The Soviet Union's wedge strategy towards the Atlantic alliance during the Cold War: The case of Turkey

This study focuses on the wedge strategies implemented by the Soviet Union to distance Turkey from the US-NATO alliance during the period between 1960 and 1970. The aim of the study is to analyze the types of strategies applied by the USSR, the methods employed in their execution, and their effectiveness. To this end, the research is conducted within the framework of the wedge strategy model developed by Timothy Crawford and Yasuhiro Izumikawa. The study employs qualitative content analysis to examine the USSR's reward-based strategies, including economic aid, diplomatic gestures, and cultural cooperation initiatives toward Turkey. The findings reveal that the USSR did not resort to punishment-based strategies but predominantly relied on reward-based strategies aimed at encouraging Turkey to demonstrate weakness in its alliance with the US. The research also shows that while these strategies failed to completely sever the Turkey-US alliance, they led to periodic tensions and achieved partial success. Moreover, Turkey's security guarantees derived from its NATO membership and its economic dependency on the West limited the effectiveness of the USSR's efforts. This study contributes to the discussion on the relative effectiveness of reward-based strategies compared to punishment-based strategies in international relations. Additionally, it provides a conceptual evaluation of the success of the USSR's wedge strategies targeting Turkey during this period.