Haklar yapısı aracılığıyla uygulanabilirlik

Implementation of a social choice rule can be thought of as a design of power(re)distribution in the society whose ?equilibrium outcomes? coincide withthe alternatives chosen by the social choice rule at any preference profile ofthe society. In this paper, we introduce a new societal framework for implementationwhich takes the power distribution in the society, representedby a code of rights, as its point of departure. We examine and identify howimplementation via code of rights (referred to as gamma implementation) isrelated to classical Nash implementation via mechanism. We characterizegamma implementability when the state space on which the rights structureis to be specified consists of the alternatives from which a social choice is to bemade. We show that any social choice rule is gamma implementable if it satisfiespivotal oligarchic monotonicity condition that we introduce. Moreover,pivotal oligarchic monotonicity condition combined with Pareto optimalityis sufficient for a non-empty valued social choice rule to be gamma implementable.Finally we revisit liberal?s paradox of A.K. Sen, which turns outto fit very well into the gamma implementation framework.