The critical assessment of the direct referentialist solutions to the semantic problems of empty names

According to Direct Referentialist account of proper names, the sole semantic meaning of a proper name is its referent if and only if it has any. On the semantic function of a proper name within a sentence, it is further endorsed by the principle of semantic compositionality that a proposition expressed by a sentence is a function of the semantic meanings of the sentence?s constituents1. Holding the semantic compositionality, Direct Referentialist account entails the conclusion that a proper name in a sentence can be used to express a proposition if and only if it has a referent, namely a semantic meaning. Thus, for Direct Referentialist account (hereafter, DR), a referring proper name such as ?Aristotle? can be used to express a proposition to which the name contributes only its referent. In other words, a well-formed declarative sentence employing a referring proper name expresses a proposition if the other sentential constituents are meaningful as well. Thus, DR maintains that the sentence ?Aristotle is a philosopher?, for instance, expresses the proposition identified by the ordered pair < Aristotle, being a philosopher> at where the semantic meaning of the name ?Aristotle? is nothing but the individual man himself. Nonetheless, some proper names (e.g. Santa Claus, Sherlock Holmes, and Vulcan) are empty from an actual or an extensional referent and thereby these names are non-referring proper names when they are taken to speak of actual individuals involving in states of affairs in actuality. In the case of such non-referring proper names, DR therefore implies that an empty name has no semantic meaning to use to express a proposition. That is to say, sentences employing an empty name, i.e. empty-name sentences2, fail to express a proposition, namely a complete semantic function. For most of DR theorists, the empty-name sentence ?Santa Claus is jolly?, for instance, expresses an incomplete semantic function that could be represented by the ?gappy? proposition <___, being jolly> at where the argument slot designated for the semantic meaning of the name ?Santa? remains unfilled3. Furthermore, it is conventionally accepted in truth-conditional semantics that a proposition posits the meaningful and truth-evaluable content expressed by a sentence. If it is the case, and empty-name sentences fail to express a proposition, then DR entails the two further conclusions: (1) Empty-name sentences fail to express something meaningful and (2) Empty-name sentences fail to express something truth-evaluable. The above conclusions driven by DR are confronted with some apparent challenges by our linguistic intuitions about the semantics of what is said by an empty-name sentence. In a word, these conclusions do not jibe with our common semantic and truth-theoretical intuitions about empty-name sentences. Firstly, as our semantic intuitions suggest in most cases, empty-name sentences such as ?Vulcan is the tenth planet?4, ?Santa Claus doesn?t exist? make sense and this implies that empty-name sentences, unlike DR predicts, say something meaningful. Hence, it further implies that an empty-name sentence expresses a proposition. Respectively, I call this complication as the Problem of Meaningfulness (hereafter, PM). Secondly, it also appears that competent speakers judge empty-name sentences to be truth-evaluable in most cases. The sentence ?Santa Claus doesn?t exist?, for instance, seems to be true for our truth-theoretical intuitions once we have an informed reflection that there is no such a thing in discourse about actuality. In contrast to the Direct Referentialist conclusion, this seeming truth-evaluability of empty-name sentences implies that these sentences say something truth-evaluable. Again, it further implies that an empty-name sentence expresses a proposition. Throughout the paper, I dub this second complication as the Problem of Truth-Evaluability (hereafter PT).