A comparative analysis of the logical criticisms of Sextus Empiricus and Ibn Taymiyyah

Before logic was systematized by Aristotelestle in antiquity, and also in the periods that followed, it was subjected to various criticisms. Some of these criticisms were formulated by thinkers of Ancient Greece, while others emerged in later intellectual traditions. Among these critiques, those put forward by Sextus Empiricus and Ibn Taymiyyah occupy a particularly significant place. Pyrrhonism, as a school of thought, rejects dogmatic claims to knowledge by emphasizing skepticism, the limitations of reasoning, and the suspension of judgment. In this context, Sextus Empiricus offered critical reflections that questioned the foundational assumptions of logic. Ibn Taymiyyah, on the other hand, was a prominent Islamic scholar and philosopher within the medieval Islamic intellectual tradition. He argued that reason and logic are limited and must be guided by revelation. He emphasized the insufficiency of logic and criticized Aristotelestelian logic and other philosophical systems for their incompatibility with Islam. For him, the intellect must remain subordinate to divine revelation. In this study, following a historical overview of criticisms directed toward logic, we will undertake a detailed examination of both thinkers' objections to the limitations inherent in logic and reasoning. While Sextus Empiricus is known for his skeptical attitude toward the reliability of logical and rational processes, Ibn Taymiyyah adopts an approach that emphasizes the primacy of revelation by highlighting the insufficiency of logic. We aim to analyze these views comprehensively and to explore the similarities and differences in their respective critiques. This study seeks to contribute to our understanding of the significance of these critiques and their impact on philosophical thought. Moreover, it intends to offer reflections on how such criticisms might inform contemporary debates in logic and philosophy.