

THE PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION OF KANT BETWEEN NEO-KANTIANIS AND
HEIDEGGER

(KANTIAN CRITIQUE AS *PROTE METHAPHYSICA*)



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YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY
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PREFACE

Started in 2014, this study compares two interpretations concerning Kant's theoretical philosophy and traces it as to whether these interpretations provide the possibility of a third field of interpretation. This was done by questioning the ground that allowed these interpretations to emerge from Kant's theoretical philosophy, rather than seeking the philosophical correctness of the interpretations. I would like to thank my advisor Asst. Prof. Levent Kavas and Prof. Dr. Ayhan Çitil for their support during this process.

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ABSTRACT

Between 17 March and 6 April 1929, a philosophy event was held in the city of Davos, Switzerland, entitled "International University Course". The event was sponsored by the Swiss, French and German governments. French and German intellectuals, academics and philosophy students came together through this activity. Among these attenders was Carnap, who later made the most efficient criticism from the logical-positivist front to Heidegger's text of the ceremony course, in 1929, at Freiburg, which was entitled "What is Metaphysics?". A discussion on Kant between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger made the event a historical fact. Both philosophers gave a few lessons to internationally invited attenders, and then they performed their famous debate.

Cassirer and Heidegger had an active and prominent position in Germany until this notable debate which has gone down as an influential event in the history of philosophy. Cassirer was a major Kantian scholar and editor of the standard edition of Kant's works. His main work, the publication of the three-volume, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, has been completed. Heidegger also had lately published *Being and Time* and getting became a new pioneer of the phenomenological movement with his professor Husserl. He even started to get a position that was more prominent than Husserl. After this debate in Davos, Cassirer assumed the Rector of the University of Hamburg and became the first Jew selected for this position in a German university. Heidegger besides published his main work on his Kant interpretation, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Thus, he completed his Kant project which he could not achieve in *Being and Time* and he presents a summary and clues of it in Davos.

The fact that the debate is ascribed to historical importance is not the personal encounters between these two philosophers and their intellectual discussion skills. What the encounter and conflict in the personality of these two philosophers were two basic and effective interpretations of Kant's philosophy. One of the interpretations was the Neo-Kantian, or more precisely, Marburg, which is one of the schools of the Neo-Kantian tradition, and in the debate, it was represented by Cassirer. Cassirer objectively holds the position of being a representative of the Neo-Kantian tradition in the discussion, although he seems to have been stripped away from the context of the scientific knowledge theory of this school through the theory of culture philosophy. The Marburg school, in summary, interprets Kant's philosophy as an epistemology. According to this interpretation, Kant's philosophy is a theory of knowledge that reveals the method of nature and mathematical sciences, and the main point that it concentrates on is the transcendental logic section of the first critique. This interpretation pushes aside the function of intuition in forming the process of cognition as an independent faculty and tries to dissolve it in understanding. The sensibility-understanding equation which Kant determines is disarranged in favor of understanding.

Heidegger strongly opposes this interpretation. According to Heidegger's interpretation, Kant's transcendental philosophy is certainly not a theory of knowledge that can be internalized into the method of natural and mathematical sciences. The philosophy of Kant and its CPR, in particular, is an ontology. Moreover, it is a fundamental ontology in the sense of laying a foundation for metaphysics. Fundamental ontology is concerned with the finite structure of the human essence, and

Kant has attempted to put forward a metaphysical project that is fully compatible with the knowledge of being of beings. The formulation of synthetic *a priori* knowledge is the form of establishing the ontological basis of the ontic and establishing the ontological basis that determines the ontic research from the beginning, in accordance with the metaphor of the Copernican revolution. On the other hand, in terms of forming cognition and cooperation, both sensibility and understanding are based on a temporal-ontological soul structure, which is determined as the power of imagination. In this context, Heidegger establishes his ontological interpretation on the structures of power of imagination, schematism, and apperception by following the open-ended clues left by Kant, and tries to demonstrate that the fundamental spiritual power that determines the content of all these structures is temporality. In this sense, temporality appears as the essential effect that determines the ontology of the subject which establishes the ontological pre-method of ontic research with synthetic *a priori* knowledge. Therefore, there are two aspects of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's philosophy as an ontology. The first is synthetic *a priori* knowledge as ontological knowledge, which occurs as a prerequisite for ontic research and determines it before turning towards beings. The second aspect is the revelation of temporality, which is a power that enables the establishment of the subjectivity of the subject that constitutes this information in the power of imagination, schematism, and apperception structures. In other words, ontology has a meaning that refers to both the method that the subject produces while turning towards the beings and the powers that reveal this method in the structural establishment of the subject.

What inspires this study in the symbolic context of the debate is the possibilities that led to these two opposite interpretations coming out of Kant's philosophy. This work

tries to trace the question of “how can these opposite interpretations come out from the Kantian philosophy?” and in doing so, it will not stop trying to determine which of these two interpretations is more correct in the philosophical sense. If the philosophy of Kant is a theory of knowledge, as interpreted by the neo-Kantian tradition, and it is also a theory of knowledge that will provide a method for the natural sciences, what are the elements and foundations that enable it in Kant? Even if these elements and foundations are eliminated, can they be based on formulating Kant in such an interpretation? Can the two elements, sensibility, and understanding, which are indispensable for Kant in constituting knowledge, evolve into a view that gives importance to understanding, as the neo-Kantian tradition does? Kant’s philosophy, on the other hand, is fundamentally an ontology, as Heidegger has interpreted it? Do the possibilities enabling Heidegger to interpret Kant in this manner make this interpretation valid? Does Heidegger distort Kant, or does his interpretation carry Kant into the realm of his philosophy?

Through all these problems that arise, this study will reveal the basic points of both interpretations by performing its Kant reading. The opinions of the Marburg School of the Neo-Kantian tradition will be examined, and the approaches of the leading representatives of this school, Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer will be traced. The points on which Heidegger bases his ontological interpretation will be revealed and the transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic readings of both sides will be analyzed in this direction. Also, what the Copernican Revolution means and what it expresses in terms of these two interpretations will be put forward as another important point.

Any philosophical study, for sure, can determine the outcome from the outset. However, it can assume what kind of conclusions it might be likely to reach through the points it was based on from the beginning. The main purpose of this study is to determine which of these two interpretations uncovers a strict realm of knowledge for us in terms of the philosophy of Kant, but mainly to inquire about the possibilities that led these two interpretations to emerge from Kant's philosophy. Therefore, we can assume that while trying to find the whatness of Kant's philosophy and Kant's philosophical position between these two interpretations, this study can accept that it is neither an ontology nor an epistemology. We can consider from the outset the assumption that Kant's philosophy is essentially a metaphysics of method from which both ontological and epistemological forms can be derived, or a *prote metaphysica*, i.e. primary metaphysics, by invoking Aristotle's term *prote philosophia* to help. This refers to a type of pluralism of forms of method that allow us to determine our orientations towards both the subject and object ontologically or epistemologically from the outset, whether in the field of natural sciences or the social sciences. In this sense, Kant's critical philosophy can be seen as an *a priori* method of mobility and pluralism, which can be called to help, whether in the field of political theory, sociology, or in the philosophical foundations of the Natural Sciences, both in the epistemological and in the ontological context. This is why we prefer the term *prote metaphysica* from the beginning and in an unscientific way by breaking away from its Aristotelian content.

Keywords: Kant, Heidegger, Neo-Kantians, Epistemology, Ontology

ÖZET

1929 yılının 17 Mart-6 Nisan tarihleri arasında, İsviçre'nin Davos kentinde “Davos Yüksek Okul Haftası” adıyla bir felsefe etkinliği düzenlendi. Etkinlik İsviçre, Fransız ve Alman hükümetlerinin sponsorluğunda gerçekleşmiş, Fransız ve Alman entelektüellerini, akademisyenlerini ve felsefe öğrencilerini bir araya getirmişti. Bu dinleyiciler arasında daha sonra Heidegger'in “Metafizik Nedir” başlıklı tören dersinin metnine mantıkçı-pozitivist cepheden en esaslı eleştiriyi getirmiş olan Carnap da bulunuyordu. Etkinliği tarihsel bir olay haline getiren şey Ernst Cassirer ve Martin Heidegger arasında Kant üzerine geçen bir tartışmaydı. Her iki filozofta uluslararası davetli dinleyiciler karşısında birkaç ders vermişler ve daha sonra o ünlü tartışmalarını gerçekleştirmişlerdi.

Cassirer ve Heidegger felsefe tarihine etkili bir olay olarak geçen ünlü tartışmalarına gelene dek Almanya'da aktif ve öne çıkan bir konum elde etmişlerdi. Cassirer belli başlı önemli bir Kant skoları ve Kant'ın eserlerinin edisyonunun editörüyüdü. Temel eseri olan üç ciltlik *Sembolik Formlar Felsefesi*'nin yayımlanması tamamlanmıştı. Heidegger de *Varlık ve Zaman*'ı yayımlamış ve hocası Husserl'le birlikte fenomenoloji hareketinin öncü bir ismi olmaya başlamıştı. Hatta hocasından daha öne çıkan bir pozisyon elde etmeye başlamıştı (Friedman syf 1). Davos'taki bu tartışmadan sonra Cassirer Hamburg Üniversitesi'nin rektörlüğünü üstlenmiş ve bir Alman üniversitesinin rektörlüğüne seçilen ilk yahudi olmuştu. Heidegger ise Davos sonrası Kant üzerine olan yorumunu ortaya koymuş olduğu yapıtı *Kant ve Metafizik Problemi*'ni yayımlamış ve VvZ'da gerçekleştiremediği, Davos'ta özetini ve ipuçlarını sunduğu Kant projesini tamamlamıştı.

Tartışmaya tarihsel anlamda bir önem yükleyen olgu bu iki filozofun şahsi karşılaşmaları ve entelektüel tartışma yetenekleri değildi elbette. Bu iki filozofun şahsında karşılaşan ve çatışan şey Kant felsefesi üzerine yapılan iki temel ve etkili yorumdu. Yorumlardan biri Yeni-kantçı geleneğin daha doğrusu bu geleneğin okullarından birisi olan Marburg okulunun ve tartışmada Cassirer'in şahsında temsil ediliyordu. Cassirer her ne kadar bu okulun bilimsel bilgi kuramının bağlamından kültür felsefesi teorisi aracılığıyla sıyrılmış görünse de tartışmada yeni-kantçı geleneğin temsilcisi olma pozisyonuna nesnel olarak sahipti. Marburg okulu özetle Kant felsefesini bir epistemoloji olarak yorumlar. Bu yoruma göre Kant felsefesi doğa ve matematiksel bilimlerin yöntemini ortaya koyan bir bilgi kuramıdır ve esas ağırlık verdiği nokta birinci kritiğin transandantal mantık bölümüdür. Bu yorum görünün bağımsız bir yeti olarak bilgiyi oluşturmadaki işlevini arka plana iter ve onu anlama yetisi içerisinde eritmeye çalışır. Kant'ın ortaya koymuş olduğu duyarlılık-anlama yetisi denklemi anlama yetisinin lehine olacak şekilde değiştirilir.

Heidegger bu yoruma şiddetle karşı çıkmaktadır. Heidegger'in yorumuna göre Kant'ın transandantal felsefesi kesinlikle doğa bilimleri ve matematiksel bilimlerin yöntemine içkinleştirilebilecek olan bir bilgi kuramı değildir. Kant felsefesi ve özellikle SAE'si bir ontoloji, dahası metafiziğe bir temel atma anlamında fundamental ontolojidir. Fundamental ontoloji insan özünün sonlu yapısıyla ilgilidir ve Kant tamamıyla varolanların varlığı bilgisiyle bağdaşacak bir metafizik projesi ortaya koymaya çalışmıştır. *Sentetik a priori* bilgi formülasyonu tam da Kopernik Devrimi metaforuyla uyumlu bir şekilde ontik olanın ontolojik temellerini oluşturma ve ontik araştırmayı baştan belirleyen ontolojik temeli kurma biçimidir. Öte yandan hem duyarlılık hem de anlama yetisi bilgiyi oluşturmaları ve beraber iş görmeleri bakımından imgelem gücü

olarak belirlenen zamansal-ontolojik bir ruhsal yapıda temellenmişlerdir. Heidegger Kant'ın bu bağlamda ucu açık olarak bırakılmış ipuçlarını takip ederek ontolojik yorumunu imgelem gücü, şematizm ve tam algı yapıları üzerine kurar ve tüm bu yapıların içeriğini belirleyen temel ruhsal gücün zamansallık olduğunu kanıtlamaya çalışır. Bu anlamda zamansallık, ontik araştırmanın ontolojik ön-yöntemini *sentetik a priori* bilgiyle kuran öznenin ontolojisini belirleyen esas etki olarak karşımıza çıkar. Bundan dolayı Heidegger'in Kant felsefesini bir ontoloji olarak yorumlamasının iki yönü vardır. İlki ontik araştırmanın ön koşulu olarak ortaya çıkan ve ontik araştırmayı ontik olanlara yönelmeden önce belirleyen ontolojik bilgi olarak *sentetik a priori* bilgidir. İkinci yön bu bilgiyi kuran öznenin öznelliğinin kurulumunu sağlayan bir güç olan zamansallığın imgelem gücü, şematizm ve tam algı yapılarında açığa çıkışıdır. Yani ontoloji, hem öznenin varolanlara yönelirken ürettiği yöntemi hem de öznenin yapısal kurulumunda bu yöntemi ortaya çıkaran güçleri ifade eden bir anlama sahiptir.

Tartışmanın sembolik bağlamında bu çalışmaya ilham veren şey Kant felsefesinden birbirine tamamiyle zıt bu iki yorumun çıkmasını sağlayan olanaklardır. Çalışma elbette ki bu iki yorumun hangisinin felsefi anlamda daha doğru olduğunu belirlemeye çalışmaktan vazgeçmeden nasıl oluyor da böylesi iki yorum Kant felsefesinden çıkabiliyor? sorusunun izini sürmeye çalışacaktır. Kant felsefesi Yeni-kantçı geleneğin yorumladığı gibi temel olarak bir bilgi kuramı üstelik doğa bilimlerine yöntem sağlayacak bir bilgi kuramı ise, Kant'da buna olanak veren unsurlar ve temeller nelerdir? Bu unsurlar ve temeller çıkarılsa dahi bunlar Kant'ı böylesi bir yorum içerisinde formüle etmeyi temellendirebilir mi? Bilgiyi oluşturmada Kant için vazgeçilmez olan iki öge, duyarlılık ve anlama yetisi, yeni-kantçı geleneğin yaptığı gibi anlama yetisine ağırlık veren bir bakışa evrilebilir mi? Diğer taraftan Kant

felsefesi Heidegger'in yorumladığı gibi temel olarak bir ontoloji midir? Heidegger'in Kant'ı bu şekilde yorumlamasını sağlayan olanaklar bu yorumu geçerli kılmakta mıdır? Heidegger Kant'ı tahrif mi etmektedir ya da yaptığı bu yorum Kant'ı kendi felsefesinin alanına çekmek midir?

Ortaya çıkan tüm bu sorunlar üzerinden bu çalışma her iki yorumun temel noktalarını kendi Kant okumasını da gerçekleştirerek ortaya koyacaktır. Yeni-Kantçı geleneğin Marburg okulunun görüşleri ele alınacak ve bu okulun önde gelen temsilcileri Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp ve Ernst Cassirer'in görüşlerinin izi sürülecektir. Heidegger'in ontolojik yorumunu dayandırdığı noktalar ortaya konulacak ve bu yönde her iki cephenin transandantal estetik ve transandantal mantık okumaları çözümlenecektir. Ayrıca Kopernik devriminin ne anlama geldiği ve bu iki yorum açısından neyi ifade ettiği önemli başka bir nokta olarak ortaya konulacaktır.

Elbette ki hiçbir felsefî çalışma varacağı sonucu baştan belirleyemez. Ancak baştan temel aldığı noktalar üzerinden hangi tür sonuçlara varmasının olası olabileceğini varsayabilir. Bu tez çalışmasının esas amacı bu iki yorumun hangisinin Kant felsefesi açısından bize sağlam bir bilgi alanı açtığını belirlemeye çalışmakla beraber esas olarak bu iki yorumun Kant felsefesinden çıkmasını sağlayan olanakları soruşturmaktır. Bundan dolayı da Kant felsefesinin neliğini ve bu iki yorum arasında Kant'ın felsefî pozisyonunu bulmaya çalışırken onun ne bir ontoloji ne de bir epistemoloji olmadığını kabul edebileceğini varsayabiliriz. Kant felsefesinin esasta hem ontolojik hem de epistemolojik formların kendisinden çıkarılabileceği bir yöntem metafiziği ya da Aristoteles'in *prote philosophia* terimini yardıma çağırarak bir *prote metafizik* yani önde gelen metafizik olduğu varsayımını baştan düşünebiliriz. Bu ister

doğa bilimleri alanında ister tin bilimleri alanında olsun hem özneye hem de nesneye olan yönelimlerimizi baştan ontolojik ya da epistemolojik olarak belirlemeye olanak sağlayan bir tür yöntem formları çoğulculuğunu ifade eder. Kant'ın kritik felsefesi bu anlamda ister siyaset teorisi alanında isterse sosyolojide, isterse doğa bilimlerinin felsefi temellerinde bilgi kuramsal bağlamda da ontolojik bağlamda da yardıma çağırılabilir. *Prote metafizik* terimini Aristotelesçi içeriğinden kopararak daha baştan ve bilimsel olmayan bir biçimde tercih etmemizin nedeni budur.

Anahtar kelimeler: Kant, Heidegger, Yeni-Kantçılar, Epistemoloji, Ontoloji

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. What is the Copernican Revolution? Kantian Philosophy and Copernican Analogy

The first (and perhaps only) thing that comes to mind when we think of Copernicus is that he is the scientist who replaced the model of the heliocentric universe with the geocentric one. However, this event is not only a change in the function and meaning of two elements (the earth and the sun) in any scientific model but also the replacement of a long-established and old paradigm with a new paradigm of science and thought, and is a significant transformation that will constitute the basis for breakthroughs and developments in the sciences.

The fundamental significance of the Copernican model arises from its unscientific influence. The history of science tells us that the idea of heliocentrism has existed since ancient times. So it is not a conception invented by Copernicus. (Karatani, 2003, 30). According to Thomas Kuhn, his main work, *De Revolutionibus*, was still based on Ptolemaic cosmology. The return to the idea of heliocentrism relied on a practical reason. Copernicus was asserting the proposition that the discrepancy in calculations of the revolutions of heavenly bodies could be overcome by the hypothesis that the earth revolves around the sun. In other words, when the central position was determined as the sun, the problem in calculations concerning the revolutions of the heavenly bodies was removed.

“The *De Revolutionibus* was written to solve the problem of the planets, which, Copernicus felt, Ptolemy and his successors had left unsolved. In Copernicus' work the revolutionary conception of the earth's motion is initially an anomalous by-product of a proficient and devoted astronomer's attempt to reform the techniques employed in computing planetary position.” (Kuhn, 1995, 136-7).

Moreover, this revolutionary conception is expressed not as the main idea of the work but only in the letter added as a preface to its introduction. Moreover, acceptance of the heliocentric model of the universe would take a century after Copernicus.

However, as mentioned above, the main impact and expansions of the view were realized in non-scientific fields. The transfer of the idea of the center from the earth to the sun has destroyed the understanding of human beings placing themselves at the center of the universe and life and establishing the idea that the world in which human beings live is only a place among millions of stars. In other words, the world has lost its meaning for human beings as the focus of God's creation and the most valuable point in the cosmic order.

“The Copernican revolution was therefore also part of a transition in Western sense of values.” (Kuhn, 1995, 2).

The Copernican revolution, therefore, had a leading role in triggering not only a change in the paradigm of science but also a change in culture and theory. Freud himself would later say that his discovery of the unconscious was similar to Copernicus' discovery in terms of its impact on human behavior.

So how does Kant draw the analogy between his and Copernicus' work? Kant makes this analogy in the preface to the B edition of the CPR:

“Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them *a priori* through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an *a priori* cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest.” (Kant, 2000, 110).

The first criticism generally encountered about this analogy made by Kant is that the analogy contains a contradiction in terms of content. This stems from a misconception that interprets Kant's transcendental subjectivity-centered philosophy as more subject-centered. J. Everett Green presents detailed and valuable literature on the Copernican analogy in his work that is titled “Kant’s Copernican Revolution.” For instance, Russell says in “Human Knowledge” that Kant would have been more accurate if he had described himself as being influenced by Ptolemy's counter-

revolution rather than the Copernican revolution because he put man back in the center, which Copernicus had dethroned. (As cited in John Everet Green, 1997, 14). This approach is a mistake that is produced by considering the analogy directly in terms of content.

H. J. Paton puts a similar interpretation forward. Paton notes that at first glance, no analogy could seem so inappropriate that Copernicus replaced the heliocentric explanation with the geocentric explanation, while in the sphere of metaphysics, Kant did almost the opposite and made the human mind the center of the phenomenal universe. (Paton, 1936, 75). However, he then grasps the formal side of the analogy, stating that Copernicus explains the apparent motion of the heavenly bodies according to the law of the observer's motion, and Kant likewise explains the apparent characteristic of reality according to the mind of the knowing subject. (Paton, 1936, 75).

Let us continue citing the literature given by Green. In his article "Copernicus' Role in Kant's Revolution", Norwood Hanson claims that the relationship between Kant and Copernicus was merely an attempt to put forward alternative hypotheses when the existent evidence was insufficient. There is no denying that there is a hypothetical approach. In other words, there is a different assumption from what has been assumed so far. Henry Allison, in his article "Kant's Transcendental Humanism", displays a different and more interesting claim. Allison sees the ultimate significance of Kant's Copernican revolution in its reconciliation of the transcendental, logical orientation of continental rationalism with the psychological, humanistic approach of English empiricism. According to Allison, Kant's outstanding achievement was to show that philosophy should be purely human or human-related. (As cited in John Everet Green, 1997, 16).

All this literature shows us that the first thing that analogy evokes is contradiction rather than parallelism. The Copernican revolution changed the design of the universe, which was based on a perspective that placed man at the center. It has accomplished this by eliminating the man from being at the center. Kant's philosophy, on the other hand, seems to have assumed the proposition that objects must conform to the conditions of the human mind, thereby putting the human being at the center of a metaphysical system. Here, however, Kant does not establish an analogy with Copernicus based on doctrinal impact. In other words, Kant is not saying anything about reducing the content of Copernican theory and the innovation brought about by this content to philosophical activity and realizing in metaphysics what Copernican content has achieved through the reduction of this content to philosophy. Kant's analogy with Copernicus is formal. Kant emphasizes a requirement based on Copernicus' change of point of departure. This emphasis, on the other hand, is an attempt to replace the epistemological blocking point of the reality imposed by empirical observation with the necessity of reconsidering this reality in a formal-relational context. That is to say, the relationship between the elements that constitute reality does not have the absoluteness that empirical observation dictates. Moving them from the absoluteness of empirical observation back to the formal context will enable us to reproduce them in a new context of reality. This requires, first and foremost, discovering the hypothetical position imposed on us by empirical observation and the formal hypothesis that will enable us to remove the blockage; this imposes and reconstruct reality in such a way as to exceed this blockage. Just as Copernicus exceeded what empirical observation imposed with a hypothesis that cannot be deduced from empirical observation at that moment, Kant suggests

exceeding the blockage in metaphysics by changing the hypothesis assumed hitherto. Copernicus, by suggesting an alternative hypothetical position on the insolubility of the hypothetical position that had been assumed to be correct until then, actually laid the foundation for a transformation that was greater and more important than he had ever envisioned. Kant likens his work to that of Copernicus because of his belief that the step he is trying to take in metaphysics can only be realized through such a hypothetical shift of position.

1.2. The Hypothesis Valid in Metaphysics

Kant mentions a presupposition that is valid in the history of metaphysics. Moreover, he believes that this presupposition is the reason why metaphysics cannot be established as a solid sphere of knowledge and argues for a fundamental change in this hypothetical position. This is the presupposition that our knowledge conforms to objects. Kant claims that we have not been able to make any progress in expanding our knowledge through this presupposition and suggests that we try to reverse it and try the presupposition that objects conform to our knowledge. Here lies the root of the analogy that is referred to as the Copernican revolution when it concerns Kantian philosophy.

However, what does this presupposition of metaphysics imply? Considering the overall history of metaphysics, wherever do we encounter it that Kant claims to be valid? In which philosophers and philosophies do the presupposition that our knowledge conforms to objects realized? What does Kant's assumption imply in Kant's philosophy?

It is not possible here to trace the presupposition that our knowledge conforms to objects through the whole history of metaphysics. We can only understand it by analyzing the problem Kant was trying to describe in general and by connecting it to certain general points in the history of philosophy to which we may relate it.

The main problem Kant recognizes in metaphysics is that it considers itself authorized to speculate on a ground that transcends the possibility of experience. It is precisely because of this problem that metaphysics cannot be established as a solid sphere of knowledge. Although with metaphysics, we will never be able to exceed the limit of possible experience, Kant nevertheless determines that the essential problem of this science is to exceed this limit. (Kant, 2000, 110).

Mathematics or natural sciences do not have this problem. This is because they have attained a structure capable of producing knowledge with a strict generality. Metaphysics, on the other hand, can speak of knowledge that exceeds the possibility of experience as if this knowledge were objects of experience. However, such knowledge, which metaphysics is concerned with, neither acquires a strict character of generality and validity nor does it expand our knowledge. Kant considers the origin of this inner problem to be precisely in the hypothesis that metaphysics had hitherto assumed, namely, that our knowledge conforms to objects.

The entire content of the philosophy developed by each philosopher should not, of course, be understood in a simplistic way. Here, however, the way to understand what Kant regards as the problem in metaphysics is to recognize how the basic propositions that philosophers have put forward in the history of metaphysics, despite all their details, can be related to the proposition that Kant puts forward. When we pursue Kant's proposition of a hypothetical change of position for metaphysics

through the CPR, we see that he engages in debate with only two philosophers. These two philosophers are Leibniz and Plato.

Kant emphasizes in CPR B62 that the Leibniz-Wolff tradition, by considering the distinction between the sensual and the intelligible as purely logical, treats the inquiry into the nature and origin of knowledge from the wrong point of view. It is clear that Kant is here attacking Leibniz's doctrine of confused and distinct perceptions. The problem here is the presupposition that through the division of perception into confused and distinct, we can obtain knowledge of the Monads, which are the thing in itself or substance. According to Kant, this is impossible. Because we can never know the thing in itself through our sensibility. As soon as our subjective nature and our form of sensibility are suspended, the represented object vanishes. Leibniz, on the other hand, reduces perception to an intro-logical distinction, confused and distinct, and argues that we have knowledge of Monads, that is, things in themselves, which he assumes to be the real elements of nature. However, according to Kant, the subject obtains the representation of objects through the properties that his sensual intuition attributes to objects. There is no knowledge that can be obtained through sensibility about the thing-in-itself that is beyond these representations.

In B320, Kant states that Leibniz treats appearances as things in themselves and thus considers them to be intelligible, that is, objects of the pure faculty of understanding. At B 326, he states that Leibniz constructs an intelligible world-system and believes that by comparing all objects with the formal concepts of the faculty of understanding, he determines the inner nature of things. And thus, he states that Leibniz judges the objects of the senses as "different" and "identical" only in the faculty of understanding. Because according to Kant, Leibniz extended the principle

of indiscernibility to the objects of the senses since he considered only concepts and not the position of given objects in intuition. Therefore, Kant indicates that Leibniz intellectualizes appearances. According to Leibniz, Monads do not have windows that something can enter or leave. Therefore, according to Kant, Leibniz has conceived the distinction between inner and outer only through their relation to the faculty of understanding. For, as simple substances, Monads have only an inner determination and are distinguished from each other according to the degree of this inner determination. However, Kant says in B330 that we cannot ascribe to substances anything other than the state of our representations.

Kant points out in B331 that Leibniz, with his doctrine of space-time, also intellectualized space and time as forms of sensibility. Space and time, therefore, become the intelligible forms of the connections of substances as things in themselves, and things become intelligible substances.

Let us now move on to Kant's assessment of Plato. Kant states in A5/B9 that Plato, by setting very narrow limits to understanding, abandons the world of the senses and goes beyond the world of the senses on the wings of the ideas into the empty space of pure understanding. In B370, Kant says that for Plato, ideas are the archetypes of things in themselves. Ideas arise from the highest reason and are partaken of the human reason. However, platonic ideas do not coincide with anything in the world of sense or experience. On the other hand, Kant says in B375 that as far as nature is concerned, it is the experience that gives the rules.

In A472, Kant compares Platonism with Epicureanism and states that although Platonic thought offers the highest principles of the practical, in terms of the domain where knowledge is possible, it indulges the reason in purely idealistic explanations and thus neglects physical investigation. Kant states in A568/B596 that what is ideal

for us is, for Plato, an idea of divine understanding, an individual object of his pure intuition, the most perfect of all possible kinds of being, and the original ground of all copies in appearances.

Nevertheless, how do Kant's assessments of Plato and Leibniz in the CPR correspond to the Copernican hypothetical turn in metaphysics he suggests? Did Plato or Leibniz say that our knowledge conforms to objects? The context Kant tries to clarify through both philosophers is obvious. Traditional metaphysics has sharply separated the world of sense, or the subject's faculty of sensibility, from the intelligible; moreover, it has subordinated sensation to the intelligible and gone beyond the sphere of possible experience. They had claimed that the knowledge of things in themselves, whether they are determined as simple substances or as ideas, can be accessed conceptually. In other words, our knowledge can enter into the object and access what it is in itself. This yielded the supposition that human cognition conforms to the condition set by the object and that through this conformity, it can know the essence of the object outside of subjective conditions.

Considering the main themes of metaphysics renders it more comprehensible why Kant regards its main problem as going beyond the limits of possible experience. In general, metaphysics has inquired about God, eternity, the immortality of the soul, freedom, etc., and has put forward thoughts on them. For Kant, all these themes that metaphysics is concerned with are ideas that have no corresponding in intuition. Since they have no corresponding in intuition, they are the issues of speculation and constitute a plane that goes beyond possible experience.

1.3. Kant's Proposed Hypothesis

Kant proposes to nullify what has hitherto been assumed as basic in metaphysics and to propose a hypothetical position that is its opposite. This proposal is the supposition that the object conforms to our knowledge. The supposition generally states that: the object does not appear to human beings as an object of knowledge through its own independent ontology. On the contrary, the object becomes an object of knowledge through adaptation to the conditions of human faculties. In fact, this is a case that arises necessarily. Because before the in itself of the object, there is the in itself of the subject. That is, there is no subject-object mediation between subject and object that supposes the independent ontology of both and entails the intentionality of both towards each other through an intermediate field that supposes this independent ontology. The subject is receptive to the object through a mediation necessitated by the conditions that constitute its subjectivity. This indicates that the object is constituted through its conformity to the conditions of the subject's knowledge.

“We call objects "actual" to the extent that they are made known to us in this form of actuality, and by this we are thus made acquainted with their individual qualities. Hence a general assertion about physical existences may be possible; in no case is its possibility understandable save through amassing particular instances, through the collection and comparison of the many impressions of the things which we have experienced.” (Cassirer, 1981, 161-2)

If objects must conform to our cognitive requirements in order to be known by us, their status as things perceived and known is, by definition, encompassed by the limits of what we can perceive and know. (Sherover, 1972, 27).

The erroneous deduction of Kant's supposition and its general and specific content is that the object and the world as its natural extension are tied to the subject, or that the sphere of objectivity is reduced to the representation of the subject. The subordination of the conditions of the constitution of objects of experience and knowledge to the conditions of the subject's subjectivity does not mean that the sphere of nature and the world are illusions that are revealed in the subject. Nature and the world are before us in their reality. However, it is only through our faculties of perception and thought and the conditions underlying these faculties that we can shape, organize, change or determine them; it is only through these conditions that we make them objects of knowledge.

The general content of Kant's supposition is, as has been said, the conformity of the object to our knowledge. However, Kant's philosophy reshapes this general content as special content within itself and presents it to us. This special content is synthetic *a priori* knowledge. Kantian criticism has linked the problem on which it bases itself and which it is fundamentally trying to solve to the question, "how is synthetic *a priori* knowledge possible?". The inquiry into the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge requires a reconsideration of the plane of dual opposition that Kantian criticism confronts us with at every stage. That is to say, the whatness of knowledge and the knowledge that should be at work in metaphysics require to be dealt with on the planes of *a priori*/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic opposition when it comes to Kantian criticism.

Kant states that all our knowledge begins with experience. With this statement, Kant suspended the classical rationalist perspective connecting the relation between experience and knowledge to the realm of *ratio* in terms of realization and origin. The only field in which the operation of knowledge can be revealed is the field of experience. Leaving aside the question of origin, the realization of knowledge cannot be assumed in a field outside of experience. This is Kant's preventive step against school metaphysics and logic and the Leibnizian-Wollfian tradition. However, Kant goes on to add that although all knowledge commences with experience, this does not necessarily imply that all knowledge is derived from experience. This is Kant's suspension of the classical empiricist perspective's reduction of the relation between experience and knowledge to the realm of experience in terms of origin and formation. Knowledge is not just raw material conveyed to the subject from the field of experience. Knowledge is a synthesis that the subject constitutes with the forms it reflects on this conveyance. This is based on the proposition that the subject can absolutely convey to the field of experience a form that does not emerge from that field.

This is the core of what Kant is seeking and what he aims to determine. If knowledge is a composition of both the material conveyed from the field of experience and the impact of the autonomous powers of our own faculty of knowledge, it is necessary to distinguish, determine and reveal this last part, that is, what it is that we impart from our own faculty of knowledge into the construction of knowledge. Because experience teaches us that something is constituted in thus and so, but not that it could not be otherwise. (Kant, 2000, 137).

In this direction, Kant treats his inquiry into the whatness of knowledge on the plane of *a priori*/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic dichotomy. And he extends this to the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge.

Kant states that by *a priori* knowledge, he means that which is independent of all experience in an absolute sense. This absoluteness makes *a priori* knowledge pure as it eliminates every empirical element. So we are confronted with pure and impure *a priori* knowledge. As an example of an impure *a priori* proposition, Kant cites the proposition "every alteration must have a cause". This is a proposition that we no longer need the criteria, observations and data of the field of experience for its grounding or justification or investigation. But the concept, alteration, is a concept that we derive from experience. Thus, we are confronted with a proposition that is *a priori* but not pure.

The main reason for Kant's motivation for *a priori* knowledge, and especially for pure *a priori* knowledge, is that it can convey the knowledge given by the field of experience into a form of necessity (Notwendigkeit) and strict generality (strenge Allgemeinheit). These two characteristics are not determinations that are conveyed to us from experience, but on the contrary, they are subjective possibilities within which we rearrange the knowledge of experience and on the basis of which solid fields of knowledge are constituted.

The other dichotomy is the analytic/synthetic judgment plane. Kant's presupposition change proposed to metaphysics is based on the seek and detection of the possibility of synthetic judgments. The main difference between analytic and synthetic knowledge lies in the fact that the former reveals the proposition as the dissolution of its intrinsic structure, while the latter connects the proposition with a point outside its intrinsic structure. In this respect, analytic judgments are based on the

identity of the predicate and subject, whereas synthetic judgments, on the contrary, are based on the non-identity of the predicate and subject. In other words, the analytic judgment does not drive us out of the scope of judgment but carries its analyticity within it as a tautology in the form of possibility. Synthetic judgment, on the other hand, both exceeds its scope and expands it by connecting with a point outside its scope. Therefore, Kant characterizes analytic judgments as explanatory (Erläuterungs) and synthetic judgments as extending (Erweiterungs).

For example, according to Kant, the proposition "All bodies are extended" is an analytic judgment. This is because the judgment does nothing more than reveal the extension already contained in the concept of body. The boundary of the scope of judgment is determined by the boundary of the analyticity of the concept of object. In other words, since the judgment does not have a structure that would allow us to go beyond the possibility it already carries as a tautology, no disclosure occurs outside the immanent of three-dimensionality to the concept of the body. Kant, however, states that the proposition "All bodies are heavy" is synthetic. "This is because the concept of weight is not already contained in three-dimensionality." (Adorno, 2001, 12). In the judgment here, it is evident that the relation between subject and predicate is determined from a point that cannot be immanent in the subject and is outside the scope of the judgment. In this sense, the dynamism of judgment is not a mode of explanation that takes place within the boundaries of the scope of judgment, but on the contrary, it is a mode of determination that exceeds and expands the boundaries of it. Therefore, Kant states that it is not necessary to refer to experience in analytical judgments. This is because analytic judgment has been completed in its logical formation and is logically closed upon itself.

“For before I go to experience, I already have all the conditions for my judgment in the concept, from which I merely draw out the predicate in accordance with the principle of contradiction...” (Kant, 2000, 142).

On the other hand, in the synthetic judgment, "all bodies are heavy", the basis for the extension of the scope of the judgment through the spontaneous and unnatural binding of the subject to the predicate by departing from its internal logical structure is, according to Kant, experience.

On the other hand, in the synthetic judgment, "all bodies are heavy", the basis for the extension of the scope of the judgment through the spontaneous and unnatural binding of the subject to the predicate by leaving from its inner logical structure is, according to Kant, experience. The proposition provides a point of connection between the subject and predicate that is not immanent to the subject with the help of experience. It is at this point that the doctrinal progress that Kantian criticism seeks to realize is revealed.

There are such judgments which we cannot detect in experience the basis for the synthetic connection between subject and predicate. The spontaneous and unnatural unification between subject and predicate in the proposition, that is, the understanding carries a predicate to the subject from outside the propositional domain and connects it with the subject, is possible through the discovery of the predicate in a domain outside the phenomena of experience. Kant asks here precisely what is this unknown=X that supports the understanding, which believes that it has found outside the concept A a predicate B that is foreign to it but nevertheless thought to be connected to it? According to him, this X cannot be experienced. Here, Kant reveals the basis of the inner possibility of the change in the main proposition of metaphysics

with the analogy of the Copernican revolution. This is the problem and knowledge of synthetic *a priori* judgment.

1.4 Synthetic *A priori* Knowledge

When we come to the problem of synthetic *a priori*, we are now in the minefield of Kantian criticism. This field, which Kant opened up as one of the foundations on which his philosophy emphasized, was continuously debated after him, and discussions on the problem of synthetic judgment or knowledge continued. Here, we leave aside the post-Kantian debate on synthetic *a priori* knowledge. This debate will persist as long as the philosophical activity continues. The main philosophical motive that concerns our work here is to reveal the inner connection of this type of knowledge, the possibility of which Kant seeks, with the analogy of the Copernican revolution.

Synthetic knowledge is, of course, not Kant's exclusive discovery. A posteriori knowledge, as the knowledge of experience, had already been introduced into the philosophical literature as synthetic knowledge. In other words, when we convey the phenomena we encounter in experience to the context of judgment, statements derived from a subject-predicate structure that is spontaneous and unnatural, that is, unified and connected, are constructed. Kant's contribution here is his exposition that synthetic knowledge can be *a priori* as well as a posteriori. In other words, there is both a judgment derived from a unified, connected subject-predicate structure and the fact that this derivation does not need the experience to assure its validity.

Kant invokes two allies to help him explain what a synthetic *a priori* judgment is. These are mathematics and natural science, i.e. physics. According to him, both mathematics and physics operate with such judgments. Especially when it comes to

mathematical judgments, things get complicated. Because the dominant perspective until Kant was that mathematical judgments are analytic. If a mathematical proposition is analytic, then in proposition $7+5=12$, it is assumed that 12 already contains 7 and 5. Another point is that mathematical propositions are constituted according to the principle of contradiction. However, Kant approaches this from a completely different point of view. The proposition $7+5=12$ is not analytic. This is because 12 is not something that is contained in the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 from the beginning. According to Kant, what is done in this operation is to connect the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 with another concept that has no inner analytic connection with it.

F. Albert Lange, in his work "The History of Materialism", discusses the opposing views on the syntheticity of mathematical propositions and quotes the opposition of R. Zimmermann, who wrote an article entitled "Kant's Judgment on Mathematics and Its Consequences". Zimmermann maintains that the proposition $7+5$ equals 12 is not only analytical but also identical. Lange interprets this claim as follows:

“Pity that Zimmermann is not right! The teachers in our national schools could then save themselves the trouble of teaching Addition. When they had taught Numeration, all would be done. As soon as the child had acquired on its fingers or the board an intuition of 5 or of 7, and had besides learned that the number which follows 11 is called 12, it must at once be clear to him that 7 and 5 make 12, for the notions are identical!” (Lange, 1880, 182-3).

The factor that makes the mathematical proposition synthetic is that numbers, as conceptual structures, are produced separately from the relational totality of mathematics. Perhaps Kant is trying to remind us that number is also a synthetic unity. As a matter of fact, Norman Kempthorne Smith remarks that Kant speaks of 7, 5 and 12 as if they were independent entities. (Smith, 1918, 168).

Kant chooses his second example from geometry. His example is the definition of a line. "The straight line is between two points is the shortest." Here, according to Kant, what makes the proposition synthetic is that the predicate "shortest" is not included in the concept of line. For the concept of straight does not contain anything related to quantity; on the contrary, it contains only quality. Here, the concept of "shortest" is an addition and cannot be deduced from the concept of straight-through analysis. In other words, the proposition does not reveal a property contained in the concept of straight or an exposition of the identity of the concept of straight with itself. An extending predicate, which is directly outside the logical boundaries of the concept itself and is connected to it, has engaged, and the proposition is synthetic in this sense. Another science that Kant calls for help is a natural science, that is, physics. According to Kant, the propositions that express the equality of effect and counter-effect the fact that the quantity of matter remains the same in all natural alterations are synthetic *a priori* propositions. In the proposition expressing the conservation of the quantity of matter, according to Kant, we again go beyond the implications of the concept of matter and add to it something that is not thought in it. And this addition takes place not with the help of experiment but independently of it, *a priori*, that is, with conditions derived from the faculty of understanding itself.

What does this whole picture tell us? First of all, synthetic propositions are binding propositions. Synthetic propositions are the judicial *topos* of the subject's processes of forming bonds, making connections, and synthesizing. These propositions are not based on the logical context of completeness constituted by the identity between subject and predicate, as analytic propositions are, but on the process of addition or connection established between a subject and predicate that are foreign to each other. This is already a natural conclusion when we carry the natural operation of the field of experience into propositional structures. The accidental and specific structurality of the field of experience does not allow us to express subjects and predicates that are foreign to each other except by connecting them to each other. When we say, "The grass is wet," we are making a synthetic judgment. Because when we arrived at the grass, we saw that it was wet. "The grass is yellow" because this time, we arrived at the grass and saw that it was yellow. The predicate of yellowing or the predicate of wet, that is, these predicates that are completely foreign to and separate from the concept of grass, are nothing other than what the accidental and specific structurality of the field of experience confronts us with and what we convey to the *topos* of judgment and articulate through connection. Synthetic judgment is, at the same time, a synthetic unity. Moreover, all objects in the field of experience are before us as subjects and predicates to be connected or added to each other.

However, the distinctive and original aspect of Kant's philosophy is revealed at this point. Kant mentioned a third factor and called it the unknown X. In other words, while accomplishing the process of connecting A and B, which are foreign to each other, the third factor that enables me to realize the process in a posteriori synthetic judgment is the experience itself. So what is the third power, which enables one to connect two elements that are foreign to each other in mathematical, geometrical or

physical propositions, if not experience? In these propositions, which realize the subject-predicate binding *a priori* without relying on experience, what is this third force that enables the binding? This third power, which enables us to constitute the synthetic proposition *a priori*, is the subject's pure faculties independent of experience.

Synthetic *a priori* judgments are those in which the unification between subject and predicate is not grounded in experience. That is to say, we constitute judgments in such a way that we do not need to wait for experience to reveal to us a subject and predicate that need to be connected. In other words, judgment is both a *topos* of binding, unification and synthesis, and it can also take a form of generality and necessity that transcends the accidental and specific structurality of the field of experience. Precisely because it possesses a character that transcends this structure of the field of experience, it has a constitutive characteristic of our experience. The subjective faculties, which activate by experience, also activate an aspect of itself that is independent of experience (because Kant has stated that the priority of *a priori* knowledge is logical, not temporal), and the effect it adds to the experience with this aspect makes it the basic condition for the constitution of our knowledge of experience. Therefore, as Deleuze points out, synthetic *a priori* knowledge is a rule of construction. That is, it is constitutive knowledge that gives us the procedures of how to get to objects before they are given to us.

The synthetic *a priori* exposition of knowledge that Kant proposes for metaphysics emphasizes three points. The first is related to the field of the experiment itself. This is related to the precaution Kant takes against the empirical tradition at the very beginning of CPR.

“experience is no open door through which external things, as they are, can wander into us, but a process by which the appearance of things arises within us. That in this process, all the properties of these 'things' come from without, and the man who receives them has nothing to do, contradicts all the analogy of nature in the case of any development of a new thing from the co-operation of two others.” (Lange, 1880, 188).

That is, the subject is not in a passive, receptive position, which receives raw data from the experimental field and, through this receptivity, can recognize the experimental field as an object. On the other hand:

“While pre-Kantian metaphysics had maintained that the subject copies the external object, Kant proposed that objects are constituted by the form that the subject *projects into* the external world.” (Karatani, 2003, 29).

It can be seen here that Kant tries to create two possible ways out against the frozen epistemologies of the empiricist and rationalist dogmatic traditions, which have now become an obstacle. The first of these two ways is to describe the object in the form reflected from the subject, as Karatani so aptly puts it, as opposed to the conception of rationalist dogmatism that transforms the object into a noetic representation or idea unit in the subject. The target of the second way out is the conception of empirical dogmatism that passivates the subject vis-à-vis the object of experimentation and transforms the experience into an absolute source of knowledge that is exempt from the subject's subjective powers. The Kantian way out attempts to overcome these two obstacles by grounding the possibility of the constitution of the

object of the experiment and the field of experience in the subject's pre-experiential subjective powers.

The second point emphasized by the synthetic *a priori* is the displacement of necessity from the object of experience to the subject. Pre-Kantian metaphysics focused on the condition imposed by the object on the subject through the assumption of an element of necessity coming from objects. Synthetic *a priori* knowledge, on the other hand, developed the thesis that the subject's faculties, which are not based on experience but constitute experience, are the main point of departure in the determination of objects.

“While until now necessity was held to be founded in objects and only indirectly carried over from them into knowledge, now it is understood that the reverse is true, that every idea of the object arises from an original necessity in knowledge itself” (Cassirer, 1981, 170).

From this point we can proceed to the third point of emphasis of the synthetic *a priori*. This point is actually a framework that includes both of these points and the inner relation between the analogy of the Copernican revolution and synthetic *a priori* knowledge, which we have been trying to unveil since the beginning of this chapter. Synthetic *a priori* knowledge is the condition that provides the subject with a context of predetermination of what the subject's orientation to the object will be like before the subject orients to the objects of the experiment and determines those objects in certain modes. Since the object has a mode of manifestation that is subordinated to the necessary conditions of subjective faculties, it appears in accordance with the knowledge that lies at the ground of the necessary conditions of these faculties. The

necessary knowledge which lies at the ground of these conditions is synthetic *a priori* knowledge. That is, they are both constitutive knowledge and they attain this constitutive mode without the aid of experience. The *topos* of this constitutive mode of knowledge is pure subjective faculties that are logically prior to experience.

Kant's proposed change of supposition to metaphysics is grounded in synthetic *a priori* knowledge. Thus, the Copernican revolution, which is the symbolization of this proposal, means the supposition of synthetic *a priori* knowledge and its discovery in the field of metaphysics. In this way, metaphysics will both able to be constituted as a solid field of knowledge and will be deprived of the authorization to speculate beyond possible experience. Because the conformity of objects to our knowledge, that is, the subjection of the object of experience to the conditions of the subject's subjectivity, will determine the boundaries of the field of experience and the places and functions of the objects that enable us to go beyond these boundaries in the human reason will be revealed.

1.5. Heidegger and the Copernican Revolution

1.5.1. Synthetic *a priori* knowledge in the context of Heidegger's ontic-ontological distinction and the meaning of the Copernican Revolution.

What does Heidegger see in Kant's Copernican revolution? How does Heidegger interpret the inner relation between the analogy of the Copernican revolution and synthetic *a priori* knowledge that we have attempted to examine in the previous section? In this section, we will try to answer these questions. However, in the Copernican turn and the related synthetic *a priori* knowledge, the basic distinction of Heidegger's philosophy, the beings-Being, and its ontic-ontological plane that attains meaning in the context of this difference is involved. For Heidegger holds that

Kant, with the Copernican turn, shifted the classical formulation of truth from the knowledge of beings to the knowledge of the Being of beings and that the synthetic *a priori* knowledge that provides the inner possibility of this shift is the ontological knowledge that makes ontic knowledge possible. Therefore, we first need to address Heidegger's distinction and the plane of ontic-ontological knowledge that emerges in the context of this difference. The ontic-ontological distinction, which Heidegger also determines as the being-being, is a key context in his critique of the history of metaphysics/ontology. According to him, metaphysics has always thought of the beings and has forgotten to think of Being. Since metaphysics interrogates the beings as beings, it has been stuck in the beings and has not been able to turn to Being as "Being".

The conceptuality that Heidegger tries to specify as a sphere of beings refers to all the "things" that metaphysics, which designates the human being as *animal rationale* or *subiectum* or epistemic subject, determines as "relative" to this subject. Therefore, the entire field of nature that the sciences determine as the object of investigation, all the things that humans make meaning in terms of form and content, all mental, spiritual, psychic, temporal, and aesthetic determinations are beings in this sense. The chair is a being, and the number is also a being.

“Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way, is being; what we are is being, and so is how we are. Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is; in Reality; in presence-at-hand; in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the ‘there is’.” (Heidegger, 1985, 26).

Here, we encounter not simply a sum of "things" or "objects". Because human beings are also included in the sphere of beings. Moreover, the human being is both within and part of this sphere, and since he is the only being who has the possibility to ask questions about Being, he is the only one from whom the elucidation of Being can be initiated. What makes a human being, a being in its whatness and howness, different from other beings is that it has an existence. Among all other beings, the human being has an essential and fundamental relation to Being. Heidegger expresses this very strikingly as follows:

“The being that exists is the human being. The human being alone exists. Rocks are, but they do not exist. Trees are, but they do not exist. Horses are, but they do not exist. Angels are, but they do not exist. God is, but he does not exist.” (Heidegger, 1998, 284).

This statement does not mean that other beings are illusions or representations of the human being alone. Only the human being has an essential relation to Being, and only he, through the possibilities of this essential relation, is able to rely on the last fundamental possibility called existence. Beings are beings not only because they are on their own, but also because human beings have the possibility of a configuration that is expressed as Being. They obtain a truth through the human being's ability to call them "there is". This "there is" is of course, not the sole condition that makes them exist, but this "there is" is the sole condition that makes them beings. Moreover, it is the human being who exists in the mode of existence that has the sole relation to this condition itself.

Thus, this is what we should come to understand when we speak of beings:
 The human being, the only being in the mode of Existence, constitutes an ontic sphere of reality through the possibility of an ontological configuration that we call Being. The human being is also part of this sphere and determines the other beings with whom he is in relation as beings.

There is no thought here that the presence or non-presence of any beings, for example, a number, a chair, an atom, or an angel, is dependent on the beings called a human being. They "are". Because the human being is able to say "there is" and to convey them to the logos through this "there is". This "there is" (or "is", "atoms are atoms", "the universe is infinite", and "water is useful") is the ontological possibility that makes them beings as beings, not that creates them. Furthermore, human beings are the only beings who can possess this ontological possibility. Therefore, Heidegger states that the ontic uniqueness of Dasein is found in its ontological character. Therefore, beings are not the sum of "things" or "objects" that are found in the world on their own or because of human beings, but the expression of the totality of the meaningful content of the experience that Dasein, an ontological being, constitutes with its ontological structuring possibilities.

At this point, the question "what is Being?" appears as an ontological question that Heidegger highlights. As Dasein, we are ourselves beings, and in front of us, in our thought, in our history, in our science, in our life, we are in a huge sphere of beings. Among beings, only Dasein can say "is", and only Dasein can ask questions about Being.

But is the Being that Heidegger is attempting to mention here something that goes beyond beings in terms of a universal, a genus, or an idea and is shared by them?

Just reading the introduction to "Being and Time" will be enough to see that Heidegger does not imply such a thing and does not consider his question from such a point of departure. On the contrary, Heidegger wants to annihilate this perspective.

According to Heidegger, the presuppositions of classical ontology about Being have prevented the question about it from being asked, and this question has been forgotten. This is because Being is not a universal that subsumes and includes beings, such as the concept of a genus. A particular being can be subsumed under a concept with other beings with which it possesses a common characteristic. However, when it concerns Being, there is no universal that organizes and determines beings like any genus. Because all beings are not beings by virtue of their standing under a universal concept designated as Being. Being indefinable and being a self-evident concept already prevents us in advance from any inquiry into Being and compels us to operate from within a presupposed formulation of "Being".

Heidegger initiates the question about Being from Dasein, the only being that can ask it. Therefore, what is pursued as the question of Being is itself the ontological horizon opened before us by the question one can ask about one's own being or the being of beings. Dasein is "ontological becomeness" itself, which provides the truth of the world of ontic experience.

So how does all this context that Heidegger has put forward function when it regards Kant's Copernican revolution? Where do ontic knowledge and ontological knowledge stand in the context of Kantian criticism?

In the preface to the B edition of the CPR, Kant states that a light dawned on all those who study nature when they discovered the "previously designed plan" to construct the experiment before conducting it. (Kant, 2000, 109). The researcher of

nature is not a student who learns from nature, but a judge who expects nature to respond according to this pre-designed plan to the experiment he has set up with the principles of reason. It is at this very point that Heidegger's ontic-ontological distinction overlaps with Kantian synthetic *a priori* knowledge.

“In the first place, the "previously projected plan" of one Nature in general determines in advance the constitution of the Being of beings, to which all questions that are investigated should be capable of being related. This preliminary plan of the Being of beings is inscribed within the basic concepts and principles of the Science of Nature to which we already referred. Hence, what makes the comporting toward beings (ontic knowledge) possible is the preliminary understanding of the constitution of Being, ontological knowledge. Mathematical natural science gives an indication of this fundamental conditional connection between ontic experience and ontological knowledge.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 7).

Heidegger refers to Kant's use of Baumgarten's definition of metaphysics in his lectures, and the definition is as follows: *Metaphysica est scientia prima cognitionis humanae principia continens*. Heidegger translates it as: "Metaphysics is the science which contains the first principles of what is grasped by human knowledge." According to Heidegger, this definition indicates not human knowledge but what is known by that knowledge. Thus, according to him, Kant attempted to constitute a metaphysics that seeks not the grounds of knowledge but the grounds of beings. Thus, Heidegger states that natural science in the Kantian context refers to the science of

beings, while metaphysics refers to the science of Being of beings. (Heidegger, 1997-2, 10).

Heidegger states that it is not an accident that Kant considers the natural mathematical sciences as the ideal of the science of beings. According to him, from antiquity until Kant and after, beings were first understood as beings belonging to nature, that is, as beings that is present at hand. Moreover, the science of beings has been seen primarily as the science of nature. Heidegger points out that mathematical natural science plays an important role in the problem posed by Kant. Because according to Heidegger, the problem is the question of the grounding of the possibility of the science of beings in general. Therefore, Heidegger claims that what Kant mainly wanted to examine was not the epistemology of mathematical natural science but the fundamental question of the possibility of the science of beings. (Heidegger, 1997-2, 30).

Thus, according to Heidegger, laying the ground for metaphysics means, in its wholeness, an unveiling of the inner possibility of ontology. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 8). It is precisely this point that reveals the connection of ontological knowledge, which makes ontic knowledge possible, with the Copernican turn. In other words, according to Heidegger, what we encounter in the change of presupposition proposed by Kant through the analogy of the Copernican turn is the presupposition that what makes ontic knowledge (knowledge of objects) possible is ontological knowledge. Therefore, the proposed change of presupposition toward metaphysics has an ontological ground.

Referring to the Copernican analogy in the preface to the B edition of the CPR, Heidegger makes the following interpretation:

“With this Kant wants to say: not ‘all knowledge’ is ontic, and where there is such knowledge, it is only possible through ontological knowledge. Through the Copernican Revolution, the ‘old’ concept of truth in the sense of the ‘correspondence’ (*adaequatio*) of knowledge to the being is so little shaken that it [the Copernican Revolution] actually presupposes it [the old concept of truth], indeed even grounds it for the first time. Ontic knowledge can only correspond to beings (‘objects’) if this being as being is already first apparent [*offenbar*], i.e., is already first known in the constitution of its Being.

Apparentness of beings (ontic truth) revolves around the unveiledness of the constitution of the Being of beings (ontological truth); at no time, however, can ontic knowledge itself conform ‘to’ the objects because, without the ontological, it cannot even have a possible ‘to what.’” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 9).

Here, we see that the Kantian proposal, which posits the presupposition that our knowledge does not conform to objects, but objects conform to our knowledge, is not distorted through conveying it to the context of Heidegger's ontic-ontological distinction but almost reproduced by not destroying the structure of the Kantian context. Heidegger states that the problem Kant wants to put forward is, in a brief way, how understanding conceives the real principles of the possibility of things. That is, how the subject can have the understanding of the Being structure of beings in advance. Heidegger says that Kant also saw the connection that he himself formulated in a radical and principled manner, which is this: beings are in no way accessible without an antecedent understanding of Being. This implies that the beings we encounter must already be understood in advance in their own constitution of Being. This conception of the Being of beings, this synthetic *a priori* knowledge, is crucial

for all experiences of beings. For Heidegger, this alone is the meaning of Kant's often misunderstood thesis, the so-called Copernican turn. The turn, according to which objects must conform to our knowledge, does not mean that real beings are interpreted and resolved in purely subjective representations. According to Heidegger, when Kant says that objects must conform to our knowledge, what Kant means is synthetic *a priori* judgments, that is, pre-ontological and, therefore ontological knowledge, knowledge of the constitution of Being of beings. The Copernican Turn, for Heidegger, simply says: that the ontic knowledge of beings must already be guided in advance by ontological knowledge. Rather than the dissolution of real beings into subjective representations, the Copernican turn revealed for the first time the possibility of access to the objects themselves. (Heidegger, 1997-2, 38-9).

In his Kant lectures in Marburg, Heidegger quotes the famous paragraph from the preface to the B edition of the CPR that begins with Galileo:

“When Galileo rolled balls of a weight chosen by himself down an inclined plane, or when Torricelli made the air bear a weight that he had previously thought to be equal to that of a known column of water, or when in a later time Stahl changed metals into calx and then changed the latter back into metal by first removing something and then putting it back again, a light dawned on all those who study nature. They comprehended that reason has insight only into It Itself produces according to its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its judgments according to constant laws and compel nature to answer its questions, rather than letting nature guide its movements by keeping reason, as it were, in leading-strings; for otherwise accidental observations, made according to no previously designed plan, can never connect up into a

necessary law, which is yet what reason seeks and requires.” (Kant, 2000, 108-9).

After this quotation, Heidegger remarks that Kant has seen the Platonic problem. It is this: underlying all beings is the principle of their Being. This conception, in turn, has allowed Kant to discover the central problem posed in his task of laying the ground for the science of beings in general. According to Heidegger, the instance of mathematical natural science has shown that reason resides in the science of beings. That is, in these sciences, something must be known *a priori*. In other words, in the science of beings, something about objects is already fixed before they are given to us. This fixing (*festsetzung*), which is *a priori* and independent of experience, makes it possible for these objects to be given to us as what they are. These *a priori* fixings or determinations precede all experience and are valid for all experience, that is, they make experience possible. (Heidegger, 1997-2, 32).

All these interpretations of Heidegger show that he formulates synthetic *a priori* knowledge as ontological knowledge. Heidegger grounds the knowledge which Kant determines as the knowledge of experience as ontic knowledge, that is, the knowledge of beings. Heidegger identifies synthetic *a priori* knowledge, which Kant determines as the knowledge that does not find its validity, justification or foundation in experience, that is, the knowledge that is not borrowed from experience but that provides the condition for the possibility of experience, that is, the knowledge that constructs our experience, as ontological knowledge, knowledge concerning the structure of Being of the beings.

“Knowledge which brings forth the quiddity [*Wasgehalt*] of the being, i.e., knowledge which unveils the being itself, Kant calls "synthetic." Thus the question concerning the possibility of ontological knowledge becomes the problem of the essence of *a priori* synthetic judgments.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 9).

Heidegger holds that Kant's question "how are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?" can be understood in the direction of his own inquiries as follows: "How is the preontological, respectively explicitly ontological, understanding of the Being of beings possible?". This understanding is based on the objectification of all beings in the sciences. Heidegger thus turns the question this time as follows: "how is regional ontology of a realm of beings possible?" (Heidegger, 1997-2, 35-6).

Heidegger states that ontological knowledge is making judgments according to foundations that are not necessarily taught according to experience. In this sense, the grounding of our judgments about Being and beings is not experienced since the experience of beings depends on the ontological understanding of beings.

Heidegger sees in the CPR the revelation of the essence of ontological knowledge and thus states that the revelation of the essence of pure reason becomes the revelation of the essence of ontological knowledge. This relates to Kant's determination of pure reason as our faculty of knowing *a priori* on the basis of principles. According to this determination, the principles of pure reason give the possibility of *a priori* knowledge. And if the possibility of *a priori* knowledge resides in the principles of pure reason, the revelation of the essence of this knowledge and the revelation of the essence of pure reason coincide, according to Heidegger. From this, Heidegger draws the following conclusion:

“The delimitation of the essence of pure reason, however, is at the same time the differentiating determination of its nonessence and, with that, the limitation and restriction (critique) of its essential possibilities. Laying the ground for metaphysics as unveiling the essence of ontology is ‘Critique of Pure Reason.’ It is ontological knowledge, i.e., the *a priori* synthesis, ‘for the sole sake of which the whole critique is undertaken.’” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 10).

In this context, Heidegger remarks that the term transcendental philosophy is merely another indication and formulation of the problem of ontology. He answers the question "What does CPR mean?" by saying that it is the laying of the ground for metaphysics as science. And in this answer lies the suggestion that the CPR is laying the ground for a science of beings in general. And this also means the following for Heidegger: CPR is laying the foundation for the building site of the science of beings in general. It lays the foundation for synthetic *a priori* knowledge itself. CPR is laying the foundation for the essence of this building site, that is, laying the foundation for relating to objects. This, too, is a transcendental investigation as grounding transcendental philosophy or ontology. (Heidegger, 1997-2, 35-6). Thus, Heidegger states that transcendental philosophy corresponds approximately to *Metaphysica Generalis*.

Kant identified knowledge as transcendent, which is concerned not with objects as far as *a priori* is possible, but with our manner of knowing them. Heidegger says that there is another form of synthesis in synthetic *a priori* judgments problematized here. Not our knowledge of the object itself, but knowledge of the

manner in which we relate to the object *a priori*, requires synthesis. The synthesis here must teach something about beings that do not emerge empirically from beings. The ontological determination of beings is temporarily grounded in the beings, and this grounding is experienced in the beings through empirical synthesis.

“It is now a question of elucidating the possibility of this *a priori* synthesis.

Kant calls an investigation concerning the essence of this synthesis a transcendental investigation... Hence, transcendental knowledge does not investigate the being itself, but rather the possibility of the preliminary understanding of Being, i.e., at one and the same time: the constitution of the Being of the being. It concerns the stepping-over (transcendence) of pure reason to the being, so that it can first and foremost be adequate to its possible object.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 10).

Heidegger sees a dominant relationship between the determination of the concept of synthesis and the problem of the justification of metaphysics. For in the CPR, the justification of *a priori* synthetic judgments is essentially the justification of synthetic unity and the act of synthesis that provides this unity. In the CPR, Kant treats the concept of synthesis in several senses. For Heidegger, however, these meanings are intertwined with the problem of grounding metaphysics, that is, the problem of constituting metaphysics as a solid science in the context of Kantian criticism. The problem of constituting metaphysics as solid science, that is, the problem of re-grounding metaphysics, stretches to the basic question of pure reason: "How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?".

“Now every judgment as such is already an "I connect": namely, subject and predicate. As judgments, "analytic" judgments are also already synthetic, even if the ground for the univocity of the subject-predicate connection lies merely in the representation of the subject [*der Subjektvorstellung*]. But the synthetic judgments, then, are "synthetic" in a twofold sense: first, as judgments in general; and second, insofar as the legitimacy of the "connection" (synthesis) of the representation is "brought forth" (synthesis) from the being itself with which the judgment is concerned.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 10).

Here we see an important determination of Heidegger regarding the essence of synthetic judgment. The determination that the synthetic judgment is synthetic because it is a judgment in the first place is correct because the judgment, as the *topo* of judgment, represents the field in which the interconnected elements are put into a statement. That is, since a judgment is the constitution of the subject-predicate relation through binding, it is synthetic as an act. However, the question "if every judgment is synthetic just because it is a judgment, do analytic judgments become synthetic judgments?" inevitably arises. In Heidegger's terms, an analytic judgment is synthetic because it resides in a subjectivity in which there is an act of "I connect". That is, although the analytical judgment does nothing but unveil a predicate that is contained in the subject from the beginning, that is, exposing the subject-predicate identity it contains, each judgment has become scientifically synthetic, even if not by definition because it turns into a subject-predicate unity corresponding to an "I connect". Heidegger should have elaborated on this point and deepened the grounding of his determination. However, he does not do this; he leaves the bomb in our laps and runs away. What can be said here, as a supposition, is that Heidegger's basis for making

this determination is the transcendental apperception, which is the basis of "I connect". Since the representation of the I, as an originally synthetic unity, is the basis of all the subject's acts of judgment, Heidegger might be saying that analytic judgment has "already" become synthetic because it resides there.

In this way, the structure that Heidegger has put forward in relation to Kant's Copernican revolution is revealed. The Copernican turn was a change of thesis proposed by Kant to metaphysics. This thesis maintained that our knowledge conforms not to objects but that objects conform to our knowledge. In other words, the condition for objects to be objects was determined as subordination to the necessary subjective conditions of the subject. These conditions were not found in experience but in the subject's purely subjective faculties. Heidegger saw in Kant's thesis change that he proposed to metaphysics the proposal to attain knowledge of the Being constitution of beings. According to him, ontic knowledge, which is the knowledge of objects, cannot be realized without ontological knowledge, and this ontological knowledge corresponds to synthetic *a priori* knowledge in the context of Kantian criticism. The synthetic *a priori* judgment, which "connects" to the subject a predicate not previously thought of in the subject, but which achieves this "connecting" not with the aid of experience but on the basis of subjective faculties independent of experience, is according to Heidegger, the knowledge of the principles of Being of beings, i.e. ontological knowledge, which predetermines our comportment towards being. Therefore, the inner connection between the Copernican turn and synthetic *a priori* knowledge renders the Copernican turn an ontological thesis change proposal, and the CPR as a whole turns into the justification of metaphysics as an intrinsic possibility of ontology.

“If its truth belongs to the essence of knowledge, then the transcendental problem of the inner possibility of *a priori* synthetic knowledge is the question concerning the essence of the truth of ontological transcendence... Ontic truth necessarily adjusts itself to the ontological. Accordingly, the legitimate interpretation of the sense of the "Copernican Revolution" is renewed. Hence, with this revolution Kant forces the problem of ontology to center stage.”

(Heidegger, 1997-1, 11)



CHAPTER 2

Heidegger on Transcendental Aesthetic

Before examining Heidegger's and Neo-Kantianism's views on Transcendental Aesthetics, it is necessary to take a brief look at the position and meaning of aesthetics in Kantian criticism. One of the main points on which the difference in interpretation between Heidegger and Neo-Kantianism is based is the approach to the transcendental aesthetic. As such, one of Heidegger's main criticisms of the Neo-Kantian interpretation is that it ignores the importance of the transcendental aesthetic section and consequently dissolves the element of sensibility or intuition into understanding. This point will be taken up later.

2.1. What is Transcendental Aesthetic?

Transcendental aesthetics is the first part of the doctrine of transcendental elements. The reason that it is the first part of the doctrine is simple. The conditions under which objects are given to the subject precede the conditions for thinking about them. However, what enables this precedence is revealed in the opening sentence of aesthetics. This is intuition. Kant's definition of intuition is as follows:

“In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate the objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition.” (Kant, 2000, 155).

Intuition has an important role in the investigation of transcendental aesthetics. This importance stems from both its providing immediate relation between knowledge

and object and its relation with the element of thinking. Intuition ensures the field in which the activation of thinking is possible. Our study here does not aim to repeat the aesthetic inquiry as it was put forward by Kant. The important point of our study is to reveal what the essence of aesthetic inquiry.

One of the most important discoveries of transcendental aesthetic investigation has been to deepen Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities with a more original distinction. Locke has asserted that primary qualities are in the object itself, and secondary qualities are in the sense organs of the subject affected by the object. In this sense, qualities such as sound, taste, smell, and color are not objective realities. On the other hand, Locke considers primary qualities such as space, motion, and form, which produce simple ideas in the subject, as the real qualities of the object. This is the point where Kantian investigation of aesthetics intervenes. When we abstract primary and secondary qualities from the object, certain qualities still remain. This is the formal being of the object, and these are the pure intuitions that allow empirical intuitions to be constructed. That is, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is nullified by the determination of pre-formal possibilities. On the other hand, it is disclosed that the center of the distinction is not the object but the subject because the place where this pre-formal structure resides is the mind and *a priori*. Hardness, color, and smell are not in the object but in the modifications of the subject who receives it through the senses. Properties such as substance, force, and divisibility are representations that subjective thinking attributes to the object. But when all this is abstracted away, what remains in the subject is extension and form. These are not actual objects of sensation and are peculiar to the mind. In this context, a new approach to transcendental aesthetics comes into play. The object is representation. Intuition, which constitutes the immediate relation between knowledge

and object, is based on the condition that objects are given to the subject. This requires an interaction between the object and the mind, which has continuity. This leads us to the definition of sensibility:

“The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility.” (Kant, 2000, 155).

Another unique aspect of the investigation of transcendental aesthetics is the original relation it builds between sensibility and the mind. This original approach shows that the immanent structure of sensibility as receptivity is not found in sensation or sense organs but is grounded in the immanent formality of the mind. In other words, the mind is not a purely mental or intellectual structure but a heterogeneous structure that enables the qualitative unfolding of *aisthesis*. For when the primary and secondary qualities of the object are isolated, the form that remains of the object finds its basis not in sensation or sense organs but in the prior formal structure that resides *a priori* in the mind and is related to sensibility. In this context, the transcendental aesthetics investigation is isolation. First, it isolates all concepts of understanding that pertain to sensibility. Secondly, it eliminates all that belongs to sensation in empirical intuition. Thus, two pure intuitions emerge that operate as preliminary possibilities in the representation of the object in relation to *aisthesis*.

2.2. Space and Time as Forms of Pure Intuitions

Space and time are the core themes of transcendental aesthetics, and its exposition of these concepts is considered a milestone in the history of metaphysics. The significance of the exposition on this issue is the great effort to overcome the traditional approach of metaphysics. The difference that transcendental aesthetic investigation has made on the question of space and time can, of course, be grasped through a retrospective overview of the history of philosophy.

For example, let us recall the debate about space between Leibniz and Newton's public representative Clarke. Although this debate seems to be a theological debate, it is fundamentally a debate about the conception of space. Leibniz thought that the Newtonian conception of absolute space reinforced materialist philosophies. On the other hand, he criticizes Newton's treatment of space as a sensorium of God. According to Leibniz, space is fiction, and there is no absolute space. Space is the order of the coexistence of objects, and without objects, there is no space. The Newtonian conception of space is based on the factual being of space. Space is absolute, one, that is, indivisible and infinite. Objects move relative to this factual and static space. More precisely, the observer perceives the spatial positions of objects according to this absolute and immovable space in which the objects exist as a medium. Demonstrating the position of Kant's new exposition of the concept of space in the context of this debate will give us a solid clue to the essence of transcendental aesthetic investigation. It has been said that Kant constructed his philosophy under the influence of Newton's conception of science. However, Kant's formulation of space suspends the absoluteness of the facticity of space. Space is not a sensorium in which objects move. Position, correlation, and directionality is not an order that we derive from the factual absoluteness of the space in which objects are located, but the order

of our sensible intuition that logically precedes the reality of space, that is, to operate the representation of pure space in subjective mediation as the possibility of spatial determination of objects. On the other hand, space in the manner defined by Leibniz, is not a relation between objects or the order of the coexistence of objects. For according to this approach, the existence of space is conditioned on the existence of objects, and space is nothing if there are no objects. The Kantian approach, on the contrary, shifted the concept of space from the object to the subject. In other words, space is nothing if there is no subject. This is because the correlation of objects or their spatial relations is not a consequence that we deduce from objects but rather a determination directed towards the object. For example, there is no directionality in the supposed factual existence of space. Subjectivity uses the directionality it determines through the representation of space to determine objects. Correlation is a form projected by our minds, and we follow objects in space with a coordinate system.

When time is in question, different approaches are presented in the history of metaphysics up to Kant. In his dialogue *Timaeus*, Plato defines time as an image of eternity. In the Platonic cosmogony, Demiourgos, who created a copy of the ideas, created time as a copy of eternity. Thus, time is a form that eternity takes in the visible world. Aristotle's determination of time has actually worked as a more effective formulation in the history of metaphysics. In physics, Aristotle defines time as the number of change in respect of before and after (219b). The first question to ask here is: what is the number of change? Of course, it is a measure. Time measures change, and change measures time. But who is the measurer? It is, of course, the *zoon logon echon* (animal that articulates speech) that measures objects in motion or stasis over time. In Aristotle's formulation, however, time is not a quality attributed to the *subiectum* or *obiectum*, but rather like a measuring instrument that gives us the

quantity of the relationality of objects in motion. In other words, we can follow the addition of the boundaries between the different successive states of objects in becoming (before and after) with the measurements given by time. This is also to follow the motion. In other words, time is the number that makes it possible to follow becoming and motion. But this is again possible within the motion, which is a phenomenon that emerges in *empeiria* (experience). One might ask here, is there time when there is no motion (and stasis is not absolute motionlessness, it is relative to motion)? We wait for the boiling water to cool down a little. In other words, we wait for the water molecules to gain kinetic energy and dissolve into the air. We need to measure this motion as a state change in the water. Because we are waiting for the water to cool down. After a certain period of time, the water drops to, for example, 80 degrees. The number of this state change is time. For example, the water dropped to 80 degrees in 10 minutes. We move from one point to another. For example, from one city to another city. We are in motion. Time gives us numerical information of the change of position between two points. This is *arithmos* in the Aristotelian approach. Time is the knowledge of the arithmetic measure of the boundaries that the object in motion has left behind and will overcome. The Kantian formulation of time, on the other hand, is not a measurement that roughly depends on motion. On the contrary, time in Kant is the representation under which phenomena in the broad sense and appearances in the narrow sense, that is, the structures of objects that are revealed by their adaptation to subjective forms, are organized. In other words, time is not the *arithmos* that is obtained by the following motion within the motion, but on the contrary, it is the form that allows us to follow motion as motion in appearances from the very outset. It is through the pure formality of the *arithmos* as succession that we

gain the possibility of attaining the arithmetical reciprocal of motion in *empeiria*. This possibility is the form of time. Kant expresses this in aesthetics as follows:

“The concept of alteration and, with it, the concept of motion (as alteration of place), is only possible through and in the representation of time - that if this representation were not *a priori* (inner) intuition, then no concept, whatever it might be, could make comprehensible the possibility of an alteration, i.e., of a combination of contradictorily opposed predicates (e.g., a thing's being in a place the not-being of the very same thing in the same place) in one and the same object. Only in time can both contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing be encountered, namely successively” (Kant, 2000, 179-180).

Kant's statement in this passage is that it is time that enables us to find a physical phenomenon, like motion itself, before we obtain the *arithmos* of motion in the appearances. It is the formal structure of pure succession as the time that gives us the Arithmos. Because the concept of change, which is an indicator of our ability to grasp motion, becomes possible through the condition given by the succession contained in subjectivity.

As said before, this introduction in comparison with the tradition, was intended to present the essential approach of transcendental aesthetics. We will now present the basic framework of aesthetics as laid out by Kant.

Kant describes transcendental aesthetics as a science of all principles of *a priori* sensibility. This clearly delineates the field of research. The principles of *a priori* sensibility are space and time. Kant treats space and time from two perspectives: metaphysical and transcendental. The metaphysical exposition reveals

what space and time are. The transcendental exposition shows how they make *a priori* synthetic knowledge possible. We will not follow Kant's argumentation step by step. We will only try to give the essence of his approach and the new perspective that emerged in transcendental aesthetics.

The most important hypothetical discovery of aesthetic research is that space and time are not empirical concepts derived from experience. Moreover, if they are not derived from experience, what is their place? Where do these two fundamental data of human experience find their source, and how do they acquire meaning and function in the field of experience?

In his "Confessiones", Augustine said of time: *Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio*. Let us add space to this statement. How can it be interpreted in the context of transcendental aesthetics that time (or space) is known when it is not asked what they are but not known when they require explanation? So we need something more about time or space than the data or context provided by ordinary or scientific experience. Because when we ask what time is, phenomena such as clocks, durations, calendars, or processes cannot give us a complete picture of time in terms of what it is. The interrogation as to where these predicates, which we attribute to particular instances in experience, are based on as more general frameworks remains with us as an inner remnant. Kant's distinction between outer sense and inner sense at this point is not in vain. This is because the contact with the data of experience has subjective engagements as internal and external. This engagement shows that the ultimate limit of what we learn about the experience is not the experience itself. The contact of subjectivity with the world and nature is revealed in a certain orderedness as soon as knowledge begins in experience. The

transcendental aesthetics inquiry, therefore, seeks to discover this orderedness by going backwards from the limit of experience.

Kant had stated that intuition is what provides the immediate relation between knowledge and the object. Intuition is sensual. However, sensuality is not only related to our outer structure but also to our inner structure. Therefore, the ultimate limit of sensuality cannot be our sensuality in experience. Because sensibility in experience already has an orderedness when the knowledge of experience begins. According to Kant, the foundations of this already given sensual orderedness are space and time.

Space and time are not empirical concepts derived from experience. Kant's reasoning for this is that spatial or temporal relatedness cannot be derived from objective determinations in experience. This is because the subject does not infer the locational differences from things themselves. Subject perceives objects knowing from the beginning that they are in separate spatial positions. Separateness is not a boundary drawn by experience but a boundary incorporated into the experience. We bring it into the experience. Therefore, experience operates with the spatial boundaries included in it. The same reasoning is valid for time. Temporal connections between things are transferred to experience. For example, the phenomenon of motion by itself is just motion. The knowledge of experience about the operation of motion arises when we introduce temporal structures into motion. This structure is simultaneity or succession. When clouds suddenly appear in sunny weather and it rains, we say "the weather suddenly clouded over and it rained". What does "suddenly" mean in this expression? In the inner operation of nature, it makes no sense at all. Clouds come and it rains. This is a purely coincidental event. But we make sense of the relation between the two phenomena on the grounds of succession. And this succession, the representation of time, informs us that the movement between the two events is very

rapid. There is no successive relation between the cloud and the sun. They are just in their own place in the causality of nature. They do not themselves decide the rapidity with which they will occur. Subjectivity, however, perceives these phenomena by projecting its sensible structurality onto them. The possibility of this perception is the representation of time, which is underlying, that is, residing *a priori* in the subjective mind.

The natural consequence of this first step is that space and time are necessary *a priori* representations. This is because we cannot eliminate space and time as originary in the mind. Even if we abstract the whole objective universe and appearances from space and time, they remain as mental remnants. For they are not the result of the actual presence of objects but their possibility.

Space and time are not discursive concepts but pure intuitions. They are not derived from the relations of things in a comparative way. The concept of a table is a roof under which every individual table is grouped. But there are innumerable tables of different types and functions. However, space and time are not universal concepts under which different spaces and times of different types and functions are subsumed. Every space where objects take up space is the same, that is, it is still space. Therefore, these different spaces are not parts of space but its limits.

“If one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot, as it were, precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather are only thought in it. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations.” (Kant, 2000, 175).

This argument applies to time as well. Time is a form of pure sensible intuition. This implies that it is not a universal concept derived from different times. According to Kant, there are no different times. There are parts of time. Time has only one dimension, Kant says. Because simultaneity applies to space, all spatial boundaries are at the same moment. However, the boundaries of time itself are not simultaneous but successive. In other words, neither space nor time is constituted something by bringing the differences between particular objects under a universal concept. For space and time are not derived from particular differences through abstraction, but rather they are the whole in which the actuality of particular differences is possible.

And after all these steps, the metaphysical exposition concludes with the thesis that space and time are represented as given infinity. Kant states that space is represented as a given infinite magnitude. Because all magnitudes are measured according to the representation of space as a given infinite magnitude. The representation of space as a given infinite magnitude means that it cannot be exceeded in an ultimate sense in itself and is only the possibility by which we measure all magnitudes relative to it. Space has no actual end limit in the ultimate sense. Each final magnitude representation has to be measured relative to the infinite magnitude representation given as a representation. The same is true when it comes to time. For Kant, the infinity of time is not an actual representation. The infinity of time is only the foundation that makes all temporal limitations possible. Every limit of time can be determined according to the representation of the infinity of time. On the other hand, all these possibilities of determination are not conceptual but intuitive. Because there is no conceptual derivation in these limitations. Concepts are not conceived as

subsuming an infinite set of representations within themselves. The set of possible representations is brought under the concept in terms of common property. The given infinite representations of space and time are therefore based on their residing in subjective sensibility as *a priori* intuitions.

After the metaphysical exposition, Kant moves on to the transcendental exposition of space and time. This is what is to be understood by transcendental exposition:

“I understand by a **transcendental exposition** the explanation of a concept as a principle from which insight into the possibility of other synthetic *a priori* cognitions can be gained.” (Kant, 2000, 176).

In what field do space and time, as pure intuitions operate synthetic *a priori* knowledge? According to Kant, geometry determines the properties of space as synthetic *a priori*. Because geometric propositions are apodictic, they do not emerge from the concept itself. The aid of intuition is involved. The intuition involved is a pure representation of space. The proposition that the internal angles of a triangle are equal to two straight angles is demonstrated not by the concept of the triangle itself, but by the addition to the triangle in intuition. Kant's conclusion in this context is the empirical reality and transcendental ideality of space. Space has no sense outside the determination of our conditions of sensual intuition. That is, it does not depend on things themselves. We are unable to intuit things on themselves without the representation of space, which is the form of subjective sensibility. For it is under this form that things appear to subject. This is what Kant calls appearances. Space is the form of all appearances of the outer sense. Thus, space is real in terms of the

conditions of sensibility of the human world. In other words, it has empirical reality because it is the constitutive condition of human experience. It is ideal only under conditions to which the human world has no access, that is, in the context of the impossible relation of the thing-in-itself to sensibility. For it is impossible for us to sense the existence of the thing in itself by transcending the conditions of subjective sensibility; we can only think of it through reason. Therefore, when the necessary condition of subjective sensibility is suspended, space is ideal and, in fact, nothing.

The transcendental exposition of time indicates that it is the basis of synthetic *a priori* knowledge in the general doctrine of motion. As we have already mentioned in this chapter, since the intuition of pure time is already present in the subject as a basic possibility, the concept of change and motion can be the object of knowledge. To be able to follow the motion and perceive change is based on the *a priori* containment of pure formal sequence in subjectivity. This is a possibility provided by the intuition of pure time. There is no necessary successive relation between the change and motion of natural phenomena. This relation is provided by the possibility of pure temporal succession, which allows us to attribute successive forms to phenomena.

In this context, Kant concludes that time does not depend on things and it does not subsist for itself. If it were a determination dependent on things themselves, time would be a condition that objects impose on human beings. However, time is a condition that man imposes on things and precedes things. Therefore, according to Kant, time is the form of the inner sense. Time is immanent to the human being. This shows that it is not related to external appearances. We cannot understand shape or position from a temporal perspective. However, Kant takes a new step after this determination. Since the intuition of time has no relation with outer appearances, the

subject bridges this gap by analogy. In other words, he tries to intuit time through a mediated relation with outer appearances. It constructs this mediated relation through analogy. It represents time by means of a line stretching to infinity. This shows that although the intuition of time belongs to the inner situation, it can be mediately expressed in the outer intuition. This possibility of representing the intuition of time in the outer intuition by analogy makes it the formal *a priori* condition of all appearances, according to Kant. (Kant, 2000, 180). Kant's primary grounding for this is that representation is essentially a mental determination. Representation, which is based on an outer object, is rooted originally in subjectivity in terms of being a representation. That is, the external world is not immediately but mediately inside the subject. But according to Kant, this "inside" is under the formal condition of time. Thus, time appears as a horizon of formalization that encompasses both the inner and the outer state.

The basic condition that determines the empirical reality and transcendental ideality of time is again the possible and meaningful limits of the human world. Time has no meaning and function outside the conditions of human intuition. We have no access to the knowledge of whether objects themselves are under a temporal determination. For time is the formal condition of subjective sensibility and the possibility for objects to appear to us. The empirical reality of time, like space, is valid with respect to human experience. In the realm of Appearances, time has empirical reality because it functions and has a reciprocal in the world of human experience. But beyond the limits of subjective form, we cannot know what it means, because beyond the subjective form is an impossible representation for human beings.

“Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensible, i.e., insofar as we are affected by objects), and in itself, outside the subject, is nothing.” (Kant, 2000, 181).

Hence the transcendental ideality of time arises from this point. Time is only ideal when the sphere of experience of the human world based on appearances is suspended. Ideality comes from the fact that time can be thought beyond the conditions of the subject who intuits it. In other words, the ideal time is actually an empty concept without intuition. Beyond the condition imposed by the subjective sensible form is the realm of ideal representation of time, and the rest is the realm of empirical reality.

What the doctrine of transcendental aesthetics basically offers us is that representations of space and time are based on subjectivity, both in terms of whatness and in terms of knowledge. That they do not exist outside of subjectivity does not mean that they are meaningless. What this reveals is that the human world is unable to go beyond the conditions of subjectivity, and this is not possible. Nor does this mean that the subject is a captive imprisoned in subjectivity. It only means that the world of experience rests on this foundation and that our acts of knowledge are actualized at this ultimate limit. On the other hand, the thesis that subjective forms of sensibility are the source of the spatial and temporal determinations we execute within the world of experience and that we act with the prior orderliness and organization of these forms as soon as experience begins, appears as a discovery of transcendental aesthetic inquiry. This discovery can be considered a retreat of the concepts of space and time toward an anthropocentric philosophy. However, this is not exactly the major

breakthrough Kant made. "To on" is given to man through a field of mediation characterized by the conditions that determine the whatness of man's *aisthesis*.

2.3. Heidegger on Transcendental Aesthetic

The chapter on transcendental aesthetics has a special significance for Heidegger. Because one of the main contradictions between him and the Marburg interpretation emerges through this chapter. According to Heidegger, transcendental aesthetics has an independent and central importance in the entirety of critique. Therefore, it has an indispensable position in terms of ontological knowledge.

At the very beginning of his interpretation of the section on aesthetics, Heidegger quotes from Paul Natorp's "Die Logischen Grundlagen der Exakten Wissenschaften". In the quoted passage, Natorp states (and this paper will take up these points later) that it is a mistake to prioritize space and time over thinking. According to Natorp, the proper place of space and time is the category of modality, that is, actuality. This interpretation is generally agreed upon by Neo-Kantian philosophers and is a characteristic orientation of the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant. However, for Heidegger, if logic is to be the center of critique, it will not be logic as understood by Neo-Kantianism.

"The fact that logic is at the center precisely because in this logic Kant discusses not only the interpretation of *thinking* but also the use of the whole of knowledge as *thinking intuition*, this indicates that neither "aesthetic" nor "logic" are appropriate titles for what Kant is basically dealing with."
(Heidegger, 1997-2, 53).

Heidegger emphasizes, however, that it would be equally incorrect to take the opposite approach, that is, to dissolve logic in aesthetics. The aim of the phenomenological ontological interpretation is to maintain the independence of both parts of the doctrine of transcendental elements and to reveal the basis of their unity.

Heidegger reformulates the distinction between empirical knowledge and synthetic *a priori* knowledge as a distinction between ontic and ontological knowledge. Therefore, the fundamental function of the aesthetic section in relation to the fundamental question of Critique, namely, how synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible, must be elucidated. This can be done by demonstrating the essential and primary role of intuition in the characterization of knowledge in general.

Heidegger states that the answer to the question "What is knowledge in general and what is its originary character?" is found in the first sentence of aesthetics. At the very beginning of the section on aesthetics, Kant writes as follows:

"In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition." (Kant, 2000, 155).

In this introductory passage, according to Heidegger, the essence of the relation between thinking and intuition is laid down by Kant. Knowledge, in general, is a relation to objects, and intuition provides this relation in an immediate manner. However, Heidegger's focus is on the phrase "in which all thought as a means is directed". According to Heidegger, this statement means the following:

“‘*All thinking*’ is only a ‘*means*’; and all thinking stands in *service* to intuition, is based on the intuition of objects, and serves only the interpretation and determination of what is rendered accessible in intuition.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 57).

Kant's determination of the relationship between intuition and thinking in this introductory passage of aesthetics is very important for Heidegger. According to him, in this determination, the relation between the elements of intuition and thinking does not indicate their functioning alongside each other but the inner connection between them. For thinking primarily and continuously serves what intuition is directed towards. That is to say, intuition's primary originary relation to objects determines the field in which thinking operates. Only in this co-operation do intuition and thinking acquire a common inner structurality based on reciprocal relation, according to Heidegger. However, Heidegger leads this interpretation to the following thought, which may be considered a distortion according to doctrinaire Kantianism:

“From this one could conclude that a reciprocal and indeed fully balanced relationship prevails between intuiting and thinking. As a result, one may say with equal justification: knowing is intuitive thinking, and thus at bottom [*im Grunde*] is certainly judgment.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 16).

This essential and primary structure of intuition in the characterization of knowledge and the fact that thinking is in the service of intuition indicates that, according to Heidegger, synthetic *a priori* knowledge is also primarily intuition. The natural consequence of this is that ontological knowledge is fundamentally and

ultimately intuition. Therefore, the question "how is synthetic *a priori* knowledge possible?" is turned to "what is intuition?". This leads to the question of the problem of time through the element of intuition in terms of Heideggerian interpretation. Therefore, phenomenological-ontological interpretation investigates the basic function of intuition as time in the construction of ontological knowledge. Because in transcendental aesthetics, pure intuition of time emerges as the encompassing formal possibility of inner and outer sense, moreover, all appearances.

The guiding question of Heidegger's interpretation of the transcendental aesthetics section is "what is intuition?". The important point in conceiving the element of intuition is the finitude of human intuition. Human intuition is not divine intuition as *intuitus originarius*. *Intuitus originarius* creates its objects. God does not think but intuits directly. However, human intuition is derivative. It is dependent on the givenness of objects and on receiving this givenness through intuition. Knowing being has a mode of relating to objects by being affected by the beings that intuition offers the possibility of givenness or encountering. The point Heidegger draws attention to here is that the essence of sensibility is not based on sense organs. Kant does not talk about the five sense organs. Sensibility provides the subject with intuition, and it is finite intuition. Because finite intuition requires the self-announce of beings that are already at hand. Subjective sensibility does not imply a sensualistic structure of receptivity. On the contrary, sensibility represents the preliminary possibility of objects being given to the subject. Colors, sounds, smells, or other qualities occur in adaptation to the mode of receptivity of the subject's sensible faculty. And this mode precedes these qualities. Our ear receives sound through a certain frequency. Actually, sound is a mechanical irregularity in the material environment. But our sensible receptivity encounters it in a certain form. Colors are

refractions of light, its absorption or reflection. The subject, however, perceives these differences on a certain scale according to the mode of sensibility. The mode of sensibility that enables the variety of outer effects to be given is finite because it is dependent on the variety being given to intuition. The possibility of sensualistic experience is provided by this prior mode, that is, by the form of intuition. According to Heidegger, this context reveals Kant's difference regarding sensibility:

“The organs that serve affection are thus sense organs because they belong to finite intuition, i.e., sensibility. With this, Kant for the first time, attains a concept of sensibility which is ontological rather than sensualistic.”
(Heidegger, 1997-1, 19).

Kant stated that intuition depends on the givenness of objects and that this is possible only if the object affects the mind in a certain way. In other words, the mind is affected in a certain way, not in an accidental way. And the capacity to receive representations through this certain mode of being affected, Kant defines as sensibility. According to Heidegger, this certain mode of receptivity is the finite sensibility that affects and determines intuition and makes it possible to encounter beings. Since thinking depends on the intuitively given in order to be able to think, it is under the inclusiveness of intuition in its relation to the object.

“Thus what is essential about knowing relatedness to objects becomes clear. Basically and primarily and in its ultimate objective, knowing is intuition and as such conceals thinking within itself as means for its determination.”
(Heidegger, 1997-2, 67).

One of the main motivations for Heidegger's interpretation of the aesthetic part is that he gives the element of intuition priority and superiority in the construction of knowledge. Concept and intuition are the basis of all our knowledge, and knowledge arise from their unity. However, Heidegger thinks that the structural priority of intuitive givenness is fundamental to the construction of knowledge. Intuition without concept is blind. But thinking is empty without intuition. That is, it is useless. Thinking needs intuitive givenness in order to function. But intuition continues to give us objects without the element of thinking. Let us consider the basic codes given by Kant for the equation of intuition and thinking in the context of the construction of knowledge. "Blind" and "empty". The blindness of intuition does not fundamentally nullify intuition. Subjectivity continues to contact the world through intuition without concepts. However, when thinking is without intuition (without content), that is, empty, and it is, so to speak, dead. It has no effect. Therefore, for Heidegger, intuition is the basis of thinking and the determination of the function of thinking.

Determining the function and role of intuition in synthetic *a priori* knowledge, of course, requires the distinction between pure intuition and empirical intuition. Heidegger advances his interpretation by focusing on this difference. Heidegger states that finite intuition refers to what is already extant, and in this context, this intuition is directed towards the effect coming from the object. The extant being encountered manifests itself through the effect it has. The effect is primarily sensation. Any object is presented in intuition with sense datums, and this is empirical intuition. However, with empirical intuition, appearances come into play.

Kant's determination of appearances is as follows: "The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance." The term Appearance (*Erscheinung*) appears as one of the fundamental concepts of Kant's philosophy. And it is one of the most debated concepts of Kantian philosophy in terms of the dichotomy it forms with the concept of the thing in itself. Appearances are given to us immediately, and it is intuition that is immediately related to the object in them. The term Appearance does not mean an illusion that is separate from things in the Kantian sense. This is also Heidegger's emphasis.

"Appearances [*Erscheinungen*] are not mere illusion [*Schein*], but are the being itself. And again, this being is not something different from the thing in itself, but rather this [thing in itself] is precisely a being. The being itself can be apparent without the being "in itself" (i.e., as a thing which stands forth) being known. The double characterization of the being as "thing in itself" and as "appearance" corresponds to the twofold manner according to which it [the being] can stand in relationship to infinite and finite knowing: the being in the standing-forth [*Entstandl*] and the same being as object [*Gegenstand*]." (Kant, 1997-1, 22).

Appearances are the extant things themselves that we encounter or discover in the world. In this context, Heidegger states that appearances are those encountered through finite intuition, whereas the thing in itself is the object of infinite intuition. Because finite intuition has no access to this "in itself". As Kant states in the *opus posthumum*, the thing in itself is not another object, but a different relation to the representation of the same object. According to Heidegger, the reason why the

Marburg school rejected the concept of thing in itself was that they thought of it with reference to the concept of being of ancient ontology. According to Heidegger, this is a misconception.

The "undetermined" in the determination of Appearance as the undetermined object of empirical intuition implies, according to Heidegger, that the object is theoretically and scientifically undetermined. "Undetermined" here does not mean that appearances are exempt from thought determinations. It means that they are undetermined in relation to the field of nature.

“Appearances are beings which are encountered in prescientific experiential knowledge.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 70).

In empirical intuition, the matter that appearances have is given as manifold through the senses. The object has a certain hardness, color, and smell. Heidegger thinks that the expression matter in this manifold, which Kant determines as matter of appearances, does not imply materiality. According to him, the matter here means real or what-content (*wasgehalt*). However, in empirical intuition, there is another regularity underlying the empirical manifold of the object as a "matter of appearance". The object becomes manifest in intuition under other determinations than qualities such as color, hardness, etc. The object has a position in the Extension. It is "there" or "here". It has definite boundaries, a dimension which establishes relational positions with other objects. It is here "now" at the same time as other objects. These determinations do not emerge from sense organs like color. However, the "matter of appearances" is in this type of organization. These determinations are present *a priori* in the mind, as Kant notes. However, the *a priori* presence of these determinations in

the mind leads to danger. This danger was exposed in the Marburg interpretation. Since these determinations are present *a priori* in the mind, they are taken as thought-determinations and based on categories. However, Heidegger states that for Kant these determinations do not belong to the element of thinking

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At this problematic point, Heidegger thinks that we should go one step beyond the traditional understanding of the concept of *a priori*. The concept of *a priori* means, of course, that which precedes experience and already lies within the mind. But on the other hand, it also points to the capacity of subjectivity to enable, to make possible. This is exactly why pure forms of intuition, which are independent of experience and sensation, lies at the basis of empirical intuition. As Kant stated in CPR, the manifold of sensory intuitions as appearances are intuited in a certain relationality under the forms provided by pure intuition. This is the point that Heidegger's phenomenological-ontological interpretation stresses with regard to transcendental aesthetics. In the construction of synthetic *a priori* knowledge as ontological knowledge, the elements of pure intuition have an essential meaning.

Heidegger will attempt to clarify some of the points left ambiguous by transcendental aesthetics through his interpretation. For example, according to him, concepts such as "intuition" and "representations" remain ambiguous in aesthetic inquiry. Therefore, determinations such as "pure intuition", "pure forms of sensibility" and "original representation" should be clarified. Another point that needs to be

clarified is whether space and time as forms of pure intuition are also things that are intuited. Accordingly, the issue of "form of intuition" and "formal intuition" should be clarified.

Heidegger first interprets the metaphysical exposition of space and time. For him, metaphysical exposition means pure analysis of the essence of space and time. In his interpretation of exposition, Heidegger follows Kant's order of argumentation. Space and time are not empirical concepts. Because space is not something that is extant. Rather, it is the basis that provides the possibility for extant things to be extant. Therefore, we do not find space as something extant in extant things. "If I look for space 'under' what is extant, I have already found space." (Heidegger, 1997-1, 79). This reasoning is also valid for time. The possibility of something extant being presented to me simultaneously in perception is realized through the possibility provided by the prioritizing presence of time in the subject. Time cannot be obtained by abstracting from external experience. On the contrary, it enables me to follow the occurrence of external experience in a formal order. As Extant, things appear in formal relations such as here, there, now, and then, with space and time lying at the basis as functions.

Space and time are *a priori* necessary representations. This is because they are independent of experience and arise from the mind itself. They are not attributed as *accidens* or relation to extant things. Nor are they properties of them. We can remove all extant things from space and time, but we cannot mentally eliminate space and time, that is, we cannot represent the absence of space and time. Space and time are not discursive or universal concepts but pure intuitions. This is the third thesis of Kant's metaphysical exposition. According to Heidegger, this thesis requires a clarification of the concept of pure intuition. Space or time does not have the relation

of a universal concept to the singular object to which it pertains. Individual space or times are limitations of space and time and not parts of them. That is, space or time are not predicates attributed to individual space or time. Universal concepts are determined and obtained through predicates. Space and time are not a genus or a sum, they are essentially one, whole. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 81). They are therefore given only in intuition as *representatio singularis*. Space and time as singular and unifying wholes must be determined as pure intuition since they are given prior to empirical experience.

The fourth thesis of the exposition argues that space and time are conceived as a given infinite magnitude. In this thesis, Heidegger is primarily concerned with the concept of magnitude. Heidegger states that the concept of magnitude in Kantian terminology refers to something like largeness and that Kant used the Latin concept of *quantum*. But here, *quantum* does not refer to quantity. Because the category of quantity is based on comparison and is relative to the categories of plurality and totality. On the other hand, magnitude does not imply a relation to the magnitude of something very massive. In other words, the magnitude of space and time is not relativity that enables magnitude comparison. According to Heidegger, quantum or magnitude refers to largeness, which means providing the basis in general for something that is very massive. It is the magnitude that makes it possible to determine the magnitude of something that is specifically big. Because magnitude itself as largeness is not big or small. The representation of space and time as a given magnitude means that they are the underlying unity that allows something to be determined as big or small. They are magnitude because this totality cannot be reduced to parts.

The other point Heidegger addresses is the infinity of space and time. Here again, the concept of infinite means that the wholeness of space and time cannot be reduced to parts. Even the largest parts of space and time do not allow us to reach their wholeness. Because even in their largest parts, they are fundamentally found as wholeness themselves. We get the largest part by extracting it from their totality. But this still does not bring us to their end. For the wholeness of space and time is not an actuality to be attained through the parts but the possibility that enables the actuality of each part. Heidegger concludes from Kant's metaphysical exposition that space and time are both pure intuitions and modes of intuiting.

“Summing up these four stages of the metaphysical exposition of space and time, we see clearly, not only that *space and time* are modes of *intuiting* and not only modes of intuiting which occur in the mind *independent of experience* but also that these intuitions have something which is being intuited. For in the third and fourth stages of the exposition it is explicitly stated that space and time are unified wholes and as such are *given*. ‘Given’ here obviously means ‘intuited in a pure intuiting.’ Space and time are thus each a mode of pure intuiting and at the same time something intuited. They are a pure intuiting which does not need any determination in terms of sensation. Rather this intuiting makes possible such determinations.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 83-4).

Another crucial point here, according to Heidegger, is that space and time are not objects. This means that they are not ontically extant. That is to say, they enable ontic things. The significance of space and time in terms of ontological differences will be made apparent through their phenomenological analysis. At this point, it is

necessary for Heidegger to address the main contradiction between him and the Marburg school, namely the issue between the form of intuition and formal intuition.

Heidegger states that the forms of intuition are, for Kant, the arrangement of the sensations encountered. In this respect, forms are those in which there is possible order or disorder. However, this should not be seen in a way that leads to a misunderstanding of the relation between form and matter. The form is not a container into which matter is filled. Because the classically form-matter relation is the reciprocal relatedness of content and form, Heidegger holds that formulating the relation of form and matter in this way is futile for understanding Kant. Kant points out in the CPR that the concepts of form and matter are concepts of reflection. The matter signifies determinable, the form its determination. (Kant, 2000, 370). What Heidegger wants to reveal phenomenologically is how form, as the determination of the determinable, can operate with respect to space and time. In this context, Heidegger focuses on how space and time determine the manifold in advance. Spatial or temporal relations are not things that are attributed to objects. The accidental or chaotic states of things come into order through the forms of subjectivity that precede these states. But this depends on the givenness of a certain unity in advance. After encountering objects, we do not say that they are next to each other, in front or behind. They are already next to each other under the determination of form, and the unity that makes this possible is the preceding unity of form. The form of pure intuition as a preceding ordering possibility determines empirical intuiting, that is, matter.

“That space and time are forms of intuiting means that they are primarily ways of determining how intuiting is to occur, namely on the basis of the non-objectifiable viewing in advance of what constitutes the purely next to one

another, or purely subsequent to one another. These pure relations are in themselves a whole and are given as such.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 89).

The point to be noted about the forms of intuition is that the forms of intuition are the factors that determine the manifold encountered in intuition, as well as that they themselves are intuitions as the determining factor. Therefore, according to Heidegger, form as a determining factor is not the execution of understanding. Kant's paraphrase of the formal intuition constituted by understanding reveals critical importance at this point. Because based on this, the Marburg school subordinates space and time to categories and thus to the determining factor of understanding.

The distinction between the form of intuition and formal intuition appears in the note to Chapter 26 of the Transcendental Logic. The points Kant emphasizes in this note are as follows. When space is represented as an object, as we do in geometry, it requires more than the mere form of intuition, it requires a summation, a summary of the manifold, that is, formal intuition. The form of intuition gives the manifold, and formal intuition gives the unity of representation. However, Kant states that this unity of sensibility presupposes a synthesis that does not belong to the senses and that understanding determines sensibility. (Kant, 2000, 261). Based on this note, which states that formal intuition is determined by understanding, the Marburg school attempts to make the forms of space and time intrinsic to understanding. However, according to Heidegger, no such interpretation can be derived from this note. On the contrary, according to him, this note preserves the independent role of space and time as forms of intuition.

What causes ambiguity in Kant's note is how to deal with the synthesis presupposed by the unity given by formal intuition (the unity of representation). Kant indicates that space and time are first given as intuitions through this synthesis. If the act of synthesis is attributed to understanding, the Marburg interpretation emerges. Heidegger argues that the synthesis Kant mentions here is related to the synopsis he used earlier. Heidegger also associates the concept of synopsis with the concept of *syndosis*. Because according to him, the synthesis Kant refers to in the note is not the synthesis of concepts but the synodical?? character of space and time. In the giving of the manifold, there is an intuitive synthesis before the concepts. This synthesis is the antecedent togetherness of the unity of space and time as a whole. It should be noted that Kant states that in geometry, we represent space as an object. However, space as a form of pure intuition, is not an object. It is a given infinite magnitude. This implies that space is not reducible to its parts but that every actual part is its limitation as a given magnitude - that is, as a single wholeness. That is, it is a possible form that cannot be exhausted. The space that geometry takes as its object expresses the scientific determination of this form of pure intuition. But this determination requires the synthesis of the wholeness of pure intuition.

“Space is represented in geometry as object (Gegenstand) and ob-ject (Objekt).

This means that, through an objectification, space as originally given is now something in-tuited, which presupposes the original wholeness. The geometrical representation of space is a formal intuition, i.e., a form of intuition which is determined by forms of understanding or categories.

Therefore this representation is thus categorically determined according to

understanding is not the original intuition of space -i.e., the form of intuition- but a derived representation.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 94-5).

Heidegger's interpretation of the difference between the form of intuition and formal intuition is the exact opposite of that of the Marburg school. While space as pure intuition gives the manifold, it gives the manifold through its original wholeness, that is, through its syndotical unity.

According to Heidegger, the synthesis presupposed by the unity of representation is the synthesis that expresses the preceding unity of pure intuition. Geometry takes space as its object on the basis of this syndotical??? unity and acquires the unity of the geometric representation of space through the formal intuition formed by the limitations of space (point, surface, line).

“So the formal intuition that Kant discusses is founded on the form of intuition. This distinction makes it clear what Kant means (on my interpretation): This possible pre-viewed basis-on-which, which is constantly unthematic in ordinary experience, can be thematized; and when it is thematic, it is a delimited field of objects proper to a specific science, namely, geometry.” (Heidegger, 2010, 245).

2.4. Transcendental Exposition

Metaphysical exposition revealed the whatness of space and time. They are pure intuitions. The transcendental exposition shows how these pure intuitions are the basis for synthetic *a priori* knowledge.

Stating that space and time are the sources of synthetic *a priori* knowledge, Heidegger emphasizes that propositions concerning space and time function in different fields. The synthetic *a priori* propositions (ben yerinde olsam ‘proposition’ yerine judgement ifadesini kullanırdım çünkü propositionlar judgementlar’ın kendisinden ziyade içeriklerine analitik felsefede tekabül ediyor) that are made possible by the pure intuition of space are actualized in the field of geometry. But time propositions are the components of the doctrine of pure motion. Knowledge of the mode of alteration is constituted by *a priori* propositions provided by pure time intuition. In pure intuition, there is pure succession. The projection of the formal structure of pure succession that precedes experience allows us to capture the positional alteration of something extant.

“Only in the horizon of successiveness can I understand something like motion. Only in the horizon of time is the transition from something to something graspable.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 97).

However, Heidegger articulates that the knowledge from which space and time as pure intuitions originate is ontological knowledge. Synthetic *a priori* knowledge as ontological knowledge is the basis for the possibility of certain ontic knowledge. Nevertheless, Heidegger considers that time plays a more fundamental role than space in enabling ontological knowledge and synthetic *a priori* judgments. In fact, the phenomenological-ontological interpretation of the aesthetic section also focuses on clarifying the primary role of time and how this occurs.

Why does time acquire *a priority* in relation to space? For Heidegger, this is based on the difference between the inner sense and outer sense. Indeed, Kant states in

his chapter on aesthetics that space is the form of the outer sense and time is the form of the inner sense. Space, as a form of the outer sense, is related to external appearances. Its function is to determinate entities such as shape, position, and boundary. Time, conversely, is related to inner senses, that is, to inner determinations such as representation, mood, and state. Inner states are sensed through the pure sequences given by the intuition of time. However, Kant states that time relations can be represented in the external intuition by analogy. We represent time, which is not related to external form, in the external intuition by analogy. We represent the time sequence through a line that stretches to infinity. (Kant, 2000, 163). It is precisely after this determination that Kant expresses time is the *a priori* formal condition of all appearances in general. For Kant states that the representations regarding appearances, whether inner or outer, are the determinations of the mind, and under this condition they pertain to the inner state. Since the inner state is under the formal condition of the intuition of time, all appearances are under the formal condition of time. For Heidegger, this determination of Kant is a clear indication of the priority of time over space.

“Thus time is the formal condition *a priori* of both inner and outer appearances. Thus time is given priority over space, because space is the formal condition of the physical, while time is the formal condition of both the physical and the psychic.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 101).

However, Heidegger considers that there seems to be a contradiction between the unrelatedness of time to outer appearances, as posited by Kant, and the time is the *a priori* formal condition of time of all appearances. The question is what reconciles

the first thesis with the second. The things that have physical extension are outer appearances and are not subject to temporal determination., However, the formal condition of all appearances, whether outer or inner, is time. Kant seems to have resolved the correspondence between the two theses through the originary relation of representations to modifications of the mind. He would even mention this again at the beginning of the deduction chapter in the first edition of the CPR. The point to note, according to Heidegger, is that outer appearances are not immediately intra-temporal, they are related to temporal formality through mediation. With the thesis that time cannot determine outer appearances, Kant only denies the immediate intra-temporality of physical objects. Rather than the object of outer intuition itself, the outer object as representation is indirectly subject to time determination. For the place of origin of representation is the mental structure of subjectivity.

“Among the representations are found those which, as representations, also allow beings to be encountered which are not the same as the representing creature itself. Hence, Kant's reflections take this path: Because all representations, as states of representing, fall immediately in time, what is represented in representing belongs as such in time. By the digression into the immediate within-time-ness of representing, a mediate within-time-ness of what is represented, i.e., of those "representations" determined through external sense, is given. Hence, since the external appearances are only mediately within time, in one sense the determination of time belongs to them and in another sense it does not.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 35).

The point that Heidegger's phenomenological-ontological interpretation of transcendental aesthetics underlines has already been made. Space and time are intuited as the given infinite magnitudes, but according to Heidegger, Kant has left this approach incomplete. For Heidegger thinks that space and time are also and primarily a manner of intuiting in advance what is encountered. In this context space and time as pure intuitions are “*basic comportments of human Dasein*, as the “determinations of our mind,’ of subjectivity.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 106).

Apart from these, another important point to be understood about transcendental aesthetics for Heidegger is the transcendental ideality and empirical reality of space and time. However, according to him, the comprehension of this point is related to the conception of the finitude of intuition. Because according to Heidegger, finitude is a characteristic inherent to our existence, Hence, the finitude of Dasein can be shown radically by going outside of Dasein itself. The ontic intuition enabling Dasein to encounter objects is possible on the basis of pure intuition. Pure intuitions are thus the sharpest indexes of Dasein's finitude.

So how does Heidegger interpret the reality of space and time in this context? According to Heidegger, the fact that space and time are real does not mean that they have extension. Space and time belong to the factual character of objects and are real in this sense. Space and time are real in the sense that they are the reception of objects not in themselves but through the mediation of subjectivity. According to Heidegger, identifying the real in the Kantian sense with having extension in the sense of being actual is a great mistake, and this mistake was made by the Neo-Kantians as follows:

“The neo-Kantian epistemological interpretation totally mistook the significance of reality and identified it with actuality, that is with what is objectively real. Correspondingly, the neo-Kantian interpretation mistook "objective" in the sense of intersubjectively objective reality. Kant's 'objective reality' was interpreted as follows: By 'objective reality' Kant means the constitution of objective knowledge as an inner process of thinking, so that out of this process there emerges, so to speak, a knowledge which applies objectively to what is real or what is actual. This interpretation is pure fantasy! 'Objectively real' means belonging to the factuality of objects, objects, and appearances. 'Empirically real' means the same: belonging to the factual character of objects insofar as they become accessible to us through empirical and finite experience.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 107).

The empirical reality of space and time does not mean absolute reality. The fact that they are objective, that is, real, through the mediation of subjectivity may seem like a contradiction at the first glance. However, they are real and objective because they are generalities that enable subjectivity to make appearances the objects of the field of experience. Thus, the subjective formality of temporal and spatial relations reflected in appearances produces the sphere of objectivity in which subjectivity operates through universal propositions. What suspends the absolute reality of space and time is their transcendental ideality. That is to say, space and time are nothing but the conditions of subjectivity's receptivity. Kant mentions this occasionally in transcendental aesthetics. They are transcendental because they are related to subjectivity's *a priori* mode of knowing. Only when subjectivity, which is their carrier, vanishes do they cease to have any meaning in terms of appearances and

experience. Ideality derives from their belonging to the totality of the structure of subjectivity. We cannot know whether objects are themselves subordinate to space and time because “[A]s finite existing Dasein, we know beings only insofar as they are disclosed to us. And only within these limits are they a possible problem. We cannot at all say that things themselves are in space and time.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 108).

Another point to note about the subjectivities of space and time is that their subjectivity should not be understood as subjectivity based on the senses. Relativism based on the psycho-physicality of the subject does not apply to the subjectivity of space and time. Such an approach also results in a false formulation of the distinction between things in themselves and appearances. Heidegger emphasizes the example of rainbow and rain given by Kant. We can think of the rainbow that appears after the rain falling on a sunny day as appearance and the rain as a thing in itself. However, this is to treat the distinction ontically. When we consider raindrops in themselves, we arrive at their shape and their relation to the space into which they fall. And arriving at this shows that the subjective formal conditions of the receptivity of our finite intuition are as valid for raindrops as they are for rainbows.

“Hence the distinction between appearance and things themselves cannot be illustrated on the basis of the difference between sense qualities and spatial determinations. As something spatially extant, rain is an appearance no less than the rainbow. For ‘appearance’ simply does not mean something like a random way of conceiving on the part of the subject. The term appearance

means beings themselves, what is extant from out of itself and what announces itself as such.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 107-8).

Transcendental aesthetics is of crucial significance for Heidegger's phenomenological-ontological interpretation. However, in terms of the doctrine of elements, the isolation and inquiry of sensibility in the first place are not sufficient to show the basis on which the unity of ontological knowledge is rest. Nevertheless, aesthetics is special in that it demonstrates the ontological knowledge requiring pure intuition. Human intuition is finite, and this finitude lies in the fact that space and time as pure intuitions are subjective formal conditions. Subjective existence constitutes the plane of objective experience, which it establishes as the sphere of nature, primarily by translating things to itself in forms of pure intuition. The immediate contact of subjectivity with objects is through intuition, and it is the formal order of pure intuitions of space and time that precedes objects allowing this contact to take place in an orderly, systematic, and meaningful way. The inquiry of transcendental aesthetics is of crucial significance in that it reveals that subjective sensibility requires certain preliminary structures, i.e. that the perception of *to on* requires the pre-formal conditions that make perception possible. Indeed, in this context, the task of transcendental aesthetics for Heidegger is the following:

“The ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ has as its task to set forth the ontological αἰσθησις which makes it possible ‘to disclose *a priori*’ the Being of beings.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 36).

In terms of the question this study pursues, it will not be sufficient to consider Heidegger's interpretation of transcendental aesthetics alone. For Heidegger considers Kantian philosophy as ontology in a special kind of unification between intuition and thinking and temporality as the factor of subjective constitutive that enables this unification.

However, the ground that allows Heidegger to interpret Kant's philosophy basically as an ontology in his research on transcendental aesthetics can be presented in terms of providing a general framework. First of all, transcendental aesthetics does not deal with sensibility on a sensualistic basis. That is to say, the sensual relation with *to on* is not based on *empeiria* but on the whatness of the aesthesis of subjectivity. However, this whatness is not a transcendental structure, but the possibilities that participate in *empeiria* and that are grounded in the inner structure of subjective aesthesis. This inner structure is characterized by space and time. That is, the whatness of subjective *aisthesis* is space and time as forms that make *empeiria* chronological and topological. Space and time are not *to on*, the Kantian doctrine of sensibility is therefore ontological.

In "Being and Time" Heidegger states of Kant that "...he was bringing the phenomenon of time back into the subject again...". This statement provides a clue to the way the phenomenon of time has been treated in the history of metaphysics. The presupposition is that our knowledge of time is conformed to objects. In this sense, the Kantian Copernican turn is also employed in the inquiry of aesthetics. The object can be a matter of knowledge by conforming to the subjective temporal form. In this sense, time is reformulated not in terms of the objectivity of *to on*, but as the implication of the *subiectum* and the reflection of this implication. Schopenhauer

expressed this very succinctly as follows: “Thus before Kant we were *in* time; now time is in us, and so on.” (Schopenhauer, 1969, 424).

So what does it mean ontologically that time is brought back to the subject or that it is now within us? This is related to the whatness of the subject's structure of sensibility. For temporal or spatial determinations are determinations conditioned by the whatness of subjective *aisthesis*. And these are realized in *scientia* as the ontic knowledge of the contented fields.

This brief summary will be elaborated in the interpretation of Heidegger's interpretation, which will be linked to the concluding thesis of this study.

CHAPTER 3

Chapters that Form the Foundations of Heidegger's Ontological Interpretation in CPR.

The main motivation pointing Heidegger's ontological interpretation in Kant are imagination, apperception, and schematism. These motivation points emerge comprehensively in the CPR starting from *The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding*. However, this section has been modified in the B edition of the CPR. Heidegger describes this change as a fundamental shift in direction for Kantian criticism. Before examining Heidegger's ontological interpretation concerning these fundamental chapters, we will first try to clarify what is meant by the presentation of the Deduction of the Concepts of Understanding in the two editions of the CPR and the Schematism of Pure Concepts of the Understanding.

3.1. The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding (A Edition)

We can state that objective reality (Objektive Realität) for Kant implies being with content. In other words, when we mention objective reality, we are speaking of the field of objectification formed through the unity of intuition and concept. Being with content means a thought that has found its intuitive counterpart. That is not not a mere thought because a mere thought does not express objective reality. It is an abstract logical form. And an experience that cannot fall under pure thought or categories has no objective reality, it is blind intuition.

In the Deduction of the Concepts of the Understanding, Kant's aim is to demonstrate that these concepts have objective realities, that is, objective correspondences. Moreover, it is to prove that these concepts are constitutive elements of our experience rather than abstract entities in our minds.

However, there is a point to be asked here. Both Paul Guyer and Peter Strawson ask why Kant introduces an episode of transcendental deduction on this point when the metaphysical deduction has already shown that categories are the elements of pure thought that enable an object to be thought. Strawson gives an interesting interpretation on this issue. According to him, the transcendental deduction is of course an argument, but it is also an explanation, a description, and a story. Earlier we had the ingredients of transcendental drama. Now we want to know how the drama is played out. (Strawson, 2006, 86).

Nature, as something constructed by understanding, is an outcome. It is a different thing to learn its story. Therefore, according to Strawson, in transcendental deduction, this story is narrated and an explanation is given.

Guyer, on the other hand, reveals what deduction is obliged to show with a quotation from CPR [A93]. Here Kant states that experience includes concept as well as intuition. In other words, concepts are also present as *a priori* conditions on the ground of the knowledge of experience. Thus, to demonstrate that an experience is possible through these concepts is to show that they have objective validity. Furthermore, Guyer says that Kant rejects this interpretation in the deduction section of the second edition of the CPR. We now have an experience that depends solely on understanding. Guyer adds that the transcendental deduction is not an irrelevant repetition of the metaphysical deduction. According to him, Kant's argument as whole proceeds in two steps. In the first, he wants to show that every knowledge of objects involves categories, and in the second that categories apply to the whole of our experience. (Guyer, 2010, 121-2)

Kant says that we find the pure thought contained in every experience in the categories. (Kant, 2000, 227). That is to say, according to Kant, in every experience,

there is necessarily the pure form reflected by the subject. Experience necessarily contains an element that comes from outside itself. This element is the *a priori* concepts, the categories, which are the foundations of the subject's act of objectification. Kant considers the proof that an object can only be thought through categories to be a condition for proving their objective validity. However, this statement is ambiguous. Do we seek to find out whether the categories have correspondents in experience or to show that any object cannot be thought without them?

Understanding is a faculty of knowledge and must be related to objects.

Inquiring into the possibility of this correlation is the same as inquiring into the *a priori* basis of experience. The significance of the Deduction part of edition A is this: it inquires into the subjective sources that constitute the *a priori* grounds of the possibility of experience. What does this mean? To investigate the objective realities of categories in terms of the transcendental nature of the subjective sources that form the *a priori* basis of the possibility of experience. The subjective source is the subject's experience-constitutive *a priori* structure itself. Through these subjective sources, Kant presents three modes of synthesis. The unification of receptivity and spontaneity is the basis of this threefold synthesis. In the section on deduction in edition A, the concept of synthesis fully comes to the fore. We see that what is synthesized are representations as modifications of the mind in intuition. In this section, Kant presents a three-phase process of synthesis: the *Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition*, the *Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination*, and the *Synthesis of*

Recognition in Concept. It is important to understand what this threefold synthesis is.

3.2. The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition

Kant commences this section with what he calls a general statement, a commentary. This is about time. Our representations, whatever their source, stand under the formal condition of the inner sense, that is, time. As modifications of our mind, our representations, whether *a priori* or empirical, are subordinated to time, and these representations are collectively ordered, connected, and brought into relation to time. (Kant, 2000, 228). This determination, which was made as a general note at the beginning of this chapter, is parallel to the prioritization of the intuition of time in Transcendental Aesthetics. In Transcendental Aesthetics, while space and time are determined as forms of pure receptivity, time is determined as the formal *a priori* condition of all appearances. For Kant considers all representations as belonging to the mind. The presence of objects in spatial relations is mediately in the temporal relations. Spatial relations are the subject's determination of external objects in forms such as next to each other, one after the other, successively presented... etc. However, the objects determined in spatial relations in forms such as juxtaposition or succession are all at the same time or at different times. Many objects that we determine in relation to juxtaposition appear at the same time. However, we do not use spatial relations in our representations of the inner sense. The possibilities for our inner representations to appear cannot be through spatial forms. This can only arise from forms of temporal relations. The mere expression "I am here" implicitly contains the condition of temporal form. "I am here" means "I am here now". In this way, phenomena are also encompassed by this formal condition. Because phenomena are

given to the subject under this condition. All of man's psychic life, all of his acts can appear before man only with the possibility given by the formal condition of time. Recollection is subordinate to this formal condition. A psychic presence in itself does not signify anything to us. The time of that psychic presence makes our psychic presence meaningful. In any case, linguistic forms of expression do not allow us to abstract them from the temporal-formal condition.

Therefore, the subject is under the determination of time as an encompassing formal condition. It is only through the possibilities provided by the formal condition of time, that is, through the forms of temporal relations, that the subject can acquire nature as an object and render it a field of knowledge, as well as confront its inner life, its soul, its mind, make sense of them and construct them as objects of knowledge. The law of causality, which is the basis for constituting nature as a field of knowledge, is essentially a temporal form. Event 'A' is followed by event 'B'. 'A' is the cause of 'B'. However, this succession shows us the fact that we can make sense and object of nature in the formality of one thing following another. The formality of succession requires temporal formality.

It is no coincidence that Kant begins the synthesis of apprehension in intuition by noting that all our representations, whatever their source, are meaningful under the formal condition of time. This is because the synthesis of intuitive apprehension refers to obtaining a whole by distinguishing the manifold in intuition in a time sequence. Kant puts it this way:

“Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another.” (Kant, 2000, 228).

Unification and representation of the manifold in intuition depend on the mind's ability to distinguish time in the series of impressions. What does this mean? Kant first assumes the manifold in intuition as a series of impressions. That is, what intuitively without the binding and regulative act of the subject itself is a stack of sensations. However, the subject encounters this stack, not as a stack but placed in a certain sequence. To encounter it in sequential order means to grasp each individual sensation by casting it into the mold of a temporal sequence. Intuitions that appear in succession become a single representation, a synthesis, in this succession, as the mind accomplishes temporal distinction. This is because the mind unifies the direct contact of intuition with objects and the manifold, which is the range of this contact, by saying "this" and "this" and "this". But time as a purely formal condition is the basis of this unification. Heidegger says that in distinguishing time, the mind constantly and in advance (from the beginning) says "now and now and now" in order to be able to encounter "now this" and "now that" and finally "now all of these at once". (Heidegger, 1962, 184-5). It is only by distinguishing the now that it is possible to run through the impressions and then take them together. In a series of impressions, the distinguishing of time is the distinguishing of the now. Without this, as Kant points out, every representation would be contained in one moment and there would be an absolute closedness. In other words, each representation would be distinct from the each other, absolute closedness that could not be unified. The temporal pure form apprehends each impression to the subject both in the 'now' and in the connection of these 'now's' to each other through temporal succession. The subject penetrates into the manifold with the 'now' of each impression, each sensation, and connects them all to each other in the form of temporal succession. The mind apprehends each

impression through the pure temporal form, that is, both in the 'now' and through the connection of these 'now's' to each other through temporal succession. The subject penetrates into the manifold with the 'now' of each impression, each sensation, and connects them all to each other through the form of temporal succession. This is what Kant calls the synthesis of apprehension in intuition. Later in this chapter, in A120, Kant states that we have an active faculty for the synthesis of the manifold, which he calls imagination. Kant defines apprehension as the action of this synthesis, and therefore of the imagination, the active faculty that enables this synthesis, exercised immediately on perceptions. (Kant, 2000, 239). Heidegger interprets Kant's statement as the grounding of the synthesis of intuition in the power of imagination. This interpretation seems to be correct when we look at the marks left by Kant.

3.3. The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination.

The synthesis of reproduction in the imagination is the synthesis that ensures that the act of unity remains undistorted in the sequence of representations as we move from the previous representation to the next, that is, as we apprehend multiple representations one after the other. In this section, Kant first argues that this synthesis presupposes a rule under which appearances stand and that our empirical imagination is able to function on the basis of this rule. There are no constantly altered objects in front of the subject. That is, the world as appearances has a state in which the mind can follow them in a certain sequence. Otherwise, our empirical imagination would not be able to represent the object in its absence and create a unifying synthesis.

The synthesis of reproduction in the imagination is thus the activity that enables us to retain the previous stage in the series of impressions while constituting unity. Kant states that this synthesis is inseparably connected with the synthesis of apprehension in intuition. (Kant, 2000, 230). The synthesis that gives unity to intuition was realizing in the series of impressions through the unifying formal condition of time. In other words, impressions could be apprehended in pure temporal form as a succession of 'now's. The synthesis of reproduction in the imagination can be seen as the retention of each 'now' as 'no longer now', again in its pure time form, and the unification of the transition to the next 'now'. Each 'now' is retained as 'no longer now' and this retention allows us not to lose the previous one in the transition to the next 'now' and to reach the unifying synthesis. Reproduction requires an *a priori*, pure foundation. For without the actual presence of the object, the mind is able to reproduce the object as if it were in that actuality.

It is a natural consequence that the synthesis of apprehension in intuition and the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination are inseparably connected. While the synthesis of apprehension in intuition gives intuitive unity to the mass of impressions as the distinguishing of 'now's in the form of pure temporal succession, the distinguishing of each 'now' entails the retention and reproduction of each passing, gone, no longer 'now' in connection with the next 'now'. For the act of unification requires the temporal distinguishing of each actual moment into 'now's' as well as the retention of each 'no longer now' and its reproduction when the new actual 'now' is apprehended. It is no coincidence that people whose acts of retention, that is, whose memories are damaged, also lose their unity of self. This is related to the loss of the synthesis of reproduction and the emergence of each 'now' as a new 'now' in the subject. In case of memory loss or damage, although the mind continues to encounter

empirical data, it cannot perform the activity of objectification because it loses the act of reproductive synthesis. This implies that reproduction in the imagination has a pure or *a priori* ground and makes this reproduction of appearances possible as the *a priori* ground of the necessary synthetic unity of appearances, as Kant puts it. Therefore, the reproductive synthesis of the imagination depends on the transcendental activity of the mind. That is, this synthesis belongs to our activity that constitutes our *a priori* mode of knowledge of objects.

3.4. Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept

In this section, Kant analyzes the unity of consciousness and the unity obtained by the object, the world, and beings through this unity. In the first paragraph of the chapter, Kant actually speaks about the root act, which ensures the formal unity of consciousness. The consciousness that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before. In fact, this point may seem to lead us back to the act of retention. But what does it mean that what we think (this means something we think) is exactly the same as what we thought one step before when we thought it? Kant then goes on to state that without this consciousness, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain. So what is the same here does not seem to be a sameness like the identity of the previous representation of consciousness and the representation produced immediately after it. In other words, Kant is not mentioning a situation like the identity of two successive objects in a sequence. What Kant is suggesting here is that the mind produces representations gradually, that this production leads to the unity of a sequence of representations, and that each step of the synthesis that gives unity has a formal identity. Our consciousness does not lose what it thought a moment ago because it has an action that constructs the new phase it passes through a moment

later with a formality identical to the formality of the previous phase. Kant gives the example of counting. If, while counting, we forget to add the units hovering in before our senses successively to each other, the very concept of number cannot arise. “for this concept consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis.” (Kant, 2000, 230-1). The consciousness that repetition continues in each new unit, that is, the formal identity of what is repeated in the new phase with what was repeated in the previous phase is the basis of the unifying synthesis act of consciousness.

One of the basic daily experiences in which the human mind loses consciousness that, in Kant's terms, what is thought is exactly the same as what was thought a moment before is fainting. We are not talking about very long fainting. Even in momentary blackouts, when consciousness comes back, it cannot identify the point from which it came because the previous temporal point in the sequence has fallen from thought. Therefore, for a few seconds, the mind cannot identify and make sense of the moment of reawakening. When the sequence starts to work in the mind again and one remembers the retroactive identity from the previous point of the point that fell from the thought, or more precisely, when one regains the formal structure of the consciousness of unity, which is the basic act of consciousness, one realizes that one has fainted.

From the second paragraph onwards, Kant states that the word ‘concept’ can guide us at this point. This is because the word ‘concept’ contains the process that yields the concept from the outset. In other words, when we say "this is a concept", we imply step by step what is intuited, that is, the manifold, and its reproduction, and finally the consciousness that unifies it into one representation. In other words, the concept is the name of the consciousness that organizes all this capacity-forming process, together with the signification of its content. Kant states that this

consciousness can be weak in the mind. So we can recognize this consciousness in its effects. The mind already maintains this functioning in its spontaneity.

In the next paragraph, Kant says that what is meant by 'an object of representations' needs to be made clear. This paragraph is actually the essence of Kantian epistemology. Appearances cannot be taken as objects in themselves. They are sensible representations. Therefore, we cannot speak of an epistemic object in itself. This is because we cannot encounter the object from the outside of the conditions of the subject's receptivity and spontaneity that allow it to manifest as an appearance. These are the conditions that nullify the subject's ability to be known the object as it is in itself. Thus, the object is actually X. Something to consider in general "since outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could set over against this cognition as corresponding to it." (Kant, 2000, 231). The subject's knowledge does not find an object to correspond to apart from the conditions of space and time that the subject possesses. Knowledge determined by the conditions of space and time corresponds to an object determined by these conditions. But the object also has a being in itself that is exempt from these conditions. But since the subject cannot abstract the conditions of space and time from itself, it cannot access the object's being in itself exempt from these conditions. If we are seeking this correspondence of knowledge to the relevant object, as Kant states, then the object of this correspondence is X.

Nevertheless, it is the object that gives unity to our knowledge, and secures it from contingency and arbitrariness, and determines it *a priori* in a certain way. Kant holds that the fact that our knowledge is related to objects brings with it a necessity. Necessity does not come from the object itself. It comes from the subject. For the subject's knowledge can become knowledge when it constitutes its relation to the

object. This shows that the object is a field of objectness produced only by the forms that the subject projects onto it. This is precisely why, after this paragraph, Kant states that the unity which is necessary for objects to conform to our knowledge is nothing other than the formal unity of consciousness:

“It is clear, however, that since we have to do only with the manifold of our representations, and that X which corresponds to them (the object), because it should be something distinct from all of our representations, is nothing for us, the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the representations.” (Kant, 2000, 231).

There is a transcendental condition that underlies necessity. Kant states that this condition is transcendental apperception. Apperception is the transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness. Just as space and time, as pure forms of possible experience, underlie intuition, so apperception, as the pure original condition, underlies the unity of consciousness, that which makes possible the synthesis of the manifold of our intuitions, the concepts of objects, and all objects of experience as objects of knowledge to consciousness. While Kant mentions a unity necessitated by the object, he considers the condition for this unity not as in the object itself, but as in the projection of the formal unity of our consciousness onto the object. The object cannot produce unity by itself. Kant puts apperception as the pure original condition on the basis of this formal unity of consciousness. For the synthesizing act of unity in the subject must be based on a formal ground, namely pure, original, unchanging consciousness. This is the definition Kant gives. Is this consciousness the

consciousness that the mind is identical with itself? If we look at Kant, the answer seems to be a 'yes' because he uses the definition as "the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself" (Kant, 2000, 233). One of the main reasons for this can be thought to separate Kant himself from psychologism. It seems possible to separate the formal unity of consciousness from the changes and transformations experienced by the personality and the ego in the empirical context by assuming it as a pure ego on the ground or in an origin that precedes these changes and transformations. However, it cannot be said that Kant subjected the issue of apperception to a clear and step-by-step grounding as he did with space and time. Space and time are pure forms underlying the manifold of intuition; and Kant himself grounded this by explaining the reasons for assuming the structures of spatial and temporal relations that must precede experience. That is to say, he grounded it on the assumption that what makes it possible for us to perceive things simultaneously and at different times is that the pure form of time, as temporal succession precedes our perception of things. However, we do not encounter such a clear justification for apperception. Apperception is determined as the pure self on which the formal unity of consciousness, allowing it to project onto objects and objectify them in unity, is based. Apperception is the consciousness of the identity of the mind's function. This function of the mind is the synthetic unification of the manifold into the knowledge. In other words, while the mind gives synthetic unity to the manifold, it is at the same time conscious of the identity of its act within itself. That is, it both gives unity to the manifold and is conscious about that the possibility of giving unity to the manifold is based on the pure unity of itself. "[F]or the mind could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this *a priori*, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its action" (Kant, 2000, 233).

Thus, Kant grounds the synthesis of recognition in the concept on apperception. For Kant puts *a priori* space and time at the basis of intuitions, i.e., as the pure ground that enables intuitions to become possible objects of experience and apperception as the original and necessary consciousness of self-identity at the basis of the consciousness of the necessary unity of the synthesis of appearances according to concepts. Apperception is the consciousness of formal identity that says “I unify”, “I represent”, and “I objectify”. This is the basis of the statement “The ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations”.

So what do these three modes of synthesis Kant puts forward tell us? How can we relate these three modes of synthesis to the grounding of the objective reality of categories? The aim of the chapter on the deduction of categories is to show that these *a priori* elements of our thought have some correspondence in our experience. So where does the grounding that, for example, a category of unity or a category of necessity has such correspondence in experience standing in the context of the three modes of synthesis? The answer to these questions will be given after the parts of the deduction section of the edition A that continue after the three modes of synthesis. However, we may say the following at the outset: As in Chapter 10 on categories, Kant has described the process that constitutes *a priori* knowledge. The process is carried out through these three modes of synthesis. However, it is questionable as to whether describing the process of the formation of *a priori* knowledge reside in the subject and proving that this knowledge has a correspondence in experience are the same thing.

3.5. Provisional Explanation of the Possibility of Categories as *A priori* Knowledge

Kant commences this section by giving a formal definition of experience. The thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions constitute precisely the form of experience. He then adds that this is nothing but the synthetic unity of appearances according to concepts. (Kant, 2000, 234). This in fact corresponds precisely to what Kant determines as the object of experience. Appearance is the manifestation of the transcendental object X in the subject. The unification of this manifestation with the concepts of understanding into one knowledge is the subjectivity that constitutes the object of experience. Kant continues the reasoning that he constantly produces.

Although the synthesis produced by the subject is recognized by the subject as a unity according to empirical concepts, Kant assumes that this must be based on a transcendental unity because he thinks that the necessary character of knowledge has a necessary connection with the pre-experiential ground. Since the subject is able to construct the object of experience through its own regulative acts, the elements of universality and necessity, which are assumed to come from these regulative acts, are taken as the basis of the empirical recognition and organization of the subject. Kant, therefore, considers the *a priori* conditions of possible experience and the conditions of the possibility of objects of experience as being identical. The *a priori* conditions of possible experience are actually rules of construction. That is, they are the conditions that make experience possible. These conditions are space and time as the forms of pure intuition and categories as the elements of pure thought. Possible experience can only be constituted on the basis of these conditions. Such an experience made possible by these conditions also means the experience that has acquired its objective correspondence (to what?), that is, the experience that has constituted its object. Kant says that categories are the conditions of thought in possible experience. The other conditions of this possible experience are the conditions of intuition. Kant thus

determines categories as the fundamental concepts for thinking objects in general for the appearances. (Kant, 2000, 234). Kant grounds their *a priori* objective validity here. Appearances have a direct relation to sensibility. That is, the relation of appearances to the pure forms of our receptivity is different from their relation to our faculty of understanding. Objects have a natural state given to sensibility even without the faculty of understanding. That is, objects are in relation to our receptivity independently of the conditions of our thinking about them but there is no object given without categorical concepts of understanding. However, the fact that objects remain in their form of receptivity as appearances cannot constitute experience. These appearances must also be organized by bringing them under the elements of pure thought, that is, *a priori* concepts. Otherwise, it is of course possible for intuitions to remain in sensibility on their own, without being subject to the conditions of thought, but it does not make sense. Kant's demonstration that categories have objective correspondences seems more like a logical legitimization of the dualism (intuition-comprehension) assumed by the Kantian ground than proof. What we see here, rather than a proof, is the logical deduction that if experience involves the conditions of intuition, it must also involve the conditions of thought, because experience is constituted by the combination of these two conditions. But this is a different discussion. Kant then grounds the possibility or necessity of the categories, together with all appearances and sensibility, in the originary apperception. Here we see pure apperception, that is, pure identity-unity consciousness, as the ground on which all the regulative acts that constitute the Kantian subject are based. Kant states that all possible appearances belong to the whole possible self-consciousness as representations. (Kant, 2000, 235).

This determination is actually to ground the epistemic subject in the wholeness of self-consciousness. For all possible appearances as representations mean experience and the conditions of intuition and thought it includes. A possible appearance as representation means the embodiment of the conditions of pure intuition and pure thought in the subject. From this, we can say that Kant links all knowledge to the wholeness of self-consciousness. Kant states that the grounding of nature in subjective apperception seems absurd at the first glance. For, as an objective field of knowledge, it would seem logically contradictory to base such a field on a purely subjective ground. However, as a field of knowledge, nature is the sum total of appearances. In other words, it is a unity formed by the conditions of the subject's intuition and thinking. In Kant, objectivity is subjectivity. Subjectivity, also, is not relativity located as opposed to the objective, but a constitutive structure that carries universal and necessary connections to the object field. In other words, nature, which appears as an objective field on its own, is the sum total of appearances translated into the subject's spectacles. Thanks to the unity-identity consciousness it possesses through its originary self-consciousness, the subject projects unity into this field, which it translates to itself as nature as a sum of appearances. Kant conceives the bringing of nature into the unity, and the *a priori* and necessary knowledge of this unity as the natural consequence of the structure of this subject as he put forward. It is because Kant sees no locus outside the subject from which universal and necessary connections can be deduced. A universal unity of nature and its synthetic propositions cannot be deduced from the objects of nature themselves. According to Kant, the empirical only describes what is. The empirical tells us that A is followed by B. But Kant thinks that one must go one step beyond this for knowledge. This is to abstract what experience tells us. Experience tells us what is, but it does not tell us that we

have to abstract it, and it does not tell us the universal and necessary elements that give the required form to this abstraction. We project these elements onto what experience tells us and then abstract it. This abstraction does not come from the natural objects themselves. Natural objects operate in their contingency. The seasons change, the planets move along their paths, and animals mate when it is time to reproduce, but man participates in all this with a representation of unity that comes from the sources of his own thought. Under this idea of unity, he makes sense of recognizing, and operating with the laws he constructs on the basis of universality and necessity. If the unity that the subject determines as the sphere of nature did not come from the ground of the subject's originary unity but from the objects of nature themselves, the subject could not intervene in nature with forms of lawfulness that are beyond the reach of its experience. If the unity that the subject determines as the sphere of nature did not come from the ground of the subject's originary unity but from the objects of nature themselves, the subject could not intervene in nature with forms of lawfulness that are beyond the scope of its experience. It would always remain at the limit of empiricism, which describes what is and could extend its knowledge in so far as this limit would allow. According to Kant, such a thing is not possible since to remain within the empirical account of what is means to remain in contingency. So experience also includes what might not be so from the very beginning. This is the basis of the inability to derive a category of necessity from experience itself.

3.6. Deduction of the Concepts of Pure Understanding / Section 3

Kant maintains here that he will now present in a connected and unified way what he has explained separately and individually in the previous chapter. Kant had

mentioned three subjective sources of knowledge: Sensibility, imagination, and apperception. These three sources have empirical representations. But these sources are also the *a priori* foundations that make their empirical representations possible. Sensibility represents appearances empirically in perception, but all perception is *a priori* grounded in pure intuition. That is, it is pure succession as pure intuition of time that makes possible the organization of perceptions as representations in the subject. The imagination empirically represents appearances in association and reproduction. But the *a priori* basis for association and reproduction is the pure synthesis of the imagination. The pure formal synthesis, which gives the consciousness that the previous phase in the series of representations is the same as what is encountered in the next phase, makes reproduction possible. Apperception is represented in recognition of appearances, that is, in the empirical consciousness of the identity of the reproduced representations with the appearances that give them. But pure apperception is also at the basis of this recognition. That is, the thoroughgoing identity of oneself in all representations from beginning to end, this *a priori* basis, makes the empirical consciousness that recognizes appearances in reproduced representations possible. (Kant, 2000, 236-7). So what does the objective reality of categories have to do with this process that Kant presents through the threefold synthesis phase? The process Kant describes through the threefold synthesis phase is the revelation of the subject's knowledge of experience and its revelation as objectivity. This unfolding also carries within it the effect of categories. The determination of the foundation of the last phase and even of the three phases with the consciousness of identity on pure apperception and pure apperception involve categories, namely, the pure concepts of understanding. Therefore, the subject's experience-forming process also contains the pure elements of the thought that this experience-forming process encompasses. The

end of this process is the obtaining of the object of experience. And since the object of experience contains the pure elements of thought of the process that gives it, these pure elements of thought acquire their objective reality. Now the critical point is this: the connection of our representations has been revealed through the threefold synthesis phase. If we consider the inner ground of this connection through the unity of the necessary knowledge for the experience of all these representations, Kant proposes apperception as the point where all these come together and says that we should start from here. (Kant, 2000, 237). In other words, the connections of representation put forth through the threefold synthesis find the unified knowledge that provides experience in their unification that emerges in pure apperception. Kant determines that the condition for representations to be meaningful is that these representations are connected to one consciousness, i.e., that they are contained in one consciousness. And this also includes our intuitions as our representations. To put into words differently, our intuitions, which are determined under the forms of pure space-time, are also nothing unless they are unified in one consciousness. Consciousness, on the other hand, basically operates unconsciously or *a priori* through the motor of its identity. Kant, therefore, attributes the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition to pure apperception. Kant is not interested in whether this pure apperception is actual, explicit, or implicit. However, he necessarily attributes the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge to this faculty. In fact, this is roughly to determine *cogito* as formal self-consciousness without content. The principle of identity is constituted as the pure ego of the subject as formal self-consciousness is fixed as the possibility of systematic knowledge production under an act of unity that organizes all representations. But Kant takes a further step after making this fixation. The synthetic unity connected to the pure apperception - the synthetic unity of our representations,

including our intuitions - presupposes or includes a synthesis (it is unclear why Kant uses these two words since the notions of presupposing and including have very different meanings). This presupposed or included synthesis is the synthesis of the imagination. Kant goes on to say that if the synthetic unity of the manifold in the subject is as *a priori* necessary, then apperception must also be an *a priori* synthesis:

“Thus the transcendental unity of apperception is related to the pure synthesis of the imagination, as an *a priori* condition of the possibility of all composition of the manifold in a cognition. But only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place *a priori*; for the reproductive synthesis rests on conditions of experience. The principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination prior to apperception is thus ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially that of experience.” (Kant, 2000, 238).

This is perhaps the most important part of the deduction section in edition A. Heidegger also sees it in this way. In this section, Kant explains the necessary connection of the faculty of understanding to the appearances through categories in two ways: The first way is what he calls top-down, that is, from pure apperception to the empirical, and the other way is bottom-up, that is, starting from the empirical to the pure apperception. What is being analyzed here is the pure synthesis. And the above quote implies that apperception presupposes a synthesis. Apperception is the pure foundation that gives the principle to all our representations and also to the synthetic unity of intuition. But apperception, like our senses, cannot produce the synthesis itself. It is the productive imagination, namely the power of pure

imagination, that provides this synthesis. The dependence of pure thought on pure intuition is achieved through pure synthesis, i.e., through the synthesis of the productive imagination.

What needs to be kept in mind at this point is that the process of the formation of knowledge is roughly or easily understood as having two stages. Accordingly, since our immediate relation to objects is through intuition, it is as if the object is first given to our sensibility and then operated upon with the concepts of the faculty of understanding. The reason for such a conception comes from Kant's identification of intuition with immediacy and the faculty of understanding with mediacy and this is because intuition is a singular representation that is immediately related to its object whereas concepts as general representations mediately related to their objects. However, the fact that objects are first given to us through sensibility, and that this giving of objects to sensibility would remain even if there were no faculty of understanding, does not mean that there is a mechanical and gradual formation of knowledge in the subject, such as first passing through the compartment of sensibility, being taken into the faculty of understanding, and from there being worked out with pure concepts. Pure sensibility and pure understanding are already related to each other. Their unity in forming knowledge does not imply that they follow one another. What should be considered is the function that relates these two different structures in unity to each other. And this function is pure synthesis. We do not see that Kant arrives at this unifying function (apperception) through the inner operations of pure intuition or pure thought. The faculty of pure understanding has a necessary relation to pure intuition, but these two sources have different structures and are not reducible to one another. Despite this irreducibility, the necessary relation that has emerged (because knowledge is the unification of these two) necessitates an intermediary

structure. It is this intermediate link as a pure synthesis that is analyzed in the transcendental deduction section.

Kant analyzes this pure synthesis in the chapter on deduction, in which he expounds on the connection of the faculty of understanding with appearances through the categories in two paths, from the pure to the empirical and from the empirical to the pure. The aspect of the subject that realizes this synthesis is neither intuition nor the faculty of understanding. This synthesis belongs to the imagination of the soul. The faculty of imagination can actually be said to be Kant's invention. Because this power was included in Kantian criticism as a structure attributed to the soul by Kant and solving the irreducibility of pure intuition/pure understanding. Regarding intuition or sensibility, determining the pure forms of intuition can ultimately still be presupposed through empirical representations of intuition. To claim that the faculty of understanding is based on pure concepts seems to be justifiable since we are dealing with a human mind that operates with concepts. However, pure imagination and its productive synthesis are presupposed on the basis of the necessity of the coexistence of pure intuition and the faculty of understanding, whose structures are completely different from each other, but which are united in constituting knowledge. If knowledge is the unity of intuition and concept, the unity of these two sources, which cannot be together because of their structure, necessitated an intermediate faculty, which Kant determined as a blind but indispensable function of the soul.

Kant thus relates apperception and imagination to each other. However, there is no synthesis of reproduction in the imagination. Apperception stands as the *a priori* condition for the subject to unify the manifold in knowledge. That is, the unity of the subject's representations is only possible through the consciousness of its pure identity. The *a priori* I lie at the basis of subjectivity as a structure of continuous

possibility. It is not something that is constantly unfolding in the ego in actuality. On the contrary, it is the *a priori* continuous possibility that enables the subject to be capable of doing at every moment of the subject's actuality. Kant argues that the subject cannot conceive of objects in unity without presupposing the pure formal grounding of this "standing and lasting I". This *a priori* ground of unity is the ground on which the whole manifold in the subject (all our representations, including intuitions) also acquires the principle of unity. Kant, however, makes simple reasoning. If the unity of the manifold in the subject is synthetic, then there is a synthesis. The unity of the manifold of representations is synthetic in the subject. That is to say, this unity is not a predicate already contained in the subject itself, but something the subject attaches to itself, and it is realized *a priori*. All representations are brought into unity through the subject's constructive rules preceding experience. This *a priori* synthetic unity thus necessitates an *a priori* synthesis. This synthesis does not emerge from either intuition or the faculty of understanding. This synthesis is realized by the imagination that relates these two elements together. Kant says something very important:

“The principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination prior to apperception is thus ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially that of experience.” (Kant, 2000, 238).

Here it is clearly stated that the faculty of imagination precedes apperception. However, the context of this prioritization is not made clear enough by Kant. That is, in what sense the principle of the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the faculty of imagination precedes apperception is not clearly stated. However, since Kant

establishes a relation of necessity between apperception and pure synthesis, there is a unity of pure imagination and apperception in terms of the pure form of all possible knowledge. That is, since the unity of apperception is fundamental to the possibility of all knowledge, and since apperception presupposes or includes a synthesis, and since this synthesis is the function of pure imagination, the synthesis of imagination is the pure form of all possible knowledge. Thus, Kant says “The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding, and this very same unity, in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, is the pure understanding.” (Kant, 2000, 238). So the pure faculty of understanding is apperception as it finds before it the pure synthesis of the faculty of imagination. Apperception expresses the unity of my consciousness. It also expresses the synthetic unity of all my representations. But since the synthesis that brings me this synthetic unity is neither my senses nor pure apperception, it is the imagination as a function of the soul that makes this synthesis.

Kant had shown that there are three syntheses that establish subjectivity and the knowledge of experience. Together with the synthesis of recognition in the concept, that is, the synthesis in which apperception is revealed as the pure ground, he revealed the axis of the faculty of pure understanding. In other words, the faculty of understanding, which is one of our sources of knowledge, was based on apperception as a pure ground, just as sensibility is grounded on pure intuition. This implies that the ground of the faculty of understanding is apperception. And if apperception presupposes or includes a synthesis, if this synthesis is executed by the imagination as an *a priori* synthesis, then it is comprehensible to determine apperception as the faculty of pure understanding in relation to this synthesis. However, Kant's motive for establishing this equation is to pass on to the categories. Because according to him, the

pure synthesis of the imagination also includes categories. In this way, the relation of categories to appearances is explained in terms of apperception.

From A120 onwards, Kant proceeds on the second way of explanation, that is, the way of explaining the necessary connection of the understanding with appearances through categories, starting with the empirical one. Kant begins this section by explaining appearance, perception, and imagination. He defines perception as the binding of appearance with consciousness. However, Kant states that it is the faculty of imagination, not the senses, that unites the manifold contained by appearance. (Kant, 2000, 239). Since the diversity of senses, i.e. the manifold, contained by the appearances are separate and dispersed in the mind (i.e. different perceptions), the power of imagination is determined as the factor that achieves their unification, i.e. their synthesis. In other words, the faculty of imagination is a faculty that organizes our perceptions in the mind. And Kant calls the action of the imagination exercised immediately on perceptions apprehension. There are two points here that affirm Heidegger. The first is related to time. It is to be remembered that before introducing the three modes of synthesis, Kant made a preliminary remark as a general observation. This was that all our representations, whether their sources are inner or outer, as modifications of the mind, stand under the formal condition of the inner sense, that is, under time. The basic formal condition that organizes, binds, and relates information is time. Here, the power of imagination is put forward as the faculty that unites perceptions that are separate and dispersed in the mind on their own. Therefore, it is possible to see the faculty of imagination as related to time, and even identical since they do the same function. The second point is related to apprehension. Kant designates the action of the imagination exercised immediately on perceptions as apprehension. In other words, the synthesis of apprehension in intuition is the result of

the action of the power of imagination exercised immediately on perceptions. We have seen that the synthesis of apprehension in intuition is the apprehension of the succession of pure now. Distinguishing time in the series of impressions. This point again reveals the temporality structure of the power of imagination. In other words, it is possible to deduce these two points on which Heidegger bases his consideration of the power of imagination as temporal synthesis from the inner procedure of Kantian criticism.

However, apprehension as the act of the imagination exercised immediately upon perceptions and the reproduction of representations must be based on a rule. Kant identifies this rule as association. (Kant, 2000, 239). This rule presupposes that representations reproduce each other on the basis of a certain distinction. Because the reverse of this presupposition implies that representations are reproduced by coming together in any way. But in its reproductive activity, the imagination combines a representation with any representation. An object does not associate us with no reason to something. The representation of that object associates with other representations related to that representation through certain distinctions and certain contacts generated by these distinctions.

But Kant again exhibits his usual reasoning. There must be an objective basis on which this subjective and empirical ground of reproduction according to rules, the unity of the association of representations, rests. That is, an *a priori* ground that makes this empirical association possible. Because the fact that I am conscious of all my perceptions in association presupposes the underlying consciousness of myself, the synthetic unity of the self, the apperception. To attribute all perceptions to consciousness is to attribute them to the originary apperception. This is the pre-foundation that allows me to be conscious of my perceptions.

“There must therefore be an objective ground, i.e., one that can be understood *a priori* to all empirical laws of the imagination, on which rests the possibility, indeed even the necessity of a law extending through all appearances, a law, namely, for regarding them throughout as data of sense that are associable in themselves and subject to universal laws of a thoroughgoing connection in reproduction. I call this objective ground of all association of appearances their **affinity**.” (Kant, 2000, 240).

The associations of appearances produced in the imagination under ruleful and universal connections, their affinities as Kant calls them, must be in conformity with the unity of apperception. For associations mean connections, and all connections in the mind are impossible without the unity of apperception, the synthetic unity of consciousness. Kant thus determines this synthetic unity of consciousness, the originary unity of apperception, as the necessary condition of all possible perception. And the affinity between all appearances is the necessary consequence of the regular *a priori* synthesis of the imagination. Kant says that “For the standing and lasting I (of pure apperception) constitutes the correlate of all of our representations.” (Kant, 2000, 240).

The synthetic unity of the standing and lasting subject constitutes the possibility of giving unity to representations. We bring representations into unity by being conscious of synthetic unity. For all representations are representations of my consciousness. However, Kant says that this function of apperception must be added to the power of imagination because this is necessary for this function to be intellectualized. The concepts belonging to the faculty of understanding are unified

and unity-giving from the outset. And this unity basically expresses subjective consciousness. The synthetic unity, that is, the elements of pure thought grounded in pure apperception, are brought into relation with sensual intuition through the synthesis of the imagination. Thus apperception obtains the sensible relation of concepts based on their pure unity. This relation is a necessary relation for knowledge, and it is the power of imagination that makes it possible.

“We therefore have a pure imagination, as a fundamental faculty of the human soul, that grounds all cognition *a priori*. By its means we bring into combination the manifold of intuition on the one side and the condition of the necessary unity of apperception on the other. Both extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must necessarily be connected by means of this transcendental function of the imagination.”
(Kant, 2000, 241).

Thus, we see that the power of imagination is clearly determined as the mediating power that enables the unification of sensibility and understanding. The answer to the question of how two elements of human knowledge, whose structures are completely different and irreducible to each other, can come together to form knowledge is through the power of imagination and its temporal synthesis.

However, categories are contained in recognition within the process of constitution of our experience (apprehension-association/reproduction-recognition of appearances). That is, the formality of the recognition of the manifold is categories. All formal unity in the imagination is also based on categories. Thus, through this synthesis, Kant also grounds the empirical use of this formal unity on categories.

Because the binding of appearances to consciousness is realized through categories based on the ground of apperception and the unity of this apperception.

Kant holds that we ourselves bring to appearances the order and lawfulness inherent in the appearances themselves, which we call nature. In other words, our understanding objectifies appearances under the lawfulness that emerges from it. This lawfulness is the establishment of necessary connections and unity. No appearance or object spontaneously makes a necessary connection with another object, nor are objects in a spontaneous unity. Our faculty of understanding bestows them onto appearances, and then rediscovers in appearances what it has given. That is, subjectivity collects laws to appearances through its acts of unity and necessary connection, and appearances become objectified to the subject in accordance with this law.

At the end of the chapter, Kant introduces a new definition of the faculty of understanding and says that this new definition is more fertile and in accordance with its essence than the previous definitions (spontaneity, the faculty of thought, the faculty of concept or judgment). This new definition is that the faculty of understanding is the faculty of rules. (Kant, 2000, 242). Sensibility confers the forms of intuition while the faculty of understanding confers the rules. A rule becomes a law when it is objective, that is when it is necessarily attached to the knowledge of the object. Kant naturally attributes the higher forms of these laws to the faculty of understanding itself, that is, they arise from the faculty of understanding prior to experience. The faculty of understanding is thus not merely a faculty that finds connections in appearances or establishes rules through their comparison, but a faculty that itself gives laws to nature. The synthetic unity of appearances is based on the faculty of understanding. Thus, just as appearances are possible in intuition in terms of

their form and lie in sensibility, these appearances lie prior to experience in the faculty of understanding as a possible experience and derive their formal possibility from it.

Kant considers the condition of the formal possibility of experience in the categories and expresses this on the basis of the pure faculty of understanding giving the law of the synthetic unity of appearances. The fact that categories make experience formally possible implies that all possible contents of experience can be constituted from the outset on the basis of the constructive rules of categories.

3.7. Deduction of the Concepts of Pure Understanding (B Edition)

The section on deduction was modified in the B edition of the SAE. The important point for our study is that Heidegger based his ontological interpretation on the A edition, while the Neo-Kantians based their epistemological interpretation on the B edition.

Kant commences the deduction section of edition B with the title "On the possibility of a combination in general". Here Kant interestingly refers to the faculty of understanding as the faculty of representation. Kant states that combination, that is, synthesis, cannot come from the senses and cannot be found in the pure forms of sensible intuition. (Kant, 2000, 245). He has already mentioned this point in edition A of the chapter on deduction. The combination is attributed to it as an act of the faculty of understanding. In this sense, the combination is determined as an act of the faculty of understanding that first takes place in the subject, and then through this act, the subject generates the combination in the object. An important shift in direction emerges here. For in the section on deduction in edition A, synthesis was clearly

determined as a function of the power of imagination. In the B edition, on the other hand, the act of synthesis is completely assigned to the faculty of understanding.

However, there is a concept of unity that precedes the concept of combination and makes the synthesis of the manifold possible. Kant says that "combination is the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold." (Kant, 2000, 246). In other words, the combination is possible with the representation of unity that precedes itself. This means the presupposition of a synthetic unity representation that adds itself to the representation of the manifold and makes its combination possible. Kantian criticism is based on the thought that the way to the unity of the object is always through the unity of the subject. The combination is possible with a representation of unity that precedes it. This is not the category of unity, which is among categories. The unity referred to here is not the category that allows us to think of objects under it and to carry them to universal-obligatory judgments, but what ensures the unity of the concept itself. The concept itself is a unity already presupposed from the outset. Kant is concerned with the origin of this unity.

In the section entitled "On the original-synthetic unity of apperception" Kant puts forward the famous formulation "I think" and says the following:

“The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me.” (Kant, 2000, 246).

Thus apperception, the synthetic unity of the subject's consciousness, is determined as the representation of "I think" that accompanies all representations of

the subject and enables the subject to recognize all representations, whether of intuition or thought, as its own representations. This representation is put forward as an act of spontaneity, that is, of the faculty of understanding. "I think" is the ultimate representation of consciousness. In other words, it is the final representation that consciousness cannot produce a representation beyond itself. Every representation of consciousness is the representation it thinks. If we do not think representations in all their variants, they cannot be bound to consciousness. The fact that a representation is my representation is made possible by the fact that I am thinking of that representation. The representation of red is parallel to thinking about the representation of red at the same time. Therefore, there is a necessary connection between the manifold and "I think" in the same subject. "I think" is also the possibility of reaching a synthesis by making me conscious of my connections between representations. The representation of red is the representation of red that I am thinking about at that very moment, and it is the representation of the red apple that I relate to the representation of the apple that I am thinking.

"Since sensible data are themselves pure multiplicity, the connections constituted between them must be the product of the understanding. However, the concept of connection requires the concept of unity. We can establish the unity of multiple elements on the condition that we grasp this multiplicity as a unity. This unity, which all connections require, is the unity of consciousness, or I Think, which accompanies all my representations." (Bumin, 2013, 21).

The scene that emerges here is briefly this: the unity in the subject is not the category of unity that gives us the possibility of universal-necessary judgment by

bringing objects under it, but the ground of unity that enables the subject's act of combination, that is, the ground of unity that *a priori* precedes all concepts of combination. This ground is the synthetic unity of the subject's consciousness, that is, pure apperception. The representation that characterizes this apperception is 'I think.' Because all representations of the subject are simultaneously thought by the subject. And moreover, all these thought representations are accompanied by the consciousness that they are thought. This occurs not only as an accompaniment but also as a manner of binding representations to each other through this consciousness and of thinking about the synthesis of representations.

Through thinking, which allows me to grasp the multiplicity of my representations in one consciousness, representations become my representations and are connected to consciousness. Otherwise, I would have a consciousness equal to the multiplicity of my representations. If I am able to synthesize the multiplicity of sense data into unity, it is thanks to the consciousness of self-identity that *a priori* precedes all my determined thought, the consciousness of unity that gives this identity. Because:

"Combination does not lie in the objects, however, and can not as it were be borrowed from them through perception and by that means first taken up in to the understanding, but is rather only an operation of the understanding, which is itself nothing further than the faculty of combining *a priori* and bringing the manifold of given representations under unity of apperception..." (Kant, 2000, 248).

The relation of intuition to sensibility and its possibility in this sense is that it stands under the formal conditions of space and time. The counterpart of this on the side of the faculty of understanding is that intuition stands under the conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. When Kantian criticism speaks of objective correspondence, it usually means the correspondence of what is being investigated in appearances. In other words, the final point that determines the objectivity of something is actually its becoming material (Kant uses the term material). This means that it becomes objectified in intuition, that is, it gains its sensible correspondence. Otherwise, there would be no need to seek the objective correspondence of the category. Because a category that is only a concept, that is, a concept that remains only in the head, is not objective. What makes it objective is the disclosure of the reciprocity it can obtain for itself in appearances, the ability to capture a concept formed in one's mind in appearances, that is, in the external, living, material world. Therefore, Kant's determination of the highest possibility of intuition under the formal conditions of space-time in relation to sensibility, under the conditions of the synthetic unity of apperception in relation to the faculty of understanding, indicates to us that the subject's objectifying process is fundamentally the unification of the manifold of intuition under *a priori* forms. But given intuition does not become known subject to the forms of space-time, it constitutes the only possible way in which objects can appear to us subject to these forms. What makes all multiple representations of intuition known is that it stands under the condition of another pure form. This is 'I Think.' Because through this act, which constitutes the synthetic unity of apperception, the multiple representations of intuition are unified in one consciousness. The consciousness of thinking each of the multiplicity of representations of the intuition given to me by the conditions that constitute my

receptivity, and the consciousness of connecting each to the other through the synthesis of this consciousness, constitutes the relation of the representations to the object and gives them their objectivity. Because “An object, however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united.” (Kant, 2000, 249).

Kant thus determines the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception as the pure principle of the faculty of understanding. And he determines this point as the stage of transition to knowledge. For pure spatial form prepares for us the only possible conditions of appearance of objects, but knowing an object in space apart from these conditions of appearance is only possible by establishing a synthetic unity in these forms of intuition. Pure spatial forms allow us to organize the manifold of intuition as side-by-side(ness), top-up(ness), bottom-bottom(ness), and do not give any information yet. But drawing and knowing a straight line in space requires synthetic unification of the given manifold. It is the synthetic unity of my consciousness that allows this synthetic unification. Because in the concept of the line, a unity is presupposed from the beginning, before we construct this line with a synthetic unification in the manifold of intuition. This unity is the unity of my consciousness, and it is what gives unity to the object, that is, what constitutes the objectivity of knowledge.

“The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all of the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object.” (Kant, 2000, 250).

For Kant, combining the manifold given in intuition into the concept of an object is knowledge itself. And this knowledge is objective knowledge. Kant, then,

makes the transcendental unity of apperception, that is, the unity that unifies the manifold of intuition into a concept, the ground of objective knowledge. The point to note here is that the manifold of intuition is not only determined as the possibility of objects appearing to us by standing under the formal conditions of receptivity but also that this same manifold stands under the condition of 'I think. This condition binds the manifold of representations to consciousness and makes them my representations. In this way, the subject, encounters the objects in unity through its unity, and produces objectivity. (Consciousness basically has such a synthetic unity that the moment it thinks, it thinks that it thinks that it is thinking, that the moment it thinks what it thinks, it thinks that it has thought what it has thought. I think that I am writing these words right here, right now, and I think that I think that I am writing these words). Kant bases the logical forms of judgments and the objectivity that emerges in these forms on apperception. This is because judgments express the bringing together of representations in the object and do not depend on the empirical state of the subject. "To think of an object and to cognize an object are thus not the same." (Kant, 2000, 254).

This statement is the essence of Kantian criticism. To know the object is to unify the manifold of intuition in the concept of that object, to achieve the unity of intuition and concept. A concept without an object relation, that is, a concept that has no corresponding in intuition, that is, a concept that is not objective, is only an intellectual form but not knowledge. We often see Kant emphasizing and repeating this point throughout the CPR. Merely thinking something or merely intuiting something is not in itself meaningless and irrelevant to human existence. However, it is insufficient. Kantian criticism presupposes that human beings have a structure that is cognitive only through the combination of these two elements.

As Heidegger highlights in the B edition of the Inference, two important changes have taken place with regard to the synthesis of the faculty of imagination. First, the function of the faculty of the imagination that connects the two factors of knowledge, intuition and concept, has become the function of the faculty of understanding, and the independent mediating position of the faculty of the imagination has been eliminated. Secondly, the imagination has ceased to be a synthesizing function with time at its center and has turned into *synthesis speciosa*, figurative synthesis. Whereas in the A edition, this synthesis was defined as a fundamental power of the soul that precedes even apperception. Therefore, Heidegger says that Kant retreated from the step forward he had taken in edition A. Because Kant says in edition B that the synthesis of the faculty of imagination is the effect of the faculty of understanding on sensibility.

Kant states that just as we know things not as things in themselves but as they appear to us, that is, as appearances, so we can know ourselves not in ourselves but as we appear to ourselves through the way the inner sense affects us. But with apperception it is different. What is at stake in apperception is neither a consciousness of self as I am in myself nor a consciousness of self as I appear to myself, but only a consciousness that I exist. Because according to Kant “The **I think** expresses the act of determining my existence.” (Kant, 2000, 260). Just as an intuition is needed for the knowledge of the object in addition to the concept of the object, an intuition is needed for a knowledge of myself in addition to consciousness, i.e. my thinking of myself. With regard to the knowledge of myself, this intuition is time as a condition under which the manifold of the inner sense stands.

Apart from these changes, the purpose of the chapter on deduction is the same as in edition A. How is it that pure concepts can be related to appearances and sensible

objects? Kant again reveals this relation through the process that begins with the synthesis of the apprehension. Kant puts this forward in section 26. However, there is an interesting point in this section. Kant states that space and time are represented *a priori* not only as forms of intuition but also as intuitions themselves (and these intuitions themselves include a manifold) and makes a note here. In the note, Kant says the following:

“Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains more than the mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension of the manifold the manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the representation. In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all concepts, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible.” (Kant, 2000, 261).

This note and the distinction made by Kant are important because most neo-Kantian philosophers base their integration of transcendental aesthetics into transcendental logic on it. This is a point we will deal with specifically later. If we briefly repeat what Kant says about the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, we will see that this synthesis takes place in accordance with the *a priori* forms of space and time. This is because space and time are represented *a priori* as forms of intuition, but they are also represented *a priori* as intuitions themselves and include a manifold. The synthesis of apprehension in intuition is the combination of this manifold. Thus, two points

emerge. One is the unity of the synthesis of the inner or outer manifold, and the other is that the unification (a certain representation in space and time will be according to this unification) is *a priori* given by these intuitions as a condition of the synthesis of the apprehension. This is precisely the distinction Kant makes in this section between the form of intuition and formal intuition. As pure forms of intuition, space and time provide the possibilities by which the inner and outer manifold can be organized. That is, they construct the *a priori* formal structure that enables us to recognize objects in empirical intuition. The side-by-sideness of objects, or their being at the same and different times, are not structures that arise from my recognition of objects in empirical intuition, but on the contrary, they are forms that allow me to recognize objects in this manner in empirical intuition. Moreover, space and time, as representations of intuition, involve from the outset a unification that constitutes a synthesis of any particular thing according to these intuitions. In geometry, the triangle, the square, the circle, and the cone, must be constructed according to a representation of unity. This is unity as a synthesis of the manifold included in space. These shapes can be put forward in the planar dimension that this unity representation allows from the beginning.

However, it is obvious that the main ground on which Kant bases this whole process is the unity of consciousness, and on this unity rests the faculty of understanding, in other words, the categories. Thus, the picture we see in the B edition is not very different from the logic of the deduction section in the A edition. What is different is the distribution of tasks.

Kant's shift of direction in the B edition of the section on deduction is also evident from the exemplification he gives towards the end of section 26. In edition A, in this same section, the relation of the synthesis of apprehension to the power of

imagination and temporal synthesis was revealed. It is no coincidence that the whole motivation of Heidegger's interpretation is to follow these traces left in the deduction section of the A edition. In edition B, the synthesis of the apprehension is based on categories. I apprehend the empirical intuition of a house on the basis of the necessary unity assumed in the intuition of space. That is, my apprehension of its manifold and the synthesis I reach with this apprehension is based on a unified representation of space. This unity refers to the axis, line, point, coordinates, plane, surface, base, and the purely formal spatial relations constituted according to them. However, Kant points out that when I abstract this unified representation of space on which the apprehension of the manifold is based, this unity finds its place in the faculty of understanding. This is the category of quantity. In other words, perception, which goes from beginning to end in the synthesis of apprehension, arrives at synthesis by functioning according to the categories of quantity.

3.8. Schematism of the Concepts of Pure Understanding

The section on schematism is one of the most difficult sections of the CPR to comprehend. This is primarily because it is related to one of the most difficult points Kant attempts to explain, namely the problem of grounding the concept-appearance relation. However, the main factor complicating the problem seems to be that what was attempted to be done in the section on the deduction of the concepts of the pure faculty of understanding is attempted to be done again in the section on schematism. The deduction section was concerned with the legal aspect of the relation of the pure concept to sensible objects, that is, it was trying to establish the legitimacy of this relation. However, in trying to demonstrate this legitimacy, it was inevitably revealing the subjective and objective powers and grounds that constitute this connection. The

section on schematism, on the other hand, tries to reveal what operates and realizes this connection.

Let us say at the beginning what Kant said at the end. The basic starting point for comprehending or trying to comprehend schematism is that it is a determination of time. This basically means that the sensibilization of concepts is possible in the process of time. In other words, the schemata used by the faculty of understanding can be likened to instructions that enable us to apply the correct category to the given object through functions and operations that occur in time and over time.

We observe that Kant introduces schematism, perhaps the most difficult part of the CPR, with the concepts of homogeneity and subsumption. Because objects are subsumed under concepts. And this process requires a correspondence between the representation of the object and the concept brought under this representation, or, as Kant puts it, homogeneity. We cannot bring the moon representation under the concept of the square. The representation of the moon is subsumed under the concept of roundness, and we can even subsume it under the empirical concept of a plate. In the same way, the concept of the circle in geometry and the moon or plate is homogeneous. For the roundness that is intuited with the geometric circle is thought in the representations of the moon or the plate. (Kant, 2000, 271). However, the case changes when we move on to pure concepts of the faculty of understanding. We do not find the kind of direct homogeneity between the concepts of pure understanding and empirical intuitions that we do between the empirical concept of a plate and the pure geometrical concept of a circle. The concept of pure understanding is not given in intuition. The question that gives rise to the section on schematism starts from this very point. How is it that intuitions can be subsumed under concepts of pure

understanding that are not given in intuition? And how is it possible to apply categories to appearances in this way? “Since no one would say that the category, e.g., causality, could also be intuited through the senses and is contained in the appearance?” (Kant, 2000, 272).

Since there is no homogeneity between category and appearance that allows us to subordinate one to the other, there must be a third thing that is homogeneous with both, and that makes it possible to apply category to appearance. Kant says that it is an intermediary representation and has both a sensible and an intellectual character. This mediating representation is the transcendental schema. (Kant, 2000, 272). Here again we are faced with a discovery of Kantian criticism. Because the established equation itself necessitates such a discovery or invention. Because the application of the pure concept to appearances, that is, the concretization of the concept, is not possible due to the structure of the pure concept and appearance themselves. Kant will try to overcome this impossibility with the determination of the transcendental schema.

The element that ensures homogeneity is time determination. For in both pure intuition and category, the element of time is at work as a formal condition under which all external and internal representations are organized, connected, and synthesized. The deduction of categories has revealed that the connection of categories with objects is formed by acts of temporal synthesis. The manifold of pure intuition is under the determination of time, which is the pure formal condition of intuition. Thus, Kant finds in the time determination the mediating representation of homogeneity, which is both intellectual and sensible, and which makes possible the application of the category to appearance.

“Now a transcendental time-determination is homogeneous with the category (which constitutes its unity) insofar as it is universal and rests on a rule *a priori*. But it is on the other hand homogeneous with the appearance insofar as time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold.” (Kant, 2000, 272).

In fact, the representation of time in its empirical and pure forms seems appropriate for such a bridging character when the whole context of Kantian criticism is considered. The category with its universal and *a priori* characters is temporalized by the "always" determination of time. It is determined by the assumption that it is universal and *a priori* "always" valid. And the formation of empirical intuitions and appearances is again determined by the "now" character of time. Each perception is perceived in the "now" and held in unity with the synthesis arrived at by the stringing together of these "nows". In this sense, Kant's linking of pure concept and appearance, which are in a relationship of inhomogeneity and yet subsuming each other, with the determination of time, which is kin to both of them, seems to be the natural outcome of Kantian criticism.

It must be recognized that the concept of the faculty of understanding has a usage. This is the necessary assumption of Kantian criticism. Because the concept cannot remain only in thought. If it remains, knowledge does not arise. Therefore, there must be a condition of sensibility in which the use of the faculty of understanding is restricted. For Kant, this condition is the schemata of the concept of the faculty of understanding. And the process carried out with this schema is schematism.


At this point, Kant's distinction between schema and image gains importance. Kant says that the schema is the product of the imagination. However, the synthesis of

the imagination is not a specific, singular intuition. In the synthesis of the imagination, there is the unity of sensibility. Because we cannot have a single image of any object. We have many images of a simple empirical concept, for example, the concept of a cat. But the schema implies a single fundamental method from which various images can be derived.

Kant explains the distinction between image and schema through the number five. He argues that the five points he puts one after the other,, are the image of the number five. (Kant, 2000, 273). But the number five and the number itself are the schema of quantity. We will examine how the number or the number five is a determination of time. However, the distinction Kant tries to make through the example he gives here is that the five points placed one after the other have a visual, that is, an image, which can be counted through the concept of the number five. But what is the image of the number fifty thousand? Or one million? It might be a bit difficult to put fifty thousand points one after the other. It is perhaps at this point that the function of the schema, where it differs from the image, emerges. The image is an inner power that has no connection with pure sensible conceptual structures. In other words, the image is something that is not present in the methodological characteristics by which we now begin to form the pure sensible conceptual structure. When we commence thinking of any number or concept of number, we are operating an intellectual procedure that alludes to a certain method and representation of the image that is not directly related to the image itself. We cannot obtain the image of the number five hundred thousand. This is because the number five hundred thousand means that the faculty of understanding makes the category of quantity sensible. This means that the mind adds the pure units of time, i.e. the "now"s and the "these"s, to each other in units, synthesizes these units to obtain larger units, and through such a

process corresponds them with a proper meaning in intuition. And at a protest, at a march, at a concert, at a match, we can bring a huge crowd into the image of "there were five hundred thousand people" through this 500,000 schema. Therefore "In fact it is not images of objects but schemata that ground our pure sensible concepts." (Kant, 2000, 273).

Kant clearly does not find in the image the universality that the concept possesses. For example, when we think of the image of a triangle, we will think of nothing but a three-sided shape enclosed in space. Because pure geometric concepts seem to be the most appropriate concepts to explain what a schema is. Because schemas are like skeletal structures that bring concepts into images. When a young child or an elderly person is asked to draw the concept of home on paper, they will usually draw a shape as follows:



And all the houses in the imagination are built on this skeleton. Duplex, with garden, with veranda, with low roof, with high roof, wooden, concrete, container... All kinds of house images will be constructed according to the schema of the concept of the house. (But the question is what function time determination has here, or what time determination has to do with it). Because the schema is an *a priori* rule, and these rules are formed in and through time. The faculty of imagination is not a structure included in the faculty of pure understanding. The imagination is the only spiritual

topos where the possibility of the coming together of pure understanding and intuition is there. However, the inner faculty that sensibilize the concept of the faculty of understanding is not the faculty of imagination, which is the only possible *topos* for its union with intuition. The faculty of imagination is the condition under which two structurally different sources of human knowledge can be reduced to it by the human soul. In order to adapt to this condition, the faculty of understanding produces a universal sensibilization procedure that can adapt the pure concept of the faculty of understanding to this condition. This is the schema as transcendental time determination. Just as the faculty of imagination is a hybrid field of the human psyche that enables the synthesis of the two between the faculty of understanding and intuition, the schema is the structure that mediates the adaptation of the faculty of understanding to the conditions of this hybrid field. It is perhaps because of this inherence that Kant describes schematism as an art hidden in the depths of the human soul.

Kant uses the word monogram in relation to the schema. A monogram means a brand, a self-symbol. This expression means that the schema is the intuition to which we connect a concept, or rather the sign to which intuition it is appropriate to connect a concept to. In this way, we see that there are different ways of explaining what schemata and schematism are in very different directions. At the beginning of the chapter, since the faculty of understanding includes the formal condition of sensibility, the schema was first determined as the formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the concept of the faculty of understanding is restricted in application. It was then determined *a priori* as the product of the faculty of imagination. And then came the expression that it was an art hidden in the depths of the soul and that it was a monogram. The interesting point is that Kant while talking about both the faculty of

imagination and schematism, determines them as structures of the human soul or functions of the soul. Indeed, for him, the faculty of imagination is the product of a blind yet indispensable function of the soul, a fundamental faculty of the human soul, whereas schematism is the art hidden in the depths of this soul.

However, the punchline of the schematism section is the last part, where Kant begins to explain the categories one by one as schemata, that is, as transcendental time determinations. For here Kant does not explain in detail the revelation of the concepts of the pure faculty of understanding as temporal determinations and their sensibilization under the process of schematism. He only reveals, as a definition, the relation of each of them to temporal determinations.

Kant holds that the whole category of quantity, the pure schema of magnitude, is number as a concept of the faculty of understanding. It is the summary of the successive addition of one unit to another unit homogeneous to it. (Kant, 2000, 274). It is clear that number is a synthesis of unity. But what is the relevance of number as a schema of quantity concepts of the faculty of understanding to time-determination? Kant states that number as a schema of quantity is nothing but the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition, and that it is our production of time itself in the apprehension of intuition that brings about this unity. The unity of the synthesis of the manifold attained by apprehension in intuition occurs by virtue of our passing through each multiplicity in intuition with the possibility afforded by the phases of pure "now". For it is only through the formal structure of succession, which precedes empirical intuition, that our mind can pass through each multiplicity of intuition. The subsequent apprehension of intuition as a unified synthesis is in fact made possible by the exploitation of pure formal succession from the multiplicity of

data in that intuition, that is, by the addition of pure "nows" to each other. That is, the apprehension of the manifold of intuition and the synthesis of the unity of this apprehension means that the subject has no other possibility but to organize this manifold in the form of the succession of pure units of time. In the case of the categories of quantity, number provides the sensibilization of the manifold apprehended through this pure succession. Because apprehension in intuition involves adding together each "now" as pure units, that is, each unit of pure time. Expressions of unity, multiplicity, totality are usually related to number. When I speak of the totality of people, if there are six billion people in the world at the moment I say this, I am referring to this number.

There is a plurality in front of me, a lot of people, I ask how many people there are and I get a unity as an answer; 50, 100, or 10,000 people. On my desk, I have a glass, a keyboard, a notebook, and a phone. I look at them one by one. "Now the glass", "now the keyboard", "now the notebook", "now the phone", so there are 4 things on my desk. And what does this have to do with a temporal determination? I have counted these four things in my perception, and on its basis in my pure perception, as four phases of now. My passage to each of them and my linking of each of them to each other is not possible outside of this form of pure temporal succession. In this way, I summarize and synthesize in number in relation to the concepts of quantity the only possible formality that allows me to move from one thing to another and to connect them in the diversity of intuition. This only possible formality is the succession of "now"s as units of pure time.

After positing number as the schema of the categories of quantity, Kant moves on to the schema of the category of Reality (Realität). Reality is the first of the

categories of quality in the table of categories. Kant defines the schema of reality as follows:

“Reality is in the pure concept of the understanding that to which a sensation in general corresponds, that, therefore, the concept of which in itself indicates a being (in time). Negation is that the concept of which represents a non-being (in time).” (Kant, 2000, 274).

In the introduction to transcendental logic, Kant defines sensation as the actual presence of the object (B75). That is, the object's being present at the moment. Reality is thus the schema of sensation that is formed through the filling of time by the presence of the object. Negation is the representation of the non being of the actual presence of the object. However, it is the non-being that emerges with the passage of time that sensibilize this non-being in relation to the category of negation. In fact, reality refers to a content, in Kantian terms, to being material, *sachlich*. Content, on the other hand, has to do with the object's presence taking place in time. We do not derive the category of reality from the being of the object. It is already prior to experience as a concept of pure understanding. We sense this category through the schema of the temporal difference created by the object's being, represented through its actual presence, and its non-being, represented through negation. That is to say, the difference, the opposition, between the representation of one and the same time as filled and empty time tells us that these two categories can be made sensible through the schema acquired through the use of time, through its exploitation.

Kant's next step is naturally the schema of the categories that he collects under the third heading of the table of categories, namely the heading of relation. Substance, cause, and community. Kant defines the schema of substance as follows:

“The schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time, i.e., the representation of the real as a substratum of empirical time-determination in general.” (Kant, 2000, 275).

What does this tell us? Time as timelessness on which empirical determinations of time are based, that is, time as timelessness that allows the passing, passing time to pass as time. Our use of the phrase "time as timelessness" may seem excessive. But the time that gives us the passage of the existence of the changeable is, according to Kant's formulation, the time that does not elapse. Kant puts it this way: “Time itself does not elapse, but the existence of that which is changeable elapses in it.” (Kant, 2000, 275). That is, time, with its unchangeability (i.e., its being outside the temporal measure), temporally gives the change according to this unchangeability. Therefore, in fact, time makes us sense the existence of the changeable in itself through its own unchangeability. The category that we appropriate to this sensation in appearances is substance. The substance can be captured in appearances by the non-elapse of time, that is, by the scheme of persistence that can be derived from the structure of the substratum of time. The carrier of the scheme of persistence corresponding to the substance in appearances is the real.

The schema of the cause and the causality of something is the real one. And whenever the real is posited, it is followed by something else. (Kant, 2000, 275). All causality is the realization of the posited real (the real here implies the existence - the

facticity - of what is posited as the cause) by something else that follows it in a succession under the rule. Real A is followed by B, and B is followed by C, which becomes real through the rule of this succession. Each real that is posited is bound into appearances in the atmosphere of the temporal succession required by this succession of another realization that always follows it. In other words, the scheme here is the determination of the real one by the time difference required by the sequence that provides the transition that produces the result of always following the posited.

Kant defines the schema of the community as simultaneity. For community is sensed in sensibility through the simultaneity of the reciprocal causality of the substance with its causes. This is also related to the determination of the human being as subject-substance within the community. The substance that gathers the community, which is the center that brings together the constituents of the community (this center can be an idea, a belief, or a material interest), gives sense to the concept of community through the dimension of simultaneity. The capture of the category of community through the schema of simultaneity in appearances is valid across a range from material phenomena to abstract domains.

Finally, Kant moves on to elucidate the schemas of the categories of modality. Here, too, the schema of each category is formulated as structures that form the possibility of the category's application or sensibilization to appearances in relation to time, that is, with the determinations of the difference or sum created by time taking on certain forms and relations. Kant defines the schema of possibility as the synthesis of various representations in general in agreement with the conditions of the time. (Kant, 2000, 275). And he adds that opposites cannot exist in something at the same time, but only in succession. Impossibility is often manifested as a temporal impossibility. This is evident even in daily experience. The fact that the possibility is

in question is the determination of the representations related to this possibility with an appropriate temporality in the field to be opened by the possibility. Otherwise, what will emerge will be the conflict between different representations of the possibility. Therefore, what emerges is usually temporal squeezing. This is so because the correct temporal sequence constitutes the horizon of the realization of possibility.

Kant explains the schemas of the last two modality categories in one sentence. The schema of actuality is existence at a determinate time. (Kant, 2000, 275). So what allows us to capture actuality in appearances is the ability to recognize existence within a determined time. For it is not possible for existence outside a determinate time to be brought into a relation of homogeneity with the category of actuality and to be subsumed by this concept.

Kant determines the schema of necessity as the existence of an object at all times. What we need to pay attention to in these definitions, especially the last two, is that it is not the occurrence of existence in time that makes these two categories sensible. Actuality or necessity is not the presence of existence as standing in something at a determinate time or at all times. A determinate time or all time is already what determines existence as actualization or necessity. This is so because we can connect the condition of sensibility of existence, which arises as a result of a determinate time, to the category of actuality by means of schematization, or we can attribute that condition to the proper intuition by means of the correspondence we produce as a result of the process of subsuming it under this category. Thus, Kant concludes:

“The schemata are therefore nothing but *a priori* **time-determinations** in accordance with rules, and these concern, according to the order of the categories, the time-series, the content of time, the order of time, and finally the sum total of time in regard to all possible objects.” (Kant, 2000, 276).

What does this whole picture tell us? Obviously, one of the central points of Kantian criticism is that time is the fundamental representation that is made to account for how the realization of the concepts of the pure faculty of understanding takes place. Despite all the complex, the dark structure of schematism, this point, that time is the constitutive power of the subject's subjectivity, is undeniably clear. Heidegger's appetite for Kant and the whole motivation for his interpretation of Kant is the great role played by the phenomenon of time at every point in Kant's entire critique of pure reason, which is open-ended, at times confusing, and exhausting with repetitions and reversals.

CHAPTER 4

Heidegger on Threefold Synthesis.

In the previous sections of our study, we have presented Kant's treatment of the threefold synthesis. Now we will examine Heidegger's interpretation of this important part of the Critique. For the threefold synthesis is an important part of the inquiry into transcendental deduction in edition A of the Critique. After Heidegger had revealed the essential aspect of the deduction inquiry, he critically exposed the aspects of the inquiry that had been disrupted by Kant. Let us now try to present his interpretation of the threefold synthesis.

The first thing to emphasize about Heidegger's interpretation of the threefold synthesis is the significance of synthesis. As Kant had argued before moving on to the categories, the element of synthesis is the fundamental source of the structure of knowledge and the product of the imagination. According to Heidegger, synthesis as the ontological inner possibility of the unity of intuition and concept is the carrier of the threefold synthesis process. Thus, for Heidegger, there are not three different modes of synthesis. The theme is synthesis itself. In other words, what emerges in the process of threefold synthesis is not the mode of synthesis activated in three different fields, but the declaration of synthesis itself in three modes. Therefore, Heidegger does not say synthesis of apprehension in intuition but synthesis in the manner of apprehension and interprets the threefold process of synthesis as the three modes of emergent purely imaginative ontological synthesis:

“We are dealing with the three modes of pure imaginative ontological synthesis, that is, with this synthesis in the mode of apprehension, reproduction and recognition.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 229).

Heidegger, who determines the essential meaning of transcendental deduction inquiry as the elucidation of the structural unity of ontological synthesis, maintains the same approach in his interpretation of the threefold synthesis process. As the structure representing the unity of ontological knowledge, synthesis reveals itself not by passing through three separate stages but by realizing itself in three modes:

“First, Kant's manner of expression requires closer determination. What is meant by Synthesis “of” Apprehension, Synthesis “of” Reproduction, Synthesis “of” Recognition? It does not mean that apprehension etc. are subject to a synthesis nor that apprehension, or rather reproduction and recognition, consummate a synthesis. Rather, it means that synthesis as such has the character of either apprehension or reproduction or recognition. Hence the expressions mean: Synthesis in the mode of Apprehension, Reproduction, and Recognition, or synthesis as apprehending, as reproducing, as recognizing. Thus Kant treats synthesis, i.e., the faculty of synthesis, with regard to these three modes as peculiar to it in specific ways.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 125).

Heidegger makes certain preliminary remarks before embarking on his interpretation of the threefold synthesis. Kant began his presentation of the threefold synthesis by considering the empirical process of synthesis. This is a preparation for grounding their pure mode of synthesis. Heidegger thus thinks that these modes of

pure synthesis constitute the conditions for the possibility of empirical synthesis in the attitude of knowing with respect to the beings. On the other hand, the main purpose of Heidegger's interpretation of the threefold synthesis is to show the intrinsic and essential interconnectedness of these three modes of synthesis as inherent in pure synthesis. Kant emphasized time as a general note in the apprehension section. Representations, regardless of their source, stand under the ordering, connecting, and organizing formal condition of time. This threefold mode of synthesis must therefore be considered as in advance under the characterization of time.

4.1. First Synthesis

Heidegger states that for Kant, time in the ordinary sense is the pure succession of the sequence of nows given in intuition. The now is in flux and the subject apprehends representations as a general form in this pure flux of time. Now is contiguous with not longer now and not yet now. This shows that the now does not appear as a fixed point but as a flow that includes not longer now and not yet now. This means that "time determines in advance all representing as a sequence of occurrences in the subject." (Heidegger, 1997-2, 232).

Heidegger's first remark about the synthesis of apprehension is this: The intuition in Kant's statement "every intuition contains a manifold" is empirical intuition. That is, the mind gathers and apprehends empirical intuition through sensual impressions. The following and synthesizing of empirical intuition as a series of impressions are based on the fact that pure apprehension is the basis of empirical intuition. This is the second point Heidegger draws attention to regarding this mode of synthesis. It is the pure succession of nows that allows the subject to follow and combine the empirical manifold in intuition, that is, the plurality of sensual effects, as

a sequence of impressions. On the basis provided by the succession of now as pure temporal form, impressions as empirical intuitions can be perceived in sequences. Each new now is at the same time no longer now and not yet now. This manifoldness of the now constitutes pure temporal form, i.e. pure succession, and the mind utilizes this pure foundation to objectify empirical manifoldness in intuition:

“In distinguishing time, our mind must already be saying constantly and in advance “now and now and now,” in order to be able to encounter “now this” and “now that” and “now all this in particular.” Only in such a differentiating of the now does it first become possible to ‘run through’ and collectively take up the impressions.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 126).

In the actual now, there are not-yet-now and no longer-now as the now that is to be born and the now that has died. So every now contains the articulation of a now plurality. And the unity that emerges from this articulation constitutes the possibility of the presentation of the manifold in intuition. In this unity and on the basis of the now-orientation of the intuitive act, the subject traverses the manifold and receives it together. This is apprehension or, as Heidegger calls it, seizing. Heidegger says that this synthesis has a twofold character and explains it as follows:

“This unification or synthesis has twofold character. (1) Seizing is directed at nothing short of the offering; it allows the impression to be given receptively – this seizing is a seizing of something. (2) But this unification at the same time *takes up* what is offered here; it is a spontaneous *seizing*. This seizing belongs to intuiting itself, initially to empirical intuiting; it is not an additional act of

thinking. Rather, intuition is rooted in this 'synthesis' as what offers the manifold." (Heidegger, 1997-2, 234).

What is remarkable about Heidegger's interpretation is that he attributes spontaneity to this synthesis. This synthesis both allows impressions to be given to receptivity and receives the given. According to Heidegger, this receiving of the given operates in a spontaneous manner.

Thus, Heidegger's basic approach to the synthesis of apprehension seems to have emerged. The subject traverses and brings together the manifold of intuition as a series of impressions through sensible affections. This unification is empirical apprehension. Empirical intuitions are received and synthesized in a temporal sequences. But at the basis of this is the *a priori* unifying pure apprehension. That is, it is the intuition of pure time that gives unity *a priori* to the manifold of intuition. For it is the pure temporal subjective form of the succession of a multiplicity of pure nows which allows the subject to receive impressions in series. Taking advantage of the possibility of this succession, empirical intuition is met by placing it in a sequence because "The pure, apprehending synthesis does not first take place within the horizon of time, but instead it first forms precisely the like of the now and sequence of nows." (Heidegger, 1997-1, 126).

However, Heidegger's main stress is on the inner unity of this synthesis and the synthesis of imagination. As Kant makes clear, these two syntheses are intrinsically interconnected. For apprehension is the action of imagination on perceptions. If apprehension is temporal in its orientation towards the pure nows, then imagination has a temporal character. Therefore, according to Heidegger:

“Synthesis in the mode of apprehension springs forth from the power of imagination; hence the pure apprehending synthesis must be spoken of as a mode of the transcendental power of imagination.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 126).

4.2. Second Synthesis

The purpose of transcendental deduction inquiry, which includes the threefold synthesis, is to reveal the relation of the pure concept to objects in accordance with experience within its own *a priori* foundations. Heidegger states that the object of experience is nature itself. To be related to the object is to be related to nature, and what determines nature is not something extant behind appearances, but their unifying unity constituted through the threefold synthesis. (Heidegger, 1997-2, 234). For Heidegger, the synthesis of imagination has the character of bringing-forth-again. Because the mind is in the act of retention. While the representations in the manifold of intuition presented by the apprehending synthesis are perceived in sequence on the basis of the succession of pure now, the act of retention enables the transition from the previous representation to the next representation.

“the mind has the possibility of bringing forth again representationally the being represented earlier in order to represent it in a more actual unity with the being directly perceived from time to time. The bringing-forth again - reproduction- is, accordingly, a kind of unifying.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 127).

In the synthesis of reproduction, there is the mental act by which representations that appear together accompany each other. The unity-giving reproductive synthesis is that in the sequence of representations the mind does not lose

the previous phase in thought. Therefore, synthesis necessarily involves the ability to retain.

“Beings experienced earlier, however, can only be retained if the mind “differentiates time,” and thereby has in view such [temporal distinctions] as “earlier” and “at that time.” The being experienced earlier would constantly be lost completely with each now, if it were not in general retainable. Hence, if empirical synthesis in the mode of reproduction is thereby to become possible, the no-longer-now *as such* must in advance and prior to all experience have been brought forth again and unified with the specific now. This occurs in pure reproduction as a mode of pure synthesis.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 127).

Therefore, with the empirical mode of the synthesis of reproduction, the subject brings the past before him. It is through this synthesis that it imagines and reproduces what it has previously perceived. The unity of intuition presented through the apprehending synthesis's transposition of the manifold of empirical intuition into the formality of the pure succession of the present and thus organizing perception into a sequence is recaptured by the reproductive synthesis as a totality of connectivity and transition. The act of bringing-forth-again, as retention and imagination, ensures that the connected unity between what has been past and what will come is not lost. Because there is a dynamic interconnectedness, a flow between what is no longer, what is just now, and what is not yet, and the mind is constantly constructing the possibilities of transition between representations by maintaining the connection between what is behind and what is actual.

But how is the transition from empirical reproduction to pure reproduction possible? The mind has the possibility of empirical retention. It reaches into the past and reimagines it in the actual present. In this way, the network that ensures the coherence between the multiplicity of representations continues its realization in a dynamic way. But this possibility of empirical retention “presupposes the possibility of an *a priori retaining*. I can bring back from the past what I have empirically perceived only when I have the overall possibility of going back into the past. I must have an open horizon of the past at my disposal.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 238).

The point Heidegger emphasizes is this: the subject's reaching out into the past by retaining the not-longer-now and bringing it in front of it and imagining it in union with the actual present, that is, realizing reproductive synthesis, is possible because the horizon of the past, the consciousness of the flow of pure temporal form that also goes backward, is present in the subject from the beginning. So pure reproduction constitutes the possibility of empirical reproduction. According to Heidegger, this means:

“Pure synthesis in the mode of reproduction forms having-been-ness [*Gewesenheit*] as such. But this says: the pure power of imagination, with regard to this mode of synthesis, is time-forming. It can be called pure “reproduction” not because it attends to a being which is gone nor because it attends to it as something experienced earlier. Rather, [it can be called pure “imitation”] to the extent that it opens up in general the horizon of the possible attending-to, the having-been-ness, and so it “forms” this “after” as such.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 127-8).

The retrogression of the unity of the pure nows, achieved through the reproductive synthesis of imagination, makes it possible to relate to the intuitive object that no longer exists. In its relation to intuition, subjectivity is engaged in an activity of actual synthesis. However, this actuality can only be sustained through the pure time-related activity of the imagination, i.e. synthesis that reaches back to the past. The relation of representational subjectivity to the object is also constituted on the basis of this synthesis. Therefore, the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of imagination are intrinsically connected. Thus, the synthesis of apprehension, which provides the unity of intuition, corresponds temporally to the present as it is realized through the succession of pure now. On the other hand, the pure synthesis of imagination, which sustains the unity of intuition through retention and bringing forth again, corresponds temporally to past time. From this deductive thought, Heidegger concludes that the synthesis of recognition in the concept corresponds to the future tense.

4.3. Third Synthesis

According to Heidegger, this mode of synthesis, which constitutes the third element of pure knowledge, requires a more comprehensive analysis. The reason for this is that Heidegger also sees a temporal character in this mode of synthesis. However, Kant did not display a temporal unfolding in recognition in the concept. Moreover, Kant exempted pure apperception, which is the carrier of "I think", and in parallel pure reason from temporal determinations. (CPR A551, B579). The principle of contradiction as a fundamental logical principle should also not be restricted to time relations. (CPR A152 B191)

So where do we find time in this third mode of synthesis? This is also a surprise for Heidegger. However, there is a point to consider. Just as apprehension and reproduction are bound together in the threefold synthesis, recognition and reproduction are bound together by Kant. Because in the introduction of the third mode of synthesis Kant says that “Without consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain.” (Kant, 2000, 230). According to Heidegger, this commencement of Kant is significant. Therefore, Heidegger will try to justify that without the synthesis of recognition, the synthesis of reproduction is not possible. This seems natural in terms of Heidegger's interpretation. For it is the unity of the elements of pure thinking and pure intuition that constitutes pure knowledge as ontological knowledge. This unity is revealed in the inner connection of the three synthesis. If the first two modes of synthesis are time-related, and the three modes of synthesis have inner unity, this suggests that the synthesis of recognition is also time-related.

However, while Kant is dealing with this third mode of synthesis, we encounter another fundamental concept. This is transcendental apperception. Therefore, Heidegger asks a new question and answers it as follows:

“Are we dealing here with a fourth phenomenon added to the other three? We shall see that not only are the three syntheses unified with one another, but also that transcendental apperception is connected to them as the original ground of their unity.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 241).

However, Heidegger states from the beginning that he will go beyond Kant in his interpretation of this point. The fundamental point that Kant makes visible but

does not accomplish, namely the general root of the two elements of knowledge, will be revealed through the phenomenological-ontological interpretation.

First, in the synthesis of recognition, Kant's definition of concept expresses the essence and summary of this mode of synthesis. The concept is a one consciousness (unitary) and unites manifold, intuition and reproduction into a single representation. That is, the synthesis of recognition is represented in the unfolding of the manifold as the unity of knowledge, determined by the reach of intuition into the present and reproduction into the past. The object of knowledge is the unity of knowledge and the concept is constituted through recognition. When the mind reaches back into the past and brings the beings forth again, it must be conscious that the present beings is the same as the representation it brings forth. Here, according to Heidegger, the act of identification comes into play. If the synthesis of perception that reproduction brings forth through retention fails to identify with the present of actual perception in flow, it becomes impossible:

“*Re*-production is impossible if I cannot reproduce what flows away in the past as the same by recognizing it again [as the same]. Thus apprehension leads necessarily to reproduction and reproduction to recognition as its complement. However, the designation ‘*recognition*’ is quite misleading. The fundamental act which enables that we take what we retain as what we have already intuited and grasp it as the same is the act of identification. Without the synthesis of identification, it would be impossible to grasp *any* objective interrelation.”
(Heidegger, 1997-2, 241)

However, the act of identification does not take place in the last phase, given the unity and totality of the threefold synthesis process. This act is active throughout the entire threefold synthesis and therefore takes precedence over the first two syntheses. Apprehension in intuition and reproduction in imagination are not possible without the act of identification. The apprehending and reproducing mind is in constant consciousness of the sameness of what it apprehends and reproduces. Therefore, identification presupposes the unity of the reciprocal relations of beings from the very beginning because, according to Heidegger “In identifying -and that means apprehending and reproducing- we are always already awaiting a unity of beings.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 244)

Because of this anticipatory totality of beings, recognition is designated by Heidegger as pre-cognition. In apprehending and reproducing, the mind is already in the anticipatory expectation of the regional totality of beings. This is also where Heidegger bases the relation of the third mode of synthesis to time. Synthesis in the pre-cognition mode is related to the future. For the manifold synthesized by apprehend and reproduce is in anticipation of being the same as what is to come. This inner dialectical relation of the three modes of synthesis is revealed and grounded in the unity of time.

“the synthesis of *apprehension* is related to the *present*, the synthesis of *reproduction* is related to the *past*, and the synthesis of *pre-cognition* is related to the *future*. *Insofar as all three modes of synthesis are related to time and insofar as these moments of time make up the unity of time itself, the three synthesis maintain their unified ground in the unity of time*” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 246)

Of course, in this third mode of synthesis, Kant did not present a temporal connection. In the interpretation of the first two syntheses, Heidegger adhered to the inner possibilities in Kant's presentation. However, in the interpretation of the third mode, the revealing and complementary activity of phenomenological-ontological interpretation came into play. The main point of this interpretation of Heidegger's threefold synthesis is that it focuses on the inner dialectical relation of the three modes of synthesis. These three modes of synthesis are the subjective sources of the objective reality of categories. Despite the indecisive movement of Kantian criticism, the objective reality of the category has been tied to the element of synthesis, the element of synthesis to the faculty of imagination, and the faculty of imagination to apprehension. On the other hand, the threefold synthesis must be thought under the representation of time according to the instruction given by Kant himself at the beginning. It is a natural consequence that Heidegger, who considers the essence of ontological knowledge in the inner unity of pure intuition and pure concept, interprets the threefold synthesis as the dialectical relation between the modes of temporal unity. The grounding of the synthesis of recognition as the activity of understanding in the context of temporal relation shows that the origin of categories is time. In fact, the emergence of categories in the temporal context has already been revealed in the doctrine of schematism.

4.4. Apperception

In this third mode of synthesis, we encountered the transcendental apperception. Apperception, the pure formal basis of the unity of consciousness, was determined by Kant to be the basis on which the synthesis of recognition was founded.

It is the concept of the unity of the object that ensures that our knowledge is not contingent but in a necessary relation to the object. But the object is the representation of the subjectivity of the subject. What the object is in itself is generally incognizable to the subject. Kant called this X. Therefore, with the concept of the unity of the object, the element of necessity in the subject-object relation is actually the formal unity of our consciousness. This originary condition is transcendental apperception.

However, Heidegger does not agree with the identical relation between the third mode of synthesis and apperception. There is a specific and particular relationship between them, but apperception expresses a more fundamental position. For, according to Heidegger's interpretation, apperception also has a temporal character.

The investigation of the *a priori* foundations of the possibility of experience by Kantian criticism is revealed as an elucidation of the constitutive structural unity of subjectivity of the subject. The constitutive subjective sources of this process are sense, imagination, and apperception. According to Heidegger, the threefold synthesis process shows that the character of temporality as the emergent modes of pure time-related imaginative synthesis is the origin of the subjectivity of the subject. In the synthesis of Recognition, pure I and apperception, which are the emergence of the consciousness of the unity of knowledge with the act of Identification, are exposed as the pure carrier basis of this subjective temporal ontology. Heidegger attempts to ground the time relation of apperception as 'I think', moreover, that it is time itself, by referring to certain determinations of Kant. (Kant, 2000, 210). The concept of representation of object is the universal character of the act of objectification. According to Heidegger, this indicates that the act is directly affected by time. However, this affect from time on the concept of object representation is something

that is inherent to the structural character of the subjectivity of subject. Therefore, according to Heidegger, this is pure self-affection. It is self-activating that time, grounded in subjectivity itself, acts on representation. Pure time as pure-self-affection, therefore, constitutes the essential structure of subjectivity. (Heidegger, 1997,132). Because it is the condition of the possibility for the self to activate itself as self.

Here, of course, the determination of the effect of time on the concept of the representation of the object as pure-self-affection as an inner activation based on the self itself refers to apperception. Time is immanent to the mental character of subjectivity as pure-self-affection is the basis of the possibility of selfhood and is in unity with apperception.

“In this way, however, it is obvious at a glance that time as pure self-affection is not found "in the mind" "along with" pure apperception. Rather, as the ground for the possibility of selfhood, time already lies within pure apperception, and so it first makes the mind into a mind...Time and the ‘I think’ no longer stand incompatibly and incomparably at odds; they are the same.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 132).

Another connection Heidegger makes with regard to the temporal character of apperception is Kant's attribution of the same predicates to time and to apperception as the pure carrier of "I think". Kant states in CPR A123 that the fixed and perduring I constitutes the correlate of all of our representations. On the other hand, in the section on schematism, the expressions "time does not elapse" and "time which is itself unchanging and perduring" appear. In B225, Kant states that "Time...perdures and does not change". The fact that apperception (fixed and perduring I) constitutes the correlate of all our representations shows that it is the authority that implements the

act of objectification (letting-stand-against). The fact that the subjectivity of the subject is "in front of" the object, i.e. constitutes the field of objectness with the knowledge of the unity of the object, is made possible by the fact that apperception lies at the foundation as a necessary and transcendental condition. According to Heidegger, this does not mean that it is a mental substance or infinite and eternal. Apperception is not an ontic assertion of unchangeability but a transcendental determination.

“insofar as the I as such brings before itself in advance something like fixedness and perduring in general, it forms the horizon of selfhood within which what is objective becomes experienceable as the same throughout change... The "fixed and perduring" I goes so far as to mean: the I, in the original forming of time, i.e., as original time, forms the letting-stand-against of ... and its horizon.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 135).

Heidegger interprets apperception etymologically and states that it is *ad-percipere*, grasping-along with (*Dazu-Erfassen*). In this sense, for Heidegger, apperception means the grasping of subjectivity in its own actions and activities and the act of grasping in relation to the subject's ability as "I am able to", "I can". Therefore, according to Heidegger, "Apperception means self-possession." (Heidegger, 1997-2, 254).

The subject is conscious of the identity of its acts. This consciousness is constantly manifested in the subject's transfer of itself to itself through "I can". Thinking is also an acting and is fundamentally executed in the manner of "I think".

Therefore, according to Heidegger, "I think" and transcendental apperception are the same. This is the ground that determines the mode of being of the subject.

However, Heidegger justifies Kant's designation of apperception as "the radical faculty of our knowledge" and its specific relation to the synthesis of precognition, which is the activity of understanding as a necessary transcendental condition, on the basis of a determination in CPR B399/A341. In the cited passage Kant explicitly states that "I think" is the carrier of all concepts in general and of transcendental concepts. It is also itself a transcendental concept. According to Heidegger, this determination of Kant shows that apperception is the primordial category. The transcendental concepts that determine the object as the object of knowledge and constitute the field of objectness fulfill their functions in the carrier of apperception, that is, only on its basis. For Heidegger, this determination clearly indicates that apperception guides all thinking as belonging to consciousness. All possible syntheses take place within the horizon of unification that apperception provides from the beginning. This horizon resides in the subject and is *a priori*. By possessing this horizon *a priori*, the subject gives unity to the object and relates to it. The *a priori* resistances of subjectivity, which ensure that knowledge is not accidental, are realized on the basis of the formal unity provided by apperception and constitute the reciprocal relation of the pure concept to the object of intuition. The origin of categories is thus grounded in time.

“When ‘I think’ is the primordial category, then herein lies a central clue for the ontological understanding of categories as such. All categories essentially go back to the free self-binding which characterizes the subject as such. They are grounded in a project which anticipates the unified horizon of resistance *a*

priori. But insofar as this project pertains to the unity of the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction and insofar as all three are rooted in time, the origin of categories is an origin in time.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 255).

Heidegger interpreted the threefold synthesis in unity as the emergent modes of the three dimensions of time. The third synthesis, the synthesis of precognition, gained priority over the other two syntheses. Fulfilling the function of identification, this synthesis made possible the sameness of something presented in advance in the mind's movement backward and forwards. Because the "I" is always conscious of the identity of its functions. This consciousness of identity makes possible the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction. And the pure basis of this whole process is transcendental apperception, which is the carrier of "I think" as the "fixed and perduring" self. Apperception is not a substantial ego, but a capacity that is constantly current in every knowledge act, as the carrier of the possibility of the realization of the form of knowledge. And its temporal character is based on these points.

In this way, the picture of Kantian subjectivity from the point of the Heideggerian interpretation is exhibited. The threefold synthesis is the unfolding modes of the three dimensions of time, and on this basis, they are in unity. This unity, in turn, is rooted in apperception, which provides the horizon of unity *a priori*. This temporal unity operates in the pure time-related synthesis activity of the power of imagination and reveals temporality as the basic constitution of the subject.

Heidegger's interpretation of transcendental deduction and threefold synthesis, and his interpretation of apperception through them, are as such. The structural unity of the phenomenological-ontological interpretation will be completed with the

exposition of Heidegger's interpretation of the doctrine of schematism. Of course, the interpretation of schematism and the interpretation of the imagination have an inner relationship.

4.5. Heidegger: On Schematism.

Our study presented Kant's doctrine of schematism by tracing the relevant section of the CPR. And why the essence of schematism is the transcendental determination of time has been laid out in an exposition of Kant's thought.

Schematism is one of the solid foundations on which Heidegger's phenomenological-ontological interpretation rests. For this chapter clearly reveals the central role of the phenomenon of time in the construction of subjectivity of the subject. The thesis that temporal determinations are the possibility of the application of categories to appearances, and thus the final stage of transcendental deductive inquiry, seems to have been accomplished in the doctrine of schematism.

The procedure of schematizing empirical or sensible concepts is of course included in the doctrine of schematism. But what makes it peculiar, and what is at the core of the matter, is the schematization of the pure concepts of understanding. Therefore, this is also Heidegger's focus. But for Heidegger, one of the important points about schematism is to make a sharp distinction between image and schema. It is this distinction that characterizes Heidegger's analysis of schematism. On the other hand, Heidegger criticizes Kant's commencement of the section on schematism from the possible subsumption of appearances under the categories. This beginning is incorrect, as is the treatment of deduction inquiry with the *quaestio juris* formulation.

Finite subject is receptive. However, this receptivity is made possible by the act of orientation that makes possible the preliminary mode of encountering beings.

Therefore, according to Heidegger, the subject's receptivity is not accomplished in a random way, but through the order provided by the act of orientation. As a result, the subject has the horizon of receptivity. This horizon makes it possible for what is offered to be offerable in advance. This horizon is the possibility within which objectification occurs. But within this horizon, the offering character of what is offered requires a certain perceptibility. To be immediately receivable by intuition is to be perceptible.

“Hence the horizon, as a distinct offering, must present itself in a preliminary way and constantly as a pure look (Anblick). From this it follows that the letting-stand-against of finite understanding must intuitively offer objectivity as such...” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 63).

This horizon, which makes the encounter with beings and the act of objectification possible from the beginning, is made perceptible thanks to the subject's power of imagination that constitutes the look of the horizon. The power of imagination makes the horizon intuitive and also provides images. So it is both formative and productive. Because, as Kant notes, the power of imagination brings the manifold of intuition into an image. The horizon of subjectivity, of transcendence, can be actualized in the making-sensible. In this way:

“The pure making-sensible occurs as a "Schematism." The pure power of imagination gives schema-forming in advance the look ("image") of the horizon of transcendence.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 64).

Through this determination, Heidegger focuses on the conclusion to be drawn from the difference he assumes between schema and image. Along with Kant's distinction between schema and image, Heidegger makes a distinction between schema and schema-image.

For Heidegger, the image has a dual character. It is based on the difference between watching a landscape live and looking at a picture of that landscape. In this sense, the image means the visible aspect of what offers itself.

“First of all, image can mean: the look of a determinate being to the extent that it is manifest as something at hand. It offers the look. As a derivation of this meaning, image can also mean: the look which takes a likeness of something at hand (likeness), i.e., a look which is the after-image of something no longer at hand or a look which is the premonition of a being [yet] to be produced for the first time.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 65).

The image is the appearance of what is given to the act of intuition. Heidegger states in his exposition of schematism that Kant uses the image in this sense. For Kant stated that image and schema must be distinguished from each other. The schema of the pure concepts of understanding cannot be brought into an image. What Kant calls the schema of a concept is the procedure of imagination that provides images for concepts. Heidegger argues that although the schema is distinct from the image, it is still related to something image-like. The image-character necessarily belongs to the schema. Heidegger claims that this image-character in relation to the schema has a structure of its own. This character is neither related to the first sense of the image, i.e.

actual appearance, nor to the image as a copy in the second sense. For Heidegger, this is the schema-image.

The way to understand Heidegger's schema-image determination is through an exemplification he gives through Kant. Kant says that five points placed one after the other is the image of the number five. However, for Heidegger, this is a special kind of image, the schema-image. Although there is no imaginary connection that can be constituted between the appearance of the five points and the appearance of the number 5, the five points transfer a rule to the possible intuitive context. The appearance of five points can be counted through the number five. The schema-image derives its appearance character from its representation represented in its regulation. "Of course, this row of points does not indicate the number because it is visible at a glance and because we can apparently extract the number from it, but rather because it conforms to the representation of the rule for the possible presentability of this number." (Heidegger, 1997-1, 70). The schema-image exhibits the special connection of empirical and pure sensible concepts with the image. Since notions do not have images, their intuitive aspects are constituted through the schema-image. For example, in the case of geometric concepts, which are the pure sensible concepts, it is the schema-image according to Heidegger.

The essence of schematism as pure-making sensible is revealed in the sensibilization of pure concepts of understanding. Heidegger states that these concepts thought in pure "I think" require pure discernibility. The perceptibility of the objectified in the act of pure objectification depends on this. "The pure concepts must be grounded in pure schemata, which procure an image for them." (Heidegger, 1997-1, 72).

Heidegger states that the schema is the rule that executes sensibilization.

Sensibilization means the production of a visible aspect for a concept. The production of this visible aspect is not directed towards intuition because in intuition the visible aspect of the given is already present. This is the production of the image and the act of forming. Production is the action that accomplishes combining and according to Heidegger, it is a species. This is what Kant calls *synthesis speciosa*, figurative synthesis. This synthesis alone belongs neither to spontaneity nor to sensibility. This synthesis represents a hybrid structure between the two domains and eliminates the irreducibility between receptivity and spontaneity.

“This synthesis as *synthesis speciosa* is neither just understanding nor just sensibility, neither just spontaneity nor just receptivity. But neither is it both of them together. The *synthesis speciosa* or figurative synthesis must therefore belong to a faculty that is spontaneous receptivity or receptive spontaneity. And this faculty, as its conceptual form already indicates, stands between sensibility and understanding, and it is what Kant calls the imagination [Einbildungskraft].” (Heidegger, 2010, 306).

Sensibilization as the forming of the visible aspect is executed in this mode of synthesis and is the act of imagination. The pure power of imagination as productive imagination represents the hybrid field in which the irreducibility of receptivity and spontaneity is dissolved. Schematism refers to the procedure and rule by which such function of synthesis is executed. According to Heidegger, schema means the image resulting from schematization and the process of schematization itself. As a rule, the schema is governed by *synthesis speciosa*.

“A schema is the mode of the general procedure governing figurative synthesis. It is the provision of an image according to a rule, and the rule is prescribed by the concept that is to be sensibly depicted. The rule says: The free, intuitive visualization [of the concept] must proceed in such a way that the intuitive aspect that is to be formed renders visible, in some way, what the content of the rule prescribes. The rule entails having a pre-view of both the concept that prescribes the rule and simultaneously of that wherein the something is to be sensibly depicted according to the rule. Through the rule and its constitutive previews, the depicted and what does the depicting are connected. In the rule (i.e., in the schema) I think the concept not simply as such, but in such a way that I understand it as what prescribes the *synthesis speciosa* of the imagination.” (Heidegger, 2010, 308-9).

As far as transcendental schemas are concerned, Kant makes it clear that the pure concepts of understanding cannot be brought into an image in any way. Heidegger states that the image here is the empirical image. That is, the category does not have an image like 5 dots. But on what is the sensibilization of schematization, which allows the pure concept to be applied to appearances, based? Heidegger claims that the image can be comprehensible in the context of the schema-image when it comes to making categories sensible. The pure schema must contain the *a priori* image. Depiction of the pure concepts of the understanding must necessarily take place in an *a priori* manner. (Heidegger, 2010, 310). But time is the only thing that is revealed *a priori* and antecedently and that also allows appearances to be revealed. The image that the pure schema does not possess is the sensible image. Therefore,

according to Heidegger, the transcendental schema is the procedure constituted in the pure image of time. According to Heidegger, the only possible image that the schema possesses is time.

Time as pure intuition precedes all experience and provides the possibility of the visible aspect (Anblick). According to Heidegger, this possibility of pure visualization must be determined as pure image. In the section on schematism, Kant states that time is the pure image of all sensible objects in general. On the other hand, Kant states in CPR A320/B377 that the origin of the notion is not found in the pure image of sensibility. The conclusion from these references is that the schema of the pure concepts of understanding can be brought into the pure image. Moreover, time as pure image is schema-image.

The schemas of pure concepts attain their image through the possibility of the visible aspect that time as pure image has already constituted. The schema without image finds the possibility of being made sensible in the condition provided by the possible visualization that emerges in the pure image of time as pure intuition. This condition refers to the schema-image that the transcendental schema possesses. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 74). The necessary *a priori* character of the transcendental schema is also based here.

Heidegger exposes the temporal essence of schematism through Kant's definition of the schema of the substance. Of course, Heidegger's exposition aims to validate the proposition that schemas provide concepts with their images in the pure image of time, that is, that they function as schema-images. Kant determines the schema of substance as persistence of the real in time. Heidegger proceeds from this determination to the analogy of experience and refers to the first analogy. In the first analogy, Kant presents the persistency principle of substance. Time cannot be

perceived as an object, on the other hand, Kant states that time is lasting and unchanging. With the possibilities of simultaneity and succession provided by time itself, change in appearances can be perceived within time. However, change in appearances can be represented relative to persistence. What allows us to capture appearance in change, that is, in temporal relations, is persistence, which is also a temporal determination, and this persistence is represented in the category of substance (real in the appearance).

Heidegger states that the substance is first and foremost that which constitutes the basis. Therefore, its schema must be the representation that forms the basis, and this representation presents itself in the pure image of time. The persistence of time, according to Heidegger, is based on its being a pure sequence of nows. It is always now. The fact that time is always now in actuality, despite the constant flow of the now (because when the now passes, the new now comes and so on...) provides the pure visible aspect that makes something persistent. That is to say, the subject acquires the representation of persistence from the pure image provided by the continuous nows, and grasps the changes in appearances relative to the basis that provides this persistence.

“what is meant by the notion Substance can itself procure a pure image *a priori* in time. For this reason, the objectivity in the letting-stand-against becomes discernible and distinct *a priori*, provided that Substance belongs to it as constitutive element. Through this schematism the notion as schematized stands in view in advance, so that in this preliminary view of the pure image of persistence, a being which as such is unalterable in the change can Show itself for experience.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 76).

Thus, according to Heidegger, transcendental schematism emerges as the grounding of the inner possibility of ontological knowledge. Schematism shapes the intuitive giving to the pure image of the time of what is objectified in the pure act of objectification of subjectivity, that is, what is represented in pure thinking.

4.6. Heidegger on Imagination

Heidegger's interpretation of imagination is intrinsically connected to his interpretation from transcendental deduction to threefold synthesis to apperception and schematism, and the whole interpretation arises within a unity of structure. However, imagination can be seen as the most specific element of Heidegger's interpretation as the solution to the problem that his interpretation basically traces. The problem that the Heideggerian interpretation traces is what is the fundamental transcendental faculty that enables the unity of intuition and understanding. The original function of imagination appears in this context as a discovery of the Heideggerian interpretation. In this section, it will be contended with to present a systematic exposition of Heidegger's interpretation of imagination. This is because the aim of this study is not to demonstrate the philosophical value of Heidegger's interpretation, but to investigate what is the enabling ground for Heidegger's interpretation in the CPR in particular and in Kantian critique in general. Therefore, the points where Heidegger accuses Kant of shrinking back on the subject of imagination are not the concern of this study.

Ontological knowledge forms transcendence, that is, subjectivity's going out of itself and its relation to the object based solely on its own faculties. This horizon, in

which subjectivity unfolds on the basis of self-affection and self-regulation, is made visible in advance through temporal determination, i.e. pure schematization. But this possibility is the product of transcendental imagination. This is what makes imagination play a critical role.

There are three remarkable points in Kant's determination of the pure power of imagination. First, it is a spiritual power, an "indispensable function" of the soul. Secondly, it is the faculty of intuition. Finally, this faculty does not depend on the presence of the object. But in intuition, an intuited being does not need presenting. It is already contained in the faculty of intuition as intuited. Therefore, the imagination gives the aspect of something independently of the being. Therefore, Heidegger determines pure imagination as faculty of forming (*Vermögen des Bildens*) and argues that it has a double character.

“As a faculty of intuiting, it is formative [*bildend*] in the sense of providing the image [*Bild*] (or look). As a faculty which is not dependent upon the presence of the intuitable, it fulfills itself, i.e., it creates and forms the image. This "formative power" is simultaneously a "forming" which takes things in stride (is receptive) and one which creates (is spontaneous). In this "simultaneously" lies the proper essence of its structure. But if receptivity means the same as sensibility and if spontaneity means the same as understanding, then in a peculiar way the power of imagination falls between both.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 91).

In this way, imagination intuitively enables the production of images independent of the presence of the object. Heidegger, therefore, argues that

imagination in the sense of the unity of possible time relations is the free production of a pure view. (Heidegger, 1997-2, 281). But these points are concerned with the reproductive power of imagination. So it is the empirical function of the faculty. The pure power of imagination is *a priori*. And as Heidegger cites Kant in Anthropology, *a priori* imagination is "the original presentation of the object (*exhibitio originaria*), which thus precedes experience" (Kant, 2006, 60). However, Kant says in the CPR that even if the synthesis of imagination is applied *a priori*, it is always sensible in itself. Heidegger, however, claims that sensibleness here refers to sensibility, not sense organs. Sensibility is to be understood as intuitive givenness and refers to the originality of the power of imagination.

“‘The power of imagination belongs to sensibility’ means that the power of imagination is precisely the faculty of *spontaneous* giving of images-is *exhibitio originaria*. It means that, over against understanding and intuition, the power of imagination is original, because it is in unity first and above all *both*. Because the power of imagination is finite in the true sense of the Word, understanding too is ‘sensible,’ i.e., is *finite*.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 284).

Heidegger's radical approach between intuition and finitude is also active as a dominant element in his interpretation of imagination. Accordingly, the fact that imagination is always sensible in itself is related to the characterization of the finitude of human knowledge. Moreover, according to Heidegger, this finitude makes even understanding sensible. It would seem to be a catastrophe for the classical reading of Kant to attach the predicate sensible to understanding, which is characterized by spontaneity. However, the absolute identity Heidegger presupposes between the

finitude of knowledge and the dependence of knowledge on intuition generates an interpretation that goes beyond the classical reading. On the other hand, for Heidegger's interpretation, the unity of ontological knowledge presupposes a specific relation between intuition and concept. Heidegger does not presuppose a sharp dichotomy between intuition and concept in the way that doctrinaire Kantianism follows. Reduced to the unitive synthesis of the fundamental spiritual force of imagination, the elements of intuition and concept have an inner bond created by unity. Because for Heidegger, imagination is not a bridge between the two ends of knowledge, but an active, creative faculty that provides the transitivity between the two ends of knowledge and adapts these two ends to each other in an inner context. Therefore, receptivity and spontaneity hybridize within the activity of imagination.

However, the productive character of pure imagination does not mean that the image extracts its content from something not experienced, from nothing. It only brings the visible aspect of the object into presence under certain conditions. For Heidegger, the empirical and pure character of imagination means the radical revelations of the transcendental inquiry of deduction and schematism. In the doctrine of schematism, the capture of concepts in appearances through schemata and, moreover, their being contextualized by their sensible correspondences is made possible by the underlying activity of the power of imagination. Imagination thus emerges as a fundamental faculty that also provides the possibility of experience. However, Heidegger states that the faculties of our mind as transcendental faculties do not mean the fundamental power at hand in the soul. The faculty here refers to the basic ability, that is, the continuous unfolding of possibility towards actuality. Therefore, the pure power of imagination as the basic ability to do something cannot

be reduced to pure elements. For according to Heidegger, the revealed function of imagination is not to act together with the two pure elements of knowledge.

We have already mentioned the reason for Heidegger's deeper tracing of the imagination. This reason is mainly based on the paradoxical relation between the two determinations Kant makes in the CPR. The first determination is the following: "there are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding." (Kant, 2000, 152). In the second determination, Kant says the following: "There are, however, three original sources (capacities or faculties the soul), which contain the-conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind namely **sense, imagination, and apperception**... In addition to their empirical use, all of these faculties have a transcendental one, which is concerned solely with form, and which is possible *a priori*." (Kant, 2000, 225).

On the one hand, the two stems of knowledge with an unknown common source, and on the other, the three subjective sources of the soul whose *a priori* use makes the object of knowledge possible. It is easy to see that Kant leaves a gap here in terms of determination. The main motivation of Heidegger's interpretive activity is to fill this gap. Following the traces left by Kant, Heidegger fills this gap with imagination. This is because, in certain passages of the CPR, imagination emerges in a significant way. Imagination is blind, but it is an indispensable function of the soul, and all knowledge is possible with it. On the other hand, we are rarely conscious of it.

This "rarely" fills the gap left by the determination which expresses that two stems of knowledge have a common but unknown source. On the other hand, Kant determined the essential role of imagination as combining the manifold of intuition with the conditions for the necessary knowledge of apperception. This reveals its

importance as a mediating faculty in the grounding of *a priori* knowledge. However, Kant did not treat imagination in transcendental aesthetics, which he determined as belonging essentially to intuition. However, Heidegger does not interpret the occurrence of this triad of basic faculties in the duality of stems of knowledge as a coincidence. Transcendental inquiry, bifurcated into transcendental aesthetics and transcendental logic, is oriented towards a fundamental unity, so Kant's introduction of triad faculties against the duality of knowledge indicates their common root. However, Heidegger makes a note about his interpretation. The fact that the elements of pure intuition and pure thinking are grounded in the transcendental power of imagination does not mean that they are the product of imagination and something imaginary. It means that:

“The structure of these faculties has been rooted in' the structure of the transcendental power of imagination, so that indeed this latter can "imagine" something for the first time only in structural unity with those two.”
(Heidegger, 1997-1, 74).

Heidegger states that in the transcendental power of imagination, according to its essence, something at hand does not take form. It is not ontically creative. On the contrary, the horizon of object, the understanding of Being (*Seinsverständnis*), is formed in it. Although the transcendental power of imagination belongs to intuition, it does not function like intuition; on the contrary, it enables the actual function of intuition.

There are points that need to be explained in terms of Heidegger's interpretation of imagination. If imagination represents the fundamental structure in

which pure intuition-pure concept is grounded, then the relation of imagination to the elements of pure intuition and pure thinking must be revealed. Space and time as original representations, as Kant determines, do not imply something innate in the soul or being-at-hand in the psychological, ontic sense. On the other hand, like *intuitus originarius* cannot be used in the sense of enabling the creation of something.

According to Heidegger, Kant's original predicate expresses the formative character. This character implies that they pro-pose (vor-stellen) the aspect of space and time as totalities that are manifold in themselves. According to Heidegger, the majority of interpreters reject what is intuited in pure intuition because space and time are forms of intuition. However, their formality does not mean that they are empty according to Heidegger. There is a unified totality in intuition. This unity shows that intuition is fundamentally unitive. This unified totality allows itself to be distinguished relative to the manifoldness it encompasses. Heidegger's complex interpretation actually shows the following. Forms of intuition are not empty formal structures that enable beings to be given to subjective receptivity. These pure forms are structuralities that have in advance the unified totality of space and time and are pre-formings that enable objects to be possible in spatio-temporal forms. According to Heidegger, this is the reason why Kant attributes synopsis, not synthesis, to intuition. Time has no image because it is the pure image. And in the horizon constituted by this pure image, beings take place as possible representations. The basis of this pure imaginary horizon is, according to Heidegger, the pure power of imagination. As Kant pointed out, pure space and time as forms of intuiting are actually something, but they are not in themselves objects that are intuited. They are *ens imaginarium*. For Heidegger, this means that pure intuition is pure imagination.

“Thus the original interpretation of pure intuition as pure power of imagination first provides the possibility to elucidate positively what the intuited is in pure intuition. As preliminary forming of a pure, unthematic, and (in the Kantian sense) unobjective look, pure intuition makes it possible that the empirical intuiting of spatio-temporal things which moves within its horizon does not first need to intuit space and time in the sense of an apprehension which first ascertains these multiplicities.” (Heidegger, 1997-1, 101-2).

However, the difficult part of justifying the claim that imagination is the common root arises when we come to understanding. Heidegger says that such an attempt seems absurd at first glance. Because imagination is determined by Kant as sensible. Moreover, how can imagination as sensible be the root of understanding, which is a "superior" faculty? However, Heidegger rejects such an organization of "inferior" and "superior" faculties from the beginning. This is because Kantian criticism treats the subjective faculties not as a subordinate-superior relationship but as a relationship between equals.

Nevertheless, it seems impossible to determine the origin of understanding, which is sharply separated from intuition, as pure imagination. At this point, Heidegger's first emphasis is on the representational character of intuition and understanding. Intuiting and thinking is different, but Heidegger thinks that they cannot be separated as two completely dissimilar things. “Rather, as species of representing [*Vorstellens*] both belong to the same genus of pre-presenting [*Vorstellens*] in general. Both are modes of the representing of ... [*des Vorstellens von...*]. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 103).

Heidegger's second stress is one of the main presuppositions of his Kant interpretation. The dependence of understanding on intuition. One of the basic presuppositions of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is that knowledge is primarily intuition and that the thinking element serves intuition. This dependence characterizes the being structure of the understanding. And the whatness and howness of this structure of being is accomplished in the pure synthesis of pure imagination. For Heidegger, the relation of understanding to intuition is achieved through the pure power of imagination.

In order to understand the determination of the origin of understanding as pure imagination, the classical logical positioning must be abandoned. Therefore, the characterization of thinking not as judging but as "faculty of rules" is, according to Heidegger, more acceptable for grounding. Faculty of rules, as represented unities, is that categories give direction in advance to possible unifications. The basis for this is pure "I", "I think" or pure apperception as lasting unity. In Heidegger's interpretation of deduction, the act of objectification of thinking towards intuition was mentioned. This act expresses the expansion of pure unity in thinking towards intuition. Thinking constitutes the field of objectness with the act of letting-stand-against as Heidegger determines and encounters the unified object in intuition in advance with this field. But underlying this act of thinking is pure self-consciousness, which represents the pure unity of subjectivity. All unity is possible through this primordial unity. Pure I, apperception is the vehicle of categories as pure unities. It is therefore pure subjectivity as Pure I that fundamentally unfolds itself. All representations of subjectivity are accompanied by this pure I. The provider of this unfolding of subjectivity by going outside of itself is schematism. So it is schematism as a procedure that makes concepts sensible. This inner connection with schematism is

naturally connected to the pure power of imagination because schematism is grounded in the transcendental power of imagination.

Heidegger's other consideration of this matter is based on a critically important passage in the CPR. In the relevant passage, Kant states the following:

“This synthetic unity, however, presupposes a synthesis, or includes it, and if the former is to be necessary *a priori* then the latter must also be a synthesis *a priori*.

Thus the transcendental unity of apperception is related to the pure synthesis of the imagination, as an *a priori* condition of the possibility of all composition of the

manifold in a cognition. But only the **productive synthesis of the imagination** can take place *a priori*; for the **reproductive** synthesis rests on conditions of experience.

The principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination prior to apperception is thus the ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially that of experience.” (Kant, 2000, 237-8).

The significant point here for Heidegger is the expression "prior to apperception". According to Heidegger, this expression reveals the priority of pure imagination to pure apperception. The determination of imagination as the origin of understanding is also based on this statement. Apperception requires a synthesis.

Without this synthesis *a priori* knowledge is not possible. This synthesis is the synthesis of pure imagination. For Heidegger, prior or before (vor) implies this:

“... ‘before [vor] apperception’ means then that synthesis to a certain extent occurs ‘before the eyes’ of apperception, of the ‘I think’.” (Heidegger, 1997-2, 279).

On the other hand, Kant additionally states that the synthesis of pure imagination is contained in apperception. This additional statement actually has the potential to nullify Heidegger's justification. However, Heidegger thinks that this additional statement is Kant's typical hesitation in the face of the fear of falling into logic or psychologism. But if the productive synthesis of imagination expresses the ground of the possibility of all experience prior to apperception, this suggests that the thesis that understanding is rooted in imagination is a defensible position.

In Heidegger's radical interpretation, pure imagination, which is determined in the CPR as mediating character, is determined as the root of the faculty of intuition and concept. Considering the radical synthesis of imagination, according to Heidegger, the whole process takes place in the original time. Imagination encompasses and executes the process of threefold synthesis retrospectively and prospectively. Threefold synthesis represents the unitary structure of time. The imagination that produces this unified structure as a synthesis can be seen as original time since it produces the temporal ontology of subjectivity. The fundamental structure of imagination, that is, its underlying character as the condition that resolves the irreducibility between intuition and concept, reveals it in the character of spontaneous receptivity and receptive spontaneity. However, Heidegger's radical interpretation goes to an extreme that doctrinaire Kantianism cannot accept. The transference of the properties of receptivity and spontaneity to each other due to the fundamental unifying structure of imagination can be seen as a border violation of Heidegger's interpretation. For it is on this basis that Heidegger argues that pure reason is also sensible.

Kant's elimination of this central role of imagination in the second edition of the CPR and its reformulation as a secondary element to understanding is a retreat for

Heidegger. Therefore, if one focuses on the innermost character of ontological knowledge as laying the ground for metaphysics in Kantian criticism, the first edition takes precedence over the second edition. According to Heidegger, Kant approached the ontological analysis of the subjectivity of the subject, that is, of transcendence, in the first edition.

Thus, the points underlying Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's philosophy as an ontology were revealed. Ontological knowledge is a unity, a synthesis. The carrier and producer of synthesis is pure imagination. Pure imagination relates to apperception, the primordial unity of understanding, on the basis of the dimension of temporality and thus constitutes the unity of pure intuition-pure concept. Why this construction is in the temporal dimension is revealed through the doctrines of threefold synthesis and also schematism as the main content of deduction inquiry. Pure imagination is thus revealed as the root of the faculties of subjectivity as original time and as the basic constitution of the subjectivity of the subject.

The foundations in Kantian philosophy that allow Heidegger to interpret Kant's philosophy as an ontology require an interpretation of Heidegger's interpretation. This is the point that is being traced in terms of this study. This will be discussed in the conclusion of this study.

CHAPTER 5

The Characteristic Textual Examples of Neo-Kantianism

In this section we will examine some of the main texts on the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant. First of course, we will consider the texts of Herman Cohen. Herman Cohen is the founding father of the Neo-Kantian school and the leading philosopher who laid the foundations of the school's interpretation of Kant. Cohen's KTE and LRE laid the foundations of this interpretation. In addition, the other Neo-Kantian philosopher we will examine in this section is Paul Natorp. Natorp's interpretation of Kant follows Cohen completely. Finally, we will present Cassirer's critique of Heidegger and see that through this critique, Cassirer reinforces his Neo-Kantian position.

5.1. Kants Theorie der Erfahrung

KTE is considered a fundamental and influential work of Cohen's, as it marks an important stage in the development of his thought and a turning point in the history of his interpretation of Kant's philosophy. It is one of the main sources of the neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant and guided the systematic Kantian interpretation of the Marburg school. There are first and second editions of the work. The second edition is an expanded version of the first edition. However, it can be said that the first edition is more important from a historical point of view. (Beiser, 2018, 54).

In fact, the title of the work gives a basic at first-hand impression: "Theory of experience". This means that the critique of pure reason is taken as a theory of experience. Kant has given us a theory of experience, and more precisely, he has taught us the possibilities for the construction of the object of experience. Cohen, like the major figures of the Neo-Kantian school before him, does not interpret Kant with

the motivation of psychological or physiological science. This is because others regard Kant as the pioneer of psychology and physiology, which were on the rise at the time (the science of the mind). Cohen, on the other hand, focuses epistemologically on Kant. According to Cohen, Kant's main aim is not to determine the causes of knowledge, but to determine its limits, foundations and justification. (Beiser, 2018, 55).

Indeed, in the first sentence of the preface to KTE, Cohen succinctly states the purpose of his work. To undertake to restore Kant's doctrine of the *a priori*. (Cohen, 1871, III). Cohen states that his idea of the correctness of the Kantian system was formed in the struggle against the attacks on Kant. For his generation, Kant is a surpassed and historicized figure. However, Cohen expresses that it was up to him to re-present the historical Kant and defend him against his rivals. In a way, Cohen relearned Kant in this polemical struggle and constructed his work on this basis. (Cohen, 1871, IV).

So why was it necessary to re-establish Kant's *a priori* doctrine? Is Kant's doctrine a mere doctrine of *a priori*? And if so, what are the foundations of the need for its renewal? On the other hand, does the restoration of this *a priori* doctrine imply that it is a theory of experience?

Of course, our study will try to answer these questions by following in Cohen's footsteps. However, the main point to be pursued is to reveal the essential relation between Cohen's reconstruction and Kantian criticism. For our study investigates the provider possibilities of Cohen's interpretation in Kant. However, Cohen states that systematic partisanship is inevitable. According to Cohen, the necessity to test the concepts made possible by Kant in terms of the theory of knowledge creates this partisanship. (Cohen, 1871, IV). Because to understand Kant's criticism is to

understand the critic's philosophy. For Cohen, this means putting forward a meta-critique.

5.1.1. Logical determination of space and time

Cohen begins his inquiry on the logical determination of space and time. The question that philosophy was preoccupied with for a century before Kant was: are our representations innate or acquired? The question is as much about the validity of our knowledge as it is about its origin. Where does the certainty of our thinking come from? According to Cohen, the whole debate stems from this metaphysical question. (Cohen, 1871, 1).

The idea of the innate was of course first presented by Descartes. On the other hand, Leibniz defended innate ideas against the sensualistic side and Locke. He accomplished this by making the ground of knowledge and the cause of being identical. The ground of knowledge and the ground of reality coincide in *a priori* knowledge. However, Cohen asks whether Leibniz proves this identity.

This is because Kant also asked this question, and with this question, he found himself in the debate between the schools. Cohen states that Kant attacks the problem of innate ideas with this question and, as his own inquiry will show, surpasses it. (Cohen, 1871, 2-3).

On the other hand, there is Hume's response to this problem. Kant stated that he woke up from his dogmatic slumber thanks to Hume. However, Kant does not follow Hume's conclusion. Hume thinks that the representations we think of as innate ideas are formed in the subject depending on the habit of experience. For example, causality, which is considered as an *a priori* form of thought, is the interconnection of perceptions in flux. Kant has set out his position on both sides of this debate in the

introductory sentence of the CPR. All knowledge begins with experience, but this does not mean that experience is the source of all knowledge. The acceptance that knowledge begins with experience is the connection with the empirical side. However, the idea that experience is not the source of all knowledge represents an engagement with the rationalist side. Thus, Kant does not side with one of the parties in the debate that had preceded him for a century, but rather tries to achieve a unique position among the parties. According to Cohen, this introduction of CPR left the experience as an enigma. According to him, the solution to this enigma is the content of Kant's philosophy. Kant discovered a new concept of experience. The critique of pure reason is a critique of experience. Whether Kant satisfies the natural claims of empirical skepticism and rational dogmatism and resolves the dispute between them depends on the exact determination of this concept of experience. (Cohen, 1871, 3-4). To eliminate skepticism but not to leap into dogmatism is the motivation for this first introductory sentence of the CPR. Both sides will converge on this new concept of experience that Kant has discovered. And Cohen notes that Kant grounds this unification in the doctrine of space-time.

As a matter of fact, the chapter on transcendental aesthetics first declares that space is not a concept derived from outer experience. This first sentence is, for Cohen, an objection to the empiricist concept of experience. Space is not an empirical concept, and according to our concept of experience, space is not contained in experience, so our concept of experience in this sense is false. On the other hand, space cannot be derived from outer experience, i.e. space is not an abstraction, it must be put into the experience. Thus, the notion of experience with respect to space is shown to be false in two respects. I cannot derive it from experience. For in order to be able to relate to sensations or impressions outside of me, to represent them not only

separately but also in separate places and side by side, the representation of space must be present from the beginning. The representation of space cannot be borrowed through experience from the relations of appearances. However, Cohen suggests that one should look closely at the grounding and pay attention to the point that space is already at the basis of experience. For being at the basis of experience implies that space is still present somewhere, somehow, in experience. Space is found at the basis of outer appearances, but this determination does not reveal whether space is in the object or in the subject. On the other hand, experience does not derive the representation of space, but shows that it is a component of experience because it is already present in the basis of appearances.

The metaphysical exposition of space and time requires a preliminary explanation of the meaning of the Kantian *a priori*. Kant calls knowledge that is universal and necessary *a priori*. However, according to Cohen, this explanation does not determine the concept of *a priori* but only depicts it. The predicates of universality and necessity only depict the value of the *a priori*, but they do not reveal what this value consists of and what it is based on. (Cohen, 1871, 10). Therefore, one must ask what knowledge is generally valid and strictly necessary. The terms general and necessary reveal not the inner criterion of the concept of *a priori* but its external value. According to Cohen, the concept of *a priori* is completed and fulfilled through another concept. For Cohen, this concept is transcendental. In this context, the predicates of general validity and strict necessity, which only reveal the value of the concept of *a priori*, acquire their first content in a revolution of thought that finds its symbolic meaning in the Copernican turn. The natural sciences acquired universal and necessary knowledge about objects through the principles that thought had established over them. The manifestation of *a priori* knowledge in nature as universal and

necessary was realized when the locomotive center of the subject-object plane was determined as the representation of the subject. Therefore, the first basis of *a priori* knowledge is this revolution in the mode of thought.

However, the very characteristic essence of *a priori*, according to Cohen, appears in the second proposition of the metaphysical exposition of the concept of space. The first proposition suggests that the representation of space is necessary in order to sense spatial distinctions. The second proposition, however, refers directly to the source of representation. One can conceive of a space in which there are no objects, but one can never represent that there is no space. (Kant, 2000, 157).

According to Cohen, in the first proposition, space had acquired a relative priority derived from particular localization. That is, the subject was discovering space as the condition on which its spatial experience depended. What is revealed by the second proposition, however, is that the subject puts space into its experience. The inability to represent that there is no space shows that space is what the subject puts into experience itself. Herein lies the unique characteristic of the *a priori*. *A priori* are *a priori* only because they originate from the subject. The subject does not derive them from things, but rather puts them into things.

According to Cohen, this is the first stage of *a priori*. We discover the *a priori* in our own mind, isolate it through conscious experimentation and bring it to things. The fact of consciousness that reveals that space is immanent in all our representations makes it *a priori*. This fact of consciousness (*tatsache*) assigns to itself the value of universal and necessary knowledge. But this value of worth is itself only a fact of consciousness. (Cohen, 1871, 13). The context Cohen describes as the first stage, the step, of *a priori* is its originality. The factor that makes space *a priori* is not its universal and necessary predicates, but its direct residence in the mind, in the subject,

as a representation underlying outer appearances, and the subject's attribution of it to things. The experiment of the fact of consciousness, that is, the fact that even if we can abstract things from space, we cannot abstract space from consciousness, is the first step in demonstrating its *a priori* character.

Cohen argues that in transcendental aesthetics, as the science of the principles of sensibility, it is necessary to understand what sensibility essentially refers to. It is certainly not the organs that are posited here as sensibility. Kant does not proceed from a sensibility from which psychologism can be derived. Rather, sensibility here points to a process. What Kant refers to as sensibility is process as the activity of knowledge. (Cohen, 1871, 15). All knowledge is related to the object. Intuition is what knowledge immediately relates to and what every thinking aims at as a means. Cohen states that all thinking wants to grasp the object, and the object is given in intuition. However, this givenness should not be misconceived according to Cohen. Because the object is given only by being intuited. According to Cohen, Kantian criticism is based on the dissolution of this circle. The object can be given only by affecting the mind in a certain way. (Cohen, 1871, 15-6). However, Cohen focuses on the capacity of the mind to be affected, rather than the power of the object to affect. Kant describes our capacity to receive representations through the way we are affected by objects as sensibility. However, Cohen points out that this is not the only capacity to receive representations. For the capacity for sensibility is based solely on being affected by objects. Understanding's thinking is also related to objects. However, the way in which understanding is being aroused by objects is different. This emphasis by Cohen is of course no coincidence. The emphasis that intuition is only a mode of receiving representations is intended to ensure that the sensibility element does not overpower the understanding element. If the capacity to receive representations is assigned solely

to the element of sensibility through intuition, then the mode of relating to the object will be reduced to the element of sensibility alone. This context is risky for Cohen and Neo-Kantianism. It pushes back the factor of understanding in relation to the object. Cohen, therefore, emphasizes that understanding is related to the object through a different kind of stimulation. This is why he states that the givenness of the object should not be misunderstood. The givenness of the object does not only consist in its being given in the element of intuition. In terms of its capacity to receive representations, understanding is also a factor at play.

When investigating the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge, of course, the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment is important for the rediscovery of the *a priori*. The content and activity of mathematical science are entirely based on synthetic *a priori* judgments. However, Cohen distinguishes between philosophical knowledge and mathematical knowledge while continuing his reflection on the Kantian concept of *a priori*. Philosophical knowledge is the knowledge of reason derived from concepts (Vernunftkenntniss). Mathematical knowledge is knowledge derived from the construction of concepts. (Cohen, 1871, 23). According to Cohen, constituting a concept means representing its corresponding intuition *a priori*. The meaning and value of the *a priori* representation here will not be misunderstood because it is not based on an external experience. This is because it is thought to arise from the activity of our mind (Geist). It is precisely because of this that *a priori* knowledge needs no further certification because it originates in our mind, that is, it is based on the formal structure of our thought. Thus, other kinds of cognition are guaranteed by the correspondence that arises from the same natural source. That is, cognitions are valid to the extent that they correspond to the natural

formal source of *a priori* cognition. For Cohen, this protects the free construction of *a priori* knowledge from the arbitrariness of speculation. (Cohen, 1871, 23).

As a matter of fact, according to Cohen, the proof of the concept of *a priori* is prepared in the third proposition of the representation of space. Space is not a discursive or universal concept derived from the relations of things, but a pure intuition. Cohen argues in the first proposition that space emerges as a representation that precedes every single perception of local differences, in the second proposition this relative priority is extended to the constant presence of local differences, and in the third proposition this apriority is revealed in a special kind of reason knowledge. (Cohen, 1871, 28). That is, the first proposition about space holds that the representation of space underlies the singular perception of the local distinction between any two things. The second proposition formulates the representation of space underlying these singular perceptions of these separate locations as a constant presence (it cannot be represented that there is no space). The third proposition, which asserts that space is a pure intuition, reveals that it resides in the mere subject as a special kind of mind-knowledge and allows geometric propositions to be derived with apodictic certainty. Cohen states that in this progression of propositions, space is detached from raw experience, presented as *a priori* on the axis of a correct revolution of thought, and assigned to the material from which experience can be constructed. Cohen's focus on space as *a priori* intuition is to reveal what *a priori* is. My local perception of the difference between "there" and "here" is based on the fact that the space representation that allows me to feel this difference is already present in the subject. In the next step, I discover that the space I have is a one space representation. Different locations are actually limitations of one space. This step implies an extension towards the constant presence of the representation that enables localization.

But the question still remains "what is *a priori*? The third step establishes precisely what the *a priori* is with an originary approach. *A priori* is the knowledge of what the subject itself puts into things. "we can cognize of things *a priori* only what we ourselves have put into them" (Kant, 2000, 111). Experience or a singular triangle does not prove that the two sides of the triangle are greater than the third side. We put it in the triangle through our own intuition, and this is what we know *a priori*. Our intuition constructs this apodicticity. This is exactly the point Cohen wants to emphasize. *A priori* expresses subjective correspondence. But this subjectivity is general and necessary for all human subjects.

However, according to Cohen, certain questions arise from this third proposition. These are questions about the objective correspondence of space. Is it only in our heads that we delimit space by cutting it off? Cohen thinks that the fourth proposition answers this. The fourth proposition functions not as a special proposition but as a confirmation of the third proposition. The fourth proposition asserts that space is represented as a given magnitude. Cohen holds that this proposition *prima facie* contradicts the fact that space is a pure intuition. Because with this fourth proposition, one can develop the conception that space is a concept represented in an outer given magnitude. So with this proposition, space can be thought of as a concept represented under a given magnitude as a general characteristic of empirical representations. However, according to Cohen, with this fourth proposition, Kant has provided a new proof for *a priori*. Space is not a concept. That is because concepts are not thought of as things that contain infinite representations. On the contrary, it subsumes and fixes possible infinite representations under itself through a common characteristic. Whereas space is simultaneous infinitely with all its parts. So intuition simultaneously

progresses space towards infinity. Because there is a boundlessness in the progress of intuition. Therefore, the principle of infinity comes from intuition, not from concepts. According to Cohen, this is precisely where the new unfolding of the *a priori* lies. The principle of infinity represented in the intuition of space cannot contain a concept of relations, so it needs an intuition whose nature is to move towards the infinite. This nature is the pure and *a priori* because it constructs everything first. (Cohen, 1871, 30).

The basis that forms the concept of *a priori* is clear here. Cohen concentrates on the first stage of *a priori* as the primary origin. The progress of intuition to infinity is not the structure we take from things but the structure we put into things. The root of this structure is in the formal structure of the subject. In this sense, *a priori* is the free constructive power of the subject.

The fact that I construct the triangle and represent it in intuition occurs *a priori*. But is this triangle real? The strict necessary and universal validity of the triangle proves that it is real? On the other hand, Cohen argues, we cannot avoid thinking of the *a priori* as subjective as opposed to objective. But Cohen thinks that this correlation is false in principle and that other false distinctions arise from it.

It is precisely at this point that Cohen thinks there is a complement. *A priori* presupposes another concept through which it is a complete concept. And this complement concept is completely beyond the subjective-objective distinction. According to Cohen, this complementary concept that allows us to exceed the distinction between subject and object is the concept of the transcendental. By transcendental Kant means knowledge that is concerned not with the objects themselves, but with our mode of knowledge of them insofar as they are *a priori* possible. Cohen thinks that the term transcendental, which is the complement of *a*

priori, is made explicit here. If *a priori* our mode of knowledge is called transcendental, this implies that it is possible to recognize the *a priori* in the transcendental mode of knowledge. (Cohen, 1871, 36). Stating that Kant defines the knowledge, which is an *a priori* concept, as metaphysical knowledge, Cohen argues that this knowledge is realized empirically through questioning inner experience. However, the mode of knowledge that is valid as long as the *a priori* is possible is transcendental. Cohen points out that one should be attentive to the term mode of knowledge. The object of transcendental knowledge is metaphysical knowledge, but it differs from it in method or mode. The transcendental first proves the *a priori* within its own possibility. It thus fulfills the concept of *a priori*. (Cohen, 1871, 36).

The fundamental point that Cohen reformulates in his concept of the transcendental is its original and complementary relation to the concept of the *a priori*. The transcendental as a mode of knowledge, whether the object is intuition or concept, is not concerned with the *a priori* object, but with our mode of recognizing and knowing the object *a priori*. In other words, transcendental knowledge is the field in which the *a priori* emerges as a possibility. Because of this complementary relation between the transcendental and the *a priori*, the subject-object dualism is exceeded. For the *a priori* knowledge of the subject is not the knowledge of the object, but transcendental knowledge as the knowledge of knowing the object. This indicates that the subject is not engaged with an object in a position opposed to itself, but with the mode in which its agency, which transforms the object within its own structure of knowing, is realized. Therefore, oppositions such as subjective-objective, object-concept, or possible-actual are resolved within the sphere of transcendental agency.

Cohen states that the question "is space actual?" (*wirklich*) cannot be asked in the context of transcendental knowledge. However, the ground that makes *a priori*

knowledge of objects possible is not a product of poetic fantasy. It has reality. Cohen asks how it is possible for an intuition to project itself into infinity. On what basis does the intuition that provides *a priori* concepts of things continue to persist in the subject? How is this apriority, which we put into things and which persists in things, possible, and what is its reality based on?

According to Cohen, the answer to how intuition is *a priori* possible is given in transcendental exposition. The subject has a formal structure. This formal structure is the formal structure of the outer sense, and the subject is inhabited by such a structure. The subject's mind is affected by objects and in this way, the subject receives immediate representations of objects, i.e. intuitions. What makes this possible is the formal structure of the subject. Space is the form of outer sense and resides in the subject. This formal structure is the ground for the fulfillment of intuition *a priori*. However, Cohen states that in order to understand this answer well, the meaning of the term form in Kant should be examined (Cohen, 1871, 37). Understanding what Kant means by "space is the form of the outer sense" will determine the scientific value of transcendental aesthetic inquiry. Cohen asks the following regarding this: Does Kant mean by the term form an organ into which sensations enter and are then transformed or a mode and type of appearances?

According to Cohen, the meaning of the term form cannot be an organ in the Kantian sense. In other words, the form cannot be thought of as a mold into which impressions are poured, like an organ. According to Cohen, the Kantian distinction between form and matter can be understood in the context of the term appearance. In the introduction to the chapter on transcendental aesthetics, Kant defines the terms form and matter in relation to the term appearance. Thus, what corresponds to sensation in appearance is the matter of appearance, and the possibility of organizing

the manifold of appearance in certain relations is determined as the form of appearance. The sensation is the effect of an object on our faculty of representation. Kant defines appearance as the undetermined object of an empirical intuition.

In this reciprocal pattern of terms, Cohen wants one to pay attention to the following. The form is not what organizes the manifold in certain relations, but what makes this organization possible. Cohen argues that Kant calls form the potential relation that constitutes the condition for the orderly perception of the manifold presented only through sensation. (Cohen, 1871, 42). As a matter of fact, Kant also states that it is not a sensation that enables the possibility of organizing sensations. The possibility of formally organizing sensations lies *a priori* ready in the mind. But matter and form come together in appearance. What is in question here is this: the matter of appearance, the sensation, is given to the subject a posteriori. What, then, is given as matter in the experience from which all knowledge begins? In fact, Cohen asks the question: if all knowledge begins with experience, how can the elements matter and form be positioned at this beginning? Because matter and form are given to us in appearances, and we are already confronted with an appearance at the moment when the experience begins. But this questioning finds its definitive and adequate explanation in the determination that, according to Cohen, the term form is the form of appearance. The form is not the correspondence of matter as an object to our subjectivity. Both are determinations of appearance. According to Cohen, in the Kantian form-matter context, there is no encounter in which subjectivity receives impressions from actual things. Cohen emphasizes that according to Kant's exact determination, form is only a relation, and under this relation it is possible to organize the manifold of sensations in our intuition in appearances. (Cohen, 1871, 44).

The reason for Cohen's emphasis on the term form is that he is opposed to the approach that formulates it as an organ. The form is not a container or mold that contains things or impressions of things. This approach leads to a false formulation of the Kantian concept of *a priori*. It may even lead to a wrong view of the transcendental. For in the Kantian context, subjectivity is engaged not with things themselves but with the mode of knowledge of things. In this sense, the term form is the mode of knowledge of subjectivity, and under this mode, things are given to it as appearances.

According to Cohen, the Kantian term form has another reference. The term involves not only organizing the manifold of appearances in a certain relation but also intuiting them. Kant states in CPR B35 that the pure form of sensible intuitions is encountered *a priori* in the mind and that the entire manifold of appearances is intuited under this form in certain relations. Thus, Cohen argues, the Kantian term form refers not only to organizing the manifold of appearances but also to intuiting them in the form of pure sensibility. So the act of intuition itself is called form, it is the appearance form of pure intuition. (Cohen, 1871, 46). Thus, for Kant, the term form is not an organ, a faculty in the mind, or a substantialized container. Kant equated the form of sensibility, which is assumed to lie ready in the mind, with intuition. However, according to Cohen, the fact that the form lies ready in the mind does not mean that it is a completed or finished form. From this ground provided by aesthetic inquiry, the term form attains its fullness within the scope of transcendental logic. For Cohen, the unity of aesthetics and logic is very important in this context.

Finally, the term form, in the Kantian context, also refers to the affecting of the mind through its own self-activity. For space and time are also determined by Kant as modifications of sensible intuition. Thus, form refers to a type or mode in which the

mind is modified through its own activity. On the other hand, Kant states in the section on transcendental deduction (A86) that experience consists of two elements, one is the matter that comes through the senses and the other is a certain form that comes from the inner source of pure intuition and thinking to organize this matter. According to Cohen, this statement is an equalization of intuition and form and does not contain a contradiction. On the other hand, form does not have an ultimate meaning as finished or completed, it is only a "certain" form. The form that comes from the inner source of intuition and makes it possible to organize matter is itself intuition itself. (Cohen, 1871, 48).

5.1.2. Transcendental exposition of space and time

Cohen follows the determinations of the exposition of transcendental aesthetic inquiry in trying to determine the Kantian notion of *a priori*. For example, the transcendental question for the intuition of space is simply this: how can space as an outer intuition, which produces outerness, be inner? Here Kant's response is obvious. Space as an outer intuition is the formal constitution of the intuiting subject. Space is thus determined as the intuition of the outer sense of subjectivity. Being the formal constitution of subjectivity makes space inner on the other hand. Here it becomes obvious that space as intuition is solely subjective. So where does this conclusion place in the context of objectivity? Is space not an objective thing? Cohen states that what is subjective can also be quite objective. (Cohen, 1871, 48). Colors are subjective, but they are also objective in the sense that they are based on molecular vibration. Cohen tries to show that Kantian subjectivity does not exclude objectivity. For the Kantian *a priori* resides in the subject, but this does not mean that it is subjective in a relative sense. The *a priori* is also constitutive with respect to the

objective field. The fact that intuition precedes the object and resides in the subject does not mean that it is a fantasy unrelated to objects. Colors are in the object as well as in the subject. Here the specificity of the transcendental mode of knowledge is revealed. In the transcendental context, the concept of *a priori* precedes objects but also constitutes them. This shows that Kantian subjectivity is a constitutive structure that also has an objective correspondence.

For a geometrician, for example, the triangle does not express an objective spatiality. On the contrary, the triangle is constructed from the formal constitution of the subjective intuition of space. For this very reason, the triangle is *a priori*. As mentioned earlier, the Kantian concept of *a priori* is characterized firstly by the fact that it resides in the subject, that is, its primary source is the subject, and secondly by the fact that it is constitutive. These two points reveal it as a mode of knowledge that has a counterpart in objective reality. Indeed, Cohen argues that it is only possible for the intuition of space, which is *a priori* given, to construct experience when it is defined as a formal constitution of the subject. (Cohen, 1871, 49). In tracing the Kantian doctrine of the *a priori*, Cohen wants to eliminate the subjectivity-objectivity opposition. For example, the question Kant asks in A23 of his transcendental aesthetics is: are space and time actual entities? This question is directed toward the objectivity of space and time. Kant states that they are not actual entities in the absolute sense. They are actual in the sense that they are the form of our inner and outer intuition. For they are the predicates we impose on things depending on the particular constitution of our mind. It is precisely here that a special mode of knowledge of the mediation of subjectivity and objectivity emerges. The concept of strict *a priori* reveals an understanding of objectivity that wants to be subjective. (Cohen, 1871, 51).

According to Cohen, the Kantian concept of *a priori*, which emerges in the context of subjective sensibility, overcomes the subjective-objective disjunction assumed by dogmatic realism and dogmatic idealism. Dogmatic realism considers objectivity in the nature of things and subjectivity in the creations of imagination. The dogmatic idealist, on the other hand, rejects the material world because he regards it as subjective and accepts as true only what the inner world of thought proves. Thus both agree that the objective and the subjective are members of a necessary disjunction. (Cohen, 1871, 52).

In between these two camps, of course, stands skepticism. Cohen says that according to skepticism, all science is impossible. This is because skepticism asserts that the lawful links of thought contained in science are associations of subjective sensations. Ideas are abstractions of experience, and experience is the epitome of sensations. Thus there are no *a priori* concepts and not even mathematics. Cohen states that this is the conclusion Kant was attacking. Kant found *a priori* knowledge in mathematics. (Cohen, 1871, 53).

The mathematical *a priori* is based on pure intuition. What makes this possible is the determination of pure intuition as the formal constitution of the subject, the form of sensibility. This identifies sensibility itself as the *a priori* source of knowledge, that is, as the source that constructs experience. According to Cohen, this source is dug into us, into our sensibility. (Cohen, 1871, 53). According to Cohen, this source is the first *a priori* from which synthetic *a priori* propositions are derived and which the subject recognizes. Our sensibility is our subjectivity. Of course, it is not the whole of our subjectivity, but a part of it, but a necessary part. If space and time are the conditions of our subjectivity, then everything is captured in our subjectivity insofar

as we engage with it in space and time. Cohen argues that Kantian subjectivity changes the meaning of subjectivity. For subjective sensibility is not the complex preliminary stage of objective thought, but an equally productive source of knowledge. (Cohen, 1871, 54). Kantian subjectivity changed the anti-objective meaning of subjectivity in this context.

With the detection of the transcendental difference between sensibility and understanding, with the transcendental recognition of sensibility, the subjective-objective disjunction in the old sense was abolished. For Cohen, transcendental subjectivity implies a necessary exclusive (*ausschliessend*) subjectivity. For there is no higher and more certain objectivity than the apriority of intuition as determined in the formal constitution of subjective sensibility. (Cohen, 1871, 54). Only what *a priori* subjectivity produces, that is, constructs is objective.

Let us try to explain Cohen's emphasis on the mediation of subjectivity-objectivity. As we mentioned at the beginning, Cohen treated Kantian criticism as a new doctrine of experience. The essence of this doctrine of experience was contained in the constitution of the concept of *a priori*. What Cohen traced was the inner criterion of *a priori*. In other words, apart from the general and necessary predicates of the *a priori*, he was investigating the structure of *a priori* that corresponds to reality. Because the properties of being general and necessary only revealed the value of the concept of *a priori*. However, it had to be revealed that it was the constructive origin of reality. In this context, Cohen was confronted with two main points when he set out to investigate transcendental aesthetics. The first was the origin of the concept of *a priori*. This origin was the formal constitution of the subject. That is, the *a priori* was *a priori* not because it was general and necessary, but because it was the formal constitution of the subject. The provider basis for this formal constitution was

subjective sensibility. Subjective sensibility was space and time as pure intuition. The other basis that determined the nature of the *a priori* was that it was constructive. That is, pure sensibility as the formal constitution of the subjective mind, that is, pure intuition, was *a priori* because it emerged as the constructive formal condition of experience. But doesn't the objectivity of the mathematical natural sciences, which operate with *a priori* knowledge, become doubtful in this context? How can objective knowledge emerge from a knowledge process based entirely on the formal conditions of subjectivity? This is where Cohen introduces the concept of the transcendental. The classical subjectivity-objectivity mediation is exceeded by the transcendental mode of knowledge. For Kantian subjectivity is not individual relativity that suspends objective knowledge. On the contrary, it is the formal constitution that produces objectivity. The propositions of mathematics and geometry are based on the pure intuition of subjectivity. These propositions are derived on the basis of intuitions of space and time, i.e. the conditions that the subject has. But these propositions are objective. That is, these propositions produce their correspondent and reality in the field of nature and in the collective life of the subject. The subject constructs a world based on the conditions of its subjective constitution, and this world acquires objectivity that is general and necessary for all objects. The transcendental subject reconstitutes the object by the forms it projects onto the object and constitutes the objectivity of the object that applies to collective subjectivity. This is the whole reason for Cohen's emphasis on this point.

On the other hand, according to Cohen, the study of transcendental aesthetics has shown that the *a priori* is comprehensible only in form and form only in appearances. The *a priori* thus constructs an experience that is nothing but an epitome of appearances. In the concept of *a priori* lies the basis for a new kind of idealism,

which Kant derived from the doctrine of space-time. (Cohen, 1871, 58). Of course, Cohen also emphasizes that the doctrine of space-time must be addressed through the inquiry of its organic complement, transcendental logic. Therefore, after his investigation of the doctrine of space-time, Cohen focuses on the relation between transcendental aesthetics and transcendental logic.

5.1.3. Relation between transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic

According to Cohen, the connection between aesthetics and logic as Kantian principles of knowledge can already be indicated by the name of the former. The title Transcendental aesthetics points to three things. The fact that the doctrine is transcendental points to its methodology. Transcendental aesthetics treats space and time as neither objects nor concepts. Nor is it enough to present them as *a priori* intuitions. The focus of the doctrine is on the possibility of space and time as *a priori* modes of knowledge. This is the first characteristic of the title Transcendental aesthetics. It exhibits the methodological aspect of the doctrine. The doctrine does not aim to dogmatically postulate an *a priori*. It questions the possibility of *a priori* in general. Cohen states that metaphysics becomes critique through this singular thought. (Cohen, 1871, 79).

However, Cohen asks what kind of a concept of possibility critique has. Does possibility imply no contradiction in its concept, or does it presuppose an X under which it stands and is conditioned? Cohen states that such an X is indeed present for Kantian thought. According to Cohen, this X is experience. Kant determined transcendental knowledge as the knowledge that proves the possibility of the *a priori*. However, this determination shows that the possibility of the *a priori* is demonstrated in a possible experience. "Possible experience" or "the possibility of all experience" is

the consistent term of Kantian criticism. Cohen states that the main question here is: "And what is this possible experience?" (Cohen, 1871, 80).

A priori cannot be derived from experience. Experience can only give a comparative generality. Concepts alone, on the other hand, only yield one kind of *a priori*. This too is analytic *a priori* and is based on the principle of contradiction. But when the subject connects appearances and asserts that they belong to each other *a priori*, no single concept will suffice to prove this. For what characterizes the act of binding is that it presents the interconnectedness of different things that are not contained in a singular concept. The *a priority* of judgments that bind different things together presupposes a synthesis of concepts. But the synthesis of concepts depends on the laws that execute the synthesis. And according to Cohen, these laws must be developed from the concept of possible experience. Possible experience is thus the source from which the *a priority* of synthetic propositions is derived.

At this point, the central point of both Cohen's and Neo-Kantianism's interpretation of Kant becomes evident. Because Cohen thinks that the doctrine of transcendental aesthetics does not include the laws of synthesis. The content of the concept of transcendental is directed towards transcendental logic. Transcendental aesthetics offered the formal and methodical value of the transcendental concept, that is, the possibility of the concept of *a priori*. According to Cohen, however, this possibility implies the possibility of *a priori* experience. And transcendental aesthetics cannot reveal this content of the transcendental concept. (Cohen, 1871, 81). This is precisely why transcendental aesthetics refers to transcendental logic. This is the second point that the name transcendental aesthetics indicates.

The third point to which the title Transcendental aesthetics refers is Kant's choice of the word aesthetics for the doctrine of sensibility. For Kant notes that the Germans understood the word aesthetics to mean the critique of taste. However, Kant preferred the word aesthetics as the science of the principles of sensibility. On the other hand, as Kant states in the CPR, the doctrine of sensibility is the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense. For Cohen, the fact that the doctrine of aesthetics is the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense shows in an essential way that transcendental aesthetics and logic are complements of each other. Here is the third reference of the name transcendental aesthetics. (Cohen, 1871, 82). According to Cohen, the title transcendental aesthetics naturally refers to transcendental logic. For the doctrine of space and time involves the doctrine of the conditions of phenomena, and under these conditions thought aims at intuitions. Cohen argues that because of this "aim" (*abzwecken*), space and time emerge as preconditions for the application of categories. But the doctrine of space-time is also the doctrine of a certain constitution of noumena. According to Cohen, this dark meaning of transcendental aesthetics can be illuminated in transcendental logic, in which the essence of noumena finds its limitation in the norm of categories. (Cohen, 1871, 82).

Cohen's interpretation is of course very important in that it lays the foundations for the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant. Although the value of the doctrine of transcendental aesthetics is recognized, the subject's synthetic act is entirely assigned to transcendental logic. According to this interpretation, the act of synthesis that enables the synthetic binding of Appearances is not included in transcendental aesthetics. Transcendental aesthetics is completed by transcendental logic, but the act of synthesis, the most important unfolding of critique, is located only in transcendental logic as a synthesis of concepts. In other words, the doctrine of transcendental

aesthetics has no independent meaning in terms of the principles of knowledge. The Kantian doctrine of sensibility is meaningful thanks to the complementary movement towards transcendental logic. Cohen describes the negative side of the doctrine of sensibility in relation to the doctrine of noumena as the dark side of transcendental aesthetic inquiry. And this dark side, according to him, is illuminated in transcendental logic.

Cohen actually brings his interpretation of Kant to the point he is aiming for. As we will see in the next section, he sows the seeds of the radicalism he exhibits in the LRE. The doctrine of sensibility founded on the doctrine of *a priori* space-time, and through it, the independent and constitutive role of intuition is treated in favor of understanding. Cohen quotes the following from the CPR:

“All that seems necessary for an introduction or preliminary is that there are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought.” (Kant, 2000, 152).

Cohen states that this quote points to the inner unity of the doctrines of transcendental aesthetics and logic. On the other hand, he is against the formulation of this unity at the expense of the separation of the elements of intuition and thinking. The object is given to us through one of the two roots and thought through the other, but the given and thought object are the same. In this context, Cohen emphasizes the illogicality of assigning a separate and independent position to the doctrine of sensibility. (Cohen, 1871, 83).

Because criticism has brought us the context of possible experience. And according to Cohen, the doctrine of space and time should be considered in relation to this term of possible experience. Cohen disagrees with the prevailing view of the meaning of the form of sensibility. According to this view, the fact that the form lies ready in the mind fully expresses the term form, and it is sufficient to grasp the doctrine of sensibility on this ground. However, the doctrine of transcendental logic should be treated as the complement and executor of the doctrine of sensibility. For space and time acquire meaning only if they are related to a possible experience. And a possible experience is realized under the execution of categories. It is not sufficient to treat the *a priori* form as the form of appearances. It is necessary to grasp it in its application to possible experience. Therefore, the fundamental meaning of the givenness of the object must be grasped. To emphasize this, Cohen quotes from the chapter "On the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments" in the CPR:

“To give an object, if this is not again meant only mediately, but it is rather to be exhibited immediately in intuition, is nothing other than to relate its representation to experience (whether this be actual or still possible). Even space and time, as pure as these concepts are from everything empirical and as certain as it is that they are represented in the mind completely *a priori*, would still be without objective validity and without sense and significance if their necessary use on the objects of experience were not shown; indeed, their representation is a mere schema..” (Kant, 2000, 282).

The condition of the object's givenness is based on its being related to possible or actual experience. This shows that the *a priori* forms of sensibility are meaningless if they are not combined with the pure forms of understanding that executes the synthesis of phenomena. There is no interpretation here that doctrinaire Kantianism can object to. But Cohen's assignment of such an emphasis on his interpretation makes sense. It is that the doctrine of space-time does not make sense on its own. The doctrine of sensibility is not a separate and independent part of the Kantian system, but a precondition that is completed and given meaning by the doctrine of logic. Based on Kant, Cohen emphasizes that the pure forms of intuition would be a fantasy if they were not combined with the pure forms of understanding. This unification means a synthesis of the phenomena that provide us with experience in the first place. According to Cohen, this synthesis is only possible in the inner sense. Cohen states that the inner sense has two objects. The first are representations of the outer sense, which constitutes the actual material that fills our minds. The second object is the I-ego (Ich). However, the question of how the ego emerges in these representations is, according to Cohen, the question of the emergence of self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstseins). Here the question of transcendental apperception comes into play. Cohen argues that if the spontaneity of understanding is ambiguous, then sensibility itself will remain ambiguous. Therefore, without an insight into the essence of apperception, the essence of sensibility will be incomplete. (Cohen, 1871, 85-6). Cohen claims that pure forms of understanding can only bring complete lucidity (licht) over pure forms of sensibility. In other words, he consolidates the classical Neo-Kantian position that emphasizes understanding. The doctrine of sensibility finds its content in the doctrine of transcendental logic. Transcendental logic is not a doctrine eclectically attached to transcendental aesthetics. According to Cohen's

execution of interpretation, which shapes Neo-Kantianism's interpretation of Kant, transcendental logic emerges as an absolute conclusion within the continuity of Kantian doctrine that complements, contextualizes, and takes precedence over transcendental aesthetics. There is a general view that Kant, while determining the two roots of knowledge, did not clarify the issue of their unity. Cohen thinks that the unity of the two roots depends on the doctrine of categories. This emphasis on categories is, of course, the cornerstone of Neo-Kantianism. For, according to Cohen's foundation-laying interpretation, the doctrine of categories encircles the doctrine of sensibility by encompassing it backward and frees it from the meaninglessness it has on its own. Space and time as pure intuitions are carried into the context of possible experience through categories, so it is wrong to treat the doctrine of sensibility as a separate and independent part of the Kantian system. Cohen, therefore, sets out to investigate the formal condition of experience.

5.1.4. The formal conditions of experience.

According to Cohen, the answer to the question of whether space and time are innate for Kant is a gap that transcendental logic must fill. The epistemological character of the concept of *a priori* can be firmly established by determining the relation between the concepts of innate and *a priori*. This is because Cohen thinks that the concepts of *a priori* and innate are identified in the general orientation towards Kant. However, Kant is against the formulation of these two terms as mutually inclusive.

Cohen had put forward the concept of transcendental as a complement to the concept of *a priori*. On the other hand, through the transcendental concept, Cohen wants to prove that the idea of "innate" belonging to pre-Kantian epistemology has

been overcome. To show this, Cohen discusses all the stages of the *a priori* being of space. And these stages are equally valid for time.

The first stage is the originality of the representation of space. This is because space is recognized as a representation that precedes and underlies all spatial sensations. According to Cohen, this fact of consciousness demonstrates that the *a priori* of space means its originality. (Cohen, 1871, 88). However, Cohen argues that Kant here wants to prove the metaphysical originality of the representation of space, not its psychological origin. For space is not something included in sensations. On the contrary, it is a representation that makes spatial sensations themselves possible and underlies them. Kant provided this proof by demonstrating through the analysis of consciousness that the *a priori* lies at the basis of sensations, which he called metaphysical deduction. The second stage is revealed in the justification of the *a priori* being of space as a form of sensibility. According to Cohen, this form of justification is in accordance with Kant's conception of what *a priori* is in the preface to the second edition of the CPR. (Cohen, 1871, 90). We know *a priori* about things only what we put into them. That is to say, the second stage that determines the *a priori* existence of space and time is the subject's putting the form of sensibility into things. So what makes space *a priori* possible is not that we discover it in things, but that it is from the subject towards things. But the fact that space and time are forms of sensibility, that is, of pure intuition, only makes sense if they are related to the object of experience. If they are not related to the object of experience, they are mere abstractions.

However, these two degrees of the *a priori*, namely its origination and its being a form of subjective sensibility, seem to reinforce the identity between the *a priori* and the innate. If what characterizes the *a priori* is that it resides in the subject

as its origin and is the form of sensibility that the subject puts into things, this strengthens the illusion that it is an innate property. According to Cohen, this problem is solved by the third stage of *a priori*. For according to Cohen, the *a priori* being of space does not rest on the fact that it underlies all experience as a formal constitution of sensibility. On the contrary, the *a priori* being of space lies in the fact that the intuition of space is recognized as a formal condition of the possibility of experience. According to Cohen, this problem is solved by the third stage of *a priori*. For according to Cohen, the *a priori* being of space does not rest on the fact that it underlies all experience as a formal constitution of sensibility. On the contrary, the *a priori* being of space lies in the fact that the intuition of space is recognized as a formal condition of the possibility of experience. (Cohen, 1871, 93). Although this fact makes the *a priori* look like a rational magic, this is not the case. What gives the criterion of the *a priori* is not necessity and strict generality, as Cohen has already pointed out. These predicates only determine its value. The criterion of the *a priori* is offered in transcendental inquiry. The answer to the question of how an *a priori* mode of knowledge is possible is simple in the transcendental context. We put it into things ourselves. What characterizes the *a priori* mode of knowledge is that it is from the subject towards the objects and that the subject knows what it has already extracted from itself and placed in the objects. This is how strict necessity and unlimited generality are acquired in the first place. And with the third stage of *a priori*, according to Cohen, the idea of the innate is overcome. The third stage is that *a priori* is the formal condition of the possibility of our experience. Thus, transcendental knowledge proves *a priori* knowledge as a knowledge necessary for the possibility of experience. Accordingly, the fact that space is an *a priori* intuition means that it is the constitutive condition of experience. According to Cohen, space does not appear *a*

priori because it is innate, on the contrary, it appears innate because it is the *a priori* condition of possible experience. (Cohen, 1871, 94). How should Cohen's detection be understood? If *a priori* were an innate property, we would be assuming a force or deterministic genetics that implants it in human beings before they are born. On the other hand, we would be formulating *a priori* as a temporal priority. However, the subject operates *a priori* knowledge within the context of possible experience, and the *a priori* is logically prior. In other words, while constructing a possible experience, the subject operates simultaneously with the experience but with a structure that perceptually and conceptually precedes the experience. *A priori* knowledge is not the activation of principles that are present in man before experience begins. On the contrary, it is the knowledge that makes it possible for something like an experience to begin. That is to say, it is not an element that the subject adds to experience before the initial movement of experience, but the logical preliminary stage of the content constituted in the continuous movement of experience. Since we do not consciously recognize this preliminary stage in experience, we think that a prior is an innate property. Experience is a "synthetic unity of appearances". But in appearances, form comes first as the determining factor. But in space and time the "manifold of intuition" is given. For this manifold to be combined into a synthetic unity, the whole concept of possible experience requires another feature, a different kind of formal condition. As the subject puts space and time into sensations from itself, it also brings unity into the change of perceptions from itself. According to Cohen, this other formal condition of experience is the category. According to Cohen, the category, which is a formal condition, first and foremost makes experience possible. For it is the form of our thought that constructively precedes the determinable. And because the category is the

formal condition of experience, it is *a priori*. (Cohen, 1871, 98). This is the third stage of *a priori* for Cohen, as emphasized earlier.

The essence of the category, however, is not to include the application to objects of experience at all, but to include applicability. According to Cohen, in the category, we have only the form of the connection itself. How these forms should be applied to specific appearances in relation to real cognition cannot be expressed in the psychological nature of the category. The *a priori* is only the formal condition of experience, and it is generally possible according to the same experience. For, according to Cohen, the experience itself does not stand before us complete according to its content and material conditions. Controversial philosophical problems, such as whether the universe is fundamentally one or composed of multiplicity, or whether human actions are contingent or necessary, cannot be determined within the apriority of categories. Cohen claims that his analysis will show that Kant is exempt from such a perspective. (Cohen, 1871, 100). According to Cohen, the focus of *a priori* is that it contains the formal condition of experience. In this context, Cohen proposes only the synthetic unity in the connection of the manifold as an *a priori* category. Because according to Cohen, experience is not possible without it. Through it, the rhapsody of perceptions becomes the synthetic unity of appearances. In this context, Cohen claims that *a priori* not of categories but of the category. (Cohen, 1871, 101). Cohen's interpretation at this point seems to be very crucial for Neo-Kantianism. In addition to the *a priori* status of categories, Cohen formulates the *a priori* itself as a category. According to him, the *a priori* status of categories can only be asserted in an extended figurative sense. Although each individual category is not necessarily a form of thought in terms of its logical qualities, it is *a priori* insofar as it contains the synthetic

unity of the manifold. The synthesis of spatial is the *a priori* of space. Cohen establishes a logical inversion of the notion of *a priori*. Cohen does not attribute the *a priori* status of space to its not being derivable from experience. On the contrary, space is *a priori* because it contains the formal condition of experience, namely the possibility of a spatial synthetic unity of appearances. That is, spatial synthesis is an extension of the *a priori* of space.

Summarizing the *a priori* of categories as causality, Schopenhauer states that Kant needs the example of causality wherever he wants to show that categories are *a priori*. However, Kant states that the proposition "every alteration has a cause" is *a priori* but not pure. Because the concept of alteration is derived from experience. At this point, Cohen states that causality as a form of cause-effect connection cannot be thought without the representation of alteration. In other words, the category of causality is not a pure form of thinking. (Cohen, 1871, 102). For only the synthetic unity represented in synthesis signifies the essence of *a priori*. Therefore, according to Cohen, the general nature of the category of causality as a synthetic unity is not inferred from experience, but rather it makes experience possible.

The deepening of the *a priori* as the formal condition of experience was realized in transcendental logic. With the unfolding of transcendental logic, experience becomes a concept that we must construct in pure intuition and pure thought. The formal conditions of the possibility of experience, namely space, time and synthetic unity, are considered *a priori* because we construct experience with them. In this context, it does not matter to Cohen whether space is *a priori* or innate. A concept of experience is formed according to transcendental principles as a synthetic unity of experiences, and the necessary constituent parts of the synthetic unity are formulated *a priori*. (Cohen, 1871, 104).

5.1.5. Categories as forms of thinking

Cohen holds that Kant's discovery of categories as formal conditions of experience is parallel to the recognition of space and time as *a priori* forms. This discovery was made by separating the constituents of the material content of experience from the constructive elements that we put into things. However, Cohen opens a parenthesis at this point. If knowledge begins with experience, as in the first sentence of the Critique, then the *a priori* must also have been discovered. Otherwise, the *a priori* would become an empirical concept. (Cohen, 1871, 105).

According to Cohen, the possibility of synthetic propositions is based on synthetic unity, and this synthetic unity is the category. (Cohen, 1871, 109). The *a priori* status of categories is increasing, just like that of space and time. Categories are determined as root concepts of understanding. But these root concepts then deepen as forms of experience. The principle for the discovery of categories is laid down in the conception of synthetic unity. In this context, the task of transcendental logic is to prove the possibility of judgments of experience. Since judgments of experience express objective validity and necessary generality, they must be distinguished from judgments of perception. The transcendental question thus arises as to what is the possibility of judgments of experience that express necessary generality. (Cohen, 1871, 112). According to Cohen, the answer to the question is obvious. Only the subject produces this necessity. As Kant states in the Prolegomena, judgments of experience presuppose special concepts generated in the understanding, and thus these concepts ensure that judgments of experience are objectively valid. (Kant, 2004, 50). But Cohen again opens a parenthesis here. Where can we find the difference between

experimental judgments and perceptual judgments? Because experiment seems to be a comparison and combination of perceptions.

Cohen suggests that there are two answers to this question. The first is that if the experience is thought of as the comparison and connection of perceptions, then we fall into Hume's context. The second answer is decisive in a positive sense. The difference between the proposition "when the sun's rays hit a stone, the stone heats up" and the proposition "the sun heats the stone" reveals the answer. The contingency in the perceptual proposition is eliminated by the necessity in the experimental judgment. In the former, a subjective judgment is made based on the habit of perception. In the second, one ascends to a synthetic proposition to which necessity is attributed. In other words, the subject attributes a necessity to the judgment that is not present in the judgment. Just as space and time do not exist in sensations themselves, but rather are placed in appearances by the subject, so the forms of connection in all judgments are originally generated concepts, that is, *a priori* forms of thinking. (Cohen, 1871, 113). The principle "a straight line is the shortest distance between two points" presupposes that the line is subsumed under the concept of magnitude, and this concept cannot be given by mere intuition; the concept is found in understanding. The objective validity of judgment is founded above all on the concept of pure understanding. The meaning of pure understanding is unity in judgments. In this context, Cohen again refers back to the "Prolegomena" and draws support from Kant. Kant states that when objectively valid synthetic judgments are decomposed into their constituent elements, they do not consist merely of intuitions connected in a judgment by comparison. To the concepts derived from intuition is added the concept of pure understanding, which subsumes them and binds them in an objectively valid

judgment. (Kant, 2004, 53). This means that the concept of pure understanding is above all the basis on which the objective validity of judgment is founded. But the central question must be emphasized. How do we arrive at pure concepts that *a priori* condition the possibility of this experience? Cohen holds that the answer to this question is simple. The concept of pure understanding means the connected unity in judgments so what needs to be done is to bring together the possible judgments and seek synthetic unity in them. In this way, one obtains the possible categories. (Cohen, 1871, 115).

Cohen states that thinking is knowledge through concepts. However, concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, relate to certain representations of an as yet undetermined object. In other words, a concept is a concept because it relates to the representations under it. According to Cohen, this relation is judgment. Therefore, the essence and types of the concept must be derived from the forms of judgment. Therefore, intuition is an immediate representation, whereas judgment is a mediate representation, that is, a representation of an object through a concept, and consequently a representation of a representation of an object. Cohen emphasizes the unity of the act of thinking at this point because since a concept is only a concept as a predicate of possible judgments, it presupposes the unity of the act of thinking in order to organize different representations under a common representation. (Cohen, 1871, 115-6).

The difference between general logic and transcendental logic with regard to judgments is evident. General logic deals with hypothetical judgments. Transcendental logic questions the origin, scope, and objective validity of these judgments. In the proposition "The sun heats the stone", the subject attributes unlimited generality and the strict necessity to judgment. According to Cohen, this

synthesis takes place in a manifold of intuition, but it is not contained in this manifold. (Cohen, 1871, 116). Here, the concept of cause is the basis of unity that places the sun and the hot stone offered by intuition in a synthetic relation. Therefore, according to Cohen, categories are found in the representations of the necessary synthetic unity and are based on understanding. The concept of pure understanding is the *a priori* form of the function of judgment. The fact that categories are originally generated concepts means that a synthetic unity underlies all judgments. Cohen claims that categories are *a priori* forms of experience insofar as they are particular kinds of the synthetic unity common to them. The answer to whether these concepts are empty concepts not related to the forms of sensibility is given in the transcendental deduction of categories.

5.1.6 Transcendental deduction of categories

How are categories obtained as formal conditions of experience?

Transcendental deduction seeks to answer this question. According to Cohen, the metaphysical deduction has answered this question by discovering synthetic unity as the *a priori* concept of understanding. Categories, which are forms of experience, are present in types of judgment according to Cohen. (Cohen, 1871, 121).

Metaphysical deduction shows what is *a priori* in the forms of consciousness or in the functions of unity in judgments. *A priori* synthesis is neither in things nor in perceptions. On the other hand, it is the task of transcendental deduction to prove the correspondence between the elements of knowledge themselves. There are also psychological approaches to the transcendental deduction. Cohen is quite clear against the approach that interprets the grounding of the objective reality of categories as a demonstration of a psychological mental process. Of course, a psychological

interpretation of categories can be grounded. However, this obscures the distinction between psychology and metaphysics. As a matter of fact, the approach of the sciences to phenomena can also be characterized as psychological in this context. Because the inner sense is also involved in the relationship with phenomena. Cohen thinks that transcendental logic presupposes general logic and general logic presupposes psychology. And if there is to be a theory of knowledge separate from psychology, the transcendental deduction should be seen as an investigation belonging to the theory of knowledge.

Synthetic representations could relate to the object in two ways. Either object representation or representation makes the object possible. The former is the empirical mode and the latter is the transcendental mode. In this context, the transcendental deduction is the demonstration of how the correspondence of representation and object is realized in the *a priori* mode. How do the concepts of subjective innerness coincide with an outer object? In fact, Cohen emphasizes here Kant's distinction between inner sense and outer sense. What makes an outer intuition *a priori* possible depends on the fact that this outer intuition is in fact contained by subjective internality. The intuition of the outer object is itself the formal constitution of our subjective innerness.

According to Cohen, it is precisely because of this that externality itself is based on the formal constitution of understanding, and it is in this context that the real essence of the category emerges. This is because the externality is justified as an ingredient of subjectivity, and its objective validity is constituted in this context. Cohen argues that what constitutes the content of transcendental deduction is the return to the unity of consciousness and through it a demonstration of the process of knowledge as a series of appearances as a totality of experience. (Cohen, 1871, 128).

This content distinguishes transcendental deduction as the mental process of thinking from the empirical.

The objective reality of a pure concept of understanding is that it contains the formal condition of a possible experience, for only in this way is it *a priori* and can prove itself *a priori* in transcendental inquiry. Therefore, Cohen states that if we want to know the relation of categories to the objects apprehended by them, this must be investigated in possible experience, for this is the only way in which objects exist. But since the experience, together with its objects, is the product of our cognition, the subjective sources that constitute the *a priori* basis for the possibility of experience must first be examined.

Cohen states that it is the concept that gives representation its object, which makes it an object. (Cohen, 1871, 132). It actually marks the point where Neo-Kantianism diverges with respect to the interpretation of deduction. Here, objectness is assigned to understanding, that is, concept, rather than intuition. For Cohen, on the other hand, the unity in the concept of object is the unity of consciousness itself in the synthesis of representations.

It can be said that the main point of Cohen's interpretation of deduction and categories is the relation to apperception. The *a priority* of categories is essentially the synthetic unity of apperception, the unity of consciousness, which is the basis of unity in the object. Just as space is the form of outer intuition and time is the form of inner intuition, transcendental apperception is the form of categories. In this sense, the transcendental condition in which we generate the pure concepts of understanding is self-consciousness. Synthetic unity is the form that is the common basis of all the individual types of unities that are thought in categories. Thus the objective unity of

self-consciousness consists of the synthetic unity of the representations under the category. (Cohen, 144-5).

In this way, the transcendental self loses its ontological character and is grounded as the constitutive condition of the possibility of experience as a pure transcendental form.

We have set out Cohen's interpretation of the conditions of the transcendental possibility of *a prioric* experience. The interpretation was about the essence of the *a priori*, the complementarity of the transcendental to the *a priori*, and how categories should be taken as the form of objective thinking. Let us now take a brief look at Cohen's interpretation of the schematism section. Because the schematism section has a critical role in Heidegger's interpretation and it is important for this study to reveal the differences with Cohen's interpretation of schematism.

5.1.7. Schematism

Stating that it is not enough for the categories of Understanding to set rules that give order to the sensible multiplicity of appearances, Cohen states that there must also be a situation in which these rules are to be applied. The purpose of the application of categories to the rules they determine is treated in the doctrine of schematism. The doctrine serves to justify the use and content of categories.

According to Cohen, intuition should be treated under the category that presupposes homogeneity. (Cohen, 1871, 188). But how can experiences be subsumed under the category of substance, or how can synthetic unity of causality be applied to appearances? These are the questions Cohen asks.

According to Cohen, in terms of their application, all categories bring us back to the synthetic unity of apperception. Apperception is the mere form of consciousness without content. The content of apperception is only that it is based on inner sense. The inner sense is the epitome in which all our representations are contained. Cohen argues that since the content of synthetic apperception is an epitome of the representations that are the objects of inner sense, the content of categories, which are particular types of this synthetic apperception, is this same epitome of the representations with which they are connected. (Cohen, 1871, 188). On the other hand, each category, which is a singular type of apperception, can be applied to appearances, which are representations of the subject as a special development of the inner sense. The concept of understanding is restricted to this formal and pure condition of the inner sense. Cohen states that this limiting and realizing sensible condition of the category is the transcendental schema, and the procedure of understanding realized through these schemas is schematism. However, Cohen suggests that it should be noted that schematism does not generate a new spiritual process. The sensible concept means only the schematized concept. The concept of a dog is a schematization because it does not concretely refer to a particular dog. Cohen limits schematism to explaining its value for the solution of the transcendental problem. And so, in accordance with the development of the Neo-Kantian interpretation of schematism, Cohen argues that categories have the value of forms of knowledge only as schematized concepts. This point is important as a divergence from Heidegger's ontological interpretation.

Cohen bases his interpretation of schematism on the difference between analytic and synthetic propositions. In this context, Cohen determines the concept of

synthetic based on the concept of synthetic unity. Because Cohen considers it important that synthetic unity is effective in judgment, not that consciousness is expanded by a concept. For Cohen, synthetic judgments are judgments in which the synthetic unity of apperception is indicated, and this synthetic unity is based on the manifold of inner sense as a function. (Cohen, 1871, 196-7). Therefore, according to Cohen, synthetic judgments are judgments in which subject and predicate are connected to an object of experience by the synthetic unity of apperception. On the other hand, synthetic propositions should not go beyond the limits of sensible intuition. Therefore, Cohen states that synthetic unity always corresponds to a schema. The concepts of synthetic judgments must be schematized concepts; only in this way can they be applied to objects of experience. According to Cohen, synthetic judgments are distinguished from analytic judgments in that they combine in the unity of consciousness empty concepts that are not based on an object of intuition and are not fulfilled by the schema. Therefore, Cohen considers that this consciousness itself is analytic consciousness, whereas synthetic consciousness arises only in the synthesis of the manifold contained in the inner sense.

Cohen argues that analytic judgments are ontological judgments, while synthetic judgments are judgments about possible objects of experience. Analytic ones explain concepts as they are; synthetic ones place appearances in the context of experience. In the section on the interpretation of schematism, Cohen oddly focuses on analytic and synthetic *a priori* judgments. He does not seem to focus on the element of temporal determination as the application of pure concepts to appearances or the sensibilization of the pure concept. Because according to Cohen, schematism is the application of the *a priori* conditions of experience to the content of experience.

Therefore, schematism belongs to the section of *a priori* principles constituted in *a priori* forms. (Cohen, 1871, 165).

Emphasizing that it is not sufficient for understanding to determine the rules by which the sensible manifold of appearances can be ordered through categories, Cohen holds that these rules must also include the situation in which they will be applied. Otherwise, rules are transformed into general conditions. According to Cohen, objects demand the conditions under which they can be given in general but sufficient properties in accordance with concepts. He states that these signs for the purpose of principles are contained in the doctrine of the schematism of pure concepts of understanding. The condition sought in the category's relation to intuition is a sensible condition. Without this condition, categories are devoid of any content and usage.

Here, it is seen that Cohen maintains the epistemological interpretation concerning schematism. On schematism, Cohen focuses on the conditions of usage and application of categories to appearances. In this respect, he radically differs from Heidegger's interpretation of schematism. Heidegger's interpretation of schematism focuses on the revelation of the temporal ontological essence of categories rather than their usage and application. The interpretation thus claims to reveal the inner possibility of ontological knowledge as the result of the unity of pure intuition and pure concept.

Although Cohen's interpretation of Kant that emerged in the CTE diverged slightly from the radical approach in the LRE, it laid the foundations for the epistemological and scientific interpretation of Neo-Kantianism in terms of its focus. The clarification of the concept of *a priori* and the essential character of the concept of the transcendental were dealt with on a new basis. Our study presents Cohen's

exposition of these points but does not limit itself to this exposition. Moreover, the primary aim of this study is to trace which inner possibilities in Kantian philosophy constitute the conditions for Cohen's interpretation.

5.2. Logik Der Reinen Erkenntniss

In the preface to the LRE, Cohen states that the logic he presents in his work is the foundation of a system of philosophy. Logic as the logic of pure knowledge is the foundation that provides philosophy with systematic unity. Cohen's central motivation in his work is that the method of logic is based on pure thinking. For Cohen, pure thinking is not merely formal, it produces its own content. This of course seems to be an extra-ordinary approach to Kantian dualism. For this means that pure thinking does not need the givenness of the object; on the contrary, it creates the object itself, which is assumed to be givenness. In this sense, pure thinking does not need intuitive givenness. So what are the referents of logic, which is dealt with under the title of the logic of pure knowledge? First of all, logic investigates the conditions of knowledge and in this context, it has an epistemological reference. This knowledge is acquired through science and logic is the study of the scientific method. Because according to Cohen, logic is the thinking of science. Specifically, logic is intertwined with the method of mathematical natural science. Secondly, logic is not only formal. It also deals with knowledge, and knowledge has not only form but also content. Therefore logic cannot be limited to the purely formal relations of judgments and inferences. On the other hand, logic is also concerned with the form of being in a metaphysical sense. Insofar as logic is concerned with our knowledge, it is also concerned with our knowledge of the world, and in this sense, the knowledge of being is its object. Finally, logic is anti-psychological. For logic excludes the subjectivity of

psychologism as the basis of pure knowledge. Knowledge of the world and knowledge of nature is objective.

Of course, after KTE, the place of this new work in Cohen's complete study of Kant is important. Cohen argues that when he began to reconstruct the Kantian system, he found to his astonishment that understanding the basic concepts of the Kantian system was not only lost, but in fact never attained. And this astonishment makes him recognize a historical insight. The basis for this historical insight is Kant's reference to Plato. Through the comparative arrangement of his sentences we can understand an author better than he understands himself. (Cohen, 1922, XI).

Interestingly, Heidegger also mentions this reference in his interpretation of Kant. For Cohen, understanding Kant better than he did led to a reconstruction of the concept of the transcendental, while for Heidegger it led him to interpret Kant's philosophy as the early foundation of an ontology of subjectivity. In this new work, Cohen states that he maintains the meaning and content of his own complete study of Kant, but he declares that he has also put forward a sharp polemic against the main pillars of the Kantian system. For him, however, these two situations are not contradictions but rather complements. (Cohen, 1922, XII). Historical Kant, that is, the complete Kant system with its fallacies and errors has always been a cornerstone for Cohen and the direction of his further education towards the Kant system. However, Marburg Neo-Kantianism, especially Cohen and Natorp, always tried to eliminate historical Kant. It is possible to purge the Kantian system of its errors by emphasizing and reinforcing the truths in historical Kant.

In his chapter "History of Pure Knowledge" Cohen states that Kant, first of all, avoided all moral philosophy and theology and thus rational psychology. According to Cohen, Kant concentrated metaphysics only on Newton's system of principles. This

converted metaphysics into a critique for Kant. Therefore, according to Cohen, Kant's decisive act is to determine the relation between metaphysics and mathematical natural science. It is the system of nature that leads Kant to the system of metaphysics. (Cohen, 1922, 8-9).

Cohen states that the basis of this relation is found in synthetic principles. These principles are the specific, methodical arguments that underlie the mathematical natural sciences. It is through these principles that science becomes science and explains its continuous progress. This signifies the new beginning of philosophy as criticism.

Kantian criticism is divided into logic and dialectic. According to Cohen, dialectic is the negative part. Stating that this section deals with psychology and cosmology and also includes theology in relation to the doctrine of freedom and the proofs of God, Cohen says that the logic section constitutes the positive side of the critique as the grounding of mathematical natural science. However, logic is preceded by aesthetics as the doctrine of pure sensibility. Considering that Kant's partiality on the issue of sensibility seems historically understandable, Cohen argues that this partiality stems not only from opportunism against British empiricism but also from Leibniz's position. Cohen obviously regards Kant as an opportunist against English empiricism on the issue of sensibility, and on the other hand, he believes that Leibniz's failure to formulate sensibility in a strong way creates such partiality in Kant. (Cohen, 1922, 12). Emphasizing Kant's insistence on the distinction between pure intuition and pure thought, Cohen states that Kant makes this distinction not so that the two elements remain separate, but so that they are connected and united. However, according to Cohen, this has caused intrinsic damage to thought. Thus thinking is preceded by intuition, and Cohen argues that this formulation is the underlying

weakness of Kant's system. For thinking has something outside of itself at its very beginning. (Cohen, 1922, 12). Cohen's approach is the main departure point of Marburg Neo-Kantianism. The assumed relation between intuition and the elements of thinking is seen as the inclusion of a foreign element in thinking. For pure thinking is not a secondary faculty that is determined by taking something from the outside in, but an active and fundamental faculty that determines from the inside out.

Cohen explicitly states that he rejects the precedence of logic by the doctrine of sensibility and that their starting point is thinking. Because, according to Cohen, thinking should not have an origin other than itself. Pure thinking must in itself and specifically produce pure knowledge. Thus the doctrine of thinking must be the doctrine of knowledge. Such a doctrine of thinking that is in itself a doctrine of knowledge signifies the logic that Cohen tries to establish in LRE. (Cohen, 1922, 13).

Cohen argues that Kant determines thinking as synthesis and defines and formulates all his systematic concepts through synthesis. However, Cohen again thinks that it is also a weakness for thought that the factor of intuition is in play in relation to synthesis. Not only thinking but also knowledge is determined through synthesis. In this synthesis, thinking is together with intuition. However, Cohen states that Kant also characterizes thinking itself as a synthesis. In other words, thinking itself is a synthesis in addition to the synthesis of intuition and thinking in terms of the formation of knowledge, and Kant distinguished the types of synthesis in this sense. Combining does not constitute synthesis, synthesis rather means its consequence. But this excludes the appearances of combining because it is unity. In other words, synthesis is not seen in the different modes of the act of combination, but ultimately in its consequence, that is, in unity.

Synthesis is the synthesis of unity. And according to Cohen, the fact that unity constitutes the opposite of every kind of composition was put forward not by Kant but by Leibniz. From this point of view, the determination of thinking as synthesis is faultless. Because thinking is the synthesis of unity. (Cohen, 1922, 25-6). Therefore, synthesis should not be thought of as the composition of a given manifold, but as the unity of separation and unification. The synthesis of unity is the synthesis of unification as well as the synthesis of separation. (Cohen, 1922, 61).

Although for Cohen the distinction between pure sensibility and pure intuition is an assumption to bring intuition closer to thinking, there is still an objection when this is properly considered. This is the damage done to the independence of the thinking element. Thinking is synthesis, synthesis is the synthesis of unity. But synthesis presupposes a multiplicity (*mehrheit*), and thinking neither creates nor is responsible for this multiplicity. This multiplicity is given to the thinking element. Cohen points out that this is precisely the fatal phrase and denotes a weakness arising from Kant's connection with the English century. (Cohen, 1922, 27). Cohen sees a fundamental error in the Kantian construction of synthesis. For example, the fact that even mathematics is dependent on intuition is related to this fundamental error. To appeal to intuition for help in drawing the line is like a denial of thinking, and the fact that the pure givenness achieved through synthesis is not due to thinking is, according to Cohen, an error that even Kantian terminology cannot correct.

For Cohen, critique should be organized to deal with logic in a more original way. Kant prioritized the doctrine of pure sensibility over logic, but Cohen believes that logic must be organized critically. And for Cohen this means the origin of logic. For Cohen, there is an almost identical relation between pure thinking and origin. If there is a sameness between knowledge and principle, knowledge is conditioned by

the origin. And if knowledge is the thinking of knowledge, it has its result and its basis in the thinking of the origin. And if production is not grasped in this essentiality as a production of the origin, thinking cannot achieve a clear determination even through production. The origin cannot be givenness. Arguing that it demands the origin in all pure knowledge, Cohen states that thinking is the origin of the thinking. Thus thinking is the thinking of knowledge, and logic as the logic of another type of thinking is the logic of pure knowledge. Only thinking of the origin as pure thinking is genuine. The thought of the origin gives competence to pure thinking and its application is the task of the logic of pure knowledge. (Cohen, 1922, 36-7-8).

The approach that emerges from Cohen's thoughts presented so far can be summarized as follows: Criticism has a fundamental relation to the epistemology of the mathematical natural sciences. This relationship is established through synthetic principles, and synthetic principles enable science to understand its own essence and progress. On the issue of sensibility, Kant was influenced by British empiricism, but this influence also stems from the fact that Leibniz did not leave a strong legacy on sensibility. The focal point in the critique is the thinking element. This is because thinking is the origin and this origin must be dealt with in terms of itself. However, assuming the element of sensibility as pure and putting it in relation to the origin of thought damages the inner structure of thought. The critique is to constitute the logic of the unity of synthesis, that is, of pure knowledge grounded in pure thinking as the origin. The roots of the basic orientation of Neo-Kantian radicalism are clearly visible in Cohen's determinations. The first point to be considered concerns the determination of being "pure". The apportionment of being "pure" (Reinheit) or purity between the elements of sensibility and thinking is regarded as an in advance misdetermination that contradicts the essence of purity. For the mathematical natural sciences do not

rely on the element of sensibility for the axioms from which they proceed; on the contrary, they construct the empirical content of the principle based on these pure principles. In this sense, purity is first and foremost made absolutely immanent to the element of thinking. Pure knowledge, according to Cohen, is not empty content. On the contrary, pure content refers to the content produced by thinking in pure knowledge. Cohen rejects the conception of purity as if it were empty, devoid of content. Only impure content, which is not real, is the opposite of pure, which means that the pure is included in the impure content to transform the impure content into pure content. This is the inevitable relation of purity to content. Otherwise pure is meaningless. (Cohen, 1922, 5). The factor of sensibility, which we assume to be at work in the knowledge of the object, is the empirical result of the determining and constitutive activity of pure thinking. In other words, sensibility is not at the beginning point of the movement of knowledge, but at the end point. Therefore, it does not have the origin of purity.

This approach is more evident in Cohen's discussion of Kant's concept of time. Stating that Kant makes the time the pillar of his system, Cohen emphasizes that he distinguishes time as a form of pure intuition according to the classification of the formal conditions of experience. Cohen considers it interesting that time appears in Kant as the basis of motion and not of number. It is as if time would be a more intellectual structure if it were determined as the basis of number. But more is assumed here than thinking has. This is givenness. It is assigned to intuition and is pure. But Cohen explicitly states that they reject this difference in purity. (Cohen, 1922, 150). This is because, according to Cohen, purity can only be of one kind, and this implies the production of knowledge at every stage in order to produce the object. The assumed difference regarding purity endangers it in terms of sensibility and

thinking. This difference makes thinking seem as if it is more subjective than intuition. It makes intuition appear as if it does not have to produce its givenness. In other words, the classification of intuition as pure intuition makes it appear as if its content is given in a different sense, while the content is what it gives itself. In other words, according to Cohen, the allocation of purity to the element of intuition along with thinking creates the illusion of attributing thought to be more subjective than intuition, and intuition to be a given that precedes the content of sensible givenness.

In this respect, for Cohen, the doctrine of schematism indicates that Kant does not consider the realization in categories sufficient. (Cohen, 1922, 151). According to Cohen, the fact that Kant makes time schema, that is, formulates the realization of categories as having to take place in time, is a symptom of Kant's idealism. Kant made time a bed for the entire flow of reality. Cohen nevertheless argues that time remains a form of intuition that executes a new performance as a schema. According to Cohen, over-authorizing the element of intuition makes its purity doubtful. According to him, givenness threatens purity. The thinking element is no less concerned with the object than intuition. Moreover, the object of thinking has to be the object of experience, that is, it has to be related to experience, and so in fact it has to be givenness. Therefore, this fundamentally wrong formulation of the element of intuition makes both intuition itself and thinking doubtful, according to Cohen. (Cohen, 1922, 151).

Cohen states that according to Kant, time has two modes. Sequence and simultaneity. Cohen says that Kant determines these two aspects of time in the definition of time in the most important synthetic principles. The most important categories provided this determination. However, for Cohen, this is precisely what is overlooked in the definition of time. The categories primarily provide the determination. The modes of appearance themselves are not co-founded in the

fundamental determination of time. Cohen argues that this is the fundamental error in the entire concession to pure sensibility, since it is assumed to contain the actual power of content, even though pure sensibility provides temporal content. (Cohen, 1922, 151). This encourages the mixing of thinking and representation. Thus the time sequence appears as a psychological succession and becomes the archetype of objects as if the succession were given in and for itself. This situation concerning succession becomes even more difficult when it comes to simultaneity. Co-existence is imitated by sensation. However, according to Cohen, if time is to be seen as given under this mode, the semblance of sensation is expressed. If simultaneity is to be valid, it must be producible. Cohen states that all these ideas are put forward because they determine time as a category. (Cohen, 1922, 152). Therefore, if space and time are to be pure structures, they must reside in categories, not in intuition. For space and time are also determinations, and the element of determination is the activity of pure thinking that unfolds from thinking to experience. If we consider Cohen's thoughts, the reason why we capture succession or simultaneity in sensibility is not because of the element of intuition that adheres to the temporary and complex character of sensibility, but because time as a modal category is realized as a determination in the element of intuition. There are of course many questions to be asked here. However, this study leaves these questions and possible answers to the concluding thesis.

In his chapter on Kantian pure intuition, Cohen notes that space is of high importance because of Newton's use of synthetic principles. However, Cohen says that Newton not only defined space but also described it as high status, and this is dangerous because Newton made space the sensorium of God. Cohen states that Kant went beyond this mystical context, he made the human way scientific in relation to this context. Until Kant, there was no *a priori* execution of sense. Thinking has always

been considered pure. However, Kant purified sensibility together with space and time for the first time. Thus, pure sensibility emerged as pure intuition.

However, Cohen's objections to pure intuition remain. These objections are based on the thought that pure thinking cannot in any way be given because pure thinking would be weakened by such a givenness. But the most radical implication of this thought is this: The category of time produces the unities of multiplicity, which produces content in pure thought, and vice versa, which means that content is valid as givenness. Time with its products is now recognized as a hypothesis through which space operates. (Cohen, 1922, 192-3). However, Cohen argues that space as a category must occur in the judgment of totality. Totality is not the multiplicity in which time occurs. The beginning and the end point in time do not constitute content in themselves, but rather their succession (*Reihe*) is content. Cohen states that from a psychological point of view, the more content-filled a succession is, the shorter it appears, whereas the more the dots are separated, the more the succession itself is stretched in content. The psychological parable, therefore, speaks the imprecise language. (Cohen, 1922, 193).

According to Cohen, there are no separate dots in time and the extension of the succession should not be thought of as an extension. Unities are not dots and the succession should not be thought of as a line. Only anticipations occur in time, and a back occurs correlatively to a forward. In this field nothing stands still and there is change as a constant coming and going, looking forward and backward. Only the monotonous mode of production survives in this field. If time alone changes, an outline for the content is prepared, but the content itself is not formed. In general, the manifold has only manifested itself as a preparation for the content itself. It is a relativity-like finite number. It continues with and after number and does not reach a

conclusion. Totality comes to the aid of this inconclusive relativity by bringing unification. The category of totality is also exempt from the fate of constant change to which time is subject and which cannot create permanent content. Totality encounters time as space. Thus, the future and the past do not hum in a changing already-being. Space retains these unities, it does not consume them as unities of multiplicity because its totality unites them all. Unity is the responsibility of space and is a new performance that it will perform. (Cohen, 1922, 193-4).

According to Cohen, the difference between space and time is clear. Time is passing, space is coexistence. Cohen seems to ascribe a more essential role to space. Space should reveal content and represent nature. It cannot be limited to relative multiplicities and their changes. Because comparisons made in space through the scale of conventional unities do not yield the ultimate result. Unification does not exist in decomposition, on the contrary, decomposition is in unification. Cohen seems to be trying to say here that in space, as in time, there is no decomposition that allows for the comparison of forward and backward units. The preservation by which all pure thinking is conditioned is the preservation realized by space, by togetherness. And only in infinite allness can this preservation of togetherness be realized. As in infinite summation, infinite elements are unified in the universe of space. (Cohen, 1922, 195).

The focus of Cohen's interpretation is on the independence given to pure thinking. This is a point that becomes so important that it is made the main basis for the interpretation of the Kantian system. The concepts that are necessarily interconnected are purity, pure thinking, origin, synthesis, unity, and content. This conceptual network creates a plot as the initial principles of knowledge, in which the element of intuition has no place. In this context, the question of intuition as form or the formulation of knowledge as form and matter comes into play. Because Cohen

finds the distinction between matter and form in relation to knowledge psychological and frees himself from it. Pure thinking is not a representation (form and matter are at stake in representation) and it cannot be thought of as a process of consciousness. Thus Cohen thinks that the content of thought is not matter but unity. Therefore the whole manifold must be unity in itself. Hence matter, as the matter of sensation, is not merely a heterogeneous assumption, the matter of thought can only be content, that is, it must be unity. Cohen states that claims about content from other perspectives are not to be taken into account. Because, according to Cohen, in this context, only logic, i.e. thinking of knowledge, is in question, not psychology with its consciousness processes. The thinking of knowledge only demands thinking as unity. This means that the activity itself is content. The production itself is the product. Unification is unity. This shows how far the characteristics of thinking in terms of pure knowledge can be taken. Cohen thinks that at this point the term judgment provides an openness to overcome all difficulties. (Cohen, 1922, 59-60). The fact that production is product and unification is unity means that pure thinking does not produce an object outside of itself, independent of it, that is, it does not synthesize a given manifold, but rather its own activity is the content itself. Judgment is here the productive process of thinking and produces the manifold as unity. The fundamental perspective towards the object of knowledge is logical, and this is represented in thinking as content, that is, in unity. At this point, Cohen rejects the conception of a given manifold that is given to thinking from outside thinking itself and unified by thinking. Manifoldness is produced by and within thinking. Thinking is thus determined as a whole and indivisible activity. Of course, these thoughts are part of a movement from Cohen's KTE. The central role given to the notion of the transcendental in KTE resulted in the reformulation of pure thinking in LRE. *A priori* knowledge is a production and this

production is based on the rational activity of the subject. The subject finds the concrete empirical reciprocal of this activity, that is, the knowledge of experience, in the scientific field. This field, as mathematical natural science, also shows the subject the *a priori* foundations of the knowledge it creates, that is, the principles of pure thinking. Pure thinking gives law to nature.

However, Cohen does not seem to have exposed these thoughts in the LRE, nor does he provide a detailed justification for them. He only presents his conclusions. This radical disruption of the Kantian equation of pure intuition and pure thinking in favor of thinking deserves a solid justification. However, Cohen's hypothesis based solely on the notion of purity, namely that purity cannot be the subject of intuition, remains as the driving basis of his interpretation.

The important point for this study is the following: Can intuition be rejected in Kant's doctrine of pure reason to the extent Cohen suggests? Or can the CPR's shift from subjective to objective deduction provide legitimacy to Cohen's radical interpretation? Is the formulation of pure intuition really a fundamental fault of the Kantian system? On the other hand, does the priority given to the element of intuition through givenness and purity damage the independence and inner structure of the element of thinking? We leave the answers to these questions to the conclusion for the moment.

5.3. Kant und die Marburger Schule

In this section, Paul Natorp's text titled "Kant and the Marburg School" (Kant und die Marburger Schule) published in the *Kant-Studien* journal will be discussed. As it is known, *Kant-Studien* functions as the official publication of the Neo-Kantian school. The leading representatives of the Neo-Kantian school submit their remarks on

Kantian philosophy to the philosophical public through this journal. A detailed analysis of the text will not be attempted. Only the main approaches of the Neo-Kantian school on Kant's philosophy will be presented. Thus, the basic aspects of the conception that Heidegger criticizes will be tried to be revealed.

Natorp begins his article by stating that Kant's philosophy is still alive. The primary task of anyone willing to progress in philosophy is to confront Kant. Any philosophical school aware of this responsibility should study Kant's doctrine from its solid historical form. Therefore, Kant's philosophy should be understood not from an outward perspective, but by its own inner principles. From this point, it might be seen that Natorp recommends adhering to the intrinsic critique of Kant's philosophy. The interpretation should not go beyond the context that Kant put forward. Therefore, before surpassing Kant, it is necessary to read him literally (*buchstäblich*). (Natorp, 1912, 193)

Natorp goes on by making an interesting comment. He asserts that there can be no denying that there is more than one tendency in Kant. But he believes that a pure balance cannot be achieved among the motives that work in his philosophy. Natorp's detection sounds significant. He accepts pluralism in Kant's philosophy as implicit. Kantian critique includes several interpretation possibilities due to both the lively but indecisive movement between empiricism and rationalism, and the change in position formed by the differences between the two editions of CPR.

However, Natorp proposes a common realm (pure balance) where this diversity of tendencies, which operates in Kant's philosophy, can be synthesized rather than the multiple interpretation realms that these possibilities will render. (Natorp, 1912, 193). Because Natorp states that Kant understands the philosophy, especially as a critique, as a method, and wants to teach making philosophy, not a "one"

philosophy. Those who cannot grasp this will be the bad pupils of Kant. (Natorp, 1912, 194).

Neo-Kantian philosophers remark that there is a consensus in the Kant interpretation of the school they are affiliated with. Cassirer emphasized this in his review of Heidegger. It is seen that Natorp made the same emphasis. Natorp states that despite the differences in formulation, it is self-evident that there is contextual accordance among Neo-Kantians about the corrections to be made in Kant's doctrine. The fixed starting point and constant guide of the philosophy of the Neo-Kantian school is the "transcendental method". (Natorp, 1912, 196).

Natorp states that when it comes to the transcendental justification of the philosophical proposition, when a *deductio iuris* is demanded, as Kant himself said, this demand includes two essential elements. The first is the following: Kantian philosophy is grounded in solid historical references of science, morals, art, and religion. Philosophy cannot breathe in the airless space of pure thought. As Kant stated, there is a lot of wind in the high towers of metaphysical builders and Kant avoids it. What Kant seeks is the fertile lowland of experience. Kantian philosophy tries to take root in the literal reading of appearances in the theoretical and scientific context, the practical shaping of social order and the individual life within this order, the aesthetic way of life and artistic formation, and the most intrinsic shaping of religious life. (Natorp, 1912, 196-7). All these points designate to human creative act as all kinds of object formation (*Objekt gestaltung*)¹, which builds its own essence and allows it to establish its spiritual world. This act is the original law which is designated as *ratio*, *logos*, or reason. This is the second element of the transcendental

¹ This term used by Natorp appears to be a term that refers to the Kantian object of knowledge and means to construct the object.

method. It is to prove the basis of possibility, and thus its legal basis (*Rechtsgrund*), that is, to show the unity of the logos, the ratio, by working in all the creative act and purity of the culture. (Natorp, 1912, 197). It is seen from this approach of Natorp that for Neo-Kantian thought, the transcendental method expresses the lawfulness (validity) of the unity of *ratio* and demands the demonstration of it through the method. Natorp states that this is how the transcendental method has become “critical.” Kantian thought is critical toward of both the encroachments of metaphysics and lawless empiricism. Kantian critique asserts the autonomy of experience against a metaphysical ideology (*Metaphysizismus*) that wants to dominate it, as well as against the ruleless empiricism that is an enemy of the law. (Natorp, 1912, 198).

Natorp states that the transcendental method as an immanent method does not seek the law of objective formation anywhere other than this objective formation itself. On the other hand, the transcendental method does not pursue its research outside of humanity's progressive and never-ending cultural life, thus preserving its objective character and sharply separating itself from any psychologism. (Natorp, 1912, 198).

According to Natorp, the transcendental method does not expose the danger of freezing life like an absolutist philosophy. It progresses and grows in an infinite development. One can refrain from the identity or tautology which eleatic and idealistic philosophy supposes between being and thought through transcendental philosophy. Natorp asserts that this avoidance is expressed in Kant's determination of thinking as a function, an action, a production from the basis of infinity, that is, spontaneity. Concerning the form, understanding is not just the interpreter of nature, but the creator of nature as a legislative function. (Natorp, 1912, 199).

These thoughts conveyed from Natorp are connected with the general lines of his approach to Kant's philosophy and summarize the common basis of neo-Kantian thought. The focus is on the determination of the Kantian critique as a transcendental method. This shows that the Critique is basically considered as a method related to the manner the object is known. Kantian philosophy operates on the foundations of the objective configuration of the spheres of science, morality, art, and religion, and constitutes the unity of the *ratio* through this operation.

But the specific point of Neo-Kantianism's Kant interpretation is, of course, the relation between intuition and thought. This is also the point that Heidegger particularly attacks. And Natorp also naturally comes to this point. Natorp states that at the very beginning of the Critique, an old difficulty was encountered. According to Natorp, this difficulty arises from the opposition of intuition, which is a special type of givenness on the side of the object and receptivity for the subject, to spontaneity, which is the only essential function of thinking. According to him, to comprehend the factors of knowledge through such a duality means not to take seriously the main idea of the transcendental method. (Natorp, 1912, 201). Therefore, if this duality is to be removed from the transcendental method, the receptivity of the subject and the material of the knowledge formed by the effect of the object, that is, the givenness of sensation, must also be eliminated. In this context, Natorp claims that there is no given manifold, in which understanding, which is considered depending on given intuition forms, has to sequence, bind and then recognize (threefold synthesis). However, the entire meaning of "Synthesis" and "Apperception", in short, almost all the establishment in Kant must change accordingly. (Natorp, 1912, 201).

Natorp interrogates the value of the conception of knowledge, which departs from a starting point based on object effect and subject receptivity. According to Natorp, the context of effective object and receptive subject, which includes effective givenness on the one hand and being affected by the particular nature of receptivity on the other, means constructing knowledge from the outside. (Natorp, 1912, 201). For Natorp, such an equation is a reversion to a metaphysicianism (Metaphysizismus) that is absolutely incompatible with the transcendental method. On the other hand, determining the intuitive givenness as a departing point in which the process of knowledge can be commenced would mean that the knowledge conforms to the object, and the basic approach of Kant's philosophy, which asserts the object must conform to the knowledge would be suspended. (Natorp, 1912, 202).

Natorp considers the sharp separation of space and time as forms of intuition from pure concepts to be a significant achievement of Kant, but according to him, space and time are not sensational givenness. Natorp asserts that the spatial and temporal order is not and cannot be within givenness. For him, givenness is determination and is demanded by thinking. Because according to him, to think is to determine. This determination of the object as a fact can be realized and revealed through thinking. In terms of the fact of science (Faktums der Wissenschaft), especially as they have taken shape since Kant, Natorp says, thinking in the fundamental determinations of space and time is almost typically expressed not as "intuition" but as "function". "Givenness" itself is the problem of thinking. (Natorp, 1912, 203-4).

Natorp refers to Kant's footnote in chapter 26 of his inquiry into transcendental deduction in the second edition of the CPR. There Kant states that the faculty of understanding determines sensibility and it is through it that space and time first

become givenness. (Kant, 2000, 261). According to Natorp, the systematic location of this operation of understanding - the determination of intuition - is the modal category of actuality (Modalitätskategorie der Wirklichkeit). This category does not mean the outcome of knowledge, but only the condition of the possibility of experience. Thus, intuition is not a factor foreign to and opposed to thinking; on the contrary, it is thinking. It is not merely lawful thinking, but solely it relates to the thinking of the concept as the function itself in the execution of the law of the function. (Natorp, 1912, 204).

Natorp quotes the following from the SAE chapter "On the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments":

“To give an object, if this is not again meant only mediately, but it is rather to be exhibited immediately in intuition, is nothing other than to relate its representation to experience (whether this be actual or still possible).” (Kant, 2000, 282).

According to Natorp, with these sentences of Kant, givenness becomes an axiom (postulate) of actuality and acquires a pure modal meaning. According to Natorp, this alone is pure idealism. According to him, Kant's professorial dissertation of 1770 expresses a dogmatic position. In Kant, this radical arrangement in favor of the faculty of understanding is already in place, and to continue the provisions of transcendental aesthetics in Kantian philosophy is to abandon the deepest critique of reason. (Natorp, 1912, 204-5).

Natorp argues that in transcendental deduction, sensation (*Empfindung*) is the "apprehension" of the particular, just as perception is actually a process of "reproduction" (*Reproduktion*), the production of perceptual images. However, this notion of sensation as the expression of the ultimate determination of empirical-actuality does not imply the recognition of a previously given identity. On the contrary, according to him, it means the absolute originary placement of identity and is fulfilled in the determining act of "recognition" (*rekognition*). (Natorp, 1912, 205).

In the first edition of the transcendental deduction, Natorp refers to Kant's process of threefold synthesis and thus, to the exposition of the subjective sources that provide the objective reality of the category. He considers the synthesis of apprehension in intuition and reproduction in imagination to be merely the perceptual positioning of the particular object and attributes the ultimate meaning of the process to the synthesis of recognition in concept. He describes this as the determining thinking retrospectively establishing and contextualizing the existence of the particular object in the process of perception as absolute identity. That is to say, the intuitive phases of comprehension and reproduction, which initially appear to be independent, gain meaning when the determining act of recognition brings them into this determination. According to Natorp, in this context, the distinctive character of intuition and sensation does not disappear. They only cease to be the second factor of knowledge. Intuition ceases to be alien to, independent of, and dominant over thinking. (Natorp, 1912, 205). Natorp puts forward, two types of determinism: the determinacy of the general laws of thinking and real determinacy. Spontaneity is both of these. But the first is valid as law and the second never as a receptive determination, but always as the actual execution of what is spontaneous. The basic idea in Natorp's approach is that sensibility does not include the given matter of knowledge. On the contrary,

intuitive givenness refers to the determination of experience and thus, to the determination of thinking. Therefore, what is given outside the determination of thinking (in intuition) is not actually given. It is the hypothesis posited by thinking. Indeed, Natorp states that determination is not arbitrary, but rather in our possession. In this sense, causality is not "given" as Hume determines. On the contrary, it is posited by thinking and recognized hypothetically when it is recognized. Knowledge of causality is explicitly an attempt at unity structure and an act of thinking. Therefore, Natorp states that anti-idealist empiricism reveals itself as false absolutism. Transcendental idealism is a genuine empiricism that recognizes no absolute in experience. (Natorp, 1912, 206).

Natorp's way of thinking reveals a radical rejection of Kantian subjectivity. The reason for this is his attempt to sharply distinguish transcendental idealism as subjective idealism from psychologism. According to Natorp, the object is always the object for the level of knowledge reached. There is no more or less than this level. Objectification emerges as a kind of dissolution of subjectivity (*Entsubjektivierung*) by passing out of the subjective. For Natorp, subjectification is a posterior problem and the issue of psychology. Because any kind of object relation precedes the subject relation. Natorp states that the unconditional rejection of subjectivity by Kant is sufficiently fulfilled and that transcendental idealism is distinguished with all certainty from any kind of subjective idealism. (Natorp, 1912, 208).

Considering Natorp's text, it can be said that it is a characteristic instance of Neo-Kantianism. All the points that Heidegger criticizes Neo-Kantianism are clearly revealed through this text of Natorp's. Natorp explicitly expels intuition from the Kantian context of knowledge, primarily through the rejection of givenness. He argues that the equation of intuition and the understanding should be changed in favor of

understanding and regards this as a "correction" of Kantian philosophy. He carries this approach so far as to describe Kant's sensibility-thinking dualism as a dogmatic position left over from his professorial dissertation and transcendental aesthetics. It is clear from Natorp's conception that the intuitive givenness of the object and the subject's reception of this givenness with receptivity cannot be included in the structural construction of knowledge. Moreover, construing the structure of knowledge from such a starting point means treating knowledge from a foreign and external perspective. Because the object has not yet been determined in intuitive givenness. This undetermined-ness would then cancel the givenness of the object, and intuitive givenness would not carry an epistemic meaning on its own. Because determination originates from thinking. The natural consequence of this is that space and time as forms of intuition are disconnected from intuitive givenness and transformed into categorical hypotheses of thinking. The only basis that Neo-Kantians find from Kant for this approach is Kant's statement in the second edition of the CPR that thinking determines intuition.

Despite this grounding in the CPR, such a radical rejection of intuition in the Kantian formulation of knowledge is of course worth questioning. The scientific and epistemological essence of the neo-Kantian approach is sharply revealed in this rejection. Since, Kantian criticism as a transcendental method is dealt with on a basis that establishes the unity of *ratio* and *logos*. This basis drives the whole motivation of Neo-Kantianism towards the factor of thinking as understanding. It seems that in order to reject psychologism, the Neo-Kantian approach also rejects Kantian subjectivity. Therefore, the Kantian foundation that the subject's first connection with the object is through intuition is suspended. Because the subject cannot acquire the object of knowledge without the determination of the object. As such, the subject is made

identical to the determination of the object under the determination of thinking.

Indeed, Natorp explicitly rejects the subject through this approach. The implicit Neo-Kantian approach revealed here is the supposition of a hierarchical relationship between thinking and intuition, and the superiority of thinking in this relationship, or rather the trivialization of intuition. The object is not given in the form of intuition; on the contrary, when thinking determines the object, that is, when it says what it is, it turns out that the supposition that the object is given is actually thinking's determination of it. This indicates that givenness is a fundamental hypothesis produced by thinking. Thus this formulation implies that space and time is not the subject's mode of receiving the object from the form of intuition, but the category projected from the determining activity of thinking towards the object. This is the reason why Natorp considers space and time as the category of modality. Because they represent the possibility of experience, not the possibility of the givenness of the object.

In this context, Kantian criticism for Natorp is the transcendental method based on epistemology. And this method constitutes the unity, the unity of *ratio*, which operates in the spheres of science, morality, art and religion. From Heidegger's point of view, this whole picture is a complete misunderstanding of Kantian philosophy.

5.4. Remarks of Ernst Cassirer on Heidegger's interpretation of Kant

There is almost no text-based polemic between the Neo-Kantian philosophers and Heidegger. Heidegger does not carry out his critical view of the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant through a text-based analysis. Only in certain references to figures such as Cohen or Natorp does he offer a general outline of the Neo-Kantian school's interpretation of Kant. Neo-Kantian philosophers, too, have hardly produced

texts critical of Heidegger's interpretation. There are two texts we come across in the literature. One is Rudolf Odebrecht's article published in *Blätter für deutsche philosophie* in 1932. The other is Ernst Cassirer's article "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics-Reflections on Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant" (KANT UND DAS PROBLEM DER METAPHYSIK-Bemerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Kant-Interpretation) published in *Kant-Studien* in 1931. Cassirer's article is important in two respects. First, after the famous Davos debate, he presented his views to the philosophical public within a certain framework. Secondly, it is the first critical text on Heidegger's interpretation from the Neo-Kantian front.

Cassirer begins his essay by referring to Kant's letter to Markus Herz in 1772. The letter, as is well known, announces a radical shift in the direction of transcendental philosophy. Kant determines that it is the questioning of the ground on which the relation between representation and object rests that will hold the key to the whole mystery of metaphysics. Cassirer points out that it is precisely here that Kant regards the "transcendental object" as the core of metaphysics, and that this approach is the new orientation that will constitute the content and basic meaning of the "Copernican Turn". This shift involves not only a new conception of what is known and knowable, but also the task and nature of the basic function of knowledge. The novelty that is expressed in the Copernican turn differs radically from the relocation of the object in the space of thought. This shift concerns the structure and organization of the space of thought. (Cassirer, 1931, 1).

Even this beginning of Cassirer's reveals the difference between Heidegger and the Neo-Kantians. For Heidegger, the "Copernican Turn" represents a turn towards the knowledge of the being of beings as the grounding of the ontology of subjectivity. In other words, the turn does not essentially imply an intervention into the structure of

the epistemic function, but rather the encompassing of the subject-object relation by subjective ontology and the production of the knowledge of beings on the basis of this ontology. In Cassirer's explicit account, the "turn" is an unfolding of the nature of the function of knowledge and at the same time a shift in the manner and approach to the construction of knowledge, a reconstruction of thinking on this basis. To summarize, "return" refers to the shift in the direction of the movement along with the cognitive structure in which the epistemological approach operates.

Cassirer is of course conscious of this difference and emphasizes it by stating the minimum common point of Neo-Kantianism. The known representatives of Neo-Kantianism agree on this point: The focal point of Kant's system is the doctrine of knowledge, i.e. epistemology. The "fact of science" (Faktum der Wissenschaft) and its possibility constitute the beginning and aim of the Kantian formulation. (Cassirer, 1931, 2). For them, the scientific character and scientific priority of Kantian doctrine lies in this formulation. Cassirer notes that this insight was expressed with programmatic sharpness in Aloys Riehls' Freiburg lecture "On Scientific and Non-Scientific Philosophy" (Über wissenschaftliche und nichtwissenschaftliche Philosophie-1883). Riehls argues that the task of philosophy, which claims to be a solid science, cannot be based on anything other than the establishment of universal principles. This is philosophy's specific endeavor and its proper field. Only the science of knowledge (Erkenntniswissenschaft) gives it its genuine inner security and frees it from delusions and puts it on a solid ground. This is the method of distinguishing philosophy from worldview (Weltanschauung). For according to Riehls, worldviews are not the subject of the faculty of understanding (Verstand). World views are located in the mind (Gemüt) and are therefore subjective. They are the object of belief, not science. As a result, philosophy as a worldview doctrine is not science. Cassirer

attempts to soften this rigid conception of Riehls by opening a parenthesis. According to him, Riehls does not exclude traditional problems that have entered the agenda of philosophy. However, in order to give philosophy scientific solidity, this conception put forward by Riehls should be seen as a sacrifice that must be made. Cassirer states at the beginning of his review that he deliberately refers to Riehls. For these considerations make explicit the difference between Heidegger's conception of the central task of metaphysics and the philosophical view of the positivist-oriented "critique". (Cassirer, 1931, 3). It is obvious that this is an approach Heidegger strongly criticizes. A radical critique of the comprehension of Kant's philosophy on the basis of this approach is the starting point of his interpretation of Kant.

After presenting this sharp difference, Cassirer lays out the general outlines of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant. To determine the essence of the "Critique of Pure Reason" as a theory of knowledge and consequently to regard it as a theory of the positive sciences or a "theory of experience" is to fundamentally miscomprehend Kant. With such a misunderstanding, the problems of metaphysics cannot be solved. Metaphysics cannot be compressed into the logic of pure knowledge. Metaphysics is essentially the doctrine of being, that is, ontology. However, all questions about being require the question about the being of man, because Kantian criticism is based on the question "What is man?". The unfolding of human knowledge thus requires a metaphysics of Dasein. And this is the fundamental ontology for Heidegger. Kant's entire philosophical endeavor is grounded in the concretization of the metaphysics of Dasein. This is the revelation of the relation between ontological synthesis and human finitude. There is no distortion in Cassirer's presentation of Heidegger's views in general outlines. On the other hand, Cassirer argues that a discussion with Heidegger should be based on this ground. If a philosophical discussion is to be possible and

beneficial, this ground chosen by Heidegger must be accepted. (Cassirer, 1931, 4).

Cassirer states that he is far from a mere polemic. He is not bothered by Heidegger's unfair attitude towards the historical value of Neo-Kantianism and Cohen's interpretation of Kant. Because the problem is not historical accuracy, but systematic and contextual accuracy. However, Cassirer then makes an interesting quip about Heidegger's attitude. According to him, there is at least one "Kantian" contesting Heidegger, who advises Neo-Kantians to relearn Kant, and that is Kant himself.

Cassirer quotes Kant's *Reflexionen*. Kant says that one should examine one's propositions in all their various applications, assume the opposite of them and postpone them until the truth becomes clear in all its aspects. With this quote, Cassirer is in a subtle way saying to Heidegger that he should not be too sure about the accuracy of his interpretation.

After the introduction, Cassirer devotes the first chapter to the problems of the finitude of human knowledge and the transcendental imagination (Die Endlichkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis und das Problem der "transzendentalen Einbildungskraft"). The finitude of human knowledge has an significant position in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant. For according to Heidegger, the main motivation of Kantian criticism is not a theory about the universal whatness of things, but the question about the whatness of human beings. As a matter of fact, Heidegger determined the analysis of the finite human whatness as fundamental ontology. In this context, Kantian criticism revealed the answer to the question of what is human in the specific finitude of human beings. Heidegger states in KPM that laying the ground for metaphysics is the dissolving of our finite knowledge into its elements. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 152). Cassirer states that when asked what this finitude is, Kant has a definite answer. All human knowledge is based on intuition. All intuition is receptive, an originary mode

of receiving. The faculty of understanding is not creative in recognizing and placing objects in front of it; it does not create objects, but rather acquires content through their representation. In this context, it is not *intellectus archetypus* but *intellectus ectypus*. Cassirer notes that this opposition is important to Kant and that he sharply emphasizes it by explaining the whatness of finite human knowledge in its opposition to the idea of infinite divine knowledge. (Cassirer, 1931, 6). Human intuition, *intuitus derivativus*, in the context of its opposition to divine intuition, *intuitus originarius*, cannot exceed the given intuitiveness, that is, it is finite. The finitude of human knowledge lies in this dependence on objects. This dependence is found in the givenness of the object in intuition and the finitude of human knowledge is tied to the intuitive givenness of the object. Through this distinction, Heidegger focused on the finitude of human knowledge and interpreted it as a dominant element characterizing critique. Therefore, he displayed an ontological unfolding that immanentized the Kantian formulation of knowledge into the intuitive context. For Cassirer, however, this is the starting point of the problematic content of the Heideggerian interpretation. According to Cassirer, linking the Kantian formulation of human knowledge centrally to intuitive givenness would necessarily confine all subsequent interpretation to this central point, which is what Heidegger does. However, Cassirer points out that Kant does not stop at the "receptivity of intuition". On the one hand, the "spontaneity of the faculty of understanding" is also firmly established in Kantian criticism. Moreover, in the "Transcendental Deduction", Kant has firmly treated and emphasized the spontaneity of the faculty of understanding. Understanding this emphasis does not contradict the fundamental approach of Kantian criticism. That is, the faculty of understanding should not be understood as a refutation or abolition of the finite character of human knowledge, but as a particular characteristic of it. (Cassirer, 1937,

7). Cassirer here responds symmetrically to a fundamental accusation Heidegger makes against the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant. Heidegger accuses the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant of favoring the faculty of understanding and decreasing the importance of intuition. Cassirer implies that Heidegger's approach privileges intuition and diminishes the importance of understanding.

Cassirer demonstrates how encompassing the factor of finitude is in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant. He does this by summarizing and quoting specific thoughts in the KPM. Finitude is not left behind in the movement of knowledge from sensibility to understanding and from there to reason. The fundamental connection with intuition remains permanent. The chain of finitude cannot be broken. So much so that even the use of pure logical understanding is labeled with the stamp of finitude. For every thought as discursive thought requires a mediateness concerning generality that makes particulars conceptually representable by and according to it. According to Heidegger, this mediateness belongs to the essence of the faculty of understanding and is the sharpest mark of its finitude. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 21). Such that finitude is also included in the realm of reason. Human reason is not only externally finite but also strictly internally finite. All inquiries and questions of reason (e.g. the three questions of the Kantian critique) are grounded in finitude. In Heidegger's expression in KPM, reason asks these questions because it is finite, and in fact it is so finite that this finitude is itself at issue in its own rational-ness. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 152). However much reason seems to soar above experience, this does not simply mean that it flies over it. For transcendence (Transzendenz) is itself *a priori* sensible, and again, as Heidegger argues in KPM, pure human reason is inevitably pure sensible reason. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 121). With this exposition Cassirer reveals the radical mode of Heidegger's conception of finitude. (Cassirer, 1931, 7-8).

Cassirer lists the conclusions that emerge from all these points according to Heidegger as follows: Kant's analytical division into sensibility, the faculty of understanding and reason has a provisional character. Human knowledge is unified and determined in the faculty of imagination, which is a fundamental spiritual faculty. The unity of intuition and concept is also constituted through this fundamental faculty. The peculiar functions of pure intuition and pure thinking can be understood through the transcendental imagination. Transcendental aesthetics and analytics express a preparatory pre-character and can only be read correctly from the perspective of transcendental schematism. (Cassirer, 1931, 8).

After listing these conclusions arising from the interpretation of Heidegger, Cassirer states that he disagrees with the idea, often encountered in Kantian literature, that the doctrine of schematism is "artificial". According to this view, this artificiality arises from Kant's love of "symmetry" or "architectonics". Cassirer states that the absurdity of this idea can be recognized through Heidegger's deep analysis of schematism.

Cassirer states that the doctrine of the imagination cannot be understood without Kantian dualism. We must distinguish between the "sensible" and the "thought" world, between "experience" and "idea", between "phenomenon" and "noumenon". For it is only from this dualistic point of view that the Kantian problem of the finitude of knowledge can acquire its full meaning. For Heidegger, the essential symptom of this finitude is that human understanding (*Verstand*) cannot create its objects, but rather obtains content by representing the "images" of the being of objects and presents them to itself from the beginning. However, Cassirer points out that transcendental philosophy is not concerned with the absolute basis of objects. It does

not directly orient itself to the object and its origin, but rather to the mode of knowledge of objects insofar as they are *a priori* possible. Kant's usage of receptive human knowledge as being relative to *intuitus originarius* requires that this opposition be understood not as an absolutization of the finitude of human knowledge, but as a limiting concept against the assumptions of sensibility. (Cassirer, 1931, 9).

Cassirer holds that knowledge cannot be defined as receptive and finite as long as it moves in its own field. Knowledge has a creative character in the field of experience and its phenomena. It is the basis of the order and lawfulness of appearances (*Erscheinung*) when speaking of nature as empirical nature. In this sense, the faculty of understanding does not exist as a "thing in itself" but as a "creator of nature" and is the being of things insofar as it is determined by general laws. The limitation of the faculty of understanding shows its true, creative power. The fact that the faculty of understanding is related to intuition does not mean that the faculty of understanding is at the service of intuition and works under its sway, as Heidegger's basic thesis suggests. On the contrary, this relation is the positive force that produces all determinations and forms of intuition. It is the synthesis of the faculty of understanding that enables intuition to relate to an object and gives it a determinacy. The "objectness" (*Gegenständlichkeit*) attributed to knowledge is always an execution of spontaneity, not receptivity. Heidegger insists that in Kant thinking is only in the service of intuition. For Heidegger, despite the reciprocal relation between intuition and thinking, intuition has always had a central role. (Cassirer, 1931, 10).

However, Cassirer treats this idea of service from a peculiar point of view by calling on Kant for help. The old saying goes like this: "Philosophy is the servant of theology." Kant demands that this proposition be accepted if necessary, but asks the following question. Is this servanthood the carrying of the long skirts of his gracious

wife behind her, or is it the carrying of a torch in front of her? Cassirer argues that Kant definitely considers the relation between intuition and thinking in the latter sense. The service of the faculty of understanding to intuition does not destroy its independence. The activity of the faculty of understanding in service to intuition cannot mean that it works under intuition. The faculty of understanding aims at intuition but is not its servant. The existence of intuition as determinate intuition and the function of the faculty of understanding is what gives determinacy to every entity. (Cassirer, 1931, 10).

Cassirer's views on the determination of the object are the basic approach of Neo-Kantianism. The existence of intuition as determined is realized through the activity of the faculty of understanding. Because there is no determination in intuition itself. For Heidegger, however, the opposite is the case. Heidegger does not deal with the relation between intuition and the faculty of understanding through the category of determination. For him, the relation is the revelation of the inner unity between the two. Therefore, time acquires a critical position. Because the originary-spiritual force that constitutes the unity between intuition and the faculty of understanding is time. And time is grounded in the power of imagination and the doctrine of schematism as revealed by the critique. Precisely because Heidegger's point of departure is time, Cassirer takes up this point and quotes from the CPR and the Prolegomena to ground the element of determinateness. Kant says in CPR B154:

“in drawing a straight line (which is to be the external figurative representation of time), attending merely to the action of the synthesis of the manifold through which we successively determine the inner sense, and thereby attending to the succession of is determination in inner sense. Motion, as

action of the subject (not as determination of an object), consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space, if we abstract from this manifold in space and attend solely to the action in accordance with which we determine the form of inner sense, first produces the Concept of succession at all. The understanding therefore does not find some sort of combination of the manifold already in inner sense, but produces it, by affecting inner sense.” (Kant, 2000, 258).

In parallel to this quote, Cassirer quotes the following from the "Prolegomena":

“By contrast, that which determines space into the figure of a circle, a cone, or a sphere is the understanding, insofar as it contains the basis for the unity of the construction of these figures.” (Kant, 2004, 73).

It is obvious from the quotations that Cassirer and Neo-Kantianism insist on the determinacy of the faculty of understanding in the relation between intuition and thinking. As much as Heidegger finds supportive foundations for his theses in Kant, so does Neo-Kantianism. Heidegger regards ontological knowledge as the unity between intuition and concept, and as the main factor that provides this unity, in the encompassing temporal determination moving from intuitive form to conceptual thinking. Neo-Kantianism, on the other hand, considers the intuitive givenness of the object to be *pseudo* on its own and considers that through the creativity of determination from thought to intuition, the intuitive givenness is made the object of knowledge. Therefore, formally, time is contextualized and "meaningful" through the determination of thinking. From this point of view, Cassirer states that all construction

necessarily involves aspects of spontaneity. In the faculty of understanding, the object does not announce itself as accepted. What occurs in the faculty of understanding is not simply a mode of relating to and being affected by the object. On the contrary, in the faculty of understanding the object is constructed from its fundamental elements, that is, from the conditions of its possibility. (Cassirer, 1931, 11).

Cassirer indicates that the issue becomes even more acute when the transition from transcendental analytic to transcendental dialectic is achieved. For in this transition, we encounter not direct intuition but the use of the faculty of understanding itself, which provides the highest systematic unity, and the determinative concept we face here is the "Idea of the unconditioned" (die Idee des Unbedingten). Cassirer states that when the faculty of understanding grasps all the conditions of experience, reason is not satisfied with the domain of these conditions and asks a question that extends beyond them. This act is its basic function. It does not orient itself towards sensibility in order to grasp something as a concrete empirical object, but its task extends beyond the entire sphere of the determination and concretization of this kind of "thingness" (Dinglichkeit). With this movement of reason we stand precisely on the real ground of "transcendence". Cassirer therefore emphasizes that for Kant the unconditioned is the general title of all concepts of reason. Thus, for Cassirer, the following is clear: The characteristic of the faculty of understanding as a "finite" faculty of knowledge is related to one aspect of its usage. As a creative force, it can be characterized as "finite" insofar as it can never grasp absolute objects, let alone produce them from itself. But it is not "finite" insofar as "absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions" is its essential task. Because of this demand that places reason before him, it becomes fully conscious of its own nature and limitlessness. If the faculty of understanding is seen as bound to finitude through its relation between sensibility and the

transcendental imagination, it must also be seen as part of infinity through its equally necessary relation to the pure ideas of reason. And this relation to the pure ideas of reason can be presented symbolically because they cannot be preserved and represented in a mere "schema" or "monogram of the imagination". For, as Kant makes clear in the CPR, there is no schema of sensibility corresponding to the principles of pure reason, and therefore they cannot have any object *in concreto*. (Cassirer, 1931, 12).

According to Cassirer, this ground means that the spell of "receptivity" is ultimately broken. For Kant, the reason is never merely sensible; on the contrary, it is a commanding and demanding power. It offers us the command of the unconditioned, and based on this approach, according to Cassirer, Kant is directly on Plato's side. (Cassirer, 1931, 12). To illustrate this point, Cassirer refers to Kant's view of the Platonic idea in CPR B371, 375. In these passages Kant states in summary: Plato understood very well that our faculty of knowledge has a higher need than the object of experience, and that reason therefore rises to knowledge which has no counterpart in experience and which is not fabricated but has reality. Kant considers the philosopher's spiritual ascent, which tackles the copy of the material world order and from there reaches its architectural connection according to the ends, that is, according to the ideas, to be an endeavor worthy of respect. (Kant, 2000, 396-398). In this context, Cassirer states that mere time commitment, mere temporal existence and mere temporal consciousness detonate. According to him, for Kant, it is beyond doubt that all pure theoretical knowledge is time-related. From the theoretical point of view, reason, as Kant notes, seeks to free the concept of the faculty of understanding from the inevitable limitations of a possible experience, and thus to extend it beyond the limits of the empirical without breaking the connection with the empirical. (Kant,

2000, 460). For reason does not aim to transcend the faculty of understanding as if flying over it, but rather to give it its systematic unity and completeness. Therefore, the primary goal of reason is the totality of experience, that is, the totality of Being under the condition of time. However, Cassirer states that according to Kant, this relation changes when reason moves from the theoretical to the practical context. Because with the "unconditional" context of the idea of freedom, one steps into the pure "intelligible", supersensible and timeless. (Cassirer, 1931, 13).

Cassirer supports this change of relation, which is valid when it comes to the practical sphere, with a quote from CPR B 431. Kant states that in the use of pure reason we are *a priori* legislator (*gesetzgebend*) subjects in terms of our existence, and that the spontaneity that arises in this position determines our performativity (*wirklichkeit*) without the need for the conditions of empirical intuition. Thus, our sensible existence is determined solely in relation to the intelligible world (*Intelligible Welt*). (Kant, 2000, 457). What Cassirer wants to say here against Heidegger is quite obvious. There is no intuition, imagination or schema, i.e. temporal determination, at the stage where we can determine our existence solely by the law we set ourselves. Cassirer states that the critique of practical reason already begins with these ideas and gives them a systematic determination and application. According to Cassirer, this stage implies that in the idea of freedom there is no intuition of the supersensible substance, but rather the certainty of the supersensible determination of rational being. (Cassirer, 1931, 14). This is because the unconditionality of the moral law elevates the subject above mere phenomenal being and engages it in an entirely different order by moving it to a peculiar center. Cassirer notes that for Kant the distinction between *mundus intelligibilis* and *mundus sensibilis* is ultimately a demonstration of two completely different kinds of evaluation and orientation. This means that the whole of

human existence and action is measured according to two fundamentally different standards and considered from two opposing points of view. The concept of the world of Understanding (*Der Begriff der Verstandeswelt*) is a point of view that reason finds itself obliged to take apart from appearances in order to think practically, but this would not be possible if the effects of the sensible were determinative for human beings. This is absolutely necessary for man to be able to think of himself as an *Intelligenz*, as a free personality in the "kingdom of ends". At this point Cassirer points out that in the field of morality there is the miracle of a "creative" kind of knowledge. Because here the "I" is basically only what it wants to do. The moral law is in imperative form and stands in opposition to us. However, this type of "standing against" (*Entgegenstehens*) is not the same as the theoretical object. This is because pure dependence or heteronomy no longer prevails here. Only the self-imposed law of the free self is valid. In the kingdom of ends, every will depends on both ruler and vassal being one. (Cassirer, 1931, 14).

Pointing out that the noumenal meaning of the idea of freedom is distinct from the ways in which it emerges in the psychological sphere, Cassirer states that when it comes to the idea of freedom and practical reason, Kant does not see them as mere "intelligible" dependent on temporal conditions. On the contrary, they are pure contemplation of timelessness. (Cassirer, 1931, 15). Thus, Cassirer emphasizes the pure "intelligible" structure of the subject independent of temporal conditions when we enter the realm of the idea of freedom and practical reason, in opposition to the Heideggerian temporal interpretation. What he wants to reveal with this is that the Heideggerian interpretation is constructed by ignoring the totality of Kantian criticism. Cassirer quotes the following from the CPrR:

“But the very same subject, being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing in itself, also views his existence insofar as it does not stand under conditions of time and himself as determinable only through laws that he gives himself by reason; and in this existence of his nothing is, for him, antecedent to the determination of his will...” (Kant, 2015, 79).

Following this quotation from CPrR, Cassirer says that at this point we are wholly in ourselves (in uns) and in principle we are above ourselves. This context in Kantian ethics shows that we stand at the center of our existence as beings of pure reason. Cassirer returns again to the CPrR:

“The concept of freedom alone allows us to find the unconditioned and intelligible for the conditioned and sensible without going outside ourselves. For, it is our reason itself which by means of the supreme and unconditional practical law cognizes itself and the being that is conscious of this law (our own person) as belonging to the pure world of understanding and even determines the way in which, as such, it can be active.” (Kant, 2015, 85-6).

Cassirer thus comes to his main criticism of Heidegger's interpretation by showing our existence transcending the sensible and temporal condition in the context of dualism and the idea of freedom in Kantian thought. Heidegger links all faculties of knowledge to the transcendental imagination and traces them by going back to the transcendental imagination. It thus remains only in the given relation of temporal Dasein. The difference between phenomenon and noumenon is blurred and leveled, so that all existence is tied to the field of time and finitude. According to Cassirer, this

approach means the collapse of the pillars on which Kant's thought is based. Kant did not present such a monism of the imagination within his system but rather insisted on a radical and specific dualism, a dualism of the sensible and the intelligible. Cassirer argues that Kant's fundamental problem is not the problem of "being" and "time" but the problem of "being" and "necessity" (Sollen), "experience" and "idea". (Cassirer, 1931, 16).

According to Cassirer, from the point of view of fundamental ontology, Heidegger has the right to reject this dualism, but he is not obliged to do so. Of course, Heidegger argues that his interpretation from this point of view is to reveal what is unsaid in Kant. By following the movement of Kantian criticism, phenomenological interpretation must fill in the gaps left by it. While Cassirer considers it justified for interpretation as a philosophical "event" to be based on such a principle, he nevertheless notes that there is an unjustified use of the principle. Cassirer refers to Heidegger's thoughts on interpretation in KPM. Heidegger argues that his interpretation is not a direct transference of what Kant said, but a going beyond what Kant said. This, he maintains, can be achieved by taking into account the unsaid in what has been said. Any interpretation that attempts to do this naturally performs violence. But this interpretation should not be arbitrary, but guided by the shining power of the idea. What is left unsaid can be expressed in this way. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 140-1). Heidegger's view of interpretation seems reasonable to Cassirer. But Cassirer asks: is it not arbitrary to force the interpreted author to say what he has not said - because he is not sufficient to say it? Even if Heidegger's determinations of "pure receptive spontaneity" or "pure sensible reason" seem intelligible on the basis of the analysis of "Being and Time", they would remain alien and aggressors in Kant's doctrine. Cassirer states that for Kant, such a determination of "sensible reason"

would mean iron from wood. Because Cassirer argues that according to Kant, the reason is a supersensible and timeless faculty. In this respect, Cassirer likens Heidegger not so much to an interpreter as to a usurper (Usurpator) who breaks into the Kantian system in order to make it the servant of his own problems. (Cassirer, 1931, 17). The systematic meaning and significance of the schematism section cannot be denied, but the doctrines of schematism and transcendental imagination are not the focal point of the Kantian system. The system is determined and completed in continuity in the transcendental dialectic, "CPrR" and "CJ". Cassirer holds that the title "Kant and Metaphysics" can be considered not as a sub-genre of schematism but as a sub-genre of Kant's doctrine of ideas, especially his theory of freedom and his theory of beauty. In Kant's doctrine of the man, practical reason and the power of judgment endeavor to place the human being under the "idea of humanity" from the beginning and to see and reveal him in a manner that is formed from this. According to Cassirer, the essential target of these phases of Kantian criticism is not human Dasein but the *intelligible substratum* of humanity (intelligible Substrat der Menschheit). (Cassirer, 1931, 18).

In this context, Cassirer argues that Heidegger's interpretation displays a paradox. For Heidegger, it is a great mistake to treat Kantian philosophy as a "doctrine of experience". Kantian criticism is a fundamental ontology as the discovery and revelation of human essence. Cassirer, however, argues that schematism and the doctrine of transcendental imagination are not the appropriate place to prove this thesis. Because for him this doctrine is not a component of Kantian metaphysics, but a real and necessary element of the doctrine of experience. Schematism and imagination do not deal directly and fundamentally with Human Dasein, but with the conditions, quality, and organization of the empirical object. The schematization required by the

concepts of pure understanding does not orient directly towards the knowledge of "things in themselves" but rather towards the order of phenomena in time. It is through this necessity that the categories are delimited and realized. They are in a particular use of experience and are related to the empirical object. Through the relation to the schemas of the transcendental imagination, the concepts of the faculty of understanding, as Kant points out, bring appearances under the universal rules of synthesis and make them amenable to a connection that goes from beginning to end in experience. (Kant, 2000, 276). Therefore, Cassirer holds that schematism belongs essentially to the phenomenology of the object, not to the subject. Concepts such as substantiality and causality acquire their objective meaning primarily through their relation to the intuition of time. This shows that their specific function, according to Cassirer, is to bring time determination under phenomena into strict and universally valid rules. Because schemas allow us to capture an objective order in appearances. They are tools that provide objects for our intuitions. As conditions of the possibility of experience, they are also conditions of the possibility of objects of experience. And according to Cassirer, Kant further elucidated them as belonging to the metaphysical foundations of the natural sciences. Cassirer, therefore, argues that the doctrine of schematism belongs to the epistemology that Heidegger rejects. According to Cassirer, despite all his diligence and care, Heidegger compressed his holistic analysis of Kant into a single point. His whole motivation in his interpretive activity has been an attempt to replace "objective deduction" with "subjective deduction". And he did so only without developing the totality of the systematic effects and consequences of the concept of the "transcendental schema". (Cassirer, 1931, 19-20).

In the second part of his analysis, Cassirer focuses on Kant's "retreating". Heidegger argues that Kant shrank back from his discovery of the subjectivity of the subject on the basis of temporality due to the pressure of logic and tradition. He bases this thesis on the fact that in the second edition of the CPR the subjective sources of deductive research are removed and replaced by objective grounds. In this way, the objective reality of categories is reformulated not as the structural unity of ontological subjectivity resulting from the concentric unity between intuition and concept, but as the grounding of the objective validity of the concepts of the faculty of understanding. Heidegger attempts to reveal Kant's ontological unfolding in a negative sense by tracing this "retreat". In other words, Kantian ontological unfolding is attempted to be proved through the demonstration of the renunciation of this unfolding. However, according to Cassirer, Heidegger's claim is a hypothesis and its meaning can be revealed by considering the place of the hypothesis in transcendental philosophy. Cassirer notes that for Kant, hypotheses are used polemically, not dogmatically, in the case of purely speculative questions of pure reason. Hypotheses are for Kant only "weapons of war" in the field of pure reason. They are used to defend a right, not to ground it (Kant, 662-3). The underlying idea behind Cassirer's emphasis is to show that Heidegger uses his hypothesis not to defend his interpretation but to re-ground Kantian criticism. Heidegger regards the hypothesis on which he builds his interpretation as a thesis and transforms this thesis into the central character of Kantian philosophy as an essential element of it. Cassirer states in the first edition of the CPR that Kant's effort was to distinguish transcendental idealism from psychological idealism. Therefore, according to him, Kant had to shift transcendental analysis from subjective deduction to objective deduction. For the essential matter he had to show was not how the "faculty of thinking" itself was possible, but under what

conditions and how the object of experience was possible. Cassirer notes that Kant nevertheless left the section on schematism unchanged in the second edition. In this way, the central force of the doctrine of the transcendental imagination was preserved. Therefore, Cassirer states that he does not see any "retreat" in Kant. According to him, Kant maintained the position of thought he had gained. (Cassirer, 1931, 21).

For Kant, what is at stake is not the metaphysics of the "absolute". According to Cassirer, Kant is not searching for "the secrets of a different world" but for the power of knowing itself. Cassirer wants to imply that Kant does not seek an absolute determination of finitude and temporality as the inner grounding of this finitude. The holistic and systematic movement of the Kantian system from the context of theoretical reason to the context of practical reason represents an expansion in line with the temporal character of the transcendental imagination. With the transition to the "kingdom of ends", the temporal laws of the imagination are left behind. This is because the essential character of this realm is pure "intelligible" and schematization does not apply here. The moral law differs from the physical law, and naturally from the phenomenal law, in that it does not initiate itself from the external sensible world. On the contrary, it starts from the "invisible self". There is a continuous correspondence between the limitation of the use of categories in experience to the schemata of the imagination and the "supersensible" postulations that are valid in the practical field. However, according to Cassirer, if we take the concept of finitude as a point of departure in a different way, as Heidegger does, there is a gap in this correlation. For Cassirer, therefore, the suggestion that Kant retreated from his own thought is not correct. On the contrary, he did not stop his path of thought in any consequence. (Cassirer, 1931, 23).

Cassirer states that for Kant metaphysics is the doctrine of the "primary reasons of human knowledge". Here the concept of reason should be seen in its simple and innocuous sense, which, according to him, indicates the "final principles" of knowledge and must make them intelligible. However, according to Heidegger, the "the realm of the question of the essence of reason" is *transcendence*. The reason emerges from "finite freedom". But "as this kind of reason, however, freedom is the 'abyss' of Dasein,," (Heidegger, 1969, 127-129). Cassirer argues that such sentences, which, according to Heidegger, disintegrate the idea of "logic" "in the turbulence of a more originary questioning", (Heidegger, 1998, 92) are intelligible in Kierkegaard's world but have no place in Kant's world of thought. Referring to "What is Metaphysics?", Cassirer states that it was not anxiety that clarified metaphysics for Kant and that he discovered a fundamental form of idealism. This idealism points on the one hand to the ordinary human experience and its construction, and on the other hand to the participation in the ideal and eternity. Kant's metaphysics and path forbids anxiety in front of Nothing.

In concluding his analysis, Cassirer touches on the significance and meaning of Heidegger's work and emphasizes the high value of his interpretation despite all his criticisms. The value of Heidegger's interpretation is that it is a philosophical "event". Nevertheless, he did not completely traverse the problem field of transcendental idealism.

These are the main points of Cassirer's analysis. It can be seen from these points that Cassirer maintains the tension between the difference in interpretation between Heidegger and Neo-Kantians in a way that favors the latter. First, Cassirer considers that Heidegger makes the Kantian formulation of finite knowledge an absolutized point of departure for his interpretation. According to Cassirer, the

relativity of *intuitus originarius-intuitus derivativus* is not valid for making finitude the essence of human knowledge, but for understanding the limitation of human knowledge. Conceiving the opposition as the absoluteness of the finitude of human knowledge results in an overestimation of the role of intuition in Kantian criticism. In this way, Heidegger in a reversed way diminishes the function and importance of the faculty of understanding. The doctrine of transcendental imagination and schematism is an important part of Kantian thought. However, this is only a part of the Kantian system when approached as a whole. Through its critical movement, the Kantian system expands the haunts of subjectivity from the context of theoretical reason to the context of practical reason and thus overcomes the dimension of temporality by moving to the dimension of the purely "intelligible". The subject, who, together with the idea of the unconditioned, sets its own law from a non-sensible context through itself, transcends schematization and constitutes itself as the freely acting agent of freedom. The Heideggerian interpretation, on the other hand, remains within the context of imagination and schema and fixes Kantian subjectivity as the essential basis of this context. For Cassirer, on the other hand, the temporal determinations of imagination and schematization are not about the ontological structuring of subjectivity as Heidegger thinks, but about the phenomenology of the object of knowledge. Subjectivity provides the objective order of nature by bringing the object under a universal and lawful order through the temporal determinations of schemata. In this sense, for Cassirer, the essential meaning of imagination and schematism is related to the epistemology that Heidegger rejects.

This text, which Cassirer put forward after the Davos debate, is a serious analysis of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant presented to the philosophical public, despite its points that can be seen as controversial. Cassirer emphasizes the holistic

incompleteness of Heidegger's interpretation of the Kantian human formulation through a certain part of Kant's thought and argues that the Kantian question "What is man?" can be interpreted correctly by considering the holistic critical movement of the critique. However, the main motivation points of his critique maintain the epistemology-centered scientific character of Neo-Kantianism, albeit in a softened form, and continue to defend, albeit implicitly, the importance and superiority of understanding over intuition.



CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

6.1. Kantian Critique as *Prote Metaphysica*

This study has mainly sought to conclude two different interpretations of Kant's philosophy through the possibilities that enable them to emerge from Kant's philosophy. The first of the two different interpretations belonged to Heidegger. However, Heidegger's interpretation was a relative one to the interpretation of the Neo-Kantian tradition. In other words, Heidegger's interpretation appeared to be an exegesis developed on the interpretation of the Neo-Kantian Marburg school, and in this sense, it contained a reactive element. In this section, our study will evaluate these two opposing interpretations in terms of their inner possibilities and will try to elucidate the seeds of these inner possibilities in the *prote metaphysica* it puts forward as his concluding thesis. First, it will reveal what *prote metaphysica* signifies in the difference and tension between the two editions of the CPR. Then, it will pursue the traces of Heidegger's ontological interpretation in the CPR and investigate the position of this interpretation in the context of the concluding thesis of our study. It will then present the foundations of the Marburg school's scientific epistemological interpretation and trace the possibilities of this interpretation in the CPR. And in doing so, it will try to elucidate the inner relationship of this interpretation with the *prote metaphysica* determination. And finally, it will reveal what Kantian criticism corresponds to as *prote metaphysica*.

The first thing that Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* provides us here is a new field of interpretation constituted by the difference between the first and second editions of the CPR. The Neo-Kantian activity of interpretation is based on the second edition. Although Heidegger puts the first edition at the center of his interpretive

activity, he attempts to fill the gaps created by the difference and tension between the two editions by bringing the first edition forward. The point to be noted here in terms of the preference of the parties is the following: Kant states in the preface to the first edition of the CPR (A XVI) that he knows of no more important investigation into the grounding of the faculty of understanding and the determination of the rules and boundaries of its use than his investigation in the deduction of the concepts of pure understanding. But the investigation is twofold. The first one is objective, and is an elucidation of the objective validity of *a priori* concepts. The other aspect of investigation is subjective and concerns the faculty of pure understanding itself, its possibility and the faculties of knowledge on which it is based. Kant, however, states that objective investigation is itself essential. (Kant, 2000, 103). It is precisely such a division of the investigation that is the basis for Heidegger's and Neo-Kantianism's positioning in terms of interpretation. Subjective investigation revealed the deduction of categories through the threefold synthesis as a complementary unity of the time-related process of subjectivity, and Heidegger construed his ontological interpretation through the temporal unity of this process, which both flows forward and affects each other backward in each phase. However, objective investigation has parenthesized this basis of subjective investigation in a new way. In objective investigation, these three subjective sources were eliminated and instead the faculty of understanding and the pure apperception at the basis of the faculty of understanding came into play. That is, the deduction of the concepts of the pure faculty of understanding is assigned to apperception as the origin of the subject's pure consciousness, and apperception is formulated as the ground that provides objective validity to the categories. This is the point where the Neo-Kantian interpretation concentrates.

But there are fundamental questions to be asked here? Did Kant completely reject the first edition of the CPR? In discussing the relation between subjective and objective investigation, he only emphasized that objective investigation was the essential point for his work, but nevertheless did not propose a definitive rejection of subjective investigation.

It is precisely here that the first crucial and formal condition of Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* emerges. The CPR does not present a preference for the first and second editions in opposition to each other. The CPR offers us a third field of interpretation created by the difference and tension between the two editions. Kantian critique has bequeathed to us not the difference between the two editions, but the dialectic of continuity and rupture between the two editions as plural possibilities of interpretation. It is not philosophically wrong to make a choice between the two editions. Indeed, Schopenhauer argues that the first edition is more important. However, the difference and tension between the two editions of the CPR can give priority to both a preference for one or the other and a third field of interpretation created by the unity between them. The different concepts and definitions in the writing of the CPR move the text into an analytically plural contextual sphere and seem to be in line with Kant's original position between empirical metaphysics and rational metaphysics. Indeed, as Kojin Karatani points out, Kant exhibits a fluid, dynamic and hybrid shift of position which confronts dominant empiricism versus rationalism and empiricism versus dominant rationalism. (Karatani, 2003, 4). Heidegger's ontological interpretation through the mediation of subjectivity and the scientific epistemological interpretation of the Neo-Kantians are based on the pluralism bequeathed to us by the work. Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* has therefore provided us with a sphere of freedom between subjective inquiry and

objective inquiry. As a matter of fact, Schopenhauer has made some observations that seem pertinent to Kant's procedure, which I have formulated as Kant's "innovational indecision". Schopenhauer states that Kant is very clear in the transcendental aesthetics section, but when it comes to transcendental logic, the opposite is the case. According to him, Kant's language in this section is blurred, ambiguous, inadequate and implicit. Let's try to expound this observation of Schopenhauer by following in his footsteps. Kant states in [A11/B24] that reason is the faculty that provides the principles of *a priori* knowledge. In [A330/B387], reason is the faculty of inference, that is, of judgment. In [A553/B581] reason is determined as the persistent condition of all voluntary actions. In [A644/B672] the reason is determined as that which unites the manifold of concepts through ideas. In [A646/B674], reason is defined as the faculty of deriving the particular from the universal. (Schopenhauer, 1969, 432-3, as cited, Schopenhauer). We also see this "innovational indecision" of Kant's in the section on schematism. The transcendental schema is defined as a third mediating representation that ensures the homogeneity of category and appearance. On the other hand, he determines the restriction of the concept of the faculty of understanding to the condition of pure sensibility as schema, and the operation of the faculty of understanding with these schemas as schematism. On the one hand, schematism is defined as an art hidden in the depths of the human soul. On the other hand, the schema of sensible concepts is described as the monogram of pure *a priori* imagination. Finally, schemas are defined as *a priori* time determinations according to rules.

However, this study, which posits Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica*, does not consider all this conceptual density and variability as a disadvantage. It should be seen as the conceptual pluralism brought about by Kant's innovational indecision. In

this activity, Kant, who destroys everything, bequeathed us a conceptual network through constant repetitions, reversals and new definitions, and thus handed down the formal and contextual pluralism of the critique to the history of philosophy.

Kant states in the preface to the B edition of the CPR:

“It is a treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself; but it catalogs the entire outline of the science of metaphysics, both in respect of its boundaries and in respect of its entire internal structure. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity about it, that it can and should measure its own capacity according to the different ways for choosing the objects of its thinking...” (Kant, 2000, 113).

Here, Kant's thought has a spontaneous and natural coincidence with the determination of *prote metaphysica*. Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* provided an outline for every field of inquiry and for the subjectivity that constitutes the thought of that field of inquiry, in terms of its boundaries and internal structure, and showed that it is based on internal freedom to measure its faculties according to the differences between how they choose their objects in the process of inquiry. This is the essence that makes it the model from which ontological or epistemological procedures can emerge. Criticism grants such internal freedom to the method of inquiry. All the pluralism in Kant's conceptual organization is the internal dynamic of Kantian criticism. Concepts are connected to each other through different determinations at each step, and through the internal articulation of concepts one tries to arrive at their totality. This, then, is the first intrinsic possibility that Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* offers us. Not to sharply distinguish between the two editions of the

CPR, but to focus on the complementary internal structure of the two editions and to orient towards the internal articulation that makes ontology and epistemology themselves possible.

Let us now look at the what possibilities in the CPR enables Heidegger's ontological interpretation and the inner relation of his interpretation to the prote metaphysica determination. But before that, let us try to clarify the formal framework of Heidegger's interpretive activity. Heidegger gives a phenomenological interpretation of CPR. But why the phenomenological interpretation? Couldn't he have restricted himself to the interpretation of the CPR?

Here Heidegger's view concerning phenomenology comes into play. Heidegger declares that he makes a phenomenological interpretation. Phenomenological interpretation, on the other hand, is essentially based on uncovering what the text reveals, shows, points to, as well as the points that this revealing, showing may have concealed or obscured. Indeed, when Heidegger discusses the concept of phenomenon in B&T, he states that if something has the tendency to manifest itself on account of its meaning (i.e., if it is a phenomenon), it can also have the possibility to manifest itself as what it is not, to appear as something else. Heidegger gives the phrase *phainomenon agathon* as an example. This phrase means that which looks good, but in actuality is not as good as it looks. (Heidegger, 2001, 51). In this sense, Heidegger distinguishes the term phenomenon from its meaning as semblance and states that he considers it as the negating modification of the phenomenon. (Heidegger, 2001, 51). Heidegger also mentions the example of "the symptoms of diseases" and states that this expression, which tries to point to the phenomena that manifest themselves in our bodies, actually refers to that which does not manifest itself from itself. Heidegger says that the emergence of such occurrences, that is, the manifestation of appearances

expressed as symptoms of a disease, goes together with symptoms that do not manifest themselves, so that something that does not manifest itself announces itself through something that manifests itself. (Heidegger, 2001, 52). Here, Heidegger succinctly sets out his focus on the concept of the phenomenon and the how-ness of the phenomenological method. Rather than addressing the conditions of the way in which the thing shows itself, the thought is that this way of showing conceals the thing as much as it reveals it. In this sense, what is phenomenal has something that it conceals in itself as well as what it reveals in itself. In this way, it can be understood what a phenomenological interpretation in this context is trying to move forward by basing itself on.

Heidegger seeks to discover not only the self-revealing meaning of the text, but also the connections and contexts that this revealing conceals and obscures. This is not violence perpetrated against the text, but the birth of possible horizons, extensions and meanings of the text from the points naturally impregnated by the phenomenological relationship with the text. When the method of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is analyzed, it will be seen that Heidegger precisely attempts to complete the ambiguous, unclear and incomplete points in the CPR by relying on the clues and traces left by the CPR and to provide new expansions to the text. Heidegger does not assimilate Kant's philosophy into his own philosophy; on the contrary, he attempts to demonstrate that the coincidence of Kant's philosophy and the issue of time, which is the central point of his own philosophy, is a link that completes Kant's philosophy. Indeed, the relation between Kant's attempt to make time the constitutive power of the subject and Heidegger's determination of time as the essential element of Dasein is the main factor characterizing Heidegger's attitude towards Kant's philosophy. Heidegger's motivation point here is the idea that Kant did not complete

his attempt, that he left it incomplete. And it is this idea that determines his interpretation of Kant. However, this cannot be the basis for the interpretation to be a distortion or a misinterpretation. However, it is also possible to see the points where Heidegger pushes the inner critique of CPR as a transgression. Let us now turn to the main pillars of Heidegger's ontological interpretation.

Heidegger's ontological interpretation focuses primarily on what the concept of metaphysics is that Kant confronts and from what this traditional concept of metaphysics proceeds. As a result, through these questions, he asks why the laying ground of metaphysics in Kant becomes a critique of pure reason. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 3). In its traditional formation, metaphysics is divided into *metaphysica specialis* and *metaphysica generalis*. *Metaphysica specialis* was subdivided into theology, cosmology and psychology. *Metaphysica generalis*, on the other hand, emerged as an ontology that deals with beings "in general". However, Heidegger argues that a "overstepping" occurs in metaphysics. This overstepping is made possible by pure rational cognition that goes beyond the specific experience of particular beings with content. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 6) The grounding of metaphysics thus becomes the determination of the essence of *metaphysica specialis* because this is the cognition of supersensible beings. However, the cognition of the supersensible beings returns itself to the inner possibility of making beings apparent as beings. In this way it is revealed what the general comporting of the being is. It is precisely at this point that Heidegger refers to the section in the preface to the B edition of the CPR where Kant mentions what the natural scientists discover. The natural scientists operate according to a certain conception before the contingent observations of experience. This preliminary design contains necessary laws, and with these laws, natural researchers, as beings, answer questions about the field of nature. In this way, human questions to nature are

answered according to the preliminary character of pure rational cognition. Let us remember from Kant. Galileo determines the weight of the balls before rolling them in the inclined plane. Torricelli found the exit velocity of a liquid in a container by moving a weight equal to a column of water, which he knew in advance, into the air. Stahl added something to the metals and then withdrew them, oxidized them and turned them back into metals. Thus, Heidegger states that the previously projected plan of a nature predetermines the constitution of being of beings. Thus, he argues that what makes ontic cognition of being possible is the preliminary understanding of the structure of Being, that is, ontological cognition. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 7). But mathematical natural science is exhausted on the condition of this relation of ontic and ontological cognition. That is, mathematical natural science reveals only the relation of ontic and ontological cognition and nothing more. Pointing to this condition does not solve the problem.

That is, the possibility in the ontic cognition of *metaphysica specialis* returns to the point of the possibility of ontological cognition determined by *metaphysica generalis*. In this way, the "Copernican Turn" is reached. Human cognition does not conform to the objects. Conversely, objects are determined according to human cognition. Thus, the ontological cognition that makes ontic cognition possible is fundamentally present.

It is precisely at this point that Heidegger's interpretation of synthetic *a priori* knowledge as the knowledge of Being of beings unfolds. But how should its inner possibility and correspondence be displayed in Kantian philosophy? Does the formulation of synthetic *a priori* knowledge as knowledge of Being of beings have a legitimate basis? That is the question. On the other hand, does synthetic *a priori* knowledge reveal the whatness of knowledge or does it reveal the subject's mode of

knowledge of objects? Kant exemplifies synthetic *a priori* knowledge through mathematics and physical science. Let us take his well-known mathematical example as a basis. The proposition $7+5=12$ is a synthetic *a priori* judgment. But what does this proposition have to do with ontological cognition? Why is this proposition, in terms of Heidegger's interpretation, a preliminary proposition concerning the structure of being of beings? Kant's determination is obvious. When we analyze neither 7 nor 5 by backtracking, we cannot arrive at 12. In other words, in the combination of 7 and 5, the predicate 12 is not already included from the beginning. As Lange points out, if the proposition were analytic, counting would not be taught in schools. That is, the predicate to which the sum of 7 and 5 must necessarily be connected would not be explained. What makes the mathematical proposition synthetic here is that there is no relation based on identity between the sum of 7 and 5 and 12. Or there is no overlap of whatness in these two elements that can be revealed by analysis. We are simply adding a predicate that is externally related to 7 and 5 independently of experience.

So how can one ground Heidegger's approach, which regards the preliminary cognition of being of beings in this synthetic *a priori* proposition? It seems that Heidegger considers here the preliminary structure of mathematical science's activity of constructing and forming the world towards the being of beings. All disciplines that deal with mathematical sciences display this approach toward beings. Domains such as engineering science and physical science have to work with mathematics. For example, when scientific Dasein wants to make use of nature, it acts according to the preliminary ontological structure of the mathematical sciences. When building a dam, it is calculated which rivers and streams are suitable. Calculations and measurements are made to provide electricity, agricultural irrigation and municipal water. The construction of the dam is done entirely according to the designs of engineering

science. That is to say, the subject who wants to make benefit from nature acts according to the approach of ontological preliminary cognition towards beings in its relationship with nature.

Indeed, according to Heidegger, Kant reduced the problem of the possibility of ontology to the question "how are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?". Ontic experience is preceded by the *a priori* mode of ontological cognition. According to Heidegger, Kant called the cognition that determines the quiddity of beings and, moreover, reveals the beings themselves synthetic cognition. Thus, the possibility of ontological cognition has been tied to the essence of *a priori* synthetic cognition. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 9).

Synthetic judgment establishes the subject-predicate connection on the basis of beings that the subject does not include. On the other hand, this connection is not derived from experience. This *a priori* synthesis is transcendently revealed. So this cognition is not engaged with objects. On the contrary, it is engaged with the mode of our *a priori* cognition of objects. Therefore, Heidegger associates the transcendental mode of cognition not with ontic things but with the structure of being of what is ontic. This is the revelation of the mode of cognition of pure reason. What needs to be done is to reveal this *a priori* synthesis within its own possibility. That is to say, pure reason is in the act which transcends beings. Therefore, *metaphysica generalis* is revealed as transcendental philosophy. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 10).

However, Kant does not mention ontology when he is speaking of synthetic *a priori* knowledge. He only mentions the importance of reference to them in terms of limiting metaphysics. In other words, he argues that if metaphysics is to be possible as a science, it must operate with the scientific knowledge possessed by the sciences.

The question to be asked through this interpretation of Heidegger is this. While Heidegger identifies synthetic *a priori* cognition with ontological cognition, does he provide us with traces of this through his own philosophy? For example, can we trace synthetic *a priori* knowledge in "B&T" in relation to the knowledge of being of beings?

In Heidegger, there does not seem to be a determination that we can clearly trace. Heidegger's treatment of synthetic *a priori* knowledge on the plane of the ontologicality of what is ontic is based on his equating "*a priori*" with Dasein's preliminary attitude towards being and synthetic cognition with the whatness of beings. Of course, Kant's emphasis on the principles of pure cognition predetermining scientific research according to certain laws of reason through the light that flashes in the minds of natural scientists has a natural overlap with the context Heidegger presents. In other words, it seems that Heidegger is able to provide logistical support from Kant for his unfolding of the ontological difference. By reconciling ontological difference with synthetic *a priori* cognition, he both discovered the historicity of a particular opening in his own philosophy and contained this discovery as an affirmation of his own philosophy.

However, this determination still does not prove the legitimacy of Heidegger's identification of ontological knowledge with synthetic *a priori* knowledge. The philosophical task is to determine whether this connection is present in the philosopher's text as an inner possibility. This study will try to understand this determination through "B&T", but not in great detail. Let us recall the introduction of B&T. There, Heidegger treats the definitions of being and argues that these definitions, far from revealing the conception of being, leave it ambiguous. Being is the most general and universal concept. It is self-evident. Therefore, being cannot be

defined. It is also clear within that propositional activity. It is precisely at this point that Heidegger opens a parenthesis. It is precisely these prejudices that reveal that an enigma lies *a priori* in every comporting we make with beings as beings. (Heidegger, 1985, 23). It is interesting that Heidegger uses the concept of *a priori* here. There is an *a priori* enigma in the relation established with beings. Why is it *a priori*? He could have said that it is just an enigma. That is to say, our comportment and situations towards the beings contain a dark but *a priori* element. Precisely for this reason, the question of being does not limit itself to aiming at the conditions of possibility of the sciences that operate within a certain understanding of being, but aims at the conditions of possibility of the ontologies that precede and underlie the ontic sciences. (Heidegger, 1985, 31). So here, one might ask the following question? Is Dasein *a priori*? Does Heidegger, who emphasizes the preparatory analyticity of Dasein throughout the whole work, make synthetic *a priori* knowledge and the knowledge of being of beings identical through the preliminary compartment of Dasein towards being?

Indeed, Heidegger states that the interpretation of Dasein is not a determination of the *a priori*, which consists in the combination of separate pieces, but a structure that is essentially and constantly whole. (Heidegger, 1985, 65). He adds that in Dasein's state of everydayness and inauthenticity, too, lies *a priori* the structure of existentiality. (Heidegger, 1985, 69). That is, Dasein, as the bearer and thinker of about being, always acts in a preliminary structural totality, that is, *a priori*, in its attitude towards beings.

Indeed, for Heidegger, if the question "What is man?" is to be philosophically investigated, the very *a priori* that needs to be made visible must be uncovered. (Heidegger, 1985, 71). Dasein's determinations of being must be seen and understood

as *a priori* above the constitution of being, for example through 'Being-in-the-world'. (Heidegger, 1985, 78). On the other hand, worldhood as an ontological concept is, according to Heidegger, modifiable according to the totality of the structure of special worlds and embraces in itself the *a priori* character of worldhood. (Heidegger, 1985, 93). In other words, Dasein constructs the special worlds that it establishes in its existential motion and plurality of being according to the preliminary being of worldliness, that is, according to its *a priori* character.

Heidegger argues that the point which Kant takes up without contextualizing it as, for example, having a right and left direction is actually grounded in the fact that Dasein possesses a directionality as essential. Kant on the other hand wished to demonstrate that this directedness needs only the subjective principle. However, Heidegger states that Kant actually means *a priori* by the subjective principle. Thus, for Heidegger, the *a priori* character of directedness with respect to right and left is grounded on the subjective *a priori* of being-in-the-world. (Heidegger, 1985, 144). Stating that the generally demanded subject of philosophy is not empirical facts but "*a priori*", Heidegger thinks that it is not enough to proceed from the ideal subject to fulfill this demand. Because proceeding from the ideal subject misses the *a priori* of the factual subject, Dasein. (Heidegger, 1985, 272).

What traces do Heidegger's interpretations in B&T leave us in terms of his identification of ontological knowledge with synthetic *a priori* knowledge? First of all, it should be noted that the *a priori* character of Dasein is grounded in its factual subjectivity. For it is this factual *a priority* that itself enables the *a priori* character of the ideal subject. All the states of Dasein that anticipate, concern, calculate, project into the future, and constitute being-in-the-world are realized under the encompassingness of its prioritizing attitude towards beings. In this sense, the entire *a*

priori character of the epistemic subject emerges on the basis of the antecedent *a priori* character in the attitude of factual Dasein towards beings. Here, to be sure, Heidegger's recognition of an early Dasein analytic in Kantian subjectivity is also effective. Kantian subjectivity reveals beings as beings in a discovering manner through the constitution of being. In this context, Heidegger considers in synthetic *a priori* knowledge not the essence of the constructive knowledge used instrumentally by the sciences, but the structurality of subjectivity's *a prioritizing* attitude towards objects that discovers beings as beings. Of course, there is no distortion here, at least in terms of the activity of interpretation. Heidegger claims to have discovered the early historical foundations of the analytic of Dasein in Kant. Subjectivity places the structure of being constituted by the conditions of sensibility and thinking into beings. Through this placement, the ontic experience of beings is established. In synthetic *a priori* judgment, subject entity and object entity are bound together by the *a priori* possibility of the ontological being of subjectivity, and subject entity and object entity, which do not contain each other, are bound together through the act of judgment. Moreover, this context reveals the beings about which judgment is made in an explorative manner and reconstructs it in the context of beings as beings. This study does not consider this interpretation of Heidegger as a distortion. However, from the point of view of doctrinaire Kantianism, it can be interpreted as an overstepping of boundary. However, the following can be stated at this point. Kant defined synthetic *a priori* cognition as knowledge that extends our cognition. That is, it adds a new cognition to our cognition, a cognition that we do not acquire from ontic experience. Therefore, Heidegger's statement here that all kinds of truth are relative to the existence of Dasein is important. However, this relativity does not imply a subjectivity such as being at the arbitrariness of the subject. Dasein as the bearer and thinker of

being operates its being as an ontological structuring possibility in the interconnection of ontic things. Therefore, the ontological knowledge of ontic things is under the determination of Dasein's antecedent understanding of being. Dasein is not interested in the being of 7, 5 and 12 as mathematical beings. On the contrary, Dasein is the antecedent ontological existence of the attitude of discovering and revealing beings as beings in an activity of counting that results in 12. In this context, Dasein is the antecedent ontological existence that makes even something like *a priori* cognition possible.

But what possibilities lie in Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* in this first phase of Heidegger's ontological interpretation? *Prote metaphysica* implies that the collective life and natural sphere of beings are constructed on the basis of a subjectivity that precedes these spheres. The object is assimilated into the whatness of subjective *aisthesis* and subjective thinking. More precisely, the object is conceived as adapted to the whatness of the conditions of aisthesis and thinking of subjectivity that precede experience. *Prote metaphysica* is object-containing subjectivity. Here, the inner possibility of ontology is the coincidence of the being of beings with the being of the subject. That is, the object-ness of objects is constructed as representation through the beingness of subjectivity. The object contained by pure intuition and pure concept is unveiled and discovered by representing it under the conditions of the whatness of subjectivity. This discovery results in the represented object being organized and determined as beings by this antecedent ontological structure in the sphere of ontic experience and nature. *Prote metaphysica* offers the inner possibility of determining subjectivity as the ontological center. In other words, it contains the inner possibility of something like ontology itself on this plane.

The second focus of Heidegger's ontological interpretation was the finitude of human cognition. However, the unity of intuition and thinking constituted the basis of ontological knowledge. Heidegger, who considers the source ground of metaphysics in pure human reason, argues that it is precisely the essentiality of reason's humanness, its finitude, that belongs to this source ground. The finitude of reason is inherent in the very structure of cognition itself. It is this very structure that creates the factual limitation of knowledge. However, Heidegger's primary motivation is a statement in the chapter on transcendental aesthetics. It is intuition that all thought considers as a means. Through this statement of Kant, Heidegger argues that cognition is primarily intuition and that the faculty of understanding is at the service of intuition. Of course, the thought of serving here creates an essential correlation between intuition and thinking. Heidegger's radical conclusion here is to assume a kinship between intuition and thinking. The fact that thinking serves what intuition aims at does not mean that they are separated by a sharp boundary, but rather that there is an essential relation between them. The kinship that emerges from the transitive nature of this reciprocal relation leads Heidegger to conclude that cognition is thinking which intuits. However, intuition still retains its dominance over thinking.

However, Heidegger does not derive the primacy of intuition from the statement that thinking as a mere means aims at it. Kant treats human intuition as relative to divine intuition and determines the finitude of human intuition through this relativity. However, Heidegger's interpretation does not seem to roughly express such a context. For Heidegger states that intuition also needs to be determined by the faculty of understanding, despite the preservation of the hierarchical relation based on service between intuition and thinking. In other words, intuition is in a sense dependent on the faculty of understanding. Because the particulars received in

intuition become conceptually representable through the faculty of understanding. According to Heidegger, this discursive character belonging to the essence of the faculty of understanding is the sharpest index of its finitude.

The representability of beings under a general perspective is derived from the intuitable itself. The function of the faculty of understanding at this point is to provide the mode by which the particular content of the intuitable is valid for many things under an all-embracing unity.

In other words, if intuition is the primary structure of relating to objects as a singular representation, the faculty of understanding provides the form of the concept. Just as the object given in intuition becomes accessible and receptive under the determination of pure forms of intuition, thinking also constitutes the field of objectivity, which is the executer of object-ness, by giving a determination to the determined object of intuition, through its bringing forward representation. Heidegger argues that the essence of the faculty of understanding is originary conceiving. The faculty of understanding already contains in itself representations of unity as representational unification. This unity is the content of pure concepts. Heidegger argues that the whatness content of these concepts is every unification that makes unification possible. In fact, Heidegger wants to emphasize the following here. The determination from the faculty of understanding towards intuition is the representation of unity which is found *a priori* in the faculty of understanding. The pure concept as a unifying unity is not the provider of the concept form but is fundamentally this form itself. That is, in the inner relation of intuition and understanding, the determination included in the relation by the understanding is the form-forming action of pure concepts, the pure unity that unites the contents. While the faculty of understanding

serves what intuition aims at, it incorporates intuition into the context of object-ness, which it constitutes with the form of pure unity as the content of pure concepts.

The point to be noted here is this. The fact that none of the properties of intuition and thinking are preferable to the other jumps to another context with the proposition that they have an unknown common root. For Heidegger, this unknown root lies in the concept of synthesis. Synthesis is not a factor that combines these two sources randomly and side by side, on the contrary, it is the enabling root of their inner connection. Synthesis brings intuition and thinking into unity on the plane of belonging to each other. The main conclusion that can be drawn from here is this.

Although intuition is primary in terms of human cognition according to Heidegger, it nevertheless finds a sense of belonging and inner coherence on the basis of the unity achieved through the act of synthesis. As a result of this inner harmony, intuition and thinking are characteristically not to be seen as sources that must be strictly separated from each other; on the contrary, they undergo a hybridization in the field of synthesis.

However, here we need to follow the traces of Heidegger's ontological interpretation in the CPR. According to Heidegger's interpretation, ontology is essentially unity. This unity reveals ontological knowledge as the result of the unity between intuition and thinking. Heidegger focuses on the root that Kant left unclear. What is this unknown root of the two sources? Heidegger considers this root in the unifying field of unity provided by the act of synthesis. That is, the two sources are combined in a reduction to the condition of a third field provided by the synthesis. Intuition and thinking are related to each other through reciprocal determination and undergo a heterogeneous evolution that suspends their homogeneity in a correlation.

Ontology is therefore first and foremost the unity of the dual source of knowledge of subjectivity. This unity of subjectivity coincides with the unity of ontological knowledge. In other words, the unity of intuition-concept in ontological knowledge is based on the unity of intuition-concept achieved in the synthesis act of subjectivity. Indeed, to mention the possibility of an ontology is not to divide subjectivity into its parts on the ground of an ideal subjectivity, but to discover the originary unity that makes possible the ground of unity constitutive of the totality of the structure of subjectivity.

In this context, Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* means the unilateral irreducibility of the subject. Subjectivity is not an eclectic representation that can be divided among the elements of mere sensibility or mere thinking, but an ontological representation embodied in the unity of the sources that constitute the structural unity of subjectivity. *Prote metaphysica* has left us as a possibility the priority of treating subjectivity as an ontological unity. Heidegger's interpretation, again as an overstepping of boundary, is actually softened by this possibility provided by the *prote metaphysica* and is in harmony with the textual inner motion of the CPR. The third pillar of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's philosophy as an ontology is the inquiry of transcendental deduction. The necessary exposition of this part of the CPR has been provided in the previous sections of our study. However, it is still necessary to briefly set out the important points here. First of all, the inquiry into deduction is different in the first and second editions. Heidegger prefers the inquiry in the first edition.

Kant based his inquiry of transcendental deduction on three subjective sources of knowledge: sense, imagination, and apperception. He defined the synthesis of these faculties as the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, the synthesis of reproduction in

imagination, and the synthesis of recognition in concept. But all synthesis is under the encompassing formality of time. For all representations, whether empirical or *a priori*, stand under the formal condition of the inner sense, that is, under time. In the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, the mind represents the manifold in intuition as a manifold by distinguishing time. That is to say, the manifold given in intuition is apprehended in unity by placing it in the pure formal succession of time. The synthesis of reproduction in the imagination accomplishes the continuity of the relation between the previous phase and the next phase in the pure phases of succession by retaining the previous phase. The synthesis of recognition in concept is to bring this whole process to unity through the mediation of the identity of the previous phase and the next phase. It is the unity of consciousness that enables this. Because without this consciousness, all reproduction in the series of representations would be futile.

In the chapter on deduction in the B edition of the CPR, the situation changes. Here it is stated that synthesis as unification cannot be found in the pure forms of sensible intuition. In this context, the act of synthesis is not assigned to subjective sources but to the faculty of understanding. However, there is a ground of unity that precedes the concept of unification and makes the synthesis of the manifold possible. This ground is the synthetic unity of the subject's consciousness, that is, pure apperception. The representation that characterizes apperception is "I think". Because all representations of the subject are at the same time what is thought by the subject. However, Heidegger thinks differently about the meaning and task of transcendental deduction. For Heidegger, the threefold synthesis is not a process of synthesis executed separately by pure intuition, pure imagination, and pure concept. For the synthesis at work in all three stages reveals the inner possibility of the essential unity

of pure cognition. The subjective interpretation of transcendental deduction exemplifies the subject's pure act of bringing forth something within the horizon of object-ness.

Heidegger relates the synthesis of apprehension in intuition to the now. For while the manifold in empirical intuition is unified through the pure temporal form of succession, each phase of succession is revealed as a 'now' phase of the mind. The mind assembles the manifold of impressions by passing through the nows. For Heidegger, the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination is a kind of unification as retrieval. For our mind does not lose in its thought what is to be brought back again. This synthesis therefore takes place in the mode of retention. So the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination is the unification of the no-longer-now with the relevant now. Heidegger therefore formulates the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination as 'past' in the context of what has been. If time is the triple unity of now, past, and future, the temporal character of recognition in the concept will be revealed as the future.

According to Heidegger, this mode of synthesis, which constitutes the third element of pure knowledge, requires a thorough analysis. The reason for this is that Heidegger also considers a temporal character in this mode of synthesis. However, Kant did not exhibit a temporal unfolding in the synthesis of recognition in concept. So how is the time character revealed in this third mode of synthesis? The critical point here is this. Just as the synthesis of apprehension in intuition is tied to the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination, the synthesis of recognition in concept is tied to the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination. For in the first sentence of the synthesis of recognition in the concept, Kant states that the consciousness that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before is the provider of all

reproduction in the series of representations. Heidegger proceeds from this determination and tries to justify that reproduction in the imagination is not possible without the synthesis of recognition in the concept. If the first two modes of synthesis are time-related and the third mode of synthesis has an inner unity with these two modes of synthesis, this shows that the synthesis of recognition in the concept is also time-related.

In the interpretation of the first two syntheses, Heidegger adhered to the inner possibilities in Kant's presentation. However, in the interpretation of the third mode, the revealing and complementary activity of his phenomenological-ontological interpretation came into play. The main point of Heidegger's interpretation regarding the threefold synthesis is that it focuses on the inner dialectical relation of the three modes of synthesis. These three modes of synthesis are the subjective sources of the objective reality of categories. Despite the undecided movement of Kantian criticism, the objective reality of the category is connected to the element of synthesis, the element of synthesis to the power of imagination, and the power of imagination to comprehension. On the other hand, the threefold synthesis should be considered under the representation of time according to the instruction given by Kant himself at the beginning. It is a natural consequence that Heidegger, who regards the essence of ontological knowledge in the inner unity of pure intuition and pure concept, interprets the threefold synthesis as the dialectical relation between the modes of temporal unity. The fact that the synthesis of recognition as an activity of the faculty of understanding is grounded in the context of temporal relation shows that the origin of categories is also time.

Heidegger's interpretation of the objective validity of categories, which we have already presented in the previous sections of our study, is quite clear. The

category of validity is to treat the deductive inquiry incorrectly with the *quaestio juris* formulation. This formulation converts the category into an inner logical notion and questions the legitimacy of the relation of this inner logical element to the external object. However, Heidegger argues sharply that inquiry acquires its concrete content through the unity of subjective sources embedded in the category's time-related synthesis. The objective reality of categories means that they are not material components of experience, but conditions of possible experience. That is to say, the conditions for the actualization of any possible experience are constituted through the categories, that is, the potential antecedent principles of the correspondence of these conditions regarding experience. That is, categories as ontological predicates find their objective corresponding through the unification of pure intuition, pure imagination and pure concept. Because Kant at the beginning of this chapter has placed time as an encompassing factor. Heidegger interprets this encompassing time factor as a component that completes the initial and final stages of the synthesis process. It is precisely because of this that the objective reality of categories is revealed through the operation of temporal synthesis.

But what relation does Heidegger's interpretation of transcendental deduction have to Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica*? *Prote metaphysica* has bequeathed us the subjective and objective interpretation of the deduction of categories at the same time. The problematic here is not to prefer one over the other. The point to be questioned here is why interpretation based on subjective sources is an ontology. So we are faced with the proposition that subjectivity is again an ontology. Sense, imagination and apperception are the ingredients of subjective ontology. That is, the objective reality of the category is founded on these structures. The question then is this. Where is the objective reality of the category rooted? In the context of threefold

synthesis, it is rooted in the synthesis process of subjective resources. That is to say, subjectivity constitutes the relation between category and object with the possibilities it derives from its own internal structure. That is to say, the category arrives at its objective reality through the being of the subject's subjectivity, that is, through its ontological conditions.

It is precisely here that *prote metaphysica* opens up a dimension that makes the objective reality of deduction accessible through subjectivity. This dimension brings the possibility of the revelation of the transcendental mode to its ultimate limit in the condition of the relation between representation and object. Subjectivity both recognizes and does not recognize the object. But this is never determined as the formulation of an essence that lies as a hidden force behind the object.

Kantian criticism as *Prote metaphysica* states the following. Pure intuition and pure concept can unite. This can also reveal the inner possibility of ontological knowledge. But *prote metaphysica* also offers us the objective unfolding of the categories in this context. That is, in addition to the category's inner unification with intuition, it also shows that the category operates in the context of the whatness of knowledge as a category. In addition to their ontological unity with pure intuition, categories are also characterized by their epistemological function in acts of knowledge. Precisely for this reason, *prote metaphysica* offers us the instrumental whatness of knowledge as well as the time-related synthesis of intuition that contextualizes the category.

The fourth pillar of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's philosophy as an ontology, which gains priority in terms of importance, is the faculty of imagination and schematism. Heidegger's motivation here is again the element of synthesis. And the faculty of imagination is the root and bearer of the act of synthesis in this context.

Heidegger argues that the synthesis of the faculty of imagination is the root element that constitutes the unity of pure intuition and pure concept.

Ontological knowledge forms transcendence, that is, subjectivity's stepping out of itself and its relation to the object based solely on its own faculties. This horizon, which opens up on the basis of subjectivity's self-affection and self-regulation, is made visible in advance through temporal determination, that is, through pure schema. But this possibility is the product of the transcendental imagination. This is what makes the imagination play a critical role.

Here the doctrine of schematism acquires a distinct authenticity. Heidegger regards in transcendental schematism the making-sensible method of pure concepts. Here, the act of letting-stand-against is in question. This means that the faculty of pure understanding is based on pure intuition. Therefore, according to Heidegger, pure sensibilization occurs as schematism. On the other hand, the difference between schema and image implies this. The image is the representation of the plural image of the particular. The schema, on the other hand, presents the unity of the general rule of various particulars by gathering them under one rule. Therefore, Heidegger sees the possibility of the image in the representation of the rule of exhibition. Thus, as Kant says in [CPR A140/B180], our pure sensible concepts are not based on images of objects but on schemas. Schema-forming sensibilization provides the image for the concept. Concepts of pure understanding need making-sensible if they are to be revealed as an ontological unity. They are not closed absolutes of the faculty of understanding as pure notions, but constructive potentialities with content that are captured in appearances through schemas. For subjectivity must confront the ontological cognition consisting of the unification of pure intuition and pure concept within the horizon of being pure stand-against to correspond to its experience. For

subjectivity must encounter the ontological cognition consisting of the unification of pure intuition and pure concept within the horizon of being pure stand-against to correspond to its experience. In his interpretation of transcendental deduction, Heidegger had seen the ontological unity of the pure concept with pure intuition through temporal determination. However, schematism places this unity in time by placing the concepts of the pure faculty of understanding in time by subjecting them to rules. Accordingly, for Heidegger, transcendental schematism is the basis of the inner possibility of ontological cognition. What is represented in pure thinking makes itself intuitable in the pure image of time. That is, by utilizing the difference and repetition of temporal relations, the possibility of capturing pure concepts in appearances is realized, moreover, the capture of the category in the appropriate appearance. For example, the schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time. According to Kant, time does not elapse, but the existence of the changeable in it does. In other words, it gives the change temporally relative to the non- elapsing of time. Therefore, in fact, time makes us sense the existence of the changeable in itself through its own unchangeability. The category that we appropriate to this sensation in appearances is substance. The substance can be captured in appearances by the non-elapse of time, that is, by the scheme of persistence that can be derived from the structure of the *substratum* of time. The carrier of the scheme of persistence corresponding to the substance in appearances is the real.

So what are the enabling possibilities of this third pillar of Heidegger's ontological interpretation in CPR? Kant first mentioned the two sources of our knowledge: sensibility and understanding. And interestingly, he argued that these two sources have a common root that is unknown to us. Later, in the first edition of the CPR of his inquiry of transcendental deduction, he mentioned three sources of

subjective knowledge: sense, imagination and apperception. Moreover, he demonstrated that the synthesis process of these subjective sources of knowledge is the basis for the objective reality of categories. On the other hand, he emphasized the element of synthesis precisely in the section preceding the table of categories, and furthermore, he determined the element of synthesis as a product of the power of imagination. He inseparably connected the power of imagination to the synthesis of apprehension in intuition. In this way, he placed the threefold synthesis of subjective sources under the encompassing power of imagination. On the other hand, he revealed that the process of synthesis takes place entirely under the determination of time. Heidegger connected all these traces and interpreted the synthesis of subjective sources under the encompassing forward and backward progression of temporal determination.

According to Heidegger, the root of pure intuition and pure concept, which is common but unknowable to us, is synthesis. And synthesis is the execution of the faculty of imagination. This structure re-emerged as a method of rules in the doctrine of schematism through temporal determination. Therefore, the Kantian representation of the subjectivity of the subject is a unified ontology constituted in the context of original temporality.

But can the interpretation of the whole structure of Kantian subjectivity as temporality on the basis of all these sources prove that Kantian philosophy is essentially an ontology? Is it appropriate here to think that Heidegger, in this case, transfers the context he sets forth in B&T to Kantian subjectivity and makes a forced correspondence with it? Heidegger explicitly asserts that the meaning of the being of the beings which are called Dasein is temporality. (Heidegger, 1985, 38). Heidegger considers the primordial ontological basis of Dasein in temporality. (Heidegger, 1985,

277). Temporality makes the unity of existence and facticity possible. Temporality is not something that exists as a beings, it temporalizes itself. (Heidegger, 1985 376-7). The multiplicity of Dasein's modes of being, that is, the possible infinity of its ontological unfolding towards the world, becomes possible on the basis of the occurrence of temporality. In other words, temporality is not something produced by time, but rather an ontological priority that makes something like time possible. That is, temporality is the possibility of Dasein's essential totality. So Dasein is aware of time. The possibility of being in the world of which Dasein is aware and time are so close that Dasein has begun to calculate this awareness with time, which is the closest thing to this awareness. Because according to Heidegger, Dasein does not have to carry a clock because it is the clock itself. (Heidegger, 1985, 469). Therefore, it is impossible to try to determine time in either the subject or the object because, according to Heidegger, it is present neither in the "object" nor in the "subject". Heidegger's proposition, which determines Dasein as time itself, can be seen as contradictory by asserting that it is not in the subject. But this subject here is the subject of traditional metaphysics. The temporality of Dasein expresses a mode of dynamic existence that transcends the subject-object correlation. Time is neither "inside" nor "outside" any kind of subjectivity and objectivity, nor does it exist earlier than them. Because time is the condition of possibility even of that "earlier" becoming. (Heidegger, 1985, 472). Therefore, it is temporality that constitutes the being of Dasein.

So what is the connection between Heidegger's approach and the inner possibilities of CPR? First of all, according to Heidegger, Kantian subjectivity is an early design of Dasein. Although he accuses Kant of retreating from an early historical analytic of Dasein, he regards the analytic of the finite human essence, the object of

fundamental ontology, as historically situated in Kantian criticism. In the CPR, the time factor comes into play in the crucial sections of the work from the transcendental aesthetic section onwards. Heidegger has seen in transcendental aesthetics the whatness of subjective *aisthesis*, that is, its ontological unfolding. In the elements of transcendental deduction, imagination and schematism, he has seen the construction of the subjectivity of the subject under temporal determination. He has done so by resolving the tensions and filling the gaps left by the first edition of the CPR. So what are the possibilities that Heidegger's ontological interpretation corresponds to in Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica*. Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* means the unity of subjectivity. That is, subjectivity is a set of structure that emerge through the root that ensures the unity of its faculties. In other words, the structural totality of the subjectivity of the subject is a possibility offered to us by Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica*. For Heidegger, the carrier of this whole process is subjectivity, which contains the possibility of an ontological configuration such as being. Subjectivity establishes ontological knowledge through its temporal constitutive origin. Moreover, Kantian subjectivity as early Dasein projects its own structural unity into experience as the structural unity of ontological knowledge and constructs its experience. In other words, the possible experience is the construction of the ontological structural totality of the subject's subjectivity. *Prote metaphysica* offers us the inner possibility of ontology in its possible movement towards the mediation of subjectivity.

We have laid out the foundations of Heidegger's ontological interpretation and its compatibility with Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica*.

We will now try to deal with the texts of the Neo-Kantian Marburg school through the concluding thesis of the study, and to show how the Neo-Kantian

interpretation of Kant is intrinsically related to the CPR and what coincidence it has with Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica*. Cohen's "KTE" and "LRE" and Natorp's "Kant and the Marburg School" stand out here as characteristic texts of Neo-Kantianism. On the other hand, Cassirer's critique of Heidegger, which our study has already dealt with in detail, will also be included in our analysis.

Let us start with Cohen. Cohen, who sets the main task of his interpretation of Kant as to re-establish Kant's *a priori* doctrine, argues that the point to be considered in Kantian philosophy is a new concept of experience. Kant does not give a definition of experience in the introduction to CPR. He only states that knowledge cannot be fundamentally restricted to the context of experience. All knowledge begins with experience, of course, but this does not mean that experience alone is the source of all knowledge. According to Cohen, this beginning leaves the concept of experience as an enigma. And the content of Kant's philosophy depends on the solution to this enigma. While Cohen undertakes to re-establish the concept of *a priori*, he proposes to focus on its internal criterion and not on its external value. As is well known from CPR, the concept of *a priori* is characterized as generally valid and necessary. However, Cohen argues that these predicates do not reveal the concrete content of the concept of *a priori*. These predicates only describe the external value of the concept of *a priori*. According to Cohen, the concept of *a priori* is integrated with another concept that complements and realizes it. This is the concept of the transcendental. The complementary relation between the transcendental and the *a priori* will reveal the essential context of the Kantian *a priori* doctrine.

Cohen determines that there are three stages of the *a priori*. These three stages reveal the inner structure of the concept of *a priori*. Cohen grounds the first stage of the *a priori* with the second proposition of the exposition of the concept of space in

the chapter on transcendental aesthetics. This proposition refers to the origin of the concept of space. The subject can represent a space in which there are no objects. But it can never represent there is no space. Space is therefore put into the context of experience by the subject. That is, space is an *a priori* representation, since the *a priori* resides in the subject originally. According to Cohen, this is the first stage of the concept of *a priori*.

Cohen grounds the second stage of the *a priori* in the revelation of the *a priori* as form. It is the subject's forms of sensibility that enable the subject to come into contact with objects under spatial and temporal relations. This is the basis that reveals the formal character of the *a priori*.

According to Cohen, this foundation is essentially in line with Kant's conception of what *a priori* is in the preface to the second edition of the CPR. We know *a priori* about things only that which we put into them. What is revealed through this second phase of the concept of *a priori* is that the subject puts the form of sensibility into things. Here, however, the Kantian meaning of the term form should be clarified. According to Cohen, Kant does not mean by the term form an organ in which sensations are filled and then transformed, but a mode and type of appearances. However, these two stages of the *a priori* as laid out by Cohen, namely its origin and its being a form of subjective sensibility, seem to strengthen the relation between the *a priori* and innateness. According to Cohen, this problem is solved by the third stage of *a priori*. This is because, according to Cohen, the *a priori* being of space is not based on the fact that it underlies all experience as a formal structure of sensibility. On the contrary, the *a priori* being of space lies in the fact that the intuition of space is recognized as a formal condition of the possibility of experience. What characterizes the concept of *a priori* in this third stage is that it is the formal condition of the

possibility of experience. If *a priori* were an innate property, we would be assuming a force or deterministic genetics that implanted it in human beings before they were born. On the other hand, we would be formulating *a priori* as a temporal priority. However, the subject operates *a priori* knowledge within the context of possible experience, and the *a priori* is logically prior. In other words, while constructing possible experience, the subject operates simultaneously with experience but with a structure that perceptually and conceptually prioritizes experience. *A priori* knowledge is not the activation of principles that are already present in the man before experience begins. Rather, it is the knowledge that makes it possible for something like experience to begin. In other words, it is not an element that the subject adds to experience before the initial movement of experience, but the logical preliminary stage of the content established within the continuous movement of experience. Since we do not notice this preliminary stage in experience, we think of *a priori* as an innate property.

Another concept Cohen focuses on in KTE is the concept of the transcendental. As we have already mentioned, the concept of *a priori* is complemented by the concept of transcendental. Transcendental knowledge proves *a priori* knowledge as knowledge necessary for the possibility of experience. Kant describes as transcendental the knowledge that deals not with the objects themselves, but with our mode of knowledge of them insofar as they are *a priori* possible. Cohen thinks that the term transcendental, which is the complement of *a priori*, is made explicit here. If our mode of knowledge as *a priori* is called transcendental, this implies that it is possible to recognize the *a priori* in the transcendental mode of knowledge. The transcendental object as a mode of knowledge, whether intuition or concept, is nevertheless not concerned with the *a priori* object, but with our mode of

knowing, of recognizing the object *a priori*. In other words, the field where the *a priori* emerges as a possibility is transcendental knowledge. Because of this complementary relation between the transcendental and the *a priori*, the subject-object dichotomy is overcome. For the *a priori* knowledge of the subject is not knowledge of the object, but transcendental knowledge as the knowledge of knowing the object. This shows that the subject is not preoccupied with an object in opposition to itself, but with the manner in which its agency, which transforms the object within its own structure of knowing, is realized. Therefore, oppositions such as subjective-objective, object-concept, or possible-actual are resolved within the field of transcendental agency.

Although Cohen acknowledges the value of the doctrine of transcendental aesthetics, he assigns the subject's act of synthesis entirely to transcendental logic. According to this interpretation, the act of synthesis, which provides the synthetic connection of appearances, is not included in transcendental aesthetics. Transcendental aesthetics is complemented by transcendental logic, but the act of synthesis, the most important unfolding of critique, is located only in transcendental logic as a synthesis of concepts. That is, the doctrine of transcendental aesthetics has no independent meaning in terms of the principles of knowledge. The Kantian doctrine of sensibility is meaningful because of the complementary movement toward transcendental logic. The doctrine of transcendental logic should be taken as the complement and executor of the doctrine of sensibility. For space and time only acquire meaning if they are connected to a possible experience. A possible experience is realized under the execution of categories.

Kant grounds the condition of the givenness of the object on its being related to possible or actual experience. This implies that the *a priori* forms of sensibility are

meaningless unless they are united with the pure forms of the faculty of understanding that execute the synthesis of phenomena. There is no interpretation here that doctrinaire Kantianism can object to. However, there is a sense in which Cohen assigns the interpretation to such an emphasis. And that is that the doctrine of space-time does not make sense on its own. The doctrine of sensibility is not a separate and independent part of the Kantian system, but a precondition that is completed and given meaning by the doctrine of logic. Based on Kant, Cohen emphasizes that the pure forms of intuition would be a fantasy if they were not combined with the pure forms of the faculty of understanding.

According to Cohen, the possibility of synthetic propositions is based on synthetic unity, and this synthetic unity is the category. Categories are determined as the root concepts of the faculty of understanding. However, these root concepts then deepen as forms of experience. In this context, the task of transcendental logic is to prove the possibility of judgments of experience. Just as space and time do not exist in sensations themselves, but rather are inserted from the subject into appearances, so the forms of connection in all judgments are fundamentally created concepts, that is, *a priori* forms of thinking. The objective validity of judgment is founded first and foremost on the concept of pure understanding. The meaning of pure understanding is unity in judgments.

So how does Cohen interpret transcendental deduction, one of the pillars of Heidegger's ontological interpretation? According to him, it is the task of transcendental deduction to prove the correspondence between the elements of knowledge. Cohen argues that what constitutes the content of transcendental deduction is the return to the unity of consciousness and the demonstration of the process of knowledge, of the series of appearances, as a totality of experience.

It can be said that the main point of Cohen's interpretation of deduction and categories is about apperception. The a-priority of categories is essentially the synthetic unity of apperception, the unity of consciousness, which is the basis of the unity in the object. Just as space is the form of outer intuition and time is the form of inner intuition, transcendental apperception is the form of categories. In this context, the transcendental condition under which we produce the pure concepts of understanding is self-consciousness. Synthetic unity is the form that is the common basis of all the individual kinds of unities conceived in categories. Thus the objective unity of self-consciousness consists of the synthetic unity of representations under the category.

Although Cohen's interpretation of Kant that emerged in the CTE diverged somewhat from the radical approach in the "LRE", it laid the foundations for the epistemological and scientific interpretation of Neo-Kantianism in terms of its focus. It clarified the concept of *a priori* and dealt with the essential character of the transcendental on a new basis.

Let us now try to summarize Cohen's radical interpretation in his work "LRE" based on the foundation laid in KTE. The reason we prefer the term radical here is that Cohen radically rejects the Kantian dichotomy of intuition and thinking and reduces this dichotomy to the monism of thinking.

According to Cohen, logic is the logic of a system of philosophy. It is logic as the logic of pure knowledge that gives philosophy its systematic unity. The method of logic is based on pure thinking. However, according to Cohen, pure thinking does not refer to the purely formal. Pure thinking also produces its own content. In this context, pure thinking is formulated not as a coincide with the given object, but as the power that produces the given object itself.

Kant's metaphysics is based on Newton's system of principles. Consequently, according to Cohen, Kant's metaphysics is based on the system of nature.

The section on transcendental logic constitutes the positive side of the CPR as the grounding of the mathematical natural sciences. However, the prioritization of the doctrine of sensibility over the doctrine of logic is a major mistake. The reason that led Kant to this mistake was his opportunist position against English empiricism and Leibniz's legacy of a weak doctrine of sensibility. According to Cohen, treating the doctrine of sensibility as prioritizing the doctrine of logic causes inner damage to thinking. To conceive of intuition in the context of knowledge in a *prioritizing* position implies the inclusion of a foreign element in thinking. Cohen therefore firmly rejects the prioritization of logic by the doctrine of sensibility. Thinking has no origin outside itself. If such an origin is assumed, the independence of the thinking element is undermined.

According to Cohen, thinking is synthesis and synthesis is the synthesis of unity. The fatal mistake in the Kantian system is to assume a multiplicity in the act of synthesis that is not created by thinking but given to it.

The roots of the basic orientation of neo-Kantian radicalism are clearly visible in Cohen's determinations. The first point to note concerns the determination of being "pure". The division of "purity" (Reinheit) or purity between the elements of sensibility and thinking is considered an advance misdetermination that contradicts the essence of purity. In this sense, purity is primarily made immanent to the thinking element in an absolute sense. Pure knowledge, according to Cohen, is not empty content. Otherwise, it would be pure meaningless. The factor of sensibility, which we assume to be at work in the knowledge of the object, is the empirical result of the determining and constitutive activity of pure thinking. In other words, sensibility is

not at the starting point of the movement of knowledge, but at the end point.

Therefore, it does not have the origin of purity.

The approach of Cohen's interpretation presented here is the essence of Neo-Kantian radicalism. The term radicalism is used here because Neo-Kantianism's fundamental rejection of the Kantian doctrine of sensibility is made the methodology of the interpretation. This methodology basically grounds itself in attributing the right of representation of the concept of purity to thinking as absolute. Purity is formulated essentially as the negation of intuitive givenness. Moreover, givenness is the facticity of experience, and this facticity is intrinsically unified with the determination of the thinking element. The produced content of intuition is already the external correspondent of this unity. For intuition or sensibility cannot be from the beginning or as already pure. Cohen tries to justify the reason for the negation of the purity of intuition not from intuition but from thinking. Purity as a common quality attributed to intuition and thinking is transformed into a tension through the assumption of the primordial purity of thinking, and the tension is resolved in the name of thinking by the principle of the primacy of the determining power of thinking. The guiding pure principles of mathematical natural science are brought into absolute correspondence with the Kantian elements of pure thinking, the categories. In this way, the provisional and complex nature of intuition is clarified relative to the principles of pure thinking. Let us now turn to Paul Natorp's interpretation. First of all, it should be noted that Natorp's interpretation parallels Cohen's interpretation and repeats the same radicalism. Natorp's article "Kant and the Marburg School" reveals a manner characteristic of Neo-Kantianism.

Stating that it is self-evident that there is a contentual consensus among the Neo-Kantians, Natorp identifies the "transcendental method" as the central point of Neo-Kantian interpretation.

According to Natorp, the transcendental method as an immanent method establishes the law of objective formation and does not seek this lawfulness outside the field of objective formation.

According to Natorp, thinking in Kant emerges as a function, an action and as a production from the basis of infinity, that is, spontaneity. The faculty of understanding is not only the interpreter of nature but also the creator of nature as a legislative function. Natorp's thoughts so far summarize the common basis of Neo-Kantian thought. The emphasis is on the determination of Kantian criticism as a transcendental method. This indicates that criticism is basically a method that emerges in the way the object is known. Kantian philosophy provides an objective construction of humanity's collective sphere of thought and culture, and through this it investigates the laws of universal reason.

But the specific point of Neo-Kantianism's Kant interpretation is, of course, the relation between intuition and thought. Natorp states that at the very beginning of the Critique, an old difficulty was encountered. According to Natorp, this difficulty arises from the opposition of intuition, which is a special type of givenness on the side of the object and receptivity for the subject, to spontaneity. According to him, this dualism in the context of knowledge means losing sight of the main idea of the transcendental method. In order to remove this dualism from the transcendental method, subjective receptivity and the givenness of sensation as the material of knowledge must also be suspended.

For Natorp, space and time are not sensible givennesses. Natorp argues that there is no givenness in spatial and temporal organization. For him, being given refers to being determined and is the act of thinking. Because for him, to think is to determine. Factuality, which is revealed through the determinateness of the object, can be realized through thinking. "Givenness" itself is the problem of thinking.

Natorp refers to Kant's footnote in Chapter 26 of his inquiry into transcendental deduction in the second edition of the CPR. There Kant states that the faculty of understanding determines sensibility and it is through it that space and time are first given. According to Natorp, the systematic location of this functioning of the faculty of understanding as determining intuition is the modal category of actuality (*Modalitätskategorie der Wirklichkeit*). This category does not mean the result of knowledge, but only the condition of the possibility of experience. Thus, intuition is not found as a factor foreign to and opposed to thinking.

According to Natorp, the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, which is determined as the perceptual positioning of the particular object, and the synthesis of reproduction in imagination attain their final meaning in the synthesis of recognition in concept. What contextualizes the presence of the particular object in the process of perception is that absolute identity, that is, the determining thinking, encompasses them backward. That is to say, the intuitive phases that initially appear to be independent, as apprehension in intuition and reproduction in imagination, acquire meaning through the overarching function of the determining act of recognition. According to Natorp, in this context the distinctive character of intuition and sensation does not vanish. Only their being the second factor of knowledge disappears. The structure of intuition as alien to, independent of, and dominant over thought comes to an end. Intuitive givenness expresses the determination of experience and thus the

determination of thinking. Therefore, what is given outside the determination of thinking (in intuition) is not what is actually given. It is the hypothesis set by thinking. The main motivation for this idea, which emerged as a radical rejection of Kantian subjectivity, is to draw a sharp distinction between transcendental idealism and psychologism. Natorp thinks that at the level of knowledge, the object is revealed as the ultimate limit. In other words, there is no level that goes beyond the object in the context of knowledge. The construction of an objective field of knowledge leaves subjectivity behind and results in a dissolution of subjectivity. Because subjectivity is the subject of psychology. The underlying assumption here is that any type of object relation prioritizes the subject relation.

Considering Natorp's text, it can be said that it is a characteristic example of Neo-Kantianism. Natorp first of all expels intuition from the Kantian context of knowledge and does so through the rejection of givenness. He considers that Kant's philosophy can be placed on the proper axis by shifting the equation of intuition and the faculty of understanding in favor of the faculty of understanding. He goes so far as to say that the relation between sensibility and thinking is a dogma inherited from Kant's professorial dissertation and transcendental aesthetics. It is clear from Natorp's approach to the thought that intuitive givenness and subjective receptivity have no place in the construction of objective knowledge. When the structure of knowledge is taken into account, introducing the element of intuition means that human knowledge is handled in terms of an element that is foreign and external to it. If the determination is only an act of thinking, there is no intuitive givenness that precedes it. For the object is not yet determined in this givenness. In this context, the givenness of the object is canceled and intuitive givenness acquires an epistemic meaning through the determination that comes from thinking. As a natural consequence, this interpretation

transforms space and time, which are forms of intuition, into categorical hypotheses of thinking. The only basis that Neo-Kantians find for this approach from Kant is Kant's statement in the second edition of the CPR that thinking determines intuition.

It seems that the Neo-Kantian approach, which makes psychologism and subjectivity identical, sacrifices Kantian subjectivity in the name of this identity. Therefore, intuition, which immediately relates knowledge to the object, is bracketed. The subject's construction of the object of knowledge is tied to the category of determination, and thus the subject is placed under the object-determining power of thinking. Here, a hierarchical relation between thinking and intuition is assumed and thinking is made superior to intuition in this relation. In this way, the epistemic object is grounded not as a construction process that begins with the element of intuition, but in the field of determination provided by thinking, which is superior to intuition. Space and time are thus transformed as fundamental hypotheses of thinking into categories that are projected from determinative thinking toward the object.

But given both Cohen's and Natorp's interpretation, can the element of intuition be rejected in the doctrine of pure reason? Or can the CPR's shift from subjective to objective deduction give legitimacy to the radical interpretation of Neo-Kantianism? Is the formulation of pure intuition really a fundamental error of the Kantian system? On the other hand, does the priority given to the element of intuition in terms of givenness and purity harm the independence and inner structure of the element of thinking?

The first point to consider is the following: Does Kantian dualism offer us the possibility that the elements of intuition and thinking can be subject to a relation of primacy and posteriority, or that a philosophical preference can be made towards one of these elements? Kant explicitly declared that one of these elements cannot be

preferred to the other and that the coalition of the two elements is necessary for the formation of knowledge. However, the mediation of objectivity, that is, the knowledge of nature as the knowledge of the object of experience, and the factor of the faculty of understanding that dictates laws to nature, gives us the possibility to prioritize knowledge of the object. Subjectivity, which constructs the object of experience, carries itself into the objective field. The objective field is revealed on the basis of the operation of universal and necessary principles. It is scientific *Dasein* that operates in the field revealed on the basis of these principles. It is precisely for this reason that Cohen and Neo-Kantianism consider Kantian dualism not as a fundamental cause, but as a means left behind by objectivity, which is the conclusion of this dualism. In such a way that the knowledge of experience established as knowledge of the object retrospectively cancels subjectivity. This cancellation reveals that the factor of sensibility, which is assumed to be in the initial movement of knowledge, is in fact not in the beginning but only in the end. According to Neo-Kantianism, what we see in experience is the content of experience created by subjectivity. The element that realizes this is the faculty of understanding, the element of pure thinking. This is because sensibility only emerges when the content is formed, i.e. it is an appearance that is added to it later, not at the beginning. Of course, in Cohen and Neo-Kantianism the influence of ancient metaphysics and ontology towards the element of sensibility is evident. Sensibility is provisional and confused. Therefore, purity cannot be attributed to it. It is only *ratio* that is pure.

But is it possible that purity cannot be intuitive, or that the rejection of pure intuition is possible in Kantian philosophy and especially in the CPR? Is not this radical rejection of the element of pure intuition by Neo-Kantianism a violence of interpretation or a distortion of Kantian thought? Neo-Kantianism can only justify this

by bringing forward the second edition of the CPR. It is clear that transcendental deduction as the inquiry of the objective reality of categories is reformulated in the second edition in favor of the faculty of understanding. But does this reformulation justify the removal of space and time from being pure intuition and their transformation into modal categories? Heidegger stated that Kant's statement that space and time exist *a priori* in the mind potentially carries the danger of treating them as categories. Neo-Kantianism seems to have exploited this potential danger on behalf of the Kantian representation of scientific *Dasein*. The deduction is shifted from subjective sources to the objective sphere, that is, to the faculty of understanding. What is given is the content of experience, and this content actively exhibits its unfolding towards nature through the principles residing in the element of pure thinking. This content is imbued with an antecedent pure unfolding of categories as content. If space and time are creative functions added to the content, their retrospective, i.e. subject-oriented, analysis shows that their source is also the categories of pure thinking. Because reality as content is the result of the category of pure reality, and if reality appears as the realization of space and time, then their originary background must be rooted in this category.

As a clear example of the basic approach of Neo-Kantianism, Cassirer's criticism of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is also important. Our study has already presented Cassirer's criticism in detail in the previous section. Here we will only touch upon the critical points of Cassirer's criticism.

The first point Cassirer emphasizes is the minimum common context of Neo-Kantianism. The known representatives of Neo-Kantianism agree on this point: The focal point of Kant's system is the doctrine of knowledge, i.e. epistemology.

The second point Cassirer criticizes Heidegger on is the issue of the finitude of human knowledge. Kant's usage of receptive human knowledge as being relative to *intuitus originarius* requires that this opposition be understood not as an absolutization of the finitude of human knowledge, but as a limiting concept against the assumptions of sensibility. For Cassirer, however, this is the starting point of the problematic content of his interpretation of Heidegger. According to Cassirer, tying the Kantian formulation of human knowledge to intuitive givenness as a central point of departure would necessarily confine all subsequent interpretation to this point, which is what Heidegger does. However, Cassirer points out that Kant does not stop at the "receptivity of intuition". On the one hand, the "spontaneity of the faculty of understanding" is also firmly established in Kantian criticism. That is, the faculty of understanding is to be understood not as a refutation or abolition of the finite character of human knowledge, but as a particular characteristic of it.

Cassirer here responds symmetrically to a fundamental accusation of Heidegger's Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant. Heidegger accuses Neo-Kantianism's interpretation of Kant of favoring the faculty of understanding and diminishing the significance of intuition. Cassirer implies that Heidegger's approach emphasizes intuition and diminishes the significance of the faculty of understanding. On the other hand, Cassirer states that the doctrine of the imagination cannot be understood without Kantian dualism. We must distinguish between the "sensible" and the "intelligible" world, between "experience" and "idea", between "phenomenon" and "noumenon". For it is only from this dualistic perspective that the Kantian problem of the finitude of knowledge can acquire its full meaning.

The limitation of the faculty of understanding indicates its true, creative power. The fact that the faculty of understanding is related to intuition does not mean that the

faculty of understanding is at the service of intuition and works under its subordination, as Heidegger's basic thesis suggests. On the contrary, this relation is the positive force that produces all determinations and forms of intuition. It is the synthesis of the faculty of understanding that makes it possible for intuition to relate to an object and gives it a determinacy. The "objectness" (Gegenständlichkeit) attributed to knowledge is always an exercise of spontaneity, not receptivity. These views put forward by Cassirer are the basic approach of Neo-Kantianism. The existence of intuition as determined is realized through the activity of the faculty of understanding. Because there is no determination in intuition itself. Therefore, Neo-Kantianism considers the intuitive givenness of the object to be *pseudo* in itself and thinks that through the creativity of the determination directed from thought towards it, the intuitive givenness is made the object of knowledge. Formally, therefore, time is contextualized and "meaningful" through the determination of thinking. Cassirer states that the issue becomes even sharper when we move from transcendental analytic to transcendental dialectics. In the context opened by transcendental dialectics, we are now confronted with the idea of the unconditioned. And when it comes to the ideas of reason, there is neither imagination nor schematism. For Cassirer, this ground ultimately means that the spell of "receptivity" is broken.

On the other hand, when we move into the realm of practical reason, we encounter a different context. Because with the "unconditional" context of the idea of freedom, one steps into the pure "intelligible", supersensible and timeless. Cassirer reinforces this change of relation, which is valid as far as the practical sphere is concerned, with a quotation from CPR B 431. Kant states that in the use of pure reason we are *a priori* law-giving (gesetzgebend) subjects in terms of our existence,

and that the spontaneity that emerges from this position determines our actuality (wirklichkeit) without the need for the conditions of empirical intuition. Our sensible existence is thus determined in relation to the intelligible world (Intelligible Welt). It is quite clear what Cassirer wants to say here against Heidegger. There is no intuition, imagination, or schema, i.e. temporal determination, at the stage where we can determine our existence solely by the law we set ourselves. This is because the unconditionality of the moral law elevates the subject above mere phenomenal being and engages it in an entirely different order by moving it to a center of its own. Cassirer thus comes to his main criticism of Heidegger's interpretation by showing our existence transcending the sensible and temporal condition in the context of dualism and the idea of freedom in Kantian thought. Heidegger links all faculties of knowledge to the transcendental imagination and traces them by going back to the transcendental imagination. He thus remains only in the given relation of temporal *Dasein*. The difference between phenomenon and noumenon is blurred and flattened, so that all existence is tied to the field of time and finitude. According to Cassirer, this approach means the collapse of the pillars on which Kant's thought is based. Kant did not present such a monism of the imagination within his system, but rather insisted on a radical and specific dualism, a dualism of the sensible and the intelligible. According to Cassirer, the systematic meaning and significance of the section on schematism cannot be denied, but the doctrines of schematism and transcendental imagination are not the focus of the Kantian system. The system is determined and completed in the transcendental dialectic in continuity and moreover in the "CPrR" and "CJ".

In this context, Cassirer argues that Heidegger's interpretation exposes a paradox. For Heidegger, it is a great misconception to treat Kant's philosophy as a

"doctrine of experience". However, Cassirer argues that schematism and the doctrine of transcendental imagination are not the appropriate place to prove this thesis. Because, according to him, this doctrine is not a component of Kantian metaphysics, but a real and necessary element of the doctrine of experience. Schematism and imagination do not deal directly and fundamentally with Human *Dasein*, but with the conditions, quality and constitution of the empirical object. Therefore, Cassirer considers that schematism belongs essentially to the phenomenology of the object, not to the subject. Cassirer argues that the doctrine of schematism belongs to the epistemology that Heidegger rejects. According to him, despite all his care and attention, Heidegger compressed his complete analysis of Kant into a single point. So what inner connection does this whole interpretation of Neo-Kantianism have with Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica*? As the primary metaphysics, *prote metaphysica* refers not to a context in which an epistemological representation can be essentialized, but to the primordial plane of knowledge that makes something like epistemology itself possible. Neo-Kantianism suspended Kantian subjectivity through the mediation of objectivity against the danger of psychologism. By utilizing the transcendental concept of Kantian criticism, the Neo-Kantians have seen the surpassing of the subject-object plane in the dimension emerging from the objective determination of nature. The concept of the transcendental expresses the dual relation of the subject to the object. The subject thinks that the object stands in front of it in its own existence. However, its relation to the object is not realized through this in-itselfness. What it relates to is the mode of knowing the object. So transcendental cognition is the subject knowing how to know the object. In this sense, the object is revealed both by the subject's *a priori* mode of cognition and by a mode of being that is independent of the subject. Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* coincides subject

and object in the mode of cognition of subjectivity. But does this mean that the subject only knows the object as a representation in its own mind? This does not seem possible in terms of *prote metaphysica*. Because Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* presents the positive and negative whatness of the object in the context of possible experience. The positive whatness of the object shows how knowledge of the object operates in the field of experience through its whatness. That is, the object representation of subjectivity realizes in the field of experience as nature and functions as the constructive element of the human collective world. Neo-Kantians interpreted these constructive elements as the object of scientific knowledge and thought that Kantian criticism constituted the pure foundation of this object of scientific knowledge. The negative whatness of the object is that the object's being-in-itself is inaccessible to subjectivity. That is to say, the ultimate limit of subjectivity's access is exhausted in the being-in-itself of the object.

In Kantian criticism, the discovery of the pre-experiential conditions of the forms of subjectivity also gave the how-ness of the relation to the object. The relation to the object is subject to the purely formal conditions of subjectivity. This subordination has closed the ontological homogeneity of the object to the subject. The object cannot have a pure, ontology in itself in the face of the subject. Thus, the object field cannot contain an ontological method beyond the conditions of appearing to the subject. This is the epistemological condition that Kantian criticism provides for the object field. And any method in which this condition is a premise will emerge as an epistemological method research. No matter how much the sciences determine or investigate it, a chemical element does not have a homogeneous, in itself, pure ontology vis-à-vis the subject. This all-object investigation of the sciences opens up the possibilities of different epistemological methods under the pressure of this

condition. The Neo-Kantian interpretation tried to deepen this context. They set the epistemological condition that *prote metaphysica* sets for the object field as the absolute point of Kantian interpretation.

But does Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* allow the Neo-Kantians to eliminate the element of intuition? Here again, the shifting of position based dynamic movement of *prote metaphysica* comes into play. This dynamic movement is based on the following. Kant says that all our knowledge begins with experience. This statement is a bracketing of the Kantian critique on the classical rationalist view's linking the relation between experience and knowledge to the field of ratio in terms of realization and origin. It is only in the field of experience that the actualization of knowledge at work can be revealed. Leaving aside the question of origin, realization cannot be assumed in a field outside of experience. This is Kant's preemptive step against school metaphysics and logic and the Leibnizian-Wollfian tradition he left behind. However, Kant goes on to add that although all knowledge begins with experience, this does not imply that all knowledge emerges from experience. This is the second bracketing of the Kantian critique on the classical empiricist view's reduction of the relation between experience and knowledge to the field of experience in terms of origin and formation. Knowledge can be not only a raw material transferred to human beings from the field of experience, but also a synthesis that this process of transfer itself constructs through the human being's interaction with the forms it reflects. This is based on the premise that human beings necessarily transfer to the field of experience a form that does not emerge from the field of experience. And this has led Neo-Kantianism to take Kantian criticism, which takes a unique position between rational dogmatism and empirical skepticism, on the basis of the concept of experience.

However, according to them, the object of experience is formed by the creative activity of the faculty of understanding. It does not seem possible to argue that there is a possibility to eliminate the element of intuition in Kantian critique. However, Kantian critique as *prote metaphysica* also offers the possibility of treating the faculty of understanding, which is legislative vis-à-vis nature, as the fundamental basis of experience. For example, does pure intuition have laws? Does pure intuition give us organizing rules in the lawfulness we dictate to nature? Of course not. Pure intuition is the primary structurality of relating to things. That is, it is the formality of our receptivity that precedes objects. Our primordial reception of objects under spatial and temporal forms does not give us their legislative connections, but rather it is how the conditions of their first appearance to subjectivity. This is the point that the neo-Kantians exploit. This is actually related to the call to "return to Kant", which is the opening motto of Neo-Kantianism. But in what context and in what manner has this call to return to Kant emerged? Indeed, one might ask why go back to Kant a century later. In what direction and manner should the content and meaning of this return take place? The main point here concerns the inner movement of the history of philosophy. German idealism and Hegelianism, which emerged after Kant and were the pinnacle of philosophical speculation, reached the last possible limit and began to lose their influence. The loss of this influence is of course related to the development of the positive sciences. The tremendous development in fields such as physiology, psychology, physics and chemistry has brought philosophy back to a position of being ashamed in the face of the sciences. The category of truth is no longer the object of philosophical speculation but of the sciences. It is precisely at such a historical stage that the call to "go back to Kant" should make sense. This call indicates that only through Kant can philosophy, which has regressed in the face of the sciences, be put

back on a solid ground. This is because the main cause of Kantian criticism is to re-establish metaphysics as a solid field of knowledge. It is precisely for this reason that the Neo-Kantians believed that the possibility of reconciliation between philosophy and the natural sciences could be re-established on the basis of pure Kantian principles. This is the motivation for their interpretation of Kant as the epistemological foundation of the mathematical natural sciences.

Interestingly, Kantian critique as *prote metaphysica* presents the epistemological relation to be established with the positive sciences as a possibility in itself. Synthetic *a priori* cognition as the constructive basis of experience is exemplified through mathematics and physical science. And the condition that metaphysics does not exceed the limits of possible experience is tied to the what-ness and how-ness of this cognition.

The Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant emphasized the factor of the faculty of understanding as the source of synthetic principles in Kantian critique for the sake of the relation of correspondence between sciences and philosophy, and as a natural consequence of this emphasis, they interpreted the doctrine of sensibility not as an independent structure of subjectivity, but as a tool left behind by the subjectivity that established the field of objective experience. That is to say, sensibility is not the beginning of the cognition process, but rather it is coded as a temporary phase that is contextualized by the cognition process established by the principles of the pure faculty of understanding and is deactivated by the determination of the faculty of understanding.

Before we set out what Kantian critique as *prote metaphysica* means, we would like to open a parenthesis and quote the following from Nicolai Hartmann's "German Idealism" in the chapter "Kantians and Anti-Kantians":

“If one does not take into account the transcendental character of Kantian idealism, which belongs not to the empirical singular subject but to 'consciousness in general', if one ignores Kant's emphasis on the preservation of 'empirical realism' as the natural and inevitable standpoint of the singular subject, and if one fails to come to a profound grasp of the peculiar relation of mutual conditionality and mutual complementarity in which the CPR brings the two standpoints together, then Kant's position on what the central standpoint is will necessarily seem ambiguous” (Hartmann, 1960, 26).

Hartmann's determination clearly reveals the whatness of Kantian critique as *prote metaphysica*. *Prote metaphysica* simultaneously contains the natural and inevitable existence of the individual subject and the transcendental character of consciousness in general. Moreover, these two points complement each other with their mutual conditionality and contain a specific relation of this completion. Kantian critique as *prote metaphysica* reveals the transcendental epistemological condition of consciousness and the ontological whatness of the singular subject in a complementary relation.

This study considers Kant's philosophy as neither an ontology nor an epistemology. It is a metaphysics of method from which both epistemological and ontological procedures can be derived. But doesn't this seem to express a vulgar view that Kantian critique is both ontology and epistemology? On the other hand, what does this study aim at by purging the term *prote philosophia* from its historical content and calling for help only formally? Can it be considered a contradiction to call for help the term *prote philosophia*, which has already historically become metaphysics after a

period of time? When the primary philosophy is already metaphysics, what does it mean to be the primary metaphysics?

Kantian critique as *prote metaphysica* does not claim that Kantian philosophy is both an ontology and an epistemology. On the contrary, it claims that it contains the inner possibility of ontology or epistemology centered approaches. Therefore, *prote metaphysica* means subjectivity with object inclusion. The being of beings overlaps with subjective sensibility and the whatness of the conditions of subjective thinking. Subjectivity realizes its ontological structural totality through the possibility of experience it constructs in the objective field.

On the other hand, the subject stands as an ontology against the object with the conditions it possesses in itself. More precisely, subjectivity is positioned as an ontological center that includes both the conditions of the whatness of knowledge and the object it constructs according to these conditions. While this is where the accusation of a retreat into the philosophy of subjectivity that is leveled against Kantian critique rests, this is not a world and a field of objects that is imprisoned in the representation of subjectivity. Kantian critique shifted the classical mode of the subject-object equation by recalling the ontological point of departure back to the subject. This recall was realized not by contextualizing the subject, as classical philosophy did, but by discovering the subject in its pre-contentual formality and in the conditions of this formality that are independent of experience. In other words, Kantian critique as *prote metaphysica* is a preliminary metaphysics as the provider of the possibility of positioning subjectivity as an ontological center. Regarding this very determination, Heidegger interprets it as follows:

"The *Critique of Pure Reason*, however, gives no "system" of transcendental philosophy, but rather it is "a treatise on method. " In this context, however, that does not signify a doctrine concerning the technique for proceeding. It signifies instead the working out of a complete determination of the "whole contour" and the "whole internal, articular structure" of ontology. In this laying of the ground for metaphysics as projection of the inner possibility of ontology, the "complete sketch of a system of metaphysics is drawn." (Heidegger, 1997-1, 11).

In terms of the concluding thesis we want to develop, Heidegger's emphasis is on the idea that the critique as *prote metaphysica* also contains the inner possibility of ontology. Here, the point of departure from which ontological procedures can be derived from *prote metaphysica* is that it allows subjectivity as a homogeneous ontology to be made the point of departure for investigation.

Kantian criticism includes the whatness of the subject, the whatness of knowledge and the whatness of the object. It dialectically connects these ingredients through certain limitations and through certain pure formal subjective discoveries. For example, the condition of the object's whatness and the limit imposed by this condition (thing-in-itself) correspond to a condition simultaneously contained in the subject's whatness and the limit imposed by this condition. His discoveries on the whatness of knowledge overlap with the constitutive pure forms of subjectivity, but these overlaps also have distinctions that can be treated separately from each other. In this way, any investigation that will develop in the contexts of subject-knowledge-object will have the possibility of progressing with the orientations produced by a dialectical mode of relation created by conditions and boundaries and will gain an

epistemological or ontological direction according to the point where it initiates the investigation. Kant's discovery of the pure formality of subjectivity is a great discovery in terms of method. For thanks to this discovery, every inquiry has acquired the consciousness of the condition of reflecting on the forms of orientation before determining the object to be oriented towards.

Kantian critique as *prote metaphysica* is the inner possibility of ontological orientation. For *prote metaphysica* points out that the being structure of the subjectivity of the subject is the basis for the relation to beings as the field of nature. That is, the being structure of subjectivity established on the grounds of sensibility and thinking emerges as the holistic inner possibility of determining beings as beings. On the other hand, *prote metaphysica* establishes the objective field of experience in the dimension opened by the transcendental mode of cognition. This field provides the phenomenology of the object of knowledge and the epistemological conditions of subjectivity in the field of experience. *Prote metaphysica* does not imply a separation of the subject from the object, but rather a correspondence with the epistemological conditions that the subject projects onto objects. In this respect, as it exhibits the ontological inner possibility that ensures the identity of subjective faculties with being, it also contains the epistemological correspondence in the field of the object of knowledge and possible experience as a possibility. Therefore, *prote metaphysica* does not represent a context in which an ontological or epistemological representation can be made an essence or center, but rather as a primary metaphysics that fundamentally contains the inner possibility of ontology and epistemology and in this sense precedes both.

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Appendix A: Abbreviations

- *CPR* – Critique of Pure reason
- *CPrR* – Critique of Practical Reason
- *KPM* – Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
- *KTE* – Kants Theorie Der Erfahrung
- *LRE* – Logik Der Reinen Erkenntniss
- *B&T* – Being and Time

