A reluctant friendship: Socrates and Nietzsche

The names Socrates and Nietzsche represent two significant landmarks in the history of philosophy. Both philosophers completely rejected the problems, methods and proposed solutions of their predecessors and thus redefined the orientation of philosophical interest. This redefinition manifested itself in Socrates by means of the transformation of the image of philosophy determined by his predecessors's interest in nature and matter into an image of philosophy determined by an orientation towards being and mind, an orientation we have been familiar with since the beginning of the history of philosophy. Nietzsche, on the other hand, embarked on completely disrupting and annihilating the image of philosophy – created by some major philosophers including Socrates – by asserting that it is impractible and, more importantly, artificial and harmful for life and humanity. Therefore, once we study these two philosophers, we inevitably feel as if we are examining a painting depicting the birth and death of philosophy. On the other hand, as the events that took place between these moments of birth and death were shaped by metaphysics and Christianity that Nietzsche interpreted as variations of Platonism, Socrates – as Plato's mentor and the person who provided Plato with philosophical inspiration – transpired as a figure with whom Nietzsche always had to contraverse in an offensive instinct. Yet, between the lines of his work, Nietzsche suspects Socrates; while Nietzsche views Socrates as a part of the guilty tradition on the one hand, he also views him as an innocent person used as an instrument for the crime on the other. Is Socrates innocent? As a matter of course he is guilty to the extent that his name is involved with the guilty tradition. Yet, this wise man who never wrote anything down is neither guilty nor innocent as a figure or a person; he is silent and indifferent both to guilt and innocence. This thesis grounds on those moments of innocence in which Nietzsche embraces Socrates and views him as a friend, and with this object in mind attempts to reclaim him from Platonism. It is also attempted in this thesis to build a friendship between Socrates and Nietzsche by means of the latter's writings and his self-developed instruments, and to weaken the traditional understanding of history of philosophy that compels this friendship to remain reluctant. Ultimately, by juxtaposing Plato's dialogues with Nietzschean instruments, this thesis calls into question the possibility of the emergence of such a new philosophical thought as Socrates' philosophy. Hence, if ever possible, this thesis will reveal that the greatest heir to Socrates is not Plato, but Nietzsche. When the aforementioned discussion and its concomitant results are accepted, by means of the new observations made possible by these two special figures from the beginning and the end of philosophy, the stern, firm and stable structure called history of philosophy will transform into a subtle, flexible and fluid process in order to create new designs about it and make its new images of it. If this is ever true, how this process can be used to attempt to create new images and designs will be demonstrated in the ensuing chapters as an argument this study puts forward and will attempt to defend.