Radicalizing the radical: Towards a radically externalist biology of cognition

In this thesis, I outline a radically externalist approach to cognitive science, explain why such an approach is needed, and discuss the potential benefits it offers. I examine the dominant divisions in the field, i.e. internalism vs. externalism and representationalism vs. anti-representationalism, and track the argumentative steps that yield these positions. Along the way, I identify key background assumptions, particularly realism, multiple realizability, and the autonomy of the special sciences. I argue that these assumptions underlie most theoretical frameworks in cognitive science and that they ultimately lead to the problem of mental causation and the hard problem of content. I claim that these problems disappear once we abandon those assumptions. In their place, I defend an anti-realist stance, draw on the new mechanistic philosophy of science, and propose a new tool: the Naturalistic Coherence Criterion. I argue that this framework points us toward a radically externalist cognitive science, one that remains agnostic about the metaphysics of mind and avoids unnecessary theoretical burdens.