Önden bağış altında Nash pazarlık çözümü

We consider two person bargaining problems under predonation. Before thebargaining solution is applied we allow the alteration of the bargaining set bymeans of pre-donations of a share in one?s would-be payoffs to one?s opponent.Thus, a pre-bargain stage is instituted in which the bargainers may manipulate,via pre-donations, the (Nash) bargaining solution as applied in the nextstage.We firstly concentrate on the simple bargaining problems with bargainingsets that have linear pareto frontier and show that the stronger bargainer(with greater ideal payoff) giving a pre-donation, her best pre-donation transformingthe bargaining set into one on which the Nash bargaining solutiondistributes payoffs so that while other bargainer gets exactly the same payoff(as applied to the original simple bargaining problem), stronger bargainermakes strictly better off. Then, we look for Stackelberg and Nash equilibriaof the so called ?predonation game?. Furthermore, we list our results for twoby two normal form games.