Dimensions of Central Bank independence under inflation targeting strategy: The case of CBRT (2013-2020)

The concept of central bank independence has gained prominence within the context of inflation targeting strategy. While independence has been evaluated in mainstream economic theories with various aspects and types of it, some implicit factors could be disregarded. The hierarchy among the central banks in the international system and interest groups related with political circles or capital cliques often influence decision-making mechanisms of the central banks systematically, coercing them into taking decisions against their own will. In this dissertation, the degrees of those influences particularly on the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) were examined with a focus on the policy rate decisions of the bank's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) between 2013 and 2020 and factors that were expressed or not mentioned in the MPC meeting summary texts. In light of the findings, it has been observed that the Central Bank was partially under pressure while taking decisions. Using several different tool sets under such pressures cannot provide desired levels of success, and meanwhile lack of convincing justifications for the usage of those tools could harm the bank's institutional reputation, causing permanent deviations from policy targets.