The relationship between epistemology, logic and mathematics in Leibniz

There are many studies on Leibniz in national and international literature. Despite the existence of these successful studies, the purpose of conducting this thesis is to specifically reveal Leibniz's criteria of true knowledge within the scope of logic, mathematics, and mechanical knowledge. Furthermore, on the basis of this connection, Leibniz's differences and similarities with Descartes, Kant, and Newton will be analyzed, and his place in the history of philosophy will be shown in Turkish literature. To this end, we examined what Leibniz meant by logical and mathematical truths, and how he established a relationship between logical and mathematical truths and epistemology. We think that this examination is essential for understanding how Leibniz defined mathematical knowledge, which became the criterion of objective knowledge in the 17th-century intellectual environment, and how he established a relationship between mathematical propositions, logical propositions, and epistemological propositions. Since we see these contexts as missing or underemphasized points in recent studies on Leibniz, we aim to fill that gap with this study. Contrary to Descartes and Kant's view that syllogistic logic does not yield new knowledge, Leibniz argues that syllogistic logic derives new knowledge from given rational principles and that this knowledge is synthetic a priori knowledge.