The place of revelation in Kant's epistemology

The problem of revelation is one of the most important topics of debate in the history of thought, and with it the place of revelation in epistemology is also controversial. Without taking Kant's views on knowledge into consideration, it is nearly impossible to talk about epistemology in the modern sense. Because Kant's philosophy, in all its aspects, deeply influenced both his own time and the period after him. In this context, one of his most prominent views, which even forms the basis of his philosophical system, is the limitation he places on knowledge. According to Kant, human beings can only have knowledge of phenomena in the theoretical intellect. The noumenal domain is beyond human knowledge. In this case, Kant's system does not include knowledge of metaphysical issues such as God and divine revelation, which belong to the noumenal domain. The question of the possibility of revelation in western philosophy in general and Kant's epistemology in particular and its possible answers constitute the main goal of this study. For this purpose, firstly, Kant's epistemology is discussed in its main outlines and salient aspects, and then the Western view of revelation from the past to the present is analyzed. As a result, it is concluded that there is no place for revelation in Kant's epistemology, but "pure intellectual revelation" is possible based on practical reason and historical revelation is considered as a stepping stone to pure intellectual revelation. Key words: Kant, Epistemology, Pure Reason, God, Revelation