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**THE NEW TERRORISM AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY'S SECURITY**

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***To Sublime Martyrs who has died while serving the integrity of the Turkish
State***



I certify that I have read this thesis and I have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.



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ABSTRACT

THE NEW TERRORISM AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY

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This thesis analyzes the consequences of the American National Security Strategy, carried out as part of the post September 11 'war on terrorism', in terms of Turkey's security. Whether the reasons or aims of a declaration of war on terrorism are right or not, the reality is that the U.S. has made important steps with significant implications for the whole world as well as for Turkey. Terrorism, which has changed some of its features by the help of elements of globalization, hit the U.S. The U.S. perceived that fighting against terrorism could not be successful by traditional retaliation as had been done by the U.S. before September 11. This new enemy required a new plan, and therefore, a new security strategy began to be carried out. Undoubtedly, Turkey has been affected by the NSS of the U.S., due not only to her geographic position that is next to the Middle East chosen as a target place by the U.S. but also to her close relationship with the U.S. the America's new strategy has forced Turkey to reevaluate her security priorities and threat perceptions that have been shaped by the end of Cold War. In the assessment, it is seen that the new American NSS has increased Turkey's security anxieties.

Keywords: Turkey's Security, American National Security Strategy, New Terrorism, Greater Middle East , Threats for Turkey.

ÖZET

YENİ TERÖRİZM VE AMERİKAN ULUSAL GÜVENLİK STRATEJİSİ: TÜRKİYE’NİN GÜVENLİĞİ İÇİN SONUÇLARI

TÜRE, NAİL

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tezde, 11 Eylül saldırılarından sonra uygulamaya başlanan Amerikan Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisinin Türkiye’nin güvenliği açısından ortaya çıkardığı sonuçlar incelenmektedir. Teröre karşı ilan edilen savaşın sebepleri veya amaçları haklı olsun veya olmasın, Amerika’nın tüm dünya ve özellikle de Türkiye için önemli sonuçlar doğuran adımlar atmaya başladığı gerçeği ortadadır. Küreselleşmenin yardımıyla bazı özellikleri değişen terörizm Amerika’yı vurmuştur. Bu saldırılarla Amerika , 11 Eylül saldırılarına kadar başvurduğu klasik misilleme yöntemi ile teröre karşı savaşın başarılı olamayacağını anlamıştır. Yeni düşman yeni bir plan gerektirdiğinden yeni güvenlik stratejisi uygulanmaya başlanmıştır. Hiç şüphesiz Türkiye, hem hedef olarak seçilen Orta Doğu’ya komşu olan coğrafi konumu, hem de Amerika ile yakın ilişkileri nedeniyle bu yeni güvenlik stratejisinden etkilenmektedir. Bu strateji Türkiye’yi, soğuk savaşın bitmesiyle şekillenen güvenlik önceliklerini ve tehdit algılamalarını yeniden değerlendirmeye zorlamıştır. Değerlendirmede, stratejinin Türkiye’nin güvenlik endişelerini arttırdığı görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye’nin Güvenliği, Amerikan Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi, Yeni Terörizm, Büyük Orta Doğu, Türkiye için Tehditler.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BLACKSEAFOR	Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force
CBRN	Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GME	Greater Middle East
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IFOR	Implementation Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KADEK	Kongreya Azad-ü Demokrasiya Kurdistan / Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MC	Military Committee
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPFSEE	Multinational Peace Force South East Europe
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear Biological Chemical
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan / Kurdish Workers' Party
PLO	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review Report
SEECF	South-East European Coordination Process
SFOR	Stabilization Force
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
U.S.C.	United States' Constitution
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destructions
WTC	World Trade Center

CHAPTER I:

INTRODUCTION

There are many debates about whether the current United States (U.S.) policy is right or not, and discussions about the sincerity of the U.S. concerning the fight against terrorism. Whether one agrees with it or not, there is a reality that the U.S. launched her new National Security Strategy (NSS) under the name of the ‘war against terrorism’. The entire world system is affected by this war. Since Turkey certainly has been affected by this era in world politics, it is important to try and understand what kinds of outcomes have emerged for Turkey’s security as a result of the new NSS of the U.S. This thesis analyses the effects of the NSS of the U.S. on the security of Turkey.

This study argues that the implementation of the American NSS in the Middle East, and especially in Iraq, has increased Turkey’s security anxieties. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has concentrated on the south in terms of her security, because threats to Turkey’s integrity have tended to come from the south, not north. After the realization of the American NSS, some of these threats became to be felt more intensely. The main aim of this study is to be able to clarify which threats emerged with the new situation.

In addition, in order to support and better analyze the issue, this thesis will initially attempt to provide answers to the following questions: How has ‘new

terrorism' differed from classical terrorism and assumed the character of a non-state actor after the Cold War? What kinds of changes have taken place in American foreign and security policies after the September 11 attacks? What are the main elements of the new American NSS? What are the security policies and threat perceptions of Turkey after the Cold War?

The September 11 attacks, targeting the homeland of the U.S., shocked the entire world. It was a phenomenon, which nobody had dared to attempt since the Pearl Harbor assault. In nearly all assessments made after the September 11 attacks, the concept of 'new terrorism' can easily be seen. Indeed, the concept of 'new terror', emerged with the end of the Cold War, had already existed but it became 'popular' with September 11. Many evaluations about 'new terrorism' have been made before and after September 11, some going so far as to perceive the attacks as a 'polar' capable of balancing the unipolar international system after the Cold War. In the attacks of September 11, all characteristics of 'new terrorism' can be seen; moreover there is a challenge to the hegemon. Chapter II clarifies the characteristics of 'new terrorism' as a starting point, igniting a to new world order, and explores these features seen in the events of the September 11.

The U.S., as the only superpower in the post-Cold War era, felt obliged to take action because on the one hand her public was distressed on the other hand her superpower image was damaged. A big blow had been received and revenge had to be taken. At this point, President Bush declared the war against terrorism and the world was divided between 'others' and 'US'. This declaration of war necessitated a new plan and a new strategy. The U.S. gave up its method of retaliation, which had been used by previous presidents as a tool of war against terrorism. The new NSS of the U.S. was now put into action. The main parameters of the strategy are based on

realistic foundations. They clearly indicate to paces of the U.S. carried out today and in the future. Considering that a superpower is unlikely to bluff about such a serious security issues, it is not so difficult to say 'the world will be never same again'. In addition, turning towards the Middle East, the Iraq case proved that the U.S. is very serious about implementation of new NSS. Chapter III identifies US's changing perceptions and methods about war against terrorism, main parameters of the new strategy and outcome of the idea of war against terrorism.

This American NSS undoubtedly would affect Turkey's security. In order to clarify implications of the American NSS on Turkey's security, the meaning of Turkey's security should be explained. The end of the Cold War altered the security and threat perceptions of Turkey. Since the Soviet threat, which had been in the core of Turk's anxiety, was disappeared and the Gulf War created several outcomes for Turkey's new foreign and security policy, threat and security perception shifted. In the beginning of 1990s, they were directed to the south from the north. Consequences of the end of the Cold War, ethnic problems, nationalism, asymmetric threats such as terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) affected in the new threat assessments. Particularly terrorism became a major threat to the integrity of Turkey. In Chapter IV, pre-September 11 security and threat assessments and perceptions of Turkey are evaluated to make a concrete comparison with post-September 11 situations. So as to understand anxieties of Turkey correctly, cornerstones of her security policy, which were shaped after the Cold War, should be understood.

Not only because of her geographic position but also her close relations with the U.S., whether she wants or not, Turkey is involving in the new phase of new world order. Turkey has a significant role in the scenario because shaping of the world started right beside her. Radical changes, disagreements and problematic

events have emerged owing to the intentions of the U.S. In Chapter V, outcomes of the implementation of the American NSS in the Middle East regarding the Turkey's security will be explained.

The methodology used in this thesis depends on descriptive and analytical research of the resources. The resources that are used in the thesis include; primary sources, including official documents and reports, interviews, intelligence reports, military field manuals. Especially, information about Turkey's security and threat perceptions are based on military field manuals, which clearly point who the enemy for Turkey is. Secondary sources consist of reports, documents, and articles procured from edited books, periodicals, online databases, newspapers, and newsmagazines.

CHAPTER II:

NEW THREAT: THE MEANING OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS AND THE NEW TERRORISM

The world, which has already been observing a new structure and order after the Cold War, is witnessing new dimensions of changing politics after the attacks of the September 11. Terrorism, which is in all new threat assessments in the Post-Cold War era, proved to be yet more important. Moreover, terrorism has become an element directing the world politics and international relations. Terrorism used to be a tool for the actors of the world politics to reach their aims. But now it became itself an actor in the international arena. Once a tool in the hands of some states, terrorism has become a non-state actor. International relations began to rotate around terrorism. Events, after the September 11 attacks that hit the only superpower within her homeland, are the most remarkable examples of this fact. The U.S. has changed her foreign policy. She stated to pursue a more assertive and unilateral foreign policy at the global level against the new enemy (Cottey, 2002). War on terrorism started. September 11 is a turning point not only for U.S. but also for the whole world.

The U.S. has accepted terrorism as a threat and enemy. If so, who is the enemy? What are the characteristics of this 'new enemy'? What makes it 'new'? What are the reasons for which the U.S. started the war on terrorism? In order to understand the starting point of the U.S.'s current politics, evolution and

characteristics of the 'new terrorism' should be explored. In this chapter, the evolution of the terrorism with the end of the Cold War will be explained shortly to show its changing role in the world. Additionally, characteristics of new terrorism will be explained. After putting characteristics, how and why 'new terrorism' forms a global threat for all states will be elucidated. Then aspects of September 11 will be shown in the perspective of new terror. So features of new terror in September 11 will be pointed clearly. Lastly, the aim of the September 11, messages given by terrorists and taken by the world will be explained. Accordingly, the new global threat will be explained in detail which will provide us with an understanding of the roots of both the U.S.'s opinions and its current tough politics.

2.1. What is New Terrorism?

2.1.1. Terrorism in the Cold War Era

In order to understand current different position of terrorism in the world arena, its Cold War role should be shortly mentioned. As has been known, terrorism is a cheap, low-risk and highly effective tool, which allows the weak to challenge the strong. These can be labeled as the fixed characteristics of terrorism. As the time passes, some modifications and additions on terrorism may be done according to world position. For instance, according to Brian Jenkins, in the 1970s and 1980s terrorism was driven largely by ideology or the 'narrow nationalism' that spawned separatist violence. He continues that toward the end of the century, proclaimed religious beliefs increasingly provided its contexts (Jenkins, 2001: 5). In the Cold War era, three important aspects of terrorism can be easily seen. These are first struggle for independence; second method used by some states in international politics and third rivalry tool of superpowers against to each other (Tuğtan, 2002).

During the Cold War, terrorism was viewed within a revolutionary context (Hoffman, 1998: 22). Many terrorists have defined themselves as “freedom fighters”. However, this form of the terrorism expanded to include nationalist and ethnic separatist groups (Pillar, 2001: 12). According to Hoffman, exiled nationalist minorities, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Basque ETA and even unknown South Moluccan irredentist group seeking independence from Indonesia, adopted terrorism as a means to draw an attention to themselves and their respective causes (Hoffman, 1998: 26).

As well, some states used terrorism in pursuing their foreign policy goals. According to Stohl, states may prefer to apply terrorism if they regard themselves powerless to pursue other policy instruments (Stohl, 1988: 161). It can be shortly said that state sponsored-terrorism was born due to this. Due to its fixed characteristics; cheap, low-risk, highly effective, challenge of weak, states are ready to use international terrorism as a form of covert warfare in order to undermine rival countries (Selvi, 2003: 28). Terrorism has been used as a weapon by some weak states that cannot compete with the rest of the world economically, politically, and militarily. These countries understood that applying terrorist strategies is an effective way of making political changes in the international system or challenging their rivals. This made terrorism a tool for state actors. This kind of terrorism has been used even after the Cold War and it was the most popular one until September 11.

Additionally, terrorism was also a tool of rivalry between superpowers. With the end of the World War II, well-known meaning of war, namely total war, turned out to be an action exceeding the capacity and budgets of states separately. The world was divided between two superpowers in a very strict manner and two blocs were formed around those. Given that any war in a traditional meaning was thought

as an end of the world due to the destruction power of the weapons, the total war became more risky and undesirable option for states. There was no direct armed-conflict between them because no side wanted to take such kind of a risk except for using terrorism (Stohl, 1988: 192). For that reason, as Tuğtan states, many of the wars after the World War II can be categorized as “low intensity conflict” (Tuğtan, 2002). Terrorism and regional wars were perceived as a reflection of a total war. Both sides used this option (Akgün, 2001: 116) because of both cost and demolishing damages of the total war to the whole world. Namely, terrorism was a tool of the Cold War period used by superpowers to implement their foreign policies. But after the Cold War, position of terrorism started to change. It started to take new role in the international arena.

2.1.2. Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War brought to an end to the period of bipolarity. Since then, academics, journalists and policy-makers have tried to work out exactly what kind of power structure would replace it (Smith, 2001). At this point, position of terrorism changed. It started to try to fill up this gap emerged with disappear of the Soviet Union. In this part, changing process of the terrorism and emerge of ‘New Terrorism’ as a non-state actor will be clarified.

Disappear of one polar and accelerate of globalization ‘caused’ new problems, and some concepts gained new meanings. Security is one of them. Very simply Amitav Acharya defined security as “reducing vulnerability to threats” (Smith, Acharya, 2002: 16). It has gained new dimensions and its aspect was broadened with the end of Cold War. New threats and new enemies have been added to sense of security concept within the context of globalization. Ethnic nationalism and regional conflicts, proliferation of WMD, international terrorism, religious fundamentalism,

political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in the countries, smuggling all kinds of person and weapon can be listed as the main threats in the new era (National Position of Turkey, 2002). K. Jayasuriya argues that new language of the security reflects the fact that “globalization has changed the internal architecture of the state and this is clearly apparent in the increasing emphasis placed on aspects of 'risk' and 'security' across social life” (Jayasuriya, 2001).

In the light of these explanations, terrorism emerged as one of the main threats of new world order if the human security a concept clearly holding the key to the building of the international order in the 21st century is considered in a very simply and its basic manner as a protection of human life. Because, today terrorist attacks are horrifying indication of the pervasiveness of the threats to people's safety, rights and lives.

Of course, there is no doubt that terrorism threat existed in the Cold War era, but as Kostas argues, it had never been considered so seriously as an actor or even a polar in the world arena (Kostas, 2002: 101-115). New Terrorism can be accepted as an actor in world politics because: Their activity area is the world not a limited region in one part of the world. Even, their aim is to change the whole world system not to change political order in one country or not any independence claims. They are trying to direct world politics. Results of new terrorist actions have influenced not only a specific country but also the whole world affairs. For instance, September 11 changed all international politics. Besides, since they are mostly religious-motivated, terrorists have beyond nationalistic sensation. Religion became the primary motive for terrorists (Jenkins, 2001: 4-5). Lastly, it generally targets superpower and hegemon to challenge to her. It is usually dealing with the U.S. Religion and whole world became major issue of terrorism by replacing ideology and country.

Reactions of the states and the international organizations strengthen the non-state role of New Terrorism. For instance, after the attacks, the U.S. divided the world as the fighters against terrorism and terrorists. More simply, unique superpower has been determining her policy priorities according to terrorism. As well, although it was established for communism threat, North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) new mission in the post-Cold War era has been tried to be reshaped within the perspective of fight against terrorism. Even after the September 11 attacks, NATO put the Article V into action for the first time in its history. These examples can be increased. The important point is that today, international relations are dominantly determined between terrorism and the states struggle against terrorism; not between East and West, or NATO and Warsaw Pact. Therefore, it can be said that terrorism, which was method of "freedom fighters" and some states to implement their policies previously, can be seen as a non-state actor giving a route to the world politics.

New non-state actor, global terrorism started to rise under the name of 'New Terrorism' with its special characteristics. It does not completely resemble with nationalist, religious, state-sponsored, right wing or anarchist terrorism (Karagöz, 2002: 156). It can be said that new terrorism is both mixed of them and completely different from them. Main aim is to change or demolish world order (Whine, 2001). While pursuing this aim, they are not restricted by anybody and they can freely use any methods and any weapons, including WMD, whatever they want (Hoffman, 2001). Thus, dangers of the new kind of the threat are terrifying. As Laqueur argues, no society can fully protect all its members from such kind of terrorist attacks (Laqueur, 2001: 80). To be able to control or to prevent terrorism is very hard because it turned into an actor in world politics. From now on, it is not a tool of

actors but it became an actor. It is the evolution from being a tool to the actorness. Third world countries some of which were under the authority of communism in previous years suffered because they cannot manage to establish their social order due to terrorism. On the other hand, for the West, especially, for the U.S., new terror became a candidate for taking the place of communism.

From the perspective of terrorism, it needed to renew itself and adjust to the globalism. One polar disappeared and the other side was still standing. It must be defeated and disappeared because merely overcoming hegemon can change system. So as to accomplish this aim, terrorism decided to exploit the benefits of globalism (Nacos, 2002: 11) and attached new dimensions and peculiarities to its configuration. Global developments in recent years have helped terrorism to shape its modern face because they live in a global world (Roy, 2001). Diffusion of information technology and advanced communication, increased ease of movement across international boundaries are the main assists of globalization to terrorism. Shortly, what is good for international business is also good for international terrorists (Tucker, 2001).

Many experts and academicians saw these developments, and new terrorism has been frequently identified as a major threat in the new era. Many actions and developments proved that new terrorism would be a big headache for many states either directly or indirectly. Chief of those actions are the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) bombings in New York, and related conspiracies; the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing; the 1998 East Africa bombings; the Tokyo sarin-gas attack in 1995, September 11 attacks in 2001, Istanbul and Madrid bombings in 2003. These attacks were, as Simon argues, the indications of a new and more threatening terrorism, one that aims to produce casualties on a massive scale (Simon: 2003). At this point,

Richard Shultz described such a big threat as one of the steps of war's transformation (Shultz, Vogt, 2003: 5).

2.1.3. Transformation of War

Wars have been the reasons and the results of international relations. Today, since terrorism has been shaping the world politics, as Shultz argues, struggle with terrorism can be accepted as the last step of war. It is now generally accepted that struggle with terrorism is war.¹ Thus, distinctiveness of terrorism as a war will be detailed.

New terrorism could be defined as a problem child who was gifted by globalism to the world after the Cold War (Shultz, Vogt, 2003:8). Simon Serfaty argues that there has been a renovation in the warfare with terrorism (Serfaty, 2001: 6). Even, Richard Shultz defined terrorism as the fourth step of transformation of war (Shultz, Vogt, 2003: 5). According to Shultz, the first generation of war had been perfected by Napoleon as classical nation-state war. This was followed by industrial-age wars of erosion based on massive firepower as in World War I. Maneuver warfare, introduced by the Germans in World War II and refined by the US in the 1980s, marked third generation. The last kind of war is against non-state actors and threats. This war has its own characteristics and Martin Creveld (Creveld, 1991:224) pointed them as follows:

- * Warfare will be highly irregular, unconventional and decentralized in approach.

- * Asymmetrical operations will be employed to bypass the superior military power.

¹ In previous years, the states have avoided using 'war' word in their struggle with terrorists. Because they have thought that war took place between two states or more. According to this idea, using the 'war' word against terrorists would strength terrorists' arguments.

* Both the organization operation of fourth-generation warriors will be masked by deception, denial, stealth and related techniques of intelligence tradecraft.

* Terrorist organizations and operations will be profoundly affected by information-age technologies.

* Modern communications and transportation technologies will have a profound impact on this new battlefield.

* Laws and conventions of war that apply to nation-states will not constrain terrorists and their state sponsor as they seek new and innovative means, including WMD, to attack civilians and nonmilitary targets.

* Fourth-generation warriors, frequently in the name of religiously based ideologies, will be remorseless enemies for the states they challenge.

* Countering terrorists and other violent non-state actors will be difficult for armies of post-modern states.

Indeed many academicians, experts has emphasized in their researches or analyses that new terrorism whose aim is to change world system completely is a growing threat for all world since their capacity and tendency to steer to world politics. Terrorism, which was also very dangerous as a tool in previous years, has become stronger and more dangerous with the help of its new characteristics. So its new characteristics should be understood in order to shape the danger in the minds.

2.1.4. Characteristics of New Terrorism

To identify the threat correctly, its characteristics have to be known very well. According to David Tucker (Tucker, 2001: 1) networked structure is good place to begin analyzing new terrorism. Terrorists are now able and willing to develop network forms of organization for the same reason that businesses are. The information revolution, by lowering the cost of communication, allows organizations

to push functions outside a controlling hierarchical structure. Organizations can control and approach a network form,² a group of more or less autonomous, dispersed entities, linked by advanced communications and perhaps nothing more than a common purpose.

Motivating or compelling the move from hierarchy to network is the advantages that an organization acquires it for transformation. (Karstedt, 2002: 96-111). It becomes more flexible, adaptive and durable because of its loose coordination with the others. This is how non-stateness builds up. This multiplies the opportunities for the organization to learn, making it more flexible and adaptive. The organization becomes more flexible because if one or even several of its constituent entities are destroyed, the others carry on. As Hoffman points (Lesser, Hoffman, 1999: 41) a network, unlike a hierarchy, cannot be destroyed by execution. It is called as a “leaderless resistance” (Whine, 2001). Utilizing the leaderless resistance concept, all individuals in groups operate independently of each other, and never report to a central headquarters or single leader for directional instruction. Since current networks are very numerous and have a global reach, terrorism is not static but dynamic.

Secondly, Michael Whines (Whine, 2001) states that new terrorists are amateurs or operate on a part time basis. New terrorists can be anyone who sympathies to such kind of thoughts or actions and hates to his states or world system. Furthermore, amateurs come together with the like-minded to conduct a

² Michael Whine indicates Hamas as a case. According to him, Hamas constitutes example of the network format, compared with, for instance, the hierarchical format of Arafat's al-Fatah. Because, Hamas has separated its political and military wings, and its leadership is divided between Gaza and (until their exclusion) Jordan and now Syria. Yet, some of its political direction and most of its fund-raising has been carried out in the US whilst its publications are partly produced in the UK. Whine puts that Filistin al Muslima, the main Hamas paper is published in London, as is Palestine Times, the editorial line of which is pro-Hamas . (Whine, 2001).

terrorist attack and then disband. They create *ad hoc* organizations to implement for one action. After the action, they disperse. Bombings in Istanbul in November 2003 are examples of it. Furthermore, terrorists do not receive training or other logistical support from state sponsors but rely on networks of supporters, learning what they need to know from publications or the World Wide Web or demobilized soldiers. They have only an informal organizational structure and no permanent existence.

Thirdly, the networked form is assisted by the growing use of information and communication technologies. In addition to facilitating networks, the communication revolution also facilitates finding political and individual support, reaching the knowledge and resources as well money that all terrorist organizations must do. The declining cost and increasing ease of communicating over great distances means that terrorist groups have greatly increased the potential pool of resources they can draw on. They can now more easily appeal to an ethnic or religious diasporas or to political sympathizers around the world (Elçi, 2002). They can also more easily get their message to a worldwide audience or to the people of the country or countries they deem most important in their struggle. Through the internet, they have access to important sources of the information. Paul Pillar alleges that computers and satellite phones have become a standard equipment in terrorists groups (Pillar, 2001: 47). Moreover, the know-how for making nuclear weapons is increasingly available over internet (Perry, 2001: 226).

Fourthly, the new terrorism does not confine itself to any boundaries and possesses a terrifying lethality. The new terrorism tends to go for the highest possible body count, (e.g., the Oklahoma City bombing, 1995; the WTC bombing, 1993; and the Tokyo sarin gas attack, 1995; September 11 attacks, 2001 and two attacks in Istanbul, 2003). Of more than 10000 incidents of international terrorism recorded

since 1968, only 14 prior to the September 11 had resulted in 100 or more fatalities (Jenkins, 2001: 4). Hoffman shows that although the total volume of terrorist incidents worldwide has declined in the 1990s, the percentage of terrorist incidents with fatalities has increased (Lesser, Hoffman, 1999: 11). According to the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, a record 484 international terrorist incidents were recorded in 1991, the year of the Gulf War, followed by 343 incidents in 1992, 360 in 1993, 353 in 1994, falling to 278 incidents in 1995 and to only 250 in 1996. Indeed, the 1996 total was the lowest annual tally in 23 years. However, this declining was not reflected reducing the number of the fatalities. On the contrary, 1996 was one of the bloodiest years on record. A total of 510 persons were killed: 223 more than in 1995 and 91 more than in 1994. In fact, apart from the September 11, the 1996 death toll ranks as the fourth highest recorded in the chronology since it was monitoring international terrorism in 1968.³

According to Hoffman, there are some reasons accounts for terrorism's increased lethality (Lesser, Hoffman, 1999: 13). First is that, terrorists want to attract more attention than earlier and do more dramatic in order to get their point across. Second terrorists have profited from past experience of their friends and have become more adept at killing. Third, meeting of new motivations, adversaries, and means (tactics) leads to higher lethality levels. The ideological nature of the terrorists' causes lead to an 'unlimited' nature of their operations. Lastly, the proliferation of amateurs taking part in terrorist acts has also contributed to terrorism's increasing lethality because the means and methods of terrorism can be easily obtained at bookstores, from mail-order publishers, on CD-ROM, or over the Internet.

³ The reason of excluding September 11 is to be able to show emerge and the evolution of New Terrorism until the September 11 attacks.

Fifth characteristic is that the new terrorists are mostly religious motivated. They differ from politically motivated terrorism (Simon, Benjamin, 2001/02:5). Jenkins asserts that this shift is significant because those convinced that they have the mandate of God to kill their foes have fewer moral doubts about mass murder and care less about people (Jenkins, 2001: 4-5). For 1995, Hoffman's data shows that religiously motivated terrorists were responsible for a quarter of all incidents in that year, but caused nearly 60 percent of all fatalities (Lesser, Hoffman, 1999: 16). Moreover, he says that in 1996, the last year for which he has data, 'Groups driven in whole or in part by a salient religious or theological motive committed 10 of the 13 most lethal terrorists attacks'. Especially Islamic groups are dominant in the number of the international terrorist organizations. Ayşe Hür gives the information that 27 of 53 organizations, which are in the list of the international terrorist organization, express themselves as an Islamic (Hür, 2003). Although jihadists are a significant problem, the threat of intensified violence posed by terrorists motivated by other radical religious traditions, including the American Christian Patriot movement, Israel's Jewish messianic militants and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo, increased. All these share a worldview characterized by a life-or-death struggle with the 'other' in order to redeem the world. They die for the God. It can be concluded that religious motivation is pushing terrorists beyond nationalistic sensation.

Sixth, the new terrorists frequently do not claim responsibility for the action and may even deny it. The new terrorist intends to strike without publicity for himself or his cause, until he is caught. He does not need to claim responsibility perhaps because he acknowledges only God as his master, and God has seen his action. Due to having no anxiety of any political message and performing with only hatred emotion, no one else matters (Küçük, 2003: 33-35). J. Stevenson states that

what drives terrorist to kill is essentially hatred unlike the classical terrorist organizations that present their demands clearly and generally take direct responsibility for their acts in order to make it clear to their adversaries that the bloodletting will stop when those demands are met (Stevenson, 2001/02: 35). In a sense, it is facing patriotism about religious within the terrorist network just like a state.

2.1.5. Difficulties of Dealing with New Terrorism:

If states face with a threat or enemy, they take some measures for it. Nevertheless, characteristics of 'New Terrorism' make very difficult to deal with it. Loose tie and leaderless structure of organization make very difficult or more correctly impossible to dissolve the structure of organization. Arresting one or two, even many members of organization do not have any meaning to destroy the terrorist organization. Moreover, since members are amateur and they generally die in their first action, prevention of terrorist activities before performing is very complicated.

Additionally, advanced technology helps terrorists about not only concealing their identity but also gaining materials in order to use in their actions. Terrorists, who do not have any political purpose and are motivated by religious emotions, do not limit themselves about death numbers in their action. More corpses mean success. Indeed, it is the most dangerous side of new. The idea and the aim of killing as many people as they can succeed is the main reason why new terrorism is thought to be as primary threat in the new era. Due to this idea, it is frightened that new terrorists are searching WMD. The action concept of new terrorists gives a hint that if they gain or reach such kind of weapon, they will not hesitate to use it (Alexander, Hoenig, 2002). Experts and researchers are also of the same mind (Cameron, 1999: 51). It is alleged that terrorists seek to get such kind of weapons. Since those

materials can be obtained easily from the ex-Soviet bloc states and third world countries, the world is extremely uneasy. In 1998, William C. Potter, administrator of Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California, stated that there were warehouses equal to 70,000 nuclear weapons without any protection in Russia (Küçük, 2003: 40). According to Steve Simon, acquisition and use of WMD by a terrorist group is near a certainty (Simon, Benjamin, 2001/02: 1-15).

Although it was pointed and warned about terrorism in whole world after the Cold War, war on terrorism has not been succeed multilaterally because of disagreement on what terrorism is.⁴ The world could not image and estimate how its dangers and damages are and the most importantly it was not perceived as a global threat so seriously until September 11.

2.2. September 11 in the Perspective of New Terrorism:

2.2.1. September 11 Attacks

On September 11, four terrorist groups, which were consisted of 19 men, hijacked four airlines. Two of planes crashed into the towers of WTC, one into the Pentagon and the last one, which could not succeed what it had aimed, targeted to the White House. Then everything started to change in the whole world. The world was shocked because the superpower was hit with massive casualties. New terrorism, which emerged after the Cold War, was on the highest point of world politics anymore. Many characteristics of it can be seen in the attacks of September 11. For that reason, the new terror was accepted as a global threat after those attacks. It became the most dominant actor in the world arena, especially due to targeting the U.S.'s homeland. If, the period between 1991 and September 11 is named as

⁴ Nearly 109 definitions of terrorism have been made and there is no exact definition of terrorism accepted by the whole world. (Stratejik Araştırma ve Etüt Merkezi (SAREM).2002. Küresel Terör ve Türkiye. Ankara: ATASE Başkanlığı, 18.)

'incubation period' for New Terrorism, it can be said that the birth in a real meaning existed in the September 11.

After the attacks, everybody asked who did it. Many terrorist organizations were suspect. Japanese Red Army took the responsibility but the government of the U.S. and many people pointed out the Al-Qaeda (Karagöz, 2002: 152). As the time passed, Al-Qaeda was declared as a responsible. There is no doubt that the name of the organization is important but the characteristic and concept of the attacks are more significant.

Firstly, loose network organization can be seen in the attacks. Certainly, terrorists must have made a very detailed planning, but making clear about which organization they belonged took very long time. Their leader has not been captured. Many supporters both financially and logistically have been seized in different countries such as Germany or Philippines. According to Cottey, each operates autonomously with its members not knowing the identity of other cells. The pattern that has emerged is of a web of cells around the world that provide the intelligence and manpower to execute these terrorist attacks (Cottey, 2002).

Second, members of these attacks are commonly amateur and they created *ad hoc* organization. They met for only one action. September 11 was their first and last action. As well, they did not take the attention of the intelligence agencies although they had lived in the U.S. for two or three years. Shultz describes them as a 'sleepers agents' (Shultz, Vogt, 2003: 10) because they waited in the place where they would make an action ever since they were ordered. Pilot-terrorists, who used the planes crashed into the WTC and Pentagon, had been trained unintentionally in the U.S. civil aviation organizations since 1999 (Millar, 2001). They were not in the terrorists or suspicious lists.

Third, September 11 terrorists did not have any headquarters in a physical sense. The center of a new terrorism is the internet and global cellular communications. Karagöz alleges that the September 11 attacks were accomplished by the help of open information (Karagöz, 2002: 162). By using the internet, they were able to accelerate mobilization and intensify communication between members. They reached flight plans of the airline companies and probably they might have learned the weak or defenseless sides of the Pentagon. Although the U.S. has very modern technology in defence technology and war industry, terrorists managed to pass all security measures of her or they made inefficient those measures. Thanks to using Information and Communication Technology (ICT), they could even hit Pentagon (Cottey, 2003).

Fourth, the September 11 attacks conformed to trend of escalating lethality even when the volume of the international terrorism declined (Jenkins, 2001: 1-15). In the attacks, nearly 3600 people died. It shows that they targeted to murder as many people as they could succeed. They did not limit themselves about killing that is the most dangerous feature of the new terrorism. They must have planned their action very carefully because they crashed into the middle of the Twin Towers, where was one of the most crowded places of New York, with oil-full planes.

Fifthly, attacks were explicitly religious motivated. Although Islam does not order or give permission to kill people, even it prohibits concluding life of any being, all terrorists were Muslim. They committed suicide because they probably saw themselves as a 'sword of the Islam' (Katzman, 2002). They used a faction of Islam as an ideology. After the attacks, in the video cassette, which belonged to some of

the terrorists, they declared that they were ready for dying for the God and they would punish the 'big evil', the U.S. (Berger, 2001: 123-129).⁵

Lastly, no organization has taken the responsibility of attacks. At first Japanese Red Army took but it was not insisted on this issue (Karagöz, 2002: 159). Although Al-Qaeda was seen as a guilty for the attacks neither any member of Al-Qaeda nor Osama Bin Laden has never taken the responsibility. However, Laden declared his pleasures for seeing demolishing the WTC and he commented these actions as, it was the first time the balance of terror has been close between Muslims and Americans (Nacos, 2003: 1-16). Taking responsibility is not matter for 'new Terrorism' because according to their opinion God saw their action. They did not have any anxiety to send a message (Küçük, 2003: 33-35).

Without any declaration, the world found the responsible for the attacks. Who was the responsible for September 11? New Terrorism. Which organization could be so bold or could dare to hit the U.S. within the homeland and fit with the characteristic of new terrorism? Al-Qaeda. The world accepted this name as a responsible and within 24 hours of the terrorist attacks, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and the Security Council adopted two resolutions unanimously.⁶ Likewise, the NATO Council agreed that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty covered these attacks.⁷ It was the first time such a decision about Article 5 was taken in NATO's history. The entire world agreed on that new terrorism was the most dangerous threat for the world peace.

Taking such big decisions showed that the whole world took some messages from the September 11 attacks. People and states realized the seriousness of

⁵ On the other hand, Jenkins alleges that 13 of 19 did not know it was a suicide mission (Jenkins, 2001: 1-15).

⁶ UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/56/1 and UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001)

⁷ North Atlantic Council Statement of 12 September 2001.

terrorism. Noelle Quenivet argues that the world discovered terrorism again (Quenivet, 2002). Taken messages were important for the future of world affairs.

2.2.2. Messages of September 11 Attacks:

All terrorist actions carry some messages (Hoffman, 1998: 41). September 11 also carried different messages. In order to understand future reaction of the world, particularly the U.S.'s, what kind of messages was taken in different level should be explained. Since the U.S. perceived new messages from attacks, they changed foreign policy priorities.

With the attacks, name of the child was given and new terrorism became very 'popular' in the whole world. Although there had been several attacks carrying the new terrorism's features and many warnings were made about it, both the world and the U.S. were acquainted with terrorism in its real meaning (Nye, 2001: 199). However, its characteristics change, all terrorist actions want to give some messages. September 11 attacks had own aims and messages. Reasons of the attacks can be found in its messages.

If it is accepted that Al Qaeda did these attacks, some clear aims can be put. First aim can said as the removal the U.S. military and thus the reduction or removal of the U.S. interest from Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region; secondly, the end of the U.S. pressure on and sanctions against Iraq; thirdly, the destruction of the U.S.-Israeli alliance and strengthening of the Palestinians' battle against Israel (Nacos,2003: 1-16). Moreover Karagöz argues that strategic goals of the Osama Bin Laden were that furthering the cause Islamic revolution within the Muslim world itself and he tried to face-to-face Islam and the U.S. (Karagöz, 2002: 159). Similarly, Brian Jenkins asserts that Bin Laden knew that U.S. would give a fierce reply due to

the September 11 attacks. Thus, their strategy was based on provoking the U.S to assault on Islam (Jenkins, 2001: 14). Michael Doran also alleges that polarizing the Islamic world between the *umma* and regimes allied with the U.S. would help achieve Laden's primary goal, furthering the cause of Islamic revolution within the Islamic world itself (Doran, 2001: 32-33). He even asserts that goal is to help his brand of extremist Islam alive and flourishing among believers.

In a broadened perspective of terrorism not from the perspective of any terrorist organization, own messages of new terrorism are more important than what the name of organization is. Apart from the classical aims and messages of terrorism such as violence, panic and drawing attention, terrorists gave some extra messages relating to their aims to everyone for in every level while performing September 11 attacks. These levels can be categorized as individual, state and international level.

For the citizens of the U.S. or individual level hatred was the first message. They so hated from the Americans that they gave their own lives for killing them. After the attacks, there were many debates in America about why they hate from the U.S. Besides, the argument that U.S. creates such kind of terrorist attacks itself due to its policies it carries on was started to be increasingly spoken while searching the hatred against the U.S. Fear, insecurity was the second message in this level. These attacks showed that Americans are not completely in a safe in their homeland. Just before the September 11 attacks, Pillar stated that American homeland is the best place to inflict fear on Americans (Pillar, 2001: 58). Until the September 11, most Americans were clearly believing that U.S. had very good measures of protection from its enemies because oceans to the east and west and friendly neighbors to the north and south had given a security from dangers. Most of the Americans will not

get rid of the September 11 syndrome (Halliday, 2001: 256). It is not wrong to say that Americans faced with the realities of the world (Howard, 2002).

For the U.S. government or state level, vulnerability of the U.S. can be perceived as the first message. These attacks deteriorated the image of superpower by hitting homeland although this superpower has extremely big and strong military power. Punishment can be pointed as a second message at this stage. With relating to hatred, they tried to prove that policies of the U.S., which were not liked by them, would eventually be punished (Baranovsky, 2002: 21-28). Additionally, that terrorists tried to punish the U.S. in all fields could be seen in their target selections. White House carried political message, Pentagon carried military message and WTC carried economic message. In classical total war, war has military, economic and political aims. If one state is wanted to be defeated completely in a strategic level, its military and economic structures must be demolished so that enemy can be captured in political level.⁸ September 11 itself carried these messages on itself. As for the world or on international level, terrorism confirmed that it was the most dangerous enemy, which could use every kind of method to accomplish its aims. It also mean that such terrorist attacks may be executed in any country since it dared to assault to superpower because there is no authority who has capability to prevent or control the terrorism. After the attacks, French President Jacques Chirac said "This time it was New York; next time it could be Paris, Berlin or London." (Serfaty, 2001: 8). Istanbul and Madrid bombings were proved this view. "United against terrorism" became the leading word in international affairs.

The challenge can be perceived as the most important message at the international level since it attacked the only polar of unipolar world system.

⁸ The level of the total war can be found in Field Manuel, *MT 145-1 Müşterek Harekat Talimnamesi*. 2001. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi.

September 11 proved that weak non-state actors can strike hard against even the strongest of today's nation. With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, no country could balance American military power. According to Joseph Nye in the September 11 attacks, terrorists tried to prove that this balance could be supplied (Nye, 2001: 200). September 11 showed that the weak balanced the strong and weak was not as weak as the U.S. thought. Each 'successful' terrorist operation against the U.S. demonstrates that it is vulnerable; it is not the hegemonic power of the world (Pillar, 2001: 56). Terrorists' aim that is to remind the U.S. that they are not the only powerful actor in the international arena became successful and terrorism took the non-state actor role for world affairs. Indeed, due to this challenging message, U.S.'s policy started to change and the world became anxious about how the U.S. would give a reply to terrorists' challenge.

Apart from the all aims, messages and reasons; conclusions of the attacks are the most important side for the world level. They triggered to change of international system. There had been many terrorist activities in the world targeting to Americans until September 11. For example, terrorists drove a truck filled with explosives into the basement of the WTC in New York City in 1993, followers of Osama Bin Laden killed American soldiers in an ambush on the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993, the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia was destroyed by a tanker-truck bomb in 1996, US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were simultaneously attacked by truck bombs in 1998 and the USS Cole was attacked in the port city of Yemen in 2000.⁹ But on the one point, the September 11 differentiated from those attacks as well as its death toll. Targeting homeland of the U.S. is the most significant side because everybody knew that eventually the U.S. would normally respond and punish

⁹ In those terrorist attacks totally 361 people were killed.

someone for these actions. Additionally, the U.S., would probably use and change this bad situation for the benefit of its interests due to overcoming the shock. At this point it can be said that September 11 attacks have given the U.S. the opportunity to attempt to hold the international arena under its leadership according to American priorities. So the world started to wait how the U.S. would respond September 11. In addition to terrorism fear, U.S. policy against this challenge became another anxiety of the states.

As a result, new terrorism, which appeared in the beginning of 1990s, developed and became an actor in the international arena. September 11 is a solid evidence for this idea. The emergence of new terrorism is a significant and new development in international politics because for the first time a terrorist organization with global pretensions has emerged and shown that it is capable of undertaking a campaign of violence against any states. Two aspects of new terrorism made it a worldwide actor; first is its global characteristics different from classical terrorism, second is targeting the homeland of U.S. with the September 11.

Now, threat of new terrorism is the most famous, well-known and active actor in the world arena. Due to the respond of the U.S., everybody knew that the world would never be the same again. Nobody was mistaken on this issue. The U.S. started from the Afghanistan. Then government prepared a new NSS for 'war against terrorism'. The new strategy of the U.S. will be clarified in the next chapter in order to show the direction of the current U.S.'s policies.

CHAPTER III:

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE U.S. AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11

September 11 marked the start of a new era in American strategic thinking. The terrorist attacks have had an impact comparable to the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, that propelled the U.S. into World War II. Attacks changed both the U.S.'s war strategy with terrorism and its priorities concerning foreign and security policies. After the September 11, all Americans were convinced that new terrorism was new threat. War on terrorism has become the U.S.'s number one priority for foreign policy. Moreover, offensive policies started to be applied against terrorism instead of defensive ones. Such policies have affected foreign and global security policies of the U.S.

In this chapter, the changing strategy of the U.S. against terrorism and its reflections to the American security and foreign policies will be explained. In order to clarify the roots of current policies of the U.S.'s, firstly struggle of the U.S. with terrorism before September 11 will be explained. For many times, U.S. declared that they were in a war with terrorism. The defensive war method they used, their point of view about terrorism will be clarified. Secondly, changing minds about terrorism, decisions and measures for a war will be clarified. After the September 11, U.S. realized that terrorism could be very dangerous for the people of the U.S. and took some decisions for fighting with new type of terrorism. New Terrorism may have

taken the place of communism for foreign policy of the U.S. New type of enemy necessities new strategy since other previous methods did not work against it. Therefore, method had to be changed. Thirdly, characteristics and main parameters of the emerging new security strategy of the U.S. will be explained. It is worth noting that corrects or errors; neither negative nor positive critics to this strategy will not be analyzed. In other words, this research does not take normative stance with respect to American security. Only what the U.S. says in the strategy is tried to be clarified to draw the frame of war on terrorism. Lastly, selection of the U.S. to implement the NSS will be shown. For proving her seriousness, U.S. started to carry out her strategy in the Middle East, which is the convenient place to begin war against terrorism according to her priorities and opinion.

3.1. Struggle of the U.S. with Terrorism before September 11

As said by Paul Pillar, combating international terrorism had been one of the major objectives of the U.S. (Pillar, 2001: i) because in an average, 26 Americans had been killed per year by terrorists before September 11 (Office of Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2000: 1). George Tenet, director of Central Intelligence, argues in 2001 that the U.S. remained a number one target of international terrorism. According to numbers provided by him, close to one-third of all incidents worldwide in 2000 were directed against Americans. (Hoffman, 2001: 2). For that reason, there had also been a war against terrorism in previous years. In this part strategy of the U.S. against terrorism before September 11 will be clarified in order to putting differences with current policies.

Especially after the Cold War, 'war against terrorism' has been heard more frequently. The commitment to the fight against terrorism was reflected in the statements of national leaders about the persistence and fortitude that the fight would

require. For instance, Clinton stated in 1998 that the U.S. was in “a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism, between the rule of law and terrorism”.¹⁰ Opinions polls also showed the public support for counter terrorism. In a survey done in 1998, Americans cited international terrorism more often than any other issue as a critical threat to U.S.’s vital interests (Rielly, 1999: 15-16)¹¹. In the same poll, 79 percent of the public said that fighting international terrorism should be a very important goal of the U.S. Thus, before September 11 the U.S. also used some methods against terrorism. Indeed, there are two different ways to struggle with terrorism; anti-terrorism and counterterrorism (Akgün, 2001: 117). Anti-terrorism means to take only some measures against the terrorist actions in order to minimize the risks for the public. On the other hand, counterterrorism comes to mean showing more active and aggressive attitude to suppress terrorist activities. It includes using physical force to destroy terrorist organization¹². In this perspective, pre-September 11 period the method used was anti-terrorism. Its measures can be listed as economic, financial, political measures and sanctions, diplomatic pressure, intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and lastly military measures. They did not include major foreign policy transformations.

Believing that terrorism was one of the threats for the U.S., governments took some drastic measures for struggle against it. American analysts believed that new terrorism would persist for many years in the future and according to Simon and Benjamin, the resources, which the U.S. had devoted to combating the threat of

¹⁰ Address to the nation by President Bill Clinton, August 20, 1998. This address is available online at <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/strike/clinton980820.ahtr> (December 20, 2002).

¹¹ This survey was conducted between October and December 1998. In August 1998, the U.S. embassies were bombed. For that reason, it may partly reflected feeling emerged with the bombings. However, it also showed that after such kind of attacks, American people could highly support the counter terrorism activities and measures.

¹² More detailed information about the measures against terrorism can be found in Field Manuel Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı. 1998. *İç Güvenlik Harekatı KKT 31-2* (Internal Security Operation). Ankara: K.K. Basımevi.

terrorism, reflected this view (Simon and Benjamin, 2000:59). In terms of financial measures, as said by them, the U.S. had doubled what it spent to fight terrorism since 1994, to more than \$ 10 billion for fiscal year 2000. Already, the U.S. spent \$ 1.4 bn each year on defensive measures against terrorist use of Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. In 1998, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director Louis Freeh made terrorism the top priority and his counterterrorism budget grew to \$ 423 million by 2001 (Nye, 2001: 200). The U.S. had also frozen of assets belonging to individual terrorists, terrorist groups, or state sponsor and the prohibition of material support to terrorists.

In terms of diplomatic pressure, although it had a problem to take some strict measures against to terrorism, diplomacy was seen a method for fighting against terrorism by the U.S. Resolution 731 in the security council of UN against Libya and Resolution 1267 against the Afghanistan could be seen as a diplomatic sample of anti-terrorism efforts. Libya was enforced to make a cooperation to find responsible of the Pan Am action. Afghanistan was imposed a sanction to turnover the Osama bin Laden. Moreover, U.S. decided to take strict measures against some states, which were giving support to the international terrorism. She imposed four main sets of U.S. Government sanctions: A ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls over exports of dual use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism, prohibitions on economic assistance; and imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.

In the state level, the U.S. amended some criminal laws. According to Stephen Flynn, application of criminal law had become an increasingly large part of U.S. efforts to anti-terrorism (Flynn, 2001: 191-193). Long sentences have the most

important side of this method. For instance Ramzi Yousef, who attacked the WTC in 1993, was sentenced to 240-year.

Intelligence and covert actions were other options for combating terrorism. The anti-terrorism contribution most often expected from intelligence is to detect terrorists' plots in time for measures to be taken to remove threat. Once terrorists attacks occurs intelligence tackles with to determine responsibility for the crime and to locate and capture the perpetrators. FBI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were used for these purposes in the phase of anti-terrorism. George Tenet stated in February 2000 that the U.S. agencies had assisted in the rendition of more than two dozen terrorists since July 1998.¹³ Moreover, he claimed that the counter-terrorism center at the CIA was strengthened and coordination between that agency and the FBI was improved.¹⁴

Regarding to military measures, retaliation has been the most important anti-terrorism method used by U.S. military force (Pillar, 2001: 100). As Paul Pillar indicates, she first employed it for this purpose against Libya in 1986 in response to the bombing of a nightclub in Berlin on April 4. American casualties at the nightclub included two killed and seventy-nine wounded. The U.S. response on April 14 was a strike by one hundred combat aircraft based on carriers or in the United Kingdom. The targets were several military sites in and around Tripoli and Benghazi as well as numerous surface-to-air missile installations. The second retaliatory use was against Iraq for having unsuccessfully attempted to use agents to assassinate Bush Senior while he was visiting Kuwait in April 1993. The retaliatory strike on June 26, twenty-three Tomahawk cruise missiles were used, aimed at the headquarters of the

¹³ The statement is available online at http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speechs/dci_speech-020200.html (December 21, 2002)

¹⁴ However, the September 11 investigation showed that this coordination and cooperation could not be succeeded.

intelligence service in Baghdad. Third instance was a set of strikes on August 20, 1998 against targets associated with Osama bin Laden, in response to the bombings U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Several dozen cruise missiles were fired. Most of the missiles were targeted to eastern Afghanistan and some of them were targeted to Sudan. American sentiments about retaliation were reflected in another poll: 74 percent of the public and 77 percent of the smaller sample of leaders said they would support retaliatory air strikes against terrorists (Rielly, 1999: 27). Moreover, 57 percent of the public and 58 percent of the leaders even expressed support for the use of ground troops to respond to terrorist attacks.

Although these measures were taken and conducted, terrorist activities continued. Indeed financial, diplomatic, intelligence and criminal laws are standard measures which are taken by every country dealing with terrorism. For that reason, it may be wrong to expect that those measures would stop or control terrorism. They have not deterred the terrorists. Retaliation was perceived more concrete method for preventing or stopping terrorist activities for U.S. governments. Nevertheless, it could not be named as the perfect method of fighting with terrorism. Michael Hirsh indicates the inefficiency of this method and he claims, periodic cruise-missile strikes of Bill Clinton only seemed to encourage Bin Laden, who derided the U.S. as a 'paper tiger' (Hirsh, 2002). American retaliations can be perceived as a 'make-up' or 'reactionary approach' for mollifying own public opinion. If terrorists hit one, the U.S. hit back one or two.¹⁵ Retaliation means defense. In the perspective of this explanation, it is not wrong to say that U.S. used anti-terrorism method before September 11.

¹⁵ The Turkish army used the same method while struggling with PKK before 1993. Troops were waiting in the stations and if they were attacked, they would start to defense. But this method was given up for taking the concrete successes against terrorists.

All samples and experiences about fighting against terrorism have showed that defender never wins unless it attacks. Nevertheless, it was very difficult to apply more rigorous methods because public had to be convinced. Some terrorism experts emphasized that more strict and assertive measures had to be taken to prevent terrorism activities in the U.S. before September 11. They had noticed that new terrorism became very dangerous actor for its unique characteristics for only superpower. In February 2001, George Tenet put the Osama bin Laden as the most dangerous threat for the U.S. (Nye, 2001: 198). Nye also showed that, a June 2000 report of the National Commission on Terrorism urged that “number one priority” should be given to the terrorism. However, it was very difficult to convince people into taking further steps. It was also very hard to activate enthusiasm for dramatic increasing in spending for counterterrorism. Richard Clark, antiterrorism official handling terrorism at the National Security Council (NSC) for both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, stated in an interview in 1999, “There is problem convincing person that there is a threat. There is disbelief and resistance. Most people do not understand.” According to Shultz, in addition to the public, U.S. intelligence community did not grasp the implications of terrorism. Moreover, he argues that Pentagon and State Department wanted nothing to do with such risky military operations and fought bureaucratically to block them (Shultz, 2003: 23).

That is to say, the U.S. war strategy against terrorism based on defensive methods and those methods did not require major alterations in its global security and foreign policies until September 11 attacks.

3.2. War against New Terrorism after the September 11

September 11 became a turning point for method and strategy of the U.S. used against terrorism, which is now clearly perceived as a threat for national and

international, as well as grand transformation in its global security and foreign policy priorities. Thomas Kuhn alleges that crisis is a precondition for emerging new methods used for solving problems (Kangas, 2003: 6). September 11 attacks are that crisis for the U.S. After the attacks, American people were convinced -- complaint issue of terrorism experts of the U.S. -- with terrible experience. Everybody suddenly understood the dimensions of threat. Public opinion, administration and international actors agreed on the seriousness of the terrorism. New method had to be found for fighting with terrorism. This search was immediately started and it turned towards using force harshly. Anti-terrorism strategy became counterterrorism and defensive methods were replaced by offensives. Moreover, terrorism sat the first place of foreign policy's agenda.

On the domestic front, the administration sought and received a joint resolution from Congress authorizing use of military force, in the exercise of legitimate self-defense. In the language of the resolution: "The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 ... in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States...." (Lieber, 2002: 4). The resolution passed by a margin of 98-0 in the Senate and 420-1 in the House of Representatives. David Gombert argues that public opinion, which had been deeply divided since the November 2000 presidential election, rallied in broad support not only of the war effort, but also of the President himself (Gompert, 2001: 8-14). Alan Wolfe clarifies that the terrorist attacks have united Americans as at no time since World War II (Wolfe, 2001: 283).

Second, the U.S. sought and received a unanimous U.N. Security Council vote on September 28. Resolution 1373 -- adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter that provides wide authority for the Security Council to enforce its decision and makes the resolution binding for all U.N. member countries -- requires all member states to criminalize Al-Qaeda financial activities, share intelligence information, and take measures to prevent the movement of terrorists. While the resolution has a more symbolic than practical effect, it provides multilateral legitimacy for the American-led battle against terrorism (Lieber, 2002: 4). Lastly, the 19 members of NATO invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the history of the alliance. Article V treats an attack on one member state as an attack on all, and requires that they take action under their respective constitutional procedures.

From the explanations of President and other members of administration, it can be concluded that firstly, military methods, not the international law, would make this war. Secondly, war would be in all over the world until terrorism was finished. President Bush proclaimed in his speech to Congress, "our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated" (Stevenson, 2001/02: 35). Lastly, main method must have been counterterrorism not anti-terrorism (Akgün, 2001: 117).

All these showed that new enemy of the U.S. henceforth was New Terrorism. In the history, U.S. had designated her enemy within perspective of ideologies, ideas and symbols such as Hitler, genocide, totalitarianism and communism (Gökay, 2002: 14-35). New Terrorism became new symbol for the U.S. The new black and white areas were defined as being with the U.S. or with terrorists. On 20 September, the president Bush told Congress "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to

make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorist”¹⁶ (Homontree, 2003). Indeed, this is a great example of changing patterns of the U.S. global foreign and security policies. The gravity of this enemy is amplified by two additional factors. One is raised fears about potential use of WMD the other is ‘rouge states’ (Lieber, 2002: 2). It can be said that definition and perception of terrorism were developed with the participation of ‘rouge states’ and WMD. The biggest fear for the U.S. was the meeting of this trio against to the U.S. (Koç, 2003: 1).

Struggle with terrorism generally is not evaluated as a ‘war’. Similarly, at the beginning there was no consensus on how to define the September 11 attacks and response to them. For instance, soon after the attacks, President Bush described the events of September 11 at first as “apparent terrorist attack on the U.S.”, however on the next day he called them acts of war (Karagöz, 2002: 142). Later description took on a shape rapidly. Bush explained that attacks meant to declaration a war against the U.S. and “this war would be the first war of 21st century” (Mandelbaum, 2001: 254). This was the counter-declaration of war for the U.S. Likewise, soon after the attacks great majority of the media declared that U.S. was in a war (Gökdağ, 2001: 4).

In that case, the kind of war is important. In Field Manuel *Müşterek Harekat* MT 145-1 (Joint Operation), kinds of war are defined as this order: non-war operation, deterrence, shaping of security environment, crisis management, use of limited force and war with a definite result (*Müşterek Harekat* MT 145-1, 2001: 1-25). In this perspective, taking a decision of the U.S. for war with terrorism can be matched with the war with a definite result since all clues and the way thing were going showed that very huge power would be used.

¹⁶ According to Brzezinski, this sentence was used ninety-nine times after the attacks at the government level. "New American Strategies for Security and Peace" conference in November 4, 2003. Full text of speech can be found in <http://www.newamericanstrategies.org> (December 5, 2003).

There is no doubt that this war would not be like and be conventional war (Clark, 2001: 242). Characteristics of New Terrorism would not give permission people to fight against it with traditional war methods. This war would be very difficult for the U.S. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay define war against terrorism, as “like the fight against Soviet communism, campaign against terrorism will be nasty, brutish and long” (Daalder and Lindsay, 2001: 403) due to the characteristics of non-state actor. As Shultz explains, this war will be fourth-generation war¹⁷ (Shultz, 2003: 23).

If threat and enemy were designated and if there would be a war, method had to be decided. Method of deterrence had already used against ‘rouge states’ but it worked at all. Deterrence and other options apart from military could not be successful. For example in Afghanistan, diplomatic pressures and law enforcement efforts to arrest Bin Laden have not worked. (Quenivet, 2002). The U.S. must have decided, as Brzezinski pointed, to apply more strict methods including use of force (Brzezinski, 2001: 212-214).

The method the U.S. decided to use can be matched with ‘area control’.¹⁸ Main concepts of this method are that searching the terrorists in the suspected areas; after finding and cleaning them, keeping some troops in the same field for impeding terrorist to use there again (İç Güvenlik Harekatı KKT 31-2, 1998: 4-66). It also includes that every risky region must be taken under the control and in some mixed periods troops walk around there.¹⁹ Main aim of the method is to capture terrorists and/or to make ineffective them. Therefore, this suspected and risky region cannot

¹⁷ The characteristics of the fourth-generation war were explained in the first chapter page 9.

¹⁸ While evaluating the method of ‘area control’, it should be considered that U.S. is a superpower or hegemon. For that reason, area may include whole world and it should be thought at the global level. The area should be considered as the world.

¹⁹ How the method of ‘Area Control’ was performed by the Turkish Military Forces clearly explained in the book of Osman Pamukoğlu. 2003. *Unutulanlar Dışında Yeni Bir Şey Yok* (There is no new thing except forgotten). İstanbul.

create any threat for anybody as long as it is controlled. In the core of concept, attacker always has an advantage contrary to defender. Paul Pillar reminds it with famous sentence; 'the offense knows where it will strike, but the defense does not' (Pillar, 2001: 59). Donald Rumsfeld remarked about this issue: "A terrorist can attack at any time at any place using a range of techniques. It is physically impossible to defend at every time in every location.... The only effective way to defend is to take the battle to where the terrorists are.... So preemption with military force is now an operative idea." (Lieber, 2002: 4). Taking and preserving initiative, and striking first is the most important rule in the battlefield. Moreover, if strict measures and military options are not thought, public may have started to ask why the U.S. has so big army since, armed forces exists for such critical decisions. In 2000, National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice beforehand verified this opinion by saying "The president must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is not a political referee. Military force is best used to support clear political objectives" (Freedman, 2001/02: 75).

For establishing 'area control' method, the U.S. government started to activate the project of defense institutions' transformation, which had been planed before September 11 attacks (Kangas, 2003: 7-12). Jack Kangas points phases of project as follows: to protect U.S.'s homeland and military bases abroad, to envisage troops for far threats and reinforce them, to determine enemy shelter, to establish information web, to use information technology for more effective joint operations and lastly protecting ability related to the space.

In the perspective of 'area control', the plan of the U.S. can be categorized in two levels. Short-term level is to make criminal investigation and punish them. This phase can be named as Post-action hot reply. In the long-term level, they have

searched roots and turned their terrorism policy direction to the Middle East. Transformation of the Middle East according to U.S.'s priorities is necessitated. This second level changed global foreign and security policies of the U.S.

First step of the new method was Afghanistan operation. The U.S. believed that without operation in Afghanistan, the terrorist network of Al-Qaeda would be intact (Quenivet, 2002). On several occasions, the U.S. had requested the government of Afghanistan, the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden. Afghanistan had nevertheless refused even after the Security Council of the UN had passed resolutions demanding his extradition. The administration launched the first phase of its military campaign on October 7, by bombing targets in Afghanistan with British force. Land forces were also used and after the operation, troops were located to the Afghanistan that is the necessities of 'area control'. Indeed this operation was very comprehensive. According to Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, it had three components: Kosovo-style strategic bombing of military targets to weaken the Taliban's power, Somalia-like commando raids to wipe out the terrorists and Nicaragua-like support for the Taliban's adversaries, especially the Northern Alliance (Daalder and Lindsay, 2001: 404).

In fact, it can be said that this strategy became very successful at the beginning. Soon after the Afghanistan operation, Syria was trying to promote herself as an example of counterterrorism success, Iran was becoming nervous and President Khatami assured that Iran would not harbor any terrorist group and that members of Al-Qaeda arrested and sent back to their country. Sudan started to cooperate with the U.S. while Yemen and Philippines invited U.S. troops for military support and advice. These examples can be thought as the products of new method.

As to other measures, financial, legal and diplomatic methods were also revised and reinforced. Nevertheless, they would not be main ways for struggling terrorism. They would be assistant methods to support military option. These measures were mostly internal. In September 20, Tom Ridge was appointed head of new Office of Homeland Security by the White House (Zakariaa, 2001: 310)²⁰. Brigitte Nacos gives some numbers as; in the four months following the events of September 11, 98 percent of all bills, resolutions and amendments proposed by the House of Representatives and 97 percent by the Senate related to terrorism. Moreover, the president Bush issued 12 Executives Orders and 10 Presidential Proclamations related to attacks (Nacos, 2003: 3). As to financial measures, the 2003 Pentagon budget was set at \$ 379 billion – a 15 percent increase over the 2002 budget. This budget is 93 percent as high as the average annual expenditure during the Cold War decade of 1980s (Conetta, 2002: 3). \$45 billion was reserved for counterterrorism activities (Hür, 2003). Samples can be increased but important thing is these measures have been perceived sub-methods to support the main method; use of force.

From the beginning, however, the president Bush has been explicit in saying that the war against terror will not be quickly completed. In a one-year after attacks, special features of new war appeared clearly. They had to be depended on a security strategy. So continuity of the 'war against' terrorism could be reinforced and administration was able to explain the direction of her policies. Moreover, some perceived this war as a credibility of the U.S. (Serfaty, 2001: 10-11). Therefore, the U.S. could not afford loosing against the terrorists as the superpower that would mean loosing the status as the mega power.

²⁰ The Homeland Security Council consist of the president, the vice president and key cabinet members and agency heads, who will advise and assist the president on all aspects of the homeland security.

3.3. American New Security Strategy:

If new enemy was identified as new terrorism, foreign policy of the U.S. had to be oriented according to the new enemy's characteristics. The strategies that won the Cold War—containment and deterrence—will not work against the new terrorism, because those strategies assumed the existence of identifiable regimes, enemies and territories (Gaddis, 2002). Therefore, security strategy or the “Grand Strategy” had to be renewed again. The new NSS of the U.S. is going to be analyzed in the next paragraphs to find the change in the U.S. foreign and security policy due to the terrorism.

3.3.1. What is the National Security Strategy?

Before analyzing NSS, firstly the meaning of the NSS is explained in order to show its importance in American policies. “Grand strategy” is the term describing how a country will use various means she possesses -- military, economic, political, technological, ideological, and cultural -- to protect and promote its overall security, values, and national interests (Lieber, 2002). As for the U.S., according to section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 -- codified at 50 United States' Constitution (U.S.C.) 404a --, the President of U.S. is required to transmit to Congress each year a “comprehensive report on the NSS of the United States”(Lieber, Lieber, 2002: 32). The goal of the NSS report is to outline the global interests, goals, and objectives of the U.S. that are vital to its national security.

According to Haine and Lindström, the NSS document represents a broad collection of different sensibilities and offers a tentative synthesis of diverse beliefs of American officials inside the administration. In the document, it is relatively easy to map out these various views expressed by several Departments, notably Defense

and State. The NSS is not merely a formal exercise; in practice, it serves as a reference and justification for actual policy choices (Haine and Lindström, 2004).

Namely, security strategies are dominant factor of the American policies. Since 1986, 12 reports have been published; two during the second Reagan administration (1987, 1988), three in the George Bush Senior Administration (1990, 1991, 1993), six in the Clinton administration (1994-1999), and one by the current Bush Administration (2002). These strategies have drawn the path of the U.S. foreign policies.

3.3.2. Historical Background of New Security Strategy:

According to Charles Kupchan, candidate George Bush won the election by promising to pursue a more “humble” foreign policy, to scale back America’s international commitments, to be more selective and to focus more attention on her own hemisphere (Kupchan, 2003: 221). He also adds that after the elections, Bush generally adhered to these promises. During his first months, Bush drew down U.S. troops’ levels in Bosnia and reduced America’s role as a mediator in many different regional conflicts.

On the other side, a report of European Union (EU) commission²¹ alleges that while designing defense and security program, the new Administration has developed a new defense and security strategy with far-reaching international consequences. According to this report speeches by the President and the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and a number of program documents, set out a distinctly unilateralist option. The concepts developed subsequently have already been implied in "Rebuilding America's Defenses" (2000), and the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) (2001): unilateral military intervention, with or without UN backing,

²¹ Prepared by the Political Committee of the EU. June 2003. “Europe and New United States National Security Strategy,” *Document A/1819*.

US decision-making on the basis of national interests, pre-emptive warfare, coalitions of the willing and so on. Similarly, John Ikenberry asserts that in its first six months in office, Bush administration signaled towards more unilateral position. It rejected series of international treaties and agreements -- such as Kyoto protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Biological Weapons Convention, UN action on the trade in small arms -- and championed missile defense and its desire to repeal anti-ballistic missile treaty (Ikenberry, 2001/02: 20).

Before September 11, the Bush administration had been in the process of developing a new NSS. This was taking place through the Quadrennial Defense Review as well as in other places. On 30 September 2001, soon after the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration released the congressionally mandated 2001 QDR. The new QDR establishes four functional goals for America's armed forces (QDR-01, p. iii-iv): Assuring allies and friends; dissuading future military competition; deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and decisively defeating any adversary should deterrence fail. QDR puts a distinctive emphasis on war-fighting and war-fighting capabilities. It aims for the decisive defeat of adversaries. It defines quite ambitiously in terms of "changing the regime of an adversary state" and occupying "foreign territory until U.S. strategic objectives are met." (QDR-01, p. 13).

During the one-year period between 2001 and 2002, administration of the U.S. started to prepare a new security doctrine. All speeches of Bush and other administrators formed the roots of the new strategy. Even, this doctrine is defined by the Philip Zerikow as a more comprehensive articulation of themes that the President Bush had already begun to introduce in his speeches in different places (Zelikow, 2003: 17). First message related to the new strategy was the President Bush's

remarks on September 20, 2001; "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." (Hirsh, 2002). On 6 October 2001, a new element was introduced; the U.S. would "fight evil regimes". On 29 January 2002, in his State of the Union address, Bush finally criticized the terrorists of 'rogue states'²²: "States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil".²³ In addition, he stated that September 11 created unprecedented "new deadly challenges" that necessitated new approaches and rules for statecraft on June 1, 2002, at West Point. Punishing tyrants like Iraq's Saddam Hussein as international outlaws, the President announced, "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use WMD against the U.S. and our allies and friends.... Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents, whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death.... The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction--and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively." (Kegley and Raymond, 2003).

3.3.3. Summary of the New Security Strategy²⁴:

The new security doctrine of the U.S., which has been orienting current American policies, was issued on September 17, 2002. Many allege that there are no

²² The expression of 'rogue states' was used in the Clinton administration for states, which supported terrorism and had a problem for this reason with the U.S. such as North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Cuba and Sudan.

²³ 'Axis of Evil' consists of Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

²⁴ Full text of the New Security Strategy is available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov.nsc>

considerable changes in the new strategy.²⁵ However, the biggest change lies on the fact that anymore there is a strong motive in the strategy to implement determined tough policies due to the September 11. Policies written only on the papers started to become real. Because people who thought that U.S. should pursue and perform more active and dominant policies; and who thought that new terrorism was an enemy which had to be defeated in the new era came together on the same point. In other words, a child, whose name had been evident, was born with the September 11 attacks and started to walk when it was twelve-month-old.

The new Strategy consists of nine chapters apart from foreword of the President Bush. As a beginning, Bush clearly declared that new type of terrorism is the enemy of the U.S. in the new era (NSS, 2002: i). Declaration of war against terrorism is made and methods used in the war are put. Threats sourcing from both WMD and weak states are pointed.

In the first section of the Strategy, the unparalleled military power of the U.S. is emphasized. It is recommended that this power be used for the encouraging balance of power, which supports freedom (NSS, 2002: 1). So, it starts with a 'power' analysis before pointing out the goals. The primary goal of the strategy is identified as to assist making the world not only safer but also better place.

In the second section, the first thing that the U.S. will do to achieve her aim is elucidated as to defend liberty and justice for all people (NSS, 2002: 3).

The third section obviously puts that U.S. is in a global war against terrorism. Changing features of terrorism as a threat can be seen from different aspect in this chapter (NSS, 2002: 5). The target is shown here very clear. The terrorism and the states, which support and give permission to terrorism activities and organizations,

²⁵ Condoleezza Rice recalls that the National Security Strategy does not overturn previous doctrines (Rice, 2002: 6).

are accepted as enemies. Strategy explicitly pronounces that there will be no distinctions between terrorists and such kind of states. Additional point is that, it is accepted that fighting against terrorism is not same with any other war in their history. Therefore, methods and strategies of this war will be different. The U.S. plans to annihilate and disrupt terrorism by using all the elements of national and international measures in order to prevent terrorists to gain or use WMD, defending the U.S. and her interests in the whole world by multilaterally or unilaterally if necessary, disallowing further sponsorship, support and shelter to terrorists by convincing or coercing states. Moreover, it is implied that this war will be long and Afghanistan was the first step of this war. The most noteworthy theme is acting unilaterally if necessary.

The section four outlines the problematic regions and regional conflicts are indicated. Israeli- Palestine conflict, problem between India and Pakistan, situations of Mexico, Brazil, Canada, and Indonesia, regional conflicts in Latin America, and problems in Africa are pointed out. Approaches of the America to these problems are enlightened in general.

In the fifth section, characteristics of 'rouge states' are listed as brutalizing their own public, no respect to the international laws and agreements, determining to have WMD and using as a threat to the rest of the world, supporting terrorism, refusing fundamental human values and hating the U.S and everything related with the U.S. (NSS, 2002: 14). The U.S. government thinks that terrorists and rouge states must be stopped before they threat to the world with WMD or use them. It is accepted that deterrence is not a useful action against this type of enemies and threats (NSS, 2002: 15). For that reason, it is declared that preemptive actions will be used to defend national security of the U.S. Because the new Strategy believes that international

laws permit every state to apply such kind of action if there is an imminent danger of attack.

Section six investigates the economic side of the security on the world level. It is expressed that the global economic growth is useful for the national security. Besides, it is emphasized that the U.S. will strengthen global energy security for her own (NSS, 2002: 19).

In the following part, the document shows the measures and methods for repair the income distribution and to defeat poverty in the world.

The eighth section emphasizes the international cooperation and harmony. It also gives importance to the international institutions to use implementing America's strategies. Successful operations of some institutions such as NATO are mentioned. It is pointed that new kind of alliance is required for the new era.

In the last section, some necessary adaptations of the U.S.'s institutions to the new era are indicated. Obligation of transformation, particularly for the army, to fight against new threats is stated. In the meantime, no state or army will be permitted to compete with the U.S. power (NSS, 2002: 30). Another important point for the modification, it is asserted that the U.S. will require new bases within Western Europe and Northeast Asia (NSS, 2002: 29). It is also emphasized that this war will not be 'a clash of civilizations'. Aim of the U.S. for the Muslim states is expressed battle for the future of the Muslim world.

3.3.4. Main Parameters of the New Security Strategy:

Due to being a superpower, her strategies are conducted not only for one aim but for many. First, this new strategy must first save the superpower image of the U.S.; second compensate for pain of the U.S. nation; third give new kind of strong deterrence messages to both terrorists and states, which support terrorists' activities

and fourth solve the unsolved problems and shape the world according to desires and priorities of the U.S. Such a strategy would provide the U.S. with the ability to control all things and to minimize whole risks, which could be direct to interests of the U.S. in the perspective of 'area control'. Because a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985: 10). Although it consists of nine chapters, this strategy, as Kirshner points out, can be summarized with preemption, unilateralism and primacy (Kirshner, 2003: 1-11).

3.3.4.1. Preemptive Strike:

The NSS, for the survival of the U.S., calls for preemptive military action against hostile states and terrorist groups seeking to develop WMD. Pre-emptive action means striking first at an adversary that is about to attack (Gaddis, 2002).²⁶ The NSS tries to specify a legal basis for preemption by alleging that international law recognizes "nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack." (NSS, 2002: 15).²⁷ "The best defense is offence" or "the offense knows where it will strike, but the defense does not" can be seen as the starting point of this main theme.

Administration officials have consistently stated that the concept of preemption is focused on terrorists and rogue states. Though the President seems to have avoided the term "axis of evil" since he used it in his January 2002 State of the Union address, the NSS's characterization of rogue states appears to define the common traits of countries in the chapter five of the strategy (Bunn, 2003). The NSS defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against

²⁶ Sometimes prevention and preemption are confused. Prevention action is undertaken even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack (Kirshner, 2003: 2). Some asserts that the strategy implies prevention not preemption. On the other hand, Haine and Lindström asserts that although there is a clear difference between preemption and prevention, the NSS avoids making such distinctions (Haine and Lindström, 2004).

²⁷ On the other hand, some, like Kegley and Raymond, assert that preemption represents a direct rejection of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter that condones war only in self-defense (Kegley and Raymond, 2003).

innocents" and focuses on disrupting and destroying "terrorist organizations of global reach" as a priority. Main reason of this vision is the thought that traditional deterrence methods now are unsuccessful to such kind of threats to defend U.S. (Köni, 2003a: 82). Krauthammer argues that the doctrine of preemption is an improvement on classical deterrence (Krauthammer, 2004). The document assumes that containment and deterrence, the strategic pillars during the Cold War, are no longer applicable in a world where the threat of retaliation "is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states." (Haine and Lindström, 2004). Colin Powell asserts that undeterrable enemies are the first reason to apply preemption (Powell, 2004).

September 11 showed that terrorism carries big risks for the U.S. since she is the major target. Now, there is a non-state actor, which cannot be deterred by traditional measures. Anything can be done anytime. According to the U.S., even the slightest risks should not be taken since it may cause great casualties. President Bush has said if they recognize a clear and present threat that is undeterrable by the means they have at hand, then they must deal with it. They do not wait for it to strike; and do not allow future attacks to happen before they take action (Kirshner, 2003: 1-11). Powell asserts that second reason for including the notion of preemption in the NSS is to convey to their adversaries that they are in big trouble (Powell, 2004). According to their thought, instilling a certain amount of anxiety in terrorist groups increases the likelihood that they will cease activity or make mistakes and be caught. Namely, concept of deterrence turns into preemption action.

3.3.4.2. Unilateralism:

The NSS expresses a commitment to multilateral international cooperation, but makes clear that the U.S. "will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary" to defend national interests and security. Although unilateral action is mentioned two times in

the strategy, it should be remembered that main idea of the paragraphs, articles or statements is either in the beginning or at the end. If someone tries to find the main idea, he should look at beginning or ending. First using of “unilateral action if necessary” is in the beginning of the enemy definition and second using is at the end of the strategy. Thus, unilateral action is one of the cornerstones of the strategy.

According to Robert Jervis, preventive wars is linked to the fundamental unilateralism in the Bush doctrine since forming a consensus for such strong actions in the international arena is very difficult (Jervis, 2003: 374). Many states mean many problems for taking a decision. Many the U.S. administration members perceive institutions as a ‘hobble’. Terrorism is one of the chief subjects, which can be perceived differently from state to state. There is not even a common definition for it. Bush stated, “Yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events while dangers gather.” in the state of Union Address on January 29, 2002. The administration thinks that there is no time to loose for punishing terrorists by waiting other states consensus. The president Bush declares in the strategy, “We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best” (NSS, 2002: ii).

If the strategy is examined carefully, in six chapters of nine, alliance and coalitions or working together are mentioned. Moreover, ally, coalition and such kind of topics are mentioned for twenty-five times. Strategy admits that multilateralism is important but sense of multilateralism in the document is different. Multilateralism is accepted but under the leadership of the U.S. Besides, it should be considered that people who contributed to preparation of the strategy generally think that institutions or multilateralism has been hindering to implement U.S.’s interests.²⁸ The U.S. thinks that as well as the relatively limited capacities of international or

²⁸ For instance, Richard Perle is one of those people. He made a comment in *Guardian* on March 21, 2003 under the title of “Thank God for the death of the UN”.

regional bodies such as the UN and EU, she possesses a unique role in coping with the most urgent international problems, whether in regional conflicts, ethnic cleansing, financial crises, or other kinds of issues (Lieber, 2002). For instance, although NATO invoked Article V after the attacks, the U.S. acted alone in the Afghanistan operation.

3.3.4.3. Primacy of Power:

In order to implement first two idea, preemptive and unilateralist action, power is the necessary element. For the security of U.S., NSS sees the military strength as obligatory since it defines primary mission of the military as defending the U.S. The strongest military means the strong U.S. and it means more security.

The Bush NSS confidently acknowledges America's unparalleled position of power in the world²⁹ and clearly holds the argument that a fundamental goal of U.S. grand strategy should be to maintain her position (NSS, 2002: 30). Because, the NSS document expresses a need to maintain that position to discourage other nations from acquiring weapons to challenge U.S. power on the one side, American power is essential to the building and maintenance of existing order on the other side.

In addition, the unparalleled hegemonic position enjoyed by the U.S. is now a welcome reality that offers opportunities to shape the international arena. Thus, the NSS announces that the U.S. has it and she will not allow her global military strength to be challenged by any foreign power. So according to strategy, big states realizing the power of the U.S. will choose to cooperate with the U.S., there will be no competition in other states hence the world will be safer.

Besides, with relation to protecting even increasing American power NSS clarifies that the U.S. will require bases and stations within and beyond Western

²⁹ This topic is highlighted seven times in the strategy.

Europe and Northern Asia (NSS, 2002: 29). Power of the U.S. will be made stronger by the help of these new bases. They will supply to let world know about the power of the U.S. more dominantly.

3.3.4.4. Miscellaneous:

Of course, there are some other themes in the doctrine. Nevertheless, they are not as important as first three. Spreading democracy can be listed as a sub-theme. It has started to become even more important than first three issues with 'Greater Middle East Project' (GME). NSS states that the U.S. will spread democracy and freedom for human dignity. Strategy involves 'democratic peace' thesis: that open democratic polities are less able or willing to use power in an arbitrary and indiscriminate manner against other democracies (Russett and O'Neal, 2001: 6-25). Thus, problem issues especially terrorism will be solved by the help of democracy. NSS targets especially Muslim countries (NSS, 2002: 6 and 31). Regime changes for this purpose are the main subject for the NSS.

Other sub-theme may be the security of energy resources for the U.S. (NSS, 2001: 19). NSS expresses that the U.S. will strengthen her own energy security in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region. So interests of the U.S. could be secured. No country could use the energy as a 'card' against the U.S. The NSS accepts that while doing this, the U.S. would need new bases.

Indeed, first three main elements emphasized in the NSS are like a path showing how the miscellaneous issues will be managed or executed. Sub-theme issues can be perceived as targets on the one side, main parameters of the strategy can be seen as methods to reach these targets on the other side. That is to say, foremost elements of the strategy are methodology to pursue the aims. This

methodology is a clue of American policies' direction within the frame of 'war against terrorism'.

3.4. Directions of the U.S Foreign Policy within the Frame of Realist New Security Strategy:

Terrorism became the major element to direct American policies. The NSS, based on 'war against terrorism' has shaped foreign and security policies of the U.S. After explaining main parameters of security strategy, new directions of the U.S.'s policies can be understood by looking at the theoretical roots of it. At first sight, new strategy seems to be a mix of two main approach of international relations theory; realism and liberalism.³⁰ However, its realism aspects are dominant factors in the strategy. Especially, people who prepared this strategy generally share realist arguments.

According to realism, state is the most important or principal actor. It is state centric. State is viewed as a unitary and rational actor. Realism depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war (Ari, 2002: 121-136). There is hierarchy between issues, those of military and security have a priority, and they are called as 'high politics'. According to Tim Dunne all realists subscribe to the following 'three Ss': statism, survival, self-help (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001:150).

According to realism, the primary objective of all states is survival. This is the most important national interest to which all politicians must adhere. In order to preserve the security of their state, leaders must adopt an ethic, which judges actions according to outcome rather than act is wrong or right (Morgenthau and Thompson,

³⁰ Michael Hirsh argues that the president Bush in the middle of 'titanic fights' between Secretary of State Colin Powell and his lonely band of moderate multilateralists, the Donald Rumsfeld-Dick Cheney axis of realist unilateralists, and a third group of influential neoconservatives led by Wolfowitz (Hirsh, 2002).

1985: 10). If a state tries to provide her security, she must be aware of dangers, anticipate them and take precautions. Political leaders should not wait for things to happen or others to act. It can clearly be matched with the preemption theme of the NSS.

Additionally, realism argues that no other state can be depended on to guarantee your survival. State actors are responsible for ensuring their own survival (Ari, 2002: 120-121). Realists do not believe it is prudent for a state to entrust its safety on another actor or international institutions such as UN. This argument of realism can be perceived equal to the unilateralism theme of the NSS.

Statism is the centerpiece of realism. It involves two claims; one is that state is the preeminent actor and others are less significant, the other is that state sovereignty signifies the existence of an independent community. For the survival and security, states seek power. Strong states can give a route to the international politics in proportion to their power (Forde, 1995: 375-376). In addition, power consists of effect and capacity (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985: 10). Power does not have any meaning if it is not used. In order to be able to provide great effect of capacity, state must change static power into dynamic power. Primacy issue of the NSS can be matched with realism's principle of statism.

Matching of Statism (Power)-Primacy, Survival (Deterrence)-Preemption and Self_Help-Unilateralism can be can be done within this perspective. Namely, New Security Strategy of the U.S. for the war against terrorism was prepared within the standpoint of realism. That is to say, peculiarities of realism would give clear hints about U.S.'s activities. For that reason, other clarifying other issues of realism will be useful to see route of the U.S.

According to realism, elements orienting the statesman are fear, suspect, security dilemma, insecurity, prestige and interests. Especially fear and fear-rooted insecurity are main reasons, which compel states to make a war (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001:150). It is the duty of a statesperson to make calculations rationally in a hostile and threatening environment. Fear of terrorism settled into the minds of administration members like all Americans after the September 11. It even became 'phobia'. Since political leaders must firstly pursue national interests and protect state from external threats, the U.S. would try to find a country or countries for defeating fear or gaining self-confidence again. First conclusion about NSS of the U.S. can be pointed as a war, hot war. Since the NSS of the U.S. carries realist elements, war would be product of NSS.

Furthermore, for realists, survival of the state can never be guaranteed thus the use of force is a legitimate instrument of statesman. Machiavelli argued that an ethic of responsibility is the limits of ethics in international politics (Arl, 2002: 124). Preserving the life of the state and community is the moral duty of statesperson. If a war is considered necessary to protect national interest, it is moral. Thus, outcomes of actions are important. If the result is positive for state, it is moral (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985: 12). That is to say, realism does not concentrate on right-wrong or legal-illegal war. Second result can be concluded from this perspective of realism as; war, which would be made by the U.S., would not have been legal or illegal. It would not be a problem for the U.S.

As well, realism perceives self-defense concept very broadly. If threat is clearly perceived, there is no need to wait for other side's action. That is, realism legitimizes hegemony (Forde, 1995: 375-376). Moreover, Carr argues that, a war, which was started due to the security anxieties self-defense primarily, can turn into an attack-

war (Carr, 1972: 23-40). He gave an example that, World War I begun for defense but then it turned into a war for gaining a territory. Third result for the U.S. policy, war against terrorism would turn a tool for hegemonic aspirations. Alternatively, 'war against terrorism' would target wrong cases; there would have been some deviations.

These three outcomes for the U.S.'s policies after declaring NSS were not surprising because NSS carries realist features and such results are the main products of realistic policies. Henceforward more specifically;

U.S. policy became more assertive and offensive. Preemptive and/or preventive actions take place around the policy makers as well as the society. International norms would not be criteria for the U.S. if they were not consistent with interests of the U.S. The emphasis upon the readiness to use of force in the international arena pronounced more and sooner or later, the U.S. government would have to present the U.S. public with some concrete results of its struggle against terrorism. This became an incentive for broadening military operations and orients them towards areas where the changes of achieving an impressive victory are greater. The U.S. has counted on herself and refrained from other international actors for fighting terrorism. At the same time, other countries' attitudes towards the U.S. struggle with terrorism will be criteria for U.S. policy towards them. These tendencies and directions took the U.S. to the Middle East region.

3.5. Heading towards Middle East to Implement the New Strategy:

New NSS designated a mainframe of how the war on terrorism would be performed. Middle East which can be named as the 'rotten tooth' was chosen for the implementation of the NSS. Main reason of this choice is security anxiety. According to Ronald Asmus, threat for the U.S. public comes from Middle East after

the Cold War (Asmus and Pollack, 2004). Because U.S. perceives that terrorist attacks, targeting US, stem from this region. Dictators, despotism regimes, poverty, radicalism are seen major causes of terrorism. According to Americans, terrorism can find life-place due to the lack of authority in the region. In their opinion, democracy will fill the absence of authority and it will plug to terrorism canals (Sanberk, 2003). For that reason, U.S. government thinks that democratization of the region is a very important step for the war against terrorism. So transformation decision of the Middle East can be seen as the output of the NSS or implementation area of it.

Before the Iraq war, Pentagon alleged that by intervening in the Gulf region, global security could be taken under the control (Barnett, 2003). Barnett alleges that war in the Gulf will mark a historical tipping point—the moment when Washington takes real ownership of strategic security against terrorism and rouge states. In addition, R. Asmus asserts that democratic, economic and political transformation must be done in the region and nowhere is that kind of change needed more than GME (Asmus, 2003). Such kind of thoughts mean that war against terrorism in the Middle East, by transforming it, has replaced the struggle with communism especially in the Europe in the Cold War era. Beginning of this phase became Iraq War.

Indeed, interests of the US in the region are not limited with security for terrorism. Energy security especially petroleum, ensuring Israel's survival, forestalling the emergence of a hostile regional hegemon can be listed as other interests (Lesser, Nardulli and Arghavan, 172). In other words, U.S. will gain multidimensional interest by dealing with this region within the perspective of war against terrorism. Not one but more than one aim is not abnormal for the superpower. In addition, it should not be forgotten that war against terrorism might be easily

deviated from original purposes (Özcan, 2003: 95-101). Beginning aims and destination points may be very different. It exists in the soul of war against terrorism.³¹ As well, NSS is based on realist arguments and according to realists as Carr argues that, a war, which was started due to the security anxieties self-defense concept at first, can turn attack-war (Carr, 1981: 23-40). Concerning to this idea, Iraq War can be characterized as a deviation from war against terrorism. But by the tactical and operational changes in the transformation period, this deviation can be removed while the purpose of war against terrorism remains the same.

On the other hand, in Iraqi War period the U.S. comforted with the main parameters of the own NSS. Firstly, WMD was showed as a reason for war. Iraq had used such kind of weapons two times in the history; one was against Iran the other was against her own Kurdish people. Many people (were) believed that there were WMD in Iraq. According to U.S. government there was not any guarantee that those WMD would not be used against to the U.S. by Saddam or any terrorist groups. Moreover, Iraq had resisted for a long time to give permission to UN commission to inspect WMD in Iraq. It increased suspicions. At the end, WMD became the main reason for war. This opinion reminds us to preemption even prevention parameter of the NSS.³²

Secondly, although there were strong oppositions in the international arena, U.S. did not give up the idea of war with Iraq. Many EU states, including Germany and permanent member of the UN Security Council France, in addition to permanent member of the UN Security Council, Arab States opposed the U.S. who was trying to convince them. After US understood that they were not convinced to be with US, she

³¹ The similar instance was seen in Turkey with Susurluk case. While struggling with terrorism different methods, the state lost the control of her tools and many illegal events was appeared for that reason.

³² On the other hand, after the Iraqi war, WMD claims were disproved.

decided to act with her own decision by the help of some supporter states. So unilateral act when it is necessary pointed in the NSS was implemented.

Thirdly, while doing this unilaterally, the U.S. proved her army power. War was won within 20 days although Turkey did not allow U.S. to open north front. Many thought that, especially in Turkey, the U.S. could not be successful without opening a north front. Even some alleged that Iraqi army would strongly resist the American soldiers. Nevertheless, it did not become so. American primacy and military technology was demonstrated all over again.

Spreading democracy pointed in the NSS was also objected by explaining aim of the war as 'democratization of Iraq'. Also undertaking the Middle East would provide energy security, which was indicated in the chapter six of NSS.

In spite of strong oppositions in the world, war decision of U.S. showed that she was very serious about shaping the Middle East. Persuasive deterrence of her has increased. Although she stumbles in Iraq,³³ Iran and Libya accepted to be inspected for nuclear and biologic activities. Syria is also in some actions, which aim to prove that she does not support terrorist activities, such as trying to establish close relations with Turkey and to solve problems with Israel. Namely, these countries have understood the seriousness of the U.S. about the region. From now on, even if the U.S. apply soft power in place of hard power for transforming the region, region countries undoubtedly bear in their mind that the U.S. can apply hard power when she sees it necessary.

GME initiative, which is mentioned after the Iraq war, is the indication that transformation of the region will be continued with some tactical changes. This

³³ Indeed stumbling of the US in Iraq is not surprising. Until this time, the U.S. made 200 foreign interventions. She has aimed to state building in 16 of them but she has only accomplished four cases; Germany, Japan, Panama and Grenada.

project, although it has not completely explained,³⁴ aims to compensate for Iraq War wrongs, difficulties. Moreover, U.S. tries to insert NATO and EU in changing period for gaining international support and sharing burdens. Nevertheless, all events will be under the control of her authority.

This project includes series of political, economic and military programmes (Perthes, 2004:1). These will include multilateral and bilateral measures to democratize Middle Eastern countries, offers of free trade made to individual countries, the geographical extension and deepening of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-Mediterranean partnership and programme of military cooperation akin to NATO's Partnership for Peace (Wright, 2004). It calls for the U.S. and Europe to press for and assist free elections, foster new independent media, help create a "literate generation," establish a greater Middle East Development Bank modeled on Europe's postwar model, translate Western classics into Arabic, and give \$500 million in loans to small entrepreneurs, especially women, according to the draft report (Çongar, 2004). This initiative contains 22 countries and Turkey, Israel, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It surrounds North Africa, Arab peninsula, Caucasus and Afghanistan shortly Muslim countries. Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright evaluate GME initiative as Helsinki accord of the Middle East³⁵ (Kessler and Wright, 2004). The help of this project will pull terrorism to tolerable level, security of petroleum will be supplied and democracy will be established in the region countries (Özcan, 2004).

³⁴ This project was discussed in G-8 summit in June 2004 and it will also be discussed in NATO Summit in June 2004. An eight-page draft of the plan was first published on the Web site of the London newspaper Al Hayat on February 26, 2004.

³⁵ In 1975, 35 countries was signed an agreement in Helsinki in order to oppress Soviet Union and Eastern Europe States for more freedom. There were some 'magic' concepts in accord such as freedom, human rights, democracy, free trade, support to opposition parties.

GME project proves that Iraq was first step of the transformation. Name of the transformation project will be GME or different. Since failure is not an option for both the U.S. and all other states, changing period will be continued. In view of the fact that communism threat was replaced by terrorism, new struggle field is anymore Middle East. In addition, this struggle will be very long like fifty-year Cold War period. It can be alleged that GME project may not be succeeded as it is proposed. However, transformation of the Middle East is seemed inevitable because the U.S. produces terrorism-oriented policies. This transformation period will affect all countries especially region countries including Turkey.

As a result, after the cold war there were great debates about defining new enemy in the U.S. People, who thought that terrorism was a number one threat for the U.S., got the 'victory' 'by the help of September 11'. Public now are convinced. Great majority, thinking that war against terrorism had to be done, in the public were formed. On the other side another group in the administration and public, who thought that U.S. should have perceived more assertive policy in the international arena to strengthen her power, gained to atmosphere to realize their ideas and plans. The consolidation of two groups formed nearly all of the U.S. due to the September 11 and gave the reason for new security strategy whose main themes were depended on the realistic thoughts. By preparing and implementing new strategy, former became happy for seeing war against to terrorism later was also happy for seeing assertive policy to show American power while fighting against to terrorism. It should not be forgotten that new terrorism formed such kind of situation by executing September 11. Some type of war seemed inevitable. Battlefield was determined as Middle East where was seen as roots of terrorism.

This new strategy and war against terrorism will affect Turkey's security because three of seven 'rouge states' and two of three 'axis of evil' states are neighbors of Turkey. Moreover, battlefield chosen by the U.S. is next to Turkey. All eyes turned to the Middle East and especially on Iraq. First step of the NSS was carried out in Iraq neighbor of Turkey. Moreover, US want to give some role for Turkey. GME project includes Turkey. Both her geographic position and her alignment with the US make inevitable that Turkey will be included this war and transformation period like in the Cold War. War and transformation is next to Turkey. This means that there will be important outcomes for Turkey's security. Yet in order to better analyze the inevitable changes for Turkish security, it is necessary to see how the traditional Turkish security concerns were outlined before the September 11 world affairs.

CHAPTER IV:

SECURITY POLICY AND THREAT PERCEPTION OF TURKEY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Turkey whose main security policy is to protect territorial integrity already concentrated on the Middle East long before the U.S. due to the some security anxieties coming from this region. Terrorism was the main reason of this. Even, it can be said that due to the Middle East, Turkey's foreign policy was established on security issues or more correctly, it was "securitized". In the previous chapters, new terrorism and new American NSS were analyzed. To point out whether implementation of the American NSS in the Middle East increased or decreased Turkey's security anxieties and what kind of changes occurred in Turkey's threat and security assessments, firstly traditional security issues and threat perceptions for Turkey should be clarified. In this chapter, Turkey's post-Cold War era security policy and threat assessment in the period between 1991 and 2002 will be clarified in order to point out what the security means for Turkey and what kind of events are evaluated as a threat.

During the Cold War, Turkey paid attention on Soviet Union and Greece in terms of security issues. However, in the post-Cold War era, Turkey has been focused more heavily than ever before on events to the South not as an alternative foreign policy direction but as a response to security challenges related with both

external and internal dimensions (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003: 127). These challenges emerged with the end of the Cold War and new and more dangerous threats appeared for Turkey from the South. Double-team of Greece and Soviet was replaced with the team of Greece and the Middle East. Thus, Turkey has revised her security policies and threat perceptions in the new context. Main idea about security, to protect territorial integrity is the same but focused direction is different.

At first events occurring after the Cold War, which affected Turkish foreign and security policy, will be clarified. Disintegration of the Soviet Union and Gulf War in 1991 made considerable changes on Turkey's security and threat assessments. After putting these developments, leading threats Turkey concentrated on, especially in the new era, will be put one by one. Because of the changing conditions and emerging new threats, Turkey revised her national security policy and threat assessment. The National Security Policy and Military Strategy shaped by these threats and events will be explained. Considering of her security policy, Turkey perceived the threat from the South more heavily than the other regions. Lastly, measures Turkey has taken will be pointed for proving that threat perception and security calculation of Turkey changed and directed to the South from the North.

4.1. Post-Cold War Developments Causing to Change Turkey's Security Assessments:

In Turkey, although threat perceptions and directions have been changed, main parameter of the security policy is the same; to protect territorial integrity (White Papers, 2003). It is seen as the core of security policy of Turkey. Considering the main parameter, methods and strategies have been modified parallel with changing events in the world. According to Ergüvenç, there were some important events, which caused to change in Turkey's security evaluation, in the period between 1991

and 2002 (Ergüvenç, 1998: 34-42). First one is the disintegration of the Soviet Union and second is the Gulf War in 1991. Just as other states modified their security perceptions again so Turkey evaluated her position, assessments and made radical changes in her policies for her core aim in the light of these developments. They radically altered Turkey's foreign and security policy by creating opportunities to expand its role while also posing new risks and challenges (Sayari, 2000: 169-183).

Weakening of 'Russian threat' was the most important result of disintegration of the Soviet Union in terms of Turkey. Turkey's traditional security policy was based on Greece and especially Soviet threats. Owing to the Soviet demands from Turkey and communism jeopardy, Turkey had wanted to be a member of NATO and she became. This threat together with problems existing with Greece gave a framework to Turkey for foreign and security policy (Lesser, 2002: 275-299).

Indeed 'Moscow threat' phobia reached over to the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire. Turks' policy with including the Ottoman period had been defensive since the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000: 196-216) and this continued to beginning of 1990s. After the disintegration, the pressure of Soviet Union on Turkey was removed although it did not disappear completely. Russia was not as strong as before, she had her own problems especially about economic issues and domestic problems. As well, Turkey does not have land border with Russia. In order to gain her previous activity and to be able to maintain her dominance in the world, Russia has tried to make good relations with other states especially about energy issue. She applied military methods only within the Russia and ex-Soviet states. There is no doubt that Russia is still very strong and important country not only in the region but also in the world, however she is not perceived as a direct threat to Turkey's integrity.

Moreover, regarding to threat assessment, as Hunter pointed, Turkey has benefited from the systemic changes triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union: the collapse of the Soviet Union has weakened Turkey's enemies and rivals such as Syria, Iraq and Iran, thereby relieving Turkish foreign and security policy of certain constraints and increasing its options (Hunter, 1999). So this can be seen as a positive impact. Thus, this situation gave an opportunity to Turkey to play more dynamic role in the region and to change her policy from defensive to active. Even Turkey's role was started to be defined as 'pivotal state'³⁶ by many strategists (Makovsky, 1999: 49) due to having border with the Middle East, which is the most problematic area of the world.

On the other hand, there were some negative impacts of disintegration of the Soviet Union in terms of Turkey's security. After the dissolution of Soviet Union risk free region such as Balkans and Middle East increased, while as Turkey had found itself facing with new risks and challenges. Turkey places at the centre of the Balkans; Middle East and the Caspian Region. According to the NATO's Military Committee (MC) 161 Document, there are 16 regions, which are determined by the Alliance as "instable and risky", and 13 of them are just said to be around Turkey (Ateşoğlu, 2003). Unstable condition emerging in the Balkans and in the Middle East became 'headaches' for Turkey. There are 13 countries around Turkey in the new context with 11 different ethnic nationalities in addition to speaking 10 different languages and practicing 6 different religions (Ergüvenç, 1998: 43-42) and all of them have their own different historical experiences and aspirations. This diversity created big conflicts in some regions such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia in the Balkans or Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucasus. Middle East is

³⁶ Definition and information about the pivotal states can be found in Chase, Robert, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy. January/February 1996. "The Pivotal States," *Foreign Affairs*.

problem all on its own with Israel-Palestine problem, terrorism issue and, energy, petroleum struggle of states. Turkey placed at the heart of fire.

As she places in the middle of these unsteady regions, Turkey has been anxious about her security especially about the Middle East. There have been unsteady in the Balkans but there have not been direct threat to Turkey's integrity. In order to be dominant regional power and due to having close historical and cultural ties with Balkan people, Turkey of course has concerned with those problems. Nevertheless, those problems have never posed unease to Turkey in terms of home security. On the other hand, situation of the Middle East is different. In the Middle East, the conflict has never been lack. Iran-Iraq war, Arab-Israeli conflicts, supports of Syria, Iran, and Iraq to terrorism against to Turkey, energy issues have made the region more complex. Finding a solution to these problems has been difficult. Especially desire of region countries to be a hegemonic power has prevented to find a solution (Yilmaz, 2002: 115-140). Turkey's security has been directly affected by unsteadiness in the region. Especially terrorism issue became major problem for Turkey in the new era.

Beginning of the Gulf War in 1991, owing to the occupation of Iraq to Kuwait is second important event, which caused significant changes on Turkey's security directions. Traditional policy of Turkey towards the Middle East, non-involvement, was given up (Ersoy, 2001: 323-335). During the Cold War period, Turkey, avoided any participation in inter-Arab disputes, Arab-Israeli conflict and other regional conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War in which she maintained scrupulous neutrality. Passive policy was abandoned by giving permission to the coalition forces to use Turkish territory for their operations to bomb Iraq and by closing oil pipelines, which caused then very important economic loses. Besides and more importantly, lack of authority in the north part of Iraq emerged that created very important results for

Turkey. The PKK exploited the collapse of Saddam's power in northern Iraq. Operation Provide Comfort conducted soon after the Cold War aroused suspicious of Turkey since it gave opportunity to Kurds to be freer in the region. Thus, heaviness of southeast in terms of security was felt more dominantly.

4.2. Main Threats to Turkey's Security after the Cold War:

In the light of these events, Turkey has determined her threat assessment in order to adapt herself to new order. While determining her security policy, national interest is the most important factor. Historical ties and geographic position have always become diagnostic points for Turkey to shape security perceptions (Ergüvenç, 1998: 34-42). Turkey's security policy and threat perception was shaped by disintegration of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War. Relations with countries and events experienced by Turkey became a guide in the phase of shaping the new security policy of Turkey. So as to understand why Turkey's security relations and policies have been concentrated on south, threats, emerged and condensed after the Cold War, have to be clarified. These threats can be listed as terrorism, probability of a 'Kurdish state', WMD, fundamentalism and Iraq, Iran and Syria's desires and activities against Turkey.

4.2.1. Terrorism

After the Cold War, the most important threat became the PKK/KADEK separatist terrorism³⁷ in terms of Turkey's security. Especially after 1990, terrorist activities became the most important agenda of Turkey's security. Nearly 30,000 people have died and 85 billion dollars have been spent for struggling with terrorism (Kirişçi, 2002a: 151-180). Particularly lack of authority in the north part of the Iraq after the Gulf War supplied terrorist to move freely in the region. Between 1993 and

³⁷ Detailed information about the PKK terrorism can be found in Nihat Ali Özcan. 1999. PKK-Kürdistan İşçi Partisi: Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yönetimi (PKK-Kurdistan Worker Party: Its History, Ideology and Administration). Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları.

1995 terrorist activities reached to the top. Apart from the economic losses, which could have been spent for development of the country, due to dying of many people and danger to ambition of separatism, Turkey took strict measures both in and out of the country. The NSC affirmed in the national security document of 1992 that the threat of the terrorism with a motion of separatism was the foremost threat against Turkey's security (Turkpulse, 2001).

Because of fighting against the terrorism in the post-Cold War era, Turkish foreign policy and mutual relations with other states depended on terrorism issue in a great degree. İdris Bal argues that many opportunities were missed in the international arena due to dealing with terrorism (Bal and Aytuğ, 2001: 685-699). Especially relations with Middle East states; Iran, Iraq and Syria, became strained due to their support to terrorism and for many times Turkey warned them for not to give any support to terrorism. Especially, Syria helped terrorists by giving logistics support and head of the terrorists had stayed in Syria until Turkey explicitly threatened in 1998. Bekaa Valley in Syria was a training center of PKK. As for Iraq, As Ümit Özdağ points that Saddam located PKK terrorists in villages where are the near of Turkish border (Özdağ, 1996). Northern Iraq was used as a base by the PKK. Even Tank Aziz, who was the foreign minister of Saddam regime, was showed a file, which proved supports of Iraqi government to PKK when he visited to Turkey in 1999 (Yılmaz, 2002: 115-140).

PKK issue was also matter with Iran since Turkey alleged that some PKK terrorists were settled in the border of Iran. Turkey declared that she had some proofs, which showed Iran support to PKK (Yılmaz, 2002: 115-140). Even it was even rumored that a frustrated Turkish government considered a military attack on PKK bases in Iran in May 1995 (Tempo, 1996). In 1996, due to the terrorist attacks

to villages near the Iran border, the president of Turkey warned Iran very strictly. The refusal of Iran to Turkey's accusations did not decrease the level of tension between both states. Turkey applied different methods such as diplomatic and military measures to protect her territorial integrity against terrorism. For instance, in order to deter these countries, military cooperation agreement was signed with Israel in 1996 (Yılmaz, 2002: 115-140). Moreover, owing to the importance of the threat, Turkey did not give any concession about performing her measures against the terrorism although West has made many criticisms about humanitarian rights and using their weapons in the region. Shortly terrorism has still been one of the main threats for Turkey's integrity and it has still a place at the top of the threat list.³⁸

4.2.2. 'Kurdish State' Threat

Possibility of Kurdish state due to the situation in the Iraq emerged after the Gulf War was another important threat. Due to the lack of official authority in the north part of Iraq, some Kurdish groups started to attempt for establishing a Kurd state. In December 1991 eight Kurdish groups were gathered and took a decision for establish a council. They made an election in 1992 and founded a Council of Minister, which was an important step in terms of their aims of establishing a Kurd state (Arı, 2001: 441-460). According to their desires; in addition to northern Iraq, which is called 'southern Kurdistan' by them, many cities of Turkey such as Hakkari, Diyarbakır even Iskenderun belong to their state. Leaders of Kurd groups have explained several times that they have been waiting for appropriate time to establish a state (Hürriyet, September 8, 2002). Even their names of parties contain 'Kurdistan', which shows their intentions clearly. For that reason, Turkey always declares that integrity of Iraq should be preserved. Turkey sometimes even tried to

³⁸ In an interview of M.Ali Kışlalı, Hilmi Özkök clarified that terrorism is still major problem issue for Turkey. *Radikal* November 9, 2003.

repair the relations with Iraq with for that reason despite American opposition. Common points of terrorism and 'Kurdish state' threats are; they directly targeted territorial integrity of Turkey, they both became stronger after the Gulf War, and lastly they interacted with each other very closely.

4.2.3. Weapons of Mass Destruction

Third threat was WMD and ballistic missiles. Apart from Turkey, all states of the region have ballistic missiles (Kirişçi, 2002a: 151-180). Fueled by a combination of external and internal motives or both, Iran, Iraq and Syria have been acquiring WMD capabilities, along with the means for delivering them. Iran already has a substantial chemical warfare capability. She has been pursuing nuclear and biological weapons (Al, 2001: 3). It also has an advanced long-range ballistic missile development program. WMD has taken great importance particularly after an agreement between Russia and Iran, which was about develop nuclear weapons. Studies of Iran have been continuing and Şahab-3 missile was produced and tested successfully in July 2000 (Sabah, July 18, 2000). Iraq's WMD development programs were on hold while UN sanctions prevail, but it was widely believed that during the Saddam regime, Iraq retained chemical and biological weapons production capability and Baghdad was in a position to produce chemical and biological weapons quickly once international sanctions were lifted. Syria has chemical weapons and a biotechnical infrastructure to support a limited biological warfare program. Damascus increasingly has relied on a strategic deterrent based on ballistic missiles and chemical warfare capabilities (Al, 2001: 2-4). Nowhere else in NATO have been the disturbing effects of WMD proliferation felt more keenly than in Turkey.

Turkey has been completely exposed to WMD threats and to air and missile attacks on its southeastern borders. More than two thirds of Turkey's territory, including the capital city Ankara, and Turkey's other population centers, dams, power stations, air bases, communication facilities and military headquarters are within the range of Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian ballistic missiles. Because these missiles are capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads, Turkey has felt very insecure. (Larrabee, 2003: 142). And there is no guarantee that these states will not use such kind of weapons against Turkey (Kibaroglu, 2002: 61-65). In a crisis with Syria in 1998, Turkey strongly perceived missile threat from Syria. Moreover, in both war being made by UN and U.S. against Iraq in 1991 and in 2003 Turkey demanded from NATO anti ballistic missile protection against to Iraq. A debate about responsibility area of NATO was done due to application of Turkey because Turkey was not sure that NATO would help Turkey to defend against missiles from the Middle East. Since Turkey lacks surface-to-surface missiles, she has based its strategy on detecting and retaliating against missile launching sites in neighboring countries (Kirişçi, 1997). Thus, opinion of making such kind of weapons has been put forward several times (Pak, 2002: 102-117) but due to signing some disarmament agreements and cost of such project is very expensive, Turkey only has tried to improve defence system for protection against WMD (Turgut, 2003: 141-151).

4.2.4. Fundamentalism:

Lastly, with related to internal security problems, fundamentalism has been seen as a threat especially after the second period of the 1990s. Indeed, religious issue has always become sensitive issue for Turkey. Since it directly targets to democratic character of Turkish Republic and aims to regime change, fundamentalism with its external supports has been perceived as one of the most

dangerous threats to Turkey by laic part of the society especially by military. In 1997, General Staff gave a briefing to academicians, journalists, and some Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and declared that there was a change in national military strategic concept. New concept defined two internal threat, divisiveness and fundamentalism supported in a great degree by Iran and Syria and put those threats to the top of the list (Altunışık, 2002: 79-99). Especially, Turkey accused several times Iran for her attempts to export Islamic regime into Turkey. There was some concern among Turkish officials about an Iranian hand in Turkish politics, including philosophical and monetary support for Islamists. Connections of Iran with Hizbullah, Turkey carefully pursued Iran activities not only in Turkey both also in the region. The ambassador of Iran was declared *persona non grata* after his speech, which called for Turkey to prefer the Shari'a in a celebration of 'Jerusalem Day', prepared by Sincan municipality. Since the suspect of regime export of Iran and internal political developments NSC made a change in the national security policy document in 1997 by declaring that fundamentalism or political Islam was as dangerous as terrorism for Turkish Republic (Ülman, 1999: 125). Even this threat caused government changed in 1997 and Erbakan government resigned.³⁹

In addition to these threats, Turkey has faced with some individual troubles with region countries creating problems for her. With three countries, Turkey has a land border there have been important problems causing to form dangerous.

4.2.5. Other Security Problems with Syria, Iraq and Iran:

Syria has been the most problematic country for Turkey especially after 1990s (Yılmaz, 2002: 115-140). Apart from the ballistic missiles and terrorism two issues created problem between Turkey and Syria. First was water matter. Syria has

³⁹ This change is named as an 'unarmed coup' by the Center for Strategic & International Studies. <http://www.csis.org/turkey/TU9706.htm> (16.05.2004).

demanding more water from Turkey and she always becomes uneasy about all Turkey's water projects. Even, support of Syria to PKK terrorism started with the beginning of Southeastern Anatolia Project in order to hinder to such kind of projects. Particularly in 1995, Syria attempted to internationalize the water issue in the platforms of Western and Arab countries (Hürriyet, September 17, 2003). But Turkey has stated several times that water given to Syria is both enough and compatible to international laws.

Second issue with Syria was Hatay. Syria has alleged that Hatay should be in the borders of Syria. Demanding any part of Turkey's territory always makes Turkey uneasy. Apart from all, Syria conducted very close relations with Greece, which could be evaluated as against to Turkey. It is known that both states made an agreement, which included cooperation in military activities, and according to this treaty if Greece had made a war with Turkey, Greece warplane would have used Syrian air bases (Turkish Daily News, August 10, 1996). Even, as a result of this agreement some Greece warplane got off Syrian air bases while they were conducting military practice in the Mediterranean. Both states pursued the policy that 'enemy of my enemy is my friend'. Former ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ proposed to produce a 2½ strategy, which was against to Greece, Syria and PKK (Elekdağ, 1996). Elekdağ's scenario came close to reality in mid-1996 (Kirişçi, 1997). Turkey and Syria amassed troops along the border after Syrian claims that Turkey was behind a series of bomb attacks in Syrian cities. This coincided with tense Turkish-Greek relations over the islands of Kardak/Imea, which nearly brought war in January/February. In April, tension resurfaced after a Greek patrol boat fired on a Turkish fishing boat and the Greek government withdrew from a foreign ministers' meeting scheduled for June to seek ways to diffuse tensions. These events happened

together with a big military operation in May against the PKK, including an incursion into northern Iraq. According to Makovsky, the Syrian threat was the reason and the common point of Turkey-Israel military cooperation agreement (Makovsky, 1996: 147-171).

As for Iraq, its situation has always been problem for Turkey. For that reason, relations with Iraq can be best identified as an uncertain (Kirişçi, 2002b: 54-78). Since two major threats PKK and sovereign Kurd state have been seen in this region Turkey is always careful about Iraq especially about her territorial integrity. Water issue has also been problem with Iraq tough not as big as Syria. Turkey was explicitly threatened by the Saddam regime two times. In 1991, because of the Turkey's permission to bomb Iraq from her air bases to use her airspace, Iraq warned Turkey to retaliate. Additionally in 1999, Iraq another time threatened to Turkey because of Turkey's support to U.S. policies in the region. Gaining ballistic missiles made probable to attack of Iraq to Turkey, by looking past war examples such as Iran, Kuwait.

There were also several problems with Iran apart from terrorism and regime export problems. In fact, there has been a struggle for being dominant power both in the Middle East and in the Caucasus and being a model for ex-Soviet countries. In addition, competition not only in Central Asia but also in the Caucasus also caused problems between Iran and Turkey.

4.3. Official National Security Policy and Military Strategy of Turkey:

In the directions of new situations and threats emerging after the Cold War, Turkey revised her security policy and threat perception. This new policy's root was established after the Cold War and as times passes it has been shifted according to

new situations. According to Turkish law⁴⁰ national security is expressed as “the preservation and protection against all kind of internal and external threats to the constitutional order of state, her national existence, her integrity and her all political, social, cultural, and economic interests and contractual rights in the international arena”. The national security policy is defined in the same law as “It is a policy including the principles related to internal, external and defense type operations determined by the Council of Ministers within the views determined by the NSC with the objective of providing national security and attaining the national goals”. It is the same law that underlines Atatürk’s principle of ‘Peace at Home, Peace in the World’. Moreover, according to Article 5 of the constitution, the basic aim and responsibility of state is expressed as to protect independence and integrity of Turkish Nation. National Security Policy can be pointed as to protect territorial integrity and national independence, to defence vital national interest against to threats and risks, to provide peace and stability in the region, to contribute global peace and stability (Harp Akademileri, 2001).

In the light of these policies Turkey has aimed; to contribute to peace and security in the region and to spread to large areas, to become a country producing strategy and security that could influence all the strategies aimed as her region and beyond, to become an element of power in her region and to make use of every opportunity and take initiatives for cooperation (White Papers, 2003).⁴¹ These aims show, national security policy of Turkey relies on efforts for lessening tension; avoid any conflict in her neighbors and creating a secure environment for peace and stability (Harp Akademileri, 1996).

⁴⁰ Law No. 2945.

⁴¹ The White Paper is annual open source of the Ministry of National Defence which shows national security policy of Turkey. The second document of Turkey about national security is National Security Policy Document, Red Booklet, which is prepared by National Security Council when changes on it are necessary and it is secret.

States always determine policy and strategy and with the purpose of putting those in a practice. They use some methods. In order to accomplish them, policies must be depended on some military strategies. As to Turkey, military strategies of Turkey's security policy are stated as: deterrence, forward defense, military contribution to crisis management and intervention in crises, collective security (White Papers, 2003).

Owing to existence of many threats toward her in the region, Turkey has applied different methods, which has been changed according to situation, to overcome them. Indeed these methods Turkey used clearly indicate where Turkey concerns more heavily. Deterrence and forward defense are the most important among four of them because these are directly related with to protect territorial integrity and likelihood of use of force. Meaning of the deterrence can be expressed as maintaining a military force aiming to pose an influence. Due to being at the center of instable area and surrounded by uncertainties deterrence is the cornerstone of the Turkey's security. Turkey with her military power, necessity of deterrence, has always applied to this policy against any states, which directly attack her vital national interest. In Aegean Sea about territorial waters and continental shelf, Turkey declared that 12 miles is a reason of war against Greece. In addition, this was used again in the problem of S300 missiles with Greece. Those missiles were settled to Crete although they had been intended to deploy to South Cyprus at first.

Another experience was lived with Syria for two times in 1996 and in 1998. Particularly in 1998, Turkey openly threatened to Syria due to her support of PKK activities and sheltering the head of terrorists and wanted Syria to give up her supports and to surrender the head of terrorists. In October 1998, Commander of Land Forces Atilla Ateş stated that there had been an undeclared war with Syria due

to her support to PKK (Kirişçi, 2002a: 155) and clearly threatened to Syria. Soon after this declaration, Turkey deployed many troops to Syria border. Finally, Syria had to send the head of terrorists out of the country and signed Adana declaration with Turkey about giving up supports to terrorists. Besides Turkey signed an agreement with Israel in 1996 which contained military cooperation in the region (Yılmaz, 2002: 115-140). Although it was declared that the agreement was not against to third country, it is commonly believed that this agreement was signed for deterring region countries. Syria, Iran and Iraq were uneasy owing to the agreement since they perceived this treaty as a big threat for their countries. And they were left no choice but rethinking their policies towards Turkey.

Secondly, that detection of the scope of a possible aggression as early as possible and halting an actual aggression from out of borders is understood from the phrase of forward defense. Turkey has also been using method of forward defense in north part of Iraq for preventing terrorist activities. Due to lack of authority in the region Turkey located some military troops in northern Iraq via agreements about hot pursuit having signed with Iraq in order to provide security of her borders and to be able to control of the region.⁴² For two times in 1992 and 1995, Turkey made big operations in the Iraq borders to prevent and stroke to terrorist activities. Some Turkish military troops have been permanently located beyond Iraq border to be able to control area. Additionally, sense of forward defense can be seen in other issues such as Cyprus and Aegean. Hilmi Özkök pointed strategic importance of Cyprus in the perspective of forward defense, as “any positioned hostile power on the island can be reached all Turkey territory, which can not be reached even by plane now.... We have already some troubles in the West; if there is another trouble in the south it

⁴² The first hot pursuit agreement was signed in 1984 and it was renewed in 1997 (Turkish Daily News, Jan 14, 1997)

means the imprisonment of Turkey” (Radikal, November 9, 2003). Turkey’s insistence about these issues clearly shows that she does not want to be surrounded.

Turkey is quite successful about performing security strategies whose main lines are drawn with National Military Strategy especially executing collective security and military contribution to crisis management. Active participation in international and regional alliances is the third element of her strategy. Especially in the north, in the Black Sea and in the Balkans she has carried out very good jobs. Although number of her neighbors was increased by disentangled of Soviet Union, tension has never increased very seriously for Turkey’s integrity. For example, she started to initiative of Black Sea Economic Cooperation in 1992 and Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR) was created by littoral states of Black Sea. Also she initiated a process called South-East European Coordination Process (SEECP), which brings Turkey together with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Greece, Bosnia-Herzegovina and as an observer Croatia. Another initiative of Turkey in the Balkans is the Multinational Peace Force South East Europe (MPFSEE) originated from a Turkish proposal in 1997.⁴³

Beside her regional cooperation efforts for promotion of peace and stability, Turkey has actively participated in international peace operations from the beginning of 1990s. In Somalia, a Turkish force served in UNOSOM. In the Balkans since 1995 Turkey has taken part an active role in all operations led by NATO; Implementation Force (IFOR), Stabilization Force (SFOR), Kosovo Force (KFOR). Turkish troops have been in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania. Lastly Turkey assumed the command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in

⁴³ More information about these operations can be found in “Turkey’s Security Perspectives and Its Relations with NATO”. Available online at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htm> (10.05.2003)

Afghanistan. Turkey also provides personnel to the Observer Mission in Georgia as well as to the operation in East Timor.

The aim of showing to military strategies of security policy Turkey used is to point out which method Turkey has applied in different region and to indicate real politic policies of Turkey in the Middle East because of changing her threat assessments. Although the Balkan states are one of the most instable regions of the world in the post-Cold War era, Turkey did not show great anxiety in terms of her territorial integrity. On the other hand, in the Middle East, situation is completely different because structure of states and understanding of public is completely different. Chaotic situation has continued more and more in the region and Turkey could not have done something in support of cooperative initiatives. Two different approaches are perceived in two different regions. Security policy of Turkey can be defined as; collective security in the north and real politic in the south. Considering to idea that the most dangerous threat is the nearest, south became very critic. For that reason in the new threat assessment of Turkey, south is given a special importance for territorial integrity.

4.4. Measures Taken by Turkey against threats:

There have been many measures both politically and economically about region but seeing military actions makes easier to perceive that Turkey has concentrated on the south. In 1992, terrorism was put at the top of the threats in national security policy document with passing Greece. Despite some amendments in 1997, 1999 and 2001 in this document, terrorism and fundamentalism were at the top of security risks again (Yücel, 2002: 10). Priorities of them have sometimes changed successively. Military cooperation agreement with Israel can be perceived another military measure to defeat risks and threats. Military Training and Education

Agreement was signed between Turkey and Israel in February 1996. The main objective of the accord was to facilitate cooperation between the two countries in military education through a series of measures, including joint air force training, naval visits, military personnel exchanges and joint training in military academics. A separate agreement signed in December 1996 called for Israel's aid in upgrading Turkey's fleet of F-4 Phantom jets at an estimated cost of \$650 million. It is clear that Turkey expected to accomplish several strategic objectives such as winning to fight against terrorism, deterring region countries for not giving any support to terrorism, because of its increased military cooperation with Israel. Moreover, Turkey tried to find alternative sources for weapon systems and military equipment (Altunışık, 2002: 79-99). The Israel-Turkish agreement of February 1996 was perceived as a realistic move and it was widely perceived that Israeli-Turkish security cooperation would help Turkey in its fight against the PKK (Naaz, 1999). Moreover, Turkey would want to see and use NATO's guarantee in the south region if any country from there attacked, and made a great effort to prevent any change in structure of Article 5 the Washington Treaty of April 1949 establishing NATO, committed member countries to defend any member facing aggression. If it is necessary for putting more specific examples;

Another measure taken by Turkey against new threats was that, many troops were deployed to south eastern and eastern of Turkey and number of soldiers, with gendarmerie, reached nearly 200,000. These troops are normally assigned in other parts of Turkey but due to the terrorism in those years they were assigned in the southeast region. For instance, some troops, which are normally assigned in the Thrace, were used in the south until 2000 and they were taken back to their real area of responsibility gradually not immediately. As well, 'extraordinary situation' was

declared in the southeastern of Turkey and it was conducted until beginning of 2000s. Besides, demands of shortening the period of compulsory military service was refused in those years by indicating terror threat in the southern Turkey.

As well, Turkey has continued to her armament due to maintenance of threats from other states. Her military expenditures are the first in the region and fourth in the NATO.⁴⁴ With relating to this, modernization of weapons, used by army, has been done by taking into consideration the necessities of region's provision. Certainly, NATO standards have been considered but policy of armament and modernizations have been made in the light of 'low intensity conflict'. For example, in the Cold War era, Turkey and Greece were in a competition about armament and each was on the alert for their weapons mutually. In the Post-Cold War era, Turkey has cared about armament of Greece on the one hand, but much paid careful attention about useful arms in fighting against to terrorism. In the light of experiences gained from skirmishes and necessities, many new pickup and jeep was bought and tanks were modernized. In addition, attack helicopters were located and used in the fighting against terrorism in the southeast although Greece had them near the Turkey border. A lot of money has been spent for military operations in the southeastern, for personnel, for arms and for equipments.

Additionally, Turkey has not given any concession when her vital national interest is to subject even if many pressures are made such as in Cyprus issue, both in intervention phase and in a period finding a solution. Alleging violation of human rights in the southeastern of Turkey, some European countries and U.S. did not want to sell weapon to Turkey. For that reason Turkey tried to find alternative channels or states, which could sell weapon, she wanted. She did not submit to those pressures.

⁴⁴ Military expenditures of states can be found in *Monterey Institute of International Studies* and specifically Turkey's expenses look at online <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcssbalanceTurkey.pdf> (10.09.2003)

Fourth, with relating to armament, field manuals of military have been changed considering struggling against terrorism. Not only new field manuals were published but also previous field manuals were adapted by adding new chapters about struggle against terrorism. In the cold war era, information in such kind of field manuals was about especially Soviet Union. Besides until the beginning of 1990s, enemy or 'red powers'⁴⁵ were defined as Soviet armies and its strategies and tactics were written. But in the new field manuals published after 1995, 'red power' concept was changed and information about tactics and strategies about enemy were also changed. As well, measures against WMD are also put these field manuals for protection of soldiers and troops. Safety against Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) arms gained importance in the training and war plans in the army.

Fifthly, command and control structure of army was changed by taking into account both developments in the world and necessities of fighting against terrorism, which requires flexibility and velocity. Number of the Special Forces was increased from one regiment to three and their main activity plans were only about the south eastern and eastern of Turkey. Even changing general tendency or path, which is pursued by the commander who will be the Head of General Staff, is thought to be changed in the Turkish army. Normally first step for being Head of General Staff is to be a commander of 1st Army, then to be commander of Land Forces. But it has been discussed about replace to commander of 1st Army with commander of 2nd. Key point in here is to be able to show the importance of the region by appointing to the commander, who will be the Head of General Staff, to this region as a commander of Army.

⁴⁵ In military terms, the red power symbolizes enemy, the blue powers symbolizes own or ally units.

Consequently, changing security environment with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the Gulf War shifted to milestones of Turkey's security policy. Threats Turkey faced from the south are both internal and external which interact each other -what makes them more dangerous-. All threats emerged for whole world with the end of Cold War, can be seen in Turkey's security assessments. Regional and ethnic conflicts became major problem for Turkey relating with separatist movements. Nearly all countries around Turkey have WMD whose ranges include many important cities and structures of Turkey. Dealing with every kind of terrorism for many years, Turkey mostly felt pains of terrorism in the post-Cold War era. Fundamentalism is always delicate subject for laic Turkish Republic. As seen, all threats and security challenges appeared after the Cold War affected Turkey's security policy. If it is examined carefully, considering the fact that cornerstone of the security policy of Turkey is to protect territorial integrity, all matters and threats can be observed in the south of Turkey. For that reason, Turkey's security policy have been renewed to calculate risks from south and concentrated into this region in the post-Cold War era.

After declaring a war against terrorism within the frame of new NSS, the U.S. also directed to the Middle East and specifically to Iraq as a starting point of war. Security anxieties of the U.S. and Turkey met in the Middle East. New situations emerged. It required new threat assessments. In the next chapter, increased and decreased Turkish security anxieties will be clarified in the light of Turkey's main security policy, to protect territorial integrity.

CHAPTER V:

EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ON TURKEY'S SECURITY

Beginning of the U.S.'s activation of the NSS for reshaping the Middle East in the perspective of 'war against terrorism' affects Turkey who shifted security perceptions to the south long before. The NSS of the U.S. and security uneasiness of Turkey about region conflicted. The application of the NSS in the Middle East has increased the security concerns of Turkey. Especially Kurdish issue, PKK question and to a certain degree fundamentalist terrorism have increased their importance. They have become crucial and more important as a result of U.S.'s coming to the region and her NSS. This chapter aims to show that, implementation of the American NSS in the Middle East increased Turkey's security anxieties.

The NSS of the U.S. is making and will make some changes in the region. These changes seem inevitable because the U.S. thinks that terrorism stems from the Middle East. In addition, according to Ronald Asmus, after the Cold War, threat for the U.S. public comes from the Middle East (Asmus and Pollack, 2004). Dictators, despot regimes, poverty, radicalism are seen major causes of the terrorism. According to Americans, terrorism can find life-place due to the lack of authority in the region. In their opinion, democracy will fill the vacuum caused by the absence of an authority and it will plug to terrorism canals (Sanberk, 2003). The entire region should be considered at macro level while evaluating events and changes. It is mostly believed that Iraqi War is the first step for the U.S. for war against terrorism. Namely

Iraqi war is micro level. Next steps will follow. This point is confirmed by recent GME project. In other words, situations that occurred by the Iraqi War constitute one part of the general frame. In the region, situations, which are related with the changing processes, and situations that will occur after the war in Iraq must be considered together.

There is no doubt that a large scaled change such as the transformation of the Middle East will affect Turkey. Turkey will be a part of the change process because she is both within the region and ally of the U.S. Turkey has already related with the region due to the threats coming from there. In the new phase, being a neighbor of the Middle East and being in alliance with the U.S. are the two primary factors shaping Turkey's security situations in the Middle East, which is the application area of the new American strategy. The basic reason of increasing the anxieties stems from disagreements between present and future roles Turkey wants to play and the roles that the U.S. expects from Turkey to play. Rejection of the March 1 motion and its results are good examples of disagreement between two countries. The present situation is closely related with the rejection of the motion.⁴⁶

In this chapter, the effects of the U.S.'s war strategy against terrorism in the Middle East on Turkey's security will be examined —by taking post-Cold War threat perception and security approach of Turkey into account—. Situation of the threats for Turkey will be clarified. In this manner, it will be showed how American NSS affected Turkey's security. While these effects are interpreted, the results of the Iraqi war will be judged with the general circumstance in the region. Threats both intensified and lessened will be pointed.

⁴⁶ On the other hand, undoubtedly if the motion had been accepted, there would have been different security problems.

5.1. Negative Results:

Due to the revision efforts of the U.S., stemmed from fear of terrorism related with the region and going to war with Iraq in the first step of this change, some of the threat anxieties of Turkey, on which Turkey has concentrated after the Cold War, seem to become more visible. There is a war situation, and the tense situations will continue after Iraqi war. Indeed destabilized region is enough reason to increase the security annoyances.

5.1.1. A “Kurdish State”

In the threat perception of Turkey, every movement against her territorial integrity is determined as the most significant peril. According to this determination, current profits of Kurds in Iraq are primary and the most important security problem of Turkey. America’s intervention in the region increased or, more correctly, made a Kurdish state establishment a definite probability⁴⁷ On one hand, some attempts to enlarge this “Federal Kurdish state” borders by including some parts of Turkey may be done in the future, on the other hand as Aydınli and Özcan argue, Turkey’s own Kurdish population may want to be a part of such kind of ‘state’. Turkey fears a ‘Kurdish state’ in the region will try to enlarge into Turkey’s border (Aydınli, Özcan, 2002). Increasing Kurdish nationalism in the region is a problem related with the Turkey’s integrity. The most important negative effect of the implementation of the American NSS is the position of the Kurds and their prospective state.

Kurds have great advantages to become an independent state with the help of American strategy in the region. Many reasons can be set forth for this. First, it can be a necessity of the American NSS. Kurds’ province can be used as a home for new

⁴⁷ According to Talabani, Kurds, who has established and managed their own administration since 1991, have come very close to their aim of establishing a state for the first time (Hürriyet, August 25, 2003).

bases, which is indicated as a requisite in the American NSS (NSS, 2002: 29) to implement new policies. In addition, a 'Kurdish state' can be a part of the GME initiative related with the NSS. Other reason can be a dilemma of the U.S. in Iraq. Since northern part of the Iraq is the only stabilized region of the Iraq, the U.S. does not want make the situation more complex by offending Kurds. These reasons, individually or together, increase the probability of a 'Kurdish state' establishment in the region.

Kurds have their own advantages themselves. The first advantage is their cooperation with the US with relating to American NSS. They are "reliable allies" of the U.S. in the region. American thought of "the mission would define the coalition"⁴⁸ during the implementation of the NSS is the primary reason for this alignment. It can be said that this alignment is a necessity of the NSS. The U.S., who trusted Turkey for the northern front, moved with the Kurds due to rejection of the motion. Michael Radu defines this situation as, "both Massoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) are now allies of the coalition forces in northern Iraq, with their *pesh mergha* ("those who fight to death") irregulars accepting U.S. command in operations there" (Radu, 2003). Because of their supports during the war, U.S. behaves in favour of the Kurds. The best example for this is that; although Turkey accepted second motion for sending troops into the Iraq, U.S. gave up the soldier demand due to Kurdish groups' oppositions. In addition, it should not be forgotten that during the preparation of

⁴⁸ When NATO after September 11 invoked its Article V for the first time ever, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dispatched his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, to say this would not be necessary because "the mission would define the coalition." (Hirsh, 2002).

Transitional Administrative Law, the U.S. concealed the draft from Turkey⁴⁹ and she did not consider about the sensitivities of Turkey.

Besides, the U.S. has a tendency to use the Kurds in the following steps of “war against terrorism” plan in the Middle East. Indeed, Kurdish card is always reserve of the U.S. in the region. For instance, the U.S. has been using this card after deciding to implement her NSS. Using Kurds began by sending a celebrity message by Powell, the U.S. Secretary of State, when Kurdish Parliament was opened in Northern Iraq on October 2, 2002. After rejection of the motion, demonstrations of Kurds in Kirkuk showed that U.S. would be with the Kurds hereafter.⁵⁰ Many assume that after Iraq, Syria and Iran are in turn. ‘Kurd card’ will be an option for the U.S. to deal with these states. Namely, Kurds’ role is not limited with Iraq. It means that close relations between the Kurds and the U.S. will continue and profits of Kurds will increase.

Second, there is already a *de facto* state, which has been managing itself for 10 years and designed its administrative affairs, autonomous even from the Saddam regime.⁵¹ In the war period, this position was the same. Big oil resources of Kirkuk and Mosul were under their control, five memberships were taken in Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) with 4 million-population, their own people were appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, any coalition unit did not enter Northern Iraq except small amount of American soldiers, and armed forces were not dissolved. In other words, it is the only stable region of unstable Iraq. U.S. does not want to deal with additional problems in Iraq that may appear due to not paying

⁴⁹ Turkey took the draft of from Shi’a groups.

⁵⁰ On March 3, 2003, there was a great demonstration in Irbil. Nearly 50.000 Kurds met in this demonstration and fired Turkish flags. Murat Yetkin points that events were organized by Barzani’s IKDP by the help of American secret agencies and military (Yetkin, 2004).

⁵¹ It should not be forgotten that Turkish protection to Kurdish groups helped this situation.

attention to demands of “ally” Kurds.⁵² Even in the following phases of establishing a federal Iraq, U.S. may show the social order of Kurdish groups as an example for the other parts of the Iraq. The current structure can be defined as comfortable in terms of the U.S.

Third, except the coalition troops, Kurdish groups are the only armed groups with 80,000 ‘peshmerges’ in Iraq. In addition, these soldiers are equipped with heavy arms⁵³ and they have been training and will continue to be trained. In the period of preparing new constitution of the Iraq, Kurds have not wanted to hand over their weapons. Moreover, they have refused to be a part of Iraqi army and to dissolve their armed troops. Furthermore, while establishing air forces of the Iraq, the U.S chose 30 candidates, who would be trained in the U.S. to be a pilot in Iraqi air forces, and 27 of them were Kurds. In other words, they have been preparing their forces to use when necessary.

Fourth, the leaders of Kurdish groups are the most diplomatic experienced leaders in terms of in Iraq CPA. These experienced leaders have had close relations with Turkey, U.S. and EU. They also can find international supports easier than other groups. Additionally, these experiences provide some advantages in CPA. They can strongly defend and try to take their demands in the council. For instance, Barzani explained that they agreed with CPA about federalism (NTV, January 14, 2004). As well, instead of giving only ideas about the constitution before Transitional Administrative Law, they were able to prepare their own draft for both Iraq and

⁵² Barzani threaten that if autonomy including Kirkuk was not given to “Kurdistan”, they would rebel in the region. (Radikal, January 19, 2004).

⁵³ Talabani explained in an interview that Kurdish pesmerges have heavy weapons such as tank and artillery (Hürriyet, August 25, 2003).

“Federal Kurdistan” and presented those to the temporary administration council.⁵⁴ Besides, two Kurdish groups decided to govern “their Kurdish province” with one-head government. There was a disagreement between two groups since conflicts in 1994. It created some difficulties to move together. For that reason, IKDP and PUK agreed on solving this issue (Radikal, January 14, 2004). In this manner, problem between two groups was solved.

Fifth, although there have been disagreements about the Middle East and Iraqi war between U.S. and EU, the only issue that they can concur is Kurds. They have strong support in the world. It is known that some European states, for example France, strongly support Kurds in every issue. Even before the war, Jacques Chirac, the President of France, told that France would take part in the war in the case of attacks of Saddam to the Kurds. Radu asserts that Kurdish "national sentiments" active in Western Europe (Radu, 2003). Alon Liel, ex-Foreign Affairs diplomat of Israel, alleges that EU will recognize a Kurdish state if established (Hürriyet, February 24, 2004). In other words, EU is said to be behind the Kurds. Therefore, EU will also support rights that will be given to Kurds by the U.S. Even, the conflict between the U.S. and the EU in Iraq may turn into cooperation on the Kurdish issue.

Sixth, establishing a Kurdish state is useful for Israel’s interests. A ‘Kurdish’ state will disturb both Iran and Syria. When these states deal with the Kurdish problem, the pressure on Israel will decrease. Israel will not be only problematic country in the Middle East and so that a second problem⁵⁵, which the countries of the region should solve, will arise (Jenkins, 2003). Support to such kind of a ‘Kurdish’ state can be seen as the extension of general Israeli policy, which is to support non-

⁵⁴ According to Nihat Ali Özcan, architects of the drafts are Americans. Brenden O’Leary director of ethno-politics studies center , Peter Galbright ve Halit Salih Kurdish origin American were paid for preparation of drafts. (Radikal, December 22, 2003).

⁵⁵ Barzani defines Kirkuk as the “Jerusalem of Kurds”. (Radikal, January, 18, 2004).

Arab elements.⁵⁶ In other words, Israeli support is also very important for Kurdish state.⁵⁷

Kurds, who were seen as the most benefited group in the war, stiffened their advantages by gaining a federal state in a federal Iraq with a Transitional Administrative Law. In the Transitional Administrative Law, a federal structure is established by 18 cities, but the situation of the north will be determined afterwards. Also in the Transitional Administrative Law, Kurdish is accepted as an official language along with Arabic. Lastly, they minted “Kurdish dinar” for using as a valid currency (Radikal, March 20, 2004).

Kurdish leaders, who explicitly demonstrate their wishes on establishing an independent state, told that for now conditions are not suitable for being completely independent, but when the conditions are set, they have an aim to establish an independent “Kurdistan”. Before the war in Iraq, Iraqi Opposition Meeting was organized on July 2002 in London to determine how the administration would be after Saddam, and Iraq KDP declared an idea of “Federal Kurdistan State”, in which Kirkuk was considered as capital city, in that meeting. During the war and post war period, necessary conditions have been forming to establish this state. Besides, before the Transitional Administrative Law was prepared, in 75th article of their own Kurdistan draft constitution, it was said that if they were in a disagreement with the Iraqi government, they would use their right of self-determination.⁵⁸ Briefly, everybody accept that there will be “Federal Kurdish state” in new Iraq. After that,

⁵⁶ Detailed information about policy of Israeli to support non-Arab elements in the Middle East can be found in Meliha B. Altunışık, (ed.) 1999. *Türkiye ve Ortadoğu Tarih Kimlik Güvenlik (Turkey and Middle East: History, Identity, Security)*. İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları.

⁵⁷ For that reason, Turkey worries about an establishment permanent alliances between Israel and Kurds (NTV, November 1, 2003).

⁵⁸ The drafts of constitution for Iraq and “Federal Kurdistan” prepared by Kurdish groups can be found in http://www.kurdnet.net/www.kdp.info/reports/reports_detail.asp?intReportNr=1153 (December 25, 2003).

when the conditions are suitable, Kurds are going to establish an independent Kurdistan. For that reason, Turkey thinks that vital security challenges will arise for the Turkish security, which was already highly concerned about its southern borders, as it was analyzed in the preceding chapters.

Ankara is worried about the reflections of a Kurdish state on Turkey. This prospective state would try to enlarge in Turkey, which has 10-12 million Kurd populations, by demanding some territory from her. The Kurdish groups that are under Massoud Barzani's leadership have eight "Kurdistan" maps in their web site and majority of East and South East Anatolia regions are shown in "Kurdistan" borders in all of these maps.⁵⁹ Kurds in Iraq think there some another "Kurdistan" provinces in the region. Using "Iraqi Kurdistan" or "South Kurdistan" in their explanations is proof of this thought. According to these explanations, if there is an Iraqi Kurdistan, there is also a Turkish Kurdistan and if Southern Kurdistan is North of Iraq, Northern Kurdistan is south of Turkey. As well, in the Khabat newspaper of IKDP, Barzani said, "Kurdistan was divided after the World War I and its territories were given to some states. One of those pieces is in Iraq." (Milliyet, December12, 2003). Similar thoughts can be found in their "Kurdish dinar".⁶⁰ This idea in the mind of Kurdish leaders' can be interpreted as a danger to Turkey's territorial integrity.

In addition, any kind of Kurdish state may cause to stimulate the idea of Kurdish nationalism in the region. There are Kurds in both Syria and Iran. Gaining high advantages in Iraq will ignite their sense of nationalism in these regions. Gareth Smyth alleges that giving wide autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq inspired other Kurds

⁵⁹ One of those web sites is <http://www.kurdnet.net>

⁶⁰ Kurdish dinar was minted in Switzerland. On the money, there are phrase of "Kurdistan" and four mountains remaining side by side. Those mountains symbolize presence of Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran. Date of the money is 2003 (Radikal, March 20, 2004).

living in regional countries (Financial Times, March 18, 2004). Ethnic problems can be expected to erupt. It brings chaos and instability to the region. Events on March 12 in Syria and March 15 in Iran are indications of future problems.⁶¹ The spread of this movement to Turkey due to her own Kurdish originated citizens with demands of unifying with “Iraqi Kurdistan” can be evaluated as a second situation in terms of security anxiety of Turkey about a Kurdish state.

Briefly, Turkey, who tried to defend her own territorial integrity in the southeast for almost 20 years, is in a more dangerous period in terms of territorial integrity due to the position of Kurds in the region. Because Kurds profited from the situation in Iraq very much and such kind of profits will increasingly continue due to following steps of the U.S. who is planning to continue to use the Kurds as a card to region states.

5.1.2. The Situation of the PKK Terrorist Organization:

Turkey lost initiative and is limited about PKK terrorism after coming of the U.S. into the region. Before the Iraqi War, Turkey localized PKK issue. But, since the region, as in the first Gulf War, has become international again, control of area has been lost. The U.S. is active in the event again. Although PKK terrorism is not as active, almost finished even in the mountains, Turkey cannot totally destroy it due to losing her maneuver area. As well, future of what will be done to PKK became even more ambiguous.

The PKK terror, which was the most important security problem of Turkey in early 90s, entered in the waiting process after their leader is caught and almost 5000 militants located in Candel Mountain. When the U.S. interfered in the region, waiting process, in terms of making terrorist attacks, has continued due to the complexity of

⁶¹ After a football match, Kurds in Syria made trouble. In those events they demanded more rights in the country.

the region. Turkey thinks that if PKK does some actions, she has the right to interfere in the region and will interfere. Such a situation creates chaos on one the hand; it also causes conflict between Kurdish groups and Turkey out of U.S.'s control on the other hand. For that reason, both the U.S. and Kurdish groups do not permit PKK to make any action in the region. In addition, the organization, which needs logistic base to fight in the mountains, loses its logistic support. Therefore, it seems that active PKK threat is disappeared for now.

On the other hand, Turkey has been obliged to fulfill policies determined by the U.S. The security problems related with the PKK can be described as; Turkey cannot apply own policies against the organization to evaporate it completely and there is vagueness about the future of the organization. It tries to become a political figure and its members try to come into Turkey. The uncertainty, related with what is going to be done and what is going to happen, are followed with annoyance in Turkey. Since the U.S. tries to take Turkey away from the region, Turkey cannot do much. Existence of Turkey in the northern part of Iraq may make issues more complex for the U.S. who does not want to deal with northern part of the Iraq because she has enough problems in the other parts of the country. Due to their disquiet, Kurds are opposing Turkish existence in the region. They may think that, Turkey may use her existence in the region as a card against a 'Kurdish state'. Namely, Turkey may use PKK issue as a 'mask' against Kurds. For that reason, troops of Turkey, which have been in the northern part of Iraq for controlling the border and region because of the PKK terrorism, create uneasiness especially among Kurds. Several times, they demand from Turkey to withdraw these troops. Even, Behram Salih 'threatened' Turkey with using force against Turkish troops in the north part of the Iraq (Hurriyet, March 20, 2004).

Nevertheless, Turkey does not accept to withdraw her troops from there since that region is the only place where Turkey watches the events actively. The region is not completely safe in terms of terrorists' passing through borders and their activities in the region. Also, Turkey suspects that evacuating the region would make terrorists freer. Moreover, if the terrorist events start again, strong and quick reply will not be given. Existence of troops in the region until it becomes completely safe provides Turkey the control over the terrorists and events.

Indeed, PKK was one of the main issues of the motion bargaining with the U.S. (Bila, 2003). U.S.'s behaviors during the bargaining of this concept are considered as recondite.⁶² This obscure manner has continued after the war. Turkey has wanted the U.S. to fight with the PKK, which is in the terrorist organizations list of the U.S., more seriously but the U.S. does not give any satisfactory answers or action to this desire.⁶³ Turkey is waited with a tactic of distracting. The U.S. does not seem to want to interfere in Candle Mountain. In March 17, the U.S.'s head of General Staff Myers explained, "They would fight with PKK with 'suitable methods'" (NTV, March 20, 2004). It shows that they do not intend to interfere yet. On the other hand, Turkey cannot make any intervention to this organization and she has to behave according to the U.S.'s wishes. Concerning U.S.'s wishes "law of returning home" was accepted by the Parliament but results are not as expected.⁶⁴ Main aim was support the U.S. to solve the problems by the help of this law and to take Turkey away from the north part of the Iraq. Even, Ümit Özdağ says that there are rumors about a bargain between the U.S. and PKK for this amnesty law (Özdağ, 2003). Despite the

⁶² According to Mustafa Balbay, in secret document discussed between Turkey and the U.S., the U.S. mentioned about necessities of war against terrorist organizations in the region but name of the PKK was not in this document. (Balbay, 2003).

⁶³ This situation can be evaluated as a contradiction of the U.S. fighting with terrorism.

⁶⁴ The numbers of applicants, including other organizations' members, are declared as 3277. 2616 of these applications are made from the prisons. 663 of 1518 militants of PKK are released. Namely mountain staff of PKK remains.

propaganda, especially in East and Southeast Anatolia, there is no solution in PKK's armed mountain elements.

Organization's efforts for becoming political are another issue that disturbs Turkey. The recent aim of the PKK is to make some political maneuvers to find a life zone for them. The organization, renamed as Kurdistan People's Congress (Kongra-Gel), announced that the organization dissolved by itself in its second Extraordinary Congress. While the military resources tell that the organization will increase their "political activities", it is told that the organization makes "Public Defense Forces" autonomous and they try to put themselves out of the name of "terrorist organization". In this frame, the organization tried to activate under the name of Democratic Solution Party in Iraq, but the U.S. closed this party with a sudden attack on 30 January. Another issue related with this is, it is well known that Mahmud Osman representative in CPA is a sympathizer and supporter of PKK (Özdağ, 2003).

Another issue carefully followed by Turkey is that members of terrorist organization try and want to trespass the boundaries of Turkey secretly and to blend in the public. In the Mahmur camp in northern Iraq, there are refugees, who emigrated from Turkey to Iraq in the years of increasing PKK terrorism. UN, Turkey, U.S and Iraq made an agreement for returning of those to Turkey on January 22, 2004 (NTV, January 23, 2004). It is suspected that while refugees come back to Turkey, militants of PKK will attempt to appear as a refugee and enter to Turkey. Doubts arouse from the numbers of refugees and demands of UN's representative. The number of immigrants to Mahmur camp was about nine thousand people 10 years ago (Radikal, December 11, 2003). Now the number returning to Turkey is mentioned as twelve thousand. When it is thought that the augmentation of population cannot be that much, this difference causes suspicions In addition, three

preconditions are set for the returning of those refugees. These are listed as; returning refugees will be located to specific regions according to their wishes, men are excused from the compulsory military service and there will be no investigation and questioning for those refugees after returning to Turkey. These types of conditions cause suspicion in Turkey.

The reason why the U.S. is not willing to interfere with the PKK may be her wishes using the PKK as a card or an option in the region (Sönmezoğlu, 2003). Faruk Sönmezoğlu argues that forcing PKK's militants to go Iran for disturbing her, using against Syria, using as a balancing unit against Kurdish groups in Iraq or using against Turkey in order to prevent her making any uncontrolled actions can be listed for being an option of the U.S.

Namely, Turkey lost her initiative to take a step against PKK. She is limited with the policies of the U.S. Besides, although it is seemed that there is no danger situation related with PKK for now, if U.S. does not concern seriously with the situation, this would make the conditions imperceptible. Turkey entered in a "wait and see" period in the PKK issue.

5.1.3. New Terror Events Seen in Turkey:

After the U.S. went towards Middle East actively, Turkey's role began to be questioned in perspective of new developments. The role of Turkey as a 'Pivotal' or 'front state' against terrorism has been frequently discussed. Being a front country probably means that Turkey may take the Germany's Cold War mission. Terrorist attacks happening after the Iraqi War showed that terrorists are ready to accept Turkey as a new front and they are ready to fight in the new front.

After Iraqi war, in Turkey there have been three attacks, which carry out the properties of new terrorism. Two attacks in November 2003 and one in March 2004

show that Turkey is one of the target states for terrorists. According to Graham Fuller, the regional events in the Muslim world bring terrorism to Turkey (Fuller, 2003). Even, Paul Marie De la Gorce suggests that Turkey became the new battlefield in the war with terrorism started after September (De la Gorce, 2003). Additionally, Hüseyin Bağcı claims that, choosing Turkey as a target is not a coincidence, it is deliberate because, Turkey is an example country who lives Islam with democracy (Bağcı, 2003) and supports the U.S. policies. In an interview with Follman, terrorism expert Jessica Stern says that, with its secular Islamic government particularly damnable in the eyes of fundamentalists, Turkey is as prime a target as any for Al-Qaeda (Follman, 2003). For example, there will be a NATO summit in Turkey in June. Presidents and Prime Ministers of NATO countries will come to Turkey. They are good targets for terrorists. In May 15, CIA sent a report to Turkish government and security units about some activities of terrorists planning to take an action during the summit (Milliyet, May 16, 2004).

Besides, November attacks were performed soon after canceling the decision to send troops to Iraq. One of the main aims of terrorists may be sending a message not to support the U.S.'s regional policies. In addition, Ömer Bekri, the leader of El Muhacirun group whose centre in London, calls whole Muslims to remove from power the Turkish government (Radikal, March 15, 2004). By determining the roles of Turkey for next phases of transformation, this type of attacks will increase.

In addition to this, the terrorist organizations and actions aiming to the U.S. will also disturb Turkey. As well chosen as activation area, Turkey will also be determined and used as a base by these organizations.

5.1.4. Invalidation of ‘Red Lines’:

Red lines, which are clear signs to the others not to cross the minimums, indicate ‘musts’ of Turkish policy. They have important role in Turkey’s foreign affairs. These are concrete outputs of deterrence concept. They have been used for indicating the tolerance limitation of Turkey about security issues. For instance, in Aegean Sea about territorial waters and continental shelf, Turkey declared that 12 miles is a reason of war against Greece. Especially after the 90s, within more active foreign policy there seemed to be an increase in the number of these lines. Nevertheless, coming of a superpower into the region has obliged Turkey not to do what these lines necessitate on the one hand and to revise her Red Line policy according to U.S. priorities on the other hand.

Before the war, Turkey drew some red lines and she declared if those lines had been exceeded, she would interfere to the situation and region. These sensibilities were put on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which was signed between Turkey and the U.S. about technical details to open a northern front in war. According to the information given by Fikret Bila (Bila, 2003), Mustafa Balbay (Balbay, 2003) and Murat Yetkin (Yetkin, 2004) Red Lines in the MOU can be listed as follows: Kurds will not interfere in Mosul and Kirkuk after war and these cities will not be Kurdish cities, Turcoman will not be pressured, the new administration will be central and a Kurdish government, whatever the type is, will not be accepted, terrorists will not be allowed to create a ‘saved region’ in Iraq.

The red lines put before war related with the region have been crossed over. On April 9 day of ending of war and following day, Kurds entered in Mosul and Kirkuk,

destroyed all documents in both Public Registration Office and Register of Title Deed. They attacked Turcomans. As well, Turcoman are represented with only one member in CPA.⁶⁵ Turcoman's situation and rights were not taken into consideration while preparing Transitional Administrative Law. Turkish demands about Turcomans have not been realized. Additionally, PKK terror organization is waiting on the Candle Mountain, which can almost be named as a 'liberated zone'. Finally, Kurds have taken very important steps and advanced to establish a state. Everybody agrees on the fact that Kurds are very close to become a federal state. Kurds will not loose their gains after this point. Turkey could not do anything about those Red Lines. Namely, Turkey's red lines became invalid.

It brings us to a point that, Turkey, who has deterrence by the help of showing her power to region countries and has declared Red Lines about some issues, from now on will have to take U.S.'s policies into consideration about region. Either these red lines will be in harmony with the policies of the U.S. or Turkey cannot draw such lines. For instance if a 'Kurdish state' in the region is in the interest of the U.S., Turkey cannot behave on her own easily.

On the other hand, seeing that Red Lines of Turkey can be crossed, other countries may also try to advance in other security problems that are determined with red lines. Such situations might create problems since Turkey may give very strict reply against them in order to gain her prestige about Red Lines and restore her deterrence. For instance, Greece may try to increase her territorial waters to 12 miles. In normal condition, minor conflicts in the Aegean can be expected. But now Turkey may directly hit in all Greek planes or ships for repairing her prestige and showing

⁶⁵ According to Ümit Özdağ, whether this member is Turcoman is doubtful (Özdağ, 2003).

her seriousness. In other words, minor event may create bigger outcomes than expected.

5.1.5. Damaged Relations with the U.S.:

Before Iraq war, the U.S.-who had thought that Turkey would open the Northern front -and Turkey -who had thought that the U.S. could not go to war without Turkey-, lived a crisis due to the rejection of motion. According to many, 'Strategic Partnership' was ended. Everybody questioned the future of the Turk-American relations. Henceforth, suspicions of both sides will be in the mind of them. Especially Turkey has been affected from 'motion crisis. According to Tarık Oğuzlu, Turkey would not feel so secure the U.S. supports to predominantly Turkish Foreign Policy interests (Oğuzlu, 2003: 1).

Although, Turkey gave the U.S. permission to use the air space and took decision to send troops with the second motion, the relation does not seem to be like before. Seizure of Turkish officers on 23rd April -though their activities were known by the U.S. - and 'sack event'⁶⁶ on 4th July prove that relations are deeply injured. Head of General Staff Hilmi Özkök described 'sack event' as "the deepest trust crisis" (Hürriyet, July 6,2003). According to Ümit Özdağ although the U.S. was angry about Turkey during the war, she pursued 'calm revenge' policy against Turkey. However, after the war, pressure and revenge policies were materialized (Özdağ, 2003).

⁶⁶ On July 4, 2003, American forces made a surprise attack on Turkish Liaison Office and Office of the Turkmen Front in Kirkuk with Kurdish pesmerges. The Turkish officers, who were working for coordination with the U.S. in the region, were seized and sack was made to wear on their heads. During three days, the 'ally' American forces interrogated them.

The rejection of the motion⁶⁷ made people think what the topics were going to be, such as the U.S.'s military and technology supports and aids to Turkey, Cyprus issue, EU membership, Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, relations with IMF. For now, any negative results related with these issues have not yet appeared. Since problems of the U.S. in Iraq and uncertainty in the region, the U.S. does not behave emotional. They perceive pragmatic policies. She does not want to burn the bridges with Turkey because she still needs Turkey.

On the other hand, Turkey remained out of the developments in the region especially in Iraq. It must be accepted that events presented as negative results stem from 'motion crisis', which damaged the relations between Turkey and the U.S. Firstly, Turkey, is not able to take part in establishing the new administration of Iraq. The sensitivities of Turkey are not taken into consideration. Second, Turkey willing to repair the relations with the U.S. seems too eager to cooperate with the U.S. Turkey may take heavy responsibilities, which cannot be accepted by her in normal conditions. Many concessions related with foreign policy may be given. Such a situation may be seen during the implementation of the GME initiative. Özdağ alleges that efforts for restoring relations with the U.S. have given a chance to the U.S. to develop a pressure policy on Turkey (Özdağ, 2003). During the process of rebuilding the Middle East, it is evaluated that these pressures will continue.

5.2. Positive Result:

Besides security problems have been increased, some events that Turkey perceived as a threat after the Cold War lost their importance due to the coming of the U.S. to the region. The basic results of lessening the importance of those threats

⁶⁷ Indeed, although the problem is rejection of motion, main problem is that Turkey distract the U.S. as if she had accepted the motion but she did not approved the motion at the end. The U.S. lost time.

are firstly Syria and Iran think that they will be next target after Iraq and the U.S. is very serious about this issue (Rogers, 2003). Additionally, they have problems about protecting their territorial integrities with related with the Kurdish issue.

5.2.1. Approach of Iran:

Iran, who felt the pressure on herself with the interference of the U.S. in the region, started to develop relations with Turkey and she has tried to stay close with Turkey. There are common points that matter to both countries. First of them is the integrity of Iraq. It is in the interest of both countries for their own territorial integrity since both of them have sensitivities on 'Kurdish state concept'. In addition to that, Iran, who thinks that the next can be her, accepts investigation of UN inspectors about nuclear studies (Hurriyet, October 22, 2003). She has also stopped nuclear activities. In other words, producing ballistic weapons in Iran, which is perceived as a threat to Turkey, is stopped. Besides two countries have ever has such kind of close relations.

5.2.2. Approach of Syria:

Syria, who feels similar pressure as Iran, tries to establish good relations with Turkey. Relations between Ankara and Damascus, also marked by high-level visits, improved in 2003 as well. Abdullah Gül visited Damascus in April; his Syrian counterpart, Farouq al-Shara, traveled to Turkey in January; and Syrian Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa Miro went to Ankara in July. The most important visit of the year, however, was Asad's recent trip, during which the Syrian leader carefully avoided controversial issues especially about Hatay. In other words, Syria who disturbed the territorial integrity of Turkey, gives up this behavior. In a commercial agreement, Syria accepted that Hatay belongs to Turkey (Milliyet, January 6, 2004). In addition, with signing security cooperation agreement, two countries made a

progress in their relations. Its results can be seen after terror events in Istanbul. Syria extradicted suspects wanted by Turkey. As well, due to Turkey's request, Syria forbade foreign students to get education in religious schools.⁶⁸

Perhaps, for the first time Turkey has become this close with Iran and Syria. Nevertheless, there are some factors limiting this approach. Due to not wanting to disturb the U.S. with this approach, Turkey restricted herself. In addition, Israel became a part of activity because she is also disturbed from this approach. As a counter attack, Israel wanted to hold Turkey in check by signing Manavgat Water Project on February 16, 2004. As a result, Turkey has some profits related with security due to the U.S. plan about region. However, these are limited and they cannot balance losses of Turkey in the region.

5.3. Situations Emerged with the 'Greater Middle East' Project:

It is generally believed that Iraqi war is the first step to the implementation of the NSS. Put forth 'GME' project for consideration is evidence that the U.S. will make some changes in the region and this changes will not be limited with Iraq. This project may change depending on the situation. However, putting by such kind of a project, the U.S. is determined to give a new shape to Middle Eastern countries' regimes that are seen as the root of terrorism. Though the details of the project are not known, its scope will be the same what was discussed recently. Since this project includes Turkey,⁶⁹ especially negative elements indicated above should be considered in the macro level with relation to Turkey's role, which is considered to be given, or Turkey wants to take. Emerge of some situations related with the security of Turkey is inevitable.

⁶⁸ Emerging that suspicious related with the terror events in Istanbul were educated in religious schools in Syria, makes this demand necessary in terms of Turkey.

⁶⁹ According to Muhammed Nureddin, the relations of Turkey with the project are first appeared in the meeting of Bush-Erdoğan on 28th March (Zaman, March 1, 2004)

In the next step of the transformation of the Middle East, the U.S. may want to give Turkey, as Özcan points, three kinds of roles (Özcan, 2004). First is the model role. Turkey is being indicated as a model that possess both Muslim and democratic features. Turkey is a Western Muslim country; Özdem Sanberk points that Turkey is located at the breaking point of GME project (Sanberk, 2003). It is told that Turkey is seen as a locomotive country. In recent times, the explanations of either Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs in Iran, Malaysia and Kuwait are seemed to persuade Muslim countries in this context. For instance, in the fifth meeting of 'Neighbor Countries of Iraq and Region Countries' Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, offered to establish Peace Forces among Muslim countries to provide security in the Middle East (NTV, February 14, 2004). Moreover, he offered to unite like European states. As for Prime Minister, R.Tayyip Erdoğan, he offered to Muslim countries to turn their face to the West in Malaysia (NTV, February 20, 2004).

Nevertheless, the Islamic and democratic identity of Turkey has already been since establishing of the Republic. She has never been taken as a model by region countries especially by the Arabic states. Besides, they have criticized Turkey because of the secular structure. For that reason, the U.S. wants Turkey to play Democratic-Muslim role more actively by regarding her Muslim identity. For instance, in one of his speeches Powell defined Turkey as 'Islamic Republic' like Pakistan (Radikal, April 2, 2004). Since many objections and criticisms were risen, statement was tried to be corrected by emphasizing to importance of 'secular' dimension of Turkey (NTV, April 4, 2004). As well, the party in power is so available to play such kind of a role. Nowadays, "Moderate Islam" and "conservative democrats" debates have increased in Turkey. Some minor modifications may be thought in the structure of Turkey. The Islamic identity of Turkey has been more

emphasized. The difficult and dangerous side of these events is that the U.S. may let things get out of hand, because it is a very sensitive issue in Turkey. Religion can easily be exploited. If it would do so, regime debates would appear even it started. Emphasizing Islamic identity of Turkey and giving more importance than the secular one disturbs many especially Military. General İlker Başbuğ, Deputy Chief of General Staff, explained, “ ‘moderate Islam’ is not secular, for that reason Turkey has not have a claim for being a model” (Radikal, March 20, 2004). Due to its sensitivity, if this issue is considered more and if all sides are not careful, it will create internal crises, which reach over to the regime debates. Military does not allow making a regime debate in Turkey since Turkey’s regime is evident. It is secular. 27 February is the best example of it. Tension in the internal policy may increase.

Second role, expected from Turkey, is related with her geography. The geostrategic value of a country is not only measured by its geography. It is also measured by the ability to use these advantages related with the geography. In the change process, the U.S. also plans to benefit Turkey’s territory according to the tasks of the project. Benefits the U.S. from Turkey’s geography in the transformation of the Middle East are; controlling of the region, command and control facilities, using as a base to the national missile defense system and as evidence that the war against the terror is not against Islam. Even some argue that, Turkey, who was ‘side’ country in the cold war process, will become a ‘central’ country in the war of the U.S. against the terror and will take the Cold War duty and role of Germany (Petkov, 2004). This argument is verified by the U.S.’s demands during the motion bargains such as locating great amount of soldiers for a long period, using many bases in

Turkey.⁷⁰ After the rejection of the motion, planning to change status of the Incirlik base and wanting to use it against the terrorism can be showed as additional evidences. If NATO's new mission area is determined as the Middle East, such a demand will increase. In that case, Turkey will be Germany of the Cold War period. It will increase the importance of Turkey in NATO on one side; Turkey will be openly target of terrorists on the other. Turkey may become struggle field in the period.

However, it can be thought that, the role of being a central country was postponed due to rejection of the motion. Nevertheless, demands of the U.S. about increasing the number of bases, is one of the possible conditions that Turkey can meet. As well, if Turkey became central country, it can be thought that terrorist attacks targeting to U.S., Israel and Turkey would increase in the country.

Third, Turkey may be asked to send soldiers or to train the region countries' soldiers in order to actively participate in the change process. Additionally, with the project if NATO or UN took mission in the region, new army structure, considering dealing with terrorism, would be thought for NATO's army or UN peace operations (Cordesman, 2004). Turkey will need new army structure in order to keep up with the new process. Search efforts will try how the new structure of army will be. New Special Forces and new trainings are needed to adapt to these conditions. Small but rapid units will be needed. Another point, that relating with the military structure, is about the threat evaluation. Henceforth, threat coming from the region will not from a state but from non-state actors due to the application of the project. These two situations show that change process will force Turkey to revise her army structure according to 'war against terrorism' concept. Indeed revision has already started in

⁷⁰ 80 thousand soldiers, location of 250 planes, usage of 14 airports and 5 harbors were wanted from Turkey by USA before the Iraqi war.

the Turkish army.⁷¹ This revision period may gain speed. Since changing world and changing dimensions of security require that kind of a revision, it will have positive impact on Turkish army structure. Professionalism will increase. Army will become smaller, more flexible and more effective than it is now.

As a result, implementation of the U.S.'s NSS, prepared for 'war against terrorism' after September 11 attacks, has created both negative and positive results in terms of Turkey's security. But it is seen that if Turkey's post-Cold War security and threat assessment is considered negative results are more dominant than positive ones. Turkey's security anxieties increased. Instability of the region is a problem all on its own. Future actions in the region are not so clear. Especially, 'Kurdish state', PKK and fundamentalist terrorism problems have gained more importance. These negative results related with the territorial integrity will give a big headache to Turkey in the long term. Among these threats, 'Kurdish state' issue settled at the top. Besides, Turkey doesn't have many options to find a solution to these threats. Neighborhood and alliances have obliged Turkey to be included in transformation period of the Middle East. Effects of the September 11 attacks taking its roots from 'new terrorism' reached to Turkey due to the implementation of NSS by the U.S. These effects have increased security anxieties of Turkey.

⁷¹ This Project is being carried out under the name of 'Concept 2010' by the Turkish Head of General Staff.

CHAPTER VI:

CONCLUSION

Al-Qaeda network by using 'New Terrorism' dynamics have become a non-state actor in the international arena by hitting the U.S. in her homeland. It showed that the superpower is vulnerable. It challenged the hegemon. Today's policies and relations stemmed from September 11 attacks. Attacks carried the features of 'new terrorism'. Since the U.S. public and the administration are convinced that terrorism is the major threat for their security after the Cold War, 'war against terrorism' has become the frame of international relations. After the September 11 attacks, foreign policy of the U.S. became terrorism oriented. Terrorism phobia infected to the U.S. New enemy being searched after the Cold War was decided as terrorism.

Many knew that after the September 11, the U.S. would give strong respond to repair many things. There are many methods to struggle with terrorism. Due to the pain and shock, the U.S. decided to use the power and the military measures to fight with the terrorism. According to U.S. government, classical deterrence cannot be a tool for this war as characteristics of new threat are very different and very difficult to deal with it. Everybody who hates Americans can be enemy and these enemies can be in anywhere anytime. Applying strict measures by using force is a good way to show that the U.S. is very serious about dealing with terrorism. Global war against terrorism would be started.

For realization of this thought, the new NSS was prepared and put into action. Indeed, there were no big changes in proportion to previous strategies apart from 'the motive' to implement necessities pointed in the strategy. September 11 created this 'motive'. NSS of the U.S. dominantly shows the way of war against terrorism than aim of the strategy. Aims in the strategy can be listed as defeating terrorism and rouge states, bringing democracy to whole world for cutting support to terrorism and democratization of dictatorships. Nevertheless, major points in the methodology of the NSS are; preemption, unilateralism and primacy of power. It clearly declares that the U.S. would fight this war at any cost. Although there were strong oppositions in great part of the world, use of force was chosen by the U.S. Besides, implementation of the NSS would supply many extra interest and advantage to the U.S.

The Middle East was chosen for implementation of the strategy. The U.S. sees that terrorism against American interests emerge from this region because there is a lack of authority in some places and many undemocratic states are in there. They think that democratization of those states will solve the terrorism problem. For that reason, transformation of the Middle East is necessary or 'obligatory'. Iraq was chosen as a first step. Although many assert that it is wrong to start a war with terrorism and the U.S. pursues other interests, they started to implement their strategy.

Turkey, which had turned towards Middle East relating with security issues and threat perceptions long before the U.S., has been affected from this process, because she is both neighbor to the region and ally of the U.S. at the same time. Since changing plan was started from Iraq, it was inevitable that events would influence Turkey's security. Namely, the new NSS of the U.S. has created both negative and positive results in terms of Turkey's security. Probability of an establishment any

kind of a 'Kurdish state' in Iraq, losing initiative on PKK terrorist organization issue, 'new terror' events in Turkey, invalidation of 'red lines' about foreign policy and damaged relations with the U.S. can be listed as the negative results. As for positive results, they can be pointed as, approach with Syria and Iran, lessening the importance of the WMD threat from region countries. But negative results are more dominant than positive results. Some post-Cold War security anxieties have been feeling more intensely. In this context, implementation of the U.S.'s NSS has created negative results for Turkey's security and increased seriousness of some her threat perceptions.

Considering the fact that Turkey defines every action against her territorial integrity as a major threat, probability of a 'Kurdish state' has become main anxiety of Turkey. Perhaps, a 'federal Kurdish state' in Iraq will be established. Turkey normally fears that such a state will create big problems for own territorial integrity. It is the most critical issue among results of the negative situations. Although it seems very difficult, henceforth, Turkey should stress on preventing the establishment of a 'Kurdish state' while expressing her demands about Iraq to the U.S. Recently, Turkey is emphasizing on the PKK issue. Nevertheless, PKK is not so dangerous owing to the developments in the region. It is true that it is hazardous for Turkey's security but not as dangerous as 'Kurdish state' for today. Turkey should reevaluate her threat perception and make hierarchy among negative results. Priority should be given the Kurdish state issue, not PKK. In the new structure of the Middle East, Turkey should strongly defend the idea that any kind of 'Kurdish state' brings chaos into the region. On the other, Turkey should prepare alternative plans in case of establishment a 'Kurdish state'. Because the profits of the Kurds are very much and they are very close to establish a state. In order to decrease or prevent reflections

of such kind of state into the Turkey, she should start to take some measures in the country. She must pursue careful policies for not giving any concession relating with her territorial integrity. Being careful while doing some amendments in the laws and in the constitution is very important for not giving any advantages to people who have the idea that east and south east of Turkey are part of 'Kurdistan'. How the extension of this 'prospective state' can be stopped or prevented might be future research.

As well, although PKK issue is in a waiting process, it can be big problem for Turkey again. Restart of terrorist activities may limit Turkey's foreign policy field. Besides, Turkey may not concentrate on other important security issues such as 'Kurdish state' in Iraq. For not being outside of the developments in the region, Turkey should keep on careful about PKK and continue to pressure on the U.S. for eliminating the organization completely.

Additionally, Turkey should not give permission any debates about her regime. Laic and democratic character of the state should be emphasized. If Islamic character of Turkey is underlined more, it creates regime trouble in the state. For that reason, Turkey should remind the U.S. that Turkey will not give any concession from her laic and democratic character.

Another important issue is future role of Turkey in the changing process of the Middle East. The role Turkey will burden is very critical as seen in Iraq issue. Changing process will be continued although American administration is changed. Because failure both in Iraq and in the region is not an option for the U.S. Methods may be changed in order to gain aims. For instance, use of force may be given and diplomatic and multilateral options may come on the scene. However, the expression of 'war against terrorism' will continue. The U.S. will not give up this idiom. For

that reason, Turkey should be ready for taking different kinds of role in order to compensate negative situations for her security in ongoing developments. It should be thought that if the U.S. manages to insert the NATO in this process, what kind of role Turkey may play and what kind of military troops may be needed. Especially, type of army's structure to fight against 'new terrorism' should be evaluated. It is correct that Turkish army is experienced about both fighting against terrorism due to the PKK terrorism and taking active role in UN and NATO operations. Nevertheless, the situations in the Middle East are very different. Taking a role in the war against terrorism and state building mission in the region requires new kind of military concepts. New structure of Turkish army with relating to future NATO's mission both in the region and in terrorism operations may be another research subject.

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