The interplay between false readiness and negative hybrid peace the Doha peace process in Afghanistan (2018-2021)

Genuine commitment of disputing parties to settle conflict peacefully is an essential element of a successful negotiation. Established theories in conflict resolution assert that conflicting parties likely want to resolve their dispute peacefully once they enter negotiations. In protracted conflicts, however, this is not always the case, as conflicting parties may initiate peace talks for reasons other than reaching a negotiated settlement. Moreover, hybrid peace building model has been prescribed as the most appropriate for the conflicting societies. Nonetheless, the aforementioned dominant argument in conflict resolution, as well as the hybrid model of peace flopped in Afghanistan, particularly concerning the Doha peace process (or intra-Afghan negotiations). The present dissertation argues that the failure of the Intra-Afghan Negotiations (IAN) was due to the interplay between the false readiness of the conflicting parties and negative hybrid peace efforts. Neither the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan nor the Taliban demonstrated sufficient interest in a negotiated resolution to the conflict during the intra-Afghan negotiations. This deficiency in commitment is about power dynamics and the US-Taliban agreement signed on February 29, 2020 in Doha, which influenced the approaches of the parties to the pursuit of peace. The study deploys ''False Readiness Theory'' as its main theoretical framework and negative hybrid peace as the central conceptual base to demonstrate their intersection in the context of Afghanistan peace process. Data was collected qualitatively from primary and secondary sources, mainly through interviews with negotiating team members and former officials of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This thesis critically exposes the deep connection between false readiness theory and the negative hybrid peace approach in the intra-Afghan peace negotiations, directly challenging the dominant view that the hybrid peace model best suits conflict-affected societies. It further examines the model's theoretical and practical implications, while highlighting key limitations and offering recommendations.