From body phenomenology to heterophenomenology: Towards the science of consciousness

In this study, the approaches of the important representatives of two different traditions, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's and Daniel Dennett's approaches to the mind and body problem are compared. In this comparison, resemblances rather than differences between these two thinkers are highlighted. Although Merleau-Ponty and Dennett used quite different methods in order to understand human mind, both present a sort of monist theory. Merleau-Ponty describes human consciousness inseparable from a vivid, extended, moving, perceiving, and intentional body. For Dennett, although mind is simply brain, it is important to examine the nature of mind and consciousness in order to answer the "hard" philosophical problems about the mind. For Dennett, brain and the nervous system pervaded throughout the body function as consciousness and mind. In this respect, Dennett looks like to behaviorists and functionalists, but unlike them, he argues that the nature of consciousness and mind should be examined. Similarly, for Merleau-Ponty, behaviors must be analyzed in order to understand the relationship of living and perceiving consciousness with the world. So, Merleau-Ponty similar to Dennett does not use the introspection method to understand consciousness. According to both thinkers, the mind-body duality stems from the error caused by traditional philosophy. Both Dennett and Merleau-Ponty challenge this duality by pointing at the movements of the human body. In addition, they point out that human being is a social creature and intersubjectivity totally affects human consciousness and mental processes. In conclusion, despite the apparent differences there are some similarities between these two philosopher's approaches to the problem of consciousness. Instead of considering the phenomenological and neuroscientific methods as rivals in explaining consciousness, taking these two approaches together as complementary explanations will bring us closer to explaining consciousness.