Geçiş ülkelerinde sorumluluğun paylaşımı: Türkiye ve Meksika'da göçün "yönetimi"

This thesis examines why transit states accept disproportionate responsibilities in migration agreements and how the decision-making process is influenced by the interplay between domestic variables and international negotiations in asymmetric conditions. Through a comparative case study of the EU-Türkiye and US-Mexico agreements, the research applies Putnam's two-level game theory as a framework to analyze both levels of negotiation and the overall outcome of the agreement. The findings offer a nuanced view of how international migration agreements are constructed through variables other than considerations of human displacement and their impact on the protection of refugees and migrants. Ultimately, the study promotes soft-law efforts rather than enduring changes to existing migration governance structures. Furthermore, it offers a critical lens to understand how bilateral migration agreements often prioritize containment, undermining the development of formal, rights-based responsibility-sharing frameworks built into international law practice.