John R. Searle's concept of intentionality and its reached

Intentionality theory is constructed by Searle by imposing the concepts and structures of speech act theory on mental faculties. Intentional states are expected to represent the world as speech acts represent their content. The most important concepts needed to define intentionality as a representation ability are propositional content and completion conditions. According to Searle's theory, the contents of certain kinds of intentional states can be expressed as a proposition. These propositions aim to either represent a phenomenon in the world as it is, or to make the situation in the world suitable for the mind. For example, for beliefs require an appropriate representation of the situation in the world, while for intentions need to match the situation in the world to the content of the intention. Searle aims to explain the relationship of human as an individual with the world, and the reality of society based on the relations between propositional attitudes and conditions of satisfaction; but Intentionality theory is based on principles accepted as default situations, which do not need to be proven, and on the assumption that Searle's determinations about reality are true. Therefore, Intentionality theory is expected to fulfill its explanatory function even if it does not contain a theoretical grounding. In this thesis, it is aimed to determine the limits of Intentionality theory and to organize it as a general theory, determining the area in which its validity can be judged based on whether it fulfills the explanatory function and to question its validity.