Evaluating transaction costs of distribution channel in the context of opportunism and cooperation: An empirical evidence on the distribution channel of Turkish automotive industry

The aim of this study is to explain the opposite role of opportunism and cooperation in contractual relations. Contracts are incomplete, in the case of asset specificity and uncertainty. This incompleteness leads to opportunistic behaviour. In this case both sides of the contract want to safeguard its asset specific investments. In the literature, cooperation is evaluated as a mechanism to safeguard asset specific investments. In this context, this study examines whether cooperation can be thought as a defensive mechanism against tarnsaction costs which are created form opportunistic behaviours. After evaluating the relationship between opportunism and cooperation, this study examines the effects of these concepts on transaction costs.As the distribution channel is created through franchise contracts and as these contracts provide a suitable research field, the empirical research was conducted on the Turkish automotive industry distribution channel. In this context, an online survey, which was designed on the basis of prior studies in this field, was sent to the managers of franchisees to evaluate their franchisors. 54 surveys were collected and analyzed by regression models run statistical programs SPSS 13 and Minitab 16.It?s expected that, this sudy will contribute to the literature in determining the role of opportunism and cooperation to evaluate the transaction costs created from the relationship of franchisee and franchisor. In this context, this study examines whether the determinants of opportunism like asset specificity and uncertainty could be considered as the determinants of cooperation. The findings about the evaluation of asset specificity and uncertainty as determinants of cooperation in contractual relations are expected to make contributions to the literature. It?s also expected that, this study will contribute to the research field in the context of evaluating transaction costs of franchisees through opportunism and cooperation. This study has thought to have an importance for both evaluating the role of asset specificity and uncertainty in determining the cooperation, and supporting the relation between opportunism and cooperation with empirical results. Another important feature of this study comes from the evaluation of the transaction costs of distribution channel through opportunism and cooperation and supporting this context with empirical findings.