Algoritmanın ötesinde: Fenomenal makine bilinci için hesaplamacı paradigmanın yetersizliği üzerine

This thesis investigates the theoretical plausibility of artificial phenomenal consciousness, the conditions under which artificial systems could have phenomenal experience, and questions whether computational approaches can provide an adequate explanation of this phenomenon. Its central claim is that while computation may model intelligent behavior and simulate cognition, it fails to account for the ontological reality of phenomenal experience. Through a critical analysis of computationalist models, the thesis identifies a causal residue, an irreducible remainder that abstract structure cannot explain. This residue marks the boundary at which computational sufficiency collapses. In its final chapters, the thesis explores non-computational alternatives that seek to ground consciousness not in formal mechanisms, but in physically specific and world-involving processes, arguing that any serious model of phenomenal machine consciousness must derive its explanatory power from this orientation.