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Protecting IMSI from fake base stations exploitations and spoofers impersonations in 5G and beyond cellular networks

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Abstract (EN)

Fifth age (5G) portable organizations require confirmed and completely got transmissions between client gadgets and 5G base stations (gNodeB). In the ongoing 5G innovation standard, cell phones can't recognize a genuine and a phony base station (BS) by observing the guideline 5G security conventions. This weakness is a perilous security issue recognized in 5G cell networks around the world, where programmers and spoofers can undoubtedly imitate or hack the important data of portable clients. Albeit 5G security conventions are upgraded to forestall such sorts of assaults, counterfeit BSs compromise the security of remote correspondence organizations. To the best of the creators' information, there is right now no security technique accessible in the writing that can empower clients to distinguish who is sending the association demand reaction., in this work, we propose a clever hack-verification structure that can totally get IMSI bringing about avoidance against satirizing assaults.

Author

Hamza Alı

How to Cite

Hamza Alı (Master Thesis). Protecting IMSI from fake base stations exploitations and spoofers impersonations in 5G and beyond cellular networks, 2022, Antalya Bilim University.

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