Desert adjustment in axiology

This dissertation develops a contextualist desert-adjusted axiological theory that aims to evaluate well-being based on what individuals morally deserve. The traditional form of utilitarianism, grounded in welfarism, seeks to maximize total utility but does not directly address the fairness of distribution. Fred Feldman's justicised utilitarianism, however, proposes a solution: it argues that deserved well-being holds greater value than undeserved well-being, as it is better when people get what they deserve. Building on this intuition, this project defines and advocates for contextualism in axiology. According to this view, the moral value of well-being distributions depends on the context in which desert and well-being interact. The dissertation begins by examining fundamental debates on intrinsic value and pleasure. It then analyzes Feldman's, Arrhenius's, and Skow's attempts to develop desert-adjusted axiology, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches. It rejects the pursuit of a single value function, and defends a pluralist understanding grounded in shared context-types—or 'metacontexts'—that supervene on specific evaluative contexts. To operationalize this framework, the dissertation presents a set of quantitative tools that account for positive and negative desert conditions, allowing for comparative value assessments across different metacontexts. Ultimately, it proposes a sophisticated, flexible, and pluralist axiology that takes justice intuitions seriously without collapsing into value relativism, positioning itself as a potential foundation for desert-sensitive consequentialism.