Existential transitions and the creation of freedom in Kierkegaard

In Kierkegaard's philosophy, freedom is a central concept that intertwines with nearly all of the themes he addresses. For Kierkegaard, freedom is inextricably linked to existence. Kierkegaard defines the self as freedom and argues that the self does not have a fixed nature. Rather, the self is realized through the choices an individual makes, and this process must not be passive; the individual must have the courage to make choices in the face of uncertainty and must fully take on the moral responsibility of those choices. At the heart of Kierkegaard's understanding of freedom is his opposition to Hegelian thought. In Hegel's philosophy, freedom and the individual are explained within a comprehensive deterministic system, where the individual is seen as a moment in historical development. For Hegel, everything is examined within a system, and the pursuit of certainty is central. Unlike existence, by its nature, is unpredictable and cannot be contained within any system. However, Kierkegaard argues that such a system invalidates the individual's existence because it seeks to incorporate the individual into a larger, impersonal narrative. In this study, while attempting to interpret Kierkegaard's concept of freedom and philosophy within the context of its contrast with Hegelian philosophy, I worked to understand how freedom is established in the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages of existence. Specifically, I analyzed how the concepts of freedom are treated differently by comparing Hegel's systematic and historical perspective with Kierkegaard's individual and subjective view of freedom. While Hegel's philosophy provides a philosophical backdrop, the primary aim is to elucidate Kierkegaard's unique contribution to the idea of freedom.