapers of the primary parties to the conflict, the newspapers of the secondary parties of the conflict, namely Turkey and Greece, follow the same pattern: Turkish newspaper cartoons mostly support the plan, whereas Greek newspaper cartoons mostly oppose it. Since the "there is no alternative" frame is used as a justification for voting "yes" in the referendum on the Annan plan, it is present in the Turkish newspaper cartoons. The logic of the frame is "Turkish Cypriots must vote 'yes' because they have no alternative." On the other hand, game theory as a more general theme is present in both the Turkish and Greek newspaper cartoons. The newspapers of the secondary parties to the conflict have the same aspect of racism and sexism present in the cartoons of primary party newspapers. In the case of Turkish newspapers, we can say that the widespread "*ver kurtul*" frame, which is used to express making concessions on the Cyprus conflict, is also present in the cartoons. Finally, also Turkish and Greek cartoons of newspapers from the left are critical of third-party intervention.

A pattern of important difference is visible when contrasting the Turkish Cypriot and the Turkish left. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper from the left of the political spectrum, *Afrika*, is pro-"yes," yet it takes a position against third-party intervention, whereas the Turkish newspaper with a similar political leaning, *Cumhuriyet*, is pro-"no," and at the same time, it takes a position against third-party intervention. It can be said that the anti-third-party intervention serves as a general common ground, and each leftist newspaper takes its own position in regard to the Annan Plan.

8.5 What This Research Adds to the Field

The comparative content analysis carried out provides important instruments and data for further research. The codebook used in this research, “Depiction of the 2004 Referendum on the Annan Peace Plan in Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish,” can be used for other cases of content analysis. Either the codebook can be taken without any changes, or it can be adapted to fit the needs of the conflict studied. Given that the Cyprus conflict remains to be solved, understanding the ways the parties think remains an important prerequisite in resolution. Also, the dataset, consisting of 332 headline articles, 1237 op-eds, and 347 cartoons from *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, *Vatan*, *Charavgi*, *Fileleftheros*, *Mahhi*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Yeni Şafak*, *Rizospastis*, *Ta Nea*, and *Kathimerini* can be reused as secondary data for further research, content analysis, or discourse analysis.

Last but not least, the Cyprus conflict remains unresolved. Conflict resolution literature points out that following the metaphor of a burning house, we first need to understand why the house caught on fire, to begin with. In other words, the key to resolving a multiparty conflict is understanding its root causes. Understanding the root causes, or dynamics of deep-rooted conflict is not possible by looking at a single cause, or single narrative. Looking at press narratives of all parties of the conflict, not only those of the primary parties such as Turkish Cypriots, and Greek Cypriots, but also secondary parties such as Turkey and Greece, from newspaper accounts representing the left, center, and right of the political spectrum provides us with a multilayer understanding. Multilayer complex conflicts can be solved only after reaching a multilevel understanding.

This is an example to descriptive research. Not every segment of the parties is represented in the analyzed content, nevertheless, it provides us with a thorough understanding. The point of departure for this research was first learning how game theoretical frames such as "win-win," "win-lose," "lose/lose," and "there is no alternative" were detrimental in the "yes" and "no" campaign of the press before the twin referenda on the Annan Peace Plan. The second question was whether the studied Turkish/Cypriot, Greek/Cypriot, Turkish and Greek press rectangle constitutes an example of the Mediterranean Media Model. We found out that the game theoretical logic was used not only to sell the "yes" or "no." Better parties refuted the game theoretical logic when wanting to refute the referendum itself. Thus, the logic of game theory appears to be the backbone of the referendum.

In addition, this study ascertained that the logic of the referendum was laid down as such as presented to the parties by third parties to the conflict such as the UN and the US. The game theoretical logic was first used by the third parties to the national governments, and from the national governments to the media. In its turn, the national press conveyed the logic to its leadership, used the same logic to bring through its own perspective, or refused the entire logic, equivalent to refusing the legitimacy of the referendum. Very interestingly, the game theoretical logic was the backbone of the referendum. That is why US secretary of state Collin Powell stated the Cypriots needed to understand that there was no Plan B, and foreign minister Gül at one point talked of the Pareto optimal; but then again, when not buying the logic of the referendum, the opposition papers first refuted the game theoretical logic, *Cumhuriyet* by interpreting the "win-win" frame as "*kazı, kazan, kazık*," and *Vatan* by stating that we cannot talk about pluses and minuses when we become "ex".

As for the Aegean Mediterranean rectangle of Northern Cyprus, Southern Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, the study not only proved that the newspapers studied constitute an example of the Mediterranean Model, but also went a step further. That is, it unfolded the complexity of multiparty conflict where primary and secondary parties adhere to the Mediterranean Media Model. One pattern that unfolded was that the conflict was not only among the primary parties, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, but there was also a difference of interest between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, on the one hand, and Greek Cypriots and Greece on the other. Also, another pattern that unraveled is that although the parties thought differently about the issues at stake, they used the same metaphors to understand and explain the conflict. Thus, we can complete by saying “*una razza una faccia*”⁹⁶ also in conflict, therefore showing the way of resolution.

⁹⁶ Italian saying which means one race one face.

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APPENDIX A

DEPICTION OF THE 2004 REFERENDUM ON THE ANNAN PLAN IN TURKISH, GREEK, TURKISH CYPRIOT AND GREEK CYPRIOT PRESS - CODEBOOK

Formal categories

A Coder ID Please indicate your coder ID

1. Volga Kurbanzade
2. Orestis Alexiou

B Newspaper ID

1. Cumhuriyet (Turkey, “left” media)
2. Milliyet (Turkey, “center” media)
3. Yeni Şafak (Turkey, “right” media)
4. Rizospastis (Greece, “left” media)
5. Ta Nea (Greece, “center left” media)
6. Kathimerini (Greece, “center right” media)
7. Afrika (Turkish Cypriot “left” media)
8. Kıbrıs (Turkish Cypriot “center” media)
9. Vatan (Turkish Cypriot “right” media)
10. Charavgi (Greek Cypriot “left” media)
11. Fileleftheros (Greek Cypriot “center” media)
12. Machi (Greek Cypriot “right” media)

C. Data type

D. Data rank

E. Day

F. Month

G. Year

Point of view on the Annan Plan and the issues the plan covers

H (Q1) Point of view on the Annan Plan

- 0 neutral
- 1 supportive
- 2 against
- 99 not mentioned

I (Q2) Point of view on the Annan Plan's proposal regarding the political system

- 0 neutral
- 1 supportive
- 2 against
- 99 not mentioned

J (Q3) Point of view on the Annan Plan's proposal on guarantorship issues

- 0 neutral
- 1 supportive
- 2 against
- 99 not mentioned

K (Q4) Point of view on the Annan Plan's proposal on three freedoms

- 0 neutral
- 1 supportive
- 2 against
- 99 not mentioned

L (Q5) Point of view on the Annan Plan's proposal on territorial adjustment

- 0 neutral
- 1 supportive
- 2 against
- 99 not mentioned

M (Q6) Point of view on the plan's proposal on military built up

- 0 neutral
- 1 supportive
- 2 against
- 99 not mentioned

N (Q7) Point of view on the plan's proposal on displaced persons and properties

- 0 neutral
- 1 supportive
- 2 against
- 99 not mentioned

O (Q8) Point of view on the plan's proposal on settlers and immigrants

- 0 neutral
- 1 supportive
- 2 against
- 99 not mentioned

P (Q9) Point of view on the plan's proposal on settlers and immigrants

- 0 neutral
- 1 supportive
- 2 against
- 99 not mentioned

References to primary, secondary and third parties

Q(Q10) Turkish Cypriots

- 1 Cypriot Turks
- 2 Turkish Cypriots
- 99 Not mentioned

R(Q11) Greek Cypriots

- 1 Rum
- 2 Cypriot Greeks
- 3 Greek Cypriots
- 99 Not mentioned

Wording used to describe political entities

S(Q12) wording used to describe Greek Cypriot political entity

- 1 “Southern Cyprus”
- 2 The Republic of Cyprus
- 99 Not mentioned

T (Q13) wording used to describe Turkish Cypriot political entity

- 1 TRNC
- 2 The so-called Republic of Northern Cyprus
- 3 The pseudo state or the occupied territories
- 99 Not mentioned

Primary parties to the conflict, the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and leaders, institutions of

U (Q14) Reference to Cyprus as a whole

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

V (Q15) Denktash

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

W (Q 16) Mehmet Ali Talat

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

X (Q17) Serdar Denktash

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

Y(Q18) Papadopoulos

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

Turkish Cypriot political parties

Z (Q19) Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi) and members of

- 0 neutral
- 1 mentioned positively
- 2 mentioned negatively
- 3 quoted
- 99 not mentioned

AA(Q20) National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi) and members of

- 0 neutral
- 1 mentioned positively
- 2 mentioned negatively
- 3 quoted
- 99 not mentioned

AB (Q21) Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) and members of

- 0 neutral
- 1 mentioned positively
- 2 mentioned negatively
- 3 quoted
- 99 not mentioned

Greek Cypriot political parties

AC (Q22) Democratic Rally (DISY)

- 0 neutral
- 1 mentioned positively
- 2 mentioned negatively
- 3 quoted
- 99 not mentioned

AD (Q23) Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)

- 0 neutral
- 1 mentioned positively
- 2 mentioned negatively
- 3 quoted
- 99 not mentioned

AE (Q24) Democratic Party (DIKO)

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

AF (Q25) Northern Cyprus/Turkish Cypriots /civil society/ NGO's

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

AG (Q26) Southern Cyprus/ Greek Cypriots /civil society/ NGO's

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

AH (Q27) Greek Cypriot Church

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

Secondary parties to the conflict, Turkey and Greece, leaders, institutions, and people

AI (Q28) Turkey

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted

99 not mentioned

AJ (Q29) President of Republic of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted

99 not mentioned

AK (Q30) Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted

99 not mentioned

AL (Q31) Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted

99 not mentioned

AM (Q32) Chief of Staff General Özkök

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted

99 not mentioned

AN(Q33) National Security Council

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

AO (Q34) Head of Parliament Bülent Arınç

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

Turkish political parties and leaders

AP (Q35) AKP (Justice and Development Party) and members of

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

AQ (Q36) CHP (The Republican People's Party) and members of

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

AR (Q37) MHP (National Action Party)

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

AS (Q38) Turkish Civil Society/NGOs

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

AT (Q39) Greece

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

AU (Q40) President of the Republic of Greece Konstantinos Stephanopoulos

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

AV (Q41) Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

AW (Q42) Minister of Foreign Affairs Petros Molyviatis

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

AX (Q43) Chief of Staff

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

Greek political parties and leaders

AY(Q44) New Democracy and members of

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

AZ (Q45) PASOK and members of

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

BA (Q46) Leader of PASOK Andreas Papandreou

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

BB(Q47) Communist Party of Greece and members of

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

BC (Q48) SYRIZA and members of

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

BD(Q49) Greek Civil Society/NGOs

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

Third parties to the conflict

BE (Q50) United Nations and institutions of (Security Council)

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

BF (Q51) Secretary General Kofi Annan, Under Secretary de Soto

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

BG (Q52) EU

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

BH (Q53) European Commissioner for Enlargement Günther Verheugen

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

BI (Q54) USA

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

BJ (Q55) President of USA George Bush

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

BK(Q56) Secretary of State Powell, undersecretary of state Mark Grossman

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

BL (Q57) Special envoy for Cyprus Weston

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

BM (Q58) Russian Federation

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

BN (Q59) Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

BO (Q60) Russian Federation Prime Minister Medvedev

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

BP (Q61) Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

BQ (Q62) Great Britain

0 neutral
1 mentioned positively
2 mentioned negatively
3 quoted
99 not mentioned

BR (Q63) Great Britain Prime Minister Tony Blair

0 neutral
 1 mentioned positively
 2 mentioned negatively
 3 quoted
 99 not mentioned

Other references

Historical references

BS (Q64) Sévres Treaty

0 no (no reference made)
 1 yes

BT (Q65) Lausanne Treaty

0 no (no reference made)
 1 yes

BU (Q66) The Hatay Conflict

0 no (no reference made)
 1 yes

BV(Q67) Ancient Rome, ancient Greece

0 no (no reference made)
 1 yes

BW (Q68)

BX (Q 69)

References to 1974

BY (Q70) Reference to events of 1974 as an invasion by Turkey

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

BZ (Q71) Reference to the events of 1974 as an intervention

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

CA (Q72) Reference to the events of 1974 as Cyprus Peace Operation

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

CB (Q73) References to conflict issues between Turkey and Greece other than Cyprus

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

References to international politics

CC(Q74) References to Iraq

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

CD(Q75) References to US Foreign policy concerning the Middle East and Near
East (e.g., Palestine)

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Legal references

CE (Q76) References to primary law

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

CF (Q77) References to secondary law

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

CG (Q78) References to the derogation issue

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Literary references

CH (Q79) References to Greek Literature

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

CI (Q80) References to Turkish Literature

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

CJ (Q81) References to Cypriot (TR of Gr) literature and folklore

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

CK (Q82) References to World Literature

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Game theoretical references

CL (Q83) References to win-win

- 0 no (no reference made)
- 1 yes

CM (Q84) References to loss of one party, and gain of the other

- 0 no (no reference made)
- 1 yes

CN (Q85) References to loss of two parties

- 0 no
- 1 yes

CO (Q86) Presence of the game theme (also chance games)

- 0 no
- 1 yes

CP(Q87) References to not having an alternative

- 0 no (no reference made)
- 1 yes

Depiction patterns and discrimination

Depiction of parties as an animal

CQ (Q88) depiction of Cyprus as a bird/chicken

- 0 no (not present)
- 1 yes (present)

CR (Q89) depiction of Turkey as a wolf

- 0 no (not present)
- 1 yes (present)

CS (Q 90) depiction of “Yes” and “No” as a snake

0 no (not present)

1 yes (present)

CT (Q 91)

0 no (not present)

1 yes (present)

CU (Q 92)

0 no (not present)

1 yes (present)

CV (Q93) sexual references

0 no (not present)

1 yes (present)

CW (Q94) gender-based discrimination

0 no (not present)

1 yes (present)

CX(Q95) race-based discrimination

0 no (not present)

1 yes (present)

Positive and negative consequences of a “yes” vote

This section assesses positive and negative consequences that are mentioned or suggested as a direct or very likely result of a “yes” vote. Please do always indicate if such references were made in the article or not.

Positive consequences

Positive consequences for Turkish Cypriots

CY (Q 96) End of isolation and sanctions

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Positive consequences for Greek Cypriots

CZ (Q 97) Positive consequences for Greek Cypriots

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Positive consequences for Turkey

DA (Q98) Accession to the EU

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Positive consequences for Greece

DB (Q99) Positive consequences for Greece

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Negative consequences

Negative consequences for Turkish Cypriots

DC (Q100) The withering away of TRNC

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Negative consequences for Greek Cypriots

DD (Q 101) Negative consequences for Greek Cypriots (Continuation of Attila /
Division of the island- formalization of the Invasion)

0 no (no reference made)
1 yes

Negative consequences for Turkey

DE (Q102) Accepting a “give and survive (ver kurtul)” policy on national cause

0 no (no reference made)
1 yes

DF (Q103) Negative consequences for Greece

0 no (no reference made)
1 yes

Positive and negative consequences of a “no” vote

This section assesses positive and negative consequences that are mentioned or suggested as a direct or very likely result of a “no” vote. Please do indicate if such references were made in the article or not.

Positive Consequences

Positive consequences for Turkish Cypriots

DG (Q104) Survival of TRNC

0 no (no reference made)
1 yes

Positive consequences for Greek Cypriots

DH (Q105) Positive consequences for Greek Cypriots

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Positive consequences for Turkey

DI (Q106) Honorable foreign policy

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Positive consequences for Greece

DJ (Q 107) Positive consequences for Greece

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Negative Consequences**Negative consequences for Turkish Cypriots**

DK(Q108) Continued political isolation

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

DL (Q109) Continued economic sanctions

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Negative consequences for Greek Cypriots

DM (Q 110) Negative consequences for Greek Cypriots

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

DN (Q111) Negative consequences for Greek Cypriots

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Negative consequences for Turkey

DO (Q 112) Not being an EU member

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

Negative consequences for Greece

DP (Q 113)

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

DQ (Q114). Unit of Analysis directly taken from another newspaper

0 no

1 yes

Additions to the Codebook

Language usage

DR (Q115) Use of local dialect

0 no

1 yes

DS (Q116) Use of Greek in Turkish language press/ Use of Turkish in Greek language press

0 no

1 yes

DT (Q117) Use of English

0 no

1 yes

DU (Q118) Use of word games

0 no

1 yes

Ideologies

DV (Q119) ultra nationalism

0 neutral

1 mentioned positively

2 mentioned negatively

3 quoted

99 not mentioned

DW (Q120)

0 neutral

1 mentioned positively

2 mentioned negatively

3 quoted

99 not mentioned

DX (Q121)

Reference to Green line

0 not present

1 present

DY (Q122)

Reference to the International Community

- 1 mentioned positively
- 2 mentioned negatively
- 3 quoted
- 99 not mentioned

DZ (Q123)

Christofias

- 0 neutral
- 1 mentioned positively
- 2 mentioned negatively
- 3 quoted
- 99 not mentioned

EA (Q124)

Papariga (general secretary of KKE)

- 1 mentioned positively
- 2 mentioned negatively
- 3 quoted
- 99 not mentioned

EB (Q125)

Konstandopoulos (SYN)

- 1 mentioned positively
- 2 mentioned negatively
- 3 quoted
- 99 not mentioned

EC (Q126)

Religious references/ analogies

0 not present

1 present

ED (Q127)

Ambivalence between “yes” and “no”/ loss-loss situation

0 (no)

1 (yes)

EE (Q128)

France

1 mentioned positively

2 mentioned negatively

3 quoted

99 not mentioned

EF (Q129)

Thoughts about a second referendum

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

EG (Q130)

Anastasiadis

0 neutral

1 mentioned positively

2 mentioned negatively

3 quoted

99 not mentioned

EH (Q131)

Constitutional Court and Referendum Bill

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

EI (Q132)

EJ (Q133)

Bürgenstock summit

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

EK (Q134)

Secret bargain

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

EL (Q135)

Ömer Kalyoncu

0 neutral

1 mentioned positively

2 mentioned negatively

3 quoted

99 not mentioned

EM (Q136)

Partition (Taksim)

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

EN (Q137)

Power struggle

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

EO (Q138)

China

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

EP (Q139)

Taiwanization

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

EQ (Q140)

BDH Peace and Democracy Movement (Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi, Mustafa Akıncı)

0 neutral

1 mentioned positively

2 mentioned negatively

3 quoted

99 not mentioned

ER (Q141)

Numbers and percentages

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

ES (Q142)

Azerbaijani president Aliyev

0 neutral

1 mentioned positively

2 mentioned negatively

3 quoted

99 not mentioned

ET (Q143)

Bülent Ecevit

0 neutral

1 mentioned positively

2 mentioned negatively

3 quoted

99 not mentioned

EU (Q144)

Intertextuality, use of other newspapers

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

EV (Q145)

Legitimacy of referendum

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

EW (Q146)

Hypothetical thoughts

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

EX (Q147)

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

EY (Q148)

Bargain

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

EZ (Q149)

Hellenization

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

FA (Q150)

Give it and save yourself (Ver kurtul frame)

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

FB (Q151)

International NGOs

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes

FC (Q152)

Media propaganda

0 no (no reference made)

1 yes