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A neoclassical realist explanation of burden sharing: The case of NATO burden sharing between 2014 and 2020
NATO requires substantial amounts of resources to operate which involves material and political costs to be shared among allies. The issue of unfair burden-sharing commitments in NATO intrigued scholars across many disciplines such as economics, international relations, and security studies. This thesis focuses on explaining the variables which have the most explanatory power to account for allies' divergent burden-sharing commitments. The latest flare-up of burden-sharing discussions which started in 2014 (mainly as a response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine) is elaborated in this research by employing a neoclassical realist theoretical framework. Here we show that allies make their burden-sharing decisions based primarily on systemic pressures. There are recent attempts to explain burden-sharing behavior by intra-Alliance management strategies or strategic culture in the literature. However, our analysis indicates that intra-Alliance bargaining might be useful in setting the stage for new burden-sharing arrangements, but burden-sharing commitment is still a matter of national preference. Furthermore, associating Atlanticist strategic culture with reduced personnel costs and increased major defense equipment acquisition costs might be misleading if an ally is reducing the number of military personnel and purchasing new equipment to satisfy its national military requirements. We anticipate our research to be the starting point for a more sophisticated analysis of burden-sharing indicators.
A neoclassical realist explanation of burden sharing: The case of NATO burden sharing between 2014 and 2020
NATO requires substantial amounts of resources to operate which involves material and political costs to be shared among allies. The issue of unfair burden-sharing commitments in NATO intrigued scholars across many disciplines such as economics, international relations, and security studies. This thesis focuses on explaining the variables which have the most explanatory power to account for allies' divergent burden-sharing commitments. The latest flare-up of burden-sharing discussions which started in 2014 (mainly as a response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine) is elaborated in this research by employing a neoclassical realist theoretical framework. Here we show that allies make their burden-sharing decisions based primarily on systemic pressures. There are recent attempts to explain burden-sharing behavior by intra-Alliance management strategies or strategic culture in the literature. However, our analysis indicates that intra-Alliance bargaining might be useful in setting the stage for new burden-sharing arrangements, but burden-sharing commitment is still a matter of national preference. Furthermore, associating Atlanticist strategic culture with reduced personnel costs and increased major defense equipment acquisition costs might be misleading if an ally is reducing the number of military personnel and purchasing new equipment to satisfy its national military requirements. We anticipate our research to be the starting point for a more sophisticated analysis of burden-sharing indicators.
A neoclassical realist explanation of burden sharing: The case of NATO burden sharing between 2014 and 2020
NATO requires substantial amounts of resources to operate which involves material and political costs to be shared among allies. The issue of unfair burden-sharing commitments in NATO intrigued scholars across many disciplines such as economics, international relations, and security studies. This thesis focuses on explaining the variables which have the most explanatory power to account for allies' divergent burden-sharing commitments. The latest flare-up of burden-sharing discussions which started in 2014 (mainly as a response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine) is elaborated in this research by employing a neoclassical realist theoretical framework. Here we show that allies make their burden-sharing decisions based primarily on systemic pressures. There are recent attempts to explain burden-sharing behavior by intra-Alliance management strategies or strategic culture in the literature. However, our analysis indicates that intra-Alliance bargaining might be useful in setting the stage for new burden-sharing arrangements, but burden-sharing commitment is still a matter of national preference. Furthermore, associating Atlanticist strategic culture with reduced personnel costs and increased major defense equipment acquisition costs might be misleading if an ally is reducing the number of military personnel and purchasing new equipment to satisfy its national military requirements. We anticipate our research to be the starting point for a more sophisticated analysis of burden-sharing indicators.