

WISE PEOPLE COMMISSION THROUGH NATIONAL PRESS
REPRESENTATIONS: A PEACE JOURNALISM ANALYSIS

A Master's Thesis

by

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To everyone whom I consider family



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PEACE JOURNALISM ANALYSIS

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of

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by

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ABSTRACT

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Inclusivity in peace processes is a norm that aims to engage marginalized actors and issues at different stages of a peace process. Previous studies show that inclusivity can contribute to the building of sustainable peace through creating transparency and accountability, garnering public support, and addressing legitimacy gaps. Through its agenda-setting power and mass communication platform, the media can enhance these functions of inclusivity and support the creation of a democratic debate that involves different segments of society. Based on this, this study analyzes how the national press in Turkey represented the activities and meetings of the Wise People Commission, which was a consultative inclusion mechanism that aimed to build a bridge between the public and negotiation parties in the peace process of Turkey (2009-2015). In order to do this analysis, this study uses a coding scheme based on Johan Galtung's

peace and war journalism framework; and finds that peace journalism is overall more dominant in the sample of five daily national newspapers. The findings also suggest that rather than a conscious and knowledgeable peace journalism approach that can support the expected benefits of inclusivity, the news in the sample had a truth-based journalism approach that is driven by political party positions of the newspapers. The elite oriented representation of WPC suggests that the press discourse itself was exclusive to high politics, and this can be detrimental to the functions of inclusivity. Thus, the media debate around the Kurdish issue can be expanded in order to contribute to sustainable peace.

Keywords: Kurdish issue, inclusivity, Wise People Commission, peace journalism, press

ÖZET

YAZILI BASININ GÖZÜNDEN AKİL İNSANLAR HEYETİ: BİR BARIŞ GAZETECİLİĞİ ANALİZİ

Aytemiz, Öykü Deniz

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Barış süreçlerinde kapsayıcılık, ötekileştirilmiş aktörleri ve sorunları bir barış sürecinin farklı aşamalarına dahil etmeyi amaçlayan bir normdur. Önceki araştırmalar, kapsayıcılığın şeffaflık ve hesap verebilirlik yaratarak, halkın desteğini alarak ve meşruiyet boşluklarını ele alarak sürdürülebilir barışın inşasına katkıda bulunabileceğini göstermektedir. Medya, gündem belirleme gücü ve kitle iletişim platformu aracılığıyla bu kapsayıcılık işlevlerini geliştirebilir ve toplumun farklı kesimlerini içeren demokratik bir tartışmanın yaratılmasını destekleyebilir. Buradan hareketle bu çalışma, Türkiye'nin barış sürecinde halk ile müzakere tarafları arasında köprü kurmayı amaçlayan bir danışma mekanizması olan Akil İnsanlar Heyeti'nin faaliyetlerini ve toplantılarını ulusal basının nasıl temsil ettiğini analiz etmektedir (2009 - 2015). Bu analizi yapmak için, bu çalışma Johan Galtung'un barış ve savaş gazeteciliği çerçevesine dayalı bir kodlama şeması kullanmaktadır ve beş adet günlük ulusal gazete örneğinde barış gazeteciliğinin daha baskın olduğunu bulmuştur. Bulgular ayrıca, kapsayıcılığın beklenen faydalarını destekleyebilecek bilinçli ve bilgili bir barış gazeteciliği

yaklaşımından ziyade, hakikate dayalı bir gazetecilik anlayışının odakta olduğunu ve örneklemedeki gazetelerin siyasi parti konumlarından hareketle Akil İnsanlar Heyeti aktivitelerini yorumladığını göstermektedir. Akil İnsanlar Heyeti'nin yazılı basındaki elit odaklı temsili, basın söyleminin yüksek siyaseti merkeze aldığını göstermektedir ve bu temsil kapsayıcılığın işlevlerine zarar verme potansiyeline sahiptir. Sonuçlar, sürdürülebilir barışa ve kapsayıcılığa katkıda bulunmak için Kürt meselesi etrafındaki medya tartışmasının genişletilebileceğini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kürt meselesi, kapsayıcılık, Akil İnsanlar Heyeti, barış gazeteciliği, yazılı basın

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1. CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There has been an increase in the interest for inclusive peace processes as inclusivity can offer ways of incorporating public input to peace processes and is shown to be able to contribute to more sustainable peace (Nilsson, 2012; Paffenholz, 2014; Wanis-St. John & Kew, 2008). However, the benefits of inclusivity are not embedded in the norm itself, but accomplishing these depend on how different inclusion modalities are adapted and employed in a given peace process. Because of this, inclusivity practices require the assistance of various actors from different segments of society for enabling an inclusive transformation from violent conflict to peace, and for creating sustainable peace. The media withholds an important platform in this sense as it can reach different strata of society on a mass scale and it has considerable agenda-setting power to contribute to a democratic, pro-peace debate that allows for public input. Moving on from this platform and power of media, the focus of this study is on the roles that the media can take in peace processes, specifically, its role in supporting inclusivity in a process. This study suggests that media can enhance the functions of inclusivity such as creating public ownership of the process, providing legitimacy to it, increase transparency and accountability, and allow a platform for public buy-in. Yet, it is important to note that media can also take on roles that are detrimental to the peace process, ranging from being the mouthpiece of the parties to the conflict to inciting hatred and violence as in the case of Rwandan Genocide. Then, what can be done on the part of

media to enhance these benefits of inclusivity so that the peace process is owned by the public and made participatory? Here, it is argued that Johan Galtung's peace journalism framework offers a way of assisting a more public and inclusive peace process to media and the press.

In order to explore the potential role of media in supporting inclusivity, this study uses the case of the Wise People Commission that was established to act as a bridge between the public and decision-makers in the peace process in Turkey that was made public between 2013 and 2015. As this was an attempt at inclusivity during the peace process of Turkey, a public and democratic media debate around the Commission and its activities could help expand the debate on the Kurdish question in Turkey, in addition to its potential to enhance inclusivity. Moving on from these, this study aims to answer the following question:

1. Did the press in Turkey adopt a peace journalism approach toward the Wise People Commission and its activities between April-June 2013?

1.1 Inclusivity in Peace Processes

The traditional top-down conflict resolution approaches that are shaped in a strongly high-politics fashion have been problematized for decades by different scholars and practitioners in the field. The seemingly endless escalation/de-escalation cycles in conflicts, the disappointment in the belief that the end of the Cold War would create a more peaceful and stable world politics, and failed attempts at peace have encouraged the students and practitioners of conflict resolution to revise their assumptions about traditional power hierarchies and their reflections in a conflict, and to strive for sustainable peace. This means a bottom-up approach to conflict and peace. For instance, defining peace not only as non-violence or the absence of conflict but as a concept that entails social justice leads practitioners to create

mechanisms that enable reconciliation at a societal level also. Examples of this include Galtung's differentiation between negative and positive peace, Lederach's approach that argues for a framework that makes a differentiation between the need to respond to immediate realities of conflict and transforming the dynamics of it, or the multi-track diplomacy approach by Diamond and McDonald that counters putting all non-governmental activities and issues in the box of Track 2 Diplomacy (Allen Nan & Strimling, 2004). In order to achieve reconciliation at the societal level, there is need for public representation and participation mechanisms that enable various experiences of conflict to be heard and different issues that are mostly subordinated to the immediate realities of conflict to be addressed. Through extending the scope of peace beyond negotiations, security concerns and "power politics" (Lloyd Jones, 2000), this revised approach to conflict resolution allows for the agency of groups that are not conventionally visible and powerful in peace processes such as minorities, women, the youth and civil society organizations.

A recent norm that has developed and evolved to contribute to creating sustainable peace in conflict-torn societies has been the concept of inclusivity in peace processes. Inclusivity refers to "...the degree of access to the various arenas of political settlements for all sectors of society beyond the most powerful (pre-war) elites, either by participating – directly or indirectly – in decision-making, or by having their concerns addressed by the state" (Dudouet & Lundström, 2016, p. 8). In other words, inclusivity refers to the set of mechanisms, frameworks and practices adopted in peace processes to involve and engage traditionally marginalized groups and issues in different stages of the peace process. In 2012, inclusivity in peace processes was also brought up to the agenda of the United Nations Security Council where it was

introduced as a priority direction in peacemaking (United Nations, 2012). The inclusivity chapter of the UNSC report focuses on involving a diverse set of actors in the peace process, ranging from civil society actors and refugees to the business elite in order to create more sustainable peace. It is important to note that inclusivity is not restricted to who takes place at the negotiation table, it can include formal and informal mechanisms that are employed in different stages of a peace process. Because of this, there are different modalities of inclusion that can range from informal consultation practices (Paffenholz, 2015) to national dialogues (Planta, Prinz, & Vimalarajah, 2015). There are various classifications for differentiating between different forms of inclusion. For instance, in their research report that analyzes the opportunities that inclusivity can offer through a case study of six countries; Dudouet and Lundström make a differentiation between process and outcome inclusivity according to which phase of the peace process inclusion took place, and vertical and horizontal inclusivity according to between which actors the mechanism of inclusivity was employed (2016, pp. 8–10). With the help of the literature and their own work with mediation practitioners, Çuhadar and Paffenholz outline seven different modalities of inclusion that are not mutually exclusive: Direct representation at the negotiation table, observer status, consultations, inclusive commissions, high level problem solving workshops, public decision making, and mass action (Çuhadar & Paffenholz, 2017). Here, a framework that makes a classification regarding different forms of inclusion is more beneficial as this study is based on a specific inclusion modality in the peace process of Turkey.

Although inclusivity in peace processes as a norm has been gaining momentum, there are suspicions about how effective it is, especially in regard to the fragility of peace processes. The ones that are more skeptical about the benefits of inclusivity

argue that involving and engaging a wider set of actors and issues renders the stages of the peace process even more vulnerable to collapse, as it further complexifies the process with the inclusion of diverse interests, grievances and demands (Nilsson, 2012; Paffenholz, 2014; Wanis-St. John & Kew, 2008). Yet, many scholars and practitioners argue that inclusivity offers more advantages through its ability to create a sense of ownership of the process by different actors (Barnes, 2002; Nilsson, 2012; United Nations, 2012), provide legitimacy to the process and its mechanisms (Barnes, 2002; Nilsson, 2012; Paffenholz, 2015; Planta, Prinz, & Vimalarajah, 2015; United Nations, 2012; Wanis-St. John & Kew, 2008), allow for public buy-in (Barnes, 2002; Paffenholz, 2015), build trust between the negotiation parties (United Nations, 2012), strengthen the possibility of holding negotiating parties accountable (Barnes, 2002; Nilsson, 2012; Planta et al., 2015; Wanis-St. John & Kew, 2008), and contribute to the transparency of the process (Barnes, 2002; Nilsson, 2012; United Nations, 2012), and previous research has shown that inclusivity contributes to the durability of peace (Wanis-St. John & Kew, 2008; Nilsson, 2012; United Nations, 2012; Paffenholz, 2015). However, it is important to note that in order to benefit from inclusivity, it should not be conceptualized as the mere involvement of previously marginalized actors, but the quality of inclusion and participation should also be considered. In other words, the mere existence of inclusivity modalities is not sufficient for a more inclusive process (Barnes, 2002), and the extent of participation, engagement and contribution to political agreements and settlements by marginalized actors is crucial in order to benefit from the expected outcomes of inclusivity that are outlined above.

Here, it is argued that for these functions and benefits of inclusivity to arise, media holds a crucial platform. Through informing the public about the peace process and

what it can bring, media can address the possible gaps of legitimacy. Furthermore, its agenda-setting power can help it to enhance public buy-in by enabling an environment of discussion for issues that were conventionally ignored or overshadowed by other concerns; and it can act as an observer of the process by making information public, thus contributing to the legitimacy and transparency of the process, in addition to creating a platform for holding negotiating parties accountable through providing information about the process.

1.2 The Peace Process in Turkey

After decades of violent conflict between the Turkish state forces and the Kurdish insurgent group PKK, an offer by high-ranked officials from the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) to start peace negotiations with the PKK was accepted during a National Security Council meeting in 2005 (Özel Tümer, 2016). Signals of this decision were shared with the public by government officials, such as then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's remarks on the past mistakes of the Turkish state to parts of its population (Dilek, 2019). This was followed by another election victory for AK Party in 2007 with considerable votes from the Kurdish population, and secret talks started between the parties in 2008 (Bahçeli & Noel, 2011), which came to be known as the Oslo Talks. Although there was no clear statement shared with the public concerning these talks, PM Erdoğan made remarks about the possibility of "openings" on Turkey's Kurdish question in May 2009 (Sabah, 2009; Hürriyet, 2009). In the same month, PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire, and Interior Minister Beşir Atalay announced that the government is attempting to establish contacts for taking steps on the Kurdish issue (BİA, 2009). This process was named the Democratic Opening at the beginning, and later it was

changed to “Unity and Fraternity Project” in 2010 (Dilek, 2019). In September 2011, a pro-Kurdish news agency leaked a voice recording of Hakan Fidan, who was the deputy undersecretary in the Prime Ministry at the time, and became the undersecretary of MİT later. In the recordings, Fidan is heard negotiating with representatives of the PKK about starting a peace process (BBC, 2011). Although the recording was taken down from the website and the agency stated that it was a cyber attack that caused the recording to be released; the release of the secret talks that were previously vehemently denied by PM Erdoğan caused domestic turmoil, ranging from nationalist reactions against the talks, to what came to be known as the Testification Crisis where Fidan was called to testify concerning the negotiations (Arslan, 2013). Shortly after, the talks were abandoned. Erdoğan stated that the reason they wanted to end the talks was the insincerity and leakage of information, referring to Fidan’s recorded negotiations with PKK representatives (Derviş, 2012). The end of the talks resulted in relapse into violence (Dilek, 2019, p. 10).

In December 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan acknowledged that MİT was conducting talks with the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan in İmralı where he was imprisoned (CNNTürk, 2014). This was followed by the first BDP commission’s visit to Öcalan on İmralı in January 2013 (CNNTürk, 2014). The talks were about the realization of “...PKK’s disarmament in exchange for granting legal and cultural rights to the Kurdish collective” (Çuhadar, 2019). These started the second phase of the talks, and it was the first time that open talks were being conducted to address the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Throughout the peace process, different commissions that consist of government and HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) officials visited Öcalan. Despite significant events such as the Dolmabahçe Agreement (Çuhadar, 2019), the establishment of a Resolution Process Commission under the parliament (Dilek,

2019), and the formation of the Wise People Commission to act as a bridge between the public and negotiating parties; scholars such as Çiçek and Coşkun, Çuhadar, and Dilek argued that a negotiation framework for the talks was never set up (2016; 2019; 2019). Hence, the content of the talks remained vague. Combined with the disagreements over the establishment of a monitoring committee and a parliamentary body, the conditions of disarmament, and regional pressures such as the spill-over of the war in Syria to Turkey (Çiçek & Coşkun, 2016); the process collapsed in June 2015 and violence ensued (Çuhadar, 2019).

1.3 Wise People Commission

On March 19th, 2013, Erdoğan answered questions about the peace process. In response to a question on the possibility of establishing a parliamentary mechanism for the peace process, Erdoğan said “I’ve left the door open to a Wise Men Commission months ago... We are doing work on this with the administration... The men in this commission need to be public figures that are respected individually, but also they should be representatives of organizations...” (Milliyet, 2013). Although his use of “men” instead of “people” was criticized both by BDP and CHP (Evrensel, 2013), both parties were supportive of the establishment of such a mechanism. On the 4th of April, 63 names for the WPC were announced. The members that composed the WPC came from various backgrounds such as journalists, academics, civil society leaders, actors and actresses. Each person was assigned to one of the seven geographic regions of Turkey, and each regional group had a chair, vice chair and spokesperson. Deputy PM Arınç defined the task of the Commission as promoting the peace process to the people of Turkey, and stated that Erdoğan would have a meeting the next day with the members of the Commission (Milliyet, 2013). Following the first meeting with Erdoğan, the members of the seven groups started

their visits in their respective regions, and reached to more than sixty thousand citizens. They have visited or met with organizations, martyr families, universities, and prisons (AA, 2013). During their visits, some groups have faced protests, and some of these protests were disbanded by the police with the use of tear gas and pressurized water (İHA, 2013). The total span of the study took 83 days, including the final meeting on the 26th of June, 2013 where members presented their reports to Erdoğan, and government and AK Party officials.

According to Paffenholz and Çuhadar's differentiation between different inclusion modalities, there are seven forms of inclusivity that can be identified in peace processes: Direct representation at the negotiation table, observer status, consultations, inclusive commissions, high level problem solving workshops, public decision making, and mass action (2017; 2015). Among these modalities, consultative inclusion bodies are found to be the most commonly encountered form of inclusivity in peace processes. Consultations can be both official and unofficial, and can be restricted to an elite group, or can include public participation in the form of forums and public hearings (Çuhadar & Paffenholz, 2019). The Wise People Commission was composed of members from different strata of society such as civil society leaders, academics, well-known figures and aimed to represent diversity in its membership. Its purpose was to listen to the concerns, suggestions and demands of the public, and transfer these to the decision makers. Building onto this, the Wise People Commission can be classified as a consultative body that aimed to increase public buy-in for the process. However, its impact was limited and the public opinion in Turkey remained overall the same (Çuhadar, 2019). Using Paffenholz's summary of potential challenges to inclusivity, the problems with the Commission can be

classified as problems with the selection procedure, public buy-in and legitimacy, and preparedness of included actors.

Problems with the selection procedure: In her briefing paper for the UN high-level review panel, Paffenholz states that the selection criteria and procedures for inclusive bodies matter (2015). The main conflict parties can have a tendency to design this selection process based on the expected support for their position; and because of this, mechanisms where constituents make the selection are the most successful (Çuhadar & Paffenholz, 2017; Paffenholz, 2015). In the case of WPC, the selection procedure was secretive and allowed for the input of only the most powerful actors in the negotiation parties. This can create problems regarding the transparency of the process, and can harden the already existing suspicions about the peace process.

Preparedness of included actors: Paffenholz suggests that the preparation phase could either relate to the included actors' technical abilities to deliver their assigned tasks; or their ability to have coherence in their approach to issues (2015). As not every member was included in the Commission for their technical abilities but also for their public standing, there was a need for preparation and training for the members of the Commission in order to effectively communicate with the public. The lack of such training increased communication problems, and affected the organization and reporting of the field work of each regional group.

The effects of these could be seen in the reports prepared by each regional group. These reports and recommendations by WPC are crucial for their potential role as a “medium” between the public and negotiation parties, or as a “transfer strategy” between the public and conflict parties (Çuhadar & Paffenholz, 2019; Paffenholz, 2015). Transfer strategies are defined by Paffenholz as “...essential to ensure the

inputs of included actors find their way into agreements” (2015, p. 3). The reports by the WPC regional groups aim to present a coherent, structured analysis of public opinion on the peace process, and the reports and recommendations are expected to be transferred to decision-makers. In the case of WPC, the reports were presented to PM Erdoğan and officials from the administration, however, how these reports will be employed in the peace process was uncertain. Furthermore, the reports were not shared with the public, which can pose another threat to the transparency of the process, in addition to the selection procedure. As the transfer process was not designed effectively, the reports of regional groups were mostly very different from each other in their analysis and presentation of findings, which rendered them very difficult to compare (İ. Kaya, 2014).

Public buy-in and legitimacy: The Commission aimed to enhance public support for the peace process, and through this, provide legitimacy to it. However, the above challenges caused the meetings to witness intense discussions and protest, and “...prevalent entrenched views were repeated without a genuine dialogue format” (Çuhadar, 2019). This can be detrimental to the formation of public buy-in and legitimacy, and might even serve as grounds for the existing divisive and polarized views and suspicions to get stronger.

As the negotiations were exclusive to very few representatives of the main conflict parties, the mechanisms that were established to reach out to the public carried even more importance; however, the Commission ended up being very restricted in what it can achieve because of the process design and context challenges that were outlined above. Based on these, this study suggests that the support of media could contribute to the formation of a more democratic debate both around the peace process, and in regard to the activities of the Commission. WPC has failed to create a more inclusive

process on its own, and the platform of media could be very beneficial in supporting the expected outcomes from inclusivity, especially as a transfer strategy.

1.4 A Brief Historical Background of the Press in Turkey

After the War of Independence (1920-1923) and the establishment of the Republic, the single-party rule in Turkey that was led by the Kemalist elite put in place strict regulations and censorship, especially regarding the expression and distribution of Islamic and far-left views and opinions (Uzun, 2014). This media policy was a follow-up of the top-down modernization and secularization model that was followed by the founder of the Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Kemalist elite, and it was combined with nationalist and statist sentiments, which was an approach that was also visibly present in the media sphere of Turkey (Yeşil, 2016c). Although the restrictions were eased and oppositional views were relatively more tolerated by the ruling elite after the 1931 Press Law, the reach of these newspapers were very limited and aimed to take an advocacy approach to current affairs, in addition to speaking to a very small group of educated and politically inclined constituency (Kaya & Çakmur, 2010). Following the switch to a multi-party system, the oppositional Democrat Party (DP) challenged the Kemalist establishment about religious freedoms and liberalizing reforms, and put expanding press freedoms to its election agenda where it became a main point of contention and a partisan issue (Yeşil, 2016c). In 1950, the Press Law that recognized the freedom of press and journalists' right to form unions was passed with the DP government (Kaya & Çakmur, 2010). With increasing industrialization and economic growth, newspaper circulation grew bigger and reached hundreds of thousands with the commercialization of press (Kaya & Çakmur, 2010). However, these newspapers

heavily relied on government subsidies and advertisements, and this allowed the DP to develop clientelistic relationships with certain newspaper outlets and journalists, which negatively affected impartiality (Yeşil, 2016). After ten years in government, the DP was shut down by the military for the declared purpose of protecting the secular structure of the Republic, and its leaders were hung.

Following these years, the persistent economic crises, combined with the flow of advertisement revenue to televisions in 1970s created fertile grounds for newspaper owners to extend their business into non-press sectors (Kayhan, 2017). Another wave of change hit the media among other sectors in the 1980s with the third military coup: Hundreds of journalists were convicted, leftist newspapers were shut down, press unions were weakened, and freedom of speech and freedom of the press were severely restricted with the National Security Council (NSC)'s exercise of control over all publications and communication (Yeşil, 2016). In addition, the Press Law was amended in a way that criminalized the expression and dissemination of thought in languages that are prohibited by law, referring to the use of Kurdish language (Yeşil, 2016). Despite the presence of clientelistic relationships between the governments and the media sector before the 1980s, these were accelerated between the 1980s and 1990s with "...the entry of nonmedia entrepreneurs into the field, the integration of print ventures into conglomerates, and the establishment of clientelism as the dominant mode of operation", and the continuing reliance on government subsidies and licenses resulted in the "...loss of editorial independence and decline in journalistic professionalism, and increase in partisanship" (Yeşil, 2016, p. 35). As Bilge Yeşil notes, the military carved a hegemonic position for itself in politics, and "by placing like-minded sympathizers in the judiciary and state bureaucracy, the military cemented its self-proclaimed role as the guardian of the Republic, while its

leadership established close ties with secular-Kemalist civil society organizations and media outlets, all of which helped to advocate the military's involvement in politics as a means of defending the country" (2016, pp. 52–53).

In this environment, the armed Kurdish insurgency PKK (Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê) was founded by now imprisoned Abdullah Öcalan, and launched its first attack on the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) in 1984 (Al, 2015). Followingly, the military created a securitizing discourse around the Kurdish issue in Turkey where the denial of repression of the Kurdish identity became mainstream, and the Kurdish issue started being framed as an issue of terrorism (Al, 2015). This hardliner and securitizing approach of the military became visible also in media representations, and through its platform in politics, the military came to draw the lines of acceptable and unacceptable reporting around the Kurdish issue. This ranged from phone calls to media bosses about the standards of reporting on the violent conflict between the TSK and PKK forces, to police raids on pro-Kurdish news outlets and criminal investigations on journalists that did not support the hardliner approach of the military (Yeşil, 2016). Despite the change in tone regarding the Kurdish issue with Turgut Özal's presidency in the beginning of 1990s, his sudden and unexpected death was followed by political instability and economic downturn that resulted in a return to hardliner policies regarding the PKK and the resolution of the Kurdish issue.

The persistent political instability with the coalition governments and economic crises brought winds of change once again, and the 'conservative democrat' Justice and Development Party (AK Party) that broke up from the Islamist Welfare Party that was shut down won the 2002 elections. AK Party introduced series of reforms as part of its EU agenda that eased restrictions on press freedoms and Kurdish

communications; however, domestic, regional and international events kept triggering ethnic and statist impulses, which became visible also in the media sphere (Kayhan, 2017). Although the relationship between AK Party and media was not problematic during its first term, the state of affairs started changing with a concentration of ownership around pro-AK Party media outlets following the Ergenekon, Balyoz and KCK investigations that were launched on the military, the opposition media and Kurdish journalists. The investigations resulted in the imprisonment of hundreds of journalists, Kemalist intellectuals and military officials, and caused the Kemalist military elite to lose their political weight (Yeşil, 2016d). Similar to the times that DP started challenging the Kemalist elite, the issue of press freedoms became a partisan issue rather than a debate around democracy. As Yeşil notes, “it was evident that by the end of the decade, new patron client relationships had emerged, political parallelism had increased, and the resignations and dismissals of critical voices from mainstream news media had started to become normalized” (2016, p. 93).

As Raşit Kaya and Barış Çakmur suggest, it is possible to see a strong political parallelism in the media of Turkey that is defined by an alignment with political parties and strong statism (2010). Building on this background, it is in place to give a basic overview of the newspapers that are used in this study as I aimed to represent the mainstream political orientations in Turkey through this sample.

The Kemalist nationalist newspaper *Sözcü* echoes the Kemalist military establishment’s discourse, and aligns itself with the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which is the main opposition party in Turkey that was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It is a center-left newspaper, and the statist and nationalist sentiments are visible in most of its reporting. Because of its alignment with the Kemalist

military discourse, its approach to the peace process was marked by a securitizing framing that is mostly sensational where every step was seen as giving in to the demands of Öcalan and the PKK. Sözcü's publications are done by Estetik Publishing (Bianet & Reporters Without Borders, 2019).

The pro-Kurdish leftist newspaper Evrensel has a Marxist-Leninist orientation and it is published through Bülten Publishing and Advertisement (Bianet & Reporters Without Borders, 2019). Although it is politically far away from AK Party, it was supportive of the move away from hardliner policies in the resolution of the violent conflict, and supported a democratic peace process. In political party terms, it is in line with the pro-Kurdish HDP (Peoples' Democracy Party) that is nowadays criminalized by the government as a "terrorist party".

Yeni Çağ is another newspaper that was against the peace process, and it is published by YeniÇağ Printing House (Bianet & Reporters Without Borders, 2019). It also has a securitizing approach toward the Kurdish issue; however, it is stronger in its ethno-nationalism compared to Sözcü. In terms of its political party support, it aligns itself with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

Cumhuriyet is another newspaper that was critical of the peace process; however, it is a historically more established newspaper that employs professional journalism principles. Because of this, its news reporting is relatively less sensational. It is an oppositional newspaper that is more or less in line with the main opposition party CHP. Its publications are done by Yenigün News Agency (Bianet & Reporters Without Borders, 2019).

Lastly, Türkiye is a center-right newspaper that was supportive of the peace process because of its pro-government position. It is owned by İhlas Holding, which is a

conglomerate that operates in other sectors such as construction, health and education, and has received many government bids (Bianet & Reporters Without Borders, 2019).

1.5 Thesis Plan

In order to see the press position vis-a-vis the Commission and to explore to what extent has it been supportive of inclusivity during the peace process, this study is divided into four chapters. The second chapter presents the theoretical framework and methods of the study. The theoretical framework around the role of media in peace processes, and specifically, how peace journalism can contribute to peace and enhance the functions of inclusivity is discussed, and the limitations of the selected research and data analysis methods are outlined. The third chapter presents the overall findings along with the findings for each newspaper that is analyzed through SPSS, and presents a discussion of these findings. The concluding chapter presents a final discussion, and proposes suggestions for further research.

2. CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODS

This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the study in the following way:

First, it provides a literature review on peace and the media. It is argued that through its mass communication and agenda-setting abilities, the media can contribute to a more democratic and inclusive public debate around a peace process, in addition to its role as a monitoring agent. Secondly, it introduces Galtung's peace journalism into the media and peace debate, and argues that the inherent pro-peace orientation of peace journalism can be adopted as a practice during a peace process to support the transformation from conflict to peace. Lastly, it summarizes the data analysis methods and coding scheme to measure peace journalism in a news item.

2.1 Media in Building Peace

There is rich literature on how media can be used to escalate conflict and violence, ranging from the works on the Nazi propaganda to the ones on Rwandan media and radio's role in contributing to the escalation of the genocide. Yet, the focus on how media can contribute to the process of building sustainable peace is relatively new. There is overall agreement on media's inability to create peace or violence on its own (Bratic, 2006; Deutsche Welle, 2019; Hattotuwa, 2002), and it is difficult to come across studies that attempt to measure the effects of media on peace (Bratic, 2006). Because of this, some argue that the potential relationship between media and peace processes should be further theoretically developed to explore its impact on peace in a more methodological way (Bratic, 2006; Peleg, 2014). An attempt at this

is Vladimir Bratic's employment of media effects theories to clarify the potential impact pro-peace media can have on the audience (2006). Samuel Peleg goes one step further and presents an integrated approach of media and conflict theory (2014) where he combines the situation, attitude and behavior dimensions of conflict with media theory; and encourages researchers and practitioners to build a more concrete bridge between these two strands. This gap in the literature mainly stems from the difficulties associated with isolating the influence of media on individuals, and the effects of media depend on various conditions. In other words, not all audience is affected by the media in the same manner and to the same extent, because the audience is not a passive receptor of information that is provided. The audience also interacts with the information received and variables such as age, gender, pre-existing political beliefs, and personality traits influence the type of media and content people prefer and are exposed to (McQuail, 2009). In other words, the media does not act as a hypodermic needle where it is possible to impose certain beliefs, attitudes and behaviors into the audience (McQuail, 2009). Yet, this does not mean that media's influence is null, rather, it means that "some media outputs influence some people, under some conditions" (Nabi & Oliver, 2009, p.39), and it is overall agreed that media holds an important platform and should be considered as an actor in peace processes (Galtung, 2002; Hattotuwa, 2002; Peleg, 2014).

Firstly, the media can increase transparency and accountability in a peace process by providing information regularly. Through providing information to the public, media can enhance a participatory process (Deutsche Welle, 2019) where different groups of society are kept updated about the peace process. This can also create pressure on the negotiating parties to remain in the talks since the public is informed about the actions of conflict parties.

In addition to media's ability to use mass communication to reach different segments of society, its agenda setting power can contribute to how the public debate around the peace process is framed. Agenda-setting theory suggests that media has the ability to tell its audiences "...not what to think, but what to think about" (Cohen, 1963, as cited in Bratic, 2006, p.8). With this platform, the reproduction of approaches and views that have been detrimental to peace and societal reconciliation by the media can serve as a reinforcer of these views, and the debate around the process might get stuck at a point where different stakeholders repeat entrenched views about parties to conflict and their motivations. On the other hand, a more pro-peace attitude on the part of media that allows for diversity of views and opinions can expand the debate around the conflict and contribute to creating a more democratic approach that considers the complexity of the given conflict. In other words, as media and public discourse affect each other, the introduction of a debate that reflects the complexity of the conflict can have an impact on what is debated among the different segments of that community. In addition, this agenda-setting and mass communication platform allows the media to contribute to public buy-in and legitimacy for actors and issues included in the peace process (Deutsche Welle, 2019; Hattotuwa, 2002).

2.1.1 Peace Journalism

As it was previously mentioned, media holds a crucial platform for supporting the benefits of inclusivity. Inclusivity aims to create legitimacy and public buy-in through involving more actors and issues in the peace process. Media can make the voices of societal actors heard in the peace process and can support the formation of local ownership and public buy-in. It can lay the grounds for creating a more public and participatory process, and it can give voice to the marginalized issues and actors

that are stakeholders in the conflict. However, media can choose to do none of these and even act in a way that is detrimental to the peace process and inclusivity. Which media and journalism approach to conflict and its aftermath is the most beneficial for a peace process? Galtung answers this question by differentiating between two approaches: War and peace journalism. While war journalism is the traditional road that tends to define and analyze conflict through the interests, statements, agendas and actions of the main conflicting parties in a reactionary manner, peace journalism is based on a more inclusive representation of conflict that aims to transform the debate surrounding it. In other words, peace journalism has an inherent preference for non-violence, while war journalism approaches conflict as a zero-sum game and hardens the distinctions between us and them. As Galtung summarizes, the distinction is based on whether the media is focused on the conflict, or its transformation (Galtung & Fischer, 2013). Below, a summary of peace and war journalism orientations are presented through Galtung's writing on peace journalism (2013, p. 98).

Peace journalism is peace-conflict oriented, truth oriented, people oriented, and solution oriented; and war journalism is focused on war-violence, propaganda, the elite and victory. War journalism is reactionary in the sense that it only pays attention to conflict in reaction to an escalation, rather than following the conflict and attempting to shed a light on each stakeholder's position. This reactionary attitude leads to reporting immediate and material realities, but never creates a discussion around the historical, social, economic and cultural reasons that sustain the conflict. The zero-sum orientation of war journalism pressures it into choosing a side in the conflict, and this has the potential to exacerbate the differences between the parties to conflict in the eyes of the public. This us vs. them journalism repeats the truth of one

party to conflict, and can turn into media propaganda as it tends to repeat the dominant discourses that do not have transformative capacity. In addition, war journalism tends to portray the conflict through the eyes of the elite, and this contributes to the invisibility of marginalized actors and issues in the conflict. As elite-based journalism does not introduce a media platform that the public can feel included, it is difficult for it to contribute to more participatory politics. Lastly, its victory orientation entails a focus on winning and negative peace rather than the transformation and reconciliation of conflict, which minimizes its potential contributions to post-conflict reconciliation.

Peace journalism's peace-conflict orientation aims to report the invisible or marginalized effects of violence, and problematizes violence and military as solutions to a conflict. Through reporting on the marginalized issues and actors, it aims to humanize all parties to the conflict and represent the diversity of opinions and issues in conflict. As "...stimuli for escalation are mostly psychological and subjective" (Peleg, 2014, p. 2), peace journalism tries to be truth-based through representing the issues, grievances and atrocities of all sides to a conflict.

Furthermore, peace journalism aims to represent the effects of violence and developments regarding the conflict through the less visible actors such as the youth, women, and the elderly. In other words, it aims to bring an emphasis to the struggles and suffering of all; thus, it is more people-oriented. Lastly, peace journalism is solution oriented in the sense that it tries to take on an active role in the transformation of conflict through emphasizing the structural and cultural roots of the conflict, and focuses on societal reconciliation. Below, a table that presents the different orientations of war and peace journalism is provided.

Table 1: Galtung's Peace and War Journalism Categories, (2013)

PEACE JOURNALISM	WAR JOURNALISM
Peace-conflict oriented	War-violence oriented
Truth oriented	Propaganda oriented
People oriented	Elite oriented
Solution oriented	Victory oriented

As Lee and Maslog have put it, “peace journalism is supported by framing theory” on the theoretical level (2005, p. 313). Although framing in mass communication research has many different definitions and applications, it broadly refers to the process of inclusion and exclusion of certain attributes in the presentation of an event that helps to organize, interpret and represent the mass amount of information. While agenda-setting refers to what is considered newsworthy and thus tells the audience what to think about, framing is about what characteristics of an event are more salient. In McComb’s words, “In addition to providing cues about the salience of issues, the mass media also provide cues about the salience of various attributes or facets of those issues. Not every attribute of an issue, idea, or event in the news is considered newsworthy” (1977, p. 93). Through its eight categories that are on opposing sides, peace and war journalism framing is about what attributes and characteristics of the conflict are emphasized, and thus rendered more salient to the audience. While war journalism chooses a framing that renders immediate and material realities of conflict more salient, peace journalism suggests that information that has the capacity to contribute to societal reconciliation is more salient. This does not mean a complete exclusion of immediate and material realities of conflict in reporting. Rather, as conflict is never restricted to the battleground and the elite,

peace journalism reporting is more about representing and interpreting information in a more inclusive and comprehensive manner, without excluding the narratives and issues that have been marginalized.

Lastly, it is important to touch upon the objectivity debate in journalism with regard to peace journalism. At this time in history, very few would argue that complete objectivity is possible (Cunningham, 2003; Lee & Maslog, 2005) as all information and knowledge is socially constructed, located in history and thus politically situated (Pascale, 2010). Yet, objectivity continues to be a notion that journalists and practitioners still try to ascribe to, and peace journalism can run counter to this expectation because of its proactivity and its aim to take a role in the transformation of conflict. At this point, it is important to remember that there is no agreed upon definition of objectivity, and it becomes a slippery slope especially with regard to issues that involve conflict. Does objectivity require the journalist to provide information about the conflict without any intervention, or does it also entail reporting on all sides of the conflict? If there is no intervention on the information provided, can reporting only about the most visible and immediate realities of conflict be considered objective? If even the selection of what is covered in the news and what is not is an intervention (Lacasse & Forster, 2012; McQuail, 2009), what can be considered as objective reporting of conflict? Furthermore, isn't the journalist already restricted by economic, social, political, organizational and psychological factors that determine what options are available to a journalist in reporting? As there are no clear-cut answers and wide agreement in response to these questions, the conceptualization of peace journalism is not based on the dichotomy of being objective or not; but rather, it is based on truth orientation. As it was explained above, there is more than one truth in every interaction, and conflict is one of the

cases where this issue becomes even more visible. Because of this, instead of the vague principle of objectivity, peace journalism takes the road of reporting on the truth of all sides to a conflict. By doing this, peace journalism allows the media to be considered as an actor that can contribute to transformation of conflict through its emphasis on responsible journalism, rather than treating the journalist as an isolated actor that is objective and impartial. As Ottosen puts it, “the peace journalism section of the model takes a moral and ethical point of departure, acknowledging the fact that the media themselves play a role in the propaganda war” (2010, p. 262).

Previous studies on the issue of conflict reporting have shown that news are far from being an objective representation of events. In Lee and Maslog’s media framing analysis of four Asian conflicts, war journalism was more dominant (2006), similar to Lai Fong’s findings on Indonesia (2009). Studies that focus on the US media during different conflicts such as the Gulf War, the Cold War, Vietnam and Afghanistan (Hussain & Rehman, 2015) shielded similar results in which the media do not act as mirrors of reality, but are politically positioned on one side or the other. Lacasse and Forster’s research on US media position regarding the drug war in Mexico has found a proximity effect: The further away a region is from the border, the more its frames are on the war journalism side (2012). Although there are promising examples of peace journalism such as the case of Sri Lanka (Lee & Maslog, 2005) and Balochistan (Hussain & Rehman, 2015), it is possible to observe that “the interlocking and reinforcing triangle of government, news media and corporate needs works together to further a culture supportive of military adventures...” (Reese & Buckalew, 1995, p. 41, as cited in Lee & Maslog, p.323). In other words, the news media is not objective, and its agenda is shaped by various

factors and restraints such as the organizational policy of the news outlet, the political status quo in a given country, and financial ties of the organization. Although peace journalism cannot curb the potential negative impact of all these pressures, it aims to offer a roadmap to practitioners that aim to take an active role in the transformation of conflict. Through its components that focus on peace, truth, people and solutions; peace journalism offers a “broader, fairer and more accurate way of framing stories, drawing on the insights of conflict analysis and transformation” (McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000, as cited in Lee & Maslog, 2005).

2.1.2 Inclusivity and Peace Journalism

Where does peace journalism stand in relation to inclusivity in peace processes? As it was previously mentioned, this study suggests that media can enhance the following functions of inclusivity through peace journalism: Public ownership and buy-in, legitimacy, and transparency and accountability. Through its public orientation that leads reporters to give voice to the invisible actors and issues of conflict, peace journalism allows for the agency of the public. An elite orientation can reinforce the sense that the conflict and its transformation is an exclusively high-politics issue; however, as all effects of violence and conflict are highlighted through peace journalism, ordinary citizens can see the conflict and its transformation as a concern of theirs. Although peace journalism neither denies the existence of conflict, nor avoids reporting it; it sees non-violence and democratic politics as the road to take when it comes to resolving conflict. With this orientation in peace and solutions, peace journalism can provide legitimacy to attempts at peace and transformation. Lastly, with its truth-orientation that does not present certain truths but aims to cover truths from all sides, peace journalism can increase transparency and contribute to the accountability of the negotiating parties.

Because of these, this study argues that peace journalism presents an opportunity to contribute to societal reconciliation and the functions of inclusivity. It is true that peace journalism or any other media practice is not adequate by itself to resist all pressures. However, it is also true that a zero-sum and elite based reporting on conflict is not the only option. In Lynch and McGoldrick's words, "the question is more about 'what can I do with my intervention to enhance the prospects for peace?'" (2000, as cited in Lee & Maslog, 2005, p.313). In here, it is argued that peace journalism can support inclusivity practices, provide legitimacy to them, and reinforce their effects. It goes without saying that neither inclusivity, nor peace journalism have the power and platform to transform conflict; however, for the benefits of them to arise, there is a need for working hand-in-hand. As conflict and peace researcher Rousbeh Legatis has summarized in an interview with Deutsche Welle, "neither the media nor peacebuilders alone can bring about peace. However, by connecting meaningfully with the other's work, they can create synergies, helping peace processes maintain momentum and reach all levels of society" (2019).

2.2 Methods & Data Analysis

In order to explore the approach of the national press to WPC, this study employs a content analysis of five national daily newspapers with the highest circulation rate from each of the most visible parties/ideological orientations in Turkey: Sözcü for nationalist Kemalism (ulusalcılık), Cumhuriyet for center-left, Evrensel for pro-Kurdish left-wing, Yeni Çağ for Turkish nationalism, and Türkiye for center-right pro-government. This non-random sampling method was chosen to be able to represent different ideological/partisan orientations in the press since different political groups had different positions both on the peace process and on the Commission itself. The content analysis was restricted to the first pages of each

newspaper, and the specified time frame was between April and June of 2013 since this marks the beginning and end of WPC activities in the peace process. All newspaper data was collected from the National Library in Ankara, Turkey. However, there has been an unexpected issue in data collection: Under normal circumstances, this study aimed to use Sabah in its sample since it is the newspaper with the highest circulation that represents the right-wing pro-government position; however, with the spread of COVID-19 also in Turkey, all public libraries and universities were closed. This created serious issues with data collection as it was impossible to get access to many newspaper archives, and although I managed to complete most of my data collection prior to this, a significant portion of the Sabah files were partially corrupt. Since using the remaining news items was going to drive down the sample size significantly, and thus impact the validity of the results; switching to Türkiye newspaper that still has considerable circulation and represents the same political position was found to be more appropriate. Although the initial number of data was higher, there were some items that were dropped from the study as they were not convenient for analysis. For instance, there were many items that were too short to be analyzed with the existing coding scheme; and since including these items could have posed a threat to the validity of the findings, these items were left out of the content analysis. In the end, the sample had 113 news items: Sözcü and Yeni Çağ made up 60.2% of the news items collected; compared to 15.9% from Evrensel, 12.4% from Türkiye and 11.5% from Cumhuriyet.

This study uses an adapted version of Galtung's own criteria for war and peace journalism, which is provided in the Appendices. For peace journalism, the categories were defined as peace-conflict oriented, truth oriented, people oriented, and solution oriented; and for war journalism, the categories were war-violence

oriented, propaganda oriented, elite oriented, and victory oriented as it was laid out by Galtung (2013). A news item's score on a category was measured with the use of two indicators that define that category, and if an item contains the indicator, it was given the score of 1. If the item did not contain the indicator, it was given the score of 0. The score of an item on a given category was calculated by taking the sum of scores on the two indicators that compose that category. It should be noted that categories and indicators are not mutually exclusive.

For war journalism, the categories are war-violence oriented, propaganda oriented, elite oriented, and victory oriented. Below, the coding scheme is explained in detail with a table that shows the indicators and their corresponding categories.

War/violence oriented. For a news item to be considered in this category, it needs to conceptualize the conflict as a distinction between us and them. Conflict is seen in an irreconcilable manner, and the losses of one side are emphasized over the others. This category of war journalism was measured by the sum of scores on the zero-sum understanding of conflict, and revengeful approach indicators.

- a. Zero-sum game: The conflict is presented in a sports game-like manner where victory is the ultimate goal. One party's win is the other's loss.
- b. Revengeful: Overemphasizes past traumas of one party and highlights the need for revenge and payback, targets individuals and/or groups.

Propaganda oriented. A news item under this category is characterized by the intense emotional signals it sends to the audience. It uses an emotionally charged language at the expense of context. This category of war journalism was measured by the sum of scores on the 'vague' and 'sensational' indicators. Vague items contain

anonymous statements that are generalized to a situation, or group. Sensational items aim to appeal to emotions with dramatic, explicit language.

a. Vague: The news item contains claims that lack references, or generalizations of individual statements to groups.

b. Sensational: Stimulates strong emotions such as anger, revenge, distrust, and danger; misrepresents events in order to appeal to emotions.

Elite oriented. For an item to be considered under this category, it needs to give voice to conventionally visible actors of the conflict such as the leaders of the warring parties, able bodied males etc. This category of war journalism was measured by the sum of scores on the ‘uniformity in opinions’ and ‘high politics’ indicators. The former requires the news item to present only one point of view, and it doesn’t matter how many different people are quoted to give the same opinion. The latter refers to the reporting of issues and events only through the statements of mainstream and traditionally powerful actors.

a. Partisan: Gives voice to one party and supports its position on the issue

b. High politics: Gives voice to traditionally visible actors of the conflict, does not mention statements and reactions of other stakeholders to the conflict

Victory oriented. For a news item to be considered under this category, its conceptualization of conflict and its aftermath is dependent on military power and values. The grounds for cooperation are ignored or rejected, and it stimulates suspicions about non-military solutions. This category of war journalism was measured by the sum of scores on the ‘war-military’ and ‘cooperation denial’ indicators. The former refers to the proposal of, or emphasis on war and military as a

solution to conflict, and the latter refers to a presentation of issues that raises suspicions about the possibility and efficiency of cooperation.

a. War & military: emphasizes the need for military victory in order to achieve security, military values and military responses to violence are emphasized.

b. Denial of cooperation: Raises suspicions about the efficiency of non-military solutions, possible grounds for cooperation are either ignored or countered.

Peace/conflict oriented. For a news item to be considered in this category, it needs to problematize war and violence. Peace is seen to be the desired goal to avoid harm to all sides. This category of peace journalism is measured by the sum of scores on a win-win approach to conflict and peace, and humanizing approach or story indicators.

a. Win-win: Grounds for cooperation and peace are established, violent conflict is conceptualized as damaging for all stakeholders.

b. Humanizing: Does not reproduce stigmas about conflict parties and/or stakeholders, does not apply to normative judgments about the person/group. Uses neutral language without demonizing any party.

Truth-oriented. For an item to be considered in this category, it needs to focus on the content of the news, rather than normative meanings of the event. It doesn't use polarizing language. This category of peace journalism was measured by the sum of scores on the 'clear' and 'neutral' indicators. The former requires a given news item to be clear in terms of its reporting, and neutral indicator refers to the use of neutral, non-emotional language in the presentation of events.

a. Clear: All the claims in the news item have clear references, whom said what is clear.

b. Neutral: The language does not contain a strongly emotional language; rather, it informs the reader about the given event without subjective judgments.

People-oriented. For a news item to be considered 'diverse', there has to be at least 2 different views presented in the piece. For the latter, giving voice to the public by reporting their statements is considered to be adequate. A news item under this category gives voice to traditionally marginalized groups. It informs the reader about the positions and reactions of different groups and the overall public. This category of peace journalism was measured by the sum of scores on the 'diversity of opinions' and 'public' indicators.

a. Multi-party: Gives voice to more than one party's position and statements on the issue.

b. Public: Gives voice to ordinary citizens, informs the reader on the positions of individuals and groups that are not traditionally visible and powerful.

Solution oriented. For a news item to be considered under this category, it needs to stimulate interest in non-military solutions by emphasizing the need for discussion, debate, truth and reconciliation. This category of peace journalism was measured by the sum of scores on the 'structural and cultural roots of conflict' and 'cooperation accepted' indicators. The first indicator refers to the attempt of a given news item to desecuritize the conflict by drawing attention to the structural and cultural reasons underlying conflict. The second indicator is about the news item's focus on potential points of cooperation and reconciliation between the main conflict parties or different groups in society.

- a. Institutions & reform: Emphasizes the structural and cultural reasons underlying the conflict, focuses on how these can be reformed/transformed
- b. Grounds for cooperation: Possible grounds for cooperation are identified and discussed.

After each news item about WPC was coded according to these indicators, the sum of scores on each of the journalistic frames were compared. If the score on peace journalism was higher than the war journalism side, the news item was coded as peace journalism, and war journalism was coded if the score on that frame was higher. The news items that had an equal score on both frames were coded “neutral”.

Table 2: Peace & War Journalism Categories, Indicators and Examples

	Category	Indicators	Examples
PEACE JOURNALISM	Peace-conflict oriented	Win-win	“Türkler kazanmayacak diye bir şey yok, hepimiz kazanacağız” (Evrensel).
		Humanizing	“Diyarbakır’daki Nevruz kutlamasında PKK lideri Öcalan ‘Yeni Türkiye, Yeni Ortadoğu’ sürecinin başladığını belirterek mesajında Türk ve Kürt birliğini “İslamiyet şemsiyesi” ile ifade etti” (Cumhuriyet).
	Truth oriented	Clear	“CHP sözcüsü Koç, komisyonu ‘Başbakan’ın memurları’ olarak nitelendirdi.
		Neutral	Akil İnsanlar Komisyonu, 63 kişiden oluşuyor. Listede aydınlar ve sanatçıların yanı sıra, sendikacılar ve kitle örgütü yöneticileri de bulunuyor”(Türkiye).
	People oriented	Multi-party	“...Arınç, başbakanın titiz bir çalışmayla listeyi hazırladığını savundu... İdris Baluken, hükümet yetkilileriyle görüştiklerini, ancak geri dönüş olmadığını söyledi” (Evrensel).
		Public	“Üç aylık torununu gösteren dede, ‘Bugün en çok onun için mutluyum... Herkes, herkesi bağışlayacak’ dedi” (Cumhuriyet).
	Solution oriented	Institutions & Reform	“Türkiye’de tek çözüm siyasi çözümdür” (Evrensel)
		Grounds for cooperation	“Silahlar susacak, siyaset konuşacak” (Evrensel)
WAR JOURNALISM	War-violence oriented	Zero-sum	Teröristbaşı Öcalan adına Türk milletinden helallik istemeleri teklif edilecek mesaj taşıyıcıları, „Ölen öldü kalan sağlar bizindir“ mantığıyla görevlendirildikleri bölgelerde barış turları atacak” (Yeniçağ).
		Revengeful	“İliklerine kadar, nesiller boyu itliklerinin, rezilliklerinin, şerefsizliklerinin acısını yaşatacağız” (Yeniçağ).

	Propaganda oriented	Vague	“Gaziler, ‘Seçilenler akıl değil, taraftır. Gerçek akiller biziz. Bize bir şey soran yok...” dedi” (Sözcü).
		Sensational	“Vatan için canını, kolunu, bacağına verenler hakkını helal etmiyor” (Sözcü).
	Elite oriented	Partisan	“CHP lideri, ‘Çözümün değil hukuksuzluğun karşısındayız’ dedi ve süreci şöyle yorumladı...” (Sözcü) ¹ .
		High-politics	“Başbakan Erdoğan, İstihdamda Engel Yok toplantısında konuştu: Terör enerjimizi tüketemez” (Türkiye).
	Victory oriented	War & military	“Türkiye’de Kürt sorunu değil terör sorunu olduğunun kanıtıdır” (Sözcü).
		Denial of cooperation	“Akiler bir çadır tiyatrosudur” (Sözcü)

2.2.1 Methodological Limitations and Data Analysis

It is important to point out to the fact that the operationalization of peace journalism is very pre-mature, and very few studies have attempted to use the framework of peace journalism in quantitative research (Lee & Maslog, 2006). Because of this, this study is based on Galtung’s own classification of war and peace journalism; however, this classification is not without its problems. The use of more than two indicators could increase the reliability and precision of the measurement. However, this could have required the use of discourse analysis in addition to the quantitative analysis. In fact, the lack of critical discourse analysis in combination with peace journalism is problematized in the literature, and it is offered as a way to improve the empirical analyses of the issue (Ottosen, 2010). As the resources of this study were very limited especially after COVID-19, critical discourse analysis was left out of the

¹ It was not possible to put the whole news item in this table; however, the indicator “partisan” is about the lack of different views and opinions in an article. The news item in this example did not give place to any other views, thus, it was put here as an example.

study. Future studies can integrate CDA in their analysis to improve the methods that are used in the analysis of peace and war journalism.

This study has a relatively small sample size of 113 news items. Although a major part of this stems from the presence of a specified time frame, extending the data collection beyond the first pages of newspapers could have increased both the validity and reliability of results. Further studies into these newspapers, and beyond the mainstream political positions can present a more accurate picture of the media debate. Further studies can conduct a comparative research on the difference between 2013-2015 and after the process has collapsed can show if the frames used during the peace process are consistent.

The selection of print press as a medium poses certain trade-offs. This study uses newspapers in its data collection for two main reasons: the role of newspapers in agenda-setting, and the ability to determine newsworthiness. As McCombs and Shaw has found, newspapers have more influence in agenda-setting compared to television news (1977, as cited in McCombs, 1977). Secondly, it is possible to see what has been considered more newsworthy in newspapers through characteristics such as the placement of the news item on the page, the images that are used, the size of the item compared to the page, and the headlines. Combined with the easier access to newspaper pages, this study uses newspapers as its medium. Further studies can use television news and social media to further analyze the use of peace and war journalism, and can compare the findings with the items in the print press.

Lastly, the selection of most circulated newspapers from the mainstream political orientations does not capture the whole media debate about the WPC and around the peace process; rather, it presents a snapshot of it through the print press. For instance,

there are news agencies such as Bianet that are online and use consistent peace journalism frames in their representation of events. However, these are very restricted in their reach, and restricts their agenda-setting capabilities. Further studies can include these agencies, which would allow going beyond the mainstream political positions, and can capture the media debate surrounding WPC and the peace process in a more holistic manner.



3. CHAPTER 3

FINDINGS

3.1 Findings According to Newspapers

In this part, findings according to each newspaper are presented through the most commonly encountered peace and war journalism indicators. Example news items are provided in order to present the reporting style of each newspaper, to summarize the newspaper's approach to WPC, and to make it easier to understand the coding categories.

Sözcü

Sözcü has been the newspaper that uses war journalism frames the most with 61.1% of all news item coded with war journalism, followed by 25% peace journalism and 13.9% neutral. The most frequently encountered indicator of war journalism is sensationalism with 72.2% of all news item from Sözcü scoring 1 on the indicator, followed by a 58.8% on uniformity in opinions, and 55.6% on cooperation denial. 52.8% of the news published on WPC had a zero-sum conceptualization of conflict, and 30.6% of all items used revengeful language towards the “other”, such as Yeni Çağ's news article that promises to “make them pay for their scoundrel and betrayal”. 27.8% of 36 stories were vague in their description of events and presentation of statements, and 11.1% emphasized military victory as a solution to the conflict. The least frequent war journalism indicator was high politics with 2 (5.6%) of all items having a high-politics orientation. The most common indicator of peace journalism among Sözcü news items were clear (66.7%) and public (44.4%).

11.1% of the news stories used a neutral language in the presentation of events, and 1 item (2.8%) presented diversity in opinions. On the rest of the peace journalism indicators; namely win-win orientation, humanizing language/story, pointing out to the cultural/structural roots of conflict and emphasizing potential points of cooperation, all items scored 0. To put differently, no stories made use of any of these peace journalism indicators in their presentation of events.

Figure 1: Example news item that uses sensational, cooperation denying and vague reporting from Sözcü



³Figure 2: Example news item that uses sensational, public and war & military indicators from Sözcü



Türkiye

⁴Out of the 14 stories published directly about the WPC, there were no items that qualified as war journalism; 11 used peace journalistic

frames, followed by 3 news items being neutral. Out

of all peace journalism indicators, neutral was the most frequent one for Türkiye with

Figure 3: Example news item that uses win-win, public and humanizing indicators from Türkiye



all stories scoring 1 on it, followed by 12

news scoring 1 on clear and 7 stories had

a win-win orientation in its

conceptualization of conflict resolution

and the peace process. 6 stories pointed

out to possible points of cooperation as a

solution to conflict, and 5 stories used a humanizing language towards minorities or

under-represented groups. Out of 14 stories, 2 stories had a public orientation, and 1

story offered diversity in opinions. There were no stories that pointed out to the need

for reforms or offered resolutions to address the structural, social and cultural

dynamics of conflict. Although in the overall no stories scored higher on the war

journalism side, one indicator of war journalism was considerably frequently

observed with 8 of the 14 news scoring 1 on high politics. 2 news stories had vague

descriptions of events and two items were uniform in the opinions they gave voice to

on the issue. Türkiye scored 0 on all the other war journalism indicators.

⁴ Türkiye print newspaper, 19.04.2013, p.1.

Cumhuriyet

Cumhuriyet ranked the second among all newspapers on peace journalism, right after Evrensel with 12 out of 13 of its news items published on the issue being coded as peace journalism, followed by 1 story coded as neutral. The most common peace journalism indicators were firstly clarity and neutrality, with 13 and 11 items respectively scoring 1. This was followed by 3 news stories that offered diverse points of view, and 2 stories that pointed out to the structural and cultural roots of the conflict. 1 item underlined the potential points for cooperation, and an equal number was found on win-win orientation and humanizing language indicators. Lastly, there were no news stories that scored 1 on public, meaning no news items on WPC had a public orientation. The most common war journalism indicator was high politics with 8 news out of 13 having a high-politics orientation in its presentation. 1 news story qualified as sensational, and Cumhuriyet stories on WPC all scored 0 on rest of the war journalism indicators.

Evrensel⁵

Evrensel has been the newspaper that gives place to peace journalism proportionally the most among others with no items coded as war journalism, and 17 out of 18 stories were coded as peace journalism, in addition to one story that is neutral. The most common peace journalism indicator for Evrensel was also neutrality and clarity with 15 and 14 news items being coded as such respectively. Followingly, half of all stories published on the WPC point out to possible points of cooperation as a

⁵ Evrensel print newspaper, 25.04.2013, p.1.

solution to conflict, and 8 items have a win-win orientation in their approach to the

conflict resolution process. 7 stories on the

Figure 4: Example news item that uses win-win indicator from Evrensel



issue point out to the cultural, structural and institutional roots of the conflict and open them to discussion, followed by 6 news stories having a public orientation, and an equal number of stories that use humanizing language. Finally, 4 news stories out of 18 offer diverse opinions on the issue. Although no story on WPC that was published by Evrensel scored higher on war journalism indicators than peace journalism ones; 7 out of 18 stories had a high-politics orientation. 3 news stories

were vague in their references/descriptions, and one story scored 1 on the use of revengeful language. Evrensel news items all scored 0 on the rest of the war journalism indicators.

Yeni Çağ

⁶Out of 32 news items coded between the time span, Yeni Çağ has published stories that are more on the war journalism side with 59.4% of all stories scoring higher on

Figure 5: Example news item that uses revengeful, cooperation denial, zero-sum, sensational and vague indicators from Yeni Çağ

Sözde akıl adamlar "Türk"e kin dolu!..

AKP'nin inrallı sürecini halka anlatmakla görevlendirdiği ancak gittikleri her yerde tepki gören akıl adamların ortak özelliklerinden biri de bitmek bilmeyen "Türk" kını... Bu isimlerin "Türk"e bakışı ve söylemleri, görevleriyle anlam kazandı. Sayfa 9

war journalism indicators, followed by

25% peace journalism and 15.6%

neutral stories. The most frequent war

journalism indicator among Yeni Çağ stories was sensationalism with 56.3% of all items scoring 1 on the indicator. This was followed by an equal 37.5% stories scoring 1 on vagueness and denial of cooperation. A very close number of news were high-politics oriented with 34.4% of all stories scoring 1 on the indicator. 28.1% of all stories on WPC had uniformity in the opinions they presented, and 21.9% of all news item conceptualized conflict as a zero-sum game. Revengeful language was visible in 15.6% of all stories and finally, 6.2% (2 items) emphasized the efficiency of/the need for military solutions. Similar to other newspapers, Yeni Çağ's most frequent indicator of peace journalism was clarity with 62.5% of all items scoring 1. 28.1% of all stories on WPC were public oriented, and 21.9% used neutral language in its presentation of opinions and events. Lastly, one item offered diverse points of view (3.1%); and Yeni Çağ stories scored 0 on all other peace journalism indicators.

Figure 6: Example news item that displays every war journalism indicator except vague from Yeni Çağ⁷



Below on Table 3, the distribution of peace and war journalism categories according to newspapers are summarized comparatively.

Table 3: Peace and war journalism frame distributions according to newspapers

Newspaper/Framing	Sözcü	Yeni Çağ	Evrensel	Türkiye	Cumhuriyet
Peace Journalism	25%	25%	94,4%	78,6%	92,3%
War Journalism	61,1%	59,4%	0	0	0
Neutral	13,9%	15,6%	5,6%	21,4%	7,7%

3.2 Overall Findings

In the sample, 50,4% news items were framed as peace journalism, followed by 37,2% war journalism and 12,4% neutral. Among the categories of peace-conflict

⁷ Yeni Çağ print newspaper, 06.05.2013, p.1.

oriented, truth oriented, people oriented and solution oriented, the most common category was truth oriented with 39,8%, meaning that the news concerning WPC were mostly clear and neutral. The second most common category of peace journalism was peace-conflict orientation with 6,2% of all items falling under the category, which means that only 6.2% of all news had both a win-win and humanizing approach to WPC and the conflict. This was followed by 3,5% of all news items scoring 2 on the solution oriented category, meaning that 3.5% of all items contained both an emphasis on structural and cultural roots of conflict, and an acceptance of cooperation. The least common peace journalism category was people orientation, and only 1,8% of items had both a public and multi-party orientation.

Table 4: Overall peace journalism indicator distributions

Category	Indicators	Indicator Percentage	Category percentage
Truth oriented	Clear	45,1	39,8
	Neutral	73,5	
People oriented	Public	29,2	1,8
	Multi-party	8,8	
Peace-conflict oriented	Win-win	14,2	6,2%
	Humanizing	9,8	
Solution oriented	Structural & cultural roots of conflict	8,0	3,5%
	Acceptance of cooperation	14,2	

Among the war journalism categories of war-violence oriented, propaganda oriented, elite oriented and victory oriented; the most common war journalism category was propaganda oriented with 15% of all items scoring 2 on the indicator. This means that 15% of all items contained both sensationalism and vague descriptions of events. The second most common indicator was war-violence oriented as 11.5% of all items scored 2 on the indicator, showing that these items had both a zero-sum conceptualization of the conflict and WPC's actions, and revengeful language. This was followed by the category elite oriented with 7,1% of all items scoring 2 on the category, which means that these items had both a partisan and high-politics approach to the conflict and WPC. The least common war journalism category was victory oriented with 4,4%, which shows that among all items, only 4,4% contained both denial of cooperation, and an emphasis on military solutions.

Category	Indicators	Indicator Percentage	Category percentage
War-violence oriented	Zero-sum	23%	11.5%
	Revengeful	15%	
Propaganda oriented	Vague	23.9%	15%
	Sensational	39.8%	
Elite oriented	Partisan	28,3%	7,1%
	High politics	31,9%	
Victory oriented	War-violence	4.5%	4,4%

	Denial of cooperation	28,3%	
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Table 5: Overall war journalism indicator distributions

3.3 Discussion of the Findings

In the overall sample's frequency analysis, the dominant journalistic frame was peace journalism. Although this might seem promising at first, a more in-depth look into these findings seem to suggest that this has more to do with the fact that there was an ongoing peace process, and the imperfect measurement of peace and war journalism frames, rather than an intentional journalistic choice that aims to open neglected issues to discussion.

As it was previously stated, the most common peace journalism category was truth-orientedness, and this requires some elaboration. It is important to point out to two issues related to the measurement of the truth-oriented category. Firstly, one should keep in mind that being truth oriented is a simple good journalistic practice, and it does not point to an intentional conflict de-escalatory attitude on the part of the reporter or the media outlet. As peace journalism requires more than truth orientation, the neutrality and clarity of a news item does not present a conscious act to transform conflict and advocate for peace. In fact, when the truth-oriented category is discarded from the measurement of peace and war journalism frames, a significant difference occurs: 53,1% of all items are classified under war journalism. This points out to a need to better define and operationalize the truth oriented category of peace journalism. The second issue is related to this problem with peace journalism: the classification and operationalization of truth and propaganda oriented categories can be problematic (Kempf, 2006; Spicer, 2006; Lynch & Mcgoldrick, 2005; as cited in Shinar, 2007) as the dichotomy of truth and propaganda does not fully capture the complexity of the discussion on journalistic objectivity and bias.

Combined with the lack of proper measures of peace and war journalism frames, the measurement of truth orientation can prove to be quite difficult and open to criticism. In addition to the ongoing peace process, this can explain the dominance of peace journalism frames in the overall sample. An improvement of truth and propaganda oriented categories and its operationalization can offer better results for future studies.

More than 70% of the items had a neutral language when covering WPC, but only 45% had a clear language in their approach. This stems from the fact that the newspapers that were critical of the peace process frequently generalized individual statements to groups without clear references, such as Sözcü's piece on WPC that wrote "Citizens have asked the Wise People: Come talk to us if you have the heart"⁸. Although it might be true that the citizens that were not allowed into the talks had issues that question the legitimacy of the WPC, a peace journalistic reporting around this issue could have emphasized the differences between citizens in their approach to WPC and the overall peace process. Giving voice to only one group's views on the Commission can serve to reinforce the existing views against it, and contribute to the polarization of the debate surrounding the activities of the Commission. It can also raise further questions about the legitimacy of WPC, and impact the public support that WPC aimed to enhance.

The third most common peace journalism indicator was "public" with 29,2% of all items scoring 1 on the indicator. What is surprising to see is that Sözcü and Yeniçağ, the newspapers with the highest scores on war journalism, were the newspapers that made references to public opinion the most. This can be explained with two

⁸ Vatandaş kendilerinden kaçan akillere böyle seslendi: Yüreğiniz yetiyorsa gelin bizimle konuşun!, Sözcü, 7 Mayıs 2013.

interrelated factors in this case: news values and the position of the newspaper on the peace process. News values refer to what is determining in the selection of news, in other words, what is newsworthy. For Sözcü, the protests that took place against the Commission and police use of force against the protesters seemed to be newsworthy because of the newspaper's criticizing position of the peace process. This led Sözcü and Yeni Çağ to frequently give voice to public opinion; however, the presentation of public opinion only focused on the citizens that were critical of the peace process and those that are supportive of it were not mentioned. For instance, although both Yeni Çağ and Sözcü gave voice to veterans and martyr families frequently, the ones that are supportive of the peace process were never included. This might strengthen the perception that WPC is an exclusive mechanism that does not garner public support, and might lead the audience to believe that the ones that were personally affected by violent conflict do not see peace as a viable option. This can reinforce the public opinion that is critical of, or against the peace process. Furthermore, it was also seen that the pro-government center right newspaper Türkiye only gave place to the protests once, and it was in the context of Prime Minister Erdoğan's speech against the protestors. This shows that these newspapers gave selective attention to issues about the Commission according to their political position, and it points out to a need to expand the debate around the Commission and overall peace process beyond partisan politics.

A very small percentage of news have scored high on the rest of the peace journalism indicators multi-party orientation, structural and cultural roots of conflict, and humanizing language/story; and this finding requires elaboration. As it was previously mentioned, although being truth oriented is indispensable to peace journalism, it is not adequate for an item to be labeled as peace journalism. What

differentiates peace journalism from good journalism is its inherent preference for peace, and this requires conscious effort to transform conflict on the part of the media. This is done through employing simple journalistic frames that would prevent demonizing and othering language, and avoiding militarization of political issues. In this case, the very low scores on these indicators that require conscious effort such as offering humanizing story/language, diverse points of view and the structural, cultural and political reasons underlying conflict show us that the newspapers in Turkey didn't really adopt a knowledgeable and active approach towards peace journalism. Rather, most newspapers seem to represent issues to their audience after filtering them according to their own political position; as it could also be seen in the examples of *Türkiye* and *Sözcü*. This means that the audience is rarely, if ever, exposed to different truths that the conflict has created, and such an approach might create difficulties for establishing a genuine dialogue between various stakeholders. Furthermore, it can serve to diminish the effects of WPC activities by reproducing the previously held beliefs about the conflict and conflict parties.

The most common war journalism indicator was sensationalism with nearly 40% of all items scoring 1 on it. Among the newspapers that scored higher on peace journalism, *Cumhuriyet* was the only one that made use of sensational statements, and this was restricted to one item. However, the newspapers on the war journalism side frequently reported WPC activities in a sensational way. The use of sensational statements often referred to martyrs, veterans and civilian casualties; and aimed to stimulate strong emotions through emphasizing the disapproval of these groups of the peace process. In these representations, the use of vague statements that generalize individual beliefs to groups was also present. However in reality, these groups are also diverse in their approach. In fact, even among the families that are

critical of the peace process, the reasons underlying skepticism differ from each other. Through representing these issues in a sensational and vague way, martyr families and veterans are presented as a monolith that all feel and think the same way about the peace process and WPC. The inclusion of veterans and martyr families in the Commission could curb these reactions as it would show the diversity in opinions about the transformation of conflict. When their exclusion from the Commission is combined with the sensational representations of the press, the representativeness and legitimacy of the Commission can be up to debate, especially for the groups that are skeptical of the peace process and its mechanisms. This in turn can act as an obstacle for the formation of a more genuine and profound debate both about the overall peace process and WPC.

Although the position of “public” as the third most common peace journalism indicator might seem hopeful, less than 30% of the news are coded as such. On the opposite end, the indicator high politics turned out to be the second most common war journalism indicator with 31.9% of all items coded with this orientation.

Different from the indicator sensationalism, the use of the indicator high politics is not restricted to newspapers that used war journalism frames. In fact, despite using peace journalism frames more than war journalism, Cumhuriyet is the newspaper that has the highest score on this indicator, and all newspapers frequently had a high-politics orientation. This was accompanied with a lack of diversity in the opinions presented with 28,3% of all items scoring higher on the uniformity of opinions indicator, compared to only 8% that has scored on multi-party orientation. Moving on from this, it can be said that the overall conflict reporting and conceptualization has an elite-oriented approach where most news give voice to the already visible actors/stakeholders and issues of conflict. The inclusion of different views with a

more public orientation could have contributed to a more diversified dialogue during the meetings of WPC, and the discussions between the public and Commission members could have gone beyond the previously held beliefs about the conflict. The presentation of issues and actors in this elite oriented fashion not only prevents the formation of this dialogue, but it also contributes to the perception that the transformation of the conflict is restricted to the high politics realm in which the public has no agency and power. This further excludes the marginalized issues and actors from the debate, and runs counter to what inclusivity aims to achieve.

Another important finding is the relationship between the position of a newspaper on the peace negotiations/process and the journalistic frame preference. The use of peace journalistic frames are much more frequent in newspapers that have a neutral (92.3%) or supportive (87.5%) position on the peace negotiations and peace process. If a newspaper is against the peace process/negotiations, it is way more likely to use war journalism in its stories (60.3%) than peace journalism (25%) or neutral (14.7%). Thus, it won't be wrong to suggest that the more negative a newspaper's attitude is towards the peace process, the more prone it is to frequently use war journalistic frames. Although this seems commonsensical, it should be kept in mind that war journalism refers to how one conceptualizes conflict and its transformation, rather than the position on the peace process; thus, a critical position on the peace process is not the equivalent of having a war/military approach to conflict. At this point, it is important to refer back to the reinforcement effect of media: As it is evident from its name, reinforcement theory suggests that media can serve to enhance and harden the pre-existing beliefs on a given issue. As people prefer media that is in line with their previously held beliefs, it would not be wrong to suggest that at best, the audience of these newspapers that were critical of the peace process had their beliefs about the

conflict and its parties unchanged. In fact, some of the regional reports of WPC referred to the prevalence of this media discourse during the meetings that regional groups have held, and called the media to adopt a more neutral position. These findings can serve to confirm that. In the case of Turkey, this can be critical as the “...core political attitudes of the majority did not change” (Çuhadar, 2019) during the peace process, and WPC aimed to open these issues to debate in order to garner public support and contribute to societal reconciliation.

It was also seen that there were significant differences between newspapers in their frequency of reporting on the Commission and its activities. The newspapers that had the most items on WPC were Sözcü and Yeni Çağ, which were against the peace process and are the newspapers that preferred war journalism framing. These newspapers mostly focused on the exclusivity of the Commission, and often made remarks about its lack of representativeness and legitimacy because of its selection procedures. The newspapers that were supportive of the peace process rarely reported on WPC, and most news had very little information on what was discussed in the meetings. A more informative approach to WPC meetings and activities could create an alternative media discourse around WPC that is not dominated by the critical positions on the peace process, and could highlight possible points for building a bridge between the negotiation parties and the overall public. As WPC was the only inclusivity mechanism in this peace process that was highly restricted to the Turkish and Kurdish elite, reporting on its activities more frequently by pro-peace newspapers could help the WPC to expand the debate beyond its meetings. The lack of this caused the press debate around the Commission to be dominated by sensational and critical attitudes.

When the findings according to each newspaper are analyzed, a general definition of the dominant approach in the newspapers can be outlined. Being the newspaper with the highest number of war journalistic items, Sözcü was defined particularly by its sensational attitude that tends to present the issues from a uniform point of view. In addition, it has a tendency to conceptualize conflict as a zero-sum game where every step in the peace process is considered to be giving in to Öcalan and PKK. Yet, its public approach is also one of its defining characteristics. Following Sözcü, Yeni Çağ is another newspaper that had a dominant war journalistic approach. Although sensationalism was present in more than half of the items that were collected from Yeni Çağ, it has considerably high scores on vagueness of its stories/language, and its cooperation denying attitude. Going more on the peace journalism side, Türkiye is defined by its neutrality, clarity and win-win orientation. However; its lack of emphasis on the structural and cultural roots of conflict (0 items), and the visibly low score it obtained on diversity of opinions (1 item) shows that Türkiye's position was steered more by a partisan preference rather than a conscious peace journalism attitude. The second highest on peace journalism was Cumhuriyet, and its peace journalism was defined by its clarity, neutral language, and its considerably more diverse attitude compared to the other newspapers. Yet, it is also important to note that it was considerably lower than other items on peace journalism framing with its tendency to accept cooperation, and it had the most items with a high-politics orientation. The former might be the result of Cumhuriyet's hesitance on the process because of its structure and implementation; yet, its high-politics orientation shows that it follows the footsteps of mainstream conflict reporting when it comes to what and who is made visible. The last, and the most "model-like" in terms of peace journalism in this sample is Evrensel with the highest number of items that were

defined as peace journalistic. Different from other newspapers that have also scored higher on the peace journalism side, Evrensel has not scored 0 on any of the peace journalism indicators. To put differently, every indicator of peace journalism was encountered at least a few times among Evrensel's news items, which already puts it ahead of the other newspapers in terms of its consciousness in adopting a peace journalistic approach. Its peace journalism was defined by its reference to the structural and cultural roots of conflict, cooperation acceptance and diversity in the points of views offered to the audience. Although its score on public is the second highest among all newspapers, that score is still lower than the score Evrensel has on high-politics; which points out to a need for more emphasis on the issues and people that are made invisible in the traditional approach to conflict and its reporting.

3.4 Conclusion

In the overall sample, peace journalism was more dominant than war journalism. Although this can be the result of the ongoing peace process at the time, this finding can be promising when one considers how fractured and polarised Turkey is on the Kurdish question. However, when a more in-depth analysis of the findings is conducted, it is possible to see that the peace journalism framing was dominated by truth orientation, rather than more conscious elements of peace journalism such as the use of humanizing story and language, and references to the historical and structural roots of conflict. This was followed by sensationalism, a high politics approach, and a lack of diversity of opinions in the presentation of events. In addition, it was possible to see that the overall representation of WPC lacked detail as there were very few items that referred to the content of the meetings of WPC. These show that although the overall representation of events was not propaganda oriented, there was very little effort by these newspapers to contribute to societal

reconciliation with the exception of Evrensel. Taken all together, it can be said that rather than enabling an environment for a more democratic and participatory debate, the newspapers were leaning towards reproducing the pre-existing core political attitudes according to their own organizational and political positions.

Despite the high scores of all newspapers on the peace journalism indicator clarity, the dominant peace journalism indicators differed from one newspaper to another. For instance, while Cumhuriyet was defined more by its clarity, neutral language and diversity; Evrensel was higher on its emphasis on the structural and cultural roots of conflict and the possible points for cooperation. Out of the three newspapers that have scored higher on the peace journalism side, Türkiye's peace journalism seems to be overshadowed by its pro-government political position that was visible both in its significantly low score on the diversity of views that were offered, and its lack of emphasis on the structural and cultural roots of conflict. Similarly, the newspapers that scored higher on the war journalism Sözcü and Yeni Çağ put emphasis on different indicators, such as sensationalism, vagueness and uniformity in the opinions presented. The war journalism indicator high politics was most frequent in news items that are from peace journalistic newspapers, which shows that the overall news reporting was dominated by an exclusive approach where the public is mostly not given voice.

The statistically significant relationship between the position of a newspaper on the peace process and its preference for peace or war journalism framing tells that the newspapers that were against the peace process did not adopt a constructive approach towards the WPC, but preferred sensational reporting on the issue to stimulate strong emotions. As these newspapers reported on WPC and its activities considerably more than the newspapers that preferred peace journalism, it would not be wrong to

suggest that the press debate around the WPC was dominated by sensational attitudes that disregard the complexity of the conflict and its transformation.

This chapter has summarized the findings both according to different newspapers and war and peace journalism indicators. Although the Commission and the media would not be able to establish peace and ensure a more inclusive process by themselves, a more conscious pro-peace approach by the media could have allowed the activities of the Commission to reach different segments of society, and expand the debate around the peace process. In this sample, it was found that the press debate was defined by its truth orientation on the peace journalism side, and sensational and elite oriented approach on the war journalism side. This shows that there is an evident need for creating a more inclusive and public journalism that reflects the diversity of all groups in the conflict. When this is taken into account together with the lack of detail in the representation of WPC and its activities, it can be said that the media debate around the Commission has not helped it to gain legitimacy. Furthermore, the very limited number of news that were reported on WPC by newspapers that were supportive of the peace process might have contributed to the lack of public buy-in for the Commission. Finally, the tendency of newspapers to report events according to their own political positions might have served to restrict the debate to the pre-existing beliefs and attitudes about the conflict, which has also reflected on the discussions of WPC.

4. CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

As it was explained in the introduction of this study, this is a humble attempt to draw attention to media's potential role in peace processes and inclusivity. Inclusivity aims to contribute to sustainable peace through creating representation, legitimacy, public buy-in and participation; and achieving these requires more than the communication between the main conflict parties. When the aim is to create public and inclusive mechanisms, the platform of media is crucial in order to communicate with the masses and reinforce their participation in the process. In this study, it was argued that the cooperation of media could further enhance these functions of inclusivity, and Galtung's peace and war journalism framework can serve as a roadmap for media professionals to adopt a conscious pro-peace attitude that can reinforce the benefits of inclusivity. Through an analysis of the national press representation of the Wise People Commission that was established as a consultative inclusion modality during the peace process of Turkey, this study aimed to investigate the approach of national press to this inclusion modality with the use of Galtung's peace and war journalism framework. This last chapter aims to summarize the findings of this study, and the conclusions that were drawn from the analysis.

Inclusivity aims to integrate the conventionally marginalized issues and actors of conflict into the transformation from violent conflict to peace. Inclusivity can increase the sense of public ownership of the process and contribute to public buy-in, and it can enhance the sustainability of peace through its ability to address grievances

of marginalized groups that can act as spoilers. Inclusion can take on different forms, and this study has used Paffenholz's distinction between different inclusion modalities. According to this differentiation, the Wise People Commission was set up as a consultative mechanism to enhance public buy-in and legitimacy for the peace process; however, the Commission remained restricted in its ability to accomplish this. Alongside other reasons related to the organization and structure of the peace process, problems with the Commission's selection procedures, and the lack of training for the included actors have contributed to the limitations of the Commission. In here, it was argued that a conscious and knowledgeable application of peace journalism could have helped with these aims of the Commission. In order to explore if media has taken on this supportive role, five daily national newspapers that represent different political positions were chosen, and their adoption of war and peace journalism frames was analyzed.

While peace journalism is defined by its orientations in peace, truth, people, and solutions; war journalism is defined by war/violence, propaganda, elite, and victory orientations at the opposite side. Peace journalism problematizes the mainstream media approach to conflict that is reactive and focused on material realities, and aims to display the complexity of conflict and the need for its transformation through its four pillars. Thus, it has a pro-peace orientation that avoids demonization of conflict parties, and aims to bring the invisible effects of violence to the surface through its focus on marginalized issues and actors that have been affected by violent conflict. Through its solution and people orientedness, peace journalism abstains from militarization of political issues and puts emphasis on the structural, historical and cultural roots of conflict. Considered together with the platform of media that can reach different strata of society, and its agenda setting power; a conscious application

of peace journalism could have supported the Commission in garnering public support, extending the debate beyond the entrenched views of the public, familiarizing different sides with each other's truths, humanizing the stakeholders, highlighting the possible points of cooperation, and giving voice to the marginalized issues and actors. Alongside these, the media representation of the Commission could contribute to the legitimacy of its actions, and allow the creation of a platform for public participation. Yet, the absence of these and the dominance of war journalism can be detrimental to the process and inclusivity mechanisms. When media does not adopt a public approach to the process, when war journalism remains the mainstream approach to conflict; media's role as a mass communicator can work against the functions and purposes of inclusivity by excluding the narratives, experiences, grievances, suggestions and demands of the ones that inclusivity aims to engage in the peace process, and denies them representation and participation even further. In addition to silencing the addressees of conflict, this high politics orientation perpetuates the understanding that conflict and peace belong in the realm of high politics where nobody else is included and given agency.

In the case of national press approach to the Commission, the dominant frame was peace journalism, and the most common indicators were clarity and neutrality in the representation of events. Although these indicators are indispensable to peace journalism, the mere existence of this truth orientation can be easily equated with professional journalism; thus, it is not sufficient by itself to define the media approach to conflict as peace oriented. In this sample, it was difficult to come across elements of peace journalism that can contribute to societal reconciliation; such as references to the structural, cultural and historical roots of conflict, and the employment of humanizing stories and language. Furthermore, the newspapers on

the peace journalism side have made use of stories that give voice to the elite more than the public and marginalized actors. While Cumhuriyet, a newspaper on the peace journalism side, had the highest scores on high politics; Türkiye was defined by a lack of diversity in the opinions it presented. Evrensel was the closest to a conscious application of peace journalism as it made use of every peace journalism indicator in its news; however, its score on high politics was equally significant. On the war journalism side, both Sözcü and Yeni Çağ frequently made use of sensational statements that often made references to martyrs and veterans. This discourse could have been easily countered with the inclusion of pro-peace martyr families and veterans in the Commission, which points out to one of the problems associated with the selection procedures of the Commission. Although these newspapers on the war journalism side gave considerably more platform to public opinion, the diversity of public opinion on peace and how to achieve it was disregarded and only those that were critical of the peace process were reported. The statistically significant relationship between the position of a newspaper on the peace process and its preference for war and peace journalism has shown that newspapers that are critical of the peace process tend to portray the issues associated with the Commission from a war journalism perspective. Lastly, it was seen that there were very few references to the substance of the meetings and discussions of the Commission, which can act as an obstacle on the way to informing the public and expanding discussions of the Commission to different segments of society, in addition to a potential negative impact on the public support that the Commission has received.

In this study, it was seen that the overall press debate around the Commission does not have a knowledgeable and conscious peace journalism approach. The lack of diversity in the opinions presented by newspapers show that the press debate is

shaped mostly according to the partisan position of the organization. This lack of diversity in opinions has caused different stakeholders that have been affected by conflict to be represented as uniform groups of people, and this can act as an impediment to their humanization in the eyes of others. Furthermore, it has caused previously held beliefs to be repeated in the newspapers, and the repetition of these entrenched views were present also in the discussions of the WPC, which has affected the members' ability to establish a dialogue that can be extended beyond these views. The lack of references to the structural, cultural, and historical roots of conflict and the use of humanizing stories and language show that the press remained limited in its ability to transform the debate around the peace process. It was also seen that the newspapers that are critical of the peace process reported on WPC considerably more than the newspapers that were neutral or supportive of it. As the newspapers that were critical of the peace process ended up on the war journalism side, it would not be wrong to suggest that the press debate around the Commission was dominated by sensational attitudes and slogans rather than an attempt to create a democratic and public discussion. This can affect how informed the public is on the activities and purposes of the Commission, and it can have a negative impact on the public support that the Commission has received.

In summary, despite the dominance of peace journalism frames, the press debate around the Commission has not gone beyond partisan concerns for the most part. Although the criticisms against the Commission could have been legitimate, they were not expressed in a constructive manner that could create a democratic debate, but sensational and slogan-like approaches were common. This could reinforce the arguments about the conflict that have been detrimental to its transformation, and it is likely that such a debate has not contributed to societal reconciliation, in addition

to public buy-in and legitimacy for the Commission. In addition to media's potential negative impact, the findings of the Commission were not shared with the public, and it was not clear how these findings were going to be employed outside of the activities of the Commission. Thus, it is possible to suggest that the Commission remained very limited in its public impact, and the media has not been supportive of this inclusion modality in a conscious and constructive manner.

As it was stated before, the literature on peace and war journalism needs to be developed theoretically and practically. The operationalization of these frames is still pre-mature, and future studies can develop better measurement methods especially for the truth and propaganda orientation categories. Furthermore, there is a need to measure the impact of peace and war journalism frames on the audience. Further studies into the topic can conduct research on the audience to see if the media discourse matches the discourse of the audience. It is also important to conduct more research on intrastate conflict, as most studies on peace and war journalism were concerned with interstate conflict and its representation. Another research direction can be concerning the Turkish case. This study used only Evrensel to represent the pro-Kurdish side's discourse; however, the Kurdish block is much more diverse than what was captured in this study. An analysis into the Kurdish media can generate enlightening results, and would provide a better representation of the Kurdish side.

This study has attempted to point to a possible bridge between media and inclusivity mechanisms, and suggested that a peace journalism dominant media can enhance the benefits of inclusivity through its emphasis on peace, truth, people and solutions. Specifically, it was suggested that a conscious application of peace journalism can contribute to public buy-in and legitimacy, which are indispensable to a peace process as it is very difficult to build sustainable peace without these. The findings of

the study has shown that the press in Turkey did not adopt such an approach, and hopefully, these attempts and the insights generated from this study can serve as a roadmap in the upcoming peace negotiations in Turkey that can offer hope for societal reconciliation.



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APPENDICES

Appendix A. GALTUNG'S PEACE AND WAR JOURNALISM OPERATIONALIZATION

The following table is taken from Galtung's own article on peace and war journalism(2013), and presents how the operationalization of peace and war journalism was done in this study.

Peace/conflict journalism	War/violence journalism
I. Peace/conflict-oriented explore conflict <i>formation</i> , x parties, y goals, z issues general 'win, win' orientation open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture making conflicts transparent giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding see conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapons <i>proactive</i> : prevention before any violence/war occurs focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture) II. Truth-oriented expose untruths on all sides uncover all cover-ups III. People-Oriented focus on suffering all over; on women, aged, children, giving voice to the voiceless give name to all evil-doers focus on people peace-makers IV. Solution-oriented peace = nonviolence + creativity highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war focus on structure, culture the peaceful society aftermath: resolution, re-construction, reconciliation	I. War/violence-oriented focus on conflict <i>arena</i> , 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war general zero-sum orientation closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone making wars opaque/secret 'us-them' journalism, propaganda, voice, for 'us' see 'them' as the problem, focus on who prevails in war dehumanization of 'them'; more so the worse the weapon <i>reactive</i> : waiting for violence before reporting focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, wounded and material damage) II. Propaganda-oriented expose 'their' untruths help 'our' cover-ups/lies III. Elite-Oriented focus on 'our' suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece give name of their evil-doer focus on elite peace-makers IV. Victory-oriented peace = victory + cease-fire conceal peace-initiative, before victory is at hand focus on treaty, institution the controlled society leaving for another war, return if the old flares up

Appendix B. CODEBOOK FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPERS

Inclusivity, when reduced to its simplest and broadest terms, can be defined as the inclusion and involvement of conventionally marginalized groups, actors, and issues in different stages of peace processes; and it was declared as a ‘priority direction’ for peace making at United Nations Security Council General Assembly in 2012 (United Nations, 2012). Studies show that succesful practices of inclusivity can contribute to the legitimacy of a process and create public buy-in, and thus contribute significantly to the sustainability of the resulting peace (Barnes, 2002; Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008; Paffenholz, 2015); yet, most processes are still marked by their exclusivity. Johan Galtung suggests that this continues to be the case in media representations of conflict and its aftermath, and offers ‘peace journalism’ as a peace, truth, people and solution oriented type of journalism. As media holds a crucial platform for many functions of inclusivity, but especially for legitimacy and public buy-in, how media contributes to, or challenges, inclusivity practices and an overall peace process becomes a crucial question, especially regarding the creation of a pro-peace constituency.

Followingly, this study analyzes the representation of Wise People Commission, an inclusivity mechanism in the 2013-2015 peace process of Turkey, in print press in order to realize the approach of press to this mechanism, and how this approach was transferred to the audience. To do so, news between April and June 2013 regarding the WPC are collected from five national daily newspapers; and each news item is coded according to Galtung’s peace journalism framework that has eight categories.

Each category consists of two indicators, and if a given news item complies with one of the indicators, it is given a score of 1; if not, 0. The overall score on one of the categories is then calculated by taking the average of scores.



1. War-violence oriented: For a news item to be considered in this category, it needs to conceptualize the conflict as a distinction between us and them. Conflict is seen in an irreconcilable manner, and the losses of one side are emphasized over the others.
 - a. Zero-sum game: One party's win is other's loss, military values and military responses to violence are emphasized.
 - b. Revengeful: Overemphasizes past traumas of one party and highlights the need for revenge and payback, targets individuals and/or groups.
2. Peace-conflict oriented: For a news item to be considered in this category, it needs to problematize war and violence. Peace is seen to be the desired goal to avoid harm to all sides.
 - a. Win-win: Grounds for cooperation and peace are established, conflict is conceptualized as damaging for all stakeholders.
 - b. Humanizing: Doesn't reproduce stigmas about conflict parties and/or stakeholders, does not apply to normative judgments about the person/group.
3. Propaganda oriented: A news item under this category is characterized by the intense emotional signals it sends to the audience. It uses an emotionally charged language at the expense of context.
 - a. Vague: The news item contains claims that lack references, or generalizations of individual statements to groups.
 - b. Sensational: Stimulates strong emotions such as anger, revenge, distrust, and danger; misrepresents events in order to appeal to emotions.
4. Truth oriented: For an item to be considered in this category, it needs to focus on the content of the news, rather than normative meanings of the event. It doesn't use polarizing language.

- a. Clear: All the claims in the news item have clear references, whom said what is clear.
 - b. Neutral: The language does not contain a strongly emotional language; rather, it informs the reader about the given event without subjective judgments.
- 5. Elite oriented: For an item to be considered under this category, it needs to give voice to conventionally visible actors of the conflict such as the leaders of the warring parties, able bodied males etc.
 - a. Partisan: Gives voice to one political party and its position on the issue
 - b. High politics: Gives voice to traditionally visible actors of the conflict, does not mention statements and reactions of other stakeholders to the conflict
- 6. People oriented: A news item under this category gives voice to traditionally marginalized groups. It informs the reader about the positions and reactions of different groups.
 - a. Multi-party: Gives voice to more than one political party's position and statements on the issue
 - b. Public: Gives voice to ordinary citizens, informs the reader on the positions of individuals and groups that are not traditionally visible and powerful
- 7. Victory oriented: For a news item to be considered under this category, its conceptualization of conflict and its aftermath is dependent on military power and values. The grounds for cooperation are ignored or rejected, and it stimulates suspicions about non-military solutions.
 - a. War & military: Raises suspicions about the efficiency of non-military solutions, emphasizes the need for military victory
 - b. Denial of cooperation: Possible grounds for cooperation are either ignored or countered.

8. Solution oriented: For a news item to be considered under this category, it needs to stimulate interest in non-military solutions by emphasizing the need for discussion, debate, truth and reconciliation.
 - a. Institutions & reform: Emphasizes the structural and cultural reasons underlying the conflict, focuses on how these can be reformed/transformed
 - b. Grounds for cooperation: Possible grounds for cooperation are identified and discussed.



War-violence oriented	Zero sum	Teröristbaşı Öcalan adına Türk milletinden helallik istemeleri teklif edilecek mesaj taşıyıcıları, „Ölen öldü kalan sağlar bizimdir“ mantığıyla görevlendirildikleri bölgelerde barış turları atacak” (Yeniçağ).
	Revengeful	“İliklerine kadar, nesiller boyu itliklerinin, rezilliklerinin, şerefsizliklerinin acısını yaşatacağız” (Yeniçağ).
Peace- conflict oriented	Win-win	“Türkler kazanmayacak diye bir şey yok, hepimiz kazanacağız” (Evrensel).
	Humanizing	“Diyarbakır’daki Nevruz kutlamasında PKK lideri Öcalan ‘Yeni Türkiye, Yeni Ortadoğu’ sürecinin başladığını belirterek mesajında Türk ve Kürt birliğini „İslamiyet şemsiyesi“ ile ifade etti” (Cumhuriyet).
Propaganda oriented	Vague	“Gaziler, ‘Seçilenler akil değil, taraftır. Gerçek akıllar biziz. Bize bir şey soran yok...” dedi” (Sözcü).
	Sensational	“Vatan için canını, kolunu, bacağı verenler hakkını helal etmiyor” (Sözcü).
Truth oriented	Clear	“CHP sözcüsü Koç, komisyonu ‘Başbakan’ın memurları’ olarak nitelendirdi.
	Neutral	Akil İnsanlar Komisyonu, 63 kişiden oluşuyor. Listede aydınlar ve sanatçıların yanı sıra, sendikacılar ve kitle örgütü yöneticileri de bulunuyor”(Türkiye).
Elite oriented	Partisan	“CHP lideri, ‘Çözümün değil hukuksuzluğun karşısındayız’ dedi ve süreci şöyle yorumladı...” (Sözcü).

	High politics	“Başbakan Erdoğan, İstihdamda Engel Yok toplantısında konuştu: Terör enerjimizi tüketemez” (Türkiye).
People oriented	Multi-party	“...Arınç, başbakanın titiz bir çalışmayla listeyi hazırladığını savundu... İdris Baluken, hükümet yetkilileriyle görüştiklerini, ancak geri dönüş olmadığını söyledi” (Evrensel).
	Public	“Üç aylık torununu gösteren dede, ‘Bugün en çok onun için mutluyum... Herkes, herkesi bağışlayacak’ dedi” (Cumhuriyet).
Victory oriented	War & violence	“Türkiye’de Kürt sorunu değil terör sorunu olduğunun kanıtıdır” (Sözcü).
	Denial of cooperation	“Akiller bir çadır tiyatrosudur” (Sözcü)
Solution oriented	Institutions & reform	“Türkiye’de tek çözüm siyasi çözümdür” (Evrensel)
	Grounds for cooperation	“Silahlar susacak, siyaset konuşacak” (Evrensel)

Appendix C. SPSS SYNTAX FOR THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

This syntax can be copied and pasted into SPSS to see the results of the tests that were ran.

```
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet2.
```

```
COMPUTE Warviolenceorientation=MEAN(zerosumgame, revengeful).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
COMPUTE peaceconflictoriented=MEAN(winwin, humanizing).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
COMPUTE propagandaoriented=MEAN(vague, sensational).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
COMPUTE truthoriented=MEAN(clear, neutral).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
COMPUTE elite_oriented=MEAN(partisan, highpolitics).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
COMPUTE people_oriented=MEAN(multiparty, public).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
COMPUTE victory_oriented=MEAN(war_military, cooperation_denial).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

```
COMPUTE solution_oriented=MEAN(institutions_reform, cooperation_accepted).
```

```
EXECUTE.
```

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=zerosumgame revengeful winwin humanizing clear neutral
vague sensational

uniformity highpolitics diversity public war_military cooperation_denial
institutions_reform

cooperation_accepted

/STATISTICS=MEAN MEDIAN MODE SUM

/BARCHART FREQ

/ORDER=ANALYSIS.

CROSSTABS

/TABLES=revengeful BY zerosumgame

/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES

/STATISTICS=CHISQ PHI

/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED COLUMN

/COUNT ROUND CELL.

CROSSTABS

/TABLES=humanizing BY winwin

/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES

/STATISTICS=CHISQ PHI

/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED COLUMN

/COUNT ROUND CELL.

CROSSTABS

/TABLES=neutral BY clear

/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=CHISQ PHI
/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED COLUMN
/COUNT ROUND CELL.

CROSSTABS

/TABLES=sensational BY vague
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=CHISQ PHI
/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED COLUMN
/COUNT ROUND CELL.

CROSSTABS

/TABLES=highpolitics BY uniformity
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=CHISQ PHI
/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED COLUMN
/COUNT ROUND CELL.

CROSSTABS

/TABLES=diversity BY public
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=CHISQ PHI
/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED COLUMN
/COUNT ROUND CELL.

CROSSTABS

```
/TABLES=cooperation_denial BY war_military  
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES  
/STATISTICS=CHISQ PHI  
/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED COLUMN  
/COUNT ROUND CELL.
```

CROSSTABS

```
/TABLES=cooperation_accepted BY institutions_reform  
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES  
/STATISTICS=CHISQ PHI  
/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED COLUMN  
/COUNT ROUND CELL.
```

```
COMPUTE war_2=war_journalism - peace_journalism.  
EXECUTE.
```

FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=war_2

```
/STATISTICS=MEAN MEDIAN MODE SUM  
/HISTOGRAM NORMAL  
/ORDER=ANALYSIS.
```

```
STRING journalism_type (A8).
```

```
RECODE war_2 (0='neutral') (1 thru 8='war') (-8 thru -1='peace') INTO journalism_type.  
EXECUTE.
```

CROSSTABS

```
/TABLES=humanizing BY neutral
```

/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=CHISQ LAMBDA
/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED COLUMN
/COUNT ROUND CELL
/METHOD=EXACT TIMER(5).

CROSSTABS

/TABLES=humanizing BY clear
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=CHISQ LAMBDA
/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED COLUMN
/COUNT ROUND CELL.

CROSSTABS

/TABLES=diversity BY clear
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=CHISQ LAMBDA
/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED COLUMN
/COUNT ROUND CELL.

CROSSTABS

/TABLES=public BY clear
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
/STATISTICS=CHISQ LAMBDA
/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED COLUMN
/COUNT ROUND CELL.

CROSSTABS

/TABLES=public BY neutral

/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES

/STATISTICS=CHISQ LAMBDA

/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED COLUMN

/COUNT ROUND CELL.

